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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7b82bc --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +*.txt text eol=lf +*.htm text eol=lf +*.html text eol=lf +*.md text eol=lf diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..158a48c --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #63210 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/63210) diff --git a/old/63210-0.txt b/old/63210-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 3a6cad8..0000000 --- a/old/63210-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,17976 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of English Battles and Sieges in the Peninsula., by -William Napier - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: English Battles and Sieges in the Peninsula. - Extracted from his 'Peninsula War'. - -Author: William Napier - -Release Date: September 15, 2020 [EBook #63210] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK BRITISH BATTLES, SIEGES IN THE PENINSULA *** - - - - -Produced by Brian Coe, Charlie Howard, and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This -book was created from images of public domain material -made available by the University of Toronto Libraries -(http://link.library.utoronto.ca/booksonline/).) - - - - - - - - - -Transcriber’s Note - -Superscripts are indicated with a circumflex: M^cKenzie. Italics are -enclosed in _underscores_. - - - - -[Illustration: W Napier - -Lieu^t.-General Sir W. Napier. Pinx^t. W.H. Egleton, sculp^t.] - - - - - ENGLISH - BATTLES AND SIEGES - IN THE - PENINSULA. - - EXTRACTED FROM HIS ‘PENINSULA WAR.’ - - BY - LIEUT.-GEN. SIR WILLIAM NAPIER, K.C.B., - &c. &c. - - - LONDON: - JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET. - 1855. - - - - - LONDON: PRINTED BY W. CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET, - AND CHARING CROSS. - - - - -NOTICE. - - -In this publication, the combats of Roriça, Vimiero, and Coruña, and -the character of Sir John Moore, have been entirely recomposed. The -other battles and sieges are, with more or less compression of details, -transcripts from the History of the Peninsula War. Thus arranged they -will perhaps most effectually exhibit the constant energy of the -British soldier, and draw attention in their neighbourhoods to the -veterans who still survive. Few of those brave men have more than -a scanty provision, many have none; and nearly all, oppressed with -wounds, disease, and poverty, sure attendants on an old soldier’s -services, feel life a burthen, so heavy as to make them envy the lot of -comrades who threw it off early on the field of battle. - -For the authenticity of the events the reader has this guarantee. -The author was either an eye-witness of what he relates, or acquired -his knowledge from those who were. Persons of no mean authority. -Commanders-in-chief, generals, and other officers on both sides; -private official correspondence of the English envoys; military -journals and reports of the French leaders; the correspondence of the -intrusive King Joseph, and his ministers, and the private military -notes and instructions of the Emperor Napoleon, have all contributed to -establish the truth of the facts and motives of action. - -For the great Captain who led the British troops so triumphantly, -this record gives no measure of ability. To win victories was the -least of his labours. Those who desire to know what an enormous -political, financial, and military pressure he sustained, what wiles -he circumvented, what opposing skill he baffled, what a powerful -enemy he dealt with and overcame, must seek the story in the original -History from which this work has been extracted. For the soldiers it -is no measure of their fortitude and endurance: it records only their -active courage. But what they were, their successors now are--witness -the wreck of the Birkenhead, where four hundred men, at the call of -their heroic officers, Captain Wright and Lieutenant Girardot, calmly -and without a murmur, accepted death in a horrible form rather than -endanger the women and children already saved in the boats. The records -of the world furnish no parallel to this self-devotion! - - - - -CONTENTS. - - - BOOK I. - Page - Combat of Roriça--Battle of Vimiero--Coruña--Battle of - Coruña--Heroic Death and Character of Sir John Moore 1 - - - BOOK II. - - Douro--Passage of the Douro--Talavera--Combat of Salinas--First - Combat of Talavera--Second Combat of Talavera--Battle - of Talavera 18 - - - BOOK III. - - Combats on the Coa and Agueda--Barba de Puerco--Combat of - Almeida on the Coa--Anecdotes of British Soldiers--Battle of - Busaco 44 - - - BOOK IV. - - Matagorda--Battle of Barosa--Massena’s Retreat--Combat of - Redinha--Combat of Cazal Nova--Combat of Foz d’Aronce--Combat - of Sabugal--Extraordinary Escape of Colonel Waters--Combat - of Fuentes Onoro--Battle of Fuentes Onoro--Evacuation - of Almeida 61 - - - BOOK V. - - Combat of Campo Mayor--First English Siege of Badajos--Battle - of Albuera--Renewed Siege of Badajos--First Assault of - Christoval--Second Assault of Christoval 86 - - - BOOK VI. - - Blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo--Combat of Elbodon--Guinaldo--Combat - of Aldea Ponte--Surprise of Arroyo de Molinos--Defence - of Tarifa--English Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo--Third - English Siege of Badajos--Assault of Picurina--Assault of - Badajos 109 - - - BOOK VII. - - Beira--Extraordinary Escape of Major Grant--Surprise of - Almaraz--Siege of the Salamanca Forts--Combats between the - Duero and the Tormes--Combats of Castrejon and the Guarena-- - Battle of Salamanca--Combat of La Serna 157 - - - BOOK VIII. - - Madrid--Siege of Burgos--First Assault--Second Assault--Third - Assault--Fourth Assault--Fifth Assault--Retreat from Burgos-- - Combat of Venta de Pozo--Combat on the Carion--Pisuerga-- - Duero--Retreat from Madrid--Tormes--Matilla--Combat of the - Huebra 202 - - - BOOK IX. - - March to Vittoria--Battle of Vittoria 237 - - - BOOK X. - - Battle of Castalla--English Siege of Tarragona--Siege of San - Sebastian--Storming of San Bartolomeo--First Storm of San - Sebastian 262 - - - BOOK XI. - - Pyrenees--Combat of Roncesvalles--Combat of Linzoain--Combat - of Maya--Combat of Zabaldica--First Battle of Sauroren--Combat - of Buenza--Second Battle of Sauroren--Combat of - Doña Maria--Combats of Echallar and Ivantelly 287 - - - BOOK XII. - - Catalonia--Combat of Ordal--Renewed Siege of San Sebastian-- - Storm of San Sebastian--Battles on the Bidassoa--Combat of - San Marcial--Combat of Vera 325 - - - BOOK XIII. - - English Passage of the Bidassoa and Second Combat of Vera--The - Passage of the Lower Bidassoa--Second Combat of Vera--Battle - of the Nivelle; Characters of Colonel Lloyd and - Lieutenant Freer 352 - - - BOOK XIV. - - Passage of the Nive--Battles in front of Bayonne--Combat of - Arcangues--First Battle of Barrouilhet--Second Battle of - Barrouilhet--Third Combat of Barrouilhet--Battle of St. - Pierre--Operations beyond the Nive 385 - - - BOOK XV. - - Passages of the Gaves and the Adour--Passage of the Gaves-- - Combat of Garris--Passage of the Adour--Passage of the Gaves - continued--Battle of Orthes--Combat of Aire 412 - - - BOOK XVI. - - Garonne--Adour Combat of Vic Bigorre--Death and Character of - Colonel Sturgeon; Surprising Feat of Captain Light--Combat - of Tarbes--Operations on the Garonne--Major Hughes; Battle - of Toulouse--Sally from Bayonne 440 - - - - -BATTLES AND SIEGES - -OF THE - -PENINSULA. - - - - -BOOK I. - - Combat of Roriça--Battle of Vimiero--Coruña--Battle of Coruña. - - -In the year 1808 Sir Arthur Wellesley marched from the Mondego river -with twelve thousand three hundred men, and eighteen guns, to attack -General Junot who was in military possession of Portugal. The French -troops were scattered, but General Laborde had been detached with a -division to cover their concentration, and watch the English movements. -This led to the first fight between the French and English in the -Peninsula. - - -COMBAT OF RORIÇA. (Aug. 1808.) - -Fourteen hundred Portuguese, under Colonel Trant, a military agent, -joined the British on the march, and the French were felt the 15th -of August at Brilos, in front of Obidos, where some men fell in a -skirmish. Sir A. Wellesley then entered the Valley of Obidos, in the -middle of which Laborde occupied isolated ground of moderate elevation, -near the village of Roriça; he had only five thousand men and six guns, -little more than one-third of the English numbers, but he had five -hundred cavalry, had chosen his position well, and could handle troops -with dexterity. - -On his right was a lofty mountain ridge, on his left lower but very -rough ground, and the valley behind him was closed, not only by -the commingling of the hills in a mountainous knot, but by a rocky -projection called the Zambugeira or Columbeira heights, which, at less -than a mile, stood like a citadel in his rear, and was so covered with -copses, wild evergreens and forest trees, and so rugged that only by -paths leading up deep clefts and hollows could it be ascended. - -The British general marched from the town of Obidos on the 17th with -fourteen thousand men and eighteen guns in order of battle. His right, -composed of Trant’s Portuguese, turned the French left; his centre, -nine thousand infantry with twelve guns, moved against their front; -his left, one division with six guns, having gained the crest of the -mountain ridge by a wide movement from Obidos, turned the French right, -and was to oppose any counter attack from General Loison, who had -been heard of on that side, and might come up during the action with -a division six thousand strong of all arms. Such an order of battle, -with such superior numbers, forbade Laborde to maintain his ground at -Roriça, and after a cannonade, during which his skirmishers vigorously -disputed the approaches, he, with a nice calculation of time and -distance, retreated under the protection of his cavalry to the rocks -of Zambugeira, and then turned to fight, still hoping to be joined by -Loison. - -This masterly movement compelled Sir Arthur Wellesley to show all -his forces, and imposed a change in disposition. His left was then -reinforced on the mountain, because each passing hour rendered Loison’s -arrival more likely; Trant was more closely to menace the French -heights on the right, and the centre was to break in on the front when -the strength of the position should be shaken by the progress of the -wings. - -In war, however, error is the rule not the exception. Some mistake -caused the left to move directly against the French right instead of -passing the flank to take them in rear, and as Trant was distant and -too feeble to give uneasiness, the centre dashed prematurely against -the crags of Zambugeira on a front of less than a mile. The advantage -of superior numbers was thus lost, and that of ground was entirely with -the enemy. Only four thousand British could be thrust into the fight, -and though the remainder were at hand, the foremost combatants had -to win their way against an equal force of brave and active troops, -defending rocks which vigorous men only could scale unopposed. Very -crowded also were the assailing columns in the narrow paths, which only -admitted a few men abreast, and hence no positive connection could be -maintained between the different attacks, nor could any unity of power -be insured: but the skirmishers soon covered the face of the ascent, -and the noise and flashing of their musketry, with the smoke bursting -up through the foliage, enabled the English general to mark the -progress of the battle and govern his masses: it was soon manifest that -the position would be finally forced, but within that flame-shooting, -smoking labyrinth, rough work was being done and various turns of -fortune had place. - -Laborde, unable to hold his ground alone against the great force -opposed, sought to gain time for Loison’s junction by clinging -tenaciously to the side from whence that general was expected, -and gradually drawing off his troops from the left as the battle -approached. While thus operating, two English regiments, the 9th and -29th, were by a false movement suddenly thrown into his hands. Forming -with the 5th regiment one column of attack, they were to have united -with Trant on the left of the French, but with a fierce neglect of -orders had taken a path leading more directly to the enemy: the head of -the 29th thus reached the table-land above at a point where Laborde was -concentrating his left wing on his centre, and as some of the former -were still coming in, the regiment was assailed in front and flank. -Colonel Lake fell, many men went down with him, and the French on the -English right, few in number and thinking they should be cut off, -furiously broke through the disordered mass, carrying with them a major -and many other prisoners. - -Then, dropping below the brow of the hill, the oppressed troops -rallied on their left wing and on the 9th Regiment, and all rushing up -together, regained the table-land, presenting a confused front, which -Laborde vainly endeavoured to destroy: yet many brave men he struck -down, and mortally wounded Colonel Stewart of the 9th, fighting with -great vehemence. Soon the 5th Regiment, which had not deviated from the -true path, appeared on his left, while the skirmishers of the other -attacks emerged thickly from the crags and copses of the ascent: the -left flanking column had now also turned his right, had cut off the -line of communication with Loison, and was so rapidly advancing, as to -render a retreat imperative and difficult. His situation was indeed -critical in the extreme, and he was wounded, but with unyielding -resolution he made the movement along a narrow table-land leading from -his position to the knot of mountains behind, checking pursuit by -partial charges of cavalry, until he reached the village of Zambugeira: -there the ground opened, and the danger from the flanking force being -fended off by deep ravines, he turned and made another stand, but was -finally forced to seek refuge in the higher mountains, having lost -three guns and six hundred men killed and wounded: the British loss -being nearly five hundred. - - -BATTLE OF VIMIERO. (Aug. 1808.) - -Laborde was not pursued, his retreat was inland, and to keep near -the coast was essential to the English general, because he expected -reinforcements by sea, and desired to insure their disembarkation and -receive provisions from the ships. In this view he designed to march by -his right on Torres Vedras, which would bring him near the ocean, give -command of the great road to Lisbon, and throw off Loison and Laborde -from that capital; but in the night came intelligence that a large -fleet, conveying two brigades of infantry, was on the coast, and to -protect their landing he made for Vimiero, a village near the sea, nine -miles from Torres Vedras: there the brigades from the ocean augmented -his force to sixteen thousand British soldiers. Junot, meanwhile, -having rallied Laborde’s and Loison’s troops, had forestalled him at -Torres Vedras, with fourteen thousand good soldiers and twenty-three -guns of small calibre; and while his powerful cavalry prevented the -scouts from making observations, he prepared to march in the night of -the 20th and attack on the 21st. Sir Arthur had also projected a march -for the night of the 20th, to turn Junot’s left and gain Mafra in his -rear, without assailing Torres Vedras, which, though shrouded by the -horsemen, was known as a strong position. The armies would thus have -changed places without encountering, if the English ministers had not -appointed three generals senior to Sir Arthur to act in Portugal, one -of whom, Sir Harry Burrard, had arrived. He did not land and assume -command, but he forbade the projected march, and thus deprived the -English army of the initiatory movement, giving it to the French: -moreover, as the ground at Vimiero had been taken temporarily and for -ease, the troops were not in fighting order, thus violating the maxim -which prescribes constant readiness for battle when near an enemy. It -was thus posted. - -On the right a mountain ridge, trending from the sea inland, ended -abruptly on a small plain in which the village of Vimiero was situated, -and the greater part of the army was heaped on the summit. - -On the other side of the plain the same line was continued by a ridge -of less elevation, narrow, yet protected by a ravine almost impassable, -and being without water had only one regiment and some picquets posted -there. - -In front of the break between these heights and within cannon-shot, was -an isolated hill of inferior elevation, yet of good strength, masking -the village and plain of Vimiero, and leaving only narrow egress from -the latter on the right. On this hill six guns and two brigades of -infantry, Fane’s and Anstruther’s, were posted, the former on the left: -behind them in the plain the commissariat and artillery stores were -parked. - -All the cavalry with the army--a single squadron under Col. Taylor--was -placed at the egress from the plain, on the direct road to Torres -Vedras; but from the counter hills, facing the position, another road, -running from Torres Vedras to Lourinham, led at the distance of two -miles round the left, and by it an enemy could gain the ridge where the -picquets were posted, seize the artillery and commissariat stores in -the plain, and take the central hill and right-hand mountain in reverse. - -In the night of the 20th a German officer of cavalry aroused Sir Arthur -Wellesley, saying the French army, twenty thousand strong, was within -an hour’s march. Incredulous of this tale, the bearer of which was in -evident consternation, he merely took some additional precautions; -and at sunrise all eyes were turned southward, seeking an enemy who -was not to be seen. Nevertheless the German’s report was only an -exaggeration.[1] Junot had been in march all night with fourteen, not -twenty, thousand men, designing to fall on at daybreak; but the rugged -ways had retarded his progress, and his vanguard of cavalry did not -crown the hills facing the English position before eight o’clock--the -dust of its march having been discovered an hour before. Had he arrived -by daybreak this dust could not have been observed, and an hour of -preparation would have been lost to the English general, which, with -a good plan of battle, would have enabled the French to gain the -left-hand ridge, by the Lourinham road, before the troops on the right -could cross to occupy that part of the position. - -Junot employed little time to note his adversary’s ground and -dispositions, and entirely neglected the mountain on the English right, -as being refused to his line of march; but as the left-hand ridge -appeared naked of troops, he resolved to seize it by a detachment, and -take the English central hill in reverse while he attacked it in front -with his main body, thinking he should find the bulk of the army there. -In this view he directed General Brennier with a brigade across the -ravine covering the ridge, and Laborde with another against the central -hill, supporting the latter with Loison’s division, a reserve of -grenadiers under Kellermann, and the cavalry, thirteen hundred strong, -under Margaron. - -To act on conjecture is dangerous in war. Junot conjectured falsely, -and his entire disregard of the English right was a great error; for -when his cavalry crowned the counter hills, Sir A. Wellesley, seeing -the movements did not menace that part of his position, retained there -one brigade under General Hill to serve as a support to the centre, -while four other brigades were sent across the plain to occupy the -left-hand ridge, and a fifth, reinforced with Trant’s Portuguese, moved -to a parallel ridge in rear, where they could watch the Lourinham road. - -All these movements were hidden from Junot by the central hill, and two -brigades reached their ground before the action commenced; yet, knowing -the ravine in front to be impracticable, they looked for an attack from -the left, and formed two lines across the ridge, trusting to a chain -of skirmishers to protect their right. The two other brigades were -to have furnished a third line, but while they were passing the plain -below the battle was begun in the centre with great fury. - -In front of the English position the ground was so broken and wooded -that the movements of the French, after they passed the counter hills, -could not be discerned until they burst upon the centre in attack; -and though their artillery was most numerous, the tormented ground -impeded its action, while the English guns, of heavier metal, had -free play: their infantry, inferior in number, would therefore have -fought at great disadvantage, even if Junot’s combinations had not -failed; but soon that general discovered the mischief of over-haste -in war. Brennier found the bottom of the ravine impracticable, and -floundering amidst rocks and the beds of torrents was unable to -co-operate with Laborde; hence Junot had to reinforce the latter with -Loison’s infantry, and detach another column of all arms under General -Solignac to turn the English flank by the Lourinham road. But he did -not perceive that Sir Arthur, anticipating such an effort, had there, -not a flank but a front, three lines deep, while the fifth brigade and -Trant’s Portuguese were so disposed, that Solignac, whose movement was -isolated, could be cut off and placed between two fires. - -Laborde and Loison opened three attacks, one principal, with minor -bodies on the flanks. The first, being well led and covered by -skirmishers, forced its way up with great vehemence and power, but with -great loss also; for General Fane had called up the reserve artillery -under Colonel Robe to reinforce the six guns already on the platform, -and while they smote the column in front, another battery, belonging to -one of the brigades then ascending the left-hand ridge, smote it in the -right flank, and under this conjoint fire of artillery and a wasting -musketry the French reached the summit, there to sustain a murderous -volley, to be charged by the 50th Regiment, overturned, and driven down -again. - -Of the other two columns, the one assailing Anstruther’s brigade was -beaten quickly, and that general had time to reinforce Fane’s left -with the second battalion of the 43rd in opposition to Kellermann’s -grenadiers, half of whom now reinforced the third column on that side. -This regiment, posted in a churchyard on the edge of the declivity, -had one or two companies in advance amongst some trees, and from thence -the first burst of the grenadiers drove them upon the main body; but -then Robe’s battery so smote the left of the French that they dipped -into the ravine on their right, where the battery from the ridge -caught them on the other flank; the moment was happily seized by the -43rd to pour down in a solid mass, and with ringing shouts it dashed -against the column, driving it back with irrecoverable disorder: yet -not without the fiercest fighting. The loss of the regiment was a -hundred and twenty, and when the charge was over, a French soldier and -the Sergeant Armourer, Patrick, were found grimly confronting each -other in death as they had done in life, their hands still clutching -their muskets, and their bayonets plunged to the sockets in each manly -breast! It is by such men that thousands are animated and battles won. - -Broken by these rough shocks, the French, to whom defeat was amazement, -retired in confused masses and in a slanting direction towards the -Lourinham road, and while thus disordered Colonel Taylor rode out upon -them doing great execution; but as suddenly Margaron came down with -his strong cavalry, and the gallant Englishman fell with most of his -horsemen. However, half of Junot’s army was now beaten with the loss -of seven guns, and though Margaron’s powerful cavalry, and that moiety -of Kellermann’s grenadiers which had not been engaged, interposed to -prevent pursuit, the line of retreat left the shortest road to Torres -Vedras uncovered--a great fault which did not escape the English -general’s rapid comprehension. - -Brennier, unable to emerge from the rocks and hollows where he was -entangled, had been of no weight in this action, but Solignac, having -turned the ravine, appeared on the left about the time Taylor’s -charge terminated the fight in the centre, and his division, strongly -constituted with all arms, was advancing impetuously along the narrow -ground, when General Ferguson, who was there in opposition, met him -with a counter attack, so fierce, so rapid and sustained, that the -French, though fighting stubbornly, bent to the strong pressure. -Solignac was wounded, his cavalry, artillery and infantry, heaped -together and out-flanked, were cut off from their line of retreat -and forced into low ground on their right with a loss of six guns. -These pieces, placed under guard of the 71st and 82nd while Ferguson -continued his course, were again lost by one of those events which make -battles the property of fortune; for Brennier, after long struggling, -having worked up the ravine by his right to an accessible place, had -ascended the ridge, and, unexpectedly falling upon the two regiments -in charge of the captured guns, beat them back. He thus got behind -Ferguson, and had time been given to reform his troops and assail that -general’s rear mischief would have ensued; but the English regiments -were disordered only for a moment; they rallied on higher ground, -poured in their fire, broke the French brigade with a charge and made -Brennier, who was wounded, a prisoner. Solignac’s division was then -without resource, when suddenly another and more decisive change came -over this fitful battle. - -Junot’s left wing and centre had been so discomfited, that only half -of Kellermann’s grenadiers and Margaron’s cavalry remained unbroken, -and the road of Torres Vedras, the shortest to Lisbon, was uncovered; -Brennier’s column was entirely broken; Solignac’s division was in -confusion on low ground, cut off from Junot, and menaced front and -rear. But of the English army, Hill’s brigade had not fired a shot; -neither had the brigade conjoined with Trant’s Portuguese, and it was -then marching to take Solignac’s division in rear. The two brigades of -Ferguson’s third line had lost only a few men, and those on the central -hill had not been hardly handled; there was therefore a powerful force -in hand for further operations. Now Brennier, when first taken, eagerly -asked if the reserve had attacked, and the other prisoners being -questioned on this point replied in the affirmative,[2] wherefore the -English general, judging the French power exhausted, and the moment -come for rendering victory decisive, with the genius of a great captain -resolved to make it not only decisive on the field but of the fate of -Portugal. - -Expecting Solignac’s division to lay down its arms, he designed to -push his own right wing and centre, under Hill, on Torres Vedras, to -which they were two miles nearer than any part of the French army; -that stroke was sure, and Junot would have been cut off from Lisbon. -Meanwhile Sir Arthur meaned in person vigorously to drive him across -the Baragueda mountain on to the Tagus, by which he would lose his -remaining artillery, and have with disorganised and dispirited troops -to seek refuge under the guns of one of the frontier fortresses. This -great project was stifled as soon as conceived. General Burrard had -arrived on the field of battle, he could not comprehend such a stroke -of war, and not only stopped the execution but ordered Ferguson to -halt. Then Solignac’s division, with the alacrity which distinguished -Napoleon’s soldiers, instantly rejoined Junot, who as promptly -recovered his original ground, and being joined by twelve hundred fresh -men from Lisbon regained Torres Vedras. The battle of Vimiero thus -terminated impotently. Nevertheless, Burrard’s decision, with exception -of the unaccountable order to arrest Ferguson’s career, was not without -a military justification, admitted to be of weight by Sir Arthur, but -it was that of an ordinary general in opposition to a great captain. - - -CORUÑA. (Jan. 1809.) - -The battle of Vimiero, in which the French lost thirteen guns and -about two thousand killed or wounded, the British eight hundred, was -followed by a convention which relieved Portugal, and the English -Government then sent an army into Spain under Sir John Moore. Great -success was looked for by the ministers, yet they took no measures to -render it even probable; and the incredible absurdity of the Spaniards, -who were overthrown in every quarter before the English could reach -them, made that which was improbable impossible. Moore found himself -alone in the midst of a French army commanded by Napoleon, of which -the cavalry alone counted twelve thousand more than the whole British -force! Compelled to retreat, he was pursued by the Emperor, who made -a prodigious march to cut him off at Astorga, and failing of that, -launched Marshal Soult on his traces with one army, supported by -another under Marshal Ney. Through the mountains of Gallicia the three -armies passed like a tempest, yet Moore, with unflinching resolution, -amidst winter rains and appalling difficulties, and without one gleam -of good fortune to nourish energy, reached Coruña with a gain of two -marches on his pursuers. His retreat was one of suffering, of privation -and fatigue, but he met with no disaster in arms, and in many combats -taught the enemy to beware of his sword. At Rueda his cavalry, under -C. Stewart,[3] surprised a French post and made eighty prisoners. Near -Valladolid Major Otway[4] in a sharp action took a colonel, and more -prisoners than he had men to guard them with. At Sahagun Lord Paget[5] -overthrew six hundred dragoons, killed twenty, and took thirteen -officers and one hundred and fifty men. At Mayorga the same nobleman -killed as many, and took a hundred prisoners; and at Benevente defeated -the light cavalry of the Imperial Guard, capturing General Lefebre and -seventy men. At Calcavallos Moore, in person, repulsed a serious attack -in which the French general Colbert was killed. At Constantino he -repulsed another attack, and at Lugo checked the enemy with a loss of -four hundred men. - -At Coruña his design was to embark without fighting, but the ships did -not arrive in time, and he had to accept battle in a bad position. -The ground he desired to take was a rocky range abutting on the Mero, -a tidal river, but it being too extensive for his troops, he was -compelled to adopt a similar yet lower range, likewise abutting on the -Mero, yet inclosed on two sides by the greater heights, which were -left for the enemy. Neither of these ranges were crested, and on the -inferior one Moore had to display a front in opposition to the superior -range, from whence the French not only commanded most of the English -line in front within cannon-shot, but could flank it also on the right. -Soult’s ground was indeed in every way advantageous. His left rested -on a clump of rocks overlooking both ranges, and all the country -immediately about; and in the night of the 15th he placed there eleven -heavy guns which, from their elevation, could oppress the right of the -English line and send their bullets raking even to the centre. - -Between the two positions the ground was comparatively easy of passage, -though broken and laced with stone inclosures; and as both ridges -ended abruptly on a narrow valley running perpendicular to their range, -there was a seeming facility from their proximity at that flank for -the French to envelop the British right with superior numbers. On the -far side of this valley also was a mountainous chain of hills on which -all Soult’s cavalry were posted, his light horsemen being pushed far -behind the British rear, while his heavy dragoons dismounted to act as -infantry. Thus the French army seemed to be surrounding the English, -but Moore, comprehending all the defects of his position, had adopted a -counteracting order of battle, evincing his own martial vigour, and the -confidence a long career of glorious and successful service had given -him in the stern valour of the British soldier. - -To receive battle on the inferior ridge was of necessity, but to extend -his line athwart the narrow valley on his right to the height occupied -by the French cavalry would only have placed more men under the rock -battery, and his flank would still be exposed to the dismounted French -dragoons. Wherefore he merely stretched a thin line of skirmishers -across, and placed a battalion on the lower falls of the hills on their -right, to check the horsemen on the summit. This disposition, and a -scanty manning of the main ridge, where he posted only two divisions, -Hope’s and Baird’s, the latter on the right, gave him two divisions of -reserve, Paget’s and M^cKenzie Frazer’s. The last he placed on rising -ground closely covering Coruña, to watch a road leading round the -heights where the French cavalry were, and which Soult, whose movements -could not be seen, might use to turn the British and cut them off from -the town and harbour. - -Paget’s division, the best in the army, remained, and with it Moore -resolved to strike for victory. He kept it in mass behind the right -of his main line, on a moderate elevation, from whence it commanded a -full view of the narrow valley, and could support the screen of light -troops without being exposed to the fire of the eleven-gun battery. -Thus, while the main ridge, strong in itself though ill presented to -the enemy, was offered in defence, with protected flanks, two other -divisions remained in hand to meet the changes of battle--a fine result -to obtain for an inferior army occupying unfavourable ground. But Moore -meaned more than defence. Confident that Baird and Hope would repel -every attack on the ridge, he designed, when time should be ripe, if -the French did not join infantry to their cavalry on the other side of -the valley, to pour down the latter with Paget’s division, reinforcing -it with Frazer’s, and thus carry in one course the rock battery; then -changing from the defensive to the offensive with all his troops, -to drive the enemy into the Mero: it was the conception of a daring -man and a great commander, and only with such potent soldiers as the -British could a like stroke be made. And only a general who had proved -their quality in many a desperate fight could have expected this effort -from his men, after a distressing winter retreat, with a strong enemy -in front and the sea behind! But general and soldiers were of England’s -best. No suffering, no danger could quell their courage, or shake his -confidence in them: and it was so proved in that hour, for many of the -principal officers, appalled at the superior force of the enemy, the -disadvantage of ground, and the difficulty of embarkation, proposed -negotiations, which Moore rejected with cold disdain, trusting as he -had ever done to his gallant troops. - -Belonging to the French position, and occupied by them in force, were -two villages, Palavia Abajo in front of their right, Portosa in front -of their centre. - -Belonging to the English position, though rather too much advanced, -the village of Elvina covered the right flank, and was occupied by the -picquets of the 50th Regiment. - -These features dictated Soult’s order of attack. Forming three columns -of infantry, which he supported with all his light artillery, he -directed two by Palavia and Portosa against the left and centre of -Moore’s line--those villages serving as intermediate supports in case -of disaster--while the third and strongest column was destined to carry -Elvina and then lap round Baird’s right. - - -BATTLE OF CORUÑA. (Jan. 1809.) - -On the 16th of January, 1809, at two o’clock in the afternoon, twenty -thousand French veterans opened this battle against fourteen thousand -British, who, having but nine six-pounders to oppose to a numerous -light artillery, were also galled by eleven heavy guns on the rocks: -and soon that formidable battery opened the fight with a slaughtering -fire, sending its bullets crashing through the English ranks from -right to centre. Then the columns of infantry, throwing out clouds of -skirmishers, descended from their strong ridge to the fight. Those -coming from Palavia and Portosa, having some distance to march, did not -immediately engage, but the third dashed at once against Elvina, and -there was the stress of battle; the picquets were driven in heaps out -of the village, and when that was passed the French mass divided, one -portion advancing against Baird’s front, the other turning his right by -the valley, where it was only opposed by the screen of light troops. - -Sir John Moore sent the 42nd and 50th Regiments against the half column -at Elvina, and wheeling back the 4th Regiment on the extremity of his -right, poured a fire into the flank of the mass penetrating by the -valley, where it was also stoutly opposed by the light troops, and -soon abated of its vehemence in attack. Then the English general knew -that his adversary’s whole force and order of battle was unfolded. -No infantry menaced the valley from where the French cavalry stood, -and the number in front showed that no body of strength for mischief -was behind those heights: it was evident that Soult offered a close -rough trial of arms, without subtlety, trusting to the valour of his -veterans. Eagerly the gallant Moore accepted the challenge. The moment -for his counter-stroke had arrived, and at once he called up Frazer’s -division in support of Paget, giving the latter, who was previously -well instructed, the signal to descend into the valley: the French -column on his flank being thus provided with opponents, he turned to -observe the progress of the fight at Elvina, for as yet the battle had -but slightly touched his centre and left. - -The 42nd and 50th had driven the enemy back into the village, and the -last-named regiment, entering the streets with the repulsed disordered -mass and giving no respite, forced it through and broke out, still -fighting, on the other side. To support this advance the general now -sent a battalion of the Guards down, whereupon the 42nd, thinking -it a relief and not a reinforcement, retired, with exception of the -grenadier company. Some confusion thus occurred, the village was not -occupied, and the 50th, still accompanied by the 42nd Grenadiers, were -engaged without support beyond the houses, their array being quite -broken by stone inclosures and the disorder of the street fight. At -that critical moment the French were strongly reinforced, retook the -offensive and forced the regiment back into Elvina, having killed -beyond it the second Major, Stanhope, a nephew of Mr. Pitt, and made -prisoner the commanding officer, Major Napier, known since as the -conqueror of Scinde; encompassed by enemies, and denied quarter, he -received five wounds, but he still fought and struggled for life -until a French drummer with a generous heat and indignation forcibly -rescued him from his barbarous assailants. Meanwhile Sir John Moore, -observing the error of the 42nd, had galloped down and with a fiery -exhortation sent it back to the village, where the 50th notwithstanding -the loss of their commander was successfully sustaining a very violent -conflict: then with heroic anticipations from the development of his -counter-combination, he returned to the ridge from whence he could view -the whole action. - -Elvina was now his centre of battle and pivot of movements, for on -his left the battle had then become general and furious, yet the -French made no progress against Hope’s division; and on the right, -in the valley, the attacking column was at bay, wavering under a -double fire in front and flank: everywhere the signs of coming victory -were bright, when the gallant man, the consummate commander, who had -brought the battle to this crisis, was dashed from his horse to the -earth. A cannon-shot from the rock battery had torn away all the flesh -from his left breast and shoulder, and broken the ribs over a heart -undaunted even by this terrible this ghastly mortal hurt; for with -incredible energy he rose to a sitting posture, and with fixed look and -unchanged countenance continued to regard the fight at Elvina until the -Frenchmen’s backward steps assured him the British were victorious: -then sinking down he accepted succour. - -Being placed in a blanket for removal, an entanglement of his belts -caused the hilt to enter the wound and Captain Hardinge[6] attempted to -take away the weapon altogether; but with martial pride the stricken -man forbade the alleviation--_he would not part with his sword in the -field_! Epaminondas, mortally wounded at Mantinea, was anxious for the -recovery of his shield. Moore, mortally wounded at Coruña, sustained -additional torture rather than part with his sword! - -The Theban hero’s fall dismayed and paralyzed his victorious troops. -It was not so with the British at Coruña. They saw Baird, second in -command, carried from the field as the General-in-Chief had been, -and they would have seen all their generals fall one after another -without abating their battle; hence it was not long before the French -were entirely driven from Elvina, while on the left, they were not -only repulsed from the ridge, but pursued and assailed in their own -villages; that of Palavia, defended by the since celebrated General -Foy, was taken. Meanwhile Paget, pouring into the valley with -conquering violence, overthrew everything in his front, and driving off -the dismounted French dragoons who had descended to the lower falls on -his right, made for the great rock battery, which he would certainly -have stormed if the counter-attack had been continued, and Frazer’s -division been thrown, as Moore designed, into the fight. The French -would thus have been wrecked; for their ammunition of which the rapid -marches through Gallicia had only allowed them to bring up a small -supply, was exhausted, the river Mero was in full tide behind them, and -only one bridge remained for retreat. But this want of ammunition was -unknown to the English general Hope, on whom the command had devolved, -and he, judging a night action, for it was then dark, too hazardous, -profited from the confusion of the French to embark the army without -loss and sailed for England. The heroic spirit of Moore went with the -troops, his body rested with the enemy. - -For some hours after receiving his hurt that great man had lived -painfully, but with a calm fortitude that excited the admiration of -those about him. Several times he expressed his satisfaction at having -won the battle, and his last words were to express a hope “_that his -country would do him justice_!” - -Full justice has not been done, because malignant faction has strived -hard to sully his reputation as a general--but thus he died, and the -record of his worth will be as a beacon to posterity so long as heroic -virtue combined with great capacity is reverenced, for in any age, any -nation, any conjuncture, Sir John Moore would have been a leading man. -Tall he was and vigorous of person, and of a very comely noble aspect, -indicating penetration which no subtlety could deceive, valour which no -danger could appal, and withal a dignity of mind which awed while it -attracted admiration and confidence. With him indeed, all commanding -qualities seemed to be united to and inseparable from estimable -sentiments. Integrity, honour, generosity, patriotism, adorned the -whole course of his existence, and his death furnished an irrefragable -test of the sincerity of his life: for both he may claim a place with -the greatest men of antiquity. - - - - -BOOK II. - - Passage of the Douro--Talavera--Combat of Salinas--First Combat of - Talavera--Second Combat of Talavera--Battle of Talavera. - - -Napoleon having failed to cut off the English army, returned to France, -leaving precise instructions with his lieutenants for the invasion of -Portugal. Marshal Ney, who reached Coruña three days after the battle, -was to hold Gallicia. Soult was to march by Oporto upon Lisbon. General -Lapisse, previously directed on Ciudad Rodrigo with twelve thousand -men, was to connect Soult’s invasion with another, to be conducted -south of the Tagus by Marshal Victor, who had thirty thousand troops. -Soult had twenty-five thousand, and, after several battles with the -Portuguese of the northern provinces, stormed Oporto in March; but -he could hear nothing of Lapisse or Victor, and, his own progressive -strength being then exhausted, he endeavoured to establish himself -solidly until new combinations could be formed. - -Lapisse took no pains to open a communication with Soult, and after -several weeks of inactivity suddenly made for Alcantara, crossed the -Tagus there and joined Victor. The Portuguese and Spaniards, thinking -he was flying, rose along his line of march on both sides of the -frontier and cut off all communication between Victor and Soult. The -former was however little disposed to act. He had defeated the Spanish -general Cuesta in a great battle at Medellin, and only accidentally -failed to obtain Badajos by treason; but then he took quarters at -Merida, sullenly resistant of his orders to enter Portugal. This -enabled Cuesta, who had all the resources of Andalusia, to reappear in -Estramadura with an army of thirty thousand infantry and six thousand -cavalry--and at the same time a new force sprung up in Portugal. - -Previous to this period the English ministers, without resolution -or capacity to adopt any judicious course, at one time looking to -Portugal, at another negotiating for the occupation of Cadiz, had -during these events displayed only infirmity of purpose and ignorance -of the real state of affairs; but after four months of vacillation, -subsequent to the battle of Coruña, they decided to act in Portugal, -where the Regency had accepted General Beresford as their field -marshal. The British troops in that country were then largely -reinforced, and Sir Arthur Wellesley, assuming the supreme military -command of both nations, commenced that series of victories which has -placed him amongst the truly great generals of the world--and they are -few, though the vanity of nations would make them many. - -Soult was then in Oporto, Victor at Merida, but the frontier -insurrection debarred all intercourse between them; and Sir Arthur, -after making arrangements to cover Lisbon from Victor, marched against -Soult, in whose army there was a conspiracy of officers to deliver him -to the English. One D’Argenton twice secretly visited head-quarters on -this subject, yet the treason, though of weight as an accessory, was -not permitted to affect the British preparations or movements, which -were carefully concealed. - -On the 7th of May Beresford was detached with a mixed force, six -thousand being Portuguese, to operate on the side of Lamego. - -On the 8th, sixteen thousand British troops, fifteen hundred being -cavalry, with twenty-four guns, moved from Coimbra under Sir A. -Wellesley’s personal command towards the Vouga river. - -Up to this time Soult was ignorant that such a force had been -assembled, but hearing nothing of Lapisse or Victor he had decided to -make a flank march into the Salamanca country, and had pushed his light -cavalry under Franceschi to the Vouga, supporting it with Mermet’s -division of infantry. Loison’s division, six thousand strong, was then -beyond the Tamega at Pezo de Ragoa, and Lorge’s heavy cavalry was on -the Lima, watching the Portuguese insurgents. - -In this scattered state the French on the Vouga were surprised and -driven fighting upon the Douro, which they crossed in the night of -the 11th and destroyed the boat bridge. Soult, who had discovered the -conspiracy on the 9th, was thus suddenly beset with perils. Treason in -his army which he could not probe, a powerful enemy suddenly springing -up in front, an active insurrection on his rear; his troops parcelled -from the Vouga to the Lima and Tamega, and under officers necessarily -suspected while the extent of the conspiracy was unknown! He did not -quail. Directing Lorge to abandon the Lima and make for the Tamega, he -ordered Loison to hold Amarante on that river, as the only means of -concentration and safety for the army; he sent his stores and most of -the heavy guns towards that place on the 10th and night of the 11th; -and when the troops from the Vouga came pouring in, the remaining heavy -guns and the baggage were also put in movement, Mermet’s division -following them as far as Vallonga, with orders to secure the boats on -the Douro and vigilantly patrol up the bank. All the craft from Oporto -to the mouth of the river was then drawn to the right bank, guards -were set, and Soult, thinking his position secure, decided to hold -Oporto another day, to give Lorge’s dragoons and other detachments -time to reach Amarante: he was however curiously misled. In the recent -operations, an English column, moving in boats up the Lake of Ovar, -which runs parallel with the coast, had disembarked on Mermet’s flank, -who thought it had landed from the ocean; hence Soult, expecting the -empty vessels would enter the Douro to effect a passage, directed his -attention entirely to the lower river, while on the upper his orders -were neglected and false reports made of their execution, for the -conspirators were many and busy. - - -PASSAGE OF THE DOURO. (May, 1809.) - -Before eight o’clock on the morning of the 12th the British army was -secretly concentrated behind a rocky height, on which stood a convent -immediately facing Oporto. The Douro rolled in front, and the French -on the other side could with two marches gain the Tamega, secure their -retreat, and defeat Beresford in passing; for that general had been -sent over the Douro, above the confluence of the Tamega, merely to -infest Soult’s line of march towards the Salamanca country, and thus -induce him to take the rugged Chaves road leading to Gallicia, and that -could not be risked unless the main army under Sir Arthur was closely -pressing the French rear; hence his safety, and the forcing Soult into -Gallicia, alike called for an immediate passage of the Douro. Yet how -pass a river, deep, swift, more than three hundred yards wide, and -in the face of ten thousand veterans guarding the opposite bank? The -Macedonian hero might have turned from it without shame. - -The stream came with an elbow round the convent height, which barred -sight of the upper water from the place where Soult was watching for -ships which did not exist; and he knew not that the British army was -behind the frowning rock above, nor that a great captain was on its -summit, searching with an eagle glance the river, the city, and the -country around. Horses and baggage that captain saw on the Vallonga -road, and the dust of distant columns as in retreat, but no large force -near the river; the guards also were few and widely spread, the patrols -not vigilant--an auspicious negligence seeming to prevail. Suddenly a -large unfinished building called the Seminary caught his eye; it was -isolated, had an easy access from the water, and was surrounded by a -high wall which extended to the river bank on each side, inclosing -space enough for two battalions, the only egress being an iron gate -opening on the Vallonga road. This structure commanded everything -around, except one mound, within cannon-shot, but too pointed to hold -guns; there were no French posts near the building, and as the direct -line across the water was entirely hidden from the city by the rock, -Sir Arthur, with a marvellous hardihood, instantly resolved to force -a passage there in face of a veteran army and a renowned general, his -means being as scanty as his resolution was great, yet with his genius -they sufficed. - -Colonel Waters, an officer on his staff, a quick-witted, daring man, -discovered a poor barber, who had come over the river the night before -in a small skiff and readily agreed to go back; he was accompanied by -the Prior of Amarante, who gallantly offered his services: thus Waters -crossed unperceived and returned with three large barges. Meanwhile -eighteen guns had been placed in battery on the convent rock, and -General John Murray was detached with a brigade of German infantry, the -14th Dragoons, and two guns, to seek a passage at the Barca de Avintas, -three miles up the river: he was reinforced with other troops when the -barges were secured, and then also the head of the army cautiously -approached the water. - -At 10 o’clock, the French being tranquil and unsuspicious, the British -wondering and expectant, Sir Arthur was told that one boat was ready. -_Well! Let the men cross_ was the reply, and a quarter of an hour -afterwards an officer and twenty-five British soldiers were silently -placed on the other side of the Douro in the midst of the French -army! The Seminary was thus gained, all remained quiet, and a second -boat passed. No hostile stir succeeded, no sound of war was heard; -but when the third boat passed, tumultuous noises rolled through -Oporto, the drums beat to arms, shouts arose, the citizens, vehemently -gesticulating, made signals from their houses, and confused masses of -troops rushing out from the higher streets threw forward swarms of -skirmishers, and came furiously down on the Seminary. - -Secrecy was then no longer valuable and the army crowded to the river -bank. Paget’s and Hill’s divisions pressed to the point of passage, -Sherbrooke’s to where the bridge had been cut away the night before. -Paget himself passed with the third boat, but on the roof of the -Seminary was deeply wounded. Hill took his place, and the musketry, -sharp and voluble from the first, augmented as the forces accumulated -on each side; yet the French attack was eager and constant, their -fire increased more rapidly than that of the English, and their guns -soon opened against the building. The English battery on the convent -rock swept the inclosure on each side and confined the attack to the -front; but Murray did not come down the right bank, and the struggle -was such that Sir Arthur was only restrained from crossing by the -remonstrances of those about him, and the confidence he had in Hill. -Soon, however, some citizens were seen bringing over several great -boats to Sherbrooke, while a prolonged shout from the streets, and the -waving of handkerchiefs from the windows, gave notice that the enemy -had abandoned the lower town: Murray also was then descried on the -right bank. - -Three battalions were now in the Seminary, the attack slackened, and -the French began to hurry across the front of the inclosure by the -Vallonga road, and Hill, advancing to the inclosure wall, was pouring -a heavy fire into the disordered masses as they passed his front, when -suddenly five guns galloped out of the city on his left, but appalled -at the terrible stream of musketry pulled up: while thus hesitating a -volley from behind stretched most of the artillerymen in the dust, and -the rest dispersing left the guns on the road. It was from Sherbrooke, -who had passed through the streets, this volley came, and he now -pressed the French rear while Hill sent his damaging fire into their -flank, and the guns from the rock deeply searched their masses. The -passage was thus won, the allies were on the right bank of the Douro, -and if Murray had fallen on the disordered crowd, approaching him, -the discomfiture would have been complete. He however suffered column -after column to pass, and seemed to fear they would step aside to push -him into the river. General C. Stewart and Major Harvey, impatient of -this timidity, took two squadrons of the 14th Dragoons, and riding over -the French rear in a narrow way unhorsed General Laborde and wounded -General Foy; but having no support from Murray fought their way back -with loss, and Harvey lost his arm. Of the English twenty were killed, -one general and nearly a hundred men wounded on the day; the French -lost a general and five hundred men killed or wounded, and they left -several hundreds in hospital. Five guns were taken in the fight; and -stores of ammunition with fifty pieces of artillery, the carriages of -which had been burned, were found in the arsenal. The overthrow was -great, but Napoleon’s veterans were so inured to war that no troops so -readily recovered from a surprise. Before they reached Vallonga their -order was restored, a rear-guard was formed, and in the night was -rejoined by a detachment from the mouth of the Douro, which had been -guided by some friendly Portuguese: then Soult, believing Loison held -Amarante, thought himself well out of his difficulties. He was soon -undeceived. - -Sir Arthur Wellesley now brought his baggage, stores, and artillery -over the Douro; but this was not effected until the evening of the -13th, and though Murray’s Germans were sent in pursuit on the morning -of that day, they did not advance more than ten miles. “_An enemy once -surprised should never be allowed time to recover_,” is a great maxim, -and so proved on this occasion: yet there were sound reasons for the -halt. Part of the troops were still on the left bank of the Douro, and -the whole had outmarched provisions, baggage and spare ammunition, -having made more than eighty miles of rough ground in four days, -besides fighting. Men and animals required rest, and nothing was known -of Beresford, whose proceedings had been of far greater importance than -either he or Sir Arthur knew at the time.[7] - -Loison had fallen back from Pezo de Ragoa on the Douro the 10th when -Beresford crossed that river. The latter was then in the position -required for turning Soult on to the Chaves road; but Loison again -retreated on the 11th, and Beresford, finding him timid, followed -briskly, while a Portuguese insurgent force under General Sylveira -closed on his flank. The 12th his outposts were driven into Amarante, -and next day he abandoned that place. - -These events were unknown to Sir Arthur on the 13th, but he heard Soult -had destroyed guns and ammunition near Penafiel, and judging that to -be a result of Beresford’s operations, reinforced Murray with cavalry, -ordering him to push on to Penafiel, and if Loison lingered near -Amarante to open a communication with Beresford--the latter was then to -ascend the Tamega and intercept the French at Chaves. - -On the 14th Sir Arthur had moved forward himself, and the 15th reached -Braga; Beresford was then near Chaves, Sylveira marching towards -Salamonde, and Soult’s capture seemed inevitable to his pursuers; -he was however beyond their toils, having by a surprising effort -extricated himself from perils as fearful as ever beset a general. - -While retreating towards Amarante he was between the Douro and the -Sierra de Catalina, both said to be impassable, and the road was very -narrow and very rugged. His design was to pass the Tamega and march -on Braganza; failing in that, he could from Amarante and Guimaraens -reach Braga by a good road leading behind the Catalina ridge; in either -case however Amarante was to be first gained, and his safety depended -on Loison holding that place. But that general had relinquished it -to Beresford on the 13th, and marched on Guimaraens, though a staff -officer, sent by Soult on the 12th, was in his camp protesting against -the movement: the retreat from Oporto being also known to him. He thus -deliberately abandoned his general and two-thirds of the army to what -appeared certain destruction; for Beresford could not be forced, and -if Murray only had come up on the French rear, and he was not far off, -Soult must have laid down his arms. - -This calamity was made known to that marshal as he was passing the -rugged bed of the Souza, a cross torrent falling into the Douro. The -weather was boisterous, the troops worn with fatigue and recently -defeated were dismayed, voices were heard calling for capitulation, -and all things tended to ruin: but in that hour of peril the Duke of -Dalmatia justified fortune for having raised him to such dignity. He -had fallen from his horse and severely injured his hip, broken before -by a shot at the siege of Genoa, yet neither pain nor bodily weakness -nor danger could abate his resolution. A Spanish pedlar told him of -a path leading up that bank of the Souza which he had just left, by -which he could scale the Catalina ridge and reach the Guimaraens road -to Braga: whereupon, with a haughty commandment he silenced the murmurs -of treacherous officers and fearful soldiers, destroyed his guns, -abandoned his military chest and baggage, loaded the animals which had -carried them with sick men and ammunition, and repassed the Souza to -follow his Spanish guide. Torrents of rain descended and the path was -wild and rough as the desolate region it threaded, yet with a fierce -domination he forced his troops over the mountain, and descending on -Guimaraens, refound Loison: Lorge’s dragoons came in at the same time -from Braga, and thus almost beyond hope the whole army was concentrated. - -Soult’s energy had been great, his sagacity was now as conspicuous. The -slackness of pursuit, after passing Vallonga, made him judge Sir Arthur -was pushing for Braga and would reach it first; a fighting retreat and -the loss of guns and baggage would then ensue, and perhaps fatally -depress the soldiers’ spirit; it would also favour the malcontents, -and already one general, apparently Loison, was urging a convention. -Soult replied by destroying the guns, ammunition, and baggage of the -divisions he found at Guimaraens, and again taking to the mountains -crossed them to Carvalho d’Este, thus gaining a day’s march and -baffling the combination to surround him. Next morning he drew up his -twenty thousand men on the position they had occupied two months before -at the battle of Braga, an imposing spectacle, and on the scene of a -recent victory, by which he aroused the sinking pride of the French -soldier. It was a happy reach of generalship! - -Now he reorganized his army, giving Loison the advanced guard and -taking the rear himself; at which, says the French historian of -this expedition, “the whole army was astonished.” As if it were not -consummate policy to oppose the British pursuit with men under the -General-in-Chief, while the van, having to fight insurgents, was -led by an officer whose very name called forth execrations from the -natives--_Maneta, the one-handed_, as Loison was called, however -willing, dared not surrender to a Portuguese force. - -From Carvalho the French made for Salamonde, whence there were two -lines of retreat; the one by Ruivaens to Chaves, the other, shorter -and more rugged, by the Ponte Nova to Montelegre. The scouts said the -bridge at Ruivaens was broken, the passage defended by twelve hundred -insurgents with artillery; moreover, that men had been all the morning -working to destroy the Ponte Nova. The breaking of the first blocked -the road to Chaves, the breaking of the second would, if completed, cut -the army off from Montelegre. - -Night was setting in, the soldiers were harassed, barefooted, and -starving, the ammunition was injured by rain, which had never ceased -since the 13th, and was now accompanied by storms of wind, with the -morning the British army would be on the rear, and if the Ponte Nova -could not be secured the hour of surrender was come! In this extremity, -Major Dulong, justly reputed as one of the most daring men in the -French ranks, was thus addressed by Soult: “_I have chosen you from the -whole army to seize the Ponte Nova, which has been cut by the enemy. -Take a hundred grenadiers and twenty-five horsemen, surprise the guards -and secure the passage. If you succeed, say so, but send no other -report; your silence will suffice._” - -Dulong, favoured by the storm, reached the bridge, killed the sentinel -without any alarm being given, and being followed by twelve grenadiers, -crawled along a narrow slip of masonry which had not been destroyed. -The Cavado river was flooded and roaring in its deep rocky channel -below, and one of the grenadiers fell into the gulf, but the waters -were much louder than his cry, and the others surprised the nearest -guards; then the main body rushed on, and some crossing the broken -bridge while others ascended the heights, shouting and firing, scared -the insurgents away. - -At four o’clock the bridge was repaired and the troops filed slowly -over; but the road beyond was only a narrow cut in the side of a -mountain, an unfenced precipice yawned on the left for several miles, -and the way was finally crossed by the Misarella torrent, rolling in -a deep chasm and only to be passed by the _Saltador_ or _leaper_, a -bridge so called because it was a single arch, high and boldly thrown, -which admitted only three persons abreast: it was not cut, but was -intrenched, and the rocks on the further side were occupied by some -hundred armed insurgents. Here the good soldier Dulong again saved the -army. For when two assaults had been repulsed he won the passage with -a third, in which he fell deeply wounded; yet his admiring soldiers -carried him forward in their arms, and then the head of the long French -column poured over the Saltador. It was full time, for the English guns -were thundering on the rear and the restored Ponte Nova was choked with -the dead. - -Sir Arthur Wellesley, quitting Braga in the morning of the 16th, -overtook Soult’s rear-guard in the evening, at Salamonde, before it -could cross the Ponte Nova; it was in a strong position, but men -momentarily expecting an order to retire seldom stand firmly. Some -light troops turned their left, Sherbrooke assailed their front, and -after one discharge they fled by their right to the Ponte Nova. It was -dusk, the way to the bridge was not that of apparent retreat, and for -a while the French were lost to view; they thus gained time to form a -rear-guard, but ere their cavalry could pass the bridge the English -guns opened, sending men and horses crushed together into the gulf, -and the bridge and the rocks and the defile beyond were strewed with -mangled carcasses. - -This was the last infliction by the sword in a retreat signalized by -many horrid and many glorious actions; for the peasants in their fury -tortured and mutilated the sick and straggling soldiers who fell into -their hands, the troops in revenge shot the peasants, and the marches -could be traced from afar by the smoke of burning houses. - - -TALAVERA. (July, 1809.) - -When Soult saved himself in Gallicia Sir Arthur Wellesley marched to -Abrantes on the Tagus, from whence, thinking the French marshal’s army -so ruined it could be of no weight in the war for several months, he -designed to make a great movement against Madrid, in concert with the -Spanish generals Cuesta and Venegas. He was at the time incredulous of -the Spaniards’ failings, thinking Sir John Moore had misrepresented -them as apathetic and perverse; but this expedition taught him to -respect that great man’s judgment, both as to the people and the nature -of their warfare. - -His plan of operations, as might be expected from so great a general, -was bold, comprehensive, and military, according to the data presented: -but he accepted false data. He under-calculated the French in the -Peninsula by more than a hundred thousand men, he overrated the -injury inflicted on Soult; and while slighting the personal energy -and resources of that marshal, relied on Spanish politicians, Spanish -generals, Spanish troops, and Spanish promises. The time was indeed one -of riotous boasting and ill-founded anticipations with the Spanish, -Portuguese, and British governments. Their agents and partisans were -incredibly noisy, their newspapers teemed with idle stories of the -weakness, misery, fear and despondency of the French armies, and of the -successful fury of the Spaniards; the most inflated notions of easy -triumph pervaded councils and camps, and the English general’s judgment -was not entirely proof against the pernicious influence. - -Victor, relinquishing the south side of the Tagus, was then in position -at Talavera, and behind him King Joseph had his own guards, a great -body of horsemen, and Sebastiani’s army corps. Thus more than fifty -thousand men, seven thousand being cavalry, covered Madrid. - -Cuesta, following Victor’s movements, had taken post at Almaraz, with -thirty thousand infantry, seven thousand cavalry, and seventy pieces of -artillery. - -Venegas was in La Mancha with twenty-five thousand men. - -Sir Arthur Wellesley had eighteen thousand infantry, and three thousand -cavalry, with thirty guns; eight thousand men, recently landed from -England, were on the march to join him, and both the Spanish government -and generals gave him the strongest assurances of co-operation and -support. He had made contracts with the alcaldes in the valley of the -Tagus for a supply of provisions, and, confiding in those promises and -contracts, entered Spain the latter end of June, with scanty means of -transport and without magazines, to find every Spanish promise broken, -every contract a failure. When he remonstrated, all the Spaniards -concerned, political or military, vehemently denied that any breach -of engagements had taken place, and as vehemently offered to make new -ones, without the slightest intention to fulfil them. - -A junction with Cuesta was effected the 18th of July. - -He was sullen, obstinate, and absurdly prompt to display contempt for -the English general; he marched with him, yet rejected his counsels, -and after reaching Talavera, from whence Victor had retired, pushed -on alone, thinking in his foolish pride to enter Madrid. But King -Joseph, who had concentrated fifty thousand men and ninety guns on -the Guadarama stream, drove him back the 26th with the loss of four -thousand men, and his army would have dispersed, if Sherbrooke, who -was in advance of the English forces, had not interposed his division -between the scared troops and the enemy. - -Sir Arthur Wellesley, whose soldiers were starving, from the failures -of the Spanish authorities, had not passed the Alberche, and was intent -to retire from Spain; yet now, seeing the disorder beyond that river, -judged that a great battle was at hand, and being convinced that in a -strong position only would the Spaniards stand, besought their general -to withdraw to Talavera, where there was ground suited for defence. -Cuesta’s uncouth nature then broke out. His troops, beaten, dispirited, -fatigued, and bewildered, were clustering in fear on a low narrow slip -of land, between the Alberche, the Tagus, and the heights of Salinas. -The first shot must have been the signal for dispersion; yet when -entreated to avoid the fall of the rock thus trembling overhead, he -replied, that his army would be disheartened by further retreat--he -would fight where he stood: had the French advanced his ruin would have -ensued. At daybreak Sir Arthur renewed his solicitations, but they -were fruitless, until the enemy’s cavalry came in sight and Sherbrooke -prepared to retire; then indeed the sullen old man yielded, yet with -frantic pride told his staff, “_he had first made the Englishman go -down on his knees_.” Having vented this stupid folly, he retired -to a lumbering coach which attended his head-quarters, while _The -Englishman_, by virtue of an imperious genius, assumed command of -both armies, and leaving one division with a brigade of cavalry under -General M^cKenzie on the Alberche to mask his movements, retired six -miles to Talavera; having before chosen a field of battle there, and -strengthened it with some field-works on a line perpendicular to the -Tagus. - -The country in front was a plain, open near this position, but beyond -it covered with olive and cork trees up to the Alberche. A series of -unconnected hills, steep, yet of moderate height, and running parallel -with the Tagus at a distance of two miles, bounded this plain on the -left, and half a mile beyond them was a mountain-ridge, from which they -were separated by a rugged valley. - -Sir Arthur posted the Spanish infantry in two lines on the right, -having their flank resting on the town of Talavera, which touched the -river. - -Their left was closed by a mound crowned with a large field redoubt, -behind which a brigade of British cavalry was posted. - -Their front was protected by a convent, by ditches, mud walls, -breastworks, and felled trees; their cavalry was behind their line, and -in rear of all, nearly touching on the town, was a wood with a large -house, well placed for and designed by the English general to cover -a retreat on the main roads leading from Talavera to Arzobispo and -Oropesa. - -From the large redoubt, on the mound closing the Spanish left, the -line was prolonged by the British army. Campbell’s division, in two -lines, touched the Spaniards; Sherbrooke’s touched Campbell’s, but -arrayed in one line only, M^cKenzie’s division, then on the Alberche, -being to form the second. Hill’s division should have closed the left, -by taking post on the highest of the isolated heights which bounded -the plain, but from some error only the flat ground was occupied, and -the height was left naked, an error afterwards felt. The English left -wing was covered in front by a watercourse, which, shallow at first, -went deepening and widening as it passed the round hill, and became a -formidable chasm in the valley. The cavalry, originally placed along -the front, was destined to take post, partly behind the British left -wing, partly behind the redoubt on the Spanish left, and the whole -front of battle was two miles long. The Spaniards, reduced by their -recent action to thirty-four thousand combatants, but still having -seventy guns, occupied one-third of it, and were nearly inattackable -from the nature of the ground. The British and Germans held the -remainder of the position, and the weakest part, although they were but -nineteen thousand sabres and bayonets with thirty guns. The combined -armies therefore, with forty-four thousand infantry, ten thousand -cavalry, and one hundred pieces of artillery, offered battle to the -king, who was coming on with eighty guns and fifty thousand men, seven -thousand being cavalry. - -Before daylight the French were in march to attack, and at one o’clock -Victor reached the heights of Salinas overhanging the Alberche, from -whence he could see the dust raised by taking up the position, though -the forest masked the dispositions. The ground was however known to -him, and the king, at his instance, sent Sebastiani at once against -the allies’ right, the cavalry against the centre, and Victor himself -against the left-supporting the two first with his guards and the -reserve. - - -COMBAT OF SALINAS. (July, 1809.) - -Victor first marched on the _Caza de Salinas_, a house situated in the -plain below. To reach it he had to ford the Alberche and penetrate two -miles through the forest, yet the position of M^cKenzie’s division -was indicated by the dust, and as the British cavalry had sent no -patrols, the post was surprised. England was then like to have lost her -great commander, for Sir Arthur, who was in the house for observation, -very hardly escaped capture; for the French charged so hotly that the -English brigades were separated, fired on each other, and were driven -in disorder through the forest into the open plain. In the midst of -this confusion the 45th, a stubborn old regiment, accompanied by some -companies of the 60th Riflemen, kept good array, and on them Sir Arthur -rallied the others and checked the enemy, covering his retreat with -cavalry; yet he lost four hundred men, and the retrograde movement was -hastily made in face of both armies. - -M^cKenzie with one brigade now took post behind the Guards in the -centre, but Colonel Donkin, seeing the hill on the extreme left -unoccupied, crowned it with the other brigade, and thus accidentally -filled the position. Meanwhile Victor, issuing from the forest in fine -martial order, rapidly crossed the plain, seized another isolated -hill, opposite to that held by Donkin, and opened a heavy cannonade: -at the same time Sebastiani approached the Spanish line, and pushed -forward his light cavalry to make Cuesta show his order of battle; -whereupon happened one of those events which show what a chance-medley -thing a battle is, even in the hands of a great captain. The French -horsemen, riding boldly up, commenced a pistol skirmish, to which the -Spaniards replied with one general discharge of musketry, and then ten -thousand infantry, with all the artillerymen, as if deprived of their -senses, broke and fled away in confused heaps; the gunners carried away -their horses, the footmen threw away their arms, the Adjutant-General -O’Donoghue was foremost in flight, and even Cuesta went off some -distance in his coach: the panic was spreading wide, and the elated -horsemen charged down the Royal road, but Sir Arthur instantly flanked -them with some English squadrons, the ditches on the opposite side -were impracticable, the Spaniards who stood fast began to use their -firearms, and those daring troopers had to retreat. - -Most of the Spanish runaways made for Oropesa, saying the allies were -defeated, the French in hot pursuit. Incredible disorder followed. -The English commissaries went off with their animals, the paymasters -carried away their money-chests, the baggage was scattered, and the -alarm spread along the rear even to the frontier of Portugal. Cuesta -indeed, having recovered his presence of mind, sent several thousand -horsemen to head the fugitives and drive them back, and some of the -artillerymen and horses were thus recovered; many of the infantry also, -but in the next day’s battle the Spanish army was less by six thousand -fighting men than it should have been, and the great redoubt in the -centre was silent for want of guns. - -While this disgraceful flight was being perpetrated on the right, -the left of the English line displayed the greatest intrepidity. The -round hill at the extremity was of easy ascent in rear, but steep and -rugged towards the French, and was also protected there by the deep -watercourse at the bottom. Nevertheless Victor, seeing Donkin’s brigade -was not numerous, and the summit of the hill still naked of troops, -thought to seize the latter by a sudden assault. - - -FIRST COMBAT OF TALAVERA. (July, 1809.) - -The sun was sinking, but the twilight and the confusion amongst the -Spaniards appeared so favourable to the French marshal, that, without -informing the king, he directed Ruffin’s division to attack, Villatte’s -to follow in support, and Lapisse to assail the German Legion as a -diversion for Ruffin, without engaging seriously. The assault was -vigorous, and though Donkin beat back the French in his front, many -of them turned his left and won the height in his rear. General Hill -had been previously ordered to reinforce him, and it was not quite -dark when that officer, while giving orders below, was shot at by men -on the highest point; thinking they were English stragglers firing at -the enemy, he rode up, followed by his brigade-major Fordyce, and in a -moment found himself in the midst of the French. Fordyce was killed, -Hill’s horse was wounded, and a grenadier seized his bridle, but -spurring hard he broke the man’s hold and galloping down met the 29th -Regiment, which he led up with so strong a charge the enemy could not -sustain the shock. - -When the summit was thus happily recovered, the 48th Regiment and a -battalion of detachments were brought forward, and in conjunction with -the 29th and Donkin’s brigade presented a formidable front and in good -time; for the troops beaten back were but part of a regiment forming -the van of Ruffin’s division, the two other regiments having lost their -way in the watercourse; the attack had therefore only subsided, Lapisse -soon opened fire against the Germans, and Ruffin’s regiment in one -mass again assailed the hill. The fighting then became vehement, and -in the darkness the opposing flashes of musketry showed how resolutely -the struggle was maintained, for the combatants were scarcely twenty -yards asunder, and the event seemed doubtful; but the charging shout -of the British soldier was at last heard above the din of arms, and -the enemy’s broken troops went down once more into the ravine below: -Lapisse, who had made some impression on the Germans, then abandoned -his false attack and the fighting of the 27th ceased. The British lost -eight hundred men, the French a thousand. - -Now the bivouac fires blazed up and the French and British soldiers -were quiet, but at midnight the Spaniards opened a prodigious peal -of musketry and artillery without cause or object; and during the -remainder of the night, the line was frequently disturbed with -desultory firing, which killed several men and officers. - -From the prisoners Victor ascertained the exact position of the -Spaniards, until then unknown, and when reporting his own failure -proposed a second attack for next morning on the hill. Marshal Jourdan, -chief of the king’s staff, opposed this as a partial enterprise leading -to no great result; yet Victor was so earnest for a trial, urging his -intimate knowledge of the ground, that he won Joseph’s assent. Then -he placed all his guns in one mass on the height to the English left, -from whence they could plunge into the great valley on their own right, -range the summit of the hill in their front, and obliquely search the -whole British line as far as the great redoubt between the allied -armies. Ruffin was in front of the guns, Villatte in rear, yet having -one regiment close to the watercourse; Lapisse occupied low table-land, -opposite Sherbrooke; Latour Maubourg’s cavalry formed a reserve for -Lapisse; Beaumont’s cavalry a reserve for Ruffin. - -On the English side, Hill’s division was concentrated on the disputed -height; the cavalry was massed in a plain behind; the park of artillery -and the hospitals were between the cavalry and Hill. - - -SECOND COMBAT OF TALAVERA. (July, 1809.) - -About daybreak Ruffin’s troops again menaced the English hill, moving -against the front and by the great valley on their own right, thus -embracing two sides. Their march was rapid and steady; they were -followed by Villatte’s men, and the assault was preceded with a burst -of artillery that rattled round the height and swept away the English -ranks by sections; the sharp chattering of musketry succeeded, and then -the French guns were pointed towards the British centre and right. Soon -their grenadiers closed, the height sparkled with fire, and, as the -inequalities of ground broke the formation, on both sides small bodies -were seen, here and there, struggling for the mastery with all the -virulence of a single combat. In some places the French were overthrown -at once, in others they would not be denied and reached the summit, yet -the English reserves always vindicated their ground and no permanent -footing was obtained. Still the conflict was maintained with singular -obstinacy. Hill himself was wounded and his men were falling fast, but -the enemy suffered more and gave way, step by step at first and slowly -to cover the retreat of their wounded, yet finally, unable to sustain -the increasing fury of their opponents and having lost above fifteen -hundred men in the space of forty minutes, the whole mass broke away in -disorder, sheltered by the renewed play of their powerful artillery. -To this destructive fire no adequate answer could be made, for the -English guns were few and of small calibre, and when a reinforcement -was demanded from Cuesta he sent two pieces! useful however they were, -and the Spanish gunners fought them gallantly. - -Most of the repulsed troops had gone off by the great valley, and a -favourable opportunity for a charge of horse occurred, but the English -cavalry, having retired during the night for water and forage, were -too distant to be of service. However, these repeated efforts of the -French against the hill, and the appearance of their light troops on -the mountain beyond the valley, taught the English general that he -should prolong his flank on that side; wherefore he now posted a mass -of cavalry with the leading squadrons looking into the valley, and sent -a Spanish division of infantry to the mountain itself. At this time -also, the Duke of Albuquerque, discontented with Cuesta’s arrangements, -came with his cavalry to the left and was placed behind the British: a -formidable array of horsemen, six lines in depth, was thus presented. - -Joseph, after examining the position from left to right, demanded of -Jourdan and Victor if he should deliver a general battle. The former -replied that when the great valley and the mountain were unoccupied on -the 27th, Sir Arthur Wellesley’s attention should have been drawn to -the right by a feint on the Spaniards: that during the night the whole -army should have been silently placed in column at the entrance of the -great valley, ready at daybreak to form line of battle to its left on a -new front, and so have attacked. Such a movement would have compelled -the allies to change their front also, and during the operation they -might have been assailed with success. This project could not then -be executed. The English, aware of their mistake, had occupied the -valley and the mountain, and were, front and flank alike, inattackable. -_Hence, the only prudent line was to take up a position on the -Alberche, and await the effect of Soult’s operations on the English -rear._ - -Victor opposed this counsel. He engaged to carry the hill on the -English left notwithstanding his former failures, provided Sebastiani -would attack the right and centre at the same moment, finishing his -argument thus: “_If such a combination failed, it was time to renounce -making war._”[8] - -The king was embarrassed. His own opinion coincided with Jourdan’s, -yet he feared Victor would make the emperor think a great opportunity -had been lost, and while thus wavering a despatch arrived from Soult, -saying his forces could only reach Placencia between the 2nd and 5th -of August; intelligence also came that a detachment from the army -of Venegas had appeared near Toledo, and his van was approaching -Aranjuez. This made the king tremble for Madrid. The stores, reserve -artillery, and general hospitals of all the armies in Spain were there, -and the tolls received at the gates formed almost the only pecuniary -resource of his court: so narrowly did Napoleon reduce the expenditure -of the war. These considerations overpowered his judgment; rejecting -the better counsel, he resolved to succour the capital, yet first to -try the chance of battle. - -While the French chiefs were thus engaged in council, the wounded -were carried to the rear on both sides; but the English soldiers -were suffering from hunger, regular service of provisions had ceased -for several days, and a few ounces of wheat in the grain formed the -subsistence of men who had fought and were yet to fight so hardly. -The Spanish camp was full of confusion and distrust. Cuesta inspired -terror by his ferocity, but no confidence; and Albuquerque, from -conviction or momentary anger, just as the French were coming on to the -final attack, sent one of his staff to inform the English commander -that Cuesta was betraying him. This message was first delivered to -Colonel Donkin, who carried it to Sir Arthur, then seated on the hill -intently watching the movements of the advancing enemy; he listened -without turning his head, and drily answering--_Very well, you may -return to your brigade_--continued his survey of the French. Such was -his imperturbable resolution and quick penetration, and his conduct -throughout the day was such as became a general upon whose vigilance -and intrepidity the fate of fifty thousand men depended. - -The dispositions of the French were soon completed. Ruffin’s division, -on the extreme right, was destined to cross the valley and move by the -foot of the mountain to turn the British left. - -Villatte was to menace the key hill with one brigade, and guard the -valley with another, thus connecting Ruffin’s movement with the main -attack. - -Lapisse, supported by Latour Maubourg’s dragoons and the king’s -reserve, was to fall with half his infantry upon Sherbrooke; the other -half, connecting its attack with Villatte’s brigade, was to make a -third effort to master the twice-contested hill. - -Milhaud’s dragoons were placed in front of Talavera to keep Cuesta in -check; the rest of the heavy cavalry was brought into the centre behind -Sebastiani, who was to assail the right of the British army. - -Part of the French light cavalry supported Villatte’s brigade in the -valley, part remained in reserve, and many guns were distributed among -the divisions; but the principal mass remained on Victor’s hill with -the reserve of light cavalry, where also the Duke of Belluno took post -to direct the movements of his corps. - - -BATTLE OF TALAVERA. (July, 1809.) - -From nine o’clock in the morning until mid-day there was no appearance -of hostility, the weather was intensely hot, and the troops on both -sides descended and mingled without fear or suspicion to quench their -thirst at a brook separating the positions; but at one o’clock the -French soldiers were seen to gather round their eagles, and the roll of -drums was heard along their whole line. Half an hour later, Joseph’s -guards, the reserve, and Sebastiani’s corps were descried in movement -to join Victor’s corps, and at two o’clock, the table-land and the -height on the French right, even to the great valley, were covered with -dark lowering masses of men. - -At this moment, some hundreds of English soldiers employed to carry -the wounded to the rear returned in one body, and were by the French -supposed to be a detached corps rejoining the army; nevertheless, -the Duke of Belluno gave the signal for battle, and eighty pieces of -artillery sent a tempest of bullets before the light troops, who came -on with the swiftness and violence of a hail-storm, and were closely -followed by the broad black columns in all the majesty of war. - -Sir Arthur Wellesley had from the summit of the hill a clear view of -the whole field of battle. First he saw Sebastiani’s troops rushing -forwards with the usual impetuosity of French soldiers, clearing the -intersected ground in their front and falling upon Campbell’s division -with infinite fury; yet that general, assisted by Mackenzie’s brigade -and two Spanish battalions, withstood their utmost efforts; for the -English regiments, putting the French skirmishers aside, met the -advancing columns with loud shouts, broke their front, lapped their -flanks with fire, and giving no respite pushed them back with a -terrible carnage. Ten guns were taken, but as Campbell would not break -his line by a pursuit, the French, rallying on their supports, made -head for another attack; yet the British guns and musketry played so -vehemently on their masses while a Spanish cavalry regiment charged -their flank, that they again retired in disorder and the victory was -secured in that quarter. - -During this fight Villatte, preceded by chosen grenadiers and supported -by two regiments of light cavalry, advanced up the great valley, and -Ruffin was discovered marching towards the mountain, whereupon Sir -Arthur directed Anson’s cavalry, composed of the 23rd Light Dragoons -and 1st German hussars, to charge the head of Villatte’s column. Going -off at a canter and increasing their speed as they advanced, these -regiments rode against the enemy, but soon came upon the brink of -the water-course, which, descending from the hill, was there a chasm -though not perceptible at a distance; the French, throwing themselves -into squares behind it, opened their fire, and then the German Colonel -Arentschildt, an officer whom forty years’ service had made a master -in his art, reined up at the brink, exclaiming, in his broken phrase, -_I will not kill my young mens_! Higher up however, facing the 23rd, -the chasm was more practicable, and that regiment plunged down, men and -horses rolling over each other in horrible confusion, the survivors -ascending the opposite bank by twos and threes; their colonel, Seymour, -was wounded, but Frederick Ponsonby, a hardy soldier, rallied all who -came up, passed through Villatte’s columns, which poured fire from each -side, and fell with inexpressible violence upon a brigade of French -_chasseurs_ in the rear. The combat was fierce yet short, for Victor -had before detached his Polish lancers and Westphalian light horse -to support Villatte, and these fresh troops coming on when the 23rd, -already over-matched, could scarcely stand against the _chasseurs_, -entirely broke them: those who were not killed or taken made for the -Spanish division on the mountain, leaving behind more than two hundred -men and officers. - -During this time the hill, the key of the position, was again -attacked, while Lapisse, having crossed the watercourse, pressed hard -upon the English centre, where his artillery, aided by the great -battery on Victor’s hill, opened large gaps in Sherbrooke’s ranks, -and his columns went close up in the resolution to win. They were -vigorously encountered and yielded in disorder, but the English Guards, -quitting the line and following with inconsiderate ardour, were met -by the French supporting columns and dragoons, whereupon the beaten -troops turned, while heavy batteries pounded the flank and front of the -Guards, who, thus maltreated, drew back, and coincidently, the German -Legion being sorely pressed, got into confusion. - -At this time Hill’s and Campbell’s divisions stood fast on each -extremity of the line, yet the centre of the British was absolutely -broken, and victory inclined towards the French, when suddenly Colonel -Donellan was seen advancing with the 48th through the midst of the -disordered masses. It seemed as if this regiment must be carried away -with the retiring crowds, but wheeling back by companies it let them -pass through the intervals, and then resuming its proud and beautiful -line struck against the right of the pursuing enemy, plying such a -destructive musketry and closing with such a firm countenance that his -forward movement was checked. The Guards and Germans then rallied, a -brigade of light cavalry came up from the second line at a trot, the -artillery battered the flanks without intermission, the French wavered, -and the battle was restored. - -In all actions there is one critical and decisive moment which offers -victory to the general who can seize it. When the Guards made their -rash charge, Sir Arthur, foreseeing the issue, had sent the 48th down -from the hill, although a rough battle was going on there, and at the -same time directed the light cavalry to advance. This made the British -strongest at the decisive point, the French relaxed their fighting -while the English fire grew hotter, and their ringing shouts--sure -augury of success--were heard along the whole line. In the hands of -a great general, Joseph’s guards and the reserve might have restored -the combat, but combination was over with the French. Sebastiani’s -corps, beaten on the left with the loss of ten guns, was in confusion; -the troops in the great valley on the right, amazed at the furious -charge of the 23rd, and awed by four distinct lines of cavalry still in -reserve, remained stationary, and no impression had been made on the -hill; Lapisse was mortally wounded, his division had given way, and the -king retired to his original position. - -This retrograde movement was covered by skirmishers and an increasing -fire of artillery; the British, exhausted by toil and want of food, and -reduced to less than fourteen thousand sabres and bayonets, could not -pursue, and the Spanish army was incapable of any evolution: at six -o’clock hostilities ceased, yet the battle was scarcely over when the -dry grass and shrubs took fire, and a volume of flames passing with -inconceivable rapidity across a part of the field, scorched in its -course both the dead and the wounded! - -Two British generals, Mackenzie and Langworth, thirty-one officers of -inferior rank, seven hundred and sixty-seven sergeants and soldiers -were killed. Three generals, a hundred and ninety-two officers, three -thousand seven hundred and eighteen sergeants and privates were -wounded; nine officers, six hundred and forty-three sergeants and -soldiers were missing: making a total loss of six thousand two hundred -and sixty-eight in the two days’ fighting, of which five thousand four -hundred and twenty-two fell on the 28th. - -On the French side, nine hundred and forty-four, including two -generals, were killed. Six thousand two hundred and ninety-four were -wounded, one hundred and fifty-six made prisoners; giving a total of -seven thousand three hundred and eighty-nine men and officers, of which -four thousand were of Victor’s corps: ten guns were taken and seven -left in the woods by the French. The Spaniards returned twelve hundred -men killed and wounded, but the correctness of their report was very -much doubted. - -Early on the 29th the French quitted their position for the heights -of Salinas behind the Alberche; and that day General Robert Craufurd -reached the English camp with the 43rd, 52nd and 95th regiments, and -immediately took charge of the outposts. These troops, after a march of -twenty miles, were in _bivouac_ near Malpartida de Placencia when the -alarm caused by the Spanish fugitives spread to that part. Craufurd, -fearing the army was pressed, allowed his men to rest for a few hours, -and then withdrawing fifty of the weakest marched with a resolution not -to halt until he reached the field of battle. As the brigade advanced -it met crowds of the runaways, not all Spaniards, but all propagating -the vilest falsehoods: _the army was defeated--Sir Arthur Wellesley -was killed--the French were only a few miles distant_: some, blinded -by their fears, pretended even to point out the enemy’s posts on the -nearest hills! Indignant at this shameful scene the troops pressed on -with impetuous speed, and leaving only seventeen stragglers behind, in -twenty-six hours crossed the field of battle, a strong compact body, -having during that time marched sixty-two English miles in the hottest -season of the year, each man carrying from fifty to sixty pounds -weight. Had the historian Gibbon known of such an effort, he would have -spared his sneer about the delicacy of modern soldiers![9] - -The desperate fighting of the English soldier, responding to his -general’s genius, had now saved the army from the danger imposed by -Cuesta’s perverseness and the infirmity of the Spanish troops; but -Sir A. Wellesley had still to expiate his own errors as to Spanish -character, Spanish warfare, and the French power and resources. - -Soult, after his retreat, had so promptly reorganized his force as -to be co-operating with Ney against the Gallician insurgents, when -in the British camp he was supposed to be wandering, distressed, and -shirking every foe. Meanwhile Napoleon, foreseeing with intuitive -sagacity that the English general would operate by the valley of the -Tagus, and Gallicia consequently be abandoned, gave Soult authority to -unite in Leon the troops of Mortier, Ney and Kellermann to his own, -above fifty thousand fighting men in all. With them he was to fall -on the British communications, by crossing the Gredos mountains and -entering the valley of the Tagus; but Ney, discontented at being under -Soult’s command, was dilatory, and the latter only passed the Gredos -the 31st instead of the 29th as he designed; the allies thus escaped -being inclosed between two French armies, each an overmatch for them in -numbers and power of movement. - -Sir A. Wellesley had heard on the 30th that Soult was likely to cross -the mountains, yet, thinking him weak, only desired Cuesta to reinforce -some Spanish troops previously posted at the pass of Baños, which had -however been already forced by the French; but on the 2nd of August -it became known that Soult had descended upon Placencia and taken all -the English stores there; news which aroused both generals; then they -agreed that Sir Arthur should march against him, while Cuesta remained -at Talavera to watch the king--promising to bring off the men in the -British hospitals if forced to retreat. Sir Arthur, relying on this, -marched the 3rd, still thinking Soult had only fifteen thousand men, -the remnant of his former army; but he had fifty-three thousand, and on -the morning of the 4th the English general found himself with seventeen -thousand half-starved soldiers at Oropesa, Soult being in his front, -Victor menacing his rear, and Cuesta, false to his word, close at hand, -having left fifteen hundred British sick and wounded to the enemy. The -fate of the Peninsula was then hanging by a thread which could not -support the weight for twelve hours, and only one resource remained: -the bridge of Arzobispo was near, and the army crossed the Tagus, -leaving the French with all the credit of the campaign. - -On the mountains beyond that river, the English general maintained a -defensive position until the 20th against the enemy; but against the -evil proceedings of the Spanish government and Spanish generals he -could not hold his ground, and therefore retired into Portugal; having -during his short campaign lost by sickness and in battle, or abandoned, -three thousand five hundred gallant soldiers and nearly two thousand -horses, fifteen hundred of which died of want. - - - - -BOOK III. - - Combats on the Coa and Agueda--Barba de Puerco--Combat of - Almeida--Anecdotes of British Soldiers--Battle of Busaco. - - -COMBATS ON THE COA AND AGUEDA. (July, 1810.) - -“_I have fished in many troubled waters, but Spanish troubled waters I -will never try again._” - -Thus said Sir A. Wellesley after the campaign of Talavera, by which -he had acquired the title of Viscount Wellington, and a thorough -knowledge of the Spanish character. Looking then to Portugal as his -base for future operations, he conceived and commenced the gigantic -lines of Torres Vedras as a depository for the independence of the -Peninsula--a grand project, conceived and enforced with all the might -of genius. But while preparing this stronghold he did not resign the -frontier, and when Massena, Prince of Essling, menaced Portugal in -1810 with sixty-five thousand fighting men in line, besides garrisons -and reserves, he found a mingled British and Portuguese army ready to -oppose him. - -This defensive force was disposed in two distinct masses. One under -General Hill opposed invasion by the line of the Tagus, the other -under Lord Wellington opposed it by the line of the Mondego; they were -however separated by the great Estrella mountain and its offshoots, and -Massena, when he took Ciudad Rodrigo, could concentrate his whole army -on either line, moving in front of the Estrella by a shorter and easier -road than the English general could concentrate his troops behind that -mountain. Lord Wellington opened indeed a military road which shortened -the line of co-operation with Hill; yet this was only an alleviation, -the advantage remained with the French, and Wellington had to trust -his own quickness and the strength of intermediate positions for -uniting his army in the lines of Torres Vedras. Yield ground without -force however he would not, and therefore had, previous to the fall -of Ciudad Rodrigo, detached General Robert Craufurd with the light -division, two regiments of cavalry, and six pieces of horse-artillery, -to the Agueda, in observation of the French army. On that advanced -position they sustained several actions. The first at Barba de Puerco, -a village, between which and the opposite French post of San Felices -yawned a gloomy chasm, and at the bottom, foaming over huge rocks, the -Agueda swept along beneath a high narrow bridge. This post, held by the -English riflemen, was of singular strength, yet scarcely was the line -of the Agueda taken when General Ferey, a bold officer, desirous to -create a fear of French enterprise, attempted a surprise. - -Secretly placing six hundred grenadiers below, at an hour when the -moon, rising behind him, cast long shadows from the rocks deepening the -darkness of the chasm, he silently passed the bridge, surprised and -bayoneted the sentinels, ascended the opposite crags with incredible -speed, and fell upon the picquets so fiercely that all went fighting -into the village while the first shout was still echoing in the gulf -behind. So sudden was the attack, so great the confusion, that no order -could be maintained, and each soldier encountering the nearest enemy -fought hand to hand, while their colonel, Sidney Beckwith, conspicuous -from his lofty stature and daring action, a man capable of rallying a -whole army in flight, exhorting, shouting, and personally fighting, -urged all forward until the French were pushed down the ravine again in -retreat. - -After this combat Craufurd kept his dangerous position for four months, -during which several skirmishes took place. The one of most note was at -the village of Barquilla, where he surprised and captured some French -horsemen, but afterwards rashly charging two hundred French infantry -under Captain Gouache, was beaten off with the loss of the cavalry -colonel, Talbot, and thirty-two troopers. - - -COMBAT OF ALMEIDA ON THE COA. (July, 1810.) - -Soon after this skirmish Ciudad Rodrigo fell, and Ney advanced towards -Almeida on the Coa. Craufurd’s orders were to recross that river, yet -from headstrong ambition he remained with four thousand British and -Portuguese infantry, eleven hundred cavalry and six guns to fight -thirty thousand French on bad ground; for though his left, resting on -an unfinished tower eight hundred yards from Almeida, was protected by -the guns of that fortress, his right was insecure; most of his cavalry -was in an open plain in front, and in his rear was a deep ravine, at -the bottom of which, more than a mile off, was the Coa with only one -narrow bridge for a retreat. - -A stormy night ushered in the 24th of July, and the troops, drenched -with rain, were under arms before daylight expecting to retire when -some pistol-shots in front, followed by an order for the cavalry -reserves and guns to advance, gave notice of the enemy’s approach; then -the morning cleared, and twenty-four thousand French infantry, five -thousand cavalry, and thirty pieces of artillery, were observed in -march beyond the Turones. The British line was immediately contracted -and brought under the edge of the ravine, but Ney had seen Craufurd’s -false disposition, and came down with the stoop of an eagle--four -thousand horsemen and a powerful artillery swept the English cavalry -from the plain, and Loison’s infantry, rushing on at a charging pace, -made for the centre and left of the position. - -While the French were thus pouring down, several ill-judged changes -were made on the English side; a part of the troops were advanced, -others drawn back; the 43rd Regiment was placed within an inclosure of -solid masonry ten feet high, near the road, about half-musket-shot down -the ravine and having but one narrow outlet! The firing in front became -heavy, the cavalry, the artillery and Portuguese caçadores successively -passed this inclosure in retreat, the sharp clang of the rifles was -heard along the edge of the plain above, and in a few moments the -imprisoned regiment would have been without a hope of escape, if here, -as in every other part of the field, the battalion officers had not -remedied the faults of the general. The egress was so narrow that some -large stones were loosened, a powerful simultaneous effort of the whole -line then burst the wall, and the next instant the regiment was up with -the riflemen. There was no room for array, no time for anything but -battle, every captain carried off his company independently, joining as -he could with the riflemen and 52nd, and a mass of skirmishers was thus -presented, acting in small parties and under no regular command, yet -each confident in the courage and discipline of those on his right and -left, and all keeping together with surprising vigour. - -It is unnecessary to describe the first burst of French soldiers, it is -well known with what gallantry the officers lead, with what vehemence -the troops follow, with what a storm of fire they waste a field of -battle. At this moment, with the advantage of ground and numbers, they -were breaking over the edge of the ravine, their guns, ranged along -the summit, pouring down grape, while their hussars galloped over the -glacis of Almeida and along the road to the bridge sabreing everything -in their way. Ney, desirous that Montbrun should follow the hussars -with the whole of the French cavalry, sent five officers in succession -to urge him on, and so mixed were friends and enemies, that only a few -guns of the fortress dared open, and no courage could have availed -against such overwhelming numbers: but Montbrun enjoyed an independent -command, and as the attack was made without Massena’s knowledge he -would not stir. Then the British regiments, with singular intelligence -and discipline, extricated themselves from their perilous situation. -Falling back slowly and stopping to fight whenever opportunity -offered, they retired down the ravine, tangled as it was with crags -and vineyards, in despite of their enemies; who were yet so fierce and -eager that even their horsemen rode amongst the inclosures, striking at -the soldiers as they mounted the walls or scrambled over the rocks. - -Soon the retreating troops approached the river, and the ground became -more open, but the left wing, hardest pressed and having the shortest -distance, arrived while the bridge was crowded with artillery and -cavalry, and the right was still distant! Major M‘Leod of the 43rd -instantly rallied four companies of his regiment on a hill to cover -the line of passage, he was joined by some riflemen, and at the same -time the brigade-major Rowan[10] posted two companies on another hill -to the left, flanking the road: these posts were maintained while the -right wing was filing over the river, yet the French gathering in -great numbers made a rush, forcing the British companies back before -the bridge was cleared, and when part of the 52nd was still distant -from it. Very imminent was the danger, but M‘Leod, a young man endowed -with a natural genius for war, turned his horse, called on the troops -to follow, waved his cap, and rode with a shout towards the enemy, -on whom the suddenness of the thing and the animating gesture of the -man produced the effect designed, for the soldiers rushed after him, -cheering and charging as if a whole army had been at their backs: the -enemy’s skirmishers not comprehending this stopped short, and before -their surprise was over the 52nd passed the river, and M‘Leod followed -at speed: it was a fine exploit! - -As the infantry passed the bridge they planted themselves in loose -order on the side of the mountain, the artillery went to the summit, -and the cavalry observed the roads to the right; this disposition -was made to watch some upper fords two miles off, and the bridge of -Castello Bom; for it was to be apprehended that while Ney attacked in -front, other troops might pass by those fords and bridge of Castello -Bom and so cut off the division from the army: the river was however -rising fast with the rain, and it was impossible to retreat farther -until nightfall. - -Soon the French skirmishers opened a biting fire across the water: -it was returned as bitterly; the artillery on both sides played -vigorously, the sounds were repeated by numberless echoes, and the -smoke slowly rising, resolved itself into an immense arch, spanning -the whole gulf and sparkling with the whirling fuzes of the flying -shells. Fast and thickly the French gathered behind the high rocks, and -a dragoon was seen to try the depth of the upper stream above, but two -shots from the 52nd killed horse and man, and the carcasses floating -down between the contending forces intimated that the river was -impassable save by the bridge. Then the monotonous tones of a French -drum were heard, the head of a noble column darkened the long narrow -bridge, a drummer and an officer, the last in a splendid uniform, -leaped together to the front and the whole rushed on with loud cries. -The depth of the ravine so deceived the English soldiers’ aim at first, -that two-thirds of the passage was won ere a shot had brought down -an enemy; yet a few paces onwards the line of death was traced, and -the whole of the leading French section fell as one man; the gallant -column still pressed forward, but none could pass that terrible line, -and the killed and wounded rolled together until the heap rose nearly -even with the parapet, while the living mass behind them melted away -rather than gave back. - -The shouts of the British now rose loudly, yet they were confidently -answered, and in half an hour another column, more numerous than the -first, again crowded the bridge: this time the range was far better -judged, and ere half the passage was gained the multitude was again -torn, shattered, dispersed or slain: only ten or twelve men crossed to -take shelter under the rocks at the brink of the river. The skirmishing -was then renewed, yet a French surgeon, coming to the very foot of the -bridge, waved a handkerchief and commenced dressing the wounded under -the hottest fire; nor was the brave man’s touching appeal unheeded, -every musket turned from him, although his still undaunted countrymen -were preparing for a third attempt, a last effort, which was made -indeed, yet with fewer numbers and less energy, for the impossibility -of forcing the passage was become apparent. The combat was however -continued. By the French as a point of honour, to cover the escape -of those who had passed the bridge; by the English from ignorance -of their object. One of the enemy’s guns was dismantled, a field -magazine exploded, and many continued to fall on both sides until -about four o’clock, when torrents of rain caused a momentary cessation -of fire, the men amongst the rocks then escaped to their own side, -the fight ceased and Craufurd retired in the night behind the Pinhel -river. Forty-four Portuguese, two hundred and seventy-two British, -including twenty-eight officers, were killed, wounded, or taken; and -it was at first supposed that half a company of the 52nd, posted in -the unfinished tower, were captured; but their officer, keeping close -until the night, had passed the enemy’s posts, and crossed the Coa. The -French lost above a thousand men, and the slaughter at the bridge was -fearful to behold. - -During the combat General Picton came up from Pinhel alone, and -Craufurd asked him for the support of the third division; he refused, -and they separated after a sharp altercation.[11] Picton was wrong, -for Craufurd’s situation was one of extreme danger; he could not then -retire, and Massena might, by the bridge of Castello Bom, have taken -the division in flank and destroyed it between the Coa and Pinhel -rivers. Picton and Craufurd were however not formed by nature to agree. -The stern countenance, robust frame, saturnine complexion, caustic -speech and austere demeanour of the first promised little sympathy -with the short thick figure, dark flashing eyes, quick movements -and fiery temper of the second: nor did they often meet without a -quarrel. Nevertheless, they had many points of resemblance in their -characters and fortunes. Both were harsh and rigid in command; both -prone to disobedience, yet exacting entire submission from inferiors; -alike ambitious and craving of glory, they were both enterprising, yet -neither was expert in handling troops under fire. After distinguished -services both perished in arms, and being celebrated as generals of -division while living, have been, since their deaths, injudiciously -spoken of as rivalling their great leader in war. - -That they were officers of mark and pretension is -unquestionable--Craufurd far more so than Picton, because the -latter never had a separate command and his opportunities were more -circumscribed--but to compare either to the Duke of Wellington displays -ignorance of the men and of the art they professed. If they had even -comprehended the profound military and political combinations he was -then conducting, the one would have carefully avoided fighting on the -Coa, and the other, far from refusing, would have eagerly proffered his -support. - - * * * * * - -Here some illustrations of the intelligence and the lofty spirit of -British soldiers will not be misplaced. - -When the last of the retreating troops had passed the bridge, an -Irishman of the 43rd, named Pigot, a bold turbulent fellow, leaned on -his firelock, regarded the advancing enemy for some time, and then in -the author’s hearing thus delivered his opinion of the action. - -“_General Craufurd wanted glory, so he stopped on the wrong side of the -river, and now he is knocked over to the right side. The French general -won’t be content until his men try to get on the wrong side also, and -then they will be knocked back. Well! both will claim a victory, which -is neither here nor there, but just in the middle of the river. That’s -glory!_” Then firing his musket he fell into the ranks. Even to the -letter was his prediction verified, for General Craufurd published a -contradiction of Massena’s dispatch. - -This sarcasm was enforced by one of a tragic nature. There was a -fellow-soldier to Pigot, a north of Ireland man, named Stewart but -jocularly called the _Boy_ because of his youth, being only nineteen, -and of his gigantic stature and strength. He had fought bravely and -displayed great intelligence beyond the river, and was one of the last -men who came down to the bridge, but he would not pass. Turning round, -he regarded the French with a grim look, and spoke aloud as follows. -“_So! This is the end of our boasting. This is our first battle and -we retreat! The boy Stewart will not live to hear that said._” Then -striding forward in his giant might he fell furiously on the nearest -enemies with the bayonet, refused the quarter they seemed desirous of -granting, and died fighting in the midst of them! - -Still more touching, more noble, more heroic was the death of Sergeant -Robert M‘Quade. During M‘Leod’s rush this man, also from the north of -Ireland, saw two Frenchmen level their muskets on rests against a high -gap in a bank, awaiting the uprise of an enemy; the present Sir George -Brown, then a lad of sixteen, attempted to ascend at the fatal point, -but M‘Quade, himself only twenty-four years of age, pulled him back, -saying with a calm decided tone “_You are too young Sir to be killed_,” -and then offering his own person to the fire fell dead, pierced with -both balls! - - -BATTLE OF BUSACO. (Sept. 1810.) - -Soon after Craufurd’s combat, Almeida was betrayed by some Portuguese -officers, and Massena, who had previously menaced both lines of -invasion, adopted that of the Mondego. This river, flowing between -the Estrella mountain and the Sierra de Caramula, is separated by the -latter from the coast, along which the Royal road runs from Oporto to -Lisbon. The roads on each side of the river were very rugged, and at -the southern end of the valley crossed by two mountain ridges, namely, -the Sierra de Murcella on the left bank, the Sierra de Busaco on the -right bank. Wellington had prepared the former for battle, and General -Hill was coming to it by the military road, but Massena, aware of its -strength, crossed to the right of the Mondego, and moved by Viseu, to -turn Wellington’s flank and surprise Coimbra; he however knew nothing -of Busaco, which covered that city, and so fell into the worst road and -lost two days waiting for his artillery. Meanwhile his adversary also -passed the Mondego, and sending troops to the front broke the bridges -on the Criz and Dão, mountain torrents crossing the French line of -march. - -Coimbra could not then be surprised, yet Massena could from Viseu -gain the Royal coast-road and so reach Coimbra, turning the Busaco -position; he could also repass the Mondego and assail the Murcella; -wherefore the allied army was necessarily scattered. Hill had by forced -marches reached the Murcella; Spencer was detached to watch the Royal -coast-road; the light division, Pack’s Portuguese, and the cavalry, -were in observation on the Viseu road; the remainder of the army was -in reserve at the fords of the Mondego, to act on either side. In this -state of affairs happened a strange incident. The light division had -established its bivouac towards evening in a pine-wood, but a peasant -advised a removal, saying it was known as the Devil’s wood, that an -evil influence reigned, and no person who slept there had ever escaped -it. He was laughed at, yet he did not fable. In the night all the -troops, men and officers, seized as it were with sudden frenzy, started -from sleep and dispersed in all directions: nor was their strange -terror allayed until voices were heard crying out that the enemy’s -cavalry were amongst them, when the soldiers mechanically ran together -and the illusion was dissipated. - -After some delay Massena moved down the Mondego and Busaco was then -occupied by the English general. His line was eight miles long, flanked -on the right by the river, and on the left connected with the Caramula -by ridges and ravines impervious to an army. A road along the crest -furnished easy communication, and the ford of Pena Cova, behind the -right, gave direct access to the Murcella ridge. Rugged and steep the -face of Busaco was, yet the summit had space for the action of a few -cavalry and salient points gave play to the artillery, while the -counter-ridge offered no facility to the enemy’s guns. When it was -first adopted some generals expressed a fear that the Prince of Essling -would not attack--“_But if he does I shall beat him_” was Wellington’s -reply: he knew his obstinate character. - -Massena had three army corps, Ney’s, Junot’s, and Reynier’s, with a -division of heavy cavalry under Montbrun; and as he knew nothing of -the Torres Vedras lines, and despised the Portuguese, he was convinced -the English would retreat and embark. A great general in dangerous -conjunctures, he was here, from age and satisfied ambition, negligent, -dilatory, and misled by some Portuguese noblemen in his camp. Instead -of marching with his whole army compact for battle he retained Junot -and Montbrun in the rear, while Ney and Reynier, restoring the bridges -over the Criz, drove the English cavalry into the hills, forced back -the light division with a sharp fight, and crowned the counter-ridges -in front of Busaco. - -Ney seeing that Busaco was a crested mountain and could not hide -strong reserves, that it was only half-occupied and the troops were -moving about in the disorder of first taking up unknown ground, wished -to attack at once; but Massena was ten miles in rear, and an officer -sent to ask his assent was kept two hours without an audience and -then sent back with an order to await the prince’s arrival.[12] A -great opportunity was thus lost, for Spencer had not then come in, -Leith was only passing the Mondego, Hill was on the Murcella, scarcely -twenty-five thousand men were in line, and there was unavoidable -confusion and great intervals between the divisions. - -Ney and Reynier wrote in the night to Massena, advising an attack at -daybreak, yet he did not come up until midday with Junot’s corps and -the cavalry, and then proceeded leisurely to examine the position. It -was now completely manned. Hill had the extreme right, Leith was next -in line, Picton next to Leith. Spencer’s division and a regiment of -dragoons were on the highest crest in reserve, having on their left -the convent of Busaco. In front of Spencer a Portuguese division -was posted half-way down the mountain, and on his left, in front of -the convent, was the light division, supported by a German brigade -and the 19th Portuguese Regiment. Cole’s division closed the extreme -left, on a line with the light division and covered, flank and front, -by impassable ravines. There were long intervals in the line, but the -spaces between were unassailable, artillery was disposed on all the -salient points, skirmishers covered all the accessible ground, and so -formidable did the position appear that Ney now strongly objected to an -attack. Reynier however, a presumptuous man, advised one, and Massena -made dispositions for the next morning. - -His ground did not permit any broad front of attack, and two points -were chosen. Reynier was to fall on Picton; Ney was to assail the -light division. These attacks, governed by the roads, were about three -miles asunder, and as Junot’s corps and Montbrun’s cavalry were held -in reserve, only forty thousand men were employed to storm a mountain -on which sixty thousand enemies were posted; yet the latter, from the -extent of their ground and the impossibility of making any counter -attack, were the weakest at the decisive points. - -The light division was on a spur, or rather brow of ground, overhanging -a ravine so deep that the eye could scarcely discern troops at the -bottom, yet so narrow that the French twelve-pounders ranged across. -Into the lowest parts of this ravine their light troops towards dusk -dropped by twos and threes, and endeavoured to steal up the wooded -dells and hollows, close to the picquets of the division; they were -vigorously checked, yet similar attempts at different points kept the -troops watchful, and indeed none but veterans tired of war could have -slept beneath that serene sky, glittering with stars above, while the -dark mountains were crowned with innumerable fires, around which more -than a hundred thousand brave men were gathered. - -Before daybreak on the 27th, five columns of attack were in motion, and -Reynier’s troops, having comparatively easier ground, were in the midst -of the picquets and skirmishers of Picton’s division almost as soon -as they could be perceived; the resistance was vigorous and six guns -played along the ascent with grape, yet in half an hour the French were -close to the summit of the mountain, with such astonishing power and -resolution did they overthrow everything that opposed their progress! -The right of the third division was forced back, the 8th Portuguese -Regiment broken, the highest part of the crest was gained between -Picton and Leith, and the leading battalions established themselves -amongst some crowning rocks, while a following mass wheeled to the -right, designing to sweep the summit of the sierra. Lord Wellington -immediately opened two guns loaded with grape upon their flank, a heavy -musketry was poured into their front, and the 88th Regiment, joined -by a wing of the 45th, charged furiously; fresh men could not have -withstood that terrible shock; the French, exhausted by their efforts, -opposed only a straggling fire, and both parties went mingling together -down the mountain side with a mighty clamour and confusion, their track -strewed with the dead and dying even to the bottom of the valley. - -Meanwhile the battalions which had first gained the crest formed to -their left, resting their right on a precipice overhanging the reverse -side of the sierra: the position was thus won if any reserve had -been at hand; for the greatest part of Picton’s troops were engaged -elsewhere, and some of the French skirmishers actually descended the -back of the ridge. A misty cloud capped the summit, and this hostile -mass, ensconced amongst the rocks, could not be seen except by Leith; -but that officer had put a brigade in motion when he first perceived -the vigorous impression made on Picton, and though two miles of rugged -ground were to be passed on a narrow front before it could mingle -in the fight, it was coming on rapidly; the Royals were in reserve, -the 38th were seeking to turn the enemy’s right, and the 9th, under -Colonel Cameron, menaced his front: the precipice stopped the 38th, -but Cameron, hearing from a staff-officer how critical was the affair, -formed line under a violent fire, and without returning a shot run -in upon the French grenadiers and drove them from the rocks with -irresistible bravery; then he plied them with a destructive musketry as -long as they could be reached, yet with excellent discipline refrained -from pursuit lest the crest of the position should be again lost; for -the mountain was rugged, and to judge the general state of the action -difficult. Hill however now edged in towards the scene of action, -Leith’s second brigade joined the first, and a great mass of fresh -troops was thus concentrated, while Reynier had neither reserves nor -guns to restore the fight. - -Ney’s attack had as little success. From the mountain-spur where the -light division stood the bottom of the valley could be discerned, the -ascent was much steeper than where Reynier had attacked, and Craufurd -in a happy mood of command made masterly dispositions. The platform -which he held was scooped so as to conceal the 43rd and 52nd Regiments, -though in line, and hence the German infantry who were behind them, -being on higher ground, appeared the only solid force for resistance. -Some rocks overhanging the descent furnished natural embrasures, in -which the divisional guns were placed, and the riflemen and Portuguese -caçadores, planted as skirmishers, covered the slope of the mountain. - -While it was still dark a straggling musketry was heard in the deep -ravine, and when light broke, three heavy masses, entering the woods -below, threw forward a swarm of light troops. One column, under General -Marchand, on emerging from the dark chasm, turned to its left, and -seemed intent to turn the right of the division; a second under Loison -made straight up the face of the mountain by a road leading to the -convent; the third remained in reserve. General Simon’s brigade was at -the head of Loison’s attack, and it ascended with a wonderful alacrity; -for though the skirmishers plied it unceasingly with musketry, and the -artillery bullets swept through it from front to rear, its order was -not disturbed, nor its speed abated. The English guns were worked with -great rapidity, yet their range was contracted every round, the enemy’s -musket-balls came singing up in a sharper key, and soon the British -skirmishers, breathless and begrimed with powder, rushed over the edge -of the ascent--the artillery then drew back, and the victorious cries -of the French were heard within a few yards of the summit. - -Craufurd, standing alone on one of the rocks, had silently watched the -attack, but now, with a quick shrill cry, called on the two regiments -to charge! Then a horrid shout startled the French column, and eighteen -hundred British bayonets went sparkling over the brow of the hill: yet -so sternly resolute, so hardy was the enemy, that each man of the first -section raised his musket, and two officers with ten soldiers of the -52nd fell before them--not a Frenchman had missed his mark! They could -do no more: the head of their column was violently thrown back upon the -rear, both flanks were overlapped, three terrible discharges at five -yards’ distance shattered the wavering mass, and a long trail of broken -arms and bleeding carcasses marked the line of flight. The main body of -the British stood fast, but some companies followed down the mountain, -whereupon Ney threw forward his reserved division, and opening his guns -from the opposite heights, killed some of the pursuers: thus warned, -they recovered their own ground, and the Germans were brought forward -to skirmish: meanwhile a small flanking detachment had passed round the -right, and rising near the convent, was defeated by the 19th Portuguese -Regiment under Colonel M‘Bean. - -Loison did not renew the fight, but Marchand, having gained a pine-wood -half-way up the mountain, on the right of the light division, sent -a cloud of skirmishers up from thence about the time General Simon -was beaten: the ascent was however so steep that Pack’s Portuguese -sufficed to hold them in check, and higher up Spencer showed his line -of foot-guards in support; Craufurd’s artillery also smote Marchand’s -people in the pine-wood; and Ney, who was there in person, after -sustaining this murderous cannonade for an hour relinquished that -attack. The desultory fighting of light troops then ceased, and before -two o’clock parties from both armies were, under a momentary truce, -amicably mixed searching for wounded men. - -Towards evening a French company with signal audacity seized a village -half musket-shot from the light division, and refused to retire; -whereupon Craufurd, turning twelve guns on the houses, overwhelmed them -with bullets; but after paying the French captain this distinguished -honour, recovering his temper, he sent a company of the 43rd down, -which cleared the village in a few minutes. Meanwhile an affecting -incident, contrasting strongly with the savage character of the -preceding events, added to the interest of the day. A poor orphan -Portuguese girl, seventeen years of age and very handsome, was seen -coming down the mountain, driving an ass loaded with all her property -through the midst of the French army. She had abandoned her dwelling -in obedience to the proclamation, and now passed over the field of -battle with a childish simplicity, totally unconscious of her perilous -situation, and scarcely understanding which were the hostile and which -the friendly troops, for no man on either side was so brutal as to -molest her. - -This battle was fought unnecessarily by Massena, and by Wellington -reluctantly, being forced thereto from the misconduct of the Portuguese -government. It was however entirely to the disadvantage of the French, -who had a general and eight hundred men killed, two generals wounded, -and one, Simon, made prisoner. Their whole loss may be estimated at -four thousand five hundred men, while that of the allies did not exceed -thirteen hundred. - -Massena now judged Busaco impregnable, and as it could not be turned -by the Mondego, because the allies might pass that river on a shorter -line, it was proposed in council to return to Spain; but at that moment -a peasant told him of a road leading over the Caramula and he resolved -to turn the allies’ left. To mask this movement the skirmishing was -renewed on the 28th so warmly that a general battle was expected; yet -an ostentatious display of men, the disappearance of baggage, and the -casting up of earth indicated some other design. In the evening, the -French infantry were sensibly diminished, the cavalry was descried -winding over the distant mountains towards the allies’ left, and the -project was then apparent. Wellington arrived from the right, and -observed the distant columns for some time with great earnestness; he -seemed uneasy, his countenance bore a fierce and angry expression, and -suddenly mounting his horse he rode off without speaking--one hour -later and the army was in movement to abandon Busaco, for Massena had -threaded the defiles of the Caramula and was marching upon Coimbra. - -Wellington’s plan was to lay the country waste before the enemy, but -only the richest inhabitants had quitted Coimbra; that city was still -populous when the enemy’s approach left no choice but to fly or risk -the punishment of death and infamy announced for remaining: then a -scene of distress ensued that the most hardened could not behold -without emotion. Mothers with children of all ages, the sick, the old, -the bedridden, and even lunatics, went or were carried forth, the most -part with little hope and less help, to journey for days in company -with contending armies. Fortunately for this unhappy multitude the -weather was fine and the roads firm, or the greatest number must have -perished in the most deplorable manner: but all this misery was of no -avail, for though the people fled, the provisions were left and the -mills were but partially and imperfectly ruined. - -On the 1st of October, the allied outposts were driven from a hill -north of Coimbra, and the French horsemen entered a plain, where they -suffered some loss from a cannonade. The British cavalry were there -drawn up on open ground in opposition, and as the disparity of numbers -was not very great, the opportunity seemed fair for a good stroke; -yet they withdrew across the Mondego, and so unskilfully that some of -the hindmost were cut down in the middle of the river, and the French -were only prevented from forcing the passage of the ford by a strong -skirmish in which fifty or sixty men fell. - -This untoward fight compelled the light division to march hastily -through the city to gain the defile of Condeixa, which commenced at the -end of the bridge; all the inhabitants who had not before quitted the -place then rushed out with what could be caught up in hand, driving -animals loaded with sick people and children on to the bridge, where -the press became so great the troops halted. This stoppage was close -to the prison, from whence the jailer had fled with the keys, and the -prisoners, crowding to the windows, strived to tear the bars off with -their hands, and even with their teeth, bellowing in the most frantic -manner. Then the bitter lamentations of the multitude increased, -and the pistol-shots of the cavalry engaged at the ford below were -distinctly heard; it was a shocking scene; but William Campbell, a -staff officer of heroic strength and temper, broke the prison doors -and freed the wretched inmates. The troops now forced a way over the -bridge, yet at the other end, the defile was cut through high rocks, -and so crowded that no passage could be made, and a troop of French -dragoons, having passed an unwatched ford, hovered close to the flank: -one regiment of infantry could have destroyed the whole division, -wedged as it was in a hollow way, unable to retreat, advance, or break -out on either side. - -Three days Massena halted at Coimbra, the fourth he advanced, leaving -behind his sick and wounded with a garrison, in all five thousand men, -who were suddenly captured four days later by a small militia force -under Colonel Trant! This “_heavy blow and great discouragement_”[13] -did not stop the French prince, and during his pursuit thirty-six -French squadrons fell on ten British squadrons, but in a severe fight -did not gain five miles in as many hours; yet a few days after his -cavalry had the advantage in a greater action, and finally the allies -entered the lines of Torres Vedras, the existence of which was first -made known to Massena by the bar they offered! Several skirmishes, in -which the English general Harvey was wounded and the French general St. -Croix killed, were necessary to convince him they could not be stormed; -but though he was without magazines, he continued to hold his menacing -position until the country behind him was a desert: then falling back -two marches, he took a defensive position at Santarem, and was in turn -blockaded by Lord Wellington. - - - - -BOOK IV. - - Matagorda--Battle of Barosa--Massena’s Retreat--Combat of - Redinha--Cazal Nova--Foz d’Aronce--Sabugal--Fuentes Onoro--Battle - of Fuentes Onoro--Evacuation of Almeida. - - -MATAGORDA. (March, 1811.) - -Before Massena invaded Portugal king Joseph had subdued Andalusia, -except the Isla de Leon where Cadiz stands. He left Soult in that -province with a large army, of which a part under Sebastiani held -Granada, while another part under Victor blockaded the Isla with -immense works; the remainder, under Soult in person, formed a -field-force to war against insurrections and the numerous Spanish -troops, which in separate bodies acted against him. The Spaniards, -after long demurring, admitted an auxiliary British and Portuguese -force into Cadiz, under General Graham,[14] whose arrival was -signalized by the cannonade of Matagorda. This small fort, without -ditch or bomb-proof, was held for fifty-four days by a garrison of -seamen and soldiers, under Captain M‘Lean,[15] close to the French -lines at the Trocadero. A Spanish seventy-four, and a flotilla, had -co-operated in the resistance until daybreak on the 21st of March, but -then a hissing shower of heated shot made them cut their cables and -run under the works of Cadiz, while the fire of forty-eight guns and -mortars of the largest size, was turned upon the fort, whose feeble -parapet vanished before that crashing flight of metal, leaving only the -naked rampart and undaunted hearts of the garrison for defence. The men -fell fast, and the enemy shot so quick and close, that a staff bearing -the Spanish flag was broken six times in an hour; the colours were then -fastened to the angle of the work itself, but unwillingly by the men, -especially the sailors, all calling out to hoist the British ensign, -and attributing the slaughter to their fighting under a foreign flag! - -Thirty hours this tempest lasted, and sixty-four men out of one -hundred and forty had fallen, when Graham, finding a diversion he had -projected impracticable, sent boats to carry off the survivors. With -these boats went Major Lefebre, an engineer of great promise, but to -fall there, the last man whose blood wetted the ruins thus abandoned: -and here be recorded an action of which it is difficult to say whether -it were most feminine or heroic. A sergeant’s wife, named Retson, was -in a casemate with wounded men, when a young drummer was ordered to -fetch water from the well of the fort; seeing the child hesitate, she -snatched the vessel from him, braved the terrible cannonade, and when a -shot cut the bucket-cord from her hand, recovered it and fulfilled her -mission. - - -BATTLE OF BAROSA. (March, 1811.) - -After Matagorda was abandoned, the Spaniards in Cadiz became so -apathetic that General Graham bitterly said of them “_They wished the -English would drive away the French, that they might eat strawberries -at Chiclana_.” However, in December, Soult was ordered to co-operate -with Massena, and when his departure was known in January, 1811, -Victor’s force being then weak, Graham undertook, in concert with La -Peña, captain-general at the Isla, to raise the blockade by a maritime -expedition. Contrary winds baffled this project, and in February -Victor was reinforced; nevertheless ten thousand infantry and six -hundred cavalry were again embarked, being to land at Tarifa, march -upon Chiclana, and take the French lines in reverse. Meanwhile General -Zayas, who remained with the Spanish forces left in the Isla, was to -cast a bridge near the sea-mouth of the Santi Petri, a ship-canal -joining the harbour to the sea and cutting off the Isla from the -continent; Ballesteros was to menace Seville; the Partidas were to keep -Sebastiani in check, and insurrections were expected in all quarters. - -The British troops, passing their port in a gale the 22nd, landed at -Algesiras and marched to Tarifa, being there joined by the garrison. -Somewhat more than four thousand men, including two companies of the -20th Portuguese, and one hundred and eighty German hussars, were thus -assembled under Graham, good and hardy troops, and himself a daring -old man of a ready temper for battle. La Peña arrived the 27th with -the Spanish contingent, and Graham, to preserve unanimity, ceded the -command, although contrary to his instructions. Next day the whole -moved forward twelve miles, passing some ridges, which, descending -from the Ronda to the sea, separate the plains of San Roque from those -of Medina and Chiclana. The troops were then reorganized. General -Lardizabal had the vanguard, the Prince of Anglona the centre; the -reserve, of two Spanish regiments and the British troops, was confided -to Graham, and the cavalry of both nations was given to Colonel -Whittingham, an English officer in the Spanish service. - -At this time a French covering division, under General Cassagne, was at -Medina, with outposts at Vejer de la Frontera and Casa Vieja. La Peña -stormed the last the 2nd of March, and then General Beguines, coming -from San Roque, augmented his force to twelve thousand infantry, eight -hundred horsemen, and twenty-four guns. The 3rd, hearing Medina was -intrenched, he turned towards the coast and drove the French from Vejer -de la Frontera. In the night of the 4th he continued his movement, and -on the morning of the 5th, after a skirmish, in which his advanced -guard of cavalry was routed by a French squadron, he reached the Cerro -de Puerco, called by the English the heights of Barosa, four miles from -the sea-mouth of the Santi Petri. - -This Barosa ridge, creeping in from the coast for a mile and a half, -overlooked a broken plain, which was bounded on the left by the -coast cliffs, on the right by the forest of Chiclana, in front by a -pine-wood, beyond which rose a long narrow height called the Bermeja, -to be reached by moving through the pine-wood, or by the beach under -the cliffs. Graham, foreseeing Victor would come out of his lines -to fight, had previously obtained La Peña’s promise to make short -marches, and not approach the enemy except in a mass. In violation of -this promise the march from Casa Vieja had been one of fifteen hours -on bad roads, and the night march to Barosa was still more fatiguing. -The troops therefore straggled, and before all had arrived, La Peña, -as if in contempt of his colleague, neither disclosing his own plans -nor communicating by signal or otherwise with Zayas, sent Lardizabal -straight to the mouth of the Santi Petri. Zayas had there cast his -bridge on the 2nd, but he was surprised in the night and driven into -the Isla; Lardizabal had therefore to win his way with a sharp fight, -in which three hundred Spaniards fell, yet he forced the French posts -and effected a junction. - -La Peña directed Graham to follow the vanguard, but the latter desired -to hold Barosa, arguing justly that Victor could not attack Lardizabal -and Zayas, as no general would lend his flank to an enemy by assailing -the Bermeja while Barosa was occupied: Lascy, chief of the Spanish -staff, controverted this, and La Peña peremptorily commanded Graham to -march. With great temper he obeyed this discourteous order, leaving -only the flank companies of the 9th and 82nd regiments under Major -Brown to guard his baggage. He moved however in the persuasion that La -Peña would remain at Barosa with Anglona’s division and the cavalry, -because a Spanish column was still behind near Medina: yet scarcely had -he entered the pine-wood when La Peña carried off the corps of battle -and the cavalry by the sea-road to Santi Petri, leaving Barosa crowded -with baggage and protected only by a rear-guard of four guns and five -battalions. - -During these events Victor kept close in the forest of Chiclana, the -patrols could find no enemy, and Graham’s march of only two miles -seemed safe--but the French marshal was keenly watching the movement. -He had recalled Cassagne from Medina when La Peña first reached Barosa -and hourly expected his arrival; yet he felt so sure of success, as -to direct most of his cavalry, then at Medina and Arcos, upon Vejer -and other points to cut off the fugitives after the battle. He had -in hand fourteen pieces of artillery and nine thousand excellent -soldiers, commanded by Laval, Ruffin, and Villatte. From this force -he drafted three grenadier battalions as reserves, two of which and -three squadrons of cavalry he attached to Ruffin, the other to Laval. -Villatte with two thousand five hundred men, originally on the Bermeja, -now covered the works of the camp against Zayas and Lardizabal; but -Cassagne was still distant when Victor, seeing Graham in the pine-wood, -Zayas and Lardizabal on the Bermeja, a third body and the baggage on -the Barosa height, a fourth in movement by the coast, a fifth still -on the march from Vejer, poured at once into the plain and began the -battle. Laval confronted the British force, while Victor, leading -Ruffin’s men in person, ascended the rear of the Barosa height, and -having thus intercepted the Spanish column on the Medina road, drove -the rear-guard off the hill towards the sea, dispersed the baggage and -followers, and took three Spanish guns. - -Major Brown, who had kept his troops in good order, being unable to -stem the torrent, slowly retired into the plain and sent for orders to -Graham, who was then near Bermeja. Fight! was the laconic answer, and -facing about himself he regained the open plain, expecting to find La -Peña and the cavalry on the Barosa hill. But when the view opened, he -beheld Ruffin’s brigade, flanked by the two grenadier battalions, near -the summit on the one side, the Spanish rear-guard and the baggage -flying towards the sea on the other, the French cavalry following the -fugitives in good order, Laval close upon his own left flank, and La -Peña nowhere! - -In this desperate situation, feeling that a retreat upon Bermeja would -bring the enemy pell-mell with the allies on to that narrow ridge and -be disastrous, he resolved to make a counter-attack, although the key -of the battle-field was already in the enemy’s possession. Ten guns -under Major Duncan instantly opened a terrific fire against Laval’s -column, and Colonel Andrew Barnard[16] running vehemently out with his -riflemen and some Portuguese companies, commenced the fight; the rest -of the troops, without attention to regiments or brigades, so sudden -was the affair, formed two masses, with one of which General Dilkes -marched against Ruffin while Colonel Wheatley led the other against -Laval. Duncan’s guns ravaged the French ranks, Laval’s artillery -replied vigorously, Ruffin’s batteries took Wheatley’s column in flank, -and the infantry on both sides closed eagerly and with a pealing -musketry; but soon a fierce, rapid and prolonged charge of the 87th -Regiment overthrew the first line of the French, and though the latter -fought roughly, they were dashed so violently upon the second line that -both were broken by the shock and went off, their retreat being covered -by the reserve battalion of grenadiers. - -Meanwhile Graham’s Spartan order had sent Brown headlong upon Ruffin, -and though nearly half his detachment went down under the first fire, -he maintained the fight until Dilkes’ column, having crossed a deep -hollow, came up, with little order indeed but in a fighting mood. Then -the whole ran up towards the summit, and there was no slackness, for -at the very edge of the ascent their gallant opponents met them and a -dreadful and for some time a doubtful combat raged; but soon Ruffin, -and Chaudron Rousseau who commanded the chosen grenadiers fell, both -mortally wounded, the English bore strongly onward, and their incessant -slaughtering fire forced the French from the hill with the loss of -three guns and many brave soldiers. All the discomfited divisions then -retired concentrically from their different points, and thus meeting, -with infinite spirit endeavoured to renew the action, but the play of -Duncan’s guns, close, rapid and murderous, rendered the attempt vain: -Victor quitted the field, and the British, who had been twenty-four -hours under arms without food, were too exhausted to pursue. - -While these terrible combats of infantry were being fought, La Peña -looked idly on, giving no aid, not even menacing Villatte who was close -to him and comparatively weak. The Spanish Walloon guards, the regiment -of Ciudad Real, and some Guerilla cavalry, turning without orders, came -up indeed just as the action ceased, and it was expected that Colonel -Whittingham, an Englishman commanding a strong body of Spanish horse, -would have done as much; yet no stroke of a Spanish sabre was that day -given, though the French cavalry did not exceed two hundred and fifty -men, and the eight hundred under Whittingham would have rendered the -defeat ruinous. So certain was this, that Frederick Ponsonby, drawing -off his hundred and eighty German hussars, reached the field of battle, -charged the French squadrons in their retreat, overthrew them, took -two guns, and even attempted though vainly to sabre Rousseau’s chosen -grenadiers. Such was the fight of Barosa. Short, for it lasted only -one hour and a half; violent and bloody, for fifty officers, sixty -sergeants, eleven hundred British soldiers, and more than two thousand -French were killed and wounded; and six guns, an eagle, two generals, -both mortally wounded, with four hundred other prisoners fell into the -hands of the victors. - -Graham remained several hours on the height, still hoping La Peña -would awake to the prospect of success and glory which the extreme -valour of the British had opened. Four thousand fresh men and a -powerful artillery had come over the Santi Petri; he had therefore -twelve thousand infantry and eight hundred cavalry, while before him -were only the remains of the French line of battle, retreating in the -greatest disorder upon Chiclana; but military spirit was extinct with -the Spaniard, Graham could no longer endure his command and leaving the -dastard on the Bermeja filed the British troops into the Isla. - - -MASSENA’S RETREAT. (March, 1811.) - -Soon after the Barosa fight, Wellington and Massena were again pitted -in attack and defence. Massena had kept Santarem until the 6th of -March expecting Soult’s co-operation, yet retreated when that marshal -after defeating twenty thousand Spaniards on the Gebora, and taking -Olivenza, Badajos, Albuquerque and Campo Mayor, was coming to his -aid; of this however he was ignorant, because Wellington’s forces on -the south bank of the Tagus had intercepted all communication. Hence -when Soult was invading Portugal on one side of that river, Massena -abandoned the other side and was pursued by the allied army. He left -however a desert behind him, and soon a horrible spectacle disclosed -all the previous misery of the inhabitants. In the hills was found a -house where thirty women and children were lying dead from hunger, -and sitting by the bodies fifteen or sixteen living beings--only one -a man--so enfeebled by want they could not devour the food offered to -them. All the children were dead; none were emaciated, but the muscles -of their faces were invariably dragged transversely, as if laughing, -and unimaginably ghastly. The man was most eager for life, the women -patient and resigned, and they had carefully covered and laid out the -dead! A field of battle strewed with bloody carcasses would have been a -solacing sight by comparison! - -Strong positions crossed Massena’s line of retreat, which was confined -by mountains, every village being a defile; and Ney, governing the -rear-guard, lost no advantage. He was driven by the light division with -a sharp skirmish from Pombal the 10th, but on the 11th he offered -battle at Redinha with five thousand infantry, some cavalry and guns; -his wings were covered by pine-woods which, hanging on the brow of the -table-land he occupied, were filled with light troops; the deep bed of -the Soure protected his right, his left rested on the Redinha, which -flowed also round his rear; behind his centre the village of Redinha, -lying in a hollow, masked a narrow bridge, and on a rugged height -beyond a reserve was so posted as to seem a great force. - - -COMBAT OF REDINHA. (March, 1811.) - -The light division under Sir William Erskine soon won the wooded slopes -covering Ney’s right, and the skirmishers pushed into the open plain, -but were there checked by a heavy rolling fire, and a squadron of -hussars, charging, took fourteen prisoners. Erskine then formed his -line, which, outflanking the French right, was reinforced with two -regiments of dragoons. Picton had also seized the wood covering the -French left, and Ney’s position was laid bare; but he, observing that -Wellington, deceived by the reserve beyond the bridge, was bringing all -the allied troops into line, would not retire; he even charged Picton’s -skirmishers and held his ground, though the third division was nearer -to the bridge than his right, and there were troops and guns enough -on the plain to overwhelm him. In this posture both sides remained -an hour, but then three cannon-shots fired from the British centre, -gave the signal for a splendid spectacle of war. The woods seemed -alive with troops, and suddenly thirty thousand men, presenting three -gorgeous lines of battle, were stretched across the plain, bending on a -gentle curve and moving majestically onwards, while horsemen and guns, -springing simultaneously from the centre and left, charged under a -general volley from the French battalions, who were thus covered with -smoke, and when that cleared away none were to be seen! Ney, keenly -watching the progress of this grand formation, had opposed Picton’s -skirmishers with his left, while he withdrew the rest of his people -so rapidly as to gain the village before even the cavalry could touch -him, the utmost efforts of the light troops and horse-artillery only -enabling them to gall the hindmost with fire. - -One howitzer was dismounted, but the village of Redinha was in flames -between it and the pursuers, and Ney in person carried off the injured -piece; yet with a loss of fifteen or twenty men and great danger to -himself; for the British guns were thundering on his rear, and the -light troops, chasing like heated bloodhounds, almost passed the river -with his men; his reserve beyond the bridge then opened a cannonade, -but fresh dispositions soon made it fall back ten miles. Twelve -officers and two hundred men were killed and wounded in this combat. -Ney lost as many, but he might have been destroyed, Wellington paid him -too much respect. - -Condeixa, where the French now took position, commanded two roads, one -behind their right leading to Coimbra; the other on their left, leading -to the Sierra de Murcella. The first offered the Mondego as a permanent -line of defence, with the power of seizing Oporto by a detachment. -The second presented only a rugged narrow line of retreat up the left -bank of the Mondego, and involved the evacuation of Portugal; for that -river was not fordable at the season and the Portuguese militia were in -force on the other side. Massena first detached Montbrun to ascertain -the state of Coimbra, which was really defenceless, yet Trant with -a few militia-men made such show of resistance that it was reported -inattackable; whereupon the French prince set fire to Condeixa and -adopted the position of Cazal Nova on the Murcella road: not however -without a skirmish in which he narrowly escaped capture. - -No orders were given in the night to attack, nevertheless, next -morning, although an impenetrable mist covered the French position and -the dull sound of a stirring multitude came from its depths, Sir W. -Erskine, with astounding indifference, and against the opinion of all -the officers about him, ordered the 52nd Regiment to plunge in column -of sections, without even an advanced guard, into the sea of fog below -him. The road dipped suddenly and the regiment was instantly lost in -the mist, which was so thick that, the troops, unconsciously passing -the enemy’s out-posts, nearly captured Ney, who slept with his pickets. -The rest of the division was about to descend into the same gulf, when -the rattling of musketry and the booming of round shot were heard, the -vapour rose slowly, and the 52nd was seen on the slopes of the opposite -mountain, closely engaged in the midst of an army! - - -COMBAT OF CAZAL NOVA. (March, 1811.) - -Wellington arrived. His design was to turn the French left, for their -front was strong, and they held mountain-ridges in succession to the -Deuca river and the defiles of Miranda de Corvo. He had sent Cole by -a circuit towards the sources of the Deuca and Ceira, Picton more -directly to menace the French flank, and the main body was coming up, -when Erskine forced the light division prematurely into action. Ney’s -ground was extensive, his skirmishers so thick and well supported, that -the light division offered only a thread of battle, closely engaged in -every part, without any reserve; nor could it then present an equal -front, until Picton sent some riflemen to prolong the line. Some -advantages were indeed gained, but the main position was not shaken, -until Picton near and Cole further off, had turned the left, and three -divisions, with the heavy cavalry and artillery, came up in the centre. -Then Ney, covering his rear with guns and light troops, retired from -ridge to ridge without confusion until midday, when the guns got within -range of his masses and his retreat became more rapid and less orderly, -yet he reached the strong pass of Miranda de Corvo, where Massena was -in position. The light division lost eleven officers and a hundred and -fifty men; the French loss was greater, and a hundred prisoners were -taken. - - -COMBAT OF FOZ D’ARONCE. (March, 1811.) - -Massena, fearing Cole would get in his rear, set fire to the town -of Miranda, crossed the Ceira in the night, and being then crowded -in a narrow way between the sierras and the Mondego, destroyed -ammunition and baggage, and directed Ney to cover the movement with a -few battalions, but charged him not to risk an action: Ney, however, -little regarding his orders, kept the left bank with ten or twelve -battalions, a brigade of cavalry and some guns, and thus provoked a -combat. His right was on rugged ground, his left at the village of Foz -d’Aronce; the weather was obscure and rainy, the allies did not come up -until evening, and little expecting an action kindled their fires; but -Wellington, suddenly directing the light division and Pack’s brigade to -hold the French right in check, sent the third division against their -left, and the horse-artillery on the gallop to rising ground, whence it -opened with a surprising effect. - -Ney’s left wing was soon overthrown by the third division, and fled -in such confusion towards the river that many men rushed into the -deeps and were drowned, while others madly crowding the bridge were -crushed to death. On the other flank the ground was so rough the action -resolved itself into a skirmish, and Ney sent some battalions to stop -the pursuit of his left; but then darkness fell and the French troops -in their disorder fired on each other. Four officers and sixty men fell -on the side of the British; the enemy lost above five hundred, one half -drowned, and an eagle was afterwards found in the bed of the river. -Massena retired in the night behind the Alva. Ney kept his post on the -Ceira until every encumbrance had passed, and then blowing up seventy -feet of the bridge, remained with a weak rear-guard. Wellington halted. - -Up to this point of the retreat the French prince had displayed -infinite ability, with a ruthless spirit. The burning of some towns -and villages protected his rear, but Leiria and the convent of -Alcobaça were off the line yet given to the flames by express orders -and in a spirit of vengeance. But every horror that could make war -hideous attended this retreat. Distress, conflagrations, death, in all -modes from wounds, from fatigue, from water, from the flames, from -starvation! On all sides unlimited violence, unlimited vengeance. -I myself saw a peasant hounding on his dog to devour the dead and -dying, and the spirit of cruelty smote even the brute creation; for -the French general, to lessen encumbrances, ordered beasts of burden -to be destroyed, and the inhuman fellow charged with the execution -hamstringed five hundred asses and left them to starve; they were so -found by the British, and the mute, sad, deep expression of pain and -grief visible in the poor creatures’ looks, excited a strange fury in -the soldiers: no quarter would have been given at that time: humane -feelings would have thus led direct to cruelty. But all passions are -akin to madness. - -From this quarter, Lord Wellington, who had before detached troops -with the same view, now sent Cole’s division to join Beresford in the -Alemtejo, where the latter had been left to oppose Soult’s progress. - - -COMBAT OF SABUGAL. (April, 1811.) - -The pursuit of Massena was soon resumed. He attempted to hold the -Guarda mountain on the flank of the Estrella, and being driven from -thence with the loss of three hundred prisoners descended the eastern -slopes to take a position behind the Coa. There being reinforced, he -disposed his troops on two sides of a triangle, the apex at Sabugal, -where Reynier commanded. Both wings were covered by the river, which -had a sharp bend at Sabugal, and the right had free communication with -Almeida, on which side the craggy ravine of the Coa forbade an attack. -Above Sabugal it was easier, and Wellington, after menacing the right -for two days, suddenly, at daybreak on the 3rd of April, sent Slade’s -cavalry and the light division to pass the upper stream by a wide -movement and penetrate between the left wing and centre of the French. -The third division moved at the same time to cross the river by a -closer movement, yet still above the bridge of Sabugal, which the fifth -division and the artillery were to force. Two other divisions were in -reserve, and it was hoped Reynier, whose main body was some distance -above bridge, would be thus turned surrounded and crushed before the -wings could succour him: one of those accidents so frequent in war -marred this well-concerted scheme. - -A thick fog prevented the troops gaining their points of attack -simultaneously, and Erskine took no heed to put the light division in -a right direction; his columns were not even held together, and he -carried off the cavalry without communicating with Colonel Beckwith, -who commanded his first brigade. That officer thus left without -instructions halted at a ford, until one of the general staff came -up and rudely asked why he did not attack; the thing appeared rash, -yet with an enemy in front, Beckwith could only reply by passing the -river, which was deep and rapid. A very steep wooded hill was on the -other side and four companies of riflemen ascended, followed by the -43rd Regiment, but the caçadores of the brigade had joined another -column which was passing the river higher up and moving independently -to the right, on the true point of direction. At this time very heavy -rain was falling, all was obscure, and none of the other divisions had -yet reached their respective posts; Beckwith’s attack was therefore -premature, partial, dangerous, and at the wrong point; for Reynier’s -whole corps was in front, and one bayonet-regiment, with four companies -of riflemen, were assailing more than twelve thousand infantry -supported by cavalry and artillery! - -Scarcely had the riflemen reached the top of the hill when a strong -body of French drove them back upon the 43rd, the weather cleared at -the instant, and Beckwith saw and felt all the danger, but his heart -was too big to quail. With one fierce charge he beat back the enemy, -and he gained, and kept the summit of the hill, although two French -howitzers poured showers of grape into his ranks, while a fresh force -came against his front, and considerable bodies advanced on either -flank. Fortunately, Reynier, little expecting to be attacked, had for -the convenience of water placed his main body in low ground behind the -height on which the action commenced; his renewed attack was therefore -up-hill, yet his musketry, heavy from the beginning, soon increased -to a storm, and his men sprung up the acclivity with such a violence -and clamour it was evident that desperate fighting only could save the -British from destruction, and they fought accordingly. - -Captain Hopkins, commanding a flank company of the 43rd, running out -to the right, with admirable presence of mind seized a small eminence, -close to the French guns and commanding the ascent up which the French -troops turning the right flank were approaching. His first fire threw -them into confusion; they rallied and were again disordered by his -volleys; a third time they made head; but a sudden charge shook them, -and then two battalions of the 52nd Regiment, attracted by the fire, -entered the line. The centre and left of the 43rd were all this time -furiously engaged, and wonderfully excited; for Beckwith, with the -blood streaming from a wound in the head, rode amongst the skirmishers, -praising and exhorting them in a loud cheerful tone as a man sure to -win his battle; and though the bullets flew thicker and closer, and -the fight became more perilous, the French fell fast and a second -charge again cleared the hill. A howitzer was taken by the 43rd, and -the skirmishers were descending in eager pursuit when small bodies of -cavalry came galloping in from all parts and compelled them to take -refuge with the main body, which had reformed behind a low stone wall; -one French squadron however, with incredible daring rode close to -this wall, and were in the act of firing over it with pistols when a -rolling volley laid nearly the whole lifeless on the ground. A very -strong column of infantry then rushed up and endeavoured to retake the -howitzer, which was on the edge of the descent, fifty yards from the -wall, but no man could reach it and live, so deadly was the 43rd’s -fire. Two English guns now came into action, and the 52nd charging -violently upon the flank of the enemy’s infantry again vindicated the -possession of the height; nevertheless fresh squadrons of cavalry, -which had followed the infantry in the last attack, seeing the 52nd -men scattered by this charge, flew upon them with great briskness and -caused some disorder before they were repulsed. - -Reynier, convinced at last that he should not use his troops -piece-meal, then put all his reserves, six thousand infantry with -artillery and cavalry, in motion, and outflanked the English left, -resolute to storm the contested height. But at that moment the fifth -division passed the bridge of Sabugal, the British cavalry appeared on -the hills beyond the French left, and, emerging from the woods close -on Reynier’s right, the third division opened a fire which instantly -decided the fate of the day. The French general, fearing to be -surrounded, hastily retreated, and meeting the right wing of the army, -which had also retired, both fell back, pursued by the English cavalry. - -In this bloody encounter, which did not last quite an hour, nearly -two hundred British were killed and wounded, and the enemy’s loss was -enormous: three hundred dead bodies were heaped together on the hill, -the greatest part round the captured howitzer, and more than twelve -hundred were wounded, so unwisely had Reynier handled his masses, and -so true and constant was the English fire. It was no exaggeration of -Lord Wellington to say, “this was one of the most glorious actions -British troops were ever engaged in.” - -Massena retreated on Ciudad Rodrigo, and the 5th crossed the frontier -of Portugal, when the vigour of French discipline was surprisingly -manifested. Those men who had for months been living by rapine, whose -retreat had been one continued course of violence and devastation, -having passed a conventional line became the most orderly of soldiers. -Not the slightest rudeness was offered to any Spaniard, and everything -was scrupulously paid for, although bread was sold at two shillings a -pound! Massena himself also, fierce and terrible as he was in Portugal, -always treated the Spaniards with gentleness and moderation. - -During these events Trant crossed the Lower Coa with four thousand -militia near Almeida, but the river flooded behind him, the bridges had -been broken by Massena, and there was a French brigade close at hand; -hence, constructing a temporary bridge with great difficulty, he was -going to retire, but there came a letter from Wellington, desiring him -to be vigilant in preventing communication with Almeida, and fearless, -because next morning a British force would be up to his assistance. -Boldly then he interposed between the fortress and the French brigade, -yet the promised succour did not appear, and the advancing enemy was -within half a mile. His destruction appeared inevitable, when suddenly -two cannon-shots were heard to the southward, the French hastily formed -squares to retire, and six squadrons of British cavalry with a troop of -horse-artillery came up like a whirlwind in their rear; military order -however marked their perilous retreat, and though the bullets fearfully -ploughed through their masses while the horsemen flanked their line of -march, they got over the Agueda by Barba de Puerco, with the loss of -only three hundred men killed wounded and prisoners. - -A few days after this, Colonel Waters, the boat-finder at Oporto, who -had been taken prisoner, escaped by an effort of extraordinary daring. -Confident in his own resources he refused parole, but having rashly -mentioned his intention of escaping to the Spaniard in whose house he -was lodged at Ciudad Rodrigo, the man betrayed counsel; his servant, -detesting the treachery, secretly offered his own aid, but Waters -only told him to get the rowels of his spurs sharpened, no more, for -his design was one of open daring. Guarded by four _gens d’armes_, he -was near Salamanca when the chief, who rode the only good horse of -the party, alighted, whereupon Waters gave the spur to his own mare, -a celebrated animal, and galloped off. They were on a wide plain, -and for many miles the road was covered with the French columns, his -hat fell off, and thus marked he rode along the flank of the troops, -some encouraging him, others firing at him, the _gens d’armes_ being -always, sword in hand, close at his heels. Suddenly he broke at full -speed between two of the columns, gained a wooded hollow, baffled -his pursuers, and the third day reached head-quarters, where Lord -Wellington had caused his baggage to be brought, observing that he -would not be long absent! - - -FUENTES ONORO. (May, 1811.) - -On the Agueda Massena could not subsist. He retired to Salamanca, where -he was in communication with Marshal Bessières, who commanded a great -force called the Army of the North. Wellington then invested Almeida, -thinking it was provisioned only for a fortnight, yet it was still -resistant the latter end of April, when the Prince of Essling, having -reorganized his army and obtained cavalry and guns from Bessières, came -down to raise the blockade. The English general, not expecting this -interference, had gone southwards to superintend the operations of -Marshal Beresford, but he returned rapidly when he heard of the French -movement, and fixed on a field of battle between the Agueda and Coa. -There the ground, though open and fit for cavalry, was traversed from -east to west by three nearly parallel rivers, the Azava, Duas Casas, -and Turones; the first considerable, and all having, in common with the -Agueda and Coa, this peculiarity, their channels deepen as the water -flows: mere streams with low banks in their upper courses, they soon -become foaming torrents rushing along rocky gulfs. - -Almeida, situated on high table-land between the Turones and Coa, was -closely blockaded, the light division and the cavalry were on the Azava -covering the investment, the rest of the army was cantoned in the -villages behind them. Swollen and unfordable was the Azava, and two -thousand French attempted to seize the bridge of Marialva on the 24th, -but the ground was strong, and they were vigorously repulsed by Captain -Dobbs of the 52nd, though he had but a single bayonet-company and some -riflemen. Next day Massena reached Ciudad Rodrigo in person, and the -27th he felt the light division posts from Espeja to Marialva. On the -28th Wellington arrived, and took position behind the Duas Casas. - -The Azava was still difficult to ford, and Massena continued to feel -the outposts until the 2nd of May, when the waters subsided and his -army came out of Ciudad Rodrigo. The light division, after a slight -skirmish of horse at Gallegos, retired from that place and Espeja upon -the Duas Casas, a delicate operation, for though the country behind -those villages was a forest, an open plain between the woods offered -the enemy’s powerful cavalry an opportunity of cutting off the retreat; -the French neglected the advantage and the separated brigades of the -division remained in the woods until the middle of the night, and then -safely crossed the Duas Casas at Fuentes Onoro, a beautiful village -which had been uninjured during the previous warfare although occupied -alternately for above a year by both sides. Every family was well known -to the light division, and it was with deep regret and indignation -they found the preceding troops had pillaged it, leaving shells of -houses where three days before a friendly population had been living -in comfort. This wanton act was felt indeed so much by the whole army, -that eight thousand dollars were subscribed for the inhabitants, yet -the injury sunk deeper than the atonement. - -Wellington did not wish to risk much for the blockade, and he knew -Massena could bring down superior numbers; for so culpably negligent -was the Portuguese government that their troops were starving -under arms, the infantry abandoning their colours or dropping from -extenuation by thousands, the cavalry useless: it was even feared that -a general dispersion would take place. Nevertheless, when the trial -came, he would not retreat, although his troops, reduced to thirty-two -thousand infantry, twelve hundred cavalry in bad condition, and -forty-two guns, were unable to oppose the enemy’s numerous horsemen in -the plain. His position was on the table-land between the Turones and -the Duas Casas, his left being at Fort Conception, his centre opposite -the village of Alameda, his right at Fuentes Onoro. The whole distance -was five miles, and the Duas Casas, here flowing in a deep ravine, -protected the front of the line. - -Massena dared not march by his own right upon Almeida, lest the allies, -crossing the ravine at the villages of Alameda and Fuentes Onoro, -should fall on his flank and drive him upon the Lower Agueda; hence, -to cover the blockade, maintained by Pack’s brigade and an English -regiment, it was sufficient to leave the fifth division near Fort -Conception, and the sixth division opposite Alameda, while the first -and third concentrated on a gentle rise cannon-shot distance behind -Fuentes Onoro, and where a steppe of land turned back on the Turones, -becoming rocky as it approached that river. - - -COMBAT OF FUENTES ONORO. (May, 1811.) - -On the 3rd of May the French came up in three columns abreast. The -cavalry, the sixth corps, and Drouet’s division, threatened Fuentes, -while the eighth and second corps moved against Alameda and Fort -Conception, menacing the allies’ left, which caused the light division -to reinforce the sixth. Loison, without orders, now fell upon Fuentes, -in which were five battalions detached from the first and third -divisions. Most of the houses were in the bottom of the ravine, but -an old chapel and some buildings on a craggy eminence behind offered -a prominent point for rallying, and all the low parts were vigorously -defended; yet the attack was so violent and the cannonade so heavy the -British abandoned the streets, and could scarcely maintain the upper -ground about the chapel; the commanding officer fell badly wounded, and -the fight was being lost, when the 24th, the 71st, and 79th regiments, -coming down from the main position, charged the French and drove them -quite over the Duas Casas. During the night the detachments were -withdrawn, the three succouring regiments keeping the village, where -two hundred and sixty British and somewhat more of the French had -fallen. - -On the 4th Massena arrived, accompanied by Bessières, who brought up -twelve hundred cavalry and a battery of the imperial guard. Designing -to fight next morning he resolved to hold the left of the allies in -check with the second corps, and turn their right with the remainder -of the army. Forty thousand French infantry and five thousand horse, -with thirty pieces of artillery, were under arms, and they had shown -their courage was not abated; it was therefore a very daring act of the -English general to receive battle; for though his position, as far as -Fuentes Onoro, was strong and covered his communication across the Coa -by the bridge of Castello Bom, the plain was continued on his right to -Nava d’Aver, where a round hill, overlooking all the country, commanded -the roads leading to the bridges of Seceiras and Sabugal. Massena could -therefore have placed his army at once in battle-array across the -right flank and attacked the army between the Duas Casas, the Turones, -the Coa and the fortress of Almeida: the bridge of Castello Bom alone -would then have been open for retreat. To prevent this, and cover his -communications with Sabugal and Seceiras, Wellington, yielding to -Spencer’s suggestions, stretched his right wing out to the hill of Nava -d’Aver, where he placed Julian Sanchez, supporting him with the seventh -division under General Houstoun. This line of battle was above seven -miles, besides the circuit of blockade; and above Fuentes Onoro the -Duas Casas ravine became gradually obliterated, resolving itself into a -swampy wood, which extended to Poço Velho, a village half-way between -Fuentes and Nava d’Aver. - - -BATTLE OF FUENTES ONORO. (May, 1811.) - -Massena’s intention was to attack at daybreak, but a delay of two hours -occurred and all his movements were plainly descried. The eighth corps, -withdrawn from Alameda and supported by all the French cavalry, was -seen marching to turn Poço Velho and the swampy wood, both occupied -by Houstoun’s left, his right being thrown back on the plain towards -Nava d’Aver. The sixth corps and Dronet’s division were likewise -taking ground to their left, yet keeping a division to menace Fuentes -Onoro. At this sight the light division and the cavalry hastened to -the support of Houstoun, while the first and third divisions made a -movement parallel to that of the sixth corps; the latter, however, -drove the seventh division from Poço Velho, and was gaining ground in -the wood also, when the riflemen of the light division arrived there -and restored the fight. - -The French cavalry, after passing Poço Velho, formed an order of battle -on the plain between the wood and the hill of Nava d’Aver, whereupon -Sanchez retired across the Turones, partly in fear, more in anger, -because his lieutenant, having foolishly ridden close up to the enemy, -making violent gestures, was mistaken for a French officer and shot -by a soldier of the Guards before the action commenced. Montbrun lost -an hour observing this _partida_, but when it disappeared he turned -the right of the seventh division and charged the British cavalry; -the combat was unequal; for by an abuse too common, so many men had -been drawn from the ranks as orderlies to general officers, and other -purposes, that not more than a thousand English troopers were in the -field. The French therefore with one shock drove in all the outguards, -cut off Norman Ramsay’s battery of horse-artillery, and came sweeping -in upon the reserves and the seventh division. - -Their leading squadrons, approaching in a loose manner, were partially -checked by the British, and then a great commotion was observed in -their main body. Their troopers were seen closing with disorder and -tumult towards one point, where a thick dust arose, and where loud -cries and the sparkling of blades and flashing of pistols indicated -some extraordinary occurrence. Suddenly the crowd became violently -agitated, an English shout pealed high and clear, the mass was rent -asunder, and Norman Ramsay burst forth sword in hand at the head of his -battery, his horses, breathing fire, stretched like greyhounds along -the plain, the guns bounded behind them like things of no weight, and -the mounted gunners followed close, with heads bent low and pointed -weapons in desperate career. At this sight Brotherton[17] of the 14th -Dragoons, instantly galloping to his aid with a squadron, shocked the -head of the pursuing troops, and General Charles Stewart,[18] joining -in the charge, took the French colonel Lamotte, fighting hand to hand. -However the main body came forward rapidly, and the British cavalry -retired behind the light division, which was thrown into squares; the -seventh division, which was more advanced, endeavoured to do the same, -but the horsemen were too quickly upon them, and some were cut down; -the remainder stood firm, and the Chasseurs Britanniques, ranged behind -a loose stone wall, poured such a fire that the French recoiled and -seemed bewildered. - -While these brilliant actions were passing, the enemy had made progress -in the wood of Poço Velho, and as the English divisions were separated -and the right wing turned, it was abundantly evident the battle would -be lost if the original position above Fuentes Onoro was not quickly -regained. To effect this Wellington ordered the seventh division to -cross the Turones and move down the left bank to Frenada, while the -light division and the cavalry retired over the plain; he also withdrew -the first and third divisions, and the Portuguese, to the steppe of -land before mentioned, as running perpendicularly from the ravine of -Fuentes Onoro to the Turones. - -Craufurd, who had now resumed command of the light division, covered -the passage of the seventh over the Turones, and then retired slowly -along the plain in squares. The French horsemen outflanked him and -surprised a post of the Guards under Colonel Hill, taking that officer -and fourteen men prisoners, but continuing their course against the -42nd Regiment were repulsed. Many times, this strong cavalry made as if -it would storm the light division squares, yet always found them too -formidable, and happily so, for there was not during the war a more -perilous hour. The whole of that vast plain was covered with a confused -multitude of troops, amidst which the squares appeared as specks, -and there was a great concourse of commissariat followers, servants, -baggage, led horses, and peasants attracted by curiosity, and all mixed -with broken picquets and parties coming out of the woods: the seventh -division was separated by the Turones, while five thousand French -horsemen, with fifteen pieces of artillery, were trampling, bounding, -shouting, and impatient to charge; the infantry of the eighth corps -being in order of battle behind them, and the wood on their right -filled with the sixth corps. If the latter body, pivoting upon Fuentes, -had come forth while Drouet’s division fell on that village, if the -eighth corps had attacked the light division and all the cavalry had -charged, the loose crowd encumbering the plain, driven violently in -upon the first division, would have intercepted the latter’s fire and -broken its ranks: the battle would have been lost. - -No such effort was made. The French horsemen merely hovered about -Craufurd’s squares, the plain was soon cleared, the British cavalry -took post behind the centre, and the light division formed a reserve to -the first division, the riflemen occupying the rocks on its right and -connecting it with the seventh division, which had arrived at Frenada -and was again joined by Julian Sanchez. At sight of this new front, -perpendicular to the original one and so deeply lined with troops, the -French army stopped short and commenced a cannonade, which did great -execution amongst the close masses of the allies; but twelve British -guns replied with such vigour that the enemy’s fire abated, their -cavalry drew out of range, and a body of infantry attempting to glide -down the ravine of the Turones was repulsed by the riflemen and the -light companies of the Guards. - -All this time a fierce battle was going on at Fuentes Onoro. Massena -had directed Drouet to carry this village when Montbrun’s cavalry first -turned the right wing, it was however two hours later ere the attack -commenced. The three British regiments made a desperate resistance, -but, overmatched in number and unaccustomed to the desultory fighting -of light troops, they were pierced and divided; two companies of the -79th were taken, their Colonel, Cameron, mortally wounded, and the -lower part of the town was carried: the upper part was however stiffly -held and the musketry was incessant. - -Had the attack been made earlier, and all Drouet’s division thrown -frankly into the fight, while the sixth corps from the wood of Poço -Velho closely turned Fuentes Onoro, the latter must have been forced -and the new position falsified. But Wellington, having now all his -reserves in hand, detached considerable masses to support the fight, -and as the French reinforced their troops, the whole of the sixth corps -and part of Drouet’s were finally engaged. At one time the fighting -was on the banks of the stream and the lower houses, at another on the -heights and around the chapel, and some of the enemy’s skirmishers -even penetrated towards the main position; yet the village was never -entirely abandoned by the defenders, and in one charge against a -heavy mass on the chapel eminence a great number of French fell. Thus -the fight lasted until evening, when the lower part of the town was -abandoned by both parties, the British holding the chapel and crags, -the French retiring about cannon-shot distance from the stream. - -After the action a brigade of the light division relieved the regiments -in the village, a slight demonstration by the second corps, near Fort -Conception, was checked by a battalion of the Lusitanian legion, and -both armies remained in observation. Fifteen hundred men and officers, -of which three hundred were prisoners, constituted the loss of the -allies. That of the enemy was estimated at the time to be near five -thousand, but this was founded on the supposition that four hundred -dead were lying about Fuentes Onoro. Having had charge to bury the -carcasses at that point, I can affirm, that about the village not -more than one hundred and thirty bodies were to be found, more than -one-third of which were British. - - -EVACUATION OF ALMEIDA. (May, 1811.) - -Massena retired on the 10th across the Agueda, and was relieved in -his command by Marmont. The fate of Almeida was then decided, yet its -brave governor, Brennier, who had been exchanged after the battle of -Vimiero, carried off the garrison. He had fifteen hundred men and -during the battle had skirmished boldly with the blockading force, -while loud explosions, supposed to be signals, were frequent in the -place. When all hope of succour vanished, a French soldier, named -Tillet, penetrated in uniform through the posts of blockade, carrying -an order to evacuate the fortress and rejoin the army by Barba de -Puerco. Meanwhile the British general, placing the light division -in its old position on the Azava with cavalry-posts on the Lower -Agueda, had desired Sir William Erskine to send the 4th Regiment to -Barba de Puerco, and directed General Alexander Campbell to continue -the blockade with the sixth division and Pack’s brigade. Campbell’s -dispositions were negligently made and negligently executed. Erskine -transmitted no orders to the 4th Regiment, and Brennier resolved to -force his way through the blockading troops. An open country and a -double line of posts greatly enhanced the difficulty of the enterprise, -yet he was resolute not only to cut his own passage but to render the -fortress useless. In this view he had mined the principal bastions, -and destroyed his guns by a singular expedient, firing several at the -same moment with heavy charges but placing the muzzles of all but one -against the sides of the others; thus while some shots flew towards the -besiegers others destroyed the pieces without attracting notice: these -were the explosions supposed to be signals. - -At midnight on the 10th he sprung his mines and in a compact column -broke through the picquets, passing between the quarters of the -reserves with a nicety proving his talent and his coolness. Pack, -following with a few men collected on the instant, plied him with a -constant fire, yet could not shake or retard his column, which in -silence gained the rough country leading upon Barba de Puerco, where -it halted just as daylight broke. Pack still pursued, and knowing some -English dragoons were a short distance off sent an officer to bring -them out upon the French flank, thus occasioning a slight skirmish -and consequent delay. The other troops had paid little attention to -the explosion of the mines, thinking them a repetition of Brennier’s -previous practice, but Pack’s fire had roused them, the 36th Regiment -was now close at hand, and the 4th also, having heard the firing, was -rapidly gaining the right flank of the enemy. Brennier drove off the -cavalry and was again in march, yet the infantry, throwing off their -knapsacks, overtook him as he descended the deep chasm of Barba de -Puerco and killed or wounded many, taking three hundred, but the 36th -Regiment rashly passing the bridge was repulsed with a loss of forty -men. Had Erskine given the 4th Regiment its orders, the French column -would have been lost, and Lord Wellington, stung by this event, and -irritated by previous examples of undisciplined valour, issued this -strong rebuke. “_The officers of the army may depend upon it that the -enemy to whom they are opposed is not less prudent than powerful. -Notwithstanding what has been printed in gazettes and newspapers, we -have never seen small bodies unsupported successfully opposed to large; -nor has the experience of any officer realized the stories which all -have read of whole armies being driven by a handful of light infantry -and dragoons._” - - - - -BOOK V. - - Combat of Campo Mayor--First English Siege of Badajos--Battle - of Albuera--Renewed Siege of Badajos--First Assault of - Christoval--Second Assault on Christoval. - - -COMBAT OF CAMPO MAYOR. (May, 1811.) - -It has been shown how Beresford was sent to oppose Soult beyond the -Tagus, but the latter, disturbed by the battle of Barosa, which put all -Andalusia in commotion, had returned to Seville, leaving Mortier to -continue the operations. Campo Mayor surrendered the 21st of March, and -four days after, Latour Maubourg, having to bring away the battering -train and a convoy of provisions, issued from the gates with nine -hundred cavalry, three battalions of infantry, some horse-artillery and -sixteen heavy guns, all in column of march, just as Beresford emerged -from an adjacent forest with twenty thousand infantry, two thousand -cavalry and eighteen field-pieces. An astonishing apparition this was -to the French, for so adroitly had Wellington, while seemingly absorbed -in the pursuit of Massena, organized this army, that its existence was -only made known by its presence. - -All Beresford’s cavalry, supported by a field battery and a detachment -of infantry under Colonel Colborne,[19] were close up ere the enemy -knew of their approach, and the horsemen, sweeping by their left round -the town and moving along gentle slopes, gradually formed a crescent -about the French, who were retreating along the road to Badajos. -Colborne was then coming up at a run, a division was seen behind him, -and the French infantry formed squares, supported by their cavalry, -while their battering guns and baggage hurried on. General Long, -holding back his heavy cavalry, directed some Portuguese squadrons, -and the 18th Light Dragoons under Colonel Head, to charge. Head, -galloping forward under a fire from the square, was met half-way by -the French hussars with loose reins, and fiercely they came together, -and many went down on both sides, yet those who kept the saddle drove -clean through each other, re-formed, and again charged in the same -fearful manner! Desperately all struggled for victory, but Head’s -troopers riding close and on better chargers overthrew horse and man, -and the hussars dispersed, yet still fighting in small bodies with the -Portuguese, while the British squadron, passing under the fire of the -square without flinching, rode forward, hewing down the gunners of the -battering train and seeking to head the long line of convoy. - -They thought the heavy dragoons, the infantry and the artillery, -marching behind them, would suffice to dispose of the enemies they -passed, but Beresford took a different view. He stopped a charge of -the heavy dragoons; he suffered only two guns to open when six were -at hand; he even silenced those two after a few rounds, and let the -French recover their battering train, rally their hussars, and retreat -in safety. Meanwhile the 13th and some of the Portuguese dragoons -reached the bridge of Badajos and there captured more guns, but were -repulsed by the fire of the fortress, and being followed by Mortier and -met by Latour Maubourg’s retreating column lost some men, but passing -by the flanks they escaped, to be publicly censured by Beresford! The -admiration of the army consoled them. One hundred of the allies were -killed, or hurt, and seventy taken; the French lost only three hundred -and a howitzer, but the colonel of hussars, Chamorin, a distinguished -officer, fell in single combat with a trooper of the 13th Dragoons, an -Irishman of astonishing might, whose sword went through helmet and head -with a single blow. - - -FIRST ENGLISH SIEGE OF BADAJOS. (May, 1811.) - -Mortier now resigned the command to Latour Maubourg, who spread his -foragers fifty miles abroad to gather provisions for Badajos, which -General Phillipon, one of the best governors that ever defended a -fortress, was with scanty means striving to prepare for a siege. -Beresford, by adopting a wrong line of operations, lost time, his -first bridge was swept away by floods, he passed the Guadiana with -some difficulty at Jerumenha, and a squadron of the 13th Dragoons -was carried off bodily by the French at that place; but he reduced -Olivenza, drove Latour Maubourg into the Morena, and defeated two -regiments of cavalry near Usagre: he however neglected to restrain -the garrison of Badajos, by which he gave Phillipon time and license -to prepare for resistance--a great error and pregnant with terrible -consequences. His field operations were inadequate to his means, for -he was not only master of the open country with his own troops, but -had been joined by the captain-general Castaños with the fifth Spanish -army, and was in communication with Ballesteros and Blake, co-operating -Spanish generals, at the head of considerable bodies. In this state he -was first reinforced with a German brigade from Lisbon under General -Alten, and then Wellington arrived from the north. - -He came the 21st of April and immediately changed the direction of -the warfare. Looking to Badajos, and feeling the value of time, he -instantly forded the Guadiana and pushed close to it with the German -troops and some Portuguese cavalry, to take a convoy going into the -place, but the governor sallied, the convoy escaped, and the allies -lost a hundred men. Beresford had been contemptuous of Soult’s power -and resolution to disturb the siege; but Wellington had learned to -respect that marshal’s energy and resources, and knowing well he would -come with strength and danger, refused to invest the place until the -Spanish generals consented to the following co-operation. Blake to -bring his army from Ayamonte, and in concert with Ballesteros and -the cavalry of Castaños to watch the passes of the Morena. Castaños, -furnishing three battalions for the siege, to support the other Spanish -generals. The British covering troops to be in second line having their -point of concentration for battle at Albuera, a village centrically -placed with respect to the roads leading from Andalusia to Badajos. -While awaiting the Spaniards’ consent he prepared the means of siege, -yet under great difficulties. - -The Portuguese government had reported that guns, provisions, boats, -stores and means of carriage had been actually collected for the -operation: this was false. The battering train and stores for the -attack had therefore to be taken from Elvas, and as it was essential -for the safety of the fortress to preserve its armament, and the -Guadiana had again carried away the bridge at Jerumenha, that direct -line of communication was given up for the circuitous one of Merida, -where a stone bridge rendered all safe. But then political difficulties -arose. The Portuguese government was on the point of declaring war -against Spain, which made the Spanish generals delay assent to the plan -of co-operation, and in the midst of this confusion Massena’s advance -recalled Wellington to fight the battle of Fuentes Onoro. - -As Latour Maubourg still held on to Estremadura and foraged the fertile -districts, Colonel Colborne, a man of singular talent for war, was -sent with a brigade of infantry, some horsemen and guns to curb his -inroads. In concert with Count Penne Villemur, a commander of Spanish -cavalry, he intercepted several convoys, forced the French troops to -quit many frontier towns, and acted with so much address, that Latour -Maubourg went into the Morena, thinking a great force was at hand. -Colborne then attempted to surprise the fortified post of Benelcazar. -Riding on to the drawbridge in the grey of the morning, he summoned the -commandant to surrender, as the only means of saving himself from a -Spanish army which was coming up and would give no quarter; the French -officer was amazed at the appearance of the party, yet hesitated, -whereupon Colborne, perceiving he would not yield, galloped off under -a few straggling shot and soon after rejoined the army without loss. -During his absence, the Spanish generals had acceded to Wellington’s -proposition, Blake was in march, the Guadiana had subsided and the -siege was undertaken. - -General William Stewart invested Badajos the 5th of May, on the left -bank of the Guadiana, where the principal features were an ancient -castle and some out-works. - -On the 8th General Lumley invested Christoval, an isolated fort or -citadel, on the other bank of the Guadiana, which commanded the bridge; -but this operation was not well combined, and sixty French dragoons, -moving under the fire of the place, maintained a sharp skirmish beyond -the walls. - -Thus the first serious siege undertaken by the British army in -the Peninsula was commenced, and, to the discredit of the English -government, no army was ever worse provided for such an enterprise. The -engineers were zealous, and some of them well versed in the theory of -their business, but the ablest trembled at their utter destitution. -Without sappers and miners, or a soldier who knew how to carry on an -approach under fire, they were compelled to attack a fortress defended -by the most practised and scientific troops of the age; hence the best -officers and boldest soldiers were forced to sacrifice themselves in a -lamentable manner, to compensate for the negligence and incapacity of -a government _always_ ready to plunge into war without the slightest -care for what was necessary to obtain success. The sieges carried on -by the British in Spain were a succession of butcheries, because the -commonest materials and means necessary for their art were denied to -the engineers. - -To breach the castle, while batteries established on the right bank of -the Guadiana took it in reverse, and false attacks were made against -the out-works, was the plan adopted; but San Christoval was to be -reduced before the batteries against the castle could be constructed; -wherefore on the night of the 8th, the captain of engineers, Squire, -was ordered to break ground there at a distance of four hundred yards. -The moon shone bright, he was ill provided with tools, and exposed to -a destructive fire of musketry from the fort, of shot and shells from -the town; hence he worked with loss until the 10th, and then the French -in a sally entered his battery; they were driven back, but the allies -pursued too hotly, were caught with grape and lost four hundred men. -Thus five engineers and seven hundred officers and soldiers of the line -were already inscribed upon the bloody list of victims offered to this -Moloch, and only one small battery against an outwork was completed! -On the 11th it opened, and before sunset the fire of the enemy had -disabled four of its five guns and killed many soldiers. No other -result could be expected. The concert essential to success in double -operations had been neglected by Beresford. Squire was exposed to the -undivided fire of the fortress before the approaches against the castle -were even commenced, and the false attacks scarcely attracted the -notice of the enemy. - -To check future sallies a second battery was erected against the -bridge-head, yet this was also overmatched, and Beresford, having -received intelligence that the French army was again in movement, then -arrested the progress of all the works. On the 12th, believing this -information premature, he directed the trenches to be opened against -the castle; but the intelligence was confirmed at twelve o’clock in the -night, and measures were taken to raise the siege. - - -BATTLE OF ALBUERA. (May, 1811.) - -Soult had resolved to succour Badajos the moment he heard that -Beresford was in Estremadura, and the latter’s tardiness gave him -time to tranquillise his province and arrange a system of resistance -to the allied army in the Isla during his absence. Beresford believed -he was trembling for Andalusia. Nothing could be more fallacious. He -had seventy thousand fighting men there, and Drouet, who had quitted -Massena immediately after the battle of Fuentes Onoro, was in march for -that province with eleven thousand, by the way of Toledo. - -On the 10th of May Soult quitted Seville with three thousand heavy -dragoons, thirty guns, and two strong brigades of infantry under the -generals Werlé and Godinot. - -The 13th a junction was effected with Latour Maubourg, who assumed the -command of the heavy cavalry, resigning the fifth corps to General -Girard. - -On the 14th, having reached Villa Franca, thirty miles from Badajos, -Soult caused his heaviest guns to fire salvos in the night to notify -his approach to the garrison. This expedient failed, but on the evening -of the 15th the whole French army was concentrated at Santa Marta. - -Beresford had raised the siege in the night of the 12th, against the -wish of the chief engineer, who promised him the place in three days! -This promise was nought, and had it been good Soult would yet have -surprised him in his trenches: his firmness therefore saved the army, -and his arrangements for carrying off the stores were well executed. By -twelve o’clock on the 15th the guns and stores were on the left bank of -the Guadiana, the gabions and fascines were burnt, the flying-bridge -removed; all being so well masked by the fourth division, which in -concert with the Spaniards continued to maintain the investment, that -a sally on the rear-guard, in which some Portuguese picquets were -roughly treated, first told the French the siege was raised--of the -cause they were still ignorant. - -Beresford held a conference with the Spanish generals at Valverde on -the 13th, and the chief command was ceded to him by the management of -Castaños, to the discontent of Blake, who soon showed his ill-will. It -was agreed to receive battle at the village of Albuera. Ballesteros’ -and Blake’s corps had then united, and Blake engaged to bring them -into line before twelve o’clock on the 15th. Meanwhile, Badajos being -the centre of an arc sweeping through Valverde, Albuera and Talavera -Real, it was arranged that Blake should watch the roads on the right; -the British and fifth Spanish army those leading upon the centre, and -Madden’s Portuguese cavalry those on the left. The main body of the -British could thus reach Albuera by a half march, as no part of the arc -was more than four leagues from Badajos, and the enemy was still eight -leagues from Albuera: Beresford therefore, thinking he could not be -forestalled on any point of importance, kept the fourth division in the -trenches. - -On the 14th Colborne rejoined the army, Madden took post at -Talavera Real, Blake was in march and his dragoons had joined the -Anglo-Portuguese cavalry under General Long, who was at Santa Marta. - -In the morning of the 15th the Anglo-Portuguese army occupied the left -half of the Albuera position, a ridge four miles long, having the -stream of the Aroya Val de Sevilla in rear and the Albuera in front. -The ascent from the last river was easy for cavalry and artillery, and -in advance of the centre were the bridge and village of Albuera--the -former commanded by a battery, the latter occupied by Alten’s Germans. -Behind Alten, the second division, under William Stewart, formed one -line, the right on a commanding hill over which the Valverde road -passed, the left on the road of Badajos, beyond which the array was -continued on two lines by the Portuguese troops under Hamilton and -Collins. - -The right of the ground being roughest, highest, and broadest, was left -open for Blake, because Beresford, thinking the hill on the Valverde -road the key of the position as covering the only line of retreat, was -desirous to secure it with his own troops. The fourth division and the -infantry of the fifth Spanish army were still before Badajos, but had -orders to march on the first signal. - -About three o’clock on the evening of the 15th, Beresford being on the -left, the whole mass of the allied cavalry, closely followed by the -French light horsemen, came pouring in from Santa Marta, and finding -no infantry beyond the Albuera to support them passed that river in -retreat. The wooded heights on the right bank being thus abandoned -to the enemy, his force and dispositions were effectually concealed -and the strength of the position was already sapped. Beresford was -disquieted, he formed a temporary right wing with his cavalry and -artillery, stretched his picquets along the road by which Blake was -expected, and sent officers to hasten his movements; that general had -only a few miles of good road to march and promised to be in line at -noon, yet did not even bring up his van before eleven at night, nor his -rear before three in the morning. - -Cole and Madden were now called up. The order failed to reach Madden; -but Cole brought the infantry of the fifth army, two squadrons of -Portuguese cavalry, and two brigades of his own division to Albuera -between eight and nine o’clock on the morning of the 16th: his third -brigade having invested San Christoval was unable to pass the Guadiana -above Badajos, and was in march by Jerumenha. Cole’s Spanish troops -joined Blake on the right, the two brigades of the fourth division -were drawn up in columns behind the second division, the Portuguese -squadrons reinforced Colonel Otway, whose horsemen, of the same nation, -were pushed forwards in front of the left wing: all the rest of the -allied cavalry was concentrated behind the centre, and Beresford, -dissatisfied with General Long, gave Lumley the chief command. - -Thirty thousand infantry, more than two thousand cavalry, and -thirty-eight pieces of artillery, eighteen being nine-pounders, were -now in line; but one brigade of the fourth division was still absent, -the British infantry, the pith and strength of battle, did not exceed -seven thousand, and already Blake’s arrogance was shaking Beresford’s -authority. The French had forty guns, four thousand veteran cavalry and -nineteen thousand chosen infantry: obedient to one discipline, animated -by one national feeling, their composition compensated for the want of -numbers, and their general’s talent was immeasurably greater than his -adversary’s. - -Soult examined Beresford’s position without hindrance on the evening of -the 15th. He knew the fourth division was then before Badajos, heard -that Blake would not arrive before the 17th, and resolved to attack -next morning, having detected all the weakness of the English order -of battle. The hill in the centre, commanding the Valverde road, was -undoubtedly the key of the position if an attack was made parallel to -the front; but Soult saw that on the right, the rough broad heights -trended back towards the Valverde road, looking into the rear of -Beresford’s line, and if he could suddenly place his masses there he -might roll up the right on the centre and push it into the valley of -the Aroya: the Valverde road could then be seized, the retreat cut, and -his strong cavalry would complete the victory. - -Beresford’s right and Soult’s left were only divided by a hill about -cannon-shot from each. Separated from the allies by the Albuera, from -the French by a rivulet called the Feria, this height was neglected by -Beresford: but Soult in the night placed behind it the greatest part -of his artillery under General Ruty, the fifth corps under Girard, -the heavy cavalry under Latour Maubourg; thus concentrating fifteen -thousand men and thirty guns within ten minutes’ march of Beresford’s -right wing: and yet that general could not see a man, or draw a sound -conclusion as to the plan of attack. The light cavalry, the brigades -of Godinot and Werlé, and ten guns remained. These were placed in -the woods which lined the banks of the Feria towards its confluence -with the Albuera. Werlé was in reserve, Godinot was to attack the -village and bridge, bear strongly against Beresford’s centre, attract -his attention, separate his wings, and double up his right when the -principal attack should be developed. - -Blake and Cole brought up more than sixteen thousand men, the first -joining in the night, the second at nine o’clock in the morning after -the action was begun; yet so defectively had Beresford occupied his -position that Soult, though he saw how the allied army had been -reinforced, made no change of disposition. At nine o’clock Godinot -emerged from the woods with his division in one heavy column, preceded -by a battery of ten guns; he was flanked by the light cavalry, followed -by Werlé’s division, and made straight for the bridge of Albuera, -attempting with a sharp cannonade and musketry to force a passage. -General Briché, being on his right, now led two hussar regiments down -the river in observation of Otway’s horsemen, while the French lancers -passed the stream above bridge. The 3rd Dragoon Guards drove the -lancers back, and Dickson’s Portuguese guns, from a rising ground above -the village, ploughed through Godinot’s column, which crowded towards -the bridge although the water was fordable above and below. - -These feints along the front did not deceive Beresford, he saw Werlé -did not follow Godinot closely, and felt the principal effort would be -on the right; he therefore desired Blake to throw part of his first -and all his second line across the broad part of the hills, at right -angles to their actual front. Then drawing the Portuguese infantry of -the left wing to the centre, he sent a brigade to support Alten at the -bridge, and directed Hamilton to hold the others in hand as a general -reserve. The 13th Dragoons he posted near the river above bridge, and -sent the second English division to support Blake. The horse-artillery, -and cavalry under Lumley, and Cole’s division, took ground to their -right, the two first on a small plain behind the Aroya stream, the last -about half musket-shot behind them. This done, Beresford galloped to -Blake, who had refused to change his front, and with great heat told -Colonel Hardinge, the bearer of the order, the real attack was at the -village and bridge; he was entreated to obey, but was obstinate until -Beresford arrived in person, and then only assented because the enemy’s -columns were appearing on his flank, acting however with such pedantic -slowness, that Beresford, impatient of his folly, took the direction in -person. - -Great was the confusion and delay thus occasioned, and ere the troops -were formed the French were amongst them. For scarcely had Godinot -engaged Alten’s brigade, when Werlé, leaving only a battalion of -grenadiers to support the former, and some squadrons to watch the 13th -Dragoons and connect the attacks, countermarched and gained the rear -of the fifth corps as it was mounting the hill on the right of the -allies. The light cavalry, also quitting Godinot, crossed the Albuera -above bridge, ascended the left bank at a gallop, and sweeping round -the rear of the fifth corps joined Latour Maubourg, who was already in -face of Lumley’s squadrons! Half-an-hour had thus sufficed to render -Beresford’s position nearly desperate; for two-thirds of the French -had been thrown in order of battle across his right, while his army, -disordered and of different nations, was still in the act of changing -its front. Vainly he strove to get the Spaniards forward and make room -for Stewart’s division, the French guns opened, their infantry threw -out a heavy musketry fire, their cavalry menaced different points, and -the Spaniards, falling fast, drew back. Soult thought the whole army -was yielding, he pushed forward his columns, his reserves came up the -hill, and General Ruty placed all the French batteries in position. - -At this moment William Stewart reached the foot of the height with the -brigade under Colborne, and that able officer, seeing the confusion -above, desired to form in order of battle previous to mounting; but -Stewart, whose boiling courage generally overlaid his judgment, -heedlessly led up in column of companies, passed the Spanish right and -attempted to open a line as the battalions arrived: he could not do it, -for so galling was the French fire that the foremost troops impatiently -charged, heavy rain obscured the view, and four regiments of hussars -and lancers, which, unseen, had gained the right flank, immediately -galloped upon the rear of the disordered brigade and slew or took -two-thirds: the 31st only, being still in column, escaped this charge -and maintained its ground, while the French horsemen, riding violently -over everything else, penetrated to all parts and captured six guns. -The tumult was great, and a lancer fell upon Beresford, but he, a man -of great strength, putting the spear aside, cast the trooper from his -saddle, and then a shift of wind blowed aside the smoke and mist, -whereupon Lumley, seeing the mischief from the plain below, sent four -squadrons up against the straggling hussars and cut many off. Penne -Villemur’s Spanish cavalry was at the same time directed to charge some -French horsemen in the plain, but when within a few yards of their foes -they turned and shamefully fled. - -Great was the disorder on the hill. The shrinking Spaniards were -in one part blindly firing, though the British troops were before -them, and in another part, flying before the lancers, would have -broken through the 29th, then advancing to the succour of Colborne; -but, terribly resolute, that regiment smote friends and foes without -distinction in their onward progress: meanwhile Beresford urging the -main body of the Spaniards to advance in his heat seized an ensign by -the breast and bore him and his colours by main force to the front, yet -the troops did not follow, and the coward ran back when released from -the marshal’s iron grasp. - -In this crisis, the weather, which had ruined Colborne’s brigade, saved -the day, for Soult could not see the whole field of battle and kept his -troops halted in masses when the decisive blow might have been struck. -His cavalry indeed, began to hem in that of the allies, yet the fire of -the horse-artillery enabled Lumley, covered by the bed of the Aroya and -supported by the fourth division, to check them; Colborne still kept -the height with the 31st Regiment, and the British artillery, under -Julius Hartman, was coming fast into action; William Stewart, also, -having escaped the lancers, was again mounting the hill with Houghton’s -brigade, which he brought on with the same vehemence but in a juster -order of battle. The day now cleared and a dreadful fire poured into -the thickest of the French columns taught Soult the fight was yet to be -won. - -Houghton’s regiments reached the height under a heavy cannonade, and -the 29th, after breaking through the fugitive Spaniards, was charged in -flank by the French lancers, but two companies, wheeling to the right, -foiled this attack; and then the third brigade of Stewart’s division -came up on the left, and the Spaniards under Zayas and Ballesteros -moved forward. Hartman’s artillery had made the enemy’s infantry -recoil, yet, soon recovering, they renewed the battle with greater -violence than before, and the cannon on both sides discharged showers -of grape at half-range, while the play of musketry was incessant -and often within pistol-shot; but the crowded columns of the French -embarrassed their battle, and the British line would not yield them an -inch of ground or a moment of time to open their ranks. Their fighting -was however fierce and dangerous. Stewart was twice wounded, Colonel -Duckworth was slain, and the gallant Houghton, having received many -wounds without shrinking, fell and died in the act of cheering on his -men. - -Still the struggle continued with unabated fury. Colonel Inglis, -twenty-two officers, and more than four hundred men, out of five -hundred and seventy, fell in the 57th alone, and the other regiments -were scarcely better off, not one-third were standing in any; their -ammunition failed, and as their fire slackened the enemy established -a column in advance upon the right flank, which the play of the -artillery could only check for a time, and in that dreadful crisis -Beresford wavered! Destruction stared him in the face, his personal -resources were exhausted and the unhappy thought of a retreat rose in -his agitated mind. He had before posted Hamilton’s Portuguese with a -view to a retrograde movement, and now sent Alten orders to abandon the -bridge of Albuera, to rally the Portuguese artillery on his Germans, -and take ground to cover a retreat by the Valverde road. But while the -commander was thus preparing to resign the contest, Colonel Hardinge, -using his name, had urged Cole to bring up the fourth division, and -then riding to the third brigade of Stewart’s division, which, under -Colonel Abercrombie, had hitherto been only slightly engaged, directed -it also to push forward. The die was thus cast, Beresford acquiesced, -Alten received orders to retake the village, and this terrible battle -was continued. - -Two brigades of the fourth division were present, one of Portuguese -under General Harvey, the other under Sir William Myers, composed of -the 7th and 23rd Regiments, was called the fusileer brigade. Harvey, -pushing between Lumley’s cavalry and the hill, was charged by some -French horse and beat them off, while Cole led the fusileers up the -contested height. At this time six guns were in the enemy’s possession, -Werlé’s reserve was pressing forward to reinforce the French front, and -the remnant of Houghton’s brigade could no longer maintain its ground, -the field was heaped with carcasses, the lancers were riding furiously -about the captured artillery on the upper parts of the hill, and -Hamilton’s Portuguese and Alten’s Germans, withdrawing from the bridge, -seemed to be in full retreat. Soon however Cole’s fusileers, flanked -by a battalion of the Lusitanian legion under Colonel Hawkshawe, -surmounted the hill, drove off the lancers, recovered five guns and -one colour, and passed the right of Houghton’s brigade, precisely as -Abercrombie passed its left. - -Such a gallant line, issuing from the midst of the smoke and rapidly -separating itself from the confused and broken multitude, startled the -enemy’s masses, then augmenting and pressing onwards as to an assured -victory; they wavered, hesitated, and vomiting forth a storm of fire -hastily endeavoured to enlarge their front, while a fearful discharge -of grape from all their artillery whistled through the British ranks. -Myers was killed, Cole, the three colonels, Ellis, Blakeney and -Hawkshawe fell wounded, and the fusileer battalions, struck by the iron -tempest, reeled and staggered like sinking ships: but suddenly and -sternly recovering they closed on their terrible enemies, and then was -seen with what a strength and majesty the British soldier fights. In -vain did Soult with voice and gesture animate his Frenchmen; in vain -did the hardiest veterans, breaking from the crowded columns, sacrifice -their lives to gain time for the mass to open out on such a fair -field; in vain did the mass itself bear up, and fiercely striving fire -indiscriminately upon friends and foes, while the horsemen hovering on -the flank threatened to charge the advancing line. Nothing could stop -that astonishing infantry. No sudden burst of undisciplined valour, -no nervous enthusiasm weakened the stability of their order, their -flashing eyes were bent on the dark columns in their front, their -measured tread shook the ground, their dreadful volleys swept away -the head of every formation, their deafening shouts overpowered the -dissonant cries that broke from all parts of the tumultuous crowd, as -slowly and with a horrid carnage it was pushed by the incessant vigour -of the attack to the farthest edge of the height. There the French -reserve, mixing with the struggling multitude, endeavoured to restore -the fight but only augmented the irremediable disorder, and the mighty -mass giving way like a loosened cliff went headlong down the steep: -the rain flowed after in streams discoloured with blood, and eighteen -hundred unwounded men, the remnant of six thousand unconquerable -British soldiers, stood triumphant on the fatal hill! - -While the fusileers were battling above, the cavalry and Harvey’s -brigade advanced, and Latour Maubourg’s dragoons, battered also -by Lefebre’s guns, retired before them, yet still threatening the -fusileers with their right, and with their left preventing Lumley -falling on the defeated infantry. The crisis was however past, and -Beresford, seeking to profit from the circumstances of the moment, made -Alten retake Albuera, supported him with Blake’s first line, which -had not been engaged, and quickly brought up Hamilton’s and Collins’s -Portuguese, ten thousand fresh men, to strengthen the fusileers and -Abercrombie’s brigade. But so rapid was the execution of the last, -the enemy was never attained by these reserves, which yet suffered -severely, for Ruty having set the French guns altogether, worked them -with prodigious activity while the fifth corps was still making head, -and when the day was irrevocably lost, he regained the other side of -the Albuera and protected the passage of the broken infantry. - -Beresford, too hardly handled to pursue, now formed a front with the -Portuguese parallel to the heights where Soult’s troops were rallying, -and though the action continued a short time after at the bridge, all -was terminated before three o’clock. The serious fighting had endured -only four hours, and in that time seven thousand allies and above eight -thousand of their adversaries were struck down. Three French generals -were wounded, two slain, and eight hundred soldiers so badly hurt as to -be left on the field. On Beresford’s side only two thousand Spaniards -and six hundred Germans and Portuguese were killed or wounded, and with -what resolution the pure British fought was thus made manifest, for -they had but eighteen hundred men left standing! The laurel is nobly -won when the exhausted victor reels as he places it on his bleeding -front. The French took five hundred unwounded prisoners, a howitzer and -several stand of colours. The British had no trophy to boast of, but -the horrid piles of carcasses within their lines told with dreadful -eloquence who were the conquerors, and all that night the rain poured -down, and the river and the hills and the woods resounded with the -dismal clamour and groans of dying men. - -Beresford was oppressed with the number of his wounded, far exceeding -the sound amongst the British soldiers. When the picquets were posted -few remained to help the sufferers, and in this cruel distress he sent -Hardinge to demand assistance from Blake; but wrath and mortified -pride were predominant with that general; he refused, saying, it was -customary with allies for each to take care of their own men. Yet the -British had fought for Spain. - -Morning came and both armies remained in their respective situations, -the wounded still covering the field of battle, the hostile lines still -menacing and dangerous. The greater number had fallen with the French, -the best soldiers with the allies, and Soult’s dark masses of cavalry -and artillery, covering all his front, seemed able alone to contend -again for victory. The right of the French appeared also to threaten -the Badajos road, and Beresford in gloom and doubt awaited another -attack; soon however the third brigade of the fourth division came up -from Jerumenha, and then the second division retook its old ground -between the Valverde and Badajos roads: on the 18th Soult retreated. - -He left to English generosity several hundred men too deeply wounded -to be removed, but all those who could travel he had, in the night -of the 17th, sent by the royal road of Monasterio to Seville; and -now, protecting his movements with his horsemen and six battalions of -infantry, he filed his right on to the road of Solano. When this flank -march was completed, Latour Maubourg covered the rear with the heavy -dragoons, while Briché protected the march of the wounded men by the -royal road. - -Beresford sent Hamilton to re-invest Badajos, and the whole of his -cavalry, supported by Alten’s Germans, after the French; but soon -Wellington, hurrying from the north, reached the field of battle and -directed him to follow the enemy cautiously in person, while the third -and seventh divisions, just come down from the Coa, completed the -reinvestment of the fortress. - -Soult now took a permanent position at Llerena, to await the junction -of Drouet’s division and reinforcements from Andalusia, resolved to -contend again for Badajos. Meanwhile his cavalry advanced to Usagre -designing to scour the country beyond; but the only outlet from that -place was a bridge over a river with steep banks, which the French -general Bron passed rashly with two regiments and being charged by -General Lumley lost two hundred men. This terminated Beresford’s -operations. The miserable state to which the Regency had reduced the -Portuguese troops required his presence at Lisbon and General Hill -succeeded to his command. - - -RENEWED SIEGE OF BADAJOS. (May, 1811.) - -Lord Wellington had left General Spencer with an army to straiten -Ciudad Rodrigo and watch Marmont, who had succeeded Massena; but -Marmont could from the Salamanca country cross the mountains and join -Soult to disturb the siege of Badajos, and in that case Spencer, who -had a shorter line, was to join Wellington. With this precaution it was -hoped the place might be taken. But though no operation in war is so -certain as a modern siege, if the rules of art are strictly followed, -no operation is less open to irregular daring: the engineer can -neither be hurried nor delayed without danger. Now the time required -by the French to gather in force depended on Marmont, whose march from -Salamanca by the mountain passes could not be stopped by Spencer: it -was also possible for him to pass the Tagus on the shortest line by -fords near Alcantara. But Beresford’s siege had damaged the carriages -of the battering guns, eleven days were required to repair them, and -the scanty means of transport for stores was diminished by carrying the -wounded from Albuera: hence more than fifteen days of open trenches, -including nine days of fire, could not be expected. With good guns, -plentiful stores and regular sappers and miners, this time would have -sufficed; but none of these things were in the camp, and it was a -keen jest of Picton to say, “_Lord Wellington sued Badajos in formâ -pauperis_.” His guns were of soft brass, false in their bore, and the -shot of different sizes, the largest being too small; the Portuguese -gunners were inexperienced, there were few British artillery-men, few -engineers, no sappers or miners, and no time to teach the troops of the -line how to make fascines and gabions. - -Regular and sure approaches against the body of the place, first -reducing the outworks, could not now be attempted; yet Beresford’s -lines against the castle and Fort Christoval might be renewed, avoiding -his errors; that is to say, by pushing the attacks simultaneously -and with more powerful means. This plan was adopted, and something -was hoped from the inhabitants, something from the effect of Soult’s -retreat after Albuera. The battering train was of fifty pieces, a -convoy of engineers’ stores came up from Alcacer do Sal, and a company -of British artillery was on the march from Lisbon to be mixed with the -Portuguese, making a total of six hundred gunners. Volunteers from -the line acted as assistant engineers, and a draft of three hundred -intelligent infantry soldiers, including twenty-five artificers of the -staff corps, were employed as sappers. - -Hamilton’s Portuguese first invested the place on the left bank, and, -the 24th of May, General Houston, having five thousand men, invested -San Christoval; a flying bridge was then laid down on the Guadiana -below the town, and Picton, crossing that river by a ford above, joined -Hamilton. Hill commanded the covering army, all the cavalry was pushed -forward in observation of Soult, and when intelligence of Drouet’s -junction was obtained, two regiments of cavalry and two brigades of -infantry, which had been quartered at Coria as posts of communication -with Spencer, were called up to reinforce Hill. - -Phillipon had during the interval of siege levelled Beresford’s -trenches, repaired his own damages, mounted more guns and obtained a -small supply of wine and vegetables from the people of Estremadura, who -were still awed by the presence of Soult’s army. Within the place all -was quiet, the citizens did not now exceed five thousand souls, and -many of them were seen, mixed with soldiers, working at the defences; -hence, as retrenchments in the castle behind the intended points of -attack would have prolonged the siege beyond the calculated period, -Lord Wellington to obtain timely notice of such works had a large -telescope placed in the tower of La Lyppe near Elvas, by which the -interior of the castle could be searched. - -In the night of the 29th the engineers broke ground for a false attack, -and the following night sixteen hundred workmen, with a covering party -of twelve hundred, sunk a parallel against the castle without being -discovered; at the same time twelve hundred workmen, covered by a guard -of eight hundred, opened a parallel four hundred and fifty yards from -San Christoval and seven hundred yards from the bridge-head. On this -line, one breaching and two counter batteries were raised against the -fort and bridge-head, to prevent a sally from the last point; a fourth -battery was also commenced to search the defences of the castle, but -the workmen were discovered and a heavy fire struck down many. - -On the 31st the attack against the castle, where the soil was soft, -advanced rapidly; but Christoval being on a rock, earth had to be -brought from the rear and the attack proceeded slowly and with -considerable loss. This day the British artillery company came up on -mules from Estremos, the engineer hastened his work, and, to save time, -prematurely traced a work for fourteen twenty-four pounders with six -large howitzers to batter the castle. - -On the Christoval side the batteries were not finished until the night -of the 1st of June, for the soil was so rocky the miner had to level -ground for platforms, while mortars, of eighteen inches’ diameter, -sent shells from the castle unerringly amongst the workmen; these -huge missiles would have ruined the works on that side if they had -not been on the edge of a ridge, down which most of the shells rolled -before bursting: yet so difficult is it to judge rightly in war, -that Phillipon stopped this fire, thinking it was thrown away![20] -The progress of the works was so delayed by bringing up earth, that -woolpacks purchased at Elvas were adopted as a substitute, and on the -2nd, all the batteries being completed and armed with forty-three -pieces of different sizes, twenty were pointed against the castle. The -shot being too small for the guns the fire was very ineffectual at -first, and five pieces became unserviceable; but towards evening the -practice became steadier, the fire of Christoval was nearly silenced, -and the covering of masonry fell from the castle-wall, discovering a -perpendicular bank of clay. - -In the night of the 3rd a fresh battery for seven guns was traced -against the castle, about six hundred yards from the breach, but the -4th the garrison’s fire was also increased by additional guns, six of -the besiegers’ pieces were disabled, principally by their own fire, and -the batteries only slightly marked the bank of clay. At Christoval, the -fort was much injured, and some damage done to the castle also from -the batteries on that side, yet the guns were so soft that the rate of -firing was much reduced. In the night the new battery was armed, the -damaged works repaired, and next day, as the enemy had caused a gun -from Christoval to plunge into the trenches on the castle side, the -parallel was deepened and traverses constructed to protect the troops. - -Fifteen uninjured pieces still played against the castle, and the bank -of clay fell away in flakes, yet it remained perpendicular. - -In the night the parallel against the castle was extended, a fresh -battery was traced out five hundred and twenty yards from the breach, -and on the Christoval side new batteries were opened and some old ones -abandoned. The garrison now began to retrench the castle breach, and -their workmen were soon covered, while from Christoval two pieces of -artillery plunged directly into the trenches with great effect: on the -other hand the clay bank took a slope nearly practicable, and stray -shells set fire to the houses nearest the castle. - -On the 6th, one of two breaches in Christoval being judged practicable, -a company of grenadiers with twelve ladders was ordered to assault, a -second turned the fort to divert the enemy’s attention, three hundred -men cut the communication between the fort and the bridge, and a -detachment with a six-pounder moved into the valley of the Gebora to -prevent any passage of the Guadiana by boats. - - -FIRST ASSAULT OF CHRISTOVAL. (June, 1811.) - -Major M‘Intosh of the 85th Regiment led the stormers, preceded by -a forlorn hope under Lieutenant Dyas of the 51st, and that gallant -gentleman, guided by the engineer Forster, a young man of uncommon -bravery, reached the glacis and descended the ditch without being -discovered; but the French had cleared the rubbish away, seven feet of -perpendicular wall remained, carts and pointed beams of wood chained -together were placed above, and shells were ranged along the ramparts -to roll down. The forlorn hope finding the opening impracticable was -retiring, when the main body, which had been exposed to a flank fire -from the town as well as a direct fire from the fort, came leaping into -the ditch with ladders and strove to escalade; but the ladders were too -short, the garrison, seventy-five men besides the cannoneers, made a -stout resistance, the confusion and mischief occasioned by the bursting -of the shells was great, and the stormers were beaten off with the loss -of more than a hundred men. - -Bad success produces disputes. The failure was attributed by some -to the breach being impracticable from the first, by others to the -confusion which arose after the main body had entered. French writers -affirm that the breach, practicable on the night of the 5th was not -so on the 6th, because the besiegers did not attack until midnight -and thus gave the workmen time to remove the ruins and raise fresh -obstacles: the bravery of the soldiers, who were provided with three -muskets each, did the rest. The combinations for the assault were -however not well calculated: the storming party was too weak, the -ladders too few and short, the breach not sufficiently scoured by the -fire of the batteries, and the leading troops were repulsed before -the main body had descended the ditch. In such attacks the supports -should almost form one body with the leaders, for the sense of power -derived from numbers is a strong incentive to valour, and obstacles, -insurmountable to a few, vanish before a multitude. - -During the storm six iron guns were placed in battery against the -castle, but two brass pieces became unserviceable, and the following -day three others were disabled. However the bank of clay seemed to -offer now a good slope, and in the night the engineer Patton examined -it closely; he was mortally wounded in returning, yet lived to report -it practicable. At Christoval the garrison continued to clear away the -ruins at the foot of the breach, made interior retrenchments with bales -of wool and other materials, ranged huge shells and barrels of powder -with matches along the ramparts, and gave the defenders, chosen men, -four muskets each. In this state of affairs news came that Drouet was -close to Llerena, and Marmont on the move from Salamanca, wherefore -Wellington ordered another assault on Christoval at both breaches. -Four hundred men, carrying sixteen long ladders, were employed, the -supports were better closed up, the appointed hour was nine instead of -twelve, and more detachments were planted on the right and left to cut -off communication with the town; but Phillipon, in opposition, made the -garrison two hundred strong. - - -SECOND ASSAULT OF CHRISTOVAL. (June, 1811.) - -Major M‘Geechy commanded the stormers, the forlorn hope, again led by -the gallant Dyas, was accompanied by the engineer Hunt, and a little -after nine o’clock the leading troops bounded forward, followed by the -support, amidst a shattering fire of musketry which killed M‘Geechy, -Hunt, and many men upon the glacis. Loudly shouted the British as -they jumped into the ditch, but the French scoffingly called them on, -and rolling down the barrels of powder and shells made fearful and -rapid havoc. A column had been designed for each breach, yet both -came together at the main breach, where some confusion about the -ladders caused only a few to be reared, and the enemy, standing on the -ramparts, bayoneted the foremost assailants, overturned the ladders, -and again poured their destructive fire upon the crowd below until one -hundred and forty fell and the rest retired. - -The castle breach remained for assault, yet the troops could not -form between the top and the retrenchments behind the opening unless -Christoval was taken, and its guns used to clear the interior of the -castle; but to take Christoval required several days; hence, as Soult -was ready to advance, the stores were removed and the attack turned -into a blockade, the allies having lost four hundred men and officers: -the process of siege had been altogether false and irregular. - -Marmont now joined Soult, Spencer joined Wellington, and the 19th of -June the French armies entered Badajos. The allies were only a few -miles off holding both sides of the Caya, a small river flowing between -Elvas and Campo Mayor into the Guadiana: yet their disposition was -so skilfully concealed by undulating ground and woods, that on the -23rd the French marshals were forced to send out two exploring bodies -of cavalry to obtain information. One column cut off a squadron of -the 11th Light Dragoons, and the 2nd German Hussars escaped it with -difficulty; the other column was checked by the heavy dragoons and -Madden’s Portuguese cavalry with a sharp skirmish, in which happened a -single combat similar to that between Ariosto’s Rogero and Mandricardo. -An English horseman, standing high in his stirrups with raised sword, -encountered a French officer who pierced him under the arm; slowly the -weapon was driven through his body, yet no shrinking motion could be -observed; he seemed only to give more force to his descending weapon, -which bit into the Frenchman’s brain and both fell dead together. - -Soult and Marmont had above sixty thousand men in line, seven thousand -being cavalry, with ninety guns. Wellington had only twenty-eight -thousand sabres and bayonets, and the country, a cavalry one, furnished -no position to compensate for inferior numbers: a battle gained would -certainly have terminated the war. Yet the crisis passed without -mischief, because Wellington so concealed his weakness, and outfaced -his enemies with such audacity, such a blending of resolution and -genius that the French marshals retired and separated without striking! -The political and military difficulties supported and overcome by the -English general at this period were indeed most extraordinary, and must -be sought for in my History of the War, from which this work, treating -only of combats, is extracted. - - - - -BOOK VI. - - Blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo--Combat of Elbodon--Combat of Aldea de - Ponte--Surprise of Aroyo de Molinos--Defence of Tarifa--English - Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo--Third English Siege of Badajos--Assault - of Picurina--Assault of Badajos. - - -BLOCKADE OF CIUDAD RODRIGO. (Sept. 1811.) - -After the second siege of Badajos the contest in the Peninsula -presented a new phase. French reinforcements were poured into Spain, -forty thousand old soldiers entered by the northern line alone, and -General Dorsenne took command of the _Army of the North_, which now -contained seventeen thousand of Napoleon’s young guard. The king had a -particular force about Madrid called the _Army of the Centre_; Soult -commanded the _Army of the South_; Marmont the _Army of Portugal_, -with which, by the emperor’s orders, he took post in the valley of the -Tagus, leaving a division at Truxillo south of that river, establishing -a bridge of communication at Almaraz, which he fortified on both sides -strongly. - -This disposition of the French armies was at once offensive and -defensive. Portugal was menaced from the north by Dorsenne, who had -Ciudad Rodrigo as an advanced place of arms; from the south by Soult, -who had Badajos for an advanced place of arms; in the centre by -Marmont, who could march on Abrantes, join Dorsenne, or unite with -Soult. In defence the French were still more powerful. If Wellington -assailed Dorsenne, the latter by retiring could concentrate a great -force, while Marmont acted on the English right flank; and together -they could present seventy thousand men in line. If he assailed Soult, -as he had indeed designed before the failure of Badajos, Marmont could -act on his left flank, and, united with Soult, could present sixty-five -thousand fighting men. If he marched against Marmont by either bank of -the Tagus, that marshal, reinforced with detachments from Dorsenne, -Soult, and the king, could deliver battle with more than seventy -thousand men. - -The English general could not contend with such powerful armies beyond -the mountains of Portugal, yet from political pressure he could not -stand still, and there were defects in his adversaries’ breast-plate -through which he hoped to pierce. He saw that Badajos and Rodrigo were -isolated and difficult to provision; that each depended for succour on -the junction of armies under generals of equal authority, ill disposed -to act together, and whose communications were long and uneasy, -furnishing pretences for non-coöperation. Marmont had indeed a direct -line of intercourse with Dorsenne across the Gredos mountains, by the -fortified pass of Baños; but to reach Soult the Tagus was to be crossed -at Almaraz, the defiles of Estremadura and the passes of the Morena to -be threaded before a junction could be made in the plains of Badajos: -wherefore, General Girard, having the remains of Mortier’s army, called -_the fifth corps_, was employed as a moving column in Estremadura, to -support Badajos and connect the army of Portugal with that of Soult. - -In this state of affairs Wellington, who had received large -reinforcements after the siege of Badajos, left General Hill, in -August, with twelve thousand men of all arms to keep Girard in check, -and in person marched to the north, under pretence of seeking healthy -quarters for his sickly troops, really to blockade Ciudad Rodrigo, -which an intercepted letter described as wanting provisions; it had -however been previously supplied by Bessières before he quitted his -command, and this effort was frustrated. The army was then placed near -the sources of the Agueda and Coa, close to the line of communication -between Marmont and Dorsenne, and preparations were made for a siege, -in the notion that the last general’s force was weak: but that also was -an error, and when discovered, a blockade was established. Almeida, -whose renewed walls had been destroyed by Spencer when he marched to -the south, was now repaired for a place of arms, the bridge over the -Coa was restored, and with the utmost subtilty of combination and the -most extensive arrangements the English general, while appearing only -to blockade, secretly prepared for a siege. All his art was indeed -required, for though the Anglo-Portuguese were at this time eighty -thousand on paper, with ninety guns, twenty-two thousand men were in -hospital; wherefore, Hill’s corps being deducted, less than forty-five -thousand were on the watch to snatch a fortress which was in the -keeping of eighty thousand. - -In September Rodrigo called for succour, whereupon Marmont and Dorsenne -advanced to its relief with sixty thousand men, six thousand being -cavalry, and they had a hundred pieces of artillery. Wellington could -not fight this great army beyond the Agueda, but would not retreat -until he had seen all their force, lest a detachment should relieve the -place to his dishonour. In this view he took the following positions. - -Picton’s division, reinforced with three squadrons of German and -British cavalry, was placed at the heights of Elbodon and Pastores, -on the left of the Agueda, within three miles of Rodrigo. The light -division with some squadrons of cavalry and six guns, were posted on -the right of the Agueda, at the Vadillo, a river with a rugged channel -falling into the Agueda three miles above Rodrigo: from this line an -enemy coming from the eastern passes of the hills could be discerned. -The sixth division and Anson’s brigade of cavalry, forming the left of -the army, was under General Graham at Espeja, on the Lower Azava, with -advanced posts at Carpio and Marialva, from whence to Rodrigo was eight -miles over a plain. Julian Sanchez’s Partida watched the Lower Agueda, -and the heads of columns were thus presented to the fortress on three -points, namely, Vadillo, Pastores and Espeja. Two brigades of heavy -cavalry on the Upper Azava, supported by Pack’s Portuguese, connected -Graham with Elbodon; but he was very distant from Guinaldo, the pivot -of operations, and to obviate the danger of a flank march in retreat -the first and seventh divisions were posted in succession towards -Guinaldo. The army was thus spread out on different roads, like the -sticks of a fan, having their point of union on the Coa. - -This disposition was faulty. Broad heights lining the left bank of the -Agueda ended abruptly above the villages of Elbodon and Pastores, and -were flanked in their whole length by woods and great plains, extending -from Rodrigo to the Coa; they could not therefore be held against an -enemy commanding those plains, and if the French pushed along them -suddenly, beyond Guinaldo, the distant wings could be cut off. At -Guinaldo however, three field redoubts had been constructed on high -open ground, to impose upon the enemy and so gain time to assemble and -feel his disposition for a battle, because a retreat beyond the Coa was -to be avoided if possible. - -On the 23rd the French encamped behind the hills northeast of Rodrigo, -and a strong detachment, entering the plain, looked at the light -division on the Vadillo and returned. - -The 24th, six thousand cavalry and four divisions of infantry crossed -the hills in two columns to introduce the convoy, while on the English -side the fourth division occupied the position of Guinaldo, and the -redoubts were completed. No other change was made, for it was thought -the French would not advance further; but the 25th, soon after -daybreak, fourteen squadrons of the imperial guards drove Graham’s -outpost from Carpio across the Azava; the Lancers of Berg then crossed -that river in pursuit, but were flanked by some infantry in a wood -and beaten back by two squadrons of the 14th and 16th Dragoons, -who re-occupied the post of Carpio. During this skirmish, fourteen -battalions of infantry and thirty squadrons of cavalry, with twelve -guns, under Montbrun, passing the Agueda at Rodrigo marched towards -Guinaldo; the road divided there, one branch turning the Elbodon -heights on the French right the other leading through Pastores and -Elbodon, and as the point of divarication was covered by a gentle -ridge, it was doubtful which branch would be taken. Soon that doubt -vanished. The cavalry pouring along the right-hand road leading to -Guinaldo, drove in the advanced posts, and without waiting for their -infantry fell on. - - -COMBAT OF ELBODON. (Sept. 1811.) - -The action began disadvantageously for the allies. The left of the -third division was turned, the 74th and 60th Regiments, being at -Pastores, far on the right, were too distant to be called in, and -Picton, having three other regiments at Elbodon, could take no -immediate part in the fight. Wellington sent to Guinaldo for a brigade -of the fourth division, and meanwhile directed General Colville to -draw up the 77th and 5th British Regiments, the 21st Portuguese and -two brigades of artillery of the same nation, on a hill over which -the road to Guinaldo passed, supporting their flanks with Alten’s -three squadrons. This position, convex towards the enemy, was covered, -front and flanks, by deep ravines; but it was too extensive, and -before Picton could come from Elbodon the crisis was over. Vainly the -Portuguese guns sent their shot through Montbrun’s horsemen, they -crossed the ravine in half squadrons, and with amazing vigour rode up -the rough height on three sides; neither the loose fire of the infantry -nor the artillery stopped them, but they were checked by the fine -fighting of the cavalry, who charged the heads of the ascending masses, -not once but twenty times, and always with a good will, maintaining the -upper ground for an hour. - -It was astonishing to see so few troopers resist that surging multitude -even on such steep ground; but when Montbrun, obstinate to win, brought -up his artillery, his horsemen, gaining ground in the centre, cut down -some gunners and captured the Portuguese guns, and at the same time -one German squadron, charging too far, got entangled in the ravines. -The danger was then imminent, but suddenly the 5th Regiment, led by -Major Ridge, a daring man, dashed bodily into the midst of the French -cavalry and retook the artillery, which again opened, while the 77th, -supported by the 21st Portuguese, vigorously repulsed the enemy on the -left. These charges of infantry against a powerful cavalry, which had -room to expand, could however only check the foe at particular points, -and Montbrun pressed with fresh masses against the left of the allies, -while other squadrons penetrated between their right and the village of -Elbodon, from the inclosures and vineyards of which Picton was, with -difficulty and some confusion, extricating his regiments. He could -give no succour, the brigade of the fourth division was not in sight, -the French infantry was rapidly approaching, and Wellington therefore -directed both Picton and Colville to fall back and unite in the plain -behind. - -Colville, forming his battalions in two squares, descended at once -from the hill, but Picton had a considerable distance to move, there -was a great interval, and at that moment, the cavalry, fearing to be -surrounded, galloped for refuge to the Portuguese regiment, which -was farthest in retreat. Then the 5th and 77th, two weak battalions -formed in one square, were quite exposed, and in an instant the whole -of the French horsemen came thundering down upon them. But how vain, -how fruitless to match the sword with the musket, to send the charging -horseman against the steadfast veteran! The multitudinous squadrons, -rending the skies with their shouts, closed upon the glowing squares -like the falling edges of a burning crater, and were as instantly -rejected, scorched and scattered abroad; then a rolling peal of -musketry echoed through the hills, bayonets glittered at the edge of -the smoke, and with firm and even step the British regiments came forth -like the holy men from the Assyrian’s furnace. - -Picton now effected his junction and the whole retired to Guinaldo, -about six miles. The French would not renew the close attack, yet plied -shot and shell until the entrenched camp was gained; there the fourth -division presented a fresh front, Pack then came in from Campillo, the -heavy cavalry from the Upper Azava, and as it was near dusk the action -ceased. The 74th and 60th Regiments, posted at Pastores, were abandoned -by this retreat, but they crossed the Agueda at a ford, and moving up -the right bank reached Guinaldo in the night after a march of fifteen -hours. - -Graham had early received orders to fall back on the first division, -yet to keep posts of observation on the Azava, while Sanchez’s infantry -went behind the Coa; the guerilla chief himself passed with his cavalry -to the French rear, and the seventh division was withdrawn behind the -left wing, which was now in line with the centre, though still distant. -The light division should have come by Robledo to Fuente Guinaldo; -Craufurd received the order at three o’clock, heard the cannonade, and -might have reached it before midnight; but fearing a march in darkness -he merely retired a league from the Vadillo, which was immediately -passed by fifteen hundred French; Guinaldo was thus maintained by -only fourteen thousand men, two thousand six hundred being cavalry. -Graham was ten miles distant; the light division, debarred of a direct -route by the enemy, was sixteen miles distant; the fifth division, -posted at Payo in the mountains, was twelve miles distant; and during -the night and the following day, Marmont united sixty thousand men in -front of Guinaldo. The English general was thus in great danger, yet -he would not abandon the light division, which, intercepted by the -French cavalry at Robledo, did not arrive until after three o’clock in -the evening. Marmont’s fortune was fixed in that hour! He knew not how -matters really stood. He detached a strong column by the valley of the -Azava to menace the allies’ left, and made an ostentatious display of -the Imperial Guards in the plain, instead of attacking an adversary who -laughed to see him so employed, and soon changed the state of affairs. - -In the night, by an able concentric movement, Wellington united his -whole army on new ground between the Coa and the sources of the Agueda, -twelve miles behind Guinaldo. Marmont, unconscious of his advantages, -instead of troubling this difficult movement had also retired in -the night, and was marching back when the scouts of his column in -the valley of Azava reported that the allies were in retreat, and -their divisions widely separated. Then discovering all the deceit -of Guinaldo, and the escape of the light division, he prophetically -exclaimed, alluding to Napoleon’s fortune, _And Wellington, he also -has a star._ In this mood he would have continued his retreat, but it -is said Dorsenne forced him to wheel round and pursue: Wellington was -then however in a strong position behind the stream of the Villa Maior, -where he could not be turned, and where it covered all the practicable -roads leading to the bridges and fords of the Coa. - - -COMBAT OF ALDEAPONTE. (Sept. 1811.) - -The French moved by two roads against the right and centre. Checked -on the first by the light division, on the second their horsemen -drove the cavalry posts across the Villa Maior and took possession of -Aldeaponte, where at twelve o’clock the head of their infantry attacked -a brigade of the fourth division, posted on opposing heights, under -General Pakenham. Wellington arriving at that moment directed a charge, -and the French were driven back; they attempted to turn the brigade -by a wood on their own left while their cavalry advanced to the foot -of the hills, but the artillery sufficed to baffle the effort, and -then the English general, taking the offensive, turned their left and -seized the opposite hills: this finished the action and Aldeaponte was -re-occupied. Wellington, who had been much exposed to fire, rode to -another part, yet scarcely had he departed when the French from the -other road joined those near Aldeaponte, and at five o’clock retook the -village; Pakenham recovered it, but the enemy was very numerous, the -country rugged, and so wooded he could not tell what was passing on the -flanks: wherefore, knowing the chosen ground of battle was behind the -Coa, he abandoned Aldeaponte for his original post. - -In the night the allies retreated, and on the morning of the 28th -occupied a new and strong position in a deep loop of the Coa, where -it could only be attacked on a narrow front; but the French, who had -brought only a few days’ provisions and could gather none in that -country, retired the same day. Dorsenne marched to Salamanca, a strong -division was posted at Alba de Tormes to communicate with Marmont, and -the latter resumed his old position in the valley of the Tagus. The -light division, reinforced by some cavalry, now resumed the nominal -blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo, in concert with Julian Sanchez; the rest of -the army was cantoned on both sides of the Coa and head-quarters were -fixed at Freneda. - -Only three hundred men and officers fell in these combats on the -British side. The French lost more, because of the unreturned fire at -Elbodon, and here a fine chivalric action on their side merits notice. -In one of the cavalry fights, an officer in the act of striking at -Felton Harvey of the 14th Dragoons, perceived that he had but one arm -and with a rapid change brought down his sword to a salute and passed -on! - - -SURPRISE OF ARROYO DE MOLINOS. (Oct. 1811.) - -While Rodrigo was being blockaded, General Hill co-operated with the -Spaniards in Estremadura against General Drouet, who first joined -Girard, but after various movements returned to the Morena, leaving -his colleague at Caceres between the Tagus and the Guadiana. From -that place Hill drove him the 26th of October, and hoping to cut him -off from the bridge of Merida, moved by a cross road next day. On -the march he heard Girard had halted in Arroyo de Molinos, leaving -a rear-guard on the Caceres road--thus showing he knew not of the -cross-road movement and looked for pursuit only from Caceres. With a -rapid decision and a forced march the English general moved in the -night upon Alcuesca, just one league from Arroyo, which was in a plain, -and close behind it rose a rocky sierra, crescent-shaped, and about two -miles wide on the chord. From Alcuesca one road led direct to Arroyo, -another entered it on the left, and three led from it, the most distant -of the last being the Truxillo road, which rounded the extremity of -the sierra; the nearest was the Merida road, and between them was that -of Medellin. The weather was very stormy and wet, but no fires were -permitted in the allies’ camp, and at two o’clock in the morning of the -28th the troops moved to a low ridge half a mile from Arroyo, under -cover of which they formed three bodies--the infantry on the wings, -the cavalry in the centre. The left column marched straight upon the -village, the right towards the extreme point of the sierra, where the -Truxillo road turned the horn of the crescent, the cavalry kept the -centre. - -One brigade of Girard’s division had marched at four o’clock by the -road of Medellin, but Dombrouski’s brigade and the cavalry of Briche -were still in the place, and the horses of the rear-guard, unbridled, -were tied to trees. The infantry were gathering on the Medellin road -outside the village, and Girard was in a house waiting for his horse, -when two British officers galloped into the street and in an instant -all was confusion; hastily the cavalry bridled their horses and the -infantry ran to their alarm-posts, but a tempest raged, a thick mist -rolled down the craggy mountain, a terrific shout was heard amidst -the clatter of the elements, and with the driving storm the 71st and -92nd Regiments came charging down. The French rear-guard of horsemen, -fighting and struggling hard, were driven to the end of the village, -where the infantry, forming their squares, endeavoured to cover the -main body of the cavalry; but then the 71st, lining the garden walls, -opened a galling fire on the nearest square, the 92nd, filing out of -the streets, formed upon the French right, and the 50th Regiment, -following closely, secured the prisoners. - -The rest of the column, headed by the Spanish cavalry, skirted outside -the houses to intercept the line of retreat, and soon the guns opened -on the squares, and the 13th Dragoons captured the French artillery, -while the 9th Dragoons and German Hussars dispersed their cavalry. -Girard, an intrepid officer, although wounded, still kept his infantry -together, retreating by the Truxillo road; but the right column of -the allies was in possession of that line, the cavalry and artillery -were close upon his flank, and the left column followed fast; his -men fell by fifties and his situation was desperate, yet he would -not surrender, and giving the word to disperse endeavoured to scale -the almost inaccessible rocks of the sierra. His pursuers, not less -obstinate, immediately divided. The Spaniards ascended the hills at -an easier point beyond his left; the 39th Regiment and Ashworth’s -Portuguese turned the mountain by the Truxillo road; the 28th and -34th, led by General Howard, followed him step by step up the rocks, -taking prisoners, but finally the pursuers, heavily loaded, were beaten -in speed by men who had thrown away their arms and packs. Girard, -Dombrouski, and Briche, escaped into the Guadalupe mountains, and then -crossing the Guadiana at Orellana, on the 9th of November rejoined -Drouet with six hundred men, the remains of three thousand: they were -said to be the finest troops then in Spain, and their resolution in -such an appalling situation was no mean proof of their excellence. - -Thirteen hundred prisoners, including General Bron and the Prince of -Aremberg, all the artillery, baggage, commissariat, and a contribution -just raised, were taken. The allies had seventy killed and wounded, -and one officer, Lieutenant Strenowitz, was taken. He was an Austrian, -and distinguished for courage and successful enterprises, but he had -abandoned the French to join Julian Sanchez, and was liable to death by -the laws of war. Originally forced into the French service he was, in -reality, no deserter, and General Hill applied frankly in his favour -to Drouet, who was so good-tempered that, while smarting under this -disaster, he released his prisoner. - -This exploit set all the French corps in motion to revenge it; yet on -the 28th of November Hill, by a forced march, again surprised three -hundred infantry and some hussars under Captain Neveux, who however -lost only forty men, escaping the British cavalry, said his generous -antagonist, by “_the intrepid and admirable manner in which he -retreated_.” - - -DEFENCE OF TARIFA. (Dec. 1811.) - -Soult had long resolved to reduce the maritime town of Tarifa, but -General Campbell, governor of Gibraltar, equally resolute to prevent -him, threw in an English garrison, under Colonel Skerrett. The defences -were ancient, the place being encircled with towers connected by an -archery wall, irregular, without a ditch, and too thin to resist even -field artillery. It was commanded also by heights within cannon-shot, -but the English engineer Smith[21] adapted the defence to the -peculiarities of ground so skilfully as to fix the enemy’s attention -entirely to one point, which offered facilities for an internal -resistance, to begin when the weak ramparts should be broken. - -Tarifa was cloven by a periodical torrent, entering at the east and -passing out at the west. It was barred at the entrance by a tower with -a portcullis, in front of which palisades were planted across its bed. -The houses within the walls were strongly built on inclined planes, -rising from each side of the torrent; and at the exit of the water were -two massive structures, called the tower and castle of the Gusmans, -both looking up the hollow formed by the inclined planes. From these -structures, a sandy neck, prolonged by a causeway for eight hundred -yards, joined the town to an island, whose perpendicular sides forbade -entrance save by the causeway which ended on an unfinished entrenchment -and battery. - -On the neck of land were sand hills, the highest, called the Catalina, -being scarped and crowned with a field-work holding a twelve-pounder. -This hill masked the causeway towards the enemy, and with the tower of -the Gusmans, which was armed with a ship eighteen-pounder, flanked the -western front of the tower. This tower gun also shot clear over Tarifa -to the slope where the French batteries were expected, and there were a -ship of the line, a frigate, and some gun-boats, anchored to flank the -approaches. - -Smith deterred the enemy from attacking the western front by the -flanking fire of a fortified convent beyond the walls, by the Catalina -hill, and by the appearance of the shipping; but he deceitfully -tempted an attack on the eastern front and the line of the torrent, -whose bed rendered the inner depth of wall greater than the outer. -There he loopholed the houses behind, opened communications to the -rear, and barricaded the streets; so that the enemy, after forcing the -breach, would have been confined between the houses on the inclined -planes, exposed on each side to musketry from loopholes and windows, -and in front to a fire from the Gusmans, which looked up the bed of -the torrent; finally the garrison could have taken refuge in that -castle and tower, which, high and massive, were fitted to cover the -evacuation, and were provided with ladders for the troops to descend -and retreat to the island under protection of the Catalina. - -There was no want of guns. Besides those of the Catalina, there were -in the island twelve pieces, comprising four twenty-four pounders and -two ten-inch mortars; in the town were six field-pieces, with four -cohorns on the east front; an eighteen-pounder was on the Gusmans, a -howitzer on the portcullis tower, and two field-pieces were in reserve -for sallies: yet most of the island ordnance was mounted after the -investment, and the walls and towers of the town were too weak and -narrow to sustain heavy guns; hence only three field-pieces and the -cohorns did in fact reply to the enemy’s fire. - -The garrison, including six hundred Spanish infantry and one hundred -horse of that nation, amounted to two thousand five hundred men, of -whom seven hundred were in the island, one hundred in the Catalina, two -hundred in the convent, and fifteen hundred in the town. - -On the 19th of December, General Laval, having eight thousand men, -drove in the advanced posts, but was with a sharp skirmish designedly -led towards the eastern front. - -The 20th the place was invested, and the 21st some French troops -having incautiously approached the western front, Captain Wren of the -11th, suddenly descended from the Catalina and carried them off. In -the night the enemy approached close to the walls of that front, but -in the morning Wren again fell on them; and at the same time a sally -of discovery was made from the convent so vigorously that Lieutenant -Welstead of the 82nd, entering one of the enemy’s camps captured a -field-piece; he was unable to bring it off in face of the French -reserves, yet the latter were drawn by the skirmish under the fire -of the ships, of the island, and of the town, whereby they suffered -severely and with difficulty recovered the captured piece. - -In the night of the 22nd the anticipations of the British engineer were -realized. The enemy broke ground five hundred yards from the eastern -front, and worked assiduously until the 26th, under a destructive fire, -replying principally with wall-pieces, which would have done much -mischief if the garrison had not been copiously supplied with sand-bags. - -On the 23rd the ships were driven off in a gale; on the 29th the French -guns opened against the town and their howitzers against the island; -the piece at the Gusmans was dismounted, yet quickly re-established; -but the ramparts came down by flakes, and in a few hours opened a -wide breach a little to the English right of the portcullis tower. -Skerrett then proposed to abandon the place, and though strenuously -opposed by Major King and the engineer Smith, he would have done so, if -General Campbell, hearing of this intention, had not called away the -transports. Tarifa was indeed open to assault and escalade. But behind -the breach the depth to the street was fourteen feet, and Smith had -covered the ground below with iron gratings, having every second bar -turned up; the houses were also prepared and garrisoned, and the troops -well disposed on the ramparts, each regiment having its own quarter. -The breach was held by the 87th under Colonel Gough.[22] On his left -were some riflemen: on his right some Spaniards should have been, yet -were not, and two companies of the 47th took their place. - -In the night of the 29th the enemy fired salvos of grape, but the -besieged cleared the foot of the breach between the discharges. - -The 30th the breaching fire was renewed, and the wall, broken for -sixty feet, offered an easy ascent; yet the besieged again removed the -rubbish, and in the night were augmenting the defences, when, flooded -by rain, the torrent brought down from the French camp a mass of -planks, fascines, gabions, and dead bodies, which broke the palisades, -bent the portcullis back, and with the surge of waters injured the -defences behind: a new passage was thus opened in the wall, yet the -damage was repaired before morning, and the troops confidently awaited -the assault. - -In the night the torrent subsided as quickly as it had risen, and at -daylight a living stream of French grenadiers gliding swiftly down its -bed, as if assured of victory, arrived without shout or tumult within -a few yards of the walls; but then, instead of quitting the hollow to -reach the breach, they dashed like the torrent of the night against -the portcullis. The 87th, previously silent and observant, as if at a -spectacle, now arose and with a shout and a crashing volley smote the -head of the French column; the leading officer, covered with wounds, -fell against the portcullis grate and gave up his sword through the -bars to Colonel Gough: the French drummer, a gallant boy, while beating -the charge dropped lifeless by his officer’s side, and the dead and -wounded filled the hollow. The survivors breaking out right and left, -and spreading along the slopes of ground under the ramparts, opened an -irregular musketry, and at the same time men from the trenches leaped -into pits digged in front and shot fast; but no diversion at other -points was made and the storming column was dreadfully shattered. The -ramparts streamed fire, and a field-piece sent a tempest of grape -whistling through the French ranks in such a dreadful manner that, -unable to endure the torment, they plunged once more into the hollow -and regained their camp, while a shout of victory mingled with the -sound of musical instruments passed round the wall of the town. - -The allies had five officers wounded, and thirty-one men killed or -hurt; the French dead covered the slopes in front of the rampart, -and choked the bed of the river: ten wounded officers, of whom -only one survived, were brought in by the breach, and Skerrett, -compassionating the sufferings of the others, and admiring their -bravery, permitted Laval to fetch them off. The siege was then -suspended, for the rain had partially ruined the French batteries, -interrupted their communications, and stopped their supplies; and the -torrent, again swelling, broke the stockades of the allies and injured -their retrenchments: some vessels also, coming from Gibraltar with -ammunition, were wrecked on the coast. Nevertheless a fresh assault -was expected until the night of the 4th, when frequent firing in the -French camp without any bullets reaching the town, indicated that the -enemy were destroying guns previous to retreating. Hence, at daylight -the besieged, issuing from the convent, commenced a skirmish with the -rear-guard, but were impeded by a heavy storm and returned, after -making a few prisoners. Laval’s misfortunes did not end there. His -troops had contracted sickness, many deserted, and it was computed the -expedition cost him a thousand men, while the allies lost only one -hundred and fifty, and but one officer, Longley of the engineers, was -killed. - -Such is the simple tale of Tarifa, yet the true history of its defence -cannot there be found. Colonel Skerrett obtained the credit, but he -and Lord Proby, second in command, always wished to abandon both town -and island. It was the engineer Smith’s vigour and capacity which -overmatched the enemy’s strength without, and the weakness of those -commanders within, repressing despondency where he failed to excite -confidence. Next in merit was the artillery captain, Mitchel, a noble -soldier who has since perished in the Syrian campaign against Ibrahim -Pasha: his talent and energy at Tarifa were conspicuous. - - -ENGLISH SIEGE OF CIUDAD RODRIGO. (Jan. 1812.) - -Lord Wellington, unable to maintain the blockade of Rodrigo, had -withdrawn behind the Coa in November and widely spread his army -for provisions; but the year 1812 opened favourably for his views. -Napoleon, then preparing for his gigantic invasion of Russia, had -recalled from Spain many old officers and sixty thousand of the best -soldiers, including all the Imperial Guards. The _Army of the North_, -thus reduced, was ordered to quarter about Burgos, while the _Army of -Portugal_, leaving troops to guard Almaraz, moved across the Gredos -mountains into the Salamanca country. It had been reinforced with -eighteen thousand men, but was spread for subsistence from Salamanca -to the Asturias on one side, and to the valley of the Tagus and Toledo -on the other; Montbrun also had been detached from it to Valencia. The -_Army of the Centre_ was in a state of great disorder, and the king and -Marmont were at open discord. In this state of affairs, seeing that -Ciudad Rodrigo was weakly guarded, that Marmont, deceived by previous -combination, had no suspicion of a siege, that Soult’s attention -was fixed on Tarifa; seeing in fine that opportunity was ripe, Lord -Wellington leaped with both feet on Ciudad Rodrigo. - -Thirty-five thousand men, cavalry included, were disposable for this -siege, the materials for which were placed in villages on the left -of the Azava river, and the ammunition in Almeida, where seventy -pieces of ordnance had been secretly collected. Hired carts and mules -were employed to bring up the stores, but for the guns the means of -transport were so scanty that only thirty-eight could be brought to the -trenches. A bridge was laid down on the Agueda, six miles below the -fortress, on the 1st of January, and the investment was designed for -the 6th, but the native carters took two days to travel ten miles of -good road with empty carts, and it could not be made before the 8th: to -find fault with them was dangerous, as they deserted on the slightest -offence. - -Rodrigo was on high ground overhanging the right bank of the Agueda; an -old rampart thirty feet high, nearly circular and flanked with a few -projections, formed the body of the fortress; a second bulwark, called -a _Fausse-braye_, with a ditch and covered way, enclosed this rampart, -yet was placed so low on the descent, as to give little cover to the -main wall. - -Beyond the walls, on the side farthest from the river, the suburb -of Francisco was intrenched, and within it two large convents were -fortified; the convent of Santa Cruz on the opposite side, near the -river, was fortified as another outwork; and nearly between those -points was an isolated ridge called the Little Teson, of less elevation -than the place but only one hundred and fifty yards distant. - -Behind the Little Teson and parallel to it, was another ridge called -the Great Teson, which at six hundred yards overlooked the lesser one, -and saw over it to the bottom of the ditch. - -In the centre of the large Teson, on the edge towards the town, was an -enclosed and palisadoed redoubt called Francisco, which was supported -by the fire of two guns and a howitzer, placed on the flat roof of a -convent in the fortified suburb. An old castle, forming part of the -walls, gave access to the bridge at pistol-shot distance, but was of -little value in defence. - -On the side of the Tesons the ground was rocky, the front of the place -better covered with outworks, and more fire could be directed on the -trenches; yet that line of attack was adopted with reason, because -elsewhere the batteries must have been constructed on the edge of the -counterscarp to see low enough for breaching; whereas the lesser Teson -would enable them to strike over the glacis, and a deep gully near the -latter offered cover for the miner. It was therefore resolved to storm -Fort Francisco, form a lodgement there, open the first parallel along -the greater Teson, place thirty-three pieces in counter-batteries, ruin -the defences and drive the besieged from the convent of Francisco; -then, working forward by the sap, breaching batteries were to be raised -on the lesser Teson and the counterscarp blowed in, while seven guns -demolished a weak turret on the left, and opened a second breach to -turn retrenchments behind the principal one. Previous to breaking -ground, Carlos España and Julian Sanchez were pushed to the Tormes, -and then four British divisions and Pack’s Portuguese commenced the -siege; but as neither fuel nor cover were to be had on that side of -the Agueda, the troops kept their quarters on the hither bank, cooking -their provisions there and fording the river each day in severe frost -and snow. Eight hundred carts drawn by horses had been constructed -by the artificers, and were now the surest means for bringing up -ammunition; but so many delays were anticipated from the irregularity -of the native carters and muleteers, and the chances of weather, that -Wellington calculated upon an operation of twenty-four days. He hoped -to steal that time from his adversaries, yet knew, if he failed, the -clash of arms would draw their scattered troops to this quarter as -tinkling bells draw swarming bees: and to make them thus gather and -consume their magazines was an essential part of his warfare. - -On the 8th of January the light division and Pack’s Portuguese forded -the Agueda, three miles above the fortress, and took post beyond the -great Teson, where they remained quiet, and as there was no regular -investment the enemy did not think the siege was commenced. But in -the evening the troops stood to their arms, and Colonel Colborne, now -commanding the 52nd, taking two companies from each regiment of the -light division stormed the redoubt of Francisco. This he did with -so much fury that the assailants appeared to be at one and the same -time in the ditch, mounting the parapets, fighting on the top of the -rampart, and forcing the gorge of the redoubt, where the explosion of -a French shell had burst the gate open. Of the defenders, a few were -killed and forty made prisoners. The post being thus taken with a loss -of only twenty-four men and officers, a lodgement was begun on the -right, because the fort was instantly covered with shot and shells from -the town. This tempest continued through the night, yet at daybreak the -parallel, six hundred yards in length, was sunk three feet deep, four -wide, and a communication over the Teson was completed: thus the siege -gained several days by this well-managed assault. - -On the 9th the first division took the trenches, and the place was -encircled by posts to prevent any external communication. In the night -twelve hundred workmen commenced three counter-batteries for eleven -guns each, under a heavy fire of shells and grape; before daylight the -labourers obtained cover, and a ditch was sunk in front to provide -earth for the batteries, which were made eighteen feet thick at top to -resist the powerful artillery of the place. - -On the 10th the fourth division relieved the trenches, and a -thousand men laboured, yet in great peril, for the besieged had a -superabundance of ammunition and did not spare it. In the night a -communication from the parallel to the batteries was opened, and on the -11th the third division undertook the siege. - -This day the magazines in the batteries were excavated and the -approaches widened; but the enemy’s fire was destructive, and shells -fell so on the ditch in front of the batteries that the troops were -withdrawn, and earth raised from the inside. Great damage was also -sustained from salvos of shells with long fuzes, whose simultaneous -explosion cut away the parapets in a strange manner, and in the night a -howitzer from the garden of the Francisco convent killed many men. - -On the 12th the light division resumed work, and the riflemen during -a thick fog digged pits for themselves in front of the trenches, from -whence they picked off the enemy’s gunners; yet the weather was so -cold and the besieged shot so briskly little progress was made. The -13th, the same causes impeded the labourers of the first division. -The scarcity of transport also baulked the operations, for one third -only of the native carts arrived, the drivers were very indolent, -most of the twenty-four pound ammunition was still at Villa de Ponte, -and intelligence arrived that Marmont was preparing to succour the -place. Wellington, thus pressed, decided to open a breach with his -counter-batteries, which were only six hundred yards from the curtain, -and then storm without blowing in the counterscarp: in other words, -to overstep the rules of science and sacrifice life rather than time, -for the capricious Agueda might in one night flood and enable a small -French force to relieve the place. - -The whole army was now brought up and posted in villages on the Coa, -ready to cross the Agueda and give battle. Hill also sent a division -across the Tagus, lest Marmont, despairing to save Rodrigo, should fall -on the communications by Castello Branco and Villa Velha. - -In the night of the 13th the batteries were armed with twenty-eight -guns, the approaches were continued by the flying sap, and the Santa -Cruz convent was surprised by the Germans of the first division, which -secured the right flank of the trenches. - -On the 14th the enemy, who had observed that the men in the trenches, -when relieved, went off in a disorderly manner, made a sally and -overturned the gabions of the sap; they even penetrated to the -parallel, and were upon the point of entering the batteries, when a -few workmen getting together checked them until a support arrived. -The guns were thus saved, but this sally, the death of the engineer -on duty, and the heavy fire from the town, delayed the opening of -the breaching-batteries. However, at half-past four in the evening -twenty-five heavy guns battered the fausse-braye and ramparts, while -two pieces smote the convent of Francisco. Then was beheld a spectacle -fearful and sublime. For the French replied with more than fifty -pieces, and the bellowing of eighty large guns shook the ground far -and wide; the smoke rested in heavy volumes upon the battlements of -the place, or curled in light wreaths about the numerous spires, and -the shells hissing through the air seemed fiery serpents leaping from -the darkness; the walls crashed to the stroke of the bullet, and the -distant mountains, faintly returning the sound, appeared to moan over -the falling city. When night put an end to this turmoil, the quick -clatter of musketry was heard like the pattering of hail after a peal -of thunder, for the 40th Regiment assaulted and carried the convent -of Francisco, and established itself in the suburb on the left of the -attack. - -Next day the ramparts were again battered, and fell so fast it was -judged expedient to commence the small breach, wherefore in the night -five more guns were mounted. The 16th, at daylight, the batteries -recommenced, but at eight o’clock a thick fog compelled them to desist; -nevertheless the small breach was open and the place was summoned, yet -without effect. At night the parallel on the Lower Teson was extended, -a sharp musketry was directed against the great breach, and the -riflemen of the light division, from their pits, picked off the enemy’s -gunners. - -The 17th the fire on both sides was heavy and the wall was beaten down -in large cantles; but several of the besiegers’ guns were dismounted, -their batteries injured, many men killed, the general of artillery -wounded, and the sap entirely ruined. The riflemen in the pits were -overpowered with grape, yet towards evening recovered the upper hand; -the French could then only fire from distant embrasures, and in the -night a new battery against the lesser breach was armed, and that on -the Lower Teson was raised to afford more cover. - -On the 18th, the besiegers’ fire being resumed with great violence, -a turret was shaken at the small breach, and the large breach became -practicable in the middle; the enemy commenced retrenching it and the -sap made no progress, the engineer was badly wounded, and a twenty-four -pounder, bursting, killed several men. In the night the battery on the -Lower Teson was improved, and a field-piece and howitzer from thence -played on the great breach to destroy the retrenchments. - -On the 19th both breaches became practicable, the assault was ordered, -the battering-guns were turned against the artillery of the ramparts, -and the order of attack terminated with these remarkable words, -“_Ciudad Rodrigo must be stormed this evening_.”--“_We will do it_,” -was the soldiers’ comment. - -For the storm the third and light divisions and Pack’s Portuguese were -organized in four parts. - -1°. _Right attack._ On the extreme right, troops posted in some houses -beyond the bridge were to cross the river and escalade an outwork -in front of the castle, where there was no ditch, but where two -guns commanded the junction of the counterscarp. On their left, two -regiments, assembled behind the convent of Santa Cruz with a third in -reserve, were to enter the ditch at the extremity of the counterscarp, -escalade the fausse-braye, and scour it on their left as far as the -great breach. - -2°. _Great breach._ One hundred and eighty men carrying hay-bags were -to move out of the second parallel, followed by a storming party, and -supported by Mackinnon’s brigade of the third division. - -3°. _Left attack._ The light division, assembled behind the convent of -Francisco, was to send three rifle companies to scour the fausse-braye -on the right. At the same time a storming party, preceded by men -carrying hay-sacks and followed by the division, was to assault the -small breach, detaching men, when the fausse-braye should be passed, -to their right to assist the main assault, to the left to force a -passage at the Salamanca gate. - -4°. _False attack._ An escalade, to be attempted by Pack’s Portuguese -at the opposite side of the town. - -The right attack was conducted by Colonel O’Toole. Five hundred -volunteers under Major Manners, with a forlorn hope under Lieut. -Mackie, composed the storming party of the third division. Three -hundred volunteers led by Major George Napier,[23] with a forlorn hope -under Lieutenant Gurwood, composed the storming party of the light -division. - -The deserters, of which there were many, had told the governor the -light division was come out of its turn, and it must be to storm, yet -he took no heed, and all the troops reached their posts without seeming -to attract attention; but before the signal was given, and while -Wellington, who in person had pointed out the lesser breach to Major -Napier, was still on the ground, the attack at the right commenced, -and was instantly taken up along the whole line. The space between -the trenches and the ditch was then suddenly covered with soldiers -and ravaged by a tempest of grape from the ramparts; for though the -storming parties in the centre jumped out of the parallel when the -first shout arose, so rapid were the troops on their right, that before -they could reach the ditch, Ridge, Dunkin, and Campbell, with the 5th, -77th, and 94th Regiments, had already scoured the fausse-braye, and -pushed up the great breach amidst bursting shells, the whistling of -grape and musketry, and the shrill cries of the French, who were driven -fighting behind the inner retrenchments. There they rallied, and, aided -by musketry from the houses, made hard battle for their post; none -would go back on either side; yet the British could not get forward, -and the bodies of men and officers, falling in heaps, choked up the -passage, which from minute to minute was raked with grape, from two -guns flanking the breach, at the distance of a few yards; yet striving -and trampling alike upon dead and wounded these brave men maintained -the combat. - -Meanwhile the stormers of the light division, who had three hundred -yards of ground to clear, would not wait for the hay-bags, and with -extraordinary swiftness running to the crest of the glacis jumped down -the scarp, a depth of eleven feet, and rushed up the fausse-braye -under a smashing discharge of grape and musketry. The ditch was dark -and intricate, and the forlorn hope inclined to the left while the -stormers went straight to the breach, which was so narrow at top that -a gun placed across nearly barred the opening; then the forlorn hope -rejoined, and the whole rushed up, yet the head, forcibly contracted -as the ascent narrowed, staggered under the fire. With the instinct of -self-preservation the men snapped their muskets though they had not -been allowed to load, and Napier, his arm shattered by a grape-shot, -went down, but in falling called aloud to use the bayonet, while the -unwounded officers instantly and simultaneously sprung to the front: -the impulse of victory was thus given and with a furious shout the -breach was carried. The supporting regiments, coming up abreast, -then gained the rampart, the 52nd wheeled to the left, the 43rd to -the right, and the place was won. During this contest, which lasted -about ten minutes, the fighting at the great breach was unabated: -but when the stormers and the 43rd poured along the rampart towards -that quarter, the French wavered, three of their expense magazines -exploded, and the third division with a mighty effort broke through the -retrenchments: the garrison still fought awhile in the streets indeed, -but finally fled to the castle, where the governor surrendered. - -Now plunging into the town from all quarters, and throwing off all -discipline, the troops committed frightful excesses; houses were soon -in flames, the soldiers menaced their officers and shot each other, -intoxication increased the tumult to absolute madness, and a fire -being wilfully lighted in the middle of the great magazine, the town -would have been blown to atoms but for the energetic coolness of -some officers and a few soldiers who still preserved their senses. -To excuse these excesses it was said, “the soldiers were not to be -controlled.” Colonel M^cLeod of the 43rd, a young man of a noble and -energetic spirit, proved the contrary. He placed guards at the breach -and constrained his men to keep their ranks for a long time, but as no -organized efforts were made by higher authorities, and the example was -not followed, the regiment dissolved by degrees in the general disorder. - -Three hundred French fell, fifteen hundred were made prisoners, and -immense stores of ammunition with a hundred and fifty pieces of -artillery, including the battering-train of Marmont’s army, were -captured. The loss of the allies was twelve hundred soldiers and -ninety officers, of which six hundred and fifty men and sixty officers -had been slain or hurt at the breaches. General Craufurd and General -Mackinnon, the former a person of great ability, were killed, and with -them died many gallant men; amongst others a captain of the 45th, of -whom it has been felicitously said, that “three generals and seventy -other officers had fallen, yet the soldiers fresh from the strife only -talked of Hardyman.” General Vandeleur, commanding the light division -after Craufurd fell, was badly wounded; so was Colonel Colborne, with -a crowd of inferior rank; and unhappily the slaughter did not end with -the storm; for as the prisoners and their escort were marching out by -the breach, an accidental explosion killed numbers of both. - -This siege lasted only twelve days, half the time originally -calculated, yet from the inexperience of engineers and soldiers, and -the extraordinarily heavy fire of the place, the works were rather -slowly executed. The cold also impeded the labourers, yet with less -severe frost the trenches would have been overflowed, because in open -weather the water rises everywhere to within six inches of the surface. -The greatest impediment was the badness of the cutting tools furnished -from the storekeeper-general’s office in England; the profits of the -contractor seemed to be the only thing respected: the engineers eagerly -sought for French cutlery, because the English was useless! - -Marmont heard of the siege the 15th and made great efforts to collect -his forces at Salamanca. The 26th he heard of its fall and retired to -Valladolid, thus harassing his men by winter marches. Had he remained -between Salamanca and Rodrigo with strong advanced guards he would have -recovered the place; for on the 28th the Agueda flooded two feet over -the stone bridge, and carried away the allies’ trestle-bridge. The army -was then on the left bank, the breaches not closed, and no resistance -could be offered. The greatest captains are the very slaves of fortune. - - * * * * * - -When Ciudad Rodrigo fell, Wellington’s eyes were turned towards -Badajos. He desired to invest it again early in March, because the -flooding of the rivers in Beira, from the periodical rains, would then -render a French incursion into Portugal difficult, enable him to carry -nearly all his forces to the siege, and impede the junction of Soult -and Marmont in Estremadura. Many obstacles arose, some military, some -political, some from the perverseness of coadjutors and the errors of -subordinates; yet on the 5th of March the troops were well on their -way towards the Tagus, and then the English general, who had remained -on the Coa to the last moment that he might not awaken the enemy’s -suspicions, gave up Rodrigo to Castaños and departed for Elvas. - -Victor Alten’s cavalry was left on the Yeltes in advance of the -Agueda to mask the movements, but Marmont was unable to measure his -adversary’s talent or fathom his designs. He had again spread his army -far and wide, appeared to expect no further winter operations, and -having lost all his secret friends and emissaries at Ciudad Rodrigo, -where they had been discovered and put to death by Carlos España, with -an overstrained severity that gave general disgust, knew nothing of the -allies’ march to the Tagus. On the other hand the projected siege was, -by the incredibly vexatious conduct of the Portuguese Regency, delayed -ten days, and thrown into the violent equinoctial rains, which greatly -augmented the difficulties. It was in vain Wellington threatened, -remonstrated and wasted his mental powers to devise remedies for those -evils, and to impart energy and good faith to that extraordinary -government. Insolent anger, falsehood or stolid indifference in all -functionaries, from the highest to the lowest, met him at every turn, -and the responsibility even in small matters became too onerous for -subordinate officers; he was compelled to arrange every detail of -service himself with the native authorities. His iron strength of body -and mind were thus strained until all men wondered how they resisted, -and indeed he did fall sick, but recovered after a few days. - -On the 15th of March pontoons were laid over the Guadiana four miles -from Elvas, where the current was dull, and two large Spanish boats -being arranged as flying-bridges, Beresford crossed that river on the -16th to invest Badajos with fifteen thousand men. - -Soult was then before Cadiz, but Drouet and Daricau were with ten -thousand men in Estremadura; wherefore General Graham marched with -three divisions of infantry and two brigades of cavalry upon Llerena, -while Hill moved by Merida upon Almendralejos. These covering corps -were together thirty thousand strong, five thousand being cavalry, and -the whole army presented fifty-one thousand sabres and bayonets, of -which twenty thousand were Portuguese. Castaños had gone to Gallicia, -and the fifth Spanish army, under Morillo and Penne Villemur, four -thousand strong, passed down the Portuguese frontier to the Lower -Guadiana, intending to fall on Seville when Soult should march to -succour Badajos. - -As the allies advanced, Drouet moved by his right towards Medellin, to -maintain the communication with Marmont by Truxillo. Hill and Graham -then halted, the latter at Zafra, having Slade’s cavalry in front. -Marmont meanwhile recalled his sixth division from Talavera to Castile, -and four other divisions and his cavalry, quartered at Toledo, marched -over the Guadarama towards Valladolid. - -It was therefore manifest that he would not act this time in -conjunction with Soult. - - -THIRD ENGLISH SIEGE OF BADAJOS. (March, 1812.) - -Badajos stands between the Rivillas, a small stream, and the Guadiana, -a noble river five hundred yards broad. From the angle formed by -their confluence the town spread out like a fan, having eight regular -bastions and curtains, with good counterscarps, covered way, and glacis. - -At the meeting of the rivers, the Rivillas being there for a short -distance deep and wide, was a rock one hundred feet high, crowned -with an old castle, the ascent to which was not steep. This was the -extreme point of defence on the enemy’s left, and from thence to the -Trinidad bastion, terminating this the eastern front of resistance, an -inundation protected the ramparts, one short interval excepted, which -was defended by an outwork, beyond the stream, called the cunette of -San Roque. - -On the enemy’s right of San Roque, also beyond the Rivillas and four -hundred yards from the walls, another outwork called the Picurina was -constructed on an isolated hill, about the same distance from San Roque -as the latter was from the castle. These two outworks had a covered -communication with each other, and the San Roque had one with the town, -but the inundation cut the Picurina off from the latter, and it was an -inclosed and palisadoed work. - -The southern front, the longest, was protected in the centre by a -crown-work, constructed on the lofty Sierra de Viento, the end of -which, at only two hundred yards, overlooked the walls. The remainder -of that front and the western front had no outworks. - -On the right bank of the Guadiana there were no houses, but the -twice-besieged fort of San Christoval, three hundred feet square, stood -there on a rocky height, and from its superior elevation looked into -the castle, which was exactly opposite to it and consequently but five -hundred yards distant. This fort also commanded the works heading the -stone bridge, a quarter of a mile below stream. - -Phillipon’s garrison, nearly five thousand strong, was composed of -French and Hessian, and some Spanish troops in Joseph’s service. He had -since the last siege made himself felt in every direction, scouring -the country, defeating small guerilla bands, carrying off cattle -almost from under the guns of Elvas and Campo Mayor, and pushing his -spies to Ciudad Rodrigo, Lisbon, and even to Ayamonte, by which he -gained a knowledge of the forces, material and personal, combined -against his fortress, and prepared accordingly. He had formed an -interior retrenchment at the castle, and mounted more guns there; he -had strengthened San Christoval on the side before attacked, and made -a covered communication to the bridge-head; he had constructed two -ravelins on the south front, and commenced a third with counterguards -for the bastions. At the eastern front he had dug a _cunette_ at the -bottom of the great ditch, which was in some parts filled with water. -The gorge of the Pardaleras was enclosed and connected with the body of -the place, from whence it was overlooked by powerful batteries; the -glacis of the western front was mined, and the arch of a bridge behind -the San Roque was built up to cause the inundation. The inhabitants -had been compelled to store food for three months, and provisions and -ammunition had come in on the 10th and 16th of February, yet the supply -of powder was inadequate, and there were not many shells. - -Lord Wellington desired to assail the western front, but the engineer -had not mortars, miners, or guns enough, or the means of bringing -up stores for that attack: indeed the want of transport had again -compelled the drawing of stores from Elvas, to the manifest hazard of -that fortress. Hence, here, as at Ciudad Rodrigo, time was paid for -with the loss of life, and the crimes of politicians were atoned by the -blood of soldiers. - -It was finally agreed to attack the bastion of Trinidad, because the -counterguard there was unfinished, and the bastion could be battered -from the Picurina. The first parallel was therefore to embrace that -fort, the San Roque and the eastern front, so as to enable the -counter-batteries to destroy the armaments of the southern fronts, -which bore against the Picurina hill. The Picurina was to be stormed, -and from thence the Trinidad and the next bastion, called the Santa -Maria, were to be breached. The guns were then to be turned against the -connecting curtain, known to be of weak masonry, and to open a third -breach, whereby a storming party might turn any retrenchments behind -the other breaches. In this way the inundation could be avoided. A -French deserter declared, and truly, that the ditch was eighteen feet -deep at the Trinidad, yet Wellington was so confident that he resolved -to storm the place there without blowing in the counterscarp. - -The battering train was of fifty-two pieces, including sixteen -twenty-four-pound howitzers for throwing Shrapnel-shells; but this -species of missile, much talked of at the time, was little prized by -Lord Wellington, who had detected its insufficiency, save with large -guns and as a common shell; and partly to avoid expense, partly from a -dislike to injure the inhabitants, neither in this, nor in any former -siege did he use mortars. Here indeed he could not have brought them -up, for the peasantry, and even the ordenança, employed to move the -battering train, although well paid, deserted. Of nine hundred gunners -present three hundred were British, the rest Portuguese; there were -one hundred and fifty sappers, volunteers from the third division, -unskilled, yet of signal bravery. - -The engineer’s park was established behind the heights of St. Michael -which faced the Picurina, and in the night of the 17th, eighteen -hundred men broke ground one hundred and sixty yards from that fort. -A tempest stifled the sound of the pickaxes, and a communication four -thousand feet long, with a parallel of six hundred yards, three feet -deep and three feet six inches wide, was opened without hindrance; -but when day broke the fort was reinforced, and a sharp musketry, -interspersed with discharges from some field-pieces and aided by heavy -guns from the body of the place, was directed on the trenches. - -In the night of the 18th two batteries were traced, the parallel -prolonged, and the previous works improved; but the garrison raised -the parapets of the Picurina, lined the top of the covered way with -sand-bags, and planted musketeers to gall the men in the trenches. - -The 19th, secret notice of a sally being received, the guards were -reinforced; nevertheless, at one o’clock some cavalry came out by the -Talavera gate, and thirteen hundred infantry under General Vielland, -second in command, filed unobserved into the communication between the -Picurina and San Roque; one hundred men were also ready in the former, -and all these troops, jumping out at once, drove the workmen off and -began to demolish the parallel. Previous to this outbreak the French -cavalry had commenced a sham fight on the right of the trenches, and -the smaller party, pretending to fly toward the besiegers, answered -Portuguese to the challenge of the picquets and were allowed to pass. -Elated by their stratagem, they galloped to the engineer’s park, a -thousand yards in rear, where they killed some men before succour came; -meanwhile the troops at the parallel rallied on the relief and beat the -infantry back along the front of the ramparts even to the castle. - -In this fight the besieged lost three hundred men and officers, the -besiegers one hundred and fifty; but the chief engineer, Fletcher, was -badly wounded, and several hundred intrenching tools were carried off; -Phillipon had promised a high price for each, which turned out ill, -because the soldiers, instead of pursuing briskly, dispersed to gather -the tools. After the action a squadron of dragoons and six field-pieces -were placed behind the St. Michael ridge, and a signal-post was -established on the lofty Sierra de Viento, to give notice of the -enemy’s motions. - -The weather continued wet and boisterous, making the labour very -severe, yet in the night of the 19th the parallel was opened on its -whole length; the 20th it was enlarged, and though the rain, flooding -the trenches, greatly impeded progress, the work was extended to the -left. Three counter-batteries were then commenced in its rear, because -the ground was too soft in front to sustain the guns, and the San Roque -was within three hundred yards; hence, the parallel, eighteen hundred -yards long, being only guarded by fourteen hundred men, a few bold -soldiers might by a sudden rush have spiked the guns in front of the -trench. - -A slight sally was this day repulsed, and a shoulder was given to the -right of the parallel to cover that flank; in good time, for next day -two field-pieces placed on the right bank of the Guadiana, tried to -rake the trenches and were baffled by this shoulder. Indications of a -similar design against the left flank, from the Pardaleras hill, were -then observed, and three hundred men with two guns were posted on that -side in some broken ground. - -In the night, though the works went on, rain again impeded progress, -and the besiegers, failing to drain the lower parts of the parallel by -cuts, made an artificial bottom of sand-bags. On the other hand the -besieged, thinking the curtain adjoining the castle was the object of -attack, threw up earth in front and removed the houses behind; they -also made a covered communication from the Trinidad gate to the San -Roque, to take this supposed attack in reverse; and as the labour of -digging was great, hung up brown cloth which appeared like earth, by -which ingenious expedient they passed unseen between those points. - -Vauban’s maxim, that a perfect investment is the first requisite in -a siege, had been neglected to spare labour, yet the great master’s -art was soon vindicated by his countryman. Phillipon, finding the -right bank of the Guadiana free, made a battery in the night for three -field-pieces, which at daylight raked the trenches, the shots sweeping -the parallel destructively; the loss was great and would have been -greater but for the soft ground, which prevented the touch and bound -of the bullets. Orders were therefore sent to the fifth division, -then at Campo Mayor, to invest the place on the other bank, but those -troops were distant and misfortunes accumulated. Heavy rain filled the -trenches, the Guadiana run the fixed bridge under water, sunk twelve -pontoons, and broke the tackle of the flying bridges; the provisions of -the army could not be brought over, the battering-guns and ammunition -were still on the right bank, and the siege was on the point of being -raised. In a few days however the river subsided, some Portuguese craft -were brought up to form another flying bridge, the pontoons saved were -employed as row-boats, and the communication thus secured for the rest -of the siege. - -On the 23rd rain again filled the trenches, the works crumbled and the -attack was entirely suspended. Next day the fifth division invested -the place on the right bank, the weather cleared, and the batteries, -armed with twenty-one guns and seven five-and-a-half-inch howitzers, -opened on the 25th, but were so vigorously answered, that one howitzer -was dismounted, and several artillery and engineer officers killed. -Nevertheless the San Roque was silenced, the garrison of the Picurina -so galled by marksmen that none dared look over the parapet, and as the -external appearance of that fort did not indicate much strength General -Kempt was charged to assault it in the night. - -This outward seeming of the Picurina was fallacious; it was very -strong. The fronts were well covered by the glacis, the flanks deep, -the rampart, fourteen feet perpendicular from the bottom of the ditch, -was guarded with slanting pales above, and from thence to the top was -an earthen slope of sixteen feet. A few palings had been knocked off at -the covered way, and the parapet, slightly damaged, was repaired with -sand-bags, but the ditch was deep, narrow at the bottom, and flanked by -four splinter-proof casemates. Seven guns were mounted. The entrance in -the rear was protected with three rows of thick paling, the garrison -was above two hundred strong, and every man had two muskets; the top of -the rampart was garnished with loaded shells, a retrenched guard-house -formed a second internal defence, and small mines, with a loopholed -gallery under the counterscarp to take the assailants in rear, were -begun but not finished. - -Five hundred men of the third division assembled for the attack. -Two hundred under Major Rudd were to turn the fort on the left, an -equal force under Major Shaw to turn it by the right, each being to -detach half their force to seize the communication with San Roque and -intercept succour coming from the town. The remainder were to attack -Picurina by the gorge, leaving one hundred under Captain Powis as a -reserve. The engineers, Holloway, Stanway, and Gipps, with twenty-four -sappers bearing hatchets and ladders, guided these columns, and fifty -men of the light division, likewise provided with axes, were to move -out of the trenches at the moment of attack. - - -ASSAULT OF PICURINA. (March, 1812.) - -The night was fine and the stormers quickly reached the fort, which, -black and silent before, then seemed a mass of fire, under which the -stormers run up to the palisades in rear and endeavoured to break -through; the destructive musketry and thickness of the pales rendered -their efforts nugatory, wherefore, turning against the sides of the -work they strove to get in there, but the depth of the ditch and the -slanting stakes at the top of the brickwork again baffled them. At this -time, the French shooting fast and dangerously, the crisis appeared so -imminent that Kempt sent the reserve headlong against the front. The -fight was thus supported and the carnage terrible. A battalion which -came from the town to succour the fort was beaten back by the men in -the communication, the guns from the town and castle then opened, the -guard of the trenches replied with musketry, rockets were thrown up -by the besieged, and the shrill sound of alarm-bells mixing with the -shouts of the combatants increased the tumult. - -Still the Picurina sent out streams of fire, by the light of which -dark figures were seen furiously struggling on the ramparts; for Powis -had escaladed in front where the artillery had broken the pales; and -the other assailants, throwing their ladders in the manner of bridges -from the brink of the ditch to the slanting stakes thus passed, and all -were fighting hand to hand with the enemy. Meanwhile the axemen of the -light division, compassing the fort like prowling wolves, discovered -the gate, and hewing it down broke in by the rear. Nevertheless the -struggle continued. Powis, Holloway, Gipps, and Oates fell wounded on -or beyond the rampart, Nixon of the 52nd was shot two yards within the -gate, Shaw, Rudd, and nearly all the other officers of the 79th had -fallen outside, and it was not until half the garrison were killed, -that Gaspar Thiery, the commandant, surrendered with eighty-six men, -while others, not many, rushing out of the gate endeavoured to cross -the inundation and were drowned. - -Phillipon had thought to delay the siege five or six days by the -resistance of Picurina, and one day later this would have happened; -for the mines and loop-holed gallery in the counterscarp would have -been completed, and the work was too well covered by the glacis to be -quickly ruined by fire. His calculations were baffled by this heroic -assault, which, lasting only an hour, cost four officers and fifty -men killed, fifteen officers and two hundred and fifty men wounded; -and so vehement was the fight throughout, that the garrison forgot or -had no time to roll over the shells and combustibles on the ramparts. -Phillipon did not conceal the danger accruing to Badajos from the loss -of the Picurina, but he stimulated his soldiers’ courage, by calling to -their recollection, how infinitely worse than death it was to be the -inmate of an English prison-hulk--an appeal which must have been deeply -felt, for the annals of civilized nations furnish nothing more inhuman -towards captives of war than the prison-ships of England. - -When Picurina was taken three battalions advanced to secure it, and -though a great turmoil and firing from the town continued until -midnight, a lodgement in the works and communication with the first -parallel were established; the second parallel was also begun, but at -daylight the redoubt was overwhelmed with fire, no troops could remain -and the lodgement was destroyed. In the evening the sappers effected -another lodgement on the flanks, the second parallel was then opened in -its whole length, and next day the counter-batteries on the right of -Picurina exchanged a vigorous fire with the town. - -In the night of the 27th three breaching-batteries were traced out. The -first, between the Picurina and the inundation, to breach the right -face of the Trinidad. The second, on the Picurina, to breach the Santa -Maria. The third, on a prolonged line of the front attacked, contained -three Shrapnel howitzers to scour the ditch and prevent the garrison -working in it; for Phillipon, having now discovered the true line of -attack, was raising the counterguard of the Trinidad and the imperfect -ravelin. At daybreak these works being well furnished with gabions and -sandbags were lined with musketeers, who severely galled the workmen -employed on the breaching-batteries, and the artillery practice was -brisk on both sides. Two of the besiegers’ guns were dismounted, the -gabions placed in front of the batteries to protect the workmen were -knocked over, and the musketry became so destructive the men were -withdrawn to throw up earth from the inside. - -In the night of the 27th the second parallel was extended on the right, -to raise batteries against San Roque and the dam which held up the -inundation, and to breach the curtain behind: but the ground was hard, -the moon shone brightly, the labourers were quite exposed and the work -was relinquished. - -On the 28th the screen of gabions before the batteries was restored, -the workmen resumed their labours outside and the parallel was -improved. The besieged then withdrew their guns from San Roque, yet -their marksmen still shot from thence with great exactness, and -the plunging fire from the castle dismounted two howitzers in one -of the counter-batteries. During the night the French observed the -tracing-string, marking the direction of the sap in front of San Roque, -and a daring fellow, creeping out before the workmen arrived, brought -it on the line of the castle fire, whereby some loss was sustained. - -In the night the howitzer battery was re-armed with twenty-four -pounders to play on the San Roque, and a new breaching-battery was -traced on the site of the Picurina; the second parallel was extended by -sap, and a trench was digged for riflemen in front of the batteries. - -The 29th a slight sally made on the right bank of the river was -repulsed by the Portuguese; but the sap at San Roque was ruined by the -enemy’s fire, and the besieged continued to raise the counterguard and -ravelin of the Trinidad, and to strengthen the front attacked. The -besiegers armed two batteries with eighteen-pounders, which opened next -day against Santa Maria, yet with little effect, and the explosion of -an expense magazine killed many men. - -While the siege was thus proceeding, Soult, having little fear for -the town but designing a great battle, was carefully organizing a -powerful force to unite with Drouet and Daricau. Those generals had -endeavoured to hold the district of La Serena and keep open the -communication with Marmont by Medellin and Truxillo, but Graham and -Hill forced them into the Morena; and on the other side of the country -Morillo and Penne-Villemur descended to the Lower Guadiana, to fall -on Seville when Soult should advance. Nor were there wanting other -combinations to embarrass and delay that marshal. In February, a -Spanish army had assembled in the Ronda to fall on Seville from that -side also, which compelled Soult to send troops there, and fatally -delayed his march to Estremadura. Marmont was however concentrating his -army in the Salamanca country, and it was rumoured he meant to attack -Ciudad Rodrigo. This disquieted Wellington: for though Marmont had -no battering-train, the Spanish generals and engineers had neglected -the repairs of the place, and had not even brought up from St. Jão da -Pesqueira the provisions given to them from the British stores: the -fortress therefore had only thirty days’ supply, and Almeida was in as -bad a state. - -On the 30th, it being known that Soult was advancing from Cordova, -the fifth division was brought over the Guadiana as a reserve to the -covering army, leaving a Portuguese brigade with some cavalry of the -same nation to maintain the investment on the right bank. The siege was -then urged on, forty-eight pieces of artillery being in constant play, -and the sap against San Roque advancing: the French fire was however -destructive, and their progress in strengthening the front attacked was -visible. - -On the 1st of April the sap was pushed close to San Roque, the Trinidad -bastion crumbled under the stroke of the bullet, and the flank of -the Santa Maria, which was casemated, also began to yield. Next day -the face of the Trinidad was broken, but the Santa Maria casemates -being laid open the bullets were lost in their cavities, and Phillipon -commenced a retrenchment to cut off the whole of the attacked front -from the town. - -In the night a new battery against San Roque being armed, two officers -with some sappers glided behind that outwork, gagged the sentinel, -placed powder-barrels and a match against the dam of the inundation -and retired undiscovered. The explosion did not destroy the dam, the -inundation remained and the sap made no progress, because of the -French musketeers; for though the besiegers’ marksmen slew many, -reinforcements were sent across the inundation by means of a raft with -parapets, and men also passed unseen behind the cloth communication, -from the Trinidad. But the crisis of the siege was now approaching -rapidly. The breaches were nearly practicable, Soult had effected -his junction with Drouet and Daricau; and Wellington, who had not -sufficient force to assault the place and give battle at the same time, -resolved to leave two divisions in the trenches and fight at Albuera. -In this view Graham fell back towards that place, and Hill, destroying -the bridge at Merida, marched to Talavera Real. - -Time was now, as in war it always is, a great object, and the anxiety -on both sides redoubled. Soult was however still at Llerena when, the -breaches being declared practicable, the assault was ordered for that -evening, and Leith’s division recalled to the siege; yet a careful -personal examination caused Wellington to doubt, and he delayed the -storm, until a third breach, as originally projected, should be -formed in the curtain between Trinidad and Maria. This could not be -commenced before morning, and during the night the French workmen -laboured assiduously at their retrenchments, despite of the showers -of grape with which the batteries scoured the ditch and the breach. -On the 6th all the batteries were turned against the curtain, the bad -masonry crumbled rapidly away, in two hours a yawning breach appeared -and Wellington renewed his order for the assault. Eagerly then the -soldiers got ready for a combat, so fiercely fought, so terribly won, -so dreadful in all its circumstances, that posterity can scarcely be -expected to credit the tale: but many are still alive who know that it -is true. - -Wellington spared Phillipon the affront of a summons, and seeing the -breach strongly intrenched, the flank fire still powerful, he would not -in that dread crisis trust his fortune to a single effort. Eighteen -thousand daring soldiers burned for the signal of attack, he was -unwilling to lose the service of any, and therefore to each division -gave a task such as few generals would have the hardihood even to -contemplate. - -On the right, Picton’s division was to file out of the trenches, cross -the Rivillas, and scale the castle walls, from eighteen to twenty-four -feet high, furnished with all means of destruction, and so narrow at -top that the defenders could easily reach and as easily overturn the -ladders. - -On the left, Leith’s division was to make a false attack on the -Pardaleras, but a real assault on the distant bastion of San Vincente, -where the glacis was mined, the ditch deep, the scarp thirty feet high, -the parapet garnished with bold troops: Phillipon also, following his -old plan, had three loaded muskets placed beside each man that the -first fire might be quick and deadly. - -In the centre, the fourth and light divisions, under Colville and -Andrew Barnard, were to march against the breaches. Furnished like the -third and fifth divisions with ladders and axes, they were preceded -by storming parties of five hundred men, having each their separate -forlorn hopes. The light division was to assault the Santa Maria, -the fourth division the Trinidad and the curtain, both columns being -divided into storming and firing parties, the former to enter the -ditch, the latter to keep the crest of the glacis. - -Between these attacks, Major Wilson of the 48th was to storm the San -Roque with the guards of the trenches; and on the other side of the -Guadiana General Power was to make a feint at the bridge-head. - -At first only one brigade of the third division was to have attacked -the castle, but just before the hour fixed, a sergeant of sappers -deserted from the enemy and told Wellington there was but one -communication from the castle to the town, whereupon he ordered the -whole division to advance. - -Many nice arrangements filled up this outline, and some were followed, -some disregarded, for it is seldom all things are attended to in a -desperate fight. The enemy was not idle. While it was yet twilight -some French cavalry rode from the Pardaleras, under an officer who -endeavoured to look into the trenches with the view to ascertain if an -assault was intended, but the picquet there drove him and his escort -back into the works, darkness then fell and the troops awaited the -signal. - - -ASSAULT OF BADAJOS. (April, 1812.) - -Dry but clouded was the night, the air was thick with watery -exhalations from the rivers, the ramparts and trenches unusually still; -yet a low murmur pervaded the latter, and in the former lights flitted -here and there, while the deep voices of the sentinels proclaimed -from time to time that all was well in Badajos. The French, confiding -in Phillipon’s direful skill, watched from their lofty station the -approach of enemies they had twice before baffled, and now hoped to -drive a third time blasted and ruined from the walls. The British, -standing in deep columns, were as eager to meet that fiery destruction -as the others were to pour it down, and either were alike terrible for -their strength, their discipline, and the passions awakened in their -resolute hearts. - -Former failures there were to avenge on one side, and on both leaders -who furnished no excuse for weakness in the hour of trial; the -possession of Badajos was become a point of personal honour with the -soldiers of each nation; but the desire for glory on the British part -was dashed with a hatred of the citizens from an old grudge, and -recent toil and hardship, with much spilling of blood, had made many -incredibly savage: for these things, which render the noble-minded -averse to cruelty, harden the vulgar spirit. Numbers also, like Cæsar’s -centurion, who could not forget the plunder of Avaricum, were heated -with the recollection of Rodrigo and thirsted for spoil. Thus every -passion found a cause of excitement, while the wondrous power of -discipline bound the whole together as with a band of iron, and in the -pride of arms none doubted their might to bear down every obstacle that -man could oppose to their fury. - -At ten o’clock, the castle, the San Roque, the breaches, the -Pardaleras, the distant bastion of San Vincente, and the bridge-head on -the other side of the Guadiana, were to be simultaneously assailed. It -was hoped the strength of the enemy would quickly shrivel within that -fiery girdle, but many are the disappointments of war. An unforeseen -accident delayed the attack of the fifth division, and a lighted -carcass, thrown from the castle, falling close to the third division, -exposed its columns and forced it to anticipate the signal by half an -hour. Thus everything was suddenly disturbed, yet the double columns of -the fourth and light divisions moved silently and swiftly against the -breaches, and the guard of the trenches, rushing forward with a shout, -encompassed the San Roque with fire and broke in so violently that -scarcely any resistance was made. - -Soon however a sudden blaze of light and the rattling of musketry -indicated the commencement of a more vehement combat at the castle. -There Kempt, for Picton, hurt by a fall in the camp and expecting -no change in the hour, was not present; there Kempt, I say, led the -third division. Passing the Rivillas in single files by a narrow -bridge under a terrible musketry, he re-formed his men, and run up -the rugged hill with great fury, but only to fall at the foot of the -castle severely wounded. Being carried back to the trenches, he met -Picton at the bridge hastening to take the command, and meanwhile the -troops, spreading along the front, had reared their heavy ladders, some -against the lofty castle some against the adjoining front on the left, -and with incredible courage ascended amidst showers of heavy stones, -logs of wood, and bursting shells rolled off the parapet, while from -the flanks musketry was plied with fearful rapidity, and in front the -leading assailants were with pike and bayonet stabbed and the ladders -pushed from the walls: and all this was attended with deafening shouts, -the crash of breaking ladders, and the shrieks of crushed soldiers -answering to the sullen stroke of the falling weights. - -Still swarming round the remaining ladders those undaunted veterans -strove who should first climb, until all were overturned, when the -French shouted victory, and the British, baffled, yet untamed, fell -back a few paces to take shelter under the rugged edge of the hill. -There the broken ranks were re-formed, and the heroic Colonel Ridge, -again springing forward, called with stentorian voice on his men to -follow, and seizing a ladder raised it against the castle to the right -of the former attack, where the wall was lower and where an embrasure -offered some facility: a second ladder was placed alongside by the -grenadier officer Canch, and the next instant he and Ridge were on the -rampart, the shouting troops pressed after them, and the garrison, -amazed and in a manner surprised, were driven fighting through the -double gate into the town: the castle was won. Soon a reinforcement -from the French reserve came to the gate, through which both sides -fired and the enemy retired; but Ridge fell, and no man died that night -with more glory--yet many died, and there was much glory. - -All this time the tumult at the breaches was such as if the earth had -been rent asunder and its central fires bursting upwards uncontrolled. -The two divisions reached the glacis, just as the firing at the castle -had commenced, and the flash of a single musket, discharged from the -covered way as a signal, showed them the French were ready: yet no -stir followed, and darkness covered the breaches. Some hay-packs were -then thrown, some ladders placed, and the forlorn hopes and storming -parties of the light division, five hundred in all, descended into the -ditch without opposition: but then a bright flame, shooting upwards, -displayed all the terrors of the scene. The ramparts crowded with -dark figures and glittering arms were on one side, on the other the -red columns of the British, deep and broad, coming on like streams -of burning lava: it was the touch of the magician’s wand, a crash of -thunder followed, and the storming parties were dashed to pieces by the -explosion of hundreds of shells and powder-barrels. - -For an instant the light division soldiers stood on the brink of the -ditch, amazed at the terrific sight, but then, with a shout that -matched even the sound of the explosion they flew down the ladders, -or, disdaining their aid, leaped, reckless of the depth, into the gulf -below; and nearly at the same moment, amidst a blaze of musketry that -dazzled the eyes, the fourth division came running in to descend with -a like fury. There were only five ladders for both columns, which were -close together, and the deep cut made in the bottom of the ditch, as -far as the counterguard of the Trinidad was filled with water from the -inundation: into this miry snare the head of the fourth division fell, -and it is said above a hundred of the fusileers, the men of Albuera, -were there smothered. Those who followed, checked not, but, as if the -disaster had been expected, turned to the left and thus came upon the -face of the unfinished ravelin, which, rough and broken, was mistaken -for the breach and instantly covered with men; a wide and deep chasm -was however still between them and the ramparts, from whence came a -deadly fire wasting their ranks. Thus baffled, they also commenced a -rapid discharge of musketry, and disorder ensued; for the men of the -light division, whose conducting engineer had been disabled early, -having their flank confined by an unfinished ditch, intended to cut off -the Santa Maria, rushed towards the breaches of the curtain and the -Trinidad, which were indeed before them, but which the fourth division -had been destined to storm. - -Great was the confusion, the ravelin was crowded with men of both -divisions, and while some continued to fire, others jumped down and -run towards the breach; many also passed between the ravelin and the -counterguard of the Trinidad; the two divisions got mixed, and the -reserves, which should have remained at the quarries, also came pouring -in until the ditch was quite filled, the rear still crowding forward -and all cheering vehemently. The enemy’s shouts also were loud and -terrible, and the bursting of shells and of grenades, the roaring of -guns from the flanks, answered by the iron howitzers from the parallel, -the heavy roll and horrid explosion of the powder-barrels, the whizzing -flight of the blazing splinters, the loud exhortations of the officers, -and the continual clatter of the muskets made a maddening din. - -Now a multitude bounded up the great breach as if driven by a -whirlwind: but across the top glittered a range of sword-blades, -sharp-pointed, keen-edged, immovably fixed in ponderous beams chained -together and set deep in the ruins; and for ten feet in front the -ascent was covered with loose planks studded with iron points, on which -the feet of the foremost being set the planks slipped, and the unhappy -soldiers falling forward on the spikes rolled down upon the ranks -behind. Then the Frenchmen, shouting at the success of their stratagem -and leaping forward, plied their shot with terrible rapidity, for every -man had several muskets, and each musket in addition to its ordinary -charge contained a small cylinder of wood stuck full of wooden slugs, -which scattered like hail when they were discharged. - -Once and again the assailants rushed up the breaches, but the -sword-blades, immovable and impassable, always stopped the charge, and -the hissing shells and thundering powder-barrels exploded unceasingly. -Hundreds of men had fallen, hundreds more were dropping, yet the heroic -officers still called aloud for new trials, and sometimes followed by -many, sometimes by few, ascended the ruins; and so furious were the men -themselves, that in one of these charges the rear strove to push the -foremost on to the sword-blades, willing even to make a bridge of their -writhing bodies; the others frustrated the attempt by dropping down, -yet men fell so fast from the shot it was hard to say who went down -voluntarily, who were stricken, and many stooped unhurt that never rose -again. Vain also would it have been to break through the sword-blades; -for a finished trench and parapet were behind the breach, where the -assailants, crowded into even a narrower space than the ditch was, -would still have been separated from their enemies, and the slaughter -have continued. - -At the beginning of this dreadful conflict, Andrew Barnard had with -prodigious efforts separated his division from the other, and preserved -some degree of military array; but now the tumult was such, no command -could be heard distinctly except by those close at hand, while the -mutilated carcases heaped on each other, and the wounded, struggling to -avoid being trampled upon, broke the formations; order was impossible! -Nevertheless officers of all stations, followed more or less numerously -by the men, were seen to start out as if struck by a sudden madness and -rush into the breach, which yawning and glittering with steel seemed -like the mouth of some huge dragon belching forth smoke and flame. In -one of these attempts Colonel Macleod of the 43rd, whose feeble body -would have been quite unfit for war if it had not been sustained by an -unconquerable spirit, was killed. Wherever his voice was heard there -his soldiers gathered, and with such strong resolution did he lead them -up the ruins, that when one, falling behind him, plunged a bayonet into -his back, he complained not, but continuing his course was shot dead -within a yard of the sword-blades. There was however no want of gallant -leaders or desperate followers, until two hours passed in these vain -efforts convinced the soldiers the Trinidad was impregnable; and as -the opening in the curtain, although less strong, was retired, and the -approach impeded by deep holes and cuts made in the ditch, the troops -did not much notice it after the partial failure of one attack, which -had been made early. Gathering in dark groups and leaning on their -muskets they looked up with sullen desperation at the Trinidad, while -the enemy stepping out on the ramparts and aiming their shots by the -light of the fireballs which they threw over, asked, as their victims -fell, _Why they did not come into Badajos_? - -In this dreadful situation, while the dead were lying in heaps, and -others continually falling, the wounded crawling about to get some -shelter from the merciless shower above, and withal a sickening stench -from the burnt flesh of the slain, Captain Nicholas of the engineers, -was observed by Lieut. Shaw of the 43rd, making incredible efforts to -force his way with a few men into the Santa Maria. Collecting fifty -soldiers of all regiments he joined him, and passing a deep cut along -the foot of this breach, these two young officers, at the head of their -band, rushed up the slope of the ruins, but ere they gained two-thirds -of the ascent, a concentrated fire of musketry and grape dashed nearly -the whole dead to the earth: Nicholas was mortally wounded, and the -intrepid Shaw stood alone![24] After this no further effort was made at -any point, and the troops remained passive, but unflinching, beneath -the enemy’s shot, which streamed without intermission: for many of -the riflemen on the glacis, leaping early into the ditch, had joined -in the assault, and the rest, raked by a cross-fire of grape from the -distant bastions, baffled in their aim by the smoke and flames from -the explosions, and too few in number, had entirely failed to quell the -French musketry. - -About midnight, when two thousand brave men had fallen, Wellington, who -was on a height close to the quarries, sent orders for the remainder -to retire and re-form for a second assault; he had just then heard -that the castle was taken, and thinking the enemy would still hold out -in the town was resolved to assail the breaches again. This retreat -from the ditch was not effected without further carnage and confusion; -for the French fire never slackened, and a cry arose that the enemy -were making a sally from the flanks, which caused a rush towards the -ladders. Then the groans and lamentations of the wounded, who could not -move and expected to be slain, increased; and many officers who did not -hear of the order endeavoured to stop the soldiers from going back, -some would even have removed the ladders but were unable to break the -crowd. - -All this time the third division lay close in the castle, and either -from fear of risking the loss of a point which insured the capture of -the place, or that the egress was too difficult, made no attempt to -drive away the enemy from the breaches. On the other side however, -the fifth division had commenced the false attack on the Pardaleras, -and on the right of the Guadiana the Portuguese were sharply engaged -at the bridge: thus the town was girdled with fire. For Walker’s -brigade had, during the feint on the Pardaleras, escaladed the distant -bastion of San Vincente. Moving up the bank of the river, he reached a -French guard-house at the barrier-gate undiscovered, the ripple of the -waters smothering the sound of the footsteps; but then the explosion -at the breaches took place, the moon shone out, the French sentinels -discovering the column fired, and the British soldiers, springing -forward under a sharp musketry, began to hew down the wooden barrier -at the covered way; the Portuguese, panic-stricken, threw down the -scaling-ladders, but the others snatched them up, forced the barrier -and jumped into the ditch; there the guiding engineer was killed, a -_cunette_ embarrassed the column, and when the foremost men succeeded -in rearing the ladders they were found too short, for the walls were -generally above thirty feet high. The fire of the French was deadly, -a small mine was sprung beneath the soldiers’ feet, beams of wood and -live shells were rolled over on their heads, showers of grape from the -flank swept the ditch, and man after man dropped dead from the ladders. - -At this critical moment some of the defenders being called away to -aid in recovering the castle, the ramparts were not entirely manned, -and the assailants, having discovered a corner of the bastion where -the scarp was only twenty feet high, placed three ladders under an -embrasure which had no gun, and was only stopped with a gabion. Some -men got up with difficulty, for the ladders were still too short, but -the first man being pushed up by his comrades drew others after him, -and thus many had gained the summit; and though the French shot heavily -against them from both flanks and from a house in front they thickened -and could not be driven back. Half the 4th Regiment then entered the -town itself, while the others pushed along the rampart towards the -breach, and by dint of hard fighting successively won three bastions. -In the last, General Walker, leaping forwards sword in hand just as a -French cannonier discharged a gun, fell with so many wounds that it -was wonderful how he survived, and his soldiers seeing a lighted match -on the ground cried out a mine! At that word, such is the power of -imagination, those troops whom neither the strong barrier nor the deep -ditch, nor the high walls, nor the deadly fire of the enemy could stop, -staggered back, appalled by a chimera of their own raising. While in -that disorder a French reserve under General Veillande drove on them -with a firm and rapid charge, pitching some over the walls, killing -others outright, and cleansing the ramparts even to the San Vincente: -but there Leith had placed a battalion of the 38th, and when the French -came up, shouting and slaying all before them, it arose and with one -close volley destroyed them. This stopped the panic, and in compact -order the soldiers once more charged along the walls towards the -breaches; yet the French, although turned on both flanks and abandoned -by fortune, would not yield. - -Meanwhile the detachment of the 4th Regiment which had entered the -town when the San Vincente was first carried, was strangely situated; -for the streets though empty were brilliantly illuminated, no person -was seen, yet a low buzz and whisper were heard around, lattices were -now and then gently opened, and from time to time shots were fired -from underneath the doors of the houses by the Spaniards, while the -regiment, with bugles sounding, advanced towards the great square of -the town. In its progress several mules going with ammunition to the -breaches were taken, but the square was as empty and silent as the -streets, and the houses as bright with lamps. A terrible enchantment -seemed to prevail, nothing to be seen but light, and only low whispers -heard, while the tumult at the breaches was like the crashing thunder: -there the fight raged, and quitting the square the regiment attempted -to take the enemy in reverse, but they were received with a rolling -musketry, driven back with loss, and resumed their movement through the -streets. - -At last the breaches were abandoned by the French, other parties -entered the place, desultory combats took place in various parts, and -finally Veillande and Phillipon, both wounded, seeing all ruined, -passed the bridge with a few hundred soldiers and entered San -Christoval. Early next morning they surrendered upon summons to Lord -Fitzroy Somerset, who with great readiness had pushed through the -town to the drawbridge ere the French had time to organize further -resistance; yet even at the moment of ruin, this noble governor with -an imperturbed judgment had sent horsemen out from the fort in the -night to carry the news to Soult’s army, which they reached in time to -prevent a greater misfortune. - -Now commenced that wild and desperate wickedness, which tarnished the -lustre of the soldier’s heroism. All indeed were not alike, hundreds -risked, and many lost their lives in striving to stop violence; but -madness generally prevailed, and the worst men being leaders all the -dreadful passions of human nature were displayed. Shameless rapacity, -brutal intemperance, savage lust, cruelty and murder, shrieks and -piteous lamentations, groans, shouts, imprecations, the hissing of -fires bursting from the houses, the crashing of doors and windows, -and the reports of muskets used in violence resounded for two days -and nights in the streets of Badajos! On the third, when the city was -sacked, when the soldiers were exhausted by their own excesses, the -tumult rather subsided than was quelled: the wounded men were then -looked to, the dead disposed of! - -Five thousand men and officers fell during the siege, including seven -hundred Portuguese; three thousand five hundred were stricken in the -assault, sixty officers and more than seven hundred men slain on the -spot. Five generals, Kempt, Harvey, Bowes, Colville, and Picton were -wounded, the first three severely; six hundred men and officers fell in -the escalade of San Vincente, as many at the castle, and more than two -thousand at the breaches: each division there lost twelve hundred! But -how deadly the strife was at that point may be gathered from this; the -43rd and 52nd regiments of the light division, alone lost more men than -the seven regiments of the third division engaged at the castle! - -Let it be remembered that this frightful carnage took place in a -space of less than a hundred yards square. That the slain died not -all suddenly nor by one manner of death. That some perished by steel, -some by shot, some by water; that some were crushed and mangled by -heavy weights, some trampled upon, some dashed to atoms by the fiery -explosions; that for hours this destruction was endured without -shrinking and that the town was won at last: these things considered, -it must be admitted that a British army bears with it an awful power. -And false would it be to say the French were feeble men, the garrison -stood and fought manfully and with good discipline, behaving worthily. -Shame there was none on any side. Yet who shall do justice to the -bravery of the British soldiers? the noble emulation of the officers? -Who shall measure out the glory of Ridge, of Macleod, of Nicholas, of -O’Hare of the rifles, who perished on the breach at the head of the -stormers, and with him nearly all the volunteers for that desperate -service? Who shall describe the springing valour of that Portuguese -grenadier who was killed, the foremost man, at the Santa Maria? or the -martial fury of that desperate rifleman, who, in his resolution to win, -thrust himself beneath the chained sword-blades, and there suffered the -enemy to dash his head to pieces with the ends of their muskets? Who -can sufficiently honour the intrepidity of Walker, of Shaw, of Canch, -or the resolution of Ferguson of the 43rd, who having at Rodrigo -received two deep wounds was here, with his hurts still open, leading -the stormers of his regiment, the third time a volunteer and the third -time wounded! Nor are these selected as pre-eminent; many and signal -were the other examples of unbounded devotion, some known some that -will never be known; for in such a tumult much passed unobserved, and -often the observers fell themselves ere they could bear testimony to -what they saw: but no age, no nation ever sent forth braver troops to -battle than those who stormed Badajos. - -When the havoc of the night was told to Wellington, the pride of -conquest sunk into a passionate burst of grief for the loss of his -gallant soldiers. - - - - -BOOK VII. - - Beira--Grant--Surprise of Almaraz--Siege of the Salamanca - Forts--Combats between the Duero and the Tormes--Combats of - Castrejon and the Guarena--Battle of Salamanca--Combat of La - Serna. - - -BEIRA. (April, 1812.) - -After the storming of Badajos the English general desired to fight -Soult in Andalusia, and his cavalry under Sir Stapleton Cotton very -soon overtook the French horse and defeated them near Usagre with a -loss to the victors of fifty or sixty men, to the vanquished of two or -three hundred, one half being prisoners. Had that action been rapidly -followed up by a powerful army a great victory would probably have -crowned this extraordinary winter campaign, but obstacles, untimely and -unexpected, arose. Carlos España’s oppressions had created a dangerous -spirit in the garrison of Rodrigo, the people of the vicinity were -alarmed, both that fortress and Almeida were insecure, and Marmont was -on the Coa. These things were to be remedied before Andalusia could be -invaded. Yet the danger was not absolute, and Wellington lingered about -Badajos, hoping Soult, in anger for its fall, would risk a blow north -of the Morena. That marshal was indeed deeply moved, but the Spanish -armies were menacing Seville, and the allies were double his numbers; -hence he returned to Seville and Wellington marched to Beira, which -Marmont was now ravaging with great violence. - -Following the letter not the spirit of Napoleon’s orders, for he -was discontented at being debarred a junction with Soult, Marmont -had reluctantly made this diversion, and seemed to have exhaled his -ill-will by a savage warfare contrary to his natural disposition. -Carlos España fled before him, the Portuguese militia were dispersed -in a skirmish near Guarda, Victor Alten retreated across the Tagus -at Villa Velha though the French were still fifty miles distant; and -though personally a very brave man was so disturbed in judgment -that he meditated burning the bridge there, which would have ruined -Lord Wellington’s combinations. The whole country was in commotion, -the population flying before the ravaging enemy, and all things in -disorder; the Portuguese general Lecor alone preserved a martial -attitude: he checked the French cavalry, saved the magazines and -hospitals, and hung upon the French rear when they retired. When the -allies came on from Badajos Marmont was, at first, inclined to fight, -but found it too dangerous from the flooding of the rivers behind him, -and it was only by the interposition of fortune that he avoided a great -disaster. Finally he retired to Salamanca, carrying with him as a -prisoner Captain Colquhoun Grant, a scouting officer of great eminence, -whose escape furnished an episode in this war more surprising even than -that of Colonel Waters. - -Grant, in whom the utmost daring was so mixed with subtlety of genius, -and both so tempered by discretion that it is hard to say which -quality predominated, had been sent from Badajos to watch the French -movements. Attended by Leon, a Spanish peasant, faithful and quick of -apprehension, who had been his companion on many former occasions, he -reached the Salamanca district, passed the Tormes during the night in -uniform, for he never assumed any disguise, and remained three days -in the midst of the French camps. He thus obtained exact information -of Marmont’s object, of his provisions and scaling-ladders, making -notes, which he sent to Wellington from day to day by Spanish agents. -The third night, some peasants brought him an order thus worded--“The -notorious Grant is within the circle of cantonments, the soldiers are -to strive for his capture, and guards will be placed in a circle round -the army.” Grant consulted the peasants, and before daylight entered -the village of Huerta close to a ford on the Tormes, where there was a -French battalion, and on the other bank of the river cavalry videttes, -patrolling back and forward for the space of three hundred yards, yet -meeting always at the ford. - -At daylight, when the soldiers were at their alarm-post, he was -secretly brought with his horse behind the gable of a house, which hid -him from the infantry and was near the ford. The peasants, standing on -loose stones, spread their large cloaks to hide him from the videttes -until the latter were separated the full extent of their beat; then -putting spurs to his horse he dashed through the ford between them, -received their cross fire without damage, and reaching a wood baffled -pursuit, and was soon rejoined by Leon. - -Grant had before ascertained that ladders for storming Rodrigo were -prepared, and the French officers openly talked of doing so; but -desiring further to test this, and ascertain if Marmont’s march might -not finally be for the Tagus, wishing also to discover the French -force, he placed himself on a wooded hill near Tamames where the road -branched off to the passes and to Rodrigo. There lying perdue while the -army passed in march, he noted every battalion and gun, and finding -all went towards Rodrigo entered Tamames, and found the greatest -part of their scaling-ladders had been left there, showing that the -intention to storm Rodrigo was not real. This it was which had allayed -Wellington’s fears for that fortress when he sought to entice Soult to -battle. - -Marmont then passed the Coa, but Grant preceded him, with intent to -discover if his further march would be by Guarda upon Coimbra, or by -Sabugal upon Castello Branco; for to reach the latter it was necessary -to descend from a very high ridge, or rather succession of ridges, by -a pass at the lower mouth of which stands Penamacor. Upon one of the -inferior ridges of this pass he placed himself, thinking the dwarf -oaks which covered the hill would secure him from discovery; but from -the higher ridge the French detected his movements with their glasses, -and in a few moments Leon, whose lynx eyes were always on the watch, -called out, _the French! the French!_ Some dragoons came galloping up, -Grant and his follower darted into the wood for a little space and then -suddenly wheeling rode off in a different direction; but at every turn -new enemies appeared, and at last the hunted men dismounted and fled on -foot through the low oaks; again they were met by infantry, detached -in small parties down the sides of the pass, and directed in their -chase by the waving of hats on the ridge above: Leon fell exhausted, -and those who first came up killed him in despite of his companion’s -entreaties: a barbarous action! - -Grant they carried to Marmont, who invited him to dinner, and the -conversation turned on the prisoner’s exploits. The French marshal -said he had been long on the watch, knew all his captive’s haunts and -disguises, had discovered that only the night before he slept in the -French head-quarters, with other adventures which had not happened, for -this Grant never used any disguise; but there was another Grant, also -very remarkable in his way, who used to remain for months in the French -quarters, using all manner of disguises; hence the similarity of names -caused the actions of both to be attributed to one, and that is the -only palliative for Marmont’s subsequent conduct. - -Treating his prisoner with apparent kindness, he exacted from him an -especial parole, that he would not admit a rescue by the Partidas while -on his journey through Spain to France: this secured his captive, -though Wellington offered two thousand dollars to any guerilla chief -who should recover him. The exaction of such a parole was a tacit -compliment to the man; but Marmont sent a letter with the escort to -the governor of Bayonne, in which, still in error as to there being -but one Grant, he designated his captive as a dangerous spy who had -done infinite mischief, and whom he had not executed on the spot out -of respect to something resembling uniform which he wore: he therefore -desired, that at Bayonne he should be placed in irons and sent to -Paris: this was so little in accord with French honour, that before -the Spanish frontier was passed Grant was made acquainted with the -treachery. - -At Bayonne, in ordinary cases, the custom was for prisoners to wait -on the authorities and receive passports for Verdun; this was done; -the letter was purposely delayed, and Grant with sagacious boldness -refrained from escaping towards the Pyrenees. Judging, that if the -governor did not recapture him at once he would entirely suppress the -letter, and let the matter drop, he asked at the hotels if any French -officer was going to Paris, and finding General Souham, then on his -return from Spain, was so bent, he introduced himself, requesting -permission to join his party. The other readily assented, and while -thus travelling the general, unacquainted with Marmont’s intentions, -often rallied his companion about his adventures, little thinking he -was then an instrument to forward the most dangerous and skilful of -them all. - -In passing through Orleans, Grant by a species of intuition discovered -a secret English agent, and from him received a recommendation to -another in Paris. He looked upon Marmont’s double-dealing, and the -expressed design to take away his life, as equivalent to a discharge -of his parole, which was moreover only given with respect to Spain; -hence on reaching Paris he took leave of Souham, opened an intercourse -with the Parisian agent, and obtained money. He would not go before the -police to have his passport examined, but took lodgings in a public -street, frequented the coffee-houses and visited the theatres boldly, -for the secret agent, intimately connected with the police, soon -ascertained that his escape had been unnoticed. - -After several weeks, the agent told him a passport was ready for one -Jonathan Buck, an American who had died suddenly on the day it was to -be claimed. Grant coolly demanded this passport as for Jonathan Buck -and instantly departed for the mouth of the Loire, where, for reasons -not necessary to mention, he expected more assistance. New difficulties -awaited him, yet they were overcome by fresh exertions of his -surprising talent, which fortune seemed to delight in aiding. Having -taken a passage in an American ship its departure was unexpectedly -delayed; then he frankly told his situation to the captain, who desired -him to become a discontented seaman, gave him sailor’s clothing with -forty dollars, and sent him to lodge the money in the American consul’s -hands, as a pledge that he would prosecute for ill usage when he -reached the United States: this being the custom, the consul gave him a -certificate to pass from port to port as a discharged sailor seeking a -ship. - -A promise of ten Napoleons induced a French boatman to row him in the -night to a small island, where, by usage, English vessels watered -unmolested, and, in return, permitted the few inhabitants to fish and -traffic without interruption. The masts of the British ships were -dimly seen beyond the island, and the termination of all Grant’s -toils seemed at hand, when the boatman from fear or malice returned -to port. Some men would have strived in desperation to force fortune -and so have perished, others would have sunk in despair, for the money -promised was Grant’s all, and the boatman demanded full payment; but -with admirable coolness he gave him one piece and a rebuke for his -misconduct; the other threatened a reference to the police yet found -himself overmatched in subtlety: his opponent replied that he would -then denounce him as aiding the escape of a prisoner of war, and adduce -the price of his boat as a proof of his guilt! - -An old fisherman was afterwards engaged, and faithfully performed -his bargain, but there were then no English vessels near the island; -however the fisherman caught some fish, with which he sailed towards -the southward, having heard of an English ship of war being there. A -glimpse was obtained of her, and they were steering that way when a -shot from a coast-battery brought them to, and a boat with soldiers put -off to board. The fisherman was steadfast and true. He called Grant -his son, and the soldiers were only sent to warn them not to pass the -battery because an English vessel, the one they were in search of, was -on the coast. The old man bribed the soldiers with his fish, assuring -them he must go with his son or they would starve, and he was so well -acquainted with the coast he could easily escape the enemy. Being -desired to wait till night and then depart, he, under pretence of -avoiding the English vessel, made the soldiers point out her bearings -so exactly that when darkness fell he run her straight on board, and -the intrepid Grant stood in safety on the quarter deck. - -In England he got permission to choose a French officer for an -exchange, that no doubt might remain as to the propriety of his -escape; great was his astonishment to find in the first prison he -visited the old fisherman and his real son, who had been captured -notwithstanding a protection given to them for their services. Grant, -whose generosity and benevolence were as remarkable as the qualities of -his understanding, soon obtained their release, sent them with a sum -of money to France, returned to the Peninsula, and within four months -from the date of his first capture was again on the Tormes, watching -Marmont’s army as before! Other adventures could be mentioned of this -generous and spirited, yet gentle-minded man, who, having served his -country nobly in every climate, died a victim to continual hardships -aided by a mortified spirit, for he had not been rewarded as he -deserved. - - -SURPRISE OF ALMARAZ. (May, 1812.) - -So many obstacles, military and political, were to be overcome before -Andalusia could be invaded, 1812, that Lord Wellington finally resigned -that project and meditated instead, operations against Marmont’s -army. To obtain success it was essential to isolate him as much as -possible, and in that view various combinations were matured; but the -most important stroke was to destroy the bridge and forts at Almaraz -on the Tagus. Strong in works, that place was also a great depôt for -stores and boats, and not only facilitated the passage of the Tagus -for reinforcements coming from Soult, but was sufficient to serve as a -base and place of arms for an army to operate on the rear and flank of -the British, if they engaged with Marmont in Castile. General Hill, who -remained with a force in the Alemtejo, was charged with this great and -dangerous enterprise, for a clear understanding of which the nature of -the country must be described. - -The left bank of the Tagus, from Toledo to Almaraz, is lined with -rugged mountains, difficult for small bodies, impracticable for an -army. From Almaraz to the frontier of Portugal the banks are more open, -yet still difficult, and the Tagus was only to be crossed at certain -points, to which bad roads led. From Almaraz to Alcantara the bridges, -both those included, were ruined, and those of Arzobispo and Talavera -above Almaraz were of little value because of the rugged mountains. -Soult’s pontoon equipage had been captured in Badajos, and the French -could only cross the Tagus between Toledo and the frontier of Portugal -by Marmont’s boat bridge at Almaraz, to secure which he had constructed -three strong forts and a bridge-head. - -The first, called Ragusa, contained stores and provisions, and was, -though not finished, exceedingly strong; it had a loopholed stone tower -twenty-five feet high within, and was flanked without by a field-work -near the bridge. This was on the north bank. On the south bank the -bridge had a fortified head of masonry, which was again flanked by a -redoubt called Fort Napoleon, placed on a height a little in advance; -imperfectly constructed, however, inasmuch as a wide berm in the -middle of the scarp furnished a landing-place for troops escalading. -It was yet strong, because it contained a second interior defence or -retrenchment, with a loopholed stone tower, a ditch, drawbridge, and -palisades. - -These forts and the bridge-head were armed with eighteen guns and -garrisoned with eleven hundred men, which insured command of the -river; but the mountains on the left bank precluded the passage of an -army towards Lower Estremadura, save by the royal road to Truxillo, -which, five miles from the Tagus, went over the lofty rugged Mirabete -ridge: to secure the summit of this, the French had drawn a line of -works across the throat of the pass; that is to say, a large fortified -house was connected by smaller posts with the ancient watch-tower of -Mirabete, which contained eight guns and was surrounded by a rampart -twelve feet high. - -If all these works, and a road, which Marmont, following the -traces of an ancient Roman way, was now opening across the Gredos -mountains had been finished, the communication of the French, though -circuitous, would have been very good and secure. Wellington feared -that accomplishment and designed to surprise Almaraz previous to the -siege of Badajos, when the redoubts were far from complete; but the -Portuguese government then baffled him by neglecting to furnish the -means of transporting the artillery from Lisbon. Hill now marched to -attempt it with a force of six thousand men, including four hundred -cavalry, two field brigades of artillery, a pontoon equipage, and a -battering-train of six iron twenty-four-pound howitzers. The enterprise -was become more difficult. For when the army was round Badajos, only -the resistance of the forts was to be looked to; now Foy’s division -of Marmont’s army was in the valley of the Tagus, and troops from the -king’s army occupied Talavera. Drouet was also with eight or nine -thousand men near Medellin, and closer to Merida than Hill was to -Almaraz; he might therefore intercept the latter’s retreat--and the -king’s orders were imperative that he should hang on the English force -in Estremadura. Hill had therefore to steer, going and coming, through -all these forces with an unwieldy convoy, and as it were, blot out the -strong place without a battle; but Wellington took many precautions -to divert the French attention to other points, and to furnish support -without indicating the true object. - -Hill, though dangerously delayed by the difficulty of restoring the -bridge of Merida, which he had himself destroyed during the siege -of Badajos, crossed the Guadiana with six thousand men, twelve -field-pieces, pontoons, battering-train and fifty country carts, -conveying material and ammunition. On the 15th he reached Truxillo, -and during his march the guerillas of the Guadalupe mountains made -demonstrations at different points, between Almaraz and Arzobispo, as -if seeking a place to cast a bridge that he might join Wellington. -Foy was deceived by these feints, for his spies at Truxillo, while -reporting the passage of the Guadiana, said Hill had fifteen thousand -men, and that two brigades of cavalry were following: one report even -stated that thirty thousand men had entered Truxillo, whereas there -were less than six thousand of all arms. - -Early on the 16th the armament reached Jaraicejo, formed three columns, -and made a night march, intending to surprise at the same moment, the -tower of Mirabete, the fortified house in the pass, and the forts at -the bridge of Almaraz. The left column, directed against the tower, -was commanded by General Chowne. The centre, with the dragoons and -artillery, moved by the royal road under General Long. The right, -composed of the 50th, 71st, and 92nd Regiments, under Hill in person, -was to penetrate by the narrow and difficult way of Roman Gordo against -the forts of the bridge; but day broke before any column reached its -destination, and all hopes of a surprise were extinguished. This was -an untoward beginning, unavoidable with the right and centre column -because of the bad roads, but Chowne was negligent, for the Mirabete -tower might have been assaulted before daylight. - -Hill now saw that to reduce the Mirabete works in the pass he must -incur more loss than was justifiable, and be in such plight that he -could not finally carry the forts below; yet it was only through the -pass the artillery could move against the bridge. In this dilemma, -after losing the 17th and part of the 18th, in fruitless attempts to -discover some opening through which to reach Almaraz with his guns, -he resolved to leave them on the Sierra with the centre column, make -a false attack on the tower with Chowne’s troops, and in person, with -the right column, secretly penetrate by the scarcely practicable line -of Roman Gordo to the bridge, intent, with infantry alone, to storm -works which were defended by eighteen pieces of artillery and powerful -garrisons! - -This resolution was even more hardy than it appears, without a -reference to the general state of affairs. His march had been one of -secrecy, amidst various divisions of the enemy; he was four days’ -journey from Merida, his first point of retreat; he expected Drouet to -be reinforced and advance, and hence, whether defeated or victorious -at Almaraz, his retreat would be very dangerous; exceedingly so if -defeated, because his fine British troops could not be repulsed with -a small loss, and he would have to fall back through a difficult -country, with his best soldiers dispirited by failure and burthened by -numbers of wounded men. Then, harassed on one side by Drouet, pursued -by Foy and D’Armagnac on the other, he would have been exposed to the -greatest misfortunes, every slanderous tongue would have been let -loose on the rashness of attacking impregnable forts, and a military -career, hitherto so glorious, might have terminated in shame. Devoid -of interested ambition, he was unshaken by such fears, and remained -concealed until the evening of the 18th, when he commenced the descent, -with design to escalade the Fort Napoleon before daylight. The march -was less than six miles, but the head of the troops only reached -the fort a little before daylight, the rear was distant, and it was -doubtful if the scaling ladders, cut in halves to thread the short -narrow turns in the precipitous descent, would serve for an assault. -Some small hills concealed the head of the column, and at that moment -Chowne commenced his false attack at Mirabete. Pillars of white smoke -rose on the lofty brow of the Sierra, the heavy sound of artillery came -rolling over the valley, and the garrison of Fort Napoleon, crowding on -the ramparts, were gazing at those portentous signs of war, when, quick -and loud, a British shout broke on their ears, and the 50th Regiment -with a wing of the 71st, came bounding over the low hills. - -Surprised the French were to see an enemy so close while the Mirabete -was still defended, yet they were not unprepared; a patrol of English -cavalry had been seen from the fort on the 17th, and in the evening -of the 18th a woman had given exact information of Hill’s numbers and -designs. This intelligence had caused the commandant, Aubert, to march -in the night with reinforcements to Fort Napoleon, which was therefore -defended by six companies ready to fight, and when the first shout was -heard they smote with musketry and artillery on the British front, -while the guns of Fort Ragusa took them in flank. A rise of ground, -twenty yards from the ramparts, soon covered the assailants from the -front fire, and General Howard, leading the foremost into the ditch, -commenced the escalade. The breadth of the berm kept off the ends of -the shortened ladders from the parapet, but the first men jumped on to -the berm itself and drawing up the ladders planted them there; then -with a second escalade they won the rampart and, closely fighting, -all went together into the retrenchment round the stone tower. Aubert -was wounded and taken, and the garrison fled towards the bridge-head, -but the victorious troops would not be shaken off, they entered that -work also in one confused mass with the fugitives, who continued their -flight over the bridge itself. Still the British soldiers pushed their -headlong charge, slaying the hindmost, and would have passed the river -if some of the boats had not been destroyed by stray shots from the -forts, which were now sharply cannonading each other, for the artillery -men had turned the guns of Napoleon on Fort Ragusa. - -Many French, leaping into the water, were drowned, but the greatest -part were made prisoners, and to the amazement of the conquerors the -panic pervaded the other side of the river, where the garrison of -Ragusa, though perfectly safe, fled with the others! Some grenadiers of -the 92nd, then swimming over, brought back boats, with which the bridge -was restored and the towers and works of Ragusa were destroyed, and -the stores, ammunition, provisions and boats, burned. In the night the -troops returned to the Mirabete ridge with the colours of the foreign -regiment, and two hundred and fifty prisoners, including a commandant -and sixteen other officers, their own loss being a hundred and eighty -men. One officer of artillery was killed by his own mine, placed for -the destruction of the tower, but the only officer slain in the -assault was Captain Candler, of the 50th, a brave man, who fell leading -the grenadiers of that regiment on to the rampart of Fort Napoleon. - -Rapidity was an essential cause of this success. Foy had ordered -D’Armagnac to reinforce the forts with a battalion, which might have -entered Fort Ragusa early in the morning of the 19th; but instead of -marching before day-break, it did not move until eleven o’clock, and -meeting the fugitives on the road caught the panic. - -Hill was about to reduce the works at Mirabete, when Sir W. Erskine, -confused by the French movements, gave a false alarm, which caused a -retreat on Merida; Wellington, in reference to this error of Erskine, -told the ministers, that his generals, stout in action as the poorest -soldiers, were overwhelmed with fear of responsibility when left -to themselves: the slightest movement of an enemy deprived them of -judgment. Erskine was a miserable officer; but all officers knew, that -without powerful interest future prospects and past services would -wither under the blight of a disaster; that a selfish government would -instantly offer them as victims to a misjudging public and a ribald -press, with which success is the only criterion of merit. English -generals are, and must be, prodigal of their blood to gain reputation; -but they are timid in command, because a single failure without a fault -consigns them to shame and abuse. - -Having resumed his former position, Hill engaged in a series of marches -and countermarches against Drouet, yet no action occurred, save one -between General Slade and General Lallemande, with two regiments of -dragoons on each side. Slade, contrary to orders, drove back the French -horsemen for eight miles, and through the defile of Maquilla followed -in disorder; but in the plain beyond stood Lallemande’s reserves, -with which he broke the disorderly mass, killed or wounded fifty, -pursued for six miles and took a hundred prisoners. Two days after, -the Austrian Strenowitz, having but fifty men of Slade’s dragoons, -recovered all the wounded prisoners, defeated eighty French, killed -many and took twenty-six: such is the difference between mere dash and -military skill. - -In the summer of 1812 Lord Wellington resolved to fight Marmont. There -were many reasons for this, but the principal one was, that Napoleon -was in the heart of Russia, that his own army was stronger, especially -in cavalry, than it had yet been or was likely to be, and if he did -not then strike no better opportunity could be expected. He had ninety -thousand men, British and Portuguese, but six thousand were in Cadiz, -and the Walcheren expedition was still to be atoned for; the regiments -which had served there were so sickly that only thirty-two thousand -British were in line; yet to these he could join twenty-five thousand -Portuguese, making fifty-seven thousand sabres and bayonets, which -he judged sufficient. Of this force Hill had seventeen thousand, two -thousand being cavalry with twenty-four guns. General D’Urban was with -twelve hundred Portuguese horsemen in the Tras Os Montes, and was to -coöperate with Wellington, who had therefore nearly forty thousand of -all arms, three thousand five hundred being cavalry, with fifty-four -guns. - -Almaraz bridge had been destroyed to lengthen the French lateral line -of communication, Alcantara was now repaired to shorten the British -line; and though the break in that stupendous structure was ninety -feet wide and one hundred and fifty above the water, the genius of -Colonel Sturgeon overcame the difficulty. Hill’s army was thus brought -a fortnight nearer to Wellington than Drouet was to Marmont, if both -marched with artillery; and as the army of the centre was, by the -king’s misrule, in a state of great disorder, Marmont was for a time -isolated from all the other armies save that of the north, now under -General Caffarelli, who was however occupied by maritime expeditions -from Coruña. - -Marmont was a man to be feared. He was quick of apprehension, morally -and physically brave, scientific, used to war, strong of body, in -the prime of life, eager for glory; and though neither a great nor a -fortunate commander, such a one as could bear the test of fire. He -had strongly fortified three convents at Salamanca, and having about -twenty-five thousand men in hand, demanded aid from the king, from -Soult, and from the army of the north. His design was to dispute the -Tormes and Duero in succession, the first by his forts, the second -with an army, which he could augment to forty-six thousand without -extraneous aid by calling Bonet’s division from the Asturias. - -On the 13th of June Wellington advanced to the Tormes. The bridge -of Salamanca was barred by the French forts, all the others had -been destroyed save that of Alba de Tormes, the castle of which was -garrisoned; the allies however passed the river above and below -Salamanca by the fords of Santa Marta and Los Cantos, and General -Clinton invested the forts with the sixth division. Marmont, who had -two divisions and some cavalry, retired by the road of Toro. Salamanca -then became a scene of rejoicing. The houses were illuminated, the -people, shouting, singing and weeping for joy, gave Wellington their -welcome while his army took a position on the hill of San Christoval -five miles in advance. - - -SIEGE OF THE SALAMANCA FORTS. (June, 1812.) - -Clinton had only four heavy guns and three twenty-four-pound howitzers, -but the train used by Hill at Almaraz had passed the Tagus at -Alcantara on its way up. The strength of the forts had however been -under-estimated, they contained eight hundred men. San Vincente, placed -on a perpendicular cliff overhanging the Tormes, had a fortified -convent within, and was well flanked and separated by a deep ravine -from the other forts; and these last, called San Cajetano and La -Merced, though smaller and of a square form, were bomb-proof and with -deep ditches. - -The engineer Burgoyne, directing the siege, commenced a battery two -hundred and fifty yards from Vincente, and as the ruins of convents -all around which had been destroyed to make the forts, rendered it -impossible to excavate, earth was brought from a distance; but the moon -was up, the night short, the French musketry heavy, the sixth division -inexperienced, and at daybreak the battery was still imperfect. An -attempt had been made to attach the miner secretly to the counterscarp, -but the vigilance of a trained dog baffled this design: it was then -openly made, yet defeated by a plunging fire from the top of the -convent. - -On the 18th eight hundred Germans, placed in the ruins, mastered all -the enemy’s fire save that from loop-holes, and two field-pieces were -placed on a neighbouring convent to silence the French artillery, but -failed. - -In the night the first battery was armed; at daybreak on the 19th -seven guns opened, and by nine o’clock the wall of the convent was cut -away to the level of the rampart; a second breaching battery of iron -howitzers, which saw lower down the scarp, then commenced its fire, -but that ordnance was unmeet for battering, and the enemy’s musketry -brought down a captain and more than twenty gunners. - -The 20th Colonel Dickson arrived with more iron howitzers from Elvas, -and the second battery, reinforced with additional pieces, revived its -fire, striking only the convent, a huge cantle of which came to the -ground, crushing many of the garrison and laying bare the inside of the -building; carcasses were immediately thrown into the opening, but the -enemy extinguished the flames. A lieutenant and fifteen gunners were -lost this day, ammunition failed, and the attack was suspended. - -During this siege the aspect of affairs had changed on both sides. -Wellington, deceived as to the strength of the forts, now found by -intercepted returns that both Soult and Marmont were far stronger than -he had expected; he had calculated also that Bonet’s division would -not quit the Asturias, but that general was in full march for Leon; -Caffarelli was likewise preparing to reinforce Marmont, and thus the -brilliant prospect of the campaign was suddenly clouded. Meanwhile -Marmont, having united four divisions of infantry and a brigade of -cavalry, twenty-five thousand men, came to the succour of the forts. -His approach, over an open country, being descried at a considerable -distance, a brigade was called from the siege, the battering train -was sent across the Tormes, and the army formed in order of battle on -the top of San Christoval. This position was four miles long, rather -concave, and the steep descent in front tangled with hollow roads, -stone inclosures and villages; the summit was broad, even, and covered -with ripe corn, the right was flanked by the Upper Tormes, the left -dipped into the country bordering the Lower Tormes; for in passing -Salamanca that river took a sweep round the back of the position. The -infantry, heavy cavalry and guns, crowned the summit of the mountain, -but the light cavalry was in a low country on the left, where there -was a small stream and a marshy flat. In front of the left, centre, -and right, the villages of Christoval, Castillanos, and Moresco, were -nearly in a line at the foot of the position, which overlooked the -country for many miles, yet had neither shade nor fuel to cook with, -nor water nearer than the Tormes, and the heat was very oppressive. - -At five o’clock in the evening the enemy’s horsemen approached, -pointing towards the left of the position, as if to turn it by the -Lower Tormes; to check this the light cavalry made a short forward -movement and a partial charge took place, but the French opened six -guns and the others retired to their own ground. The light division -immediately closed towards the left, and the French cavalry halted. -Meanwhile the main body of the enemy bore with a rapid pace in one -dark volume against the right, and halting at the foot of the position -sent a flight of shells on to the lofty summit; nor did this fire -cease until after dark, when Marmont, taking possession of Moresco, -established himself behind that village and Castillanos, within -gun-shot of the allies. - -That night the English general slept amongst the troops, and the -first streak of light saw both sides under arms. Some signals were -interchanged between Marmont and the forts, yet all remained quiet -until evening, when Wellington detached the 68th Regiment to drive -the French from Moresco. This attack, made with vigour, succeeded, -but the troops being recalled just as daylight failed, a body of -French, passing unperceived through standing corn, broke into the -village unexpectedly and did considerable execution. In the skirmish -an officer, named Mackay, being surrounded, refused to surrender, and, -fighting against a multitude, received more wounds than the human frame -was thought capable of sustaining; yet he lived to show his honourable -scars. - -Next day three divisions and a brigade of cavalry joined Marmont, -who, having now forty thousand men, extended his left and seized a -part of the height in advance of the allies’ right wing. From thence -he could discern the whole of their order of battle, and attack their -right on even terms; but Graham, using the seventh division, dislodged -his detachment with a sharp skirmish before it could be formidably -reinforced, and in the night the French withdrew to some heights six -miles in rear. - -It was thought Marmont’s tempestuous advance to Moresco on the evening -of the 20th should have been his ruin; but Wellington argued, that if -he came to fight it was better to defend a strong position than descend -to combat in the plain; for the French inferiority was not such as -to insure a result decisive of the campaign, and in case of failure, -a retreat across the Tormes would have been very difficult. To this -may be added, that during the first evening there was some confusion -amongst the allies; the troops, of different nations, had formed their -order of battle slowly; the descent of the mountain towards the enemy -was by no means easy; walls, hollow ways and villages, covered the -French front, and Marmont, having plenty of guns and troops ready of -movement, could have evaded the action until night. This reasoning -however failed on the 21st. The allies, whose infantry was a third -more, their cavalry three times as numerous and much better mounted, -might have poured down by all the roads at daybreak, and then Marmont, -turned on both flanks and followed vehemently, could never have made -his retreat to the Duero through the open country: on the 22nd, when -his other troops came up, the chances were no longer the same. - -Marmont now withdrew his right, abandoning the road of Toro, but -keeping that of Tordesillas, and placing his left on the Tormes at -Huerta, where the river took a sudden bend, descending perpendicularly -towards the allies. Thus commanding the ford of Huerta he could pass -the river and communicate by the left bank with his forts. Wellington -made corresponding dispositions. Closing towards the river, he placed -the light division at the ford of Aldea Lengua, sent Graham down with -two divisions to the nearer ford of Santa Marta, and General Bock’s -heavy German cavalry over the Tormes to watch the ford of Huerta. - -On the 23rd all was tranquil, but at break of day on the 24th some -dropping pistol-shots, and now and then a shout, came faintly from a -mist covering the lower ground beyond the river; the heavy sound of -artillery succeeded, and the hissing of bullets cutting through the -thickened atmosphere told that the French were over the Tormes. Soon -the fog vanished, and the German horsemen were seen retiring in close -and beautiful order before twelve thousand French infantry, advancing -in battle array. At intervals, twenty guns would start forwards and -send their bullets whistling and tearing up the ground beneath the -Germans, while scattered parties of light cavalry scouting out capped -all the hills in succession, peering abroad and giving signals to -the main body. Wellington then sent Graham over the river with two -divisions and a brigade of English cavalry, concentrating the rest of -his troops near Moresco to await the event. - -Bock continued his retreat in fine order, regardless alike of the -cannonade and of the light horsemen on his flanks, until the enemy’s -scouts gained a height, from whence, at the distance of three miles, -they for the first time perceived Graham’s twelve thousand men, ranged -with eighteen guns on an order of battle perpendicular to the Tormes. -From the same point Wellington’s heavy columns were seen clustering -on the height above the fords of Santa Marta, and the light division -at Aldea Lengua, ready either to advance against the French troops -left on the right bank, or to pass the river in aid of Graham. At this -sight Marmont hastily faced about, repassed the Tormes, and resumed his -former ground. - -Wellington, unwilling to stir before the forts fell, here again refused -an accidental advantage; for it is not easy to see how the French could -have avoided a defeat if he had moved with all the troops on the right -bank against the French divisions on that side. - -The forts were now closely pressed. On the 23rd, the heavy guns being -brought back, a battery to breach San Cajetano was armed with four -pieces; yet the line of fire being oblique only beat down the parapet -and knocked away the palisades. An escalade of that fort and La Merced -was tried at ten o’clock, yet failed in half an hour with a loss of one -hundred and twenty men and officers; the wounded were brought off next -day under truce, and the enemy had all the credit of the fight. General -Bowes, whose rank might have excused his leading so small a force, -being wounded early in this assault, was having his hurt dressed when -he heard the troops were yielding, whereupon he returned to the fight -and fell. - -Want of powder now suspended the siege until the 26th, when a convoy -arrived. Then the second and third batteries were re-armed, and the -field-pieces replaced on the neighbouring convent. The iron howitzers, -throwing hot shot, soon set the convent within San Vincente on fire; -but the garrison extinguished the flames and this balanced combat -continued during the night. In the morning the besiegers’ fire was -redoubled, the convent was in a blaze, the breach of Cajetano improved, -and a fresh storming party was assembled, when the white flag waved -from Cajetano. Negotiation ensued, but Wellington, judging it an -artifice to gain time, ordered a double assault, to oppose which -Cajetano scarcely fired a shot, and the flames raged so at Vincente no -opposition could be made. Seven hundred prisoners, thirty pieces of -artillery, provisions, arms, clothing, and a secure passage over the -Tormes, were the immediate fruits of this capture: not the less prized -that the breaches were found more formidable than those at Rodrigo, -and a storm would have been very doubtful if the garrison could have -gained time to extinguish the flames in San Vincente. The allies had -ninety killed, and their whole loss was five hundred men and officers, -of which one hundred and sixty men with fifty horses fell outside -Salamanca, the rest in the siege. - - -COMBATS BETWEEN THE DUERO AND THE TORMES. (July, 1812.) - -When the forts were taken Marmont retreated. Wellington pursued by -easy marches, and on the 2nd of July inflicted a slight loss on the -rear-guard at the bridge of Tordesillas; it would have been a great -one if he had not been deceived by a false report that the French had -broken the bridge the night before. - -Marmont then took the line of the Duero, having fortified posts at -Zamora and Toro, and broken the bridges there and at Puente Duero and -Tudela also, preserving only that of Tordesillas. His left was at -Simancas on the Pisuerga, which was unfordable, and the bridges at that -place and Valladolid were commanded by fortified posts. His centre -was at Tordesillas and very numerous; his right on heights opposite -the ford of Pollos, which Wellington seized instantly as it gave -him a passage, though a difficult one and unfit for a large force. -Head-quarters were then fixed at Rueda, and the army disposed with a -head against the ford of Pollos and bridge of Tordesillas, the rear -on the Zapardiel and Trabancos rivers to meet any outbreak from the -Valladolid side. Marmont’s line of defence, measured from Valladolid to -Zamora, was sixty miles; from Simancas to Toro above thirty; but the -actual occupation was not above twelve; the bend of the river gave him -the chord, the allies the arc, and the fords were few and difficult. - -It was Wellington’s design to force Marmont by the co-operation of the -Gallician and other Spanish forces to live on his fixed magazines; -Castaños however, like all Spanish generals, failed in the hour of -need. Marmont had then the means of rendering the campaign futile if -not disastrous to the British general, but with a false judgment threw -away his actual advantages by striving to better them. Bonet’s recall -from the Asturias was a great error. Napoleon and Wellington had alike -foreseen the importance of holding that province; the one ordered, -the other calculated on its retention, and their judgment was now -vindicated. The Gallicians and Asturians immediately moved by the coast -towards Biscay, where the maritime expedition from Coruña, a large one -under Sir Home Popham, had descended on several points; Caffarelli -therefore retained the reinforcement destined for Marmont, and that -marshal, by gaining six thousand men under Bonet, lost twelve or -thirteen thousand of the army of the north, and opened all the northern -provinces to the Spaniards. - -In this state of affairs neither Wellington nor Marmont had reason -to fight on the Duero. The latter because his position was so strong -he could safely wait for Bonet’s and Caffarelli’s troops, while the -king operated against the allies’ communications. The former because -he could not attack the French, except at great disadvantage; for the -fords of the Duero were little known, and that of Pollos very deep. -To pass the river there and form within gunshot of the enemy’s left, -without other combinations, promised nothing but defeat, for the -strength of ground was with the French. While they had the bridge at -Tordesillas, an attempt to force a passage would have enabled Marmont -to fall on the front and rear, if the operation was within his reach; -if beyond his reach, that is to say, near Zamora, he could cut the -communication with Rodrigo and yet preserve his own with Caffarelli and -the king. Wellington therefore resolved to wait until the fords should -become lower, or the Gallicians and Partidas should be persuaded to -act, and thus force the French to detach men or dislodge for want of -provisions. - -D’Urban’s Portuguese cavalry, which was on the French side of the -river, now incommoded Marmont’s right, and Foy marched to drive them -off; General Pakenham, commanding the third division, immediately -crossed the ford of Pollos, which brought Foy back, and Marmont then -augmented the efficiency of his cavalry by taking a thousand horses -from the infantry officers and sutlers. - -On the 8th Bonet arrived, and the French marshal, extending his right -to Toro, commenced repairing the bridge there. Wellington, in like -manner, stretched his left to the Guarena, keeping his centre still -on the Trabancos and his right at Rueda, with posts near Tordesillas -and the ford of Pollos. In this situation the armies remained for some -days, during which Graham and Picton went to England in bad health, -and the principal powder magazine at Salamanca exploded with hurt to -many. No other events worth recording occurred. The weather was fine, -the country rich, the troops received their rations regularly, and wine -was so plentiful it was hard to keep the soldiers sober; the caves of -Rueda, natural or cut in the rock below the surface of the earth, were -so immense, and held so much wine, that the drunkards of two armies -failed to make any very sensible diminution in the quantity, and many -men perished in that labyrinth. The soldiers of each army also, passing -the Duero in groups, held amicable intercourse, conversing of battles -that were yet to be fought, and the camps on the banks of the Duero -seemed at times to belong to one general, so difficult is it to make -brave men hate each other. - -To the officers of the allies all looked prosperous, they were -impatient for the signal of battle, and many complained that the -French had been permitted to retreat from Christoval; had Wellington -been finally forced back to Portugal, his reputation would have been -grievously assailed by his own people. The majority, peering forward -with misty political vision, overlooked the difficulties close at hand, -but their general was fretted with care and mortification, for all -cross and evil circumstances seemed to combine against him. The Spanish -coöperation had failed in all quarters, the enemy in front was growing -stronger, Soult was seriously menacing Cadiz, and the king was said -to have been joined by Drouet; the Portuguese troops were deserting -in great numbers from misery; the English government had absurdly and -perniciously interfered with the supply of the military chest; there -was no money and the personal resources of Wellington alone kept the -army in its forward position. “I have never,” said he, “been in such -distress as at present, and some serious misfortune must happen if -the government do not attend seriously to the subject and supply us -regularly with money. The arrears and distresses of the Portuguese -government are a joke to ours, and if our credit was not better than -theirs we should certainly starve. As it is, if we don’t find means to -pay our bills for butcher’s meat there will be an end to the war at -once.” - -Thus stript as it were to the skin, he was going once more to hide his -nakedness in the mountains of Portugal, when Marmont, proud of his own -unripened skill, and perhaps, from the experience of San Christoval, -undervaluing his adversary’s tactics; desirous also, it was said, to -gain a victory without the presence of a king; Marmont, pushed on by -fate, madly broke the chain which restrained his enemy’s strength. - -To understand the remarkable movements which were now about to -commence, it must be borne in mind that the French army, while the -harvest was on the ground, had no regard to lines of communication; -it had supports on all sides, and the troops were taught to reap the -standing corn, and grind it themselves if their cavalry could not seize -flour in the villages. This organization, approaching the ancient Roman -military perfection, baffled the irregular, and threw the regular force -of the allies entirely upon the defensive; their flanks once turned a -retreat must follow to save the communications; but the French offered -no point for retaliation. Wherefore, with a force composed of four -different nations, Wellington was to make difficult evolutions in an -open country, his only chances of success being the casual errors of -his adversary, an able general, who knew the country perfectly and had -troops well disciplined, and of one nation. The game would have been -quite unequal if the English had not been so strong in cavalry. - -In the course of the 15th and 16th Marmont, who had previously made -deceptive movements, concentrated his beautiful and gallant army on -its right towards Toro, which place, intercepted letters, reports of -deserters and the talk of the peasants, had for several days assigned -as his point of passage. On the morning of the 16th English exploring -officers, passing the Duero near Tordesillas, found only the garrison -there, and in the evening the reports stated, that two French divisions -had already crossed by the bridge of Toro; wherefore Wellington -united his centre and left at Canizal, on the Guarena, during the -night, intending to attack; but as he had still some doubts of the -real object, he left Sir Stapleton Cotton on the Trabancos with the -right wing, composed of the fourth and light divisions and Anson’s -cavalry. Suddenly Marmont recalled his troops, returned to Tordesillas -and Pollos, passed the Duero and concentrated at Nava del Rey in -the evening of the 17th, some of his men having marched forty, some -fifty miles without a halt. Wellington was then near Toro, and Cotton -remained behind the Trabancos during the night without orders, in a bad -position; Wellington however hastened to his aid, bringing up Bock’s, -Le Marchant’s, and Alten’s cavalry, while the fifth division took post -six miles in rear of the Trabancos. - - -COMBATS OF CASTREJON AND THE GUARENA. (July, 1812.) - -At daybreak Cotton’s outposts were driven in, yet the bulk of his -cavalry and a troop of horse artillery showed a front, having the -two infantry divisions in support; the fourth behind his left, the -light division behind his right, but widely separated by a valley. -The country was open, like the downs of England, with here and there -water-gullies, dry hollows and naked heads of land, behind one of -which, on the other side of the Trabancos, lay the French army. Cotton, -seeing only horsemen, pushed his cavalry towards the river, advancing -cautiously by his right along some high table-land, where his troops -were lost at first in the morning fog, then thick on the stream. Very -soon the deep tones of artillery shook the ground, the sharp ring of -musketry was heard in the mist, and the 43rd Regiment was hastily -brought through the village of Castrejon to support the advancing -cavalry; for besides the deep valley separating the fourth from the -light division, there was a ravine with a marshy bottom between the -cavalry and infantry, and the village furnished the only good passage. - -The cannonade became heavy, and the spectacle surprisingly beautiful. -The lighter smoke and mist, mingling and curling in fantastic pillars, -formed a huge and glittering dome tinged with many colours by the -rising sun, and through the gross vapour below the restless horsemen -were seen or lost, as the fume thickened from the rapid play of the -artillery; the bluff head of land beyond the Trabancos, now covered -with French troops, appeared by an optical deception close at hand, -dilated to the size of a mountain, and crowned with gigantic soldiers, -who were continually breaking off and sliding down into the fight. -Suddenly a dismounted English cavalry officer stalked from the midst -of the smoke towards the line of infantry; his gait was peculiarly -rigid, and he appeared to hold a bloody handkerchief to his heart; but -that which seemed a cloth was a broad and dreadful wound: a bullet -had entirely effaced the flesh from his left shoulder and breast and -carried away part of his ribs, his heart was bared and its movement -plainly discerned. It was a piteous and yet a noble sight, for his -countenance though ghastly was firm, his step scarcely indicated -weakness, and his voice never faltered. This unyielding man’s name was -Williams. He died a short distance from the field of battle, it was -said in the arms of his son, a youth of fourteen, who had followed his -father to the Peninsula in hopes of obtaining a commission, for they -were not in affluent circumstances. - -Cotton maintained this exposed position until seven o’clock, when -Wellington and Beresford came up, and both were like to have been -slain together. For a squadron of French cavalry, breaking away from -the head of land beyond the Trabancos, had just before come with such -speed across the valley that it was for a moment thought they were -deserting; but with headlong course they mounted the table-land on -which Cotton’s left wing was posted, and drove a whole line of British -cavalry skirmishers back in confusion. The reserves then came up from -Alaejos, and these furious swordmen, scattered in all directions, were -in turn driven away or cut down; yet thirty or forty, led by their -gallant officer, suddenly appeared above the ravine separating the -British wings, just as Wellington and Beresford arrived on the slope -beneath them. Some infantry picquets were in the bottom, higher up were -two guns covered by a squadron of light cavalry disposed in perfect -order, and when the French officer saw this squadron he reined in his -horse with difficulty, his men gathering in a confused body round him; -they seemed lost, but their daring leader waving his sword soused down -with a shout on the English troopers, who turning, galloped through the -guns, and the whole mass, friends and enemies, went like a whirlwind -to the bottom, carrying away in the tumult Wellington and Beresford. -The French horsemen were now quite exhausted and a reserve of heavy -dragoons cut most of them to pieces; yet their invincible leader, -assaulted by three enemies at once, struck one dead from his horse, and -with surprising exertions saved himself from the others, though they -rode hewing at him on each side for a quarter of a mile. - -Scarcely was this over when Marmont, having ascertained that a part -only of Wellington’s army was before him, crossed the Trabancos in two -columns, and penetrating between the light and fourth divisions marched -straight upon the Guarena. The British retired in three columns, -the light division being between the fifth division and the French, -close to the latter, the cavalry on the flanks and rear. The air was -extremely sultry, the dust rose in clouds, and the close order of the -troops was rendered very oppressive by a siroc wind; but where the -light division marched the military spectacle was strange and grand. -Hostile columns of infantry, only half musket-shot from each other, -were marching impetuously towards a common goal, the officers on each -side pointing forwards with their swords, or touching their caps and -waving their hands in courtesy, while the German cavalry, huge men, on -huge horses, rode between in a close compact body as if to prevent a -collision: at times the loud tones of command to hasten the march were -heard passing from the front to the rear on both sides, and now and -then the rush of French bullets came sweeping over the columns, whose -violent pace was continually accelerated. - -Thus moving for ten miles, yet keeping the most perfect order, both -parties approached the Guarena, and the enemy seeing the light -division, although more in their power than the others, was yet -outstripping them in the march, increased the fire of their guns and -menaced an attack with infantry: the German cavalry instantly drew -close round, the column plunged suddenly into a hollow dip of ground -on the left, and ten minutes after the head of the division was in the -stream of the Guarena between Osmo and Castrillo. The fifth division -entered it at the same time higher up on the left, and the fourth -division passed on the right. The soldiers of the light division, -tormented with thirst yet long used to their enemy’s mode of warfare, -drunk as they marched; those of the fifth division, less experienced, -stopped a few moments, and on the instant forty French guns gathering -on the heights above sent a tempest of bullets amongst them. So nicely -timed was the operation. - -The Guarena, flowing from four distinct sources which united below -Castrillo, offered a very strong line of defence; yet Marmont, hoping -to carry it in the first confusion, brought up all his artillery and -pushed the head of his right column over an upper branch. Wellington, -expecting this, had previously ordered up the other divisions of his -army, and they were in line before Marmont’s infantry, oppressed with -heat and long marches, could gather strength to attempt the passage -of the other branch. Carier’s brigade of cavalry first crossed, and -was followed by a column of infantry, just as the fourth division had -gained the table-land above. Carier’s horsemen entered the valley on -the left, the infantry in one column menaced the front, but the sedgy -banks of the stream would have been difficult to force, if Victor -Alten, slow to perceive an advantage, had not suffered the French -cavalry to cross first in considerable numbers without opposition. Then -he assailed them by successive squadrons instead of regiments, and -when the 14th and German Hussars were hard-pressed, brought up the 3rd -Dragoons, who were however driven back by the fire of the infantry, and -many fell. Finally Carier being wounded and taken, the French retired, -and meanwhile the 27th and 40th Regiments, coming down the hill, broke -the enemy’s infantry with an impetuous bayonet charge: Alten’s horsemen -then sabred some of the fugitives. - -Marmont lost a general and five hundred soldiers by this combat, but, -though baffled at one point, and beaten at another, he concentrated -his army and held both banks of the branch he had gained. Wellington -also concentrated, and as the previous operations had only cost him -six hundred men and the French but eight hundred, the day being -still young, the positions open and within cannon-shot, a battle was -expected. Marmont’s troops had however been marching for two days and -nights, and Wellington’s plan did not admit of fighting unless in -defence, or with such advantage as that he could crush his opponent and -keep the field afterwards against the king. - -The French marshal had passed a great river, surprised the allies’ -right, and pushed it back above ten miles: he had nevertheless failed -as a general. His aim had been, by menacing the communication between -Salamanca and Rodrigo, to draw the allies back; yet on the evening of -the 16th, having passed the Duero at Toro, he was nearer to Salamanca -than they were, and, persisting, Wellington must have fought him at -disadvantage, or passed the Tormes at Huerta to regain the road of -Rodrigo. Marmont however relinquished this stroke to march eighty miles -in forty-eight hours, and after many nice evolutions, in which he lost -a thousand men by the sword and fatigue, found his adversary on the -18th facing him in the very position he had turned on the evening of -the 16th! - -On the 19th the armies were quiet until evening, when the French were -suddenly concentrated in one mass on their left. Wellington made a -corresponding movement on the tableland above, which caused the light -division to overlook the enemy’s main body, then at rest round the -bivouac fires; it would have remained so if Sir Stapleton Cotton -coming up had not turned a battery upon a group of French officers. At -the first shot they seemed surprised--for it was a discourteous and -ill-considered act--at the second their gunners run to their pieces, -and a reply from twelve heavier guns wounded an artillery-officer, -killed several British soldiers, swept away a whole section of -Portuguese, and compelled the division to withdraw in a mortifying -manner to avoid unnecessary blood-spilling. - -Wellington now expected a battle, because the heights he occupied -trended backwards to the Tormes on the shortest line, and as he had -thrown a Spanish garrison into the castle of Alba de Tormes he thought -the French could not turn his right; if they attempted it, he could -shoulder them off the Tormes at the ford of Huerta. At daybreak -however, instead of crossing the Guarena in front to dispute the high -land, Marmont marched rapidly up the river and crossed the stream, -though the banks were difficult, before any disposition could be made -to oppose him. He thus turned the right and gained a new range of -hills trending also towards the Tormes, and parallel to those which -Wellington possessed. Then commenced a scene similar to that of the -18th but on a greater scale. The allies moving in two lines of battle -within musket-shot of the French endeavoured to cross their march, the -guns on both sides exchanged rough salutations as the accidents of -ground favoured their play, and the officers, like gallant gentlemen -who bore no malice and knew no fear, made their military recognitions, -while the horsemen on each side watched with eager eyes for an opening -to charge: but the French, moving as one man along the crest of the -heights, preserved the lead and made no mistake. - -Soon it became evident that the allies would be outflanked, wherefore -Wellington, falling off a little, made towards the heights occupied by -Marmont during the siege of the forts, intending to halt there while -an advanced guard, forcing a march, secured the position and fords of -Christoval. But he made no effort to seize the ford of Huerta, for -his own march had been long, the French had passed over nearly twice -as much ground, and he thought they could not reach the Tormes that -day. When night approached he discovered his error. His second line -had indeed got the heights of Vellosa, but his first line was heaped -up in low ground near the French army, whose fires, crowning all the -opposite hills, showed they commanded the ford of Huerta. Wellington -then ordered the bivouac fires to be made with much smoke, under cover -of which he filed the troops off with great celerity towards Vellosa; -but the Portuguese cavalry, coming in from the front, were mistaken for -French and lost some men by cannon-shot ere they were recognised. - -Very much disquieted by this day’s operations was the English leader. -Marmont, perfectly acquainted with the country, had outflanked and -outmarched him, and gained the command of the Tormes, thus securing -his junction with the king’s army, and enabled to fight or wait for -reinforcements, while the scope of the allies’ operations would hourly -become more restricted. Meanwhile Caffarelli having finally detached -eighteen hundred cavalry with guns to aid Marmont, they were coming -on, and the king also was taking the field; hence though a victory -should be won, unless it was decisive, Wellington’s object would not be -advanced. That object was to deliver the Peninsula by a course of solid -operations, incompatible with sudden and rash strokes unauthorized by -anything but hope; wherefore, yielding to circumstances, he resolved -to retreat on Portugal and abide his time; yet with a bitter spirit, -nothing soothed by the recollection that he had refused to fight at -advantage exactly one month before upon the very hills he now occupied. -Nevertheless that steadfast temper which then prevented him from -seizing an adventitious chance would not now let him yield to fortune -more than she could ravish from him: he still hoped to give the lion’s -stroke, and resolved to cover Salamanca and the communication with -Ciudad Rodrigo to the last moment. The uncertainty of war was now -shown. This inability to hold his ground was made known to Castaños by -a letter, which Marmont intercepted, and immediately decided to push on -without waiting for the king, who afterwards announced this accident as -a subtle stroke by Wellington to draw on a premature battle! - -On the 21st, the allies being on San Christoval, the French threw -a garrison into Alba de Tormes, from whence the Spaniards had been -withdrawn by Carlos España, without the knowledge of the English -general. Marmont then passed the Tormes by the fords, between Alba -and Huerta, and moving up the valley of the Machechuco encamped at -the outer edge of a forest. Wellington also passed the Tormes in the -evening by the bridge of Salamanca and the fords of Santa Marta and -Aldea Lengua; but the third division and D’Urban’s cavalry remaining -on the right bank, intrenched themselves, lest the French, who had left -a division on the heights of Babila Fuente, should recross the Tonnes -in the night and overwhelm them. - -When the light division descended the rough side of the Aldea Lengua -mountain to cross the river night had come down suddenly, and with more -than common darkness, for a storm, that usual precursor of a battle -in the Peninsula, was at hand. Torrents of rain deepened the ford, -the water foamed and dashed with increasing violence, the thunder was -frequent and deafening, and the lightning passed in sheets of fire -close over the column, playing upon the points of the bayonets. One -flash falling amongst the cavalry near Santa Marta killed many men -and horses, while hundreds of frightened animals, breaking loose and -galloping wildly about, were supposed to be the enemy charging in the -darkness, and some of their patrols were indeed at hand, hovering like -birds of prey: but nothing could disturb the beautiful order in which -the serene veterans of the light division were seen by the fiery gleams -to pass the foaming river, pursuing their march amidst this astounding -turmoil, alike regardless of the storm and the enemy. - -The position now taken was nearly the same as that occupied by General -Graham a month before, when the forts of Salamanca were invested. The -left wing rested in low ground on the Tormes, having a cavalry post -in front. The right wing was extended on a range of heights, which -ended also in low ground, near the village of Arapiles: this line, -perpendicular to the Tormes from Huerta to Salamanca, was parallel to -it from Alba to Huerta, and covered Salamanca. Meanwhile the enemy, -extending his left along the edge of the forest, menaced the line of -communication with Rodrigo; and in the night advice came that General -Chauvel, bringing up Caffarelli’s horsemen and twenty guns, had reached -Pollos the 20th, and would join Marmont the 22nd or 23rd. Hence -Wellington, feeling he must now retreat to Rodrigo, and fearing the -French cavalry thus reinforced would hamper his movements, determined, -unless they attacked him or committed some flagrant fault, to retire -before Chauvel’s horsemen could arrive. - -At daybreak on the 22nd, Marmont called the troops at Babila Fuente -over the Tormes, brought Bonet’s and Maucune’s divisions out of the -forest, and took possession of the ridge of Calvariza Ariba; he also -occupied in advance of it on his right, a wooded height on which was an -old chapel called Nuestra Señora de la Pena. But at a little distance -from his left and from the English right, stood a pair of solitary -hills, called indifferently the _Arapiles_ or the _Hermanitos_. Steep -and savagely rugged, about half cannon-shot from each other, their -possession would have enabled Marmont to cross Wellington’s right, and -force a battle with every advantage. Nevertheless they were neglected -by the English at first, until Colonel Waters, having observed an -enemy’s detachment stealing towards them, informed Beresford, who -thought it of no consequence, but Waters then rode to Wellington who -immediately sent troops to seize them. A combat similar to that which -happened between Cæsar and Afranius at Lerida now ensued; for the -French, seeing this detachment, broke their own ranks and running to -the encounter gained the first Arapiles and kept it, yet were repulsed -in an endeavour to seize the second. This skirmish was followed by -one at Nuestra Señora de la Pena, half of which was gained, the enemy -keeping the other half: Victor Alten, aiding the attack with a squadron -of German hussars, was there wounded by a musket-shot. - -The loss of the distant Arapiles rendered a retreat difficult to the -allies during daylight; for though the one gained was a fortress in the -way of the French army, Marmont, by extending his left and gathering a -force behind his own rock, could frame a dangerous battle during the -movement. Wellington therefore extended his troops on the right of his -own Hermanito, placing the light companies of the Guards at the village -of Arapiles in low ground, and the fourth division, with exception -of the 27th Regiment, on a gentle ridge behind them. The fifth and -sixth divisions he gathered in one mass upon the internal slope of the -English Hermanito, where the ground being hollow, hid them from the -enemy. During these movements a sharp cannonade was exchanged from the -tops of those frowning hills, on whose crowning rocks the two generals -sat like ravenous vultures watching for their quarry. - -Marmont’s project was not yet developed. His troops from Babila Fuente -were still in the forest some miles off, and he had only two divisions -close up. The occupation of Calvariza Ariba and Nuestra Señora de -la Pena might be therefore only a daring defensive measure to cover -the formation of his army; but the occupation of the Hermanito was a -start forward for an advantage to be afterwards turned to profit, and -seemed to fix the operations on the left of the Tormes. In this doubt -Wellington brought up the first and light divisions to confront the -French on Calvariza Ariba, and calling the third division and D’Urban’s -cavalry over the river, posted them in a wood near Aldea Tejada, -entirely refused to the enemy and unseen by him, yet securing the main -road to Rodrigo. Thus the position was suddenly reversed. The left -now rested on the English Hermanito, the right on Aldea Tejada; that -which was the rear became the front, the interval between the third and -fourth divisions being occupied by Bradford’s Portuguese infantry, a -Spanish division, and the British cavalry. - -Breaks and hollows so screened the men that few could be seen by the -French, and those seemed pointing to the Rodrigo road in retreat; -moreover, the commissariat and baggage had been ordered to the rear -and the dust of their march was seen many miles off: nothing indicated -an approaching battle. Such a state of affairs could not last long. At -twelve o’clock Marmont, thinking the important bearing of his Hermanito -on Wellington’s retreat would induce the latter to drive him thence, -brought up Foy’s and Ferey’s divisions in support, placing the first, -with some guns, on a wooded height between the Hermanito and Nuestra -Señora de la Pena; the second, with Boyer’s dragoons, on a ridge behind -Foy. Nor was this ill-timed, for Wellington, thinking he could not -insure a safe retreat in daylight, was going to attack, but on the -approach of these troops gave counter-orders lest he should bring on a -general battle disadvantageously. - -The French from Babila Fuente had not then reached the edge of the -forest, yet Marmont resolved to fight, and fearing the allies would -retreat before his own dispositions were completed, ordered Thomières’ -division, covered by fifty guns and supported by the light cavalry, to -make a flank movement by its left and menace the Rodrigo road. Then -hastening the march of his other divisions, he watched when Wellington -should move in opposition to Thomières, designing to fall upon him by -the village with six divisions of infantry and Boyer’s dragoons, which -he now ordered to take fresh ground on the left of the Hermanito rock, -leaving only one regiment of cavalry with Foy. - -In these new circumstances the two armies embraced an oval basin, -formed by different ranges of hills that rose like an amphitheatre, -the Arapiles rocks appearing like the doorposts. Around this basin, -which was more than a mile from north to south and more than two miles -from east to west, the hostile forces were grouped. The northern and -western half formed the allies’ position; the eastern heights were held -by the French right; their left, consisting of Thomières’ division, -the artillery and light cavalry, moved along the southern side of -the basin, but with a wide loose march; for there was a long space -between Thomières’ division and those in the forest destined to form -the centre; a longer space between him and the divisions about the -French Hermanito. The artillery, fifty guns, massed on Thomières’ right -flank, opened its fire grandly, taking ground to the left by guns in -succession as the infantry moved on; and these last marched eagerly, -continually contracting their distance from the allies and bringing -up their left shoulders as if to envelope Wellington’s position and -embrace it with fire. At this time also, Bonet’s troops, one regiment -of which held the French Arapiles, carried the village of that name, -and although soon driven from the greatest part of it again maintained -a fierce struggle. - -Marmont’s first arrangements had occupied several hours, but as they -gave no positive indication of his designs, Wellington, ceasing to -watch them, had retired from his Hermanito; but when he was told the -French left was in motion pointing towards the Ciudad Rodrigo road, he -returned to the rock and observed their movements for some time with -a stern contentment. Their left wing was entirely separated from the -centre, the fault was flagrant, and he fixed it with the stroke of a -thunderbolt. A few orders issued from his lips like the incantations -of a wizard, and suddenly the dark mass of troops which covered the -English Hermanito, as if possessed by some mighty spirit, rushed -violently down the interior slope of the mountain and entered the -great basin, amidst a storm of bullets which seemed to shear away the -whole surface of the earth over which they moved. The fifth division -instantly formed on the right of the fourth, connecting the latter -with Bradford’s Portuguese, who hastened forward at the same time -from the right of the army, and then the heavy cavalry, galloping up -on the right of Bradford, closed this front of battle. The sixth and -seventh divisions, flanked on the right by Anson’s light cavalry, -were ranged at half cannon shot on a second line, which was prolonged -by the Spaniards in the direction of the third division; and this -last, reinforced by two squadrons of the 14th Dragoons, and D’Urban’s -Portuguese horsemen, formed the extreme right of the army. Behind -all, on the highest ground, the first and light divisions and Pack’s -Portuguese were disposed in heavy masses as a reserve. - -When this grand disposition was completed, the third division and its -attendant horsemen, formed in four columns and flanked on the left -by twelve guns, received orders to cross Thomières’ line of march. -The remainder of the first line, including the main body of the -cavalry, was to advance when the attack of the third division should -be developed; and as the fourth division must in this forward movement -necessarily lend its flank to the enemy’s troops stationed on the -French Hermanito, Pack was to assail that rock the moment the left -of the British line passed it. Thus, after long coiling and winding, -the armies came together, and drawing up their huge trains like angry -serpents mingled in deadly strife. - - -BATTLE OF SALAMANCA. (July, 1812.) - -Marmont from his Hermanito saw the country beneath him suddenly covered -with enemies at a moment when he was in the act of making a complicated -evolution, and when, by the rash advance of his left, his troops were -separated into three parts too dispersed to assist each other, those -nearest the enemy being neither strong enough to hold their ground nor -aware of what they had to encounter. The third division was however -still hidden by the western heights, and he hoped the tempest of -bullets in the basin beneath would check the British line until he -could bring up his other divisions and by the village of Arapiles fall -on what was now the left of the allies’ position. But even this his -only resource for saving the battle was weak, for there were in reserve -the first and light divisions and Pack’s Portuguese, in all twelve -thousand troops, with thirty pieces of artillery; the village was also -well disputed, and the English rock stood out as a strong bastion of -defence. However, nothing daunted, Marmont despatched officer after -officer, some to hasten the troops from the forest, others to stop the -progress of his left wing; and with a sanguine expectation he still -looked for victory, until Pakenham shot with the third division like a -meteor across Thomières’ path; then pride and hope alike died within -him, and desperately he was hurrying in person to that fatal point, -when an exploding shell stretched him on the earth with a broken arm -and two deep wounds in his side. Confusion ensued, and the troops, -distracted by ill-judged orders and counter-orders, knew not where to -move, whom to fight, or whom to avoid. - -It was five o’clock when Pakenham fell upon Thomières; and it was at -a moment when that general, whose column had gained an open isolated -hill, expected to see the allies in full retreat towards the Rodrigo -road, closely followed by Marmont from the Arapiles. The counter-stroke -was terrible! Two batteries of artillery, placed on the summit of the -western heights, suddenly took his troops in flank, Pakenham’s massive -columns, supported by cavalry, were in his front, and two-thirds of -his own division, lengthened out and unconnected, were still in a -wood, where they could hear but could not see the storm now bursting; -from the chief to the lowest soldier all felt they were lost, and in -an instant Pakenham, the most frank and gallant of men, commenced the -battle. - -As the British masses came on, forming lines while in march, the French -gunners, standing up manfully, sent out showers of grape, and a crowd -of light troops poured in a fire of musketry, under cover of which -the main body endeavoured to display a front. But bearing onwards -through the skirmishers with the might of a giant Pakenham broke the -half-formed lines into fragments, and sent the whole in confusion upon -the advancing supports; one only officer remained by the artillery; -standing alone he fired the last gun at the distance of a few yards, -but whether he lived or there died could not be seen for the smoke. -Some squadrons of light cavalry fell on the right of the third -division; the 5th Regiment repulsed them, and then D’Urban’s Portuguese -horsemen, reinforced by two squadrons of the 14th Dragoons under Felton -Harvey, gained the enemy’s flank, while the Oporto regiment, led by -the English Major Watson, charged his infantry, but Watson fell deeply -wounded and his men retired. - -Pakenham continued his tempestuous course against the remainder of -Thomières’ troops, which were now arrayed on the wooded heights behind -the first hill, yet imperfectly and offering two fronts; the one -opposed to the third division and its attendant horsemen, the other to -the fifth division, Bradford’s brigade, and the main body of cavalry -and artillery, all of which were now moving in one great line across -the basin. Meanwhile Bonet, repulsed from the village of Arapiles, -was sharply engaged outside with the fourth division, Maucune kept a -menacing position behind the French Hermanito, Clausel’s division came -up from the forest, and the connection of the centre and left was in -some measure restored: two divisions were however yet in the rear, -and Boyer’s dragoons were still in march. Thomières had been killed, -Bonet succeeding Marmont was disabled, hence more confusion; but the -command then devolved on Clausel, and he was of a capacity to sustain -this terrible crisis, which may be thus described. The fourth and -fifth divisions and Bradford’s brigade, hotly engaged, were steadily -gaining ground on the English left; the heavy cavalry, Anson’s light -dragoons, and Bull’s troop of artillery were next in line, advancing -at a trot on Pakenham’s left, and on that general’s right D’Urban’s -horsemen overlapped the enemy. Thus in less than half an hour, and -before an order of battle had even been formed by the French, their -commander-in-chief and two other generals had fallen, and the left of -their army was turned, thrown into confusion and enveloped. - -Clausel’s division had now joined Thomières’, and a new front had -been spread on the southern heights, yet loosely and unfit to resist; -for the troops were, some in double lines, some in columns, some in -squares, a powerful sun struck on their eyes, and the light soil, -stirred up and driven forward by a breeze, which arose in the west at -the moment of attack, came mingled with smoke full upon them in such -stifling volumes, that scarcely able to breathe and quite unable to -see their fire was given at random. In this situation, while Pakenham, -bearing onward with conquering violence was closing on their flank, and -the fifth division advancing with a storm of fire on their front, the -interval between the two attacks was suddenly filled with a whirling -cloud of dust, moving swiftly forward and carrying within its womb -the trampling sound of a charging multitude. As it passed the left of -the third division, Le Marchant’s heavy horsemen, flanked by Anson’s -light cavalry, broke out at full speed, and the next instant twelve -hundred French infantry, formed in several lines, were trampled down -with a terrible clangour and tumult. Bewildered and blinded they cast -away their arms and run through the openings of the British squadrons, -stooping and demanding quarter, while the dragoons, big men on big -horses, rode onward, smiting with their long glittering swords in -uncontrollable power, and the third division, following at speed, -shouted as the French masses fell in succession before this dreadful -charge. - -Nor were these valiant swordsmen yet exhausted. Le Marchant and many -officers had fallen, but Cotton and all his staff were still at their -head, and with ranks confused and blended in one mass, still galloping -forward, they sustained from a fresh column an irregular stream of fire -which emptied a hundred saddles; yet with fine courage and downright -force, the survivors broke through this the third and strongest body -of men that had encountered them, and Lord Edward Somerset, continuing -his course at the head of one squadron with a happy perseverance, -captured five guns. The French left was thus entirely broken, more -than two thousand prisoners were taken, their light horsemen abandoned -that part of the field, and Thomières’ division no longer existed as a -military body. Anson’s cavalry, which had passed quite over the hill -and had suffered little in the charge, was now joined by D’Urban’s -troopers and took the place of Le Marchant’s exhausted men; the heavy -German dragoons followed in reserve, forming with the third and fifth -divisions and the guns one formidable line, two miles in advance -of where Pakenham had first attacked: and that impetuous officer -with unmitigated strength still pressed forward spreading terror and -disorder on the enemy’s left. - -But while these signal events, which occupied about forty minutes, -were passing on the allies’ right, a terrible battle raged in the -centre. For when the first shock of the third division had been -observed, the fourth division, moving in a line with the fifth, had -passed the village of Arapiles under a prodigious cannonade, and -vigorously driving Bonet’s troops step by step to the southern and -eastern heights, had compelled them to mingle with the broken remains -of Clausel’s and Thomières’ divisions. This combat having opened the -French Hermanito about the time of the cavalry charge, enabled Pack’s -Portuguese to assail that rock, and the front of battle was thus -completely defined, for Foy’s division was then exchanging a distant -cannonade with the first and light divisions. However Bonet’s troops, -notwithstanding Marmont’s fall and the loss of their own general, -fought strongly, and Clausel made a surprisingly vigorous effort and -beyond all men’s expectations to restore the battle. Soon a great -change was visible. Ferey’s division, drawn off from the height of -Calvaraza, arrived in the centre behind Bonet’s men; the light cavalry, -Boyer’s dragoons, and two divisions of infantry from the forest, were -also united there; and on this mass of fresh men Clausel rallied the -remnants of his own and Thomières’ division. Thus Sarrut’s, Brennier’s -and Ferey’s unbroken divisions, supported by all the cavalry, were -suddenly massed to cover the line of retreat on Alba de Tormes, while -Maucune still held the French Hermanito, having Foy on his right. - -But Clausel, not content with having thus got the army together in a -condition to effect a retreat, attempted to turn the tide of victory, -founding hope on a misfortune which had befallen Pack. For that -officer, ascending the French Hermanito in one heavy column, was within -thirty yards of the summit, believing himself victorious, when the -enemy leaped suddenly forward from the rocks upon his front and upon -his left flank; the hostile masses closed, there was a thick cloud of -smoke, a shout, a stream of fire, and the side of the hill was covered -with the dead, the wounded and flying Portuguese. They were unjustly -scoffed at for this failure, no troops could have withstood that crash -upon such steep ground, and the propriety of attacking the hill at all -seems questionable. The result went nigh to shake the whole battle. -For the fourth division had just then reached the southern ridge of -the basin, and one regiment had actually gained the summit when twelve -hundred French, arrayed on the reverse slope, charged up hill when the -British were quite breathless and disordered by the previous fighting; -the French came up resolutely and without a shot won the crest, and -even pursued down the other side until two supporting regiments below -checked them. - -This counter-blow took place at the moment of Pack’s defeat, and then -Maucune, no longer in pain for the Hermanito, menaced the left flank -and rear of the fourth division with skirmishers, until a wing of -the 40th Regiment, wheeling about with a rough charge, cleared the -rear. Maucune would not engage more deeply at that time, yet Ferey’s -troops pressed vigorously against the front of the fourth division, -and Brennier did the same by the first line of the fifth division; -Boyer’s dragoons also came on rapidly, and the allies outflanked and -overmatched lost ground. Fiercely and fast the French followed, and -the fight once more raged in the basin below. General Cole had before -this fallen deeply wounded, Leith had the same fortune, but Beresford -promptly drew Spry’s Portuguese brigade from the second line of the -fifth division, and thus flanked the advancing columns of the enemy: -yet he also fell desperately wounded, and Boyer’s dragoons came freely -into action, because Anson’s cavalry had been checked, after Le -Marchant’s charge, by a heavy fire of artillery. - -Now the crisis of battle arrived, victory was for the general who -had the strongest reserves in hand, and Wellington, seen that day at -every point where and when his presence was most required, brought up -the sixth division, and turned the scale by a charge, rough, strong, -and successful. Nevertheless the struggle was no slight one. Hulse’s -brigade, which was on the left, went down by hundreds, and the 61st -and 11th Regiments won their way desperately and through such a fire -as British soldiers only can sustain. Some of Boyer’s dragoons also, -breaking in between the fifth and sixth divisions, slew many men and -caused some disorder in the 53rd; yet that brave regiment lost no -ground, nor did Clausel’s impetuous counter-attack avail at any point, -after the first burst, against the steady courage of the allies. The -southern ridge was thus regained, the French generals Menne and Ferey -were wounded, the first severely, the second mortally; Clausel himself -was hurt, Boyer’s reserve of dragoons, coming on at a canter, were met -and broken by the fire of Hulse’s noble brigade, and the current of the -fight once more set for the British. The third division continued to -outflank the enemy’s left, Maucune abandoned the Hermanito, Foy retired -from Calvariza, and the allied host, righting itself as a gallant ship -after a sudden gust, again bore onwards in blood and gloom: for though -the air, purified by the storm of the night before, was peculiarly -clear, one vast cloud of smoke and dust rolled along the basin, and -within it was the battle with all its sights and sounds of terror. - -When Wellington had thus restored the fight in the centre, he directed -the first division to push between Foy and the rest of the French -army, which would have rendered it impossible for the latter to rally -or escape; but this order was not executed, and Foy’s and Maucune’s -divisions were skilfully used by Clausel to protect his retreat. Foy, -posted on undulating ground and flanked by dragoons, covered the roads -to the fords of Huerta and Encina; Maucune, reinforced with fifteen -guns, was on a steep ridge in front of the forest, covering the road -to Alba de Tormes; and behind this ridge, the rest of the army, then -falling back in disorder before the third, fifth and sixth divisions, -took refuge. Wellington immediately sent the light division in two -lines, flanked by dragoons, against Foy, and supported them with the -first division in columns, flanked on the right by two brigades of the -fourth division, which he drew from the centre when the sixth division -had restored the fight. The seventh division and the Spaniards followed -in reserve, the country was covered with troops, and a new army seemed -to have arisen out of the earth. - -Foy, throwing out a cloud of skirmishers, retired by wings, firing -heavily from every rise of ground upon the light division, which -returned no shot, save by its skirmishers; for three miles this march -was under his musketry, occasionally thickened by a cannonade, but the -French aim was baffled by the twilight and rapid gliding of the lines. -Meanwhile the French general Desgraviers was killed, the flanking -brigades from the fourth division penetrated between Maucune and Foy, -and it seemed difficult for the latter to extricate his troops. Yet -he did so thus. Augmenting his skirmishers on the last defensible -ridge, along the foot of which run a marshy stream, he redoubled his -musketry and made a menacing demonstration with his horsemen just as -the darkness fell; the British guns immediately opened, a squadron of -dragoons galloped forwards from the left, the infantry impetuously -hastened to the summit of the hill, and a rough shock seemed at hand, -but there was no longer an enemy: the main body had gone into the -forest on their left during the firing, and the skirmishers fled -swiftly after covered by the smoke and coming night. - -Maucune was now maintaining a noble battle. He was outflanked and -outnumbered, yet the safety of the French army depended on his courage, -he knew it, and Pakenham, marking his bold demeanour, advised Clinton, -who was immediately in his front, not to assail him until the third -division should have turned his left. Nevertheless Clinton plunged -his troops into action under great disadvantage; for after remaining -some time unnecessarily under Maucune’s batteries, which ploughed -heavily through their ranks, they were suddenly directed to attack the -hill, and aided by a brigade of the fourth division they rushed up; -but in the darkness of the night the fire showed from afar how the -battle went. On the English side a sheet of flame was seen, sometimes -advancing with an even front, sometimes pricking forth in spear heads, -now falling back in waving lines, anon darting upwards in one vast -pyramid, the apex of which often approached yet never gained the actual -summit of the mountain; but the French musketry, rapid as lightning, -sparkled along the brow of the height with unvarying fulness, and with -what destructive effects the dark gaps and changing shapes of the -adverse fire showed too plainly: meanwhile Pakenham turned the left, -Foy glided into the forest, and Maucune’s task being then completed, -the effulgent crest of the ridge became black and silent and the whole -French army vanished as it were in the darkness. - -During this fight Wellington in person made the light division advance -towards the ford of Huerta, having the forest on his right; for he -thought the Spanish garrison was still in the castle of Alba, and -that the enemy must be found at the fords. For this final stroke he -had strengthened his left wing; nor was he diverted from it by Foy’s -retreat into the forest, because it pointed towards the fords of -Encina and Gonzalo, where the right wing of the allies would find him; -moreover a squadron of French dragoons, bursting from the forest soon -after dark and firing their pistols, had passed at full gallop across -the front of the 43rd Regiment towards the ford of Huerta, indicating -great confusion in the defeated army, and confirming Wellington’s -notion as to the direction: yet the troops were then marching through -standing corn, where no enemy could have preceded them! - -Had the castle of Alba been held the French could not have carried off -a third of their army; nor would they have been in much better plight -if Carlos España, who soon discovered his error in withdrawing the -garrison, had informed Wellington of the fact; but he suppressed it and -suffered the colonel who had only obeyed his orders to be censured. The -left wing therefore reached the fords without meeting any enemy, and, -the night being far spent, was there halted. The right wing, exhausted -by long fighting, halted after the action with Maucune, and thus the -French gained Alba unmolested; yet the action did not terminate without -two remarkable accidents. While riding close behind the 43rd Regiment, -Wellington was struck in the thigh by a spent ball which passed through -his holster; and in the night Sir Stapleton Cotton, who had gone to the -ford of Huerta, was, in returning, shot through the arm by a Portuguese -sentinel whose challenge he disregarded. These were the last events -of this famous battle in which the English general, to use a French -officer’s expression, _defeated forty thousand men in forty minutes_! -Yet he fought it as if his genius disdained such trial of its strength. -Late in the evening of that great day I saw him behind my regiment, -then marching towards the ford. He was alone, the flush of victory -was on his brow, his eyes were eager and watchful, but his voice was -calm and even gentle. More than the rival of Marlborough, for he -had defeated greater generals than Marlborough ever encountered, he -seemed with prescient pride only to accept the victory as an earnest of -greater glory. - - -COMBAT OF LA SERNA. (July, 1812.) - -During the few hours of darkness succeeding the battle of Salamanca, -Clausel with a wonderful diligence passed the Tormes at Alba; but -Wellington also crossed that river with his left wing at daylight, -and moving up stream overtook the French on the Almar rivulet, near -the village of La Serna, and launched his cavalry against them. Their -squadrons fled from Anson’s troopers, abandoning three battalions of -infantry, who in separate columns were making up a hollow slope, hoping -to gain the crest of some heights before the pursuing cavalry could -fall on, and the two foremost did reach the higher ground and there -formed squares; the last, when half-way up, seeing Bock’s heavy German -dragoons galloping hard on, faced about and commenced a disorderly -fire, and the squares above also plied their muskets on the Germans, -who, after crossing the Almar, had to pass a turn of narrow road and -clear rough ground before opening a charging front. They dropped fast -under the fire. By twos, by threes, by tens, by twenties they fell, yet -the mass, surmounting the difficulties of the ground, hurtled on the -column and went clean through it: then the squares above retreated and -several hundred prisoners were made by those able and daring horsemen. - -This charge was successful even to wonder, and the victors standing in -the midst of captives and admiring friends seemed invincible; yet those -who witnessed the scene, nay the actors themselves remained with the -conviction of the military truth,--that cavalry are not able to cope -with veteran infantry, save by surprise. The hill of La Serna offered -a frightful spectacle of the power of the musket. The track of the -Germans was marked by their huge bodies. A few minutes only had the -combat lasted, and above a hundred had fallen--fifty-one were killed -outright. In several places man and horse had died simultaneously, and -so suddenly, that falling together on their sides they appeared still -alive, the horse’s legs stretched out as in movement, the rider’s -feet in the stirrups, the bridle in hand, the sword raised to strike, -and the large hat fastened under the chin, giving to the grim yet -undistorted countenance a supernatural and terrible expression. - -When the French found their rear-guard attacked they turned to its -succour, but seeing the light division coming up recommenced the -retreat, and were soon joined by Caffarelli’s horsemen and guns, under -General Chauvel: too late they joined for the battle, yet covered -the retreat with a resolution that deterred the allied cavalry from -meddling with them. Clausel then carried his army off with such -celerity that his head-quarters were that night forty miles from the -field of battle. - -King Joseph was at this time at Blasco Sancho, one short march from -the beaten army: he came to aid Marmont with fourteen thousand men, -and so early as the 24th could easily have effected a junction, but he -then knew only of Marmont’s advance from the Duero, not of his defeat. -Next day he received, from that marshal and Clausel, letters describing -the battle and saying the army must go over the Duero to establish -new communications with the Army of the North. A junction with them -was still possible, but the king retreated in haste, leaving behind -two officers and twenty-seven horsemen, who were next day attacked -and captured by seven troopers of the 14th Dragoons led by Corporal -Hanley,[25] a noble soldier, thus described by an officer under whom he -had many times charged. “A finer fellow never rode into the field. His -feats, besides the one at Blasco Sancho, were extraordinary. He was a -very handsome man, rode magnificently, and had altogether such a noble -bearing before the enemy as is not often seen.” - -Clausel marched upon Valladolid, abandoning the garrisons of Toro, -Tordesillas and Zamora, and, being still pressed by the British, went -up the Arlazan river. Then the king passed over the Guadarama mountains -to Madrid and Wellington entered Valladolid, where he found large -stores, seventeen pieces of artillery, and eight hundred sick and -wounded men. This terminated the Salamanca operations, which present -the following remarkable results. On the 18th of July Marmont’s army, -forty-two thousand sabres and bayonets with seventy-four guns, passed -the Duero to attack the allies. On the 30th it repassed that river -in retreat, having in those twelve days marched two hundred miles, -fought three combats, and a general battle, in which one marshal of -France, seven generals, and twelve thousand five hundred men and -inferior officers were killed, wounded or taken, together with two -eagles, several standards and twelve guns, exclusive of those found at -Valladolid. In the same period the allies, who had forty-six thousand -sabres and bayonets, with sixty guns, the excess of men being Spanish, -marched one hundred and sixty miles, and had one marshal, Beresford, -four generals and six thousand men and officers killed or wounded. - - - - -BOOK VIII. - - Madrid--Siege of Burgos--Retreat from Burgos--Combat of Venta - de Pozo--Combat on the Carion--Retreat from Madrid--Alba de - Tormes--Combat of the Huebra. - - -MADRID. (Aug. 1812.) - -Wellington, having entirely separated the king’s army from Marmont’s, -had to choose between pursuing the latter and besieging Burgos, or -marching on Madrid. He adopted the last, and crossing the Guadarama -mountains descended on the Spanish capital, leaving General Clinton -with twelve thousand men to watch Clausel and co-operate with Spaniards -from Gallicia. Joseph had good troops, and being unwilling to fly -before a detachment occupied the Escurial, placing detachments on -all the roads. In this state D’Urban’s Portuguese cavalry drove back -Trielhard’s outposts and entered Majadahonda. Some German infantry, -Bock’s heavy cavalry, and a troop of horse-artillery then entered -Las Rozas, a mile in D’Urban’s rear; but in the evening, Trielhard, -reinforced by Schiazzetti’s Italian dragoons and the lancers of -Berg, returned; D’Urban called up the horse artillery and would -have charged, but his Portuguese fled, and three of the guns being -overturned on rough ground were taken. The victorious cavalry passed -through Majadahonda in pursuit, and though the German dragoons, albeit -surprised in quarters, stopped the leading French squadrons, yet, -when Schiazzetti’s horse came up, the fight would have ended badly if -Ponsonby’s cavalry and the seventh division had not arrived. Trielhard -then retired, carrying away captive, the Portuguese general, Visconde -de Barbacena, the colonel of the German cavalry, and others of less -rank. The whole loss was above two hundred, and the German dead lay -very thickly in the streets; many were stretched in their shirts and -trousers across the sills of the doors, thus manifesting the suddenness -of the action and their own bravery. - -After this combat the king crossed the Tagus with his court, but in -the most horrible confusion, for his army, composed of Spaniards, -French and Italians, began to plunder the convoy. Marshal Jourdan threw -himself into the midst of the disorderly troops, and being aided by -other generals, with great personal risk arrested the mischief, and -succeeded in making the multitude file over the bridge of Aranjuez; yet -the procession was lugubrious and shocking; crowds of weeping women and -children and despairing men, courtiers of the highest rank, desperately -struggling with savage soldiers for the animals on which they were -endeavouring to save their families. Lord Wellington did not molest -them. Ignorant of their situation, or more probably, compassionating -their misery and knowing the troops could escape over the Tagus, he -would not strike. Perhaps also he thought it wise to leave Joseph with -the burthen of a court. - -The king, expecting to find a strong reinforcement from Soult at -Toledo, was inclined to march towards the Morena; instead of troops he -found a positive refusal, and a plan for uniting his own and Suchet’s -army to Soult’s in Andalusia. From thence all were to menace Lisbon, -but this was too vast for the king’s genius, and his personal anger at -being denied the troops, overcoming prudence, he directed his march -on Valencia, peremptorily commanding Soult to abandon Andalusia and -join him there. Meanwhile Wellington entered Madrid and was met by the -whole population--not with feigned enthusiasm to a conqueror, for there -was no tumultuous exultation, famine was amongst them and misery had -subdued their spirit: but with tears and every sign of deep emotion -they crowded around his horse, hung by his stirrups, touched his -clothes, and throwing themselves on their knees blessed him aloud! - -Madrid was still vexed by the presence of an enemy in the Retiro, which -was garrisoned with two thousand good soldiers besides convalescents, -and contained enormous stores, twenty thousand stand of arms, one -hundred and eighty pieces of artillery, and the eagles of two French -regiments. The works however were bad, and the French yielding on terms -were sent to Portugal, but on the way were basely robbed and many -murdered by the escort: an infamous action perpetrated by Spaniards, -far from Madrid. It was strange to see French generals, used to war, -thus giving up armies as it were to their enemies; for including the -garrisons of Toro, Tordesillas, Astorga and Zamora, all of which might -have been saved but were not, and this of the Retiro, which should not -have been left, six thousand good soldiers were absolutely given as a -present to swell the loss of Salamanca. - -Some time Wellington remained in Madrid, apparently occupied with -balls and bull-fights, yet really watching events to decide whether he -should operate in the north or south. The hour of action came at last. -Soult abandoned Andalusia, and the 29th of August his rear-guard lost -two hundred men in Seville, where it was attacked by Colonel Skerrett -and some Spaniards from Cadiz; the former then joined Hill, who after -a series of operations against Drouet, in one of which he defeated -the French cavalry, now came to La Mancha. The south of Spain was for -the enemy then a scene of confusion which gave Wellington time for -action in the north, where his presence was absolutely required; for -Clausel had re-occupied Valladolid with a renovated force of twenty-two -thousand men and fifty guns, Clinton had made some serious errors, and -the Spanish generals had as usual failed on all points. - -Leaving Hill a powerful force to co-operate with all the southern -Spanish armies beyond the Tagus, Lord Wellington quitted Madrid the -1st of September, and at Arevalo concentrated twenty-one thousand -men, three thousand being cavalry; yet the Portuguese soldiers were -ill equipped, and could scarcely be fed, because of the continued -misconduct of their government. - -On the 6th he passed the Duero to fight Clausel, and called on Castaños -to join him with the Gallicians; but seldom did a Spanish general -deviate into activity; Castaños delayed and Clausel retreated slowly up -the beautiful valleys of the Pisuerga and Arlanzan, which, in denial -of the stories about French devastation, were carefully cultivated and -filled to repletion with corn, wine and oil. Nor were they deficient -in military strength. Off the high road ditches and rivulets impeded -the troops, while cross-ridges continually furnished strong positions, -flanked with lofty hills on either side, by means of which Clausel -baffled his adversary in a surprising manner. Each day he offered -battle, yet on ground Wellington was unwilling to assail, partly -because he momentarily expected the Gallicians; chiefly because of the -declining state of his own army from sickness, and that the hope of -ulterior operations in the south made him unwilling to lose men. By -flank movements he dislodged the enemy, yet each day darkness fell ere -they were completed and the morning’s sun always saw Clausel again in -position. Thus he barred the way at eight places, and finally covered -Burgos the 16th, by taking the strong position of Cellada del Camino. - -But eleven thousand Spanish infantry, three hundred cavalry, and eight -guns, had now joined Wellington, who would have fallen on frankly -the 17th, if Clausel, alike wary and skilful, had not observed the -increased numbers and retired in the night to Frandovinez; he was -however next day pushed sharply back to the heights of Burgos, and the -following night passed through that town leaving behind large stores of -grain. Caffarelli, who had come down to place the castle in a state of -defence, now joined him and both retreated upon Briviesca. - -The allies entered Burgos amidst great confusion. The garrison of -the castle had set fire to some houses impeding the defence, the -conflagration spread, and the Partidas, gathering like wolves round a -carcass, entered the town for mischief. Mr. Sydenham, an eye-witness -not unused to scenes of war, thus described their proceedings: “What -with the flames and plundering of the guerillas, who are as bad as -Tartars and Cossacks of the Kischack or Zagatay hordes, I was afraid -Burgos would be entirely destroyed, but order was at length restored by -the manful exertions of Don Miguel Alava.” - - -SIEGE OF BURGOS. (Sept. 1812.) - -Caffarelli had placed eighteen hundred infantry, besides artillery-men, -in the castle; and Dubreton, the governor, in courage and skill -surpassed even the hopes of his sanguine countrymen. The works inclosed -a rugged hill, between which and the river the city of Burgos was -situated. An old wall with a new parapet and flanks offered the first -line of defence; the second line, within the other, was of earth, -a kind of field-retrenchment, but well palisaded; the third line, -similarly constructed, contained two elevated points, on one of which -was an intrenched building called the White Church, on the other -the ancient keep of the castle. This last, the highest point, was -intrenched and surmounted with a casemated work called the Napoleon -battery, which commanded everything around, save on the north. There -the hill of San Michael, only three hundred yards distant and scarcely -less elevated than the fortress, was defended by a horn-work with a -sloping scarp twenty-five, and a counterscarp ten feet high. This work -was merely closed by strong palisades, but was under the fire of the -Napoleon battery, well flanked by the castle, and covered in front by -intrenchments for out picquets. Nine heavy guns, eleven field-pieces -and six mortars or howitzers, were mounted in the fortress; and as the -reserve artillery and stores of the Army of Portugal were deposited -there the armament could be augmented. - - -FIRST ASSAULT. (Sept. 1812.) - -So completely commanded were all the bridges and fords over the -Arlanzan by the castle guns, that two days elapsed ere the allies could -cross; but on the 19th, the passage being effected above the town, -Major Somers Cocks with the 79th, supported by Pack’s Portuguese, drove -in the French outposts on the hill of San Michael, and in the night, -reinforced with the 42nd Regiment, assailed the horn-work. The conflict -was murderous. The main storming column was beaten off, and the attack -would have failed if Cocks had not forced an entrance by the gorge. -The garrison was thus cut off, but the assailants not being closely -supported the French broke through them. The troops complained of each -other, and the loss was above four hundred, while that of the enemy was -less than one hundred and fifty. - -The defences of the castle were feeble and incomplete, yet Wellington’s -means were so scant that he relied more upon the enemy’s weakness than -his own power. However, it was said water was scarce, and that the -provision-magazines might be burned; wherefore twelve thousand men were -set to the siege while twenty thousand formed the covering army. - -For the attack, the trenches were to be opened on the right of San -Michael towards the town, and a battery for five guns established on -the right of the captured horn-work. A sap was then to be pushed from -the trenches towards the first wall, and from thence the engineer was -to proceed by gallery and mine. - -When the first mine should be completed, the battery from San Michael -was to open against the second line of defence, and the assault given -on the first line. Approaches were then to be continued against the -second line, and the battery turned against the third line, in front of -the White Church, where the defences were exceedingly weak. Meanwhile -a trench for musketry was to be dug along the brow of San Michael, and -a concealed battery prepared within the horn-work for a final attack -on the Napoleon battery; but the artillery consisted of only three -eighteen-pounders with five iron twenty-four-pound howitzers: slender -means which, rather than the defects of the fortress, governed the line -of attack. - -When the horn-work fell, a lodgement was commenced in the interior, -and continued vigorously under a destructive fire from the Napoleon -battery, but good cover was obtained in the night. - -On the 21st the garrison mounted several field-guns, and at night fired -heavily with grape and shells on the workmen digging the musketry -trench. The 22nd this fire was redoubled, yet the besiegers worked with -little loss, and their musketeers galled the enemy. In the night the -battery was armed with two eighteen-pounders and three howitzers, and -the secret battery within the horn-work was commenced; but Wellington, -now deviating from his first plan, directed an escalade against the -first line. In this view, at midnight four hundred men with ladders -were secretly posted in a hollow road, fifty yards from the wall, which -was from twenty-three to twenty-five feet high without flanks; and to -aid this main column, a Portuguese battalion was assembled in the town -of Burgos for a flank attack. - - -SECOND ASSAULT. (Sept. 1812.) - -In this assault, although the Portuguese were repelled by the fire of -the common guard, the principal party, composed of detachments under -Major Lawrie, entered the ditch, yet altogether and confusedly; Lawrie -was killed, the soldiers who mounted the ladders were bayoneted, -combustible missiles were thrown down in abundance, and the men gave -way, leaving half their number behind. The wounded were brought off -next day under a truce, and it is said, that on the body of an officer -the French found a complete plan of the siege. It was a very disastrous -attempt, which delayed the regular progress for two days, increased the -enemy’s courage and produced a bad effect upon the troops, some of whom -were already dispirited by the storm of the horn-work. - -The original plan being now resumed, the hollow way from whence the -escaladers had advanced, running along the front of defence, was -converted into a parallel, and the trench made deep and narrow to -secure them from the plunging shot of the castle. Musketeers were also -planted to keep down the enemy’s fire. But heavy rains incommoded the -troops, and the French raised a palisaded work on their own right, -which flanked this parallel, and from thence they killed so many of the -besiegers’ marksmen that the latter were withdrawn. - -In the night a flying sap from the right of the parallel was pushed -within twenty yards of the first line; but the directing engineer was -killed, and with him many men, for the French plied their musketry -sharply, and rolled large shells down the steep side of the hill. The -head of the sap was indeed so commanded as it approached the wall, that -a six-feet trench, added to the height of the gabions above, scarcely -protected the workmen; wherefore the gallery for a mine was worked as -rapidly as the inexperience of the miners would permit. - -When the secret battery in the horn-work of San Michael was completed -two eighteen-pounders were removed from the first battery to arm it, -being replaced by two iron howitzers. The latter were used to drive -the French marksmen from their offensive palisaded wall, but after -firing one hundred and forty rounds without success the attempt was -relinquished; and ammunition was so scarce that the soldiers were paid -to collect the enemy’s bullets. - -A zigzag was now commenced in front of the first battery, down the face -of San Michael, to obtain footing for a musketry trench to overlook the -enemy’s defences below: the workmen were exposed to the whole fire of -the castle at the distance of two hundred yards, and were knocked down -fast, yet the work went steadily on. - -On the 26th the gallery was advanced eighteen feet and the soil found -favourable; but the men, in passing the sap, were hit by the French -marksmen, and an assistant engineer was killed. In the night the -parallel was prolonged on the right to within twenty yards of the -ramparts, in the view of driving a second gallery and mine; musketeers -were then planted there and at the same time the zigzag was continued, -and the musket trench completed with little loss, though the whole fire -of the castle was concentrated on the spot. - -The 27th the French strengthened their second line, cut a step along -the edge of the counterscarp for a covered way, and palisaded the -communication. The besiegers finished the musketry trench on the right -of their parallel, and opened a gallery for the second mine; but the -first mine went on slowly, the men in the sap being galled by stones, -grenades, and small shells, which the French threw into the trenches by -hand; the artillery fire also knocked over the gabions of the musketry -trench on San Michael so fast that the troops were withdrawn during the -day. - -In the night a trench of communication, forming a second parallel -behind the first, was begun and nearly completed from the hill of San -Michael, but at daylight the French fire was heavy, and the shells -which passed over came rolling down the hill again into the trench. The -completion of the work was therefore deferred until night, and though -the back roll of the shells continued to gall the troops, this, and the -other trenches in front of the horn-work, above and on the right of -the parallel below, were filled with men whose fire was incessant: the -first mine also was completed, and being loaded with a thousand pounds -of powder, and the gallery strongly tamped for fifteen feet with bags -of clay, another storm was ordered. - - -THIRD ASSAULT. (Sept. 1812.) - -At midnight, the hollow road being lined with men to fire on the -defences, the storming party, three hundred strong, was assembled -there, attended by others who carried tools and materials to secure -a lodgement when the breach should be carried. The mine was then -exploded, the wall fell, and an officer with twenty men rushed forward -to the assault. The effect of the explosion was disappointing, yet it -cast the wall down, the enemy was stupefied, and the forlorn hope, a -sergeant and four daring soldiers, gained the summit of the breach; -soon however the French recovered, and threw them over pierced with -bayonet wounds. Meanwhile the officer, with his twenty men, missed the -breach in the dark, and finding the wall unbroken returned, saying -there was no breach; then the main body regained the trenches, and -before the sergeant and his comrades came in with streaming wounds to -tell their tale the enemy was reinforced: the scarcity of ammunition -would not permit a fire to be directed upon the work during the night, -and the French, raising a parapet behind it, placed obstacles on the -ascent which deterred the besiegers from renewing the assault at -daylight. - -Twelve days had now elapsed since the siege commenced, one assault -had succeeded, two had failed, twelve hundred men had been killed or -wounded, little progress was made, and the troops were dispirited, -notably the Portuguese, who seemed to be losing their ancient spirit. -Discipline was relaxed, ammunition was wasted, work in the trenches -avoided and neglected by officers and men, insubordination was gaining -ground, and reproachful orders were issued, the Guards only being -noticed as presenting an honourable exception. - -The French marksmen in the flanking palisaded work were so expert -that everything which could be seen from thence was hit, until the -howitzer battery on San Michael was reinforced with a captured French -eighteen-pounder, and this mischievous post was at last demolished. At -the same time the gallery of the second mine was pushed forward, and a -new breaching battery for three guns constructed behind it, so close -to the enemy’s defences that they screened it from the artillery fire -of their upper fortress. To arm this work the three eighteen-pounders -were dragged in the night from San Michael, and next day were, under -a musketry fire which thinned the workmen, placed in battery; but the -watchful Dubreton brought a howitzer down, with which he threw shells -into the battery, and making a hole through a flank wall, thrust out -a light gun also, which sent its bullets whizzing through the thin -parapet of the work at every round. The allies were thus driven from -their post, more French cannon were brought from the upper works, and -the battery was demolished; two of the gun-carriages were disabled, a -trunnion was knocked off one of the guns, and the muzzle of another -split: and vainly the marksmen endeavoured to quell this fire, the -French eventually remained masters. - -In the night a more solid battery was made on the left of the ruined -one, but at daylight the French fire, plunging from above, made the -parapet fly off so rapidly, that the besiegers relinquished it also, -returning to their mines and breaching battery on San Michael. The two -guns still serviceable were now remanded to the upper battery, to beat -down a retrenchment formed by the French behind the old breach; but the -weather was so wet and stormy that the workmen, those of the Guards -excepted, abandoned the trenches, and at daylight the guns were still -short of their destination. However, on the 2nd of October they were -placed, and at four o’clock in the evening, their fire having cleansed -the old breach, and the second mine being tamped for explosion, a -double assault was ordered. For this operation a battalion of the 24th -British Regiment, under Captain Hedderwick, was formed in the hollow -way, having one advanced party under Lieut. Holmes near the new mine, -and a second under Lieut. Frazer towards the old breach. - - -FOURTH ASSAULT. (Oct. 1812.) - -At five o’clock the mine exploded with terrific effect, sending many -of the French into the air and breaking down one hundred feet of the -wall; the next instant Holmes and his brave men went rushing through -the smoke and crumbling ruins; and Frazer, as quick and brave, was -already fighting with the defenders on the summit of the old breach. -The supports followed closely, and in a few minutes both points were -carried with a loss of thirty-seven killed and two hundred wounded, -seven being officers,--amongst them the conducting engineer. - -During the night lodgements were formed on the ruins of the new breach, -imperfectly and under a destructive fire from the upper defences; but -the previous happy attack had revived the spirits of the army, vessels -with powder were coming coastwise from Coruña, a convoy was expected by -land from Rodrigo, and a supply of ammunition, sent by Sir Home Popham, -reached the camp from Santander. This promising state of affairs was -of short duration. On the evening of the 5th three hundred French came -swiftly down the hill, and, sweeping away labourers and guards from the -trenches, killed or wounded a hundred and fifty men, got possession of -the old breach, destroyed the works and carried off all the tools. - -In the night the allies repaired the damage and pushed saps from -each flank, to meet in the centre near the second French line and -serve as a parallel to check future sallies. Meanwhile the howitzers -on San Michael continued their fire, and the breaching battery in -the horn-work opened; but the guns, being unable to see the wall -sufficiently low soon ceased to speak, and the embrasures were masked. -On the other hand the besieged could not, from the steepness of the -castle-hill, depress their guns to bear on the lodgement at the -breaches in the first line; yet their musketry was murderous, and they -rolled down large shells to retard the approaches towards the second -line. - -On the 7th the besiegers were so close to the wall that the howitzers -above could not play without danger to the workmen, and two French -field-pieces taken in the horn-work were substituted. The breaching -battery on San Michael being amended renewed its fire and at five -o’clock had beaten down fifty feet from the parapet of the second line, -yet the enemy’s return was heavy and another eighteen-pounder lost a -trunnion. In the night block-carriages with supports for the broken -trunnions were provided, and the disabled guns again fired with low -charges; but rain now filled the trenches, the communications were -injured, the workmen negligent, the approaches to the second line -went on slowly, and again Dubreton came thundering down from the upper -ground, driving the guards and workmen from the new parallel at the -lodgements, levelling all the works, carrying off all the tools, and -killing or wounding two hundred men. Colonel Cocks, promoted for his -gallant conduct at the storming of San Michael, restored the fight and -repulsed the French, but fell dead on the ground recovered: he was a -young man of a modest demeanour, brave, thoughtful and enterprising: he -lived and died a good soldier. - -After this severe check the approaches to the second line were -abandoned, the trenches were extended to embrace the whole of the -front attacked, and as the battery on San Michael had now formed a -practicable breach twenty-five feet wide the parallel was prolonged -towards it, and a trench was opened for marksmen at thirty yards’ -distance. Nevertheless another assault could not be risked, because the -powder was nearly exhausted and the troops, if unsuccessful, would have -been without ammunition in front of the French army, then gathering -head near Briviesca. Heated shot were however thrown at the White -Church to burn the magazines, and the miners were directed to drive -a gallery on the other side of the castle against the church of San -Roman, a building occupied by the French beyond their line. - -On the 10th a supply of ammunition arrived from Santander, but Dubreton -had meanwhile strengthened his works, and isolated the new breach on -one flank by a stockade, extending at right angles from the second -to the third line of defence. The fire from the Napoleon battery -then compelled the besiegers again to withdraw their guns within the -horn-work, and the attempt to burn the White Church was relinquished, -yet the gallery against San Roman was continued. - -On the 15th the battery in the horn-work was rearmed against the -Napoleon battery, but was silenced in three-quarters of an hour. The -embrasures were then altered, that the guns might bear on the breach in -the second line, and the besiegers worked to repair the mischief done -by rain, and to push the gallery under San Roman, where the mine was -loaded with nine hundred pounds of powder. - -The 17th the battery of the horn-work cleared away the temporary -defences at the breach, the howitzers damaged the rampart on each side, -and, a small mine being sprung, a cavalier or mound from which the -enemy had killed many men in the trenches was taken, yet the French -soon recovered that work. - -On the 18th the new breach being practicable, the storm was ordered, -the explosion of the mine under San Roman to be the signal; that church -was also to be assaulted, and between these attacks the works covering -the ancient breach were to be escaladed. - - -FIFTH ASSAULT. (Oct. 1812.) - -At half-past four o’clock the mine at San Roman exploded, with -little injury to the church itself; but the latter was resolutely -attacked by some Spanish and Portuguese troops, and though the enemy -sprung a countermine which brought the building entirely down the -assailants lodged themselves in the ruins. Meanwhile two hundred of -the Foot-Guards, with strong supports, pouring through the old breach -in the first line escaladed the second, and between that and the third -line were strongly met by the French. A like number of Germans under -Major Wurmb, similarly supported, simultaneously stormed the new -breach, and some men mounting the hill above actually gained the third -line. Unhappily at neither point did the supports follow closely, and -the Germans, cramped on their left by the enemy’s stockade, extended -their right towards the Guards; but at that moment Dubreton came -dashing like a torrent from the upper ground and in an instant cleared -the breaches. Wurmb and many other brave men fell, and the French -gathering round the Guards forced them also beyond the outer line. -More than two hundred men and officers were killed or wounded in this -combat, and next night the enemy recovered San Roman by a sally. - -The siege was now virtually terminated, for though the French were -beaten out of San Roman again, and a gallery was opened from that -church against the second line, these were mere demonstrations. The -fate of Burgos was fixed outside. For while the siege was going on, -Caffarelli and Clausel had received a reinforcement of twelve thousand -men from France, and thus forty-four thousand good troops were prepared -to relieve the Castle before October, although they could not act -until Souham, appointed to command in chief, had arrived. It was also -essential to combine their operations with the king, who had formed -a great army to recover Madrid; but all the lines of correspondence -were so circuitous and beset by the Partidas that the most speedy and -certain communication was through the minister of war at Paris, who -found the information he wanted in the English newspapers! These, while -deceiving the British public by accounts of battles never fought, -victories never gained, enthusiasm and vigour nowhere existing, with -great assiduity enlightened the enemy upon the numbers, situation, -movements and reinforcements of the allies. - -Souham arrived the 3rd of October with more reinforcements from -France, but he imagined that sixty thousand troops were around Burgos, -exclusive of the Partidas, and that three divisions were coming up -from Madrid; whereas none were coming, and little more than thirty -thousand were around Burgos, eleven thousand being Gallicians, scarcely -so good as the Partidas. Wellington’s real strength was in his -Anglo-Portuguese, now only twenty thousand; for besides those killed -or wounded at the siege, the sick had gone to the rear faster than the -recovered men came up. Some unattached regiments and escorts were near -Segovia and other points north of the Guadarama, and a reinforcement -of five thousand men had been sent from England in September; but the -former belonged to Hill’s army, and of the latter the Life-Guards and -Blues had gone to Lisbon: hence a regiment of Foot-Guards, and some -detachments of the line, in all three thousand, were the only available -forces in the rear. - -During the first part of the siege, the English general, seeing the -French scattered and only reinforced by conscripts, did not fear -interruption; the less so, that Sir Home Popham was again menacing the -coast line; and now, when they were concentrating, he was willing to -fight; for he thought Popham and the guerillas would keep Caffarelli -employed, and he was himself a match for Clausel. Souham however, -over-rating the allies’ force, feared a defeat, as being the only -barrier between Wellington and France; and far from meditating an -advance dreaded an attack; hence, as want of provisions forbad a -concentration of his army permanently near Burgos, he prepared to fight -on the Ebro. Soon however, the English newspapers told him Soult was in -march from Andalusia--that the king intended to move upon Madrid,--that -no English troops had left that capital to join Wellington, that the -army of the latter was not numerous, and the castle of Burgos was -sorely pressed: then he resolved to raise the siege. - -On the 13th a skirmish took place on a stream beyond Monasterio, where -Captain Perse of the 16th Dragoons, twice forced from the bridge -twice recovered it and maintained his post until F. Ponsonby, who -commanded the Cavalry reserves, arrived. Ponsonby and Perse were both -wounded, and this demonstration was followed by various others until -the evening of the 18th, when the whole French army was united and the -advanced guard captured a picquet of Brunswickers. This sudden movement -prevented Wellington taking, as he designed, the advanced position of -Monasterio. Falling back, therefore, he took ground covering the siege, -where, on the 20th, Maucune, advancing with two divisions of infantry -and one of cavalry, gained some advantage, yet, having no supports, was -finally outflanked and beaten back to Monasterio by two divisions under -Sir Edward Paget. - -There were now in position, twenty-one thousand Anglo-Portuguese -infantry and cavalry, eleven thousand Gallicians, and the guerilla -horsemen of Marquinez and Julian Sanchez. Four thousand were troopers, -but only two thousand six hundred were British and German, and the -Spanish horsemen, regular or irregular, could scarcely be reckoned as -combatants. The artillery counted forty-two pieces, including twelve -Spanish guns extremely ill equipped and scant of ammunition. The French -had nearly five thousand cavalry, and more than sixty guns. Wellington -stood therefore at great disadvantage in numbers, composition, and real -strength. In his rear was the castle and the river Arlanzan, the fords -and bridges of which were commanded by the guns of the fortress; his -generals of division, Paget excepted, were not of marked ability, and -his troops were somewhat desponding, and deteriorated in discipline. -His situation was altogether dangerous. Victory could scarcely be -expected, defeat would be destruction, and he had provoked a battle not -knowing Caffarelli’s troops were united to Souham’s. - -Souham should have forced an action, because his ground was strong, -his retreat open, his army powerful and compact, his soldiers full -of confidence, his lieutenants, Clausel, Maucune, and Foy, men of -distinguished talents, able to second, and able to succeed him in the -chief command: the chances of victory were great, the chances of defeat -comparatively small. It was thus he judged the matter himself, for -Maucune’s advance was designed as the prelude to a great battle, and -the English general was then willing to stand the trial. But generals -are not absolute masters of events. Extraneous events here governed -both sides. The king by the junction of Soult’s army was at the head of -a great force, and had designed not only to drive Hill from Madrid, but -to cut Wellington off from Portugal: hence he had ordered Souham not -to fight. Hill at the same time gave notice of the king’s advance; and -Wellington, fearing to be isolated when Hill was forced from Madrid, -raised the siege and resolved to retreat. - -Some fighting had meanwhile taken place at Burgos. Dubreton had again -got possession of the ruins of San Roman but was driven away next -morning; but then, the order to raise the siege being received the -guns and stores were removed from the batteries. The greatest part of -the draught animals had however gone to fetch powder and artillery -from Santander, and the eighteen-pounders could not be carried off. -Thus the siege was raised after five assaults, several sallies and -thirty-three days of investment, during which the besiegers lost more -than two thousand, and the besieged six hundred men killed or wounded; -the latter also suffered severely from continual labour, want of water, -and bad weather; for the fortress was too small to afford shelter for -the garrison, and the greater part had bivouacked between the lines of -defence. - - -RETREAT FROM BURGOS. (Oct. 1812.) - -It was commenced in the night of the 21st by the following daring -enterprise. The army quitted its position after dark, the artillery, -the wheels being muffled with straw, passed the bridge of Burgos under -the castle guns with such silence and celerity, that Dubreton, watchful -and suspicious as he was, knew nothing of the march until the Partidas, -failing in nerve, commenced galloping, when he poured a destructive -fire down but soon lost the range. By this delicate operation Souham -was compelled to follow, instead of using the castle to intercept the -line of retreat; for if Wellington had avoided the fortress, the French -by passing through it could have forestalled him at Cellada del Camino. - -The 23rd the infantry crossed the Pisuerga, but while the main body -made this long march, Souham having passed through Burgos in the night -of the 22nd, vigorously attacked the rear-guard under Sir Stapleton -Cotton, which was composed of cavalry and horse-artillery, two -battalions of Germans and the Partidas of Marquinez and Sanchez. - -At seven o’clock the picquets were first driven from the bridge of -Baniel, and then from the Hormaza stream, after which the whole -rear-guard drew up in a large plain behind Cellada del Camino. It had -on the left a range of hills occupied by Marquinez, on the right the -Arlanzan, and across the middle of the plain a marshy rivulet cut the -main road, being only passable by a little bridge near a house called -the Venta de Pozo. In front, about half-way between this stream and -Cellada, there was a broad ditch with a second bridge and a hamlet. -Cotton retired over the marshy stream, but left Anson’s horsemen and -Halket’s infantry as a rear-guard beyond the ditch, and then Anson, -placing the 11th Dragoons and the guns in advance at Cellada del Camino -on a gentle eminence, likewise prepared to pass the stream. - - -COMBAT OF VENTA DE POZO. (Oct. 1812.) - -When the French approached Cellada, two squadrons of the 11th beat -back their leading horsemen, and the artillery plied them briskly with -shot; yet the main body, advancing at a trot along the road, compelled -the whole to retire beyond the bridge of Venta de Pozo. Meanwhile the -French general Curto, leading a brigade of hussars and followed by -Boyer’s dragoons, ascended the hills and drove Marquinez from them -towards a ravine at the foot, which could only be passed at particular -points; towards one of those the Partida galloped, just as the French -on the plain, after a sharp struggle had forced the 11th Dragoons -across the ditch between Cellada and Venta de Pozo. The German riflemen -were in the hamlet, and the ditch might have been disputed if it had -not been thus turned by Curto; but that event compelled Anson to retire -on the Venta de Pozo stream. His movement was covered by the 16th -Dragoons, and while passing the bridge there, the Partidas, pouring -down from the hills, were so closely pursued by the French hussars that -the mixed mass hurtled on the flank of the 16th at the moment it was -charged in rear by the enemy pursuing in the plain: Colonel Pelley and -many men were taken, and the regiment was driven back on the reserves, -which however stood fast, and while the French were reforming the whole -got over the bridge of Venta de Pozo. - -Cotton now formed a new line. Anson was on the left of the road, the -German infantry and guns were in support, the heavy German cavalry on -the right--the whole presenting an imposing order of battle. But then -Caffarelli’s cavalry, composed of the lancers of Berg, a regiment of -chasseurs, and several squadrons of _gens d’armes_, all fresh men, -entered the line on the French left. At first they tried the stream on -a wide front, and finding it impassable wheeled with a quick daring -decision to their right, trotting under the heavy pounding of the -English artillery over the bridge and forming beyond in opposition -to the German cavalry. The latter charged with a rough shock and -broke their right, but they had let too many come over, the French -left gained an advantage, and their right, full of mettle, rallied; -a furious sword combat had place, in which the _gens d’armes_ fought -so fiercely that the Germans, maugre their size and courage and the -superiority of their horses, were beaten back in disorder. The French -followed on the spur with shrill and eager cries, and Anson being -outflanked and menaced on both sides retreated also; not happily, for -Boyer’s dragoons had now crossed the ravine at the foot of the hills -and came thundering in on his left, breaking the ranks and sending all -to the rear in a confused mass. - -The Germans first extricated themselves and formed a fresh line on -which the others rallied, the _gens d’armes_ and lancers who had -suffered severely from the artillery as well as in the sword fight -having halted; but Boyer’s dragoons, ten squadrons, then attacked the -new line which was still confused and wavering, and though the German -officers rode gallantly to meet the charge their men followed but a -short way and finally turned, when the swiftness of the English horses -alone prevented a terrible catastrophe. - -Some favourable ground enabled the line to reform once more, yet only -to be again broken. Meanwhile Wellington in person placed Halket’s -infantry and the guns in a position to cover the cavalry, and they -remained tranquil until the enemy, in full pursuit after the last -charge, came galloping down, lending their left flank, when the power -of the musket was again manifested. A tempest of bullets emptied the -French saddles by scores, and their hitherto victorious horsemen, -after three fruitless charges, drew off to the hills, while the -British cavalry, covered by the infantry, made good its retreat to the -Pisuerga. The loss in this combat was considerable on both sides. The -French suffered most, but took a colonel and seventy other prisoners; -and before the fight they had captured a commissariat store near Burgos. - -While the rear-guard was thus engaged, drunkenness and insubordination, -the usual concomitants of an English retreat, were exhibited at -Torquemada, where the well-stored wine-vaults became the prey of the -soldiery: twelve thousand men were at one time in a state of helpless -inebriety. This was bad, and Wellington having now retreated fifty -miles, resolved to check the pursuit. His previous arrangements had -been well combined, but the means of transport were scanty, the -weather severe, and his convoys of sick and wounded were still on the -wrong side of the Duero: wherefore, crossing the Carion river at its -confluence with the lower Pisuerga, he turned and halted. - -Here he was joined by a regiment of Guards and detachments coming from -Coruña, and his ground, extending from Villa Muriel to Dueñas below -the meeting of the waters, was strong; for though the upper Pisuerga -was parallel to the Carion, the lower part turned suddenly, to flow -at a right angle from the confluence. Hence his position, a range of -hills, lofty yet descending with an easy sweep, was covered in front by -the Carion, and on the right by the lower Pisuerga. A detachment was -left to destroy the bridge of Baños on this last river, and a battalion -was sent to aid the Spaniards in destroying the bridges high up on the -Carion at Palencia. On the immediate front some houses and convents, -lying beyond both rivers, furnished posts to cover the destruction of -the bridges of Muriel and San Isidro on the Carion, and that of Dueñas -on the lower Pisuerga. - -Souham cannonaded the rear-guard at Torquemada on the 24th, and then -passing the upper Pisuerga sent Foy’s division against Palencia, but -ordered Maucune to pursue the allies to the bridges of Baños, Isidro, -and Muriel, halting himself, however, if fame does not lie, because the -number of French drunkards were even more numerous than those of the -British army. - - -COMBAT ON THE CARION. (Oct. 1812.) - -Before the enemy appeared the summits of the hills were crowned, the -bridges mined, and that of San Isidro strongly protected by a convent -filled with troops. The left of the position was equally strong, but -the advantage of a dry canal with high banks, running parallel with the -Carion, was overlooked, and the village of Muriel was not occupied in -sufficient strength. Foy meanwhile reached Palencia, where, according -to some French writers, a treacherous attempt was made, under cover -of a parley, to kill him; he however drove the allies with loss from -the town, and in such haste that all the bridges were abandoned in a -perfect condition, and the French cavalry, spreading abroad, gathered -baggage and prisoners. - -This untoward event compelled Wellington to throw back his left at -Muriel, thus offering two fronts, the one facing Palencia, the other -the Carion; in that state Maucune, having dispersed some caçadores -defending a ford, fell with a strong body of infantry and guns on the -troops at Muriel, just as a mine was exploded and the party covering -the bridge were passing the broken arch by means of ladders. The play -of the mine checked the advance of the French, but suddenly a horseman, -darting at full speed from their column, rode down to the bridge under -a flight of bullets from his own people, calling out he was a deserter. -When he reached the chasm made by the explosion, he violently checked -his foaming horse, held up his hands, exclaimed that he was a lost -man, and with hurried accents asked if there was no ford near. The -good-natured soldiers pointed to one a little way off, whereupon the -gallant fellow looked earnestly for a few moments to fix the exact -point, then wheeling sharply round, kissed his hand in derision, and -bending low over his saddle-bow dashed back to his own comrades, amidst -showers of shot and shouts of laughter from both sides. Maucune’s -column, covered by a concentrated fire of guns, then passed the river -at the ford thus discovered, made some prisoners in the village and -lined the dry bed of the canal. - -At this moment Wellington came up, and turning some guns upon the enemy -desired that the village and canal might be retaken; General Oswald -said they could not be held afterwards; but Wellington, whose retreat -was endangered by the presence of the enemy on that side of the river, -peremptorily ordered one brigade to attack the main body, and another -brigade to clear the canal, strengthening the last with Spanish troops -and Brunswickers. A sharp fire of artillery and musketry ensued, and -the allies suffered some loss, especially by cannon-shot, which from -the other side of the river plumped into the reserves and threw the -Spaniards into confusion: they were falling back, when their fiery -countryman, Miguel Alava, with exhortation and example, for though -wounded he would not retire, urged them forward until the enemy was -driven over the river. - -During these events other French troops attempted unsuccessfully to -seize the bridge of San Isidro, but at that of Baños on the Pisuerga -the mine failed, and their cavalry galloping over made both working and -covering party prisoners. Wellington’s position was thus sapped. For -Souham could concentrate on the allies’ left by Palencia and force them -to fight with their back upon the lower Pisuerga; or he could pass that -river on his own left and forestall them on the Duero at Tudela. If -the allies pushed over the Pisuerga by the bridge of Dueñas, Souham, -having the initial movement, might be first on the ground while Foy -fell on their rear. If Wellington sought by a rapid movement down the -right of the Pisuerga to cross at Cabezon, the next bridge, and so gain -the Duero, Souham, moving by the left bank, might fall on him while -in march and hampered between the Duero, Pisuerga, and Esquevilla: he -must then have retired through Valladolid and Simancas, giving up his -communications with Hill. In this critical state of affairs, keeping -good watch on the left of the Pisuerga, and knowing the ground there -was rugged and the roads narrow and bad, while on the right bank -they were good and wide, the English general sent his baggage in the -night to Valladolid, withdrew all the troops before day-break on the -26th, made a sixteen-mile march to Cabezon, passed to the left of the -Pisuerga and mined the bridge: it was a fine stroke of generalship. - -Being then master of his own movements he sent a detachment to hold the -bridge of Tudela on the Duero, immediately behind him, and employed -the seventh division to secure the more distant bridges of Valladolid, -Simancas, and Tordesillas. The line of that great river, now in -full water, being thus assured, he again halted, partly because the -ground was favourable, partly to give the commissary-general Kennedy -time to remove the sick men and other incumbrances from Salamanca. -This operation was attended with great disasters from the negligence -of medical and escorting officers conducting the convoys, and the -consequent bad conduct of the soldiers. Outrages were perpetrated on -the inhabitants along the whole line of march, terror was predominant, -and the ill-used drivers and muleteers deserted by hundreds, some with, -some without their cattle. Great sufferings were endured by the sick, -the commissariat lost nearly the whole of the animals and carriages -employed, the villages were abandoned, and the under-commissaries were -bewildered, or paralyzed by the terrible disorder thus spread along the -line of communication. - -Souham pursued on the 26th by the right of the Pisuerga, being deterred -from taking the left bank by the rugged nature of the ground, and by -the king’s orders not to risk a serious action. In the morning of the -27th his whole army was collected in front of Cabezon, but he contented -himself with a cannonade and an unmeaning display: the former killed -Colonel Robe of the artillery; the latter enabled Wellington for the -first time to discover the numbers he had to contend with, and taught -him that he could hold neither the Pisuerga nor the Duero permanently. -Nevertheless he kept his actual position, and when the French, -leaving a division in his front, extended their right by Valladolid -to Simancas, he caused the bridges at those places to be destroyed. -Congratulating himself that he had not fought in front of Burgos with -so powerful an army, he now resolved to retire behind the Duero and, if -pressed, even behind the Tormes. Meanwhile, as General Hill would then -be liable to a flank attack, and the more certainly if any disaster -happened on the Duero, he ordered him to retreat at once from Madrid, -giving a discretion as to the line, yet desiring him, if possible, to -come by the Guadarama passes: for he still designed, if all went well, -to unite with Hill in a central position, keep Souham in check with a -part of his force, and with the remainder fall upon Soult who was now -directing the king’s army. - -On the 28th Souham, still extending his right, endeavoured to force -the bridges at Valladolid and Simancas on the Pisuerga, and that -of Tordesillas on the Duero. The first was defended by the seventh -division, but the French being strong and eager at the second it was -destroyed, and the regiment of Brunswick Oels was detached to ruin -that of Tordesillas. This was effected, and a tower behind the ruins -being occupied, the remainder of the Brunswickers took post in a -pine wood at some distance. The French arrived and seemed baffled, -yet very soon sixty officers and non-commissioned officers, headed -by Captain Guingret, a daring man, formed a small raft to hold their -arms and clothes, and then plunged into the water with their swords -between their teeth, swimming and pushing the raft before them. -Under protection of a cannonade they thus crossed this great river, -though it was in full and strong water and the weather very cold, and -having reached the other side, naked as they were, stormed the tower, -whereupon the Brunswickers, amazed at the action, abandoned their -ground, leaving the gallant Frenchmen masters of the passage. - -When Wellington heard of the attack at Simancas and saw the whole -French army in march to its right down the Pisuerga he destroyed the -bridges at Valladolid and Cabeçon, and crossed the Duero at Tudela -and Puente de Duero on the 29th; but scarcely had he effected this -when intelligence of Guingret’s splendid action at Tordesillas reached -him. Critical then was his position, but with the decision of a great -captain he marched instantly by his left, reached the heights between -Rueda and Tordesillas on the 30th, and there fronting his powerful -enemy forbad further progress. The bridge had been repaired by the -French, yet their main body had not arrived, and Wellington’s menacing -position was too significant to be misunderstood. The bridges of Toro -and Zamora were now destroyed by detachments, and though the French, -spreading along the river, commenced repairing the former, the junction -with Hill’s army was insured; the English general, therefore, thinking -the bridge of Toro could not be restored for several days, again hoped -to maintain the line of the Duero permanently, because Hill, of whose -operations it is now time to speak, was fast approaching. - - -RETREAT FROM MADRID. (Oct. 1812.) - -The king, having fifty thousand veteran infantry, eight thousand -cavalry and eighty-four pieces of artillery, came to drive the allies -from Madrid. Soult and Jourdan acted under him, and the former first -attacked General Cole at the Puente Largo, near Aranjuez on the Tagus; -but though the English mines failed to destroy the bridge the French -were vigorously repulsed. General Hill being thus menaced resolved -to retreat by the Guadarama and join Wellington, whom he knew to be -pressed by superior forces: he also thought the valley of the Tagus, -although opened, could not furnish provisions for the French; but the -commissary who had the care of that line had not removed the great -magazines formed for the allies’ advance to Madrid: they were full, and -Soult might have used them to interpose between Wellington and Portugal -while Souham pressed him in retreat; yet neither he, nor Hill, nor -Wellington, knew of their existence! Such is war. - -Hill burned his pontoons and then causing the fort of the Retiro in -Madrid to be blown up with all its stores, retreated by easy marches -across the Guadarama, followed gently by the French; for Soult did -not know his actual force, and, suspecting Wellington’s design to -unite and fight a battle, moved cautiously. When near Arevalo, fresh -orders, founded on new combinations, changed the direction of Hill’s -march. Souham had repaired the bridge of Toro several days sooner than -Wellington expected, and thus his design to join Hill on the Adaja and -attack Soult was baffled; for Souham, possessing Toro and Tordesillas, -could fall upon his rear; and he could not bring Hill up to attack -Souham, because, having destroyed the bridges, he had no means to -repass the Duero, and Soult moving by Fontiveros would reach the Tormes -on his rear. His central position was therefore no longer available for -offence or defence, and he directed Hill to gain Alba de Tormes at once -by the road of Fontiveros. On the 6th of November he fell back himself -to San Christoval, covering Salamanca. - -Joseph, thinking to prevent Hill’s junction, had gained Arevalo by -the Segovia road, and on the 8th, Souham’s scouts being met with at -Medina del Campo, the king, for the first time since he had quitted -Valencia, obtained news of the army of Portugal. One hundred thousand -combatants, of which above twelve thousand were cavalry, with a hundred -and thirty pieces of artillery, were then assembled on plains, over -which, three months before, Marmont had marched with such confidence -to his own destruction; and Soult, then expelled from Andalusia by -Marmont’s defeat, was now, after having made half the circuit of the -Peninsula, come to drive into Portugal that very army whose victory had -driven him from the south. Wellington had foreseen, and foretold, that -the acquisition of Andalusia, though politically important and useful, -would prove injurious to himself at the moment. The prophecy was -fulfilled. The French had concentrated a mighty power, from which it -required both skill and fortune to escape. Meanwhile the Spanish armies -let loose by this union of all the French troops kept aloof, or, coming -to aid, were found a burden rather than a help. - -On the 7th Hill passed the Tormes at Alba, and the bridge there was -mined; for Wellington, holding Christoval and being still uncertain of -the real numbers of the enemy, was desirous to maintain the line of the -Tormes permanently and give his troops repose. His own retreat had been -of two hundred miles; Hill had marched a greater distance; Skerrett had -come from Cadiz; the soldiers who besieged Burgos had been in the field -with scarcely an interval of repose since January; all were barefooted, -their equipments were spoiled, the cavalry were weak, the horses out of -condition, and discipline was generally failing. - -The excesses committed on the retreat from Burgos have been touched -upon; and during the first day’s march from the Tagus to Madrid, -five hundred of the rear-guard, chiefly of one regiment, finding the -inhabitants of Valdemoro had fled, plundered the houses; drunkenness -followed and two hundred and fifty fell into the hands of the enemy. -The conduct of an army can never be fairly judged by following in the -wake of a retreat. Here there was no want of provisions, no hardships -to exasperate, yet the author of this history counted on the first -day’s march from Madrid seventeen bodies of murdered peasants; by whom -killed, or for what, whether by English or Germans, by Spaniards or -Portuguese, whether in dispute, in robbery, or in wanton villany, was -unknown; but their bodies were in the ditches, and a shallow observer -might thence have drawn most foul and false conclusions against the -English general and nation. - -Wellington desired a battle. Christoval was strong, the Arapiles -glorious as well as strong; and by the bridge of Salamanca and the -fords he could concentrate on either position on a shorter line -than the French. Yet he prepared for retreat, sending sick men and -stores to the rear, ordering up small convoys of provisions on the -road to Rodrigo, and destroying spare ammunition. He gave clothing, -arms and accoutrements to the Spanish troops, but an hour after had -the mortification to see them selling their equipments under his own -windows! At this time, indeed, the Spaniards, civil and military, began -to evince hatred of the British. Daily did they attempt or perpetrate -murder, and one act of peculiar atrocity merits notice. A horse, led -by an English soldier, being frightened, backed against a Spanish -officer commanding at a gate; he caused the soldier to be dragged into -his guard-house and there bayoneted him in cold blood, and no redress -could be had for this or other crimes, save by counter-violence, which -was not long withheld. A Spanish colonel while wantonly stabbing at -a rifleman was shot dead by the latter; and a British volunteer slew -another officer at the head of his own regiment in a sword fight, -the troops of both nations looking on, but here there was nothing -dishonourable on either side. - -The civil authorities, not less savage, treated every person with -intolerable arrogance. The Prince of Orange, remonstrating about his -quarters with the sitting junta, they ordered one of their guards to -kill him; and he would have been killed, had not Lieut. Steele of the -43rd, a bold athletic person, felled the man before he could stab, -but then both had to fly. The exasperation caused by these things was -leading to serious mischief, when the enemy’s movements gave another -direction to the rising passions. - -On the 10th Soult opened a concentrated fire of eighteen guns against -the castle of Alba de Tormes, which, crowning a bare rocky knoll and -hastily intrenched, furnished scarcely any shelter from this tempest; -for two hours the garrison could only reply with musketry, but -eventually it was aided by the fire of four pieces from the left bank -of the river; the post was thus defended until dark with such vigour -that the enemy would not assault. During the night the garrison was -reinforced, the damaged walls were repaired, barricades were made, -and in the morning the enemy withdrew. This combat cost the allies a -hundred men. - -On the 11th the king reorganised his army. Uniting his own troops with -the army of the south, he placed the whole under Soult and removed -Souham to make way for Drouet. Caffarelli had before returned to Burgos -with his divisions and guns, and what with garrisons, stragglers, and -losses, scarcely ninety thousand combatants were on the Tormes; but -twelve thousand were cavalry, nearly all were veteran troops, and they -had one hundred and twenty pieces of artillery. Such a mighty power -could not remain idle, the country was exhausted of provisions, the -soldiers wanted bread, and the king, eager enough for battle, for he -was of a brave spirit and had something of his brother’s greatness of -soul, sought counsel how to deliver it with most advantage. - -Jourdan was for the boldest and shortest mode. He said Wellington’s -position was composed of three parts, namely, a right wing at Alba; a -centre at Calvariza Ariba; a left wing at San Christoval, separated -from the centre by the Tormes. This line was fifteen miles long, -the Tormes was still fordable in many places above Salamanca, and -therefore the French army might assemble in the night, pass the river -at day-break by the fords between Villa Gonzalo and Huerta, and make -a concentrated attack upon Calvariza Ariba, which would force on a -decisive battle. - -Soult opposed this. He objected to attacking a position Wellington -knew so well, which he might have fortified, and where the army must -fight its way even from the fords to gain room for an order of battle. -He proposed instead, to move by the left to certain fords, three in -number, between Exéme and Galisancho, seven or eight miles above Alba -de Tormes. Easy in themselves their banks were suited to force a -passage, and by a slight circuit the troops in march would not be seen -by the enemy. The army would thus gain two marches, would be placed -on the flank and rear of the allies, and would fight on ground chosen -by its own generals, instead of ground chosen by the enemy; or it -could force an action in a new position whence the enemy could with -difficulty retire in the event of disaster: Wellington must then fight -to disadvantage, or retire hastily, sacrificing part of his army to -save the rest, and the effect, militarily and politically, would be the -same as if he was beaten by a front attack. - -Jourdan observed, that this was prudent, and might be successful if -Wellington accepted battle; but that general could not thereby be -forced to fight, which was the great object; he would have time to -retreat before the French could touch his communication with Rodrigo, -and it was supposed by some generals that he would retreat on Almeida -at once by San Felices and Barba de Puerco.[26] - -Neither Soult nor Jourdan knew the position of the Arapiles, and the -former, while urging his plan, offered to yield if the king was so -inclined; but though Jourdan’s proposition was supported by all the -generals of the army of Portugal, except Clausel, who leaned to Soult’s -opinion, the last marshal commanded two-thirds of the army, and the -question was finally decided agreeably to his counsel. Nor is it easy -to determine which was right, for though Jourdan’s reasons were strong -and the result conformable, the failure was only in the execution. -Nevertheless it would seem, so great an army and so confident, for the -French soldiers eagerly demanded a battle, should have grappled in the -shortest way. - -Wellington, well acquainted with his ground, desired a battle on either -side of the Tormes. His hope was indeed to prevent the passage of that -river until the rains, rendering it unfordable, should force the French -to retire from want of provisions, or engage him on the position of -Christoval: yet he also courted a fight on the Arapiles, those rocky -monuments of his former victory. He had sixty-eight thousand combatants -under arms, fifty-two thousand of which, including four thousand -British cavalry, were Anglo-Portuguese, and he had nearly seventy guns. -With this force concentrated upon the strong ridges of Calvariza Ariba -and the two Arapiles, the superiority of twenty thousand men would -scarcely have availed the French.[27] - -Soult’s project was adopted, trestle bridges were made for the -artillery, and at daybreak on the 14th were thrown, while the cavalry -and infantry passed by the upper fords; the army then took a position -at Mozarbes, having the road from Alba to Tamames under the left flank. -Wellington remained in Salamanca, and when the first report came that -the enemy was over the Tormes, he made the caustic observation, that -he would not recommend it to some of them. Soon however the concurrent -testimony of many reports convinced him of his mistake, he galloped -to the Arapiles, ascertained the direction of Soult’s march, and drew -off the second division, the cavalry, and some guns to attack the head -of the French column. The fourth division and Hamilton’s Portuguese -remained at Alba to protect this movement; the third division secured -the Arapiles until the troops from Christoval should arrive; and he was -still so confident that the bulk of the troops did not quit Christoval -that day. But at Mozarbes he found the French already too strong to be -seriously meddled with, and when under cover of a cannonade which kept -off their cavalry, he examined their position, discovered that the evil -was without remedy. Wherefore he destroyed the bridge of Alba, leaving -only three hundred Spaniards in the castle, with orders, if the army -retired, to save themselves as they could. - -He still hoped the French would give battle at the Arapiles, but -placed the first division at Aldea Tejada on the Junguen stream, to -secure a passage in case Soult should finally compel him to choose -between Salamanca and Rodrigo. Meantime Clausel’s army, now under -Drouet, finding the bridge of Alba broken and the castle occupied, also -crossed the Tormes at Galisancho, and then Soult, who had commenced -fortifying Mozarbes, extended his left towards the Rodrigo road: yet -slowly, because the ground was heavy and crossed by the many sources -of the Junguen and Valmusa streams, which were flooded with the rain. -This movement was like that of Marmont at the battle of Salamanca, -but on a wider circle, and an outward range of heights, beyond a -sudden attack and catastrophe. The result in each case was remarkable. -Marmont closing with a short quick turn, a falcon striking at an eagle, -received a buffet that broke his pinions and spoiled his flight. Soult, -a wary kite, sailing slowly and with a wide wheel to seize his prey, -lost it altogether. - -When Wellington saw the French cavalry pointing to the Rodrigo -road, he judged the design was first to establish a fortified head -of cantonments at Mozarbes, from whence to operate against the -communication with Rodrigo; wherefore suddenly casting his army into -three columns he crossed the Junguen, and covering his left flank with -cavalry and guns, defiled in order of battle with a wonderful boldness -and facility at little more than cannon-shot from his enemy. He had -good fortune however to aid: for there was a thick fog and a heavy rain -which rendered the bye-ways and fields nearly impassable to the French -while he used the high roads. Then he took his army in one mass quite -round the French left, and having gained the Valmusa river halted for -the night, in rear of those who had been threatening him in front only -a few hours before! - -This was truly a surprising exploit, yet it was not creditable to the -generalship on either side. The English commander, having suffered -Soult to pass the Tormes and turn his position, waited too long on the -Arapiles, or this dangerous movement would have been unnecessary; and -a combination of bad roads, bad weather, and want of vigour on the -other side, rendered it possible and no more. It has been said by a -great master, that the defect of Soult’s military genius was a want of -promptness to strike at the decisive moment, and here he was certainly -slack. - -On the 16th the allies retired by three roads, all of which led, by -Tamames, San Munos, and Martin del Rio, to Rodrigo, through a forest -penetrable in all directions: in the evening they halted behind the -Matilla river. This march was only of twelve miles, yet stragglers -were numerous, and the soldiers finding vast herds of swine quitted -their colours by hundreds to shoot them; indeed such a rolling musketry -echoed through the forest, that Wellington thought the enemy was upon -him. Every effort was made to stop this excess, and two offenders were -hanged; still the hungry men broke from the columns, the property of -whole districts was swept away in a few hours, and the army was in -some degree placed at the mercy of the enemy; who were however content -to glean the stragglers, of whom they captured two thousand: they did -not press the rear until evening, when their lancers fell on, but were -checked by the 28th Regiment and the Light Dragoons. - -During the night, the light division having the rear-guard, the cavalry -in the front, for some unknown reason, filed off by the flanks without -giving any intimation of the movement, and at daybreak as the soldiers -of the division were rolling their blankets some strange horsemen -were seen behind the bivouac; they were taken for Spaniards, until -their cautious movements and vivacity of gesture showed them to be -French. The troops run to arms, in good time, for five hundred yards -in front the wood opened on a large plain, where eight thousand French -horsemen were discovered advancing in one solid mass, yet carelessly, -and without suspecting the vicinity of the British. The division -immediately formed columns, two squadrons of dragoons came hastily -up from the rear, and Julian Sanchez’ cavalry also appeared in small -parties on the right flank. This checked the enemy’s march while the -infantry retired, but the French, though fearing to close, sent many -squadrons to the right and left, some of which rode on the flanks near -enough to bandy wit in the Spanish tongue with the British soldiers, -and very soon mischief was visible: the road was strewed with baggage, -the bâtmen came running in for protection, some wounded, some without -arms, and all breathless as just escaped from a surprise. - -The thickness of the forest had enabled the French horsemen to pass -unperceived on the flanks, and, as opportunity offered, they galloped -from side to side, sweeping away the baggage and sabring the conductors -and guards; they even menaced one of the columns but were checked by -the fire of the artillery. In one of these charges General Paget was -carried off, and it might have been Wellington’s fortune, for he also -was continually riding between the columns and without an escort. The -main body of the army soon passed the Huebra river at three places and -took post behind it; but when the light division arrived at the edge -of a table-land which overhung the fords, the French cavalry suddenly -thickened, and the sharp whistle of musket-bullets with the splintering -of branches gave notice that their infantry were also up; for Soult, -hoping to forestal the allies at Tamames, had pushed a column towards -that place from his left, but finding Hill’s troops there in position, -turned short to his right in hopes to cut off the rear-guard. - - -COMBAT OF THE HUEBRA. (Nov. 1812.) - -The English and German cavalry, warned by the musketry, crossed the -fords in time, and the light division should have followed without -delay; for the forest ended at the edge of the table-land, and the -descent to the river, eight hundred yards, was quite open and smooth, -the fords of the Huebra deep. Instead of this General C. Alten -ordered the division to form squares! All persons were amazed, but -then Wellington happily came up and caused the astonished troops -to glide off to the fords. Four companies of the 43rd and one of -riflemen, left by him to cover the passage, were instantly assailed -on three sides with a fire showing that a large force was at hand; a -driving rain and mist prevented them from seeing their adversaries, -they were forced through the wood, and thrown out on the open slope, -where they maintained their ground for a quarter of an hour, and then -swiftly running to the fords passed them under a sharp musketry. Only -twenty-seven fell, for the tempest, beating in the Frenchmen’s faces, -baffled their aim, and the division guns, playing from the low ground -with grape, checked the pursuit: yet the deep bellow from thirty pieces -of heavy French artillery in reply, showed how critically timed was the -passage. - -The banks of the Huebra were steep and broken, but the French -infantry spread to the right and left and there were several fords -to be guarded; the 52nd and the Portuguese defended those below; the -guns, supported by the riflemen and 43rd, defended those above, and -behind the right of the light division, on higher ground, was the -seventh division. The bulk of the army was massed on the right of this -position, covering all the roads leading to Rodrigo. - -One brisk attempt to force the fords guarded by the 52nd was vigorously -repulsed by that regiment, but the skirmishing, and the cannonade, -which never slackened, continued until dark; and heavily the French -guns played on the light and 7th divisions. The former was of necessity -held near the fords and in column, lest a sudden rush of cavalry should -carry off the division pieces from the flat ground, and it was plunged -into at every round, yet suffered little loss, because the clayey soil, -saturated with rain, swallowed the shot and smothered the shells. But -the 7th division was, with astonishing want of judgment, kept by Lord -Dalhousie on open and harder ground, in one huge mass, tempting havoc -for hours, when a hundred yards in his rear the rise of the hill and -the thick forest would have entirely protected it, without in any -manner weakening the position! Nearly three hundred men were thus lost. - -On the 18th the army was to have drawn off before daylight, and -Wellington was uneasy, because the Huebra, good for defence, was yet -difficult to remove from at that season, inasmuch as the roads, hollow -and narrow, led up a steep bank to table-land, open, flat, marshy, and -scored with water-gullies. Moreover from the overflowing of one stream -the principal road was impassable at a mile from the position; hence to -get off in time, without jostling and without being attacked, required -nice management. All the baggage and stores had marched in the night, -with orders not to halt until they reached the high lands near Rodrigo; -but if the preceding days had produced some strange occurrences, the -18th was not less fertile in them. - -Wellington, knowing the direct road was impassable from the flood, -had directed several divisions by another, longer and apparently more -difficult; this seemed so extraordinary to some generals, that, after -consulting together, they deemed him unfit to conduct the army, and led -their troops by what appeared to them the fittest line of retreat! The -condemned commander had before daylight placed himself on his own road, -and waited impatiently for the arrival of the leading division until -dawn; then, suspecting something of what had happened, he galloped to -the other road and found the would-be leaders, stopped by that flood -which his arrangements had been made to avoid. The insubordination and -the danger to the whole army were alike glaring; yet the practical -rebuke was so severe and well timed, the humiliation so complete and -so deeply felt, that, with one proud sarcastic observation, indicating -contempt more than anger, he led back the troops and drew off all his -forces safely.[28] - -Some confusion and great danger still attended the operation, for even -on the true road one water-gully was so deep that the light division, -covering the rear, could only pass it man by man over a felled tree; -but Soult, unable to feed his troops a day longer, stopped on the -Huebra with his main body and only sent some cavalry to Tamames. -Thus the allies retired unmolested, yet whether from necessity, or -from negligence in the subordinates, the means of transport were too -scanty for the removal of the wounded men, most of whom were hurt by -cannon-shot; many were thus left behind; and as the enemy never passed -the Huebra, those miserable creatures perished by a horrible lingering -death. - -The marshy plains over which the army was now marching exhausted the -strength of the wearied soldiers, thousands straggled, the depredations -on the herds of swine were repeated, and the temper of the troops -generally prognosticated the greatest misfortunes if the retreat should -be continued. This was however the last day of trial. Towards evening -the weather cleared up, the hills near Rodrigo furnished dry bivouacs -and fuel, good rations restored the strength and spirits of the men, -and next day Rodrigo and the neighbouring villages were occupied in -tranquillity. The cavalry was then sent out to the forest, and being -aided by Sanchez’ Partida, brought in from a thousand to fifteen -hundred stragglers who must otherwise have perished. - -Such was the retreat from Burgos. The French gathered good spoil of -baggage, but what the exact loss of the allies in men was cannot be -exactly determined, because no Spanish returns were ever seen. An -approximation may however be easily made, and the whole loss of the -double retreat cannot be set down at less than nine thousand, including -the siege of Burgos. - - - - -BOOK IX. - - March to Vittoria--Battle of Vittoria. - - -MARCH TO VITTORIA. (May, 1813.) - -In England, the retreat from Burgos produced anger and fear; for the -public had been taught to believe the French weak and dispirited, and -the reverses were unexpected. Lord Wellesley justly attributed them to -the imbecile, selfish policy of Mr. Perceval and his colleagues, which -he characterized as having “_nothing regular but confusion_.” Lord -Wellington alone supported the contest, for the Portuguese and Spanish -Governments had become absolutely hostile to him, and were striving to -make the people of those countries hostile also. However, in 1813, the -aspect of the war, not in the Peninsula only but all over the civilized -world, was changed by the failure of Napoleon’s gigantic expedition -to Russia, and the English General, morally strengthened by this -great event, and seeing time ripe for a decisive blow, successfully -exerted all his mental vigour to overbear the folly and vices of the -governments he had to deal with. He renovated discipline, repressed -the intrigues of the Portuguese Regency, and, going to Cadiz, obtained -of the Spanish Cortes paramount military authority, with its assent to -a general combination all over the Peninsula. The three nations gave -him two hundred thousand men; the Anglo-Portuguese army furnishing -seventy thousand, with ninety pieces of artillery, and sixteen thousand -Anglo-Sicilians were at Alicant. His flanks rested on the Biscay and -Mediterranean seas, on each of which floated British fleets; now -effective auxiliaries, because the French lines of retreat being close -to and parallel with the coast on both sides of Spain, every port -abandoned by them, furnished a storehouse to the allies, and the navy -became a moveable base of operations. - -To oppose him were great armies on the French side, yet all in -confusion. Napoleon had drawn off thousands of the old soldiers and -experienced officers, to give stability to the new levies with which -he was striving to restore his failing fortunes; to compensate for -the weakness thus occasioned, he directed the king to concentrate -on the northern line of invasion and act, not as the monarch of a -subdued country but as the general of an army in the field, having to -contend with an equal power. This view demanded promptness and vigour -to clear the communications of insurgents, judgment to adopt suitable -positions, and one imperious command over all the generals. Thus -governed the French soldiers were numerous enough to hope for victory -against greater numbers than Wellington could employ against them; -for though reduced by drafts, and the secondary war of the Spaniards -after the retreat of Burgos, to two hundred and thirty thousand men, -of which seventy-eight thousand were on the southern line of invasion -and thirty thousand in hospital, a hundred and twenty thousand men with -a hundred guns, including a reserve at Bayonne, were on the northern -line of invasion. This was a great power, of one nation, one spirit, -one discipline, and the emperor with comprehensive genius had explained -how it was to be made available. Joseph could not comprehend the -spirit of the great master’s instructions, and was unwilling to obey. -Quarrelling with his subordinates, he would be still a king, lost time, -made false movements, and at the opening of the campaign, instead of -being concentrated on the right point and under one head, his troops -were scattered over all the north of Spain, under generals who agreed -in nothing but opposition to his military command. - -Such was the state of affairs when Wellington, forming two masses, -gave one of forty thousand fighting men to General Graham, with orders -to penetrate through the Portuguese province of Tras os Montes to -the Esla river, in Spain, thus turning that line of the Duero which -Marmont had the year before made an iron barrier. With the other mass, -thirty thousand, he designed to force the Tormes, pass the Duero, unite -with Graham, augment his army to ninety thousand, by calling down the -Gallicians under Castaños, and then ranging the whole on a new front -march all abreast upon the scattered French and drive them refluent to -the Pyrenees. A grand design and grandly executed. For strong of heart -and strong of hand his veterans marched to the encounter, the glories -of twelve victories playing about their bayonets, and he their leader, -so proudly confident, that in crossing the stream which marks the -frontier of Spain, he rose in his stirrups, and waving his hand cried -out _Adieu Portugal!_ - -How were the French employed and disposed at this critical moment, when -the serpent they had pursued only a few months before, slowly trailing -his exhausted length into Portugal, had thus cast his slough, and with -glistening crest and rattling scales was again rolling forward in -voluminous strength? - -The king was at Valladolid with his guards, holding a mock court -instead of a general’s orderly room. - -Drouet with the army of the centre was in march from Segovia towards -the Duero above Valladolid. - -General Leval who commanded ten thousand men at Madrid, was preparing -to move with a large convoy of pictures and other property towards -Segovia. - -General Gazan with the army of the south, was moving his troops in a -state of uncertainty between the Upper Tormes and the Duero, having an -advanced division of infantry and cavalry at Salamanca under General -Villatte. - -General Reille with the army of Portugal was on the Duero and the Esla. - -The position of the French was therefore defined by the three rivers. -The Esla covered their right wing, the Duero their centre, the Tormes -their left, and the point of concentration was Valladolid. But Leval’s -troops at Madrid were isolated, and that was not all the extent of -the dissemination. Clausel, now commanding the army of the north, was -engaged in Navarre warring down the insurgents, Foy as his lieutenant -was in Biscay with a large detachment, and half of Reille’s army was on -the march to join Clausel. Add many false reports, false conjectures, -and continued disputes as to the real plan of the English general, and -the confusion of the king’s command will be comprehended. - -On the 22nd of May, Graham being well advanced, Lord Wellington put his -right wing in motion towards the Tormes, and the 26th at 10 o’clock in -the morning the heads of his columns appeared with excellent concert -close to that river on all the roads. - -Villatte, a good officer, barricaded the bridge, sent his baggage to -the rear, and called in a detachment from Alba, yet wishing to discover -the real force of his enemy waited on the heights above the ford of -Santa Marta too long; for the ground enabled Wellington to conceal his -movements, and Fane’s horsemen with six guns passed the ford of Santa -Marta in Villatte’s rear unseen, while Victor Alten’s cavalry removed -the barricades on the bridge and pushed through the town to attack in -front. The French general indeed gained the heights of Cabrerizos, -marching towards Babila Fuente, before Fane got over the river, but at -the defile of Aldea Lengua was overtaken by both columns of cavalry, -and being first battered by the guns was charged. But horsemen are no -match for such infantry, whose courage and discipline nothing could -quell. They fell before the round shot in sections, and one hundred -died in the ranks without a wound from intolerable heat; yet they beat -off the cavalry, and in the face of thirty thousand enemies made their -way to Babila Fuente, where, being joined by the detachment from Alba, -the whole disappeared from the sight of their admiring and applauding -opponents. Two hundred had fallen dead in the ranks, a like number, -unable to keep up, were captured, and a leading gun being overturned in -the defile retarded six others, all of which were taken. - -On the 28th, having approached the point on the Duero where he proposed -to throw the bridge for communication with Graham’s corps, Wellington -left Hill in command, and went off suddenly to the Esla, being uneasy -for his combination there. Passing the Duero at Miranda, by means of a -basket moving on a rope stretched from rock to rock, the river foaming -hundreds of feet below, he on the 30th reached Carvajales. - -Graham had met with many difficulties in the rugged Tras os Montes, and -though the Gallicians did not fail here, the combination was retarded -by the difficulty of crossing the Esla. It was to have been effected -the 29th, at which time the right wing, continuing its march from -the Tormes, could have been near Zamora and the passage of the Duero -insured; the French would then have been surprised, separated, and -overtaken in detail; now, though still ignorant that a whole army was -on the Esla, they were alarmed, and had planted the opposite bank with -picquets of cavalry and infantry; moreover, the stream was full and -rapid, the banks steep, the fords hard to find, difficult and deep, -and the appearance of the allies on the Tormes was known through all -the cantonments. Nevertheless Wellington, early on the 31st, caused -some squadrons of hussars with infantry holding by their stirrups, to -pass a ford, and Graham approached the right bank with all his forces; -a French picquet was thus surprised by the hussars, the pontoons were -immediately laid, and the columns commenced crossing, but several men, -even of the cavalry, were drowned. - -On the 1st of June the rear was still on the Esla, yet the van entered -Zamora, the French retiring on Toro. Next day their rear-guard of -cavalry being overtaken by the hussars gave battle, was broken, and -driven back on the infantry with a loss of two hundred men. - -Wellington halted the 3rd to bring the Gallicians down on his left, -and to close up his own rear, for he thought the French, who were -concentrating, might give battle; but he had entirely mastered the -line of the Duero, and those who understand war may say, whether it -was an effort worthy of the man and his army. Some of his columns had -marched a hundred and fifty, some above two hundred and fifty miles in -the wild Tras os Montes, through regions thought to be impracticable -even for small corps; forty thousand men, infantry, cavalry, artillery, -and even pontoons, all had passed, and been suddenly placed as if by a -supernatural power upon the Esla before the enemy knew that they were -in movement. - -The field was now clear for the shock of arms, but the forces were -unequally matched. Wellington had ninety thousand men, and more than -one hundred pieces of artillery in hand. Twelve thousand were cavalry, -the British and Portuguese were seventy thousand; and this mass of -regulars was aided by all the Partidas. Sanchez’ horsemen, a thousand -strong, were on the right beyond the Duero; Porlier, Barcena, Salazar -and Manzo on the left between the Upper Esla and the Carion; Saornil -menaced Avila, the Empecinado hovered about Leval; and the Spanish -reserve of Andalusia, having crossed the Tagus on the 30th, drew all -the numerous small bands swarming around as it advanced. On the other -hand, though the French could collect nine or ten thousand horsemen and -one hundred guns, their infantry was less than half the number of the -allies, being only thirty-five thousand strong, exclusive of Leval. The -way to victory was therefore open, and on the 4th Wellington marched -forward with a conquering vehemence, pouring a torrent of war, whose -depth and violence the king was even now ignorant of. - -It was thought Joseph would fight on the Carion. But though he had -then fifty-five thousand fighting men, exclusive of a Spanish division -escorting the convoys and baggage, he did not judge that river a good -position and retired behind the upper Pisuerga. Meanwhile he sent -Jourdan to examine Burgos castle, and expedited fresh letters, having -before written from Valladolid, to Foy, Sarrut and Clausel, calling -them towards the plains of Burgos, and others to Suchet, directing -him to march upon Zaragoza: but Suchet was then engaged in Catalonia, -Clausel was in Aragon, Foy on the coast of Guipuscoa, and Sarrut -pursuing Longa in the Montaña. - -Joseph was still unacquainted with his enemy. Higher than seventy or -eighty thousand he did not estimate his force, and proposed to fight -on the elevated plains of Burgos. But more than a hundred thousand -men were before and around him; for all the Partidas of the Asturias -and Montaña were drawing together on his right, Julian Sanchez and -the Partidas of Castile were closing on his left, and Abispal having -passed the Gredos mountains with the Andalusian reserve and Frere’s -cavalry was in full march for Valladolid. Joseph was however hopeful -to win if he could rally Clausel’s and Foy’s divisions in time, and -his despatches to the former were frequent and urgent. Come with the -infantry of the army of Portugal! Come with the army of the north, and -we shall drive the allies over the Duero! Such was his cry, but he was -not a general to contend with Wellington, and recover the initiatory -movement at such a crisis. - -While still on the Pisuerga he received Jourdan’s report. The castle -of Burgos was untenable, there were no magazines of provisions, the -new works were unfinished and commanded the old, which were unable -to hold out a day. Of Clausel’s and Foy’s divisions nothing had been -heard. This intelligence was decisive, and he resolved to retire behind -the Ebro. All the French outposts in the Bureba and Montaña were -immediately withdrawn, and the great depôt of Burgos was evacuated -upon Vittoria, which was thus encumbered with the artillery depôts of -Madrid, Valladolid and Burgos, and with the baggage and stores of many -armies and many fugitive families; and at that moment also arrived, -from France, a convoy of treasure which had long waited for escort at -Bayonne. - -Meanwhile the tide of war flowed onwards with terrible power. The -allies having crossed the Carion the 7th, Joseph retired to Burgos -with his left wing, composed of the armies of the south and centre, -while Reille’s army, forming the right wing, moved by Castro Xerez. -Wellington followed hard: conducting his operations continually on -the same principle, he pushed his left wing and the Gallicians along -bye-roads, and passed the upper Pisuerga on the 8th, 9th, and 10th. -Having thus turned the line of the Pisuerga entirely, and outflanked -Reille, he made a short journey the 11th, and on the 12th halted his -left wing to arrange the supplies; yet he still pushed forward the -right wing, resolved to make the French yield the castle of Burgos or -fight for possession. - -Reille, who had regained the great road to Burgos the 9th, was now -strongly posted behind the Hormaza stream, barring the way to Burgos; -the other armies were in reserve behind Estepar. In this situation they -had been for three days, cheered by intelligence of Napoleon’s victory -at Bautzen, and the consequent armistice; but on the 12th, Wellington’s -columns came up, and the light division, preceded by the hussars and -dragoons, turned Reille’s right, while the rest of the troops attacked -the whole range of heights to Estepar. Reille, finding horsemen acting -behind his right flank while his front was strongly menaced, made for -the bridge of Baniel under the fire of Gardiner’s horse-artillery, -losing some prisoners and a gun; an effort was made to cut him off -from the bridge, but he bore the artillery fire without shrinking, -and, evading a serious attack, passed the Arlanzan with a loss of only -thirty men killed. The three French armies being then covered by the -Urbel and Arlanzan rivers could not be easily attacked, all the stores -of Burgos were removed, and in the night the king, having mined the -castle, retreated along the high road to Pancorbo, into which he threw -a garrison. Everything was done confusedly. The mines under the castle -exploded outwardly at the moment a column of infantry was defiling -beneath, several streets were laid in ruins, thousands of shells and -other combustibles were driven upwards with a horrible crash, the hills -rocked above the devoted column, and a shower of iron, timber, and -stony fragments falling on it, in an instant destroyed more than three -hundred men! Fewer deaths might have sufficed to determine the crisis -of a great battle! Such and so fearful is the consequence of error, so -terrible the responsibility of a general! - -Wisely did Napoleon speak when he told Joseph, if he would command -he must give himself up entirely to the business, labouring day and -night, thinking of nothing else. Here was a noble army driven like -sheep before prowling wolves, yet in every action the inferior generals -had been prompt and skilful, the soldiers brave, ready and daring, -and in a country very favourable for defence; but the mind of a great -commander was wanting, and the Esla, the Tormes, the Duero, the Carion, -the Pisuerga, the Arlanzan, seemed to be dried up, the rocks, the -mountains, the deep ravines to be levelled. Clausel’s strong positions, -Dubreton’s thundering castle, all disappeared like a dream, and sixty -thousand veteran soldiers, willing to fight, were hurried with all the -confusion of defeat across the Ebro: nor was that barrier found of more -avail to mitigate the rushing violence of their formidable adversary. - -Joseph, having placed the defile and fort of Pancorbo between him -and his enemy, thought he could safely await his reinforcements, and -extended his wings for the sake of subsistence. Hence on the 16th -Drouet marched to Aro on the left, while Gazan held the centre, having -a strong advanced guard beyond Pancorbo; for as the king’s hope was -to retake the offensive, he retained the power of issuing beyond the -defiles, and his scouting parties were pushed forward on all sides. The -rest of the army was cantoned by divisions in rear, and Reille, from -behind the Ebro, was to watch the road to Bilbao, being there joined -by Sarrut. - -While these movements were in progress, all the incumbrances of -the armies were assembled in the basin of Vittoria, and many small -garrisons of the army of the north came in; for Clausel, having -received the king’s first letter on the 15th of June, had gathered his -scattered columns to rejoin by the way of Logroño, yet his garrisons -were many, and he could only concentrate fourteen thousand men. The -king was nevertheless confident in the strength of his front, and had -no doubt of retaking the offensive when all his forces came in. - -His dream was short-lived. On the 13th, while the explosion at Burgos -was still ringing in the hills, Wellington was marching by his left -towards the country about the sources of the Ebro. This great movement, -masked by the cavalry and the Spanish irregulars who infested the -rear of the French, suddenly placed the army between the sources of -the Ebro and the great mountains of Reynosa; this cut the French -entirely off from the sea-coast, and all the ports, except Santona and -Bilbao, were immediately evacuated. Santona was then invested by the -Spaniards, and the English ships entered Sant Andero, where a depôt -and hospital station was established; the connection of the army with -Portugal was thus severed: she was cast off as a heavy tender is cast -from its towing-rope, and all the British military establishments were -transferred by sea to the coast of Biscay. - -The English general had now to choose between a march down the left -bank of the Ebro to seek a battle; or to place the army on the great -communication with France, while the fleet, keeping pace, furnished -fresh depôts at Bilbao and other ports. The first was an uncertain -operation, because of the many narrow and dangerous defiles which were -to be passed; the second was secure even if the first should fail; but -both were compatible to a certain point; for to gain the great road -leading from Burgos to Bilbao, was a good step for either, and, failing -of that, there was a road leading by Valmaceda to Bilbao in reserve. -Wherefore with an eagle’s sweep Wellington brought his left wing round, -and poured his numerous columns through all the deep narrow valleys -and rugged defiles towards the great road of Bilbao. At Medina de -Pomar, a central point, he left the sixth division to guard his stores -and supplies, but the march of the other divisions was unmitigated; -neither the winter gullies, nor the ravines, nor the precipitous -passes amongst the rocks, retarded the march even of the artillery; -where horses could not draw men hauled, when the wheels would not roll -the guns were let down or lifted up with ropes; and strongly did the -rough veteran infantry work their way through those wild and beautiful -regions: six days they toiled unceasingly; on the seventh, swelled by -Longa’s Spaniards, and all the smaller bands which came trickling from -the mountains, they burst like raging streams from every defile and -went foaming into the basin of Vittoria. - -During this movement many reports reached the French, some absurdly -exaggerated, as that Wellington had one hundred and ninety thousand -men, yet all indicating the true direction of his march; and as early -as the 15th, Jourdan, warning Joseph that the allies would turn his -right, pressed him to place Reille at Valmaceda and close the other -armies towards the same quarter. Joseph yielded so far, that Reille -was ordered to concentrate at Osma and gain Valmaceda by Orduña if it -was still possible; if not he was to descend rapidly upon Bilbao, and -rally Foy’s division and the garrisons of Biscay upon his army: but no -general decided dispositions were made. - -Reille called in Maucune from Frias, and having fears for his safety -gave him a choice between a direct road across the hills, or the -circuitous route of Puente Lara. Maucune started late in the night of -the 17th by the direct road; and meanwhile Reille having reached Osma -on the morning of the 18th, found a strong English column issuing from -the defiles in his front, and in possession of the high road to Orduña. -This was Graham. He had three divisions and a considerable body of -cavalry, and the French general, who had eight thousand infantry and -fourteen guns, engaged him with a sharp skirmish and cannonade, wherein -fifty men fell on the side of the allies, above a hundred on that of -the enemy; but at half-past two o’clock, Maucune had not arrived, and -beyond the mountains, on the left of the French, the sound of a battle -arose and seemed to advance along the valley of Boveda in rear of -Osma. Reille, suspecting the truth, instantly retired fighting towards -Espejo, where the mouths of the two valleys opened on each other, and -then suddenly, from that of Boveda Maucune’s troops rushed forth, -begrimed with dust and powder, breathless and broken. - -That general had, as before said, marched over the Araçena ridge -instead of going by the Puente Lara, and his leading brigade, after -clearing the defiles, halted near the village of San Millan in the -valley of Boveda, without planting picquets; he was there awaiting -his other brigade and the baggage, when suddenly the light division, -moving on a line parallel with Graham’s march, appeared on some rising -ground in front. The surprise was equal on both sides, but the British -riflemen instantly dashed down the hill with loud cries and a bickering -fire, the 52nd followed in support, and the French retreated fighting -as they best could. The rest of the English regiments remained in -reserve, thinking all their enemies before them, but then the second -French brigade, followed by the baggage, came hastily out from a narrow -cleft in some perpendicular rocks on their right hand, and a confused -action ensued. For the reserve scrambled over rough intervening ground -to attack this new foe, who made for a hill a little way in front, -and then the 52nd, whose rear was thus menaced, quitting their first -enemies, wheeled round and running full speed up the hill met them -on the summit; so pressed, the French cast off their packs, and half -flying, half fighting, escaped along the side of the mountains, while -their first brigade, still retreating on the road towards Espejo, -were pursued by the riflemen. Meanwhile the sumpter animals, sadly -affrighted, run about the rocks with a wonderful clamour; and though -the escort, huddled together, fought desperately, all the baggage -became the spoil of the victors, and four hundred of the French fell or -were taken: the rest with unyielding resolution and activity escaped, -though pursued through the mountains by some Spanish irregulars: Reille -then retreated behind Salinas de Añara. - -Neither Reille nor the few prisoners he had made could account for -more than six Anglo-Portuguese divisions at these defiles; hence, as -no enemy had been felt on the great road from Burgos, the king judged -that Hill was marching with the others by Valmaceda into Guipuscoa, -to menace the great communication with France. It was however clear -that six divisions were on the right and rear of the French position, -and no time was to be lost; wherefore Gazan and D’Erlon marched in the -night to unite behind the Zadora river, up the left bank of which they -had to file into the basin of Vittoria. But their way was through the -pass of Puebla de Arganzan, two miles long, and so narrow as scarcely -to furnish room for the great road: wherefore to cover the movement, -Reille fell back during the night to Subijana Morillas on the Bayas -river. His orders were to dispute the ground vigorously, for by that -route Wellington could enter the basin before the others could thread -the pass of Puebla; or he might send a corps from Frias, to attack the -king on the Miranda side in rear while his front was engaged in the -defile. One of these things the English general should have endeavoured -to accomplish, but the troops had made long marches on the 18th, and it -was dark before the fourth division reached Espejo: D’Erlon and Gazan, -therefore, without difficulty passed the defile, and the head of their -column appeared on the other side just as the allies drove Reille back -from the Bayas. - -Wellington had reached that river before mid-day the 19th, and, if -he could have forced it at once, the other two armies, then in the -defile, would have been cut off; Reille was however well posted, his -front covered by the stream, his right by the village of Subijana de -Morillas, which was occupied as a bridge-head; his left was secured -by rugged heights, and it was only by a combat in which eighty French -fell that he was forced beyond the Zadora; but the other armies had -then passed the defile, the crisis was over, and the allies pitched -their tents on the Bayas. The king now heard of Clausel at Logroño, and -called him to Vittoria; he also directed Foy, then in march for Bilbao, -to rally the garrisons of Biscay and Guipuscoa and join him on the -Zadora. These orders were received too late. - -The basin into which the king had thus poured all his troops, his -parcs, convoys and incumbrances, was eight miles broad by ten long, -Vittoria being at the further end. The Zadora, narrow and with rugged -banks, after passing that town, flows through the Puebla defile towards -the Ebro, dividing the basin unequally,--the largest portion being on -the left bank. A traveller, coming from the Ebro by the royal Madrid -road, would enter the basin by the Puebla defile, breaking through a -rough mountain ridge. On emerging from the pass, at the distance of six -miles on the left he would see the village of Subijana de Morillas, -facing the opening into the basin which Reille had defended on the -Bayas. The spires of Vittoria would appear eight miles in front, and -radiating from that town, the road to Logroño would be on his right -hand; that to Bilbao by _Murgia_ on the left hand, crossing the Zadora -at a bridge near the village of Ariaga. Further on, the road to Estella -and Pampeluna would be seen on the right, the road to Durango on the -left, and between them the royal causeway leading over the great -Arlaban ridge by the defiles of Salinas. Of all these roads, though -some were practicable for guns, especially that to Pampeluna, the royal -causeway alone could suffice for such an incumbered army; and as the -allies were behind the ridge, bounding the basin on the right bank of -the Zadora, and parallel to the causeway, they could by prolonging -their left cut off that route. - -Joseph, feeling this danger, thought to march by Salinas to Durango, -there to meet Foy’s troops and the garrisons of Guipuscoa and Biscay; -but in the rough country, neither his artillery nor his cavalry, on -which he greatly depended, though the cavalry and artillery of the -allies were scarcely less powerful, could act or subsist, and he must -have sent them into France: moreover, if pressed by Wellington in -that mountainous region, so favourable for irregulars, he could not -long remain in Spain. It was then proposed to retire to Pampeluna and -bring Suchet’s army up to Zaragoza; but Joseph desired to keep open -the great communication with France; for though the Pampeluna road was -practicable to wheels, it required something more for the enormous mass -of guns and carriages of all kinds now heaped around Vittoria. - -One large convoy had marched the 19th, and the fighting men in front -were thus diminished, while the plain was still covered with artillery -parcs and equipages, and the king, infirm of purpose, continued to -waste time in vain conjectures about his adversary’s movements. And on -the 21st, at three o’clock in the morning, Maucune’s division, more -than three thousand good soldiers, also marched with a second convoy. -The king then adopted a new line of battle. - -Reille, reinforced by a Franco-Spanish brigade of infantry and Digeon’s -dragoons, took the extreme right to defend the passage of the Zadora, -where the Bilbao and Durango roads crossed it by the bridges of Gamara -Mayor and Ariaga. The centre, under Gazan and Drouet, was distant six -or eight miles from Gamara, lining the Zadora also; but on another -front, for the stream, turning suddenly to the left round the heights -of Margarita, descended thence to the Puebla defile nearly at right -angles with its previous course. There covered by the river, on an easy -open range of heights, Gazan’s right was extended from an isolated hill -in front of the village of Margarita to the royal road; his centre was -astride of the royal road in front of the village of Arinez; his left -occupied rugged ground behind Subijana de Alava, facing the Puebla -defile, and a brigade under Maransin was on the Puebla ridge beyond -the defile. Drouet was in second line; the mass of cavalry, many -guns, and the king’s guards formed a reserve behind the centre about -the village of Gomecha, and fifty pieces of artillery were pushed in -front, pointing to the bridges of Mendoza, Tres Puentes, Villodas, and -Nanclares. - -While the king was making conjectures, Wellington had made a new -disposition of his forces; for thinking Joseph would not fight on -the Zadora, he sent Giron with the Gallicians on the 19th to seize -Orduña; Graham was to have followed him, but finally penetrated through -difficult mountain ways to Murguia, thus cutting the enemy off from -Bilbao and menacing his communications with France. The army had been -so scattered by the previous marches that Wellington halted on the 20th -to rally the columns, and took that opportunity to examine the French -position, where, contrary to his expectation, they seemed resolved to -fight, wherefore he gave Graham fresh orders and hastily recalled Giron -from Orduña. The long-expected battle was then at hand, and on neither -side were the numbers and courage of the troops of mean account. The -sixth division, six thousand five hundred strong, had been left at -Medina de Pomar, and hence only sixty thousand Anglo-Portuguese sabres -and bayonets, with ninety pieces of cannon, were actually in the field; -but the Spanish auxiliaries raised the numbers to eighty thousand -combatants. The regular muster-roll of the French was lost with the -battle, yet a careful approximate reckoning gives about sixty thousand -sabres and bayonets, and in number and size of guns they had the -advantage: but their position was visibly defective. - -Their best line of retreat was on the prolongation of Reille’s right, -at Gamara Mayor; yet he was too distant to be supported by the main -body, and therefore the safety of the latter depended on his good -fighting. Many thousand carriages and other impediments were heaped -about Vittoria, blocking all the roads and disordering the artillery -parcs; and on the extreme left, Maransin’s brigade, occupying the -Puebla ridge, was isolated and too weak to hold its ground. The -centre was indeed on an easy range of hills, its front open, with a -slope to the river, and powerful batteries bore on all the bridges; -nevertheless, many of the guns being advanced in the loop of the -Zadora, were exposed to musket-shot from a wood on the right bank. - -Seven bridges were within the scheme of operations, yet none were -broken or retrenched. The bridge of La Puebla, facing the French left, -was beyond the defile; that of Nanclares, facing Subijana de Alava, was -at the French end of the defile; three bridges around the deep loop of -the river opened upon the right of the French centre, that of Mendoza -being highest up the stream, Vellodas lowest down, Tres Puentes in the -centre: the bridges of Gamara Mayor and Ariaga were, as already said, -guarded by Reille. - -Wellington projected three distinct battles. Graham, moving by the -Bilbao road, was to force a passage with twenty thousand men against -Reille, and Giron’s Gallicians were called up to his support; the -design being to shut up the French centre and left between the Zadora -and the Puebla mountain. Hill, having Morillo’s Spaniards, Sylviera’s -Portuguese and the second British division, with cavalry and guns, in -all twenty thousand men, was to force the passage of the Zadora river -beyond the Puebla defile, assailing Maransin there with his right, -while his left, threading the pass to enter the basin on that side, -turned and menaced the French left and secured the bridge of Nanclares. - -In the centre battle, the third, fourth, seventh and light divisions of -infantry, the great mass of artillery, the heavy cavalry and Portuguese -horsemen, in all thirty thousand combatants, were led by Wellington in -person. Being encamped along the Bayas, these bodies had only to march -over the ridge which bounded the basin of Vittoria on that side, and -come down to their respective points on the Zadora, namely, the bridges -of Mendoza, Tres Puentes, Villodas and Nanclares; but the country was -so rugged exact concert could not be maintained, and each general of -division was left in some degree master of his own movements. - - -BATTLE OF VITTORIA. (June, 1813.) - -At daybreak on the 21st, the weather being rainy with a thick vapour, -the troops moved from the Bayas, crossed the ridge and slowly -approached the Zadora, while Hill on the other side of the ridge -commenced the passage of that river beyond the defile of Puebla. On -his side Morillo’s Spaniards led, and their first brigade assailed -the mountain to the right of the great road; but the ascent proved -so steep the soldiers appeared to climb rather than walk up, and the -second brigade, which was to connect the first with the British troops -below, ascended only half-way. Little opposition was made until the -first brigade was near the summit, when skirmishing commenced and -Morillo was wounded; his second brigade then joined him, and the -French, feeling the importance of the height, reinforced Maransin. -Hill soon succoured Morillo with the 71st regiment and a battalion of -light infantry, both under Colonel Cadogan, yet the fight was doubtful; -for though the British won the summit and gained ground along the -side of the mountain, Cadogan fell, and Gazan having sent Villatte’s -division to aid Maransin, the French fought so strongly that the -allies could scarcely hold their ground. Hill sent more troops, and -with the remainder of his corps passed the Zadora, threaded the Puebla -defile, and fiercely issuing forth on the other side won the village -of Subijana de Alava in front of Gazan’s line, and then connecting -his right with the troops on the mountain, maintained that forward -position, despite of the enemy’s efforts, until the centre battle was -begun on his left. - -Meanwhile Wellington, keeping all his cavalry in mass as a reserve, -placed the fourth division opposite the bridge of Nanclares, the light -division at the bridge of Villodas, both being covered by rugged -ground and woods, and the light division so close to the water, that -the skirmishers could have killed the French gunners in the loop of -the river. The weather had now cleared up, and then Hill’s battle was -prolonged by the riflemen of the light division, with a biting fire -on the enemy’s skirmishers; but no serious effort was made, because -the third and seventh divisions, meeting with rough ground, had not -reached their point of attack, and it would have been imprudent to push -the fourth division and cavalry over the bridge of Nanclares, with the -Puebla defile in their rear, before the other divisions were ready. - -While thus waiting, a Spanish peasant told Wellington the bridge of -Tres Puentes on the left of the light division was unguarded, and -offered to lead the troops over it. General Kempt’s brigade was on the -instant directed towards that quarter, and being concealed by some -rocks, passed the narrow bridge at a running pace, mounted a steep -rise of ground and halted close under the crest, being then actually -behind the king’s advanced posts, and within a few hundred yards of his -line of battle. Some French cavalry approached, and two round shots -were fired by the enemy, one of which killed the poor peasant to whose -courage and intelligence the allies were so much indebted, but no -movement of attack was made, and Kempt called the 15th Hussars over the -river: they came at a gallop, crossing the narrow bridge one by one, -horseman after horseman, and still the French remained torpid, showing -an army but no general. - -It was now one o’clock, Hill’s assault on the village of Subijana was -entirely developed, and a curling smoke, faintly seen far up the Zadora -on the extreme left, and followed by the sound of distant guns, told -that Graham’s attack had also commenced. Then the king, finding both -flanks in danger, caused his reserve to file off towards Vittoria, and -gave Gazan orders to retire by successive masses; but at that moment -the third and seventh divisions were seen moving rapidly down to the -bridge of Mendoza, whereupon Gazan’s artillery opened, a body of his -cavalry drew near the bridge, and the French light troops, very strong -there, commenced a vigorous musketry. Some British guns replied to the -French cannon from the opposite bank, and the value of Kempt’s forward -position was instantly made manifest; for Andrew Barnard, springing -forward, led the riflemen of the light division in the most daring -manner between the French cavalry and the river, taking their light -troops and gunners in flank, and engaging them so closely that the -English artillerymen, thinking his dark-clothed troops enemies, played -on both alike. - -This singular attack enabled a brigade of the third division to pass -the bridge of Mendoza without opposition, while the other brigade -forded the river higher up, followed by the seventh division and -Vandeleur’s brigade of the light division. The French now abandoned -the ground in front of Villodas; and the battle, which had slackened, -was revived with extreme violence; for Hill pressed the enemy in his -front, the fourth division passed the bridge of Nanclares, the smoke -and sound of Graham’s guns became more distinct, and the banks of the -Zadora presented a continuous line of fire. Thus the French, weakened -in the centre by the draft made of Villatte’s division, and shaken in -resolution by the king’s order to retreat, became perplexed and could -make no regular retrograde movement, because the allies were too close. - -The seventh division and Colville’s brigade of the third division, -having forded the river, formed the left of the British, and were -immediately engaged with the French right; but then Wellington, seeing -the hill in front of Arinez nearly denuded of troops by the withdrawal -of Villatte’s division, led Picton and the rest of the third division -in close column at a running pace, diagonally, across the front of both -armies, towards that central point. This attack was headed by Barnard’s -riflemen, and followed by the remainder of Kempt’s brigade and the -hussars;[29] and at the same time, when the fourth division had passed -the bridge of Nanclares, the heavy cavalry, a splendid body, galloped -over also, squadron after squadron into the plain ground between Cole -and Hill. - -Thus caught in the midst of their dispositions for retreat, the -French threw out a prodigious number of skirmishers, and fifty pieces -of artillery played with astonishing activity. To answer this fire -Wellington brought over most of his guns, and both sides were shrouded -by a dense cloud of smoke and dust, under cover of which the French -retired by degrees to the second range of heights in front of Gomecha, -on which their reserve had been posted, yet still holding the village -of Arinez on the main road. Picton’s troops, always headed by the -riflemen of the light division, then plunged into that village amidst -a heavy fire of muskets and artillery, and three guns were captured; -but the post was important, fresh French troops came down, and for some -time the smoke and dust and clamour, the flashing of the fire-arms, -and the shouts and cries of the combatants, mixed with the thundering -of the guns, were terrible: finally the British troops issued forth -victorious on the other side. During this conflict the seventh -division, reinforced by Vandeleur’s brigade of the light division, was -heavily raked by a battery at the village of Margarita, until the 52nd -regiment with an impetuous charge carried that village, and the 87th -won the village of Hermandad, and, so fighting, the whole line advanced. - -When the village of Arinez was won, the French opposed to Hill, at -Subijana de Alava, were turned, and being hard pressed in front, and on -their left by the troops of the Puebla mountain, fell back two miles in -disorder, striving to regain the line of retreat to Vittoria. It was -thought some cavalry launched at the moment would have disorganized -the whole French battle, but none moved, and the confused multitude -shooting ahead recovered order. - -The ground was exceedingly diversified with woods and plains, here -covered with corn, there broken by ditches, vineyards and hamlets; -hence the action, for six miles, resolved itself into a running fight -and cannonade, the dust and smoke and tumult of which, filling all -the basin, passed onwards towards Vittoria. Many guns were taken, and -at six o’clock the French reached the last defensible height, one -mile in front of Vittoria. Behind them was the plain in which the -city stood, and beyond the houses thousands of carriages, animals and -non-combatants, men, women, and children, huddling together in all the -madness of terror; and as the English shot went booming over head, the -vast crowd started and swerved with a convulsive movement, while a dull -and horrid sound of distress arose: but there was no hope, no stay for -army or multitude. It was the wreck of a nation. - -French courage was not yet quelled. Reille, on whom every thing now -depended, maintained his post at the Upper Zadora, and the armies of -the south and centre, drawing up on their last heights between the -villages of Ali and Armentia, made their muskets flash like lightning, -while more than eighty pieces of artillery, massed together, pealed -with such a horrid uproar, that the hills laboured and shook and -streamed with fire and smoke, amidst which the dark figures of the -French gunners were seen hounding with a frantic energy. This terrible -cannonade and musketry checked the allies. The third division, having -the brunt of the storm, could scarcely maintain its ground, and the -French generals began to draw off their infantry from the right -wing, when suddenly the fourth division rushing forward carried the -hill on the French left; then the heights were all abandoned, for at -that moment Joseph, finding the royal road so blocked by carriages -the artillery could not pass, indicated the road of Salvatierra for -retreat, and the troops at once went off in a confused mass. The -British followed hard, and the light cavalry galloped through the town -to intercept the new line, which passed a marsh, and was likewise -choked with carriages and fugitive people, for on each side there were -deep drains. Disorder and mischief then prevailed entirely. The guns -were left on the edge of the marsh, the artillerymen fled with the -horses, and the infantry, breaking through the miserable multitude, -went clean off: the cavalry however still acted with order, and many -generous horsemen were seen to carry children and women from the -dreadful scene. - -This retreat placed Reille in great danger. His advanced troops under -Sarrut had been originally posted at the village of Aranguis, beyond -the Zadora, holding some heights which covered the bridges of Ariaga -and Gamara Mayor. They were driven from thence by Graham’s vanguard -under General Oswald, who seized Gamara Menor on the Durango road, and -forced the Franco-Spaniards from Durano on the royal causeway: thus the -first blow on this side deprived the king of his best line of retreat -and confined him to the road of Pampeluna. Sarrut however recrossed -the river in good order, taking post with one brigade at the bridge -of Ariaga and the village of Abechuco covering it; the other was in -reserve to support him and General La Martinière, who defended the -bridge of Gamara Mayor and the village of that name, also on the right -of the river. Digeon’s dragoons were behind the village of Ariaga; -Reille’s own dragoons were behind the bridge of Gamara; one brigade of -light cavalry was on the extreme right to sustain the Franco-Spanish -troops, higher up the river; another, under General Curto, was on the -French left, extending down the Zadora. - -Longa’s Spaniards were to have attacked Gamara at an early hour, when -it was feebly occupied, but they did not stir, and the village being -reinforced, Robinson’s brigade of the fifth division assaulted it -instead. He made the attack at a running pace at first, but the French -fire became so heavy, that his men stopped to reply, and the columns -got intermixed; however, encouraged by their officers, and especially -by the example of General Robinson, an inexperienced man but of a -daring spirit, they renewed the charge, broke through the village and -even crossed the bridge. One gun was captured and the passage seemed -to be won, when Reille suddenly turned twelve pieces upon the village, -and then La Martinière, rallying his men under cover of this cannonade -retook the bridge: it was with difficulty the allied troops could even -hold the village until they were reinforced. - -Now a second British brigade came down, and the bridge was again -carried, but the new troops were soon driven back as the others had -been, and the bridge remained forbidden ground. Graham had meanwhile -attacked the village of Abechuco, covering the bridge of Ariaga; it -was carried at once by the German riflemen, who were supported by -Bradford’s Portuguese and the fire of twelve guns; yet here, as at -Gamara, the French maintained the bridge, so that at both places the -troops on each side remained stationary under a reciprocal fire of -artillery and small arms. Reille, with inferior numbers, thus continued -to interdict the passage until the tumult of Wellington’s battle, -coming up the Zadora, reached Vittoria itself, and a part of the -British horsemen rode out of that city upon Sarrut’s rear. Digeon’s -dragoons kept this cavalry in check for the moment, and Reille had -previously formed a reserve of infantry, which now proved his safety; -for Sarrut was killed at the bridge of Ariaga, and Menne, next in -command, could scarcely draw off his troops while Digeon’s dragoons -held the British cavalry at point; but with the aid of his reserve -Reille finally rallied all his troops at Betonio. He had now to make -head on several sides, because the allies were coming down from Ariaga, -from Durano, and from Vittoria; yet he fought his way to Metauco on the -Salvatierra road and there covered the general retreat with some degree -of order. Vehemently and closely did the British pursue, and neither -the bold demeanour of the French cavalry, which made several vigorous -charges, nor darkness, which now fell, could stop their victorious -career until the flying masses had passed Metauco. - -This was the battle of Vittoria. The French had, comparatively, few -men slain, but to use Gazan’s words, “_lost all their equipages, all -their guns, all their treasure, all their stores, all their papers; -no man could even prove how much pay was due to him: generals and -subordinate officers alike were reduced to the clothes on their backs, -and most of them were barefooted_.” Never was an army more hardly -used by its commander. The soldiers were not half beaten; yet never -was a victory more complete. The French carried off but two pieces of -artillery from the battle. Jourdan’s baton, a stand of colours, one -hundred and forty-three brass pieces, one hundred of which had been -used in the fight, all the parcs and dépôts from Madrid, Valladolid, -and Burgos, carriages, ammunition, treasure, every thing, fell into -the hands of the victors. The loss in men did not exceed six thousand; -the loss of the allies was five thousand one hundred and seventy-six, -killed, wounded, and missing. Of these one thousand and forty-nine were -Portuguese; five hundred and fifty-three Spanish. Hence the English -lost more than double what Portuguese and Spaniards did together; -yet both fought well, and especially the Portuguese: but British -troops are the soldiers of battle. The spoil was immense, yet so -plundered, principally by the followers and non-combatants, for with -some exceptions the fighting troops may be said to have marched upon -gold and silver without stooping to pick it up, that of five millions -and a half of dollars, indicated by the French accounts to be in the -money-chests, not one dollar came to the public. Wellington sent -fifteen officers with power to examine all loaded animals passing the -Ebro and the Duero, yet very little was recovered; and this robbery was -not confined to ignorant and vulgar people: officers were seen mixed -with the mob contending for the disgraceful gain. - -On the 22nd, Giron and Longa pursued the convoy which had moved under -Maucune on the morning of the battle; the heavy cavalry and Portuguese -horsemen remained at Vittoria; Pakenham came with the sixth division -from Medina Pomar, and Wellington pursued Joseph, who had been flying -up the Borundia and Araquil valleys all night. Reille, who covered the -retreat, reached Huerta in the valley of Araquil, thirty miles from the -field of battle, on the evening of the 22nd. Joseph attained Yrursun, -from which roads branched off to Pampeluna on one side, and to Tolosa -and St. Esteban on the other, from thence on the 23rd, expediting -orders to different points on the French frontier to prepare provisions -and succours for his suffering army; meanwhile he sent Reille by St. -Esteban to the Lower Bidassoa with his infantry, six hundred select -cavalry, the artillery-men and horses: Gazan’s and D’Erlon’s troops -marched upon Pampeluna, intending to cross the frontier at St. Jean -Pied de Port. - -At Pampeluna the army bivouacked on the glacis of the fortress, but in -such destitution and insubordination that the governor would not suffer -them to enter the town. - -Wellington, who had sent Graham’s corps into Guipuscoa by the pass of -St. Adrian, overtook the French rear and captured one of the two guns -saved from Vittoria, and on the 28th the king fled into France by the -Roncesvalles. Foy and Clausel were thus isolated on each flank and in -great danger. The first had a strong country, but his troops were -disseminated, and the fugitives from the battle spread such alarm that -the forts of Arlaban, Montdragon, and Salinas, blocking the passes -into Guipuscoa, were abandoned to Longa and Giron. Foy, who had only -one battalion in hand, rallied the fugitive garrisons, advanced, and -from some prisoners acquired exact intelligence of the battle. Then he -ordered the two convoys from Vittoria to march day and night towards -France, and reinforcing himself with Maucune’s escort gave battle -to the Spanish general, who, having three times his force, worsted -him with a loss of six guns and two hundred men. He retreated to -Villafranca, where, late in the evening of the 24th, Graham came upon -him from the side pass of San Adrian: he had now rallied a considerable -force and gave battle on the Orio with Maucune’s troops and St. Pol’s -Italian division: the first were beaten, yet the Italians gained some -advantages, and the position was so strong that Graham had recourse to -flank operations; Foy then retired to Tolosa, and again offered battle; -whereupon Graham turned his flank with the Spaniards, broke his front -with the Anglo-Portuguese, drove his wings beyond Tolosa on each side, -and bursting the gate of the town forced a passage through his centre -by the main road. Nevertheless Foy retreated with a loss of only four -hundred men, and he had killed and wounded more than four hundred -Anglo-Portuguese in the two days’ operations. The Spanish loss was not -known, but must have been considerable, and Graham, who was himself -hurt, halted two days to hear of Wellington’s progress. During that -time the convoys reached France in safety, and Foy, his force increased -by the junction of detachments to more than sixteen thousand men, -threw a garrison into San Sebastian and joined Reille on the Bidassoa: -twenty-five thousand men were then on that river, and Graham halted to -invest Sebastian. - -While these events passed in Guipuscoa, Clausel was more hardly pressed -on the other flank of the allies. He had approached Vittoria with -fourteen thousand men on the 22nd, but finding Pakenham there with -the 6th division, retired to Logroño and halted until the evening of -the 23rd, thus enabling Wellington, who thought he was at Tudela, to -discover his real situation and march against him. He fled to Tudela, -reached it the 27th, after a march of sixty miles in forty hours, and -thinking he had outstripped his pursuers proposed to enter France by -Taffalla and Olite, but an alcalde told him Wellington had forestalled -him at those places and he marched upon Zaragoza. He could have been -intercepted again, yet Wellington, fearing to drive him on Suchet, only -launched Mina in pursuit, and Clausel after destroying guns and baggage -finally escaped by Jacca into France. The king had meanwhile caused -Gazan to re-enter Spain by the Bastan, from whence Hill quickly drove -him. Joseph’s reign was over. After years of toils and combats, admired -rather than understood, Lord Wellington, emerging from the chaos of the -Peninsula struggle, crowned the Pyrenees--a recognized conqueror. From -that pinnacle the clangour of his trumpets was heard, and the splendour -of his genius blazed out, a flaming beacon for warring nations. - - - - -BOOK X. - - Battle of Castalla--English Siege of Taragona--Siege of San - Sebastian--Storming of San Bartolomeo--First Storm of San - Sebastian. - - -While the main armies strove in the north of Spain, the Mediterranean -coast was the scene of a secondary contest maintained by an English -expedition sent from Sicily in 1812. Destined at first for Catalonia, -it finally landed at Alicant, where it remained inactive until April, -1813, but then Sir John Murray, whose want of vigour on the Douro -was overbalanced by aristocratic influence at home, assumed command. -Acting in conjunction with the Spanish general Elio, he commenced a -series of petty enterprises, and broached several projects which he had -not nerve to execute, and only roused Suchet to serious action. That -marshal, previously inert, concentrated in the night of the 11th all -his disposable force, and next morning falling upon Mijares, Elio’s -lieutenant, defeated him with a loss of fifteen hundred prisoners. Then -he marched against Murray, who retreated through the pass of Biar to -a position of battle, leaving Colonel F. Adam with two thousand five -hundred men and six guns in the defile. The ground was very strong, but -the French light troops crowned the rocks on each side and after two -hours’ fighting the allies abandoned the pass, with a loss of two guns -and some prisoners besides killed and wounded, yet made their retreat, -three miles, to the main position, in good order, and were not pursued. - -This double success in one day indicated the approach of a decisive -battle, in anticipation of which Murray had studied and chosen his -ground with judgment. His left, composed of Whittingham’s Spanish -division, was intrenched on a rugged sierra, and the troops coming from -Biar prolonged the line on a front of two miles, until the ridge ended -abruptly over the town of Castalla. That place with its old castle, -crowning an isolated sugar-loaf hill, was prepared for defence, having -all the approaches commanded by batteries, and being strongly occupied -with Mackenzie’s British division. The cavalry was disposed on a plain, -partly in front, partly behind the town. Clinton’s English and Roche’s -Spanish divisions were in reserve in rear of the right, on a lower -height nearly perpendicular to the main front; and their line as well -as the town was covered by the dry bed of a torrent called a _baranco_, -having precipitous sides and in many places a hundred feet in depth: -that front was therefore refused and scarcely attackable. - -On the 12th Suchet’s cavalry, issuing cautiously from the defile of -Biar, extended to its left on the plain; the infantry, following, took -possession of a low ridge facing the Sierra, and then the cavalry, -passing the baranco, turned the town as if to menace the divisions -in reserve. This movement alarmed Murray, and notwithstanding the -impregnable strength of his ground he shrunk from the encounter; even -while Suchet was advancing he thrice gave orders to the quartermaster -general Donkin to put the army in retreat; the last time so -peremptorily, that obedience must have followed if at that moment the -French light troops in advance had not commenced firing. - - -BATTLE OF CASTALLA. (April, 1813.) - -Suchet’s dispositions were slowly made, as if he feared to commence. -A mountain spur, jutting from the Sierra between Whittingham and the -troops from Biar, hid two-thirds of the allies from his view, and he -first sent an exploring column of infantry towards Castalla, to turn -the intercepting spur and discover all the conditions of the position; -when that was effected his cavalry closed towards the baranco. Then he -formed two powerful columns of attack and sent them against Whittingham -and Adam on each side of the spur, retaining a reserve on his own -ridge, and keeping his exploring column towards Castalla to meet any -sally from that point. - -The ascent against Whittingham was so ruggedly steep, and the upper -part so intrenched, that the battle resolved itself there at once -into a stationary skirmish of light troops; but on the other side of -the spur the French mounted the height, slowly indeed and with many -skirmishers, yet so resolutely, that it was evident good fighting only -would send them down again. Their light troops, spreading over the face -of the Sierra and in some places attaining the summit, were met and -held in play by the Anglo-Sicilian troops with changing fortune; but -where the main column came on the 27th Regiment there was a terrible -crash of battle, and preceded by a singular encounter. For an abrupt -declination of ground enabled the French to halt and re-form for the -decisive assault, out of fire, yet close to that regiment which was by -order lying down in expectation of the charge. Suddenly a grenadier -officer, rising alone to the upper ground, challenged Waldron the -captain of the 27th Grenadiers to single combat; he, an agile Irishman -of boiling courage, instantly leaped forward to the duel, and the -hostile lines though ready to charge awaited the result. Rapidly -the champions’ swords clashed and glittered in the sun, but Waldron -cleft his adversary’s head in twain, and the 27th springing up with -a deafening shout charged and sent the French, maugre their numbers -and courage, down the mountain side, covering it with their dead and -wounded. It was a glorious exploit, erroneously attributed in the -despatch to Colonel Adam, though entirely conducted by the colonel of -the regiment, Reeves. - -Suchet seeing his principal column thus broken, and having the worst of -the fight in other parts, made two secondary attacks with his reserve -to cover a rally, yet failed in both and his army was thus separated in -three parts without connection; for the column beaten by Reeves was in -great confusion at the foot of the Sierra, the exploring column was on -the left, and the cavalry beyond the baranco, the only passage across -it being commanded by the allies. A vigorous sally from Castalla, and -a general advance, would then have compelled the French-infantry to -fall back upon Biar in confusion before the cavalry could come to their -assistance, and the victory would have been completed; but Murray, -who had remained during the whole action behind Castalla, first gave -Suchet time to rally and retire in order towards the pass of Biar, -and then gradually passing out Clinton’s and Roche’s divisions by the -right of the town, with a tedious pedantic movement, changed his own -front, keeping his left at the foot of the heights, and extending his -right, covered by the cavalry, towards another sierra called Onil: -General Mackenzie however, moving out by the left of Castalla with four -battalions and eight guns, followed the enemy without orders. - -Suchet had by this time plunged into the pass with his infantry, -cavalry and tumbrils, in one mass, leaving the rear-guard of three -battalions and eight guns to cover the passage; these being pressed -by Mackenzie and sharply cannonaded, turned and offered battle, -answering gun for gun; but they were heavily crushed by the English -shot, the clatter of musketry commenced, and one well-directed vigorous -charge would have overturned and driven them in mass upon the other -troops, then wedged in the narrow defile. Mackenzie was willing, but -his advance had been directed by the quartermaster-general Donkin, -not by Murray, and he was now compelled by the latter, despite of -all remonstrances and the indignant cries of the troops, to retreat! -Suchet, thus relieved from ruin by his adversary, immediately occupied -a position across the defile, having his flanks on the ridges above; -and though Murray finally sent some light companies to attack his left -he retained his position until night. - -This battle, in which the allies had about seventeen thousand men of -all arms, the French about fifteen thousand, was, Suchet says, brought -on against his wish by the impetuosity of his light troops, and that he -lost only eight hundred men. His statement is confirmed by Vacani the -Italian historian. Murray affirmed that it was a pitched battle, and -that the French lost above three thousand men. In favour of Suchet’s -version it may be remarked, that neither the place, nor the time, nor -the mode of attack was answerable to his talents and experience in -war, if he had really intended a pitched battle; and though the fight -was strong at the principal point, it was scarcely possible to have -so many as three thousand killed and wounded. Eight hundred seems too -few, because the loss of the victorious troops, with all advantages of -ground, was more than six hundred. This however is certain; if Suchet -lost three thousand men, which would have been at least a fourth of -his infantry, he must have been so disabled, that what with the narrow -defile of Biar in the rear, and the distance of his cavalry in the -plain, to have escaped at all was extremely discreditable to Murray’s -generalship. - - -ENGLISH SIEGE OF TARRAGONA. (June, 1813.) - -It has been shown that Lord Wellington put every armed body of the -Peninsula in movement against the French when he commenced the march to -Vittoria; and under his combinations the Duke del Parque should have -joined Elio from Andalusia, before the battle of Castalla, which would -have raised the allied forces there to fifty thousand men, including -the irregulars. Del Parque with the usual Spanish procrastination -delayed his arrival until the end of May; and then Murray had to -execute his part of the following plan, sketched by Wellington to -hamper Suchet and prevent him from moving to the king’s assistance. -The Spaniards, numerous but unwieldy, were to oppose that marshal in -front on the Xucar, while Murray with the Anglo-Sicilians was to embark -and sail for the siege of Tarragona in his rear: if he detached men to -raise the siege the Spaniards were to advance, and Murray was to return -and aid them to keep the country thus gained: if Suchet came back to -recover his ground this operation was to be repeated. - -On the 31st of May Murray, in pursuance of this arrangement, sailed -with fifteen thousand men under arms, his British and Germans being -about eight thousand, his cavalry seven hundred. His battering-train -was complete and powerful, the materials for gabions and fascines -were previously collected at Iviça, and the naval part, under Admiral -Hallowel, was strong in ships of the line, frigates, bomb-vessels, -gun-boats and transports. There was however no cordiality between -General Clinton, the second in command, and Murray; nor between the -latter and his quartermaster-general Donkin; nor between Donkin and -the admiral: subordinate officers also, adopting false notions, some -from vanity, some from hearsay, added to the uneasy state of the -leaders, and there was much tale-bearing. Neither admiral nor general -was very sanguine as to success, and in no quarter was there a clear -comprehension of Lord Wellington’s ably devised plan. - -When the fleet passed Valencia with a fair wind Suchet knew the -expedition aimed at Catalonia, and prepared to aid that principality, -but he could not march before the 7th of June. Murray’s armament -however, having very favourable weather, anchored on the evening of -the 2nd in the Bay of Tarragona, whence five ships of war were sent -with two battalions of infantry and some guns, under Colonel Prevost -to attack San Felippe de Balaguer, a fort garrisoned by a hundred men -and only sixty feet square. But it was on a steep isolated rock in -the gorge of a pass, blocking the only carriage-way from Tortoza to -Tarragona, and though the mountains on either hand commanded it, they -were nearly inaccessible themselves, and great labour was required to -form the batteries. - -Prevost, landing the 3rd, was joined by a Spanish brigade, and in -concert with the navy placed two six-pounders on the heights south -of the pass, from whence at seven hundred yards’ distance they threw -shrapnel-shells. Next day two twelve-pounders and a howitzer, brought -to the same point by the sailors, opened also, and at night the seamen -with extraordinary exertions dragged up five twenty-four pounders and -their stores. The troops then constructed their batteries with great -labour, for the earth was carried up from below, and everything else, -even water, brought from the ships, the landing-place being more than a -mile and a half off; wherefore, time being valuable, favourable terms -were offered to the garrison. They were refused and the fire continued, -yet with slight success, one battery was relinquished, and a violent -storm retarded the construction of the others. - -Colonel Prevost had early warned Murray that his means were -insufficient, and a second Spanish brigade was now sent to him; but, -so severe was the labour, that the breaching batteries were still -incomplete on the 6th, and out of three guns mounted one was disabled. -Suchet, who was making forced marches to Tortoza, ordered the governor -of that place to succour San Felippe, and he would certainly have -raised the siege, if Captain Peyton of the Thames frigate had not -brought up two eight-inch mortars, with which, on the 7th, he exploded -a small magazine, whereupon the garrison surrendered. The besiegers -then occupied the place, and meanwhile Murray had commenced the siege -of Tarragona. - -Bertoletti, an Italian, commanded the fortress and was supposed to be -disaffected, yet be proved himself a loyal and energetic officer. His -garrison, sixteen hundred strong, five hundred being privateer seamen -and Franco-Spaniards, served him well, and when Murray occupied the -Olivo and Loretto heights the first day, and the town was bombarded -in the night by the navy, the fire was returned so sharply that the -flotilla suffered most. Two batteries were then opened the 6th, but -were found too distant, and a third was commenced six hundred yards -from Fort Royal. The 8th a practicable breach was made in that outwork, -yet the assault was deferred, and some pieces removed to play from -the Olivo; whereupon the besieged, finding the fire slacken, repaired -the breach at Fort Royal and increased the defences. The subsequent -proceedings cannot be understood without reference to the relative -positions of the French and allied armies. - -Tarragona was situated on one of a cluster of rocks terminating a -range descending to the sea, but, with the exception of that range, -surrounded by an open country called the _Campo de Tarragona_, itself -environed by very rugged mountains, through which several roads descend -into the plain. - -Westward there were only two carriage-ways from Tortoza. One direct, -by the Col de Balaguer to Tarragona; the other circuitous, leading by -Mora, Falcet, Momblanch and Reus. The capture of San Felippe blocked -the first, the second was in bad order, and at best only available for -small mountain-guns. - -Northward there was a carriage-way leading from Lerida, which united -with that from Falcet at Momblanch. - -Eastward was the royal causeway from Barcelona, running through Villa -Franca and Torredembarra, and after passing Villa Franca sending two -branches to the right, one through the Col de Cristina, the other -through Col de Leibra. - -Between these various roads the mountains were too rugged to permit -cross communications; troops coming from different sides could only -unite in the Campo de Tarragona; where Murray, who had fifteen -thousand fighting men, and Copons, who had six thousand regulars and -the irregular division of Manso, could present twenty-five thousand -combatants. - -Copons indeed told Murray, that his troops could only fight in -position, and he would not join in any operation to endanger his -retreat into the mountains; but his force, the best in Spain, was now -at Reus and the Col de Balaguer, ready to harass and oppose any French -corps which should attempt to descend into the Campo. Murray could -also calculate upon seven or eight hundred seamen and marines to aid -him in the siege, or in a battle near the shore, and he expected three -thousand fresh troops from Sicily. Sir Edward Pellew, commanding the -great Mediterranean fleet, promised to distract the French by a descent -eastward of Barcelona, and a general rising of the Somatenes might have -been effected: those mountaineers were indeed all at his disposal, to -procure intelligence, to give timely notice of the French marches and -impede them by breaking up the roads. - -The French power was greater yet more scattered. On the west Suchet, -coming with nine thousand men from Valencia, was to be reinforced -by Pannetier’s brigade and some troops from Tortoza, up to eleven -or twelve thousand men with artillery; but the fall of San Felippe -de Balaguer barred his only carriage-way, and the road by Mora and -Momblanch, which remained open, was long and bad. On the eastern side -Maurice Mathieu could bring seven thousand men with artillery from -Barcelona; Decaen could move from the Ampurdam with an equal number, -and thus twenty-five thousand men in all might finally bear upon the -allied army. - -Suchet had more than a hundred and sixty miles to march, and Maurice -Mathieu was to collect his forces from various places, and march -seventy miles after Murray had disembarked; nor could he stir at -all until Tarragona was actually besieged, lest the allies should -reëmbark and attack Barcelona. Decaen had in like manner to look to -the security of the Ampurdam, and was one hundred and thirty miles -distant. Wherefore the English general could calculate upon ten days’ -clear operations after investment, before even the heads of the enemy’s -columns could issue from the hills bordering the Campo; and it was -possible that Suchet might endeavour to cripple the Spaniards in his -front at Valencia before he marched to the succour of Tarragona. -Eastward, and westward also, the royal causeway was in places exposed -to the fire of the naval squadron; and though the first siege of -Tarragona had shown that an army could not be there stopped by this -fire, it was an impediment not to be left out of the calculation. Thus, -a central position, possession of the enemy’s point of junction, the -initial movement, the good-will of the people, and the aid of powerful -flank diversions belonged to Murray: superior numbers and better -soldiers to the French, since the allies, brave and formidable to fight -in a position, were not well constituted for general operations. - -Tarragona, if the resources for an internal defence be disregarded, was -a weak place. A simple revetment three feet and a half thick, without -ditch or counterscarp, covered it on the west; the two outworks of Fort -Royal and San Carlos, slight obstacles at best, were not armed or even -repaired until after the investment; and the garrison, too weak for the -extent of rampart, was oppressed with labour. Here then, time being -precious to both sides, ordinary rule should have been set aside for -daring operations, and Murray’s troops were brave. They had been acting -together for nearly a year, and after the fight at Castalla became so -eager, that an Italian regiment, which at Alicant was ready to go over -bodily to the enemy, now volunteered to lead the assault on Fort Royal. -This confidence was not shared by their general: up to the 8th his -proceedings were ill-judged, and his after operations disgraceful to -the British army. - -False reports had made Suchet reach Tortoza on the 5th, and put two -thousand Frenchmen in motion from Lerida, whereupon Murray avowed -alarm and regret at having left Alicant; yet he constructed heavy -counter-batteries near the Olivo, sent a detachment to Valls on the -Lerida road, and placed Manso on that of Barcelona. - -On the 9th the emissaries said the French were coming from the east and -from the west, and would, when united, exceed twenty thousand. Murray -sought an interview with the admiral, and declared his intention to -raise the siege, and though his views changed during the conference, he -was discontented, and the two commanders were evidently at variance, -for Hallowel would not join in a summons to the governor, and again -bombarded the place. - -On the 10th spies in Barcelona gave notice that ten thousand French -with fourteen guns would march from that city next day, whereupon -Copons joined Manso; but Murray landed several mortars, armed the -batteries at the Olivo, and on the 11th opened their fire in concert -with the ships of war. Professing also a desire to fight the column -coming from Barcelona, he sent the cavalry under Lord Frederick -Bentinck to Altafalla, and pretending to seek a position of battle -to the eastward left orders to storm the outworks that night; he -returned however before the hour appointed, extremely disturbed by -intelligence that Maurice Mathieu was at Villa Franca with eight -thousand combatants, and Suchet closing on the Col de Balaguer. His -infirmity of mind was now apparent. At eight o’clock he repeated the -order to assault, and the storming party was awaiting the signal, -when a countermand arrived; the siege was then to be raised and the -guns removed immediately from the Olivo; the commandant of artillery -remonstrated, and the general promised to hold the batteries until next -night, but meanwhile called in the detachment at Valls and the cavalry, -without any notice to Copons, though he depended on their support. - -All the artillery stores and the heavy guns of the batteries on the -low ground, were removed to the beach for embarkation on the morning -of the 12th, and at twelve o’clock Lord Frederick Bentinck arrived -with the cavalry: it is said he was ordered to shoot his horses, but -refused to obey and moved towards the Col de Balaguer. The detachment -from Valls arrived next, the infantry marched to Cape Salou to embark, -the horsemen followed Lord Frederick, and were themselves followed by -fourteen pieces of artillery; yet each body moved independently, and -all was confused, incoherent, afflicting, and dishonourable. - -When the seamen were embarking the guns, orders were sent to abandon -that business and collect boats for the reception of troops, the enemy -being supposed close at hand; and notwithstanding Murray’s previous -promise to hold the Olivo he now directed the artillery officer to -spike the guns and burn the carriages. Then loud murmurs arose, army -and navy were alike indignant, and so excited, that it is said personal -insult was offered to the general. Three staff-officers repaired in -a body to his quarters to offer plans and opinions, and the admiral, -who did not object to raising the siege but to the manner of doing -it, would not suffer the seamen to discontinue the embarkation of -artillery; he however urged an attack upon the column coming from -Barcelona, and opposed the order to spike the guns at the Olivo, -offering to be responsible for carrying all clear off during the night. - -Murray again wavered. Denying he had ordered the battering-pieces to -be spiked, he sent counter-orders, and directed a part of Clinton’s -troops to advance towards the Gaya river; yet a few hours afterwards he -peremptorily renewed the order to destroy the guns. Even this unhappy -action was not performed without confusion. General Clinton, forgetful -of his own arrangements, with an obsolete courtesy took off his hat to -salute an enemy’s battery which had fired upon him, forgetting that -this action from that particular spot was the conventional signal for -the artillery to spike the guns: they were thus spiked prematurely. All -the troops were embarked in the night of the 12th, and many stores and -horses on the 13th, without interruption from the enemy; but nineteen -battering-pieces, whose carriages had been burnt, were, in view of the -fleet and army, carried in triumph, with all the platforms, fascines, -gabions, and small ammunition, into the fortress! Murray, seemingly -unaffected by this misfortune, shipped himself on the evening of the -12th and took his usual repose in bed! - -During these proceedings, the French, unable to surmount the obstacles -opposed to their junction, unable even to communicate by their -emissaries, were despairing of the safety of Tarragona. Suchet did -not reach Tortoza before the 10th, but a detachment from the garrison -had on the 8th attempted to succour San Felippe, and nearly captured -the naval Captain Adam, Colonel Prevost, and other officers, who were -examining the country. On the other side Maurice Mathieu reached -Villa Franca the 10th, announcing that Decaen was close behind with -a powerful force; he drove Copons from Arbos the 11th, and sent his -scouting parties into Vendrills, as if he was resolved singly to -attack Murray. Sir Edward Pellew had however landed his marines at -Rosas, which arrested Decaen’s march; and Maurice Mathieu, alarmed -at the cessation of fire about Tarragona, knowing nothing of Suchet’s -movements and too weak to fight the allies alone, fell back in the -night of the 12th to the Llobregat. - -Suchet’s operations to the westward were even less decisive. His -advanced guard under Panettier reached Perillo the 10th. Next day, -hearing nothing from his spies, he caused Panettier to pass by his left -over the mountains to some heights terminating abruptly on the Campo; -on the 12th therefore that officer was but twenty-five miles from -Tarragona, and a patrol, descending into the plains, met Lord Frederick -Bentinck’s troopers, and reported that Murray’s whole army was at hand: -Panettier would not then enter the Campo, but at night kindled large -fires to encourage the garrison. These signals were unobserved, the -country people had disappeared, no intelligence could be procured, -and Suchet could not follow him with a large force in those wild -hills, where there was no water. Thus on both sides of Tarragona the -succouring armies were quite baffled at the moment chosen by Murray for -flight. - -Suchet now received alarming intelligence from Valencia, yet still -anxious for Tarragona, pushed towards Felippe de Balaguer on the 14th, -thinking to find Prevost’s division alone; but the head of his column -was suddenly cannonaded by the Thames frigate, and he found the British -fleet anchored off San Felippe and disembarking troops. Murray’s -operations were indeed as irregular as those of a partizan, yet without -partizan vigour. He had heard in the night of the 12th of Panettier’s -march, and to protect the cavalry and guns under Lord Frederick, sent -Mackenzie’s division by sea to Balaguer on the 13th, following with the -whole army on the 14th. Mackenzie drove back the French posts at both -sides of the pass, the embarkation of the cavalry and artillery then -commenced, and Suchet, still uncertain if Tarragona had fallen, marched -to bring off Panettier. - -At this moment Murray heard that Maurice Mathieu’s column, which he -always erroneously supposed to be under Decaen, had retired to the -Llobregat, that Copons was again at Reus, and Tarragona had not been -reinforced. Elated by this information, he revolved various projects -in his mind, at one time thinking to fall upon Suchet, at another to -cut off Panettier; now resolving to march upon Cambrills, and even to -menace Tarragona again by land; then he was for sending a detachment -by sea to surprise the latter, yet finally disembarked the army on the -15th, and being ignorant of Suchet’s last movement decided to strike -at Panettier. With that object, he detached Mackenzie by a rugged -valley against Valdillos, which he reached on the 16th; but Suchet had -then carried off Panettier’s brigade, and next day the detachment was -recalled by Murray, who now only thought of re-embarking. - -This determination was caused by a fresh alarm from the eastward. -Maurice Mathieu, hearing the siege was raised, and the allies had -re-landed at the Col de Balaguer, retraced his steps and boldly entered -Cambrills the 17th, on which day, Mackenzie having returned, Murray’s -whole army was concentrated in the pass. Suchet was then behind -Perillo, and as Copons was at Reus, by Murray’s desire, to attack -Maurice Mathieu, the latter was in danger, if the English general -had been capable of a vigorous stroke. On the other hand Suchet, -too anxious for Valencia, had disregarded Mackenzie’s movement on -Valdillos, and taught by the disembarkation of the army at San Felippe -that the fate of Tarragona, for good or evil, was decided, had on the -16th retired to Perillo and Amposta, attentive only to the movement of -the fleet. - -Meanwhile Maurice Mathieu endeavoured to surprise Copons, who was led -into this danger by Murray; for having desired him to harass the French -general’s rear with a view to a general attack, he changed his plan -without giving the Spaniard notice. However he escaped, and Murray was -free to embark or remain at Col de Balaguer. He called a council of -war, and it was concluded to re-embark; but at that moment the great -Mediterranean fleet appeared in the offing, and Admiral Hallowel, -observing the signal announcing Lord William Bentinck’s arrival, -answered with more promptitude than decorum, “_we are all delighted_.” -Thus ended an operation perhaps the most disgraceful that ever befel -the British arms. - -Murray’s misconduct deeply affected Lord Wellington’s operations. The -English battering train being taken, Suchet had nothing to fear for -Catalonia, which was full of fortresses, and he could therefore move -by Zaragoza to disturb the siege of Pampeluna, which was consequently -relinquished for a blockade, and the siege of San Sebastian undertaken. -This involved the adoption of an immense line of covering positions -along the Pyrenees from Roncesvalles to the Bidassoa, and along the -left hank of that river to the sea; and the siege, itself a difficult -one, was rendered more so by the culpable negligence of the English -naval administration. - -Passages, the only port near the scene of operations suited for the -supply of the army, being between the covering and besieging forces, -the stores and guns once landed were in danger from every movement of -the enemy; and no permanent magazines could therefore be established -nearer than Bilbao, at which port and at St. Ander and Coruña the -great depôts of the army were fixed; the stores being transported to -them from the establishments in Portugal. But the French held Santoña, -whence their privateers interrupted the communication along the coast -of Spain; American privateers did the same between Lisbon and Coruña; -and the intercourse between Sebastian and the ports of France was -scarcely molested by the English vessels of war: because Wellington’s -urgent remonstrances could not procure a sufficient naval force on the -coast of Biscay! - - -SIEGE OF SAN SEBASTIAN. (June, 1813.) - -Built on a low sandy isthmus, having the harbour on one side, the river -Urumea on the other, Sebastian was strong; and behind it rose the Monte -Orgullo, a rugged cone four hundred feet high, washed by the ocean and -crowned with the small castle of La Mota. This hill was cut off from -the town by a line of defensive works, and covered with batteries; but -was itself commanded at a distance of thirteen hundred yards by the -Monte Olia, on the other side of the Urumea. - -The land front of the town, three hundred and fifty yards wide, -stretching quite across the isthmus, consisted of a high curtain or -rampart, very solid, with half bastions at either end and a lofty -casemated flat bastion or cavalier in the centre. A regular horn-work -was pushed out from this front, and six hundred yards beyond the -horn-work the isthmus was closed by the ridge of San Bartolomeo, at the -foot of which stood the suburb of San Martin. - -On the opposite side of the Urumea were certain sandy hills called the -_Chofres_, through which the road from Passages passed to a wooden -bridge over the river, and thence, by a suburb called Santa Catalina, -along the top of a sea-wall which formed a _fausse-braye_ for the -horn-work. - -The flanks of the town were protected by simple ramparts, washed on one -side by the water of the harbour, on the other by the Urumea, which -at high tide covered four of the twenty-seven feet comprised in its -elevation. This was the weak side of the fortress, though protected -by the river; for it had only a single wall, which was ill-flanked by -two old towers and a half-bastion called San Elmo, close under the -Monte Orgullo. There was no ditch, no counterscarp, no glacis; the -wall could be seen to its base from the Chofre hills, at distances -varying from five hundred to a thousand yards; and when the tide was -out the Urumea left a dry strand under the rampart as far as St. Elmo. -However the guns from the batteries at Monte Orgullo, especially that -called the Mirador, could rake this strand. The other flank of the -town was secured by the harbour, in the mouth of which was a rocky -island, called Santa Clara, where the French had established a post of -twenty-five men. - -Previous to the battle of Vittoria Sebastian was nearly dismantled; -there were no bomb-proofs, no palisades, no outworks; the wells were -foul, the place only supplied with water by an aqueduct. Joseph’s -defeat restored its importance as a fortress. General Emanuel Bey -entered it the 22nd of June, bringing with him the convoy which had -quitted Vittoria the day before the battle. The town was thus filled -with emigrant Spanish families, and the ministers and other persons -attached to the court; the population, ordinarily eight thousand, -was increased to sixteen thousand, and disorder and confusion were -predominant. Rey, pushed by necessity, forced all persons not residents -to march at once to France; the people of quality went by sea, the -others by land, and fortunately without being attacked, for the -Partidas would have given them no quarter. - -On the 27th Foy threw a reinforcement into the place, and next day -Mendizabal’s Spaniards appeared; whereupon Rey burned the wooden bridge -with both the suburbs, and commenced fortifying the heights of San -Bartolomeo. - -The 29th the Spaniards having slightly attacked San Bartolomeo were -repulsed. - -The 1st of July the governor of Gueteria abandoned that place, and -his troops, three hundred, entered San Sebastian; at the same time a -vessel from St. Jean de Luz arrived with fifty-six cannoniers and some -workmen. The garrison was thus increased to three thousand men, and all -persons not able to provide subsistence for themselves were ordered -away: meanwhile Mendizabal cut off the aqueduct. - -On the 3rd an English frigate and sloop with some small craft arrived -to blockade the harbour, but French vessels from St. Jean de Luz -continued to enter by night. - -On the 4th Rey sallied to obtain news, and after some hours’ -skirmishing returned with prisoners. - -The 6th, French vessels with a detachment of troops and a considerable -convoy of provisions from St. Jean de Luz entered the harbour. - -The 7th Mendizabal tried, unsuccessfully, to set fire to the convent of -San Bartolomeo. - -The 9th Graham arrived with British and Portuguese troops, and on the -13th the Spaniards marched away. - -At this time Reille was at Vera and Echallar, in a menacing position, -but Wellington drove him thence on the 15th and established the seventh -and light divisions there; thus covering the passes over the Peña de -Haya mountain, by which the siege might have been interrupted. - -Before Graham arrived the French had constructed a redoubt on San -Bartolomeo, connecting it with the convent of that name, which they -also fortified. These outworks were supported by posts in the ruined -houses of the San Martin suburb, and by a circular redoubt, formed of -casks, on the main road, half-way between the convent and horn-work. -Hence, working along the isthmus, it was necessary to carry in -succession three lines covering the town, and a fourth behind it, at -the foot of Monte Orgullo, before the castle of La Mota could be -assailed: seventy-six pieces were mounted on the walls. - -The besieging army consisted of the fifth division under General -Oswald, and the Portuguese brigades of J. Wilson and Bradford, -reinforced by detachments from the first division. Including the -artillery-men, some seamen commanded by Lieutenant O’Reilly of the -Surveillante, and one hundred regular sappers and miners, now for the -first time used in the sieges of the Peninsula, nearly ten thousand men -were employed, with forty pieces of artillery. The siege depôt was at -Passages, from whence to the Chofre sand-hills was only one mile and a -half of good road, and a pontoon bridge was laid over the Urumea river -above the Chofres; but from thence to the height of Bartolomeo was more -than five miles of very bad road. - -Early in July, Major Smith, the engineer of Tarifa, proposed a plan -of siege, founded upon the facility furnished by the Chofre hills to -destroy the flanks, rake the principal front, and form a breach with -the same batteries; the works would, he observed, be secured, except at -low water, by the Urumea, and counter-batteries could be constructed -on the left of that river, to rake the line in which the breach was to -be formed. Against the castle and its out-works he relied principally -upon vertical fire, instancing the reduction of Fort Bourbon in the -West Indies as proof of its efficacy. This plan would probably have -reduced Sebastian in a reasonable time without any remarkable loss of -men, and Lord Wellington approved of it, though he erroneously doubted -the efficacy of the vertical fire. He renewed his approval after -examining the works in person, and all his orders were in that spirit; -but neither the plan nor his orders were followed, and the siege -which should have been an ordinary event of war obtained a mournful -celebrity. Wellington has been unjustly charged with a contempt for the -maxims of the great masters of the art in his desire to save time: he -did not urge the engineer here beyond the rules. _Take the place in the -quickest manner, but do not from over speed fail to take it_, was the -sense of his instructions. The haste was with Graham, one of England’s -best soldiers, but of a genius intuitive rather than reflective, which, -joined to great natural modesty and a certain easiness of temper, -caused him at times to abandon his own correct conceptions for less -judicious counsels of men who advised deviations from the original plan. - -In the night of the 10th two batteries were raised against the convent -and redoubt of San Bartolomeo; and in that of the 13th, four batteries, -to contain twenty of the heaviest guns and four eight-inch howitzers, -were marked out on the Chofre sand-hills, at distances varying from -six hundred to thirteen hundred yards from the eastern rampart of the -town. No parallel of support was made, because the river was supposed -unfordable, but good trenches of communications and subsequently -regular approaches were formed. Two attacks were thus established--one -on the right bank of the Urumea by the Portuguese brigades; one on the -left bank by the fifth division: yet most of the troops were encamped -on the right bank to facilitate a junction with the covering army in -the event of a general battle. - -On the 14th a French sloop entered the harbour with supplies, and the -batteries of the left attack opened against San Bartolomeo, throwing -hot shot into the convent. The besieged responded with musketry from -the redoubt, with heavy guns from the town, and with a field-piece -which they had mounted on the belfry of the convent itself. - -The 15th Colonel Fletcher took command of the engineers, but Major -Smith retained the direction of the attack from the Chofre hills, and -Wellington’s orders continued to pass through his hands. This day, the -convent being set on fire, the musketry of the besieged silenced, and -the defences damaged, the Portuguese troops of the fifth division felt -the enemy, but were repulsed with loss: the French then sallied, and -the firing only ceased at nightfall. - -A battery for seven additional guns was now commenced against -Bartolomeo on the right of the Urumea, and the original batteries -again set fire to the convent, yet the flames were extinguished by the -garrison. - -In the night of the 16th Rey sounded the Urumea, designing to cross -and storm the batteries on the Chofres; but the fords discovered were -shifting, and the difficulty of execution deterred him. - -The 17th, the convent being nearly in ruins, an assault was ordered. -Detachments from Wilson’s Portuguese, supported by the light company -of the 9th British Regiment and three companies of the Royals, composed -one column, which under General Hay was to storm the redoubt; another -column under General Bradford, composed of Portuguese, but supported -by three companies of the 9th British Regiment under Colonel Cameron, -assailed the convent. - - -STORMING OF SAN BARTOLOMEO. (July, 1813.) - -At ten o’clock in the morning two six-pounders opened against the -redoubt, and the French, reinforced and occupying the suburb of -San Martin in support, announced with a sharp return of fire their -resolution to fight. The Portuguese advanced slowly at both attacks, -and the companies of the 9th, passing through them, first fell upon -the enemy. Cameron’s grenadiers going down the face of the hill were -exposed to a heavy cannonade from the horn-work, yet soon gained the -cover of a wall, fifty yards from the convent, and there awaited the -second signal. This rapid advance, which threatened to cut off the -garrison from the suburb, joined to the fire of the two six-pounders, -and some other field-pieces on the farther side of the Urumea, caused -the French to abandon the redoubt, whereupon Cameron jumped over the -wall and assaulted both the convent and the houses of the suburb. At -the latter a fierce struggle ensued, and Captain Woodman was killed -in the upper room of a house, after fighting his way from below; yet -the grenadiers carried the convent with such rapidity that the French -could not explode some small mines, and hastily joined the troops -in the suburb: there the combat continued, Cameron’s force was much -reduced and the affair was becoming doubtful, when the remainder of his -regiment arrived and the suburb was with much fighting entirely won. - -At the right attack the company of the 9th, although retarded by a -ravine, by a thick hedge, by the slowness of the Portuguese, and by a -heavy fire, entered the abandoned redoubt with little loss; but the -troops were then rashly led against the cask redoubt, contrary to -orders, and were beaten back by the enemy. The loss was thus balanced. -That of the French was two hundred and forty, and the companies of the -9th under Cameron, alone, had seven officers and sixty men killed or -wounded. The operation, although successful, was an error; for the -seven-gun battery on the right of the Urumea was not opened, wherefore -the assault was precipitate or the battery was not necessary, but the -loss justified the conception of the battery. When the action ceased -the engineers made a lodgement in the redoubt, and commenced two -batteries to rake the horn-work and the eastern rampart of the place. -Two other batteries were also commenced on the right bank of the Urumea. - -The 18th the besieged threw up traverses on the land front to meet the -raking fire of the besiegers; and the latter dragged four pieces up -the Monte Olia to plunge into the Mirador and other works on the Monte -Orgullo. In the night a lodgement was made on the ruins of San Martin, -the two batteries at the right attack were armed, and two additional -mortars dragged up the Monte Olia. - -On the 19th all these batteries were armed, and in the night the French -were driven from the cask redoubt. - -All the batteries opened fire the 20th, and were principally directed -to form the breach. - -Smith’s plan was similar to that followed by Marshal Berwick a century -before. He proposed a lodgement on the horn-work before the breach -should be assailed; but he had not then read the description of that -siege, and unknowingly fixed the breaching-point precisely where the -wall had been most strongly rebuilt after Berwick’s attack. This was a -fault, yet a slight one, because the wall did not resist the batteries -very long; but it was a serious matter that Graham, at the suggestion -of the commander of the artillery, began his operations by breaching. -Smith objected to it, Fletcher acquiesced very reluctantly, on the -understanding that the ruin of the defences was only postponed, a -condition afterwards unhappily forgotten. - -This first attack was not satisfactory, the weather proved bad, some -guns mounted on ship-carriages failed, one twenty-four-pounder was -rendered unserviceable by the enemy, another by accident, a captain of -engineers was killed, and the shot had little effect on the solid wall. -In the night however, the ship-guns were mounted on better carriages, -and a parallel across the isthmus was projected; but the greatest part -of the workmen, to avoid a tempest, sought shelter in the suburb of -San Martin, and when day broke only one-third of the work was performed. - -On the 21st the besiegers sent a summons, the governor refused to -receive the letter, the firing was renewed, and though the main wall -resisted the parapets crumbled; the batteries on Monte Olia also -plunged into the horn-work at sixteen hundred yards’ distance, with -such effect that the besieged, having no bomb-proofs, were forced to -dig trenches to protect themselves. The French fire, directed solely -against the breaching batteries, was feeble, but at midnight a shell -thrown from the castle into the bay gave the signal for a sally, during -which French vessels with supplies entered the harbour. The besieged -now isolated the breach by cuts in the rampart and other defences, yet -the besiegers’ parallel across the isthmus was completed, and in its -progress laid bare the mouth of a drain four feet high and three feet -wide, containing the pipe of the aqueduct cut off by the Spaniards. -Through that dangerous opening Lieutenant Reid,[30] a young and zealous -engineer, crept even to the counterscarp of the horn-work, where he -found the passage closed and returned. Thirty barrels of powder were -placed in this drain, and eight feet was stopped with sand-bags, -forming a globe of compression to blow, as through a tube, so much -rubbish over the counterscarp as might fill the narrow ditch of the -horn-work. - -On the 22nd the fire from the batteries, unexampled from its rapidity -and accuracy, opened what appeared a practicable breach in the eastern -flank wall, between two towers called Los Hornos and Las Mesquitas; but -the descent into the town behind this breach was more than twelve feet -perpendicular, and the garrison were seen from Monte Olia diligently -working at the interior defences to receive the assault: they added -also another gun to the battery of St. Elmo, just under the Mirador -battery, to flank the front attack. On the other hand the besiegers -had placed four sixty-eight pound carronades in battery to play on the -defences of the breach, yet the fire was slack because the guns were -now greatly enlarged at the vents. - -On the 23rd, the sea blockade being null, the French vessels carried -off the badly-wounded men. This day also the besiegers, judging -the breach between the towers practicable, turned the guns, at the -suggestion of General Oswald, to break the wall on the right of the -main breach. Smith opposed this, urging, that no advantage would be -gained by making a second opening, to get at which the troops must -first pass the great breach; time would be thus lost, and there was a -manifest objection on account of the tide and depth of water at the new -point attacked. His counsel was overruled, and in the course of the -day, the wall being thin, the stroke heavy and quick, a second breach -thirty feet wide was rendered practicable. - -The ten-inch mortars and sixty-eight-pound carronades were now turned -upon the great breach, and a stockade, the latter separating the -high curtain from the flank against which the attack was conducted. -Under this fire the houses near the breach were soon in flames, which -destroyed several defences and menaced the whole town with destruction, -wherefore the assault was ordered for next morning: when the troops -assembled the flames were still so fierce the attack was deferred, and -the batteries again opened. - -During the night the vigilant governor mounted two field-pieces on the -cavalier, fifteen feet above the other defences and commanding the -high curtain; and he still had on the horn-work a light piece, and two -casemated guns on the flank of the cavalier. Two other field-pieces -were mounted on an intrenchment, crossing the ditch of the land front -and bearing on the approaches; a twenty-four pounder looked from the -tower of Las Mesquitas, flanking the main breach; two four-pounders -were in the tower of Hornos; two heavy guns on the flank of St. Elmo, -and two others, on the right of the Mirador, looked on the breaches -from within the fortified line of Monte Orgullo. Thus fourteen pieces -were still available for defence, and the retaining sea-wall, or -_fausse-braye_, between which and the river the storming parties must -necessarily advance, was covered with live shells to roll over on the -columns below. Behind the burning houses other edifices were loopholed -and filled with musketeers; but as the flames forced the French to -withdraw their guns until the moment of attack, and the British -artillery officers were confident that in daylight they could silence -the enemy’s fire and keep the parapet clear of men, Graham renewed his -order for the assault. - - -FIRST STORM OF SAN SEBASTIAN. (July, 1813.) - -In the night of the 24th two thousand men of the fifth division filed -into the trenches on the isthmus. Of this force, a battalion of the -Royals, under Major Frazer, was destined for the great breach; the 38th -Regiment under Colonel Greville, was to assail the lesser and most -distant breach; the 9th Regiment under Colonel Cameron, was to support -the Royals. A detachment selected from the light companies of all those -battalions was placed in the centre of the Royals, under Lieutenant -Campbell[31] of the 9th Regiment, who was accompanied by the engineer -Machel with a ladder party, being designed to sweep the high curtain -after the breach should be won. - -From the trenches to the points of attack was three hundred yards, -the way being between the horn-work and the river, strewed with rocks -slippery from sea-weed; the tide also had left large deep pools of -water; the parapet of the horn-work was entire, the parapets of -the other works and the two towers, closely flanking the breach, -were far from being ruined, and every place was thickly garnished -with musketeers. The difficulties were obvious, and a detachment of -Portuguese was placed in a trench on the isthmus, only sixty yards from -the ramparts, to quell, if possible, the fire of the horn-work. - -It was still dark when the stormers moved out of the trenches, and -when the globe of compression in the drain was exploded against the -horn-work the astonished garrison abandoned the flanking parapet; the -troops then rushed onwards, the stormers for the main breach leading, -and suffering more from the fire of their own batteries on the right -of the Urumea than from the enemy. Frazer and the engineer Harry Jones -first reached the breach, the enemy had fallen back behind the ruins -of the burning houses, and those brave officers rushed up expecting -their troops would follow; but not many followed, for it was extremely -dark, the narrow way and the rocks had contracted the front and -disordered the column, and the soldiers came straggling and out of wind -to the foot of the breach. The foremost gathered near their gallant -leaders, yet the deep descent into the town and volumes of flames -and smoke still issuing from the houses awed the stoutest; more than -two-thirds, irritated by the destructive flank fire, had broken off at -the demi-bastion to commence a musketry battle with the enemy lining -the rampart on their left, and the shells from Monte Orgullo fell -rapidly. Then the French at the breach, recovering confidence, with a -smashing musketry from the ruins and loopholed houses smote the head of -the column, while those in the towers smote it on the flanks; and from -every quarter came showers of grape and hand-grenades tearing the ranks -in a dreadful manner. - -Frazer was killed on the flaming ruins, the intrepid Jones stood there -awhile longer amidst a few heroic soldiers, hoping for aid, but none -came and he and those with him were struck down; the engineer Machel -had been killed early, his ladder-bearers fell or were dispersed, -and the rear of the column had got disordered before the head was -beaten. It was in vain Greville, Cameron, Captain Archimbeau, and -other regimental officers, strove to rally their men and refill the -breach; in vain Campbell, breaking through the tumultuous crowd with -the survivors of his chosen detachment, mounted the ruins; twice he -ascended, twice he was wounded, and all around him died. Then the -Royals endeavoured to retire, but got intermixed with the 38th and some -companies of the 9th, which were seeking to pass them and get to the -lesser breach; and thus swayed by different impulses, pent up between -the horn-work and the river, the mass, reeling to and fro, could -neither advance nor go back until the shells and musketry, constantly -plied in front and flank, thinned the concourse and the trenches were -regained in confusion. At daylight a truce was agreed to for an hour, -during which the French, who had removed Jones and other wounded men -from the breach, carried off the more distant sufferers, lest they -should be drowned by the rising of the tide. - -Five officers of engineers, including Sir Richard Fletcher, and -forty-four officers of the line with five hundred and twenty men, were -killed, wounded, or made prisoners in this assault, the failure of -which was signal, yet the causes were obvious. - -1°. Lord Wellington, on the 22nd, had given final directions for -the attack, finishing thus: “_Fair daylight must be taken for the -assault._” These instructions and their emphatic termination were -unheeded. - -2°. Major Smith had ascertained that the ebb tide would serve exactly -at daybreak on the 24th, but the assault was made the 25th, and before -daylight, when the higher water contracted the ground, increased the -obstacles, and forced the column, with a narrow front and uneasy -progress, to trickle onwards instead of dashing with a broad surge -against the breach. - -3°. The troops filed tediously out of long narrow trenches in the -night, and were immediately exposed to a fire of grape from their own -batteries on the Chofres; this fire should have ceased when the globe -of compression was sprung in the drain, but from the darkness and noise -that explosion was neither seen nor heard. - -4°. There was a neglect of moral influence, followed by its natural -consequence, want of vigour in execution. No general went out of the -trenches. Oswald had opposed the plan of attack, and his opinion, -in which other officers of rank joined, was freely expressed out of -council, it was said even in the hearing of the troops, abating that -daring confidence which victory loves. - -Wellington repaired immediately to St. Sebastian and would have renewed -the attack, but there was no ammunition, and next day extraneous events -compelled him to turn the siege into a blockade. The battering train -was then sent to Passages, and at daybreak the garrison sallied and -swept off two hundred Portuguese with thirty British soldiers. This -terminated the first siege of San Sebastian, in which the allies lost -thirteen hundred men. - - - - -BOOK XI. - - Pyrenees--Combat of Roncesvalles--Combat of Linzoain--Combat of - Maya--Combat of Zabaldica--First Battle of Sauroren--Combat of - Buenza--Second Battle of Sauroren--Combat of Doña Maria--Combats - of Echallar and Ivantelly. - - -The battle of Vittoria was fought the 21st of June, and on the 1st of -July Marshal Soult, under a decree issued at Dresden, succeeded Joseph -as lieutenant to the emperor. - -The 12th, travelling with surprising expedition, that marshal assumed -command of the French troops, now reorganized in one body, called _the -army of Spain_, and he had secret orders to put Joseph forcibly aside -if necessary, but that monarch voluntarily retired.[32] - -Reinforced from the interior, Soult’s army was composed of nine -divisions of infantry, a reserve and two regular divisions of cavalry, -besides light horsemen attached to the infantry. Including garrisons, -and thirteen German, Italian, and Spanish battalions not belonging -to the organization, he had one hundred and fourteen thousand men: -and as the armies of Catalonia and Aragon numbered at the same period -above sixty-six thousand, the whole force still employed against Spain -exceeded one hundred and eighty thousand men, with twenty thousand -horses. - -Soult was one of the few men whose energy rendered them worthy -lieutenants of the emperor, and with singular zeal and ability he -now served. Nominally he had ninety-seven thousand men under arms, -with eighty-six pieces of artillery; but the foreign battalions, most -of which were to return to their own countries for the disciplining -of new levies, only counted as part of the garrisons of Pampeluna, -San Sebastian, Santoña and Bayonne: they amounted to seventeen -thousand, and the permanent _army of Spain_ furnished therefore, only -seventy-seven thousand five hundred men under arms, seven thousand -being cavalry. Its condition was not satisfactory. The military -administration was disorganized, the soldiers were discouraged by -disaster, discipline had been deteriorated, and the people were flying -from the frontier. - -To secure his base and restore order ere he retook the offensive was -Soult’s desire; but Napoleon’s orders were imperative against delay, -and he was compelled to immediate action, though Wellington’s advance -from Portugal had been so rapid that the great resources of the French -frontier were not immediately available, and everything was reeling and -rocking in terror from the blow given to the army at Vittoria. - -Bayonne, a fortress of no great strength, had been entirely neglected. -But the arming and provisioning that and other places; the restoration -of an intrenched camp, originally traced by Vauban to cover Bayonne; -the enforcement of discipline; the removal of the immense train of -Joseph’s wasteful court; the establishment of a general system for -supplies, and judicious efforts to stimulate the civil authorities and -excite the national spirit, soon indicated the presence of a great -commander. The soldiers’ confidence then revived, and some leading -merchants of Bayonne zealously seconded the general: the people were -however more inclined to avoid burdens than to answer calls on their -patriotism. - -Soult examined the line of military positions on the 14th, and ordered -Reille, who then occupied the passes of Vera and Echallar, to prepare -pontoons for throwing two bridges over the Bidassoa at Biriatou; -Wellington, as before said, drove him from those passes next day, -yet he prepared his bridges, and by the 16th, Soult was ready for a -gigantic offensive movement. - -His army was divided into three corps of battle and a reserve. Clausel -with the left was at St. Jean Pied de Port, and in communication, by -the French frontier, with a division under General Paris at Jaca, -belonging to Suchet but under Soult’s orders. - -Drouet, Count D’Erlon, with the centre, occupied the heights near -Espelette and Ainhoa. - -Reille with the right wing was on the mountains overlooking Vera from -the side of France. - -The reserve, under Villatte, guarded the right bank of the Bidassoa -from the mouth to Irun, at which place the stone bridge was destroyed. -The heavy cavalry under Trielhard, and the light horsemen under Pierre -Soult, the marshal’s brother, were on the banks of the Nive and the -Adour. - -To oppose this force Wellington had in Navarre and Guipuscoa above a -hundred thousand men. Of these the Anglo-Portuguese furnished fifty -thousand infantry and seven thousand cavalry; the Spanish regulars -under Giron, Abispal, and Carlos España, about twenty-five thousand -infantry; the rest were irregular; and hence the troops in line were, -of the allies, eighty-two thousand, of the French seventy-eight -thousand. - -The theatre of operations was quadrilateral, with sides from forty -to sixty miles in length, having a fortress at each angle, namely, -Bayonne, San Jean Pied de Port, San Sebastian and Pampeluna, all in -possession of the French. The interior, broken and tormented by peaked -mountains, narrow craggy passes, deep watercourses, dreadful precipices -and forests, appeared a wilderness which no military combinations could -embrace. The great spinal ridge of the Pyrenees furnished a clue to the -labyrinth. Running diagonally across the quadrilateral, it entirely -separated Bayonne, St. Jean Pied de Port and San Sebastian from -Pampeluna, and the troops blockading the latter were thus cut off from -those besieging San Sebastian, the only direct communication between -them being a great road running behind the mountains from Tolosa, by -Irurzun, to Pampeluna. - -A secondary range of mountains on the French side of the Great Spine, -inclosing the valley of Bastan and lining that of the Bidassoa, -furnished positions for the centre and left of the covering armies, -with interior but difficult lateral communications. - -The troops covering Pampeluna were on the Great Spine of the Pyrenees. -Behind them were valleys into which the passes across the spine led, -descending at the other side in parallel lines, and giving to each -division means for a concentric retreat on Pampeluna. - -Wellington having his battering-train and stores about San Sebastian, -which was nearer and more accessible to the enemy than Pampeluna, made -his army lean towards that side. His left wing, including the army of -siege, was twenty-one thousand, with singularly strong positions of -defence; his centre, twenty-four thousand strong, could in two marches -unite with the left to cover the siege or fall upon the flanks of -an enemy advancing by the high road of Irun; but three days or more -were required by those troops to concentrate for the security of the -blockade of Pampeluna on the right. - -Soult thought no decisive result would attend a direct movement upon -San Sebastian, and by his seaboard intercourse he knew that place was -not in extremity; but he had no communication with Pampeluna, and -feared its fall. Wherefore he resolved rapidly to concentrate on his -left by means of the great French roads leading to St. Jean Pied de -Port, covering his movement by the Nivelle and Nive rivers, and by the -positions of his centre: thus he hoped to gather on Wellington’s right -quicker than that general could gather to oppose him, and, compensating -by numbers the disadvantage of assailing mountain positions, force a -way to Pampeluna. - -That fortress succoured, he designed to seize the road of Irurzun, -and either fall upon the separated divisions of the centre in detail -as they descended from the Great Spine, or operate on the rear of the -troops besieging San Sebastian, while a corps of observation, left on -the Lower Bidassoa, menaced it in front. The siege of San Sebastian and -the blockade of Pampeluna would be thus raised, the French army united -in an abundant country, and its communication with Suchet secured. - -To mislead Wellington by vexing his right, simultaneously with the -construction of the bridges against his left, Soult directed General -Paris to march from Jaca, when time suited, by the higher valleys -towards Sanguessa, to drive the partizans from that side, and join -the left of the army when it should have reached Pampeluna. Clausel -was directed to repair the roads in his own front, push the heads of -columns towards the Roncesvalles pass, and with a strong detachment -menace Hill’s flank by the lateral passes of the Bastan. - -On the 20th Reille’s troops on the heights of Sarre and Vera, being -cautiously relieved by Villatte, marched towards St. Jean Pied de Port, -which they were to reach early on the 22nd; and on that day the two -divisions of cavalry and parc of artillery were to concentrate at the -same place. D’Erlon, with the centre, was to hold his positions in -front of Hill while these great movements were taking place. - -Villatte, having fifteen thousand sabres and bayonets, remained in -observation on the Bidassoa. If threatened by superior forces he was -to retire upon the intrenched camp at Bayonne, halting successively on -certain positions. If only a small corps crossed the river, he was to -drive it vigorously back; and if the allies retired in consequence of -Soult’s operations, he was to relieve San Sebastian and follow them -briskly by Tolosa. - -Rapidity was of vital importance to the French marshal, but heavy -rains swelled the streams and ruined the roads in the deep country -between Bayonne and the mountains; the head-quarters which should have -arrived at St. Jean Pied de Port on the 20th, were a few miles short -of that place the 21st, and Reille’s troops were forced to go round by -Bayonne to gain the causeway. The cavalry was also retarded, and the -army, men and horses, worn down by severe marches. Two days were thus -lost, yet the 24th more than sixty thousand fighting men, including -cavalry, national guards, and _gens d’armes_, with sixty-six pieces of -artillery, were assembled to force the passes of Roncesvalles and Maya; -the former being in the Great Spine, the latter giving entrance to the -Bastan. The main road leading to Roncesvalles was repaired, and three -hundred sets of bullocks were provided to drag the guns; the national -guards of the frontier on the left, ordered to assemble in the night on -the heights of Yropil, were reinforced with regular troops to vex and -turn the right of the allies at the foundry of Orbaiceta. - -At St. Jean Pied de Port Soult was almost in contact with the allies -at the passes of the Roncesvalles, which were also the points of the -defence nearest to Pampeluna. He had thirty thousand bayonets, the -frontier national guards to aid, and his artillery and cavalry were -massed behind his infantry; for here the great road from St. Jean -Pied de Port to Pampeluna, the only one fit for cannon, entered the -mountains: but to understand his movements a short description of the -country is necessary, taking the point of departure from his camp. - -Before him was the Val Carlos, formed by two descending shoots from -the Great Spine of the Pyrenees. That on his left hand separated this -valley from the valley of Orbaiceta; that on his right hand separated -it from several conjoint valleys, known as the Alduides and Baygorry, -the latter name being given to the lower, the former to the upper parts. - -The great road to Pampeluna led up the left hand tongue by the -remarkable rocks of Château Pignon, near which narrow branches went -off to the village of San Carlos on the right, and to the foundry of -Orbaiceta on the left. The main line, after ascending to the summit of -the Great Spine, turned to the right and run along the crest until it -reached the pass of Ibañeta, where, turning to the left, it led down by -the famous Roncesvalles into the valley of Urros. - -A lateral continuation however run along the magistral crest, beyond -the Ibañeta, to another pass called the Mendichuri, which also led down -into the Val de Urros; and from Mendichuri there was a way into the -Alduides valley through a side pass called the Atalosti. - -On Soult’s right hand the Val Carlos was bounded by the ridge and rock -of Ayrola, from the summit of which there was a way directly to the -Mendichuri and the lateral pass of Atalosti; and the ground between -those defiles, called the Lindouz, was an accessible mountain knot, -tying all the valleys together and consequently commanding them. - -Continuing along the Great Spine, after passing the Atalosti, there -would be on the right hand, descending towards the French frontier, the -Val de Ayra, the Alduides and the Bastan. On the left hand, descending -to Pampeluna, would be the Val de Zubiri and the valley of Lanz, -separated from each other by a lofty wooded range. All these valleys -on each side were, in their order, connected by roads leading over -comparatively low portions of the Great Spine, called by the French -_cols_, or necks, by the Spaniards _puertos_, or doors. - -General Byng and Morillo, the first having sixteen hundred British -troops, the second four thousand Spaniards, were in position before -Soult. Byng, reinforced with two Spanish battalions, held the rocks of -Altobiscar, just above Château Pignon. On his right a Spanish battalion -was posted at the foundry of Orbaiceta; on his left Morillo’s remaining -Spaniards were near the village of Val Carlos on a minor height called -the Iroulepe. - -Behind the Great Spine, in the valley of Urros, General Cole held -the fourth division in support of Byng; but he was twelve miles off, -separated by the Ibañeta pass, and could not come up under four hours. -General Campbell, having a Portuguese division two thousand strong, -watched the Alduides; but he was eight miles off, and separated by the -lateral pass of Atalosti. General Picton, with the third division, -was at Olague in the valley of Lanz, on the Spanish side of the -Spine; and both he and Campbell could at pleasure gain the valley -of Zubiri--Picton by a cross communication, Campbell by the pass of -Urtiaga, which was directly in his rear; he could also join Cole in the -valley of Urros by the pass of Sahorgain. - -In this state of affairs Soult placed twelve thousand infantry within -two miles of the Château Pignon, against Byng, and directed the -national guards at Yropil, reinforced with regulars, to move into the -valley of Orbaiceta and turn the Spaniards at the foundry. A second -column, four thousand strong, was placed in the Val Carlos to assail -Morillo at Iroulepe. A third column of sixteen thousand, under Reille, -assembled, in the night, at the foot of the Ayrola rock, with orders -to ascend at daylight and move along the crest of the ridge to seize -the culminant Lindouz. From that point detachments were to be pushed -through the passes of Ibañeta, Mendichuri, and Sahorgain, into the -Roncesvalles, while others extended to the right as far as the pass of -Urtiaga, thus cutting off Byng and Morillo from Cole and Hamilton. - - -COMBAT OF RONCESVALLES. (July, 1813.) - -On the 23rd Soult issued an order of the day remarkable for its force -and frankness. Conscious of ability he avowed a feeling of his own -worth; but he was too proud to depreciate brave adversaries on the eve -of battle. - -“_Let us not_,” he said to his soldiers, “_defraud the enemy of the -praise which is due to him. The dispositions of the general have been -prompt, skilful, and consecutive, the valour and steadiness of his -troops have been praiseworthy._” - -On the 25th at daylight he led up against the rocks of Altobiscar. - -Byng, warned the evening before that danger was near, and jealous for -the village of Val Carlos, had sent the 57th Regiment down there, yet -kept his main body in hand and gave notice to Cole. - -Soult, throwing out a multitude of skirmishers, pushed forward his -supporting columns and guns as fast as the steepness of the road and -difficult nature of the ground would permit; but the British fought -strongly, the French fell fast among the rocks, and their musketry -pealed in vain for hours along that cloudy field of battle, five -thousand feet above the level of the plains. Their numbers however -continually increased in front, and the national guards from Yropil, -skirmishing with the Spaniards at the foundry of Orbaiceta, threatened -to turn the right. Val Carlos was at the same time menaced by the -central column, and Reille ascending the rock of Ayrola turned -Morillo’s left. - -At mid-day Cole arrived in person at Altobiscar, but his troops were -distant, and the French, renewing their attack, neglected the Val -Carlos to gather more thickly against Byng. He resisted their efforts, -yet Reille made progress along the summit of the Ayrola ridge, Morillo -fell back towards Ibañeta, and the French were nearer that pass than -Byng, when Ross’s brigade, of Cole’s division, coming up the Mendichuri -pass, appeared on the Lindouz at the instant when the head of Reille’s -column was closing on the Atalosti to cut the communication with -Campbell. This last-named officer had been early molested, according -to Soult’s plan, by the frontier guards of the Val de Baygorry, yet he -soon detected the feint and moved by his right towards Atalosti when he -heard the firing on that side. The Val d’Ayra separated him from the -ridge of Ayrola, along which Reille was advancing, yet, noting that -general’s strength and seeing Ross’s brigade labouring up the steep -ridge of Mendichuri, he judged its commander to be ignorant of what was -going on above, and, sending Cole notice of the enemy’s proximity and -strength, offered to pass the Atalosti and join battle, if he could be -furnished afterwards with provisions and transport for his sick. - -Before this message reached Cole, a wing of the 20th Regiment and a -company of Brunswickers, forming the head of Ross’s column, had gained -the Lindouz, where suddenly they encountered Reille’s advanced guard. -The moment was critical, and Ross, an eager hardy soldier, called -aloud to charge, whereupon Captain Tovey of the 20th run forward with -a company, and full against the 6th French Light Infantry dashed -with the bayonet. Brave men fell by that weapon on both sides, yet -numbers prevailed and Tovey’s soldiers were eventually pushed back. -Ross however gained his object, the remainder of his brigade had -time to come up and the pass of Atalosti was secured, with a loss of -one hundred and forty men of the 20th Regiment and forty-one of the -Brunswickers. - -Previous to this vigorous action, Cole, seeing the French in the Val -Carlos and the Orbaiceta valley, on both flanks of Byng, whose front -was not the less pressed, had reinforced the Spaniards at the foundry, -but now recalled his men to defend the Lindouz; and learning from -Campbell how strong Reille was, caused Byng, with a view to a final -retreat, to relinquish Altobiscar and approach Ibañeta. This movement -uncovered the road leading down to the foundry of Orbaiceta, yet it -concentrated all the troops; and Campbell, although he could not enter -the line, Cole being unable to meet his demands, made such skilful -dispositions as to impress Reille with a notion that his numbers were -considerable. - -During these operations the skirmishing never ceased, though a thick -fog, coming up the valley, stopped a general attack which Soult was -preparing; thus, when night fell Cole still held the Great Spine, -having lost three hundred and eighty men killed and wounded. His right -was however turned by Orbaiceta, he had only eleven thousand bayonets -to oppose thirty thousand, and his line of retreat, five miles down -hill and flanked by the Lindouz, was unfavourable; wherefore in the -dark, silently threading the passes, he gained the valley of Urros, -and his rear-guard followed in the morning. Campbell went off by -Urtiaga into the Zubiri valley, and the Spanish battalion retreated -from the foundry by a goat path. The great chain was thus abandoned, -yet the result of the day’s operation was unsatisfactory to Soult. He -had lost four hundred men, he had not gained ten miles, and was still -twenty-two miles from Pampeluna, with strong positions in the way, -where increasing numbers of intrepid enemies were to be expected. - -His combinations had been thwarted by fortune, and by errors of -execution which the most experienced generals know to be inevitable. -Fortune sent the fog at the moment he was thrusting forward his -heaviest masses; Reille failed in execution; for he was to have gained -the Lindouz with all speed, but previous to ascending the rock of -Ayrola lost time by reorganizing two newly arrived conscript battalions -and serving out provisions; the two hours thus employed would have -sufficed to seize the Lindouz before Ross got through the pass of -Mendichuri. The fog would still have stopped the spread of his column -to the extent designed by Soult, yet fifteen or sixteen thousand men -would have been placed on the flank and rear of Byng and Morillo. - -On the 26th Soult putting his left wing on Cole’s track, ordered Reille -to follow the crest of the mountains and seize the passes from the -Bastan in Hill’s rear, while D’Erlon pressed him in front. Hill would -thus, Soult hoped, be crushed or thrown off from Pampeluna, and D’Erlon -could thus reach the valley of Zubiri with his left, while his right, -descending the valley of Lanz, would hinder Picton from joining Cole. A -retreat by those generals, on separate lines, would then be inevitable, -and the French army could issue in a compact order of battle from the -mouths of the two valleys against Pampeluna. - - -COMBAT OF LINZOAIN. (July, 1813.) - -All the columns were in movement at daybreak, but every hour brought -its obstacle. The fog still hung heavy on the mountain-tops. Reille’s -guides were bewildered, refused to lead the troops along the crests, -and at ten o’clock, having no other resource, he marched down the -Mendichuri pass and fell into the rear of Soult’s column, the head of -which, though retarded also by the fog and rough ground, had overtaken -Cole’s rear-guard. The leading infantry struck hotly upon some British -light companies under Colonel Wilson, while a squadron, passing their -flank, fell on the rear; but Wilson, facing about, drove them off, -and thus fighting Cole reached the heights of Linzoain. There Picton -met him, with intelligence that Campbell had reached Eugui in the -Val de Zubiri, and that the third division, having crossed the woody -ridge, was also in that valley. The junction of all was thus secured, -the loss of the day was less than two hundred, and neither wounded -men nor baggage had been left behind; but at four o’clock the French -seized some heights which endangered Cole’s position, and he again -fell back a mile, offering battle at a puerto, in the ridge separating -the valley of Zubiri from that of Urros, which last, though descending -on a parallel line, did not open on Pampeluna. During this skirmish, -Campbell, coming from Eugui, showed his Portuguese on the ridge above -the French right flank; he was however distant, Picton’s troops were -still further off, and there was light for an action if Soult had -pressed one; but, disturbed with intelligence received from D’Erlon, -and doubtful what Campbell’s troops might be, he put off the attack -until next morning, and after dark the junction of all the allies was -effected. - -This delay was an error. Cole was alone for five hours, and every -action, by augmenting the wounded men and creating confusion, would -have augmented the difficulties of a retreat for troops fatigued with -incessant fighting and marching during two days and a night. Moreover -Reille’s failure from the fog, had reduced the primary combinations -to D’Erlon’s co-operation, and reports now brought the mortifying -conviction that he also had gone wrong: by rough fighting only could -Soult therefore attain his object, and, it is said, his manner -discovered a secret anticipation of failure; yet his temper was too -steadfast to yield, for he gave orders to advance next day, renewing -his instructions to D’Erlon, whose operations must now be noticed. - -That general, who had eighteen thousand fighting men, placed two -divisions on the morning of the 25th near the passes of Maya, having -previously caused the national guards of Val Baygorry to make -demonstrations towards the lateral passes of Arriette, Yspeguy and -Lorietta, on Hill’s right. General William Stewart, commanding a -division, and still the same daring but imprudent man he had shown -himself at Albuera, was deceived by these feints, and looked to that -quarter which was guarded by Sylviera’s Portuguese more than to his -own front. His division, consisting of two British brigades, was -consequently neither posted as it should be, nor otherwise prepared for -an attack. His ground was strong, but however rugged a position may be, -if it is too extensive and the troops are not disposed with judgment, -the inequalities constituting its strength become advantageous to an -assailant. - -There were three passes over the Col de Maya to defend, Aretesque on -the right, Lessessa in the centre, Maya on the left; and from these -entrances two roads led into the Bastan in parallel directions; one -down the valley through the town of Maya, the other along the Atchiola -mountain. General Pringle’s brigade guarded the Aretesque, Colonel -Cameron’s brigade the Maya and Lessessa passes. The Col itself was -broad on the summit, three miles long, and on each flank lofty rocks -and ridges rose one above another; those on the right blended with the -Goramendi mountains, those on the left with the Atchiola mountain, -near the summit of which the 82nd Regiment, belonging to the seventh -division, was posted. - -Cameron, encamped on the left, had a clear view of troops coming from -Urdax, one of D’Erlon’s camps; but at Aretesque a great round hill, one -mile in front, masked the movements of an enemy coming from Espelette, -the other French camp. This hill was not occupied at night, nor in the -daytime, save by some Portuguese cavalry videttes, and the nearest -guard was an infantry picquet of eighty men posted on the French slope -of the Col. Behind this picquet there was no immediate support, but -four light companies were encamped one mile down the reverse slope, -which was more rugged and difficult of access than that towards the -enemy. The rest of Pringle’s brigade was disposed at distances of two -and three miles in the rear, and the signal for occupying the position -was to be the fire of four Portuguese guns from the rocks above the -Maya pass. Thus of six British regiments, furnishing more than three -thousand fighting men, half only were in line, and chiefly massed on -the left of a position, wide, open, and of an easy ascent from the -Aretesque side. Stewart also, quite deceived as to the real state of -affairs, was at Elisondo, several miles off, when at midday D’Erlon -commenced the battle. - - -COMBAT OF MAYA. (July, 1813.) - -From the Aretesque pass at dawn a glimpse had been obtained of cavalry -and infantry in movement along the hills in front, and soon afterwards -some peasants announced the approach of the French. At nine o’clock a -staff officer, patrolling round the great hill in front, discovered -sufficient to make him order up the light companies from the reverse -slope, to support the picquet; and they formed on the ridge with their -left at the rock of Aretesque, just as D’Armagnac’s division, coming -from Espelette, mounted the great hill in front; Abbé’s division -followed, while Maransin, with a third division, advanced from Ainhoa -and Urdax against the Maya pass, seeking also to turn it by a narrow -way leading up the Atchiola mountain. - -D’Armagnac forced the picquet back with great loss upon the light -companies, who sustained his assault with infinite difficulty; the -alarm guns were then heard from the Maya pass, and Pringle hastened to -the front; but his battalions, moving hurriedly from different camps, -came up irregularly. The 34th arrived first at a running pace, yet by -companies not in mass, and breathless from the length and ruggedness -of the ascent; the 39th and 28th followed, but not immediately nor -together, and meanwhile D’Armagnac, closely supported by Abbé, with -domineering numbers and valour combined, maugre the desperate fighting -of the light companies and the 34th, established his columns on the -broad ridge of the position. Colonel Cameron sent the 50th from the -left to the assistance of the overmatched troops, and that fierce and -formidable old regiment, charging the head of an advancing column drove -it clear out of the pass of Lessessa in the centre. But the French -were many, and checked at one point assembled with increased force -at another; nor could Pringle restore the battle with the 39th and -28th Regiments, which, cut off from the others, were, though fighting -strongly, forced back to a second and lower ridge crossing the main -road into the Bastan. They were followed by D’Armagnac, while Abbé -pushed the 50th and 34th towards the Atchiola road to the left, upon -Cameron’s brigade. That officer, still holding the pass of Maya with -the left wings of the 71st and 92nd Regiments, now brought their right -wings and the Portuguese guns into action: yet so dreadful was the -slaughter, especially of the 92nd, that the enemy was, it is said, -actually stopped for a time by the heaped mass of dead and dying; and -then the left wing of that noble regiment, coming down from the higher -ground, was forced to smite wounded friends and exulting foes alike, as -mingled together they stood or crawled before its fire.[33] - -Such was the state of affairs when Stewart reached the field by the -mountain road of Atchiola. The passes of Lessessa and Aretesque were -lost; that of Maya was still held by the left wing of the 71st, but -Stewart, seeing Maransin’s men gathered thickly on one side, and Abbé’s -men on the other, abandoned it for a new position on the first rocky -ridge covering the road over the Atchiola. He called down the 82nd from -the highest part of that mountain, sent messengers to demand further -aid from the seventh division, and meanwhile, though wounded, made -a strenuous resistance, for he was a very gallant man. During this -retrograde movement, Maransin suddenly thrust the head of his division -across the front of the British line and connected his left with Abbé, -throwing as he passed a destructive fire into the wasted remnant of the -92nd, which even then gave way but sullenly, and still fought, though -two-thirds had fallen: however, one after the other, all the regiments -were forced back, the Portuguese guns were taken and the position lost. - -Abbé now followed D’Armagnac on the road to the town of Maya, leaving -Maransin to deal with Stewart’s new position; and notwithstanding -its extreme strength the French gained ground until six o’clock; for -the British, shrunk in numbers, wanted ammunition, and a part of the -82nd defended the rocks on which they were posted with stones. In -this desperate condition Stewart was upon the point of abandoning -the mountain entirely, when Barnes’ brigade of the seventh division, -arriving from Echallar, charged and drove the French back to the Maya -ridge. Stewart was then master of the Atchiola, and D’Erlon thinking -greater reinforcements had come up, recalled his other divisions from -the Maya road and re-united his whole corps on the _Col_. He had lost -fifteen hundred men and a general, but he took four guns, and fourteen -hundred British soldiers and one general were killed or wounded. - -Such was the commencement of Soult’s operations to restore the fortunes -of France. Three considerable actions fought on the same day had -each ended in his favour. At San Sebastian the allies’ assault was -repulsed; at Roncesvalles they abandoned the passes; at Maya they were -defeated--but the decisive blow was still to be struck. - -Lord Wellington heard of the fight at Maya on his way back from San -Sebastian, after the assault, but with the false addition that D’Erlon -was beaten. As early as the 22nd he had known that Soult was preparing -a great offensive movement; yet the impassive attitude of the French -centre, the disposition of their reserve, twice as strong as he at -first supposed, together with the bridges prepared by Reille, were -calculated to mislead, and did mislead him. Soult’s combinations to -bring his centre finally into line on the crest of the great chain -being impenetrable, the English general could not believe he would -throw himself with only thirty thousand men into the valley of the -Ebro, unless sure of aid from Suchet. But that general’s movements -indicated a determination to remain in Catalonia, and Wellington, -in contrast to Soult, knew that Pampeluna was not in extremity, and -thought, the assault not having been made, that San Sebastian was. -Hence the operations against his right, their full extent not known, -appeared a feint, and he judged the real effort would be to raise -the siege of San Sebastian. But in the night of the 25th, correct -intelligence of the Maya and Roncesvalles affairs arrived. Graham was -then ordered to turn the siege into a blockade, to embark the guns and -stores, and hold his spare troops ready to join Giron, on a position of -battle marked out near the Bidassoa. Cotton was directed to move the -cavalry up to Pampeluna, and Abispal was instructed to hold some of his -Spanish troops ready to act in advance of that fortress. Meanwhile -Wellington, having arranged his lines of correspondence, proceeded to -San Esteban, which he reached early in the morning. - -While the embarkation of the guns and stores was going on it was -essential to hold the posts at Vera and Echallar, because D’Erlon’s -object was not pronounced; and an enemy in possession of those places -could approach San Sebastian by the roads leading over the Peña de -Haya, or by the defiles of Zubietta leading round that mountain. But -when Wellington reached Irueta, saw the reduced state of Stewart’s -division, and knew Picton had marched from Olague, he directed all -the troops within his power upon Pampeluna, and to prevent mistakes -indicated the valley of Lanz as the general line of movement. Of -Picton’s exact position, or of his intentions, nothing positive was -known; but supposing him to have joined Cole at Linzoain, as indeed -he had, Wellington judged their combined forces sufficient to check -the enemy until assistance could reach them from the centre, or from -Pampeluna, and he so advised Picton on the evening of the 26th.[34] - -Following these orders the seventh division marched in the night of the -26th, the sixth division the next morning, and Hill in the following -night. Meanwhile the light division, quitting Vera, reached the summit -of the Santa Cruz mountain, and there halted to cover the defiles -of Zubietta until Longa’s Spaniards should block the roads leading -over the Peña de Haya; that effected, it was to thread the passes -and descend upon the great road of Irurzun, thus securing Graham’s -communication with the army round Pampeluna. - -These movements spread fear and confusion far and wide. All the narrow -valleys and roads were crowded with baggage, commissariat stores, -artillery and fugitive families; reports of the most alarming nature -were as usual rife; each division, ignorant of what had really happened -to the other, dreaded that some of the numerous misfortunes related -might be true; none knew what to expect, or where they were to meet the -enemy, and one universal hubbub filled the wild regions through which -the French army was working its fiery path towards Pampeluna. - -D’Erlon’s inactivity gave great uneasiness to Soult: he repeated his -original orders to push forward by his left whatever might be the force -opposed, and thus stimulated D’Erlon advanced to Elisondo the 27th; yet -again halted there, and it was not until the morning of the 28th, when -Hill’s retreat had opened the way, that he followed through the pass of -Vellate. His further progress belongs to other combinations, arising -from Soult’s direct operations which shall now be continued. - -Picton having assumed command of all the troops, seventeen thousand, -in the valley of Zubiri on the evening of the 26th, retreated before -dawn the 27th, without hope or intention of covering Pampeluna; Soult -followed in two columns down both banks of the Guy river, his cavalry -and artillery closing the rear: both moved in compact order, the narrow -valley was overgorged with troops, and a bicker of musketry alone -marked the separation of the hostile forces. Meanwhile the garrison -of Pampeluna attacked the Count of Abispal, who in great alarm spiked -some of his guns, destroyed his magazines, and would have suffered -a disaster, if Carlos España had not fortunately arrived from the -Ebro with his division and checked the sally. Imminent was the crisis -however, for Cole, first emerging from the Zubiri valley, had passed -Villalba, three miles from Pampeluna, in retreat; Picton, following -close, was at Huarte, and Abispal’s Spaniards were in confusion: in -fine Soult was all but successful, when Picton, feeling the importance -of the crisis, suddenly turned on some steep ridges which stretched -across the mouths of the Zubiri and Lanz valleys and screened Pampeluna. - -Posting the third division on the right, he prolonged his left with -Morillo’s Spaniards, called upon Abispal to support him, and directed -Cole to occupy some heights a little in advance. That general had -however noted a salient hill one mile farther on, commanding the great -road, where two Spanish regiments of the blockading troops were still -posted, and towards them he directed his course. Soult had also marked -this hill, and a French detachment was in full career to seize it, when -the Spaniards, seeing the British so close, vindicated their ground -by a sudden charge. This was for Soult the stroke of fate. His double -columns, just then emerging exultant from the narrow valley, stopped at -the sight of ten thousand men crowning the summit of the mountain in -opposition, while two miles further back stood Picton with a greater -number, for Abispal had now taken post on Morillo’s left. To advance by -the great road was then impossible, and to stand still was dangerous; -for the French army, contracted to a span in front, was cleft in its -whole length by the river Guy, and compressed on each side by mountains -which there narrowed the valley to a quarter of a mile. In this -difficulty Soult, with the promptness of a great commander, instantly -shot the head of Clausel’s columns to his right, across the ridge which -separated the Zubiri from the Lanz valley, and threw one of Reille’s -divisions of infantry and a body of cavalry across the mountains on his -left, beyond the Guy river, thus giving himself a strong position of -battle and menacing Picton’s right flank. Reille’s remaining divisions -he established at the village of Zabaldica in the Val de Zubiri, close -under Cole’s right, while Clausel seized the village of Sauroren as -close under that general’s left. - -While Soult was thus establishing a line of battle, Wellington, who -had quitted Hill’s quarters in the Bastan early on the 27th, crossed -the great mountain spine into the valley of Lanz, without being able -to learn anything of Picton’s movements or position until he reached -Ostiz, a few miles from Sauroren. There he found Long’s brigade of -light cavalry, placed to furnish posts of correspondence in the -mountains, and from him heard that Picton had abandoned the heights of -Linzoain: whereupon, leaving instructions to stop all the troops coming -down the valley of Lanz until the state of affairs near Pampeluna could -be ascertained, he made at racing speed for Sauroren. As he entered -that village he saw Clausel’s divisions moving along the crest of the -mountain, and thus knew the allied troops in the valley of Lanz were -intercepted; then pulling up his horse, he wrote on the parapet of the -bridge at Sauroren fresh instructions to turn everything from that -valley to the right by a cross-road, which led out of it to Marcalain -and thence round the hills, to enter the valley again at Oricain, in -rear of the position occupied by Cole. Lord Fitzroy Somerset, who had -kept up with him, galloped with these orders out of Sauroren by one -road, the French light cavalry simultaneously dashed in by another, and -Wellington rode alone up the mountain. - -A Portuguese battalion on the left, first recognising him, raised -a joyful cry, and soon the shrill clamour was taken up by the next -regiments, swelling as it run along the line into that stern and -appalling shout which the British soldier is wont to give upon the edge -of battle, and which no enemy ever heard unmoved. In a conspicuous -place he stopped, desirous that both armies should know he was there. A -spy who was present pointed out Soult, then so near that his features -could be plainly distinguished. Fixing his eyes attentively upon that -formidable man, Wellington thus spoke, “_Yonder is a great commander, -but he is a cautious one and will delay his attack to ascertain the -cause of these shouts; that will give time for the sixth division to -arrive and I shall beat him._” The event justified the prediction. - -Cole’s position was the summit of a mountain mass, which filled all -the space between the Guy and Lanz valleys, as far back as Huarte and -Villalba. It was highest in the centre and well defined towards the -enemy, yet the trace was irregular, the right being thrown back towards -the village of Arletta so as to flank the great road, which was also -swept by guns placed on a lower range behind. - -Overlooking Zabaldica and the Guy river, was the bulging hill -vindicated by the Spaniards, a distinct but lower point on the right -of the position. The left, also abating in height, was yet extremely -rugged and steep, overlooking the Lanz river, and Ross’s brigade was -posted on that side, having in front a Portuguese battalion, whose -flank rested on a small chapel. Campbell was on the right of Ross. -Anson was on the highest ground, partly behind, partly on the right of -Campbell. Byng’s brigade was on a second mass of hills in reserve, and -the Spanish hill was further reinforced by a battalion of Portuguese. - -This front of battle was less than two miles, and well filled, its -flanks being washed by the Lanz and the Guy; and those torrents, -pursuing their course, broke by narrow passages through the steep -ridges screening Pampeluna which had been first occupied by Picton, -and where the second line was now posted; that is to say, at the -distance of two miles from, and nearly parallel to the first position, -but on a more extended front. Carlos España maintained the blockade -behind these ridges, and the British cavalry under Cotton stood on some -open ground in the rear of Picton’s right wing. - -Soult’s position was also a mountain filling the space between the two -rivers. It was even more rugged than that of the allies, and was only -separated from it by a deep narrow ravine. Clausel’s three divisions -leaned to the right on the village of Sauroren, which was down in the -valley of Lanz, close under the chapel height; Reille’s two divisions -occupied the village of Zabaldica, quite down in the valley of Zubiri -under the right of the allies. The remaining division of this wing and -the light cavalry were, as before said, thrown forward on the mountains -at the other side of the Guy river, menacing Picton and seeking to -communicate with Pampeluna. - - -COMBAT OF ZABALDICA. (July, 1813.) - -The French guns at Zabaldica first opened fire, but the elevation -required to send the shot upward rendered it so ineffectual, that the -greatest part of the artillery remained in the narrow valley of Zubiri. -Soult had however made another effort to gain the Spaniards’ hill and -establish himself near the centre of the allies’ line of battle, but -had been valiantly repulsed just before the arrival of Wellington, who -now reinforced the post with the 40th British Regiment. There was then -a general skirmish along the front, under cover of which Soult examined -the whole position, and the firing continued on the mountain side -until a terrible storm, the usual precursor of English battles in the -Peninsula, brought on premature darkness and terminated the dispute. -This was the state of affairs at daybreak on the 28th, but a signal -alteration had place before the great battle of that day commenced, -and the movements of the wandering divisions by which this change was -effected must now be traced. - -Although the Lanz covered the left of the allies and the right of -the French, the heights occupied by both were prolonged beyond that -river; the continuation of the allies’ range sweeping forward so as -to look into the rear of Sauroren, while the continuation of the -French range fell back in a direction nearly parallel to this forward -inclination of the allies’ ridge. On each side they were steep and -high, yet lower and less rugged than the heights on which the armies -stood opposed; for on the latter, rocks piled on rocks stood out like -castles, so difficult to approach and so dangerous to assail that the -hardened veterans of the Peninsula only would have dared the trial: -both sides were therefore strong in defence. But Soult was forced to -attack or retreat, and therefore Wellington looked anxiously for his -sixth division, then coming from Marcalain by a road which run behind -his ridge beyond the Lanz and fell into that valley at Oricain, one -mile in rear of Cole’s left. It had been turned into that road from -the higher part of the Lanz valley by Lord Fitzroy Somerset, and was -followed by General Hill when he arrived at the point of divarication; -the way was thus open for D’Erlon to join Soult, and the rapidity -with which that marshal had seized Sauroren would thus have proved a -master-stroke, if his lieutenant had pursued Hill vigorously: for the -change of direction gave the sixth division a march of eighteen instead -of four hours to join the army; and Hill, forced to take a position at -Marcalain, covering the great road of Irurzun on Wellington’s left, was -there joined by the seventh division and the whole were thrown out of -the line of battle. During these important movements, which were not -completed until the evening of the 28th, and which finally placed all -the allies in military communication, D’Erlon remained inactive in the -Bastan! - -The proximity of the sixth division on the morning of the 28th, with -the certainty of Hill’s co-operation, made Wellington think Soult would -not venture an attack; and the latter, disquieted about D’Erlon, of -whom he only knew that he had not followed his instructions, certainly -viewed the British position with uneasy anticipations, and again with -anxious eyes took cognizance of its rugged strength, seeming dubious -and distrustful of fortune. He could not operate with advantage by his -left beyond the Guy river, because the mountains there were rough, and -his enemy, having shorter lines of movement, could meet him with all -arms combined; moreover his artillery, unable to emerge from the Val -de Zubiri, except by the great road, would thus have been exposed to a -counter attack. In this dubious state he crossed the Lanz and ascended -the prolongation of the allies’ ridge, which, as he had possession -of the bridge of Sauroren, was for the moment his own ground; from -thence he could see into the left and rear of Cole’s position, but -the country towards Marcalain was so broken that he could not discern -the march of the sixth division. The deserters however told him that -four divisions, namely, the second, sixth, and seventh British, and -Sylviera’s Portuguese, which was under Hill, were expected from that -side; he was thus influenced to attack, because the valley, widening -as it descended, offered the means of assailing the allies in front -and flank, and intercepting the divisions from Marcalain by the same -combination. - -One of Clausel’s divisions already occupied Sauroren, and the other two -were now posted on each side of that village; that on the right hand -was ordered to send flankers to the ridge from whence Soult had made -his observations, and upon signal to move down the valley, wheel to the -left, and assail the rear of the allies while the other two divisions -assailed their front: five thousand men would thus be enveloped by -sixteen thousand, and Soult hoped to crush them notwithstanding the -strength of ground. Meanwhile Reille’s two divisions on the side of -Zabaldica, were each to send a brigade against the Spanish hill, and -connect the right of their attack with Clausel’s left. The remaining -brigades were to follow in support, the division beyond the Guy was to -keep Picton in check, and all were to throw themselves frankly into -action. - - -FIRST BATTLE OF SAUROREN. (July, 1813.) - -At midday on the 28th of July, the anniversary of the Talavera fight, -the French gathered in masses at the foot of the position, and their -skirmishers quickly spread over the face of the mountain, working -upward like a conflagration; but the columns of attack were not all -ready when Clausel’s right-hand division, without awaiting the general -signal of battle, threw out flankers on the ridge beyond the Lanz and -pushed down the valley in one mass. With a rapid pace it turned Cole’s -left and was preparing to wheel up on his rear, when suddenly Madden’s -Portuguese brigade of the sixth division appeared on the crest of the -ridge beyond the river, driving the flankers back and descending, as -from the clouds, with a rattling fire upon the right and rear of the -column; and not less suddenly the main body of that division, emerging -from behind the same ridge near the village of Oricain, presented -a line of battle across the front. It was the counter-stroke of -Salamanca! The French were, while striving to encompass Cole’s left, -themselves encompassed; for two brigades of Cole’s division instantly -turned and smote them on the left, the Portuguese smote them on the -right, and thus scathed on both flanks with fire, they were violently -shocked and pushed back with a mighty force by the sixth division, yet -not in flight, but fighting fiercely and strewing the ground with their -enemies’ bodies as well as with their own. - -Clausel’s second division, on the other side of Sauroren, seeing this -dire conflict, with a hurried movement assailed the chapel height to -draw off Cole’s fire from the troops in the valley, and gallantly did -the French soldiers throng up the craggy steep; yet the general unity -of the attack was ruined; neither the third division nor Reille’s -brigades had yet received the signal, and their attacks were made -irregularly, in succession, running from right to left as the necessity -of aiding others became apparent. It was however a terrible battle -and well fought. One column darting out of the village of Sauroren, -silently, sternly, without firing a shot, worked up to the chapel under -a tempest of bullets, which swept away whole ranks without abating the -speed and power of the mass; the Portuguese there shrunk abashed, and -that part of the position was won; soon however they rallied on Ross’s -British brigade, and the whole, running forward, charged the French -with a loud shout and dashed them down the hill. Heavily stricken the -latter were, yet undismayed, they re-formed, and again ascended, to be -again broken and overturned. But the other columns of attack now bore -upwards through the smoke and flame with which the skirmishers covered -the face of the mountain, and another Portuguese regiment, fighting -on the right of Ross, yielded to their fury; thus a heavy body crowned -the heights, and wheeling against Ross’s exposed flank forced him back -also, and his ground was instantly occupied by the enemies with whom he -had been engaged in front. Now the fight raged close and desperate on -the crest of the position, charge succeeding charge, each side yielding -and advancing by turns. This astounding effort of French valour was -however of no avail. Wellington brought Byng’s brigade forward at a -running pace, and calling the 27th and 48th British Regiments, from the -higher ground in the centre, against the crowded masses, rolled them -backward in disorder, and threw them, one after the other, violently -down the mountain-side; yet with no child’s play; the two British -regiments had to fall upon the enemy three separate times with the -bayonet, and lost more than half their own numbers. - -During this battle on the mountain-top, the sixth division gained -ground in the Lanz valley, and when it arrived on a front with the -left of the victorious troops near the chapel, Wellington, seeing the -momentary disorder of the enemy, ordered Madden’s Portuguese brigade -beyond the Lanz, which had never ceased its fire against the right -flank of the French column, to assail the village of Sauroren in rear; -but the state of the action in other parts and the exhaustion of the -troops soon induced him to countermand this movement. - -On the French left, Reille’s brigades, connecting their right with -Clausel’s third division, had environed the Spanish hill and ascended -it unchecked, at the moment when the fourth division was so hardly -pressed from Sauroren; a Spanish regiment then gave way on the left of -the 40th, but a Portuguese battalion, rushing forward, again covered -the flank of that invincible regiment, which waited in stern silence -until the French set their feet upon the broad summit. Scarcely did -their glittering arms appear over the brow of the mountain when the -charging British cry was heard, the fierce shock given, the French mass -was broken to pieces and a tempest of bullets followed it down the -mountain. Four times this assault was renewed, and the French officers -were seen even to pull up their tired men by the belts, so fierce -and resolute they were to win, but it was the labour of Sisyphus; the -vehement shout and shock of the British soldier always prevailed, and -at last, with thinned ranks, tired limbs, and fainting hearts, hopeless -from repeated failures, the French were so abashed that three British -companies sufficed to bear down a whole brigade.[35] - -While the battle was thus being fought on the mountain, Soult’s cavalry -beyond the Guy river passed a rivulet, and with a fire of carbines -forced the 10th Hussars to yield some rocky ground on Picton’s right, -but the 18th Hussars renewed the combat, killed two officers, and drove -them over the rivulet again. - -Such were the leading events of this sanguinary struggle, which -Lord Wellington, fresh from the fight, with homely emphasis called -“_bludgeon work_.” Two generals and eighteen hundred men had been -killed or wounded on the French side, following their official reports; -a number far below the estimate made at the time by the allies, -whose loss amounted to two thousand six hundred. These discrepancies -between hostile calculations ever occur, and there is little wisdom in -disputing where proof is unattainable; yet the numbers actually engaged -were twenty-five thousand French and twelve thousand allies; hence, -if the strength of the latter’s position did not save them from the -greater loss, their steadfast courage is more to be admired. - -The 29th the armies rested in position without firing a shot, and the -wandering divisions on both sides were now entering the line. - -Hill had sent all his baggage, artillery, and wounded men to Berioplano -behind Picton’s ridge, but still occupied his position, covering the -Marcalain and Irurzun roads; thus posted, he likewise menaced the -valley of Lanz in rear of Soult’s right, his communication with Oricain -being maintained by the seventh division; the light division was also -approaching Hill’s left, and therefore on Wellington’s side the crisis -was over. He had vindicated his position with only sixteen thousand -combatants, and now, including the Spanish troops blockading Pampeluna, -he had fifty thousand in close military combination. Thirty thousand -flushed with recent successes were in hand, and Hill’s troops were -well placed for re-taking the offensive. - -Soult’s situation was proportionably difficult. Seeing he could not -force the position, he had sent his artillery, part of his cavalry, and -his wounded men, back to France immediately after the battle, ordering -the two former to join Villatte on the Lower Bidassoa and await further -instructions. Having shaken off this burthen he awaited D’Erlon’s -arrival by the valley of Lanz, and that general did reach Ostiz, a few -miles above Sauroren, at mid-day on the 29th, bringing intelligence, -obtained indirectly during his march, that Graham had retired from the -Bidassoa and Villatte had crossed that river. This gave Soult a hope -that his first movements had disengaged San Sebastian, and he instantly -conceived a new plan of operations, dangerous indeed, yet conformable -to the critical state of his affairs. - -No success was to be expected from another attack, yet he could not, -being reinforced with eighteen thousand men, retire by the road he -came without some dishonour; nor could he remain where he was, because -his supplies of provisions and ammunition, derived from distant -magazines by slow and small convoys, were unequal to the consumption. -Two-thirds of the British troops, great part of the Portuguese and -all the Spaniards, were, as he supposed, assembled in his front under -Wellington, or on his right flank under Hill; and it was probable other -reinforcements were on the march; wherefore he resolved to prolong his -right with D’Erlon’s corps, and cautiously drawing off the rest of his -army place the whole between the allies and the Bastan, in military -connection with his reserve and closer to his frontier magazines. Thus -posted he could combine all his forces in one operation to relieve San -Sebastian, and profit from new combinations. - -In the evening of the 29th the second division of cavalry, which was in -the valley of Zubiri, passed over to that of Lanz and joined D’Erlon, -who was ordered to march early on the 30th by the cross road, leading -on Marcalain, which Hill had followed to get out of that valley. During -the night the first division of cavalry and La Martinière’s division -of infantry, both on the extreme left of the French army, retired -over the mountains to Eugui, in the upper part of the Zubiri valley, -having orders to cross the separating ridge there and join D’Erlon in -the valley of Lanz. The remainder of Reille’s wing moved by the crest -of the position to Sauroren, being gradually to relieve Clausel’s -troops, which were then to move up the Lanz valley, follow D’Erlon, -and be followed in like manner by Reille: meanwhile Clausel detached -two regiments to the ridges beyond the Lanz river, to cover his own -march and open a military connection with D’Erlon, whose new line of -operations was just beyond those heights. - -In the night Soult again heard, from deserters, that three divisions -were to make an offensive movement next day by the Marcalain road -on his right, and at daylight he was convinced the men spoke truly; -because from the ridges held by Clausel beyond Sauroren he descried -columns descending from Picton’s position and from above Oricain, while -others were in movement apparently to turn Clausel’s right flank. -These columns were Morillo’s Spaniards, Campbell’s Portuguese, and the -seventh division, marching to adopt a new disposition, which shall be -presently explained. - -Early in the morning Soult’s combination was apparent: Foy’s division, -the last of Reille’s wing, was seen in march along the crest of -the mountain to Sauroren, where Maucune’s division had previously -relieved Conroux’s, and the latter, belonging to Clausel, was moving -up the valley of Lanz. Wellington was not a general to suffer a flank -march across his front within cannon-shot. He immediately opened -his batteries from the chapel height, and sent skirmishers against -Sauroren; and soon this fire, spreading to the right, became brisk -between Cole and Foy; but it subsided at Sauroren, and Soult, relying -on the strength of the ground, directing Reille to maintain that -village until nightfall, went off himself to join D’Erlon. His design -was to fall upon the troops he had seen moving to turn his right and -crush them with superior numbers: a daring project, well and finely -conceived, but he had to deal with a man more rapid of perception and -of a rougher stroke than himself. Overtaking D’Erlon, who had three -divisions of infantry and two of heavy cavalry, he found him facing, -not the troops seen in march the evening before, but Hill who was in -position with ten thousand men. - - -COMBAT OF BUENZA. (July, 1813.) - -Hill, occupying a very extensive mountain ridge, had his right strongly -posted on rugged ground, but his left was insecure. D’Erlon, who -had not less than twenty thousand sabres and bayonets in line, was -followed by La Martinière’s division of infantry. Soult’s combination -was therefore still extremely powerful, the light troops were already -engaged when he arrived, and thus the same soldiers on both sides who -had so strenuously combated at Maya were again opposed to each other. - -D’Armagnac made a false attack on Hill’s right, Abbé endeavoured to -turn his left and gain the summit of the ridge in the direction of -Buenza; Maransin followed Abbé, and the French cavalry, entering the -line, connected the two attacks. D’Armagnac pushed his feint too far, -became seriously engaged and was beaten; but after some hard fighting -Abbé turned the left flank, gained the summit of the mountain, and -rendered the position untenable. - -Hill, who had lost four hundred men, retired to the heights of Eguaros, -drawing towards Marcalain with his right and throwing back his left; -being there joined by Campbell and Morillo he again offered battle. -Soult, whose principal loss was in D’Armagnac’s division, had however -gained his main object; he had turned Hill’s left, secured a fresh line -of retreat, a shorter communication with Villatte by the pass of Doña -Maria, and withal, the command of the great Irurzun road to Toloza, -which was distant only one league. His first thought was to seize it -and march upon Toloza or Ernani to raise the siege of San Sebastian; -there was nothing to oppose this, except the light division, whose -movements shall be noticed hereafter, but neither Hill nor Soult knew -of its presence. If the French marshal’s other combinations had been -happily executed he would have broken into Guipuscoa on the 31st with -fifty thousand men, thrust aside the light division in his march, and -taken Graham in reverse while Villatte’s reserve attacked him in front. -Wellington would have followed, yet scarcely in time, for he did not -suspect his views, and was ignorant of his strength, thinking D’Erlon’s -force to be only three divisions, whereas it was four divisions of -infantry and two of cavalry. This error however did not prevent him -from seizing the decisive point of operation and like a great captain -giving a counter-stroke which Soult, trusting to the strength of -Reille’s position, little expected. For when La Martinière’s division -and the cavalry had abandoned the mountains above Elcano, and that -Zabaldica was evacuated, Picton, reinforced with two squadrons of -cavalry and a battery of artillery, was directed to enter the Zubiri -valley and turn the French left. Meanwhile the seventh division swept -over the hills beyond the Lanz river upon Clausel’s right, with safety, -because Campbell and Morillo insured communication with Hill, who -was ordered to push the head of his column towards Olague and menace -Soult’s rear in the valley of Lanz. He was in march to do this when -D’Erlon, as shown, met and forced him back. During these movements Cole -never ceased to skirmish with Foy on the mountain between Zabaldica -and Sauroren, while the sixth division reinforced with Byng’s brigade -assaulted the latter village. - - -SECOND BATTLE OF SAUROREN. (July, 1813.) - -Picton quickly gained the Val de Zubiri, and threw his skirmishers -against Foy’s left flank on the mountain, while on the other flank -General Inglis, one of those veterans who purchase every step of -promotion with their blood, advancing with only five hundred men of the -seventh division, broke at one shock the two French regiments on the -ridges covering Clausel’s right, and drove them down into the valley of -Lanz. He lost indeed one-third of his own men, but instantly spread the -remainder in skirmishing order along the descent and opened a biting -fire upon the flank of Conroux’s division, which being in march up -the valley from Sauroren, was now thrown into disorder by having two -regiments thus suddenly tumbled upon it from the top of the mountain. - -Foy’s division was marching along the crest of the position between -Zabaldica and Sauroren at the moment of this attack; but he was too -far off to give aid, and his own light troops were engaged with Cole’s -skirmishers; moreover Inglis had been so sudden that before the evil -was well perceived it was past remedy; for Wellington instantly pushed -the sixth division under Pakenham to the left of Sauroren, and sent -Byng headlong down from the chapel height against Maucune, who was in -that village. This vigorous assault was simultaneously enforced from -the other side of the Lanz by Madden’s Portuguese, and the battery near -the chapel sent its bullets crashing through the houses, or booming up -the valley towards Conroux’s column, which Inglis never ceased to vex. - -The village and bridge of Sauroren and the straits beyond were soon -covered with a pall of smoke, the musketry pealed frequent and loud, -and the tumult and affray echoing from mountain to mountain filled all -the valley. Byng with hard fighting carried Sauroren, fourteen hundred -prisoners were made, and the two French divisions, being entirely -broken, fled, partly up the valley towards Clausel’s other divisions, -partly up the original position, to seek refuge with Foy, who remained -on the summit a helpless spectator of this rout. He rallied the -fugitives in great numbers, but had soon to look to himself, for his -own skirmishers were now driven up the mountain by Cole’s men, and his -left was infested by Picton’s detachments. Thus pressed, he fell back -along the hills separating the valley of Zubiri from that of Lanz, and -the woods enabled him to effect his retreat without much loss; yet he -dared not descend into either valley, and thinking himself entirely -cut off, sent advice to Soult and went over the Great Spine into the -Alduides by the pass of Urtiaga. Clausel meanwhile had been driven up -the valley of Lanz to Olague, where, being joined by La Martinière, -he took a position; and Wellington, whose pursuit had been damped by -hearing of Hill’s action, also halted. - -The allies lost nineteen hundred men killed, wounded, or taken in this -and Hill’s battle, and nearly twelve hundred were Portuguese, for the -soldiers of that nation bore the brunt of both fights. On the French -side the loss was enormous. Conroux’s and Maucune’s divisions were -completely disorganized. Eight thousand men under Foy were entirely -separated from the main body, two thousand at the lowest computation -were killed or wounded, many were dispersed in the woods and ravines, -and three thousand prisoners were taken. Soult’s fighting men were -thus reduced to thirty-five thousand, of which fifteen thousand under -Clausel and Reille were dispirited by defeat, and the whole in a -critical situation, seeing that Hill’s force, increased to fifteen -thousand men by the junction of Morillo and Campbell, was in their -front at Eguaros, and thirty thousand were on their rear in the valley -of Lanz; for Picton, finding no enemies in the valley of Zubiri, had -joined Cole on the heights. - -Wellington had sent some Spaniards to Marcalain when he first heard of -Hill’s action, yet he was not then aware of the true state of affairs -on that side, and his operations were founded on the notion that Soult -was in retreat towards the Bastan. Hence he designed to follow closely -and push his own left forward to support Graham on the Bidassoa; but -he still underrated D’Erlon’s force, and thought La Martinière’s -division had originally retreated up the Val de Zubiri to Roncesvalles, -instead of crossing the intervening ridge to the Lanz valley; and -as Foy’s column was numerous, and two divisions had been broken at -Sauroren, he judged the force immediately under Soult to be very weak, -and made dispositions accordingly. The sixth division and the 13th -Light Dragoons were ordered to join Picton, the whole to move upon the -Roncesvalles; Cole was called down into the valley of Lanz, and Hill -was directed to press Soult, turning his right, yet still directing his -own march upon Lanz: the seventh division was to let Hill cross its -front, and then march for the pass of Doña Maria. - -These arrangements show that Wellington expected Soult to rejoin -Clausel, and make for the Bastan by the pass of Vellate. But the French -marshal was so far advanced he could not return to Lanz; he was between -two fires, and could only retreat into the valley of St. Estevan by the -pass of Doña Maria; wherefore, calling up Clausel, and giving D’Erlon, -whose divisions were in good order, the rear-guard, he commenced his -march at midnight towards the pass. Mischief was thickening around him. -Graham, on the British left, had twenty thousand men ready to move -either against Villatte or into the valley of St. Estevan; and there -remained on that side the light division, under Charles Alten, of whose -operations it is time to speak. - -That general had descended the mountain of Santa Cruz on the evening of -the 28th, to gain the great road of Irurzun; but whether by orders from -Graham, or in default of orders, the difficulty of communication being -extreme in those wild regions, he commenced his movement very late, and -darkness falling on his rear brigade while in march, the troops got -dispersed in that frightful wilderness of woods and precipices. Many -soldiers made faggot torches, waving them as signals, and, so moving, -the lights served indeed to assist those who carried them, yet misled -and bewildered others who saw them at a distance; for the heights and -the ravines were alike studded with these small fires, and the soldiers -calling to each other filled the whole region with their clamour. Thus -they continued to rove and shout until morning showed the face of the -mountain covered with scattered men and animals, who had not gained -half a league of ground beyond their starting place, and it was many -hours ere they could be collected. - -Alten, now for three days separated from the army, sent mounted -officers in various directions to obtain tidings, and at six o’clock in -the evening renewed his march, but at Areysa halted without suffering -fires to be lighted; for he knew nothing of the enemy and was fearful -of discovering his situation. At night he moved again, and finally -established his bivouacs near Lecumberri early on the 30th, having -heard the noise of Hill’s battle at Buenza in the course of the day. -The light division was thus brought into the immediate system of -operations, and had Soult continued his march, after driving back Hill, -it would have been in great danger. Now it was a new power thrown into -Wellington’s hands at a critical moment, for Villatte, contrary to -the intelligence received, had not advanced, and Soult was therefore -completely isolated: he had indeed no resources save what his ability -and courage could supply. - -His single line of retreat by Doña Maria was secure only as far as -San Estevan, and from that town he could march up the Bidassoa to the -Bastan, to regain France by the Col de Maya; or down the same river -towards Vera by Sumbilla and Yanzi, from both of which roads branching -off to the right led over the mountains to Echallar: yet he might be -intercepted on either side. The Col de Maya way was good, that down -the Bidassoa was a long and terrible defile, so contracted about the -bridges of Yanzi and Sumbilla that a few men only could march abreast. -This then he had to dread. First, that Wellington by the pass of -Vellate would reach the Bastan before him, and block the Maya passes. -Second, that Graham would occupy the rocks of Yanzi and cut him off -from Echallar. Then, confined to a narrow mountain-way leading from San -Estevan to Zagaramurdi, and far too rugged for wounded men and baggage, -he would be followed by Hill, and perhaps headed at Urdax by Wellington. - -In this state, the first object being to get through Doña Maria, he -commenced his retreat in the night of the 30th, while Wellington, -still ignorant of the real state of affairs, halted in the valley of -Lanz to let Hill pass his front and enter the Bastan. But early on the -31st, Soult’s real strength became known, and the seventh division -was directed to aid Hill, while Wellington marched himself through -the pass of Vellate, and sent Alten orders to cut in upon the French, -intercepting their march where he could. Longa, who was with Graham, -had instructions to seize the defiles at Yanzi, and aid the light -division to block that way, while Graham was to hold all his corps in -readiness for the same object. - - -COMBAT OF DOÑA MARIA. (July, 1813.) - -General Hill overtook the French rear-guard early on the 31st, just as -the seventh division appeared on his right, and the enemy could only -gain the summit of the Doña Maria pass under the fire of his guns; -there however they turned, and throwing out skirmishers made strong -battle. General Stewart, leading the attack and now for the third time -engaged with D’Erlon’s troops, was again badly wounded and his first -brigade was repulsed; yet Pringle renewed the attack with the second -brigade, and broke the enemy’s right; the seventh division did the same -for the left, and some prisoners were taken: a thick fog prevented -further pursuit, and the loss of the French was unknown, but that of -the allies was four hundred. - -The seventh division remained on the mountain. Hill, following his -orders, moved by a short rugged way between Doña Maria and Vellate -over the Great Spine to join Wellington, who had during this combat -entered the Bastan. Meanwhile General Byng, previously pushed forward, -had captured at Elisondo a large convoy of provisions and ammunition -left there by D’Erlon, had made several hundred prisoners after a sharp -skirmish, and seized the pass of Maya. Wellington then occupied the -hills through which the road from San Estevan led to the Bastan, and -full of hope he was to strike a terrible blow; for Soult, after passing -Doña Maria, had halted in San Estevan, although from his scouts he -knew the convoy had been taken by Byng. He was in a deep valley, and -four divisions were behind the crest of the mountains overlooking his -post; the seventh division was on the summit of the Doña Maria pass; -the light division and Graham’s Spaniards were marching to block the -valley at Vera and Echallar; Byng was at Maya, and Hill was moving by -Almandoz just behind Wellington; a few hours gained and the French must -surrender or disperse! - -Strict orders were given to prevent the lighting of fires, the -straggling of soldiers, or any other indication of the presence of -troops, and the English commander placed himself on some rocks at a -culminant point, from whence he could observe every movement. Soult -seemed tranquil, and when four of his “_gens d’armes_” were seen to -ride up the valley in a careless manner some staff-officers proposed to -cut them off. Wellington, whose object was to hide his own presence, -forbade this; but the next moment three marauding English soldiers -entering the valley, were seen and carried off by the French patrol; -half an hour afterwards their drums beat to arms and the columns began -to move out of San Estevan towards Sumbilla. Thus the disobedience of -three plundering knaves, unworthy of the name of soldiers, deprived one -consummate commander of the most splendid success, and saved another -from the most terrible disaster.[36] - -Soult walked from his prison, yet his chains still hung upon him. -The way was narrow, the multitude great, wounded men borne on their -comrades’ shoulders filed in long procession with the baggage, -Clausel’s troops, forming the rear-guard, were therefore still near -San Estevan the next morning; and scarcely had they marched a league -when Cole’s skirmishers and the Spaniards, thronging along the heights -on their flank, opened a fire on them, to which little reply could be -made: the soldiers and baggage soon got mixed in disorder, numbers fled -up the hills, and the energy of Soult, whose personal exertions were -conspicuous, could scarcely prevent a general dispersion. Prisoners and -baggage were now taken at every step, and the boldest were dismayed; -worse would have awaited them, if Wellington had been on other points -well seconded by his subordinate generals. - -Instead of taking the first road leading from Sumbilla to Echallar, -the head of the French column passed onward towards that leading from -the bridge near Yanzi; the valley narrowed to a mere cleft in the -rocks as they advanced, the Bidassoa was on their left, and there was -a tributary torrent to cross, the bridge being defended by a battalion -of Spanish Caçadores from Vera. The head of the column was by this time -as much disordered as the rear, and had the Caçadores been reinforced, -only those French near Sumbilla, who could take the road from that -place to Echallar, would have escaped; but the Spanish general Longa -kept aloof, D’Erlon won the defile, and Reille’s divisions were -following, when a new enemy appeared. - -The light division had been directed to head the French at San Estevan -or Sumbilla. The order was received on the evening of the 31st, and -General Alten, threading the defiles of Zubieta and descending the -deep valley of Lerins, reached Elgoriaga about mid-day on the 1st of -August, having then marched twenty-four miles. He was little more than -a league from Estevan, was about the same distance from Sumbilla, -and the movement of the French along the Bidassoa was immediately -discovered. Instead of moving direct on Sumbilla he turned to his -left, clambered up the great mountain of Santa Cruz and made for the -bridge of Yanzi. The weather was very sultry, the mountain steep and -hard to overcome, many men fell and died convulsed and frothing at the -mouth, others whose spirit and strength had never before been quelled, -leaned on their muskets and muttered in sullen tones that they yielded -for the first time. However, towards evening, after marching nineteen -consecutive hours, and over forty miles of mountain roads, the head of -the exhausted column reached the edge of a precipice near the bridge -of Yanzi. Below it, within pistol-shot, Reille’s divisions were seen -hurrying forward along the horrid defile in which they were pent up, -a fire of musketry commenced, and the scene which followed is thus -described by an eye-witness.[37] - -“We overlooked the enemy at stone’s throw, and from the summit of a -tremendous precipice. The river separated us, but the French were -wedged in a narrow road with inaccessible rocks on one side and the -river on the other. Confusion impossible to describe followed, the -wounded were thrown down in the rush and trampled upon, the cavalry -drew their swords and endeavoured to charge up the pass of Echallar, -but the infantry beat them back, and several, horses and all, were -precipitated into the river; some fired vertically at us, the wounded -called out for quarter, while others pointed to them, supported as they -were on branches of trees, on which were suspended great coats clotted -with gore, and blood-stained sheets taken from different habitations to -aid the sufferers.” - -On these miserable supplicants brave men could not fire, and so piteous -was the spectacle that it was with averted or doubtful aim they shot at -the others, although the latter rapidly plied their muskets in passing, -and some in their veteran hardihood even dashed across the bridge of -Yanzi to make a counter-attack. It was a soldier-like but vain effort, -the night found the British in possession of the bridge; and though the -great body of the enemy escaped by the mountain path to Echallar, the -baggage was cut off and with many prisoners fell into the hands of the -light troops which were still hanging on the rear in pursuit from San -Estevan. - -That day the French losses were great, yet Wellington was justly -discontented with the result. Neither Longa nor Alten had fulfilled -their missions. The former should have stopped D’Erlon; the latter -should have passed the bridge of Yanzi and struck a great blow: it was -for that his soldiers had made such a prodigious exertion. - -In the night Soult rallied his divisions about Echallar, and on the -morning of the 2nd occupied the Puerto of that name. His left was -on the rocks of Zagaramurdi, his right, on the Ivantelly mountain, -communicating with Villatte, who held certain ridges between the -Ivantelly and the head of the great Rhune mountain. Clausel’s three -divisions, reduced to six thousand men, were on a strong hill between -the Puerto and town of Echallar. This position was momentarily adopted -by Soult to make Wellington discover his final object, but that general -would not suffer the affront. He had the fourth, seventh, and light -divisions in hand, and resolved to fall upon Clausel, whose position -was dangerously advanced. - - -COMBATS OF ECHALLAR AND IVANTELLY. (Aug. 1813.) - -From Yanzi the light division marched to the heights of Santa Barbara, -which were connected with the Ivantelly, thus turning Clausel’s -position and menacing Soult’s right, while the fourth division moved -to attack his front, and the seventh menaced his left; these attacks -were to be simultaneous, but General Barnes led his brigade of the -seventh division against Clausel’s strong post before the fourth and -light divisions were seen or felt. A vehement fight ensued, yet neither -the steepness of the mountain, nor the overshadowing multitude of -the enemy, clustering above in support of their skirmishers, could -arrest the assailants, and the astonishing spectacle was presented of -fifteen hundred men, driving by sheer valour and force of arms six -thousand good troops from ground so rugged, the numbers might have been -reversed and the defence made good without much merit. Incalculable -is the preponderance of moral power in war! These were the Frenchmen -who had assailed the terrible rocks above Sauroren with a force and -energy that all the valour of the hardiest British veterans scarcely -sufficed to repel; yet now, five days only having elapsed, although -posted so strongly, they did not sustain the shock of one-fourth of -their own numbers! And at this very time, eighty British soldiers, -the comrades and equals of those who achieved this wonderful exploit, -having wandered to plunder, surrendered to some French peasants, who as -Lord Wellington truly observed, “_they would under other circumstances -have eat up_!” What gross ignorance of human nature then do those -writers display, who assert, that the use of brute force is the highest -qualification of a general! - -Clausel fell back fighting to a strong ridge beyond the pass of -Echallar, having his right covered by the Ivantelly mountain, which -was strongly occupied. Meanwhile the light division ascended the broad -heights of Santa Barbara, and halted until the operations of the fourth -and seventh divisions rendered it advisable to attack the Ivantelly, -which lifted its sugar-loaf head on their right rising as it were out -of the Santa Barbara heights, and shutting them off from the ridges -through which the troops beaten at Echallar were now retiring. Evening -was coming on, a thick mist capped the crowning rocks, where a strong -French regiment was ensconced, and the division, besides its terrible -march the previous day, had been for two days without sustenance. -Weak and fainting, the soldiers were leaning on their arms when the -advancing fire at Echallar imported an attack on the Ivantelly, and -Andrew Barnard led five companies of riflemen up the mountain. Four -companies of the 43rd followed in support, the misty cloud descended -lower, the riflemen were soon lost to the view, and the sharp clang of -their weapons, heard in distinct reply to the more sonorous rolling -musketry of the French, told what work was going on. For some time the -echoes rendered it doubtful how the action went, but the companies of -the 43rd could find no trace of an enemy save the killed and wounded: -Barnard had fought his way unaided, and without a check to the summit, -where his dark-clothed swarthy veterans raised their victorious shout -on the highest peak, just as the coming night showed the long ridges -of the mountains beyond, sparkling with the last musket-flashes from -Clausel’s troops retiring in disorder from Echallar. - -This day cost the British four hundred men, and Wellington himself -narrowly escaped the enemy’s hands. He had taken towards Echallar half -a company of the 43rd as an escort, and placed a sergeant, named Blood, -with a party to watch in front while he examined his maps. A French -detachment endeavoured to cut the party off, and their troops, rushing -on at speed, would infallibly have fallen unawares upon Wellington, if -Blood, leaping down the precipitous rocks, had not given him warning: -as it was, they arrived in time to send a volley after him while -galloping away. - -Now, after nine days of continual movement during which ten serious -actions had been fought, the operations ceased. Of the allies, -including the Spaniards, seven thousand three hundred officers and -soldiers had been killed, wounded, or taken, and many were dispersed -from fatigue or to plunder. On the French side the loss was terrible, -and the disorder rendered the official returns inaccurate. Wellington -called it twelve thousand, but hearing the French officers admitted -more, raised his estimate to fifteen thousand. The engineer _Belmas_, -in his Journals of Sieges compiled from official documents, sets down -above thirteen thousand. Soult in his official correspondence at the -time, gave fifteen hundred for Maya, four hundred for Roncesvalles, two -hundred on the 27th, eighteen hundred the 28th, after which he spoke -no more of losses by battle. There remain therefore to be added, the -combats of Linzoain, the battles of Sauroren and Buenza on the 30th, -the combats on the 31st, 1st and 2nd: finally, four thousand unwounded -prisoners. Let this suffice. It is not needful to sound the stream of -blood in all its horrid depths. - - - - -BOOK XII. - - Catalonia--Combat of Ordal--Renewed Siege of San Sebastian--Storm - of San Sebastian--Battles on the Bidassoa--Combat of San - Marcial--Combat of Vera. - - -CATALONIA. (Sept. 1813.) - -While Wellington was thus victorious in Navarre, Lord W. Bentinck, -having reorganized Murray’s army at Alicant, was pushing the war in -Catalonia; for to that province Suchet retired after the battle of -Vittoria, relinquishing Valencia and Aragon, though he knew Clausel was -at Zaragoza. But in every way his determination to act independently, -however injurious it might prove to the emperor’s interest, was -apparent. Had he joined Clausel, forty-five thousand men, well based -on fortresses, would have menaced Wellington’s right flank when Soult -took the command: neither Sebastian nor Pampeluna could then have been -invested, and Soult’s recent defeats would have been spared. - -Lord William Bentinck had command of the Spanish armies as well as his -own, and Lord Wellington had planned a cautious scheme for renewed -operations, with reference to his own position in the Pyrenees: but -Lord William, whose thoughts were running on Sicily and an invasion of -Italy, pushed headlong into Catalonia, and though a brave and able man -he did not meet with much success. Having passed the Ebro late in July, -leaving the fortress of Tortoza behind him, he on the 30th sat down -before Tarragona with his own and Del Parque’s armies. - -Up to this time the Spaniards, giving copious but false information -to Lord William, and none to Suchet, had induced a series of errors -on both sides. The Englishman thinking his adversary weak had pressed -forwards rashly; the Frenchman, deeming the other’s boldness the result -of strength, thought himself weak, and awaited reinforcements from -Upper Catalonia. Suchet first recognised his own superior force, and -advanced on the 16th of August to attack with thirty thousand men; and -then Lord William, also discovering the true state of affairs, refused -the battle he had provoked and retired. He had indeed equal numbers, -yet of a quality not to be put in competition with his opponents. - -During the retreat, his brother, Lord Frederick, being on the left, -defeated the French hussars with a loss of fifty men, and it was -said either General Habert or Harispe was taken but escaped in the -confusion. This checked the enemy, and in the mountains above Tortoza -the allies halted. Suchet would not assail them there, but he destroyed -the works of Tarragona and took a permanent position behind the -Llobregat, thus giving up the fertile Campo de Tarragona, allowing -the allies to invest Tortoza, and isolating himself entirely from the -operations in Navarre, where he might have decided the war. Seeing -this timidity, Lord William again moved forward, but again misled by -false information, detached Del Parque’s army by the way of Tudela to -Navarre: meanwhile going himself beyond Tarragona to Villa Franca, he -placed Colonel Adam with twelve hundred men ten miles in advance, at -the strong pass of Ordal. - -In this position, having lost Del Parque’s army, and left Whittingham’s -Spanish division in the rear for the sake of subsistence, Lord William -was exposed to a formidable attack from Suchet, who had more than -thirty thousand men on the Llobregat, a few miles off. But he could -only be approached on two lines--one in front, from Molino del Rey, by -the royal road; the other on his left by Martorel and San Sadurni. The -first he blocked with Adam’s corps, at Ordal, which he now reinforced -with three battalions and a squadron of Spanish cavalry; the second, a -rugged and difficult way, he guarded by two Catalan corps under Eroles -and Manso, reinforced with a Calabrese battalion: there was indeed a -third line on his right by Avionet, but it was little better than a -goat-path. - -He had designed to push his main body close to Ordal on the evening of -the 12th, yet from some slight cause, and in war slight causes often -determine the fate of nations, he delayed it until next day. Meanwhile -he viewed the country in front of that defile without discovering an -enemy, his confidential emissaries assured him the French were not -going to advance, and he so expressed himself to Adam on his return. A -report of a contrary tendency was made by Colonel Reeves of the 27th, -on the authority of a Spanish woman who had before proved her accuracy -and ability as a spy, but she was now disbelieved: this incredulity -was unfortunate. Suchet thus braved, and his communication with Lerida -threatened by Manso on the side of Martorel, was in person actually -marching to attack Ordal, and Decaen and Maurice Mathieu were turning -the left by San Sadurni. - - -COMBAT OF ORDAL. (Sept. 1813.) - -The heights occupied by Adam rose gradually from a magnificent -bridge, by which the main road was carried over a deep impracticable -ravine. The second battalion of the 27th British Regiment was on the -right, some Germans and Swiss with six guns defended a dilapidated -fort commanding the main road; the Spaniards were in the centre; the -Anglo-Calabrese on the left; a British squadron of cavalry in reserve. -A bright moonlight facilitated the movements of the French, three -daring scouts sent in advance discovered the state of affairs, and -a little before midnight, the leading column under General Mesclop -passed the bridge without let or hindrance, mounted the heights with -a rapid pace and driving back the picquets gave the first alarm. The -first effort was against the 27th, the Germans and Spanish battalions -were then assailed in succession as the French masses got free of the -bridge, but the Calabrese were too far on the left to take a share in -the action. The combat was fierce and obstinate. Harispe, commanding -the French, constantly outflanked the right of the allies, and at the -same time pressed their centre, where the Spaniards fought gallantly. -Adam was wounded early, Reeves succeeded him, and seeing his flank -turned and his men falling fast, in short, finding himself engaged -with a whole army on a position of which Adam had lost the key by -neglecting the bridge, resolved to retreat. He first ordered the guns -to fall back, but seeking to cover the movement by charging a column of -the enemy, which was pressing forward on the high-road, he also fell -severely wounded, and there was no recognised commander on the spot to -succeed him. Then the affair became confused. For though the order -to retreat was given, the Spaniards continued to fight desperately, -the 27th thought it shame to abandon them, and as the Germans and -Swiss still held the old fort the guns came back. The action was thus -continued with great fury, and Colonel Carey, bringing his Calabrese -into line from the left, menaced the right flank of the French. He was -too late. The Spaniards, overwhelmed in the centre, were by that time -broken, the right was completely turned, the old fort was lost, the -enemy’s skirmishers got into the rear, and at three o’clock the allies -dispersed, the most part in flight: the Spanish cavalry were then -overthrown on the main road by the French hussars, and four guns were -taken in the tumult. - -Captain Waldron with the 27th, reduced to eighty men, being joined by -Captain Müller with about the same number of Germans and Swiss, broke -through small parties of the enemy and effected a retreat in good order -by the hills on each side of the road. Colonel Carey endeavoured to -gain the road of Sadurni on the left, but meeting with Decaen’s people -on that side retraced his steps, crossed the field of battle in the -rear of Suchet’s columns and made for Villa Nueva de Sitjes, where he -finally embarked without loss, save a few stragglers. The overthrow was -complete, and the prisoners were at first very numerous, yet darkness -enabled many to escape, and two thousand men took refuge with Manso and -Eroles. - -Suchet, continuing his career, closed about nine o’clock on Lord W. -Bentinck, who retired skirmishing behind Villa Franca. He was there -assailed by the French horsemen, some of which fell on his rear-guard -while others edged to their right to secure the communication with -Decaen; the latter was looked for by both parties with great anxiety, -but he had been delayed by the resistance of Manso and Eroles in the -rugged country between Martorel and Sadurni. Suchet’s cavalry however, -continued to infest the rear of the retreating army until it reached -a deep baranco, where, the passage being dangerous and the French -horsemen importunate, that brave and honest soldier, Lord Frederick -Bentinck, charged their right, and fighting hand to hand with the -enemy’s general Myers, wounded him and overthrew his squadron. They -rallied indeed upon their dragoons and endeavoured to turn the flank, -but were stopped by the fire of two guns; and meanwhile the French -cuirassiers on the left, while pressing the Brunswick hussars and -menacing the infantry, were roughly checked by the fire of the 10th -Regiment. This cavalry action was vigorous, and the allies lost more -than ninety men, but the baranco was safely passed, and about three -o’clock the pursuit ceased. The Catalans meanwhile had retreated -towards Igulada and the Anglo-Sicilians retired to Tarragona. - -Lord William Bentinck then returned to Sicily, leaving the command to -Sir William Clinton. He had committed errors, but the loss at Ordal was -due to the folly of Colonel Adam, and whoever relies on his capacity in -peace or war will be disappointed. - - -RENEWED SIEGE OF SAN SEBASTIAN. (Aug. 1813.) - -After the combats of Echallar and Ivantelly Soult resumed his former -defensive positions, that is to say, from the mouth of the Bidassoa -up its right bank to Vera, and from thence by the lower ranges of the -Pyrenees to St. Jean Pied de Port. Lord Wellington also reoccupied his -old positions on the main spine, and on the advanced counter ridges, -which gave him the command of the Bastan and the valley of San Estevan. -Many causes had concurred to deter him from pushing his success, and -though this termination was, perhaps, scarcely defensible on high -military principles, the difficulties were so great that he contented -himself with renewing the siege of San Sebastian, the blockade of which -had been always maintained. - -On the 8th of August the attack there was renewed by sinking a shaft -and driving a gallery to countermine the enemy, who was supposed to be -working under the cask redoubt; but water rose to the height of twelve -feet, the work was discontinued, and the siege itself was vexatiously -delayed by the negligence of the English government in providing guns -and stores, and by the astounding insulting refusal of the Admiralty to -supply the necessary naval aid. To use Lord Wellington’s expression, -“_Since Great Britain had been a naval power, a British army had never -before been left in such a situation at a most important moment._” - -During this forced inactivity the garrison received supplies and -reinforcements by sea, repaired the damaged works, raised new defences, -filled the magazines, and put sixty-seven pieces of artillery in -a condition to play. Eight hundred and fifty men had been killed -and wounded since the commencement of the siege; but more than two -thousand six hundred good soldiers, still under arms, celebrated -the emperor’s birth-day by crowning the castle with a splendid -illumination--encircling it with a fiery legend to his honour in -characters so large as to be distinctly read by the besiegers. - -On the 19th of August, a battering train demanded by Wellington three -months before, did arrive from England, and in the night of the 22nd -fifteen heavy pieces were placed in battery. A second battering train -came on the 23rd, augmenting the number of pieces to a hundred and -seventeen; but with characteristic official negligence, this enormous -armament brought shot and shells for only one day’s consumption! - -On the 24th the Chofre batteries were enlarged, and two batteries were -begun on the heights of Bartolomeo, designed to breach the faces of the -horn-work of St. John and the end of the high curtain, which rose in -gradation one above another in the same line of shot. The approaches -on the isthmus were pushed forward by the sap, but the old trenches -were still imperfect, and at daylight on the 25th a sally from the -horn-work swept the left of the parallel, injured the sap, and made -some prisoners. - -On the 26th fifty-seven pieces opened with a general salvo, and -continued to play with astounding noise and rapidity until evening. The -firing from the Chofres destroyed the revêtment of the demi-bastion -of St. John, and nearly ruined the towers at the old breach, together -with the wall connecting them; but from the isthmus, the batteries only -injured the horn-work, and Wellington, who was present at this attack, -ordered a new one of six guns to be constructed amongst some ruined -houses on the right of the parallel, and only three hundred yards from -the main front: two shafts were also sunk for driving galleries to -protect this battery against the enemy’s mines. - -In the morning of the 27th the boats of the squadron, carrying a -hundred soldiers, put off to attack the island of Santa Clara, and -landed with some difficulty under a heavy fire, yet took the island -with a loss of twenty-eight men and officers, eighteen being seamen. - -In the night of the 27th the French sallied against the new battery on -the isthmus, but on the edge of the trenches the 9th Regiment met and -checked them with the bayonet. - -At daybreak the besiegers’ fire was extremely heavy, and the shrapnel -shells were supposed to be destructive; the practice was however -very uncertain, the shells frequently flew amongst the guards in the -parallel, and one struck the field-officer of the day. To meet sallies -the trenches were furnished with banquettes and parapets; yet the work -was slow, because the Spanish authorities of Guipuscoa neglected to -provide carts to convey materials from the woods, and this hard labour -was performed by the Portuguese soldiers. - -Lord Wellington again visited the works on the 28th, and in the night -the advanced battery, which at the desire of the chief engineer -Fletcher had been constructed for only four guns, was armed and opened -the 29th; an accident kept back one gun, the enemy’s fire dismounted -another, and thus only two instead of six guns, as Wellington had -designed, smote St. John and the end of the high curtain. The general -firing however damaged the castle and the town-works, their guns were -nearly silenced, and as sixty-three pieces, of which twenty-nine threw -shells or spherical case-shot, were now in play from the Chofres, the -superiority of the besiegers was established. - -At this time the Urumea was discovered to be fordable by Captain -Alexander Macdonald of the artillery, who had voluntarily waded across -in the night, passed close under the works to the breach and returned. -Hence, as a few minutes would suffice to bring the enemy into the -Chofre batteries, to save the guns from being spiked their vents were -covered with iron plates fastened by chains; and this was also done -at the advanced battery on the isthmus. The materials for a battery -to take the defences of the Monte Orgullo in reverse were now sent to -the island of Santa Clara, and some pieces on the Chofres were turned -against the retaining wall of the horn-work, in the hope of shaking -down any mines there without destroying the wall itself, which offered -cover for the troops advancing to the assault. - -On the isthmus the trenches were wide and good, the sap was pushed to -the demi-bastion of the horn-work, and the sea-wall, supporting the -high road into the town, which had cramped the formation of the columns -in the first assault, was broken through, giving access to the strand -and shortening the way to the breaches. - -In this state a false attack was ordered in the night to make the enemy -spring his mines, a desperate service, executed by Lieutenant Macadam. -The order was sudden, no volunteers were demanded, no rewards offered, -no means of excitement resorted to; yet such is the inherent bravery -of British soldiers, that seventeen men of the Royals, the nearest at -hand, immediately leaped forth ready and willing to encounter what -seemed certain death. With a rapid pace, all the breaching batteries -playing hotly at the time, they reached the foot of the breach -unperceived and rushed up in extended order shouting and firing, but -the French musketry laid the whole party low with exception of their -commander. - -On the 30th, the sea flank of the place being opened from the -half-bastion of St. John to the most distant of the old breaches, five -hundred feet, the Chofre batteries were turned against the castle and -defences of Monte Orgullo, while the advanced battery on the isthmus -demolished, in conjunction with the fire from the Chofres, the face of -St. John and the end of the high curtain above it. The whole of that -quarter was now in ruins, for the San Bartolomeo batteries had broken -the demi-bastion of the horn-work and cut away the palisades. Then -Wellington, again coming to the siege, resolved to make a lodgement on -the breach, and ordered an assault for the next day at eleven o’clock, -when the ebb of tide would leave full space between the horn-work and -the water. - -The galleries on the isthmus had now been pushed close up to the sea -wall, and three mines were formed, with the double object of opening -an easy way for the troops to reach the strand, and rendering useless -any subterranean defensive works of the enemy. At two o’clock in the -morning they were sprung and opened three wide passages, which were -immediately connected, and a traverse, six feet high, was run across -the mouth of the main trench on the left, to screen the opening -from the grape-shot of the castle. Everything was then ready for the -assault, but ere that terrible event is told the French state of -defence must be made known. - -General Graham had been before the place fifty-two days, during thirty -of which the attack was suspended. All that time the garrison had -laboured incessantly, and though the heavy fire of the besiegers since -the 26th appeared to have ruined the defences of the enormous breach in -the sea flank, it was not so. A perpendicular fall behind of more than -twenty feet barred progress, and beyond that, amongst the ruins of the -burned houses, was a strong counter wall fifteen feet high, loopholed -for musketry and extending in a parallel direction with the breaches, -which were also cut off from the sound part of the rampart by traverses -at the extremities. The only really practicable road into the town was -by the narrow end of the high curtain above the half bastion of St. -John. - -In front of the loopholed wall, about the middle of the great breach, -stood the tower of Los Hornos, still capable of some defence, and -beneath it a mine was charged with twelve hundred weight of powder. -The streets were all trenched and furnished with traverses to cover -a retreat to Monte Orgullo; and before the main breach could be -even reached a lodgement was to be effected in the horn-work; or, -as in the former assault, the advance made under a flanking fire of -musketry for two hundred yards, the first step being close to the sea -wall at a salient angle, where two mines charged with eight hundred -pounds of powder were prepared to overwhelm the advancing columns. -To support this system of retrenchments and mines there was still -one sixteen-pounder at St. Elmo, flanking the left of the breaches -on the river face; a twelve and an eight-pounder in the casemates of -the cavalier, to sweep the land face of St. John; many guns from the -Monte Orgullo, also especially those at the Mirador, could play on the -advancing columns, and there was a four-pounder hidden on the horn-work -to open during the assault. Neither the resolution of the governor -nor the courage of the garrison was abated, but the overwhelming fire -had reduced the fighting men, and Rey, who had only two hundred and -fifty in reserve, demanded of Soult whether his brave garrison should -be exposed to another assault. “_The army would endeavour to succour -him_,” was the reply, and he abided his fate. - -This assault, before the defences were ruined, was obviously a -repetition of the former fatal error; and the same generals who had -before publicly disapproved of the operations now more freely dealt -out censures, which, not ill-founded, were most ill-timed, because -doubts descend from the commanders to the soldiers. Lord Wellington -thought the fifth division had been thus discouraged, and incensed at -the cause, demanded fifty volunteers from each of the fifteen regiments -composing the first, fourth, and light divisions, “_men who could show -other troops how to mount a breach_.” That was the phrase employed, -and seven hundred and fifty gallant soldiers instantly marched to San -Sebastian in answer to the appeal. Colonel Cooke and Major Robertson -led the Guards and Germans of the first division; Major Rose commanded -the men of the fourth division; Colonel Hunt, an officer who had -already won his promotion at former assaults, led the fierce rugged -veterans of the light division, yet there were good officers and brave -soldiers in the fifth division. - -At first a simple lodgement on the great breach was designed, and -the volunteers and one brigade of the fifth division only were to be -employed; but in a council held at night, the engineer Smith maintained -that the orders were misunderstood, as no lodgement could be formed -unless the high curtain was gained; General Oswald was of the same -opinion; wherefore the remainder of the fifth division was brought to -the trenches, and General Bradford, having offered the services of -his Portuguese brigade, had a discretion to ford the Urumea from the -Chofres and assail the farthest breach. - -General Leith, commanding the fifth division, directed the attack from -the isthmus, and being offended at the arrival of the volunteers would -not suffer them to lead the assault; some he spread along the trenches -to keep down the fire of the horn-work, the remainder he kept in -reserve with Hay’s British and Sprye’s Portuguese brigades. Robinson’s -brigade was to assault in two columns, one at the old breach between -the towers, the other at St. John and the end of the high curtain. The -small breach was left for Bradford, and some large boats filled with -troops were to menace the back of Monte Orgullo from the ocean: Graham -overlooked all the operations from the Chofres. - - -STORMING OF SAN SEBASTIAN. (Aug. 1813.) - -The morning of the 31st broke heavily, and as a thick fog hid every -object the batteries could not open until eight o’clock, but from that -hour a constant shower of heavy missiles poured upon the besieged until -eleven: then Robinson’s brigade got out of the trenches, passed through -the openings in the sea-wall and was launched against the breaches. -While this column was gathering on the strand, near the salient angle -of the horn-work, twelve men under a sergeant, whose heroic death has -not sufficed to preserve his name, running violently forward, leaped on -the covered way to cut the sausage of the enemy’s mines, and the French -fired the train prematurely; the sergeant and his brave followers were -destroyed, and the high sea-wall was thrown with a dreadful crash -upon the head of the advancing column, but not more than forty men -were crushed and the rush was scarcely checked. The forlorn hope had -previously passed beyond the play of the mine, speeding along the -strand amidst a shower of grape and shells, the leader, Lieutenant -Macguire of the 4th Regiment, conspicuous from his long white plume, -his fine figure, and his swiftness, bounding far ahead of his men in -all the pride of youthful strength and courage, but at the foot of the -great breach he fell dead, and the stormers swept like a dark surge -over his body: many died with him and the trickling of wounded men to -the rear was incessant. - -A broad strand had been left by the retreating tide, and the sun had -dried the rocks, yet they still broke the ranks and the main breach -was two hundred yards off; the French also, seeing the first mass of -assailants pass the horn-work without attacking, crowded to the river -face and poured their musketry into the flank of the second column -as it rushed along a few yards below them: yet still running forward -the British returned this fire without slackening their speed. Then -the batteries of the Monte Orgullo and the St. Elmo sent showers of -shot and shells down on them, the two pieces on the cavalier swept -the breach in St. John, and the four-pounder in the horn-work, being -suddenly mounted on the broken bastion, poured grape-shot into their -rear. - -Although scourged thus with fire, and their array broken by shot and -by the rocks, the stormers reached the great breach and the head of -the first column mounted; but the unexpected gulf beyond could only be -passed at a few places where meagre parcels of the burned houses were -still attached to the rampart, and the deadly clatter of the French -muskets from the loop-holed wall beyond soon strewed the narrow crest -of the ruins with dead. In vain the following multitude, covering the -ascent, sought an entrance at every part; to advance was impossible and -the mass slowly sunk downwards, yet remained stubborn and immoveable -on the lower part. There they were covered from the musketry in front, -yet from several isolated points, especially the tower of Los Hornos -under which the great mine was placed, the French still struck them -with small arms, and the artillery from Monte Orgullo poured shells and -grape without intermission. - -Meanwhile at the St. John affairs were worse. To reach the top of the -high curtain was quite practicable, and the effort to force a way there -being strenuous and constant, the slaughter was in proportion; for -the traverse on the flank was defended by French grenadiers who would -not yield, the two guns on the cavalier swept the front face, and the -four-pounder and the musketry from the horn-work swept the river face. -In the midst of this destruction some sappers and a working party -attached to the assaulting columns endeavoured to form a lodgement; but -no artificial materials had been provided, and most of the labourers -were killed before they could raise cover. - -During this time the British batteries kept up a constant counter-fire, -which killed many French, and the reserve brigades of the 5th division -gradually fed the attack until the left wing of the 9th Regiment only -remained in the trenches. The volunteers who had been with difficulty -restrained in the parallel, calling out to know, “_why they had been -brought there if they were not to lead the assault_,”--these fierce and -terrible men, whose presence had given such offence to Leith that he -would have kept them altogether from the assault, being now perforce -let loose, went like a whirlwind to the breaches and swarmed up the -face of the ruins; but on the crest the stream of fire struck and they -came down like a falling wall; crowd after crowd were seen to mount, -to totter, to sink, and when the smoke floated away the summit bore no -living man. - -Graham, standing on the nearest of the Chofre batteries, beheld this -frightful destruction with a stern resolution to win at any cost, and -he was a man to have put himself at the head of the last company and -died sword in hand rather than sustain a second defeat: but neither -his confidence nor his resources were yet exhausted. He directed a new -attack on the horn-work, and concentrating the fire of fifty heavy -pieces upon the high curtain sent his shot over the heads of the troops -gathered at the foot of the breach; a fearful stream of missiles, -which pouring along the upper surface of the high curtain broke down -the traverses, shattering all things, and strewing the rampart with -the mangled limbs of the defenders. When this flight of bullets -first swept over the heads of the soldiers a cry arose from some -inexperienced people, “_to retire because the batteries were firing on -the stormers_;” but the veterans of the light division, being at that -point, were not to be so disturbed, and in the very heat and fury of -the cannonade effected a solid lodgement in some house ruins actually -within the rampart, on the right of the great breach. - -For half an hour the horrid tempest smote upon the works and the houses -behind, and then suddenly ceased, when the clatter of French muskets -was again heard, showing that the assailants were still in activity. -At the same time the 13th Portuguese Regiment under Major Snodgrass, -followed by a detachment of the 24th under Colonel Macbean, entered -the river from the Chofres. The ford was deep, the water rose above -the waist, and when the soldiers reached the middle of the stream, two -hundred yards wide, a shower of grape struck the column with terrible -havoc, yet the survivors closed and moved on; a second discharge tore -the ranks from front to rear; still the regiment moved on, and amidst -a confused fire of musketry from the ramparts, and artillery from -St. Elmo, the castle, and the Mirador, landed and rushed against the -third breach, while Macbean’s men reinforced the great breach. The -fighting then again became fierce and obstinate at all the breaches; -yet the French musketry rolled with deadly effect, the heaps of slain -increased, and once more the great mass of stormers sunk to the foot of -the ruins unable to win: the living sheltered themselves as they could, -and the dead and wounded lay so thickly that hardly could it be judged -whether the hurt or unhurt were most numerous. - -It was now evident the assault must fail unless some accident -intervened; for the tide was rising, the reserves all engaged, and no -greater effort could be expected from men whose passionate courage -had been already pushed to the verge of madness. Fortune intervened. -A number of powder barrels, live shells, and combustible materials -accumulated behind the traverses caught fire, a bright consuming flame -wrapped the high curtain, a succession of explosions followed, hundreds -of the French grenadiers were destroyed; the rest were thrown into -confusion, and while the ramparts were still involved with suffocating -eddies of smoke the British soldiers broke in at the first traverse. -The French, bewildered by this terrible disaster, yielded for a moment, -yet soon rallied, and a close desperate struggle took place along -the summit of the high curtain, but the fury of the stormers, whose -numbers increased every moment, could not be stemmed; the colours on -the cavalier were torn away by Lieutenant Gethin of the 11th Regiment; -the horn-work, the land front below the curtain, and the loop-holed -wall behind the great breach, all were abandoned, and then the light -division soldiers, already established in the ruins on the French left, -penetrated into the streets; and at the same moment the Portuguese at -the small breach, mixed with British who had wandered to that point -seeking for an entrance, burst in on their side. - -Five hours this dreadful battle had lasted at the walls, and now the -stream of war went pouring into the town; yet the undaunted governor -still disputed the victory at his barricades, although several hundreds -of men had been cut off in the horn-work, and his garrison was so -reduced that even to retreat behind the line of defence separating the -town from Monte Orgullo was difficult: however the troops, flying -from the horn-work on the harbour flank, broke through a body of the -British near the fortified convent of Santa Téresa, and that post was -still retained by the French within the town. It was thought Monte -Orgullo might have been then carried if a commander of rank to direct -the troops had been at hand; but, as in the first assault, whether -from wounds or accident no general entered the place until long after -the breach had been won, the battalion officers were embarrassed for -want of orders, and a thunder-storm, coming down the mountains with -unbounded fury just as the place was carried, added to the confusion of -the fight--the opportunity was lost. - -This storm seemed to be a signal from hell for the perpetration of -villany which would have shamed the most ferocious barbarians of -antiquity. At Ciudad Rodrigo intoxication and plunder had been the -principal objects; at Badajos lust and murder were joined to rapine -and drunkenness; at San Sebastian, the direst, the most revolting -cruelty was added to the catalogue of crimes: one atrocity, of -which a girl of seventeen was the victim, staggers the mind by its -enormous, incredible, indescribable barbarity. Some order was at first -maintained, but the resolution to throw off discipline was quickly -made manifest. A British staff-officer was pursued with a volley of -small arms and escaped with difficulty from men who mistook him for -a provost-marshal; a Portuguese adjutant, striving to prevent some -ruffianism, was put to death in the market-place, not with sudden -violence but deliberately. Many officers exerted themselves to preserve -order, many men were well-conducted, yet the rapine and violence -commenced by villains soon spread, the camp-followers crowded into the -place, and the disorder continued until fire, following the steps of -the plunderer, put an end to his ferocity by destroying the whole town. - -Three generals, Leith, Oswald, and Robinson, had been hurt in the -trenches; Sir Richard Fletcher, a brave man, was killed; Colonel -Burgoyne, next in command of the engineers, was wounded. The carnage -at the breaches was appalling. Nearly half the volunteers were struck -down, the fifth division suffered in the same proportion, and the -whole loss since the renewal of the siege exceeded two thousand five -hundred men and officers. Amongst the last may be mentioned Lieutenant -John O’Connel of the 43rd, in blood nearly related to the celebrated -turbulent agitator. He was gentle, amiable, and modest, and brave as -man could be, and having previously been in several storming parties -here again sought in such dangerous service the promotion he had earned -before without receiving--he found death. - -Monte Orgullo was now to be attacked. Steep and difficult to assail -it was, and just below the castle four batteries connected with -masonry were stretched across its face; from their extremities, also, -ramps protected by redans led to the convent of Santa Téresa, the -most salient part of the defence. Towards the harbour and behind the -mountain were sea batteries, and if all these works had been of good -construction and defended by fresh troops the siege would have been -difficult; but the garrison was shattered by the recent assault, most -of the engineers were killed, the governor wounded, five hundred men -sick or hurt, and the soldiers fit for duty, only thirteen hundred, had -four hundred prisoners to guard. The castle was small, the bomb-proofs -filled with ammunition and provisions, and but ten guns were left for -service, three being on the sea line. There was little water, and the -soldiers had to lie on the naked rock, exposed to fire, or only covered -by asperities of ground; they were however still resolute to fight, and -received nightly, by sea, supplies of ammunition in small quantities. - -Lord Wellington arrived the day after the assault, and judging regular -approaches up the naked rock impracticable, doubting also the power of -vertical fire, he resolved to breach the remaining line of defence and -then storm the Orgullo. Meanwhile from the Santa Téresa convent, which -was actually in the town, the French killed many men; and when, after -several days, it was assaulted, they set the lower parts on fire and -retired by a communication from the roof to a ramp on the hill behind. -All this time the flames were licking up the houses, and the Orgullo -was overwhelmed with vertical fire. - -On the 3rd of September the governor was summoned, he was unshaken, -and the vertical fire was continued day and night, the British -prisoners suffering as well as the enemy; for the officer in the -castle, irritated by the misery of the garrison, cruelly refused to -let the unfortunate captives make trenches to cover themselves. The -French however complain, that their wounded and sick men, placed in an -empty magazine with a black flag flying, were fired upon, although the -English prisoners, in their uniforms, were posted around to strengthen -the claim of humanity. - -New breaching batteries were now commenced and armed with guns, brought -from the Chofres at low water across the Urumea, at first in the night, -but the difficulty of labouring in the water during darkness finally -induced the artillery officers to transport them in daylight under the -enemy’s batteries, which did not however fire. In the town labour was -impeded by the flaming houses, but near the foot of the Orgullo the -ruins furnished shelter for musketeers to gall the garrison, and the -Santa Clara Island battery was actively worked by the seamen. With -the besieged ammunition was scarce, and the horrible vertical fire, -contrary to Lord Wellington’s expectation, subdued their energy; yet -the action was prolonged until the 8th of September, when fifty-nine -heavy battering pieces opened at once from the island, the isthmus, the -horn-work and the Chofres. In two hours the Mirador and Queen’s battery -were broken, the French fire extinguished, and the hill furrowed -in a frightful manner; the bread-ovens were destroyed, a magazine -exploded, and the castle, small and crowded with men, was overlaid -with the descending shells. Then proudly bending to fate the governor -surrendered. On the 9th this brave man and his heroic garrison, reduced -to one-third of their original number, and leaving five hundred wounded -behind, marched out with the honours of war. The siege thus terminated, -after sixty-three days’ open trenches, and just as the tempestuous -season, then beginning to vex the coast, would have rendered a -continuance of the sea blockade impossible. - -The excesses committed in the storming of San Sebastian caused great -indignation in Spain, and justly; but they were used by the Spanish -government to create a hatred of the British army, and, horrible as -were the facts, it is certain the atrocities were the work of a few. -Writers have not been wanting however to excuse them on the insulting -ground, that no soldiers can be restrained after storming a town and -British soldiers least of all, because they are brutish and insensible -to honour! Shame on such calumnies! What makes the British soldier -fight as no other soldier ever fights? His pay! Soldiers of all nations -receive pay. At the period of this assault, a sergeant of the 28th, -named Ball, being sent with a party to the coast from Roncesvalles to -make purchases for his officers, placed two thousand dollars entrusted -to him with a commissary, secured his receipt and persuaded his party -to join in the storm. He survived, reclaimed the money, made his -purchases, and returned to his regiment. And these are the men, these -the spirits who are called too brutish to work upon except by fear! It -is to fear they are most insensible! - - -BATTLES ON THE BIDASSOA. (Aug. 1813.) - -While Sebastian was being stormed Soult fought a battle with the -covering force, not willingly, nor with much hope of success; but -being averse to let it fall without another effort, he thought a bold -demeanour would best hide his real weakness. Guided however by the -progress of the siege, which he knew through his sea communication, -he awaited the last moment of action, striving meanwhile to improve -his resources and revive public confidence. Of his dispersed soldiers -eight thousand had rejoined, and he was promised a reinforcement of -thirty thousand conscripts; but these last were yet to be enrolled, and -neither the progress of the siege nor the panic along the frontier, -which recurred with increased violence after the late battles, would -suffer him to wait. - -He knew his enemy’s superior strength in positions, number and military -confidence, yet expected, as his former effort had interrupted the -siege, another would produce a like effect; and he hoped, by repeating -the disturbance, as long as he could by sea reinforce and supply -the garrison, to render the siege a wasting operation. To renew the -movement against Pampeluna was most advantageous, but it required -fifty thousand infantry for attack, twenty thousand for observation -on the Lower Bidassoa, and he had not so many. His supplies also were -uncertain, the loss of all the military carriages at Vittoria was still -felt, the resources of the country were reluctantly yielded by the -people, and to act on the side of St. Jean Pied de Port was therefore -impracticable. - -To attack the allies’ centre was unpromising. Two mountain-chains were -to be forced before the movement could seriously affect Wellington, -and as the ways were impracticable for guns success would not give any -decisive result. To attack the left of the allies by the great road -of Irun remained. He could there employ forty-five thousand infantry, -but the positions were of perilous strength. The Upper Bidassoa was -in Wellington’s power, because the light division, occupying Vera and -the heights of Santa Barbara on the right bank, commanded all the -bridges. The Lower Bidassoa, flowing from Vera with a bend to the left, -separated the hostile armies, and against that line, of nine miles, the -attack was necessarily directed. From the broken bridge of Behobia, -in front of Irun, to the sea, the river, broad and tidal, offered no -apparent passage; from the fords of Biriatu up to those of Vera, three -miles, there was only the one passage of Andarlassa, two miles below -Vera, and there steep craggy mountain-ridges without roads lining -the river forbade great operations. Thus the points of attack were -restricted to Vera itself and the fords between Biriatu and Behobia. - -To gain Oyarzun, a small town eight miles beyond the Bidassoa and close -to Passages, was Soult’s object, and a royal road led directly to it -by a broad valley between the Peña de Haya and Jaizquibel mountains; -but the Peña de Haya, called also the four-crowned mountain, filled all -the space between Vera, Lesaca, Irun and Oyarzun, and its staring head, -bound with a rocky diadem, was impassable: from the bridges of Vera -and Lesaca, however, roads, one of them not absolutely impracticable -for guns, passed over its enormous flanks to Irun on one side, to -Oyarzun on the other, falling into the royal road at both places. Soult -therefore proposed to drive the light division from Santa Barbara, and -use the bridges of Lesaca and Vera to force a passage over the Peña -de Haya on his own right of its summit, pushing the heads of columns -towards Oyarzun and the Upper Urumea, while Reille and Villatte, -passing the Bidassoa at Biriatu, forced their way by the royal road. - -Soon he changed this plan, and with great caution and subtilty brought -his left from St. Jean Pied de Port to his right, masking the movement -by his cavalry, and thus formed two columns of attack on the Lower -Bidassoa. One under Clausel, of twenty thousand men with twenty pieces -of artillery, was concentrated in the woods behind the Commissari -and Bayonette mountains above Vera. The other under Reille, eighteen -thousand strong, was placed on the Lower Bidassoa, having Foy’s -division and some light cavalry in the rear ready to augment it to -twenty-five thousand. Thirty-six pieces of artillery and two bridge -equipages were disposed near Urogne, on the royal road, all being -secreted behind the lower ridge of the mountains near Biriatu. - -Soult’s first design was to attack at daybreak on the 30th, but his -preparations being incomplete he deferred it until the 31st, taking -rigorous precautions to prevent intelligence passing over to the -allies; Wellington’s emissaries had, however, told him in the night -of the 29th that the French were in movement, and the augmentation of -troops in front of Irun was observed in the morning of the 30th. In the -evening the bridge equipage and the artillery were discovered on the -royal road, and thus warned he prepared for battle with little anxiety; -for a fresh brigade of English foot-guards, most of the marauders and -men wounded at Vittoria, and three regiments from England, forming a -new brigade under Lord Aylmer, had recently joined. - -His extreme left was on the Jaizquibel, a narrow mountain-ridge -seventeen hundred feet high, running along the coast and abutting at -one end on the Passages harbour, at the other on the navigable mouth -of the Bidassoa. Offering no mark for attack, it was only guarded -by some Spaniards; but the small fort of Figueras, commanding the -entrance of the river at its foot, was garrisoned by seamen from the -naval squadron, and Fuenterabia, a walled place, also at its base, was -occupied. - -The low ground between Fuenterabia and Irun was defended by large field -redoubts, connecting the Jaizquibel with some heights covering the -royal road to Oyarzun. - -On the right of Irun, between Biriatu and the burned bridge of Behobia, -a sudden bend in the river presented the convex to the French, who thus -commanded the fords; but beyond those fords was a stiff and lofty -ridge, called San Marcial, terminating one of the great flanks of the -Peña de Haya. The water flowed round the left of this ridge, confining -the road from the Behobia bridge to Irun, one mile, to the narrow space -between the channel and the foot of the height; Irun itself, defended -by a field-work, blocked this way; and hence the French, after passing -the river, had to win San Marcial before they could use the great -road; but six thousand Spaniards occupied that strong ridge, which was -strengthened by abbattis and temporary field-works. - -Behind Irun the first British division was posted under General Howard, -and Lord Aylmer’s brigade supported the left of the Spaniards. - -San Marcial, receding from the river on the right, was exposed to an -enemy passing above Biriatu; but Longa’s Spaniards, drawn off from -those slopes of the Peña de Haya descending towards Vera, were posted -on those descending towards Biriatu, where they supported the right of -the Spaniards on San Marcial. - -Eighteen thousand fighting men were thus in position, and as the fourth -division was still disposable, a Portuguese brigade was detached from -it to replace Longa near Vera, and cover the roads from that place over -the flanks of the Peña de Haya. The British brigades of that division -were stationed up the mountain, near the foundry of San Antonio, -commanding the intersection of the roads coming from Vera and Lesaca, -and furnishing a reserve to the Portuguese brigade, to Longa, and to -San Marcial--tying all together. The Portuguese brigade being however -too weak to guard the enormous slopes near Vera, Inglis’s brigade was -drawn from Echallar to reinforce it; yet the flanks of the Peña de Haya -were so rough and vast the troops seemed sprinkled rather than posted. - -In the night of the 30th Soult placed his guns, and gave his orders. -Reille was to storm San Marcial, to leave a strong reserve there to -meet troops coming from Vera or descending the Peña de Haya, and with -the rest of his force drive the allies from ridge to ridge, until he -gained the slope of the mountain which descends upon Oyarzun. When -the royal road was thus opened, Foy’s infantry, with the cavalry and -artillery in one column, were to cross by bridges to be laid during the -fight. - -To aid Reille’s progress and provide for a general concentration at -Oyarzun, Clausel was to make a simultaneous attack from Vera; not as -first designed, by driving the allies from Santa Barbara, but, leaving -one division and his guns to keep the light division in check, to -cross the river by fords just below the town of Vera and assail the -Portuguese brigade and Inglis, forcing his way upwards to the forge -of Antonio, from whence he was to fall down again on the rear of San -Marcial, or move on Oyarzun. - - -COMBAT OF SAN MARCIAL. (Aug. 1813.) - -At daylight on the 31st, Reille forded the Bidassoa above Biriatu -with two divisions and two pieces of artillery, to seize a detached -ridge just under San Marcial. Leaving there one brigade as a reserve, -he detached another to attack the Spanish left, while in person he -assailed their right. The side of the mountain was covered with -brushwood and very steep, the French troops preserved no order, the -supports and skirmishers got mixed in one mass, and the charging -Spaniards drove them headlong down. - -During this action two bridges were thrown below the fords, by which -Villatte’s reserve crossed and renewed the fight; one of his brigades -reached the chapel San Marcial above, and the left of the Spanish line -was shaken; but then the 85th, from Lord Aylmer’s brigade, advanced to -support, and at that moment Wellington rode up with all his staff. He -exhorted the Spaniards, and they, with a noble instinct which never -abandons the poor people of any country, acknowledged real greatness -without reference to nation; for, shouting in reply they dashed their -adversaries down with so much violence that many were driven into the -river, and some of the French pontoon boats coming to the succour -were overloaded and sunk. It was several hours before the broken and -confused masses could be rallied, or the bridges, which were broken -up to let the boats save the drowning men, be replaced. When that was -effected, Soult sent the whole of Villatte’s reserve over the river, -called up Foy, and prepared a better attack: with greater hope of -success, also, because Clausel was now making good way up the Peña de -Haya. - - -COMBAT OF VERA. (Aug. 1813.) - -Clausel had descended the Bayonette and Commissari mountains at -daybreak in a thick fog, but at seven o’clock the weather cleared, -and three heavy columns were seen by the troops on Santa Barbara -making for the fords below Vera. A fourth column and the guns remained -stationary on the mountains, the artillery opening now and then upon -Vera, from which the picquets of the light division were recalled, with -the exception of one post in a fortified house commanding the bridge. -At eight o’clock the French passed the fords, covered by a fire of -artillery, but the first shells thrown fell into the midst of their own -ranks, and the British troops on Santa Barbara cheered their battery -with a derisive shout. Their march was however sure, and their light -troops, without knapsacks, soon commenced battle with the Portuguese -brigade, forcing it to retire up the mountain. Inglis fed his line of -skirmishers until the whole of his brigade was engaged, but Clausel -menaced his left flank from the lowest ford, and the French skirmishers -still forced their way upwards in front until the contending masses -disappeared fighting amidst the asperities of the Peña de la Haya. The -British lost two hundred and seventy men and twenty-two officers, and -were driven up to the fourth division at the foundry of San Antonio. - -This fight, from the great height and asperity of the mountain, -occupied many hours, and it was past two o’clock before even the head -of Clausel’s column reached Antonio. Meanwhile, his reserve in front -of Santa Barbara made no movement, and as Wellington had directed the -light division to aid Inglis, a wing of the 43rd, three companies -of riflemen and three weak Spanish battalions, drawn from Echallar, -crossed the Bidassoa by the Lesaca bridge and marched towards some -lower slopes on the right of Inglis. This covered a knot of minor -communications coming from Lesaca and Vera, and the remainder of -Kempt’s brigade occupied Lesaca itself. Thus the chain of connection -and defence between Santa Barbara and the positions of the fourth -division on the Peña de la Haya was completed. - -Clausel seeing these movements, thought the allies at Echallar and -Santa Barbara were only awaiting to take him in flank and rear by the -bridges of Vera and Lesaca, wherefore he abated his battle and informed -Soult of his views, and his opinion was well-founded. Wellington was -not a general to have half his army paralyzed by D’Erlon’s divisions in -the centre, and had on the 30th, when Soult first assembled in front -of San Marcial, ordered attacks to be made upon D’Erlon from Echallar, -Zagaramurdi and Maya; Hill also had been directed to show the heads of -columns towards St. Jean Pied de Port; and on the 31st, when the force -and direction of Clausel’s columns were known, the seventh division was -called to Lesaca. - -Following these orders, Giron’s Spaniards skirmished on the 30th with -the advanced posts in front of Sarre, and next day the whole line was -assailed. Two Portuguese brigades drove the French from their camp -behind Urdax and burned it, but Abbé who commanded there, collecting -all his force on an intrenched position made strong battle and repulsed -the attack. Thus five combats besides the assault on Sebastian were -fought in one day at different points of the general line, and D’Erlon -who had lost three or four hundred men, seeing a fresh column coming -from Maya, as if to turn his left, judged that a great movement against -Bayonne was in progress and sent notice to Soult. He was mistaken. -Wellington only sought by these demonstrations to disturb the French -plan of attack, and the seventh division marched towards Lesaca. - -D’Erlon’s despatch reached Soult at the same time that Clausel’s report -arrived. All his arrangements for a final attack on San Marcial were -then completed, but these reports and the ominous cannonade at San -Sebastian, plainly heard during the morning, induced him to abandon -this project and prepare to receive a general battle on the Nivelle. -In this view he sent Foy’s infantry and six troops of dragoons to -the heights of Serres, behind the Nivelle, as a support to D’Erlon, -and directed Clausel to repass the Bidassoa in the night, to leave a -division on the Bayonette mountain and join Foy at Serres. - -Reille’s troops were not recalled from San Marcial and the battle -went on sharply; for the Spaniards continually detached men from the -crest to drive the French from the lower ridges into the river until -about four o’clock, when, their hardihood abating, they desired to be -relieved; but Wellington, careful of their glory, and seeing the French -attacks were exhausted, refused to relieve or aid them. It would not be -just to measure their valour by this fact; the English general blushed -while he called upon them to fight; knowing they had been previously -famished by their vile government, and that there were no hospitals to -receive, no care for them when wounded. The battle was however arrested -by a tempest, which commenced about three o’clock and raged for several -hours with wonderful violence, tearing huge branches from the trees, -and whirling them through the air like feathers on the howling winds, -while the thinnest streams swelling into torrents dashed down the -mountains, rolling innumerable stones along with a frightful clatter. -Amidst this turmoil and under cover of night the French re-crossed the -river at San Marcial. - -Clausel’s retreat was more unhappy. The order to retire reached him -when the storm had put an end to all fighting, and he repassed the -fords in person before dark at the head of two brigades, ordering -General Vandermaesen to follow with the remainder of the troops. -Expecting no difficulty, he neglected to seize the bridge of Vera and -the fortified house covering it, occupying himself with suggesting new -projects to Soult. Meanwhile Vandermaesen’s situation became desperate. -Many of his soldiers were drowned by the rising waters, and finally, -unable to effect a passage at the fords, he marched up the stream to -seize the bridge of Vera, which Clausel should have done before. His -advanced guard surprised a corporal’s picquet and rushed over, but was -driven back by a rifle company posted in the fortified house. This -happened at three o’clock in the morning, and the riflemen defended -the passage until daylight, when a second company and some Portuguese -Caçadores came to their aid. But then the French reserve left at Vera, -seeing how matters stood, opened a fire of guns against the house from -a high rock just above, and their skirmishers approached it on the -right bank, while Vandermaesen plied his musketry from the left bank: -the two rifle captains and many men fell under this cross fire and the -passage was forced; but Vandermaesen, urging the attack in person, was -killed, and more than two hundred of his soldiers were hurt. - -Meanwhile Soult, who was preparing a new attack on San Marcial, got -Rey’s report of the assault on San Sebastian, and also heard that -Hill was moving on the side of St. Jean Pied de Port. San Sebastian -was lost, an attempt to carry off the garrison of the castle would -cost five or six thousand men, and the whole army would be endangered -amongst the terrible asperities of the crowned mountain; for Wellington -could now throw his right and centre, thirty-five thousand men, upon -the French left during the action, and would be nearer to Bayonne -than their right when the battle was beyond the Lower Bidassoa. Three -thousand six hundred men had been lost, one general had been killed, -four wounded; a fresh attempt would be very dangerous, and serious -losses might cause an immediate invasion of France. Reflecting on these -things, he resolved to adopt defensive measures at once, for which -his vast knowledge of war, his foresight, his talent for methodical -arrangement, and his firmness of character, peculiarly fitted him. -Twelve battles or combats in seven weeks he had delivered to regain -the offensive, unsuccessfully; yet willing still to strive, he called -on Suchet to aid him, and demanded fresh orders from the emperor; but -Suchet helped him not, and Napoleon’s answer indicated at once his own -difficulties and his reliance upon the Duke of Dalmatia’s capacity and -fidelity. “_I have given you my confidence and can add neither to your -means nor to your instructions._” - -In this straggling battle the loss of the allies had been one thousand -Anglo-Portuguese and sixteen hundred Spaniards: hence the cost of men -on the day, including the assault, exceeded five thousand; but the -battle in no manner disturbed the siege; the French army was powerless -against such strong positions. - - - - -BOOK XIII. - - English Passage of the Bidassoa and Second Combat of Vera--The - Passage of the Lower Bidassoa--Second Combat of Vera--Battle of - the Nivelle; Characters of Colonel Lloyd and Lieutenant Freer. - - -ENGLISH PASSAGE OF THE BIDASSOA AND SECOND COMBAT OF VERA (Oct. 1813.) - -The fall of San Sebastian gave Lord Wellington a new port, and let -loose a considerable body of troops; Austria had joined the allies in -Germany; the English cabinet had promised the continental sovereigns -that France should be immediately invaded; the English newspaper -editors were actively deceiving the people of all countries by their -dictatorial absurd projects and assumptions; the Bourbon partizans were -conspiring, and the Duke of Berri desired to join the British army, -pretending that twenty thousand Frenchmen were armed and organized -to receive him. All was exultation and extravagance, but Wellington, -despising such inflated hopes and promises, exposed the absurdity -of the newspapers, and checked similar folly in higher places, by -observing, “_that if he had done all that was expected he should have -been before that period in the moon_.” - -Far from designing to invade France, he felt his own position insecure -while Suchet was master of Catalonia: and he was only prevented from -transferring the war to that province by the disasters Napoleon now -experienced in Germany, rendering it impossible to reinforce Soult. -However, pressed by the ministers and the allied sovereigns, he so far -bent his military judgment to political pressure, as to undertake the -establishing his army in a menacing position on French ground; and in -that view matured an offensive movement as daring as any undertaken -during the whole war. But to comprehend all the audacious grandeur of -this operation, the relative positions of the hostile armies must be -glanced at. - -Soult’s base and place of arms was Bayonne, from whence roads spread -out to the Pyrenees like a fan. Two only were great causeways. One, on -the French left hand, run to St. Jean Pied de Port; the other, on their -right, run along the sea-coast through St. Jean de Luz to Irun. Between -these points, a distance of nearly forty miles, the space was filled -transversely by a double range of mountain ridges nearly parallel to -each other, on which the armies were posted; not in a continuous line, -for there were no direct lateral communications, but as the passes -and inaccessible peaks governed the dispositions. Thus on the French -left, at St. Jean Pied de Port, Foy occupied with fifteen thousand -men an entrenched camp in front of that fortress, and was opposed by -Hill’s right wing, which was planted at the head of the Val Carlos, -in the Roncesvalles and Alduides; but Foy could only communicate by -a circuitous road, leading across the Nive river at Cambo, with the -French centre, entrenched, under D’Erlon, at Ainhoa and Urdax, opposite -the Maya passes, and menacing the Bastan, where Hill’s left was posted. - -At Urdax the Nivelle river bisected the French positions, and then, -turning to the left, run to St. Jean de Luz. The line of their right -centre, beyond that river, was under Clausel, and thrown forward to -Vera, along another batch of mountainous ridges, which, touching on the -Bidassoa, lined its right bank to the bridge of Behobia near Iran. - -From Clausel’s right to the mouth of the Bidassoa, Soult’s right wing, -under Reille, guarded the French territory. - -Clausel’s ground comprised the Great La Rhune mountain, two thousand -seven hundred feet high, whose bleak rocky head overlooked everything -around, and from whose flanks the positions of Sarre shot out on the -French left, and on their right the Commissari, Bayonette, and Mandale -ridge--the two first overhanging Vera, the last lining the Bidassoa -down to San Marcial and Irun. - -Opposed to Clausel Wellington held, first the Atchiola mountain on the -left of Maya, then the Echallar ridges as far as the Ivantelly mountain -facing Sarre, and the Santa Barbara ridge abutting on the Bidassoa at -Vera, facing the Bayonette and Commissari. On the left bank of the -Bidassoa he occupied the flanks of the Peña de Haya to San Marcial, -from whence his redoubts, as before noticed, run along the river to the -Jaizquibel. - -Soult had commenced a chain of entrenched camps and redoubts along his -whole line, and in the low country, from the end of the Mandale to the -sea, was constructing a double chain of entrenched positions and camps -bearing many names and to be noticed in the narrative. These works were -approaching completion when Wellington resolved to seize the Great La -Rhune with its dependents on both flanks, at the same time forcing -the passage of the Lower Bidassoa in face of Soult’s entrenchments. -Thus he would establish his left in the French territory, from Sarre -to the sea, and bring within his own lines the Rhune, the Commissari, -and Bayonette mountains, which would give him a salient menacing -point of impregnable strength towards France, and shorten his lateral -communication on both flanks of those mountains. It would also give -entire command of a road running up the Bidassoa from Irun to Vera, -and secure the port of Fuenterabia, which, though bad in winter, was -desirable for a general whose supplies came from the ocean, and who -with scanty means of transport had to sustain the perverse negligence -always, and often the hostility of the Spanish authorities. - -He had designed to force the passage in the middle of September before -the French works were advanced, but his pontoons were delayed by a -negligence of orders; the weather then became bad, and the attempt, -which depended upon the state of the tides and fords, was of necessity -deferred to the 7th of October. - -Great subtlety was to be combined with wonderful boldness, for the -Bidassoa was broad and tidal below Irun, and the ridges lining it -above that point rough and terrible to assail; both water and mountain -line were strengthened with works, incomplete indeed, but already of -strength in defence; the river was also to be passed and the positions -beyond carried between tides, or the troops would be swallowed by -the returning flood. Hence to mislead Soult, to support the blockade -of Pampeluna, and to ascertain Foy’s true position and strength at -St. Jean Pied de Port, which menaced anew that blockade, Wellington -brought up Del Parque’s army from Tudela to Pampeluna, transferred the -Andalusians at the latter place to Giron at Echallar, and directed -Mina to gather his irregulars around the Roncesvalles: then repairing -himself to that quarter on the 1st of October, he surprised a French -post on the Ayrola rock, cut off a scouting party in the Val de -Baygorry, and swept away two thousand sheep. - -These movements awakened Soult’s jealousy. He expected an invasion -of France without being able to ascertain from what quarter, and at -first, deceived by false information that Cole had reinforced Hill, -thought Mina’s troops and the Andalusians were used to mask an attack -by the Val de Baygorry. The arrival of the light cavalry in the Bastan, -Wellington’s presence at Roncesvalles, and the loss of the Ayrola post, -seemed to confirm this; but he knew that pontoons were at Oyarzun, and -the deserters, very numerous at this time, said the real object was -the Great Rhune. On the other hand, a French commissary, taken at San -Sebastian and exchanged after remaining twelve days at Wellington’s -head-quarters, assured him nothing there indicated a serious attack. -This weighed much, because the negligence about the pontoons, and the -wet weather, had caused a delay contradictory to the reports of the -spies and deserters. It was also beyond calculation that Wellington, -merely to please the allied sovereigns in Germany, should thereby seek -to establish his left wing in France, when the most obvious line for -a permanent invasion was by his right and centre, and there was no -apparent cause for deferring his operations. - -The cause of the procrastination, namely, the state of the tides and -fords on the Lower Bidassoa, was necessarily impenetrable, and Soult -finally inclined to think the only design was to secure the blockade -of Pampeluna by menacing the French, and impeding their entrenchments -which were now becoming strong. Nevertheless, as all the deserters and -spies came with the same story, he recommended increased vigilance -along the whole line; yet so little did he anticipate the real project, -that on the 6th he reviewed D’Erlon’s divisions at Ainhoa and remained -that night at Espelette, doubting if any attack was intended, and -having no fear for his right. But Wellington could not diminish his -troops on the side of Roncesvalles, lest a force should unite at St. -Jean Pied de Port to raise the blockade of Pampeluna; and at Maya, -Hill was already menacing Soult between the Nive and the Nivelle: it -was therefore only with his left wing and left centre, and against the -French right, that he could act while Pampeluna held out. - -Early in October a reinforcement of twelve hundred British soldiers -arrived from England. Mina was then on the right of Hill, who was thus -enabled to call Campbell’s Portuguese from the Alduides, and replace -at Maya the third division, which, shifting to its left, then occupied -the heights of Zagaramurdi and enabled the seventh division to relieve -Giron’s Andalusians in the Puerto de Echallar. - -These dispositions were made with a view to the attack of the Great -Rhune and its dependents, for which Wellington assembled the fourth -and light divisions on Santa Barbara, Giron’s Spaniards being on their -right, and Longa’s on their left. The sixth division, supported by the -third, was at Zagaramurdi to make a demonstration against D’Erlon’s -advanced posts. Thus, without weakening his line between Roncesvalles -and Echallar, he could assail the Rhune mountain and its dependents -with twenty thousand men, and had still twenty-four thousand disposable -for the passage of the Lower Bidassoa. - -It has been before said that between the Andarlasa ford, below Vera, -and the fords of Biriatu, a distance of three miles, there were neither -roads nor fords nor bridges. The French, trusting to this difficulty -of approach and to their entrenchments on the craggy slopes of the -Mandale, had collected their troops principally where the Bildox or -green mountain, and the entrenched camp of Biriatu overlooked the -fords, and against them Wellington directed Freyre’s Spaniards from San -Marcial. - -Between Biriatu and the sea the advanced points of defence were the -mountain of _Louis_ XIV., a ridge called the _Caffé Républicain_, and -the town of Andaya; behind which the _Calvaire d’Urogne_, the _Croix -des Bouquets_, and the camp of the _Sans Culottes_, served as rallying -posts. The first and fifth divisions, and the unattached brigades of -Wilson and Lord Aylmer, in all fifteen thousand men, were destined to -assault these works; and the Spanish fishermen had secretly indicated -three fords practicable at low water between the bridge of Behobia -and the sea. Wellington therefore, with an astonishing hardihood, -designed to pass his columns at the old known fords above and these -secret fords below bridge, though the tides rose sixteen feet, leaving -at the ebb open heavy sands not less than half a mile broad! The left -bank of the river also was completely exposed to observation from -the enemy’s hills, which, though low in comparison of the mountains -above the bridge, were strong ridges of defence; but relying on his -previous measures the English general disdained these dangers, and his -anticipations were not belied by the result. For the unlikelihood that, -having a better line of operations, he would force such a river as -the Bidassoa at its mouth, entirely deceived Soult, whose lieutenants -were also very negligent. Of Reille’s two divisions, one under Boyer -was dispersed, labouring on the entrenched camp of Urogne far from the -river; Villatte’s reserve was at Ascain and Serres; and five thousand -men of Maucune’s division, though on the first line, were unexpectant -of an attack. The works on the Mandale were finished, those at Biriatu -in a forward state, but from the latter to the sea all were imperfect. - - -THE PASSAGE OF THE LOWER BIDASSOA. (Oct. 1813.) - -On the 6th the night set in heavily. A sullen thunderstorm, gathering -about the craggy summit of the Peña de Haya, came slowly down its -flanks, and towards morning, rolling over the Bidassoa, fell in its -greatest violence upon the French positions. During this turmoil -Wellington, whose pontoons and artillery were close up to Irun, -disposed a number of guns and howitzers along the crest of San Marcial, -and his columns secretly attained their stations along the banks of the -river. The Spaniards, one brigade of Guards, and Wilson’s Portuguese, -stretching from the Biriatu fords to the broken bridge of Behobia, -were ensconced behind the lower ridge of San Marcial, which had been -seized by the French in the attack of the 31st; another brigade of -Guards and the Germans were concealed near Irun, close to a ford, below -bridge, called the Great Jonco; the fifth division were covered by a -river embankment opposite Andaya; Sprye’s Portuguese and Lord Aylmer’s -brigade were posted in the ditch of Fuenterabia. - -All the tents were left standing in the camps, and the enemy, seeing -no change on the morning of the 7th, were unsuspicious; but at seven -o’clock, the fifth division and Aylmer’s brigade, emerging from their -concealment took the sands in two columns. The left one moved against -the French camp of the Sans Culottes, the other against the ridge of -Andaya, but no shot was fired until they passed the low water channel, -when an English rocket was sent up from the steeple of Fuenterabia as -a signal. Then the artillery opened from San Marcial, the troops near -Irun, covered by the fire of a battery, made for the Jonco, and the -passage above the bridge also commenced. - -From the crest of San Marcial seven columns could now be seen at once, -attacking on a line of five miles; those above bridge plunging at once -into the fiery contest, those below, appearing in the distance like -huge serpents sullenly winding over the heavy sands. The Germans missed -the Jonco ford and got into deep water, yet quickly recovered the true -line, and the French, completely surprised, permitted even the brigades -of the fifth division to gain the right bank and form their lines -before a hostile musket flashed. The cannonade from San Marcial was -heard by Soult at Espelette, and at the same time the sixth division -made a false attack on D’Erlon’s positions; the Portuguese brigade -under Colonel Douglas, was however pushed too far and got beaten with -the loss of a hundred and fifty men. - -Soult now comprehending the true state of affairs hurried to his right, -but his camps on the Bidassoa were lost before he arrived. For when the -British artillery first opened, Maucune’s troops assembled at their -different posts, and the French guns opened from the Louis XIV. and -Caffé Républicain; then the alarm spread, and Boyer marched from Urogne -to support Maucune, without waiting for the junction of his working -parties; but his brigades moved separately as they could collect, -and before the first came into action, Sprye’s Portuguese, forming -the extreme left of the allies, were menacing the camp of the Sans -Culottes: thither therefore one of Boyer’s regiments was ordered, while -the others advanced by the royal road towards the Croix des Bouquets. -Andaya, guarded only by a picquet, was meanwhile abandoned, and -Reille, thinking the camp of the Sans Culottes would be lost before -Boyer’s men could reach it, sent a battalion there from the centre; he -thus weakened the chief point; for the British brigades of the fifth -division were now bearing from Andaya towards the Croix des Bouquets -under a fire of guns and musketry. - -The first division had passed the river, one column above bridge, -preceded by Wilson’s Portuguese, the other below, preceded by the -German light troops, who with the aid of the artillery on San Marcial -won the Caffé Républicain and the mountain of Louis XIV., driving -the French to the Croix des Bouquets. This last was the key of the -position, and towards it guns and troops were now hastening from both -sides, but the Germans were there brought to a check, for the heights -were strong and Boyer’s leading battalions close at hand; at that -moment however, Colonel Cameron, coming up with the 9th Regiment, -passed through the German skirmishers and vehemently ascended the -first height, whereupon the French opened their ranks to let their -guns retire, and then retreated at full speed to a second ridge, -somewhat lower, but only to be approached on a narrow front. Cameron -as quickly threw his men into a single column and bore against this -new position under a concentrated fire, yet his violent course did -not seem to dismay the French until within ten yards when the furious -shout and charge of the 9th appalled them and the ridges of the -Croix des Bouquets were won as far as the royal road. Cameron lost -many men and officers, and during the fight the French artillery and -scattered troops, coming from different points and rallying on Boyer’s -battalions, had gathered on other ridges close at hand. - -The entrenched camp above Biriatu had been at first well defended -in front, but the Spanish right wing being opposed only by a single -battalion, soon won the Mandale mountain whereupon the French fell back -from the camp to the Calvaire d’Urogne. Then Reille, beaten at the -Croix des Bouquets and having both his flanks turned, the left by the -Spaniards, the right along the sea-coast, retreated in great disorder -through the village of Urogne. The British skirmishers entered that -place in pursuit, but were immediately beaten out again by the second -brigade of Boyer’s division; for Soult had now arrived with part of -Villatte’s reserve and many guns, and by his presence restored order -just as retreat was degenerating into flight. - -Reille lost eight guns and four hundred men; the allies only six -hundred men, of which half were Spaniards, so easy had the skill of -the English general rendered this stupendous operation. But if Soult, -penetrating Wellington’s design, had met the allies with the sixteen -thousand troops of that quarter, instead of the five thousand actually -engaged, the passage could scarcely have been forced; and a simple -check would have been tantamount to a terrible disaster, because in two -hours the returning tide would have come with a swallowing flood upon -the rear. - - -SECOND COMBAT OF VERA. (Oct. 1813.) - -Equally unprepared and unsuccessful were the French on the side of -Vera, although the struggle there proved more fierce and constant. - -Before daybreak Giron descended with his Spaniards from the Ivantelly -rocks, and Alten with the light division from Santa Barbara; the first -to the gorge of the pass leading from Vera to Sarre, the last to the -town of Vera, where he was joined by half of Longa’s force. - -One brigade, consisting of the 43rd, 17th Portuguese Regiment, and -two battalions of British riflemen, were in columns on the right of -Vera; the other brigade under Colonel Colborne, consisting of the -52nd, two battalions of Caçadores, and a third battalion of British -riflemen, were on the left of that town: half of Longa’s division was -between these brigades, the other half, after crossing the ford of -Salinas, drew up on Colborne’s left. The whole of the narrow vale of -Vera was thus filled with troops ready to ascend the mountains; and -General Cole, displaying his force to advantage on the heights of Santa -Barbara, presented a formidable reserve. - -Taupin’s division guarded the enormous positions in front. His right -was on the Bayonette, from whence a single slope descended to a small -plain, two parts down the mountain. From this platform three distinct -tongues shot into the valley below, each defended by an advanced post; -the platform itself was secured by a star redoubt, behind which, about -half-way up the single slope, there was a second retrenchment with -abbatis. Another large redoubt and an unfinished breast-work on the -superior crest completed the defence. - -The Commissari, a continuation of the Bayonette, towards the Great -Rhune, had in front a profound gulf thickly wooded and filled with -skirmishers; and between this gulf and another of the same nature, -run the main road from Vera over the Puerto, piercing the centre of -the French position. Ascending with short abrupt turns, this road was -blocked at every uncovered point with abbatis and small retrenchments, -each obstacle being commanded at half musket shot by small detachments -placed on all the projecting parts overlooking the ascent. A regiment, -entrenched above on the Puerto itself, connected the troops on the -crest of the Bayonette and Commissari with those on a saddle-ridge, -which joined those mountains with the Great Rhune, and was to be -assailed by Giron. - -Between Alten’s right and Giron’s left was an isolated advanced ridge -called by the soldiers the _Boar’s back_, the summit of which, half -a mile long and rounded at each end, was occupied by four French -companies. This huge cavalier, thrown as it were into the gulf on the -allies’ right of the road, covered the Puerto and the saddle-ridge; -and though of mean height in comparison of the towering ranges behind, -was yet so lofty, that a few warning-shots, fired from the summit by -the enemy, only reached the allies at its base with that slow singing -sound which marks the dying force of a musket-ball. It was essential -to take this Boar’s back before the general attack commenced, and five -companies of riflemen, supported by the 17th Portuguese, assailed it -at the Vera end, while a battalion of Giron’s Spaniards, preceded by -a company of the 43rd, attacked it on the other. Meanwhile the French -were in confusion. - -Clausel knew by a spy in the night that the Bayonette was to be -assaulted, and in the morning had heard from Conroux who was at Sarre, -that Giron’s camps were abandoned although the tents of the seventh -division were still standing; at the same time musketry was heard on -the side of Urdax, a cannonade on the side of Irun; then came Taupin’s -report that the vale of Vera was filled with troops, and to this last -quarter Clausel hurried. On his left the Spaniards had then driven -Conroux’s outposts from the gorge leading to Sarre, and a detachment -was creeping up towards the unguarded head of the Great Rhune; -wherefore, ordering four regiments of Conroux’s division to occupy -the summit, the front, and the flanks, of that mountain, he placed -a reserve of two other regiments behind it, hoping thus to secure -possession and support Taupin: but that general’s fate had been already -decided by Alten. - -Soon after seven o’clock a few cannon-shot from some mountain-guns, of -which each side had a battery, were followed by the Spanish musketry -on the right, and the next moment the Boar’s back was simultaneously -assailed at both ends. The riflemen on the Vera side ascended to a -small pine-wood two-thirds up and there rested, but soon resumed -their movement and with a scornful gallantry swept the French off -the top, disdaining to use their rifles, save a few shots down the -reverse side to show they were masters of the ridge. This had been the -signal for the general attack. The Portuguese followed the victorious -sharp-shooters; the 43rd, preceded by their own skirmishers and the -remainder of the riflemen of the right wing, plunged into the rugged -pass; Longa entered the gloomy wood of the ravine on their left; and -beyond Longa, Colborne’s brigade, moving by narrow paths, assailed the -Bayonette. The 52nd took the middle tongue, the Caçadores and riflemen -the two outermost, all bearing with a concentric movement against the -star redoubt on the platform above. Longa’s second brigade should have -flanked the left of this attack with a wide skirting movement; but -neither he nor his starved soldiers knew much of such warfare, and -therefore quietly followed the riflemen in reserve. - -Soon the open slopes were covered with men and with fire, and a -confused sound of mingled shouts and musketry filled the deep hollows, -from whence the white smoke came curling up from their gloomy recesses. -The French, compared with their assailants, seemed few and scattered -on the mountain side, and Kempt’s brigade fought its way without a -check through all the retrenchments on the main pass, the skirmishers -spreading wider as the depth of the ravines on each side lessened and -melted into the higher ridges. When half-way up an open platform -gave a clear view over the Bayonette slopes, and all eyes were turned -that way. Longa’s right brigade, fighting in the gulf between, seemed -labouring and over-matched; but beyond it, on the broad open space in -front of the star-fort, Colborne’s Caçadores and riflemen were seen to -come out in small bodies from a forest which covered the three tongues -of land up to the edge of the platform. Their fire was sharp, their -pace rapid, and in a few moments they closed upon the redoubt in a -mass; the 52nd were not then in sight, and the French, thinking from -the dark clothing all were Portuguese, rushed in close order out of -the entrenchment; they were numerous and very sudden, the rifle as a -weapon is overmatched by the musket and bayonet, and this rough charge -sent the scattered assailants back over the rocky edge of the descent. -With shrill cries the French followed, but just then the 52nd soldiers -appeared on the platform and raising their shout rushed forward; their -red uniform and full career startled the hitherto adventurous French, -they stopped short, wavered, turned, and fled to their entrenchment. -The 52nd, following hard, entered the works with them, and then the -riflemen and Caçadores, who had meanwhile rallied, passed it on both -flanks; for a few moments everything was hidden by a dense volume of -smoke, but again the British shout pealed high and the whole mass -emerged on the other side, the French, now the fewer, flying, the -others pursuing, until the second entrenchment, half-way up the parent -slope, enabled the retreating troops to make another stand. - -The exulting and approving cheers of Kempt’s brigade then echoed -along the mountain-side, and with renewed vigour the men continued -to scale the craggy mountain, fighting their toilsome way to the top -of the Puerto. Meanwhile Colborne, after having carried the second -entrenchment above the star-fort, was brought to a check by the works -on the crest of the mountain, from whence the French not only plied -his troops with musketry at a great advantage but rolled huge stones -down the steep. These works were well lined with men and strengthened -by a large redoubt on the right, yet the defenders faltered, for their -left flank was turned by Kempt, and the effects of Wellington’s general -combinations were then felt in another quarter. - -Freyre’s Spaniards, after carrying the Mandale mountain, had pushed -to a road leading from the Bayonette to St. Jean de Luz, which was -the line of retreat for Taupin’s right wing. The Spaniards got there -first, and Taupin, being thus cut off on that side, had to file his -right under fire along the crest of the Bayonette to reach the Puerto -de Vera road, where he joined his centre, but, so doing, lost a -mountain-battery and three hundred men. These last were captured by -Colborne in a remarkable manner. Accompanied by one of his staff and -half-a-dozen riflemen, he crossed their march unexpectedly, and with -his usual cool intrepidity ordered them to lay down their arms; an -order which they, thinking themselves entirely cut off, obeyed. During -these events, the French skirmishers in the deep ravine between the -two lines of attack, being feebly pushed by Longa’s troops, retreated -slowly, and getting amongst some rocks from whence there was no escape -also surrendered to Kempt. Taupin’s right and centre being then -completely beaten fled down the side of the mountain, closely pursued -until they rallied upon Villatte’s reserve, which was in order of -battle on a ridge extending across the gorge of Olette, between Urogne -and Ascain. The Bayonette, Commissari, and Puerto de Vera, were thus -won after five hours’ incessant fighting, and toiling, up their craggy -sides. Nevertheless the battle was still maintained by the French -troops on the summit of the Rhune. - -Giron, after driving Conroux’s advanced post from the gorge leading -from Vera to Sarre, had pushed a battalion towards the head of the -Great Rhune, and placed a reserve in the gorge to cover his rear from -any counter-attack. When his left wing was free to move by the capture -of the _Boar’s back_, he fought his way up abreast with the British -line until near the saddle-ridge, a little to the right of the Puerto; -but there his men were arrested by a strong line of abbatis, from -behind which two French regiments poured a heavy fire. An adventurer -named Downie, then a Spanish general, exhorted them and they kept -their ranks, yet did not advance; but there happened to be present an -officer of the 43rd Regiment, named Havelock,[38] who being attached -to Alten’s staff had been sent to ascertain Giron’s progress. His fiery -temper could not brook the check. He took off his hat, called upon the -Spaniards, and putting spurs to his horse at one bound cleared the -abbatis and went headlong among the enemy. Then the soldiers, shouting -for “_El chico blanco_,”--“_the fair boy_,” so they called him, for he -was very young and had light hair,--with one shock broke through at -the very moment the French centre was flying under the fire of Kempt’s -skirmishers from the Puerto on the left. - -The two defeated regiments retired by their left to the flanks of -the Rhune, and thus Clausel had eight regiments concentrated on this -great mountain. Two occupied the highest rocks called the Hermitage; -four were on the flanks, which descended towards Ascain on one hand -and Sarre on the other; the remaining two occupied a lower parallel -mountain behind called the Small Rhune. Giron’s right wing first -dislodged a small body from a detached pile of crags about musket-shot -below the summit of the Great Rhune, and then assailed the bald staring -rocks of the Hermitage itself, endeavouring at the same time to turn it -on the right. At both points the attempts were defeated with loss; the -Hermitage was impregnable: the French rolled down stones large enough -to sweep away a whole column at once, and the Spaniards resorted to a -distant musketry which lasted until night. - -In this fight Taupin lost two generals, four hundred men killed and -wounded, and five hundred prisoners. The loss of the allies was nearly -a thousand, of which half were Spaniards, and the success was not -complete; for while the French kept possession of the summit of the -Rhune the allies’ new position was insecure. - -Wellington, observing that the left flank of the mountain descending -towards Sarre was less inaccessible, concentrated the Spaniards next -day on that side for a combined attack against the mountain itself, -and against the camp of Sarre. At three o’clock in the afternoon the -rocks which studded the lower parts of the Rhune slope were assailed by -the Spaniards, and detachments of the seventh division descended from -the Puerto de Echallar upon the fort of San Barbe and other outworks -covering the French camp of Sarre. The Andalusians easily won the rocks -and an entrenched height commanding the camp; for Clausel, alarmed by -some slight demonstrations of the sixth division in rear of his left, -thought he should be cut off from his great camp, and very suddenly -abandoned, not only the slope of the mountain but all his advanced -works in the basin below, including the fort of San Barbe. His troops -were thus concentrated on the height behind Sarre, still holding with -their right the smaller Rhune, but the consequences of his error were -soon apparent. Wellington established a strong body of Spaniards close -to the Hermitage, and the two French regiments there, seeing the lower -slopes and San Barbe given up, imagined they also would be cut off, -and without orders abandoned their impregnable post in the night. Next -morning some of the seventh division rashly pushed into the village of -Sarre, but were quickly repulsed and would have lost the camp and works -taken the day before if the Spaniards had not succoured them. - -The whole loss on the three days’ fighting was fourteen hundred French -and sixteen hundred of the allies; but many of the wounded were not -brought in until the third day after the action, and others perished -miserably where they fell, it being impossible to discover them in -those vast solitudes. Some men also descended to the French villages, -got drunk, and were taken; nor was the number small of those who -plundered in defiance of Lord Wellington’s proclamations. He arrested -and sent several officers to England, observing in his order of the -day, that if he had five times as many men he could not venture -to invade France unless marauding was prevented. It is remarkable -likewise, that the French troops on the same day acted towards their -own countrymen in the same manner, and Soult also checked the mischief -with a terrible hand, causing a captain of some reputation to be shot -as an example for having suffered his men to plunder a house in Sarre. - -With exception of the slight checks sustained at Sarre and Ainhoa, -the course of these operations had been eminently successful, and the -bravery of troops who assailed and carried such stupendous positions -must be admired. To them the unfinished state of the French works was -not visible. Day after day, for more than a month, entrenchment had -risen over entrenchment, covering the slopes of mountains scarcely -accessible from their natural steepness and asperity. These could -be seen, but the growing strength of the works, the height of the -mountains, the broad river with its heavy sands and its mighty rushing -tide, all were despised by those brave soldiers; and while they -attacked with such confident valour, the French fought in defence of -their dizzy steeps with far less fierceness than when, striving against -insurmountable obstacles, they attempted to storm the lofty rocks of -Sauroren. Continual defeat had lowered their spirit. Yet the feeble -defence on this occasion may be traced to another cause. It was a -general’s, not a soldier’s battle. Wellington had with overmastering -combinations overwhelmed every point. Taupin’s and Maucune’s divisions, -each less than five thousand strong, were separately assailed, the -first by eighteen, the second by fifteen thousand men; and at neither -point were Reille and Clausel able to bring their reserves into action -before the positions were won. - -Soult complained that his lieutenants were unprepared, although -repeatedly told an attack was to be expected; and though they heard -the noise of the guns and pontoons about Irun on the night of the 5th, -and again on the night of the 6th. The passage of the river had, he -said, commenced only at seven o’clock, long after daylight; the enemy’s -masses were clearly seen forming on the banks, and there was full time -for Boyer’s division to arrive before the Croix des Bouquets was lost; -yet the battle was fought in disorder with less than five thousand -men, instead of ten thousand in good order and supported by Villatte’s -reserve. To this negligence they also added discouragement. They had -so little confidence in the strength of their positions, that if the -allies had pushed vigorously forward before his own arrival, they would -have entered St. Jean de Luz and forced the French army back upon the -Nive and Adour. This was true, but such a stroke did not comport with -Wellington’s system. He could not go beyond the Adour, he doubted -whether he could even maintain his army during the winter in the -position he had already gained; and he was averse to the experiment, -while Pampeluna held out and the war in Germany bore an undecided -aspect. - -Soult was very apprehensive for some days of another attack; but when -he saw Wellington’s masses form permanent camps he ordered Foy to -recover the fort of San Barbe, which blocked a pass leading from the -vale of Vera to Sarre and defended some narrow ground between La Rhune -and the Nivelle river. Abandoned without reason by the French, it was -only occupied by a Spanish picquet, several battalions being encamped -in a wood close behind. Many officers and men quitted their troops to -sleep in the fort, and on the night of the 12th three French battalions -surprised and escaladed the work; the Spanish troops behind went off -in confusion at the first alarm, and two hundred soldiers with fifteen -officers were made prisoners. Two Spanish battalions, ashamed of the -surprise, made a vigorous effort to recover the fort at daylight, but -were repulsed. An attempt was then made with five battalions, but -Clausel brought up two guns, and a sharp skirmish took place in the -wood which lasted for several hours, the French endeavouring to regain -the whole of their old entrenchments, the Spaniards to recover the -fort. Neither succeeded. San Barbe remained with the French, who lost -two hundred men, while the Spaniards lost five hundred. Soon after -this action a French sloop of war run from St. Jean de Luz, but three -English brigs cut her off, and the crew after exchanging a few distant -shots set her on fire and escaped in boats to the Adour. - -Head-quarters were now fixed in Vera, and the allied army was -organized in three grand divisions. The right, having Mina’s and -Morillo’s battalions attached to it, was commanded by General Hill, -and extended from Roncesvalles to the Bastan. The centre, occupying -Maya, the Echallar, Rhune and Bayonette mountains, was given to -Marshal Beresford. The left, extending from the Mandale mountain to -the sea, was under Sir John Hope. This officer succeeded Graham, who -had returned to England. Commanding in chief at Coruña after Sir John -Moore’s death, he was superior in rank to Lord Wellington during the -early part of the Peninsular war; but when the latter obtained the -baton of field-marshal at Vittoria, Hope, with a patriotism and modesty -worthy of the pupil of Abercrombie, the friend and comrade of Moore, -offered to serve as second in command, and Wellington joyfully accepted -him, saying--“_He was the ablest officer in the army._” - - -BATTLE OF THE NIVELLE. (Nov. 1813.) - -After the passage of the Bidassoa, Soult was assiduous to complete an -immense chain of intrenchments, some thirty miles long, which he had -previously commenced. The space between the sea and the upper Nivelle, -an opening of sixteen miles, was defended by double lines, and the -lower part of that river, sweeping behind the second of them, formed -a third line, having the intrenched camp of Serres on its right bank: -the upper river separated D’Erlon’s from Clausel’s positions, but was -crossed by the bridge of Amotz; the left of D’Erlon rested on the rough -Mondarain mountains, which closed that flank, abutting on the Nive. - -Beyond the Nive, Foy was called down that river towards the bridge of -Cambo, which was fortified in rear of D’Erlon’s left, and from thence -Soult had traced a second chain of intrenched camps, on a shorter line -behind the Nivelle, by San Pé, to join his camp at Serres: thus placed, -Foy had the power of reinforcing D’Erlon or menacing the right of the -allies according to events. - -Reille still commanded on the right in the low ground covering St. Jean -de Luz. - -Lord Wellington could scarcely feed his troops; those on the right, -at Roncesvalles, went two days without provisions, being blocked up -by snow; and the rest of the army, with the exception of the first -division, was lying out on the crests of high mountains very much -exposed. This made them indeed incredibly hardy and eager to pour down -on the fertile French plains below; but notwithstanding his recent bold -operation, their general looked to a retreat into Spain and a removal -of the war to Catalonia; for his position was scarcely tenable from -political and other difficulties, all of which he had foreseen and -foretold when the foolish importunity of the English Government urged -him to enter France. And if Soult, who was continually, though vainly -urging Suchet to co-operate with him, had persuaded that marshal to act -with vigour the allies must have retreated to the Ebro. Suchet however -would not stir, and the war in Germany having taken a favourable turn -Wellington eventually resolved to force the French lines. - -For this object, when Pampeluna surrendered, early in November, Hill’s -right was moved from Roncesvalles to the Bastan with a view to the -battle, and Mina took its place on the mountains; but then the Spanish -general Freyre suddenly declared that he was unable to subsist and must -withdraw a part of his troops. This was a disgraceful trick to obtain -provisions from the English, and it was successful, for the projected -attack could not be made without his aid. Forty thousand rations of -flour, with a formal intimation that if he did not co-operate the whole -army must retire again into Spain, contented him for the moment; but it -was declared the supply given would only suffice for two days, although -there were less than ten thousand soldiers in the field! - -Heavy rain again delayed the attack, but on the 10th of November, -ninety thousand combatants, seventy-four thousand being -Anglo-Portuguese, descended to battle, and with them ninety-five pieces -of artillery, all of which were with inconceivable vigour thrown -into action: four thousand five hundred cavalry and some Spaniards -remaining in reserve near Pampeluna. The French had been augmented by -a levy of conscripts, many of whom however deserted to the interior, -and the fighting men did not exceed seventy-nine thousand, including -the garrisons. Six thousand were cavalry, and as Foy’s operations -were extraneous, scarcely sixty thousand infantry and artillery were -actually in line. - -On Soult’s side each lieutenant-general had a special position to -defend. The left of D’Erlon’s first line, resting on the fortified -rocks of Mondarain, could not be turned; his right was on the Nivelle, -and the whole, strongly intrenched, was occupied by one of Abbé’s -and one of D’Armagnac’s brigades. The second line, on a broad ridge -several miles behind, was occupied by the remaining brigades of those -divisions, and its left did not extend beyond the centre of the first -line; but the right reached to the bridge of Amotz, where the Nivelle, -flowing in a slanting direction, gave greater space. Three great -redoubts were in a row on this ridge, and a fourth had been commenced -close to the bridge. - -On the right of D’Erlon’s second line, that is to say beyond the bridge -of Amotz, Clausel’s position extended to Ascain, along a strong range -of heights fortified with many redoubts, trenches, and abbatis; and -as the Nivelle, after passing Amotz, swept in a curve completely round -this range to Ascain, both flanks rested alike upon that river,--the -bridges of Amotz and Ascain being close on the right and left, and a -retreat open by the bridges of San Pé and Harastaguia in rear of the -centre. Two of Clausel’s divisions, reinforced by one of D’Erlon’s -under General Maransin, were there posted. In front of the left were -the redoubts of San Barbe and Grenada, covering the village and ridge -of Sarre. In front of the right was the smaller Rhune, which was -fortified and occupied by a brigade of Maransin’s division: a new -redoubt with abbatis was also commenced to cover the approaches to the -bridge of Amotz. - -On the right of this line, beyond the bridge of Ascain, Daricau’s -division of Clausel’s corps, and the Italian brigade of San Pol, drawn -from Villatte’s reserve, held the intrenched camp of Serres; they -thus connected Clausel’s position with Villatte’s, which crossed the -gorges of Olette and Jollimont. Reille’s position, strongly fortified -on the lower ground and partially covered by inundations, was nearly -impregnable. - -Soult’s weakest point was between the Rhune mountains and the Nivelle, -where the space, gradually narrowing as it approached the bridge of -Amotz, was the most open and the least fortified. The Nivelle, being -fordable above this bridge, did not hamper the allies’ movements, and -a powerful force acting in that direction could therefore pass by -D’Erlon’s first line, and break between the right of his second line -and Clausel’s left; it was thus Wellington framed his battle; for -seeing the French right could not be forced, he decided to hold it in -check while he broke their centre and pushed down the Nivelle to San Pé. - -In this view, Hill, leaving four of Mina’s battalions to face the rocks -of Mondarain, moved in the night by the passes of the Puerto de Maya to -fall on D’Erlon. - -On Hill’s left, Beresford was to send the third division against the -unfinished redoubts and intrenchments covering the bridge of Amotz, -thus turning D’Erlon’s right while it was attacked in front by Hill. - -On the left of the third division, the seventh, descending from the -Echallar pass, was to storm the Grenada redoubt, pass Sarre, and -assail Clausel abreast with the third division. - -On the left of the seventh, the fourth division, assembling on the -lower slopes of the greater Rhune, was to descend upon San Barbe, and -then, moving through Sarre also, to assail Clausel abreast with the -seventh division. - -On the left of the fourth division, Giron’s Spaniards, gathered -higher up the flank of the great Rhune, were to move abreast with the -others, leaving Sarre on their right. They were to drive the enemy -from the lower slopes of the smaller Rhune, and then join the attack -on Clausel’s main position. In this way Hill’s and Beresford’s corps, -forming a mass of more than forty thousand infantry, were to be thrust -on both sides of the bridge of Amotz, between Clausel and D’Erlon. - -Charles Alten with the light division and Longa’s Spaniards, together -eight thousand, was likewise to attack Clausel’s line on the left of -Giron, while Freyre’s Gallicians approached the bridge of Ascain to -prevent reinforcements coming from the camp of Serres. But ere Alten -could assail Clausel’s right the smaller Rhune which covered it was to -be taken. This outwork was a hog’s-back ridge, rising abruptly out of -table-land opposite the greater Rhune and inaccessible along its front, -which was precipitous and from fifty to two hundred feet high; on the -enemy’s left the rocks gradually decreased, descending by a long slope -to the valley of Sarre, and, two-thirds down, the 34th French Regiment -was placed, with an outpost at some isolated crags between the two -Rhunes. On the enemy’s right the hog’s-back sunk by degrees into an -open platform, but was covered at its termination by a marsh scarcely -passable. The attacking troops had therefore first to move against the -perpendicular rocks in front, and then to file, under fire, between the -marsh and lower rocks to gain an accessible point from whence to fight -their way along the narrow ridge of the hog’s-back; the bristles of the -latter being huge perpendicular crags built up with loose stones into -small forts or castles which communicated by narrow foot-ways, and rose -one above another until the culminant point was attained. - -Beyond this ridge an extensive table-land was bounded by a deep -ravine, one narrow space on the right of the marsh excepted, where -the enemy had a traverse of loose stones running perpendicularly from -behind the hog’s-back and ending in a star fort. This rampart and -fort, and the hog’s-back itself, were defended by Barbot’s brigade, -whose line of retreat was a low neck of land bridging the deep ravine -and linking the Rhune to Clausel’s main position. A reserve was -placed there to sustain the 34th French Regiment on the slope of the -mountain, and to protect the neck, which was the only approach to the -main position in that part: to storm the smaller Rhune was therefore a -necessary preliminary to the general battle. - -Alten, filing his troops after dark on the 9th, from the Hermitage, the -Commissari, and the Puerto de Vera, collected them at midnight on that -slope of the greater Rhune which descended towards Ascain. His main -body, turning the marsh by the left, was to assail the stone traverse -and lap over the star fort by the ravine beyond; Longa, stretching -still farther on the left, was to turn the smaller Rhune altogether; -the 43rd Regiment was to assail the hog’s-back. One battalion of -riflemen and the mountain-guns were left on the greater Rhune, with -orders to assail the French 34th and connect Alten’s attack with -Giron’s. All these troops gained their respective stations so secretly -the enemy had no suspicion of their presence, although for several -hours the columns were lying within half musket-shot of the works: -towards morning indeed, five or six guns fired in a hurried manner from -the low ground near the sea broke the stillness, yet all remained quiet -on the Rhunes: the British troops silently awaited the rising of the -sun, when three guns fired from the summit of the Atchubia mountain -were to be the signal of attack. - - -BATTLE OF THE NIVELLE. (Nov. 1813.) - -With great splendour the day broke, and as the first ray of light -played on the summit of the lofty Atchubia the signal guns were fired -in rapid succession; then the light division soldiers leaped up, and -the French beheld with astonishment the columns rushing onward from -the flank of the great Rhune. Running to their works with much tumult, -they opened a few pieces, which were answered from the top of the -greater Rhune by the mountain-artillery, and two companies of the -43rd were detached to cross the marsh, if possible, and keep down the -enemy’s fire from the lower part of the hog’s-back. The action being -thus commenced, the remainder of that regiment advanced against the -high rocks, from whence the French shot fast and thickly; but the quick -even movement of the line deceived their aim, and the soldiers, running -forward very swiftly, turned suddenly between the rocks and the marsh -and were immediately joined by the two companies, which had passed that -obstacle notwithstanding its depth. Then all together jumped into the -lower works, and the men, exhausted by their exertions, for they had -run over half a mile of very rough difficult ground with a wonderful -speed, remained for a few minutes lying down and panting within -half-pistol shot of the first stone castle, from whence came a sharp -and biting musketry: when their breath returned they arose and with a -stern shout commenced the assault. - -As numerous as the assailants were the defenders, and for six weeks -they had been labouring on their well-contrived castles; but strong -and valiant in arms must the soldiers have been who stood in that hour -before the veterans of the 43rd. One French grenadier officer only -dared to sustain the rush. Standing alone on the high wall of the first -castle and flinging large stones with both his hands, a noble figure, -he fought to the last and fell, while his men, shrinking on each side, -sought safety among the rocks behind. Close and confused then was the -fight, man met man at every turn, yet with a rattling fire of musketry, -sometimes struggling in the intricate narrow paths, sometimes climbing -the loose stone walls, the British soldiers won their desperate way, -and soon carried a second castle, named by the French the magpie’s -nest because of a lofty rock within it, on which a few marksmen were -perched. From this castle they were driven into a culminant citadel, -called the Donjon, larger than the others, and covered by a natural -ditch or cleft in the rocks fifteen feet deep. - -Here they made a final stand, and the assailants, having advanced so as -to look into the rear of the rampart and star fort on the table-land -below, suspended the vehement throng of their attack for a while; -partly to gather head for storming the Donjon, partly to fire on the -enemy beneath, who were warmly engaged with the two battalions of -riflemen, the Portuguese Caçadores, and the 17th Portuguese. This last -regiment was to have followed the 43rd, but seeing how rapidly and -surely the latter were carrying the rocks, had moved at once against -the traverse on the other side of the marsh. The French thus pressed -in front, and taught by the fire they were outflanked on the ridge -above; seeing the 52nd also turning their extreme right by the deep -ravine beyond the star fort, abandoned their works below. Then the 43rd -gathering a strong head stormed the Donjon. Some leaped with a shout -down the deep cleft in the rock, others turned it by the narrow paths -on each flank, and the walls were abandoned at the moment of being -scaled. Thus in twenty minutes six hundred old soldiers were hustled -out of this labyrinth; yet not so easily but that the victorious -regiment lost eleven officers and sixty-seven men. - -The whole mountain was now cleared, for the riflemen, dropping almost -perpendicularly down from the greater Rhune upon the post of crags, -had seized it with small loss. Yet they were ill seconded by Giron’s -Spaniards, and hardly handled by the French 34th, which maintained -its main post on the slope, and covered the flight of the confused -crowd then rushing down from the smaller Rhune towards the neck of -land behind: there however all rallied and seemed inclined to renew -the action, yet, after some hesitation, continued their retreat. This -favourable moment for a decisive stroke had been looked for by the -commander of the 43rd, but the officer intrusted with the reserve -companies of the regiment had thrown them heedlessly into the fight, -and rendered it impossible to collect in time a body strong enough to -assail such a heavy mass. The contest at the stone rampart and star -fort, being shortened by the rapid success on the hog’s-back, had -not been very severe, but General Kempt, always conspicuous for his -valour, was severely wounded: nevertheless he did not quit the field, -and soon re-formed his brigade on the platform he had so gallantly -won. Longa, during the fight, got close to Ascain, in connection with -Freyre’s troops, and in this state of affairs, the enemy now and then -cannonading from a distance, Alten awaited the progress of the army -on his right, for the columns there had a long way to march and it was -essential to regulate the movements. - -The signal-guns from the Atchubia which sent the light division against -the Rhune, had also sent the fourth and seventh divisions against -San Barbe and Grenada, and while eighteen guns, placed in battery -against the former, poured streams of shot, the troops advanced -with scaling-ladders. The skirmishers soon got in rear of the work, -whereupon the French leaping out fled, and then Ross’s battery of -horse-artillery, galloping to a rising ground in rear of the Grenada -fort, drove the enemy from there also. After that the following troops -won the village of Sarre and the heights beyond, and advanced to the -attack of Clausel’s main position. - -It was now eight o’clock, and, to the troops posted on the Rhune, a -splendid spectacle was presented. On one hand the ships of war, slowly -sailing to and fro, were exchanging shots with the fort of Socoa, -while Hope, menacing all the French lines in the low ground, sent -the sound of a hundred pieces of artillery bellowing up the rocks. -He was answered by nearly as many from the tops of the mountains, -amidst the smoke of which the summit of the great Atchubia glittered -to the rising sun, while fifty thousand men, rushing down its enormous -slopes with ringing shouts, seemed to chase the receding shadows into -the deep valley. The plains of France, so long overlooked from the -towering crags of the Pyrenees, were to be the prize of battle, and the -half-famished soldiers in their fury were breaking through the iron -barrier erected by Soult as if it were but a screen of reeds. - -The principal action was on a space of seven or eight miles, yet the -skirts of battle spread wide, and in no point had the combinations -failed. Far on the right Hill by a long and difficult night march had -got near the enemy before seven o’clock; opposing then his Spanish -troops to Abbé’s left wing on the Mondarain rocks, he with the second -division brushed back D’Armagnac’s brigade from the forge of Urdax and -the village of Ainhoa; but he called the sixth division and Hamilton’s -Portuguese over the Nivelle, to act on the right instead of the left -bank, against the bridge of Amotz. Thus three divisions approached -D’Erlon’s second position in mass, yet the country was very rugged, -and it was eleven o’clock before they got within cannon-shot of the -French redoubts, each of which contained five hundred men. They were -placed along the summit of a high ridge thickly clothed with bushes and -covered by a ravine; but General Clinton, leading the sixth division -on the extreme left, turned this ravine and drove the enemy from -the unfinished works covering the bridge, after which, wheeling to -the right, he advanced against the nearest redoubt and the garrison -abandoned it. Meanwhile the Portuguese and the second division, passing -the ravine, appeared on the right of the sixth, menacing the second and -third redoubts, whereupon all were abandoned. D’Armagnac then set fire -to his hutted camp and retreated to Helbacen de Borda, behind San Pé, -pursued by Clinton. Abbé’s second brigade, forming the French left, -though separated by a ravine from D’Armagnac, after some hesitation -also retreated towards Cambo, where his first brigade, coming down the -Mondarain mountain rejoined him. - -It was the progress of the battle on the left of the Nive that rendered -D’Erlon’s fight on the right bank so feeble; for after the fall of -San Barbe and Grenada Conroux endeavoured to defend the village and -heights of Sarre, but while the fourth and seventh divisions carried -those points, the third division, on their right, pushed rapidly to the -bridge of Amotz; presenting in conjunction with the sixth division the -narrow end of a wedge now formed by Beresford’s and Hill’s corps. The -French were thus driven from all their unfinished works covering that -bridge on both sides of the Nivelle, and Conroux’s division, spread -from Sarre to Amotz, was broken by superior numbers at every point. -When he attempted to defend the finished works at the bridge itself, -he fell mortally wounded, his troops retired, and the third division, -seizing the bridge, established itself on some heights between that -structure and a large unfinished work called the redoubts of Louis XIV. -All this happened about eleven o’clock, and D’Erlon, fearing to be cut -off from San Pé, then gave up his strong position to Hill, as before -shown; at the same time the remainder of Conroux’s troops fell back -in disorder from Sarre, pursued by the fourth and seventh divisions, -which were immediately established on the left of the third. The -communication between Clausel and D’Erlon was thus cut, the left flank -of one and the right flank of the other were broken, and a direct -communication between Hill and Beresford was secured by the same blow. - -Clausel still stood firm with Taupin’s and Maransin’s divisions, -and the latter having recovered Barbot’s brigade from the smaller -Rhune, occupied the redoubt of Louis XIV. where, supported with eight -field-pieces, he attempted to cover the flight of Conroux’s troops. -Ross’s horse artillery, the only battery which had surmounted the -difficulties of ground after passing Sarre, silenced these guns, and -the infantry were then assailed in front by the fourth and seventh -divisions, and in flank by the third division. The redoubt of Louis -XIV. was soon stormed and the garrison bayoneted, Conroux’s men -continued to fly, Maransin’s were cast headlong into the ravines -behind their position, and that general was taken, but escaped in the -confusion: Giron also came up now, yet too late, and after having -abandoned the riflemen on the lower slopes of the smaller Rhune. - -Taupin’s division and a large body of conscripts forming Clausel’s -right, still remained to fight. Their left rested on a large work -called the signal redoubt, which had no artillery, yet overlooked the -whole position; their right was covered by two redoubts overhanging a -ravine which separated them from the camp of Serres; some works in the -ravine itself protected their communication by the bridge of Ascain; -and behind the signal redoubt, on a ridge crossing the road to San Pé, -along which Maransin and Conroux’s divisions were flying, there was -another work called the redoubt of Harastaguia, where Clausel thought -he might still dispute the victory, if his reserve division in the camp -of Serres could come to his aid. In this view he drew the 31st French -Regiment from Taupin to post it in front of the redoubt of Harastaguia; -his object being to rally Maransin’s and Conroux’s troops and form a -new line, the left on Harastaguia, the right on the signal redoubt, -into which last he threw six hundred of the 88th Regiment. In this -position, having a retreat by the bridge of the Ascain, he resolved -to renew the fight, but his plan failed at the moment of conception, -because Taupin could not stand before the light division, which was now -again in full action. - -About half-past nine, Alten, seeing the whole of the columns on his -right as far as the eye could reach well engaged with the enemy, had -passed the low neck of land in his front, the 52nd Regiment leading -with a rapid pace and a very narrow front, under a destructive -cannonade and musketry from the intrenchments, which covered the side -of the opposite mountain. A road coming from Ascain, by the ravine, -led up the position, and as the 52nd pushed their attack along it the -French abandoned the intrenchments on each side, and forsook even -the crowning works above. This formidable regiment was followed by -the remainder of the division, yet Taupin awaited the assault above, -being supported by the conscripts in his rear; but at that moment the -Spaniards opened a distant skirmishing fire against the works covering -the bridge of Ascain on his right, whereupon a panic seized his men, -and the 70th Regiment abandoned the two redoubts above, while the -conscripts were withdrawn. Clausel ordered Taupin to retake the forts, -yet this only added to the disorder; the 70th Regiment, instead of -facing about, disbanded entirely and were not reassembled until next -day. There remained only four regiments unbroken: one, the 88th, was in -the signal redoubt, two with Taupin kept together in the rear of the -works on the right, and the 31st covered the fort of Harastaguia, now -the only line of retreat. - -In this emergency, Clausel, anxious to bring off the 88th Regiment, -ordered Taupin to charge on one side of the signal redoubt, intending -to do the same himself on the other at the head of the 31st Regiment; -but the latter was now vigorously attacked by the Portuguese of the -seventh division, and the fourth division was rapidly interposing -between that regiment and the redoubt. Moreover Alten, previous to -this, had directed the 43rd, preceded by Andrew Barnard’s riflemen, to -turn, at the distance of musket-shot, the right flank of the redoubt; -wherefore Taupin, instead of charging, was himself charged in front by -the riflemen, and being menaced at the same time in flank by the fourth -division, retreated, closely pursued by Barnard until that intrepid -officer fell dangerously wounded. Meanwhile the seventh division broke -the French 31st, and the rout became general, the French fled to the -different bridges over the Nivelle, and the signal redoubt was left to -its fate. - -This formidable work barred the way of the light division, yet it was -of no value to the defence when the forts on its flanks were abandoned. -Colborne approached it in front with the 52nd Regiment, Giron’s -Spaniards menaced it on Colborne’s right, the fourth division was -passing to its rear, and Kempt’s brigade was turning it on the left. -Colborne, whose military judgment was seldom at fault, seeing the work -must fall, halted under the brow of the conical hill on which it was -situated to save his men; but some of Giron’s Spaniards made a vaunting -though feeble demonstration of attacking it on his right and were -beaten, and at that moment a staff-officer, without warrant, for Alten -on the spot assured the Author of this History that he sent no such -order, rode up and directed Colborne to advance. It was not a moment -for remonstrance. The steepness of the hill covered his men until he -reached the flat top, and then the troops made their rush; but then -a ditch, thirty feet deep, well fraised and palisaded, stopped them -short, and the fire of the enemy stretched the foremost in death. The -intrepid Colborne, escaping miraculously, for he was always at the head -on horseback, immediately led the regiment under the brow to another -point, where, thinking to take the French unawares, he made another -rush, yet with the same result: at three different places did he rise -to the surface in this manner, and each time the head of his column -was swept away. Then holding out a white handkerchief he summoned the -commandant, and showed to him how his work was surrounded, whereupon he -yielded, having had only one man killed; but on the British side there -fell two hundred soldiers of a regiment never surpassed in arms since -arms were first borne by men--victims to the presumptuous folly of a -young staff-officer. - -During this affair all Clausel’s other troops had crossed the Nivelle, -Maransin’s and Conroux’s divisions near San Pé, the 31st Regiment at -Harastaguia, Taupin between that place and the bridge of Serres. They -were pursued by the third and seventh divisions; and the skirmishers -of the former, crossing by Amotz and a bridge above San Pé, entered -that place while the French were in the act of passing the river below. -Conroux’s troops then pushed on to Helbacen de Borda, a fortified -position on the road from San Pé to Bayonne, where they were joined -by Taupin, and by D’Erlon with D’Armagnac’s division, while Clausel -rallied Maransin’s men and took post on some heights immediately above -San Pé. - -Soult was not present at any of these actions. He had hurried on the -first alarm from St. Jean de Luz to Serres with his reserve artillery -and spare troops, and now menaced Wellington’s left flank by Ascain; -whereupon the latter halted the fourth and light divisions and Giron’s -Spaniards, to face Serres until Clinton’s division was well advanced -on the right of the Nivelle. When he was assured of its progress he -crossed the Nivelle with the third and seventh divisions, and drove -Maransin from his new position, after a hard struggle in which General -Inglis was wounded, and the 51st and 68th Regiments were handled very -roughly. This ended the battle in the centre, for darkness was coming -on and Clinton’s men had been marching or fighting for twenty-four -hours: but three divisions were now firmly established in rear of -Soult’s right, of whose operations it is time to treat. - -In front of Reille’s intrenchments were two advanced positions, the -camp of the Sans Culottes on the right, the Bons Secours in the centre, -covering Urogne. The first had been carried early in the morning by -the fifth division, which advanced to the inundation covering the -heights of Bordegain and Ciboure: the second was also easily taken -by the Germans and the Guards, and immediately afterwards the 85th -Regiment drove a French battalion out of Urogne. The first division -then menaced the camp of Belchena, and the German skirmishers passed -a small stream covering that part of the line, yet were driven back -by the enemy, whose musketry and cannonade were brisk along the whole -front. Meanwhile Freyre, advancing on the right of the first division, -opened a battery against a large work covering Ascain, where he was -opposed by his own countrymen under Casa Palacio, commanding the -remains of Joseph’s Spanish guards. This false battle was maintained -until nightfall, with equal loss of men, yet great advantage to the -allies, because it entirely occupied Reille and Villatte, and prevented -their troops in the camp of Serres from passing by the bridge of Ascain -to aid Clausel, who was thus overpowered. When that event happened, and -Wellington had passed the Nivelle at San Pé, Reille retired to the -heights of Bidart on the road to Bayonne. He retired in good order, -destroying the bridges. - -During the night the allied army halted on the position gained in the -centre, but an accidental conflagration catching a wood completely -separated their picquets towards Ascain from the main body--spreading -far and wide over the heath, it lighted up all the hills, a blazing -sign of war to France. - -On the 11th the army advanced in order of battle. Hope forded the -Nivelle above St. Jean de Luz and marched on Bidart; Beresford moved -by the roads leading upon Arbonne; Hill brought his left forward into -communication with Beresford, and with his centre faced Cambo on the -Nive. This change of front and the time required to restore the bridges -for the artillery, enabled Soult to rally his army upon a third line of -fortified camps which he had previously commenced, the right resting on -the coast at Bidart, the centre at Helbacen Borda, the left at Ustaritz -on the Nive. His front was of eight miles, but the works were only -slightly advanced, and dreading a second battle on so wide a field he -drew back his centre and left to Arbonne and Arauntz, broke down the -bridges on the Nive at Ustaritz, and at two o’clock a slight skirmish, -commenced by the allies in the centre, closed the day’s proceedings. - -Next morning the French retired to the ridge of Beyris, having their -right in advance at Anglet and their left in the intrenched camp of -Bayonne near Marac. The movement was covered by a dense fog, but when -the day cleared Hope took post at Bidart on the left; Beresford then -occupied Ahetze, Arbonne, and the hill of San Barbe in the centre, -and Hill endeavoured to pass the fords and restore the broken bridges -of Ustaritz. He also made a demonstration against the works at Cambo, -but heavy rain in the mountains rendered the fords impassable and both -points were defended successfully by Foy, whose operations having been -distinct from the rest require notice. - -D’Erlon, mistrusting the strength of his own position, had in the night -of the 9th sent Foy orders to march from Bidaray to Espelette; but -the messenger did not arrive in time, and on the morning of the 10th, -Foy, following Soult’s previous instructions, drove Mina’s battalions -from the Gorospil mountain; then pressing against the flank of Morillo -on Hill’s right he forced him also back fighting to the Puerto de -Maya. However D’Erlon’s battle was at this period receding fast, and -Foy fearing to be cut off retired with the loss of a colonel and one -hundred and fifty men, having taken a quantity of baggage and a hundred -prisoners. Continuing his retreat all night he reached Cambo and -Ustaritz on the 11th, and on the 12th defended them against Hill. - -Such were the principal circumstances of the battle of the Nivelle, -whereby Soult was driven from a mountain position he had been -fortifying for three months. He lost four thousand two hundred and -sixty-five men and officers, including twelve or fourteen hundred -prisoners, and one general killed. His field-magazines at St. Jean de -Luz and Espelette fell into the hands of the victors, and fifty-one -pieces of artillery were taken; the greater part abandoned in the -redoubts of the low country to Hope. The allies had two generals, -Kempt and Byng, wounded, and they lost two thousand six hundred and -ninety-four men and officers. - -In the report of the battle, scant and tardy justice was done to -the light division. Acting alone, for Longa’s Spaniards scarcely -fired a shot, that division, of only four thousand seven hundred men -and officers, first carried the smaller Rhune defended by Barbot’s -brigade, and then beat Taupin’s division from the main position, -driving superior numbers from the strongest works: numbering less than -one-sixth of the whole force employed against Clausel, it had defeated -one-third of that general’s corps. So doing, it lost many brave men, -and of two who fell I will speak. - -The first, low in rank, being but a lieutenant, was rich in honour, for -he bore many scars and was young of days. He was only nineteen, and -had seen more combats and sieges than he could count years. Slight in -person, and of such surpassing and delicate beauty that the Spaniards -often thought him a girl disguised in man’s clothing, he was yet so -vigorous, so active, so brave, that the most daring and experienced -veterans watched his looks on the field of battle, and would obey -his slightest sign, in the most difficult situations. His education -was incomplete, yet his natural powers were so happy the keenest and -best-furnished intellects shrunk from an encounter of wit, and all -his thoughts and aspirations were proud and noble, indicating future -greatness if destiny had so willed it. Such was Edward Freer of the -43rd, one of three brothers who all died in the Spanish war. Assailed -the night before the battle with that strange anticipation of coming -death, so often felt by military men, he was pierced with three balls -at the first storming of the Rhune rocks, and the sternest soldiers in -the regiment wept even in the middle of the fight, when they heard of -his fate. - -On the same day and at the same hour was killed Colonel Thomas Lloyd. -He likewise had been a long time in the 43rd. Under him Freer had -learned the rudiments of his profession, but promotion had placed -Lloyd at the head of the 94th, and leading that regiment he fell. In -him were combined mental and bodily powers of no ordinary kind. A -graceful symmetry of person combined with Herculean strength, and a -frank majestic countenance, indicated a great and commanding character. -His military acquirements were extensive both from experience and -study, and on his mirth and wit, so well known in the army, it is only -necessary to remark, that he used the latter without offence, yet so as -to increase his ascendancy over those with whom he held intercourse; -for though gentle he was valiant, ambitious, and conscious of fitness -for great exploits. He like Freer was prescient of and predicted his -own fall, yet with no abatement of courage. When he received the mortal -wound, a most painful one, he would not suffer himself to be moved, but -remained watching the battle and making observations upon the changes -in it until death came, and at the age of thirty, the good, the brave, -the generous Lloyd died. Tributes to his merit have been published by -Lord Wellington and by one of his own poor soldiers! by the highest and -by the lowest! To their testimony I add mine: let those who served on -equal terms with him say, whether in aught I have exceeded his deserts. - - - - -BOOK XIV. - - Passage of the Nive--Battles in front of Bayonne--Combat of - Arcangues--First Battle of Barrouilhet--Second Battle of - Barrouilhet--Third Combat of Barrouilhet--Battle of St. - Pierre--Operations beyond the Nive. - - -Soult, having lost the Nivelle, at first designed to leave part of his -force in the entrenched camp of Bayonne, and take a flanking position -behind the Nive, half-way between Bayonne and St. Jean Pied de Port. -With his left on the entrenched mountain of Ursouia, his right on the -heights above Cambo, the double bridge-head of which would enable him -to make offensive movements on the left bank, he hoped to confine -Wellington to the district between that river and the sea, and render -his situation very uneasy during the winter if he did not retire. -He was forced to modify this plan; the Bayonne camp was incomplete; -the work on the Ursouia mountain had been neglected, contrary to his -orders; the bridge-head at Cambo was only commenced on the right bank, -and on the left constructed defectively; the river in dry weather was -fordable also at Ustaritz below Cambo, and in many places above that -point. Remaining therefore at Bayonne with six divisions and Villatte’s -reserve, he sent D’Erlon with three divisions to reinforce Foy at Cambo. - -But neither D’Erlon’s divisions nor Soult’s whole army could have -stopped Wellington if other circumstances had permitted him to follow -up his victory. Neither the works of the Bayonne camp nor the barrier -of the Nive could have barred the progress of his fiery host, if Nature -had not opposed her obstacles. The clayey country at the foot of the -Pyrenees was impassable after rain, except by the royal road near the -coast or by that of St. Jean Pied de Port, and both were in the power -of the French. On the bye-roads the infantry sunk to the mid-leg, the -cavalry above the horses’ knees, even to the saddle-girths in some -places, and the artillery could not move at all. Rain and fogs on the -12th had enabled Soult to regain his camp and secure the high road to -St. Jean Pied de Port; his troops then easily recovered their proper -posts on the Nive, while Wellington, fixed in the swamps, could only -make the ineffectual demonstration at Ustaritz and Cambo, already -noticed. On the 16th, uneasy for his right flank, he directed Hill to -menace Cambo again, where Foy had orders to preserve the bridge-head -on the right bank in any circumstances, and only abandon the left bank -in the event of a general attack; but the officer at the bridge now -destroyed in a panic all the works and the bridge itself. This was a -great loss to Soult, and enabled Wellington to take cantonments. - -Bad weather was not the only obstacle to the British operations. -During the battle of the 10th Freyre’s and Longa’s soldiers had -pillaged Ascain and murdered several persons; and next day all the -Spanish troops committed excesses in various places. On the right, -Mina’s battalions, who were mutinous, made a plundering and murdering -incursion towards Hellette; the Portuguese and British soldiers -commenced like outrages, killing two persons in one town, but General -Pakenham, arriving at the moment, put the perpetrators to death, -nipping this wickedness in the bud at his own risk, for legally he had -not that power. He was a man whose generosity, humanity and chivalric -spirit, excited the admiration of every honourable person; yet is he -the officer who, falling at New Orleans, has been so foully traduced -by American writers. Pre-eminently distinguished by his detestation -of inhumanity and outrage, he has been with astounding falsehood -represented as instigating his troops there to infamous excesses; but -from a people holding millions of their fellow-beings in the most -horrible slavery, while they prate and vaunt of liberty until men turn -with loathing from the sickening folly, what can be expected? - -Terrified by these excesses the French fled even from the large towns. -Wellington soon dissipated their fears. On the 12th, although expecting -a battle, he put to death all the Spanish marauders he could take in -the act, and then with many reproaches, and despite of the discontent -of their generals, forced the whole to withdraw into their own country. -He disarmed the mutinous battalions under Mina, placed Giron’s -Andalusians in the Bastan under O’Donnel, quartered Freyre’s Gallicians -between Irun and Ernani, and sent Longa over the Ebro. Morillo’s -division alone remained with the army. These decisive proceedings, -marking the lofty character of the man, proved not less politic -than resolute; the people returned, and, finding strict discipline -preserved, adopted an amicable intercourse with the invaders. However -the loss of such a mass of troops, and the weather, reduced the army -for a moment to a state of inactivity, the head-quarters were fixed at -St. Jean de Luz and the troops took permanent cantonments. - -The left wing extended from Bidart on the sea-coast to the Nive, on -an opening of six miles. The right wing, thrown back at right angles, -lined the bank of that river for eight miles. In front of Bidart, the -broad ridge of Barrouilhet crossing the great coast-road was occupied, -the principal post being the mayor’s house, which was covered by tanks -and pools, between which the road led. The centre of the left wing was -on a continuation of this ridge near the village of Arcangues; the -right was on the hill of San Barbe, close to Ustaritz on the Nive. - -These posts were not established without combats. On the 18th the -generals, John Wilson and Vandeleur, were wounded, and next day -Beresford, who had seized the small bridge of Urdains at the junction -of some roads, was attacked in force, yet maintained the bridge. This -acquisition covered the right flank of the troops at Arcangues, but on -the 23rd the light division had an action there, very ill managed by -the divisional generals, and lost ninety men, of which eighty fell in -the 43rd Regiment. - -Wellington, having nearly nine thousand cavalry and a hundred guns, -fretted on the curb in his contracted position until December, when -the weather cleared and he resolved to force the line of the Nive and -extend to his right, a resolution which led to sanguinary battles, -for Soult’s positions were then strong and well-chosen. Bayonne, his -base, being situated at the confluence of the Nive and the Adour rivers -furnished bridges for the passage of both; and though weak in itself, -was covered by Vauban’s entrenched camp, which was exceedingly strong -and not to be lightly attacked. In this camp Soult’s right, under -Reille, three divisions including Villatte’s reserve, touched on the -lower Adour, where there was a flotilla. His front was protected by -inundations and a swamp, through which the royal coast-road led to St. -Jean de Luz, and along which fortified outposts extended to Anglet. -On his left Clausel’s three divisions extended to the Nive, being -partly covered by the swamp, partly by a fortified house, partly by an -artificial inundation spreading from the small bridge of Urdains to the -Nive; and beyond these defences the country held by the allies was a -deep clay, covered with small farm-houses and woods, very unfavourable -for movement. - -On the right of the Nive, Vauban’s camp being continued to the upper -Adour under the name of the “_Front of Mousserolles_,” was held by -D’Erlon’s four divisions, with posts extending up the right bank of -the Nive; that is to say, D’Armagnac fronted Ustaritz, and Foy was at -Cambo. The communication with the left bank of the Nive was double; -circuitous through Bayonne, direct by a bridge of boats. Moreover, -after the battle of the Nivelle, Soult brought General Paris’s division -from St. Jean Pied de Port to Lahoussoa close under the Ursouia -mountain, whence it communicated with Foy’s left by the great road of -St. Jean Pied de Port. - -The Nive, the Adour, and the Gave de Pau, which falls into the -latter many miles above Bayonne, were all navigable; the first as -far as Ustaritz, the second to Dax, the third to Peyrehorade, and -the French had magazines at the two latter places; yet they were fed -with difficulty, and to restrain Soult from the country beyond the -Nive, to intercept his communications with St. Jean Pied de Port, to -bring a powerful cavalry into activity and obtain secret intelligence -from the interior, were Wellington’s inducements to force a passage -over the Nive. But to place an army on both sides of a navigable -river, with communications bad at all times and subject to entire -interruptions from rain; to do this in face of an army possessing short -communications, good roads, and entrenched camps for retreat, was a -delicate and dangerous operation. - -Hope and Alten, having twenty-four thousand combatants and twelve guns, -were ordered to drive back all the French advanced posts in front of -their camp, between the Nive and the sea, on the 9th, and thus keep -Soult in check while Beresford and Hill crossed the Nive--Beresford at -Ustaritz with pontoons, Hill at Cambo and Larressore by fords. Both, -generals were then to repair the bridges at those points with materials -prepared beforehand. To cover Hill’s movement on the right and protect -the valley of the Nive from General Paris, who being at Lahoussoa -might have penetrated to the rear of the army during the operations, -Morillo’s Spaniards were to cross at Itzassu. At this time D’Armagnac -was opposite Ustaritz, Foy’s division extended from Halzou, in front -of Larressore to the fords above Cambo, having the Ursouia mountain -between its left and Paris: the rest of D’Erlon’s troops occupied some -heights in advance of Mousserolles. - - -PASSAGE OF THE NIVE. (Dec. 1813.) - -At Ustaritz the double bridge was broken, but an island connecting them -was in possession of the British. Beresford laid his pontoons down on -the hither side in the night, and, on the morning of the 9th, a beacon -lighted on the heights above Cambo gave the signal of action; the -passage was soon forced, the second bridge laid, and D’Armagnac driven -back; but the swampy nature of the country between the river and the -high road by retarding the attack gave him time to retreat. Hill also -forced his passage in three columns above and below Cambo with slight -resistance, though the fords were so deep that several horsemen were -drowned, and the French very strongly posted, especially at Halzou, -where a deep strong mill-race had to be crossed as well as the river. - -Foy, seeing by the direction of Beresford’s fire that his own retreat -was endangered, went off hastily with his left, leaving his right wing -under General Berlier at Halzou, without orders; hence, when General -Pringle attacked the latter from Larressore the sixth division was -already on the high road between Foy and Berlier, and though the latter -escaped by cross roads he did not rejoin his division until two o’clock -in the afternoon. Meanwhile Morillo passed at Itzassu, and Paris -retired to Hellette, where he was joined by a regiment of light cavalry -from the Bidouse river: Morillo followed, and in one village his troops -murdered fifteen peasants, amongst them several women and children. - -Hill placed a brigade of infantry at Urcurray to cover the bridge of -Cambo, and to support the cavalry, which he despatched to scour the -roads and watch Paris and Pierre Soult. With the rest of his troops he -marched against the heights of Mousserolles in front, and was there -joined by the sixth division, the third remaining to cover the bridge -of Ustaritz. - -It was now one o’clock, Soult came from Bayonne, approved of D’Erlon’s -dispositions, and offered battle. His line crossed the high road, -and D’Armagnac’s brigade, coming from Ustaritz, was in advance at -Villefranque. A heavy cannonade and skirmish ensued along the front, -but no general fight took place because the deep roads retarded the -rear of Hill’s columns; however the Portuguese of the sixth division -drove D’Armagnac with sharp fighting out of Villefranque about three -o’clock, and a brigade of the second division was established in -advance to connect Hill with Beresford. - -Three divisions of infantry, wanting the brigade left at Urcurray, now -hemmed up four French divisions; and as the latter, notwithstanding -their superiority of numbers, made no advantage of the broken movements -caused by the deep roads, the passage of the Nive may be judged a -surprise, and Wellington had so far overreached his able adversary. Yet -he had not trusted an uncertain chance. The French masses by falling -upon the heads of his columns while the rear was still labouring in -the deep roads might have caused disorder; but they could not have -driven either Hill or Beresford over the river again, because the third -division was close at hand, and a brigade of the seventh could from -San Barbe have followed by the bridge of Ustaritz. The greatest danger -was, that Paris, reinforced by Pierre Soult’s cavalry, should have -fallen upon Morillo, or the brigade left at Urcurray in the rear, while -Soult, reinforcing D’Erlon with fresh divisions from the other side of -the Nive, attacked Hill and Beresford in front: but it was to prevent -that, Hope and Alten, whose operations are now to be related, had been -ordered to act on the left bank. - -Hope, having twelve miles to march from St. Jean de Luz before he could -reach the French works, put his troops in motion during the night, and -about eight o’clock passed between the tanks with his right, while his -left descended from the platform of Bidart towards Biaritz. The French -outposts retired fighting, and Hope, sweeping with a half circle to his -right, preceded by the fire of his guns and many skirmishers, faced the -entrenched camp about one o’clock. His left rested on the Lower Adour; -his centre menaced an advanced work on the ridge of Beyris: his right -was in communication with Alten, who had halted about Bussussary and -Arcangues until Hope’s fiery crescent closed on the French camp; then -he also advanced, but with the exception of a slight skirmish at the -fortified house met no resistance. Three divisions, some cavalry and -the unattached brigades, equal to a fourth division, sufficed therefore -to keep six French divisions in check on this side, and when evening -closed fell back towards their original positions, yet under heavy rain -and with great fatigue to Hope’s troops, for even the royal road was -knee-deep of mud, and they were twenty-four hours under arms. The whole -day’s fighting cost eight hundred men of a side, the loss of the allies -being rather greater on the left of the Nive than on the right. - - -BATTLES IN FRONT OF BAYONNE. (Dec. 1813.) - -Wellington’s wings were now divided by the Nive, and Soult resolved to -fall upon one with all his forces united. The prisoners assured him -the third and fourth divisions were both in front of Mousserolles, he -was able to assemble troops with greatest facility on the left of the -river, and as the allies’ front there was most extended, he chose that -side for his counter-stroke. In Bayonne itself were eight thousand -men, troops of the line and national guards, with which he occupied -the entrenched camp of Mousserolles; then placing ten gun-boats on -the Upper Adour, to guard it as high as the confluence of the Gave de -Pau, he made D’Erlon file four divisions over the boat-bridge on the -Nive, to take post behind Clausel’s corps on the other side. He thus -concentrated nine divisions of infantry and Villatte’s reserve, with -a body of cavalry and forty guns, in all sixty thousand combatants, -including conscripts, to assail a quarter where the allies, although -stronger by one division than he imagined, had yet only thirty thousand -infantry with twenty-four guns. - -His first design was to pour on to the table-land of Bussussary and -Arcangues, and act as circumstances should dictate, and judged so well -of his position that he warned the Minister of War to expect good news -for the next day: indeed his enemy’s situation, though better than -he knew of, gave him a right to anticipate success, for on no point -was this formidable counter-attack anticipated. Wellington was on -the right of the Nive, awaiting daylight to assail the heights where -he had last seen the French. Hope’s troops, with exception of the -Portuguese under General Campbell, who were at Barrouilhet, slept in -their cantonments--the first division at St. Jean de Luz six miles from -the outposts, the fifth division between that place and Bidart, and -all exceedingly fatigued. The light division had orders to retire from -Bussussary to Arbonne, four miles; a part had marched before dawn, but -Kempt, suspicious of the enemy’s movements, delayed the rest until he -could see well to his front: he thus saved the position. - -The extraordinary difficulty of moving through the country, the -numerous inclosures and copses which intercepted the view, the -recent easy success on the Nive, and a certain haughty confidence, -sure attendant of a long course of victory, had rendered the English -general somewhat negligent, and the troops were not prepared for a -battle. His general position was, however, strong. Barrouilhet could -only be attacked along the royal road on a narrow front between the -tanks, where he had directed entrenchments to be made; but there -was only one brigade there, and a road, made with difficulty by the -engineers, supplied a bad flank communication with the light division. -The Barrouilhet ridge was prolonged to the platform of Bussussary, -but bulged there too near the enemy to be safely occupied in force, -wherefore the ridge of Arcangues, behind it, was the real position of -battle on that side. - -From the Bussussary platform three tongues of land shot out, and the -valleys between them, as well as their slopes, were covered with -copse-woods. The left-hand tongue was held by the 52nd Regiment; the -central tongue by the picquets of the 43rd, with supporting companies -in succession towards an open common, across which the troops had to -pass to the church of Arcangues. The third tongue was guarded, partly -by the 43rd, partly by riflemen, but the valley there was not occupied. -One brigade of the seventh division, covered by the inundation and -holding the bridge of Urdains, continued this line of posts to the -Nive; the other brigades being behind San Barbe and belonging rather -to Ustaritz than to this front: the fourth division was several miles -behind the right of the light division. - -If Soult had, as he first designed, burst with his whole army upon -Bussussary and Arcangues, it would have been impossible for the light -division, scattered over difficult ground, to have stopped him for half -an hour; and there was no support within several miles, no superior -officer to direct the concentration of the different divisions. -Wellington had ordered all the line to be entrenched, but the works -were commenced on a great scale, and, as is usual when danger does not -spur, the soldiers had laboured so carelessly, that a few abbatis, -the tracing of some lines and redoubts, and the opening of a road of -communication were all the results. The French could thus have gained -the broad open hills beyond Arcangues, separated the fourth and seventh -from the light division, and cut all off from Hope. Soult, however, -in the course of the night, for reasons which have not been stated, -changed his project, and at day-break Reille marched with Boyer’s and -Maucune’s divisions, Sparre’s cavalry, and from twenty to thirty guns -against Hope by the main road on the right. He was followed by Foy and -Villatte, but Clausel assembled his troops near the fortified house -in front of Bussussary, and one of D’Erlon’s divisions approached the -bridge of Urdains. - - -COMBAT OF ARCANGUES. (Dec. 1813.) - -Heavy rain fell in the night, but the morning broke fair, and at dawn -French soldiers were observed close to the most advanced picquet of the -43rd on the left, pushing each other about as if at gambols, yet lining -by degrees the nearest ditches; a general officer was also seen behind -a farmhouse within pistol-shot, and the heads of columns could be -perceived in the rear. Thus warned, some companies were thrown on the -right into the basin, to prevent the enemy from penetrating that way -to the small common between Bussussary and Arcangues. Kempt’s foresight -in delaying his march to Arbonne was now manifest, and he immediately -placed the reserves of his brigade in the church and mansion-house of -Arcangues. Meanwhile the French, breaking forth with loud cries and -a rattling musketry, had fallen at a running pace upon the 43rd at -the tongue and in the basin, while a cloud of skirmishers, descending -on their left, penetrated between them and the 52nd, seeking to turn -both. The right tongue was in like manner assailed, and the assault was -so strong and rapid, the enemy so numerous, the ground so extensive, -that to cross the common and reach the church of Arcangues would have -been impossible if serious resistance had been attempted at first. -Wherefore, delivering their fire at pistol-shot distance, the picquets -fell back in succession, with eminent coolness and intelligence. For -though they had to run at full speed to gain the common before the -enemy, who was constantly outflanking them by the basin; though the -ways were so deep and narrow no formation could be preserved; though -the fire of the French was thick and close, and their cries vehement in -pursuit, the instant the open ground was attained, the crowd of seeming -fugitives turned and presented a compact and well-formed body, defying -and deriding the efforts of their adversaries. - -The 52nd, which was half a mile to the left, was but slightly assailed, -yet fell back also to the main ridge; for though the ground did not -permit Colonel Colborne to see the enemy’s strength, the rapid retreat -of the 43rd told him the affair was serious. Well did the regiments -of the light division understand each other’s qualities, and in good -time he withdrew to the main position. On the right-hand tongue the -troops were not so fortunate; the enemy, moving by the basin, reached -the common before them, and about a hundred of the 43rd and riflemen -were intercepted. The French were in a hollow road and careless, -never doubting that the officer of the 43rd, Ensign Campbell, a youth -scarcely eighteen years of age, would surrender; but with a shout he -broke into their column sword in hand, and though the struggle was -severe and twenty of the 43rd and thirty of the riflemen with their -officer remained prisoners, he reached the church with the rest. - -D’Armagnac’s division of D’Erlon’s corps now pushed close up to the -bridge of Urdains, and Clausel assembling his three divisions by -degrees at Bussussary, opened a sharp fire of musketry. The position -was however safe. A mansion-house on the right, covered by abbatis -and not easily accessible, was defended by a rifle battalion and the -Portuguese. The church and churchyard were occupied by the 43rd, -supported with two mountain-guns, their front being covered by a -declivity of thick copse-wood filled with riflemen, and only to be -turned by narrow hollow roads leading on each side to the church. On -the left, the 52nd, supported by the remainder of the division, spread -as far as the great basin which separated this position from the ridge -of Barrouilhet, towards which some small posts were pushed: yet there -was still a great interval between Alten and Hope. - -As the skirmishing grew hot, Clausel brought up twelve guns with which -he threw shot and shells into the churchyard of Arcangues, and four or -five hundred infantry made a rush forwards, but a heavy fire from the -43rd sent them back over the ridge where their guns were posted. Yet -their cannonade would have been murderous, if this musketry had not -made the gunners withdraw their pieces a little behind the ridge, and -caused their shot to fly wild and high. Kempt, thinking the distance -too great, was at first inclined to stop the fire, but the moment it -lulled the French pushed their pieces forwards again, and their shells -knocked down eight men in an instant: the muskets then recommenced and -the shells again flew high. The village and mansion-house on the right -were defended by the riflemen, and the action, hottest where the 52nd -fought, continued all day. It was not very severe, yet both French and -English writers, misled perhaps by an inaccurate phrase in the public -dispatch, have represented it as a desperate attack by which the light -division was driven into its entrenchments; whereas the picquets only -were forced back, and there were no entrenchments, save those made on -the spur of the moment by the soldiers in the churchyard. - - -FIRST BATTLE OF BARROUILHET. (Dec. 1813.) - -On that side Reille, having two divisions, drove Campbell’s Portuguese -from Anglet about nine o’clock, and Sparre’s cavalry cut down a -great many men. The French infantry then assailed the position of -Barrouilhet, but moving along a narrow ridge, confined on each flank -by tanks, only two brigades could get into action by the main road, -and the rain had rendered all the bye-roads so deep that it was midday -before their line of battle was filled. This delay saved the allies, -for the attack here also was so unexpected that the first division and -Lord Aylmer’s brigade were at rest in St. Jean de Luz and Bidart when -the action commenced, and the latter did not reach the position before -eleven o’clock; the foot-guards did not march until after twelve, and -only arrived at three o’clock when the fight was done; all the troops -were exceedingly fatigued, only ten guns could be brought into play, -and from some negligence part of the infantry were without ammunition. - -Robinson’s brigade of the fifth division first arrived to support -Campbell and fight the battle. The French skirmishers had then spread -along the whole valley, while their columns moved by the great road -against the mayor’s house on the platform of Barrouilhet, where the -ground was thick of hedges and coppice-wood. A most confused fight took -place. The assailants, cutting ways through the hedges, poured on in -smaller or larger bodies as the openings allowed, and were immediately -engaged, at some points successfully, at others beaten, and few knew -what was going on to the right or left of where they stood. By degrees -Reille engaged both his divisions, and some of Villatte’s reserve also -entered the fight, but then Bradford’s Portuguese and Aylmer’s brigade -arrived on the allies’ side, which enabled Greville’s brigade of the -fifth division, hitherto in reserve, to relieve Robinson’s troops who -had suffered severely, and he himself was dangerously wounded. - -A notable action now happened with the 9th Regiment under Colonel -Cameron. Posted on the extreme left of Greville’s brigade, there was -between it and Bradford’s brigade a Portuguese battalion. Opposite -the 9th was a coppice-wood possessed by the enemy, whose skirmishers -were continually gathering in masses and rushing out as if to assail -the regiment, and were as often driven back; but the ground was so -broken that nothing could be seen on the flanks, and after some time -Cameron, who had received no orders, heard a sudden firing along the -main road close to his left. His adjutant, sent to look out, returned -quickly to say a French regiment, which must have passed unseen in -small bodies between the Portuguese battalion and the 9th, was rapidly -filing into line on the rear. The 4th British Regiment was in column -at a short distance, and its commander, Colonel Piper, was directed -by Cameron to face about and fall on the French regiment; but he took -a wrong direction, no firing followed, and the adjutant again hurried -to the rear in observation. The 4th Regiment was not to be seen, and -the enemy’s line was then nearly formed, whereupon Cameron, leaving -fifty men to answer the skirmishing fire, which now increased from the -copse, faced about and marched against the new enemy, who was about his -own strength. The French opened fire, slowly at first, but increasing -vehemently as the distance lessened, until the 9th sprung forwards -to charge; then the adverse line broke and fled by their flanks in -disorder, those who made for their own right brushing the left of -Greville’s brigade and carrying off an officer of the Royals in their -rush: yet the greatest number were made prisoners and Cameron having -lost eighty men and officers resumed his old ground. - -Reille’s divisions were now all repulsed, but Villatte still menaced -the right flank, and Foy, taking possession of the narrow ridge -connecting Bussussary with the platform of Barrouilhet, threw his -skirmishers into the great basin leading to Arbonne and menaced Hope’s -right flank. It was now two o’clock, and Soult, his columns being -then all in hand, gave orders to renew the battle, and his masses -were beginning to move, when Clausel reported that a large body of -troops, coming from the right of the Nive, was menacing D’Armagnac near -Urdains. Unable to account for this, Soult, who saw the Guards and -Germans coming up from St. Jean de Luz, and the unattached brigades -already in line, suspended his attack, and ordered D’Erlon, who had two -divisions in reserve, to detach one to the support of D’Armagnac: ere -that could be done the night fell. - -The troops seen by Clausel were the third, fourth, sixth, and seventh -divisions, whose movements during the battle it is time to notice. When -Wellington discovered that the heights in Hill’s front were abandoned, -he directed that officer to push parties close up to the front of -Mousserolles; but then hearing the cannonade on the left bank of the -Nive repaired there. In passing he made the third and sixth divisions -recross that river, and ordered Beresford to lay another bridge of -communication lower down the Nive at Villefranque, to shorten the line -of movement. When he saw how the battle stood with Hope and Alten, he -made the seventh division close in from the hill of San Barbe, placed -the third division at Urdains, and brought up Cole’s division to an -open heathy ridge a mile behind the church of Arcangues, from thence a -brigade moved into the basin on the left of Colborne to cover Arbonne, -and the whole division was ready to oppose any attempt to penetrate -between Hope and Alten. It was these dispositions which checked Clausel -and prevented Soult’s attack at Barrouilhet. - -In this battle two generals and twelve hundred Anglo-Portuguese had -been killed and wounded, three hundred made prisoners. The French had -one general, Villatte, wounded, and lost two thousand men; and when the -action terminated two regiments of Nassau with one of Frankfort came -over to the allies. These men were not deserters. Their prince having -abandoned Napoleon in Germany sent secret instructions to his troops to -do so likewise, and in good time, for Napoleon’s orders to disarm them -reached Soult the next morning. - - -SECOND BATTLE OF BARROUILHET. (Dec. 1813.) - -In the night of the 10th Reille withdrew behind the tanks, while Foy -and Villatte moved along the connecting ridge towards Bussussary, to -unite with Clausel’s left and D’Erlon’s reserve; hence on the morning -of the 11th the French army, D’Armagnac’s division which remained at -Urdains excepted, was concentrated, for Soult feared a counter-attack. -The French deserters indeed declared that Clausel had formed a body -of two thousand choice grenadiers to assault the village and church -of Arcangues, yet the day passed there with only a slight skirmish. -Not so at Barrouilhet. There was a thick fog, and at ten o’clock Lord -Wellington, desirous to ascertain what Soult was doing, directed the -9th Regiment to skirmish beyond the tanks, but not to push the action -if the French augmented their force. Cameron did so and the fight was -becoming warm, when Colonel Delaney, a staff-officer, rashly directed -the 9th to enter the village: an error sharply corrected. For the fog -cleared up, and Soult, who had twenty-four thousand men at that point, -seeing the 9th unsupported, made a counter-attack so strong and sudden -that Cameron only saved his regiment with the aid of some Portuguese -troops hastily brought up by Hope. The fighting then ceased and -Wellington went to the right, leaving Hope with orders to drive back -the French picquets and re-establish his own outposts. - -Soult, hitherto seemingly undecided, was roused by this second insult. -He ordered Daricau’s division to attack the right of Barrouilhet in -reply, while Boyer’s division fell on by the main road between the -tanks. The allies, unexpectant of battle, had dispersed to gather fuel, -for the time was wet and cold, wherefore the French penetrated in all -directions; they outflanked the right, they passed the tanks, seized -the outhouses of the mayor’s house and occupied the coppice in front of -it; and though driven from the outbuildings by the Royals, the tumult -was great and the coppice was filled with men of all nations intermixed -and fighting in a perilous manner. Robinson’s brigade was very hardly -handled, the officer commanding it was wounded, a squadron of French -cavalry again cut down some Portuguese near the wood; and on the right -the colonel of the 84th having unwisely entered a hollow road, the -French, having the banks, killed him and a great number of his men. -However the 9th Regiment, posted on the main road, plied Boyer’s flank -with fire, the 85th Regiment came into action, and Hope, conspicuous -from his gigantic stature and heroic courage, was seen wherever danger -pressed, encouraging the troops: at one time he was in the midst of -the enemy, his clothes were pierced with bullets and he was severely -wounded in the ankle, yet he would not quit the field, and thus by his -calm intrepidity restored the battle; the French were beaten from -Barrouilhet, but they had recovered their original posts and continued -to gall the allies with a fire of shot and shells until the fall of -night. - -In this fight six hundred men of a side fell, and as the fifth division -was very much reduced the first division took its place in the line. -Meanwhile Soult sent his cavalry over the Nive to Mousserolles to check -the incursions of Hill’s horsemen. - - -THIRD COMBAT OF BARROUILHET. (Dec. 1813.) - -Rain again fell heavily in the night, and, though the morning broke -fair, neither side seemed inclined to recommence hostilities; but the -advanced posts being very close to each other at ten o’clock a quarrel -arose. For Soult observing the fresh regiments of the first division -close to his posts, imagined the allies were going to attack him, and -reinforced his front; this caused an English battery to fall into a -like error, it opened on the advancing troops and in an instant the -whole line of posts was engaged. Soult then brought up a number of -guns, the firing continued without object for many hours, and four -hundred men of a side were killed or wounded, although the great body -of the French army remained concentrated and quiet on the ridge between -Barrouilhet and Bussussary. - -Wellington, expecting Soult would finally abandon his attack to fall on -Hill, had sent Beresford orders to reinforce the latter with the sixth -division by the new bridge if necessary; and also with the seventh -division by Ustaritz without waiting for further instructions; yet now, -seeing Soult’s tenacity, he drew the seventh division again towards -Arbonne. Beresford had however made a movement towards the Nive, and -this, with the march of the seventh and some changes in the position of -the fourth division, caused Soult to believe the allies were gathering -with a view to attack his centre on the morning of the 13th; and it -is remarkable that the deserters, at this early period, told him the -Spaniards had re-entered France, although orders to that effect were -not, as we shall find, given until the next day. Convinced then that -his bolt was shot on that side of the Nive, he left two divisions and -Villatte’s reserve in the entrenched camp, and marched with the other -seven to Mousserolles, intending to fall upon Hill. - -That general had pushed his scouting parties far abroad, and when -Sparre’s horsemen arrived at Mousserolles on the 12th, Pierre Soult -advanced from the Bidouze river with all his light cavalry, and being -supported by General Paris drove the allies’ posts from Hasparen. -Colonel Vivian, who commanded there, ordered Major Brotherton to -charge with the 14th Dragoons across the bridge. It was an ill-judged -order, and the impossibility of succeeding was so manifest, that when -Brotherton, noted throughout the army for his daring, galloped forward, -only two men and one subaltern, Lieutenant Southwell, passed the narrow -bridge with him and they were all taken except one man who was killed. -Vivian charged with his whole brigade to rescue them, but in vain, and -he fell back to Urcurray upon Morillo’s Spaniards; Hill then put a -British brigade in march to support him on the 12th, yet recalled it at -sunset, because he had then discovered Soult’s columns passing the Nive -by the boat-bridge above Bayonne. - -Wellington, feeling the want of numbers, now brought forward a division -of Gallicians to St. Jean de Luz, and one of Andalusians from the -Bastan to Itzassu, and to prevent plunder fed them from the British -magazines. The Gallicians were to support Hope, the Andalusians to -protect the rear of the army from General Paris and Pierre Soult. - -Hill now took a position of battle on a front of two miles. - -His left, composed of the 28th, 34th and 39th Regiments under -General Pringle, occupied a wooded ridge crowned by the château of -Villefranque, where it covered the new pontoon bridge of communication, -but was separated from the centre by a small stream forming a chain of -ponds in a deep marshy valley. - -His centre was on both sides of the high road, near the hamlet of -St. Pierre, on a crescent-shaped height, broken with rocks and close -brushwood on the left hand; on the right hand inclosed with high and -thick hedges, one of which, at the distance of a hundred yards, covered -part of the line and was nearly impassable. Here Barnes’s British -brigade of the second division were posted, the 71st Regiment being on -the left, the 50th in the centre, the 92nd on the right. Ashworth’s -Portuguese were posted in advance immediately in front of St. Pierre, -with skirmishers occupying a small wood covering their right. Twelve -guns under Ross and Tullock were in the centre, looking down the great -road; and half a mile in rear Lecor’s Portuguese and two guns were in -reserve. - -The right, under Byng, was composed of the 3rd, 57th, 31st, and 66th. -The first-named was posted on a height running parallel with the Adour, -called the ridge of Old Moguerre because a village of that name was on -the summit; pushed in advance, this regiment could only be assailed by -crossing a narrow swampy valley, the upper part of which was held by -Byng with the remainder of the brigade, his post being also covered by -a great mill-pond. - -One mile in front of St. Pierre a range of counter heights were held -by the French, but the basin between was broad, open, and commanded -by the fire of the allies. All parts were too heavy and enclosed for -the action of cavalry, and the French infantry could only approach in -force on one narrow front of battle along the high road, until within -cannon-shot, but then two narrow difficult lanes branched off to the -right and left, crossing the swampy valleys on each side, and leading, -the one against the allies’ right, where the 3rd Regiment was posted; -the other against their left. - -In the night of the 12th rain swelled the Nive and carried away the -bridge of communication; it was soon restored, but for the time Hill -was cut off from the rest of the army; and while seven French divisions -of infantry, furnishing thirty-five thousand combatants, approached -him in front, an eighth under General Paris, and the cavalry of Pierre -Soult, menaced him in rear. To meet those in his front he had only -fourteen guns and fourteen thousand men in position; to check those on -his rear but four thousand Spaniards and Vivian’s cavalry at Urcurray. - - -BATTLE OF ST. PIERRE. (Dec. 1813.) - -Morning broke with a heavy mist, under cover of which Soult formed his -order of battle. D’Erlon, having D’Armagnac’s, Abbé’s, and Daricau’s -divisions of infantry, Sparre’s cavalry, and twenty-two guns, marched -in front; Foy and Maransin followed, but the remainder of the army was -in reserve, for the roads would not allow of any other order. The mist -hung heavily, and the French masses, at one moment quite shrouded in -vapour, at another dimly seen or looming sudden and large, and dark, -at different points, appeared like thunder-clouds gathering before the -storm; but at half-past eight Soult pushed back the British picquets -in the centre, the sun burst out, and the sparkling fire of the light -troops spread wide in the valley and crept up the hills on either -flank, while the bellowing of forty pieces of artillery shook the banks -of the Nive and the Adour. - -Daricau, marching on the French right, was directed against Pringle. -D’Armagnac, moving on the left, took Old Moguerre as his point of -direction, and sought to force Byng’s right. Abbé assailed the centre -at St. Pierre, where General Stewart commanded. Hill took his station -on a commanding mount in the rear, from whence he could see the whole -battle and direct the movements. - -Abbé, a man noted for vigour, pushed his attack with great violence -and gained ground so rapidly with his light troops on the left of -Ashworth’s Portuguese, that Stewart sent the 71st Regiment and two guns -from St. Pierre to the latter’s aid; then the French won the small wood -on Ashworth’s right, and half of the 50th Regiment was detached to -that quarter. The wood was thus retaken, and the flanks of Stewart’s -position secured, but his centre was weakened, the fire of the French -artillery was concentrated against it, and Abbé pushed on there with -such a power that, despite of the play of musketry on his flanks and a -crushing cannonade in his front, he gained the top of the position, and -drove back the remainder of Ashworth’s Portuguese, together with the -other half of the 50th Regiment, which had remained in reserve. - -General Barnes now brought the 92nd Regiment from behind St. Pierre -with so furious a counter-attack that the French skirmishers fell back -in disorder on each side, leaving their column to meet the charge, -which was so roughly pushed that the French mass wavered and gave way: -Abbé immediately replaced it with another, and Soult, redoubling the -heavy play of his heavy guns from the heights, sent a battery of horse -artillery galloping down into the valley, where it opened fire close -to the allies with destructive activity. The cannonade and musketry -then rolled like a prolonged peal of thunder, and Abbé’s second column, -regardless of Ross’s guns, though they tore the ranks in a horrible -manner, advanced so steadily up the high road, that the 92nd was -compelled to take shelter behind St. Pierre. The Portuguese guns, their -British commanding officer having fallen wounded, then limbered up to -retire, and the French skirmishers reached the thick hedge in front of -Ashworth’s right. - -Barnes, seeing that hard fighting only could save the position, now -made the Portuguese guns resume fire, while the wing of the 50th and -the Caçadores gallantly held the small wood on the right; but he was -soon wounded, the greatest part of his and Stewart’s staff were hurt, -and the matter seemed desperate. For the light troops, overpowered by -numbers, were all driven in, except those in the wood, the artillerymen -were falling at the guns, Ashworth’s line crumbled rapidly before the -musketry and cannonade, the ground was strewed with the dead in front, -and the wounded crawling to the rear were many. If the French light -troops could then have penetrated through the thick hedge, defeat would -have been inevitable. For the column of attack was steadily advancing -up the main road, and a second column launched on its right was already -victorious, because the colonel of the 71st shamefully withdrew that -gallant regiment and abandoned the Portuguese. Pringle was still -fighting strongly against Daricau’s superior numbers on the hill of -Villefranque; but on the extreme right, the colonel of the 3rd regiment -also shamefully abandoned his strong post to D’Armagnac, whose leading -brigade then rapidly turned Byng’s other regiments on that side. - -Foy’s and Maransin’s divisions, hitherto retarded by the deep roads, -were now coming into line to support Abbé, and at a moment when the -troops opposed to him were deprived of their reserve, because Hill, -beholding the retreat of the 3rd and 71st Regiments, descended in haste -from his mount, turned the latter back, renewed the fight in person, -and bringing one brigade of Lecor’s reserve to the same quarter sent -the other against D’Armagnac at Old Moguerre. Thus at the decisive -moment of the battle the French reserve was augmenting, while that -of the allies was thrown as a last resource into action. However the -right wing of the 50th and Ashworth’s Caçadores never lost the small -wood in front, upholding the fight there and towards the high road with -unflinching courage: this gave the 92nd Regiment time to reform behind -the hamlet of St. Pierre, and its gallant colonel, Cameron, once more -led it down the road with colours flying and music playing, resolved to -give the shock to whatever stood in the way. At this sight the British -skirmishers on the flanks, suddenly changing from retreat to attack, -rushed forward and drove those of the enemy back on each side; yet the -battle seemed hopeless, for Ashworth was badly wounded, his line was -shattered, and Barnes, who had not quitted the field for his former -hurt, was now shot through the body. - -The 92nd was but a small clump compared with the heavy mass in its -front, and the French soldiers seemed willing enough to close with -the bayonet, until an officer riding at their head suddenly turned -his horse, waved his sword and appeared to order a retreat: then they -faced about and retired across the valley to their original position, -in good order however, and scarcely pursued by the allies, so exhausted -were the victors. This retrograde movement, for there was no panic -or disorder, was produced partly by the gallant advance of the 92nd -and the returning rush of the skirmishers; partly by the state of -affairs immediately on the right of the French column, where the 71st, -indignant at their colonel’s conduct, had returned to the fight with -such fierceness, and were so well aided by Lecor’s Portuguese, Hill -and Stewart in person leading the attack, that the hitherto victorious -French were overthrown there also, at the very moment when the 92nd -came with that brave show down the main road. Many men fell and Lecor -was wounded, but the double action in the centre being seen from the -hill of Villefranque, Daricau’s division, already roughly handled by -Pringle, also fell back in confusion; while on the extreme right, -Buchan’s Portuguese, detached by Hill to recover the Moguerre ridge, -ascended under a flank fire from Soult’s guns, and rallied the 3rd -Regiment: in happy time, for D’Armagnac’s first brigade had passed -Byng’s flank at the mill-pond and was in rear of his line. - -It was now twelve o’clock, and while the fire of the light troops and -cannonade in the centre continued, the contending generals restored -their respective orders of battle. Soult’s right wing had been quite -repulsed by Pringle, his left was giving way before Buchan, and the -difficult ground forbad his sending immediate succour to either; -moreover in the exigency of the moment he had called D’Armagnac’s -reserve brigade to sustain Abbé’s retiring columns. However that -brigade, and Foy’s and Maransin’s divisions, were in hand to renew -the fight in the centre, and the allies could not, unsuccoured, have -sustained a fresh assault, their ranks being wasted with fire, nearly -all the staff killed or wounded, and three generals badly hurt. - -In this crisis Hill, seeing Buchan well engaged on Old Moguerre and -Byng master of his ground in the valley of the mill-pond, drew the 57th -Regiment from the latter place to reinforce his centre; at the same -time the bridge of boats having been restored, the sixth division, -which had been marching since daybreak, appeared in order of battle -on the mount below St. Pierre. It was soon followed by the fourth and -third divisions, and two brigades of the seventh division were likewise -in march. With the first of these troops came Wellington. He had -hurried from Barrouilhet when the first sound of cannon reached him, -yet he arrived only to witness the close of the battle--the crisis was -past. Hill’s day of glory was complete. - -Soult, according to the French method, now made another attack, or -rather demonstration against the centre to cover his new dispositions, -but he was easily repulsed, and at the same moment Buchan drove -D’Armagnac headlong off the Moguerre ridge. The French masses continued -to maintain a menacing position on the high road, and on a hillock -rising between the road and the mill-pond, but were soon dispossessed -by Wellington, who sent Byng with two battalions against the hillock, -and some troops from the centre against those on the high road. At -this last point however the generals and staff had been so cut down, -that Colonel Currie, the aide-de-camp, could find no superior officer -to deliver the order to and led the troops himself to the attack. -Both charges were successful, and two of the light guns, sent down in -the early part of the fight by Soult and which, had played without -ceasing, were taken. - -The battle now abated to a skirmish, under cover of which the French -endeavoured to carry off their wounded and rally their stragglers, but -at two o’clock Wellington commanded a general advance of the whole -line. Then the French retreated fighting, and the allies, following -close on the side of the Nive, plied them with musketry until dark; -yet they maintained their line towards the Adour, and Sparre’s cavalry -passing out that way rejoined Pierre Soult. This last general and Paris -had during the day skirmished with Morillo and Vivian’s cavalry at -Ureurray, until the ill-success at St. Pierre became known, when they -retired. - -In this bloody action Soult had designed to employ seven divisions of -infantry with one brigade of cavalry on the front, and one brigade of -infantry with a division of cavalry on the rear; but the state of the -roads and the narrow front did not permit more than five divisions -to act, and only half of those were seriously engaged. His loss was -certainly three thousand, making a total, on the five days’ fighting, -of six thousand men with two generals, Villatte and Maucomble, wounded. -Hill had three generals and fifteen hundred men killed or wounded, -and Wellington’s loss on the five days’ fighting was five thousand, -including five hundred prisoners. Five generals, Hope, Robinson, -Barnes, Lecor and Ashworth, were wounded. - - -OPERATIONS BEYOND THE NIVE. (Dec. 1813.) - -When Soult lost the battle of St. Pierre, he left three divisions on -the Mousserolles camp, sent two over the Nive to reinforce Reille, -and passing the Adour in the night with Foy’s division, extended it -up the right bank of that river to the confluence of the Gave de Pau, -to protect the navigation, on which his supplies now depended. To -intercept those supplies, to cut the French communication with St. Jean -Pied de Port, and open a fertile tract of country for the subsistence -and action of his powerful cavalry, had been Wellington’s object in -forcing the passage of the Nive; for Bayonne could not be assailed with -success until the army occupying the entrenched camp in its front was -drawn away by want. Soult was resolved to hold his position around -that fortress, and the country beyond the Nive favoured that object, -being deep, traversed by many rivers, which flooding with every shower -in the mountains furnished in their concentric courses to the Adour -barriers not easy to break through without great loss: and to turn them -by their sources near the mountains required wide movements, and fine -weather to harden the roads. But the winter of 1813 was peculiarly -wet. Still Soult’s security depended on the weather, and three fine -days made him tremble. He was now also dependent on water-carriage -for his supplies, his chief magazines being at Dax on the Adour, and -Peyrehorade on the Gave de Pau; the latter only twenty-four miles from -Bayonne, and both so exposed to sudden incursions that he was compelled -to entrench them. - -While thus watching clouds and skies for the signal of great -operations, the two commanders carried on a minor warfare of posts and -surprises. Soult, finding the navigation of the Adour most endangered -near Urt, where the river narrowed, sent Foy across to cast a bridge -and fortify a head to it; but Wellington, forestalling the attempt, -drove him back again, and the supplies were then only brought down at -night by stealth or with a guard of gunboats under fire: indeed the -French army could not have been thus supplied if the coasting trade -from Bordeaux to Bayonne had been interrupted by the English navy, but -Wellington’s remonstrances on that head were still unheeded by the -Admiralty. However Soult was so embarrassed, that leaving Reille with -but four divisions in Vauban’s camp, he transferred his head-quarters -to Peyrehorade, and sent Clausel with two divisions, all the light -cavalry and Trielhard’s heavy dragoons beyond the Adour to take post -on the Bidouze, one of the many rivers descending concentrically from -the Pyrenees to the Adour. His advanced posts were then pushed to the -Joyeuse and Aran rivers, close to Wellington, who immediately made -counter dispositions, and thus the principal fronts of opposition were -placed on a line perpendicular to that against Bayonne, which thus -became secondary. - -This did not prevent the minor warfare for the command of the -navigation of the Adour being continued. Hill seized the island of -Holriague in the Adour; those of Berens and Broc above it, were taken -by Foy, and the allies were momentarily embarrassed by the loss of -their boat-bridge on the Nive, which was carried away by a flood. -On their extreme right Morillo, having without authority taken two -squadrons of the 18th Hussars to aid one of his foraging incursions, -abandoned them at a critical moment, whereby their major, Hughes, two -captains and a lieutenant were wounded and many men lost. Mina also -invaded the valleys of Baygorry, plundering, burning, and murdering -men, women, and children; whereupon the people there took arms, and -being reinforced with two hundred regulars from St. Jean Pied de Port -surprised one of his battalions and pressed the others with vigour. -This gave Soult hopes of exciting the Basques to an insurgent warfare; -and General Harispe, a Basque by birth and of great reputation, who had -been long expected from Suchet’s army, now arrived to aid this plan. -If Harispe had come in November, Wellington’s strict discipline being -then unknown, a formidable warfare would have been raised. It was now -too late for a general rising, yet his presence, and Mina’s incursions, -with the licentious conduct of Morillo, had so awakened the warlike -propensities of the Baygorry Basques, that Harispe soon made a levy and -commenced active operations. To aid him Soult extended and strengthened -his own left, and made the light cavalry menace all the outposts, -whereupon Wellington, thinking he sought a general battle, resolved -to fall on him at once, but was stopped by the sudden swelling of the -rivers. When they subsided, he marched to attack Clausel in the centre, -and as Soult was there in person a general battle seemed inevitable; -but the movements on both sides were founded on mistakes, and the -matter ended with a slight skirmish. - -Harispe reinforced with Paris’s division and Dauture’s brigade then -drove Mina with loss into the high mountains, surprised Morillo’s -foragers, and captured some English dragoons. Lord Wellington, fearing -this warfare, put forth his authority in a vigorous manner to check -the Spanish generals, and a sullen obedience followed, yet the Basque -insurrection spread, and he therefore published a manifesto calling -on the people to declare for war or peace, announcing his intention -to burn their villages and put them to death if they continued -insurgent--in fine, to treat them as the French generals had treated -the insurgents in Spain. This stopped Harispe’s efforts, and Soult, -who now expected reinforcements and was desirous to resume the -offensive with his whole army, ordered him to abandon his Peasant war, -to concentrate his regular force and hem in the allies’ right. Then -Harispe, always daring and active, drove back all Morillo’s foragers, -and with them a body of English cavalry: at the same time one of Hill’s -cavalry posts on the left was cut off in retaliation for a French post -which had been surprised by the sixth division, with circumstances -entirely opposed to good feeling and to the generous habits long -established between the light division and the French soldiers, of -which the following are fine illustrations. - -On the 9th of December, the 43rd was assembled within twenty yards of -a French out-sentry, yet he continued his beat for an hour without -concern, relying so confidently on the customary system as to place -his knapsack on the ground. When the order to advance was given, one -of the British soldiers told him to go away and helped him to replace -his pack before the firing commenced. Next morning the French in like -manner warned a 43rd sentry to retire. At another time Lord Wellington, -desirous to gain the top of a hill occupied by the enemy near Bayonne, -ordered his escort of riflemen to drive the French away, and seeing the -soldiers stealing up too close, as he thought, called out to fire, but -with a loud voice one of those veterans replied, _No firing!_ Holding -up the butt of his rifle towards the French, he tapped it in a peculiar -way, and at the private signal, which meaned, _We must have the hill -for a short time_, the French, who could not maintain yet would not -have relinquished it without a fight if they had been fired upon, -quietly retired: yet this signal would never have been made if the post -had been one capable of a permanent defence, so well did those veterans -understand war and its proprieties. - -Soult’s conscripts were now deserting fast, and the inclemency of the -weather filled his hospitals, while Wellington’s bronzed soldiers, -impassive to fatigue, patient to endure, fierce in execution, were free -from serious maladies, ready and able to plant their colours wherever -their general listed. The country was however a vast quagmire; neither -provisions nor orders could be conveyed to the different quarters; a -Portuguese brigade was several days without food from the swelling of -the rivulets, which stopped the commissariat mules. At the sea-side the -troops were better off, yet with a horrible counterpoise; for on that -iron-bound coast, storms and shipwrecks were so frequent, that scarcely -a day passed without some vessel, sometimes many together, being seen -embayed and drifting towards the reefs, which shoot out like needles -for several miles. Once in that situation there was no human help! -A faint cry might be heard at intervals, but the tall ship floated -solemnly onwards until the first rock arrested her, when a roaring -surge would dash her to pieces and the shore was strewed with broken -timbers and dead bodies. January was thus passed by the allies, but -February saw Wellington break into France, the successful invader of -that mighty country. - - - - -BOOK XV. - - Passages of the Gaves and the Adour--Passage of the Gaves--Combat - of Garris--Passage of the Adour--Passage of the Gaves - continued--Battle of Orthes--Combat of Aire. - - -PASSAGES OF THE GAVES AND THE ADOUR. (Feb. 1814.) - -While the armies remained inactive, political difficulties accumulated -on both sides in a strange manner. What those difficulties were and -their causes must be sought for in the original History: this work -treats only of battles. Yet their gravity will be understood when it is -said, that Soult, surrounded with traitors and lukewarm friends, had -his army again so reduced by drafts that he proposed to Napoleon, then -driven from Germany and striving hard to defend France on the east, no -longer to contend with Wellington in regular warfare, but to scatter -his forces as great partizan corps in opposition to the invasion. On -the other hand, Wellington seriously warned his Government that he -looked to San Sebastian as a post where he should soon have to fight -for an embarkation against the united French and Spanish armies! In -fine that the war could no longer be continued. Suddenly however his -position was ameliorated by a change in the Spanish councils, by the -approach of fine weather, and the simultaneous receipt of a large sum -in gold, which enabled him again to employ the Spaniards in France with -less danger of their plundering the country. He had sent before him the -fame of a just discipline and wise consideration for the people, and -there was indeed nothing he dreaded more than the insurgent warfare -projected by Soult. Harispe’s Basques had done him more mischief than -the French army, the terrible menace of destroying their villages and -killing all the male population, by which he stopped their warfare, -marked his apprehensions, and he neglected no means of conciliation. - -He permitted the local authorities to carry on the internal government, -to take their salaries and raise the necessary taxes, and by opening -the ports he drew a large commerce to support his army; he established -many channels for intelligence, political and military, and would have -extended his policy further if the English ministers had not abruptly -and ignorantly interfered with his proceedings. Finally, foreseeing -that his gold, being in foreign coin, would create embarrassment, -he adopted an expedient which he had before practised in India; for -knowing that in a British army a wonderful variety of vocations, -good and bad, may be found, he secretly caused false coiners and -die-sinkers to be sought for amongst the soldiers, and they, when -assured no ill was designed for them, very readily acknowledged their -peculiar talents. With these men he secretly coined gold Napoleons, -marking them with a private stamp and carefully preserving their just -fineness and weight, to enable the French government, when peace -should be established, to call them in again. He thus avoided all the -difficulties of exchange, and removed a fruitful source of quarrels -between the troops and shopkeepers, the latter being always fastidious -in taking and desirous of abating the real worth of strange coin; while -the former attribute to fraud any declination from the value at which -they receive their money. This sudden increase of current coin tended -also to diminish the pressure necessarily attendant upon troubled times. - -Nor was his provident sagacity less eminent in military than in -administrative and political operations. During the bad weather he had -formed large magazines at the ports, examined the course of the Adour, -and carefully meditated on his plans. To penetrate France and rally a -great Bourbon party under the protection of his army was the system he -desired to follow; and though the last depended on the proceedings of -the allied sovereigns, his own military operations would not clash, -because to drive the French from Bayonne and blockade or besiege it -were the first steps in either case. - -That fortress and its citadel, comprising in their circuit the -confluence of the Nive and the Adour, could not be safely invested with -less than three times the number necessary to resist the garrison at -any one point; and hence the whole must be so numerous as seriously -to weaken the forces operating towards the interior. How and where to -cross the Adour for the investment was also a subject of solicitude. -It was a great river with a strong current, and well guarded by troops -and gun-boats above Bayonne; still greater was it below the town, and -there the ebb-tide run seven miles an hour; there also, gun-boats, a -sloop of war, and armed merchant-vessels could be employed to interrupt -the passage. To collect boats enough to bridge the stream above or -below Bayonne, and the carriage of them, an immense operation in -itself, would inevitably give notice of the design, unless the French -army were first driven away; and even then the garrison of Bayonne, -fifteen thousand men, might baffle the attempt. Nevertheless in the -face of these difficulties he resolved to pass, his preparations being -proportionate to the greatness of the design. - -Many reasons concurred to make him throw his bridge below and not above -Bayonne, and in that view he had collected at St. Jean de Luz forty -large sailing-boats of from fifteen to thirty tons’ burthen, called -_chasse-marées_, as if for the commissariat service; but he had them -secretly loaded with materials for his bridge, designing with naval -aid to run up the Adour to a certain point, upon which the troops and -artillery were to move; then with hawsers, and rafts made of pontoons, -he designed to throw over a covering body, trusting that the greatness -and danger of the attempt would lull suspicion. No obstacles deterred -him. All the French trading vessels in the Adour had in January -secretly offered to come out upon licenses and serve his commissariat; -but he was compelled to forego that advantage by the silly meddling of -the English ministers, which added greatly to the difficulty of his -enterprise, inasmuch as it forced him, instead of receiving these men -as friends and coadjutors, to prepare means for burning their vessels. - -Soult was not less active in defensive measures. He had fortified all -the main passes of the rivers on the great roads leading against his -left; yet the diminution of his force in January had compelled him to -withdraw his outposts from Anglet, which enabled Wellington to examine -the whole course of the Adour below Bayonne and arrange for the passage -with more facility. Soult then, in pursuance of Napoleon’s system of -warfare, which always prescribed a recourse to moral force to cover -physical weakness, concentrated his left wing against the allies’ -right beyond the Nive, and renewed that harassing partizan warfare -already noticed, endeavouring to throw his adversary entirely upon the -defensive. - -He knew however he could not thus check the allies long; and judging -Wellington would aim at Bordeaux and the line of the Garonne, while his -own line of retreat must ultimately be in a parallel direction with -the Pyrenees, he tried to organize in time a defensive system. In this -view he sent Daricau, a native of the Landes, to prepare an insurgent -levy in that wilderness, and directed Maransin to the High Pyrenees to -extend the insurrection of the mountaineers, already commenced in the -Lower Pyrenees by Harispe. - -At Bordeaux there was a small reserve, which he urged the Minister -of War to increase with conscripts from the interior, and he sent -artillerymen there, ordering various dispositions: but there was no -public spirit awakened and treason was rife in that city. - -On the side of the Lower Pyrenees he improved the works of Navarrens, -and designed an entrenched camp; the castle of Lourdes in the High -Pyrenees was already defensible, and he gave orders to fortify the -castle of Pau, thus providing supporting points for a retreat. At -Mauleon he put on foot partizan corps, and had hopes of forming a -reserve of seven or eight thousand national guards, _gens d’armes_ -and artillerymen at Tarbes. Dax, containing his principal depôts, was -being fortified, and the communication with it maintained across the -rivers by bridges, with bridge-heads at Port de Lannes, Hastingues, -Peyrehorade, and Sauveterre; but in the beginning of February floods -carried away that at Port de Lannes, and the communication between -Bayonne and the left of the army was thus interrupted until he -established a flying bridge. - -Such was his situation when Wellington retook the offensive, with one -hundred and twenty thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry, -as Soult supposed; for he knew not of the political and financial -difficulties which had reduced the English general’s power and -prevented the junction of the reinforcements expected. His emissaries -told him that Clinton’s Catalonian force was broken up, and the British -part in march to join Wellington; that the garrisons of Carthagena, -Cadiz and Ceuta were at hand, and reinforcements were coming from -England and Portugal. This made him conclude there was no intention of -pressing the war in Catalonia, and that all would be united to march -against him; wherefore with more earnestness than before he urged that -Suchet should be ordered to join him, that their united forces might -form a dike against the torrent which threatened to overwhelm the -south of France. The real power opposed to him was however much below -these calculations. Twenty thousand British and Portuguese had been -promised by their governments, but did not arrive; Clinton’s army was -still in Catalonia; the regular Spanish forces available, and that -only partially on account of their licentious conduct, did not exceed -thirty thousand; the Anglo-Portuguese were but seventy thousand, with -ninety-five pieces of artillery. - -Soult, exclusive of his garrisons and detachments at Bordeaux and in -the High Pyrenees, exclusive also of the conscripts of the second levy -which were now beginning to arrive, had only thirty-five thousand -soldiers of all arms, three thousand being cavalry, with forty pieces -of artillery. But Bayonne alone, without reference to St. Jean Pied -de Port and Navarrens, occupied twenty-eight thousand of the allies; -and by this and other drains Wellington’s superiority was so reduced, -that his penetrating into France, that France which had made all Europe -tremble at her arms, must be viewed as a surprising example of courage -and fine conduct, military and political. - - -PASSAGE OF THE GAVES. (Feb. 1814.) - -In the second week of February the weather set in with a strong -frost, and the English general advanced, precisely at the moment when -General Paris had marched with a convoy from Navarrens to make a last -effort for the relief of Jaca in Spain, where a French garrison still -remained. But clothing for the troops, which had been long negligently -delayed in England, arrived at that moment also, and the regiments, -wanting the means of carriage, had to march for it to the coast. The -first design was therefore restricted to turning the French left by -the sources of the rivers with Hill’s corps, marching by the roots of -the Pyrenees; Beresford meanwhile keeping the centre in check upon the -lower parts of the same rivers, in hope that Soult’s attention would -thus be attracted while the passage of the Adour was being made below -Bayonne. It would seem also, that uncertain if he should be able to -force the passage of the tributary rivers with his right, Wellington -intended, if his bridge was happily thrown, to push his main operations -in that quarter, turning the Gaves by the right bank of the Adour: a -fine conception by which his superiority of numbers would have best -availed him to seize Dax and the Port de Landes, and cut Soult off from -Bordeaux. - -Events frustrated this plan. On the 14th Hill, having twenty thousand -combatants and sixteen guns, marched in two columns; one to drive -Clausel’s posts beyond the Joyeuse, another by the great road of St. -Jean Pied de Port against Harispe. This last body had the Ursouia -mountain on its right, while beyond it Morillo marched against the same -point. Harispe, who had only three brigades, principally conscripts, -retired skirmishing in the direction of St. Palais. The line of the -Joyeuse was thus turned by the allies, the direct communication with -St. Jean Pied de Port was out, that place was invested by Mina’s -battalions, and on the 15th Hill, leaving a regiment to observe -the road of St. Jean, marched upon Garris, pushing back Harispe’s -rear-guard. - -Soult knew of the intended operations on the 12th, but hearing the -allies had collected boats and constructed a fresh battery near Urt on -the Upper Adour, and that the pontoons had reached Urcurray, thought -Wellington’s design was to turn his left with Hill’s corps, to press -him on the Bidouze with Beresford’s, and keep Bayonne in check with -the Spaniards, while Hope crossed the Adour _above_ that fortress. -Wherefore, when Hill’s movement commenced, he resolved to dispute -the passage of the Bidouze, and the two Gaves of Mauleon and Oleron -in succession. He had already four divisions on the Bidouze, and he -recalled Paris to post him between St. Palais and St. Jean Pied de Port -in observation of Mina, whom he supposed to be stronger than he was. - - -COMBAT OF GARRIS. (Feb. 1814.) - -Harispe, having Paris under his orders, and supported by Pierre Soult -with a brigade of light cavalry, now covered the road from St. Jean -with his left, the upper line of the Bidouze with his right; from -thence Villatte, Taupin and Foy were extended to its confluence with -the Adour. Hill moved against Harispe. The latter had just occupied -in advance of the Bidouze a ridge called the Garris mountain, which -stretched to St. Palais, when his rear-guard came plunging into a deep -ravine in his front, closely followed by the light troops of the second -division. Upon the parallel counter-ridge thus gained, General Hill -immediately established himself, and though the evening was beginning -to close his skirmishers descended into the ravine, while two guns -played over it upon four thousand men, arrayed on the opposite mountain -by Harispe. In this state of affairs Wellington arrived. He was -anxious to turn the line of the Bidouze before Soult could strengthen -himself there, and seeing the communication with General Paris, by St. -Palais, was not well maintained, sent Morillo along the ridge towards -that place; then menacing Harispe’s centre with Le Cor’s Portuguese -division, he directed Pringle’s brigade to attack, saying with concise -energy “_The hill must be taken before dark_.” - -This expression caught the fancy of the soldiers, and was repeated by -Colonel O’Callaghan, as he and Pringle placed themselves at the head -of the 39th, which, followed by the 28th, immediately rushed with loud -and prolonged shouts into the ravine. Pringle fell wounded, and most of -the mounted officers had their horses killed; but the troops, covered -by the thick wood, gained the summit of the Garris mountain, on the -right of the enemy, who thinking from the shouting that a larger force -was coming retreated. The 39th then wheeled to their right, intending -to sweep the summit, when the French, discovering their error, came -back at a charging pace and receiving a volley without flinching tried -the bayonet. O’Callaghan, distinguished for strength and courage, had -two strokes from that weapon, but repaid them with fatal power in -each instance, and the French, nearly all conscripts, were beaten off. -Twice however they came back, and fought until the fire of the 28th was -beginning to be felt, when Harispe, seeing the remainder of the second -division ready to support the attack, Le Cor advancing against his -centre, Morillo in march towards St. Palais, retreated to that town, -and calling in Paris broke down the bridges over the Bidouze. He lost -altogether five hundred men, two hundred being taken, and would hardly -have escaped if Morillo had not been slow. The allies lost one hundred -and sixty, most of them in the bayonet contest. - -During these operations Picton, marching on Hill’s left, menaced -Villatte; but Beresford, though his scouting parties, on the left of -Picton, approached the Bidouze, facing Taupin and Foy, remained on -the Joyeuse, as the pivot upon which Wellington’s right was to sweep -round the French positions. Foy however had observed the movement of -two other divisions, pointing as he thought towards the French left, -and his reports to that effect reached Soult at the moment the latter -received notice that St. Jean Pied de Port was invested. Thinking then -that Wellington would not attempt to pass the Adour above Bayonne, but -win his way to that river by constantly turning the French left, he -made new dispositions. - -His line on the Bidouze was strong, yet too extended, and he resolved -to abandon that and the Mauleon for the Gave d’Oleron, placing his -right at Peyrehorade, his left at Navarrens. Villatte therefore took -post at Sauveterre on the Oleron where the bridge had a well-fortified -head; from thence Taupin lined the right bank to the confluence of -the Gave de Pau, which Foy guarded from Peyrehorade to its confluence -with the Adour, his front being prolonged by D’Erlon towards Dax. One -brigade of cavalry was in reserve at Sauveterre and the head-quarters -went to Orthes. But the magazines of ammunition were at Bayonne, -Navarrens, and Dax; and Soult, seeing his communications with all those -places likely to be intercepted before he could remove his stores, -wrote to the minister of war to form new depôts. - -On the 16th Wellington repaired the broken bridges of St. Palais, and -after a skirmish Hill crossed the Bidouze, but the day was spent in the -operation. Meanwhile the centre divisions passed the Joyeuse. - -The 17th Hill advanced towards the Mauleon, while Picton, on his left, -made for the heights of Somberraute, both corps converging upon General -Paris, who, in defence of the Mauleon Gave, attempted to destroy -the bridge of Arriveriete. Lord Wellington was too quick. The 92nd -regiment, covered by the fire of some guns, passed at a ford above, and -beating two French battalions from the village secured the passage. The -troops halted there, having marched only five miles, and though Paris -relinquished the Gave he did not retire until the morning of the 18th. -The allies then seized the main road between Sauveterre and Navarrens -on the left bank of the Oleron Gave, while Harispe, Villatte, and -Paris, supported by a brigade of cavalry, concentrated at Sauveterre; -Taupin was lower down on their right; Foy on the right of Taupin; -D’Erlon on the left of the Adour, above its confluence with the Gave de -Pau. - -Soult, thrown from the commencement of the operations entirely upon the -defensive, was now at a loss to discover his adversary’s object. In -this uncertainty, sending Pierre Soult with a cavalry brigade and two -battalions of infantry to act between Oleron and Pau and communicate -with the partisan corps forming at Mauleon, he decided to hold the -Gaves as long as he could; and, when they were forced, concentrate his -army at Orthes and fall upon the first of the converging columns that -approached. He had considered every likely movement, as he thought, -and his conjectures had indeed embraced every plan of operation -possible, except the one contemplated by his adversary, namely, the -stupendous bridge over the Adour _below_ Bayonne. That was now to be -done, and Wellington designed to superintend the casting of it in -person; hence, when he had established his right strongly beyond the -Mauleon and Bidouze rivers and knew his pontoons were well advanced, -he returned rapidly to St. Jean de Luz. Everything there depending on -man was ready, but the weather was boisterous with snow for two days, -and Wellington, fearful of letting Soult strengthen himself on the -Gave of Oleron, returned on the 21st to Garris, deciding to press his -operations on that side in person and leave Hope and Admiral Penrose -to throw the bridge. - - -PASSAGE OF THE ADOUR. (Feb. 1814.) - -Hope had twenty-eight thousand men and twenty pieces of artillery, and -in the night of the 22nd the first division, with six eighteen-pounders -and a rocket battery, cautiously filed towards the river; the road was -deep and one of the guns falling into a ditch delayed the march, yet -at daybreak the whole reached some sand-downs which lined the river -bank. The French picquets were then driven into the intrenched camp, -the pontoon train and field-artillery came down opposite the village of -Boucaut, and the eighteen-pounders were placed in battery on the bank. -The light troops, meanwhile, closed to the edge of the marsh covering -Vauban’s camp; and from Arcangues and Urdains the enemy’s attention was -attracted by false attacks, which were prolonged beyond the Nive by the -fifth division. - -The gun-boats and chasse-marées should have reached the mouth of -the Adour at the time the troops reached the bank; but the wind was -contrary and none were seen. Hope, whose firmness no untoward event -could ever shake, then resolved to try the passage with the army alone; -the French flotilla opened fire on his columns, but his artillery -and rockets retorted so fiercely that three of the gun-boats were -destroyed, and the sloop so hardly handled that about one o’clock the -whole took refuge higher up the river. Sixty men of the guards were -then rowed in pontoons across the mouth of the river in the face of a -French picquet, which, seemingly bewildered, retired without firing. -A raft was formed with the remainder of the pontoons, a hawser was -stretched across, and Colonel Stopford passed with six hundred of the -guards, the 60th Regiment, and some rockets: yet slowly and at slack -water, for the tide ran strongly and the waters were wide. - -General Thouvenot, deceived by spies and prisoners, thought the light -division was with Hope as well as the first division, and that fifteen -thousand men had been embarked at St. Jean de Luz to land between Cape -Breton and the Adour; he feared therefore to send a strong force to -any distance; and when he heard of Stopford’s detachment on the right -hank, detached only two battalions under Macomble to gain information, -because a pine-forest and the bending of the river prevented him from -obtaining a view from Bayonne. Macomble menaced Stopford, but the -latter, flanked by the field artillery on the other bank, received him -with a discharge of rockets; projectiles which, like the elephants in -ancient warfare, often turn upon their own side: this time, amenable -to their directors, they smote the French column and it fled amazed -with a loss of thirty wounded. It is however obvious that if Thouvenot -had kept strong guards with a field-battery on the right bank of the -Adour, Hope could not have passed his troops in pontoons, no vessels -could have crossed the bar, and to disembark troops between the river -and Cape Breton must have been attempted. This error was fatal to the -French. The British remained unmolested until twelve o’clock on the -24th, and then the long-expected flotilla was seen under a press of -sail making with a strong breeze for the mouth of the river. - -To enter the Adour is, from the flatness of the coast, never an easy -task; it was now most difficult; the high winds of the preceding days -had raised a great sea, and the enemy had removed one of the guiding -flag-staves by which the navigation was ordinarily directed. In front -of the flotilla came the boats of the men of war, and the naval -captain, O’Reilly, ran his craft, a chosen Spanish vessel, first into -the midst of the breakers, which rolling in a frightful manner over the -bar dashed her on to the beach. That brave officer, stretched senseless -on the shore, would have perished with all his crew but for the ready -succour of the soldiers; some were drowned, but the remainder with an -intrepid spirit launched their boat again to aid the passage. - -O’Reilly had been followed successfully by Lieutenant Debenham in a -six-oared cutter, but the tide was then falling, and the remainder of -the boats, the impossibility of passing until high water being evident, -drew off and a pilot was landed to direct the line of navigation by -concerted signals. When the flood again came, the crews being promised -rewards in proportion to their successful daring, the whole flotilla -approached in close order; with it however came black clouds and a -driving gale which sent along the whole coast a rough tumbling sea, -dashing and foaming without an interval of dark water to mark the -entrance of the river. The men-of-war’s boats first drew near this -terrible surge, and Mr. Bloye of the Lyra, having the chief pilot with -him, heroically led into it, but in an instant his barge was ingulfed -and he and all with him were drowned. The following vessels seeing the -Lyra’s boat thus swallowed swerved in their course, and shooting up to -the right and left kept hovering undecided on the edge of the tormented -waters. Suddenly Lieutenant Cheyne of the Woodlark pulled ahead, and -striking the right line with courage and fortune combined, safely -passed the bar. The wind then lulled, the waves as if conquered abated -somewhat of their rage, and the chasse-marées, manned with Spanish -seamen, but having an engineer officer with a party of sappers in each -who compelled them to follow the men-of-war’s boats, came plunging one -after another through the huge breakers and reached the point designed -for the bridge. Thus was achieved this perilous and glorious exploit. -Not without more loss. Captain Elliot of the Martial, with his crew and -the crews of three transports’ boats, perished close to the shore in -despite of the most violent efforts made by the troops to save them; -three other vessels, cast on the beach, lost part of their crews; and -one large chasse-marée, full of men, after passing the line of surf -safely, was overtaken by a swift bellying wave which broke on her deck -and dashed her to pieces. - -Eight thousand men were now on the right bank. They remained in the -sand-hills for the night, and next morning, sweeping in a half-circle -round the citadel and its entrenchments, placed their left on the Adour -above the fortress, their right on the same river below; the water -however made such a bend that their front was little more than two -miles wide, and for the most part covered by a marshy ravine. This nice -operation was effected without opposition, because the Vauban camps, -menaced by the troops on the other side of the Adour, were so extensive -that Thouvenot’s force was scarcely sufficient to maintain them. The -bridge was then constructed three miles below Bayonne, at a place where -the river was contracted to eight hundred feet by strong retaining -walls, built with the view of sweeping away the bar by increasing the -force of the current. Bridge and boom were the joint conception of -Colonel Sturgeon and Major Todd of the Staff corps; but the execution -was confided entirely to the latter, who, with a mind less brilliant -than Sturgeon’s, yet more indefatigable, very ably and usefully served -his country throughout this war. - -Twenty-six chasse-marées, moored head and stem at distances of forty -feet, were first bound together with ropes; two thick cables were then -carried loosely across their decks, the ends, cast over the walls on -each bank, being strained and fastened in various modes to the sands. -They were sufficiently slack to meet the spring-tides, which rose -fourteen feet, and planks were tied upon them without any supporting -beams. The boom, moored with anchors above and below, was a double line -of masts connected with chains and cables, so as to form a succession -of squares, in the design, if a vessel broke through the outside, that -it should by the shock turn round in the square and get entangled with -the floating wrecks of the line it had broken. Gun-boats, with aiding -batteries on the banks, were then stationed to protect the boom, and to -keep off fire-vessels, row-boats were furnished with grappling irons. -The whole was by the united labour of seamen and soldiers finished on -the 26th, and, contrary to the general opinion on such matters, Major -Todd assured the Author of this History that he found the soldiers, -with minds quickened by the wider range of knowledge attendant on their -service, more ready of resource, and their efforts under a regular -discipline of more avail, with less loss of time, than the irregular -activity of the seamen. But fortune, the errors of the enemy, the -matchless skill and daring of the British seamen, and the discipline -and intrepidity of the British soldiers, combined by the genius of -Wellington, were all necessary to the success of this stupendous -undertaking, which must always rank amongst the prodigies of war. - -When the bridge was finished Hope contracted the line of investment, -a difficult operation, for the position of the French outside the -citadel was exceedingly strong. The flanks were protected by ravines, -the sides of which were covered with fortified villas, the front being -on a ridge, crowned by the village and church of St. Etienne, both -dominant, strongly entrenched, and under the fire of the citadel. -Three converging columns, covered by skirmishers, were employed, and -the wings attained the edges of the ravines at either side, their -flanks resting on the Adour above and below; but a very vigorous -action happened in the centre. The German and a brigade of guards were -to attack simultaneously, the guards on the left, the light German -troops on the right, their heavy infantry in the centre; some accident -retarded the wings, and St. Etienne being first attacked the citadel -guns opened and the skirmishing fire was heavy; yet the Germans stormed -church and village, forced the entrenched line of houses, and took -a gun, which however they could not carry off under the fire of the -citadel. The action then ceased for a time, but the people of Bayonne -were in such consternation that Thouvenot to re-assure them sallied at -the head of the troops, charged the Germans twice, and fought well; -he was however wounded and finally lost a gun and the position of St. -Etienne: the British loss was however not less than five hundred men -and officers. - - -PASSAGE OF THE GAVES CONTINUED. (Feb. 1814.) - -While Hope passed the Adour, Wellington pushed his operations on the -Gaves with great vigour. Six divisions of infantry and two brigades -of cavalry were concentrated on the Gave d’Oleron, between Sauveterre -and Navarrens. Beresford lined the Bidouze to its confluence with the -Adour, and the 23rd drove Foy from his works on the lower parts of the -Oleron Gave, into the bridge-head at Peyrehorade. Soult’s right and -centre were thus held in check, and the rest of his army was at Orthes -and Sauveterre. - -On the 24th Wellington advanced to force the Gave d’Oleron. During the -previous days his movements had again deceived Soult, who thought the -light division was with Hope, and imagined the first division was with -Beresford; he did not expect however to hold the Gave, and looked to a -final concentration at Orthes. - -On the 24th also, Morillo, reinforced with a detachment of cavalry, -moved towards Navarrens, where rough ground concealed his real force -while his scouters beat back the French outposts; then a battalion -menaced the fords of the Gave at Doguen, with a view to draw the -attention of the garrison from the ford of Ville Nave, three miles -below, where Wellington designed really to pass. For that object a -great concentric movement was now in progress. Favoured by the hilly -nature of the country, which concealed all the columns, the sixth -division moved towards the ford of Montfort, three miles below that of -Ville Nave, while a battalion of the second division menaced the ford -of Barraute below Montfort. Picton marched against the bridge-head -of Sauveterre, with orders to make a feint of forcing the passage -there. Vivian’s hussars, coming up from Beresford’s right, threatened -other fords upon Picton’s left, and Beresford, keeping Foy in check -at Peyrehorade with the seventh division, sent the fourth above the -confluence of the waters to seek a fit place to throw a bridge. Thus -the French front was menaced on a line of twenty-five miles, but the -great force was above Sauveterre. - -The first operations were not happily executed. Some of the columns -missed the fords, and Picton, opening a cannonade at Sauveterre, made -four companies of Keane’s brigade and some cavalry pass the Gave in the -vicinity of the bridge; but they were driven back with a loss of ninety -men and officers, of whom some were drowned and thirty made prisoners: -the diversion was however complete and the general operations -successful. Soult on the first alarm drew Harispe from Sauveterre, -placing him on the road to Orthes where a range of hills parallel to -the Gave of Oleron separates it from the Gave of Pau; only a division -of infantry and Berton’s cavalry then remained at Sauveterre, and -Villatte, alarmed by Picton’s demonstrations, abandoned his works on -the left bank and destroyed the bridge. Meanwhile the sixth division -passed without opposition at Montfort above Sauveterre, and the main -body, meeting at the ford of Ville Nave with only a small cavalry -picquet, crossed with no more loss than two men drowned: a happy -circumstance, for the waters were deep and rapid, the cold intense, and -the ford so narrow the passage was not completed before dark. To have -forced it in face of an enemy would have been exceedingly difficult; -and it is remarkable that Soult, who was with Harispe only five miles -from Montfort and seven from Ville Nave, should not have sent that -general down to oppose either passage. - -On the 25th at daylight, Wellington pushed the French rear-guard into -the suburb of Orthes, which masked the bridge there, and the Portuguese -of the light division lost twenty-five men in the skirmish. The second, -sixth, and light divisions, Hamilton’s Portuguese, five regiments of -cavalry, and three batteries, were now massed in front of Orthes; the -third division and a brigade of cavalry were in front of the broken -bridge of Berenx five miles lower down the Gave; the fourth and seventh -divisions, with Vivian’s cavalry, were in front of Peyrehorade, from -whence Foy retired to Orthes. - -On the morning of the 26th, Beresford, finding Foy had abandoned -Peyrehorade, passed the Gave, partly by a pontoon bridge, partly by a -ford where the current ran so strong that a column was like to have -been carried away bodily; but he had previously detached the 18th -Hussars to find another ford higher up, which was effected under the -guidance of a miller, and the hussars gaining the high road to Orthes -drove some French cavalry through Puyoo. There they rallied on their -reserves and beat back the foremost of the pursuers; yet they would not -await the shock of the main body, now reinforced by Vivian’s brigade -and commanded by Beresford in person. In this affair Major Sewell, -an officer of the staff, who had frequently manifested his personal -prowess, being without a sword, pulled a large stake from a hedge and -with that weapon overthrew two hussars in succession, only ceasing to -fight when a third cut his club in twain. - -Beresford now threw out a detachment on his left to intercept the -enemy’s communication with Dax, and Wellington sent Lord Edward -Somerset’s cavalry with the third division across the Gave, by some -fords below the broken bridge of Berenx. Then directing Beresford to -take a position for the night on some heights near the village of -Baïghts, he proceeded to throw a pontoon bridge at Berenx; and thus -after a circuitous march of more than fifty miles with his right wing, -and the passage of five Gaves, he had again united it with his centre -and secured a direct communication with Hope. - -The bridge of Orthes, an ancient and beautiful structure, could not -be easily forced. Composed of irregular arches, it had a tower in the -centre, the gateway of which was built up, and the principal arch in -front of the tower was mined, the houses on both sides contributing to -the defence. The river immediately above and below the bridge was deep, -and full of needle-rocks; but above the town the water, spreading wide, -with flat banks, presented the means of crossing. Wellington’s first -design was to pass there with Hill’s troops and the light division, -but when he heard Beresford had crossed the Gave below, he suddenly -threw his bridge at Berenx. This operation was covered by Beresford, -while Soult’s attention was diverted by a continual skirmish at the -suburbs of Orthes; by the appearance of Hill’s columns above the town; -and by Wellington’s taking cognizance of the position near the bridge -so openly as to draw a cannonade. The latter thought that when Soult -knew Beresford and Picton were over the Gave he would not await a -battle, and the emissaries reported that he was already in retreat; a -circumstance to be borne in mind, because next day’s operation required -success to justify it. - -Hope’s happy passage of the Adour now became known and he was -instructed to establish a line of communication to the port of Lannes, -where a permanent bridge was to be formed with boats brought up from -Urt; a direct intercourse was thus secured; yet Wellington felt he -was going beyond his strength if Suchet should send reinforcements to -Soult; wherefore he called up Freyre’s Spaniards, who were to cross -the Adour below Bayonne and join him by the port of Lannes. O’Donnel’s -Andalusians and the Prince of Anglona’s troops were also directed to -be in readiness to enter France. These orders were given with great -reluctance. The feeble resistance made by the French in the difficult -country already passed, left him without much uneasiness as to the -power of Soult’s army in the field, but his disquietude was extreme -about the danger of an insurgent warfare. - -“_Maintain the strictest discipline, without that we are lost_,” was -his expression to Freyre; and he issued a proclamation authorizing -the people of the districts he had overrun to arm themselves for the -preservation of order under the direction of their mayors. He invited -them to arrest all straggling soldiers and followers of the army, -all plunderers and evil doers, and convey them to head-quarters with -proof of their crimes, promising to punish the culpable and pay for -all damages. At the same time he confirmed all the local authorities -who chose to retain their offices: on the sole condition of having no -political or military intercourse with the countries still possessed -by the French army. Nor was his proclamation a dead letter. In the -night of the 25th the inhabitants of a village, near the road leading -from Sauveterre to Orthes, shot one English soldier dead and wounded -a second who had come with others to plunder. Wellington caused the -wounded man to be hung as an example, and also forced an English -colonel to quit the army for suffering his soldiers to destroy the -municipal archives of a small town. - -Soult had no thought of retreating. His army was concentrated, and -every bridge except that at Orthes, the ancient masonry of which -resisted his mines, was destroyed. One regiment of cavalry was on his -right, watching the fords as far as Peyrehorade; three others, with -two battalions of infantry, under Pierre Soult, watched those between -Orthes and Pau. Two regiments of cavalry remained with the army, and -the design was to fall upon the first column which should cross the -Gave. But the officer at Puyoo, who had suffered Vivian’s hussars to -pass on the 26th without opposition, made no report of the event, -which enabled Beresford to complete his movement unmolested, instead -of being assailed by two-thirds of the French army. It was not until -three o’clock in the evening that Soult knew of his being over the -Gave, although he was then close on the flank of the French army, his -scouters being on the Dax road in its rear: and at the same time the -sixth and light divisions were seen descending from the heights beyond -the river pointing towards Berenx. - -In this crisis the French marshal hesitated whether to fall upon -Beresford and Picton while the latter was still passing the river, or -take a defensive position. Finally, judging he had not time to form -an attack, he decided upon the latter, and under cover of a skirmish, -hastily threw his army on a new line across the road from Peyrehorade. -His right extended to the heights of San Boës, along which ran the -road from Orthes to Dax; and the line was prolonged on the left -to Castetarbe, a village close to the Gave. Having thus opposed a -temporary front to Beresford, he made dispositions to receive battle -next morning, bringing Villatte’s infantry and Pierre Soult’s cavalry -from the other side of Orthes through that town: it was this movement -that led Wellington’s emissaries to say he was retiring. - -Soult’s position was on a ridge of hills, partly wooded, partly naked. - -In the centre was an open rounded hill, from whence long narrow tongues -shot out towards the high-road of Peyrehorade on the left; on the -right by St. Boës, towards the church of Baïghts; the whole presented -a concave front covered with a marshy ravine, which was crossed by two -shorter necks coming from the round hill in the centre. - -The road from Orthes to Dax passed behind the line to the village of -St. Boës; and behind the centre a succession of undulating bare heathy -hills trended for several miles to the rear. - -Behind the right the country was low and deep; but Orthes, receding -from the river up the slope of a steep hill, was behind the left wing. - -Reille, having Taupin’s, Roguet’s, and Paris’s divisions under him, -commanded on the right, holding the ground from St. Boës to the centre. - -D’Erlon, commanding Foy’s and D’Armagnac’s divisions, was on Reille’s -left, extending along a ridge towards the road of Peyrehorade--the -second being in reserve. Villatte’s division and the cavalry were -posted above the village of Rontun, on open heathy hills, from whence -they overlooked the low country beyond St. Boës, and furnished a -reserve to both D’Erlon and Reille. - -Harispe, whose troops as well as Villatte’s were under Clausel’s -orders, occupied Orthes and the bridge, having a regiment near the ford -of Souars above the town. Thus the French army extended from St. Boës -to Orthes, but the great mass was disposed towards the centre. Twelve -guns were attached to Harispe, twelve were upon the round hill in the -centre, sweeping the ground beyond St. Boës, sixteen were in reserve on -the Dax road. - -At daybreak on the 27th, the sixth and light divisions, having passed -the Gave near Berenx, by a pontoon bridge thrown in the night, wound up -a narrow way between high rocks to the great road of Peyrehorade, and -the third division, with Lord Edward Somerset’s cavalry, were already -established there, having skirmishers pushed forwards to the edge of -the wooded height occupied by D’Erlon’s left. Beresford, having the -fourth and seventh divisions and Vivian’s cavalry, then gained the -ridge of St. Boës and approached the Dax road beyond. Hill, with his -own British and Le Cor’s Portuguese division, menaced the bridge of -Orthes, and the ford of Souars from the left bank. Between Beresford -and Picton, a mile and a half, there were no troops; but half-way, -in front of the French centre, was a Roman camp crowning an isolated -peering hill nearly as lofty as the centre of Soult’s position. - -On this camp, now covered with vineyards, but then open and grassy, -with a few trees, Wellington stopped for an hour to examine the enemy’s -order of battle; his two divisions were then coming up from the river, -yet so hemmed in by rocks that only a few men could march abreast, -and their point of union with the third division was little more -than cannon-shot from the French left. It was a critical moment, and -Picton did not conceal his disquietude; but Wellington, imperturbable, -continued his observations without seeming to notice his dangerous -position. When the troops reached the main road he reinforced Picton -with the sixth, and drew the light division by cross roads behind the -Roman camp, thus connecting his wings and forming a central reserve; -because from that point byeways led, on the left to the church of -Baïghts and the Dax road; on the right to the Peyrehorade road; and two -others led by the low necks across the marsh to the French position. - -This marsh, the open hill, where Soult’s guns and reserves were -gathered, and the narrow tongues on either side, combined to forbid a -front attack, and the flanks were scarcely more promising. The ridge -occupied by the French left sunk indeed to a gentle undulation in -crossing the Peyrehorade road; yet to push there between D’Erlon and -Orthes would have been useless, because that town was strongly occupied -by Harispe, and covered by an ancient wall. To turn the St. Boës flank -the troops must have descended into the low marshy country beyond the -Dax road, where the heathy hills trending backwards from the centre of -the French position would have enabled Soult to oppose a new front, at -right angles to his actual position; the whole of the allied army must -then have made a circuitous flank movement within gun-shot, through -a difficult country, or Beresford’s left must have been dangerously -extended and the whole line weakened. Nor could the movement be hidden, -because the hills, although only moderately high, were abrupt on that -side, affording a full view of the low country, and Soult’s cavalry -detachments were in observation on every brow. - -It only remained to assail the French flanks along the narrow ridges, -making the principal effort at St. Boës, and overlapping the French -right to seize the road to St. Sever, while Hill passed the Gave at -Souars and cut off the road to Pau, thus enclosing the beaten army in -Orthes. This was no slight affair. On Picton’s side it was easy to -obtain a footing on the flank ridge near the high road; but beyond that -the ground rose rapidly, and the French were gathered thickly with a -narrow front and plenty of guns. On Beresford’s side they could only -be assailed along the summit of the St. Boës ridge, advancing from the -high church of Baïghts and the Dax road; but the village of St. Boës -was strongly occupied, the ground immediately behind it strangled to a -narrow pass; and sixteen guns on the Dax road, placed behind the centre -of Soult’s line and well covered from counter-fire, were ready to crush -any column emerging from the gorge of St. Boës. - - -BATTLE OF ORTHES. (Feb. 1814.) - -From daybreak there had been a slight skirmish, with occasional -cannon-shots on the allies’ right, and the French cavalry at times -pushed parties forward on each flank; but at nine o’clock Wellington -commenced the real attack. The third and sixth divisions won without -difficulty the lower part of the ridges occupied by Foy, and -endeavoured to extend their left towards the French centre with a sharp -fire of musketry; yet the main battle was on the other flank. There -Cole, keeping Anson’s brigade of the fourth division in reserve, -had assailed St. Boës with Ross’s British brigade and Vasconcellos’ -Portuguese, his object being to get on to the open ground beyond. -Fierce and slaughtering was the struggle; five times breaking through -the scattered houses did Ross carry his battle into the wider space -beyond; but ever as his troops emerged the French guns from the centre -hill smote them in front, and the reserved battery on the Dax road -swept through them with grape from flank to flank; while Taupin’s -supporting masses, rushing forward with a wasting fire and lapping the -flanks with skirmishers, which poured along the ravines on either hand, -forced the shattered columns back into the village. It was in vain that -with desperate valour the allies broke time after time through the -narrow way and strived to spread a front beyond: Ross fell dangerously -wounded, and Taupin’s troops, thickly clustered and well supported, -defied every effort. Nor was Soult less happy on the other side. From -the narrowness of the ground the third and sixth divisions could only -engage a few men at once, no progress was made; one small detachment, -which Picton extended to his left, attempting to gain the smaller -tongue jutting out from the central hill, was very suddenly charged -as it neared the summit, by Foy, and driven down again in confusion, -losing several prisoners. - -When the combat had continued with unabated fury on the side of St. -Boës for three hours, Wellington sent a caçadore regiment of the -light division from the Roman camp to protect the right flank of -Ross’s brigade against the French skirmishers; this was of no avail, -for the Portuguese already there under Vasconcellos being unable to -sustain the violence of the enemy, had given way in disorder, and the -French pouring on, the British troops retreated through St. Boës with -difficulty. This happened at the moment when the detachment on Picton’s -left was repulsed, victory seemed to declare for the French, and Soult, -conspicuous on his central hill, the knot of all his combinations, -seeing his enemies thus broken and thrown backwards on each side, put -all his reserves in movement to complete the success. It is said that -in the exultation of the moment he smote his thigh, exclaiming, “_At -last I have him._” And it was no vain-glorious speech, the crisis -seemed to justify the exultation. There was however a small black -cloud rising just beneath, unheeded by the French commander amidst the -thundering din and tumult that now shook the field of battle, but which -soon burst with irresistible violence. - -Wellington, seeing St. Boës was inexpugnable, had suddenly changed his -plan of battle. Supporting Ross with Anson’s brigade, which had not -hitherto been engaged, he backed both with the seventh division and -Vivian’s cavalry, thus establishing a very heavy body towards the Dax -road. Then he ordered the third and sixth divisions to be thrown in -mass upon the French left, and at the same time sent the 52nd Regiment -down from the Roman camp, with instructions to cross the marsh in -front, mount the French position, and assail the flank and rear of the -troops engaged with the fourth division at St. Boës. Colonel Colborne, -so often distinguished, immediately led this regiment across the -marsh under a skirmishing fire, the men sinking at every step above -the knees, in some places to the middle; yet still pressing forwards -with that stern resolution and order to be expected from the veterans -of the light division, soldiers who had never yet met their match in -the field, they soon obtained footing on firm land, and ascended the -heights in line at the moment when Taupin, on the French right, was -pushing vigorously through St. Boës; and when Foy and D’Armagnac, -hitherto more than masters of their positions, were being assailed on -the left by the third and sixth divisions. - -With a mighty shout and a rolling fire the 52nd soldiers dashed -forwards between Foy and Taupin, beating down a French battalion in -their course and throwing everything before them into disorder. General -Bechaud was killed, Foy was dangerously wounded, and his troops, -discouraged by his fall and by this sudden storm from a quarter where -no enemy was expected, for the march of the 52nd had been hardly -perceived save by the skirmishers, got into confusion, and the disorder -spreading to Reille’s wing, he also was forced to fall back and take -a new position. The narrow pass behind St. Boës was thus opened, and -Wellington, seizing the critical moment, thrust the fourth and seventh -divisions, Vivian’s cavalry, and two batteries of artillery through, -and spread a front beyond. Victory was thus secured. For the third -and sixth divisions on the other flank had won D’Armagnac’s position -and established a battery of guns on a knoll, from whence the bullets -ploughed through the French masses from one flank to another; and -though a squadron of French chasseurs, coming suddenly at a hard gallop -down the main road of Orthes, charged these guns and rode over some of -the sixth division which had advanced too far, their brave career was -too madly pushed, they got entangled in a hollow way and nearly all -destroyed. The third and seventh divisions then advanced and the wings -of the army were united. - -Soult now concentrated his forces on the heathy hills beyond the Dax -road, and with Taupin’s, Roguet’s, Paris’s, and D’Armagnac’s divisions -made strong battle to cover the rallying of Foy’s disordered men. -But his foes were not all in front. Hill, having twelve thousand -combatants, received orders, when Wellington changed his plan of -attack, to force the passage of the Gave, partly to prevent Harispe -from falling upon the flank of the sixth division, partly in hope of -a successful issue: and so it happened. Unable to force the bridge, -he forded the river above, at Souars, drove back the troops there, -seized the heights, cut off the French from the road to Pau, and turned -the town of Orthes. He thus menaced Soult’s only line of retreat by -Salespice, on the road to St. Sever, at the moment the junction of the -allies’ wings was effected on the French position. Clausel, so pressed, -made Harispe abandon Orthes and close towards Villatte on the heights -above Rontun, leaving however some conscript battalions on a rising -point near the road of St. Sever called the _Motte de Turenne_, while -in person he endeavoured to check Hill with two cavalry regiments and a -brigade of infantry. - -Soult, seeing that Hill’s passage at Souars rendered the whole position -untenable, now gave orders for a general retreat. This was a perilous -matter. The heathy hills upon which he was now fighting, furnished for -a short distance a succession of parallel positions favourable for -defence, but then resolved themselves into a low ridge running to the -rear on a line parallel with the road to St. Sever; and on the opposite -side of that road, at cannon-shot distance, was a corresponding -ridge along which Hill, judging by the firing how matters went, -was now rapidly advancing. Five miles off was the _Luy de Bearn_, -and four miles further on the _Luy de France_, two rivers deep and -with difficult banks. Beyond them the Lutz, the Gabas, and the Adour -crossed the line; and though once beyond the wooden bridge of Sault -de Navailles on the _Luy de Bearn_, these streams would necessarily -cover the retreat, it seemed impossible to carry off by one road and -one bridge a defeated army still closely engaged in front. Soult did -so however. For Paris sustained the fight on his right until Foy and -Taupin’s troops rallied, and when the impetuous assault of the 52nd, -and a rush of the fourth and seventh divisions, drove Paris back, -D’Armagnac interposed to cover him until the union of the allies’ -wings was completed: then both retired, covered by Villatte. In this -manner the French yielded step by step and without confusion, and the -allies advanced with an incessant deafening musketry and cannonade, -yet losing many men, especially on the right where the third division -were very strongly opposed. As the danger of being cut off at Salespice -by Hill became imminent, the retrograde movements were more hurried -and confused, and Hill seeing this quickened his pace. At last both -sides began to run violently, and so many men broke from the French -ranks, making across the fields towards the fords, and there was such -a rush by the rest to gain the bridge of Sault de Navailles, that the -whole country was covered with scattered bands, amongst which General -Cotton poured Lord Edward Somerset’s hussars, first breaking through a -covering body opposed to him by Harispe. In this charge two or three -hundred men were sabred, and two thousand threw down their arms in -an inclosed field; yet from some mismanagement the greatest part, -recovering their weapons, escaped, and the pursuit ceased at the Luy of -Bearn. - -Apparently the French army was now entirely dispersed, yet it was -not so. Soult passed the Luy of Bearn and destroyed the bridge with -the loss of only six guns and less than four thousand men killed, -wounded, and prisoners. Many thousands of conscripts however threw away -their arms, and one month afterwards the stragglers still amounted to -three thousand. Nor would the passage of the Luy have been effected -so happily, if Wellington had not been struck by a musket-ball just -above the thigh, which caused him to ride with difficulty. The loss -of the allies was two thousand three hundred, of which fifty, with -three officers, were taken; among the wounded were Wellington, General -Walker, General Ross, and the Duke of Richmond, then Lord March; this -last had served on the head-quarter staff during the whole war without -a hurt, but being made a captain in the 52nd, like a good soldier -joined his regiment the night before the battle, and was shot through -the chest a few hours afterwards; thus learning by experience the -difference between the labours and dangers of staff and regimental -officers, which are generally in the inverse ratio to their promotions. - -General Berton, who had been between Pau and Orthes during the battle, -was cut off by Hill’s movement; but skirting that general’s march -he retreated by Mant and Samadet with his cavalry, picking up two -battalions of conscripts on the road. Meanwhile Soult, having no -position to rally upon, continued his retreat in the night to St. -Sever, breaking down all the bridges behind him. Wellington pursued -at daylight in three columns, one in the centre by the main road, -the others on the right and left. At St. Sever he hoped to find the -French still in confusion, but they had crossed the river, the bridge -was broken, and the allied army halted. The result of the battle was -however soon made known far and wide, and Daricau, who with a few -hundred soldiers was endeavouring to form an insurgent levy at Dax, -immediately destroyed part of the stores, removed the rest to Mont -Marsan, and retreated through the Landes to Langon on the Garonne. - -From St. Sever, which offered no position, Soult turned short to his -own right, moving upon Barcelona up the Adour. He left D’Erlon however -with two divisions of infantry, some cavalry and four guns, at Caceres -on the right bank, sent Clausel into Aire on the opposite side of the -river, abandoned his magazines at Mont Marsan, and opened the direct -road to Bordeaux; but with his right he commanded another road by -Roquefort to that city, while his left protected at Aire the magazines -and artillery parc at that place, and covered the road to Pau. This -movement made it difficult to judge what line he meant to adopt. - -Wellington passed the Adour at St. Sever, and sent the light division -and some cavalry to seize the magazines at Mont Marsan; at the same -time he pushed a column towards Caceres, where a cannonade and charge -of cavalry had place, and a few persons were hurt on both sides. Next -day, when Hill had reached the Adour between St. Sever and Aire, -D’Erlon was driven back skirmishing to Barcelona on the other bank. It -was then evident that Soult had abandoned Bordeaux; yet the pursuit -could not be pushed vigorously, because every bridge was broken; and -a violent storm on the evening of the 1st, filling the smaller rivers -and torrents, carried away the pontoon bridges and cut off all the -supplies: the bulk of the army therefore halted on the right bank of -the Adour until the bridges could be repaired. - -Hill, who was on the left bank, had meanwhile marched to seize the -magazines at Aire. Moving in two columns he reached that place on -the 2nd at three o’clock, and having two divisions of infantry, a -brigade of cavalry, and a battery of horse-artillery, expected no -serious opposition. Clausel was however there in order of battle with -Villatte’s and Harispe’s divisions, and some guns. Occupying a steep -ridge, which was high and wooded on the right where it overlooked the -river, but merging on the left into a wide table-land, over which the -great road led to Pau, his position was strong, yet insecure. It could -be readily outflanked on the left by the table-land, and was uneasy -for retreat on the right, because the ridge was narrow and the ravine -behind very rugged, with a mill-stream at the bottom; moreover a branch -of the Adour flowing behind Aire cut it off from Barcelona, and behind -the left wing was the greater Lees, a river with steep banks and only -one bridge. - - -COMBAT OF AIRE. (Feb. 1814.) - -Hill attacked without hesitation. General Stewart with two British -brigades fell on the French right, a Portuguese brigade assailed their -centre, and the other brigades followed in columns of march; but the -action was sudden, the Portuguese were pushed forward in a slovenly -manner by General Da Costa, a man of no ability, and the French under -Harispe met them, on the flat summit, with so rough a charge that they -gave way in flight while the rear of the allies’ column was still in -march. The fight was thus like to be lost, when Stewart, having easily -won the heights on the French right, where Villatte, fearing to be -enclosed, made but a feeble resistance, immediately detached Barnes -with the 50th and 92nd Regiments to the aid of the Portuguese, and -the vehement assault of these troops turned the stream of battle; the -French were broken in turn and thrown back on their reserves. Yet they -rallied and renewed the action with great courage, fighting obstinately -until Byng’s British brigade came up; then Harispe was driven towards -the river Lees, and Villatte quite through the town of Aire into the -space between the two branches of the Adour behind. - -Reille, who was at Barcelona when the action began, now brought up a -division to support Villatte, and the combat was continued until night -at that point, while Harispe passed the Lees and broke the bridge. The -French lost many men. Two generals, Dauture and Gasquet, were wounded, -a colonel of engineers was killed, a hundred prisoners were taken, many -of Harispe’s conscripts threw away their arms and fled to their homes, -and the magazines fell into the conqueror’s hands. The British lost one -hundred and fifty men, General Barnes was wounded, Colonel Hood killed. -The Portuguese loss was never officially stated, it could not have been -less than the British, and the vigour of the action showed that the -enemy’s courage was not abated by the battle of Orthes. His retreat was -now made up the Adour by both banks, but he was not followed, because -new combinations were opening on both sides. - - - - -BOOK XVI. - - Garonne--Adour--Combat of Vic Bigorre--Death and Character of - Colonel Sturgeon; surprising Feat of Captain Light--Combat of - Tarbes--Operations on the Garonne--Major Hughes; Battle of - Toulouse--Sally from Bayonne. - - -GARONNE. (March, 1814.) - -Very perilous was Soult’s state after the battle of Orthes. Losses -in actions, desertion of conscripts, and the dispersion of the -old soldiers, had reduced his army; all his magazines were taken; -his officers were discontented; he was ill seconded by the civil -authorities, and a strong Bourbon party was actively exciting the -people to insurrection. He was, however, a man formed by nature to -struggle with difficulties, and always appeared greatest in desperate -circumstances. Retreating towards the foot of the Pyrenees, he took a -position covering Tarbes, and commanding the great road from Pau to -Toulouse; there he reorganized his army, called in all the detachments -made before the battle, put the national guards and _gens d’armes_ of -the Pyrenees in activity, and directed the commanders of districts -behind him to collect all the old soldiers they could, and send them -to the army. Then, to counteract the machinations of the Bourbonists, -he issued a proclamation remarkable for its power, and evincing the -sternest resolution, which was not belied by his acts, though his -difficulties hourly increased. - -But Wellington also was embarrassed. The weather had stopped his -pursuit when vigorous action would have been decisive; Soult had -rallied on a new line of retreat with strong defensive positions; -the allied army, weakened by every step in advance, would, if it -followed the French, have to move between the Garonne and the Pyrenees, -exposing both its flanks and its rear to all the power which the -French government could command. It was, therefore, necessary to find -a counterpoise by increasing his own force and strengthening the -Bourbonists. He had long been promised twenty thousand additional -men from England and Portugal, but the governments of both countries -failed in their engagements. He had heard and believed that Suchet had -detached ten thousand men to join Soult, and he had, as before shown, -called up Freyre’s Gallicians through the Landes, because there was -less temptation for plunder there, and he had provided them entirely -from the English magazines and military chest; yet their entrance into -France was instantly marked by outrages which began to dispose the -people to listen to Soult’s proclamation, and an insurrection was to be -feared. Inactive, however, he could not remain, and while awaiting the -junction of the Spaniards he detached Beresford with twelve thousand -men against Bordeaux, remaining with only twenty-six thousand in -position to observe Soult, who could from Tarbes move by Roquefort, -and gain Bordeaux before Beresford. That general entered the city on -the 12th; and the mayor, Lynch, eager to betray his sovereign, very -quickly tore his own scarf of honour off to meet the invaders with a -welcome. The Duke of Angoulême then arrived, the Bourbonists took the -ascendant, and Beresford returned to the army with the fourth division -and Vivian’s cavalry, leaving Lord Dalhousie behind with the seventh -division and three squadrons. - -Then the Napoleonists, recovering from their first stupor, bestirred -themselves. A partizan officer cut off fifty men sent by Lord Dalhousie -over the Garonne; the peasants of the Landes formed bands and burned -the houses of gentlemen who had assumed the white colours; forces of -various descriptions were being assembled beyond the Garonne, and -General Decaen was sent by the emperor to organize and command them. -General Beurman also, who had been detached by Suchet with six thousand -men to aid Lyons, was now directed to descend the Garonne towards -Bordeaux, where a counter-insurrection was being prepared. But then -the English fleet under Admiral Penrose entered the Garonne, sweeping -it of French vessels of war, and ruining the batteries on the banks; -whereupon Lord Dalhousie crossed the river, and, meeting with General -L’Huillier at Etauliers, took three hundred prisoners, the French -flying at the first onset. Better troops were, however, gathering in -that quarter, and the British force would have been eventually in -danger, if Napoleon, the man of mightiest capacity for good known to -history since the days of Alexander the Great, had not been just then -overthrown to make room for despots; who, with minds enlarged only to -cruelty, avarice, dissoluteness, and treachery, were secretly intent -to defraud their people of the just government they demanded as the -compensation for serving ungrateful masters. - -While Beresford was detached, Soult and Wellington remained in -observation, each thinking the other stronger than himself; for the -English general, hearing of Beurman’s march, believed his troops had -joined Soult, and the latter, not knowing of Beresford’s march until -the 13th, concluded Wellington had still those twelve thousand men. -The numbers on each side were, however, nearly equal. Three thousand -French stragglers had been collected, but were kept back by the -generals of the military districts, and Soult had therefore in line, -exclusive of conscripts without arms, only twenty-eight thousand sabres -and bayonets, with thirty-eight pieces of artillery. Wellington had -twenty-seven thousand sabres and bayonets, with forty-two guns; having, -besides, pushed detachments to Pau, to Roquefort, into the Landes, and -towards the Upper Garonne. - -Two great roads led to Toulouse; one on the English left from Aire by -Auch; the other on their right from Pau by Tarbes; Soult commanded -both, and Wellington thought he would take that of Auch; wherefore -he desired Beresford to lean towards it in returning from Bordeaux; -but Soult had arranged for the other line, and was only prevented -from retaking the offensive, on the 9th or 10th, by the loss of his -magazines, which forced him to organize a system of requisition first -for subsistence. Meanwhile his equality of force passed away; for on -the 13th, the day on which he heard of Beresford’s absence, Freyre -came up with eight thousand Spanish infantry, and next day Ponsonby’s -heavy cavalry arrived. Wellington was then the strongest, yet -awaited Beresford’s arrival, and was uneasy about his own situation. -He dreaded the junction of Suchet’s twenty thousand veterans; the -English ministers, instead of troops, had sent ridiculous projects. -The French army in his front, having recovered its stragglers, and -being reinforced by conscripts, was now reorganized in six divisions, -under Daricau, Maransin, Villatte, D’Armagnac, Taupin, and Harispe. -General Paris’s troops, hitherto acting as an unattached body, were -thus absorbed; the cavalry, composed of Berton’s and Vial’s brigades, -was commanded by Pierre Soult, and seven thousand conscript infantry -under Travot formed a reserve. Again, therefore, driven by necessity, -Wellington called Giron’s Andalusians and Del Parque’s troops also -into France, although Freyre’s soldiers had by their outrages already -created wide-spread consternation. - -The head-quarters had been fixed at Aire, with the army on each side -of the Adour, all the bridges being restored, and some small bands -which had appeared upon the left flank and rear were dispersed by -the cavalry; Soult was, however, organizing an extensive system of -partizans towards the mountains, waiting only for money to give it -activity. Meanwhile, though the main bodies were a long day’s march -asunder, the regular cavalry had frequent encounters, and both generals -claimed the superiority. In this desultory warfare, on the night of the -7th, Soult sent a strong detachment to Pau to arrest some nobles who -had assembled to welcome the Duke of Angoulême; but General Fane got -there first with a brigade of infantry and two regiments of cavalry, -and the stroke failed; the French, however, returning by another road, -made prisoners of an officer and four or five English dragoons. A -second French detachment, penetrating between Pau and Aire, carried off -a post of correspondence; and two days after, when Fane had quitted -Pau, a French officer with only four hussars captured there thirty-four -Portuguese, with their commander and ten loaded mules. - -It was these excursions which gave Soult a knowledge of Beresford’s -march, and he resolved to attack the allies, thinking to strike a -good blow on the 13th, by throwing his army offensively upon the -high tabular land between Pau and Aire; the country was open for all -arms, yet the movement produced only a few skirmishes. Pierre Soult -pushed back Fane’s cavalry posts on the English right with the loss of -two officers and a few men wounded; on the left, Berton, having two -regiments, sought to pass a difficult muddy ford, but the head of his -column was overthrown by Sir John Campbell with a squadron of the 4th -Portuguese cavalry. The latter were however too few to bar the passage, -and Berton, getting a regiment over higher up, charged the retiring -troops in a narrow way, killed several, and took some prisoners, -amongst them Bernardo de Sà, since well known as Count of Bandeira. - -Wellington, imagining the arrival of Suchet’s troops had caused Soult’s -boldness, made only defensive dispositions, and on the 14th Pierre -Soult again drove back Fane’s horsemen; at first with some loss, yet -finally was himself driven clear off the Pau road. Both generals, -acting under false information, were afraid to strike, each thought his -adversary stronger than he really was; but Soult, who was in a tangled -country, now hearing that Bordeaux had fallen, first took alarm, and -retreated in the night of the 16th. Pierre Soult then again got on to -the Pau road, and detached a hundred chosen troopers under Captain -Dania to molest the communication with Orthes. By a forced march that -partizan reached Hagetnau at nightfall, surprised six officers and -eight medical men with their baggage, made a number of other prisoners, -and returned on the evening of the 18th. This enterprise, so far in the -rear, was supposed to be an insurgent exploit; wherefore Wellington -seized the authorities at Hagetnau, and again declared he would hang -all the peasants caught in arms, and burn their villages. - -Soult’s offensive operations had now terminated. He sent his conscripts -to Toulouse and prepared for a rapid retreat on that place. His recent -operations had been commenced too late, he should have moved the 10th -or 11th, when there were not more than twenty-two thousand men in his -front. Wellington’s passive state, which had been too much prolonged, -was also at an end; all his reinforcements and detachments were either -up or close at hand, and he could now put in motion forty thousand -bayonets, six thousand sabres, and sixty pieces of artillery. - -On the evening of the 17th the hussars went up the valley of the Adour, -closely supported by the light division, and, half a march behind, by -the fourth division coming from Bordeaux. - -The 18th, the hussars, the light and the fourth division, advanced -towards Plaissance; and Hill’s troops, on the right, marched against -Conchez, keeping a detachment on the Pau road in observation of Pierre -Soult’s cavalry; the centre, under Wellington, moved by the high road -leading from Aire to Toulouse. The French right was thus turned by the -valley of the Adour, while Hill, with a sharp skirmish in which eighty -British and Germans were killed or wounded, drove back their outposts -upon Lembege. - -Soult retired during the night to a strong ridge behind a small river -with rugged banks, called the Laiza, his right, under D’Erlon, was -extended towards Vic Bigorre, on the great road of Tarhes, and Berton’s -cavalry took post in column, covering Vic Bigorre, where the road -was lined on each side by deep and wide ditches. In this situation, -being pressed by Bock’s cavalry, Berton suddenly charged, and took an -officer and some men, yet finally he was beaten and retreated. Soult, -thinking a flanking column only was in the valley of the Adour, moved -to fall upon it with his whole army. But he recognised the skill of -his opponent when he found the whole of the allies’ centre had also -been thrown on to the Tarhes road, and was close to Vic Bigorre; while -the light division, beyond the Adour, was getting in rear of it by -Rabastans, upon which place the hussars had driven a body of French -cavalry. Berton’s horsemen then passed in retreat, the danger of being -cut off from Tarbes was imminent, and Soult in alarm ordered Berton to -join the cavalry at Rabastans, and cover that road to Tarbes, while -D’Erlon checked the allies at Vic Bigorre on the main road, and enabled -him personally to hasten with Clausel’s and Reille’s divisions to -Tarbes by a circuitous way. - -D’Erlon, not comprehending the crisis, moved slowly with his baggage -in front, and, having the river Lechez to cross, rode on before his -troops, expecting to find Berton at Vic Bigorre; but he met the German -cavalry there, and had only time to place Daricau’s division, now under -Paris, amongst some vineyards, when hither came Picton to the support -of the cavalry, and fell upon him. - - -COMBAT OF VIC BIGORRE. (March, 1814.) - -The French left flank was secured by the Lechez river; the right, -extended towards the Adour river, was exposed to the German cavalry, -while the front was attacked by Picton. The action commenced about two -o’clock, and Paris was driven back in disorder; but then D’Armagnac -entered the line, and, spreading to the Adour, renewed the fight, which -lasted until D’Erlon, after losing many men, and seeing his right -turned beyond the Adour by the light division and the hussars, fell -back behind Vic Bigorre, and took post for the night. This action was -vigorous. Two hundred and fifty Anglo-Portuguese fell, and amongst them -died Colonel Henry Sturgeon. Skilled to excellence in almost every -branch of war, and possessing a variety of other accomplishments, he -used his gifts so gently for himself, so usefully for the service, -that envy offered no bar to admiration, and the whole army felt -painfully mortified that his merits were passed unnoticed in the public -despatches. - -Soult’s march was through a deep sandy plain, very harassing, and it -would have been dangerous if Wellington had sent Hill’s strong cavalry -in pursuit; but the country was unfavourable for quick observation, -and the French covered their movements with rear-guards whose real -numbers it was difficult to ascertain. One of these bodies was posted -on a hill, the end of which abutted on the high road, the slope being -clothed with trees, and well lined by skirmishers. Lord Wellington -desired to know what force thus barred his way, yet all the exploring -attempts were stopped by the enemy’s fire. Captain William Light, -distinguished by the variety of his attainments, an artist, musician, -mechanist, seaman, and soldier, then made the trial. He rode forward as -if he would force his way through the French skirmishers, but in the -wood dropped his reins and leaned back as if badly wounded; his horse -appeared to canter wildly along the front of the enemy’s light troops, -and they, thinking him mortally hurt, ceased their fire, and took no -further notice. He thus passed unobserved through the wood to the other -side of the hill, where there were no skirmishers, and, ascending to -the open summit above, put spurs to his horse, and, galloping along -the French main line, counted their regiments as he passed. His sudden -appearance, his blue undress, his daring confidence, and his speed, -made the French doubt if he was an enemy, and a few shots only were -discharged, while he, dashing down the opposite declivity, broke from -the rear through the very skirmishers whose fire he had at first -essayed in front, reached the spot where Wellington stood, and told him -there were but five battalions on the hill. - -Soult now felt that a rapid retreat upon Toulouse was inevitable, yet, -determined to dispute every position offering the least advantage, he -was on the morning of the 20th again in order of battle on the heights -of Oleac, three miles behind Tarbes, which he still covered with -Harispe’s and Villatte’s divisions, both under Clausel. The plain of -Tarbes, apparently open, was yet full of deep ditches which forbad the -action of horsemen; wherefore he sent his brother with five regiments -of cavalry to his right flank in observation of the route to Auch, -fearing Wellington would by that line intercept his retreat to Toulouse. - -At daybreak Hill moved with the right along the high-road; the -centre, under Wellington, composed of the light division and hussars, -Ponsonby’s heavy cavalry, the sixth division and Freyre’s Spaniards, -marched by the road from Rabastens; Cole, having the left, was making -forced marches with the fourth division and Vivian’s cavalry, and -throwing out detachments to watch Pierre Soult. - - -COMBAT OF TARBES. (March, 1814.) - -Wellington’s column was separated by a branch of the Adour from Hill’s, -and when he approached Tarbes the light division and the hussars -attacked Harispe’s division on the heights of Orleix; Clinton, making -a flank movement to his left through the village of Dours with the -sixth division, then opened a cannonade against Harispe’s right, and -endeavoured to get between that general and Soult’s position at Oleac; -Hill, moving by the other bank of the river, assailed the town and -bridge of Tarbes, which were defended by Villatte. These operations -were designed to envelop and crush Clausel’s troops, which seemed easy, -because there appeared only a fine plain fit for the action of cavalry -between them and Soult. The latter, however, having sent his baggage -and incumbrances off during the night, saw the movement without alarm, -being better acquainted with the difficult nature of the plain behind, -in which he had been forced to make roads to enable Harispe to retreat -upon Oleac without passing through Tarbes. Nevertheless there was -danger: for while Hill menaced Tarbes, the light division, supported -with cavalry and guns, fell upon Orleix, and Clinton with a brisk -cannonade penetrated between Harispe and Pierre Soult, cutting the -latter off from the army. - -The action commenced at twelve o’clock. Hill’s artillery thundered on -the right, Clinton’s answered it on the left, and Alten threw the light -division in mass upon the centre, where Harispe’s left brigade, posted -on a strong hill, was suddenly assailed by the three rifle battalions. -There the fight was short, yet wonderfully fierce and violent; for the -French, probably thinking their opponents Portuguese on account of -their green dress, charged with great hardiness, and being encountered -by men not accustomed to yield, the fight was muzzle to muzzle, and -very difficult it was to judge at first who should win. At last -the French gave way, and Harispe, his centre being thus suddenly -overthrown, retired rapidly over the plain by Soult’s roads before -Clinton could get into his rear; then also Hill forced the passage -of the Adour at Tarbes, and Villatte retreated along the high-road -to Tournay, yet under a continued cannonade. The flat country was -now covered with confused masses of pursuers and pursued, all moving -precipitately and with an eager musketry, the French guns replying as -they could to the allies’ artillery; the situation of the retreating -troops seemed desperate; but, as Soult had foreseen, the British -cavalry could not act, and Clausel extricating his divisions with great -ability gained the main position, where four fresh divisions were drawn -up in order of battle and immediately opened all their batteries on the -allies. The pursuit was thus checked, and before Wellington could make -arrangements for a new attack darkness came on, wherefore he halted on -the banks of the Larret and Larros rivers. The loss of the French is -unknown, that of the allies did not exceed one hundred and twenty, of -whom twelve officers and eighty men were of the rifle battalions. - -During the night Soult retreated in two columns, one by the main road, -the other on the left of it, guided by fires lighted on different hills -as points of direction. Next day he reached St. Gaudens with D’Erlon’s -and Reille’s corps, while Clausel, who had retreated across the -fields, halted at Monrejean, and was there rejoined by Pierre Soult’s -cavalry. This march of more than thirty miles was made with a view -to gain Toulouse in the most rapid manner; for Soult having now seen -Wellington’s infantry and his five thousand horsemen, and hearing from -his brother that the fourth division and Vivian’s cavalry were on his -right, feared they would cut him off from Toulouse--his great depôt, -the knot of all his future combinations, and the only position where he -could hope to make a successful stand with his small army. - -The allies pursued in three columns, but their marches were short. -However, at St. Gaudens four squadrons of French cavalry were overtaken -and overthrown by two squadrons of the 13th Dragoons; they galloped in -disorder through St. Gaudens, yet rallied on the other side and were -again broken and pursued for two miles, many being sabred and above -a hundred taken prisoners. In this action the veteran Major Dogherty -of the 13th was seen charging between his two sons at the head of the -leading squadron. - -On the 23rd Hill was at St. Gaudens, Beresford at Puymauren, Wellington -at Boulogne. - -The 24th Hill was in St. Martory, Beresford in Lombez, Wellington at -Isle en Dodon. - -The 25th Hill entered Caceres, Beresford reached St. Foy, and -Wellington was at Samatan. - -On the 26th Beresford, marching in order of battle by his left, his -cavalry skirmishing to the right, took post on the Auch road behind -the Aussonnelle stream, facing the French army, which was on the Touch -covering Toulouse. The allies thus took seven days to march what Soult -had done in four; but the two armies being thus again brought together -in opposition with a common resolution to fight, it is fitting to show -how the generals framed their combinations. - - -OPERATIONS ON THE GARONNE. (March, 1814.) - -Soult, a native of these parts, had chosen Toulouse as a strategic -post, because that ancient capital of the south, having fifty thousand -inhabitants, commanded the principal passage of the Garonne, was -the centre of a great number of roads on both sides of that river, -and the chief military arsenal of the south of France. There he -could most easily feed his troops, assemble, arm, and discipline the -conscripts, control and urge the civil authorities with more power, -and counteract the machinations of the discontented; it also gave him -command of various lines of operations. He could retire upon Suchet -by Carcassonne, or towards Lyons by Alby. He could go behind the Tarn -and defend successively that river and the Lot, or even retreat upon -Decaen’s army near Bordeaux, and thus draw the allies down the right -bank of the Garonne as he had before drawn them up the left bank; -assured that Wellington must follow him, and with weakened forces, as -it would be necessary to leave troops in observation of Suchet. - -Thus reasoning, he placed a separate body of troops recently assembled -by General Loverdo from the interior, at Montauban, with orders to -construct a bridge-head on the left of the Tarn. This secured the -passage of that river, a point of assembly for detachments observing -the Garonne below Toulouse, and the command of several great roads. -But to hold Toulouse was a great political object. It was the last -point connecting him at once with Suchet and Decaen; while he held -it, the latter general and the partizans organized in the mountains -about Lourdes could act, each on their own side, against Wellington’s -long lines of communication. At Toulouse Suchet could aid him, either -with his whole force, or by a detachment to the Upper Garonne, where -General Lafitte had collected seven or eight hundred national guards -and other troops: Suchet, however, though strongly urged, treated this -proposition, as he had done those before made, with contempt. - -Toulouse was not less valuable as a position of battle. - -The Garonne, flowing along the allies’ right, presented the concave -of a deep loop, at the bottom of which was a bridge masked by the -suburb of St. Cyprien; this last, originally protected by an ancient -brick wall three feet thick and flanked by massive towers, was now -strengthened by Soult with a line of exterior entrenchments. - -Beyond the river was the city, inclosed by an old wall flanked with -towers, and so thick as to hold twenty-four pound guns. - -The great canal of Languedoc, which joined the Garonne a few miles -below the town, was generally within point-blank shot of this wall, -covering it on the north and east, as the Garonne and St. Cyprien did -on the west. - -Eastward, two suburbs, St. Stephen and Guillermerie, lying on both -sides of this canal, were entrenched and protected by the hills of -Sacarin and Cambon, which were also entrenched, and flanked the -approaches to the canal above and below the suburbs. - -Eight hundred yards beyond these hills a high ridge called Mont Rave -ran nearly parallel with the canal, its outer slope was exceedingly -rugged, and overlooked a marshy plain, through which the Ers river -flowed. - -South of the town was a plain, but there the suburb of St. Michel -furnished another outwork; and some distance beyond it a range of -heights, called the Pech David, commenced, trending westward up the -Garonne in a nearly parallel direction. - -Such being Soult’s position, he calculated, that as Wellington could -not force the passage by the suburb of St. Cyprien without an enormous -sacrifice of men, he must seek to turn the flanks above or below -Toulouse, leaving a force to blockade St. Cyprien lest the French -should issue thence against his communications. If he passed the -Garonne above Toulouse, and above its confluence with the Arriege, he -would have to cross the latter river also, which could only be effected -at Cintegabelle, one march higher up. He would then have to come down -the right bank, through a country at that time impracticable for -guns, from rain. If he passed the Garonne below the confluence of the -Arriege, his movements would be overlooked from the Pech David, and the -heads of his columns attacked; if that failed, Toulouse and the Mont -Rave remained as a position of battle, from whence there was a secure -retreat upon Montauban. - -For these reasons the passage above Toulouse could lead to no decisive -result: but a passage below was a different matter. Wellington would -then cut the army off from Montauban and attack Toulouse from the -northern and eastern quarters; and the French, losing the battle, could -only retreat by Carcassonne to unite with Suchet in Roussillon; where -with their backs to the mountains and the allies between them and -France they would starve. Convinced therefore that the attack would be -on that side, Soult lined the Garonne with his cavalry as far as the -confluence of the Tarn, and called up some troops, recently collected -at Agen under General Despeaux, to line the Tarn itself, his design -being to attack the allies if they crossed between that river and the -Garonne rather than lose his communication with Montauban. - -Wellington having suffered the French to gain three days’ march in -the retreat from Tarbes had little choice of operations. He could not -halt until the Andalusians and Del Parque’s troops joined him, without -giving Soult time to strengthen his defence; nor without appearing -fearful of the French people, which would have been very dangerous. -Still less could he wait for the fall of Bayonne. He had taken the -offensive, and the invasion of France being begun could not be -relinquished. Leading an army victorious and superior in numbers, his -business was to fight; and as he could not force St. Cyprien, he had to -pass the Garonne above or below Toulouse. - -A passage below was undoubtedly the prudent course; but Wellington, -observing that, when across, the south side of the city would be most -open to attack, resolved to cast his bridge at Portet, six miles above -Toulouse; designing to throw his right wing suddenly into the open -country between the Garonne and the canal of Languedoc, while with -his centre and left he assailed the suburb of St. Cyprien.[39] Hence, -at eight o’clock in the evening of the 27th, one of Hill’s brigades -approached the river, some men were ferried over and the bridge was -commenced; but the river being measured was too wide for the pontoons, -there were no trestles, and that project was necessarily abandoned. -Had it been effected, some great advantage would have been gained; for -Soult only knew of the attempt two days later, and then by emissaries, -not by scouts. Wellington persisted. Collecting a great body of -infantry about Portet, he began by driving the French horsemen from -the Touch river, which was in his front, for his army lined the bank -of the Garonne above Toulouse, and did not face St. Cyprien. In this -operation a single squadron of the 18th Hussars, under Major Hughes, -being inconsiderately pushed by Colonel Vivian across the bridge of St. -Martin de la Touch, suddenly came upon a regiment of French cavalry. -The rashness of the act, as often happens in war, proved the safety of -the British; for the enemy, thinking a strong support must be at hand, -discharged their carbines and retreated at a canter; Hughes followed, -the speed of both parties increased; and as the road did not admit -egress by the sides, this great body of horsemen was pushed headlong by -a few men under the batteries of St. Cyprien. - -Soult’s attention being thus attracted below Toulouse, a bridge was -laid near Pensaguel, two miles above the confluence of the Arriege, and -Hill passed the Garonne with thirteen thousand sabres and bayonets, -eighteen guns, and a rocket brigade. His advanced guard then pushed -on rapidly by the great road to seize the bridge of Cintegabelle -fifteen miles up the Arriege; and to secure a ferry-boat known to be -at Vinergue. The main body followed with intent to pass the Arriege -at Cintegabelle, and so come down the right bank to attack Toulouse -on the south, while Wellington assailed St. Cyprien. This march was -to have been made privily in the night of the 30th, but the pontoon -bridge was not finished until five in the morning of the 31st; Soult -thus got notice in time to observe the strength of the column, and -ascertain that the great body of the army was still in front of St. -Cyprien. Knowing what swamps were to be passed, and having the suburbs -of St. Michel and St. Etienne now in a state of defence, he thought the -operation only a feint to draw off a part of his army from Toulouse -while St. Cyprien was assaulted or the Garonne passed below the city; -wherefore, keeping his infantry in hand, he merely sent cavalry up the -Arriege in observation, and directed Lafitte, who had some regular -horsemen and national guards higher up, to hang upon Hill’s skirts and -pretend to be the van of Suchet’s army. He was, however, disquieted, -because the allies’ baggage, to avoid encumbering the march, had been -sent higher up the Garonne, to cross at Carbonne, and was by the -scouts reported as a second column increasing Hill’s force to eighteen -thousand men. - -While in this uncertainty, Soult first heard of the measurement of -the river made at Portet in the night of the 27th, and that many guns -were still there; hence, as he could not know why the bridge was not -thrown, he concluded the intent was to cross there also when Hill -should descend the Arriege. To meet this danger, he gave Clausel orders -to fall upon the head of the allies with four divisions if they should -attempt the passage before Hill came down; resolving in the contrary -case to fight in the suburbs of Toulouse and on the Mont Rave, because -the positions on the right of the Arriege were all favourable to the -assailants. He was, however, soon relieved from anxiety. Hill passed -the Arriege at Cintegabelle and sent his cavalry forward; but his -artillery were unable to follow in that deep country, and as success -and safety alike depended on rapidity, he returned and recrossed the -Garonne in the night, keeping a flying bridge and a small guard of -infantry and cavalry on the right bank: he was followed by Lafitte’s -horsemen, who picked up a few stragglers and mules, but no other event -occurred, and Soult was well pleased that his adversary had thus lost -three or four important days. - -Being now sure the next attempt would be below Toulouse, he changed -his design of marching down the Garonne to fight between that river -and the Tarn; and as his works for the city and suburbs were nearly -complete, he concluded to hold Toulouse in any circumstances, and set -his whole army and all the labouring population to entrench the Mont -Rave, beyond the canal, thinking thus to bear the shock of battle, come -on which side it would. Fortune favoured him. The Garonne continued so -full and rapid that Wellington remained inactive before St. Cyprien -until the evening of the 3rd, when, forced to adopt the lower passage, -and the flood having abated, the pontoons were carried in the night to -Grenade, fifteen miles below Toulouse. The bridge was then well thrown, -and thirty guns placed in battery on the left bank to protect it. The -third, fourth, and sixth divisions, with three brigades of cavalry, -the whole under Beresford, immediately passed; and the horsemen being -pushed to the front and flanks captured a large herd of bullocks -destined for the French. But again the Garonne flooded high, the light -division and the Spaniards were unable to follow, the bridge got -damaged and was taken up. - -Soult soon heard by his cavalry scouts of this passage, but not of the -force across, and as Morillo’s Spaniards, whom he mistook for Freyre’s, -were then in front of St. Cyprien, he thought Hill had moved also to -Grenade, and that the greatest part of the allied army was over the -Garonne. Wherefore, observing Beresford with cavalry, he continued to -work at his field of battle, his resolution to fight for Toulouse being -confirmed by hearing that the allied sovereigns had entered Paris. - -On the 8th the water subsided again, and the bridge was once more laid; -Freyre’s Spaniards and the Portuguese artillery then crossed, and -Wellington in person advanced within five miles of Toulouse. Marching -up both banks of the Ers, his columns were separated by that river, -which was impassable without pontoons, and it was essential to secure -one of the stone bridges. Hence, when his left approached the heights -of Kirie Eleison, on the great road of Alby, Vivian’s horsemen first -drove Berton’s cavalry up the right of the Ers towards the bridge of -Bordes; then the 18th Hussars descended towards that of Croix d’Orade, -where after some skirmishing a French regiment suddenly appeared in -front of the bridge. The opposite bank of the river was as instantly -lined with dismounted carbineers, and the two parties stood facing -each other, hesitating to begin, until the approach of some British -infantry, when both sounded a charge at the same moment; but the -English horses were so quick the French were in an instant jammed up -on the bridge, and their front ranks sabred, while the rear went off -in disorder. They had many killed or wounded, lost above a hundred -prisoners, and were pursued through the village of Croix d’Orade, -yet rallied beyond on the rest of their brigade and advanced again; -whereupon the hussars recrossed the bridge, which was now defended by -the British infantry. The communication between the allied columns -was thus secured. The credit of this brilliant action was erroneously -given to Colonel Vivian in the despatch. That officer was wounded by a -carbine shot previous to the charge at the bridge, and the attack was -conducted by Major Hughes. - -Wellington having, from the heights of Kirie Eleison, examined the -French general’s position, decided to attack on the 9th; and, to -shorten his communications with Hill, had his bridge on the Garonne -relaid higher up at Seilh, where the light division were to cross at -daybreak; but the pontoons were not relaid until late in the day, and -he, extremely incensed at the failure, was forced to defer his battle -until the 10th. - -Soult had now by means of his fortresses, his battles, the sudden -change of his line of operations after Orthes, his rapid retreat from -Tarbes, and his clear judgment in fixing upon Toulouse as his next -point of resistance, reduced the strength of his adversary to an -equality with his own. He had gained seventeen days for preparation, -and had compelled Wellington to fight on ground naturally adapted for -defence and well fortified; where one-third of his force was separated -by a great river from the rest; where he could derive no advantage from -his numerous cavalry, and was overmatched in artillery. Covering three -sides of Toulouse the French position was indeed very strong. The left -was at St. Cyprien on the west; the centre at the canal on the north; -the right at Mont Rave on the east; the reserve of conscripts manned -the ramparts of Toulouse, and the urban guards within the town aided -the transport of artillery and ammunition to different posts. - -Hill was in front of St. Cyprien, and he could only communicate with -the main body by the pontoon bridge at Seilh, a circuit of ten or -twelve miles. Wellington was advancing from the north, but being still -intent to assail on the south, where Soult was weakest in defence, he -examined the country on the left of the Ers, designing under cover -of that river to make a flank march and gain the open ground which -he had formerly vainly endeavoured to reach by passing at Portet and -Pinsaguel. Again he was baffled by the deep country, which he could -not master so as to pass the Ers by force in the upper part; and all -the bridges there, with the exception of Croix d’Orade, were mined or -destroyed. There was no choice then but to attack the north and east -fronts. The first, open and flat, and easily approached by the great -roads of Montauban and Alby, was yet impregnable in defence; because -the canal, the bridges over which were strongly defended by works, -was under the fire of the ramparts of Toulouse, and for the most part -within musket-shot. Wherefore, as at St. Cyprien, a fortress, not a -position, was opposed, and the assault was necessarily confined to the -Mont Rave or eastern front. - -Naturally strong and rugged, that ridge was covered by the Ers river, -and presented two distinct platforms, Calvinet and St. Sypière. Between -them, where the ground dipped a little, two routes called the Lavaur -and Caraman roads led to Toulouse, passing the canal at the Guillemerie -and St. Etienne suburbs. - -The Calvinet platform was fortified on the left with two large -redoubts, having open entrenchments in front. On the right were two -other large forts, called the Colombette and Tower of Augustines. - -St. Sypière had also two redoubts, one on the extreme right called St. -Sypière, the other without a name near the road of Caraman. - -The whole occupation was two miles long, and to attack the front it was -necessary to cross the Ers under fire, advancing over ground naturally -marshy and now almost impassable from artificial inundations to the -assault of the ridge and its works. If the assailants should force a -way between the two platforms, they would, while their flanks were -battered by the redoubts above, come in succession upon new works, -at Cambon and Sacarin; upon the suburbs of Guillemerie and Etienne; -upon the canal; and finally upon the ramparts of the town. But the -Ers could not be passed except at Croix d’Orade, and Wellington was -reduced to a flank march under fire, between that river and Mont Rave, -until he could gain ground to present a front to the latter and storm -it; after which the canal was to be crossed above ere the army could -be established on the south of Toulouse. To impose that march had been -Soult’s object, and his army was disposed in the following order to -render it disastrous. - -Reille defended St. Cyprien with Taupin’s and Maransin’s divisions. - -Daricau’s division lined the canal on the north from its junction with -the Garonne to the road of Alby, defending the bridge-head of Jumeaux, -the convent of the Minimes, and the Matabiau bridge. - -Harispe’s division held the Mont Rave, his right being at St. Sypière, -his centre at the Colombette, about which Vial’s horsemen were also -collected; his left looked down the road of Alby, having in front -a detached eminence within cannon-shot, called the Hill of Pugade, -occupied by St. Pol’s brigade. - -Soult’s remaining divisions were in columns behind the Mont Rave. - -This order of battle formed an angle, each side about two miles long, -the apex towards the Alby road being covered by the Pugade hill. - -Wellington made the following dispositions of attack for the 10th. Hill -to menace St. Cyprien, augmenting or abating his efforts according to -the progress of the main battle. The third and light divisions and -Freyre’s Spaniards to move against the northern front; the two first, -supported by Bock’s cavalry, were to menace the line of canal defended -by Daricau--Picton at the bridge of Jumeaux and the Minimes; Alten to -connect him with Freyre, who, reinforced with the Portuguese artillery, -was to carry the hill of Pugade, and then halt to cover Beresford’s -column. This last, composed of the fourth and sixth divisions with -three batteries, was to move round the left of the Pugade, and along -the low ground between the Mont Rave and the Ers, until the rear should -pass the road of Lavaur in the centre, when it was to wheel into line -and attack the platform of St. Sypière. Freyre was then to assail that -of Calvinet, and Ponsonby’s dragoons were to connect that general’s -left with Beresford’s column. Meanwhile Lord Edward Somerset’s -hussars and Vivian’s cavalry were to ascend both banks of the Ers -in observation of Berton’s cavalry; because the latter could by the -bridges of Bordes and Montaudran pass from the right to the left bank, -destroy the bridges, and fall on the head of Beresford’s troops. - - -BATTLE OF TOULOUSE. (April, 1814.) - -On the 10th of April, at two o’clock in the morning, the light division -passed the Garonne by the bridge at Seilh, and at six the army moved -to the attack. Picton and Alten on the right, drove the French posts -behind the works covering the bridges on the canal. Freyre, marching -along the Alby road, was cannonaded by St. Pol until he passed a small -stream, when the French general, following his instructions, retired to -the works on the Calvinet platform: the Spaniards were thus established -on the Pugade, opposite the apex of the French position, which the -Portuguese guns cannonaded heavily. - -Beresford, preceded by the hussars, marched from Croix d’Orade in three -columns abreast, masked by the Pugade until he entered the marshy -ground; but he left his guns behind, fearing to engage them in that -deep and difficult country. Beyond the Ers, on his left, Vivian’s -cavalry, now under Colonel Arentschildt, drove Berton’s horsemen back -over the bridge of Bordes, which the French general destroyed with -difficulty. The German hussars then gained the bridge of Montaudran -higher up, though defended by a detachment sent there by Berton, who -remained in position near the bridge of Bordes, looking down the left -of the Ers. - -During these operations Freyre, who had demanded leave to lead the -battle at Calvinet, from error or impatience assailed while Beresford -was still in march, and his Spaniards, nine thousand strong, advanced -in two lines and a reserve with great resolution, throwing forward -their flanks so as to embrace the hill. The French musketry and great -guns thinned their ranks at every step, but closing upon the centre -they mounted the ascent under a formidable fire, which increased -in violence until their right wing, raked also from the bridge of -Matabiau, became unable to endure the torment, and the leading ranks -madly jumped for shelter into a hollow road, twenty-five feet deep, -covering this part of the French entrenchments; the left wing and the -second line ran back in disorder, the Cantabrian fusiliers, under -Colonel Leon de Sicilia, alone maintaining their ground under cover of -a bank which protected them. Then the French came leaping out of their -works with loud cries, and lining the edge of the hollow road, poured -an incessant stream of shot upon the helpless crowds in the gulf below, -while a battery from the Matabiau, constructed to rake the hollow, sent -its bullets from flank to flank, hissing through the quivering mass of -flesh and bones. - -The Spanish generals rallied their troops and led them back again -to the brink of the fatal hollow; but the frightful carnage below, -with the unmitigated fire in front, filled them with horror: again -they fled, and again the French bounding from their trenches pursued, -while several battalions sallying from the Matabiau and Calvinet also -followed them. The country was now covered with fugitives, and the -pursuers’ numbers and vehemence increased, until Wellington pushed -forward with Ponsonby’s cavalry and the reserve artillery, while a -brigade of the light division, wheeling to its left, menaced the flank -of the French, who then returned to the Calvinet. - -More than fifteen hundred Spaniards had been killed or wounded, and -their defeat was not the only misfortune. Picton, regardless of -his orders, which, his temper on such occasions being known, were -especially given both verbally and in writing, had turned his false -attack into a real one against the bridge of Jumeaux; but the enemy, -fighting from a work too high to be forced without ladders, and -approachable only on open ground, repulsed him with a loss of four -hundred men and officers; amongst the latter Colonel Forbes of the -45th was killed, and General Brisbane was wounded. Thus from the hill -of Pugade to the Garonne the French had vindicated their position, -the allies had suffered enormously; and beyond the Garonne, although -Hill forced the exterior line of entrenchments, the inner line, more -contracted and strongly fortified, could not be stormed. The musketry -now subsided for a time, yet a prodigious cannonade was kept up along -the whole of the French line; and by the allies, from St. Cyprien to -where the artillery left by Beresford was, in concert with the guns on -the Pugade, pouring shot incessantly against the Calvinet platform; -injudiciously it has been said by Beresford’s guns, because the -ammunition, thus used for a secondary object, was afterwards wanted -when a vital advantage might have been gained. - -In this state the victory depended on Beresford’s attack, and, from -Picton’s error, Wellington had no reserves to enforce the decision; for -the light division and the heavy cavalry only remained in hand, and -were necessarily retained to cover the rallying of the Spaniards, and -protect the artillery employed to keep the enemy in check. The crisis -therefore approached with all happy promise to the French. The repulse -of Picton, the dispersion of the Spaniards, and the strength of St. -Cyprien, enabled Soult to draw Taupin’s whole division first, and then -one of Maransin’s brigades, from that quarter, to reinforce his battle -on Mont Rave; thus three divisions and the cavalry, in all fifteen -thousand combatants, were disposable for a counter-attack. With this -mass he might have fallen upon Beresford, whose force, originally less -than thirteen thousand bayonets, was cruelly reduced, as it made slow -way for two miles through ground deep and tangled with watercourses: -sometimes moving in mass, sometimes filing under the French musketry, -always under fire of their guns without one to reply, the length of the -column augmented at every step, and frequent halts were necessary to -close up. - -Between the river and the heights the ground became narrower, and -more miry as the troops advanced, Berton’s cavalry was a-head, an -impassable river was on the left, and three French divisions supported -by artillery and horsemen overshadowed the right flank! Meanwhile -Soult, eyeing this terrible march, had carried Taupin’s division to -the platform of St. Sypière, supporting it with one of D’Armagnac’s -brigades, and now, after a short hortative, ordered Taupin to fall -on, while a regiment of Vial’s cavalry descended the Lavaur road to -intercept retreat, and Berton’s horsemen assailed the flank from the -bridge of Bordes. But this was not half the force which might have -been employed. Taupin’s artillery, retarded in its march, was still -in the streets of Toulouse, and that general, instead of attacking -frankly, waited until Beresford had completed his flank march and -formed his lines at the foot of the heights. Then the French infantry -poured down the hill, but some well-directed rockets, whose noise and -dreadful aspect were unknown before, dismayed his soldiers; whereupon -the British skirmishers running forwards plied them with a biting -fire, Lambert’s brigade of the sixth division, aided by Anson’s and -some provisional battalions of the fourth division, followed with -a terrible shout, and the French fled to the upper ground. Vial’s -horsemen, trotting down the Lavaur road, had meanwhile charged the -right flank, but Beresford’s second and third lines being thrown into -squares repulsed them; and on the other flank Cole had been so sudden -in his advance that Berton’s cavalry had no opportunity to charge. -Lambert killed Taupin, wounded a general of brigade, and without a -check won the summit of the platform; his skirmishers even pursued down -the reverse slope, while Cole, meeting with less resistance, had still -more rapidly gained the height at his side: so complete was the rout -that the two redoubts were abandoned from panic, and the French sought -shelter in Sacarin and Cambon. - -Soult, astonished at this weakness in troops from whom he had expected -so much, and who had but just before given him assurances of their -resolution and confidence, was now in fear that Beresford would seize -the bridge of the Demoiselles on the canal, and so gain the south side -of Toulouse. Wherefore, covering the flight as he could with Vial’s -cavalry, he hastily led D’Armagnac’s other brigade to Sacarin, checked -the British skirmishers there, and rallied the fugitives; Taupin’s -guns arrived from the town at the same moment, and the mischief being -thus stayed, a part of Travot’s conscripts moved to the bridge of the -Demoiselles. This new order of battle required fresh dispositions for -attack, but the indomitable courage of the British soldiers had decided -the first great crisis of the fight, and was still buoyant. Lambert’s -brigade wheeled to its right across the platform, menacing the French -left flank on the Calvinet platform, while Pack’s Scotch brigade and -Douglas’s Portuguese, composing the second and third lines of the -sixth division, formed on his right, to march against the Colombette -redoubts. Then also Arentschildt’s cavalry came down from the bridge -of Montaudran on the Ers river, round the south end of the Mont Rave, -where in conjunction with the skirmishers of the fourth division it -again menaced the bridge of the Demoiselles. - -Entirely changed now was the aspect and form of the battle. The French, -thrown entirely on the defensive, occupied three sides of a square. -Their right, extending from Sacarin to the Calvinet platform, was -closely menaced by Lambert, solidly established on the St. Sypière; the -redoubts of Colombette and Augustines were menaced by Pack and Douglas, -and the left, thrown back to the Matabiau, awaited a renewed attack: -the whole position was very strong, not exceeding a thousand yards on -each side, with the angles defended by formidable works. The canal and -the city furnished a refuge, while the Matabiau on one side, Sacarin -and Cambon on the other, insured retreat. - -In this contracted space were concentrated Vial’s cavalry, Villatte’s -division, one brigade of Maransin’s, another of D’Armagnac’s, and -the whole of Harispe’s division, except the regiment driven from the -Sypière redoubt. The victory was therefore still to be contended for, -and with apparently inadequate means; for on the right Picton was -paralyzed by Daricau, the Spaniards not to be depended upon, and there -remained only the heavy cavalry and light division; which Wellington -could not thrust into action under pain of being without a reserve in -the event of a repulse. The final stroke therefore was still to be made -on the left, and with a small force, seeing Lambert’s brigade, and -Cole’s division, were necessarily employed to keep in check the French -at the bridge of the Demoiselles, at Cambon and Sacarin, where Clausel -seemed disposed to retake the offensive. - -At half-past two o’clock Beresford renewed the action with the brigades -of Pack and Douglas. Ensconced in the Lavaur road on Lambert’s right, -they had been hitherto protected from the fire of the French redoubts; -but now scrambling up the steep banks of the road, under a wasting fire -of cannon and musketry, they carried all the French breastworks--the -Colombette and Augustine redoubts being taken by the 42nd and 79th -Regiments. It was a surprising action when the loose attack imposed by -the ground is considered; and the French, although they yielded to the -first thronging rush of the British, came back with a reflux, their -cannonade was incessant, their reserves strong, and the struggle became -terrible. Harispe, under whom the French seemed always to fight with -extraordinary vigour, surrounded the redoubts with a surging multitude, -broke into the Colombette, killed or wounded four-fifths of the 42nd, -and retook the Augustine also; but then the 11th and 91st Regiments -came up and the French again abandoned those works: yet so many of the -allies had fallen that they appeared only as a thin line of skirmishers. - -Some British cavalry, riding up from the low ground, now attempted to -charge, but were stopped by a deep hollow road, into which several -troopers fell and there perished. Meanwhile the combat about the -redoubts continued, yet the French, though most numerous, never could -retake the Platform; and when Harispe and General Baurot had fallen -dangerously wounded, drew off by their right to Sacarin, and by their -left towards the Matabiau. - -During this contest the Spaniards had again attacked the Calvinet -platform from Pugade hill, but were again put to flight; the French -thus remained masters of their entrenchments in that quarter, and -Beresford halted to reform his battle and receive his artillery, which -came to him with great difficulty, and little ammunition from the heavy -cannonade it had previously furnished. However, Soult, seeing the -Spaniards, supported by the light division, had rallied a fourth time; -that Picton again menaced the bridge of Jumeaux and the Minime convent; -and that Beresford, master of three-fourths of Mont Rave, was now -ready to advance along the summit, relinquished the Calvinet platform -entirely, and withdrew about five o’clock behind the canal, still -holding Sacarin and Cambon. Wellington was then master of the Mont -Rave, and so ended the battle of Toulouse, in which the French had five -generals and about three thousand men killed or wounded, and they lost -a gun. The allies lost four generals and more than four thousand six -hundred men and officers, two thousand being Spaniards. A lamentable -spilling of blood, and useless, for before this period Napoleon had -abdicated the throne of France, and a provisional government was -constituted at Paris. - -During the night Soult replaced the ammunition expended in the action, -reorganized and augmented his field artillery from the arsenal of -Toulouse, and made dispositions for fighting the next morning behind -the canal. Looking however to a final retreat, he wrote to Suchet to -inform him of the result of the contest, and proposed a combined plan -of operations illustrative of the firmness and pertinacity of his -temper. “March,” said he, “with the whole of your forces by Quillan -upon Carcassonne. I will meet you there with my army, we can then -retake the initiatory movement, transfer the seat of war to the Upper -Garonne, and holding on by the mountains compel the enemy to recall his -troops from Bordeaux, which will enable Decaen to recover that city and -make a diversion in our favour.” - -On the morning of the 11th he was again ready, but Wellington was not. -The French position, within musket-shot of the city walls, was still -inexpugnable on the northern and eastern fronts; the conquest of Mont -Rave was only a preliminary step to the passage of the canal, and -throwing of the army on the south side of the town; a great matter, -requiring fresh dispositions, and provision of ammunition only to be -obtained from the parc on the other side of the Garonne. Hence, to -accelerate the preparations, to ascertain Hill’s state, and give him -further instructions, Wellington repaired on the 11th by Seilh to St. -Cyprien; but the day was spent before the arrangements for the passage -of the canal could be completed, and the attack was therefore deferred -until daylight. - -Meanwhile the light cavalry were sent up the canal, to interrupt the -communications with Suchet and menace Soult’s retreat on Carcassonne. -Their appearance on the heights above Baziege, together with the -preparations in front, taught Soult he would soon be shut up in -Toulouse instead of fighting; wherefore, leaving eight pieces of heavy -artillery, two generals, Harispe being one, and sixteen hunched men -whose wounds were severe, to the humanity of the conquerors, he filed -out of the city with surprising order and ability, made a forced march -of twenty-two miles, cut the bridges over the canal and the Upper Ers, -and the 12th established his army at Villefranche. Hill followed, -and at Baziege the light cavalry beat the French with the loss of -twenty-five men, cutting off a like number of _gens d’armes_ on the -side of Revel. - -Now Wellington entered Toulouse in triumph, the white flag was -displayed, and, as at Bordeaux, a great crowd of persons adopted the -Bourbon colours; but the mayor, faithful to his sovereign, retired -with the French army; and the British general, true to his honest line -of policy, again warned the Bourbonists that their revolutionary -movement must be at their own risk. In the afternoon however two -officers, the English colonel, Cooke, and the French colonel, St. -Simon, arrived from Paris, charged to make known to the armies the -abdication of Napoleon. They had been detained near Blois by the -officiousness of the police attending the court of the Empress Louisa, -and the blood of eight thousand brave men had overflowed the Mont -Rave in consequence: nor did their arrival immediately put a stop to -the war. When St. Simon, in pursuance of his mission, reached Soult’s -quarters on the 13th, that marshal, not without just cause, demurred -to his authority, and proposed to suspend hostilities until authentic -information could be obtained from the ministers of the emperor; then -sending all his incumbrances by the canal to Carcassonne, he took a -position of observation at Castelnaudary and awaited the progress of -events. Wellington refused to accede to his proposal, and as General -Loverdo, commanding at Montauban, had acknowledged the authority of -the provincial government, he thought Soult designed to make a civil -war, and therefore marched against him. The 17th the outposts were -on the point of engaging, when the Duke of Dalmatia, having then -received official information from the chief of the emperor’s staff, -notified his adhesion to the new state of affairs in France; with this -honourable distinction, that he had faithfully sustained the cause of -his great monarch until the very last moment.[40] - -Lord Wellington immediately transmitted the intelligence to the troops -at Bayonne. Too late. Misfortune and suffering had there fallen upon -one of the brightest soldiers of the British army. - - -SALLY FROM BAYONNE. (April, 1814.) - -During the progress of the main army in the interior, General Hope had -conducted the investment of Bayonne with all the unremitting vigilance -that difficult operation required. He had gathered gabions and fascines -and platforms, and was ready to attack the citadel, when rumours -of the events at Paris reached him, yet indirectly and without any -official character to warrant a formal communication to the garrison: -he made them known indeed at the outposts, but to such irregular -communications, which might be intended to deceive, the governor -naturally paid little attention. At this time the fortified posts at -St. Etienne were held by a brigade of the fifth division; from thence -to the extreme right the Guards had charge of the line, one company -being in St. Etienne itself; Hinuber’s German brigade was encamped as -a support to the left; the remainder of the first division was in the -rear. - -In this state, about one o’clock in the morning of the 14th, a deserter -gave General Hay, who commanded the outposts that night, an exact -account of a projected sally; the general could not speak French, and -sent him to Hinuber, who interpreted the man’s story to Hay, put his -own troops under arms, and transmitted the intelligence to Hope. It -would appear that Hay, perhaps disbelieving the man’s story, took no -additional precautions, and it is probable neither the German brigade -nor the reserves of the Guards would have been under arms but for -Hinuber. However, at three o’clock, the French, commencing with a false -attack on the left of the Adour as a blind, poured suddenly out of the -citadel to the number of three thousand combatants; they surprised the -picquets, and with loud shouts, breaking through the chain of posts at -various points, carried with one rush the church and the village of -St. Etienne, with exception of a fortified house defended by Captain -Forster of the 38th. Masters of every other part, and overbearing -all before them, they drove picquets and supports in heaps along the -Peyrehorade road, killed General Hay, took Colonel Townsend of the -Guards prisoner, divided the wings of the investing troops, and, -passing in rear of the right, threw the whole line into confusion. Then -it was that Hinuber, having his Germans in hand, moved up to Etienne, -rallied some of the fifth division, and being joined by a battalion of -Bradford’s Portuguese, bravely gave the counter-stroke to the enemy and -regained the village and church. - -On the right the combat was still more disastrous. Neither picquets -nor reserves could sustain the fury of the assault, and the battle was -most confused and terrible; for on both sides the troops, broken into -small bodies by the inclosures, and unable to recover their order, came -dashing together in the darkness, fighting often with the bayonet;--and -sometimes friends encountered, sometimes foes--all was tumult and -horror. The guns of the citadel, vaguely guided by the flashes of the -musketry, sent their shot and shells booming at random through the -lines of fight, while some gun-boats, dropping down the river, opened -their fire upon the flank of the supporting columns, which being put -in motion by Hope on the first alarm were now coming up. One hundred -pieces of artillery were thus in full play at once, the shells set fire -to the fascine depôts, and to several houses, the flames from which -cast a horrid glare over the striving masses. - -Amidst this confusion General Hope suddenly disappeared, none knew -how or wherefore at the time. Afterwards it became known, that having -brought up the reserves, he had pushed for St. Etienne by a hollow -road behind the line of picquets; but the French were on both banks; -he endeavoured to return, was wounded, and his horse, a large one, as -was necessary to sustain the gigantic warrior, having received eight -bullets fell on his leg. His staff had escaped from the defile, yet -two of them, Captain Herries and Mr. Moore, nephew to Sir John Moore, -returning, endeavoured to draw him from beneath the horse, but were -both dangerously wounded and carried off with Hope, who was again badly -hurt in the foot by an English bullet. - -Light now beginning to break enabled the allies to act with more unity. -The Germans were in possession of St. Etienne, the reserve brigades of -the foot Guards, rallied in mass by General Howard, suddenly raised -their shout, and running in upon the French drove them back to their -works with such slaughter, that their own writers admit a loss of one -general and more than nine hundred men. On the British side General -Hay was killed, Stopford wounded, and the whole loss was eight hundred -and thirty men and officers, of which more than two hundred, with the -commander-in-chief, were taken. Captain Forster’s firm defence of -the fortified house first, and next the ready gallantry with which -Hinuber’s Germans retook St. Etienne, had staved off a very terrible -disaster. - -A few days after this piteous event the convention made with Soult -became known and hostilities ceased. - -All the French troops in the south were then reorganized in one body -under Suchet, but so little inclined to acquiesce in the revolution, -that Prince Polignac, acting for the duke of Angoulême, applied to the -British commissary-general Kennedy, for a sum of money to quiet them. - -The Portuguese soldiers returned to Portugal; the Spaniards to Spain; -their generals, it is said, being inclined to declare for the Cortes -against the king, but they were diverted from it by the influence of -Lord Wellington. - -The British infantry embarked at Bordeaux, some for America, some -for England; the cavalry, marching through France, took shipping at -Boulogne. Thus the war terminated, and with it all remembrance of the -veterans’ services. - -Yet those veterans had won nineteen pitched battles and innumerable -combats; had made or sustained ten sieges and taken four great -fortresses; had twice expelled the French from Portugal, once from -Spain; had penetrated France, and killed, wounded, or captured two -hundred thousand enemies--leaving of their own number forty thousand -dead, whose bones whiten the plains and mountains of the Peninsula. - - -THE END. - - -LONDON: PRINTED BY W. CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET, AND CHARING -CROSS. - - - - -FOOTNOTES - - -[1] The Chaplain-General Gleig has in one of his publications -contradicted this fact, on the authority of a German Chelsea-pensioner, -who affirms, according to Mr. Gleig, that it was he who awakened Sir -Arthur, and that he was cool and collected. My authority is the Duke of -Wellington, who assured me that it was not only a German officer, but -a titled one; a Baron; and that he was anything but cool or collected. -The name had escaped his memory at the time, but he made frequent -attempts to recover it, and said several times that he was a Baron. The -two authorities may be weighed by those who are fastidious. - -[2] General Brennier published a denial of this fact; but it may -well be imagined that a short sentence uttered at such a moment by a -prisoner wounded and highly excited, would escape his recollection. My -authority is the Duke of Wellington, who not only caught the words at -the time, and questioned the other prisoners as to their value, but -drew from them a conclusion on which to rest a great counter movement. - -[3] Now Marquis of Londonderry. - -[4] Lieut.-General Sir Loftus Otway. - -[5] Marquis of Anglesey. - -[6] The present Lord Hardinge. - -[7] A writer, or rather writers in the _Quarterly Review_, for there -were two of them, indulging in the graceless effrontery of assertion -so common with anonymous critics, treated these reasons for halting -with ridicule, calling them imaginary, and affirming that they were -unknown to the General-in-Chief! My authority however was that very -General-in-Chief. The Duke of Wellington not only gave me verbally -a description of his motives and proceedings on this occasion, but -supplied me with written notes, from which and from a memoir received -from Marshal Soult, and information derived from Colonel Waters and -other officers engaged, my narrative was composed. - -[8] My authority for this colloquy is a written communication from -Marshal Jourdan. - -[9] In a recent work upon the war in Algeria, written by General Yusuf, -a French Zoave, evidently a man of great military talent, a march of -sixty miles in twenty-six hours by a French detachment is recorded, -and by an English writer has been compared with this of the light -division. But the French soldier does not carry more than two-thirds of -the weight an English soldier carries, and Yusuf does not say how many -stragglers there were; moreover the light division had previously made -a march of twenty miles with only a few hours to rest, or rather to -wash and cook: their real march was therefore eighty-two miles. - -[10] Now Sir Charles Rowan, Metropolitan Police. - -[11] This altercation, though public and known to the whole division, -has been ridiculously denied by the writer of Picton’s life. - -[12] For this anecdote my authority was Colonel D’Esmenard, Ney’s first -aide-de-camp, the officer employed. He said Massena was in bed, and -spoke to him through the door. - -[13] This forcible expression, now become common, is generally supposed -to be an original saying of the late Lord Melbourne; but it is not -so. It was first employed by the Spanish government in a manifesto, -to characterise the battle of Baylen, and Lord Melbourne adopted it -without acknowledging its source. - -[14] Lord Lynedoch. - -[15] Now Lieut.-Gen. Sir A. M‘Lean. - -[16] General Sir A. Barnard. - -[17] Lieut.-General Brotherton. - -[18] Lord Londonderry. - -[19] Now Lord Seaton. - -[20] All Phillipon’s views and preparations are taken from his original -journal of siege in manuscript. - -[21] Now Lieut.-General Sir C. Smith. - -[22] Now Lord Gough. - -[23] General Sir G. Napier. - -[24] Now Major-General Shaw Kennedy. Captain Nicholas when dying, told -the story of this effort, adding that he saw Shaw, while thus standing -alone, deliberately pull out his watch and repeating the hour aloud -declare that the breach could not be carried that night. - -[25] Now Serjeant-major at the Tower. - -[26] For this council of war, and the opinions, I have the personal -authority of Marshal Jourdan. - -[27] For the Duke’s secret views here I have his own authority. - -[28] The details of this curious event were told to me by the Duke of -Wellington. - -[29] The conception and execution of this movement has been repeatedly -given to Picton. Erroneously so. My authority is the Duke of Wellington. - -[30] Now Sir W. Reid, Governor of Malta. - -[31] Now Major-General Sir Colin Campbell in the Crimea. - -[32] For this fact Marshal Soult is my authority. - -[33] In my original work, misled by false information, I said the -soldiers of the 92nd were all Irish: but their Colonel, McDonald, -afterwards gave me irrefragable proof, by a list of names, that they -were Scotchmen. - -[34] All these conjectures and proceedings are given on the Duke’s -personal authority. - -[35] For this fact I had the authority of a French colonel of artillery. - -[36] The facts as here stated were supplied to me by the Duke of -Wellington. - -[37] Memoirs of Captain, now Lieut.-Colonel Cooke, Gentleman-at-Arms. - -[38] Colonel Havelock, since killed in the Punjaub at the head of the -14th Dragoons. - -[39] This plan and the reasons for it are taken from MS. notes written -by the Duke of Wellington in reply to my inquiries. - -[40] Soult has been foully and falsely accused of fighting at Toulouse, -knowing that the war was over, and the slander was repeated by Lord -Aberdeen in the House of Lords, when the Marshal was minister in -France. The Duke of Wellington, with a generous warmth, instantly rose -and truly declared that Soult did not know, and it was impossible he -could know, of the Emperor’s abdication when he fought the battle. - - - - -Transcriber’s Notes - - -Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a -predominant preference was found in the original book; otherwise they -were not changed. - -Simple typographical errors were corrected; unbalanced quotation -marks were remedied when the change was obvious, and otherwise left -unbalanced. - -Text uses both Mackenzie and M^cKenzie. - -The running headers of the original book included dates. 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You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: English Battles and Sieges in the Peninsula. - Extracted from his 'Peninsula War'. - -Author: William Napier - -Release Date: September 15, 2020 [EBook #63210] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK BRITISH BATTLES, SIEGES IN THE PENINSULA *** - - - - -Produced by Brian Coe, Charlie Howard, and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This -book was created from images of public domain material -made available by the University of Toronto Libraries -(http://link.library.utoronto.ca/booksonline/).) - - - - - - -</pre> - - -<div class="transnote"> -<p class="center"><span class="large bold">Transcriber’s -Note</span></p> <p>A larger version of the Frontispiece (below) -may be seen by right-clicking it and -selecting an option to view it separately, or by double-tapping -and/or stretching it.</p> -</div> - -<div class="newpage figcenter illowe30" id="frontispiece"> - <img src="images/frontispiece.jpg" alt="W Napier (signature)" /> - <div class="caption"><p>W Napier</p> - -<p>Lieu<sup>t.</sup>-General Sir W. Napier. Pinx<sup>t.</sup> W.H. Egleton, sculp<sup>t.</sup></p></div> -</div> - -<hr /> - -<h1><span class="gesperrt">ENGLISH<br /> -<span class="larger">BATTLES AND SIEGES</span></span><br /> -<span class="xsmall">IN THE</span><br /> -<span class="larger">PENINSULA.</span></h1> - -<p class="p2 center">EXTRACTED FROM HIS ‘PENINSULA WAR.’</p> - -<p class="p2 center small">BY</p> - -<p class="p1 center vspace wspace larger">LIEUT.-GEN. SIR WILLIAM NAPIER, K.C.B.,<br /> -<span class="smaller">&c. &c.</span></p> - -<p class="p4 center vspace"><span class="gesperrt">LONDON:</span><br /> -<span class="larger">JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.</span><br /> -1855. -</p> - -<hr /> - -<p class="newpage p4 center small"> -LONDON: PRINTED BY W. CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET,<br /> -AND CHARING CROSS.</p> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_iii">iii</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="NOTICE">NOTICE.</h2> -</div> - -<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">In</span> this publication, the combats of Roriça, Vimiero, and -Coruña, and the character of Sir John Moore, have been -entirely recomposed. The other battles and sieges are, -with more or less compression of details, transcripts from -the History of the Peninsula War. Thus arranged they will -perhaps most effectually exhibit the constant energy of the -British soldier, and draw attention in their neighbourhoods -to the veterans who still survive. Few of those brave men -have more than a scanty provision, many have none; and -nearly all, oppressed with wounds, disease, and poverty, -sure attendants on an old soldier’s services, feel life a burthen, -so heavy as to make them envy the lot of comrades who -threw it off early on the field of battle.</p> - -<p>For the authenticity of the events the reader has this -guarantee. The author was either an eye-witness of what -he relates, or acquired his knowledge from those who were. -Persons of no mean authority. Commanders-in-chief, -generals, and other officers on both sides; private official -correspondence of the English envoys; military journals -and reports of the French leaders; the correspondence of -the intrusive King Joseph, and his ministers, and the private -military notes and instructions of the Emperor Napoleon, -have all contributed to establish the truth of the facts and -motives of action.</p> - -<p>For the great Captain who led the British troops so<span class="pagenum" id="Page_iv">iv</span> -triumphantly, this record gives no measure of ability. To -win victories was the least of his labours. Those who desire -to know what an enormous political, financial, and military -pressure he sustained, what wiles he circumvented, what -opposing skill he baffled, what a powerful enemy he dealt -with and overcame, must seek the story in the original History -from which this work has been extracted. For the -soldiers it is no measure of their fortitude and endurance: -it records only their active courage. But what they were, -their successors now are—witness the wreck of the Birkenhead, -where four hundred men, at the call of their heroic -officers, Captain Wright and Lieutenant Girardot, calmly -and without a murmur, accepted death in a horrible form -rather than endanger the women and children already saved -in the boats. The records of the world furnish no parallel -to this self-devotion!</p> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_v">v</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="CONTENTS">CONTENTS.</h2> -</div> - -<table id="toc" summary="Contents"> -<tr> - <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2">BOOK I.</td> -</tr> -<tr class="smaller"> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdr">Page</td> -</tr> -<tr> - <td class="tdl">Combat of Roriça—Battle of Vimiero—Coruña—Battle of Coruña—Heroic Death and Character of Sir John Moore</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#BOOK_I">1</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> - <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2">BOOK II.</td> -</tr> -<tr> - <td class="tdl">Douro—Passage of the Douro—Talavera—Combat of Salinas—First Combat of Talavera—Second Combat of Talavera—Battle of Talavera</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#BOOK_II">18</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> - <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2">BOOK III.</td> -</tr> -<tr> - <td class="tdl">Combats on the Coa and Agueda—Barba de Puerco—Combat of Almeida on the Coa—Anecdotes of British Soldiers—Battle of Busaco</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#BOOK_III">44</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> - <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2">BOOK IV.</td> -</tr> -<tr> - <td class="tdl">Matagorda—Battle of Barosa—Massena’s Retreat—Combat of Redinha—Combat of Cazal Nova—Combat of Foz d’Aronce—Combat of Sabugal—Extraordinary Escape of Colonel Waters—Combat of Fuentes Onoro—Battle of Fuentes Onoro—Evacuation of Almeida</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#BOOK_IV">61</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> - <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2">BOOK V.</td> -</tr> -<tr> - <td class="tdl">Combat of Campo Mayor—First English Siege of Badajos—Battle of Albuera—Renewed Siege of Badajos—First Assault of Christoval—Second Assault of Christoval</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#BOOK_V">86</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> - <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2">BOOK VI.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_vi">vi</span></td> -</tr> -<tr> - <td class="tdl">Blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo—Combat of Elbodon—Guinaldo—Combat of Aldea Ponte—Surprise of Arroyo de Molinos—Defence of Tarifa—English Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo—Third English Siege of Badajos—Assault of Picurina—Assault of Badajos</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#BOOK_VI">109</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> - <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2">BOOK VII.</td> -</tr> -<tr> - <td class="tdl">Beira—Extraordinary Escape of Major Grant—Surprise of Almaraz—Siege of the Salamanca Forts—Combats between the Duero and the Tormes—Combats of Castrejon and the Guarena—Battle of Salamanca—Combat of La Serna</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#BOOK_VII">157</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> - <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2">BOOK VIII.</td> -</tr> -<tr> - <td class="tdl">Madrid—Siege of Burgos—First Assault—Second Assault—Third Assault—Fourth Assault—Fifth Assault—Retreat from Burgos—Combat of Venta de Pozo—Combat on the Carion—Pisuerga—Duero—Retreat from Madrid—Tormes—Matilla—Combat of the Huebra</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#BOOK_VIII">202</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> - <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2">BOOK IX.</td> -</tr> -<tr> - <td class="tdl">March to Vittoria—Battle of Vittoria</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#BOOK_IX">237</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> - <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2">BOOK X.</td> -</tr> -<tr> - <td class="tdl">Battle of Castalla—English Siege of Tarragona—Siege of San Sebastian—Storming of San Bartolomeo—First Storm of San Sebastian</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#BOOK_X">262</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> - <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2">BOOK XI.</td> -</tr> -<tr> - <td class="tdl">Pyrenees—Combat of Roncesvalles—Combat of Linzoain—Combat of Maya—Combat of Zabaldica—First Battle of Sauroren—Combat of Buenza—Second Battle of Sauroren—Combat of Doña Maria—Combats of Echallar and Ivantelly</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#BOOK_XI">287</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> - <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2">BOOK XII.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_vii">vii</span></td> -</tr> -<tr> - <td class="tdl">Catalonia—Combat of Ordal—Renewed Siege of San Sebastian—Storm of San Sebastian—Battles on the Bidassoa—Combat of San Marcial—Combat of Vera</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#BOOK_XII">325</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> - <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2">BOOK XIII.</td> -</tr> -<tr> - <td class="tdl">English Passage of the Bidassoa and Second Combat of Vera—The Passage of the Lower Bidassoa—Second Combat of Vera—Battle of the Nivelle; Characters of Colonel Lloyd and Lieutenant Freer</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#BOOK_XIII">352</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> - <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2">BOOK XIV.</td> -</tr> -<tr> - <td class="tdl">Passage of the Nive—Battles in front of Bayonne—Combat of Arcangues—First Battle of Barrouilhet—Second Battle of Barrouilhet—Third Combat of Barrouilhet—Battle of St. Pierre—Operations beyond the Nive</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#BOOK_XIV">385</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> - <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2">BOOK XV.</td> -</tr> -<tr> - <td class="tdl">Passages of the Gaves and the Adour—Passage of the Gaves—Combat of Garris—Passage of the Adour—Passage of the Gaves continued—Battle of Orthes—Combat of Aire</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#BOOK_XV">412</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> - <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2">BOOK XVI.</td> -</tr> -<tr> - <td class="tdl">Garonne—Adour Combat of Vic Bigorre—Death and Character of Colonel Sturgeon; Surprising Feat of Captain Light—Combat of Tarbes—Operations on the Garonne—Major Hughes; Battle of Toulouse—Sally from Bayonne</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#BOOK_XVI">440</a></td> -</tr> -</table> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_1">1</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak larger" id="BATTLES_AND_SIEGES"><span class="gesperrt">BATTLES AND SIEGES</span><br /> -<span class="small">OF THE</span><br /> -<span class="large gesperrt">PENINSULA.</span></h2> -</div> - -<hr /> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="BOOK_I">BOOK I.</h2> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>Combat of Roriça—Battle of Vimiero—Coruña—Battle of Coruña.</p></div> - -<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">In</span> the year 1808 Sir Arthur Wellesley marched from the -Mondego river with twelve thousand three hundred men, -and eighteen guns, to attack General Junot who was in -military possession of Portugal. The French troops were -scattered, but General Laborde had been detached with a -division to cover their concentration, and watch the English -movements. This led to the first fight between the French -and English in the Peninsula.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Combat of Roriça.</span> (Aug. 1808.)</h3> - -<p>Fourteen hundred Portuguese, under Colonel Trant, a military -agent, joined the British on the march, and the French -were felt the 15th of August at Brilos, in front of Obidos, -where some men fell in a skirmish. Sir A. Wellesley then -entered the Valley of Obidos, in the middle of which Laborde -occupied isolated ground of moderate elevation, near the -village of Roriça; he had only five thousand men and six -guns, little more than one-third of the English numbers, but -he had five hundred cavalry, had chosen his position well, -and could handle troops with dexterity.</p> - -<p>On his right was a lofty mountain ridge, on his left lower -but very rough ground, and the valley behind him was -closed, not only by the commingling of the hills in a mountainous -knot, but by a rocky projection called the Zambugeira -or Columbeira heights, which, at less than a mile, stood like<span class="pagenum" id="Page_2">2</span> -a citadel in his rear, and was so covered with copses, wild -evergreens and forest trees, and so rugged that only by paths -leading up deep clefts and hollows could it be ascended.</p> - -<p>The British general marched from the town of Obidos on -the 17th with fourteen thousand men and eighteen guns in -order of battle. His right, composed of Trant’s Portuguese, -turned the French left; his centre, nine thousand infantry -with twelve guns, moved against their front; his left, one -division with six guns, having gained the crest of the mountain -ridge by a wide movement from Obidos, turned the -French right, and was to oppose any counter attack from -General Loison, who had been heard of on that side, and -might come up during the action with a division six thousand -strong of all arms. Such an order of battle, with such superior -numbers, forbade Laborde to maintain his ground at -Roriça, and after a cannonade, during which his skirmishers -vigorously disputed the approaches, he, with a nice calculation -of time and distance, retreated under the protection of -his cavalry to the rocks of Zambugeira, and then turned to -fight, still hoping to be joined by Loison.</p> - -<p>This masterly movement compelled Sir Arthur Wellesley -to show all his forces, and imposed a change in disposition. -His left was then reinforced on the mountain, because each -passing hour rendered Loison’s arrival more likely; Trant was -more closely to menace the French heights on the right, and -the centre was to break in on the front when the strength of -the position should be shaken by the progress of the wings.</p> - -<p>In war, however, error is the rule not the exception. -Some mistake caused the left to move directly against the -French right instead of passing the flank to take them in -rear, and as Trant was distant and too feeble to give uneasiness, -the centre dashed prematurely against the crags of -Zambugeira on a front of less than a mile. The advantage -of superior numbers was thus lost, and that of ground was -entirely with the enemy. Only four thousand British could -be thrust into the fight, and though the remainder were at -hand, the foremost combatants had to win their way against -an equal force of brave and active troops, defending rocks -which vigorous men only could scale unopposed. Very -crowded also were the assailing columns in the narrow paths, -which only admitted a few men abreast, and hence no positive<span class="pagenum" id="Page_3">3</span> -connection could be maintained between the different -attacks, nor could any unity of power be insured: but the -skirmishers soon covered the face of the ascent, and the noise -and flashing of their musketry, with the smoke bursting up -through the foliage, enabled the English general to mark the -progress of the battle and govern his masses: it was soon -manifest that the position would be finally forced, but within -that flame-shooting, smoking labyrinth, rough work was -being done and various turns of fortune had place.</p> - -<p>Laborde, unable to hold his ground alone against the great -force opposed, sought to gain time for Loison’s junction by -clinging tenaciously to the side from whence that general -was expected, and gradually drawing off his troops from the -left as the battle approached. While thus operating, two -English regiments, the 9th and 29th, were by a false -movement suddenly thrown into his hands. Forming with -the 5th regiment one column of attack, they were to have -united with Trant on the left of the French, but with a -fierce neglect of orders had taken a path leading more -directly to the enemy: the head of the 29th thus reached -the table-land above at a point where Laborde was concentrating -his left wing on his centre, and as some of the former -were still coming in, the regiment was assailed in front and -flank. Colonel Lake fell, many men went down with him, -and the French on the English right, few in number and -thinking they should be cut off, furiously broke through the -disordered mass, carrying with them a major and many other -prisoners.</p> - -<p>Then, dropping below the brow of the hill, the oppressed -troops rallied on their left wing and on the 9th Regiment, and -all rushing up together, regained the table-land, presenting a -confused front, which Laborde vainly endeavoured to destroy: -yet many brave men he struck down, and mortally wounded -Colonel Stewart of the 9th, fighting with great vehemence. -Soon the 5th Regiment, which had not deviated from the -true path, appeared on his left, while the skirmishers of the -other attacks emerged thickly from the crags and copses of -the ascent: the left flanking column had now also turned his -right, had cut off the line of communication with Loison, and -was so rapidly advancing, as to render a retreat imperative -and difficult. His situation was indeed critical in the extreme,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_4">4</span> -and he was wounded, but with unyielding resolution -he made the movement along a narrow table-land leading -from his position to the knot of mountains behind, checking -pursuit by partial charges of cavalry, until he reached the -village of Zambugeira: there the ground opened, and the -danger from the flanking force being fended off by deep -ravines, he turned and made another stand, but was finally -forced to seek refuge in the higher mountains, having lost -three guns and six hundred men killed and wounded: the -British loss being nearly five hundred.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Battle of Vimiero.</span> (Aug. 1808.)</h3> - -<p>Laborde was not pursued, his retreat was inland, and to -keep near the coast was essential to the English general, -because he expected reinforcements by sea, and desired to -insure their disembarkation and receive provisions from the -ships. In this view he designed to march by his right on -Torres Vedras, which would bring him near the ocean, give -command of the great road to Lisbon, and throw off Loison -and Laborde from that capital; but in the night came intelligence -that a large fleet, conveying two brigades of -infantry, was on the coast, and to protect their landing he -made for Vimiero, a village near the sea, nine miles from -Torres Vedras: there the brigades from the ocean augmented -his force to sixteen thousand British soldiers. Junot, meanwhile, -having rallied Laborde’s and Loison’s troops, had -forestalled him at Torres Vedras, with fourteen thousand -good soldiers and twenty-three guns of small calibre; and -while his powerful cavalry prevented the scouts from making -observations, he prepared to march in the night of the 20th -and attack on the 21st. Sir Arthur had also projected a -march for the night of the 20th, to turn Junot’s left and gain -Mafra in his rear, without assailing Torres Vedras, which, -though shrouded by the horsemen, was known as a strong -position. The armies would thus have changed places -without encountering, if the English ministers had not appointed -three generals senior to Sir Arthur to act in Portugal, -one of whom, Sir Harry Burrard, had arrived. He did not -land and assume command, but he forbade the projected -march, and thus deprived the English army of the initiatory -movement, giving it to the French: moreover, as the ground<span class="pagenum" id="Page_5">5</span> -at Vimiero had been taken temporarily and for ease, the troops -were not in fighting order, thus violating the maxim which -prescribes constant readiness for battle when near an enemy. -It was thus posted.</p> - -<p>On the right a mountain ridge, trending from the sea inland, -ended abruptly on a small plain in which the village -of Vimiero was situated, and the greater part of the army -was heaped on the summit.</p> - -<p>On the other side of the plain the same line was continued -by a ridge of less elevation, narrow, yet protected by a ravine -almost impassable, and being without water had only one -regiment and some picquets posted there.</p> - -<p>In front of the break between these heights and within -cannon-shot, was an isolated hill of inferior elevation, yet of -good strength, masking the village and plain of Vimiero, and -leaving only narrow egress from the latter on the right. On -this hill six guns and two brigades of infantry, Fane’s and -Anstruther’s, were posted, the former on the left: behind them -in the plain the commissariat and artillery stores were parked.</p> - -<p>All the cavalry with the army—a single squadron under -Col. Taylor—was placed at the egress from the plain, on the -direct road to Torres Vedras; but from the counter hills, -facing the position, another road, running from Torres Vedras -to Lourinham, led at the distance of two miles round the -left, and by it an enemy could gain the ridge where the -picquets were posted, seize the artillery and commissariat -stores in the plain, and take the central hill and right-hand -mountain in reverse.</p> - -<p>In the night of the 20th a German officer of cavalry aroused -Sir Arthur Wellesley, saying the French army, twenty -thousand strong, was within an hour’s march. Incredulous -of this tale, the bearer of which was in evident consternation, -he merely took some additional precautions; and at sunrise -all eyes were turned southward, seeking an enemy who was -not to be seen. Nevertheless the German’s report was only -an exaggeration.<a id="FNanchor_1" href="#Footnote_1" class="fnanchor">1</a> Junot had been in march all night with<span class="pagenum" id="Page_6">6</span> -fourteen, not twenty, thousand men, designing to fall on at -daybreak; but the rugged ways had retarded his progress, -and his vanguard of cavalry did not crown the hills facing -the English position before eight o’clock—the dust of its -march having been discovered an hour before. Had he -arrived by daybreak this dust could not have been observed, -and an hour of preparation would have been lost to the -English general, which, with a good plan of battle, would -have enabled the French to gain the left-hand ridge, by the -Lourinham road, before the troops on the right could cross -to occupy that part of the position.</p> - -<p>Junot employed little time to note his adversary’s ground -and dispositions, and entirely neglected the mountain on the -English right, as being refused to his line of march; but as -the left-hand ridge appeared naked of troops, he resolved to -seize it by a detachment, and take the English central hill -in reverse while he attacked it in front with his main body, -thinking he should find the bulk of the army there. In this -view he directed General Brennier with a brigade across the -ravine covering the ridge, and Laborde with another against -the central hill, supporting the latter with Loison’s division, -a reserve of grenadiers under Kellermann, and the cavalry, -thirteen hundred strong, under Margaron.</p> - -<p>To act on conjecture is dangerous in war. Junot conjectured -falsely, and his entire disregard of the English right -was a great error; for when his cavalry crowned the counter -hills, Sir A. Wellesley, seeing the movements did not menace -that part of his position, retained there one brigade under -General Hill to serve as a support to the centre, while -four other brigades were sent across the plain to occupy the -left-hand ridge, and a fifth, reinforced with Trant’s Portuguese, -moved to a parallel ridge in rear, where they could watch the -Lourinham road.</p> - -<p>All these movements were hidden from Junot by the -central hill, and two brigades reached their ground before -the action commenced; yet, knowing the ravine in front to -be impracticable, they looked for an attack from the left, -and formed two lines across the ridge, trusting to a chain of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_7">7</span> -skirmishers to protect their right. The two other brigades -were to have furnished a third line, but while they were -passing the plain below the battle was begun in the centre -with great fury.</p> - -<p>In front of the English position the ground was so broken -and wooded that the movements of the French, after they -passed the counter hills, could not be discerned until they -burst upon the centre in attack; and though their artillery -was most numerous, the tormented ground impeded its -action, while the English guns, of heavier metal, had free -play: their infantry, inferior in number, would therefore -have fought at great disadvantage, even if Junot’s combinations -had not failed; but soon that general discovered the -mischief of over-haste in war. Brennier found the bottom of -the ravine impracticable, and floundering amidst rocks and -the beds of torrents was unable to co-operate with Laborde; -hence Junot had to reinforce the latter with Loison’s infantry, -and detach another column of all arms under General Solignac -to turn the English flank by the Lourinham road. But he -did not perceive that Sir Arthur, anticipating such an effort, -had there, not a flank but a front, three lines deep, while the -fifth brigade and Trant’s Portuguese were so disposed, that -Solignac, whose movement was isolated, could be cut off and -placed between two fires.</p> - -<p>Laborde and Loison opened three attacks, one principal, -with minor bodies on the flanks. The first, being well led -and covered by skirmishers, forced its way up with great -vehemence and power, but with great loss also; for General -Fane had called up the reserve artillery under Colonel Robe -to reinforce the six guns already on the platform, and while -they smote the column in front, another battery, belonging -to one of the brigades then ascending the left-hand ridge, -smote it in the right flank, and under this conjoint fire of -artillery and a wasting musketry the French reached the -summit, there to sustain a murderous volley, to be charged -by the 50th Regiment, overturned, and driven down again.</p> - -<p>Of the other two columns, the one assailing Anstruther’s -brigade was beaten quickly, and that general had time to -reinforce Fane’s left with the second battalion of the 43rd in -opposition to Kellermann’s grenadiers, half of whom now reinforced -the third column on that side. This regiment, posted<span class="pagenum" id="Page_8">8</span> -in a churchyard on the edge of the declivity, had one or two -companies in advance amongst some trees, and from thence -the first burst of the grenadiers drove them upon the main -body; but then Robe’s battery so smote the left of the French -that they dipped into the ravine on their right, where the -battery from the ridge caught them on the other flank; the -moment was happily seized by the 43rd to pour down in a -solid mass, and with ringing shouts it dashed against the -column, driving it back with irrecoverable disorder: yet not -without the fiercest fighting. The loss of the regiment was -a hundred and twenty, and when the charge was over, a -French soldier and the Sergeant Armourer, Patrick, were -found grimly confronting each other in death as they had -done in life, their hands still clutching their muskets, and -their bayonets plunged to the sockets in each manly breast! -It is by such men that thousands are animated and battles won.</p> - -<p>Broken by these rough shocks, the French, to whom defeat -was amazement, retired in confused masses and in a slanting -direction towards the Lourinham road, and while thus disordered -Colonel Taylor rode out upon them doing great execution; -but as suddenly Margaron came down with his strong -cavalry, and the gallant Englishman fell with most of his -horsemen. However, half of Junot’s army was now beaten -with the loss of seven guns, and though Margaron’s powerful -cavalry, and that moiety of Kellermann’s grenadiers which had -not been engaged, interposed to prevent pursuit, the line of -retreat left the shortest road to Torres Vedras uncovered—a -great fault which did not escape the English general’s rapid -comprehension.</p> - -<p>Brennier, unable to emerge from the rocks and hollows -where he was entangled, had been of no weight in this -action, but Solignac, having turned the ravine, appeared on -the left about the time Taylor’s charge terminated the fight -in the centre, and his division, strongly constituted with all -arms, was advancing impetuously along the narrow ground, -when General Ferguson, who was there in opposition, met -him with a counter attack, so fierce, so rapid and sustained, -that the French, though fighting stubbornly, bent to the -strong pressure. Solignac was wounded, his cavalry, artillery -and infantry, heaped together and out-flanked, were cut off -from their line of retreat and forced into low ground on their<span class="pagenum" id="Page_9">9</span> -right with a loss of six guns. These pieces, placed under -guard of the 71st and 82nd while Ferguson continued his -course, were again lost by one of those events which make -battles the property of fortune; for Brennier, after long -struggling, having worked up the ravine by his right to an -accessible place, had ascended the ridge, and, unexpectedly -falling upon the two regiments in charge of the captured -guns, beat them back. He thus got behind Ferguson, and -had time been given to reform his troops and assail that -general’s rear mischief would have ensued; but the English -regiments were disordered only for a moment; they rallied -on higher ground, poured in their fire, broke the French -brigade with a charge and made Brennier, who was wounded, -a prisoner. Solignac’s division was then without resource, -when suddenly another and more decisive change came over -this fitful battle.</p> - -<p>Junot’s left wing and centre had been so discomfited, that -only half of Kellermann’s grenadiers and Margaron’s cavalry -remained unbroken, and the road of Torres Vedras, the -shortest to Lisbon, was uncovered; Brennier’s column was -entirely broken; Solignac’s division was in confusion on low -ground, cut off from Junot, and menaced front and rear. -But of the English army, Hill’s brigade had not fired a shot; -neither had the brigade conjoined with Trant’s Portuguese, -and it was then marching to take Solignac’s division in rear. -The two brigades of Ferguson’s third line had lost only a few -men, and those on the central hill had not been hardly -handled; there was therefore a powerful force in hand for -further operations. Now Brennier, when first taken, eagerly -asked if the reserve had attacked, and the other prisoners -being questioned on this point replied in the affirmative,<a id="FNanchor_2" href="#Footnote_2" class="fnanchor">2</a> -wherefore the English general, judging the French power -exhausted, and the moment come for rendering victory decisive, -with the genius of a great captain resolved to make it -not only decisive on the field but of the fate of Portugal.</p> - -<p>Expecting Solignac’s division to lay down its arms, he<span class="pagenum" id="Page_10">10</span> -designed to push his own right wing and centre, under Hill, -on Torres Vedras, to which they were two miles nearer than -any part of the French army; that stroke was sure, and -Junot would have been cut off from Lisbon. Meanwhile Sir -Arthur meaned in person vigorously to drive him across the -Baragueda mountain on to the Tagus, by which he would -lose his remaining artillery, and have with disorganised and -dispirited troops to seek refuge under the guns of one of the -frontier fortresses. This great project was stifled as soon as -conceived. General Burrard had arrived on the field of -battle, he could not comprehend such a stroke of war, and -not only stopped the execution but ordered Ferguson to -halt. Then Solignac’s division, with the alacrity which distinguished -Napoleon’s soldiers, instantly rejoined Junot, who -as promptly recovered his original ground, and being joined -by twelve hundred fresh men from Lisbon regained Torres -Vedras. The battle of Vimiero thus terminated impotently. -Nevertheless, Burrard’s decision, with exception of the unaccountable -order to arrest Ferguson’s career, was not without -a military justification, admitted to be of weight by Sir -Arthur, but it was that of an ordinary general in opposition -to a great captain.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Coruña.</span> (Jan. 1809.)</h3> - -<p>The battle of Vimiero, in which the French lost thirteen -guns and about two thousand killed or wounded, the British -eight hundred, was followed by a convention which relieved -Portugal, and the English Government then sent an army -into Spain under Sir John Moore. Great success was looked -for by the ministers, yet they took no measures to render it -even probable; and the incredible absurdity of the Spaniards, -who were overthrown in every quarter before the English -could reach them, made that which was improbable impossible. -Moore found himself alone in the midst of a -French army commanded by Napoleon, of which the cavalry -alone counted twelve thousand more than the whole British -force! Compelled to retreat, he was pursued by the Emperor, -who made a prodigious march to cut him off at Astorga, and -failing of that, launched Marshal Soult on his traces with one -army, supported by another under Marshal Ney. Through -the mountains of Gallicia the three armies passed like a tempest,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_11">11</span> -yet Moore, with unflinching resolution, amidst winter -rains and appalling difficulties, and without one gleam of -good fortune to nourish energy, reached Coruña with a gain -of two marches on his pursuers. His retreat was one of suffering, -of privation and fatigue, but he met with no disaster -in arms, and in many combats taught the enemy to beware of -his sword. At Rueda his cavalry, under C. Stewart,<a id="FNanchor_3" href="#Footnote_3" class="fnanchor">3</a> surprised -a French post and made eighty prisoners. Near -Valladolid Major Otway<a id="FNanchor_4" href="#Footnote_4" class="fnanchor">4</a> in a sharp action took a colonel, -and more prisoners than he had men to guard them with. -At Sahagun Lord Paget<a id="FNanchor_5" href="#Footnote_5" class="fnanchor">5</a> overthrew six hundred dragoons, -killed twenty, and took thirteen officers and one hundred and -fifty men. At Mayorga the same nobleman killed as many, -and took a hundred prisoners; and at Benevente defeated -the light cavalry of the Imperial Guard, capturing General -Lefebre and seventy men. At Calcavallos Moore, in person, -repulsed a serious attack in which the French general Colbert -was killed. At Constantino he repulsed another attack, and -at Lugo checked the enemy with a loss of four hundred men.</p> - -<p>At Coruña his design was to embark without fighting, but -the ships did not arrive in time, and he had to accept battle -in a bad position. The ground he desired to take was a -rocky range abutting on the Mero, a tidal river, but it being -too extensive for his troops, he was compelled to adopt a -similar yet lower range, likewise abutting on the Mero, yet -inclosed on two sides by the greater heights, which were left -for the enemy. Neither of these ranges were crested, and on -the inferior one Moore had to display a front in opposition to -the superior range, from whence the French not only commanded -most of the English line in front within cannon-shot, -but could flank it also on the right. Soult’s ground was -indeed in every way advantageous. His left rested on a -clump of rocks overlooking both ranges, and all the country -immediately about; and in the night of the 15th he placed -there eleven heavy guns which, from their elevation, could -oppress the right of the English line and send their bullets -raking even to the centre.</p> - -<p>Between the two positions the ground was comparatively -easy of passage, though broken and laced with stone inclosures;<span class="pagenum" id="Page_12">12</span> -and as both ridges ended abruptly on a narrow valley -running perpendicular to their range, there was a seeming -facility from their proximity at that flank for the French to -envelop the British right with superior numbers. On the far -side of this valley also was a mountainous chain of hills on -which all Soult’s cavalry were posted, his light horsemen -being pushed far behind the British rear, while his heavy -dragoons dismounted to act as infantry. Thus the French -army seemed to be surrounding the English, but Moore, -comprehending all the defects of his position, had adopted a -counteracting order of battle, evincing his own martial -vigour, and the confidence a long career of glorious and successful -service had given him in the stern valour of the -British soldier.</p> - -<p>To receive battle on the inferior ridge was of necessity, -but to extend his line athwart the narrow valley on his right -to the height occupied by the French cavalry would only -have placed more men under the rock battery, and his flank -would still be exposed to the dismounted French dragoons. -Wherefore he merely stretched a thin line of skirmishers -across, and placed a battalion on the lower falls of the hills -on their right, to check the horsemen on the summit. This -disposition, and a scanty manning of the main ridge, where -he posted only two divisions, Hope’s and Baird’s, the latter -on the right, gave him two divisions of reserve, Paget’s and -M<sup>c</sup>Kenzie Frazer’s. The last he placed on rising ground -closely covering Coruña, to watch a road leading round the -heights where the French cavalry were, and which Soult, -whose movements could not be seen, might use to turn the -British and cut them off from the town and harbour.</p> - -<p>Paget’s division, the best in the army, remained, and with -it Moore resolved to strike for victory. He kept it in mass -behind the right of his main line, on a moderate elevation, -from whence it commanded a full view of the narrow valley, -and could support the screen of light troops without being -exposed to the fire of the eleven-gun battery. Thus, while -the main ridge, strong in itself though ill presented to the -enemy, was offered in defence, with protected flanks, two -other divisions remained in hand to meet the changes of -battle—a fine result to obtain for an inferior army occupying -unfavourable ground. But Moore meaned more than defence.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_13">13</span> -Confident that Baird and Hope would repel every attack on -the ridge, he designed, when time should be ripe, if the -French did not join infantry to their cavalry on the other -side of the valley, to pour down the latter with Paget’s division, -reinforcing it with Frazer’s, and thus carry in one -course the rock battery; then changing from the defensive to -the offensive with all his troops, to drive the enemy into the -Mero: it was the conception of a daring man and a great -commander, and only with such potent soldiers as the -British could a like stroke be made. And only a general -who had proved their quality in many a desperate fight -could have expected this effort from his men, after a distressing -winter retreat, with a strong enemy in front and the sea -behind! But general and soldiers were of England’s best. -No suffering, no danger could quell their courage, or shake -his confidence in them: and it was so proved in that hour, -for many of the principal officers, appalled at the superior -force of the enemy, the disadvantage of ground, and the difficulty -of embarkation, proposed negotiations, which Moore -rejected with cold disdain, trusting as he had ever done to -his gallant troops.</p> - -<p>Belonging to the French position, and occupied by them -in force, were two villages, Palavia Abajo in front of their -right, Portosa in front of their centre.</p> - -<p>Belonging to the English position, though rather too -much advanced, the village of Elvina covered the right -flank, and was occupied by the picquets of the 50th -Regiment.</p> - -<p>These features dictated Soult’s order of attack. Forming -three columns of infantry, which he supported with all his -light artillery, he directed two by Palavia and Portosa -against the left and centre of Moore’s line—those villages -serving as intermediate supports in case of disaster—while -the third and strongest column was destined to carry Elvina -and then lap round Baird’s right.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Battle of Coruña.</span> (Jan. 1809.)</h3> - -<p>On the 16th of January, 1809, at two o’clock in the afternoon, -twenty thousand French veterans opened this battle -against fourteen thousand British, who, having but nine six-pounders -to oppose to a numerous light artillery, were also<span class="pagenum" id="Page_14">14</span> -galled by eleven heavy guns on the rocks: and soon that formidable -battery opened the fight with a slaughtering fire, -sending its bullets crashing through the English ranks from -right to centre. Then the columns of infantry, throwing out -clouds of skirmishers, descended from their strong ridge to -the fight. Those coming from Palavia and Portosa, having -some distance to march, did not immediately engage, but -the third dashed at once against Elvina, and there was the -stress of battle; the picquets were driven in heaps out of the -village, and when that was passed the French mass divided, -one portion advancing against Baird’s front, the other turning -his right by the valley, where it was only opposed by -the screen of light troops.</p> - -<p>Sir John Moore sent the 42nd and 50th Regiments against -the half column at Elvina, and wheeling back the 4th Regiment -on the extremity of his right, poured a fire into the -flank of the mass penetrating by the valley, where it was also -stoutly opposed by the light troops, and soon abated of its -vehemence in attack. Then the English general knew that -his adversary’s whole force and order of battle was unfolded. -No infantry menaced the valley from where the French -cavalry stood, and the number in front showed that no body -of strength for mischief was behind those heights: it was -evident that Soult offered a close rough trial of arms, without -subtlety, trusting to the valour of his veterans. Eagerly the -gallant Moore accepted the challenge. The moment for his -counter-stroke had arrived, and at once he called up Frazer’s -division in support of Paget, giving the latter, who was -previously well instructed, the signal to descend into the -valley: the French column on his flank being thus provided -with opponents, he turned to observe the progress of the -fight at Elvina, for as yet the battle had but slightly touched -his centre and left.</p> - -<p>The 42nd and 50th had driven the enemy back into the -village, and the last-named regiment, entering the streets -with the repulsed disordered mass and giving no respite, -forced it through and broke out, still fighting, on the other -side. To support this advance the general now sent a battalion -of the Guards down, whereupon the 42nd, thinking it -a relief and not a reinforcement, retired, with exception of -the grenadier company. Some confusion thus occurred, the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_15">15</span> -village was not occupied, and the 50th, still accompanied by -the 42nd Grenadiers, were engaged without support beyond -the houses, their array being quite broken by stone inclosures -and the disorder of the street fight. At that critical moment -the French were strongly reinforced, retook the offensive and -forced the regiment back into Elvina, having killed beyond -it the second Major, Stanhope, a nephew of Mr. Pitt, and -made prisoner the commanding officer, Major Napier, known -since as the conqueror of Scinde; encompassed by enemies, -and denied quarter, he received five wounds, but he still -fought and struggled for life until a French drummer with a -generous heat and indignation forcibly rescued him from his -barbarous assailants. Meanwhile Sir John Moore, observing -the error of the 42nd, had galloped down and with a fiery -exhortation sent it back to the village, where the 50th notwithstanding -the loss of their commander was successfully -sustaining a very violent conflict: then with heroic anticipations -from the development of his counter-combination, he -returned to the ridge from whence he could view the whole -action.</p> - -<p>Elvina was now his centre of battle and pivot of movements, -for on his left the battle had then become general and -furious, yet the French made no progress against Hope’s -division; and on the right, in the valley, the attacking -column was at bay, wavering under a double fire in front -and flank: everywhere the signs of coming victory were -bright, when the gallant man, the consummate commander, -who had brought the battle to this crisis, was dashed from -his horse to the earth. A cannon-shot from the rock battery -had torn away all the flesh from his left breast and -shoulder, and broken the ribs over a heart undaunted even -by this terrible this ghastly mortal hurt; for with incredible -energy he rose to a sitting posture, and with fixed look and -unchanged countenance continued to regard the fight at -Elvina until the Frenchmen’s backward steps assured him -the British were victorious: then sinking down he accepted -succour.</p> - -<p>Being placed in a blanket for removal, an entanglement -of his belts caused the hilt to enter the wound and Captain -Hardinge<a id="FNanchor_6" href="#Footnote_6" class="fnanchor">6</a> attempted to take away the weapon altogether;<span class="pagenum" id="Page_16">16</span> -but with martial pride the stricken man forbade the alleviation—<em>he -would not part with his sword in the field</em>! Epaminondas, -mortally wounded at Mantinea, was anxious for the -recovery of his shield. Moore, mortally wounded at Coruña, -sustained additional torture rather than part with his sword!</p> - -<p>The Theban hero’s fall dismayed and paralyzed his victorious -troops. It was not so with the British at Coruña. -They saw Baird, second in command, carried from the field -as the General-in-Chief had been, and they would have seen -all their generals fall one after another without abating their -battle; hence it was not long before the French were entirely -driven from Elvina, while on the left, they were not only -repulsed from the ridge, but pursued and assailed in their -own villages; that of Palavia, defended by the since celebrated -General Foy, was taken. Meanwhile Paget, pouring -into the valley with conquering violence, overthrew everything -in his front, and driving off the dismounted French -dragoons who had descended to the lower falls on his right, -made for the great rock battery, which he would certainly -have stormed if the counter-attack had been continued, and -Frazer’s division been thrown, as Moore designed, into the -fight. The French would thus have been wrecked; for their -ammunition of which the rapid marches through Gallicia had -only allowed them to bring up a small supply, was exhausted, -the river Mero was in full tide behind them, and only one -bridge remained for retreat. But this want of ammunition -was unknown to the English general Hope, on whom the -command had devolved, and he, judging a night action, for -it was then dark, too hazardous, profited from the confusion -of the French to embark the army without loss and sailed -for England. The heroic spirit of Moore went with the -troops, his body rested with the enemy.</p> - -<p>For some hours after receiving his hurt that great man had -lived painfully, but with a calm fortitude that excited the -admiration of those about him. Several times he expressed -his satisfaction at having won the battle, and his last words -were to express a hope “<em>that his country would do him justice</em>!”</p> - -<p>Full justice has not been done, because malignant faction -has strived hard to sully his reputation as a general—but -thus he died, and the record of his worth will be as a beacon -to posterity so long as heroic virtue combined with great<span class="pagenum" id="Page_17">17</span> -capacity is reverenced, for in any age, any nation, any conjuncture, -Sir John Moore would have been a leading man. -Tall he was and vigorous of person, and of a very comely -noble aspect, indicating penetration which no subtlety could -deceive, valour which no danger could appal, and withal a -dignity of mind which awed while it attracted admiration -and confidence. With him indeed, all commanding qualities -seemed to be united to and inseparable from estimable sentiments. -Integrity, honour, generosity, patriotism, adorned -the whole course of his existence, and his death furnished an -irrefragable test of the sincerity of his life: for both he may -claim a place with the greatest men of antiquity.</p> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_18">18</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="BOOK_II">BOOK II.</h2> -</div> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>Passage of the Douro—Talavera—Combat of Salinas—First Combat -of Talavera—Second Combat of Talavera—Battle of Talavera.</p></div> - -<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">Napoleon</span> having failed to cut off the English army, returned -to France, leaving precise instructions with his lieutenants -for the invasion of Portugal. Marshal Ney, who reached -Coruña three days after the battle, was to hold Gallicia. -Soult was to march by Oporto upon Lisbon. General Lapisse, -previously directed on Ciudad Rodrigo with twelve thousand -men, was to connect Soult’s invasion with another, to be -conducted south of the Tagus by Marshal Victor, who had -thirty thousand troops. Soult had twenty-five thousand, and, -after several battles with the Portuguese of the northern -provinces, stormed Oporto in March; but he could hear -nothing of Lapisse or Victor, and, his own progressive -strength being then exhausted, he endeavoured to establish -himself solidly until new combinations could be formed.</p> - -<p>Lapisse took no pains to open a communication with Soult, -and after several weeks of inactivity suddenly made for -Alcantara, crossed the Tagus there and joined Victor. The -Portuguese and Spaniards, thinking he was flying, rose along -his line of march on both sides of the frontier and cut off all -communication between Victor and Soult. The former was -however little disposed to act. He had defeated the Spanish -general Cuesta in a great battle at Medellin, and only accidentally -failed to obtain Badajos by treason; but then he -took quarters at Merida, sullenly resistant of his orders to -enter Portugal. This enabled Cuesta, who had all the -resources of Andalusia, to reappear in Estramadura with -an army of thirty thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry—and -at the same time a new force sprung up in Portugal.</p> - -<p>Previous to this period the English ministers, without -resolution or capacity to adopt any judicious course, at one -time looking to Portugal, at another negotiating for the occupation<span class="pagenum" id="Page_19">19</span> -of Cadiz, had during these events displayed only -infirmity of purpose and ignorance of the real state of affairs; -but after four months of vacillation, subsequent to the battle -of Coruña, they decided to act in Portugal, where the Regency -had accepted General Beresford as their field marshal. The -British troops in that country were then largely reinforced, -and Sir Arthur Wellesley, assuming the supreme military -command of both nations, commenced that series of victories -which has placed him amongst the truly great generals of -the world—and they are few, though the vanity of nations -would make them many.</p> - -<p>Soult was then in Oporto, Victor at Merida, but the frontier -insurrection debarred all intercourse between them; and -Sir Arthur, after making arrangements to cover Lisbon from -Victor, marched against Soult, in whose army there was a -conspiracy of officers to deliver him to the English. One -D’Argenton twice secretly visited head-quarters on this subject, -yet the treason, though of weight as an accessory, was -not permitted to affect the British preparations or movements, -which were carefully concealed.</p> - -<p>On the 7th of May Beresford was detached with a mixed -force, six thousand being Portuguese, to operate on the side -of Lamego.</p> - -<p>On the 8th, sixteen thousand British troops, fifteen hundred -being cavalry, with twenty-four guns, moved from -Coimbra under Sir A. Wellesley’s personal command towards -the Vouga river.</p> - -<p>Up to this time Soult was ignorant that such a force had -been assembled, but hearing nothing of Lapisse or Victor he -had decided to make a flank march into the Salamanca country, -and had pushed his light cavalry under Franceschi to the -Vouga, supporting it with Mermet’s division of infantry. -Loison’s division, six thousand strong, was then beyond the -Tamega at Pezo de Ragoa, and Lorge’s heavy cavalry was -on the Lima, watching the Portuguese insurgents.</p> - -<p>In this scattered state the French on the Vouga were -surprised and driven fighting upon the Douro, which they -crossed in the night of the 11th and destroyed the boat bridge. -Soult, who had discovered the conspiracy on the 9th, was thus -suddenly beset with perils. Treason in his army which he could -not probe, a powerful enemy suddenly springing up in front,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_20">20</span> -an active insurrection on his rear; his troops parcelled from -the Vouga to the Lima and Tamega, and under officers necessarily -suspected while the extent of the conspiracy was -unknown! He did not quail. Directing Lorge to abandon -the Lima and make for the Tamega, he ordered Loison to -hold Amarante on that river, as the only means of concentration -and safety for the army; he sent his stores and most -of the heavy guns towards that place on the 10th and night -of the 11th; and when the troops from the Vouga came -pouring in, the remaining heavy guns and the baggage were -also put in movement, Mermet’s division following them as -far as Vallonga, with orders to secure the boats on the Douro -and vigilantly patrol up the bank. All the craft from Oporto -to the mouth of the river was then drawn to the right bank, -guards were set, and Soult, thinking his position secure, -decided to hold Oporto another day, to give Lorge’s dragoons -and other detachments time to reach Amarante: he was however -curiously misled. In the recent operations, an English -column, moving in boats up the Lake of Ovar, which runs -parallel with the coast, had disembarked on Mermet’s flank, -who thought it had landed from the ocean; hence Soult, -expecting the empty vessels would enter the Douro to effect -a passage, directed his attention entirely to the lower river, -while on the upper his orders were neglected and false reports -made of their execution, for the conspirators were many -and busy.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Passage of the Douro.</span> (May, 1809.)</h3> - -<p>Before eight o’clock on the morning of the 12th the -British army was secretly concentrated behind a rocky -height, on which stood a convent immediately facing Oporto. -The Douro rolled in front, and the French on the other side -could with two marches gain the Tamega, secure their retreat, -and defeat Beresford in passing; for that general had been -sent over the Douro, above the confluence of the Tamega, -merely to infest Soult’s line of march towards the Salamanca -country, and thus induce him to take the rugged Chaves road -leading to Gallicia, and that could not be risked unless the -main army under Sir Arthur was closely pressing the French -rear; hence his safety, and the forcing Soult into Gallicia, -alike called for an immediate passage of the Douro. Yet how<span class="pagenum" id="Page_21">21</span> -pass a river, deep, swift, more than three hundred yards -wide, and in the face of ten thousand veterans guarding the -opposite bank? The Macedonian hero might have turned -from it without shame.</p> - -<p>The stream came with an elbow round the convent -height, which barred sight of the upper water from the place -where Soult was watching for ships which did not exist; -and he knew not that the British army was behind the frowning -rock above, nor that a great captain was on its summit, -searching with an eagle glance the river, the city, and -the country around. Horses and baggage that captain saw -on the Vallonga road, and the dust of distant columns as in -retreat, but no large force near the river; the guards also -were few and widely spread, the patrols not vigilant—an -auspicious negligence seeming to prevail. Suddenly a large -unfinished building called the Seminary caught his eye; it -was isolated, had an easy access from the water, and was -surrounded by a high wall which extended to the river bank -on each side, inclosing space enough for two battalions, the -only egress being an iron gate opening on the Vallonga road. -This structure commanded everything around, except one -mound, within cannon-shot, but too pointed to hold guns; -there were no French posts near the building, and as the -direct line across the water was entirely hidden from the -city by the rock, Sir Arthur, with a marvellous hardihood, -instantly resolved to force a passage there in face of a veteran -army and a renowned general, his means being as scanty as -his resolution was great, yet with his genius they sufficed.</p> - -<p>Colonel Waters, an officer on his staff, a quick-witted, -daring man, discovered a poor barber, who had come over -the river the night before in a small skiff and readily agreed -to go back; he was accompanied by the Prior of Amarante, -who gallantly offered his services: thus Waters crossed -unperceived and returned with three large barges. Meanwhile -eighteen guns had been placed in battery on the -convent rock, and General John Murray was detached with -a brigade of German infantry, the 14th Dragoons, and two -guns, to seek a passage at the Barca de Avintas, three miles -up the river: he was reinforced with other troops when the -barges were secured, and then also the head of the army -cautiously approached the water.</p> - -<p>At 10 o’clock, the French being tranquil and unsuspicious, -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_22">22</span> -the British wondering and expectant, Sir Arthur was told -that one boat was ready. <em>Well! Let the men cross</em> was the -reply, and a quarter of an hour afterwards an officer and -twenty-five British soldiers were silently placed on the other -side of the Douro in the midst of the French army! The -Seminary was thus gained, all remained quiet, and a second -boat passed. No hostile stir succeeded, no sound of war was -heard; but when the third boat passed, tumultuous noises -rolled through Oporto, the drums beat to arms, shouts arose, -the citizens, vehemently gesticulating, made signals from -their houses, and confused masses of troops rushing out from -the higher streets threw forward swarms of skirmishers, and -came furiously down on the Seminary.</p> - -<p>Secrecy was then no longer valuable and the army -crowded to the river bank. Paget’s and Hill’s divisions -pressed to the point of passage, Sherbrooke’s to where the -bridge had been cut away the night before. Paget himself -passed with the third boat, but on the roof of the Seminary -was deeply wounded. Hill took his place, and the musketry, -sharp and voluble from the first, augmented as the forces -accumulated on each side; yet the French attack was eager -and constant, their fire increased more rapidly than that of -the English, and their guns soon opened against the building. -The English battery on the convent rock swept the -inclosure on each side and confined the attack to the front; -but Murray did not come down the right bank, and the -struggle was such that Sir Arthur was only restrained from -crossing by the remonstrances of those about him, and the -confidence he had in Hill. Soon, however, some citizens -were seen bringing over several great boats to Sherbrooke, -while a prolonged shout from the streets, and the waving of -handkerchiefs from the windows, gave notice that the enemy -had abandoned the lower town: Murray also was then descried -on the right bank.</p> - -<p>Three battalions were now in the Seminary, the attack -slackened, and the French began to hurry across the front -of the inclosure by the Vallonga road, and Hill, advancing to -the inclosure wall, was pouring a heavy fire into the disordered -masses as they passed his front, when suddenly five -guns galloped out of the city on his left, but appalled at the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_23">23</span> -terrible stream of musketry pulled up: while thus hesitating -a volley from behind stretched most of the artillerymen in -the dust, and the rest dispersing left the guns on the road. -It was from Sherbrooke, who had passed through the streets, -this volley came, and he now pressed the French rear while -Hill sent his damaging fire into their flank, and the guns -from the rock deeply searched their masses. The passage -was thus won, the allies were on the right bank of the -Douro, and if Murray had fallen on the disordered crowd, -approaching him, the discomfiture would have been complete. -He however suffered column after column to pass, -and seemed to fear they would step aside to push him into -the river. General C. Stewart and Major Harvey, impatient -of this timidity, took two squadrons of the 14th Dragoons, -and riding over the French rear in a narrow way unhorsed -General Laborde and wounded General Foy; but having no -support from Murray fought their way back with loss, and -Harvey lost his arm. Of the English twenty were killed, -one general and nearly a hundred men wounded on the day; -the French lost a general and five hundred men killed or -wounded, and they left several hundreds in hospital. Five -guns were taken in the fight; and stores of ammunition with -fifty pieces of artillery, the carriages of which had been -burned, were found in the arsenal. The overthrow was -great, but Napoleon’s veterans were so inured to war that no -troops so readily recovered from a surprise. Before they -reached Vallonga their order was restored, a rear-guard was -formed, and in the night was rejoined by a detachment from -the mouth of the Douro, which had been guided by some -friendly Portuguese: then Soult, believing Loison held -Amarante, thought himself well out of his difficulties. He -was soon undeceived.</p> - -<p>Sir Arthur Wellesley now brought his baggage, stores, and -artillery over the Douro; but this was not effected until the -evening of the 13th, and though Murray’s Germans were -sent in pursuit on the morning of that day, they did not -advance more than ten miles. “<em>An enemy once surprised -should never be allowed time to recover</em>,” is a great maxim, and so -proved on this occasion: yet there were sound reasons for -the halt. Part of the troops were still on the left bank of -the Douro, and the whole had outmarched provisions, baggage<span class="pagenum" id="Page_24">24</span> -and spare ammunition, having made more than eighty -miles of rough ground in four days, besides fighting. Men -and animals required rest, and nothing was known of Beresford, -whose proceedings had been of far greater importance -than either he or Sir Arthur knew at the time.<a id="FNanchor_7" href="#Footnote_7" class="fnanchor">7</a></p> - -<p>Loison had fallen back from Pezo de Ragoa on the Douro -the 10th when Beresford crossed that river. The latter was -then in the position required for turning Soult on to the -Chaves road; but Loison again retreated on the 11th, and -Beresford, finding him timid, followed briskly, while a -Portuguese insurgent force under General Sylveira closed on -his flank. The 12th his outposts were driven into Amarante, -and next day he abandoned that place.</p> - -<p>These events were unknown to Sir Arthur on the 13th, but -he heard Soult had destroyed guns and ammunition near -Penafiel, and judging that to be a result of Beresford’s operations, -reinforced Murray with cavalry, ordering him to push -on to Penafiel, and if Loison lingered near Amarante to open -a communication with Beresford—the latter was then to -ascend the Tamega and intercept the French at Chaves.</p> - -<p>On the 14th Sir Arthur had moved forward himself, and -the 15th reached Braga; Beresford was then near Chaves, -Sylveira marching towards Salamonde, and Soult’s capture -seemed inevitable to his pursuers; he was however beyond -their toils, having by a surprising effort extricated himself -from perils as fearful as ever beset a general.</p> - -<p>While retreating towards Amarante he was between the -Douro and the Sierra de Catalina, both said to be impassable, -and the road was very narrow and very rugged. His design -was to pass the Tamega and march on Braganza; failing in -that, he could from Amarante and Guimaraens reach Braga -by a good road leading behind the Catalina ridge; in either -case however Amarante was to be first gained, and his safety<span class="pagenum" id="Page_25">25</span> -depended on Loison holding that place. But that general -had relinquished it to Beresford on the 13th, and marched on -Guimaraens, though a staff officer, sent by Soult on the 12th, -was in his camp protesting against the movement: the retreat -from Oporto being also known to him. He thus deliberately -abandoned his general and two-thirds of the army to what -appeared certain destruction; for Beresford could not be -forced, and if Murray only had come up on the French -rear, and he was not far off, Soult must have laid down his -arms.</p> - -<p>This calamity was made known to that marshal as he was -passing the rugged bed of the Souza, a cross torrent falling -into the Douro. The weather was boisterous, the troops -worn with fatigue and recently defeated were dismayed, -voices were heard calling for capitulation, and all things -tended to ruin: but in that hour of peril the Duke of Dalmatia -justified fortune for having raised him to such dignity. -He had fallen from his horse and severely injured his hip, -broken before by a shot at the siege of Genoa, yet neither -pain nor bodily weakness nor danger could abate his resolution. -A Spanish pedlar told him of a path leading up that -bank of the Souza which he had just left, by which he -could scale the Catalina ridge and reach the Guimaraens -road to Braga: whereupon, with a haughty commandment -he silenced the murmurs of treacherous officers and fearful -soldiers, destroyed his guns, abandoned his military chest -and baggage, loaded the animals which had carried them -with sick men and ammunition, and repassed the Souza to -follow his Spanish guide. Torrents of rain descended and -the path was wild and rough as the desolate region it -threaded, yet with a fierce domination he forced his troops -over the mountain, and descending on Guimaraens, refound -Loison: Lorge’s dragoons came in at the same time from -Braga, and thus almost beyond hope the whole army was -concentrated.</p> - -<p>Soult’s energy had been great, his sagacity was now as -conspicuous. The slackness of pursuit, after passing Vallonga, -made him judge Sir Arthur was pushing for Braga -and would reach it first; a fighting retreat and the loss of -guns and baggage would then ensue, and perhaps fatally -depress the soldiers’ spirit; it would also favour the malcontents,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_26">26</span> -and already one general, apparently Loison, was -urging a convention. Soult replied by destroying the guns, -ammunition, and baggage of the divisions he found at Guimaraens, -and again taking to the mountains crossed them to -Carvalho d’Este, thus gaining a day’s march and baffling the -combination to surround him. Next morning he drew up -his twenty thousand men on the position they had occupied -two months before at the battle of Braga, an imposing -spectacle, and on the scene of a recent victory, by which he -aroused the sinking pride of the French soldier. It was a -happy reach of generalship!</p> - -<p>Now he reorganized his army, giving Loison the advanced -guard and taking the rear himself; at which, says the French -historian of this expedition, “the whole army was astonished.” -As if it were not consummate policy to oppose the -British pursuit with men under the General-in-Chief, while -the van, having to fight insurgents, was led by an officer -whose very name called forth execrations from the natives—<em>Maneta, -the one-handed</em>, as Loison was called, however willing, -dared not surrender to a Portuguese force.</p> - -<p>From Carvalho the French made for Salamonde, whence -there were two lines of retreat; the one by Ruivaens to -Chaves, the other, shorter and more rugged, by the Ponte -Nova to Montelegre. The scouts said the bridge at Ruivaens -was broken, the passage defended by twelve hundred insurgents -with artillery; moreover, that men had been all the -morning working to destroy the Ponte Nova. The breaking -of the first blocked the road to Chaves, the breaking of the -second would, if completed, cut the army off from Montelegre.</p> - -<p>Night was setting in, the soldiers were harassed, barefooted, -and starving, the ammunition was injured by rain, -which had never ceased since the 13th, and was now accompanied -by storms of wind, with the morning the British -army would be on the rear, and if the Ponte Nova could not -be secured the hour of surrender was come! In this extremity, -Major Dulong, justly reputed as one of the most daring -men in the French ranks, was thus addressed by Soult: “<em>I -have chosen you from the whole army to seize the Ponte Nova, which -has been cut by the enemy. Take a hundred grenadiers and twenty-five -horsemen, surprise the guards and secure the passage. If<span class="pagenum" id="Page_27">27</span> -you succeed, say so, but send no other report; your silence will -suffice.</em>”</p> - -<p>Dulong, favoured by the storm, reached the bridge, killed -the sentinel without any alarm being given, and being followed -by twelve grenadiers, crawled along a narrow slip of -masonry which had not been destroyed. The Cavado river -was flooded and roaring in its deep rocky channel below, and -one of the grenadiers fell into the gulf, but the waters were -much louder than his cry, and the others surprised the -nearest guards; then the main body rushed on, and some -crossing the broken bridge while others ascended the heights, -shouting and firing, scared the insurgents away.</p> - -<p>At four o’clock the bridge was repaired and the troops -filed slowly over; but the road beyond was only a narrow -cut in the side of a mountain, an unfenced precipice yawned -on the left for several miles, and the way was finally crossed -by the Misarella torrent, rolling in a deep chasm and only -to be passed by the <i xml:lang="es" lang="es">Saltador</i> or <em>leaper</em>, a bridge so called -because it was a single arch, high and boldly thrown, which -admitted only three persons abreast: it was not cut, but was -intrenched, and the rocks on the further side were occupied -by some hundred armed insurgents. Here the good soldier -Dulong again saved the army. For when two assaults had -been repulsed he won the passage with a third, in which he -fell deeply wounded; yet his admiring soldiers carried him -forward in their arms, and then the head of the long French -column poured over the Saltador. It was full time, for the -English guns were thundering on the rear and the restored -Ponte Nova was choked with the dead.</p> - -<p>Sir Arthur Wellesley, quitting Braga in the morning of -the 16th, overtook Soult’s rear-guard in the evening, at -Salamonde, before it could cross the Ponte Nova; it was in -a strong position, but men momentarily expecting an order -to retire seldom stand firmly. Some light troops turned -their left, Sherbrooke assailed their front, and after one -discharge they fled by their right to the Ponte Nova. It -was dusk, the way to the bridge was not that of apparent -retreat, and for a while the French were lost to view; they -thus gained time to form a rear-guard, but ere their cavalry -could pass the bridge the English guns opened, sending men -and horses crushed together into the gulf, and the bridge<span class="pagenum" id="Page_28">28</span> -and the rocks and the defile beyond were strewed with -mangled carcasses.</p> - -<p>This was the last infliction by the sword in a retreat -signalized by many horrid and many glorious actions; for -the peasants in their fury tortured and mutilated the sick -and straggling soldiers who fell into their hands, the troops -in revenge shot the peasants, and the marches could be -traced from afar by the smoke of burning houses.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Talavera.</span> (July, 1809.)</h3> - -<p>When Soult saved himself in Gallicia Sir Arthur Wellesley -marched to Abrantes on the Tagus, from whence, thinking -the French marshal’s army so ruined it could be of no weight -in the war for several months, he designed to make a great -movement against Madrid, in concert with the Spanish generals -Cuesta and Venegas. He was at the time incredulous -of the Spaniards’ failings, thinking Sir John Moore had misrepresented -them as apathetic and perverse; but this expedition -taught him to respect that great man’s judgment, both as -to the people and the nature of their warfare.</p> - -<p>His plan of operations, as might be expected from so great -a general, was bold, comprehensive, and military, according -to the data presented: but he accepted false data. He under-calculated -the French in the Peninsula by more than a -hundred thousand men, he overrated the injury inflicted on -Soult; and while slighting the personal energy and resources -of that marshal, relied on Spanish politicians, Spanish generals, -Spanish troops, and Spanish promises. The time was -indeed one of riotous boasting and ill-founded anticipations -with the Spanish, Portuguese, and British governments. -Their agents and partisans were incredibly noisy, their -newspapers teemed with idle stories of the weakness, misery, -fear and despondency of the French armies, and of the -successful fury of the Spaniards; the most inflated notions -of easy triumph pervaded councils and camps, and the -English general’s judgment was not entirely proof against -the pernicious influence.</p> - -<p>Victor, relinquishing the south side of the Tagus, was then -in position at Talavera, and behind him King Joseph had -his own guards, a great body of horsemen, and Sebastiani’s<span class="pagenum" id="Page_29">29</span> -army corps. Thus more than fifty thousand men, seven -thousand being cavalry, covered Madrid.</p> - -<p>Cuesta, following Victor’s movements, had taken post at -Almaraz, with thirty thousand infantry, seven thousand -cavalry, and seventy pieces of artillery.</p> - -<p>Venegas was in La Mancha with twenty-five thousand -men.</p> - -<p>Sir Arthur Wellesley had eighteen thousand infantry, and -three thousand cavalry, with thirty guns; eight thousand -men, recently landed from England, were on the march to -join him, and both the Spanish government and generals -gave him the strongest assurances of co-operation and support. -He had made contracts with the alcaldes in the valley -of the Tagus for a supply of provisions, and, confiding in -those promises and contracts, entered Spain the latter end of -June, with scanty means of transport and without magazines, -to find every Spanish promise broken, every contract a -failure. When he remonstrated, all the Spaniards concerned, -political or military, vehemently denied that any breach of -engagements had taken place, and as vehemently offered -to make new ones, without the slightest intention to fulfil -them.</p> - -<p>A junction with Cuesta was effected the 18th of July.</p> - -<p>He was sullen, obstinate, and absurdly prompt to display -contempt for the English general; he marched with him, yet -rejected his counsels, and after reaching Talavera, from -whence Victor had retired, pushed on alone, thinking in his -foolish pride to enter Madrid. But King Joseph, who had -concentrated fifty thousand men and ninety guns on the -Guadarama stream, drove him back the 26th with the loss -of four thousand men, and his army would have dispersed, if -Sherbrooke, who was in advance of the English forces, had -not interposed his division between the scared troops and -the enemy.</p> - -<p>Sir Arthur Wellesley, whose soldiers were starving, from -the failures of the Spanish authorities, had not passed the -Alberche, and was intent to retire from Spain; yet now, -seeing the disorder beyond that river, judged that a great -battle was at hand, and being convinced that in a strong -position only would the Spaniards stand, besought their -general to withdraw to Talavera, where there was ground<span class="pagenum" id="Page_30">30</span> -suited for defence. Cuesta’s uncouth nature then broke out. -His troops, beaten, dispirited, fatigued, and bewildered, were -clustering in fear on a low narrow slip of land, between the -Alberche, the Tagus, and the heights of Salinas. The first -shot must have been the signal for dispersion; yet when -entreated to avoid the fall of the rock thus trembling overhead, -he replied, that his army would be disheartened by -further retreat—he would fight where he stood: had the -French advanced his ruin would have ensued. At daybreak -Sir Arthur renewed his solicitations, but they were fruitless, -until the enemy’s cavalry came in sight and Sherbrooke prepared -to retire; then indeed the sullen old man yielded, yet -with frantic pride told his staff, “<em>he had first made the Englishman -go down on his knees</em>.” Having vented this stupid folly, he retired -to a lumbering coach which attended his head-quarters, -while <em>The Englishman</em>, by virtue of an imperious genius, -assumed command of both armies, and leaving one division -with a brigade of cavalry under General M<sup>c</sup>Kenzie on the -Alberche to mask his movements, retired six miles to Talavera; -having before chosen a field of battle there, and -strengthened it with some field-works on a line perpendicular -to the Tagus.</p> - -<p>The country in front was a plain, open near this position, -but beyond it covered with olive and cork trees up to the -Alberche. A series of unconnected hills, steep, yet of moderate -height, and running parallel with the Tagus at a distance -of two miles, bounded this plain on the left, and half a mile -beyond them was a mountain-ridge, from which they were -separated by a rugged valley.</p> - -<p>Sir Arthur posted the Spanish infantry in two lines on the -right, having their flank resting on the town of Talavera, -which touched the river.</p> - -<p>Their left was closed by a mound crowned with a large -field redoubt, behind which a brigade of British cavalry was -posted.</p> - -<p>Their front was protected by a convent, by ditches, mud -walls, breastworks, and felled trees; their cavalry was behind -their line, and in rear of all, nearly touching on the town, -was a wood with a large house, well placed for and designed -by the English general to cover a retreat on the main roads -leading from Talavera to Arzobispo and Oropesa.</p> - -<p>From the large redoubt, on the mound closing the Spanish -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_31">31</span> -left, the line was prolonged by the British army. Campbell’s -division, in two lines, touched the Spaniards; Sherbrooke’s -touched Campbell’s, but arrayed in one line only, M<sup>c</sup>Kenzie’s -division, then on the Alberche, being to form the second. -Hill’s division should have closed the left, by taking post on -the highest of the isolated heights which bounded the plain, -but from some error only the flat ground was occupied, and -the height was left naked, an error afterwards felt. The -English left wing was covered in front by a watercourse, -which, shallow at first, went deepening and widening as it -passed the round hill, and became a formidable chasm in the -valley. The cavalry, originally placed along the front, was -destined to take post, partly behind the British left wing, -partly behind the redoubt on the Spanish left, and the whole -front of battle was two miles long. The Spaniards, reduced -by their recent action to thirty-four thousand combatants, -but still having seventy guns, occupied one-third of it, and -were nearly inattackable from the nature of the ground. -The British and Germans held the remainder of the position, -and the weakest part, although they were but nineteen -thousand sabres and bayonets with thirty guns. The combined -armies therefore, with forty-four thousand infantry, -ten thousand cavalry, and one hundred pieces of artillery, -offered battle to the king, who was coming on with eighty -guns and fifty thousand men, seven thousand being cavalry.</p> - -<p>Before daylight the French were in march to attack, and -at one o’clock Victor reached the heights of Salinas overhanging -the Alberche, from whence he could see the dust -raised by taking up the position, though the forest masked -the dispositions. The ground was however known to him, -and the king, at his instance, sent Sebastiani at once against -the allies’ right, the cavalry against the centre, and Victor -himself against the left-supporting the two first with his -guards and the reserve.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Combat of Salinas.</span> (July, 1809.)</h3> - -<p>Victor first marched on the <i xml:lang="es" lang="es">Caza de Salinas</i>, a house situated -in the plain below. To reach it he had to ford the -Alberche and penetrate two miles through the forest, yet<span class="pagenum" id="Page_32">32</span> -the position of M<sup>c</sup>Kenzie’s division was indicated by the -dust, and as the British cavalry had sent no patrols, the -post was surprised. England was then like to have lost her -great commander, for Sir Arthur, who was in the house for -observation, very hardly escaped capture; for the French -charged so hotly that the English brigades were separated, -fired on each other, and were driven in disorder through the -forest into the open plain. In the midst of this confusion -the 45th, a stubborn old regiment, accompanied by some -companies of the 60th Riflemen, kept good array, and on -them Sir Arthur rallied the others and checked the enemy, -covering his retreat with cavalry; yet he lost four hundred -men, and the retrograde movement was hastily made in face -of both armies.</p> - -<p>M<sup>c</sup>Kenzie with one brigade now took post behind the -Guards in the centre, but Colonel Donkin, seeing the hill -on the extreme left unoccupied, crowned it with the other -brigade, and thus accidentally filled the position. Meanwhile -Victor, issuing from the forest in fine martial order, -rapidly crossed the plain, seized another isolated hill, opposite -to that held by Donkin, and opened a heavy cannonade: -at the same time Sebastiani approached the Spanish line, -and pushed forward his light cavalry to make Cuesta show -his order of battle; whereupon happened one of those events -which show what a chance-medley thing a battle is, even in -the hands of a great captain. The French horsemen, riding -boldly up, commenced a pistol skirmish, to which the -Spaniards replied with one general discharge of musketry, -and then ten thousand infantry, with all the artillerymen, -as if deprived of their senses, broke and fled away in confused -heaps; the gunners carried away their horses, the -footmen threw away their arms, the Adjutant-General -O’Donoghue was foremost in flight, and even Cuesta went -off some distance in his coach: the panic was spreading -wide, and the elated horsemen charged down the Royal -road, but Sir Arthur instantly flanked them with some -English squadrons, the ditches on the opposite side were -impracticable, the Spaniards who stood fast began to use -their firearms, and those daring troopers had to retreat.</p> - -<p>Most of the Spanish runaways made for Oropesa, saying -the allies were defeated, the French in hot pursuit. Incredible<span class="pagenum" id="Page_33">33</span> -disorder followed. The English commissaries went off -with their animals, the paymasters carried away their money-chests, -the baggage was scattered, and the alarm spread -along the rear even to the frontier of Portugal. Cuesta -indeed, having recovered his presence of mind, sent several -thousand horsemen to head the fugitives and drive them -back, and some of the artillerymen and horses were thus -recovered; many of the infantry also, but in the next day’s -battle the Spanish army was less by six thousand fighting -men than it should have been, and the great redoubt in the -centre was silent for want of guns.</p> - -<p>While this disgraceful flight was being perpetrated on -the right, the left of the English line displayed the greatest -intrepidity. The round hill at the extremity was of easy -ascent in rear, but steep and rugged towards the French, -and was also protected there by the deep watercourse at the -bottom. Nevertheless Victor, seeing Donkin’s brigade was -not numerous, and the summit of the hill still naked of -troops, thought to seize the latter by a sudden assault.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">First Combat of Talavera.</span> (July, 1809.)</h3> - -<p>The sun was sinking, but the twilight and the confusion -amongst the Spaniards appeared so favourable to the French -marshal, that, without informing the king, he directed Ruffin’s -division to attack, Villatte’s to follow in support, and -Lapisse to assail the German Legion as a diversion for Ruffin, -without engaging seriously. The assault was vigorous, and -though Donkin beat back the French in his front, many of -them turned his left and won the height in his rear. General -Hill had been previously ordered to reinforce him, and it -was not quite dark when that officer, while giving orders -below, was shot at by men on the highest point; thinking -they were English stragglers firing at the enemy, he rode -up, followed by his brigade-major Fordyce, and in a moment -found himself in the midst of the French. Fordyce was -killed, Hill’s horse was wounded, and a grenadier seized his -bridle, but spurring hard he broke the man’s hold and -galloping down met the 29th Regiment, which he led up -with so strong a charge the enemy could not sustain the -shock.</p> - -<p>When the summit was thus happily recovered, the 48th -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_34">34</span> -Regiment and a battalion of detachments were brought forward, -and in conjunction with the 29th and Donkin’s brigade -presented a formidable front and in good time; for the troops -beaten back were but part of a regiment forming the van of -Ruffin’s division, the two other regiments having lost their -way in the watercourse; the attack had therefore only subsided, -Lapisse soon opened fire against the Germans, and -Ruffin’s regiment in one mass again assailed the hill. The -fighting then became vehement, and in the darkness the -opposing flashes of musketry showed how resolutely the -struggle was maintained, for the combatants were scarcely -twenty yards asunder, and the event seemed doubtful; but -the charging shout of the British soldier was at last heard -above the din of arms, and the enemy’s broken troops went -down once more into the ravine below: Lapisse, who had -made some impression on the Germans, then abandoned his -false attack and the fighting of the 27th ceased. The British -lost eight hundred men, the French a thousand.</p> - -<p>Now the bivouac fires blazed up and the French and -British soldiers were quiet, but at midnight the Spaniards -opened a prodigious peal of musketry and artillery without -cause or object; and during the remainder of the night, the -line was frequently disturbed with desultory firing, which -killed several men and officers.</p> - -<p>From the prisoners Victor ascertained the exact position -of the Spaniards, until then unknown, and when reporting -his own failure proposed a second attack for next morning on -the hill. Marshal Jourdan, chief of the king’s staff, opposed -this as a partial enterprise leading to no great result; yet -Victor was so earnest for a trial, urging his intimate knowledge -of the ground, that he won Joseph’s assent. Then he -placed all his guns in one mass on the height to the English -left, from whence they could plunge into the great valley on -their own right, range the summit of the hill in their front, -and obliquely search the whole British line as far as the -great redoubt between the allied armies. Ruffin was in -front of the guns, Villatte in rear, yet having one regiment -close to the watercourse; Lapisse occupied low table-land, -opposite Sherbrooke; Latour Maubourg’s cavalry formed a -reserve for Lapisse; Beaumont’s cavalry a reserve for Ruffin.</p> - -<p>On the English side, Hill’s division was concentrated on -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_35">35</span> -the disputed height; the cavalry was massed in a plain behind; -the park of artillery and the hospitals were between -the cavalry and Hill.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Second Combat of Talavera.</span> (July, 1809.)</h3> - -<p>About daybreak Ruffin’s troops again menaced the English -hill, moving against the front and by the great valley on -their own right, thus embracing two sides. Their march -was rapid and steady; they were followed by Villatte’s men, -and the assault was preceded with a burst of artillery that -rattled round the height and swept away the English ranks -by sections; the sharp chattering of musketry succeeded, -and then the French guns were pointed towards the British -centre and right. Soon their grenadiers closed, the height -sparkled with fire, and, as the inequalities of ground broke -the formation, on both sides small bodies were seen, here -and there, struggling for the mastery with all the virulence -of a single combat. In some places the French were overthrown -at once, in others they would not be denied and -reached the summit, yet the English reserves always vindicated -their ground and no permanent footing was obtained. -Still the conflict was maintained with singular obstinacy. -Hill himself was wounded and his men were falling fast, but -the enemy suffered more and gave way, step by step at first -and slowly to cover the retreat of their wounded, yet finally, -unable to sustain the increasing fury of their opponents and -having lost above fifteen hundred men in the space of forty -minutes, the whole mass broke away in disorder, sheltered -by the renewed play of their powerful artillery. To this -destructive fire no adequate answer could be made, for the -English guns were few and of small calibre, and when a reinforcement -was demanded from Cuesta he sent two pieces! -useful however they were, and the Spanish gunners fought -them gallantly.</p> - -<p>Most of the repulsed troops had gone off by the great -valley, and a favourable opportunity for a charge of horse -occurred, but the English cavalry, having retired during the -night for water and forage, were too distant to be of service. -However, these repeated efforts of the French against the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_36">36</span> -hill, and the appearance of their light troops on the mountain -beyond the valley, taught the English general that he -should prolong his flank on that side; wherefore he now -posted a mass of cavalry with the leading squadrons looking -into the valley, and sent a Spanish division of infantry to -the mountain itself. At this time also, the Duke of Albuquerque, -discontented with Cuesta’s arrangements, came -with his cavalry to the left and was placed behind the -British: a formidable array of horsemen, six lines in depth, -was thus presented.</p> - -<p>Joseph, after examining the position from left to right, -demanded of Jourdan and Victor if he should deliver a -general battle. The former replied that when the great -valley and the mountain were unoccupied on the 27th, Sir -Arthur Wellesley’s attention should have been drawn to the -right by a feint on the Spaniards: that during the night the -whole army should have been silently placed in column at -the entrance of the great valley, ready at daybreak to form -line of battle to its left on a new front, and so have attacked. -Such a movement would have compelled the allies to change -their front also, and during the operation they might have -been assailed with success. This project could not then be -executed. The English, aware of their mistake, had occupied -the valley and the mountain, and were, front and flank -alike, inattackable. <em>Hence, the only prudent line was to take up a -position on the Alberche, and await the effect of Soult’s operations on -the English rear.</em></p> - -<p>Victor opposed this counsel. He engaged to carry the -hill on the English left notwithstanding his former failures, -provided Sebastiani would attack the right and centre at the -same moment, finishing his argument thus: “<em>If such a combination -failed, it was time to renounce making war.</em>”<a id="FNanchor_8" href="#Footnote_8" class="fnanchor">8</a></p> - -<p>The king was embarrassed. His own opinion coincided -with Jourdan’s, yet he feared Victor would make the emperor -think a great opportunity had been lost, and while -thus wavering a despatch arrived from Soult, saying his -forces could only reach Placencia between the 2nd and 5th -of August; intelligence also came that a detachment from -the army of Venegas had appeared near Toledo, and his van<span class="pagenum" id="Page_37">37</span> -was approaching Aranjuez. This made the king tremble for -Madrid. The stores, reserve artillery, and general hospitals -of all the armies in Spain were there, and the tolls received at -the gates formed almost the only pecuniary resource of his -court: so narrowly did Napoleon reduce the expenditure of -the war. These considerations overpowered his judgment; -rejecting the better counsel, he resolved to succour the -capital, yet first to try the chance of battle.</p> - -<p>While the French chiefs were thus engaged in council, the -wounded were carried to the rear on both sides; but the -English soldiers were suffering from hunger, regular service -of provisions had ceased for several days, and a few ounces -of wheat in the grain formed the subsistence of men who had -fought and were yet to fight so hardly. The Spanish camp -was full of confusion and distrust. Cuesta inspired terror by -his ferocity, but no confidence; and Albuquerque, from conviction -or momentary anger, just as the French were coming -on to the final attack, sent one of his staff to inform the -English commander that Cuesta was betraying him. This -message was first delivered to Colonel Donkin, who carried -it to Sir Arthur, then seated on the hill intently watching -the movements of the advancing enemy; he listened without -turning his head, and drily answering—<em>Very well, you may return -to your brigade</em>—continued his survey of the French. -Such was his imperturbable resolution and quick penetration, -and his conduct throughout the day was such as became a -general upon whose vigilance and intrepidity the fate of fifty -thousand men depended.</p> - -<p>The dispositions of the French were soon completed. -Ruffin’s division, on the extreme right, was destined to cross -the valley and move by the foot of the mountain to turn the -British left.</p> - -<p>Villatte was to menace the key hill with one brigade, and -guard the valley with another, thus connecting Ruffin’s -movement with the main attack.</p> - -<p>Lapisse, supported by Latour Maubourg’s dragoons and -the king’s reserve, was to fall with half his infantry upon -Sherbrooke; the other half, connecting its attack with Villatte’s -brigade, was to make a third effort to master the -twice-contested hill.</p> - -<p>Milhaud’s dragoons were placed in front of Talavera to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_38">38</span> -keep Cuesta in check; the rest of the heavy cavalry was -brought into the centre behind Sebastiani, who was to assail -the right of the British army.</p> - -<p>Part of the French light cavalry supported Villatte’s -brigade in the valley, part remained in reserve, and many -guns were distributed among the divisions; but the principal -mass remained on Victor’s hill with the reserve of -light cavalry, where also the Duke of Belluno took post to -direct the movements of his corps.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Battle of Talavera.</span> (July, 1809.)</h3> - -<p>From nine o’clock in the morning until mid-day there was -no appearance of hostility, the weather was intensely hot, -and the troops on both sides descended and mingled without -fear or suspicion to quench their thirst at a brook separating -the positions; but at one o’clock the French soldiers were -seen to gather round their eagles, and the roll of drums was -heard along their whole line. Half an hour later, Joseph’s -guards, the reserve, and Sebastiani’s corps were descried in -movement to join Victor’s corps, and at two o’clock, the -table-land and the height on the French right, even to -the great valley, were covered with dark lowering masses of -men.</p> - -<p>At this moment, some hundreds of English soldiers employed -to carry the wounded to the rear returned in one -body, and were by the French supposed to be a detached -corps rejoining the army; nevertheless, the Duke of Belluno -gave the signal for battle, and eighty pieces of artillery sent -a tempest of bullets before the light troops, who came on -with the swiftness and violence of a hail-storm, and were -closely followed by the broad black columns in all the -majesty of war.</p> - -<p>Sir Arthur Wellesley had from the summit of the hill a -clear view of the whole field of battle. First he saw Sebastiani’s -troops rushing forwards with the usual impetuosity of -French soldiers, clearing the intersected ground in their -front and falling upon Campbell’s division with infinite fury; -yet that general, assisted by Mackenzie’s brigade and two -Spanish battalions, withstood their utmost efforts; for the -English regiments, putting the French skirmishers aside,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_39">39</span> -met the advancing columns with loud shouts, broke their -front, lapped their flanks with fire, and giving no respite -pushed them back with a terrible carnage. Ten guns were -taken, but as Campbell would not break his line by a pursuit, -the French, rallying on their supports, made head -for another attack; yet the British guns and musketry -played so vehemently on their masses while a Spanish cavalry -regiment charged their flank, that they again retired in disorder -and the victory was secured in that quarter.</p> - -<p>During this fight Villatte, preceded by chosen grenadiers -and supported by two regiments of light cavalry, advanced -up the great valley, and Ruffin was discovered marching -towards the mountain, whereupon Sir Arthur directed Anson’s -cavalry, composed of the 23rd Light Dragoons and 1st -German hussars, to charge the head of Villatte’s column. -Going off at a canter and increasing their speed as they -advanced, these regiments rode against the enemy, but soon -came upon the brink of the water-course, which, descending -from the hill, was there a chasm though not perceptible at -a distance; the French, throwing themselves into squares -behind it, opened their fire, and then the German Colonel -Arentschildt, an officer whom forty years’ service had made -a master in his art, reined up at the brink, exclaiming, in -his broken phrase, <em>I will not kill my young mens</em>! Higher up -however, facing the 23rd, the chasm was more practicable, -and that regiment plunged down, men and horses rolling -over each other in horrible confusion, the survivors ascending -the opposite bank by twos and threes; their colonel, -Seymour, was wounded, but Frederick Ponsonby, a hardy -soldier, rallied all who came up, passed through Villatte’s -columns, which poured fire from each side, and fell with inexpressible -violence upon a brigade of French <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">chasseurs</i> in -the rear. The combat was fierce yet short, for Victor had -before detached his Polish lancers and Westphalian light -horse to support Villatte, and these fresh troops coming on -when the 23rd, already over-matched, could scarcely stand -against the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">chasseurs</i>, entirely broke them: those who were -not killed or taken made for the Spanish division on the -mountain, leaving behind more than two hundred men and -officers.</p> - -<p>During this time the hill, the key of the position, was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_40">40</span> -again attacked, while Lapisse, having crossed the watercourse, -pressed hard upon the English centre, where his -artillery, aided by the great battery on Victor’s hill, opened -large gaps in Sherbrooke’s ranks, and his columns went -close up in the resolution to win. They were vigorously -encountered and yielded in disorder, but the English Guards, -quitting the line and following with inconsiderate ardour, -were met by the French supporting columns and dragoons, -whereupon the beaten troops turned, while heavy batteries -pounded the flank and front of the Guards, who, thus maltreated, -drew back, and coincidently, the German Legion -being sorely pressed, got into confusion.</p> - -<p>At this time Hill’s and Campbell’s divisions stood fast on -each extremity of the line, yet the centre of the British was -absolutely broken, and victory inclined towards the French, -when suddenly Colonel Donellan was seen advancing with -the 48th through the midst of the disordered masses. It -seemed as if this regiment must be carried away with the -retiring crowds, but wheeling back by companies it let them -pass through the intervals, and then resuming its proud and -beautiful line struck against the right of the pursuing enemy, -plying such a destructive musketry and closing with such a -firm countenance that his forward movement was checked. -The Guards and Germans then rallied, a brigade of light -cavalry came up from the second line at a trot, the artillery -battered the flanks without intermission, the French wavered, -and the battle was restored.</p> - -<p>In all actions there is one critical and decisive moment -which offers victory to the general who can seize it. When -the Guards made their rash charge, Sir Arthur, foreseeing -the issue, had sent the 48th down from the hill, although a -rough battle was going on there, and at the same time -directed the light cavalry to advance. This made the -British strongest at the decisive point, the French relaxed -their fighting while the English fire grew hotter, and their -ringing shouts—sure augury of success—were heard along -the whole line. In the hands of a great general, Joseph’s -guards and the reserve might have restored the combat, but -combination was over with the French. Sebastiani’s corps, -beaten on the left with the loss of ten guns, was in confusion; -the troops in the great valley on the right, amazed at the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_41">41</span> -furious charge of the 23rd, and awed by four distinct lines -of cavalry still in reserve, remained stationary, and no impression -had been made on the hill; Lapisse was mortally -wounded, his division had given way, and the king retired -to his original position.</p> - -<p>This retrograde movement was covered by skirmishers -and an increasing fire of artillery; the British, exhausted -by toil and want of food, and reduced to less than fourteen -thousand sabres and bayonets, could not pursue, and the -Spanish army was incapable of any evolution: at six o’clock -hostilities ceased, yet the battle was scarcely over when -the dry grass and shrubs took fire, and a volume of flames -passing with inconceivable rapidity across a part of the field, -scorched in its course both the dead and the wounded!</p> - -<p>Two British generals, Mackenzie and Langworth, thirty-one -officers of inferior rank, seven hundred and sixty-seven -sergeants and soldiers were killed. Three generals, a hundred -and ninety-two officers, three thousand seven hundred -and eighteen sergeants and privates were wounded; nine -officers, six hundred and forty-three sergeants and soldiers -were missing: making a total loss of six thousand two -hundred and sixty-eight in the two days’ fighting, of which -five thousand four hundred and twenty-two fell on the -28th.</p> - -<p>On the French side, nine hundred and forty-four, including -two generals, were killed. Six thousand two hundred and -ninety-four were wounded, one hundred and fifty-six made -prisoners; giving a total of seven thousand three hundred -and eighty-nine men and officers, of which four thousand -were of Victor’s corps: ten guns were taken and seven left -in the woods by the French. The Spaniards returned twelve -hundred men killed and wounded, but the correctness of -their report was very much doubted.</p> - -<p>Early on the 29th the French quitted their position for -the heights of Salinas behind the Alberche; and that day -General Robert Craufurd reached the English camp with the -43rd, 52nd and 95th regiments, and immediately took charge -of the outposts. These troops, after a march of twenty miles, -were in <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">bivouac</i> near Malpartida de Placencia when the alarm -caused by the Spanish fugitives spread to that part. Craufurd, -fearing the army was pressed, allowed his men to rest<span class="pagenum" id="Page_42">42</span> -for a few hours, and then withdrawing fifty of the weakest -marched with a resolution not to halt until he reached the -field of battle. As the brigade advanced it met crowds of -the runaways, not all Spaniards, but all propagating the -vilest falsehoods: <em>the army was defeated—Sir Arthur Wellesley -was killed—the French were only a few miles distant</em>: some, -blinded by their fears, pretended even to point out the -enemy’s posts on the nearest hills! Indignant at this -shameful scene the troops pressed on with impetuous speed, -and leaving only seventeen stragglers behind, in twenty-six -hours crossed the field of battle, a strong compact body, -having during that time marched sixty-two English miles in -the hottest season of the year, each man carrying from fifty -to sixty pounds weight. Had the historian Gibbon known -of such an effort, he would have spared his sneer about the -delicacy of modern soldiers!<a id="FNanchor_9" href="#Footnote_9" class="fnanchor">9</a></p> - -<p>The desperate fighting of the English soldier, responding -to his general’s genius, had now saved the army from the -danger imposed by Cuesta’s perverseness and the infirmity -of the Spanish troops; but Sir A. Wellesley had still to -expiate his own errors as to Spanish character, Spanish warfare, -and the French power and resources.</p> - -<p>Soult, after his retreat, had so promptly reorganized his -force as to be co-operating with Ney against the Gallician -insurgents, when in the British camp he was supposed to be -wandering, distressed, and shirking every foe. Meanwhile -Napoleon, foreseeing with intuitive sagacity that the English -general would operate by the valley of the Tagus, and -Gallicia consequently be abandoned, gave Soult authority to -unite in Leon the troops of Mortier, Ney and Kellermann to -his own, above fifty thousand fighting men in all. With -them he was to fall on the British communications, by -crossing the Gredos mountains and entering the valley of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_43">43</span> -the Tagus; but Ney, discontented at being under Soult’s -command, was dilatory, and the latter only passed the -Gredos the 31st instead of the 29th as he designed; the -allies thus escaped being inclosed between two French -armies, each an overmatch for them in numbers and power -of movement.</p> - -<p>Sir A. Wellesley had heard on the 30th that Soult was -likely to cross the mountains, yet, thinking him weak, only -desired Cuesta to reinforce some Spanish troops previously -posted at the pass of Baños, which had however been already -forced by the French; but on the 2nd of August it became -known that Soult had descended upon Placencia and taken -all the English stores there; news which aroused both generals; -then they agreed that Sir Arthur should march against -him, while Cuesta remained at Talavera to watch the king—promising -to bring off the men in the British hospitals if -forced to retreat. Sir Arthur, relying on this, marched the -3rd, still thinking Soult had only fifteen thousand men, the -remnant of his former army; but he had fifty-three thousand, -and on the morning of the 4th the English general found -himself with seventeen thousand half-starved soldiers at -Oropesa, Soult being in his front, Victor menacing his rear, -and Cuesta, false to his word, close at hand, having left -fifteen hundred British sick and wounded to the enemy. -The fate of the Peninsula was then hanging by a thread -which could not support the weight for twelve hours, and -only one resource remained: the bridge of Arzobispo was -near, and the army crossed the Tagus, leaving the French -with all the credit of the campaign.</p> - -<p>On the mountains beyond that river, the English general -maintained a defensive position until the 20th against the -enemy; but against the evil proceedings of the Spanish -government and Spanish generals he could not hold his -ground, and therefore retired into Portugal; having during -his short campaign lost by sickness and in battle, or abandoned, -three thousand five hundred gallant soldiers and -nearly two thousand horses, fifteen hundred of which died of -want.</p> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_44">44</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="BOOK_III">BOOK III.</h2> -</div> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>Combats on the Coa and Agueda—Barba de Puerco—Combat of -Almeida—Anecdotes of British Soldiers—Battle of Busaco.</p></div> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Combats on the Coa and Agueda.</span> (July, 1810.)</h3> - -<p>“<em>I have fished in many troubled waters, but Spanish troubled -waters I will never try again.</em>”</p> - -<p>Thus said Sir A. Wellesley after the campaign of Talavera, -by which he had acquired the title of Viscount Wellington, -and a thorough knowledge of the Spanish character. -Looking then to Portugal as his base for future operations, -he conceived and commenced the gigantic lines of Torres -Vedras as a depository for the independence of the Peninsula—a -grand project, conceived and enforced with all the might -of genius. But while preparing this stronghold he did not -resign the frontier, and when Massena, Prince of Essling, -menaced Portugal in 1810 with sixty-five thousand fighting -men in line, besides garrisons and reserves, he found a -mingled British and Portuguese army ready to oppose him.</p> - -<p>This defensive force was disposed in two distinct masses. -One under General Hill opposed invasion by the line of the -Tagus, the other under Lord Wellington opposed it by the -line of the Mondego; they were however separated by the -great Estrella mountain and its offshoots, and Massena, when -he took Ciudad Rodrigo, could concentrate his whole army -on either line, moving in front of the Estrella by a shorter -and easier road than the English general could concentrate -his troops behind that mountain. Lord Wellington opened -indeed a military road which shortened the line of co-operation -with Hill; yet this was only an alleviation, the advantage -remained with the French, and Wellington had to trust -his own quickness and the strength of intermediate positions -for uniting his army in the lines of Torres Vedras. Yield -ground without force however he would not, and therefore -had, previous to the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo, detached General -Robert Craufurd with the light division, two regiments of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_45">45</span> -cavalry, and six pieces of horse-artillery, to the Agueda, in -observation of the French army. On that advanced position -they sustained several actions. The first at Barba de Puerco, -a village, between which and the opposite French post of -San Felices yawned a gloomy chasm, and at the bottom, -foaming over huge rocks, the Agueda swept along beneath a -high narrow bridge. This post, held by the English riflemen, -was of singular strength, yet scarcely was the line of -the Agueda taken when General Ferey, a bold officer, -desirous to create a fear of French enterprise, attempted a -surprise.</p> - -<p>Secretly placing six hundred grenadiers below, at an hour -when the moon, rising behind him, cast long shadows from -the rocks deepening the darkness of the chasm, he silently -passed the bridge, surprised and bayoneted the sentinels, -ascended the opposite crags with incredible speed, and fell -upon the picquets so fiercely that all went fighting into the -village while the first shout was still echoing in the gulf -behind. So sudden was the attack, so great the confusion, -that no order could be maintained, and each soldier encountering -the nearest enemy fought hand to hand, while their -colonel, Sidney Beckwith, conspicuous from his lofty stature -and daring action, a man capable of rallying a whole army in -flight, exhorting, shouting, and personally fighting, urged all -forward until the French were pushed down the ravine again -in retreat.</p> - -<p>After this combat Craufurd kept his dangerous position -for four months, during which several skirmishes took place. -The one of most note was at the village of Barquilla, where -he surprised and captured some French horsemen, but afterwards -rashly charging two hundred French infantry under -Captain Gouache, was beaten off with the loss of the cavalry -colonel, Talbot, and thirty-two troopers.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Combat of Almeida on the Coa.</span> (July, 1810.)</h3> - -<p>Soon after this skirmish Ciudad Rodrigo fell, and Ney advanced -towards Almeida on the Coa. Craufurd’s orders -were to recross that river, yet from headstrong ambition he -remained with four thousand British and Portuguese infantry, -eleven hundred cavalry and six guns to fight thirty<span class="pagenum" id="Page_46">46</span> -thousand French on bad ground; for though his left, resting -on an unfinished tower eight hundred yards from Almeida, -was protected by the guns of that fortress, his right was -insecure; most of his cavalry was in an open plain in front, -and in his rear was a deep ravine, at the bottom of which, -more than a mile off, was the Coa with only one narrow -bridge for a retreat.</p> - -<p>A stormy night ushered in the 24th of July, and the -troops, drenched with rain, were under arms before daylight -expecting to retire when some pistol-shots in front, followed -by an order for the cavalry reserves and guns to advance, -gave notice of the enemy’s approach; then the morning -cleared, and twenty-four thousand French infantry, five -thousand cavalry, and thirty pieces of artillery, were observed -in march beyond the Turones. The British line was -immediately contracted and brought under the edge of the -ravine, but Ney had seen Craufurd’s false disposition, and -came down with the stoop of an eagle—four thousand horsemen -and a powerful artillery swept the English cavalry from -the plain, and Loison’s infantry, rushing on at a charging -pace, made for the centre and left of the position.</p> - -<p>While the French were thus pouring down, several ill-judged -changes were made on the English side; a part of -the troops were advanced, others drawn back; the 43rd -Regiment was placed within an inclosure of solid masonry -ten feet high, near the road, about half-musket-shot down the -ravine and having but one narrow outlet! The firing in -front became heavy, the cavalry, the artillery and Portuguese -caçadores successively passed this inclosure in retreat, -the sharp clang of the rifles was heard along the edge of the -plain above, and in a few moments the imprisoned regiment -would have been without a hope of escape, if here, as in -every other part of the field, the battalion officers had not -remedied the faults of the general. The egress was so narrow -that some large stones were loosened, a powerful simultaneous -effort of the whole line then burst the wall, and the -next instant the regiment was up with the riflemen. There -was no room for array, no time for anything but battle, -every captain carried off his company independently, joining -as he could with the riflemen and 52nd, and a mass of skirmishers -was thus presented, acting in small parties and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_47">47</span> -under no regular command, yet each confident in the courage -and discipline of those on his right and left, and all -keeping together with surprising vigour.</p> - -<p>It is unnecessary to describe the first burst of French -soldiers, it is well known with what gallantry the officers -lead, with what vehemence the troops follow, with what a -storm of fire they waste a field of battle. At this moment, -with the advantage of ground and numbers, they were -breaking over the edge of the ravine, their guns, ranged -along the summit, pouring down grape, while their hussars -galloped over the glacis of Almeida and along the road to the -bridge sabreing everything in their way. Ney, desirous -that Montbrun should follow the hussars with the whole of -the French cavalry, sent five officers in succession to urge -him on, and so mixed were friends and enemies, that only a -few guns of the fortress dared open, and no courage could -have availed against such overwhelming numbers: but -Montbrun enjoyed an independent command, and as the -attack was made without Massena’s knowledge he would not -stir. Then the British regiments, with singular intelligence -and discipline, extricated themselves from their perilous -situation. Falling back slowly and stopping to fight whenever -opportunity offered, they retired down the ravine, -tangled as it was with crags and vineyards, in despite of -their enemies; who were yet so fierce and eager that even -their horsemen rode amongst the inclosures, striking at the -soldiers as they mounted the walls or scrambled over the rocks.</p> - -<p>Soon the retreating troops approached the river, and the -ground became more open, but the left wing, hardest pressed -and having the shortest distance, arrived while the bridge -was crowded with artillery and cavalry, and the right was -still distant! Major M‘Leod of the 43rd instantly rallied -four companies of his regiment on a hill to cover the line of -passage, he was joined by some riflemen, and at the same -time the brigade-major Rowan<a id="FNanchor_10" href="#Footnote_10" class="fnanchor">10</a> posted two companies on -another hill to the left, flanking the road: these posts were -maintained while the right wing was filing over the river, -yet the French gathering in great numbers made a rush, -forcing the British companies back before the bridge was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_48">48</span> -cleared, and when part of the 52nd was still distant from it. -Very imminent was the danger, but M‘Leod, a young man -endowed with a natural genius for war, turned his horse, -called on the troops to follow, waved his cap, and rode with a -shout towards the enemy, on whom the suddenness of the -thing and the animating gesture of the man produced the -effect designed, for the soldiers rushed after him, cheering -and charging as if a whole army had been at their backs: -the enemy’s skirmishers not comprehending this stopped -short, and before their surprise was over the 52nd passed -the river, and M‘Leod followed at speed: it was a fine -exploit!</p> - -<p>As the infantry passed the bridge they planted themselves -in loose order on the side of the mountain, the artillery went -to the summit, and the cavalry observed the roads to the -right; this disposition was made to watch some upper fords -two miles off, and the bridge of Castello Bom; for it was to -be apprehended that while Ney attacked in front, other -troops might pass by those fords and bridge of Castello Bom -and so cut off the division from the army: the river was -however rising fast with the rain, and it was impossible to -retreat farther until nightfall.</p> - -<p>Soon the French skirmishers opened a biting fire across -the water: it was returned as bitterly; the artillery on both -sides played vigorously, the sounds were repeated by numberless -echoes, and the smoke slowly rising, resolved itself -into an immense arch, spanning the whole gulf and sparkling -with the whirling fuzes of the flying shells. Fast and -thickly the French gathered behind the high rocks, and a -dragoon was seen to try the depth of the upper stream above, -but two shots from the 52nd killed horse and man, and the -carcasses floating down between the contending forces intimated -that the river was impassable save by the bridge. -Then the monotonous tones of a French drum were heard, -the head of a noble column darkened the long narrow bridge, -a drummer and an officer, the last in a splendid uniform, -leaped together to the front and the whole rushed on with -loud cries. The depth of the ravine so deceived the English -soldiers’ aim at first, that two-thirds of the passage was won -ere a shot had brought down an enemy; yet a few paces -onwards the line of death was traced, and the whole of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_49">49</span> -leading French section fell as one man; the gallant column -still pressed forward, but none could pass that terrible line, -and the killed and wounded rolled together until the heap -rose nearly even with the parapet, while the living mass -behind them melted away rather than gave back.</p> - -<p>The shouts of the British now rose loudly, yet they were -confidently answered, and in half an hour another column, -more numerous than the first, again crowded the bridge: -this time the range was far better judged, and ere half the -passage was gained the multitude was again torn, shattered, -dispersed or slain: only ten or twelve men crossed to take -shelter under the rocks at the brink of the river. The skirmishing -was then renewed, yet a French surgeon, coming to -the very foot of the bridge, waved a handkerchief and commenced -dressing the wounded under the hottest fire; nor -was the brave man’s touching appeal unheeded, every musket -turned from him, although his still undaunted countrymen -were preparing for a third attempt, a last effort, which was -made indeed, yet with fewer numbers and less energy, for -the impossibility of forcing the passage was become apparent. -The combat was however continued. By the French as a -point of honour, to cover the escape of those who had passed -the bridge; by the English from ignorance of their object. -One of the enemy’s guns was dismantled, a field magazine -exploded, and many continued to fall on both sides until -about four o’clock, when torrents of rain caused a momentary -cessation of fire, the men amongst the rocks then escaped to -their own side, the fight ceased and Craufurd retired in the -night behind the Pinhel river. Forty-four Portuguese, two -hundred and seventy-two British, including twenty-eight -officers, were killed, wounded, or taken; and it was at first -supposed that half a company of the 52nd, posted in the -unfinished tower, were captured; but their officer, keeping -close until the night, had passed the enemy’s posts, and -crossed the Coa. The French lost above a thousand men, -and the slaughter at the bridge was fearful to behold.</p> - -<p>During the combat General Picton came up from Pinhel -alone, and Craufurd asked him for the support of the third division; -he refused, and they separated after a sharp altercation.<a id="FNanchor_11" href="#Footnote_11" class="fnanchor">11</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_50">50</span> -Picton was wrong, for Craufurd’s situation was one of -extreme danger; he could not then retire, and Massena -might, by the bridge of Castello Bom, have taken the division -in flank and destroyed it between the Coa and Pinhel -rivers. Picton and Craufurd were however not formed by -nature to agree. The stern countenance, robust frame, -saturnine complexion, caustic speech and austere demeanour -of the first promised little sympathy with the short thick -figure, dark flashing eyes, quick movements and fiery temper -of the second: nor did they often meet without a quarrel. -Nevertheless, they had many points of resemblance in their -characters and fortunes. Both were harsh and rigid in command; -both prone to disobedience, yet exacting entire submission -from inferiors; alike ambitious and craving of glory, -they were both enterprising, yet neither was expert in -handling troops under fire. After distinguished services -both perished in arms, and being celebrated as generals of -division while living, have been, since their deaths, injudiciously -spoken of as rivalling their great leader in war.</p> - -<p>That they were officers of mark and pretension is unquestionable—Craufurd -far more so than Picton, because the -latter never had a separate command and his opportunities -were more circumscribed—but to compare either to the Duke -of Wellington displays ignorance of the men and of the art -they professed. If they had even comprehended the profound -military and political combinations he was then conducting, -the one would have carefully avoided fighting on -the Coa, and the other, far from refusing, would have eagerly -proffered his support.</p> - -<div class="tb">* * * * *</div> - -<p>Here some illustrations of the intelligence and the lofty -spirit of British soldiers will not be misplaced.</p> - -<p>When the last of the retreating troops had passed the -bridge, an Irishman of the 43rd, named Pigot, a bold turbulent -fellow, leaned on his firelock, regarded the advancing -enemy for some time, and then in the author’s hearing thus -delivered his opinion of the action.</p> - -<p>“<em>General Craufurd wanted glory, so he stopped on the wrong side -of the river, and now he is knocked over to the right side. The -French general won’t be content until his men try to get on the wrong<span class="pagenum" id="Page_51">51</span> -side also, and then they will be knocked back. Well! both will claim -a victory, which is neither here nor there, but just in the middle of the -river. That’s glory!</em>” Then firing his musket he fell into the -ranks. Even to the letter was his prediction verified, for -General Craufurd published a contradiction of Massena’s dispatch.</p> - -<p>This sarcasm was enforced by one of a tragic nature. -There was a fellow-soldier to Pigot, a north of Ireland man, -named Stewart but jocularly called the <em>Boy</em> because of his -youth, being only nineteen, and of his gigantic stature and -strength. He had fought bravely and displayed great intelligence -beyond the river, and was one of the last men who -came down to the bridge, but he would not pass. Turning -round, he regarded the French with a grim look, and spoke -aloud as follows. “<em>So! This is the end of our boasting. This -is our first battle and we retreat! The boy Stewart will not live to -hear that said.</em>” Then striding forward in his giant might he -fell furiously on the nearest enemies with the bayonet, refused -the quarter they seemed desirous of granting, and died fighting -in the midst of them!</p> - -<p>Still more touching, more noble, more heroic was the -death of Sergeant Robert M‘Quade. During M‘Leod’s rush -this man, also from the north of Ireland, saw two Frenchmen -level their muskets on rests against a high gap in a -bank, awaiting the uprise of an enemy; the present Sir -George Brown, then a lad of sixteen, attempted to ascend at -the fatal point, but M‘Quade, himself only twenty-four years -of age, pulled him back, saying with a calm decided tone -“<em>You are too young Sir to be killed</em>,” and then offering his own -person to the fire fell dead, pierced with both balls!</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Battle of Busaco.</span> (Sept. 1810.)</h3> - -<p>Soon after Craufurd’s combat, Almeida was betrayed by -some Portuguese officers, and Massena, who had previously -menaced both lines of invasion, adopted that of the Mondego. -This river, flowing between the Estrella mountain and the -Sierra de Caramula, is separated by the latter from the coast, -along which the Royal road runs from Oporto to Lisbon. -The roads on each side of the river were very rugged, and at -the southern end of the valley crossed by two mountain<span class="pagenum" id="Page_52">52</span> -ridges, namely, the Sierra de Murcella on the left bank, the -Sierra de Busaco on the right bank. Wellington had prepared -the former for battle, and General Hill was coming to -it by the military road, but Massena, aware of its strength, -crossed to the right of the Mondego, and moved by Viseu, to -turn Wellington’s flank and surprise Coimbra; he however -knew nothing of Busaco, which covered that city, and so fell -into the worst road and lost two days waiting for his artillery. -Meanwhile his adversary also passed the Mondego, and -sending troops to the front broke the bridges on the Criz and -Dão, mountain torrents crossing the French line of march.</p> - -<p>Coimbra could not then be surprised, yet Massena could -from Viseu gain the Royal coast-road and so reach Coimbra, -turning the Busaco position; he could also repass the Mondego -and assail the Murcella; wherefore the allied army was -necessarily scattered. Hill had by forced marches reached -the Murcella; Spencer was detached to watch the Royal -coast-road; the light division, Pack’s Portuguese, and the -cavalry, were in observation on the Viseu road; the remainder -of the army was in reserve at the fords of the -Mondego, to act on either side. In this state of affairs happened -a strange incident. The light division had established -its bivouac towards evening in a pine-wood, but a peasant -advised a removal, saying it was known as the Devil’s wood, -that an evil influence reigned, and no person who slept there -had ever escaped it. He was laughed at, yet he did not -fable. In the night all the troops, men and officers, seized as -it were with sudden frenzy, started from sleep and dispersed -in all directions: nor was their strange terror allayed until -voices were heard crying out that the enemy’s cavalry were -amongst them, when the soldiers mechanically ran together -and the illusion was dissipated.</p> - -<p>After some delay Massena moved down the Mondego and -Busaco was then occupied by the English general. His -line was eight miles long, flanked on the right by the river, -and on the left connected with the Caramula by ridges and -ravines impervious to an army. A road along the crest -furnished easy communication, and the ford of Pena Cova, -behind the right, gave direct access to the Murcella ridge. -Rugged and steep the face of Busaco was, yet the summit -had space for the action of a few cavalry and salient points<span class="pagenum" id="Page_53">53</span> -gave play to the artillery, while the counter-ridge offered no -facility to the enemy’s guns. When it was first adopted some -generals expressed a fear that the Prince of Essling would not -attack—“<em>But if he does I shall beat him</em>” was Wellington’s -reply: he knew his obstinate character.</p> - -<p>Massena had three army corps, Ney’s, Junot’s, and Reynier’s, -with a division of heavy cavalry under Montbrun; -and as he knew nothing of the Torres Vedras lines, and -despised the Portuguese, he was convinced the English -would retreat and embark. A great general in dangerous -conjunctures, he was here, from age and satisfied ambition, -negligent, dilatory, and misled by some Portuguese noblemen -in his camp. Instead of marching with his whole army -compact for battle he retained Junot and Montbrun in the -rear, while Ney and Reynier, restoring the bridges over the -Criz, drove the English cavalry into the hills, forced back -the light division with a sharp fight, and crowned the -counter-ridges in front of Busaco.</p> - -<p>Ney seeing that Busaco was a crested mountain and could -not hide strong reserves, that it was only half-occupied and -the troops were moving about in the disorder of first taking -up unknown ground, wished to attack at once; but Massena -was ten miles in rear, and an officer sent to ask his assent -was kept two hours without an audience and then sent back -with an order to await the prince’s arrival.<a id="FNanchor_12" href="#Footnote_12" class="fnanchor">12</a> A great opportunity -was thus lost, for Spencer had not then come in, Leith -was only passing the Mondego, Hill was on the Murcella, -scarcely twenty-five thousand men were in line, and there -was unavoidable confusion and great intervals between the -divisions.</p> - -<p>Ney and Reynier wrote in the night to Massena, advising -an attack at daybreak, yet he did not come up until midday -with Junot’s corps and the cavalry, and then proceeded leisurely -to examine the position. It was now completely -manned. Hill had the extreme right, Leith was next in line, -Picton next to Leith. Spencer’s division and a regiment of -dragoons were on the highest crest in reserve, having on -their left the convent of Busaco. In front of Spencer a Portuguese<span class="pagenum" id="Page_54">54</span> -division was posted half-way down the mountain, -and on his left, in front of the convent, was the light division, -supported by a German brigade and the 19th Portuguese Regiment. -Cole’s division closed the extreme left, on a line -with the light division and covered, flank and front, by impassable -ravines. There were long intervals in the line, but -the spaces between were unassailable, artillery was disposed -on all the salient points, skirmishers covered all the accessible -ground, and so formidable did the position appear that Ney -now strongly objected to an attack. Reynier however, a presumptuous -man, advised one, and Massena made dispositions -for the next morning.</p> - -<p>His ground did not permit any broad front of attack, and -two points were chosen. Reynier was to fall on Picton; -Ney was to assail the light division. These attacks, governed -by the roads, were about three miles asunder, and as -Junot’s corps and Montbrun’s cavalry were held in reserve, -only forty thousand men were employed to storm a mountain -on which sixty thousand enemies were posted; yet the -latter, from the extent of their ground and the impossibility -of making any counter attack, were the weakest at the decisive -points.</p> - -<p>The light division was on a spur, or rather brow of -ground, overhanging a ravine so deep that the eye could -scarcely discern troops at the bottom, yet so narrow that -the French twelve-pounders ranged across. Into the lowest -parts of this ravine their light troops towards dusk dropped -by twos and threes, and endeavoured to steal up the wooded -dells and hollows, close to the picquets of the division; they -were vigorously checked, yet similar attempts at different -points kept the troops watchful, and indeed none but veterans -tired of war could have slept beneath that serene sky, -glittering with stars above, while the dark mountains were -crowned with innumerable fires, around which more than a -hundred thousand brave men were gathered.</p> - -<p>Before daybreak on the 27th, five columns of attack were -in motion, and Reynier’s troops, having comparatively easier -ground, were in the midst of the picquets and skirmishers of -Picton’s division almost as soon as they could be perceived; -the resistance was vigorous and six guns played along the -ascent with grape, yet in half an hour the French were close<span class="pagenum" id="Page_55">55</span> -to the summit of the mountain, with such astonishing power -and resolution did they overthrow everything that opposed -their progress! The right of the third division was forced back, -the 8th Portuguese Regiment broken, the highest part of the -crest was gained between Picton and Leith, and the leading -battalions established themselves amongst some crowning -rocks, while a following mass wheeled to the right, designing -to sweep the summit of the sierra. Lord Wellington -immediately opened two guns loaded with grape upon their -flank, a heavy musketry was poured into their front, and -the 88th Regiment, joined by a wing of the 45th, charged -furiously; fresh men could not have withstood that terrible -shock; the French, exhausted by their efforts, opposed only -a straggling fire, and both parties went mingling together -down the mountain side with a mighty clamour and confusion, -their track strewed with the dead and dying even to -the bottom of the valley.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the battalions which had first gained the crest -formed to their left, resting their right on a precipice overhanging -the reverse side of the sierra: the position was thus -won if any reserve had been at hand; for the greatest part -of Picton’s troops were engaged elsewhere, and some of the -French skirmishers actually descended the back of the ridge. -A misty cloud capped the summit, and this hostile mass, -ensconced amongst the rocks, could not be seen except by -Leith; but that officer had put a brigade in motion when he -first perceived the vigorous impression made on Picton, and -though two miles of rugged ground were to be passed on a -narrow front before it could mingle in the fight, it was -coming on rapidly; the Royals were in reserve, the 38th -were seeking to turn the enemy’s right, and the 9th, under -Colonel Cameron, menaced his front: the precipice stopped -the 38th, but Cameron, hearing from a staff-officer how -critical was the affair, formed line under a violent fire, and -without returning a shot run in upon the French grenadiers -and drove them from the rocks with irresistible bravery; -then he plied them with a destructive musketry as long as -they could be reached, yet with excellent discipline refrained -from pursuit lest the crest of the position should be again -lost; for the mountain was rugged, and to judge the general -state of the action difficult. Hill however now edged in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_56">56</span> -towards the scene of action, Leith’s second brigade joined -the first, and a great mass of fresh troops was thus concentrated, -while Reynier had neither reserves nor guns to -restore the fight.</p> - -<p>Ney’s attack had as little success. From the mountain-spur -where the light division stood the bottom of the valley -could be discerned, the ascent was much steeper than where -Reynier had attacked, and Craufurd in a happy mood of -command made masterly dispositions. The platform which -he held was scooped so as to conceal the 43rd and 52nd -Regiments, though in line, and hence the German infantry -who were behind them, being on higher ground, appeared -the only solid force for resistance. Some rocks overhanging -the descent furnished natural embrasures, in which the divisional -guns were placed, and the riflemen and Portuguese -caçadores, planted as skirmishers, covered the slope of the -mountain.</p> - -<p>While it was still dark a straggling musketry was heard -in the deep ravine, and when light broke, three heavy -masses, entering the woods below, threw forward a swarm -of light troops. One column, under General Marchand, on -emerging from the dark chasm, turned to its left, and seemed -intent to turn the right of the division; a second under -Loison made straight up the face of the mountain by a road -leading to the convent; the third remained in reserve. -General Simon’s brigade was at the head of Loison’s attack, -and it ascended with a wonderful alacrity; for though the -skirmishers plied it unceasingly with musketry, and the -artillery bullets swept through it from front to rear, its order -was not disturbed, nor its speed abated. The English guns -were worked with great rapidity, yet their range was contracted -every round, the enemy’s musket-balls came singing -up in a sharper key, and soon the British skirmishers, -breathless and begrimed with powder, rushed over the edge -of the ascent—the artillery then drew back, and the victorious -cries of the French were heard within a few yards -of the summit.</p> - -<p>Craufurd, standing alone on one of the rocks, had silently -watched the attack, but now, with a quick shrill cry, called -on the two regiments to charge! Then a horrid shout -startled the French column, and eighteen hundred British<span class="pagenum" id="Page_57">57</span> -bayonets went sparkling over the brow of the hill: yet so -sternly resolute, so hardy was the enemy, that each man of -the first section raised his musket, and two officers with ten -soldiers of the 52nd fell before them—not a Frenchman had -missed his mark! They could do no more: the head of -their column was violently thrown back upon the rear, both -flanks were overlapped, three terrible discharges at five -yards’ distance shattered the wavering mass, and a long -trail of broken arms and bleeding carcasses marked the line -of flight. The main body of the British stood fast, but some -companies followed down the mountain, whereupon Ney -threw forward his reserved division, and opening his guns -from the opposite heights, killed some of the pursuers: thus -warned, they recovered their own ground, and the Germans -were brought forward to skirmish: meanwhile a small -flanking detachment had passed round the right, and rising -near the convent, was defeated by the 19th Portuguese Regiment -under Colonel M‘Bean.</p> - -<p>Loison did not renew the fight, but Marchand, having -gained a pine-wood half-way up the mountain, on the right -of the light division, sent a cloud of skirmishers up from -thence about the time General Simon was beaten: the ascent -was however so steep that Pack’s Portuguese sufficed to hold -them in check, and higher up Spencer showed his line of -foot-guards in support; Craufurd’s artillery also smote Marchand’s -people in the pine-wood; and Ney, who was there -in person, after sustaining this murderous cannonade for an -hour relinquished that attack. The desultory fighting of -light troops then ceased, and before two o’clock parties from -both armies were, under a momentary truce, amicably mixed -searching for wounded men.</p> - -<p>Towards evening a French company with signal audacity -seized a village half musket-shot from the light division, and -refused to retire; whereupon Craufurd, turning twelve guns -on the houses, overwhelmed them with bullets; but after -paying the French captain this distinguished honour, recovering -his temper, he sent a company of the 43rd down, -which cleared the village in a few minutes. Meanwhile an -affecting incident, contrasting strongly with the savage -character of the preceding events, added to the interest of -the day. A poor orphan Portuguese girl, seventeen years of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_58">58</span> -age and very handsome, was seen coming down the mountain, -driving an ass loaded with all her property through the -midst of the French army. She had abandoned her dwelling -in obedience to the proclamation, and now passed over the -field of battle with a childish simplicity, totally unconscious -of her perilous situation, and scarcely understanding which -were the hostile and which the friendly troops, for no man -on either side was so brutal as to molest her.</p> - -<p>This battle was fought unnecessarily by Massena, and by -Wellington reluctantly, being forced thereto from the misconduct -of the Portuguese government. It was however entirely -to the disadvantage of the French, who had a general and -eight hundred men killed, two generals wounded, and one, -Simon, made prisoner. Their whole loss may be estimated -at four thousand five hundred men, while that of the allies -did not exceed thirteen hundred.</p> - -<p>Massena now judged Busaco impregnable, and as it could -not be turned by the Mondego, because the allies might pass -that river on a shorter line, it was proposed in council to -return to Spain; but at that moment a peasant told him of a -road leading over the Caramula and he resolved to turn the -allies’ left. To mask this movement the skirmishing was -renewed on the 28th so warmly that a general battle was -expected; yet an ostentatious display of men, the disappearance -of baggage, and the casting up of earth indicated some -other design. In the evening, the French infantry were -sensibly diminished, the cavalry was descried winding over -the distant mountains towards the allies’ left, and the project -was then apparent. Wellington arrived from the right, and -observed the distant columns for some time with great -earnestness; he seemed uneasy, his countenance bore a -fierce and angry expression, and suddenly mounting his -horse he rode off without speaking—one hour later and the -army was in movement to abandon Busaco, for Massena had -threaded the defiles of the Caramula and was marching upon -Coimbra.</p> - -<p>Wellington’s plan was to lay the country waste before -the enemy, but only the richest inhabitants had quitted -Coimbra; that city was still populous when the enemy’s -approach left no choice but to fly or risk the punishment of -death and infamy announced for remaining: then a scene of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_59">59</span> -distress ensued that the most hardened could not behold -without emotion. Mothers with children of all ages, the -sick, the old, the bedridden, and even lunatics, went or -were carried forth, the most part with little hope and less -help, to journey for days in company with contending armies. -Fortunately for this unhappy multitude the weather was -fine and the roads firm, or the greatest number must have -perished in the most deplorable manner: but all this misery -was of no avail, for though the people fled, the provisions -were left and the mills were but partially and imperfectly -ruined.</p> - -<p>On the 1st of October, the allied outposts were driven -from a hill north of Coimbra, and the French horsemen -entered a plain, where they suffered some loss from a cannonade. -The British cavalry were there drawn up on open -ground in opposition, and as the disparity of numbers was -not very great, the opportunity seemed fair for a good -stroke; yet they withdrew across the Mondego, and so -unskilfully that some of the hindmost were cut down in the -middle of the river, and the French were only prevented -from forcing the passage of the ford by a strong skirmish in -which fifty or sixty men fell.</p> - -<p>This untoward fight compelled the light division to march -hastily through the city to gain the defile of Condeixa, -which commenced at the end of the bridge; all the inhabitants -who had not before quitted the place then rushed -out with what could be caught up in hand, driving animals -loaded with sick people and children on to the bridge, -where the press became so great the troops halted. This -stoppage was close to the prison, from whence the jailer had -fled with the keys, and the prisoners, crowding to the -windows, strived to tear the bars off with their hands, and -even with their teeth, bellowing in the most frantic manner. -Then the bitter lamentations of the multitude increased, and -the pistol-shots of the cavalry engaged at the ford below -were distinctly heard; it was a shocking scene; but William -Campbell, a staff officer of heroic strength and temper, -broke the prison doors and freed the wretched inmates. -The troops now forced a way over the bridge, yet at the -other end, the defile was cut through high rocks, and so -crowded that no passage could be made, and a troop of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_60">60</span> -French dragoons, having passed an unwatched ford, hovered -close to the flank: one regiment of infantry could have -destroyed the whole division, wedged as it was in a hollow -way, unable to retreat, advance, or break out on either -side.</p> - -<p>Three days Massena halted at Coimbra, the fourth he advanced, -leaving behind his sick and wounded with a garrison, -in all five thousand men, who were suddenly captured four -days later by a small militia force under Colonel Trant! -This “<em>heavy blow and great discouragement</em>”<a id="FNanchor_13" href="#Footnote_13" class="fnanchor">13</a> did not stop the -French prince, and during his pursuit thirty-six French -squadrons fell on ten British squadrons, but in a severe -fight did not gain five miles in as many hours; yet a few -days after his cavalry had the advantage in a greater action, -and finally the allies entered the lines of Torres Vedras, the -existence of which was first made known to Massena by the -bar they offered! Several skirmishes, in which the English -general Harvey was wounded and the French general -St. Croix killed, were necessary to convince him they -could not be stormed; but though he was without magazines, -he continued to hold his menacing position until the -country behind him was a desert: then falling back two -marches, he took a defensive position at Santarem, and was -in turn blockaded by Lord Wellington.</p> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_61">61</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="BOOK_IV">BOOK IV.</h2> -</div> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>Matagorda—Battle of Barosa—Massena’s Retreat—Combat of Redinha—Cazal -Nova—Foz d’Aronce—Sabugal—Fuentes Onoro—Battle -of Fuentes Onoro—Evacuation of Almeida.</p></div> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Matagorda.</span> (March, 1811.)</h3> - -<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">Before</span> Massena invaded Portugal king Joseph had subdued -Andalusia, except the Isla de Leon where Cadiz stands. He -left Soult in that province with a large army, of which a -part under Sebastiani held Granada, while another part -under Victor blockaded the Isla with immense works; the -remainder, under Soult in person, formed a field-force to -war against insurrections and the numerous Spanish troops, -which in separate bodies acted against him. The Spaniards, -after long demurring, admitted an auxiliary British and -Portuguese force into Cadiz, under General Graham,<a id="FNanchor_14" href="#Footnote_14" class="fnanchor">14</a> whose -arrival was signalized by the cannonade of Matagorda. This -small fort, without ditch or bomb-proof, was held for -fifty-four days by a garrison of seamen and soldiers, under -Captain M‘Lean,<a id="FNanchor_15" href="#Footnote_15" class="fnanchor">15</a> close to the French lines at the Trocadero. -A Spanish seventy-four, and a flotilla, had co-operated in the -resistance until daybreak on the 21st of March, but then a -hissing shower of heated shot made them cut their cables -and run under the works of Cadiz, while the fire of forty-eight -guns and mortars of the largest size, was turned upon -the fort, whose feeble parapet vanished before that crashing -flight of metal, leaving only the naked rampart and undaunted -hearts of the garrison for defence. The men fell -fast, and the enemy shot so quick and close, that a staff -bearing the Spanish flag was broken six times in an hour; -the colours were then fastened to the angle of the work itself, -but unwillingly by the men, especially the sailors, all calling -out to hoist the British ensign, and attributing the slaughter -to their fighting under a foreign flag!</p> - -<p>Thirty hours this tempest lasted, and sixty-four men out -of one hundred and forty had fallen, when Graham, finding<span class="pagenum" id="Page_62">62</span> -a diversion he had projected impracticable, sent boats to -carry off the survivors. With these boats went Major -Lefebre, an engineer of great promise, but to fall there, the -last man whose blood wetted the ruins thus abandoned: and -here be recorded an action of which it is difficult to say -whether it were most feminine or heroic. A sergeant’s wife, -named Retson, was in a casemate with wounded men, when -a young drummer was ordered to fetch water from the well -of the fort; seeing the child hesitate, she snatched the vessel -from him, braved the terrible cannonade, and when a shot -cut the bucket-cord from her hand, recovered it and fulfilled -her mission.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Battle of Barosa.</span> (March, 1811.)</h3> - -<p>After Matagorda was abandoned, the Spaniards in Cadiz -became so apathetic that General Graham bitterly said of -them “<em>They wished the English would drive away the French, that -they might eat strawberries at Chiclana</em>.” However, in December, -Soult was ordered to co-operate with Massena, and when his -departure was known in January, 1811, Victor’s force being -then weak, Graham undertook, in concert with La Peña, -captain-general at the Isla, to raise the blockade by a maritime -expedition. Contrary winds baffled this project, and -in February Victor was reinforced; nevertheless ten thousand -infantry and six hundred cavalry were again embarked, -being to land at Tarifa, march upon Chiclana, and take the -French lines in reverse. Meanwhile General Zayas, who -remained with the Spanish forces left in the Isla, was to cast -a bridge near the sea-mouth of the Santi Petri, a ship-canal -joining the harbour to the sea and cutting off the Isla from -the continent; Ballesteros was to menace Seville; the Partidas -were to keep Sebastiani in check, and insurrections -were expected in all quarters.</p> - -<p>The British troops, passing their port in a gale the 22nd, -landed at Algesiras and marched to Tarifa, being there joined -by the garrison. Somewhat more than four thousand men, -including two companies of the 20th Portuguese, and one -hundred and eighty German hussars, were thus assembled -under Graham, good and hardy troops, and himself a daring -old man of a ready temper for battle. La Peña arrived the -27th with the Spanish contingent, and Graham, to preserve<span class="pagenum" id="Page_63">63</span> -unanimity, ceded the command, although contrary to his instructions. -Next day the whole moved forward twelve -miles, passing some ridges, which, descending from the -Ronda to the sea, separate the plains of San Roque from -those of Medina and Chiclana. The troops were then reorganized. -General Lardizabal had the vanguard, the Prince -of Anglona the centre; the reserve, of two Spanish regiments -and the British troops, was confided to Graham, and the -cavalry of both nations was given to Colonel Whittingham, -an English officer in the Spanish service.</p> - -<p>At this time a French covering division, under General -Cassagne, was at Medina, with outposts at Vejer de la -Frontera and Casa Vieja. La Peña stormed the last the -2nd of March, and then General Beguines, coming from San -Roque, augmented his force to twelve thousand infantry, -eight hundred horsemen, and twenty-four guns. The 3rd, -hearing Medina was intrenched, he turned towards the coast -and drove the French from Vejer de la Frontera. In the -night of the 4th he continued his movement, and on the morning -of the 5th, after a skirmish, in which his advanced guard -of cavalry was routed by a French squadron, he reached the -Cerro de Puerco, called by the English the heights of Barosa, -four miles from the sea-mouth of the Santi Petri.</p> - -<p>This Barosa ridge, creeping in from the coast for a mile -and a half, overlooked a broken plain, which was bounded -on the left by the coast cliffs, on the right by the forest of -Chiclana, in front by a pine-wood, beyond which rose a long -narrow height called the Bermeja, to be reached by moving -through the pine-wood, or by the beach under the cliffs. -Graham, foreseeing Victor would come out of his lines to -fight, had previously obtained La Peña’s promise to make -short marches, and not approach the enemy except in a mass. -In violation of this promise the march from Casa Vieja had -been one of fifteen hours on bad roads, and the night march -to Barosa was still more fatiguing. The troops therefore -straggled, and before all had arrived, La Peña, as if in contempt -of his colleague, neither disclosing his own plans nor -communicating by signal or otherwise with Zayas, sent Lardizabal -straight to the mouth of the Santi Petri. Zayas had -there cast his bridge on the 2nd, but he was surprised in the -night and driven into the Isla; Lardizabal had therefore<span class="pagenum" id="Page_64">64</span> -to win his way with a sharp fight, in which three hundred -Spaniards fell, yet he forced the French posts and effected a -junction.</p> - -<p>La Peña directed Graham to follow the vanguard, but the -latter desired to hold Barosa, arguing justly that Victor could -not attack Lardizabal and Zayas, as no general would lend -his flank to an enemy by assailing the Bermeja while Barosa -was occupied: Lascy, chief of the Spanish staff, controverted -this, and La Peña peremptorily commanded Graham to march. -With great temper he obeyed this discourteous order, leaving -only the flank companies of the 9th and 82nd regiments -under Major Brown to guard his baggage. He moved however -in the persuasion that La Peña would remain at Barosa -with Anglona’s division and the cavalry, because a Spanish -column was still behind near Medina: yet scarcely had he -entered the pine-wood when La Peña carried off the corps of -battle and the cavalry by the sea-road to Santi Petri, leaving -Barosa crowded with baggage and protected only by a rear-guard -of four guns and five battalions.</p> - -<p>During these events Victor kept close in the forest of -Chiclana, the patrols could find no enemy, and Graham’s -march of only two miles seemed safe—but the French marshal -was keenly watching the movement. He had recalled -Cassagne from Medina when La Peña first reached Barosa -and hourly expected his arrival; yet he felt so sure of success, -as to direct most of his cavalry, then at Medina and Arcos, -upon Vejer and other points to cut off the fugitives after the -battle. He had in hand fourteen pieces of artillery and nine -thousand excellent soldiers, commanded by Laval, Ruffin, -and Villatte. From this force he drafted three grenadier -battalions as reserves, two of which and three squadrons of -cavalry he attached to Ruffin, the other to Laval. Villatte -with two thousand five hundred men, originally on the Bermeja, -now covered the works of the camp against Zayas and -Lardizabal; but Cassagne was still distant when Victor, -seeing Graham in the pine-wood, Zayas and Lardizabal on the -Bermeja, a third body and the baggage on the Barosa height, -a fourth in movement by the coast, a fifth still on the march -from Vejer, poured at once into the plain and began the -battle. Laval confronted the British force, while Victor, -leading Ruffin’s men in person, ascended the rear of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_65">65</span> -Barosa height, and having thus intercepted the Spanish column -on the Medina road, drove the rear-guard off the hill towards -the sea, dispersed the baggage and followers, and took three -Spanish guns.</p> - -<p>Major Brown, who had kept his troops in good order, being -unable to stem the torrent, slowly retired into the plain -and sent for orders to Graham, who was then near Bermeja. -Fight! was the laconic answer, and facing about himself -he regained the open plain, expecting to find La Peña and -the cavalry on the Barosa hill. But when the view opened, -he beheld Ruffin’s brigade, flanked by the two grenadier -battalions, near the summit on the one side, the Spanish -rear-guard and the baggage flying towards the sea on the -other, the French cavalry following the fugitives in good -order, Laval close upon his own left flank, and La Peña -nowhere!</p> - -<p>In this desperate situation, feeling that a retreat upon -Bermeja would bring the enemy pell-mell with the allies on -to that narrow ridge and be disastrous, he resolved to make -a counter-attack, although the key of the battle-field was -already in the enemy’s possession. Ten guns under Major -Duncan instantly opened a terrific fire against Laval’s column, -and Colonel Andrew Barnard<a id="FNanchor_16" href="#Footnote_16" class="fnanchor">16</a> running vehemently out with -his riflemen and some Portuguese companies, commenced the -fight; the rest of the troops, without attention to regiments -or brigades, so sudden was the affair, formed two masses, with -one of which General Dilkes marched against Ruffin while -Colonel Wheatley led the other against Laval. Duncan’s -guns ravaged the French ranks, Laval’s artillery replied -vigorously, Ruffin’s batteries took Wheatley’s column in flank, -and the infantry on both sides closed eagerly and with a -pealing musketry; but soon a fierce, rapid and prolonged -charge of the 87th Regiment overthrew the first line of the -French, and though the latter fought roughly, they were -dashed so violently upon the second line that both were -broken by the shock and went off, their retreat being covered -by the reserve battalion of grenadiers.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile Graham’s Spartan order had sent Brown headlong -upon Ruffin, and though nearly half his detachment -went down under the first fire, he maintained the fight until<span class="pagenum" id="Page_66">66</span> -Dilkes’ column, having crossed a deep hollow, came up, with -little order indeed but in a fighting mood. Then the whole -ran up towards the summit, and there was no slackness, for -at the very edge of the ascent their gallant opponents met -them and a dreadful and for some time a doubtful combat -raged; but soon Ruffin, and Chaudron Rousseau who commanded -the chosen grenadiers fell, both mortally wounded, -the English bore strongly onward, and their incessant -slaughtering fire forced the French from the hill with the -loss of three guns and many brave soldiers. All the discomfited -divisions then retired concentrically from their -different points, and thus meeting, with infinite spirit endeavoured -to renew the action, but the play of Duncan’s -guns, close, rapid and murderous, rendered the attempt vain: -Victor quitted the field, and the British, who had been -twenty-four hours under arms without food, were too exhausted -to pursue.</p> - -<p>While these terrible combats of infantry were being -fought, La Peña looked idly on, giving no aid, not even -menacing Villatte who was close to him and comparatively -weak. The Spanish Walloon guards, the regiment of Ciudad -Real, and some Guerilla cavalry, turning without orders, -came up indeed just as the action ceased, and it was expected -that Colonel Whittingham, an Englishman commanding a -strong body of Spanish horse, would have done as much; -yet no stroke of a Spanish sabre was that day given, though -the French cavalry did not exceed two hundred and fifty -men, and the eight hundred under Whittingham would have -rendered the defeat ruinous. So certain was this, that -Frederick Ponsonby, drawing off his hundred and eighty -German hussars, reached the field of battle, charged the -French squadrons in their retreat, overthrew them, took two -guns, and even attempted though vainly to sabre Rousseau’s -chosen grenadiers. Such was the fight of Barosa. Short, -for it lasted only one hour and a half; violent and bloody, for -fifty officers, sixty sergeants, eleven hundred British soldiers, -and more than two thousand French were killed and wounded; -and six guns, an eagle, two generals, both mortally wounded, -with four hundred other prisoners fell into the hands of the -victors.</p> - -<p>Graham remained several hours on the height, still hoping<span class="pagenum" id="Page_67">67</span> -La Peña would awake to the prospect of success and glory -which the extreme valour of the British had opened. Four -thousand fresh men and a powerful artillery had come over -the Santi Petri; he had therefore twelve thousand infantry -and eight hundred cavalry, while before him were only the -remains of the French line of battle, retreating in the greatest -disorder upon Chiclana; but military spirit was extinct with -the Spaniard, Graham could no longer endure his command -and leaving the dastard on the Bermeja filed the British -troops into the Isla.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Massena’s Retreat.</span> (March, 1811.)</h3> - -<p>Soon after the Barosa fight, Wellington and Massena were -again pitted in attack and defence. Massena had kept -Santarem until the 6th of March expecting Soult’s co-operation, -yet retreated when that marshal after defeating twenty -thousand Spaniards on the Gebora, and taking Olivenza, -Badajos, Albuquerque and Campo Mayor, was coming to his -aid; of this however he was ignorant, because Wellington’s -forces on the south bank of the Tagus had intercepted all -communication. Hence when Soult was invading Portugal -on one side of that river, Massena abandoned the other side -and was pursued by the allied army. He left however a -desert behind him, and soon a horrible spectacle disclosed all -the previous misery of the inhabitants. In the hills was -found a house where thirty women and children were lying -dead from hunger, and sitting by the bodies fifteen or sixteen -living beings—only one a man—so enfeebled by want they -could not devour the food offered to them. All the children -were dead; none were emaciated, but the muscles of their -faces were invariably dragged transversely, as if laughing, -and unimaginably ghastly. The man was most eager for -life, the women patient and resigned, and they had carefully -covered and laid out the dead! A field of battle strewed -with bloody carcasses would have been a solacing sight by -comparison!</p> - -<p>Strong positions crossed Massena’s line of retreat, which -was confined by mountains, every village being a defile; -and Ney, governing the rear-guard, lost no advantage. He -was driven by the light division with a sharp skirmish from<span class="pagenum" id="Page_68">68</span> -Pombal the 10th, but on the 11th he offered battle at -Redinha with five thousand infantry, some cavalry and guns; -his wings were covered by pine-woods which, hanging on -the brow of the table-land he occupied, were filled with -light troops; the deep bed of the Soure protected his right, -his left rested on the Redinha, which flowed also round his -rear; behind his centre the village of Redinha, lying in a -hollow, masked a narrow bridge, and on a rugged height -beyond a reserve was so posted as to seem a great force.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Combat of Redinha.</span> (March, 1811.)</h3> - -<p>The light division under Sir William Erskine soon won -the wooded slopes covering Ney’s right, and the skirmishers -pushed into the open plain, but were there checked by a -heavy rolling fire, and a squadron of hussars, charging, took -fourteen prisoners. Erskine then formed his line, which, -outflanking the French right, was reinforced with two regiments -of dragoons. Picton had also seized the wood covering -the French left, and Ney’s position was laid bare; but he, -observing that Wellington, deceived by the reserve beyond -the bridge, was bringing all the allied troops into line, -would not retire; he even charged Picton’s skirmishers and -held his ground, though the third division was nearer to -the bridge than his right, and there were troops and guns -enough on the plain to overwhelm him. In this posture -both sides remained an hour, but then three cannon-shots -fired from the British centre, gave the signal for a splendid -spectacle of war. The woods seemed alive with troops, and -suddenly thirty thousand men, presenting three gorgeous -lines of battle, were stretched across the plain, bending on -a gentle curve and moving majestically onwards, while -horsemen and guns, springing simultaneously from the -centre and left, charged under a general volley from the -French battalions, who were thus covered with smoke, and -when that cleared away none were to be seen! Ney, keenly -watching the progress of this grand formation, had opposed -Picton’s skirmishers with his left, while he withdrew the -rest of his people so rapidly as to gain the village before -even the cavalry could touch him, the utmost efforts of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_69">69</span> -light troops and horse-artillery only enabling them to gall -the hindmost with fire.</p> - -<p>One howitzer was dismounted, but the village of Redinha -was in flames between it and the pursuers, and Ney in person -carried off the injured piece; yet with a loss of fifteen or -twenty men and great danger to himself; for the British -guns were thundering on his rear, and the light troops, -chasing like heated bloodhounds, almost passed the river -with his men; his reserve beyond the bridge then opened a -cannonade, but fresh dispositions soon made it fall back ten -miles. Twelve officers and two hundred men were killed -and wounded in this combat. Ney lost as many, but he -might have been destroyed, Wellington paid him too much -respect.</p> - -<p>Condeixa, where the French now took position, commanded -two roads, one behind their right leading to Coimbra; the -other on their left, leading to the Sierra de Murcella. The -first offered the Mondego as a permanent line of defence, -with the power of seizing Oporto by a detachment. The -second presented only a rugged narrow line of retreat up -the left bank of the Mondego, and involved the evacuation of -Portugal; for that river was not fordable at the season and the -Portuguese militia were in force on the other side. Massena -first detached Montbrun to ascertain the state of Coimbra, -which was really defenceless, yet Trant with a few militia-men -made such show of resistance that it was reported inattackable; -whereupon the French prince set fire to Condeixa and -adopted the position of Cazal Nova on the Murcella road: -not however without a skirmish in which he narrowly -escaped capture.</p> - -<p>No orders were given in the night to attack, nevertheless, -next morning, although an impenetrable mist covered the -French position and the dull sound of a stirring multitude -came from its depths, Sir W. Erskine, with astounding indifference, -and against the opinion of all the officers about him, -ordered the 52nd Regiment to plunge in column of sections, -without even an advanced guard, into the sea of fog below -him. The road dipped suddenly and the regiment was -instantly lost in the mist, which was so thick that, the -troops, unconsciously passing the enemy’s out-posts, nearly -captured Ney, who slept with his pickets. The rest of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_70">70</span> -division was about to descend into the same gulf, when the -rattling of musketry and the booming of round shot were -heard, the vapour rose slowly, and the 52nd was seen on the -slopes of the opposite mountain, closely engaged in the -midst of an army!</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Combat of Cazal Nova.</span> (March, 1811.)</h3> - -<p>Wellington arrived. His design was to turn the French -left, for their front was strong, and they held mountain-ridges -in succession to the Deuca river and the defiles of -Miranda de Corvo. He had sent Cole by a circuit towards -the sources of the Deuca and Ceira, Picton more directly to -menace the French flank, and the main body was coming -up, when Erskine forced the light division prematurely into -action. Ney’s ground was extensive, his skirmishers so -thick and well supported, that the light division offered -only a thread of battle, closely engaged in every part, -without any reserve; nor could it then present an equal -front, until Picton sent some riflemen to prolong the line. -Some advantages were indeed gained, but the main position -was not shaken, until Picton near and Cole further off, had -turned the left, and three divisions, with the heavy cavalry -and artillery, came up in the centre. Then Ney, covering -his rear with guns and light troops, retired from ridge to -ridge without confusion until midday, when the guns got -within range of his masses and his retreat became more -rapid and less orderly, yet he reached the strong pass of -Miranda de Corvo, where Massena was in position. The -light division lost eleven officers and a hundred and fifty -men; the French loss was greater, and a hundred prisoners -were taken.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Combat of Foz d’Aronce.</span> (March, 1811.)</h3> - -<p>Massena, fearing Cole would get in his rear, set fire to the -town of Miranda, crossed the Ceira in the night, and being -then crowded in a narrow way between the sierras and the -Mondego, destroyed ammunition and baggage, and directed -Ney to cover the movement with a few battalions, but -charged him not to risk an action: Ney, however, little -regarding his orders, kept the left bank with ten or twelve<span class="pagenum" id="Page_71">71</span> -battalions, a brigade of cavalry and some guns, and thus -provoked a combat. His right was on rugged ground, his -left at the village of Foz d’Aronce; the weather was obscure -and rainy, the allies did not come up until evening, and -little expecting an action kindled their fires; but Wellington, -suddenly directing the light division and Pack’s brigade to -hold the French right in check, sent the third division -against their left, and the horse-artillery on the gallop to -rising ground, whence it opened with a surprising effect.</p> - -<p>Ney’s left wing was soon overthrown by the third division, -and fled in such confusion towards the river that many men -rushed into the deeps and were drowned, while others madly -crowding the bridge were crushed to death. On the other -flank the ground was so rough the action resolved itself into -a skirmish, and Ney sent some battalions to stop the pursuit -of his left; but then darkness fell and the French troops in -their disorder fired on each other. Four officers and sixty -men fell on the side of the British; the enemy lost above -five hundred, one half drowned, and an eagle was afterwards -found in the bed of the river. Massena retired in the night -behind the Alva. Ney kept his post on the Ceira until every -encumbrance had passed, and then blowing up seventy feet -of the bridge, remained with a weak rear-guard. Wellington -halted.</p> - -<p>Up to this point of the retreat the French prince had displayed -infinite ability, with a ruthless spirit. The burning -of some towns and villages protected his rear, but Leiria -and the convent of Alcobaça were off the line yet given to -the flames by express orders and in a spirit of vengeance. -But every horror that could make war hideous attended this -retreat. Distress, conflagrations, death, in all modes from -wounds, from fatigue, from water, from the flames, from -starvation! On all sides unlimited violence, unlimited -vengeance. I myself saw a peasant hounding on his dog -to devour the dead and dying, and the spirit of cruelty -smote even the brute creation; for the French general, to -lessen encumbrances, ordered beasts of burden to be destroyed, -and the inhuman fellow charged with the execution -hamstringed five hundred asses and left them to starve; -they were so found by the British, and the mute, sad, deep -expression of pain and grief visible in the poor creatures’<span class="pagenum" id="Page_72">72</span> -looks, excited a strange fury in the soldiers: no quarter -would have been given at that time: humane feelings would -have thus led direct to cruelty. But all passions are akin to -madness.</p> - -<p>From this quarter, Lord Wellington, who had before detached -troops with the same view, now sent Cole’s division -to join Beresford in the Alemtejo, where the latter had been -left to oppose Soult’s progress.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Combat of Sabugal.</span> (April, 1811.)</h3> - -<p>The pursuit of Massena was soon resumed. He attempted -to hold the Guarda mountain on the flank of the Estrella, -and being driven from thence with the loss of three hundred -prisoners descended the eastern slopes to take a position -behind the Coa. There being reinforced, he disposed his -troops on two sides of a triangle, the apex at Sabugal, where -Reynier commanded. Both wings were covered by the -river, which had a sharp bend at Sabugal, and the right had -free communication with Almeida, on which side the craggy -ravine of the Coa forbade an attack. Above Sabugal it was -easier, and Wellington, after menacing the right for two -days, suddenly, at daybreak on the 3rd of April, sent Slade’s -cavalry and the light division to pass the upper stream by a -wide movement and penetrate between the left wing and -centre of the French. The third division moved at the same -time to cross the river by a closer movement, yet still above -the bridge of Sabugal, which the fifth division and the artillery -were to force. Two other divisions were in reserve, -and it was hoped Reynier, whose main body was some distance -above bridge, would be thus turned surrounded and -crushed before the wings could succour him: one of those -accidents so frequent in war marred this well-concerted -scheme.</p> - -<p>A thick fog prevented the troops gaining their points of -attack simultaneously, and Erskine took no heed to put the -light division in a right direction; his columns were not -even held together, and he carried off the cavalry without -communicating with Colonel Beckwith, who commanded -his first brigade. That officer thus left without instructions -halted at a ford, until one of the general staff came up and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_73">73</span> -rudely asked why he did not attack; the thing appeared -rash, yet with an enemy in front, Beckwith could only reply -by passing the river, which was deep and rapid. A very -steep wooded hill was on the other side and four companies -of riflemen ascended, followed by the 43rd Regiment, but -the caçadores of the brigade had joined another column -which was passing the river higher up and moving independently -to the right, on the true point of direction. At -this time very heavy rain was falling, all was obscure, and -none of the other divisions had yet reached their respective -posts; Beckwith’s attack was therefore premature, partial, -dangerous, and at the wrong point; for Reynier’s whole -corps was in front, and one bayonet-regiment, with four -companies of riflemen, were assailing more than twelve -thousand infantry supported by cavalry and artillery!</p> - -<p>Scarcely had the riflemen reached the top of the hill when -a strong body of French drove them back upon the 43rd, -the weather cleared at the instant, and Beckwith saw and -felt all the danger, but his heart was too big to quail. With -one fierce charge he beat back the enemy, and he gained, -and kept the summit of the hill, although two French -howitzers poured showers of grape into his ranks, while -a fresh force came against his front, and considerable bodies -advanced on either flank. Fortunately, Reynier, little expecting -to be attacked, had for the convenience of water -placed his main body in low ground behind the height on -which the action commenced; his renewed attack was therefore -up-hill, yet his musketry, heavy from the beginning, -soon increased to a storm, and his men sprung up the acclivity -with such a violence and clamour it was evident that -desperate fighting only could save the British from destruction, -and they fought accordingly.</p> - -<p>Captain Hopkins, commanding a flank company of the -43rd, running out to the right, with admirable presence of -mind seized a small eminence, close to the French guns and -commanding the ascent up which the French troops turning -the right flank were approaching. His first fire threw them -into confusion; they rallied and were again disordered by -his volleys; a third time they made head; but a sudden -charge shook them, and then two battalions of the 52nd -Regiment, attracted by the fire, entered the line. The<span class="pagenum" id="Page_74">74</span> -centre and left of the 43rd were all this time furiously -engaged, and wonderfully excited; for Beckwith, with the -blood streaming from a wound in the head, rode amongst -the skirmishers, praising and exhorting them in a loud -cheerful tone as a man sure to win his battle; and though -the bullets flew thicker and closer, and the fight became -more perilous, the French fell fast and a second charge -again cleared the hill. A howitzer was taken by the 43rd, -and the skirmishers were descending in eager pursuit when -small bodies of cavalry came galloping in from all parts -and compelled them to take refuge with the main body, -which had reformed behind a low stone wall; one French -squadron however, with incredible daring rode close to -this wall, and were in the act of firing over it with pistols -when a rolling volley laid nearly the whole lifeless on the -ground. A very strong column of infantry then rushed up -and endeavoured to retake the howitzer, which was on the -edge of the descent, fifty yards from the wall, but no man -could reach it and live, so deadly was the 43rd’s fire. Two -English guns now came into action, and the 52nd charging -violently upon the flank of the enemy’s infantry again vindicated -the possession of the height; nevertheless fresh -squadrons of cavalry, which had followed the infantry in the -last attack, seeing the 52nd men scattered by this charge, -flew upon them with great briskness and caused some disorder -before they were repulsed.</p> - -<p>Reynier, convinced at last that he should not use his -troops piece-meal, then put all his reserves, six thousand -infantry with artillery and cavalry, in motion, and outflanked -the English left, resolute to storm the contested -height. But at that moment the fifth division passed the -bridge of Sabugal, the British cavalry appeared on the hills -beyond the French left, and, emerging from the woods close -on Reynier’s right, the third division opened a fire which -instantly decided the fate of the day. The French general, -fearing to be surrounded, hastily retreated, and meeting the -right wing of the army, which had also retired, both fell -back, pursued by the English cavalry.</p> - -<p>In this bloody encounter, which did not last quite an hour, -nearly two hundred British were killed and wounded, and -the enemy’s loss was enormous: three hundred dead bodies<span class="pagenum" id="Page_75">75</span> -were heaped together on the hill, the greatest part round -the captured howitzer, and more than twelve hundred were -wounded, so unwisely had Reynier handled his masses, and -so true and constant was the English fire. It was no exaggeration -of Lord Wellington to say, “this was one of the -most glorious actions British troops were ever engaged in.”</p> - -<p>Massena retreated on Ciudad Rodrigo, and the 5th crossed -the frontier of Portugal, when the vigour of French discipline -was surprisingly manifested. Those men who had for months -been living by rapine, whose retreat had been one continued -course of violence and devastation, having passed a conventional -line became the most orderly of soldiers. Not the -slightest rudeness was offered to any Spaniard, and everything -was scrupulously paid for, although bread was sold at -two shillings a pound! Massena himself also, fierce and -terrible as he was in Portugal, always treated the Spaniards -with gentleness and moderation.</p> - -<p>During these events Trant crossed the Lower Coa with -four thousand militia near Almeida, but the river flooded -behind him, the bridges had been broken by Massena, and -there was a French brigade close at hand; hence, constructing -a temporary bridge with great difficulty, he was going to -retire, but there came a letter from Wellington, desiring him -to be vigilant in preventing communication with Almeida, -and fearless, because next morning a British force would -be up to his assistance. Boldly then he interposed between -the fortress and the French brigade, yet the promised -succour did not appear, and the advancing enemy was within -half a mile. His destruction appeared inevitable, when suddenly -two cannon-shots were heard to the southward, the -French hastily formed squares to retire, and six squadrons of -British cavalry with a troop of horse-artillery came up like a -whirlwind in their rear; military order however marked -their perilous retreat, and though the bullets fearfully -ploughed through their masses while the horsemen flanked -their line of march, they got over the Agueda by Barba de -Puerco, with the loss of only three hundred men killed -wounded and prisoners.</p> - -<p>A few days after this, Colonel Waters, the boat-finder at -Oporto, who had been taken prisoner, escaped by an effort of -extraordinary daring. Confident in his own resources he<span class="pagenum" id="Page_76">76</span> -refused parole, but having rashly mentioned his intention of -escaping to the Spaniard in whose house he was lodged at -Ciudad Rodrigo, the man betrayed counsel; his servant, -detesting the treachery, secretly offered his own aid, but -Waters only told him to get the rowels of his spurs sharpened, -no more, for his design was one of open daring. -Guarded by four <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">gens d’armes</i>, he was near Salamanca when -the chief, who rode the only good horse of the party, -alighted, whereupon Waters gave the spur to his own mare, -a celebrated animal, and galloped off. They were on a wide -plain, and for many miles the road was covered with the -French columns, his hat fell off, and thus marked he rode -along the flank of the troops, some encouraging him, others -firing at him, the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">gens d’armes</i> being always, sword in hand, -close at his heels. Suddenly he broke at full speed between -two of the columns, gained a wooded hollow, baffled his -pursuers, and the third day reached head-quarters, where -Lord Wellington had caused his baggage to be brought, -observing that he would not be long absent!</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Fuentes Onoro.</span> (May, 1811.)</h3> - -<p>On the Agueda Massena could not subsist. He retired to -Salamanca, where he was in communication with Marshal -Bessières, who commanded a great force called the Army of -the North. Wellington then invested Almeida, thinking it -was provisioned only for a fortnight, yet it was still resistant -the latter end of April, when the Prince of Essling, having -reorganized his army and obtained cavalry and guns from -Bessières, came down to raise the blockade. The English -general, not expecting this interference, had gone southwards -to superintend the operations of Marshal Beresford, but he -returned rapidly when he heard of the French movement, -and fixed on a field of battle between the Agueda and Coa. -There the ground, though open and fit for cavalry, was traversed -from east to west by three nearly parallel rivers, the -Azava, Duas Casas, and Turones; the first considerable, and -all having, in common with the Agueda and Coa, this peculiarity, -their channels deepen as the water flows: mere -streams with low banks in their upper courses, they soon -become foaming torrents rushing along rocky gulfs.</p> - -<p>Almeida, situated on high table-land between the Turones -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_77">77</span> -and Coa, was closely blockaded, the light division and the -cavalry were on the Azava covering the investment, the rest -of the army was cantoned in the villages behind them. -Swollen and unfordable was the Azava, and two thousand -French attempted to seize the bridge of Marialva on the -24th, but the ground was strong, and they were vigorously -repulsed by Captain Dobbs of the 52nd, though he had but a -single bayonet-company and some riflemen. Next day Massena -reached Ciudad Rodrigo in person, and the 27th he felt -the light division posts from Espeja to Marialva. On the -28th Wellington arrived, and took position behind the Duas -Casas.</p> - -<p>The Azava was still difficult to ford, and Massena continued -to feel the outposts until the 2nd of May, when the -waters subsided and his army came out of Ciudad Rodrigo. -The light division, after a slight skirmish of horse at Gallegos, -retired from that place and Espeja upon the Duas Casas, -a delicate operation, for though the country behind those -villages was a forest, an open plain between the woods offered -the enemy’s powerful cavalry an opportunity of cutting off -the retreat; the French neglected the advantage and the -separated brigades of the division remained in the woods -until the middle of the night, and then safely crossed the -Duas Casas at Fuentes Onoro, a beautiful village which had -been uninjured during the previous warfare although occupied -alternately for above a year by both sides. Every -family was well known to the light division, and it was with -deep regret and indignation they found the preceding troops -had pillaged it, leaving shells of houses where three days -before a friendly population had been living in comfort. -This wanton act was felt indeed so much by the whole army, -that eight thousand dollars were subscribed for the inhabitants, -yet the injury sunk deeper than the atonement.</p> - -<p>Wellington did not wish to risk much for the blockade, -and he knew Massena could bring down superior numbers; -for so culpably negligent was the Portuguese government -that their troops were starving under arms, the infantry -abandoning their colours or dropping from extenuation by -thousands, the cavalry useless: it was even feared that a -general dispersion would take place. Nevertheless, when<span class="pagenum" id="Page_78">78</span> -the trial came, he would not retreat, although his troops, -reduced to thirty-two thousand infantry, twelve hundred -cavalry in bad condition, and forty-two guns, were unable -to oppose the enemy’s numerous horsemen in the plain. -His position was on the table-land between the Turones -and the Duas Casas, his left being at Fort Conception, his -centre opposite the village of Alameda, his right at Fuentes -Onoro. The whole distance was five miles, and the Duas -Casas, here flowing in a deep ravine, protected the front of -the line.</p> - -<p>Massena dared not march by his own right upon Almeida, -lest the allies, crossing the ravine at the villages of Alameda -and Fuentes Onoro, should fall on his flank and drive him -upon the Lower Agueda; hence, to cover the blockade, -maintained by Pack’s brigade and an English regiment, -it was sufficient to leave the fifth division near Fort Conception, -and the sixth division opposite Alameda, while the -first and third concentrated on a gentle rise cannon-shot -distance behind Fuentes Onoro, and where a steppe of land -turned back on the Turones, becoming rocky as it approached -that river.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Combat of Fuentes Onoro.</span> (May, 1811.)</h3> - -<p>On the 3rd of May the French came up in three columns -abreast. The cavalry, the sixth corps, and Drouet’s division, -threatened Fuentes, while the eighth and second corps -moved against Alameda and Fort Conception, menacing the -allies’ left, which caused the light division to reinforce the -sixth. Loison, without orders, now fell upon Fuentes, in -which were five battalions detached from the first and third -divisions. Most of the houses were in the bottom of the -ravine, but an old chapel and some buildings on a craggy -eminence behind offered a prominent point for rallying, and -all the low parts were vigorously defended; yet the attack -was so violent and the cannonade so heavy the British abandoned -the streets, and could scarcely maintain the upper -ground about the chapel; the commanding officer fell badly -wounded, and the fight was being lost, when the 24th, the -71st, and 79th regiments, coming down from the main position, -charged the French and drove them quite over the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_79">79</span> -Duas Casas. During the night the detachments were withdrawn, -the three succouring regiments keeping the village, -where two hundred and sixty British and somewhat more of -the French had fallen.</p> - -<p>On the 4th Massena arrived, accompanied by Bessières, -who brought up twelve hundred cavalry and a battery of the -imperial guard. Designing to fight next morning he resolved -to hold the left of the allies in check with the second corps, -and turn their right with the remainder of the army. Forty -thousand French infantry and five thousand horse, with -thirty pieces of artillery, were under arms, and they had -shown their courage was not abated; it was therefore a very -daring act of the English general to receive battle; for -though his position, as far as Fuentes Onoro, was strong and -covered his communication across the Coa by the bridge of -Castello Bom, the plain was continued on his right to Nava -d’Aver, where a round hill, overlooking all the country, -commanded the roads leading to the bridges of Seceiras and -Sabugal. Massena could therefore have placed his army at -once in battle-array across the right flank and attacked the -army between the Duas Casas, the Turones, the Coa and the -fortress of Almeida: the bridge of Castello Bom alone would -then have been open for retreat. To prevent this, and cover -his communications with Sabugal and Seceiras, Wellington, -yielding to Spencer’s suggestions, stretched his right wing -out to the hill of Nava d’Aver, where he placed Julian Sanchez, -supporting him with the seventh division under General -Houstoun. This line of battle was above seven miles, besides -the circuit of blockade; and above Fuentes Onoro the Duas -Casas ravine became gradually obliterated, resolving itself -into a swampy wood, which extended to Poço Velho, a village -half-way between Fuentes and Nava d’Aver.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Battle of Fuentes Onoro.</span> (May, 1811.)</h3> - -<p>Massena’s intention was to attack at daybreak, but a delay -of two hours occurred and all his movements were plainly -descried. The eighth corps, withdrawn from Alameda and -supported by all the French cavalry, was seen marching to -turn Poço Velho and the swampy wood, both occupied by -Houstoun’s left, his right being thrown back on the plain<span class="pagenum" id="Page_80">80</span> -towards Nava d’Aver. The sixth corps and Dronet’s division -were likewise taking ground to their left, yet keeping a -division to menace Fuentes Onoro. At this sight the light -division and the cavalry hastened to the support of Houstoun, -while the first and third divisions made a movement parallel -to that of the sixth corps; the latter, however, drove the -seventh division from Poço Velho, and was gaining ground -in the wood also, when the riflemen of the light division -arrived there and restored the fight.</p> - -<p>The French cavalry, after passing Poço Velho, formed an -order of battle on the plain between the wood and the hill of -Nava d’Aver, whereupon Sanchez retired across the Turones, -partly in fear, more in anger, because his lieutenant, having -foolishly ridden close up to the enemy, making violent -gestures, was mistaken for a French officer and shot by a -soldier of the Guards before the action commenced. Montbrun -lost an hour observing this <i xml:lang="pt" lang="pt">partida</i>, but when it disappeared -he turned the right of the seventh division and -charged the British cavalry; the combat was unequal; for -by an abuse too common, so many men had been drawn -from the ranks as orderlies to general officers, and other -purposes, that not more than a thousand English troopers -were in the field. The French therefore with one shock -drove in all the outguards, cut off Norman Ramsay’s battery -of horse-artillery, and came sweeping in upon the reserves -and the seventh division.</p> - -<p>Their leading squadrons, approaching in a loose manner, -were partially checked by the British, and then a great -commotion was observed in their main body. Their troopers -were seen closing with disorder and tumult towards one -point, where a thick dust arose, and where loud cries and -the sparkling of blades and flashing of pistols indicated some -extraordinary occurrence. Suddenly the crowd became violently -agitated, an English shout pealed high and clear, the -mass was rent asunder, and Norman Ramsay burst forth -sword in hand at the head of his battery, his horses, breathing -fire, stretched like greyhounds along the plain, the guns -bounded behind them like things of no weight, and the -mounted gunners followed close, with heads bent low and -pointed weapons in desperate career. At this sight Brotherton<a id="FNanchor_17" href="#Footnote_17" class="fnanchor">17</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_81">81</span> -of the 14th Dragoons, instantly galloping to his aid with a -squadron, shocked the head of the pursuing troops, and -General Charles Stewart,<a id="FNanchor_18" href="#Footnote_18" class="fnanchor">18</a> joining in the charge, took the -French colonel Lamotte, fighting hand to hand. However -the main body came forward rapidly, and the British cavalry -retired behind the light division, which was thrown into -squares; the seventh division, which was more advanced, -endeavoured to do the same, but the horsemen were too -quickly upon them, and some were cut down; the remainder -stood firm, and the Chasseurs Britanniques, ranged behind a -loose stone wall, poured such a fire that the French recoiled -and seemed bewildered.</p> - -<p>While these brilliant actions were passing, the enemy had -made progress in the wood of Poço Velho, and as the English -divisions were separated and the right wing turned, it was -abundantly evident the battle would be lost if the original -position above Fuentes Onoro was not quickly regained. To -effect this Wellington ordered the seventh division to cross -the Turones and move down the left bank to Frenada, while -the light division and the cavalry retired over the plain; he -also withdrew the first and third divisions, and the Portuguese, -to the steppe of land before mentioned, as running -perpendicularly from the ravine of Fuentes Onoro to the -Turones.</p> - -<p>Craufurd, who had now resumed command of the light -division, covered the passage of the seventh over the Turones, -and then retired slowly along the plain in squares. The -French horsemen outflanked him and surprised a post of the -Guards under Colonel Hill, taking that officer and fourteen -men prisoners, but continuing their course against the 42nd -Regiment were repulsed. Many times, this strong cavalry -made as if it would storm the light division squares, yet -always found them too formidable, and happily so, for there -was not during the war a more perilous hour. The whole of -that vast plain was covered with a confused multitude of -troops, amidst which the squares appeared as specks, and -there was a great concourse of commissariat followers, -servants, baggage, led horses, and peasants attracted by -curiosity, and all mixed with broken picquets and parties -coming out of the woods: the seventh division was separated<span class="pagenum" id="Page_82">82</span> -by the Turones, while five thousand French horsemen, with -fifteen pieces of artillery, were trampling, bounding, shouting, -and impatient to charge; the infantry of the eighth corps being -in order of battle behind them, and the wood on their right -filled with the sixth corps. If the latter body, pivoting upon -Fuentes, had come forth while Drouet’s division fell on that -village, if the eighth corps had attacked the light division and -all the cavalry had charged, the loose crowd encumbering the -plain, driven violently in upon the first division, would have -intercepted the latter’s fire and broken its ranks: the battle -would have been lost.</p> - -<p>No such effort was made. The French horsemen merely -hovered about Craufurd’s squares, the plain was soon cleared, -the British cavalry took post behind the centre, and the -light division formed a reserve to the first division, the -riflemen occupying the rocks on its right and connecting it -with the seventh division, which had arrived at Frenada and -was again joined by Julian Sanchez. At sight of this new -front, perpendicular to the original one and so deeply lined -with troops, the French army stopped short and commenced -a cannonade, which did great execution amongst the close -masses of the allies; but twelve British guns replied with -such vigour that the enemy’s fire abated, their cavalry drew -out of range, and a body of infantry attempting to glide -down the ravine of the Turones was repulsed by the riflemen -and the light companies of the Guards.</p> - -<p>All this time a fierce battle was going on at Fuentes -Onoro. Massena had directed Drouet to carry this village -when Montbrun’s cavalry first turned the right wing, it was -however two hours later ere the attack commenced. The -three British regiments made a desperate resistance, but, -overmatched in number and unaccustomed to the desultory -fighting of light troops, they were pierced and divided; two -companies of the 79th were taken, their Colonel, Cameron, -mortally wounded, and the lower part of the town was carried: -the upper part was however stiffly held and the musketry -was incessant.</p> - -<p>Had the attack been made earlier, and all Drouet’s division -thrown frankly into the fight, while the sixth corps -from the wood of Poço Velho closely turned Fuentes Onoro, -the latter must have been forced and the new position falsified.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_83">83</span> -But Wellington, having now all his reserves in hand, -detached considerable masses to support the fight, and as the -French reinforced their troops, the whole of the sixth corps -and part of Drouet’s were finally engaged. At one time the -fighting was on the banks of the stream and the lower -houses, at another on the heights and around the chapel, -and some of the enemy’s skirmishers even penetrated towards -the main position; yet the village was never entirely abandoned -by the defenders, and in one charge against a heavy -mass on the chapel eminence a great number of French fell. -Thus the fight lasted until evening, when the lower part of -the town was abandoned by both parties, the British holding -the chapel and crags, the French retiring about cannon-shot -distance from the stream.</p> - -<p>After the action a brigade of the light division relieved -the regiments in the village, a slight demonstration by the -second corps, near Fort Conception, was checked by a -battalion of the Lusitanian legion, and both armies remained -in observation. Fifteen hundred men and officers, of which -three hundred were prisoners, constituted the loss of the -allies. That of the enemy was estimated at the time to be -near five thousand, but this was founded on the supposition -that four hundred dead were lying about Fuentes Onoro. -Having had charge to bury the carcasses at that point, I can -affirm, that about the village not more than one hundred and -thirty bodies were to be found, more than one-third of which -were British.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Evacuation of Almeida.</span> (May, 1811.)</h3> - -<p>Massena retired on the 10th across the Agueda, and was -relieved in his command by Marmont. The fate of Almeida -was then decided, yet its brave governor, Brennier, who had -been exchanged after the battle of Vimiero, carried off the -garrison. He had fifteen hundred men and during the battle -had skirmished boldly with the blockading force, while loud -explosions, supposed to be signals, were frequent in the -place. When all hope of succour vanished, a French soldier, -named Tillet, penetrated in uniform through the posts -of blockade, carrying an order to evacuate the fortress and -rejoin the army by Barba de Puerco. Meanwhile the British<span class="pagenum" id="Page_84">84</span> -general, placing the light division in its old position on the -Azava with cavalry-posts on the Lower Agueda, had desired -Sir William Erskine to send the 4th Regiment to Barba de -Puerco, and directed General Alexander Campbell to continue -the blockade with the sixth division and Pack’s brigade. -Campbell’s dispositions were negligently made and -negligently executed. Erskine transmitted no orders to the -4th Regiment, and Brennier resolved to force his way -through the blockading troops. An open country and a -double line of posts greatly enhanced the difficulty of the -enterprise, yet he was resolute not only to cut his own passage -but to render the fortress useless. In this view he had -mined the principal bastions, and destroyed his guns by a -singular expedient, firing several at the same moment with -heavy charges but placing the muzzles of all but one -against the sides of the others; thus while some shots flew -towards the besiegers others destroyed the pieces without -attracting notice: these were the explosions supposed to be -signals.</p> - -<p>At midnight on the 10th he sprung his mines and in a -compact column broke through the picquets, passing between -the quarters of the reserves with a nicety proving his talent -and his coolness. Pack, following with a few men collected -on the instant, plied him with a constant fire, yet could not -shake or retard his column, which in silence gained the -rough country leading upon Barba de Puerco, where it -halted just as daylight broke. Pack still pursued, and -knowing some English dragoons were a short distance off -sent an officer to bring them out upon the French flank, thus -occasioning a slight skirmish and consequent delay. The -other troops had paid little attention to the explosion of the -mines, thinking them a repetition of Brennier’s previous -practice, but Pack’s fire had roused them, the 36th Regiment -was now close at hand, and the 4th also, having heard the -firing, was rapidly gaining the right flank of the enemy. -Brennier drove off the cavalry and was again in march, yet -the infantry, throwing off their knapsacks, overtook him as -he descended the deep chasm of Barba de Puerco and killed -or wounded many, taking three hundred, but the 36th Regiment -rashly passing the bridge was repulsed with a loss of -forty men. Had Erskine given the 4th Regiment its orders,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_85">85</span> -the French column would have been lost, and Lord Wellington, -stung by this event, and irritated by previous examples -of undisciplined valour, issued this strong rebuke. “<em>The -officers of the army may depend upon it that the enemy to whom they -are opposed is not less prudent than powerful. Notwithstanding what -has been printed in gazettes and newspapers, we have never seen small -bodies unsupported successfully opposed to large; nor has the experience -of any officer realized the stories which all have read of whole -armies being driven by a handful of light infantry and dragoons.</em>”</p> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_86">86</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="BOOK_V">BOOK V.</h2> -</div> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>Combat of Campo Mayor—First English Siege of Badajos—Battle of -Albuera—Renewed Siege of Badajos—First Assault of Christoval—Second -Assault on Christoval.</p></div> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Combat of Campo Mayor.</span> (May, 1811.)</h3> - -<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">It</span> has been shown how Beresford was sent to oppose Soult -beyond the Tagus, but the latter, disturbed by the battle of -Barosa, which put all Andalusia in commotion, had returned -to Seville, leaving Mortier to continue the operations. -Campo Mayor surrendered the 21st of March, and four days -after, Latour Maubourg, having to bring away the battering -train and a convoy of provisions, issued from the gates with -nine hundred cavalry, three battalions of infantry, some -horse-artillery and sixteen heavy guns, all in column of -march, just as Beresford emerged from an adjacent forest -with twenty thousand infantry, two thousand cavalry and -eighteen field-pieces. An astonishing apparition this was -to the French, for so adroitly had Wellington, while seemingly -absorbed in the pursuit of Massena, organized this -army, that its existence was only made known by its -presence.</p> - -<p>All Beresford’s cavalry, supported by a field battery and -a detachment of infantry under Colonel Colborne,<a id="FNanchor_19" href="#Footnote_19" class="fnanchor">19</a> were -close up ere the enemy knew of their approach, and the -horsemen, sweeping by their left round the town and -moving along gentle slopes, gradually formed a crescent -about the French, who were retreating along the road to -Badajos. Colborne was then coming up at a run, a division -was seen behind him, and the French infantry formed -squares, supported by their cavalry, while their battering -guns and baggage hurried on. General Long, holding back -his heavy cavalry, directed some Portuguese squadrons, and -the 18th Light Dragoons under Colonel Head, to charge. -Head, galloping forward under a fire from the square, was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_87">87</span> -met half-way by the French hussars with loose reins, and -fiercely they came together, and many went down on both -sides, yet those who kept the saddle drove clean through -each other, re-formed, and again charged in the same fearful -manner! Desperately all struggled for victory, but Head’s -troopers riding close and on better chargers overthrew horse -and man, and the hussars dispersed, yet still fighting in -small bodies with the Portuguese, while the British squadron, -passing under the fire of the square without flinching, -rode forward, hewing down the gunners of the battering -train and seeking to head the long line of convoy.</p> - -<p>They thought the heavy dragoons, the infantry and the -artillery, marching behind them, would suffice to dispose of -the enemies they passed, but Beresford took a different -view. He stopped a charge of the heavy dragoons; he -suffered only two guns to open when six were at hand; he -even silenced those two after a few rounds, and let the -French recover their battering train, rally their hussars, and -retreat in safety. Meanwhile the 13th and some of the Portuguese -dragoons reached the bridge of Badajos and there -captured more guns, but were repulsed by the fire of the -fortress, and being followed by Mortier and met by Latour -Maubourg’s retreating column lost some men, but passing by -the flanks they escaped, to be publicly censured by Beresford! -The admiration of the army consoled them. One -hundred of the allies were killed, or hurt, and seventy taken; -the French lost only three hundred and a howitzer, but the -colonel of hussars, Chamorin, a distinguished officer, fell in -single combat with a trooper of the 13th Dragoons, an Irishman -of astonishing might, whose sword went through helmet -and head with a single blow.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">First English Siege of Badajos.</span> (May, 1811.)</h3> - -<p>Mortier now resigned the command to Latour Maubourg, -who spread his foragers fifty miles abroad to gather provisions -for Badajos, which General Phillipon, one of the -best governors that ever defended a fortress, was with -scanty means striving to prepare for a siege. Beresford, by -adopting a wrong line of operations, lost time, his first bridge -was swept away by floods, he passed the Guadiana with -some difficulty at Jerumenha, and a squadron of the 13th<span class="pagenum" id="Page_88">88</span> -Dragoons was carried off bodily by the French at that place; -but he reduced Olivenza, drove Latour Maubourg into the -Morena, and defeated two regiments of cavalry near Usagre: -he however neglected to restrain the garrison of Badajos, by -which he gave Phillipon time and license to prepare for -resistance—a great error and pregnant with terrible consequences. -His field operations were inadequate to his means, -for he was not only master of the open country with his own -troops, but had been joined by the captain-general Castaños -with the fifth Spanish army, and was in communication with -Ballesteros and Blake, co-operating Spanish generals, at the -head of considerable bodies. In this state he was first reinforced -with a German brigade from Lisbon under General -Alten, and then Wellington arrived from the north.</p> - -<p>He came the 21st of April and immediately changed the -direction of the warfare. Looking to Badajos, and feeling -the value of time, he instantly forded the Guadiana and -pushed close to it with the German troops and some Portuguese -cavalry, to take a convoy going into the place, but the -governor sallied, the convoy escaped, and the allies lost a -hundred men. Beresford had been contemptuous of Soult’s -power and resolution to disturb the siege; but Wellington -had learned to respect that marshal’s energy and resources, -and knowing well he would come with strength and danger, -refused to invest the place until the Spanish generals consented -to the following co-operation. Blake to bring his -army from Ayamonte, and in concert with Ballesteros and -the cavalry of Castaños to watch the passes of the Morena. -Castaños, furnishing three battalions for the siege, to support -the other Spanish generals. The British covering troops to -be in second line having their point of concentration for -battle at Albuera, a village centrically placed with respect to -the roads leading from Andalusia to Badajos. While awaiting -the Spaniards’ consent he prepared the means of siege, yet -under great difficulties.</p> - -<p>The Portuguese government had reported that guns, provisions, -boats, stores and means of carriage had been actually -collected for the operation: this was false. The battering -train and stores for the attack had therefore to be taken from -Elvas, and as it was essential for the safety of the fortress to -preserve its armament, and the Guadiana had again carried<span class="pagenum" id="Page_89">89</span> -away the bridge at Jerumenha, that direct line of communication -was given up for the circuitous one of Merida, where -a stone bridge rendered all safe. But then political difficulties -arose. The Portuguese government was on the point -of declaring war against Spain, which made the Spanish -generals delay assent to the plan of co-operation, and in the -midst of this confusion Massena’s advance recalled Wellington -to fight the battle of Fuentes Onoro.</p> - -<p>As Latour Maubourg still held on to Estremadura and -foraged the fertile districts, Colonel Colborne, a man of -singular talent for war, was sent with a brigade of infantry, -some horsemen and guns to curb his inroads. In concert -with Count Penne Villemur, a commander of Spanish cavalry, -he intercepted several convoys, forced the French troops to -quit many frontier towns, and acted with so much address, -that Latour Maubourg went into the Morena, thinking a -great force was at hand. Colborne then attempted to surprise -the fortified post of Benelcazar. Riding on to the drawbridge -in the grey of the morning, he summoned the commandant -to surrender, as the only means of saving himself -from a Spanish army which was coming up and would give -no quarter; the French officer was amazed at the appearance -of the party, yet hesitated, whereupon Colborne, perceiving -he would not yield, galloped off under a few straggling shot -and soon after rejoined the army without loss. During his -absence, the Spanish generals had acceded to Wellington’s -proposition, Blake was in march, the Guadiana had subsided -and the siege was undertaken.</p> - -<p>General William Stewart invested Badajos the 5th of May, -on the left bank of the Guadiana, where the principal features -were an ancient castle and some out-works.</p> - -<p>On the 8th General Lumley invested Christoval, an isolated -fort or citadel, on the other bank of the Guadiana, which -commanded the bridge; but this operation was not well -combined, and sixty French dragoons, moving under the -fire of the place, maintained a sharp skirmish beyond the -walls.</p> - -<p>Thus the first serious siege undertaken by the British army -in the Peninsula was commenced, and, to the discredit of the -English government, no army was ever worse provided for -such an enterprise. The engineers were zealous, and some<span class="pagenum" id="Page_90">90</span> -of them well versed in the theory of their business, but the -ablest trembled at their utter destitution. Without sappers -and miners, or a soldier who knew how to carry on an -approach under fire, they were compelled to attack a fortress -defended by the most practised and scientific troops of the -age; hence the best officers and boldest soldiers were forced -to sacrifice themselves in a lamentable manner, to compensate -for the negligence and incapacity of a government <em>always</em> -ready to plunge into war without the slightest care for what -was necessary to obtain success. The sieges carried on by -the British in Spain were a succession of butcheries, because -the commonest materials and means necessary for their art -were denied to the engineers.</p> - -<p>To breach the castle, while batteries established on the -right bank of the Guadiana took it in reverse, and false -attacks were made against the out-works, was the plan -adopted; but San Christoval was to be reduced before the -batteries against the castle could be constructed; wherefore -on the night of the 8th, the captain of engineers, Squire, was -ordered to break ground there at a distance of four hundred -yards. The moon shone bright, he was ill provided with -tools, and exposed to a destructive fire of musketry from the -fort, of shot and shells from the town; hence he worked with -loss until the 10th, and then the French in a sally entered -his battery; they were driven back, but the allies pursued too -hotly, were caught with grape and lost four hundred men. -Thus five engineers and seven hundred officers and soldiers -of the line were already inscribed upon the bloody list of -victims offered to this Moloch, and only one small battery -against an outwork was completed! On the 11th it opened, -and before sunset the fire of the enemy had disabled four of -its five guns and killed many soldiers. No other result could -be expected. The concert essential to success in double -operations had been neglected by Beresford. Squire was exposed -to the undivided fire of the fortress before the approaches -against the castle were even commenced, and the -false attacks scarcely attracted the notice of the enemy.</p> - -<p>To check future sallies a second battery was erected -against the bridge-head, yet this was also overmatched, and -Beresford, having received intelligence that the French army -was again in movement, then arrested the progress of all the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_91">91</span> -works. On the 12th, believing this information premature, -he directed the trenches to be opened against the castle; but -the intelligence was confirmed at twelve o’clock in the night, -and measures were taken to raise the siege.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Battle of Albuera.</span> (May, 1811.)</h3> - -<p>Soult had resolved to succour Badajos the moment he -heard that Beresford was in Estremadura, and the latter’s -tardiness gave him time to tranquillise his province and -arrange a system of resistance to the allied army in the Isla -during his absence. Beresford believed he was trembling for -Andalusia. Nothing could be more fallacious. He had -seventy thousand fighting men there, and Drouet, who had -quitted Massena immediately after the battle of Fuentes -Onoro, was in march for that province with eleven thousand, -by the way of Toledo.</p> - -<p>On the 10th of May Soult quitted Seville with three -thousand heavy dragoons, thirty guns, and two strong brigades -of infantry under the generals Werlé and Godinot.</p> - -<p>The 13th a junction was effected with Latour Maubourg, -who assumed the command of the heavy cavalry, resigning -the fifth corps to General Girard.</p> - -<p>On the 14th, having reached Villa Franca, thirty miles -from Badajos, Soult caused his heaviest guns to fire salvos in -the night to notify his approach to the garrison. This expedient -failed, but on the evening of the 15th the whole French -army was concentrated at Santa Marta.</p> - -<p>Beresford had raised the siege in the night of the 12th, -against the wish of the chief engineer, who promised him -the place in three days! This promise was nought, and had -it been good Soult would yet have surprised him in his -trenches: his firmness therefore saved the army, and his -arrangements for carrying off the stores were well executed. -By twelve o’clock on the 15th the guns and stores were -on the left bank of the Guadiana, the gabions and fascines -were burnt, the flying-bridge removed; all being so well -masked by the fourth division, which in concert with the -Spaniards continued to maintain the investment, that a sally -on the rear-guard, in which some Portuguese picquets were<span class="pagenum" id="Page_92">92</span> -roughly treated, first told the French the siege was raised—of -the cause they were still ignorant.</p> - -<p>Beresford held a conference with the Spanish generals at -Valverde on the 13th, and the chief command was ceded to -him by the management of Castaños, to the discontent of -Blake, who soon showed his ill-will. It was agreed to receive -battle at the village of Albuera. Ballesteros’ and Blake’s -corps had then united, and Blake engaged to bring them into -line before twelve o’clock on the 15th. Meanwhile, Badajos -being the centre of an arc sweeping through Valverde, Albuera -and Talavera Real, it was arranged that Blake should -watch the roads on the right; the British and fifth Spanish -army those leading upon the centre, and Madden’s Portuguese -cavalry those on the left. The main body of the British -could thus reach Albuera by a half march, as no part of the arc -was more than four leagues from Badajos, and the enemy was -still eight leagues from Albuera: Beresford therefore, thinking -he could not be forestalled on any point of importance, kept -the fourth division in the trenches.</p> - -<p>On the 14th Colborne rejoined the army, Madden took post -at Talavera Real, Blake was in march and his dragoons had -joined the Anglo-Portuguese cavalry under General Long, -who was at Santa Marta.</p> - -<p>In the morning of the 15th the Anglo-Portuguese army -occupied the left half of the Albuera position, a ridge four -miles long, having the stream of the Aroya Val de Sevilla in -rear and the Albuera in front. The ascent from the last -river was easy for cavalry and artillery, and in advance of -the centre were the bridge and village of Albuera—the -former commanded by a battery, the latter occupied by -Alten’s Germans. Behind Alten, the second division, under -William Stewart, formed one line, the right on a commanding -hill over which the Valverde road passed, the left on -the road of Badajos, beyond which the array was continued -on two lines by the Portuguese troops under Hamilton and -Collins.</p> - -<p>The right of the ground being roughest, highest, and -broadest, was left open for Blake, because Beresford, thinking -the hill on the Valverde road the key of the position as -covering the only line of retreat, was desirous to secure it -with his own troops. The fourth division and the infantry<span class="pagenum" id="Page_93">93</span> -of the fifth Spanish army were still before Badajos, but had -orders to march on the first signal.</p> - -<p>About three o’clock on the evening of the 15th, Beresford -being on the left, the whole mass of the allied cavalry, closely -followed by the French light horsemen, came pouring in -from Santa Marta, and finding no infantry beyond the Albuera -to support them passed that river in retreat. The wooded -heights on the right bank being thus abandoned to the -enemy, his force and dispositions were effectually concealed -and the strength of the position was already sapped. Beresford -was disquieted, he formed a temporary right wing with -his cavalry and artillery, stretched his picquets along the -road by which Blake was expected, and sent officers to -hasten his movements; that general had only a few miles of -good road to march and promised to be in line at noon, yet -did not even bring up his van before eleven at night, nor -his rear before three in the morning.</p> - -<p>Cole and Madden were now called up. The order failed -to reach Madden; but Cole brought the infantry of the fifth -army, two squadrons of Portuguese cavalry, and two brigades -of his own division to Albuera between eight and nine o’clock -on the morning of the 16th: his third brigade having invested -San Christoval was unable to pass the Guadiana above -Badajos, and was in march by Jerumenha. Cole’s Spanish -troops joined Blake on the right, the two brigades of the -fourth division were drawn up in columns behind the -second division, the Portuguese squadrons reinforced Colonel -Otway, whose horsemen, of the same nation, were pushed -forwards in front of the left wing: all the rest of the -allied cavalry was concentrated behind the centre, and -Beresford, dissatisfied with General Long, gave Lumley the -chief command.</p> - -<p>Thirty thousand infantry, more than two thousand cavalry, -and thirty-eight pieces of artillery, eighteen being nine-pounders, -were now in line; but one brigade of the fourth -division was still absent, the British infantry, the pith and -strength of battle, did not exceed seven thousand, and -already Blake’s arrogance was shaking Beresford’s authority. -The French had forty guns, four thousand veteran cavalry -and nineteen thousand chosen infantry: obedient to one -discipline, animated by one national feeling, their composition<span class="pagenum" id="Page_94">94</span> -compensated for the want of numbers, and their -general’s talent was immeasurably greater than his adversary’s.</p> - -<p>Soult examined Beresford’s position without hindrance on -the evening of the 15th. He knew the fourth division was -then before Badajos, heard that Blake would not arrive -before the 17th, and resolved to attack next morning, having -detected all the weakness of the English order of battle. -The hill in the centre, commanding the Valverde road, was -undoubtedly the key of the position if an attack was made -parallel to the front; but Soult saw that on the right, the -rough broad heights trended back towards the Valverde -road, looking into the rear of Beresford’s line, and if he -could suddenly place his masses there he might roll up the -right on the centre and push it into the valley of the Aroya: -the Valverde road could then be seized, the retreat cut, and -his strong cavalry would complete the victory.</p> - -<p>Beresford’s right and Soult’s left were only divided by a -hill about cannon-shot from each. Separated from the allies -by the Albuera, from the French by a rivulet called the -Feria, this height was neglected by Beresford: but Soult in -the night placed behind it the greatest part of his artillery -under General Ruty, the fifth corps under Girard, the heavy -cavalry under Latour Maubourg; thus concentrating fifteen -thousand men and thirty guns within ten minutes’ march of -Beresford’s right wing: and yet that general could not see a -man, or draw a sound conclusion as to the plan of attack. -The light cavalry, the brigades of Godinot and Werlé, and -ten guns remained. These were placed in the woods which -lined the banks of the Feria towards its confluence with the -Albuera. Werlé was in reserve, Godinot was to attack the -village and bridge, bear strongly against Beresford’s centre, -attract his attention, separate his wings, and double up his -right when the principal attack should be developed.</p> - -<p>Blake and Cole brought up more than sixteen thousand -men, the first joining in the night, the second at nine o’clock -in the morning after the action was begun; yet so defectively -had Beresford occupied his position that Soult, though he -saw how the allied army had been reinforced, made no -change of disposition. At nine o’clock Godinot emerged -from the woods with his division in one heavy column,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_95">95</span> -preceded by a battery of ten guns; he was flanked by the -light cavalry, followed by Werlé’s division, and made straight -for the bridge of Albuera, attempting with a sharp cannonade -and musketry to force a passage. General Briché, being on -his right, now led two hussar regiments down the river in -observation of Otway’s horsemen, while the French lancers -passed the stream above bridge. The 3rd Dragoon Guards -drove the lancers back, and Dickson’s Portuguese guns, -from a rising ground above the village, ploughed through -Godinot’s column, which crowded towards the bridge -although the water was fordable above and below.</p> - -<p>These feints along the front did not deceive Beresford, -he saw Werlé did not follow Godinot closely, and felt the -principal effort would be on the right; he therefore desired -Blake to throw part of his first and all his second line across -the broad part of the hills, at right angles to their actual -front. Then drawing the Portuguese infantry of the left -wing to the centre, he sent a brigade to support Alten at the -bridge, and directed Hamilton to hold the others in hand as -a general reserve. The 13th Dragoons he posted near the -river above bridge, and sent the second English division to -support Blake. The horse-artillery, and cavalry under -Lumley, and Cole’s division, took ground to their right, -the two first on a small plain behind the Aroya stream, -the last about half musket-shot behind them. This done, -Beresford galloped to Blake, who had refused to change his -front, and with great heat told Colonel Hardinge, the bearer -of the order, the real attack was at the village and bridge; -he was entreated to obey, but was obstinate until Beresford -arrived in person, and then only assented because the -enemy’s columns were appearing on his flank, acting however -with such pedantic slowness, that Beresford, impatient -of his folly, took the direction in person.</p> - -<p>Great was the confusion and delay thus occasioned, and -ere the troops were formed the French were amongst them. -For scarcely had Godinot engaged Alten’s brigade, when -Werlé, leaving only a battalion of grenadiers to support -the former, and some squadrons to watch the 13th Dragoons -and connect the attacks, countermarched and gained the -rear of the fifth corps as it was mounting the hill on the -right of the allies. The light cavalry, also quitting Godinot,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_96">96</span> -crossed the Albuera above bridge, ascended the left bank at -a gallop, and sweeping round the rear of the fifth corps -joined Latour Maubourg, who was already in face of Lumley’s -squadrons! Half-an-hour had thus sufficed to render -Beresford’s position nearly desperate; for two-thirds of the -French had been thrown in order of battle across his right, -while his army, disordered and of different nations, was still -in the act of changing its front. Vainly he strove to get -the Spaniards forward and make room for Stewart’s division, -the French guns opened, their infantry threw out a heavy -musketry fire, their cavalry menaced different points, and -the Spaniards, falling fast, drew back. Soult thought the -whole army was yielding, he pushed forward his columns, -his reserves came up the hill, and General Ruty placed all -the French batteries in position.</p> - -<p>At this moment William Stewart reached the foot of the -height with the brigade under Colborne, and that able officer, -seeing the confusion above, desired to form in order of -battle previous to mounting; but Stewart, whose boiling -courage generally overlaid his judgment, heedlessly led up -in column of companies, passed the Spanish right and attempted -to open a line as the battalions arrived: he could -not do it, for so galling was the French fire that the foremost -troops impatiently charged, heavy rain obscured the -view, and four regiments of hussars and lancers, which, -unseen, had gained the right flank, immediately galloped -upon the rear of the disordered brigade and slew or took -two-thirds: the 31st only, being still in column, escaped -this charge and maintained its ground, while the French -horsemen, riding violently over everything else, penetrated -to all parts and captured six guns. The tumult was great, -and a lancer fell upon Beresford, but he, a man of great -strength, putting the spear aside, cast the trooper from his -saddle, and then a shift of wind blowed aside the smoke and -mist, whereupon Lumley, seeing the mischief from the plain -below, sent four squadrons up against the straggling hussars -and cut many off. Penne Villemur’s Spanish cavalry was at -the same time directed to charge some French horsemen in -the plain, but when within a few yards of their foes they -turned and shamefully fled.</p> - -<p>Great was the disorder on the hill. The shrinking Spaniards<span class="pagenum" id="Page_97">97</span> -were in one part blindly firing, though the British -troops were before them, and in another part, flying before -the lancers, would have broken through the 29th, then advancing -to the succour of Colborne; but, terribly resolute, -that regiment smote friends and foes without distinction in -their onward progress: meanwhile Beresford urging the -main body of the Spaniards to advance in his heat seized -an ensign by the breast and bore him and his colours by -main force to the front, yet the troops did not follow, and -the coward ran back when released from the marshal’s iron -grasp.</p> - -<p>In this crisis, the weather, which had ruined Colborne’s -brigade, saved the day, for Soult could not see the whole -field of battle and kept his troops halted in masses when the -decisive blow might have been struck. His cavalry indeed, -began to hem in that of the allies, yet the fire of the horse-artillery -enabled Lumley, covered by the bed of the Aroya -and supported by the fourth division, to check them; Colborne -still kept the height with the 31st Regiment, and the -British artillery, under Julius Hartman, was coming fast -into action; William Stewart, also, having escaped the -lancers, was again mounting the hill with Houghton’s brigade, -which he brought on with the same vehemence but in -a juster order of battle. The day now cleared and a dreadful -fire poured into the thickest of the French columns taught -Soult the fight was yet to be won.</p> - -<p>Houghton’s regiments reached the height under a heavy -cannonade, and the 29th, after breaking through the fugitive -Spaniards, was charged in flank by the French lancers, but -two companies, wheeling to the right, foiled this attack; -and then the third brigade of Stewart’s division came up -on the left, and the Spaniards under Zayas and Ballesteros -moved forward. Hartman’s artillery had made the enemy’s -infantry recoil, yet, soon recovering, they renewed the battle -with greater violence than before, and the cannon on both -sides discharged showers of grape at half-range, while the -play of musketry was incessant and often within pistol-shot; -but the crowded columns of the French embarrassed -their battle, and the British line would not yield them an -inch of ground or a moment of time to open their ranks. -Their fighting was however fierce and dangerous. Stewart<span class="pagenum" id="Page_98">98</span> -was twice wounded, Colonel Duckworth was slain, and the -gallant Houghton, having received many wounds without -shrinking, fell and died in the act of cheering on his men.</p> - -<p>Still the struggle continued with unabated fury. Colonel -Inglis, twenty-two officers, and more than four hundred men, -out of five hundred and seventy, fell in the 57th alone, and -the other regiments were scarcely better off, not one-third -were standing in any; their ammunition failed, and as their -fire slackened the enemy established a column in advance -upon the right flank, which the play of the artillery could -only check for a time, and in that dreadful crisis Beresford -wavered! Destruction stared him in the face, his personal -resources were exhausted and the unhappy thought of a retreat -rose in his agitated mind. He had before posted -Hamilton’s Portuguese with a view to a retrograde movement, -and now sent Alten orders to abandon the bridge of -Albuera, to rally the Portuguese artillery on his Germans, -and take ground to cover a retreat by the Valverde road. -But while the commander was thus preparing to resign the -contest, Colonel Hardinge, using his name, had urged Cole -to bring up the fourth division, and then riding to the third -brigade of Stewart’s division, which, under Colonel Abercrombie, -had hitherto been only slightly engaged, directed -it also to push forward. The die was thus cast, Beresford -acquiesced, Alten received orders to retake the village, and -this terrible battle was continued.</p> - -<p>Two brigades of the fourth division were present, one of -Portuguese under General Harvey, the other under Sir -William Myers, composed of the 7th and 23rd Regiments, -was called the fusileer brigade. Harvey, pushing between -Lumley’s cavalry and the hill, was charged by some French -horse and beat them off, while Cole led the fusileers up the -contested height. At this time six guns were in the enemy’s -possession, Werlé’s reserve was pressing forward to reinforce -the French front, and the remnant of Houghton’s brigade -could no longer maintain its ground, the field was heaped -with carcasses, the lancers were riding furiously about the -captured artillery on the upper parts of the hill, and Hamilton’s -Portuguese and Alten’s Germans, withdrawing from -the bridge, seemed to be in full retreat. Soon however -Cole’s fusileers, flanked by a battalion of the Lusitanian<span class="pagenum" id="Page_99">99</span> -legion under Colonel Hawkshawe, surmounted the hill, -drove off the lancers, recovered five guns and one colour, -and passed the right of Houghton’s brigade, precisely as -Abercrombie passed its left.</p> - -<p>Such a gallant line, issuing from the midst of the smoke -and rapidly separating itself from the confused and broken -multitude, startled the enemy’s masses, then augmenting -and pressing onwards as to an assured victory; they wavered, -hesitated, and vomiting forth a storm of fire hastily -endeavoured to enlarge their front, while a fearful discharge -of grape from all their artillery whistled through the British -ranks. Myers was killed, Cole, the three colonels, Ellis, -Blakeney and Hawkshawe fell wounded, and the fusileer -battalions, struck by the iron tempest, reeled and staggered -like sinking ships: but suddenly and sternly recovering -they closed on their terrible enemies, and then was seen -with what a strength and majesty the British soldier fights. -In vain did Soult with voice and gesture animate his -Frenchmen; in vain did the hardiest veterans, breaking -from the crowded columns, sacrifice their lives to gain time -for the mass to open out on such a fair field; in vain did -the mass itself bear up, and fiercely striving fire indiscriminately -upon friends and foes, while the horsemen hovering -on the flank threatened to charge the advancing line. Nothing -could stop that astonishing infantry. No sudden burst -of undisciplined valour, no nervous enthusiasm weakened -the stability of their order, their flashing eyes were bent on -the dark columns in their front, their measured tread shook -the ground, their dreadful volleys swept away the head of -every formation, their deafening shouts overpowered the -dissonant cries that broke from all parts of the tumultuous -crowd, as slowly and with a horrid carnage it was pushed by -the incessant vigour of the attack to the farthest edge of the -height. There the French reserve, mixing with the struggling -multitude, endeavoured to restore the fight but only -augmented the irremediable disorder, and the mighty mass -giving way like a loosened cliff went headlong down the -steep: the rain flowed after in streams discoloured with -blood, and eighteen hundred unwounded men, the remnant -of six thousand unconquerable British soldiers, stood triumphant -on the fatal hill!</p> - -<p>While the fusileers were battling above, the cavalry and -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_100">100</span> -Harvey’s brigade advanced, and Latour Maubourg’s dragoons, -battered also by Lefebre’s guns, retired before them, yet -still threatening the fusileers with their right, and with their -left preventing Lumley falling on the defeated infantry. The -crisis was however past, and Beresford, seeking to profit -from the circumstances of the moment, made Alten retake -Albuera, supported him with Blake’s first line, which had -not been engaged, and quickly brought up Hamilton’s and -Collins’s Portuguese, ten thousand fresh men, to strengthen -the fusileers and Abercrombie’s brigade. But so rapid was -the execution of the last, the enemy was never attained by -these reserves, which yet suffered severely, for Ruty having -set the French guns altogether, worked them with prodigious -activity while the fifth corps was still making head, -and when the day was irrevocably lost, he regained the -other side of the Albuera and protected the passage of the -broken infantry.</p> - -<p>Beresford, too hardly handled to pursue, now formed a -front with the Portuguese parallel to the heights where -Soult’s troops were rallying, and though the action continued -a short time after at the bridge, all was terminated before -three o’clock. The serious fighting had endured only four -hours, and in that time seven thousand allies and above -eight thousand of their adversaries were struck down. -Three French generals were wounded, two slain, and eight -hundred soldiers so badly hurt as to be left on the field. -On Beresford’s side only two thousand Spaniards and six -hundred Germans and Portuguese were killed or wounded, -and with what resolution the pure British fought was thus -made manifest, for they had but eighteen hundred men left -standing! The laurel is nobly won when the exhausted -victor reels as he places it on his bleeding front. The -French took five hundred unwounded prisoners, a howitzer -and several stand of colours. The British had no trophy to -boast of, but the horrid piles of carcasses within their lines -told with dreadful eloquence who were the conquerors, and -all that night the rain poured down, and the river and the -hills and the woods resounded with the dismal clamour and -groans of dying men.</p> - -<p>Beresford was oppressed with the number of his wounded,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_101">101</span> -far exceeding the sound amongst the British soldiers. -When the picquets were posted few remained to help the -sufferers, and in this cruel distress he sent Hardinge to -demand assistance from Blake; but wrath and mortified -pride were predominant with that general; he refused, saying, -it was customary with allies for each to take care of -their own men. Yet the British had fought for Spain.</p> - -<p>Morning came and both armies remained in their respective -situations, the wounded still covering the field of battle, -the hostile lines still menacing and dangerous. The greater -number had fallen with the French, the best soldiers with -the allies, and Soult’s dark masses of cavalry and artillery, -covering all his front, seemed able alone to contend again -for victory. The right of the French appeared also to -threaten the Badajos road, and Beresford in gloom and -doubt awaited another attack; soon however the third -brigade of the fourth division came up from Jerumenha, -and then the second division retook its old ground between -the Valverde and Badajos roads: on the 18th Soult -retreated.</p> - -<p>He left to English generosity several hundred men too -deeply wounded to be removed, but all those who could -travel he had, in the night of the 17th, sent by the royal -road of Monasterio to Seville; and now, protecting his -movements with his horsemen and six battalions of infantry, -he filed his right on to the road of Solano. When this flank -march was completed, Latour Maubourg covered the rear -with the heavy dragoons, while Briché protected the march -of the wounded men by the royal road.</p> - -<p>Beresford sent Hamilton to re-invest Badajos, and the -whole of his cavalry, supported by Alten’s Germans, after -the French; but soon Wellington, hurrying from the north, -reached the field of battle and directed him to follow the -enemy cautiously in person, while the third and seventh -divisions, just come down from the Coa, completed the reinvestment -of the fortress.</p> - -<p>Soult now took a permanent position at Llerena, to await -the junction of Drouet’s division and reinforcements from -Andalusia, resolved to contend again for Badajos. Meanwhile -his cavalry advanced to Usagre designing to scour -the country beyond; but the only outlet from that place<span class="pagenum" id="Page_102">102</span> -was a bridge over a river with steep banks, which the -French general Bron passed rashly with two regiments and -being charged by General Lumley lost two hundred men. -This terminated Beresford’s operations. The miserable state -to which the Regency had reduced the Portuguese troops -required his presence at Lisbon and General Hill succeeded -to his command.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Renewed Siege of Badajos.</span> (May, 1811.)</h3> - -<p>Lord Wellington had left General Spencer with an army -to straiten Ciudad Rodrigo and watch Marmont, who had -succeeded Massena; but Marmont could from the Salamanca -country cross the mountains and join Soult to disturb the -siege of Badajos, and in that case Spencer, who had a -shorter line, was to join Wellington. With this precaution -it was hoped the place might be taken. But though no -operation in war is so certain as a modern siege, if the rules -of art are strictly followed, no operation is less open to -irregular daring: the engineer can neither be hurried nor -delayed without danger. Now the time required by the -French to gather in force depended on Marmont, whose -march from Salamanca by the mountain passes could not be -stopped by Spencer: it was also possible for him to pass the -Tagus on the shortest line by fords near Alcantara. But -Beresford’s siege had damaged the carriages of the battering -guns, eleven days were required to repair them, and the scanty -means of transport for stores was diminished by carrying the -wounded from Albuera: hence more than fifteen days of -open trenches, including nine days of fire, could not be expected. -With good guns, plentiful stores and regular sappers -and miners, this time would have sufficed; but none of -these things were in the camp, and it was a keen jest of -Picton to say, “<em>Lord Wellington sued Badajos in formâ pauperis</em>.” -His guns were of soft brass, false in their bore, and the -shot of different sizes, the largest being too small; the Portuguese -gunners were inexperienced, there were few British -artillery-men, few engineers, no sappers or miners, and no -time to teach the troops of the line how to make fascines -and gabions.</p> - -<p>Regular and sure approaches against the body of the place,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_103">103</span> -first reducing the outworks, could not now be attempted; -yet Beresford’s lines against the castle and Fort Christoval -might be renewed, avoiding his errors; that is to say, by -pushing the attacks simultaneously and with more powerful -means. This plan was adopted, and something was hoped -from the inhabitants, something from the effect of Soult’s -retreat after Albuera. The battering train was of fifty -pieces, a convoy of engineers’ stores came up from Alcacer -do Sal, and a company of British artillery was on the march -from Lisbon to be mixed with the Portuguese, making a -total of six hundred gunners. Volunteers from the line -acted as assistant engineers, and a draft of three hundred -intelligent infantry soldiers, including twenty-five artificers -of the staff corps, were employed as sappers.</p> - -<p>Hamilton’s Portuguese first invested the place on the left -bank, and, the 24th of May, General Houston, having five -thousand men, invested San Christoval; a flying bridge was -then laid down on the Guadiana below the town, and Picton, -crossing that river by a ford above, joined Hamilton. Hill -commanded the covering army, all the cavalry was pushed -forward in observation of Soult, and when intelligence of -Drouet’s junction was obtained, two regiments of cavalry -and two brigades of infantry, which had been quartered at -Coria as posts of communication with Spencer, were called -up to reinforce Hill.</p> - -<p>Phillipon had during the interval of siege levelled Beresford’s -trenches, repaired his own damages, mounted more -guns and obtained a small supply of wine and vegetables -from the people of Estremadura, who were still awed by the -presence of Soult’s army. Within the place all was quiet, -the citizens did not now exceed five thousand souls, and -many of them were seen, mixed with soldiers, working at -the defences; hence, as retrenchments in the castle behind -the intended points of attack would have prolonged the -siege beyond the calculated period, Lord Wellington to obtain -timely notice of such works had a large telescope -placed in the tower of La Lyppe near Elvas, by which the -interior of the castle could be searched.</p> - -<p>In the night of the 29th the engineers broke ground for a -false attack, and the following night sixteen hundred workmen, -with a covering party of twelve hundred, sunk a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_104">104</span> -parallel against the castle without being discovered; at the -same time twelve hundred workmen, covered by a guard of -eight hundred, opened a parallel four hundred and fifty -yards from San Christoval and seven hundred yards from -the bridge-head. On this line, one breaching and two -counter batteries were raised against the fort and bridge-head, -to prevent a sally from the last point; a fourth battery -was also commenced to search the defences of the castle, -but the workmen were discovered and a heavy fire struck -down many.</p> - -<p>On the 31st the attack against the castle, where the soil -was soft, advanced rapidly; but Christoval being on a rock, -earth had to be brought from the rear and the attack proceeded -slowly and with considerable loss. This day the -British artillery company came up on mules from Estremos, -the engineer hastened his work, and, to save time, prematurely -traced a work for fourteen twenty-four pounders with -six large howitzers to batter the castle.</p> - -<p>On the Christoval side the batteries were not finished -until the night of the 1st of June, for the soil was so rocky -the miner had to level ground for platforms, while mortars, -of eighteen inches’ diameter, sent shells from the castle -unerringly amongst the workmen; these huge missiles would -have ruined the works on that side if they had not been on -the edge of a ridge, down which most of the shells rolled -before bursting: yet so difficult is it to judge rightly in war, -that Phillipon stopped this fire, thinking it was thrown -away!<a id="FNanchor_20" href="#Footnote_20" class="fnanchor">20</a> The progress of the works was so delayed by -bringing up earth, that woolpacks purchased at Elvas were -adopted as a substitute, and on the 2nd, all the batteries -being completed and armed with forty-three pieces of different -sizes, twenty were pointed against the castle. The shot -being too small for the guns the fire was very ineffectual -at first, and five pieces became unserviceable; but towards -evening the practice became steadier, the fire of Christoval -was nearly silenced, and the covering of masonry fell -from the castle-wall, discovering a perpendicular bank of -clay.</p> - -<p>In the night of the 3rd a fresh battery for seven guns<span class="pagenum" id="Page_105">105</span> -was traced against the castle, about six hundred yards from -the breach, but the 4th the garrison’s fire was also increased -by additional guns, six of the besiegers’ pieces were disabled, -principally by their own fire, and the batteries only -slightly marked the bank of clay. At Christoval, the fort -was much injured, and some damage done to the castle also -from the batteries on that side, yet the guns were so soft -that the rate of firing was much reduced. In the night -the new battery was armed, the damaged works repaired, -and next day, as the enemy had caused a gun from Christoval -to plunge into the trenches on the castle side, the -parallel was deepened and traverses constructed to protect -the troops.</p> - -<p>Fifteen uninjured pieces still played against the castle, -and the bank of clay fell away in flakes, yet it remained -perpendicular.</p> - -<p>In the night the parallel against the castle was extended, -a fresh battery was traced out five hundred and twenty -yards from the breach, and on the Christoval side new -batteries were opened and some old ones abandoned. The -garrison now began to retrench the castle breach, and their -workmen were soon covered, while from Christoval two -pieces of artillery plunged directly into the trenches with -great effect: on the other hand the clay bank took a slope -nearly practicable, and stray shells set fire to the houses -nearest the castle.</p> - -<p>On the 6th, one of two breaches in Christoval being -judged practicable, a company of grenadiers with twelve -ladders was ordered to assault, a second turned the fort to -divert the enemy’s attention, three hundred men cut the -communication between the fort and the bridge, and a detachment -with a six-pounder moved into the valley of -the Gebora to prevent any passage of the Guadiana by -boats.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">First Assault of Christoval.</span> (June, 1811.)</h3> - -<p>Major M‘Intosh of the 85th Regiment led the stormers, -preceded by a forlorn hope under Lieutenant Dyas of the -51st, and that gallant gentleman, guided by the engineer -Forster, a young man of uncommon bravery, reached the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_106">106</span> -glacis and descended the ditch without being discovered; -but the French had cleared the rubbish away, seven feet of -perpendicular wall remained, carts and pointed beams of -wood chained together were placed above, and shells were -ranged along the ramparts to roll down. The forlorn hope -finding the opening impracticable was retiring, when the -main body, which had been exposed to a flank fire from the -town as well as a direct fire from the fort, came leaping -into the ditch with ladders and strove to escalade; but the -ladders were too short, the garrison, seventy-five men -besides the cannoneers, made a stout resistance, the confusion -and mischief occasioned by the bursting of the shells -was great, and the stormers were beaten off with the loss of -more than a hundred men.</p> - -<p>Bad success produces disputes. The failure was attributed -by some to the breach being impracticable from the -first, by others to the confusion which arose after the main -body had entered. French writers affirm that the breach, -practicable on the night of the 5th was not so on the 6th, -because the besiegers did not attack until midnight and -thus gave the workmen time to remove the ruins and raise -fresh obstacles: the bravery of the soldiers, who were provided -with three muskets each, did the rest. The combinations -for the assault were however not well calculated: the -storming party was too weak, the ladders too few and short, -the breach not sufficiently scoured by the fire of the batteries, -and the leading troops were repulsed before the main -body had descended the ditch. In such attacks the supports -should almost form one body with the leaders, for the sense -of power derived from numbers is a strong incentive to -valour, and obstacles, insurmountable to a few, vanish -before a multitude.</p> - -<p>During the storm six iron guns were placed in battery -against the castle, but two brass pieces became unserviceable, -and the following day three others were disabled. -However the bank of clay seemed to offer now a good -slope, and in the night the engineer Patton examined it -closely; he was mortally wounded in returning, yet lived -to report it practicable. At Christoval the garrison continued -to clear away the ruins at the foot of the breach, -made interior retrenchments with bales of wool and other<span class="pagenum" id="Page_107">107</span> -materials, ranged huge shells and barrels of powder with -matches along the ramparts, and gave the defenders, chosen -men, four muskets each. In this state of affairs news -came that Drouet was close to Llerena, and Marmont on the -move from Salamanca, wherefore Wellington ordered another -assault on Christoval at both breaches. Four hundred -men, carrying sixteen long ladders, were employed, the -supports were better closed up, the appointed hour was nine -instead of twelve, and more detachments were planted on -the right and left to cut off communication with the town; -but Phillipon, in opposition, made the garrison two hundred -strong.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Second Assault of Christoval.</span> (June, 1811.)</h3> - -<p>Major M‘Geechy commanded the stormers, the forlorn -hope, again led by the gallant Dyas, was accompanied by -the engineer Hunt, and a little after nine o’clock the leading -troops bounded forward, followed by the support, -amidst a shattering fire of musketry which killed M‘Geechy, -Hunt, and many men upon the glacis. Loudly shouted the -British as they jumped into the ditch, but the French scoffingly -called them on, and rolling down the barrels of powder -and shells made fearful and rapid havoc. A column -had been designed for each breach, yet both came together -at the main breach, where some confusion about the ladders -caused only a few to be reared, and the enemy, standing -on the ramparts, bayoneted the foremost assailants, overturned -the ladders, and again poured their destructive fire -upon the crowd below until one hundred and forty fell and -the rest retired.</p> - -<p>The castle breach remained for assault, yet the troops -could not form between the top and the retrenchments -behind the opening unless Christoval was taken, and its -guns used to clear the interior of the castle; but to take -Christoval required several days; hence, as Soult was ready -to advance, the stores were removed and the attack turned -into a blockade, the allies having lost four hundred men and -officers: the process of siege had been altogether false and -irregular.</p> - -<p>Marmont now joined Soult, Spencer joined Wellington,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_108">108</span> -and the 19th of June the French armies entered Badajos. -The allies were only a few miles off holding both sides of -the Caya, a small river flowing between Elvas and Campo -Mayor into the Guadiana: yet their disposition was so skilfully -concealed by undulating ground and woods, that on -the 23rd the French marshals were forced to send out two -exploring bodies of cavalry to obtain information. One -column cut off a squadron of the 11th Light Dragoons, and -the 2nd German Hussars escaped it with difficulty; the -other column was checked by the heavy dragoons and -Madden’s Portuguese cavalry with a sharp skirmish, in -which happened a single combat similar to that between -Ariosto’s Rogero and Mandricardo. An English horseman, -standing high in his stirrups with raised sword, encountered -a French officer who pierced him under the arm; slowly -the weapon was driven through his body, yet no shrinking -motion could be observed; he seemed only to give more -force to his descending weapon, which bit into the Frenchman’s -brain and both fell dead together.</p> - -<p>Soult and Marmont had above sixty thousand men in line, -seven thousand being cavalry, with ninety guns. Wellington -had only twenty-eight thousand sabres and bayonets, -and the country, a cavalry one, furnished no position to -compensate for inferior numbers: a battle gained would -certainly have terminated the war. Yet the crisis passed -without mischief, because Wellington so concealed his weakness, -and outfaced his enemies with such audacity, such a -blending of resolution and genius that the French marshals -retired and separated without striking! The political and -military difficulties supported and overcome by the English -general at this period were indeed most extraordinary, and -must be sought for in my History of the War, from which -this work, treating only of combats, is extracted.</p> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_109">109</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="BOOK_VI">BOOK VI.</h2> -</div> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>Blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo—Combat of Elbodon—Combat of Aldea de -Ponte—Surprise of Aroyo de Molinos—Defence of Tarifa—English -Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo—Third English Siege of Badajos—Assault -of Picurina—Assault of Badajos.</p></div> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo.</span> (Sept. 1811.)</h3> - -<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">After</span> the second siege of Badajos the contest in the Peninsula -presented a new phase. French reinforcements were -poured into Spain, forty thousand old soldiers entered by -the northern line alone, and General Dorsenne took command -of the <em>Army of the North</em>, which now contained seventeen -thousand of Napoleon’s young guard. The king had a -particular force about Madrid called the <em>Army of the Centre</em>; -Soult commanded the <em>Army of the South</em>; Marmont the <em>Army -of Portugal</em>, with which, by the emperor’s orders, he took -post in the valley of the Tagus, leaving a division at -Truxillo south of that river, establishing a bridge of communication -at Almaraz, which he fortified on both sides -strongly.</p> - -<p>This disposition of the French armies was at once offensive -and defensive. Portugal was menaced from the north -by Dorsenne, who had Ciudad Rodrigo as an advanced place -of arms; from the south by Soult, who had Badajos for an -advanced place of arms; in the centre by Marmont, who -could march on Abrantes, join Dorsenne, or unite with -Soult. In defence the French were still more powerful. If -Wellington assailed Dorsenne, the latter by retiring could -concentrate a great force, while Marmont acted on the English -right flank; and together they could present seventy -thousand men in line. If he assailed Soult, as he had indeed -designed before the failure of Badajos, Marmont could -act on his left flank, and, united with Soult, could present -sixty-five thousand fighting men. If he marched against -Marmont by either bank of the Tagus, that marshal, reinforced -with detachments from Dorsenne, Soult, and the king, -could deliver battle with more than seventy thousand men.</p> - -<p>The English general could not contend with such powerful -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_110">110</span> -armies beyond the mountains of Portugal, yet from -political pressure he could not stand still, and there were -defects in his adversaries’ breast-plate through which he -hoped to pierce. He saw that Badajos and Rodrigo were -isolated and difficult to provision; that each depended for -succour on the junction of armies under generals of equal -authority, ill disposed to act together, and whose communications -were long and uneasy, furnishing pretences -for non-coöperation. Marmont had indeed a direct line of -intercourse with Dorsenne across the Gredos mountains, by -the fortified pass of Baños; but to reach Soult the Tagus -was to be crossed at Almaraz, the defiles of Estremadura -and the passes of the Morena to be threaded before a junction -could be made in the plains of Badajos: wherefore, -General Girard, having the remains of Mortier’s army, -called <em>the fifth corps</em>, was employed as a moving column in -Estremadura, to support Badajos and connect the army of -Portugal with that of Soult.</p> - -<p>In this state of affairs Wellington, who had received large -reinforcements after the siege of Badajos, left General Hill, -in August, with twelve thousand men of all arms to keep -Girard in check, and in person marched to the north, under -pretence of seeking healthy quarters for his sickly troops, -really to blockade Ciudad Rodrigo, which an intercepted -letter described as wanting provisions; it had however been -previously supplied by Bessières before he quitted his command, -and this effort was frustrated. The army was then -placed near the sources of the Agueda and Coa, close to the -line of communication between Marmont and Dorsenne, and -preparations were made for a siege, in the notion that the -last general’s force was weak: but that also was an error, -and when discovered, a blockade was established. Almeida, -whose renewed walls had been destroyed by Spencer when -he marched to the south, was now repaired for a place of -arms, the bridge over the Coa was restored, and with the -utmost subtilty of combination and the most extensive -arrangements the English general, while appearing only to -blockade, secretly prepared for a siege. All his art was -indeed required, for though the Anglo-Portuguese were at -this time eighty thousand on paper, with ninety guns,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_111">111</span> -twenty-two thousand men were in hospital; wherefore, -Hill’s corps being deducted, less than forty-five thousand -were on the watch to snatch a fortress which was in the -keeping of eighty thousand.</p> - -<p>In September Rodrigo called for succour, whereupon -Marmont and Dorsenne advanced to its relief with sixty -thousand men, six thousand being cavalry, and they had a -hundred pieces of artillery. Wellington could not fight this -great army beyond the Agueda, but would not retreat until -he had seen all their force, lest a detachment should relieve -the place to his dishonour. In this view he took the following -positions.</p> - -<p>Picton’s division, reinforced with three squadrons of -German and British cavalry, was placed at the heights of -Elbodon and Pastores, on the left of the Agueda, within -three miles of Rodrigo. The light division with some -squadrons of cavalry and six guns, were posted on the right -of the Agueda, at the Vadillo, a river with a rugged channel -falling into the Agueda three miles above Rodrigo: from -this line an enemy coming from the eastern passes of the -hills could be discerned. The sixth division and Anson’s -brigade of cavalry, forming the left of the army, was under -General Graham at Espeja, on the Lower Azava, with -advanced posts at Carpio and Marialva, from whence to -Rodrigo was eight miles over a plain. Julian Sanchez’s -Partida watched the Lower Agueda, and the heads of columns -were thus presented to the fortress on three points, namely, -Vadillo, Pastores and Espeja. Two brigades of heavy cavalry -on the Upper Azava, supported by Pack’s Portuguese, connected -Graham with Elbodon; but he was very distant from -Guinaldo, the pivot of operations, and to obviate the danger -of a flank march in retreat the first and seventh divisions -were posted in succession towards Guinaldo. The army -was thus spread out on different roads, like the sticks of a -fan, having their point of union on the Coa.</p> - -<p>This disposition was faulty. Broad heights lining the -left bank of the Agueda ended abruptly above the villages -of Elbodon and Pastores, and were flanked in their whole -length by woods and great plains, extending from Rodrigo -to the Coa; they could not therefore be held against an -enemy commanding those plains, and if the French pushed<span class="pagenum" id="Page_112">112</span> -along them suddenly, beyond Guinaldo, the distant wings -could be cut off. At Guinaldo however, three field redoubts -had been constructed on high open ground, to impose upon -the enemy and so gain time to assemble and feel his disposition -for a battle, because a retreat beyond the Coa was to be -avoided if possible.</p> - -<p>On the 23rd the French encamped behind the hills northeast -of Rodrigo, and a strong detachment, entering the -plain, looked at the light division on the Vadillo and returned.</p> - -<p>The 24th, six thousand cavalry and four divisions of -infantry crossed the hills in two columns to introduce the -convoy, while on the English side the fourth division -occupied the position of Guinaldo, and the redoubts were -completed. No other change was made, for it was thought -the French would not advance further; but the 25th, soon -after daybreak, fourteen squadrons of the imperial guards -drove Graham’s outpost from Carpio across the Azava; the -Lancers of Berg then crossed that river in pursuit, but were -flanked by some infantry in a wood and beaten back by two -squadrons of the 14th and 16th Dragoons, who re-occupied -the post of Carpio. During this skirmish, fourteen battalions -of infantry and thirty squadrons of cavalry, with -twelve guns, under Montbrun, passing the Agueda at Rodrigo -marched towards Guinaldo; the road divided there, -one branch turning the Elbodon heights on the French -right the other leading through Pastores and Elbodon, and -as the point of divarication was covered by a gentle ridge, it -was doubtful which branch would be taken. Soon that -doubt vanished. The cavalry pouring along the right-hand -road leading to Guinaldo, drove in the advanced posts, and -without waiting for their infantry fell on.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Combat of Elbodon.</span> (Sept. 1811.)</h3> - -<p>The action began disadvantageously for the allies. The -left of the third division was turned, the 74th and 60th Regiments, -being at Pastores, far on the right, were too distant -to be called in, and Picton, having three other regiments -at Elbodon, could take no immediate part in the fight. -Wellington sent to Guinaldo for a brigade of the fourth<span class="pagenum" id="Page_113">113</span> -division, and meanwhile directed General Colville to draw -up the 77th and 5th British Regiments, the 21st Portuguese -and two brigades of artillery of the same nation, on a hill -over which the road to Guinaldo passed, supporting their -flanks with Alten’s three squadrons. This position, convex -towards the enemy, was covered, front and flanks, by deep -ravines; but it was too extensive, and before Picton could -come from Elbodon the crisis was over. Vainly the Portuguese -guns sent their shot through Montbrun’s horsemen, -they crossed the ravine in half squadrons, and with amazing -vigour rode up the rough height on three sides; neither -the loose fire of the infantry nor the artillery stopped them, -but they were checked by the fine fighting of the cavalry, -who charged the heads of the ascending masses, not once -but twenty times, and always with a good will, maintaining -the upper ground for an hour.</p> - -<p>It was astonishing to see so few troopers resist that -surging multitude even on such steep ground; but when -Montbrun, obstinate to win, brought up his artillery, his -horsemen, gaining ground in the centre, cut down some -gunners and captured the Portuguese guns, and at the same -time one German squadron, charging too far, got entangled -in the ravines. The danger was then imminent, but suddenly -the 5th Regiment, led by Major Ridge, a daring man, -dashed bodily into the midst of the French cavalry and retook -the artillery, which again opened, while the 77th, supported -by the 21st Portuguese, vigorously repulsed the -enemy on the left. These charges of infantry against a -powerful cavalry, which had room to expand, could however -only check the foe at particular points, and Montbrun -pressed with fresh masses against the left of the allies, -while other squadrons penetrated between their right and -the village of Elbodon, from the inclosures and vineyards of -which Picton was, with difficulty and some confusion, extricating -his regiments. He could give no succour, the brigade -of the fourth division was not in sight, the French -infantry was rapidly approaching, and Wellington therefore -directed both Picton and Colville to fall back and unite in -the plain behind.</p> - -<p>Colville, forming his battalions in two squares, descended -at once from the hill, but Picton had a considerable distance<span class="pagenum" id="Page_114">114</span> -to move, there was a great interval, and at that moment, the -cavalry, fearing to be surrounded, galloped for refuge to the -Portuguese regiment, which was farthest in retreat. Then -the 5th and 77th, two weak battalions formed in one square, -were quite exposed, and in an instant the whole of the -French horsemen came thundering down upon them. But -how vain, how fruitless to match the sword with the musket, -to send the charging horseman against the steadfast veteran! -The multitudinous squadrons, rending the skies with their -shouts, closed upon the glowing squares like the falling -edges of a burning crater, and were as instantly rejected, -scorched and scattered abroad; then a rolling peal of musketry -echoed through the hills, bayonets glittered at the -edge of the smoke, and with firm and even step the British -regiments came forth like the holy men from the Assyrian’s -furnace.</p> - -<p>Picton now effected his junction and the whole retired -to Guinaldo, about six miles. The French would not renew -the close attack, yet plied shot and shell until the entrenched -camp was gained; there the fourth division presented a fresh -front, Pack then came in from Campillo, the heavy cavalry -from the Upper Azava, and as it was near dusk the action -ceased. The 74th and 60th Regiments, posted at Pastores, -were abandoned by this retreat, but they crossed the Agueda -at a ford, and moving up the right bank reached Guinaldo in -the night after a march of fifteen hours.</p> - -<p>Graham had early received orders to fall back on the first -division, yet to keep posts of observation on the Azava, while -Sanchez’s infantry went behind the Coa; the guerilla chief -himself passed with his cavalry to the French rear, and the -seventh division was withdrawn behind the left wing, which -was now in line with the centre, though still distant. The -light division should have come by Robledo to Fuente Guinaldo; -Craufurd received the order at three o’clock, heard -the cannonade, and might have reached it before midnight; -but fearing a march in darkness he merely retired a league -from the Vadillo, which was immediately passed by fifteen -hundred French; Guinaldo was thus maintained by only -fourteen thousand men, two thousand six hundred being -cavalry. Graham was ten miles distant; the light division, -debarred of a direct route by the enemy, was sixteen miles<span class="pagenum" id="Page_115">115</span> -distant; the fifth division, posted at Payo in the mountains, -was twelve miles distant; and during the night and the following -day, Marmont united sixty thousand men in front of -Guinaldo. The English general was thus in great danger, yet -he would not abandon the light division, which, intercepted by -the French cavalry at Robledo, did not arrive until after -three o’clock in the evening. Marmont’s fortune was fixed -in that hour! He knew not how matters really stood. He -detached a strong column by the valley of the Azava to -menace the allies’ left, and made an ostentatious display of -the Imperial Guards in the plain, instead of attacking an adversary -who laughed to see him so employed, and soon -changed the state of affairs.</p> - -<p>In the night, by an able concentric movement, Wellington -united his whole army on new ground between the Coa and -the sources of the Agueda, twelve miles behind Guinaldo. -Marmont, unconscious of his advantages, instead of troubling -this difficult movement had also retired in the night, and -was marching back when the scouts of his column in the -valley of Azava reported that the allies were in retreat, -and their divisions widely separated. Then discovering -all the deceit of Guinaldo, and the escape of the light -division, he prophetically exclaimed, alluding to Napoleon’s -fortune, <em>And Wellington, he also has a star.</em> In this mood he -would have continued his retreat, but it is said Dorsenne -forced him to wheel round and pursue: Wellington was -then however in a strong position behind the stream of -the Villa Maior, where he could not be turned, and where -it covered all the practicable roads leading to the bridges -and fords of the Coa.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Combat of Aldeaponte.</span> (Sept. 1811.)</h3> - -<p>The French moved by two roads against the right and -centre. Checked on the first by the light division, on the -second their horsemen drove the cavalry posts across the -Villa Maior and took possession of Aldeaponte, where at -twelve o’clock the head of their infantry attacked a brigade -of the fourth division, posted on opposing heights, under -General Pakenham. Wellington arriving at that moment -directed a charge, and the French were driven back; they<span class="pagenum" id="Page_116">116</span> -attempted to turn the brigade by a wood on their own left -while their cavalry advanced to the foot of the hills, but the -artillery sufficed to baffle the effort, and then the English -general, taking the offensive, turned their left and seized -the opposite hills: this finished the action and Aldeaponte -was re-occupied. Wellington, who had been much -exposed to fire, rode to another part, yet scarcely had he departed -when the French from the other road joined those -near Aldeaponte, and at five o’clock retook the village; -Pakenham recovered it, but the enemy was very numerous, -the country rugged, and so wooded he could not tell what -was passing on the flanks: wherefore, knowing the chosen -ground of battle was behind the Coa, he abandoned Aldeaponte -for his original post.</p> - -<p>In the night the allies retreated, and on the morning of -the 28th occupied a new and strong position in a deep loop -of the Coa, where it could only be attacked on a narrow -front; but the French, who had brought only a few days’ -provisions and could gather none in that country, retired -the same day. Dorsenne marched to Salamanca, a strong -division was posted at Alba de Tormes to communicate with -Marmont, and the latter resumed his old position in the -valley of the Tagus. The light division, reinforced by some -cavalry, now resumed the nominal blockade of Ciudad -Rodrigo, in concert with Julian Sanchez; the rest of the -army was cantoned on both sides of the Coa and head-quarters -were fixed at Freneda.</p> - -<p>Only three hundred men and officers fell in these combats -on the British side. The French lost more, because of the -unreturned fire at Elbodon, and here a fine chivalric action -on their side merits notice. In one of the cavalry fights, an -officer in the act of striking at Felton Harvey of the 14th -Dragoons, perceived that he had but one arm and with -a rapid change brought down his sword to a salute and -passed on!</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Surprise of Arroyo de Molinos.</span> (Oct. 1811.)</h3> - -<p>While Rodrigo was being blockaded, General Hill co-operated -with the Spaniards in Estremadura against General -Drouet, who first joined Girard, but after various movements<span class="pagenum" id="Page_117">117</span> -returned to the Morena, leaving his colleague at -Caceres between the Tagus and the Guadiana. From that -place Hill drove him the 26th of October, and hoping to cut -him off from the bridge of Merida, moved by a cross road -next day. On the march he heard Girard had halted in -Arroyo de Molinos, leaving a rear-guard on the Caceres road—thus -showing he knew not of the cross-road movement -and looked for pursuit only from Caceres. With a rapid decision -and a forced march the English general moved in the -night upon Alcuesca, just one league from Arroyo, which -was in a plain, and close behind it rose a rocky sierra, -crescent-shaped, and about two miles wide on the chord. -From Alcuesca one road led direct to Arroyo, another entered -it on the left, and three led from it, the most distant of the -last being the Truxillo road, which rounded the extremity -of the sierra; the nearest was the Merida road, and between -them was that of Medellin. The weather was very stormy -and wet, but no fires were permitted in the allies’ camp, -and at two o’clock in the morning of the 28th the troops -moved to a low ridge half a mile from Arroyo, under cover of -which they formed three bodies—the infantry on the wings, -the cavalry in the centre. The left column marched straight -upon the village, the right towards the extreme point of the -sierra, where the Truxillo road turned the horn of the crescent, -the cavalry kept the centre.</p> - -<p>One brigade of Girard’s division had marched at four -o’clock by the road of Medellin, but Dombrouski’s brigade -and the cavalry of Briche were still in the place, and the -horses of the rear-guard, unbridled, were tied to trees. The -infantry were gathering on the Medellin road outside the -village, and Girard was in a house waiting for his horse, -when two British officers galloped into the street and in an -instant all was confusion; hastily the cavalry bridled their -horses and the infantry ran to their alarm-posts, but a tempest -raged, a thick mist rolled down the craggy mountain, a -terrific shout was heard amidst the clatter of the elements, -and with the driving storm the 71st and 92nd Regiments -came charging down. The French rear-guard of horsemen, -fighting and struggling hard, were driven to the end of the -village, where the infantry, forming their squares, endeavoured -to cover the main body of the cavalry; but then the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_118">118</span> -71st, lining the garden walls, opened a galling fire on the -nearest square, the 92nd, filing out of the streets, formed -upon the French right, and the 50th Regiment, following -closely, secured the prisoners.</p> - -<p>The rest of the column, headed by the Spanish cavalry, -skirted outside the houses to intercept the line of retreat, -and soon the guns opened on the squares, and the 13th -Dragoons captured the French artillery, while the 9th Dragoons -and German Hussars dispersed their cavalry. Girard, -an intrepid officer, although wounded, still kept his infantry -together, retreating by the Truxillo road; but the right -column of the allies was in possession of that line, the -cavalry and artillery were close upon his flank, and the left -column followed fast; his men fell by fifties and his situation -was desperate, yet he would not surrender, and giving -the word to disperse endeavoured to scale the almost inaccessible -rocks of the sierra. His pursuers, not less obstinate, -immediately divided. The Spaniards ascended the hills at -an easier point beyond his left; the 39th Regiment and Ashworth’s -Portuguese turned the mountain by the Truxillo -road; the 28th and 34th, led by General Howard, followed -him step by step up the rocks, taking prisoners, but finally -the pursuers, heavily loaded, were beaten in speed by men -who had thrown away their arms and packs. Girard, Dombrouski, -and Briche, escaped into the Guadalupe mountains, -and then crossing the Guadiana at Orellana, on -the 9th of November rejoined Drouet with six hundred -men, the remains of three thousand: they were said to be -the finest troops then in Spain, and their resolution in -such an appalling situation was no mean proof of their -excellence.</p> - -<p>Thirteen hundred prisoners, including General Bron and -the Prince of Aremberg, all the artillery, baggage, commissariat, -and a contribution just raised, were taken. The -allies had seventy killed and wounded, and one officer, -Lieutenant Strenowitz, was taken. He was an Austrian, -and distinguished for courage and successful enterprises, -but he had abandoned the French to join Julian Sanchez, -and was liable to death by the laws of war. Originally -forced into the French service he was, in reality, no deserter, -and General Hill applied frankly in his favour to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_119">119</span> -Drouet, who was so good-tempered that, while smarting -under this disaster, he released his prisoner.</p> - -<p>This exploit set all the French corps in motion to revenge -it; yet on the 28th of November Hill, by a forced march, -again surprised three hundred infantry and some hussars -under Captain Neveux, who however lost only forty men, -escaping the British cavalry, said his generous antagonist, -by “<em>the intrepid and admirable manner in which he retreated</em>.”</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Defence of Tarifa.</span> (Dec. 1811.)</h3> - -<p>Soult had long resolved to reduce the maritime town of -Tarifa, but General Campbell, governor of Gibraltar, equally -resolute to prevent him, threw in an English garrison, under -Colonel Skerrett. The defences were ancient, the place -being encircled with towers connected by an archery wall, -irregular, without a ditch, and too thin to resist even field -artillery. It was commanded also by heights within cannon-shot, -but the English engineer Smith<a id="FNanchor_21" href="#Footnote_21" class="fnanchor">21</a> adapted the defence -to the peculiarities of ground so skilfully as to fix the -enemy’s attention entirely to one point, which offered facilities -for an internal resistance, to begin when the weak -ramparts should be broken.</p> - -<p>Tarifa was cloven by a periodical torrent, entering at the -east and passing out at the west. It was barred at the entrance -by a tower with a portcullis, in front of which palisades -were planted across its bed. The houses within the -walls were strongly built on inclined planes, rising from -each side of the torrent; and at the exit of the water were -two massive structures, called the tower and castle of the -Gusmans, both looking up the hollow formed by the inclined -planes. From these structures, a sandy neck, prolonged by -a causeway for eight hundred yards, joined the town to an -island, whose perpendicular sides forbade entrance save by -the causeway which ended on an unfinished entrenchment -and battery.</p> - -<p>On the neck of land were sand hills, the highest, called -the Catalina, being scarped and crowned with a field-work -holding a twelve-pounder. This hill masked the causeway -towards the enemy, and with the tower of the Gusmans,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_120">120</span> -which was armed with a ship eighteen-pounder, flanked the -western front of the tower. This tower gun also shot clear -over Tarifa to the slope where the French batteries were -expected, and there were a ship of the line, a frigate, and -some gun-boats, anchored to flank the approaches.</p> - -<p>Smith deterred the enemy from attacking the western -front by the flanking fire of a fortified convent beyond the -walls, by the Catalina hill, and by the appearance of the -shipping; but he deceitfully tempted an attack on the -eastern front and the line of the torrent, whose bed rendered -the inner depth of wall greater than the outer. There he -loopholed the houses behind, opened communications to the -rear, and barricaded the streets; so that the enemy, after -forcing the breach, would have been confined between the -houses on the inclined planes, exposed on each side to musketry -from loopholes and windows, and in front to a fire -from the Gusmans, which looked up the bed of the torrent; -finally the garrison could have taken refuge in that castle -and tower, which, high and massive, were fitted to cover the -evacuation, and were provided with ladders for the troops -to descend and retreat to the island under protection of the -Catalina.</p> - -<p>There was no want of guns. Besides those of the Catalina, -there were in the island twelve pieces, comprising -four twenty-four pounders and two ten-inch mortars; in -the town were six field-pieces, with four cohorns on the -east front; an eighteen-pounder was on the Gusmans, a -howitzer on the portcullis tower, and two field-pieces were -in reserve for sallies: yet most of the island ordnance was -mounted after the investment, and the walls and towers of -the town were too weak and narrow to sustain heavy guns; -hence only three field-pieces and the cohorns did in fact -reply to the enemy’s fire.</p> - -<p>The garrison, including six hundred Spanish infantry and -one hundred horse of that nation, amounted to two thousand -five hundred men, of whom seven hundred were in the -island, one hundred in the Catalina, two hundred in the -convent, and fifteen hundred in the town.</p> - -<p>On the 19th of December, General Laval, having eight -thousand men, drove in the advanced posts, but was with a -sharp skirmish designedly led towards the eastern front.</p> - -<p>The 20th the place was invested, and the 21st some -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_121">121</span> -French troops having incautiously approached the western -front, Captain Wren of the 11th, suddenly descended -from the Catalina and carried them off. In the night the -enemy approached close to the walls of that front, but in -the morning Wren again fell on them; and at the same time -a sally of discovery was made from the convent so vigorously -that Lieutenant Welstead of the 82nd, entering one -of the enemy’s camps captured a field-piece; he was unable -to bring it off in face of the French reserves, yet the latter -were drawn by the skirmish under the fire of the ships, of -the island, and of the town, whereby they suffered severely -and with difficulty recovered the captured piece.</p> - -<p>In the night of the 22nd the anticipations of the British -engineer were realized. The enemy broke ground five -hundred yards from the eastern front, and worked assiduously -until the 26th, under a destructive fire, replying -principally with wall-pieces, which would have done much -mischief if the garrison had not been copiously supplied -with sand-bags.</p> - -<p>On the 23rd the ships were driven off in a gale; on the -29th the French guns opened against the town and their -howitzers against the island; the piece at the Gusmans was -dismounted, yet quickly re-established; but the ramparts -came down by flakes, and in a few hours opened a wide -breach a little to the English right of the portcullis tower. -Skerrett then proposed to abandon the place, and though -strenuously opposed by Major King and the engineer Smith, -he would have done so, if General Campbell, hearing of this -intention, had not called away the transports. Tarifa was -indeed open to assault and escalade. But behind the breach -the depth to the street was fourteen feet, and Smith had -covered the ground below with iron gratings, having every -second bar turned up; the houses were also prepared and -garrisoned, and the troops well disposed on the ramparts, -each regiment having its own quarter. The breach was -held by the 87th under Colonel Gough.<a id="FNanchor_22" href="#Footnote_22" class="fnanchor">22</a> On his left -were some riflemen: on his right some Spaniards should -have been, yet were not, and two companies of the 47th -took their place.</p> - -<p>In the night of the 29th the enemy fired salvos of grape, -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_122">122</span> -but the besieged cleared the foot of the breach between the -discharges.</p> - -<p>The 30th the breaching fire was renewed, and the wall, -broken for sixty feet, offered an easy ascent; yet the besieged -again removed the rubbish, and in the night were augmenting -the defences, when, flooded by rain, the torrent brought -down from the French camp a mass of planks, fascines, -gabions, and dead bodies, which broke the palisades, bent -the portcullis back, and with the surge of waters injured -the defences behind: a new passage was thus opened in the -wall, yet the damage was repaired before morning, and the -troops confidently awaited the assault.</p> - -<p>In the night the torrent subsided as quickly as it had -risen, and at daylight a living stream of French grenadiers -gliding swiftly down its bed, as if assured of victory, arrived -without shout or tumult within a few yards of the walls; -but then, instead of quitting the hollow to reach the breach, -they dashed like the torrent of the night against the portcullis. -The 87th, previously silent and observant, as if at -a spectacle, now arose and with a shout and a crashing -volley smote the head of the French column; the leading -officer, covered with wounds, fell against the portcullis -grate and gave up his sword through the bars to Colonel -Gough: the French drummer, a gallant boy, while beating -the charge dropped lifeless by his officer’s side, and the -dead and wounded filled the hollow. The survivors breaking -out right and left, and spreading along the slopes of -ground under the ramparts, opened an irregular musketry, -and at the same time men from the trenches leaped into -pits digged in front and shot fast; but no diversion at other -points was made and the storming column was dreadfully -shattered. The ramparts streamed fire, and a field-piece -sent a tempest of grape whistling through the French ranks -in such a dreadful manner that, unable to endure the -torment, they plunged once more into the hollow and regained -their camp, while a shout of victory mingled with -the sound of musical instruments passed round the wall of -the town.</p> - -<p>The allies had five officers wounded, and thirty-one -men killed or hurt; the French dead covered the slopes<span class="pagenum" id="Page_123">123</span> -in front of the rampart, and choked the bed of the river: -ten wounded officers, of whom only one survived, were -brought in by the breach, and Skerrett, compassionating -the sufferings of the others, and admiring their bravery, -permitted Laval to fetch them off. The siege was then -suspended, for the rain had partially ruined the French -batteries, interrupted their communications, and stopped -their supplies; and the torrent, again swelling, broke -the stockades of the allies and injured their retrenchments: -some vessels also, coming from Gibraltar with ammunition, -were wrecked on the coast. Nevertheless a fresh -assault was expected until the night of the 4th, when frequent -firing in the French camp without any bullets reaching -the town, indicated that the enemy were destroying -guns previous to retreating. Hence, at daylight the besieged, -issuing from the convent, commenced a skirmish with the -rear-guard, but were impeded by a heavy storm and returned, -after making a few prisoners. Laval’s misfortunes did not -end there. His troops had contracted sickness, many deserted, -and it was computed the expedition cost him a -thousand men, while the allies lost only one hundred and -fifty, and but one officer, Longley of the engineers, was -killed.</p> - -<p>Such is the simple tale of Tarifa, yet the true history of -its defence cannot there be found. Colonel Skerrett obtained -the credit, but he and Lord Proby, second in command, -always wished to abandon both town and island. It -was the engineer Smith’s vigour and capacity which overmatched -the enemy’s strength without, and the weakness of -those commanders within, repressing despondency where he -failed to excite confidence. Next in merit was the artillery -captain, Mitchel, a noble soldier who has since perished in -the Syrian campaign against Ibrahim Pasha: his talent and -energy at Tarifa were conspicuous.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">English Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo.</span> (Jan. 1812.)</h3> - -<p>Lord Wellington, unable to maintain the blockade of -Rodrigo, had withdrawn behind the Coa in November and -widely spread his army for provisions; but the year 1812 -opened favourably for his views. Napoleon, then preparing -for his gigantic invasion of Russia, had recalled from Spain<span class="pagenum" id="Page_124">124</span> -many old officers and sixty thousand of the best soldiers, -including all the Imperial Guards. The <em>Army of the North</em>, -thus reduced, was ordered to quarter about Burgos, while -the <em>Army of Portugal</em>, leaving troops to guard Almaraz, -moved across the Gredos mountains into the Salamanca -country. It had been reinforced with eighteen thousand -men, but was spread for subsistence from Salamanca to the -Asturias on one side, and to the valley of the Tagus and -Toledo on the other; Montbrun also had been detached -from it to Valencia. The <em>Army of the Centre</em> was in a state -of great disorder, and the king and Marmont were at open -discord. In this state of affairs, seeing that Ciudad Rodrigo -was weakly guarded, that Marmont, deceived by previous -combination, had no suspicion of a siege, that Soult’s attention -was fixed on Tarifa; seeing in fine that opportunity -was ripe, Lord Wellington leaped with both feet on Ciudad -Rodrigo.</p> - -<p>Thirty-five thousand men, cavalry included, were disposable -for this siege, the materials for which were placed -in villages on the left of the Azava river, and the ammunition -in Almeida, where seventy pieces of ordnance had been -secretly collected. Hired carts and mules were employed -to bring up the stores, but for the guns the means of transport -were so scanty that only thirty-eight could be brought -to the trenches. A bridge was laid down on the Agueda, -six miles below the fortress, on the 1st of January, and -the investment was designed for the 6th, but the native -carters took two days to travel ten miles of good road with -empty carts, and it could not be made before the 8th: to -find fault with them was dangerous, as they deserted on -the slightest offence.</p> - -<p>Rodrigo was on high ground overhanging the right bank -of the Agueda; an old rampart thirty feet high, nearly -circular and flanked with a few projections, formed the -body of the fortress; a second bulwark, called a <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Fausse-braye</i>, -with a ditch and covered way, enclosed this rampart, -yet was placed so low on the descent, as to give little -cover to the main wall.</p> - -<p>Beyond the walls, on the side farthest from the river, the -suburb of Francisco was intrenched, and within it two large -convents were fortified; the convent of Santa Cruz on the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_125">125</span> -opposite side, near the river, was fortified as another outwork; -and nearly between those points was an isolated ridge -called the Little Teson, of less elevation than the place but -only one hundred and fifty yards distant.</p> - -<p>Behind the Little Teson and parallel to it, was another -ridge called the Great Teson, which at six hundred yards -overlooked the lesser one, and saw over it to the bottom of -the ditch.</p> - -<p>In the centre of the large Teson, on the edge towards -the town, was an enclosed and palisadoed redoubt called -Francisco, which was supported by the fire of two guns and -a howitzer, placed on the flat roof of a convent in the fortified -suburb. An old castle, forming part of the walls, gave access -to the bridge at pistol-shot distance, but was of little value -in defence.</p> - -<p>On the side of the Tesons the ground was rocky, the front -of the place better covered with outworks, and more fire -could be directed on the trenches; yet that line of attack -was adopted with reason, because elsewhere the batteries -must have been constructed on the edge of the counterscarp -to see low enough for breaching; whereas the lesser Teson -would enable them to strike over the glacis, and a deep gully -near the latter offered cover for the miner. It was therefore -resolved to storm Fort Francisco, form a lodgement there, -open the first parallel along the greater Teson, place thirty-three -pieces in counter-batteries, ruin the defences and drive -the besieged from the convent of Francisco; then, working -forward by the sap, breaching batteries were to be raised on -the lesser Teson and the counterscarp blowed in, while -seven guns demolished a weak turret on the left, and opened -a second breach to turn retrenchments behind the principal -one. Previous to breaking ground, Carlos España and -Julian Sanchez were pushed to the Tormes, and then four -British divisions and Pack’s Portuguese commenced the -siege; but as neither fuel nor cover were to be had on that -side of the Agueda, the troops kept their quarters on the -hither bank, cooking their provisions there and fording the -river each day in severe frost and snow. Eight hundred -carts drawn by horses had been constructed by the artificers, -and were now the surest means for bringing up ammunition; -but so many delays were anticipated from the irregularity<span class="pagenum" id="Page_126">126</span> -of the native carters and muleteers, and the chances of weather, -that Wellington calculated upon an operation of -twenty-four days. He hoped to steal that time from his -adversaries, yet knew, if he failed, the clash of arms would -draw their scattered troops to this quarter as tinkling -bells draw swarming bees: and to make them thus gather -and consume their magazines was an essential part of his -warfare.</p> - -<p>On the 8th of January the light division and Pack’s -Portuguese forded the Agueda, three miles above the fortress, -and took post beyond the great Teson, where they -remained quiet, and as there was no regular investment the -enemy did not think the siege was commenced. But in the -evening the troops stood to their arms, and Colonel Colborne, -now commanding the 52nd, taking two companies -from each regiment of the light division stormed the redoubt -of Francisco. This he did with so much fury that -the assailants appeared to be at one and the same time in -the ditch, mounting the parapets, fighting on the top of the -rampart, and forcing the gorge of the redoubt, where the -explosion of a French shell had burst the gate open. Of the -defenders, a few were killed and forty made prisoners. The -post being thus taken with a loss of only twenty-four men -and officers, a lodgement was begun on the right, because -the fort was instantly covered with shot and shells from the -town. This tempest continued through the night, yet at -daybreak the parallel, six hundred yards in length, was -sunk three feet deep, four wide, and a communication over -the Teson was completed: thus the siege gained several -days by this well-managed assault.</p> - -<p>On the 9th the first division took the trenches, and the -place was encircled by posts to prevent any external communication. -In the night twelve hundred workmen commenced -three counter-batteries for eleven guns each, under -a heavy fire of shells and grape; before daylight the -labourers obtained cover, and a ditch was sunk in front -to provide earth for the batteries, which were made eighteen -feet thick at top to resist the powerful artillery of the -place.</p> - -<p>On the 10th the fourth division relieved the trenches, and -a thousand men laboured, yet in great peril, for the besieged<span class="pagenum" id="Page_127">127</span> -had a superabundance of ammunition and did not -spare it. In the night a communication from the parallel -to the batteries was opened, and on the 11th the third division -undertook the siege.</p> - -<p>This day the magazines in the batteries were excavated -and the approaches widened; but the enemy’s fire was -destructive, and shells fell so on the ditch in front of the -batteries that the troops were withdrawn, and earth raised -from the inside. Great damage was also sustained from -salvos of shells with long fuzes, whose simultaneous explosion -cut away the parapets in a strange manner, and in the -night a howitzer from the garden of the Francisco convent -killed many men.</p> - -<p>On the 12th the light division resumed work, and the -riflemen during a thick fog digged pits for themselves in -front of the trenches, from whence they picked off the -enemy’s gunners; yet the weather was so cold and the besieged -shot so briskly little progress was made. The 13th, -the same causes impeded the labourers of the first division. -The scarcity of transport also baulked the operations, for -one third only of the native carts arrived, the drivers were -very indolent, most of the twenty-four pound ammunition -was still at Villa de Ponte, and intelligence arrived that -Marmont was preparing to succour the place. Wellington, -thus pressed, decided to open a breach with his counter-batteries, -which were only six hundred yards from the curtain, -and then storm without blowing in the counterscarp: -in other words, to overstep the rules of science and sacrifice -life rather than time, for the capricious Agueda might in -one night flood and enable a small French force to relieve -the place.</p> - -<p>The whole army was now brought up and posted in villages -on the Coa, ready to cross the Agueda and give -battle. Hill also sent a division across the Tagus, lest -Marmont, despairing to save Rodrigo, should fall on the -communications by Castello Branco and Villa Velha.</p> - -<p>In the night of the 13th the batteries were armed with -twenty-eight guns, the approaches were continued by the -flying sap, and the Santa Cruz convent was surprised by the -Germans of the first division, which secured the right flank -of the trenches.</p> - -<p>On the 14th the enemy, who had observed that the men -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_128">128</span> -in the trenches, when relieved, went off in a disorderly -manner, made a sally and overturned the gabions of the -sap; they even penetrated to the parallel, and were upon -the point of entering the batteries, when a few workmen -getting together checked them until a support arrived. -The guns were thus saved, but this sally, the death of the -engineer on duty, and the heavy fire from the town, delayed -the opening of the breaching-batteries. However, at half-past -four in the evening twenty-five heavy guns battered -the fausse-braye and ramparts, while two pieces smote the -convent of Francisco. Then was beheld a spectacle fearful -and sublime. For the French replied with more than fifty -pieces, and the bellowing of eighty large guns shook the -ground far and wide; the smoke rested in heavy volumes -upon the battlements of the place, or curled in light -wreaths about the numerous spires, and the shells hissing -through the air seemed fiery serpents leaping from the -darkness; the walls crashed to the stroke of the bullet, and -the distant mountains, faintly returning the sound, appeared -to moan over the falling city. When night put an end -to this turmoil, the quick clatter of musketry was heard -like the pattering of hail after a peal of thunder, for the -40th Regiment assaulted and carried the convent of Francisco, -and established itself in the suburb on the left of the -attack.</p> - -<p>Next day the ramparts were again battered, and fell so -fast it was judged expedient to commence the small breach, -wherefore in the night five more guns were mounted. The -16th, at daylight, the batteries recommenced, but at eight -o’clock a thick fog compelled them to desist; nevertheless -the small breach was open and the place was summoned, yet -without effect. At night the parallel on the Lower Teson -was extended, a sharp musketry was directed against the -great breach, and the riflemen of the light division, from -their pits, picked off the enemy’s gunners.</p> - -<p>The 17th the fire on both sides was heavy and the wall -was beaten down in large cantles; but several of the besiegers’ -guns were dismounted, their batteries injured, many -men killed, the general of artillery wounded, and the sap -entirely ruined. The riflemen in the pits were overpowered<span class="pagenum" id="Page_129">129</span> -with grape, yet towards evening recovered the upper -hand; the French could then only fire from distant embrasures, -and in the night a new battery against the lesser -breach was armed, and that on the Lower Teson was raised -to afford more cover.</p> - -<p>On the 18th, the besiegers’ fire being resumed with great -violence, a turret was shaken at the small breach, and the -large breach became practicable in the middle; the enemy -commenced retrenching it and the sap made no progress, -the engineer was badly wounded, and a twenty-four -pounder, bursting, killed several men. In the night the -battery on the Lower Teson was improved, and a field-piece -and howitzer from thence played on the great breach to -destroy the retrenchments.</p> - -<p>On the 19th both breaches became practicable, the assault -was ordered, the battering-guns were turned against the -artillery of the ramparts, and the order of attack terminated -with these remarkable words, “<em>Ciudad Rodrigo must be -stormed this evening</em>.”—“<em>We will do it</em>,” was the soldiers’ -comment.</p> - -<p>For the storm the third and light divisions and Pack’s -Portuguese were organized in four parts.</p> - -<p>1°. <i>Right attack.</i> On the extreme right, troops posted in -some houses beyond the bridge were to cross the river and -escalade an outwork in front of the castle, where there was -no ditch, but where two guns commanded the junction of -the counterscarp. On their left, two regiments, assembled -behind the convent of Santa Cruz with a third in reserve, -were to enter the ditch at the extremity of the counterscarp, -escalade the fausse-braye, and scour it on their left as far as -the great breach.</p> - -<p>2°. <i>Great breach.</i> One hundred and eighty men carrying -hay-bags were to move out of the second parallel, followed -by a storming party, and supported by Mackinnon’s brigade -of the third division.</p> - -<p>3°. <i>Left attack.</i> The light division, assembled behind the -convent of Francisco, was to send three rifle companies to -scour the fausse-braye on the right. At the same time a -storming party, preceded by men carrying hay-sacks and -followed by the division, was to assault the small breach, -detaching men, when the fausse-braye should be passed, to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_130">130</span> -their right to assist the main assault, to the left to force a -passage at the Salamanca gate.</p> - -<p>4°. <i>False attack.</i> An escalade, to be attempted by Pack’s -Portuguese at the opposite side of the town.</p> - -<p>The right attack was conducted by Colonel O’Toole. -Five hundred volunteers under Major Manners, with a -forlorn hope under Lieut. Mackie, composed the storming -party of the third division. Three hundred volunteers led -by Major George Napier,<a id="FNanchor_23" href="#Footnote_23" class="fnanchor">23</a> with a forlorn hope under Lieutenant -Gurwood, composed the storming party of the light -division.</p> - -<p>The deserters, of which there were many, had told the -governor the light division was come out of its turn, and it -must be to storm, yet he took no heed, and all the troops -reached their posts without seeming to attract attention; -but before the signal was given, and while Wellington, who -in person had pointed out the lesser breach to Major Napier, -was still on the ground, the attack at the right commenced, -and was instantly taken up along the whole line. The -space between the trenches and the ditch was then suddenly -covered with soldiers and ravaged by a tempest of grape -from the ramparts; for though the storming parties in the -centre jumped out of the parallel when the first shout arose, -so rapid were the troops on their right, that before they -could reach the ditch, Ridge, Dunkin, and Campbell, with -the 5th, 77th, and 94th Regiments, had already scoured the -fausse-braye, and pushed up the great breach amidst bursting -shells, the whistling of grape and musketry, and the -shrill cries of the French, who were driven fighting behind -the inner retrenchments. There they rallied, and, aided by -musketry from the houses, made hard battle for their post; -none would go back on either side; yet the British could -not get forward, and the bodies of men and officers, falling -in heaps, choked up the passage, which from minute to -minute was raked with grape, from two guns flanking the -breach, at the distance of a few yards; yet striving and -trampling alike upon dead and wounded these brave men -maintained the combat.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the stormers of the light division, who had<span class="pagenum" id="Page_131">131</span> -three hundred yards of ground to clear, would not wait for -the hay-bags, and with extraordinary swiftness running to -the crest of the glacis jumped down the scarp, a depth of -eleven feet, and rushed up the fausse-braye under a smashing -discharge of grape and musketry. The ditch was dark -and intricate, and the forlorn hope inclined to the left while -the stormers went straight to the breach, which was so narrow -at top that a gun placed across nearly barred the -opening; then the forlorn hope rejoined, and the whole -rushed up, yet the head, forcibly contracted as the ascent -narrowed, staggered under the fire. With the instinct -of self-preservation the men snapped their muskets -though they had not been allowed to load, and Napier, his -arm shattered by a grape-shot, went down, but in falling -called aloud to use the bayonet, while the unwounded officers -instantly and simultaneously sprung to the front: the -impulse of victory was thus given and with a furious shout -the breach was carried. The supporting regiments, coming -up abreast, then gained the rampart, the 52nd wheeled to -the left, the 43rd to the right, and the place was won. -During this contest, which lasted about ten minutes, the -fighting at the great breach was unabated: but when the -stormers and the 43rd poured along the rampart towards -that quarter, the French wavered, three of their expense -magazines exploded, and the third division with a mighty -effort broke through the retrenchments: the garrison still -fought awhile in the streets indeed, but finally fled to the -castle, where the governor surrendered.</p> - -<p>Now plunging into the town from all quarters, and -throwing off all discipline, the troops committed frightful -excesses; houses were soon in flames, the soldiers menaced -their officers and shot each other, intoxication increased -the tumult to absolute madness, and a fire being wilfully -lighted in the middle of the great magazine, the town would -have been blown to atoms but for the energetic coolness of -some officers and a few soldiers who still preserved their -senses. To excuse these excesses it was said, “the soldiers -were not to be controlled.” Colonel M<sup>c</sup>Leod of the 43rd, a -young man of a noble and energetic spirit, proved the contrary. -He placed guards at the breach and constrained his -men to keep their ranks for a long time, but as no organized<span class="pagenum" id="Page_132">132</span> -efforts were made by higher authorities, and the example -was not followed, the regiment dissolved by degrees in the -general disorder.</p> - -<p>Three hundred French fell, fifteen hundred were made -prisoners, and immense stores of ammunition with a hundred -and fifty pieces of artillery, including the battering-train -of Marmont’s army, were captured. The loss of the -allies was twelve hundred soldiers and ninety officers, of -which six hundred and fifty men and sixty officers had been -slain or hurt at the breaches. General Craufurd and General -Mackinnon, the former a person of great ability, were killed, -and with them died many gallant men; amongst others a -captain of the 45th, of whom it has been felicitously said, -that “three generals and seventy other officers had fallen, -yet the soldiers fresh from the strife only talked of Hardyman.” -General Vandeleur, commanding the light division -after Craufurd fell, was badly wounded; so was Colonel -Colborne, with a crowd of inferior rank; and unhappily the -slaughter did not end with the storm; for as the prisoners -and their escort were marching out by the breach, an accidental -explosion killed numbers of both.</p> - -<p>This siege lasted only twelve days, half the time originally -calculated, yet from the inexperience of engineers and -soldiers, and the extraordinarily heavy fire of the place, the -works were rather slowly executed. The cold also impeded -the labourers, yet with less severe frost the trenches would -have been overflowed, because in open weather the water -rises everywhere to within six inches of the surface. The -greatest impediment was the badness of the cutting tools -furnished from the storekeeper-general’s office in England; -the profits of the contractor seemed to be the only thing -respected: the engineers eagerly sought for French cutlery, -because the English was useless!</p> - -<p>Marmont heard of the siege the 15th and made great -efforts to collect his forces at Salamanca. The 26th he heard -of its fall and retired to Valladolid, thus harassing his -men by winter marches. Had he remained between Salamanca -and Rodrigo with strong advanced guards he would -have recovered the place; for on the 28th the Agueda -flooded two feet over the stone bridge, and carried away -the allies’ trestle-bridge. The army was then on the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_133">133</span> -left bank, the breaches not closed, and no resistance could -be offered. The greatest captains are the very slaves of -fortune.</p> - -<div class="tb">* * * * *</div> - -<p>When Ciudad Rodrigo fell, Wellington’s eyes were turned -towards Badajos. He desired to invest it again early in -March, because the flooding of the rivers in Beira, from the -periodical rains, would then render a French incursion into -Portugal difficult, enable him to carry nearly all his forces -to the siege, and impede the junction of Soult and Marmont -in Estremadura. Many obstacles arose, some military, some -political, some from the perverseness of coadjutors and the -errors of subordinates; yet on the 5th of March the troops -were well on their way towards the Tagus, and then the -English general, who had remained on the Coa to the last -moment that he might not awaken the enemy’s suspicions, -gave up Rodrigo to Castaños and departed for Elvas.</p> - -<p>Victor Alten’s cavalry was left on the Yeltes in advance -of the Agueda to mask the movements, but Marmont was -unable to measure his adversary’s talent or fathom his designs. -He had again spread his army far and wide, appeared -to expect no further winter operations, and having lost all -his secret friends and emissaries at Ciudad Rodrigo, where -they had been discovered and put to death by Carlos -España, with an overstrained severity that gave general -disgust, knew nothing of the allies’ march to the Tagus. -On the other hand the projected siege was, by the incredibly -vexatious conduct of the Portuguese Regency, delayed ten -days, and thrown into the violent equinoctial rains, which -greatly augmented the difficulties. It was in vain Wellington -threatened, remonstrated and wasted his mental powers -to devise remedies for those evils, and to impart energy and -good faith to that extraordinary government. Insolent -anger, falsehood or stolid indifference in all functionaries, -from the highest to the lowest, met him at every turn, and -the responsibility even in small matters became too onerous -for subordinate officers; he was compelled to arrange every -detail of service himself with the native authorities. His -iron strength of body and mind were thus strained until all -men wondered how they resisted, and indeed he did fall -sick, but recovered after a few days.</p> - -<p>On the 15th of March pontoons were laid over the Guadiana -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_134">134</span> -four miles from Elvas, where the current was dull, -and two large Spanish boats being arranged as flying-bridges, -Beresford crossed that river on the 16th to invest Badajos -with fifteen thousand men.</p> - -<p>Soult was then before Cadiz, but Drouet and Daricau -were with ten thousand men in Estremadura; wherefore -General Graham marched with three divisions of infantry -and two brigades of cavalry upon Llerena, while Hill -moved by Merida upon Almendralejos. These covering -corps were together thirty thousand strong, five thousand -being cavalry, and the whole army presented fifty-one thousand -sabres and bayonets, of which twenty thousand were -Portuguese. Castaños had gone to Gallicia, and the fifth -Spanish army, under Morillo and Penne Villemur, four -thousand strong, passed down the Portuguese frontier to -the Lower Guadiana, intending to fall on Seville when -Soult should march to succour Badajos.</p> - -<p>As the allies advanced, Drouet moved by his right towards -Medellin, to maintain the communication with Marmont by -Truxillo. Hill and Graham then halted, the latter at Zafra, -having Slade’s cavalry in front. Marmont meanwhile recalled -his sixth division from Talavera to Castile, and four -other divisions and his cavalry, quartered at Toledo, marched -over the Guadarama towards Valladolid.</p> - -<p>It was therefore manifest that he would not act this time -in conjunction with Soult.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Third English Siege of Badajos.</span> (March, 1812.)</h3> - -<p>Badajos stands between the Rivillas, a small stream, and -the Guadiana, a noble river five hundred yards broad. From -the angle formed by their confluence the town spread out -like a fan, having eight regular bastions and curtains, with -good counterscarps, covered way, and glacis.</p> - -<p>At the meeting of the rivers, the Rivillas being there for a -short distance deep and wide, was a rock one hundred feet -high, crowned with an old castle, the ascent to which was -not steep. This was the extreme point of defence on the -enemy’s left, and from thence to the Trinidad bastion, terminating -this the eastern front of resistance, an inundation -protected the ramparts, one short interval excepted, which<span class="pagenum" id="Page_135">135</span> -was defended by an outwork, beyond the stream, called the -cunette of San Roque.</p> - -<p>On the enemy’s right of San Roque, also beyond the -Rivillas and four hundred yards from the walls, another -outwork called the Picurina was constructed on an isolated -hill, about the same distance from San Roque as the latter -was from the castle. These two outworks had a covered -communication with each other, and the San Roque had -one with the town, but the inundation cut the Picurina off -from the latter, and it was an inclosed and palisadoed work.</p> - -<p>The southern front, the longest, was protected in the -centre by a crown-work, constructed on the lofty Sierra de -Viento, the end of which, at only two hundred yards, overlooked -the walls. The remainder of that front and the -western front had no outworks.</p> - -<p>On the right bank of the Guadiana there were no houses, -but the twice-besieged fort of San Christoval, three hundred -feet square, stood there on a rocky height, and from its -superior elevation looked into the castle, which was exactly -opposite to it and consequently but five hundred yards distant. -This fort also commanded the works heading the -stone bridge, a quarter of a mile below stream.</p> - -<p>Phillipon’s garrison, nearly five thousand strong, was composed -of French and Hessian, and some Spanish troops in -Joseph’s service. He had since the last siege made himself -felt in every direction, scouring the country, defeating small -guerilla bands, carrying off cattle almost from under the -guns of Elvas and Campo Mayor, and pushing his spies to -Ciudad Rodrigo, Lisbon, and even to Ayamonte, by which -he gained a knowledge of the forces, material and personal, -combined against his fortress, and prepared accordingly. -He had formed an interior retrenchment at the castle, and -mounted more guns there; he had strengthened San Christoval -on the side before attacked, and made a covered communication -to the bridge-head; he had constructed two -ravelins on the south front, and commenced a third with -counterguards for the bastions. At the eastern front he had -dug a <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">cunette</i> at the bottom of the great ditch, which was in -some parts filled with water. The gorge of the Pardaleras -was enclosed and connected with the body of the place, -from whence it was overlooked by powerful batteries; the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_136">136</span> -glacis of the western front was mined, and the arch of a -bridge behind the San Roque was built up to cause the inundation. -The inhabitants had been compelled to store -food for three months, and provisions and ammunition had -come in on the 10th and 16th of February, yet the supply -of powder was inadequate, and there were not many shells.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington desired to assail the western front, but -the engineer had not mortars, miners, or guns enough, or -the means of bringing up stores for that attack: indeed the -want of transport had again compelled the drawing of stores -from Elvas, to the manifest hazard of that fortress. Hence, -here, as at Ciudad Rodrigo, time was paid for with the loss -of life, and the crimes of politicians were atoned by the -blood of soldiers.</p> - -<p>It was finally agreed to attack the bastion of Trinidad, -because the counterguard there was unfinished, and the bastion -could be battered from the Picurina. The first parallel -was therefore to embrace that fort, the San Roque and the -eastern front, so as to enable the counter-batteries to destroy -the armaments of the southern fronts, which bore against -the Picurina hill. The Picurina was to be stormed, and -from thence the Trinidad and the next bastion, called the -Santa Maria, were to be breached. The guns were then to -be turned against the connecting curtain, known to be of -weak masonry, and to open a third breach, whereby a storming -party might turn any retrenchments behind the other -breaches. In this way the inundation could be avoided. -A French deserter declared, and truly, that the ditch was -eighteen feet deep at the Trinidad, yet Wellington was so -confident that he resolved to storm the place there without -blowing in the counterscarp.</p> - -<p>The battering train was of fifty-two pieces, including sixteen -twenty-four-pound howitzers for throwing Shrapnel-shells; -but this species of missile, much talked of at the -time, was little prized by Lord Wellington, who had detected -its insufficiency, save with large guns and as a -common shell; and partly to avoid expense, partly from a -dislike to injure the inhabitants, neither in this, nor in any -former siege did he use mortars. Here indeed he could not -have brought them up, for the peasantry, and even the ordenança, -employed to move the battering train, although well<span class="pagenum" id="Page_137">137</span> -paid, deserted. Of nine hundred gunners present three -hundred were British, the rest Portuguese; there were one -hundred and fifty sappers, volunteers from the third division, -unskilled, yet of signal bravery.</p> - -<p>The engineer’s park was established behind the heights of -St. Michael which faced the Picurina, and in the night of -the 17th, eighteen hundred men broke ground one hundred -and sixty yards from that fort. A tempest stifled the sound -of the pickaxes, and a communication four thousand feet -long, with a parallel of six hundred yards, three feet deep -and three feet six inches wide, was opened without hindrance; -but when day broke the fort was reinforced, and a -sharp musketry, interspersed with discharges from some -field-pieces and aided by heavy guns from the body of the -place, was directed on the trenches.</p> - -<p>In the night of the 18th two batteries were traced, the -parallel prolonged, and the previous works improved; but -the garrison raised the parapets of the Picurina, lined the -top of the covered way with sand-bags, and planted musketeers -to gall the men in the trenches.</p> - -<p>The 19th, secret notice of a sally being received, the -guards were reinforced; nevertheless, at one o’clock some -cavalry came out by the Talavera gate, and thirteen hundred -infantry under General Vielland, second in command, filed -unobserved into the communication between the Picurina -and San Roque; one hundred men were also ready in the -former, and all these troops, jumping out at once, drove the -workmen off and began to demolish the parallel. Previous -to this outbreak the French cavalry had commenced a sham -fight on the right of the trenches, and the smaller party, pretending -to fly toward the besiegers, answered Portuguese to -the challenge of the picquets and were allowed to pass. -Elated by their stratagem, they galloped to the engineer’s -park, a thousand yards in rear, where they killed some men -before succour came; meanwhile the troops at the parallel -rallied on the relief and beat the infantry back along the -front of the ramparts even to the castle.</p> - -<p>In this fight the besieged lost three hundred men and -officers, the besiegers one hundred and fifty; but the chief -engineer, Fletcher, was badly wounded, and several hundred -intrenching tools were carried off; Phillipon had promised a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_138">138</span> -high price for each, which turned out ill, because the soldiers, -instead of pursuing briskly, dispersed to gather the tools. -After the action a squadron of dragoons and six field-pieces -were placed behind the St. Michael ridge, and a signal-post -was established on the lofty Sierra de Viento, to give notice -of the enemy’s motions.</p> - -<p>The weather continued wet and boisterous, making the -labour very severe, yet in the night of the 19th the parallel -was opened on its whole length; the 20th it was enlarged, -and though the rain, flooding the trenches, greatly impeded -progress, the work was extended to the left. Three counter-batteries -were then commenced in its rear, because the -ground was too soft in front to sustain the guns, and the San -Roque was within three hundred yards; hence, the parallel, -eighteen hundred yards long, being only guarded by fourteen -hundred men, a few bold soldiers might by a sudden rush -have spiked the guns in front of the trench.</p> - -<p>A slight sally was this day repulsed, and a shoulder was -given to the right of the parallel to cover that flank; in -good time, for next day two field-pieces placed on the right -bank of the Guadiana, tried to rake the trenches and were -baffled by this shoulder. Indications of a similar design -against the left flank, from the Pardaleras hill, were then -observed, and three hundred men with two guns were posted -on that side in some broken ground.</p> - -<p>In the night, though the works went on, rain again impeded -progress, and the besiegers, failing to drain the lower -parts of the parallel by cuts, made an artificial bottom of -sand-bags. On the other hand the besieged, thinking the -curtain adjoining the castle was the object of attack, threw -up earth in front and removed the houses behind; they also -made a covered communication from the Trinidad gate to -the San Roque, to take this supposed attack in reverse; and -as the labour of digging was great, hung up brown cloth -which appeared like earth, by which ingenious expedient -they passed unseen between those points.</p> - -<p>Vauban’s maxim, that a perfect investment is the first -requisite in a siege, had been neglected to spare labour, yet -the great master’s art was soon vindicated by his countryman. -Phillipon, finding the right bank of the Guadiana free, made -a battery in the night for three field-pieces, which at daylight<span class="pagenum" id="Page_139">139</span> -raked the trenches, the shots sweeping the parallel -destructively; the loss was great and would have been -greater but for the soft ground, which prevented the touch -and bound of the bullets. Orders were therefore sent to the -fifth division, then at Campo Mayor, to invest the place on -the other bank, but those troops were distant and misfortunes -accumulated. Heavy rain filled the trenches, the Guadiana -run the fixed bridge under water, sunk twelve pontoons, -and broke the tackle of the flying bridges; the provisions of -the army could not be brought over, the battering-guns and -ammunition were still on the right bank, and the siege was -on the point of being raised. In a few days however the -river subsided, some Portuguese craft were brought up to -form another flying bridge, the pontoons saved were employed -as row-boats, and the communication thus secured -for the rest of the siege.</p> - -<p>On the 23rd rain again filled the trenches, the works -crumbled and the attack was entirely suspended. Next day -the fifth division invested the place on the right bank, the -weather cleared, and the batteries, armed with twenty-one -guns and seven five-and-a-half-inch howitzers, opened on the -25th, but were so vigorously answered, that one howitzer -was dismounted, and several artillery and engineer officers -killed. Nevertheless the San Roque was silenced, the garrison -of the Picurina so galled by marksmen that none dared -look over the parapet, and as the external appearance of that -fort did not indicate much strength General Kempt was -charged to assault it in the night.</p> - -<p>This outward seeming of the Picurina was fallacious; it -was very strong. The fronts were well covered by the -glacis, the flanks deep, the rampart, fourteen feet perpendicular -from the bottom of the ditch, was guarded with -slanting pales above, and from thence to the top was an -earthen slope of sixteen feet. A few palings had been -knocked off at the covered way, and the parapet, slightly -damaged, was repaired with sand-bags, but the ditch was -deep, narrow at the bottom, and flanked by four splinter-proof -casemates. Seven guns were mounted. The entrance -in the rear was protected with three rows of thick paling, -the garrison was above two hundred strong, and every man -had two muskets; the top of the rampart was garnished with<span class="pagenum" id="Page_140">140</span> -loaded shells, a retrenched guard-house formed a second -internal defence, and small mines, with a loopholed gallery -under the counterscarp to take the assailants in rear, were -begun but not finished.</p> - -<p>Five hundred men of the third division assembled for the -attack. Two hundred under Major Rudd were to turn the -fort on the left, an equal force under Major Shaw to turn it -by the right, each being to detach half their force to seize -the communication with San Roque and intercept succour -coming from the town. The remainder were to attack -Picurina by the gorge, leaving one hundred under Captain -Powis as a reserve. The engineers, Holloway, Stanway, and -Gipps, with twenty-four sappers bearing hatchets and ladders, -guided these columns, and fifty men of the light division, -likewise provided with axes, were to move out of the trenches -at the moment of attack.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Assault of Picurina.</span> (March, 1812.)</h3> - -<p>The night was fine and the stormers quickly reached the -fort, which, black and silent before, then seemed a mass of -fire, under which the stormers run up to the palisades in rear -and endeavoured to break through; the destructive musketry -and thickness of the pales rendered their efforts nugatory, -wherefore, turning against the sides of the work they strove -to get in there, but the depth of the ditch and the slanting -stakes at the top of the brickwork again baffled them. At -this time, the French shooting fast and dangerously, the -crisis appeared so imminent that Kempt sent the reserve -headlong against the front. The fight was thus supported -and the carnage terrible. A battalion which came from the -town to succour the fort was beaten back by the men in the -communication, the guns from the town and castle then -opened, the guard of the trenches replied with musketry, -rockets were thrown up by the besieged, and the shrill sound -of alarm-bells mixing with the shouts of the combatants increased -the tumult.</p> - -<p>Still the Picurina sent out streams of fire, by the light of -which dark figures were seen furiously struggling on the -ramparts; for Powis had escaladed in front where the artillery -had broken the pales; and the other assailants, throwing<span class="pagenum" id="Page_141">141</span> -their ladders in the manner of bridges from the brink of -the ditch to the slanting stakes thus passed, and all were -fighting hand to hand with the enemy. Meanwhile the axemen -of the light division, compassing the fort like prowling -wolves, discovered the gate, and hewing it down broke in -by the rear. Nevertheless the struggle continued. Powis, -Holloway, Gipps, and Oates fell wounded on or beyond the -rampart, Nixon of the 52nd was shot two yards within the -gate, Shaw, Rudd, and nearly all the other officers of the -79th had fallen outside, and it was not until half the garrison -were killed, that Gaspar Thiery, the commandant, surrendered -with eighty-six men, while others, not many, -rushing out of the gate endeavoured to cross the inundation -and were drowned.</p> - -<p>Phillipon had thought to delay the siege five or six days -by the resistance of Picurina, and one day later this would -have happened; for the mines and loop-holed gallery in the -counterscarp would have been completed, and the work was -too well covered by the glacis to be quickly ruined by fire. -His calculations were baffled by this heroic assault, which, -lasting only an hour, cost four officers and fifty men killed, -fifteen officers and two hundred and fifty men wounded; -and so vehement was the fight throughout, that the garrison -forgot or had no time to roll over the shells and combustibles -on the ramparts. Phillipon did not conceal the -danger accruing to Badajos from the loss of the Picurina, -but he stimulated his soldiers’ courage, by calling to their -recollection, how infinitely worse than death it was to be -the inmate of an English prison-hulk—an appeal which -must have been deeply felt, for the annals of civilized -nations furnish nothing more inhuman towards captives of -war than the prison-ships of England.</p> - -<p>When Picurina was taken three battalions advanced to -secure it, and though a great turmoil and firing from the -town continued until midnight, a lodgement in the works -and communication with the first parallel were established; -the second parallel was also begun, but at daylight the redoubt -was overwhelmed with fire, no troops could remain -and the lodgement was destroyed. In the evening the sappers -effected another lodgement on the flanks, the second -parallel was then opened in its whole length, and next day<span class="pagenum" id="Page_142">142</span> -the counter-batteries on the right of Picurina exchanged a -vigorous fire with the town.</p> - -<p>In the night of the 27th three breaching-batteries were -traced out. The first, between the Picurina and the inundation, -to breach the right face of the Trinidad. The -second, on the Picurina, to breach the Santa Maria. The -third, on a prolonged line of the front attacked, contained -three Shrapnel howitzers to scour the ditch and prevent the -garrison working in it; for Phillipon, having now discovered -the true line of attack, was raising the counterguard -of the Trinidad and the imperfect ravelin. At daybreak -these works being well furnished with gabions and sandbags -were lined with musketeers, who severely galled the -workmen employed on the breaching-batteries, and the -artillery practice was brisk on both sides. Two of the besiegers’ -guns were dismounted, the gabions placed in front -of the batteries to protect the workmen were knocked over, -and the musketry became so destructive the men were withdrawn -to throw up earth from the inside.</p> - -<p>In the night of the 27th the second parallel was extended -on the right, to raise batteries against San Roque and the -dam which held up the inundation, and to breach the curtain -behind: but the ground was hard, the moon shone -brightly, the labourers were quite exposed and the work -was relinquished.</p> - -<p>On the 28th the screen of gabions before the batteries -was restored, the workmen resumed their labours outside -and the parallel was improved. The besieged then withdrew -their guns from San Roque, yet their marksmen still -shot from thence with great exactness, and the plunging fire -from the castle dismounted two howitzers in one of the -counter-batteries. During the night the French observed -the tracing-string, marking the direction of the sap in front -of San Roque, and a daring fellow, creeping out before the -workmen arrived, brought it on the line of the castle fire, -whereby some loss was sustained.</p> - -<p>In the night the howitzer battery was re-armed with -twenty-four pounders to play on the San Roque, and a new -breaching-battery was traced on the site of the Picurina; the -second parallel was extended by sap, and a trench was -digged for riflemen in front of the batteries.</p> - -<p>The 29th a slight sally made on the right bank of the -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_143">143</span> -river was repulsed by the Portuguese; but the sap at San -Roque was ruined by the enemy’s fire, and the besieged continued -to raise the counterguard and ravelin of the Trinidad, -and to strengthen the front attacked. The besiegers armed -two batteries with eighteen-pounders, which opened next -day against Santa Maria, yet with little effect, and the explosion -of an expense magazine killed many men.</p> - -<p>While the siege was thus proceeding, Soult, having little -fear for the town but designing a great battle, was carefully -organizing a powerful force to unite with Drouet and Daricau. -Those generals had endeavoured to hold the district of -La Serena and keep open the communication with Marmont -by Medellin and Truxillo, but Graham and Hill forced -them into the Morena; and on the other side of the country -Morillo and Penne-Villemur descended to the Lower Guadiana, -to fall on Seville when Soult should advance. Nor -were there wanting other combinations to embarrass and -delay that marshal. In February, a Spanish army had -assembled in the Ronda to fall on Seville from that side also, -which compelled Soult to send troops there, and fatally delayed -his march to Estremadura. Marmont was however -concentrating his army in the Salamanca country, and it was -rumoured he meant to attack Ciudad Rodrigo. This disquieted -Wellington: for though Marmont had no battering-train, -the Spanish generals and engineers had neglected the -repairs of the place, and had not even brought up from St. -Jão da Pesqueira the provisions given to them from the British -stores: the fortress therefore had only thirty days’ -supply, and Almeida was in as bad a state.</p> - -<p>On the 30th, it being known that Soult was advancing -from Cordova, the fifth division was brought over the Guadiana -as a reserve to the covering army, leaving a Portuguese -brigade with some cavalry of the same nation to maintain -the investment on the right bank. The siege was then urged -on, forty-eight pieces of artillery being in constant play, and -the sap against San Roque advancing: the French fire was -however destructive, and their progress in strengthening the -front attacked was visible.</p> - -<p>On the 1st of April the sap was pushed close to San Roque, -the Trinidad bastion crumbled under the stroke of the bullet,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_144">144</span> -and the flank of the Santa Maria, which was casemated, also -began to yield. Next day the face of the Trinidad was -broken, but the Santa Maria casemates being laid open the -bullets were lost in their cavities, and Phillipon commenced -a retrenchment to cut off the whole of the attacked front -from the town.</p> - -<p>In the night a new battery against San Roque being -armed, two officers with some sappers glided behind that -outwork, gagged the sentinel, placed powder-barrels and a -match against the dam of the inundation and retired undiscovered. -The explosion did not destroy the dam, the -inundation remained and the sap made no progress, because -of the French musketeers; for though the besiegers’ marksmen -slew many, reinforcements were sent across the inundation -by means of a raft with parapets, and men also -passed unseen behind the cloth communication, from the -Trinidad. But the crisis of the siege was now approaching -rapidly. The breaches were nearly practicable, Soult had -effected his junction with Drouet and Daricau; and Wellington, -who had not sufficient force to assault the place and -give battle at the same time, resolved to leave two divisions -in the trenches and fight at Albuera. In this view Graham -fell back towards that place, and Hill, destroying the bridge -at Merida, marched to Talavera Real.</p> - -<p>Time was now, as in war it always is, a great object, and -the anxiety on both sides redoubled. Soult was however -still at Llerena when, the breaches being declared practicable, -the assault was ordered for that evening, and Leith’s division -recalled to the siege; yet a careful personal examination -caused Wellington to doubt, and he delayed the storm, until -a third breach, as originally projected, should be formed in -the curtain between Trinidad and Maria. This could not be -commenced before morning, and during the night the French -workmen laboured assiduously at their retrenchments, despite -of the showers of grape with which the batteries scoured the -ditch and the breach. On the 6th all the batteries were -turned against the curtain, the bad masonry crumbled -rapidly away, in two hours a yawning breach appeared -and Wellington renewed his order for the assault. Eagerly -then the soldiers got ready for a combat, so fiercely fought, -so terribly won, so dreadful in all its circumstances, that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_145">145</span> -posterity can scarcely be expected to credit the tale: but -many are still alive who know that it is true.</p> - -<p>Wellington spared Phillipon the affront of a summons, -and seeing the breach strongly intrenched, the flank fire -still powerful, he would not in that dread crisis trust his -fortune to a single effort. Eighteen thousand daring soldiers -burned for the signal of attack, he was unwilling to lose the -service of any, and therefore to each division gave a task -such as few generals would have the hardihood even to contemplate.</p> - -<p>On the right, Picton’s division was to file out of the -trenches, cross the Rivillas, and scale the castle walls, from -eighteen to twenty-four feet high, furnished with all means -of destruction, and so narrow at top that the defenders could -easily reach and as easily overturn the ladders.</p> - -<p>On the left, Leith’s division was to make a false attack on -the Pardaleras, but a real assault on the distant bastion of -San Vincente, where the glacis was mined, the ditch deep, -the scarp thirty feet high, the parapet garnished with bold -troops: Phillipon also, following his old plan, had three -loaded muskets placed beside each man that the first fire -might be quick and deadly.</p> - -<p>In the centre, the fourth and light divisions, under Colville -and Andrew Barnard, were to march against the breaches. -Furnished like the third and fifth divisions with ladders and -axes, they were preceded by storming parties of five hundred -men, having each their separate forlorn hopes. The light -division was to assault the Santa Maria, the fourth division -the Trinidad and the curtain, both columns being divided -into storming and firing parties, the former to enter the -ditch, the latter to keep the crest of the glacis.</p> - -<p>Between these attacks, Major Wilson of the 48th was to -storm the San Roque with the guards of the trenches; and -on the other side of the Guadiana General Power was to -make a feint at the bridge-head.</p> - -<p>At first only one brigade of the third division was to have -attacked the castle, but just before the hour fixed, a sergeant -of sappers deserted from the enemy and told Wellington -there was but one communication from the castle to the -town, whereupon he ordered the whole division to advance.</p> - -<p>Many nice arrangements filled up this outline, and some<span class="pagenum" id="Page_146">146</span> -were followed, some disregarded, for it is seldom all things -are attended to in a desperate fight. The enemy was not -idle. While it was yet twilight some French cavalry rode -from the Pardaleras, under an officer who endeavoured to -look into the trenches with the view to ascertain if an assault -was intended, but the picquet there drove him and his escort -back into the works, darkness then fell and the troops -awaited the signal.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Assault of Badajos.</span> (April, 1812.)</h3> - -<p>Dry but clouded was the night, the air was thick with -watery exhalations from the rivers, the ramparts and trenches -unusually still; yet a low murmur pervaded the latter, and -in the former lights flitted here and there, while the deep -voices of the sentinels proclaimed from time to time that all -was well in Badajos. The French, confiding in Phillipon’s -direful skill, watched from their lofty station the approach -of enemies they had twice before baffled, and now hoped to -drive a third time blasted and ruined from the walls. The -British, standing in deep columns, were as eager to meet -that fiery destruction as the others were to pour it down, -and either were alike terrible for their strength, their discipline, -and the passions awakened in their resolute hearts.</p> - -<p>Former failures there were to avenge on one side, and on -both leaders who furnished no excuse for weakness in the -hour of trial; the possession of Badajos was become a point -of personal honour with the soldiers of each nation; but the -desire for glory on the British part was dashed with a hatred -of the citizens from an old grudge, and recent toil and hardship, -with much spilling of blood, had made many incredibly -savage: for these things, which render the noble-minded -averse to cruelty, harden the vulgar spirit. Numbers also, -like Cæsar’s centurion, who could not forget the plunder of -Avaricum, were heated with the recollection of Rodrigo and -thirsted for spoil. Thus every passion found a cause of -excitement, while the wondrous power of discipline bound -the whole together as with a band of iron, and in the pride -of arms none doubted their might to bear down every obstacle -that man could oppose to their fury.</p> - -<p>At ten o’clock, the castle, the San Roque, the breaches,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_147">147</span> -the Pardaleras, the distant bastion of San Vincente, and the -bridge-head on the other side of the Guadiana, were to be -simultaneously assailed. It was hoped the strength of the -enemy would quickly shrivel within that fiery girdle, but -many are the disappointments of war. An unforeseen accident -delayed the attack of the fifth division, and a lighted -carcass, thrown from the castle, falling close to the third -division, exposed its columns and forced it to anticipate the -signal by half an hour. Thus everything was suddenly disturbed, -yet the double columns of the fourth and light divisions -moved silently and swiftly against the breaches, and the -guard of the trenches, rushing forward with a shout, encompassed -the San Roque with fire and broke in so violently that -scarcely any resistance was made.</p> - -<p>Soon however a sudden blaze of light and the rattling of -musketry indicated the commencement of a more vehement -combat at the castle. There Kempt, for Picton, hurt by a -fall in the camp and expecting no change in the hour, was -not present; there Kempt, I say, led the third division. -Passing the Rivillas in single files by a narrow bridge under -a terrible musketry, he re-formed his men, and run up the -rugged hill with great fury, but only to fall at the foot of the -castle severely wounded. Being carried back to the trenches, -he met Picton at the bridge hastening to take the command, -and meanwhile the troops, spreading along the front, had -reared their heavy ladders, some against the lofty castle -some against the adjoining front on the left, and with incredible -courage ascended amidst showers of heavy stones, logs -of wood, and bursting shells rolled off the parapet, while -from the flanks musketry was plied with fearful rapidity, -and in front the leading assailants were with pike and -bayonet stabbed and the ladders pushed from the walls: and -all this was attended with deafening shouts, the crash of -breaking ladders, and the shrieks of crushed soldiers answering -to the sullen stroke of the falling weights.</p> - -<p>Still swarming round the remaining ladders those undaunted -veterans strove who should first climb, until all were overturned, -when the French shouted victory, and the British, -baffled, yet untamed, fell back a few paces to take shelter -under the rugged edge of the hill. There the broken ranks -were re-formed, and the heroic Colonel Ridge, again springing<span class="pagenum" id="Page_148">148</span> -forward, called with stentorian voice on his men to follow, -and seizing a ladder raised it against the castle to the right -of the former attack, where the wall was lower and where -an embrasure offered some facility: a second ladder was -placed alongside by the grenadier officer Canch, and the -next instant he and Ridge were on the rampart, the shouting -troops pressed after them, and the garrison, amazed and in a -manner surprised, were driven fighting through the double -gate into the town: the castle was won. Soon a reinforcement -from the French reserve came to the gate, through -which both sides fired and the enemy retired; but Ridge fell, -and no man died that night with more glory—yet many -died, and there was much glory.</p> - -<p>All this time the tumult at the breaches was such as if the -earth had been rent asunder and its central fires bursting -upwards uncontrolled. The two divisions reached the glacis, -just as the firing at the castle had commenced, and the flash -of a single musket, discharged from the covered way as a -signal, showed them the French were ready: yet no stir -followed, and darkness covered the breaches. Some hay-packs -were then thrown, some ladders placed, and the forlorn -hopes and storming parties of the light division, five hundred -in all, descended into the ditch without opposition: but -then a bright flame, shooting upwards, displayed all the -terrors of the scene. The ramparts crowded with dark -figures and glittering arms were on one side, on the other -the red columns of the British, deep and broad, coming on -like streams of burning lava: it was the touch of the magician’s -wand, a crash of thunder followed, and the storming -parties were dashed to pieces by the explosion of hundreds -of shells and powder-barrels.</p> - -<p>For an instant the light division soldiers stood on the -brink of the ditch, amazed at the terrific sight, but then, -with a shout that matched even the sound of the explosion -they flew down the ladders, or, disdaining their aid, leaped, -reckless of the depth, into the gulf below; and nearly at -the same moment, amidst a blaze of musketry that dazzled -the eyes, the fourth division came running in to descend -with a like fury. There were only five ladders for both -columns, which were close together, and the deep cut made -in the bottom of the ditch, as far as the counterguard of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_149">149</span> -the Trinidad was filled with water from the inundation: -into this miry snare the head of the fourth division fell, -and it is said above a hundred of the fusileers, the men -of Albuera, were there smothered. Those who followed, -checked not, but, as if the disaster had been expected, -turned to the left and thus came upon the face of the unfinished -ravelin, which, rough and broken, was mistaken -for the breach and instantly covered with men; a wide and -deep chasm was however still between them and the ramparts, -from whence came a deadly fire wasting their ranks. -Thus baffled, they also commenced a rapid discharge of -musketry, and disorder ensued; for the men of the light -division, whose conducting engineer had been disabled -early, having their flank confined by an unfinished ditch, -intended to cut off the Santa Maria, rushed towards the -breaches of the curtain and the Trinidad, which were indeed -before them, but which the fourth division had been destined -to storm.</p> - -<p>Great was the confusion, the ravelin was crowded with -men of both divisions, and while some continued to fire, -others jumped down and run towards the breach; many -also passed between the ravelin and the counterguard of -the Trinidad; the two divisions got mixed, and the reserves, -which should have remained at the quarries, also -came pouring in until the ditch was quite filled, the rear -still crowding forward and all cheering vehemently. The -enemy’s shouts also were loud and terrible, and the bursting -of shells and of grenades, the roaring of guns from the -flanks, answered by the iron howitzers from the parallel, -the heavy roll and horrid explosion of the powder-barrels, -the whizzing flight of the blazing splinters, the loud exhortations -of the officers, and the continual clatter of the -muskets made a maddening din.</p> - -<p>Now a multitude bounded up the great breach as if -driven by a whirlwind: but across the top glittered a range -of sword-blades, sharp-pointed, keen-edged, immovably fixed -in ponderous beams chained together and set deep in the -ruins; and for ten feet in front the ascent was covered -with loose planks studded with iron points, on which the -feet of the foremost being set the planks slipped, and the -unhappy soldiers falling forward on the spikes rolled down<span class="pagenum" id="Page_150">150</span> -upon the ranks behind. Then the Frenchmen, shouting -at the success of their stratagem and leaping forward, plied -their shot with terrible rapidity, for every man had several -muskets, and each musket in addition to its ordinary -charge contained a small cylinder of wood stuck full of -wooden slugs, which scattered like hail when they were -discharged.</p> - -<p>Once and again the assailants rushed up the breaches, -but the sword-blades, immovable and impassable, always -stopped the charge, and the hissing shells and thundering -powder-barrels exploded unceasingly. Hundreds of men -had fallen, hundreds more were dropping, yet the heroic -officers still called aloud for new trials, and sometimes followed -by many, sometimes by few, ascended the ruins; and -so furious were the men themselves, that in one of these -charges the rear strove to push the foremost on to the sword-blades, -willing even to make a bridge of their writhing -bodies; the others frustrated the attempt by dropping down, -yet men fell so fast from the shot it was hard to say who -went down voluntarily, who were stricken, and many -stooped unhurt that never rose again. Vain also would it -have been to break through the sword-blades; for a finished -trench and parapet were behind the breach, where the assailants, -crowded into even a narrower space than the ditch -was, would still have been separated from their enemies, and -the slaughter have continued.</p> - -<p>At the beginning of this dreadful conflict, Andrew Barnard -had with prodigious efforts separated his division from -the other, and preserved some degree of military array; but -now the tumult was such, no command could be heard distinctly -except by those close at hand, while the mutilated -carcases heaped on each other, and the wounded, struggling -to avoid being trampled upon, broke the formations; order -was impossible! Nevertheless officers of all stations, followed -more or less numerously by the men, were seen to -start out as if struck by a sudden madness and rush into -the breach, which yawning and glittering with steel seemed -like the mouth of some huge dragon belching forth smoke -and flame. In one of these attempts Colonel Macleod of the -43rd, whose feeble body would have been quite unfit for -war if it had not been sustained by an unconquerable<span class="pagenum" id="Page_151">151</span> -spirit, was killed. Wherever his voice was heard there -his soldiers gathered, and with such strong resolution did -he lead them up the ruins, that when one, falling behind -him, plunged a bayonet into his back, he complained not, -but continuing his course was shot dead within a yard of the -sword-blades. There was however no want of gallant -leaders or desperate followers, until two hours passed in -these vain efforts convinced the soldiers the Trinidad was impregnable; -and as the opening in the curtain, although less -strong, was retired, and the approach impeded by deep holes -and cuts made in the ditch, the troops did not much notice it -after the partial failure of one attack, which had been made -early. Gathering in dark groups and leaning on their muskets -they looked up with sullen desperation at the Trinidad, -while the enemy stepping out on the ramparts and aiming -their shots by the light of the fireballs which they threw -over, asked, as their victims fell, <em>Why they did not come into -Badajos</em>?</p> - -<p>In this dreadful situation, while the dead were lying in -heaps, and others continually falling, the wounded crawling -about to get some shelter from the merciless shower above, -and withal a sickening stench from the burnt flesh of the -slain, Captain Nicholas of the engineers, was observed by -Lieut. Shaw of the 43rd, making incredible efforts to force -his way with a few men into the Santa Maria. Collecting -fifty soldiers of all regiments he joined him, and passing a -deep cut along the foot of this breach, these two young -officers, at the head of their band, rushed up the slope of -the ruins, but ere they gained two-thirds of the ascent, a -concentrated fire of musketry and grape dashed nearly the -whole dead to the earth: Nicholas was mortally wounded, -and the intrepid Shaw stood alone!<a id="FNanchor_24" href="#Footnote_24" class="fnanchor">24</a> After this no further -effort was made at any point, and the troops remained passive, -but unflinching, beneath the enemy’s shot, which streamed -without intermission: for many of the riflemen on the glacis, -leaping early into the ditch, had joined in the assault, and -the rest, raked by a cross-fire of grape from the distant bastions,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_152">152</span> -baffled in their aim by the smoke and flames from the -explosions, and too few in number, had entirely failed to -quell the French musketry.</p> - -<p>About midnight, when two thousand brave men had -fallen, Wellington, who was on a height close to the quarries, -sent orders for the remainder to retire and re-form for a -second assault; he had just then heard that the castle was -taken, and thinking the enemy would still hold out in the -town was resolved to assail the breaches again. This retreat -from the ditch was not effected without further carnage and -confusion; for the French fire never slackened, and a cry -arose that the enemy were making a sally from the flanks, -which caused a rush towards the ladders. Then the groans -and lamentations of the wounded, who could not move and -expected to be slain, increased; and many officers who did -not hear of the order endeavoured to stop the soldiers from -going back, some would even have removed the ladders but -were unable to break the crowd.</p> - -<p>All this time the third division lay close in the castle, -and either from fear of risking the loss of a point which -insured the capture of the place, or that the egress was too -difficult, made no attempt to drive away the enemy from the -breaches. On the other side however, the fifth division had -commenced the false attack on the Pardaleras, and on the -right of the Guadiana the Portuguese were sharply engaged -at the bridge: thus the town was girdled with fire. For -Walker’s brigade had, during the feint on the Pardaleras, -escaladed the distant bastion of San Vincente. Moving up -the bank of the river, he reached a French guard-house -at the barrier-gate undiscovered, the ripple of the waters -smothering the sound of the footsteps; but then the explosion -at the breaches took place, the moon shone out, the -French sentinels discovering the column fired, and the -British soldiers, springing forward under a sharp musketry, -began to hew down the wooden barrier at the covered way; -the Portuguese, panic-stricken, threw down the scaling-ladders, -but the others snatched them up, forced the barrier -and jumped into the ditch; there the guiding engineer was -killed, a <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">cunette</i> embarrassed the column, and when the foremost -men succeeded in rearing the ladders they were found -too short, for the walls were generally above thirty feet high.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_153">153</span> -The fire of the French was deadly, a small mine was sprung -beneath the soldiers’ feet, beams of wood and live shells -were rolled over on their heads, showers of grape from the -flank swept the ditch, and man after man dropped dead from -the ladders.</p> - -<p>At this critical moment some of the defenders being called -away to aid in recovering the castle, the ramparts were not -entirely manned, and the assailants, having discovered a -corner of the bastion where the scarp was only twenty feet -high, placed three ladders under an embrasure which had no -gun, and was only stopped with a gabion. Some men got -up with difficulty, for the ladders were still too short, but -the first man being pushed up by his comrades drew others -after him, and thus many had gained the summit; and -though the French shot heavily against them from both -flanks and from a house in front they thickened and could -not be driven back. Half the 4th Regiment then entered -the town itself, while the others pushed along the rampart -towards the breach, and by dint of hard fighting successively -won three bastions. In the last, General Walker, leaping -forwards sword in hand just as a French cannonier discharged -a gun, fell with so many wounds that it was wonderful how -he survived, and his soldiers seeing a lighted match on the -ground cried out a mine! At that word, such is the power -of imagination, those troops whom neither the strong barrier -nor the deep ditch, nor the high walls, nor the deadly fire of -the enemy could stop, staggered back, appalled by a chimera -of their own raising. While in that disorder a French reserve -under General Veillande drove on them with a firm -and rapid charge, pitching some over the walls, killing -others outright, and cleansing the ramparts even to the San -Vincente: but there Leith had placed a battalion of the -38th, and when the French came up, shouting and slaying -all before them, it arose and with one close volley destroyed -them. This stopped the panic, and in compact order the -soldiers once more charged along the walls towards the -breaches; yet the French, although turned on both flanks -and abandoned by fortune, would not yield.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the detachment of the 4th Regiment which -had entered the town when the San Vincente was first -carried, was strangely situated; for the streets though empty<span class="pagenum" id="Page_154">154</span> -were brilliantly illuminated, no person was seen, yet a low -buzz and whisper were heard around, lattices were now and -then gently opened, and from time to time shots were fired -from underneath the doors of the houses by the Spaniards, -while the regiment, with bugles sounding, advanced towards -the great square of the town. In its progress several mules -going with ammunition to the breaches were taken, but the -square was as empty and silent as the streets, and the houses -as bright with lamps. A terrible enchantment seemed to -prevail, nothing to be seen but light, and only low whispers -heard, while the tumult at the breaches was like the crashing -thunder: there the fight raged, and quitting the square -the regiment attempted to take the enemy in reverse, but -they were received with a rolling musketry, driven back -with loss, and resumed their movement through the streets.</p> - -<p>At last the breaches were abandoned by the French, other -parties entered the place, desultory combats took place in -various parts, and finally Veillande and Phillipon, both -wounded, seeing all ruined, passed the bridge with a few -hundred soldiers and entered San Christoval. Early next -morning they surrendered upon summons to Lord Fitzroy -Somerset, who with great readiness had pushed through the -town to the drawbridge ere the French had time to organize -further resistance; yet even at the moment of ruin, this -noble governor with an imperturbed judgment had sent -horsemen out from the fort in the night to carry the news to -Soult’s army, which they reached in time to prevent a greater -misfortune.</p> - -<p>Now commenced that wild and desperate wickedness, -which tarnished the lustre of the soldier’s heroism. All -indeed were not alike, hundreds risked, and many lost their -lives in striving to stop violence; but madness generally -prevailed, and the worst men being leaders all the dreadful -passions of human nature were displayed. Shameless rapacity, -brutal intemperance, savage lust, cruelty and murder, -shrieks and piteous lamentations, groans, shouts, imprecations, -the hissing of fires bursting from the houses, the -crashing of doors and windows, and the reports of muskets -used in violence resounded for two days and nights in the -streets of Badajos! On the third, when the city was sacked, -when the soldiers were exhausted by their own excesses, the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_155">155</span> -tumult rather subsided than was quelled: the wounded men -were then looked to, the dead disposed of!</p> - -<p>Five thousand men and officers fell during the siege, -including seven hundred Portuguese; three thousand five -hundred were stricken in the assault, sixty officers and more -than seven hundred men slain on the spot. Five generals, -Kempt, Harvey, Bowes, Colville, and Picton were wounded, -the first three severely; six hundred men and officers fell -in the escalade of San Vincente, as many at the castle, and -more than two thousand at the breaches: each division -there lost twelve hundred! But how deadly the strife was -at that point may be gathered from this; the 43rd and -52nd regiments of the light division, alone lost more men -than the seven regiments of the third division engaged at the -castle!</p> - -<p>Let it be remembered that this frightful carnage took -place in a space of less than a hundred yards square. That -the slain died not all suddenly nor by one manner of death. -That some perished by steel, some by shot, some by water; -that some were crushed and mangled by heavy weights, some -trampled upon, some dashed to atoms by the fiery explosions; -that for hours this destruction was endured without -shrinking and that the town was won at last: these things -considered, it must be admitted that a British army bears -with it an awful power. And false would it be to say the -French were feeble men, the garrison stood and fought manfully -and with good discipline, behaving worthily. Shame -there was none on any side. Yet who shall do justice to the -bravery of the British soldiers? the noble emulation of the -officers? Who shall measure out the glory of Ridge, of -Macleod, of Nicholas, of O’Hare of the rifles, who perished -on the breach at the head of the stormers, and with him -nearly all the volunteers for that desperate service? Who -shall describe the springing valour of that Portuguese grenadier -who was killed, the foremost man, at the Santa Maria? -or the martial fury of that desperate rifleman, who, in his -resolution to win, thrust himself beneath the chained sword-blades, -and there suffered the enemy to dash his head to -pieces with the ends of their muskets? Who can sufficiently -honour the intrepidity of Walker, of Shaw, of Canch, or the -resolution of Ferguson of the 43rd, who having at Rodrigo<span class="pagenum" id="Page_156">156</span> -received two deep wounds was here, with his hurts still -open, leading the stormers of his regiment, the third time a -volunteer and the third time wounded! Nor are these -selected as pre-eminent; many and signal were the other -examples of unbounded devotion, some known some that will -never be known; for in such a tumult much passed unobserved, -and often the observers fell themselves ere they -could bear testimony to what they saw: but no age, no -nation ever sent forth braver troops to battle than those who -stormed Badajos.</p> - -<p>When the havoc of the night was told to Wellington, the -pride of conquest sunk into a passionate burst of grief for the -loss of his gallant soldiers.</p> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_157">157</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="BOOK_VII">BOOK VII.</h2> -</div> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>Beira—Grant—Surprise of Almaraz—Siege of the Salamanca Forts—Combats -between the Duero and the Tormes—Combats of Castrejon -and the Guarena—Battle of Salamanca—Combat of La Serna.</p></div> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Beira.</span> (April, 1812.)</h3> - -<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">After</span> the storming of Badajos the English general desired to -fight Soult in Andalusia, and his cavalry under Sir Stapleton -Cotton very soon overtook the French horse and defeated -them near Usagre with a loss to the victors of fifty or sixty -men, to the vanquished of two or three hundred, one half -being prisoners. Had that action been rapidly followed up -by a powerful army a great victory would probably have -crowned this extraordinary winter campaign, but obstacles, -untimely and unexpected, arose. Carlos España’s oppressions -had created a dangerous spirit in the garrison of Rodrigo, -the people of the vicinity were alarmed, both that -fortress and Almeida were insecure, and Marmont was on -the Coa. These things were to be remedied before Andalusia -could be invaded. Yet the danger was not absolute, and -Wellington lingered about Badajos, hoping Soult, in anger -for its fall, would risk a blow north of the Morena. That -marshal was indeed deeply moved, but the Spanish armies -were menacing Seville, and the allies were double his numbers; -hence he returned to Seville and Wellington marched -to Beira, which Marmont was now ravaging with great -violence.</p> - -<p>Following the letter not the spirit of Napoleon’s orders, -for he was discontented at being debarred a junction with -Soult, Marmont had reluctantly made this diversion, and -seemed to have exhaled his ill-will by a savage warfare contrary -to his natural disposition. Carlos España fled before -him, the Portuguese militia were dispersed in a skirmish -near Guarda, Victor Alten retreated across the Tagus at -Villa Velha though the French were still fifty miles distant; -and though personally a very brave man was so disturbed in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_158">158</span> -judgment that he meditated burning the bridge there, which -would have ruined Lord Wellington’s combinations. The -whole country was in commotion, the population flying before -the ravaging enemy, and all things in disorder; the -Portuguese general Lecor alone preserved a martial attitude: -he checked the French cavalry, saved the magazines and hospitals, -and hung upon the French rear when they retired. -When the allies came on from Badajos Marmont was, at first, -inclined to fight, but found it too dangerous from the flooding -of the rivers behind him, and it was only by the interposition -of fortune that he avoided a great disaster. Finally he -retired to Salamanca, carrying with him as a prisoner Captain -Colquhoun Grant, a scouting officer of great eminence, whose -escape furnished an episode in this war more surprising even -than that of Colonel Waters.</p> - -<p>Grant, in whom the utmost daring was so mixed with -subtlety of genius, and both so tempered by discretion that it -is hard to say which quality predominated, had been sent -from Badajos to watch the French movements. Attended by -Leon, a Spanish peasant, faithful and quick of apprehension, -who had been his companion on many former occasions, he -reached the Salamanca district, passed the Tormes during -the night in uniform, for he never assumed any disguise, and -remained three days in the midst of the French camps. He -thus obtained exact information of Marmont’s object, of his -provisions and scaling-ladders, making notes, which he sent -to Wellington from day to day by Spanish agents. The third -night, some peasants brought him an order thus worded—“The -notorious Grant is within the circle of cantonments, the -soldiers are to strive for his capture, and guards will be -placed in a circle round the army.” Grant consulted the peasants, -and before daylight entered the village of Huerta close -to a ford on the Tormes, where there was a French battalion, -and on the other bank of the river cavalry videttes, patrolling -back and forward for the space of three hundred yards, yet -meeting always at the ford.</p> - -<p>At daylight, when the soldiers were at their alarm-post, he -was secretly brought with his horse behind the gable of a -house, which hid him from the infantry and was near the -ford. The peasants, standing on loose stones, spread their -large cloaks to hide him from the videttes until the latter<span class="pagenum" id="Page_159">159</span> -were separated the full extent of their beat; then putting -spurs to his horse he dashed through the ford between them, -received their cross fire without damage, and reaching a wood -baffled pursuit, and was soon rejoined by Leon.</p> - -<p>Grant had before ascertained that ladders for storming -Rodrigo were prepared, and the French officers openly -talked of doing so; but desiring further to test this, and -ascertain if Marmont’s march might not finally be for the -Tagus, wishing also to discover the French force, he placed -himself on a wooded hill near Tamames where the road -branched off to the passes and to Rodrigo. There lying -perdue while the army passed in march, he noted every battalion -and gun, and finding all went towards Rodrigo entered -Tamames, and found the greatest part of their scaling-ladders -had been left there, showing that the intention to storm -Rodrigo was not real. This it was which had allayed Wellington’s -fears for that fortress when he sought to entice Soult -to battle.</p> - -<p>Marmont then passed the Coa, but Grant preceded him, -with intent to discover if his further march would be by -Guarda upon Coimbra, or by Sabugal upon Castello Branco; -for to reach the latter it was necessary to descend from a -very high ridge, or rather succession of ridges, by a pass at -the lower mouth of which stands Penamacor. Upon one of -the inferior ridges of this pass he placed himself, thinking -the dwarf oaks which covered the hill would secure him from -discovery; but from the higher ridge the French detected his -movements with their glasses, and in a few moments Leon, -whose lynx eyes were always on the watch, called out, <em>the -French! the French!</em> Some dragoons came galloping up, -Grant and his follower darted into the wood for a little -space and then suddenly wheeling rode off in a different -direction; but at every turn new enemies appeared, and at -last the hunted men dismounted and fled on foot through -the low oaks; again they were met by infantry, detached in -small parties down the sides of the pass, and directed in -their chase by the waving of hats on the ridge above: Leon -fell exhausted, and those who first came up killed him in despite -of his companion’s entreaties: a barbarous action!</p> - -<p>Grant they carried to Marmont, who invited him to dinner, -and the conversation turned on the prisoner’s exploits.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_160">160</span> -The French marshal said he had been long on the watch, -knew all his captive’s haunts and disguises, had discovered -that only the night before he slept in the French head-quarters, -with other adventures which had not happened, for this -Grant never used any disguise; but there was another Grant, -also very remarkable in his way, who used to remain for -months in the French quarters, using all manner of disguises; -hence the similarity of names caused the actions of both to -be attributed to one, and that is the only palliative for Marmont’s -subsequent conduct.</p> - -<p>Treating his prisoner with apparent kindness, he exacted -from him an especial parole, that he would not admit a -rescue by the Partidas while on his journey through Spain -to France: this secured his captive, though Wellington -offered two thousand dollars to any guerilla chief who should -recover him. The exaction of such a parole was a tacit compliment -to the man; but Marmont sent a letter with the -escort to the governor of Bayonne, in which, still in error -as to there being but one Grant, he designated his captive as -a dangerous spy who had done infinite mischief, and whom -he had not executed on the spot out of respect to something -resembling uniform which he wore: he therefore desired, -that at Bayonne he should be placed in irons and sent to -Paris: this was so little in accord with French honour, that -before the Spanish frontier was passed Grant was made -acquainted with the treachery.</p> - -<p>At Bayonne, in ordinary cases, the custom was for prisoners -to wait on the authorities and receive passports for -Verdun; this was done; the letter was purposely delayed, -and Grant with sagacious boldness refrained from escaping -towards the Pyrenees. Judging, that if the governor did -not recapture him at once he would entirely suppress the -letter, and let the matter drop, he asked at the hotels if any -French officer was going to Paris, and finding General -Souham, then on his return from Spain, was so bent, he -introduced himself, requesting permission to join his party. -The other readily assented, and while thus travelling the -general, unacquainted with Marmont’s intentions, often rallied -his companion about his adventures, little thinking he -was then an instrument to forward the most dangerous and -skilful of them all.</p> - -<p>In passing through Orleans, Grant by a species of intuition -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_161">161</span> -discovered a secret English agent, and from him received a -recommendation to another in Paris. He looked upon Marmont’s -double-dealing, and the expressed design to take -away his life, as equivalent to a discharge of his parole, -which was moreover only given with respect to Spain; -hence on reaching Paris he took leave of Souham, opened -an intercourse with the Parisian agent, and obtained money. -He would not go before the police to have his passport examined, -but took lodgings in a public street, frequented the -coffee-houses and visited the theatres boldly, for the secret -agent, intimately connected with the police, soon ascertained -that his escape had been unnoticed.</p> - -<p>After several weeks, the agent told him a passport was -ready for one Jonathan Buck, an American who had died -suddenly on the day it was to be claimed. Grant coolly demanded -this passport as for Jonathan Buck and instantly -departed for the mouth of the Loire, where, for reasons not -necessary to mention, he expected more assistance. New -difficulties awaited him, yet they were overcome by fresh -exertions of his surprising talent, which fortune seemed to -delight in aiding. Having taken a passage in an American -ship its departure was unexpectedly delayed; then he frankly -told his situation to the captain, who desired him to become -a discontented seaman, gave him sailor’s clothing with forty -dollars, and sent him to lodge the money in the American -consul’s hands, as a pledge that he would prosecute for ill -usage when he reached the United States: this being the custom, -the consul gave him a certificate to pass from port to port -as a discharged sailor seeking a ship.</p> - -<p>A promise of ten Napoleons induced a French boatman to -row him in the night to a small island, where, by usage, -English vessels watered unmolested, and, in return, permitted -the few inhabitants to fish and traffic without interruption. -The masts of the British ships were dimly seen beyond -the island, and the termination of all Grant’s toils seemed at -hand, when the boatman from fear or malice returned to -port. Some men would have strived in desperation to force -fortune and so have perished, others would have sunk in -despair, for the money promised was Grant’s all, and the boatman -demanded full payment; but with admirable coolness he<span class="pagenum" id="Page_162">162</span> -gave him one piece and a rebuke for his misconduct; the -other threatened a reference to the police yet found himself -overmatched in subtlety: his opponent replied that he -would then denounce him as aiding the escape of a prisoner -of war, and adduce the price of his boat as a proof of -his guilt!</p> - -<p>An old fisherman was afterwards engaged, and faithfully -performed his bargain, but there were then no English vessels -near the island; however the fisherman caught some fish, -with which he sailed towards the southward, having heard -of an English ship of war being there. A glimpse was obtained -of her, and they were steering that way when a shot -from a coast-battery brought them to, and a boat with soldiers -put off to board. The fisherman was steadfast and true. -He called Grant his son, and the soldiers were only sent to -warn them not to pass the battery because an English vessel, -the one they were in search of, was on the coast. The old -man bribed the soldiers with his fish, assuring them he must -go with his son or they would starve, and he was so well -acquainted with the coast he could easily escape the enemy. -Being desired to wait till night and then depart, he, under -pretence of avoiding the English vessel, made the soldiers -point out her bearings so exactly that when darkness fell he -run her straight on board, and the intrepid Grant stood in -safety on the quarter deck.</p> - -<p>In England he got permission to choose a French officer -for an exchange, that no doubt might remain as to the -propriety of his escape; great was his astonishment to find -in the first prison he visited the old fisherman and his real -son, who had been captured notwithstanding a protection -given to them for their services. Grant, whose generosity -and benevolence were as remarkable as the qualities of his -understanding, soon obtained their release, sent them with -a sum of money to France, returned to the Peninsula, -and within four months from the date of his first capture -was again on the Tormes, watching Marmont’s army as -before! Other adventures could be mentioned of this generous -and spirited, yet gentle-minded man, who, having served -his country nobly in every climate, died a victim to continual -hardships aided by a mortified spirit, for he had not -been rewarded as he deserved.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_163">163</span></p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Surprise of Almaraz.</span> (May, 1812.)</h3> - -<p>So many obstacles, military and political, were to be overcome -before Andalusia could be invaded, 1812, that Lord -Wellington finally resigned that project and meditated instead, -operations against Marmont’s army. To obtain success -it was essential to isolate him as much as possible, and in -that view various combinations were matured; but the most -important stroke was to destroy the bridge and forts at -Almaraz on the Tagus. Strong in works, that place was -also a great depôt for stores and boats, and not only facilitated -the passage of the Tagus for reinforcements coming -from Soult, but was sufficient to serve as a base and place of -arms for an army to operate on the rear and flank of the -British, if they engaged with Marmont in Castile. General -Hill, who remained with a force in the Alemtejo, was -charged with this great and dangerous enterprise, for a clear -understanding of which the nature of the country must be -described.</p> - -<p>The left bank of the Tagus, from Toledo to Almaraz, is -lined with rugged mountains, difficult for small bodies, impracticable -for an army. From Almaraz to the frontier of -Portugal the banks are more open, yet still difficult, and -the Tagus was only to be crossed at certain points, to which -bad roads led. From Almaraz to Alcantara the bridges, -both those included, were ruined, and those of Arzobispo -and Talavera above Almaraz were of little value because -of the rugged mountains. Soult’s pontoon equipage had -been captured in Badajos, and the French could only cross -the Tagus between Toledo and the frontier of Portugal by -Marmont’s boat bridge at Almaraz, to secure which he had -constructed three strong forts and a bridge-head.</p> - -<p>The first, called Ragusa, contained stores and provisions, -and was, though not finished, exceedingly strong; it had -a loopholed stone tower twenty-five feet high within, and -was flanked without by a field-work near the bridge. This -was on the north bank. On the south bank the bridge -had a fortified head of masonry, which was again flanked -by a redoubt called Fort Napoleon, placed on a height a -little in advance; imperfectly constructed, however, inasmuch<span class="pagenum" id="Page_164">164</span> -as a wide berm in the middle of the scarp furnished a -landing-place for troops escalading. It was yet strong, -because it contained a second interior defence or retrenchment, -with a loopholed stone tower, a ditch, drawbridge, and -palisades.</p> - -<p>These forts and the bridge-head were armed with eighteen -guns and garrisoned with eleven hundred men, which insured -command of the river; but the mountains on the -left bank precluded the passage of an army towards Lower -Estremadura, save by the royal road to Truxillo, which, five -miles from the Tagus, went over the lofty rugged Mirabete -ridge: to secure the summit of this, the French had drawn a -line of works across the throat of the pass; that is to say, a -large fortified house was connected by smaller posts with -the ancient watch-tower of Mirabete, which contained eight -guns and was surrounded by a rampart twelve feet high.</p> - -<p>If all these works, and a road, which Marmont, following -the traces of an ancient Roman way, was now opening -across the Gredos mountains had been finished, the communication -of the French, though circuitous, would have -been very good and secure. Wellington feared that accomplishment -and designed to surprise Almaraz previous to -the siege of Badajos, when the redoubts were far from complete; -but the Portuguese government then baffled him by -neglecting to furnish the means of transporting the artillery -from Lisbon. Hill now marched to attempt it with a force -of six thousand men, including four hundred cavalry, two -field brigades of artillery, a pontoon equipage, and a battering-train -of six iron twenty-four-pound howitzers. The -enterprise was become more difficult. For when the army -was round Badajos, only the resistance of the forts was to be -looked to; now Foy’s division of Marmont’s army was in -the valley of the Tagus, and troops from the king’s army -occupied Talavera. Drouet was also with eight or nine -thousand men near Medellin, and closer to Merida than Hill -was to Almaraz; he might therefore intercept the latter’s -retreat—and the king’s orders were imperative that he -should hang on the English force in Estremadura. Hill had -therefore to steer, going and coming, through all these forces -with an unwieldy convoy, and as it were, blot out the -strong place without a battle; but Wellington took many<span class="pagenum" id="Page_165">165</span> -precautions to divert the French attention to other points, -and to furnish support without indicating the true object.</p> - -<p>Hill, though dangerously delayed by the difficulty of restoring -the bridge of Merida, which he had himself destroyed -during the siege of Badajos, crossed the Guadiana with six -thousand men, twelve field-pieces, pontoons, battering-train -and fifty country carts, conveying material and ammunition. -On the 15th he reached Truxillo, and during his march the -guerillas of the Guadalupe mountains made demonstrations -at different points, between Almaraz and Arzobispo, as if -seeking a place to cast a bridge that he might join Wellington. -Foy was deceived by these feints, for his spies at -Truxillo, while reporting the passage of the Guadiana, said -Hill had fifteen thousand men, and that two brigades of -cavalry were following: one report even stated that thirty -thousand men had entered Truxillo, whereas there were less -than six thousand of all arms.</p> - -<p>Early on the 16th the armament reached Jaraicejo, -formed three columns, and made a night march, intending -to surprise at the same moment, the tower of Mirabete, the -fortified house in the pass, and the forts at the bridge of -Almaraz. The left column, directed against the tower, -was commanded by General Chowne. The centre, with the -dragoons and artillery, moved by the royal road under -General Long. The right, composed of the 50th, 71st, and -92nd Regiments, under Hill in person, was to penetrate by -the narrow and difficult way of Roman Gordo against the -forts of the bridge; but day broke before any column -reached its destination, and all hopes of a surprise were -extinguished. This was an untoward beginning, unavoidable -with the right and centre column because of the bad -roads, but Chowne was negligent, for the Mirabete tower -might have been assaulted before daylight.</p> - -<p>Hill now saw that to reduce the Mirabete works in the -pass he must incur more loss than was justifiable, and be in -such plight that he could not finally carry the forts below; -yet it was only through the pass the artillery could move -against the bridge. In this dilemma, after losing the 17th -and part of the 18th, in fruitless attempts to discover some -opening through which to reach Almaraz with his guns, -he resolved to leave them on the Sierra with the centre<span class="pagenum" id="Page_166">166</span> -column, make a false attack on the tower with Chowne’s -troops, and in person, with the right column, secretly -penetrate by the scarcely practicable line of Roman Gordo -to the bridge, intent, with infantry alone, to storm works -which were defended by eighteen pieces of artillery and -powerful garrisons!</p> - -<p>This resolution was even more hardy than it appears, -without a reference to the general state of affairs. His -march had been one of secrecy, amidst various divisions of -the enemy; he was four days’ journey from Merida, his first -point of retreat; he expected Drouet to be reinforced and -advance, and hence, whether defeated or victorious at Almaraz, -his retreat would be very dangerous; exceedingly so if -defeated, because his fine British troops could not be repulsed -with a small loss, and he would have to fall back -through a difficult country, with his best soldiers dispirited -by failure and burthened by numbers of wounded men. -Then, harassed on one side by Drouet, pursued by Foy and -D’Armagnac on the other, he would have been exposed to -the greatest misfortunes, every slanderous tongue would have -been let loose on the rashness of attacking impregnable forts, -and a military career, hitherto so glorious, might have terminated -in shame. Devoid of interested ambition, he was -unshaken by such fears, and remained concealed until the -evening of the 18th, when he commenced the descent, with -design to escalade the Fort Napoleon before daylight. The -march was less than six miles, but the head of the troops -only reached the fort a little before daylight, the rear was -distant, and it was doubtful if the scaling ladders, cut in -halves to thread the short narrow turns in the precipitous -descent, would serve for an assault. Some small hills concealed -the head of the column, and at that moment Chowne -commenced his false attack at Mirabete. Pillars of white -smoke rose on the lofty brow of the Sierra, the heavy sound -of artillery came rolling over the valley, and the garrison of -Fort Napoleon, crowding on the ramparts, were gazing at -those portentous signs of war, when, quick and loud, a -British shout broke on their ears, and the 50th Regiment -with a wing of the 71st, came bounding over the low hills.</p> - -<p>Surprised the French were to see an enemy so close while -the Mirabete was still defended, yet they were not unprepared;<span class="pagenum" id="Page_167">167</span> -a patrol of English cavalry had been seen from the -fort on the 17th, and in the evening of the 18th a woman -had given exact information of Hill’s numbers and designs. -This intelligence had caused the commandant, Aubert, to -march in the night with reinforcements to Fort Napoleon, -which was therefore defended by six companies ready to -fight, and when the first shout was heard they smote with -musketry and artillery on the British front, while the guns -of Fort Ragusa took them in flank. A rise of ground, twenty -yards from the ramparts, soon covered the assailants from -the front fire, and General Howard, leading the foremost -into the ditch, commenced the escalade. The breadth of the -berm kept off the ends of the shortened ladders from the -parapet, but the first men jumped on to the berm itself and -drawing up the ladders planted them there; then with a -second escalade they won the rampart and, closely fighting, -all went together into the retrenchment round the stone -tower. Aubert was wounded and taken, and the garrison -fled towards the bridge-head, but the victorious troops would -not be shaken off, they entered that work also in one confused -mass with the fugitives, who continued their flight -over the bridge itself. Still the British soldiers pushed -their headlong charge, slaying the hindmost, and would -have passed the river if some of the boats had not been -destroyed by stray shots from the forts, which were now -sharply cannonading each other, for the artillery men had -turned the guns of Napoleon on Fort Ragusa.</p> - -<p>Many French, leaping into the water, were drowned, but -the greatest part were made prisoners, and to the amazement -of the conquerors the panic pervaded the other side of the -river, where the garrison of Ragusa, though perfectly safe, -fled with the others! Some grenadiers of the 92nd, then -swimming over, brought back boats, with which the bridge -was restored and the towers and works of Ragusa were destroyed, -and the stores, ammunition, provisions and boats, -burned. In the night the troops returned to the Mirabete -ridge with the colours of the foreign regiment, and two hundred -and fifty prisoners, including a commandant and sixteen -other officers, their own loss being a hundred and eighty -men. One officer of artillery was killed by his own mine, -placed for the destruction of the tower, but the only officer<span class="pagenum" id="Page_168">168</span> -slain in the assault was Captain Candler, of the 50th, a brave -man, who fell leading the grenadiers of that regiment on to -the rampart of Fort Napoleon.</p> - -<p>Rapidity was an essential cause of this success. Foy had -ordered D’Armagnac to reinforce the forts with a battalion, -which might have entered Fort Ragusa early in the morning -of the 19th; but instead of marching before day-break, it -did not move until eleven o’clock, and meeting the fugitives -on the road caught the panic.</p> - -<p>Hill was about to reduce the works at Mirabete, when Sir -W. Erskine, confused by the French movements, gave a false -alarm, which caused a retreat on Merida; Wellington, in -reference to this error of Erskine, told the ministers, that his -generals, stout in action as the poorest soldiers, were overwhelmed -with fear of responsibility when left to themselves: -the slightest movement of an enemy deprived them of judgment. -Erskine was a miserable officer; but all officers -knew, that without powerful interest future prospects and -past services would wither under the blight of a disaster; -that a selfish government would instantly offer them as victims -to a misjudging public and a ribald press, with which -success is the only criterion of merit. English generals are, -and must be, prodigal of their blood to gain reputation; but -they are timid in command, because a single failure without -a fault consigns them to shame and abuse.</p> - -<p>Having resumed his former position, Hill engaged in a -series of marches and countermarches against Drouet, yet no -action occurred, save one between General Slade and General -Lallemande, with two regiments of dragoons on each side. -Slade, contrary to orders, drove back the French horsemen -for eight miles, and through the defile of Maquilla followed -in disorder; but in the plain beyond stood Lallemande’s -reserves, with which he broke the disorderly mass, killed -or wounded fifty, pursued for six miles and took a hundred -prisoners. Two days after, the Austrian Strenowitz, having -but fifty men of Slade’s dragoons, recovered all the wounded -prisoners, defeated eighty French, killed many and took -twenty-six: such is the difference between mere dash and -military skill.</p> - -<p>In the summer of 1812 Lord Wellington resolved to fight -Marmont. There were many reasons for this, but the principal<span class="pagenum" id="Page_169">169</span> -one was, that Napoleon was in the heart of Russia, that -his own army was stronger, especially in cavalry, than it -had yet been or was likely to be, and if he did not then -strike no better opportunity could be expected. He had -ninety thousand men, British and Portuguese, but six thousand -were in Cadiz, and the Walcheren expedition was still -to be atoned for; the regiments which had served there were -so sickly that only thirty-two thousand British were in line; -yet to these he could join twenty-five thousand Portuguese, -making fifty-seven thousand sabres and bayonets, which he -judged sufficient. Of this force Hill had seventeen thousand, -two thousand being cavalry with twenty-four guns. General -D’Urban was with twelve hundred Portuguese horsemen in -the Tras Os Montes, and was to coöperate with Wellington, -who had therefore nearly forty thousand of all arms, three -thousand five hundred being cavalry, with fifty-four guns.</p> - -<p>Almaraz bridge had been destroyed to lengthen the French -lateral line of communication, Alcantara was now repaired -to shorten the British line; and though the break in that -stupendous structure was ninety feet wide and one hundred -and fifty above the water, the genius of Colonel Sturgeon -overcame the difficulty. Hill’s army was thus brought a -fortnight nearer to Wellington than Drouet was to Marmont, -if both marched with artillery; and as the army of the centre -was, by the king’s misrule, in a state of great disorder, -Marmont was for a time isolated from all the other armies -save that of the north, now under General Caffarelli, who -was however occupied by maritime expeditions from Coruña.</p> - -<p>Marmont was a man to be feared. He was quick of apprehension, -morally and physically brave, scientific, used to -war, strong of body, in the prime of life, eager for glory; -and though neither a great nor a fortunate commander, such -a one as could bear the test of fire. He had strongly fortified -three convents at Salamanca, and having about twenty-five -thousand men in hand, demanded aid from the king, -from Soult, and from the army of the north. His design was -to dispute the Tormes and Duero in succession, the first by -his forts, the second with an army, which he could augment -to forty-six thousand without extraneous aid by calling -Bonet’s division from the Asturias.</p> - -<p>On the 13th of June Wellington advanced to the Tormes.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_170">170</span> -The bridge of Salamanca was barred by the French forts, all -the others had been destroyed save that of Alba de Tormes, -the castle of which was garrisoned; the allies however -passed the river above and below Salamanca by the fords -of Santa Marta and Los Cantos, and General Clinton invested -the forts with the sixth division. Marmont, who had -two divisions and some cavalry, retired by the road of Toro. -Salamanca then became a scene of rejoicing. The houses -were illuminated, the people, shouting, singing and weeping -for joy, gave Wellington their welcome while his army -took a position on the hill of San Christoval five miles in -advance.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Siege of the Salamanca Forts.</span> (June, 1812.)</h3> - -<p>Clinton had only four heavy guns and three twenty-four-pound -howitzers, but the train used by Hill at Almaraz had -passed the Tagus at Alcantara on its way up. The strength -of the forts had however been under-estimated, they contained -eight hundred men. San Vincente, placed on a perpendicular -cliff overhanging the Tormes, had a fortified convent -within, and was well flanked and separated by a deep -ravine from the other forts; and these last, called San Cajetano -and La Merced, though smaller and of a square form, -were bomb-proof and with deep ditches.</p> - -<p>The engineer Burgoyne, directing the siege, commenced a -battery two hundred and fifty yards from Vincente, and as -the ruins of convents all around which had been destroyed to -make the forts, rendered it impossible to excavate, earth was -brought from a distance; but the moon was up, the night -short, the French musketry heavy, the sixth division inexperienced, -and at daybreak the battery was still imperfect. -An attempt had been made to attach the miner secretly to the -counterscarp, but the vigilance of a trained dog baffled this -design: it was then openly made, yet defeated by a plunging -fire from the top of the convent.</p> - -<p>On the 18th eight hundred Germans, placed in the ruins, -mastered all the enemy’s fire save that from loop-holes, and -two field-pieces were placed on a neighbouring convent to -silence the French artillery, but failed.</p> - -<p>In the night the first battery was armed; at daybreak on<span class="pagenum" id="Page_171">171</span> -the 19th seven guns opened, and by nine o’clock the wall -of the convent was cut away to the level of the rampart; -a second breaching battery of iron howitzers, which saw -lower down the scarp, then commenced its fire, but that -ordnance was unmeet for battering, and the enemy’s musketry -brought down a captain and more than twenty -gunners.</p> - -<p>The 20th Colonel Dickson arrived with more iron -howitzers from Elvas, and the second battery, reinforced -with additional pieces, revived its fire, striking only the -convent, a huge cantle of which came to the ground, crushing -many of the garrison and laying bare the inside of the -building; carcasses were immediately thrown into the opening, -but the enemy extinguished the flames. A lieutenant -and fifteen gunners were lost this day, ammunition failed, -and the attack was suspended.</p> - -<p>During this siege the aspect of affairs had changed on -both sides. Wellington, deceived as to the strength of the -forts, now found by intercepted returns that both Soult -and Marmont were far stronger than he had expected; he -had calculated also that Bonet’s division would not quit the -Asturias, but that general was in full march for Leon; -Caffarelli was likewise preparing to reinforce Marmont, and -thus the brilliant prospect of the campaign was suddenly -clouded. Meanwhile Marmont, having united four divisions -of infantry and a brigade of cavalry, twenty-five thousand -men, came to the succour of the forts. His approach, over -an open country, being descried at a considerable distance, a -brigade was called from the siege, the battering train was -sent across the Tormes, and the army formed in order of -battle on the top of San Christoval. This position was four -miles long, rather concave, and the steep descent in front -tangled with hollow roads, stone inclosures and villages; -the summit was broad, even, and covered with ripe corn, -the right was flanked by the Upper Tormes, the left dipped -into the country bordering the Lower Tormes; for in passing -Salamanca that river took a sweep round the back of the -position. The infantry, heavy cavalry and guns, crowned -the summit of the mountain, but the light cavalry was in a -low country on the left, where there was a small stream and -a marshy flat. In front of the left, centre, and right, the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_172">172</span> -villages of Christoval, Castillanos, and Moresco, were nearly -in a line at the foot of the position, which overlooked the -country for many miles, yet had neither shade nor fuel to -cook with, nor water nearer than the Tormes, and the heat -was very oppressive.</p> - -<p>At five o’clock in the evening the enemy’s horsemen -approached, pointing towards the left of the position, as if -to turn it by the Lower Tormes; to check this the light -cavalry made a short forward movement and a partial -charge took place, but the French opened six guns and the -others retired to their own ground. The light division -immediately closed towards the left, and the French cavalry -halted. Meanwhile the main body of the enemy bore with -a rapid pace in one dark volume against the right, and -halting at the foot of the position sent a flight of shells -on to the lofty summit; nor did this fire cease until after -dark, when Marmont, taking possession of Moresco, established -himself behind that village and Castillanos, within -gun-shot of the allies.</p> - -<p>That night the English general slept amongst the troops, -and the first streak of light saw both sides under arms. -Some signals were interchanged between Marmont and the -forts, yet all remained quiet until evening, when Wellington -detached the 68th Regiment to drive the French from Moresco. -This attack, made with vigour, succeeded, but the -troops being recalled just as daylight failed, a body of -French, passing unperceived through standing corn, broke -into the village unexpectedly and did considerable execution. -In the skirmish an officer, named Mackay, being surrounded, -refused to surrender, and, fighting against a multitude, received -more wounds than the human frame was thought capable -of sustaining; yet he lived to show his honourable scars.</p> - -<p>Next day three divisions and a brigade of cavalry joined -Marmont, who, having now forty thousand men, extended -his left and seized a part of the height in advance of the -allies’ right wing. From thence he could discern the whole -of their order of battle, and attack their right on even terms; -but Graham, using the seventh division, dislodged his detachment -with a sharp skirmish before it could be formidably -reinforced, and in the night the French withdrew -to some heights six miles in rear.</p> - -<p>It was thought Marmont’s tempestuous advance to Moresco -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_173">173</span> -on the evening of the 20th should have been his ruin; but -Wellington argued, that if he came to fight it was better to -defend a strong position than descend to combat in the -plain; for the French inferiority was not such as to insure a -result decisive of the campaign, and in case of failure, a -retreat across the Tormes would have been very difficult. -To this may be added, that during the first evening there -was some confusion amongst the allies; the troops, of different -nations, had formed their order of battle slowly; the -descent of the mountain towards the enemy was by no means -easy; walls, hollow ways and villages, covered the French -front, and Marmont, having plenty of guns and troops ready -of movement, could have evaded the action until night. -This reasoning however failed on the 21st. The allies, -whose infantry was a third more, their cavalry three times -as numerous and much better mounted, might have poured -down by all the roads at daybreak, and then Marmont, -turned on both flanks and followed vehemently, could never -have made his retreat to the Duero through the open country: -on the 22nd, when his other troops came up, the -chances were no longer the same.</p> - -<p>Marmont now withdrew his right, abandoning the road of -Toro, but keeping that of Tordesillas, and placing his left on -the Tormes at Huerta, where the river took a sudden bend, -descending perpendicularly towards the allies. Thus commanding -the ford of Huerta he could pass the river and -communicate by the left bank with his forts. Wellington -made corresponding dispositions. Closing towards the -river, he placed the light division at the ford of Aldea -Lengua, sent Graham down with two divisions to the -nearer ford of Santa Marta, and General Bock’s heavy -German cavalry over the Tormes to watch the ford of -Huerta.</p> - -<p>On the 23rd all was tranquil, but at break of day on -the 24th some dropping pistol-shots, and now and then a -shout, came faintly from a mist covering the lower ground -beyond the river; the heavy sound of artillery succeeded, -and the hissing of bullets cutting through the thickened -atmosphere told that the French were over the Tormes. -Soon the fog vanished, and the German horsemen were seen<span class="pagenum" id="Page_174">174</span> -retiring in close and beautiful order before twelve thousand -French infantry, advancing in battle array. At intervals, -twenty guns would start forwards and send their bullets -whistling and tearing up the ground beneath the Germans, -while scattered parties of light cavalry scouting out capped -all the hills in succession, peering abroad and giving signals -to the main body. Wellington then sent Graham over the -river with two divisions and a brigade of English cavalry, -concentrating the rest of his troops near Moresco to await -the event.</p> - -<p>Bock continued his retreat in fine order, regardless alike -of the cannonade and of the light horsemen on his flanks, -until the enemy’s scouts gained a height, from whence, at -the distance of three miles, they for the first time perceived -Graham’s twelve thousand men, ranged with eighteen guns -on an order of battle perpendicular to the Tormes. From -the same point Wellington’s heavy columns were seen clustering -on the height above the fords of Santa Marta, and the -light division at Aldea Lengua, ready either to advance -against the French troops left on the right bank, or to pass -the river in aid of Graham. At this sight Marmont hastily -faced about, repassed the Tormes, and resumed his former -ground.</p> - -<p>Wellington, unwilling to stir before the forts fell, here -again refused an accidental advantage; for it is not easy to -see how the French could have avoided a defeat if he had -moved with all the troops on the right bank against the -French divisions on that side.</p> - -<p>The forts were now closely pressed. On the 23rd, the -heavy guns being brought back, a battery to breach San -Cajetano was armed with four pieces; yet the line of fire -being oblique only beat down the parapet and knocked away -the palisades. An escalade of that fort and La Merced was -tried at ten o’clock, yet failed in half an hour with a loss of -one hundred and twenty men and officers; the wounded -were brought off next day under truce, and the enemy had -all the credit of the fight. General Bowes, whose rank -might have excused his leading so small a force, being -wounded early in this assault, was having his hurt dressed -when he heard the troops were yielding, whereupon he returned -to the fight and fell.</p> - -<p>Want of powder now suspended the siege until the 26th, -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_175">175</span> -when a convoy arrived. Then the second and third batteries -were re-armed, and the field-pieces replaced on the -neighbouring convent. The iron howitzers, throwing hot -shot, soon set the convent within San Vincente on fire; but -the garrison extinguished the flames and this balanced combat -continued during the night. In the morning the besiegers’ -fire was redoubled, the convent was in a blaze, the -breach of Cajetano improved, and a fresh storming party was -assembled, when the white flag waved from Cajetano. Negotiation -ensued, but Wellington, judging it an artifice to -gain time, ordered a double assault, to oppose which Cajetano -scarcely fired a shot, and the flames raged so at Vincente -no opposition could be made. Seven hundred prisoners, -thirty pieces of artillery, provisions, arms, clothing, and a -secure passage over the Tormes, were the immediate fruits of -this capture: not the less prized that the breaches were found -more formidable than those at Rodrigo, and a storm would -have been very doubtful if the garrison could have gained -time to extinguish the flames in San Vincente. The allies -had ninety killed, and their whole loss was five hundred -men and officers, of which one hundred and sixty men with -fifty horses fell outside Salamanca, the rest in the siege.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Combats between the Duero and the Tormes.</span> (July, 1812.)</h3> - -<p>When the forts were taken Marmont retreated. Wellington -pursued by easy marches, and on the 2nd of July -inflicted a slight loss on the rear-guard at the bridge of Tordesillas; -it would have been a great one if he had not been -deceived by a false report that the French had broken the -bridge the night before.</p> - -<p>Marmont then took the line of the Duero, having fortified -posts at Zamora and Toro, and broken the bridges there and -at Puente Duero and Tudela also, preserving only that of -Tordesillas. His left was at Simancas on the Pisuerga, -which was unfordable, and the bridges at that place and -Valladolid were commanded by fortified posts. His centre -was at Tordesillas and very numerous; his right on heights -opposite the ford of Pollos, which Wellington seized instantly -as it gave him a passage, though a difficult one and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_176">176</span> -unfit for a large force. Head-quarters were then fixed at -Rueda, and the army disposed with a head against the ford of -Pollos and bridge of Tordesillas, the rear on the Zapardiel and -Trabancos rivers to meet any outbreak from the Valladolid -side. Marmont’s line of defence, measured from Valladolid -to Zamora, was sixty miles; from Simancas to Toro above -thirty; but the actual occupation was not above twelve; the -bend of the river gave him the chord, the allies the arc, and -the fords were few and difficult.</p> - -<p>It was Wellington’s design to force Marmont by the co-operation -of the Gallician and other Spanish forces to live on -his fixed magazines; Castaños however, like all Spanish generals, -failed in the hour of need. Marmont had then the -means of rendering the campaign futile if not disastrous to -the British general, but with a false judgment threw away his -actual advantages by striving to better them. Bonet’s recall -from the Asturias was a great error. Napoleon and Wellington -had alike foreseen the importance of holding that province; -the one ordered, the other calculated on its retention, -and their judgment was now vindicated. The Gallicians -and Asturians immediately moved by the coast towards -Biscay, where the maritime expedition from Coruña, a large -one under Sir Home Popham, had descended on several -points; Caffarelli therefore retained the reinforcement destined -for Marmont, and that marshal, by gaining six thousand -men under Bonet, lost twelve or thirteen thousand of -the army of the north, and opened all the northern provinces -to the Spaniards.</p> - -<p>In this state of affairs neither Wellington nor Marmont had -reason to fight on the Duero. The latter because his position -was so strong he could safely wait for Bonet’s and Caffarelli’s -troops, while the king operated against the allies’ communications. -The former because he could not attack the French, -except at great disadvantage; for the fords of the Duero -were little known, and that of Pollos very deep. To pass -the river there and form within gunshot of the enemy’s left, -without other combinations, promised nothing but defeat, for -the strength of ground was with the French. While they -had the bridge at Tordesillas, an attempt to force a passage -would have enabled Marmont to fall on the front and rear, if -the operation was within his reach; if beyond his reach,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_177">177</span> -that is to say, near Zamora, he could cut the communication -with Rodrigo and yet preserve his own with Caffarelli and -the king. Wellington therefore resolved to wait until the -fords should become lower, or the Gallicians and Partidas -should be persuaded to act, and thus force the French to -detach men or dislodge for want of provisions.</p> - -<p>D’Urban’s Portuguese cavalry, which was on the French -side of the river, now incommoded Marmont’s right, and Foy -marched to drive them off; General Pakenham, commanding -the third division, immediately crossed the ford of Pollos, -which brought Foy back, and Marmont then augmented the -efficiency of his cavalry by taking a thousand horses from the -infantry officers and sutlers.</p> - -<p>On the 8th Bonet arrived, and the French marshal, extending -his right to Toro, commenced repairing the bridge there. -Wellington, in like manner, stretched his left to the Guarena, -keeping his centre still on the Trabancos and his right at -Rueda, with posts near Tordesillas and the ford of Pollos. -In this situation the armies remained for some days, during -which Graham and Picton went to England in bad health, -and the principal powder magazine at Salamanca exploded -with hurt to many. No other events worth recording occurred. -The weather was fine, the country rich, the troops -received their rations regularly, and wine was so plentiful it -was hard to keep the soldiers sober; the caves of Rueda, natural -or cut in the rock below the surface of the earth, were -so immense, and held so much wine, that the drunkards of two -armies failed to make any very sensible diminution in the -quantity, and many men perished in that labyrinth. The -soldiers of each army also, passing the Duero in groups, held -amicable intercourse, conversing of battles that were yet to be -fought, and the camps on the banks of the Duero seemed at -times to belong to one general, so difficult is it to make brave -men hate each other.</p> - -<p>To the officers of the allies all looked prosperous, they were -impatient for the signal of battle, and many complained that -the French had been permitted to retreat from Christoval; -had Wellington been finally forced back to Portugal, his -reputation would have been grievously assailed by his own -people. The majority, peering forward with misty political -vision, overlooked the difficulties close at hand, but their<span class="pagenum" id="Page_178">178</span> -general was fretted with care and mortification, for all cross -and evil circumstances seemed to combine against him. The -Spanish coöperation had failed in all quarters, the enemy in -front was growing stronger, Soult was seriously menacing -Cadiz, and the king was said to have been joined by Drouet; -the Portuguese troops were deserting in great numbers from -misery; the English government had absurdly and perniciously -interfered with the supply of the military chest; -there was no money and the personal resources of Wellington -alone kept the army in its forward position. “I have -never,” said he, “been in such distress as at present, and -some serious misfortune must happen if the government do -not attend seriously to the subject and supply us regularly -with money. The arrears and distresses of the Portuguese -government are a joke to ours, and if our credit was not -better than theirs we should certainly starve. As it is, if we -don’t find means to pay our bills for butcher’s meat there -will be an end to the war at once.”</p> - -<p>Thus stript as it were to the skin, he was going once more -to hide his nakedness in the mountains of Portugal, when Marmont, -proud of his own unripened skill, and perhaps, from -the experience of San Christoval, undervaluing his adversary’s -tactics; desirous also, it was said, to gain a victory -without the presence of a king; Marmont, pushed on by -fate, madly broke the chain which restrained his enemy’s -strength.</p> - -<p>To understand the remarkable movements which were now -about to commence, it must be borne in mind that the French -army, while the harvest was on the ground, had no regard to -lines of communication; it had supports on all sides, and the -troops were taught to reap the standing corn, and grind it -themselves if their cavalry could not seize flour in the villages. -This organization, approaching the ancient Roman -military perfection, baffled the irregular, and threw the regular -force of the allies entirely upon the defensive; their -flanks once turned a retreat must follow to save the communications; -but the French offered no point for retaliation. -Wherefore, with a force composed of four different nations, -Wellington was to make difficult evolutions in an open -country, his only chances of success being the casual errors of -his adversary, an able general, who knew the country perfectly<span class="pagenum" id="Page_179">179</span> -and had troops well disciplined, and of one nation. -The game would have been quite unequal if the English had -not been so strong in cavalry.</p> - -<p>In the course of the 15th and 16th Marmont, who had previously -made deceptive movements, concentrated his beautiful -and gallant army on its right towards Toro, which place, -intercepted letters, reports of deserters and the talk of the -peasants, had for several days assigned as his point of -passage. On the morning of the 16th English exploring -officers, passing the Duero near Tordesillas, found only the -garrison there, and in the evening the reports stated, that -two French divisions had already crossed by the bridge of -Toro; wherefore Wellington united his centre and left at -Canizal, on the Guarena, during the night, intending to -attack; but as he had still some doubts of the real object, he -left Sir Stapleton Cotton on the Trabancos with the right -wing, composed of the fourth and light divisions and Anson’s -cavalry. Suddenly Marmont recalled his troops, returned to -Tordesillas and Pollos, passed the Duero and concentrated at -Nava del Rey in the evening of the 17th, some of his men -having marched forty, some fifty miles without a halt. -Wellington was then near Toro, and Cotton remained behind -the Trabancos during the night without orders, in a -bad position; Wellington however hastened to his aid, -bringing up Bock’s, Le Marchant’s, and Alten’s cavalry, -while the fifth division took post six miles in rear of the -Trabancos.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Combats of Castrejon and the Guarena.</span> (July, 1812.)</h3> - -<p>At daybreak Cotton’s outposts were driven in, yet the -bulk of his cavalry and a troop of horse artillery showed -a front, having the two infantry divisions in support; -the fourth behind his left, the light division behind his -right, but widely separated by a valley. The country was -open, like the downs of England, with here and there water-gullies, -dry hollows and naked heads of land, behind one of -which, on the other side of the Trabancos, lay the French -army. Cotton, seeing only horsemen, pushed his cavalry -towards the river, advancing cautiously by his right along -some high table-land, where his troops were lost at first in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_180">180</span> -the morning fog, then thick on the stream. Very soon the -deep tones of artillery shook the ground, the sharp ring of -musketry was heard in the mist, and the 43rd Regiment was -hastily brought through the village of Castrejon to support -the advancing cavalry; for besides the deep valley separating -the fourth from the light division, there was a ravine with a -marshy bottom between the cavalry and infantry, and the -village furnished the only good passage.</p> - -<p>The cannonade became heavy, and the spectacle surprisingly -beautiful. The lighter smoke and mist, mingling and -curling in fantastic pillars, formed a huge and glittering -dome tinged with many colours by the rising sun, and -through the gross vapour below the restless horsemen were -seen or lost, as the fume thickened from the rapid play of -the artillery; the bluff head of land beyond the Trabancos, -now covered with French troops, appeared by an optical -deception close at hand, dilated to the size of a mountain, -and crowned with gigantic soldiers, who were continually -breaking off and sliding down into the fight. Suddenly a -dismounted English cavalry officer stalked from the midst of -the smoke towards the line of infantry; his gait was peculiarly -rigid, and he appeared to hold a bloody handkerchief -to his heart; but that which seemed a cloth was a broad and -dreadful wound: a bullet had entirely effaced the flesh from -his left shoulder and breast and carried away part of his -ribs, his heart was bared and its movement plainly discerned. -It was a piteous and yet a noble sight, for his countenance -though ghastly was firm, his step scarcely indicated weakness, -and his voice never faltered. This unyielding man’s -name was Williams. He died a short distance from the field -of battle, it was said in the arms of his son, a youth of fourteen, -who had followed his father to the Peninsula in hopes -of obtaining a commission, for they were not in affluent circumstances.</p> - -<p>Cotton maintained this exposed position until seven o’clock, -when Wellington and Beresford came up, and both were like -to have been slain together. For a squadron of French -cavalry, breaking away from the head of land beyond the -Trabancos, had just before come with such speed across the -valley that it was for a moment thought they were deserting; -but with headlong course they mounted the table-land on<span class="pagenum" id="Page_181">181</span> -which Cotton’s left wing was posted, and drove a whole line -of British cavalry skirmishers back in confusion. The reserves -then came up from Alaejos, and these furious swordmen, -scattered in all directions, were in turn driven away or -cut down; yet thirty or forty, led by their gallant officer, -suddenly appeared above the ravine separating the British -wings, just as Wellington and Beresford arrived on the slope -beneath them. Some infantry picquets were in the bottom, -higher up were two guns covered by a squadron of light -cavalry disposed in perfect order, and when the French -officer saw this squadron he reined in his horse with difficulty, -his men gathering in a confused body round him; -they seemed lost, but their daring leader waving his sword -soused down with a shout on the English troopers, who -turning, galloped through the guns, and the whole mass, -friends and enemies, went like a whirlwind to the bottom, -carrying away in the tumult Wellington and Beresford. The -French horsemen were now quite exhausted and a reserve -of heavy dragoons cut most of them to pieces; yet their -invincible leader, assaulted by three enemies at once, struck -one dead from his horse, and with surprising exertions saved -himself from the others, though they rode hewing at him on -each side for a quarter of a mile.</p> - -<p>Scarcely was this over when Marmont, having ascertained -that a part only of Wellington’s army was before him, -crossed the Trabancos in two columns, and penetrating between -the light and fourth divisions marched straight upon -the Guarena. The British retired in three columns, the -light division being between the fifth division and the -French, close to the latter, the cavalry on the flanks and -rear. The air was extremely sultry, the dust rose in clouds, -and the close order of the troops was rendered very oppressive -by a siroc wind; but where the light division marched -the military spectacle was strange and grand. Hostile -columns of infantry, only half musket-shot from each other, -were marching impetuously towards a common goal, the -officers on each side pointing forwards with their swords, or -touching their caps and waving their hands in courtesy, -while the German cavalry, huge men, on huge horses, rode -between in a close compact body as if to prevent a collision: -at times the loud tones of command to hasten the march were<span class="pagenum" id="Page_182">182</span> -heard passing from the front to the rear on both sides, and -now and then the rush of French bullets came sweeping -over the columns, whose violent pace was continually accelerated.</p> - -<p>Thus moving for ten miles, yet keeping the most perfect -order, both parties approached the Guarena, and the enemy -seeing the light division, although more in their power than -the others, was yet outstripping them in the march, increased -the fire of their guns and menaced an attack with infantry: -the German cavalry instantly drew close round, the column -plunged suddenly into a hollow dip of ground on the left, -and ten minutes after the head of the division was in the -stream of the Guarena between Osmo and Castrillo. The fifth -division entered it at the same time higher up on the left, -and the fourth division passed on the right. The soldiers of -the light division, tormented with thirst yet long used to -their enemy’s mode of warfare, drunk as they marched; -those of the fifth division, less experienced, stopped a few -moments, and on the instant forty French guns gathering on -the heights above sent a tempest of bullets amongst them. -So nicely timed was the operation.</p> - -<p>The Guarena, flowing from four distinct sources which -united below Castrillo, offered a very strong line of defence; -yet Marmont, hoping to carry it in the first confusion, -brought up all his artillery and pushed the head of his right -column over an upper branch. Wellington, expecting this, -had previously ordered up the other divisions of his army, -and they were in line before Marmont’s infantry, oppressed -with heat and long marches, could gather strength to attempt -the passage of the other branch. Carier’s brigade of cavalry -first crossed, and was followed by a column of infantry, just -as the fourth division had gained the table-land above. -Carier’s horsemen entered the valley on the left, the infantry -in one column menaced the front, but the sedgy banks of the -stream would have been difficult to force, if Victor Alten, slow -to perceive an advantage, had not suffered the French cavalry -to cross first in considerable numbers without opposition. -Then he assailed them by successive squadrons instead -of regiments, and when the 14th and German Hussars -were hard-pressed, brought up the 3rd Dragoons, who were -however driven back by the fire of the infantry, and many<span class="pagenum" id="Page_183">183</span> -fell. Finally Carier being wounded and taken, the French -retired, and meanwhile the 27th and 40th Regiments, coming -down the hill, broke the enemy’s infantry with an impetuous -bayonet charge: Alten’s horsemen then sabred some of the -fugitives.</p> - -<p>Marmont lost a general and five hundred soldiers by this -combat, but, though baffled at one point, and beaten at -another, he concentrated his army and held both banks of -the branch he had gained. Wellington also concentrated, -and as the previous operations had only cost him six hundred -men and the French but eight hundred, the day being still -young, the positions open and within cannon-shot, a battle -was expected. Marmont’s troops had however been marching -for two days and nights, and Wellington’s plan did not -admit of fighting unless in defence, or with such advantage -as that he could crush his opponent and keep the field afterwards -against the king.</p> - -<p>The French marshal had passed a great river, surprised -the allies’ right, and pushed it back above ten miles: he had -nevertheless failed as a general. His aim had been, by menacing -the communication between Salamanca and Rodrigo, -to draw the allies back; yet on the evening of the 16th, -having passed the Duero at Toro, he was nearer to Salamanca -than they were, and, persisting, Wellington must have fought -him at disadvantage, or passed the Tormes at Huerta to -regain the road of Rodrigo. Marmont however relinquished -this stroke to march eighty miles in forty-eight hours, and -after many nice evolutions, in which he lost a thousand men -by the sword and fatigue, found his adversary on the 18th -facing him in the very position he had turned on the evening -of the 16th!</p> - -<p>On the 19th the armies were quiet until evening, when the -French were suddenly concentrated in one mass on their left. -Wellington made a corresponding movement on the tableland -above, which caused the light division to overlook the -enemy’s main body, then at rest round the bivouac fires; it -would have remained so if Sir Stapleton Cotton coming up -had not turned a battery upon a group of French officers. -At the first shot they seemed surprised—for it was a discourteous -and ill-considered act—at the second their gunners run -to their pieces, and a reply from twelve heavier guns wounded<span class="pagenum" id="Page_184">184</span> -an artillery-officer, killed several British soldiers, swept away -a whole section of Portuguese, and compelled the division -to withdraw in a mortifying manner to avoid unnecessary -blood-spilling.</p> - -<p>Wellington now expected a battle, because the heights he -occupied trended backwards to the Tormes on the shortest -line, and as he had thrown a Spanish garrison into the castle -of Alba de Tormes he thought the French could not turn his -right; if they attempted it, he could shoulder them off the -Tormes at the ford of Huerta. At daybreak however, instead -of crossing the Guarena in front to dispute the high land, -Marmont marched rapidly up the river and crossed the -stream, though the banks were difficult, before any disposition -could be made to oppose him. He thus turned the right -and gained a new range of hills trending also towards the -Tormes, and parallel to those which Wellington possessed. -Then commenced a scene similar to that of the 18th but on a -greater scale. The allies moving in two lines of battle within -musket-shot of the French endeavoured to cross their march, -the guns on both sides exchanged rough salutations as the -accidents of ground favoured their play, and the officers, like -gallant gentlemen who bore no malice and knew no fear, -made their military recognitions, while the horsemen on each -side watched with eager eyes for an opening to charge: but -the French, moving as one man along the crest of the heights, -preserved the lead and made no mistake.</p> - -<p>Soon it became evident that the allies would be outflanked, -wherefore Wellington, falling off a little, made towards the -heights occupied by Marmont during the siege of the forts, -intending to halt there while an advanced guard, forcing a -march, secured the position and fords of Christoval. But -he made no effort to seize the ford of Huerta, for his own -march had been long, the French had passed over nearly -twice as much ground, and he thought they could not reach -the Tormes that day. When night approached he discovered -his error. His second line had indeed got the heights of -Vellosa, but his first line was heaped up in low ground near -the French army, whose fires, crowning all the opposite -hills, showed they commanded the ford of Huerta. Wellington -then ordered the bivouac fires to be made with much -smoke, under cover of which he filed the troops off with<span class="pagenum" id="Page_185">185</span> -great celerity towards Vellosa; but the Portuguese cavalry, -coming in from the front, were mistaken for French and lost -some men by cannon-shot ere they were recognised.</p> - -<p>Very much disquieted by this day’s operations was the -English leader. Marmont, perfectly acquainted with the -country, had outflanked and outmarched him, and gained -the command of the Tormes, thus securing his junction with -the king’s army, and enabled to fight or wait for reinforcements, -while the scope of the allies’ operations would hourly -become more restricted. Meanwhile Caffarelli having finally -detached eighteen hundred cavalry with guns to aid Marmont, -they were coming on, and the king also was taking the field; -hence though a victory should be won, unless it was decisive, -Wellington’s object would not be advanced. That object -was to deliver the Peninsula by a course of solid operations, -incompatible with sudden and rash strokes unauthorized by -anything but hope; wherefore, yielding to circumstances, he -resolved to retreat on Portugal and abide his time; yet with -a bitter spirit, nothing soothed by the recollection that he -had refused to fight at advantage exactly one month -before upon the very hills he now occupied. Nevertheless -that steadfast temper which then prevented him from seizing -an adventitious chance would not now let him yield to -fortune more than she could ravish from him: he still hoped -to give the lion’s stroke, and resolved to cover Salamanca -and the communication with Ciudad Rodrigo to the last -moment. The uncertainty of war was now shown. This -inability to hold his ground was made known to Castaños by -a letter, which Marmont intercepted, and immediately decided -to push on without waiting for the king, who afterwards -announced this accident as a subtle stroke by Wellington -to draw on a premature battle!</p> - -<p>On the 21st, the allies being on San Christoval, the French -threw a garrison into Alba de Tormes, from whence the -Spaniards had been withdrawn by Carlos España, without -the knowledge of the English general. Marmont then -passed the Tormes by the fords, between Alba and Huerta, -and moving up the valley of the Machechuco encamped at -the outer edge of a forest. Wellington also passed the -Tormes in the evening by the bridge of Salamanca and the -fords of Santa Marta and Aldea Lengua; but the third<span class="pagenum" id="Page_186">186</span> -division and D’Urban’s cavalry remaining on the right bank, -intrenched themselves, lest the French, who had left a -division on the heights of Babila Fuente, should recross the -Tonnes in the night and overwhelm them.</p> - -<p>When the light division descended the rough side of the -Aldea Lengua mountain to cross the river night had come -down suddenly, and with more than common darkness, for a -storm, that usual precursor of a battle in the Peninsula, -was at hand. Torrents of rain deepened the ford, the water -foamed and dashed with increasing violence, the thunder -was frequent and deafening, and the lightning passed in -sheets of fire close over the column, playing upon the points -of the bayonets. One flash falling amongst the cavalry near -Santa Marta killed many men and horses, while hundreds of -frightened animals, breaking loose and galloping wildly -about, were supposed to be the enemy charging in the -darkness, and some of their patrols were indeed at hand, -hovering like birds of prey: but nothing could disturb the -beautiful order in which the serene veterans of the light -division were seen by the fiery gleams to pass the foaming -river, pursuing their march amidst this astounding turmoil, -alike regardless of the storm and the enemy.</p> - -<p>The position now taken was nearly the same as that occupied -by General Graham a month before, when the forts of -Salamanca were invested. The left wing rested in low -ground on the Tormes, having a cavalry post in front. The -right wing was extended on a range of heights, which ended -also in low ground, near the village of Arapiles: this line, -perpendicular to the Tormes from Huerta to Salamanca, was -parallel to it from Alba to Huerta, and covered Salamanca. -Meanwhile the enemy, extending his left along the edge of -the forest, menaced the line of communication with Rodrigo; -and in the night advice came that General Chauvel, bringing -up Caffarelli’s horsemen and twenty guns, had reached -Pollos the 20th, and would join Marmont the 22nd or 23rd. -Hence Wellington, feeling he must now retreat to Rodrigo, -and fearing the French cavalry thus reinforced would hamper -his movements, determined, unless they attacked him or -committed some flagrant fault, to retire before Chauvel’s -horsemen could arrive.</p> - -<p>At daybreak on the 22nd, Marmont called the troops at<span class="pagenum" id="Page_187">187</span> -Babila Fuente over the Tormes, brought Bonet’s and Maucune’s -divisions out of the forest, and took possession of the -ridge of Calvariza Ariba; he also occupied in advance of -it on his right, a wooded height on which was an old chapel -called Nuestra Señora de la Pena. But at a little distance -from his left and from the English right, stood a pair of solitary -hills, called indifferently the <i xml:lang="es" lang="es">Arapiles</i> or the <i xml:lang="es" lang="es">Hermanitos</i>. -Steep and savagely rugged, about half cannon-shot from each -other, their possession would have enabled Marmont to cross -Wellington’s right, and force a battle with every advantage. -Nevertheless they were neglected by the English at first, -until Colonel Waters, having observed an enemy’s detachment -stealing towards them, informed Beresford, who thought it -of no consequence, but Waters then rode to Wellington who -immediately sent troops to seize them. A combat similar to -that which happened between Cæsar and Afranius at Lerida -now ensued; for the French, seeing this detachment, broke -their own ranks and running to the encounter gained the -first Arapiles and kept it, yet were repulsed in an endeavour -to seize the second. This skirmish was followed by one at -Nuestra Señora de la Pena, half of which was gained, the -enemy keeping the other half: Victor Alten, aiding the -attack with a squadron of German hussars, was there -wounded by a musket-shot.</p> - -<p>The loss of the distant Arapiles rendered a retreat difficult -to the allies during daylight; for though the one gained was -a fortress in the way of the French army, Marmont, by extending -his left and gathering a force behind his own rock, -could frame a dangerous battle during the movement. Wellington -therefore extended his troops on the right of his own -Hermanito, placing the light companies of the Guards at the -village of Arapiles in low ground, and the fourth division, -with exception of the 27th Regiment, on a gentle ridge -behind them. The fifth and sixth divisions he gathered in -one mass upon the internal slope of the English Hermanito, -where the ground being hollow, hid them from the enemy. -During these movements a sharp cannonade was exchanged -from the tops of those frowning hills, on whose crowning -rocks the two generals sat like ravenous vultures watching -for their quarry.</p> - -<p>Marmont’s project was not yet developed. His troops<span class="pagenum" id="Page_188">188</span> -from Babila Fuente were still in the forest some miles off, -and he had only two divisions close up. The occupation -of Calvariza Ariba and Nuestra Señora de la Pena might -be therefore only a daring defensive measure to cover the -formation of his army; but the occupation of the Hermanito -was a start forward for an advantage to be afterwards -turned to profit, and seemed to fix the operations on -the left of the Tormes. In this doubt Wellington brought -up the first and light divisions to confront the French on -Calvariza Ariba, and calling the third division and D’Urban’s -cavalry over the river, posted them in a wood near Aldea -Tejada, entirely refused to the enemy and unseen by him, -yet securing the main road to Rodrigo. Thus the position -was suddenly reversed. The left now rested on the English -Hermanito, the right on Aldea Tejada; that which was the -rear became the front, the interval between the third and -fourth divisions being occupied by Bradford’s Portuguese infantry, -a Spanish division, and the British cavalry.</p> - -<p>Breaks and hollows so screened the men that few could -be seen by the French, and those seemed pointing to the -Rodrigo road in retreat; moreover, the commissariat and -baggage had been ordered to the rear and the dust of their -march was seen many miles off: nothing indicated an approaching -battle. Such a state of affairs could not last long. -At twelve o’clock Marmont, thinking the important bearing -of his Hermanito on Wellington’s retreat would induce the -latter to drive him thence, brought up Foy’s and Ferey’s -divisions in support, placing the first, with some guns, on a -wooded height between the Hermanito and Nuestra Señora -de la Pena; the second, with Boyer’s dragoons, on a ridge -behind Foy. Nor was this ill-timed, for Wellington, thinking -he could not insure a safe retreat in daylight, was -going to attack, but on the approach of these troops gave -counter-orders lest he should bring on a general battle disadvantageously.</p> - -<p>The French from Babila Fuente had not then reached -the edge of the forest, yet Marmont resolved to fight, and -fearing the allies would retreat before his own dispositions -were completed, ordered Thomières’ division, covered by -fifty guns and supported by the light cavalry, to make a -flank movement by its left and menace the Rodrigo road.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_189">189</span> -Then hastening the march of his other divisions, he -watched when Wellington should move in opposition to -Thomières, designing to fall upon him by the village with -six divisions of infantry and Boyer’s dragoons, which he -now ordered to take fresh ground on the left of the Hermanito -rock, leaving only one regiment of cavalry with Foy.</p> - -<p>In these new circumstances the two armies embraced an -oval basin, formed by different ranges of hills that rose like -an amphitheatre, the Arapiles rocks appearing like the doorposts. -Around this basin, which was more than a mile from -north to south and more than two miles from east to west, -the hostile forces were grouped. The northern and western -half formed the allies’ position; the eastern heights were -held by the French right; their left, consisting of Thomières’ -division, the artillery and light cavalry, moved along -the southern side of the basin, but with a wide loose march; -for there was a long space between Thomières’ division and -those in the forest destined to form the centre; a longer -space between him and the divisions about the French Hermanito. -The artillery, fifty guns, massed on Thomières’ -right flank, opened its fire grandly, taking ground to the left -by guns in succession as the infantry moved on; and these -last marched eagerly, continually contracting their distance -from the allies and bringing up their left shoulders as if to -envelope Wellington’s position and embrace it with fire. -At this time also, Bonet’s troops, one regiment of which held -the French Arapiles, carried the village of that name, and -although soon driven from the greatest part of it again maintained -a fierce struggle.</p> - -<p>Marmont’s first arrangements had occupied several hours, -but as they gave no positive indication of his designs, -Wellington, ceasing to watch them, had retired from his -Hermanito; but when he was told the French left was in -motion pointing towards the Ciudad Rodrigo road, he returned -to the rock and observed their movements for some -time with a stern contentment. Their left wing was entirely -separated from the centre, the fault was flagrant, and he -fixed it with the stroke of a thunderbolt. A few orders -issued from his lips like the incantations of a wizard, and -suddenly the dark mass of troops which covered the English -Hermanito, as if possessed by some mighty spirit, rushed<span class="pagenum" id="Page_190">190</span> -violently down the interior slope of the mountain and entered -the great basin, amidst a storm of bullets which -seemed to shear away the whole surface of the earth over -which they moved. The fifth division instantly formed on -the right of the fourth, connecting the latter with Bradford’s -Portuguese, who hastened forward at the same time from the -right of the army, and then the heavy cavalry, galloping up -on the right of Bradford, closed this front of battle. The -sixth and seventh divisions, flanked on the right by Anson’s -light cavalry, were ranged at half cannon shot on a second -line, which was prolonged by the Spaniards in the direction -of the third division; and this last, reinforced by two -squadrons of the 14th Dragoons, and D’Urban’s Portuguese -horsemen, formed the extreme right of the army. Behind -all, on the highest ground, the first and light divisions -and Pack’s Portuguese were disposed in heavy masses as a -reserve.</p> - -<p>When this grand disposition was completed, the third -division and its attendant horsemen, formed in four columns -and flanked on the left by twelve guns, received orders to -cross Thomières’ line of march. The remainder of the first -line, including the main body of the cavalry, was to advance -when the attack of the third division should be developed; -and as the fourth division must in this forward movement -necessarily lend its flank to the enemy’s troops stationed on -the French Hermanito, Pack was to assail that rock the -moment the left of the British line passed it. Thus, after -long coiling and winding, the armies came together, and -drawing up their huge trains like angry serpents mingled in -deadly strife.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Battle of Salamanca.</span> (July, 1812.)</h3> - -<p>Marmont from his Hermanito saw the country beneath -him suddenly covered with enemies at a moment when he -was in the act of making a complicated evolution, and when, -by the rash advance of his left, his troops were separated -into three parts too dispersed to assist each other, those -nearest the enemy being neither strong enough to hold their -ground nor aware of what they had to encounter. The third -division was however still hidden by the western heights, -and he hoped the tempest of bullets in the basin beneath<span class="pagenum" id="Page_191">191</span> -would check the British line until he could bring up his -other divisions and by the village of Arapiles fall on what -was now the left of the allies’ position. But even this his -only resource for saving the battle was weak, for there were -in reserve the first and light divisions and Pack’s Portuguese, -in all twelve thousand troops, with thirty pieces of artillery; -the village was also well disputed, and the English rock -stood out as a strong bastion of defence. However, nothing -daunted, Marmont despatched officer after officer, some to -hasten the troops from the forest, others to stop the progress -of his left wing; and with a sanguine expectation he still -looked for victory, until Pakenham shot with the third division -like a meteor across Thomières’ path; then pride and -hope alike died within him, and desperately he was hurrying -in person to that fatal point, when an exploding shell -stretched him on the earth with a broken arm and two deep -wounds in his side. Confusion ensued, and the troops, distracted -by ill-judged orders and counter-orders, knew not -where to move, whom to fight, or whom to avoid.</p> - -<p>It was five o’clock when Pakenham fell upon Thomières; -and it was at a moment when that general, whose column -had gained an open isolated hill, expected to see the allies in -full retreat towards the Rodrigo road, closely followed by -Marmont from the Arapiles. The counter-stroke was terrible! -Two batteries of artillery, placed on the summit of the -western heights, suddenly took his troops in flank, Pakenham’s -massive columns, supported by cavalry, were in his -front, and two-thirds of his own division, lengthened out -and unconnected, were still in a wood, where they could -hear but could not see the storm now bursting; from the -chief to the lowest soldier all felt they were lost, and in an -instant Pakenham, the most frank and gallant of men, commenced -the battle.</p> - -<p>As the British masses came on, forming lines while in -march, the French gunners, standing up manfully, sent out -showers of grape, and a crowd of light troops poured in -a fire of musketry, under cover of which the main body endeavoured -to display a front. But bearing onwards through -the skirmishers with the might of a giant Pakenham broke -the half-formed lines into fragments, and sent the whole in -confusion upon the advancing supports; one only officer<span class="pagenum" id="Page_192">192</span> -remained by the artillery; standing alone he fired the last -gun at the distance of a few yards, but whether he lived or -there died could not be seen for the smoke. Some squadrons -of light cavalry fell on the right of the third division; the -5th Regiment repulsed them, and then D’Urban’s Portuguese -horsemen, reinforced by two squadrons of the 14th Dragoons -under Felton Harvey, gained the enemy’s flank, while the -Oporto regiment, led by the English Major Watson, charged -his infantry, but Watson fell deeply wounded and his men -retired.</p> - -<p>Pakenham continued his tempestuous course against the -remainder of Thomières’ troops, which were now arrayed on -the wooded heights behind the first hill, yet imperfectly and -offering two fronts; the one opposed to the third division -and its attendant horsemen, the other to the fifth division, -Bradford’s brigade, and the main body of cavalry and artillery, -all of which were now moving in one great line across the -basin. Meanwhile Bonet, repulsed from the village of Arapiles, -was sharply engaged outside with the fourth division, -Maucune kept a menacing position behind the French Hermanito, -Clausel’s division came up from the forest, and the -connection of the centre and left was in some measure restored: -two divisions were however yet in the rear, and -Boyer’s dragoons were still in march. Thomières had been -killed, Bonet succeeding Marmont was disabled, hence more -confusion; but the command then devolved on Clausel, and -he was of a capacity to sustain this terrible crisis, which may -be thus described. The fourth and fifth divisions and Bradford’s -brigade, hotly engaged, were steadily gaining ground -on the English left; the heavy cavalry, Anson’s light dragoons, -and Bull’s troop of artillery were next in line, advancing -at a trot on Pakenham’s left, and on that general’s -right D’Urban’s horsemen overlapped the enemy. Thus in -less than half an hour, and before an order of battle had even -been formed by the French, their commander-in-chief and -two other generals had fallen, and the left of their army was -turned, thrown into confusion and enveloped.</p> - -<p>Clausel’s division had now joined Thomières’, and a new -front had been spread on the southern heights, yet loosely -and unfit to resist; for the troops were, some in double lines, -some in columns, some in squares, a powerful sun struck on<span class="pagenum" id="Page_193">193</span> -their eyes, and the light soil, stirred up and driven forward -by a breeze, which arose in the west at the moment of attack, -came mingled with smoke full upon them in such stifling -volumes, that scarcely able to breathe and quite unable to -see their fire was given at random. In this situation, while -Pakenham, bearing onward with conquering violence was -closing on their flank, and the fifth division advancing with -a storm of fire on their front, the interval between the two -attacks was suddenly filled with a whirling cloud of dust, -moving swiftly forward and carrying within its womb the -trampling sound of a charging multitude. As it passed the -left of the third division, Le Marchant’s heavy horsemen, -flanked by Anson’s light cavalry, broke out at full speed, and -the next instant twelve hundred French infantry, formed in -several lines, were trampled down with a terrible clangour -and tumult. Bewildered and blinded they cast away their -arms and run through the openings of the British squadrons, -stooping and demanding quarter, while the dragoons, big -men on big horses, rode onward, smiting with their long -glittering swords in uncontrollable power, and the third -division, following at speed, shouted as the French masses -fell in succession before this dreadful charge.</p> - -<p>Nor were these valiant swordsmen yet exhausted. Le -Marchant and many officers had fallen, but Cotton and all -his staff were still at their head, and with ranks confused -and blended in one mass, still galloping forward, they sustained -from a fresh column an irregular stream of fire which -emptied a hundred saddles; yet with fine courage and downright -force, the survivors broke through this the third and -strongest body of men that had encountered them, and Lord -Edward Somerset, continuing his course at the head of one -squadron with a happy perseverance, captured five guns. -The French left was thus entirely broken, more than two -thousand prisoners were taken, their light horsemen abandoned -that part of the field, and Thomières’ division no -longer existed as a military body. Anson’s cavalry, which -had passed quite over the hill and had suffered little in the -charge, was now joined by D’Urban’s troopers and took the -place of Le Marchant’s exhausted men; the heavy German -dragoons followed in reserve, forming with the third and -fifth divisions and the guns one formidable line, two miles in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_194">194</span> -advance of where Pakenham had first attacked: and that impetuous -officer with unmitigated strength still pressed forward -spreading terror and disorder on the enemy’s left.</p> - -<p>But while these signal events, which occupied about forty -minutes, were passing on the allies’ right, a terrible battle -raged in the centre. For when the first shock of the third -division had been observed, the fourth division, moving in a -line with the fifth, had passed the village of Arapiles under a -prodigious cannonade, and vigorously driving Bonet’s troops -step by step to the southern and eastern heights, had compelled -them to mingle with the broken remains of Clausel’s -and Thomières’ divisions. This combat having opened the -French Hermanito about the time of the cavalry charge, -enabled Pack’s Portuguese to assail that rock, and the front -of battle was thus completely defined, for Foy’s division was -then exchanging a distant cannonade with the first and light -divisions. However Bonet’s troops, notwithstanding Marmont’s -fall and the loss of their own general, fought strongly, -and Clausel made a surprisingly vigorous effort and beyond -all men’s expectations to restore the battle. Soon a great -change was visible. Ferey’s division, drawn off from the -height of Calvaraza, arrived in the centre behind Bonet’s -men; the light cavalry, Boyer’s dragoons, and two divisions -of infantry from the forest, were also united there; and on -this mass of fresh men Clausel rallied the remnants of his -own and Thomières’ division. Thus Sarrut’s, Brennier’s and -Ferey’s unbroken divisions, supported by all the cavalry, -were suddenly massed to cover the line of retreat on Alba de -Tormes, while Maucune still held the French Hermanito, -having Foy on his right.</p> - -<p>But Clausel, not content with having thus got the army -together in a condition to effect a retreat, attempted to turn -the tide of victory, founding hope on a misfortune which -had befallen Pack. For that officer, ascending the French -Hermanito in one heavy column, was within thirty yards of -the summit, believing himself victorious, when the enemy -leaped suddenly forward from the rocks upon his front and -upon his left flank; the hostile masses closed, there was a -thick cloud of smoke, a shout, a stream of fire, and the side -of the hill was covered with the dead, the wounded and -flying Portuguese. They were unjustly scoffed at for this<span class="pagenum" id="Page_195">195</span> -failure, no troops could have withstood that crash upon such -steep ground, and the propriety of attacking the hill at all -seems questionable. The result went nigh to shake the -whole battle. For the fourth division had just then reached -the southern ridge of the basin, and one regiment had -actually gained the summit when twelve hundred French, -arrayed on the reverse slope, charged up hill when the British -were quite breathless and disordered by the previous -fighting; the French came up resolutely and without a shot -won the crest, and even pursued down the other side until -two supporting regiments below checked them.</p> - -<p>This counter-blow took place at the moment of Pack’s -defeat, and then Maucune, no longer in pain for the Hermanito, -menaced the left flank and rear of the fourth division -with skirmishers, until a wing of the 40th Regiment, wheeling -about with a rough charge, cleared the rear. Maucune -would not engage more deeply at that time, yet Ferey’s -troops pressed vigorously against the front of the fourth -division, and Brennier did the same by the first line of the -fifth division; Boyer’s dragoons also came on rapidly, and -the allies outflanked and overmatched lost ground. Fiercely -and fast the French followed, and the fight once more raged -in the basin below. General Cole had before this fallen -deeply wounded, Leith had the same fortune, but Beresford -promptly drew Spry’s Portuguese brigade from the second -line of the fifth division, and thus flanked the advancing -columns of the enemy: yet he also fell desperately wounded, -and Boyer’s dragoons came freely into action, because -Anson’s cavalry had been checked, after Le Marchant’s -charge, by a heavy fire of artillery.</p> - -<p>Now the crisis of battle arrived, victory was for the -general who had the strongest reserves in hand, and Wellington, -seen that day at every point where and when his -presence was most required, brought up the sixth division, -and turned the scale by a charge, rough, strong, and successful. -Nevertheless the struggle was no slight one. -Hulse’s brigade, which was on the left, went down by hundreds, -and the 61st and 11th Regiments won their way -desperately and through such a fire as British soldiers only -can sustain. Some of Boyer’s dragoons also, breaking in -between the fifth and sixth divisions, slew many men and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_196">196</span> -caused some disorder in the 53rd; yet that brave regiment -lost no ground, nor did Clausel’s impetuous counter-attack -avail at any point, after the first burst, against the steady -courage of the allies. The southern ridge was thus regained, -the French generals Menne and Ferey were wounded, the -first severely, the second mortally; Clausel himself was -hurt, Boyer’s reserve of dragoons, coming on at a canter, -were met and broken by the fire of Hulse’s noble brigade, -and the current of the fight once more set for the British. -The third division continued to outflank the enemy’s left, -Maucune abandoned the Hermanito, Foy retired from Calvariza, -and the allied host, righting itself as a gallant ship -after a sudden gust, again bore onwards in blood and gloom: -for though the air, purified by the storm of the night before, -was peculiarly clear, one vast cloud of smoke and dust rolled -along the basin, and within it was the battle with all its -sights and sounds of terror.</p> - -<p>When Wellington had thus restored the fight in the centre, -he directed the first division to push between Foy and the -rest of the French army, which would have rendered it impossible -for the latter to rally or escape; but this order was -not executed, and Foy’s and Maucune’s divisions were skilfully -used by Clausel to protect his retreat. Foy, posted on -undulating ground and flanked by dragoons, covered the -roads to the fords of Huerta and Encina; Maucune, reinforced -with fifteen guns, was on a steep ridge in front of the -forest, covering the road to Alba de Tormes; and behind -this ridge, the rest of the army, then falling back in disorder -before the third, fifth and sixth divisions, took refuge. Wellington -immediately sent the light division in two lines, -flanked by dragoons, against Foy, and supported them with -the first division in columns, flanked on the right by two -brigades of the fourth division, which he drew from the -centre when the sixth division had restored the fight. The -seventh division and the Spaniards followed in reserve, the -country was covered with troops, and a new army seemed to -have arisen out of the earth.</p> - -<p>Foy, throwing out a cloud of skirmishers, retired by -wings, firing heavily from every rise of ground upon the -light division, which returned no shot, save by its skirmishers; -for three miles this march was under his musketry,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_197">197</span> -occasionally thickened by a cannonade, but the French aim -was baffled by the twilight and rapid gliding of the lines. -Meanwhile the French general Desgraviers was killed, the -flanking brigades from the fourth division penetrated between -Maucune and Foy, and it seemed difficult for the -latter to extricate his troops. Yet he did so thus. Augmenting -his skirmishers on the last defensible ridge, along -the foot of which run a marshy stream, he redoubled his -musketry and made a menacing demonstration with his -horsemen just as the darkness fell; the British guns immediately -opened, a squadron of dragoons galloped forwards -from the left, the infantry impetuously hastened to the -summit of the hill, and a rough shock seemed at hand, but -there was no longer an enemy: the main body had gone into the -forest on their left during the firing, and the skirmishers fled -swiftly after covered by the smoke and coming night.</p> - -<p>Maucune was now maintaining a noble battle. He was -outflanked and outnumbered, yet the safety of the French -army depended on his courage, he knew it, and Pakenham, -marking his bold demeanour, advised Clinton, who was -immediately in his front, not to assail him until the third -division should have turned his left. Nevertheless Clinton -plunged his troops into action under great disadvantage; -for after remaining some time unnecessarily under Maucune’s -batteries, which ploughed heavily through their ranks, they -were suddenly directed to attack the hill, and aided by a -brigade of the fourth division they rushed up; but in the -darkness of the night the fire showed from afar how the -battle went. On the English side a sheet of flame was seen, -sometimes advancing with an even front, sometimes pricking -forth in spear heads, now falling back in waving lines, anon -darting upwards in one vast pyramid, the apex of which -often approached yet never gained the actual summit of the -mountain; but the French musketry, rapid as lightning, -sparkled along the brow of the height with unvarying fulness, -and with what destructive effects the dark gaps and -changing shapes of the adverse fire showed too plainly: -meanwhile Pakenham turned the left, Foy glided into the -forest, and Maucune’s task being then completed, the effulgent -crest of the ridge became black and silent and the -whole French army vanished as it were in the darkness.</p> - -<p>During this fight Wellington in person made the light -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_198">198</span> -division advance towards the ford of Huerta, having the -forest on his right; for he thought the Spanish garrison was -still in the castle of Alba, and that the enemy must be found -at the fords. For this final stroke he had strengthened his -left wing; nor was he diverted from it by Foy’s retreat into -the forest, because it pointed towards the fords of Encina -and Gonzalo, where the right wing of the allies would find -him; moreover a squadron of French dragoons, bursting -from the forest soon after dark and firing their pistols, -had passed at full gallop across the front of the 43rd -Regiment towards the ford of Huerta, indicating great confusion -in the defeated army, and confirming Wellington’s -notion as to the direction: yet the troops were then marching -through standing corn, where no enemy could have preceded -them!</p> - -<p>Had the castle of Alba been held the French could not -have carried off a third of their army; nor would they have -been in much better plight if Carlos España, who soon discovered -his error in withdrawing the garrison, had informed -Wellington of the fact; but he suppressed it and suffered the -colonel who had only obeyed his orders to be censured. The -left wing therefore reached the fords without meeting any -enemy, and, the night being far spent, was there halted. The -right wing, exhausted by long fighting, halted after the -action with Maucune, and thus the French gained Alba -unmolested; yet the action did not terminate without two -remarkable accidents. While riding close behind the 43rd -Regiment, Wellington was struck in the thigh by a spent -ball which passed through his holster; and in the night Sir -Stapleton Cotton, who had gone to the ford of Huerta, was, -in returning, shot through the arm by a Portuguese sentinel -whose challenge he disregarded. These were the last events -of this famous battle in which the English general, to use a -French officer’s expression, <em>defeated forty thousand men in forty -minutes</em>! Yet he fought it as if his genius disdained such -trial of its strength. Late in the evening of that great day I -saw him behind my regiment, then marching towards the -ford. He was alone, the flush of victory was on his brow, -his eyes were eager and watchful, but his voice was calm -and even gentle. More than the rival of Marlborough, for<span class="pagenum" id="Page_199">199</span> -he had defeated greater generals than Marlborough ever -encountered, he seemed with prescient pride only to accept -the victory as an earnest of greater glory.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Combat of La Serna.</span> (July, 1812.)</h3> - -<p>During the few hours of darkness succeeding the battle of -Salamanca, Clausel with a wonderful diligence passed the -Tormes at Alba; but Wellington also crossed that river with -his left wing at daylight, and moving up stream overtook -the French on the Almar rivulet, near the village of La -Serna, and launched his cavalry against them. Their -squadrons fled from Anson’s troopers, abandoning three -battalions of infantry, who in separate columns were making -up a hollow slope, hoping to gain the crest of some heights -before the pursuing cavalry could fall on, and the two -foremost did reach the higher ground and there formed -squares; the last, when half-way up, seeing Bock’s heavy -German dragoons galloping hard on, faced about and commenced -a disorderly fire, and the squares above also plied -their muskets on the Germans, who, after crossing the Almar, -had to pass a turn of narrow road and clear rough ground -before opening a charging front. They dropped fast under -the fire. By twos, by threes, by tens, by twenties they -fell, yet the mass, surmounting the difficulties of the ground, -hurtled on the column and went clean through it: then the -squares above retreated and several hundred prisoners were -made by those able and daring horsemen.</p> - -<p>This charge was successful even to wonder, and the victors -standing in the midst of captives and admiring friends -seemed invincible; yet those who witnessed the scene, nay -the actors themselves remained with the conviction of the -military truth,—that cavalry are not able to cope with -veteran infantry, save by surprise. The hill of La Serna -offered a frightful spectacle of the power of the musket. -The track of the Germans was marked by their huge bodies. -A few minutes only had the combat lasted, and above a -hundred had fallen—fifty-one were killed outright. In -several places man and horse had died simultaneously, and -so suddenly, that falling together on their sides they appeared -still alive, the horse’s legs stretched out as in movement,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_200">200</span> -the rider’s feet in the stirrups, the bridle in hand, the -sword raised to strike, and the large hat fastened under the -chin, giving to the grim yet undistorted countenance a supernatural -and terrible expression.</p> - -<p>When the French found their rear-guard attacked they -turned to its succour, but seeing the light division coming up -recommenced the retreat, and were soon joined by Caffarelli’s -horsemen and guns, under General Chauvel: too late they -joined for the battle, yet covered the retreat with a resolution -that deterred the allied cavalry from meddling with them. -Clausel then carried his army off with such celerity that -his head-quarters were that night forty miles from the field -of battle.</p> - -<p>King Joseph was at this time at Blasco Sancho, one short -march from the beaten army: he came to aid Marmont with -fourteen thousand men, and so early as the 24th could easily -have effected a junction, but he then knew only of Marmont’s -advance from the Duero, not of his defeat. Next day he -received, from that marshal and Clausel, letters describing -the battle and saying the army must go over the Duero to -establish new communications with the Army of the North. -A junction with them was still possible, but the king retreated -in haste, leaving behind two officers and twenty-seven -horsemen, who were next day attacked and captured -by seven troopers of the 14th Dragoons led by Corporal -Hanley,<a id="FNanchor_25" href="#Footnote_25" class="fnanchor">25</a> a noble soldier, thus described by an officer under -whom he had many times charged. “A finer fellow never -rode into the field. His feats, besides the one at Blasco -Sancho, were extraordinary. He was a very handsome man, -rode magnificently, and had altogether such a noble bearing -before the enemy as is not often seen.”</p> - -<p>Clausel marched upon Valladolid, abandoning the garrisons -of Toro, Tordesillas and Zamora, and, being still pressed by -the British, went up the Arlazan river. Then the king -passed over the Guadarama mountains to Madrid and Wellington -entered Valladolid, where he found large stores, -seventeen pieces of artillery, and eight hundred sick and -wounded men. This terminated the Salamanca operations, -which present the following remarkable results. On the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_201">201</span> -18th of July Marmont’s army, forty-two thousand sabres and -bayonets with seventy-four guns, passed the Duero to attack -the allies. On the 30th it repassed that river in retreat, -having in those twelve days marched two hundred miles, -fought three combats, and a general battle, in which one -marshal of France, seven generals, and twelve thousand five -hundred men and inferior officers were killed, wounded or -taken, together with two eagles, several standards and twelve -guns, exclusive of those found at Valladolid. In the same -period the allies, who had forty-six thousand sabres and -bayonets, with sixty guns, the excess of men being Spanish, -marched one hundred and sixty miles, and had one marshal, -Beresford, four generals and six thousand men and officers -killed or wounded.</p> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_202">202</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="BOOK_VIII">BOOK VIII.</h2> -</div> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>Madrid—Siege of Burgos—Retreat from Burgos—Combat of Venta -de Pozo—Combat on the Carion—Retreat from Madrid—Alba de -Tormes—Combat of the Huebra.</p></div> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Madrid.</span> (Aug. 1812.)</h3> - -<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">Wellington,</span> having entirely separated the king’s army from -Marmont’s, had to choose between pursuing the latter and -besieging Burgos, or marching on Madrid. He adopted -the last, and crossing the Guadarama mountains descended -on the Spanish capital, leaving General Clinton with twelve -thousand men to watch Clausel and co-operate with Spaniards -from Gallicia. Joseph had good troops, and being unwilling -to fly before a detachment occupied the Escurial, placing detachments -on all the roads. In this state D’Urban’s Portuguese -cavalry drove back Trielhard’s outposts and entered -Majadahonda. Some German infantry, Bock’s heavy cavalry, -and a troop of horse-artillery then entered Las Rozas, a mile -in D’Urban’s rear; but in the evening, Trielhard, reinforced -by Schiazzetti’s Italian dragoons and the lancers of Berg, -returned; D’Urban called up the horse artillery and would -have charged, but his Portuguese fled, and three of the guns -being overturned on rough ground were taken. The victorious -cavalry passed through Majadahonda in pursuit, and -though the German dragoons, albeit surprised in quarters, -stopped the leading French squadrons, yet, when Schiazzetti’s -horse came up, the fight would have ended badly if Ponsonby’s -cavalry and the seventh division had not arrived. -Trielhard then retired, carrying away captive, the Portuguese -general, Visconde de Barbacena, the colonel of the German -cavalry, and others of less rank. The whole loss was above -two hundred, and the German dead lay very thickly in the -streets; many were stretched in their shirts and trousers -across the sills of the doors, thus manifesting the suddenness -of the action and their own bravery.</p> - -<p>After this combat the king crossed the Tagus with his -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_203">203</span> -court, but in the most horrible confusion, for his army, composed -of Spaniards, French and Italians, began to plunder the -convoy. Marshal Jourdan threw himself into the midst of -the disorderly troops, and being aided by other generals, -with great personal risk arrested the mischief, and succeeded -in making the multitude file over the bridge of Aranjuez; -yet the procession was lugubrious and shocking; crowds of -weeping women and children and despairing men, courtiers -of the highest rank, desperately struggling with savage -soldiers for the animals on which they were endeavouring to -save their families. Lord Wellington did not molest them. -Ignorant of their situation, or more probably, compassionating -their misery and knowing the troops could escape over the -Tagus, he would not strike. Perhaps also he thought it wise -to leave Joseph with the burthen of a court.</p> - -<p>The king, expecting to find a strong reinforcement from -Soult at Toledo, was inclined to march towards the Morena; -instead of troops he found a positive refusal, and a plan for -uniting his own and Suchet’s army to Soult’s in Andalusia. -From thence all were to menace Lisbon, but this was too -vast for the king’s genius, and his personal anger at being -denied the troops, overcoming prudence, he directed his -march on Valencia, peremptorily commanding Soult to abandon -Andalusia and join him there. Meanwhile Wellington -entered Madrid and was met by the whole population—not -with feigned enthusiasm to a conqueror, for there was no -tumultuous exultation, famine was amongst them and misery -had subdued their spirit: but with tears and every sign of -deep emotion they crowded around his horse, hung by his -stirrups, touched his clothes, and throwing themselves on -their knees blessed him aloud!</p> - -<p>Madrid was still vexed by the presence of an enemy in -the Retiro, which was garrisoned with two thousand good -soldiers besides convalescents, and contained enormous -stores, twenty thousand stand of arms, one hundred and -eighty pieces of artillery, and the eagles of two French -regiments. The works however were bad, and the French -yielding on terms were sent to Portugal, but on the way -were basely robbed and many murdered by the escort: an -infamous action perpetrated by Spaniards, far from Madrid.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_204">204</span> -It was strange to see French generals, used to war, thus -giving up armies as it were to their enemies; for including -the garrisons of Toro, Tordesillas, Astorga and Zamora, -all of which might have been saved but were not, and this -of the Retiro, which should not have been left, six thousand -good soldiers were absolutely given as a present to swell the -loss of Salamanca.</p> - -<p>Some time Wellington remained in Madrid, apparently -occupied with balls and bull-fights, yet really watching -events to decide whether he should operate in the north -or south. The hour of action came at last. Soult abandoned -Andalusia, and the 29th of August his rear-guard lost two -hundred men in Seville, where it was attacked by Colonel -Skerrett and some Spaniards from Cadiz; the former then -joined Hill, who after a series of operations against Drouet, -in one of which he defeated the French cavalry, now came to -La Mancha. The south of Spain was for the enemy then a -scene of confusion which gave Wellington time for action in -the north, where his presence was absolutely required; for -Clausel had re-occupied Valladolid with a renovated force of -twenty-two thousand men and fifty guns, Clinton had made -some serious errors, and the Spanish generals had as usual -failed on all points.</p> - -<p>Leaving Hill a powerful force to co-operate with all the -southern Spanish armies beyond the Tagus, Lord Wellington -quitted Madrid the 1st of September, and at Arevalo concentrated -twenty-one thousand men, three thousand being -cavalry; yet the Portuguese soldiers were ill equipped, and -could scarcely be fed, because of the continued misconduct -of their government.</p> - -<p>On the 6th he passed the Duero to fight Clausel, and called -on Castaños to join him with the Gallicians; but seldom did -a Spanish general deviate into activity; Castaños delayed -and Clausel retreated slowly up the beautiful valleys of the -Pisuerga and Arlanzan, which, in denial of the stories about -French devastation, were carefully cultivated and filled to -repletion with corn, wine and oil. Nor were they deficient -in military strength. Off the high road ditches and rivulets -impeded the troops, while cross-ridges continually furnished -strong positions, flanked with lofty hills on either side, by -means of which Clausel baffled his adversary in a surprising<span class="pagenum" id="Page_205">205</span> -manner. Each day he offered battle, yet on ground Wellington -was unwilling to assail, partly because he momentarily -expected the Gallicians; chiefly because of the declining -state of his own army from sickness, and that the hope of -ulterior operations in the south made him unwilling to lose -men. By flank movements he dislodged the enemy, yet each -day darkness fell ere they were completed and the morning’s -sun always saw Clausel again in position. Thus he barred -the way at eight places, and finally covered Burgos the 16th, -by taking the strong position of Cellada del Camino.</p> - -<p>But eleven thousand Spanish infantry, three hundred -cavalry, and eight guns, had now joined Wellington, who -would have fallen on frankly the 17th, if Clausel, alike wary -and skilful, had not observed the increased numbers and -retired in the night to Frandovinez; he was however next -day pushed sharply back to the heights of Burgos, and the -following night passed through that town leaving behind -large stores of grain. Caffarelli, who had come down to -place the castle in a state of defence, now joined him and -both retreated upon Briviesca.</p> - -<p>The allies entered Burgos amidst great confusion. The -garrison of the castle had set fire to some houses impeding -the defence, the conflagration spread, and the Partidas, -gathering like wolves round a carcass, entered the town -for mischief. Mr. Sydenham, an eye-witness not unused -to scenes of war, thus described their proceedings: “What -with the flames and plundering of the guerillas, who are as -bad as Tartars and Cossacks of the Kischack or Zagatay -hordes, I was afraid Burgos would be entirely destroyed, -but order was at length restored by the manful exertions of -Don Miguel Alava.”</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Siege of Burgos.</span> (Sept. 1812.)</h3> - -<p>Caffarelli had placed eighteen hundred infantry, besides -artillery-men, in the castle; and Dubreton, the governor, -in courage and skill surpassed even the hopes of his sanguine -countrymen. The works inclosed a rugged hill, between -which and the river the city of Burgos was situated. An -old wall with a new parapet and flanks offered the first line -of defence; the second line, within the other, was of earth,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_206">206</span> -a kind of field-retrenchment, but well palisaded; the third -line, similarly constructed, contained two elevated points, on -one of which was an intrenched building called the White -Church, on the other the ancient keep of the castle. This -last, the highest point, was intrenched and surmounted with -a casemated work called the Napoleon battery, which commanded -everything around, save on the north. There the -hill of San Michael, only three hundred yards distant and -scarcely less elevated than the fortress, was defended by a -horn-work with a sloping scarp twenty-five, and a counterscarp -ten feet high. This work was merely closed by strong -palisades, but was under the fire of the Napoleon battery, -well flanked by the castle, and covered in front by intrenchments -for out picquets. Nine heavy guns, eleven field-pieces -and six mortars or howitzers, were mounted in the -fortress; and as the reserve artillery and stores of the -Army of Portugal were deposited there the armament could -be augmented.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">First Assault.</span> (Sept. 1812.)</h3> - -<p>So completely commanded were all the bridges and fords -over the Arlanzan by the castle guns, that two days elapsed -ere the allies could cross; but on the 19th, the passage being -effected above the town, Major Somers Cocks with the 79th, -supported by Pack’s Portuguese, drove in the French outposts -on the hill of San Michael, and in the night, reinforced -with the 42nd Regiment, assailed the horn-work. The -conflict was murderous. The main storming column was -beaten off, and the attack would have failed if Cocks had -not forced an entrance by the gorge. The garrison was -thus cut off, but the assailants not being closely supported -the French broke through them. The troops complained of -each other, and the loss was above four hundred, while that -of the enemy was less than one hundred and fifty.</p> - -<p>The defences of the castle were feeble and incomplete, -yet Wellington’s means were so scant that he relied more -upon the enemy’s weakness than his own power. However, -it was said water was scarce, and that the provision-magazines -might be burned; wherefore twelve thousand men -were set to the siege while twenty thousand formed the -covering army.</p> - -<p>For the attack, the trenches were to be opened on the -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_207">207</span> -right of San Michael towards the town, and a battery for -five guns established on the right of the captured horn-work. -A sap was then to be pushed from the trenches towards the -first wall, and from thence the engineer was to proceed by -gallery and mine.</p> - -<p>When the first mine should be completed, the battery from -San Michael was to open against the second line of defence, -and the assault given on the first line. Approaches were -then to be continued against the second line, and the battery -turned against the third line, in front of the White Church, -where the defences were exceedingly weak. Meanwhile a -trench for musketry was to be dug along the brow of San -Michael, and a concealed battery prepared within the horn-work -for a final attack on the Napoleon battery; but the -artillery consisted of only three eighteen-pounders with five -iron twenty-four-pound howitzers: slender means which, -rather than the defects of the fortress, governed the line of -attack.</p> - -<p>When the horn-work fell, a lodgement was commenced in -the interior, and continued vigorously under a destructive -fire from the Napoleon battery, but good cover was obtained -in the night.</p> - -<p>On the 21st the garrison mounted several field-guns, and -at night fired heavily with grape and shells on the workmen -digging the musketry trench. The 22nd this fire was redoubled, -yet the besiegers worked with little loss, and their -musketeers galled the enemy. In the night the battery was -armed with two eighteen-pounders and three howitzers, and -the secret battery within the horn-work was commenced; -but Wellington, now deviating from his first plan, directed -an escalade against the first line. In this view, at midnight -four hundred men with ladders were secretly posted in a -hollow road, fifty yards from the wall, which was from -twenty-three to twenty-five feet high without flanks; and to -aid this main column, a Portuguese battalion was assembled -in the town of Burgos for a flank attack.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_208">208</span></p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Second Assault.</span> (Sept. 1812.)</h3> - -<p>In this assault, although the Portuguese were repelled by -the fire of the common guard, the principal party, composed -of detachments under Major Lawrie, entered the ditch, yet -altogether and confusedly; Lawrie was killed, the soldiers -who mounted the ladders were bayoneted, combustible -missiles were thrown down in abundance, and the men gave -way, leaving half their number behind. The wounded were -brought off next day under a truce, and it is said, that on the -body of an officer the French found a complete plan of the -siege. It was a very disastrous attempt, which delayed the -regular progress for two days, increased the enemy’s courage -and produced a bad effect upon the troops, some of whom -were already dispirited by the storm of the horn-work.</p> - -<p>The original plan being now resumed, the hollow way -from whence the escaladers had advanced, running along -the front of defence, was converted into a parallel, and the -trench made deep and narrow to secure them from the -plunging shot of the castle. Musketeers were also planted -to keep down the enemy’s fire. But heavy rains incommoded -the troops, and the French raised a palisaded work -on their own right, which flanked this parallel, and from -thence they killed so many of the besiegers’ marksmen that -the latter were withdrawn.</p> - -<p>In the night a flying sap from the right of the parallel was -pushed within twenty yards of the first line; but the directing -engineer was killed, and with him many men, for the -French plied their musketry sharply, and rolled large shells -down the steep side of the hill. The head of the sap was -indeed so commanded as it approached the wall, that a six-feet -trench, added to the height of the gabions above, -scarcely protected the workmen; wherefore the gallery for a -mine was worked as rapidly as the inexperience of the -miners would permit.</p> - -<p>When the secret battery in the horn-work of San Michael -was completed two eighteen-pounders were removed from -the first battery to arm it, being replaced by two iron howitzers. -The latter were used to drive the French marksmen -from their offensive palisaded wall, but after firing one hundred<span class="pagenum" id="Page_209">209</span> -and forty rounds without success the attempt was -relinquished; and ammunition was so scarce that the soldiers -were paid to collect the enemy’s bullets.</p> - -<p>A zigzag was now commenced in front of the first battery, -down the face of San Michael, to obtain footing for a musketry -trench to overlook the enemy’s defences below: the workmen -were exposed to the whole fire of the castle at the distance of -two hundred yards, and were knocked down fast, yet the -work went steadily on.</p> - -<p>On the 26th the gallery was advanced eighteen feet and the -soil found favourable; but the men, in passing the sap, were -hit by the French marksmen, and an assistant engineer was -killed. In the night the parallel was prolonged on the right -to within twenty yards of the ramparts, in the view of -driving a second gallery and mine; musketeers were then -planted there and at the same time the zigzag was continued, -and the musket trench completed with little loss, though -the whole fire of the castle was concentrated on the spot.</p> - -<p>The 27th the French strengthened their second line, cut a -step along the edge of the counterscarp for a covered way, -and palisaded the communication. The besiegers finished -the musketry trench on the right of their parallel, and -opened a gallery for the second mine; but the first mine -went on slowly, the men in the sap being galled by stones, -grenades, and small shells, which the French threw into -the trenches by hand; the artillery fire also knocked over the -gabions of the musketry trench on San Michael so fast that -the troops were withdrawn during the day.</p> - -<p>In the night a trench of communication, forming a second -parallel behind the first, was begun and nearly completed -from the hill of San Michael, but at daylight the French fire -was heavy, and the shells which passed over came rolling -down the hill again into the trench. The completion of the -work was therefore deferred until night, and though the -back roll of the shells continued to gall the troops, this, and -the other trenches in front of the horn-work, above and on -the right of the parallel below, were filled with men whose -fire was incessant: the first mine also was completed, and -being loaded with a thousand pounds of powder, and the -gallery strongly tamped for fifteen feet with bags of clay, -another storm was ordered.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_210">210</span></p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Third Assault.</span> (Sept. 1812.)</h3> - -<p>At midnight, the hollow road being lined with men to fire -on the defences, the storming party, three hundred strong, -was assembled there, attended by others who carried tools -and materials to secure a lodgement when the breach should -be carried. The mine was then exploded, the wall fell, and -an officer with twenty men rushed forward to the assault. -The effect of the explosion was disappointing, yet it cast the -wall down, the enemy was stupefied, and the forlorn hope, a -sergeant and four daring soldiers, gained the summit of the -breach; soon however the French recovered, and threw them -over pierced with bayonet wounds. Meanwhile the officer, -with his twenty men, missed the breach in the dark, and -finding the wall unbroken returned, saying there was no -breach; then the main body regained the trenches, and -before the sergeant and his comrades came in with streaming -wounds to tell their tale the enemy was reinforced: -the scarcity of ammunition would not permit a fire to be -directed upon the work during the night, and the French, -raising a parapet behind it, placed obstacles on the ascent -which deterred the besiegers from renewing the assault at -daylight.</p> - -<p>Twelve days had now elapsed since the siege commenced, -one assault had succeeded, two had failed, twelve hundred -men had been killed or wounded, little progress was made, -and the troops were dispirited, notably the Portuguese, who -seemed to be losing their ancient spirit. Discipline was -relaxed, ammunition was wasted, work in the trenches -avoided and neglected by officers and men, insubordination -was gaining ground, and reproachful orders were issued, -the Guards only being noticed as presenting an honourable -exception.</p> - -<p>The French marksmen in the flanking palisaded work -were so expert that everything which could be seen from -thence was hit, until the howitzer battery on San Michael -was reinforced with a captured French eighteen-pounder, -and this mischievous post was at last demolished. At the -same time the gallery of the second mine was pushed forward, -and a new breaching battery for three guns constructed<span class="pagenum" id="Page_211">211</span> -behind it, so close to the enemy’s defences that they screened -it from the artillery fire of their upper fortress. To arm -this work the three eighteen-pounders were dragged in the -night from San Michael, and next day were, under a musketry -fire which thinned the workmen, placed in battery; but the -watchful Dubreton brought a howitzer down, with which he -threw shells into the battery, and making a hole through a -flank wall, thrust out a light gun also, which sent its bullets -whizzing through the thin parapet of the work at every -round. The allies were thus driven from their post, more -French cannon were brought from the upper works, and -the battery was demolished; two of the gun-carriages were -disabled, a trunnion was knocked off one of the guns, and -the muzzle of another split: and vainly the marksmen endeavoured -to quell this fire, the French eventually remained -masters.</p> - -<p>In the night a more solid battery was made on the left of -the ruined one, but at daylight the French fire, plunging from -above, made the parapet fly off so rapidly, that the besiegers -relinquished it also, returning to their mines and breaching -battery on San Michael. The two guns still serviceable -were now remanded to the upper battery, to beat down a -retrenchment formed by the French behind the old breach; -but the weather was so wet and stormy that the workmen, -those of the Guards excepted, abandoned the trenches, and -at daylight the guns were still short of their destination. -However, on the 2nd of October they were placed, and at -four o’clock in the evening, their fire having cleansed the -old breach, and the second mine being tamped for explosion, -a double assault was ordered. For this operation a battalion -of the 24th British Regiment, under Captain Hedderwick, -was formed in the hollow way, having one advanced party -under Lieut. Holmes near the new mine, and a second under -Lieut. Frazer towards the old breach.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Fourth Assault.</span> (Oct. 1812.)</h3> - -<p>At five o’clock the mine exploded with terrific effect, sending -many of the French into the air and breaking down one -hundred feet of the wall; the next instant Holmes and his -brave men went rushing through the smoke and crumbling -ruins; and Frazer, as quick and brave, was already fighting<span class="pagenum" id="Page_212">212</span> -with the defenders on the summit of the old breach. The -supports followed closely, and in a few minutes both points -were carried with a loss of thirty-seven killed and two hundred -wounded, seven being officers,—amongst them the conducting -engineer.</p> - -<p>During the night lodgements were formed on the ruins of -the new breach, imperfectly and under a destructive fire -from the upper defences; but the previous happy attack had -revived the spirits of the army, vessels with powder were -coming coastwise from Coruña, a convoy was expected by -land from Rodrigo, and a supply of ammunition, sent by -Sir Home Popham, reached the camp from Santander. This -promising state of affairs was of short duration. On the -evening of the 5th three hundred French came swiftly down -the hill, and, sweeping away labourers and guards from the -trenches, killed or wounded a hundred and fifty men, got -possession of the old breach, destroyed the works and carried -off all the tools.</p> - -<p>In the night the allies repaired the damage and pushed -saps from each flank, to meet in the centre near the second -French line and serve as a parallel to check future sallies. -Meanwhile the howitzers on San Michael continued their -fire, and the breaching battery in the horn-work opened; -but the guns, being unable to see the wall sufficiently low -soon ceased to speak, and the embrasures were masked. On -the other hand the besieged could not, from the steepness of -the castle-hill, depress their guns to bear on the lodgement at -the breaches in the first line; yet their musketry was murderous, -and they rolled down large shells to retard the approaches -towards the second line.</p> - -<p>On the 7th the besiegers were so close to the wall that the -howitzers above could not play without danger to the workmen, -and two French field-pieces taken in the horn-work -were substituted. The breaching battery on San Michael -being amended renewed its fire and at five o’clock had beaten -down fifty feet from the parapet of the second line, yet the -enemy’s return was heavy and another eighteen-pounder lost -a trunnion. In the night block-carriages with supports for -the broken trunnions were provided, and the disabled guns -again fired with low charges; but rain now filled the trenches, -the communications were injured, the workmen negligent,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_213">213</span> -the approaches to the second line went on slowly, and again -Dubreton came thundering down from the upper ground, -driving the guards and workmen from the new parallel at -the lodgements, levelling all the works, carrying off all the -tools, and killing or wounding two hundred men. Colonel -Cocks, promoted for his gallant conduct at the storming of -San Michael, restored the fight and repulsed the French, but -fell dead on the ground recovered: he was a young man of a -modest demeanour, brave, thoughtful and enterprising: he -lived and died a good soldier.</p> - -<p>After this severe check the approaches to the second line -were abandoned, the trenches were extended to embrace the -whole of the front attacked, and as the battery on San -Michael had now formed a practicable breach twenty-five -feet wide the parallel was prolonged towards it, and a trench -was opened for marksmen at thirty yards’ distance. Nevertheless -another assault could not be risked, because the -powder was nearly exhausted and the troops, if unsuccessful, -would have been without ammunition in front of the French -army, then gathering head near Briviesca. Heated shot -were however thrown at the White Church to burn the -magazines, and the miners were directed to drive a gallery -on the other side of the castle against the church of San -Roman, a building occupied by the French beyond their -line.</p> - -<p>On the 10th a supply of ammunition arrived from Santander, -but Dubreton had meanwhile strengthened his works, -and isolated the new breach on one flank by a stockade, -extending at right angles from the second to the third line -of defence. The fire from the Napoleon battery then compelled -the besiegers again to withdraw their guns within -the horn-work, and the attempt to burn the White Church -was relinquished, yet the gallery against San Roman was -continued.</p> - -<p>On the 15th the battery in the horn-work was rearmed -against the Napoleon battery, but was silenced in three-quarters -of an hour. The embrasures were then altered, -that the guns might bear on the breach in the second line, -and the besiegers worked to repair the mischief done by -rain, and to push the gallery under San Roman, where the -mine was loaded with nine hundred pounds of powder.</p> - -<p>The 17th the battery of the horn-work cleared away the -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_214">214</span> -temporary defences at the breach, the howitzers damaged -the rampart on each side, and, a small mine being sprung, a -cavalier or mound from which the enemy had killed many -men in the trenches was taken, yet the French soon recovered -that work.</p> - -<p>On the 18th the new breach being practicable, the storm -was ordered, the explosion of the mine under San Roman to -be the signal; that church was also to be assaulted, and -between these attacks the works covering the ancient breach -were to be escaladed.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Fifth Assault.</span> (Oct. 1812.)</h3> - -<p>At half-past four o’clock the mine at San Roman exploded, -with little injury to the church itself; but the latter was -resolutely attacked by some Spanish and Portuguese troops, -and though the enemy sprung a countermine which brought -the building entirely down the assailants lodged themselves -in the ruins. Meanwhile two hundred of the Foot-Guards, -with strong supports, pouring through the old breach in the -first line escaladed the second, and between that and the -third line were strongly met by the French. A like number -of Germans under Major Wurmb, similarly supported, simultaneously -stormed the new breach, and some men mounting -the hill above actually gained the third line. Unhappily at -neither point did the supports follow closely, and the Germans, -cramped on their left by the enemy’s stockade, extended -their right towards the Guards; but at that moment Dubreton -came dashing like a torrent from the upper ground and -in an instant cleared the breaches. Wurmb and many -other brave men fell, and the French gathering round the -Guards forced them also beyond the outer line. More than -two hundred men and officers were killed or wounded in this -combat, and next night the enemy recovered San Roman by -a sally.</p> - -<p>The siege was now virtually terminated, for though the -French were beaten out of San Roman again, and a gallery -was opened from that church against the second line, these -were mere demonstrations. The fate of Burgos was fixed -outside. For while the siege was going on, Caffarelli and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_215">215</span> -Clausel had received a reinforcement of twelve thousand men -from France, and thus forty-four thousand good troops were -prepared to relieve the Castle before October, although they -could not act until Souham, appointed to command in chief, -had arrived. It was also essential to combine their operations -with the king, who had formed a great army to recover -Madrid; but all the lines of correspondence were so circuitous -and beset by the Partidas that the most speedy and certain -communication was through the minister of war at Paris, -who found the information he wanted in the English newspapers! -These, while deceiving the British public by accounts -of battles never fought, victories never gained, enthusiasm -and vigour nowhere existing, with great assiduity enlightened -the enemy upon the numbers, situation, movements and -reinforcements of the allies.</p> - -<p>Souham arrived the 3rd of October with more reinforcements -from France, but he imagined that sixty thousand -troops were around Burgos, exclusive of the Partidas, and -that three divisions were coming up from Madrid; whereas -none were coming, and little more than thirty thousand were -around Burgos, eleven thousand being Gallicians, scarcely so -good as the Partidas. Wellington’s real strength was in his -Anglo-Portuguese, now only twenty thousand; for besides -those killed or wounded at the siege, the sick had gone to the -rear faster than the recovered men came up. Some unattached -regiments and escorts were near Segovia and other -points north of the Guadarama, and a reinforcement of five -thousand men had been sent from England in September; -but the former belonged to Hill’s army, and of the latter -the Life-Guards and Blues had gone to Lisbon: hence a -regiment of Foot-Guards, and some detachments of the line, -in all three thousand, were the only available forces in the -rear.</p> - -<p>During the first part of the siege, the English general, -seeing the French scattered and only reinforced by conscripts, -did not fear interruption; the less so, that Sir Home -Popham was again menacing the coast line; and now, when -they were concentrating, he was willing to fight; for he -thought Popham and the guerillas would keep Caffarelli -employed, and he was himself a match for Clausel. Souham -however, over-rating the allies’ force, feared a defeat, as<span class="pagenum" id="Page_216">216</span> -being the only barrier between Wellington and France; and -far from meditating an advance dreaded an attack; hence, as -want of provisions forbad a concentration of his army permanently -near Burgos, he prepared to fight on the Ebro. -Soon however, the English newspapers told him Soult was -in march from Andalusia—that the king intended to move -upon Madrid,—that no English troops had left that capital -to join Wellington, that the army of the latter was not -numerous, and the castle of Burgos was sorely pressed: then -he resolved to raise the siege.</p> - -<p>On the 13th a skirmish took place on a stream beyond -Monasterio, where Captain Perse of the 16th Dragoons, twice -forced from the bridge twice recovered it and maintained -his post until F. Ponsonby, who commanded the Cavalry -reserves, arrived. Ponsonby and Perse were both wounded, -and this demonstration was followed by various others until -the evening of the 18th, when the whole French army was -united and the advanced guard captured a picquet of Brunswickers. -This sudden movement prevented Wellington -taking, as he designed, the advanced position of Monasterio. -Falling back, therefore, he took ground covering the siege, -where, on the 20th, Maucune, advancing with two divisions -of infantry and one of cavalry, gained some advantage, yet, -having no supports, was finally outflanked and beaten back -to Monasterio by two divisions under Sir Edward Paget.</p> - -<p>There were now in position, twenty-one thousand Anglo-Portuguese -infantry and cavalry, eleven thousand Gallicians, -and the guerilla horsemen of Marquinez and Julian Sanchez. -Four thousand were troopers, but only two thousand six -hundred were British and German, and the Spanish horsemen, -regular or irregular, could scarcely be reckoned as -combatants. The artillery counted forty-two pieces, including -twelve Spanish guns extremely ill equipped and -scant of ammunition. The French had nearly five thousand -cavalry, and more than sixty guns. Wellington stood therefore -at great disadvantage in numbers, composition, and -real strength. In his rear was the castle and the river -Arlanzan, the fords and bridges of which were commanded -by the guns of the fortress; his generals of division, Paget excepted, -were not of marked ability, and his troops were somewhat -desponding, and deteriorated in discipline. His situation<span class="pagenum" id="Page_217">217</span> -was altogether dangerous. Victory could scarcely be -expected, defeat would be destruction, and he had provoked -a battle not knowing Caffarelli’s troops were united to -Souham’s.</p> - -<p>Souham should have forced an action, because his ground -was strong, his retreat open, his army powerful and compact, -his soldiers full of confidence, his lieutenants, Clausel, -Maucune, and Foy, men of distinguished talents, able to -second, and able to succeed him in the chief command: the -chances of victory were great, the chances of defeat comparatively -small. It was thus he judged the matter himself, -for Maucune’s advance was designed as the prelude to a -great battle, and the English general was then willing to -stand the trial. But generals are not absolute masters of -events. Extraneous events here governed both sides. The -king by the junction of Soult’s army was at the head of a -great force, and had designed not only to drive Hill from -Madrid, but to cut Wellington off from Portugal: hence he -had ordered Souham not to fight. Hill at the same time -gave notice of the king’s advance; and Wellington, fearing -to be isolated when Hill was forced from Madrid, raised the -siege and resolved to retreat.</p> - -<p>Some fighting had meanwhile taken place at Burgos. -Dubreton had again got possession of the ruins of San -Roman but was driven away next morning; but then, the -order to raise the siege being received the guns and stores -were removed from the batteries. The greatest part of the -draught animals had however gone to fetch powder and -artillery from Santander, and the eighteen-pounders could -not be carried off. Thus the siege was raised after five -assaults, several sallies and thirty-three days of investment, -during which the besiegers lost more than two thousand, -and the besieged six hundred men killed or wounded; the -latter also suffered severely from continual labour, want of -water, and bad weather; for the fortress was too small to -afford shelter for the garrison, and the greater part had -bivouacked between the lines of defence.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_218">218</span></p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Retreat from Burgos.</span> (Oct. 1812.)</h3> - -<p>It was commenced in the night of the 21st by the following -daring enterprise. The army quitted its position after -dark, the artillery, the wheels being muffled with straw, -passed the bridge of Burgos under the castle guns with such -silence and celerity, that Dubreton, watchful and suspicious -as he was, knew nothing of the march until the Partidas, -failing in nerve, commenced galloping, when he poured a -destructive fire down but soon lost the range. By this -delicate operation Souham was compelled to follow, instead -of using the castle to intercept the line of retreat; for if -Wellington had avoided the fortress, the French by passing -through it could have forestalled him at Cellada del Camino.</p> - -<p>The 23rd the infantry crossed the Pisuerga, but while the -main body made this long march, Souham having passed -through Burgos in the night of the 22nd, vigorously attacked -the rear-guard under Sir Stapleton Cotton, which was composed -of cavalry and horse-artillery, two battalions of -Germans and the Partidas of Marquinez and Sanchez.</p> - -<p>At seven o’clock the picquets were first driven from the -bridge of Baniel, and then from the Hormaza stream, after -which the whole rear-guard drew up in a large plain behind -Cellada del Camino. It had on the left a range of hills -occupied by Marquinez, on the right the Arlanzan, and -across the middle of the plain a marshy rivulet cut the main -road, being only passable by a little bridge near a house -called the Venta de Pozo. In front, about half-way between -this stream and Cellada, there was a broad ditch with a -second bridge and a hamlet. Cotton retired over the marshy -stream, but left Anson’s horsemen and Halket’s infantry as -a rear-guard beyond the ditch, and then Anson, placing the -11th Dragoons and the guns in advance at Cellada del Camino -on a gentle eminence, likewise prepared to pass the stream.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Combat of Venta de Pozo.</span> (Oct. 1812.)</h3> - -<p>When the French approached Cellada, two squadrons of -the 11th beat back their leading horsemen, and the artillery -plied them briskly with shot; yet the main body, advancing<span class="pagenum" id="Page_219">219</span> -at a trot along the road, compelled the whole to retire beyond -the bridge of Venta de Pozo. Meanwhile the French general -Curto, leading a brigade of hussars and followed by -Boyer’s dragoons, ascended the hills and drove Marquinez -from them towards a ravine at the foot, which could only be -passed at particular points; towards one of those the Partida -galloped, just as the French on the plain, after a sharp -struggle had forced the 11th Dragoons across the ditch -between Cellada and Venta de Pozo. The German riflemen -were in the hamlet, and the ditch might have been disputed -if it had not been thus turned by Curto; but that event -compelled Anson to retire on the Venta de Pozo stream. -His movement was covered by the 16th Dragoons, and while -passing the bridge there, the Partidas, pouring down from -the hills, were so closely pursued by the French hussars that -the mixed mass hurtled on the flank of the 16th at the -moment it was charged in rear by the enemy pursuing in -the plain: Colonel Pelley and many men were taken, and -the regiment was driven back on the reserves, which however -stood fast, and while the French were reforming the -whole got over the bridge of Venta de Pozo.</p> - -<p>Cotton now formed a new line. Anson was on the left -of the road, the German infantry and guns were in support, -the heavy German cavalry on the right—the whole presenting -an imposing order of battle. But then Caffarelli’s -cavalry, composed of the lancers of Berg, a regiment of -chasseurs, and several squadrons of <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">gens d’armes</i>, all fresh -men, entered the line on the French left. At first they -tried the stream on a wide front, and finding it impassable -wheeled with a quick daring decision to their right, trotting -under the heavy pounding of the English artillery over the -bridge and forming beyond in opposition to the German -cavalry. The latter charged with a rough shock and broke -their right, but they had let too many come over, the French -left gained an advantage, and their right, full of mettle, -rallied; a furious sword combat had place, in which the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">gens d’armes</i> -fought so fiercely that the Germans, maugre their -size and courage and the superiority of their horses, were -beaten back in disorder. The French followed on the spur -with shrill and eager cries, and Anson being outflanked and -menaced on both sides retreated also; not happily, for<span class="pagenum" id="Page_220">220</span> -Boyer’s dragoons had now crossed the ravine at the foot of -the hills and came thundering in on his left, breaking the -ranks and sending all to the rear in a confused mass.</p> - -<p>The Germans first extricated themselves and formed a fresh -line on which the others rallied, the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">gens d’armes</i> and lancers -who had suffered severely from the artillery as well as in the -sword fight having halted; but Boyer’s dragoons, ten squadrons, -then attacked the new line which was still confused -and wavering, and though the German officers rode gallantly -to meet the charge their men followed but a short way and -finally turned, when the swiftness of the English horses -alone prevented a terrible catastrophe.</p> - -<p>Some favourable ground enabled the line to reform once -more, yet only to be again broken. Meanwhile Wellington -in person placed Halket’s infantry and the guns in a position -to cover the cavalry, and they remained tranquil until the -enemy, in full pursuit after the last charge, came galloping -down, lending their left flank, when the power of the musket -was again manifested. A tempest of bullets emptied the -French saddles by scores, and their hitherto victorious -horsemen, after three fruitless charges, drew off to the hills, -while the British cavalry, covered by the infantry, made -good its retreat to the Pisuerga. The loss in this combat -was considerable on both sides. The French suffered most, -but took a colonel and seventy other prisoners; and before -the fight they had captured a commissariat store near -Burgos.</p> - -<p>While the rear-guard was thus engaged, drunkenness and -insubordination, the usual concomitants of an English retreat, -were exhibited at Torquemada, where the well-stored wine-vaults -became the prey of the soldiery: twelve thousand -men were at one time in a state of helpless inebriety. This -was bad, and Wellington having now retreated fifty miles, -resolved to check the pursuit. His previous arrangements -had been well combined, but the means of transport were -scanty, the weather severe, and his convoys of sick and -wounded were still on the wrong side of the Duero: wherefore, -crossing the Carion river at its confluence with the -lower Pisuerga, he turned and halted.</p> - -<p>Here he was joined by a regiment of Guards and detachments -coming from Coruña, and his ground, extending from<span class="pagenum" id="Page_221">221</span> -Villa Muriel to Dueñas below the meeting of the waters, -was strong; for though the upper Pisuerga was parallel to -the Carion, the lower part turned suddenly, to flow at a -right angle from the confluence. Hence his position, a -range of hills, lofty yet descending with an easy sweep, was -covered in front by the Carion, and on the right by the -lower Pisuerga. A detachment was left to destroy the -bridge of Baños on this last river, and a battalion was sent -to aid the Spaniards in destroying the bridges high up on the -Carion at Palencia. On the immediate front some houses -and convents, lying beyond both rivers, furnished posts to -cover the destruction of the bridges of Muriel and San Isidro -on the Carion, and that of Dueñas on the lower Pisuerga.</p> - -<p>Souham cannonaded the rear-guard at Torquemada on the -24th, and then passing the upper Pisuerga sent Foy’s division -against Palencia, but ordered Maucune to pursue the -allies to the bridges of Baños, Isidro, and Muriel, halting -himself, however, if fame does not lie, because the number -of French drunkards were even more numerous than those -of the British army.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Combat on the Carion.</span> (Oct. 1812.)</h3> - -<p>Before the enemy appeared the summits of the hills were -crowned, the bridges mined, and that of San Isidro strongly -protected by a convent filled with troops. The left of the -position was equally strong, but the advantage of a dry canal -with high banks, running parallel with the Carion, was -overlooked, and the village of Muriel was not occupied in -sufficient strength. Foy meanwhile reached Palencia, where, -according to some French writers, a treacherous attempt was -made, under cover of a parley, to kill him; he however -drove the allies with loss from the town, and in such haste that -all the bridges were abandoned in a perfect condition, and -the French cavalry, spreading abroad, gathered baggage and -prisoners.</p> - -<p>This untoward event compelled Wellington to throw back -his left at Muriel, thus offering two fronts, the one facing -Palencia, the other the Carion; in that state Maucune, having -dispersed some caçadores defending a ford, fell with a strong -body of infantry and guns on the troops at Muriel, just as a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_222">222</span> -mine was exploded and the party covering the bridge were -passing the broken arch by means of ladders. The play of -the mine checked the advance of the French, but suddenly a -horseman, darting at full speed from their column, rode -down to the bridge under a flight of bullets from his own -people, calling out he was a deserter. When he reached the -chasm made by the explosion, he violently checked his -foaming horse, held up his hands, exclaimed that he was a -lost man, and with hurried accents asked if there was no ford -near. The good-natured soldiers pointed to one a little way -off, whereupon the gallant fellow looked earnestly for a few -moments to fix the exact point, then wheeling sharply round, -kissed his hand in derision, and bending low over his saddle-bow -dashed back to his own comrades, amidst showers of -shot and shouts of laughter from both sides. Maucune’s -column, covered by a concentrated fire of guns, then passed -the river at the ford thus discovered, made some prisoners in -the village and lined the dry bed of the canal.</p> - -<p>At this moment Wellington came up, and turning some -guns upon the enemy desired that the village and canal -might be retaken; General Oswald said they could not be -held afterwards; but Wellington, whose retreat was endangered -by the presence of the enemy on that side of the river, -peremptorily ordered one brigade to attack the main body, -and another brigade to clear the canal, strengthening the -last with Spanish troops and Brunswickers. A sharp fire of -artillery and musketry ensued, and the allies suffered some -loss, especially by cannon-shot, which from the other side of -the river plumped into the reserves and threw the Spaniards -into confusion: they were falling back, when their fiery -countryman, Miguel Alava, with exhortation and example, -for though wounded he would not retire, urged them forward -until the enemy was driven over the river.</p> - -<p>During these events other French troops attempted unsuccessfully -to seize the bridge of San Isidro, but at that of -Baños on the Pisuerga the mine failed, and their cavalry galloping -over made both working and covering party prisoners. -Wellington’s position was thus sapped. For Souham could -concentrate on the allies’ left by Palencia and force them to -fight with their back upon the lower Pisuerga; or he could -pass that river on his own left and forestall them on the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_223">223</span> -Duero at Tudela. If the allies pushed over the Pisuerga by -the bridge of Dueñas, Souham, having the initial movement, -might be first on the ground while Foy fell on their rear. -If Wellington sought by a rapid movement down the right -of the Pisuerga to cross at Cabezon, the next bridge, and so -gain the Duero, Souham, moving by the left bank, might -fall on him while in march and hampered between the -Duero, Pisuerga, and Esquevilla: he must then have retired -through Valladolid and Simancas, giving up his communications -with Hill. In this critical state of affairs, keeping -good watch on the left of the Pisuerga, and knowing the -ground there was rugged and the roads narrow and bad, -while on the right bank they were good and wide, the -English general sent his baggage in the night to Valladolid, -withdrew all the troops before day-break on the 26th, made -a sixteen-mile march to Cabezon, passed to the left of the -Pisuerga and mined the bridge: it was a fine stroke of -generalship.</p> - -<p>Being then master of his own movements he sent a detachment -to hold the bridge of Tudela on the Duero, immediately -behind him, and employed the seventh division to -secure the more distant bridges of Valladolid, Simancas, and -Tordesillas. The line of that great river, now in full water, -being thus assured, he again halted, partly because the -ground was favourable, partly to give the commissary-general -Kennedy time to remove the sick men and other -incumbrances from Salamanca. This operation was attended -with great disasters from the negligence of medical and -escorting officers conducting the convoys, and the consequent -bad conduct of the soldiers. Outrages were perpetrated -on the inhabitants along the whole line of march, -terror was predominant, and the ill-used drivers and muleteers -deserted by hundreds, some with, some without their -cattle. Great sufferings were endured by the sick, the -commissariat lost nearly the whole of the animals and carriages -employed, the villages were abandoned, and the -under-commissaries were bewildered, or paralyzed by the -terrible disorder thus spread along the line of communication.</p> - -<p>Souham pursued on the 26th by the right of the Pisuerga, -being deterred from taking the left bank by the rugged<span class="pagenum" id="Page_224">224</span> -nature of the ground, and by the king’s orders not to risk -a serious action. In the morning of the 27th his whole -army was collected in front of Cabezon, but he contented -himself with a cannonade and an unmeaning display: the -former killed Colonel Robe of the artillery; the latter enabled -Wellington for the first time to discover the numbers -he had to contend with, and taught him that he could hold -neither the Pisuerga nor the Duero permanently. Nevertheless -he kept his actual position, and when the French, -leaving a division in his front, extended their right by -Valladolid to Simancas, he caused the bridges at those places -to be destroyed. Congratulating himself that he had not -fought in front of Burgos with so powerful an army, he now -resolved to retire behind the Duero and, if pressed, even -behind the Tormes. Meanwhile, as General Hill would -then be liable to a flank attack, and the more certainly if -any disaster happened on the Duero, he ordered him to -retreat at once from Madrid, giving a discretion as to the -line, yet desiring him, if possible, to come by the Guadarama -passes: for he still designed, if all went well, to unite -with Hill in a central position, keep Souham in check with -a part of his force, and with the remainder fall upon Soult -who was now directing the king’s army.</p> - -<p>On the 28th Souham, still extending his right, endeavoured -to force the bridges at Valladolid and Simancas on -the Pisuerga, and that of Tordesillas on the Duero. The -first was defended by the seventh division, but the French -being strong and eager at the second it was destroyed, and -the regiment of Brunswick Oels was detached to ruin that -of Tordesillas. This was effected, and a tower behind the -ruins being occupied, the remainder of the Brunswickers -took post in a pine wood at some distance. The French -arrived and seemed baffled, yet very soon sixty officers and -non-commissioned officers, headed by Captain Guingret, a -daring man, formed a small raft to hold their arms and -clothes, and then plunged into the water with their swords -between their teeth, swimming and pushing the raft before -them. Under protection of a cannonade they thus crossed -this great river, though it was in full and strong water and -the weather very cold, and having reached the other side, -naked as they were, stormed the tower, whereupon the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_225">225</span> -Brunswickers, amazed at the action, abandoned their ground, -leaving the gallant Frenchmen masters of the passage.</p> - -<p>When Wellington heard of the attack at Simancas and -saw the whole French army in march to its right down the -Pisuerga he destroyed the bridges at Valladolid and Cabeçon, -and crossed the Duero at Tudela and Puente de Duero on -the 29th; but scarcely had he effected this when intelligence -of Guingret’s splendid action at Tordesillas reached him. -Critical then was his position, but with the decision of a -great captain he marched instantly by his left, reached the -heights between Rueda and Tordesillas on the 30th, and -there fronting his powerful enemy forbad further progress. -The bridge had been repaired by the French, yet their main -body had not arrived, and Wellington’s menacing position -was too significant to be misunderstood. The bridges of -Toro and Zamora were now destroyed by detachments, -and though the French, spreading along the river, commenced -repairing the former, the junction with Hill’s army -was insured; the English general, therefore, thinking the -bridge of Toro could not be restored for several days, again -hoped to maintain the line of the Duero permanently, because -Hill, of whose operations it is now time to speak, was -fast approaching.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Retreat from Madrid.</span> (Oct. 1812.)</h3> - -<p>The king, having fifty thousand veteran infantry, eight -thousand cavalry and eighty-four pieces of artillery, came to -drive the allies from Madrid. Soult and Jourdan acted -under him, and the former first attacked General Cole at -the Puente Largo, near Aranjuez on the Tagus; but though -the English mines failed to destroy the bridge the French -were vigorously repulsed. General Hill being thus menaced -resolved to retreat by the Guadarama and join Wellington, -whom he knew to be pressed by superior forces: he also -thought the valley of the Tagus, although opened, could not -furnish provisions for the French; but the commissary who -had the care of that line had not removed the great magazines -formed for the allies’ advance to Madrid: they were -full, and Soult might have used them to interpose between -Wellington and Portugal while Souham pressed him in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_226">226</span> -retreat; yet neither he, nor Hill, nor Wellington, knew of -their existence! Such is war.</p> - -<p>Hill burned his pontoons and then causing the fort of -the Retiro in Madrid to be blown up with all its stores, -retreated by easy marches across the Guadarama, followed -gently by the French; for Soult did not know his actual -force, and, suspecting Wellington’s design to unite and fight -a battle, moved cautiously. When near Arevalo, fresh -orders, founded on new combinations, changed the direction -of Hill’s march. Souham had repaired the bridge of Toro -several days sooner than Wellington expected, and thus his -design to join Hill on the Adaja and attack Soult was -baffled; for Souham, possessing Toro and Tordesillas, could -fall upon his rear; and he could not bring Hill up to attack -Souham, because, having destroyed the bridges, he had no -means to repass the Duero, and Soult moving by Fontiveros -would reach the Tormes on his rear. His central position -was therefore no longer available for offence or defence, and -he directed Hill to gain Alba de Tormes at once by the -road of Fontiveros. On the 6th of November he fell back -himself to San Christoval, covering Salamanca.</p> - -<p>Joseph, thinking to prevent Hill’s junction, had gained -Arevalo by the Segovia road, and on the 8th, Souham’s scouts -being met with at Medina del Campo, the king, for the first -time since he had quitted Valencia, obtained news of the -army of Portugal. One hundred thousand combatants, of -which above twelve thousand were cavalry, with a hundred -and thirty pieces of artillery, were then assembled on plains, -over which, three months before, Marmont had marched with -such confidence to his own destruction; and Soult, then -expelled from Andalusia by Marmont’s defeat, was now, after -having made half the circuit of the Peninsula, come to drive -into Portugal that very army whose victory had driven him -from the south. Wellington had foreseen, and foretold, that -the acquisition of Andalusia, though politically important -and useful, would prove injurious to himself at the moment. -The prophecy was fulfilled. The French had concentrated a -mighty power, from which it required both skill and fortune -to escape. Meanwhile the Spanish armies let loose by this -union of all the French troops kept aloof, or, coming to aid, -were found a burden rather than a help.</p> - -<p>On the 7th Hill passed the Tormes at Alba, and the bridge -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_227">227</span> -there was mined; for Wellington, holding Christoval and -being still uncertain of the real numbers of the enemy, was -desirous to maintain the line of the Tormes permanently and -give his troops repose. His own retreat had been of two -hundred miles; Hill had marched a greater distance; Skerrett -had come from Cadiz; the soldiers who besieged Burgos had -been in the field with scarcely an interval of repose since -January; all were barefooted, their equipments were spoiled, -the cavalry were weak, the horses out of condition, and -discipline was generally failing.</p> - -<p>The excesses committed on the retreat from Burgos have -been touched upon; and during the first day’s march from -the Tagus to Madrid, five hundred of the rear-guard, chiefly -of one regiment, finding the inhabitants of Valdemoro had -fled, plundered the houses; drunkenness followed and two -hundred and fifty fell into the hands of the enemy. The -conduct of an army can never be fairly judged by following -in the wake of a retreat. Here there was no want of provisions, -no hardships to exasperate, yet the author of this -history counted on the first day’s march from Madrid seventeen -bodies of murdered peasants; by whom killed, or for -what, whether by English or Germans, by Spaniards or -Portuguese, whether in dispute, in robbery, or in wanton -villany, was unknown; but their bodies were in the ditches, -and a shallow observer might thence have drawn most -foul and false conclusions against the English general and -nation.</p> - -<p>Wellington desired a battle. Christoval was strong, the -Arapiles glorious as well as strong; and by the bridge of -Salamanca and the fords he could concentrate on either -position on a shorter line than the French. Yet he prepared -for retreat, sending sick men and stores to the rear, -ordering up small convoys of provisions on the road to -Rodrigo, and destroying spare ammunition. He gave clothing, -arms and accoutrements to the Spanish troops, but -an hour after had the mortification to see them selling -their equipments under his own windows! At this time, -indeed, the Spaniards, civil and military, began to evince -hatred of the British. Daily did they attempt or perpetrate -murder, and one act of peculiar atrocity merits notice. A<span class="pagenum" id="Page_228">228</span> -horse, led by an English soldier, being frightened, backed -against a Spanish officer commanding at a gate; he caused -the soldier to be dragged into his guard-house and there -bayoneted him in cold blood, and no redress could be had -for this or other crimes, save by counter-violence, which -was not long withheld. A Spanish colonel while wantonly -stabbing at a rifleman was shot dead by the latter; and a -British volunteer slew another officer at the head of his -own regiment in a sword fight, the troops of both nations -looking on, but here there was nothing dishonourable on -either side.</p> - -<p>The civil authorities, not less savage, treated every person -with intolerable arrogance. The Prince of Orange, remonstrating -about his quarters with the sitting junta, they -ordered one of their guards to kill him; and he would have -been killed, had not Lieut. Steele of the 43rd, a bold athletic -person, felled the man before he could stab, but then both -had to fly. The exasperation caused by these things was -leading to serious mischief, when the enemy’s movements -gave another direction to the rising passions.</p> - -<p>On the 10th Soult opened a concentrated fire of eighteen -guns against the castle of Alba de Tormes, which, crowning -a bare rocky knoll and hastily intrenched, furnished -scarcely any shelter from this tempest; for two hours the -garrison could only reply with musketry, but eventually it -was aided by the fire of four pieces from the left bank of the -river; the post was thus defended until dark with such -vigour that the enemy would not assault. During the night -the garrison was reinforced, the damaged walls were repaired, -barricades were made, and in the morning the enemy withdrew. -This combat cost the allies a hundred men.</p> - -<p>On the 11th the king reorganised his army. Uniting -his own troops with the army of the south, he placed the -whole under Soult and removed Souham to make way for -Drouet. Caffarelli had before returned to Burgos with his -divisions and guns, and what with garrisons, stragglers, and -losses, scarcely ninety thousand combatants were on the -Tormes; but twelve thousand were cavalry, nearly all were -veteran troops, and they had one hundred and twenty pieces -of artillery. Such a mighty power could not remain idle, -the country was exhausted of provisions, the soldiers wanted<span class="pagenum" id="Page_229">229</span> -bread, and the king, eager enough for battle, for he was of a -brave spirit and had something of his brother’s greatness of -soul, sought counsel how to deliver it with most advantage.</p> - -<p>Jourdan was for the boldest and shortest mode. He said -Wellington’s position was composed of three parts, namely, a -right wing at Alba; a centre at Calvariza Ariba; a left wing -at San Christoval, separated from the centre by the Tormes. -This line was fifteen miles long, the Tormes was still fordable -in many places above Salamanca, and therefore the -French army might assemble in the night, pass the river at -day-break by the fords between Villa Gonzalo and Huerta, -and make a concentrated attack upon Calvariza Ariba, which -would force on a decisive battle.</p> - -<p>Soult opposed this. He objected to attacking a position -Wellington knew so well, which he might have fortified, and -where the army must fight its way even from the fords to gain -room for an order of battle. He proposed instead, to move -by the left to certain fords, three in number, between Exéme -and Galisancho, seven or eight miles above Alba de Tormes. -Easy in themselves their banks were suited to force a passage, -and by a slight circuit the troops in march would -not be seen by the enemy. The army would thus gain two -marches, would be placed on the flank and rear of the allies, -and would fight on ground chosen by its own generals, -instead of ground chosen by the enemy; or it could force -an action in a new position whence the enemy could with -difficulty retire in the event of disaster: Wellington must -then fight to disadvantage, or retire hastily, sacrificing part -of his army to save the rest, and the effect, militarily and -politically, would be the same as if he was beaten by a front -attack.</p> - -<p>Jourdan observed, that this was prudent, and might be -successful if Wellington accepted battle; but that general -could not thereby be forced to fight, which was the great -object; he would have time to retreat before the French -could touch his communication with Rodrigo, and it was -supposed by some generals that he would retreat on Almeida -at once by San Felices and Barba de Puerco.<a id="FNanchor_26" href="#Footnote_26" class="fnanchor">26</a></p> - -<p>Neither Soult nor Jourdan knew the position of the Arapiles,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_230">230</span> -and the former, while urging his plan, offered to yield -if the king was so inclined; but though Jourdan’s proposition -was supported by all the generals of the army of -Portugal, except Clausel, who leaned to Soult’s opinion, the -last marshal commanded two-thirds of the army, and the -question was finally decided agreeably to his counsel. Nor -is it easy to determine which was right, for though Jourdan’s -reasons were strong and the result conformable, the -failure was only in the execution. Nevertheless it would -seem, so great an army and so confident, for the French soldiers -eagerly demanded a battle, should have grappled in -the shortest way.</p> - -<p>Wellington, well acquainted with his ground, desired a -battle on either side of the Tormes. His hope was indeed -to prevent the passage of that river until the rains, rendering -it unfordable, should force the French to retire -from want of provisions, or engage him on the position -of Christoval: yet he also courted a fight on the Arapiles, -those rocky monuments of his former victory. He had -sixty-eight thousand combatants under arms, fifty-two -thousand of which, including four thousand British cavalry, -were Anglo-Portuguese, and he had nearly seventy guns. -With this force concentrated upon the strong ridges of -Calvariza Ariba and the two Arapiles, the superiority of -twenty thousand men would scarcely have availed the -French.<a id="FNanchor_27" href="#Footnote_27" class="fnanchor">27</a></p> - -<p>Soult’s project was adopted, trestle bridges were made for -the artillery, and at daybreak on the 14th were thrown, -while the cavalry and infantry passed by the upper fords; -the army then took a position at Mozarbes, having the road -from Alba to Tamames under the left flank. Wellington remained -in Salamanca, and when the first report came that -the enemy was over the Tormes, he made the caustic observation, -that he would not recommend it to some of them. -Soon however the concurrent testimony of many reports -convinced him of his mistake, he galloped to the Arapiles, -ascertained the direction of Soult’s march, and drew off the -second division, the cavalry, and some guns to attack the -head of the French column. The fourth division and Hamilton’s<span class="pagenum" id="Page_231">231</span> -Portuguese remained at Alba to protect this movement; -the third division secured the Arapiles until the troops from -Christoval should arrive; and he was still so confident that -the bulk of the troops did not quit Christoval that day. But -at Mozarbes he found the French already too strong to be -seriously meddled with, and when under cover of a cannonade -which kept off their cavalry, he examined their -position, discovered that the evil was without remedy. -Wherefore he destroyed the bridge of Alba, leaving only -three hundred Spaniards in the castle, with orders, if the -army retired, to save themselves as they could.</p> - -<p>He still hoped the French would give battle at the Arapiles, -but placed the first division at Aldea Tejada on the -Junguen stream, to secure a passage in case Soult should -finally compel him to choose between Salamanca and Rodrigo. -Meantime Clausel’s army, now under Drouet, finding -the bridge of Alba broken and the castle occupied, also -crossed the Tormes at Galisancho, and then Soult, who had -commenced fortifying Mozarbes, extended his left towards -the Rodrigo road: yet slowly, because the ground was heavy -and crossed by the many sources of the Junguen and Valmusa -streams, which were flooded with the rain. This -movement was like that of Marmont at the battle of Salamanca, -but on a wider circle, and an outward range of -heights, beyond a sudden attack and catastrophe. The -result in each case was remarkable. Marmont closing with -a short quick turn, a falcon striking at an eagle, received a -buffet that broke his pinions and spoiled his flight. Soult, a -wary kite, sailing slowly and with a wide wheel to seize his -prey, lost it altogether.</p> - -<p>When Wellington saw the French cavalry pointing to the -Rodrigo road, he judged the design was first to establish a -fortified head of cantonments at Mozarbes, from whence to -operate against the communication with Rodrigo; wherefore -suddenly casting his army into three columns he crossed -the Junguen, and covering his left flank with cavalry and -guns, defiled in order of battle with a wonderful boldness -and facility at little more than cannon-shot from his enemy. -He had good fortune however to aid: for there was a thick -fog and a heavy rain which rendered the bye-ways and fields -nearly impassable to the French while he used the high<span class="pagenum" id="Page_232">232</span> -roads. Then he took his army in one mass quite round the -French left, and having gained the Valmusa river halted for -the night, in rear of those who had been threatening him in -front only a few hours before!</p> - -<p>This was truly a surprising exploit, yet it was not creditable -to the generalship on either side. The English commander, -having suffered Soult to pass the Tormes and turn -his position, waited too long on the Arapiles, or this dangerous -movement would have been unnecessary; and a -combination of bad roads, bad weather, and want of vigour -on the other side, rendered it possible and no more. It has -been said by a great master, that the defect of Soult’s military -genius was a want of promptness to strike at the -decisive moment, and here he was certainly slack.</p> - -<p>On the 16th the allies retired by three roads, all of which -led, by Tamames, San Munos, and Martin del Rio, to Rodrigo, -through a forest penetrable in all directions: in the -evening they halted behind the Matilla river. This march -was only of twelve miles, yet stragglers were numerous, and -the soldiers finding vast herds of swine quitted their colours -by hundreds to shoot them; indeed such a rolling musketry -echoed through the forest, that Wellington thought the -enemy was upon him. Every effort was made to stop this -excess, and two offenders were hanged; still the hungry -men broke from the columns, the property of whole districts -was swept away in a few hours, and the army was in some -degree placed at the mercy of the enemy; who were however -content to glean the stragglers, of whom they captured -two thousand: they did not press the rear until evening, -when their lancers fell on, but were checked by the 28th -Regiment and the Light Dragoons.</p> - -<p>During the night, the light division having the rear-guard, -the cavalry in the front, for some unknown reason, filed off -by the flanks without giving any intimation of the movement, -and at daybreak as the soldiers of the division were -rolling their blankets some strange horsemen were seen -behind the bivouac; they were taken for Spaniards, until -their cautious movements and vivacity of gesture showed -them to be French. The troops run to arms, in good time, -for five hundred yards in front the wood opened on a large -plain, where eight thousand French horsemen were discovered<span class="pagenum" id="Page_233">233</span> -advancing in one solid mass, yet carelessly, and -without suspecting the vicinity of the British. The division -immediately formed columns, two squadrons of dragoons -came hastily up from the rear, and Julian Sanchez’ cavalry -also appeared in small parties on the right flank. This -checked the enemy’s march while the infantry retired, but -the French, though fearing to close, sent many squadrons to -the right and left, some of which rode on the flanks near -enough to bandy wit in the Spanish tongue with the British -soldiers, and very soon mischief was visible: the road was -strewed with baggage, the bâtmen came running in for protection, -some wounded, some without arms, and all breathless -as just escaped from a surprise.</p> - -<p>The thickness of the forest had enabled the French horsemen -to pass unperceived on the flanks, and, as opportunity -offered, they galloped from side to side, sweeping away the -baggage and sabring the conductors and guards; they even -menaced one of the columns but were checked by the fire of -the artillery. In one of these charges General Paget was -carried off, and it might have been Wellington’s fortune, for -he also was continually riding between the columns and -without an escort. The main body of the army soon passed -the Huebra river at three places and took post behind it; -but when the light division arrived at the edge of a table-land -which overhung the fords, the French cavalry suddenly -thickened, and the sharp whistle of musket-bullets with the -splintering of branches gave notice that their infantry were -also up; for Soult, hoping to forestal the allies at Tamames, -had pushed a column towards that place from his left, but -finding Hill’s troops there in position, turned short to his -right in hopes to cut off the rear-guard.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Combat of the Huebra.</span> (Nov. 1812.)</h3> - -<p>The English and German cavalry, warned by the musketry, -crossed the fords in time, and the light division -should have followed without delay; for the forest ended at -the edge of the table-land, and the descent to the river, eight -hundred yards, was quite open and smooth, the fords of the -Huebra deep. Instead of this General C. Alten ordered the -division to form squares! All persons were amazed, but<span class="pagenum" id="Page_234">234</span> -then Wellington happily came up and caused the astonished -troops to glide off to the fords. Four companies of the 43rd -and one of riflemen, left by him to cover the passage, were -instantly assailed on three sides with a fire showing that a -large force was at hand; a driving rain and mist prevented -them from seeing their adversaries, they were forced through -the wood, and thrown out on the open slope, where they -maintained their ground for a quarter of an hour, and then -swiftly running to the fords passed them under a sharp -musketry. Only twenty-seven fell, for the tempest, beating -in the Frenchmen’s faces, baffled their aim, and the division -guns, playing from the low ground with grape, checked the -pursuit: yet the deep bellow from thirty pieces of heavy -French artillery in reply, showed how critically timed was -the passage.</p> - -<p>The banks of the Huebra were steep and broken, but -the French infantry spread to the right and left and there -were several fords to be guarded; the 52nd and the Portuguese -defended those below; the guns, supported by the -riflemen and 43rd, defended those above, and behind the -right of the light division, on higher ground, was the -seventh division. The bulk of the army was massed on -the right of this position, covering all the roads leading to -Rodrigo.</p> - -<p>One brisk attempt to force the fords guarded by the 52nd -was vigorously repulsed by that regiment, but the skirmishing, -and the cannonade, which never slackened, continued -until dark; and heavily the French guns played on the -light and 7th divisions. The former was of necessity held -near the fords and in column, lest a sudden rush of cavalry -should carry off the division pieces from the flat ground, and -it was plunged into at every round, yet suffered little loss, -because the clayey soil, saturated with rain, swallowed the -shot and smothered the shells. But the 7th division was, -with astonishing want of judgment, kept by Lord Dalhousie -on open and harder ground, in one huge mass, tempting -havoc for hours, when a hundred yards in his rear the rise -of the hill and the thick forest would have entirely protected -it, without in any manner weakening the position! Nearly -three hundred men were thus lost.</p> - -<p>On the 18th the army was to have drawn off before<span class="pagenum" id="Page_235">235</span> -daylight, and Wellington was uneasy, because the Huebra, -good for defence, was yet difficult to remove from at that -season, inasmuch as the roads, hollow and narrow, led up -a steep bank to table-land, open, flat, marshy, and scored -with water-gullies. Moreover from the overflowing of one -stream the principal road was impassable at a mile from the -position; hence to get off in time, without jostling and -without being attacked, required nice management. All the -baggage and stores had marched in the night, with orders -not to halt until they reached the high lands near Rodrigo; -but if the preceding days had produced some strange occurrences, -the 18th was not less fertile in them.</p> - -<p>Wellington, knowing the direct road was impassable from -the flood, had directed several divisions by another, longer -and apparently more difficult; this seemed so extraordinary -to some generals, that, after consulting together, they -deemed him unfit to conduct the army, and led their troops -by what appeared to them the fittest line of retreat! The -condemned commander had before daylight placed himself -on his own road, and waited impatiently for the arrival of -the leading division until dawn; then, suspecting something -of what had happened, he galloped to the other road and -found the would-be leaders, stopped by that flood which his -arrangements had been made to avoid. The insubordination -and the danger to the whole army were alike glaring; yet -the practical rebuke was so severe and well timed, the -humiliation so complete and so deeply felt, that, with one -proud sarcastic observation, indicating contempt more than -anger, he led back the troops and drew off all his forces -safely.<a id="FNanchor_28" href="#Footnote_28" class="fnanchor">28</a></p> - -<p>Some confusion and great danger still attended the operation, -for even on the true road one water-gully was so deep -that the light division, covering the rear, could only pass it -man by man over a felled tree; but Soult, unable to feed his -troops a day longer, stopped on the Huebra with his main -body and only sent some cavalry to Tamames. Thus the -allies retired unmolested, yet whether from necessity, or -from negligence in the subordinates, the means of transport -were too scanty for the removal of the wounded men, most<span class="pagenum" id="Page_236">236</span> -of whom were hurt by cannon-shot; many were thus left -behind; and as the enemy never passed the Huebra, those -miserable creatures perished by a horrible lingering death.</p> - -<p>The marshy plains over which the army was now marching -exhausted the strength of the wearied soldiers, thousands -straggled, the depredations on the herds of swine were -repeated, and the temper of the troops generally prognosticated -the greatest misfortunes if the retreat should be -continued. This was however the last day of trial. Towards -evening the weather cleared up, the hills near Rodrigo -furnished dry bivouacs and fuel, good rations restored the -strength and spirits of the men, and next day Rodrigo and -the neighbouring villages were occupied in tranquillity. -The cavalry was then sent out to the forest, and being aided -by Sanchez’ Partida, brought in from a thousand to fifteen -hundred stragglers who must otherwise have perished.</p> - -<p>Such was the retreat from Burgos. The French gathered -good spoil of baggage, but what the exact loss of the allies in -men was cannot be exactly determined, because no Spanish -returns were ever seen. An approximation may however be -easily made, and the whole loss of the double retreat cannot -be set down at less than nine thousand, including the siege -of Burgos.</p> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_237">237</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="BOOK_IX">BOOK IX.</h2> -</div> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>March to Vittoria—Battle of Vittoria.</p></div> - -<h3><span class="smcap">March to Vittoria.</span> (May, 1813.)</h3> - -<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">In</span> England, the retreat from Burgos produced anger and -fear; for the public had been taught to believe the French -weak and dispirited, and the reverses were unexpected. -Lord Wellesley justly attributed them to the imbecile, selfish -policy of Mr. Perceval and his colleagues, which he characterized -as having “<em>nothing regular but confusion</em>.” Lord Wellington -alone supported the contest, for the Portuguese and -Spanish Governments had become absolutely hostile to him, -and were striving to make the people of those countries hostile -also. However, in 1813, the aspect of the war, not in the -Peninsula only but all over the civilized world, was changed -by the failure of Napoleon’s gigantic expedition to Russia, -and the English General, morally strengthened by this great -event, and seeing time ripe for a decisive blow, successfully -exerted all his mental vigour to overbear the folly and vices -of the governments he had to deal with. He renovated discipline, -repressed the intrigues of the Portuguese Regency, -and, going to Cadiz, obtained of the Spanish Cortes paramount -military authority, with its assent to a general combination -all over the Peninsula. The three nations gave him -two hundred thousand men; the Anglo-Portuguese army -furnishing seventy thousand, with ninety pieces of artillery, -and sixteen thousand Anglo-Sicilians were at Alicant. His -flanks rested on the Biscay and Mediterranean seas, on each -of which floated British fleets; now effective auxiliaries, -because the French lines of retreat being close to and -parallel with the coast on both sides of Spain, every port -abandoned by them, furnished a storehouse to the allies, and -the navy became a moveable base of operations.</p> - -<p>To oppose him were great armies on the French side, yet<span class="pagenum" id="Page_238">238</span> -all in confusion. Napoleon had drawn off thousands of the -old soldiers and experienced officers, to give stability to the -new levies with which he was striving to restore his failing -fortunes; to compensate for the weakness thus occasioned, -he directed the king to concentrate on the northern line of -invasion and act, not as the monarch of a subdued country -but as the general of an army in the field, having to contend -with an equal power. This view demanded promptness and -vigour to clear the communications of insurgents, judgment -to adopt suitable positions, and one imperious command over -all the generals. Thus governed the French soldiers were -numerous enough to hope for victory against greater numbers -than Wellington could employ against them; for though -reduced by drafts, and the secondary war of the Spaniards -after the retreat of Burgos, to two hundred and thirty thousand -men, of which seventy-eight thousand were on the -southern line of invasion and thirty thousand in hospital, a -hundred and twenty thousand men with a hundred guns, -including a reserve at Bayonne, were on the northern line -of invasion. This was a great power, of one nation, one -spirit, one discipline, and the emperor with comprehensive -genius had explained how it was to be made available. -Joseph could not comprehend the spirit of the great master’s -instructions, and was unwilling to obey. Quarrelling with -his subordinates, he would be still a king, lost time, made -false movements, and at the opening of the campaign, instead -of being concentrated on the right point and under one head, -his troops were scattered over all the north of Spain, under -generals who agreed in nothing but opposition to his military -command.</p> - -<p>Such was the state of affairs when Wellington, forming two -masses, gave one of forty thousand fighting men to General -Graham, with orders to penetrate through the Portuguese -province of Tras os Montes to the Esla river, in Spain, -thus turning that line of the Duero which Marmont had the -year before made an iron barrier. With the other mass, -thirty thousand, he designed to force the Tormes, pass the -Duero, unite with Graham, augment his army to ninety -thousand, by calling down the Gallicians under Castaños, -and then ranging the whole on a new front march all abreast -upon the scattered French and drive them refluent to the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_239">239</span> -Pyrenees. A grand design and grandly executed. For -strong of heart and strong of hand his veterans marched to -the encounter, the glories of twelve victories playing about -their bayonets, and he their leader, so proudly confident, -that in crossing the stream which marks the frontier of -Spain, he rose in his stirrups, and waving his hand cried out -<i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Adieu Portugal!</i></p> - -<p>How were the French employed and disposed at this -critical moment, when the serpent they had pursued only a -few months before, slowly trailing his exhausted length into -Portugal, had thus cast his slough, and with glistening crest -and rattling scales was again rolling forward in voluminous -strength?</p> - -<p>The king was at Valladolid with his guards, holding a -mock court instead of a general’s orderly room.</p> - -<p>Drouet with the army of the centre was in march from -Segovia towards the Duero above Valladolid.</p> - -<p>General Leval who commanded ten thousand men at -Madrid, was preparing to move with a large convoy of -pictures and other property towards Segovia.</p> - -<p>General Gazan with the army of the south, was moving -his troops in a state of uncertainty between the Upper -Tormes and the Duero, having an advanced division of -infantry and cavalry at Salamanca under General Villatte.</p> - -<p>General Reille with the army of Portugal was on the -Duero and the Esla.</p> - -<p>The position of the French was therefore defined by the -three rivers. The Esla covered their right wing, the Duero -their centre, the Tormes their left, and the point of concentration -was Valladolid. But Leval’s troops at Madrid were -isolated, and that was not all the extent of the dissemination. -Clausel, now commanding the army of the north, was engaged -in Navarre warring down the insurgents, Foy as his -lieutenant was in Biscay with a large detachment, and half -of Reille’s army was on the march to join Clausel. Add -many false reports, false conjectures, and continued disputes -as to the real plan of the English general, and the confusion -of the king’s command will be comprehended.</p> - -<p>On the 22nd of May, Graham being well advanced, Lord -Wellington put his right wing in motion towards the -Tormes, and the 26th at 10 o’clock in the morning the heads<span class="pagenum" id="Page_240">240</span> -of his columns appeared with excellent concert close to that -river on all the roads.</p> - -<p>Villatte, a good officer, barricaded the bridge, sent his baggage -to the rear, and called in a detachment from Alba, yet -wishing to discover the real force of his enemy waited on -the heights above the ford of Santa Marta too long; for the -ground enabled Wellington to conceal his movements, and -Fane’s horsemen with six guns passed the ford of Santa -Marta in Villatte’s rear unseen, while Victor Alten’s cavalry -removed the barricades on the bridge and pushed through -the town to attack in front. The French general indeed -gained the heights of Cabrerizos, marching towards Babila -Fuente, before Fane got over the river, but at the defile of -Aldea Lengua was overtaken by both columns of cavalry, -and being first battered by the guns was charged. But -horsemen are no match for such infantry, whose courage and -discipline nothing could quell. They fell before the round -shot in sections, and one hundred died in the ranks without -a wound from intolerable heat; yet they beat off the cavalry, -and in the face of thirty thousand enemies made their way -to Babila Fuente, where, being joined by the detachment -from Alba, the whole disappeared from the sight of their -admiring and applauding opponents. Two hundred had -fallen dead in the ranks, a like number, unable to keep up, -were captured, and a leading gun being overturned in the -defile retarded six others, all of which were taken.</p> - -<p>On the 28th, having approached the point on the Duero -where he proposed to throw the bridge for communication -with Graham’s corps, Wellington left Hill in command, and -went off suddenly to the Esla, being uneasy for his combination -there. Passing the Duero at Miranda, by means of a -basket moving on a rope stretched from rock to rock, the -river foaming hundreds of feet below, he on the 30th reached -Carvajales.</p> - -<p>Graham had met with many difficulties in the rugged -Tras os Montes, and though the Gallicians did not fail here, -the combination was retarded by the difficulty of crossing -the Esla. It was to have been effected the 29th, at which -time the right wing, continuing its march from the Tormes, -could have been near Zamora and the passage of the Duero -insured; the French would then have been surprised, separated,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_241">241</span> -and overtaken in detail; now, though still ignorant -that a whole army was on the Esla, they were alarmed, and -had planted the opposite bank with picquets of cavalry and -infantry; moreover, the stream was full and rapid, the banks -steep, the fords hard to find, difficult and deep, and the -appearance of the allies on the Tormes was known through -all the cantonments. Nevertheless Wellington, early on -the 31st, caused some squadrons of hussars with infantry -holding by their stirrups, to pass a ford, and Graham approached -the right bank with all his forces; a French picquet -was thus surprised by the hussars, the pontoons were immediately -laid, and the columns commenced crossing, but -several men, even of the cavalry, were drowned.</p> - -<p>On the 1st of June the rear was still on the Esla, yet the -van entered Zamora, the French retiring on Toro. Next day -their rear-guard of cavalry being overtaken by the hussars -gave battle, was broken, and driven back on the infantry -with a loss of two hundred men.</p> - -<p>Wellington halted the 3rd to bring the Gallicians down -on his left, and to close up his own rear, for he thought the -French, who were concentrating, might give battle; but he -had entirely mastered the line of the Duero, and those who -understand war may say, whether it was an effort worthy of -the man and his army. Some of his columns had marched a -hundred and fifty, some above two hundred and fifty miles -in the wild Tras os Montes, through regions thought to be -impracticable even for small corps; forty thousand men, infantry, -cavalry, artillery, and even pontoons, all had passed, -and been suddenly placed as if by a supernatural power -upon the Esla before the enemy knew that they were in -movement.</p> - -<p>The field was now clear for the shock of arms, but the -forces were unequally matched. Wellington had ninety -thousand men, and more than one hundred pieces of artillery -in hand. Twelve thousand were cavalry, the British -and Portuguese were seventy thousand; and this mass of -regulars was aided by all the Partidas. Sanchez’ horsemen, -a thousand strong, were on the right beyond the Duero; -Porlier, Barcena, Salazar and Manzo on the left between the -Upper Esla and the Carion; Saornil menaced Avila, the -Empecinado hovered about Leval; and the Spanish reserve<span class="pagenum" id="Page_242">242</span> -of Andalusia, having crossed the Tagus on the 30th, drew -all the numerous small bands swarming around as it advanced. -On the other hand, though the French could -collect nine or ten thousand horsemen and one hundred -guns, their infantry was less than half the number of the -allies, being only thirty-five thousand strong, exclusive of -Leval. The way to victory was therefore open, and on the -4th Wellington marched forward with a conquering vehemence, -pouring a torrent of war, whose depth and violence -the king was even now ignorant of.</p> - -<p>It was thought Joseph would fight on the Carion. But -though he had then fifty-five thousand fighting men, exclusive -of a Spanish division escorting the convoys and baggage, -he did not judge that river a good position and retired behind -the upper Pisuerga. Meanwhile he sent Jourdan to examine -Burgos castle, and expedited fresh letters, having before -written from Valladolid, to Foy, Sarrut and Clausel, calling -them towards the plains of Burgos, and others to Suchet, -directing him to march upon Zaragoza: but Suchet was then -engaged in Catalonia, Clausel was in Aragon, Foy on the -coast of Guipuscoa, and Sarrut pursuing Longa in the -Montaña.</p> - -<p>Joseph was still unacquainted with his enemy. Higher -than seventy or eighty thousand he did not estimate his -force, and proposed to fight on the elevated plains of Burgos. -But more than a hundred thousand men were before and -around him; for all the Partidas of the Asturias and Montaña -were drawing together on his right, Julian Sanchez and -the Partidas of Castile were closing on his left, and Abispal -having passed the Gredos mountains with the Andalusian -reserve and Frere’s cavalry was in full march for Valladolid. -Joseph was however hopeful to win if he could rally Clausel’s -and Foy’s divisions in time, and his despatches to the -former were frequent and urgent. Come with the infantry -of the army of Portugal! Come with the army of the north, -and we shall drive the allies over the Duero! Such was his -cry, but he was not a general to contend with Wellington, -and recover the initiatory movement at such a crisis.</p> - -<p>While still on the Pisuerga he received Jourdan’s report. -The castle of Burgos was untenable, there were no magazines -of provisions, the new works were unfinished and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_243">243</span> -commanded the old, which were unable to hold out a day. -Of Clausel’s and Foy’s divisions nothing had been heard. -This intelligence was decisive, and he resolved to retire -behind the Ebro. All the French outposts in the Bureba -and Montaña were immediately withdrawn, and the great -depôt of Burgos was evacuated upon Vittoria, which was -thus encumbered with the artillery depôts of Madrid, Valladolid -and Burgos, and with the baggage and stores of many -armies and many fugitive families; and at that moment also -arrived, from France, a convoy of treasure which had long -waited for escort at Bayonne.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the tide of war flowed onwards with terrible -power. The allies having crossed the Carion the 7th, Joseph -retired to Burgos with his left wing, composed of the armies -of the south and centre, while Reille’s army, forming the -right wing, moved by Castro Xerez. Wellington followed -hard: conducting his operations continually on the same -principle, he pushed his left wing and the Gallicians along -bye-roads, and passed the upper Pisuerga on the 8th, 9th, -and 10th. Having thus turned the line of the Pisuerga -entirely, and outflanked Reille, he made a short journey the -11th, and on the 12th halted his left wing to arrange the -supplies; yet he still pushed forward the right wing, resolved -to make the French yield the castle of Burgos or -fight for possession.</p> - -<p>Reille, who had regained the great road to Burgos the -9th, was now strongly posted behind the Hormaza stream, -barring the way to Burgos; the other armies were in -reserve behind Estepar. In this situation they had been -for three days, cheered by intelligence of Napoleon’s victory -at Bautzen, and the consequent armistice; but on the -12th, Wellington’s columns came up, and the light division, -preceded by the hussars and dragoons, turned Reille’s right, -while the rest of the troops attacked the whole range of -heights to Estepar. Reille, finding horsemen acting behind -his right flank while his front was strongly menaced, made -for the bridge of Baniel under the fire of Gardiner’s horse-artillery, -losing some prisoners and a gun; an effort was -made to cut him off from the bridge, but he bore the artillery -fire without shrinking, and, evading a serious attack, -passed the Arlanzan with a loss of only thirty men killed.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_244">244</span> -The three French armies being then covered by the Urbel -and Arlanzan rivers could not be easily attacked, all the -stores of Burgos were removed, and in the night the king, -having mined the castle, retreated along the high road to -Pancorbo, into which he threw a garrison. Everything was -done confusedly. The mines under the castle exploded -outwardly at the moment a column of infantry was defiling -beneath, several streets were laid in ruins, thousands of -shells and other combustibles were driven upwards with a -horrible crash, the hills rocked above the devoted column, -and a shower of iron, timber, and stony fragments falling on -it, in an instant destroyed more than three hundred men! -Fewer deaths might have sufficed to determine the crisis of -a great battle! Such and so fearful is the consequence of -error, so terrible the responsibility of a general!</p> - -<p>Wisely did Napoleon speak when he told Joseph, if he -would command he must give himself up entirely to the -business, labouring day and night, thinking of nothing else. -Here was a noble army driven like sheep before prowling -wolves, yet in every action the inferior generals had been -prompt and skilful, the soldiers brave, ready and daring, -and in a country very favourable for defence; but the mind -of a great commander was wanting, and the Esla, the -Tormes, the Duero, the Carion, the Pisuerga, the Arlanzan, -seemed to be dried up, the rocks, the mountains, the deep -ravines to be levelled. Clausel’s strong positions, Dubreton’s -thundering castle, all disappeared like a dream, and -sixty thousand veteran soldiers, willing to fight, were hurried -with all the confusion of defeat across the Ebro: nor -was that barrier found of more avail to mitigate the rushing -violence of their formidable adversary.</p> - -<p>Joseph, having placed the defile and fort of Pancorbo -between him and his enemy, thought he could safely await -his reinforcements, and extended his wings for the sake of -subsistence. Hence on the 16th Drouet marched to Aro on -the left, while Gazan held the centre, having a strong -advanced guard beyond Pancorbo; for as the king’s hope -was to retake the offensive, he retained the power of issuing -beyond the defiles, and his scouting parties were pushed -forward on all sides. The rest of the army was cantoned -by divisions in rear, and Reille, from behind the Ebro,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_245">245</span> -was to watch the road to Bilbao, being there joined by -Sarrut.</p> - -<p>While these movements were in progress, all the incumbrances -of the armies were assembled in the basin of Vittoria, -and many small garrisons of the army of the north -came in; for Clausel, having received the king’s first letter -on the 15th of June, had gathered his scattered columns to -rejoin by the way of Logroño, yet his garrisons were many, -and he could only concentrate fourteen thousand men. The -king was nevertheless confident in the strength of his front, -and had no doubt of retaking the offensive when all his -forces came in.</p> - -<p>His dream was short-lived. On the 13th, while the -explosion at Burgos was still ringing in the hills, Wellington -was marching by his left towards the country about the -sources of the Ebro. This great movement, masked by the -cavalry and the Spanish irregulars who infested the rear of -the French, suddenly placed the army between the sources -of the Ebro and the great mountains of Reynosa; this cut -the French entirely off from the sea-coast, and all the ports, -except Santona and Bilbao, were immediately evacuated. -Santona was then invested by the Spaniards, and the English -ships entered Sant Andero, where a depôt and hospital station -was established; the connection of the army with -Portugal was thus severed: she was cast off as a heavy -tender is cast from its towing-rope, and all the British -military establishments were transferred by sea to the coast -of Biscay.</p> - -<p>The English general had now to choose between a march -down the left bank of the Ebro to seek a battle; or to -place the army on the great communication with France, -while the fleet, keeping pace, furnished fresh depôts at -Bilbao and other ports. The first was an uncertain operation, -because of the many narrow and dangerous defiles -which were to be passed; the second was secure even if the -first should fail; but both were compatible to a certain -point; for to gain the great road leading from Burgos to -Bilbao, was a good step for either, and, failing of that, there -was a road leading by Valmaceda to Bilbao in reserve. -Wherefore with an eagle’s sweep Wellington brought his left -wing round, and poured his numerous columns through all<span class="pagenum" id="Page_246">246</span> -the deep narrow valleys and rugged defiles towards the great -road of Bilbao. At Medina de Pomar, a central point, he -left the sixth division to guard his stores and supplies, but -the march of the other divisions was unmitigated; neither -the winter gullies, nor the ravines, nor the precipitous passes -amongst the rocks, retarded the march even of the artillery; -where horses could not draw men hauled, when the wheels -would not roll the guns were let down or lifted up with -ropes; and strongly did the rough veteran infantry work -their way through those wild and beautiful regions: six -days they toiled unceasingly; on the seventh, swelled by -Longa’s Spaniards, and all the smaller bands which came -trickling from the mountains, they burst like raging -streams from every defile and went foaming into the basin -of Vittoria.</p> - -<p>During this movement many reports reached the French, -some absurdly exaggerated, as that Wellington had one -hundred and ninety thousand men, yet all indicating the -true direction of his march; and as early as the 15th, -Jourdan, warning Joseph that the allies would turn his -right, pressed him to place Reille at Valmaceda and close -the other armies towards the same quarter. Joseph yielded -so far, that Reille was ordered to concentrate at Osma and -gain Valmaceda by Orduña if it was still possible; if not -he was to descend rapidly upon Bilbao, and rally Foy’s division -and the garrisons of Biscay upon his army: but no -general decided dispositions were made.</p> - -<p>Reille called in Maucune from Frias, and having fears for -his safety gave him a choice between a direct road across the -hills, or the circuitous route of Puente Lara. Maucune -started late in the night of the 17th by the direct road; and -meanwhile Reille having reached Osma on the morning of -the 18th, found a strong English column issuing from the -defiles in his front, and in possession of the high road to -Orduña. This was Graham. He had three divisions and a -considerable body of cavalry, and the French general, who -had eight thousand infantry and fourteen guns, engaged him -with a sharp skirmish and cannonade, wherein fifty men fell -on the side of the allies, above a hundred on that of the -enemy; but at half-past two o’clock, Maucune had not arrived, -and beyond the mountains, on the left of the French, the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_247">247</span> -sound of a battle arose and seemed to advance along the -valley of Boveda in rear of Osma. Reille, suspecting the -truth, instantly retired fighting towards Espejo, where the -mouths of the two valleys opened on each other, and then -suddenly, from that of Boveda Maucune’s troops rushed -forth, begrimed with dust and powder, breathless and -broken.</p> - -<p>That general had, as before said, marched over the Araçena -ridge instead of going by the Puente Lara, and his leading -brigade, after clearing the defiles, halted near the village of -San Millan in the valley of Boveda, without planting picquets; -he was there awaiting his other brigade and the baggage, -when suddenly the light division, moving on a line parallel -with Graham’s march, appeared on some rising ground in -front. The surprise was equal on both sides, but the British -riflemen instantly dashed down the hill with loud cries and -a bickering fire, the 52nd followed in support, and the French -retreated fighting as they best could. The rest of the -English regiments remained in reserve, thinking all their -enemies before them, but then the second French brigade, -followed by the baggage, came hastily out from a narrow -cleft in some perpendicular rocks on their right hand, and a -confused action ensued. For the reserve scrambled over -rough intervening ground to attack this new foe, who made -for a hill a little way in front, and then the 52nd, whose -rear was thus menaced, quitting their first enemies, wheeled -round and running full speed up the hill met them on the -summit; so pressed, the French cast off their packs, and half -flying, half fighting, escaped along the side of the mountains, -while their first brigade, still retreating on the road towards -Espejo, were pursued by the riflemen. Meanwhile the -sumpter animals, sadly affrighted, run about the rocks with -a wonderful clamour; and though the escort, huddled together, -fought desperately, all the baggage became the spoil of -the victors, and four hundred of the French fell or were -taken: the rest with unyielding resolution and activity -escaped, though pursued through the mountains by some -Spanish irregulars: Reille then retreated behind Salinas de -Añara.</p> - -<p>Neither Reille nor the few prisoners he had made could -account for more than six Anglo-Portuguese divisions at<span class="pagenum" id="Page_248">248</span> -these defiles; hence, as no enemy had been felt on the great -road from Burgos, the king judged that Hill was marching -with the others by Valmaceda into Guipuscoa, to menace the -great communication with France. It was however clear -that six divisions were on the right and rear of the French -position, and no time was to be lost; wherefore Gazan and -D’Erlon marched in the night to unite behind the Zadora -river, up the left bank of which they had to file into the -basin of Vittoria. But their way was through the pass of -Puebla de Arganzan, two miles long, and so narrow as -scarcely to furnish room for the great road: wherefore to -cover the movement, Reille fell back during the night to -Subijana Morillas on the Bayas river. His orders were to -dispute the ground vigorously, for by that route Wellington -could enter the basin before the others could thread the pass -of Puebla; or he might send a corps from Frias, to attack -the king on the Miranda side in rear while his front was -engaged in the defile. One of these things the English -general should have endeavoured to accomplish, but the -troops had made long marches on the 18th, and it was dark -before the fourth division reached Espejo: D’Erlon and -Gazan, therefore, without difficulty passed the defile, and -the head of their column appeared on the other side just as -the allies drove Reille back from the Bayas.</p> - -<p>Wellington had reached that river before mid-day the -19th, and, if he could have forced it at once, the other two -armies, then in the defile, would have been cut off; Reille -was however well posted, his front covered by the stream, -his right by the village of Subijana de Morillas, which was -occupied as a bridge-head; his left was secured by rugged -heights, and it was only by a combat in which eighty French -fell that he was forced beyond the Zadora; but the other -armies had then passed the defile, the crisis was over, and -the allies pitched their tents on the Bayas. The king now -heard of Clausel at Logroño, and called him to Vittoria; he -also directed Foy, then in march for Bilbao, to rally the -garrisons of Biscay and Guipuscoa and join him on the -Zadora. These orders were received too late.</p> - -<p>The basin into which the king had thus poured all his -troops, his parcs, convoys and incumbrances, was eight -miles broad by ten long, Vittoria being at the further end.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_249">249</span> -The Zadora, narrow and with rugged banks, after passing -that town, flows through the Puebla defile towards the -Ebro, dividing the basin unequally,—the largest portion -being on the left bank. A traveller, coming from the Ebro -by the royal Madrid road, would enter the basin by the -Puebla defile, breaking through a rough mountain ridge. -On emerging from the pass, at the distance of six miles on -the left he would see the village of Subijana de Morillas, -facing the opening into the basin which Reille had defended -on the Bayas. The spires of Vittoria would appear eight -miles in front, and radiating from that town, the road to -Logroño would be on his right hand; that to Bilbao by -<i>Murgia</i> on the left hand, crossing the Zadora at a bridge near -the village of Ariaga. Further on, the road to Estella and -Pampeluna would be seen on the right, the road to Durango -on the left, and between them the royal causeway leading -over the great Arlaban ridge by the defiles of Salinas. Of -all these roads, though some were practicable for guns, especially -that to Pampeluna, the royal causeway alone could -suffice for such an incumbered army; and as the allies were -behind the ridge, bounding the basin on the right bank of -the Zadora, and parallel to the causeway, they could by -prolonging their left cut off that route.</p> - -<p>Joseph, feeling this danger, thought to march by Salinas -to Durango, there to meet Foy’s troops and the garrisons of -Guipuscoa and Biscay; but in the rough country, neither -his artillery nor his cavalry, on which he greatly depended, -though the cavalry and artillery of the allies were scarcely -less powerful, could act or subsist, and he must have sent -them into France: moreover, if pressed by Wellington in -that mountainous region, so favourable for irregulars, he -could not long remain in Spain. It was then proposed to -retire to Pampeluna and bring Suchet’s army up to Zaragoza; -but Joseph desired to keep open the great communication -with France; for though the Pampeluna road was -practicable to wheels, it required something more for the -enormous mass of guns and carriages of all kinds now heaped -around Vittoria.</p> - -<p>One large convoy had marched the 19th, and the fighting -men in front were thus diminished, while the plain was still -covered with artillery parcs and equipages, and the king,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_250">250</span> -infirm of purpose, continued to waste time in vain conjectures -about his adversary’s movements. And on the 21st, at -three o’clock in the morning, Maucune’s division, more than -three thousand good soldiers, also marched with a second -convoy. The king then adopted a new line of battle.</p> - -<p>Reille, reinforced by a Franco-Spanish brigade of infantry -and Digeon’s dragoons, took the extreme right to defend the -passage of the Zadora, where the Bilbao and Durango roads -crossed it by the bridges of Gamara Mayor and Ariaga. The -centre, under Gazan and Drouet, was distant six or eight -miles from Gamara, lining the Zadora also; but on another -front, for the stream, turning suddenly to the left round the -heights of Margarita, descended thence to the Puebla defile -nearly at right angles with its previous course. There covered -by the river, on an easy open range of heights, Gazan’s -right was extended from an isolated hill in front of the village -of Margarita to the royal road; his centre was astride -of the royal road in front of the village of Arinez; his left -occupied rugged ground behind Subijana de Alava, facing -the Puebla defile, and a brigade under Maransin was on the -Puebla ridge beyond the defile. Drouet was in second line; -the mass of cavalry, many guns, and the king’s guards -formed a reserve behind the centre about the village of -Gomecha, and fifty pieces of artillery were pushed in front, -pointing to the bridges of Mendoza, Tres Puentes, Villodas, -and Nanclares.</p> - -<p>While the king was making conjectures, Wellington had -made a new disposition of his forces; for thinking Joseph -would not fight on the Zadora, he sent Giron with the -Gallicians on the 19th to seize Orduña; Graham was to have -followed him, but finally penetrated through difficult mountain -ways to Murguia, thus cutting the enemy off from Bilbao -and menacing his communications with France. The army -had been so scattered by the previous marches that Wellington -halted on the 20th to rally the columns, and took that -opportunity to examine the French position, where, contrary -to his expectation, they seemed resolved to fight, wherefore -he gave Graham fresh orders and hastily recalled Giron from -Orduña. The long-expected battle was then at hand, and on -neither side were the numbers and courage of the troops of -mean account. The sixth division, six thousand five hundred<span class="pagenum" id="Page_251">251</span> -strong, had been left at Medina de Pomar, and hence only -sixty thousand Anglo-Portuguese sabres and bayonets, with -ninety pieces of cannon, were actually in the field; but the -Spanish auxiliaries raised the numbers to eighty thousand -combatants. The regular muster-roll of the French was lost -with the battle, yet a careful approximate reckoning gives -about sixty thousand sabres and bayonets, and in number and -size of guns they had the advantage: but their position was -visibly defective.</p> - -<p>Their best line of retreat was on the prolongation of -Reille’s right, at Gamara Mayor; yet he was too distant to -be supported by the main body, and therefore the safety of -the latter depended on his good fighting. Many thousand -carriages and other impediments were heaped about Vittoria, -blocking all the roads and disordering the artillery parcs; -and on the extreme left, Maransin’s brigade, occupying the -Puebla ridge, was isolated and too weak to hold its ground. -The centre was indeed on an easy range of hills, its front -open, with a slope to the river, and powerful batteries bore -on all the bridges; nevertheless, many of the guns being -advanced in the loop of the Zadora, were exposed to musket-shot -from a wood on the right bank.</p> - -<p>Seven bridges were within the scheme of operations, yet -none were broken or retrenched. The bridge of La Puebla, -facing the French left, was beyond the defile; that of Nanclares, -facing Subijana de Alava, was at the French end of -the defile; three bridges around the deep loop of the river -opened upon the right of the French centre, that of Mendoza -being highest up the stream, Vellodas lowest down, Tres -Puentes in the centre: the bridges of Gamara Mayor and -Ariaga were, as already said, guarded by Reille.</p> - -<p>Wellington projected three distinct battles. Graham, -moving by the Bilbao road, was to force a passage with -twenty thousand men against Reille, and Giron’s Gallicians -were called up to his support; the design being to shut up -the French centre and left between the Zadora and the Puebla -mountain. Hill, having Morillo’s Spaniards, Sylviera’s -Portuguese and the second British division, with cavalry and -guns, in all twenty thousand men, was to force the passage -of the Zadora river beyond the Puebla defile, assailing -Maransin there with his right, while his left, threading the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_252">252</span> -pass to enter the basin on that side, turned and menaced the -French left and secured the bridge of Nanclares.</p> - -<p>In the centre battle, the third, fourth, seventh and light -divisions of infantry, the great mass of artillery, the heavy -cavalry and Portuguese horsemen, in all thirty thousand -combatants, were led by Wellington in person. Being encamped -along the Bayas, these bodies had only to march -over the ridge which bounded the basin of Vittoria on that -side, and come down to their respective points on the -Zadora, namely, the bridges of Mendoza, Tres Puentes, -Villodas and Nanclares; but the country was so rugged -exact concert could not be maintained, and each general of -division was left in some degree master of his own movements.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Battle of Vittoria.</span> (June, 1813.)</h3> - -<p>At daybreak on the 21st, the weather being rainy with a -thick vapour, the troops moved from the Bayas, crossed the -ridge and slowly approached the Zadora, while Hill on the -other side of the ridge commenced the passage of that river -beyond the defile of Puebla. On his side Morillo’s Spaniards -led, and their first brigade assailed the mountain to the right -of the great road; but the ascent proved so steep the soldiers -appeared to climb rather than walk up, and the second -brigade, which was to connect the first with the British -troops below, ascended only half-way. Little opposition -was made until the first brigade was near the summit, when -skirmishing commenced and Morillo was wounded; his -second brigade then joined him, and the French, feeling -the importance of the height, reinforced Maransin. Hill -soon succoured Morillo with the 71st regiment and a battalion -of light infantry, both under Colonel Cadogan, yet the -fight was doubtful; for though the British won the summit -and gained ground along the side of the mountain, Cadogan -fell, and Gazan having sent Villatte’s division to aid Maransin, -the French fought so strongly that the allies could -scarcely hold their ground. Hill sent more troops, and -with the remainder of his corps passed the Zadora, threaded -the Puebla defile, and fiercely issuing forth on the other -side won the village of Subijana de Alava in front of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_253">253</span> -Gazan’s line, and then connecting his right with the troops -on the mountain, maintained that forward position, despite -of the enemy’s efforts, until the centre battle was begun on -his left.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile Wellington, keeping all his cavalry in mass as -a reserve, placed the fourth division opposite the bridge of -Nanclares, the light division at the bridge of Villodas, both -being covered by rugged ground and woods, and the light -division so close to the water, that the skirmishers could -have killed the French gunners in the loop of the river. -The weather had now cleared up, and then Hill’s battle -was prolonged by the riflemen of the light division, with a -biting fire on the enemy’s skirmishers; but no serious effort -was made, because the third and seventh divisions, meeting -with rough ground, had not reached their point of attack, -and it would have been imprudent to push the fourth -division and cavalry over the bridge of Nanclares, with the -Puebla defile in their rear, before the other divisions were -ready.</p> - -<p>While thus waiting, a Spanish peasant told Wellington the -bridge of Tres Puentes on the left of the light division was -unguarded, and offered to lead the troops over it. General -Kempt’s brigade was on the instant directed towards that -quarter, and being concealed by some rocks, passed the -narrow bridge at a running pace, mounted a steep rise of -ground and halted close under the crest, being then actually -behind the king’s advanced posts, and within a few hundred -yards of his line of battle. Some French cavalry approached, -and two round shots were fired by the enemy, one of which -killed the poor peasant to whose courage and intelligence -the allies were so much indebted, but no movement of attack -was made, and Kempt called the 15th Hussars over the -river: they came at a gallop, crossing the narrow bridge -one by one, horseman after horseman, and still the French -remained torpid, showing an army but no general.</p> - -<p>It was now one o’clock, Hill’s assault on the village of -Subijana was entirely developed, and a curling smoke, faintly -seen far up the Zadora on the extreme left, and followed by -the sound of distant guns, told that Graham’s attack had also -commenced. Then the king, finding both flanks in danger, -caused his reserve to file off towards Vittoria, and gave<span class="pagenum" id="Page_254">254</span> -Gazan orders to retire by successive masses; but at that -moment the third and seventh divisions were seen moving -rapidly down to the bridge of Mendoza, whereupon Gazan’s -artillery opened, a body of his cavalry drew near the bridge, -and the French light troops, very strong there, commenced -a vigorous musketry. Some British guns replied to the -French cannon from the opposite bank, and the value of -Kempt’s forward position was instantly made manifest; for -Andrew Barnard, springing forward, led the riflemen of the -light division in the most daring manner between the French -cavalry and the river, taking their light troops and gunners -in flank, and engaging them so closely that the English -artillerymen, thinking his dark-clothed troops enemies, -played on both alike.</p> - -<p>This singular attack enabled a brigade of the third division -to pass the bridge of Mendoza without opposition, while the -other brigade forded the river higher up, followed by the -seventh division and Vandeleur’s brigade of the light division. -The French now abandoned the ground in front of Villodas; -and the battle, which had slackened, was revived with extreme -violence; for Hill pressed the enemy in his front, the -fourth division passed the bridge of Nanclares, the smoke -and sound of Graham’s guns became more distinct, and the -banks of the Zadora presented a continuous line of fire. Thus -the French, weakened in the centre by the draft made of -Villatte’s division, and shaken in resolution by the king’s -order to retreat, became perplexed and could make no regular -retrograde movement, because the allies were too close.</p> - -<p>The seventh division and Colville’s brigade of the third -division, having forded the river, formed the left of the -British, and were immediately engaged with the French -right; but then Wellington, seeing the hill in front of Arinez -nearly denuded of troops by the withdrawal of Villatte’s -division, led Picton and the rest of the third division in close -column at a running pace, diagonally, across the front of -both armies, towards that central point. This attack was -headed by Barnard’s riflemen, and followed by the remainder -of Kempt’s brigade and the hussars;<a id="FNanchor_29" href="#Footnote_29" class="fnanchor">29</a> and at the same time, -when the fourth division had passed the bridge of Nanclares,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_255">255</span> -the heavy cavalry, a splendid body, galloped over also, -squadron after squadron into the plain ground between Cole -and Hill.</p> - -<p>Thus caught in the midst of their dispositions for retreat, -the French threw out a prodigious number of skirmishers, -and fifty pieces of artillery played with astonishing activity. -To answer this fire Wellington brought over most of his -guns, and both sides were shrouded by a dense cloud of -smoke and dust, under cover of which the French retired -by degrees to the second range of heights in front of -Gomecha, on which their reserve had been posted, yet still -holding the village of Arinez on the main road. Picton’s -troops, always headed by the riflemen of the light division, -then plunged into that village amidst a heavy fire of muskets -and artillery, and three guns were captured; but the post -was important, fresh French troops came down, and for -some time the smoke and dust and clamour, the flashing of -the fire-arms, and the shouts and cries of the combatants, -mixed with the thundering of the guns, were terrible: finally -the British troops issued forth victorious on the other side. -During this conflict the seventh division, reinforced by -Vandeleur’s brigade of the light division, was heavily raked -by a battery at the village of Margarita, until the 52nd -regiment with an impetuous charge carried that village, and -the 87th won the village of Hermandad, and, so fighting, the -whole line advanced.</p> - -<p>When the village of Arinez was won, the French opposed -to Hill, at Subijana de Alava, were turned, and being hard -pressed in front, and on their left by the troops of the Puebla -mountain, fell back two miles in disorder, striving to regain -the line of retreat to Vittoria. It was thought some cavalry -launched at the moment would have disorganized the whole -French battle, but none moved, and the confused multitude -shooting ahead recovered order.</p> - -<p>The ground was exceedingly diversified with woods and -plains, here covered with corn, there broken by ditches, -vineyards and hamlets; hence the action, for six miles, -resolved itself into a running fight and cannonade, the dust -and smoke and tumult of which, filling all the basin, passed -onwards towards Vittoria. Many guns were taken, and at -six o’clock the French reached the last defensible height,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_256">256</span> -one mile in front of Vittoria. Behind them was the plain in -which the city stood, and beyond the houses thousands of -carriages, animals and non-combatants, men, women, and -children, huddling together in all the madness of terror; -and as the English shot went booming over head, the vast -crowd started and swerved with a convulsive movement, -while a dull and horrid sound of distress arose: but there -was no hope, no stay for army or multitude. It was the -wreck of a nation.</p> - -<p>French courage was not yet quelled. Reille, on whom -every thing now depended, maintained his post at the Upper -Zadora, and the armies of the south and centre, drawing up -on their last heights between the villages of Ali and Armentia, -made their muskets flash like lightning, while more -than eighty pieces of artillery, massed together, pealed with -such a horrid uproar, that the hills laboured and shook and -streamed with fire and smoke, amidst which the dark figures -of the French gunners were seen hounding with a frantic -energy. This terrible cannonade and musketry checked the -allies. The third division, having the brunt of the storm, -could scarcely maintain its ground, and the French generals -began to draw off their infantry from the right wing, when -suddenly the fourth division rushing forward carried the hill -on the French left; then the heights were all abandoned, for -at that moment Joseph, finding the royal road so blocked by -carriages the artillery could not pass, indicated the road of -Salvatierra for retreat, and the troops at once went off in a -confused mass. The British followed hard, and the light -cavalry galloped through the town to intercept the new -line, which passed a marsh, and was likewise choked with -carriages and fugitive people, for on each side there were -deep drains. Disorder and mischief then prevailed entirely. -The guns were left on the edge of the marsh, the artillerymen -fled with the horses, and the infantry, breaking through -the miserable multitude, went clean off: the cavalry however -still acted with order, and many generous horsemen -were seen to carry children and women from the dreadful -scene.</p> - -<p>This retreat placed Reille in great danger. His advanced -troops under Sarrut had been originally posted at the village -of Aranguis, beyond the Zadora, holding some heights which<span class="pagenum" id="Page_257">257</span> -covered the bridges of Ariaga and Gamara Mayor. They -were driven from thence by Graham’s vanguard under -General Oswald, who seized Gamara Menor on the Durango -road, and forced the Franco-Spaniards from Durano on -the royal causeway: thus the first blow on this side deprived -the king of his best line of retreat and confined him to the -road of Pampeluna. Sarrut however recrossed the river in -good order, taking post with one brigade at the bridge of -Ariaga and the village of Abechuco covering it; the other -was in reserve to support him and General La Martinière, -who defended the bridge of Gamara Mayor and the village -of that name, also on the right of the river. Digeon’s dragoons -were behind the village of Ariaga; Reille’s own dragoons -were behind the bridge of Gamara; one brigade of -light cavalry was on the extreme right to sustain the -Franco-Spanish troops, higher up the river; another, under -General Curto, was on the French left, extending down the -Zadora.</p> - -<p>Longa’s Spaniards were to have attacked Gamara at an -early hour, when it was feebly occupied, but they did not -stir, and the village being reinforced, Robinson’s brigade -of the fifth division assaulted it instead. He made the -attack at a running pace at first, but the French fire became -so heavy, that his men stopped to reply, and the -columns got intermixed; however, encouraged by their officers, -and especially by the example of General Robinson, an -inexperienced man but of a daring spirit, they renewed the -charge, broke through the village and even crossed the -bridge. One gun was captured and the passage seemed to -be won, when Reille suddenly turned twelve pieces upon the -village, and then La Martinière, rallying his men under -cover of this cannonade retook the bridge: it was with difficulty -the allied troops could even hold the village until -they were reinforced.</p> - -<p>Now a second British brigade came down, and the bridge -was again carried, but the new troops were soon driven -back as the others had been, and the bridge remained forbidden -ground. Graham had meanwhile attacked the village -of Abechuco, covering the bridge of Ariaga; it was -carried at once by the German riflemen, who were supported -by Bradford’s Portuguese and the fire of twelve guns; yet<span class="pagenum" id="Page_258">258</span> -here, as at Gamara, the French maintained the bridge, so -that at both places the troops on each side remained stationary -under a reciprocal fire of artillery and small arms. -Reille, with inferior numbers, thus continued to interdict -the passage until the tumult of Wellington’s battle, coming -up the Zadora, reached Vittoria itself, and a part of the British -horsemen rode out of that city upon Sarrut’s rear. -Digeon’s dragoons kept this cavalry in check for the moment, -and Reille had previously formed a reserve of infantry, -which now proved his safety; for Sarrut was killed at the -bridge of Ariaga, and Menne, next in command, could -scarcely draw off his troops while Digeon’s dragoons held -the British cavalry at point; but with the aid of his reserve -Reille finally rallied all his troops at Betonio. He had now to -make head on several sides, because the allies were coming -down from Ariaga, from Durano, and from Vittoria; yet he -fought his way to Metauco on the Salvatierra road and there -covered the general retreat with some degree of order. -Vehemently and closely did the British pursue, and neither -the bold demeanour of the French cavalry, which made -several vigorous charges, nor darkness, which now fell, -could stop their victorious career until the flying masses had -passed Metauco.</p> - -<p>This was the battle of Vittoria. The French had, comparatively, -few men slain, but to use Gazan’s words, “<em>lost all -their equipages, all their guns, all their treasure, all their stores, all -their papers; no man could even prove how much pay was due to him: -generals and subordinate officers alike were reduced to the clothes on -their backs, and most of them were barefooted</em>.” Never was an -army more hardly used by its commander. The soldiers -were not half beaten; yet never was a victory more complete. -The French carried off but two pieces of artillery -from the battle. Jourdan’s baton, a stand of colours, one -hundred and forty-three brass pieces, one hundred of which -had been used in the fight, all the parcs and dépôts from -Madrid, Valladolid, and Burgos, carriages, ammunition, -treasure, every thing, fell into the hands of the victors. -The loss in men did not exceed six thousand; the loss of -the allies was five thousand one hundred and seventy-six, -killed, wounded, and missing. Of these one thousand -and forty-nine were Portuguese; five hundred and fifty-three<span class="pagenum" id="Page_259">259</span> -Spanish. Hence the English lost more than double what -Portuguese and Spaniards did together; yet both fought -well, and especially the Portuguese: but British troops are -the soldiers of battle. The spoil was immense, yet so plundered, -principally by the followers and non-combatants, for -with some exceptions the fighting troops may be said to -have marched upon gold and silver without stooping to -pick it up, that of five millions and a half of dollars, indicated -by the French accounts to be in the money-chests, not -one dollar came to the public. Wellington sent fifteen officers -with power to examine all loaded animals passing the -Ebro and the Duero, yet very little was recovered; and this -robbery was not confined to ignorant and vulgar people: -officers were seen mixed with the mob contending for the -disgraceful gain.</p> - -<p>On the 22nd, Giron and Longa pursued the convoy which -had moved under Maucune on the morning of the battle; -the heavy cavalry and Portuguese horsemen remained at -Vittoria; Pakenham came with the sixth division from -Medina Pomar, and Wellington pursued Joseph, who had -been flying up the Borundia and Araquil valleys all night. -Reille, who covered the retreat, reached Huerta in the valley -of Araquil, thirty miles from the field of battle, on the -evening of the 22nd. Joseph attained Yrursun, from which -roads branched off to Pampeluna on one side, and to Tolosa -and St. Esteban on the other, from thence on the 23rd, expediting -orders to different points on the French frontier to -prepare provisions and succours for his suffering army; -meanwhile he sent Reille by St. Esteban to the Lower -Bidassoa with his infantry, six hundred select cavalry, the -artillery-men and horses: Gazan’s and D’Erlon’s troops -marched upon Pampeluna, intending to cross the frontier at -St. Jean Pied de Port.</p> - -<p>At Pampeluna the army bivouacked on the glacis of the -fortress, but in such destitution and insubordination that the -governor would not suffer them to enter the town.</p> - -<p>Wellington, who had sent Graham’s corps into Guipuscoa -by the pass of St. Adrian, overtook the French rear and captured -one of the two guns saved from Vittoria, and on the -28th the king fled into France by the Roncesvalles. Foy -and Clausel were thus isolated on each flank and in great<span class="pagenum" id="Page_260">260</span> -danger. The first had a strong country, but his troops were -disseminated, and the fugitives from the battle spread such -alarm that the forts of Arlaban, Montdragon, and Salinas, -blocking the passes into Guipuscoa, were abandoned to -Longa and Giron. Foy, who had only one battalion in -hand, rallied the fugitive garrisons, advanced, and from -some prisoners acquired exact intelligence of the battle. -Then he ordered the two convoys from Vittoria to march -day and night towards France, and reinforcing himself with -Maucune’s escort gave battle to the Spanish general, who, -having three times his force, worsted him with a loss of six -guns and two hundred men. He retreated to Villafranca, -where, late in the evening of the 24th, Graham came upon -him from the side pass of San Adrian: he had now rallied a -considerable force and gave battle on the Orio with Maucune’s -troops and St. Pol’s Italian division: the first were -beaten, yet the Italians gained some advantages, and the -position was so strong that Graham had recourse to flank -operations; Foy then retired to Tolosa, and again offered -battle; whereupon Graham turned his flank with the Spaniards, -broke his front with the Anglo-Portuguese, drove -his wings beyond Tolosa on each side, and bursting the gate -of the town forced a passage through his centre by the main -road. Nevertheless Foy retreated with a loss of only four -hundred men, and he had killed and wounded more than -four hundred Anglo-Portuguese in the two days’ operations. -The Spanish loss was not known, but must have been considerable, -and Graham, who was himself hurt, halted two -days to hear of Wellington’s progress. During that time -the convoys reached France in safety, and Foy, his force increased -by the junction of detachments to more than sixteen -thousand men, threw a garrison into San Sebastian and -joined Reille on the Bidassoa: twenty-five thousand men -were then on that river, and Graham halted to invest -Sebastian.</p> - -<p>While these events passed in Guipuscoa, Clausel was more -hardly pressed on the other flank of the allies. He had -approached Vittoria with fourteen thousand men on the -22nd, but finding Pakenham there with the 6th division, -retired to Logroño and halted until the evening of the 23rd, -thus enabling Wellington, who thought he was at Tudela, to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_261">261</span> -discover his real situation and march against him. He fled -to Tudela, reached it the 27th, after a march of sixty miles -in forty hours, and thinking he had outstripped his pursuers -proposed to enter France by Taffalla and Olite, but an -alcalde told him Wellington had forestalled him at those -places and he marched upon Zaragoza. He could have been -intercepted again, yet Wellington, fearing to drive him on -Suchet, only launched Mina in pursuit, and Clausel after -destroying guns and baggage finally escaped by Jacca into -France. The king had meanwhile caused Gazan to re-enter -Spain by the Bastan, from whence Hill quickly drove him. -Joseph’s reign was over. After years of toils and combats, -admired rather than understood, Lord Wellington, emerging -from the chaos of the Peninsula struggle, crowned the Pyrenees—a -recognized conqueror. From that pinnacle the -clangour of his trumpets was heard, and the splendour of his -genius blazed out, a flaming beacon for warring nations.</p> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_262">262</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="BOOK_X">BOOK X.</h2> -</div> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>Battle of Castalla—English Siege of Taragona—Siege of San Sebastian—Storming -of San Bartolomeo—First Storm of San Sebastian.</p></div> - -<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">While</span> the main armies strove in the north of Spain, the -Mediterranean coast was the scene of a secondary contest -maintained by an English expedition sent from Sicily in -1812. Destined at first for Catalonia, it finally landed at -Alicant, where it remained inactive until April, 1813, but -then Sir John Murray, whose want of vigour on the Douro -was overbalanced by aristocratic influence at home, assumed -command. Acting in conjunction with the Spanish general -Elio, he commenced a series of petty enterprises, and broached -several projects which he had not nerve to execute, and only -roused Suchet to serious action. That marshal, previously -inert, concentrated in the night of the 11th all his disposable -force, and next morning falling upon Mijares, Elio’s lieutenant, -defeated him with a loss of fifteen hundred prisoners. -Then he marched against Murray, who retreated through the -pass of Biar to a position of battle, leaving Colonel F. Adam -with two thousand five hundred men and six guns in the -defile. The ground was very strong, but the French light -troops crowned the rocks on each side and after two hours’ -fighting the allies abandoned the pass, with a loss of two -guns and some prisoners besides killed and wounded, yet -made their retreat, three miles, to the main position, in good -order, and were not pursued.</p> - -<p>This double success in one day indicated the approach of -a decisive battle, in anticipation of which Murray had -studied and chosen his ground with judgment. His left, -composed of Whittingham’s Spanish division, was intrenched -on a rugged sierra, and the troops coming from Biar prolonged -the line on a front of two miles, until the ridge ended -abruptly over the town of Castalla. That place with its old -castle, crowning an isolated sugar-loaf hill, was prepared for -defence, having all the approaches commanded by batteries,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_263">263</span> -and being strongly occupied with Mackenzie’s British division. -The cavalry was disposed on a plain, partly in front, -partly behind the town. Clinton’s English and Roche’s -Spanish divisions were in reserve in rear of the right, on a -lower height nearly perpendicular to the main front; and -their line as well as the town was covered by the dry bed of -a torrent called a <i xml:lang="es" lang="es">baranco</i>, having precipitous sides and in -many places a hundred feet in depth: that front was therefore -refused and scarcely attackable.</p> - -<p>On the 12th Suchet’s cavalry, issuing cautiously from the -defile of Biar, extended to its left on the plain; the infantry, -following, took possession of a low ridge facing the Sierra, -and then the cavalry, passing the baranco, turned the town -as if to menace the divisions in reserve. This movement -alarmed Murray, and notwithstanding the impregnable -strength of his ground he shrunk from the encounter; even -while Suchet was advancing he thrice gave orders to the -quartermaster general Donkin to put the army in retreat; -the last time so peremptorily, that obedience must have followed -if at that moment the French light troops in advance -had not commenced firing.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Battle of Castalla.</span> (April, 1813.)</h3> - -<p>Suchet’s dispositions were slowly made, as if he feared to -commence. A mountain spur, jutting from the Sierra between -Whittingham and the troops from Biar, hid two-thirds -of the allies from his view, and he first sent an exploring -column of infantry towards Castalla, to turn the intercepting -spur and discover all the conditions of the position; when -that was effected his cavalry closed towards the baranco. -Then he formed two powerful columns of attack and sent -them against Whittingham and Adam on each side of the -spur, retaining a reserve on his own ridge, and keeping his -exploring column towards Castalla to meet any sally from -that point.</p> - -<p>The ascent against Whittingham was so ruggedly steep, -and the upper part so intrenched, that the battle resolved -itself there at once into a stationary skirmish of light troops; -but on the other side of the spur the French mounted the -height, slowly indeed and with many skirmishers, yet so<span class="pagenum" id="Page_264">264</span> -resolutely, that it was evident good fighting only would -send them down again. Their light troops, spreading over -the face of the Sierra and in some places attaining the -summit, were met and held in play by the Anglo-Sicilian -troops with changing fortune; but where the main column -came on the 27th Regiment there was a terrible crash of -battle, and preceded by a singular encounter. For an abrupt -declination of ground enabled the French to halt and re-form -for the decisive assault, out of fire, yet close to that regiment -which was by order lying down in expectation of the charge. -Suddenly a grenadier officer, rising alone to the upper ground, -challenged Waldron the captain of the 27th Grenadiers to -single combat; he, an agile Irishman of boiling courage, -instantly leaped forward to the duel, and the hostile lines -though ready to charge awaited the result. Rapidly the -champions’ swords clashed and glittered in the sun, but -Waldron cleft his adversary’s head in twain, and the 27th -springing up with a deafening shout charged and sent the -French, maugre their numbers and courage, down the mountain -side, covering it with their dead and wounded. It was -a glorious exploit, erroneously attributed in the despatch to -Colonel Adam, though entirely conducted by the colonel of -the regiment, Reeves.</p> - -<p>Suchet seeing his principal column thus broken, and -having the worst of the fight in other parts, made two -secondary attacks with his reserve to cover a rally, yet failed -in both and his army was thus separated in three parts -without connection; for the column beaten by Reeves was -in great confusion at the foot of the Sierra, the exploring -column was on the left, and the cavalry beyond the baranco, -the only passage across it being commanded by the allies. -A vigorous sally from Castalla, and a general advance, would -then have compelled the French-infantry to fall back upon -Biar in confusion before the cavalry could come to their -assistance, and the victory would have been completed; but -Murray, who had remained during the whole action behind -Castalla, first gave Suchet time to rally and retire in order -towards the pass of Biar, and then gradually passing out -Clinton’s and Roche’s divisions by the right of the town, -with a tedious pedantic movement, changed his own front, -keeping his left at the foot of the heights, and extending his<span class="pagenum" id="Page_265">265</span> -right, covered by the cavalry, towards another sierra called -Onil: General Mackenzie however, moving out by the left -of Castalla with four battalions and eight guns, followed the -enemy without orders.</p> - -<p>Suchet had by this time plunged into the pass with his -infantry, cavalry and tumbrils, in one mass, leaving the rear-guard -of three battalions and eight guns to cover the passage; -these being pressed by Mackenzie and sharply cannonaded, -turned and offered battle, answering gun for gun; but they -were heavily crushed by the English shot, the clatter of -musketry commenced, and one well-directed vigorous charge -would have overturned and driven them in mass upon the -other troops, then wedged in the narrow defile. Mackenzie -was willing, but his advance had been directed by the -quartermaster-general Donkin, not by Murray, and he was -now compelled by the latter, despite of all remonstrances -and the indignant cries of the troops, to retreat! Suchet, -thus relieved from ruin by his adversary, immediately occupied -a position across the defile, having his flanks on the -ridges above; and though Murray finally sent some light -companies to attack his left he retained his position until -night.</p> - -<p>This battle, in which the allies had about seventeen -thousand men of all arms, the French about fifteen thousand, -was, Suchet says, brought on against his wish by the impetuosity -of his light troops, and that he lost only eight hundred -men. His statement is confirmed by Vacani the Italian -historian. Murray affirmed that it was a pitched battle, and -that the French lost above three thousand men. In favour -of Suchet’s version it may be remarked, that neither the -place, nor the time, nor the mode of attack was answerable -to his talents and experience in war, if he had really intended -a pitched battle; and though the fight was strong at the -principal point, it was scarcely possible to have so many as -three thousand killed and wounded. Eight hundred seems -too few, because the loss of the victorious troops, with all -advantages of ground, was more than six hundred. This -however is certain; if Suchet lost three thousand men, which -would have been at least a fourth of his infantry, he must -have been so disabled, that what with the narrow defile of -Biar in the rear, and the distance of his cavalry in the plain,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_266">266</span> -to have escaped at all was extremely discreditable to Murray’s -generalship.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">English Siege of Tarragona.</span> (June, 1813.)</h3> - -<p>It has been shown that Lord Wellington put every armed -body of the Peninsula in movement against the French when -he commenced the march to Vittoria; and under his combinations -the Duke del Parque should have joined Elio from -Andalusia, before the battle of Castalla, which would have -raised the allied forces there to fifty thousand men, including -the irregulars. Del Parque with the usual Spanish procrastination -delayed his arrival until the end of May; and then -Murray had to execute his part of the following plan, sketched -by Wellington to hamper Suchet and prevent him from -moving to the king’s assistance. The Spaniards, numerous -but unwieldy, were to oppose that marshal in front on the -Xucar, while Murray with the Anglo-Sicilians was to embark -and sail for the siege of Tarragona in his rear: if he detached -men to raise the siege the Spaniards were to advance, and -Murray was to return and aid them to keep the country thus -gained: if Suchet came back to recover his ground this -operation was to be repeated.</p> - -<p>On the 31st of May Murray, in pursuance of this arrangement, -sailed with fifteen thousand men under arms, his -British and Germans being about eight thousand, his cavalry -seven hundred. His battering-train was complete and powerful, -the materials for gabions and fascines were previously -collected at Iviça, and the naval part, under Admiral Hallowel, -was strong in ships of the line, frigates, bomb-vessels, -gun-boats and transports. There was however no cordiality -between General Clinton, the second in command, and -Murray; nor between the latter and his quartermaster-general -Donkin; nor between Donkin and the admiral: -subordinate officers also, adopting false notions, some from -vanity, some from hearsay, added to the uneasy state of the -leaders, and there was much tale-bearing. Neither admiral -nor general was very sanguine as to success, and in no quarter -was there a clear comprehension of Lord Wellington’s ably -devised plan.</p> - -<p>When the fleet passed Valencia with a fair wind Suchet<span class="pagenum" id="Page_267">267</span> -knew the expedition aimed at Catalonia, and prepared to aid -that principality, but he could not march before the 7th of -June. Murray’s armament however, having very favourable -weather, anchored on the evening of the 2nd in the Bay of -Tarragona, whence five ships of war were sent with two -battalions of infantry and some guns, under Colonel Prevost -to attack San Felippe de Balaguer, a fort garrisoned by a -hundred men and only sixty feet square. But it was on a -steep isolated rock in the gorge of a pass, blocking the only -carriage-way from Tortoza to Tarragona, and though the -mountains on either hand commanded it, they were nearly -inaccessible themselves, and great labour was required to -form the batteries.</p> - -<p>Prevost, landing the 3rd, was joined by a Spanish brigade, -and in concert with the navy placed two six-pounders on the -heights south of the pass, from whence at seven hundred -yards’ distance they threw shrapnel-shells. Next day two -twelve-pounders and a howitzer, brought to the same point -by the sailors, opened also, and at night the seamen with extraordinary -exertions dragged up five twenty-four pounders -and their stores. The troops then constructed their batteries -with great labour, for the earth was carried up from below, -and everything else, even water, brought from the ships, the -landing-place being more than a mile and a half off; wherefore, -time being valuable, favourable terms were offered to -the garrison. They were refused and the fire continued, yet -with slight success, one battery was relinquished, and a -violent storm retarded the construction of the others.</p> - -<p>Colonel Prevost had early warned Murray that his means -were insufficient, and a second Spanish brigade was now sent -to him; but, so severe was the labour, that the breaching -batteries were still incomplete on the 6th, and out of three -guns mounted one was disabled. Suchet, who was making -forced marches to Tortoza, ordered the governor of that -place to succour San Felippe, and he would certainly have -raised the siege, if Captain Peyton of the Thames frigate had -not brought up two eight-inch mortars, with which, on the -7th, he exploded a small magazine, whereupon the garrison -surrendered. The besiegers then occupied the place, and -meanwhile Murray had commenced the siege of Tarragona.</p> - -<p>Bertoletti, an Italian, commanded the fortress and was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_268">268</span> -supposed to be disaffected, yet be proved himself a loyal and -energetic officer. His garrison, sixteen hundred strong, five -hundred being privateer seamen and Franco-Spaniards, -served him well, and when Murray occupied the Olivo and -Loretto heights the first day, and the town was bombarded -in the night by the navy, the fire was returned so sharply -that the flotilla suffered most. Two batteries were then -opened the 6th, but were found too distant, and a third was -commenced six hundred yards from Fort Royal. The 8th a -practicable breach was made in that outwork, yet the assault -was deferred, and some pieces removed to play from the -Olivo; whereupon the besieged, finding the fire slacken, -repaired the breach at Fort Royal and increased the defences. -The subsequent proceedings cannot be understood without -reference to the relative positions of the French and allied -armies.</p> - -<p>Tarragona was situated on one of a cluster of rocks terminating -a range descending to the sea, but, with the exception -of that range, surrounded by an open country called -the <i xml:lang="es" lang="es">Campo de Tarragona</i>, itself environed by very rugged -mountains, through which several roads descend into the -plain.</p> - -<p>Westward there were only two carriage-ways from Tortoza. -One direct, by the Col de Balaguer to Tarragona; the -other circuitous, leading by Mora, Falcet, Momblanch and -Reus. The capture of San Felippe blocked the first, the -second was in bad order, and at best only available for small -mountain-guns.</p> - -<p>Northward there was a carriage-way leading from Lerida, -which united with that from Falcet at Momblanch.</p> - -<p>Eastward was the royal causeway from Barcelona, running -through Villa Franca and Torredembarra, and after passing -Villa Franca sending two branches to the right, one through -the Col de Cristina, the other through Col de Leibra.</p> - -<p>Between these various roads the mountains were too -rugged to permit cross communications; troops coming from -different sides could only unite in the Campo de Tarragona; -where Murray, who had fifteen thousand fighting men, and -Copons, who had six thousand regulars and the irregular -division of Manso, could present twenty-five thousand combatants.</p> - -<p>Copons indeed told Murray, that his troops could only -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_269">269</span> -fight in position, and he would not join in any operation to -endanger his retreat into the mountains; but his force, the -best in Spain, was now at Reus and the Col de Balaguer, -ready to harass and oppose any French corps which should -attempt to descend into the Campo. Murray could also calculate -upon seven or eight hundred seamen and marines to -aid him in the siege, or in a battle near the shore, and he -expected three thousand fresh troops from Sicily. Sir -Edward Pellew, commanding the great Mediterranean fleet, -promised to distract the French by a descent eastward of -Barcelona, and a general rising of the Somatenes might have -been effected: those mountaineers were indeed all at his -disposal, to procure intelligence, to give timely notice of -the French marches and impede them by breaking up the -roads.</p> - -<p>The French power was greater yet more scattered. On -the west Suchet, coming with nine thousand men from -Valencia, was to be reinforced by Pannetier’s brigade and -some troops from Tortoza, up to eleven or twelve thousand -men with artillery; but the fall of San Felippe de Balaguer -barred his only carriage-way, and the road by Mora and -Momblanch, which remained open, was long and bad. On -the eastern side Maurice Mathieu could bring seven thousand -men with artillery from Barcelona; Decaen could -move from the Ampurdam with an equal number, and thus -twenty-five thousand men in all might finally bear upon the -allied army.</p> - -<p>Suchet had more than a hundred and sixty miles to march, -and Maurice Mathieu was to collect his forces from various -places, and march seventy miles after Murray had disembarked; -nor could he stir at all until Tarragona was actually -besieged, lest the allies should reëmbark and attack Barcelona. -Decaen had in like manner to look to the security of the -Ampurdam, and was one hundred and thirty miles distant. -Wherefore the English general could calculate upon ten -days’ clear operations after investment, before even the -heads of the enemy’s columns could issue from the hills -bordering the Campo; and it was possible that Suchet might -endeavour to cripple the Spaniards in his front at Valencia -before he marched to the succour of Tarragona. Eastward,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_270">270</span> -and westward also, the royal causeway was in places exposed -to the fire of the naval squadron; and though the first siege -of Tarragona had shown that an army could not be there -stopped by this fire, it was an impediment not to be left out -of the calculation. Thus, a central position, possession of -the enemy’s point of junction, the initial movement, the -good-will of the people, and the aid of powerful flank diversions -belonged to Murray: superior numbers and better -soldiers to the French, since the allies, brave and formidable -to fight in a position, were not well constituted for general -operations.</p> - -<p>Tarragona, if the resources for an internal defence be disregarded, -was a weak place. A simple revetment three feet -and a half thick, without ditch or counterscarp, covered it -on the west; the two outworks of Fort Royal and San Carlos, -slight obstacles at best, were not armed or even repaired -until after the investment; and the garrison, too weak for -the extent of rampart, was oppressed with labour. Here -then, time being precious to both sides, ordinary rule should -have been set aside for daring operations, and Murray’s -troops were brave. They had been acting together for -nearly a year, and after the fight at Castalla became so eager, -that an Italian regiment, which at Alicant was ready to go -over bodily to the enemy, now volunteered to lead the -assault on Fort Royal. This confidence was not shared by -their general: up to the 8th his proceedings were ill-judged, -and his after operations disgraceful to the British army.</p> - -<p>False reports had made Suchet reach Tortoza on the 5th, -and put two thousand Frenchmen in motion from Lerida, -whereupon Murray avowed alarm and regret at having left -Alicant; yet he constructed heavy counter-batteries near the -Olivo, sent a detachment to Valls on the Lerida road, and -placed Manso on that of Barcelona.</p> - -<p>On the 9th the emissaries said the French were coming -from the east and from the west, and would, when united, -exceed twenty thousand. Murray sought an interview with -the admiral, and declared his intention to raise the siege, -and though his views changed during the conference, he was -discontented, and the two commanders were evidently at -variance, for Hallowel would not join in a summons to the -governor, and again bombarded the place.</p> - -<p>On the 10th spies in Barcelona gave notice that ten thousand -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_271">271</span> -French with fourteen guns would march from that city -next day, whereupon Copons joined Manso; but Murray -landed several mortars, armed the batteries at the Olivo, and -on the 11th opened their fire in concert with the ships of -war. Professing also a desire to fight the column coming -from Barcelona, he sent the cavalry under Lord Frederick -Bentinck to Altafalla, and pretending to seek a position of -battle to the eastward left orders to storm the outworks that -night; he returned however before the hour appointed, extremely -disturbed by intelligence that Maurice Mathieu was -at Villa Franca with eight thousand combatants, and Suchet -closing on the Col de Balaguer. His infirmity of mind was -now apparent. At eight o’clock he repeated the order to -assault, and the storming party was awaiting the signal, -when a countermand arrived; the siege was then to be -raised and the guns removed immediately from the Olivo; -the commandant of artillery remonstrated, and the general -promised to hold the batteries until next night, but meanwhile -called in the detachment at Valls and the cavalry, -without any notice to Copons, though he depended on their -support.</p> - -<p>All the artillery stores and the heavy guns of the batteries -on the low ground, were removed to the beach for -embarkation on the morning of the 12th, and at twelve -o’clock Lord Frederick Bentinck arrived with the cavalry: -it is said he was ordered to shoot his horses, but refused to -obey and moved towards the Col de Balaguer. The detachment -from Valls arrived next, the infantry marched to -Cape Salou to embark, the horsemen followed Lord Frederick, -and were themselves followed by fourteen pieces of -artillery; yet each body moved independently, and all was -confused, incoherent, afflicting, and dishonourable.</p> - -<p>When the seamen were embarking the guns, orders were -sent to abandon that business and collect boats for the -reception of troops, the enemy being supposed close at -hand; and notwithstanding Murray’s previous promise to -hold the Olivo he now directed the artillery officer to spike -the guns and burn the carriages. Then loud murmurs -arose, army and navy were alike indignant, and so excited, -that it is said personal insult was offered to the general.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_272">272</span> -Three staff-officers repaired in a body to his quarters to offer -plans and opinions, and the admiral, who did not object to -raising the siege but to the manner of doing it, would not -suffer the seamen to discontinue the embarkation of artillery; -he however urged an attack upon the column coming -from Barcelona, and opposed the order to spike the guns at -the Olivo, offering to be responsible for carrying all clear off -during the night.</p> - -<p>Murray again wavered. Denying he had ordered the -battering-pieces to be spiked, he sent counter-orders, and -directed a part of Clinton’s troops to advance towards the -Gaya river; yet a few hours afterwards he peremptorily -renewed the order to destroy the guns. Even this unhappy -action was not performed without confusion. General -Clinton, forgetful of his own arrangements, with an obsolete -courtesy took off his hat to salute an enemy’s battery which -had fired upon him, forgetting that this action from that -particular spot was the conventional signal for the artillery -to spike the guns: they were thus spiked prematurely. All -the troops were embarked in the night of the 12th, and -many stores and horses on the 13th, without interruption -from the enemy; but nineteen battering-pieces, whose carriages -had been burnt, were, in view of the fleet and army, -carried in triumph, with all the platforms, fascines, gabions, -and small ammunition, into the fortress! Murray, seemingly -unaffected by this misfortune, shipped himself on the evening -of the 12th and took his usual repose in bed!</p> - -<p>During these proceedings, the French, unable to surmount -the obstacles opposed to their junction, unable even -to communicate by their emissaries, were despairing of the -safety of Tarragona. Suchet did not reach Tortoza before -the 10th, but a detachment from the garrison had on the -8th attempted to succour San Felippe, and nearly captured -the naval Captain Adam, Colonel Prevost, and other officers, -who were examining the country. On the other side Maurice -Mathieu reached Villa Franca the 10th, announcing -that Decaen was close behind with a powerful force; he -drove Copons from Arbos the 11th, and sent his scouting -parties into Vendrills, as if he was resolved singly to attack -Murray. Sir Edward Pellew had however landed his marines -at Rosas, which arrested Decaen’s march; and Maurice<span class="pagenum" id="Page_273">273</span> -Mathieu, alarmed at the cessation of fire about Tarragona, -knowing nothing of Suchet’s movements and too weak to -fight the allies alone, fell back in the night of the 12th to -the Llobregat.</p> - -<p>Suchet’s operations to the westward were even less decisive. -His advanced guard under Panettier reached Perillo -the 10th. Next day, hearing nothing from his spies, he -caused Panettier to pass by his left over the mountains to -some heights terminating abruptly on the Campo; on the -12th therefore that officer was but twenty-five miles from -Tarragona, and a patrol, descending into the plains, met Lord -Frederick Bentinck’s troopers, and reported that Murray’s -whole army was at hand: Panettier would not then enter -the Campo, but at night kindled large fires to encourage the -garrison. These signals were unobserved, the country -people had disappeared, no intelligence could be procured, -and Suchet could not follow him with a large force in those -wild hills, where there was no water. Thus on both sides of -Tarragona the succouring armies were quite baffled at the -moment chosen by Murray for flight.</p> - -<p>Suchet now received alarming intelligence from Valencia, -yet still anxious for Tarragona, pushed towards Felippe de -Balaguer on the 14th, thinking to find Prevost’s division -alone; but the head of his column was suddenly cannonaded -by the Thames frigate, and he found the British fleet -anchored off San Felippe and disembarking troops. Murray’s -operations were indeed as irregular as those of a partizan, -yet without partizan vigour. He had heard in the -night of the 12th of Panettier’s march, and to protect the -cavalry and guns under Lord Frederick, sent Mackenzie’s -division by sea to Balaguer on the 13th, following with -the whole army on the 14th. Mackenzie drove back the -French posts at both sides of the pass, the embarkation of -the cavalry and artillery then commenced, and Suchet, still -uncertain if Tarragona had fallen, marched to bring off -Panettier.</p> - -<p>At this moment Murray heard that Maurice Mathieu’s -column, which he always erroneously supposed to be under -Decaen, had retired to the Llobregat, that Copons was -again at Reus, and Tarragona had not been reinforced. -Elated by this information, he revolved various projects in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_274">274</span> -his mind, at one time thinking to fall upon Suchet, at -another to cut off Panettier; now resolving to march upon -Cambrills, and even to menace Tarragona again by land; -then he was for sending a detachment by sea to surprise -the latter, yet finally disembarked the army on the 15th, -and being ignorant of Suchet’s last movement decided to -strike at Panettier. With that object, he detached Mackenzie -by a rugged valley against Valdillos, which he -reached on the 16th; but Suchet had then carried off Panettier’s -brigade, and next day the detachment was recalled -by Murray, who now only thought of re-embarking.</p> - -<p>This determination was caused by a fresh alarm from -the eastward. Maurice Mathieu, hearing the siege was -raised, and the allies had re-landed at the Col de Balaguer, -retraced his steps and boldly entered Cambrills the 17th, -on which day, Mackenzie having returned, Murray’s whole -army was concentrated in the pass. Suchet was then behind -Perillo, and as Copons was at Reus, by Murray’s desire, -to attack Maurice Mathieu, the latter was in danger, if the -English general had been capable of a vigorous stroke. On -the other hand Suchet, too anxious for Valencia, had disregarded -Mackenzie’s movement on Valdillos, and taught by -the disembarkation of the army at San Felippe that the fate -of Tarragona, for good or evil, was decided, had on the 16th -retired to Perillo and Amposta, attentive only to the movement -of the fleet.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile Maurice Mathieu endeavoured to surprise -Copons, who was led into this danger by Murray; for -having desired him to harass the French general’s rear with -a view to a general attack, he changed his plan without -giving the Spaniard notice. However he escaped, and -Murray was free to embark or remain at Col de Balaguer. -He called a council of war, and it was concluded to re-embark; -but at that moment the great Mediterranean fleet -appeared in the offing, and Admiral Hallowel, observing -the signal announcing Lord William Bentinck’s arrival, -answered with more promptitude than decorum, “<em>we are all -delighted</em>.” Thus ended an operation perhaps the most -disgraceful that ever befel the British arms.</p> - -<p>Murray’s misconduct deeply affected Lord Wellington’s -operations. The English battering train being taken, Suchet<span class="pagenum" id="Page_275">275</span> -had nothing to fear for Catalonia, which was full of fortresses, -and he could therefore move by Zaragoza to disturb the -siege of Pampeluna, which was consequently relinquished -for a blockade, and the siege of San Sebastian undertaken. -This involved the adoption of an immense line of covering -positions along the Pyrenees from Roncesvalles to the Bidassoa, -and along the left hank of that river to the sea; and the -siege, itself a difficult one, was rendered more so by the -culpable negligence of the English naval administration.</p> - -<p>Passages, the only port near the scene of operations suited -for the supply of the army, being between the covering -and besieging forces, the stores and guns once landed were -in danger from every movement of the enemy; and no -permanent magazines could therefore be established nearer -than Bilbao, at which port and at St. Ander and Coruña -the great depôts of the army were fixed; the stores being -transported to them from the establishments in Portugal. -But the French held Santoña, whence their privateers -interrupted the communication along the coast of Spain; -American privateers did the same between Lisbon and -Coruña; and the intercourse between Sebastian and the -ports of France was scarcely molested by the English vessels -of war: because Wellington’s urgent remonstrances could -not procure a sufficient naval force on the coast of Biscay!</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Siege of San Sebastian.</span> (June, 1813.)</h3> - -<p>Built on a low sandy isthmus, having the harbour on -one side, the river Urumea on the other, Sebastian was -strong; and behind it rose the Monte Orgullo, a rugged -cone four hundred feet high, washed by the ocean and -crowned with the small castle of La Mota. This hill was -cut off from the town by a line of defensive works, and -covered with batteries; but was itself commanded at a distance -of thirteen hundred yards by the Monte Olia, on the -other side of the Urumea.</p> - -<p>The land front of the town, three hundred and fifty -yards wide, stretching quite across the isthmus, consisted -of a high curtain or rampart, very solid, with half bastions -at either end and a lofty casemated flat bastion or cavalier<span class="pagenum" id="Page_276">276</span> -in the centre. A regular horn-work was pushed out from -this front, and six hundred yards beyond the horn-work the -isthmus was closed by the ridge of San Bartolomeo, at the -foot of which stood the suburb of San Martin.</p> - -<p>On the opposite side of the Urumea were certain sandy hills -called the <i xml:lang="es" lang="es">Chofres</i>, through which the road from Passages -passed to a wooden bridge over the river, and thence, by a -suburb called Santa Catalina, along the top of a sea-wall -which formed a <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">fausse-braye</i> for the horn-work.</p> - -<p>The flanks of the town were protected by simple ramparts, -washed on one side by the water of the harbour, -on the other by the Urumea, which at high tide covered -four of the twenty-seven feet comprised in its elevation. -This was the weak side of the fortress, though protected by -the river; for it had only a single wall, which was ill-flanked -by two old towers and a half-bastion called San -Elmo, close under the Monte Orgullo. There was no -ditch, no counterscarp, no glacis; the wall could be seen -to its base from the Chofre hills, at distances varying from -five hundred to a thousand yards; and when the tide was -out the Urumea left a dry strand under the rampart as far -as St. Elmo. However the guns from the batteries at -Monte Orgullo, especially that called the Mirador, could -rake this strand. The other flank of the town was secured -by the harbour, in the mouth of which was a rocky island, -called Santa Clara, where the French had established a post -of twenty-five men.</p> - -<p>Previous to the battle of Vittoria Sebastian was nearly -dismantled; there were no bomb-proofs, no palisades, no -outworks; the wells were foul, the place only supplied -with water by an aqueduct. Joseph’s defeat restored its -importance as a fortress. General Emanuel Bey entered it -the 22nd of June, bringing with him the convoy which had -quitted Vittoria the day before the battle. The town was -thus filled with emigrant Spanish families, and the ministers -and other persons attached to the court; the population, -ordinarily eight thousand, was increased to sixteen -thousand, and disorder and confusion were predominant. -Rey, pushed by necessity, forced all persons not residents -to march at once to France; the people of quality went -by sea, the others by land, and fortunately without being<span class="pagenum" id="Page_277">277</span> -attacked, for the Partidas would have given them no -quarter.</p> - -<p>On the 27th Foy threw a reinforcement into the place, -and next day Mendizabal’s Spaniards appeared; whereupon -Rey burned the wooden bridge with both the suburbs, and -commenced fortifying the heights of San Bartolomeo.</p> - -<p>The 29th the Spaniards having slightly attacked San -Bartolomeo were repulsed.</p> - -<p>The 1st of July the governor of Gueteria abandoned that -place, and his troops, three hundred, entered San Sebastian; -at the same time a vessel from St. Jean de Luz arrived with -fifty-six cannoniers and some workmen. The garrison was -thus increased to three thousand men, and all persons not -able to provide subsistence for themselves were ordered away: -meanwhile Mendizabal cut off the aqueduct.</p> - -<p>On the 3rd an English frigate and sloop with some -small craft arrived to blockade the harbour, but French -vessels from St. Jean de Luz continued to enter by night.</p> - -<p>On the 4th Rey sallied to obtain news, and after some -hours’ skirmishing returned with prisoners.</p> - -<p>The 6th, French vessels with a detachment of troops and -a considerable convoy of provisions from St. Jean de Luz -entered the harbour.</p> - -<p>The 7th Mendizabal tried, unsuccessfully, to set fire to the -convent of San Bartolomeo.</p> - -<p>The 9th Graham arrived with British and Portuguese -troops, and on the 13th the Spaniards marched away.</p> - -<p>At this time Reille was at Vera and Echallar, in a menacing -position, but Wellington drove him thence on the 15th and -established the seventh and light divisions there; thus -covering the passes over the Peña de Haya mountain, by -which the siege might have been interrupted.</p> - -<p>Before Graham arrived the French had constructed a -redoubt on San Bartolomeo, connecting it with the convent -of that name, which they also fortified. These outworks -were supported by posts in the ruined houses of the San -Martin suburb, and by a circular redoubt, formed of casks, -on the main road, half-way between the convent and horn-work. -Hence, working along the isthmus, it was necessary -to carry in succession three lines covering the town, and a -fourth behind it, at the foot of Monte Orgullo, before the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_278">278</span> -castle of La Mota could be assailed: seventy-six pieces were -mounted on the walls.</p> - -<p>The besieging army consisted of the fifth division under -General Oswald, and the Portuguese brigades of J. Wilson -and Bradford, reinforced by detachments from the first -division. Including the artillery-men, some seamen commanded -by Lieutenant O’Reilly of the Surveillante, and one -hundred regular sappers and miners, now for the first time -used in the sieges of the Peninsula, nearly ten thousand men -were employed, with forty pieces of artillery. The siege -depôt was at Passages, from whence to the Chofre sand-hills -was only one mile and a half of good road, and a pontoon -bridge was laid over the Urumea river above the Chofres; -but from thence to the height of Bartolomeo was more than -five miles of very bad road.</p> - -<p>Early in July, Major Smith, the engineer of Tarifa, proposed -a plan of siege, founded upon the facility furnished by -the Chofre hills to destroy the flanks, rake the principal -front, and form a breach with the same batteries; the works -would, he observed, be secured, except at low water, by the -Urumea, and counter-batteries could be constructed on the -left of that river, to rake the line in which the breach was -to be formed. Against the castle and its out-works he relied -principally upon vertical fire, instancing the reduction of -Fort Bourbon in the West Indies as proof of its efficacy. -This plan would probably have reduced Sebastian in a -reasonable time without any remarkable loss of men, and -Lord Wellington approved of it, though he erroneously -doubted the efficacy of the vertical fire. He renewed his -approval after examining the works in person, and all his -orders were in that spirit; but neither the plan nor his -orders were followed, and the siege which should have been -an ordinary event of war obtained a mournful celebrity. -Wellington has been unjustly charged with a contempt for -the maxims of the great masters of the art in his desire to -save time: he did not urge the engineer here beyond the -rules. <em>Take the place in the quickest manner, but do not from over -speed fail to take it</em>, was the sense of his instructions. The -haste was with Graham, one of England’s best soldiers, but -of a genius intuitive rather than reflective, which, joined to -great natural modesty and a certain easiness of temper,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_279">279</span> -caused him at times to abandon his own correct conceptions -for less judicious counsels of men who advised deviations -from the original plan.</p> - -<p>In the night of the 10th two batteries were raised against -the convent and redoubt of San Bartolomeo; and in that of -the 13th, four batteries, to contain twenty of the heaviest -guns and four eight-inch howitzers, were marked out on the -Chofre sand-hills, at distances varying from six hundred to -thirteen hundred yards from the eastern rampart of the town. -No parallel of support was made, because the river was supposed -unfordable, but good trenches of communications and -subsequently regular approaches were formed. Two attacks -were thus established—one on the right bank of the Urumea -by the Portuguese brigades; one on the left bank by the -fifth division: yet most of the troops were encamped on the -right bank to facilitate a junction with the covering army -in the event of a general battle.</p> - -<p>On the 14th a French sloop entered the harbour with supplies, -and the batteries of the left attack opened against San -Bartolomeo, throwing hot shot into the convent. The -besieged responded with musketry from the redoubt, with -heavy guns from the town, and with a field-piece which they -had mounted on the belfry of the convent itself.</p> - -<p>The 15th Colonel Fletcher took command of the engineers, -but Major Smith retained the direction of the attack from the -Chofre hills, and Wellington’s orders continued to pass -through his hands. This day, the convent being set on fire, -the musketry of the besieged silenced, and the defences -damaged, the Portuguese troops of the fifth division felt the -enemy, but were repulsed with loss: the French then sallied, -and the firing only ceased at nightfall.</p> - -<p>A battery for seven additional guns was now commenced -against Bartolomeo on the right of the Urumea, and the -original batteries again set fire to the convent, yet the flames -were extinguished by the garrison.</p> - -<p>In the night of the 16th Rey sounded the Urumea, designing -to cross and storm the batteries on the Chofres; but the -fords discovered were shifting, and the difficulty of execution -deterred him.</p> - -<p>The 17th, the convent being nearly in ruins, an assault -was ordered. Detachments from Wilson’s Portuguese, supported<span class="pagenum" id="Page_280">280</span> -by the light company of the 9th British Regiment and -three companies of the Royals, composed one column, which -under General Hay was to storm the redoubt; another -column under General Bradford, composed of Portuguese, -but supported by three companies of the 9th British Regiment -under Colonel Cameron, assailed the convent.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Storming of San Bartolomeo.</span> (July, 1813.)</h3> - -<p>At ten o’clock in the morning two six-pounders opened -against the redoubt, and the French, reinforced and occupying -the suburb of San Martin in support, announced with -a sharp return of fire their resolution to fight. The Portuguese -advanced slowly at both attacks, and the companies of -the 9th, passing through them, first fell upon the enemy. -Cameron’s grenadiers going down the face of the hill were -exposed to a heavy cannonade from the horn-work, yet soon -gained the cover of a wall, fifty yards from the convent, and -there awaited the second signal. This rapid advance, which -threatened to cut off the garrison from the suburb, joined -to the fire of the two six-pounders, and some other field-pieces -on the farther side of the Urumea, caused the French -to abandon the redoubt, whereupon Cameron jumped over -the wall and assaulted both the convent and the houses of -the suburb. At the latter a fierce struggle ensued, and -Captain Woodman was killed in the upper room of a house, -after fighting his way from below; yet the grenadiers carried -the convent with such rapidity that the French could not -explode some small mines, and hastily joined the troops in -the suburb: there the combat continued, Cameron’s force -was much reduced and the affair was becoming doubtful, -when the remainder of his regiment arrived and the suburb -was with much fighting entirely won.</p> - -<p>At the right attack the company of the 9th, although -retarded by a ravine, by a thick hedge, by the slowness of -the Portuguese, and by a heavy fire, entered the abandoned -redoubt with little loss; but the troops were then rashly led -against the cask redoubt, contrary to orders, and were beaten -back by the enemy. The loss was thus balanced. That of -the French was two hundred and forty, and the companies -of the 9th under Cameron, alone, had seven officers and sixty<span class="pagenum" id="Page_281">281</span> -men killed or wounded. The operation, although successful, -was an error; for the seven-gun battery on the right of the -Urumea was not opened, wherefore the assault was precipitate -or the battery was not necessary, but the loss justified -the conception of the battery. When the action ceased the -engineers made a lodgement in the redoubt, and commenced -two batteries to rake the horn-work and the eastern rampart -of the place. Two other batteries were also commenced on -the right bank of the Urumea.</p> - -<p>The 18th the besieged threw up traverses on the land front -to meet the raking fire of the besiegers; and the latter -dragged four pieces up the Monte Olia to plunge into the -Mirador and other works on the Monte Orgullo. In the -night a lodgement was made on the ruins of San Martin, the -two batteries at the right attack were armed, and two additional -mortars dragged up the Monte Olia.</p> - -<p>On the 19th all these batteries were armed, and in the -night the French were driven from the cask redoubt.</p> - -<p>All the batteries opened fire the 20th, and were principally -directed to form the breach.</p> - -<p>Smith’s plan was similar to that followed by Marshal -Berwick a century before. He proposed a lodgement on the -horn-work before the breach should be assailed; but he had -not then read the description of that siege, and unknowingly -fixed the breaching-point precisely where the wall had been -most strongly rebuilt after Berwick’s attack. This was a -fault, yet a slight one, because the wall did not resist the -batteries very long; but it was a serious matter that Graham, -at the suggestion of the commander of the artillery, began -his operations by breaching. Smith objected to it, Fletcher -acquiesced very reluctantly, on the understanding that the -ruin of the defences was only postponed, a condition afterwards -unhappily forgotten.</p> - -<p>This first attack was not satisfactory, the weather proved -bad, some guns mounted on ship-carriages failed, one twenty-four-pounder -was rendered unserviceable by the enemy, another -by accident, a captain of engineers was killed, and the -shot had little effect on the solid wall. In the night however, -the ship-guns were mounted on better carriages, and a -parallel across the isthmus was projected; but the greatest -part of the workmen, to avoid a tempest, sought shelter in the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_282">282</span> -suburb of San Martin, and when day broke only one-third -of the work was performed.</p> - -<p>On the 21st the besiegers sent a summons, the governor -refused to receive the letter, the firing was renewed, and -though the main wall resisted the parapets crumbled; the -batteries on Monte Olia also plunged into the horn-work at -sixteen hundred yards’ distance, with such effect that the -besieged, having no bomb-proofs, were forced to dig trenches -to protect themselves. The French fire, directed solely -against the breaching batteries, was feeble, but at midnight -a shell thrown from the castle into the bay gave the signal -for a sally, during which French vessels with supplies entered -the harbour. The besieged now isolated the breach by cuts -in the rampart and other defences, yet the besiegers’ parallel -across the isthmus was completed, and in its progress laid -bare the mouth of a drain four feet high and three feet -wide, containing the pipe of the aqueduct cut off by the -Spaniards. Through that dangerous opening Lieutenant -Reid,<a id="FNanchor_30" href="#Footnote_30" class="fnanchor">30</a> a young and zealous engineer, crept even to the -counterscarp of the horn-work, where he found the passage -closed and returned. Thirty barrels of powder were placed -in this drain, and eight feet was stopped with sand-bags, -forming a globe of compression to blow, as through a tube, -so much rubbish over the counterscarp as might fill the narrow -ditch of the horn-work.</p> - -<p>On the 22nd the fire from the batteries, unexampled from -its rapidity and accuracy, opened what appeared a practicable -breach in the eastern flank wall, between two towers called -Los Hornos and Las Mesquitas; but the descent into the -town behind this breach was more than twelve feet perpendicular, -and the garrison were seen from Monte Olia diligently -working at the interior defences to receive the -assault: they added also another gun to the battery of St. -Elmo, just under the Mirador battery, to flank the front -attack. On the other hand the besiegers had placed four -sixty-eight pound carronades in battery to play on the defences -of the breach, yet the fire was slack because the guns -were now greatly enlarged at the vents.</p> - -<p>On the 23rd, the sea blockade being null, the French<span class="pagenum" id="Page_283">283</span> -vessels carried off the badly-wounded men. This day also -the besiegers, judging the breach between the towers practicable, -turned the guns, at the suggestion of General Oswald, -to break the wall on the right of the main breach. -Smith opposed this, urging, that no advantage would be -gained by making a second opening, to get at which the -troops must first pass the great breach; time would be thus -lost, and there was a manifest objection on account of the -tide and depth of water at the new point attacked. His -counsel was overruled, and in the course of the day, the wall -being thin, the stroke heavy and quick, a second breach thirty -feet wide was rendered practicable.</p> - -<p>The ten-inch mortars and sixty-eight-pound carronades -were now turned upon the great breach, and a stockade, the -latter separating the high curtain from the flank against -which the attack was conducted. Under this fire the houses -near the breach were soon in flames, which destroyed several -defences and menaced the whole town with destruction, -wherefore the assault was ordered for next morning: when -the troops assembled the flames were still so fierce the -attack was deferred, and the batteries again opened.</p> - -<p>During the night the vigilant governor mounted two -field-pieces on the cavalier, fifteen feet above the other -defences and commanding the high curtain; and he still had -on the horn-work a light piece, and two casemated guns on -the flank of the cavalier. Two other field-pieces were -mounted on an intrenchment, crossing the ditch of the land -front and bearing on the approaches; a twenty-four pounder -looked from the tower of Las Mesquitas, flanking the main -breach; two four-pounders were in the tower of Hornos; -two heavy guns on the flank of St. Elmo, and two others, on -the right of the Mirador, looked on the breaches from within -the fortified line of Monte Orgullo. Thus fourteen pieces -were still available for defence, and the retaining sea-wall, -or <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">fausse-braye</i>, between which and the river the storming -parties must necessarily advance, was covered with live -shells to roll over on the columns below. Behind the burning -houses other edifices were loopholed and filled with -musketeers; but as the flames forced the French to withdraw -their guns until the moment of attack, and the British artillery -officers were confident that in daylight they could silence<span class="pagenum" id="Page_284">284</span> -the enemy’s fire and keep the parapet clear of men, Graham -renewed his order for the assault.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">First Storm of San Sebastian.</span> (July, 1813.)</h3> - -<p>In the night of the 24th two thousand men of the fifth -division filed into the trenches on the isthmus. Of this -force, a battalion of the Royals, under Major Frazer, was -destined for the great breach; the 38th Regiment under -Colonel Greville, was to assail the lesser and most distant -breach; the 9th Regiment under Colonel Cameron, was to -support the Royals. A detachment selected from the light -companies of all those battalions was placed in the centre of -the Royals, under Lieutenant Campbell<a id="FNanchor_31" href="#Footnote_31" class="fnanchor">31</a> of the 9th Regiment, -who was accompanied by the engineer Machel with a -ladder party, being designed to sweep the high curtain after -the breach should be won.</p> - -<p>From the trenches to the points of attack was three hundred -yards, the way being between the horn-work and the -river, strewed with rocks slippery from sea-weed; the tide -also had left large deep pools of water; the parapet of the -horn-work was entire, the parapets of the other works and -the two towers, closely flanking the breach, were far from -being ruined, and every place was thickly garnished with -musketeers. The difficulties were obvious, and a detachment -of Portuguese was placed in a trench on the isthmus, only -sixty yards from the ramparts, to quell, if possible, the fire of -the horn-work.</p> - -<p>It was still dark when the stormers moved out of the -trenches, and when the globe of compression in the drain -was exploded against the horn-work the astonished garrison -abandoned the flanking parapet; the troops then rushed -onwards, the stormers for the main breach leading, and suffering -more from the fire of their own batteries on the right -of the Urumea than from the enemy. Frazer and the engineer -Harry Jones first reached the breach, the enemy had -fallen back behind the ruins of the burning houses, and -those brave officers rushed up expecting their troops would -follow; but not many followed, for it was extremely dark,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_285">285</span> -the narrow way and the rocks had contracted the front and -disordered the column, and the soldiers came straggling and -out of wind to the foot of the breach. The foremost gathered -near their gallant leaders, yet the deep descent into the town -and volumes of flames and smoke still issuing from the houses -awed the stoutest; more than two-thirds, irritated by the -destructive flank fire, had broken off at the demi-bastion to -commence a musketry battle with the enemy lining the -rampart on their left, and the shells from Monte Orgullo fell -rapidly. Then the French at the breach, recovering confidence, -with a smashing musketry from the ruins and loopholed -houses smote the head of the column, while those in -the towers smote it on the flanks; and from every quarter -came showers of grape and hand-grenades tearing the ranks -in a dreadful manner.</p> - -<p>Frazer was killed on the flaming ruins, the intrepid Jones -stood there awhile longer amidst a few heroic soldiers, hoping -for aid, but none came and he and those with him were struck -down; the engineer Machel had been killed early, his ladder-bearers -fell or were dispersed, and the rear of the column had -got disordered before the head was beaten. It was in vain -Greville, Cameron, Captain Archimbeau, and other regimental -officers, strove to rally their men and refill the -breach; in vain Campbell, breaking through the tumultuous -crowd with the survivors of his chosen detachment, mounted -the ruins; twice he ascended, twice he was wounded, and all -around him died. Then the Royals endeavoured to retire, -but got intermixed with the 38th and some companies of the -9th, which were seeking to pass them and get to the lesser -breach; and thus swayed by different impulses, pent up -between the horn-work and the river, the mass, reeling to -and fro, could neither advance nor go back until the shells -and musketry, constantly plied in front and flank, thinned -the concourse and the trenches were regained in confusion. -At daylight a truce was agreed to for an hour, during which -the French, who had removed Jones and other wounded men -from the breach, carried off the more distant sufferers, lest -they should be drowned by the rising of the tide.</p> - -<p>Five officers of engineers, including Sir Richard Fletcher, -and forty-four officers of the line with five hundred and -twenty men, were killed, wounded, or made prisoners in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_286">286</span> -this assault, the failure of which was signal, yet the causes -were obvious.</p> - -<p>1°. Lord Wellington, on the 22nd, had given final directions -for the attack, finishing thus: “<em>Fair daylight must be -taken for the assault.</em>” These instructions and their emphatic -termination were unheeded.</p> - -<p>2°. Major Smith had ascertained that the ebb tide would -serve exactly at daybreak on the 24th, but the assault -was made the 25th, and before daylight, when the higher -water contracted the ground, increased the obstacles, and -forced the column, with a narrow front and uneasy progress, -to trickle onwards instead of dashing with a broad surge -against the breach.</p> - -<p>3°. The troops filed tediously out of long narrow trenches -in the night, and were immediately exposed to a fire of -grape from their own batteries on the Chofres; this fire -should have ceased when the globe of compression was -sprung in the drain, but from the darkness and noise that -explosion was neither seen nor heard.</p> - -<p>4°. There was a neglect of moral influence, followed by -its natural consequence, want of vigour in execution. No -general went out of the trenches. Oswald had opposed the -plan of attack, and his opinion, in which other officers of -rank joined, was freely expressed out of council, it was said -even in the hearing of the troops, abating that daring -confidence which victory loves.</p> - -<p>Wellington repaired immediately to St. Sebastian and -would have renewed the attack, but there was no ammunition, -and next day extraneous events compelled him to turn -the siege into a blockade. The battering train was then -sent to Passages, and at daybreak the garrison sallied and -swept off two hundred Portuguese with thirty British -soldiers. This terminated the first siege of San Sebastian, -in which the allies lost thirteen hundred men.</p> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_287">287</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="BOOK_XI">BOOK XI.</h2> -</div> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>Pyrenees—Combat of Roncesvalles—Combat of Linzoain—Combat -of Maya—Combat of Zabaldica—First Battle of Sauroren—Combat -of Buenza—Second Battle of Sauroren—Combat of Doña Maria—Combats -of Echallar and Ivantelly.</p></div> - -<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">The</span> battle of Vittoria was fought the 21st of June, and on -the 1st of July Marshal Soult, under a decree issued at -Dresden, succeeded Joseph as lieutenant to the emperor.</p> - -<p>The 12th, travelling with surprising expedition, that -marshal assumed command of the French troops, now reorganized -in one body, called <em>the army of Spain</em>, and he had -secret orders to put Joseph forcibly aside if necessary, but -that monarch voluntarily retired.<a id="FNanchor_32" href="#Footnote_32" class="fnanchor">32</a></p> - -<p>Reinforced from the interior, Soult’s army was composed -of nine divisions of infantry, a reserve and two regular -divisions of cavalry, besides light horsemen attached to -the infantry. Including garrisons, and thirteen German, -Italian, and Spanish battalions not belonging to the organization, -he had one hundred and fourteen thousand men: -and as the armies of Catalonia and Aragon numbered at the -same period above sixty-six thousand, the whole force still -employed against Spain exceeded one hundred and eighty -thousand men, with twenty thousand horses.</p> - -<p>Soult was one of the few men whose energy rendered -them worthy lieutenants of the emperor, and with singular -zeal and ability he now served. Nominally he had ninety-seven -thousand men under arms, with eighty-six pieces of -artillery; but the foreign battalions, most of which were to -return to their own countries for the disciplining of new -levies, only counted as part of the garrisons of Pampeluna, -San Sebastian, Santoña and Bayonne: they amounted to seventeen -thousand, and the permanent <em>army of Spain</em> furnished -therefore, only seventy-seven thousand five hundred men -under arms, seven thousand being cavalry. Its condition was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_288">288</span> -not satisfactory. The military administration was disorganized, -the soldiers were discouraged by disaster, discipline -had been deteriorated, and the people were flying from -the frontier.</p> - -<p>To secure his base and restore order ere he retook the -offensive was Soult’s desire; but Napoleon’s orders were -imperative against delay, and he was compelled to immediate -action, though Wellington’s advance from Portugal -had been so rapid that the great resources of the French -frontier were not immediately available, and everything was -reeling and rocking in terror from the blow given to the -army at Vittoria.</p> - -<p>Bayonne, a fortress of no great strength, had been entirely -neglected. But the arming and provisioning that and other -places; the restoration of an intrenched camp, originally -traced by Vauban to cover Bayonne; the enforcement of -discipline; the removal of the immense train of Joseph’s -wasteful court; the establishment of a general system for -supplies, and judicious efforts to stimulate the civil authorities -and excite the national spirit, soon indicated the presence -of a great commander. The soldiers’ confidence then -revived, and some leading merchants of Bayonne zealously -seconded the general: the people were however more -inclined to avoid burdens than to answer calls on their -patriotism.</p> - -<p>Soult examined the line of military positions on the -14th, and ordered Reille, who then occupied the passes of -Vera and Echallar, to prepare pontoons for throwing two -bridges over the Bidassoa at Biriatou; Wellington, as -before said, drove him from those passes next day, yet he -prepared his bridges, and by the 16th, Soult was ready for -a gigantic offensive movement.</p> - -<p>His army was divided into three corps of battle and a -reserve. Clausel with the left was at St. Jean Pied de -Port, and in communication, by the French frontier, with -a division under General Paris at Jaca, belonging to Suchet -but under Soult’s orders.</p> - -<p>Drouet, Count D’Erlon, with the centre, occupied the -heights near Espelette and Ainhoa.</p> - -<p>Reille with the right wing was on the mountains overlooking -Vera from the side of France.</p> - -<p>The reserve, under Villatte, guarded the right bank of -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_289">289</span> -the Bidassoa from the mouth to Irun, at which place the -stone bridge was destroyed. The heavy cavalry under -Trielhard, and the light horsemen under Pierre Soult, the -marshal’s brother, were on the banks of the Nive and the -Adour.</p> - -<p>To oppose this force Wellington had in Navarre and -Guipuscoa above a hundred thousand men. Of these the -Anglo-Portuguese furnished fifty thousand infantry and -seven thousand cavalry; the Spanish regulars under Giron, -Abispal, and Carlos España, about twenty-five thousand -infantry; the rest were irregular; and hence the troops in -line were, of the allies, eighty-two thousand, of the French -seventy-eight thousand.</p> - -<p>The theatre of operations was quadrilateral, with sides -from forty to sixty miles in length, having a fortress at each -angle, namely, Bayonne, San Jean Pied de Port, San Sebastian -and Pampeluna, all in possession of the French. The -interior, broken and tormented by peaked mountains, -narrow craggy passes, deep watercourses, dreadful precipices -and forests, appeared a wilderness which no military -combinations could embrace. The great spinal ridge -of the Pyrenees furnished a clue to the labyrinth. Running -diagonally across the quadrilateral, it entirely separated -Bayonne, St. Jean Pied de Port and San Sebastian from -Pampeluna, and the troops blockading the latter were thus -cut off from those besieging San Sebastian, the only direct -communication between them being a great road running -behind the mountains from Tolosa, by Irurzun, to Pampeluna.</p> - -<p>A secondary range of mountains on the French side of the -Great Spine, inclosing the valley of Bastan and lining that -of the Bidassoa, furnished positions for the centre and left -of the covering armies, with interior but difficult lateral -communications.</p> - -<p>The troops covering Pampeluna were on the Great Spine -of the Pyrenees. Behind them were valleys into which the -passes across the spine led, descending at the other side in -parallel lines, and giving to each division means for a concentric -retreat on Pampeluna.</p> - -<p>Wellington having his battering-train and stores about<span class="pagenum" id="Page_290">290</span> -San Sebastian, which was nearer and more accessible to -the enemy than Pampeluna, made his army lean towards -that side. His left wing, including the army of siege, was -twenty-one thousand, with singularly strong positions of -defence; his centre, twenty-four thousand strong, could in -two marches unite with the left to cover the siege or fall -upon the flanks of an enemy advancing by the high road of -Irun; but three days or more were required by those troops -to concentrate for the security of the blockade of Pampeluna -on the right.</p> - -<p>Soult thought no decisive result would attend a direct -movement upon San Sebastian, and by his seaboard intercourse -he knew that place was not in extremity; but he -had no communication with Pampeluna, and feared its fall. -Wherefore he resolved rapidly to concentrate on his left by -means of the great French roads leading to St. Jean Pied -de Port, covering his movement by the Nivelle and Nive -rivers, and by the positions of his centre: thus he hoped to -gather on Wellington’s right quicker than that general -could gather to oppose him, and, compensating by numbers -the disadvantage of assailing mountain positions, force a -way to Pampeluna.</p> - -<p>That fortress succoured, he designed to seize the road -of Irurzun, and either fall upon the separated divisions of the -centre in detail as they descended from the Great Spine, or -operate on the rear of the troops besieging San Sebastian, -while a corps of observation, left on the Lower Bidassoa, -menaced it in front. The siege of San Sebastian and the -blockade of Pampeluna would be thus raised, the French -army united in an abundant country, and its communication -with Suchet secured.</p> - -<p>To mislead Wellington by vexing his right, simultaneously -with the construction of the bridges against his -left, Soult directed General Paris to march from Jaca, -when time suited, by the higher valleys towards Sanguessa, -to drive the partizans from that side, and join the left of the -army when it should have reached Pampeluna. Clausel was -directed to repair the roads in his own front, push the heads -of columns towards the Roncesvalles pass, and with a strong -detachment menace Hill’s flank by the lateral passes of the -Bastan.</p> - -<p>On the 20th Reille’s troops on the heights of Sarre and -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_291">291</span> -Vera, being cautiously relieved by Villatte, marched towards -St. Jean Pied de Port, which they were to reach early on the -22nd; and on that day the two divisions of cavalry and parc -of artillery were to concentrate at the same place. D’Erlon, -with the centre, was to hold his positions in front of Hill -while these great movements were taking place.</p> - -<p>Villatte, having fifteen thousand sabres and bayonets, -remained in observation on the Bidassoa. If threatened by -superior forces he was to retire upon the intrenched camp -at Bayonne, halting successively on certain positions. If -only a small corps crossed the river, he was to drive it -vigorously back; and if the allies retired in consequence of -Soult’s operations, he was to relieve San Sebastian and follow -them briskly by Tolosa.</p> - -<p>Rapidity was of vital importance to the French marshal, -but heavy rains swelled the streams and ruined the roads in -the deep country between Bayonne and the mountains; the -head-quarters which should have arrived at St. Jean Pied de -Port on the 20th, were a few miles short of that place the -21st, and Reille’s troops were forced to go round by Bayonne -to gain the causeway. The cavalry was also retarded, and -the army, men and horses, worn down by severe marches. -Two days were thus lost, yet the 24th more than sixty -thousand fighting men, including cavalry, national guards, -and <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">gens d’armes</i>, with sixty-six pieces of artillery, were assembled -to force the passes of Roncesvalles and Maya; the -former being in the Great Spine, the latter giving entrance -to the Bastan. The main road leading to Roncesvalles was -repaired, and three hundred sets of bullocks were provided -to drag the guns; the national guards of the frontier on the -left, ordered to assemble in the night on the heights of -Yropil, were reinforced with regular troops to vex and turn -the right of the allies at the foundry of Orbaiceta.</p> - -<p>At St. Jean Pied de Port Soult was almost in contact with -the allies at the passes of the Roncesvalles, which were also -the points of the defence nearest to Pampeluna. He had thirty -thousand bayonets, the frontier national guards to aid, and -his artillery and cavalry were massed behind his infantry; -for here the great road from St. Jean Pied de Port to Pampeluna, -the only one fit for cannon, entered the mountains:<span class="pagenum" id="Page_292">292</span> -but to understand his movements a short description -of the country is necessary, taking the point of departure -from his camp.</p> - -<p>Before him was the Val Carlos, formed by two descending -shoots from the Great Spine of the Pyrenees. That on -his left hand separated this valley from the valley of Orbaiceta; -that on his right hand separated it from several -conjoint valleys, known as the Alduides and Baygorry, the -latter name being given to the lower, the former to the -upper parts.</p> - -<p>The great road to Pampeluna led up the left hand -tongue by the remarkable rocks of Château Pignon, near -which narrow branches went off to the village of San -Carlos on the right, and to the foundry of Orbaiceta on the -left. The main line, after ascending to the summit of the -Great Spine, turned to the right and run along the crest -until it reached the pass of Ibañeta, where, turning to the -left, it led down by the famous Roncesvalles into the valley -of Urros.</p> - -<p>A lateral continuation however run along the magistral -crest, beyond the Ibañeta, to another pass called the Mendichuri, -which also led down into the Val de Urros; and -from Mendichuri there was a way into the Alduides valley -through a side pass called the Atalosti.</p> - -<p>On Soult’s right hand the Val Carlos was bounded by the -ridge and rock of Ayrola, from the summit of which there -was a way directly to the Mendichuri and the lateral pass -of Atalosti; and the ground between those defiles, called the -Lindouz, was an accessible mountain knot, tying all the valleys -together and consequently commanding them.</p> - -<p>Continuing along the Great Spine, after passing the Atalosti, -there would be on the right hand, descending towards -the French frontier, the Val de Ayra, the Alduides and -the Bastan. On the left hand, descending to Pampeluna, -would be the Val de Zubiri and the valley of Lanz, separated -from each other by a lofty wooded range. All these -valleys on each side were, in their order, connected by -roads leading over comparatively low portions of the Great -Spine, called by the French <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">cols</i>, or necks, by the Spaniards -<i xml:lang="es" lang="es">puertos</i>, or doors.</p> - -<p>General Byng and Morillo, the first having sixteen hundred<span class="pagenum" id="Page_293">293</span> -British troops, the second four thousand Spaniards, -were in position before Soult. Byng, reinforced with two -Spanish battalions, held the rocks of Altobiscar, just above -Château Pignon. On his right a Spanish battalion was -posted at the foundry of Orbaiceta; on his left Morillo’s -remaining Spaniards were near the village of Val Carlos on -a minor height called the Iroulepe.</p> - -<p>Behind the Great Spine, in the valley of Urros, General -Cole held the fourth division in support of Byng; but he -was twelve miles off, separated by the Ibañeta pass, and -could not come up under four hours. General Campbell, -having a Portuguese division two thousand strong, watched -the Alduides; but he was eight miles off, and separated by -the lateral pass of Atalosti. General Picton, with the third -division, was at Olague in the valley of Lanz, on the Spanish -side of the Spine; and both he and Campbell could at pleasure -gain the valley of Zubiri—Picton by a cross communication, -Campbell by the pass of Urtiaga, which was directly in his -rear; he could also join Cole in the valley of Urros by the -pass of Sahorgain.</p> - -<p>In this state of affairs Soult placed twelve thousand infantry -within two miles of the Château Pignon, against Byng, and -directed the national guards at Yropil, reinforced with -regulars, to move into the valley of Orbaiceta and turn the -Spaniards at the foundry. A second column, four thousand -strong, was placed in the Val Carlos to assail Morillo at -Iroulepe. A third column of sixteen thousand, under Reille, -assembled, in the night, at the foot of the Ayrola rock, with -orders to ascend at daylight and move along the crest of the -ridge to seize the culminant Lindouz. From that point -detachments were to be pushed through the passes of -Ibañeta, Mendichuri, and Sahorgain, into the Roncesvalles, -while others extended to the right as far as the pass of -Urtiaga, thus cutting off Byng and Morillo from Cole and -Hamilton.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Combat of Roncesvalles.</span> (July, 1813.)</h3> - -<p>On the 23rd Soult issued an order of the day remarkable -for its force and frankness. Conscious of ability he avowed -a feeling of his own worth; but he was too proud to depreciate -brave adversaries on the eve of battle.</p> - -<p>“<em>Let us not</em>,” he said to his soldiers, “<em>defraud the enemy of -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_294">294</span> -the praise which is due to him. The dispositions of the general have -been prompt, skilful, and consecutive, the valour and steadiness of his -troops have been praiseworthy.</em>”</p> - -<p>On the 25th at daylight he led up against the rocks of -Altobiscar.</p> - -<p>Byng, warned the evening before that danger was near, -and jealous for the village of Val Carlos, had sent the 57th -Regiment down there, yet kept his main body in hand and -gave notice to Cole.</p> - -<p>Soult, throwing out a multitude of skirmishers, pushed -forward his supporting columns and guns as fast as the -steepness of the road and difficult nature of the ground would -permit; but the British fought strongly, the French fell fast -among the rocks, and their musketry pealed in vain for -hours along that cloudy field of battle, five thousand feet -above the level of the plains. Their numbers however continually -increased in front, and the national guards from -Yropil, skirmishing with the Spaniards at the foundry of -Orbaiceta, threatened to turn the right. Val Carlos was at -the same time menaced by the central column, and Reille -ascending the rock of Ayrola turned Morillo’s left.</p> - -<p>At mid-day Cole arrived in person at Altobiscar, but his -troops were distant, and the French, renewing their attack, -neglected the Val Carlos to gather more thickly against -Byng. He resisted their efforts, yet Reille made progress -along the summit of the Ayrola ridge, Morillo fell back -towards Ibañeta, and the French were nearer that pass than -Byng, when Ross’s brigade, of Cole’s division, coming up -the Mendichuri pass, appeared on the Lindouz at the instant -when the head of Reille’s column was closing on the Atalosti -to cut the communication with Campbell. This last-named -officer had been early molested, according to Soult’s plan, -by the frontier guards of the Val de Baygorry, yet he soon -detected the feint and moved by his right towards Atalosti -when he heard the firing on that side. The Val d’Ayra -separated him from the ridge of Ayrola, along which Reille -was advancing, yet, noting that general’s strength and seeing -Ross’s brigade labouring up the steep ridge of Mendichuri, -he judged its commander to be ignorant of what was going -on above, and, sending Cole notice of the enemy’s proximity<span class="pagenum" id="Page_295">295</span> -and strength, offered to pass the Atalosti and join battle, if -he could be furnished afterwards with provisions and transport -for his sick.</p> - -<p>Before this message reached Cole, a wing of the 20th -Regiment and a company of Brunswickers, forming the head -of Ross’s column, had gained the Lindouz, where suddenly -they encountered Reille’s advanced guard. The moment -was critical, and Ross, an eager hardy soldier, called aloud -to charge, whereupon Captain Tovey of the 20th run forward -with a company, and full against the 6th French Light -Infantry dashed with the bayonet. Brave men fell by that -weapon on both sides, yet numbers prevailed and Tovey’s -soldiers were eventually pushed back. Ross however gained -his object, the remainder of his brigade had time to come up -and the pass of Atalosti was secured, with a loss of one -hundred and forty men of the 20th Regiment and forty-one -of the Brunswickers.</p> - -<p>Previous to this vigorous action, Cole, seeing the French -in the Val Carlos and the Orbaiceta valley, on both flanks of -Byng, whose front was not the less pressed, had reinforced -the Spaniards at the foundry, but now recalled his men to -defend the Lindouz; and learning from Campbell how strong -Reille was, caused Byng, with a view to a final retreat, to -relinquish Altobiscar and approach Ibañeta. This movement -uncovered the road leading down to the foundry of Orbaiceta, -yet it concentrated all the troops; and Campbell, although -he could not enter the line, Cole being unable to meet his -demands, made such skilful dispositions as to impress Reille -with a notion that his numbers were considerable.</p> - -<p>During these operations the skirmishing never ceased, -though a thick fog, coming up the valley, stopped a general -attack which Soult was preparing; thus, when night fell -Cole still held the Great Spine, having lost three hundred -and eighty men killed and wounded. His right was however -turned by Orbaiceta, he had only eleven thousand bayonets -to oppose thirty thousand, and his line of retreat, five miles -down hill and flanked by the Lindouz, was unfavourable; -wherefore in the dark, silently threading the passes, he -gained the valley of Urros, and his rear-guard followed in -the morning. Campbell went off by Urtiaga into the Zubiri -valley, and the Spanish battalion retreated from the foundry<span class="pagenum" id="Page_296">296</span> -by a goat path. The great chain was thus abandoned, yet -the result of the day’s operation was unsatisfactory to Soult. -He had lost four hundred men, he had not gained ten miles, -and was still twenty-two miles from Pampeluna, with strong -positions in the way, where increasing numbers of intrepid -enemies were to be expected.</p> - -<p>His combinations had been thwarted by fortune, and by -errors of execution which the most experienced generals -know to be inevitable. Fortune sent the fog at the moment -he was thrusting forward his heaviest masses; Reille failed -in execution; for he was to have gained the Lindouz with -all speed, but previous to ascending the rock of Ayrola lost -time by reorganizing two newly arrived conscript battalions -and serving out provisions; the two hours thus employed -would have sufficed to seize the Lindouz before Ross got -through the pass of Mendichuri. The fog would still have -stopped the spread of his column to the extent designed by -Soult, yet fifteen or sixteen thousand men would have been -placed on the flank and rear of Byng and Morillo.</p> - -<p>On the 26th Soult putting his left wing on Cole’s track, -ordered Reille to follow the crest of the mountains and seize -the passes from the Bastan in Hill’s rear, while D’Erlon -pressed him in front. Hill would thus, Soult hoped, be -crushed or thrown off from Pampeluna, and D’Erlon could -thus reach the valley of Zubiri with his left, while his right, -descending the valley of Lanz, would hinder Picton from -joining Cole. A retreat by those generals, on separate lines, -would then be inevitable, and the French army could issue -in a compact order of battle from the mouths of the two -valleys against Pampeluna.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Combat of Linzoain.</span> (July, 1813.)</h3> - -<p>All the columns were in movement at daybreak, but every -hour brought its obstacle. The fog still hung heavy on the -mountain-tops. Reille’s guides were bewildered, refused to -lead the troops along the crests, and at ten o’clock, having -no other resource, he marched down the Mendichuri pass -and fell into the rear of Soult’s column, the head of which, -though retarded also by the fog and rough ground, had overtaken -Cole’s rear-guard. The leading infantry struck hotly<span class="pagenum" id="Page_297">297</span> -upon some British light companies under Colonel Wilson, -while a squadron, passing their flank, fell on the rear; but -Wilson, facing about, drove them off, and thus fighting Cole -reached the heights of Linzoain. There Picton met him, -with intelligence that Campbell had reached Eugui in the -Val de Zubiri, and that the third division, having crossed -the woody ridge, was also in that valley. The junction of -all was thus secured, the loss of the day was less than two -hundred, and neither wounded men nor baggage had been -left behind; but at four o’clock the French seized some -heights which endangered Cole’s position, and he again fell -back a mile, offering battle at a puerto, in the ridge separating -the valley of Zubiri from that of Urros, which last, -though descending on a parallel line, did not open on Pampeluna. -During this skirmish, Campbell, coming from -Eugui, showed his Portuguese on the ridge above the French -right flank; he was however distant, Picton’s troops were -still further off, and there was light for an action if Soult -had pressed one; but, disturbed with intelligence received -from D’Erlon, and doubtful what Campbell’s troops might -be, he put off the attack until next morning, and after dark -the junction of all the allies was effected.</p> - -<p>This delay was an error. Cole was alone for five hours, -and every action, by augmenting the wounded men and -creating confusion, would have augmented the difficulties of -a retreat for troops fatigued with incessant fighting and -marching during two days and a night. Moreover Reille’s -failure from the fog, had reduced the primary combinations -to D’Erlon’s co-operation, and reports now brought the mortifying -conviction that he also had gone wrong: by rough -fighting only could Soult therefore attain his object, and, -it is said, his manner discovered a secret anticipation of -failure; yet his temper was too steadfast to yield, for he gave -orders to advance next day, renewing his instructions to -D’Erlon, whose operations must now be noticed.</p> - -<p>That general, who had eighteen thousand fighting men, -placed two divisions on the morning of the 25th near the -passes of Maya, having previously caused the national guards -of Val Baygorry to make demonstrations towards the lateral -passes of Arriette, Yspeguy and Lorietta, on Hill’s right. -General William Stewart, commanding a division, and still<span class="pagenum" id="Page_298">298</span> -the same daring but imprudent man he had shown himself -at Albuera, was deceived by these feints, and looked to that -quarter which was guarded by Sylviera’s Portuguese more -than to his own front. His division, consisting of two -British brigades, was consequently neither posted as it should -be, nor otherwise prepared for an attack. His ground was -strong, but however rugged a position may be, if it is too extensive -and the troops are not disposed with judgment, the -inequalities constituting its strength become advantageous to -an assailant.</p> - -<p>There were three passes over the Col de Maya to defend, -Aretesque on the right, Lessessa in the centre, Maya on the -left; and from these entrances two roads led into the Bastan -in parallel directions; one down the valley through the -town of Maya, the other along the Atchiola mountain. -General Pringle’s brigade guarded the Aretesque, Colonel -Cameron’s brigade the Maya and Lessessa passes. The Col -itself was broad on the summit, three miles long, and on -each flank lofty rocks and ridges rose one above another; -those on the right blended with the Goramendi mountains, -those on the left with the Atchiola mountain, near the summit -of which the 82nd Regiment, belonging to the seventh -division, was posted.</p> - -<p>Cameron, encamped on the left, had a clear view of troops -coming from Urdax, one of D’Erlon’s camps; but at Aretesque -a great round hill, one mile in front, masked the movements -of an enemy coming from Espelette, the other French camp. -This hill was not occupied at night, nor in the daytime, save -by some Portuguese cavalry videttes, and the nearest guard -was an infantry picquet of eighty men posted on the French -slope of the Col. Behind this picquet there was no immediate -support, but four light companies were encamped one mile -down the reverse slope, which was more rugged and difficult -of access than that towards the enemy. The rest of Pringle’s -brigade was disposed at distances of two and three miles in -the rear, and the signal for occupying the position was to be -the fire of four Portuguese guns from the rocks above the -Maya pass. Thus of six British regiments, furnishing more -than three thousand fighting men, half only were in line, -and chiefly massed on the left of a position, wide, open, and -of an easy ascent from the Aretesque side. Stewart also,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_299">299</span> -quite deceived as to the real state of affairs, was at Elisondo, -several miles off, when at midday D’Erlon commenced the -battle.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Combat of Maya.</span> (July, 1813.)</h3> - -<p>From the Aretesque pass at dawn a glimpse had been -obtained of cavalry and infantry in movement along the hills -in front, and soon afterwards some peasants announced the -approach of the French. At nine o’clock a staff officer, -patrolling round the great hill in front, discovered sufficient -to make him order up the light companies from the reverse -slope, to support the picquet; and they formed on the ridge -with their left at the rock of Aretesque, just as D’Armagnac’s -division, coming from Espelette, mounted the great hill in -front; Abbé’s division followed, while Maransin, with a third -division, advanced from Ainhoa and Urdax against the Maya -pass, seeking also to turn it by a narrow way leading up the -Atchiola mountain.</p> - -<p>D’Armagnac forced the picquet back with great loss upon -the light companies, who sustained his assault with infinite -difficulty; the alarm guns were then heard from the Maya -pass, and Pringle hastened to the front; but his battalions, -moving hurriedly from different camps, came up irregularly. -The 34th arrived first at a running pace, yet by companies -not in mass, and breathless from the length and ruggedness -of the ascent; the 39th and 28th followed, but not immediately -nor together, and meanwhile D’Armagnac, closely -supported by Abbé, with domineering numbers and valour -combined, maugre the desperate fighting of the light companies -and the 34th, established his columns on the broad -ridge of the position. Colonel Cameron sent the 50th from -the left to the assistance of the overmatched troops, and that -fierce and formidable old regiment, charging the head of an -advancing column drove it clear out of the pass of Lessessa -in the centre. But the French were many, and checked at -one point assembled with increased force at another; nor -could Pringle restore the battle with the 39th and 28th -Regiments, which, cut off from the others, were, though -fighting strongly, forced back to a second and lower ridge -crossing the main road into the Bastan. They were followed<span class="pagenum" id="Page_300">300</span> -by D’Armagnac, while Abbé pushed the 50th and 34th -towards the Atchiola road to the left, upon Cameron’s -brigade. That officer, still holding the pass of Maya with -the left wings of the 71st and 92nd Regiments, now brought -their right wings and the Portuguese guns into action: yet -so dreadful was the slaughter, especially of the 92nd, that -the enemy was, it is said, actually stopped for a time by the -heaped mass of dead and dying; and then the left wing of -that noble regiment, coming down from the higher ground, -was forced to smite wounded friends and exulting foes -alike, as mingled together they stood or crawled before its -fire.<a id="FNanchor_33" href="#Footnote_33" class="fnanchor">33</a></p> - -<p>Such was the state of affairs when Stewart reached the -field by the mountain road of Atchiola. The passes of -Lessessa and Aretesque were lost; that of Maya was still -held by the left wing of the 71st, but Stewart, seeing Maransin’s -men gathered thickly on one side, and Abbé’s men -on the other, abandoned it for a new position on the first -rocky ridge covering the road over the Atchiola. He called -down the 82nd from the highest part of that mountain, sent -messengers to demand further aid from the seventh division, -and meanwhile, though wounded, made a strenuous resistance, -for he was a very gallant man. During this retrograde -movement, Maransin suddenly thrust the head of his -division across the front of the British line and connected -his left with Abbé, throwing as he passed a destructive fire -into the wasted remnant of the 92nd, which even then gave -way but sullenly, and still fought, though two-thirds had -fallen: however, one after the other, all the regiments were -forced back, the Portuguese guns were taken and the position -lost.</p> - -<p>Abbé now followed D’Armagnac on the road to the town -of Maya, leaving Maransin to deal with Stewart’s new position; -and notwithstanding its extreme strength the French -gained ground until six o’clock; for the British, shrunk in -numbers, wanted ammunition, and a part of the 82nd defended -the rocks on which they were posted with stones. In -this desperate condition Stewart was upon the point of abandoning<span class="pagenum" id="Page_301">301</span> -the mountain entirely, when Barnes’ brigade of the -seventh division, arriving from Echallar, charged and drove -the French back to the Maya ridge. Stewart was then -master of the Atchiola, and D’Erlon thinking greater reinforcements -had come up, recalled his other divisions from -the Maya road and re-united his whole corps on the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Col</i>. He -had lost fifteen hundred men and a general, but he took four -guns, and fourteen hundred British soldiers and one general -were killed or wounded.</p> - -<p>Such was the commencement of Soult’s operations to -restore the fortunes of France. Three considerable actions -fought on the same day had each ended in his favour. At -San Sebastian the allies’ assault was repulsed; at Roncesvalles -they abandoned the passes; at Maya they were defeated—but -the decisive blow was still to be struck.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington heard of the fight at Maya on his way -back from San Sebastian, after the assault, but with the false -addition that D’Erlon was beaten. As early as the 22nd -he had known that Soult was preparing a great offensive -movement; yet the impassive attitude of the French centre, -the disposition of their reserve, twice as strong as he at first -supposed, together with the bridges prepared by Reille, -were calculated to mislead, and did mislead him. Soult’s -combinations to bring his centre finally into line on the -crest of the great chain being impenetrable, the English -general could not believe he would throw himself with only -thirty thousand men into the valley of the Ebro, unless sure -of aid from Suchet. But that general’s movements indicated -a determination to remain in Catalonia, and Wellington, in -contrast to Soult, knew that Pampeluna was not in extremity, -and thought, the assault not having been made, that San Sebastian -was. Hence the operations against his right, their -full extent not known, appeared a feint, and he judged the -real effort would be to raise the siege of San Sebastian. -But in the night of the 25th, correct intelligence of the -Maya and Roncesvalles affairs arrived. Graham was then -ordered to turn the siege into a blockade, to embark the -guns and stores, and hold his spare troops ready to join -Giron, on a position of battle marked out near the Bidassoa. -Cotton was directed to move the cavalry up to Pampeluna, -and Abispal was instructed to hold some of his Spanish<span class="pagenum" id="Page_302">302</span> -troops ready to act in advance of that fortress. Meanwhile -Wellington, having arranged his lines of correspondence, -proceeded to San Esteban, which he reached early in -the morning.</p> - -<p>While the embarkation of the guns and stores was going -on it was essential to hold the posts at Vera and Echallar, -because D’Erlon’s object was not pronounced; and an -enemy in possession of those places could approach San -Sebastian by the roads leading over the Peña de Haya, or -by the defiles of Zubietta leading round that mountain. -But when Wellington reached Irueta, saw the reduced state -of Stewart’s division, and knew Picton had marched from -Olague, he directed all the troops within his power upon -Pampeluna, and to prevent mistakes indicated the valley -of Lanz as the general line of movement. Of Picton’s exact -position, or of his intentions, nothing positive was known; -but supposing him to have joined Cole at Linzoain, as indeed -he had, Wellington judged their combined forces sufficient -to check the enemy until assistance could reach them from -the centre, or from Pampeluna, and he so advised Picton on -the evening of the 26th.<a id="FNanchor_34" href="#Footnote_34" class="fnanchor">34</a></p> - -<p>Following these orders the seventh division marched in -the night of the 26th, the sixth division the next morning, -and Hill in the following night. Meanwhile the light division, -quitting Vera, reached the summit of the Santa Cruz -mountain, and there halted to cover the defiles of Zubietta -until Longa’s Spaniards should block the roads leading -over the Peña de Haya; that effected, it was to thread the -passes and descend upon the great road of Irurzun, thus -securing Graham’s communication with the army round -Pampeluna.</p> - -<p>These movements spread fear and confusion far and wide. -All the narrow valleys and roads were crowded with baggage, -commissariat stores, artillery and fugitive families; -reports of the most alarming nature were as usual rife; each -division, ignorant of what had really happened to the other, -dreaded that some of the numerous misfortunes related -might be true; none knew what to expect, or where they -were to meet the enemy, and one universal hubbub filled<span class="pagenum" id="Page_303">303</span> -the wild regions through which the French army was working -its fiery path towards Pampeluna.</p> - -<p>D’Erlon’s inactivity gave great uneasiness to Soult: he -repeated his original orders to push forward by his left -whatever might be the force opposed, and thus stimulated -D’Erlon advanced to Elisondo the 27th; yet again halted -there, and it was not until the morning of the 28th, when -Hill’s retreat had opened the way, that he followed through -the pass of Vellate. His further progress belongs to other -combinations, arising from Soult’s direct operations which -shall now be continued.</p> - -<p>Picton having assumed command of all the troops, seventeen -thousand, in the valley of Zubiri on the evening of the -26th, retreated before dawn the 27th, without hope or -intention of covering Pampeluna; Soult followed in two -columns down both banks of the Guy river, his cavalry and -artillery closing the rear: both moved in compact order, the -narrow valley was overgorged with troops, and a bicker of -musketry alone marked the separation of the hostile forces. -Meanwhile the garrison of Pampeluna attacked the Count of -Abispal, who in great alarm spiked some of his guns, destroyed -his magazines, and would have suffered a disaster, if -Carlos España had not fortunately arrived from the Ebro -with his division and checked the sally. Imminent was the -crisis however, for Cole, first emerging from the Zubiri -valley, had passed Villalba, three miles from Pampeluna, in -retreat; Picton, following close, was at Huarte, and Abispal’s -Spaniards were in confusion: in fine Soult was all but -successful, when Picton, feeling the importance of the crisis, -suddenly turned on some steep ridges which stretched across -the mouths of the Zubiri and Lanz valleys and screened -Pampeluna.</p> - -<p>Posting the third division on the right, he prolonged his -left with Morillo’s Spaniards, called upon Abispal to support -him, and directed Cole to occupy some heights a little in -advance. That general had however noted a salient hill -one mile farther on, commanding the great road, where two -Spanish regiments of the blockading troops were still posted, -and towards them he directed his course. Soult had also -marked this hill, and a French detachment was in full career -to seize it, when the Spaniards, seeing the British so close,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_304">304</span> -vindicated their ground by a sudden charge. This was for -Soult the stroke of fate. His double columns, just then -emerging exultant from the narrow valley, stopped at the -sight of ten thousand men crowning the summit of the -mountain in opposition, while two miles further back stood -Picton with a greater number, for Abispal had now taken -post on Morillo’s left. To advance by the great road was -then impossible, and to stand still was dangerous; for the -French army, contracted to a span in front, was cleft in its -whole length by the river Guy, and compressed on each -side by mountains which there narrowed the valley to a -quarter of a mile. In this difficulty Soult, with the promptness -of a great commander, instantly shot the head of Clausel’s -columns to his right, across the ridge which separated -the Zubiri from the Lanz valley, and threw one of Reille’s -divisions of infantry and a body of cavalry across the mountains -on his left, beyond the Guy river, thus giving himself -a strong position of battle and menacing Picton’s right flank. -Reille’s remaining divisions he established at the village of -Zabaldica in the Val de Zubiri, close under Cole’s right, -while Clausel seized the village of Sauroren as close under -that general’s left.</p> - -<p>While Soult was thus establishing a line of battle, Wellington, -who had quitted Hill’s quarters in the Bastan early -on the 27th, crossed the great mountain spine into the valley -of Lanz, without being able to learn anything of Picton’s -movements or position until he reached Ostiz, a few miles -from Sauroren. There he found Long’s brigade of light -cavalry, placed to furnish posts of correspondence in the -mountains, and from him heard that Picton had abandoned -the heights of Linzoain: whereupon, leaving instructions to -stop all the troops coming down the valley of Lanz until the -state of affairs near Pampeluna could be ascertained, he -made at racing speed for Sauroren. As he entered that -village he saw Clausel’s divisions moving along the crest of -the mountain, and thus knew the allied troops in the valley -of Lanz were intercepted; then pulling up his horse, he -wrote on the parapet of the bridge at Sauroren fresh instructions -to turn everything from that valley to the right -by a cross-road, which led out of it to Marcalain and thence -round the hills, to enter the valley again at Oricain, in rear<span class="pagenum" id="Page_305">305</span> -of the position occupied by Cole. Lord Fitzroy Somerset, -who had kept up with him, galloped with these orders out -of Sauroren by one road, the French light cavalry simultaneously -dashed in by another, and Wellington rode alone -up the mountain.</p> - -<p>A Portuguese battalion on the left, first recognising him, -raised a joyful cry, and soon the shrill clamour was taken up -by the next regiments, swelling as it run along the line into -that stern and appalling shout which the British soldier is -wont to give upon the edge of battle, and which no enemy -ever heard unmoved. In a conspicuous place he stopped, -desirous that both armies should know he was there. A spy -who was present pointed out Soult, then so near that his features -could be plainly distinguished. Fixing his eyes attentively -upon that formidable man, Wellington thus spoke, -“<em>Yonder is a great commander, but he is a cautious one and will -delay his attack to ascertain the cause of these shouts; that will give -time for the sixth division to arrive and I shall beat him.</em>” The -event justified the prediction.</p> - -<p>Cole’s position was the summit of a mountain mass, which -filled all the space between the Guy and Lanz valleys, as -far back as Huarte and Villalba. It was highest in the -centre and well defined towards the enemy, yet the trace -was irregular, the right being thrown back towards the -village of Arletta so as to flank the great road, which was -also swept by guns placed on a lower range behind.</p> - -<p>Overlooking Zabaldica and the Guy river, was the bulging -hill vindicated by the Spaniards, a distinct but lower point -on the right of the position. The left, also abating in height, -was yet extremely rugged and steep, overlooking the Lanz -river, and Ross’s brigade was posted on that side, having in -front a Portuguese battalion, whose flank rested on a small -chapel. Campbell was on the right of Ross. Anson was on -the highest ground, partly behind, partly on the right of -Campbell. Byng’s brigade was on a second mass of hills in -reserve, and the Spanish hill was further reinforced by a -battalion of Portuguese.</p> - -<p>This front of battle was less than two miles, and well -filled, its flanks being washed by the Lanz and the Guy; -and those torrents, pursuing their course, broke by narrow -passages through the steep ridges screening Pampeluna<span class="pagenum" id="Page_306">306</span> -which had been first occupied by Picton, and where the -second line was now posted; that is to say, at the distance -of two miles from, and nearly parallel to the first position, -but on a more extended front. Carlos España maintained -the blockade behind these ridges, and the British cavalry -under Cotton stood on some open ground in the rear of -Picton’s right wing.</p> - -<p>Soult’s position was also a mountain filling the space between -the two rivers. It was even more rugged than that -of the allies, and was only separated from it by a deep -narrow ravine. Clausel’s three divisions leaned to the right -on the village of Sauroren, which was down in the valley -of Lanz, close under the chapel height; Reille’s two divisions -occupied the village of Zabaldica, quite down in the -valley of Zubiri under the right of the allies. The remaining -division of this wing and the light cavalry were, as before -said, thrown forward on the mountains at the other side of -the Guy river, menacing Picton and seeking to communicate -with Pampeluna.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Combat of Zabaldica.</span> (July, 1813.)</h3> - -<p>The French guns at Zabaldica first opened fire, but the -elevation required to send the shot upward rendered it so -ineffectual, that the greatest part of the artillery remained in -the narrow valley of Zubiri. Soult had however made another -effort to gain the Spaniards’ hill and establish himself near -the centre of the allies’ line of battle, but had been valiantly -repulsed just before the arrival of Wellington, who now -reinforced the post with the 40th British Regiment. There -was then a general skirmish along the front, under cover of -which Soult examined the whole position, and the firing continued -on the mountain side until a terrible storm, the usual -precursor of English battles in the Peninsula, brought on -premature darkness and terminated the dispute. This was -the state of affairs at daybreak on the 28th, but a signal alteration -had place before the great battle of that day commenced, -and the movements of the wandering divisions by -which this change was effected must now be traced.</p> - -<p>Although the Lanz covered the left of the allies and the -right of the French, the heights occupied by both were<span class="pagenum" id="Page_307">307</span> -prolonged beyond that river; the continuation of the allies’ -range sweeping forward so as to look into the rear of Sauroren, -while the continuation of the French range fell back -in a direction nearly parallel to this forward inclination of -the allies’ ridge. On each side they were steep and high, -yet lower and less rugged than the heights on which the -armies stood opposed; for on the latter, rocks piled on rocks -stood out like castles, so difficult to approach and so dangerous -to assail that the hardened veterans of the Peninsula -only would have dared the trial: both sides were therefore -strong in defence. But Soult was forced to attack or retreat, -and therefore Wellington looked anxiously for his -sixth division, then coming from Marcalain by a road which -run behind his ridge beyond the Lanz and fell into that -valley at Oricain, one mile in rear of Cole’s left. It had -been turned into that road from the higher part of the Lanz -valley by Lord Fitzroy Somerset, and was followed by -General Hill when he arrived at the point of divarication; -the way was thus open for D’Erlon to join Soult, and the -rapidity with which that marshal had seized Sauroren would -thus have proved a master-stroke, if his lieutenant had pursued -Hill vigorously: for the change of direction gave the -sixth division a march of eighteen instead of four hours to -join the army; and Hill, forced to take a position at Marcalain, -covering the great road of Irurzun on Wellington’s -left, was there joined by the seventh division and the whole -were thrown out of the line of battle. During these important -movements, which were not completed until the -evening of the 28th, and which finally placed all the allies -in military communication, D’Erlon remained inactive in -the Bastan!</p> - -<p>The proximity of the sixth division on the morning of -the 28th, with the certainty of Hill’s co-operation, made -Wellington think Soult would not venture an attack; and -the latter, disquieted about D’Erlon, of whom he only knew -that he had not followed his instructions, certainly viewed -the British position with uneasy anticipations, and again -with anxious eyes took cognizance of its rugged strength, -seeming dubious and distrustful of fortune. He could not -operate with advantage by his left beyond the Guy river, -because the mountains there were rough, and his enemy,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_308">308</span> -having shorter lines of movement, could meet him with all -arms combined; moreover his artillery, unable to emerge -from the Val de Zubiri, except by the great road, would -thus have been exposed to a counter attack. In this dubious -state he crossed the Lanz and ascended the prolongation of -the allies’ ridge, which, as he had possession of the bridge -of Sauroren, was for the moment his own ground; from -thence he could see into the left and rear of Cole’s position, -but the country towards Marcalain was so broken that -he could not discern the march of the sixth division. The -deserters however told him that four divisions, namely, the -second, sixth, and seventh British, and Sylviera’s Portuguese, -which was under Hill, were expected from that -side; he was thus influenced to attack, because the valley, -widening as it descended, offered the means of assailing the -allies in front and flank, and intercepting the divisions -from Marcalain by the same combination.</p> - -<p>One of Clausel’s divisions already occupied Sauroren, -and the other two were now posted on each side of that -village; that on the right hand was ordered to send -flankers to the ridge from whence Soult had made his observations, -and upon signal to move down the valley, wheel to -the left, and assail the rear of the allies while the other two -divisions assailed their front: five thousand men would -thus be enveloped by sixteen thousand, and Soult hoped to -crush them notwithstanding the strength of ground. Meanwhile -Reille’s two divisions on the side of Zabaldica, were -each to send a brigade against the Spanish hill, and connect -the right of their attack with Clausel’s left. The remaining -brigades were to follow in support, the division beyond the -Guy was to keep Picton in check, and all were to throw -themselves frankly into action.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">First Battle of Sauroren.</span> (July, 1813.)</h3> - -<p>At midday on the 28th of July, the anniversary of the -Talavera fight, the French gathered in masses at the foot of -the position, and their skirmishers quickly spread over the -face of the mountain, working upward like a conflagration; -but the columns of attack were not all ready when Clausel’s -right-hand division, without awaiting the general signal of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_309">309</span> -battle, threw out flankers on the ridge beyond the Lanz -and pushed down the valley in one mass. With a rapid -pace it turned Cole’s left and was preparing to wheel up -on his rear, when suddenly Madden’s Portuguese brigade of -the sixth division appeared on the crest of the ridge beyond -the river, driving the flankers back and descending, as from -the clouds, with a rattling fire upon the right and rear of -the column; and not less suddenly the main body of that -division, emerging from behind the same ridge near the -village of Oricain, presented a line of battle across the front. -It was the counter-stroke of Salamanca! The French were, -while striving to encompass Cole’s left, themselves encompassed; -for two brigades of Cole’s division instantly turned -and smote them on the left, the Portuguese smote them on -the right, and thus scathed on both flanks with fire, they -were violently shocked and pushed back with a mighty -force by the sixth division, yet not in flight, but fighting -fiercely and strewing the ground with their enemies’ bodies -as well as with their own.</p> - -<p>Clausel’s second division, on the other side of Sauroren, -seeing this dire conflict, with a hurried movement assailed -the chapel height to draw off Cole’s fire from the troops in -the valley, and gallantly did the French soldiers throng up -the craggy steep; yet the general unity of the attack was -ruined; neither the third division nor Reille’s brigades -had yet received the signal, and their attacks were made -irregularly, in succession, running from right to left as the -necessity of aiding others became apparent. It was however -a terrible battle and well fought. One column darting -out of the village of Sauroren, silently, sternly, without -firing a shot, worked up to the chapel under a tempest of -bullets, which swept away whole ranks without abating the -speed and power of the mass; the Portuguese there shrunk -abashed, and that part of the position was won; soon however -they rallied on Ross’s British brigade, and the whole, -running forward, charged the French with a loud shout and -dashed them down the hill. Heavily stricken the latter -were, yet undismayed, they re-formed, and again ascended, -to be again broken and overturned. But the other columns -of attack now bore upwards through the smoke and flame -with which the skirmishers covered the face of the mountain,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_310">310</span> -and another Portuguese regiment, fighting on the right -of Ross, yielded to their fury; thus a heavy body crowned -the heights, and wheeling against Ross’s exposed flank -forced him back also, and his ground was instantly occupied -by the enemies with whom he had been engaged in front. -Now the fight raged close and desperate on the crest of the -position, charge succeeding charge, each side yielding and -advancing by turns. This astounding effort of French -valour was however of no avail. Wellington brought -Byng’s brigade forward at a running pace, and calling the -27th and 48th British Regiments, from the higher ground in -the centre, against the crowded masses, rolled them backward -in disorder, and threw them, one after the other, violently -down the mountain-side; yet with no child’s play; -the two British regiments had to fall upon the enemy three -separate times with the bayonet, and lost more than half their -own numbers.</p> - -<p>During this battle on the mountain-top, the sixth division -gained ground in the Lanz valley, and when it arrived on a -front with the left of the victorious troops near the chapel, -Wellington, seeing the momentary disorder of the enemy, -ordered Madden’s Portuguese brigade beyond the Lanz, -which had never ceased its fire against the right flank of the -French column, to assail the village of Sauroren in rear; -but the state of the action in other parts and the exhaustion -of the troops soon induced him to countermand this movement.</p> - -<p>On the French left, Reille’s brigades, connecting their -right with Clausel’s third division, had environed the Spanish -hill and ascended it unchecked, at the moment when the -fourth division was so hardly pressed from Sauroren; a -Spanish regiment then gave way on the left of the 40th, but -a Portuguese battalion, rushing forward, again covered the -flank of that invincible regiment, which waited in stern -silence until the French set their feet upon the broad summit. -Scarcely did their glittering arms appear over the brow of -the mountain when the charging British cry was heard, the -fierce shock given, the French mass was broken to pieces -and a tempest of bullets followed it down the mountain. -Four times this assault was renewed, and the French officers -were seen even to pull up their tired men by the belts, so<span class="pagenum" id="Page_311">311</span> -fierce and resolute they were to win, but it was the labour -of Sisyphus; the vehement shout and shock of the British -soldier always prevailed, and at last, with thinned ranks, -tired limbs, and fainting hearts, hopeless from repeated -failures, the French were so abashed that three British companies -sufficed to bear down a whole brigade.<a id="FNanchor_35" href="#Footnote_35" class="fnanchor">35</a></p> - -<p>While the battle was thus being fought on the mountain, -Soult’s cavalry beyond the Guy river passed a rivulet, and -with a fire of carbines forced the 10th Hussars to yield some -rocky ground on Picton’s right, but the 18th Hussars renewed -the combat, killed two officers, and drove them over -the rivulet again.</p> - -<p>Such were the leading events of this sanguinary struggle, -which Lord Wellington, fresh from the fight, with homely -emphasis called “<em>bludgeon work</em>.” Two generals and eighteen -hundred men had been killed or wounded on the French -side, following their official reports; a number far below the -estimate made at the time by the allies, whose loss amounted -to two thousand six hundred. These discrepancies between -hostile calculations ever occur, and there is little wisdom in -disputing where proof is unattainable; yet the numbers -actually engaged were twenty-five thousand French and -twelve thousand allies; hence, if the strength of the latter’s -position did not save them from the greater loss, their -steadfast courage is more to be admired.</p> - -<p>The 29th the armies rested in position without firing a -shot, and the wandering divisions on both sides were now -entering the line.</p> - -<p>Hill had sent all his baggage, artillery, and wounded men -to Berioplano behind Picton’s ridge, but still occupied his -position, covering the Marcalain and Irurzun roads; thus -posted, he likewise menaced the valley of Lanz in rear of -Soult’s right, his communication with Oricain being maintained -by the seventh division; the light division was also -approaching Hill’s left, and therefore on Wellington’s side -the crisis was over. He had vindicated his position with -only sixteen thousand combatants, and now, including the -Spanish troops blockading Pampeluna, he had fifty thousand -in close military combination. Thirty thousand flushed<span class="pagenum" id="Page_312">312</span> -with recent successes were in hand, and Hill’s troops were -well placed for re-taking the offensive.</p> - -<p>Soult’s situation was proportionably difficult. Seeing he -could not force the position, he had sent his artillery, part of -his cavalry, and his wounded men, back to France immediately -after the battle, ordering the two former to join -Villatte on the Lower Bidassoa and await further instructions. -Having shaken off this burthen he awaited D’Erlon’s -arrival by the valley of Lanz, and that general did reach -Ostiz, a few miles above Sauroren, at mid-day on the 29th, -bringing intelligence, obtained indirectly during his march, -that Graham had retired from the Bidassoa and Villatte had -crossed that river. This gave Soult a hope that his first -movements had disengaged San Sebastian, and he instantly -conceived a new plan of operations, dangerous indeed, yet -conformable to the critical state of his affairs.</p> - -<p>No success was to be expected from another attack, yet he -could not, being reinforced with eighteen thousand men, -retire by the road he came without some dishonour; nor -could he remain where he was, because his supplies of provisions -and ammunition, derived from distant magazines by -slow and small convoys, were unequal to the consumption. -Two-thirds of the British troops, great part of the Portuguese -and all the Spaniards, were, as he supposed, assembled -in his front under Wellington, or on his right flank under -Hill; and it was probable other reinforcements were on the -march; wherefore he resolved to prolong his right with -D’Erlon’s corps, and cautiously drawing off the rest of his -army place the whole between the allies and the Bastan, in -military connection with his reserve and closer to his frontier -magazines. Thus posted he could combine all his forces in -one operation to relieve San Sebastian, and profit from new -combinations.</p> - -<p>In the evening of the 29th the second division of cavalry, -which was in the valley of Zubiri, passed over to that of -Lanz and joined D’Erlon, who was ordered to march early -on the 30th by the cross road, leading on Marcalain, which -Hill had followed to get out of that valley. During the -night the first division of cavalry and La Martinière’s division -of infantry, both on the extreme left of the French army, -retired over the mountains to Eugui, in the upper part of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_313">313</span> -Zubiri valley, having orders to cross the separating ridge -there and join D’Erlon in the valley of Lanz. The remainder -of Reille’s wing moved by the crest of the position to Sauroren, -being gradually to relieve Clausel’s troops, which -were then to move up the Lanz valley, follow D’Erlon, and -be followed in like manner by Reille: meanwhile Clausel -detached two regiments to the ridges beyond the Lanz river, -to cover his own march and open a military connection with -D’Erlon, whose new line of operations was just beyond those -heights.</p> - -<p>In the night Soult again heard, from deserters, that three -divisions were to make an offensive movement next day by -the Marcalain road on his right, and at daylight he was convinced -the men spoke truly; because from the ridges held -by Clausel beyond Sauroren he descried columns descending -from Picton’s position and from above Oricain, while others -were in movement apparently to turn Clausel’s right flank. -These columns were Morillo’s Spaniards, Campbell’s Portuguese, -and the seventh division, marching to adopt a new -disposition, which shall be presently explained.</p> - -<p>Early in the morning Soult’s combination was apparent: -Foy’s division, the last of Reille’s wing, was seen in march -along the crest of the mountain to Sauroren, where Maucune’s -division had previously relieved Conroux’s, and the -latter, belonging to Clausel, was moving up the valley of -Lanz. Wellington was not a general to suffer a flank march -across his front within cannon-shot. He immediately opened -his batteries from the chapel height, and sent skirmishers -against Sauroren; and soon this fire, spreading to the right, -became brisk between Cole and Foy; but it subsided at Sauroren, -and Soult, relying on the strength of the ground, -directing Reille to maintain that village until nightfall, went -off himself to join D’Erlon. His design was to fall upon the -troops he had seen moving to turn his right and crush -them with superior numbers: a daring project, well and -finely conceived, but he had to deal with a man more rapid -of perception and of a rougher stroke than himself. Overtaking -D’Erlon, who had three divisions of infantry and two -of heavy cavalry, he found him facing, not the troops seen in -march the evening before, but Hill who was in position with -ten thousand men.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_314">314</span></p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Combat of Buenza.</span> (July, 1813.)</h3> - -<p>Hill, occupying a very extensive mountain ridge, had his -right strongly posted on rugged ground, but his left was -insecure. D’Erlon, who had not less than twenty thousand -sabres and bayonets in line, was followed by La Martinière’s -division of infantry. Soult’s combination was therefore still -extremely powerful, the light troops were already engaged -when he arrived, and thus the same soldiers on both sides -who had so strenuously combated at Maya were again opposed -to each other.</p> - -<p>D’Armagnac made a false attack on Hill’s right, Abbé -endeavoured to turn his left and gain the summit of the -ridge in the direction of Buenza; Maransin followed Abbé, -and the French cavalry, entering the line, connected the two -attacks. D’Armagnac pushed his feint too far, became seriously -engaged and was beaten; but after some hard fighting -Abbé turned the left flank, gained the summit of the -mountain, and rendered the position untenable.</p> - -<p>Hill, who had lost four hundred men, retired to the -heights of Eguaros, drawing towards Marcalain with his -right and throwing back his left; being there joined by -Campbell and Morillo he again offered battle. Soult, whose -principal loss was in D’Armagnac’s division, had however -gained his main object; he had turned Hill’s left, secured a -fresh line of retreat, a shorter communication with Villatte -by the pass of Doña Maria, and withal, the command of the -great Irurzun road to Toloza, which was distant only one -league. His first thought was to seize it and march upon -Toloza or Ernani to raise the siege of San Sebastian; there -was nothing to oppose this, except the light division, whose -movements shall be noticed hereafter, but neither Hill nor -Soult knew of its presence. If the French marshal’s other -combinations had been happily executed he would have -broken into Guipuscoa on the 31st with fifty thousand -men, thrust aside the light division in his march, and -taken Graham in reverse while Villatte’s reserve attacked -him in front. Wellington would have followed, yet scarcely -in time, for he did not suspect his views, and was ignorant -of his strength, thinking D’Erlon’s force to be only three<span class="pagenum" id="Page_315">315</span> -divisions, whereas it was four divisions of infantry and -two of cavalry. This error however did not prevent him -from seizing the decisive point of operation and like a -great captain giving a counter-stroke which Soult, trusting -to the strength of Reille’s position, little expected. -For when La Martinière’s division and the cavalry had -abandoned the mountains above Elcano, and that Zabaldica -was evacuated, Picton, reinforced with two squadrons of -cavalry and a battery of artillery, was directed to enter the -Zubiri valley and turn the French left. Meanwhile the -seventh division swept over the hills beyond the Lanz river -upon Clausel’s right, with safety, because Campbell and -Morillo insured communication with Hill, who was ordered -to push the head of his column towards Olague and menace -Soult’s rear in the valley of Lanz. He was in march to do -this when D’Erlon, as shown, met and forced him back. -During these movements Cole never ceased to skirmish with -Foy on the mountain between Zabaldica and Sauroren, while -the sixth division reinforced with Byng’s brigade assaulted -the latter village.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Second Battle of Sauroren.</span> (July, 1813.)</h3> - -<p>Picton quickly gained the Val de Zubiri, and threw his -skirmishers against Foy’s left flank on the mountain, while -on the other flank General Inglis, one of those veterans -who purchase every step of promotion with their blood, -advancing with only five hundred men of the seventh -division, broke at one shock the two French regiments on -the ridges covering Clausel’s right, and drove them down -into the valley of Lanz. He lost indeed one-third of his -own men, but instantly spread the remainder in skirmishing -order along the descent and opened a biting fire upon the -flank of Conroux’s division, which being in march up the -valley from Sauroren, was now thrown into disorder by -having two regiments thus suddenly tumbled upon it from -the top of the mountain.</p> - -<p>Foy’s division was marching along the crest of the position -between Zabaldica and Sauroren at the moment of -this attack; but he was too far off to give aid, and his own -light troops were engaged with Cole’s skirmishers; moreover -Inglis had been so sudden that before the evil was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_316">316</span> -well perceived it was past remedy; for Wellington instantly -pushed the sixth division under Pakenham to the left of -Sauroren, and sent Byng headlong down from the chapel -height against Maucune, who was in that village. This -vigorous assault was simultaneously enforced from the other -side of the Lanz by Madden’s Portuguese, and the battery -near the chapel sent its bullets crashing through the houses, -or booming up the valley towards Conroux’s column, which -Inglis never ceased to vex.</p> - -<p>The village and bridge of Sauroren and the straits beyond -were soon covered with a pall of smoke, the musketry pealed -frequent and loud, and the tumult and affray echoing from -mountain to mountain filled all the valley. Byng with hard -fighting carried Sauroren, fourteen hundred prisoners were -made, and the two French divisions, being entirely broken, -fled, partly up the valley towards Clausel’s other divisions, -partly up the original position, to seek refuge with Foy, -who remained on the summit a helpless spectator of this -rout. He rallied the fugitives in great numbers, but had -soon to look to himself, for his own skirmishers were now -driven up the mountain by Cole’s men, and his left was infested -by Picton’s detachments. Thus pressed, he fell back -along the hills separating the valley of Zubiri from that of -Lanz, and the woods enabled him to effect his retreat without -much loss; yet he dared not descend into either valley, -and thinking himself entirely cut off, sent advice to Soult -and went over the Great Spine into the Alduides by the -pass of Urtiaga. Clausel meanwhile had been driven up -the valley of Lanz to Olague, where, being joined by La -Martinière, he took a position; and Wellington, whose -pursuit had been damped by hearing of Hill’s action, also -halted.</p> - -<p>The allies lost nineteen hundred men killed, wounded, -or taken in this and Hill’s battle, and nearly twelve hundred -were Portuguese, for the soldiers of that nation bore -the brunt of both fights. On the French side the loss was -enormous. Conroux’s and Maucune’s divisions were completely -disorganized. Eight thousand men under Foy were -entirely separated from the main body, two thousand at -the lowest computation were killed or wounded, many were -dispersed in the woods and ravines, and three thousand<span class="pagenum" id="Page_317">317</span> -prisoners were taken. Soult’s fighting men were thus reduced -to thirty-five thousand, of which fifteen thousand -under Clausel and Reille were dispirited by defeat, and -the whole in a critical situation, seeing that Hill’s force, -increased to fifteen thousand men by the junction of Morillo -and Campbell, was in their front at Eguaros, and thirty -thousand were on their rear in the valley of Lanz; for -Picton, finding no enemies in the valley of Zubiri, had -joined Cole on the heights.</p> - -<p>Wellington had sent some Spaniards to Marcalain when -he first heard of Hill’s action, yet he was not then aware of -the true state of affairs on that side, and his operations were -founded on the notion that Soult was in retreat towards the -Bastan. Hence he designed to follow closely and push his -own left forward to support Graham on the Bidassoa; but -he still underrated D’Erlon’s force, and thought La Martinière’s -division had originally retreated up the Val de -Zubiri to Roncesvalles, instead of crossing the intervening -ridge to the Lanz valley; and as Foy’s column was numerous, -and two divisions had been broken at Sauroren, he -judged the force immediately under Soult to be very weak, -and made dispositions accordingly. The sixth division and -the 13th Light Dragoons were ordered to join Picton, the -whole to move upon the Roncesvalles; Cole was called -down into the valley of Lanz, and Hill was directed to -press Soult, turning his right, yet still directing his own -march upon Lanz: the seventh division was to let Hill cross -its front, and then march for the pass of Doña Maria.</p> - -<p>These arrangements show that Wellington expected Soult -to rejoin Clausel, and make for the Bastan by the pass of -Vellate. But the French marshal was so far advanced he -could not return to Lanz; he was between two fires, and -could only retreat into the valley of St. Estevan by the pass -of Doña Maria; wherefore, calling up Clausel, and giving -D’Erlon, whose divisions were in good order, the rear-guard, -he commenced his march at midnight towards the -pass. Mischief was thickening around him. Graham, on -the British left, had twenty thousand men ready to move -either against Villatte or into the valley of St. Estevan; and -there remained on that side the light division, under Charles -Alten, of whose operations it is time to speak.</p> - -<p>That general had descended the mountain of Santa Cruz -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_318">318</span> -on the evening of the 28th, to gain the great road of Irurzun; -but whether by orders from Graham, or in default of orders, -the difficulty of communication being extreme in those wild -regions, he commenced his movement very late, and darkness -falling on his rear brigade while in march, the troops -got dispersed in that frightful wilderness of woods and -precipices. Many soldiers made faggot torches, waving -them as signals, and, so moving, the lights served indeed to -assist those who carried them, yet misled and bewildered -others who saw them at a distance; for the heights and the -ravines were alike studded with these small fires, and the -soldiers calling to each other filled the whole region with -their clamour. Thus they continued to rove and shout until -morning showed the face of the mountain covered with -scattered men and animals, who had not gained half a league -of ground beyond their starting place, and it was many hours -ere they could be collected.</p> - -<p>Alten, now for three days separated from the army, sent -mounted officers in various directions to obtain tidings, and -at six o’clock in the evening renewed his march, but at -Areysa halted without suffering fires to be lighted; for he -knew nothing of the enemy and was fearful of discovering -his situation. At night he moved again, and finally established -his bivouacs near Lecumberri early on the 30th, -having heard the noise of Hill’s battle at Buenza in the -course of the day. The light division was thus brought -into the immediate system of operations, and had Soult continued -his march, after driving back Hill, it would have -been in great danger. Now it was a new power thrown into -Wellington’s hands at a critical moment, for Villatte, contrary -to the intelligence received, had not advanced, and -Soult was therefore completely isolated: he had indeed no -resources save what his ability and courage could supply.</p> - -<p>His single line of retreat by Doña Maria was secure only -as far as San Estevan, and from that town he could march -up the Bidassoa to the Bastan, to regain France by the Col -de Maya; or down the same river towards Vera by Sumbilla -and Yanzi, from both of which roads branching off to the -right led over the mountains to Echallar: yet he might be -intercepted on either side. The Col de Maya way was good,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_319">319</span> -that down the Bidassoa was a long and terrible defile, so contracted -about the bridges of Yanzi and Sumbilla that a few -men only could march abreast. This then he had to dread. -First, that Wellington by the pass of Vellate would reach -the Bastan before him, and block the Maya passes. Second, -that Graham would occupy the rocks of Yanzi and cut him -off from Echallar. Then, confined to a narrow mountain-way -leading from San Estevan to Zagaramurdi, and far too -rugged for wounded men and baggage, he would be followed -by Hill, and perhaps headed at Urdax by Wellington.</p> - -<p>In this state, the first object being to get through Doña -Maria, he commenced his retreat in the night of the 30th, -while Wellington, still ignorant of the real state of affairs, -halted in the valley of Lanz to let Hill pass his front and -enter the Bastan. But early on the 31st, Soult’s real strength -became known, and the seventh division was directed to aid -Hill, while Wellington marched himself through the pass of -Vellate, and sent Alten orders to cut in upon the French, -intercepting their march where he could. Longa, who was -with Graham, had instructions to seize the defiles at Yanzi, -and aid the light division to block that way, while Graham -was to hold all his corps in readiness for the same object.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Combat of Doña Maria.</span> (July, 1813.)</h3> - -<p>General Hill overtook the French rear-guard early on the -31st, just as the seventh division appeared on his right, and -the enemy could only gain the summit of the Doña Maria -pass under the fire of his guns; there however they turned, -and throwing out skirmishers made strong battle. General -Stewart, leading the attack and now for the third time engaged -with D’Erlon’s troops, was again badly wounded and -his first brigade was repulsed; yet Pringle renewed the attack -with the second brigade, and broke the enemy’s right; -the seventh division did the same for the left, and some -prisoners were taken: a thick fog prevented further pursuit, -and the loss of the French was unknown, but that of the -allies was four hundred.</p> - -<p>The seventh division remained on the mountain. Hill, -following his orders, moved by a short rugged way between -Doña Maria and Vellate over the Great Spine to join Wellington,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_320">320</span> -who had during this combat entered the Bastan. Meanwhile -General Byng, previously pushed forward, had captured -at Elisondo a large convoy of provisions and ammunition left -there by D’Erlon, had made several hundred prisoners after -a sharp skirmish, and seized the pass of Maya. Wellington -then occupied the hills through which the road from San -Estevan led to the Bastan, and full of hope he was to strike -a terrible blow; for Soult, after passing Doña Maria, had -halted in San Estevan, although from his scouts he knew -the convoy had been taken by Byng. He was in a deep -valley, and four divisions were behind the crest of the mountains -overlooking his post; the seventh division was on the -summit of the Doña Maria pass; the light division and Graham’s -Spaniards were marching to block the valley at Vera -and Echallar; Byng was at Maya, and Hill was moving by -Almandoz just behind Wellington; a few hours gained and -the French must surrender or disperse!</p> - -<p>Strict orders were given to prevent the lighting of fires, -the straggling of soldiers, or any other indication of the -presence of troops, and the English commander placed -himself on some rocks at a culminant point, from whence -he could observe every movement. Soult seemed tranquil, -and when four of his “<i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">gens d’armes</i>” were seen to ride up -the valley in a careless manner some staff-officers proposed -to cut them off. Wellington, whose object was to hide -his own presence, forbade this; but the next moment three -marauding English soldiers entering the valley, were -seen and carried off by the French patrol; half an hour -afterwards their drums beat to arms and the columns began -to move out of San Estevan towards Sumbilla. Thus -the disobedience of three plundering knaves, unworthy of -the name of soldiers, deprived one consummate commander -of the most splendid success, and saved another from the -most terrible disaster.<a id="FNanchor_36" href="#Footnote_36" class="fnanchor">36</a></p> - -<p>Soult walked from his prison, yet his chains still hung -upon him. The way was narrow, the multitude great, -wounded men borne on their comrades’ shoulders filed in -long procession with the baggage, Clausel’s troops, forming -the rear-guard, were therefore still near San Estevan the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_321">321</span> -next morning; and scarcely had they marched a league -when Cole’s skirmishers and the Spaniards, thronging along -the heights on their flank, opened a fire on them, to which -little reply could be made: the soldiers and baggage soon -got mixed in disorder, numbers fled up the hills, and the -energy of Soult, whose personal exertions were conspicuous, -could scarcely prevent a general dispersion. Prisoners and -baggage were now taken at every step, and the boldest were -dismayed; worse would have awaited them, if Wellington -had been on other points well seconded by his subordinate -generals.</p> - -<p>Instead of taking the first road leading from Sumbilla to -Echallar, the head of the French column passed onward -towards that leading from the bridge near Yanzi; the valley -narrowed to a mere cleft in the rocks as they advanced, the -Bidassoa was on their left, and there was a tributary torrent -to cross, the bridge being defended by a battalion of Spanish -Caçadores from Vera. The head of the column was by this -time as much disordered as the rear, and had the Caçadores -been reinforced, only those French near Sumbilla, who -could take the road from that place to Echallar, would -have escaped; but the Spanish general Longa kept aloof, -D’Erlon won the defile, and Reille’s divisions were following, -when a new enemy appeared.</p> - -<p>The light division had been directed to head the French -at San Estevan or Sumbilla. The order was received on the -evening of the 31st, and General Alten, threading the defiles -of Zubieta and descending the deep valley of Lerins, reached -Elgoriaga about mid-day on the 1st of August, having then -marched twenty-four miles. He was little more than a -league from Estevan, was about the same distance from Sumbilla, -and the movement of the French along the Bidassoa -was immediately discovered. Instead of moving direct on -Sumbilla he turned to his left, clambered up the great -mountain of Santa Cruz and made for the bridge of Yanzi. -The weather was very sultry, the mountain steep and hard -to overcome, many men fell and died convulsed and frothing -at the mouth, others whose spirit and strength had never -before been quelled, leaned on their muskets and muttered -in sullen tones that they yielded for the first time. However, -towards evening, after marching nineteen consecutive hours,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_322">322</span> -and over forty miles of mountain roads, the head of the exhausted -column reached the edge of a precipice near the -bridge of Yanzi. Below it, within pistol-shot, Reille’s -divisions were seen hurrying forward along the horrid -defile in which they were pent up, a fire of musketry -commenced, and the scene which followed is thus described -by an eye-witness.<a id="FNanchor_37" href="#Footnote_37" class="fnanchor">37</a></p> - -<p>“We overlooked the enemy at stone’s throw, and from -the summit of a tremendous precipice. The river separated -us, but the French were wedged in a narrow road with -inaccessible rocks on one side and the river on the other. -Confusion impossible to describe followed, the wounded were -thrown down in the rush and trampled upon, the cavalry -drew their swords and endeavoured to charge up the pass of -Echallar, but the infantry beat them back, and several, -horses and all, were precipitated into the river; some fired -vertically at us, the wounded called out for quarter, while -others pointed to them, supported as they were on branches -of trees, on which were suspended great coats clotted with -gore, and blood-stained sheets taken from different habitations -to aid the sufferers.”</p> - -<p>On these miserable supplicants brave men could not fire, -and so piteous was the spectacle that it was with averted or -doubtful aim they shot at the others, although the latter -rapidly plied their muskets in passing, and some in their -veteran hardihood even dashed across the bridge of Yanzi to -make a counter-attack. It was a soldier-like but vain effort, -the night found the British in possession of the bridge; and -though the great body of the enemy escaped by the mountain -path to Echallar, the baggage was cut off and with many -prisoners fell into the hands of the light troops which were -still hanging on the rear in pursuit from San Estevan.</p> - -<p>That day the French losses were great, yet Wellington -was justly discontented with the result. Neither Longa nor -Alten had fulfilled their missions. The former should have -stopped D’Erlon; the latter should have passed the bridge of -Yanzi and struck a great blow: it was for that his soldiers -had made such a prodigious exertion.</p> - -<p>In the night Soult rallied his divisions about Echallar,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_323">323</span> -and on the morning of the 2nd occupied the Puerto of that -name. His left was on the rocks of Zagaramurdi, his right, -on the Ivantelly mountain, communicating with Villatte, -who held certain ridges between the Ivantelly and the head -of the great Rhune mountain. Clausel’s three divisions, -reduced to six thousand men, were on a strong hill between -the Puerto and town of Echallar. This position was -momentarily adopted by Soult to make Wellington discover -his final object, but that general would not suffer the affront. -He had the fourth, seventh, and light divisions in hand, and -resolved to fall upon Clausel, whose position was dangerously -advanced.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Combats of Echallar and Ivantelly.</span> (Aug. 1813.)</h3> - -<p>From Yanzi the light division marched to the heights of -Santa Barbara, which were connected with the Ivantelly, -thus turning Clausel’s position and menacing Soult’s right, -while the fourth division moved to attack his front, and the -seventh menaced his left; these attacks were to be simultaneous, -but General Barnes led his brigade of the seventh -division against Clausel’s strong post before the fourth and -light divisions were seen or felt. A vehement fight ensued, -yet neither the steepness of the mountain, nor the overshadowing -multitude of the enemy, clustering above in -support of their skirmishers, could arrest the assailants, and -the astonishing spectacle was presented of fifteen hundred -men, driving by sheer valour and force of arms six thousand -good troops from ground so rugged, the numbers might have -been reversed and the defence made good without much -merit. Incalculable is the preponderance of moral power in -war! These were the Frenchmen who had assailed the -terrible rocks above Sauroren with a force and energy that -all the valour of the hardiest British veterans scarcely -sufficed to repel; yet now, five days only having elapsed, -although posted so strongly, they did not sustain the shock -of one-fourth of their own numbers! And at this very time, -eighty British soldiers, the comrades and equals of those who -achieved this wonderful exploit, having wandered to plunder, -surrendered to some French peasants, who as Lord Wellington -truly observed, “<em>they would under other circumstances have eat up</em>!”<span class="pagenum" id="Page_324">324</span> -What gross ignorance of human nature then do those writers -display, who assert, that the use of brute force is the highest -qualification of a general!</p> - -<p>Clausel fell back fighting to a strong ridge beyond the -pass of Echallar, having his right covered by the Ivantelly -mountain, which was strongly occupied. Meanwhile the -light division ascended the broad heights of Santa Barbara, -and halted until the operations of the fourth and seventh -divisions rendered it advisable to attack the Ivantelly, which -lifted its sugar-loaf head on their right rising as it were -out of the Santa Barbara heights, and shutting them off -from the ridges through which the troops beaten at Echallar -were now retiring. Evening was coming on, a thick mist -capped the crowning rocks, where a strong French regiment -was ensconced, and the division, besides its terrible march -the previous day, had been for two days without sustenance. -Weak and fainting, the soldiers were leaning on their arms -when the advancing fire at Echallar imported an attack on -the Ivantelly, and Andrew Barnard led five companies of -riflemen up the mountain. Four companies of the 43rd followed -in support, the misty cloud descended lower, the -riflemen were soon lost to the view, and the sharp clang of -their weapons, heard in distinct reply to the more sonorous -rolling musketry of the French, told what work was going -on. For some time the echoes rendered it doubtful how the -action went, but the companies of the 43rd could find no -trace of an enemy save the killed and wounded: Barnard -had fought his way unaided, and without a check to the -summit, where his dark-clothed swarthy veterans raised their -victorious shout on the highest peak, just as the coming night -showed the long ridges of the mountains beyond, sparkling -with the last musket-flashes from Clausel’s troops retiring in -disorder from Echallar.</p> - -<p>This day cost the British four hundred men, and Wellington -himself narrowly escaped the enemy’s hands. He -had taken towards Echallar half a company of the 43rd as -an escort, and placed a sergeant, named Blood, with a -party to watch in front while he examined his maps. A -French detachment endeavoured to cut the party off, and -their troops, rushing on at speed, would infallibly have -fallen unawares upon Wellington, if Blood, leaping down<span class="pagenum" id="Page_325">325</span> -the precipitous rocks, had not given him warning: as it -was, they arrived in time to send a volley after him while -galloping away.</p> - -<p>Now, after nine days of continual movement during which -ten serious actions had been fought, the operations ceased. -Of the allies, including the Spaniards, seven thousand three -hundred officers and soldiers had been killed, wounded, or -taken, and many were dispersed from fatigue or to plunder. -On the French side the loss was terrible, and the disorder -rendered the official returns inaccurate. Wellington called -it twelve thousand, but hearing the French officers admitted -more, raised his estimate to fifteen thousand. The engineer -<i>Belmas</i>, in his Journals of Sieges compiled from official -documents, sets down above thirteen thousand. Soult in -his official correspondence at the time, gave fifteen hundred -for Maya, four hundred for Roncesvalles, two hundred on -the 27th, eighteen hundred the 28th, after which he spoke -no more of losses by battle. There remain therefore to -be added, the combats of Linzoain, the battles of Sauroren -and Buenza on the 30th, the combats on the 31st, 1st and -2nd: finally, four thousand unwounded prisoners. Let this -suffice. It is not needful to sound the stream of blood in all -its horrid depths.</p> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_326">326</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="BOOK_XII">BOOK XII.</h2> -</div> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>Catalonia—Combat of Ordal—Renewed Siege of San Sebastian—Storm -of San Sebastian—Battles on the Bidassoa—Combat of San -Marcial—Combat of Vera.</p></div> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Catalonia.</span> (Sept. 1813.)</h3> - -<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">While</span> Wellington was thus victorious in Navarre, Lord W. -Bentinck, having reorganized Murray’s army at Alicant, -was pushing the war in Catalonia; for to that province -Suchet retired after the battle of Vittoria, relinquishing Valencia -and Aragon, though he knew Clausel was at Zaragoza. -But in every way his determination to act independently, -however injurious it might prove to the emperor’s interest, -was apparent. Had he joined Clausel, forty-five thousand -men, well based on fortresses, would have menaced Wellington’s -right flank when Soult took the command: neither -Sebastian nor Pampeluna could then have been invested, and -Soult’s recent defeats would have been spared.</p> - -<p>Lord William Bentinck had command of the Spanish -armies as well as his own, and Lord Wellington had -planned a cautious scheme for renewed operations, with -reference to his own position in the Pyrenees: but Lord -William, whose thoughts were running on Sicily and an -invasion of Italy, pushed headlong into Catalonia, and -though a brave and able man he did not meet with much -success. Having passed the Ebro late in July, leaving the -fortress of Tortoza behind him, he on the 30th sat down before -Tarragona with his own and Del Parque’s armies.</p> - -<p>Up to this time the Spaniards, giving copious but false -information to Lord William, and none to Suchet, had -induced a series of errors on both sides. The Englishman -thinking his adversary weak had pressed forwards rashly; -the Frenchman, deeming the other’s boldness the result of -strength, thought himself weak, and awaited reinforcements -from Upper Catalonia. Suchet first recognised his own -superior force, and advanced on the 16th of August to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_327">327</span> -attack with thirty thousand men; and then Lord William, -also discovering the true state of affairs, refused the battle -he had provoked and retired. He had indeed equal numbers, -yet of a quality not to be put in competition with his -opponents.</p> - -<p>During the retreat, his brother, Lord Frederick, being on -the left, defeated the French hussars with a loss of fifty men, -and it was said either General Habert or Harispe was taken -but escaped in the confusion. This checked the enemy, and -in the mountains above Tortoza the allies halted. Suchet -would not assail them there, but he destroyed the works of -Tarragona and took a permanent position behind the Llobregat, -thus giving up the fertile Campo de Tarragona, allowing -the allies to invest Tortoza, and isolating himself entirely -from the operations in Navarre, where he might have decided -the war. Seeing this timidity, Lord William again -moved forward, but again misled by false information, detached -Del Parque’s army by the way of Tudela to Navarre: -meanwhile going himself beyond Tarragona to Villa Franca, -he placed Colonel Adam with twelve hundred men ten miles -in advance, at the strong pass of Ordal.</p> - -<p>In this position, having lost Del Parque’s army, and left -Whittingham’s Spanish division in the rear for the sake of -subsistence, Lord William was exposed to a formidable -attack from Suchet, who had more than thirty thousand men -on the Llobregat, a few miles off. But he could only be -approached on two lines—one in front, from Molino del Rey, -by the royal road; the other on his left by Martorel and -San Sadurni. The first he blocked with Adam’s corps, at -Ordal, which he now reinforced with three battalions and -a squadron of Spanish cavalry; the second, a rugged and -difficult way, he guarded by two Catalan corps under Eroles -and Manso, reinforced with a Calabrese battalion: there was -indeed a third line on his right by Avionet, but it was little -better than a goat-path.</p> - -<p>He had designed to push his main body close to Ordal on -the evening of the 12th, yet from some slight cause, and in -war slight causes often determine the fate of nations, he delayed -it until next day. Meanwhile he viewed the country -in front of that defile without discovering an enemy, his -confidential emissaries assured him the French were not<span class="pagenum" id="Page_328">328</span> -going to advance, and he so expressed himself to Adam on -his return. A report of a contrary tendency was made by -Colonel Reeves of the 27th, on the authority of a Spanish -woman who had before proved her accuracy and ability as a -spy, but she was now disbelieved: this incredulity was unfortunate. -Suchet thus braved, and his communication with -Lerida threatened by Manso on the side of Martorel, was in -person actually marching to attack Ordal, and Decaen and -Maurice Mathieu were turning the left by San Sadurni.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Combat of Ordal.</span> (Sept. 1813.)</h3> - -<p>The heights occupied by Adam rose gradually from a magnificent -bridge, by which the main road was carried over a -deep impracticable ravine. The second battalion of the 27th -British Regiment was on the right, some Germans and Swiss -with six guns defended a dilapidated fort commanding the -main road; the Spaniards were in the centre; the Anglo-Calabrese -on the left; a British squadron of cavalry in reserve. -A bright moonlight facilitated the movements of the -French, three daring scouts sent in advance discovered the -state of affairs, and a little before midnight, the leading -column under General Mesclop passed the bridge without -let or hindrance, mounted the heights with a rapid pace and -driving back the picquets gave the first alarm. The first effort -was against the 27th, the Germans and Spanish battalions -were then assailed in succession as the French masses got -free of the bridge, but the Calabrese were too far on the left -to take a share in the action. The combat was fierce and -obstinate. Harispe, commanding the French, constantly -outflanked the right of the allies, and at the same time -pressed their centre, where the Spaniards fought gallantly. -Adam was wounded early, Reeves succeeded him, and -seeing his flank turned and his men falling fast, in short, -finding himself engaged with a whole army on a position of -which Adam had lost the key by neglecting the bridge, -resolved to retreat. He first ordered the guns to fall back, -but seeking to cover the movement by charging a column of -the enemy, which was pressing forward on the high-road, he -also fell severely wounded, and there was no recognised -commander on the spot to succeed him. Then the affair<span class="pagenum" id="Page_329">329</span> -became confused. For though the order to retreat was -given, the Spaniards continued to fight desperately, the 27th -thought it shame to abandon them, and as the Germans and -Swiss still held the old fort the guns came back. The action -was thus continued with great fury, and Colonel Carey, -bringing his Calabrese into line from the left, menaced the -right flank of the French. He was too late. The Spaniards, -overwhelmed in the centre, were by that time broken, the -right was completely turned, the old fort was lost, the -enemy’s skirmishers got into the rear, and at three o’clock -the allies dispersed, the most part in flight: the Spanish -cavalry were then overthrown on the main road by the -French hussars, and four guns were taken in the tumult.</p> - -<p>Captain Waldron with the 27th, reduced to eighty men, -being joined by Captain Müller with about the same number -of Germans and Swiss, broke through small parties of the -enemy and effected a retreat in good order by the hills on -each side of the road. Colonel Carey endeavoured to gain -the road of Sadurni on the left, but meeting with Decaen’s -people on that side retraced his steps, crossed the field of -battle in the rear of Suchet’s columns and made for Villa -Nueva de Sitjes, where he finally embarked without loss, -save a few stragglers. The overthrow was complete, and -the prisoners were at first very numerous, yet darkness -enabled many to escape, and two thousand men took refuge -with Manso and Eroles.</p> - -<p>Suchet, continuing his career, closed about nine o’clock -on Lord W. Bentinck, who retired skirmishing behind Villa -Franca. He was there assailed by the French horsemen, -some of which fell on his rear-guard while others edged to -their right to secure the communication with Decaen; the -latter was looked for by both parties with great anxiety, but -he had been delayed by the resistance of Manso and Eroles -in the rugged country between Martorel and Sadurni. -Suchet’s cavalry however, continued to infest the rear of -the retreating army until it reached a deep baranco, where, -the passage being dangerous and the French horsemen importunate, -that brave and honest soldier, Lord Frederick -Bentinck, charged their right, and fighting hand to hand -with the enemy’s general Myers, wounded him and overthrew -his squadron. They rallied indeed upon their dragoons<span class="pagenum" id="Page_330">330</span> -and endeavoured to turn the flank, but were stopped -by the fire of two guns; and meanwhile the French cuirassiers -on the left, while pressing the Brunswick hussars and -menacing the infantry, were roughly checked by the fire of -the 10th Regiment. This cavalry action was vigorous, and -the allies lost more than ninety men, but the baranco was -safely passed, and about three o’clock the pursuit ceased. -The Catalans meanwhile had retreated towards Igulada and -the Anglo-Sicilians retired to Tarragona.</p> - -<p>Lord William Bentinck then returned to Sicily, leaving -the command to Sir William Clinton. He had committed -errors, but the loss at Ordal was due to the folly of Colonel -Adam, and whoever relies on his capacity in peace or war -will be disappointed.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Renewed Siege of San Sebastian.</span> (Aug. 1813.)</h3> - -<p>After the combats of Echallar and Ivantelly Soult resumed -his former defensive positions, that is to say, from the mouth -of the Bidassoa up its right bank to Vera, and from thence -by the lower ranges of the Pyrenees to St. Jean Pied de -Port. Lord Wellington also reoccupied his old positions on the -main spine, and on the advanced counter ridges, which gave -him the command of the Bastan and the valley of San Estevan. -Many causes had concurred to deter him from pushing his -success, and though this termination was, perhaps, scarcely -defensible on high military principles, the difficulties were so -great that he contented himself with renewing the siege of -San Sebastian, the blockade of which had been always maintained.</p> - -<p>On the 8th of August the attack there was renewed by -sinking a shaft and driving a gallery to countermine the -enemy, who was supposed to be working under the cask redoubt; -but water rose to the height of twelve feet, the work -was discontinued, and the siege itself was vexatiously delayed -by the negligence of the English government in providing -guns and stores, and by the astounding insulting -refusal of the Admiralty to supply the necessary naval aid. -To use Lord Wellington’s expression, “<em>Since Great Britain -had been a naval power, a British army had never before been left in -such a situation at a most important moment.</em>”</p> - -<p>During this forced inactivity the garrison received supplies -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_331">331</span> -and reinforcements by sea, repaired the damaged works, -raised new defences, filled the magazines, and put sixty-seven -pieces of artillery in a condition to play. Eight hundred and -fifty men had been killed and wounded since the commencement -of the siege; but more than two thousand six hundred -good soldiers, still under arms, celebrated the emperor’s -birth-day by crowning the castle with a splendid illumination—encircling -it with a fiery legend to his honour in -characters so large as to be distinctly read by the besiegers.</p> - -<p>On the 19th of August, a battering train demanded by -Wellington three months before, did arrive from England, -and in the night of the 22nd fifteen heavy pieces were placed -in battery. A second battering train came on the 23rd, augmenting -the number of pieces to a hundred and seventeen; -but with characteristic official negligence, this enormous -armament brought shot and shells for only one day’s consumption!</p> - -<p>On the 24th the Chofre batteries were enlarged, and two -batteries were begun on the heights of Bartolomeo, designed -to breach the faces of the horn-work of St. John and the end -of the high curtain, which rose in gradation one above -another in the same line of shot. The approaches on the -isthmus were pushed forward by the sap, but the old trenches -were still imperfect, and at daylight on the 25th a sally from -the horn-work swept the left of the parallel, injured the sap, -and made some prisoners.</p> - -<p>On the 26th fifty-seven pieces opened with a general salvo, -and continued to play with astounding noise and rapidity -until evening. The firing from the Chofres destroyed the -revêtment of the demi-bastion of St. John, and nearly ruined -the towers at the old breach, together with the wall connecting -them; but from the isthmus, the batteries only injured -the horn-work, and Wellington, who was present at -this attack, ordered a new one of six guns to be constructed -amongst some ruined houses on the right of the parallel, and -only three hundred yards from the main front: two shafts -were also sunk for driving galleries to protect this battery -against the enemy’s mines.</p> - -<p>In the morning of the 27th the boats of the squadron, -carrying a hundred soldiers, put off to attack the island of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_332">332</span> -Santa Clara, and landed with some difficulty under a heavy -fire, yet took the island with a loss of twenty-eight men and -officers, eighteen being seamen.</p> - -<p>In the night of the 27th the French sallied against the -new battery on the isthmus, but on the edge of the trenches -the 9th Regiment met and checked them with the bayonet.</p> - -<p>At daybreak the besiegers’ fire was extremely heavy, and -the shrapnel shells were supposed to be destructive; the -practice was however very uncertain, the shells frequently -flew amongst the guards in the parallel, and one struck the -field-officer of the day. To meet sallies the trenches were -furnished with banquettes and parapets; yet the work was -slow, because the Spanish authorities of Guipuscoa neglected -to provide carts to convey materials from the woods, and this -hard labour was performed by the Portuguese soldiers.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington again visited the works on the 28th, and -in the night the advanced battery, which at the desire of the -chief engineer Fletcher had been constructed for only four -guns, was armed and opened the 29th; an accident kept back -one gun, the enemy’s fire dismounted another, and thus only -two instead of six guns, as Wellington had designed, smote -St. John and the end of the high curtain. The general firing -however damaged the castle and the town-works, their guns -were nearly silenced, and as sixty-three pieces, of which -twenty-nine threw shells or spherical case-shot, were now in -play from the Chofres, the superiority of the besiegers was -established.</p> - -<p>At this time the Urumea was discovered to be fordable -by Captain Alexander Macdonald of the artillery, who had -voluntarily waded across in the night, passed close under the -works to the breach and returned. Hence, as a few minutes -would suffice to bring the enemy into the Chofre batteries, -to save the guns from being spiked their vents were covered -with iron plates fastened by chains; and this was also done -at the advanced battery on the isthmus. The materials for -a battery to take the defences of the Monte Orgullo in reverse -were now sent to the island of Santa Clara, and some -pieces on the Chofres were turned against the retaining wall -of the horn-work, in the hope of shaking down any mines -there without destroying the wall itself, which offered cover -for the troops advancing to the assault.</p> - -<p>On the isthmus the trenches were wide and good, the sap -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_333">333</span> -was pushed to the demi-bastion of the horn-work, and the -sea-wall, supporting the high road into the town, which had -cramped the formation of the columns in the first assault, was -broken through, giving access to the strand and shortening -the way to the breaches.</p> - -<p>In this state a false attack was ordered in the night to -make the enemy spring his mines, a desperate service, executed -by Lieutenant Macadam. The order was sudden, no -volunteers were demanded, no rewards offered, no means of -excitement resorted to; yet such is the inherent bravery of -British soldiers, that seventeen men of the Royals, the nearest -at hand, immediately leaped forth ready and willing to encounter -what seemed certain death. With a rapid pace, all -the breaching batteries playing hotly at the time, they -reached the foot of the breach unperceived and rushed up -in extended order shouting and firing, but the French -musketry laid the whole party low with exception of their -commander.</p> - -<p>On the 30th, the sea flank of the place being opened from -the half-bastion of St. John to the most distant of the old -breaches, five hundred feet, the Chofre batteries were turned -against the castle and defences of Monte Orgullo, while the -advanced battery on the isthmus demolished, in conjunction -with the fire from the Chofres, the face of St. John and the -end of the high curtain above it. The whole of that quarter -was now in ruins, for the San Bartolomeo batteries had -broken the demi-bastion of the horn-work and cut away the -palisades. Then Wellington, again coming to the siege, resolved -to make a lodgement on the breach, and ordered an -assault for the next day at eleven o’clock, when the ebb of -tide would leave full space between the horn-work and the -water.</p> - -<p>The galleries on the isthmus had now been pushed close -up to the sea wall, and three mines were formed, with the -double object of opening an easy way for the troops to -reach the strand, and rendering useless any subterranean -defensive works of the enemy. At two o’clock in the morning -they were sprung and opened three wide passages, -which were immediately connected, and a traverse, six feet -high, was run across the mouth of the main trench on the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_334">334</span> -left, to screen the opening from the grape-shot of the castle. -Everything was then ready for the assault, but ere that -terrible event is told the French state of defence must be -made known.</p> - -<p>General Graham had been before the place fifty-two days, -during thirty of which the attack was suspended. All that -time the garrison had laboured incessantly, and though the -heavy fire of the besiegers since the 26th appeared to have -ruined the defences of the enormous breach in the sea flank, -it was not so. A perpendicular fall behind of more than -twenty feet barred progress, and beyond that, amongst the -ruins of the burned houses, was a strong counter wall fifteen -feet high, loopholed for musketry and extending in a -parallel direction with the breaches, which were also cut -off from the sound part of the rampart by traverses at the -extremities. The only really practicable road into the town -was by the narrow end of the high curtain above the half -bastion of St. John.</p> - -<p>In front of the loopholed wall, about the middle of the -great breach, stood the tower of Los Hornos, still capable -of some defence, and beneath it a mine was charged with -twelve hundred weight of powder. The streets were all -trenched and furnished with traverses to cover a retreat -to Monte Orgullo; and before the main breach could be -even reached a lodgement was to be effected in the horn-work; -or, as in the former assault, the advance made under -a flanking fire of musketry for two hundred yards, the first -step being close to the sea wall at a salient angle, where -two mines charged with eight hundred pounds of powder -were prepared to overwhelm the advancing columns. To -support this system of retrenchments and mines there was -still one sixteen-pounder at St. Elmo, flanking the left of -the breaches on the river face; a twelve and an eight-pounder -in the casemates of the cavalier, to sweep the land -face of St. John; many guns from the Monte Orgullo, also -especially those at the Mirador, could play on the advancing -columns, and there was a four-pounder hidden on the horn-work -to open during the assault. Neither the resolution -of the governor nor the courage of the garrison was abated, -but the overwhelming fire had reduced the fighting men, -and Rey, who had only two hundred and fifty in reserve,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_335">335</span> -demanded of Soult whether his brave garrison should be -exposed to another assault. “<em>The army would endeavour to -succour him</em>,” was the reply, and he abided his fate.</p> - -<p>This assault, before the defences were ruined, was obviously -a repetition of the former fatal error; and the same -generals who had before publicly disapproved of the operations -now more freely dealt out censures, which, not ill-founded, -were most ill-timed, because doubts descend from -the commanders to the soldiers. Lord Wellington thought -the fifth division had been thus discouraged, and incensed -at the cause, demanded fifty volunteers from each of the -fifteen regiments composing the first, fourth, and light divisions, -“<em>men who could show other troops how to mount a breach</em>.” -That was the phrase employed, and seven hundred and fifty -gallant soldiers instantly marched to San Sebastian in -answer to the appeal. Colonel Cooke and Major Robertson -led the Guards and Germans of the first division; Major -Rose commanded the men of the fourth division; Colonel -Hunt, an officer who had already won his promotion at -former assaults, led the fierce rugged veterans of the light -division, yet there were good officers and brave soldiers in -the fifth division.</p> - -<p>At first a simple lodgement on the great breach was designed, -and the volunteers and one brigade of the fifth -division only were to be employed; but in a council held at -night, the engineer Smith maintained that the orders were -misunderstood, as no lodgement could be formed unless the -high curtain was gained; General Oswald was of the same -opinion; wherefore the remainder of the fifth division was -brought to the trenches, and General Bradford, having -offered the services of his Portuguese brigade, had a discretion -to ford the Urumea from the Chofres and assail the farthest -breach.</p> - -<p>General Leith, commanding the fifth division, directed -the attack from the isthmus, and being offended at the -arrival of the volunteers would not suffer them to lead the -assault; some he spread along the trenches to keep down -the fire of the horn-work, the remainder he kept in reserve -with Hay’s British and Sprye’s Portuguese brigades. -Robinson’s brigade was to assault in two columns, one at -the old breach between the towers, the other at St. John<span class="pagenum" id="Page_336">336</span> -and the end of the high curtain. The small breach was left -for Bradford, and some large boats filled with troops were -to menace the back of Monte Orgullo from the ocean: Graham -overlooked all the operations from the Chofres.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Storming of San Sebastian.</span> (Aug. 1813.)</h3> - -<p>The morning of the 31st broke heavily, and as a thick fog -hid every object the batteries could not open until eight -o’clock, but from that hour a constant shower of heavy -missiles poured upon the besieged until eleven: then Robinson’s -brigade got out of the trenches, passed through the -openings in the sea-wall and was launched against the -breaches. While this column was gathering on the strand, -near the salient angle of the horn-work, twelve men under -a sergeant, whose heroic death has not sufficed to preserve -his name, running violently forward, leaped on the covered -way to cut the sausage of the enemy’s mines, and the French -fired the train prematurely; the sergeant and his brave followers -were destroyed, and the high sea-wall was thrown -with a dreadful crash upon the head of the advancing -column, but not more than forty men were crushed and the -rush was scarcely checked. The forlorn hope had previously -passed beyond the play of the mine, speeding along -the strand amidst a shower of grape and shells, the leader, -Lieutenant Macguire of the 4th Regiment, conspicuous from -his long white plume, his fine figure, and his swiftness, bounding -far ahead of his men in all the pride of youthful strength -and courage, but at the foot of the great breach he fell -dead, and the stormers swept like a dark surge over his -body: many died with him and the trickling of wounded -men to the rear was incessant.</p> - -<p>A broad strand had been left by the retreating tide, and -the sun had dried the rocks, yet they still broke the ranks -and the main breach was two hundred yards off; the French -also, seeing the first mass of assailants pass the horn-work -without attacking, crowded to the river face and poured -their musketry into the flank of the second column as it -rushed along a few yards below them: yet still running -forward the British returned this fire without slackening -their speed. Then the batteries of the Monte Orgullo and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_337">337</span> -the St. Elmo sent showers of shot and shells down on them, -the two pieces on the cavalier swept the breach in St. John, -and the four-pounder in the horn-work, being suddenly -mounted on the broken bastion, poured grape-shot into -their rear.</p> - -<p>Although scourged thus with fire, and their array broken -by shot and by the rocks, the stormers reached the great -breach and the head of the first column mounted; but the -unexpected gulf beyond could only be passed at a few places -where meagre parcels of the burned houses were still -attached to the rampart, and the deadly clatter of the -French muskets from the loop-holed wall beyond soon -strewed the narrow crest of the ruins with dead. In vain -the following multitude, covering the ascent, sought an entrance -at every part; to advance was impossible and the -mass slowly sunk downwards, yet remained stubborn and -immoveable on the lower part. There they were covered -from the musketry in front, yet from several isolated points, -especially the tower of Los Hornos under which the great -mine was placed, the French still struck them with small -arms, and the artillery from Monte Orgullo poured shells -and grape without intermission.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile at the St. John affairs were worse. To reach -the top of the high curtain was quite practicable, and the -effort to force a way there being strenuous and constant, -the slaughter was in proportion; for the traverse on the -flank was defended by French grenadiers who would not -yield, the two guns on the cavalier swept the front face, and -the four-pounder and the musketry from the horn-work -swept the river face. In the midst of this destruction some -sappers and a working party attached to the assaulting -columns endeavoured to form a lodgement; but no artificial -materials had been provided, and most of the labourers were -killed before they could raise cover.</p> - -<p>During this time the British batteries kept up a constant -counter-fire, which killed many French, and the reserve brigades -of the 5th division gradually fed the attack until the -left wing of the 9th Regiment only remained in the trenches. -The volunteers who had been with difficulty restrained in -the parallel, calling out to know, “<em>why they had been brought -there if they were not to lead the assault</em>,”—these fierce and terrible<span class="pagenum" id="Page_338">338</span> -men, whose presence had given such offence to Leith -that he would have kept them altogether from the assault, -being now perforce let loose, went like a whirlwind to the -breaches and swarmed up the face of the ruins; but on the -crest the stream of fire struck and they came down like a -falling wall; crowd after crowd were seen to mount, to -totter, to sink, and when the smoke floated away the summit -bore no living man.</p> - -<p>Graham, standing on the nearest of the Chofre batteries, -beheld this frightful destruction with a stern resolution to -win at any cost, and he was a man to have put himself at -the head of the last company and died sword in hand rather -than sustain a second defeat: but neither his confidence nor -his resources were yet exhausted. He directed a new attack -on the horn-work, and concentrating the fire of fifty heavy -pieces upon the high curtain sent his shot over the heads of -the troops gathered at the foot of the breach; a fearful stream -of missiles, which pouring along the upper surface of the -high curtain broke down the traverses, shattering all things, -and strewing the rampart with the mangled limbs of the defenders. -When this flight of bullets first swept over the -heads of the soldiers a cry arose from some inexperienced -people, “<em>to retire because the batteries were firing on the stormers</em>;” -but the veterans of the light division, being at that point, -were not to be so disturbed, and in the very heat and fury -of the cannonade effected a solid lodgement in some house -ruins actually within the rampart, on the right of the great -breach.</p> - -<p>For half an hour the horrid tempest smote upon the works -and the houses behind, and then suddenly ceased, when the -clatter of French muskets was again heard, showing that the -assailants were still in activity. At the same time the 13th -Portuguese Regiment under Major Snodgrass, followed by a -detachment of the 24th under Colonel Macbean, entered the -river from the Chofres. The ford was deep, the water rose -above the waist, and when the soldiers reached the middle -of the stream, two hundred yards wide, a shower of grape -struck the column with terrible havoc, yet the survivors -closed and moved on; a second discharge tore the ranks from -front to rear; still the regiment moved on, and amidst a confused -fire of musketry from the ramparts, and artillery from<span class="pagenum" id="Page_339">339</span> -St. Elmo, the castle, and the Mirador, landed and rushed -against the third breach, while Macbean’s men reinforced the -great breach. The fighting then again became fierce and -obstinate at all the breaches; yet the French musketry -rolled with deadly effect, the heaps of slain increased, and -once more the great mass of stormers sunk to the foot of -the ruins unable to win: the living sheltered themselves as -they could, and the dead and wounded lay so thickly that -hardly could it be judged whether the hurt or unhurt were -most numerous.</p> - -<p>It was now evident the assault must fail unless some accident -intervened; for the tide was rising, the reserves all -engaged, and no greater effort could be expected from men -whose passionate courage had been already pushed to the -verge of madness. Fortune intervened. A number of powder -barrels, live shells, and combustible materials accumulated -behind the traverses caught fire, a bright consuming flame -wrapped the high curtain, a succession of explosions followed, -hundreds of the French grenadiers were destroyed; the rest -were thrown into confusion, and while the ramparts were -still involved with suffocating eddies of smoke the British -soldiers broke in at the first traverse. The French, bewildered -by this terrible disaster, yielded for a moment, yet -soon rallied, and a close desperate struggle took place along -the summit of the high curtain, but the fury of the stormers, -whose numbers increased every moment, could not be stemmed; -the colours on the cavalier were torn away by Lieutenant -Gethin of the 11th Regiment; the horn-work, the land -front below the curtain, and the loop-holed wall behind the -great breach, all were abandoned, and then the light division -soldiers, already established in the ruins on the French left, -penetrated into the streets; and at the same moment the -Portuguese at the small breach, mixed with British who had -wandered to that point seeking for an entrance, burst in on -their side.</p> - -<p>Five hours this dreadful battle had lasted at the walls, -and now the stream of war went pouring into the town; yet -the undaunted governor still disputed the victory at his barricades, -although several hundreds of men had been cut off -in the horn-work, and his garrison was so reduced that even -to retreat behind the line of defence separating the town<span class="pagenum" id="Page_340">340</span> -from Monte Orgullo was difficult: however the troops, flying -from the horn-work on the harbour flank, broke through a -body of the British near the fortified convent of Santa Téresa, -and that post was still retained by the French within the -town. It was thought Monte Orgullo might have been then -carried if a commander of rank to direct the troops had been -at hand; but, as in the first assault, whether from wounds or -accident no general entered the place until long after the -breach had been won, the battalion officers were embarrassed -for want of orders, and a thunder-storm, coming down the -mountains with unbounded fury just as the place was carried, -added to the confusion of the fight—the opportunity was -lost.</p> - -<p>This storm seemed to be a signal from hell for the perpetration -of villany which would have shamed the most ferocious -barbarians of antiquity. At Ciudad Rodrigo intoxication -and plunder had been the principal objects; at Badajos -lust and murder were joined to rapine and drunkenness; at -San Sebastian, the direst, the most revolting cruelty was -added to the catalogue of crimes: one atrocity, of which a -girl of seventeen was the victim, staggers the mind by its -enormous, incredible, indescribable barbarity. Some order -was at first maintained, but the resolution to throw off discipline -was quickly made manifest. A British staff-officer was -pursued with a volley of small arms and escaped with difficulty -from men who mistook him for a provost-marshal; a -Portuguese adjutant, striving to prevent some ruffianism, was -put to death in the market-place, not with sudden violence -but deliberately. Many officers exerted themselves to preserve -order, many men were well-conducted, yet the rapine -and violence commenced by villains soon spread, the camp-followers -crowded into the place, and the disorder continued -until fire, following the steps of the plunderer, put an end to -his ferocity by destroying the whole town.</p> - -<p>Three generals, Leith, Oswald, and Robinson, had been -hurt in the trenches; Sir Richard Fletcher, a brave man, was -killed; Colonel Burgoyne, next in command of the engineers, -was wounded. The carnage at the breaches was appalling. -Nearly half the volunteers were struck down, the fifth division -suffered in the same proportion, and the whole loss -since the renewal of the siege exceeded two thousand five<span class="pagenum" id="Page_341">341</span> -hundred men and officers. Amongst the last may be mentioned -Lieutenant John O’Connel of the 43rd, in blood -nearly related to the celebrated turbulent agitator. He was -gentle, amiable, and modest, and brave as man could be, -and having previously been in several storming parties here -again sought in such dangerous service the promotion he -had earned before without receiving—he found death.</p> - -<p>Monte Orgullo was now to be attacked. Steep and difficult -to assail it was, and just below the castle four batteries -connected with masonry were stretched across its face; from -their extremities, also, ramps protected by redans led to the -convent of Santa Téresa, the most salient part of the defence. -Towards the harbour and behind the mountain were sea batteries, -and if all these works had been of good construction and -defended by fresh troops the siege would have been difficult; -but the garrison was shattered by the recent assault, most of -the engineers were killed, the governor wounded, five -hundred men sick or hurt, and the soldiers fit for duty, only -thirteen hundred, had four hundred prisoners to guard. The -castle was small, the bomb-proofs filled with ammunition -and provisions, and but ten guns were left for service, three -being on the sea line. There was little water, and the -soldiers had to lie on the naked rock, exposed to fire, or only -covered by asperities of ground; they were however still resolute -to fight, and received nightly, by sea, supplies of -ammunition in small quantities.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington arrived the day after the assault, and -judging regular approaches up the naked rock impracticable, -doubting also the power of vertical fire, he resolved -to breach the remaining line of defence and then -storm the Orgullo. Meanwhile from the Santa Téresa -convent, which was actually in the town, the French killed -many men; and when, after several days, it was assaulted, -they set the lower parts on fire and retired by a communication -from the roof to a ramp on the hill behind. All this -time the flames were licking up the houses, and the Orgullo -was overwhelmed with vertical fire.</p> - -<p>On the 3rd of September the governor was summoned, he -was unshaken, and the vertical fire was continued day and -night, the British prisoners suffering as well as the enemy; -for the officer in the castle, irritated by the misery of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_342">342</span> -garrison, cruelly refused to let the unfortunate captives make -trenches to cover themselves. The French however complain, -that their wounded and sick men, placed in an empty -magazine with a black flag flying, were fired upon, although -the English prisoners, in their uniforms, were posted around -to strengthen the claim of humanity.</p> - -<p>New breaching batteries were now commenced and armed -with guns, brought from the Chofres at low water across the -Urumea, at first in the night, but the difficulty of labouring -in the water during darkness finally induced the artillery -officers to transport them in daylight under the enemy’s -batteries, which did not however fire. In the town labour -was impeded by the flaming houses, but near the foot of -the Orgullo the ruins furnished shelter for musketeers to -gall the garrison, and the Santa Clara Island battery -was actively worked by the seamen. With the besieged -ammunition was scarce, and the horrible vertical fire, contrary -to Lord Wellington’s expectation, subdued their -energy; yet the action was prolonged until the 8th of September, -when fifty-nine heavy battering pieces opened at -once from the island, the isthmus, the horn-work and the -Chofres. In two hours the Mirador and Queen’s battery -were broken, the French fire extinguished, and the hill furrowed -in a frightful manner; the bread-ovens were destroyed, -a magazine exploded, and the castle, small and crowded -with men, was overlaid with the descending shells. Then -proudly bending to fate the governor surrendered. On the 9th -this brave man and his heroic garrison, reduced to one-third -of their original number, and leaving five hundred wounded -behind, marched out with the honours of war. The siege -thus terminated, after sixty-three days’ open trenches, and -just as the tempestuous season, then beginning to vex the -coast, would have rendered a continuance of the sea blockade -impossible.</p> - -<p>The excesses committed in the storming of San Sebastian -caused great indignation in Spain, and justly; but they were -used by the Spanish government to create a hatred of the -British army, and, horrible as were the facts, it is certain -the atrocities were the work of a few. Writers have not -been wanting however to excuse them on the insulting -ground, that no soldiers can be restrained after storming a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_343">343</span> -town and British soldiers least of all, because they are -brutish and insensible to honour! Shame on such calumnies! -What makes the British soldier fight as no other soldier ever -fights? His pay! Soldiers of all nations receive pay. At -the period of this assault, a sergeant of the 28th, named Ball, -being sent with a party to the coast from Roncesvalles to -make purchases for his officers, placed two thousand dollars -entrusted to him with a commissary, secured his receipt and -persuaded his party to join in the storm. He survived, -reclaimed the money, made his purchases, and returned to -his regiment. And these are the men, these the spirits who -are called too brutish to work upon except by fear! It is to -fear they are most insensible!</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Battles on the Bidassoa.</span> (Aug. 1813.)</h3> - -<p>While Sebastian was being stormed Soult fought a battle -with the covering force, not willingly, nor with much hope of -success; but being averse to let it fall without another effort, -he thought a bold demeanour would best hide his real weakness. -Guided however by the progress of the siege, which -he knew through his sea communication, he awaited the last -moment of action, striving meanwhile to improve his resources -and revive public confidence. Of his dispersed -soldiers eight thousand had rejoined, and he was promised a -reinforcement of thirty thousand conscripts; but these last -were yet to be enrolled, and neither the progress of the siege -nor the panic along the frontier, which recurred with -increased violence after the late battles, would suffer him to -wait.</p> - -<p>He knew his enemy’s superior strength in positions, number -and military confidence, yet expected, as his former -effort had interrupted the siege, another would produce a -like effect; and he hoped, by repeating the disturbance, as -long as he could by sea reinforce and supply the garrison, -to render the siege a wasting operation. To renew the -movement against Pampeluna was most advantageous, but it -required fifty thousand infantry for attack, twenty thousand -for observation on the Lower Bidassoa, and he had not so -many. His supplies also were uncertain, the loss of all the -military carriages at Vittoria was still felt, the resources of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_344">344</span> -the country were reluctantly yielded by the people, and to -act on the side of St. Jean Pied de Port was therefore impracticable.</p> - -<p>To attack the allies’ centre was unpromising. Two mountain-chains -were to be forced before the movement could -seriously affect Wellington, and as the ways were impracticable -for guns success would not give any decisive result. -To attack the left of the allies by the great road of Irun -remained. He could there employ forty-five thousand infantry, -but the positions were of perilous strength. The Upper -Bidassoa was in Wellington’s power, because the light division, -occupying Vera and the heights of Santa Barbara on -the right bank, commanded all the bridges. The Lower -Bidassoa, flowing from Vera with a bend to the left, separated -the hostile armies, and against that line, of nine miles, -the attack was necessarily directed. From the broken bridge -of Behobia, in front of Irun, to the sea, the river, broad and -tidal, offered no apparent passage; from the fords of Biriatu -up to those of Vera, three miles, there was only the one passage -of Andarlassa, two miles below Vera, and there steep -craggy mountain-ridges without roads lining the river forbade -great operations. Thus the points of attack were -restricted to Vera itself and the fords between Biriatu and -Behobia.</p> - -<p>To gain Oyarzun, a small town eight miles beyond the -Bidassoa and close to Passages, was Soult’s object, and a -royal road led directly to it by a broad valley between the -Peña de Haya and Jaizquibel mountains; but the Peña de -Haya, called also the four-crowned mountain, filled all the -space between Vera, Lesaca, Irun and Oyarzun, and its -staring head, bound with a rocky diadem, was impassable: -from the bridges of Vera and Lesaca, however, roads, one of -them not absolutely impracticable for guns, passed over its -enormous flanks to Irun on one side, to Oyarzun on the other, -falling into the royal road at both places. Soult therefore -proposed to drive the light division from Santa Barbara, and -use the bridges of Lesaca and Vera to force a passage over -the Peña de Haya on his own right of its summit, pushing -the heads of columns towards Oyarzun and the Upper Urumea, -while Reille and Villatte, passing the Bidassoa at Biriatu, -forced their way by the royal road.</p> - -<p>Soon he changed this plan, and with great caution and -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_345">345</span> -subtilty brought his left from St. Jean Pied de Port to his -right, masking the movement by his cavalry, and thus -formed two columns of attack on the Lower Bidassoa. One -under Clausel, of twenty thousand men with twenty pieces -of artillery, was concentrated in the woods behind the Commissari -and Bayonette mountains above Vera. The other -under Reille, eighteen thousand strong, was placed on the -Lower Bidassoa, having Foy’s division and some light cavalry -in the rear ready to augment it to twenty-five thousand. -Thirty-six pieces of artillery and two bridge equipages were -disposed near Urogne, on the royal road, all being secreted -behind the lower ridge of the mountains near Biriatu.</p> - -<p>Soult’s first design was to attack at daybreak on the 30th, -but his preparations being incomplete he deferred it until -the 31st, taking rigorous precautions to prevent intelligence -passing over to the allies; Wellington’s emissaries had, however, -told him in the night of the 29th that the French were -in movement, and the augmentation of troops in front of -Irun was observed in the morning of the 30th. In the evening -the bridge equipage and the artillery were discovered on -the royal road, and thus warned he prepared for battle with -little anxiety; for a fresh brigade of English foot-guards, -most of the marauders and men wounded at Vittoria, and -three regiments from England, forming a new brigade under -Lord Aylmer, had recently joined.</p> - -<p>His extreme left was on the Jaizquibel, a narrow mountain-ridge -seventeen hundred feet high, running along the -coast and abutting at one end on the Passages harbour, at the -other on the navigable mouth of the Bidassoa. Offering no -mark for attack, it was only guarded by some Spaniards; -but the small fort of Figueras, commanding the entrance of -the river at its foot, was garrisoned by seamen from the naval -squadron, and Fuenterabia, a walled place, also at its base, -was occupied.</p> - -<p>The low ground between Fuenterabia and Irun was defended -by large field redoubts, connecting the Jaizquibel -with some heights covering the royal road to Oyarzun.</p> - -<p>On the right of Irun, between Biriatu and the burned -bridge of Behobia, a sudden bend in the river presented the -convex to the French, who thus commanded the fords; but<span class="pagenum" id="Page_346">346</span> -beyond those fords was a stiff and lofty ridge, called San -Marcial, terminating one of the great flanks of the Peña de -Haya. The water flowed round the left of this ridge, confining -the road from the Behobia bridge to Irun, one mile, -to the narrow space between the channel and the foot of the -height; Irun itself, defended by a field-work, blocked this -way; and hence the French, after passing the river, had to -win San Marcial before they could use the great road; but -six thousand Spaniards occupied that strong ridge, which -was strengthened by abbattis and temporary field-works.</p> - -<p>Behind Irun the first British division was posted under -General Howard, and Lord Aylmer’s brigade supported the -left of the Spaniards.</p> - -<p>San Marcial, receding from the river on the right, was -exposed to an enemy passing above Biriatu; but Longa’s -Spaniards, drawn off from those slopes of the Peña de Haya -descending towards Vera, were posted on those descending -towards Biriatu, where they supported the right of the -Spaniards on San Marcial.</p> - -<p>Eighteen thousand fighting men were thus in position, and -as the fourth division was still disposable, a Portuguese -brigade was detached from it to replace Longa near Vera, -and cover the roads from that place over the flanks of the -Peña de Haya. The British brigades of that division were -stationed up the mountain, near the foundry of San Antonio, -commanding the intersection of the roads coming from Vera -and Lesaca, and furnishing a reserve to the Portuguese brigade, -to Longa, and to San Marcial—tying all together. The Portuguese -brigade being however too weak to guard the enormous -slopes near Vera, Inglis’s brigade was drawn from Echallar -to reinforce it; yet the flanks of the Peña de Haya were so -rough and vast the troops seemed sprinkled rather than posted.</p> - -<p>In the night of the 30th Soult placed his guns, and gave -his orders. Reille was to storm San Marcial, to leave a -strong reserve there to meet troops coming from Vera or -descending the Peña de Haya, and with the rest of his force -drive the allies from ridge to ridge, until he gained the slope -of the mountain which descends upon Oyarzun. When the -royal road was thus opened, Foy’s infantry, with the cavalry -and artillery in one column, were to cross by bridges to be -laid during the fight.</p> - -<p>To aid Reille’s progress and provide for a general concentration -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_347">347</span> -at Oyarzun, Clausel was to make a simultaneous -attack from Vera; not as first designed, by driving the allies -from Santa Barbara, but, leaving one division and his guns -to keep the light division in check, to cross the river by -fords just below the town of Vera and assail the Portuguese -brigade and Inglis, forcing his way upwards to the forge of -Antonio, from whence he was to fall down again on the rear -of San Marcial, or move on Oyarzun.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Combat of San Marcial.</span> (Aug. 1813.)</h3> - -<p>At daylight on the 31st, Reille forded the Bidassoa above -Biriatu with two divisions and two pieces of artillery, to -seize a detached ridge just under San Marcial. Leaving -there one brigade as a reserve, he detached another to attack -the Spanish left, while in person he assailed their right. The -side of the mountain was covered with brushwood and very -steep, the French troops preserved no order, the supports -and skirmishers got mixed in one mass, and the charging -Spaniards drove them headlong down.</p> - -<p>During this action two bridges were thrown below the -fords, by which Villatte’s reserve crossed and renewed the -fight; one of his brigades reached the chapel San Marcial -above, and the left of the Spanish line was shaken; but -then the 85th, from Lord Aylmer’s brigade, advanced to -support, and at that moment Wellington rode up with all -his staff. He exhorted the Spaniards, and they, with a -noble instinct which never abandons the poor people of any -country, acknowledged real greatness without reference to -nation; for, shouting in reply they dashed their adversaries -down with so much violence that many were driven into -the river, and some of the French pontoon boats coming -to the succour were overloaded and sunk. It was several -hours before the broken and confused masses could be -rallied, or the bridges, which were broken up to let the -boats save the drowning men, be replaced. When that was -effected, Soult sent the whole of Villatte’s reserve over the -river, called up Foy, and prepared a better attack: with -greater hope of success, also, because Clausel was now -making good way up the Peña de Haya.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_348">348</span></p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Combat of Vera.</span> (Aug. 1813.)</h3> - -<p>Clausel had descended the Bayonette and Commissari -mountains at daybreak in a thick fog, but at seven o’clock -the weather cleared, and three heavy columns were seen by -the troops on Santa Barbara making for the fords below -Vera. A fourth column and the guns remained stationary -on the mountains, the artillery opening now and then upon -Vera, from which the picquets of the light division were -recalled, with the exception of one post in a fortified house -commanding the bridge. At eight o’clock the French -passed the fords, covered by a fire of artillery, but the first -shells thrown fell into the midst of their own ranks, and -the British troops on Santa Barbara cheered their battery -with a derisive shout. Their march was however sure, and -their light troops, without knapsacks, soon commenced -battle with the Portuguese brigade, forcing it to retire up -the mountain. Inglis fed his line of skirmishers until the -whole of his brigade was engaged, but Clausel menaced his -left flank from the lowest ford, and the French skirmishers -still forced their way upwards in front until the contending -masses disappeared fighting amidst the asperities of the -Peña de la Haya. The British lost two hundred and seventy -men and twenty-two officers, and were driven up to the -fourth division at the foundry of San Antonio.</p> - -<p>This fight, from the great height and asperity of the -mountain, occupied many hours, and it was past two o’clock -before even the head of Clausel’s column reached Antonio. -Meanwhile, his reserve in front of Santa Barbara made no -movement, and as Wellington had directed the light division -to aid Inglis, a wing of the 43rd, three companies of riflemen -and three weak Spanish battalions, drawn from Echallar, -crossed the Bidassoa by the Lesaca bridge and marched -towards some lower slopes on the right of Inglis. This -covered a knot of minor communications coming from Lesaca -and Vera, and the remainder of Kempt’s brigade occupied -Lesaca itself. Thus the chain of connection and defence -between Santa Barbara and the positions of the fourth -division on the Peña de la Haya was completed.</p> - -<p>Clausel seeing these movements, thought the allies at -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_349">349</span> -Echallar and Santa Barbara were only awaiting to take him -in flank and rear by the bridges of Vera and Lesaca, wherefore -he abated his battle and informed Soult of his views, -and his opinion was well-founded. Wellington was not a -general to have half his army paralyzed by D’Erlon’s divisions -in the centre, and had on the 30th, when Soult first assembled -in front of San Marcial, ordered attacks to be made -upon D’Erlon from Echallar, Zagaramurdi and Maya; Hill -also had been directed to show the heads of columns towards -St. Jean Pied de Port; and on the 31st, when the force and -direction of Clausel’s columns were known, the seventh -division was called to Lesaca.</p> - -<p>Following these orders, Giron’s Spaniards skirmished on -the 30th with the advanced posts in front of Sarre, and next -day the whole line was assailed. Two Portuguese brigades -drove the French from their camp behind Urdax and burned -it, but Abbé who commanded there, collecting all his force -on an intrenched position made strong battle and repulsed -the attack. Thus five combats besides the assault on Sebastian -were fought in one day at different points of the general -line, and D’Erlon who had lost three or four hundred men, -seeing a fresh column coming from Maya, as if to turn his -left, judged that a great movement against Bayonne was in -progress and sent notice to Soult. He was mistaken. Wellington -only sought by these demonstrations to disturb the -French plan of attack, and the seventh division marched -towards Lesaca.</p> - -<p>D’Erlon’s despatch reached Soult at the same time that -Clausel’s report arrived. All his arrangements for a final -attack on San Marcial were then completed, but these reports -and the ominous cannonade at San Sebastian, plainly heard -during the morning, induced him to abandon this project -and prepare to receive a general battle on the Nivelle. In -this view he sent Foy’s infantry and six troops of dragoons -to the heights of Serres, behind the Nivelle, as a support to -D’Erlon, and directed Clausel to repass the Bidassoa in the -night, to leave a division on the Bayonette mountain and -join Foy at Serres.</p> - -<p>Reille’s troops were not recalled from San Marcial and the -battle went on sharply; for the Spaniards continually detached<span class="pagenum" id="Page_350">350</span> -men from the crest to drive the French from the lower -ridges into the river until about four o’clock, when, their -hardihood abating, they desired to be relieved; but Wellington, -careful of their glory, and seeing the French attacks -were exhausted, refused to relieve or aid them. It would -not be just to measure their valour by this fact; the English -general blushed while he called upon them to fight; knowing -they had been previously famished by their vile government, -and that there were no hospitals to receive, no care for them -when wounded. The battle was however arrested by a tempest, -which commenced about three o’clock and raged for -several hours with wonderful violence, tearing huge branches -from the trees, and whirling them through the air like feathers -on the howling winds, while the thinnest streams -swelling into torrents dashed down the mountains, rolling -innumerable stones along with a frightful clatter. Amidst -this turmoil and under cover of night the French re-crossed -the river at San Marcial.</p> - -<p>Clausel’s retreat was more unhappy. The order to retire -reached him when the storm had put an end to all fighting, -and he repassed the fords in person before dark at the head -of two brigades, ordering General Vandermaesen to follow -with the remainder of the troops. Expecting no difficulty, -he neglected to seize the bridge of Vera and the fortified -house covering it, occupying himself with suggesting new -projects to Soult. Meanwhile Vandermaesen’s situation became -desperate. Many of his soldiers were drowned by the -rising waters, and finally, unable to effect a passage at the -fords, he marched up the stream to seize the bridge of Vera, -which Clausel should have done before. His advanced guard -surprised a corporal’s picquet and rushed over, but was -driven back by a rifle company posted in the fortified house. -This happened at three o’clock in the morning, and the -riflemen defended the passage until daylight, when a second -company and some Portuguese Caçadores came to their aid. -But then the French reserve left at Vera, seeing how -matters stood, opened a fire of guns against the house from a -high rock just above, and their skirmishers approached it on -the right bank, while Vandermaesen plied his musketry from -the left bank: the two rifle captains and many men fell -under this cross fire and the passage was forced; but Vandermaesen,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_351">351</span> -urging the attack in person, was killed, and more -than two hundred of his soldiers were hurt.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile Soult, who was preparing a new attack on San -Marcial, got Rey’s report of the assault on San Sebastian, and -also heard that Hill was moving on the side of St. Jean Pied -de Port. San Sebastian was lost, an attempt to carry off the -garrison of the castle would cost five or six thousand men, -and the whole army would be endangered amongst the terrible -asperities of the crowned mountain; for Wellington -could now throw his right and centre, thirty-five thousand -men, upon the French left during the action, and would be -nearer to Bayonne than their right when the battle was -beyond the Lower Bidassoa. Three thousand six hundred -men had been lost, one general had been killed, four -wounded; a fresh attempt would be very dangerous, and -serious losses might cause an immediate invasion of France. -Reflecting on these things, he resolved to adopt defensive -measures at once, for which his vast knowledge of war, his -foresight, his talent for methodical arrangement, and his -firmness of character, peculiarly fitted him. Twelve battles -or combats in seven weeks he had delivered to regain the -offensive, unsuccessfully; yet willing still to strive, he called -on Suchet to aid him, and demanded fresh orders from the -emperor; but Suchet helped him not, and Napoleon’s answer -indicated at once his own difficulties and his reliance upon -the Duke of Dalmatia’s capacity and fidelity. “<em>I have given -you my confidence and can add neither to your means nor to your -instructions.</em>”</p> - -<p>In this straggling battle the loss of the allies had been -one thousand Anglo-Portuguese and sixteen hundred Spaniards: -hence the cost of men on the day, including the -assault, exceeded five thousand; but the battle in no manner -disturbed the siege; the French army was powerless against -such strong positions.</p> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_352">352</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="BOOK_XIII">BOOK XIII.</h2> -</div> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>English Passage of the Bidassoa and Second Combat of Vera—The -Passage of the Lower Bidassoa—Second Combat of Vera—Battle -of the Nivelle; Characters of Colonel Lloyd and Lieutenant Freer.</p></div> - -<h3><span class="smcap">English Passage of the Bidassoa and Second Combat of Vera</span> (Oct. 1813.)</h3> - -<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">The</span> fall of San Sebastian gave Lord Wellington a new port, -and let loose a considerable body of troops; Austria had -joined the allies in Germany; the English cabinet had promised -the continental sovereigns that France should be immediately -invaded; the English newspaper editors were -actively deceiving the people of all countries by their dictatorial -absurd projects and assumptions; the Bourbon -partizans were conspiring, and the Duke of Berri desired -to join the British army, pretending that twenty thousand -Frenchmen were armed and organized to receive him. All -was exultation and extravagance, but Wellington, despising -such inflated hopes and promises, exposed the absurdity of -the newspapers, and checked similar folly in higher places, by -observing, “<em>that if he had done all that was expected he should -have been before that period in the moon</em>.”</p> - -<p>Far from designing to invade France, he felt his own position -insecure while Suchet was master of Catalonia: and -he was only prevented from transferring the war to that province -by the disasters Napoleon now experienced in Germany, -rendering it impossible to reinforce Soult. However, -pressed by the ministers and the allied sovereigns, he so far -bent his military judgment to political pressure, as to undertake -the establishing his army in a menacing position on -French ground; and in that view matured an offensive -movement as daring as any undertaken during the whole -war. But to comprehend all the audacious grandeur of this -operation, the relative positions of the hostile armies must -be glanced at.</p> - -<p>Soult’s base and place of arms was Bayonne, from whence -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_353">353</span> -roads spread out to the Pyrenees like a fan. Two only were -great causeways. One, on the French left hand, run to St. -Jean Pied de Port; the other, on their right, run along the -sea-coast through St. Jean de Luz to Irun. Between these -points, a distance of nearly forty miles, the space was filled -transversely by a double range of mountain ridges nearly -parallel to each other, on which the armies were posted; not -in a continuous line, for there were no direct lateral communications, -but as the passes and inaccessible peaks governed -the dispositions. Thus on the French left, at St. Jean Pied -de Port, Foy occupied with fifteen thousand men an entrenched -camp in front of that fortress, and was opposed by -Hill’s right wing, which was planted at the head of the Val -Carlos, in the Roncesvalles and Alduides; but Foy could -only communicate by a circuitous road, leading across the -Nive river at Cambo, with the French centre, entrenched, -under D’Erlon, at Ainhoa and Urdax, opposite the Maya -passes, and menacing the Bastan, where Hill’s left was -posted.</p> - -<p>At Urdax the Nivelle river bisected the French positions, -and then, turning to the left, run to St. Jean de Luz. -The line of their right centre, beyond that river, was under -Clausel, and thrown forward to Vera, along another batch -of mountainous ridges, which, touching on the Bidassoa, -lined its right bank to the bridge of Behobia near Iran.</p> - -<p>From Clausel’s right to the mouth of the Bidassoa, Soult’s -right wing, under Reille, guarded the French territory.</p> - -<p>Clausel’s ground comprised the Great La Rhune mountain, -two thousand seven hundred feet high, whose bleak -rocky head overlooked everything around, and from whose -flanks the positions of Sarre shot out on the French left, and -on their right the Commissari, Bayonette, and Mandale -ridge—the two first overhanging Vera, the last lining the -Bidassoa down to San Marcial and Irun.</p> - -<p>Opposed to Clausel Wellington held, first the Atchiola -mountain on the left of Maya, then the Echallar ridges as -far as the Ivantelly mountain facing Sarre, and the Santa -Barbara ridge abutting on the Bidassoa at Vera, facing the -Bayonette and Commissari. On the left bank of the Bidassoa -he occupied the flanks of the Peña de Haya to San<span class="pagenum" id="Page_354">354</span> -Marcial, from whence his redoubts, as before noticed, run -along the river to the Jaizquibel.</p> - -<p>Soult had commenced a chain of entrenched camps and -redoubts along his whole line, and in the low country, from -the end of the Mandale to the sea, was constructing a -double chain of entrenched positions and camps bearing -many names and to be noticed in the narrative. These works -were approaching completion when Wellington resolved to -seize the Great La Rhune with its dependents on both -flanks, at the same time forcing the passage of the Lower -Bidassoa in face of Soult’s entrenchments. Thus he would -establish his left in the French territory, from Sarre to the -sea, and bring within his own lines the Rhune, the Commissari, -and Bayonette mountains, which would give him -a salient menacing point of impregnable strength towards -France, and shorten his lateral communication on both -flanks of those mountains. It would also give entire command -of a road running up the Bidassoa from Irun to Vera, -and secure the port of Fuenterabia, which, though bad in -winter, was desirable for a general whose supplies came -from the ocean, and who with scanty means of transport had -to sustain the perverse negligence always, and often the -hostility of the Spanish authorities.</p> - -<p>He had designed to force the passage in the middle of -September before the French works were advanced, but his -pontoons were delayed by a negligence of orders; the weather -then became bad, and the attempt, which depended -upon the state of the tides and fords, was of necessity -deferred to the 7th of October.</p> - -<p>Great subtlety was to be combined with wonderful boldness, -for the Bidassoa was broad and tidal below Irun, and -the ridges lining it above that point rough and terrible to -assail; both water and mountain line were strengthened -with works, incomplete indeed, but already of strength in -defence; the river was also to be passed and the positions -beyond carried between tides, or the troops would be swallowed -by the returning flood. Hence to mislead Soult, to -support the blockade of Pampeluna, and to ascertain Foy’s -true position and strength at St. Jean Pied de Port, which -menaced anew that blockade, Wellington brought up Del -Parque’s army from Tudela to Pampeluna, transferred the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_355">355</span> -Andalusians at the latter place to Giron at Echallar, and -directed Mina to gather his irregulars around the Roncesvalles: -then repairing himself to that quarter on the 1st of -October, he surprised a French post on the Ayrola rock, cut -off a scouting party in the Val de Baygorry, and swept away -two thousand sheep.</p> - -<p>These movements awakened Soult’s jealousy. He expected -an invasion of France without being able to ascertain from -what quarter, and at first, deceived by false information that -Cole had reinforced Hill, thought Mina’s troops and the -Andalusians were used to mask an attack by the Val de -Baygorry. The arrival of the light cavalry in the Bastan, -Wellington’s presence at Roncesvalles, and the loss of the -Ayrola post, seemed to confirm this; but he knew that pontoons -were at Oyarzun, and the deserters, very numerous at -this time, said the real object was the Great Rhune. On the -other hand, a French commissary, taken at San Sebastian and -exchanged after remaining twelve days at Wellington’s head-quarters, -assured him nothing there indicated a serious -attack. This weighed much, because the negligence about -the pontoons, and the wet weather, had caused a delay contradictory -to the reports of the spies and deserters. It was -also beyond calculation that Wellington, merely to please -the allied sovereigns in Germany, should thereby seek to -establish his left wing in France, when the most obvious -line for a permanent invasion was by his right and centre, -and there was no apparent cause for deferring his operations.</p> - -<p>The cause of the procrastination, namely, the state of the -tides and fords on the Lower Bidassoa, was necessarily impenetrable, -and Soult finally inclined to think the only design -was to secure the blockade of Pampeluna by menacing -the French, and impeding their entrenchments which were -now becoming strong. Nevertheless, as all the deserters and -spies came with the same story, he recommended increased -vigilance along the whole line; yet so little did he anticipate -the real project, that on the 6th he reviewed D’Erlon’s -divisions at Ainhoa and remained that night at Espelette, -doubting if any attack was intended, and having no fear for -his right. But Wellington could not diminish his troops on -the side of Roncesvalles, lest a force should unite at St. Jean<span class="pagenum" id="Page_356">356</span> -Pied de Port to raise the blockade of Pampeluna; and at -Maya, Hill was already menacing Soult between the Nive -and the Nivelle: it was therefore only with his left wing and -left centre, and against the French right, that he could act -while Pampeluna held out.</p> - -<p>Early in October a reinforcement of twelve hundred British -soldiers arrived from England. Mina was then on the right -of Hill, who was thus enabled to call Campbell’s Portuguese -from the Alduides, and replace at Maya the third division, -which, shifting to its left, then occupied the heights of -Zagaramurdi and enabled the seventh division to relieve -Giron’s Andalusians in the Puerto de Echallar.</p> - -<p>These dispositions were made with a view to the attack of -the Great Rhune and its dependents, for which Wellington -assembled the fourth and light divisions on Santa Barbara, -Giron’s Spaniards being on their right, and Longa’s on their -left. The sixth division, supported by the third, was at -Zagaramurdi to make a demonstration against D’Erlon’s advanced -posts. Thus, without weakening his line between -Roncesvalles and Echallar, he could assail the Rhune mountain -and its dependents with twenty thousand men, and had -still twenty-four thousand disposable for the passage of the -Lower Bidassoa.</p> - -<p>It has been before said that between the Andarlasa ford, -below Vera, and the fords of Biriatu, a distance of three -miles, there were neither roads nor fords nor bridges. The -French, trusting to this difficulty of approach and to their -entrenchments on the craggy slopes of the Mandale, had collected -their troops principally where the Bildox or green -mountain, and the entrenched camp of Biriatu overlooked -the fords, and against them Wellington directed Freyre’s -Spaniards from San Marcial.</p> - -<p>Between Biriatu and the sea the advanced points of defence -were the mountain of <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Louis</i> XIV., a ridge called the -<i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Caffé Républicain</i>, and the town of Andaya; behind which the -<i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Calvaire d’Urogne</i>, the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Croix des Bouquets</i>, and the camp of the -<i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Sans Culottes</i>, served as rallying posts. The first and fifth -divisions, and the unattached brigades of Wilson and Lord -Aylmer, in all fifteen thousand men, were destined to assault -these works; and the Spanish fishermen had secretly indicated -three fords practicable at low water between the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_357">357</span> -bridge of Behobia and the sea. Wellington therefore, with an -astonishing hardihood, designed to pass his columns at the -old known fords above and these secret fords below bridge, -though the tides rose sixteen feet, leaving at the ebb open -heavy sands not less than half a mile broad! The left bank -of the river also was completely exposed to observation from -the enemy’s hills, which, though low in comparison of the -mountains above the bridge, were strong ridges of defence; -but relying on his previous measures the English general disdained -these dangers, and his anticipations were not belied -by the result. For the unlikelihood that, having a better -line of operations, he would force such a river as the Bidassoa -at its mouth, entirely deceived Soult, whose lieutenants were -also very negligent. Of Reille’s two divisions, one under -Boyer was dispersed, labouring on the entrenched camp of -Urogne far from the river; Villatte’s reserve was at Ascain -and Serres; and five thousand men of Maucune’s division, -though on the first line, were unexpectant of an attack. The -works on the Mandale were finished, those at Biriatu in a -forward state, but from the latter to the sea all were imperfect.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Passage of the Lower Bidassoa.</span> (Oct. 1813.)</h3> - -<p>On the 6th the night set in heavily. A sullen thunderstorm, -gathering about the craggy summit of the Peña de -Haya, came slowly down its flanks, and towards morning, -rolling over the Bidassoa, fell in its greatest violence upon -the French positions. During this turmoil Wellington, whose -pontoons and artillery were close up to Irun, disposed a -number of guns and howitzers along the crest of San Marcial, -and his columns secretly attained their stations along the -banks of the river. The Spaniards, one brigade of Guards, -and Wilson’s Portuguese, stretching from the Biriatu fords -to the broken bridge of Behobia, were ensconced behind the -lower ridge of San Marcial, which had been seized by the -French in the attack of the 31st; another brigade of Guards -and the Germans were concealed near Irun, close to a ford, -below bridge, called the Great Jonco; the fifth division were -covered by a river embankment opposite Andaya; Sprye’s -Portuguese and Lord Aylmer’s brigade were posted in the -ditch of Fuenterabia.</p> - -<p>All the tents were left standing in the camps, and the -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_358">358</span> -enemy, seeing no change on the morning of the 7th, were -unsuspicious; but at seven o’clock, the fifth division and -Aylmer’s brigade, emerging from their concealment took -the sands in two columns. The left one moved against the -French camp of the Sans Culottes, the other against the -ridge of Andaya, but no shot was fired until they passed -the low water channel, when an English rocket was sent up -from the steeple of Fuenterabia as a signal. Then the -artillery opened from San Marcial, the troops near Irun, -covered by the fire of a battery, made for the Jonco, and the -passage above the bridge also commenced.</p> - -<p>From the crest of San Marcial seven columns could now be -seen at once, attacking on a line of five miles; those above -bridge plunging at once into the fiery contest, those below, -appearing in the distance like huge serpents sullenly winding -over the heavy sands. The Germans missed the Jonco -ford and got into deep water, yet quickly recovered the true -line, and the French, completely surprised, permitted even -the brigades of the fifth division to gain the right bank and -form their lines before a hostile musket flashed. The cannonade -from San Marcial was heard by Soult at Espelette, and -at the same time the sixth division made a false attack on -D’Erlon’s positions; the Portuguese brigade under Colonel -Douglas, was however pushed too far and got beaten with -the loss of a hundred and fifty men.</p> - -<p>Soult now comprehending the true state of affairs hurried -to his right, but his camps on the Bidassoa were lost before -he arrived. For when the British artillery first opened, -Maucune’s troops assembled at their different posts, and the -French guns opened from the Louis XIV. and Caffé Républicain; -then the alarm spread, and Boyer marched from -Urogne to support Maucune, without waiting for the -junction of his working parties; but his brigades moved -separately as they could collect, and before the first came into -action, Sprye’s Portuguese, forming the extreme left of the -allies, were menacing the camp of the Sans Culottes: thither -therefore one of Boyer’s regiments was ordered, while the -others advanced by the royal road towards the Croix des -Bouquets. Andaya, guarded only by a picquet, was meanwhile -abandoned, and Reille, thinking the camp of the Sans<span class="pagenum" id="Page_359">359</span> -Culottes would be lost before Boyer’s men could reach it, -sent a battalion there from the centre; he thus weakened -the chief point; for the British brigades of the fifth division -were now bearing from Andaya towards the Croix des -Bouquets under a fire of guns and musketry.</p> - -<p>The first division had passed the river, one column above -bridge, preceded by Wilson’s Portuguese, the other below, -preceded by the German light troops, who with the -aid of the artillery on San Marcial won the Caffé Républicain -and the mountain of Louis XIV., driving the French to the -Croix des Bouquets. This last was the key of the position, -and towards it guns and troops were now hastening from -both sides, but the Germans were there brought to a check, -for the heights were strong and Boyer’s leading battalions -close at hand; at that moment however, Colonel Cameron, -coming up with the 9th Regiment, passed through the German -skirmishers and vehemently ascended the first height, -whereupon the French opened their ranks to let their guns -retire, and then retreated at full speed to a second ridge, -somewhat lower, but only to be approached on a narrow -front. Cameron as quickly threw his men into a single -column and bore against this new position under a concentrated -fire, yet his violent course did not seem to dismay the -French until within ten yards when the furious shout and -charge of the 9th appalled them and the ridges of the Croix -des Bouquets were won as far as the royal road. Cameron -lost many men and officers, and during the fight the French -artillery and scattered troops, coming from different points -and rallying on Boyer’s battalions, had gathered on other -ridges close at hand.</p> - -<p>The entrenched camp above Biriatu had been at first -well defended in front, but the Spanish right wing being -opposed only by a single battalion, soon won the Mandale -mountain whereupon the French fell back from the camp to -the Calvaire d’Urogne. Then Reille, beaten at the Croix -des Bouquets and having both his flanks turned, the left by -the Spaniards, the right along the sea-coast, retreated in -great disorder through the village of Urogne. The British -skirmishers entered that place in pursuit, but were immediately -beaten out again by the second brigade of Boyer’s -division; for Soult had now arrived with part of Villatte’s<span class="pagenum" id="Page_360">360</span> -reserve and many guns, and by his presence restored order -just as retreat was degenerating into flight.</p> - -<p>Reille lost eight guns and four hundred men; the allies -only six hundred men, of which half were Spaniards, so easy -had the skill of the English general rendered this stupendous -operation. But if Soult, penetrating Wellington’s design, -had met the allies with the sixteen thousand troops of that -quarter, instead of the five thousand actually engaged, the -passage could scarcely have been forced; and a simple check -would have been tantamount to a terrible disaster, because -in two hours the returning tide would have come with a -swallowing flood upon the rear.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Second Combat of Vera.</span> (Oct. 1813.)</h3> - -<p>Equally unprepared and unsuccessful were the French on -the side of Vera, although the struggle there proved more -fierce and constant.</p> - -<p>Before daybreak Giron descended with his Spaniards from -the Ivantelly rocks, and Alten with the light division from -Santa Barbara; the first to the gorge of the pass leading -from Vera to Sarre, the last to the town of Vera, where he -was joined by half of Longa’s force.</p> - -<p>One brigade, consisting of the 43rd, 17th Portuguese -Regiment, and two battalions of British riflemen, were in -columns on the right of Vera; the other brigade under -Colonel Colborne, consisting of the 52nd, two battalions -of Caçadores, and a third battalion of British riflemen, -were on the left of that town: half of Longa’s division -was between these brigades, the other half, after crossing -the ford of Salinas, drew up on Colborne’s left. The whole -of the narrow vale of Vera was thus filled with troops ready -to ascend the mountains; and General Cole, displaying his -force to advantage on the heights of Santa Barbara, presented -a formidable reserve.</p> - -<p>Taupin’s division guarded the enormous positions in front. -His right was on the Bayonette, from whence a single slope -descended to a small plain, two parts down the mountain. -From this platform three distinct tongues shot into the -valley below, each defended by an advanced post; the -platform itself was secured by a star redoubt, behind which,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_361">361</span> -about half-way up the single slope, there was a second -retrenchment with abbatis. Another large redoubt and an -unfinished breast-work on the superior crest completed the -defence.</p> - -<p>The Commissari, a continuation of the Bayonette, towards -the Great Rhune, had in front a profound gulf thickly -wooded and filled with skirmishers; and between this gulf -and another of the same nature, run the main road from -Vera over the Puerto, piercing the centre of the French -position. Ascending with short abrupt turns, this road was -blocked at every uncovered point with abbatis and small -retrenchments, each obstacle being commanded at half musket -shot by small detachments placed on all the projecting -parts overlooking the ascent. A regiment, entrenched above -on the Puerto itself, connected the troops on the crest of the -Bayonette and Commissari with those on a saddle-ridge, -which joined those mountains with the Great Rhune, and -was to be assailed by Giron.</p> - -<p>Between Alten’s right and Giron’s left was an isolated -advanced ridge called by the soldiers the <em>Boar’s back</em>, the -summit of which, half a mile long and rounded at each end, -was occupied by four French companies. This huge cavalier, -thrown as it were into the gulf on the allies’ right -of the road, covered the Puerto and the saddle-ridge; and -though of mean height in comparison of the towering ranges -behind, was yet so lofty, that a few warning-shots, fired -from the summit by the enemy, only reached the allies -at its base with that slow singing sound which marks the -dying force of a musket-ball. It was essential to take this -Boar’s back before the general attack commenced, and five -companies of riflemen, supported by the 17th Portuguese, -assailed it at the Vera end, while a battalion of Giron’s -Spaniards, preceded by a company of the 43rd, attacked it -on the other. Meanwhile the French were in confusion.</p> - -<p>Clausel knew by a spy in the night that the Bayonette -was to be assaulted, and in the morning had heard from -Conroux who was at Sarre, that Giron’s camps were abandoned -although the tents of the seventh division were still -standing; at the same time musketry was heard on the -side of Urdax, a cannonade on the side of Irun; then came -Taupin’s report that the vale of Vera was filled with troops,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_362">362</span> -and to this last quarter Clausel hurried. On his left the -Spaniards had then driven Conroux’s outposts from the -gorge leading to Sarre, and a detachment was creeping -up towards the unguarded head of the Great Rhune; wherefore, -ordering four regiments of Conroux’s division to occupy -the summit, the front, and the flanks, of that mountain, he -placed a reserve of two other regiments behind it, hoping -thus to secure possession and support Taupin: but that general’s -fate had been already decided by Alten.</p> - -<p>Soon after seven o’clock a few cannon-shot from some -mountain-guns, of which each side had a battery, were -followed by the Spanish musketry on the right, and the -next moment the Boar’s back was simultaneously assailed at -both ends. The riflemen on the Vera side ascended to a -small pine-wood two-thirds up and there rested, but soon -resumed their movement and with a scornful gallantry swept -the French off the top, disdaining to use their rifles, save -a few shots down the reverse side to show they were masters -of the ridge. This had been the signal for the general attack. -The Portuguese followed the victorious sharp-shooters; the -43rd, preceded by their own skirmishers and the remainder -of the riflemen of the right wing, plunged into the rugged -pass; Longa entered the gloomy wood of the ravine on their -left; and beyond Longa, Colborne’s brigade, moving by -narrow paths, assailed the Bayonette. The 52nd took the -middle tongue, the Caçadores and riflemen the two outermost, -all bearing with a concentric movement against the -star redoubt on the platform above. Longa’s second brigade -should have flanked the left of this attack with a wide skirting -movement; but neither he nor his starved soldiers knew -much of such warfare, and therefore quietly followed the -riflemen in reserve.</p> - -<p>Soon the open slopes were covered with men and with -fire, and a confused sound of mingled shouts and musketry -filled the deep hollows, from whence the white smoke came -curling up from their gloomy recesses. The French, compared -with their assailants, seemed few and scattered on the -mountain side, and Kempt’s brigade fought its way without -a check through all the retrenchments on the main pass, the -skirmishers spreading wider as the depth of the ravines on -each side lessened and melted into the higher ridges. When<span class="pagenum" id="Page_363">363</span> -half-way up an open platform gave a clear view over the -Bayonette slopes, and all eyes were turned that way. Longa’s -right brigade, fighting in the gulf between, seemed labouring -and over-matched; but beyond it, on the broad open -space in front of the star-fort, Colborne’s Caçadores and -riflemen were seen to come out in small bodies from a forest -which covered the three tongues of land up to the edge of -the platform. Their fire was sharp, their pace rapid, and in -a few moments they closed upon the redoubt in a mass; the -52nd were not then in sight, and the French, thinking from -the dark clothing all were Portuguese, rushed in close order -out of the entrenchment; they were numerous and very -sudden, the rifle as a weapon is overmatched by the musket -and bayonet, and this rough charge sent the scattered assailants -back over the rocky edge of the descent. With shrill -cries the French followed, but just then the 52nd soldiers -appeared on the platform and raising their shout rushed forward; -their red uniform and full career startled the hitherto -adventurous French, they stopped short, wavered, turned, -and fled to their entrenchment. The 52nd, following hard, -entered the works with them, and then the riflemen and -Caçadores, who had meanwhile rallied, passed it on both -flanks; for a few moments everything was hidden by a dense -volume of smoke, but again the British shout pealed high -and the whole mass emerged on the other side, the French, -now the fewer, flying, the others pursuing, until the second -entrenchment, half-way up the parent slope, enabled the -retreating troops to make another stand.</p> - -<p>The exulting and approving cheers of Kempt’s brigade -then echoed along the mountain-side, and with renewed -vigour the men continued to scale the craggy mountain, -fighting their toilsome way to the top of the Puerto. Meanwhile -Colborne, after having carried the second entrenchment -above the star-fort, was brought to a check by the works on -the crest of the mountain, from whence the French not only -plied his troops with musketry at a great advantage but rolled -huge stones down the steep. These works were well lined -with men and strengthened by a large redoubt on the right, -yet the defenders faltered, for their left flank was turned by -Kempt, and the effects of Wellington’s general combinations -were then felt in another quarter.</p> - -<p>Freyre’s Spaniards, after carrying the Mandale mountain, -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_364">364</span> -had pushed to a road leading from the Bayonette to St. Jean -de Luz, which was the line of retreat for Taupin’s right -wing. The Spaniards got there first, and Taupin, being thus -cut off on that side, had to file his right under fire along the -crest of the Bayonette to reach the Puerto de Vera road, -where he joined his centre, but, so doing, lost a mountain-battery -and three hundred men. These last were captured -by Colborne in a remarkable manner. Accompanied by one -of his staff and half-a-dozen riflemen, he crossed their march -unexpectedly, and with his usual cool intrepidity ordered -them to lay down their arms; an order which they, thinking -themselves entirely cut off, obeyed. During these events, -the French skirmishers in the deep ravine between the two -lines of attack, being feebly pushed by Longa’s troops, -retreated slowly, and getting amongst some rocks from -whence there was no escape also surrendered to Kempt. -Taupin’s right and centre being then completely beaten fled -down the side of the mountain, closely pursued until they -rallied upon Villatte’s reserve, which was in order of battle -on a ridge extending across the gorge of Olette, between -Urogne and Ascain. The Bayonette, Commissari, and Puerto -de Vera, were thus won after five hours’ incessant fighting, -and toiling, up their craggy sides. Nevertheless the battle -was still maintained by the French troops on the summit of -the Rhune.</p> - -<p>Giron, after driving Conroux’s advanced post from the -gorge leading from Vera to Sarre, had pushed a battalion -towards the head of the Great Rhune, and placed a reserve in -the gorge to cover his rear from any counter-attack. When -his left wing was free to move by the capture of the <em>Boar’s -back</em>, he fought his way up abreast with the British line -until near the saddle-ridge, a little to the right of the -Puerto; but there his men were arrested by a strong line of -abbatis, from behind which two French regiments poured a -heavy fire. An adventurer named Downie, then a Spanish -general, exhorted them and they kept their ranks, yet did -not advance; but there happened to be present an officer of -the 43rd Regiment, named Havelock,<a id="FNanchor_38" href="#Footnote_38" class="fnanchor">38</a> who being attached<span class="pagenum" id="Page_365">365</span> -to Alten’s staff had been sent to ascertain Giron’s progress. -His fiery temper could not brook the check. He took off -his hat, called upon the Spaniards, and putting spurs to his -horse at one bound cleared the abbatis and went headlong -among the enemy. Then the soldiers, shouting for “<i xml:lang="es" lang="es">El -chico blanco</i>,”—“<em>the fair boy</em>,” so they called him, for he was -very young and had light hair,—with one shock broke through -at the very moment the French centre was flying under the -fire of Kempt’s skirmishers from the Puerto on the left.</p> - -<p>The two defeated regiments retired by their left to the -flanks of the Rhune, and thus Clausel had eight regiments -concentrated on this great mountain. Two occupied the -highest rocks called the Hermitage; four were on the flanks, -which descended towards Ascain on one hand and Sarre on -the other; the remaining two occupied a lower parallel -mountain behind called the Small Rhune. Giron’s right -wing first dislodged a small body from a detached pile of -crags about musket-shot below the summit of the Great -Rhune, and then assailed the bald staring rocks of the Hermitage -itself, endeavouring at the same time to turn it on -the right. At both points the attempts were defeated with -loss; the Hermitage was impregnable: the French rolled -down stones large enough to sweep away a whole column at -once, and the Spaniards resorted to a distant musketry which -lasted until night.</p> - -<p>In this fight Taupin lost two generals, four hundred men -killed and wounded, and five hundred prisoners. The loss -of the allies was nearly a thousand, of which half were -Spaniards, and the success was not complete; for while -the French kept possession of the summit of the Rhune the -allies’ new position was insecure.</p> - -<p>Wellington, observing that the left flank of the mountain -descending towards Sarre was less inaccessible, concentrated -the Spaniards next day on that side for a combined attack -against the mountain itself, and against the camp of Sarre. -At three o’clock in the afternoon the rocks which studded -the lower parts of the Rhune slope were assailed by the -Spaniards, and detachments of the seventh division descended -from the Puerto de Echallar upon the fort of San Barbe and -other outworks covering the French camp of Sarre. The -Andalusians easily won the rocks and an entrenched height<span class="pagenum" id="Page_366">366</span> -commanding the camp; for Clausel, alarmed by some slight -demonstrations of the sixth division in rear of his left, -thought he should be cut off from his great camp, and very -suddenly abandoned, not only the slope of the mountain but -all his advanced works in the basin below, including the fort -of San Barbe. His troops were thus concentrated on the -height behind Sarre, still holding with their right the smaller -Rhune, but the consequences of his error were soon apparent. -Wellington established a strong body of Spaniards close to -the Hermitage, and the two French regiments there, seeing the -lower slopes and San Barbe given up, imagined they also -would be cut off, and without orders abandoned their impregnable -post in the night. Next morning some of the -seventh division rashly pushed into the village of Sarre, but -were quickly repulsed and would have lost the camp and -works taken the day before if the Spaniards had not succoured -them.</p> - -<p>The whole loss on the three days’ fighting was fourteen -hundred French and sixteen hundred of the allies; but many -of the wounded were not brought in until the third day after -the action, and others perished miserably where they fell, it -being impossible to discover them in those vast solitudes. -Some men also descended to the French villages, got drunk, -and were taken; nor was the number small of those who -plundered in defiance of Lord Wellington’s proclamations. -He arrested and sent several officers to England, observing -in his order of the day, that if he had five times as many -men he could not venture to invade France unless marauding -was prevented. It is remarkable likewise, that the French -troops on the same day acted towards their own countrymen -in the same manner, and Soult also checked the mischief with -a terrible hand, causing a captain of some reputation to be -shot as an example for having suffered his men to plunder -a house in Sarre.</p> - -<p>With exception of the slight checks sustained at Sarre and -Ainhoa, the course of these operations had been eminently -successful, and the bravery of troops who assailed and carried -such stupendous positions must be admired. To them -the unfinished state of the French works was not visible. -Day after day, for more than a month, entrenchment had -risen over entrenchment, covering the slopes of mountains<span class="pagenum" id="Page_367">367</span> -scarcely accessible from their natural steepness and asperity. -These could be seen, but the growing strength of the works, -the height of the mountains, the broad river with its heavy -sands and its mighty rushing tide, all were despised by -those brave soldiers; and while they attacked with such -confident valour, the French fought in defence of their dizzy -steeps with far less fierceness than when, striving against -insurmountable obstacles, they attempted to storm the lofty -rocks of Sauroren. Continual defeat had lowered their -spirit. Yet the feeble defence on this occasion may be -traced to another cause. It was a general’s, not a soldier’s -battle. Wellington had with overmastering combinations -overwhelmed every point. Taupin’s and Maucune’s divisions, -each less than five thousand strong, were separately -assailed, the first by eighteen, the second by fifteen thousand -men; and at neither point were Reille and Clausel able to -bring their reserves into action before the positions were won.</p> - -<p>Soult complained that his lieutenants were unprepared, -although repeatedly told an attack was to be expected; and -though they heard the noise of the guns and pontoons about -Irun on the night of the 5th, and again on the night of the -6th. The passage of the river had, he said, commenced only -at seven o’clock, long after daylight; the enemy’s masses -were clearly seen forming on the banks, and there was full -time for Boyer’s division to arrive before the Croix des -Bouquets was lost; yet the battle was fought in disorder -with less than five thousand men, instead of ten thousand in -good order and supported by Villatte’s reserve. To this -negligence they also added discouragement. They had so -little confidence in the strength of their positions, that if the -allies had pushed vigorously forward before his own arrival, -they would have entered St. Jean de Luz and forced the -French army back upon the Nive and Adour. This was -true, but such a stroke did not comport with Wellington’s -system. He could not go beyond the Adour, he doubted -whether he could even maintain his army during the winter -in the position he had already gained; and he was averse to -the experiment, while Pampeluna held out and the war in -Germany bore an undecided aspect.</p> - -<p>Soult was very apprehensive for some days of another -attack; but when he saw Wellington’s masses form permanent<span class="pagenum" id="Page_368">368</span> -camps he ordered Foy to recover the fort of San -Barbe, which blocked a pass leading from the vale of Vera -to Sarre and defended some narrow ground between La -Rhune and the Nivelle river. Abandoned without reason -by the French, it was only occupied by a Spanish picquet, -several battalions being encamped in a wood close behind. -Many officers and men quitted their troops to sleep in the -fort, and on the night of the 12th three French battalions -surprised and escaladed the work; the Spanish troops behind -went off in confusion at the first alarm, and two hundred -soldiers with fifteen officers were made prisoners. Two -Spanish battalions, ashamed of the surprise, made a vigorous -effort to recover the fort at daylight, but were repulsed. An -attempt was then made with five battalions, but Clausel -brought up two guns, and a sharp skirmish took place in -the wood which lasted for several hours, the French endeavouring -to regain the whole of their old entrenchments, -the Spaniards to recover the fort. Neither succeeded. San -Barbe remained with the French, who lost two hundred -men, while the Spaniards lost five hundred. Soon after this -action a French sloop of war run from St. Jean de Luz, but -three English brigs cut her off, and the crew after exchanging -a few distant shots set her on fire and escaped in boats to the -Adour.</p> - -<p>Head-quarters were now fixed in Vera, and the allied army -was organized in three grand divisions. The right, having -Mina’s and Morillo’s battalions attached to it, was commanded -by General Hill, and extended from Roncesvalles to the -Bastan. The centre, occupying Maya, the Echallar, Rhune -and Bayonette mountains, was given to Marshal Beresford. -The left, extending from the Mandale mountain to the sea, -was under Sir John Hope. This officer succeeded Graham, -who had returned to England. Commanding in chief at -Coruña after Sir John Moore’s death, he was superior in -rank to Lord Wellington during the early part of the Peninsular -war; but when the latter obtained the baton of field-marshal -at Vittoria, Hope, with a patriotism and modesty -worthy of the pupil of Abercrombie, the friend and comrade -of Moore, offered to serve as second in command, and Wellington -joyfully accepted him, saying—“<em>He was the ablest -officer in the army.</em>”</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_369">369</span></p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Battle of the Nivelle.</span> (Nov. 1813.)</h3> - -<p>After the passage of the Bidassoa, Soult was assiduous to -complete an immense chain of intrenchments, some thirty -miles long, which he had previously commenced. The -space between the sea and the upper Nivelle, an opening of -sixteen miles, was defended by double lines, and the lower -part of that river, sweeping behind the second of them, -formed a third line, having the intrenched camp of Serres -on its right bank: the upper river separated D’Erlon’s from -Clausel’s positions, but was crossed by the bridge of Amotz; -the left of D’Erlon rested on the rough Mondarain mountains, -which closed that flank, abutting on the Nive.</p> - -<p>Beyond the Nive, Foy was called down that river towards -the bridge of Cambo, which was fortified in rear of D’Erlon’s -left, and from thence Soult had traced a second chain of intrenched -camps, on a shorter line behind the Nivelle, by San -Pé, to join his camp at Serres: thus placed, Foy had the -power of reinforcing D’Erlon or menacing the right of the -allies according to events.</p> - -<p>Reille still commanded on the right in the low ground -covering St. Jean de Luz.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington could scarcely feed his troops; those on -the right, at Roncesvalles, went two days without provisions, -being blocked up by snow; and the rest of the army, with -the exception of the first division, was lying out on the -crests of high mountains very much exposed. This made -them indeed incredibly hardy and eager to pour down on -the fertile French plains below; but notwithstanding his -recent bold operation, their general looked to a retreat into -Spain and a removal of the war to Catalonia; for his position -was scarcely tenable from political and other difficulties, -all of which he had foreseen and foretold when the foolish -importunity of the English Government urged him to enter -France. And if Soult, who was continually, though vainly -urging Suchet to co-operate with him, had persuaded that -marshal to act with vigour the allies must have retreated to -the Ebro. Suchet however would not stir, and the war in -Germany having taken a favourable turn Wellington eventually -resolved to force the French lines.</p> - -<p>For this object, when Pampeluna surrendered, early in -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_370">370</span> -November, Hill’s right was moved from Roncesvalles to the -Bastan with a view to the battle, and Mina took its place on -the mountains; but then the Spanish general Freyre suddenly -declared that he was unable to subsist and must -withdraw a part of his troops. This was a disgraceful trick -to obtain provisions from the English, and it was successful, -for the projected attack could not be made without his aid. -Forty thousand rations of flour, with a formal intimation that -if he did not co-operate the whole army must retire again -into Spain, contented him for the moment; but it was -declared the supply given would only suffice for two days, -although there were less than ten thousand soldiers in the -field!</p> - -<p>Heavy rain again delayed the attack, but on the 10th of -November, ninety thousand combatants, seventy-four thousand -being Anglo-Portuguese, descended to battle, and with -them ninety-five pieces of artillery, all of which were with -inconceivable vigour thrown into action: four thousand five -hundred cavalry and some Spaniards remaining in reserve -near Pampeluna. The French had been augmented by a -levy of conscripts, many of whom however deserted to the -interior, and the fighting men did not exceed seventy-nine -thousand, including the garrisons. Six thousand were -cavalry, and as Foy’s operations were extraneous, scarcely -sixty thousand infantry and artillery were actually in line.</p> - -<p>On Soult’s side each lieutenant-general had a special position -to defend. The left of D’Erlon’s first line, resting on -the fortified rocks of Mondarain, could not be turned; his -right was on the Nivelle, and the whole, strongly intrenched, -was occupied by one of Abbé’s and one of D’Armagnac’s brigades. -The second line, on a broad ridge several miles -behind, was occupied by the remaining brigades of those -divisions, and its left did not extend beyond the centre of -the first line; but the right reached to the bridge of Amotz, -where the Nivelle, flowing in a slanting direction, gave -greater space. Three great redoubts were in a row on this -ridge, and a fourth had been commenced close to the bridge.</p> - -<p>On the right of D’Erlon’s second line, that is to say beyond -the bridge of Amotz, Clausel’s position extended to Ascain, -along a strong range of heights fortified with many redoubts,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_371">371</span> -trenches, and abbatis; and as the Nivelle, after passing -Amotz, swept in a curve completely round this range to -Ascain, both flanks rested alike upon that river,—the bridges -of Amotz and Ascain being close on the right and left, and -a retreat open by the bridges of San Pé and Harastaguia in -rear of the centre. Two of Clausel’s divisions, reinforced -by one of D’Erlon’s under General Maransin, were there -posted. In front of the left were the redoubts of San Barbe -and Grenada, covering the village and ridge of Sarre. In -front of the right was the smaller Rhune, which was fortified -and occupied by a brigade of Maransin’s division: a new -redoubt with abbatis was also commenced to cover the approaches -to the bridge of Amotz.</p> - -<p>On the right of this line, beyond the bridge of Ascain, -Daricau’s division of Clausel’s corps, and the Italian brigade -of San Pol, drawn from Villatte’s reserve, held the intrenched -camp of Serres; they thus connected Clausel’s position with -Villatte’s, which crossed the gorges of Olette and Jollimont. -Reille’s position, strongly fortified on the lower ground -and partially covered by inundations, was nearly impregnable.</p> - -<p>Soult’s weakest point was between the Rhune mountains -and the Nivelle, where the space, gradually narrowing as it -approached the bridge of Amotz, was the most open and the -least fortified. The Nivelle, being fordable above this bridge, -did not hamper the allies’ movements, and a powerful force -acting in that direction could therefore pass by D’Erlon’s -first line, and break between the right of his second line and -Clausel’s left; it was thus Wellington framed his battle; for -seeing the French right could not be forced, he decided to -hold it in check while he broke their centre and pushed -down the Nivelle to San Pé.</p> - -<p>In this view, Hill, leaving four of Mina’s battalions to face -the rocks of Mondarain, moved in the night by the passes of -the Puerto de Maya to fall on D’Erlon.</p> - -<p>On Hill’s left, Beresford was to send the third division -against the unfinished redoubts and intrenchments covering -the bridge of Amotz, thus turning D’Erlon’s right while it -was attacked in front by Hill.</p> - -<p>On the left of the third division, the seventh, descending -from the Echallar pass, was to storm the Grenada redoubt,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_372">372</span> -pass Sarre, and assail Clausel abreast with the third division.</p> - -<p>On the left of the seventh, the fourth division, assembling -on the lower slopes of the greater Rhune, was to descend -upon San Barbe, and then, moving through Sarre also, to -assail Clausel abreast with the seventh division.</p> - -<p>On the left of the fourth division, Giron’s Spaniards, -gathered higher up the flank of the great Rhune, were to -move abreast with the others, leaving Sarre on their right. -They were to drive the enemy from the lower slopes of the -smaller Rhune, and then join the attack on Clausel’s main -position. In this way Hill’s and Beresford’s corps, forming -a mass of more than forty thousand infantry, were to be -thrust on both sides of the bridge of Amotz, between Clausel -and D’Erlon.</p> - -<p>Charles Alten with the light division and Longa’s -Spaniards, together eight thousand, was likewise to attack -Clausel’s line on the left of Giron, while Freyre’s Gallicians -approached the bridge of Ascain to prevent reinforcements -coming from the camp of Serres. But ere Alten could assail -Clausel’s right the smaller Rhune which covered it was to -be taken. This outwork was a hog’s-back ridge, rising -abruptly out of table-land opposite the greater Rhune and -inaccessible along its front, which was precipitous and from -fifty to two hundred feet high; on the enemy’s left the rocks -gradually decreased, descending by a long slope to the -valley of Sarre, and, two-thirds down, the 34th French Regiment -was placed, with an outpost at some isolated crags -between the two Rhunes. On the enemy’s right the hog’s-back -sunk by degrees into an open platform, but was covered -at its termination by a marsh scarcely passable. The -attacking troops had therefore first to move against the perpendicular -rocks in front, and then to file, under fire, -between the marsh and lower rocks to gain an accessible -point from whence to fight their way along the narrow ridge -of the hog’s-back; the bristles of the latter being huge perpendicular -crags built up with loose stones into small forts -or castles which communicated by narrow foot-ways, and -rose one above another until the culminant point was attained.</p> - -<p>Beyond this ridge an extensive table-land was bounded<span class="pagenum" id="Page_373">373</span> -by a deep ravine, one narrow space on the right of the marsh -excepted, where the enemy had a traverse of loose stones -running perpendicularly from behind the hog’s-back and -ending in a star fort. This rampart and fort, and the hog’s-back -itself, were defended by Barbot’s brigade, whose line -of retreat was a low neck of land bridging the deep ravine -and linking the Rhune to Clausel’s main position. A reserve -was placed there to sustain the 34th French Regiment on the -slope of the mountain, and to protect the neck, which was -the only approach to the main position in that part: to storm -the smaller Rhune was therefore a necessary preliminary to -the general battle.</p> - -<p>Alten, filing his troops after dark on the 9th, from the -Hermitage, the Commissari, and the Puerto de Vera, collected -them at midnight on that slope of the greater Rhune which -descended towards Ascain. His main body, turning the -marsh by the left, was to assail the stone traverse and lap -over the star fort by the ravine beyond; Longa, stretching -still farther on the left, was to turn the smaller Rhune -altogether; the 43rd Regiment was to assail the hog’s-back. -One battalion of riflemen and the mountain-guns were left on -the greater Rhune, with orders to assail the French 34th and -connect Alten’s attack with Giron’s. All these troops gained -their respective stations so secretly the enemy had no suspicion -of their presence, although for several hours the -columns were lying within half musket-shot of the works: -towards morning indeed, five or six guns fired in a hurried -manner from the low ground near the sea broke the stillness, -yet all remained quiet on the Rhunes: the British troops -silently awaited the rising of the sun, when three guns fired -from the summit of the Atchubia mountain were to be the -signal of attack.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Battle of the Nivelle.</span> (Nov. 1813.)</h3> - -<p>With great splendour the day broke, and as the first ray -of light played on the summit of the lofty Atchubia the signal -guns were fired in rapid succession; then the light division -soldiers leaped up, and the French beheld with astonishment -the columns rushing onward from the flank of the great -Rhune. Running to their works with much tumult, they<span class="pagenum" id="Page_374">374</span> -opened a few pieces, which were answered from the top of -the greater Rhune by the mountain-artillery, and two companies -of the 43rd were detached to cross the marsh, if -possible, and keep down the enemy’s fire from the lower part -of the hog’s-back. The action being thus commenced, the -remainder of that regiment advanced against the high rocks, -from whence the French shot fast and thickly; but the quick -even movement of the line deceived their aim, and the -soldiers, running forward very swiftly, turned suddenly -between the rocks and the marsh and were immediately joined -by the two companies, which had passed that obstacle notwithstanding -its depth. Then all together jumped into the -lower works, and the men, exhausted by their exertions, for -they had run over half a mile of very rough difficult ground -with a wonderful speed, remained for a few minutes lying -down and panting within half-pistol shot of the first stone -castle, from whence came a sharp and biting musketry: -when their breath returned they arose and with a stern shout -commenced the assault.</p> - -<p>As numerous as the assailants were the defenders, and for -six weeks they had been labouring on their well-contrived -castles; but strong and valiant in arms must the soldiers -have been who stood in that hour before the veterans of the -43rd. One French grenadier officer only dared to sustain -the rush. Standing alone on the high wall of the first castle -and flinging large stones with both his hands, a noble figure, -he fought to the last and fell, while his men, shrinking on -each side, sought safety among the rocks behind. Close and -confused then was the fight, man met man at every turn, -yet with a rattling fire of musketry, sometimes struggling in -the intricate narrow paths, sometimes climbing the loose -stone walls, the British soldiers won their desperate way, -and soon carried a second castle, named by the French the -magpie’s nest because of a lofty rock within it, on which a -few marksmen were perched. From this castle they were -driven into a culminant citadel, called the Donjon, larger -than the others, and covered by a natural ditch or cleft in -the rocks fifteen feet deep.</p> - -<p>Here they made a final stand, and the assailants, having -advanced so as to look into the rear of the rampart and star -fort on the table-land below, suspended the vehement throng<span class="pagenum" id="Page_375">375</span> -of their attack for a while; partly to gather head for storming -the Donjon, partly to fire on the enemy beneath, who -were warmly engaged with the two battalions of riflemen, -the Portuguese Caçadores, and the 17th Portuguese. This -last regiment was to have followed the 43rd, but seeing how -rapidly and surely the latter were carrying the rocks, had -moved at once against the traverse on the other side of the -marsh. The French thus pressed in front, and taught by the -fire they were outflanked on the ridge above; seeing the -52nd also turning their extreme right by the deep ravine -beyond the star fort, abandoned their works below. Then the -43rd gathering a strong head stormed the Donjon. Some -leaped with a shout down the deep cleft in the rock, others -turned it by the narrow paths on each flank, and the walls -were abandoned at the moment of being scaled. Thus in -twenty minutes six hundred old soldiers were hustled out of -this labyrinth; yet not so easily but that the victorious -regiment lost eleven officers and sixty-seven men.</p> - -<p>The whole mountain was now cleared, for the riflemen, -dropping almost perpendicularly down from the greater -Rhune upon the post of crags, had seized it with small loss. -Yet they were ill seconded by Giron’s Spaniards, and hardly -handled by the French 34th, which maintained its main post -on the slope, and covered the flight of the confused crowd -then rushing down from the smaller Rhune towards the neck -of land behind: there however all rallied and seemed inclined -to renew the action, yet, after some hesitation, continued -their retreat. This favourable moment for a decisive stroke -had been looked for by the commander of the 43rd, but the -officer intrusted with the reserve companies of the regiment -had thrown them heedlessly into the fight, and rendered it -impossible to collect in time a body strong enough to assail -such a heavy mass. The contest at the stone rampart and -star fort, being shortened by the rapid success on the hog’s-back, -had not been very severe, but General Kempt, always -conspicuous for his valour, was severely wounded: nevertheless -he did not quit the field, and soon re-formed his -brigade on the platform he had so gallantly won. Longa, -during the fight, got close to Ascain, in connection with -Freyre’s troops, and in this state of affairs, the enemy now -and then cannonading from a distance, Alten awaited the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_376">376</span> -progress of the army on his right, for the columns there had -a long way to march and it was essential to regulate the -movements.</p> - -<p>The signal-guns from the Atchubia which sent the light -division against the Rhune, had also sent the fourth and -seventh divisions against San Barbe and Grenada, and while -eighteen guns, placed in battery against the former, poured -streams of shot, the troops advanced with scaling-ladders. -The skirmishers soon got in rear of the work, whereupon -the French leaping out fled, and then Ross’s battery of horse-artillery, -galloping to a rising ground in rear of the Grenada -fort, drove the enemy from there also. After that the following -troops won the village of Sarre and the heights beyond, -and advanced to the attack of Clausel’s main position.</p> - -<p>It was now eight o’clock, and, to the troops posted on the -Rhune, a splendid spectacle was presented. On one hand -the ships of war, slowly sailing to and fro, were exchanging -shots with the fort of Socoa, while Hope, menacing all the -French lines in the low ground, sent the sound of a hundred -pieces of artillery bellowing up the rocks. He was answered -by nearly as many from the tops of the mountains, amidst -the smoke of which the summit of the great Atchubia glittered -to the rising sun, while fifty thousand men, rushing -down its enormous slopes with ringing shouts, seemed to -chase the receding shadows into the deep valley. The -plains of France, so long overlooked from the towering crags -of the Pyrenees, were to be the prize of battle, and the half-famished -soldiers in their fury were breaking through the -iron barrier erected by Soult as if it were but a screen of -reeds.</p> - -<p>The principal action was on a space of seven or eight -miles, yet the skirts of battle spread wide, and in no point -had the combinations failed. Far on the right Hill by a -long and difficult night march had got near the enemy -before seven o’clock; opposing then his Spanish troops to -Abbé’s left wing on the Mondarain rocks, he with the -second division brushed back D’Armagnac’s brigade from the -forge of Urdax and the village of Ainhoa; but he called the -sixth division and Hamilton’s Portuguese over the Nivelle, -to act on the right instead of the left bank, against the -bridge of Amotz. Thus three divisions approached D’Erlon’s<span class="pagenum" id="Page_377">377</span> -second position in mass, yet the country was very -rugged, and it was eleven o’clock before they got within -cannon-shot of the French redoubts, each of which contained -five hundred men. They were placed along the summit of -a high ridge thickly clothed with bushes and covered by a -ravine; but General Clinton, leading the sixth division on -the extreme left, turned this ravine and drove the enemy -from the unfinished works covering the bridge, after which, -wheeling to the right, he advanced against the nearest -redoubt and the garrison abandoned it. Meanwhile the -Portuguese and the second division, passing the ravine, appeared -on the right of the sixth, menacing the second and -third redoubts, whereupon all were abandoned. D’Armagnac -then set fire to his hutted camp and retreated to Helbacen -de Borda, behind San Pé, pursued by Clinton. Abbé’s -second brigade, forming the French left, though separated -by a ravine from D’Armagnac, after some hesitation also -retreated towards Cambo, where his first brigade, coming -down the Mondarain mountain rejoined him.</p> - -<p>It was the progress of the battle on the left of the Nive -that rendered D’Erlon’s fight on the right bank so feeble; -for after the fall of San Barbe and Grenada Conroux endeavoured -to defend the village and heights of Sarre, but while -the fourth and seventh divisions carried those points, the -third division, on their right, pushed rapidly to the bridge -of Amotz; presenting in conjunction with the sixth division -the narrow end of a wedge now formed by Beresford’s and -Hill’s corps. The French were thus driven from all their -unfinished works covering that bridge on both sides of the -Nivelle, and Conroux’s division, spread from Sarre to Amotz, -was broken by superior numbers at every point. When he -attempted to defend the finished works at the bridge itself, -he fell mortally wounded, his troops retired, and the third -division, seizing the bridge, established itself on some heights -between that structure and a large unfinished work called -the redoubts of Louis XIV. All this happened about eleven -o’clock, and D’Erlon, fearing to be cut off from San Pé, then -gave up his strong position to Hill, as before shown; at the -same time the remainder of Conroux’s troops fell back in -disorder from Sarre, pursued by the fourth and seventh -divisions, which were immediately established on the left of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_378">378</span> -the third. The communication between Clausel and D’Erlon -was thus cut, the left flank of one and the right flank of the -other were broken, and a direct communication between Hill -and Beresford was secured by the same blow.</p> - -<p>Clausel still stood firm with Taupin’s and Maransin’s divisions, -and the latter having recovered Barbot’s brigade from -the smaller Rhune, occupied the redoubt of Louis XIV. -where, supported with eight field-pieces, he attempted to -cover the flight of Conroux’s troops. Ross’s horse artillery, -the only battery which had surmounted the difficulties of -ground after passing Sarre, silenced these guns, and the infantry -were then assailed in front by the fourth and seventh -divisions, and in flank by the third division. The redoubt of -Louis XIV. was soon stormed and the garrison bayoneted, -Conroux’s men continued to fly, Maransin’s were cast headlong -into the ravines behind their position, and that general -was taken, but escaped in the confusion: Giron also came up -now, yet too late, and after having abandoned the riflemen -on the lower slopes of the smaller Rhune.</p> - -<p>Taupin’s division and a large body of conscripts forming -Clausel’s right, still remained to fight. Their left rested on -a large work called the signal redoubt, which had no artillery, -yet overlooked the whole position; their right was -covered by two redoubts overhanging a ravine which -separated them from the camp of Serres; some works in the -ravine itself protected their communication by the bridge of -Ascain; and behind the signal redoubt, on a ridge crossing -the road to San Pé, along which Maransin and Conroux’s -divisions were flying, there was another work called the redoubt -of Harastaguia, where Clausel thought he might still -dispute the victory, if his reserve division in the camp of -Serres could come to his aid. In this view he drew the 31st -French Regiment from Taupin to post it in front of the redoubt -of Harastaguia; his object being to rally Maransin’s -and Conroux’s troops and form a new line, the left on Harastaguia, -the right on the signal redoubt, into which last he -threw six hundred of the 88th Regiment. In this position, -having a retreat by the bridge of the Ascain, he resolved to -renew the fight, but his plan failed at the moment of conception, -because Taupin could not stand before the light division, -which was now again in full action.</p> - -<p>About half-past nine, Alten, seeing the whole of the columns -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_379">379</span> -on his right as far as the eye could reach well engaged with -the enemy, had passed the low neck of land in his front, the -52nd Regiment leading with a rapid pace and a very narrow -front, under a destructive cannonade and musketry from the -intrenchments, which covered the side of the opposite mountain. -A road coming from Ascain, by the ravine, led up the -position, and as the 52nd pushed their attack along it the -French abandoned the intrenchments on each side, and forsook -even the crowning works above. This formidable regiment -was followed by the remainder of the division, yet -Taupin awaited the assault above, being supported by the -conscripts in his rear; but at that moment the Spaniards -opened a distant skirmishing fire against the works covering -the bridge of Ascain on his right, whereupon a panic seized -his men, and the 70th Regiment abandoned the two redoubts -above, while the conscripts were withdrawn. Clausel ordered -Taupin to retake the forts, yet this only added to the disorder; -the 70th Regiment, instead of facing about, disbanded -entirely and were not reassembled until next day. There -remained only four regiments unbroken: one, the 88th, was -in the signal redoubt, two with Taupin kept together in the -rear of the works on the right, and the 31st covered the fort -of Harastaguia, now the only line of retreat.</p> - -<p>In this emergency, Clausel, anxious to bring off the 88th -Regiment, ordered Taupin to charge on one side of the signal -redoubt, intending to do the same himself on the other at the -head of the 31st Regiment; but the latter was now vigorously -attacked by the Portuguese of the seventh division, and the -fourth division was rapidly interposing between that regiment -and the redoubt. Moreover Alten, previous to this, -had directed the 43rd, preceded by Andrew Barnard’s riflemen, -to turn, at the distance of musket-shot, the right flank -of the redoubt; wherefore Taupin, instead of charging, was -himself charged in front by the riflemen, and being menaced -at the same time in flank by the fourth division, retreated, -closely pursued by Barnard until that intrepid officer fell -dangerously wounded. Meanwhile the seventh division -broke the French 31st, and the rout became general, the -French fled to the different bridges over the Nivelle, and the -signal redoubt was left to its fate.</p> - -<p>This formidable work barred the way of the light division, -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_380">380</span> -yet it was of no value to the defence when the forts on its -flanks were abandoned. Colborne approached it in front -with the 52nd Regiment, Giron’s Spaniards menaced it on -Colborne’s right, the fourth division was passing to its rear, -and Kempt’s brigade was turning it on the left. Colborne, -whose military judgment was seldom at fault, seeing the -work must fall, halted under the brow of the conical hill on -which it was situated to save his men; but some of Giron’s -Spaniards made a vaunting though feeble demonstration of -attacking it on his right and were beaten, and at that moment -a staff-officer, without warrant, for Alten on the spot -assured the Author of this History that he sent no such order, -rode up and directed Colborne to advance. It was not a -moment for remonstrance. The steepness of the hill covered -his men until he reached the flat top, and then the troops -made their rush; but then a ditch, thirty feet deep, well -fraised and palisaded, stopped them short, and the fire of -the enemy stretched the foremost in death. The intrepid -Colborne, escaping miraculously, for he was always at the -head on horseback, immediately led the regiment under the -brow to another point, where, thinking to take the French -unawares, he made another rush, yet with the same result: -at three different places did he rise to the surface in this -manner, and each time the head of his column was swept -away. Then holding out a white handkerchief he summoned -the commandant, and showed to him how his work -was surrounded, whereupon he yielded, having had only one -man killed; but on the British side there fell two hundred -soldiers of a regiment never surpassed in arms since arms -were first borne by men—victims to the presumptuous folly -of a young staff-officer.</p> - -<p>During this affair all Clausel’s other troops had crossed -the Nivelle, Maransin’s and Conroux’s divisions near San -Pé, the 31st Regiment at Harastaguia, Taupin between that -place and the bridge of Serres. They were pursued by the -third and seventh divisions; and the skirmishers of the -former, crossing by Amotz and a bridge above San Pé, entered -that place while the French were in the act of passing -the river below. Conroux’s troops then pushed on to Helbacen -de Borda, a fortified position on the road from San Pé to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_381">381</span> -Bayonne, where they were joined by Taupin, and by D’Erlon -with D’Armagnac’s division, while Clausel rallied Maransin’s -men and took post on some heights immediately above San -Pé.</p> - -<p>Soult was not present at any of these actions. He had -hurried on the first alarm from St. Jean de Luz to Serres -with his reserve artillery and spare troops, and now menaced -Wellington’s left flank by Ascain; whereupon the latter halted -the fourth and light divisions and Giron’s Spaniards, to face -Serres until Clinton’s division was well advanced on the -right of the Nivelle. When he was assured of its progress -he crossed the Nivelle with the third and seventh divisions, -and drove Maransin from his new position, after a hard -struggle in which General Inglis was wounded, and the 51st -and 68th Regiments were handled very roughly. This ended -the battle in the centre, for darkness was coming on and -Clinton’s men had been marching or fighting for twenty-four -hours: but three divisions were now firmly established in -rear of Soult’s right, of whose operations it is time to treat.</p> - -<p>In front of Reille’s intrenchments were two advanced positions, -the camp of the Sans Culottes on the right, the Bons -Secours in the centre, covering Urogne. The first had been -carried early in the morning by the fifth division, which advanced -to the inundation covering the heights of Bordegain -and Ciboure: the second was also easily taken by the Germans -and the Guards, and immediately afterwards the 85th -Regiment drove a French battalion out of Urogne. The first -division then menaced the camp of Belchena, and the German -skirmishers passed a small stream covering that part of -the line, yet were driven back by the enemy, whose musketry -and cannonade were brisk along the whole front. -Meanwhile Freyre, advancing on the right of the first division, -opened a battery against a large work covering Ascain, -where he was opposed by his own countrymen under Casa -Palacio, commanding the remains of Joseph’s Spanish -guards. This false battle was maintained until nightfall, -with equal loss of men, yet great advantage to the allies, -because it entirely occupied Reille and Villatte, and prevented -their troops in the camp of Serres from passing by the -bridge of Ascain to aid Clausel, who was thus overpowered. -When that event happened, and Wellington had passed the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_382">382</span> -Nivelle at San Pé, Reille retired to the heights of Bidart -on the road to Bayonne. He retired in good order, destroying -the bridges.</p> - -<p>During the night the allied army halted on the position -gained in the centre, but an accidental conflagration catching -a wood completely separated their picquets towards Ascain -from the main body—spreading far and wide over the -heath, it lighted up all the hills, a blazing sign of war to -France.</p> - -<p>On the 11th the army advanced in order of battle. Hope -forded the Nivelle above St. Jean de Luz and marched on -Bidart; Beresford moved by the roads leading upon Arbonne; -Hill brought his left forward into communication -with Beresford, and with his centre faced Cambo on the -Nive. This change of front and the time required to restore -the bridges for the artillery, enabled Soult to rally his army -upon a third line of fortified camps which he had previously -commenced, the right resting on the coast at Bidart, the -centre at Helbacen Borda, the left at Ustaritz on the Nive. -His front was of eight miles, but the works were only -slightly advanced, and dreading a second battle on so wide -a field he drew back his centre and left to Arbonne and -Arauntz, broke down the bridges on the Nive at Ustaritz, -and at two o’clock a slight skirmish, commenced by the allies -in the centre, closed the day’s proceedings.</p> - -<p>Next morning the French retired to the ridge of Beyris, -having their right in advance at Anglet and their left in the -intrenched camp of Bayonne near Marac. The movement -was covered by a dense fog, but when the day cleared Hope -took post at Bidart on the left; Beresford then occupied -Ahetze, Arbonne, and the hill of San Barbe in the centre, -and Hill endeavoured to pass the fords and restore the -broken bridges of Ustaritz. He also made a demonstration -against the works at Cambo, but heavy rain in the mountains -rendered the fords impassable and both points were defended -successfully by Foy, whose operations having been distinct -from the rest require notice.</p> - -<p>D’Erlon, mistrusting the strength of his own position, had -in the night of the 9th sent Foy orders to march from Bidaray -to Espelette; but the messenger did not arrive in time, -and on the morning of the 10th, Foy, following Soult’s previous<span class="pagenum" id="Page_383">383</span> -instructions, drove Mina’s battalions from the Gorospil -mountain; then pressing against the flank of Morillo on -Hill’s right he forced him also back fighting to the Puerto -de Maya. However D’Erlon’s battle was at this period receding -fast, and Foy fearing to be cut off retired with the -loss of a colonel and one hundred and fifty men, having -taken a quantity of baggage and a hundred prisoners. -Continuing his retreat all night he reached Cambo and -Ustaritz on the 11th, and on the 12th defended them against -Hill.</p> - -<p>Such were the principal circumstances of the battle of -the Nivelle, whereby Soult was driven from a mountain -position he had been fortifying for three months. He lost -four thousand two hundred and sixty-five men and officers, -including twelve or fourteen hundred prisoners, and one -general killed. His field-magazines at St. Jean de Luz -and Espelette fell into the hands of the victors, and fifty-one -pieces of artillery were taken; the greater part abandoned -in the redoubts of the low country to Hope. The -allies had two generals, Kempt and Byng, wounded, and -they lost two thousand six hundred and ninety-four men -and officers.</p> - -<p>In the report of the battle, scant and tardy justice was -done to the light division. Acting alone, for Longa’s -Spaniards scarcely fired a shot, that division, of only four -thousand seven hundred men and officers, first carried the -smaller Rhune defended by Barbot’s brigade, and then beat -Taupin’s division from the main position, driving superior -numbers from the strongest works: numbering less than -one-sixth of the whole force employed against Clausel, -it had defeated one-third of that general’s corps. So -doing, it lost many brave men, and of two who fell I will -speak.</p> - -<p>The first, low in rank, being but a lieutenant, was rich in -honour, for he bore many scars and was young of days. He -was only nineteen, and had seen more combats and sieges than -he could count years. Slight in person, and of such surpassing -and delicate beauty that the Spaniards often thought him -a girl disguised in man’s clothing, he was yet so vigorous, so -active, so brave, that the most daring and experienced veterans -watched his looks on the field of battle, and would obey<span class="pagenum" id="Page_384">384</span> -his slightest sign, in the most difficult situations. His education -was incomplete, yet his natural powers were so happy -the keenest and best-furnished intellects shrunk from an -encounter of wit, and all his thoughts and aspirations were -proud and noble, indicating future greatness if destiny had -so willed it. Such was Edward Freer of the 43rd, one of -three brothers who all died in the Spanish war. Assailed -the night before the battle with that strange anticipation of -coming death, so often felt by military men, he was pierced -with three balls at the first storming of the Rhune rocks, -and the sternest soldiers in the regiment wept even in the -middle of the fight, when they heard of his fate.</p> - -<p>On the same day and at the same hour was killed Colonel -Thomas Lloyd. He likewise had been a long time in the -43rd. Under him Freer had learned the rudiments of his -profession, but promotion had placed Lloyd at the head of -the 94th, and leading that regiment he fell. In him were -combined mental and bodily powers of no ordinary kind. A -graceful symmetry of person combined with Herculean -strength, and a frank majestic countenance, indicated a great -and commanding character. His military acquirements were -extensive both from experience and study, and on his mirth -and wit, so well known in the army, it is only necessary to -remark, that he used the latter without offence, yet so as to -increase his ascendancy over those with whom he held intercourse; -for though gentle he was valiant, ambitious, and -conscious of fitness for great exploits. He like Freer was -prescient of and predicted his own fall, yet with no abatement -of courage. When he received the mortal wound, a -most painful one, he would not suffer himself to be moved, -but remained watching the battle and making observations -upon the changes in it until death came, and at the age of -thirty, the good, the brave, the generous Lloyd died. Tributes -to his merit have been published by Lord Wellington -and by one of his own poor soldiers! by the highest and by -the lowest! To their testimony I add mine: let those who -served on equal terms with him say, whether in aught I -have exceeded his deserts.</p> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_385">385</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="BOOK_XIV">BOOK XIV.</h2> -</div> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>Passage of the Nive—Battles in front of Bayonne—Combat of Arcangues—First -Battle of Barrouilhet—Second Battle of Barrouilhet—Third -Combat of Barrouilhet—Battle of St. Pierre—Operations -beyond the Nive.</p></div> - -<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">Soult,</span> having lost the Nivelle, at first designed to leave part -of his force in the entrenched camp of Bayonne, and take a -flanking position behind the Nive, half-way between Bayonne -and St. Jean Pied de Port. With his left on the entrenched -mountain of Ursouia, his right on the heights above Cambo, -the double bridge-head of which would enable him to make -offensive movements on the left bank, he hoped to confine -Wellington to the district between that river and the sea, -and render his situation very uneasy during the winter if he -did not retire. He was forced to modify this plan; the Bayonne -camp was incomplete; the work on the Ursouia mountain -had been neglected, contrary to his orders; the bridge-head -at Cambo was only commenced on the right bank, and -on the left constructed defectively; the river in dry weather -was fordable also at Ustaritz below Cambo, and in many -places above that point. Remaining therefore at Bayonne -with six divisions and Villatte’s reserve, he sent D’Erlon with -three divisions to reinforce Foy at Cambo.</p> - -<p>But neither D’Erlon’s divisions nor Soult’s whole army -could have stopped Wellington if other circumstances had -permitted him to follow up his victory. Neither the works -of the Bayonne camp nor the barrier of the Nive could have -barred the progress of his fiery host, if Nature had not opposed -her obstacles. The clayey country at the foot of the -Pyrenees was impassable after rain, except by the royal road -near the coast or by that of St. Jean Pied de Port, and both -were in the power of the French. On the bye-roads the -infantry sunk to the mid-leg, the cavalry above the horses’ -knees, even to the saddle-girths in some places, and the artillery -could not move at all. Rain and fogs on the 12th had -enabled Soult to regain his camp and secure the high road<span class="pagenum" id="Page_386">386</span> -to St. Jean Pied de Port; his troops then easily recovered -their proper posts on the Nive, while Wellington, fixed in -the swamps, could only make the ineffectual demonstration -at Ustaritz and Cambo, already noticed. On the 16th, uneasy -for his right flank, he directed Hill to menace Cambo again, -where Foy had orders to preserve the bridge-head on the -right bank in any circumstances, and only abandon the left -bank in the event of a general attack; but the officer at the -bridge now destroyed in a panic all the works and the bridge -itself. This was a great loss to Soult, and enabled Wellington -to take cantonments.</p> - -<p>Bad weather was not the only obstacle to the British operations. -During the battle of the 10th Freyre’s and Longa’s -soldiers had pillaged Ascain and murdered several persons; -and next day all the Spanish troops committed excesses in -various places. On the right, Mina’s battalions, who were mutinous, -made a plundering and murdering incursion towards -Hellette; the Portuguese and British soldiers commenced -like outrages, killing two persons in one town, but General -Pakenham, arriving at the moment, put the perpetrators to -death, nipping this wickedness in the bud at his own risk, -for legally he had not that power. He was a man whose -generosity, humanity and chivalric spirit, excited the admiration -of every honourable person; yet is he the officer who, -falling at New Orleans, has been so foully traduced by American -writers. Pre-eminently distinguished by his detestation -of inhumanity and outrage, he has been with astounding -falsehood represented as instigating his troops there to infamous -excesses; but from a people holding millions of their -fellow-beings in the most horrible slavery, while they prate -and vaunt of liberty until men turn with loathing from the -sickening folly, what can be expected?</p> - -<p>Terrified by these excesses the French fled even from the -large towns. Wellington soon dissipated their fears. On the -12th, although expecting a battle, he put to death all the -Spanish marauders he could take in the act, and then with -many reproaches, and despite of the discontent of their -generals, forced the whole to withdraw into their own -country. He disarmed the mutinous battalions under Mina, -placed Giron’s Andalusians in the Bastan under O’Donnel, -quartered Freyre’s Gallicians between Irun and Ernani, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_387">387</span> -sent Longa over the Ebro. Morillo’s division alone remained -with the army. These decisive proceedings, marking the lofty -character of the man, proved not less politic than resolute; -the people returned, and, finding strict discipline preserved, -adopted an amicable intercourse with the invaders. However -the loss of such a mass of troops, and the weather, -reduced the army for a moment to a state of inactivity, the -head-quarters were fixed at St. Jean de Luz and the troops -took permanent cantonments.</p> - -<p>The left wing extended from Bidart on the sea-coast to the -Nive, on an opening of six miles. The right wing, thrown -back at right angles, lined the bank of that river for eight -miles. In front of Bidart, the broad ridge of Barrouilhet -crossing the great coast-road was occupied, the principal post -being the mayor’s house, which was covered by tanks and -pools, between which the road led. The centre of the left -wing was on a continuation of this ridge near the village of -Arcangues; the right was on the hill of San Barbe, close to -Ustaritz on the Nive.</p> - -<p>These posts were not established without combats. On the -18th the generals, John Wilson and Vandeleur, were wounded, -and next day Beresford, who had seized the small bridge of -Urdains at the junction of some roads, was attacked in force, -yet maintained the bridge. This acquisition covered the -right flank of the troops at Arcangues, but on the 23rd the -light division had an action there, very ill managed by -the divisional generals, and lost ninety men, of which eighty -fell in the 43rd Regiment.</p> - -<p>Wellington, having nearly nine thousand cavalry and a -hundred guns, fretted on the curb in his contracted position -until December, when the weather cleared and he resolved -to force the line of the Nive and extend to his right, a resolution -which led to sanguinary battles, for Soult’s positions -were then strong and well-chosen. Bayonne, his base, -being situated at the confluence of the Nive and the Adour -rivers furnished bridges for the passage of both; and though -weak in itself, was covered by Vauban’s entrenched camp, -which was exceedingly strong and not to be lightly attacked. -In this camp Soult’s right, under Reille, three divisions -including Villatte’s reserve, touched on the lower Adour, -where there was a flotilla. His front was protected by<span class="pagenum" id="Page_388">388</span> -inundations and a swamp, through which the royal coast-road -led to St. Jean de Luz, and along which fortified -outposts extended to Anglet. On his left Clausel’s three -divisions extended to the Nive, being partly covered by the -swamp, partly by a fortified house, partly by an artificial -inundation spreading from the small bridge of Urdains to -the Nive; and beyond these defences the country held by -the allies was a deep clay, covered with small farm-houses -and woods, very unfavourable for movement.</p> - -<p>On the right of the Nive, Vauban’s camp being continued -to the upper Adour under the name of the “<em>Front of Mousserolles</em>,” -was held by D’Erlon’s four divisions, with posts extending up -the right bank of the Nive; that is to say, D’Armagnac -fronted Ustaritz, and Foy was at Cambo. The communication -with the left bank of the Nive was double; circuitous -through Bayonne, direct by a bridge of boats. Moreover, -after the battle of the Nivelle, Soult brought General Paris’s -division from St. Jean Pied de Port to Lahoussoa close under -the Ursouia mountain, whence it communicated with Foy’s -left by the great road of St. Jean Pied de Port.</p> - -<p>The Nive, the Adour, and the Gave de Pau, which falls -into the latter many miles above Bayonne, were all navigable; -the first as far as Ustaritz, the second to Dax, the third to -Peyrehorade, and the French had magazines at the two latter -places; yet they were fed with difficulty, and to restrain -Soult from the country beyond the Nive, to intercept his -communications with St. Jean Pied de Port, to bring a -powerful cavalry into activity and obtain secret intelligence -from the interior, were Wellington’s inducements to force a -passage over the Nive. But to place an army on both sides -of a navigable river, with communications bad at all times -and subject to entire interruptions from rain; to do this in -face of an army possessing short communications, good roads, -and entrenched camps for retreat, was a delicate and dangerous -operation.</p> - -<p>Hope and Alten, having twenty-four thousand combatants -and twelve guns, were ordered to drive back all the French -advanced posts in front of their camp, between the Nive and -the sea, on the 9th, and thus keep Soult in check while -Beresford and Hill crossed the Nive—Beresford at Ustaritz -with pontoons, Hill at Cambo and Larressore by fords.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_389">389</span> -Both, generals were then to repair the bridges at those points -with materials prepared beforehand. To cover Hill’s movement -on the right and protect the valley of the Nive from -General Paris, who being at Lahoussoa might have penetrated -to the rear of the army during the operations, Morillo’s -Spaniards were to cross at Itzassu. At this time D’Armagnac -was opposite Ustaritz, Foy’s division extended from Halzou, -in front of Larressore to the fords above Cambo, having the -Ursouia mountain between its left and Paris: the rest of -D’Erlon’s troops occupied some heights in advance of -Mousserolles.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Passage of the Nive.</span> (Dec. 1813.)</h3> - -<p>At Ustaritz the double bridge was broken, but an island -connecting them was in possession of the British. Beresford -laid his pontoons down on the hither side in the night, and, -on the morning of the 9th, a beacon lighted on the heights -above Cambo gave the signal of action; the passage was soon -forced, the second bridge laid, and D’Armagnac driven back; -but the swampy nature of the country between the river and -the high road by retarding the attack gave him time to -retreat. Hill also forced his passage in three columns -above and below Cambo with slight resistance, though the -fords were so deep that several horsemen were drowned, -and the French very strongly posted, especially at Halzou, -where a deep strong mill-race had to be crossed as well as -the river.</p> - -<p>Foy, seeing by the direction of Beresford’s fire that his -own retreat was endangered, went off hastily with his left, -leaving his right wing under General Berlier at Halzou, -without orders; hence, when General Pringle attacked the -latter from Larressore the sixth division was already on the -high road between Foy and Berlier, and though the latter -escaped by cross roads he did not rejoin his division until -two o’clock in the afternoon. Meanwhile Morillo passed at -Itzassu, and Paris retired to Hellette, where he was joined -by a regiment of light cavalry from the Bidouse river: -Morillo followed, and in one village his troops murdered -fifteen peasants, amongst them several women and children.</p> - -<p>Hill placed a brigade of infantry at Urcurray to cover the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_390">390</span> -bridge of Cambo, and to support the cavalry, which he -despatched to scour the roads and watch Paris and Pierre -Soult. With the rest of his troops he marched against the -heights of Mousserolles in front, and was there joined by the -sixth division, the third remaining to cover the bridge of -Ustaritz.</p> - -<p>It was now one o’clock, Soult came from Bayonne, approved -of D’Erlon’s dispositions, and offered battle. His -line crossed the high road, and D’Armagnac’s brigade, coming -from Ustaritz, was in advance at Villefranque. A heavy -cannonade and skirmish ensued along the front, but no -general fight took place because the deep roads retarded the -rear of Hill’s columns; however the Portuguese of the sixth -division drove D’Armagnac with sharp fighting out of Villefranque -about three o’clock, and a brigade of the second -division was established in advance to connect Hill with -Beresford.</p> - -<p>Three divisions of infantry, wanting the brigade left at -Urcurray, now hemmed up four French divisions; and as -the latter, notwithstanding their superiority of numbers, -made no advantage of the broken movements caused by the -deep roads, the passage of the Nive may be judged a surprise, -and Wellington had so far overreached his able adversary. -Yet he had not trusted an uncertain chance. The French -masses by falling upon the heads of his columns while the rear -was still labouring in the deep roads might have caused disorder; -but they could not have driven either Hill or Beresford -over the river again, because the third division was close at -hand, and a brigade of the seventh could from San Barbe -have followed by the bridge of Ustaritz. The greatest -danger was, that Paris, reinforced by Pierre Soult’s cavalry, -should have fallen upon Morillo, or the brigade left at -Urcurray in the rear, while Soult, reinforcing D’Erlon with -fresh divisions from the other side of the Nive, attacked Hill -and Beresford in front: but it was to prevent that, Hope and -Alten, whose operations are now to be related, had been -ordered to act on the left bank.</p> - -<p>Hope, having twelve miles to march from St. Jean de Luz -before he could reach the French works, put his troops in -motion during the night, and about eight o’clock passed -between the tanks with his right, while his left descended<span class="pagenum" id="Page_391">391</span> -from the platform of Bidart towards Biaritz. The French -outposts retired fighting, and Hope, sweeping with a half -circle to his right, preceded by the fire of his guns and many -skirmishers, faced the entrenched camp about one o’clock. -His left rested on the Lower Adour; his centre menaced an -advanced work on the ridge of Beyris: his right was in -communication with Alten, who had halted about Bussussary -and Arcangues until Hope’s fiery crescent closed on the -French camp; then he also advanced, but with the exception -of a slight skirmish at the fortified house met no resistance. -Three divisions, some cavalry and the unattached brigades, -equal to a fourth division, sufficed therefore to keep six -French divisions in check on this side, and when evening -closed fell back towards their original positions, yet under -heavy rain and with great fatigue to Hope’s troops, for even -the royal road was knee-deep of mud, and they were twenty-four -hours under arms. The whole day’s fighting cost eight -hundred men of a side, the loss of the allies being rather -greater on the left of the Nive than on the right.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Battles in front of Bayonne.</span> (Dec. 1813.)</h3> - -<p>Wellington’s wings were now divided by the Nive, and -Soult resolved to fall upon one with all his forces united. -The prisoners assured him the third and fourth divisions -were both in front of Mousserolles, he was able to assemble -troops with greatest facility on the left of the river, and -as the allies’ front there was most extended, he chose that -side for his counter-stroke. In Bayonne itself were eight -thousand men, troops of the line and national guards, with -which he occupied the entrenched camp of Mousserolles; -then placing ten gun-boats on the Upper Adour, to guard -it as high as the confluence of the Gave de Pau, he made -D’Erlon file four divisions over the boat-bridge on the Nive, -to take post behind Clausel’s corps on the other side. He -thus concentrated nine divisions of infantry and Villatte’s -reserve, with a body of cavalry and forty guns, in all sixty -thousand combatants, including conscripts, to assail a quarter -where the allies, although stronger by one division than -he imagined, had yet only thirty thousand infantry with -twenty-four guns.</p> - -<p>His first design was to pour on to the table-land of Bussussary -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_392">392</span> -and Arcangues, and act as circumstances should dictate, -and judged so well of his position that he warned the -Minister of War to expect good news for the next day: -indeed his enemy’s situation, though better than he knew -of, gave him a right to anticipate success, for on no point -was this formidable counter-attack anticipated. Wellington -was on the right of the Nive, awaiting daylight to assail the -heights where he had last seen the French. Hope’s troops, -with exception of the Portuguese under General Campbell, -who were at Barrouilhet, slept in their cantonments—the -first division at St. Jean de Luz six miles from the -outposts, the fifth division between that place and Bidart, -and all exceedingly fatigued. The light division had orders -to retire from Bussussary to Arbonne, four miles; a part -had marched before dawn, but Kempt, suspicious of the -enemy’s movements, delayed the rest until he could see -well to his front: he thus saved the position.</p> - -<p>The extraordinary difficulty of moving through the country, -the numerous inclosures and copses which intercepted -the view, the recent easy success on the Nive, and a certain -haughty confidence, sure attendant of a long course of victory, -had rendered the English general somewhat negligent, -and the troops were not prepared for a battle. His general -position was, however, strong. Barrouilhet could only be attacked -along the royal road on a narrow front between the -tanks, where he had directed entrenchments to be made; but -there was only one brigade there, and a road, made with difficulty -by the engineers, supplied a bad flank communication -with the light division. The Barrouilhet ridge was prolonged -to the platform of Bussussary, but bulged there too near the -enemy to be safely occupied in force, wherefore the ridge of -Arcangues, behind it, was the real position of battle on that -side.</p> - -<p>From the Bussussary platform three tongues of land shot -out, and the valleys between them, as well as their slopes, -were covered with copse-woods. The left-hand tongue was -held by the 52nd Regiment; the central tongue by the -picquets of the 43rd, with supporting companies in succession -towards an open common, across which the troops -had to pass to the church of Arcangues. The third tongue<span class="pagenum" id="Page_393">393</span> -was guarded, partly by the 43rd, partly by riflemen, but the -valley there was not occupied. One brigade of the seventh -division, covered by the inundation and holding the bridge -of Urdains, continued this line of posts to the Nive; the -other brigades being behind San Barbe and belonging -rather to Ustaritz than to this front: the fourth division -was several miles behind the right of the light division.</p> - -<p>If Soult had, as he first designed, burst with his whole -army upon Bussussary and Arcangues, it would have been -impossible for the light division, scattered over difficult -ground, to have stopped him for half an hour; and there -was no support within several miles, no superior officer to -direct the concentration of the different divisions. Wellington -had ordered all the line to be entrenched, but the works -were commenced on a great scale, and, as is usual when danger -does not spur, the soldiers had laboured so carelessly, -that a few abbatis, the tracing of some lines and redoubts, -and the opening of a road of communication were all the -results. The French could thus have gained the broad -open hills beyond Arcangues, separated the fourth and -seventh from the light division, and cut all off from Hope. -Soult, however, in the course of the night, for reasons which -have not been stated, changed his project, and at day-break -Reille marched with Boyer’s and Maucune’s divisions, -Sparre’s cavalry, and from twenty to thirty guns against -Hope by the main road on the right. He was followed by -Foy and Villatte, but Clausel assembled his troops near the -fortified house in front of Bussussary, and one of D’Erlon’s -divisions approached the bridge of Urdains.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Combat of Arcangues.</span> (Dec. 1813.)</h3> - -<p>Heavy rain fell in the night, but the morning broke fair, -and at dawn French soldiers were observed close to the -most advanced picquet of the 43rd on the left, pushing each -other about as if at gambols, yet lining by degrees the -nearest ditches; a general officer was also seen behind a -farmhouse within pistol-shot, and the heads of columns could -be perceived in the rear. Thus warned, some companies -were thrown on the right into the basin, to prevent the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_394">394</span> -enemy from penetrating that way to the small common between -Bussussary and Arcangues. Kempt’s foresight in -delaying his march to Arbonne was now manifest, and he -immediately placed the reserves of his brigade in the -church and mansion-house of Arcangues. Meanwhile the -French, breaking forth with loud cries and a rattling musketry, -had fallen at a running pace upon the 43rd at the -tongue and in the basin, while a cloud of skirmishers, -descending on their left, penetrated between them and the -52nd, seeking to turn both. The right tongue was in like -manner assailed, and the assault was so strong and rapid, -the enemy so numerous, the ground so extensive, that to -cross the common and reach the church of Arcangues would -have been impossible if serious resistance had been attempted -at first. Wherefore, delivering their fire at pistol-shot -distance, the picquets fell back in succession, with -eminent coolness and intelligence. For though they had to -run at full speed to gain the common before the enemy, -who was constantly outflanking them by the basin; though -the ways were so deep and narrow no formation could be -preserved; though the fire of the French was thick and -close, and their cries vehement in pursuit, the instant -the open ground was attained, the crowd of seeming -fugitives turned and presented a compact and well-formed -body, defying and deriding the efforts of their adversaries.</p> - -<p>The 52nd, which was half a mile to the left, was but -slightly assailed, yet fell back also to the main ridge; for -though the ground did not permit Colonel Colborne to see -the enemy’s strength, the rapid retreat of the 43rd told him -the affair was serious. Well did the regiments of the light -division understand each other’s qualities, and in good time -he withdrew to the main position. On the right-hand tongue -the troops were not so fortunate; the enemy, moving by the -basin, reached the common before them, and about a hundred -of the 43rd and riflemen were intercepted. The French were -in a hollow road and careless, never doubting that the officer -of the 43rd, Ensign Campbell, a youth scarcely eighteen -years of age, would surrender; but with a shout he broke -into their column sword in hand, and though the struggle -was severe and twenty of the 43rd and thirty of the riflemen<span class="pagenum" id="Page_395">395</span> -with their officer remained prisoners, he reached the church -with the rest.</p> - -<p>D’Armagnac’s division of D’Erlon’s corps now pushed -close up to the bridge of Urdains, and Clausel assembling -his three divisions by degrees at Bussussary, opened a sharp -fire of musketry. The position was however safe. A mansion-house -on the right, covered by abbatis and not easily -accessible, was defended by a rifle battalion and the Portuguese. -The church and churchyard were occupied by the -43rd, supported with two mountain-guns, their front being -covered by a declivity of thick copse-wood filled with riflemen, -and only to be turned by narrow hollow roads leading -on each side to the church. On the left, the 52nd, supported -by the remainder of the division, spread as far as the great -basin which separated this position from the ridge of Barrouilhet, -towards which some small posts were pushed: yet -there was still a great interval between Alten and Hope.</p> - -<p>As the skirmishing grew hot, Clausel brought up twelve -guns with which he threw shot and shells into the churchyard -of Arcangues, and four or five hundred infantry made a -rush forwards, but a heavy fire from the 43rd sent them back -over the ridge where their guns were posted. Yet their -cannonade would have been murderous, if this musketry had -not made the gunners withdraw their pieces a little behind -the ridge, and caused their shot to fly wild and high. Kempt, -thinking the distance too great, was at first inclined to stop -the fire, but the moment it lulled the French pushed their -pieces forwards again, and their shells knocked down eight -men in an instant: the muskets then recommenced and the -shells again flew high. The village and mansion-house on -the right were defended by the riflemen, and the action, -hottest where the 52nd fought, continued all day. It was -not very severe, yet both French and English writers, misled -perhaps by an inaccurate phrase in the public dispatch, have -represented it as a desperate attack by which the light division -was driven into its entrenchments; whereas the picquets -only were forced back, and there were no entrenchments, -save those made on the spur of the moment by the soldiers -in the churchyard.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_396">396</span></p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">First Battle of Barrouilhet.</span> (Dec. 1813.)</h3> - -<p>On that side Reille, having two divisions, drove Campbell’s -Portuguese from Anglet about nine o’clock, and Sparre’s -cavalry cut down a great many men. The French infantry -then assailed the position of Barrouilhet, but moving along -a narrow ridge, confined on each flank by tanks, only two -brigades could get into action by the main road, and the -rain had rendered all the bye-roads so deep that it was -midday before their line of battle was filled. This delay -saved the allies, for the attack here also was so unexpected -that the first division and Lord Aylmer’s brigade were at -rest in St. Jean de Luz and Bidart when the action commenced, -and the latter did not reach the position before -eleven o’clock; the foot-guards did not march until after -twelve, and only arrived at three o’clock when the fight was -done; all the troops were exceedingly fatigued, only ten -guns could be brought into play, and from some negligence -part of the infantry were without ammunition.</p> - -<p>Robinson’s brigade of the fifth division first arrived to -support Campbell and fight the battle. The French skirmishers -had then spread along the whole valley, while their -columns moved by the great road against the mayor’s -house on the platform of Barrouilhet, where the ground -was thick of hedges and coppice-wood. A most confused -fight took place. The assailants, cutting ways through -the hedges, poured on in smaller or larger bodies as the -openings allowed, and were immediately engaged, at some -points successfully, at others beaten, and few knew what -was going on to the right or left of where they stood. By -degrees Reille engaged both his divisions, and some of -Villatte’s reserve also entered the fight, but then Bradford’s -Portuguese and Aylmer’s brigade arrived on the allies’ side, -which enabled Greville’s brigade of the fifth division, -hitherto in reserve, to relieve Robinson’s troops who had -suffered severely, and he himself was dangerously wounded.</p> - -<p>A notable action now happened with the 9th Regiment -under Colonel Cameron. Posted on the extreme left of -Greville’s brigade, there was between it and Bradford’s -brigade a Portuguese battalion. Opposite the 9th was a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_397">397</span> -coppice-wood possessed by the enemy, whose skirmishers -were continually gathering in masses and rushing out as -if to assail the regiment, and were as often driven back; -but the ground was so broken that nothing could be seen -on the flanks, and after some time Cameron, who had -received no orders, heard a sudden firing along the main -road close to his left. His adjutant, sent to look out, returned -quickly to say a French regiment, which must have -passed unseen in small bodies between the Portuguese -battalion and the 9th, was rapidly filing into line on the rear. -The 4th British Regiment was in column at a short distance, -and its commander, Colonel Piper, was directed by Cameron -to face about and fall on the French regiment; but he took -a wrong direction, no firing followed, and the adjutant again -hurried to the rear in observation. The 4th Regiment was -not to be seen, and the enemy’s line was then nearly formed, -whereupon Cameron, leaving fifty men to answer the skirmishing -fire, which now increased from the copse, faced -about and marched against the new enemy, who was about -his own strength. The French opened fire, slowly at first, -but increasing vehemently as the distance lessened, until -the 9th sprung forwards to charge; then the adverse line -broke and fled by their flanks in disorder, those who made -for their own right brushing the left of Greville’s brigade -and carrying off an officer of the Royals in their rush: yet -the greatest number were made prisoners and Cameron -having lost eighty men and officers resumed his old ground.</p> - -<p>Reille’s divisions were now all repulsed, but Villatte still -menaced the right flank, and Foy, taking possession of the -narrow ridge connecting Bussussary with the platform of -Barrouilhet, threw his skirmishers into the great basin -leading to Arbonne and menaced Hope’s right flank. It -was now two o’clock, and Soult, his columns being then all -in hand, gave orders to renew the battle, and his masses -were beginning to move, when Clausel reported that a large -body of troops, coming from the right of the Nive, was -menacing D’Armagnac near Urdains. Unable to account -for this, Soult, who saw the Guards and Germans coming -up from St. Jean de Luz, and the unattached brigades -already in line, suspended his attack, and ordered D’Erlon, -who had two divisions in reserve, to detach one to the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_398">398</span> -support of D’Armagnac: ere that could be done the night -fell.</p> - -<p>The troops seen by Clausel were the third, fourth, sixth, -and seventh divisions, whose movements during the battle it -is time to notice. When Wellington discovered that the -heights in Hill’s front were abandoned, he directed that -officer to push parties close up to the front of Mousserolles; -but then hearing the cannonade on the left bank of the Nive -repaired there. In passing he made the third and sixth -divisions recross that river, and ordered Beresford to lay -another bridge of communication lower down the Nive at -Villefranque, to shorten the line of movement. When he -saw how the battle stood with Hope and Alten, he made the -seventh division close in from the hill of San Barbe, placed -the third division at Urdains, and brought up Cole’s division -to an open heathy ridge a mile behind the church of Arcangues, -from thence a brigade moved into the basin on the left -of Colborne to cover Arbonne, and the whole division was -ready to oppose any attempt to penetrate between Hope and -Alten. It was these dispositions which checked Clausel and -prevented Soult’s attack at Barrouilhet.</p> - -<p>In this battle two generals and twelve hundred Anglo-Portuguese -had been killed and wounded, three hundred -made prisoners. The French had one general, Villatte, -wounded, and lost two thousand men; and when the action -terminated two regiments of Nassau with one of Frankfort -came over to the allies. These men were not deserters. -Their prince having abandoned Napoleon in Germany sent -secret instructions to his troops to do so likewise, and in -good time, for Napoleon’s orders to disarm them reached -Soult the next morning.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Second Battle of Barrouilhet.</span> (Dec. 1813.)</h3> - -<p>In the night of the 10th Reille withdrew behind the tanks, -while Foy and Villatte moved along the connecting ridge -towards Bussussary, to unite with Clausel’s left and D’Erlon’s -reserve; hence on the morning of the 11th the French army, -D’Armagnac’s division which remained at Urdains excepted, -was concentrated, for Soult feared a counter-attack. The -French deserters indeed declared that Clausel had formed a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_399">399</span> -body of two thousand choice grenadiers to assault the village -and church of Arcangues, yet the day passed there with only -a slight skirmish. Not so at Barrouilhet. There was a -thick fog, and at ten o’clock Lord Wellington, desirous to -ascertain what Soult was doing, directed the 9th Regiment -to skirmish beyond the tanks, but not to push the action if the -French augmented their force. Cameron did so and the -fight was becoming warm, when Colonel Delaney, a staff-officer, -rashly directed the 9th to enter the village: an error -sharply corrected. For the fog cleared up, and Soult, who -had twenty-four thousand men at that point, seeing the 9th -unsupported, made a counter-attack so strong and sudden -that Cameron only saved his regiment with the aid of some -Portuguese troops hastily brought up by Hope. The fighting -then ceased and Wellington went to the right, leaving Hope -with orders to drive back the French picquets and re-establish -his own outposts.</p> - -<p>Soult, hitherto seemingly undecided, was roused by this -second insult. He ordered Daricau’s division to attack the -right of Barrouilhet in reply, while Boyer’s division fell on -by the main road between the tanks. The allies, unexpectant -of battle, had dispersed to gather fuel, for the time was wet -and cold, wherefore the French penetrated in all directions; -they outflanked the right, they passed the tanks, seized the -outhouses of the mayor’s house and occupied the coppice in -front of it; and though driven from the outbuildings by the -Royals, the tumult was great and the coppice was filled with -men of all nations intermixed and fighting in a perilous -manner. Robinson’s brigade was very hardly handled, the -officer commanding it was wounded, a squadron of French -cavalry again cut down some Portuguese near the wood; and -on the right the colonel of the 84th having unwisely entered -a hollow road, the French, having the banks, killed him -and a great number of his men. However the 9th Regiment, -posted on the main road, plied Boyer’s flank with fire, the -85th Regiment came into action, and Hope, conspicuous from -his gigantic stature and heroic courage, was seen wherever -danger pressed, encouraging the troops: at one time he was in -the midst of the enemy, his clothes were pierced with bullets -and he was severely wounded in the ankle, yet he would not -quit the field, and thus by his calm intrepidity restored<span class="pagenum" id="Page_400">400</span> -the battle; the French were beaten from Barrouilhet, but -they had recovered their original posts and continued to -gall the allies with a fire of shot and shells until the fall of -night.</p> - -<p>In this fight six hundred men of a side fell, and as the -fifth division was very much reduced the first division took -its place in the line. Meanwhile Soult sent his cavalry over -the Nive to Mousserolles to check the incursions of Hill’s -horsemen.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Third Combat of Barrouilhet.</span> (Dec. 1813.)</h3> - -<p>Rain again fell heavily in the night, and, though the -morning broke fair, neither side seemed inclined to recommence -hostilities; but the advanced posts being very close -to each other at ten o’clock a quarrel arose. For Soult observing -the fresh regiments of the first division close to his -posts, imagined the allies were going to attack him, and reinforced -his front; this caused an English battery to fall into a -like error, it opened on the advancing troops and in an -instant the whole line of posts was engaged. Soult then -brought up a number of guns, the firing continued without -object for many hours, and four hundred men of a side were -killed or wounded, although the great body of the French -army remained concentrated and quiet on the ridge between -Barrouilhet and Bussussary.</p> - -<p>Wellington, expecting Soult would finally abandon his -attack to fall on Hill, had sent Beresford orders to reinforce -the latter with the sixth division by the new bridge if necessary; -and also with the seventh division by Ustaritz without -waiting for further instructions; yet now, seeing Soult’s -tenacity, he drew the seventh division again towards Arbonne. -Beresford had however made a movement towards -the Nive, and this, with the march of the seventh and some -changes in the position of the fourth division, caused Soult -to believe the allies were gathering with a view to attack his -centre on the morning of the 13th; and it is remarkable -that the deserters, at this early period, told him the Spaniards -had re-entered France, although orders to that effect were -not, as we shall find, given until the next day. Convinced -then that his bolt was shot on that side of the Nive, he left -two divisions and Villatte’s reserve in the entrenched camp,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_401">401</span> -and marched with the other seven to Mousserolles, intending -to fall upon Hill.</p> - -<p>That general had pushed his scouting parties far abroad, and -when Sparre’s horsemen arrived at Mousserolles on the 12th, -Pierre Soult advanced from the Bidouze river with all his -light cavalry, and being supported by General Paris drove -the allies’ posts from Hasparen. Colonel Vivian, who commanded -there, ordered Major Brotherton to charge with the -14th Dragoons across the bridge. It was an ill-judged order, -and the impossibility of succeeding was so manifest, that -when Brotherton, noted throughout the army for his daring, -galloped forward, only two men and one subaltern, Lieutenant -Southwell, passed the narrow bridge with him and -they were all taken except one man who was killed. Vivian -charged with his whole brigade to rescue them, but in vain, -and he fell back to Urcurray upon Morillo’s Spaniards; Hill -then put a British brigade in march to support him on the -12th, yet recalled it at sunset, because he had then discovered -Soult’s columns passing the Nive by the boat-bridge above -Bayonne.</p> - -<p>Wellington, feeling the want of numbers, now brought -forward a division of Gallicians to St. Jean de Luz, and one -of Andalusians from the Bastan to Itzassu, and to prevent -plunder fed them from the British magazines. The Gallicians -were to support Hope, the Andalusians to protect the -rear of the army from General Paris and Pierre Soult.</p> - -<p>Hill now took a position of battle on a front of two miles.</p> - -<p>His left, composed of the 28th, 34th and 39th Regiments -under General Pringle, occupied a wooded ridge crowned by -the château of Villefranque, where it covered the new pontoon -bridge of communication, but was separated from the -centre by a small stream forming a chain of ponds in a deep -marshy valley.</p> - -<p>His centre was on both sides of the high road, near the -hamlet of St. Pierre, on a crescent-shaped height, broken with -rocks and close brushwood on the left hand; on the right -hand inclosed with high and thick hedges, one of which, at -the distance of a hundred yards, covered part of the line and -was nearly impassable. Here Barnes’s British brigade of the -second division were posted, the 71st Regiment being on the -left, the 50th in the centre, the 92nd on the right. Ashworth’s<span class="pagenum" id="Page_402">402</span> -Portuguese were posted in advance immediately in -front of St. Pierre, with skirmishers occupying a small wood -covering their right. Twelve guns under Ross and Tullock -were in the centre, looking down the great road; and half a -mile in rear Lecor’s Portuguese and two guns were in reserve.</p> - -<p>The right, under Byng, was composed of the 3rd, 57th, -31st, and 66th. The first-named was posted on a height -running parallel with the Adour, called the ridge of Old -Moguerre because a village of that name was on the summit; -pushed in advance, this regiment could only be assailed by -crossing a narrow swampy valley, the upper part of which -was held by Byng with the remainder of the brigade, his post -being also covered by a great mill-pond.</p> - -<p>One mile in front of St. Pierre a range of counter heights -were held by the French, but the basin between was broad, -open, and commanded by the fire of the allies. All parts -were too heavy and enclosed for the action of cavalry, and -the French infantry could only approach in force on one -narrow front of battle along the high road, until within -cannon-shot, but then two narrow difficult lanes branched off -to the right and left, crossing the swampy valleys on each -side, and leading, the one against the allies’ right, where the -3rd Regiment was posted; the other against their left.</p> - -<p>In the night of the 12th rain swelled the Nive and carried -away the bridge of communication; it was soon restored, but -for the time Hill was cut off from the rest of the army; and -while seven French divisions of infantry, furnishing thirty-five -thousand combatants, approached him in front, an eighth -under General Paris, and the cavalry of Pierre Soult, menaced -him in rear. To meet those in his front he had only fourteen -guns and fourteen thousand men in position; to check -those on his rear but four thousand Spaniards and Vivian’s -cavalry at Urcurray.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Battle of St. Pierre.</span> (Dec. 1813.)</h3> - -<p>Morning broke with a heavy mist, under cover of which -Soult formed his order of battle. D’Erlon, having D’Armagnac’s, -Abbé’s, and Daricau’s divisions of infantry, Sparre’s -cavalry, and twenty-two guns, marched in front; Foy and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_403">403</span> -Maransin followed, but the remainder of the army was in reserve, -for the roads would not allow of any other order. The -mist hung heavily, and the French masses, at one moment -quite shrouded in vapour, at another dimly seen or looming -sudden and large, and dark, at different points, appeared like -thunder-clouds gathering before the storm; but at half-past -eight Soult pushed back the British picquets in the centre, -the sun burst out, and the sparkling fire of the light troops -spread wide in the valley and crept up the hills on either -flank, while the bellowing of forty pieces of artillery shook -the banks of the Nive and the Adour.</p> - -<p>Daricau, marching on the French right, was directed -against Pringle. D’Armagnac, moving on the left, took Old -Moguerre as his point of direction, and sought to force Byng’s -right. Abbé assailed the centre at St. Pierre, where General -Stewart commanded. Hill took his station on a commanding -mount in the rear, from whence he could see the whole battle -and direct the movements.</p> - -<p>Abbé, a man noted for vigour, pushed his attack with great -violence and gained ground so rapidly with his light troops -on the left of Ashworth’s Portuguese, that Stewart sent the -71st Regiment and two guns from St. Pierre to the latter’s -aid; then the French won the small wood on Ashworth’s -right, and half of the 50th Regiment was detached to that -quarter. The wood was thus retaken, and the flanks of -Stewart’s position secured, but his centre was weakened, the -fire of the French artillery was concentrated against it, and -Abbé pushed on there with such a power that, despite of the -play of musketry on his flanks and a crushing cannonade in -his front, he gained the top of the position, and drove back -the remainder of Ashworth’s Portuguese, together with the -other half of the 50th Regiment, which had remained in -reserve.</p> - -<p>General Barnes now brought the 92nd Regiment from behind -St. Pierre with so furious a counter-attack that the -French skirmishers fell back in disorder on each side, -leaving their column to meet the charge, which was so -roughly pushed that the French mass wavered and gave way: -Abbé immediately replaced it with another, and Soult, redoubling -the heavy play of his heavy guns from the heights, -sent a battery of horse artillery galloping down into the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_404">404</span> -valley, where it opened fire close to the allies with destructive -activity. The cannonade and musketry then rolled like -a prolonged peal of thunder, and Abbé’s second column, regardless -of Ross’s guns, though they tore the ranks in a -horrible manner, advanced so steadily up the high road, that -the 92nd was compelled to take shelter behind St. Pierre. -The Portuguese guns, their British commanding officer having -fallen wounded, then limbered up to retire, and the French -skirmishers reached the thick hedge in front of Ashworth’s -right.</p> - -<p>Barnes, seeing that hard fighting only could save the position, -now made the Portuguese guns resume fire, while the -wing of the 50th and the Caçadores gallantly held the small -wood on the right; but he was soon wounded, the greatest -part of his and Stewart’s staff were hurt, and the matter -seemed desperate. For the light troops, overpowered by -numbers, were all driven in, except those in the wood, the -artillerymen were falling at the guns, Ashworth’s line crumbled -rapidly before the musketry and cannonade, the ground -was strewed with the dead in front, and the wounded crawling -to the rear were many. If the French light troops could -then have penetrated through the thick hedge, defeat would -have been inevitable. For the column of attack was steadily -advancing up the main road, and a second column launched -on its right was already victorious, because the colonel of the -71st shamefully withdrew that gallant regiment and abandoned -the Portuguese. Pringle was still fighting strongly -against Daricau’s superior numbers on the hill of Villefranque; -but on the extreme right, the colonel of the 3rd -regiment also shamefully abandoned his strong post to D’Armagnac, -whose leading brigade then rapidly turned Byng’s -other regiments on that side.</p> - -<p>Foy’s and Maransin’s divisions, hitherto retarded by the -deep roads, were now coming into line to support Abbé, and at -a moment when the troops opposed to him were deprived of -their reserve, because Hill, beholding the retreat of the 3rd -and 71st Regiments, descended in haste from his mount, -turned the latter back, renewed the fight in person, and -bringing one brigade of Lecor’s reserve to the same -quarter sent the other against D’Armagnac at Old Moguerre. -Thus at the decisive moment of the battle the French reserve<span class="pagenum" id="Page_405">405</span> -was augmenting, while that of the allies was thrown as -a last resource into action. However the right wing of the -50th and Ashworth’s Caçadores never lost the small wood in -front, upholding the fight there and towards the high road -with unflinching courage: this gave the 92nd Regiment time to -reform behind the hamlet of St. Pierre, and its gallant colonel, -Cameron, once more led it down the road with colours flying -and music playing, resolved to give the shock to whatever -stood in the way. At this sight the British skirmishers on -the flanks, suddenly changing from retreat to attack, rushed -forward and drove those of the enemy back on each side; -yet the battle seemed hopeless, for Ashworth was badly -wounded, his line was shattered, and Barnes, who had not -quitted the field for his former hurt, was now shot through -the body.</p> - -<p>The 92nd was but a small clump compared with the -heavy mass in its front, and the French soldiers seemed -willing enough to close with the bayonet, until an officer -riding at their head suddenly turned his horse, waved his -sword and appeared to order a retreat: then they faced about -and retired across the valley to their original position, in -good order however, and scarcely pursued by the allies, so -exhausted were the victors. This retrograde movement, for -there was no panic or disorder, was produced partly by the -gallant advance of the 92nd and the returning rush of the -skirmishers; partly by the state of affairs immediately on -the right of the French column, where the 71st, indignant -at their colonel’s conduct, had returned to the fight with -such fierceness, and were so well aided by Lecor’s Portuguese, -Hill and Stewart in person leading the attack, that -the hitherto victorious French were overthrown there also, -at the very moment when the 92nd came with that brave -show down the main road. Many men fell and Lecor was -wounded, but the double action in the centre being seen -from the hill of Villefranque, Daricau’s division, already -roughly handled by Pringle, also fell back in confusion; -while on the extreme right, Buchan’s Portuguese, detached -by Hill to recover the Moguerre ridge, ascended under a -flank fire from Soult’s guns, and rallied the 3rd Regiment: -in happy time, for D’Armagnac’s first brigade had passed -Byng’s flank at the mill-pond and was in rear of his line.</p> - -<p>It was now twelve o’clock, and while the fire of the light -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_406">406</span> -troops and cannonade in the centre continued, the contending -generals restored their respective orders of battle. -Soult’s right wing had been quite repulsed by Pringle, his -left was giving way before Buchan, and the difficult ground -forbad his sending immediate succour to either; moreover -in the exigency of the moment he had called D’Armagnac’s -reserve brigade to sustain Abbé’s retiring columns. However -that brigade, and Foy’s and Maransin’s divisions, were -in hand to renew the fight in the centre, and the allies -could not, unsuccoured, have sustained a fresh assault, their -ranks being wasted with fire, nearly all the staff killed or -wounded, and three generals badly hurt.</p> - -<p>In this crisis Hill, seeing Buchan well engaged on Old -Moguerre and Byng master of his ground in the valley of -the mill-pond, drew the 57th Regiment from the latter place -to reinforce his centre; at the same time the bridge of -boats having been restored, the sixth division, which had been -marching since daybreak, appeared in order of battle on the -mount below St. Pierre. It was soon followed by the -fourth and third divisions, and two brigades of the seventh -division were likewise in march. With the first of these -troops came Wellington. He had hurried from Barrouilhet -when the first sound of cannon reached him, yet he arrived -only to witness the close of the battle—the crisis was past. -Hill’s day of glory was complete.</p> - -<p>Soult, according to the French method, now made another -attack, or rather demonstration against the centre to cover -his new dispositions, but he was easily repulsed, and at the -same moment Buchan drove D’Armagnac headlong off the -Moguerre ridge. The French masses continued to maintain -a menacing position on the high road, and on a hillock -rising between the road and the mill-pond, but were -soon dispossessed by Wellington, who sent Byng with two -battalions against the hillock, and some troops from the -centre against those on the high road. At this last point -however the generals and staff had been so cut down, that -Colonel Currie, the aide-de-camp, could find no superior -officer to deliver the order to and led the troops himself -to the attack. Both charges were successful, and two -of the light guns, sent down in the early part of the fight<span class="pagenum" id="Page_407">407</span> -by Soult and which, had played without ceasing, were -taken.</p> - -<p>The battle now abated to a skirmish, under cover of -which the French endeavoured to carry off their wounded -and rally their stragglers, but at two o’clock Wellington -commanded a general advance of the whole line. Then the -French retreated fighting, and the allies, following close on -the side of the Nive, plied them with musketry until dark; -yet they maintained their line towards the Adour, and -Sparre’s cavalry passing out that way rejoined Pierre Soult. -This last general and Paris had during the day skirmished -with Morillo and Vivian’s cavalry at Ureurray, until the ill-success -at St. Pierre became known, when they retired.</p> - -<p>In this bloody action Soult had designed to employ seven -divisions of infantry with one brigade of cavalry on the -front, and one brigade of infantry with a division of cavalry -on the rear; but the state of the roads and the narrow front -did not permit more than five divisions to act, and only half -of those were seriously engaged. His loss was certainly -three thousand, making a total, on the five days’ fighting, -of six thousand men with two generals, Villatte and Maucomble, -wounded. Hill had three generals and fifteen hundred -men killed or wounded, and Wellington’s loss on the -five days’ fighting was five thousand, including five hundred -prisoners. Five generals, Hope, Robinson, Barnes, Lecor -and Ashworth, were wounded.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Operations beyond the Nive.</span> (Dec. 1813.)</h3> - -<p>When Soult lost the battle of St. Pierre, he left three -divisions on the Mousserolles camp, sent two over the Nive -to reinforce Reille, and passing the Adour in the night with -Foy’s division, extended it up the right bank of that river to -the confluence of the Gave de Pau, to protect the navigation, -on which his supplies now depended. To intercept those -supplies, to cut the French communication with St. Jean Pied -de Port, and open a fertile tract of country for the subsistence -and action of his powerful cavalry, had been Wellington’s -object in forcing the passage of the Nive; for Bayonne -could not be assailed with success until the army occupying -the entrenched camp in its front was drawn away by want.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_408">408</span> -Soult was resolved to hold his position around that fortress, -and the country beyond the Nive favoured that object, -being deep, traversed by many rivers, which flooding with -every shower in the mountains furnished in their concentric -courses to the Adour barriers not easy to break through -without great loss: and to turn them by their sources near -the mountains required wide movements, and fine weather -to harden the roads. But the winter of 1813 was peculiarly -wet. Still Soult’s security depended on the weather, and -three fine days made him tremble. He was now also dependent -on water-carriage for his supplies, his chief magazines -being at Dax on the Adour, and Peyrehorade on the -Gave de Pau; the latter only twenty-four miles from Bayonne, -and both so exposed to sudden incursions that he was compelled -to entrench them.</p> - -<p>While thus watching clouds and skies for the signal of -great operations, the two commanders carried on a minor -warfare of posts and surprises. Soult, finding the navigation -of the Adour most endangered near Urt, where the -river narrowed, sent Foy across to cast a bridge and fortify -a head to it; but Wellington, forestalling the attempt, drove -him back again, and the supplies were then only brought -down at night by stealth or with a guard of gunboats under -fire: indeed the French army could not have been thus supplied -if the coasting trade from Bordeaux to Bayonne had -been interrupted by the English navy, but Wellington’s remonstrances -on that head were still unheeded by the Admiralty. -However Soult was so embarrassed, that leaving -Reille with but four divisions in Vauban’s camp, he transferred -his head-quarters to Peyrehorade, and sent Clausel -with two divisions, all the light cavalry and Trielhard’s -heavy dragoons beyond the Adour to take post on the Bidouze, -one of the many rivers descending concentrically -from the Pyrenees to the Adour. His advanced posts were -then pushed to the Joyeuse and Aran rivers, close to Wellington, -who immediately made counter dispositions, and -thus the principal fronts of opposition were placed on a -line perpendicular to that against Bayonne, which thus -became secondary.</p> - -<p>This did not prevent the minor warfare for the command -of the navigation of the Adour being continued. Hill seized<span class="pagenum" id="Page_409">409</span> -the island of Holriague in the Adour; those of Berens -and Broc above it, were taken by Foy, and the allies were -momentarily embarrassed by the loss of their boat-bridge on -the Nive, which was carried away by a flood. On their extreme -right Morillo, having without authority taken two -squadrons of the 18th Hussars to aid one of his foraging incursions, -abandoned them at a critical moment, whereby their -major, Hughes, two captains and a lieutenant were wounded -and many men lost. Mina also invaded the valleys of Baygorry, -plundering, burning, and murdering men, women, and -children; whereupon the people there took arms, and being -reinforced with two hundred regulars from St. Jean Pied de -Port surprised one of his battalions and pressed the others -with vigour. This gave Soult hopes of exciting the Basques -to an insurgent warfare; and General Harispe, a Basque by -birth and of great reputation, who had been long expected -from Suchet’s army, now arrived to aid this plan. If Harispe -had come in November, Wellington’s strict discipline being -then unknown, a formidable warfare would have been raised. -It was now too late for a general rising, yet his presence, -and Mina’s incursions, with the licentious conduct of Morillo, -had so awakened the warlike propensities of the Baygorry -Basques, that Harispe soon made a levy and commenced -active operations. To aid him Soult extended and strengthened -his own left, and made the light cavalry menace all -the outposts, whereupon Wellington, thinking he sought a -general battle, resolved to fall on him at once, but was -stopped by the sudden swelling of the rivers. When they -subsided, he marched to attack Clausel in the centre, and as -Soult was there in person a general battle seemed inevitable; -but the movements on both sides were founded on mistakes, -and the matter ended with a slight skirmish.</p> - -<p>Harispe reinforced with Paris’s division and Dauture’s -brigade then drove Mina with loss into the high mountains, -surprised Morillo’s foragers, and captured some English -dragoons. Lord Wellington, fearing this warfare, put forth -his authority in a vigorous manner to check the Spanish -generals, and a sullen obedience followed, yet the Basque -insurrection spread, and he therefore published a manifesto -calling on the people to declare for war or peace, announcing -his intention to burn their villages and put them to death if<span class="pagenum" id="Page_410">410</span> -they continued insurgent—in fine, to treat them as the -French generals had treated the insurgents in Spain. This -stopped Harispe’s efforts, and Soult, who now expected -reinforcements and was desirous to resume the offensive -with his whole army, ordered him to abandon his Peasant -war, to concentrate his regular force and hem in the allies’ -right. Then Harispe, always daring and active, drove back -all Morillo’s foragers, and with them a body of English -cavalry: at the same time one of Hill’s cavalry posts on the -left was cut off in retaliation for a French post which had -been surprised by the sixth division, with circumstances -entirely opposed to good feeling and to the generous habits -long established between the light division and the French -soldiers, of which the following are fine illustrations.</p> - -<p>On the 9th of December, the 43rd was assembled within -twenty yards of a French out-sentry, yet he continued his -beat for an hour without concern, relying so confidently on -the customary system as to place his knapsack on the -ground. When the order to advance was given, one of the -British soldiers told him to go away and helped him to -replace his pack before the firing commenced. Next morning -the French in like manner warned a 43rd sentry to -retire. At another time Lord Wellington, desirous to gain -the top of a hill occupied by the enemy near Bayonne, -ordered his escort of riflemen to drive the French away, and -seeing the soldiers stealing up too close, as he thought, -called out to fire, but with a loud voice one of those veterans -replied, <em>No firing!</em> Holding up the butt of his rifle towards -the French, he tapped it in a peculiar way, and at the -private signal, which meaned, <em>We must have the hill for a short -time</em>, the French, who could not maintain yet would not -have relinquished it without a fight if they had been fired -upon, quietly retired: yet this signal would never have -been made if the post had been one capable of a permanent -defence, so well did those veterans understand war and its -proprieties.</p> - -<p>Soult’s conscripts were now deserting fast, and the inclemency -of the weather filled his hospitals, while Wellington’s -bronzed soldiers, impassive to fatigue, patient to endure, -fierce in execution, were free from serious maladies, ready -and able to plant their colours wherever their general listed.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_411">411</span> -The country was however a vast quagmire; neither provisions -nor orders could be conveyed to the different quarters; -a Portuguese brigade was several days without food from -the swelling of the rivulets, which stopped the commissariat -mules. At the sea-side the troops were better off, yet with -a horrible counterpoise; for on that iron-bound coast, storms -and shipwrecks were so frequent, that scarcely a day passed -without some vessel, sometimes many together, being seen -embayed and drifting towards the reefs, which shoot out like -needles for several miles. Once in that situation there was -no human help! A faint cry might be heard at intervals, -but the tall ship floated solemnly onwards until the first -rock arrested her, when a roaring surge would dash her to -pieces and the shore was strewed with broken timbers and -dead bodies. January was thus passed by the allies, but -February saw Wellington break into France, the successful -invader of that mighty country.</p> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_412">412</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="BOOK_XV">BOOK XV.</h2> -</div> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>Passages of the Gaves and the Adour—Passage of the Gaves—Combat -of Garris—Passage of the Adour—Passage of the Gaves continued—Battle -of Orthes—Combat of Aire.</p></div> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Passages of the Gaves and the Adour.</span> (Feb. 1814.)</h3> - -<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">While</span> the armies remained inactive, political difficulties -accumulated on both sides in a strange manner. What those -difficulties were and their causes must be sought for in the -original History: this work treats only of battles. Yet their -gravity will be understood when it is said, that Soult, surrounded -with traitors and lukewarm friends, had his army -again so reduced by drafts that he proposed to Napoleon, -then driven from Germany and striving hard to defend -France on the east, no longer to contend with Wellington in -regular warfare, but to scatter his forces as great partizan -corps in opposition to the invasion. On the other hand, -Wellington seriously warned his Government that he looked -to San Sebastian as a post where he should soon have to -fight for an embarkation against the united French and -Spanish armies! In fine that the war could no longer be -continued. Suddenly however his position was ameliorated -by a change in the Spanish councils, by the approach of fine -weather, and the simultaneous receipt of a large sum in gold, -which enabled him again to employ the Spaniards in France -with less danger of their plundering the country. He had -sent before him the fame of a just discipline and wise consideration -for the people, and there was indeed nothing he -dreaded more than the insurgent warfare projected by Soult. -Harispe’s Basques had done him more mischief than the -French army, the terrible menace of destroying their villages -and killing all the male population, by which he stopped -their warfare, marked his apprehensions, and he neglected -no means of conciliation.</p> - -<p>He permitted the local authorities to carry on the internal -government, to take their salaries and raise the necessary<span class="pagenum" id="Page_413">413</span> -taxes, and by opening the ports he drew a large commerce -to support his army; he established many channels for intelligence, -political and military, and would have extended -his policy further if the English ministers had not abruptly -and ignorantly interfered with his proceedings. Finally, -foreseeing that his gold, being in foreign coin, would create -embarrassment, he adopted an expedient which he had before -practised in India; for knowing that in a British army a -wonderful variety of vocations, good and bad, may be found, -he secretly caused false coiners and die-sinkers to be sought -for amongst the soldiers, and they, when assured no ill was -designed for them, very readily acknowledged their peculiar -talents. With these men he secretly coined gold Napoleons, -marking them with a private stamp and carefully preserving -their just fineness and weight, to enable the French government, -when peace should be established, to call them in -again. He thus avoided all the difficulties of exchange, and -removed a fruitful source of quarrels between the troops and -shopkeepers, the latter being always fastidious in taking and -desirous of abating the real worth of strange coin; while the -former attribute to fraud any declination from the value at -which they receive their money. This sudden increase of -current coin tended also to diminish the pressure necessarily -attendant upon troubled times.</p> - -<p>Nor was his provident sagacity less eminent in military -than in administrative and political operations. During the -bad weather he had formed large magazines at the ports, -examined the course of the Adour, and carefully meditated -on his plans. To penetrate France and rally a great Bourbon -party under the protection of his army was the system he -desired to follow; and though the last depended on the proceedings -of the allied sovereigns, his own military operations -would not clash, because to drive the French from Bayonne -and blockade or besiege it were the first steps in either -case.</p> - -<p>That fortress and its citadel, comprising in their circuit -the confluence of the Nive and the Adour, could not be safely -invested with less than three times the number necessary to -resist the garrison at any one point; and hence the whole -must be so numerous as seriously to weaken the forces operating -towards the interior. How and where to cross the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_414">414</span> -Adour for the investment was also a subject of solicitude. -It was a great river with a strong current, and well guarded -by troops and gun-boats above Bayonne; still greater was it -below the town, and there the ebb-tide run seven miles -an hour; there also, gun-boats, a sloop of war, and armed -merchant-vessels could be employed to interrupt the passage. -To collect boats enough to bridge the stream above or below -Bayonne, and the carriage of them, an immense operation in -itself, would inevitably give notice of the design, unless -the French army were first driven away; and even then the -garrison of Bayonne, fifteen thousand men, might baffle the -attempt. Nevertheless in the face of these difficulties he -resolved to pass, his preparations being proportionate to the -greatness of the design.</p> - -<p>Many reasons concurred to make him throw his bridge -below and not above Bayonne, and in that view he had collected -at St. Jean de Luz forty large sailing-boats of from -fifteen to thirty tons’ burthen, called <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">chasse-marées</i>, as if for -the commissariat service; but he had them secretly loaded -with materials for his bridge, designing with naval aid to -run up the Adour to a certain point, upon which the troops -and artillery were to move; then with hawsers, and rafts -made of pontoons, he designed to throw over a covering -body, trusting that the greatness and danger of the attempt -would lull suspicion. No obstacles deterred him. All the -French trading vessels in the Adour had in January secretly -offered to come out upon licenses and serve his commissariat; -but he was compelled to forego that advantage by the silly -meddling of the English ministers, which added greatly to -the difficulty of his enterprise, inasmuch as it forced him, -instead of receiving these men as friends and coadjutors, to -prepare means for burning their vessels.</p> - -<p>Soult was not less active in defensive measures. He had -fortified all the main passes of the rivers on the great roads -leading against his left; yet the diminution of his force in -January had compelled him to withdraw his outposts from -Anglet, which enabled Wellington to examine the whole -course of the Adour below Bayonne and arrange for the passage -with more facility. Soult then, in pursuance of Napoleon’s -system of warfare, which always prescribed a recourse to -moral force to cover physical weakness, concentrated his left<span class="pagenum" id="Page_415">415</span> -wing against the allies’ right beyond the Nive, and renewed -that harassing partizan warfare already noticed, endeavouring -to throw his adversary entirely upon the defensive.</p> - -<p>He knew however he could not thus check the allies long; -and judging Wellington would aim at Bordeaux and the -line of the Garonne, while his own line of retreat must -ultimately be in a parallel direction with the Pyrenees, he -tried to organize in time a defensive system. In this view -he sent Daricau, a native of the Landes, to prepare an insurgent -levy in that wilderness, and directed Maransin to -the High Pyrenees to extend the insurrection of the mountaineers, -already commenced in the Lower Pyrenees by -Harispe.</p> - -<p>At Bordeaux there was a small reserve, which he urged -the Minister of War to increase with conscripts from the interior, -and he sent artillerymen there, ordering various dispositions: -but there was no public spirit awakened and -treason was rife in that city.</p> - -<p>On the side of the Lower Pyrenees he improved the works -of Navarrens, and designed an entrenched camp; the castle -of Lourdes in the High Pyrenees was already defensible, -and he gave orders to fortify the castle of Pau, thus providing -supporting points for a retreat. At Mauleon he put -on foot partizan corps, and had hopes of forming a reserve -of seven or eight thousand national guards, <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">gens d’armes</i> and -artillerymen at Tarbes. Dax, containing his principal -depôts, was being fortified, and the communication with it -maintained across the rivers by bridges, with bridge-heads -at Port de Lannes, Hastingues, Peyrehorade, and Sauveterre; -but in the beginning of February floods carried away -that at Port de Lannes, and the communication between -Bayonne and the left of the army was thus interrupted until -he established a flying bridge.</p> - -<p>Such was his situation when Wellington retook the offensive, -with one hundred and twenty thousand infantry and -fifteen thousand cavalry, as Soult supposed; for he knew -not of the political and financial difficulties which had reduced -the English general’s power and prevented the junction -of the reinforcements expected. His emissaries told -him that Clinton’s Catalonian force was broken up, and the -British part in march to join Wellington; that the garrisons<span class="pagenum" id="Page_416">416</span> -of Carthagena, Cadiz and Ceuta were at hand, and reinforcements -were coming from England and Portugal. This made -him conclude there was no intention of pressing the war in -Catalonia, and that all would be united to march against -him; wherefore with more earnestness than before he urged -that Suchet should be ordered to join him, that their -united forces might form a dike against the torrent which -threatened to overwhelm the south of France. The real -power opposed to him was however much below these calculations. -Twenty thousand British and Portuguese had -been promised by their governments, but did not arrive; -Clinton’s army was still in Catalonia; the regular Spanish -forces available, and that only partially on account of their -licentious conduct, did not exceed thirty thousand; the -Anglo-Portuguese were but seventy thousand, with ninety-five -pieces of artillery.</p> - -<p>Soult, exclusive of his garrisons and detachments at Bordeaux -and in the High Pyrenees, exclusive also of the conscripts -of the second levy which were now beginning to arrive, -had only thirty-five thousand soldiers of all arms, three thousand -being cavalry, with forty pieces of artillery. But Bayonne -alone, without reference to St. Jean Pied de Port and Navarrens, -occupied twenty-eight thousand of the allies; and by -this and other drains Wellington’s superiority was so reduced, -that his penetrating into France, that France which had -made all Europe tremble at her arms, must be viewed as a -surprising example of courage and fine conduct, military and -political.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Passage of the Gaves.</span> (Feb. 1814.)</h3> - -<p>In the second week of February the weather set in with a -strong frost, and the English general advanced, precisely at -the moment when General Paris had marched with a convoy -from Navarrens to make a last effort for the relief of Jaca in -Spain, where a French garrison still remained. But clothing -for the troops, which had been long negligently delayed in -England, arrived at that moment also, and the regiments, -wanting the means of carriage, had to march for it to the -coast. The first design was therefore restricted to turning -the French left by the sources of the rivers with Hill’s corps,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_417">417</span> -marching by the roots of the Pyrenees; Beresford meanwhile -keeping the centre in check upon the lower parts of the -same rivers, in hope that Soult’s attention would thus be -attracted while the passage of the Adour was being made -below Bayonne. It would seem also, that uncertain if he -should be able to force the passage of the tributary rivers -with his right, Wellington intended, if his bridge was happily -thrown, to push his main operations in that quarter, -turning the Gaves by the right bank of the Adour: a fine -conception by which his superiority of numbers would have -best availed him to seize Dax and the Port de Landes, and cut -Soult off from Bordeaux.</p> - -<p>Events frustrated this plan. On the 14th Hill, having -twenty thousand combatants and sixteen guns, marched in -two columns; one to drive Clausel’s posts beyond the Joyeuse, -another by the great road of St. Jean Pied de Port against -Harispe. This last body had the Ursouia mountain on its -right, while beyond it Morillo marched against the same -point. Harispe, who had only three brigades, principally -conscripts, retired skirmishing in the direction of St. Palais. -The line of the Joyeuse was thus turned by the allies, the -direct communication with St. Jean Pied de Port was out, -that place was invested by Mina’s battalions, and on the -15th Hill, leaving a regiment to observe the road of St. -Jean, marched upon Garris, pushing back Harispe’s rear-guard.</p> - -<p>Soult knew of the intended operations on the 12th, but -hearing the allies had collected boats and constructed a fresh -battery near Urt on the Upper Adour, and that the pontoons -had reached Urcurray, thought Wellington’s design was to -turn his left with Hill’s corps, to press him on the Bidouze -with Beresford’s, and keep Bayonne in check with the -Spaniards, while Hope crossed the Adour <em>above</em> that fortress. -Wherefore, when Hill’s movement commenced, he -resolved to dispute the passage of the Bidouze, and the two -Gaves of Mauleon and Oleron in succession. He had already -four divisions on the Bidouze, and he recalled Paris to post -him between St. Palais and St. Jean Pied de Port in observation -of Mina, whom he supposed to be stronger than he -was.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_418">418</span></p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Combat of Garris.</span> (Feb. 1814.)</h3> - -<p>Harispe, having Paris under his orders, and supported by -Pierre Soult with a brigade of light cavalry, now covered -the road from St. Jean with his left, the upper line of -the Bidouze with his right; from thence Villatte, Taupin -and Foy were extended to its confluence with the Adour. -Hill moved against Harispe. The latter had just occupied -in advance of the Bidouze a ridge called the Garris mountain, -which stretched to St. Palais, when his rear-guard came -plunging into a deep ravine in his front, closely followed by -the light troops of the second division. Upon the parallel -counter-ridge thus gained, General Hill immediately established -himself, and though the evening was beginning to -close his skirmishers descended into the ravine, while two -guns played over it upon four thousand men, arrayed on -the opposite mountain by Harispe. In this state of affairs -Wellington arrived. He was anxious to turn the line of -the Bidouze before Soult could strengthen himself there, -and seeing the communication with General Paris, by St. -Palais, was not well maintained, sent Morillo along the ridge -towards that place; then menacing Harispe’s centre with -Le Cor’s Portuguese division, he directed Pringle’s brigade -to attack, saying with concise energy “<em>The hill must be taken -before dark</em>.”</p> - -<p>This expression caught the fancy of the soldiers, and was -repeated by Colonel O’Callaghan, as he and Pringle placed -themselves at the head of the 39th, which, followed by the -28th, immediately rushed with loud and prolonged shouts -into the ravine. Pringle fell wounded, and most of the -mounted officers had their horses killed; but the troops, -covered by the thick wood, gained the summit of the Garris -mountain, on the right of the enemy, who thinking from the -shouting that a larger force was coming retreated. The -39th then wheeled to their right, intending to sweep the -summit, when the French, discovering their error, came back -at a charging pace and receiving a volley without flinching -tried the bayonet. O’Callaghan, distinguished for strength -and courage, had two strokes from that weapon, but repaid<span class="pagenum" id="Page_419">419</span> -them with fatal power in each instance, and the French, -nearly all conscripts, were beaten off. Twice however -they came back, and fought until the fire of the 28th was -beginning to be felt, when Harispe, seeing the remainder -of the second division ready to support the attack, Le Cor -advancing against his centre, Morillo in march towards St. -Palais, retreated to that town, and calling in Paris broke -down the bridges over the Bidouze. He lost altogether -five hundred men, two hundred being taken, and would -hardly have escaped if Morillo had not been slow. The -allies lost one hundred and sixty, most of them in the -bayonet contest.</p> - -<p>During these operations Picton, marching on Hill’s left, -menaced Villatte; but Beresford, though his scouting parties, -on the left of Picton, approached the Bidouze, facing Taupin -and Foy, remained on the Joyeuse, as the pivot upon which -Wellington’s right was to sweep round the French positions. -Foy however had observed the movement of two other divisions, -pointing as he thought towards the French left, and -his reports to that effect reached Soult at the moment the -latter received notice that St. Jean Pied de Port was invested. -Thinking then that Wellington would not attempt -to pass the Adour above Bayonne, but win his way to that -river by constantly turning the French left, he made new -dispositions.</p> - -<p>His line on the Bidouze was strong, yet too extended, -and he resolved to abandon that and the Mauleon for the -Gave d’Oleron, placing his right at Peyrehorade, his left -at Navarrens. Villatte therefore took post at Sauveterre -on the Oleron where the bridge had a well-fortified head; -from thence Taupin lined the right bank to the confluence -of the Gave de Pau, which Foy guarded from Peyrehorade -to its confluence with the Adour, his front being prolonged -by D’Erlon towards Dax. One brigade of cavalry was in -reserve at Sauveterre and the head-quarters went to Orthes. -But the magazines of ammunition were at Bayonne, Navarrens, -and Dax; and Soult, seeing his communications with -all those places likely to be intercepted before he could remove -his stores, wrote to the minister of war to form new -depôts.</p> - -<p>On the 16th Wellington repaired the broken bridges of St.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_420">420</span> -Palais, and after a skirmish Hill crossed the Bidouze, but -the day was spent in the operation. Meanwhile the centre -divisions passed the Joyeuse.</p> - -<p>The 17th Hill advanced towards the Mauleon, while Picton, -on his left, made for the heights of Somberraute, both -corps converging upon General Paris, who, in defence of the -Mauleon Gave, attempted to destroy the bridge of Arriveriete. -Lord Wellington was too quick. The 92nd regiment, -covered by the fire of some guns, passed at a ford above, and -beating two French battalions from the village secured the -passage. The troops halted there, having marched only five -miles, and though Paris relinquished the Gave he did not -retire until the morning of the 18th. The allies then seized -the main road between Sauveterre and Navarrens on the left -bank of the Oleron Gave, while Harispe, Villatte, and Paris, -supported by a brigade of cavalry, concentrated at Sauveterre; -Taupin was lower down on their right; Foy on the -right of Taupin; D’Erlon on the left of the Adour, above its -confluence with the Gave de Pau.</p> - -<p>Soult, thrown from the commencement of the operations -entirely upon the defensive, was now at a loss to discover -his adversary’s object. In this uncertainty, sending Pierre -Soult with a cavalry brigade and two battalions of infantry -to act between Oleron and Pau and communicate with the -partisan corps forming at Mauleon, he decided to hold the -Gaves as long as he could; and, when they were forced, -concentrate his army at Orthes and fall upon the first of the -converging columns that approached. He had considered -every likely movement, as he thought, and his conjectures -had indeed embraced every plan of operation possible, except -the one contemplated by his adversary, namely, the -stupendous bridge over the Adour <em>below</em> Bayonne. That was -now to be done, and Wellington designed to superintend -the casting of it in person; hence, when he had established -his right strongly beyond the Mauleon and Bidouze rivers -and knew his pontoons were well advanced, he returned -rapidly to St. Jean de Luz. Everything there depending on -man was ready, but the weather was boisterous with snow -for two days, and Wellington, fearful of letting Soult -strengthen himself on the Gave of Oleron, returned on the -21st to Garris, deciding to press his operations on that side<span class="pagenum" id="Page_421">421</span> -in person and leave Hope and Admiral Penrose to throw the -bridge.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Passage of the Adour.</span> (Feb. 1814.)</h3> - -<p>Hope had twenty-eight thousand men and twenty pieces -of artillery, and in the night of the 22nd the first division, -with six eighteen-pounders and a rocket battery, cautiously -filed towards the river; the road was deep and one of the -guns falling into a ditch delayed the march, yet at daybreak -the whole reached some sand-downs which lined the river -bank. The French picquets were then driven into the -intrenched camp, the pontoon train and field-artillery came -down opposite the village of Boucaut, and the eighteen-pounders -were placed in battery on the bank. The light -troops, meanwhile, closed to the edge of the marsh covering -Vauban’s camp; and from Arcangues and Urdains the -enemy’s attention was attracted by false attacks, which were -prolonged beyond the Nive by the fifth division.</p> - -<p>The gun-boats and chasse-marées should have reached -the mouth of the Adour at the time the troops reached the -bank; but the wind was contrary and none were seen. -Hope, whose firmness no untoward event could ever shake, -then resolved to try the passage with the army alone; the -French flotilla opened fire on his columns, but his artillery -and rockets retorted so fiercely that three of the gun-boats -were destroyed, and the sloop so hardly handled that about -one o’clock the whole took refuge higher up the river. Sixty -men of the guards were then rowed in pontoons across the -mouth of the river in the face of a French picquet, which, -seemingly bewildered, retired without firing. A raft was -formed with the remainder of the pontoons, a hawser was -stretched across, and Colonel Stopford passed with six hundred -of the guards, the 60th Regiment, and some rockets: -yet slowly and at slack water, for the tide ran strongly -and the waters were wide.</p> - -<p>General Thouvenot, deceived by spies and prisoners, -thought the light division was with Hope as well as the first -division, and that fifteen thousand men had been embarked -at St. Jean de Luz to land between Cape Breton and the -Adour; he feared therefore to send a strong force to any<span class="pagenum" id="Page_422">422</span> -distance; and when he heard of Stopford’s detachment on -the right hank, detached only two battalions under Macomble -to gain information, because a pine-forest and the bending of -the river prevented him from obtaining a view from Bayonne. -Macomble menaced Stopford, but the latter, flanked by the -field artillery on the other bank, received him with a discharge -of rockets; projectiles which, like the elephants in -ancient warfare, often turn upon their own side: this time, -amenable to their directors, they smote the French column -and it fled amazed with a loss of thirty wounded. It is -however obvious that if Thouvenot had kept strong guards -with a field-battery on the right bank of the Adour, Hope -could not have passed his troops in pontoons, no vessels -could have crossed the bar, and to disembark troops between -the river and Cape Breton must have been attempted. This -error was fatal to the French. The British remained unmolested -until twelve o’clock on the 24th, and then the long-expected -flotilla was seen under a press of sail making with -a strong breeze for the mouth of the river.</p> - -<p>To enter the Adour is, from the flatness of the coast, never -an easy task; it was now most difficult; the high winds of -the preceding days had raised a great sea, and the enemy -had removed one of the guiding flag-staves by which the -navigation was ordinarily directed. In front of the flotilla -came the boats of the men of war, and the naval captain, -O’Reilly, ran his craft, a chosen Spanish vessel, first into the -midst of the breakers, which rolling in a frightful manner -over the bar dashed her on to the beach. That brave officer, -stretched senseless on the shore, would have perished with -all his crew but for the ready succour of the soldiers; some -were drowned, but the remainder with an intrepid spirit -launched their boat again to aid the passage.</p> - -<p>O’Reilly had been followed successfully by Lieutenant -Debenham in a six-oared cutter, but the tide was then falling, -and the remainder of the boats, the impossibility of passing -until high water being evident, drew off and a pilot was -landed to direct the line of navigation by concerted signals. -When the flood again came, the crews being promised rewards -in proportion to their successful daring, the whole flotilla -approached in close order; with it however came black clouds -and a driving gale which sent along the whole coast a rough<span class="pagenum" id="Page_423">423</span> -tumbling sea, dashing and foaming without an interval of -dark water to mark the entrance of the river. The men-of-war’s -boats first drew near this terrible surge, and Mr. Bloye -of the Lyra, having the chief pilot with him, heroically led -into it, but in an instant his barge was ingulfed and he and -all with him were drowned. The following vessels seeing -the Lyra’s boat thus swallowed swerved in their course, -and shooting up to the right and left kept hovering undecided -on the edge of the tormented waters. Suddenly Lieutenant -Cheyne of the Woodlark pulled ahead, and striking -the right line with courage and fortune combined, safely -passed the bar. The wind then lulled, the waves as if conquered -abated somewhat of their rage, and the chasse-marées, -manned with Spanish seamen, but having an engineer officer -with a party of sappers in each who compelled them to follow -the men-of-war’s boats, came plunging one after another -through the huge breakers and reached the point designed -for the bridge. Thus was achieved this perilous and glorious -exploit. Not without more loss. Captain Elliot of the -Martial, with his crew and the crews of three transports’ -boats, perished close to the shore in despite of the most -violent efforts made by the troops to save them; three other -vessels, cast on the beach, lost part of their crews; and one -large chasse-marée, full of men, after passing the line of surf -safely, was overtaken by a swift bellying wave which broke -on her deck and dashed her to pieces.</p> - -<p>Eight thousand men were now on the right bank. They -remained in the sand-hills for the night, and next morning, -sweeping in a half-circle round the citadel and its entrenchments, -placed their left on the Adour above the fortress, -their right on the same river below; the water however -made such a bend that their front was little more than two -miles wide, and for the most part covered by a marshy -ravine. This nice operation was effected without opposition, -because the Vauban camps, menaced by the troops on the -other side of the Adour, were so extensive that Thouvenot’s -force was scarcely sufficient to maintain them. The bridge -was then constructed three miles below Bayonne, at a place -where the river was contracted to eight hundred feet by -strong retaining walls, built with the view of sweeping away -the bar by increasing the force of the current. Bridge and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_424">424</span> -boom were the joint conception of Colonel Sturgeon and -Major Todd of the Staff corps; but the execution was confided -entirely to the latter, who, with a mind less brilliant -than Sturgeon’s, yet more indefatigable, very ably and usefully -served his country throughout this war.</p> - -<p>Twenty-six chasse-marées, moored head and stem at distances -of forty feet, were first bound together with ropes; two -thick cables were then carried loosely across their decks, the -ends, cast over the walls on each bank, being strained and -fastened in various modes to the sands. They were sufficiently -slack to meet the spring-tides, which rose fourteen -feet, and planks were tied upon them without any supporting -beams. The boom, moored with anchors above and below, -was a double line of masts connected with chains and cables, -so as to form a succession of squares, in the design, if a -vessel broke through the outside, that it should by the shock -turn round in the square and get entangled with the floating -wrecks of the line it had broken. Gun-boats, with aiding -batteries on the banks, were then stationed to protect the -boom, and to keep off fire-vessels, row-boats were furnished -with grappling irons. The whole was by the united labour -of seamen and soldiers finished on the 26th, and, contrary to -the general opinion on such matters, Major Todd assured the -Author of this History that he found the soldiers, with -minds quickened by the wider range of knowledge attendant -on their service, more ready of resource, and their efforts -under a regular discipline of more avail, with less loss of -time, than the irregular activity of the seamen. But fortune, -the errors of the enemy, the matchless skill and daring of -the British seamen, and the discipline and intrepidity of the -British soldiers, combined by the genius of Wellington, -were all necessary to the success of this stupendous undertaking, -which must always rank amongst the prodigies of -war.</p> - -<p>When the bridge was finished Hope contracted the line -of investment, a difficult operation, for the position of the -French outside the citadel was exceedingly strong. The -flanks were protected by ravines, the sides of which were -covered with fortified villas, the front being on a ridge, -crowned by the village and church of St. Etienne, both -dominant, strongly entrenched, and under the fire of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_425">425</span> -citadel. Three converging columns, covered by skirmishers, -were employed, and the wings attained the edges of the -ravines at either side, their flanks resting on the Adour -above and below; but a very vigorous action happened in -the centre. The German and a brigade of guards were -to attack simultaneously, the guards on the left, the light -German troops on the right, their heavy infantry in the -centre; some accident retarded the wings, and St. Etienne -being first attacked the citadel guns opened and the skirmishing -fire was heavy; yet the Germans stormed church -and village, forced the entrenched line of houses, and took -a gun, which however they could not carry off under the -fire of the citadel. The action then ceased for a time, but -the people of Bayonne were in such consternation that -Thouvenot to re-assure them sallied at the head of the troops, -charged the Germans twice, and fought well; he was however -wounded and finally lost a gun and the position of -St. Etienne: the British loss was however not less than five -hundred men and officers.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Passage of the Gaves continued.</span> (Feb. 1814.)</h3> - -<p>While Hope passed the Adour, Wellington pushed his -operations on the Gaves with great vigour. Six divisions of -infantry and two brigades of cavalry were concentrated on -the Gave d’Oleron, between Sauveterre and Navarrens. -Beresford lined the Bidouze to its confluence with the -Adour, and the 23rd drove Foy from his works on the lower -parts of the Oleron Gave, into the bridge-head at Peyrehorade. -Soult’s right and centre were thus held in check, -and the rest of his army was at Orthes and Sauveterre.</p> - -<p>On the 24th Wellington advanced to force the Gave -d’Oleron. During the previous days his movements had -again deceived Soult, who thought the light division was -with Hope, and imagined the first division was with Beresford; -he did not expect however to hold the Gave, and looked -to a final concentration at Orthes.</p> - -<p>On the 24th also, Morillo, reinforced with a detachment -of cavalry, moved towards Navarrens, where rough ground -concealed his real force while his scouters beat back the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_426">426</span> -French outposts; then a battalion menaced the fords of the -Gave at Doguen, with a view to draw the attention of the -garrison from the ford of Ville Nave, three miles below, -where Wellington designed really to pass. For that object -a great concentric movement was now in progress. Favoured -by the hilly nature of the country, which concealed all the -columns, the sixth division moved towards the ford of Montfort, -three miles below that of Ville Nave, while a battalion -of the second division menaced the ford of Barraute below -Montfort. Picton marched against the bridge-head of Sauveterre, -with orders to make a feint of forcing the passage -there. Vivian’s hussars, coming up from Beresford’s right, -threatened other fords upon Picton’s left, and Beresford, -keeping Foy in check at Peyrehorade with the seventh -division, sent the fourth above the confluence of the waters -to seek a fit place to throw a bridge. Thus the French front -was menaced on a line of twenty-five miles, but the great -force was above Sauveterre.</p> - -<p>The first operations were not happily executed. Some of -the columns missed the fords, and Picton, opening a cannonade -at Sauveterre, made four companies of Keane’s -brigade and some cavalry pass the Gave in the vicinity of -the bridge; but they were driven back with a loss of ninety -men and officers, of whom some were drowned and thirty -made prisoners: the diversion was however complete and -the general operations successful. Soult on the first alarm -drew Harispe from Sauveterre, placing him on the road to -Orthes where a range of hills parallel to the Gave of Oleron -separates it from the Gave of Pau; only a division of -infantry and Berton’s cavalry then remained at Sauveterre, -and Villatte, alarmed by Picton’s demonstrations, abandoned -his works on the left bank and destroyed the bridge. Meanwhile -the sixth division passed without opposition at Montfort -above Sauveterre, and the main body, meeting at the -ford of Ville Nave with only a small cavalry picquet, crossed -with no more loss than two men drowned: a happy circumstance, -for the waters were deep and rapid, the cold intense, -and the ford so narrow the passage was not completed before -dark. To have forced it in face of an enemy would have -been exceedingly difficult; and it is remarkable that Soult, -who was with Harispe only five miles from Montfort and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_427">427</span> -seven from Ville Nave, should not have sent that general -down to oppose either passage.</p> - -<p>On the 25th at daylight, Wellington pushed the French -rear-guard into the suburb of Orthes, which masked the -bridge there, and the Portuguese of the light division lost -twenty-five men in the skirmish. The second, sixth, and light -divisions, Hamilton’s Portuguese, five regiments of cavalry, -and three batteries, were now massed in front of Orthes; -the third division and a brigade of cavalry were in front of -the broken bridge of Berenx five miles lower down the -Gave; the fourth and seventh divisions, with Vivian’s cavalry, -were in front of Peyrehorade, from whence Foy retired to -Orthes.</p> - -<p>On the morning of the 26th, Beresford, finding Foy had -abandoned Peyrehorade, passed the Gave, partly by a pontoon -bridge, partly by a ford where the current ran so strong -that a column was like to have been carried away bodily; but -he had previously detached the 18th Hussars to find another -ford higher up, which was effected under the guidance of a -miller, and the hussars gaining the high road to Orthes drove -some French cavalry through Puyoo. There they rallied on -their reserves and beat back the foremost of the pursuers; -yet they would not await the shock of the main body, now -reinforced by Vivian’s brigade and commanded by Beresford -in person. In this affair Major Sewell, an officer of the staff, -who had frequently manifested his personal prowess, being -without a sword, pulled a large stake from a hedge and with -that weapon overthrew two hussars in succession, only ceasing -to fight when a third cut his club in twain.</p> - -<p>Beresford now threw out a detachment on his left to -intercept the enemy’s communication with Dax, and Wellington -sent Lord Edward Somerset’s cavalry with the third -division across the Gave, by some fords below the broken -bridge of Berenx. Then directing Beresford to take a -position for the night on some heights near the village of -Baïghts, he proceeded to throw a pontoon bridge at Berenx; -and thus after a circuitous march of more than fifty miles -with his right wing, and the passage of five Gaves, he had -again united it with his centre and secured a direct communication -with Hope.</p> - -<p>The bridge of Orthes, an ancient and beautiful structure,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_428">428</span> -could not be easily forced. Composed of irregular arches, it -had a tower in the centre, the gateway of which was built -up, and the principal arch in front of the tower was mined, -the houses on both sides contributing to the defence. The -river immediately above and below the bridge was deep, and -full of needle-rocks; but above the town the water, spreading -wide, with flat banks, presented the means of crossing. -Wellington’s first design was to pass there with Hill’s troops -and the light division, but when he heard Beresford had -crossed the Gave below, he suddenly threw his bridge at -Berenx. This operation was covered by Beresford, while -Soult’s attention was diverted by a continual skirmish at the -suburbs of Orthes; by the appearance of Hill’s columns -above the town; and by Wellington’s taking cognizance of -the position near the bridge so openly as to draw a cannonade. -The latter thought that when Soult knew Beresford -and Picton were over the Gave he would not await a battle, -and the emissaries reported that he was already in retreat; -a circumstance to be borne in mind, because next day’s -operation required success to justify it.</p> - -<p>Hope’s happy passage of the Adour now became known -and he was instructed to establish a line of communication -to the port of Lannes, where a permanent bridge was to be -formed with boats brought up from Urt; a direct intercourse -was thus secured; yet Wellington felt he was going beyond -his strength if Suchet should send reinforcements to Soult; -wherefore he called up Freyre’s Spaniards, who were to -cross the Adour below Bayonne and join him by the port -of Lannes. O’Donnel’s Andalusians and the Prince of -Anglona’s troops were also directed to be in readiness to -enter France. These orders were given with great reluctance. -The feeble resistance made by the French in the -difficult country already passed, left him without much -uneasiness as to the power of Soult’s army in the field, but -his disquietude was extreme about the danger of an insurgent -warfare.</p> - -<p>“<em>Maintain the strictest discipline, without that we are lost</em>,” was -his expression to Freyre; and he issued a proclamation -authorizing the people of the districts he had overrun to arm -themselves for the preservation of order under the direction -of their mayors. He invited them to arrest all straggling<span class="pagenum" id="Page_429">429</span> -soldiers and followers of the army, all plunderers and evil -doers, and convey them to head-quarters with proof of their -crimes, promising to punish the culpable and pay for all -damages. At the same time he confirmed all the local -authorities who chose to retain their offices: on the sole -condition of having no political or military intercourse -with the countries still possessed by the French army. Nor -was his proclamation a dead letter. In the night of the -25th the inhabitants of a village, near the road leading from -Sauveterre to Orthes, shot one English soldier dead and -wounded a second who had come with others to plunder. -Wellington caused the wounded man to be hung as an example, -and also forced an English colonel to quit the army -for suffering his soldiers to destroy the municipal archives -of a small town.</p> - -<p>Soult had no thought of retreating. His army was concentrated, -and every bridge except that at Orthes, the -ancient masonry of which resisted his mines, was destroyed. -One regiment of cavalry was on his right, watching the fords -as far as Peyrehorade; three others, with two battalions of -infantry, under Pierre Soult, watched those between Orthes -and Pau. Two regiments of cavalry remained with the -army, and the design was to fall upon the first column -which should cross the Gave. But the officer at Puyoo, who -had suffered Vivian’s hussars to pass on the 26th without -opposition, made no report of the event, which enabled -Beresford to complete his movement unmolested, instead of -being assailed by two-thirds of the French army. It was -not until three o’clock in the evening that Soult knew of his -being over the Gave, although he was then close on the -flank of the French army, his scouters being on the Dax -road in its rear: and at the same time the sixth and light -divisions were seen descending from the heights beyond the -river pointing towards Berenx.</p> - -<p>In this crisis the French marshal hesitated whether to -fall upon Beresford and Picton while the latter was still -passing the river, or take a defensive position. Finally, -judging he had not time to form an attack, he decided upon -the latter, and under cover of a skirmish, hastily threw his -army on a new line across the road from Peyrehorade. His -right extended to the heights of San Boës, along which ran<span class="pagenum" id="Page_430">430</span> -the road from Orthes to Dax; and the line was prolonged -on the left to Castetarbe, a village close to the Gave. -Having thus opposed a temporary front to Beresford, he -made dispositions to receive battle next morning, bringing -Villatte’s infantry and Pierre Soult’s cavalry from the other -side of Orthes through that town: it was this movement -that led Wellington’s emissaries to say he was retiring.</p> - -<p>Soult’s position was on a ridge of hills, partly wooded, -partly naked.</p> - -<p>In the centre was an open rounded hill, from whence long -narrow tongues shot out towards the high-road of Peyrehorade -on the left; on the right by St. Boës, towards the church of -Baïghts; the whole presented a concave front covered with -a marshy ravine, which was crossed by two shorter necks -coming from the round hill in the centre.</p> - -<p>The road from Orthes to Dax passed behind the line to -the village of St. Boës; and behind the centre a succession -of undulating bare heathy hills trended for several miles to -the rear.</p> - -<p>Behind the right the country was low and deep; but -Orthes, receding from the river up the slope of a steep hill, -was behind the left wing.</p> - -<p>Reille, having Taupin’s, Roguet’s, and Paris’s divisions -under him, commanded on the right, holding the ground -from St. Boës to the centre.</p> - -<p>D’Erlon, commanding Foy’s and D’Armagnac’s divisions, -was on Reille’s left, extending along a ridge towards the -road of Peyrehorade—the second being in reserve. Villatte’s -division and the cavalry were posted above the village of -Rontun, on open heathy hills, from whence they overlooked -the low country beyond St. Boës, and furnished a reserve to -both D’Erlon and Reille.</p> - -<p>Harispe, whose troops as well as Villatte’s were under -Clausel’s orders, occupied Orthes and the bridge, having a -regiment near the ford of Souars above the town. Thus the -French army extended from St. Boës to Orthes, but the -great mass was disposed towards the centre. Twelve guns -were attached to Harispe, twelve were upon the round hill -in the centre, sweeping the ground beyond St. Boës, sixteen -were in reserve on the Dax road.</p> - -<p>At daybreak on the 27th, the sixth and light divisions,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_431">431</span> -having passed the Gave near Berenx, by a pontoon bridge -thrown in the night, wound up a narrow way between high -rocks to the great road of Peyrehorade, and the third division, -with Lord Edward Somerset’s cavalry, were already -established there, having skirmishers pushed forwards to -the edge of the wooded height occupied by D’Erlon’s left. -Beresford, having the fourth and seventh divisions and -Vivian’s cavalry, then gained the ridge of St. Boës and approached -the Dax road beyond. Hill, with his own British -and Le Cor’s Portuguese division, menaced the bridge of -Orthes, and the ford of Souars from the left bank. Between -Beresford and Picton, a mile and a half, there were no -troops; but half-way, in front of the French centre, was a -Roman camp crowning an isolated peering hill nearly as -lofty as the centre of Soult’s position.</p> - -<p>On this camp, now covered with vineyards, but then open -and grassy, with a few trees, Wellington stopped for an hour -to examine the enemy’s order of battle; his two divisions -were then coming up from the river, yet so hemmed in by -rocks that only a few men could march abreast, and their -point of union with the third division was little more than -cannon-shot from the French left. It was a critical moment, -and Picton did not conceal his disquietude; but Wellington, -imperturbable, continued his observations without seeming -to notice his dangerous position. When the troops reached -the main road he reinforced Picton with the sixth, and drew -the light division by cross roads behind the Roman camp, -thus connecting his wings and forming a central reserve; -because from that point byeways led, on the left to the -church of Baïghts and the Dax road; on the right to the -Peyrehorade road; and two others led by the low necks -across the marsh to the French position.</p> - -<p>This marsh, the open hill, where Soult’s guns and reserves -were gathered, and the narrow tongues on either side, combined -to forbid a front attack, and the flanks were scarcely -more promising. The ridge occupied by the French left -sunk indeed to a gentle undulation in crossing the Peyrehorade -road; yet to push there between D’Erlon and Orthes -would have been useless, because that town was strongly -occupied by Harispe, and covered by an ancient wall. To -turn the St. Boës flank the troops must have descended into<span class="pagenum" id="Page_432">432</span> -the low marshy country beyond the Dax road, where the -heathy hills trending backwards from the centre of the -French position would have enabled Soult to oppose a new -front, at right angles to his actual position; the whole of the -allied army must then have made a circuitous flank movement -within gun-shot, through a difficult country, or Beresford’s -left must have been dangerously extended and the -whole line weakened. Nor could the movement be hidden, -because the hills, although only moderately high, were -abrupt on that side, affording a full view of the low country, -and Soult’s cavalry detachments were in observation on -every brow.</p> - -<p>It only remained to assail the French flanks along the -narrow ridges, making the principal effort at St. Boës, and -overlapping the French right to seize the road to St. Sever, -while Hill passed the Gave at Souars and cut off the road -to Pau, thus enclosing the beaten army in Orthes. This -was no slight affair. On Picton’s side it was easy to obtain -a footing on the flank ridge near the high road; but beyond -that the ground rose rapidly, and the French were gathered -thickly with a narrow front and plenty of guns. On Beresford’s -side they could only be assailed along the summit of -the St. Boës ridge, advancing from the high church of -Baïghts and the Dax road; but the village of St. Boës was -strongly occupied, the ground immediately behind it -strangled to a narrow pass; and sixteen guns on the Dax -road, placed behind the centre of Soult’s line and well -covered from counter-fire, were ready to crush any column -emerging from the gorge of St. Boës.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Battle of Orthes.</span> (Feb. 1814.)</h3> - -<p>From daybreak there had been a slight skirmish, with -occasional cannon-shots on the allies’ right, and the French -cavalry at times pushed parties forward on each flank; but -at nine o’clock Wellington commenced the real attack. -The third and sixth divisions won without difficulty the -lower part of the ridges occupied by Foy, and endeavoured -to extend their left towards the French centre with a sharp -fire of musketry; yet the main battle was on the other -flank. There Cole, keeping Anson’s brigade of the fourth<span class="pagenum" id="Page_433">433</span> -division in reserve, had assailed St. Boës with Ross’s -British brigade and Vasconcellos’ Portuguese, his object -being to get on to the open ground beyond. Fierce and -slaughtering was the struggle; five times breaking through -the scattered houses did Ross carry his battle into the -wider space beyond; but ever as his troops emerged the -French guns from the centre hill smote them in front, and -the reserved battery on the Dax road swept through them -with grape from flank to flank; while Taupin’s supporting -masses, rushing forward with a wasting fire and lapping -the flanks with skirmishers, which poured along the ravines -on either hand, forced the shattered columns back into the -village. It was in vain that with desperate valour the -allies broke time after time through the narrow way and -strived to spread a front beyond: Ross fell dangerously -wounded, and Taupin’s troops, thickly clustered and well -supported, defied every effort. Nor was Soult less happy on -the other side. From the narrowness of the ground the -third and sixth divisions could only engage a few men at -once, no progress was made; one small detachment, which -Picton extended to his left, attempting to gain the smaller -tongue jutting out from the central hill, was very suddenly -charged as it neared the summit, by Foy, and driven down -again in confusion, losing several prisoners.</p> - -<p>When the combat had continued with unabated fury on -the side of St. Boës for three hours, Wellington sent a caçadore -regiment of the light division from the Roman camp -to protect the right flank of Ross’s brigade against the -French skirmishers; this was of no avail, for the Portuguese -already there under Vasconcellos being unable to sustain -the violence of the enemy, had given way in disorder, and -the French pouring on, the British troops retreated through -St. Boës with difficulty. This happened at the moment when -the detachment on Picton’s left was repulsed, victory seemed -to declare for the French, and Soult, conspicuous on his central -hill, the knot of all his combinations, seeing his enemies -thus broken and thrown backwards on each side, put all his -reserves in movement to complete the success. It is said -that in the exultation of the moment he smote his thigh, -exclaiming, “<em>At last I have him.</em>” And it was no vain-glorious -speech, the crisis seemed to justify the exultation. There<span class="pagenum" id="Page_434">434</span> -was however a small black cloud rising just beneath, unheeded -by the French commander amidst the thundering din -and tumult that now shook the field of battle, but which -soon burst with irresistible violence.</p> - -<p>Wellington, seeing St. Boës was inexpugnable, had suddenly -changed his plan of battle. Supporting Ross with -Anson’s brigade, which had not hitherto been engaged, he -backed both with the seventh division and Vivian’s cavalry, -thus establishing a very heavy body towards the Dax road. -Then he ordered the third and sixth divisions to be thrown -in mass upon the French left, and at the same time sent the -52nd Regiment down from the Roman camp, with instructions -to cross the marsh in front, mount the French position, -and assail the flank and rear of the troops engaged with the -fourth division at St. Boës. Colonel Colborne, so often distinguished, -immediately led this regiment across the marsh -under a skirmishing fire, the men sinking at every step -above the knees, in some places to the middle; yet still -pressing forwards with that stern resolution and order to -be expected from the veterans of the light division, soldiers -who had never yet met their match in the field, they soon -obtained footing on firm land, and ascended the heights in -line at the moment when Taupin, on the French right, was -pushing vigorously through St. Boës; and when Foy and -D’Armagnac, hitherto more than masters of their positions, -were being assailed on the left by the third and sixth divisions.</p> - -<p>With a mighty shout and a rolling fire the 52nd soldiers -dashed forwards between Foy and Taupin, beating down a -French battalion in their course and throwing everything -before them into disorder. General Bechaud was killed, -Foy was dangerously wounded, and his troops, discouraged -by his fall and by this sudden storm from a quarter where -no enemy was expected, for the march of the 52nd had -been hardly perceived save by the skirmishers, got into -confusion, and the disorder spreading to Reille’s wing, he -also was forced to fall back and take a new position. The -narrow pass behind St. Boës was thus opened, and Wellington, -seizing the critical moment, thrust the fourth and -seventh divisions, Vivian’s cavalry, and two batteries of -artillery through, and spread a front beyond. Victory was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_435">435</span> -thus secured. For the third and sixth divisions on the other -flank had won D’Armagnac’s position and established a battery -of guns on a knoll, from whence the bullets ploughed -through the French masses from one flank to another; and -though a squadron of French chasseurs, coming suddenly at -a hard gallop down the main road of Orthes, charged these -guns and rode over some of the sixth division which had -advanced too far, their brave career was too madly pushed, -they got entangled in a hollow way and nearly all destroyed. -The third and seventh divisions then advanced and the -wings of the army were united.</p> - -<p>Soult now concentrated his forces on the heathy hills beyond -the Dax road, and with Taupin’s, Roguet’s, Paris’s, and -D’Armagnac’s divisions made strong battle to cover the rallying -of Foy’s disordered men. But his foes were not all -in front. Hill, having twelve thousand combatants, received -orders, when Wellington changed his plan of attack, to force -the passage of the Gave, partly to prevent Harispe from falling -upon the flank of the sixth division, partly in hope of a -successful issue: and so it happened. Unable to force the -bridge, he forded the river above, at Souars, drove back -the troops there, seized the heights, cut off the French -from the road to Pau, and turned the town of Orthes. He -thus menaced Soult’s only line of retreat by Salespice, on the -road to St. Sever, at the moment the junction of the allies’ -wings was effected on the French position. Clausel, so -pressed, made Harispe abandon Orthes and close towards -Villatte on the heights above Rontun, leaving however some -conscript battalions on a rising point near the road of St. -Sever called the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Motte de Turenne</i>, while in person he endeavoured -to check Hill with two cavalry regiments and a brigade -of infantry.</p> - -<p>Soult, seeing that Hill’s passage at Souars rendered the -whole position untenable, now gave orders for a general -retreat. This was a perilous matter. The heathy hills upon -which he was now fighting, furnished for a short distance a -succession of parallel positions favourable for defence, but -then resolved themselves into a low ridge running to the rear -on a line parallel with the road to St. Sever; and on the opposite -side of that road, at cannon-shot distance, was a corresponding -ridge along which Hill, judging by the firing how<span class="pagenum" id="Page_436">436</span> -matters went, was now rapidly advancing. Five miles off -was the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Luy de Bearn</i>, and four miles further on the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Luy de -France</i>, two rivers deep and with difficult banks. Beyond -them the Lutz, the Gabas, and the Adour crossed the line; -and though once beyond the wooden bridge of Sault de -Navailles on the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Luy de Bearn</i>, these streams would necessarily -cover the retreat, it seemed impossible to carry off by -one road and one bridge a defeated army still closely engaged -in front. Soult did so however. For Paris sustained the fight -on his right until Foy and Taupin’s troops rallied, and when -the impetuous assault of the 52nd, and a rush of the fourth -and seventh divisions, drove Paris back, D’Armagnac interposed -to cover him until the union of the allies’ wings was -completed: then both retired, covered by Villatte. In this -manner the French yielded step by step and without confusion, -and the allies advanced with an incessant deafening -musketry and cannonade, yet losing many men, especially -on the right where the third division were very strongly -opposed. As the danger of being cut off at Salespice by -Hill became imminent, the retrograde movements were more -hurried and confused, and Hill seeing this quickened his -pace. At last both sides began to run violently, and so -many men broke from the French ranks, making across the -fields towards the fords, and there was such a rush by the -rest to gain the bridge of Sault de Navailles, that the whole -country was covered with scattered bands, amongst which -General Cotton poured Lord Edward Somerset’s hussars, first -breaking through a covering body opposed to him by -Harispe. In this charge two or three hundred men were -sabred, and two thousand threw down their arms in an inclosed -field; yet from some mismanagement the greatest -part, recovering their weapons, escaped, and the pursuit -ceased at the Luy of Bearn.</p> - -<p>Apparently the French army was now entirely dispersed, -yet it was not so. Soult passed the Luy of Bearn and -destroyed the bridge with the loss of only six guns and less -than four thousand men killed, wounded, and prisoners. -Many thousands of conscripts however threw away their -arms, and one month afterwards the stragglers still amounted -to three thousand. Nor would the passage of the Luy have -been effected so happily, if Wellington had not been struck<span class="pagenum" id="Page_437">437</span> -by a musket-ball just above the thigh, which caused him to -ride with difficulty. The loss of the allies was two thousand -three hundred, of which fifty, with three officers, were -taken; among the wounded were Wellington, General -Walker, General Ross, and the Duke of Richmond, then -Lord March; this last had served on the head-quarter staff -during the whole war without a hurt, but being made a -captain in the 52nd, like a good soldier joined his regiment -the night before the battle, and was shot through the chest -a few hours afterwards; thus learning by experience the -difference between the labours and dangers of staff and -regimental officers, which are generally in the inverse ratio -to their promotions.</p> - -<p>General Berton, who had been between Pau and Orthes -during the battle, was cut off by Hill’s movement; but -skirting that general’s march he retreated by Mant and -Samadet with his cavalry, picking up two battalions of conscripts -on the road. Meanwhile Soult, having no position -to rally upon, continued his retreat in the night to St. Sever, -breaking down all the bridges behind him. Wellington -pursued at daylight in three columns, one in the centre by -the main road, the others on the right and left. At St. -Sever he hoped to find the French still in confusion, but -they had crossed the river, the bridge was broken, and the -allied army halted. The result of the battle was however -soon made known far and wide, and Daricau, who with a -few hundred soldiers was endeavouring to form an insurgent -levy at Dax, immediately destroyed part of the stores, -removed the rest to Mont Marsan, and retreated through the -Landes to Langon on the Garonne.</p> - -<p>From St. Sever, which offered no position, Soult turned -short to his own right, moving upon Barcelona up the -Adour. He left D’Erlon however with two divisions of -infantry, some cavalry and four guns, at Caceres on the -right bank, sent Clausel into Aire on the opposite side of -the river, abandoned his magazines at Mont Marsan, and -opened the direct road to Bordeaux; but with his right he -commanded another road by Roquefort to that city, while -his left protected at Aire the magazines and artillery parc -at that place, and covered the road to Pau. This movement -made it difficult to judge what line he meant to adopt.</p> - -<p>Wellington passed the Adour at St. Sever, and sent the -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_438">438</span> -light division and some cavalry to seize the magazines at -Mont Marsan; at the same time he pushed a column towards -Caceres, where a cannonade and charge of cavalry had place, -and a few persons were hurt on both sides. Next day, -when Hill had reached the Adour between St. Sever and -Aire, D’Erlon was driven back skirmishing to Barcelona -on the other bank. It was then evident that Soult had -abandoned Bordeaux; yet the pursuit could not be pushed -vigorously, because every bridge was broken; and a violent -storm on the evening of the 1st, filling the smaller rivers -and torrents, carried away the pontoon bridges and cut off -all the supplies: the bulk of the army therefore halted -on the right bank of the Adour until the bridges could be -repaired.</p> - -<p>Hill, who was on the left bank, had meanwhile marched -to seize the magazines at Aire. Moving in two columns he -reached that place on the 2nd at three o’clock, and having -two divisions of infantry, a brigade of cavalry, and a battery -of horse-artillery, expected no serious opposition. Clausel -was however there in order of battle with Villatte’s and -Harispe’s divisions, and some guns. Occupying a steep -ridge, which was high and wooded on the right where it -overlooked the river, but merging on the left into a wide -table-land, over which the great road led to Pau, his position -was strong, yet insecure. It could be readily outflanked on -the left by the table-land, and was uneasy for retreat on the -right, because the ridge was narrow and the ravine behind -very rugged, with a mill-stream at the bottom; moreover -a branch of the Adour flowing behind Aire cut it off from -Barcelona, and behind the left wing was the greater Lees, -a river with steep banks and only one bridge.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Combat of Aire.</span> (Feb. 1814.)</h3> - -<p>Hill attacked without hesitation. General Stewart with -two British brigades fell on the French right, a Portuguese -brigade assailed their centre, and the other brigades followed -in columns of march; but the action was sudden, -the Portuguese were pushed forward in a slovenly manner -by General Da Costa, a man of no ability, and the French<span class="pagenum" id="Page_439">439</span> -under Harispe met them, on the flat summit, with so rough -a charge that they gave way in flight while the rear of the -allies’ column was still in march. The fight was thus like -to be lost, when Stewart, having easily won the heights on -the French right, where Villatte, fearing to be enclosed, -made but a feeble resistance, immediately detached Barnes -with the 50th and 92nd Regiments to the aid of the Portuguese, -and the vehement assault of these troops turned the -stream of battle; the French were broken in turn and -thrown back on their reserves. Yet they rallied and renewed -the action with great courage, fighting obstinately -until Byng’s British brigade came up; then Harispe was -driven towards the river Lees, and Villatte quite through -the town of Aire into the space between the two branches -of the Adour behind.</p> - -<p>Reille, who was at Barcelona when the action began, now -brought up a division to support Villatte, and the combat -was continued until night at that point, while Harispe -passed the Lees and broke the bridge. The French lost -many men. Two generals, Dauture and Gasquet, were -wounded, a colonel of engineers was killed, a hundred -prisoners were taken, many of Harispe’s conscripts threw -away their arms and fled to their homes, and the magazines -fell into the conqueror’s hands. The British lost one -hundred and fifty men, General Barnes was wounded, Colonel -Hood killed. The Portuguese loss was never officially -stated, it could not have been less than the British, and the -vigour of the action showed that the enemy’s courage was -not abated by the battle of Orthes. His retreat was now -made up the Adour by both banks, but he was not followed, -because new combinations were opening on both sides.</p> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_440">440</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="BOOK_XVI">BOOK XVI.</h2> -</div> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>Garonne—Adour—Combat of Vic Bigorre—Death and Character of -Colonel Sturgeon; surprising Feat of Captain Light—Combat of -Tarbes—Operations on the Garonne—Major Hughes; Battle of Toulouse—Sally -from Bayonne.</p></div> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Garonne.</span> (March, 1814.)</h3> - -<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">Very</span> perilous was Soult’s state after the battle of Orthes. -Losses in actions, desertion of conscripts, and the dispersion -of the old soldiers, had reduced his army; all his magazines -were taken; his officers were discontented; he was ill -seconded by the civil authorities, and a strong Bourbon party -was actively exciting the people to insurrection. He was, -however, a man formed by nature to struggle with difficulties, -and always appeared greatest in desperate circumstances. -Retreating towards the foot of the Pyrenees, he -took a position covering Tarbes, and commanding the great -road from Pau to Toulouse; there he reorganized his army, -called in all the detachments made before the battle, put -the national guards and <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">gens d’armes</i> of the Pyrenees in -activity, and directed the commanders of districts behind -him to collect all the old soldiers they could, and send them -to the army. Then, to counteract the machinations of the -Bourbonists, he issued a proclamation remarkable for its -power, and evincing the sternest resolution, which was not -belied by his acts, though his difficulties hourly increased.</p> - -<p>But Wellington also was embarrassed. The weather had -stopped his pursuit when vigorous action would have been -decisive; Soult had rallied on a new line of retreat with -strong defensive positions; the allied army, weakened by -every step in advance, would, if it followed the French, -have to move between the Garonne and the Pyrenees, exposing -both its flanks and its rear to all the power which the -French government could command. It was, therefore, necessary -to find a counterpoise by increasing his own force and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_441">441</span> -strengthening the Bourbonists. He had long been promised -twenty thousand additional men from England and Portugal, -but the governments of both countries failed in their -engagements. He had heard and believed that Suchet had -detached ten thousand men to join Soult, and he had, as -before shown, called up Freyre’s Gallicians through the -Landes, because there was less temptation for plunder there, -and he had provided them entirely from the English magazines -and military chest; yet their entrance into France -was instantly marked by outrages which began to dispose -the people to listen to Soult’s proclamation, and an insurrection -was to be feared. Inactive, however, he could not -remain, and while awaiting the junction of the Spaniards -he detached Beresford with twelve thousand men against -Bordeaux, remaining with only twenty-six thousand in -position to observe Soult, who could from Tarbes move by -Roquefort, and gain Bordeaux before Beresford. That general -entered the city on the 12th; and the mayor, Lynch, eager -to betray his sovereign, very quickly tore his own scarf of -honour off to meet the invaders with a welcome. The Duke of -Angoulême then arrived, the Bourbonists took the ascendant, -and Beresford returned to the army with the fourth division -and Vivian’s cavalry, leaving Lord Dalhousie behind with -the seventh division and three squadrons.</p> - -<p>Then the Napoleonists, recovering from their first stupor, -bestirred themselves. A partizan officer cut off fifty men -sent by Lord Dalhousie over the Garonne; the peasants of -the Landes formed bands and burned the houses of gentlemen -who had assumed the white colours; forces of various -descriptions were being assembled beyond the Garonne, and -General Decaen was sent by the emperor to organize and command -them. General Beurman also, who had been detached -by Suchet with six thousand men to aid Lyons, was now -directed to descend the Garonne towards Bordeaux, where -a counter-insurrection was being prepared. But then the -English fleet under Admiral Penrose entered the Garonne, -sweeping it of French vessels of war, and ruining the batteries -on the banks; whereupon Lord Dalhousie crossed the -river, and, meeting with General L’Huillier at Etauliers, -took three hundred prisoners, the French flying at the first -onset. Better troops were, however, gathering in that quarter,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_442">442</span> -and the British force would have been eventually in danger, -if Napoleon, the man of mightiest capacity for good known -to history since the days of Alexander the Great, had not -been just then overthrown to make room for despots; who, -with minds enlarged only to cruelty, avarice, dissoluteness, -and treachery, were secretly intent to defraud their people -of the just government they demanded as the compensation -for serving ungrateful masters.</p> - -<p>While Beresford was detached, Soult and Wellington remained -in observation, each thinking the other stronger than -himself; for the English general, hearing of Beurman’s -march, believed his troops had joined Soult, and the latter, -not knowing of Beresford’s march until the 13th, concluded -Wellington had still those twelve thousand men. The numbers -on each side were, however, nearly equal. Three -thousand French stragglers had been collected, but were -kept back by the generals of the military districts, and Soult -had therefore in line, exclusive of conscripts without arms, -only twenty-eight thousand sabres and bayonets, with -thirty-eight pieces of artillery. Wellington had twenty-seven -thousand sabres and bayonets, with forty-two guns; -having, besides, pushed detachments to Pau, to Roquefort, -into the Landes, and towards the Upper Garonne.</p> - -<p>Two great roads led to Toulouse; one on the English left -from Aire by Auch; the other on their right from Pau by -Tarbes; Soult commanded both, and Wellington thought he -would take that of Auch; wherefore he desired Beresford to -lean towards it in returning from Bordeaux; but Soult had -arranged for the other line, and was only prevented from -retaking the offensive, on the 9th or 10th, by the loss of his -magazines, which forced him to organize a system of requisition -first for subsistence. Meanwhile his equality of force -passed away; for on the 13th, the day on which he heard of -Beresford’s absence, Freyre came up with eight thousand -Spanish infantry, and next day Ponsonby’s heavy cavalry -arrived. Wellington was then the strongest, yet awaited -Beresford’s arrival, and was uneasy about his own situation. -He dreaded the junction of Suchet’s twenty thousand veterans; -the English ministers, instead of troops, had sent ridiculous -projects. The French army in his front, having -recovered its stragglers, and being reinforced by conscripts,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_443">443</span> -was now reorganized in six divisions, under Daricau, Maransin, -Villatte, D’Armagnac, Taupin, and Harispe. General -Paris’s troops, hitherto acting as an unattached body, -were thus absorbed; the cavalry, composed of Berton’s and -Vial’s brigades, was commanded by Pierre Soult, and seven -thousand conscript infantry under Travot formed a reserve. -Again, therefore, driven by necessity, Wellington called -Giron’s Andalusians and Del Parque’s troops also into France, -although Freyre’s soldiers had by their outrages already -created wide-spread consternation.</p> - -<p>The head-quarters had been fixed at Aire, with the army -on each side of the Adour, all the bridges being restored, -and some small bands which had appeared upon the left -flank and rear were dispersed by the cavalry; Soult was, however, -organizing an extensive system of partizans towards -the mountains, waiting only for money to give it activity. -Meanwhile, though the main bodies were a long day’s march -asunder, the regular cavalry had frequent encounters, and -both generals claimed the superiority. In this desultory -warfare, on the night of the 7th, Soult sent a strong detachment -to Pau to arrest some nobles who had assembled to -welcome the Duke of Angoulême; but General Fane got -there first with a brigade of infantry and two regiments of -cavalry, and the stroke failed; the French, however, returning -by another road, made prisoners of an officer and four or -five English dragoons. A second French detachment, penetrating -between Pau and Aire, carried off a post of correspondence; -and two days after, when Fane had quitted Pau, -a French officer with only four hussars captured there thirty-four -Portuguese, with their commander and ten loaded -mules.</p> - -<p>It was these excursions which gave Soult a knowledge -of Beresford’s march, and he resolved to attack the allies, -thinking to strike a good blow on the 13th, by throwing his -army offensively upon the high tabular land between Pau -and Aire; the country was open for all arms, yet the movement -produced only a few skirmishes. Pierre Soult pushed -back Fane’s cavalry posts on the English right with the -loss of two officers and a few men wounded; on the left, -Berton, having two regiments, sought to pass a difficult -muddy ford, but the head of his column was overthrown by<span class="pagenum" id="Page_444">444</span> -Sir John Campbell with a squadron of the 4th Portuguese -cavalry. The latter were however too few to bar the -passage, and Berton, getting a regiment over higher up, -charged the retiring troops in a narrow way, killed several, -and took some prisoners, amongst them Bernardo de Sà, -since well known as Count of Bandeira.</p> - -<p>Wellington, imagining the arrival of Suchet’s troops had -caused Soult’s boldness, made only defensive dispositions, -and on the 14th Pierre Soult again drove back Fane’s horsemen; -at first with some loss, yet finally was himself driven -clear off the Pau road. Both generals, acting under false -information, were afraid to strike, each thought his adversary -stronger than he really was; but Soult, who was in -a tangled country, now hearing that Bordeaux had fallen, -first took alarm, and retreated in the night of the 16th. -Pierre Soult then again got on to the Pau road, and -detached a hundred chosen troopers under Captain Dania -to molest the communication with Orthes. By a forced -march that partizan reached Hagetnau at nightfall, surprised -six officers and eight medical men with their baggage, made -a number of other prisoners, and returned on the evening of -the 18th. This enterprise, so far in the rear, was supposed -to be an insurgent exploit; wherefore Wellington seized -the authorities at Hagetnau, and again declared he would -hang all the peasants caught in arms, and burn their -villages.</p> - -<p>Soult’s offensive operations had now terminated. He -sent his conscripts to Toulouse and prepared for a rapid -retreat on that place. His recent operations had been commenced -too late, he should have moved the 10th or 11th, -when there were not more than twenty-two thousand men -in his front. Wellington’s passive state, which had been -too much prolonged, was also at an end; all his reinforcements -and detachments were either up or close at hand, and -he could now put in motion forty thousand bayonets, six -thousand sabres, and sixty pieces of artillery.</p> - -<p>On the evening of the 17th the hussars went up the -valley of the Adour, closely supported by the light division, -and, half a march behind, by the fourth division coming -from Bordeaux.</p> - -<p>The 18th, the hussars, the light and the fourth division,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_445">445</span> -advanced towards Plaissance; and Hill’s troops, on the -right, marched against Conchez, keeping a detachment on -the Pau road in observation of Pierre Soult’s cavalry; the -centre, under Wellington, moved by the high road leading -from Aire to Toulouse. The French right was thus turned -by the valley of the Adour, while Hill, with a sharp skirmish -in which eighty British and Germans were killed or -wounded, drove back their outposts upon Lembege.</p> - -<p>Soult retired during the night to a strong ridge behind -a small river with rugged banks, called the Laiza, his right, -under D’Erlon, was extended towards Vic Bigorre, on the -great road of Tarhes, and Berton’s cavalry took post in -column, covering Vic Bigorre, where the road was lined on -each side by deep and wide ditches. In this situation, -being pressed by Bock’s cavalry, Berton suddenly charged, -and took an officer and some men, yet finally he was beaten -and retreated. Soult, thinking a flanking column only was -in the valley of the Adour, moved to fall upon it with his -whole army. But he recognised the skill of his opponent -when he found the whole of the allies’ centre had also been -thrown on to the Tarhes road, and was close to Vic Bigorre; -while the light division, beyond the Adour, was getting in -rear of it by Rabastans, upon which place the hussars had -driven a body of French cavalry. Berton’s horsemen then -passed in retreat, the danger of being cut off from Tarbes -was imminent, and Soult in alarm ordered Berton to join the -cavalry at Rabastans, and cover that road to Tarbes, while -D’Erlon checked the allies at Vic Bigorre on the main road, -and enabled him personally to hasten with Clausel’s and -Reille’s divisions to Tarbes by a circuitous way.</p> - -<p>D’Erlon, not comprehending the crisis, moved slowly -with his baggage in front, and, having the river Lechez to -cross, rode on before his troops, expecting to find Berton at -Vic Bigorre; but he met the German cavalry there, and -had only time to place Daricau’s division, now under Paris, -amongst some vineyards, when hither came Picton to the -support of the cavalry, and fell upon him.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_446">446</span></p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Combat of Vic Bigorre.</span> (March, 1814.)</h3> - -<p>The French left flank was secured by the Lechez river; -the right, extended towards the Adour river, was exposed -to the German cavalry, while the front was attacked by -Picton. The action commenced about two o’clock, and -Paris was driven back in disorder; but then D’Armagnac -entered the line, and, spreading to the Adour, renewed the -fight, which lasted until D’Erlon, after losing many men, -and seeing his right turned beyond the Adour by the light -division and the hussars, fell back behind Vic Bigorre, and -took post for the night. This action was vigorous. Two -hundred and fifty Anglo-Portuguese fell, and amongst them -died Colonel Henry Sturgeon. Skilled to excellence in -almost every branch of war, and possessing a variety of -other accomplishments, he used his gifts so gently for himself, -so usefully for the service, that envy offered no bar to -admiration, and the whole army felt painfully mortified that -his merits were passed unnoticed in the public despatches.</p> - -<p>Soult’s march was through a deep sandy plain, very harassing, -and it would have been dangerous if Wellington -had sent Hill’s strong cavalry in pursuit; but the country -was unfavourable for quick observation, and the French -covered their movements with rear-guards whose real -numbers it was difficult to ascertain. One of these bodies -was posted on a hill, the end of which abutted on the high -road, the slope being clothed with trees, and well lined by -skirmishers. Lord Wellington desired to know what force -thus barred his way, yet all the exploring attempts were -stopped by the enemy’s fire. Captain William Light, distinguished -by the variety of his attainments, an artist, musician, -mechanist, seaman, and soldier, then made the trial. -He rode forward as if he would force his way through the -French skirmishers, but in the wood dropped his reins and -leaned back as if badly wounded; his horse appeared to -canter wildly along the front of the enemy’s light troops, and -they, thinking him mortally hurt, ceased their fire, and -took no further notice. He thus passed unobserved through -the wood to the other side of the hill, where there were no -skirmishers, and, ascending to the open summit above, put<span class="pagenum" id="Page_447">447</span> -spurs to his horse, and, galloping along the French main -line, counted their regiments as he passed. His sudden -appearance, his blue undress, his daring confidence, and his -speed, made the French doubt if he was an enemy, and a -few shots only were discharged, while he, dashing down -the opposite declivity, broke from the rear through the very -skirmishers whose fire he had at first essayed in front, -reached the spot where Wellington stood, and told him -there were but five battalions on the hill.</p> - -<p>Soult now felt that a rapid retreat upon Toulouse was -inevitable, yet, determined to dispute every position offering -the least advantage, he was on the morning of the 20th again -in order of battle on the heights of Oleac, three miles behind -Tarbes, which he still covered with Harispe’s and Villatte’s -divisions, both under Clausel. The plain of Tarbes, apparently -open, was yet full of deep ditches which forbad the -action of horsemen; wherefore he sent his brother with five -regiments of cavalry to his right flank in observation of the -route to Auch, fearing Wellington would by that line intercept -his retreat to Toulouse.</p> - -<p>At daybreak Hill moved with the right along the high-road; -the centre, under Wellington, composed of the light -division and hussars, Ponsonby’s heavy cavalry, the sixth -division and Freyre’s Spaniards, marched by the road from -Rabastens; Cole, having the left, was making forced marches -with the fourth division and Vivian’s cavalry, and throwing -out detachments to watch Pierre Soult.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Combat of Tarbes.</span> (March, 1814.)</h3> - -<p>Wellington’s column was separated by a branch of the -Adour from Hill’s, and when he approached Tarbes the -light division and the hussars attacked Harispe’s division -on the heights of Orleix; Clinton, making a flank movement -to his left through the village of Dours with the sixth division, -then opened a cannonade against Harispe’s right, and -endeavoured to get between that general and Soult’s position -at Oleac; Hill, moving by the other bank of the river, -assailed the town and bridge of Tarbes, which were defended -by Villatte. These operations were designed to envelop -and crush Clausel’s troops, which seemed easy, because there -appeared only a fine plain fit for the action of cavalry between<span class="pagenum" id="Page_448">448</span> -them and Soult. The latter, however, having sent his -baggage and incumbrances off during the night, saw the movement -without alarm, being better acquainted with the difficult -nature of the plain behind, in which he had been forced to -make roads to enable Harispe to retreat upon Oleac without -passing through Tarbes. Nevertheless there was danger: -for while Hill menaced Tarbes, the light division, supported -with cavalry and guns, fell upon Orleix, and Clinton with a -brisk cannonade penetrated between Harispe and Pierre -Soult, cutting the latter off from the army.</p> - -<p>The action commenced at twelve o’clock. Hill’s artillery -thundered on the right, Clinton’s answered it on the left, -and Alten threw the light division in mass upon the centre, -where Harispe’s left brigade, posted on a strong hill, was -suddenly assailed by the three rifle battalions. There the -fight was short, yet wonderfully fierce and violent; for the -French, probably thinking their opponents Portuguese on -account of their green dress, charged with great hardiness, -and being encountered by men not accustomed to yield, the -fight was muzzle to muzzle, and very difficult it was to judge -at first who should win. At last the French gave way, and -Harispe, his centre being thus suddenly overthrown, retired -rapidly over the plain by Soult’s roads before Clinton could -get into his rear; then also Hill forced the passage of -the Adour at Tarbes, and Villatte retreated along the -high-road to Tournay, yet under a continued cannonade. -The flat country was now covered with confused masses of -pursuers and pursued, all moving precipitately and with an -eager musketry, the French guns replying as they could to -the allies’ artillery; the situation of the retreating troops -seemed desperate; but, as Soult had foreseen, the British -cavalry could not act, and Clausel extricating his divisions -with great ability gained the main position, where four -fresh divisions were drawn up in order of battle and immediately -opened all their batteries on the allies. The pursuit -was thus checked, and before Wellington could make -arrangements for a new attack darkness came on, wherefore -he halted on the banks of the Larret and Larros rivers. The -loss of the French is unknown, that of the allies did not -exceed one hundred and twenty, of whom twelve officers and -eighty men were of the rifle battalions.</p> - -<p>During the night Soult retreated in two columns, one by -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_449">449</span> -the main road, the other on the left of it, guided by fires -lighted on different hills as points of direction. Next day -he reached St. Gaudens with D’Erlon’s and Reille’s corps, -while Clausel, who had retreated across the fields, halted -at Monrejean, and was there rejoined by Pierre Soult’s -cavalry. This march of more than thirty miles was made -with a view to gain Toulouse in the most rapid manner; -for Soult having now seen Wellington’s infantry and his -five thousand horsemen, and hearing from his brother that -the fourth division and Vivian’s cavalry were on his right, -feared they would cut him off from Toulouse—his great -depôt, the knot of all his future combinations, and the only -position where he could hope to make a successful stand -with his small army.</p> - -<p>The allies pursued in three columns, but their marches -were short. However, at St. Gaudens four squadrons of -French cavalry were overtaken and overthrown by two -squadrons of the 13th Dragoons; they galloped in disorder -through St. Gaudens, yet rallied on the other side and -were again broken and pursued for two miles, many being -sabred and above a hundred taken prisoners. In this -action the veteran Major Dogherty of the 13th was seen -charging between his two sons at the head of the leading -squadron.</p> - -<p>On the 23rd Hill was at St. Gaudens, Beresford at -Puymauren, Wellington at Boulogne.</p> - -<p>The 24th Hill was in St. Martory, Beresford in Lombez, -Wellington at Isle en Dodon.</p> - -<p>The 25th Hill entered Caceres, Beresford reached St. Foy, -and Wellington was at Samatan.</p> - -<p>On the 26th Beresford, marching in order of battle by his -left, his cavalry skirmishing to the right, took post on the -Auch road behind the Aussonnelle stream, facing the French -army, which was on the Touch covering Toulouse. The -allies thus took seven days to march what Soult had done in -four; but the two armies being thus again brought together -in opposition with a common resolution to fight, it is fitting -to show how the generals framed their combinations.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_450">450</span></p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Operations on the Garonne.</span> (March, 1814.)</h3> - -<p>Soult, a native of these parts, had chosen Toulouse as a -strategic post, because that ancient capital of the south, -having fifty thousand inhabitants, commanded the principal -passage of the Garonne, was the centre of a great number of -roads on both sides of that river, and the chief military -arsenal of the south of France. There he could most easily -feed his troops, assemble, arm, and discipline the conscripts, -control and urge the civil authorities with more power, and -counteract the machinations of the discontented; it also gave -him command of various lines of operations. He could retire -upon Suchet by Carcassonne, or towards Lyons by Alby. -He could go behind the Tarn and defend successively that -river and the Lot, or even retreat upon Decaen’s army near -Bordeaux, and thus draw the allies down the right bank of -the Garonne as he had before drawn them up the left bank; -assured that Wellington must follow him, and with weakened -forces, as it would be necessary to leave troops in observation -of Suchet.</p> - -<p>Thus reasoning, he placed a separate body of troops recently -assembled by General Loverdo from the interior, at -Montauban, with orders to construct a bridge-head on the -left of the Tarn. This secured the passage of that river, a -point of assembly for detachments observing the Garonne -below Toulouse, and the command of several great roads. -But to hold Toulouse was a great political object. It was -the last point connecting him at once with Suchet and -Decaen; while he held it, the latter general and the partizans -organized in the mountains about Lourdes could act, -each on their own side, against Wellington’s long lines of -communication. At Toulouse Suchet could aid him, either -with his whole force, or by a detachment to the Upper Garonne, -where General Lafitte had collected seven or eight -hundred national guards and other troops: Suchet, however, -though strongly urged, treated this proposition, as he had -done those before made, with contempt.</p> - -<p>Toulouse was not less valuable as a position of battle.</p> - -<p>The Garonne, flowing along the allies’ right, presented -the concave of a deep loop, at the bottom of which was a -bridge masked by the suburb of St. Cyprien; this last,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_451">451</span> -originally protected by an ancient brick wall three feet -thick and flanked by massive towers, was now strengthened -by Soult with a line of exterior entrenchments.</p> - -<p>Beyond the river was the city, inclosed by an old wall -flanked with towers, and so thick as to hold twenty-four -pound guns.</p> - -<p>The great canal of Languedoc, which joined the Garonne -a few miles below the town, was generally within point-blank -shot of this wall, covering it on the north and east, as -the Garonne and St. Cyprien did on the west.</p> - -<p>Eastward, two suburbs, St. Stephen and Guillermerie, -lying on both sides of this canal, were entrenched and protected -by the hills of Sacarin and Cambon, which were also -entrenched, and flanked the approaches to the canal above -and below the suburbs.</p> - -<p>Eight hundred yards beyond these hills a high ridge -called Mont Rave ran nearly parallel with the canal, its -outer slope was exceedingly rugged, and overlooked a -marshy plain, through which the Ers river flowed.</p> - -<p>South of the town was a plain, but there the suburb of -St. Michel furnished another outwork; and some distance -beyond it a range of heights, called the Pech David, commenced, -trending westward up the Garonne in a nearly -parallel direction.</p> - -<p>Such being Soult’s position, he calculated, that as Wellington -could not force the passage by the suburb of St. -Cyprien without an enormous sacrifice of men, he must -seek to turn the flanks above or below Toulouse, leaving a -force to blockade St. Cyprien lest the French should issue -thence against his communications. If he passed the Garonne -above Toulouse, and above its confluence with the -Arriege, he would have to cross the latter river also, which -could only be effected at Cintegabelle, one march higher -up. He would then have to come down the right bank, -through a country at that time impracticable for guns, -from rain. If he passed the Garonne below the confluence -of the Arriege, his movements would be overlooked from -the Pech David, and the heads of his columns attacked; -if that failed, Toulouse and the Mont Rave remained as a -position of battle, from whence there was a secure retreat -upon Montauban.</p> - -<p>For these reasons the passage above Toulouse could lead -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_452">452</span> -to no decisive result: but a passage below was a different -matter. Wellington would then cut the army off from -Montauban and attack Toulouse from the northern and -eastern quarters; and the French, losing the battle, could -only retreat by Carcassonne to unite with Suchet in Roussillon; -where with their backs to the mountains and the -allies between them and France they would starve. Convinced -therefore that the attack would be on that side, -Soult lined the Garonne with his cavalry as far as the -confluence of the Tarn, and called up some troops, recently -collected at Agen under General Despeaux, to line the Tarn -itself, his design being to attack the allies if they crossed -between that river and the Garonne rather than lose his -communication with Montauban.</p> - -<p>Wellington having suffered the French to gain three days’ -march in the retreat from Tarbes had little choice of operations. -He could not halt until the Andalusians and Del -Parque’s troops joined him, without giving Soult time to -strengthen his defence; nor without appearing fearful of the -French people, which would have been very dangerous. -Still less could he wait for the fall of Bayonne. He had -taken the offensive, and the invasion of France being begun -could not be relinquished. Leading an army victorious and -superior in numbers, his business was to fight; and as he -could not force St. Cyprien, he had to pass the Garonne above -or below Toulouse.</p> - -<p>A passage below was undoubtedly the prudent course; -but Wellington, observing that, when across, the south side -of the city would be most open to attack, resolved to cast -his bridge at Portet, six miles above Toulouse; designing -to throw his right wing suddenly into the open country -between the Garonne and the canal of Languedoc, while -with his centre and left he assailed the suburb of St. -Cyprien.<a id="FNanchor_39" href="#Footnote_39" class="fnanchor">39</a> Hence, at eight o’clock in the evening of the -27th, one of Hill’s brigades approached the river, some men -were ferried over and the bridge was commenced; but the -river being measured was too wide for the pontoons, there -were no trestles, and that project was necessarily abandoned.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_453">453</span> -Had it been effected, some great advantage would have been -gained; for Soult only knew of the attempt two days later, -and then by emissaries, not by scouts. Wellington persisted. -Collecting a great body of infantry about Portet, he -began by driving the French horsemen from the Touch river, -which was in his front, for his army lined the bank of the -Garonne above Toulouse, and did not face St. Cyprien. In -this operation a single squadron of the 18th Hussars, under -Major Hughes, being inconsiderately pushed by Colonel -Vivian across the bridge of St. Martin de la Touch, suddenly -came upon a regiment of French cavalry. The rashness of -the act, as often happens in war, proved the safety of the -British; for the enemy, thinking a strong support must be -at hand, discharged their carbines and retreated at a canter; -Hughes followed, the speed of both parties increased; and as -the road did not admit egress by the sides, this great body -of horsemen was pushed headlong by a few men under the -batteries of St. Cyprien.</p> - -<p>Soult’s attention being thus attracted below Toulouse, -a bridge was laid near Pensaguel, two miles above the confluence -of the Arriege, and Hill passed the Garonne with -thirteen thousand sabres and bayonets, eighteen guns, and -a rocket brigade. His advanced guard then pushed on -rapidly by the great road to seize the bridge of Cintegabelle -fifteen miles up the Arriege; and to secure a ferry-boat -known to be at Vinergue. The main body followed with -intent to pass the Arriege at Cintegabelle, and so come -down the right bank to attack Toulouse on the south, while -Wellington assailed St. Cyprien. This march was to have -been made privily in the night of the 30th, but the pontoon -bridge was not finished until five in the morning of the 31st; -Soult thus got notice in time to observe the strength of the -column, and ascertain that the great body of the army was -still in front of St. Cyprien. Knowing what swamps were -to be passed, and having the suburbs of St. Michel and St. -Etienne now in a state of defence, he thought the operation -only a feint to draw off a part of his army from Toulouse -while St. Cyprien was assaulted or the Garonne passed -below the city; wherefore, keeping his infantry in hand, he -merely sent cavalry up the Arriege in observation, and -directed Lafitte, who had some regular horsemen and national<span class="pagenum" id="Page_454">454</span> -guards higher up, to hang upon Hill’s skirts and pretend to -be the van of Suchet’s army. He was, however, disquieted, -because the allies’ baggage, to avoid encumbering the march, -had been sent higher up the Garonne, to cross at Carbonne, -and was by the scouts reported as a second column increasing -Hill’s force to eighteen thousand men.</p> - -<p>While in this uncertainty, Soult first heard of the measurement -of the river made at Portet in the night of the -27th, and that many guns were still there; hence, as he -could not know why the bridge was not thrown, he concluded -the intent was to cross there also when Hill should descend -the Arriege. To meet this danger, he gave Clausel orders -to fall upon the head of the allies with four divisions if they -should attempt the passage before Hill came down; resolving -in the contrary case to fight in the suburbs of Toulouse -and on the Mont Rave, because the positions on the right of -the Arriege were all favourable to the assailants. He was, -however, soon relieved from anxiety. Hill passed the Arriege -at Cintegabelle and sent his cavalry forward; but his artillery -were unable to follow in that deep country, and as -success and safety alike depended on rapidity, he returned -and recrossed the Garonne in the night, keeping a flying -bridge and a small guard of infantry and cavalry on the -right bank: he was followed by Lafitte’s horsemen, who -picked up a few stragglers and mules, but no other event -occurred, and Soult was well pleased that his adversary had -thus lost three or four important days.</p> - -<p>Being now sure the next attempt would be below Toulouse, -he changed his design of marching down the Garonne to -fight between that river and the Tarn; and as his works for -the city and suburbs were nearly complete, he concluded to -hold Toulouse in any circumstances, and set his whole army -and all the labouring population to entrench the Mont Rave, -beyond the canal, thinking thus to bear the shock of battle, -come on which side it would. Fortune favoured him. The -Garonne continued so full and rapid that Wellington remained -inactive before St. Cyprien until the evening of the -3rd, when, forced to adopt the lower passage, and the flood -having abated, the pontoons were carried in the night to -Grenade, fifteen miles below Toulouse. The bridge was -then well thrown, and thirty guns placed in battery on the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_455">455</span> -left bank to protect it. The third, fourth, and sixth divisions, -with three brigades of cavalry, the whole under Beresford, -immediately passed; and the horsemen being pushed -to the front and flanks captured a large herd of bullocks -destined for the French. But again the Garonne flooded -high, the light division and the Spaniards were unable to -follow, the bridge got damaged and was taken up.</p> - -<p>Soult soon heard by his cavalry scouts of this passage, -but not of the force across, and as Morillo’s Spaniards, whom -he mistook for Freyre’s, were then in front of St. Cyprien, he -thought Hill had moved also to Grenade, and that the greatest -part of the allied army was over the Garonne. Wherefore, -observing Beresford with cavalry, he continued to work -at his field of battle, his resolution to fight for Toulouse being -confirmed by hearing that the allied sovereigns had entered -Paris.</p> - -<p>On the 8th the water subsided again, and the bridge was -once more laid; Freyre’s Spaniards and the Portuguese -artillery then crossed, and Wellington in person advanced -within five miles of Toulouse. Marching up both banks of -the Ers, his columns were separated by that river, which -was impassable without pontoons, and it was essential to -secure one of the stone bridges. Hence, when his left -approached the heights of Kirie Eleison, on the great road -of Alby, Vivian’s horsemen first drove Berton’s cavalry -up the right of the Ers towards the bridge of Bordes; then -the 18th Hussars descended towards that of Croix d’Orade, -where after some skirmishing a French regiment suddenly -appeared in front of the bridge. The opposite bank of the -river was as instantly lined with dismounted carbineers, and -the two parties stood facing each other, hesitating to begin, -until the approach of some British infantry, when both sounded -a charge at the same moment; but the English horses were -so quick the French were in an instant jammed up on the -bridge, and their front ranks sabred, while the rear went off -in disorder. They had many killed or wounded, lost above -a hundred prisoners, and were pursued through the village -of Croix d’Orade, yet rallied beyond on the rest of their -brigade and advanced again; whereupon the hussars recrossed -the bridge, which was now defended by the British -infantry. The communication between the allied columns<span class="pagenum" id="Page_456">456</span> -was thus secured. The credit of this brilliant action was -erroneously given to Colonel Vivian in the despatch. That -officer was wounded by a carbine shot previous to the charge -at the bridge, and the attack was conducted by Major -Hughes.</p> - -<p>Wellington having, from the heights of Kirie Eleison, -examined the French general’s position, decided to attack -on the 9th; and, to shorten his communications with Hill, -had his bridge on the Garonne relaid higher up at Seilh, -where the light division were to cross at daybreak; but -the pontoons were not relaid until late in the day, and he, -extremely incensed at the failure, was forced to defer his -battle until the 10th.</p> - -<p>Soult had now by means of his fortresses, his battles, -the sudden change of his line of operations after Orthes, -his rapid retreat from Tarbes, and his clear judgment in -fixing upon Toulouse as his next point of resistance, reduced -the strength of his adversary to an equality with his own. -He had gained seventeen days for preparation, and had -compelled Wellington to fight on ground naturally adapted -for defence and well fortified; where one-third of his force -was separated by a great river from the rest; where he -could derive no advantage from his numerous cavalry, and -was overmatched in artillery. Covering three sides of -Toulouse the French position was indeed very strong. The -left was at St. Cyprien on the west; the centre at the canal -on the north; the right at Mont Rave on the east; the -reserve of conscripts manned the ramparts of Toulouse, and -the urban guards within the town aided the transport of -artillery and ammunition to different posts.</p> - -<p>Hill was in front of St. Cyprien, and he could only communicate -with the main body by the pontoon bridge at -Seilh, a circuit of ten or twelve miles. Wellington was -advancing from the north, but being still intent to assail on -the south, where Soult was weakest in defence, he examined -the country on the left of the Ers, designing under cover -of that river to make a flank march and gain the open -ground which he had formerly vainly endeavoured to reach -by passing at Portet and Pinsaguel. Again he was baffled -by the deep country, which he could not master so as to -pass the Ers by force in the upper part; and all the bridges<span class="pagenum" id="Page_457">457</span> -there, with the exception of Croix d’Orade, were mined or -destroyed. There was no choice then but to attack the -north and east fronts. The first, open and flat, and easily -approached by the great roads of Montauban and Alby, was -yet impregnable in defence; because the canal, the bridges -over which were strongly defended by works, was under the -fire of the ramparts of Toulouse, and for the most part -within musket-shot. Wherefore, as at St. Cyprien, a fortress, -not a position, was opposed, and the assault was necessarily -confined to the Mont Rave or eastern front.</p> - -<p>Naturally strong and rugged, that ridge was covered by -the Ers river, and presented two distinct platforms, Calvinet -and St. Sypière. Between them, where the ground -dipped a little, two routes called the Lavaur and Caraman -roads led to Toulouse, passing the canal at the Guillemerie -and St. Etienne suburbs.</p> - -<p>The Calvinet platform was fortified on the left with two -large redoubts, having open entrenchments in front. On -the right were two other large forts, called the Colombette -and Tower of Augustines.</p> - -<p>St. Sypière had also two redoubts, one on the extreme -right called St. Sypière, the other without a name near the -road of Caraman.</p> - -<p>The whole occupation was two miles long, and to attack -the front it was necessary to cross the Ers under fire, -advancing over ground naturally marshy and now almost -impassable from artificial inundations to the assault of the -ridge and its works. If the assailants should force a way -between the two platforms, they would, while their flanks -were battered by the redoubts above, come in succession -upon new works, at Cambon and Sacarin; upon the -suburbs of Guillemerie and Etienne; upon the canal; and -finally upon the ramparts of the town. But the Ers could -not be passed except at Croix d’Orade, and Wellington was -reduced to a flank march under fire, between that river and -Mont Rave, until he could gain ground to present a front to -the latter and storm it; after which the canal was to be -crossed above ere the army could be established on the -south of Toulouse. To impose that march had been Soult’s -object, and his army was disposed in the following order to -render it disastrous.</p> - -<p>Reille defended St. Cyprien with Taupin’s and Maransin’s -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_458">458</span> -divisions.</p> - -<p>Daricau’s division lined the canal on the north from its -junction with the Garonne to the road of Alby, defending -the bridge-head of Jumeaux, the convent of the Minimes, -and the Matabiau bridge.</p> - -<p>Harispe’s division held the Mont Rave, his right being -at St. Sypière, his centre at the Colombette, about which -Vial’s horsemen were also collected; his left looked down -the road of Alby, having in front a detached eminence -within cannon-shot, called the Hill of Pugade, occupied by -St. Pol’s brigade.</p> - -<p>Soult’s remaining divisions were in columns behind the -Mont Rave.</p> - -<p>This order of battle formed an angle, each side about two -miles long, the apex towards the Alby road being covered -by the Pugade hill.</p> - -<p>Wellington made the following dispositions of attack for -the 10th. Hill to menace St. Cyprien, augmenting or -abating his efforts according to the progress of the main -battle. The third and light divisions and Freyre’s Spaniards -to move against the northern front; the two first, supported -by Bock’s cavalry, were to menace the line of canal -defended by Daricau—Picton at the bridge of Jumeaux and -the Minimes; Alten to connect him with Freyre, who, reinforced -with the Portuguese artillery, was to carry the hill -of Pugade, and then halt to cover Beresford’s column. This -last, composed of the fourth and sixth divisions with three -batteries, was to move round the left of the Pugade, and -along the low ground between the Mont Rave and the Ers, -until the rear should pass the road of Lavaur in the centre, -when it was to wheel into line and attack the platform of -St. Sypière. Freyre was then to assail that of Calvinet, -and Ponsonby’s dragoons were to connect that general’s -left with Beresford’s column. Meanwhile Lord Edward -Somerset’s hussars and Vivian’s cavalry were to ascend -both banks of the Ers in observation of Berton’s cavalry; -because the latter could by the bridges of Bordes and Montaudran -pass from the right to the left bank, destroy the -bridges, and fall on the head of Beresford’s troops.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_459">459</span></p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Battle of Toulouse.</span> (April, 1814.)</h3> - -<p>On the 10th of April, at two o’clock in the morning, the -light division passed the Garonne by the bridge at Seilh, -and at six the army moved to the attack. Picton and Alten -on the right, drove the French posts behind the works -covering the bridges on the canal. Freyre, marching along -the Alby road, was cannonaded by St. Pol until he passed -a small stream, when the French general, following his -instructions, retired to the works on the Calvinet platform: -the Spaniards were thus established on the Pugade, opposite -the apex of the French position, which the Portuguese guns -cannonaded heavily.</p> - -<p>Beresford, preceded by the hussars, marched from Croix -d’Orade in three columns abreast, masked by the Pugade -until he entered the marshy ground; but he left his guns -behind, fearing to engage them in that deep and difficult -country. Beyond the Ers, on his left, Vivian’s cavalry, -now under Colonel Arentschildt, drove Berton’s horsemen -back over the bridge of Bordes, which the French general -destroyed with difficulty. The German hussars then gained -the bridge of Montaudran higher up, though defended by a -detachment sent there by Berton, who remained in position -near the bridge of Bordes, looking down the left of the Ers.</p> - -<p>During these operations Freyre, who had demanded leave to -lead the battle at Calvinet, from error or impatience assailed -while Beresford was still in march, and his Spaniards, nine -thousand strong, advanced in two lines and a reserve with -great resolution, throwing forward their flanks so as to embrace -the hill. The French musketry and great guns thinned -their ranks at every step, but closing upon the centre they -mounted the ascent under a formidable fire, which increased -in violence until their right wing, raked also from the bridge -of Matabiau, became unable to endure the torment, and the -leading ranks madly jumped for shelter into a hollow road, -twenty-five feet deep, covering this part of the French -entrenchments; the left wing and the second line ran back -in disorder, the Cantabrian fusiliers, under Colonel Leon de -Sicilia, alone maintaining their ground under cover of a -bank which protected them. Then the French came leaping<span class="pagenum" id="Page_460">460</span> -out of their works with loud cries, and lining the edge of -the hollow road, poured an incessant stream of shot upon the -helpless crowds in the gulf below, while a battery from the -Matabiau, constructed to rake the hollow, sent its bullets -from flank to flank, hissing through the quivering mass of -flesh and bones.</p> - -<p>The Spanish generals rallied their troops and led them -back again to the brink of the fatal hollow; but the frightful -carnage below, with the unmitigated fire in front, filled -them with horror: again they fled, and again the French -bounding from their trenches pursued, while several battalions -sallying from the Matabiau and Calvinet also followed -them. The country was now covered with fugitives, -and the pursuers’ numbers and vehemence increased, until -Wellington pushed forward with Ponsonby’s cavalry and -the reserve artillery, while a brigade of the light division, -wheeling to its left, menaced the flank of the French, who -then returned to the Calvinet.</p> - -<p>More than fifteen hundred Spaniards had been killed or -wounded, and their defeat was not the only misfortune. -Picton, regardless of his orders, which, his temper on such -occasions being known, were especially given both verbally -and in writing, had turned his false attack into a real one -against the bridge of Jumeaux; but the enemy, fighting -from a work too high to be forced without ladders, and approachable -only on open ground, repulsed him with a loss -of four hundred men and officers; amongst the latter Colonel -Forbes of the 45th was killed, and General Brisbane was -wounded. Thus from the hill of Pugade to the Garonne the -French had vindicated their position, the allies had suffered -enormously; and beyond the Garonne, although Hill forced -the exterior line of entrenchments, the inner line, more contracted -and strongly fortified, could not be stormed. The -musketry now subsided for a time, yet a prodigious cannonade -was kept up along the whole of the French line; and by the -allies, from St. Cyprien to where the artillery left by Beresford -was, in concert with the guns on the Pugade, pouring -shot incessantly against the Calvinet platform; injudiciously -it has been said by Beresford’s guns, because the ammunition, -thus used for a secondary object, was afterwards wanted -when a vital advantage might have been gained.</p> - -<p>In this state the victory depended on Beresford’s attack, -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_461">461</span> -and, from Picton’s error, Wellington had no reserves to -enforce the decision; for the light division and the heavy -cavalry only remained in hand, and were necessarily retained -to cover the rallying of the Spaniards, and protect the -artillery employed to keep the enemy in check. The crisis -therefore approached with all happy promise to the French. -The repulse of Picton, the dispersion of the Spaniards, and -the strength of St. Cyprien, enabled Soult to draw Taupin’s -whole division first, and then one of Maransin’s brigades, -from that quarter, to reinforce his battle on Mont Rave; -thus three divisions and the cavalry, in all fifteen thousand -combatants, were disposable for a counter-attack. With this -mass he might have fallen upon Beresford, whose force, -originally less than thirteen thousand bayonets, was cruelly -reduced, as it made slow way for two miles through ground -deep and tangled with watercourses: sometimes moving in -mass, sometimes filing under the French musketry, always -under fire of their guns without one to reply, the length of -the column augmented at every step, and frequent halts were -necessary to close up.</p> - -<p>Between the river and the heights the ground became -narrower, and more miry as the troops advanced, Berton’s -cavalry was a-head, an impassable river was on the left, and -three French divisions supported by artillery and horsemen -overshadowed the right flank! Meanwhile Soult, eyeing -this terrible march, had carried Taupin’s division to the -platform of St. Sypière, supporting it with one of D’Armagnac’s -brigades, and now, after a short hortative, ordered -Taupin to fall on, while a regiment of Vial’s cavalry descended -the Lavaur road to intercept retreat, and Berton’s -horsemen assailed the flank from the bridge of Bordes. But -this was not half the force which might have been employed. -Taupin’s artillery, retarded in its march, was still in the -streets of Toulouse, and that general, instead of attacking -frankly, waited until Beresford had completed his flank -march and formed his lines at the foot of the heights. Then -the French infantry poured down the hill, but some well-directed -rockets, whose noise and dreadful aspect were -unknown before, dismayed his soldiers; whereupon the -British skirmishers running forwards plied them with a biting<span class="pagenum" id="Page_462">462</span> -fire, Lambert’s brigade of the sixth division, aided by Anson’s -and some provisional battalions of the fourth division, -followed with a terrible shout, and the French fled to the -upper ground. Vial’s horsemen, trotting down the Lavaur -road, had meanwhile charged the right flank, but Beresford’s -second and third lines being thrown into squares repulsed -them; and on the other flank Cole had been so sudden in -his advance that Berton’s cavalry had no opportunity to -charge. Lambert killed Taupin, wounded a general of -brigade, and without a check won the summit of the platform; -his skirmishers even pursued down the reverse slope, -while Cole, meeting with less resistance, had still more -rapidly gained the height at his side: so complete was the -rout that the two redoubts were abandoned from panic, and -the French sought shelter in Sacarin and Cambon.</p> - -<p>Soult, astonished at this weakness in troops from whom -he had expected so much, and who had but just before given -him assurances of their resolution and confidence, was now -in fear that Beresford would seize the bridge of the Demoiselles -on the canal, and so gain the south side of Toulouse. -Wherefore, covering the flight as he could with Vial’s -cavalry, he hastily led D’Armagnac’s other brigade to -Sacarin, checked the British skirmishers there, and rallied -the fugitives; Taupin’s guns arrived from the town at the -same moment, and the mischief being thus stayed, a part of -Travot’s conscripts moved to the bridge of the Demoiselles. -This new order of battle required fresh dispositions for attack, -but the indomitable courage of the British soldiers had decided -the first great crisis of the fight, and was still buoyant. -Lambert’s brigade wheeled to its right across the platform, -menacing the French left flank on the Calvinet platform, -while Pack’s Scotch brigade and Douglas’s Portuguese, composing -the second and third lines of the sixth division, -formed on his right, to march against the Colombette redoubts. -Then also Arentschildt’s cavalry came down from -the bridge of Montaudran on the Ers river, round the south -end of the Mont Rave, where in conjunction with the skirmishers -of the fourth division it again menaced the bridge -of the Demoiselles.</p> - -<p>Entirely changed now was the aspect and form of the -battle. The French, thrown entirely on the defensive,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_463">463</span> -occupied three sides of a square. Their right, extending -from Sacarin to the Calvinet platform, was closely menaced -by Lambert, solidly established on the St. Sypière; the -redoubts of Colombette and Augustines were menaced by -Pack and Douglas, and the left, thrown back to the Matabiau, -awaited a renewed attack: the whole position was very -strong, not exceeding a thousand yards on each side, with -the angles defended by formidable works. The canal and -the city furnished a refuge, while the Matabiau on one side, -Sacarin and Cambon on the other, insured retreat.</p> - -<p>In this contracted space were concentrated Vial’s cavalry, -Villatte’s division, one brigade of Maransin’s, another of -D’Armagnac’s, and the whole of Harispe’s division, except -the regiment driven from the Sypière redoubt. The victory -was therefore still to be contended for, and with apparently -inadequate means; for on the right Picton was paralyzed by -Daricau, the Spaniards not to be depended upon, and there -remained only the heavy cavalry and light division; which -Wellington could not thrust into action under pain of being -without a reserve in the event of a repulse. The final stroke -therefore was still to be made on the left, and with a small -force, seeing Lambert’s brigade, and Cole’s division, were -necessarily employed to keep in check the French at the -bridge of the Demoiselles, at Cambon and Sacarin, where -Clausel seemed disposed to retake the offensive.</p> - -<p>At half-past two o’clock Beresford renewed the action -with the brigades of Pack and Douglas. Ensconced in the -Lavaur road on Lambert’s right, they had been hitherto -protected from the fire of the French redoubts; but now -scrambling up the steep banks of the road, under a wasting -fire of cannon and musketry, they carried all the French -breastworks—the Colombette and Augustine redoubts being -taken by the 42nd and 79th Regiments. It was a surprising -action when the loose attack imposed by the ground is -considered; and the French, although they yielded to the -first thronging rush of the British, came back with a reflux, -their cannonade was incessant, their reserves strong, and -the struggle became terrible. Harispe, under whom the -French seemed always to fight with extraordinary vigour, -surrounded the redoubts with a surging multitude, broke -into the Colombette, killed or wounded four-fifths of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_464">464</span> -42nd, and retook the Augustine also; but then the 11th and -91st Regiments came up and the French again abandoned -those works: yet so many of the allies had fallen that they -appeared only as a thin line of skirmishers.</p> - -<p>Some British cavalry, riding up from the low ground, -now attempted to charge, but were stopped by a deep hollow -road, into which several troopers fell and there perished. -Meanwhile the combat about the redoubts continued, yet -the French, though most numerous, never could retake the -Platform; and when Harispe and General Baurot had fallen -dangerously wounded, drew off by their right to Sacarin, -and by their left towards the Matabiau.</p> - -<p>During this contest the Spaniards had again attacked the -Calvinet platform from Pugade hill, but were again put to -flight; the French thus remained masters of their entrenchments -in that quarter, and Beresford halted to reform his -battle and receive his artillery, which came to him with -great difficulty, and little ammunition from the heavy -cannonade it had previously furnished. However, Soult, -seeing the Spaniards, supported by the light division, had -rallied a fourth time; that Picton again menaced the bridge -of Jumeaux and the Minime convent; and that Beresford, -master of three-fourths of Mont Rave, was now ready to -advance along the summit, relinquished the Calvinet platform -entirely, and withdrew about five o’clock behind the -canal, still holding Sacarin and Cambon. Wellington was -then master of the Mont Rave, and so ended the battle of -Toulouse, in which the French had five generals and about -three thousand men killed or wounded, and they lost a gun. -The allies lost four generals and more than four thousand -six hundred men and officers, two thousand being Spaniards. -A lamentable spilling of blood, and useless, for before this -period Napoleon had abdicated the throne of France, and a -provisional government was constituted at Paris.</p> - -<p>During the night Soult replaced the ammunition expended -in the action, reorganized and augmented his field artillery -from the arsenal of Toulouse, and made dispositions for -fighting the next morning behind the canal. Looking -however to a final retreat, he wrote to Suchet to inform him -of the result of the contest, and proposed a combined plan -of operations illustrative of the firmness and pertinacity of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_465">465</span> -his temper. “March,” said he, “with the whole of your -forces by Quillan upon Carcassonne. I will meet you there -with my army, we can then retake the initiatory movement, -transfer the seat of war to the Upper Garonne, and holding -on by the mountains compel the enemy to recall his troops -from Bordeaux, which will enable Decaen to recover that -city and make a diversion in our favour.”</p> - -<p>On the morning of the 11th he was again ready, but -Wellington was not. The French position, within musket-shot -of the city walls, was still inexpugnable on the northern -and eastern fronts; the conquest of Mont Rave was only a -preliminary step to the passage of the canal, and throwing -of the army on the south side of the town; a great matter, -requiring fresh dispositions, and provision of ammunition -only to be obtained from the parc on the other side of the -Garonne. Hence, to accelerate the preparations, to ascertain -Hill’s state, and give him further instructions, Wellington -repaired on the 11th by Seilh to St. Cyprien; but the day -was spent before the arrangements for the passage of the -canal could be completed, and the attack was therefore -deferred until daylight.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the light cavalry were sent up the canal, to -interrupt the communications with Suchet and menace -Soult’s retreat on Carcassonne. Their appearance on the -heights above Baziege, together with the preparations in -front, taught Soult he would soon be shut up in Toulouse -instead of fighting; wherefore, leaving eight pieces of heavy -artillery, two generals, Harispe being one, and sixteen -hunched men whose wounds were severe, to the humanity -of the conquerors, he filed out of the city with surprising -order and ability, made a forced march of twenty-two miles, -cut the bridges over the canal and the Upper Ers, and the -12th established his army at Villefranche. Hill followed, -and at Baziege the light cavalry beat the French with the -loss of twenty-five men, cutting off a like number of <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">gens d’armes</i> -on the side of Revel.</p> - -<p>Now Wellington entered Toulouse in triumph, the white -flag was displayed, and, as at Bordeaux, a great crowd of -persons adopted the Bourbon colours; but the mayor, faithful -to his sovereign, retired with the French army; and the -British general, true to his honest line of policy, again<span class="pagenum" id="Page_466">466</span> -warned the Bourbonists that their revolutionary movement -must be at their own risk. In the afternoon however two -officers, the English colonel, Cooke, and the French colonel, -St. Simon, arrived from Paris, charged to make known to -the armies the abdication of Napoleon. They had been -detained near Blois by the officiousness of the police attending -the court of the Empress Louisa, and the blood of eight -thousand brave men had overflowed the Mont Rave in consequence: -nor did their arrival immediately put a stop to -the war. When St. Simon, in pursuance of his mission, -reached Soult’s quarters on the 13th, that marshal, not -without just cause, demurred to his authority, and proposed -to suspend hostilities until authentic information could be -obtained from the ministers of the emperor; then sending -all his incumbrances by the canal to Carcassonne, he took -a position of observation at Castelnaudary and awaited the -progress of events. Wellington refused to accede to his proposal, -and as General Loverdo, commanding at Montauban, -had acknowledged the authority of the provincial government, -he thought Soult designed to make a civil war, and -therefore marched against him. The 17th the outposts were -on the point of engaging, when the Duke of Dalmatia, -having then received official information from the chief of -the emperor’s staff, notified his adhesion to the new state -of affairs in France; with this honourable distinction, that -he had faithfully sustained the cause of his great monarch -until the very last moment.<a id="FNanchor_40" href="#Footnote_40" class="fnanchor">40</a></p> - -<p>Lord Wellington immediately transmitted the intelligence -to the troops at Bayonne. Too late. Misfortune and suffering -had there fallen upon one of the brightest soldiers of -the British army.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Sally from Bayonne.</span> (April, 1814.)</h3> - -<p>During the progress of the main army in the interior, -General Hope had conducted the investment of Bayonne<span class="pagenum" id="Page_467">467</span> -with all the unremitting vigilance that difficult operation -required. He had gathered gabions and fascines and platforms, -and was ready to attack the citadel, when rumours -of the events at Paris reached him, yet indirectly and without -any official character to warrant a formal communication -to the garrison: he made them known indeed at the outposts, -but to such irregular communications, which might -be intended to deceive, the governor naturally paid little -attention. At this time the fortified posts at St. Etienne -were held by a brigade of the fifth division; from thence -to the extreme right the Guards had charge of the line, one -company being in St. Etienne itself; Hinuber’s German -brigade was encamped as a support to the left; the remainder -of the first division was in the rear.</p> - -<p>In this state, about one o’clock in the morning of the -14th, a deserter gave General Hay, who commanded the outposts -that night, an exact account of a projected sally; the -general could not speak French, and sent him to Hinuber, -who interpreted the man’s story to Hay, put his own troops -under arms, and transmitted the intelligence to Hope. It -would appear that Hay, perhaps disbelieving the man’s -story, took no additional precautions, and it is probable -neither the German brigade nor the reserves of the Guards -would have been under arms but for Hinuber. However, -at three o’clock, the French, commencing with a false attack -on the left of the Adour as a blind, poured suddenly out of -the citadel to the number of three thousand combatants; -they surprised the picquets, and with loud shouts, breaking -through the chain of posts at various points, carried with -one rush the church and the village of St. Etienne, with -exception of a fortified house defended by Captain Forster -of the 38th. Masters of every other part, and overbearing -all before them, they drove picquets and supports in heaps -along the Peyrehorade road, killed General Hay, took Colonel -Townsend of the Guards prisoner, divided the wings of the -investing troops, and, passing in rear of the right, threw -the whole line into confusion. Then it was that Hinuber, -having his Germans in hand, moved up to Etienne, rallied -some of the fifth division, and being joined by a battalion of -Bradford’s Portuguese, bravely gave the counter-stroke to -the enemy and regained the village and church.</p> - -<p>On the right the combat was still more disastrous. Neither -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_468">468</span> -picquets nor reserves could sustain the fury of the assault, -and the battle was most confused and terrible; for on both -sides the troops, broken into small bodies by the inclosures, -and unable to recover their order, came dashing together in -the darkness, fighting often with the bayonet;—and sometimes -friends encountered, sometimes foes—all was tumult -and horror. The guns of the citadel, vaguely guided by -the flashes of the musketry, sent their shot and shells booming -at random through the lines of fight, while some gun-boats, -dropping down the river, opened their fire upon the -flank of the supporting columns, which being put in motion -by Hope on the first alarm were now coming up. One hundred -pieces of artillery were thus in full play at once, the -shells set fire to the fascine depôts, and to several houses, -the flames from which cast a horrid glare over the striving -masses.</p> - -<p>Amidst this confusion General Hope suddenly disappeared, -none knew how or wherefore at the time. Afterwards -it became known, that having brought up the reserves, -he had pushed for St. Etienne by a hollow road -behind the line of picquets; but the French were on both -banks; he endeavoured to return, was wounded, and his -horse, a large one, as was necessary to sustain the gigantic -warrior, having received eight bullets fell on his leg. His -staff had escaped from the defile, yet two of them, Captain -Herries and Mr. Moore, nephew to Sir John Moore, returning, -endeavoured to draw him from beneath the horse, but -were both dangerously wounded and carried off with Hope, -who was again badly hurt in the foot by an English bullet.</p> - -<p>Light now beginning to break enabled the allies to act -with more unity. The Germans were in possession of St. -Etienne, the reserve brigades of the foot Guards, rallied in -mass by General Howard, suddenly raised their shout, and -running in upon the French drove them back to their works -with such slaughter, that their own writers admit a loss of -one general and more than nine hundred men. On the -British side General Hay was killed, Stopford wounded, and -the whole loss was eight hundred and thirty men and officers, -of which more than two hundred, with the commander-in-chief, -were taken. Captain Forster’s firm defence of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_469">469</span> -fortified house first, and next the ready gallantry with -which Hinuber’s Germans retook St. Etienne, had staved off -a very terrible disaster.</p> - -<p>A few days after this piteous event the convention made -with Soult became known and hostilities ceased.</p> - -<p>All the French troops in the south were then reorganized -in one body under Suchet, but so little inclined to acquiesce -in the revolution, that Prince Polignac, acting for -the duke of Angoulême, applied to the British commissary-general -Kennedy, for a sum of money to quiet them.</p> - -<p>The Portuguese soldiers returned to Portugal; the Spaniards -to Spain; their generals, it is said, being inclined to -declare for the Cortes against the king, but they were -diverted from it by the influence of Lord Wellington.</p> - -<p>The British infantry embarked at Bordeaux, some for -America, some for England; the cavalry, marching through -France, took shipping at Boulogne. Thus the war terminated, -and with it all remembrance of the veterans’ -services.</p> - -<p>Yet those veterans had won nineteen pitched battles and -innumerable combats; had made or sustained ten sieges -and taken four great fortresses; had twice expelled the -French from Portugal, once from Spain; had penetrated -France, and killed, wounded, or captured two hundred -thousand enemies—leaving of their own number forty thousand -dead, whose bones whiten the plains and mountains of -the Peninsula.</p> - -<p class="p2 center wspace">THE END.</p> - -<hr class="footer" /> -<p class="center small">LONDON: PRINTED BY W. CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET, -AND CHARING CROSS.</p> - -<div class="chapter"><div class="footnotes"> -<h2 class="nobreak p1" id="FOOTNOTES">FOOTNOTES</h2> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_1" href="#FNanchor_1" class="fnanchor">1</a> The Chaplain-General Gleig has in one of his publications contradicted -this fact, on the authority of a German Chelsea-pensioner, who affirms, according -to Mr. Gleig, that it was he who awakened Sir Arthur, and that he was cool -and collected. My authority is the Duke of Wellington, who assured me that -it was not only a German officer, but a titled one; a Baron; and that he was -anything but cool or collected. The name had escaped his memory at the -time, but he made frequent attempts to recover it, and said several times -that he was a Baron. The two authorities may be weighed by those who are -fastidious.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_2" href="#FNanchor_2" class="fnanchor">2</a> General Brennier published a denial of this fact; but it may well be -imagined that a short sentence uttered at such a moment by a prisoner wounded -and highly excited, would escape his recollection. My authority is the Duke of -Wellington, who not only caught the words at the time, and questioned the -other prisoners as to their value, but drew from them a conclusion on which to -rest a great counter movement.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_3" href="#FNanchor_3" class="fnanchor">3</a> Now Marquis of Londonderry.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_4" href="#FNanchor_4" class="fnanchor">4</a> Lieut.-General Sir Loftus Otway.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_5" href="#FNanchor_5" class="fnanchor">5</a> Marquis of Anglesey.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_6" href="#FNanchor_6" class="fnanchor">6</a> The present Lord Hardinge.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_7" href="#FNanchor_7" class="fnanchor">7</a> A writer, or rather writers in the <cite>Quarterly Review</cite>, for there were -two of them, indulging in the graceless effrontery of assertion so common -with anonymous critics, treated these reasons for halting with ridicule, calling -them imaginary, and affirming that they were unknown to the General-in-Chief! -My authority however was that very General-in-Chief. The Duke -of Wellington not only gave me verbally a description of his motives and -proceedings on this occasion, but supplied me with written notes, from -which and from a memoir received from Marshal Soult, and information -derived from Colonel Waters and other officers engaged, my narrative was -composed.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_8" href="#FNanchor_8" class="fnanchor">8</a> My authority for this colloquy is a written communication from Marshal -Jourdan.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_9" href="#FNanchor_9" class="fnanchor">9</a> In a recent work upon the war in Algeria, written by General Yusuf, a -French Zoave, evidently a man of great military talent, a march of sixty miles -in twenty-six hours by a French detachment is recorded, and by an English -writer has been compared with this of the light division. But the French soldier -does not carry more than two-thirds of the weight an English soldier carries, -and Yusuf does not say how many stragglers there were; moreover the light -division had previously made a march of twenty miles with only a few hours to -rest, or rather to wash and cook: their real march was therefore eighty-two -miles.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_10" href="#FNanchor_10" class="fnanchor">10</a> Now Sir Charles Rowan, Metropolitan Police.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_11" href="#FNanchor_11" class="fnanchor">11</a> This altercation, though public and known to the whole division, has been -ridiculously denied by the writer of Picton’s life.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_12" href="#FNanchor_12" class="fnanchor">12</a> For this anecdote my authority was Colonel D’Esmenard, Ney’s first -aide-de-camp, the officer employed. He said Massena was in bed, and spoke to -him through the door.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_13" href="#FNanchor_13" class="fnanchor">13</a> This forcible expression, now become common, is generally supposed to be -an original saying of the late Lord Melbourne; but it is not so. It was first -employed by the Spanish government in a manifesto, to characterise the battle -of Baylen, and Lord Melbourne adopted it without acknowledging its source.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_14" href="#FNanchor_14" class="fnanchor">14</a> Lord Lynedoch.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_15" href="#FNanchor_15" class="fnanchor">15</a> Now Lieut.-Gen. Sir A. M‘Lean.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_16" href="#FNanchor_16" class="fnanchor">16</a> General Sir A. Barnard.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_17" href="#FNanchor_17" class="fnanchor">17</a> Lieut.-General Brotherton.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_18" href="#FNanchor_18" class="fnanchor">18</a> Lord Londonderry.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_19" href="#FNanchor_19" class="fnanchor">19</a> Now Lord Seaton.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_20" href="#FNanchor_20" class="fnanchor">20</a> All Phillipon’s views and preparations are taken from his original journal -of siege in manuscript.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_21" href="#FNanchor_21" class="fnanchor">21</a> Now Lieut.-General Sir C. Smith.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_22" href="#FNanchor_22" class="fnanchor">22</a> Now Lord Gough.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_23" href="#FNanchor_23" class="fnanchor">23</a> General Sir G. Napier.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_24" href="#FNanchor_24" class="fnanchor">24</a> Now Major-General Shaw Kennedy. Captain Nicholas when dying, told -the story of this effort, adding that he saw Shaw, while thus standing alone, -deliberately pull out his watch and repeating the hour aloud declare that the -breach could not be carried that night.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_25" href="#FNanchor_25" class="fnanchor">25</a> Now Serjeant-major at the Tower.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_26" href="#FNanchor_26" class="fnanchor">26</a> For this council of war, and the opinions, I have the personal authority of -Marshal Jourdan.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_27" href="#FNanchor_27" class="fnanchor">27</a> For the Duke’s secret views here I have his own authority.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_28" href="#FNanchor_28" class="fnanchor">28</a> The details of this curious event were told to me by the Duke of Wellington.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_29" href="#FNanchor_29" class="fnanchor">29</a> The conception and execution of this movement has been repeatedly given -to Picton. Erroneously so. My authority is the Duke of Wellington.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_30" href="#FNanchor_30" class="fnanchor">30</a> Now Sir W. Reid, Governor of Malta.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_31" href="#FNanchor_31" class="fnanchor">31</a> Now Major-General Sir Colin Campbell in the Crimea.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_32" href="#FNanchor_32" class="fnanchor">32</a> For this fact Marshal Soult is my authority.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_33" href="#FNanchor_33" class="fnanchor">33</a> In my original work, misled by false information, I said the soldiers of the -92nd were all Irish: but their Colonel, McDonald, afterwards gave me irrefragable -proof, by a list of names, that they were Scotchmen.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_34" href="#FNanchor_34" class="fnanchor">34</a> All these conjectures and proceedings are given on the Duke’s personal -authority.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_35" href="#FNanchor_35" class="fnanchor">35</a> For this fact I had the authority of a French colonel of artillery.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_36" href="#FNanchor_36" class="fnanchor">36</a> The facts as here stated were supplied to me by the Duke of Wellington.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_37" href="#FNanchor_37" class="fnanchor">37</a> Memoirs of Captain, now Lieut.-Colonel Cooke, Gentleman-at-Arms.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_38" href="#FNanchor_38" class="fnanchor">38</a> Colonel Havelock, since killed in the Punjaub at the head of the 14th -Dragoons.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_39" href="#FNanchor_39" class="fnanchor">39</a> This plan and the reasons for it are taken from MS. notes written by the -Duke of Wellington in reply to my inquiries.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_40" href="#FNanchor_40" class="fnanchor">40</a> Soult has been foully and falsely accused of fighting at Toulouse, knowing -that the war was over, and the slander was repeated by Lord Aberdeen in the -House of Lords, when the Marshal was minister in France. The Duke of Wellington, -with a generous warmth, instantly rose and truly declared that Soult -did not know, and it was impossible he could know, of the Emperor’s abdication -when he fought the battle.</p></div> -</div></div> - -<div class="chapter"><div class="transnote"> -<h2 class="nobreak p1" id="Transcribers_Notes">Transcriber’s Notes</h2> - -<p>Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made -consistent when a predominant preference was found -in the original book; otherwise they were not changed.</p> - -<p>Simple typographical errors were corrected; unbalanced -quotation marks were remedied when the change was -obvious, and otherwise left unbalanced.</p> - -<p>Text uses both Mackenzie and M<sup>c</sup>Kenzie.</p> - -<p>The running headers of the original book included -dates. In this eBook, those dates appear in -parentheses, next to the Section headings.</p> -</div></div> - - - - - - - - -<pre> - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of English Battles and Sieges in the -Peninsula., by William Napier - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK BRITISH BATTLES, SIEGES IN THE PENINSULA *** - -***** This file should be named 63210-h.htm or 63210-h.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/6/3/2/1/63210/ - -Produced by Brian Coe, Charlie Howard, and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This -book was created from images of public domain material -made available by the University of Toronto Libraries -(http://link.library.utoronto.ca/booksonline/).) - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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