diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | .gitattributes | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | LICENSE.txt | 11 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | README.md | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-0.txt | 15415 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-0.zip | bin | 270429 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h.zip | bin | 6378803 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h/62881-h.htm | 19321 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h/images/cover.jpg | bin | 258681 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h/images/i_000.jpg | bin | 130057 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h/images/i_001.png | bin | 4308 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h/images/i_005.jpg | bin | 32603 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h/images/i_028a.jpg | bin | 130502 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h/images/i_028b.jpg | bin | 130569 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h/images/i_028c.jpg | bin | 130840 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h/images/i_028d.jpg | bin | 115838 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h/images/i_064a.jpg | bin | 130256 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h/images/i_064b.jpg | bin | 129657 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h/images/i_096a1.jpg | bin | 130264 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h/images/i_096a2.jpg | bin | 129858 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h/images/i_096b1.jpg | bin | 120269 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h/images/i_096b2.jpg | bin | 130941 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h/images/i_132a.jpg | bin | 130022 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h/images/i_132b.jpg | bin | 130174 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h/images/i_132c.jpg | bin | 129751 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h/images/i_132d.jpg | bin | 130253 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h/images/i_144a.jpg | bin | 131071 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h/images/i_144b1.jpg | bin | 130880 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h/images/i_144b2.jpg | bin | 129937 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h/images/i_176a.jpg | bin | 130314 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h/images/i_176b1.jpg | bin | 129348 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h/images/i_176b2.jpg | bin | 130738 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h/images/i_200a1.jpg | bin | 127890 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h/images/i_200a2.jpg | bin | 128874 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h/images/i_200b1.jpg | bin | 130914 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h/images/i_200b2.jpg | bin | 130888 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h/images/i_304a1.jpg | bin | 128126 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h/images/i_304a2.jpg | bin | 130127 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h/images/i_304b1.jpg | bin | 129155 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h/images/i_304b2.jpg | bin | 130027 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h/images/i_336a1.jpg | bin | 131066 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h/images/i_336a2.jpg | bin | 130960 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h/images/i_336b1.jpg | bin | 130214 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h/images/i_336b2.jpg | bin | 130527 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h/images/i_368a.jpg | bin | 129113 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h/images/i_368b1.jpg | bin | 130780 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h/images/i_368b2.jpg | bin | 129659 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h/images/i_384a.jpg | bin | 129839 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h/images/i_384b.jpg | bin | 130387 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h/images/i_396a.jpg | bin | 130720 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h/images/i_396b.jpg | bin | 125046 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h/images/i_416.jpg | bin | 242048 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/62881-h/images/i_416large.jpg | bin | 1008223 -> 0 bytes |
52 files changed, 17 insertions, 34736 deletions
diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7b82bc --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +*.txt text eol=lf +*.htm text eol=lf +*.html text eol=lf +*.md text eol=lf diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4c6cce5 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #62881 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/62881) diff --git a/old/62881-0.txt b/old/62881-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index b739092..0000000 --- a/old/62881-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,15415 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Tank Corps, by -Clough Williams-Ellis and Amabel Williams-Ellis - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: The Tank Corps - -Author: Clough Williams-Ellis - Amabel Williams-Ellis - -Release Date: August 8, 2020 [EBook #62881] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE TANK CORPS *** - - - - -Produced by Brian Coe, Charlie Howard, and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This -book was produced from images made available by the -HathiTrust Digital Library.) - - - - - - - - - -Transcriber’s Note - -This book uses footnote anchors at the beginning of some quoted text to -refer to footnotes crediting the sources of those quotes. It also uses -mid-paragraph footnote anchors to refer to other kinds of footnotes. - - - - -THE TANK CORPS - -[Illustration: MAJOR-GENERAL HUGH ELLES, C. B., D. S. O. - -FROM A PORTRAIT BY SIR WILLIAM ORPEN, A. R. A.] - - - - - THE TANK CORPS - - BY - MAJOR CLOUGH WILLIAMS-ELLIS, M.C. - - AND - A. WILLIAMS-ELLIS - - WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY - MAJOR-GENERAL H. J. ELLES, C.B., D.S.O. - COMMANDER OF THE TANK CORPS - - ILLUSTRATED - - [Illustration: (publisher’s logo)] - - NEW YORK - GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY - - - - - COPYRIGHT, 1919, - BY GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY - - - PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA - - - - -INTRODUCTION - - -MY DEAR WILLIAMS-ELLIS, - -You ask me for a foreword to your history, and invite me, too, to agree -to, criticise, or even refute the conclusions of your Epilogue. - -The first task I undertake with pleasure, though I feel it would be -more justly and more skilfully done either by one of the pioneers who -sowed that we might reap, or by the rare thinker who in our own time -has contributed so much to keep us on the lines of clear understanding -and progress. - -As to the second task I must decline a direct reply, and for many -reasons I can no more than touch generally upon the questions you have -dealt with in so interesting a way. I find them, however, not yet -sufficiently remote in time, either to be clear themselves, or to be -distinctly placed in a picture itself still obscure. - - * * * * * - -Of the early days of the Tanks, and of the early struggles, -difficulties and hopes of the pioneers, I have no first-hand -knowledge--to comment at any length upon them would be out of place. -They do, however, represent a remarkable effort of persistent -and courageous faith, of determination to succeed in the face of -lukewarmness and even scepticism, of the overcoming of many practical -difficulties. Above all, they present a great clearness of vision on -the part of three men in particular--Swinton, Stern and d’Eyncourt. - -It is remarkable that one of the first official papers on the tactical -use of Tanks, written by General Swinton early in 1915, should have -been almost literally translated into action on August 8, 1918. - -To General Swinton, too, is due the implanting, into all ranks, of -the fundamental idea of the Tank as a weapon for saving the lives of -infantry. This idea was indeed the foundation of the moral of the Tank -Corps, for it spread from the fighting personnel to the depots and -workshops, and even to the factories. - -More than anything else, it was this sentiment which kept men ploughing -through the mud of 1917, in the dark days when often the chance of -reaching an objective had fallen to ten per cent.; which kept workshops -in full swing all round the clock on ten and eleven hour shifts for -weeks and, once, for months on end; which, finally, secured from the -factories an intensive and remarkable output. - -Sir Albert Stern brought to his labours a whole-hearted energy and -enthusiasm unsurpassed. But more practical than this alone, he ensured -initial production by a contempt for routine and material difficulties -and a resilience to rebuff as fortunate as they were courageous. - -To Sir Eustace d’Eyncourt, the only member of the original Committee -still officially connected with us, a great debt is due. We have been -fortunate to have had at our disposal an engineer of his wide practical -experience, who devoted much of his scanty leisure to our guidance both -in policy and in detail, whose sagacious counsels have more than once -checked the impetuosity of some of his associates. - - * * * * * - -Before passing to the aspects of Tank history with which I have been -directly concerned, I wish to make reference to two organisations vital -to the Tank Corps in the field. For if that represented the point of -the spear, they combined to form a most solid and dependable shaft. - -The first of these two was the Training Organisations set up in England -to produce the men; second, the manufactories which produced the -machines. - -The task of the Training Centre and the cadet schools was particularly -onerous. The organisation of any new instructional centre in the -haste and pressure of the time was no easy task--its work was often -thankless and subject to much ill-informed and light-hearted criticism. - -The Training Centre of the Tank Corps had additional difficulties. -There was no guidance as to training--the entire system had to be -thought out from the beginning, and continually modified by the -experience of the battlefield--instructors had not only to be found but -trained--esprit de corps and discipline had to be built up; and all -this against time. - -It may perhaps be a compensation to the many officers and men who lived -laborious days, and were not rewarded by seeing the results of their -work in the field, to know that “France” has never been under any -illusion as to the great thoroughness of their work. - - * * * * * - -The work carried through in the munitions factories, and the ingenuity -and solid labour that backed the efforts of the soldier in the field, -are perhaps not yet fully appreciated by the fighting men. In France -one might hear of sporadic unrest, but till one met with it, one -realised nothing of the genuine faithful grind at production of objects -of whose destination the worker often knew nothing, of the blind -patience under duress of shortage, and of crowded accommodation; of -hope deferred. - -The Tank Corps was fortunate indeed in having established at an early -date close relations with its workers, and more fortunate still at a -critical time in being able to declare a substantial dividend on the -capital of wealth, labour and brains entrusted to it by its section of -industrial Britain. - -Once touch was obtained with the worker himself, the interest taken by -J. Bull in the factory, in T. Atkins in the field, was more than fully -proved, not only by the demand for copies of accounts of Tank actions, -but by the steadily increased output that was maintained. - -The thing is only natural. Put a man or a woman to turn out bolts -from a machine for eight hours a day, and you will get a certain -result. Tell her or him that the bolts will go into a Tank that will -fight probably in six weeks’ time; that the Tank will save lives and -slay Huns; that yesterday Tanks did so-and-so; that last week No. -10567, made in Birmingham, and commanded by Sergeant Jones of Cardiff, -rounded up five machine-guns ... you will get quite a different result; -moreover, it is John Bull’s right and due to be told these things. - -We had not got quite a complete result in this direction, but we were -getting near it, and perhaps our co-operation of the back and the front -was as nearly a microcosm of an ideal national co-operation in war as -has been achieved. We aimed at Team Work. - - * * * * * - -You who have coped in a short compass with the whole story of Tanks -can well realise the difficulties of dealing concisely, even by -comment, with the kaleidoscopic events of two and a half crowded -years--with the questions of organisation, training, personnel, design, -supply, fighting, reorganisation, workshops, experiments, salvage, -transportation, maintenance. - -I shall attempt no more than to supplement your admirably drawn -narrative as to one or two points which appear to me to be of major -importance or interest. - - * * * * * - -The employment of Tanks in the field was one long conflict between -policy and expediency. Policy seemed always to demand that we should -wait until all was prepared, until sufficient masses of machines -should be ready to use in one great attack that would break the German -defensive system. Expediency necessitated the employment of all -available forces at dates predetermined, and in localities fixed for -reasons other than their suitability as Tank country. Battles are not -won with Tanks alone, and in early 1917, for example, the Tank was -still a comparatively untested machine. Indeed, the later issues of -the Mark I. developed weaknesses in detail so alarming as to preclude -anything more than a short-lived effort in battle. - -Not until the Mark IV. machine was well into delivery could a guarantee -as to its degree of mechanical reliability be given, and by that time -the trend of the year’s campaigning was unalterably fixed. - -And so it was that it was our fate up to the first Cambrai battle to -“chip in when we could” in conditions entirely unfavourable. - -The employment of Tanks in Flanders has often been criticised, without -intelligent appreciation of the fact that had they not fought in -Flanders they would have probably fought nowhere. Better, therefore, -that they should fight and pull less than half their weight, and still -save lives, than that they should stand idle while tremendous issues -were at stake. - - * * * * * - -If employment in the field was a struggle between policy and -expediency, the principles of production and design represented a -direct conflict of opposing policies, resulting happily in compromise. -The fighting man, conscious of the weaknesses of the earlier weapons, -and visualising development which he believed to be obtainable, and -knew to be necessary, and the soldier-engineer overburdened with -difficulties of maintenance and cursed with the nightmare of Spares and -Spares and more Spares--both cried aloud from France for rapid progress -in design. - -In England the other side of the picture was presented with equal -force. The process of bulk production necessitates orders placed long -in advance, materials were difficult to obtain, plans of track work -and workshop organisation are not susceptible of change without delay, -change, too, entailing irritation of factory staffs and workmen. -Production once agreed to and embarked upon, a very complicated -machinery is with difficulty set in motion. To stop or change this -machinery results often in a loss of output which is in no way -compensated by the improvements ultimately obtained. - -The same problem must have occurred in many branches of war production. -The best, however, is only the enemy of the good, if the good is good -enough. - -You have portrayed the difficulties arising from these conditions in -Chapter V. The picture you draw belongs to the earlier stages, when -the two sides worked rather upon regulation than upon formula. The -later stages of the war saw a very full appreciation of each other’s -point of view and the growth of a very sturdy spirit of co-operation, -which carried us over more than one difficulty to meet which special -appliances or special construction were necessary. - - * * * * * - -The Tank, as a weapon, has been threatened with several crises. Some -have been averted by intelligent forecast in specification. Some have -been dealt with by the improvisations of the engineers both in France -and in England. Some have disappeared before a general improvement in -design. You, I think, have touched on one crisis only--the mud crisis. -The mud crisis was defeated at long last, but the swamp crisis, never. -Although none of the other troubles was of long duration, any one of -them, unless cured, would have caused a permanent disappearance of the -arm. - -Failure of rollers was succeeded by failure of sprockets. Sprockets and -rollers were hardly cured when the Germans produced a very reliable -armour-piercing bullet. This after a very short innings was defeated by -the arrival of the Mark IV. Tank. The Mark IV. Tank was barely rescued -from the mud of Flanders by the invention of the unditching beam, when -we discovered that the Hindenburg trenches were about one foot too wide -to cross without some form of help to the Tank. This difficulty was -overcome, but about this time the effect of concentrated machine-gun -fire upon Mark IV. Tanks must have become known to the Germans, as -also their vulnerability to the ordinary field gun. The position -with regard to both splash and casualties from guns firing over the -sights, was becoming serious when the arrival of Mark V. Tank, with its -increased handiness and speed, put an end to the splash difficulty for -ever, and defeated the field gun for a good long time. - -So on to the last days of the war, when we were able to look forward -to 1919 with a certain knowledge that we had much in hand against any -measure of opposition--short of a superior Tank--that the enemy could -produce. - -The idea undoubtedly exists still in the minds of certain people -that the particular form of Tank which they have seen or fought with -represents the latest word in design. It does not. The latest Tank -produced in any bulk was the type that marched through London on July -19. It has never fought, and it represents the last word only of the -elementary series of Tanks of which Mark I. was the original. - - * * * * * - -If finality in design has by no means been approached in the war, -the same may be said as regards the employment of the then existing -types. This depended, after due consideration of their limitations -and powers, on the training of personnel, not only of the Tank Corps, -but essentially of infantry too. Lack of time, lack of opportunity, -and wastage of trained personnel were the great difficulties which -confronted commanders of every arm and formation in their efforts to -reach even average standards of skill in only a few of the commoner -phases of warfare. With the Tank Corps the additional difficulties of -mechanical training were no more than balanced by freedom from the -trench routine of troops employed for defence. For the infantry Tank, -the training of Tank personnel alone is not sufficient. In the assault, -Tanks are no more than a part of infantry, an integral part of the -_troupes d’assaut_. For real success, i.e., cheap success, not only -must the two arms train and re-train together, but they should live -together, feed together, and drink together. - -Much was attempted and much was done to supplement the lack of -opportunity by demonstration, lectures, attachments. But by reason of -the incomplete military education of our hastily-trained troops it -was necessary to limit manœuvre and tactics on the battlefield to the -simplest elements. Anything in the nature of finesse had to be avoided. -Skilful use of ground and mutual fire support were things hoped for -more often than achieved. - -It was a question of bulk production against time, but the results -obtained only prove how much more could be achieved with the same -material had conditions of training been those of peace time with its -long service and rigorous and plentiful supervision. - - * * * * * - -The preceding paragraph may seem ungracious from one who has had the -privilege of commanding a great force of citizen soldiers. It is -nevertheless true that soldiering, like any other trade, takes time -and experience to learn--that though there may be many who, being -engineers, or advocates, or business men, or farmers, learn soldiering -with great aptitude, the great bulk of any body of men, call them -regular soldiers or citizen soldiers, require a deal of training under -the best instructors, if they are to draw the full advantage from the -ever varying conditions of the battlefield. - - * * * * * - -I have alluded above to the Tank Corps as a citizen force. It was, -indeed, peculiarly so, for of the 20,000 odd souls that went to compose -it, perhaps not more than two or three per cent. were professional -soldiers; and, while the General Staff officers on H.Qs. were almost -without exception regulars, the whole of the Administrative and -Engineering staffs with one solitary exception were drawn from various -civil vocations. - -Moreover, units as they came into being were built up, not on any -old-time tradition of a parent regiment, but each one very much around -the personality of its own commanding officer. And it has indeed been -interesting to watch the development of particular idiosyncrasies of -whole battalions and companies from the characters of their leaders. - -Your record has faithfully set forth what has been accomplished by -these troops. They are well able to sustain criticism in the light of -their achievements. - - * * * * * - -I have alluded before to the esprit de corps, founded as it was upon -the sentiment of saving of life--a sentiment to which appeal has never -failed. Other factors went to strengthen it. It was braced by a high -standard of results demanded, by the determination to make good in -spite of partial first successes. But the strongest element in it was -the faith in our weapon--the machine necessary to supplement the other -machines of war, in order to break the stalemate produced by the great -German weapon, the machine-gun--our mobile offensive answer to the -immobile defensive man-killer. - - * * * * * - -It is indeed a curious reflection that the Germans before committing -themselves to their great final offensive, should not have followed -to their logical conclusion the preparations which they made for the -preceding phases of the war with such meticulous forethought. In 1914, -they removed from the path of their attacking infantry the prepared -obstacles of permanent fortification by means of specially-constructed -machines--siege cannon of unprecedented size. Later, they developed -the machine-gun in bulk, and so modified the preconceived course of -warfare to their own advantage for defence. It is astonishing that for -their final offensive effort, they should not have equipped their men -with armament for overcoming the very defence in depth supported by the -very machine-guns from which they had reaped so much advantage in the -previous years. - -And yet we see them in March, 1918, reverting after an initial attack, -powerfully covered by artillery fire, to the same attempt to break -through with men that had failed in 1914. Although machine-gun support -was stronger, there was little help from the other arms beyond scanty -artillery support and considerable frightfulness of day and night -bombing and long-range bombardment. The German infantry was well, often -magnificently, led, whether in Picardy or Flanders; and one could -not watch the work of the strong offensive patrols without intense -admiration of their skill and courage. - -The Germans failed against defence in depth. The elements that were -wanting were those of continuous mobility necessary to overcome such -defence, against which infantry without powerful support and plentiful -supply sooner or later become powerless. The Germans lacked the means -to move and to supply their guns rapidly. They lacked Tanks to produce -surprise or to carry forward the battle as an alternative to guns. They -lacked lorries, they lacked cross-country vehicles. - -With us, when the tide turned, the converse was the case, and it was at -least a part reason of success against an enemy who fought bravely and -often bitterly almost to the end. - - * * * * * - -Whether you justly appraise the contribution of the Tank Corps towards -the final victory is for history to declare--at some interval yet--but -I am hardy enough to give you a parable in the terms of a great -national pastime. - -Rugby football of all games affords the closest analogy to war--to -warfare on the Western Front the parallel, without labouring the -detail, is remarkable. - -In the early nineties the accepted tactics of the game demanded a -distribution of the team into nine forwards and six backs. The orthodox -believed in forward play, and in emergency sometimes even a tenth -forward would be added at the expense of one back. - -At this time there occurred in the annual matches between two -countries an uninterrupted series of defeats for one. As a measure of -resource or despair, I do not know which, a new distribution was made -in its forces. Instead of nine, eight forwards were played, one back -was added--the fourth three-quarter. - -The tactics were for the forwards to hold the opposing attack and for -the backs to play offensively. The game is historic. For three-quarters -of the match the nine forwards pressed the eight heavily, and these -were very hard put to it to maintain their lines. In the last phase of -the game one of the four three-quarters got away unmarked, the game was -won and lost. - -That was twenty-five years ago. The rules of the game remain unchanged, -but the distribution of the players has been modified and the tactics -of teams have developed on the lines of that historic match and beyond. - -Whether the parallel of the Tank Corps to the extra three-quarter is a -completely true one history will record in due season. What, however, -we may claim is that the fourth three-quarter after a nervous start, in -which perhaps he was sometimes out of his place, nevertheless on more -than one occasion got away unmarked; that he ran straight even when he -was being heavily tackled and drew the opposition for his side; that he -went down well to the rushes of the German forwards; and that, finally, -he more than once handled the ball in the great combined run which took -his team from within its own twenty-five over the opponents’ goal line. - - Yours sincerely, - -[Illustration: Hugh Ellis (signature)] - - _United Service Club, - July 28, 1919._ - - - - -CONTENTS - - - CHAPTER PAGE - INTRODUCTION v - - I A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE TANK, ITS CREW AND ITS TACTICAL - FUNCTIONS, AS THEY WERE AT THE DATE OF THE ARMISTICE 25 - - II THE EARLIEST TANKS, GENERAL SWINTON, ADMIRAL BACON,--THE - HOLT TRACTOR AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE “LAND CRUISER” 31 - - III THE TANK CORPS IN EMBRYO 46 - - IV THE FIRST TANK BATTLES--THE ATTACK ON MORVAL, FLERS, THE - QUADRILATERAL, THIEPVAL, AND BEAUMONT-HAMEL 57 - - V WINTER TRAINING, EXPANSION AND READJUSTMENTS 77 - - VI THE BATTLES OF ARRAS AND BULLECOURT 89 - - VII THE BATTLE OF MESSINES AND THE “HUSH” OPERATION 110 - - VIII THE FLANDERS CAMPAIGN--PREPARATIONS FOR THE THIRD BATTLE - OF YPRES 124 - - IX THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES 138 - - X THE FIRST BATTLE OF CAMBRAI 160 - - XI THREE NEW TYPES OF TANK--THE DEPOT--CENTRAL WORKSHOPS 190 - - XII THE FRENCH TANK CORPS--AMERICAN TANKS AND BRITISH TANKS - IN EGYPT 209 - - XIII SUSPENSE--THE “SAVAGE RABBITS” EPISODE--THE ENEMY’S - INTENTIONS 235 - - XIV THE MARCH RETREAT 243 - - XV THE EQUILIBRIUM--MINOR ACTIONS--HAMEL--THE BALLON - D’ESSAI 265 - - XVI WITH THE FRENCH--THE BATTLE OF MOREUIL 280 - - XVII THE BATTLE OF AMIENS, OR BATTLE OF AUGUST 8 288 - - XVIII THE GERMAN ATTITUDE--“MAN-TRAPS AND GINS”--THE BATTLE - OF BAPAUME 323 - - XIX BREAKING THE DROCOURT-QUÉANT LINE--THE BATTLE OF EPEHY 341 - - XX THE SECOND BATTLE OF CAMBRAI, OR THE BATTLE OF - CAMBRAI-ST. QUENTIN 361 - - XXI THE SECOND BATTLE OF LE CATEAU--THE RUNNING FIGHT 380 - - XXII THE ROUT--MORMAL FOREST--THE BATTLE OF THE SAMBRE--THE - ARMISTICE 392 - - EPILOGUE 402 - - INDEX 417 - - - - -ILLUSTRATIONS - - - MAJOR-GENERAL HUGH ELLES, C.B., D.S.O. From a portrait by Sir - William Orpen, A.R.A. _Frontispiece_ - - FACING - PAGE - - GENERAL ARRANGEMENTS OF MARK V. TANK--FRONT VIEW 28 - - GENERAL ARRANGEMENT OF MARK V. TANK--SECTIONAL ELEVATION 28 - - GENERAL ARRANGEMENT OF MARK V. TANK--SECTIONAL PLAN 29 - - DIAGRAM SHOWING ADAPTATION TO THE “LARGE-WHEELED TRACTOR” IDEA 29 - - THE ORIGINAL THIEPVAL MARK I. TANK WITH ANTI-BOMB ROOF AND - “TAIL” 64 - - FIELD CAMOUFLAGE 64 - - A DERELICT. VALLEY OF THE SCARPE 96 - - A BURNING TANK 96 - - “DIRECT HITS” 97 - - BELLIED ON A TREE-STUMP AND SUBSEQUENTLY HIT 97 - - A FLANDERS PILL-BOX 132 - - THE UNDITCHING BEAM IN ACTION 132 - - THE STEENBEEK VALLEY BEFORE THE BATTLE 133 - - THE STEENBEEK VALLEY AFTER BOMBARDMENT 133 - - A DEADLY SWAMP (THE WRECKS OF SIX TANKS MAY BE COUNTED) 144 - - “CLAPHAM JUNCTION” NEAR SANCTUARY WOOD 145 - - “THE SALIENT” 145 - - PREPARING FOR CAMBRAI. A TRAIN OF TANKS WITH FASCINES IN - POSITION 176 - - THE BAPAUME-CAMBRAI ROAD 177 - - A TANK CRUSHING DOWN THE ENEMY’S WIRE 177 - - SLEDGE TOWING TANK TAKING UP SUPPLIES 200 - - BERMICOURT CHATEAU NEAR ST. POL. TANK CORPS MAIN HEADQUARTERS 200 - - GUN-CARRYING TANK TAKING UP A HOWITZER 201 - - A WHIPPET GOING IN 201 - - SMOKE SCREEN AND SEMAPHORE 304 - - A TANKADROME 304 - - MOVING UP. BATTLE OF AMIENS 305 - - THE ARMOURED CARS GOING UP 305 - - GERMAN ANTI-TANK GUNNERS. (From a photograph found on a - prisoner) 336 - - AN ANTI-TANK GUN IN A STEEL CUPOLA (YPRES) 336 - - A CAPTURED GERMAN TANK 337 - - A GERMAN ANTI-TANK RIFLE 337 - - INFANTRY ADVANCING BEHIND TANKS. A PRACTICE ATTACK AT - BERMICOURT 368 - - THE ST. QUENTIN CANAL TUNNEL, BELLICOURT 369 - - CARRIER PIGEON BEING RELEASED 369 - - HIS MAJESTY THE COLONEL-IN-CHIEF AND GENERAL ELLES 384 - - MANUFACTURE 385 - - THE WESTERN EDGE OF MORMAL FOREST 396 - - A “WIRELESS” TANK 397 - - MAP OF TANK OPERATIONS, AUGUST–NOVEMBER, 1918 416 - - - - -THE TANK CORPS - - - - -CHAPTER I - -A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE TANK, ITS CREW AND ITS TACTICAL FUNCTIONS, AS -THEY WERE AT THE DATE OF THE ARMISTICE - - -I - -The secrets of the Tank Corps have been so well kept that there are few -civilians who even now know anything of Tanks or their crews beyond -what might be learned from photographs, or a distant view of “Egbert” -or some other War Bond or Olympian Tank. - -The Censorship has seen to it that the civilian has had no opportunity -of making himself familiar with the tactical opportunities and problems -that the use of Tanks has introduced or with the conditions under which -Tank crews fight. - -It is for the civilian reader that the present chapter is intended. -He is to be given some idea of the oak tree before he is invited to -dissect the acorn. - -If he has no idea of the appearance and habits of the Tanks that fought -at the Canal du Nord or that pushed back the enemy at Mormal, he cannot -be expected to thrill as he should over the vicissitudes of the first -converted Holt Tractor. For to one who had never seen the engine of a -through express the history of “Puffing Billy” would almost certainly -prove insufferably tedious. - -The authors, therefore, propose to deal, very briefly, with the modern -Tank before plunging the reader into the dark ages of 1914, where, to -pursue our analogy, Watt’s kettle-lid and the “Rocket” dwell obscurely. - - -II - -Every detail of Tank Corps’ training, equipment, and tactics has -been modified in view of some limitation or opportunity arising from -the structure of the Tank itself. Therefore, though this book is -principally concerned with the development of the Tank Corps rather -than with the intricate evolution of the Tanks themselves, the reader -will find it necessary to have a general idea of the construction and -workings of the different types of machine. - -It would indeed be as idle to describe the anatomy of a snail or a -lobster without mention of its shell, as to endeavour to separate the -story of the Tank Corps from that of its Tanks. - -When the War ended in November, 1918, there were, besides obsolete -types which were still used for such work as carrying and the towing of -supply sledges, three main types of Tank. First, the Mark V., which was -26 ft. long, 8 ft. 4 in. wide, weighed 27 tons, and had a horse-power -of 150. The Male Tanks carried two 6-pounder guns, and one Hotchkiss -gun. The Female carried five Hotchkiss machine-guns and no 6-pounder -guns. - -_The Mark V. Star._--This Tank resembled the Mark V., except that it -had a length of 32 ft. 6 in., and was designed for the transport of -infantry and for the traversing of trenches too wide for the Mark V. -Each had a normal speed of about five miles an hour, and was protected -by armour up to five-eights of an inch thick. - -They were both so designed as to turn easily at their maximum speed, -and carried attachments for use on soft ground, which increased the -grip of the tracks. - -Each was fought by a crew consisting of a subaltern and seven men, -three drivers (two of whom normally fought the Hotchkiss guns), and -three gunners. - -The third type was the Whippet. The tracks were nearly as long as those -of a heavy Tank, but the body had been reduced to a small cab perched -at the back, rather as an urchin rides a donkey. It was armed with two -machine-guns, managed by a crew of three men, and developed a speed of -seven miles an hour. Whippets were designed for use as raiders and in -conjunction with cavalry. In practice, however, the cavalry was seldom -able to act with them. Partly in consequence of this, partly owing to -the state of open warfare being of such short duration, the Whippets, -though having brilliant feats to their credit (see the exploits of -“Musical Box,” Chapter XIII), remained creatures of promise rather than -of achievement. - - -III - -As a rule Male Mark V. Tanks were used against Pill-Boxes and other -“strong points,” while the special work of Female Tanks was to -deal with hostile infantry (for example, by sitting astride and -thus enfilading their trenches), and then to finish the process of -flattening the enemy’s wire which the Male Tanks had begun. - -All three types of Tank were capable of going across country. That -is to say they could, for example, follow a pack of hounds anywhere, -except perhaps in the Fens. - -Ditches, heavy plough, banks, walls, hedges, or fences could all be -negotiated. - -Tanks could also go over many obstacles--notably over wire--where the -Field, even were they willing “to take a windmill in the harbour of the -chase,” must go round. - -But as a moment’s reflection will show, there must remain in every -country certain features which will prove absolute barriers to the -progress of Tanks. - -Chief among these are canals and deep rivers (unless spanned by strong -bridges), very steep railway cuttings, railway embankments, marsh, or -woods in which the trees are too strong to be pushed over, and too -dense-set to be steered through. - -Besides these natural, or at least civilian, obstacles, there will be -inevitable military obstacles in any country that has been fought over. - -For example, old half-blown-in trench systems make ground “awkward,” -and Tanks operate at extreme disadvantage in country like that round -Ypres, which was by 1917 a continuous network of water-logged shell and -mine craters, with no original ground left at all. - -Again, by the close of hostilities the number of anti-Tank devices -employed by the Germans was very considerable. They paid the new arm -the compliment of an intricate system of defence and counter-offence -which included concealed Tank traps made on the model of elephant-pits, -formidable double-traversed trenches, a branch of special anti-Tank -artillery, heavily reinforced concrete stockades, and an elaborate -system of land mines. - -With so many obstacles to avoid or to negotiate, with their fate often -hanging upon a prompt and accurate use of their guns, the crew inside -the Tank were doomed by the conditions under which they fought to an -almost incredibly limited view of the surrounding world. - -[Illustration: GENERAL ARRANGEMENT OF MARK V. TANK--FRONT VIEW] - -[Illustration: GENERAL ARRANGEMENT OF MARK V. TANK--SECTIONAL ELEVATION] - -When the flaps were closed (see diagram showing interior of a Mark -V. Tank), as they had to be directly the Tank came under close fire, -the crew were in almost complete darkness, and had to rely upon their -periscope or, alternatively, upon minute eye-holes (about the size of -the capital O’s used in this text) bored through the armour-plating. If -the fire was at all heavy the periscope was usually quickly put out of -action, and the officer and gunners had only the extremely limited view -afforded by these holes. - -[Illustration: GENERAL ARRANGEMENT OF MARK V. TANK--SECTIONAL PLAN] - -[Illustration: DIAGRAM SHOWING HOW THE CATERPILLAR METHOD OF TRACTION -CARRIED OUT THE PRINCIPLE OF THE “LARGE-WHEELED TRACTOR.” SEE NOTE AT -END OF CHAPTER II.] - -They were thus almost entirely dependent upon their maps, the -special Tank compass, and upon the information which a preliminary -reconnaissance of the ground had given them. - -This circumstance not only profoundly modified the training of the -officers and crews, but also necessitated the organisation of what was -almost a new service. This service was the “Reconnaissance” branch of -the Intelligence. When the Tank Corps was ordered to take part in an -attack, the Reconnaissance Staff was responsible for the preliminary -survey of the proposed battle site for a report as to where and how -Tanks could best operate, and finally for a series of detailed maps -and sketches. In these maps and sketches the route of every individual -Tank was set forth from landmark to landmark, together with the -assigned objectives of each machine and the obstacles which it was -likely to encounter. These maps and sketches were compiled from aerial -surveys, captured German maps and documents, information gained from -local inhabitants, accounts given by prisoners, the original Ordnance -survey, and from personal reconnaissance. By 1918 this system had been -so developed that the infantry came to rely almost entirely upon their -accompanying Tanks for direction. - -This added greatly to the importance and responsibility of the work -both of Tank Reconnaissance officers and of commanders. - - -IV - -Topographical information can only be adequately conveyed to a more -or less trained receiver, and it was therefore found necessary to add -an elementary course on Reconnaissance to the already long list of -subjects in which the members of every Tank crew must train. The crew -were an assemblage of experts. - -An average of about a month was spent by every soldier at the training -depots and battle-practice grounds. Here each man did about ten days’ -course as a driver or gunner, learned revolver-shooting, signalling, -and the management of carrier pigeons, and went through a gas course. -In view of the probability of casualties, each man was also given a -working knowledge of every other man’s job. But most vital of all--the -conditions under which Tank crews fought being out of the common trying -and arduous--the scheme of training aimed at creating a high sense of -discipline; that _esprit de corps_ and that tradition of valour which -teaches men to endure the unendurable. - -This supreme end it achieved, as a perusal of the Tank Corps Honours -List will show. - -Such, then, were the Tanks and their crews in the autumn of 1918. - -In the pages which follow, the reader will see from how crude an embryo -the Tank sprang, and through what hair-breadth escapes alike from -official overlaying and annihilation by the enemy, it passed in the -four years of which we are about to relate the history. - - - - -CHAPTER II - -THE EARLIEST TANKS--GENERAL SWINTON--ADMIRAL BACON--THE HOLT TRACTOR -AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE “LAND CRUISER” - - -I - -The War had only been in progress for a few weeks when the first idea -of the first Tank was born almost simultaneously in the minds of -General E. D. Swinton, Major Tulloch, Captain Hetherington and Mr. -Diplock, and--if we are to believe rumour and their own account of the -affair--of several hundreds of other gentlemen. - -“Born” is perhaps not quite the appropriate word. At any rate it is to -be understood, if not in a Pickwickian, at least in a Pythagorean sense. - -For by 1914 the Tank had successively passed through several tentative -and inconclusive incarnations. - -In 1482 Leonardo da Vinci invented a kind of Tank;[1] a wooden “War -Cart” was used by the Scottish in the fifteenth century.[2] - -There were designs for a Tank for the Crimea, but the project of this -weapon was abandoned as being barbarous. Lastly, a really practical -design for a kind of “Caterpillar” to be driven by steam was made in -1888. A trial machine was even constructed. But Fate decreed that all -trace of design and model should be instantly lost, only apparently to -be rediscovered after the modern Tank had been thought out afresh. - -Why, if the Tank was constantly being invented, did it as constantly -disappear? The reason appears to have been that, like the early -aeroplanes, all these abortive machines had failed in one particular. - -The engine was not powerful enough. The steam Tank had not in the least -answered the riddle. The horse-power could, it is true, be almost -indefinitely increased, but, like a kind of Old Man of the Sea, the -engine weight would have increased proportionately and the “free” power -have been no more. - -Indeed till the invention of the petrol engine the Tank was doomed to -be unpractical. Its three essentials--armour-plating, guns, and ability -to surmount obstacles and traverse open country--demanded a large -amount of this “free” power. - -Only, therefore, when an engine was produced whose proportion of power -to weight was about 100 H.P. to every ten hundredweight, did the Tank -become a possible and effective engine of war. - -Thus, till the time was ripe the Tank had been doomed to enjoy very -brief excursions into the actual, and to sojourn, long forgotten, -beyond the waters of Lethe. - -Does memory survive transmigration? Were General Swinton and his -co-inventors aware of the Crimea Tank and the 1888 Tractor? In any -case the matter is not one of great importance, for--to put it -briefly--ultimately their Tank went, and the others did not. - -By October, 1914, Colonel Swinton and Captain Tulloch had independently -worked out the details of an engine of war. Like the other early -inventors, they imagined a machine that was to “arise” out of a cross -between an armoured car and an agricultural tractor. It was to be -slower, more formidable and far heavier than any armoured car that had -yet been seen, a kind of “Land Cruiser” capable of plodding on its -caterpillar feet across country right up to the enemy’s gun positions. -Like the other early “mobile machine-gun destroyers,” it was to be -strongly armed with guns and machine-guns, and so heavily steel-plated -as to be impervious to shrapnel, H.-E. fragments and rifle bullets. -It was to cross trenches with ease, and was to be capable either of -cutting or of flattening the enemy’s wire in the mere act of its -progress. - -By November Colonel Swinton and Captain Tulloch were in close touch -with one another, and the child of their fancy descended from the clear -regions of pure thought to battle its slow way forward amid the fogs -and thornbrakes of actual experiment and official memoranda. - -Well-informed readers will perhaps wonder why the present authors have -singled out Captain Tulloch and Colonel Swinton from amid “the press of -knights.” Do they intend to lay the laurel on their brows? To declare -that they alone invented the Tank? - -The chroniclers pretend to no such judicial powers. Be theirs rather -the genial rôle of the Dodo in _Alice in Wonderland_, who at the end -of the Caucus-race allotted one of Alice’s comfits to each of the -competitors. - -As far, however, as they can disentangle the complexities of the -evidence, it does appear to have been through these two enthusiasts -that the Tank idea first took tangible shape. The notion was in the -air, perhaps it took unsubstantial form in other minds before October, -1914,--it seems probable that it did in Mr. Diplock’s and Mr. McFee’s, -for example. Perhaps, too, in other minds it was later to take clearer -and more practical shape. - -But it does seem to have been Colonel Swinton and Captain Tulloch who, -first of the band of pioneers, had the courage and the practical energy -to forward a somewhat startling notion in official quarters. - -For Mr. Diplock’s first “Pedrail” machine, whose plans he laid before -Lord Kitchener and Mr. Winston Churchill in November, 1914, was a Gun -Tractor, not a fighting machine. It was not till February 1915 that Mr. -Diplock (in conjunction with a Committee appointed by Mr. Churchill) -officially so much as contemplated the building of a “Land Cruiser.” - -Fortunately one of the first of the Swinton memoranda was submitted -through Colonel Sir Maurice Hankey, Secretary to the Committee of -Imperial Defence, who was an early and active friend to the idea of the -new arm. - -Difficulties, however, abounded. Many were actual, some were imaginary. - -For example, it was urged that to design and build such machines would -take over a year. Surely the war would be over! - -Then when the counsels of those kill-joys prevailed who believed that -the war would “hold,” and it was decided to experiment with the “mobile -machine-gun destroyers,” various technical difficulties arose. - -It was difficult to procure some of the essentials without elaborate -manufacture and the making of special tools, and makeshift parts were, -therefore, substituted. Fitted with these makeshifts, the Land Cruisers -were a disappointment. - -The first tests were carried out in February 1915, when Captain -Tulloch’s adaptation of the Holt Tractor was given a trial. It did not -prove a complete failure, and much was learned from the experiment. For -example, the machine was unexpectedly effective in rolling in the wire -which it had been originally intended that its automatic “lobster-claw” -wire-cutters should alone deal with. - -In June Admiral Bacon’s Forster-Daimler Tractor of 155 H.P., fitted -with a self-bridging apparatus, was experimented with. - -This, too, proved disappointing, in so far as the device was to fulfil -the proposed functions of a Land Cruiser. It refused to cross trenches, -though it proved a practical Tractor, and it was later used in “trams” -of eight machines for the transport of 15-in. guns. - -The position, therefore, in June 1915, as far as the War Office was -concerned, was as follows: Proposals had been put forward by Colonel -Swinton, Admiral Bacon, and Captain Tulloch, and submitted to the War -Office; certain trials had been made, the result of which was, in -the view of the authorities, to emphasise the engineering and other -difficulties. It was only in June that the War Office ascertained that -investigations on similar lines were being carried out by the Admiralty. - -For the Admiralty, with a large land force at its disposal, had been -for some time casting about for means whereby the men of that force -might go into battle more in Navy fashion, that is (to misquote the -“heroic Spanish gunners”) with something better than serge, “joined to -their own invincible courage,” between them and the enemy’s bullets. - -Mr. Churchill had, as early as January 1915, written a letter to the -Prime Minister expressing his entire agreement with Colonel Hankey’s -remarks “on the subject of special mechanical devices for taking -trenches.” - -The idea of employing a large armoured shield on wheels, or of using -ordinary steam tractors on which a small bullet-proof shelter had -been fitted, had been considered. Mr. Churchill interested himself -personally in the scheme, and he and his expert, Major Hetherington of -the R.N.A.S.--the third independent inventor--worked hard to evolve and -then “push” a practical machine. - -In the early spring of 1915 a Committee, called the Land Ship -Committee, was appointed,[3] and many designs of wheel and caterpillar -tractors were submitted to it. One of these designs was especially -interesting not only for its astonishing appearance, but for the -influence which it exerted upon the “profile” of the future Tank. The -curious will find a brief account of it in the Note at the end of the -chapter. It was Mr. Churchill’s Committee who called in Major Wilson, -Mr. Tritton, and Mr. Tennyson d’Eyncourt as consultants, “when a design -was evolved which embodied the form finally adopted for Tanks.” - -Thus, while the honour of the first designs and experiments belongs to -the War Office, it was to the enterprise of this Admiralty Committee -that most of the credit of the evolution of the Mark I. Tank was due. - -It was, as we have said, apparently not until the Admiralty Committee -had been at work for some time that the Director of Fortifications and -Works, on behalf of the War Office, ascertained that the Admiralty had -designs for a “Land Cruiser” in hand. - -The two Departments met at Wormwood Scrubs to witness the Admiralty’s -trials of a Killen-Straight tractor. It was a remarkable occasion, for -a number of men who were destined profoundly to influence the history -of the Tanks now saw a foreshadowing of such an engine for the first -time. - -Among them were Lord Kitchener, Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Balfour, and Mr. -McKenna. Mr. Winston Churchill was also there, but to him an armoured -tractor was no novelty. - -After this gathering the Tank enthusiasts of the two Departments fell -upon each other’s necks, swore eternal friendship, and in the middle of -June formed a Joint Committee, of which Lieutenant Stern was Secretary. - -Tanks--when any existed which would work--were to be a military service -in the Department of the Master-General of Ordnance. - -The Admiralty was to continue its work of designing, was to provide -cash for experiments, and Mr. Churchill, its late First Lord, was to -continue his invaluable work as a propellant. All seemed prosperous, -for the representatives of the two Services appear to have worked -pretty harmoniously, and the better informed and more progressive heads -of Departments on both sides showed an interested benevolence. - -But unfortunately--especially at the War Office--there appear to have -been a certain number of obstructionists. - -One senior Officer, fearing, one supposes, to be diverted from his -ideal of the official attitude by the sight of these ungodly engines, -refused so much as to attend the trials. The Adjutant-General (then -no doubt, poor man, sufficiently harassed) rigidly refused a single -man for the new arm. Fortunately, the Joint Committee was resourceful, -and, after a preliminary appeal to Mrs. Pankhurst for militant -suffragists,[4] they induced the Admiralty to turn over to them the -20th Squadron of the Armoured Car Reserve, and to increase the strength -of this unit from 50 to 600 men. - -By July Colonel Swinton--another of the Tank’s best sources of -power--had returned to France. G.H.Q. was later to be more propitious, -but now the taste of those inconclusive experiments was still in its -mouth, and their chief technical adviser had begun to have horrid -doubts about the whole affair. “Caterpillars,” he remarked, that he had -lately seen “could only go at the rate of 1½ miles an hour on roads, -were very slow in turning, and nearly every bridge in the country would -require strengthening to carry them.” “It was necessary to descend from -the realms of imagination to solid fact.” - -Colonel Swinton explained and exhorted and expostulated. - - -II - -Meanwhile the Joint War Office and Admiralty Committee system was too -simple to last. - -From August 1915 to August 1917, when the “New” Tank Committee was -formed, the control and administration of Tank manufacture and design -were extraordinarily tentative and shifting. Necessarily so. The home -organisation had to expand very rapidly, and constantly to adapt itself -to changed conditions of Tank tactics abroad and Tank manufacture at -home. - -Even the multiplicity of the authorities concerned seems to have been -to a great extent inevitable. The Tank had, of course, initially -complicated its early history by starting life in Infantry puttees and -a south-wester. - -At the point we have reached, its story plunges into a whirling -quicksand of departments, branches, committees, and conferences, -which were reorganised and rearranged--changed hats and functions -with bewildering frequency. This tangle of activity Colonel Swinton -throughout made it his hobby to understand and his business to -co-ordinate. - -The present historians, on the contrary, feel tempted to adopt the -simple method of their Hebrew predecessor, who, having picked out one -plum, so often blandly continues: “And the rest of the acts of the -Trench Warfare Department and all that they did, are they not written -in the book of the archives of the War Office?” - -However, it is possible that the Hebrew historian honestly believed -that the lost books of the Chronicles were really available to the -inquiring reader. The present authors have no such illusion about War -Office papers, and therefore propose to give at least an outline of the -vicissitudes and fluctuations of early Tank control. - -The chief persons of the Drama remain throughout: - -_The War Office_: (1) In its capacity as Ordnance, and (2) in its -capacity as General Staff. Later (3) as the Tank Department, War Office. - -_G.H.Q._: (1) In its main capacity, and as (2) The Experiments -Committee. - -Later, the _H.B.M.G.C._ - -Finally, the Tank Corps. - -_The Admiralty_: (1) In its capacity as the Land Ship Committee, and -(2) as Squadron 20 of the R.N.A.S. - -_The Ministry of Munitions_: (1) In its capacity as the Trench Warfare -Department; (2) in its capacity as the Inventions Department. (3) -Later, as the Mechanical Warfare Supply Department (really another Tank -Committee). (4) Later still, as the Tank Supply Department. - -_The successive Main Tank Committees_: (1) The Joint Naval and -Military Committee (which did not survive Act I.). (2) The Tank Supply -Committee, afterwards called the Advisory Committee of the Tank Supply -Department, and divided into a main committee and a sub-committee. -(It was this sub-committee which afterwards formed the backbone of -the very active and occasionally criticised M.W.S.D., before referred -to). Later, (3) after a gap, the First Tank Committee; (4) the Second -reconstructed Tank Committee. - -_Grand Chorus of Directors General, Interdepartmental Conferences, -Manufacturers, and Workshop Personnel._ - - -III - -We find that the period from August 1915 to February 1916 constitutes a -kind of Act I. in the history of Tank administration and manufacture, -for the 1914 and early 1915 period is too dim and legendary to serve as -anything but prologue. - -During the whole of the Act I. period it was the Admiralty and the -Joint Land Ship Committee which played the “leads.” - -It was the Admiralty which defrayed the whole cost of the extensive -experimental work and provided the necessary personnel, and it was by -members of the Joint Committee in consultation that the Mark I. Tank, -“Mother,” was ultimately designed. - -On September 11, two months after Colonel Swinton’s visit, the -Experiments Committee, G.H.Q., laid down in an excellent and -far-sighted memorandum what were the qualities which they desired -should be aimed at in designs for the caterpillar cruiser and what were -the tactical purposes which it must serve. - -By September 28 the Joint Committee had so far perfected the design -of “Mother” as to have had a wooden dummy (officially described as -a “mock-up”) made, and on that day her counterfeit was inspected at -Wembley by an Interdepartmental Conference, and approved. - -Some weeks elapsed while the Joint Committee worked out the further -details of their machine, and about December 3 Mr. Churchill -wrote a Memorandum entitled “Variants of the Offensive,” in which -he paradoxically accentuated the value of defensive armour as a -preservative of mobility. There was to be a new form of attack. It was -to be launched at night under the guidance of searchlights. Caterpillar -Tractors were to breach the enemy’s line, and then turn right and left. -The Infantry were to follow them closely under cover of bullet-proof -shields. - -On Christmas Day Sir Douglas Haig (who had lately taken over from Sir -John French, and who as yet “knew not Joseph”) read the paper with -interest, and pinned a pencil slip upon it, “Is anything known about -the Caterpillar referred to in para. 4, page 3?” - -No time was lost in finding out, and a few days later G.H.Q. sent -an officer to England to inquire into the matter. This officer was -Lieutenant-Colonel Hugh Elles, who was afterwards to be the first Tank -General. - -By the end of January 1916 the experimental machine--no pasteboard -simulation, but “Mother” herself--was complete, and on February 2 the -official trial was held at Hatfield, before the Army Council and a -representative of G.H.Q. - -“Mother” made good, and G.H.Q. asked to be supplied with a certain -number of the Land Cruisers. A small Executive Tank Supply Committee -with much fuller powers than the old Joint Committee, was formed under -the Presidency of Lieutenant (now Colonel Sir Albert) Stern, and orders -were at once given to begin manufacture. - -So ended Act I. - - -IV - -The first scene of Act II. (March to mid-August) was occupied with one -of the most dramatic achievements of the War. - -This was the manufacture at Lincoln of the first 150 “Land Ships” -ordered by the Government, in the space of six months, and in absolute -secrecy. - -The public discussed the phantom Russians who travelled through England -by night. It discussed the Germans who nightly signalled to each other -throughout the inland counties. But it did not discuss the large -water-tanks or cisterns that were being made for Petrograd, Egypt, or -Mesopotamia, or some such place. - -That this vital secrecy was kept for months by hundreds of people was -chiefly due to the happy effect of copious and imaginative lying. - -There was no mystery about these grotesque armour-plated creatures! -They were not really for Mesopotamia at all. Every one knew that. - -The Russian Government had ordered them. They were ridiculous things? -Of course they were. It was a Russian design. Was there not even -an inscription in Russian characters on them? At least they might -frighten the Germans if they served no other useful purpose. - -Tradition relates that when the first drawings were brought to the -manager’s office of the factory which had been selected for the -manufacture of the “water-carriers,” the manager and his staff -expressed themselves as being seriously concerned for the sanity of the -designers, and of those who submitted such drawings to practical men -like themselves. - -They were, however, let into the secret of the real part which Tanks -were to play, and though still profoundly incredulous, decided, like -good citizens, to carry out whatever work was asked of them. The -vital necessity of secrecy having been impressed upon them, they were -asked--tradition continues--what arrangements they would like made -about sentries and the isolation of their workpeople. After a little -consideration they answered that they would only guarantee that the -secret should be kept on condition that they were given a completely -free hand and not interfered with. - -They proposed to have no sentries, no “isolated area” to proclaim -trumpet-tongued, “Here is a secret!” - -They desired merely to propound a satisfactory system of lies, to give -an “alternative explanation”--to put it more delicately--and to carry -out their work with a disarming publicity. - -After some hesitation the authorities consented to this strange system. -We shall see how, on September 15, “wisdom was justified of her -children.” - -The factory where these curious interviews are reported to have -taken place was that of Messrs. Forsters, Agricultural Implement -Manufacturers of Lincoln. We almost literally beat our ploughshares -into swords. - -In London, changes in Tank administration were going on as usual. The -trend as far as supply and manufacture were concerned was towards -centralisation. - -A Tank Supply Department was created at the Ministry of Munitions, and -the Tank Supply Committee changed its name to “Advisory Committee of -the Tank Supply Department.” In August this Committee--gradually, as -it were--turned into the Mechanical Warfare Supply Department before -alluded to. Lieutenant (by now Colonel Stern was at its head.) - -In the M.W.S.D. were now concentrated three separate functions: - -They were Tank designers; they were responsible for supply; they were -responsible for the final inspection of machines. The future was to -show that such concentration had some drawbacks as well as many obvious -advantages. - -_Note._--The genesis of the “large-wheeled tractor” was as follows: -Trenches with a parados and parapet about 4 ft. high were being -constructed by the enemy in Flanders. - -The engineers consulted by the Land Ship Committee gave it as their -considered opinion that if these obstacles were to be crossed, a wheel -of not less than 15 ft. diameter would be necessary. - -Machines with these gigantic wheels were actually ordered, but the -wooden model that was knocked together as a preliminary at once -convinced even its best friends that the design was fantastic, and that -any machine of the kind would be little better than useless on account -of its conspicuousness and vulnerability. - -However, the “big wheel” idea did not utterly die, for in the upturned -snout of the Mark I. Tank we have, as it were, its “toe” preserved, -the track turning sharply back at about axle level, instead of mounting -uselessly skyward, as would have been the case had not the old wheel -idea been supplanted by that of the sliding track. - - - - -CHAPTER III - -THE TANK CORPS IN EMBRYO - - -PART I - - -I - -Not till Act III. do we get the opening of the main plot of our drama. -For it was only at the end of March, 1916 that recruiting for the new -arm began, and therefore that “The Fighting Side” first appeared. - - [5]“At the end of March certain officer cadets with engineering - experience and drawn from the 18th, 19th, and 21st Royal Fusiliers, - were asked to volunteer their services for what they were given to - understand was an experimental armoured car unit. (The Armoured Car - Section of the Motor Machine Gun Corps.) - - “Those who decided to throw in their lot with the new Service - were interviewed by Colonel Swinton and Colonel Bradley, who, in - the course of their examination, threw out no hints as to further - details relative to the new unit. Results of these interviews were - communicated on the Thursday before Easter Friday, when successful - volunteers were informed that they were to be granted temporary - commissions in the M.M.G.C., and were despatched the same morning - to report to the M.M.G.C. Headquarters at Bisley. Upon arrival - further information was received from the Adjutant that short - leave would be granted for the purpose of obtaining kit, and that - all officers would report their return with kit, on the following - Tuesday evening. - - “During the week that followed Easter the two first selected - Companies, _i.e._, ‘K’ and ‘L,’ were formed, officers being posted - to one or other of the Companies.” - -Specially selected officers and men of the original M.M.G.C. formed -the nucleus of these Companies, and the Companies were formed into a -Battalion as further reinforcements arrived. On the Monday after Easter -Bank Holiday training began, instructions being given in the use of -the Vickers and Hotchkiss .303 Machine Guns and later in the Hotchkiss -6-pounder Naval gun. - -An officer who arrived in about the second batch tells how he and -another man from the same regiment were sent down to Bisley after the -usual brief but formidable interview with Colonel Swinton. They arrived -at Brookwood Station only to be told that the ever mysterious Motor -Machine Gun Corps had left two days before for Siberia. - -Tableau! - -“Siberia” proved, however, to be a camp not so far from Bisley as to be -beyond the radius of the station cab in which they both presently set -off. - -No Tanks were, of course, yet available for training, and therefore -instruction was concentrated upon the use of the three guns, “each -officer, N.C.O. and man being required to pass out at the examination.” - - [6]“With the above exception, physical drill and an occasional - route march, no further training of military character was imposed; - thus in the early summer of 1916 practically all the personnel of - the new branch of the service were efficient in the manipulation - of the three guns in question. During the whole of the foregoing - period no further information other than widely different rumours - could be obtained by the junior personnel of the Unit as to the - purposes for which they, or the experimental armoured car, would be - used.” - -About June it became increasingly evident that if the Land Cruisers -were to be fought that year, production must be accelerated. - - “A very limited number of officers, N.C.O.’s and men, totalling - about one dozen, were despatched to Lincoln and other centres, - where they were employed in connection with what they later - understood to be Tank production.” - -Meanwhile, a very carefully chosen and elaborately prepared training -area had been organised on Lord Iveagh’s estate near Thetford, and -as soon as information came that the first machines would soon be -available for training, the Battalion was again moved. - -This time the still mystified companies found themselves in a camp -more ringed about than was the palace of the Sleeping Beauty, and -more zealously guarded than the Paradise of a Shah. Three rows of -plantations and shelter belts guarded them from the eyes of the -profane, and the intruder or the breaker of camp must pass six lines of -sentries assisted by cavalry patrols. - -A highroad which ran through the training ground was closed, and all -inhabited farms within the area were evacuated. No civilians were -allowed under any pretext to pass the guard, nor were troops allowed to -leave the area except on production of special passes which were very -difficult to get. - -Once an aeroplane from a neighbouring aerodrome flew over, moved by a -friendly spirit of inquiry. It was immediately greeted with a hail of -machine-gun bullets and was obliged to depart in some haste. - -For now the Tanks had to appear in their true character as fighting -machines, and needed a better screen than Russian Fairy Tales. The -machines had been long expected. Almost daily some one in the camp had -“heard” an unfamiliar engine throb, and when this happened the entire -camp would rush out to see if “they” had come. - -The wildest rumours were afoot. - -The car could climb trees! It could swim! It could jump like a flea! - -Any one who has lived in an ordinary camp where there were no secrets -and remembers what rumours flourished on the most ethereal food, can -imagine their growth in a camp where there was a real mystery. - -But at last, towards the beginning of June, a limited number of Mark I. -machines were detrained at a special railhead within the area.[7] The -training of the Battalion now began in earnest. Machines and men were -destined to be launched in little over six weeks’ time into the then -newly begun Somme offensive. - -Two types of Tank were detrained, “Big Willie” and “Little Willie.” -The Mark I. (Big Willie) was very different from the Mark V. machine -described in Chapter I. - -It took four men to drive it. It had an unwieldly two-wheeled tail, or -to give this appendage its official name, a “Hydraulic Stabiliser.” By -this device it could let itself down gently over a drop of over 5 ft., -and partly with the aid of it, the machine was steered. - -In practice, compared with the handy Mark V., the whole steering -arrangement of the Mark I. was extraordinarily clumsy and laborious. -She would not turn sharply at all on rough ground, and had to be coaxed -to any change of direction. Her engine and tracks also needed constant -adjustment, the rollers being an everlasting source of trouble. Drivers -and mechanics who have handled both machines, seem to regard the -running of a Mark V. as child’s-play after struggling with the caprices -of “Mother.” - -“Little Willie” was used only as a training Tank, as in practice he was -found to have a defective balance. His centre of gravity was misplaced, -and he was, besides, too short for the work of crossing trenches. - - -II - -But there were other than technical problems awaiting solution. - -It would be difficult to over-estimate the difficulties which -confronted those officers who were responsible for the preliminary -training of the Heavy Section of the Machine Gun Corps; no one had -ever actually fought inside a Tank, and it was, therefore, upon the -spirit of prophecy alone that they must rely in their preparations. -There was no manual to help them. They had, however, one very excellent -official document, the secret _Notes on the Employment of Tanks_, which -was issued in February 1916 (signed “E. D. S.”[8]), which gave an -extraordinarily good forecast of what the rôle of Tanks would probably -be when in action. - -But the paper was very short and very objective, and was more concerned -with an analysis of the place of the Tanks in the orchestra of battle -than with the difficulties presented by their individual score. - -This was where the training of the first Tank crew fell short--almost -inevitably. Their teachers had a rather hazy mental picture of the -actuality of battle. They did not squarely face the essential question -upon whose answer all specific training and all specific preparation -depend, the question, that is, “What is it going to be like?” - -Thus, though they did teach most of the essentials, they left out half -a dozen subjects of which an accurate knowledge was, as we shall see, -ever afterwards held to be absolutely necessary. - -One of their difficulties was the shortness of the time. What must the -crews know? Would physical fitness or map reading prove more important -when the day came? Signalling or _esprit de corps_? Visual training or -revolver drill? There was no time for everything. There were, however, -obviously three or four essentials. Most of the officers and men were -already first-rate engineers or mechanics, but they must be trained -exactly in the strange machine they were to use. They must understand -the peculiarities of Tanks, and, if possible, of their individual Tank, -the monster which they had to render animate. - -They must be thoroughly at home with their Vickers guns, be accurate -shots with them, be able to remedy all stoppages, and to strip their -weapons with speed and accuracy. Above all, crews must train together, -be accustomed to work under their officer, each with his special work -as brakeman, gearsman, driver or gunner, but each still part of an -organic whole. They must also attain to a certain physical level, must -undergo some visual training, and must know how to fire a revolver. - -All this and more was achieved, for the men were picked individuals of -more than ordinary intelligence, and soon became extraordinarily keen -on their work. - - [9]“If anything went wrong with the Tank, they used to look upon - it not as a bore but as a pleasure to put it right.... We felt a - terrific pride in our Company and Section, and also as a Tank crew - against other crews. There was always healthy competition, and this - competition carried us right out to France.... Besides that, Tank - Commanders had the very great advantage of training their crews - themselves.... We knew our men thoroughly.” - -But, as another Tank Commander wrote afterwards: - - “The first Company to go out had to work at tremendous speed. The - Tanks did not arrive till the last minute, and I and my crew did - not have a Tank of our own the whole time we were in England ... - as our Tank went wrong the day it arrived.... Again we had no - reconnaissance or map reading ... no practices or lectures on the - compass.... We had no signalling ... and no practice in considering - orders. This was a thing I very much missed when I got out to - France. When you work with a Division you get very long orders, - and you have to analyse these orders to discover what concerns you - and what does not.... We had no knowledge of where to look for - information that would be necessary for us as Tank Commanders, nor - did we know what information we should be likely to require.” - -No one, in short, had sat down to imagine a Tank in action from within. - -We had official painters in France, but alas! we had no official -writers of prophetic fiction. - -The history of the attack on Morval shows that this probably inevitable -lack of, say, an official clairvoyant, this dependence upon methods -of trial and error, though it ultimately did little to hurt the -development of Tanks, did very much to prevent the Tank personnel from -feeling satisfied by their début. - - -PART II - - -I - -It must have been with some sense of having taken a momentous step -that the authorities sanctioned the manufacture of 150 Tanks after -witnessing the trials at Hatfield. - -We were short of men and short of steel, and to divert steel from -shells and men from the infantry was a grave decision. Our rulers were -for a moment, perhaps, granted the gift of prevision. They saw that the -new weapon might prove the sword that was ultimately to tip the level -balance, and to break the intolerable equilibrium which had settled on -the line from the Alps to the sea. - -This prophetic mood did fitfully visit the authorities. - -For a few months they would, as it were, have faith, and personnel -would be granted and machines would be ordered. - -Then perhaps for half a precious year they would relapse and backslide -and revert, till Colonel Swinton, the Fighting Side, and all the other -missionaries and preachers of the Tank Corps almost despaired. - -But in February 1916 there was much to uphold them. The situation -demanded some desperate remedy. - -The balance hung deadly level. We could hold the Germans _now_, but for -how long? The race for the coast had been a draw, and the First Battle -of Ypres had ended open warfare on the Western Front. - - [10]“Quick-firing field guns and the machine-guns used defensively, - proved too strong for the endurance of the attackers, who were - forced to seek safety by means of their spades rather than through - their rifles. Whole fronts were entrenched, and, except for a few - small breaks, a man could have walked by trench, had he wished to, - from Nieuport almost into Switzerland.” - -The Germans were dug in. - - [11]“And with the trench came wire entanglements--the horror of the - attack--and the trinity of trench, machine-gun, and wire made the - defence so strong that each offensive operation was brought to a - standstill. - - “The problem which then confronted us was a two-fold one: - - “Firstly, how could the soldier in the attack be protected against - shrapnel, shell-splinters and bullets? Helmets were reintroduced, - armour was tried, shields were invented, but all to no great - purpose. - - “Secondly, even if bullet-proof armour could be invented, which - it certainly could, how were men laden down with it going to get - through the wire entanglements which protected every position?” - -It was, in fact, impossible for infantry alone to attack such positions -without the most extensive artillery preparation. The enemy and his -trenches and his wire must be blown out of the ground. This was the -accepted answer to the problem of the deadlock. But as yet we had not -got the shells. We were straining every nerve to reach the solution -by bombardment, but in February 1916 we had not got the necessary -ammunition. Was there no other answer to the problem? Nothing that -could be done meanwhile? - -This was the mood in which the missionaries of the “mobile machine-gun -destroyer” found the High Command. Had we had shells in February 1916 -we should not have had the Tank. We must have waited another year -for it, till, in fact, we had found out the defects of the hoped-for -solution by bombardment. - -The German, who was full fed with ammunition, felt at this early date -no urging to go out and seek any such fantastic remedy. His High -Command would have laughed at the idea of Tanks as Dives may have -laughed at hungry Lazarus’ antics over broken victuals. - - -II - -So, while our shells were making, we built Tanks. And Fate, whose taste -in humour is not ours, and who knew what we did not, namely, that the -Tank and prolonged artillery preparation are alternative weapons, -decreed that both shells and Tanks should be ready for the Somme -offensive. - -It was thus upon a “substructure” of the new artillery preparation that -we gaily imposed the Tank. We were to take fourteen months in working -out the proposition that they could never be effectively used together. - -The Tanks had been designed for the sort of conditions which had -prevailed at Loos. Their training grounds had been carefully modelled -on the “Loos” pattern. By the time Tanks could be put into the field, a -year later, our artillery superiority had completely changed the nature -of the fighting. - -At Beaumont-Hamel in November 1916, for example, we fired off as much -ammunition as was expended in three weeks at the Battle of Loos. - -On the Somme--owing to our having advanced--four miles of churned-up, -shell-pitted ground had to be crossed before the front line could be -reached. It had also--to state the case after the manner of the author -of _Erewhon_--become the fashion, just before the day of battle, for -the attacking side to blast the ground which they were about to cross -to the condition of plum pudding on stir-up Sunday. This blasting -process, moreover, necessarily gave the enemy several days’ warning of -any proposed attack. - -It had also incidentally had another effect upon the industrious -German. When we were bombarded our chief idea was retaliation; when the -German was shelled he dug. - -So it had come about that on the Somme, everywhere behind the German -lines, were great electrically-lit and comfortably warmed dug-outs, -where a company or so could lie secure thirty or forty feet below -ground and there wait for the bombardment to “blow over.” Then they -would emerge ready to welcome our infantry. Thus the system of the, -say, six days’ artillery preparation, though it did very much to -raise our _moral_ and depress that of the enemy in time resulted in -an almost complete system of enemy counter-measures, and in a state -of the battle-ground which caused attackers and attacked to be almost -immobile. The system, necessary as had been our adoption of it, had not -solved the problem of the deadlock. - -The Tank, as we have said, had been intended for use on reasonably -sound ground. It was also to be a surprise weapon. Not once for the -next fourteen months did we omit to give the enemy at least five days’ -notice of our proposed attacks, nor did we decline to co-operate with -his artillery in reducing the intended battle-ground to a morass. It -was, therefore, not till the First Battle of Cambrai, when we did adopt -other tactics, that Tanks came by their own. - - - - -CHAPTER IV - -THE FIRST TANK BATTLES--THE ATTACK ON MORVAL, FLERS, THE QUADRILATERAL, -THIEPVAL AND BEAUMONT-HAMEL - - -I - -It was not till the Somme offensive, which was launched on July 1, -1916, had been in progress for two months and a half, that it was found -possible for the new arm to take its place in the fighting. We have -seen how, secretly, urgently, behind a rich curtain of ingenious and -circumstantial lies, the manufacture of the Tanks had been going on. -How, secretly, urgently, the crews had been training for their unknown -job. - -Of the fifty Tanks which were destined to take part in the battle of -September 15, about thirteen left England on August 15, and the rest -followed at intervals and in driblets as the limited transport allowed. -The last batch arrived on August 30 and, like its fellows, proceeded -to the training centre at Yvrench. Here trenches had been dug and wire -entanglements erected, and machine-gun and 6-pounder practice could be -carried out after a fashion. But there was no staff of instructors, the -ranges were too short, and the conditions for battle practice quite -unlike those which prevailed on the Somme. But it had to suffice. The -Tanks were wanted at once, and by September 10 “C” and “D” Companies -had arrived in the forward area, their H.Q. being established at the -Loop. It was thus within a week of their arrival forward that Tanks -were called upon to take part in the attack. - -The battle had now been in progress for nearly ten weeks. We had -advanced and occupied a depth of four miles of devastated country. - -Most of the men and many of the officers had not been to France before. -They found themselves in a strange world. Endless lines of transport -crawled over incredibly bad roads bordered by gaunt stumps of trees and -by a sordid and tragic litter of dead men and horses, rags, tin cans, -rotting equipment, and derelict transport. - -The enemy was counter-attacking over the whole of the thirty-mile -front, and the sound of our guns was everywhere. At night the stream of -lorries never ceased, and at some point or other in our line, far away, -a star shell could always be seen sailing up from behind a rise of -ground, giving some fringe of shattered wood, or ruined sugar factory, -a fleeting silhouette against its cold white light. - -All ranks were desperately busy, from the mechanics who had new spare -engine parts to adjust, to those in command who had their own minds -and those of several Major-Generals to make up. Colonel Brough had -commanded when the Tanks disembarked, but had now handed over to -Colonel Bradley, and he and the Army Corps, and Divisional Commanders -with whom he conferred on the 13th seem, perhaps inevitably, to -have been as uncertain how to wield the new weapon as were the Tank -Commanders of such details as how to fit their new camouflage covers or -anti-bombing nets. - -In an advance when ought a Tank to start? If it started too soon it -would draw the enemy barrage; if it started too late the infantry would -reach the first objective before it, and it would be of no use. - -This and other similar dilemmas darkened their counsels, and it was -finally decided that the Tanks’ start should be so timed that they -reached the first objective five minutes before the infantry, and, -further that Tanks should be used in twos and threes against strong -points. No special or detailed reconnaissance work had been done, and a -somewhat indigestible mass of aerial photographs was presented by the -Divisional Staff to the bewildered Tank Commanders, many of whom had -never seen such things before.[12] - -Much more useful were a series of maps with routes marked out and -annotated with the necessary compass bearings, and a detailed -time-table with full barrage and other particulars. At least they would -have been more useful had not all orders been changed in such a way at -the last moment as to invalidate almost every route and hour which they -showed. - -Meanwhile the Tank crews and commanders had been enjoying three or four -days of almost comically complete nightmare. In the first place, they -had all manner of mechanical preoccupations--newly arrived spare engine -parts to test, new guns to adjust, box respirators to struggle with, -and an astounding amount of “battle luggage” to stow away. But worst -of all, they found themselves regarded as the star variety-turn of the -Western Front. - -Already, before leaving Thetford, they had given a demonstration before -the King and several members of the Cabinet. At Yvrench they had -performed before General Joffre, Sir Douglas Haig, and the greater part -of the G.H.Q. Staffs,[13] but on reaching the Loop they found to their -horror that it was to be “Roses, roses, all the way.” A Tank Commander -wrote bitterly: - - “It rather reminded me of Hampstead Heath. When we got there we - found that the Infantry Brigades had been notified that the Tanks - were to perform daily from 9 to 10 and from 2 to 3, and every - officer within a large radius and an enormous number of the Staff - came to inspect us. We were an object of interest to every one. - This did not help on one’s work.” - -On the 13th they were to move the Loop to the point of assembly, and -the problems of “housekeeping” became acute. - - [14]“The officer and each man carried two gas helmets and one pair - of goggles, and in addition to their ordinary service caps, a - leather ‘anti-bruise’ helmet; we also had a large field dressing - as well as an ordinary first-aid dressing. The usual equipment - consisted of revolver, haversack, water-bottles and iron rations. - There are eight people in a Tank, and as soon as they get in they - naturally take off all these things, which lie about on the floor, - unless you devise some method of packing all your equipment.... - We carried, in addition to iron rations, sixteen loaves and about - thirty tins of food, cheese, tea, sugar and milk. These took up - a lot of room. We also had one spare drum of engine oil and one - of gear oil, two small drums of grease, three water-cans and two - boxes of revolver ammunition ... four spare Vickers barrels, - one spare Vickers gun, a spare barrel for the Hotchkiss and two - wire-cutters. We also had three flags for signalling purposes, - which unfortunately proved to have been lost when they were really - wanted.” - -But Captain Henriques’ list was, even so, not complete. Many Tanks also -carried two carrier pigeons, 33,000 rounds of S.A. ammunition for -their machine-guns, a lamp-signalling set, and a telephonic contrivance -consisting of an instrument and one hundred yards of cable wound upon a -drum. The second instrument was to be left at the “jumping-off place,” -and the Tank was to unwind the cable as it advanced, relating its -experiences the while to the telephone operator or other interested -person in the rear. What was to happen when the Tank began to traverse -the hundred and first yard we do not know. In practice the device was -not used. - -But that was not all. The orders, time-tables and maps upon which the -Tank Commanders depended, proved to have been issued in insufficient -quantities. - - “For every three Tanks only one set of orders had been issued, and - only one map supplied: consequently we had to grasp these orders - before we passed them on to the other two officers.” - -However, at 5 p.m. on the day before the battle, these written orders -were cancelled and new verbal instructions substituted. Roughly, the -Tanks were to operate as follows:-- - -_On the right_ with the 14th Corps, ten Tanks were to work with the -Guards Division, and seven with the 6th and 56th Divisions, their -objectives being Ginchy and the Quadrilateral. - -_On the left_ eight Tanks were allotted to the 3rd Corps, operating -through High Wood and East of Martinpuich. The 15th Corps had seventeen -Tanks attached, and the Reserve (5th) Army--fighting between Pozières -and Martinpuich--had six tanks. - -With all these groups of Tanks the preliminary moving up into the -first-line positions--in the pitch dark, through the mud and in and out -of the shell-holes of badly crumped ground--proved most arduous, and -a good many Tanks broke down in the process. One Tank Commander who -struck a narrow sunken road remarks: - - “It was full of the bodies of dead Boches, and my driver did not - like going along it.” - -For the Tanks’ crews the remainder of the night passed in a final -tightening of loose tracks and adjustment of the engines, and in -listening to the steadily increasing crash and roar of the British -bombardment. - -The strain on men and officers had been tremendous. Most of them seem -to have started the battle having had no sleep for over twenty-four -hours. - -They were desperately anxious, too, that Tanks should prove their -worth, and the Mark I. machine was too capricious to give them much -assurance. - -To this list of discomforts must be added that most of the men had -never heard guns before, and that the lying-up places were close to our -batteries. - - -II - -The morning of the 15th was fine with a thin ground mist, and at six -o’clock the thunder of the British artillery rose to a final hurricane. -The barrage crept forward, and our Tanks and infantry crossed the -parapets. - -The Germans seemed to have heard no breath of the nature of the new arm -which was to be used against them, and the light haze added greatly to -the looming mystery of the approaching Tanks. - -Official documents that were later on captured from the enemy revealed -something of the deep psychological effect that our Tanks had had on -the German infantry. These significant admissions might have done more -to convince our own High Command of the great potentialities of the -new weapon than they actually did. - -One of the best known individual Tank exploits was that of the machine -belonging to “C” Company, which helped a New Zealand and an English -division in their assault upon Flers. - -This was the furthest penetration achieved by any Tank that day. - -This machine led its infantry, and these had their first taste of -entering a village which they knew bristled with enemy machine-guns -without suffering a single casualty. - -The adventure had all the exhilaration of surprise, and the men, who -had nerved themselves for the usual ordeal of house-to-house fighting, -laughed at the astonishing anticlimax presented by their own and the -Tanks’ stately progress down an almost empty street. - -“All dressed up and no one to fight.” - -It was on this occasion that the airmen’s now famous message was sent -back, a message whose repetition rather galled the Tank Corps in the -days of ill-rewarded effort that still lay between it and its final -triumphs: - - “A Tank is walking up the High Street of Flers with the British - Army cheering behind.” - -Of two other Tanks which did particularly well, the first, a male, -entered Gueudecourt, where it attacked a German Battery and destroyed a -field gun; the other gave great assistance to attacking infantry which -was held up by wire and machine-guns. The Tank Commander placed his -machine astride the trench and enfiladed it; the Tank then travelled -along behind the trench and 300 Germans surrendered and were taken -prisoners. - -The following is a short summary of the returns of Tanks engaged. - -The casualties among Tank personnel were insignificant, though one -officer of great promise was lost: - - 49 Tanks were employed. - - 32 reached their starting-points. - - 9 pushed ahead of the infantry and caused considerable loss - to the enemy. - - 9 others did not catch up the infantry but did good work in - “clearing up.” - - 5 became ditched. - - 9 broke down from mechanical trouble. - -Of these last fourteen, some served as useful rallying-points for the -infantry after they had become immobile, and several could have been -extricated in time to render some service if they had not been knocked -out by indirect hits. - -Crews who had been obliged to abandon their Tanks either got out their -machine-guns and continued fighting or helped the wounded. - - -III - -The battle had been essentially experimental. What opinion had been -formed of the Tanks? - -We now know what was the opinion of the German infantry. The German -High Command seems in public to have ignored the new arm. - -In a secret “Instruction” the Chief of the Staff of the 3rd Army Group, -however, reminds units that they must “hold ground at whatever cost” -and “defend every inch of ground to the last man.” - -“The enemy in the latest fighting have employed new engines of war as -cruel as effective.” - -[Illustration: THE ORIGINAL THIEPVAL MARK I. TANK WITH ANTI-BOMB ROOF -AND “TAIL”] - -[Illustration: FIELD CAMOUFLAGE] - -Every possible counter-measure is to be used against these “monstrous -engines,” which will probably be adopted on an extensive scale by the -British. - -To our own infantry the Tank appeared as a lusty friend, who had -at last found a convenient way of dealing with the hitherto deadly -partnership of wire and machine-gun--a friend, too, who had a -grotesqueness of gait and appearance which was intrinsically endearing. - -A wounded London Territorial said: - - “‘Old Mother Hubbard’ they called her and lots of other funny names - as well. She looked like a pantomime animal or a walking ship with - iron sides moving along, very slow, apparently all on her own, and - with none of her crew visible. There she was, groanin’ and gruntin’ - along, pokin’ her nose here and there, stopping now and then as if - she was not sure of the road, and then going on--very slow, but - over everything. - - “It was her slowness that scared us as much as anything, and the - way she shook her wicked old head and stopped to cough. It _was_ - a circus--my word! I only saw her for about ten minutes. She came - humping out of the fog at one end of the line and humped into it - again at the other. The last I saw of her was when she was nosing - down a shell crater like a great big hippopotamus with a crowd of - Tommies cheering behind.” - -To the British High Command the Tanks appeared as engines of war -which showed considerable promise. They must overcome certain -mechanical weaknesses, and tactics must be further modified to suit -their peculiarities. The G.H.Q. attitude was, in short, that of men -satisfied, though not enthusiastic, and was well expressed by Sir -Douglas Haig in his Somme Despatch: - - “Our new heavily armoured cars, known as ‘Tanks,’ now brought into - action for the first time, successfully co-operated with the - infantry, and coming as a surprise to the enemy rank and file, gave - valuable help in breaking down their resistance.” - -The despatch goes on to mention the taking of Flers. - -The delight of the British and French Press knew no bounds. The -correspondents threw up their hats and set to ransack their -dictionaries for octosyllables in which to describe the new “All -British” destroyer of Germans. - -It was “Diplodocus Galumphant,” it was a “Polychromatic Toad.” It was -a “flat-footed monster” which “performed the most astonishing feats of -agility as it advanced, spouting flames from every side.” - -“It ‘leant’ against a wall until it fell and then crawled over the -fallen débris. - -“It went irresistibly through High Wood, the trees smashing like -matchwood before it. - -“It went up to machine-gun emplacements, ‘crushed the gun under its -ribs,’ and passed on, spitting death at the demoralised Germans. - -“It ‘stamped’ down a dug-out as though it were a wasps’ nest. - -“It crashed through broken barns and houses, ‘straddled’ a dug-out and -fired enfilading shot down German trenches. - -“It put a battery and a half of guns out of action at Flers.” - -Reuter added a cow-catcher to its equipment. - -The French Press was enthusiastic: - - “At the precise moment when the bombardment stopped, the Germans - had the surprise of seeing advance in front of the waves of - assaulting troops, enormous steel monsters from which spurted a - continuous fire of great violence. One would have described them - as gigantic infernal machines. Their front, which was shaped like - a ram, smashed down every obstacle. The heavy automobiles bounded - across the overturned and uneven ground, breaking through the - barbed wire and jumping the trenches. In the German ranks there was - a really mad terror. A prey to panic, the soldiers of the German - Emperor fell back in haste, abandoning their arms, ammunition and - equipment.” - -And how did the Tank personnel itself view the events of the day? - -Half choked with the engine fumes, boxed up for many hours without -respite in the intolerable clamour and shaking of their machines, -or, worse, having wrestled for hours under heavy shelling with a -broken-down Tank, they were inclined to see the exasperations of the -battle rather than its successes. It is indeed curious to note the -difference in tone between the accounts of those who saw the Tanks -dispassionately from without and those who had weltered within, between -those who saw what the Tanks did and those whose view of achievement -was obscured by a knowledge of what might have been. - -The Tank Corps was too keen to be in the least satisfied by the measure -of success which it had achieved. - -Only the Press and the Germans perceived that a new “Excalibur” had -been forged in England. “Out of the mouths....” - - -IV - -After the battle, such of the Tanks as could go under their own power -rallied, and steps were at once taken to salve as many as possible of -those which had become incapacitated. - -From this point, till all available Tanks had been used up and till -the ground became finally impossible in mid-November, Tanks were to -be constantly employed in insignificant numbers in a series of small -experimental actions. - -This method of fighting by twos and threes against special strong -points was afterwards discarded, as it proved unsatisfactory. Several -of these small actions were nevertheless very successful, and showed in -miniature some special purpose which Tanks could serve, or illustrated -the importance of some special Tank organisation. - -For example, Thiepval showed how Tanks could be used without artillery -preparation, and Beaumont-Hamel showed the importance of a good -Reconnaissance Branch. These small actions were therefore important, -not in themselves, but because they were microcosms. In one or two -unsuccessful actions it was rather the state of the ground which -spoiled the battle than mistaken tactics. - -For as the campaign drew on conditions became worse and worse. By the -beginning of October the Army in general, and particularly the Tanks, -had a foretaste of the miseries of Flanders. The general conditions of -this part of the campaign are admirably described by Colonel Buchan in -his _History of the War_: - - “October was one long succession of tempestuous gales and drenching - rains. - - “To understand the difficulties which untoward weather imposed on - the Allied advance, it is necessary to grasp the nature of the - fifty square miles of tortured ground which three months’ fighting - had given them, and over which lay the communications between their - fighting line and the rear.... Not the biggest mining camp or - the vastest engineering undertaking had ever produced one tithe - of the activity which existed behind each section of the battle - line. There were places like Crewe, places like the outskirts of - Birmingham, places like Aldershot or Salisbury Plain.... - - “There were now two No Man’s Lands. One was between the front - lines; the other lay between the old enemy front and the front we - had won. The second was the bigger problem, for across it must be - brought the supplies of a great army.... - - “The problem was hard enough in fine weather; but let the rain come - and soak the churned-up soil, and the whole land became a morass. - There was no _pavé_, as in Flanders, to make a firm causeway. Every - road became a water-course, and in the hollows the mud was as deep - as a man’s thighs.... - - “The expected fine weather of October did not come. On the - contrary, the month provided a record in wet, spells of drenching - rain being varied by dull, misty days, so that the sodden land - had no chance of drying. The carrying of the lower spurs--meant - as a preliminary step to a general attack--proved an operation so - full of difficulties that it occupied all our efforts during the - month, and with it all was not completed. The story of these weeks - is one of minor operations, local actions with strictly limited - objectives undertaken by only a few battalions. In the face of - every conceivable difficulty we moved gradually up the intervening - slopes.” - -Such was the setting of this batch of experimental actions. The -first of them took place on September 25, when two small parties of -Tanks were employed in two distinct actions; the first with the 3rd -Corps, and the second on September 25 and 26 with the 15th Corps near -Gueudecourt. - -The first was a failure. Only two Tanks had been allotted; one was -ditched on the way to the starting-point, and the other machine was -caught in the enemy barrage and knocked out. - -Very different is the story of the Tanks operating with the 15th Corps -at Gird Trench near Gueudecourt, when with the help of a low-flying -aeroplane 1500 yards of trench and 370 prisoners were taken by one Tank -at a cost to us of five casualties. - -The story is told in the Somme Despatch: - - “In the early morning a Tank started down the portion of the trench - held by the enemy from the north-west, firing its machine-guns and - followed by bombers. The enemy could not escape, as we held the - trench at its southern end. At the same time an aeroplane flew - down the length of the trench, also firing a machine-gun at the - enemy holding it. These then waved white handkerchiefs in token - of surrender, and when this was reported by the aeroplane the - infantry accepted the surrender of the garrison. By 8.30 a.m. the - whole trench had been cleared, great numbers of the enemy had been - killed, and eight officers and 362 other ranks made prisoners. Our - total casualties amounted to five.” - -At noon on September 26 an attack was launched by General Gough’s -reserve army on Thiepval. Eight Tanks co-operated. - -It was the second attack that we had made on Thiepval, of which -the Germans had made a most formidable fortress. The ground had -been blasted into the familiar alternation of crumbling mounds -and water-logged holes, and the shattered houses and splintered -trees--particularly a certain row of apple trees--stood up forlornly -amid the general desolation. - -From the point of view of the Tanks, however, the action was important, -because here for the first time Tanks were employed in a surprise -attack. - -No artillery preparation was used, and - - “our men were over the German parapets and into the dug-outs before - machine-guns could be got up to repel them.” - -A large number of prisoners were taken, and in the Somme Despatch the -attack was noted as “highly successful,” and the Tanks as having given -“valuable assistance.” - -By the middle of October 1916 when Tanks were next in action, the -ground was hopelessly sodden, and the story of the month which ensued -might, with an alteration of place names, be taken for a narrative of -the campaign in Flanders. Than this there is no greater condemnation. - -It would be tedious to particularise the five or six minor actions in -which Tanks played, or more often endeavoured to play, a part between -October 17 and November 18. Excepting in the interesting little action -which took place at Beaumont-Hamel, to which we have alluded before, no -further light was to be thrown upon the uses and capabilities of the -new arm. - -The following account of the Beaumont-Hamel fighting was given to the -authors by a Tank Officer who was present: - - “At the end of September it became clear that the Somme battle was - fizzling out. The ratio of ‘cost’ to ‘results’ became more and more - unsatisfactory; every advance, too, made the devastated and almost - roadless area an ever greater problem. - - “It was decided that an attack, if possible a surprise attack, - should be launched on the flank of the Somme battle. The position - selected was roughly from about Serre to the high ground some half - a mile south of the river Ancre. This sector had, of course, been - attacked at the beginning of the Somme battle in July, but the - attack had been a complete failure, and this front had relapsed - into comparative quiet. - - “Tanks were collected and again entrained, the new detraining - station being Acheux. This was the first of the many flank moves - carried out with Tanks in order that a fresh front might be engaged. - - “On arrival at Acheux, however, at the beginning of October, - very bad weather set in and the preparations for the attack were - delayed. Day after day the rain continued, and the ground in the - battle zone became steadily worse and worse. It was a trying time - for the officers and men of ‘C’ and ‘D’ Companies, as they were - not in very good accommodation just outside Acheux, expecting - daily to move up to battle. It was not until the beginning of - November, however, that a move was made by night via Beausart to - Auchonvillers and La Signy Farm. The Tanks having reached these - lying-up places, the rain came down even faster than before, and a - study of aeroplane photographs of the proposed battle sector showed - that all the old shell-holes and many of the old trenches had - filled up with water, and that the greater part of the front was in - a hopeless condition for that type of Tank (_i.e._, Mark I.). - - “Just before the day of the Battle, November 13, it was decided - to send back nearly all the Tanks from La Signy Farm, and some of - those from Auchonvillers, only a few being held in readiness in - case the infantry advance should give scope for their use further - ahead on better ground. - - “Three Tanks of ‘A’ Company were due to attack with the main - assault on November 13; and one of them succeeded in penetrating - into the enemy’s position and advancing for some distance along the - enemy’s support line and nearly reaching the Ancre before it became - ‘ditched.’ - - “Further north the attack had met with considerable success, - except that the village of Beaumont-Hamel had held out for some - hours. Tanks had been called upon to assist, and two of them - had advanced along the road to Beaumont-Hamel; just about the - time that they reached the village the remainder of the German - garrison capitulated. Between Beaumont-Hamel and the river Ancre a - considerable body of Germans were holding out in the enemy front - and support trenches; although troops of the 63rd Division had - reached the outskirts of Beaucourt well in the rear of this body - of men, they continued to hold out throughout the day. Tanks were - again called upon to deal with this situation. They reached the - position the next morning, being led up by a trench mortar officer - of the Division concerned. One Tank succeeded in crossing the very - large German front trench, but, unfortunately, became stuck soon - afterwards; the second Tank came to grief just before it reached - the enemy front trench. It appeared that a deadlock had again been - reached, and the crews of the Tanks were in a precarious position. - On examining the ground about them the Officer Commanding the - leading Tank (which incidentally was leading no longer, since it - was stuck and all too stationary) noticed that the whole area - appeared to be shimmering with white. On opening the front flap - of the Tank and obtaining a better view, it was seen that all - the German garrison, some 400 in number, appeared to have found - something white to wave in token of surrender; those who could not - produce anything better were waving lumps of chalk about or bits - of board or rifle-stocks which they had rapidly chalked white. The - situation was rather an embarrassing one for so small a number as - the crew of Two Tanks to deal with; fortunately, however, it was - possible by signs, and with the assistance of the infantry, to ‘mop - up’ these 400 prisoners before they realised that both the Tanks - were stuck and out of action. - - “Some of the worst of the ground was now in our line, and an effort - was made to get the Tanks through this bad zone in order that - they might continue to attack in the neighbourhood of Beaucourt. - Efforts were made to prepare a track for the Tanks by means of a - considerable digging party, but when the Tanks reached the very - broken ground just north of the Ancre, they became one after - another firmly stuck; with enormous efforts they were dug out, and - succeeded in getting a few yards further, only to stick again. It - was heart-breaking work, which would undoubtedly have been rendered - far easier if the Tanks had then had the unditching beams which - were only introduced some time later. - - “Finally, on the evening of the 17th, only one Tank had succeeded - in getting through this bad zone and reaching the comparatively - good ground beyond. The crew, to whom great credit is due, had - already been working continuously for some days and night, and - were not only exhausted, but had had no time to carry out any - reconnaissance of the position which was to be attacked at dawn the - next day. There being, however, only one Tank, made it of greater - importance than ever that it should be made the most of. It was - decided that it should be used against the very strong position - known as the Triangle, which was a redoubt on the high ground, - roughly midway between Beaumont-Hamel and Beaucourt. The ground - about this redoubt was, unfortunately, also very heavily shelled, - and a frontal approach with the infantry was impossible, and it was - necessary for the Tank to go in on the flank while the infantry - attacked the position frontally. It was realised that the first - necessity was that the Tank should reach this redoubt as rapidly as - possible, and during the night a route was taped slightly beyond - our front line and directing the Tank straight for the Triangle. - The weather was now much colder, and the frost rendered the ground - less hopelessly outside the capacity of the Tank. - - “Just before dawn, however, a fresh difficulty arose, and tried - still further the already severely tried expedition. It began - to snow, and the white tape which was to guide the Tank was - obliterated.” - -Captain Hotblack (now Major, D.S.O., M.C.), the Reconnaissance Officer -who had done the taping, was the only man who had reconnoitred this -piece of ground, and he immediately volunteered to lead the Tank upon -which so much depended. - -Taking what little cover he could in shell-holes full of ice and water, -he walked in front of the Tank past our front line close up to the -Triangle. Marvellously enough, not one among the hail of bullets which -greeted him and the Tank found its mark. Having succeeded in this -arduous enterprise and having guided the machine to its position, he -returned to report on the progress of the action. The light was now -improving, and the Tank started its “rolling up” movement along the -German trenches. - -The machine was now so much in the midst of the enemy that the German -artillery did not dare to open upon it, and the Tank poured in a -devastating fire from its machine-guns not only upon the men in the -trenches, but also upon some horse transport behind the enemy lines. - -But, meanwhile, the infantry was hung up in another part of the field, -and the Tank was urgently needed. - -At that time signal communication to the Tanks was very imperfect, -and there seemed no way of letting the Tank Commander know of the new -development. - -Again Major Hotblack came forward and again he crossed the fire-swept -zone undeterred. He reached the Tank and piloted it back behind our -lines, where a renewed attack was planned. - -But before the tired crew could be sent out again, the wind changed -and it began to thaw. The ground over which the Tank had passed with -difficulty when it was hard became impassable, and the project was -abandoned. - -It was for this remarkable piece of work that Major Hotblack was -awarded his D.S.O. - -The incident naturally had far-reaching results. An inspiring deed, -especially if it be one demanding skill as well as courage, will -influence and “set the tone” of a new unit or a new branch of an old -service. It is far more effectual than the most convincing arguments as -to the necessity for a high standard of conduct and of competence. Much -of the subsequent efficiency of the Reconnaissance Branch of the Tank -Corps may be traced to this incident. - -Reconnaissance took its proper place, it was recognised as a fighting -service, and its work was seen to be a necessary preliminary to every -action. - -Of the total of about ten Tanks engaged in other small actions which -took place at this period, hardly one machine had satisfactory records -to look back upon. - -On November 18 ended the Tanks’ first short campaign. If it did not -close in a blaze of glory, at least it had been sufficiently successful -for the authorities to decided not upon doubling but on quadrupling -their establishment. - - - - -CHAPTER V - -WINTER TRAINING, EXPANSION AND READJUSTMENTS - - -I - -Though plans for expansion and the complete reorganisation of the -unit on a large scale had been begun directly after the results of -the action of September 15 were known, little of the actual work of -training could be started till the end of November, when the “veteran” -Tank personnel were at last available as instructors. They were, as we -have said, withdrawn on November 19 and moved to the Bermicourt area, -which had been already prepared for them. - -They were the leaven--less than one “old” Company to each new -Battalion--who must impart their knowledge and experience to the new -men. - -A subaltern who had seen any fighting with the Tanks would suddenly -find himself regarded as the greatest living expert on some obscure -technical point, and the newly joined who had never seen a Tank “looked -with awe upon these battle-tried warriors.” - -Men and officers were allowed to volunteer for the Tank Corps from -other units either in France or at home. The notion of fighting in a -Tank was popular, for on many of the men of the old arms--especially -the infantry--the ordinary battle routine had--to put it -conservatively--begun to pall. - -Therefore, there was no difficulty as to supplies of men whenever the -authorities turned the tap. - - [15]“We came from the infantry, from the cavalry, from the - artillery, from the Machine Gun Corps, the Motor Machine Gun Corps, - the Flying Corps, the Army Service Corps, and even from the Navy.” - -At first each individual wore the dress of his original unit, so that -there was a strange collection of uniforms at Bermicourt--Scottish -bonnets and kilts, riding breeches, and bandoleers, every conceivable -dress, even to naval blue. - - [15]“The spirit of adventure called us to the Tanks ... and so the - call for volunteers found us ready, and when the word of acceptance - came, our hearts beat quickly and our hopes were high ... some - of us were selected because we were machine-gunners, and others - because we were motor drivers. But there were many of us to whom - the machine-gun and the motor were incomprehensible things. But - in the end we did not find this lack of knowledge any handicap; - for the Army authorities, who were wiser than we, knew that to - men of average intelligence these things were easy to learn; and - to our very great amazement we found that a week was all that was - necessary thoroughly to master any machine-gun ... and that it only - took us two weeks to grasp the principle of the internal combustion - engine and the mechanism of the Tank.” - -At Bermicourt and at Wool the deficiencies of the old Thetford training -were realised. The experience gained on the Somme had been assimilated. -Instructors now knew exactly what they must teach, and this time the -spirit of the course of training was definite and businesslike. - -The whole scheme was most carefully planned to ensure a proper -balance, and the right amount of time was allotted to the different -courses. - -At first the work consisted chiefly in the training of more -instructors, for the expansion of the Corps was to be rapid. The -“settings” of all the courses showed great advances on the Thetford -model, for at last the practice grounds could be made to resemble the -actuality. There were old trenches and shell and mine craters, and the -men were at once taken over bad ground, until the conditions of this -curious progress became things of custom. - - [16]“There is not one of us who will ever forget his first - ride--the crawling in at the sides, the discovery that the height - did not permit a man of medium stature to stand erect, the sudden - starting of the engine, the roar of it all when the throttle - opened, the jolt forward, and the sliding through the mud that - followed, until at last we came to the ‘jump’ which had been - prepared. Then came the downward motion, which suddenly threw us - off our feet and caused us to stretch trusting hands toward the - nearest object--usually, at first, a hot pipe through which the - water from the cylinder jackets flowed to the radiator. So, down - and down and down, the throttle almost closed, the engine just - ‘ticking over,’ until at last the bottom was reached, and as the - power was turned full on, the Tank raised herself to the incline, - like a ship rising on a wave, and we were all jolted the other way, - only to clutch again frantically for things which were hot and - burned, until at last, with a swing over the top, we gained level - ground. And in that moment we discovered that the trenches and the - mud and the rain and the shells and the daily curse of bully beef - had not killed everything within, for there came to us a thrill of - happiness in that we were to sail over stranger seas than man had - ever crossed, and set out on a great adventure.” - -The necessity of regularising and systematising the Reconnaissance -Branch had not been forgotten, and a separate Reconnaissance -Service--really a specially adapted branch of “Intelligence”--was set -up, under Major Hotblack. - -The first organised work of the Branch was to be done in the -preparations for the Battle of Arras, and it is at that period that we -shall see the tentative beginnings of the very special system which was -later on developed. - -For the present “Reconnaissance” spent its time lecturing and being -lectured, and in preparing maps or training areas for theoretical or -practical exercises in the new art of Tank warfare. - - -II - -By February 1917, when individual courses came to an end and unit -training began, the H.B.M.G.C. was about 9000 strong. - -Warmed by the sun of official approval, and watered with a kindly dew -of Memoranda and official “definitions,” Companies had budded into -Battalions and later Battalions were to burgeon into Brigades. - -Even by this early date the authorities had decided that ultimately -three Brigades of three Battalions each should be formed. - -Each Battalion was to be equipped with seventy-two machines and to -consist of four fighting sections, a Headquarters Section and a -Battalion Workshop, besides that curious collection of miscellaneous -individuals, tailors, barbers, shoemakers and clerks, which is -necessary in every unit. General Elles was to command in France, and -took over on September 29 with the rank of Colonel. His “charter” was -as follows: - - “The Headquarters in France is to command the Heavy Branch M.G.C. - in the field, to be responsible for the advanced training and for - the Tactical employment of the Corps under the command of the - C.-in-C.” - -He was also to have a large Central Depot and Repairing Shop in his -charge. - -In England there was to be a Headquarters directly under the War Office -and which was to administer the Corps as a whole. The home Headquarters -was to be responsible for the provision of men, for supplies of -“technical material,” the preliminary training of units, and the -maintenance of units in France as regards men, machines, material and -spare parts. - -The experienced reader will perceive in this system of dual control a -very promising sowing of dragon’s teeth. - -No one who has had an inside knowledge of the growth of any unit or of -any institution whatsoever during the War will be surprised at the fact -that the Tank Corps did not escape the common lot. It suffered from -growing pains. - -Is there a new Ministry, a new Hospital, a new Factory, a new -Battalion, nay, a single new Committee, the tiniest Association of -Allotment Holders, the smallest Village Ladies’ Work Depot, that did -not? - -Among such organisations there are but two categories--those who have -the candour to acknowledge that they went through such a period, and -those who still dare not trust themselves to allude to it. Perhaps if -we consider the examples that come within our own experience, we shall -find that the stronger and more vital the new unit, the more capable -and full of character the men who moved it, the more marked was that -initial stage of uncomfortable adolescence. - -The settling down, before responsibilities and prerogatives had been -properly paired and allotted to the right individuals. The time -when one department was still irritable from overwork and another -exasperated by not being given enough responsibility. We have all of -us known such a time, and most of us now look back upon its very real -miseries with a kind of mingled wonder and amusement. Not otherwise do -the pioneers of the Tanks look back upon their awkward age. - -As soon as the programme of expansion had been decided upon[17] -the question of how Tank production could be increased became an -exceedingly important one. Owing to the inevitable loss in battle, and -still more to the unfortunate defects of the type of the track roller -then supplied, there were not enough Tanks even for the training scheme -proposed for France, where there were in December 1916 only sixteen -machines in working order. The needs of the big training centre which -was setting up at Wool could not at present be met at all, and the -accumulation of any adequate reserve of fighting Tanks was, for the -moment, impossible. - -The Mechanical Warfare Supply Department was now responsible for Tank -production, and they had the task of arranging for the building of the -1000 Tanks which had been sanctioned on September 29. - -In November the M.W.S. Department made an unofficial forecast of the -probable rate of production. This forecast they confirmed officially on -February 1. - -The total output of Tanks was to be roughly as follows: - - 1917 - January 50 - February 50 - March 120 - April 120 - May 140 - June 200 - July 240 - August 260 - September 280 - -Of these, after March at least eighty per month were to be of the Mark -IV. type, of which, with the Mark IV._a_, there was to be a total of -over 1000. - -In August or September, a proportion of the output was to be of the -greatly improved Mark V. type. Actually at the end of March only sixty -Tanks could be scraped together for the Battle of Arras, and most of -these were machines that had been repaired after the Somme. - -Not a single Mark IV. machine arrived in France until April 22, after -the Battle of Arras had been fought and won, and no Mark V. machines -until March 23, 1918. The entire programme was, in short, many months -late. - -The M.W.S.D. were, however, not altogether blameable for the -occasionally somewhat astonishing discrepancy between their promises -and performance. - -It is, in fact, related for the defence that even the airy promises -had their purpose--that the very discrepancies which the Fighting -Side viewed aghast were deliberately created by the wily M.W.S.D. as -bogies with which to scare supine manufacturers or reluctant Government -Departments. - -“What!” the M.W.S.D. would say. “You can’t do better than that! But -look what we’ve actually promised! And just see what sort of names -our partners the Fighting Side are calling us already! You _must_ do -better.” A duly enraged Fighting Side must have made an unsurpassable -Jorkins. - -In any case, however, it was usually only the M.W.S.D.’s promises -which could even be called in question. Considering the means at their -disposal and the difficulties which surrounded them, their practical -efforts were praiseworthy. - -Their troubles came chiefly from three sources. Some of the -difficulties from each were inevitable, and some were not. - -First there were the physical difficulties of manufacture. The shortage -both of labour and material was acute, and at the period with which -we are now concerned, Tanks came low in the Ministry of Munitions’ -priority list. Shells, guns, aeroplanes and even transport lorries all -took precedence of Tanks. - -A second difficulty was the habit which the Authorities had of blowing -alternately hot and cold, according as Tanks momentarily did well or -ill in the field. This resulted in a tendency towards a see-saw of -alternate periods of slackness and overwhelming hurry in the factories. - -Tradition relates that Sir Albert Stern (the Director-General of the -M.W.S.D.) here played a most useful part. He used his whole influence -to maintain a steady output, acting, in fact, as a kind of stabiliser. - -The third set of difficulties came from the M.W.S.D.’s own Tank -designers, and from technical experts of the Fighting Side in France. -Both constantly asked for small alterations in design. Often these -alterations were necessary; frequently they were more or less frivolous -even when they came from what might be considered the best source, -that is, from those who fought the Tanks. - -If the M.W.S.D. was sometimes accused of adopting an academic attitude -towards the results of the “acid test” of battle, it may as truly be -said of the Fighting Side that they often underrated the difficulties -and problems of manufacture and failed to appreciate how often quality -could only be obtained by a disproportionate sacrifice of quantity. - - -III - -About the end of December 1916, when the dual control of Tank affairs -had been working for nearly three months, it became obvious that -the system was not one that would easily stand the strain of active -operations. The Tank Corps had outgrown it, and the shoe would soon -begin to pinch. General Elles thus summarised the position in his -report of December 31: - - “_In France._ The fighting organisation is under a junior officer - who _faute de mieux_ has become responsible for initiating all - important questions of policy, design, organisation and personnel - through G.H.Q., France, and thence through five different branches - at the War Office. - - “_In England._ Administrative and training organisation are under - a senior officer, located 130 miles from the War Office, with a - junior Staff Officer (Staff-Captain) in London to deal with the - five branches above mentioned. - - “The system is working now because Headquarters in France have been - free from the questions of operations for most of the last six - weeks, and have, therefore, been in a position to deal imperfectly - and at a distance with the larger aspects of the whole matter. - - “This will not be possible when operations become a more pressing - obligation, as they are now doing. - - “Then, this duty must devolve either on the five War Office - branches, not one of which, I submit with all respect, can have any - comprehensive grip of the subject, or on the G.O.C., Administrative - Centre, who is out of continued personal touch either with the - War Office or the requirements in this country, and is, moreover, - debarred by his charter from really having any control or direction - except at the instance of his Junior. - - “In actual fact, the Director-General of Mechanical Warfare Supply, - an official of the Ministry of Munitions, at the head of a very - energetic body, becomes the head of the whole organisation. This - officer, owing to his lack of military knowledge, requires and - desires guidance, which none of the five departments at the War - Office can, and which the G.O.C., Administrative Centre, is not in - a position to, give him. - - “In effect the tail in France is trying to wag a very distant and - headless dog in England. We have had one check already in the - matter of the increased weight of Mark IV. which it is possible may - have serious results as regards transportation. - - “In view of the inevitable expansion and great possibilities - of this arm of the Service, I wish to urge most strongly that - a Directorate (however small to begin with) be formed at the - War Office on the lines of the Directorate of Aeronautics. Its - functions to be to study possibilities of development, to watch - design and supply, to co-ordinate training and administer the Corps - as a whole. The officer in charge to be a senior officer, free to - travel and empowered to issue definite instructions and decisions - as to requirements to the Ministry of Munitions.” - -As a result of this remonstrance, General Capper was appointed to the -War Office, and the first Tank Committee was set up in the following -May. - -This Committee was commissioned “to systematise and strengthen liaison -between the Army and the Ministry of Munitions.” - -But when we consider the list of its members we do not find a single -representative of the still drooping “tail.”[18] - -However, the appointment of the Committee proved to be a step in the -right direction, and an improvement began to be felt immediately. - -Officers of the Tank Corps now took charge of the final running trials -of all Tanks. The M.W.S.D. submitted their designs to the Committee, -and in several other small particulars the control exercised by the -Military side was increased. - -But in August the Committee was rent asunder. - -A Memorandum was submitted by the two military members, calling -attention to the long and serious delays that were still occurring -in the preparation of new kinds of Tanks, after the execution of the -designs had been approved by the Tank Committee. - -The delays, it stated, were largely due to the absence of direct -intercourse between the Committee as a body and the actual designer, -and they recommended that the designer should be _ex officio_ a member -of the Committee. - -Sir Albert Stern and Sir Eustace Tennyson d’Eyncourt dissented strongly -from this Memorandum--we are not told upon what grounds--and in October -a new Tank Committee was formed. - -At last--upon this new Committee--the “tail” was fully represented, and -the Committee met fortnightly alternately in France and in England, -so keeping in touch with both factors in its work. A satisfactory -organisation seems, in fact, to have been found, and the interests -of all the departments involved in manufacturing and fighting these -complex machines seem at last to have been adequately represented. -After October difficulties appear to have been halved. - -But this happier era did not dawn till after the Battle of Arras had -been won, and the long misery of the Flemish campaign had somehow been -endured. Meanwhile, as far as Tank control was concerned, things went -on much as before. - -The reader is to imagine that just such “growing pains” and just such -difficulties, correspondences and memoranda filled in the background -for the next six months, while the fighting at Arras, at Messines and -in Flanders, whose story we are about to relate, was in progress. - - - - -CHAPTER VI - -THE BATTLES OF ARRAS AND BULLECOURT - - -I - -The Reconnaissance Officers were the first of the Junior personnel to -learn that operations were contemplated for early April, and that the -new battle was to be fought before the town of Arras on the banks of -the river Scarpe. By the beginning of March, the first small parties -of Battalion and Company Reconnaissance Officers had begun to leave -Bermicourt. - -It was rumoured that this offensive was going to be the blooding of the -1st Brigade; it was to be on a much larger scale than any the Tanks had -taken part in on the Somme. It was said that sixty machines would be -thrown in in one action. The Tanks were going to have an opportunity of -making a name for themselves, and of justifying all the embarrassingly -pleasant things that the newspapers had said of them in the previous -September. For this lavish praise had spread a gloom over the Tank -Corps; they had been unmercifully twitted by unfeeling gunners and -infantrymen who knew the real facts. - -The newspapers had succeeded in making their intercourse with any -but battalions fresh from England one unbearable round of facile -jest. Never had any unit, save, perhaps, the London Scottish, been so -unmercifully hailed as “Mother’s blue-eyed boy.” - -By March they lusted for blood, and the first whispers of battle were -listened to with a satisfied expectancy. - -The new 1st Brigade of the Heavy Branch Machine Gun Corps was a very -much more assured body than the little band of pioneers who had waited -so anxiously for the dawn on September 15, 1916. - -Owing to delays in manufacture, they were still only equipped with 60 -Mark I. Tanks instead of about 120 Mark I.’s and Mark IV.’s, as had -been hoped. Still, the March 1917 Mark I. was very different from the -September 1916 Mark I. The most striking improvement was the shedding -of the cumbersome and ineffectual “Tail” or hydraulic stabiliser. - -Most of the machines had also undergone a most careful overhauling at -the hands of the indefatigable vulcan, at the Battalion workshops, and -those innumerable tiny adjustments, repairs and improvements which -constitute “tuning up” had been made. - -The machine-gun armament, too, had been modified, the Hotchkiss -being replaced by the Lewis gun. A new contrivance for use on soft -ground had also been fitted, consisting of stout little cigar-shaped -splinter-bars, a yard or so in length, attached to the track by means -of chains. - -But more particularly crews had had proper time to train and they -knew that they knew their work. Their officers, too, were sure that -they would this time be properly supplied with maps and detailed -orders. Therefore, officers and crews got on with their own battle -preparations, or, later, rehearsed the coming action with the infantry, -with a good heart. - - -II - -In the front line active preparations had begun. The Reconnaissance -Officers, several of whom took up their quarters in the half-deserted -town of Arras, had each had his area allotted to him, and they were -busy helping “Q” side to find suitable positions for the supply dumps, -for at this time there was no system of supply Tanks. Every tin of -petrol, every round of ammunition, had, therefore, to be carried by -hand from the railhead, and the task was one which took weeks to -complete. - -It was calculated that had supply Tanks been available each machine -would have saved a carrying party of 300 men. The real work of the -Reconnaissance Officers, however, was to observe the enemy’s lines and -the country which lay beyond them. - -Much of this country, even within our own lines, was practically -unknown to us, as the greater part of the sector selected for attack -had only just been “uncovered” by the sudden and unforeseen German -retirement. On this portion of the line the retirement had occurred -about a month before the battle was due. As in other parts of the line, -and as the enemy had intended, the retirement had proved extremely -embarrassing. We had carefully selected a site for our battle, and the -chosen ground had been thoroughly studied. - -The sudden change to a piece of imperfectly known country involved -an enormous amount of extra photographing, map-making, sketching -and reconnaissance generally. This was merely troublesome; more -uncomfortable was the element of uncertainty which the retirement -introduced. - -Would the enemy stand? And, if so, where? Was there some trap being -prepared for us? It was uncanny, for it was contrary to the tradition -of more than two years of trench warfare. - -The final scheme of the attack was, however, planned on the assumption -that the enemy would give battle. For he now held a line of great -natural strength which he had improved with extraordinary skill and -energy. The scheme, as it affected the Tanks, was shortly this. - -The general object of the action was to achieve a rapid success. That -is, to inflict a wound in the first twenty-four hours, severe enough -to force the enemy to bring up his reserves, thus depleting his line -near Soissons and Reims, where the French offensive was to be launched -immediately afterwards. - -A proportion of Tanks was allotted to each of the Armies taking part. - - 1. _With the First Army_ (“D” Battalion) to the North: - - Eight Tanks were to operate against Vimy Heights and the village - and heights of Thélus, considered amongst the most formidable enemy - positions in France. Tanks were to play a subsidiary part, as the - soil here was a soft heavy loam, highly unfavourable to Tanks. - - 2. _With the Third Army_ (“C” Battalion): - - Forty Tanks were to operate, some north, some south of the river - Scarpe. This sector contained several notorious strong points, such - as the Harp and Telegraph Hill. The ground here was hard and chalky - and afforded good going for Tanks, though it was intersected by old - trench lines and had been heavily crumped. - - 3. _With the Fifth Army_ (“D” Battalion): - - Twelve Tanks were to operate in the region of Lagnicourt. Here - the ground conditions were bad. The roads especially had been - destroyed, and it was found impossible to bring up sufficient - artillery for a preliminary bombardment. Therefore, on this sector - Tanks were to play a leading part, preceding the infantry and - largely replacing the barrage. This action was not to be launched - till about forty-eight hours after that on the other two sectors. - Zero day was to be April 9, and the attack was to be made at dawn. - - -III - -Till the night before the battle the work of preparation had gone -smoothly. - -Maps had been issued, stores stood ready, pack animals and limbers were -at hand to form advanced dumps. - -The Reconnaissance Officers had taken little parties of Tank Commanders -to the best observation posts in their sectors, and had there shown -them the ground they must cross and expounded their maps to them. All -the Tanks had been brought safely to their railheads and successfully -detrained, and now they lay waiting in their tankodromes. “C” -(afterwards No. 3) Battalion lay in Arras itself. The town had been -most carefully prepared for troops to assemble and wait in. - -Great chalk quarries underlay it, and these had been linked up and -lit with electricity, and here two divisions could lie thirty feet -underground secure from the heaviest shelling. - -The Tanks had chosen the Citadel as their assembly place. There in the -great grassy ditch of the old Vauban Fort they lay, nosing for cover -into the re-entrant angles of the tall cliff of mellow brickwork that -towered above them. - -As soon as it was dark, on the night of April 8–9, the Tanks set off on -their journey up the line. - -There had been a question as to the route which these Tanks were to -follow. - -The alternatives were a long detour round the head of a shallow valley -or a short cut over ground of questionable soundness. - -The short cut had finally been decided upon, and, on the Reconnaissance -Officer’s report, the Battalion had applied for enough brushwood and -sleepers to build a rough causeway. - -Owing to transport misunderstandings and difficulties, only a very -small proportion of this material arrived in time. It was, however, -decided still to chance the short cut. Brushwood had been laid in some -of the worst places and the ground had a firm top. It was thought -probable that this would, after all, bear the weight of the Tanks. - -Alas, the hope was vain! The smooth turf proved to be no more than a -crust, covering a veritable bog, and it broke through when the column -was about halfway across. In the darkness six Tanks floundered one -after another into the morass. - -The scene which followed is described by an officer who was present: - - “Never shall I forget the scene at Achicourt on the eve of the - battle. It was round about midnight when I got there and pitch dark - save for the fitful light from the still burning village[19] near - by and the flashes of the guns. - - “We had got word of ‘trouble near the railway crossing,’ and - trouble indeed there was. - - “There, sunk and wallowing in a bog of black mud, were some - half-dozen Tanks--Tanks that should by then have been miles ahead - and getting into their battle position for the attack at dawn. - - “Instead, here were the machines on which so much depended, lying - helpless and silent at all sorts of ominous angles, and turned this - way and that in their vain struggles to churn their way out of the - morass. - - “About them were great weals and hummocks of mud and ragged holes - brimming with black slime. The crews, sweating and filthy, were - staggering about and trying to help their machines out by digging - away the soil from under their bellies and by thrusting planks - and brushwood under their tracks. Now and again an engine would be - started up and some half-submerged Tank would heave its bulk up - and out in unsteady floundering fashion, little by little and in - wrenching jerks as the engine was raced and the clutch released. - - “Then the tracks of a sudden would cease biting and would rattle - round ineffectively, the ground would give way afresh on one side, - and the Tank would slowly heave over and settle down again with - a perilous list, the black water awash in her lower sponson. No - lights could be shown on account of enemy observation, and at any - time he might reopen with his heavy artillery, which had already - been blasting the immediate neighbourhood earlier in the night. - - “Altogether it was a desperate and discouraging business for those - of us who knew that there were infantry already assembled for the - morning’s assault who had practised with us, who looked to us for a - lead across the German wire, and who must now do as best they might - without us.” - -In the event, however, it did not turn out as blackly as those at the -Achicourt slough had feared. - -Had the approach march of the Tanks been run to time, the column would -almost certainly have come in for the blowing up of the ammunition dump -at Achicourt, which was hit and exploded by a German shell soon after -nightfall. - -Also, the half-dozen Tanks that were extricated from the bog too late -to join in that morning’s attack, provided a small local reserve that -later proved of the utmost value and had an appreciable effect on the -course and ultimate issue of the battle. - -The ruins of Achicourt continued to smoulder through the night. - - [20]“It had just been very badly shelled by the enemy. Two sides - of the square were burned and blasted away (it had been all right, - nearly, when I passed through it a few days before). The ruins - still smoked and glowed, and shadowy working parties shovelled - rubbish into shell craters to make them passable for transport and - cleared a way through the sorry wreck. Smashed limbers, strings - of dead mules, burnt-out and buckled motor lorries, transport - wagons, and the like, all rather weird and depressing, the red - glow of some other conflagration as a background, and this - stabbed with the flicker of white light from our guns, little - and great--thousands of them (actually), a throbbing roar in the - distance, and fit to deafen you anywhere near. The great thing - is to go about with an open mouth. It equalises the pressure on - your ear-drums. I am acquiring a permanent droop of the lower - jaw. Anyway, a discouraged, shell-shaken sentry told me that one - could not go through for the shells, mostly our own, exploding in - the fire, and refused to let me take the car in. It did not look - anything like as bad as he tried to make out--from the danger point - of view--and indeed when I walked through there were the working - parties stolidly filling up the craters by the light of the glowing - ruins. Having fulfilled my mission, I got back to report at Brigade - Headquarters about 4 a.m., and then set out again at 4.30 to follow - the battle and note and report the doings of our Willies.” - -[Illustration: A DERELICT. VALLEY OF THE SCARPE] - -[Illustration: A BURNING TANK] - -[Illustration: “DIRECT HITS”] - -[Illustration: BELLIED ON A TREE-STUMP AND SUBSEQUENTLY HIT] - - -IV - -At about 3.30 a.m. heavy rain had begun to fall, and all day the armies -fought amid intermittent storms of sleet and drenching rain. - - [21]“Our bombardment was quite unimaginable--all that could - possibly be desired, I should think, for accuracy, evenness and - intensity. The final barrage was a really wonderful sight; just at - dawn the grey sky ablaze with star shells and coloured rockets all - along the line, nothing else to be seen. - - “Then when it got a little lighter and the barrage had crept on, - we could see thousands of our men popping up from their barely - visible ‘assembly slits’ in the ground and pouring up the slope in - a slow-moving, loose sort of crowd with no discernible formation, - and with and among them, the Tanks. - - “They had previously come up across an apparently deserted valley - over the heads of our waiting infantry in their shelter trenches. - They appeared breasting the hill and disappeared over the brow - together with the attacking waves of troops. The enemy’s shrapnel - and high explosives that came back were almost laughable in - comparison with what we put over them, and our casualties were, on - the whole, unusually light. Where I was watching was reported to be - the hardest nut on the whole line.[22] - - “What with the barrage and the Tanks the defence appears to have - just collapsed, and a few minutes and a few casualties gave us - possession of a wonderful redoubt that the enemy had lavished - extraordinary ingenuity and industry in preparing for many months - past. - - “I saw it all from a hedge in a hillside about 1000 yards away. I - had determined on the spot, and, as luck would have it, I found - when I got there that there was a half-finished observation post - with a lovely little pit to jump down into if things got hot. - However, there was no need to use it. It was only getting into - it that was rather exciting. I got spattered with débris time - and again, but by tacking, waiting, and using the country, I got - through without any real unpleasantness. - - “It’s been a real thoroughgoing victory so far as we can see and - hear--or rather hear, for I only saw the first phase. Good old - Willies, it’s partly their victory, too, as all can see. Wonderful - messages come in, a dozen or more to the hour, reports, telegrams, - telephone messages, kite balloons, aeroplanes, pigeon letters, - etc., and nearly all good, _awfully_ good. - - “‘We have reached Z.22.B.64 and are going strong.’ - - “‘Have taken Tilloy Village.’ - - “‘Over 2000 prisoners in our Corps cages already, including thirty - officers and a Battalion Commander.’ - - “‘Nine hundred prisoners, scared and starved, _moral_ rotten.’ - - “‘Have reached the Blue Line,’ _Signed_ Daphne, ‘Consolidated at - Y.13.C.68 to 15.D. Central,’ only we don’t consolidate, we just - hammer on line after line exactly to programme and as never before. - - “‘Tanks seen zero plus 5 hours 15 minutes in the “Howitzer Valley” - accompanied by infantry. Guns still in position, gunners not.’ - - “And so on; and our blue cardboard slips representing infantry and - little red flags, denoting Tanks, march on and on and on.” - -Partly owing to the weather conditions and partly because the sixty -Tanks were strung out along so wide a front, Tank Commanders had been -told to act more or less independently against the strong points which -had been allotted to them. Once zero had struck, therefore, the history -of the battle becomes, from the Tank point of view, chiefly that of the -exploits of individual machines. - -The only exception is the history of the eight Tanks operating with the -Canadians at Vimy. Alas! their story is easily summarised. - -It had been originally decided that if the weather was wet no Tanks -were to operate on this sector at all, as the condition of the ground -was already exceptionally bad. The eight were to be sent down to -reinforce the 5th Army where the going was good. - -As luck would have it, April 7 and 8 were fine, and it was determined -that the Tanks should not be sent down, but should go in on the ridge. -When a drenching rain set in two hours before zero it was too late to -alter the plan of attack. The result was as had been expected. - -Every Tank without exception ditched or got stuck in No Man’s Land or -in the enemy front line. - -Therefore, the Tanks claim no share in the Canadians’ brilliant and -historic taking of the ridge. - -So great was the Canadians’ _élan_, and so successful was our barrage, -that by the time the Tanks were extricated there was happily no rôle -for them to play. They were, therefore, withdrawn as quickly as -possible, and were, after all, sent down to reinforce the 5th Army. - -With the 3rd Army, several Tanks performed interesting exploits. - -Second Lieutenant Weber’s Tank, “Lusitania,” for example, spent an -exciting and profitable two days. This machine was some three hours -late in starting owing to trouble with the secondary gear. Just as it -was getting off, word was brought that the infantry was held up. The -arrival of the Tank effected an entire change in the situation, and a -machine-gun placed in a wood north of the railway having been silenced -by the Tank’s 6-pounder fire, it proceeded towards the Blue Line. The -infantry advanced at the same time, and both reached the next enemy -trench together. - -The movement was carried out in such close alignment that the Tank was -prevented from making use of its guns and enfilading the trench, but -the Germans, unable to face the combined attack, held up their hands -and surrendered. The Tank then cruised along the railway towards Fleury -Redoubt, firing as it went with its 6-pounder and Lewis guns. The -Germans made haste to evacuate the Redoubt, and could be seen to take -refuge in a dug-out close to a railway arch. - -The Tank drew on towards the arch, firing in its progress at any -object suggesting a machine-gun emplacement. Near the arch it found -itself under our own barrage and also shelled by an anti-Tank gun. It -accordingly wheeled about, reclimbed the slope it had just descended, -and signalled to the infantry to come on. Then, returning to the arch, -it mounted guard while the infantry unearthed the Germans who had -taken refuge in the dug-out. This point disposed of and a steep bank -hindering further advance, it was found necessary to take a southerly -course to find a more possible place for climbing, the engine having -become badly overheated. Indeed, so hot was it that the machine now -jibbed at the easiest exit from the valley that could be found, and -there was nothing for it but to wait until the engine should cool down. - -On the instant that the Tank Commander announced his decision to -lie-up, down dropped each man of the crew where he sat or stood, -overcome by heat and the cumulative exhaustion of days and nights of -almost ceaseless preparation. - -Shells whined and droned overhead, and would now and again pitch in the -valley on this or that side of the Tank, throwing up a brown cascade of -earth with a reverberating crash. - -Along the western bank of the valley were the excavated and concreted -pits that had sheltered the enemy’s guns for two and a half years. -From some the pieces had been withdrawn, in others our fire had caught -the gunners and their teams in the very act, and the valley bottom -was strewn with tragic heaps--guns, limbers, men and horses, huddled -together in shapeless tangles of brown and grey, or tossed apart to -lie singed and torn amongst the short grass and the shell-holes. - -Down near the railway arch through which the valley track led to the -river Scarpe, one diminutive Highlander had paraded a drove of some 200 -prisoners who had somehow come under his sole charge. - -They were neatly lined up in fours, each man with his hands above his -head, and as they drooped from weariness or fidgeted from fear of the -shells that continued to fall haphazardly about them, their small and -solitary escort would flourish, and more than flourish his bayonet. Up -would go the 400 hands once more and the parade be restored to order. - -Not for nothing had one young Scotsman been taught the value of -discipline. - -By the time the engine had cooled down, the crew been roused, and the -far bank surmounted, the infantry were well on their way to their -objective. Dropping into third gear the Tank gradually gained on them, -and its commander, observing that they had entered the German trench, -swung half right and took a course through the barbed wire parallel to -it. On the flank of the 15th Division, the trench was seen to be still -in German hands. The Tank opened fire accordingly with 6-pounders and -machine-guns, doing what damage it could. It caused a redoubt to be -evacuated, it searched out and caused two snipers to surrender, and -later in the evening, in answer to an urgent request from a Colonel of -infantry, it approached within fifty yards of a trench and silenced two -out of four machine-guns. Then, the already defective magneto giving -out altogether and the Tank being brought to a standstill, it opened a -heavy fire along the trench with Lewis and 6-pounder guns. Having thus -killed many Germans, and the engine refusing to restart, the commander -at 9.30 p.m. decided to abandon the Tank, after a full twelve hours in -action. - -It had then been dark for some time, and the Germans had kept up a -lively fire on the stranded Tank with rifles and machine-guns, taking -aim at the chinks and loopholes through which the lights shone out in -tell-tale beams. - -For hour after hour, those within had striven laboriously yet vainly -to set their engines going, and so to bring their Tank safely back out -of its gallant maiden action. But nothing availed, and, the enemy fire -becoming more intense and accurate, the lights were switched off and -the preparations for evacuation made in total darkness. - -It was first necessary to find out where our own line lay and to warn -our infantry that the crew would be coming in. - -Sergeant Latham at once volunteered for this reconnaissance, and -crawled out of the Tank into the lesser blackness of the night. Rifles -spat and stray bullets cracked and whined impartially around, and -British and German rifles and bullets sound very much alike. However, -partly by judgment and partly by luck, Sergeant Latham stumbled into -our own lines and warned the garrison of the trench to fire high as the -crew from the derelict Tank would soon be coming in. - -It was as well that the sergeant succeeded in delivering his message, -as a relief had taken place under cover of the night, and the new -garrison had been told nothing of the Tank out in front, and would -certainly have greeted the returning crew as enemy raiders. - -Next day, having procured a new magneto, the Tank Commander and some -of his crew set out for their machine with better hope of salving her. - -They were approaching the battle front when an agitated battery -commander hailed them and sought information as to the Tank out to his -front. Hearing that it was a derelict that they were on their way to -try to bring in, he exclaimed, “Thank God for that! I’ve been blasting -that part this morning. I didn’t know about the Tank, and I’ve just got -a direct hit on it that’s crumpled it up. I feared it might have been -manned.” - -So ended the short but valiant career of the avenging “Lusitania.” For -his very gallant command, Second Lieutenant Weber received an immediate -award of the Military Cross, and Sergeant Latham the Military Medal. -The specific action for which the latter was decorated is officially -described as follows: - - “76441 _Sgt. F. Latham, ‘C’ Batt., awarded M.M._ for conspicuous - gallantry and devotion to duty. During the Battle of Arras on April - 9, 1917, whilst passing through a severe enemy barrage, lengths - of barbed wire were caught up by the tracks of his Tank which - pulled the camouflage cover over the exhaust openings, and caused - the whole mass to catch fire. Without waiting for orders Sergeant - Latham climbed on top of the Tank and removed the burning material. - Later on this N.C.O. displayed the greatest courage whilst - attempting to dig out his Tank under heavy fire.” - -Another Tank, commanded by Second Lieutenant S. S. Ching, in this -sector was late in starting, and had barely caught up its infantry when -it became ditched. It held out, however, for no less than three days -while the fighting eddied about it. - -It made most active use of its 6-pounders, thereby effectively -protecting the right flank of its infantry. - -Another Tank fell bodily into an old gun emplacement near -Neuville-Vitasse which had been carefully turfed over. - - -V - -BULLECOURT - -By the night of the 9th the force of the first wave was spent, and -though, as we have seen, many units were continuously in action for the -next three days, for the bulk both of Tanks and infantry April 10 was -spent in consolidating positions or digging out and repairing Tanks. - -On April 11 the attack on Bullecourt and two other lesser actions were -fought. One of the two minor attacks was that on Monchy, in which six -Tanks took part. - -It was highly successful owing chiefly to the extremely gallant way in -which the machines were fought. The Tanks took the village practically -unassisted and held it for two hours till the infantry came up. - -Unfortunately, there were no further supplies of Tanks to exploit the -success or more might have been achieved. The second attack was made -from Neuville-Vitasse down the Siegfried Line. Four Tanks took part and -did great execution, all the machines returning safely. - -The stars in their courses seem to have fought against the success of -the attack against Bullecourt in which eleven Tanks co-operated with -the Australians. - -It will be remembered that the 5th Army attack was not to be launched -till some time after that in the other sectors. Also that the state of -the roads was such that it was impossible to bring up enough artillery -for a preliminary bombardment. Therefore the Battle of Bullecourt was -to have been a first wave attack in which a small number of Tanks were -to play the lead. - -The eleven Tanks were to have advanced in line upon the Siegfried -defences east of Bullecourt. Some were then to have wheeled west to -attack Bullecourt itself, while others were to move east down the -German trench system, a third party pushing straight ahead to Riencourt -and Hedecourt. - -The attack was to have been made at dawn on April 10, and at nightfall -on the 9th the Tanks began their move up to their battle positions -behind the railway embankment. All day the weather had been cold and -stormy, and the Tanks had not gone half a mile before a violent snow -blizzard came on, blotting out every landmark. Most of the troops who -had moves to make that night were confounded in the swirling darkness, -and though the eleven Tanks did not stray far, their pace had to be -reduced to a crawl and at dawn they were still far from their battle -stations. The Australian infantry, who had already assembled at the -railway embankment, had to be withdrawn under heavy shelling, the whole -attack postponed, and the manner of it much modified. All next night -the snow fell. When the attack did take place on the 11th, it proved, -both for Tanks and infantry, a costly little failure. The day dawned -clear and against the whiteness of the snow every advancing Tank and -its broad double track, stood out sharply. Further, the Australian -infantry wading through the snow, found the path made by the Tanks -irresistible and followed in long lines strung out along their tracks. -Thus Tanks and infantry provided the Germans with the most perfect -artillery targets imaginable. - -Of the eleven Tanks, nine were knocked out by direct hits before -their work was half accomplished. Worst of all, two Tanks which, with -about 200 Australians, pressed on nearly five miles to Riencourt and -Hedecourt, found their right unprotected owing to our failure to -advance the other part of our line. The Germans organised a sweeping -counter-attack, and the two villages, the infantry and the Tanks, were -surrounded and taken. [23] “The First Battle of Bullecourt was a minor -disaster--the three brigades of infantry lost very heavily indeed--and -the company of Tanks had been apparently nothing but a broken reed. - -“For many months after, the Australians distrusted Tanks--‘the Tanks -had failed them’--‘the Tanks had let them down.’” We shall see that -it was not till after the Battle of Hamel that their confidence was -restored. - -Not a single Tank survived to rally after the battle. But our -worst loss was that of the two Tanks which were “taken alive,” for -examination of the captured machines revealed to the enemy how -effective a weapon was their armour-piercing bullet against the Mark I. - -After this action a German Order was issued that every man should be -provided with five rounds of the “K” (armour-piercing) ammunition, and -every machine-gun with several hundred. As long as the Mark I. was -used, these bullets were to cause heavy casualties among Tanks and -their crews. - -For the next ten days Tanks were busy refitting. By the 20th thirty of -the original sixty Tanks were fit again for action, and on April 23 -eleven Tanks were employed in two and threes to help on the infantry -advance on the line of Monchy-Rœux-Gavrelle. - -Again the feature of the day was the fine individual work. - -The story of a Tank which worked opposite Rœux is told in the Honours -and Awards List in the note on Sergeant J. Noel’s D.C.M.: - - “During the battle of Arras on April 23 this N.C.O. took command - of his Tank after his officer had been wounded. He fought his Tank - with the greatest gallantry and skill, putting out of action many - machine-guns and killing numbers of the enemy, besides taking fifty - prisoners. His action enabled the infantry to gain possession - of the Chemical Works. He brought his Tank back safely to its - starting-point. His skill and gallantry were beyond all praise. He - was continuously in action for nine hours.” - -This was the first time a Tank was commanded in action by an N.C.O. - -Another pause followed the actions of the 23rd. Of the sixty Tanks -which had gone in on the 9th, not many machines remained that could -soon be repaired. - -However, twelve Tanks were somehow made “battle-worthy,” and on May 3 -were sent in for the last time before the Brigade was withdrawn to rest -and to be re-equipped at Wailly, their new training ground. - -A party of four operated between Croisilles and St. Léger and became -heavily engaged in a fight at close quarters against bombs and trench -mortars. - -The second group of eight Tanks made another assault upon Bullecourt. - -Though individuals did extremely well, the attack was once more -unsuccessful, as, though Tanks reached their objective, they were -obliged to retire again. - -No less than ten Military Medals and a D.C.M. were awarded to men and -N.C.O.’s of the Tanks who took part in this little action. - -The Germans had learnt their lesson, and Tanks and crews suffered -heavily from armour-piercing bullets. Several of the decorations were -given to drivers who had brought their Tanks safely out of action when -themselves severely wounded. - -With this second attack on Bullecourt ended, as far as the Tanks were -concerned, the Battle of Arras. There were not many 1st Brigade Tanks -to withdraw to Wailly nor many unwounded men to man them. It was, -however, with feelings very different from those of the “veterans” of -the Somme that officers and men left the battle. - -The careful training at Bermicourt with its well-planned courses, -its boxing, and its games was justified. Men and officers could not -have displayed a finer fighting spirit. The value of their work was -recognised by all the units with whom they fought. - -Major-General Williams, commanding the 37th division, wrote of “C” -Battalion’s work in the attack on Monchy: - - “It was a great achievement, and in itself more than justifies the - existence of the Tanks. Officers and men concerned deserve the - highest credit.” - -Lieut.-General Aylmer Haldane, commanding the 6th Corps, wrote to -Colonel Baker-Carr, commanding the 1st Brigade, on April 13: - - “... I am really most grateful for all the Tanks and their - commanders have done, and the great success of this Corps is only - attributable to the help you have given us. This has been my first - experience of the co-operation of Tanks, and I certainly never - again want to be without them, when so well commanded and led.” - -Not only had the personnel done extraordinarily well, their conduct -being “a triumph of _moral_ over technical difficulties,” but on the -whole the general work of the Tanks had been a success. - -These were briefly the technical lessons of the battle: - - Tanks should be used in masses. - - They should be concentrated. - - A large reserve should always be kept in hand. - - Mark I. machines are not suitable for use on very wet or very - heavily shelled ground. - - Signal and supply Tanks are essential. - -In fine, the chief obstacle to a still fuller measure of success had -been that there were 60, and not 260, Tanks available. - - - - -CHAPTER VII - -THE BATTLE OF MESSINES AND THE “HUSH” OPERATION - - “And little would’st thou grudge them - Their greater depth of soul. - Thy partners in the torch race, - Though nearer to the goal.”--IONICA. - - -I - -In many battles in which Tanks later took part, two or more Tank -Brigades would be associated. But the Battles of Arras and Messines -belong, the former to the 1st and the latter to the 2nd Brigade -exclusively. - -The 2nd Brigade had been formed exactly like the 1st. - -That is to say, a nucleus of Somme “Tank Veterans” had been reinforced -by picked volunteers from the other branches of the Service. Like the -1st Brigade they trained in France, in the Bermicourt area. The unknown -author of the 2nd Battalion history gives an amusing account of this -training in which sports of all kinds, rugger, soccer, snow fights, -boxing and swimming, helped in the “edification” as well as the more -serious courses. - -One feature of the period was, as usual, a shortage of instructional -machines. - -Dummy Tanks were therefore used for several practice attacks. The -dummies were made of wood and canvas and were carried from within by -their crew of seven. - - “They looked for all the world like some drab-coloured prehistoric - monster with as many legs as a centipede. A high wind blew during - a certain ‘action’ in March, and made things most difficult. By - the time the final objective was reached many of the Tanks were - in a state of collapse, the torn canvas revealing the perspiring - machinery to the amused gaze of the onlookers. The remains of the - Tanks were, however, most useful for firewood and the renovation of - beds.” - -The account goes on to relate the delightful keenness of the men, and -how their interest in their training was so great that such serious -_contretemps_ as getting in late for tea “were regarded as nothing.” - -The 2nd Brigade was to be equipped with Mark IV. Tanks as soon as a -supply was available. - -The first batch of machines arrived in France towards the end of April. - -The Mark IV. Tank was an improved Mark I., and did not differ very -materially from its predecessor in design. - -These were, briefly, the principal improvements: - -First, its armour was of a special steel which was impervious to the -German armour-piercing bullet. - -Secondly, the sponsons were of a better pattern. In the Mark I. they -had to be completely unshipped whenever the Tank was moved by rail; in -the Mark IV. they were so constructed that they could be “pushed in” -sufficiently for railway transport. - -Thirdly, a new and heavier design of track rollers and links was -introduced. - -Fourthly, danger from fire was reduced by the petrol tank (protected, -of course, by special armour-plates) being outside and at the back of -the machine. - -There were also other minor improvements in armament, and the total -weight of the Tank was slightly reduced. - -Such was the weapon which was to be first tried at Messines, and such -was the unit which was at the same time to make its début. - - -II - -The Battle of Messines did not prove one in which Tanks were able -to show to any particular advantage; this not because of adverse -conditions, but because of the battle’s very success. It was throughout -an extremely well-planned little action, and would probably have been -perfectly successful even without the co-operation of Tanks. - -An expert military critic has said of it: - - “The Battle of Messines, one of the shortest and best mounted - limited operations of the War, was in no sense a Tank battle.” - -It was perhaps a little hard on the 2nd Brigade, who fought throughout -with particular gallantry, that more of the laurel could not fall to -them. - -For not only was the 2nd Brigade’s maiden battle notable for gallantry -in the field, but also for the very high standard of the Staff -work--the administrative arrangements indeed long remaining the model -for subsequent Tank operations. - -So inspiring a little action was it, so well planned and executed in -every stage, that the 2nd Brigade themselves felt that they had been -privileged in playing even a relatively minor part in such an assault. - -Though Tanks proved useful in several phases of the battle, Tank -Commanders are the first to attribute the successes of the day to the -artillery, the tunnelling companies and the infantry. - -They had early established particularly cordial relations with the -infantry, and it is said that a Maori Unit of the 2nd Anzac Corps gave -expert help to the 2nd Tank Battalion in camouflaging its machines. - -Messines was to be a prelude to a more considerable attack in the Ypres -Salient. The village of Messines itself and the Wytschaete Ridge were -to be taken, thus securing the British Right for the Ypres attack, and -depriving the enemy of dominating ground. - -The advance was to be a very short one, and the rôle of the Tanks was -to be subsidiary to that of gunners, sappers and infantry. - -Land Mines were to be a special feature of the action. The explosion of -twenty of these containing over a million pounds of ammonal was to be -the signal for attack on the morning of June 7. - -Some of the mines had been ready for more than a year, and we had -constructed nearly five miles of galleries. The Germans too had not -been idle. - -At the time of our attack we knew that the enemy was driving a gallery -leading to our Hill 60 mine. By careful listening we judged that if our -offensive were launched on the date arranged the enemy’s counter-mine -would just fail to reach us. He was, therefore, allowed to proceed. - -Altogether seventy-two Mark IV. Tanks were to be employed, and, the -lesson of Arras having been learnt, twelve Mark I. and Mark II. Tanks -had been converted into supply machines. Each of these was able to -bring up sufficient petrol, ammunition and other stores to replenish -five fighting Tanks. - -Forty Tanks were to cross the parapet at zero hour and the rest of the -Tanks were to be held in reserve. - -They were to be distributed as follows:-- - -_To the North_: twelve Tanks were to work with the 10th Corps, whose -objective was the Oosttaverne line. - -_In the Centre_: sixteen Tanks were attached to the 9th Corps, who were -to capture Wytschaete. - -_To the South_: twenty Tanks were to fight with the 2nd Corps, who were -to take Messines and a strong point named Fanny’s Farm, the reserves -pushing on to capture the Oosttaverne line in the second phase of the -attack. - -The weather had been fine and hot for nearly three weeks before the -battle, and a heavy thunder shower which fell on June 6 hardly laid the -dust which had hung for weeks in a hazy curtain over the approach roads. - -The Tanks were as usual moved up during the night before the action. It -was very dark, with heavy thunder clouds hiding the moon. - - [24]“The last part of the approach march will never be forgotten by - those who took part in it. - - “The enemy took it into his head to bombard with lachrymatory and - other gas shells, and the night was so black that it was impossible - to keep gas-masks on the whole time. - - “So with streaming eyes, with no sort of light, with Tank - Commanders and drivers coughing and spluttering, the Tanks - forged ahead over this area of unseen trenches, barbed wire and - shell-holes, the men buoyed up by the knowledge of the shock the - Hun would receive in an hour or so.” - -Zero hour was to be at dawn. - -Somewhere north of Wytschaete a German dump had caught fire, and the -red flames streamed up against the pale summer sky. - -It grew lighter, and our aeroplanes and balloons began to go up, dark -against the dawn. - -Our unusual activity in the air did not escape the watchful enemy, and -his suspicions were soon thoroughly aroused. - -He began to send up rockets calling for barrage fire, and soon his guns -were responding with growing emphasis. - -At seven minutes past three our artillery stopped, and the rattle of -machine-guns stood out in the comparative silence. - -There was a pause. A low rumbling was heard. The earth rocked and -quivered until with a prolonged and rending crash a screen of fire rose -where the German front lines had been. - -Masses of earth were hurled skywards, and as they rose gleamed for a -moment purple and gold in the first rays of the sun. They writhed and -shifted, fantastically swaying, and shot through with flames. Balls of -fire were hurled in every direction, and the air quivered and vibrated -with the shock. Before the tortured earth could fall again, down came -the stunning roar and crash of the British barrage; and Tanks and -infantry were over the parapet. - -By 7 a.m. the Anzacs were in Messines, and both Tanks and infantry had -reached Fanny’s Farm by noon, their day’s objective gained. - -One Tank working with the 2nd Corps reached its final objective (at a -distance of about two miles) in an hour and forty minutes. - -A Tank led the Ulstermen and the Southern Irish of the 9th Division -into Wytschaete. - -By about three o’clock three Tanks had reached Oosttaverne, and they -patrolled the ground beyond the village till their accompanying Welsh -and West Country troops came up. - -By nightfall we held our final objective everywhere, and had besides -captured 7300 prisoners and 67 guns, 94 trench mortars and a very large -number of machine-guns. - -All through the night of the 7th-8th the Germans launched small hastily -organised counter-attacks, and in repelling one of these, chance -enabled three Tanks to play a curious and useful part. - -Three of the Tanks, which had helped in the capture of Oosttaverne, had -ultimately got ditched near a place named Joye Farm. - -It was impossible to extricate them in the darkness, and the crews -stood by, hoping to get them out as soon as it was light again. - -Meanwhile towards morning word came that the Germans were going to -counter-attack. - -In the position in which the Tanks lay, the crews were able to train -their 6-pounders against the enemy, who had been seen massing in -the Wanbeke Valley. As the Lewis guns could not be brought to bear, -they were dismounted, and the rest of the crews operated them from -neighbouring shell-holes. - - [25]“Word was sent to the infantry to warn them of the coming - attack, and to ask for co-operation. They replied that they had run - short of ammunition for their Lewis gun, and some was supplied to - them from the Tanks.” - -The attack did not develop as early as had been expected, but when it -came it was in force. - -From about 6.30 onwards the enemy repeatedly attempted to advance, -raking the Tanks with a hail of armour-piercing bullets, which, -however, failed to penetrate. - -They were driven off every time with heavy loss, until at 11.30 a.m. -our artillery opened and dispersed them with barrage fire. - - -III - -The failure of their armour-piercing bullets against the Mark IV. must -have proved something of a disappointment to the enemy. - -It is curious to trace the effort which the Germans made to keep up -with our development of the Tank. - -For once, we had moved first, and the enemy was always to be a lap -behind. - -No sooner had he discovered how effective was his “K” bullet against -the Mark I. Tank, than we confronted him with the Mark IV., against -which it was powerless. - -The Germans always had rather hazy ideas as to the capabilities and -habits of our current Tank. They had had ample opportunity of examining -two Tanks which lay derelict in their lines on the Somme, yet until the -Battle of Arras they believed that Tanks were largely dependent on the -use of roads, and that therefore pits and other obstacles in roads must -form a useful anti-Tank defence. - - [26]“It was also not till the later stages of the Battle of Arras - that the enemy realised from some captured Tanks near Bullecourt - that the ‘K’ bullet was effective against the type of Tank that had - been in use against them since September 1916. - - “By the time the enemy had fully realised this, however, the old - Tanks were used up, and at Messines the Mark IV. had made its - appearance and the chance of the armour-piercing bullet was over.... - - “After Messines the Germans began to realise the importance of - artillery as a defence against Tanks, and ‘the chief rôle allotted - to the infantry was to keep its head’ and leave the rest to the - guns.... - - “Prominence was given to indirect fire[27] of guns of both heavy - and light calibres on approaching Tanks. In spite of several dawn - attacks the enemy laid great stress on what he called ‘Distant - Defence,’ and a few special anti-Tank guns, about two per - divisional front, were placed in specially covered positions.” - -It was not till the Battle of Cambrai in November 1917 that he was to -discover by chance the one effective weapon against Tanks. That is to -say, Direct Fire by field guns. - - -THE “HUSH” OPERATION - -I - -Before it was decided to fight the enemy at Messines there had been an -idea of an attack near Lens, and most of the reconnaissance for such a -battle had been carried out. - -Like many another battle of the War, it was never fought, and remained -only the shadow of an operation. - -Of all these shadows and projected attacks, the one which had attracted -more interest than any other was in active preparation while the 2nd -Brigade was fighting at Messines. - -This was the revised and abridged version of the famous “Hush” -operation, that is, of the projected attack on the Belgian coast. - -The first time such a notion had been suggested was in the spring of -1916, and elaborate plans were then made for a surprise landing in and -near Ostend. - -But we were obliged to co-operate with the French, and to fight instead -on the Somme. The First Battle of the Somme, however, developed into a -“slogging match” and lasted through the rest of that campaigning season. - -Next year the idea was again brought up. This time Tanks were to take -part. The scheme was a less ambitious one, and the landing was to be -effected between Ostend and the Allied line about Nieuport. A special -detachment of Tanks was located at Erin, and started training for the -difficult manœuvre of climbing the sea wall which here protects the -coast. This training was carried out as secretly as possible, and it -was given out that its object was the surmounting of some of the Lille -fortifications, a figment which for long satisfied the minds of the -curious. - -The problem to be solved was an exceedingly complex one. - -The mere landing of Tanks on an open beach is no light matter. When -that beach is heavily defended by an alert and resourceful enemy, when -it is commanded and enfiladed by a concentration of artillery of all -calibres concealed amongst the dunes, and when in addition the shelving -beach is crowned by a steep sea wall of concrete, a landing would seem -to have but small chance of success. Still, there was a chance, and the -stake at hazard being a big one, big risks might be cheerfully accepted. - -The general plans for the enterprise having been approved in the -highest quarters, were then very carefully worked out down to the -smallest details by a little band of experts, prominent amongst whom -were Admiral Bacon, Lieut.-Colonel Philip Johnson, and Major Hotblack. - -The whole of the projected landing was elaborately staged, and long -and patiently rehearsed--the Tanks playing the lead in what the whole -various cast hoped was to be a really notable success. - -Immense pontoons 600 ft. in length were specially built to carry the -landing parties--armies in little with representatives almost of every -arm and branch except the cavalry. - -These strange craft were to be lashed between a couple of monitors, -and so pushed across the channel and up the beach at certain selected -points, points that exhaustive air reconnaissance and photography at -all states of the tide had indicated as most suitable. - -Actual trials of the pontoons and their monitor escorts were made in -the secret waters of the Thames, and officers of the Tank Corps would -suddenly disappear on unknown missions, to reappear as suddenly with no -memory as to where they had been or what they had seen in the interval. - -The sea wall itself might well have been designed as a special defence -against sea-borne hostile Tanks, its smooth concave face and projecting -coping making it absolutely unscalable by an honest Tank. - -The wall was of recent construction, and by a fortunate chance the -Belgian architect who had designed it had escaped to France with all -his drawings. - -From his plans an exact reproduction of a length of the wall was made. - -There in the experimental ground it stood, perfectly smooth, and worst -of all, ending at the top in a curl-over coping. - -At least, however, the engineers now knew the extent of their problem. - -In the first place, the Tanks had to get up somehow, and in the second -place, when they were up they had to help haul up guns and transport -lorries. - -After “trying on” various devices, the Tanks at last adopted what was -practically a portable ramp for the occasion. - -The Tank, until it reached the sea wall, carried it well in the air on -a long spar supported by wire hawsers. - -Then the ramp was lowered on to the pair of little wheels with which -it was fitted. On these the Tank pushed it up the incline, wheelbarrow -fashion, until further progress was stopped by the coping. - -The two wheels were then immediately shed, and steel spikes on the -under side of the work were driven into the concrete by the weight of -the Tank, which now, disengaging itself, proceeded to climb up its own -scaling ladder which it had thus placed in position. But the lorries -and guns had still to be provided for. - -The angle formed by the inclined plane and the level ground above the -retaining wall was a sharp one. - -Besides, it must be understood that the inclined plane used by the -Tanks fitted in under the concrete lip. At the point of junction -between the ground and the inclined plane there was, therefore, a -considerable bump. Both the acuteness of the angle and this “bump” -made it necessary to adopt some less back-breaking device for the -four-wheeled vehicles. A strong gangway, like a see-saw, was therefore -employed, and up this they were hauled, the weight of the gun or lorry -gently tipping the board down when it passed the balancing point. - -But the landing was never made, and for this many elaborate -explanations have been put forward. - -Two circumstances seem, however, sufficient to explain the apparent -withdrawal of our hands from the plough. - -The first was what seemed a trivial attack which the Germans made on -July 10. - -It will be remembered that the Belgian inundations stretched inland -opposite Nieuport, almost from the mile-wide belt of dry ground next -the sea which was formed by the sand dunes. Through these dunes cut the -river Yser, and near the coast we held both banks of the river. When -the time came, General Rawlinson could have moved his troops forward -freely over the numerous bridges which had been made, to join hands -with the landing party for whom he had so long been waiting. - -In the dune and polder country trenches were impossible, and our -defence here consisted of breastworks built in the sand. - -Now it had been abundantly and constantly proved throughout 1915 and -1916 that any advanced trench system could be taken at any time by the -side which was prepared to mass sufficient troops and guns for the -purpose. - -The Germans could have stretched out their hands at any moment for this -bit of coast. - -They chose not to grasp it until they imagined that our plans, whatever -they might be, were complete, and when their attack would probably -cause us the maximum of inconvenience. Therefore, it was on July 10 -that, after a tremendous bombardment, they attacked the position in -overwhelming force. Our defence was gallant but vain, and by the -evening the Germans had captured the northern part of our bridgeheads. - -It is true that we succeeded in holding Nieuport itself, but the -loss of even the small strip of ground to the north of it rendered -the assembly of troops in that area for our own attack, which was to -co-operate with the coast landing, almost impossible. - -The second and more weighty circumstance was the fatal slowness of our -main advance at Ypres. - -In the next chapters we shall consider these tragic months, whose slow -passage swept away so many schemes and hopes, and made unfruitful so -much thought and labour. - -Enough that the “Hush” operation was swept silently away with the rest. -As late as the beginning of October, however, the men who had planned -so cunningly, whose minds had surmounted so many difficulties, still -hoped that their work might not prove barren. - -But by the middle of the month it had become clear that the landing -could not take place, and the end of October the special Tank -detachment was finally disbanded. - - - - -CHAPTER VIII - -THE FLANDERS CAMPAIGN--PREPARATIONS FOR THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES - - -The Third Battle of Ypres represented the remaining fragment of what -was to have been a great and extensive campaign. It was the stump of a -tree shorn down to shoulder height and bare of leaves and branches. - -One circumstance after another had postponed the execution of the large -design. Troops which had been earmarked for it had had to be diverted -to other parts of the front. - -We had had to put it off to co-operate more closely with the French, -and certain other obstacles had arisen, the full story of which has not -even yet been told. - -The Battle of Messines was over by June 12, but it was considered that -if an attack in the strongly fortified Ypres Salient was to have a real -chance of success, it must be an attack in force, a regular full-dress -battle, for which the preparations were then held to be necessarily -extremely elaborate. - -About six weeks were therefore to elapse before the attack was -launched. Once launched, however, the attackers must gain their -objectives rapidly. That was essential to the plan. - -The Russian front was crumbling. Germany was bringing troops and guns -westward. We should soon be face to face with an enemy so strongly -reinforced that our chance of victory in an attack would be slight. - - [28]“It was in some degree a race against time. If a true strategic - purpose was to be effected before winter, the first stages must be - quickly passed. The high ground east of the Salient must be won in - a fortnight, to enable the British to move against the German bases - in West Flanders and clear the coastline.” - -Not only must we hasten because we faced an enemy whose strength would -be increasing daily, but because we were to attack in Flanders, and the -summer would be far spent before we could complete our preparations. - -The enemy’s lines lay on the slopes of the semicircle of low hills that -overlook Ypres. Behind him lay another swampy valley, which rose again -to another slightly higher crescent of hills. - -In the inner arena lay the ruins of Ypres, and, set in the marshy -levels and immediately overlooked by the first semicircle of hillocks -and more distantly by the second, lay our lines. - - [29]“The territory lying within the crescent was practically all - reclaimed swamp land including Ypres and as far back as to St. - Omer, both of which, a few hundred years ago, were seaports. All - agriculture in this area depended on careful drainage, the water - being carried away in innumerable dykes. So important was the - maintenance of this drainage system considered, that in normal - times a Belgian farmer who allowed his dykes to fall into disrepair - was heavily fined.” - -Across this terrain two great armies had faced each other for nearly -three years. - -The Salient was, after Verdun, the most tortured of the Western -battlefields. Constant shelling of the low ground west of the ridges -had blocked or diverted the streams and the natural drainage, and -turned it into a sodden wilderness. - -If August was a wet month, as it had been the year before for the -Battle of the Somme, our chance of success was scanty. - - [30]“Much rain would make a morass of the Salient where Tanks could - not be used, transport could scarcely move, and troops would be - exposed to the last degree of misery.” - -However, the previous shelling of the ground was as nothing compared -with the bombardment which we now intended to inflict. - -Every corner of the enemy’s ground was to be drenched with our fire. - - [31]“The present battle was to be preceded by the longest - bombardment ever carried out by the British Army, eight days’ - counter-battery work (begun on July 7) being followed by sixteen - days’ intense bombardment. The effect of this cannonade was to - destroy the drainage system and to produce water in the shell-holes - formed, even before the rain fell.” - - -II - -The enemy had for long been in no doubt of our intentions. The coming -battle was much discussed in Germany. - -General von Armin (Commander of the German 4th Army) was to remain -strictly on the defensive. - -He was to “put in time,” to “poke,” in fact, until the big movement of -troops from the East should have thoroughly reconstituted the Western -Front. - -We were to be allowed to waste our time and our forces in petty gains -of unimportant territory, and to eat our hearts out in the slough. - -To this end, and because the waterlogged soil of Flanders did not allow -of the making of another Siegfried Line, the enemy had devised a new -tactical method. - -Directly the theory of this method is understood, many of the once -puzzling circumstances of this battle become comprehensible. - -It involved the use of but one comparatively new contrivance, the -“pill-box.” The “pill-box,” first seen at Messines, was a small -concrete fort. Sometimes it only stood up a yard or two above the -ground. More often it stood well up, concealed within the ruins of a -derelict farm. - -It held a garrison of anything up to thirty or forty men, and bristled -with machine-guns. - -The tactics themselves in which the pill-boxes figured are admirably -described by Mr. Buchan: - - “The enemy’s plan was to hold his first line--which was often a - mere string of shell-craters linked by a trench--with a few men, - who would fall back before an assault. He had his guns well behind, - so that they should not be captured in the first rush, and would - be available for a barrage when his opponents were entangled in - the ‘pill-box’ zone. Finally, he had his reserves in the second - line, ready for the counterstroke before the assault could secure - the ground won.... Any attack would be allowed to make some - advance; but if the German plan worked well, this advance would be - short-lived, and would be dearly paid for. Instead of the cast-iron - front of the Siegfried area, the Flanders line would be highly - elastic, but would spring back into position after pressure with a - deadly rebound.” - -The thoroughness and success with which this plan was carried out may -be read in the story of Glencorse Wood, of St. Julien, and of many -another bitterly fought “Minor Action.” - -In the meantime, the enemy watched us from his vantage ground, and day -and night harassed us with his shelling, his aerial bombing, and his -gas. - - -III - -On our side the preparations for a formidable attack continued steadily. - - [32]“The various problems inseparable from the mounting of a great - offensive, the improvement and construction of roads and railways, - the provision of an adequate water supply and of accommodation for - troops, the formation of dumps, the digging of dug-outs, subways - and trenches, and the assembling and registering of guns, had - all to be met and overcome in the new theatre of battle, under - conditions of more than ordinary disadvantage. - - “On no previous occasion, not excepting the attack on the - Messines-Wytschaete Ridge, had the whole of the ground from - which we had to attack been so completely exposed to the enemy’s - observation. Even after the enemy had been driven from the - Messines-Wytschaete Ridge, he still possessed excellent direct - observations over the Salient from the east and south-east, as well - as from the Pilckem Ridge to the north. Nothing existed at Ypres - to correspond with the vast caves and cellars which proved of such - value in the days prior to the Arras battle, and the provision of - shelter for the troops presented a very serious problem.” - -It was a problem which in some sectors proved insoluble, and troops and -working parties had to come up night by night into the forward area, -going back far behind the lines at dawn. - -Like their fellows of every other arm, members of the Tank Corps -carried out their battle preparations under conditions of peculiar -difficulty. - -But the 1st Brigade of Tanks had something more than indiscriminate -harassing fire and “area shoots” to trouble them. - -The enemy had obtained information of our tankodrome in Oosthoek Wood -from a British prisoner, who was either a garrulous fool or a very -treacherous knave. - -A soldier belonging to a certain infantry regiment, had betrayed every -detail of the whereabouts of the Tanks of the 1st Brigade, and of the -programme of their movements. A German document was captured setting -forth the whole of this creature’s evidence and explaining its value -and significance. The official account of this murderous piece of -treachery was periodically read out on parade to all Tank units, and -formed the text of many discourses on the vital importance of strict -secrecy and high _moral_. The name of this man will for ever have a -sinister sound for all who served in the Tank Corps. - -Fortunately for us, the Germans seem to have but half believed his -story--at any rate, the shelling to which they thereafter periodically -subjected the secret tankodrome was, though accurate, never so heavy -as such an important target would have seemed to warrant. Perhaps the -Germans, having no illusions as to what fighting in Flanders meant, and -being reasonably alive to the natural limitations of Tanks, scouted -the idea of a Tank attack being possible or being even seriously -contemplated. Be that as it may, they certainly failed to act on the -very valuable information given them in anything like an adequate way. - -Still, after some days of well-directed shelling and bombing, it was -decided to withdraw the whole of the personnel from Oosthoek Wood, and -to lodge them in camps in the plantations just north of Château Lovie, -where the Headquarters of the 1st Brigade was already established. - -Hither, too, had come the Advanced Headquarters of the Tank Corps, -the original intention of occupying a most eligible house in the town -of Poperinghe being given up, in view of the inconvenience caused by -the periodic shelling of the place and the consequent interruption of -communications. - -The advance Reconnaissance party had spent some weeks in the town, and -had been considerably annoyed by frequent and accurate high-velocity -shelling. - -The concentration of personnel which thus came about seemed -inconvenient enough at first, but turned out most usefully, and liaison -between the Brigade and its battalions had never been so good. - -There were forward dumps to be established with the aid of the supply -Tanks.[33] - -Very special preparations had to be made in order to bring the Tanks -within striking distance of the enemy. The roads were reserved for -lighter traffic. The enemy shelling was too heavy for railway making to -be possible beyond the detraining camps at Oosthoek Wood. - -Tentative attempts to push the line further on were constantly made, -and as constantly detected and discouraged by the enemy. - -The Tanks must have some sort of independent routes of their own over -the innumerable small waterways that must be crossed. - -The Kemmelbeke, the Lambardtheke, and in some places the Yser Canal, -all lay in the way. Miles of rough causeways over the marshes had to be -built; splinter-proof shelters for the various advanced Headquarters, -and, further back, camps, Tank “stables,” storage sheds, kitchens and -so forth, had all to be constructed. - -Such a programme of work was beyond the unaided power of the Tank -Corps, and therefore the 184th Tunnelling Company was allotted to the -Corps, one section to each Brigade. - -Much of the canal bridging and of the track making was done under fire, -shrapnel, gas and H.E. - -Often a series of shells, bursting on the newly laid causeway would -undo a day’s work in a few minutes. Half the time the men had to wear -gas-masks, and almost always they worked knee-deep in liquid mud or in -the oozy bed of some little “beke.” - -Yet in no instance did the 184th Tunnelling Company fail to carry out -the work allotted to it. - -One very ingenious piece of mechanism for use on the Tank itself had -been evolved at Central Workshops in view of the Flanders mud. This was -the “Unditching Beam.” It was a massive baulk of teak, iron shod at the -ends, and having heavy chains whereby it might be secured to the tracks -when it was needed. - -Its length was somewhat greater than the width of the Tank over its -tracks, and therefore ordinarily it was carried lengthwise along the -back of the machine. - -Its battle position was across the Tank, where it rested on the raised -guide-rails which served to lift it clear of the conning-tower, the -silencer and the other excrescences above the armoured back. - -To these guide-rails it was secured by special holdfasts to prevent -it from breaking adrift when the Tank pitched or rolled amongst the -shell-holes. - -When the Tank got “bellied,” these holdfasts had to be released and -the drag-chains attached to the tracks by one of the crew climbing out -on to the roof--the feat being one of some danger when in the near -presence of the enemy. - -The beam having been duly attached, the differential gear would be -locked and the clutch released, when the revolving tracks would carry -the beam over the nose of the Tank, from which it would dangle by its -two track-chains until dragged beneath the Tank itself. - -If the ground proved loose and boggy beyond a certain point, the beam -would merely be dragged under the Tank to come up again behind, clogged -and dripping with mud and leaving the “ditched” Tank still wallowing on -its belly. - -Sometimes Tanks would thrash away with their unditching beams until -their vain efforts to struggle out of some quaking quagmire on to -better ground overheated the engines or caused the machine to settle -down so hopelessly in the oozing mud as to be flooded out. - -Save on the very worst ground, however, the unditching beam proved a -most effective contrivance, and but little could have been done in the -Ypres fighting without it. - -[Illustration: A FLANDERS PILL-BOX] - -[Illustration: THE UNDITCHING BEAM IN ACTION] - -[Illustration: THE STEENBECK VALLEY BEFORE THE BATTLE] - -[Illustration: THE STEENBECK VALLEY AFTER BOMBARDMENT] - - -IV - -The Reconnaissance Side had also been busy during the weeks of -preparation. - -To facilitate the movement of Tanks over the battlefield a new system -was made use of, by which a list of compass bearings from well-defined -points to a number of features in the enemy’s territory was prepared, -thus enabling direction to be picked up. - -This system was to prove invaluable when, later, the tides of battle -had obliterated all the nearer landmarks, and men wandered hopelessly -lost in the increasing desolation. - -The Reconnaissance Officers’ methods of observation did not differ from -those they had employed at Arras. - -They used artillery O.P.’s, they flew over the enemy lines, a “supply -of prisoners” for special examination was allotted to them, they talked -to refugees, they observed, made and annotated maps, and drew many -panoramas, and made detailed raised maps in plasticine. - -By early July they had collected a great mass of information that was -not only vitally important to the Tank Corps, but also of great use to -the other arms. - -Very carefully constructed from information collected from all sources, -a huge sand model was laid out by the 19th Corps in Oosthoek Wood. -Every hillock or depression, every road, railway, trench, stream, ruin, -spinney, or other landmark, was faithfully reproduced to scale. The -miniature trenches were formed in lengths of cast concrete, the trees -were represented by little evergreen bushes, and real water lay in the -pools and shallows of the Lilliputian Steenbeek. - -The model covered nearly an acre--a man to the same scale would have -been about the size of a normal mouse. - -At one side of the model was a high wooden platform raised on a -scaffolding and reached by a ladder, and from this point of vantage -this Ypres Salient in little could be overlooked and memorised as from -a kite balloon. - -For several weeks before the day appointed for the battle, the platform -was almost constantly occupied by groups of officers. Indeed, it was -seldom unoccupied during daylight from the time it was erected to the -eve of the great attack, and round and across the model perpetually -wandered little groups of officers and N.C.O.’s with maps and notebooks -and orders--discussing, pointing, explaining. Generals personally -conducted their immediate subordinates over the mimic battlefield, -whilst N.C.O.’s were coached by their Company Commanders. - -From a liaison point of view the model was invaluable. Individual Tank -Commanders there met the infantry officers with whom they were actually -to fight, and would walk and talk over “the ground” together, until -they were perfectly clear about their own and each other’s rôles, -routes, objectives and time-tables, after which mutual esteem and -confidence would be cemented and reinforced at the dinner table. - -In this and similar ways a close and cordial _entente_ was established -between the Tanks and their partners the infantry, and there were many -battlefield incidents that showed vividly how much success depended on -this personal liaison and good fellowship. - - -V - -There was to be nothing novel in our general plan of assault. - - [34] “The 5th Army attack was to be carried out on well-recognised - lines; namely, a lengthy artillery preparation followed by an - infantry attack on a large scale and infantry exploitation until - resistance became severe, when the advance would be halted and - a further organised attack prepared on the same scale. This - methodical progression was to be continued until the exhaustion of - the German reserves and _moral_ created a situation which would - enable a complete break through to be effected.” - -Tanks were everywhere to be auxiliary, and were to be employed to deal -with strong points and for “mopping up” behind the infantry. - -There was, however, one great improvement in the method of using them. - -They were to be used in definite “waves.” That is to say, supposing -thirty-six Tanks were to be employed on a sector where the Germans had -established the usual three lines of defence, twelve Tanks would start -at zero and be used to take the first objective. Meanwhile, the second -wave would have been advancing, and as soon as the first objective had -been taken by the first wave, the second wave would pass through them -and on to the second objective. The third party of twelve would advance -in the same way--a wave to each objective. - -The method did not, as a matter of fact, have a good trial on this -occasion, for, in the first place, the Tanks’ first objective was only -the infantry second objective; and as we have seen, the enemy did not -this time employ his usual method of three set lines at all. - -Altogether three Brigades of Tanks were to be employed with the 5th -Army. - -Tank Brigade Commanders were to keep in touch with Corps Commanders, -Tank Battalions were to act with Divisions, Tank Companies (twelve -fighting Tanks) with Brigades, and individual Tanks with Battalions. - -The three Brigades were to be distributed as follows:-- - - A. _2nd Corps_ (consisting of the 24th, 30th, 18th, 8th and - 25th Divisions). - - _2nd Tank Brigade_ (“A” and “B” Battalions). - - 72 Tanks to be allotted as follows:-- - - 1st Objective 16 - 2nd ” 24 - 3rd ” 24 - The remainder to be held in reserve. - -The main objective was to be the Broodseinde Ridge. - -The ground in this area was broken by swamps and woods; only three -approaches were possible for Tanks, and these formed dangerous defiles. - - B. _19th Corps_ (consisting of the 15th, 55th, 16th and 36th - Divisions). - - _3rd Tank Brigade_ (“C” and “F” Battalions). - - 72 Tanks to be arranged as follows:-- - - 1st Objective 24 - 2nd ” 24 - Reserve 24 - -The main objective was to be a section of the Gheluvelt-Langemarck line. - -On the 19th Corps front the valley of the Steenbeek was in a terrible -condition, innumerable shell-holes and pools of water existed, the -drainage of the Steenbeek having been seriously affected by the -shelling. - - C. _18th Corps_ (consisting of the 39th, 51st, 11th and 48th - Divisions). - - _1st Tank Brigade_ (“D” and “G” Battalions). - - 36 Tanks to be allotted thus:-- - - 1st Objective 12 - 2nd ” 12 - Corps Reserve 12 - -They were to seize the crossings of the Steenbeek and establish posts -beyond it. - -On the 18th Corps front the ground between our front line and Steenbeek -was cut up and sodden. The Steenbeek itself was a difficult obstacle, -and the only good crossing was at St. Julien, thus forming a dangerous -defile. - -Thirty-six Tanks belonging to the 1st Brigade were held in Army Reserve. - -Such was the battle order of the Tanks. - -Zero was fixed for 3.30 a.m. on July 31. By the last week in July misty -weather with often a drizzle of rain at night had set in. - -Our preparations were complete, but it was perhaps not without -a certain anxiety that our commanders awaited the issues of the -engagement. - -By none might such an uneasiness have been felt with better reason than -by General Elles. - -The Army had staked much upon a gamble, but at least it had not been -forced to stake its prestige. General Elles must have been conscious -that the very existence of the Tank Corps might hang upon the fortunes -of the coming attack. - - - - -CHAPTER IX - -THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES - - “Quenched in a boggy Syrtis, neither sea - Nor good dry land--nigh foundered, on he fares, - Treading the crude consistence; half on foot.” - - _Paradise Lost._ - - -The night of July 30 was dark and wet, and towards morning a fine -mizzling rain blurred the outlines of the star shells that lit up the -lines. Along fifteen miles of front the English and German guns had -roared against each other all night. - -The waiting men shivered in their wet assembly trenches. - -About three o’clock on the morning of the 31st there was a lull in -the firing. A low soaking blanket of Scotch mist had crept up and lay -heavily enfolding the opposing armies. Zero hour was drawing near. All -along the front, men were feeling for the little footholds above the -fire-step. - -At 3.50 the streaming darkness was rent along the seven miles of -attack. Thermite and blazing oil flared out, and such a barrage as had -not yet been crashed upon the enemy’s line, and infantry and Tanks -scrambled and lurched in the darkness in and out of shell-holes over -the torn and slimy ground. - -The German front line fell at once along the whole seven miles. Until -nearly eight o’clock men and Tanks could hardly get through the mud -fast enough to come to grips with the enemy. On each Corps front there -were many machines that got ditched on the enemy front line as they -nosed about here and there, seeking to mop up lurking machine-gun nests -and snipers. - -There some of them remained stuck fast, not having seen the main body -of the enemy at all, so immediate had been his retreat. - -His artillery was, however, active enough, and as the Tanks floundered -or stuck utterly in the mud, his guns and his low-flying aeroplanes -took steady toll. - -All morning we pressed on, the enemy Command patiently conserving the -power of its armies. - -The doings of a group of Tanks belonging to the 3rd Brigade give -an extraordinarily good idea of this part of the action. They were -fighting on the 19th Corps front. - - [35]“At 11.30 a.m. message was received that a Battalion of Argyll - and Sutherland Highlanders were held up on the right. Tank ‘Canada’ - moved in this direction and silenced enemy machine-guns in the - Railway Embankment, assisted by the Tank ‘Cuidich’n Rich.’ When - patrolling in front of the infantry whilst they were consolidating, - Tank bellied. - - “At the same time enemy barrage came down, and both Tank ‘Canada’ - and Tank ‘Cuidich’n Rich’ received direct hits. Five of the - crew remained with the infantry, and assisted in repelling a - counter-attack, two of the men being wounded. - - “... Tank ‘Cape Colony’ arrived at Low Farm and proceeded in front - of the infantry. Came under heavy shell-fire and bellied. Whilst - unditching, Tanks ‘Cyprus’ and ‘Culloden’ were observed under heavy - fire from anti-Tank guns, which were in position on the high ground - beyond. Both ‘Cyprus’ and ‘Culloden’ were seen to be hit. - - “‘Cape Colony’ then came under heavy M.G. fire from both flanks. - On request of infantry ‘Cape Colony’ proceeded to a wood on right - flank, where they were held up. - - “Although not fired upon from the Tank, several enemy - machine-gunners surrendered to the infantry, on seeing the Tank - approach. ‘Cape Colony’ now turned N.E. towards Beck House, where a - good view of anti-Tank guns, which had been shelling ‘Cyprus’ and - ‘Culloden,’ was obtained. Whilst manœuvring to take these guns in - flank or rear, the Tank sank in a swamp, water rising to the engine - cover. Boche aeroplanes circled low overhead whilst unsuccessful - attempts were made to unditch. Enemy shelling then became very - heavy, so Lewis guns were taken out and Tank locked up. - - “... Flag Tank ‘Cumbrae’ was delayed half an hour by bellying in - a trench near Bill Cottage, went in front of the infantry towards - second objective. Opened fire on enemy who were disappearing in - direction of Delva Farm. Ground was quite water-logged, and Tank - bellied in a borrow pit. Whilst digging out was fired at by a - sniper, and by an aeroplane flying low overhead. Time was then zero - plus 9 hours (_i.e._, 12.50 p.m.). - - “... Tank ‘Caithness’ came under sniper and machine-gun fire near - Beck House. No bullets penetrated armour-plating. Proceeded in - company with Tank ‘Carstairs,’ which silenced enemy M.G. fire. - Cameron Highlanders then advanced, and Tank followed, bellied near - Zonnebeke Stream. Mud was up to floor level and door of sponson was - pushed off its hinges. Enemy aeroplane circled overhead, and fired - on them whilst attempting to unditch. Eventually Tank ‘Carstairs’ - came to the rescue, and Tank was got clear. - - “... Tank ‘Culloden’ had her unditching gear carried away by barbed - wire near Hill Cottage. Unditching beam was recovered, but again - broke lose, until secured with rope. Just west of Frost House - shell burst under front of Tank. Whilst crossing light railway - half-way between Frost House and Square Farm, a second shell hit - roof door and killed one gunner. Tank stopped, and it was found - petrol pressure pipe was cut. Time 9.15 a.m. A third shell struck - behind right sponson. Crew were withdrawn from Tank, and took up - a position in shell-holes near Square Farm. Tank was still being - shelled, undoubtedly by an anti-Tank gun, about ten shells being - fired at it in five minutes, six of which hit the Tank. - - “Tank ‘Cyprus’ was then seen to be hit by the same anti-Tank gun. - At 10.15 a.m. survivors of Tanks ‘Culloden’ and ‘Cyprus,’ together - with undamaged Lewis guns, withdrew to Battalion Rallying Point, - after pigeon messages had been despatched reporting the situation. - - “... Tank ‘Carstairs’ arrived at Black Line near Beck House, but - infantry had not then arrived. - - “Tank soon bellied in boggy ground, but was unditched successfully. - Just west of Borry Farm Tank ‘Caithness’ was found badly bellied, - and with unditching gear lost. - - “Having been informed by 6th Cameron Highlanders that the second - objective had been captured, Tank ‘Carstairs’ hitched on to Tank - ‘Caithness’ and towed it out. Enemy shell-fire was extremely heavy, - and an aeroplane flew over, firing at crew with machine-guns during - the operation. - - “Instructions were then received to return to Battalion Rallying - Point.” - -Another very gallant action was fought by a Tank crew also belonging to -this Battalion. - -They started the battle in a Tank named “Ca’ Canny” under command of -Lieutenant H. P. M. Jones, who was killed near Wilde Wood. The crew -carried on under command of Corporal Jenkins until about 11 p.m., when -the Tank “bellied” hopelessly. Corporal Jenkins withdrew his Lewis guns -and crew, and, placing some of them on the top of the Tank and some -on the ground, kept up an effective fire on the enemy, who were then -attempting a small counter-attack. - -He then transferred his men to another Tank, “Clyde,” whose crew -had all been wounded. They fought this Tank for a further two hours, -but at about three o’clock “Clyde,” too, stuck in the mud and proved -inextricable. He and his crew then returned on foot to their Battalion -Rallying Point. - -With the 18th Corps, the 1st Brigade Tanks were on several occasions -signalled for by fairly distant parties of infantry, who proceeded -to “set” them at strong points that were giving trouble. This system -worked extremely well, and had a particularly impressive moral effect -on the enemy. Several occasions are recorded on which enemy garrisons -did not wait for the Tank which had been thus “whistled up” to get near -enough to fire, but surrendered as soon as they saw it coming. - -Our advance had continued for about ten hours, that is, till nearly -three in the afternoon, when our enterprise seemed to have succeeded. - -As early as nine in the morning we held the whole of our second -objective north of Westhoek. - -By the afternoon we had entered St. Julien, Frezenberg and the Pommern -Redoubt, and had taken the crossings of the Steenbeek and Stirling -Castle. - -Glencorse Wood and Inverness Copse had proved more difficult, but even -here we held a footing on the ridge. - -We had “riven the oak,” we were now to feel the force of the rebound. - -That afternoon in a downpour of rain the enemy counter-attacked along -the fronts of all three Corps. There was a fierce struggle, in which in -many instances Tanks were able to do a good deal of execution. - -We were shelled out of St. Julien. North of it we withdrew to the line -of the Steenbeek, and we were obliged to fall back from all but the -western outskirts of Westhoek. - -All afternoon we slowly lost ground, yet when night fell we could still -boast a battle well begun. It was, after all, never meant to be a -one-day attack, and to-morrow we should start well. We had everywhere -taken and held our first objective, that is, the low muddy ridge from -which the enemy had so closely threatened the original Ypres arena. - -The second flat valley and the higher ridge from Passchendaele to -Staden now lay before us. - -At least we were in a good position for to-morrow’s attack. Mr. Buchan -thus in effect analyses our gains: - -Along two-thirds of our line of attack we held our first objectives. On -half of the remaining third we had only fallen just short of our final -objective. On the remaining sixth we had even slightly exceeded our -final objective. We had besides taken 6000 prisoners and a quantity of -machine-guns. - - -II - -All that night the enemy counter-attacked us doggedly, resolved upon -driving us down again. All night we fought to keep what we had won, and -prepared the redoubled blow that we meant to deliver next day. - -That blow was destined never to be struck. The wind that brought the -rain blew out our hopes of victory. - - [36] “The weather had been threatening throughout the [first] day, - and had rendered the work of our aeroplanes very difficult from the - commencement of the battle. During the afternoon, while fighting - was still in progress, rain began, and fell steadily all night. - - “Thereafter, for four days, the rain continued without - cessation.... The low-lying, clayey soil, torn by shells and sodden - with rain, turned to a succession of vast muddy pools. The valleys - of the choked and overflowing streams were speedily transformed - into long stretches of bog, impassable except by a few well-defined - tracks, which became marks for the enemy’s artillery. To leave - these tracks was to risk death by drowning, and in the course of - the subsequent fighting on several occasions both men and pack - animals were lost in this way. In these conditions operations - of any magnitude became impossible, and the resumption of our - offensive was necessarily postponed until a period of fine weather - should allow the ground to recover. As had been the case in the - Arras battle, this unavoidable delay in the development of our - offensive was of the greatest service to the enemy. Valuable time - was lost, the troops opposed to us were able to recover from the - disorganisation produced by our first attack, and the enemy was - given the opportunity to bring up reinforcements.” - -It was nearly a fortnight before the 5th Army could again attack. - -The disappointment of the Higher Command was acute; acute, too, were -the physical and mental miseries suffered during that fortnight by the -Tank Corps and all the other arms engaged. - -Their magnificent efforts, their sacrifices, were of no avail. There -they lay day after day, drenched by the inexorable rain, those in the -forward area half choked in the rising streams of liquid mud. - -It was in no sunny frame of mind that the 5th Army Headquarters Staff -read the verdict of the three Corps upon the day’s work done by the -Tanks. - -The three Summaries were agreed that the courage and perseverance shown -by Tank personnel had been admirable. - -[Illustration: A DEADLY SWAMP (THE WRECKS OF SIX TANKS MAY BE COUNTED)] - -[Illustration: “CLAPHAM JUNCTION” NEAR SANCTUARY WOOD] - -[Illustration: “THE SALIENT”] - -One Corps, however, had given way thoroughly to the spirit of the -time. They practically reported that Tanks had been of no use to -any one, and moreover that they were never likely to be. With the -30th Division they had been unable to deal with certain machine-gun -emplacement; with the 24th they had been late, they always drew enemy -shell-fire; and with the 8th Division one Tank had even lost direction -and been reported as firing on our own men. - -Another Corps had found Tanks helpful, and said all they could for them. - -Tanks had greatly assisted the Gordons and Black Watch at Frezenberg, -they had dealt effectively with concrete dug-outs; with the 55th -Division they had broken the wave of an enemy counter-attack at -Winnipeg, and everywhere their moral effect on the enemy had been of -great assistance. Twenty-four Tanks had been put out of action by bad -going or shell-fire. - -A third Corps with fewer machines had in many cases reached their -objective without being held up. The Tanks had in these cases merely -followed the infantry, but they reported that without Tanks the capture -of the strongly wired position of Alberta would have cost the 39th -Division dear, and that on the Steenbeek near Ferdinand Farm the enemy, -who had bolted at the mere sight of a Tank, had been “dealt with” at -ease with a machine-gun by infantry of the 51st Division. - -Upon these Summaries and upon later failures the Commander of the 5th -Army was subsequently to base a generally unfavourable report upon -Tanks. - -The report may be condensed into a simple syllogism:-- - - 1. Tanks were unable to negotiate bad ground. - - 2. The ground on a battlefield will always be bad. - - 3. Therefore Tanks are no good on a battlefield. - -He added to this, that being no longer a surprise to the enemy, he -considered that Tanks had lost their moral effect, and had no value -used in masses. - -This report was not officially presented for some weeks, but the Higher -Tank Command must early have perceived the drift of affairs. The events -of the first day and the manner in which those events were interpreted -gave only too much data to the prophetic spirit. The junior Tank -personnel knew little of what was going on. Like Burns’s mouse, they -were only touched by the present, the throwing away of what had cost -them so many weeks of toil. To the Higher Tank Command was reserved -Burns’s own fate: - - “But, och! I backward cast my ee - On prospects drear! - And forward, tho’ I canna see, - I guess and fear.” - -What would be the results of the initial ill-success of the battle, -and of the further Tank failures which seemed only too probable when -an advance which had begun so ill was continued, after perhaps two or -three inches more rain? - -How were the final arbiters, G.H.Q. and the War Cabinet, going -to regard such failures? Tanks had been employed under grotesque -conditions, and after all, they had failed in common with every other -arm. Were the events of the next few weeks to be disastrous enough to -consign them irrevocably to Bottomless Perdition? - -At best their hopes of expansion would most probably be nipped. Their -establishment would be reduced, and Tanks would be used in _petits -paquets_ again, by ones and twos as they had been in the past, because, -once more, there would never be enough machines for an effective -action. - -As the days wore on, and the rain continued (at the rate often of an -inch a day), one of these alternative fates seemed inevitable. - -The gloomy surmises of the Tank Headquarters Staff were only too well -founded. The authorities were in fact suffering from one of the worst -cold fits which the pilots of the Tank Corps at home and abroad ever -endured. - -Tank Corps Headquarters heard it all. They knew well enough that in -well-informed but irresponsible London circles the remark, “I hear the -Tanks are going to be abolished,” was a common one; that often in such -gossip circumstances of person and date would be added. - -For all this they had no certain refutation. If only Tanks could -even now do something that would catch the eye of authority. Some -little “show” exploit. Something that would at least make a summary -condemnation unlikely. The battle would have to be continued some -day. Tanks would have to play their part, but in that intolerable -swamp was it likely that they would do anything except engulf -themselves--literally and metaphorically--yet deeper than before? - -There, however, lay the Tanks’ best hope. Chance and their own -exertions might bring them a success even in Flanders. - - -III - -Thirty-six Tanks belonging to the 1st Brigade had remained in Army -Reserve. On August 16, the weather having been less wet for a day or -two, the first and most considerable of a series of renewed attacks was -to be made. - -Twelve Tanks were to co-operate with the infantry on the Langemarck-St. -Julien front. - -On the night of the 13th the Tanks began to move up. The roads were -already congested with other traffic, and the Tanks were not to be -allowed to make use of them. - - [37]“The country they had to traverse was all very deep in mud, - and the Tanks wallowed on their bellies in ground too soft for the - tracks to hold. The approach was continued during the following - night, but in spite of the repeated use of unditching beams, - the mutual help of Tanks in towing each other, and the valuable - assistance of a Tunnelling Company, it was recognised on the 15th - that none but the four leading Tanks could hope to reach the line - in time to take part in the battle. These four made strenuous - efforts to complete the journey the next night, but without - success. None of them could overcome the difficulties of the - ground, and the infantry had to go into attack without them.” - -The infantry attacked, and after the action a nest of pill-box -strongholds north-east of St. Julien still remained untaken. - -Like most of these little fortresses, they had been extremely skilfully -placed. An unwary advance would be trapped in their wire just within -convenient range of their machine-guns. - -They were so small, scattered, and well concealed as to be almost -impossible targets for heavy guns, and as they were built of reinforced -concrete at least three feet thick, the ordinary high-explosive shell -thrown by a field gun had no effect upon them. - -This particular nest consisted of four pill-boxes of more than average -size. - -Three of them were hidden in the ruins of farmsteads. That in the -Mont du Hibou was manned by a garrison of about eighty men, and the -Cockcroft was still more strongly held. Triangle Farm and Hillock Farm -were slightly smaller. It was essential that they should be taken, and -General Sir Ivor Maxse, commanding the 18th Corps, was informed by the -Brigadiers concerned that their capture would probably cost us 600 to -1000 casualties. He and Colonel Baker-Carr (commanding 1st Brigade of -Tanks) then considered the possibility of a Tank attack. - -Colonel Baker-Carr, admirably undismayed by the dismal events of the -16th, optimistically guaranteed the fortresses at half the estimated -cost to the infantry, and the attack was arranged. One innovation he -specially asked for. There was to be no shelling, but he was to be -granted the concealment of a smoke barrage. Having once decided to -entrust the affair to the Tanks, General Maxse was zealous to give them -every possible chance of success and did not hesitate to modify his -orders to suit their considered demands. Only twelve Tanks were to be -employed, and they and their infantry were to use the roads for as far -as these served them. Colonel Baker-Carr decided to form a composite -Company from “G” (7th) Battalion under the command of Major Broome. - -The resulting action, small as were the numbers engaged, will ever find -a place in the annals of the Tank Corps. - - [38]“In spite of the appalling condition of the ground, for it had - now been raining steadily for three weeks, a very memorable feat of - arms was achieved.” - -The four strong points were triumphantly captured. - - [39]“Phenomenal results were obtained at very little cost, for - instead of 600 to 1000 casualties, the infantry following the Tanks - only sustained fifteen!” - -At 4.45 a.m. on the morning of August 19, the artillery isolated the -doomed strongholds in clouds of dense smoke. - -The action had been carefully rehearsed. Two Tanks were to be used -against each pill-box, and they were to take them in rear, so striking -where the forts were most vulnerable, and at the same time cutting off -the garrison’s retreat. - -Just before six o’clock the enveloping manœuvre was complete, and the -first pill-box--Hillock Farm--fell, nearly all its garrison having fled. - -At 6.15 two Tanks reached the Mont du Hibou, and fired forty rounds -from their 6-pounder guns into the back door of the stronghold. Sixty -of the garrison fled, of whom about half escaped or were shot down, and -the rest surrendered to the infantry as soon as it came up. - -Triangle Farm fell ten minutes afterwards. The garrison had put up a -fight against the Tanks and our infantry killed them all, mostly with -the bayonet. - -At the Cockcroft the attacking Tank[40] got ditched within fifty yards -of its victim. But at sight of it the garrison of over 100 “withdrew.” -The Tank and its infantry immediately opened fire with their Lewis -guns, and more than half the fugitives fell. - - [41]“Our infantry then consolidated the Cockcroft. This completed - the capture of all objectives. - - “The Tanks waited till consolidation was well forward before - returning. - - “_Casualties_--Infantry: no killed, 15 wounded. - - “Tank Personnel--Killed: Officers, none; other Ranks, 2. Wounded: - Officers, 2; other Ranks, 10.” - -In one of the strong points we found a German officer who had been -hanged by his men. - -The St. Julien attack, as it was afterwards called, proved a sufficient -counterblast to the 5th Army report. - -The friends of the Tank Corps made the most of it. It was a brilliant -little exploit, and once brought to notice, the casualty figures -pleaded too loudly to be ignored. - -It is probably no exaggeration to say that it was in some measure to -the Tanks which won the little Battle of St. Julien that the Tank Corps -owed the opportunity of winning the Battle of Cambrai. - - -IV - -From August 22 till October 9, by which time hope of British success -at Ypres had been more or less abandoned, the Tanks fought in about -a dozen minor actions. They made almost as many more unavailing -attempts to fight. Like the rest of the Army, they spent much vain -labour and knew the weariness of much frustrated effort. They made -elaborate and toilsome movements in preparation for attacks which were -never launched. They struggled night after night to get up to some -battle which eventually had to take place without them. Tanks had now -invariably to move upon the roads, as the ground between had finally -and definitely been reduced to impassable swamp. The roads naturally -formed standing targets for the German gunners. We lost heavily in men -and machines. General Elles had originally estimated that one machine -in two would get into effective action. Now, in view of the appalling -ground conditions, he revised this, only reckoning on one machine in -ten getting into effective contact with the enemy. This modest estimate -was as a matter of fact seldom exceeded. - -Whenever Tanks did get into action, however, they usually did well, -though rarely decisively, in spite of the standard of extraordinary -courage which was steadfastly maintained by the crews. - -The briefest review of most of these depressing little engagements -is all that need be given. They were remarkable for nothing except -the heroic patience shown day after day by every arm of our attacking -forces. - -On August 22 a minor attack was launched by all three Corps. Small -parties of Tanks fought with each. - -With the _2nd Corps_ in Glencorse Wood four Tanks of the 2nd Brigade -were of some service, and did considerable execution. - -With the _19th Corps_ eighteen Tanks of the 3rd Brigade were used -on the off-chance of their being able to reach the objectives. -The going was more than ordinarily atrocious, the whole of the -Frezenberg-Zonnebeke road having been shot away. One Tank fought a very -remarkable action, engaging the enemy near “Gallipoli” for sixty-eight -hours. - -With the _18th Corps_ twelve Tanks of the 1st Brigade headed an attack -on Bülow Farm, Vancouver, Winnipeg, and other strong points. They -proved useful, and several Tanks were in action for longish periods. - -Two things are remarkable about this operation: first, that every Tank -which ventured to leave the road instantly bellied. One was “drowned” -in six or seven feet of water. - -Secondly, the remarkable way in which they affected enemy _moral_. In -several instances parties of the enemy surrendered at the sight of -them. Prisoners in their examination said that they could have held up -infantry, but “felt helpless against Tanks.” - -Next day, on August 23, four 2nd Brigade Tanks went into action near -Inverness Copse. The operation had had to be undertaken in a hurry, -liaison was bad, and the attack a failure. - -On August 26 four Tanks fought with the 33rd Division in the -neighbourhood of Jerk House (near Glencorse Wood). The morning was -misty, and an enemy shell unfortunately exploded a dump of smoke bombs -just behind our lines. The attack was a failure. That night an inch of -rain fell, and four Tanks which were to have operated with the 14th -Division next day, August 27th, never reached their starting-point. -Thirteen men were wounded and an officer killed on the way up. - -Nearly three weeks elapsed before Tanks were again in action, and -several battalions from the 2nd and 3rd Brigades were moved back to a -new training area near Arras. A certain number of “Replacement Tanks” -were issued to remaining battalions. The 1st Brigade stood ready in -case they should be wanted at short notice, but no attacks of any -sort were launched, probably partly on account of weather, and partly -because a section of the 5th Army front was in process of transfer to -the 2nd Army. - -By the middle of September the relief had been completed, and again we -endeavoured to press on. - -On September 20 a fairly successful assault was made along the whole -line. 2nd Brigade Tanks took part near Inverness Copse, and 1st Brigade -Tanks near Triangle and Wurst Farms. But the ground being known to be -unusually appalling in both areas, they had been given minor parts. -These parts they played with fair success, and they undoubtedly scared -the enemy a good deal. On the 18th Corps front 3rd Battalion Tanks had -rather better luck. - -The efforts made by the crews to get to the battle at all were -superhuman. - -Trees had been felled across the road by the enemy, resting breast -high on their branches and the tall stumps from which they were not -completely severed. At Wurst Farm also this kind of obstacle had been -opposed to the Tanks--the butts of the trees lying obliquely and at a -slope, forming a barrier very difficult to surmount. - -If one leading machine got into difficulties struggling in the dark -through or over these obstacles, the whole string of Tanks behind would -be hung up, the deep swamps on either hand making it impossible to -leave the road. - -The Tanks, however, arrived, and are reported to have “inflicted many -casualties.” - -On September 26 fifteen Tanks operated near Zonnebeke Village. The -attack was not a success, though the Tanks did a great deal of good -work. - -On October 4 took place the last two actions of this battle in which -Tanks succeeded in playing a part. The first was fought by twelve Tanks -of the 1st Brigade, who had the honour of taking part in the capture of -Poelcapelle. It was a most successful little attack, and after reducing -three strong points which guarded the outskirts, the Tanks hunted -through the main street and out beyond the village. - -In the other action four Tanks of the 1st Battalion were to take part -in an attack upon Juniper Cottage on the line of the Reutelbeek. - -Not only was this, like the other, a successful little action, it was -ennobled by affording the background to one of the most patiently -courageous actions of the War. - -It was on October 4 that Captain Robertson fell upon completing a -service for which he was posthumously awarded the V.C. - -Tanks and infantry were to endeavour to cross the Reutelbeek and drive -the enemy from the positions which they held on the further bank. - -There was only one bridge over the marshy stream. If, in the half-light -of the early morning and in the confusion of battle, they missed this -crossing-place, their one chance of success was gone. - -Captain Robertson, the officer commanding the section of Tanks, -early realised that here lay the crux of the little operation for -whose success he was responsible. For three days and nights he and -his servant, Private Allen (subsequently awarded the D.C.M.), went -carefully backwards and forwards over the ground under heavy fire, -taping the routes for the Tanks. - -Working without a break, this task took him until half-past nine on the -night before the action. - -It was time to get the machines up. - -He started out at once again with his Tanks. The weather was dark and -misty, and from inside a Tank it was impossible to see the way over the -heavily shelled ground. Captain Robertson therefore walked ahead; they -reached the assembly point in good time, and at 6 a.m. on October 4 he -led them into action. - -In imagining the rest of the story we are to remember that Captain -Robertson had already been continuously under fire and without sleep -for three days and nights. - -The roads and every other landmark had all been wiped out by the -shelling, but the bridge still stood. Captain Robertson still led -his Tanks on foot, facing besides the shells an intense close-range -machine-gun and rifle fire. He must have known that to go forward on -foot means certain death. - -He and his convoy were by now well ahead of the infantry. Still he led -his Tanks on, carefully and patiently guiding them at a foot’s pace -towards their objective. - -They reached the bridge, and one by one the Tanks crossed over. He led -them on towards a road that would take them straight up to the enemy -positions, the machine-gun fire growing more and more intense as they -advanced. - -They reached the road, and as they reached it, Captain Robertson at -last fell, shot through the head. - -But the Tanks went on, and succeeded in their mission. The object for -which Captain Robertson had so deliberately sacrificed his life was -achieved. - -The 2nd and 3rd Brigades had by now gone back to Arras to refit their -machines, and to replenish their ranks. The 1st Brigade, however, made -two more efforts to take part in the fighting. The battle was by now -recognised as a serious British check. The Germans’ “elastic tactics” -and the weather had together delayed us for so long that they had -defeated us. - -We had inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, and had in the act suffered -still more severely ourselves. - -Our hopes of clearing the coast were gone. - -At the end of ten weeks we had achieved gains which had been on the -programme for the first fortnight. - -The whole plan of campaign had to be reconsidered, and to take -Passchendaele must now be our ultimate ambition. - -On October 7 two Tanks were to operate ahead of their infantry and -endeavour to capture two fortified farms. Halfway to their objective a -derelict Tank blocked the way, and the two advancing machines became -ditched on trying to make a détour. By the time they had been unditched -it was too late to go on. - -On the 9th eight Tanks were to have attacked strong points on the -Poelcapelle Road. At midnight on the night of the 8th-9th they started -for their objectives. - -The road was everywhere encumbered with blown-up limbers and the bodies -of dead teams. - -Large shell-holes had been blown in it. - -The Tanks managed to get on as far as the Poelcapelle cross-roads, -but the enemy then began to shell the road heavily. The leading Tank -ditched in a new shell-hole, the second Tank as it waited to pass was -set on fire by a direct hit. - -These two wrecks formed a complete barrier to the advance of the rest -of the column. - -No way being found by which the surviving Tanks could circumvent the -obstacle, and the shelling having grown hotter, it was decided to -return. - -But they had not gone far on the return journey when they discovered -that on the way up the last machine of the column had somehow fouled -an old derelict Tank. The remaining machines were trapped, and could -neither go forward nor back. - -The efforts of their crews proved vain, and they were all five lost, -some being hit by enemy shells and the crews killed or wounded, and -some ditched in vain efforts to make their escape across country. - -The enemy continued to shell the road, which was one we were obliged to -use, and it was a work of extreme hazard and difficulty to clear it of -the wrecks by which it was completely blocked. - -The work was, however, performed. Every night for a week Major G. L. -Wilkes,[42] the 1st Brigade Engineer, used to go up the road as far as -he could in a Tank. Then he would get out and work till morning. Most -of the wrecks he blew up, some he and his small party of men were able -to tip over into the swamp. - -The scene on the first of these expeditions is thus described by an -engineer officer who accompanied him: - - “I left St. Julien in the dark, having been informed that our guns - were not going to fire. I waded up the road, which was swimming - in a foot or two of slush; frequently I would stumble into a - shell-hole hidden by the mud. The road was a complete shambles and - strewn with débris, broken vehicles, dead and dying horses and - men; I must have passed hundreds of them as well as bits of men - and animals littered everywhere. As I neared Poelcapelle our guns - started to fire; at once the Germans replied, pouring shells on and - around the road; the flashes of the bursting shells were all round - me. I cannot describe what it felt like; the nearest approach to - a picture I can give is that it was like standing in the centre - of the flame of a gigantic Primus stove. As I neared the derelict - Tanks, the scene became truly appalling: wounded men lay drowned - in the mud, others were stumbling and falling through exhaustion, - others crawled and rested themselves up against the dead to raise - themselves a little above the mud. On reaching the Tanks I found - them surrounded by the dead and dying; men had crawled to them for - what shelter they would afford. The nearest Tank was a Female. Her - left sponson doors were open. Out of these protruded four pairs of - legs; exhausted and wounded men had sought refuge in this machine - and dead and dying lay in a jumbled heap inside.” - -So ended the tragedy of October 9, the last of a series of hopeless -adventures. - -A few Tanks were later moved up to a new railhead, with the hope that -better weather might enable them to take part in the final attack on -Passchendaele, the attack which was to end the Flanders offensive. But -the weather did not mend, and it was without the help of Tanks that -by a final effort the heights of Passchendaele were stormed and taken -in the first week of November. We held our gains. The high ground was -ours, the weary armies might rest, and the tragic nightmare of the -Third Battle of Ypres was over at last. - -When time brought the verdict of the Official Despatch upon the work of -the Tanks, it was neither an unjust nor an unkindly one:-- - - [43]“Although throughout the major part of the Ypres battle, - and especially in its later stages, the condition of the ground - made the use of Tanks difficult or impossible, yet whenever - circumstances were in any way favourable, and even when they were - not, very gallant and valuable work has been accomplished by Tank - Commanders and crews on a great number of occasions. Long before - the conclusion of the Flanders offensive these new instruments had - proved their worth, and amply justified the labour, material and - personnel diverted to their construction and development.” - -It was not to be long before the Corps had an opportunity of proving -their worth indeed. - - - - -CHAPTER X - -THE FIRST BATTLE OF CAMBRAI - - “On they move - Indissolubly firm; nor obvious hill - Nor straightening vale, nor wood nor stream divides - Their perfect ranks.” - - _Paradise Lost._ - - -PART I - - -I - -All through the later part of the Ypres struggle the Tank Corps had -turned their eyes towards certain other parts of the line with a -longing as for The Delectable Mountains. - -They imagined places in dry rolling chalk country where a Tank could -travel on the surface of the ground. They dreamed of battles in which -the artillery had neither given the enemy weeks of warning nor helped -him to reduce the ground to a swamp or the likeness of an ash heap. - -A starving man does not picture every circumstance of a meal, a -drowning man the sensations of warmth and solidity, more vividly than -did the Tank Corps call up their dream battle. - -General Elles and his Staff had several places in mind in which such a -battle might be fought. Perhaps they dwelt most affectionately on the -thoughts of some sector of the Hindenburg line, some high rolling chalk -plateau anywhere south of Arras. - -Several such delightful spots lay in the domain of General Sir Julian -Byng’s 3rd Army. Perhaps he had some sort of operation in view -already! In September General Elles hopefully paid him a visit as he -lay at Albert. They conferred. - -The Army Commander had, indeed, an idea of attacking. - -More, he had already independently worked out the place, and many of -the details, of just such an attack as the Tank Corps had been sighing -for. - -Together the two Generals worked at the scheme and a draft plan was -forwarded to G.H.Q. - -G.H.Q., however, could not allow the attack for the present. The Ypres -affair must first be thrashed out, but when that was ended, say by -early November, then such an attack would have their blessing. - -Meanwhile the two conspirators waited eagerly, all the while working -out and perfecting their plans. - -At last, on October 20, the scheme was finally sanctioned, and Z day -was fixed for November 20. Still only four members of the Tank Corps -Staff knew of the project, and these four immediately stole off to our -lines near Havrincourt to make a preliminary survey of the new site. - - -II - -The First Battle of Cambrai was to be a single-minded battle. It was -to fulfil in the simplest way the prime function of war, that is, to -destroy the forces of the enemy. - -To attain this end it was to rely upon surprise, audacity, and rapidity -of movement. - -Its main action was to be completed in about twenty-four hours, during -which time it was proposed to penetrate the Hindenburg Line, which -here consisted of four systems of trenches. Territorial gains were -not to be so much considered as were the destruction and capture of -enemy personnel and material. In other words, we were out to kill and -chivvy Germans. The system of attack was to be one completely new for a -full-dress battle. There was to be no artillery preparation whatever. -To all appearance the front line was to be perfectly normal up to the -very moment of attack, when two Army Corps and three Brigades of Tanks -were suddenly to hurl their whole weight against the enemy. - -Such tactics demanded that the most complete secrecy should be -maintained up to zero hour itself, and for the second time in the -history of the Tanks a vital secret was successfully kept. - -The area to be raided lay just south of Cambrai. It was an open rolling -chalk plateau, which had lain uncultivated for two years, and was now -covered with a thin growth of wan grey grass. - -From north-west to south-east the low ridges ran, save where the -dominating hump of Bourlon’s wood-crowned Hill ran across the grain of -the country. - -On either flank of this area, sometimes at right angles to the curve -of our lines, sometimes running parallel to the German lines, ran the -Canal du Nord and the Canal de l’Escaut. - -The slopes were nowhere very steep, but the levels were everywhere -varied by spurs and--so-called--“ravines.” One of these, which lay -just within the German lines, and parallel to our front, for some time -gave grave concern both to the Tanks and to other arms, who apparently -coupled it in their minds with the Grand Cañon of Colorado. Its name -sounded so formidable, and it was marked so large on the map! It might -well prove a serious obstacle to the progress of Tanks. A series of -exhaustive reconnaissances carried out by the Tank Corps, however, -dispelled this alarming legend and the “Grand Ravine” stood revealed as -being no more than a shallow dry field ditch which could be jumped by -any rabbit of reasonable activity. - -The German defences, the famous Hindenburg Line, lay wide and strong -across the spurs. The main line of resistance had been everywhere well -placed on the reverse slopes of the main ridges, and was invisible from -our lines. Only from the air and from rare posts of vantage could we -see a length of it. There were three lines of trenches, each trench -anything up to 15 ft. wide, with an outpost line thrown forward to -screen these main defences. In front of the main line lay band upon -band and acre upon acre of dense wire; nowhere was it less than 50 -yards deep, and here and there it jutted out in great salients flanked -by batteries of machine-guns. Never had we before been faced with such -a wilderness of wire. - -It was calculated that to cut it with artillery would have taken five -weeks and cost twenty millions of money. - -Not only was the actual “ditch” of the trench believed to be in most -places some 12 ft. wide and 18 ft. deep, but at either side, the -parados and parapet (each about 2 ft. 6 in. high) were, we had reason -to believe, so sloped as to increase the effective width to about 16 to -18 ft. - -These were the dimensions of some trenches captured by us at Arras, and -for such trenches we had to be prepared. - -The space to be cleared was too wide for a Tank. A special means of -crossing was, however, devised by the Staff of the Central Workshops at -Erin. - -This was a special huge fascine made of about seventy-five ordinary -bundles of brushwood, strongly compressed and bound by heavy chains. - -It was carried on the nose of the machine, and could be released by a -touch from inside the Tank by a specially ingenious releasing gear, and -dropped neatly into the trench. - -The manufacture of the 350 fascines and the fitting of the Tanks with -the releasing gear was a piece of work of which the Central Workshops -have reason to be proud. They received the order for 350 fascines and -110 Tank sledges on October 24, when they had already for some months -been working at high pressure, chiefly upon Tanks salved from the -Salient. - -To fulfil the new order the shops worked day and night for three weeks. - -To make the fascines, 21,000 ordinary stout bundles of brushwood, such -as are used for road repairing, were unloaded at the Central Workshops. - -Here eighteen Tanks had been specially fitted up, for binding and -fastening these into bundles of sixty or seventy. - -The Tanks acted in pairs, pulling in opposite directions at steel -chains which had been previously wound round and round the bundles. - -So great was the pressure thus exerted that, months afterwards, an -infantryman in search of firewood, who found one of these fascines -and gaily filed through its binding chain, was killed by the sudden -springing open of the bundle. - -When they were ready, each bundle weighed a ton and a half, and it -took twenty of the Chinese coolies employed at the Central Workshops -to roll one of them through the mud. On one occasion 144 fascines had -to be loaded on to trucks within twenty-four hours. Concurrently with -the fascines the Central Workshops achieved the making of the 110 Tank -sledges. The whole of the timber needed for this work had to be sawn -out of logs. Besides this they repaired and issued 127 Tanks. - - -III - -Each Tank could only carry one fascine, and once it had dropped it into -a trench had no means of picking it up again. There were, however, -three broad trenches to be crossed. - -This circumstance had to be taken into account in the general scheme of -attack. Every detail of this plan had been most ably worked out either -by Lieut-Colonel Fuller himself (G.S.O.I. to the Tank Corps), or by -the Staff whom he inspired. Every movement and formation which we are -going to describe had been reduced to an exact drill, several special -exercises being evolved for the occasion. One of them, a simple platoon -drill for the infantry, was, we are told by an official historian, -based upon a drill described by Xenophon in the _Cyropædia_, and -attributed by him to Cyrus of Persia (_circa_ 500 B.C.). - -Very briefly the main plan was as follows:-- - -The whole line of attack was divided into areas for three Tanks who -formed a section and worked together. - -Of these one was an “Advance Guard Tank,” and the other two were -“Infantry Tanks.” - -The advance guard Tank was to go straight forward through the enemy’s -wire, and, turning to the left without crossing it, to shoot along the -fire trench which lay in front of it. - -Its object was to keep down the enemy and protect the two infantry -Tanks. These the while both made for one selected spot in the trench; -the left-hand one cast in its fascine, crossed the trench on it, turned -to the left and worked down the fire trench; the right-hand Tank -crossed the fire trench on the first Tank’s fascine, and made for the -second trench, dropped in its fascine, and crossing, worked down this -second trench. Meanwhile the advance guard Tank had swung round and -crossed over the first and second trenches on the fascines of the two -infantry Tanks, and it therefore moved forward with its own fascine -still in position for the third line. - -The infantry were also divided into three forces and worked in single -file. The first force were “Trench Clearers.” They worked with the -Tanks, and helped to clear up trenches and dug-outs. They carried small -red flags with which they marked the paths which the Tanks had made -through the wire. The second were the “Trench Stops,” who, as it were, -played the net over the rabbit hole to the Tank’s ferret. The third -force were the “Trench Garrisons,” who took over the trenches as they -were captured. - -One feature of the combined Tank and infantry training for this battle -was particularly interesting. - -They had not very long to work together, yet it was essential that the -infantry should have confidence in the trench-spanning and wire-cutting -power of the Tanks. - -Infantry units were therefore invited by the Tank Corps to build their -own defences and entanglements, the Tanks guaranteeing to cross the -trenches and chew up the wire of their best efforts. - -Some very formidable and ingenious defences were made. - -The Tanks, however, everywhere carried out their guarantee, to the -great edification of the infantry. - -The following table gives briefly the allocation of Tanks and infantry -to the various objectives: - - ALLOCATION OF FIGHTING TANKS - - _1st Brigade Battalions._ _Tanks (No.)_ _3rd Corps Divisions._ - D (4) 42 On Right: 51st. - E (5) 42 51st and 62nd. - G (7) 42 On Left: 62nd. - - _Objectives_: Havrincourt, Flesquières. - - Of each battalion: thirty-six Tanks for 1st, 12 (plus survivors) - for 2nd Objective. - - _Exploitation towards_ Fontaine, Bourlon Wood, the Bapaume-Cambrai - Road, Bourlon Village and Graincourt. Bridges over Canal du Nord. - - _2nd Brigade Battalions._ _Tanks (No.)_ _4th Corps Divisions._ - B (2) 42 on Right. 6th. - H (8) 42 on Left. 6th. - - _Objectives_: Beaucamp, Villers, Plouich Road. - - _Exploitation towards_ Marcoing, Preny Chapel, and Nine Wood. - - _3rd Brigade Battalions._ _Tanks (No.)_ _4th Corps Divisions._ - C (3) 42 12th. - F (6) 42 ” - I (9) 42 20th. - A[44] (1) 42 ” - - _Objective_: La Vacquerie. - - _Exploitation towards_ Crèvecœur, Masnières, and Marcoing. - -The part to be played by the artillery was carefully worked out. There -was to be no preliminary bombardment, but as soon as the attack was -launched the heavy guns were to begin counter-battery work and were to -shrapnel the bridges along the Canal. - -At the same time a jumping barrage of smoke shells and H.E. was to -cover the advance of the Tanks and infantry. - -The secrecy of the attack made it impossible for any registering shots -to be fired, and the ranges could be worked out in theory only. - -Several squadrons of the R.A.F. were to co-operate, flying low; their -especial work being to bomb enemy Headquarters. - -The cavalry were also billed to co-operate. - -Special wire-pulling Tanks fitted with grapnels were employed to clear -convenient broad lanes through the wire for them, and their needs were -throughout carefully considered. - -For one reason and another, however, the cavalry did not, after all, -find it possible to take much part in the fighting. - -The preparations for the battle were of the thorough and laborious kind -always requisite for a “full-dress” attack. - -An immense amount of railway movement was necessary in order to bring -up the three Tank Brigades, whose component parts were a good deal -scattered. Thirty-six trainloads of twelve Tanks each had to be dealt -with, and their stores besides. - -For the sake of secrecy all this movement was done after dark. There -were only two minor accidents, otherwise the whole scheme was worked -out exactly to programme. - -The usual huge dumps of petrol and grease and special stores had to be -formed. Most of them were made in neighbouring woods, where the Tanks -also lay up. Havrincourt Wood and Desert Wood were, for instance, used -for main dumps, and as lying-up places for the 1st and 2nd Brigades, -for in these woods the hornbeam undergrowth had not yet shed its leaves -and the Tanks and their stores could lie in perfect secrecy. - -For the 3rd Brigade, however, there was no wood conveniently near, and -the Tanks lay out in a village with camouflage clothes thrown over -them, painted to represent bricks and tiles. - -For the forward dumps splendid work was done by the 3rd Army’s light -railways, who handled astonishing masses of stores; for example, -165,000 gallons of petrol, 541,000 rounds of 6-pounder ammunition, and -5,000,000 rounds of S.A.A. - -Beyond the light railways the Tank fills were transported by supply -Tanks. - -All these preparations had to be carried out as secretly as possible. -Moves were made after dark. - -No new wheel tracks must be made. There must be no reference to the -battle over the telephone. There must be no extra horse or mechanical -transport seen about in daylight. - -The concentration of Tanks in the background was explained by the -establishment of an alleged new training area. Tank Corps Headquarters -established with the army at Albert was disguised under the plausible -alias of “The Tank Corps Training Office.” - -There must be no increase in aeroplane activity for reconnaissance -purposes. - -The same troops were to continue to hold the line, the attacking forces -passing through them, and those in the line were as far as possible to -be kept in the dark as to the new operations. There was always a danger -of men in the trenches being taken prisoner in some raid, and the less -they knew the better. Oosthoek Wood had not been forgotten. - -All the Reconnaissance Officers and the Tank Staff who had to frequent -the line wore non-committal burberries and discreet tin hats; one -well-known Staff Officer even went to the length of affecting blue -glasses; in fact, in the matter of disguise the line was only drawn at -ginger whiskers. The cars they came in had their distinguishing badges -taken off, and their drivers were carefully primed with cock-and-bull -stories with which to explain their presence. Staff and Reconnaissance -Officers slunk about, above all avoiding Headquarters and those other -social centres which etiquette enjoins must be first called upon by all -who visit other people’s trenches. Friends were stealthily avoided, and -a curious jumble of assorted and obvious lies was gradually put into -circulation. - -At the Lyceum the villain conducts his affairs in this sort of way -without arousing the least suspicion in any one, but in real life, and -particularly in the line where a look-out must constantly be kept for -spies, such conduct is apt to cause remark. - -Before Cambrai embarrassing situations frequently arose which could -be elucidated only by the drawing aside of some justly indignant -Commanding Officer for a few minutes’ whispered conversation. - -At the 1st Brigade Headquarters in Arras there was a locked room with -“No admittance” written large upon the door. Here were ostentatiously -hung spoof maps of other topical districts and a profusion of plans lay -spread about. - -The Reconnaissance Officer always hoped that this room was duly -ransacked by the “unauthorised person,” for whose visit he had taken -such pains to prepare. - -One more precaution was most carefully observed in the line itself. -Exactly the amount of artillery fire to which the enemy was accustomed -must be continued, and from guns of the calibre which he expected. It -was considered that more or less shooting, or the use of guns to which -he was not accustomed, would be sure to alarm him. - -For more than a week before the battle there was no rain. Low, creeping -mists screened our movements and made it almost impossible that the -enemy should have seen us from the air. - -But the time was, nevertheless, an anxious one. - -On the night of the 18th-19th the enemy raided our line and captured -some of our men. - -We were uncertain how much these men knew, and how much information -they would give under examination. - -If under prompt examination they gave away the gist of our plans the -enemy would have twenty-four hours in which to bring up reserves. There -was, however, nothing to be done except to await the event. - -There was yet one other particular in which the Battle of Cambrai was -to differ from other battles. - -In modern warfare the place of the General commanding any considerable -body of troops is almost invariably in the rear at some point where -communications are good and whence he can effectively control his -reserves. - -His leadership is more a matter of the spirit and _moral_ which he can -infuse into his troops, than of his actual presence in the forefront -of the battle. But General Elles had determined to lead his Tanks in -person. All the available machines were to be used, there would be no -reserves for him to handle. He would be best placed, he argued, in his -Flag Tank where he could keep his hand on the pulse of the battle. It -must have been with great satisfaction that he perceived that he would -here once more be able to indulge his remarkable penchant for battles, -a penchant from whose gratification his responsibilities as a commander -had now long (officially) debarred him. - -On the evening before the attack he issued his Special Order to the -Tank Corps. It was not the incitement to “do their damnedest” which the -contemporary Press fathered upon him. That spurious fosterling he hated -the worse, the more he perceived its popularity. - -His authentic Order was as follows:-- - - “_Special Order, No. 6_ - - “1. To-morrow the Tank Corps will have the chance for which it has - been waiting for many months, to operate on good going in the van - of the battle. - - “2. All that hard work and ingenuity can achieve has been done in - the way of preparation. - - “3. It remains for unit commanders and for Tank crews to complete - the work by judgment and pluck in the battle itself. - - “4. In the light of past experience I leave the good name of the - Corps with great confidence in your hands. - - “5. I propose leading the attack of the Centre Division. - - November 19, 1917. - - (_Signed_) HUGH ELLES, - “B.-G. Commanding Tank Corps.” - -The statement that the G.O.C. was to lead the attack came as a great -surprise to every one; it was probably a greater surprise to some of -the authorities than it was even to the Tank Corps themselves. This -decision was generally accepted with pleasure by the fighting troops, -but many of the more thoughtful were filled with very great anxiety. -It was clear that the General’s Tank, the “Hilda,” was going to be -thrust close behind the barrage in a conspicuous position flying the -flag; the dangers that it ran were, therefore, greater than those run -by any of the other Tanks. On the other hand, it was generally realised -that the Tank Corps had, in this action, a very great deal at stake; it -risked not merely machines and the lives of its officers and men, but -its very existence. If the Tanks failed to make good this time there -is little doubt that this type of mechanical warfare would have been -abandoned for some time at least. On November 20, therefore, the Tank -Corps was “all in” in every sense of the word. - - -IV - -At 4.30 on the morning of the 20th a heavy burst of firing from the -enemy made us fear for the integrity of our secret, but to our great -relief it died away, and for an hour before zero (6 a.m.) quiet reigned -along almost the whole front of attack. - -From documents captured during the battle we found that up to the 18th -the Germans had issued such reports as “The enemy’s work is confined to -the improvement of his trenches and wire.” But the prisoners whom the -Germans had taken on the night of the 18th had yielded more interesting -information. On the strength only of their preliminary examination the -Germans moved reserve machine-guns up to Flesquières. - -At the last moment a higher enemy authority seems to have again -examined the prisoners, and, too late, an urgent warning was sent down -to all units in the line to maintain a sharp lookout and to issue -armour-piercing bullets immediately. - -This message we found half transcribed in a front-line signal dug-out. - -Six o’clock had struck. - -Under cover of the mist the whole line of 350 Tanks moved forward, led -by General Elles’ Flag Tank, the “Hilda.” As they moved a thousand -concealed guns hailed down their fire upon the German line. Even -through the din of the barrage and the clamour of their own engines the -Tank crews could hear, as they advanced, the tearing and snapping of -the German wire as they trampled it under them. The bewildered enemy -was overwhelmed. He had only one last hope. Perhaps the wide trenches -themselves would hold back this inexorable company! - -But when each of the second line of Tanks stopped, ducked its head, -laid its “stepping stone” in the trench and crawled easily over it, the -enemy completely lost his balance. - -All along the line men fled in panic. Only at a few tactical points -did our onrush meet with any real opposition. The surprise, the novel -tactics, the crushing onrush of the Tanks proved too much in those -first confounding minutes for one of the best fighting armies the world -had ever seen. - -The “Hilda” reached the outposts line in the van of the battle; the -resistance here was only slight, but General Elles succeeded in picking -up a few targets which he pointed out to the gunners. It is reported -that he did most of his observing with his head thrust up through the -hatch in the roof of the Tank, using his feet in the gunner’s ribs to -indicate targets. - -Once the Tanks were astride the enormous Hindenburg ditch, the enemy -only offered resistance in a few places. The “Hilda,” still carrying -the flag which had been several times hit but not brought down, went -on to her first objective line, which included the main Hindenburg -front, and support lines. - -But the General’s holiday was over. The great problem had been -triumphantly solved. - -The next most pressing need would be for reorganisation. - -If any of the Tanks were required to operate again the next day, that -reorganisation must be begun at once. So reluctantly leaving the -“Hilda” to carry on to further objectives, the General came back on -foot, somewhat impeded by various parties of “unmopped up” Germans who -insisted on surrendering to him. By the afternoon, General Elles was -back at his Headquarters, functioning by telephone and shorthand-typist -in the manner usual to Generals. - -Here and there, after the first rush, a desperate handful of the enemy -would be rallied by their officers to defend some point of vantage. - -At Lateau Wood on the right of the attack heavy fighting took place, -including a duel between a Tank and a 5.9 in. howitzer. Turning on -the Tank the howitzer fired, shattering and tearing off most of the -right-hand sponson of the approaching machine, but fortunately not -injuring its vitals; before the German gunners could reload, the Tank -was upon them, and in a few seconds the great gun was crushed in a -jumbled mass amongst the brushwood surrounding it. - -A little to the west of this wood the Tanks of “F” (the 6th) Battalion, -which had topped the ridge, were speeding down on Masnières. One -approached the bridge, the key to the Rumilly-Seranvillers ridge, upon -the capture of which so much depended. The bridge had, as the Tank -Commander knew, been damaged either by shell-fire or by the German -sappers. It was, however, most important that he should cross, and he -very pluckily, therefore, went for it. As the Tank neared the centre -of the bridge, there was a rending of steel girders--the bridge had -broken, and as it collapsed the Tank disappeared into the waters of the -canal. Other Tanks arriving, and not being able to cross, assisted the -infantry to do so by opening a heavy covering fire. - -The Tank that had fallen into the canal had been let down quite -gradually into the water as the bridge slowly subsided. - -There was but one loss. The wig of one of the crew got knocked off as -his head emerged from the manhole, and it floated away down the canal -and was never seen again. Lost to view, its memory was kept green for -many months by its injured owner’s claims for compensation. - -The dilemma which most cruelly racked the official mind was the -question whether a wig came under the heading of “Field Equipment,” -“Loss of a Limb,” “Medical Comfort,” “Clothing,” “Personal Effects,” or -“Special Tank Stores.” Finally, however, its owner did receive monetary -compensation for his loss. - -But the genius of Comedy had not done with the Tanks. - - [45]“The town had been evacuated so suddenly by the enemy that some - civilian population still remained. - - “Two cows belonging to the German Town Major were solemnly - presented by their French civilian keeper to Major Hammond as a - token of the joy that the inhabitants felt at their liberation.” - -These absurd camp followers remained for long the most cherished -possessions of the Battalion, and accompanied them wherever they went. - -[Illustration: PREPARING FOR THE CAMBRAL. A TRAIN OF TANKS WITH -FASCINES IN POSITION] - -[Illustration: THE BAPAUME-CAMBRAI ROAD] - -[Illustration: A TANK CRUSHING DOWN THE ENEMY’S WIRE] - -At Flesquières the 51st Highland Division, which was using an -attack formation of its own, was held up; it appears that the Tanks -outdistanced the infantry, or that the tactics adopted did not permit -of the infantry keeping close enough up to the Tanks. As the Tanks -topped the crest, they came under direct artillery fire at short range -and suffered heavy casualties. - -No less than sixteen Tanks were knocked out by a single field gun. - -This gun was at the west end of the village, and from its position the -Tanks were each outlined against the sky as they topped the ridge. -Its story is told in Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatch, with a generosity -which might well have encouraged what the Tank crews considered a most -undesirable spirit in enemy gunners: - - “Many of the hits upon our tanks at Flesquières were obtained by - a German artillery officer who, remaining alone at his battery, - served a field gun single-handed until killed at his gun. The great - bravery of this officer aroused the admiration of all ranks.” - -There was stiff fighting at Havrincourt, and before nightfall the 62nd -Division and its Tanks had captured Graincourt. Several Tanks even -pushed on beyond towards Bourlon Wood and the Cambrai road, but by this -time the infantry were too exhausted to follow. - -By 4 p.m. on November 20 one of the most astonishing battles in all -history had been won, and as far as the Tank Corps was concerned, -tactically finished. - -There were no reserves of Tanks, and the crews that had fought all day -were now very spent and weary. - -The infantry were still more exhausted and a further advance was -impossible. The night was spent by Tank crews and infantry in resting, -and by the Staff in planning a renewed attack for the next day. - -A letter home from a Tank officer describes a typical scene: - - “We had captured the village of Havrincourt that morning, or - rather its ruins, and it was in the one remaining room of the once - magnificent Château that General John Ponsonby, commanding the 40th - Division, established his Headquarters and convened a conference - for ten o’clock in the evening. - - “The road thither had already been sufficiently restored to permit - of cars getting through, granted skilful driving and good luck. - - “Felled trees, wire, breastworks, and other barriers had been - cleared aside, trenches and craters on both sides of No Man’s Land - had been roughly filled in, whilst the notorious ‘Grand Ravine’ had - been made passable for carriage folk by the judicious placing of a - few fascines. - - “There were a round dozen of us at the conference, a muddy, rather - blear-eyed party, some in tin hats and trench coats, revolver - girt--some in honorific red and gold--all with slung gas-masks. - - “General Ponsonby and his G.S.O.I. sat on an old packing-case with - a map spread out before them on another, lit by the dancing flicker - of two guttering candles stuck into German beer bottles. General - Elles and Colonel Baker-Carr were there with a chorus of Commanding - Officers, Company Commanders and Reconnaissance Officers from the - 1st Tank Brigade. - - “An armed sentry stood at the breach in the wall that served for - doorway--signallers and orderlies entered and left the little - circle of yellow light, stirring up the dust from the fallen débris - on the broken floor. - - “One felt uneasily conscious of forming part of a Graphic picture - entitled ‘Advanced Headquarters,’ or ‘Planning the Battle.’ - - “Anyway, the battle _was_ eventually planned and to the - satisfaction of all parties present. The G.S.O.I. finished writing - his operation orders for the morning’s attack, the conference - dissolved, and we stumbled out once more into the night, each of us - with some job to get done before the dawn. - - “To me it fell to push on to the advanced Headquarters of the - Infantry Brigades concerned to explain the plans for the morrow’s - battles and to deliver certain necessary maps to the Tank - Commanders who would be co-operating. - - “I slung the maps for easier porterage along a pole that I and my - orderly shouldered and from which they dangled in swaying white - packages to the great interest and mystification of passing troops, - to whom the bearers and the pole were invisible in the inky dark. - - “It was a weary way up to Graincourt with nothing but gun flashes - and infrequent star-shells to light the way, but at last we reached - it. - - “Two of the Infantry Brigades had, we found, established their - Headquarters in a sort of catacomb underneath the ruined church--a - wonderful place, part mediæval and part the work of the industrious - Hun. - - “Down and down you went--the old vaulted brickwork giving place - to stout German timbering--until at the very bottom, some hundred - feet below the floor of the church, the steep stairway ended in a - gallery off which opened a whole street of little chambers. - - “The place was insufferably hot and stuffy to one fresh in from the - cold of the outer night; there was haze and reek of tobacco smoke - and cooking, half drowning the stale dank smell, inseparable from a - deep dug-out that has been long occupied--especially by Germans. - - “Graincourt had been taken by surprise and had changed hands so - quickly that we had taken over these very eligible Headquarters as - a going concern ‘ready furnished for immediate occupation.’ - - “So sudden, indeed, had been the change of tenancy that the two - Boche engineers whose job it was to run the electric lighting - plant had been captured in their own subterranean engine-room and - were even now stolidly carrying on their old duties, seemingly but - little concerned by the fact that they were now ‘under entirely new - management.’ - - “As it turned out, it was very well for us that we did capture and - retain this precious pair, for when they found that they were going - to be kept on to run the lighting as before, they quite shamelessly - said: - - “‘Well, if that’s the case, there’s just one little point we ought - to warn you about, and that is, if any one moves what looks like - the main switch--as any one would who didn’t know, when starting up - the plant--the demolition charges would be blown. If you would like - these removed in case of accidents, we can show you where to dig - for them--we know exactly where to find them, as it was our job to - lay them.’ - - “Even whilst I was there, I saw these ruffians superintending - the removal of case after case of high-explosive from cunningly - concealed chambers behind the timber linings and under floors. - - “The cramped stairways, galleries and cubby-holes were crowded with - odd specimens of all ranks and arms, some eating or talking, others - huddled uneasily asleep, with the constant tide of traffic pouring - over their sprawling limbs. - - “Electric lights burned brilliantly, and the engine sent a steady - shiver through the timbered walls like the vibrations of a steamer. - - “Like a ship breasting the waves, too, were the intermittent thud - and tremor of bursting shells in the village high overhead, or the - replies of our own artillery. - - “Telephones buzzed, a typewriter rattled away, and the clatter of - plates being washed in a bucket made one wonder wistfully whether - it would occur to any one to suggest that you might be hungry. - - “One Brigadier, presumably the first come, sat in the utmost pomp - and luxury in a sumptuous arm-chair of crimson plush, a ci-devant - drawing-room table before him, on which was spread a large-scale - detailed map of Bourlon Wood--a very valuable legacy left behind by - the over-hasty Boches. - - “On the walls were framed oleographs of Hindenburg and the Kaiser, - whilst a gilt clock still kept German time as it ticked above the - door. - - “Two tiers of wire rabbit-net bunks lined one side of the little - chamber, and a smart little stove surmounted by a fine old mirror - adorned the other. - - “They are pretty sound on Home Comforts are the Boches, and they - don’t think twice about pinching anything they fancy from the - unfortunate natives. - - “Like another much advertised system of furnishing, ‘It’s so - simple’! ‘Deferred Payment,’ if they will have it so--deferred, but - payment at the last--payment good and plenty or I’ll eat my tin - hat--including visor and lining.” - - -V - -The next day (November 21) saw composite companies of Tanks fighting in -co-operation with new infantry. - -But though the infantry was new, it was unfortunately not fresh. Sir -Julian Byng had no rested troops at all at his disposal. It may be -said that the whole of the subsequent history of the battle and its -sequel hinges upon these two points. All our infantry was weary in the -extreme, and most of it had never co-operated with Tanks before. - -Consequently many strong points, though they were finally captured, -gave us more trouble than they should. - -On the 21st, Tanks attacked several villages and strong points with -success. - -Thirteen Tanks of “B” (2nd) Battalion surrounded the village of -Cantaing. They met with a stubborn resistance as they closed in upon -it. To this they replied vigorously with machine-gun and 6-pounder -fire, and by noon the enemy had been driven out. - -Two Tanks also, of “B” Battalion, were sent for by the infantry, who -were held up by heavy machine-gun fire outside Noyelles. In half an -hour they succeeded in crushing all resistance, setting fire to an -ammunition dump and patrolling the village till the infantry took over. - -Neither Tank was in the least hurt, and there were no casualties among -the crews. - -Twelve Tanks of “H” (8th) Battalion received orders soon after 8 a.m. -to attack Fontaine-Notre-Dame. - -The village was six miles distant, and the Tanks came in for severe -fighting on the way there. - -They reached their objective at about 4.30. By 5.30 they had captured -it and were withdrawn after handing it over to the infantry. - -But next day a furious German counter-attack dislodged our garrison. - -We were determined to possess it, and on the 23rd attacked again in -force. - -The enemy was prepared, and a desperate battle ensued among the houses. -Twenty-four Tanks from “B” and “H” Battalions had entered the village -first, whereupon the enemy retired to the tops of the houses and rained -down bombs and bullets upon the roofs of the machines. - -The Germans were in force, and in the narrow streets it was difficult -for the Tanks to bring an effective fire to bear upon them. - -The infantry was too weary to clear the place, and after patrolling the -streets the Tanks withdrew, as soon as darkness covered their retreat. - -On the same day thirty-four Tanks of the 1st Brigade supported a -brilliant attack made by the 40th Division upon Bourlon Wood. The wood -was captured after a sharp struggle. The Tanks then pressed on towards -the village, but as at Fontaine, the infantry, who had suffered severe -casualties in the taking of the wood, was too exhausted to follow up. - -On November 25 and 26 we renewed our attack upon Fontaine-Notre-Dame -and again tried to capture Bourlon Village. - -In the end, however, both these important points remained in enemy -hands. - -A week had now elapsed since the launching of the battle. - -According to the original scheme, the action should not have been -continued for more than three days, but in spite of our original -“Self-Denying Ordinance” as to ground, when desirable posts of vantage -were actually in our hands, we had fallen a prey to “land hunger,” and -had still fought on and continued to advance in order to consolidate -these new and delightful possessions. - -But now we held the extremely important tactical point formed by the -heights of Bourlon Wood, and it was plain that to take Fontaine and -Bourlon Village would cost us more than they were worth to us. - -We had done all and more than all we set out to do. The troops urgently -needed resting. They had had no proper rest before the battle, and now -despite their sense of victory they were extraordinarily spent. - -The Tanks’ crews, too, were almost fought to a standstill, and -owing to the constant daily necessity there had been for hurrying -composite companies into action, their units had become inconveniently -disorganised. - -So on November 27 we rested from our labours and counted the spoil. - - [46]“Whatever may be the future historian’s dictum as to its value, - the First Battle of Cambrai must always rank as one of the most - remarkable battles ever fought. On November 20, from a base of - some 13,000 yards in width, a penetration of no less than 10,000 - yards was effected in twelve hours (at the Third Battle of Ypres a - similar penetration took three months), 8000 prisoners and 100 guns - were captured, and these prisoners alone were nearly double the - casualties suffered by the 3rd and 4th Armies during the first day - of the battle. It is an interesting point to remember that in this - battle the attacking infantry were assisted by 690 officers and - 3500 other ranks of the Tank Corps, a little over 4000 men, or the - strength of a strong brigade, and that these men replaced artillery - for wire-cutting, and rendered unnecessary the old preliminary - bombardment. More than this, by keeping close to the infantry, - they effected a much higher co-operation than had ever before been - attainable with artillery. When on November 21 the bells of London - pealed forth in celebration of the victory of Cambrai, consciously - or unconsciously to their listeners they tolled out an old tactics - and rang in a new--Cambrai had become the Valmy of a new epoch in - war, the epoch of the mechanical engineer.” - -It was a weary but satisfied body of men that General Elles inspected -at Havrincourt on November 29 when the party broke up. - -The 1st and 3rd Brigades were entraining immediately for Mult and Bray -respectively, and the 2nd was to follow them in a few days’ time. - -Good-byes were exchanged, and, as every one thought, the curtain rung -down upon the First Battle of Cambrai. - - -Part II - -(_November 30_) - -In order to understand the events that followed, we have to imagine a -victorious but very weary British Army holding a newly consolidated -salient against an enemy whom they have just roused to a revengeful -fury by a sudden stinging slap in the face. - -The enemy had been horribly frightened, and now that he had recovered -he realised how urgently his prestige demanded signal vindication. -We were, it would seem, half expecting in a tired unimaginative sort -of way that he might hit at us on the new Bourlon Wood flank of our -salient. On the Gouzeaucourt side were old-established defences. These -we held thinly--it never entering our heads apparently that he would -attack an old piece of the line. - -But the German Army Commander, General von der Marwitz, had an -ambitious scheme in his mind. He meant to pinch off our salient and, if -possible, to capture the entire third and fourth Corps, who held it. -His right wing was to operate from Bourlon southward, and his left from -Masnières westwards, the two attacks converging on Havrincourt and Metz. - -The attack was launched shortly after daylight on November 30, and -failed completely on the right against Bourlon Wood; here the enemy was -caught by our artillery and machine-guns and mown down by hundreds. On -the left, however, the attack succeeded; first, it came as a surprise; -secondly, the Germans heralded their assault by lines of low-flying -aeroplanes, which made our men keep down and so lose observation. Under -the protection of this aeroplane barrage and a very heavy trench -mortar bombardment the German infantry advanced and speedily captured -Villers Guislain and Gouzeaucourt. - -It was not till nearly ten o’clock on November 30 that -Brigadier-General Courage of the 2nd Tank Brigade received a telephone -message warning him of the attack. - -The Tanks had been definitely “dismissed,” and were busy refitting, -and at that moment every machine was in complete _déshabillé_. Many of -the engines were in process of being tinkered with, and not a single -Tank was filled up or contained its battle equipment. Those whom some -emergency has obliged to get out an ordinary car on a cold winter’s -morning when it has neither petrol, oil, nor water in it, and has half -its engine strewn about the garage, will understand the difficulties -that faced the Tank Corps. They will realise that when no less than -twenty-two Tanks of “B” (2nd) Battalion had started for the battle by -12.40, a very smart piece of work had been done. Very soon fourteen -Tanks of “A” (1st) Battalion followed them, and by two o’clock twenty -Tanks of “H” (8th) Battalion were able to move up in support. - -In the words of Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatch, “Great credit is due to -the officers and men of the (2nd) Tank Brigade for the speed with which -they brought their Tanks into action.” - -By the time the first twenty Tanks reached Gouzeaucourt, however, the -Guards, who had been hurried up with all speed, had managed to retake -it, and the Tanks were therefore pushed out as a screen to cover their -consolidation. - -Here they remained all day, beating off enemy counter-attacks. - -All day along both sides of the salient the enemy hammered fiercely -at our lines. Here and there he penetrated them. Cooks, servants, and -signallers, every available man, was given a rifle and put into the -line, and the Despatch tells of wonderful individual deeds that were -done as the battle surged and eddied confusedly. We did not propose to -allow the Germans to hold their new possessions, the points of vantage -out of which they had hustled us. - -On December 1, Tanks, Guards, and dismounted Indian cavalry hit back -against Villers Guislain and Gauche Wood. - - “Tanks were,” the Despatch notes, “in great measure responsible - for the capture of the wood. Heavy fighting took place for this - position, which it is clear that the enemy had decided to hold at - all costs. When the infantry and cavalry finally took possession - of the wood, great numbers of German dead and smashed machine-guns - were found. In one spot four German machine-guns, with dead crews - lying round, were discovered within a radius of twenty yards. Three - German field guns, complete with teams, were also captured in this - wood. - - “Other Tanks proceeded to Villers Guislain, and in spite of heavy - direct artillery fire three reached the outskirts of the village, - but the fire of the enemy’s machine-guns prevented our troops - advancing from the south from supporting them, and the Tanks - ultimately withdrew.” - -For two more days the enemy pressed on against us, and the battle raged -round Bourlon, Fontaine, Marcoing, and La Vacquerie. - -Everywhere he dented in our line, and by December 4 the outline of our -front showed an impossible series of irregularities. We must either -renew the attack on a big scale, or make up our minds - - [47]“to withdraw to a more compact line on the Flesquières Ridge. - - “Although this decision involved giving up important positions - most gallantly won, I had no doubt as to the correct course under - the conditions. Accordingly, on the night of December 4–5 the - evacuation of the positions held by us north of the Flesquières - Ridge was commenced. On the morning of December 7 this withdrawal - was completed successfully without interference from the enemy.” - -It is as well that the enemy did not “interfere,” for through some -oversight the Tanks did not receive due notice of the intended -withdrawal, and certain salvage parties, busily at work on disabled -Tanks, in forward positions, knew nothing of the evacuation until, to -their astonishment, they found our infantry streaming back past them in -the darkness. There was then nothing for it but to abandon the wrecks -and to get back themselves with such gear as they could carry. - -So ended the second phase of the battle. - -It had been an exceedingly vexatious business. - -Putting the best construction we could upon it, we had to admit to -having been caught napping. The German attack had thrown us into -complete, if momentary, confusion. But afterwards, when the situation -could be calmly reviewed, contemporary criticism was unanimously agreed -that we had, after all, suffered little but moral damage. And from -that sort of damage the British have the art of deriving wholesome -instruction in a unique degree. We braced ourselves up, and determined -that this sharp rap over the knuckles should do us good. - -But to the Tank Corps the exploits of the 2nd Brigade were more -directly advantageous. - -Amid the hubbub and confusion the Tank crews, like the Guards and the -2nd Cavalry Division, had known but one impulse--they had gone straight -east against the enemy. That was the pole to which their compass -pointed. - -While everything had been doubt and hesitation they had had but one -thought, to fill and adjust their machines and hurry them forward. At -9 a.m. the Tank crews had been peacefully preparing to break camp and -leave for their training area. By four in the afternoon seventy-three -Tanks had been launched with decisive effect against the enemy. - -To many High Commanders who had believed that Tanks could only be used -in a “full-dress” attack after weeks of preparation, the events of -November 30 came as a joyful revelation. - -So for the Tanks ended the 1917 campaign. - - - - -CHAPTER XI - -THREE NEW TYPES OF TANK--THE DEPOT--CENTRAL WORKSHOPS - - -I - -The “Fighting Side” had now been for many months almost exclusively -engaged with “operations,” and having fought themselves nearly to a -standstill at the Battle of Cambrai, were now in as urgent need of -reorganisation as were their machines of overhaul and repair. - -The present chronicle has also for long followed their fortunes, with -not a glance to spare for the activities of the manufacturing and other -organisations which played the supporting parts “Aaron and Hur” to the -Fighting Side’s “Moses.” - -At the period we have reached it is high time to pick up the dropped -histories of the other persons of the drama. For while the Tank Corps -had been fighting, manufacturers had been busy, and a huge network of -auxiliary services and organisations had grown up, by means of which -the whole Corps was to rise rejuvenated from its ashes. - -Before the Tanks fought their next pitched battle the Mark V. had -come into being, Whippet Tanks had been issued, a heavy type of -infantry-carrying Tank had been designed, and for fast work on good -roads a Battalion of Armoured Cars had grown up. - -Besides this, a complete system of Supply Tanks and Field Maintenance -Companies for salvage and supplies had been gradually evolved during -the course of the last campaign. - -The Tank Corps Depot had been enormously enlarged, and had moved to its -final “location” on the coast near Le Tréport. - -The Home Depot at Wool had also increased, and there had been changes -and developments at the Ministry of Munitions and in the Tank -production side generally. - -It is in fact impossible in a single chapter to give more than a brief -indication of this universal and increasing “back area” activity. - -To begin with the changes in the home organisation and in the -production of Tanks. - -The “New” Tank Committee was, as we have already related, a success. - -In December 1917 and January 1918 it saw a rather interesting new -phase, when Majors Drain and Alden, of the U.S. Tank Corps, attended -certain of its meetings, and when the manufacture for the British and -American Armies of the Mark VIII. or “Allied Tank” was decided upon. -This Tank was never fought, but its projection is perhaps interesting -as an example of inter-Allied solidarity. - -By January 1918 proposals for an expansion from nine to eighteen -Battalions and for a reorganisation of Tank control had been put -forward. - -These proposals were eventually (in April 1918) discussed by the -Inter-Allied Tank Committee, a sort of sub-committee of the Versailles -Conference, on which the British, French and American Tank Corps were -represented. - -But neither men nor really constructive thought could then be spared -from the immediate needs of meeting the German onrush, and nothing was -done to realise their proposals until that onrush was finally stemmed. - -But in July 1918 the business was taken up again. It was decided to -expand the Tank Corps to thirty-four Battalions armed with about six -thousand machines. - - -II - -In December 1917 the manufacturing situation was not particularly -satisfactory. As late as August 20 the Commander-in-Chief had, it will -be remembered, laid down, in an official letter, an order of priority -in which there were four categories preferred to Tanks. - - “The manufacture of Tanks should not be allowed to interfere in any - way with: - - “(1) The output of aeroplanes. - - “(2) The output of guns and ammunition. - - “(3) The provision of mechanical transport, spare parts therefor, - and petrol tractors up to the scale demanded. - - “(4) The provision of locomotives up to the scale demanded. - -And though by December the views of the authorities had changed -considerably, the sudden expansion of the Tank building programme was -not easy. - -In October 1917, 700 Mark IV. Tanks had already been delivered in -France, and a balance of about 500 was still due. But the Fighting Side -was anxious that these should not all be of the unimproved Mark IV. -pattern. For up to now no change in the design had been made since the -first Mark IV. had been delivered. It was decided, therefore, that some -of the 500 should be given Ricardo engines and Epicyclic gears, and -that others should be fitted as Supply Tanks. - -The M.W.S.D. hoped to build about 1600 new Heavy Tanks, 800 of which -were to be of the Mark V. type and ready by May 1, and the others to -be of other heavy types, probably Mark V. star and Mark VI., while 385 -Whippet (“Medium A”) Tanks were also to be ready by May 1918. - -Further, there was to be a small cadre of Salvage Tanks and of special -infantry Supply Tanks, two of the latter being able to carry complete -supplies for an infantry Brigade for one day. - -A large number of these Tanks were as before to be built by the -Metropolitan Carriage and Wagon Company. - -A very brief account of most of these new types of Tank has already -been given in Chapter I., and it is not necessary to repeat here the -details of their speeds, armament, and so forth. - -Salvage Tanks were usually Mark IV. Tanks on which special gear, such -as winches and small cranes, had been fitted for hoisting wrecks out of -the mud, or for towing. - -The Supply Tank was a Mark IV. fitted with very capacious sponsons. In -order to save weight these carriers were not made as fully armoured as -the fighting Tanks. - -The Gun Carrier Tank was a machine with an elongated tail which formed -a platform whence it was intended that a 60-pounder gun or a 6-in. -howitzer could be fired. - -The Tank Corps Armoured Cars were of the usual turreted pattern, and -were armed with machine-guns. - -But more important than any other new development was the improvement -in the main issue of heavy Tanks, an improvement which is very well -described by the historian of the 13th Battalion: - - “The old Mark IV. type had serious disadvantages. Its engine power - on bad ground was insufficient, and the clumsy secondary gears made - turning slow and difficult as well as requiring the services of at - least two members of the crew in addition to the driver. This, in - battle, became a heavy handicap upon the fighting powers of the - Tank. The officer was hampered by the need to attend to brakes, - and a gunner called upon suddenly to help alter gears would lose - the fleeting chance of firing at favourable targets. In the new - Mark V. Tank these troubles largely disappeared. An engine of new - design gave both greater speed and greater turning power, while - a system of epicyclic gears made turning easy and under the sole - control of the driver. The officer was free to supervise his crew, - the gunner was free to use his weapons to the best advantage. Add - that a greatly increased field of view was obtained by the addition - of an observer’s turret, and it will be understood that an immense - advance in type had been secured.” - -The Mark V. had, however, one serious drawback. Its ventilation was -extremely faulty. We shall see later how serious a disadvantage this -was to prove. - - -III - -There were also to be changes in the technical and mechanical -engineering side of the Tank Corps itself, by which an economy of -man-power was to be effected. - -When the Tank Corps was first formed each Company had its own -workshops, and this system lasted to the end of 1916. Then in the -course of the winter reorganisation, Company Workshops were abolished -and Battalion Workshops were substituted. - -By the autumn of 1917 the experiment was tried of centralising still -further and merging Battalion into Brigade Workshops, and early in 1918 -it was decided to take the last step and to concentrate all repairs in -the Central Workshops. - -This system, which achieved a great economy of skilled men, was made -possible by a very clear line of demarcation being drawn between -Repairs and Maintenance, a principle which had been laid down by -Colonel F. Searle, D.S.O., the chief engineer of the Corps and the head -of the whole mechanical side of the Tanks. - -No damaged part was ever to be repaired on the field; mechanical -efficiency was to be maintained by the broken bit of mechanism being -immediately replaced by a complete new part. - -This replacement was carried out by the crew, whose efficiency as -mechanics was enormously increased by being thus made responsible for -their own machines. - -One point had, of course, to be carefully attended to in carrying out -this system. There had to be a very efficient supply organisation by -which the necessary spares were quickly available in the field. - -When the crew had removed the damaged part from the Tank, it was sent -back to the Central Workshops to be repaired. - -Here a specially skilled man would be always employed upon damages to -one particular part. - - [48]“For example, broken unions of petrol pipes commonly occur - in all petrol engines, and if a small unit workshop exists, the - brazing out and repair of such broken unions can be carried out - there. But in order to do this a coppersmith must be kept at the - unit workshop, and only part of his time will be employed in this - work of brazing petrol unions. If now, however, all broken unions, - from every unit, are sent back to a Central Workshop for repair, - there is a sufficient amount of work of this description to keep - one man, or possibly two or three men fully employed all their time. - - “These men become absolute experts in brazing broken unions, and - before very long can do in a few minutes a job which would take a - coppersmith with the unit workshop an hour or two to carry out.” - -It is interesting to trace what might have been the itinerary of a Tank -from the time it left the manufacturers in about Midsummer 1917, till -after going into action in, say, the Third Battle of Ypres. - -On completion every Tank was first sent to testing grounds at Newbury, -where it was manned by No. 20 Squadron R.N.A.S. From here it was -forwarded to Richborough, whence it was shipped by the Channel ferry -and received at Le Havre by another detachment of Squadron 20. Thence -it went to Bermicourt, was again tested, this time by Tank Corps -personnel, and then handed on to the Central Stores at Erin. These -stores were first established in 1917, and eventually consisted of -over seven acres of railway siding and six acres of buildings. The -Central Workshops were at one time also installed here, but as more -accommodation became necessary they were moved to Teneur, about a mile -and a half away. - -From the Central Stores the Tanks would be issued to Battalions as -needed. - -For example, during the Third Battle of Ypres a large number of Tanks -were supplied to Companies actually in the line. We will suppose that -a particular Tank was so supplied, and received a bullet through its -carburettor during one of the small actions of the end of October. - -The crew would immediately draw a new carburettor from the -neighbouring mobile advanced store, which was run by one of the two -Tank Salvage or Field Companies. - -Thus re-equipped the Tank would again go into action, perhaps within a -day of being damaged. - -This time we will suppose that the Tank got knocked out between the -first and second objective by a direct hit, the unwounded members of -the crew going forward with their Lewis guns and leaving the Tank -stranded and immovable. - -The position of the derelict having been reported, men from a Tank -Salvage Company would go up that night, probably under shell-fire, and -possibly in full view of the enemy whenever a Véry light went up. - -The experts would arrive at the wreck with their favourite set of -repairing tools, possibly consisting of the specially designed -Tank-repairing outfit, but more probably of a few pet spanners, some -odd lengths of tubing and a coil of copper wire. They would toil at the -Tank till dawn. - -Sometimes after one or more nights spent like this they would induce -the Tank to go. In the Ypres area Tanks were sometimes salved that had -completely disappeared into the mud. Sometimes it was possible to tow a -machine away, particularly after the special salvage Tanks with their -hoisting gear came into use. Sometimes only _disjecta membra_, such as -engine parts, 6-pounders, or parts of the gears or transmissions, could -be saved. - -During the two years of their existence the Field Companies, at the -lowest computation, saved two or three million pounds’ worth of stores, -a work which they did not accomplish without heavy cost to themselves. - -We will suppose that the Tank whose history we have followed was salved -whole. - -The next step would be that it would be entrained by the Field Company -and sent back to the Central Workshops at Teneur. - -This was really a vast engineering works covering about twenty acres -of ground, where, besides a very large number of trained and expert -mechanics, more than a thousand Chinese coolies worked. - -These coolies often became very dexterous artisans. - -Here, in endless ranks down the long shops, they would toil -indefatigably, in the summer stripped to the waist, their brown bodies -gleaming in the white light of the arc lamps or in the glow of the -forges, or in the winter dressed in their loose blue quilted jackets -and close caps with curious rabbits’ fur ear-lappets. - -Possibly the shattered or burnt-out Tank would have to be almost -entirely rebuilt, two wrecked Tanks providing, perhaps, parts enough -to make one good one. Here, finally, the reconstructed Tank would be -tested and sent back to the Central Stores. - -Possibly it would have been reduced to a sort of “C. III.” category, -and made into a Supply Tank. Possibly it would have been fitted with -all the latest gadgets, and come out from its reforging a better weapon -than it was originally. - -For the activities of the Central Workshops were not confined to mere -repair. It will be remembered how they distinguished themselves in -the matter of the lightning delivery of fascines, releasing gear, and -supply sledges for the Battle of Cambrai. - -A large proportion, too, of the experiments which led to improvements -in the design of Tanks were carried out here; for example, the long -Tank and the unditching beam were of Central Workshops origin, and -here the officers who fought the Tanks could have their ideas for -gadgets sympathetically reviewed and put to practical proof by the -band of expert engineers that Lieut.-Colonel Brocklebank had brought -together. But they were more than mere experts; they were enthusiasts -whose unflagging zeal had created the marvel of Central Workshops where -there had been bare ploughland so short a time before. - - -IV - -We have traced a Tank from its setting forth from home with unscratched -paint through the vicissitudes of battle to its remoulding as a greatly -improved machine or to its relegation to “Permanent Base.” - -How would the military history run of a member of a Tank crew which had -fought, say, at the Battle of Cambrai? - -We have already related how the Tank Corps was chiefly recruited -in early days, that is, either from among mechanical experts or -from volunteers from other branches of the Service. Later men with -no special qualifications were taken by direct enlistment. We will -suppose, however, that 1234 Pte. John Smith got his transfer from -the West Surreys when in the line in about June 1917, and that at -that moment the training schools in France had no vacancies. To their -great joy, therefore, Pte. Smith and his batch would be sent home for -training to the Tank Depot at Wool. - -Here was a huge camp where men like themselves, who had seen fighting, -and also men fresh from the Recruiting Depots, were being formed into -the new Tank Battalions. By July about nine of these new Battalions -were in training. The men went through the usual recruits’ curriculum. -First of all, drill, discipline and physical training; then individual -courses in Tank Gunnery, Driving and Maintenance. Then they would go -through the Signalling, Revolver and Compass Schools, the Gas and -Reconnaissance Schools. - -There was also here an Officer Cadet Preliminary Training Company where -the same sort of instruction was given. Gunners at this time did all -their firing practice with 6-pounders at the Naval School of Gunnery, -Chatham, or rather, to be exact, on “H.M.S. Excellent,” Whale Island. -All the other courses were gone through in and around the camp. - -Practically, only individual instruction was given at Wool, and their -collective and tactical training was done by the men at Bermicourt, -after their arrival in France. At Wool it was reckoned that, with this -important omission, nearly four months would usually be occupied in -raising and training a Tank Battalion. It would, therefore, be towards -the end of September that Pte. Smith found himself in France. - -He was, he found, to be detailed to one of the old Battalions, and was, -therefore, despatched to the Training and Reinforcement Depot, then -established at Erin, and later to be moved to Le Tréport. - -Here he was attached to a Reception Company, put through a kind of -examination in the subjects he had studied at Wool, but passing -satisfactorily and his records being duly completed, he was issued -with his kit and equipment and posted to his Company. He was soon -sent to join it at an improvised training area where it was at this -moment “resting” from the Battle of Ypres. It was not actually having a -particularly restful time, as tactical training with the infantry was -in progress, and there was more than enough night work in the programme. - -[Illustration: SLEDGE-TOWING TANK TAKING UP SUPPLIES] - -[Illustration: BERMICOURT CHATEAU NEAR ST. POL. - -TANK CORPS MAIN HEADQUARTERS] - -[Illustration: GUN-CARRYING TANK TAKING UP A HOWITZER] - -[Illustration: A WHIPPET GOING IN] - -This phase did not last long, however, for the Company was soon sent -back to join its Battalion in the Salient, where they executed an -astonishing number of moves and were considerably shelled, but never -succeeded in getting into action. - -After that they were hurried off to do intensive training for Cambrai. -Then came the battle, in the last three days of which a very much -exhausted 2nd Driver Smith was wounded in the face by a bullet splash. -The trouble was not serious enough to get him to England, and on -his return from an all too brief stay in a Hospital in France, he -again found himself at the Depot. This time, after only a day in the -Reception Company and after a medical examination, he was posted for -fourteen days to the Seaside Rest Camp at Merlimont. - -This Rest Camp consisted of rows and rows of rather pretty bungalows -built among the sand dunes. Here both men and officers were given a -very pleasant time, though they were still under military discipline -and had a certain number of parades to keep. For the officers there was -a comfortable club, and for the men an exceedingly well-run Y.M.C.A. -hut, where there were concerts or pierrot shows almost nightly--either -home-grown or imported. - -Games and, in summer, swimming and bathing were great features. There -is no doubt, first, that the Camp was immensely popular, and, secondly, -that the Tank Corps owed a good deal of its cheerful spirit and high -_moral_ to the refreshment which the Camp afforded to many a weary body -and mind. - -After this fortnight by the sea Smith rejoined his Battalion, and was, -with the rest of the Tank world, plunged into winter training. - - -V - -The general organisation of the 1917–18 training, though, of course, on -a much larger scale, was very much like that of the previous winter. -New training centres had been established and old centres extended. - -But perhaps a chronicle of the numbers who passed through these courses -of instruction at Wailly, Le Tréport, Bermicourt and Merlimont, and of -the sequence in which the different Brigades took their turns at the -different areas, might prove less interesting than a brief account of -what was actually taught and of the sort of way a syllabus would be -carried out. - -In the official “Instructions for the Training of the Tank Corps in -France” these are the sort of general principles we find laid down: - - “All work must be carried out at high pressure. Every exercise and - movement should, if possible, be reduced to a precise drill. - - “Games will be organised as a definite part of training (see S.S. - 137, ‘Recreational Training’). - - “Order is best cultivated by carrying out all work on a fixed plan. - Order is the foundation of discipline. Small things like marching - men always at attention to and from work, making them stand to - attention before dismissing them, assist in cultivating steadiness - and discipline. Each day should commence with a careful inspection - of the billets and the men, or some similar formal parade. Strict - march discipline to and from the training grounds must be insisted - upon. - - “It is an essential part of training for war that the men are - taught to care for themselves, so as to maintain their physical - fitness. To this end the necessity for taking the most scrupulous - care of their clothing, equipment and accoutrements will be - explained to them.” - -The following is the syllabus (slightly condensed) of a Maintenance -Course for Tank Commanders: - - How to drive a Tank. - - How to set a magneto. - - When an engine is misfiring or overheating. - - When an engine is knocking too badly to continue working or is not - pulling. - - When carburation is bad. - - When a Tank is at such an angle that it is dangerous to run the - engine. - - The causes of engine failures and how to correct them. - - How the autovac works. - - The correct tension for fan belts. - - When an engine bed is loose. - - How much petrol, oil, grease, and water should be used during - average hour’s run. - - When road chain sprocket wheels or pinions should be changed. - - How long it takes to change a set of sprocket wheels and pinions. - - When a track or the Coventry driving chains are too slack. - - When a clutch is too fierce, and how to correct it. - - When a clutch is slipping, and how to adjust it. - - When secondary gears are too much worn for further service, and - what is the effect of their not being fully in mesh. - - How long it takes to change such gears. - - When tracks or secondary gears are over or under lubricated. - - When brakes are operative or not. - - How long it takes to prepare a Tank for a day’s run. - - How long it takes thoroughly to clean and adjust a Tank after a - day’s work. - - How long it takes to detrain Tanks and adjust sponsons. - - How the equipment of a Tank should be stowed. - - The appliances which are necessary to dismantle various sections of - a Tank, and how it should be done. - - That it is just as necessary for a Company Commander to inspect - Tanks daily as it is for a Cavalry Squadron Commander to inspect - his horses. - -For an interesting “Immediate Action Course,” _i.e._, first aid to the -engine, the following directions are given to instructors: - - “In order to inspire confidence at the outset, particular stress - should be laid upon the fact that in a Tank there are practically - only three causes of engine failure--Valves--Ignition--Petrol. - - “If this is borne in mind, a very little experience in the simple - operations connected with these three functions, coupled with a - little training in diagnosis, will enable students to deal very - easily with troubles as they occur. - - “Drivers should know by the ‘feel’ of their engine whether it is - firing correctly or not, and any member of a crew ought to be able - to detect and report at once any irregularity in the sound of an - exhaust from outside the machine. - - “When the students have been through a course (using the book) of - what to do when: - - “1. The Engine won’t start, - - “2. Engine starts and stops after a few Revs, - - “3. Irregular sound of exhaust--machine will not climb, - - “4. Popping back of Carburettor, - - “5. Overheating and knocking, - - the Instructor is to set up faults for the students to remedy.” - -He is given ideas for nearly fifteen ways of producing the symptom -“Engine won’t start.” - - “It is suggested that the Instructor should insert a piece of - paper between the platinum points in the little magneto, or fit a - faulty contact breaker with a stiff rocker in the big magneto, or - smear segments and outside of the distributor with a little dirty - oil; if he desires to queer the plugs, he may insert one with its - gap closed up or bridged with dirt or with a cracked insulation. - To produce symptom No. 2, he may insert a punctured float in the - Carburettor or insert a piece of rag in the passage between the - float chamber and the jets, or block a cock under the Autovac. Or - in order to produce an irregular sound in the exhaust and to make - the machine refuse to climb, he may remove the roller and pin from - one or more inlet valves; or place two faulty plugs in the engine. - To make the engine overheat, he is to insert an extra link in the - Radiator Fan Bolt, open the Air Slide, or start a leak in one or - more of the water outlet elbows. He may make the engine tap and - rattle by adjusting the valves with abnormal clearances, and so on - with the number of other defects, which each student in turn is to - be called upon to diagnose and remedy.” - -For the conduct of a “Refresher” Battle Practice Course the following -points are suggested for the guidance of instructors: - - “The ammunition required for each man firing will be 20 rounds of - shell, 5 rounds of case shot, and 250 rounds of S.A.A. - - “Before beginning a Battle Practice, the following points must be - seen to: - - “That each practice or scheme is of a practical nature, _i.e._, - that it should bring out certain lessons under as near battle - conditions as possible. - - “All ports, etc., in the Tanks will be closed during the practice. - Targets should represent as nearly as possible those met with in - action. The practice must not be hurried and the Tank must never - contain more than the normal crew. Students should be allowed to - ride on the top of the Tanks, in order to observe the fire effect. - In this way, by observing the faults of others, they should be able - to avoid committing the same errors themselves, when their turn - comes to fire. - - “Battle Practice exercises must be regarded by the Tank Crews as - what the Field firing practices are to the Infantry. - - “Vizors and Gas-Masks must frequently be worn during a Battle - Practice Course. - - “Before the Battle Practice begins, Crews and Gunners will form up - outside the Tanks and the scheme of attack will be explained to - them; also how it is intended to carry out the attack and what are - their objectives. All drivers and gunners must fully understand the - scheme of attack and what is expected of them; they must be told to - ask their Tank Commander to explain any point that does not appear - clear to them. Positions where Anti-Tank guns are expected must be - pointed out to them on a map, and other information of this type - may be given. This will add to the keenness and interest of the men. - - “Drivers must be reminded that the goodness or badness of the - shooting will probably depend upon their driving. - - “The Gunnery Officer must see that the targets are sited properly; - he should always go over the Course in a Tank previous to the - practice to satisfy himself on these points. - - “If flashes are to be used, or moving targets employed, he must - see that the fatigue men know their work, and the Gunnery Officer - should always give these fatigue men one rehearsal before a Battle - Practice Course, as it is most important for everything to go - smoothly on the day. - - “N.C.O. Instructors must be told off, one to each gun in the Tank - which is firing, and their duty will be to see that points taught - in the elementary training are brought into play and that the - necessary safety precautions are adhered to. - - “There will always be a conference at the end of each Battle - Practice exercise. All members of the crews, students, instructors, - etc., will attend. Constructive criticism and encouragement should - be the tone of the conference. Faults brought to light should be - carefully explained so that all can hear, learn and correct, in - the future. The Gunner is as anxious to learn and to improve his - shooting as is the Instructor to have a pupil who will do him - credit.” - -Very excellent courses were also arranged in the Reconnaissance -Schools. But almost the most interesting of the Reconnaissance Side’s -activities was the series of improvised courses--outdoor schemes, -indoor practices and lectures which they arranged during the weary time -while the Tank Corps “stood to quarters” through January, February and -early March 1918. - -The events of this time we propose to chronicle in the next chapter but -one. - -There had by this time been many other Tank activities which we have -not at present chronicled at all. The French had trained and equipped a -Tank Corps. The Americans were busy with Tanks, and a Detachment of our -own Corps had fought in two engagements in Palestine. - - -_Note to Chapter XI_ - -Stories of the early days of Wool are related in the 6th Battalion -History. - -When the first few consignments of Tanks were sent to the Camp at -Bovington from Wool Station the most elaborate precautions were taken -to secure the machines from the eyes of the profane. - -The route was guarded by military policemen marshalled by A.P.M.’s. -All civilian traffic was stopped, and--as if the Tanks had been so -many Lady Godivas--all the blinds in the front rooms of the farms -and cottages which bordered the roads had to be drawn, and all the -inhabitants were relegated to the back rooms. - -This ritual was observed every time a batch of Tanks arrived. - -One farmer remarked that he was delighted to help keep the secret in -any manner that seemed good to the authorities, but he thought they -might like to know that a day or two before a Tank had broken down and -that he and his horses had helped to tow it into his yard, where it had -remained for forty-eight hours. - - - - -CHAPTER XII - -THE FRENCH TANK CORPS--AMERICAN TANKS AND BRITISH TANKS IN EGYPT - - -It is said that there is something in the Anglo-Saxon mind which has a -special affinity for committees. - -“Enough,” said the logical Asiatic when the doctrine of the Trinity was -being explained to him by the English missionary, “I understand you -perfectly. It is a Committee of three.” - -At least, there is no doubt that the British Tank sprang from -committees, and was matured and licked into shape entirely by a large -assortment of these excellent bodies. - -So with the American Tank Corps. Three or four names are equally -illustrious in its early annals. - -But with the French, one man, and one man only, stands out as the -Father and Mother of Tanks. He was the General Swinton, the Sir Albert -Stern, and the General Elles of the French Tanks. That is to say, he -was first the principal independent inventor, deriving his inspiration -(in early 1915) from Holt Tractors which he saw at work with the -British. Then he was for long the principal “propellant” of the Tank -idea in official quarters, and was the Commander-in-Chief’s delegate to -the Ministry of Munitions in the matter of Tanks. Finally, on September -30, 1916, he was gazetted “Commandant de l’Artillerie d’Assaut[49] aux -Armées.” - -So much did the personality of this remarkable man permeate and -vitalise the French Tank Corps that we offer no apology to the -reader in setting forth the following delightful miniature biography -of General Estienne by the hand of Major Robert Spencer, the British -Liaison Officer to the French Tank Corps: - - “Jean Baptiste Eugène Estienne was born at Condé en Barrois - (Lorraine) on November 7, 1860. Owing to the trend of events during - the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71 his school, the Lycée of Bar le - Duc, was forced to shut, and it was whilst enjoying an enforced - holiday at the age of ten years at Condé with his parents that - his idea of embracing a military career was born. He was one day - an interested spectator of the passage of a column of Prussian - artillery through the paved streets of his native town, and was - lost in youthful admiration of this display of military power. He - hastened back to tell his parents of his decision one day to enter - as a conqueror into a town with his guns clattering behind him. - - “From this hour he became wedded to an artillery-man’s life, and - in due course passed in and out of the famous École Polytechnique, - where his mathematical ability enjoyed full scope. - - “In due course, too, he passed through the artillery school of - Fontainebleau, and in 1884 entered the garrison town of Vannes as a - Second Lieutenant. - - “Promoted Captain in 1891, he completed his studies in the use - of the _collimateur_[50] and became the apostle of the use of - direct fire for field artillery, which he eventually succeeded - in introducing in the French Army. In 1909 he was summoned to - Vincennes with a view to determining if any use could be made of - aeroplanes in conjunction with field artillery, and succeeded in - establishing a part for F.A. aircraft service. This, however, was - transferred to the R.E. and Lieut.-Colonel Estienne consequently - asked to be returned to regimental duty. - - “In 1913 he was again summoned to Vincennes to continue his - research, and was here at the outbreak of war, when he obtained - command of the 22nd Regiment of Artillery. This he commanded in - Belgium and throughout the retreat from Charleroi to the Seine. - He had with him his two experimental aeroplanes, which rendered - invaluable service during the Battle of the Marne, where he served - under General Pétain. - - “It was during the retreat that Colonel Estienne first spoke to - members of his Staff of the future which would attend a machine - capable of crossing ploughed fields and trenches, transporting arms - and men. With this thought in his mind he was wont to invite his - casual visitors and members of his Staff to assume all manner of - peculiar attitudes under tables, etc., with a view to determining - how many human beings could conveniently be crammed in a certain - cubic area. - - “His last command before being selected to father the future _Chars - d’Assaut_ was at Verdun, when he did not hesitate to employ a - barrage of his heavy guns to break up a threatening German attack. - - “As a man he appears to enjoy perpetual youth. He is short of - stature, with no neck and a large round head. His hair is white, - plentiful and worn _en brosse_, and he appears to be clean-shaven, - so short is his clipped white moustache. - - “Two things strike one immediately, the charm of his perennial - smile and the quick brilliance of his brown eyes. - - “As a raconteur he is inimitable, whilst as a lecturer his - marvellous power of expression, his command of vocabulary and his - convincing use of simile make it possible for him to communicate to - his less erudite audiences a certain measure of his vast knowledge. - This is by no means confined to military subjects, and his power of - quotation from the classics is marked, whilst he has at least once - published a lengthy poem in a volume dealing with the mathematics - of gunnery. - - “As an ardent philologist, he bristles all over at the sound of - the word ‘Tancque’ from French lips, and opens a violent crusade - against the use of foreign words as a substitute for good French - equivalents. - - “His voice is loud and resonant and his speech accompanied by - frequent gestures, his favourite being the placing of his left hand - flat upon his chest as if he implies that his utterances emanate - from his heart. - - “He possesses many characteristic attitudes, and when in - conversation is often to be seen tossing his _képi_ from one side - of his head to the other. In fact it is scarcely ever to be seen - except jauntily tilted over one ear. - - “His admiration for the cavalryman at the head of a triumphal entry - into a town is reduced to nothingness by his conviction that he is - useless in modern war. He would prefer to see a victorious General - enter a town on foot, escorted by a section of _Chars d’Assaut_, as - being more typical of the present-day battlefield. - - “He is himself a great walker, and may frequently be seen alone, - wearing, as is his wont, a pair of pale blue spats or gaiters, a - relic of the Empire uniform, and in summer no socks. - - “This latter habit was recommended to him by a friend, and its - adoption by him is typical of the man in that he is always prepared - to give careful thought and personal trial to any scheme laid - before him. - - “To this quality, added to his immense personal charm and vast - experience, is due his undoubted right to rank amongst the big men - of this war, a successful issue to which has ever been the dream of - his life.” - -On December 1, 1915, Colonel Estienne wrote an official letter to the -Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies in which he outlined the idea -of a new engine of war exactly as Colonel Swinton had done earlier -in the year to our own War Office. A few days later he was given an -interview at French General Headquarters, when he was able to enlarge -upon his theories as to the new arm. Here he must, one conjectures, -have received some encouragement, for about a week afterwards he -visited the Schneider Engineering Works in Paris and discussed -mechanical details with the management. - -But the good seed which Colonel Estienne had sown at Headquarters -would, he knew, take some time to germinate. He returned to his -command, now the artillery of the 3rd Corps, at that time before -Verdun. All the while he kept unofficially in touch with the Schneider -Works. - -At last, about February 25, 1916, he learned that the Under-Secretary’s -Department for Artillery had decided to place an order for 400 armoured -vehicles with Schneider’s. - -But about two months later, at the end of April, he heard a more -surprising piece of news. - -The Under-Secretary’s Department had, without the approval of the -Commander-in-Chief or any notice to him, Estienne, placed an order for -a further 400 vehicles of a different and heavier type, driven by a -petrol-electric motor. - -Curious as was their parentage, these 400 machines were actually made -and were known as the St. Chamond Tanks. It is said to have been upon -stolen drawings of this type that the Germans afterwards based their -still heavier, “Hagens” and “Schultzes.” - -In the course of the summer, the new French Ministry of Munitions -formed an experimental and instructional area at Marly-le-Roi, and in -the early autumn, Colonel Estienne was gazetted to the command of the -French Tanks, and, as we have said, to be delegate, as far as this arm -was concerned, from the Commander-in-Chief to the Ministry of Munitions. - -Like the British, the French were beginning to need a name for their -new engine of war. - -But more logical than we, instead of an absurd, if pleasant, nickname, -they chose “Artillerie d’Assaut,” which they contracted into the -letters “A.S.,” as being more agreeable to the ear than “A.A.” - -Apparently Colonel Estienne had no preliminary inkling of what our -activities had been in the “Land Cruiser” direction. - -It is interesting to conjecture how eagerly he must have read of what -was happening on the Somme during the fortnight before he was finally -gazetted to his new post. His “heart” must, indeed, have been “at our -festival” when the British Tanks were everywhere acclaimed by the -public, and when even the most conservative soldiers had to admit that -the new weapon had at least earned a right to further trial. - -In October 1916 a training centre for personnel was established at -Champlieu, on the southern edge of the Forest of Compiègne, and here in -December the first lot of sixteen Schneider Tanks were delivered, other -batches both of Schneiders and St. Chamonds following them during the -succeeding months, until, in April 1917, nine Schneider Companies and -one St. Chamond Company and their crews were ready for action. - -On April 16, 1917, French Tanks took part in their first battle, -fighting with the 5th French Army in the attempted penetration of the -Chemin des Dames. - -Of the eight Schneider Companies employed, five succeeded in reaching -their third and final objectives, but owing to lack of previous -training with the infantry, the attack as a whole was not very -successful, and the Tanks, though they played an exceedingly gallant -part, suffered severely. - -A week or two later, one St. Chamond and two Schneider Companies took -part in a hurriedly prepared operation with the 6th Army. - -The Schneiders did extremely well, but of sixteen St. Chamond machines, -only one managed to cross the German trenches. All through the summer -months, the 6th French Army was preparing another attack on the west -of the Chemin des Dames, and for this battle, warned by their previous -experiences, infantry and Tanks trained diligently together, special -detachments known as _troupes d’accompagnement_ being taught how to -help the Tanks over trenches. - -But the agile mind of Colonel Estienne was not content. He had had -another idea. This time his mind had worked at the idea of the armoured -attacking force from a slightly different standpoint. - -He envisaged waves of armoured skirmishers attacking in open order, -each man possessing besides his armour a quick-firing weapon with which -he could shoot as he advanced. - -Now, armour which will protect from machine-gun and rifle fire is too -heavy for human legs. The armour must be independently propelled. More, -if its occupant is to fire as he advances, it must carry him as well -as itself. This postulates an engine, and if there is an engine, there -must be a second man to look after it. This set of propositions he laid -before the Rénault firm in July 1916, and the design of the famous -Rénault Tank was evolved. - -But the Ministry would have none of it. - -However, the designs were worked out in greater detail, and at the end -of November 1916 Colonel Estienne proposed to the Commander-in-Chief -that a number of such machines should be constructed. A few, he -explained, had already been ordered to act as “Command” Tanks for the -heavy Battalions. The Commander-in-Chief consented to a trial. - -This, however, was not held until March 1917, and when it had been -held, the Ministry were still not convinced. - -Therefore, still further demonstrations were arranged in May, when at -last they ceased to doubt, and finally, in June 1917, ordered 3500 of -the new machines. - -In October the five Companies of heavy Tanks, which had been in -training all summer, were launched when the 6th Army delivered its blow -at Malmaison. - -As before, the Schneider Companies were successful, and again the St. -Chamond Tanks were nearly all unable so much as to get into action. - -Still, at the end of October the general verdict was that the French -heavies had justified themselves, though many soldiers of the old -school still doubted their utility. - -But in November the British Tanks fought the Battle of Cambrai, and all -doubts were finally dispelled from the French mind. - -It is to be imagined that Colonel Estienne did not fail to rub in the -facts proved by that engagement. - -They were facts which it was impossible to deny or to overlook. The -Ministry removed its hold from the brakes, and from that moment life -behind the scenes of the French Tank Corps became happy. It was decided -to form thirty light Tank Battalions, each Battalion to consist of -seventy-five machines, and the firms of Schneider, Rénault and Berliet -were all set to work upon their manufacture, while over a thousand -machines were ordered in America. - -All the winter of 1917–18, the French Tank Corps, like the British, -continued to train and to organise. - -For the future of the French Tanks was to be a brilliant one. - -Those matchless givers of “unsolicited testimonials,” the German -General Staff, attributed the great victories which the late summer of -1918 brought to the French arms, chiefly to the employment of “masses -of Tanks.” - -Naturally the annals of the French Tank Corps are full of stories of -individual deeds of gallantry. - - _Chevrel, R. C., Brigadier, 505th Regt., Chars Légers._ - - “In the course of an attack he refused to abandon his Tank, which - remained isolated in the German lines. Protected by his turret, he - ceaselessly opened machine-gun fire on the surrounding enemy, and - shot down with his revolver those who succeeded in approaching the - Tank and who called upon him to surrender. For thirty-six hours - he never slackened. Finally rescued by our advancing troops, he - immediately undertook the unditching of his Tank and volunteered to - support the further advance of the infantry, and then brought his - Tank to the rallying point. - - Médaille militaire and Croix de Guerre with Palm.”--Official - Gazette, dated October 26, 1918. - - _Cellier, Pierre, Brigadier in 35th Co., 11th Heavy Battery._ - - “This soldier, on July 18, when his Tank had been hit by a shell, - placed himself at the head of fifteen American soldiers and stalked - a position whence the Germans were using many machine-guns to - resist the attack. These he engaged with an automatic rifle and - forced the Germans to surrender after an hour’s struggle. This act - resulted in the capture of fifteen officers, including one Colonel, - guns and numerous machine-guns. - - Chevalier de la Légion d’Honneur and Croix de Guerre with - Palm.”--Official Gazette. - - _Dr. Gilles, Raoul Jules Gustave, Cte. in the 506th Regt., Chars - Légers._ - - “Although blinded by wounds, brought his Tank back into French - lines guided (by signals tapped on his shoulders) by the Tank - Commander Maréchal de logis Joseph, who was himself wounded in the - stomach. - - Médaille militaire and Croix de Guerre with Palm.”--Official - Gazette, No. 2127 “D,” July 26, 1918. - -Colonel Estienne was promoted to the rank of General of Division and -received the Cravat de la Légion d’Honneur, and the Commander-in-Chief -of the French Armies issued the following special Order of the Day to -the French Tank Corps: - - “Vous avez bien mérite (de) la Patrie.” - - -AMERICAN TANKS - -By the time the United States of America declared War (April 1917) the -value of Tanks had already been demonstrated in battle by the British -in the Somme Offensive, and by the end of October 1916 the French were -already training with their first machines. It is not, therefore, -surprising that the Americans, with their great experience of Tractors -(it was, the reader will remember, an American Tractor that was the -chief ingredient in the make-up of the Mark I.) had a strong desire to -include this new arm in their Expeditionary Force. - -Colonel Rockenbach, who was later to command the American Tank Corps in -the field, was detailed to initiate preliminaries. He arrived in France -in June 1917, and followed General Pershing to Chaumont, the United -States General Headquarters, where he immediately occupied himself with -the future organisation of the Corps. - -By September 23, 1917, the provisional American Tank Corps -establishment had been approved. It was to be of a size to match -the original Expeditionary Force, which was to be limited to twenty -Divisions and ten replacement Divisions--that is to say, to one Army. -The American Tank Corps in France was to consist of five Heavy and -twenty Light Battalions, with the usual complement of Headquarters -Units, Depot Companies, instructors and Workshops; and, in the United -States, a Training Centre, accommodating two Heavy and two Light -Battalions, was to be maintained. When the American Expeditionary Force -was increased to three Armies, a new Tank Establishment was authorised -to match it. There were to be five Brigades per Army. These Brigades -were to consist of one Heavy and two Light Battalions. The Light Tanks -were to be of the French Rénault type, and the Heavy were to be of the -British pattern. The first Tanks with which the Americans were equipped -were, in fact, actually of French or British manufacture, but as soon -as an establishment was sanctioned, Tank manufacture was pushed forward -in America, and by the time the Armistice was signed, there were -several thousand American-made machines ready for shipment. - -So keen on the Tanks were Americans, that private enterprise was not -idle, and early in October 1918 a three-and-a-half-ton Ford Tank -arrived in France. This tank, indeed, had the honour to be the first -American-made Tank to appear in France. But though it was extremely -agile and handy, its designers had not quite succeeded in producing a -genuine fighting machine. It could, however, be turned out quickly and -in great quantities, and in spite of its defects, it was thought in -America that it would be worth while to continue its construction, and -tradition has it that no less than 10,000 of these little Ford Tanks -were ordered. - -In the autumn of 1917, a number of American officers who were later on -to have charge of the organising and training of the new Tank Corps -were sent on visits to the British and French Brigades, to learn as -much as they could, both from the mistakes and successes of the two -older Corps. By February 1918, there were a large number of volunteers -for the American Tank Corps, some in England at Wool, who were to form -the American Heavy Section, and others (about 500) at Burg in France, -where a Training Centre was being formed for instruction in the Light -French Rénault machines. At Burg were ten French Tanks which were -used for training purposes, and in the course of the summer, as the -personnel to be trained increased, this number was added to, and at the -end of August 124 Rénault Tanks were delivered to the Training Centre -for impending operations. - -Two Light Battalions were formed into a Brigade under Colonel G. S. -Patton, Junr., and they proceeded to the St. Mihiel Salient. Here they -went into action with the First American Army on September 12, the -first occasion on which United States Forces fought independently. - -But, alas, it was our First Battle of the Somme over again! Nobody -quite understood the habits of the new beasts, and unfortunately -both Battalions were called upon to trek over twenty kilometres to -their lying-up places from the railhead, and, the ground in the back -area being very difficult, they did not succeed in catching up the -infantry at all on the first day. The enemy resistance was, however, -very feeble, as they had already decided to give up the Salient, but -misfortune still dogged the unhappy Tanks. They had run out of petrol, -and no supplies being immediately available, they were not able to get -into action on the second day. - -On the third day, however, they did get into the fight, but by this -time the enemy had been thoroughly demoralised by the American -infantry, and there was little more for them to do than to receive the -surrender of a number of prisoners. The two Battalions suffered hardly -at all in casualties and were withdrawn practically intact. - -The American Light Tanks next appeared at the beginning of October in -the Argonne, in operations where they fought side by side with French -Tank Units. This time the two Battalions had much better luck, and -though they must have been a good deal handicapped by the fact that -they and the infantry with whom they were to co-operate had had no -opportunity of training together, the Tanks rendered good service. All -the machines were launched on the first day, although in the original -plan of the battle, it had been proposed to hold back a reserve for the -second day; but the infantry had been held up, and the reserve Tanks -had, instead, to go to the rescue in the afternoon of the first day. -From this time to October 13 these two Battalions were continuously -at the disposal of the infantry. But, as with us in the early days, -the infantry do not seem to have had a very clear idea of the uses -and limitations of the Tanks, and the Battalions were frequently -called upon to traverse many weary miles--much to the detriment of -their machines--without finally being ordered into action. On one or -two occasions they were used for independent reconnaissance and for -unsupported assaults upon positions which the infantry had failed -to capture. By the middle of October the long distance covered and -losses in battle had caused the numbers of the two Battalions to -dwindle exceedingly, and they were formed into a provisional Company, -which accompanied the advance of the American Forces right up to the -Armistice. - -A Third Light Battalion had also been mobilised and supplied by the -French with seventy-two Tanks. Recruiting, too, had been continued and -there were no less than 7000 officers and men awaiting admission to the -Corps at Burg alone. - -Meanwhile, on August 24, 1918, the 301st U. S. Heavy Battalion had left -Wool for France, and was almost immediately sent to the forward area, -where it was attached to begin with to the 1st and later to the 4th and -2nd British Tank Brigades. With the 4th Brigade and still later with -the 2nd Tank Brigade the 301st was, as we shall see in Chapters XX and -XXI, destined to take part in several successful actions. - -The 301st had based its methods of training almost entirely upon -British lines, and though the American Tank Corps would undoubtedly -have struck out improvements and methods of its own had the war gone -on, the 301st, being throughout its active service brigaded with -British Tanks, very wisely adopted a battle organisation practically -uniform with the British. Only in minor details did their habits -vary. Their reconnaissance procedure, for instance, was almost -exactly like ours, except for one improvement. Special Reconnaissance -N.C.O.’s relieved Reconnaissance Officers, Tank Commanders and Section -Commanders from the work of guiding the machines on approach marches. -From the tankodromes to the lining-up points the Tanks were in charge -of these N.C.O.’s, who were directly under the orders of the Battalion -Reconnaissance Officer. This system worked out extremely well. - -In later chapters we shall see how worthy a representative both of the -arms of the United States and of the best traditions of the British -Tank Corps the 301st Battalion proved themselves in the supreme test of -battle. - -In February 1919, to the regret of their British colleagues, the men -of the 301st sailed for America, when General Elles expressed the -sentiments of all ranks of his Corps in a special order. - - “_February 15, 1919._ - - “1. On the departure of the 301st American Tank Battalion, I wish - to place on record my appreciation of the services it has rendered. - - 2. The Battalion has practically formed part of the British Tank - Corps since April 1918, and while fully maintaining its national - identity, has co-operated with British troops and adapted itself to - British methods with a spirit that deserves fullest recognition. - - 3. In the field the 301st Battalion, after experiencing heavy - casualties in its first engagement at Bony, which might have - deterred less determined troops, volunteered for the next action, - in which, as in subsequent ones, it inflicted heavy casualties upon - the enemy at Brancourt, the Selle and Catillon. - - 4. I feel I am voicing the opinion of all commanders and troops who - have been associated with them, in expressing sincere regret at the - departure of our American comrades and in wishing them all good - fortune in the future. - - (_Signed_) H. J. ELLES, - Major-General, - Commanding Tank Corps in the Field.” - - -TANKS IN PALESTINE - -_The Second and Third Battles of Gaza, April and November 1917_ - - “Gaza yet stands, but all her sons are fallen, - All in a moment overwhelmed and fallen.” - - _Samson Agonistes._ - -The Tanks that had fought in the Battle of the Somme, in the autumn of -1916, had proved successful enough for the authorities to consider that -a test ought to be made of their capabilities in some other theatre of -war. - -Accordingly a small--a very small--detachment of Tanks was sent to -“assist our troops in the Sinai Peninsula.” - -Unfortunately only eight Tanks were ultimately sent, and -further,[51]“through an unfortunate error, old experimental machines -were sent out instead of new ones as intended.” - -The experiment was thus upon so extremely miniature a scale that -it cannot be said to have proved anything save what was already -clear, that is, the general proposition that with a few mechanical -modifications Tanks are perfectly suitable to desert warfare. - -The Tanks were, of course, too few to exert any influence upon the -fortunes of war in Palestine, and the two actions in which they fought -amid palms and cactuses and lay up in groves of fig trees, form a -curious, rather than an important, little incident in their history. - -The field on which they fought was like the plain of Flanders, one of -those ominous lands which seem predestined for ever to witness the -strife of men. - - [52]“The land from the Wadi el Arish--the ancient ‘River of - Egypt’--to the Philistian plain had for twenty-six hundred years - been a cockpit of war. Sometimes a conqueror from the north like - Nebuchadnezzar, Napoleon and Mehemet Ali, or from the south like - Ali Bey, met the enemy in Egypt or Syria, but more often the - decisive fight was fought in the gates. Ascalon, Gaza, Rafa, El - Arish, are all names famous in history. Up and down the strip of - seaward levels marched the great armies of Egypt and Assyria, while - the Jews looked fearfully on from their barren hills.... In this - gate of ancient feuds it had now fallen to Turkey’s lot to speak - with her enemy.” - -In December 1916 a little company of 22 officers and 226 other ranks, -under Major Nutt, embarked with their eight Tanks at Devonport and -Avonmouth and landed in Egypt in January. - -The first business was to show the Staffs of the various fighting -units, with whom they were to co-operate, exactly what Tanks could and -could not do. - -Demonstrations were therefore given among the sand dunes near Kilban, a -village which lies between Port Said and El Kantara on the Suez Canal. - -One day in February--the exact date seems uncertain[53]--the detachment -received orders to entrain immediately for the fighting zone, and -within three hours of receiving the message, the whole little force -with its Tanks and accessories was travelling towards the forward area. -A delay occurred half-way, at El Arish, which had only recently been -captured, but next morning the Tank Train arrived at its destination, -Khan Yunus, an old Crusaders’ stronghold, surrounded by fig groves and -lying inland about fifteen miles south-west of Gaza. - -Here the detachment remained for about ten days. - -During these ten days the First Battle of Gaza had come to an end. - -Gaza had not been captured, as, though we had fought in its streets, we -had just not been able to keep up the attack long enough to keep what -we had gained owing to lack of water. - -In his despatch, General Murray, the Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian -Expeditionary Force, characterised it as a most successful operation -which only the waterless nature of the country had prevented from being -“a complete disaster to the enemy.” - -We had been obliged to withdraw again to our water supplies, but we -immediately began to prepare a second attack in greater force. - -This time great cisterns were set up forward, and filled with -rail-borne water. Three weeks of careful preparation were allowed for -what was to prove one of the most hotly contested actions fought in the -Eastern theatre. - -We were to attack a Turkish force of about 30,000 men which lay upon a -front of some sixteen miles, between Gaza on the north and Hereira and -Sheria to the south-east. - -Two ridges, Sheikh Abbas and Mansura, run almost at right angles to the -coast and command the town of Gaza from the south, and the capture of -these heights was allotted to the 52nd, 53rd, and 54th Divisions. - -On their left flank was the sea, and their right, on the Hereira front, -was protected by the Desert Column, consisting of cavalry units and of -the Imperial Camel Corps which was manned by Australian, New Zealand, -and British personnel. - -The eight Tanks were to be widely spaced along the crucial five miles -of attack. The 53rd Division nearest to the sea was to have two Tanks, -which were to be held in reserve until the infantry had taken their -first objective. Next to them the 52nd Division was to have four Tanks, -which were to support the infantry in the attack on the Mansura Ridge. -With the 54th Division, two Tanks were to support the attack on the -Sheikh Abbas Ridge. The battle was to be in two phases; the Turkish -outer defences were to be taken in the first phase, and in the second -his inner ring was to be broken through and Gaza itself taken. - -It was a country of sand dunes, deep nullahs, and criss-cross ridges, a -labyrinth admirably adapted to defence and containing endless natural -machine-gun positions. Between Gaza and the sea the enemy had built a -double line of trenches and redoubts[54]“strongly held by infantry and -machine-guns well placed and concealed in impenetrable cactus hedges -built on high mud banks and enclosing orchards and gardens on the -outskirts of the town.” - -The Tank Detachment had been able to do little or no reconnaissance; -routes had been arranged to the starting-places, and petrol and -ammunition dumps had been formed in convenient places, but no forward -preparations had been possible. - -All eight Tanks reached their assembly places before daybreak on -April 17, and at zero hour, the dawn of what promised to be a day -of scorching heat, the first phase of the attack was successfully -launched. - -The advance of the 53rd and 52nd Divisions came as a complete surprise -to the Turks, and the six Tanks did not come into action at all on -the first day, as the enemy fled from his trenches and strongholds in -complete confusion, and the slow Mark I.’s and Mark II.’s had no chance -of getting in at him. The outer defence line had fallen by seven that -morning. The two Tanks, however, on the 54th Division’s front saw a -good deal of fighting. One received a direct hit and was destroyed, but -the other did admirable work in clearing the enemy out of his trenches, -north-west of the Abbas Ridge. The Tank inflicted heavy casualties, -and our infantry had only to come up and occupy the defences which the -Turks had abandoned. - -By the evening the three attacking Divisions found themselves in -satisfactory positions on high ground, and proceeded to entrench -themselves and to prepare for the second phase. - -On the morning of April 19 we again attacked, this time upon a wider -front, a French man-of-war and two British monitors supporting on the -left, and the Australians on the right. The three original Divisions -were, however, once more to deliver the main blow. - -A very stiff programme was outlined for the seven surviving Tanks. - -The four with the 52nd in the centre had finally four lines of defence -to attack, and their orders were changed during the night before the -action. - -With the 53rd Division two Tanks were to work separately, each having a -succession of objectives, while with the 54th the single Tank had only -one redoubt allotted to it. - -This time the Turks were ready for us. - -One of the Tanks with the 53rd Division, the “Tiger,” led the infantry -advance on its sector. The enemy was quickly driven from our first -objective, Samson Ridge. The Tank went on to the second objective, -the El Arish redoubt, but the infantry being unable to follow, after -being in action for six hours and having fired 27,000 rounds from its -machine-guns, the Tank withdrew, all its crew being wounded. - -On the front of the 52nd Division, our advance was hotly contested. - -The Turks had massed hundreds of machine-guns along their entire front, -but on this sector their fire was particularly intense. One tank was -able to do good service at Outpost Hill, which it helped to clear -before receiving a direct hit. - -Of the other three Tanks, one fell into a gully, the sides of which -unexpectedly crumbled under its weight; another was put out of action -by a direct hit, while the third eventually rallied. - -The objective of the Tank fighting with the 54th Division was a -particularly strong redoubt. The work was held in force, but the -garrison soon surrendered on the advance of the Tank. Our infantry -immediately took over the position, which the Turks forthwith proceeded -to shell. - -It was not long before the Tank was hit and one of its tracks broken, -and the Turks, counter-attacking, eventually captured Tank, infantry -and redoubt. - -By nightfall our position all along the line was unfavourable. The left -of the 54th Division was more or less in the air. We had, in several -parts of the line, been forced off the lately won main ridges. We had -lost 7000 men, and our troops were worn out by the dust and heat, and -were once more short of water. The battle had to be admitted as a -failure. The Tanks had been too few and of too old a type for the work -they had been given. - -Their co-operation was, however, much appreciated, and they were -considered to have given a good deal of protection to the infantry. - -It is interesting to note that by the time the battle was over these -antiquated machines are said, on an average, each to have covered forty -miles of country. - - -_The Third Battle of Gaza_ - -The Second Battle of Gaza had been so completely unsuccessful that -the troops who had been engaged in it had to be withdrawn from their -advanced positions. - -The Tanks were concentrated in a fig grove to the rear. Here, no work -being found for them, they stayed till October, being reinforced by -three Mark IV. machines. - -General Allenby had now succeeded to the command, and there was to be -another attack upon Gaza, for the town and its defences effectually -barred our further advance along the coast or towards Jerusalem. - -We were this time to operate upon a still wider front. The usual shock -troops, the same three Divisions and their eight Tanks, were to attack -nearest the coast. - -Next to them, a mixed force of French, Italian and West Indian troops -were to make feint raids near Outpost Hill. - -Opposite Gaza itself several cavalry Divisions, mounted and dismounted, -were to attack, and from Hereira to Beersheba a synchronised assault -was to be made by the Australians. The position was, in fact, to be -turned by an extensive flanking movement. - -On October 23, 1917, the Tanks moved up to a new station on the beach. - -From here, on horseback and by boat, the new area was thoroughly -reconnoitred. This was the special country of cactus hedge and strong -mud bank, and in it had been dug a veritable labyrinth of trenches. It -had been a country of small fig groves and of little irrigated gardens, -and its close boundaries afforded unending cover to the enemy. However, -it was divided into Tank sectors, and by dint of patient toil, the -Tank Commanders at last formed a more or less coherent picture of the -intricacies. Tank Officers and N.C.O.’s were attached to each Brigade -with which they were to work, for ten days before the battle. - -Most of the Tanks were detailed to bring up R.E. stores, such as wire, -pickets, shovels and sandbags for their infantry. These things they -were to carry on their roofs. - -The first phase of the attack, timed in consideration of a full moon -for an hour before midnight, was to be independent of Tanks, and was -to consist of an infantry attack protected by a creeping barrage. -While this attack was going on, six of the Tanks were to move to their -starting-points, in order to be ready to advance at 3 a.m. Two Tanks -were held in reserve. It will be observed that the plans, preparations -and liaison were in general much more complete than for the Second -Battle of Gaza, but unfortunately one mistake of that battle was -repeated. - -The six first-line Tanks were given among them no less than twenty-nine -objectives to attack. - -At eleven o’clock on the night of November 1–2, the first phase of the -battle began. - -The 156th Infantry Brigade attacked Umbrella Hill, the first -objective. The Turks were taken completely by surprise, there was -little resistance, and even their artillery seemed too startled to fire. - -Unfortunately, however, the smoke of the battle and a dense haze made -so thick an atmosphere that not a ray of the expected moonlight reached -the combatants, and the infantry had to fight and the Tanks to manage -their approach march in profound darkness. - -Also, when the enemy’s artillery at last woke up, it was to open a -heavy fire on our back areas, where the second wave was gathering. All -the Tanks, however, came safely through and were at their stations half -an hour before the second zero at 3 a.m. - -The Turkish resistance had by now stiffened, and when the Tanks and -the fresh infantry advanced behind a heavy barrage it was to meet with -dogged opposition. - -The two Tanks detailed to the El Arish redoubt were, after a stiff -fight, successful in driving the enemy out of the enclosed stronghold, -and were making their way through the maze of trenches, cactus hedges -and gardens beyond, when one received a direct hit and the other got -ditched in the darkness. Both crews at once joined the infantry. -Slowly, scrambling up the mud banks, often fighting hand to hand in the -darkness, we advanced. The Turks were fighting stubbornly, but inch by -inch we pushed them back. The remaining Tanks lumbered slowly on. - -At last all along the coast all the objectives were taken. No. 6 Tank -captured Sea Post, and, followed by the infantry, moved along the -enemy’s trenches, crushing down the wire as far as Beach Post. It -successively attacked three other strong points and deposited its R.E. -stores at the appointed place. It was again moving forward to attack -a certain isolated Turkish trench when one track broke, so ending a -brilliant innings. The crew went on, but the Tank had to be temporarily -abandoned. - -The two reserve Tanks both caught fire through the empty sandbags with -which their roofs were loaded being set ablaze by the heat of their -exhaust pipes. - -The coastal attack had done its work, and the Turks’ hold upon Gaza had -been loosened. - -The other attackers, the troops who had advanced from Beersheba, broke -through the enemy’s resistance completely, and drove them back for nine -miles on an eight-mile front. - -The battle was decisive, and after about three days’ fighting our -troops at last entered Gaza. Our persistency in attack was well -rewarded. The _Spectator_, commenting on the battle, said, “Samson took -away the gates of Gaza, but General Allenby has secured the gates of -Palestine.” - -On the whole the Tanks had been a success. - -All machines except one reached their first objectives; four reached -their second, third, and fourth, and one Tank reached its fifth. - -All five damaged machines were afterwards salved. - -This was the last Tank action fought with the Army of Palestine, for, -for some reason or other, the repaired and renovated Tanks were never -used again. - -Later, however, during the Turkish retreat, we had great trouble in -rounding up the tattered and wandering Turkish rearguard. - -We felt the need of some sort of sheep-dog, so a mission was sent to -France to ask for a number of Whippet Tanks. - -By an ironical chance, this mission reached Tank Headquarters in France -on March 21, the very day the German offensive was launched. It need -not be added that no Whippets were sent. - -There seemed no work left for the heavies, and the Tank Detachment, -therefore, handed over their machines to the Ordnance Department at -Alexandria, and returned to England. - - - - -CHAPTER XIII - -SUSPENSE--THE “SAVAGE RABBITS” EPISODE--THE ENEMY’S INTENTIONS - - -The story of the Tank Corps from the beginning of February to nearly -the end of March 1918 is one of waiting and expectancy, of strategic -moves to unexpected places, of diligent rehearsal for first nights upon -which the curtain never rose, of endless preparations for events which -never happened. - -And through all the moves, in all the odd billets, or in the open -fields, when--in hourly expectation of the German attack--Tanks -and their crews lay ready under the hedges, run the Tank Corps’ -Pinkerton-like efforts at self-improvement, its determination to finish -its winter training. - -From before the middle of January we had been perfectly aware that the -enemy meant to strike and to strike hard. He held a wasting security. -We were waxing and he was waning. He was still our superior, still had -more men available, but by Midsummer he knew that the Allies would -outnumber him. - -He had troubles, we knew, at home too, troubles for which the only -salve was victory. - -We had besides long known that before the war ended, whenever and -however that end might come, we must expect a last desperate struggle. -It would be the last spring of the wounded beast in which he might -still find our throats, the last staggering blast of the hurricane by -which the ship might still be confounded and overwhelmed. - -Every sign spoke of the coming storm, but none told from which quarter -we must expect it. The Germans were concentrating in such a way--at the -base of the great salient formed by their line--that they could plant -their blow wherever it might at the last moment seem good to them. - -For better or worse, it was decided that our available forces were to -be impartially distributed all along the line. Not that we had very -much choice, as with our limited resources a concentration at any one -strategic point must imply virtual gaps in our defence elsewhere. - -For we had in January taken over an additional forty miles of line, and -the men for whom the High Command in France had so frequently pleaded -had not been sent out to them. - -We were in for a lean three months, and to hold the extended line was -as much as we could hope to accomplish. - -The British and French Spring Campaign must be a defensive one. There -was no longer a Russian front, and till the Americans were ready--which -could not be till Midsummer at earliest--the Germans would have a -numerical preponderance of nearly a quarter of a million men. Besides -this, their position on interior lines and their superior lateral -railway communications could at any moment give them an overwhelming -local superiority. - -However, we had faced worse odds before. We could form a strong line -and cunning schemes of defence against which the enemy would hammer in -vain. Our first defence was a deep forward zone. It consisted first of -an outpost line and second of a “line of resistance.” - -The line of resistance was extremely carefully laid out. About every -mile redoubts of special strength were so arranged that on this sector -an attack would be entrapped into our wire and held exposed to a -cross-fire from our machine-guns. - -The line was, in fact, to offer “patches” of resistance, and so break -up the ordered advance of the enemy, who was to arrive at the next -line, the “battle zone,” weakened and disorganised. - -Here the main fight was to take place, and upon this zone we lavished -all our skill and industry, and, having faith, we prepared no serious -positions in rear of it. - -The Tanks were spaced out all along a sixty-mile front. - -Near Lens in the 1st Army area was the 1st Tank Brigade. - -The 2nd Brigade was in 3rd Army Reserve at Haplincourt, near Bapaume. - -The 3rd Brigade--which was in process of being equipped with Whippet -Tanks--was also in 3rd Army Reserve. - -The 4th Brigade was attached to the 5th Army and established itself in -camps near Péronne. - -The 5th Brigade was in process of forming, and therefore had no -definite task allotted to it, though, as we shall see, the 13th (its -nucleus) Battalion actually saw a considerable amount of fighting. - -Each Tank Brigade got out a defence scheme in conjunction with the Army -to which it was attached. As a rule the Tanks--which had been moved up -as secretly as possible--were to lie in ambush till the last moment, -and then, emerging--as General Elles described it--“like Savage Rabbits -from their holes,” were to fall upon the Germans in flank or rear. - -His phrase struck the fancy of the Tank Corps, and the whole of this -period is frequently referred to _tout court_ as “Savage Rabbits,” -somewhat to the bewilderment of the uninitiated. - - -II - -Their schemes prepared, their Tanks in position, after an exhaustive -reconnaissance, the Tank Corps waited, a process which all troops find -both tedious and demoralising, unless some really profitable means can -be found of employing their time. - -For the Tank Corps the need of the moment was further training. Several -of the Battalions had been dragged untimely from half-finished courses, -several were almost fresh from Wool, and had still most of their -tactical training to do. Everywhere there were units and individuals -who had lost “school attendances” to make up. - -The great difficulty was that Battalions and even Companies were so -spread out and scattered that it was almost impossible to collect the -students for instruction. - -The regular curriculums were out of the question, so the directors of -Tank training immediately set to work to evolve new courses that would -fit the altered circumstances. - -In some ways the Reconnaissance Side fared best. - -Their chief instructional material--the actual country to be fought -over--was there for their students to study, and even when the pupils -were so scattered that a sufficient audience could not be collected -for a formal lecture, many ingenious little practical schemes could be -carried out and written work could always be done. - -They had a fairly definite standard to aim at. Had the battalions -remained in the training areas, every officer and man would have been -put through a five days’ course in Reconnaissance. Under normal -conditions such courses were arranged more or less as follows: - - _On the first day_, the students heard an introductory lecture, - practised chalk layering, heard a short discourse on map reading, - did a practical comparison of map and country upon which they had - to answer questions. - - _On the second day_, visualising country from a map was taught, and - practice indoors was gone through with a model. In the afternoon - panorama sketching was practised, a short lecture heard, some - visualising was done and the characterisation of landmarks was - practised, the day being finished up by night guiding. - - _On the third morning_, close observation of a certain sector, - involving sketches and notes, was undertaken, and visibility - practices carried out. Later, the students were taken for an - “observation march,” and having described the features of the - country they had traversed, they had to write a report upon the new - sector which they had observed in the morning, and upon this report - they were later questioned. - - _On the fourth day_, a new sector was visited, upon which they had - previously made notes from a map. These notes they had to compare - with reality, and to notice whether their imagination had been - faulty. A lecture on obstacles commonly found on approach marches - followed, and one on aerial photographs with practical work. Night - work followed, with special reference to the study of the stars. - - _On the fifth day_, oblique and other aerial photographs were - compared with the actual ground, and a lecture was delivered - summing up the special points of the course. - -Sometimes, however, during the “Savage Rabbit” period, lectures were -possible, and for these occasions a rather new type of discourse was -evolved, in which the broader aspects of Reconnaissance and of the -study of country were dealt with. - -Local history was recalled:--how men had lived and fought in the -villages and cornfields that lay immediately about them; how that great -abbey church that stood alone was erected by a group of pious merchants -as a thankoffering for their town’s escape from the plague; how to this -little town the Revolution had brought a Committee of Public Safety, -and how it had held its red assize in the coffee-room of the Hôtel de -l’Europe, or how Bonaparte had lain at this or that château on his way -to the Camp at Boulogne. - -Or again, the lecture might be more strictly military and concern the -place of Reconnaissance amongst the arts of war, and the action and -reaction of one arm of the Service upon another--the ever-present -trilogy of wire, trench and machine-gun, new theories of artillery -work, the latest fashions in tactics or the effects of the latest -poison-gas. - -Then, where some isolated Tank Company or even section lay ready day -and night by its machines and lectures were impossible, an itinerant -instructor would set the exiles little schemes to carry out. - -The two following exercises are typical:-- - - “Two small parties of officers go at different times to positions - from which a good view is obtainable. They pick out landmarks, - etc., and their peculiarities, taking notes or making sketches. - From these notes or sketches each party writes out three or four - questions on landmarks, general observation, routes taken, etc. - On their return the two parties exchange their questions, answers - are written, and these answers returned to the writers of the - questioners to correct. - - “Catch questions, such as ‘How many windows had such and such a - house?’ will, of course, be discountenanced, and only useful tests - permitted. - - “Exercise II.--The student was asked to sketch the outline of a - cottage from about 800 yards distant. He then had to consider from - the position of the house on the map, and the contour lines of the - ground, what the appearance of that cottage would be likely to be - from a different point of view. Of this hypothetical elevation he - had then to make an outline sketch, and finally to walk over the - ground and compare his imaginings with actuality.” - -Practices for approach marches were also given by means of an exercise -on tape laying and the taking of compass bearings. - - -III - -And still the Germans stayed their hands, and still we waited and -speculated upon what the coming campaign might hold for us. For the -Tank Corps it seemed certainly to portend a new form of warfare--the -Tank duel. - -All sorts of things were rumoured concerning the German preparations, -and the sheets of the Tank Corps Intelligence Summary for late February -are full of little items of information of a perfectly new kind. - -Tanks of some sort were certainly being made at Krupp’s. - -Prisoners had been caught who described them as larger and heavier than -the British machines. We had reason to believe that men were being -withdrawn from certain other units to form Tank crews. - -Then, in the next day’s Summary, it would be reported that airmen had -found out that in certain Regimental, Brigade, and Divisional training -schemes which were being carried out by the enemy, horses and wagons -were being used, representing Tanks. Combined infantry and Tank attacks -of all sorts appeared to be being rehearsed. Again, some recently -captured prisoners said that a few derelict Tanks, which the Germans -had taken at Cambrai, were being put into order, they seemed to think, -as training rather than as fighting machines. - -It is to be imagined that the notion of the new warfare, of meeting -their kind in combat for the first time, was exceedingly interesting to -all ranks of the Tank Corps; and there was not a single hut in a single -camp where wonderful new ideas for tactics and manœuvres wherewith to -annihilate the new enemy, were not really elaborated. - -We did not know that the bitterness and anxiety of a long retreat -lay before us; a retreat whose gall and wormwood were to enter into -our very souls, and of whose confused events it is even now almost -impossible to write either with accuracy or impartiality. - - - - -CHAPTER XIV - -THE MARCH RETREAT - - “A mile around the city, - The throng stopped up the ways; - A fearful sight it was to see - Through two long nights and days. - - “For aged folks on crutches, - And women great with child, - And mothers sobbing over babes - That clung to them and smiled, - And sick men borne in litters - High on the necks of slaves, - And troops of sun-burned husbandmen - With reaping-hooks and staves. - - “And droves of mules and asses - Laden with skins of wine, - And endless flocks of goats and sheep, - And endless herds of kine, - And endless trains of waggons - That creaked beneath the weight - Of corn-sacks and of household goods, - Choked every roaring gate. - - “Now, from the rock Tarpeian, - Could the wan burghers spy - The line of blazing villages - Red in the midnight sky. - The Fathers of the City, - They sat all night and day, - For every hour some horseman came - With tidings of dismay.” - - LORD MACAULAY. - - -I - -About March 14 the 3rd and 5th Armies were warned by their aerial -reconnaissance that a new and ominous concentration was taking place -behind the enemy’s lines. - -These two Armies, to which the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Tank Brigades were, -it will be remembered, attached, held the line which lay between -Bullecourt to the north and St. Quentin to the south. - -Behind them lay the old Somme battlefields, and about them was a dry, -rather bare, downland country with few woods and divided up by broad -valleys that ran east and west across it. It was a part of the line -upon which we had long considered the blow might probably fall. - -The 3rd and 5th Armies, now on the alert, immediately set about raiding -the enemy and, having captured the desired prisoners and examined them, -were consistently told the same story. - -Thursday, March 21, was to be the day of attack. - -The weather, which had been clear and bright for a week or two, broke -on Tuesday, the 19th, and all day it rained heavily. On the night of -the 20th a thick mist came up and lay densely over the downs. Such -weather conditions only made an attack the more certain, and all along -the line Tanks were moved forward into their allotted positions. - -At two o’clock in the morning of the 21st the British line was warned -to expect an attack. The forward zone was already fully manned, but at -4.30 an order was sent out to man the battle zone. Nor was the order -premature. The mist still lay heavily over the lines, and under its -cover the Germans had secretly pushed up their troops until all along -the front between Bullecourt and La Fère, they had massed thirty-seven -divisions on a line little more than a mile from our outposts. - -The drama was about to begin. At a quarter to five every German battery -from the Marne to Dunkirk opened fire. Such a bombardment had never -been known before, and it reached its zenith on the fronts of the 3rd -and 5th Armies. - -Torrents of gas shells and high explosives were poured out upon our -forward and battle lines, upon our Headquarters, upon our artillery -positions, and upon all our lines of communication. - -The batteries of the 3rd and 5th Armies replied as best they could, -but owing to the mist our artillery observers were helpless. It was -impossible to see fifty yards ahead, and the German fire seemed to -crash upon us out of some alien planet. - -By 8 or 9 o’clock the first parties of Germans had begun to advance, to -cut our wire here and there along the front of attack, and to filter -unobtrusively through our outpost line. - -We began to perceive that the enemy was behaving in a most -unaccountable way. Even by 10 o’clock--as far as we could learn in -the confusion--he seemed in some places to have made no attempt at -an infantry attack at all. In others compact but apparently isolated -little parties of Guards or Cockchafers, or men from some other picked -regiment, had pushed right through our forward zone and were away -beyond the places where the cross-fire from our machine-guns was to -have checked them, before the men in the redoubts, half-blind amid the -clouds of gas, had realised that any Germans had crossed No Man’s Land. -Again and again the garrisons were overwhelmed from the rear before -they could send back any warning to the men behind in the battle zone. -When they did endeavour to signal, the S.O.S. would be blanketed in the -mist. - -Only too often the first news of the attack to reach our batteries was -the appearance of German infantry on their flank and rear. - -There would be nothing left but to mow down the enemy at point-blank -range, till finally the gun crews were overwhelmed by the in-flooding -tide. - -As at Ypres, we had begun amazedly to feel that we were up against -a type of tactics against which we had never fought before. Our -conjecture was perfectly right. It was a system of surprise, and of the -theory of _Sturmtruppen_ carried to its extreme conclusion. Mr. Buchan -has likened the new method to the advance of a hand whose finger-tips -are shod with steel pushing its way into a soft substance. - -In practice the assault was conducted as follows: The infantry attack -was preceded by a short but extremely intense bombardment in which a -large proportion of gas was used. - -This was followed by the advance at irregular intervals of clusters -of highly trained assault troops, carrying light trench mortars or -machine-guns (each cluster really constituting a kind of human Tank. -It was well, indeed, for us that they were no more than mere flesh -and blood, and neither armoured nor engined.) These clusters, which -were closely followed and supported by the field batteries, made gaps -through which the line troops poured, guided by an elaborate system of -flares and rockets. - -Each section of the defence might thus find itself caught between the -“fingers”--outflanked and encircled. - -Each body of the advancing enemy was under the command of a specially -trained officer, whose leadership generally proved a model of skill and -initiative; each detachment was instructed to push on as far as its -strength allowed, and every man carried iron rations for several days. - -When a regiment had advanced as far as it was able, another took its -place, the waves of the advance thus leapfrogging over each other in an -endless chain. - -The dangers of such tactics are obvious, but on March 21 the system was -portentously successful. - - -II - -As in all disasters, events seemed to move with a terrible rapidity. - -A moment before the motor accident you are a free man; a moment after -and you are involved in an endless line of consequences which have -sprung up while you could hold your breath, and amid whose mushroom -growth you may wander for the rest of your life. - -Five hours after the opening of the German cannonade the world seemed -to have changed for the two armies which had stood in the path of the -hurricane. - -In the course of the next fourteen days the Germans were to sweep -forward for forty miles, and their advance was even then to be checked, -not by the British Army, but by the gradual attenuation of their supply -system. - -The whole fourteen days of the retreat were completely confused. Units -were inextricably mixed, and communications were impossible. - -Some sort of immediate action was always having to be taken by -junior Commanders on information which they justly believed to be -untrustworthy. There were often more Germans to the flank of any given -body than to its front. When we try to form any general conception -of the events of this period, we seem to see the actors moving in a -kind of mist from which they emerge for a moment, perform some action -which may or may not appear relevant, and then disappear again into -the confusion, leaving us to guess at the meaning of the play. As far -as the events of such a time can be chronicled, we propose for this -fortnight to follow separately the doings of the three Tank Battalions -chiefly involved, and to make no effort to present a coherent picture -of this return to the reign “of Chaos and old Night.” - -The 4th and 5th Battalions (4th Brigade) lay near Cartigny (south of -Péronne). - -On the morning of the 21st the two Battalions of Tanks were moved up -into the line, two Tanks of the 4th Battalion counter-attacking at -Peizière and clearing a railway cutting of the enemy. - -On the 22nd all the Tanks were ordered into action. The infantry were -retreating, and their chief duty was to gain time and to cover that -retreat. - -Twelve Tanks of the 5th Battalion attacked the enemy at Hervilly -Wood, and several from the 4th Battalion near Epehy. Both detachments -suffered rather severely. - -At this point the two Battalions seem to have more or less parted -company. - -Seventeen Tanks belonging to the 5th Battalion rallied at Cartigny that -night, and next day (the 23rd) were ordered to retire over the Somme. - -The only available crossing place was the bridge at Brie, a few miles -to the south. - -They set off immediately, but the enemy advance was too rapid for them. -They were unable to cross the bridge, and, lest they should fall into -the hands of the enemy, all the machines were destroyed by their crews. - -The story of one of these Tanks is told in the 5th Battalion History: - - “Second Lieutenant T. E. Van Zeller’s Tank was covering the - withdrawal of the infantry across the Somme, moving from Cartigny - to Brie on the east side of the river. He inflicted severe - casualties on the enemy, and was under heavy and continuous - shell-fire. On arriving at Brie late in the afternoon of the 23rd, - he found that the bridge was about to be blown up, and that his - Tank could not cross. He accordingly destroyed his Tank, and then - directed his crew in assisting to carry wounded across the bridge. - Finding two men seriously wounded who had been left behind, he - decided, with three of his crew, to make an effort to rescue them - at the last moment. - - “When half-way across, the bridge was blown up in front and behind - them. Second Lieutenant Van Zeller, however, succeeded in getting - the whole party across the débris under heavy shell-fire, and - finally brought them back behind our lines on the west side of the - river. - - “For this he was awarded the M.C., and the three members of his - crew who assisted in the last plucky effort were each awarded the - Military Medal.” - -There were other places where the now “dismounted” Tank crews could -cross the river. - -But they had no means of transport, and were, therefore, obliged to -burn or otherwise destroy most of their stores and kit. - -Indeed, as a rule, the Lewis guns from the Tanks were their only -salvage. - -One Staff Sergeant, however, hid away or buried a number of his tools, -and six months later, when the British advance swept back again, they -were recovered. - -By March 24 the Battalion had lost all its Tanks. But in almost every -case the Lewis guns had been salved. - -As the crews fell back they were immediately organised as Lewis gun -detachments, and distributed along the line wherever their help was -most needed. - -Colonel O’Kelly, Commanding the 5th Tank Battalion, had to use his -own initiative in the matter, as communications were by this time -hopelessly disorganised and the need was instant. - -Once, too, a detachment had been sent off, as it were disappeared, and -each party had to rely upon its individual Commander. - -Tank crews had had no training in this kind of warfare, but the strange -dilemmas in which a Tank frequently finds itself had accustomed them to -the unexpected, and thus left alone they displayed plenty of initiative. - -The chief work which fell to them was that of forming rearguards and of -protecting the retreat of the infantry. - -Food and ammunition were both short, and they, like the other troops, -suffered many hardships. - -Each of these Lewis gun detachments was made up of about four officers -and forty men, and they ordinarily had twelve Lewis guns with them. - -Three such detachments fought near Masvillers and Merlaincourt, others -near Villers Bretonneux, Caix, Harbonnières and Marcourt, the general -retreat carrying them back almost to Amiens. - -Again and again small parties failed to get the orders to retire in -time, and had to fight their way back after being surrounded and cut -off by the enemy. - -Sometimes they fought with French infantry, but chiefly with the -Sherwoods, Queen’s and Royal Fusiliers of the 19th Corps. - -Extraordinarily good individual work was done, as the list of honours -shows. The story of a 5th Battalion detachment gives a typical picture: - - [55]“The 5th detachment under the command of Lieutenant Pitt, - consisted of Second Lieutenants Whyte and Storm, forty-one men and - seven guns. On March 28 this detachment was attached to ‘Carey’s - Force’ and ordered to hold the line on each side of the Villers - Bretonneux--Warfusée--Abancourt Road, a position which was to be - held for two days at all costs. - - “While placing his guns, Lieutenant Pitt was wounded and Second - Lieutenant Whyte took over the command. - - “A Vickers gun section was in position north of the road, so Second - Lieutenant Whyte posted his guns on the south side. The infantry - holding the line at this point were all low category men and - convalescents, and not more than twenty men had any experience of - holding a rifle. - - “At 6 p.m. on the 28th, word was received that the enemy were about - to attack and, at close range, machine-gun fire was opened on them. - - “The infantry began to fall back, but were rallied by Second - Lieutenant Whyte and Captain Bingham, M.C., and taken back to their - former position. - - “Second Lieutenant Whyte then assumed command of this section. At - 10 p.m. the enemy again attacked, but were again driven back by the - Lewis gun fire. - - “On the following day (29th) the enemy launched an attack on the - right, but it was completely broken up by enfilade fire from Second - Lieutenant Whyte’s guns, the enemy suffering extremely heavy - casualties. Some relief was afforded on the night of 29th-30th by - cavalry, who came up on the right of this sector. - - “Enemy machine-guns and snipers were very active, but two of the - former and three snipers were accounted for by Lewis gun fire. - Second Lieutenant Whyte held the line until 10.30 p.m. on the 31st, - when he was relieved by Australian troops. - - “For his gallant defence of this position Second Lieutenant Whyte - was awarded the M.C. - - “Corporal S. Archbold working under Second Lieutenant Whyte showed - conspicuous gallantry throughout these trying days. Single-handed - he worked his Lewis gun, carrying it and its ammunition to a new - position, firing it and loading his magazines without assistance - for twenty-four hours. During this period he helped in breaking two - enemy attacks. - - “On the 30th he was wounded in the head by a sniper, but continued - to work his gun all day until he was ordered by his officer to the - dressing-station. This devotion to duty gained for him the D.C.M. - Another member of this party, Pte. W. Lyon, was awarded the M.M. - for carrying important messages in broad daylight across the open - under heavy machine-gun and rifle fire at 200 yards range.” - -Between March 24 and April 2 the 5th Battalion had sent a total of -eighty-four Lewis guns and crews into the line. - -Every available man had gone, cooks, officers’ servants, clerks and -orderlies. They had suffered heavy casualties, and on April 4 the -Battalion, or what was left of it, was taken to Auchy by lorry. - -Here they drew Hotchkiss guns, and began to train again. But they were -not to be left long in peace. - -On April 12 they had orders to form again as a Lewis gun Battalion, -and next day found them once more in the forward area, this time at -Meteren, not far from Hazebrouck, where they relieved an infantry -Battalion which had held a switch line through the village and an -isolated point near Meteren Church. On April 15 they got news that the -enemy had captured high ground between Neuve Eglise and Bailleul, and -on the 16th the enemy advanced on Meteren. - - “Breaking through a section of trench which had been left unmanned, - they forced back the infantry on the right and also ‘B’ Company, - and got behind the latter. No. 8 section was entirely cut off and - lost. - - “Second Lieutenant Carter showed great presence of mind at this - juncture. He was Reconnaissance Officer of his Company. On seeing - the position caused by the enemy break-through, he immediately - rallied and reorganised the various parties as they fell back and - took up a line in rear. He was all the time under heavy shell-fire. - - “The position of ‘C’ Company had then become precarious. - - “Second Lieutenant Dawson, assisted by Second Lieutenant Bayliss, - immediately placed four of his guns in the open, covered the now - exposed flank and held up the attack. During the night of the - 27th-28th he dug a trench, connecting these isolated posts with our - original line, and posted his guns in this new trench. The enemy - mounted two guns behind a hedge about 200 yards in front of the - position. These two guns, however, were knocked out before firing a - shot. The Germans also tried to assemble behind this same hedge for - an attack; but they were driven back with heavy casualties. This - well-thought-out defence performed throughout under frontal and - enfiladed fire, saved the company from an attack which would have - endangered the entire position.” - -On April 17 the Battalion, except for twenty guns, was relieved by the -Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. After helping to hold back one more -serious attack, the remaining gun crews were finally withdrawn and -joined the rest of the Battalion at the Mont des Cats. - -On April 24 detachments of the 5th Battalion, which were helping to man -the line before Kemmel, were heavily in action. - -The enemy attacked after a fierce bombardment, and Kemmel Hill was -taken. - -On the 29th the enemy opened a heavy gas and H.E. barrage and attacked -Mont Rouge in force. They were driven away, but returned again and -again, always being beaten off. - -At last in the first days of May the Battalion was relieved, and was -sent back to the training and rest area at Blangy, the Divisional -General having complimented the gun crews upon their conduct in the -field. - -The story of the 4th Battalion is very like that of the 5th. All -through the last days of March there was the same heartbreaking -destruction of machines that had run out of petrol or grease, or were -suffering from some slight defect which there was no time to rectify. -Again kits and orderly-room material had to be burnt, and again the -Lewis guns were salved. The usual Lewis gun detachments were formed, -but this time did not have quite so much fighting, their chief battle -being on March 26, on the Bray-Albert road, where they did exceedingly -well. - -The 2nd Battalion was near Maricourt when the crash came, and -twenty-five of their Tanks went into action on the afternoon of March -22. - - [56]“The Tanks had to come into view when they crossed the - Bapaume-Cambrai road, and as soon as the enemy spotted them coming - into action, very heavy machine-gun fire was brought to bear upon - them, to be followed in a few minutes by heavy direct artillery - fire. Several Tanks were knocked out by shells almost as soon as - they arrived amongst the enemy infantry, who were found to be very - numerous, as if massing for a further advance. - - “The appearance of the Tanks seems to have been a complete surprise - to the enemy infantry, who became disorganised and retired some - distance in confusion. - - “The Tanks carried out the attack without any infantry, and - practically no artillery, co-operation. - - “The casualties both in Tanks and personnel were heavy, but the - attack achieved its object, in that it upset the plans of the enemy - and delayed any further attack on their part for nearly twenty-four - hours. It was known at the time by the Staff that the enemy was - massing for an attack at once, and the appearance of the Tanks - rendered this impossible. - - “The first Tanks came out of action about 7.30 p.m.” - -Of the twenty-five Tanks which went into action only six came out -undamaged, and the Battalion was not really in a fit state to fight -again without reorganisation. - -But the enemy were still advancing, and the Albert-Bapaume road had to -be defended at all costs. - -So on the 24th the surviving Tanks were manned and sent forward again, -and the Tankless crews were formed into Lewis gun detachments. - -They waited all through the night of the 24th expecting to be sent -forward. - -No orders came till midday on March 25, when they were sent to the 3rd -Tank Brigade Camp near Bray, which they later in the day were ordered -to burn to prevent it from falling into the hands of the enemy. - -All next day the infantry fell back, and with them the Lewis gun teams. - -Some idea of the confusion may be gathered from the fact that at this -moment the 2nd Battalion was separated into no less than eight parts, -none of which could communicate quickly enough with its fellows to make -any combined action possible. - -The 8th and 10th Battalions still had some Tanks in going order, -and, on the day when the 3rd Army was forced across the old Somme -battlefield, they fought an exceedingly good rearguard action on either -side of the Albert-Bapaume road. The Tanks received a special message -of commendation from the General Commanding the 3rd Army. - -Another incident--of which the authors have not been able to obtain -many particulars--was the action fought by a scratch Tank force formed -out of all the fighting Tanks from the driving school, Aveluy. - -The 7th Battalion was one of several which were not in the path of the -hurricane, and consequently lost no Tanks. - -A certain number of its men were, however, organised as Lewis gun -detachments, and by mid-April saw a considerable amount of fighting. - -One such detachment was attached to the 61st Division near Nieppe -Forest, and with them manned a line of fortified shell-holes. - -There were no trenches and the country was absolutely flat. The -whereabouts of the enemy was extremely uncertain. The Tank Lewis -gunners held about a mile and a half of improvised line, their -headquarters being a little farmhouse not far from Merville. Hardly -had the detachment taken over than the enemy put down a hot barrage. -A Reconnaissance Officer who was present described the events that -followed in a letter home: - - “I went out of the northern door of the farm. A beastly sniper’s - bullet whizzed past my head, and then another and another. The - bullets were all coming from the north, and it seemed as though - Fritz had made his way through the town and would get us from the - rear. This is what he did do. A sergeant was killed next to me, - and Norton[57] told me to go back to Divisional Headquarters and - report the situation. After I had been there about an hour, a - runner came back to say Norton had been wounded, and soon after - we heard that the enemy had broken through to the north of the - Canal. Just at that moment General Elles came up and asked what - the situation was, and having heard that there were some Tanks and - men of another Battalion on the northern side of the Canal, said - he would go up and see for himself. He had his A.D.C. with him, - and took me along as well. We motored right up to where we came in - touch with our men, who were being pushed back on the north of the - Canal. We then got out of the car and went forward on foot. The - General had not even his tin hat on, but his red and gold. He went - out beyond the withdrawing infantry and taking out his map, held a - council of war, a council not uninterrupted by machine-gun bullets. - - “He then sent me back a couple of hundred yards and told me to stop - every man on a certain cross-road, reorganise them and make them - take up fresh positions. This I did, and we thus re-established - a line. The General took command and made his Headquarters in a - small house until shelled out of it and into a neighbouring ditch. - I was sent back to Divisional Headquarters to report and get some - more ammunition. When I returned the situation was pretty well the - same, and we were holding on all right. The General then suggested - that we might see in which houses the enemy really were. During - these investigations Ian Stewart went forward by himself on our - flank, and had a private battle with a company of Germans, killing, - amongst others, one who was on a bicycle, and himself returning on - the captured machine, the original rider’s papers in his pocket. - - “We were relieved about 7 p.m. by a new Division, and I got back to - Divisional Headquarters about 9. The next morning the C.O. turned - up with the rest of the Battalion.” - -The 3rd Tank Battalion, whose camp at Bray had been destroyed, were now -a fully fledged Whippet unit. - -During the first few days the Whippets saw no actual fighting but were -subject to plenty of alarms, and made a great number of fruitless -excursions from place to place. - -At the Bray Camp there had been, unfortunately, a certain number of -Whippet machines which were temporarily laid up with engine trouble. - -But there were no spare parts and no time for repairs, and a good many -machines had to be blown up “unblooded.” - -On March 26 two Companies of the 3rd Battalion were moved to -Mailly-Maillet Wood. - -As soon as the machines had arrived the Company Commanders went out to -reconnoitre the position near the village (Mailly-Maillet). - -The result of their investigations is typical of the whole retreat: - - [58]“The position on the front between Beaumont-Hamel and Hébuterne - proved to be very obscure, a gap in our line appearing to exist - between these two places. The only troops of ours to be found - consisted of two small posts of about one platoon each on the - outskirts of Colincamps, the ground to the front and between them - being occupied by enemy patrols and machine-gunners.” - -About noon the Whippets arrived at the village. The situation was -explained to the Section Commanders, and half the Tanks proceeded down -the main street while the rest guarded the two flanks. - -A small body of our infantry which was holding the village had been on -the point of falling back before the rapidly advancing enemy when the -Tanks arrived. - -The Tanks had gone forward almost beyond the village, when suddenly, -round the edge of the wood, they met 300 of the enemy advancing in -close formation. - -The Germans were too much surprised to attempt to resist, and fled in -disorder. - -A number of them were shot down by the Whippet’s machine-guns, and many -surrendered to the infantry who had by now arrived. - -The remnant scattered, and were pursued by the Tanks right on to the -outskirts of Auchonvillers. - -The two Whippets remained out on patrol for about an hour, but no -further attack was attempted, and they returned to the village about -3 p.m. Later in the afternoon the gap in our lines was filled by the -arrival of a New Zealand Division. This successful little action is -interesting as the first ever fought by the Whippets. - -There were several other sections of Whippets and heavy Tanks out on -patrol on this and the following days. - -Several Tanks of the 10th Battalion fought in Rossignol Wood on two -occasions, and Whippets of the 2nd Battalion were in action near -Bouzencourt in a blinding rainstorm. - -Everywhere it was the same story of villages the question of whose -ownership was “obscure” of gaps in the line which the Tanks had to -bridge for a critical hour or two, often firing their machine-guns into -the advancing waves of the enemy until the guns grew hot and jammed and -the Tanks had to retreat. Often they would go back till their petrol -gave out, and the crews had to blow up their machines. - -The new Medium A machines (the Whippets) acquitted themselves -extremely well, and there were astonishingly few cases of mechanical -trouble. - -The Battalion histories describe many pitiful scenes which took -place during the retreat, the fate of the inhabitants, for whom our -withdrawal meant complete ruin, striking the eye-witnesses as the most -distressing feature of the whole business. - - [59]“During the withdrawal the condition of the villagers was - pitiful. Women and children and old men crazed with fright with - liveliest memories of the conduct of the Germans in the area - occupied by them, were to be seen streaming westwards from their - homes, pushing their meagre possessions before them in hand-carts - and alternately invoking the aid of their Saints and calling down - their wrath upon the hated Boche.” - -Nor was the retreat only tragic to those of the Tank Corps who had to -witness the supreme misery of these processions of the Cross. There -was a lesser unhappiness for the tacticians of the Tank Corps in the -contemplation of the appalling waste of Tank machines and men. - -The Tanks had been far too scattered ever to pull their weight. - - [60]“To hit with them as they were distributed on March 21 was like - hitting out with an open hand instead of with a clenched fist. - - “When the German blow fell there was no time to hit and - simultaneously to close the fingers.” - -Out of 370 Tanks which were fit to fight, only 180 saw any action, a -great many machines running out of supplies or being incapacitated by -some temporary mechanical trouble, and so lost without having fired a -shot. - -The fault lay in the fact that the infantry Commanders under whom they -were acting did not fully understand the functions and limitations of -the Tank, or realise that as the final loss of a good many Mark IV. -machines in such a retreat was inevitable, it would have been much -better to give the Tanks a run for their money. - - -III - -_Villers Bretonneux_ - -It was not till the German offensive had lasted for more than a month -that opposing Tanks at last met in battle. - -The enemy had pushed us back to within six or seven miles of Amiens, -and he now planned a more or less full-dress attack upon positions on -high ground, which were, in fact, the outer defences not only of the -town, but of the vital Amiens-Paris railway. A break through on this -sector would be a serious disaster, and the situation was an anxious -one. The weather was unsettled, and the mornings often still misty in -the Somme country. - -At 6.30 on April 23 the river fog lay thick, and under cover of this -mist the Germans attacked the whole of the line south of the Somme -after a short and particularly intense bombardment. - -A company of heavy Tanks of the 1st and seven Whippets of the 3rd -Battalion had been hastily moved up into the domain of the 3rd Corps, -north and south of Villers Bretonneux, where it was rumoured that the -Germans were going to use Tanks, and, in fact, when at last the first -little knots of German infantry appeared through the fog, three huge -forms accompanied them. - -It was over Tanks of this type, the “Schultz” and the “Hagan,” that -the little boys of London scrambled so delightedly on the Horse Guards -Parade in the spring of 1919. Now all we could see of them, as they -lumbered slowly through the fog, was that they were a good deal larger -and heavier than the heavy British Tanks, and that they were rather -tortoise shaped, the armoured “shell” everywhere coming down over the -tracks like a sort of crinoline. - -They broke right through our line, opening a way for the infantry which -was following them. But three of our Tanks, under Captain F. C. Brown, -M.C., happened to be on their way to the very spot (Cachy) where the -German Tanks had attacked. Unfortunately two of the three were females, -whose machine-guns were not of much use against the new thick-skinned -enemy. - -However, they went on, hoping for chinks in their opponents’ armour, -but in spite of their superior power of manœuvre both the females were -soon knocked out by shells from the German Tanks. - -The one male Tank, under Lieutenant Mitchell, was now opposed to three -undamaged enemy machines, each more heavily armoured than the British -Tank. Lieutenant Mitchell, however, immediately engaged them and, -after some dodging of the salvos of his three antagonists, who seemed -to be trying to close upon him, he managed to obtain a direct hit -with one of his six-pounders upon the leading German. Twice again he -fired, each time hitting the same machine. The third shot completed its -discomfiture; in its efforts to get away it fell into a sandpit, where -it lay on its side, its tracks still rattling round ineffectively. - -With its first enemy definitely out of action, the British Tank turned -upon the other two. - -But they had not waited, and had already discreetly turned tail, -leaving Lieutenant Mitchell master of the situation. - -Such was the rather inglorious end of the Germans’ first endeavour to -meet the British Tank Corps with its own weapons. - -It was not far from the scene of this strange encounter that about half -an hour later seven Whippets came into action, debouching from north -of Cachy, attacking the enemy on the ridge between Villers Bretonneux -and Hangard Wood. The ridge was held by machine-gun groups concealed -in shell-holes, while on the eastern slopes two German Battalions -were forming up in the open ready to attack. The Whippets moved from -shell-hole to shell-hole, destroying the machine-gun groups, and then -proceeded to deal with the infantry. Their success was terrible. They -got right in among the enemy, who had absolutely no cover, and mowed -the unhappy Germans down in ranks as they stood. At least 400 of the -enemy are estimated to have been killed, and the rest at last fled in -confusion, the threatened attack being completely broken up. - -Not only were these two Battalions disposed of, but by nightfall it was -clear that for the time being at least some circumstance had definitely -held up the German advance. We did not know it, but our defences had -withstood and survived the last hungry lickings of the great spring -tide. - -Its impulse was too far spent to overflow the frail dam of our Villers -Bretonneux positions. The German advance had reached slack water. - -There had been one incident which had genuinely cheered the hard -pressed men of the Tank Corps. At the very blackest moment of the -retreat, when machines were being sacrificed by the dozen, and when -the grey waves of the German infantry seemed to pursue our weary men -with endless, tireless iteration, General Elles received a telegram -from Mr. Docker, the chairman of the Metropolitan Carriage Company of -Birmingham:-- - - “A resolution has been passed unanimously by the Works people of - the Metropolitan Carriage Company to forgo any holidays, and to do - their utmost to expedite delivery of Tanks to assist their comrades - in the Field.” - - - - -CHAPTER XV - -THE EQUILIBRIUM--MINOR ACTIONS--HAMEL--THE BALLON D’ESSAI - - -It is not perhaps too fanciful to envisage the battles of April 24, -25 and 26, though they were by no means uniformly satisfactory little -actions, as belonging to a different and a happier era than the action -of Villers Bretonneux itself. On the 23rd we had been fighting for our -lives. Through the three subsequent days’ fighting, it began to be -more and more obvious that a change had taken place. Either through -our desperate efforts to save Amiens, or by the workings of some -deeper cause, spent and disorganised as we were, we had begun to pull -level with the Germans again. The change was slight, but none the less -palpable. - -On the 25th, a few Tanks of the 1st and 3rd Battalions fought with the -3rd Corps in a counter-attack against the most advanced of the new -German positions in the Bois d’Aquenne. The Tanks did a good deal of -execution, and we succeeded in driving in some of the forward German -posts. - -On the 26th, four Tanks of the 1st Brigade had an interesting -experience. - -The Allied forces on this part of the line consisted of a most curious -mixture of arms and races. - -The scene, for example, in a neighbouring wood about ten days before is -thus described by the historian of the 1st Battalion: - - “The Bois d’Abbé presented a most picturesque spectacle, and any - one taking the trouble to walk through it could have had the unique - experience of seeing practically every branch of both the British - and French Armies represented. In this wood were to be found - Tanks of all descriptions, Mark IV.’s, V’s, Whippets and French - Rénaults, heavy and light artillery, British infantry, Australians, - French cavalry and infantry, Moroccans, and lastly a detachment - of the Legion of Frontiersmen mounted on little Arab ponies, - which presented a strange contrast to the heavy Percherons of the - artillery.” - -On April 26, it was in company with the Moroccan Division that the 1st -Battalion fought. - -The enemy had launched a strong attack against the Front held by -these troops at 6 a.m. on the morning of the 26th, under cover of -the usual heavy mist. Very soon, however, a section of Tanks under -Captain Groves got right in amongst the advancing Germans and inflicted -heavy casualties upon them. The French Colonial infantry, who had -been obliged to fall back, immediately rallied and brought the German -assault to a standstill. In the course of the action Second Lieutenant -Wilson’s Tank found itself among some German heavy guns, which it -attacked with case shot[61] and machine-gun fire, wounding most of -their crews and killing the rest. Mr. Wilson then patrolled up and down -some trenches held by the enemy and cost them very heavy losses by his -enfilading fire. Eventually, having fired every round of ammunition -in his Tank, he decided to go back, but while he was on his way, his -magneto broke down. However, he sent back a messenger to fetch a new -magneto, and after this had been fitted, he returned to the rallying -point, his Tank having suffered the total casualties of two men -slightly wounded. - -On the 28th, another Company of the same Battalion again co-operated -with the Moroccan Division. This time it was the Allies who were -the attackers, their objective being the Hangard Wood. Owing to a -mistake, the four Tanks did not get into action until rather late. -Second Lieutenant Jones’ Tank, however, fought a very good action, -clearing out a great number of machine-gun nests in the Wood, and -generally giving a great deal of help to the Moroccan infantry in their -advance. The Tank stayed in the Wood, until all its ammunition had been -expended, and then, the infantry deciding not to make a further attack, -it was withdrawn and rejoined its Company. - -Except a small action of the 1st Battalion on May 2, the Tank Corps saw -no fighting for the next six weeks, and it was not till July 4 that -they fought again in any considerable action. - - -II - -The general situation in May was still such as to cause our High -Command a certain anxiety. It is easy to be wise after the event and -say that the Germans must obviously have outrun their transport and -overtaxed the limited road capacity of the devastated area which -lay behind them. In early May this, though true, was not obvious. -Meanwhile, we had been too much weakened by the disasters of the last -six weeks to be able to counter-attack. Consequently, the enemy had -the same opportunities for reconstruction as we had ourselves, and -although we felt confident that after such a hurricane of battles -there must be a breathing space for both Armies, we were by no means -certain what would be the respective rôles of the two opposing sides -when the struggle came to be resumed. Our most pressing need was the -filling of the gaps in our Divisions and the closing of the huge -breaches which the German advance had made in our defensive systems. -The greatest need was for men. We had, it is true, to lay out new -trench lines and reconstruct such old systems as already existed, but -it was not likely that the enemy would afford us time to establish new -defences comparable with those which he had already proved his power of -overrunning. Therefore it was to procuring new and well-trained troops -that our chief efforts must be directed. The men procured, there must -be railways upon which to move them. - - [62]“The depth to which the enemy had penetrated in the Somme and - Lys valleys had disrupted important lateral lines of railway, - and had created a situation of extreme gravity with regard to - the maintenance of communications in Northern France. At Amiens, - Béthune, and Hazebrouck, much-used railway junctions had been - brought under the effective fire of the enemy’s guns, while the - railway centre at St. Pol was threatened. To relieve the situation - a comprehensive programme of railway construction was undertaken.” - -Some 200 miles of broad-gauge track was laid between April and -July and a complete series of new defences were built, involving, -incredible as it may seem, 5000 miles of trench. Nor were Tanks left -out of the scheme of reorganisation. But, alas! owing to the extreme -need of infantry reinforcements, and the difficulty of immediately -re-arming Battalions which had lost their Tanks during the Retreat, -this “reconstruction” all but took the form, not of augmentation, -but of diminution. It was proposed to reduce the number of Tank -Brigades from six to four. The appearance of enemy Tanks, however, -soon quashed this project. Not only had the Corps lost heavily in -machines, but the fighting done by the Lewis gun Units had been of a -particularly strenuous kind, and several Battalions had sustained such -casualties in trained and experienced men as to cause great anxiety -at Tank Headquarters. However, the Tank Corps were only in the same -predicament as the rest of the British Army, and there was nothing -for it but to gather up the bits with as much grace as possible and -to start away as quickly as might be on the work of reconstruction. -All through May, Mark V. machines were arriving in France at the rate -of about sixty a week. Some of the Battalions which had not taken any -part in the Retreat had been left in their original areas, in case the -Germans should attack, so that we find Battalions (for example of the -1st Brigade) doing “Savage Rabbit” as late as the middle of May. For -the most part, however, the Corps was gathered together undergoing -intensive training in the Bermicourt area. All Tank Units were to be -ready for action--re-armed, re-equipped and re-trained--by August 1. - -The Central Workshops set to work in early June to prepare sledges -for supply haulage, bridges upon which the Whippets could cross wide -obstacles, and “Cribs” for the heavy Tanks. There “Cribs” were big -hexagonal oaken crates, reinforced with steel, which were an improved -and lighter version of the fascines which were improvised for the -Battle of Cambrai. Training grounds and workshops hummed with the -preparations, and when, in the last days of July, the call came, it -was, as we shall see, found possible to launch 400 Tanks at little over -a week’s notice. - -It was while the Corps was training at Bermicourt that the foundation -of the excellent relations which ever afterwards existed between -Tanks and the French infantry was laid. A great number of French -troops happened to be billeted in and around the Tank Corps area, and -their keenness to learn all they could about our machines and their -tactics afforded great pleasure to the men of the British Tank Corps. -General Le Maistre, commanding the 10th French Army, particularly -asked that Tank demonstrations should be held for the Units of his -command. This was done, and all through May and June two or three -of these demonstrations were given weekly. Besides French troops, -representatives from a number of British and Colonial Corps, and the -Canadian and Australian Corps, also came to watch, to their great -edification. - - -III - -We have said that only a few minor Tank actions were fought during the -last part of May and the month of June. Two of these small encounters, -however, were rather interesting. To begin with, the 17th Armoured Car -Battalion fought its first action in company with the French on June -11. At 9.30 on the morning of June 10 orders were received by Colonel -Carter, commanding the Battalion, to report to the 1st French Army at -Contay. At Contay instructions were issued for the Battalion to proceed -to Ravenel, near St. Just. The Battalion got this order by telephone, -and although the night was very dark and wet, and the roads crowded -with traffic, it reached Ravenel after a sixty miles’ journey by five -in the morning of June 11. That same day it went into action with -the 10th French Army in its counter-attack at Belloy. Two sections -of the Armoured Cars engaged the enemy with machine-gun fire, but -unfortunately the roads here were piled high with every sort of débris. -This prevented the cars from being as active as they were to prove -themselves later. - -The second small action was a night raid, interesting as the first -in which Tanks had ever been engaged. Here the 10th Battalion fought -in conjunction with the 4th Corps. We were endeavouring to capture -a series of posts near Bucquoy, only five Platoons of infantry and -five female Tanks being employed. The raid began at about half-past -eleven at night. We were met with a heavy barrage from trench mortars -and machine-guns, and the infantry were held up. The Tanks, however, -managed to push forward, and carried on the attack in the pitch dark -by themselves. As they advanced they met with a number of large -parties of Germans, into the “brown” of which they fired. The Tanks -certainly accounted for a great many of the enemy, though it being, as -we have said, extremely dark, it was impossible to make a very exact -computation of the “bag.” Curiously enough, not a single Tank was -damaged by the trench mortar barrage, which was extremely heavy. One -Tank was swarmed over by a particularly bold party of the enemy and -the crew shot them down with their revolvers. Later on this same Tank -managed to rescue a wounded infantry officer who had earlier been taken -prisoner by the Germans. The raid is interesting as it demonstrated -the possibility of manœuvring Tanks in the dark through the enemy’s -lines--not a single machine lost direction--and also showed how much -protection was afforded to the machines by their invisibility. - - -IV - -By the middle of June the British High Command had grown anxious to -make some test of the position of things on the enemy’s side of the -line. This they proposed to do by a more or less limited and tentative -attack, an attack which might, if it was successful, be utilised -as a dress rehearsal for larger ventures, or which, if it failed, -would not commit us too deeply. The Australians had been constantly -harassing their _vis à vis_ on the Villers Bretonneux Front, and the -High Command gave out that for this and other reasons they considered -that a better place than the sector opposite Villers Bretonneux could -hardly be found from which to launch our _ballon d’essai_. What those -“other reasons” were did not appear for nearly a month after the battle -had been fought. It was proposed that between sixty and seventy Tanks -belonging to the 5th Brigade should be employed. Our attack was to have -a strictly limited objective, its ostensible purpose being to capture -the spur running from the main Villers Bretonneux plateau towards -the Somme, on the east side of Hamel, and thus to gain important -observation and incidentally a useful jumping-off place for any -subsequent advance. “Z” day was to be on July 4. - -Directly the attack had been decided upon, Tanks and Australians began -their combined training in the area of the 5th Tank Brigade. Tank -units were at once permanently affiliated to corresponding Australian -infantry units with whom they were to fight, and by this means a -very close comradeship was cultivated. It was (tradition relates), -most necessary that some special steps should be taken to ensure the -confidence of the Australian infantry in the Tank Corps, for, in the -absence of artillery preparation, upon the Tanks would almost entirely -depend the success and prestige of the Australians in this first Allied -offensive since the March disaster. - -Now the Australians, though having, as it were, a natural affinity for -the activity and surprise of a Tank as against a prepared artillery -attack, were not inclined to bestow their approval on the Tanks without -due cause being given. - -They still had vivid memories of the tragedy of errors of the -Bullecourt incident in 1917. - -They were, however, very open-minded, and the battle partners had not -long been in training together before their relations were particularly -cordial. - -Coy and hard to please as were the Australians in the beginning, the -triumphant success of their partnership in battle left them no memory -of their earlier shyness, and made them vociferous in their praises -of a combination that the Tanks had long felt would prove notably -effective. - -The plan of the attack soon took exact shape. It is worth more or less -detailed consideration, as it was upon the lines of the Battles of -Cambrai and Hamel that all set Tank attacks were afterwards based. - - [63]“The operation was to be conducted as a direct advance - of infantry and Tanks in two waves, under cover of a rolling - artillery barrage. From a Brigade point of view, the points of - chief interest lay, first, in the preliminary arrangements with - the Australian Corps and the infantry concerned; secondly, in the - somewhat intricate plans for assembling Tanks at their start lines - with due provision for concealment; and, thirdly, in the methods - devised for bringing up large quantities of infantry supplies to - the final objective. At a conference held by the Australian Corps - three days prior to the action the plans were finally settled and - no alteration in these was permitted after that date. Thus infantry - and Tank officers were able to confer in perfect faith that their - mutual arrangements would be carried out without change, and this - method was adhered to in all subsequent operations of a prepared - type with the Australian Corps. Tanks were employed on a scale - that was large in proportion to the front attacked, the saving of - casualties to the infantry being made the most important factor in - the plan.” - -The main tactical features of the attack were the strongholds of Vaire -Wood, Hamel Wood, Pear-shaped Trench and Hamel Village. There was no -defined system of trench, except the old British lines just east of -Hamel which the enemy now occupied, and which had, of course, been -originally sited to face east. For the rest, the German defensive -consisted in machine-gun nests. - -The attacking forces were the 4th Australian Division and four -companies of American infantry. The Artillery was to provide a rolling -barrage, behind which the infantry were to advance, followed by the -Tanks, which were only to pass ahead of them when resistance was -encountered. This last arrangement did not prove a good one. - -The going was good, and the fertile country lay still and smiling in -its Midsummer pride. The camp allotted to the Tanks lay five miles -behind the line in the angle formed by the meeting of the Somme and the -Luce. - - [64]“It was an ideal spot in which to spend the summer months. In - the cool of the evening, looking toward the west over the uncut - cornfields, we could obtain a wonderful view of the old city of - Amiens, its large cathedral, with the numbers of smaller church - spires and smokeless chimneys clustering around it, being outlined - against the setting sun. Toward the east one saw the ruined village - of Villers Bretonneux standing on Hill 104, its château dominating - the surrounding wreck of houses. It was hard to believe that the - line was so close until the view was suddenly obliterated by the - familiar sight of bursting shrapnel and the heavy smoke of the gas - shells.” - -The sixty fighting Tanks which were employed in the attack were divided -into two waves, the first of forty-eight, and the second of twelve -machines. As the advance intended was but a short one, the usual -gigantic system of supply dumps was not necessary. On the contrary, -each fighting Tank carried forward ammunition and water for the -infantry, and the four supply Tanks were detailed to carry up R.E. -supplies and other stores. - - [65]“Each of these four machines eventually delivered a load of - about 12,500 lbs. within 500 yards of the final objective and - within half an hour of its capture. The total amount of supplies - delivered on July 4 at 40 lbs. per man represented the loads of - a carrying party 1,250 men strong. The number of men used in the - supply Tanks was twenty-four.” - -No precise information as to time and place had been given to the Tank -Corps till just a week before the battle; but as the area had been -carefully reconnoitred for the last two months, very little had to be -done to complete this side of the preparations. - -On the night of July 1–2, the Tanks were moved up to the assembly -point, an early move which was the result of the Australians’ last -lingering doubts as to the capacity of the Tanks for arriving in time -at _rendezvous_. No chance was thus given to any Tank of being late in -the starting line. - -Machines of “C” flight of No. 8 Squadron of aeroplanes were to make -their début as honorary members of the Tank Corps on the morrow, for -the wonderful potentialities of aeroplane and Tank co-operation were -now fully realised, and the Tank Corps had been allotted a squadron of -its own. - - -VI - -At three o’clock on the morning of July 4, almost before the sky had -begun to lighten, the Tank engines were swung up all along our line, -and at two minutes past the hour sixty graceful Mark V.’s slid forward -after their infantry, two low-flying aeroplanes escorting them. As the -Tanks moved along, the crew’s blessed the sweet running of their new -machines, for there had not been a single mechanical hitch of any sort, -and they knew that the shrewd eyes of the Australians had been fixed -like gimlets upon them. - -But the whole day was to be one long triumph for the Mark V. - -Here and there as the attack surged forward the Tanks were leading, -following close behind the bursting shells. Here and there the -Australians were ahead. The enemy’s infantry put up little or no fight, -but their machine-gunners resisted us with the tenacious courage which -we had learned to expect. - -But our onrush was inexorable. The new Tanks were possessed, the -Germans found, of a deadly power of manœuvre which they used to the -full, expending little ammunition upon machine-gun nests, but, even -when they had passed an emplacement by in the first rush, swinging -swiftly round on the wretched gunners and crushing guns and crews -beneath them. As a Tank chronicler somewhat grimly remarks: “This -method eliminated all chance of the enemy coming to life again after -the attack had passed by.” - -Over 200 machine-guns were accounted for during the day. There were -also other and rarer little groups of picked men which the Tanks here -and there routed out of the standing crops. - -These little parties, generally consisting of three men, were armed -with a special rifle of gigantic size designed to be fired--like -our Lewis gun--from a bipod. Its projectile was a heavy steel-cored -armour-piercing bullet. - -It was a new anti-Tank weapon, a weapon from which the Germans hoped -great things. - -With the 13th Battalion, a Tank which had advanced ahead of the -infantry, came upon some enemy dug-outs, on the far side of a trench -too broad for their machine to cross. From these dug-outs the enemy -were keeping up a hot fire. - -The Tank Commander, Second Lieutenant Edwards, and Private Benns, -immediately got out of their Tank and attacked the garrison on foot. -Between them the two killed seven of the enemy with their revolvers, -and the rest they took prisoners, and handed over to the infantry at -the first opportunity. - -There were many fine pieces of individual work, especially instances of -Tanks helping each other under heavy fire, and there is little doubt -that it was to this friendly co-operation, this towing of lame Tanks -out of hot corners, the astonishingly low casualties in machines were -partly due. - -The despatch tells how the battle fared all along the line. - - “Moving up and down behind the barrage, the Tanks either killed the - enemy or forced him to take shelter in dug-outs, where he became an - easy prey to the infantry. Hamel was taken by envelopment from the - flanks and rear, the enemy was driven from Vaire Wood, and at the - end of the day our troops had gained all their objectives and over - 1500 prisoners.” - -Our little success had been complete and triumphant. - -No less than fifty-seven of the sixty fighting Tanks came through the -day without a scratch, the infantry killed and wounded amounted to -less than half the German prisoners who passed through our cages; and -as we have seen, the battle between Tanks and machine-guns being _à -l’outrance_, the proportion of Germans killed to those made prisoners -had been unusually high. - -As for the Tank crews, they suffered only thirteen men wounded. To our -great satisfaction also, the five damaged machines were all salved, and -thus the armament of the Mark V.’s could not be investigated by the -enemy. - -But at first almost the most striking characteristic of the victory -seemed the perfect co-operation between Tanks and infantry. - -The Tanks and the Australians were equally enthusiastic over one -another’s performances. The Australians were surprised and delighted at -the weight and solidity which the sixty Tanks had lent their impact, -and at the sense of support and comradeship which their men had -experienced. - -The Tank Corps were equally impressed by the superb _moral_ of the -Australians,[66] “who never considered that the presence of Tanks -exonerated them from fighting, and who took instant advantage of any -opportunity created by the Tanks.” - -A generous and lasting friendship had been established. The 5th Tank -Brigade and their Australians were destined throughout their coming -partnership to prove an almost invincible combination. - -But it was not alone the battle partners who were pleased and surprised. - -The whole Allied front rang with the news of victory. - -We had sent up our tentative _ballon d’essai_, and behold it had sailed -up, high above our highest expectations and now hung, a token in the -sky. All men might know that though Apollyon had straddled all across -the way, we had beaten him and were at last come out of the Valley of -Humiliation. - - - - -CHAPTER XVI - -WITH THE FRENCH--THE BATTLE OF MOREUIL - - -The 5th Brigade and the Australians had sworn eternal friendship with a -refreshing enthusiasm. - -They were like two schoolgirl friends, not to be separated, and at -Vaux, whither they had retired for combined training, metaphorically -went about all day with their arms round each other’s waists. - -Therefore, when on July 17 orders reached the 5th Tank Brigade -that they were to send a Battalion south to fight with the French, -consternation reigned. - -If anybody went it would have to be the 2nd Battalion, which had not -fought at Hamel at all. - -But surely some way out could be found by which the Australians’ own -Brigade of Tanks should not be thus cruelly dismembered? - -And the authorities, with positively avuncular benevolence--after -a little humming and hahing--were actually induced to make -another arrangement; as the friends firmly believed, solely upon -their representations. There were, however, other more military -considerations. - -The attack was still to be under Brigadier-General Courage, but an -extra Battalion, the 9th, should be added to the Brigade for the -occasion. - -This apparently whimsical outcry of the new-found affinities, and the -yielding of the authorities, were to be justified thrice over in the -events of the next few months. - -For at this early period a little thing might upset the forging of a -weapon which was to prove the two-edged sword with which we were to -“smite Amalek hip and thigh.” - -As soon as it had been decided that the 9th Battalion was to go, -preparations were at once begun. - -The French plans were already well advanced before the Tanks came upon -the scene at all. The attacking troops had indeed been in the area -since April, but the Tanks felt that they would be eternally disgraced -if they were obliged so much as to hint that they would like even a -day’s postponement of this, their first battle with the French. - -Indeed in this battle we see the first instance of the wonderful -“speeding up” which the Allied Army underwent almost as soon as the -joint command was concentrated in the hands of Marshal Foch. - -An officer who was present throughout the battle and its preliminaries -writes: - - “On a certain Wednesday General Elles and General Courage had an - interview at 3 p.m. with the 4th Army Commander and were consulted - as to the project. - - “At 4.30 they saw General Debeney (the French Army Commander) and - the French Corps Commander, when railheads and a general scheme of - movement were decided upon. - - “That night the 9th Battalion was warned, and the battle took place - at dawn on the following Tuesday.” - -Practice makes perfect, and we gradually discovered that the kind of -full-dress attacks for which we had always, as a matter of course, -allowed a month of preparation, could, in fact, be staged in half that -time. - -We see in the huge Battle of Amiens, of which only ten days’ notice was -given to the troops who took part, how great a reform we managed to -accomplish. - - -II - -The attack was to be at dawn on July 23, and was to be--like Hamel--a -more or less limited and experimental battle. - -Its immediate object was to seize St. Ribert Wood in order to outflank -Mailly Raineval from the south, to abolish certain highly objectionable -German batteries which lay near St. Ribert, and to advance the French -field guns eastward in such a way that they would bear upon the high -ridges which dominate the right bank of the river Avre. - -The country here was undulating and the soil well drained, and, except -for a number of large and very dense woods, there were very few Tank -obstacles. - -There were to be three objectives. The first was a line which -ran through the Bois des Sauvillers, Adelpare Farm, and -Les-Trois-Boqueleaux. Twelve Tanks and four Battalions of French -infantry were detailed for its capture. - -The second objective included the clearing of the plateau to the north -of the Bois des Sauvillers, and the capture of a corner of the Bois -de Harpan. Twenty-four Tanks were allotted to this objective and four -infantry Battalions. - -The third was a line of German posts, known as the “Blue Line,” -covering the second objective, and was to be attacked by a strong -force of infantry and all the surviving Tanks. The whole attack -was to be preceded by a short intense bombardment, including heavy -counter-battery work, and the creeping barrage was to consist of a -mixture of high explosive and smoke. The Tanks were to attack in -sections of three, two in front and one in immediate support, the -infantry advancing in small groups close behind the Tanks. - -Three days before the battle the officers of the 9th Battalion and some -of the Staff of the 5th Brigade came down to the battle site, and, -helped by the Staff of the French 3rd Division, made a pretty thorough -reconnaissance of the ground. That same evening the Tanks detrained at -Contay. - -The 9th Battalion had been busy doing such tactical training as was -possible with its new colleagues on the 5th Brigade training ground. -The time was short and the difficulties of language great, but in spite -of this a very friendly understanding had been come to. - -Besides this, it had had an unusual amount of trekking to do. - -It had had over eight miles to travel across country to its place of -entrainment. From Contay, the rail terminus, the Tanks moved in all -over another eight miles before they got into action. - -At ten o’clock on the night before the battle the Tanks were informed -that the attack, which was to have been at dawn, was postponed -until 5.30. By this time it would, the Tank crews somewhat ruefully -reflected, be broad daylight. - -However, there was nothing to be done but to hope that the wind would -help our smoke screens. - -The weather had for some time been fine, but on the morning of attack -heavy rain began to fall, driven up by a south wind. - -The prospect of a really effective smoke cloud did not seem very great. - -However, it was in the best of fighting spirits that the Tanks and -their infantry went forward at zero hour--indeed, though it was no -walk-over and all arms suffered fairly heavily, high spirits seem to -have particularly characterised both French and British in this battle. - -A member of the Tank Corps testifies naïvely to the way in which the -Tanks had got their tails up. - - “Brigadier-General Courage, who was much in evidence, was - continually visiting the Battalion and conversing with the - officers. From the nature of his suggestions and advice, a very - ordinary thinker could easily come to the conclusion that he did - not care for the Germans.” - -As the first wave Tanks and infantry advanced, they found that the -enemy was putting down a fairly heavy barrage in many places. However, -moving ahead of the infantry, the Tanks cleared Arrachis Wood, -destroying a number of machine-guns, and after a slight resistance, -captured the first objective--Sauvillers Village, Adelpare Farm and -Les-Trois-Boqueleaux--fifteen minutes before the infantry arrived. Two -Tanks were knocked out by shells. - -In the second phase, the Tanks of “B” and “C” Companies moved forward -in support of their infantry on either side of Sauvillers Wood. As -they swept forward, they outstripped the French patrols, but after a -while turned back to maintain touch. It was by now about 9.30 a.m. The -Tanks could not immediately find their partners, and unfortunately, as -they were thus cruising about, no less than six Tanks were put out of -action, one after another, by a single battery, apparently one of those -lurking to the south of St. Ribert Wood, and whose destruction was one -of the objects of the attack. - -In another sector a Battalion Commander in the 51st Regiment of French -Infantry, which was moving up in support, determined that if possible -he would attack Harpon Wood, and asked the officer commanding “B” -Company of Tanks for assistance. The Company Commander immediately -entered into the scheme with alacrity and between them a plan of attack -for the French infantry and the seven Tanks was rapidly arranged. This -little improvised action was a great success, Tanks and infantry duly -capturing the Wood and at least one hostile battery. Only two Tanks -were damaged. - -It was not far from Harpon that Captain Dalton’s Tank, in the confusion -due to the smoke, got some distance ahead of its infantry. Near -the Wood, Captain Dalton located an enemy battery. After a little -manœuvring he managed to get a direct hit upon one of the guns and -drove off the crews of the other pieces with machine-gun fire, thus -silencing the whole battery. He then manœuvred his Tank into position -to tow back one of the enemy guns, but at this moment his machine -received a direct hit, and shortly after, a second shell added to -the damage. Captain Dalton evacuated his crew, and, having done so, -made every effort to get back to the derelict Tank, for it must be -remembered that as yet no Mark V. had ever fallen into German hands. -He was under intense machine-gun fire and in direct view of the enemy, -but, realising the importance of blowing up the remains of his Tank, he -still attempted the adventure. But it was in vain, for as he was thus -trying to crawl up, he was severely wounded in the thigh. He managed, -however, to drag himself back into the French lines. - -Nor was Second Lieutenant C. Mecredy, a Section Commander, less anxious -that his knocked-out Tank should be completely destroyed rather than -fall into the hands of the enemy. - -He had been advancing ahead of his infantry, when a shell from a -concealed field gun hit the Tank in which he was leading the attack. -At once seizing up a number of smoke bombs, he got out of his machine, -went back, and, throwing down his bombs, put up a smoke curtain to -cover the Tanks that were following him, lest they should share the -fate of his own machine. His manœuvre was perfectly successful, for -under cover of the smoke the other Tanks changed their direction and -escaped the guns. With some difficulty Mr. Mecredy managed to dodge -his way back to his Tank, under heavy hostile shelling and machine-gun -fire, successfully blew it up, and was preparing to go back when he -discovered that one of his crew was lying wounded in the leg in a very -exposed place. This man he managed to bring back with him to safety. - -By the evening all the three objectives had been gained, and the French -Command were very well satisfied with the success of the action. - -Especially delighted was the General Commanding the 3rd -Division--General Bourgon--who was a great friend of the British Tank -Corps, and who had been as anxious as we that no hitch should mar this -first combined battle. - -Both French and British had suffered rather heavy casualties, the -French 3rd Division, with whom we had acted, losing over seven hundred -officers and men. - -Fifteen Tanks out of thirty-six had been knocked out by direct hits, -and of the fifteen rather a large proportion were beyond salving. - -However, the enemy’s losses were also heavy. The prisoners totalled -over eighteen hundred, and we took 5 field guns, 45 trench mortars and -275 machine-guns. - -Before the 9th Battalion went back to the training area it had the -honour of being inspected by General Debeney, commanding the 1st French -Army. - -He was kind enough to express extreme pleasure at the way in which the -Tanks fought, and in his special Order of the Day gave the Battalion -praise of which they will ever be proud. - - “Finally, I owe a special tribute of thanks to the Battalion of - British Tanks, whose powerful and devoted assistance has aided and - assured our success. - - “Commanded by an experienced and skilful leader, the Tanks have - again added to that rich harvest of laurels which this new arm has - not ceased to gather since its first appearance in September 1916. - They have given to the Division the finest example of bravery, of - energy, of comradeship in action, and of training for war carried - to the highest degree of perfection. Their assistance has enabled - the infantry to gain a brilliant victory in which they themselves - share largely.” - -Finally, as a token of comradeship between the French troops of the 3rd -Division and the 9th Tank Battalion, this Battalion had the honour of -being presented with the badge of the 3rd French Division. Since that -day they have worn it proudly on their left sleeve. - - - - -CHAPTER XVII - -THE BATTLE OF AMIENS, OR BATTLE OF AUGUST 8 - - -I - -The ambitious offensive which the Germans had launched on July 15 had -collapsed. Our somewhat tentative counter-offensive at Hamel had been -surprisingly successful, and there had been a complete change in the -general military situation. - -The German reserves were, it would seem, nearly used up, while -ours--fresh troops which had become available during the spring and -early summer--had now been incorporated and trained. Better still, the -American Army was growing rapidly. - -We were at last ready again to take the offensive on a grand scale. - -On July 23, when the success of the battles of the 18th was well -assured, a conference was held in which General Foch asked that the -British, French, and American Armies should each simultaneously take -the offensive. - -Their assaults were to be immediate. - -On the British front, after some consideration of the rival merits -of various battle sites, it was decided that the attack was to be -delivered to the east of Amiens on a front extending from Albert to -Montdidier, and was to have for its immediate object the freeing of the -Paris-Amiens railway, whose proximity to the German lines had proved so -exceedingly hampering to our transport arrangements. - -If the battle was successful, our advance could be exploited in a -second attack directed towards the St. Quentin-Cambrai line. This line -was one whose integrity was of vital importance to the enemy, as he had -long ago confessed in the labour and money which he had poured out upon -the vast elaborations of the Hindenburg defences. - -For, twenty miles behind the Hindenburg Line lay the great railway -centres round Maubeuge, the key position of his whole system of lateral -communication. - -If we could once penetrate so far, we should cut the only -communications by which the German forces to the south in Champagne -could be supplied and maintained, and should sever these troops -completely from the group of German Armies operating in Flanders. - -Of this great enterprise the first step was the ever memorable Battle -of Amiens. - - -II - -Preparations for the great attack were instantly begun. The battle -plans were first made known in the last days of July to the commanders -who were to take part, “Z” day being fixed for August 8. - -The three Brigades of Tanks which were to fight, (the 5th, 3rd, and -4th) had their first intimation of what was afoot on July 27, and their -orders were confirmed on August 4. - -Briefly, these were the general lines on which the battle was to be -fought. - -Preparations were to be rushed through. They were to be as secret as -brief. - -The battle itself was to be in two phases. - -First, an attack without artillery preparation, but under the -protection of a creeping barrage. The whole action was to be very much -on the lines of the First Battle of Cambrai, save that this time (1) -an even larger number of Tanks--about 430 including Whippets--were to -head the battle; (2) that light skirmishing lines of infantry were to -be used; and that (3) as at Hamel we were this time attacking a more -or less improvised defence line. The second phase of the attack, which -was to be made by a fresh wave of troops, was to start about four hours -after zero, that is, after the first objective had been taken. - -During this second phase, the artillery was to be moved up and we were -to advance without a barrage. - -_On the right_ was to be the Canadian Corps, and with them the 4th -Brigade[67] of Tanks was to fight. - -_In the centre_, with the Australian Corps its usual battle partner, -the 5th Tank Brigade,[68] was again to operate. - -_On the left_, north of the Somme, two Divisions of the 3rd Corps were -to have the 10th Tank Battalion attached to them. - -Behind these three bodies three cavalry Divisions, the 3rd Brigade of -Whippet Tanks, and the 17th Battalion of Armoured Cars, were to be -concentrated. - -Their work was chiefly the exploitation of the second phase. The -Armoured Car Battalion had only just returned from operations with the -French. - - [69]“When the 6th French Cavalry Division was withdrawn to rest, - the 17th Battalion proceeded to Senlis, and at 9 a.m., having - just entered this town, it received orders to proceed forthwith - to Amiens and report to the Headquarters of the Australian Corps. - Amiens, which was nearly 100 miles distant, was reached the same - night. - - “On arriving, Lieut.-Colonel Carter was informed that his unit was - to take part in the projected attack east of that town. The chief - difficulty foreseen in an armoured car action in this neighbourhood - was the crossing of the trenches. Although only one day was - available wherein to find a solution to this difficulty, it was - accomplished by attaching a small force of Tanks to the Battalion. - These Tanks were used to tow the armoured cars over the obstacles, - or rather along the tracks the Tanks formed through them. This - solution proved eminently successful.” - -Short as was the time for preparations, an elaborate deceptive scheme -was planned and carried out, to make it seem that we intended to -fight in Flanders. Canadians were put into the line on the Kemmel -front, where in due course the enemy identified them. Ostentatious -Headquarters and Casualty Clearing Stations were conspicuously -disposed about the area. Throughout the 1st Army sector our wireless -stations hummed with messages about the concentration of troops, and -arrangements were made to make it seem that a great assembling of Tanks -was taking place near St. Pol. Here, indeed, Tanks elaborately trained -with infantry on fine days--days, that is to say, on which the enemy’s -long-distance reconnaissance and photographic aeroplanes were likely to -be at work behind our lines. - -The ruse was perfectly successful and--as we found out afterwards--the -news of our “great projected attack in Flanders” soon spread, and by -the time we were ready to strike on the Somme the enemy was momentarily -expecting to be attacked in force in the north. - - -III - -Meanwhile, hectic days and still more hectic nights were being passed -near Amiens. - -The reader is to imagine that elaborate preparations such as were -described as the preliminaries to Cambrai and which took a month to -carry out, had now to be executed in a little over a week. - -Reconnaissance had to be carried out, details of plans and liaison -arranged, and dumps had to be made, the last on an unprecedentedly -large scale, so great a number of Tanks never having gone into action -together before. - -In the centre (the Australian sector) certain units in the 5th Brigade -had been newly equipped with Mark V. star infantry-carrying Tanks. No -one was very familiar with these machines, and so, in addition to other -preparations, such units had infantry-carrying to practise with their -Australians. One circumstance greatly added to the fraternal feeling of -the 5th Brigade towards their familiar battle partners. As soon as the -final conference was ended, General Monash laid down the principle that -on no consideration should any alteration be allowed in the plans as -then approved. It was therefore possible for all the Tank units to work -out the details of their schemes in perfect confidence. - -The battlefield lay on either bank of the river Somme, which ran to the -north of the area of attack, and as far as Péronne, almost at right -angles to the lines of the two armies. - -South of it, a number of gullies, roughly parallel to the battle front, -ran down to the river from high ground which formed the watershed -between the Somme and the small river Luce. - -Two of these steep gullies, the Cérisy Valley, and another which ran -from Morcourt almost to Harbonnières, were to be great features in the -battle, forming as they did admirable cover for the concealment of -batteries or for the assembling of troops for a counter-attack. - -The following notes on the Luce were given to the author by Major -Hotblack:-- - -“The river Luce, though only a small marshy stream, formed _the_ great -difficulty of the plan of operations. - -“Part of it was in the French lines, and as to put up fresh bridges -would have attracted the enemy’s attention, the attacking troops had to -cross it in a few places and deploy afterwards in the dark. - -“In that sector where the Luce flowed within the enemy’s lines, it ran -diagonally across the front of attack of the Canadian Division. - -“A great deal of trouble was taken in finding out all possible details -of this little river, and it caused anxiety to every one concerned from -the Field-Marshal himself downwards. - -“The Luce sector of the front lay within the lines then held by -the French, and in addition to various Reconnaissance Officers, -Major-General Lipsett, commanding the 3rd Canadian Division, and -Brig.-General Hankey, commanding the 4th Tank Brigade, carried out -personal reconnaissance of the river in general and Domarat Bridge in -particular. - -“Both these General Officers had great reputations for personal -gallantry, and always endeavoured to see for themselves what the -conditions really were before committing their troops. - -“The French troops then holding the line, knowing nothing beyond the -fact that they were to be relieved by the British, expressed the -greatest astonishment and admiration for our thoroughness and for the -remarkable conscientiousness and pertinacity of our Generals and -General Staff Officers, in so frequently visiting the forward positions -of an unhealthy sector. We had no choice but blandly to assure them -that this was their unvarying practice whenever a relief of any sort -was contemplated.” - -As another result of the great secrecy that had been imposed, no -officer knew who else was in the secret, and on one occasion Major -Hotblack and another British officer met on the banks of the Luce and -each made lengthy explanations which explained everything except the -real reason why they were there. Two days later these officers met at -a conference on the operations, and congratulated each other on the -plausibility of their several explanations. It had been no easy matter -to pretend that it was quite a normal thing for them to paddle in the -Luce in close proximity to the enemy. - -On the day all went well, however, and the information about the river -proved to be correct to the last detail, and as had been anticipated, -though the bridges in the enemy lines had been blown up, the gaps were -sufficiently small for Tanks to cross on the abutments. - -Generally speaking, the going was good, and the fact that the weather -had been reasonably fine for some time before the day of attack made -our preparations the easier. - -All night, for four or five nights before the battle, the carrying -Tanks had plied up and down, forming dumps of tens of thousands of -gallons of petrol and water and millions of rounds of ammunition. - -At last the time came for the final moving up of both the fighting and -supply Tanks to their assembly positions, about two miles behind the -lines. - -No. 1 Gun Carrier Company of Tanks had been allotted to the -5th Australian Division, and lay up in an orchard north of -Villers-Bretonneux. - -All went well till the late afternoon of August 7, when a chance shot -from the enemy set one of these Tanks blazing. - -The enemy promptly began to shell the area heavily, and destroyed -nearly the whole Company of Tanks and their loads. It was on this -occasion that Second Lieutenant Henderson Smith was awarded the -Military Cross. - -The following account of his action appears in the list of “Honours and -Awards”:-- - - “As soon as the first Tank was hit, Second Lieutenant Smith rushed - to the scene and collected men to aid him, and so initiated - the work of rescuing the Tanks. He showed the utmost skill in - organising the withdrawal of Tanks from the blaze. - - “Although several of his helpers were men from other units and - inexperienced in Tank work, this gallant officer succeeded in - moving two Tanks away from the heart of the fire. This bold action - undoubtedly enabled the people on his right to save three Tanks. - Unfortunately these two Tanks were hit and set on fire by the - explosions on other Tanks. On each occasion Second Lieutenant - Smith was the last to leave the blazing machine. The Tanks were - loaded with explosives for the infantry, gun-cotton, bombs, trench - mortars, etc., besides two fills of petrol each.” - -The shelling was an uncomfortable incident, not only because of the -loss at the last moment of the machines and of the masses of stores -which they carried, but because such a bombardment might be an -indication that the enemy suspected the presence of Tanks. - -However, as at Cambrai, there was nothing to be done, and it remained -only to try to hurry forward more stores to replace those which had -been burnt. This was successfully accomplished. - -Final lying-up places for the 300 heavy Tanks had been arranged all -along the front at about 4000 yards from the front line. - -At about the time when the Tanks were moving up to these “jumping-off -places” the enemy may have been somewhat puzzled to observe that a -number of large aeroplanes with exceedingly noisy engines kept flying -about between the lines. In any case, what he did not observe was the -noise made by 300 advancing Tanks. - - -IV - -The night of the 7th-8th was damp and still, and at about four o’clock -on the 8th a dense ground mist had begun to drift up the river valley. -Soon the whole air was one silent white sea of vapour. So thick was it -that the assaulting infantry and Tanks had immediately to prepare to -move entirely by compass, for it was impossible to see a yard ahead -through the dense silent blanket. - -Nothing, it would seem, was further from the Germans’ thoughts than -that the steaming quiet of the early autumn morning was to be so -terribly broken. At a quarter past four his lines were perfectly -silent. He was far from being in a truculent mood in this sector, and -for a week his attitude had been unobtrusive. Here and there a German -sentry, his grey greatcoat silvered like gossamer by the pearls of the -mist, would cough, stamping his feet as he peered listlessly through -the fog for stray trespassers in No Man’s Land. - -Suddenly at 4.20 our massed artillery opened an intense fire along the -eleven miles of front. - -The German front line was drenched in a hurricane of shells, and -behind, his unprepared batteries were for some time completely -smothered by the violence of our fire. - -Before the Germans had had time to recover their wits, all along the -line the Tanks emerged by tens and twenties upon them out of the fog. - -The forward positions were completely overwhelmed, the Tanks not so -much destroying the enemy with their fire as simply running down his -machine-gun emplacements and crushing crews and guns beneath them. - -Our first wave was soon out beyond the enemy’s lightly held -front-trench system, and the survivors and the second wave were -fighting their way through his scattered machine-gun emplacements -towards the first phase objective. - -With the Australians in the centre, a Company of the 13th Battalion -advanced rapidly over undulating country, apparently “swallowing the -ground” of both first and second phases at a run. - - [70]“The method of attack was adapted to suit the ground; leaving - the infantry established on a crest, Tanks would go forward across - the valley, maintaining fire on isolated machine-gun posts, and - gain positions on the forward ridge. In all cases this induced the - enemy to give themselves up, and enabled the infantry to advance - to the next crest. On the right of this sector ‘B’ Company quickly - placed their infantry in their final first phase objective north - of the main road. ‘C’ Company on the left had more trouble; a - field gun placed on the high ground across the river near Chipilly - was in position to enfilade the advance, and knocked out three - Tanks. This for some time caused a withdrawal by the infantry. - By noon, however, the remaining Tanks had placed their infantry - in the required final positions, and all active opposition had - ceased. Throughout the operation there was abundant evidence of the - hasty retreat of the enemy. In the gully south-east of Morcourt a - transport-park, complete with wagons and harness, was left behind, - and at the southern end of the same gully a field canteen was found - well stocked with light wines and German beer.” - -With the Canadians also the advance was rapid, but here the mist was so -thick that Tank sections got completely mixed up and fought cheerfully -all over each other’s areas. - -The carefully planned and methodical assault had to give place to a -more or less primitive _mêlée_ in which each Tank generally sought out -and slew Germans wherever they might happen to find them. - -Though far from scientific, this method when allied with the _élan_ of -the Canadian infantry proved highly successful. - -With the 3rd Corps the fighting was heavier, and more difficulty was -experienced in advancing. The heavy Tanks and infantry, however, soon -everywhere held the line whose capture was to mark the end of the -first phase (_i.e._, Marcelcave, and the Cérisy Valley to south of -Morlancourt). - - -V - -The second phase of the attack, which started four hours after zero, -was very different from the first. The mist which had hampered but -concealed our approach had now given place to brilliant sunshine. The -enemy had had ample warning and had time to dispose his “stout-hearted -artillery and machine-gunners” to meet the advance. In these conditions -his resistance stiffened. With the Australians,[71] “Enemy field -batteries firing over open sights engaged and knocked out Tanks, some -in the neighbourhood of Bayonvillers and near Cérisy Village. The crews -were, however, in many cases able to move forward with their Hotchkiss -guns and put the hostile batteries out of action. The surviving Tanks -pressed on to the final objective, the Australian infantry being quick -to seize the openings that had been made.” - -The final objective allotted to the 2nd Tank Battalion was Harbonnières -Village. - -The machine-gun and artillery fire had been heavy. However, the -first-wave Tanks rallied at the Cérisy Valley and with the rest of the -Battalion launched the attack on the second objective. - -Lieut.-Colonel Bryce led his Tanks triumphantly to the successive -capture of all the objectives allotted to them--Warfusée, Lamotte, -Bayonvillers, and a number of other villages. - -At last they reached Harbonnières, their last objective, and, still on -foot, Colonel Bryce entered the place with his leading Tanks and ran up -an Australian flag over the village. - -In the naïve words of “Honours and Awards,” “This had a most -stimulating effect on every one.” - -In the same sector, Lieutenant Percy Eade and his Tank (of the 2nd -Battalion) appear to have captured a village single-handed, and, best -of all, to have solemnly demanded a receipt upon handing it over to the -Australians. - - [72]“During the attack on the 8th inst. this officer showed great - initiative, skill and bravery in dealing with unexpected resistance - by the enemy. - - “On being informed by the infantry that Marcelcave was still - holding out and was endangering their right flank, he arranged - a scheme of attack with the infantry commander and proceeded to - quell the opposition. He destroyed at least six machine-guns with - their crews, besides taking many prisoners. He then handed over - the village to the infantry, from whom he took a receipt. After - regaining his position and during the second phase of the attack, - he heard opposition coming from Bayonvillers, so he proceeded - towards that village. As he was approaching it from the south-west - he discovered a group of three light field guns, two of which were - firing at him at short range. These guns had already knocked out - several Tanks. With great gallantry and determination he manœuvred - his Tank in their direction, and so directed the fire of his own - guns that he dispersed the gunners. After running over one of the - field guns, he proceeded into the village, where his Tank was - directly responsible for capturing at least forty of the enemy. - - “Throughout the whole of the operation, this Tank Commander set his - crew a magnificent example of courage and determination. (Immediate - Reward.)” - -The 13th Battalion History is particularly full of allusions to -the excellence of their relations with their battle partners, the -Australians. - -All Tanks of this Battalion displayed on a painted board the colours of -their own infantry, of whom one N.C.O. stayed with each crew and rode -as an observer in the Tank on the day of battle. It may here be noted -that these Australian N.C.O.’s were of the greatest use in keeping -touch with the infantry, and incidentally returned to their units with -a largely enhanced opinion of the courage and endurance of the Tank -Corps personnel. - -In the second phase one Tank was of service in keeping touch between -two Companies of infantry, until a gap in the line could be closed. - -With the Canadians, the second phase was equally hot. A typical action -was fought by a machine belonging to the 14th Battalion. - - [73]“Second Lieutenant Gould’s Tank was pushing on towards the Red - Line, which overlooked the valley running south. Here the enemy - were found to be organising for a counter-attack. Enemy transport - with a large number of stragglers, estimated at 1000, was in full - retreat up the road, and in the valley itself a force estimated - at half a battalion was forming up and being reinforced by other - parties coming over the hill in rear. All the time this Tank was - under heavy fire from machine-guns and snipers from the left - flank and rear. Fire was opened with 6-pounders on the transport - and direct hits observed. M.G. fire was also directed with good - effect on the excellent targets in the valley, causing confusion - and disorganisation in the enemy ranks. With the prolonged running - at high speed the interior of the Tank rapidly became unbearable - through heat and petrol fumes, and the crew were forced to evacuate - it and to take cover underneath. At this moment two of the crew - were wounded, one was sick, one fainted and one was delirious. - Fortunately, before the enemy could take advantage of the lull, two - Whippet Tanks and a body of cavalry came up, and the enemy in the - valley began to retreat over the hill.” - -The 1st Tank Battalion, with the Canadians, suffered extremely severely. - - [74]“Owing to the French having been held up, the British were - subjected to a heavy enfilade fire from the villages of Beaucourt - and Le Quesneu and nine of the eleven Tanks belonging to ‘A’ - Company received direct hits from a field battery firing over open - sights from Le Quesneu. The majority caught fire and were burnt - out, and very severe casualties resulted, three out of the four - Section Commanders being killed and the remaining one wounded and - captured. This disaster was followed by a particularly heroic - action on the part of Second Lieutenant Cassell, who observed the - destructive fire of the battery, and, passing through the burning - victims of its shells, steered straight on to it, in an attempt to - avenge the destruction of his comrades. His heroism was in vain, - for before he had proceeded many yards he received a shell through - the front of his Tank which put it out of action and killed Second - Lieutenant Cassell and most of his crew.” - -Meanwhile, the Whippets and the cavalry had pushed forward. - -They and the armoured cars were to press on beyond the limits of the -infantry and heavy Tank attack. - -Generally the Whippets were to precede the cavalry, in order to silence -machine-guns, deal with wire, if any, and generally to pave the way. - -In practice, however: - - [75]“Difficulty was found in maintaining touch with cavalry owing - to the impossibility of keeping up with galloping horsemen on the - one hand, and to the impossibility of a mounted advance in the face - of heavy machine-gun fire on the other hand. Thus, two sections - of ‘C’ Company, 3rd Battalion lost touch with their cavalry in - climbing a steep hill out of Ignaucourt Valley.” - -There were, in fact, innumerable instances of liaison difficulties. - - “Another Company was ordered to obtain touch with 3rd Cavalry - Brigade, but on reporting to the rendezvous, no cavalry was seen. - - “Zero hour had been postponed three hours, but this was not known - till later. - - “Being unable to obtain touch with the cavalry, assistance was - rendered about noon to Canadian infantry attacking Beaufort and - Warvillers. This attack was successful and Whippets rendered great - assistance.” - -Far happier was the lot of certain Whippets which played an independent -part. The following is a first-hand account of the adventures of one -such machine, the ever-to-be-remembered Whippet, “Musical Box.” - -[Illustration: SMOKE SCREEN AND SEMAPHORE] - -[Illustration: A TANKADROME] - -As the story will show, for many months no news was obtained of the -fate of the machine or of her crew of one officer, Lieutenant C. B. -Arnold, and two men, Gunner Ribbans and Driver Carney, and it was not -till January 1919 that the following amazing tale appeared in _Weekly -Tank Notes_:-- - - “On August 8, 1918, I commanded Whippet ‘Musical Box’ in ‘B’ - Company, 6th Battalion. We left the lying-up point at zero (4.20 - p.m.) and proceeded across country to the south side of the - railway at Villers-Bretonneux. We crossed the railway, in column - of sections, by the bridge on the eastern outskirts of the town. I - reached the British front line and passed through the Australian - infantry and some of our heavy Tanks (Mark V.), in company with - the remainder of the Whippets of ‘B’ Company. Four sections of - ‘B’ Company proceeded parallel with the railway (Amiens-Ham) - across country due east. After proceeding about 2000 yards in this - direction I found myself to be the leading machine, owing to the - others having become ditched, etc. To my immediate front I could - see more Mark V. Tanks being followed very closely by Australian - infantry. About this time we came under direct shell-fire from a - 4-gun field battery, of which I could see the flashes, between - Abancourt and Bayonvillers. Two Mark V. Tanks, on my right, were - knocked out. I saw clouds of smoke coming out of these machines - and the crews evacuate them. The infantry following the heavy - machines were suffering casualties from this battery. I turned - half-left and ran diagonally across the front of the battery, at - a distance of about 600 yards. Both my guns were able to fire on - the battery, in spite of which they got off about eight rounds at - me without damage, but sufficiently close to be audible inside - the cab, and I could see the flash of each gun as it fired. By - this time I had passed behind a belt of trees running along a - roadside. I ran along this belt until level with the battery, when - I turned full-right and engaged the battery in rear. On observing - our appearance from the belt of trees, the gunners, some thirty - in number, abandoned their guns and tried to get away. Gunner - Ribbans and I accounted for the whole lot. I cruised forward, - making a detour to the left, and shot a number of the enemy, who - appeared to be demoralised, and were moving about the country in - all directions. This detour brought me back to the railway siding - N.N.W. of Guillaucourt. I could now see other Whippets coming up - and a few Mark V.’s also. The Australian infantry, who followed - magnificently, had now passed through the battery position which - we had accounted for and were lying in a sunken road about 400 - yards past the battery and slightly to the left of it. I got out - of my machine and went to an Australian full Lieutenant and asked - if he wanted any help. Whilst talking to him, he received a bullet - which struck the metal shoulder title, a piece of the bullet-casing - entering his shoulder. While he was being dressed, Major Rycroft - (horse) and Lieutenant Waterhouse (Tanks) and Captain Strachan of - ‘B’ Company, 6th Battalion, arrived and received confirmation from - the Australian officer of our having knocked out the field battery. - I told Major Rycroft what we had done, and then moved off again at - once, as it appeared to be unwise for four machines (Lieutenant - Watkins had also arrived) to remain stationary at one spot. I - proceeded parallel with the railway embankment in an easterly - direction, passing through two cavalry patrols of about twelve - men each. The first patrol was receiving casualties from a party - of enemy in a field of corn. I dealt with this, killing three or - four, the remainder escaping out of sight into the corn. Proceeding - further east, I saw the second patrol pursuing six enemy. The - leading horse was so tired that he was not gaining appreciably - on the rearmost Hun. Some of the leading fugitives turned about - and fired at the cavalryman when his sword was stretched out and - practically touching the back of the last Hun. Horse and rider - were brought down on the left of the road. The remainder of the - cavalrymen deployed to right, coming in close under the railway - embankment, where they dismounted and came under fire from the - enemy, who had now taken up a position on the railway bridge, and - were firing over the parapet, inflicting one or two casualties. I - ran the machine up until we had a clear view of the bridge, and - killed four of the enemy with one long burst, the other two running - across the bridge and on down the opposite slope out of sight. On - our left I could see, about three-quarters of a mile away, a train - on fire being towed by an engine. I proceeded further east, still - parallel to the railway, and approached carefully a small valley - marked on my map as containing Boche hutments. As I entered the - valley (between Bayonvillers and Harbonnières) at right angles, - many enemy were visible packing kits and others retiring. On our - opening fire on the nearest, many others appeared from huts, making - for the end of the valley, their object being to get over the - embankment and so out of our sight. We accounted for many of these. - I cruised round, Ribbans went into one of the huts and returned, - and we counted about sixty dead and wounded. There were evidences - of shell-fire amongst the huts, but we certainly accounted for most - of the casualties counted there. I turned left from the railway - and cruised across country, as lines of enemy infantry could be - seen retiring. We fired at these many times at ranges of 200 yards - to 600 yards. These targets were fleeting, owing to the enemy - getting down into the corn when fired on. In spite of this, many - casualties must have been inflicted, as we cruised up and down for - at least an hour. I did not see any more of our troops or machines - after leaving the cavalry patrols already referred to. During the - cruising, being the only machine to get through, we invariably - received intense rifle and machine-gun fire. I would here beg to - suggest that no petrol be carried on the outside of the machine, - as under orders we were carrying nine tins of petrol on the roof, - for refilling purposes when well into the enemy lines (should - opportunity occur). The perforated tins allowed the petrol to run - all over the cab. These fumes, combined with the intense bullet - splash and the great heat after being in action (by this time) nine - to ten hours, made it necessary at this point to breathe through - the mouth-piece of the box respirator, without actually wearing the - mask. - - [Illustration: MOVING UP. BATTLE OF AMIENS] - - [Illustration: THE ARMOURED CARS GOING UP] - - “At 2 p.m. or thereabouts I again proceeded east, parallel to - the railway and about 100 yards north of it. I could see a large - aerodrome and also an observation balloon at a height of about 200 - ft. I could also see great quantities of motor and horse transport - moving in all directions. Over the top of another ridge on my left - I could see the cover of a lorry coming in my direction; I moved - up out of sight and waited until he topped the bridge, when I shot - the driver. The lorry ran into a right-hand ditch. The railway - had now come out of the cutting in which it had rested all the - while, and I could see both sides of it. I could see a long line of - men retiring on both sides of the railway, and fired at these at - ranges of 400 to 500 yards, inflicting heavy casualties. I passed - through these and also accounted for one horse and the driver of - a two-horse canvas-covered wagon on the far side of the railway. - We now crossed a small road which crossed the main railway, and - came in view of large horse and wagon lines--which ran across the - railway and close to it. Gunner Ribbans (R.H. gun) here had a view - of south side of railway and fired continuously into motor and - horse transport moving on three roads (one north and south, one - almost parallel to the railway, and one diagonally between these - two). I fired many bursts at 600 to 800 yards at transport blocking - roads on my left, causing great confusion. Rifle and machine-gun - fire was not heavy at this time, owing to our sudden appearance, as - the roads were all banked up in order to cross the railway. There - were about twelve men in the middle aisle of these lines. I fired - a long burst at these. Some went down and others got in amongst - the wheels and undergrowth. I turned quarter-left towards a small - copse, where there were more horses and men, about 200 yards away. - On the way across we met the most intense rifle and machine-gun - fire imaginable from all sides. When at all possible, we returned - the fire, until the L.H. revolver port cover was shot away. I - withdrew the forward gun, locked the mounting and held the body of - the gun against the hole. Petrol was still running down the inside - of the back door. Fumes and heat combined were very bad. We were - still moving forward and I was shouting to Driver Carney to turn - about, as it was impossible to continue the action, when two heavy - concussions closely followed one another and the cab burst into - flames. Carney and Ribbans got to the door and collapsed. I was - almost overcome, but managed to get the door open and fell out on - to the ground, and was able to drag out the other two men. Burning - petrol was running on to the ground where we were lying. The fresh - air revived us, and we all got up and made a short rush to get away - from the burning petrol. We were all on fire. In this rush Carney - was shot in the stomach and killed. We rolled over and over to try - to extinguish the fumes. I saw numbers of the enemy approaching - from all round. The first arrival came for me with a rifle and - bayonet. I got hold of this, and the point of the bayonet entered - my right forearm. The second man struck at my head with the butt - end of his rifle, hit my shoulder and neck, and knocked me down. - When I came to, there were dozens all round me, and any one who - could reach me did so and I was well kicked. They were furious. - Ribbans and I were taken away and stood by ourselves about - twenty yards clear of the crowd. An argument ensued, and we were - eventually marched to a dug-out where paper bandages were put on - our hands. Our faces were left as they were. We were then marched - down the road to the main railway. There we joined a party of about - eight enemy, and marched past a field kitchen, where I made signs - for food. We had had nothing since 8.30 p.m. on the night previous - to the action, and it was 3.30 p.m. when we were set on fire. We - went on to a village where, on my intelligence map, a Divisional - Headquarters had been marked. An elderly stout officer interrogated - me, asking if I was an officer. I said ‘Yes.’ He then asked various - other questions, to which I replied, ‘I do not know.’ He said, ‘Do - you mean you do not know or you will not tell me?’ I said, ‘You can - take it whichever way you wish.’ He then struck me in the face, - and went away. We went on to Chaulone to a canvas hospital, on the - right side of the railway, where I was injected with anti-tetanus. - Later I was again interrogated, with the same result as above, - except that instead of being struck, I received five days’ solitary - confinement in a room with no window, and only a small piece of - bread and a bowl of soup each day. On the fifth day I was again - interrogated, and said the same as before. I said that he had no - right to give me solitary confinement, and that unless I were - released, I should, at first opportunity, report him to the highest - possible authority. The next day I was sent away, and eventually - reached the camp at Freiburg, when I found my brother, Captain - A. E. Arnold, M.C., Tank Corps. The conduct of Gunner Ribbans and - Driver Carney was beyond all praise throughout. Driver Carney drove - from Villers-Bretonneux onwards. - - “(_Signed_) C. B. ARNOLD, Lieut., - “6th Tank Battalion. - - “_January 1, 1919._” - -The Tank was found close to the small railway on the eastern side of -the Harbonnières-Rosières Road. - - -VI - -The final stage of the day’s battle had been reached by early afternoon. - -The armoured cars, moving rapidly east along the main roads, did much -to complete the demoralisation of the enemy. - - [76]“The enemy, once in retreat, became completely demoralised. One - heard from the commanders of the armoured cars which were returning - on the main Villers-Bretonneux road, how they chased excited German - Staff cars and officers through the ruined village of Faucourt, and - eventually had been held up, because the enemy’s traffic was so - congested on the roads behind his lines that they could penetrate - no further. The Air Force were then reported to have completed this - confusion, by obtaining some excellent results in flying low over - these roads.... - - “The cars which had turned northwards entered Proyart and - Chuignolles, two moving up to the river Somme. At Proyart the - cars found the German troops at dinner; these they shot down and - scattered in all directions, and then moving westwards met masses - of the enemy driven from their trenches by the Australians. In - order to surprise these men who were moving eastwards, the cars - hid in the outskirts of Proyart and only advanced when the enemy - was between fifty and one hundred yards distant, when they moved - forward, rapidly shooting down great numbers. Scattering from - before the cars at Proyart, the enemy made across country towards - Chuignolles, only to be met by the cars which had proceeded to - this village, and they were once again fired on and dispersed. - Near Chuignolles one armoured car obtained ‘running practice’ with - its machine-guns at a lorry full of troops, and kept up fire until - the lorry ran into the ditch. There were also several cases of - armoured cars following German transport vehicles, without anything - unusual being suspected, until fire was opened at point-blank range. - - “Although more than half the cars were out of action by the evening - of the 8th, there were no casualties amongst their personnel - sufficiently serious to require evacuation.” - -The Mark V. star Tanks successfully reached the day’s final objective -and delivered their infantry machine-gunners on the line which was to -be the limit of our advance. - -That they were duly “delivered” is, however, about as much as can be -said of many of these unfortunates. - -The motion, the heat, and the fumes of the inside of a Tank closed for -action, almost invariably proved too much for all but the Tank’s own -well-salted crew. - -Consequently where little fire had been met with, the machine-gunners -had come up either riding or walking behind it. - -Where the fire had been heavy and they had been sternly ordered in and -the Tank closed up, they had been delivered flushed, feverish, and -either vomiting or extremely faint and quite unfit for duty until they -had been given at least a couple of hours’ rest. - -The Australian Corps and their Tanks had alone taken about 7900 -prisoners, and our total captures amounted to over 13,000 prisoners, -and more than 300 guns, besides all kinds of stores and ammunition. -Along the eleven miles of attack we had advanced to a depth of nearly -seven miles, and (except Le Quesnoy, which we captured before dawn on -the 9th) the whole of the outer defences of Amiens had been taken. The -armoured cars and some of the cavalry had, as we have seen, been in -action far beyond. It was north of the Somme that our advance had been -most hotly contested, but even here we had pushed forward considerably -and the enemy’s casualties had been particularly heavy. - -The Paris-Amiens railway was completely disengaged, and the Despatch -characterises the first day’s fighting as a “sweeping success.” - - -VII - -All night, to the east beyond the limit of our advance, we could hear -the enemy blowing up his ammunition dumps. - -All night his transport and limbers streamed eastwards, and all night -our airmen hung upon his retreating columns. - -Next morning we attacked again along the whole line, no less than 155 -Tanks being actually engaged. - -The Australians advanced upon Lihons, Framerville and Vauxvillers, -while on their right the Canadians continued the attack south of the -Amiens-Chaulnes railway. - -In the attack on Framerville, out of thirteen Tanks engaged, only one -was hit. - -This fact was attributable to the admirable co-operation between the -infantry and Tanks. - - [77]“Riflemen working hand in hand with the machines picking - off the enemy’s field gunners, as soon as the Tanks came into - observation. At Vauxvillers, seven Tanks went into action just - before noon, unaccompanied by infantry and without artillery - support. After the Tanks had gone forward a little way, the 5th - Australian Division followed up and not only captured the high - ground, but the village itself, which was not included in their - original objective.” - -Near Rosières the opposition stiffened, and here no less than eight -Tanks were knocked out by a German battery which came into action near -Lihons. It was not until 5 p.m. that this battery was silenced, and we -did not reach Lihons that night. - - [78]“The day’s operations were especially interesting through - the rapidity with which the enemy got his field batteries into - action from commanding positions against Tanks advancing in broad - daylight. He also employed a number of low-flying aeroplanes - against the infantry, but as these did not carry bombs their fire - had no effect upon the Tanks. The resistance put up by his riflemen - and machine-gunners was feeble, and showed clearly the moral effect - of the victorious advance of the previous day.” - -With the Canadians as many Tanks as possible were rallied and about -fifty-five went into action. They went forward, as before, in waves, -the same Tank Battalions working with the same Infantry Divisions as on -the previous day. - -North of the Somme, with the 3rd Corps (which included the 33rd -American Division) the 10th Tank Battalion put sixteen Tanks into -action. - -They had a hard task round Chipilly, where the enemy had a large number -of machine-guns cleverly concealed in woods and gullies. By the early -evening, however, all the objectives were taken, and our positions -advanced in line with those which we held south of the river, an -advance achieved at a cost of five casualties to the sixteen machines -engaged. - -The Whippets’ action, in as far as they were billed to act with the -cavalry, was disappointing. By some fault of liaison they were kept too -long at Brigade Headquarters. - -At Beaufort and Warvillers, however, they were able to give great help -to the infantry by chasing hostile machine-gunners out of the standing -corn and shooting them down as they fled. - -On the whole August 9th was a successful day, for we continued to push -forward steadily all along our line. - - -VIII - -We had, in fact, pushed forward so far that all along the line during -the next day’s fighting we reached the old trench systems of the First -Battle of the Somme. And it was this fact, combined with the usual -and inevitable petering out of all attacks which are not supported by -immense reserves, that now slowed our rate of advance down to nothing. -Two days later we left off hammering. - -The 10th proved an unfortunate day for the Tanks, for though we -advanced, the eighty-five Tanks engaged suffered heavily in every -sector. - -With the Canadians, owing to orders having been issued late, the hour -of attack had to be altered, and it finally took place in daylight -without smoke. - -A stubborn resistance was encountered, and of the forty-three Tanks -engaged no less than twenty-three received direct hits. - -Before Warvillers the cavalry and Whippets had a particularly poor time -of it, the old trench systems and the old shelled area, of which the -enemy had taken ingenious and thorough advantage, proving too much for -both arms. - -With the Australians a rather remarkable night attack was arranged. - -During the three previous days’ fighting it had been found very -inconvenient to have the Somme Valley as an inter-corps boundary, and -General Monash was allowed to extend his territory northward in such a -way that the Australians should hold both sides of the valley. - -An encircling movement was, therefore, undertaken, of which Captain -Denny, M.C., M.P., gives the following account in his article on the -work of the Australians which appeared in the _Daily Telegraph_ of -April 1919: - - “The 3rd and 4th Australian Divisions were ordered to carry out - an encircling operation on the night of August 10–11 in order to - cut off the Etinehem spur north of the Somme and the ridge east of - Proyart, south of the Somme. The general lines of the operation - both to the north and the south of the river were similar. Columns - were to move along defined roads leaving the objectives well to - the flanks, and then encircle the enemy positions. Each column was - accompanied by Tanks, and was to move in an easterly direction, and - then to wheel inwards towards the Somme. It was recognised that - this action involved certain risks, as Tanks had never been tried - by night in this way, but in view of the condition of the enemy’s - _moral_ at this stage it was considered that the effect of the - advance of the Tanks and infantry would lead immediately to the - collapse of the defence. - - “The action north of the river was entirely successful. South of - the river the enemy bombed the forward area heavily early in the - night, causing considerable delay in the preparations for the - attack. Progress was at first slow owing to heavy enemy artillery - and machine-gun fire and the disorganisation caused by the bombing. - Two of the Tanks allotted for the operations were destroyed or put - out of action very soon after zero hour.” - -Almost from the outset of the attack heavy enemy machine-gun fire was -encountered from the large enemy dump by the side of the main road. -Tanks were unable in the dark to locate these machine-guns, and could -not do much to assist the infantry. It was therefore decided to abandon -the operation and withdraw the infantry under cover of unaimed fire -from the Tanks, who were themselves recalled when the infantry had got -clear away. - -It was not till the evening of August 12 that Tanks and infantry were -able to advance in this sector, and that we gained the positions east -of Proyart. - -By August 11 the Tank Corps reserves were used up, and the Tanks and -their crews were almost fought to a standstill. They had had three -days of continuous fighting and marching, and of the thirty-eight -Tanks which went into action on the 11th there was not one but badly -needed overhauling. The crews were completely exhausted. We have -already described the conditions under which the men fought in the -Mark V. Tank, and how after an average of three hours in a closed Tank -whose guns are in action, all men begin to suffer from severe headache -and giddiness, and most from sickness, a high temperature and heart -disturbance. - -After the Battle of Amiens the crews of most of the surviving Tanks -had fought for three days, not three hours, and 50 per cent. of them -were on the verge of collapse. However, as we have said, thirty-eight -machines and crews were scraped together, and on August 11 ten Tanks of -the 2nd Battalion helped in the taking of Lihons by the Australians. -These Tanks had an approach march of eight miles before they reached -their jumping-off places. - -With the Canadians, Tanks attacked Domeny and twice entered the -village, but the 4th Canadian Division could not get forward to -consolidate, owing to lack of support on the right. - -On the 12th, while six Tanks were still thrashing out the Proyart -affair north of the Somme, the 4th and 5th Brigades were withdrawn, to -be followed next day by the remainder of the Tanks. - - -IX - -We called a halt, and the Battle of Amiens was at an end, for it was -again at last the Allies who chose the time and the place where they -would offer battle. - -Commanders who had the bitter taste of the forced actions of the -March retreat in their mouths, must have savoured this easy choice -extraordinarily. There is something thrilling in the assured words of -the Despatch. We did not care for the new battle site! We would change -it and fight elsewhere! - - “The derelict battle area which now lay before our troops, seared - by old trench lines, pitted with shell-holes, and crossed in all - directions with tangled belts of wire, the whole covered by the - wild vegetation of two years, presented unrivalled opportunities - for stubborn machine-gun defences.... - - “I therefore determined to break off the battle on this front, and - transferred the front of attack from the 4th Army to the sector - north of the Somme, where an attack seemed unexpected by the enemy. - My intention was for the 3rd Army to operate in the direction of - Bapaume so as to turn the line of the old Somme defences from the - north.” - -We struck at once. Only four days were given to the Tanks for -overhauling machines and patching up the crews, for on August 21 we -opened the new battle. - -Meanwhile it was hard to realise how great was the moral and physical -blow which we had dealt the Germans. The July attacks had been -tentative, but the Battle of Amiens was the decisive victory, the sure -proof that the Germans had lost all hope of winning the War by force of -arms. - -But at the time we could not read the thundering sign of our -deliverance with certainty. We could see only what were the more -immediate results of the battle. - - [79]“Within the space of five days the town of Amiens and the - railway centring upon it had been disengaged. Twenty German - Divisions had been heavily defeated by thirteen British Infantry - Divisions and three Cavalry Divisions, assisted by a regiment of - the 33rd American Division and supported by some 400 Tanks. Nearly - 22,000 prisoners and over 400 guns had been taken by us, and our - line had been pushed forward to a depth of some twelve miles in a - vital sector. Further, our deep advance, combined with the attacks - of the French Armies on our right, had compelled the enemy to - evacuate hurriedly a wide extent of territory to the south of us. - - “The effect of this victory--following so closely after the Allied - victory on the Marne--upon the _moral_ both of the German and - British troops was very great. Buoyed up by the hope of immediate - and decisive victory, to be followed by an early and favourable - peace, constantly assured that the Allied reserves were exhausted, - the German soldiery suddenly found themselves attacked on two - fronts and thrown back with heavy losses from large and important - portions of their earlier gains. The reaction was inevitable and of - a deep and lasting character. - - “On the other hand, our own troops felt that at last their - opportunity had come, and that, supported by a superior artillery - and numerous Tanks they could now press forward resolutely to reap - the reward of their patient, dauntless, and successful defence in - March and April.” - -We knew, however, that we had still hard fighting before us, and we -were careful to analyse every phase of the action to see if we could -not learn some practical lesson from it that should help us in the -coming months. - -The Tank Command noted several points “for reference.” In the first -place, the battle would have been ended the quicker if the Tanks had -had a larger general reserve. - -Then neither the Mark V. nor the Whippet was fast enough for open -warfare. - -Had we then possessed machines such as we have now,[80] of double the -speed of the Mark V., and having a radius of action of 100 miles and -more, we should, at a modest estimate, have finished the battle on the -first day. - -Last, we had not used our Whippets to the best advantage. - -The 3rd (Light) Brigade Commander, Brig.-General Hardress-Lloyd, -thus admirably summarised the lessons of the battle, and laid down -alternative principles upon which the light machines might be used: - - “I do not think it advisable to attempt to use the present Whippet - in conjunction with cavalry. Better results would have been - obtained during these operations if Whippets had been working in - close liaison with Mark V. Tanks and infantry. - - “The Whippet is not fast enough to conform to cavalry tactics in - the early stages of a battle. - - “The Whippets’ rôle should be to push on amongst the retreating - enemy and prevent him from reorganising, engage reinforcements - coming up, eventually enabling the infantry to make a further - advance, capture prisoners, guns, etc. - - “... They must move forward in close touch with the heavy Tanks so - as to be near enough up to go though when required. If kept back - with the cavalry the speed of the Whippet is not sufficient to - enable the machine to be in the forward position at the required - moment, and its offensive power will be seriously diminished.” - -But it was not for us that the battle of August 8 had its chief lessons. - -The German High Command waxed eloquent with indignant exhortation, and -demanded passionately that the experiences of the German Army should be -utilised, and that such things as had occurred on the 8th should never -happen again. - -On August 11 General Ludendorff issued a secret Order: - - “Troops allowed themselves to be surprised by a mass attack of - Tanks, and lost all cohesion when the Tanks suddenly appeared - behind them, having broken through under cover of a mist, natural - and artificial. The defensive organisation, both of the first - line and in the rear, was insufficient to permit of a systematic - defence.... As a weapon against Tanks, the prepared defence of the - ground must play a larger part than ever, and the aversion of the - men to the pick and shovel must be overcome at all hazards.... - Especially there must be defences against Tanks. It was absolutely - inadmissible that the Tanks, having penetrated into our advance - line without meeting with obstacles or anything, should be able - to push on along the roads or beside them for miles.... The - principle that a body of troops even when surrounded must defend - their ground, unless otherwise ordered, to the last man and the - last cartridge, seems to have fallen into oblivion ... a large - proportion of our ranks fight unskilfully against Tanks. A Tank is - an easy prey for artillery of all calibres....” - -An account follows of measures for the proper disposition of artillery -against Tanks, and the rest of the Order is occupied with directions -to the infantry concerning the question at what range the anti-Tank -rifle and gun are most effective. The consideration of these points is -long and exhaustive. Ludendorff further hopes much from “the active and -inventive genius of the lower ranks of the non-commissioned officers -to arrange Tank traps, and demands that every encouragement should be -shown to those who show any inventive talent.” - -These were but peddling remedies. When, as at Amiens, the understanding -between infantry and Tanks is almost perfect, and when the magnificent -_élan_ of an assault by Australians and Canadians is supported by the -weight of 400 Tanks, not even the troops of what was the best-trained -Army in the world can stand the concerted shock of their attack. - -A Special Order was issued on August 16 by General Sir Henry Rawlinson, -the 4th Army Commander: - - “_Tank Corps._--The success of the operations of August 8 and - succeeding days was largely due to the conspicuous part played by - the 3rd, 4th and 5th Brigades of the Tank Corps, and I desire to - place on record my sincere appreciation of the invaluable services - rendered both by the Mark V. and the Mark V. star and the Whippets. - - “The task of secretly assembling so large a number of Tanks - entailed very hard and continuous work by all concerned for four or - five nights previous to the battle. - - “The tactical handling of the Tanks in action made calls on the - skill and physical endurance of the detachments which were met - with a gallantry and devotion beyond all praise. - - “I desire to place on record my appreciation of the splendid - success that they achieved, and to heartily congratulate the Tank - Corps as a whole on the completeness of their arrangements and the - admirable prowess exhibited by all ranks actually engaged on this - occasion. There are many vitally important lessons to be learned - from their experiences. These will, I trust, be taken to heart by - all concerned and made full use of when next the Tank Corps is - called upon to go into battle. - - “The part played by the Tanks and Whippets in the battle on August - 8 was in all respects a very fine performance. - - “(_Signed_) H. RAWLINSON, _General_, - “Commanding 4th Army. - - “Headquarters, 4th Army, - “_August 16, 1918_.” - -Nor were the Australians less generous. - -The following message is typical of many. It was sent to Brig.-General -Courage (commanding 5th Tank Brigade) by the 4th Australian Divisional -Commander: - - “G.O.C. 5th Tank Brigade. - - “I wish to express to you and the command associated with us on - August 8 and following days, on behalf of the 4th Australian - Division, our deep appreciation of the most gallant service - rendered during our offensive operations by the Tank Corps. The - consistent skill and gallantry with which the Tanks, individually - and collectively, were handled during the battle, was the - admiration of all ranks of the infantry with whom they were so - intimately associated, and our success was due in a very large - measure to your efforts. - - “We hope sincerely, that in future offensive operations in which we - may take part, we shall have the honour to be associated with the - same units of the Tank Corps as during the operations on August 8 - and following days. - - “(_Signed_) E. G. SINCLAIR MCLAGAN, - “Major-General, - “Commanding 4th Australian Division.” - -Finally, in a congratulatory telegram after the battle, the -Commander-in-Chief paid a high tribute to the skill and bravery -displayed by the Tank Corps in the gaining of this signal victory. - - - - -CHAPTER XVIII - -THE GERMAN ATTITUDE--“MAN-TRAPS AND GINS”--THE BATTLE OF BAPAUME - - -I - -We had, as we have said, called a halt to the Battle of Amiens. - -But the pause was to be only one of a few days. - -The new battle was to be fought in the area which lay between the -rivers Somme and Scarpe, and for his selection of this particular place -Sir Douglas Haig in his Despatch gives two reasons. - - “The enemy did not seem prepared to meet an attack in this - direction, and, owing to the success of the Fourth Army, he - occupied a salient, the left flank of which was already threatened - from the south. A further reason for my decision was that the - ground north of the Ancre River was not greatly damaged by - shell-fire, and was suitable for the use of Tanks. A successful - attack between Albert and Arras in a south-easterly direction would - turn the line of the Somme south of Péronne, and gave every promise - of producing far-reaching results. It would be a step forward - towards the strategic objective St. Quentin-Cambrai.” - -It is interesting to see how high a place Tanks now held in the -estimation of the General Staff, and how carefully their peculiarities -were considered. - -But it was not only the British High Command which had begun to busy -itself with the natural history of the Tank. - -Since the lesser battles of July and the greater battle of August 8, -the attitude of the German G.H.Q. had entirely changed. - -When we first began to use Tanks it will be remembered that the -Germans, though perfunctorily alluding to them as “cruel and -detestable,” had in effect sneered at them as makeshifts by which we -hoped to supplement our scanty supply of more legitimate munitions of -war. - -Besides, their contempt for all we did being sincere, the Tanks’ -British parentage damned them without further investigation. - -“Search and see, for out of Galilee cometh no good thing.” - -The Germans themselves made their attitude perfectly clear. - - “The use of 300 British Tanks at Cambrai (1917) was a ‘battle of - material,’ and the German Higher Command decided from the very - outset _not_ to fight a ‘battle of material.’” - -Their policy was masses of men rather than mechanism, quantity rather -than quality. - -The best men went to machine-gun units and to assault troops. In many -cases the remainder of the infantry were of little fighting value, -though many of the men might have been otherwise usefully employed in a -war which, if not one of material, was at least one in which economic -factors played a large part. - -The German Higher Command was able, however, to look at an order of -battle, showing some 250 Divisions on paper. - -But the Germans were thus naturally not in a position to find the -labour for the construction of additional material, such as Tanks; they -were, besides, concentrating any labour and any suitable material they -possessed upon the work of submarine making. - -It seems clear that the whole policy, at least as far as Tanks was -concerned, was regretted before the end of the War. - -The following now well known extracts from German documents indicate -the effect of our Tanks on the German Army: - -“Staff officers sent from G.H.Q. report that the reasons for the defeat -of the Second Army[81] are as follows: - -“1. The fact that the troops were surprised by the massed attack of -Tanks, and lost their heads when the Tanks suddenly appeared behind -them, having broken through under cover of natural and artificial fog. - -“2. Lack of organised defences. - -“3. The fact that the artillery allotted to reserve infantry units at -the disposal of the Higher Command was wholly insufficient to establish -fresh resistance with artillery support against the enemy who had -broken through and against his Tanks. - - “LUDENDORFF, 11. 8. 18.” - - “_Crown Prince’s Group of Armies._ - “12. 8. 18. - - “G.H.Q. reports that during the recent fighting on the fronts of - the 2nd and 18th Armies, large numbers of Tanks broke through - on narrow fronts and pushing straight forward, rapidly attacked - battery positions and the headquarters of divisions. - - “In many cases no defence could be made in time against the Tanks, - which attacked them from all sides. - - “Anti-Tank defence must now be developed to deal with such - situations.” - - Signal Communication-- - - “Messages concerning Tanks will have priority over all other - messages or calls whatsoever.” - - “Order dated 8. 9. 18.” - - -II - -The first efforts at combating Tanks made by the German High Command -were half contemptuously instituted chiefly to reassure their infantry, -who seemed to them, for no particular reason, liable to extraordinary -fits of nerves and panic upon the approach of their new assailants. - -The measures of defence were ill devised and carelessly used. - -In the autumn of 1917, it will be remembered that the Germans had -captured a number of our Mark IV. machines. - -These they used for the purposes of propaganda, parading them in -the streets of Berlin and showing them to the Army, as a man might -demonstrate the harmless nature of snakes by the aid of a tame cobra. - -The infantry were lectured to about the miseries endured by the crews -who manned Tanks, as to their mechanical defects, their vulnerability -and general worthlessness. For example, the following passage appeared -in an Order issued to the 7th German Cavalry Division. It will be -gathered from the text that the Order was illustrated by detailed -drawings. - - “7th Cavalry ‘Schützen’ Div. Div. H.Q. 26.9.18. - - “Subject:--Anti-Tank Defence. - - “_Divisional Order_ - - “1. _General._ - - “The infantry must not let itself be frightened by Tanks. The - fighting capacity of the Tank is small owing to the bad visibility, - and the shooting of the machine-guns and guns is cramped and - inaccurate as the result of the motion. - - “It has been proved that the Tank crews are nervous and are - inclined to turn back, or leave the Tank, even in the case of - limited fire effects, such as a light T.M. (Trench Mortar) barrage - at 800–1000 yards. In order to make it more difficult for the - artillery, the Tanks pursue a zigzag course towards their objective. - - “The hostile infantry follows Tanks only half-heartedly. Experience - shows that hostile attacks are soon checked by aimed machine-gun - and artillery fire. Co-operation between the Tanks and their - infantry detachments must be hindered as much as possible. The - arms should be separated and destroyed in detail. All projectiles - which do not hit the armour-plating at right angles ricochet - off instead of penetrating. Artillery, light trench mortar and - anti-Tank rifle fire is effective against all portions of the Tank, - especially against the broadside and the cab (framed in red in - the illustrations). Machine-gun and rifle fire with A.P. bullets, - on the other hand, should be aimed especially at the observation - and machine-gun loopholes (framed in green and blue in the - illustrations).” - -But the enemy was not content with a merely dialectical defence. Among -other practical measures the Germans, with curious inconsequence, -decided to form a small Tank Corps of their own, partly armed with new -Tanks of German manufacture and partly with captured British machines. - -But here a little unexpected awkwardness arose. The infantry from whom -they now wished to recruit their Tank crews, had unfortunately been -completely convinced by the unanswerable arguments which they had just -heard, and now thoroughly believed in the perfect uselessness, the -extreme vulnerability, of Tanks. - -Thus it came about that the German Tank Corps was made up of a quite -astonishingly reluctant and half-hearted body of men. Altogether, only -fifteen German Tanks were ever manufactured, and only twenty-five -captured British Mark IV. Tanks were repaired, so that the whole affair -amounted to but little. - -The German Tanks were, as we have said, much heavier and larger than -the British or French heavy Tanks, though, as we have noted, they -rather resembled the French St. Chamond. They could not cross large -trenches or heavily shelled ground, owing to their shape, and the lack -of clearance between the ground and the body. On smooth ground, their -speed was good--being about eight miles an hour. - -Their armour was thick and tough, capable of withstanding -armour-piercing bullets, and, at a long range, even direct hits from -field guns not firing armour-piercing shells. Only the front of the -Tank was, however, sufficiently strong for this, and the roof was -scarcely armoured at all. - -They were very vulnerable to the splash of ordinary small arms -ammunition, owing to the numerous crevices and joints left in the -armour-plate. - -The most interesting feature of these otherwise exceedingly bad -machines was the fact that they ran on a spring track. The use of -springs for so heavy a Tank was the one progressive departure in the -German design. - -Their crew consisted of an officer and no less than fifteen other -ranks. This huge crew, twice that of a heavy British Tank, actually -went into action in a Tank 24 feet long by 10 feet wide. However, -the close association of the crew was merely physical, for they were -composed of no less than three distinct arms, and appear to have done -little or no training together as a crew. - -There were the drivers who were mechanics, there were the gunners -who were artillerymen, and the machine-gunners who were infantrymen. -Members of the British Tank Corps were at one time much puzzled by -German Tank prisoners’ statements, that on such or such an occasion -the infantry had spoiled their shooting, or that the artillery had not -backed them up, in circumstances when there was no particular question -of co-operation with other arms. They came afterwards to understand -that the anathema’d representatives of rival arms were inside the -machine, not out. - -But in reality rival machines constituted but a small part of the -German anti-Tank measures, for, as we have said, after the victories -of July and early August, these begin to be panic-stricken in their -elaboration, and after the Battle of Amiens, we find Ludendorff himself -pouring out his soul on the subject. - -He obviously realised that anti-Tank defences had been neglected, and -he probably saw also that this neglect was going to be difficult to -explain to an Army and a public which, as the result of failures, were -about to become extremely critical of their leaders. - -After the Battle of Amiens, therefore, the Germans began feverishly to -set their house in order, and we find special Staff Officers appointed -at the Army, Corps, Divisional and Brigade Headquarters, whose sole -duty it was to organise the anti-Tank defences within their formation. - -A special artillery was told off and divided into two sections. The -first was to provide a few forward silent guns in each divisional -sector. They were to remain hidden till the moment of our attack, and -then to concentrate upon our Tanks. These guns, however, proved apt -to be smothered by our barrage, or not to be able to distinguish their -prey in the half-light of our dawn attacks. Secondly, there were to be -reserve guns whose duty it was to go forward and take up previously -reconnoitred positions after the Tank attack had been launched. It was -generally from these pieces that the Tanks had most to fear. Finally, -all German batteries, including howitzers, had general instructions -to plan their positions in such a way that advancing Tanks would be -subject to a direct fire at about 500 or 600 yards range. In the event -of a Tank attack, the engagement of our machines was now to be the -first call upon the artillery, to the exclusion of counter-battery or -any other work. As for the infantry, the chief rôle allotted to them -was “to keep their heads,” and “to keep calm.” Other Orders instructed -them to move to a flank in the event of a Tank attack. “No advice was -given, however, as to how this was to be done when Tanks were attacking -on a frontage of twenty or thirty miles.” - -A large armoury of special anti-Tank weapons arose, and of these the -most important was the anti-Tank rifle, of which we have spoken before. - - [82] “The weapon weighed 36 lb. and was 5½ feet long. It had no - magazine and fired single shots, using A.P. ammunition of .530 - calibre. It was obviously too conspicuous and too slow a weapon - to be really effective against Tanks, though the steel core could - penetrate the armour of British Tanks at several hundred yards - range. - - “The chief disadvantage of the anti-Tank rifle, however, was that - the German soldier would not use it. He was untrained in its use, - afraid of its kick, and still more afraid of the Tanks themselves. - It is doubtful if one per cent. of the A.T. rifles captured in our - Tank attacks had ever been fired.” - -Road obstacles, such as carts full of stones, linked up with wire -cables, concrete stockades and mines, provided a good deal of the -rest of the enemy anti-Tank stock-in-trade. Of mines there was a -considerable variety. They ranged from elaborate specially made pieces -of apparatus to high explosive shells, buried and hastily fitted with a -device by which the weight of the Tank exploded them. - -They were sometimes buried in lines across roads, and sometimes -extensive minefields were laid. Their singular ineffectiveness always -seemed somewhat mysterious to members of the Tank Corps, the proportion -of effort to result seeming always many tons of mine to each Tank -damaged. - -However, we always thought we might some day encounter a really -effective type of mine, and possibly the Germans were satisfied if -their efforts so much as made our monsters walk delicately, for -in an elaborate document, giving every kind of anti-Tank defence -instructions, they somewhat pathetically conclude: “Every obstacle, -even if it only checks the hostile Tank temporarily, is of value.” - -But there was one form of weapon which was, we felt sure, bound to be -evolved by the Germans. It was one which we were not at all anxious -to encounter. We imagined a weapon which should practically be the -machine-gun version of the anti-Tank rifle; that is to say, a weapon -which could pour out a stream of high-velocity, large-calibre bullets -at the rate of two hundred a minute. Actually it was almost precisely -such an engine that the Germans had got in their “Tuf” machine-gun, of -which an interesting account is given in _Weekly Tank Notes_. - -The name was an abbreviation for “_Tank und Flieger_” (tank and -aeroplane), for it was against these enemies that this machine-gun was -intended. It was to consist of no less than 250 pieces, which were -made by sixty different factories, of which the _Maschinen Fabrik -Augsburg Nürnberg_, was the only one entrusted with the assembling and -mounting. The projectile fired was to be 13 millimetres in diameter. -From experiments made with captured Tanks, the Germans ascertained -that these bullets could pierce steel plates of 30 millimetres in -thickness. No less than six thousand of these guns were to be in the -field by April 1919, and delivery was to begin early in the previous -December--just a month too late. - -However, when the Armistice was signed, the firms were already in -possession of the greater part of the stores and raw material for the -manufacture of the guns, a quantity of which were by then well on the -way to completion. Immediately after the signing of the Armistice, all -the factories were instructed by telephone to continue manufacturing -the “Tuf,” and about November 20 they received confirmation in writing -of this order, and were instructed to keep on their workmen at all -costs. Our occupation of the left bank of the Rhine proved a serious -drawback to a continuation of the manufacture, as it completely -interrupted communication between several of the factories. The Pfaff -Works of Kaiserlautern (Palatinate) and the great Becker steel works of -Frefeld, which played an important part in the manufacture of the guns, -had to close down, both being on the left bank of the Rhine. - -The Minister of War throughout the period of its manufacture asked for -daily and minute reports as to the progress of the “Tuf,” and it was -given priority over both submarines and aeroplanes. But once more, as -ever in all that concerned Tanks, the Germans were several months too -late. We were never destined to face this particular weapon with the -Mark V. The modern Tank fears it not at all. - - -III - -Our chronicle has now reached the three last, and the decisive months -of the war. - -It was a period of continuous fighting, in which a battle begun in -any particular sector would spread along the front on either hand, -until at last, by the middle of October, the whole line was in roaring -conflagration; and by the second week in November the blaze had swept -on almost to the borders of Germany, and the forces of the enemy had -withered and shrivelled before it. - -At first we made a series of more or less set attacks. Then came the -break through the Hindenburg Line after the Second Battle of Cambrai, -and the hastily-organised running fights of October, which culminated -in the complete overthrow of German arms. - -The whole period is at the moment of writing exceedingly difficult -to dissect and to classify into definite battles, it being usually a -matter of opinion when one engagement can be said to have ended and -another to have begun. The nomenclature even is still fluid. Take, for -example, the vast inchoate battle which raged from August 21 and 23 -and culminated on September 2. It was fought by three separate armies. -There were at least three principle “Z” days, and the battle seems to -be indifferently known as the Battle of Bapaume, the Second Battle of -Arras, or even as the Battle of Amiens. Nor if the historian were to -attempt to name it by date would it be clearly more proper to call it -the Battle of August 23 or 21. There is a good deal to be said for the -German plan of christening their battles by some fancy name, or dubbing -them “Kaiserchlact” or “Clarence,” according to one’s taste. A campaign -of nameless battles is apt to defy Clio’s efforts at dissection and -tidy arrangement, and to defeat her longing to see a neat row of -actions dried, classified, and labelled in her _Hortus Siccus_. - -We have indicated the changes which had taken place in the attitude -of our own and the German High Commands toward Tanks. Much had been -learnt by the Tank Corps themselves, and much had been regularised -and systematised in their methods. We find that by August, Tank Corps -preparation for a battle had been so completely reduced to a routine -that to attempt to chronicle the preparation for any of our set attacks -would be to make a mere _cento_, whose pieces might be culled from -particulars already recorded for Cambrai, for Hamel and for Amiens. We -therefore trust that the reader, without hearing any enumeration of -gallons of petrol, tons of grease, or acres of maps, will understand -that each of these “formal” battles was preceded by the usual herculean -tasks of preparation. - - -IV - -The Battle of Bapaume was, as we have already said, to constitute a -sequel to the Battle of Amiens (August 8). On August 21 the 3rd Army -was to launch an attack to the north of the Ancre with the general -object of pushing the enemy back towards Bapaume. Meanwhile the 4th -Army was to continue its pressure on the enemy south of the river. -August 22 was to be a “slack” day and was to be used to get troops and -guns into position on the 3rd Army front. The principal attack was -to be delivered on the 23rd by the 3rd Army, and those divisions of -the 4th Army which lay to the north of the Somme, the rest of the 4th -Army fighting a covering action on the flank of the main operation. -Afterwards, if our efforts were successful, the whole of both Armies -were to press forward with their utmost vigour and exploit any -advantage we might have gained. If our success was such as to force the -enemy back from the high ground he held, thus securing our southern -flank, the 1st Army was further to make another attack immediately to -the north. This gradual extension of the front of assault was intended -to mislead the enemy as to where the main blow would fall and cause him -to throw in his reserves piecemeal. - -A large number of Tanks were to be concentrated in the 3rd Army area. -They were to attack between Moyenneville and Bucquoy with the 4th and -6th Corps. With them the 1st and 2nd Brigades were to operate. - -With the 4th Army the 3rd Corps was to attack on August 23, between -Bray and Albert, and the 4th Tank Brigade was to assist in this -assault. Then, with the portion of the 4th Army which operated south -of the Somme, namely, the Australians, the 5th Tank Brigade was as -usual to co-operate, their action also taking place on the 23rd. In the -course of the two days’ operations the 3rd, 6th, 7th, 14th, 15th, 11th, -12th, 10th and 17th Battalions were to be employed. - -The total of 280 machines seems at first sight a curiously small -one, considering the number of battalions involved, but it must be -remembered that most units had been hotly in action at Amiens ten days -before, and that some battalions could not muster more than sixteen -fighting Tanks, pending repairs and a fresh issue of machines. - -Supply Tanks and aeroplanes were to co-operate as usual, the latter -in greater strength than before; for just before the battle No. 73 -Squadron, armed with Sopwith Camels, was attached to the Tank Corps, in -addition to No. 8 Squadron for counter-gun work. - -One of the most prominent features of the whole sector of attack was -the Albert-Arras railway, which lay some distance behind the enemy’s -front line. It proved to have been carefully prepared for defence by -the enemy, being commanded at point-blank range by a large number of -field guns, which had been specially and secretly withdrawn from more -forward positions, and all the sections of the line where it would be -possible for the Tanks to cross--that is to say, the “neutral” portions -where the line was neither embanked nor in a cutting--were not only -carefully registered, but were blocked by concrete and iron anti-Tank -stockades. - -The attack was to be opened at 4.55 a.m. on the 21st by the 4th and 6th -Corps and their Tanks. - - -V - -The morning dawned in the inevitable white blanket of mist which now -always seemed to accompany our attacks. Till nearly 11 a.m. it was -impossible to see more than a few yards ahead, and it was with the -greatest difficulty that the Tanks kept their direction. If, however, -the mist was confusing to us, it was doubly so to the enemy. The -Germans were completely taken by surprise; we even found candles -still burning in the trenches when we crossed them, and papers and -equipments were scattered broadcast, bearing witness to a hurried -flight. - -[Illustration: GERMAN ANTI-TANK GUNNERS - -(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH FOUND ON A PRISONER)] - -[Illustration: AN ANTI-TANK GUN IN A STEEL CUPOLA (VPRES)] - -[Illustration: A CAPTURED GERMAN TANK] - -[Illustration: A GERMAN ANTI-TANK RIFLE] - -We carried the front line so easily that we soon realised we must be -up against a system of defence rather like that which the Germans -had adopted at Ypres. He was keeping his reserves well in rear of a -lightly-held outpost line, and, as we have said, unknown to us, his -guns had been withdrawn in such a way as to cover the railway. - -The Armoured Cars and the Whippets both took an active part in the -attack on Bucquoy. At the entrance of the village a large crater had -been blown in the road over which the armoured cars were hauled, after -a smooth path had been beaten down across it by a Whippet. The cars -then sped on through the enemy’s lines, reaching Achiet-le-Petit ahead -of our infantry, and silenced a number of machine-guns. Two of the cars -received direct hits, one of them being burnt and completely destroyed. - -During the attack on Courcelles, Captain Richard Annesley West of the -6th Battalion took charge of some infantry who had lost their bearings -in the dense fog. He gathered up all the scattered men he could find. -He was mounted, and in the course of the morning he had two horses shot -under him; but after the second horse had been shot he went on with his -work on foot. Having rallied the infantry, he continued his original -task of leading forward his Tanks, and our capture of Courcelles was -chiefly due to his individual initiative and gallantry. He was awarded -a bar to his D.S.O. - -About eleven o’clock the greater number both of Mark V. Tanks and -Whippets had reached the line of the railway. A few leading Tanks -had even crossed it, when all in a moment the mist lifted with the -suddenness of a withdrawn curtain. A blazing sun appeared, and each -advancing Tank stood out clearly under its bright light. The German -artillery, which was covering the railway, immediately directed a -deadly fire on the Tanks, and each individual machine became the centre -of a zone of bullets and bursting shells. The infantry as they advanced -had to avoid these little whirlwinds of fire. It was at this time that -most of the thirty-seven Tanks which were hit by shells during the day -were accounted for. - -It was a good day for the enemy from an anti-Tank point of view, such a -day indeed as they were never to repeat. - -Second Lieutenant Hickson of the 3rd Tank Battalion was one of the -few who had got his Tank across the line just before the mist lifted. -As the sun came out he found himself right in front of the enemy’s -batteries at point-blank range. His Whippet was immediately hit, -but he managed to get his two men away in safety. The artillery and -machine-gun fire was extremely heavy, but without any thought of his -own safety, he at once went back on foot to warn a number of other -Tanks which were about to cross the railway at the same place. In this -he was successful and undoubtedly saved a large number of machines from -being knocked out. Later, though the spot was still under heavy fire, -he made several ineffectual efforts to salve his Tank. - -The weather could hardly have done us a worse turn. Had the mist lasted -for half an hour longer the Tanks would have been able to overrun the -artillery positions without being seen. However, the lifting of the fog -at least enabled the aeroplanes attached to the Tanks to go up. The -counter-gun machines at once flew out to attack the hostile batteries, -and a good deal of execution was done. - -All the rest of the day we fought under a blazing sun. - -The German resistance was curiously patchy; here and there we -found every inch of our advance disputed, the machine-gunners and -artillerymen fighting their weapons till the last moment, and the -reserves launching small counter-attacks whenever opportunity offered. - -Here and there large parties, a hundred and more strong, would -surrender before the Tanks had time to open fire. - -The Tank crews,--especially of the Mark V.’s and the Whippets, whose -ventilation was less adequate than the old Mark IV.’s--suffered greatly -from the terrific heat. - -In one or two instances the whole crew of a Mark V. seems to have -become unconscious through the appalling heat, the fumes from their -own engines, and the gas used by the enemy, the unconsciousness being -followed by temporarily complete loss of memory and extreme prostration. - -Inside the Whippets, though the men fared slightly better, the lack of -ventilation was equally fatal to efficiency. - - [83]“The heat temporarily put several Whippets out of action as - fighting weapons. - - “On a hot summer’s day one hour’s running with door closed renders - a Whippet weaponless except for revolver fire. - - “The heat generated is so intense that it not only causes - ammunition to swell so that it jams the gun, but actually in - several cases caused rounds to explode inside the Tank. - - “Guns became too hot to hold, and in one case the temperature of - the steering wheel became unbearable.” - -But evening came at last, and with the darkness the two armies -disengaged. - -We had suffered more casualties than we had quite bargained -for--chiefly owing to the accident of the mist--but upon the whole we -were well satisfied with the events of the day. - -We had reached the general line of the railway practically along the -whole front of attack. We had captured Achiet-le-Petit and Longeast -Wood, Courcelles and Moyenneville. Most important of all, the -position we needed for the launching of our principal attack had been -successfully gained and we had taken over 2000 prisoners. - - - - -CHAPTER XIX - -BREAKING THE DROCOURT-QUÉANT LINE--THE BATTLE OF EPEHY - - -I - -We have said that August 22 had, in the original plan, been devoted -to consolidation and to the moving up of guns. Only the 3rd Corps -in the 4th Army area, with its twenty-four Tanks of the 4th and 5th -Battalions, launched an interim attack on the Bray-Albert front. - -We gained all our objectives. The 18th Division crossed the river -Ancre, captured Albert by an enveloping movement from the south-east, -and our line between the Somme and the Ancre was now advanced well to -the east of the Bray-Albert road. - -The left of the 4th Army was taken forward in conformity with the rest -of our line. - -The way had now been cleared for what was really the main attack, -though it was not the attack in which the greatest number of Tanks were -employed. - -The assault opened on August 23 by a series of attacks on the whole -of a thirty-three-mile front, that is to say, from our junction with -the French, north of Lihons, to the spot near Mercatel, where the -Hindenburg Line from Quéant and Bullecourt joined the old Arras-Vimy -defence of 1916. - -The hundred Tanks which went into action on this day were nearly all -fresh machines which had not fought on the 21st. - -They were distributed in groups along the fronts of both the 3rd and -4th Armies. - -South of the Somme, with the Australians near Chuignolles, the largest -group of nearly sixty Tanks went into action. They were machines -belonging to the 2nd, 8th and 13th Battalions. - -The enemy had withdrawn their anti-Tank guns to the top of the ridge, -which it was impossible for Tanks to climb except at one spot. Upon -this one crossing-place they had trained their guns, and here several -Tanks suffered direct hits. - -We attacked as usual without a preliminary bombardment and met with a -desperate resistance, the German machine-gunners defending their posts -with extraordinary heroism, and often firing their guns till the very -moment when they and their weapons were crushed to the earth by an -attacking Tank. - -A particularly interesting account of the action is given in the 13th -Battalion History-- - - “It was soon evident that the enemy were prepared to make a stout - resistance; there was no definite trench system, but nests of - machine-guns were encountered in organised shell-holes almost from - the start; while Saint Martin’s Wood and the gully to the east of - this, Herleville Wood, and the quarry at its southern end, were - all strongly held by machine-guns in prepared emplacements. As - before, the German gunners fought with magnificent pertinacity - and courage; one Tank Commander claimed to have knocked out over - thirty machine-guns, and this claim was supported by the infantry - with him; the estimates of several other Tanks were almost as high. - These machine-guns were provided with armour-piercing bullets, - and Tanks were pitted all over and in many places penetrated by - these. There is no doubt that by themselves becoming the targets - for these batteries, the Tanks saved many casualties among the - infantry. With the machine-guns well in hand, the Australian - infantry were quick to seize the chances of advance, and by 6.30 - a.m. were all established in their final objectives. After sunrise - the heat of the day became oppressive in the open air, and in the - Tanks intolerable. Several cases were reported of men becoming - delirious during the action. The cause appears to be three-fold: - the weather conditions were trying even to fresh men; in many - cases the composite crew had recently endured the strain of action - without a complete rest to follow; and a third disadvantage, which - was inherent in the design of the Mark V. Tank, was now for the - first time becoming evident. In these engines the heat generated - by the explosion of the propelling gases is very great, and the - exhaust pipes speedily become red, and even white hot. In a new - engine this is merely an inconvenience, but after a certain period - of use the joints of the exhaust pipes tend to warp, and thus to - release into the inner air the carbon gases of the explosion. - These gases, if breathed continuously, even in small quantities, - produce exhaustion, mental confusion and finally unconsciousness. - Further, the effect is cumulative, and a man once poisoned by the - fumes becomes more quickly affected by further exposure to them. - The study of these conditions and the remedy for them became - henceforward a matter of the first importance. - - “Of the twelve Tanks of the 13th Battalion which started in this - action, seven reached their final objectives. Five Tanks received - direct hits from enemy field guns, the crews in these cases going - on with their Hotchkiss guns and assisting the infantry forward. - - “Eventually nine Tanks rallied to Company Headquarters, two of - these being towed out of action by their friends.” - -Altogether in this part of the battle 2000 prisoners and the important -villages of Chuignolles, Herleville and Chuignes had fallen to us -before nightfall. - -It was the same story all along the line. - -In the 3rd Army area, where altogether sixty-five Tanks fought -in several fairly widely separated groups, the battle was opened -rather earlier by a moonlight attack, which began just before 4 a.m. -against the village of Gomiécourt. In the 6th Corps’ domain, the 3rd -Division was supported by ten Mark IV. Tanks of the 12th Battalion. -They attacked Gomiécourt, carried it triumphantly and captured 500 -prisoners. To the north of them, in the second phase, the Guards -Division, with four Mark IV.’s, captured the village of Hamelincourt. -At Bihucourt, just beyond Achiet-le-Grand, 300 of the enemy were forced -by Tanks to surrender to the infantry. In one Whippet Tank, the officer -and the sergeant were both killed, and the private drove his Tank into -action by himself, when a target presented itself, locking his back -axle and firing his Hotchkiss gun. - -Later in the morning, some of the Whippets of the 6th Battalion were -operating with the infantry of the 4th Corps to the east of Courcelles. -It was suddenly noticed that the artillery barrage table had been -altered, and that the rate of progress of the barrage was now 100 -yards in four minutes, that is to say, considerably slower than it -had been originally intended. The Tanks were therefore obliged to -manœuvre and wheel about, in order to let the barrage keep ahead. They -were constantly under anti-Tank gun fire at this time. Seven of the -Whippets, however, did not wait, but passed through our barrage, and -getting beyond it, surprised and scattered large numbers of the enemy -who had taken cover. As the Germans ran, the Whippet machine-gunners -were able to inflict heavy casualties upon them. Meanwhile, these -seven Tanks were played upon by a perfect hail of machine-gun -fire, especially from the direction of Achiet-le-Grand. Changing -their direction, they advanced upon the troublesome machine-guns -and succeeded in cutting off several hundred of the enemy north of -the village, who had been holding up an attack by our infantry. The -Whippets headed and drove them neatly towards our lines, where the -King’s Royal Rifles immediately took them prisoners. Achiet-le-Grand -was captured with extraordinary small losses. - -Owing to the better weather conditions, aeroplane co-operation was much -more successful throughout the day than it had been on August 21. - -Messages dropped by aeroplanes were invaluable in keeping the whole -straggling action in hand, and in giving information, by means of which -commanders could send up reserves where they were wanted. - -The following will give the reader an idea of the sort of information -that the aeroplanes were constantly furnishing. - - “_Messages dropped on H.Q., 1st Brigade._ - - “Lieutenant Wittal (pilot). Lieutenant Mitchell (observer). _12 - noon._ - - “Four Whippets seen in G. 21, two Mark IV. and several Whippets - seen in G. 15d, all moving S.E. - - “Several Whippets and Mark V. seen in G. 16a, G. 10 and 11d, - proceeding S.E. - - “We do not hold Bihucourt.” - -The counter-Tank gun work done on this day was also exceedingly -successful, the following is the report of an action fought by a -counter Gun Machine: - - “_No. 73 Squadron._ - - “At 1.15 p.m. batteries were observed unlimbering and coming - into action near Béhagnies. Twenty-four bombs were dropped and - nearly 2000 rounds fired at these batteries, causing the greatest - confusion. Several limbers were overturned, and horses stampeded, - and the personnel scattered in all directions.” - -Altogether we had every reason to be satisfied by the events of the -day, and we prepared to continue the action with all possible vigour on -the morrow. - - -II - -But by August 24, there were only fifty-three Tanks of the 1st, 3rd -and 4th Brigades fit for action, and nearly all the units which went -in on this day were motley collections from various Battalions. One -composite unit of the 11th Battalion fought a very successful action in -conjunction with the 4th Corps, in spite of the fact that their orders -reached them late and that they had an approach march of six or seven -miles. They managed to catch up the infantry and all their objectives -were taken. - -In the course of the afternoon, Tanks belonging to the 9th Battalion -attacked and met with very stubborn resistance opposite Mory Copse, -where the Hindenburg Line was strongly held. Here more than one enemy -garrison refused to surrender and had all to be killed. One party of -about sixty was accounted for by four rounds of 6-pounder case shot. - -One machine, which was doing a piece of reconnaissance work near -Croisilles later in the day, had a particularly exciting experience. -The crew was forced to evacuate the Tank on account of the phosphorus -bombs with which the enemy had drenched it. Before leaving it, the -officer in command turned the head of his machine towards home and -started the Tank on its lonely way; then, almost choked with the -fumes, he got out and walked between the front horns of the moving -machine till the inside of the Tank was clear of phosphorus. All the -while, he and the machine were completely surrounded by the enemy. In -the end, he got his Tank home in safety. - -On the 4th Army front, five Tanks of the 1st Battalion attacked at -dawn with the 47th Division in an effort to recapture Happy Valley, -which had been lost by us on the previous afternoon. The attack was -exceedingly successful, and besides our original objective, the large -village of Bray was added to our gains. - -For the next week, the fighting consisted of a series of small local -engagements for the most part improvised on the spot by the Divisions -concerned. - -Tanks fought every day in one part of the line or another, and every -day we forced a stubbornly resisting enemy further and further back. - -We propose only to give a short account of most of the actions of this -period. - -On August 25, about forty-two Tanks were again in action in little -“blobs,” strung out on the fronts of the 4th and 6th Corps. Tanks from -the 3rd, 7th, and 10th Battalions went into action, the 9th Battalion -attacking with the Guards Division, north of Mory. Owing to the -dense mist, co-operation between Tanks and infantry was phenomenally -difficult and the attack was not very successful. During the engagement -one Tank had five of its crew wounded by anti-Tank rifle bullets. - -On the Canadian Corps front an attack was carried out on August 26, -near Fampoux and Neuville-Vitasse, with the help of Tanks of the 9th -and 11th Battalions. - -Near Monchy several Tanks were knocked out, the crews joining the -infantry to repel a local counter-attack. The sergeant of one crew -hearing that the enemy had captured his Tank, collected his men and -charged forward to recover it, arriving at one sponson door of the -machine as the enemy were scrambling out of the opposite one. - -The Tank Corps records characterise August 27 as “an uneventful day.” -Fourteen Tanks of the 9th and 11th Battalions were used for mopping up -points of resistance. - -On the 28th no Tanks went into action at all. - -But the 29th was more memorable, for on this day the enemy evacuated -Bapaume, and in a minor attack on Frémicourt Lieutenant C. H. Sewell -won the V.C. - -It was a very small engagement south-west of Beugnâtre, in which only -four Whippet Tanks took part. - -The following is extracted from the report of the engagement sent in by -Lieutenant Sewell’s Commanding Officer: - - “At about 2 p.m. on the afternoon of August 29, ‘Whippets’ of the - 3rd (Light) Tank Battalion reached the Quarry near the ‘Monument - Comémoratif,’ south-west of Favreuil. Acting under instructions - received from the New Zealand Division, one Section of ‘Whippets’ - under Lieutenant C. H. Sewell was ordered forward to clear up the - situation on the front of the 3rd New Zealand Rifle Brigade before - Frémicourt and the Bapaume-Cambrai road, where the infantry were - reported to be held up by machine-gun fire. - - “On reaching the railway line south-east of Beugnâtre in advance of - our infantry, enemy batteries and machine-guns opened heavy fire - on the Section of ‘Whippets.’ In manœuvring to avoid the fire and - to retain formation, Car No. A.233, commanded by Lieutenant O. L. - Rees-Williams, side-slipped in a deep shell crater and turned - completely upside down, catching fire at the same time. - - “Lieutenant Sewell, in the leading ‘Whippet,’ on seeing the plight - of Lieutenant Rees-Williams’ car, immediately got out of his own - ‘Whippet’ and came to the rescue; with a shovel he dug an entrance - to the door of the cab, which was firmly jammed and embedded in the - side of the shell-hole, forced the door open and liberated the crew. - - “Had it not been for Lieutenant Sewell’s prompt and gallant action, - the imprisoned crew might have been burnt to death, as they were - helpless to extricate themselves without outside assistance. - - “During the whole of this time ‘Whippets’ were being very heavily - shelled and the ground swept by machine-gun fire at close range. - On endeavouring to return to his own car, Lieutenant Sewell was - unfortunately hit several times, his body being subsequently found - lying beside that of his driver, Gunner Knox. W., also killed, just - outside the Tank, which at that time was within short range of - several machine-guns and infantry gun-pits.” - -The rescued men were emphatic in their praise of the gallant manner in -which Lieutenant Sewell had saved them from a peculiarly horrible form -of death. - -On the 30th, the 3rd Division was to undertake operations designing -to seize the villages of Ecoust and Longâtte with the trench system -beyond. Six Tanks of the 12th Battalion were to operate, and in -anticipation of their orders had already moved forward to the head -of the Sensée Valley. Unfortunately their orders did not reach the -Battalion till 9 p.m. on the night before the battle. The night was -intensely dark, and as luck would have it, the Reconnaissance Officer -who alone knew the ground had been recalled to England that day, and -there still remained nearly four miles by the shortest route before -the Tanks reached the jumping-off place. It was clear the machines -would have their work cut out if they were to reach the place in time. -The whole operation was dogged by misfortune. The taping party took -the wrong direction in the pitch dark, and when at last the Tanks -reached the point where the infantry guides were to lead them the rest -of the way, the guide for the left-hand section lost himself and the -Tanks completely before they had gone half the distance. For an hour -the Tanks and their conductor wandered about the devastated wastes -about Ecoust. The guide could not even point out on the map where the -infantry were formed up. At last the Section Commander went forward -by himself and managed to discover the whereabouts of the front line -and his own position, but only to find he was nearly a mile away and -it wanted five minutes to “zero.” It was impossible that he should -reach the battle in time, and he withdrew his Section according to -instructions as he was in an exposed position. Thus the unfortunate -infantry went over the top unaccompanied by a single Tank. The assault -was a complete failure and the infantry suffered heavy casualties. - - [84]“On August 31 a further action took place. ‘C’ Company of - the 15th Battalion under Captain G. A. Smith assisting the 185th - Brigade in attacking Vaulx-Vraucourt from the south. - - “Five Tanks reached their objectives, one failing owing to - mechanical trouble; these Tanks did considerable execution and - rendered great assistance to the infantry. Again heavy machine-gun - and anti-Tank rifle fire were encountered. After the show the - Tanks themselves bore mute witness to what they had been through. - In particular the Tank ‘Opossum,’ commanded by Lieutenant C. F. - Uzielli, had very little paint left on its sides because of bullet - marks. The infantry suffered heavily. In one case the strength of a - platoon on reaching its objective was only three men.” - - -III - -But we had reached a stage of the battle when it was clear that another -considerable effort on our part would be well worth the making. - -The enemy’s resistance showed him passionately anxious to gain time. He -retreated with extreme reluctance. - -It was the moment to redouble our blows. - -The actual small operations carried out by the Tanks during these last -few days were only a minor consideration. Tanks and infantry were -busy preparing for a considerable attack which was to take place on -September 2. On this day, the whole vast battle reached its zenith and -we broke the famous Drocourt-Quéant Line which we had failed to reach -in April 1917. This line was a switch which joined on to the Hindenburg -system. Though we had had scant time for elaborate preparation, the -attack was to be practically a full-dress affair, eighty-one Tanks -being put in on a comparatively small area. We were expecting a heavy -resistance and our dispositions were very carefully made. The order of -our attack was as follows, starting from the south: - -With the 4th Corps near Villers-au-Flos the 7th Tank Battalion. - -With the 6th Corps near Lagnicourt and Moreuil the 12th and 6th -Battalions of the 1st Brigade, and against the actual Drocourt-Quéant -Line with the Canadians and the 17th Corps as many Tanks as the 9th, -11th and 14th Battalions of the 3rd Brigade could muster (about forty -in all). - -The battle was to be fought in the intricate country of the Sensée -Valley, and active operations were taking place throughout the time of -preparation for the renewed battle. It was, therefore, under conditions -of exceptional difficulty that the Tanks assembled, some of them -being obliged to travel along our front across areas which were far -from healthy. The enemy’s defences had been built in the Spring of -1917. They were remarkable for extremely strong belts of wire, and we -expected that every effort would be made by the Germans to hold these -defences at all cost. - -Zero was at 5.30 a.m. and a clear dawn was just breaking when we -launched our attack. - -On the Lagnicourt sector, Tanks of the 12th Battalion immediately came -under tremendous fire from field guns and anti-Tank rifles. - -As it grew lighter, we discovered that a number of the heavy rifles -were being fired with great effect from a derelict Whippet. This nest -was soon dealt with by a male Tank. - -One female Tank in this sector fired over 4000 rounds of S.A.A., until, -having all its Lewis guns except one disabled, and five of its crew -severely wounded, it endeavoured to return, its Commander, Lieutenant -Saunders, alternately driving, working the brakes and firing the -remaining gun. As the Tank was thus being successfully withdrawn, a -direct hit set it on fire and the wounded men were rescued with great -difficulty. - -It was not far from Lagnicourt that the Whippets of the 6th Battalion -operated. - -They were commanded by Lieut.-Colonel West, of whose action on August -21 we have already told the story: - - [85]“On the night of September 1–2, nine Whippets, under Captain - C. H. Strachan, left Gomiécourt to attack in the direction of - Lagnicourt. Owing to the pressure at which the Tanks had been - working for the last five weeks, little time had been available - for overhauling, and as the Tanks were running badly, it was - impossible to get them up in time for zero hour. The Commanding - Officer, Lieut.-Colonel R. A. West, D.S.O., M.C., left camp early - on the morning of September 2, with two mounted orderlies. It was - his intention to get up with the Whippets before they went into - action, by Lagnicourt. He went as far as the infantry on horseback, - in order to watch the progress of the battle, and to ascertain when - to send the Whippets forward. He arrived at the front line when the - enemy were in process of delivering a strong local counter-attack. - The infantry battalion had suffered heavy officer casualties, and - its flanks were exposed. Realising that there was a danger of the - Battalion giving way, he at once rode in front of them, under - extremely heavy machine-gun and rifle fire, and rallied the men. In - spite of the fact that the enemy were now close upon him, he took - charge of the situation, and detailed N.C.O.’s to replace officer - casualties. He then rode up and down in front of the men, in face - of certain death, encouraging all, and calling upon them to ‘Stick - it, men and show them fight.’ His last words were ‘For God’s sake - put up a good fight.’ He fell, riddled by machine-gun bullets.” - -The infantry had been inspired to redoubled efforts by Colonel West’s -example and the hostile attack was defeated. He had originally come to -the Battalion as a Company Commander, and had been awarded the D.S.O. -for his work in the Arras battle. Between August 8 and September 2, he -was awarded the M.C., a bar to his D.S.O., and, for his last action, -the V.C. - -Elsewhere the fighting was not so heavy, and on the whole we met with -less opposition than we had expected. - -In the Canadian sector, the armoured cars were working in close -conjunction with Tank Corps aeroplanes. At one moment a number of cars -were going along a road, when four machines were hit by shells from -hidden batteries. Their accompanying aeroplanes, however, immediately -attacked the German guns so vigorously that the crews of the disabled -cars, though completely surrounded by the enemy, were able to escape -capture. - -By noon, on the Canadian section, the whole elaborate maze of wire, -trenches and strong points, which constituted the Drocourt-Quéant Line, -was in our hands, but elsewhere there was hard fighting until dusk, -especially on the reverse slopes of Dury Ridge. Dury itself we took, -capturing the Town Major. Our task had not, however, we considered, -been quite completed that day, and next morning Tanks and infantry -prepared to “tidy up” the line, especially Maricourt Wood. - -But long before zero hour, at 5.20, a glare of burning dumps in the -east seemed to show that the enemy were already withdrawing, and, -in fact, when the Tanks went over just after dawn, they encountered -scarcely any opposition at all, save a perfunctory fire from rearguard -machine-gunners. Small parties of the enemy were found in dug-outs, -waiting to be captured. His infantry and guns were already well on -their way back to the Canal du Nord. - - -IV - -The Second Battle of Arras was over and we had pierced the renowned -Drocourt-Quéant Line and had delivered a blow from which the enemy’s -_moral_ never quite recovered. - -Since August 21, in all, some 500 Tanks had been in action, and except -for one or two minor failures every attack had culminated in a cheap -success. We had pushed forward for fifteen or twenty miles along about -thirty miles of front. - - [86]“During the night of September 2–3, the enemy fell back - rapidly on the whole front of the 3rd Army and the right of the - 1st Army. By the end of the day, he had taken up positions along - the general line of the Canal du Nord, from Péronne to Ypres, and - thence east of Hermies, Inchy-en-Artois and Ecoust St. Quentin to - the Sensée, east of Lecluse. On the following day he commenced to - withdraw also from the east bank of the Somme, south of Péronne, - and by the night of September 8 was holding the general line - Vermand--Epehy--Havrincourt, and thence along the east bank of the - Canal du Nord. - - “The withdrawal was continued on the front of the French forces on - our right. - - “Throughout this hasty retreat our troops followed up the enemy - closely. Many of his rearguards were cut off and taken prisoner; - on numerous occasions our forward guns did great execution among - his retiring columns, while our airmen took full advantage of the - remarkable targets offered them. Great quantities of material and - many guns fell into our hands.” - -But the Tank Brigades were, all of them, in such urgent need of -refitting, of new machines and of fresh crews, that after the 3rd they -had to be withdrawn into G.H.Q. reserve, and, “faint with pursuing,” -were unable to take any further part in the battle for just over a -fortnight. - -Even so, that fortnight was spent, not in rest, but in feverish -preparation of the most arduous kind. We had begun to practise the -fitting of Cribs, for we were getting back to the Hindenburg Line. - -The other dogs of war were in full cry. The Tanks did not propose to -waste time. - -By September 18, the 5th Brigade was able to put a few machines into -the field. They belonged to the 2nd Battalion, which had not fought -since the earlier stages of the last battle. - - -V - -This time the Tanks were to be put in the south, in the 4th Army area. - -There were to be about twenty Tanks, and they were to work with the -Australians and the 9th and 3rd Corps on a wide front between Epehy and -Villeret. - - [87]“The operations about to be undertaken by the 4th Army aimed at - the capture of the Hindenburg Outpost Line in order (1) to secure - direct observation over the main Hindenburg Line, and (2) to allow - our artillery positions to be advanced in preparation for the - assault on the main positions.” - -The area attacked had a front of about fourteen miles, thus a Battalion -of twenty Tanks could merely be employed against certain known strong -points. - -Eight Tanks were allotted to the 3rd Corps on the left, eight Tanks -in the centre were to work with the 1st and 4th Divisions of the -Australian Corps. - -On the 9th Corps sector on the right, four Tanks were allotted to the -6th Division. - -The night had been fine, but when zero hour came (5.20) it was raining -heavily, and all day the weather was dull and cloudy, visibility being -often bad enough to make the Tank Commanders glad of their compasses. - - [88]“The company operating with the 3rd Corps had for their two - main objectives the villages of Epehy and Ronssoy. The former place - was taken with no great resistance, the enemy surrendering in - numbers on the appearance of the Tanks. Ronssoy was more stoutly - defended; here machine-gun fire with armour-piercing bullets was - very heavy, and anti-Tank rifles were also freely used. Two Tanks - had for their objective the very strong organisation of trenches - and fortified cottages known as the Quadrilateral, which formed the - key to the German Defensive System between Fresnoy and Selency.” - -During the attack two Tanks belonging to “C” Company fought an -extremely gallant action. - - [89]“Fresnoy was the line of the first objective, but in going - forward, the infantry came under heavy machine-gun fire from the - Quadrilateral on their right flank. Both officers, unseen by one - another in the mist and smoke, headed their Tanks straight for the - thickest of the fire. Second Lieutenant G. F. Smallwood arrived - first and encountered terrific resistance, with which he was - successfully dealing when his Tank became ditched while crossing - a sunken road, all guns but one being covered. It was impossible - to use the unditching beam owing to the intense fire from short - range. At this moment Second Lieutenant W. R. Hedges, driving his - own Tank, as the driver had been killed and the second driver badly - wounded, appeared from the mist heading for the Quadrilateral with - all guns firing. Captain Hamlet, the Section Commander, was also - inside this Tank. Just as Second Lieutenant Hedges was appearing - to get the upper hand of the enemy his Tank burst into flames. - Desperate efforts were apparently made to put these out, but after - five minutes Captain Hamlet and the crew jumped out of the Tank on - the right-hand side straight into the arms of the Huns, who had - surrounded the Tank. Second Lieutenant Hedges, however, sprang - out from the other side and darted through them though subject - to a heavy fire. Though hit two or three times he reached the - shelter of the sunken road about fifty yards from Second Lieutenant - Smallwood’s Tank. The latter left the Tank and brought Second - Lieutenant Hedges back with him. Heavy shelling all round the Tank - compelled its evacuation, and Second Lieutenant Smallwood and crew - took up a position with their machine-guns and successfully held - off the enemy. Later on, the infantry, who had been held up some - 200 yards behind, were able to come up and take over the post. - Meanwhile Second Lieutenant Hedges had been sent to a Dressing - Station, but he never arrived there. This very gallant officer’s - fate is still unknown.” - -On the 9th Corps front progress was slow, but by the end of the day we -held Ronssoy and Hargicourt. - -A good idea is given of the minor mechanical difficulties of this part -of the campaign in the 2nd Battalion History: - - “Liaison, reconnaissance and Tank maintenance were rendered far - more difficult than usual owing to the lack of transport, which was - in such a state that no car, box-body, lorry or motor-cycle could - be relied upon. The nearest M.T. Park for repairs was twenty-five - miles away. Long treks by night meant work on Tanks by day. - Reconnaissance and liaison had often to be carried out on foot with - consequent loss of time. There was very little rest or sleep for - any one between September 13 and 18.” - -We did not renew the advance till the 21st, when nine Tanks helped the -attack on the 3rd Corps front against the Knoll and Guillemont and -Quennemont Farms. Two of these Tanks were of the Mark V. Star pattern -and carried forward infantry machine-gunners. - -But we were up against a desperate enemy resistance, machine-guns -firing armour-piercing bullets, anti-Tank rifles, field guns and land -mines all being used against us. - -The attack did not succeed in gaining us the coveted positions, and we -were to pay dearly for this failure. - -Again two days elapsed, and meanwhile (on the 20th) the 8th, 16th and -13th Battalions, and the 5th Supply Co. had been brought forward. - -There was a big enterprise in view. - -This hitherto more or less isolated sector of attack was to be -“federated” with the new vast projected attack which was to be made -by no fewer than three Armies, their blows timed to fall in rapid -succession. - -Meanwhile a piece of ground which we coveted remained in enemy hands. - -We were anxious to hold the high ground north of Selency and to clear -up the formidable Quadrilateral south of Fresnoy. - -The 9th Corps, therefore, was to attack on a two-division front with -the aid of twenty Tanks of the newly arrived 13th Battalion. - -The plans were discussed at a conference held on September 22, and the -Tanks brought up to the assembly points by skeleton crews that same -night. - -The fighting crews were brought up by lorry the following afternoon, -according to the wise practice which was now beginning to be generally -employed, whenever there was enough personnel to make it possible. The -final approach march was begun at 8.30 p.m. the night of the 23rd. - - [90]“After Clearing St. Quentin Wood, in which some delay was - caused by overhead signal wires, which had to be passed from hand - to hand to avoid catching the semaphore standards, Tanks had - to pass through a heavy harassing fire in which gas shell was - largely employed. Thus the latter part of the march was made with - Tanks closed and gas masks often worn; in consequence the crews, - especially of the company working on the left, suffered greatly - from gas and petrol fumes. While waiting on the Start Lines, Tanks - were heavily shelled, and enemy ’planes twice during the night - dropped flares exactly over the sections with the 6th Division on - the right.” - -Anti-Tank guns were extremely active throughout the operation. - -Three Tanks, which with their infantry penetrated right into the -Quadrilateral, were all put out of action by a single gun. - -Altogether, the Tanks suffered a 50 per cent. loss of machines in this -action. - -However, we won some of the points of observation that were needed for -the next attack, and though we failed to hold the Quadrilateral we had -practically outflanked and sterilised it by the end of the day. - -So ended the little Battle of Epehy. - -Our advance had not been a long one, for the enemy had contested every -yard with a desperate valour. - -His losses had been enormous, and this minor battle added no less than -12,000 prisoners and 100 guns to the Allied “bag.” - - - - -CHAPTER XX - -THE SECOND BATTLE OF CAMBRAI, OR THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI-ST. QUENTIN - - -The enemy was in full retreat, but we had every reason to suppose that -once he had got “home,” back to the Hindenburg Line, he would resist -our further attempts to advance with all his strength. - -If we attacked the line and our assault was successful, and we could -break his defences, the way, as we have said, lay clear to the heart -of his great system of lateral railway communications. We could cut -his forces completely in two. But besides this, if we could beat him -here on his chosen battleground, if we could wound him, even behind -the rampart upon which he had for years spent such an infinity of -toil, where, in the open unprepared country behind, could he hope to -withstand us? The lists were set for a struggle _à outrance_, the two -forces faced each other grimly, for upon the fortunes of the champions -in this combat hung the fate of the German nation. It was to be a Tank -attack. We were to make the assault on a very wide front, and were to -continue our system of hitting in rapid succession in alternate Army -areas. The last blow had been delivered by the 4th Army on September -18. The new battle was to be begun by the 1st and 3rd Armies. - - [91]“On the 1st and 3rd Army fronts, strong positions covering - the approaches to Cambrai between the Nord and Schelde Canals, - including the section of the Hindenburg Line itself north of - Gouzeaucourt, were still in the enemy’s possession. His trenches in - this sector faced south-west, and it was desirable that they should - be taken in the early stages of the operation, so as to render it - easier for the artillery of the 4th Army to get into position.” - -To the south, as soon as certain points of vantage, Quennemont Farm, -the Knoll and Bellicourt, were in our hands, there was to be a lull, -and the 4th Army was to attack in strength on the 29th, two days -later--as soon, that is, as the Germans had had time thoroughly to -involve their reserves in the first mêlée. - -Meanwhile the Tank Brigades had to be rapidly reorganised and -redistributed, the Battalions being almost all reshuffled. About -one-third of the available machines were to be put in on the northern -part of the front, and the other two-thirds were to fight with the 4th -Army on the 29th. - -For the sake of clarity, it is simpler to treat the two halves of the -battle separately, for though they were completely interdependent and -formed part of one strategic conception, each offered very distinct -tactical problems of its own. In each the ground had very marked -topographical features, features that gave to each half a special -character. - - -PART I - - -I - -We have said that the 1st and 3rd Armies were to strike first. -Tanks belonging to the 7th and 11th Battalions of the 1st Brigade -were to fight with the Canadians and the 4th Corps opposite Bourlon -and Gouzeaucourt, and the 2nd Brigade was to contribute the 15th -Battalion, which was to co-operate with the 17th Corps opposite -Graincourt and Flesquières. - -Altogether fifty-three fighting Tanks were to be employed. - -As in the 4th Army sector, the peculiar lie of the country was the -chief influence which shaped our battle tactics, as in the 4th Army -area a canal was the central feature of the attack. - -In the First Battle of Cambrai the Tanks had all attacked from south of -the northward bend of the Canal du Nord near Havrincourt, and so worked -up the enemy’s side of this great obstacle. - -Now we were in a better position to force a direct crossing, both -strategically and mechanically, and the hazardous venture was to -be attempted. Direct ground reconnaissance of the Canal itself was -impossible, as the enemy held the hither bank in strength, but every -conceivable source of information was exhaustively exploited in the -endeavour to find crossing-places for the Tanks, that might offer at -least a possibility of success. - -Daring flights were made by special observers in low-flying aeroplanes, -and a wonderful mosaic was pieced together from successive sets of -air-photographs. - -This was annotated, re-photographed, enlarged, and circulated to all -concerned for further amplification and annotation as additional -information was collected; Major Macavity of the Canadian Corps -Intelligence, and Captain Oswald Birly of 1st Army Headquarters, being -largely responsible for the thoroughness of this, as well as of several -previous “over-the-line” surveys. - -In addition, the _Garde Champêtre_, the _Ponts et Chaussées_ service, -and the engineers’ working drawings for the Canal, were all laid under -contribution, as well as the evidence of a number of prisoners, -refugees and _repatriés_. - -From such sources and on such evidence the requisite number of -crossings were at length determined on, and the Tanks definitely and -severally allotted to them, for good or ill. - -But when all had been done, there were one or two points about which -there still remained a disquieting element of doubt. - -At one of these, where aerial photographs showed a breach through -the retaining banks of the dry Canal that just might, or that just -might not, allow sufficient width for Tanks to cross, a crossing was -imperative for the local success of the attack. Somehow, a passage had -to be positively assured--and there seemed but one sure way of keeping -our contract with the infantry, who were to storm the Canal at that -place. - -A bridge was to be formed of three old and obsolete Tanks, upon the -broad backs of which their juniors and betters might scramble across -and get to close quarters with the enemy. Four elderly machines, -warranted unsound, were accordingly sought out, specially stiffened up -with internal timber struts, and allotted the self-sacrificing task of -slithering down into the Canal bed, and there swinging and shunting -until they lay side by side ready for the fighters to crawl over them. - -Under the heading “A BRIDGE OF TANKS,” the actual crossing was very -vividly described in the Press. - - “_Paris, September 28._ - - “A French correspondent relates the following interesting episode - which happened in the battle yesterday. - - “It had been decided that a Tank detachment of the older types - should lead the attack, expose themselves to the enemy fire, and, - on arriving at the brink of the Canal, drop themselves into the - bed so as to form an improvised bridge from one Tank to the other. - The fast Tanks were to follow, and this new rapid type was to pass - over the backs of their older comrades, opening out a path for the - infantry. Volunteers were asked for this post of danger, and for - one crew wanted ten crews offered themselves. Lots had to be drawn - finally to choose the heroic winners of this contest of honour. The - wonderful feat was accomplished. The old scarred Tanks, covered - with ancient gashes and wounds proudly gained in the fighting on - the Somme, and in the fighting of over a year ago before Cambrai, - took for the last time their slow and massive way, and plunged - with noble abnegation over the edge. Over their bodies the new - strong Tanks passed with giant strides, our soldiers followed - them to victory, and shortly after eight o’clock they penetrated - Flesquières.” - -As a matter of fact, the actuality fell somewhat short of this -description. The veteran machines found themselves quite unequal to the -long trek, and even the least decrepit of the four finally doddered to -a standstill whilst yet miles away from the Canal. - -So there was no “Bridge of Tanks” after all, though, as things turned -out, its absence embarrassed no one, with the possible though unlikely -exception of the “close-up” correspondent. - -Most fortunately the doubtful crossing proved practicable, and all -machines, save one that struck a land-mine, passed safely over. - - -II - -The attack was, as usual, at dawn, and, as the first-wave Tanks and -infantry went over the top, they met with fierce resistance. On the -right we encountered particularly strong opposition near Beaucamp Ridge. - -The 11th Battalion History remarks upon the extraordinarily gallant -fighting of the enemy on this sector. - - “In some cases they even attempted to pull the machine-guns and - 6-pounders out of the Tanks. We inflicted many casualties by - actually running over machine-guns and infantry, as well as by our - fire.” - -Indeed, the Germans here constantly counter-attacked throughout the -day, so important did they deem the position. In spite of them, -however, we successfully established our right flank. - -Just to the north of them the Guards and the 3rd Division forced a -crossing of the Canal in face of their heavy machine and field gun -fire, captured Ribecourt and Flesquières, the Guards taking Arival Wood -and pushing north of Premy Chapel, where the 2nd Division took up the -advance. - -The 15th Battalion History tells the story of four Tanks which were -co-operating with the Guards Division. It is typical of this part of -the battle. On the northern outskirts of Flesquières they awaited the -arrival of the 1st Grenadiers, filling in the interval by helping the -Gordons in their occupation of the village. - -When the Guards arrived the situation was still somewhat obscure, -and Major Skeggs, commanding the Tanks, made a daring forward -reconnaissance from Flesquières towards Premy Chapel. - -The Tanks were brought round north of the village immediately, engaging -a number of machine and field guns, which were firing from Arival Wood. -In order to cover the advance of the infantry, the Tanks had to come up -over a bare stretch of country, exposed to direct fire from a number of -field pieces. - -Two Tanks, “Orchid” and “Othello,” were soon knocked out, and 2nd -Lieutenant Riddle’s “Orestes” and Sergeant Whatley’s “Oribi” only were -left. - -But it was in the centre that the Tanks fought their chief battle. -Under cover of darkness, the Canadians and the 63rd Division had moved -down the west bank of the Canal near Mœuvres and Sains-lez-Marquion. In -the half light of dawn they stormed the Canal itself. The resistance -here was far from well organised. - - [92]“Silkem Chapel and Wood Switch were packed with enemy infantry, - who were in great confusion, unable to move one way or the other. - The Tank ‘Odetta,’ commanded by Second Lieutenant C. W. Luck, did - great execution there, bringing all his guns to bear on the enemy, - and using case shot at point-blank range.” - -All day the 15th Battalion fought. - - “About 4.30 p.m. the G.S.O.3, 63rd Division, brought up a - Brigadier-General (brigade not ascertained), who asked if Tanks - could go forward with his Brigade, who were then about to resume - the advance. He was informed that they had very little petrol - left, but would go on if he (the Brigadier-General) would accept - responsibility for Tanks being stranded right forward without - petrol. The Brigadier-General agreed to this, and said he wanted to - get his Brigade on to the Marquion Line. - - “The two Tanks went forward and picked up the infantry north - of Graincourt. From this point they preceded the infantry, - encountering practically no opposition. - - “Beyond Anneux, the Tanks came under a lot of machine-gun fire - from the direction of Fontaine-Notre-Dame. Both Tanks were - turned broadside on, and fire was brought to bear on the German - machine-guns in order to support the infantry advancing on the - left. Parties of the enemy, who were seen coming over the crest - towards the Marquion Line, were engaged by all Tank guns which - could be brought to bear. The enemy ran away and many casualties - were caused. - - “Soon after this some heavy shells, believed to have been fired - from trench mortars, fell very close to the Tanks. These two Tanks - reached a point about 1000 yards from Cantaing before completing - their work. - - “Petrol was then almost finished, crews were much exhausted, - having left the final lying-up place at about twelve midnight, on - September 26–27. The work required of the Tanks was completed, so - they were withdrawn to a point well east of the Canal.” - -Meanwhile our line had been pushed on east of Anneux to -Fontaine-Notre-Dame. Bourlon Village had been carried by the 7th Tank -Battalion and the Canadians. We had passed through Bourlon Wood, which -was now wholly in our possession. - -On the extreme left a Division of the 22nd Corps had also crossed the -Canal, cleared Sauchy-Lestrée and had moved on northward. - -The air co-operation had been particularly effective throughout the -day. The work of the 8th Squadron had, however, been a good deal -hampered, as they had concentrated on the 4th Army front for the recent -fighting there, and therefore had a long flight and difficult signal -communications when ordered to work with the 3rd and 1st Armies. -However, their arrangements with their Tank partners were, as usual, -admirable. With the 7th Battalion, who, with the Canadians, had been -set the task of crossing the Canal du Nord opposite Inchy, and then -taking Bourlon Village, co-operation was particularly good; not only -were vital messages dropped at Battalion Headquarters, but a gun which -was firing on three of our Tanks from Bourlon Wood was effectively -bombed, and twice the airman chased its crew away with his machine-gun. - -[Illustration: INFANTRY ADVANCING BEHIND TANKS. A PRACTICE ATTACK AT -BERMICOURT] - -[Illustration: THE ST. QUENTIN CANAL TUNNEL, BELLICOURT] - -[Illustration: CARRIER PIGEON BEING RELEASED] - -On September 28 Tanks of the 7th and 11th Battalions fought again at -Baillencourt. Seven Tanks of the 11th Battalion with the 5th Corps -captured Villers Guislain and Gonnelieu. - -By the evening of the 28th we had taken all our objectives, and had -advanced beyond our old high-water line of the First Battle of Cambrai. -Fontaine-Notre-Dame, Bourlon Village, Epinoy and Haynecourt were all -ours, and we had captured over 10,000 prisoners and 200 guns. The Tanks -had suffered heavy casualties, but they had not suffered them in vain. - - -PART II - - -I - -We have said that in the original battle scheme, certain points of -vantage, Quennemont, the Knoll, and Bellicourt, were assumed to be in -our hands a day or so before the main attack on the 4th Army front was -launched. - -These fortified heights were of importance owing to the singular -geography of this sector of the line. - -All along this piece of the front, more or less parallel to the lines -of the armies, runs--deep and broad--the St. Quentin Canal. - -For three and a half miles, however, between Bellicourt and Vendhuille -it runs underground through a tunnel. - -We have seen how, in the northern part of the line, the enemy had -relied upon the Canal du Nord to form the principal obstacle to an -attack. - -In August we had captured a document which proved that he realised -that if we attacked at all in the south, and whether we attacked with -Tanks or not, it would be in that three-and-a-half-mile gap that our -heaviest blow would fall. - -The photograph gives an excellent notion why we had to avoid certain -sectors of the Canal at all costs, and Sir Douglas Haig, in his -Despatch, gives an admirable idea of some of the complex features which -the topography here possessed. - - “The general configuration of the ground through which this sector - of the Canal runs, produces deep cuttings of a depth in places of - some sixty feet; while between Bellicourt and the neighbourhood - of Vendhuille the Canal passes through a tunnel for a distance of - 6000 yards. In the sides of the cuttings the enemy had constructed - numerous tunnelled dug-outs and concrete shelters. Along the top - edge of them he had concealed well-sited concrete or armoured - machine-gun emplacements. The tunnel itself was used to provide - living accommodation for troops, and was connected by shafts with - the trenches above. South of Bellicourt the Canal cutting gradually - becomes shallow, till at Bellenglise the Canal lies almost at - ground level. South of Bellenglise the Canal is dry. - - “On the western side of the Canal, south of Bellicourt, two - thoroughly organised and extremely heavily wired lines of - continuous trench run roughly parallel to the Canal, at average - distances from it of 2000 and 1000 yards respectively. The whole - series of defences, with the numerous defended villages contained - in it, formed a belt of country varying from 7000 to 10,000 yards - in depth, organised by the employment of every available means into - a most powerful system, well meriting the great reputation attached - to it.” - -On the three and a half miles of front, where alone Tanks and artillery -could cross the line of the Canal, the outpost system which everywhere -protected the Hindenburg Line, was doubly reinforced, and gained a -natural strength from its position on the heights, beneath which the -Canal had burrowed. - -Only a very “full dress” attack on so highly organised a system as the -Hindenburg Line was likely to be successful, and in order to launch -such an attack it was essential that we should already hold the Knoll -and Guillemont and Quennemont Farms. - -We have seen how in the last day or two of the battle of Epehy we -assaulted the line again and again, duly captured the sector opposite -Bellicourt, but how, two days before the main attack was to be -launched, the Knoll and Quennemont were still in the hands of the enemy. - -This state of affairs caused grave anxiety, as the whole set-piece -attack was based on the idea of using this line as a “jumping-off” -position. - -It had been intended that the two American Divisions, which were to -fight on this sector, should only be put in when this line had been -secured. - -It was now decided that they must themselves make a final effort to -capture the outpost line before the main assault, which was due for -dawn on September 29. - -Therefore, at dawn on the 27th, the 27th American Division, assisted -by twelve Tanks of the 4th Battalion, again attacked under cover of a -creeping barrage. - - [93]“The attack met with strong opposition, and the final position - reached was the subject of conflicting reports from the troops - engaged and from the air observers. Subsequent events showed that - small parties of Americans and Tanks had reached the vicinity of - their objective, and had very gallantly maintained themselves - there; but the line as a whole was not materially advanced by the - day’s operations.... The barrage could not now be brought back on - this flank owing to the knowledge that parties of American troops, - as well as a number of American wounded, would be exposed to our - own fire. Also any alteration in the barrage plans, which had - already been issued, would inevitably lead to confusion.” - -Either, therefore, the whole main attack must be delayed, or the -American divisions and some of the British troops north of them must -start some 1000 yards behind their barrage, and from a very indefinite -jumping-off line. - -The latter course was decided upon. - - [94]“The artillery start line, as originally planned, was to hold - good, and the troops of the 27th American Division would form up - for the attack on a line as far forward as possible, and would be - assisted by an additional number of Tanks. The strength in Tanks - was augmented to such an extent as should easily overwhelm the - enemy resistance west of the start line. It was thought that this, - with the slow rate of barrage, would enable the Americans to carry - out their task.” - -But there was yet one more difficulty, a serious obstacle of which -we were serenely unaware. A British anti-Tank minefield, consisting -of rows of buried heavy trench-mortar bombs, each holding 50 lb. of -ammonal, had been put down just prior to our loss of the area in March -1918, and of this minefield no information had reached the Tanks. - -It will thus be seen that the dice were very heavily loaded against -success on this part of the front before day dawned on the eventful -29th of September, 1918. - -The whole attack was to be on a twelve-mile front. The infantry were to -take advantage of a number of foot-bridges, which our bombardment had -prevented the enemy from getting out to destroy, and in some places our -men were prepared to wade or swim through the water. - -It was expected, however, that the chief resistance would be offered on -the famous three and a half miles. - -Altogether about 175 Tanks, including the new American Battalion, were -to be launched, and four Corps were to be involved. - -To the 9th Corps on the right, the 5th, 6th and 7th Tank Battalions of -the 3rd Brigade were allotted. - -In the centre, with the Australian and American Corps, the 1st, 4th and -301st American Battalions of the 4th Brigade were to fight.[95] - -The 8th, 13th and 16th Battalions of the 5th Tank Brigade were to be -held in 4th Army Reserve. - -Almost up to zero hour on the 29th we still hoped to get news that we -held the Knoll and Quennemont. But no reassuring message came through. - -It was thus in a very singular world that the 301th American Tank -Battalion was destined to make its debut. - - [96]“The 301st’s reconnaissance before the battle was very - efficiently carried out in spite of many disadvantages. The taping - especially was a classic example of pluck and efficiency. It - must be borne in mind that this was no quiet front, and that the - attempts to take his outpost line had made the Boche exceedingly - nervous and alert. In consequence, the nights preceding the battle - were some of the dirtiest I’ve experienced. The Battalion R.O. - (I’ve forgotten his name), one Company R.O. (Lieutenant T. C. - Naedale) and a sergeant were knocked out whilst supervising the - taping. Lieutenant Naedale got his wounds dressed and continued - his work up till zero hour. It is worthy of mention, in connection - with this incident, that each American Tank had its own tape laid - out over our front line towards the Boche by the Company R.O.’s. - Tank Commanders told me afterwards that they had to start fighting - before the end of their tape was reached.” - - -II - -When the dawn broke the usual mist lay thick and added its quota of -confusion to the uncertainties of the morning. - -All along the line, the battle swayed confusedly, developing into what -was perhaps the most complete “mix-up” of any battle of the War. - -To the north, the fighting was extremely heavy. - -Owing to the employment of an effective barrage having been impossible, -the American 27th Division suffered severely from the fire of massed -hostile machine-guns from the moment the attack began. - -Just as the Tanks of the 301st were moving up in support, ready to -deal with the machine-guns which were, as an eye-witness describes it, -by now “mowing down the other Americans in swathes,” no less than ten -machines struck upon the forgotten minefield. - -The American Tanks experienced the bitterest of war’s accidents, -useless destruction at the hands of their own colleagues. - -The explosions were terrific, the whole bottom of many machines being -torn out and a large proportion of the crews being killed. - -A little further to the south our attack was progressing well. - -Tanks of the 4th and 5th Battalions and their infantry had pushed -forward. The intricate trench system and the confusion of wire and -dug-outs, however, were responsible for a certain loss of cohesion, -so that by the time the village of Bellicourt had been reached the -attacking troops were some distance behind the barrage, and a good deal -of the weight had gone out of the assault. - -But though several large parties of the enemy still held out, we had, -on this sector, actually penetrated the Hindenburg Line before noon. - -But now the mist began to lift. The enemy still held Quennemont Farm -and the land to the north of it in great strength, and from that high -ground they were now beginning to be able to see well enough to pour a -devastating fire into the backs of the troops who were advancing in the -Bellicourt Sector. The situation was critical and called for immediate -action. - -Major Hotblack, the Head of the Tank Corps Intelligence, who was -watching the progress of the battle near this point, luckily realised -the situation before the enemy and rushed to try to improvise a -diversion. He fortunately found two Tanks[97] which were waiting, ready -to take part in a later stage of the attack. With the permission of the -Battalion Commander, the two machines were hastily set going, and Major -Hotblack jumped into the leading Tank. The machines were driven rapidly -towards Quennemont Ridge. There was no body of infantry immediately -available, and with the weather in its present mood, there was no -time to wait; so the two Tanks without artillery or infantry support -attacked what afterwards proved to be an unbroken sector of the enemy’s -front. - -But if confusion reigned in the British line, there is no doubt -that the Germans, though fighting exceedingly well, were far from -clear about the actual position. In the confusion, they appear to -have mistaken the two isolated machines for a considerable force. -The two Tanks successfully made their way on to the heretofore -impregnable Ridge, and actually succeeded in driving the enemy off -it, killing large numbers of the defenders and capturing a quantity -of machine-guns. Then at last the German field gunners awoke to the -situation, and being otherwise unharassed, opened a devastating fire -upon the two presumptuous machines. They succeeded in hitting and -setting fire to both of them, the crews being obliged to evacuate, -having suffered considerable casualties. - -Major Hotblack, though partially blinded, was able to carry on, but -the only other officer was severely wounded, and a derisory little -force--one officer and five or six men, was thus left to hold the -Ridge. Quite undaunted, they immediately set to work to prepare for the -German counter-attack which, now that the Tanks were out of action and -ablaze, seemed imminent. There was an abundance of enemy machine-guns -lying about, and some of these were got ready for action, for the -Tanks’ own guns had been destroyed when the machines were knocked out. - -While these guns were being turned round ready for their late owners, -the tiny garrison was joined, first by an Australian and then by an -American officer, each with an orderly, who had each separately come -out to try and find out the position of affairs. The situation was -rapidly explained to them, and was soon made clearer still by the -expected counter-attack from the Germans. Twice during the previous -week’s fighting, the enemy had regained this Ridge when it was held -in force. This time less than a dozen men successfully held it against -them, and although almost every one of the defenders was wounded, they -held out until relief came, several hours later. - -For his part in this action Major Hotblack was awarded a bar to his -Military Cross. This was his last action in the war, as the wounds he -received on this occasion incapacitated him till the Armistice had been -signed. - -It is rather interesting to note that this officer was wounded five -times during the course of the war--on four occasions in the head; but -so admirable is our hospital system that he is now practically none the -worse for his experiences. - -On the extreme right of the battle the attack of the 9th Corps was a -complete success, the 46th Division particularly distinguishing itself -in the capture of Bellenglise. - - [98]“Equipped with lifebelts, and carrying mats and rafts, the 46th - Division stormed the western arm of the Canal at Bellenglise and to - the north of it, some crossing the Canal on foot bridges, which the - enemy was given no time to destroy, others dropping down the sheer - sides of the Canal wall, and, having swum or waded to the far side, - climbing up the farther wall to the German trench lines on the - eastern bank.” - -The Tanks were, of course, unable to cross with their infantry. They -moved on Bellicourt, crossed over the tunnel at the nearest point, and -swung south, working down the further bank of the Canal and arriving -just in time to take part in the attack on Monchy. - -Our success here was so complete that one division alone captured 4000 -prisoners and seventy guns. - -Many of these batteries were taken from the rear by Tanks and infantry -while they were still in action, the enemy not realising in the least -that they had been outflanked. - - -III - -At the end of the day it was pretty clear what must be the ultimate -result of the battle. But our front was extremely ragged and the -breaches we had driven in the Hindenburg Line but narrow. - -So for some days our attacks continued on all fronts; from north of -Cambrai, where the 7th Battalion Tanks and the Canadians met with a -desperate resistance, right down to our junction with the French 1st -Army south of St. Quentin. - -With the exception of a party of six machines belonging to the 1st -Brigade, who helped in an attack just north of Cambrai, all the Tank -actions of this period were fought in the 4th Army area, where we were -busied in driving in the wedge whose thin end we had inserted with so -much effort on September 29. - -On the 30th, twenty Tanks belonging to the 5th, 6th, 13th and 7th -Battalions fought in different groups, none with striking success, in -one or two cases owing to the fact that the fresh infantry who had been -brought up were unaccustomed to Tanks, and that liaison was therefore -defective. - -The village of Bony, which had just been entered by the Armoured Cars -on the 29th, still held out stubbornly. - -On October 1, Tanks of the 9th Battalion were engaged with the 32nd -Division in an attack on a part of the line near Joncourt. In this -action the Tanks made very successful use of smoke screens. - -On the 2nd no Tanks fought, but on October 3 about forty machines went -into action. - -As on the previous days, we met with stubborn resistance, and as on the -previous days, foot by foot, inch by inch, we pushed our line forward, -always patiently enlarging the width of the holes we had pierced. - -A new attack on a large scale was now contemplated, and for this -assault the Tank Corps had to furnish between eighty and ninety -machines, some on the 3rd, some on the 4th Army front. Preparations -were immediately begun, and no Tanks fought on the 4th. - -Our line, however, had just reached the outskirts of two large -villages, Montbrehain and Beaurevoir, and we were anxious not to begin -the day of our new attack with street fighting--of all forms of warfare -the most incalculable. - -Therefore, the Australians and the 16th Tank Battalion attacked -Montbrehain, and after fighting a strenuous but brilliant little -action, captured it. - -The last phase of the Cambrai-St. Quentin battle was at hand; nay more, -the last phase of the warfare we had known for nearly four years. - -The next day we were to match our strength against that torn and -breached, but still formidable ruin, that had once been the Hindenburg -Line. - - - - -CHAPTER XXI - -THE SECOND BATTLE OF LE CATEAU--THE RUNNING FIGHT - - -I - -“TANK CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY, OCTOBER 8TH” - - “An attack was launched this morning between Cambrai and St. - Quentin on a front of eighteen miles, which was entirely - successful--all objectives being gained--in spite of obstinate - machine-gun defence. - - “Heavy Tanks and Whippets co-operated. - - “The line now runs N. and E. of Niergnies--E. of Seranvillers - and La Targette--Esnes Mill--E. edge of Esnes--through Briseux - Wood--Walincourt--Audigny trench line to Walincourt Wood--W. of - Walincourt--N. and E. of Serain--E. of Prémont--E. of Brancourt--E. - of Beauregard. - - “Depth of penetration varies, the maximum being 6000 yards. - - “The French continued the attack on the southern portion of the - battle front and made progress in the vicinity of Fontaine Utetre - and Essigny le Petit. - - “A large number of prisoners have been taken, but the actual - numbers are not yet known. - - “The enemy made a heavy counter-attack from the direction of - Awoingt against our line between Niergnies and Seranvillers, and - the situation at Forenville is not quite clear. - - “In this counter-attack the enemy used captured British Tanks. - Seven appeared in the sunken road N.E. of Niergnies without any - infantry support. Our infantry used enemy anti-Tank rifles, and - four or five enemy Tanks are reported to have been put out of - action.” - -This was the form in which the news of what proved the last set -action of the war reached resting Tank Battalions, and the great Tank -organisation behind the lines. - -The whole action had somehow seemed unusually dramatic. There was -now everywhere a sense of momentousness of events. We knew in our -hearts that the hour had come. Still, the enemy had so often revealed -unexpected strengths, we had so often been tricked into optimism, -and now we fought with a sort of surprised joy in thrusting home, of -feeling the German resistance really crumble under our blows. - -Every time we struck we were feverishly impatient at our own weariness, -a weariness which delayed the next blow. We longed to be sure, to -strike again and again, no matter how, and so end the long nightmare. - -All through that last month we hurried on, blind with fatigue, too -eager for the next battle to have been fought, too deeply concerned -with the culmination of the great drama, to care what had been the -details of our achievements in the last action. - -It is difficult in attempting any chronicle of this period not to feel -again the impatience of the hour, or to achieve enough detachment to -describe the individual threads out of which the great pattern of -victory was woven. - - -II - -To return to the attack of October 8. - -Besides the very good action fought by Whippets of the 3rd and 6th -Battalions near Serain and Prémont, there were two particularly -interesting features in the attack: first, the action fought by the -301st American and 1st Tank Battalions; and, second, the German -counter-attack with Tanks which is mentioned in the Summary. - -Nineteen Tanks of the 301st went into action opposite Serain, doing -great execution. - - [99]“In one railway cutting near Brancourt, which was a mass - of machine-guns, I counted nearly fifty mangled Boches who had - been caught in enfilade with case shot as the Tanks crossed the - line. The infantry casualties were very low, and all agreed on - the masterly way the American Tank gunners had dealt with M.G. - opposition. - - “The _pièce de résistance_ of the battle was the performance of - Major Sasse, D.S.O., for which he received his decoration. - - “As on a former occasion, he went into action in the Wireless Tank. - After the capture of Brancourt he left his Tank this side of the - village and went forward to reconnoitre. He eventually ascended - the church tower in order to get a forward view of the battle. - While doing this a very heavy bombardment of the village commenced, - and Major Sasse noticed that the infantry had begun to retire. - He accordingly descended and tried to find the officer in charge - of the troops on the spot. Not being able to do this he assumed - command himself, stopped the retirement and organised the troops - as a defensive force round the outskirts of the village. Lewis - guns were posted and the men ordered to resist any attempt on the - part of the Boche to retake the village, should this be made. As - was expected, a determined counter-attack developed, which was - successfully beaten off by Major Sasse’s detachment. This occurred - a second time, and Major Sasse sent off a wireless message for - help. He was rescued some hours later from a somewhat precarious - position by American reinforcements.” - -It was to Tanks of the 12th Battalion that the interesting lot fell of -meeting captured British Mark IV. Tanks in action. - -Four Tanks belonging to “A” Company were in the neighbourhood of -Niergnies when the enemy launched a strong counter-attack. The -battlefield was thick with smoke and it was not yet fully light, and -when in the half-dark the Tank crews and infantry saw four Tanks -advancing to meet them, they supposed that the strangers belonged to -“C” Company, who had been sent to execute an encircling movement, and -who had, they imagined, somehow been able to outflank the enemy with -extraordinary speed. “L 16,” commanded by Captain Rowe, was near a -farm named Mont St. Meuve when the Tanks appeared in sight, and the -foremost was within fifty yards before Captain Rowe realised that it -was an enemy machine. He immediately fired a 6-pounder shot at it which -disabled it, but almost at the same time “L 16” was hit by two shells, -one of which came through the cab, wounding Captain Rowe and killing -his driver. The Tank Commander immediately got his crew out and crossed -over to “L 19,” which was near at hand, and led it forward towards the -German machines, of whose presence it was still unaware. “L 19” had -already had five men wounded, had been on fire, and having no gunners -left, could not use its 6-pounders. Its Commander, Second Lieutenant -Worsap, however, nothing daunted, immediately engaged the enemy with -his Lewis guns until the Tank received a direct hit which set it on -fire a second time. There was nothing now to be done but to evacuate -the machine, and as the German counter-attack seemed to be succeeding, -Mr. Worsap blew up the wreck of his Tank. - -“L 12,” the third Tank, a male, was hit and finally disabled before its -Commander and crew had discovered that the strange Tanks did not belong -to “C” Company. There remained “L 8” under Lieutenant Martell, but this -Tank had a leaky radiator and was almost out of water. It, too, had -been hit, and three of its Lewis guns put out of action. Lieutenant -Martell, however, sent his crew back, and he and an artillery officer -managed to get up to a captured German field gun, which the two -turned round and used against the enemy’s Tanks, almost immediately -obtaining a direct hit on one of them. Two of the German machines -were now accounted for. And now at last a genuine “C” Company Tank--a -female--appeared and finally drove or scared away the two remaining -German machines. The situation was restored, and the infantry, who had -retired before the counter-attack, went forward again and reoccupied -the ridge beyond Niergnies. A comparison of the British and German -accounts of this action is not unentertaining. - - -_German Wireless News_ - - “During the heavy fighting south of Cambrai on October 8, German - ... Tanks and a column of infantry advanced ... behind a wall of - artificial fog. The German Tanks, which were feeling their way - forward, surprised a large number of Englishmen who were standing - in disordered groups. By means of machine-gun fire and Tank - gunfire the English were driven back. The English troops on the - eastern outskirts of Niergnies took to flight and evacuated. On - the Cambrai-Crévecœur Road there were five English Tanks advancing - in support of their own infantry. As they came into sight of the - German Tanks the English Tanks stopped, and they were set on fire - by their own crews.” - -By the end of the day we had advanced and widened our line along -the whole front of the attack, and the next day was devoted to -exploitation. - -[Illustration: HIS MAJESTY THE COLONEL-IN-CHIEF AND GENERAL ELLES] - - SPECIAL ORDER NO. 18. - - By Major-General H. J. Elles, C.B., D.S.O., Commanding TANK CORPS - in the Field. - - 18th October, 1918. - - 1. His Majesty the King was graciously pleased to become - COLONEL-IN-CHIEF of the Tank Corps on the 17th instant. - - 2. The following telegram was sent on behalf of the TANK CORPS: - - “To H. M. the King, - - “The news that your Majesty has graciously consented to - become Colonel-in-Chief of the Tank Corps has just been - received here. All ranks are deeply sensible of this signal - honour conferred upon the Corps and are determined to - continue worthy of it. - - GENERAL ELLES. - - “Advanced H. Q. Tank Corps. - In the Field. 17th October.” - -3. The following reply has been received: - - “To MAJOR-GENERAL H. J. ELLES. - - H. Q. Tank Corps, In the Field. - - “I sincerely thank you for the message which you have - conveyed to me in the name of all ranks of the Tank Corps. - - “I am indeed proud to be Colonel-in-Chief of this great - British organization invented by us which has played so - prominent a part in our recent victories. - - “I wish you all every possible good luck. - - GEORGE R. I., Colonel-in-Chief. - - Buckingham Palace. - LONDON, 18th October.” - - (Signed) H. J. ELLES, Major-General. - Commanding Tank Corps in the Field. - - -The enemy was in full retreat and a rapid advance met with the feeblest -opposition. The contemporary record in the Tank Corps Intelligence -Summary remarks this feature. - -[Illustration: MANUFACTURE] - - “_October 9._ - - “A penetration of over six miles has been made towards Le Cateau, - and in the area gained, twenty-six villages have been occupied. - - “Tanks again co-operated. - - “Shortly after midnight our troops commenced the attack N. of - Cambrai, capturing Ramillies and securing a bridgehead over the - Escaut Canal at Pont D’Aire. - - “The whole of Cambrai was occupied this morning.... - - “Air reports state that there is great confusion on roads N.E. - and S.E. of Le Cateau, and that our low-flying scouts have been - shooting at record targets.... - - “The number of prisoners taken in yesterday’s attack by the British - Armies amounted to 6300, and by the French in the St. Quentin area - 1200. No detail yet received of captures to-day.” - -The Battle of Cambrai-St. Quentin was at an end, and the Hindenburg -Line had now to all intents and purposes ceased to exist, broken as it -was on a front of nearly thirty miles. - -Before the whole British forces in France, from north of Menin to -Bohain, seven miles north-west of Guise, open country stretched, uncut -by trench, unhung by wire. The time for exploitation had arrived. - -Considering our comparative numerical weakness, the lateness of the -season and the nature of the country, to have fought their way so far -had been a notable performance. Now to carry out a rapid pursuit was -beyond even the endeavours of the infantry. For the German Army, though -beaten, was not yet broken. - - [100]“A pursuit by cavalry was unthinkable, for the German - rearguards possessed many thousands of machine-guns, and as long - as these weapons existed, pursuit, as cavalry dream it to be, was - utterly impossible. One arm alone could have turned the present - defeat into a rout--the Tank, but few of these remained, for since - August 8 no less than 819 machines had been handed over to salvage - by the Tank Battalions, and these Battalions themselves had lost - in personnel 550 officers and 2557 other ranks, out of a fighting - state of some 9500.” - -The 3rd, 4th, 5th, 7th and 15th Battalions--or what was left of -them--had all to be withdrawn into G.H.Q. reserve on October 12. - - -III - -THE BATTLE OF THE SELLE - -As fast, however, as the weariness of our infantry and the fewness of -our Tanks allowed, we pursued the flying but still coherent German -Divisions. - -Again and again the enemy tried to turn, to stand just so long behind -some natural defence as should enable him to organise his retreat. He -still had a hope that a shortened line might enable him to make a final -rally, if only, meantime, too headlong a flight had not reduced his -army to a mob, and if the advance of the Allies could be stemmed for a -little before the vital centre of Maubeuge. - -Seven Tanks of the 5th Battalion had advanced with the French and the -9th Corps near Riquerval Wood; but the first action of this new type, -in which any considerable number of machines took part, was the Battle -of the Selle River, which began in the 4th Army area on October 17. - - [101]“Our operations were opened on October 17 by an attack by the - 4th Army on a front of about ten miles from Le Cateau southwards, - in conjunction with the French 1st Army operating west of the - Sambre and Oise Canal. The assault, launched at 5.20 a.m., was - delivered by the 9th, 2nd American and 13th Corps.... The enemy was - holding the difficult wooded country east of Bohain, and the line - of the Selle north of it, in great strength, his infantry being - well supported by artillery.” - -The 4th was the Tank Brigade concerned. - -The 1st Battalion was allotted to the 9th Corps on the right. - -The 2nd American Corps in the centre fought as usual with the 301st -American Battalion. - -On the left the 13th Corps had the 16th Battalion, while the 6th Tank -Battalion was in Army reserve. - -The Germans had chosen their battle ground with great skill. They held -the right bank of the Selle, and the river itself, therefore, threaded -No-Man’s-Land. This particular choice of a defence was undoubtedly -dictated by a fear of Tanks. There had been heavy rain, and the river -was in flood. - - [102]“Very little was known of the stream, except that it varied - every few yards in nature, breadth and depth; and the only way of - establishing safe crossing-places for the Tanks, was by personal - reconnaissance. - - “This work was done successfully by the R.O.’s of the 1st and 301st - Battalions, which were fighting alongside each other. - - “The reconnaissance necessary on the front of the 301st promised - to be extremely dangerous and the success rather doubtful, owing - to the presence of several unlocated Boche posts on our side of - the stream. It was a question of slipping through these unobserved, - gaining the necessary information, and coming back again through - their lines. - - “Lieutenant T. C. Naedale, Battalion R.O., undertook to do this - in the company of an infantry guide from the sector. This officer - walked down the stream 500 yards, literally under the noses of - the Boche posts, and returned to our lines with the requisite - intelligence. He was thus able to pick safe crossings for all his - Tanks.” - -At 5.30 a.m. on October 17, the fog was so thick that Tanks had to move -forward on compass bearings. The infantry could see nothing, and had, -in many cases, to rely almost entirely on the Tanks as guides. Every -Tank of the forty-eight carried a crib, and with their help, north of -St. Souplet and of Molain, both Tank Battalions crossed the river in -safety at the previously selected fords. - -The Germans had clearly relied almost entirely upon the flooded river -for their defence, and it was only here and there that we met with any -opposition. Isolated posts would, however, occasionally hold out with -great vigour, and what with the fog and the irregular speed of our -advance, the whole battle was an exceedingly confused one. The enemy -was well supplied with artillery, and wherever the fog permitted made -good use of it. - -At about 10 a.m. the infantry, who were badly held up by machine-guns -near Demilieue, summoned Whippets of the 6th Battalion to their help. -A number of machines immediately hurried up, but even then, so heavy -was the machine-gun fire, that it was only with great difficulty that -the infantry could advance even under cover of the Whippets. Just as -they were approaching the village, three Whippets were knocked out -in rapid succession by a single field gun. Deprived of the cover of -these machines, the infantry had to retire again. It was not till -considerably later that the village was taken. - -On the 18th and 19th the infantry managed to make good progress, and -at 2 p.m. on the 20th we made another attack, still on the line of the -Selle, north of Le Cateau. - -Only four Tanks of the 11th Battalion were employed. The enemy’s -resistance was serious, for he had been able to erect strong wire -entanglements along the greater part of the line. This time, there -being no available fords, the Tanks successfully crossed the river by -means of an under-water sleeper bridge, which the Sappers had secretly -constructed at night, the enemy being quite unaware of its existence, -until, to their dismay, they saw the Tanks crossing over it. - -There was severe fighting round Neuvilly, Solesmes and Haspres, but we -gained all our objectives on the high ground east of the Selle, all the -four Tanks successfully reaching their final goal. - -Our capture of these positions on the river Selle was immediately -followed up by a larger bid, this time for the general line running -from the Sambre Canal along the edge of Mormal Forest to the -neighbourhood of Valenciennes. We were to make a night attack on a -fifteen-mile line in the 4th Army area, the 9th, 5th and 13th Corps -being supported by thirty-seven Tanks from the 10th, 11th, 12th and -301st (American) Battalions. - -Zero hour was 1.30 a.m. Unfortunately the hoped-for moonlight was -shrouded, and the night misty and dark. To add to our difficulties, -the enemy was shelling freely with gas. Gas-masks had to be worn, and -through them it was impossible to see anything. Consequently we did -not make much progress until dawn. But directly it was light we went -ahead, the Tanks had fine shooting at “ground game,” and a great amount -of case shot was fired, and both Tanks and infantry ultimately won -through to their objectives. - -Next day the 17th Corps took up the attack in the 1st Army area, so -extending our line of assault a further five miles north to the Schele. -No Tanks, however, operated at this stage of the 1st Army’s offensive, -but six machines belonging to the 10th Battalion attacked near -Robewsart. One of these Tanks managed to explode a German ammunition -dump with a lucky shot from one of its 6-pounders. This threw the enemy -into great confusion, whilst the explosion of his own shells helped us -considerably with the killing. - - -IV - -We had now reached another--the last--stage of the battle. The nature -of the terrain had begun to change, for we were travelling at last. - - [103]“Despite the unfavourable weather and the determined - opposition at many points from the German machine-gunners, in two - days our infantry and Tanks had realised an advance of five or six - miles over difficult country.” - -We had now reached the half wooded, half pasture and orchard country -which lay on the outskirts of the Forest of Mormal, “like fringe upon a -petticoat,” and the last of our battles had been fought amid the trees -of the Bois L’Evêque and of Pommereuil. - -We were within a mile of Le Quesnoy, which lay in a clearing in the -Forest. - -There was no chance of giving our machines an overhaul. It was -therefore in a state of mechanical “efficiency,” which a little while -before we should have said made any sort of fighting out of the -question, that most of the remaining Tanks gaily tackled this difficult -piece of the advance. - - - - -CHAPTER XXII - -THE ROUT--MORMAL FOREST--THE BATTLE OF THE SAMBRE--THE ARMISTICE - - -I - - “Some greater issue was at stake, some mightier cause, than ever - before the sword had pleaded or the trumpet had proclaimed.” - - DE QUINCEY. - -On November 4, the 1st, 3rd and 4th Armies were to deliver an attack -on a combined front of about thirty miles, from the Sambre to the -north of Oisy and Valenciennes. The country across which our advance -was to be made was exceedingly difficult: in the south, the river -Sambre had to be crossed almost at the outset. In the centre the great -Forest of Mormal, though here and there thinned by German foresters, -still presented a formidable obstacle. In the north lay the strongly -fortified town of Le Quesnoy, which was defended naturally by several -streams which ran parallel to the line of our advance, offering the -enemy repeated opportunities for a successful defence. - -On November 2, we fought a small action west of Landrecies. We were -anxious to improve our position near Happegarbes before the big attack -on the 4th. - -Only three Tanks of the 10th Battalion took part. - -Unfortunately, although we took all our objectives, the Germans -suddenly plucked up heart, launched a surprise attack, and we lost them -again before nightfall. - -The Battle of Mormal Forest was the last set Tank attack of the War, -and for it we could only scrape together just thirty-seven machines. - -Tank units were bled almost white. Sections took the place of -companies, companies of battalions, and Tanks were parcelled out in -such a way that the very most might be made of their scanty numbers. - -At dawn, after an intense bombardment, Tanks and infantry moved forward -to the assault under a heavy barrage, and it was not long before they -had penetrated the enemy’s positions on the whole battle front. - -On the right of the attack, zero was at 5.45. The 9th Corps, which, it -will be remembered, was supported by four sections of the 10th Tank -Battalion, pushed forward and captured Catillon, where the Tanks fought -a particularly good action. The infantry were able to cross the Sambre -at this place, capturing a lock some two miles to the south of it. By -two hours after zero two battalions of infantry were east of the river. - -The Tanks with the 13th Corps were also extremely successful, -especially in the neighbourhood of Hecq, Preux and the north-western -edge of the Forest of Mormal. - -An account of the fighting on this central part of the line is given in -the Tank Corps Intelligence Summary. - - “The early morning was fine and clear, but a dense mist came up - with the dawn and persisted until about 8.30. In addition, the - country S.W. of Mormal Forest is peculiarly enclosed with thick - orchards, quick-set fences and hedgerow trees, confining visibility - to no more than fifty yards or so, under the best conditions. - The infantry largely depended on the Tanks to give them their - direction, and many of the latter had to steer exclusively by - compass. By this means they were able to keep approximately - to their allotted routes, and were of considerable help to the - infantry in breaking through the dense hedges (some wired) and in - dealing with machine-guns. In places the enemy barrage came down - heavily with a high proportion of gas, whilst elsewhere it was - inconsiderable. Resistance also was unusually ‘patchy,’ some few - M.G. posts holding out well, whilst many others, though well sited - and camouflaged, were found not to have fired a round. A show of - resistance was put up at Landrecies bridge by some 300 German - infantry and machine-gunners, but they gave in when outflanked by - the crossing of the canal on rafts further to the south. The enemy - had lined some of the hedges with deep and very well camouflaged - rifle-pits, which here and there were held in strength. The main - body of the enemy, however, appears to have been withdrawn a - kilometre or so in rear of his forward positions just prior to our - attack. French inhabitants of the most forward villages state that - he started withdrawing at five o’clock this morning. In a number - of instances the enemy was found hiding, unarmed, awaiting an - opportunity to surrender. In one village over fifty Germans emerged - from the house cellars where they had been hiding together with the - inhabitants. Other Germans attempted to hide themselves in trees - and were dealt with with case shot. A number of anti-Tank rifles - were found in rifle-pits, etc., but appear to have been made little - or no use of. There were instances of detached field guns being - sited to enfilade hedges and cover crests, but so far no reports - have come in as to their effect--if any. One Brigade operating - with Tanks is reported to have had over 350 prisoners through its - cage before 11 a.m., including a Regimental Commander and part of - his Staff, whilst one Division reported over 1000 prisoners by - 12.30. A German pigeon loft (complete with birds) was captured - in Landrecies. Air visibility was nil until after 9 a.m., and - communication therefore difficult. - - “_Later._--Prisoners now reported 10,000 with 200 guns.” - -It was at Landrecies that three supply Tanks managed, despite their -almost complete lack of arms or armour, to take a most gallant and -effective part in the battle. - -These three Tanks were working for the 25th Division, and were carrying -up material to rebuild one of the numerous bridges that the Germans -had destroyed; as they drew near their rendezvous they found that the -enemy was still holding the place in some strength, and had succeeded -in stopping the advance of our infantry. As the Tanks approached they -began to draw fire and their situation became precarious. With great -pluck and resource the Tanks decided to go on, and rely on their -appearance (which was similar to that of the fighting Tanks) to drive -the enemy from his position. One Tank became a casualty, but the other -two went straight for the enemy. Even when the Tanks got close up, the -Germans were still under the impression that they were being faced -by fighters, and part of the garrison put up their hands, whilst the -remainder fled. - -With the 5th Corps, the 1st Company of the 9th Battalion encountered -stiff resistance, but nevertheless they pushed forward far into the -Forest of Mormal. - -The Tanks were particularly active in the attack on Jolimetz, just -south of Le Quesnoy, when they and the 37th Division took upwards -of 1000 prisoners, and later in the afternoon and evening pushed on -into the heart of the Forest. North of them the New Zealanders had -surrounded Le Quesnoy by 8 a.m. Here also Tanks were operating. - -By the end of the day we had made a five-mile advance, reaching the -general line Fesny-Landrecies--centre of Mormal Forest--and five miles -beyond Valenciennes. - - [104]“In these operations and their developments twenty British - Divisions utterly defeated thirty-two German Divisions, and - captured 19,000 prisoners and more than 450 guns. On our right the - French 1st Army, which had continued the line of attack southwards - to the neighbourhood of Guise, kept pace with our advance, taking - 5000 prisoners and a number of guns. - - “By this great victory the enemy’s resistance was definitely - broken. On the night of November 4–5 his troops began to fall back - on practically the whole battle front.” - - -II - -But the Tank Corps was at last at an end of its resources both in -machines and in men. - -Pending reinforcements from England, they could at the moment muster -but eight machines that could be sent after the flying enemy, and -therefore, though the Armoured Cars went on, it was on November 5 that -the last Tank action of the War was fought, when eight Whippets of the -6th Battalion took part in an attack of the 3rd Guards Brigade, on the -northern outskirts of the Forest of Mormal. - -The weather was atrocious and the country most difficult for a combined -operation, for it was intersected by numerous ditches and fences, which -rendered it ideal for the rearguard actions which the Germans were now -fighting all along their front. - - [105]“At 10 a.m. on the morning of November 5 the 3rd Guards - Brigade, having pushed through the 1st and 2nd Brigades, were - ordered to continue the advance by bounds.” - -[Illustration: THE WESTERN EDGE OF MORMAL FOREST] - -[Illustration: A “WIRELESS” TANK] - -No definite orders had reached the Whippets’ Company Commander as to -what part--if any--his machines were to play. - -He and the General commanding the 3rd Guards Brigade, however, came to -the conclusion that in view of the nature of the ground and the fact -that the Bultiaux River would have to be crossed in the first stage of -the battle, the Whippets should lead the attack upon the second, third -and final objectives only. - -Two Tanks proved unfit for action, owing to mechanical trouble. -The three Tanks which covered the advance of the Grenadiers found -themselves in a country of small orchards divided by extremely high -hedges, where it was most difficult to locate the enemy machine-guns -whose fire was here considerable. - -The Whippets therefore worked up and down the hedges like ratting -terriers, being ordered to[106]“fire short bursts along them for moral -effect even when no enemy were visible.” This they did, and found a few -fleeting targets before returning to get in touch with the infantry. - -Two Whippets which were co-operating with the Scots Guards met with a -good deal of opposition. Twice had they and the infantry attempted to -capture and consolidate high ground beyond the village of Buvignies. - -The driver of the first Tank was hit as he was endeavouring to put -right a minor mechanical trouble, and the second Tank went on alone. - -In attempting to run over an enemy rifle-pit, it ran on to a jagged -tree stump and was damaged, finally breaking down in the enemy’s lines -beyond Buvignies. [107] From accounts of civilians, who were behind -the enemy’s lines, it appears that the crew held out till midnight, -the Tank being then blown up. - - “They also reported that after the Tanks had been through Buvignies - the enemy hurriedly departed, and also vacated the railway, which - had been holding up the Grenadiers.” - -The 3rd Guards Brigade pushed forward unopposed for a mile and a half -during the night, but when darkness came the four remaining Whippets -were ordered to rally. - - “It was decided not to use these four on the following day, and - work was concentrated on getting fit the six Whippets which might - be made available to trek or fight.” - -For, though that through all this period we knew well enough that the -end had come, in these last few days of the War we acquired a new -tradition. It became the magnificent custom of the British Army to act -as though the War would go on for ever. - -The spirit that says, “I’ve been lucky so far. Why tempt Providence -with the War won, anyway?” must have reared its head in every man. -But it was rigorously kept down, and never among the attacking troops -in these last tense days was there found any inclination to spare -themselves or to spoil our victory by undue chariness of life and limb. -Not only in the racking circumstances of the battlefield, but also -behind the lines, this new tradition was manifest, and after the 5th -the Tank crews were everywhere feverishly engaged, day and night, in -refitting and furbishing up their machines on the complete assumption -that they would surely be called upon to fight again. Everywhere, too, -the Staffs were busy endeavouring to build up an organised fighting -force from the scarred, battle-weary remnants of the Corps. - -The Tank Corps’ record since August 8 was indeed a remarkable one. -There had been ninety-six days of almost continuous battle since that -great Tank attack, and in these ninety-six days about two thousand -Tanks and Armoured Cars had been engaged. - -Nearly half this number of machines had been handed over to salvage. Of -these, 313 had been sufficiently badly damaged to be sent to Central -Workshops, who had repaired no less than 204 of them and reissued them -to battalions. Of the whole 887, only fifteen machines had been struck -off the strength as beyond repair. - -The personnel, too, had been lamentably reduced. However, the total -strength of the Tank Corps on August 7, 1918, had been considerably -under that of a single infantry division, and in the old days of -the artillery battles, such as the First Battle of the Somme, an -infantry division often sustained 4000 casualties in twelve hours. In -comparison, the Tanks’ losses of just 3000 in three months, out of a -fighting strength of under 10,000, seem comparatively light. They were -heavy enough, however, effectually to cripple the Corps for several -weeks. - - -III - -Meanwhile the last act of the great drama was being played out. - -Though there were for the moment no Tanks to share in the culminating -glories, our forces were pushing forward along the whole front. On -November 6 and 7 the enemy’s resistance had very much weakened. Early -on the morning of the 7th the Guards entered Bavay; next day Avesnes -fell. Six cars of the Tank 17th Armoured Car Battalion here did -excellent service in conjunction with “Bethell’s Force,” the cars, -“full out,” putting roadside machine-guns out of action and in many -cases preventing the flying enemy from blowing up the crossroads behind -his rearguards. Hautmont was captured, and our troops reached the -outskirts of Maubeuge, the goal upon which our eyes had for so long -been fixed. To the north of Mons the enemy was now rapidly withdrawing. -All through the night of November 7–8 we could see the glare of burning -dumps behind the German lines, and could hear the irregular clamour -of their detonations. At Tournai the enemy abandoned his bridgehead -without a fight. - -On the 9th the enemy was in full retreat on the whole front; the Guards -entered Maubeuge at the moment when the Canadians were approaching -Mons. The whole of our 2nd Army crossed the Schelde, and next day all -five British Armies advanced in line, preceded by cavalry, cyclists and -Armoured Cars. - -Only round Mons was any opposition met with, and at dawn on November -11 the Third Canadian Division captured the town, killing or taking -prisoner the whole of the German garrison. - -It was the last of the tasks of slaughter to which our hands were to be -forced. - -For four days there had been a coming and going of envoys and of -messages. For four days men and women in England had listened and -waited, restless and sick with expectancy, with a sudden realisation of -their longing to emerge from the long nightmare. - -On November 11, just after eleven in the morning, the church bells -were rung in every town and village at home; and in France the expected -message was quietly passed from mouth to mouth. There is no need to -describe a moment which no reader of this book will ever forget. - - - - -EPILOGUE - - -I - -And what, the reader will ask, is the conclusion of the whole matter? - -First, how far did Tanks really contribute to our overthrow of the -Germans? - -Secondly, what would be the place of the Tank if another war broke out -within the next generation; and, thirdly, what place are Tanks going to -be given in the reconstituted British Army? - -As far as they can be answered, we will reply to these questions in -order. For upon the performances of the Tanks in this war, will be--or -should be--based the answers to the other questions, and on this point -we propose to call the evidence of three or four expert witnesses. - -For the rest, the reader has had an opportunity of studying a large -mass of evidence for himself. - -He has seen how, when the line from Switzerland to the sea had been -formed, both armies sought some means of putting an end to the -stalemate. - -How to both the Allies and the Germans the solution by artillery was -the first to occur. How, secondly, we and the Germans each according -to our national habits of mind, thought of another solution. The -Germans--who were chemists--of gas, used treacherously in despite of -signed undertakings to the contrary; we, who were mechanics, of a -self-propelled shield, from behind which we could direct an effective -fire. - -He knows how gas was countered, after the first surprise, by -means of various air-filtering devices; but how the Tank gradually -revolutionised warfare, because there was no particular specific or -antidote to the Tank, which depended not so much upon surprise as -on the simple factors of its enormous fire power, and its ability -to surmount obstacles. For whether the troops attacked had fought -against Tanks before or no, the Tank crushed down wire and smothered -machine-gun fire just the same. - -Marshal Foch is the first of our witnesses. - -He sketches the evolution of the Tank, and describes the circumstances -which called it into being, in his foreword to the English translation -of his republished _Principles of War_. He has dealt with the old -slowness of “digging in.” - -We translate his words literally: - - “The machine-gun and the barbed-wire entanglement have permitted - defences to be organised with indisputable rapidity. These - have endowed the trench, or natural obstacle, with a strength - which has permitted offensive fronts to be extended over areas - quite impracticable until this time.... The offensive for the - time was powerless, new weapons were sought for, and, after a - formidable artillery had been produced Tanks were invented--_i.e._ - machine-guns or guns protected by armour, and rendered mobile by - petrol, capable, over all types of ground, to master the enemy’s - entanglements and his machine-guns.... - - “Thus it is the industrial power of nations that has alone - permitted armies to attack, or the want of this power has reduced - them to the defensive.” - -Monsieur Loucheur--in January 1919 French Minister of Munitions--was a -strong advocate for Tanks in the French Army. - - “There are two kinds of infantry: men who have gone into action - with Tanks, and men who have not; and the former never want to go - into action without Tanks again.” - -Sir Douglas Haig’s summing up in his Despatch, though necessarily -conservative, is not therefore the less significant: - - “Since the opening of our offensive on _August 8_ Tanks have been - employed in every battle, and the importance of the part played - by them in breaking the resistance of the German infantry can - scarcely be exaggerated. The whole scheme of the attack of _August - 8_ was dependent upon Tanks, and ever since that date on numberless - occasions the success of our infantry has been powerfully assisted - or confirmed by their timely arrival. So great has been the effect - produced upon the German infantry by the appearance of British - Tanks that in more than one instance, when for various reasons real - Tanks were not available in sufficient numbers, valuable results - have been obtained by the use of dummy Tanks painted on frames of - wood and canvas. - - “It is no disparagement of the courage of our infantry or of the - skill and devotion of our artillery, to say that the achievements - of those essential arms would have fallen short of the full measure - of success achieved by our armies had it not been for the very - gallant and devoted work of the Tank Corps, under the command of - Major-General H. J. Elles.” - -Lastly, what is the opinion of the enemy? - -Herr Maximilian Harden in a speech upon the causes of the German -defeat, gave first place to the “physical shock of the Tank,” at which -“Ludendorff had laughed.” - -Speaking for the Minister of War in the Reichstag, General Wrisberg -said: - - “The attack on August 8 between the Avre and the Ancre was not - unexpected by our leaders. When, nevertheless, the English - succeeded in achieving a great success the reasons are to be sought - in the massed employment of Tanks and surprise under the protection - of fog.... - - “The American Armies should not terrify us.... More momentous for - us is the question of Tanks.” - -The G.O.C. of the 51st German Corps, in an Order dated July 23, 1918, -remarks: “As soon as the Tanks are destroyed the whole attack fails.” - -On October 23 the German Wireless published the following statement by -General Scheuch, Minister of War: - - “Germany will never need to make peace owing to a shortage of war - material. - - “The superiority of the enemy at present is principally due to - their use of Tanks. - - “We have been actively engaged for a long period in working at - producing this weapon (which is recognised as important), in - adequate numbers. - - “We shall thus have an additional means for the successful - continuance of the war, if we are compelled to continue it.” - -The following passage occurred in a German Order issued on August 12, -1918: - - “It has been found that the enemy’s attacks have been successful - solely because the Tanks surprised our infantry, broke through our - ranks, and the infantry thought itself outflanked.” - -The German Press was also very generally inclined to attribute the -German failure to the Allied use of Tanks, and their attitude is well -illustrated by the following paragraph which appeared early in October, -a time when German journalists seem to have been most carefully -instructed from official quarters. It was their task to prepare the -German people for surrender. - - “The successes which the Allies have gained since the First Battle - of Cambrai do not rest on any superior strategy on the part - of Foch or on superiority in numbers, although the latter has - undoubtedly contributed to it. The real reason has been the massed - use of Tanks. Whereas the artillery can only cut wire and blot - out trenches with an enormous expenditure of ammunition, the Tank - takes all these obstacles with the greatest of ease, and will make - broad paths in which the advancing infantry can follow. They are - the most dangerous foe to hostile machine-guns. They can approach - machine-gun nests and destroy them at close range. The great - danger of the Tank is obvious when one considers that the defence - of the front battle zone chiefly relies on the defensive value - of the machine-guns, and that the armour of the Tank renders it - invulnerable to rifle fire, and that only seldom and in exceptional - cases is machine-gun fire effective. The infantry is therefore - opposed to an enemy to whom it can do little or no harm.” - - -II - -The question of the place of Tanks in the next war has been answered -with the greatest emphasis by some enthusiastic advocates of this arm. - -The possession of a superior weapon, they say, ensures victory to the -army which possesses it. In war, any army, even if led by a mediocre -General, can safely meet an army of the previous century, though the -old force be led by the greatest military genius of his age. - - [108]“Napoleon was an infinitely greater general than Lord Raglan, - yet Lord Raglan would, in 1855, have beaten any army Napoleon could - have brought against him, because Lord Raglan’s men were armed with - the Minie rifle. - - “Eleven years after Inkerman Moltke would have beaten Lord Raglan’s - army hollow, not because he was a greater soldier than Lord Raglan, - but because his men were armed with the needle gun. - - “Had Napoleon, at Waterloo, possessed a company of Vickers - machine-guns, he would have beaten Wellington, Blücher, and - Schwartzenburg combined, as completely as Lord Kitchener beat the - Soudanese at Omdurman. It would have been another ‘massacre of the - innocents.’” - -In every case, they say, the superior weapon would have defeated the -great tactician before he had had time to show his mettle. To repeat -the words of the German journalist: “Their infantry would be opposed to -an enemy to whom it could do little or no harm.” - -We shall not discuss here the materialistic argument, except to say -that if it were entirely true, savages and badly-equipped Tribesmen -would never have completely beaten well-armed civilised troops. Yet -they have done so on frequent occasions. Witness the First Afghan War, -the Zulu Wars, the American-Indian Wars, and a host of minor actions. -Material only wins hands down when the _moral_ of the side possessing -it is at least fairly comparable to that of its opponents. Otherwise -Byzantium with its “Greek Fire” would have ruled the world. - -According to this “material” school of thought, we have in Tanks our -superior weapon. They will be developed upon more than one line, and we -shall have cross-country equivalents for all arms and services except -heavy artillery, the Navy and the Air Force. - -Mr. Hugh Pollard, writing in the _English Review_ of January 1919 -states the case of the mechanical warfare and Tank enthusiasts, with -great vigour and ingenuity. - - “Even at present there is no effective answer to Tanks but - possibly other Tanks, and in the Tank we have rediscovered a - modern application of a very old principle. The Tank is the most - economical method of using man-power in war, and it also affords - the highest possible percentage of invulnerability to the soldiers - engaged. - - “The armament problems of the future will be limited to three - fleets of armoured machines, in which a very limited highly - specialised number of men operate the largest possible number of - weapons in the most effective way. Armoured fleets at sea, armoured - aeroplanes, and armoured landships, or Tanks--these will be our - forces for war.” - -Tanks of various speeds and carrying various weapons, will replace -both infantry and cavalry, for one full size modern heavy Tank holding -eight men has the aggressive power of a hundred infantry with rifles, -bayonets, bombs and Lewis guns. The Whippet has about the same speed -and radius as cavalry, and one Whippet holding two men “could withstand -the onslaught of a cavalry regiment and kill it off to the last man -and the last horse without being exposed to the least danger or -inconvenience.” We shall soon regard the heroic tale of how men once -exposed their defenceless bodies to machine-gun fire and shells, and -depended for the élan of their assault upon the weight of human limbs -and the endurance of human muscles as almost legendary. - - “Most people think of a Tank as a rather ludicrous but effective - engine of war. They look upon it as a mechanical novelty, and - are content to assume that the Tank of to-day is not much of an - improvement upon the earliest Tanks of the Somme battle, and that - it is a war implement of indifferent importance. The real facts are - entirely different, for the Tank of to-day is simply an infant, a - lusty two-year-old, and there is no mechanical limit to its future. - This may seem the remark of a fanatic, but it is perfectly true.... - - “The Tank of to-day is a little thing compared with the obvious - developments which will result in the Tank of the future, but even - as it stands to-day it is the most economical fighting machine yet - devised. A Tank uses petrol instead of muscle, and it extracts the - highest possible fighting or killing value out of the men inside - it; they can give their blows without being exposed to injury in - return, and, above all things, they can fight while moving--a thing - outside the powers of the infantry or guns of the land forces.” - -The arguments of those who maintain that the Tank must always be -dependent upon the older arms are nearly all based upon the assumption -that the Tank is already limited. “It is pointed out that they cannot -cross rivers, that they are not proof against shell-fire, against -mines, against special forms of attack. The answer is that the Tank of -to-day may be subject to casualties, but all the skill and resources -of the German nation have failed to produce an effective answer to -Tanks, that river after river has been crossed, that line after line -of ‘impregnable’ defences have fallen, that deeply écheloned artillery -particularly arranged to fight Tanks has failed before Tank and -aeroplane attack. We come to a war of sea, air, and land fleets acting -in co-operation. Anti-Tank artillery is vulnerable to armoured planes. -The big commercial freight-carrying planes of the future might even fly -light Tanks into the heart of hostile territory. The unprotected men -and arms of the present day must disappear.” - -And here another question is suggested--a question upon which the -civilian ought to satisfy himself. Let us for the moment assume that it -is superiority in weapons, not better generalship, not a more stubborn -“will to win,” that decides the fate of war. - -What reason have we to suppose that it will be superiority in Tanks and -not in some other weapon, in aeroplanes for example, that will decide -the next conflict? - -At present, when we try to imagine war upon a foreign army waged on one -side by air alone, we encounter a dozen mechanical difficulties even in -our attempted picture of the first stages: the enormous paraphernalia -of bases, the ground-staff, fuel, weather conditions, difficulties of -landing, and finally, what is perhaps the fundamental difficulty. - -The aeroplane alone, like the big gun, is not an engine by whose means -it is possible to come into decisive contact with an enemy who chooses -to remain on the ground. The rabbits can always go to earth when they -see the gliding shadow of the hawk. - -Till both sides are equipped solely for air combat, Tanks or infantry -will still be needed to play the part of ferret. - -But these difficulties will almost certainly some day be overcome. - -When they have been solved, then the day of the comparatively -cumbersome Tank, with its dependence upon shipping and rail transport -will be over. But that will not be in our time we are assured. To us, -therefore, “War in the Air” remains of a somewhat academic interest. -We have got to see to it that we survive the present. - -For can the most optimistic of us truthfully declare, as he casts his -eye over the world, as he looks from Middle Europe to the Far East, -from Russia to Mexico, from the Balkans to Egypt, or from Asia Minor to -the confines of India, that we need not even consider the possibility -of a war within his own generation? Alas, no! - -Now having for the moment dismissed the purely air war from our -calculations, we can be pretty certain that a war between civilised -countries fought within that period would not differ utterly from the -war which is just over, and that a war between a civilised and an -uncivilised country would differ from it only along well-known lines. - -We have heard a good deal of evidence which makes it appear certain -that, every other factor having cancelled out, the fact that the French -and British possessed Tanks and the Germans did not, was just enough -to win the last war for the Allies. Let us then sedulously cultivate -the grub of the present that we may survive to see the more glorious -butterfly of the future--perhaps the aerial Tank. Shall we neglect the -Tank because it seems likely that in this (as please Heaven in most -other affairs) our sons will go one better? - -The British and French led, and in 1919 still lead, absolutely with -Tanks. - -If we like to carry on, we have such a start both in design and -manufacturing experience, that we could easily make it impossible for -any other nation to draw abreast of us during the period after which we -are assuming the “Tank Age” in military evolution may conceivably be -over. - -It is, of course, impossible to be too discreet as to the new machines -which have already been made and tested, or as to the new projects -which exist. - -Perhaps the position can be best indicated by saying that progress has -been so rapid of late that those who know, would probably be delighted -to sell any number of Mark V. Tanks to a prospective enemy. - - -III - -The present writers are ignorant whether we have determined to keep -our lead or no. Shall we have the foresight, when it comes to the -remodelling of the Army, to give to Tanks the place they ought to hold -in it? Shall we be willing to spend money on experiments, money which -we must spend if we want to keep that lead? Will the Tanks be given -the facilities for both mechanical and tactical training that they -ought to have? We may so easily slide back into our old groove. It is -always hard to turn to new ways, and to give a preponderating place in -the “New Model” to Tanks, would certainly be to effect a very radical -change. There does seem to be a certain fear that the Army and the -public may feel that the Tanks are all right for War, but hardly the -thing for soldiering. - -And yet how well the requirements of a strong force of Tanks would in -reality fit the kind of framework which the wisest minds seem agreed -should be our Army of the future. We ought to have, they say, a small -and highly specialised Standing Army, and behind that a vast Citizen -Army on the basis of the Territorial system. What weapon could be -more suitably added to the gun and the aeroplane than the Tank in the -Regular Army? Our Standing Army would thus consist of a nucleus of -mechanical experts. - -Nor need the question of finance ever rise spectre-like between us and -the idea of a strong force of Tanks, for the Tank is an absurdly cheap -weapon compared with its co-efficient of infantry. - -But there is another direction in which, if it claim any considerable -place in our Standing Army, the Tank must make good. That army may at -any moment be called upon to undertake police work in any part of the -world. - -The Tank, even the old Mark I., is, as we saw at Gaza, suitable for -desert warfare. The Mark V. and Whippets with General Denikin’s force -in Russia have been prodigiously successful, and there are probably few -species of campaign against a semi-civilised enemy in which the newer -“Medium” Tanks would not do admirably. - -Another point is that “minor wars” are fought by us with as much -avoidance of bloodshed as is compatible with the bringing of our -opponents to reason. - -A weapon which admittedly affected the _moral_ even of admirably -disciplined troops like the Germans to a phenomenal degree, is -particularly well adapted to this purpose. - -It is infinitely more humane to appal a rioter or a savage by showing -him a Tank than to shoot him down with an inoffensive looking -machine-gun.[109] - -There is yet one final consideration. - -The reader may still very properly object: “Though the Tank may, as -it rather begins to appear, have been the decisive factor in the last -War, and though it might be very convenient to use it again, before -we put our money on it, literally and metaphorically, for the future, -are we sure that it is a weapon which suits the British soldier? Time -was when at the direction of Military Experts we spent a great deal of -money upon the building of forts at home and abroad which were never of -the slightest use to any one, because they did not suit our style of -fighting. What reason have we to suppose that we shall like the Tank as -a permanent addition on a large scale to the equipment of our Army?” -The present authors consider this line of criticism a very proper one. -They differ from the “hardshell” advocates of the superior weapon in -considering it of the greatest importance that the balance and poise -of the broadsword should suit the hand that is to wield it. But they -believe that the Tank, like the ship and the aeroplane, is a weapon -peculiarly suited to the British temperament, and that fundamentally it -was for that reason that we, and not some other nation, first evolved -it. For good or ill, our Commanders both on land and sea have certain -peculiarities. Our men dislike standing on the defensive. They hate -digging, and in the present War were beaten by the Germans every time -at this particularly unpopular form of activity. Also, almost worse -than digging, do they hate carrying things on their backs, and we are -noted among all nations as the least tolerant of burdens. All these -peculiarities have filled the ranks of the Navy and of the Cavalry, -and all these peculiarities are suited by the aeroplanes and the Land -Ships. Our Commanders, like their men, prefer to be the attackers, and -like a war of movement. Almost the whole creed of Nelson, our most -popular fighting-hero, was expressed in his assertion that the first -and last duty of an Admiral was to find out the enemy’s fleet and to -attack it, and in his famous signal, “Engage the enemy more closely.” - -Further, our leaders particularly and temperamentally dislike a large -butcher’s bill. It was, indeed, their extreme reluctance to send -unprotected men to meet the hail of bullets from German machine-guns, -that lay behind most of the ostensible reasons for which the Tanks were -first given a trial. It was a deciding factor. We may even perhaps say -without seeming fantastic that it was their inhumanity which cost the -Germans the War. They had no bowels of compassion, and were just as -ready to send the “infantry equivalent” (say seventy unprotected men) -over the top as they were to put in seven men enclosed in armour. To -them it was the coldest question of military expediency. Purely upon -military considerations they decided against the seven clad in armour. -Our Commanders, though in theory they were inclined to agree with the -German Higher Command, though they recognised the ultimate cruelty of -the policy of “cheap war,” and knew, with Nelson, that they had not -come to the Western Front to preserve their lives, were yet tempted by -the idea of using steel and petrol in place of flesh and blood. More -than once in the course of the chequered career of the Tanks it was -this consideration which saved the Corps from extinction. - -But it is not, of course, enough that the Tank offers protection to -those who fight in it. A trench or a hole in the ground will do the -same. But the Tank is essentially a mobile weapon of _offence_. It is -the weapon for the nation which does not fight willingly, but when it -fights, fights to win, and to win quickly with as little bloodshed as -possible. It is the weapon for men who, if they must fight, like to -fight like intelligent beings still subjecting the material world to -their will, and who are most unwillingly reduced to the rôles of mere -marching automata, bearers of burdens and diggers of the soil, rôles -from which the patient German did not seem averse. - - -IV - -The creed of the present writers can be very briefly summarised. A -considerable amount of evidence points to the conclusion that in the -phase at which military science has arrived, and at which it will -probably remain for at least a generation, a superior force of Tanks -can always tip the scales of the military balance of power. - -Within the period of a generation, a time may again come when we shall -have to defend our lives and our liberties. We lead the world in the -design and manufacture of Tanks. Let us not abandon that lead in the -production and use of a vital weapon. - -We know too well the tragic cost of one day of war, and it has been -said that had we been visibly prepared the Germans would not have -attacked. - -Obviously we cannot be going to fall again so quickly into an old -error. We certainly intend to be armed, but who can say that through -sheer absence of mind it will not be with arquebuses? Surely not for -the sake of Army precedent, for the sake of emphasising our pacific -intentions, for the sake of saving a little money, or even--dearest of -all--for the luxury of “not bothering” about our Army, must we lose our -present unparalleled position of advantage. This advantage is not only -a material one. The Tanks are accustomed to win. Do not let us throw -away a fine tradition of victory. - -Of all that, in our agony of striving we gained by the way, let us lose -nothing. - -[Illustration: _TANK OPERATIONS._ - -AUGUST, SEPTEMBER, OCTOBER & NOVEMBER, 1918. - - _NOTE._ - - Thick black lines indicate position of British line on dates noted. - Red wash indicates areas in which Tanks operated, with numbers of - Tanks operating and date. - - Red lines indicate the ground gained on day of Tank operations. - Thick black dotted lines indicate army boundaries. - - Headquarters - Tank Corps - - - - -INDEX - - - Acheux, 72 - - Achicourt, 94 - - Achiet-le-Grand, 344 - - Achiet-le-Petit, 337, 340 - - Adelpare Farm, 282, 284 - - Albert, 255, 288, 341 - - Allenby, General, 230 - - American Tanks, 191, 218–223 - in Second Battle of Cambrai, 371–374 - in Battle of the Selle, 386–390 - - Amiens, Battle of, 288–322 - the town, 261, 265, 268 - - Anneux, 367 - - Archbald, Corporal, S., D.C.M., 252 - - Arival Wood, 366 - - Armin, General von, 126 - - Arnold, Lieutenant C. B., 303–309 - - Arrachis Wood, 284 - - Arras, Battle of, 89–109 - - Auchonvillers, 72, 259 - - Auchy, 252 - - Australians, and the Tanks, 106, 272–289, 297–300, 310–314 - - Australian co-operation with the French, 280 - - Aveluy Driving School, 256 - - Avesnes, 400 - - - Bacon, Admiral, 35, 120 - - Bailleul, 252 - - Baker-Carr, Colonel, 108, 149, 178 - - _Ballon d’Essai_, 272 - - Bapaume, Battle of, 334–340 - the town, 254, 348 - - Battalion Histories, quotations from: - “B” 3rd Battalion, 114; - 3rd Battalion, 139, 258, 302, 339; - 7th Battalion, 148; - “F” 6th Battalion, 176; - 13th Battalion, 194; - 5th Battalion, 251; - 2nd Battalion, 254; - 1st Battalion, 260, 266; - 8th Battalion, 274; - 13th Battalion, 297; - 14th and 1st Battalions, 301, - A Battalion History, 311; - 13th Battalion, 342; - 15th Battalion, 350; - 6th Battalion, 353, 396–397; - 11th Battalion, 366; - 15th Battalion, 367. - (_See also_ Brigade and Unit Histories.) - - Bavay, 400 - - Bayliss, Second Lieutenant, 253 - - Bayonvillers, 299 - - Beaucamp Ridge, 365 - - Beaucourt, 73, 301 - - Beaufort, 303, 313 - - Beaumont-Hamel, 55, 68, 71, 74, 258 - - Beaurevoir, 379 - - Bellenglise, 370, 377 - - Bellicourt, 362, 370, 371, 375 - - Belloy, 271 - - Bermicourt, 77, 108, 110, 196, 200, 269 - - Béthune, 268 - - Beugnâtre, 348 - - Bihucourt, 344 - - Bingham, Captain, M.C., 251 - - Birly, Captain, Oswald, 363 - - Blangy, 254 - - Bohain, 385 - - Bois d’Abbé, 266 - - Bois d’Aquenne, 265 - - Bois de Harpon, 282 - - Bony, 378 - - Bourgon, General, 286 - - Bourlon, Wood and Village, 162, 177, 183–185, 187, 362, 368 - - Bouzencourt, 259 - - Bradley, Colonel, 46–59 - - Brancourt, 382 - - Bray, 255, 341, 347 - - “Bridge of Tanks,” 364 - - Brie, 249 - - Brigade Histories, quotations from: - 5th Brigade, 273, 298; - A Brigade, 356, 357–360. - (_See also_ Battalion and Unit Histories.) - - Broome, General, 149 - - Brough, Colonel, 58 - - Brown, Captain F. C., M.C., 262 - - Bryce, Lieut.-Colonel, 299 - - Buchan, Colonel: _History of the War_, quotations from, 68, 125–127, - 225, 246. - - Bucquoy, 271, 335 - - Bullecourt, 105–108, 244 - - Bultiaux River, 397 - - Buvignies, 398 - - Bung, General Sir Julian, 160, 181 - - - Cachy, 262 - - Caix, 250 - - Cambrai, First Battle of, 160–184 - German Counter-attack at, 185–189 - Second Battle of, 361–379 - - Canal du Nord, 162, 363–368 - - Cantaing, 181 - - Capper, General, 86 - - Carney, driver, 303–308 - - Carter, Colonel, 270, 290 - - Carter, Second Lieutenant, 253 - - Cartigny, 248 - - Cassell, Second Lieutenant, 302 - - Cérisy Valley, 292, 298 - - Ching, Second Lieut. S. S., 103 - - Chipilly, 312 - - Chuignies, 343 - - Chuignolles, 309, 342, 343 - - Churchill, Mr., 34–36, 38 - - Cockcroft, 149 - - Colincamps, 258 - - Contay, 270, 283 - - Courage, Brigadier-General, 186, 280–283 - - Courcelles, 337, 344 - - Croisilles, 107, 346 - - - Dalton, Captain, 285 - - Dawson, Second Lieutenant, 253 - - Debeney, General, 281, 287 - - Demilieue, 388 - - Deniken, General, 413 - - Denny, Colonel, M. C., M. P., 314, 371 - - Desert Wood, 168 - - Diplock, Mr., 31–34 - - Domeny, 315 - - Drocourt-Quéant Line, breaking, 341–355 - - Duel between Tanks, First, 263 - - Dummy Tanks, 110 - - Dury Ridge, 354 - - - Eade, Lieutenant Percy, 299 - - Ecoust, 350 - - Edwards, Second Lieutenant, 277 - - Elles, General, 80, 85, 137, 160, 171–175, 178, 184, 223, 237 257, - 264, 281, 404 - - Epehy, Battle of, 356–360 - the Town, 248, 356 - - Epinoy, 369 - - Erin, 119, 196 - - Estienne, General, 210–218 - - Etinehem, 314 - - Exploits of Individual Tanks, 63, 99, 103, 139–142, 248, 285, 299, - 301–308, 348, 367 - - - Fampoux, 347 - - Fanny’s Farm, 114 - - Faucourt, 309 - - Favreuil, 348 - - Fesny, 395 - - Fifth Army Headquarters, adverse report of, 145–146 - - Fighting Side, 46, 190 - - Flers, 63 - - Flesquières, 173, 177, 188, 363, 365 - - Fleury Redobut, 99 - - Foch, Marshal, on the Tanks, 403 - - Fontaine-Notre-Dame, 182, 187, 367 - - Forsyth-Major, Major, 225 - - Framerville, 311 - - Frémicourt, 348 - - French Tanks Corps, 209–218 - - Fresnoy, 357, 359 - - Frezenberg, 142, 145, 152 - - Fuller, Lieut.-Colonel, 165 - - - Gauche Wood, 187 - - Gaza, Second and Third Battles of, 224–234 - - German Press, and the Tanks, 405 - - German Tanks, fights with, 261, 383 - - Germans and the Tanks, 55, 64, 106, 117, 323–333 - - Ginchy, 61 - - Glencorse Wood, 142, 152 - - Gomiécourt, 344 - - Gonnelieu, 369 - - Gould, Second Lieutenant, 301 - - Gouzeaucourt, 185, 362 - - Graincourt, 177, 179, 363 - - Groves, Captain, 266 - - Gueudecourt, 70 - - Guillemont, 359, 371 - - Guise, 385 - - - Haig, Sir Douglas, despatches of, 41, 65, 128, 143, 159, 177, 186, - 268, 316, 323, 355, 361, 370, 377, 387, 390, 396, 404 - - Haldane, Lieut.-General Aylmer, 108 - - Hamelincourt, 344 - - Hamel Wood and Village, 274, 278 - - Hangard Wood, 263, 267 - - Hankey, Brigadier-General, 293 - - Hankey, Colonel Sir Maurice, 34 - - Happegarbes, 392 - - Happy Valley, 347 - - Harbonnières, 250, 299 - - Harden, Herr Maximilian, on the Tanks, 404 - - Hardress-Lloyd, Brigadier-General, 318 - - Hargicourt, 358 - - Harpon Wood, 282 - - Harp, the, 97 - - Haspres, 389 - - Hatton-Hall, Captain, 373, 382, 387 - - Hautmont, 400 - - Havrincourt, 161, 168, 177, 184 - - Haynecourt, 369 - - Hazebrouck, 268 - - Hébuterne, 258 - - Hecq, 393 - - Hedecourt, 105 - - Hedges, Second Lieutenant, W. R., 358 - - Henriques, Captain, 51, 60 - - Herleville Wood, 342 - - Hervilly Wood, 248 - - Hetherington, Major, 31, 36 - - Hickson, Second Lieutenant, 338 - - High Wood, 66 - - Hillock Farm, 149 - - Hotblack, Major, D.S.O., M.C., 75, 80, 120, 293, 375 - - “Hush Operation,” proposed, on the Belgian coast, 118–123 - - - Ignaucourt Valley, 302 - - Inchy, 368 - - “Instructions for Training of Tank Corps in France,” 202–207 - - Inverness Copse, 153 - - - Jerk House, 153 - - Johnson, Lieut. Col. Philip, 120 - - Jolimetz, 395 - - Jones, Second Lieutenant, 267 - - Juniper Cottage, 154 - - - Kemmel, 253, 291 - - Knoll, The, 359, 362, 369 - - - La Fère, 244 - - Lagnicourt, 352 - - Lamotte, 299 - - Landrecies, 392–395 - - Langemarck, 148 - - La Signy Farm, 72 - - Lateau Wood, 175 - - Latham, Sergeant F., M.M., 102 - - La Vacquerie, 187 - - Le Cateau, Second Battle of, 380–386 - - Le Maistre, General, 270 - - Le Quesneu, 301 - - Le Quesnoy, 310, 390, 395 - - Les-Trois-Boqueleaux, 282, 284 - - Le Tréport, 200 - - Lewis Gun Detachments, 251 - - Lihons, 312, 315 - - Lipsett, Major-General, 293 - - Littledale, Sergeant: Account of Tank Training at Bermicourt, 77–80 - - Logeast, Wood, 340 - - Longâtte, 349 - - Loop, The, 57–60 - - Losses of the Tank Corps, 268–269 - - Loucheur, M., on the Tanks, 403 - - Luce River, 292 - - Luck, Second Lieutenant C. W., 367 - - Ludendorff, General, and the Tanks, 319, 325 - - “Lusitania” Tank, Exploit of, 99, 103 - - Lyon, Private W., M.M., 252 - - - Macavity, Major, 363 - - Machine Gun Corps, Heavy Section of, 50 - Heavy Branch of, 80 - - Mailly-Raineval, 282 - - Mailly-Maillet Wood, 258 - - Marcelcave, 298 - - March, 1918, British Retreat of, 243–264 - - Marcoing, 187 - - Marcourt, 250 - - Maricourt, 254 - - Martell, Lieutenant, 384 - - Martinpuich, 61 - - Marwitz, General von der, 185 - - Masnières, 175, 185 - - Masvillers, 250 - - Maubeuge, 289, 386, 400 - - Maxse, General, 149 - - McFee, Mr., 34 - - McLagan, Major-General E. G. S., 321–322 - - Mecredy, Second Lieutenant C., 286 - - Menin, 385 - - Mercatel, 341 - - Merlaincourt, 250 - - Merlimont, 202 - - Merville, 256 - - Messines, Battle of, 110–117 - - Meteren, 252 - - Metz, 185 - - Mitchell, Lieutenant, 262 - - Molain, 388 - - Monash, General, 292, 314 - - Monchy, 104, 108, 347, 377 - - Mons, 400 - - Montbrehain, 379 - - Mont des Cats, 253 - - Montdidier, 288 - - Mont du Hibou, 149 - - Mont Rouge, 254 - - Morcourt, 292, 298 - - Moreuil, Battle of, 280–287 - - Mormal Forest, 389–396 - - Moroccans, and Tanks, 267 - - Mory Copse, 347 - - Moyenneville, 335, 340 - - Murray, General, 226 - - “Musical Box” Tank, adventures of, 303–308 - - - Naedale, Lieutenant T. C., 374, 388 - - Neuve Eglise, 252 - - Neuville-Vitasse, 104, 347 - - Neuvilly, 389 - - Nieppe Forest, 256 - - Niergnies, 383 - - Noel, Sergeant J., D.C.M., 107 - - Norton, Major, 256 - - Nutt, Major, 225 - - - Oisy, 392 - - O’Kelly, Colonel, 250 - - Oosthoek Wood, 130 - - Oosttaverne, 114 - - - Palestine, Tanks in, 224–234 - - Pankhurst, Mrs., 38 - - Passchendaele, 143, 156, 159 - - Pear-Shaped Trench, 274 - - Peizière, 248 - - Péronne, 292 - - “Pill-Boxes,” 127, 148–151 - - Pitt, Lieutenant, 251 - - Poelcapelle Village, 154–158 - - Poelcapelle Road, Disaster on, 157 - - Pollard, Hugh, on the Future of Tanks, 408 - - Ponsonby, General John, 178 - - Pozières, 61 - - Prémont, 381 - - Premy Chapel, 366 - - Preux, 393 - - Proyart, 309, 314 - - - Quadrilateral, 61, 357, 359 - - Quennemont Farm and Ridge, 359, 362, 369, 375 - - - Ravenel, 270 - - Rawlinson, General Sir Henry, 320 - - Reconnaissance Branch, 29 - - Reconnaissance Officer, Narrative of, 256 - - Reconnaissance Service, 80, 133 - - Rees-Williams, Lieutenant O. L., 348 - - Renouf, Major, 46 - - Reutelbeek, 154 - - Ribbans, gunner, 303–308 - - Ribecourt, 360 - - Riddle, Second Lieutenant, 367 - - Riencourt, 105 - - Riquerval Wood, 386 - - Robertson, Captain, V.C., 155 - - Roeux, 107 - - Ronssoy, 357 - - Rosières, 312 - - Rossignol, 259 - - Rowe, Captain, 383 - - Rumilly, 175 - - - St. Julien, the town, 142, 148, 158 - Tanks’ Success at, 136 - - St. Léger, 107 - - St. Martin’s Wood, 342 - - St. Pol, 268, 291 - - St. Quentin, 244 - - St. Quentin Canal, 369–373 - - St. Quentin Wood, 360 - - St. Ribert Wood, 282 - - St. Souplet, 388 - - Sambre and Oise Canal, 387 - - Sambre, the River, 392 - - Sasse, Major, D.S.O., 382 - - Sauchy-Lestrée, 368 - - Saunders, Lieutenant, 352 - - Sauvillers, 282, 284 - - “Savage Rabbits,” 237 - - Schele, The, 390 - - Scheuch, General, on the Tanks, 405 - - Selency, 357, 359 - - Selle, Battle of the, 386–391 - - Sensée Valley, 349, 252 - - Serain, 381 - - Seranvillers, 175 - - Sewell, Lieutenant C. H., V.C., 349 - - Skeggs, Major, 366 - - Smallwood, Second Lieutenant G. F., 358 - - Smith, Captain G. A., 350 - - Smith, Second Lieutenant Henderson, M.C., 295 - - Soldier’s Treachery, a, 129 - - Solesmes, 389 - - Somme, Battle of the, 57–65 - - _Spectator_, on the Battle of Gaza, 233 - - Staden, 143 - - Steenbeek, 133, 137, 142 - - Stern, Sir Albert, 37, 44, 84, 87 - - Stewart, Ian, 257 - - Storm, Second Lieutenant, 251 - - Strachan, Captain C. H., 353 46, 50, 53 - - Swinton, General E. D., 31–34, 38, 39 - - - Tactics, new, 246 - - Tanks, inception of the, 25 - Different types of, 26 - Uses of, 27–28 - Training of the crews of, 30 - Pre-1914 designs for, 31 - First steps in designing of, 32 - War Office and the, 33–39 - Admiralty and the, 33–41 - Further steps in progress of, 41–56 - 150 sanctioned, 53 - Production, problem of, 81 - Mechanical War Supply Department, 44, 82 - Tank Committees, 86 - Mark I. Tanks, 40, 44, 49, 62, 90, 114 - Mark II. Tanks, 114 - Mark IV. Tanks, 111, 117, 193, 194 - Mark V. Tanks, the uses of, 27–30, 193, 269 - Mark VI. Tanks, 193 - Whippets, 193 - Fascines, manufacture of, 164 - Cribs, 269 - Central workshops, 195, 199, 269, 399 - - Tank actions, minor, 270 - - “Tank Corps Intelligence Summary,” 380, 385, 393 - - Tank Commanders, Maintenance Course, etc., for, 203–207 - - Tank Crew, Military History of Member of, 199–202 - - Tank, itinerary of a, 196–199 - - Tank Officers, narrative by, 71, 94, 96, 178–181, 284 - - Tanks: destroying, 249 - future of, 402–416 - - Tennyson-d’Eyncourt, Sir Eustace, 36, 87 - - Thetford, 48 - - Thiepval, 68 - - Tournai, 400 - - Triangle Farm, 149, 153 - - Tritton, Mr., 36 - - Tulloch, Major, 31–35 - - Tunnelling Company (184th), work of, 131 - - - “Unditching Beam,” 131 - - Unit Histories, quotations from, 357–360 - (_See also_ Battalion and Brigade Histories.) - - Uzielli, Lieutenant, C. F., 350 - - - Vaire Wood, 274, 278 - - Valenciennes, 389, 392, 395 - - Van Zeller, Second Lieutenant, T. E., M.C., 249 - - Vaulx-Vraucourt, 350 - - Vauvillers, 311 - - Vaux, 280 - - Vendhuille, 370 - - Villeret, 356 - - Villers Bretonneux, 251, 261–265, 272, 295 - - Villers Guislain, 187, 369 - - Vimy, the village, 98 - Canadians at, 98 - - - Wailly, the town, 108, 202 - training ground at, 108 - - Wanbeke, 116 - - Warfusée, 251, 299 - - Warvillers, 303, 313 - - Watson, Major, on Battle of Bullecourt, 106 - - Weber, Second lieutenant, 99 - - _Weekly Tank Notes_, quotations from, 54, 125, 126, 135, 149, 184, - 260, 275, 278, 293, 303–309, 330, 386, 406 - - West, Captain Richard Annesley, D.S.O. 337 - - West, Lieut.-Colonel R. A., D.S.O., M.C., 352 - - Westhoek, 143 - - Whatley, Sergeant, 367 - - Whyte, Second Lieutenant, M.C., 251 - - Wig, Comedy of a, 176 - - Wilkes, Major G. L., D.S.O., 158 - - Williams, Major-General, 108 - - Wilson, Lieutenant, 266 - - Wilson, Major, 36 - - Wool, 199, 207, 238 - - Worsap, Second Lieutenant, 383 - - Wrisberg, General, on the Tanks, 404–405 - - Wurst Farm, 154 - - Wytschaete, 114, 128 - - - Ypres Salient, sand model of, 134 - - Ypres, Third Battle of, 124–159 - - Yvrench, training center at, 57 - - - Zonnebeke, 152 - - - - -FOOTNOTES - - -[1] “I am building secure and covered chariots which are invulnerable, -and when they advance with their guns into the midst of the foe even -the largest enemy masses must retreat, and behind them the infantry can -follow in safety and without opposition.” - -[2] It differed from an ordinary chariot in that the two little fat -hollow-backed horses, which are depicted as providing the motive power, -were like the crew, enclosed within the wooden armour. - -[3] It appears to have been the Committee which investigated Mr. -Diplock’s machine, with some additional members. - -[4] Although the appeal was necessarily tentative and unofficial, -and no details of the nature of the work could be given, sixty women -immediately volunteered. - -[5] Major Renouf. - -[6] Major Renouf. - -[7] Most of these Tanks were training machines, in the sense that their -“armour” was boiler-plate instead of hardened steel. - -[8] Colonel Swinton. - -[9] Captain Henriques. - -[10] From _Weekly Tank Notes_, a confidential official periodical for -private circulation. - -[11] _W.T.N._ - -[12] See Plate, Chapter VIII. (An unannotated air photograph of badly -crumped ground.) - -[13] Among other Army Commanders was General Sir H. S. Rawlinson, -who was later to be so good a friend to the Tanks. On this occasion, -however, it is said that their performances left him completely cold -and unconvinced. - -[14] Captain Henriques. - -[15] Sergeant Littledale of the Tank Corps writing in the _Atlantic -Monthly_. - -[16] Sergeant Littledale of the Tank Corps writing in the _Atlantic -Monthly_. - -[17] The progress of this decision has been slightly telescoped, the -“operative” resolutions only being recorded, and the story of a good -deal of proposal and counter-proposal omitted. - -[18] The list was as follows: - - _Chairman._--Major-General Sir J. Capper. - _War Office._--Lieut.-Colonel Sir J. Keane. - Lieut.-Colonel Mathew-Lannaw. - _Ministry of Munitions._--Lieut.-Colonel Stern. - Sir Eustace Tennyson d’Eyncourt. - - -[19] Achicourt. - -[20] Letter from a Tank officer dated “April 9, evening.” - -[21] Letter from an eye-witness written on the evening of April 9. - -[22] The Harp. - -[23] Major Watson, the Tank Company Commander, writing in _Blackwood’s -Magazine_. - -[24] “B” (2) Battalion History. - -[25] _W.T.N._ - -[26] Official paper. - -[27] Indirect fire may be defined as fire directed towards the spot -where you believe the enemy to be. Fire is called “direct” when the -target can be seen. - -[28] Mr. Buchan’s _History of the War_. - -[29] _W.T.N._ - -[30] Mr. Buchan’s _History of the War_. - -[31] _W.T.N._ - -[32] Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatch. - -[33] The size of these dumps was now always computed in “Tank Fills.” - - 1 fill consisting of: - 60 galls. of Petrol. - 10 galls. of Oil. - 20 galls. of Water. - 10 lb. of Grease. - 10,000 rounds of S.A. Ammunition for a Female Tank, - or - 200 rounds of 6-pdr. Ammunition - and - 6000 rounds of S.A. Ammunition for a Male. - - -[34] _W.T.N._ - -[35] 3rd Battalion History. - -[36] From Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatch. - -[37] From the History of 7th Battalion. - -[38] _W.T.N._ - -[39] _W.T.N._ - -[40] The second Tank detailed for this strong point had--in common with -the two reserve Tanks--bellied or become ditched on the way up. - -[41] Official Summary. - -[42] Major Wilkes was awarded the D.S.O. for this piece of work. - -[43] Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatch. - -[44] “A” Battalion was borrowed from 2nd Brigade. - -[45] From “F” (6th) Battalion History. - -[46] _W.T.N._ - -[47] Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatch. - -[48] _W.T.N._ - -[49] Artillery of Assault, _i.e._, Tanks. - -[50] An aiming instrument. - -[51] _W.T.N._ - -[52] Mr. Buchanan’s _History of the War_. - -[53] Major Forsyth-Major (the Second in Command of the E.T.D.), on -whose report through Colonel Fuller this summary is largely based, -was torpedoed on his return to England in 1918 and all his maps and -documents were lost. - -[54] General Murray’s Despatch. - -[55] 5th Battalion History. - -[56] 2nd Battalion History. - -[57] Major Norton, commanding the Lewis gun detachment. - -[58] 3rd Battalion History. - -[59] 1st Battalion History. - -[60] _W.T.N._ - -[61] Case shot: bullets not enclosed in a shell, but fired direct from -a 6-pounder and scattering like the charge of a shot gun. - -[62] Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatch. - -[63] 5th Brigade History. - -[64] 8th Battalion History. - -[65] _W.T.N._ - -[66] _W.T.N._ - -[67] The 1st, 4th, 5th, and 14th Battalions. - -[68] The 8th, 13th, 2nd, and 15th Battalions. - -[69] From _W.T.N._ - -[70] 13th Battalion History. - -[71] From the 5th Brigade History. - -[72] Honours and Awards. - -[73] From 14th Battalion History. - -[74] From 1st Battalion History. - -[75] From 3rd Battalion History. - -[76] From 8th Battalion History - -[77] From a Battalion History. - -[78] From a Battalion History. - -[79] Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatch. - -[80] Summer, 1919. - -[81] _i.e._, In the Battle of Amiens, 8.8.18. - -[82] _W.T.N._ - -[83] 3rd Battalion History. - -[84] 15th Battalion History. - -[85] 6th Battalion History and “Honours and Awards.” - -[86] Despatch. - -[87] A Brigade History. - -[88] Unit History. - -[89] _Ibid._ - -[90] Unit History. - -[91] Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatch. - -[92] 15th Battalion Tank History. - -[93] Captain Denny, _Daily Telegraph_, April 1, 1919. - -[94] Captain Denny, _Daily Telegraph_, April 1, 1919. - -[95] The 301st was attached to the 27th American Division. - -[96] From information specially given to the author by Captain -Hatton-Hall, Reconnaissance Officer of the Brigade. - -[97] 16th Battalion. - -[98] Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatch. - -[99] Captain Hatton-Hall. - -[100] _W.T.N._ - -[101] Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatch. - -[102] Captain Hatton-Hall. - -[103] Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatch. - -[104] Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatch. - -[105] 6th Battalion History. - -[106] 6th Battalion History. - -[107] _Ibid._ - -[108] _W.T.N._ - -[109] Tradition relates that had General Swinton had his way, the Tanks -for Palestine would have had hideous faces and minatory texts from the -Koran painted upon them. - - - - -Transcriber’s Notes - - -Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a -predominant preference was found in the original book; otherwise they -were not changed. - -Simple typographical errors were corrected; unbalanced quotation -marks were remedied when the change was obvious, and otherwise left -unbalanced. - -Illustrations in this eBook have been positioned between paragraphs -and outside quotations. In versions of this eBook that support -hyperlinks, the page references in the List of Illustrations lead to -the corresponding illustrations. - -The text always uses “moral”, not “morale”. - -The index was not checked for proper alphabetization or correct page -references. - -Chapter XV does not have a Section “V”; the section after “IV” is “VI”; -no pages or text are missing. - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Tank Corps, by -Clough Williams-Ellis and Amabel Williams-Ellis - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE TANK CORPS *** - -***** This file should be named 62881-0.txt or 62881-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/6/2/8/8/62881/ - -Produced by Brian Coe, Charlie Howard, and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This -book was produced from images made available by the -HathiTrust Digital Library.) - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part -of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm -concept and trademark. Project Gutenberg is a registered trademark, -and may not be used if you charge for the eBooks, unless you receive -specific permission. If you do not charge anything for copies of this -eBook, complying with the rules is very easy. You may use this eBook -for nearly any purpose such as creation of derivative works, reports, -performances and research. They may be modified and printed and given -away--you may do practically ANYTHING in the United States with eBooks -not protected by U.S. copyright law. Redistribution is subject to the -trademark license, especially commercial redistribution. - -START: FULL LICENSE - -THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE -PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK - -To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free -distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work -(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full -Project Gutenberg-tm License available with this file or online at -www.gutenberg.org/license. - -Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works - -1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to -and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property -(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all -the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or -destroy all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your -possession. If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a -Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound -by the terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the -person or entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph -1.E.8. - -1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be -used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who -agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few -things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See -paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this -agreement and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works. See paragraph 1.E below. - -1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the -Foundation" or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection -of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual -works in the collection are in the public domain in the United -States. If an individual work is unprotected by copyright law in the -United States and you are located in the United States, we do not -claim a right to prevent you from copying, distributing, performing, -displaying or creating derivative works based on the work as long as -all references to Project Gutenberg are removed. Of course, we hope -that you will support the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting -free access to electronic works by freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm -works in compliance with the terms of this agreement for keeping the -Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with the work. You can easily -comply with the terms of this agreement by keeping this work in the -same format with its attached full Project Gutenberg-tm License when -you share it without charge with others. - -1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern -what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are -in a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, -check the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this -agreement before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, -distributing or creating derivative works based on this work or any -other Project Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no -representations concerning the copyright status of any work in any -country outside the United States. - -1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: - -1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other -immediate access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear -prominently whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work -on which the phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the -phrase "Project Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, -performed, viewed, copied or distributed: - - This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and - most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no - restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it - under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this - eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the - United States, you'll have to check the laws of the country where you - are located before using this ebook. - -1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is -derived from texts not protected by U.S. copyright law (does not -contain a notice indicating that it is posted with permission of the -copyright holder), the work can be copied and distributed to anyone in -the United States without paying any fees or charges. If you are -redistributing or providing access to a work with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the work, you must comply -either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 or -obtain permission for the use of the work and the Project Gutenberg-tm -trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted -with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution -must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any -additional terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms -will be linked to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works -posted with the permission of the copyright holder found at the -beginning of this work. - -1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm -License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this -work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. - -1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this -electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without -prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with -active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project -Gutenberg-tm License. - -1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, -compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including -any word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access -to or distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format -other than "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official -version posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site -(www.gutenberg.org), you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense -to the user, provide a copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means -of obtaining a copy upon request, of the work in its original "Plain -Vanilla ASCII" or other form. Any alternate format must include the -full Project Gutenberg-tm License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. - -1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, -performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works -unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing -access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -provided that - -* You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from - the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method - you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is owed - to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he has - agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the Project - Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments must be paid - within 60 days following each date on which you prepare (or are - legally required to prepare) your periodic tax returns. Royalty - payments should be clearly marked as such and sent to the Project - Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the address specified in - Section 4, "Information about donations to the Project Gutenberg - Literary Archive Foundation." - -* You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies - you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he - does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm - License. You must require such a user to return or destroy all - copies of the works possessed in a physical medium and discontinue - all use of and all access to other copies of Project Gutenberg-tm - works. - -* You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of - any money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the - electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days of - receipt of the work. - -* You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free - distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. - -1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work or group of works on different terms than -are set forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing -from both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and The -Project Gutenberg Trademark LLC, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm -trademark. Contact the Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. - -1.F. - -1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable -effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread -works not protected by U.S. copyright law in creating the Project -Gutenberg-tm collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may -contain "Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate -or corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other -intellectual property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or -other medium, a computer virus, or computer codes that damage or -cannot be read by your equipment. - -1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right -of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project -Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all -liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal -fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT -LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE -PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE -TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE -LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR -INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH -DAMAGE. - -1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a -defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can -receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a -written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you -received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium -with your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you -with the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in -lieu of a refund. If you received the work electronically, the person -or entity providing it to you may choose to give you a second -opportunity to receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If -the second copy is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing -without further opportunities to fix the problem. - -1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth -in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS', WITH NO -OTHER WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT -LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. - -1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied -warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of -damages. If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement -violates the law of the state applicable to this agreement, the -agreement shall be interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or -limitation permitted by the applicable state law. The invalidity or -unenforceability of any provision of this agreement shall not void the -remaining provisions. - -1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the -trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone -providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in -accordance with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the -production, promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works, harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, -including legal fees, that arise directly or indirectly from any of -the following which you do or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this -or any Project Gutenberg-tm work, (b) alteration, modification, or -additions or deletions to any Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any -Defect you cause. - -Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm - -Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of -electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of -computers including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It -exists because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations -from people in all walks of life. - -Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the -assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's -goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will -remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure -and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future -generations. To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation and how your efforts and donations can help, see -Sections 3 and 4 and the Foundation information page at -www.gutenberg.org - - - -Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation - -The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit -501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the -state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal -Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification -number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent permitted by -U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. - -The Foundation's principal office is in Fairbanks, Alaska, with the -mailing address: PO Box 750175, Fairbanks, AK 99775, but its -volunteers and employees are scattered throughout numerous -locations. Its business office is located at 809 North 1500 West, Salt -Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email contact links and up to -date contact information can be found at the Foundation's web site and -official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact - -For additional contact information: - - Dr. Gregory B. Newby - Chief Executive and Director - gbnewby@pglaf.org - -Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg -Literary Archive Foundation - -Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide -spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of -increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be -freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest -array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations -($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt -status with the IRS. - -The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating -charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United -States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a -considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up -with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations -where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To SEND -DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any particular -state visit www.gutenberg.org/donate - -While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we -have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition -against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who -approach us with offers to donate. - -International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make -any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from -outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. - -Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation -methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other -ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. To -donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate - -Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works. - -Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project -Gutenberg-tm concept of a library of electronic works that could be -freely shared with anyone. For forty years, he produced and -distributed Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of -volunteer support. - -Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed -editions, all of which are confirmed as not protected by copyright in -the U.S. unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not -necessarily keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper -edition. - -Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search -facility: www.gutenberg.org - -This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, -including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to -subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. - diff --git a/old/62881-0.zip b/old/62881-0.zip Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index 52a39b3..0000000 --- a/old/62881-0.zip +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/62881-h.zip b/old/62881-h.zip Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index 6bc39c2..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h.zip +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/62881-h/62881-h.htm b/old/62881-h/62881-h.htm deleted file mode 100644 index 832f32a..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h/62881-h.htm +++ /dev/null @@ -1,19321 +0,0 @@ -<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" - "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> -<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en" lang="en"> - <head> - <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=utf-8" /> - <meta http-equiv="Content-Style-Type" content="text/css" /> - <title> - The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Tank Corps, by Clough Williams-Ellis. - </title> - <link rel="coverpage" href="images/cover.jpg" /> - <style type="text/css"> - -body { - margin-left: 2.5em; - margin-right: 2.5em; -} - -h1, h2, h3 { - text-align: center; - clear: both; - margin-top: 2.5em; - margin-bottom: 1em; - font-weight: normal; - word-spacing: .3em; -} - -h1 {line-height: 1;} - -h2+p {margin-top: 1.5em;} -h2+h3 {margin-top: 1.5em;} - -.transnote h2 { - margin-top: .5em; - margin-bottom: 1em; -} - -h3 {margin-top: 1.5em; margin-bottom: 1em;} -h3 .subhead {line-height: 2;} - -p.subhead { - text-indent: 0; - margin: 1em 10% .5em 10%; - text-align: center; - line-height: 1.5; - word-spacing: .3em; -} -h2 p.subhead, h2+p.subhead {margin: -1em 10% 1.5em 10%;} - -p { - text-indent: 1.75em; - margin-top: .51em; - margin-bottom: .24em; - text-align: justify; -} -.caption p, .center p, p.center {text-align: center; text-indent: 0;} -.caption p.right {text-align: right;} - -.p0 {margin-top: 0em;} -.p1 {margin-top: 1em;} -.p2 {margin-top: 2em;} -.p4 {margin-top: 4em;} -.b0 {margin-bottom: 0;} -.b1 {margin-bottom: 1em;} -.b2 {margin-bottom: 2em;} -.b4 {margin-bottom: 4em;} -.vspace {line-height: 1.5;} - -.in0 {text-indent: 0;} -.in1 {padding-left: 1em;} -.in2 {padding-left: 2em;} -.in3 {padding-left: 3em;} -.in4 {padding-left: 4em;} -.in18a {padding-left: 5.5em;} -.in18b {padding-left: 10em;} -.l2 {padding-right: 2em;} -.l4 {padding-right: 4em;} -.l5 {padding-right: 5em;} -.l6 {padding-right: 6em;} - -.small {font-size: 70%;} -.smaller {font-size: 85%;} -.larger {font-size: 125%;} -.large {font-size: 150%;} -.xxlarge {font-size: 200%;} - -.center {text-align: center;} - -.right {text-align: right;} - -.smcap {font-variant: small-caps;} -.smcap.smaller, .allsmcap {font-size: 75%;} -.firstword {font-variant: small-caps;} - -.bold {font-weight: bold;} - -hr { - width: 33%; - margin-top: 4em; - margin-bottom: 4em; - margin-left: 33%; - margin-right: auto; - clear: both; -} - -.tb { - text-align: center; - padding-top: .76em; - padding-bottom: .24em; - letter-spacing: 1.5em; - margin-right: -1.5em; -} - -table { - margin-left: auto; - margin-right: auto; - max-width: 80%; - border-collapse: collapse; -} -table.narrow20 {width: 20em;} -table.narrow25 {width: 25em; margin: 1em auto 1em auto;} -table.narrow25.td {padding-left: 1em; padding-right: 1em;} - -.tdl { - text-align: left; - vertical-align: top; - padding-right: 1em; - padding-left: 1.5em; - text-indent: -1.5em; -} - -.tdc {text-align: center;} - -.tdr { - text-align: right; - vertical-align: bottom; - padding-left: .3em; - white-space: nowrap; -} -.tdr.w4 {min-width: 4em;} -.tdr.w8 {min-width: 8em;} -.tdr.top{vertical-align: top; padding-left: 0; padding-right: .75em;} -#toc td, #loi td {padding-bottom: .5em;} -#toc tr.small td, #loi tr.small td {padding-bottom: 0;} - -.pagenum { - position: absolute; - right: .25em; - text-indent: 0; - text-align: right; - font-size: 70%; - font-weight: normal; - font-variant: normal; - font-style: normal; - letter-spacing: normal; - line-height: normal; - color: #acacac; - border: .0625em solid #acacac; - background: #ffffff; - padding: .0625em .125em; -} - -.figcenter { - margin: 2em auto 2em auto; - text-align: center; - page-break-inside: avoid; - max-width: 100%; -} -.figcenter.p4 {margin-top: 4em;} -.figcenter+.figcenter {margin-top: 4em;} -.figcenter.isig {margin: 0 auto 0 auto; padding-left: 5em;} - -img { - padding: 1em 0 .5em 0; - max-width: 100%; - height: auto; -} - -a.ref {text-decoration: none;} - -.caption { - text-align: left; - margin-left: 1em; - margin-top: 0; - font-size: .8em; - word-spacing: .3em; -} -.caption.center {text-align: center;} - -.sans {font-family: sans-serif, serif;} -.underline {text-decoration: underline;} - -ul {margin-left: 3em; padding-left: 0;} -li {list-style-type: none; padding-left: 2em; text-indent: -2.5em; text-align: left;} - -.footnotes { - border: thin dashed black; - margin: 4em 5% 1em 5%; - padding: .5em 1em .5em 1.5em; -} - -.footnote {font-size: .95em;} -.footnote p {text-indent: 1em;} -.footnote p.in0 {text-indent: 0;} -.footnote p.fn1 {text-indent: -.7em;} -.footnote p.fn2 {text-indent: -1.1em;} -.footnote p.fn3 {text-indent: -1.5em;} - -.fnanchor { - vertical-align: 60%; - line-height: .7; - font-size: smaller; - text-decoration: none; -} -.footnote .fnanchor {font-size: .8em;} - -a.ref {text-decoration: none;} - -.index {margin-left: 1em;} -ul.index {padding-left: 0;} -li {list-style-type: none;} -li.indx, li.ifrst {list-style-type: none; padding-left: 3em; text-indent: -3em; padding-top: .2em;} -li.isub1 {padding-left: 3em; text-indent: -2em;} -li.ifrst {padding-top: 1em;} - -.blockquot { - margin: 1.5em 5% 1.5em 5%; - font-size: 95%; -} -.blockquot.narrow {margin: 1.5em 10% 1.5em 10%;} - -.blockquot.inhead p {padding-left: 1.5em; text-indent: -1.5em;} -.blockquot.inhead.center p {padding-left: 0; text-indent: 0; text-align: center;} - -.hang, .center .hang, .hang p { - text-align: justify; - padding-left: 1.5em; - text-indent: -1.5em; -} -.in1h {margin-left: 1.125em;} - -.poetry-container { - margin: 1.5em auto; - text-align: center; - font-size: 98%; -} - -.poetry { - display: inline-block; - text-align: left; - margin-left: 0; -} - -.poetry .stanza {padding: 0.5em 0;} -.poetry .verse {text-indent: -3em; padding-left: 3em;} - -.poetry .tb {margin: .3em 0 0 0;} - -.poetry .attrib {margin-right: -2em; text-align: right; margin-top: -.5em;} - -.poetry .indentq {text-indent: -3.45em;} -.poetry .indent0 {text-indent: -3em;} -.poetry .indent14 {text-indent: 2em;} -.poetry .indent2 {text-indent: -2em;} -.poetry .indent34 {text-indent: 10em;} - -.transnote { - background-color: #999999; - border: thin dotted; - font-family: sans-serif, serif; - margin-left: 5%; - margin-right: 5%; - margin-top: 4em; - margin-bottom: 2em; - padding: 1em; -} - -.sigright { - margin-right: 2em; - text-align: right;} - -.wspace {word-spacing: .3em;} - -span.locked {white-space:nowrap;} - -.epubonly {visibility: hidden; display: none;} -.vtight {line-height: .8;} -.vlogo {vertical-align: 75%;} -.narrow416 {margin-left: 45%; width: 50%;} - -@media print, handheld -{ - h1, .chapter, .newpage {page-break-before: always;} - h1.nobreak, h2.nobreak, .nobreak {page-break-before: avoid; padding-top: 0;} - - p { - margin-top: .5em; - text-align: justify; - margin-bottom: .25em; - } - - table {width: auto; max-width: 100%; margin: 1em auto 1em auto;} - table.narrow20 {width: auto; max-width: 30em; margin-left: 25%;} - table.narrow25 {width: auto; max-width: 40em; margin-left: 20%;} - table.narrow35 {width: auto; max-width: 40em; margin-left: 15%;} - - .tdl { - padding-left: 1em; - text-indent: -1em; - padding-right: 0; - } - - .epubonly {display: block; visibility: visible;} - .htmlonly {display: none; visibility: hidden;} -} - -@media handheld -{ - body {margin: 0;} - - hr { - margin-top: .1em; - margin-bottom: .1em; - visibility: hidden; - color: white; - width: .01em; - display: none; - } - - ul {margin-left: 1em; padding-left: 0;} - li {list-style-type: none; padding-left: 1em; text-indent: -1.5em;} - - .blockquot {margin: 1.5em 3% 1.5em 3%;} - - .poetry-container {text-align: center;} - .pw18 {width: 18em;} - .pw20 {width: 20em;} - .pw25 {width: 25em;} - .pw30 {width: 30em;} - .poetry {display: block; text-align: left;} - .poetry .attrib {text-align: right; margin-right: 0;} - .poetry .stanza {page-break-inside: avoid;} - - .transnote { - page-break-inside: avoid; - margin-left: 2%; - margin-right: 2%; - margin-top: 1em; - margin-bottom: 1em; - padding: .5em; - } - - .index {margin-left: 0;} -} - - </style> - </head> - -<body> - - -<pre> - -The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Tank Corps, by -Clough Williams-Ellis and Amabel Williams-Ellis - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: The Tank Corps - -Author: Clough Williams-Ellis - Amabel Williams-Ellis - -Release Date: August 8, 2020 [EBook #62881] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE TANK CORPS *** - - - - -Produced by Brian Coe, Charlie Howard, and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This -book was produced from images made available by the -HathiTrust Digital Library.) - - - - - - -</pre> - - -<div class="transnote"> -<p class="center larger">Transcriber’s Note</p> -<p>This book uses footnote anchors at the beginning -of some quoted text to refer to footnotes crediting -the sources of those quotes. It also uses -mid-paragraph footnote anchors to refer to -other kinds of footnotes.</p> -</div> - -<div class="htmlonly"> -<hr /> -<div id="i_cover" class="p4 figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;"> - <img src="images/cover.jpg" width="1063" height="1600" alt="cover" /> -</div> -<hr /> -</div> - -<h1>THE TANK CORPS</h1> - -<div id="i_frontis" class="p4 figcenter" style="max-width: 38em;"> - <img src="images/i_000.jpg" width="601" height="746" alt="" /> - <div class="caption"><p>MAJOR-GENERAL HUGH ELLES, C. B., D. S. O.</p> - -<p>FROM A PORTRAIT BY SIR WILLIAM ORPEN, A. R. A.</p></div></div> - -<div class="newpage p4 center vspace wspace"> -<p class="xxlarge bold">THE TANK CORPS</p> - -<p class="p2 larger"><span class="small">BY</span><br /> -<span class="smcap">Major</span> CLOUGH WILLIAMS-ELLIS, M.C.<br /> -<span class="small">AND</span><br /> -A. WILLIAMS-ELLIS</p> - -<p class="p2 smaller">WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY<br /> -<span class="larger"><span class="smcap">Major-General</span> H. J. ELLES, C.B., D.S.O.</span><br /> -COMMANDER OF THE TANK CORPS</p> - -<p class="p2">ILLUSTRATED</p> - -<div class="epubonly"> -<div id="if_i_001" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 7em;"> - <img src="images/i_001.png" width="105" height="106" alt="(publisher’s logo)" /> -</div> - -<p>NEW YORK<br /> -GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY</p> -</div> - -<div class="htmlonly"> -<p class="large vtight"><span class="vlogo">NEW</span> <img src="images/i_001.png" width="105" height="106" alt="(publisher’s logo)" /> <span class="vlogo">YORK</span><br /> -GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY -</p> -</div> - -<hr /> - -<p class="newpage p4"> -COPYRIGHT, 1919,<br /> -BY GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY -</p> - -<p class="p4">PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA</p> -</div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_5">5</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="INTRODUCTION">INTRODUCTION</h2> -</div> - -<p class="in0"><span class="smcap">My dear Williams-Ellis</span>,</p> - -<p>You ask me for a foreword to your history, and -invite me, too, to agree to, criticise, or even refute the -conclusions of your Epilogue.</p> - -<p>The first task I undertake with pleasure, though I feel -it would be more justly and more skilfully done either -by one of the pioneers who sowed that we might reap, -or by the rare thinker who in our own time has contributed -so much to keep us on the lines of clear understanding -and progress.</p> - -<p>As to the second task I must decline a direct reply, -and for many reasons I can no more than touch generally -upon the questions you have dealt with in so interesting -a way. I find them, however, not yet sufficiently -remote in time, either to be clear themselves, or -to be distinctly placed in a picture itself still obscure.</p> - -<div class="tb">* * * * *</div> - -<p>Of the early days of the Tanks, and of the early -struggles, difficulties and hopes of the pioneers, I have -no first-hand knowledge—to comment at any length -upon them would be out of place. They do, however, -represent a remarkable effort of persistent and courageous -faith, of determination to succeed in the face of -lukewarmness and even scepticism, of the overcoming -of many practical difficulties. Above all, they present -a great clearness of vision on the part of three men in -particular—Swinton, Stern and d’Eyncourt.</p> - -<p>It is remarkable that one of the first official papers -on the tactical use of Tanks, written by General -Swinton early in 1915, should have been almost literally -translated into action on August 8, 1918.</p> - -<p>To General Swinton, too, is due the implanting, into -all ranks, of the fundamental idea of the Tank as a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_6">6</span> -weapon for saving the lives of infantry. This idea was -indeed the foundation of the moral of the Tank Corps, -for it spread from the fighting personnel to the depots -and workshops, and even to the factories.</p> - -<p>More than anything else, it was this sentiment which -kept men ploughing through the mud of 1917, in the -dark days when often the chance of reaching an objective -had fallen to ten per cent.; which kept workshops -in full swing all round the clock on ten and eleven hour -shifts for weeks and, once, for months on end; which, -finally, secured from the factories an intensive and remarkable -output.</p> - -<p>Sir Albert Stern brought to his labours a whole-hearted -energy and enthusiasm unsurpassed. But more -practical than this alone, he ensured initial production -by a contempt for routine and material difficulties -and a resilience to rebuff as fortunate as they were -courageous.</p> - -<p>To Sir Eustace d’Eyncourt, the only member of the -original Committee still officially connected with us, a -great debt is due. We have been fortunate to have -had at our disposal an engineer of his wide practical -experience, who devoted much of his scanty leisure to -our guidance both in policy and in detail, whose sagacious -counsels have more than once checked the impetuosity -of some of his associates.</p> - -<div class="tb">* * * * *</div> - -<p>Before passing to the aspects of Tank history with -which I have been directly concerned, I wish to make -reference to two organisations vital to the Tank Corps -in the field. For if that represented the point of the -spear, they combined to form a most solid and dependable -shaft.</p> - -<p>The first of these two was the Training Organisations -set up in England to produce the men; second, -the manufactories which produced the machines.</p> - -<p>The task of the Training Centre and the cadet schools -was particularly onerous. The organisation of any -new instructional centre in the haste and pressure of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_7">7</span> -the time was no easy task—its work was often thankless -and subject to much ill-informed and light-hearted -criticism.</p> - -<p>The Training Centre of the Tank Corps had additional -difficulties. There was no guidance as to training—the -entire system had to be thought out from the -beginning, and continually modified by the experience -of the battlefield—instructors had not only to be found -but trained—esprit de corps and discipline had to be -built up; and all this against time.</p> - -<p>It may perhaps be a compensation to the many -officers and men who lived laborious days, and were -not rewarded by seeing the results of their work in -the field, to know that “France” has never been under -any illusion as to the great thoroughness of their work.</p> - -<div class="tb">* * * * *</div> - -<p>The work carried through in the munitions factories, -and the ingenuity and solid labour that backed the -efforts of the soldier in the field, are perhaps not yet -fully appreciated by the fighting men. In France one -might hear of sporadic unrest, but till one met with it, -one realised nothing of the genuine faithful grind at -production of objects of whose destination the worker -often knew nothing, of the blind patience under duress -of shortage, and of crowded accommodation; of hope -deferred.</p> - -<p>The Tank Corps was fortunate indeed in having -established at an early date close relations with its -workers, and more fortunate still at a critical time in -being able to declare a substantial dividend on the -capital of wealth, labour and brains entrusted to it by -its section of industrial Britain.</p> - -<p>Once touch was obtained with the worker himself, the -interest taken by J. Bull in the factory, in T. Atkins -in the field, was more than fully proved, not only by -the demand for copies of accounts of Tank actions, but -by the steadily increased output that was maintained.</p> - -<p>The thing is only natural. Put a man or a woman -to turn out bolts from a machine for eight hours a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_8">8</span> -day, and you will get a certain result. Tell her or him -that the bolts will go into a Tank that will fight probably -in six weeks’ time; that the Tank will save lives -and slay Huns; that yesterday Tanks did so-and-so; -that last week No. 10567, made in Birmingham, and -commanded by Sergeant Jones of Cardiff, rounded up -five machine-guns ... you will get quite a different -result; moreover, it is John Bull’s right and due to be -told these things.</p> - -<p>We had not got quite a complete result in this direction, -but we were getting near it, and perhaps our co-operation -of the back and the front was as nearly a -microcosm of an ideal national co-operation in war as -has been achieved. We aimed at Team Work.</p> - -<div class="tb">* * * * *</div> - -<p>You who have coped in a short compass with the -whole story of Tanks can well realise the difficulties of -dealing concisely, even by comment, with the kaleidoscopic -events of two and a half crowded years—with -the questions of organisation, training, personnel, design, -supply, fighting, reorganisation, workshops, experiments, -salvage, transportation, maintenance.</p> - -<p>I shall attempt no more than to supplement your -admirably drawn narrative as to one or two points -which appear to me to be of major importance or -interest.</p> - -<div class="tb">* * * * *</div> - -<p>The employment of Tanks in the field was one long -conflict between policy and expediency. Policy seemed -always to demand that we should wait until all was -prepared, until sufficient masses of machines should be -ready to use in one great attack that would break the -German defensive system. Expediency necessitated the -employment of all available forces at dates predetermined, -and in localities fixed for reasons other than -their suitability as Tank country. Battles are not won -with Tanks alone, and in early 1917, for example, the -Tank was still a comparatively untested machine. Indeed,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_9">9</span> -the later issues of the Mark I. developed weaknesses -in detail so alarming as to preclude anything -more than a short-lived effort in battle.</p> - -<p>Not until the Mark IV. machine was well into delivery -could a guarantee as to its degree of mechanical -reliability be given, and by that time the trend of the -year’s campaigning was unalterably fixed.</p> - -<p>And so it was that it was our fate up to the first -Cambrai battle to “chip in when we could” in conditions -entirely unfavourable.</p> - -<p>The employment of Tanks in Flanders has often been -criticised, without intelligent appreciation of the fact -that had they not fought in Flanders they would have -probably fought nowhere. Better, therefore, that they -should fight and pull less than half their weight, and -still save lives, than that they should stand idle while -tremendous issues were at stake.</p> - -<div class="tb">* * * * *</div> - -<p>If employment in the field was a struggle between -policy and expediency, the principles of production and -design represented a direct conflict of opposing policies, -resulting happily in compromise. The fighting man, -conscious of the weaknesses of the earlier weapons, -and visualising development which he believed to be -obtainable, and knew to be necessary, and the soldier-engineer -overburdened with difficulties of maintenance -and cursed with the nightmare of Spares and Spares -and more Spares—both cried aloud from France for -rapid progress in design.</p> - -<p>In England the other side of the picture was presented -with equal force. The process of bulk production -necessitates orders placed long in advance, materials -were difficult to obtain, plans of track work and -workshop organisation are not susceptible of change -without delay, change, too, entailing irritation of factory -staffs and workmen. Production once agreed to -and embarked upon, a very complicated machinery is -with difficulty set in motion. To stop or change this -machinery results often in a loss of output which is in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_10">10</span> -no way compensated by the improvements ultimately -obtained.</p> - -<p>The same problem must have occurred in many -branches of war production. The best, however, is -only the enemy of the good, if the good is good -enough.</p> - -<p>You have portrayed the difficulties arising from these -conditions in Chapter V. The picture you draw belongs -to the earlier stages, when the two sides worked rather -upon regulation than upon formula. The later stages -of the war saw a very full appreciation of each other’s -point of view and the growth of a very sturdy spirit of -co-operation, which carried us over more than one difficulty -to meet which special appliances or special construction -were necessary.</p> - -<div class="tb">* * * * *</div> - -<p>The Tank, as a weapon, has been threatened with several -crises. Some have been averted by intelligent forecast -in specification. Some have been dealt with by the -improvisations of the engineers both in France and in -England. Some have disappeared before a general improvement -in design. You, I think, have touched on -one crisis only—the mud crisis. The mud crisis was -defeated at long last, but the swamp crisis, never. Although -none of the other troubles was of long duration, -any one of them, unless cured, would have caused a -permanent disappearance of the arm.</p> - -<p>Failure of rollers was succeeded by failure of -sprockets. Sprockets and rollers were hardly cured -when the Germans produced a very reliable armour-piercing -bullet. This after a very short innings was -defeated by the arrival of the Mark IV. Tank. The -Mark IV. Tank was barely rescued from the mud of -Flanders by the invention of the unditching beam, when -we discovered that the Hindenburg trenches were about -one foot too wide to cross without some form of help -to the Tank. This difficulty was overcome, but about -this time the effect of concentrated machine-gun fire -upon Mark IV. Tanks must have become known to the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_11">11</span> -Germans, as also their vulnerability to the ordinary -field gun. The position with regard to both splash and -casualties from guns firing over the sights, was becoming -serious when the arrival of Mark V. Tank, with its -increased handiness and speed, put an end to the splash -difficulty for ever, and defeated the field gun for a good -long time.</p> - -<p>So on to the last days of the war, when we were able -to look forward to 1919 with a certain knowledge that -we had much in hand against any measure of opposition—short -of a superior Tank—that the enemy could -produce.</p> - -<p>The idea undoubtedly exists still in the minds of certain -people that the particular form of Tank which they -have seen or fought with represents the latest word in -design. It does not. The latest Tank produced in any -bulk was the type that marched through London on -July 19. It has never fought, and it represents the -last word only of the elementary series of Tanks of -which Mark I. was the original.</p> - -<div class="tb">* * * * *</div> - -<p>If finality in design has by no means been approached -in the war, the same may be said as regards the employment -of the then existing types. This depended, after -due consideration of their limitations and powers, on -the training of personnel, not only of the Tank Corps, -but essentially of infantry too. Lack of time, lack of -opportunity, and wastage of trained personnel were the -great difficulties which confronted commanders of -every arm and formation in their efforts to reach even -average standards of skill in only a few of the commoner -phases of warfare. With the Tank Corps the -additional difficulties of mechanical training were no -more than balanced by freedom from the trench routine -of troops employed for defence. For the infantry Tank, -the training of Tank personnel alone is not sufficient. -In the assault, Tanks are no more than a part of infantry, -an integral part of the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">troupes d’assaut</i>. For -real success, i.e., cheap success, not only must the two<span class="pagenum" id="Page_12">12</span> -arms train and re-train together, but they should live -together, feed together, and drink together.</p> - -<p>Much was attempted and much was done to supplement -the lack of opportunity by demonstration, lectures, -attachments. But by reason of the incomplete -military education of our hastily-trained troops it was -necessary to limit manœuvre and tactics on the battlefield -to the simplest elements. Anything in the nature -of finesse had to be avoided. Skilful use of ground and -mutual fire support were things hoped for more often -than achieved.</p> - -<p>It was a question of bulk production against time, -but the results obtained only prove how much more -could be achieved with the same material had conditions -of training been those of peace time with its long -service and rigorous and plentiful supervision.</p> - -<div class="tb">* * * * *</div> - -<p>The preceding paragraph may seem ungracious from -one who has had the privilege of commanding a great -force of citizen soldiers. It is nevertheless true that -soldiering, like any other trade, takes time and experience -to learn—that though there may be many who, -being engineers, or advocates, or business men, or -farmers, learn soldiering with great aptitude, the great -bulk of any body of men, call them regular soldiers or -citizen soldiers, require a deal of training under the -best instructors, if they are to draw the full advantage -from the ever varying conditions of the battlefield.</p> - -<div class="tb">* * * * *</div> - -<p>I have alluded above to the Tank Corps as a citizen -force. It was, indeed, peculiarly so, for of the 20,000 -odd souls that went to compose it, perhaps not more -than two or three per cent. were professional soldiers; -and, while the General Staff officers on H.Qs. were -almost without exception regulars, the whole of the -Administrative and Engineering staffs with one solitary -exception were drawn from various civil vocations.</p> - -<p>Moreover, units as they came into being were built<span class="pagenum" id="Page_13">13</span> -up, not on any old-time tradition of a parent regiment, -but each one very much around the personality of its -own commanding officer. And it has indeed been interesting -to watch the development of particular idiosyncrasies -of whole battalions and companies from the -characters of their leaders.</p> - -<p>Your record has faithfully set forth what has been -accomplished by these troops. They are well able to -sustain criticism in the light of their achievements.</p> - -<div class="tb">* * * * *</div> - -<p>I have alluded before to the esprit de corps, founded -as it was upon the sentiment of saving of life—a sentiment -to which appeal has never failed. Other factors -went to strengthen it. It was braced by a high standard -of results demanded, by the determination to make -good in spite of partial first successes. But the -strongest element in it was the faith in our weapon—the -machine necessary to supplement the other machines -of war, in order to break the stalemate produced -by the great German weapon, the machine-gun—our -mobile offensive answer to the immobile defensive man-killer.</p> - -<div class="tb">* * * * *</div> - -<p>It is indeed a curious reflection that the Germans -before committing themselves to their great final offensive, -should not have followed to their logical conclusion -the preparations which they made for the preceding -phases of the war with such meticulous forethought. -In 1914, they removed from the path of their attacking -infantry the prepared obstacles of permanent fortification -by means of specially-constructed machines—siege -cannon of unprecedented size. Later, they developed -the machine-gun in bulk, and so modified the preconceived -course of warfare to their own advantage for -defence. It is astonishing that for their final offensive -effort, they should not have equipped their men with -armament for overcoming the very defence in depth -supported by the very machine-guns from which they -had reaped so much advantage in the previous years.</p> - -<p>And yet we see them in March, 1918, reverting after<span class="pagenum" id="Page_14">14</span> -an initial attack, powerfully covered by artillery fire, -to the same attempt to break through with men that -had failed in 1914. Although machine-gun support was -stronger, there was little help from the other arms beyond -scanty artillery support and considerable frightfulness -of day and night bombing and long-range bombardment. -The German infantry was well, often magnificently, -led, whether in Picardy or Flanders; and one -could not watch the work of the strong offensive patrols -without intense admiration of their skill and courage.</p> - -<p>The Germans failed against defence in depth. The -elements that were wanting were those of continuous -mobility necessary to overcome such defence, against -which infantry without powerful support and plentiful -supply sooner or later become powerless. The Germans -lacked the means to move and to supply their guns -rapidly. They lacked Tanks to produce surprise or to -carry forward the battle as an alternative to guns. -They lacked lorries, they lacked cross-country vehicles.</p> - -<p>With us, when the tide turned, the converse was the -case, and it was at least a part reason of success against -an enemy who fought bravely and often bitterly almost -to the end.</p> - -<div class="tb">* * * * *</div> - -<p>Whether you justly appraise the contribution of the -Tank Corps towards the final victory is for history to -declare—at some interval yet—but I am hardy enough -to give you a parable in the terms of a great national -pastime.</p> - -<p>Rugby football of all games affords the closest -analogy to war—to warfare on the Western Front the -parallel, without labouring the detail, is remarkable.</p> - -<p>In the early nineties the accepted tactics of the game -demanded a distribution of the team into nine forwards -and six backs. The orthodox believed in forward play, -and in emergency sometimes even a tenth forward -would be added at the expense of one back.</p> - -<p>At this time there occurred in the annual matches<span class="pagenum" id="Page_15">15</span> -between two countries an uninterrupted series of defeats -for one. As a measure of resource or despair, I -do not know which, a new distribution was made in -its forces. Instead of nine, eight forwards were played, -one back was added—the fourth three-quarter.</p> - -<p>The tactics were for the forwards to hold the opposing -attack and for the backs to play offensively. The -game is historic. For three-quarters of the match the -nine forwards pressed the eight heavily, and these were -very hard put to it to maintain their lines. In the last -phase of the game one of the four three-quarters got -away unmarked, the game was won and lost.</p> - -<p>That was twenty-five years ago. The rules of the -game remain unchanged, but the distribution of the -players has been modified and the tactics of teams have -developed on the lines of that historic match and -beyond.</p> - -<p>Whether the parallel of the Tank Corps to the extra -three-quarter is a completely true one history will -record in due season. What, however, we may claim is -that the fourth three-quarter after a nervous start, in -which perhaps he was sometimes out of his place, nevertheless -on more than one occasion got away unmarked; -that he ran straight even when he was being heavily -tackled and drew the opposition for his side; that he -went down well to the rushes of the German forwards; -and that, finally, he more than once handled the ball -in the great combined run which took his team from -within its own twenty-five over the opponents’ goal line.</p> - -<p class="p1 center l2"> -Yours sincerely, -</p> - -<div id="ip_15" class="figcenter isig" style="max-width: 23em;"> - <img src="images/i_005.jpg" width="356" height="158" class="in4" alt="Hugh Ellis (signature)" /> -</div> - -<p class="in0 in1"> -<i>United Service Club,<br /> -<span class="in1">July 28, 1919.</span></i> -</p> -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_17">17</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="CONTENTS">CONTENTS</h2> -</div> - -<table id="toc" summary="Contents"> - <tr class="small"> - <td class="tdr">CHAPTER</td> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdr w4">PAGE</td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Introduction</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#INTRODUCTION">v</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">I</td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">A Brief Account of the Tank, Its Crew and Its Tactical Functions, As They Were at the Date of the Armistice</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_I">25</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">II</td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Earliest Tanks, General Swinton, Admiral Bacon,—the Holt Tractor and the Evolution of the “Land Cruiser”</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_II">31</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">III</td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Tank Corps in Embryo</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_III">46</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">IV</td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The First Tank Battles—The Attack on Morval, Flers, the Quadrilateral, Thiepval, and Beaumont-Hamel</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_IV">57</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">V</td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Winter Training, Expansion and Readjustments</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_V">77</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">VI</td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Battles of Arras and Bullecourt</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_VI">89</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">VII</td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Battle of Messines and the “Hush” Operation</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_VII">110</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">VIII</td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Flanders Campaign—Preparations for the Third Battle of Ypres</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_VIII">124</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">IX</td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Third Battle of Ypres</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_IX">138</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">X</td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The First Battle of Cambrai</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_X">160</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">XI</td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Three New Types of Tank—The Depot—Central Workshops</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_XI">190</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">XII</td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The French Tank Corps—American Tanks and British Tanks in Egypt</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_XII">209</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">XIII</td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Suspense—The “Savage Rabbits” Episode—The Enemy’s Intentions</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_XIII">235</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">XIV</td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The March Retreat</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_XIV">243</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">XV</td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Equilibrium—Minor Actions—Hamel—The Ballon D’Essai</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_XV">265</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">XVI</td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">With the French—The Battle of Moreuil</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_XVI">280</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">XVII</td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Battle of Amiens, or Battle of August 8</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_XVII">288</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">XVIII</td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The German Attitude—“Man-Traps and Gins”—The Battle of Bapaume</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_XVIII">323</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">XIX</td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Breaking the Drocourt-Quéant Line—The Battle of Epehy</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_XIX">341</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_18">18</span></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">XX</td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Second Battle of Cambrai, or the Battle of Cambrai-St. Quentin</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_XX">361</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">XXI</td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Second Battle of Le Cateau—The Running Fight</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_XXI">380</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">XXII</td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Rout—Mormal Forest—The Battle of the Sambre—The Armistice</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_XXII">392</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Epilogue</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#EPILOGUE">402</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Index</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#INDEX">417</a></td></tr> -</table> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_19">19</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="ILLUSTRATIONS">ILLUSTRATIONS</h2> -</div> - -<table id="loi" summary="Illustrations"> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Major-General Hugh Elles, C.B., D.S.O.</span><br />From a portrait by Sir William Orpen, A.R.A.</td> - <td class="tdr w8"><i><a href="#i_frontis">Frontispiece</a></i></td></tr> - <tr class="small"> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdr">FACING<br />PAGE</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">General Arrangements of Mark V. Tank—Front View</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_28">28</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">General Arrangement of Mark V. Tank—Sectional Elevation</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_28b">28</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">General Arrangement of Mark V. Tank—Sectional Plan</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_29">29</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Diagram Showing Adaptation to the “Large-Wheeled Tractor” Idea</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_29b">29</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Original Thiepval Mark I. Tank with Anti-Bomb Roof and “Tail”</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_64">64</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Field Camouflage</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_64b">64</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">A Derelict. Valley of the Scarpe</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_96">96</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">A Burning Tank</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_96b">96</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">“Direct Hits”</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_96c">97</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Bellied on a Tree-Stump and Subsequently Hit</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_96d">97</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">A Flanders Pill-Box</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_133">132</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Unditching Beam in Action</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_133b">132</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Steenbeek Valley Before the Battle</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_133c">133</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Steenbeek Valley After Bombardment</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_133d">133</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">A Deadly Swamp (the Wrecks of Six Tanks May Be Counted)</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_144">144</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">“Clapham Junction” Near Sanctuary Wood</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_144b">145</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">“The Salient”</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_144c">145</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Preparing for Cambrai. A Train of Tanks with Fascines in Position</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_177">176</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Bapaume-Cambrai Road</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_177b">177</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">A Tank Crushing down the Enemy’s Wire</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_177c">177</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Sledge Towing Tank Taking up Supplies</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_201">200</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_20">20</span></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Bermicourt Chateau near St. Pol. Tank Corps Main Headquarters</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_201b">200</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Gun-Carrying Tank Taking up a Howitzer</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_201c">201</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">A Whippet Going In</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_201d">201</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Smoke Screen and Semaphore</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_303">304</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">A Tankadrome</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_303b">304</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Moving Up. Battle of Amiens</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_306">305</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Armoured Cars Going Up</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_306b">305</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">German Anti-Tank Gunners.</span> (From a photograph found on a prisoner)</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_337">336</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">An Anti-Tank Gun in a Steel Cupola (Ypres)</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_337b">336</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">A Captured German Tank</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_337c">337</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">A German Anti-Tank Rifle</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_337d">337</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Infantry Advancing Behind Tanks. A Practice Attack at Bermicourt</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_369">368</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The St. Quentin Canal Tunnel, Bellicourt</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_369b">369</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Carrier Pigeon Being Released</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_369c">369</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">His Majesty the Colonel-in-Chief and General Elles</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_384">384</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Manufacture</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_385">385</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Western Edge of Mormal Forest</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_396">396</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">A “Wireless” Tank</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_396b">397</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Map of Tank Operations, August–November, 1918</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_416">416</a></td></tr> -</table> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_25">25</span></p> -<h2 class="nobreak" id="THE_TANK_CORPS"><span class="large bold">THE TANK CORPS</span></h2> -</div> - -<h2 class="nobreak p2" id="CHAPTER_I">CHAPTER I</h2> - -<p class="subhead">A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE TANK, ITS CREW AND ITS -TACTICAL FUNCTIONS, AS THEY WERE AT THE -DATE OF THE ARMISTICE</p> - -<h3>I</h3> - -<p><span class="firstword">The</span> secrets of the Tank Corps have been so well -kept that there are few civilians who even now know -anything of Tanks or their crews beyond what might -be learned from photographs, or a distant view of -“Egbert” or some other War Bond or Olympian -Tank.</p> - -<p>The Censorship has seen to it that the civilian has -had no opportunity of making himself familiar with -the tactical opportunities and problems that the use -of Tanks has introduced or with the conditions under -which Tank crews fight.</p> - -<p>It is for the civilian reader that the present chapter -is intended. He is to be given some idea of the oak -tree before he is invited to dissect the acorn.</p> - -<p>If he has no idea of the appearance and habits of -the Tanks that fought at the Canal du Nord or that -pushed back the enemy at Mormal, he cannot be expected -to thrill as he should over the vicissitudes of -the first converted Holt Tractor. For to one who had -never seen the engine of a through express the history -of “Puffing Billy” would almost certainly prove insufferably -tedious.</p> - -<p>The authors, therefore, propose to deal, very briefly,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_26">26</span> -with the modern Tank before plunging the reader into -the dark ages of 1914, where, to pursue our analogy, -Watt’s kettle-lid and the “Rocket” dwell obscurely.</p> - -<h3>II</h3> - -<p>Every detail of Tank Corps’ training, equipment, and -tactics has been modified in view of some limitation -or opportunity arising from the structure of the Tank -itself. Therefore, though this book is principally concerned -with the development of the Tank Corps rather -than with the intricate evolution of the Tanks themselves, -the reader will find it necessary to have a general -idea of the construction and workings of the different -types of machine.</p> - -<p>It would indeed be as idle to describe the anatomy -of a snail or a lobster without mention of its shell, as -to endeavour to separate the story of the Tank Corps -from that of its Tanks.</p> - -<p>When the War ended in November, 1918, there were, -besides obsolete types which were still used for such -work as carrying and the towing of supply sledges, -three main types of Tank. First, the Mark V., which -was 26 ft. long, 8 ft. 4 in. wide, weighed 27 tons, and -had a horse-power of 150. The Male Tanks carried two -6-pounder guns, and one Hotchkiss gun. The Female -carried five Hotchkiss machine-guns and no 6-pounder -guns.</p> - -<p><i>The Mark V. Star.</i>—This Tank resembled the Mark -V., except that it had a length of 32 ft. 6 in., and was -designed for the transport of infantry and for the -traversing of trenches too wide for the Mark V. Each -had a normal speed of about five miles an hour, and -was protected by armour up to five-eights of an inch -thick.</p> - -<p>They were both so designed as to turn easily at their<span class="pagenum" id="Page_27">27</span> -maximum speed, and carried attachments for use on -soft ground, which increased the grip of the tracks.</p> - -<p>Each was fought by a crew consisting of a subaltern -and seven men, three drivers (two of whom normally -fought the Hotchkiss guns), and three gunners.</p> - -<p>The third type was the Whippet. The tracks were -nearly as long as those of a heavy Tank, but the body -had been reduced to a small cab perched at the back, -rather as an urchin rides a donkey. It was armed with -two machine-guns, managed by a crew of three men, -and developed a speed of seven miles an hour. Whippets -were designed for use as raiders and in conjunction -with cavalry. In practice, however, the cavalry -was seldom able to act with them. Partly in consequence -of this, partly owing to the state of open warfare -being of such short duration, the Whippets, -though having brilliant feats to their credit (see the -exploits of “Musical Box,” Chapter XIII), remained -creatures of promise rather than of achievement.</p> - -<h3>III</h3> - -<p>As a rule Male Mark V. Tanks were used against -Pill-Boxes and other “strong points,” while the special -work of Female Tanks was to deal with hostile infantry -(for example, by sitting astride and thus enfilading -their trenches), and then to finish the process of flattening -the enemy’s wire which the Male Tanks had -begun.</p> - -<p>All three types of Tank were capable of going across -country. That is to say they could, for example, follow -a pack of hounds anywhere, except perhaps in the Fens.</p> - -<p>Ditches, heavy plough, banks, walls, hedges, or fences -could all be negotiated.</p> - -<p>Tanks could also go over many obstacles—notably<span class="pagenum" id="Page_28">28</span> -over wire—where the Field, even were they willing -“to take a windmill in the harbour of the chase,” must -go round.</p> - -<p>But as a moment’s reflection will show, there must -remain in every country certain features which will -prove absolute barriers to the progress of Tanks.</p> - -<p>Chief among these are canals and deep rivers (unless -spanned by strong bridges), very steep railway cuttings, -railway embankments, marsh, or woods in which -the trees are too strong to be pushed over, and too -dense-set to be steered through.</p> - -<p>Besides these natural, or at least civilian, obstacles, -there will be inevitable military obstacles in any country -that has been fought over.</p> - -<p>For example, old half-blown-in trench systems make -ground “awkward,” and Tanks operate at extreme -disadvantage in country like that round Ypres, which -was by 1917 a continuous network of water-logged shell -and mine craters, with no original ground left at all.</p> - -<p>Again, by the close of hostilities the number of anti-Tank -devices employed by the Germans was very considerable. -They paid the new arm the compliment of -an intricate system of defence and counter-offence -which included concealed Tank traps made on the -model of elephant-pits, formidable double-traversed -trenches, a branch of special anti-Tank artillery, -heavily reinforced concrete stockades, and an elaborate -system of land mines.</p> - -<p>With so many obstacles to avoid or to negotiate, with -their fate often hanging upon a prompt and accurate -use of their guns, the crew inside the Tank were doomed -by the conditions under which they fought to an almost -incredibly limited view of the surrounding world.</p> - -<div id="ip_28" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 42em;"> - <img src="images/i_028a.jpg" width="663" height="565" alt="" /> - <div class="caption">GENERAL ARRANGEMENT OF MARK V. TANK—FRONT VIEW</div></div> - -<div id="ip_28b" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 63em;"> - <img src="images/i_028b.jpg" width="998" height="400" alt="" /> - <div class="caption">GENERAL ARRANGEMENT OF MARK V. TANK—SECTIONAL ELEVATION</div></div> - -<p>When the flaps were closed (see diagram showing<span class="pagenum" id="Page_29">29</span> -interior of a Mark V. Tank), as they had to be -directly the Tank came under close fire, the crew were -in almost complete darkness, and had to rely upon -their periscope or, alternatively, upon minute eye-holes -(about the size of the capital O’s used in this text) -bored through the armour-plating. If the fire was at -all heavy the periscope was usually quickly put out of -action, and the officer and gunners had only the extremely -limited view afforded by these holes.</p> - -<div id="ip_29" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 61em;"> - <img src="images/i_028c.jpg" width="969" height="611" alt="" /> - <div class="caption">GENERAL ARRANGEMENT OF MARK V. TANK—SECTIONAL PLAN</div></div> - -<div id="ip_29b" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 28em;"> - <img src="images/i_028d.jpg" width="442" height="302" alt="" /> - <div class="caption">DIAGRAM SHOWING HOW THE CATERPILLAR METHOD OF -TRACTION CARRIED OUT THE PRINCIPLE OF THE -“LARGE-WHEELED TRACTOR.” SEE <a href="#note44">NOTE</a> AT END OF CHAPTER II.</div></div> - -<p>They were thus almost entirely dependent upon their -maps, the special Tank compass, and upon the information -which a preliminary reconnaissance of the ground -had given them.</p> - -<p>This circumstance not only profoundly modified the -training of the officers and crews, but also necessitated -the organisation of what was almost a new service. -This service was the “Reconnaissance” branch of the -Intelligence. When the Tank Corps was ordered to -take part in an attack, the Reconnaissance Staff was -responsible for the preliminary survey of the proposed -battle site for a report as to where and how Tanks -could best operate, and finally for a series of detailed -maps and sketches. In these maps and sketches the -route of every individual Tank was set forth from -landmark to landmark, together with the assigned objectives -of each machine and the obstacles which it was -likely to encounter. These maps and sketches were -compiled from aerial surveys, captured German maps -and documents, information gained from local inhabitants, -accounts given by prisoners, the original Ordnance -survey, and from personal reconnaissance. By -1918 this system had been so developed that the -infantry came to rely almost entirely upon their accompanying -Tanks for direction.</p> - -<p>This added greatly to the importance and responsibility<span class="pagenum" id="Page_30">30</span> -of the work both of Tank Reconnaissance officers -and of commanders.</p> - -<h3>IV</h3> - -<p>Topographical information can only be adequately -conveyed to a more or less trained receiver, and it was -therefore found necessary to add an elementary course -on Reconnaissance to the already long list of subjects -in which the members of every Tank crew must train. -The crew were an assemblage of experts.</p> - -<p>An average of about a month was spent by every soldier -at the training depots and battle-practice grounds. -Here each man did about ten days’ course as a driver -or gunner, learned revolver-shooting, signalling, and -the management of carrier pigeons, and went through -a gas course. In view of the probability of casualties, -each man was also given a working knowledge of -every other man’s job. But most vital of all—the conditions -under which Tank crews fought being out of -the common trying and arduous—the scheme of training -aimed at creating a high sense of discipline; that -<i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">esprit de corps</i> and that tradition of valour which -teaches men to endure the unendurable.</p> - -<p>This supreme end it achieved, as a perusal of the Tank -Corps Honours List will show.</p> - -<p>Such, then, were the Tanks and their crews in the -autumn of 1918.</p> - -<p>In the pages which follow, the reader will see from -how crude an embryo the Tank sprang, and through -what hair-breadth escapes alike from official overlaying -and annihilation by the enemy, it passed in the four -years of which we are about to relate the history.</p> -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_31">31</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_II">CHAPTER II</h2> - -<p class="subhead">THE EARLIEST TANKS—GENERAL SWINTON—ADMIRAL -BACON—THE HOLT TRACTOR AND THE EVOLUTION -OF THE “LAND CRUISER”</p> -</div> - -<h3>I</h3> - -<p><span class="firstword">The</span> War had only been in progress for a few weeks -when the first idea of the first Tank was born almost -simultaneously in the minds of General E. D. Swinton, -Major Tulloch, Captain Hetherington and Mr. Diplock, -and—if we are to believe rumour and their own account -of the affair—of several hundreds of other gentlemen.</p> - -<p>“Born” is perhaps not quite the appropriate word. -At any rate it is to be understood, if not in a Pickwickian, -at least in a Pythagorean sense.</p> - -<p>For by 1914 the Tank had successively passed -through several tentative and inconclusive incarnations.</p> - -<p>In 1482 Leonardo da Vinci invented a kind of Tank;<a id="FNanchor_1" href="#Footnote_1" class="fnanchor">1</a> -a wooden “War Cart” was used by the Scottish in the -fifteenth century.<a id="FNanchor_2" href="#Footnote_2" class="fnanchor">2</a></p> - -<p>There were designs for a Tank for the Crimea, but -the project of this weapon was abandoned as being barbarous. -Lastly, a really practical design for a kind of -“Caterpillar” to be driven by steam was made in 1888.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_32">32</span> -A trial machine was even constructed. But Fate decreed -that all trace of design and model should be instantly -lost, only apparently to be rediscovered after -the modern Tank had been thought out afresh.</p> - -<p>Why, if the Tank was constantly being invented, did -it as constantly disappear? The reason appears to -have been that, like the early aeroplanes, all these abortive -machines had failed in one particular.</p> - -<p>The engine was not powerful enough. The steam -Tank had not in the least answered the riddle. The -horse-power could, it is true, be almost indefinitely -increased, but, like a kind of Old Man of the Sea, the -engine weight would have increased proportionately -and the “free” power have been no more.</p> - -<p>Indeed till the invention of the petrol engine the Tank -was doomed to be unpractical. Its three essentials—armour-plating, -guns, and ability to surmount obstacles -and traverse open country—demanded a large amount -of this “free” power.</p> - -<p>Only, therefore, when an engine was produced whose -proportion of power to weight was about 100 H.P. to -every ten hundredweight, did the Tank become a possible -and effective engine of war.</p> - -<p>Thus, till the time was ripe the Tank had been doomed -to enjoy very brief excursions into the actual, and to -sojourn, long forgotten, beyond the waters of Lethe.</p> - -<p>Does memory survive transmigration? Were General -Swinton and his co-inventors aware of the Crimea -Tank and the 1888 Tractor? In any case the matter -is not one of great importance, for—to put it briefly—ultimately -their Tank went, and the others did not.</p> - -<p>By October, 1914, Colonel Swinton and Captain -Tulloch had independently worked out the details of -an engine of war. Like the other early inventors, they<span class="pagenum" id="Page_33">33</span> -imagined a machine that was to “arise” out of a -cross between an armoured car and an agricultural -tractor. It was to be slower, more formidable and far -heavier than any armoured car that had yet been seen, -a kind of “Land Cruiser” capable of plodding on its -caterpillar feet across country right up to the enemy’s -gun positions. Like the other early “mobile machine-gun -destroyers,” it was to be strongly armed with guns -and machine-guns, and so heavily steel-plated as to be -impervious to shrapnel, H.-E. fragments and rifle bullets. -It was to cross trenches with ease, and was to be -capable either of cutting or of flattening the enemy’s -wire in the mere act of its progress.</p> - -<p>By November Colonel Swinton and Captain Tulloch -were in close touch with one another, and the child of -their fancy descended from the clear regions of pure -thought to battle its slow way forward amid the fogs -and thornbrakes of actual experiment and official -memoranda.</p> - -<p>Well-informed readers will perhaps wonder why the -present authors have singled out Captain Tulloch and -Colonel Swinton from amid “the press of knights.” -Do they intend to lay the laurel on their brows? To -declare that they alone invented the Tank?</p> - -<p>The chroniclers pretend to no such judicial powers. -Be theirs rather the genial rôle of the Dodo in <cite>Alice -in Wonderland</cite>, who at the end of the Caucus-race -allotted one of Alice’s comfits to each of the competitors.</p> - -<p>As far, however, as they can disentangle the complexities -of the evidence, it does appear to have been -through these two enthusiasts that the Tank idea first -took tangible shape. The notion was in the air, perhaps -it took unsubstantial form in other minds before<span class="pagenum" id="Page_34">34</span> -October, 1914,—it seems probable that it did in Mr. -Diplock’s and Mr. McFee’s, for example. Perhaps, too, -in other minds it was later to take clearer and more -practical shape.</p> - -<p>But it does seem to have been Colonel Swinton and -Captain Tulloch who, first of the band of pioneers, had -the courage and the practical energy to forward a somewhat -startling notion in official quarters.</p> - -<p>For Mr. Diplock’s first “Pedrail” machine, whose -plans he laid before Lord Kitchener and Mr. Winston -Churchill in November, 1914, was a Gun Tractor, not a -fighting machine. It was not till February 1915 that -Mr. Diplock (in conjunction with a Committee appointed -by Mr. Churchill) officially so much as contemplated -the building of a “Land Cruiser.”</p> - -<p>Fortunately one of the first of the Swinton memoranda -was submitted through Colonel Sir Maurice -Hankey, Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence, -who was an early and active friend to the idea -of the new arm.</p> - -<p>Difficulties, however, abounded. Many were actual, -some were imaginary.</p> - -<p>For example, it was urged that to design and build -such machines would take over a year. Surely the war -would be over!</p> - -<p>Then when the counsels of those kill-joys prevailed -who believed that the war would “hold,” and it was -decided to experiment with the “mobile machine-gun -destroyers,” various technical difficulties arose.</p> - -<p>It was difficult to procure some of the essentials without -elaborate manufacture and the making of special -tools, and makeshift parts were, therefore, substituted. -Fitted with these makeshifts, the Land Cruisers were -a disappointment.</p> - -<p>The first tests were carried out in February 1915,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_35">35</span> -when Captain Tulloch’s adaptation of the Holt Tractor -was given a trial. It did not prove a complete failure, -and much was learned from the experiment. For example, -the machine was unexpectedly effective in rolling -in the wire which it had been originally intended -that its automatic “lobster-claw” wire-cutters should -alone deal with.</p> - -<p>In June Admiral Bacon’s Forster-Daimler Tractor of -155 H.P., fitted with a self-bridging apparatus, was experimented -with.</p> - -<p>This, too, proved disappointing, in so far as the device -was to fulfil the proposed functions of a Land Cruiser. -It refused to cross trenches, though it proved a practical -Tractor, and it was later used in “trams” of eight -machines for the transport of 15-in. guns.</p> - -<p>The position, therefore, in June 1915, as far as the -War Office was concerned, was as follows: Proposals -had been put forward by Colonel Swinton, Admiral -Bacon, and Captain Tulloch, and submitted to the War -Office; certain trials had been made, the result of which -was, in the view of the authorities, to emphasise the -engineering and other difficulties. It was only in June -that the War Office ascertained that investigations on -similar lines were being carried out by the Admiralty.</p> - -<p>For the Admiralty, with a large land force at its -disposal, had been for some time casting about for -means whereby the men of that force might go into -battle more in Navy fashion, that is (to misquote the -“heroic Spanish gunners”) with something better than -serge, “joined to their own invincible courage,” between -them and the enemy’s bullets.</p> - -<p>Mr. Churchill had, as early as January 1915, written -a letter to the Prime Minister expressing his entire<span class="pagenum" id="Page_36">36</span> -agreement with Colonel Hankey’s remarks “on the subject -of special mechanical devices for taking trenches.”</p> - -<p>The idea of employing a large armoured shield on -wheels, or of using ordinary steam tractors on which a -small bullet-proof shelter had been fitted, had been considered. -Mr. Churchill interested himself personally in -the scheme, and he and his expert, Major Hetherington -of the R.N.A.S.—the third independent inventor—worked -hard to evolve and then “push” a practical -machine.</p> - -<p>In the early spring of 1915 a Committee, called the -Land Ship Committee, was appointed,<a id="FNanchor_3" href="#Footnote_3" class="fnanchor">3</a> and many designs -of wheel and caterpillar tractors were submitted -to it. One of these designs was especially interesting -not only for its astonishing appearance, but for the influence -which it exerted upon the “profile” of the -future Tank. The curious will find a brief account of -it in the <a href="#note44">Note</a> at the end of the chapter. It was Mr. -Churchill’s Committee who called in Major Wilson, Mr. -Tritton, and Mr. Tennyson d’Eyncourt as consultants, -“when a design was evolved which embodied the form -finally adopted for Tanks.”</p> - -<p>Thus, while the honour of the first designs and experiments -belongs to the War Office, it was to the enterprise -of this Admiralty Committee that most of the -credit of the evolution of the Mark I. Tank was due.</p> - -<p>It was, as we have said, apparently not until the -Admiralty Committee had been at work for some time -that the Director of Fortifications and Works, on behalf -of the War Office, ascertained that the Admiralty -had designs for a “Land Cruiser” in hand.</p> - -<p>The two Departments met at Wormwood Scrubs to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_37">37</span> -witness the Admiralty’s trials of a Killen-Straight -tractor. It was a remarkable occasion, for a number of -men who were destined profoundly to influence the history -of the Tanks now saw a foreshadowing of such an -engine for the first time.</p> - -<p>Among them were Lord Kitchener, Mr. Lloyd George, -Mr. Balfour, and Mr. McKenna. Mr. Winston Churchill -was also there, but to him an armoured tractor was no -novelty.</p> - -<p>After this gathering the Tank enthusiasts of the two -Departments fell upon each other’s necks, swore eternal -friendship, and in the middle of June formed a Joint -Committee, of which Lieutenant Stern was Secretary.</p> - -<p>Tanks—when any existed which would work—were -to be a military service in the Department of the -Master-General of Ordnance.</p> - -<p>The Admiralty was to continue its work of designing, -was to provide cash for experiments, and Mr. Churchill, -its late First Lord, was to continue his invaluable work -as a propellant. All seemed prosperous, for the representatives -of the two Services appear to have worked -pretty harmoniously, and the better informed and more -progressive heads of Departments on both sides showed -an interested benevolence.</p> - -<p>But unfortunately—especially at the War Office—there -appear to have been a certain number of obstructionists.</p> - -<p>One senior Officer, fearing, one supposes, to be diverted -from his ideal of the official attitude by the sight -of these ungodly engines, refused so much as to attend -the trials. The Adjutant-General (then no doubt, poor -man, sufficiently harassed) rigidly refused a single man -for the new arm. Fortunately, the Joint Committee was -resourceful, and, after a preliminary appeal to Mrs.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_38">38</span> -Pankhurst for militant suffragists,<a id="FNanchor_4" href="#Footnote_4" class="fnanchor">4</a> they induced the -Admiralty to turn over to them the 20th Squadron of -the Armoured Car Reserve, and to increase the strength -of this unit from 50 to 600 men.</p> - -<p>By July Colonel Swinton—another of the Tank’s -best sources of power—had returned to France. G.H.Q. -was later to be more propitious, but now the taste of -those inconclusive experiments was still in its mouth, -and their chief technical adviser had begun to have -horrid doubts about the whole affair. “Caterpillars,” -he remarked, that he had lately seen “could only go at -the rate of 1½ miles an hour on roads, were very slow -in turning, and nearly every bridge in the country -would require strengthening to carry them.” “It was -necessary to descend from the realms of imagination -to solid fact.”</p> - -<p>Colonel Swinton explained and exhorted and expostulated.</p> - -<h3>II</h3> - -<p>Meanwhile the Joint War Office and Admiralty Committee -system was too simple to last.</p> - -<p>From August 1915 to August 1917, when the “New” -Tank Committee was formed, the control and administration -of Tank manufacture and design were extraordinarily -tentative and shifting. Necessarily so. The -home organisation had to expand very rapidly, and constantly -to adapt itself to changed conditions of Tank -tactics abroad and Tank manufacture at home.</p> - -<p>Even the multiplicity of the authorities concerned -seems to have been to a great extent inevitable. The -Tank had, of course, initially complicated its early history<span class="pagenum" id="Page_39">39</span> -by starting life in Infantry puttees and a south-wester.</p> - -<p>At the point we have reached, its story plunges into a -whirling quicksand of departments, branches, committees, -and conferences, which were reorganised and rearranged—changed -hats and functions with bewildering -frequency. This tangle of activity Colonel Swinton -throughout made it his hobby to understand and his -business to co-ordinate.</p> - -<p>The present historians, on the contrary, feel tempted -to adopt the simple method of their Hebrew predecessor, -who, having picked out one plum, so often blandly -continues: “And the rest of the acts of the Trench -Warfare Department and all that they did, are they -not written in the book of the archives of the War -Office?”</p> - -<p>However, it is possible that the Hebrew historian -honestly believed that the lost books of the Chronicles -were really available to the inquiring reader. The -present authors have no such illusion about War Office -papers, and therefore propose to give at least an outline -of the vicissitudes and fluctuations of early Tank control.</p> - -<p>The chief persons of the Drama remain throughout:</p> - -<p><i>The War Office</i>: (1) In its capacity as Ordnance, and -(2) in its capacity as General Staff. Later (3) as the -Tank Department, War Office.</p> - -<p><i>G.H.Q.</i>: (1) In its main capacity, and as (2) The -Experiments Committee.</p> - -<p>Later, the <i>H.B.M.G.C.</i></p> - -<p>Finally, the Tank Corps.</p> - -<p><i>The Admiralty</i>: (1) In its capacity as the Land Ship -Committee, and (2) as Squadron 20 of the R.N.A.S.</p> - -<p><i>The Ministry of Munitions</i>: (1) In its capacity as the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_40">40</span> -Trench Warfare Department; (2) in its capacity as the -Inventions Department. (3) Later, as the Mechanical -Warfare Supply Department (really another Tank -Committee). (4) Later still, as the Tank Supply Department.</p> - -<p><i>The successive Main Tank Committees</i>: (1) The Joint -Naval and Military Committee (which did not survive -Act I.). (2) The Tank Supply Committee, afterwards -called the Advisory Committee of the Tank Supply -Department, and divided into a main committee and a -sub-committee. (It was this sub-committee which afterwards -formed the backbone of the very active and -occasionally criticised M.W.S.D., before referred to). -Later, (3) after a gap, the First Tank Committee; -(4) the Second reconstructed Tank Committee.</p> - -<p><i>Grand Chorus of Directors General, Interdepartmental -Conferences, Manufacturers, and Workshop -Personnel.</i></p> - -<h3>III</h3> - -<p>We find that the period from August 1915 to February -1916 constitutes a kind of Act I. in the history -of Tank administration and manufacture, for the 1914 -and early 1915 period is too dim and legendary to serve -as anything but prologue.</p> - -<p>During the whole of the Act I. period it was the -Admiralty and the Joint Land Ship Committee which -played the “leads.”</p> - -<p>It was the Admiralty which defrayed the whole cost -of the extensive experimental work and provided the -necessary personnel, and it was by members of the -Joint Committee in consultation that the Mark I. Tank, -“Mother,” was ultimately designed.</p> - -<p>On September 11, two months after Colonel Swinton’s<span class="pagenum" id="Page_41">41</span> -visit, the Experiments Committee, G.H.Q., laid -down in an excellent and far-sighted memorandum -what were the qualities which they desired should be -aimed at in designs for the caterpillar cruiser and what -were the tactical purposes which it must serve.</p> - -<p>By September 28 the Joint Committee had so far perfected -the design of “Mother” as to have had a wooden -dummy (officially described as a “mock-up”) made, -and on that day her counterfeit was inspected at -Wembley by an Interdepartmental Conference, and approved.</p> - -<p>Some weeks elapsed while the Joint Committee -worked out the further details of their machine, and -about December 3 Mr. Churchill wrote a Memorandum -entitled “Variants of the Offensive,” in which he paradoxically -accentuated the value of defensive armour as -a preservative of mobility. There was to be a new -form of attack. It was to be launched at night under -the guidance of searchlights. Caterpillar Tractors -were to breach the enemy’s line, and then turn right -and left. The Infantry were to follow them closely -under cover of bullet-proof shields.</p> - -<p>On Christmas Day Sir Douglas Haig (who had lately -taken over from Sir John French, and who as yet -“knew not Joseph”) read the paper with interest, and -pinned a pencil slip upon it, “Is anything known about -the Caterpillar referred to in para. 4, page 3?”</p> - -<p>No time was lost in finding out, and a few days later -G.H.Q. sent an officer to England to inquire into the -matter. This officer was Lieutenant-Colonel Hugh -Elles, who was afterwards to be the first Tank General.</p> - -<p>By the end of January 1916 the experimental machine—no -pasteboard simulation, but “Mother” herself—was -complete, and on February 2 the official trial was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_42">42</span> -held at Hatfield, before the Army Council and a representative -of G.H.Q.</p> - -<p>“Mother” made good, and G.H.Q. asked to be supplied -with a certain number of the Land Cruisers. A -small Executive Tank Supply Committee with much -fuller powers than the old Joint Committee, was formed -under the Presidency of Lieutenant (now Colonel Sir -Albert) Stern, and orders were at once given to begin -manufacture.</p> - -<p>So ended Act I.</p> - -<h3>IV</h3> - -<p>The first scene of Act II. (March to mid-August) -was occupied with one of the most dramatic achievements -of the War.</p> - -<p>This was the manufacture at Lincoln of the first 150 -“Land Ships” ordered by the Government, in the space -of six months, and in absolute secrecy.</p> - -<p>The public discussed the phantom Russians who travelled -through England by night. It discussed the Germans -who nightly signalled to each other throughout -the inland counties. But it did not discuss the large -water-tanks or cisterns that were being made for Petrograd, -Egypt, or Mesopotamia, or some such place.</p> - -<p>That this vital secrecy was kept for months by hundreds -of people was chiefly due to the happy effect of -copious and imaginative lying.</p> - -<p>There was no mystery about these grotesque armour-plated -creatures! They were not really for Mesopotamia -at all. Every one knew that.</p> - -<p>The Russian Government had ordered them. They -were ridiculous things? Of course they were. It was -a Russian design. Was there not even an inscription -in Russian characters on them? At least they might<span class="pagenum" id="Page_43">43</span> -frighten the Germans if they served no other useful -purpose.</p> - -<p>Tradition relates that when the first drawings were -brought to the manager’s office of the factory which had -been selected for the manufacture of the “water-carriers,” -the manager and his staff expressed themselves -as being seriously concerned for the sanity of -the designers, and of those who submitted such drawings -to practical men like themselves.</p> - -<p>They were, however, let into the secret of the real -part which Tanks were to play, and though still profoundly -incredulous, decided, like good citizens, to carry -out whatever work was asked of them. The vital necessity -of secrecy having been impressed upon them, they -were asked—tradition continues—what arrangements -they would like made about sentries and the isolation -of their workpeople. After a little consideration they -answered that they would only guarantee that the -secret should be kept on condition that they were given -a completely free hand and not interfered with.</p> - -<p>They proposed to have no sentries, no “isolated -area” to proclaim trumpet-tongued, “Here is a -secret!”</p> - -<p>They desired merely to propound a satisfactory system -of lies, to give an “alternative explanation”—to -put it more delicately—and to carry out their work -with a disarming publicity.</p> - -<p>After some hesitation the authorities consented to -this strange system. We shall see how, on September -15, “wisdom was justified of her children.”</p> - -<p>The factory where these curious interviews are reported -to have taken place was that of Messrs. Forsters, -Agricultural Implement Manufacturers of Lincoln. -We almost literally beat our ploughshares into swords.</p> - -<p>In London, changes in Tank administration were<span class="pagenum" id="Page_44">44</span> -going on as usual. The trend as far as supply and -manufacture were concerned was towards centralisation.</p> - -<p>A Tank Supply Department was created at the Ministry -of Munitions, and the Tank Supply Committee -changed its name to “Advisory Committee of the Tank -Supply Department.” In August this Committee—gradually, -as it were—turned into the Mechanical Warfare -Supply Department before alluded to. Lieutenant -(by now Colonel Stern was at its head.)</p> - -<p>In the M.W.S.D. were now concentrated three separate -functions:</p> - -<p>They were Tank designers; they were responsible for -supply; they were responsible for the final inspection -of machines. The future was to show that such concentration -had some drawbacks as well as many obvious -advantages.</p> - -<p id="note44"><i>Note.</i>—The genesis of the “large-wheeled tractor” -was as follows: Trenches with a parados and parapet -about 4 ft. high were being constructed by the enemy -in Flanders.</p> - -<p>The engineers consulted by the Land Ship Committee -gave it as their considered opinion that if these obstacles -were to be crossed, a wheel of not less than 15 ft. -diameter would be necessary.</p> - -<p>Machines with these gigantic wheels were actually -ordered, but the wooden model that was knocked together -as a preliminary at once convinced even its best -friends that the design was fantastic, and that any -machine of the kind would be little better than useless -on account of its conspicuousness and vulnerability.</p> - -<p>However, the “big wheel” idea did not utterly die, -for in the upturned snout of the Mark I. Tank we have,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_45">45</span> -as it were, its “toe” preserved, the track turning -sharply back at about axle level, instead of mounting -uselessly skyward, as would have been the case had not -the old wheel idea been supplanted by that of the sliding -track.</p> -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_46">46</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_III">CHAPTER III</h2> - -<p class="subhead">THE TANK CORPS IN EMBRYO</p> -</div> - -<h3 class="larger"><span class="smcap">Part I</span></h3> - -<h3>I</h3> - -<p><span class="firstword">Not</span> till Act III. do we get the opening of the main -plot of our drama. For it was only at the end of -March, 1916 that recruiting for the new arm began, -and therefore that “The Fighting Side” first appeared.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_5" href="#Footnote_5" class="fnanchor">5</a>“At the end of March certain officer cadets with -engineering experience and drawn from the 18th, 19th, -and 21st Royal Fusiliers, were asked to volunteer their -services for what they were given to understand was an -experimental armoured car unit. (The Armoured Car -Section of the Motor Machine Gun Corps.)</p> - -<p>“Those who decided to throw in their lot with the -new Service were interviewed by Colonel Swinton and -Colonel Bradley, who, in the course of their examination, -threw out no hints as to further details relative -to the new unit. Results of these interviews were communicated -on the Thursday before Easter Friday, when -successful volunteers were informed that they were to -be granted temporary commissions in the M.M.G.C., -and were despatched the same morning to report to the -M.M.G.C. Headquarters at Bisley. Upon arrival further -information was received from the Adjutant that -short leave would be granted for the purpose of obtaining -kit, and that all officers would report their return -with kit, on the following Tuesday evening.</p> - -<p>“During the week that followed Easter the two first -selected Companies, <i>i.e.</i>, ‘K’ and ‘L,’ were formed, -officers being posted to one or other of the Companies.”</p></div> - -<p>Specially selected officers and men of the original<span class="pagenum" id="Page_47">47</span> -M.M.G.C. formed the nucleus of these Companies, and -the Companies were formed into a Battalion as further -reinforcements arrived. On the Monday after Easter -Bank Holiday training began, instructions being given -in the use of the Vickers and Hotchkiss .303 Machine -Guns and later in the Hotchkiss 6-pounder Naval -gun.</p> - -<p>An officer who arrived in about the second batch tells -how he and another man from the same regiment were -sent down to Bisley after the usual brief but formidable -interview with Colonel Swinton. They arrived at -Brookwood Station only to be told that the ever mysterious -Motor Machine Gun Corps had left two days -before for Siberia.</p> - -<p>Tableau!</p> - -<p>“Siberia” proved, however, to be a camp not so far -from Bisley as to be beyond the radius of the station -cab in which they both presently set off.</p> - -<p>No Tanks were, of course, yet available for training, -and therefore instruction was concentrated upon the -use of the three guns, “each officer, N.C.O. and man -being required to pass out at the examination.”</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_6" href="#Footnote_6" class="fnanchor">6</a>“With the above exception, physical drill and an -occasional route march, no further training of military -character was imposed; thus in the early summer of -1916 practically all the personnel of the new branch -of the service were efficient in the manipulation of the -three guns in question. During the whole of the foregoing -period no further information other than widely -different rumours could be obtained by the junior personnel -of the Unit as to the purposes for which they, -or the experimental armoured car, would be used.”</p></div> - -<p>About June it became increasingly evident that if the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_48">48</span> -Land Cruisers were to be fought that year, production -must be accelerated.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“A very limited number of officers, N.C.O.’s and men, -totalling about one dozen, were despatched to Lincoln -and other centres, where they were employed in connection -with what they later understood to be Tank production.”</p></div> - -<p>Meanwhile, a very carefully chosen and elaborately -prepared training area had been organised on Lord -Iveagh’s estate near Thetford, and as soon as information -came that the first machines would soon be available -for training, the Battalion was again moved.</p> - -<p>This time the still mystified companies found themselves -in a camp more ringed about than was the palace -of the Sleeping Beauty, and more zealously guarded -than the Paradise of a Shah. Three rows of plantations -and shelter belts guarded them from the eyes of -the profane, and the intruder or the breaker of camp -must pass six lines of sentries assisted by cavalry -patrols.</p> - -<p>A highroad which ran through the training ground -was closed, and all inhabited farms within the area -were evacuated. No civilians were allowed under any -pretext to pass the guard, nor were troops allowed to -leave the area except on production of special passes -which were very difficult to get.</p> - -<p>Once an aeroplane from a neighbouring aerodrome -flew over, moved by a friendly spirit of inquiry. It was -immediately greeted with a hail of machine-gun bullets -and was obliged to depart in some haste.</p> - -<p>For now the Tanks had to appear in their true character -as fighting machines, and needed a better screen<span class="pagenum" id="Page_49">49</span> -than Russian Fairy Tales. The machines had been long -expected. Almost daily some one in the camp had -“heard” an unfamiliar engine throb, and when this -happened the entire camp would rush out to see if -“they” had come.</p> - -<p>The wildest rumours were afoot.</p> - -<p>The car could climb trees! It could swim! It could -jump like a flea!</p> - -<p>Any one who has lived in an ordinary camp where -there were no secrets and remembers what rumours -flourished on the most ethereal food, can imagine their -growth in a camp where there was a real mystery.</p> - -<p>But at last, towards the beginning of June, a limited -number of Mark I. machines were detrained at a special -railhead within the area.<a id="FNanchor_7" href="#Footnote_7" class="fnanchor">7</a> The training of the Battalion -now began in earnest. Machines and men were -destined to be launched in little over six weeks’ time -into the then newly begun Somme offensive.</p> - -<p>Two types of Tank were detrained, “Big Willie” and -“Little Willie.” The Mark I. (Big Willie) was very -different from the Mark V. machine described in -Chapter I.</p> - -<p>It took four men to drive it. It had an unwieldly -two-wheeled tail, or to give this appendage its official -name, a “Hydraulic Stabiliser.” By this device it -could let itself down gently over a drop of over 5 ft., -and partly with the aid of it, the machine was steered.</p> - -<p>In practice, compared with the handy Mark V., the -whole steering arrangement of the Mark I. was extraordinarily -clumsy and laborious. She would not turn -sharply at all on rough ground, and had to be coaxed -to any change of direction. Her engine and tracks also<span class="pagenum" id="Page_50">50</span> -needed constant adjustment, the rollers being an everlasting -source of trouble. Drivers and mechanics who -have handled both machines, seem to regard the running -of a Mark V. as child’s-play after struggling with -the caprices of “Mother.”</p> - -<p>“Little Willie” was used only as a training Tank, -as in practice he was found to have a defective balance. -His centre of gravity was misplaced, and he was, besides, -too short for the work of crossing trenches.</p> - -<h3>II</h3> - -<p>But there were other than technical problems awaiting -solution.</p> - -<p>It would be difficult to over-estimate the difficulties -which confronted those officers who were responsible for -the preliminary training of the Heavy Section of the -Machine Gun Corps; no one had ever actually fought -inside a Tank, and it was, therefore, upon the spirit of -prophecy alone that they must rely in their preparations. -There was no manual to help them. They had, -however, one very excellent official document, the secret -<cite>Notes on the Employment of Tanks</cite>, which was issued -in February 1916 (signed “E. D. S.”<a id="FNanchor_8" href="#Footnote_8" class="fnanchor">8</a>), which gave -an extraordinarily good forecast of what the rôle of -Tanks would probably be when in action.</p> - -<p>But the paper was very short and very objective, and -was more concerned with an analysis of the place of -the Tanks in the orchestra of battle than with the difficulties -presented by their individual score.</p> - -<p>This was where the training of the first Tank crew -fell short—almost inevitably. Their teachers had a -rather hazy mental picture of the actuality of battle. -They did not squarely face the essential question upon<span class="pagenum" id="Page_51">51</span> -whose answer all specific training and all specific -preparation depend, the question, that is, “What is it -going to be like?”</p> - -<p>Thus, though they did teach most of the essentials, -they left out half a dozen subjects of which an accurate -knowledge was, as we shall see, ever afterwards held -to be absolutely necessary.</p> - -<p>One of their difficulties was the shortness of the -time. What must the crews know? Would physical fitness -or map reading prove more important when the -day came? Signalling or <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">esprit de corps</i>? Visual -training or revolver drill? There was no time for -everything. There were, however, obviously three or -four essentials. Most of the officers and men were already -first-rate engineers or mechanics, but they must -be trained exactly in the strange machine they were to -use. They must understand the peculiarities of Tanks, -and, if possible, of their individual Tank, the monster -which they had to render animate.</p> - -<p>They must be thoroughly at home with their Vickers -guns, be accurate shots with them, be able to remedy -all stoppages, and to strip their weapons with speed and -accuracy. Above all, crews must train together, be accustomed -to work under their officer, each with his special -work as brakeman, gearsman, driver or gunner, but -each still part of an organic whole. They must also -attain to a certain physical level, must undergo some -visual training, and must know how to fire a revolver.</p> - -<p>All this and more was achieved, for the men were -picked individuals of more than ordinary intelligence, -and soon became extraordinarily keen on their work.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_9" href="#Footnote_9" class="fnanchor">9</a>“If anything went wrong with the Tank, they used -to look upon it not as a bore but as a pleasure to put it<span class="pagenum" id="Page_52">52</span> -right.... We felt a terrific pride in our Company -and Section, and also as a Tank crew against other -crews. There was always healthy competition, and this -competition carried us right out to France.... -Besides that, Tank Commanders had the very great -advantage of training their crews themselves.... -We knew our men thoroughly.”</p></div> - -<p>But, as another Tank Commander wrote afterwards:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“The first Company to go out had to work at tremendous -speed. The Tanks did not arrive till the last -minute, and I and my crew did not have a Tank of our -own the whole time we were in England ... as our -Tank went wrong the day it arrived.... Again we -had no reconnaissance or map reading ... no practices -or lectures on the compass.... We had no signalling -... and no practice in considering orders. -This was a thing I very much missed when I got out -to France. When you work with a Division you get -very long orders, and you have to analyse these orders -to discover what concerns you and what does not.... -We had no knowledge of where to look for information -that would be necessary for us as Tank Commanders, -nor did we know what information we should -be likely to require.”</p></div> - -<p>No one, in short, had sat down to imagine a Tank -in action from within.</p> - -<p>We had official painters in France, but alas! we had -no official writers of prophetic fiction.</p> - -<p>The history of the attack on Morval shows that this -probably inevitable lack of, say, an official clairvoyant, -this dependence upon methods of trial and error, though -it ultimately did little to hurt the development of -Tanks, did very much to prevent the Tank personnel -from feeling satisfied by their début.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_53">53</span></p> - -<h3 class="larger"><span class="smcap">Part II</span></h3> - -<h3>I</h3> - -<p>It must have been with some sense of having taken a -momentous step that the authorities sanctioned the -manufacture of 150 Tanks after witnessing the trials at -Hatfield.</p> - -<p>We were short of men and short of steel, and to divert -steel from shells and men from the infantry was a grave -decision. Our rulers were for a moment, perhaps, -granted the gift of prevision. They saw that the new -weapon might prove the sword that was ultimately to -tip the level balance, and to break the intolerable equilibrium -which had settled on the line from the Alps to -the sea.</p> - -<p>This prophetic mood did fitfully visit the authorities.</p> - -<p>For a few months they would, as it were, have faith, -and personnel would be granted and machines would be -ordered.</p> - -<p>Then perhaps for half a precious year they would -relapse and backslide and revert, till Colonel Swinton, -the Fighting Side, and all the other missionaries and -preachers of the Tank Corps almost despaired.</p> - -<p>But in February 1916 there was much to uphold -them. The situation demanded some desperate remedy.</p> - -<p>The balance hung deadly level. We could hold the -Germans <em>now</em>, but for how long? The race for the coast -had been a draw, and the First Battle of Ypres had -ended open warfare on the Western Front.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_10" href="#Footnote_10" class="fnanchor">10</a>“Quick-firing field guns and the machine-guns used -defensively, proved too strong for the endurance of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_54">54</span> -attackers, who were forced to seek safety by means of -their spades rather than through their rifles. Whole -fronts were entrenched, and, except for a few small -breaks, a man could have walked by trench, had he -wished to, from Nieuport almost into Switzerland.”</p></div> - -<p>The Germans were dug in.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_11" href="#Footnote_11" class="fnanchor">11</a>“And with the trench came wire entanglements—the -horror of the attack—and the trinity of trench, -machine-gun, and wire made the defence so strong that -each offensive operation was brought to a standstill.</p> - -<p>“The problem which then confronted us was a two-fold -one:</p> - -<p>“Firstly, how could the soldier in the attack be protected -against shrapnel, shell-splinters and bullets? -Helmets were reintroduced, armour was tried, shields -were invented, but all to no great purpose.</p> - -<p>“Secondly, even if bullet-proof armour could be -invented, which it certainly could, how were men laden -down with it going to get through the wire entanglements -which protected every position?”</p></div> - -<p>It was, in fact, impossible for infantry alone to attack -such positions without the most extensive artillery -preparation. The enemy and his trenches and his wire -must be blown out of the ground. This was the accepted -answer to the problem of the deadlock. But as yet we -had not got the shells. We were straining every nerve -to reach the solution by bombardment, but in February -1916 we had not got the necessary ammunition. Was -there no other answer to the problem? Nothing that -could be done meanwhile?</p> - -<p>This was the mood in which the missionaries of the -“mobile machine-gun destroyer” found the High Command. -Had we had shells in February 1916 we should -not have had the Tank. We must have waited another<span class="pagenum" id="Page_55">55</span> -year for it, till, in fact, we had found out the defects -of the hoped-for solution by bombardment.</p> - -<p>The German, who was full fed with ammunition, felt -at this early date no urging to go out and seek any such -fantastic remedy. His High Command would have -laughed at the idea of Tanks as Dives may have laughed -at hungry Lazarus’ antics over broken victuals.</p> - -<h3>II</h3> - -<p>So, while our shells were making, we built Tanks. -And Fate, whose taste in humour is not ours, and who -knew what we did not, namely, that the Tank and prolonged -artillery preparation are alternative weapons, -decreed that both shells and Tanks should be ready for -the Somme offensive.</p> - -<p>It was thus upon a “substructure” of the new artillery -preparation that we gaily imposed the Tank. We -were to take fourteen months in working out the proposition -that they could never be effectively used together.</p> - -<p>The Tanks had been designed for the sort of conditions -which had prevailed at Loos. Their training -grounds had been carefully modelled on the “Loos” -pattern. By the time Tanks could be put into the field, -a year later, our artillery superiority had completely -changed the nature of the fighting.</p> - -<p>At Beaumont-Hamel in November 1916, for example, -we fired off as much ammunition as was expended -in three weeks at the Battle of Loos.</p> - -<p>On the Somme—owing to our having advanced—four -miles of churned-up, shell-pitted ground had to be -crossed before the front line could be reached. It had -also—to state the case after the manner of the author of -<cite>Erewhon</cite>—become the fashion, just before the day of -battle, for the attacking side to blast the ground which<span class="pagenum" id="Page_56">56</span> -they were about to cross to the condition of plum pudding -on stir-up Sunday. This blasting process, moreover, -necessarily gave the enemy several days’ warning -of any proposed attack.</p> - -<p>It had also incidentally had another effect upon the -industrious German. When we were bombarded our -chief idea was retaliation; when the German was shelled -he dug.</p> - -<p>So it had come about that on the Somme, everywhere -behind the German lines, were great electrically-lit and -comfortably warmed dug-outs, where a company or so -could lie secure thirty or forty feet below ground and -there wait for the bombardment to “blow over.” Then -they would emerge ready to welcome our infantry. -Thus the system of the, say, six days’ artillery preparation, -though it did very much to raise our <em>moral</em> and -depress that of the enemy in time resulted in an almost -complete system of enemy counter-measures, and in a -state of the battle-ground which caused attackers and -attacked to be almost immobile. The system, necessary -as had been our adoption of it, had not solved the problem -of the deadlock.</p> - -<p>The Tank, as we have said, had been intended for use -on reasonably sound ground. It was also to be a surprise -weapon. Not once for the next fourteen months -did we omit to give the enemy at least five days’ notice -of our proposed attacks, nor did we decline to co-operate -with his artillery in reducing the intended battle-ground -to a morass. It was, therefore, not till the First Battle -of Cambrai, when we did adopt other tactics, that Tanks -came by their own.</p> -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_57">57</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_IV">CHAPTER IV</h2> - -<p class="subhead">THE FIRST TANK BATTLES—THE ATTACK ON MORVAL, -FLERS, THE QUADRILATERAL, THIEPVAL AND -BEAUMONT-HAMEL</p> -</div> - -<h3>I</h3> - -<p><span class="firstword">It</span> was not till the Somme offensive, which was -launched on July 1, 1916, had been in progress for two -months and a half, that it was found possible for the -new arm to take its place in the fighting. We have -seen how, secretly, urgently, behind a rich curtain of -ingenious and circumstantial lies, the manufacture of -the Tanks had been going on. How, secretly, urgently, -the crews had been training for their unknown job.</p> - -<p>Of the fifty Tanks which were destined to take part -in the battle of September 15, about thirteen left England -on August 15, and the rest followed at intervals -and in driblets as the limited transport allowed. The -last batch arrived on August 30 and, like its fellows, -proceeded to the training centre at Yvrench. Here -trenches had been dug and wire entanglements erected, -and machine-gun and 6-pounder practice could be carried -out after a fashion. But there was no staff of instructors, -the ranges were too short, and the conditions -for battle practice quite unlike those which prevailed -on the Somme. But it had to suffice. The Tanks were -wanted at once, and by September 10 “C” and “D” -Companies had arrived in the forward area, their H.Q. -being established at the Loop. It was thus within a -week of their arrival forward that Tanks were called -upon to take part in the attack.</p> - -<p>The battle had now been in progress for nearly ten<span class="pagenum" id="Page_58">58</span> -weeks. We had advanced and occupied a depth of four -miles of devastated country.</p> - -<p>Most of the men and many of the officers had not -been to France before. They found themselves in a -strange world. Endless lines of transport crawled over -incredibly bad roads bordered by gaunt stumps of trees -and by a sordid and tragic litter of dead men and horses, -rags, tin cans, rotting equipment, and derelict transport.</p> - -<p>The enemy was counter-attacking over the whole of -the thirty-mile front, and the sound of our guns was -everywhere. At night the stream of lorries never ceased, -and at some point or other in our line, far away, a star -shell could always be seen sailing up from behind a rise -of ground, giving some fringe of shattered wood, or -ruined sugar factory, a fleeting silhouette against its -cold white light.</p> - -<p>All ranks were desperately busy, from the mechanics -who had new spare engine parts to adjust, to those in -command who had their own minds and those of several -Major-Generals to make up. Colonel Brough had commanded -when the Tanks disembarked, but had now -handed over to Colonel Bradley, and he and the Army -Corps, and Divisional Commanders with whom he conferred -on the 13th seem, perhaps inevitably, to have -been as uncertain how to wield the new weapon as were -the Tank Commanders of such details as how to fit -their new camouflage covers or anti-bombing nets.</p> - -<p>In an advance when ought a Tank to start? If it -started too soon it would draw the enemy barrage; if -it started too late the infantry would reach the first -objective before it, and it would be of no use.</p> - -<p>This and other similar dilemmas darkened their counsels, -and it was finally decided that the Tanks’ start<span class="pagenum" id="Page_59">59</span> -should be so timed that they reached the first objective -five minutes before the infantry, and, further that Tanks -should be used in twos and threes against strong points. -No special or detailed reconnaissance work had been -done, and a somewhat indigestible mass of aerial photographs -was presented by the Divisional Staff to the bewildered -Tank Commanders, many of whom had never -seen such things before.<a id="FNanchor_12" href="#Footnote_12" class="fnanchor">12</a></p> - -<p>Much more useful were a series of maps with routes -marked out and annotated with the necessary compass -bearings, and a detailed time-table with full barrage -and other particulars. At least they would have been -more useful had not all orders been changed in such a -way at the last moment as to invalidate almost every -route and hour which they showed.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the Tank crews and commanders had been -enjoying three or four days of almost comically complete -nightmare. In the first place, they had all manner -of mechanical preoccupations—newly arrived spare engine -parts to test, new guns to adjust, box respirators -to struggle with, and an astounding amount of “battle -luggage” to stow away. But worst of all, they found -themselves regarded as the star variety-turn of the -Western Front.</p> - -<p>Already, before leaving Thetford, they had given a -demonstration before the King and several members of -the Cabinet. At Yvrench they had performed before -General Joffre, Sir Douglas Haig, and the greater part -of the G.H.Q. Staffs,<a id="FNanchor_13" href="#Footnote_13" class="fnanchor">13</a> but on reaching the Loop they<span class="pagenum" id="Page_60">60</span> -found to their horror that it was to be “Roses, roses, -all the way.” A Tank Commander wrote bitterly:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“It rather reminded me of Hampstead Heath. When -we got there we found that the Infantry Brigades had -been notified that the Tanks were to perform daily from -9 to 10 and from 2 to 3, and every officer within a large -radius and an enormous number of the Staff came to -inspect us. We were an object of interest to every one. -This did not help on one’s work.”</p></div> - -<p>On the 13th they were to move the Loop to the point -of assembly, and the problems of “housekeeping” became -acute.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_14" href="#Footnote_14" class="fnanchor">14</a>“The officer and each man carried two gas helmets -and one pair of goggles, and in addition to their ordinary -service caps, a leather ‘anti-bruise’ helmet; we -also had a large field dressing as well as an ordinary -first-aid dressing. The usual equipment consisted of -revolver, haversack, water-bottles and iron rations. -There are eight people in a Tank, and as soon as they -get in they naturally take off all these things, which lie -about on the floor, unless you devise some method of -packing all your equipment.... We carried, in addition -to iron rations, sixteen loaves and about thirty -tins of food, cheese, tea, sugar and milk. These took -up a lot of room. We also had one spare drum of -engine oil and one of gear oil, two small drums of grease, -three water-cans and two boxes of revolver ammunition -... four spare Vickers barrels, one spare Vickers -gun, a spare barrel for the Hotchkiss and two wire-cutters. -We also had three flags for signalling purposes, -which unfortunately proved to have been lost when they -were really wanted.”</p></div> - -<p>But Captain Henriques’ list was, even so, not complete. -Many Tanks also carried two carrier pigeons,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_61">61</span> -33,000 rounds of S.A. ammunition for their machine-guns, -a lamp-signalling set, and a telephonic contrivance -consisting of an instrument and one hundred yards of -cable wound upon a drum. The second instrument was -to be left at the “jumping-off place,” and the Tank was -to unwind the cable as it advanced, relating its experiences -the while to the telephone operator or other interested -person in the rear. What was to happen when the -Tank began to traverse the hundred and first yard we -do not know. In practice the device was not used.</p> - -<p>But that was not all. The orders, time-tables and -maps upon which the Tank Commanders depended, -proved to have been issued in insufficient quantities.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“For every three Tanks only one set of orders had -been issued, and only one map supplied: consequently -we had to grasp these orders before we passed them on -to the other two officers.”</p></div> - -<p>However, at 5 p.m. on the day before the battle, these -written orders were cancelled and new verbal instructions -substituted. Roughly, the Tanks were to operate -as <span class="locked">follows:—</span></p> - -<p><i>On the right</i> with the 14th Corps, ten Tanks were to -work with the Guards Division, and seven with the 6th -and 56th Divisions, their objectives being Ginchy and -the Quadrilateral.</p> - -<p><i>On the left</i> eight Tanks were allotted to the 3rd Corps, -operating through High Wood and East of Martinpuich. -The 15th Corps had seventeen Tanks attached, and the -Reserve (5th) Army—fighting between Pozières and -Martinpuich—had six tanks.</p> - -<p>With all these groups of Tanks the preliminary moving -up into the first-line positions—in the pitch dark, -through the mud and in and out of the shell-holes of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_62">62</span> -badly crumped ground—proved most arduous, and a -good many Tanks broke down in the process. One Tank -Commander who struck a narrow sunken road remarks:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“It was full of the bodies of dead Boches, and my -driver did not like going along it.”</p></div> - -<p>For the Tanks’ crews the remainder of the night -passed in a final tightening of loose tracks and adjustment -of the engines, and in listening to the steadily increasing -crash and roar of the British bombardment.</p> - -<p>The strain on men and officers had been tremendous. -Most of them seem to have started the battle having had -no sleep for over twenty-four hours.</p> - -<p>They were desperately anxious, too, that Tanks should -prove their worth, and the Mark I. machine was too -capricious to give them much assurance.</p> - -<p>To this list of discomforts must be added that most -of the men had never heard guns before, and that the -lying-up places were close to our batteries.</p> - -<h3>II</h3> - -<p>The morning of the 15th was fine with a thin ground -mist, and at six o’clock the thunder of the British artillery -rose to a final hurricane. The barrage crept forward, -and our Tanks and infantry crossed the parapets.</p> - -<p>The Germans seemed to have heard no breath of the -nature of the new arm which was to be used against -them, and the light haze added greatly to the looming -mystery of the approaching Tanks.</p> - -<p>Official documents that were later on captured from -the enemy revealed something of the deep psychological -effect that our Tanks had had on the German infantry. -These significant admissions might have done more to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_63">63</span> -convince our own High Command of the great potentialities -of the new weapon than they actually did.</p> - -<p>One of the best known individual Tank exploits was -that of the machine belonging to “C” Company, which -helped a New Zealand and an English division in their -assault upon Flers.</p> - -<p>This was the furthest penetration achieved by any -Tank that day.</p> - -<p>This machine led its infantry, and these had their -first taste of entering a village which they knew bristled -with enemy machine-guns without suffering a single -casualty.</p> - -<p>The adventure had all the exhilaration of surprise, -and the men, who had nerved themselves for the usual -ordeal of house-to-house fighting, laughed at the astonishing -anticlimax presented by their own and the Tanks’ -stately progress down an almost empty street.</p> - -<p>“All dressed up and no one to fight.”</p> - -<p>It was on this occasion that the airmen’s now famous -message was sent back, a message whose repetition -rather galled the Tank Corps in the days of ill-rewarded -effort that still lay between it and its final triumphs:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“A Tank is walking up the High Street of Flers with -the British Army cheering behind.”</p></div> - -<p>Of two other Tanks which did particularly well, the -first, a male, entered Gueudecourt, where it attacked a -German Battery and destroyed a field gun; the other -gave great assistance to attacking infantry which was -held up by wire and machine-guns. The Tank Commander -placed his machine astride the trench and enfiladed -it; the Tank then travelled along behind the -trench and 300 Germans surrendered and were taken -prisoners.</p> - -<p>The following is a short summary of the returns of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_64">64</span> -Tanks engaged.</p> - -<p>The casualties among Tank personnel were insignificant, -though one officer of great promise was lost:</p> - -<div class="p1 b1 center"> -<table id="t64" class="narrow35" summary="Casualties among Tank personnel"> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">49</td> - <td class="tdl">Tanks were employed.</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">32</td> - <td class="tdl">reached their starting-points.</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">9</td> - <td class="tdl">pushed ahead of the infantry and caused considerable loss to the enemy.</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">9</td> - <td class="tdl">others did not catch up the infantry but did good work in “clearing up.”</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">5</td> - <td class="tdl">became ditched.</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">9</td> - <td class="tdl">broke down from mechanical trouble.</td></tr> -</table> -</div> - -<p>Of these last fourteen, some served as useful rallying-points -for the infantry after they had become immobile, -and several could have been extricated in time to render -some service if they had not been knocked out by indirect -hits.</p> - -<p>Crews who had been obliged to abandon their Tanks -either got out their machine-guns and continued fighting -or helped the wounded.</p> - -<h3>III</h3> - -<p>The battle had been essentially experimental. What -opinion had been formed of the Tanks?</p> - -<p>We now know what was the opinion of the German -infantry. The German High Command seems in public -to have ignored the new arm.</p> - -<p>In a secret “Instruction” the Chief of the Staff of -the 3rd Army Group, however, reminds units that they -must “hold ground at whatever cost” and “defend -every inch of ground to the last man.”</p> - -<p>“The enemy in the latest fighting have employed new -engines of war as cruel as effective.”</p> - -<div id="ip_64" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 41em;"> - <img src="images/i_064a.jpg" width="647" height="470" alt="" /> - <div class="caption">THE ORIGINAL THIEPVAL MARK I. TANK WITH ANTI-BOMB ROOF AND “TAIL”</div></div> - -<div id="ip_64b" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 41em;"> - <img src="images/i_064b.jpg" width="644" height="450" alt="" /> - <div class="caption">FIELD CAMOUFLAGE</div></div> - -<p>Every possible counter-measure is to be used against<span class="pagenum" id="Page_65">65</span> -these “monstrous engines,” which will probably be -adopted on an extensive scale by the British.</p> - -<p>To our own infantry the Tank appeared as a lusty -friend, who had at last found a convenient way of dealing -with the hitherto deadly partnership of wire and -machine-gun—a friend, too, who had a grotesqueness of -gait and appearance which was intrinsically endearing.</p> - -<p>A wounded London Territorial said:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“‘Old Mother Hubbard’ they called her and lots of -other funny names as well. She looked like a pantomime -animal or a walking ship with iron sides moving -along, very slow, apparently all on her own, and with -none of her crew visible. There she was, groanin’ and -gruntin’ along, pokin’ her nose here and there, stopping -now and then as if she was not sure of the road, and -then going on—very slow, but over everything.</p> - -<p>“It was her slowness that scared us as much as anything, -and the way she shook her wicked old head and -stopped to cough. It <em>was</em> a circus—my word! I only -saw her for about ten minutes. She came humping out -of the fog at one end of the line and humped into it -again at the other. The last I saw of her was when she -was nosing down a shell crater like a great big hippopotamus -with a crowd of Tommies cheering behind.”</p></div> - -<p>To the British High Command the Tanks appeared -as engines of war which showed considerable promise. -They must overcome certain mechanical weaknesses, and -tactics must be further modified to suit their peculiarities. -The G.H.Q. attitude was, in short, that of men -satisfied, though not enthusiastic, and was well expressed -by Sir Douglas Haig in his Somme Despatch:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“Our new heavily armoured cars, known as ‘Tanks,’ -now brought into action for the first time, successfully<span class="pagenum" id="Page_66">66</span> -co-operated with the infantry, and coming as a surprise -to the enemy rank and file, gave valuable help in breaking -down their resistance.”</p></div> - -<p>The despatch goes on to mention the taking of Flers.</p> - -<p>The delight of the British and French Press knew no -bounds. The correspondents threw up their hats and -set to ransack their dictionaries for octosyllables in -which to describe the new “All British” destroyer of -Germans.</p> - -<p>It was “Diplodocus Galumphant,” it was a “Polychromatic -Toad.” It was a “flat-footed monster” which -“performed the most astonishing feats of agility as it -advanced, spouting flames from every side.”</p> - -<p>“It ‘leant’ against a wall until it fell and then -crawled over the fallen débris.</p> - -<p>“It went irresistibly through High Wood, the trees -smashing like matchwood before it.</p> - -<p>“It went up to machine-gun emplacements, ‘crushed -the gun under its ribs,’ and passed on, spitting death -at the demoralised Germans.</p> - -<p>“It ‘stamped’ down a dug-out as though it were a -wasps’ nest.</p> - -<p>“It crashed through broken barns and houses, -‘straddled’ a dug-out and fired enfilading shot down -German trenches.</p> - -<p>“It put a battery and a half of guns out of action at -Flers.”</p> - -<p>Reuter added a cow-catcher to its equipment.</p> - -<p>The French Press was enthusiastic:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“At the precise moment when the bombardment -stopped, the Germans had the surprise of seeing advance -in front of the waves of assaulting troops, enormous -steel monsters from which spurted a continuous fire of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_67">67</span> -great violence. One would have described them as gigantic -infernal machines. Their front, which was -shaped like a ram, smashed down every obstacle. The -heavy automobiles bounded across the overturned and -uneven ground, breaking through the barbed wire and -jumping the trenches. In the German ranks there was -a really mad terror. A prey to panic, the soldiers of -the German Emperor fell back in haste, abandoning -their arms, ammunition and equipment.”</p></div> - -<p>And how did the Tank personnel itself view the events -of the day?</p> - -<p>Half choked with the engine fumes, boxed up for -many hours without respite in the intolerable clamour -and shaking of their machines, or, worse, having -wrestled for hours under heavy shelling with a broken-down -Tank, they were inclined to see the exasperations -of the battle rather than its successes. It is indeed curious -to note the difference in tone between the accounts -of those who saw the Tanks dispassionately from without -and those who had weltered within, between those -who saw what the Tanks did and those whose view of -achievement was obscured by a knowledge of what -might have been.</p> - -<p>The Tank Corps was too keen to be in the least satisfied -by the measure of success which it had achieved.</p> - -<p>Only the Press and the Germans perceived that a -new “Excalibur” had been forged in England. “Out -of the mouths....”</p> - -<h3>IV</h3> - -<p>After the battle, such of the Tanks as could go under -their own power rallied, and steps were at once taken -to salve as many as possible of those which had become -incapacitated.</p> - -<p>From this point, till all available Tanks had been<span class="pagenum" id="Page_68">68</span> -used up and till the ground became finally impossible -in mid-November, Tanks were to be constantly employed -in insignificant numbers in a series of small experimental -actions.</p> - -<p>This method of fighting by twos and threes against -special strong points was afterwards discarded, as it -proved unsatisfactory. Several of these small actions -were nevertheless very successful, and showed in miniature -some special purpose which Tanks could serve, or -illustrated the importance of some special Tank organisation.</p> - -<p>For example, Thiepval showed how Tanks could be -used without artillery preparation, and Beaumont-Hamel -showed the importance of a good Reconnaissance -Branch. These small actions were therefore important, -not in themselves, but because they were microcosms. -In one or two unsuccessful actions it was rather the -state of the ground which spoiled the battle than -mistaken tactics.</p> - -<p>For as the campaign drew on conditions became worse -and worse. By the beginning of October the Army in -general, and particularly the Tanks, had a foretaste of -the miseries of Flanders. The general conditions of -this part of the campaign are admirably described by -Colonel Buchan in his <cite>History of the War</cite>:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“October was one long succession of tempestuous -gales and drenching rains.</p> - -<p>“To understand the difficulties which untoward -weather imposed on the Allied advance, it is necessary -to grasp the nature of the fifty square miles of tortured -ground which three months’ fighting had given them, -and over which lay the communications between their -fighting line and the rear.... Not the biggest mining -camp or the vastest engineering undertaking had<span class="pagenum" id="Page_69">69</span> -ever produced one tithe of the activity which existed -behind each section of the battle line. There were -places like Crewe, places like the outskirts of Birmingham, -places like Aldershot or Salisbury Plain....</p> - -<p>“There were now two No Man’s Lands. One was -between the front lines; the other lay between the old -enemy front and the front we had won. The second -was the bigger problem, for across it must be brought -the supplies of a great army....</p> - -<p>“The problem was hard enough in fine weather; but -let the rain come and soak the churned-up soil, and -the whole land became a morass. There was no <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">pavé</i>, -as in Flanders, to make a firm causeway. Every road -became a water-course, and in the hollows the mud was -as deep as a man’s thighs....</p> - -<p>“The expected fine weather of October did not come. -On the contrary, the month provided a record in wet, -spells of drenching rain being varied by dull, misty -days, so that the sodden land had no chance of drying. -The carrying of the lower spurs—meant as a preliminary -step to a general attack—proved an operation so -full of difficulties that it occupied all our efforts during -the month, and with it all was not completed. The -story of these weeks is one of minor operations, local -actions with strictly limited objectives undertaken by -only a few battalions. In the face of every conceivable -difficulty we moved gradually up the intervening -slopes.”</p></div> - -<p>Such was the setting of this batch of experimental -actions. The first of them took place on September 25, -when two small parties of Tanks were employed in two -distinct actions; the first with the 3rd Corps, and the -second on September 25 and 26 with the 15th Corps near -Gueudecourt.</p> - -<p>The first was a failure. Only two Tanks had been -allotted; one was ditched on the way to the starting-point, -and the other machine was caught in the enemy -barrage and knocked out.</p> - -<p>Very different is the story of the Tanks operating<span class="pagenum" id="Page_70">70</span> -with the 15th Corps at Gird Trench near Gueudecourt, -when with the help of a low-flying aeroplane 1500 yards -of trench and 370 prisoners were taken by one Tank -at a cost to us of five casualties.</p> - -<p>The story is told in the Somme Despatch:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“In the early morning a Tank started down the portion -of the trench held by the enemy from the north-west, -firing its machine-guns and followed by bombers. -The enemy could not escape, as we held the trench at its -southern end. At the same time an aeroplane flew -down the length of the trench, also firing a machine-gun -at the enemy holding it. These then waved white -handkerchiefs in token of surrender, and when this was -reported by the aeroplane the infantry accepted the surrender -of the garrison. By 8.30 a.m. the whole trench -had been cleared, great numbers of the enemy had -been killed, and eight officers and 362 other ranks -made prisoners. Our total casualties amounted to -five.”</p></div> - -<p>At noon on September 26 an attack was launched by -General Gough’s reserve army on Thiepval. Eight -Tanks co-operated.</p> - -<p>It was the second attack that we had made on Thiepval, -of which the Germans had made a most formidable -fortress. The ground had been blasted into the familiar -alternation of crumbling mounds and water-logged -holes, and the shattered houses and splintered trees—particularly -a certain row of apple trees—stood up -forlornly amid the general desolation.</p> - -<p>From the point of view of the Tanks, however, the -action was important, because here for the first time -Tanks were employed in a surprise attack.</p> - -<p>No artillery preparation was used, and</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_71">71</span></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“our men were over the German parapets and into the -dug-outs before machine-guns could be got up to repel -them.”</p></div> - -<p>A large number of prisoners were taken, and in the -Somme Despatch the attack was noted as “highly successful,” -and the Tanks as having given “valuable assistance.”</p> - -<p>By the middle of October 1916 when Tanks were next -in action, the ground was hopelessly sodden, and the -story of the month which ensued might, with an alteration -of place names, be taken for a narrative of the -campaign in Flanders. Than this there is no greater -condemnation.</p> - -<p>It would be tedious to particularise the five or six -minor actions in which Tanks played, or more often endeavoured -to play, a part between October 17 and November -18. Excepting in the interesting little action -which took place at Beaumont-Hamel, to which we have -alluded before, no further light was to be thrown upon -the uses and capabilities of the new arm.</p> - -<p>The following account of the Beaumont-Hamel fighting -was given to the authors by a Tank Officer who was -present:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“At the end of September it became clear that the -Somme battle was fizzling out. The ratio of ‘cost’ to -‘results’ became more and more unsatisfactory; every -advance, too, made the devastated and almost roadless -area an ever greater problem.</p> - -<p>“It was decided that an attack, if possible a surprise -attack, should be launched on the flank of the Somme -battle. The position selected was roughly from about -Serre to the high ground some half a mile south of the -river Ancre. This sector had, of course, been attacked -at the beginning of the Somme battle in July, but the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_72">72</span> -attack had been a complete failure, and this front had -relapsed into comparative quiet.</p> - -<p>“Tanks were collected and again entrained, the new -detraining station being Acheux. This was the first of -the many flank moves carried out with Tanks in order -that a fresh front might be engaged.</p> - -<p>“On arrival at Acheux, however, at the beginning of -October, very bad weather set in and the preparations -for the attack were delayed. Day after day the rain -continued, and the ground in the battle zone became -steadily worse and worse. It was a trying time for the -officers and men of ‘C’ and ‘D’ Companies, as they -were not in very good accommodation just outside -Acheux, expecting daily to move up to battle. It was -not until the beginning of November, however, that a -move was made by night via Beausart to Auchonvillers -and La Signy Farm. The Tanks having reached these -lying-up places, the rain came down even faster than -before, and a study of aeroplane photographs of the proposed -battle sector showed that all the old shell-holes -and many of the old trenches had filled up with water, -and that the greater part of the front was in a hopeless -condition for that type of Tank (<i>i.e.</i>, Mark I.).</p> - -<p>“Just before the day of the Battle, November 13, it -was decided to send back nearly all the Tanks from -La Signy Farm, and some of those from Auchonvillers, -only a few being held in readiness in case the infantry -advance should give scope for their use further ahead on -better ground.</p> - -<p>“Three Tanks of ‘A’ Company were due to attack -with the main assault on November 13; and one of -them succeeded in penetrating into the enemy’s position -and advancing for some distance along the enemy’s -support line and nearly reaching the Ancre before it -became ‘ditched.’</p> - -<p>“Further north the attack had met with considerable -success, except that the village of Beaumont-Hamel -had held out for some hours. Tanks had been called -upon to assist, and two of them had advanced along the -road to Beaumont-Hamel; just about the time that they<span class="pagenum" id="Page_73">73</span> -reached the village the remainder of the German garrison -capitulated. Between Beaumont-Hamel and the -river Ancre a considerable body of Germans were holding -out in the enemy front and support trenches; although -troops of the 63rd Division had reached the outskirts -of Beaucourt well in the rear of this body of -men, they continued to hold out throughout the day. -Tanks were again called upon to deal with this situation. -They reached the position the next morning, being -led up by a trench mortar officer of the Division concerned. -One Tank succeeded in crossing the very large -German front trench, but, unfortunately, became stuck -soon afterwards; the second Tank came to grief just -before it reached the enemy front trench. It appeared -that a deadlock had again been reached, and the crews -of the Tanks were in a precarious position. On examining -the ground about them the Officer Commanding the -leading Tank (which incidentally was leading no longer, -since it was stuck and all too stationary) noticed that -the whole area appeared to be shimmering with white. -On opening the front flap of the Tank and obtaining a -better view, it was seen that all the German garrison, -some 400 in number, appeared to have found something -white to wave in token of surrender; those who could -not produce anything better were waving lumps of -chalk about or bits of board or rifle-stocks which they -had rapidly chalked white. The situation was rather -an embarrassing one for so small a number as the crew -of Two Tanks to deal with; fortunately, however, it was -possible by signs, and with the assistance of the infantry, -to ‘mop up’ these 400 prisoners before they realised -that both the Tanks were stuck and out of action.</p> - -<p>“Some of the worst of the ground was now in our -line, and an effort was made to get the Tanks through -this bad zone in order that they might continue to attack -in the neighbourhood of Beaucourt. Efforts were -made to prepare a track for the Tanks by means of a -considerable digging party, but when the Tanks reached -the very broken ground just north of the Ancre, they -became one after another firmly stuck; with enormous<span class="pagenum" id="Page_74">74</span> -efforts they were dug out, and succeeded in getting a -few yards further, only to stick again. It was heart-breaking -work, which would undoubtedly have been -rendered far easier if the Tanks had then had the unditching -beams which were only introduced some time -later.</p> - -<p>“Finally, on the evening of the 17th, only one Tank -had succeeded in getting through this bad zone and -reaching the comparatively good ground beyond. The -crew, to whom great credit is due, had already been -working continuously for some days and night, and were -not only exhausted, but had had no time to carry out -any reconnaissance of the position which was to be attacked -at dawn the next day. There being, however, -only one Tank, made it of greater importance than ever -that it should be made the most of. It was decided that -it should be used against the very strong position known -as the Triangle, which was a redoubt on the high ground, -roughly midway between Beaumont-Hamel and Beaucourt. -The ground about this redoubt was, unfortunately, -also very heavily shelled, and a frontal approach -with the infantry was impossible, and it was necessary -for the Tank to go in on the flank while the infantry -attacked the position frontally. It was realised that the -first necessity was that the Tank should reach this redoubt -as rapidly as possible, and during the night a -route was taped slightly beyond our front line and directing -the Tank straight for the Triangle. The weather -was now much colder, and the frost rendered the -ground less hopelessly outside the capacity of the Tank.</p> - -<p>“Just before dawn, however, a fresh difficulty arose, -and tried still further the already severely tried expedition. -It began to snow, and the white tape which was -to guide the Tank was obliterated.”</p></div> - -<p>Captain Hotblack (now Major, D.S.O., M.C.), the -Reconnaissance Officer who had done the taping, was -the only man who had reconnoitred this piece of ground, -and he immediately volunteered to lead the Tank upon -which so much depended.</p> - -<p>Taking what little cover he could in shell-holes full<span class="pagenum" id="Page_75">75</span> -of ice and water, he walked in front of the Tank past -our front line close up to the Triangle. Marvellously -enough, not one among the hail of bullets which greeted -him and the Tank found its mark. Having succeeded in -this arduous enterprise and having guided the machine -to its position, he returned to report on the progress of -the action. The light was now improving, and the Tank -started its “rolling up” movement along the German -trenches.</p> - -<p>The machine was now so much in the midst of the -enemy that the German artillery did not dare to open -upon it, and the Tank poured in a devastating fire from -its machine-guns not only upon the men in the trenches, -but also upon some horse transport behind the enemy -lines.</p> - -<p>But, meanwhile, the infantry was hung up in another -part of the field, and the Tank was urgently needed.</p> - -<p>At that time signal communication to the Tanks was -very imperfect, and there seemed no way of letting the -Tank Commander know of the new development.</p> - -<p>Again Major Hotblack came forward and again he -crossed the fire-swept zone undeterred. He reached the -Tank and piloted it back behind our lines, where a renewed -attack was planned.</p> - -<p>But before the tired crew could be sent out again, the -wind changed and it began to thaw. The ground over -which the Tank had passed with difficulty when it was -hard became impassable, and the project was abandoned.</p> - -<p>It was for this remarkable piece of work that Major -Hotblack was awarded his D.S.O.</p> - -<p>The incident naturally had far-reaching results. An -inspiring deed, especially if it be one demanding skill -as well as courage, will influence and “set the tone”<span class="pagenum" id="Page_76">76</span> -of a new unit or a new branch of an old service. It is -far more effectual than the most convincing arguments -as to the necessity for a high standard of conduct and -of competence. Much of the subsequent efficiency of the -Reconnaissance Branch of the Tank Corps may be traced -to this incident.</p> - -<p>Reconnaissance took its proper place, it was recognised -as a fighting service, and its work was seen to be -a necessary preliminary to every action.</p> - -<p>Of the total of about ten Tanks engaged in other -small actions which took place at this period, hardly -one machine had satisfactory records to look back upon.</p> - -<p>On November 18 ended the Tanks’ first short campaign. -If it did not close in a blaze of glory, at least it -had been sufficiently successful for the authorities to -decided not upon doubling but on quadrupling their -establishment.</p> -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_77">77</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_V">CHAPTER V</h2> - -<p class="subhead">WINTER TRAINING, EXPANSION AND READJUSTMENTS</p> -</div> - -<h3>I</h3> - -<p><span class="firstword">Though</span> plans for expansion and the complete reorganisation -of the unit on a large scale had been begun -directly after the results of the action of September 15 -were known, little of the actual work of training could -be started till the end of November, when the “veteran” -Tank personnel were at last available as instructors. -They were, as we have said, withdrawn on November -19 and moved to the Bermicourt area, which had been -already prepared for them.</p> - -<p>They were the leaven—less than one “old” Company -to each new Battalion—who must impart their knowledge -and experience to the new men.</p> - -<p>A subaltern who had seen any fighting with the Tanks -would suddenly find himself regarded as the greatest -living expert on some obscure technical point, and the -newly joined who had never seen a Tank “looked with -awe upon these battle-tried warriors.”</p> - -<p>Men and officers were allowed to volunteer for the -Tank Corps from other units either in France or at -home. The notion of fighting in a Tank was popular, -for on many of the men of the old arms—especially the -infantry—the ordinary battle routine had—to put it -conservatively—begun to pall.</p> - -<p>Therefore, there was no difficulty as to supplies of -men whenever the authorities turned the tap.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_78">78</span></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_15" href="#Footnote_15" class="fnanchor">15</a>“We came from the infantry, from the cavalry, from -the artillery, from the Machine Gun Corps, the Motor -Machine Gun Corps, the Flying Corps, the Army Service -Corps, and even from the Navy.”</p></div> - -<p>At first each individual wore the dress of his original -unit, so that there was a strange collection of uniforms -at Bermicourt—Scottish bonnets and kilts, riding -breeches, and bandoleers, every conceivable dress, even -to naval blue.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_15a" href="#Footnote_15" class="fnanchor">15</a>“The spirit of adventure called us to the Tanks -... and so the call for volunteers found us ready, and -when the word of acceptance came, our hearts beat -quickly and our hopes were high ... some of us were -selected because we were machine-gunners, and others -because we were motor drivers. But there were many -of us to whom the machine-gun and the motor were incomprehensible -things. But in the end we did not find -this lack of knowledge any handicap; for the Army -authorities, who were wiser than we, knew that to men -of average intelligence these things were easy to learn; -and to our very great amazement we found that a week -was all that was necessary thoroughly to master any -machine-gun ... and that it only took us two weeks -to grasp the principle of the internal combustion engine -and the mechanism of the Tank.”</p></div> - -<p>At Bermicourt and at Wool the deficiencies of the old -Thetford training were realised. The experience gained -on the Somme had been assimilated. Instructors now -knew exactly what they must teach, and this time the -spirit of the course of training was definite and businesslike.</p> - -<p>The whole scheme was most carefully planned to ensure<span class="pagenum" id="Page_79">79</span> -a proper balance, and the right amount of time -was allotted to the different courses.</p> - -<p>At first the work consisted chiefly in the training of -more instructors, for the expansion of the Corps was to -be rapid. The “settings” of all the courses showed -great advances on the Thetford model, for at last the -practice grounds could be made to resemble the actuality. -There were old trenches and shell and mine craters, -and the men were at once taken over bad ground, -until the conditions of this curious progress became -things of custom.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_16" href="#Footnote_16" class="fnanchor">16</a>“There is not one of us who will ever forget his -first ride—the crawling in at the sides, the discovery -that the height did not permit a man of medium stature -to stand erect, the sudden starting of the engine, the -roar of it all when the throttle opened, the jolt forward, -and the sliding through the mud that followed, until -at last we came to the ‘jump’ which had been prepared. -Then came the downward motion, which suddenly threw -us off our feet and caused us to stretch trusting hands -toward the nearest object—usually, at first, a hot pipe -through which the water from the cylinder jackets -flowed to the radiator. So, down and down and down, -the throttle almost closed, the engine just ‘ticking over,’ -until at last the bottom was reached, and as the power -was turned full on, the Tank raised herself to the incline, -like a ship rising on a wave, and we were all -jolted the other way, only to clutch again frantically -for things which were hot and burned, until at last, with -a swing over the top, we gained level ground. And in -that moment we discovered that the trenches and the -mud and the rain and the shells and the daily curse -of bully beef had not killed everything within, for there -came to us a thrill of happiness in that we were to sail -over stranger seas than man had ever crossed, and set -out on a great adventure.”</p></div> - -<p>The necessity of regularising and systematising the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_80">80</span> -Reconnaissance Branch had not been forgotten, and a -separate Reconnaissance Service—really a specially -adapted branch of “Intelligence”—was set up, under -Major Hotblack.</p> - -<p>The first organised work of the Branch was to be done -in the preparations for the Battle of Arras, and it is -at that period that we shall see the tentative beginnings -of the very special system which was later on -developed.</p> - -<p>For the present “Reconnaissance” spent its time lecturing -and being lectured, and in preparing maps or -training areas for theoretical or practical exercises in -the new art of Tank warfare.</p> - -<h3>II</h3> - -<p>By February 1917, when individual courses came to -an end and unit training began, the H.B.M.G.C. was -about 9000 strong.</p> - -<p>Warmed by the sun of official approval, and watered -with a kindly dew of Memoranda and official “definitions,” -Companies had budded into Battalions and later -Battalions were to burgeon into Brigades.</p> - -<p>Even by this early date the authorities had decided -that ultimately three Brigades of three Battalions each -should be formed.</p> - -<p>Each Battalion was to be equipped with seventy-two -machines and to consist of four fighting sections, a -Headquarters Section and a Battalion Workshop, besides -that curious collection of miscellaneous individuals, -tailors, barbers, shoemakers and clerks, which is -necessary in every unit. General Elles was to command -in France, and took over on September 29 with the -rank of Colonel. His “charter” was as follows:</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_81">81</span></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“The Headquarters in France is to command the -Heavy Branch M.G.C. in the field, to be responsible for -the advanced training and for the Tactical employment -of the Corps under the command of the C.-in-C.”</p></div> - -<p>He was also to have a large Central Depot and Repairing -Shop in his charge.</p> - -<p>In England there was to be a Headquarters directly -under the War Office and which was to administer the -Corps as a whole. The home Headquarters was to be -responsible for the provision of men, for supplies of -“technical material,” the preliminary training of units, -and the maintenance of units in France as regards men, -machines, material and spare parts.</p> - -<p>The experienced reader will perceive in this system -of dual control a very promising sowing of dragon’s -teeth.</p> - -<p>No one who has had an inside knowledge of the growth -of any unit or of any institution whatsoever during the -War will be surprised at the fact that the Tank Corps -did not escape the common lot. It suffered from growing -pains.</p> - -<p>Is there a new Ministry, a new Hospital, a new Factory, -a new Battalion, nay, a single new Committee, the -tiniest Association of Allotment Holders, the smallest -Village Ladies’ Work Depot, that did not?</p> - -<p>Among such organisations there are but two categories—those -who have the candour to acknowledge -that they went through such a period, and those who -still dare not trust themselves to allude to it. Perhaps -if we consider the examples that come within our own -experience, we shall find that the stronger and more -vital the new unit, the more capable and full of character -the men who moved it, the more marked was that -initial stage of uncomfortable adolescence.</p> - -<p>The settling down, before responsibilities and prerogatives<span class="pagenum" id="Page_82">82</span> -had been properly paired and allotted to the right -individuals. The time when one department was still -irritable from overwork and another exasperated by not -being given enough responsibility. We have all of us -known such a time, and most of us now look back upon -its very real miseries with a kind of mingled wonder -and amusement. Not otherwise do the pioneers of the -Tanks look back upon their awkward age.</p> - -<p>As soon as the programme of expansion had been decided -upon<a id="FNanchor_17" href="#Footnote_17" class="fnanchor">17</a> the question of how Tank production -could be increased became an exceedingly important -one. Owing to the inevitable loss in battle, and still -more to the unfortunate defects of the type of the track -roller then supplied, there were not enough Tanks even -for the training scheme proposed for France, where -there were in December 1916 only sixteen machines in -working order. The needs of the big training centre -which was setting up at Wool could not at present be -met at all, and the accumulation of any adequate -reserve of fighting Tanks was, for the moment, impossible.</p> - -<p>The Mechanical Warfare Supply Department was -now responsible for Tank production, and they had the -task of arranging for the building of the 1000 Tanks -which had been sanctioned on September 29.</p> - -<p>In November the M.W.S. Department made an unofficial -forecast of the probable rate of production. This -forecast they confirmed officially on February 1.</p> - -<p>The total output of Tanks was to be roughly as follows:</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_83">83</span></p> - -<div class="p1 b1 center"> -<table id="t83" class="narrow20 p1 b1" summary="Tank output, 1917"> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="in1">1917</span></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">January</td> - <td class="tdr">50</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">February</td> - <td class="tdr">50</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">March</td> - <td class="tdr">120</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">April</td> - <td class="tdr">120</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">May</td> - <td class="tdr">140</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">June</td> - <td class="tdr">200</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">July</td> - <td class="tdr">240</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">August</td> - <td class="tdr">260</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">September</td> - <td class="tdr">280</td></tr> -</table> -</div> - -<p>Of these, after March at least eighty per month were to -be of the Mark IV. type, of which, with the Mark IV.<i>a</i>, -there was to be a total of over 1000.</p> - -<p>In August or September, a proportion of the output -was to be of the greatly improved Mark V. type. Actually -at the end of March only sixty Tanks could be -scraped together for the Battle of Arras, and most of -these were machines that had been repaired after the -Somme.</p> - -<p>Not a single Mark IV. machine arrived in France -until April 22, after the Battle of Arras had been fought -and won, and no Mark V. machines until March 23, -1918. The entire programme was, in short, many -months late.</p> - -<p>The M.W.S.D. were, however, not altogether blameable -for the occasionally somewhat astonishing discrepancy -between their promises and performance.</p> - -<p>It is, in fact, related for the defence that even the -airy promises had their purpose—that the very discrepancies -which the Fighting Side viewed aghast were -deliberately created by the wily M.W.S.D. as bogies with -which to scare supine manufacturers or reluctant Government -Departments.</p> - -<p>“What!” the M.W.S.D. would say. “You can’t do -better than that! But look what we’ve actually promised!<span class="pagenum" id="Page_84">84</span> -And just see what sort of names our partners the -Fighting Side are calling us already! You <em>must</em> do -better.” A duly enraged Fighting Side must have made -an unsurpassable Jorkins.</p> - -<p>In any case, however, it was usually only the M.W.S.D.’s -promises which could even be called in question. -Considering the means at their disposal and the difficulties -which surrounded them, their practical efforts -were praiseworthy.</p> - -<p>Their troubles came chiefly from three sources. Some -of the difficulties from each were inevitable, and some -were not.</p> - -<p>First there were the physical difficulties of manufacture. -The shortage both of labour and material was -acute, and at the period with which we are now concerned, -Tanks came low in the Ministry of Munitions’ -priority list. Shells, guns, aeroplanes and even transport -lorries all took precedence of Tanks.</p> - -<p>A second difficulty was the habit which the Authorities -had of blowing alternately hot and cold, according -as Tanks momentarily did well or ill in the field. This -resulted in a tendency towards a see-saw of alternate -periods of slackness and overwhelming hurry in the -factories.</p> - -<p>Tradition relates that Sir Albert Stern (the Director-General -of the M.W.S.D.) here played a most useful -part. He used his whole influence to maintain a steady -output, acting, in fact, as a kind of stabiliser.</p> - -<p>The third set of difficulties came from the M.W.S.D.’s -own Tank designers, and from technical experts of -the Fighting Side in France. Both constantly asked for -small alterations in design. Often these alterations -were necessary; frequently they were more or less frivolous -even when they came from what might be considered<span class="pagenum" id="Page_85">85</span> -the best source, that is, from those who fought the -Tanks.</p> - -<p>If the M.W.S.D. was sometimes accused of adopting -an academic attitude towards the results of the “acid -test” of battle, it may as truly be said of the Fighting -Side that they often underrated the difficulties and problems -of manufacture and failed to appreciate how often -quality could only be obtained by a disproportionate -sacrifice of quantity.</p> - -<h3>III</h3> - -<p>About the end of December 1916, when the dual control -of Tank affairs had been working for nearly three -months, it became obvious that the system was not one -that would easily stand the strain of active operations. -The Tank Corps had outgrown it, and the shoe would -soon begin to pinch. General Elles thus summarised -the position in his report of December 31:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“<i>In France.</i> The fighting organisation is under a -junior officer who <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">faute de mieux</i> has become responsible -for initiating all important questions of policy, design, -organisation and personnel through G.H.Q., France, -and thence through five different branches at the War -Office.</p> - -<p>“<i>In England.</i> Administrative and training organisation -are under a senior officer, located 130 miles from -the War Office, with a junior Staff Officer (Staff-Captain) -in London to deal with the five branches above -mentioned.</p> - -<p>“The system is working now because Headquarters -in France have been free from the questions of operations -for most of the last six weeks, and have, therefore, -been in a position to deal imperfectly and at a distance -with the larger aspects of the whole matter.</p> - -<p>“This will not be possible when operations become -a more pressing obligation, as they are now doing.</p> - -<p>“Then, this duty must devolve either on the five War<span class="pagenum" id="Page_86">86</span> -Office branches, not one of which, I submit with all -respect, can have any comprehensive grip of the subject, -or on the G.O.C., Administrative Centre, who is out of -continued personal touch either with the War Office or -the requirements in this country, and is, moreover, debarred -by his charter from really having any control or -direction except at the instance of his Junior.</p> - -<p>“In actual fact, the Director-General of Mechanical -Warfare Supply, an official of the Ministry of Munitions, -at the head of a very energetic body, becomes the -head of the whole organisation. This officer, owing to -his lack of military knowledge, requires and desires -guidance, which none of the five departments at the -War Office can, and which the G.O.C., Administrative -Centre, is not in a position to, give him.</p> - -<p>“In effect the tail in France is trying to wag a very -distant and headless dog in England. We have had one -check already in the matter of the increased weight of -Mark IV. which it is possible may have serious results -as regards transportation.</p> - -<p>“In view of the inevitable expansion and great possibilities -of this arm of the Service, I wish to urge most -strongly that a Directorate (however small to begin -with) be formed at the War Office on the lines of the -Directorate of Aeronautics. Its functions to be to study -possibilities of development, to watch design and supply, -to co-ordinate training and administer the Corps as a -whole. The officer in charge to be a senior officer, free -to travel and empowered to issue definite instructions -and decisions as to requirements to the Ministry of -Munitions.”</p></div> - -<p>As a result of this remonstrance, General Capper was -appointed to the War Office, and the first Tank Committee -was set up in the following May.</p> - -<p>This Committee was commissioned “to systematise -and strengthen liaison between the Army and the Ministry -of Munitions.”</p> - -<p>But when we consider the list of its members we do<span class="pagenum" id="Page_87">87</span> -not find a single representative of the still drooping -“tail.”<a id="FNanchor_18" href="#Footnote_18" class="fnanchor">18</a></p> - -<p>However, the appointment of the Committee proved -to be a step in the right direction, and an improvement -began to be felt immediately.</p> - -<p>Officers of the Tank Corps now took charge of the -final running trials of all Tanks. The M.W.S.D. submitted -their designs to the Committee, and in several -other small particulars the control exercised by the -Military side was increased.</p> - -<p>But in August the Committee was rent asunder.</p> - -<p>A Memorandum was submitted by the two military -members, calling attention to the long and serious delays -that were still occurring in the preparation of new -kinds of Tanks, after the execution of the designs had -been approved by the Tank Committee.</p> - -<p>The delays, it stated, were largely due to the absence -of direct intercourse between the Committee as a body -and the actual designer, and they recommended that -the designer should be <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">ex officio</i> a member of the Committee.</p> - -<p>Sir Albert Stern and Sir Eustace Tennyson d’Eyncourt -dissented strongly from this Memorandum—we -are not told upon what grounds—and in October a new -Tank Committee was formed.</p> - -<p>At last—upon this new Committee—the “tail” was -fully represented, and the Committee met fortnightly -alternately in France and in England, so keeping in -touch with both factors in its work. A satisfactory<span class="pagenum" id="Page_88">88</span> -organisation seems, in fact, to have been found, and -the interests of all the departments involved in manufacturing -and fighting these complex machines seem at -last to have been adequately represented. After October -difficulties appear to have been halved.</p> - -<p>But this happier era did not dawn till after the -Battle of Arras had been won, and the long misery of -the Flemish campaign had somehow been endured. -Meanwhile, as far as Tank control was concerned, -things went on much as before.</p> - -<p>The reader is to imagine that just such “growing -pains” and just such difficulties, correspondences and -memoranda filled in the background for the next six -months, while the fighting at Arras, at Messines and in -Flanders, whose story we are about to relate, was in -progress.</p> -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_89">89</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_VI">CHAPTER VI</h2> - -<p class="subhead">THE BATTLES OF ARRAS AND BULLECOURT</p> -</div> - -<h3>I</h3> - -<p><span class="firstword">The</span> Reconnaissance Officers were the first of the -Junior personnel to learn that operations were contemplated -for early April, and that the new battle was -to be fought before the town of Arras on the banks of -the river Scarpe. By the beginning of March, the first -small parties of Battalion and Company Reconnaissance -Officers had begun to leave Bermicourt.</p> - -<p>It was rumoured that this offensive was going to be -the blooding of the 1st Brigade; it was to be on a much -larger scale than any the Tanks had taken part in on -the Somme. It was said that sixty machines would be -thrown in in one action. The Tanks were going to have -an opportunity of making a name for themselves, and of -justifying all the embarrassingly pleasant things that -the newspapers had said of them in the previous September. -For this lavish praise had spread a gloom over -the Tank Corps; they had been unmercifully twitted by -unfeeling gunners and infantrymen who knew the real -facts.</p> - -<p>The newspapers had succeeded in making their intercourse -with any but battalions fresh from England one -unbearable round of facile jest. Never had any unit, -save, perhaps, the London Scottish, been so unmercifully -hailed as “Mother’s blue-eyed boy.”</p> - -<p>By March they lusted for blood, and the first whispers -of battle were listened to with a satisfied expectancy.</p> - -<p>The new 1st Brigade of the Heavy Branch Machine<span class="pagenum" id="Page_90">90</span> -Gun Corps was a very much more assured body than -the little band of pioneers who had waited so anxiously -for the dawn on September 15, 1916.</p> - -<p>Owing to delays in manufacture, they were still only -equipped with 60 Mark I. Tanks instead of about 120 -Mark I.’s and Mark IV.’s, as had been hoped. Still, the -March 1917 Mark I. was very different from the September -1916 Mark I. The most striking improvement -was the shedding of the cumbersome and ineffectual -“Tail” or hydraulic stabiliser.</p> - -<p>Most of the machines had also undergone a most careful -overhauling at the hands of the indefatigable vulcan, -at the Battalion workshops, and those innumerable tiny -adjustments, repairs and improvements which constitute -“tuning up” had been made.</p> - -<p>The machine-gun armament, too, had been modified, -the Hotchkiss being replaced by the Lewis gun. A new -contrivance for use on soft ground had also been fitted, -consisting of stout little cigar-shaped splinter-bars, a -yard or so in length, attached to the track by means of -chains.</p> - -<p>But more particularly crews had had proper time to -train and they knew that they knew their work. Their -officers, too, were sure that they would this time be -properly supplied with maps and detailed orders. -Therefore, officers and crews got on with their own -battle preparations, or, later, rehearsed the coming -action with the infantry, with a good heart.</p> - -<h3>II</h3> - -<p>In the front line active preparations had begun. The -Reconnaissance Officers, several of whom took up their -quarters in the half-deserted town of Arras, had each<span class="pagenum" id="Page_91">91</span> -had his area allotted to him, and they were busy helping -“Q” side to find suitable positions for the supply -dumps, for at this time there was no system of supply -Tanks. Every tin of petrol, every round of ammunition, -had, therefore, to be carried by hand from the railhead, -and the task was one which took weeks to complete.</p> - -<p>It was calculated that had supply Tanks been available -each machine would have saved a carrying party -of 300 men. The real work of the Reconnaissance Officers, -however, was to observe the enemy’s lines and -the country which lay beyond them.</p> - -<p>Much of this country, even within our own lines, was -practically unknown to us, as the greater part of the -sector selected for attack had only just been “uncovered” -by the sudden and unforeseen German retirement. -On this portion of the line the retirement had occurred -about a month before the battle was due. As in other -parts of the line, and as the enemy had intended, the -retirement had proved extremely embarrassing. We -had carefully selected a site for our battle, and the -chosen ground had been thoroughly studied.</p> - -<p>The sudden change to a piece of imperfectly known -country involved an enormous amount of extra photographing, -map-making, sketching and reconnaissance -generally. This was merely troublesome; more uncomfortable -was the element of uncertainty which the retirement -introduced.</p> - -<p>Would the enemy stand? And, if so, where? Was -there some trap being prepared for us? It was uncanny, -for it was contrary to the tradition of more than two -years of trench warfare.</p> - -<p>The final scheme of the attack was, however, planned -on the assumption that the enemy would give battle. -For he now held a line of great natural strength which<span class="pagenum" id="Page_92">92</span> -he had improved with extraordinary skill and energy. -The scheme, as it affected the Tanks, was shortly this.</p> - -<p>The general object of the action was to achieve a -rapid success. That is, to inflict a wound in the first -twenty-four hours, severe enough to force the enemy to -bring up his reserves, thus depleting his line near -Soissons and Reims, where the French offensive was to -be launched immediately afterwards.</p> - -<p>A proportion of Tanks was allotted to each of the -Armies taking part.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>1. <i>With the First Army</i> (“D” Battalion) to the -North:</p> - -<p>Eight Tanks were to operate against Vimy Heights -and the village and heights of Thélus, considered -amongst the most formidable enemy positions in France. -Tanks were to play a subsidiary part, as the soil here -was a soft heavy loam, highly unfavourable to Tanks.</p> - -<p class="p1">2. <i>With the Third Army</i> (“C” Battalion):</p> - -<p>Forty Tanks were to operate, some north, some south -of the river Scarpe. This sector contained several notorious -strong points, such as the Harp and Telegraph -Hill. The ground here was hard and chalky and afforded -good going for Tanks, though it was intersected -by old trench lines and had been heavily crumped.</p> - -<p class="p1">3. <i>With the Fifth Army</i> (“D” Battalion):</p> - -<p>Twelve Tanks were to operate in the region of Lagnicourt. -Here the ground conditions were bad. The roads -especially had been destroyed, and it was found impossible -to bring up sufficient artillery for a preliminary -bombardment. Therefore, on this sector Tanks were to -play a leading part, preceding the infantry and largely -replacing the barrage. This action was not to be -launched till about forty-eight hours after that on the -other two sectors. Zero day was to be April 9, and the -attack was to be made at dawn.</p></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_93">93</span></p> - -<h3>III</h3> - -<p>Till the night before the battle the work of preparation -had gone smoothly.</p> - -<p>Maps had been issued, stores stood ready, pack animals -and limbers were at hand to form advanced dumps.</p> - -<p>The Reconnaissance Officers had taken little parties -of Tank Commanders to the best observation posts in -their sectors, and had there shown them the ground -they must cross and expounded their maps to them. -All the Tanks had been brought safely to their railheads -and successfully detrained, and now they lay -waiting in their tankodromes. “C” (afterwards No. -3) Battalion lay in Arras itself. The town had been -most carefully prepared for troops to assemble and wait -in.</p> - -<p>Great chalk quarries underlay it, and these had been -linked up and lit with electricity, and here two divisions -could lie thirty feet underground secure from the -heaviest shelling.</p> - -<p>The Tanks had chosen the Citadel as their assembly -place. There in the great grassy ditch of the old -Vauban Fort they lay, nosing for cover into the re-entrant -angles of the tall cliff of mellow brickwork that -towered above them.</p> - -<p>As soon as it was dark, on the night of April 8–9, -the Tanks set off on their journey up the line.</p> - -<p>There had been a question as to the route which these -Tanks were to follow.</p> - -<p>The alternatives were a long detour round the head -of a shallow valley or a short cut over ground of questionable -soundness.</p> - -<p>The short cut had finally been decided upon, and, -on the Reconnaissance Officer’s report, the Battalion<span class="pagenum" id="Page_94">94</span> -had applied for enough brushwood and sleepers to build -a rough causeway.</p> - -<p>Owing to transport misunderstandings and difficulties, -only a very small proportion of this material -arrived in time. It was, however, decided still to chance -the short cut. Brushwood had been laid in some of -the worst places and the ground had a firm top. It -was thought probable that this would, after all, bear -the weight of the Tanks.</p> - -<p>Alas, the hope was vain! The smooth turf proved -to be no more than a crust, covering a veritable bog, -and it broke through when the column was about halfway -across. In the darkness six Tanks floundered one -after another into the morass.</p> - -<p>The scene which followed is described by an officer -who was present:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“Never shall I forget the scene at Achicourt on the -eve of the battle. It was round about midnight when -I got there and pitch dark save for the fitful light from -the still burning village<a id="FNanchor_19" href="#Footnote_19" class="fnanchor">19</a> near by and the flashes of -the guns.</p> - -<p>“We had got word of ‘trouble near the railway crossing,’ -and trouble indeed there was.</p> - -<p>“There, sunk and wallowing in a bog of black mud, -were some half-dozen Tanks—Tanks that should by -then have been miles ahead and getting into their battle -position for the attack at dawn.</p> - -<p>“Instead, here were the machines on which so much -depended, lying helpless and silent at all sorts of -ominous angles, and turned this way and that in their -vain struggles to churn their way out of the morass.</p> - -<p>“About them were great weals and hummocks of mud -and ragged holes brimming with black slime. The -crews, sweating and filthy, were staggering about and -trying to help their machines out by digging away the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_95">95</span> -soil from under their bellies and by thrusting planks -and brushwood under their tracks. Now and again an -engine would be started up and some half-submerged -Tank would heave its bulk up and out in unsteady -floundering fashion, little by little and in wrenching -jerks as the engine was raced and the clutch -released.</p> - -<p>“Then the tracks of a sudden would cease biting and -would rattle round ineffectively, the ground would give -way afresh on one side, and the Tank would slowly -heave over and settle down again with a perilous list, -the black water awash in her lower sponson. No lights -could be shown on account of enemy observation, and -at any time he might reopen with his heavy artillery, -which had already been blasting the immediate neighbourhood -earlier in the night.</p> - -<p>“Altogether it was a desperate and discouraging -business for those of us who knew that there were -infantry already assembled for the morning’s assault -who had practised with us, who looked to us for a lead -across the German wire, and who must now do as best -they might without us.”</p></div> - -<p>In the event, however, it did not turn out as blackly -as those at the Achicourt slough had feared.</p> - -<p>Had the approach march of the Tanks been run to -time, the column would almost certainly have come in -for the blowing up of the ammunition dump at -Achicourt, which was hit and exploded by a German -shell soon after nightfall.</p> - -<p>Also, the half-dozen Tanks that were extricated from -the bog too late to join in that morning’s attack, provided -a small local reserve that later proved of the utmost -value and had an appreciable effect on the course -and ultimate issue of the battle.</p> - -<p>The ruins of Achicourt continued to smoulder -through the night.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_96">96</span></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_20" href="#Footnote_20" class="fnanchor">20</a>“It had just been very badly shelled by the enemy. -Two sides of the square were burned and blasted away -(it had been all right, nearly, when I passed through -it a few days before). The ruins still smoked and -glowed, and shadowy working parties shovelled rubbish -into shell craters to make them passable for transport -and cleared a way through the sorry wreck. Smashed -limbers, strings of dead mules, burnt-out and buckled -motor lorries, transport wagons, and the like, all rather -weird and depressing, the red glow of some other conflagration -as a background, and this stabbed with the -flicker of white light from our guns, little and great—thousands -of them (actually), a throbbing roar in the -distance, and fit to deafen you anywhere near. The -great thing is to go about with an open mouth. It -equalises the pressure on your ear-drums. I am acquiring -a permanent droop of the lower jaw. Anyway, a -discouraged, shell-shaken sentry told me that one could -not go through for the shells, mostly our own, exploding -in the fire, and refused to let me take the car in. It -did not look anything like as bad as he tried to make -out—from the danger point of view—and indeed when -I walked through there were the working parties -stolidly filling up the craters by the light of the glowing -ruins. Having fulfilled my mission, I got back to -report at Brigade Headquarters about 4 a.m., and then -set out again at 4.30 to follow the battle and note and -report the doings of our Willies.”</p></div> - -<div id="ip_96" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 43em;"> - <img src="images/i_096a1.jpg" width="682" height="396" alt="" /> - <div class="caption">A DERELICT. VALLEY OF THE SCARPE</div></div> - -<div id="ip_96b" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 50em;"> - <img src="images/i_096a2.jpg" width="799" height="538" alt="" /> - <div class="caption">A BURNING TANK</div></div> - -<div id="ip_96c" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 44em;"> - <img src="images/i_096b1.jpg" width="692" height="328" alt="" /> - <div class="caption">“DIRECT HITS”</div></div> - -<div id="ip_96d" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 43em;"> - <img src="images/i_096b2.jpg" width="684" height="464" alt="" /> - <div class="caption">BELLIED ON A TREE-STUMP AND SUBSEQUENTLY HIT</div></div> - -<h3>IV</h3> - -<p>At about 3.30 a.m. heavy rain had begun to fall, and -all day the armies fought amid intermittent storms of -sleet and drenching rain.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_21" href="#Footnote_21" class="fnanchor">21</a>“Our bombardment was quite unimaginable—all -that could possibly be desired, I should think, for accuracy,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_97">97</span> -evenness and intensity. The final barrage was -a really wonderful sight; just at dawn the grey sky -ablaze with star shells and coloured rockets all along -the line, nothing else to be seen.</p> - -<p>“Then when it got a little lighter and the barrage -had crept on, we could see thousands of our men popping -up from their barely visible ‘assembly slits’ in -the ground and pouring up the slope in a slow-moving, -loose sort of crowd with no discernible formation, and -with and among them, the Tanks.</p> - -<p>“They had previously come up across an apparently -deserted valley over the heads of our waiting infantry -in their shelter trenches. They appeared breasting the -hill and disappeared over the brow together with the -attacking waves of troops. The enemy’s shrapnel and -high explosives that came back were almost laughable -in comparison with what we put over them, and our -casualties were, on the whole, unusually light. Where -I was watching was reported to be the hardest nut on -the whole line.<a id="FNanchor_22" href="#Footnote_22" class="fnanchor">22</a></p> - -<p>“What with the barrage and the Tanks the defence -appears to have just collapsed, and a few minutes and -a few casualties gave us possession of a wonderful redoubt -that the enemy had lavished extraordinary ingenuity -and industry in preparing for many months -past.</p> - -<p>“I saw it all from a hedge in a hillside about 1000 -yards away. I had determined on the spot, and, as -luck would have it, I found when I got there that there -was a half-finished observation post with a lovely little -pit to jump down into if things got hot. However, -there was no need to use it. It was only getting into -it that was rather exciting. I got spattered with débris -time and again, but by tacking, waiting, and using the -country, I got through without any real unpleasantness.</p> - -<p>“It’s been a real thoroughgoing victory so far as we -can see and hear—or rather hear, for I only saw the -first phase. Good old Willies, it’s partly their victory, -too, as all can see. Wonderful messages come in, a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_98">98</span> -dozen or more to the hour, reports, telegrams, telephone -messages, kite balloons, aeroplanes, pigeon letters, etc., -and nearly all good, <em>awfully</em> good.</p> - -<p>“‘We have reached Z.22.B.64 and are going strong.’</p> - -<p>“‘Have taken Tilloy Village.’</p> - -<p>“‘Over 2000 prisoners in our Corps cages already, -including thirty officers and a Battalion Commander.’</p> - -<p>“‘Nine hundred prisoners, scared and starved, <em>moral</em> -rotten.’</p> - -<p>“‘Have reached the Blue Line,’ <i>Signed</i> Daphne, -‘Consolidated at Y.13.C.68 to 15.D. Central,’ only we -don’t consolidate, we just hammer on line after line -exactly to programme and as never before.</p> - -<p>“‘Tanks seen zero plus 5 hours 15 minutes in the -“Howitzer Valley” accompanied by infantry. Guns -still in position, gunners not.’</p> - -<p>“And so on; and our blue cardboard slips representing -infantry and little red flags, denoting Tanks, march -on and on and on.”</p></div> - -<p>Partly owing to the weather conditions and partly -because the sixty Tanks were strung out along so wide -a front, Tank Commanders had been told to act more -or less independently against the strong points which -had been allotted to them. Once zero had struck, therefore, -the history of the battle becomes, from the Tank -point of view, chiefly that of the exploits of individual -machines.</p> - -<p>The only exception is the history of the eight Tanks -operating with the Canadians at Vimy. Alas! their -story is easily summarised.</p> - -<p>It had been originally decided that if the weather -was wet no Tanks were to operate on this sector at all, -as the condition of the ground was already exceptionally -bad. The eight were to be sent down to reinforce -the 5th Army where the going was good.</p> - -<p>As luck would have it, April 7 and 8 were fine, and it<span class="pagenum" id="Page_99">99</span> -was determined that the Tanks should not be sent down, -but should go in on the ridge. When a drenching rain -set in two hours before zero it was too late to alter the -plan of attack. The result was as had been expected.</p> - -<p>Every Tank without exception ditched or got stuck -in No Man’s Land or in the enemy front line.</p> - -<p>Therefore, the Tanks claim no share in the Canadians’ -brilliant and historic taking of the ridge.</p> - -<p>So great was the Canadians’ <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">élan</i>, and so successful -was our barrage, that by the time the Tanks were extricated -there was happily no rôle for them to play. -They were, therefore, withdrawn as quickly as possible, -and were, after all, sent down to reinforce the 5th -Army.</p> - -<p>With the 3rd Army, several Tanks performed interesting -exploits.</p> - -<p>Second Lieutenant Weber’s Tank, “Lusitania,” for -example, spent an exciting and profitable two days. -This machine was some three hours late in starting -owing to trouble with the secondary gear. Just as it -was getting off, word was brought that the infantry -was held up. The arrival of the Tank effected an entire -change in the situation, and a machine-gun placed in -a wood north of the railway having been silenced by -the Tank’s 6-pounder fire, it proceeded towards the -Blue Line. The infantry advanced at the same time, -and both reached the next enemy trench together.</p> - -<p>The movement was carried out in such close alignment -that the Tank was prevented from making use of -its guns and enfilading the trench, but the Germans, -unable to face the combined attack, held up their hands -and surrendered. The Tank then cruised along the -railway towards Fleury Redoubt, firing as it went with -its 6-pounder and Lewis guns. The Germans made<span class="pagenum" id="Page_100">100</span> -haste to evacuate the Redoubt, and could be seen to -take refuge in a dug-out close to a railway arch.</p> - -<p>The Tank drew on towards the arch, firing in its -progress at any object suggesting a machine-gun emplacement. -Near the arch it found itself under our -own barrage and also shelled by an anti-Tank gun. It -accordingly wheeled about, reclimbed the slope it had -just descended, and signalled to the infantry to come -on. Then, returning to the arch, it mounted guard -while the infantry unearthed the Germans who had -taken refuge in the dug-out. This point disposed of -and a steep bank hindering further advance, it was -found necessary to take a southerly course to find a -more possible place for climbing, the engine having become -badly overheated. Indeed, so hot was it that the -machine now jibbed at the easiest exit from the valley -that could be found, and there was nothing for it but -to wait until the engine should cool down.</p> - -<p>On the instant that the Tank Commander announced -his decision to lie-up, down dropped each man of the -crew where he sat or stood, overcome by heat and the -cumulative exhaustion of days and nights of almost -ceaseless preparation.</p> - -<p>Shells whined and droned overhead, and would now -and again pitch in the valley on this or that side of -the Tank, throwing up a brown cascade of earth with -a reverberating crash.</p> - -<p>Along the western bank of the valley were the excavated -and concreted pits that had sheltered the enemy’s -guns for two and a half years. From some the pieces -had been withdrawn, in others our fire had caught the -gunners and their teams in the very act, and the valley -bottom was strewn with tragic heaps—guns, limbers, -men and horses, huddled together in shapeless tangles<span class="pagenum" id="Page_101">101</span> -of brown and grey, or tossed apart to lie singed and -torn amongst the short grass and the shell-holes.</p> - -<p>Down near the railway arch through which the valley -track led to the river Scarpe, one diminutive Highlander -had paraded a drove of some 200 prisoners who -had somehow come under his sole charge.</p> - -<p>They were neatly lined up in fours, each man with -his hands above his head, and as they drooped from -weariness or fidgeted from fear of the shells that continued -to fall haphazardly about them, their small and -solitary escort would flourish, and more than flourish -his bayonet. Up would go the 400 hands once more -and the parade be restored to order.</p> - -<p>Not for nothing had one young Scotsman been taught -the value of discipline.</p> - -<p>By the time the engine had cooled down, the crew -been roused, and the far bank surmounted, the infantry -were well on their way to their objective. Dropping -into third gear the Tank gradually gained on them, and -its commander, observing that they had entered the -German trench, swung half right and took a course -through the barbed wire parallel to it. On the flank -of the 15th Division, the trench was seen to be still in -German hands. The Tank opened fire accordingly with -6-pounders and machine-guns, doing what damage it -could. It caused a redoubt to be evacuated, it searched -out and caused two snipers to surrender, and later in -the evening, in answer to an urgent request from a -Colonel of infantry, it approached within fifty yards of -a trench and silenced two out of four machine-guns. -Then, the already defective magneto giving out altogether -and the Tank being brought to a standstill, it -opened a heavy fire along the trench with Lewis and -6-pounder guns. Having thus killed many Germans,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_102">102</span> -and the engine refusing to restart, the commander at -9.30 p.m. decided to abandon the Tank, after a full -twelve hours in action.</p> - -<p>It had then been dark for some time, and the Germans -had kept up a lively fire on the stranded Tank with -rifles and machine-guns, taking aim at the chinks and -loopholes through which the lights shone out in tell-tale -beams.</p> - -<p>For hour after hour, those within had striven laboriously -yet vainly to set their engines going, and so to -bring their Tank safely back out of its gallant maiden -action. But nothing availed, and, the enemy fire becoming -more intense and accurate, the lights were -switched off and the preparations for evacuation made -in total darkness.</p> - -<p>It was first necessary to find out where our own line -lay and to warn our infantry that the crew would be -coming in.</p> - -<p>Sergeant Latham at once volunteered for this reconnaissance, -and crawled out of the Tank into the lesser -blackness of the night. Rifles spat and stray bullets -cracked and whined impartially around, and British -and German rifles and bullets sound very much alike. -However, partly by judgment and partly by luck, -Sergeant Latham stumbled into our own lines and -warned the garrison of the trench to fire high as the -crew from the derelict Tank would soon be coming in.</p> - -<p>It was as well that the sergeant succeeded in delivering -his message, as a relief had taken place under cover -of the night, and the new garrison had been told nothing -of the Tank out in front, and would certainly -have greeted the returning crew as enemy -raiders.</p> - -<p>Next day, having procured a new magneto, the Tank<span class="pagenum" id="Page_103">103</span> -Commander and some of his crew set out for their machine -with better hope of salving her.</p> - -<p>They were approaching the battle front when an agitated -battery commander hailed them and sought information -as to the Tank out to his front. Hearing -that it was a derelict that they were on their way to -try to bring in, he exclaimed, “Thank God for that! -I’ve been blasting that part this morning. I didn’t -know about the Tank, and I’ve just got a direct hit on -it that’s crumpled it up. I feared it might have been -manned.”</p> - -<p>So ended the short but valiant career of the avenging -“Lusitania.” For his very gallant command, Second -Lieutenant Weber received an immediate award of the -Military Cross, and Sergeant Latham the Military -Medal. The specific action for which the latter was -decorated is officially described as follows:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“76441 <i>Sgt. F. Latham, ‘C’ Batt., awarded M.M.</i> for -conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty. During -the Battle of Arras on April 9, 1917, whilst passing -through a severe enemy barrage, lengths of barbed wire -were caught up by the tracks of his Tank which pulled -the camouflage cover over the exhaust openings, and -caused the whole mass to catch fire. Without waiting -for orders Sergeant Latham climbed on top of the Tank -and removed the burning material. Later on this -N.C.O. displayed the greatest courage whilst attempting -to dig out his Tank under heavy fire.”</p></div> - -<p>Another Tank, commanded by Second Lieutenant -S. S. Ching, in this sector was late in starting, and had -barely caught up its infantry when it became ditched. -It held out, however, for no less than three days while -the fighting eddied about it.</p> - -<p>It made most active use of its 6-pounders, thereby -effectively protecting the right flank of its infantry.</p> - -<p>Another Tank fell bodily into an old gun emplacement<span class="pagenum" id="Page_104">104</span> -near Neuville-Vitasse which had been carefully -turfed over.</p> - -<h3>V<br /> - -<span class="subhead"><span class="smcap">Bullecourt</span></span></h3> - -<p>By the night of the 9th the force of the first wave -was spent, and though, as we have seen, many units -were continuously in action for the next three days, -for the bulk both of Tanks and infantry April 10 was -spent in consolidating positions or digging out and repairing -Tanks.</p> - -<p>On April 11 the attack on Bullecourt and two other -lesser actions were fought. One of the two minor -attacks was that on Monchy, in which six Tanks took -part.</p> - -<p>It was highly successful owing chiefly to the extremely -gallant way in which the machines were fought. -The Tanks took the village practically unassisted and -held it for two hours till the infantry came up.</p> - -<p>Unfortunately, there were no further supplies of -Tanks to exploit the success or more might have been -achieved. The second attack was made from Neuville-Vitasse -down the Siegfried Line. Four Tanks took -part and did great execution, all the machines returning -safely.</p> - -<p>The stars in their courses seem to have fought -against the success of the attack against Bullecourt in -which eleven Tanks co-operated with the Australians.</p> - -<p>It will be remembered that the 5th Army attack was -not to be launched till some time after that in the other -sectors. Also that the state of the roads was such that -it was impossible to bring up enough artillery for a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_105">105</span> -preliminary bombardment. Therefore the Battle of -Bullecourt was to have been a first wave attack in -which a small number of Tanks were to play the lead.</p> - -<p>The eleven Tanks were to have advanced in line upon -the Siegfried defences east of Bullecourt. Some were -then to have wheeled west to attack Bullecourt itself, -while others were to move east down the German trench -system, a third party pushing straight ahead to Riencourt -and Hedecourt.</p> - -<p>The attack was to have been made at dawn on -April 10, and at nightfall on the 9th the Tanks began -their move up to their battle positions behind the railway -embankment. All day the weather had been cold -and stormy, and the Tanks had not gone half a mile -before a violent snow blizzard came on, blotting out -every landmark. Most of the troops who had moves -to make that night were confounded in the swirling -darkness, and though the eleven Tanks did not stray -far, their pace had to be reduced to a crawl and at dawn -they were still far from their battle stations. The Australian -infantry, who had already assembled at the -railway embankment, had to be withdrawn under heavy -shelling, the whole attack postponed, and the manner -of it much modified. All next night the snow fell. -When the attack did take place on the 11th, it proved, -both for Tanks and infantry, a costly little failure. -The day dawned clear and against the whiteness of the -snow every advancing Tank and its broad double track, -stood out sharply. Further, the Australian infantry -wading through the snow, found the path made by the -Tanks irresistible and followed in long lines strung -out along their tracks. Thus Tanks and infantry provided -the Germans with the most perfect artillery targets -imaginable.</p> - -<p>Of the eleven Tanks, nine were knocked out by direct<span class="pagenum" id="Page_106">106</span> -hits before their work was half accomplished. Worst -of all, two Tanks which, with about 200 Australians, -pressed on nearly five miles to Riencourt and Hedecourt, -found their right unprotected owing to our -failure to advance the other part of our line. The Germans -organised a sweeping counter-attack, and the two -villages, the infantry and the Tanks, were surrounded -and taken. -<a id="FNanchor_23" href="#Footnote_23" class="fnanchor">23</a> -“The First Battle of Bullecourt was a minor -disaster—the three brigades of infantry lost very -heavily indeed—and the company of Tanks had been -apparently nothing but a broken reed.</p> - -<p>“For many months after, the Australians distrusted -Tanks—‘the Tanks had failed them’—‘the Tanks had -let them down.’” We shall see that it was not till -after the Battle of Hamel that their confidence was -restored.</p> - -<p>Not a single Tank survived to rally after the battle. -But our worst loss was that of the two Tanks which -were “taken alive,” for examination of the captured -machines revealed to the enemy how effective a weapon -was their armour-piercing bullet against the Mark I.</p> - -<p>After this action a German Order was issued that -every man should be provided with five rounds of the -“K” (armour-piercing) ammunition, and every machine-gun -with several hundred. As long as the -Mark I. was used, these bullets were to cause heavy -casualties among Tanks and their crews.</p> - -<p>For the next ten days Tanks were busy refitting. By -the 20th thirty of the original sixty Tanks were fit -again for action, and on April 23 eleven Tanks were<span class="pagenum" id="Page_107">107</span> -employed in two and threes to help on the infantry advance -on the line of Monchy-Rœux-Gavrelle.</p> - -<p>Again the feature of the day was the fine individual -work.</p> - -<p>The story of a Tank which worked opposite Rœux is -told in the Honours and Awards List in the note on -Sergeant J. Noel’s D.C.M.:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“During the battle of Arras on April 23 this N.C.O. -took command of his Tank after his officer had been -wounded. He fought his Tank with the greatest gallantry -and skill, putting out of action many machine-guns -and killing numbers of the enemy, besides taking -fifty prisoners. His action enabled the infantry to gain -possession of the Chemical Works. He brought his -Tank back safely to its starting-point. His skill and -gallantry were beyond all praise. He was continuously -in action for nine hours.”</p></div> - -<p>This was the first time a Tank was commanded in -action by an N.C.O.</p> - -<p>Another pause followed the actions of the 23rd. Of -the sixty Tanks which had gone in on the 9th, not many -machines remained that could soon be repaired.</p> - -<p>However, twelve Tanks were somehow made “battle-worthy,” -and on May 3 were sent in for the last time -before the Brigade was withdrawn to rest and to be -re-equipped at Wailly, their new training ground.</p> - -<p>A party of four operated between Croisilles and St. -Léger and became heavily engaged in a fight at close -quarters against bombs and trench mortars.</p> - -<p>The second group of eight Tanks made another assault -upon Bullecourt.</p> - -<p>Though individuals did extremely well, the attack -was once more unsuccessful, as, though Tanks reached -their objective, they were obliged to retire again.</p> - -<p>No less than ten Military Medals and a D.C.M. were<span class="pagenum" id="Page_108">108</span> -awarded to men and N.C.O.’s of the Tanks who took -part in this little action.</p> - -<p>The Germans had learnt their lesson, and Tanks and -crews suffered heavily from armour-piercing bullets. -Several of the decorations were given to drivers who -had brought their Tanks safely out of action when -themselves severely wounded.</p> - -<p>With this second attack on Bullecourt ended, as far -as the Tanks were concerned, the Battle of Arras. -There were not many 1st Brigade Tanks to withdraw -to Wailly nor many unwounded men to man them. It -was, however, with feelings very different from those -of the “veterans” of the Somme that officers and men -left the battle.</p> - -<p>The careful training at Bermicourt with its well-planned -courses, its boxing, and its games was justified. -Men and officers could not have displayed a finer fighting -spirit. The value of their work was recognised by -all the units with whom they fought.</p> - -<p>Major-General Williams, commanding the 37th division, -wrote of “C” Battalion’s work in the attack on -Monchy:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“It was a great achievement, and in itself more than -justifies the existence of the Tanks. Officers and men -concerned deserve the highest credit.”</p></div> - -<p>Lieut.-General Aylmer Haldane, commanding the 6th -Corps, wrote to Colonel Baker-Carr, commanding the -1st Brigade, on April 13:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“... I am really most grateful for all the Tanks -and their commanders have done, and the great success -of this Corps is only attributable to the help you have -given us. This has been my first experience of the co-operation<span class="pagenum" id="Page_109">109</span> -of Tanks, and I certainly never again want -to be without them, when so well commanded and led.”</p></div> - -<p>Not only had the personnel done extraordinarily well, -their conduct being “a triumph of <em>moral</em> over technical -difficulties,” but on the whole the general work of the -Tanks had been a success.</p> - -<p>These were briefly the technical lessons of the battle:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>Tanks should be used in masses.</p> - -<p>They should be concentrated.</p> - -<p>A large reserve should always be kept in hand.</p> - -<p>Mark I. machines are not suitable for use on very -wet or very heavily shelled ground.</p> - -<p>Signal and supply Tanks are essential.</p></div> - -<p>In fine, the chief obstacle to a still fuller measure of -success had been that there were 60, and not 260, Tanks -available.</p> -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_110">110</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_VII">CHAPTER VII</h2> - -<p class="subhead">THE BATTLE OF MESSINES AND THE “HUSH” OPERATION</p> -</div> - -<div class="poetry-container pw20"> -<div class="poetry"> - <div class="stanza"> - <div class="verse indentq">“And little would’st thou grudge them</div> - <div class="verse indent2">Their greater depth of soul.</div> - <div class="verse indent0">Thy partners in the torch race,</div> - <div class="verse indent2">Though nearer to the goal.”—<span class="smcap">Ionica.</span></div> - </div> -</div> -</div> - -<h3>I</h3> - -<p><span class="firstword">In</span> many battles in which Tanks later took part, two -or more Tank Brigades would be associated. But the -Battles of Arras and Messines belong, the former to the -1st and the latter to the 2nd Brigade exclusively.</p> - -<p>The 2nd Brigade had been formed exactly like the 1st.</p> - -<p>That is to say, a nucleus of Somme “Tank Veterans” -had been reinforced by picked volunteers from the other -branches of the Service. Like the 1st Brigade they -trained in France, in the Bermicourt area. The unknown -author of the 2nd Battalion history gives an -amusing account of this training in which sports of all -kinds, rugger, soccer, snow fights, boxing and swimming, -helped in the “edification” as well as the more -serious courses.</p> - -<p>One feature of the period was, as usual, a shortage -of instructional machines.</p> - -<p>Dummy Tanks were therefore used for several practice -attacks. The dummies were made of wood and -canvas and were carried from within by their crew of -seven.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“They looked for all the world like some drab-coloured -prehistoric monster with as many legs as a -centipede. A high wind blew during a certain ‘action’<span class="pagenum" id="Page_111">111</span> -in March, and made things most difficult. By the time -the final objective was reached many of the Tanks were -in a state of collapse, the torn canvas revealing the perspiring -machinery to the amused gaze of the onlookers. -The remains of the Tanks were, however, most useful -for firewood and the renovation of beds.”</p></div> - -<p>The account goes on to relate the delightful keenness -of the men, and how their interest in their training was -so great that such serious <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">contretemps</i> as getting in late -for tea “were regarded as nothing.”</p> - -<p>The 2nd Brigade was to be equipped with Mark IV. -Tanks as soon as a supply was available.</p> - -<p>The first batch of machines arrived in France towards -the end of April.</p> - -<p>The Mark IV. Tank was an improved Mark I., and -did not differ very materially from its predecessor in -design.</p> - -<p>These were, briefly, the principal improvements:</p> - -<p>First, its armour was of a special steel which was -impervious to the German armour-piercing bullet.</p> - -<p>Secondly, the sponsons were of a better pattern. In -the Mark I. they had to be completely unshipped whenever -the Tank was moved by rail; in the Mark IV. they -were so constructed that they could be “pushed in” -sufficiently for railway transport.</p> - -<p>Thirdly, a new and heavier design of track rollers -and links was introduced.</p> - -<p>Fourthly, danger from fire was reduced by the petrol -tank (protected, of course, by special armour-plates) -being outside and at the back of the machine.</p> - -<p>There were also other minor improvements in armament, -and the total weight of the Tank was slightly -reduced.</p> - -<p>Such was the weapon which was to be first tried at<span class="pagenum" id="Page_112">112</span> -Messines, and such was the unit which was at the same -time to make its début.</p> - -<h3>II</h3> - -<p>The Battle of Messines did not prove one in which -Tanks were able to show to any particular advantage; -this not because of adverse conditions, but because of -the battle’s very success. It was throughout an extremely -well-planned little action, and would probably -have been perfectly successful even without the co-operation -of Tanks.</p> - -<p>An expert military critic has said of it:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“The Battle of Messines, one of the shortest and best -mounted limited operations of the War, was in no sense -a Tank battle.”</p></div> - -<p>It was perhaps a little hard on the 2nd Brigade, who -fought throughout with particular gallantry, that more -of the laurel could not fall to them.</p> - -<p>For not only was the 2nd Brigade’s maiden battle -notable for gallantry in the field, but also for the very -high standard of the Staff work—the administrative -arrangements indeed long remaining the model for subsequent -Tank operations.</p> - -<p>So inspiring a little action was it, so well planned -and executed in every stage, that the 2nd Brigade themselves -felt that they had been privileged in playing even -a relatively minor part in such an assault.</p> - -<p>Though Tanks proved useful in several phases of the -battle, Tank Commanders are the first to attribute the -successes of the day to the artillery, the tunnelling -companies and the infantry.</p> - -<p>They had early established particularly cordial relations -with the infantry, and it is said that a Maori Unit<span class="pagenum" id="Page_113">113</span> -of the 2nd Anzac Corps gave expert help to the 2nd -Tank Battalion in camouflaging its machines.</p> - -<p>Messines was to be a prelude to a more considerable -attack in the Ypres Salient. The village of Messines -itself and the Wytschaete Ridge were to be taken, thus -securing the British Right for the Ypres attack, and -depriving the enemy of dominating ground.</p> - -<p>The advance was to be a very short one, and the rôle -of the Tanks was to be subsidiary to that of gunners, -sappers and infantry.</p> - -<p>Land Mines were to be a special feature of the action. -The explosion of twenty of these containing over a million -pounds of ammonal was to be the signal for attack -on the morning of June 7.</p> - -<p>Some of the mines had been ready for more than a -year, and we had constructed nearly five miles of galleries. -The Germans too had not been idle.</p> - -<p>At the time of our attack we knew that the enemy -was driving a gallery leading to our Hill 60 mine. By -careful listening we judged that if our offensive were -launched on the date arranged the enemy’s counter-mine -would just fail to reach us. He was, therefore, allowed -to proceed.</p> - -<p>Altogether seventy-two Mark IV. Tanks were to be -employed, and, the lesson of Arras having been learnt, -twelve Mark I. and Mark II. Tanks had been converted -into supply machines. Each of these was able to bring -up sufficient petrol, ammunition and other stores to -replenish five fighting Tanks.</p> - -<p>Forty Tanks were to cross the parapet at zero hour -and the rest of the Tanks were to be held in reserve.</p> - -<p>They were to be distributed as <span class="locked">follows:—</span></p> - -<p><i>To the North</i>: twelve Tanks were to work with the -10th Corps, whose objective was the Oosttaverne line.</p> - -<p><i>In the Centre</i>: sixteen Tanks were attached to the 9th<span class="pagenum" id="Page_114">114</span> -Corps, who were to capture Wytschaete.</p> - -<p><i>To the South</i>: twenty Tanks were to fight with the -2nd Corps, who were to take Messines and a strong -point named Fanny’s Farm, the reserves pushing on to -capture the Oosttaverne line in the second phase of the -attack.</p> - -<p>The weather had been fine and hot for nearly three -weeks before the battle, and a heavy thunder shower -which fell on June 6 hardly laid the dust which had -hung for weeks in a hazy curtain over the approach -roads.</p> - -<p>The Tanks were as usual moved up during the night -before the action. It was very dark, with heavy -thunder clouds hiding the moon.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_24" href="#Footnote_24" class="fnanchor">24</a>“The last part of the approach march will never -be forgotten by those who took part in it.</p> - -<p>“The enemy took it into his head to bombard with -lachrymatory and other gas shells, and the night was -so black that it was impossible to keep gas-masks on the -whole time.</p> - -<p>“So with streaming eyes, with no sort of light, with -Tank Commanders and drivers coughing and spluttering, -the Tanks forged ahead over this area of unseen -trenches, barbed wire and shell-holes, the men buoyed -up by the knowledge of the shock the Hun would receive -in an hour or so.”</p></div> - -<p>Zero hour was to be at dawn.</p> - -<p>Somewhere north of Wytschaete a German dump had -caught fire, and the red flames streamed up against -the pale summer sky.</p> - -<p>It grew lighter, and our aeroplanes and balloons began -to go up, dark against the dawn.</p> - -<p>Our unusual activity in the air did not escape the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_115">115</span> -watchful enemy, and his suspicions were soon thoroughly -aroused.</p> - -<p>He began to send up rockets calling for barrage fire, -and soon his guns were responding with growing -emphasis.</p> - -<p>At seven minutes past three our artillery stopped, -and the rattle of machine-guns stood out in the comparative -silence.</p> - -<p>There was a pause. A low rumbling was heard. -The earth rocked and quivered until with a prolonged -and rending crash a screen of fire rose where the German -front lines had been.</p> - -<p>Masses of earth were hurled skywards, and as they -rose gleamed for a moment purple and gold in the first -rays of the sun. They writhed and shifted, fantastically -swaying, and shot through with flames. Balls of fire -were hurled in every direction, and the air quivered and -vibrated with the shock. Before the tortured earth -could fall again, down came the stunning roar and crash -of the British barrage; and Tanks and infantry were -over the parapet.</p> - -<p>By 7 a.m. the Anzacs were in Messines, and both -Tanks and infantry had reached Fanny’s Farm by -noon, their day’s objective gained.</p> - -<p>One Tank working with the 2nd Corps reached its -final objective (at a distance of about two miles) in an -hour and forty minutes.</p> - -<p>A Tank led the Ulstermen and the Southern Irish of -the 9th Division into Wytschaete.</p> - -<p>By about three o’clock three Tanks had reached -Oosttaverne, and they patrolled the ground beyond the -village till their accompanying Welsh and West Country -troops came up.</p> - -<p>By nightfall we held our final objective everywhere,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_116">116</span> -and had besides captured 7300 prisoners and 67 guns, -94 trench mortars and a very large number of machine-guns.</p> - -<p>All through the night of the 7th-8th the Germans -launched small hastily organised counter-attacks, and -in repelling one of these, chance enabled three Tanks -to play a curious and useful part.</p> - -<p>Three of the Tanks, which had helped in the capture -of Oosttaverne, had ultimately got ditched near a place -named Joye Farm.</p> - -<p>It was impossible to extricate them in the darkness, -and the crews stood by, hoping to get them out as soon -as it was light again.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile towards morning word came that the -Germans were going to counter-attack.</p> - -<p>In the position in which the Tanks lay, the crews were -able to train their 6-pounders against the enemy, who -had been seen massing in the Wanbeke Valley. As the -Lewis guns could not be brought to bear, they were dismounted, -and the rest of the crews operated them from -neighbouring shell-holes.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_25" href="#Footnote_25" class="fnanchor">25</a>“Word was sent to the infantry to warn them of -the coming attack, and to ask for co-operation. They -replied that they had run short of ammunition for their -Lewis gun, and some was supplied to them from the -Tanks.”</p></div> - -<p>The attack did not develop as early as had been expected, -but when it came it was in force.</p> - -<p>From about 6.30 onwards the enemy repeatedly attempted -to advance, raking the Tanks with a hail of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_117">117</span> -armour-piercing bullets, which, however, failed to -penetrate.</p> - -<p>They were driven off every time with heavy loss, until -at 11.30 a.m. our artillery opened and dispersed them -with barrage fire.</p> - -<h3>III</h3> - -<p>The failure of their armour-piercing bullets against -the Mark IV. must have proved something of a disappointment -to the enemy.</p> - -<p>It is curious to trace the effort which the Germans -made to keep up with our development of the Tank.</p> - -<p>For once, we had moved first, and the enemy was -always to be a lap behind.</p> - -<p>No sooner had he discovered how effective was his -“K” bullet against the Mark I. Tank, than we confronted -him with the Mark IV., against which it was -powerless.</p> - -<p>The Germans always had rather hazy ideas as to the -capabilities and habits of our current Tank. They had -had ample opportunity of examining two Tanks which -lay derelict in their lines on the Somme, yet until the -Battle of Arras they believed that Tanks were largely -dependent on the use of roads, and that therefore pits -and other obstacles in roads must form a useful anti-Tank -defence.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_26" href="#Footnote_26" class="fnanchor">26</a>“It was also not till the later stages of the Battle -of Arras that the enemy realised from some captured -Tanks near Bullecourt that the ‘K’ bullet was effective -against the type of Tank that had been in use against -them since September 1916.</p> - -<p>“By the time the enemy had fully realised this, however, -the old Tanks were used up, and at Messines the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_118">118</span> -Mark IV. had made its appearance and the chance of -the armour-piercing bullet was over....</p> - -<p>“After Messines the Germans began to realise the -importance of artillery as a defence against Tanks, and -‘the chief rôle allotted to the infantry was to keep its -head’ and leave the rest to the guns....</p> - -<p>“Prominence was given to indirect fire<a id="FNanchor_27" href="#Footnote_27" class="fnanchor">27</a> of guns of -both heavy and light calibres on approaching Tanks. -In spite of several dawn attacks the enemy laid great -stress on what he called ‘Distant Defence,’ and a few -special anti-Tank guns, about two per divisional front, -were placed in specially covered positions.”</p></div> - -<p>It was not till the Battle of Cambrai in November -1917 that he was to discover by chance the one effective -weapon against Tanks. That is to say, Direct Fire by -field guns.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">The “Hush” Operation</span><br /> -<span class="subhead">I</span></h3> - -<p>Before it was decided to fight the enemy at Messines -there had been an idea of an attack near Lens, and -most of the reconnaissance for such a battle had been -carried out.</p> - -<p>Like many another battle of the War, it was never -fought, and remained only the shadow of an operation.</p> - -<p>Of all these shadows and projected attacks, the one -which had attracted more interest than any other was -in active preparation while the 2nd Brigade was fighting -at Messines.</p> - -<p>This was the revised and abridged version of the -famous “Hush” operation, that is, of the projected -attack on the Belgian coast.</p> - -<p>The first time such a notion had been suggested was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_119">119</span> -in the spring of 1916, and elaborate plans were then -made for a surprise landing in and near Ostend.</p> - -<p>But we were obliged to co-operate with the French, -and to fight instead on the Somme. The First Battle -of the Somme, however, developed into a “slogging -match” and lasted through the rest of that campaigning -season.</p> - -<p>Next year the idea was again brought up. This time -Tanks were to take part. The scheme was a less ambitious -one, and the landing was to be effected between -Ostend and the Allied line about Nieuport. A special -detachment of Tanks was located at Erin, and started -training for the difficult manœuvre of climbing the sea -wall which here protects the coast. This training was -carried out as secretly as possible, and it was given out -that its object was the surmounting of some of the -Lille fortifications, a figment which for long satisfied -the minds of the curious.</p> - -<p>The problem to be solved was an exceedingly complex -one.</p> - -<p>The mere landing of Tanks on an open beach is no -light matter. When that beach is heavily defended by -an alert and resourceful enemy, when it is commanded -and enfiladed by a concentration of artillery of all -calibres concealed amongst the dunes, and when in -addition the shelving beach is crowned by a steep sea -wall of concrete, a landing would seem to have but -small chance of success. Still, there was a chance, and -the stake at hazard being a big one, big risks might be -cheerfully accepted.</p> - -<p>The general plans for the enterprise having been approved -in the highest quarters, were then very carefully -worked out down to the smallest details by a little band<span class="pagenum" id="Page_120">120</span> -of experts, prominent amongst whom were Admiral -Bacon, Lieut.-Colonel Philip Johnson, and Major Hotblack.</p> - -<p>The whole of the projected landing was elaborately -staged, and long and patiently rehearsed—the Tanks -playing the lead in what the whole various cast hoped -was to be a really notable success.</p> - -<p>Immense pontoons 600 ft. in length were specially -built to carry the landing parties—armies in little with -representatives almost of every arm and branch except -the cavalry.</p> - -<p>These strange craft were to be lashed between a -couple of monitors, and so pushed across the channel -and up the beach at certain selected points, points that -exhaustive air reconnaissance and photography at all -states of the tide had indicated as most suitable.</p> - -<p>Actual trials of the pontoons and their monitor -escorts were made in the secret waters of the Thames, -and officers of the Tank Corps would suddenly disappear -on unknown missions, to reappear as suddenly -with no memory as to where they had been or what -they had seen in the interval.</p> - -<p>The sea wall itself might well have been designed as -a special defence against sea-borne hostile Tanks, its -smooth concave face and projecting coping making it -absolutely unscalable by an honest Tank.</p> - -<p>The wall was of recent construction, and by a fortunate -chance the Belgian architect who had designed -it had escaped to France with all his drawings.</p> - -<p>From his plans an exact reproduction of a length of -the wall was made.</p> - -<p>There in the experimental ground it stood, perfectly -smooth, and worst of all, ending at the top in a curl-over -coping.</p> - -<p>At least, however, the engineers now knew the extent<span class="pagenum" id="Page_121">121</span> -of their problem.</p> - -<p>In the first place, the Tanks had to get up somehow, -and in the second place, when they were up they had -to help haul up guns and transport lorries.</p> - -<p>After “trying on” various devices, the Tanks at last -adopted what was practically a portable ramp for the -occasion.</p> - -<p>The Tank, until it reached the sea wall, carried it -well in the air on a long spar supported by wire -hawsers.</p> - -<p>Then the ramp was lowered on to the pair of little -wheels with which it was fitted. On these the Tank -pushed it up the incline, wheelbarrow fashion, until -further progress was stopped by the coping.</p> - -<p>The two wheels were then immediately shed, and steel -spikes on the under side of the work were driven into -the concrete by the weight of the Tank, which now, disengaging -itself, proceeded to climb up its own scaling -ladder which it had thus placed in position. But the -lorries and guns had still to be provided for.</p> - -<p>The angle formed by the inclined plane and the level -ground above the retaining wall was a sharp one.</p> - -<p>Besides, it must be understood that the inclined plane -used by the Tanks fitted in under the concrete lip. At -the point of junction between the ground and the inclined -plane there was, therefore, a considerable bump. -Both the acuteness of the angle and this “bump” made -it necessary to adopt some less back-breaking device for -the four-wheeled vehicles. A strong gangway, like a -see-saw, was therefore employed, and up this they were -hauled, the weight of the gun or lorry gently tipping -the board down when it passed the balancing -point.</p> - -<p>But the landing was never made, and for this many<span class="pagenum" id="Page_122">122</span> -elaborate explanations have been put forward.</p> - -<p>Two circumstances seem, however, sufficient to explain -the apparent withdrawal of our hands from the -plough.</p> - -<p>The first was what seemed a trivial attack which the -Germans made on July 10.</p> - -<p>It will be remembered that the Belgian inundations -stretched inland opposite Nieuport, almost from the -mile-wide belt of dry ground next the sea which was -formed by the sand dunes. Through these dunes cut -the river Yser, and near the coast we held both banks -of the river. When the time came, General Rawlinson -could have moved his troops forward freely over the -numerous bridges which had been made, to join hands -with the landing party for whom he had so long been -waiting.</p> - -<p>In the dune and polder country trenches were impossible, -and our defence here consisted of breastworks -built in the sand.</p> - -<p>Now it had been abundantly and constantly proved -throughout 1915 and 1916 that any advanced trench -system could be taken at any time by the side which -was prepared to mass sufficient troops and guns for the -purpose.</p> - -<p>The Germans could have stretched out their hands at -any moment for this bit of coast.</p> - -<p>They chose not to grasp it until they imagined that -our plans, whatever they might be, were complete, and -when their attack would probably cause us the maximum -of inconvenience. Therefore, it was on July 10 -that, after a tremendous bombardment, they attacked -the position in overwhelming force. Our defence -was gallant but vain, and by the evening the Germans<span class="pagenum" id="Page_123">123</span> -had captured the northern part of our bridgeheads.</p> - -<p>It is true that we succeeded in holding Nieuport -itself, but the loss of even the small strip of ground to -the north of it rendered the assembly of troops in that -area for our own attack, which was to co-operate with -the coast landing, almost impossible.</p> - -<p>The second and more weighty circumstance was the -fatal slowness of our main advance at Ypres.</p> - -<p>In the next chapters we shall consider these tragic -months, whose slow passage swept away so many -schemes and hopes, and made unfruitful so much -thought and labour.</p> - -<p>Enough that the “Hush” operation was swept silently -away with the rest. As late as the beginning of -October, however, the men who had planned so cunningly, -whose minds had surmounted so many difficulties, -still hoped that their work might not prove barren.</p> - -<p>But by the middle of the month it had become clear -that the landing could not take place, and the end of -October the special Tank detachment was finally disbanded.</p> -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_124">124</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_VIII">CHAPTER VIII</h2> - -<p class="subhead">THE FLANDERS CAMPAIGN—PREPARATIONS FOR THE -THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES</p> -</div> - -<p><span class="firstword">The</span> Third Battle of Ypres represented the remaining -fragment of what was to have been a great and -extensive campaign. It was the stump of a tree shorn -down to shoulder height and bare of leaves and -branches.</p> - -<p>One circumstance after another had postponed the -execution of the large design. Troops which had been -earmarked for it had had to be diverted to other parts -of the front.</p> - -<p>We had had to put it off to co-operate more closely -with the French, and certain other obstacles had arisen, -the full story of which has not even yet been told.</p> - -<p>The Battle of Messines was over by June 12, but it -was considered that if an attack in the strongly fortified -Ypres Salient was to have a real chance of success, it -must be an attack in force, a regular full-dress battle, -for which the preparations were then held to be necessarily -extremely elaborate.</p> - -<p>About six weeks were therefore to elapse before the -attack was launched. Once launched, however, the attackers -must gain their objectives rapidly. That was -essential to the plan.</p> - -<p>The Russian front was crumbling. Germany was -bringing troops and guns westward. We should soon -be face to face with an enemy so strongly reinforced -that our chance of victory in an attack would be slight.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_125">125</span></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_28" href="#Footnote_28" class="fnanchor">28</a>“It was in some degree a race against time. If a -true strategic purpose was to be effected before winter, -the first stages must be quickly passed. The high -ground east of the Salient must be won in a fortnight, -to enable the British to move against the German bases -in West Flanders and clear the coastline.”</p></div> - -<p>Not only must we hasten because we faced an enemy -whose strength would be increasing daily, but because -we were to attack in Flanders, and the summer would -be far spent before we could complete our preparations.</p> - -<p>The enemy’s lines lay on the slopes of the semicircle -of low hills that overlook Ypres. Behind him lay -another swampy valley, which rose again to another -slightly higher crescent of hills.</p> - -<p>In the inner arena lay the ruins of Ypres, and, set -in the marshy levels and immediately overlooked by the -first semicircle of hillocks and more distantly by the -second, lay our lines.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_29" href="#Footnote_29" class="fnanchor">29</a>“The territory lying within the crescent was practically -all reclaimed swamp land including Ypres and -as far back as to St. Omer, both of which, a few hundred -years ago, were seaports. All agriculture in this -area depended on careful drainage, the water being carried -away in innumerable dykes. So important was -the maintenance of this drainage system considered, -that in normal times a Belgian farmer who allowed his -dykes to fall into disrepair was heavily fined.”</p></div> - -<p>Across this terrain two great armies had faced each -other for nearly three years.</p> - -<p>The Salient was, after Verdun, the most tortured of -the Western battlefields. Constant shelling of the low -ground west of the ridges had blocked or diverted the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_126">126</span> -streams and the natural drainage, and turned it into a -sodden wilderness.</p> - -<p>If August was a wet month, as it had been the year -before for the Battle of the Somme, our chance of success -was scanty.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_30" href="#Footnote_30" class="fnanchor">30</a>“Much rain would make a morass of the Salient -where Tanks could not be used, transport could scarcely -move, and troops would be exposed to the last degree of -misery.”</p></div> - -<p>However, the previous shelling of the ground was as -nothing compared with the bombardment which we now -intended to inflict.</p> - -<p>Every corner of the enemy’s ground was to be -drenched with our fire.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_31" href="#Footnote_31" class="fnanchor">31</a>“The present battle was to be preceded by the -longest bombardment ever carried out by the British -Army, eight days’ counter-battery work (begun on -July 7) being followed by sixteen days’ intense bombardment. -The effect of this cannonade was to destroy -the drainage system and to produce water in the shell-holes -formed, even before the rain fell.”</p></div> - -<h3>II</h3> - -<p>The enemy had for long been in no doubt of our intentions. -The coming battle was much discussed in -Germany.</p> - -<p>General von Armin (Commander of the German 4th -Army) was to remain strictly on the defensive.</p> - -<p>He was to “put in time,” to “poke,” in fact, until -the big movement of troops from the East should have -thoroughly reconstituted the Western Front.</p> - -<p>We were to be allowed to waste our time and our<span class="pagenum" id="Page_127">127</span> -forces in petty gains of unimportant territory, and to -eat our hearts out in the slough.</p> - -<p>To this end, and because the waterlogged soil of -Flanders did not allow of the making of another Siegfried -Line, the enemy had devised a new tactical -method.</p> - -<p>Directly the theory of this method is understood, -many of the once puzzling circumstances of this battle -become comprehensible.</p> - -<p>It involved the use of but one comparatively new contrivance, -the “pill-box.” The “pill-box,” first seen at -Messines, was a small concrete fort. Sometimes it only -stood up a yard or two above the ground. More often -it stood well up, concealed within the ruins of a derelict -farm.</p> - -<p>It held a garrison of anything up to thirty or forty -men, and bristled with machine-guns.</p> - -<p>The tactics themselves in which the pill-boxes figured -are admirably described by Mr. Buchan:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“The enemy’s plan was to hold his first line—which -was often a mere string of shell-craters linked by a -trench—with a few men, who would fall back before -an assault. He had his guns well behind, so that they -should not be captured in the first rush, and would be -available for a barrage when his opponents were entangled -in the ‘pill-box’ zone. Finally, he had his reserves -in the second line, ready for the counterstroke -before the assault could secure the ground won.... -Any attack would be allowed to make some advance; -but if the German plan worked well, this advance would -be short-lived, and would be dearly paid for. Instead -of the cast-iron front of the Siegfried area, the -Flanders line would be highly elastic, but would spring -back into position after pressure with a deadly -rebound.”</p></div> - -<p>The thoroughness and success with which this plan<span class="pagenum" id="Page_128">128</span> -was carried out may be read in the story of Glencorse -Wood, of St. Julien, and of many another bitterly -fought “Minor Action.”</p> - -<p>In the meantime, the enemy watched us from his vantage -ground, and day and night harassed us with his -shelling, his aerial bombing, and his gas.</p> - -<h3>III</h3> - -<p>On our side the preparations for a formidable attack -continued steadily.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_32" href="#Footnote_32" class="fnanchor">32</a>“The various problems inseparable from the mounting -of a great offensive, the improvement and construction -of roads and railways, the provision of an adequate -water supply and of accommodation for troops, the -formation of dumps, the digging of dug-outs, subways -and trenches, and the assembling and registering of -guns, had all to be met and overcome in the new theatre -of battle, under conditions of more than ordinary disadvantage.</p> - -<p>“On no previous occasion, not excepting the attack -on the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge, had the whole of -the ground from which we had to attack been so completely -exposed to the enemy’s observation. Even -after the enemy had been driven from the Messines-Wytschaete -Ridge, he still possessed excellent direct observations -over the Salient from the east and south-east, -as well as from the Pilckem Ridge to the north. -Nothing existed at Ypres to correspond with the vast -caves and cellars which proved of such value in the -days prior to the Arras battle, and the provision of -shelter for the troops presented a very serious problem.”</p></div> - -<p>It was a problem which in some sectors proved -insoluble, and troops and working parties had to come<span class="pagenum" id="Page_129">129</span> -up night by night into the forward area, going back -far behind the lines at dawn.</p> - -<p>Like their fellows of every other arm, members of -the Tank Corps carried out their battle preparations -under conditions of peculiar difficulty.</p> - -<p>But the 1st Brigade of Tanks had something more -than indiscriminate harassing fire and “area shoots” -to trouble them.</p> - -<p>The enemy had obtained information of our tankodrome -in Oosthoek Wood from a British prisoner, who -was either a garrulous fool or a very treacherous -knave.</p> - -<p>A soldier belonging to a certain infantry regiment, -had betrayed every detail of the whereabouts of the -Tanks of the 1st Brigade, and of the programme of their -movements. A German document was captured setting -forth the whole of this creature’s evidence and explaining -its value and significance. The official account of -this murderous piece of treachery was periodically read -out on parade to all Tank units, and formed the text -of many discourses on the vital importance of strict -secrecy and high <em>moral</em>. The name of this man will -for ever have a sinister sound for all who served in the -Tank Corps.</p> - -<p>Fortunately for us, the Germans seem to have but -half believed his story—at any rate, the shelling to -which they thereafter periodically subjected the secret -tankodrome was, though accurate, never so heavy as -such an important target would have seemed to warrant. -Perhaps the Germans, having no illusions as to -what fighting in Flanders meant, and being reasonably -alive to the natural limitations of Tanks, scouted the -idea of a Tank attack being possible or being even seriously -contemplated. Be that as it may, they certainly<span class="pagenum" id="Page_130">130</span> -failed to act on the very valuable information given -them in anything like an adequate way.</p> - -<p>Still, after some days of well-directed shelling and -bombing, it was decided to withdraw the whole of the -personnel from Oosthoek Wood, and to lodge them in -camps in the plantations just north of Château Lovie, -where the Headquarters of the 1st Brigade was already -established.</p> - -<p>Hither, too, had come the Advanced Headquarters of -the Tank Corps, the original intention of occupying a -most eligible house in the town of Poperinghe being -given up, in view of the inconvenience caused by the -periodic shelling of the place and the consequent interruption -of communications.</p> - -<p>The advance Reconnaissance party had spent some -weeks in the town, and had been considerably annoyed -by frequent and accurate high-velocity shelling.</p> - -<p>The concentration of personnel which thus came -about seemed inconvenient enough at first, but turned -out most usefully, and liaison between the Brigade and -its battalions had never been so good.</p> - -<p>There were forward dumps to be established with the -aid of the supply Tanks.<a id="FNanchor_33" href="#Footnote_33" class="fnanchor">33</a></p> - -<p>Very special preparations had to be made in order to -bring the Tanks within striking distance of the enemy. -The roads were reserved for lighter traffic. The enemy -shelling was too heavy for railway making to be possible<span class="pagenum" id="Page_131">131</span> -beyond the detraining camps at Oosthoek -Wood.</p> - -<p>Tentative attempts to push the line further on were -constantly made, and as constantly detected and discouraged -by the enemy.</p> - -<p>The Tanks must have some sort of independent routes -of their own over the innumerable small waterways that -must be crossed.</p> - -<p>The Kemmelbeke, the Lambardtheke, and in some -places the Yser Canal, all lay in the way. Miles of -rough causeways over the marshes had to be built; -splinter-proof shelters for the various advanced Headquarters, -and, further back, camps, Tank “stables,” -storage sheds, kitchens and so forth, had all to be constructed.</p> - -<p>Such a programme of work was beyond the unaided -power of the Tank Corps, and therefore the 184th Tunnelling -Company was allotted to the Corps, one section -to each Brigade.</p> - -<p>Much of the canal bridging and of the track making -was done under fire, shrapnel, gas and H.E.</p> - -<p>Often a series of shells, bursting on the newly laid -causeway would undo a day’s work in a few minutes. -Half the time the men had to wear gas-masks, and almost -always they worked knee-deep in liquid mud or -in the oozy bed of some little “beke.”</p> - -<p>Yet in no instance did the 184th Tunnelling Company -fail to carry out the work allotted to it.</p> - -<p>One very ingenious piece of mechanism for use on -the Tank itself had been evolved at Central Workshops -in view of the Flanders mud. This was the “Unditching -Beam.” It was a massive baulk of teak, iron shod -at the ends, and having heavy chains whereby it might -be secured to the tracks when it was needed.</p> - -<p>Its length was somewhat greater than the width of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_132">132</span> -the Tank over its tracks, and therefore ordinarily it -was carried lengthwise along the back of the machine.</p> - -<p>Its battle position was across the Tank, where it -rested on the raised guide-rails which served to lift it -clear of the conning-tower, the silencer and the other -excrescences above the armoured back.</p> - -<p>To these guide-rails it was secured by special holdfasts -to prevent it from breaking adrift when the Tank -pitched or rolled amongst the shell-holes.</p> - -<p>When the Tank got “bellied,” these holdfasts had to -be released and the drag-chains attached to the tracks -by one of the crew climbing out on to the roof—the feat -being one of some danger when in the near presence of -the enemy.</p> - -<p>The beam having been duly attached, the differential -gear would be locked and the clutch released, when the -revolving tracks would carry the beam over the nose of -the Tank, from which it would dangle by its two track-chains -until dragged beneath the Tank itself.</p> - -<p>If the ground proved loose and boggy beyond a certain -point, the beam would merely be dragged under -the Tank to come up again behind, clogged and dripping -with mud and leaving the “ditched” Tank still -wallowing on its belly.</p> - -<p>Sometimes Tanks would thrash away with their unditching -beams until their vain efforts to struggle out -of some quaking quagmire on to better ground overheated -the engines or caused the machine to settle down -so hopelessly in the oozing mud as to be flooded out.</p> - -<p>Save on the very worst ground, however, the unditching -beam proved a most effective contrivance, and but -little could have been done in the Ypres fighting without -it.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_133">133</span></p> - -<div id="ip_133" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 43em;"> - <img src="images/i_132a.jpg" width="688" height="379" alt="" /> - <div class="caption">A FLANDERS PILL-BOX</div></div> - -<div id="ip_133b" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 43em;"> - <img src="images/i_132b.jpg" width="680" height="454" alt="" /> - <div class="caption">THE UNDITCHING BEAM IN ACTION</div></div> - -<div id="ip_133c" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 28em;"> - <img src="images/i_132c.jpg" width="436" height="448" alt="" /> - <div class="caption">THE STEENBECK VALLEY BEFORE THE BATTLE</div></div> - -<div id="ip_133d" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 29em;"> - <img src="images/i_132d.jpg" width="454" height="483" alt="" /> - <div class="caption">THE STEENBECK VALLEY AFTER BOMBARDMENT</div></div> - -<h3>IV</h3> - -<p>The Reconnaissance Side had also been busy during -the weeks of preparation.</p> - -<p>To facilitate the movement of Tanks over the battlefield -a new system was made use of, by which a list of -compass bearings from well-defined points to a number -of features in the enemy’s territory was prepared, thus -enabling direction to be picked up.</p> - -<p>This system was to prove invaluable when, later, the -tides of battle had obliterated all the nearer landmarks, -and men wandered hopelessly lost in the increasing -desolation.</p> - -<p>The Reconnaissance Officers’ methods of observation -did not differ from those they had employed at -Arras.</p> - -<p>They used artillery O.P.’s, they flew over the enemy -lines, a “supply of prisoners” for special examination -was allotted to them, they talked to refugees, they observed, -made and annotated maps, and drew many -panoramas, and made detailed raised maps in plasticine.</p> - -<p>By early July they had collected a great mass of information -that was not only vitally important to the -Tank Corps, but also of great use to the other arms.</p> - -<p>Very carefully constructed from information collected -from all sources, a huge sand model was laid out -by the 19th Corps in Oosthoek Wood. Every hillock or -depression, every road, railway, trench, stream, ruin, -spinney, or other landmark, was faithfully reproduced -to scale. The miniature trenches were formed in -lengths of cast concrete, the trees were represented by -little evergreen bushes, and real water lay in the pools -and shallows of the Lilliputian Steenbeek.</p> - -<p>The model covered nearly an acre—a man to the same<span class="pagenum" id="Page_134">134</span> -scale would have been about the size of a normal -mouse.</p> - -<p>At one side of the model was a high wooden platform -raised on a scaffolding and reached by a ladder, -and from this point of vantage this Ypres Salient in -little could be overlooked and memorised as from a kite -balloon.</p> - -<p>For several weeks before the day appointed for the -battle, the platform was almost constantly occupied by -groups of officers. Indeed, it was seldom unoccupied -during daylight from the time it was erected to the -eve of the great attack, and round and across the model -perpetually wandered little groups of officers and N.C.O.’s -with maps and notebooks and orders—discussing, -pointing, explaining. Generals personally conducted -their immediate subordinates over the mimic battlefield, -whilst N.C.O.’s were coached by their Company Commanders.</p> - -<p>From a liaison point of view the model was invaluable. -Individual Tank Commanders there met the infantry -officers with whom they were actually to fight, -and would walk and talk over “the ground” together, -until they were perfectly clear about their own and each -other’s rôles, routes, objectives and time-tables, after -which mutual esteem and confidence would be cemented -and reinforced at the dinner table.</p> - -<p>In this and similar ways a close and cordial <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">entente</i> -was established between the Tanks and their partners -the infantry, and there were many battlefield incidents -that showed vividly how much success depended on this -personal liaison and good fellowship.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_135">135</span></p> - -<h3>V</h3> - -<p>There was to be nothing novel in our general plan of -assault.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_34" href="#Footnote_34" class="fnanchor">34</a> “The 5th Army attack was to be carried out on -well-recognised lines; namely, a lengthy artillery preparation -followed by an infantry attack on a large scale -and infantry exploitation until resistance became severe, -when the advance would be halted and a further -organised attack prepared on the same scale. This methodical -progression was to be continued until the exhaustion -of the German reserves and <em>moral</em> created a -situation which would enable a complete break through -to be effected.”</p></div> - -<p>Tanks were everywhere to be auxiliary, and were to -be employed to deal with strong points and for “mopping -up” behind the infantry.</p> - -<p>There was, however, one great improvement in the -method of using them.</p> - -<p>They were to be used in definite “waves.” That is -to say, supposing thirty-six Tanks were to be employed -on a sector where the Germans had established the usual -three lines of defence, twelve Tanks would start at zero -and be used to take the first objective. Meanwhile, the -second wave would have been advancing, and as soon -as the first objective had been taken by the first wave, -the second wave would pass through them and on to -the second objective. The third party of twelve would -advance in the same way—a wave to each objective.</p> - -<p>The method did not, as a matter of fact, have a good -trial on this occasion, for, in the first place, the Tanks’ -first objective was only the infantry second objective;<span class="pagenum" id="Page_136">136</span> -and as we have seen, the enemy did not this time employ -his usual method of three set lines at all.</p> - -<p>Altogether three Brigades of Tanks were to be employed -with the 5th Army.</p> - -<p>Tank Brigade Commanders were to keep in touch with -Corps Commanders, Tank Battalions were to act with -Divisions, Tank Companies (twelve fighting Tanks) -with Brigades, and individual Tanks with Battalions.</p> - -<p>The three Brigades were to be distributed as <span class="locked">follows:—</span></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p class="hang">A. <i>2nd Corps</i> (consisting of the 24th, 30th, 18th, 8th -and 25th Divisions).</p> -<p class="in1h hang"><i>2nd Tank Brigade</i> (“A” and “B” Battalions).</p> -<p class="in1h hang">72 Tanks to be allotted as <span class="locked">follows:—</span></p> - -<div class="p1 b1 center"> -<table id="t136a" class="narrow25" summary="2nd Tank Brigade allocation"> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">1st Objective</td> - <td class="tdr">16</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">2nd<span class="in2">”</span></td> - <td class="tdr">24</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">3rd<span class="in2"> ”</span></td> - <td class="tdr">24</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl" colspan="2">The remainder to be held in reserve.</td></tr> -</table> -</div></div> - -<p>The main objective was to be the Broodseinde Ridge.</p> - -<p>The ground in this area was broken by swamps and -woods; only three approaches were possible for Tanks, -and these formed dangerous defiles.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p class="hang">B. <i>19th Corps</i> (consisting of the 15th, 55th, 16th and -36th Divisions).</p> - -<p class="in1h hang"><i>3rd Tank Brigade</i> (“C” and “F” Battalions).</p> - -<p class="in1h hang">72 Tanks to be arranged as <span class="locked">follows:—</span></p> - -<div class="p1 b1 center"> -<table id="t136b" class="narrow25" summary="3rd Tank Brigade arrangement"> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">1st Objective</td> - <td class="tdr">24</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">2nd<span class="in2">”</span></td> - <td class="tdr">24</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Reserve</td> - <td class="tdr">24</td></tr> -</table> -</div></div> - -<p>The main objective was to be a section of the Gheluvelt-Langemarck -line.</p> - -<p>On the 19th Corps front the valley of the Steenbeek<span class="pagenum" id="Page_137">137</span> -was in a terrible condition, innumerable shell-holes and -pools of water existed, the drainage of the Steenbeek -having been seriously affected by the shelling.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p class="hang">C. <i>18th Corps</i> (consisting of the 39th, 51st, 11th and -48th Divisions).</p> - -<p class="in1h hang"><i>1st Tank Brigade</i> (“D” and “G” Battalions).</p> - -<p class="in1h hang">36 Tanks to be allotted <span class="locked">thus:—</span></p> - -<div class="p1 b1 center"> -<table id="t137" class="narrow25" summary="1st Tank Brigade allocation"> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">1st Objective</td> - <td class="tdr">12</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">2nd<span class="in2">”</span></td> - <td class="tdr">12</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Corps Reserve</td> - <td class="tdr">12</td></tr> -</table> -</div></div> - -<p>They were to seize the crossings of the Steenbeek and -establish posts beyond it.</p> - -<p>On the 18th Corps front the ground between our front -line and Steenbeek was cut up and sodden. The Steenbeek -itself was a difficult obstacle, and the only good -crossing was at St. Julien, thus forming a dangerous -defile.</p> - -<p>Thirty-six Tanks belonging to the 1st Brigade were -held in Army Reserve.</p> - -<p>Such was the battle order of the Tanks.</p> - -<p>Zero was fixed for 3.30 a.m. on July 31. By the last -week in July misty weather with often a drizzle of rain -at night had set in.</p> - -<p>Our preparations were complete, but it was perhaps -not without a certain anxiety that our commanders -awaited the issues of the engagement.</p> - -<p>By none might such an uneasiness have been felt with -better reason than by General Elles.</p> - -<p>The Army had staked much upon a gamble, but at -least it had not been forced to stake its prestige. General -Elles must have been conscious that the very existence -of the Tank Corps might hang upon the fortunes of -the coming attack.</p> -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_138">138</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_IX">CHAPTER IX</h2> - -<p class="subhead">THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES</p> -</div> - -<div class="poetry-container pw25"> -<div class="poetry"> - <div class="stanza"> - <div class="verse indentq">“Quenched in a boggy Syrtis, neither sea</div> - <div class="verse indent0">Nor good dry land—nigh foundered, on he fares,</div> - <div class="verse indent0">Treading the crude consistence; half on foot.”</div> - </div> - <div class="attrib"><cite>Paradise Lost.</cite></div> - -</div> -</div> - -<p><span class="firstword">The</span> night of July 30 was dark and wet, and towards -morning a fine mizzling rain blurred the outlines of the -star shells that lit up the lines. Along fifteen miles of -front the English and German guns had roared against -each other all night.</p> - -<p>The waiting men shivered in their wet assembly -trenches.</p> - -<p>About three o’clock on the morning of the 31st there -was a lull in the firing. A low soaking blanket of Scotch -mist had crept up and lay heavily enfolding the opposing -armies. Zero hour was drawing near. All along -the front, men were feeling for the little footholds above -the fire-step.</p> - -<p>At 3.50 the streaming darkness was rent along the -seven miles of attack. Thermite and blazing oil flared -out, and such a barrage as had not yet been crashed -upon the enemy’s line, and infantry and Tanks scrambled -and lurched in the darkness in and out of shell-holes -over the torn and slimy ground.</p> - -<p>The German front line fell at once along the whole -seven miles. Until nearly eight o’clock men and Tanks -could hardly get through the mud fast enough to come -to grips with the enemy. On each Corps front there -were many machines that got ditched on the enemy front<span class="pagenum" id="Page_139">139</span> -line as they nosed about here and there, seeking to mop -up lurking machine-gun nests and snipers.</p> - -<p>There some of them remained stuck fast, not having -seen the main body of the enemy at all, so immediate had -been his retreat.</p> - -<p>His artillery was, however, active enough, and as the -Tanks floundered or stuck utterly in the mud, his guns -and his low-flying aeroplanes took steady toll.</p> - -<p>All morning we pressed on, the enemy Command -patiently conserving the power of its armies.</p> - -<p>The doings of a group of Tanks belonging to the 3rd -Brigade give an extraordinarily good idea of this part -of the action. They were fighting on the 19th Corps -front.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_35" href="#Footnote_35" class="fnanchor">35</a>“At 11.30 a.m. message was received that a Battalion -of Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were held -up on the right. Tank ‘Canada’ moved in this direction -and silenced enemy machine-guns in the Railway -Embankment, assisted by the Tank ‘Cuidich’n Rich.’ -When patrolling in front of the infantry whilst they -were consolidating, Tank bellied.</p> - -<p>“At the same time enemy barrage came down, and -both Tank ‘Canada’ and Tank ‘Cuidich’n Rich’ received -direct hits. Five of the crew remained with the -infantry, and assisted in repelling a counter-attack, two -of the men being wounded.</p> - -<p>“... Tank ‘Cape Colony’ arrived at Low Farm -and proceeded in front of the infantry. Came under -heavy shell-fire and bellied. Whilst unditching, Tanks -‘Cyprus’ and ‘Culloden’ were observed under heavy -fire from anti-Tank guns, which were in position on the -high ground beyond. Both ‘Cyprus’ and ‘Culloden’ -were seen to be hit.</p> - -<p>“‘Cape Colony’ then came under heavy M.G. fire -from both flanks. On request of infantry ‘Cape Colony’<span class="pagenum" id="Page_140">140</span> -proceeded to a wood on right flank, where they were -held up.</p> - -<p>“Although not fired upon from the Tank, several -enemy machine-gunners surrendered to the infantry, on -seeing the Tank approach. ‘Cape Colony’ now turned -N.E. towards Beck House, where a good view of anti-Tank -guns, which had been shelling ‘Cyprus’ and ‘Culloden,’ -was obtained. Whilst manœuvring to take these -guns in flank or rear, the Tank sank in a swamp, water -rising to the engine cover. Boche aeroplanes circled low -overhead whilst unsuccessful attempts were made to -unditch. Enemy shelling then became very heavy, so -Lewis guns were taken out and Tank locked up.</p> - -<p>“... Flag Tank ‘Cumbrae’ was delayed half an -hour by bellying in a trench near Bill Cottage, went in -front of the infantry towards second objective. Opened -fire on enemy who were disappearing in direction of -Delva Farm. Ground was quite water-logged, and Tank -bellied in a borrow pit. Whilst digging out was fired -at by a sniper, and by an aeroplane flying low overhead. -Time was then zero plus 9 hours (<i>i.e.</i>, 12.50 p.m.).</p> - -<p>“... Tank ‘Caithness’ came under sniper and -machine-gun fire near Beck House. No bullets penetrated -armour-plating. Proceeded in company with -Tank ‘Carstairs,’ which silenced enemy M.G. fire. Cameron -Highlanders then advanced, and Tank followed, -bellied near Zonnebeke Stream. Mud was up to floor -level and door of sponson was pushed off its hinges. -Enemy aeroplane circled overhead, and fired on them -whilst attempting to unditch. Eventually Tank ‘Carstairs’ -came to the rescue, and Tank was got clear.</p> - -<p>“... Tank ‘Culloden’ had her unditching gear -carried away by barbed wire near Hill Cottage. Unditching -beam was recovered, but again broke lose, until -secured with rope. Just west of Frost House shell burst -under front of Tank. Whilst crossing light railway -half-way between Frost House and Square Farm, a -second shell hit roof door and killed one gunner. Tank -stopped, and it was found petrol pressure pipe was cut. -Time 9.15 a.m. A third shell struck behind right sponson.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_141">141</span> -Crew were withdrawn from Tank, and took up a -position in shell-holes near Square Farm. Tank was -still being shelled, undoubtedly by an anti-Tank gun, -about ten shells being fired at it in five minutes, six of -which hit the Tank.</p> - -<p>“Tank ‘Cyprus’ was then seen to be hit by the same -anti-Tank gun. At 10.15 a.m. survivors of Tanks ‘Culloden’ -and ‘Cyprus,’ together with undamaged Lewis -guns, withdrew to Battalion Rallying Point, after -pigeon messages had been despatched reporting the -situation.</p> - -<p>“... Tank ‘Carstairs’ arrived at Black Line near -Beck House, but infantry had not then arrived.</p> - -<p>“Tank soon bellied in boggy ground, but was unditched -successfully. Just west of Borry Farm Tank -‘Caithness’ was found badly bellied, and with unditching -gear lost.</p> - -<p>“Having been informed by 6th Cameron Highlanders -that the second objective had been captured, Tank ‘Carstairs’ -hitched on to Tank ‘Caithness’ and towed it -out. Enemy shell-fire was extremely heavy, and an -aeroplane flew over, firing at crew with machine-guns -during the operation.</p> - -<p>“Instructions were then received to return to Battalion -Rallying Point.”</p></div> - -<p>Another very gallant action was fought by a Tank -crew also belonging to this Battalion.</p> - -<p>They started the battle in a Tank named “Ca’ -Canny” under command of Lieutenant H. P. M. Jones, -who was killed near Wilde Wood. The crew carried -on under command of Corporal Jenkins until about 11 -p.m., when the Tank “bellied” hopelessly. Corporal -Jenkins withdrew his Lewis guns and crew, and, placing -some of them on the top of the Tank and some on the -ground, kept up an effective fire on the enemy, who were -then attempting a small counter-attack.</p> - -<p>He then transferred his men to another Tank,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_142">142</span> -“Clyde,” whose crew had all been wounded. They -fought this Tank for a further two hours, but at about -three o’clock “Clyde,” too, stuck in the mud and proved -inextricable. He and his crew then returned on foot -to their Battalion Rallying Point.</p> - -<p>With the 18th Corps, the 1st Brigade Tanks were on -several occasions signalled for by fairly distant parties -of infantry, who proceeded to “set” them at strong -points that were giving trouble. This system worked -extremely well, and had a particularly impressive moral -effect on the enemy. Several occasions are recorded -on which enemy garrisons did not wait for the Tank -which had been thus “whistled up” to get near enough -to fire, but surrendered as soon as they saw it -coming.</p> - -<p>Our advance had continued for about ten hours, that -is, till nearly three in the afternoon, when our enterprise -seemed to have succeeded.</p> - -<p>As early as nine in the morning we held the whole of -our second objective north of Westhoek.</p> - -<p>By the afternoon we had entered St. Julien, Frezenberg -and the Pommern Redoubt, and had taken the -crossings of the Steenbeek and Stirling Castle.</p> - -<p>Glencorse Wood and Inverness Copse had proved -more difficult, but even here we held a footing on the -ridge.</p> - -<p>We had “riven the oak,” we were now to feel the -force of the rebound.</p> - -<p>That afternoon in a downpour of rain the enemy -counter-attacked along the fronts of all three Corps. -There was a fierce struggle, in which in many instances -Tanks were able to do a good deal of execution.</p> - -<p>We were shelled out of St. Julien. North of it we -withdrew to the line of the Steenbeek, and we were<span class="pagenum" id="Page_143">143</span> -obliged to fall back from all but the western outskirts -of Westhoek.</p> - -<p>All afternoon we slowly lost ground, yet when night -fell we could still boast a battle well begun. It was, -after all, never meant to be a one-day attack, and to-morrow -we should start well. We had everywhere taken -and held our first objective, that is, the low muddy ridge -from which the enemy had so closely threatened the -original Ypres arena.</p> - -<p>The second flat valley and the higher ridge from Passchendaele -to Staden now lay before us.</p> - -<p>At least we were in a good position for to-morrow’s -attack. Mr. Buchan thus in effect analyses our gains:</p> - -<p>Along two-thirds of our line of attack we held our -first objectives. On half of the remaining third we had -only fallen just short of our final objective. On the remaining -sixth we had even slightly exceeded our final -objective. We had besides taken 6000 prisoners and a -quantity of machine-guns.</p> - -<h3>II</h3> - -<p>All that night the enemy counter-attacked us doggedly, -resolved upon driving us down again. All night -we fought to keep what we had won, and prepared the -redoubled blow that we meant to deliver next day.</p> - -<p>That blow was destined never to be struck. The -wind that brought the rain blew out our hopes of victory.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_36" href="#Footnote_36" class="fnanchor">36</a> “The weather had been threatening throughout the -[first] day, and had rendered the work of our aeroplanes -very difficult from the commencement of the battle. -During the afternoon, while fighting was still in progress, -rain began, and fell steadily all night.</p> - -<p>“Thereafter, for four days, the rain continued without<span class="pagenum" id="Page_144">144</span> -cessation.... The low-lying, clayey soil, torn by -shells and sodden with rain, turned to a succession of -vast muddy pools. The valleys of the choked and overflowing -streams were speedily transformed into long -stretches of bog, impassable except by a few well-defined -tracks, which became marks for the enemy’s artillery. -To leave these tracks was to risk death by drowning, -and in the course of the subsequent fighting on several -occasions both men and pack animals were lost in this -way. In these conditions operations of any magnitude -became impossible, and the resumption of our offensive -was necessarily postponed until a period of fine weather -should allow the ground to recover. As had been the -case in the Arras battle, this unavoidable delay in the -development of our offensive was of the greatest service -to the enemy. Valuable time was lost, the troops opposed -to us were able to recover from the disorganisation -produced by our first attack, and the enemy was -given the opportunity to bring up reinforcements.”</p></div> - -<p>It was nearly a fortnight before the 5th Army could -again attack.</p> - -<p>The disappointment of the Higher Command was -acute; acute, too, were the physical and mental miseries -suffered during that fortnight by the Tank Corps and -all the other arms engaged.</p> - -<p>Their magnificent efforts, their sacrifices, were of no -avail. There they lay day after day, drenched by the -inexorable rain, those in the forward area half choked -in the rising streams of liquid mud.</p> - -<p>It was in no sunny frame of mind that the 5th Army -Headquarters Staff read the verdict of the three Corps -upon the day’s work done by the Tanks.</p> - -<p>The three Summaries were agreed that the courage -and perseverance shown by Tank personnel had been -admirable.</p> - -<div id="ip_144" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 42em;"> - <img src="images/i_144a.jpg" width="658" height="282" alt="" /> - <div class="caption">A DEADLY SWAMP (THE WRECKS OF SIX TANKS MAY BE COUNTED)</div></div> - -<div id="ip_144b" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 44em;"> - <img src="images/i_144b1.jpg" width="690" height="494" alt="" /> - <div class="caption">“CLAPHAM JUNCTION” NEAR SANCTUARY WOOD</div></div> - -<div id="ip_144c" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 43em;"> - <img src="images/i_144b2.jpg" width="675" height="339" alt="" /> - <div class="caption">“THE SALIENT”</div></div> - -<p>One Corps, however, had given way thoroughly to the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_145">145</span> -spirit of the time. They practically reported that Tanks -had been of no use to any one, and moreover that they -were never likely to be. With the 30th Division they -had been unable to deal with certain machine-gun emplacement; -with the 24th they had been late, they always -drew enemy shell-fire; and with the 8th Division -one Tank had even lost direction and been reported as -firing on our own men.</p> - -<p>Another Corps had found Tanks helpful, and said all -they could for them.</p> - -<p>Tanks had greatly assisted the Gordons and Black -Watch at Frezenberg, they had dealt effectively with -concrete dug-outs; with the 55th Division they had -broken the wave of an enemy counter-attack at Winnipeg, -and everywhere their moral effect on the enemy -had been of great assistance. Twenty-four Tanks had -been put out of action by bad going or shell-fire.</p> - -<p>A third Corps with fewer machines had in many cases -reached their objective without being held up. The -Tanks had in these cases merely followed the infantry, -but they reported that without Tanks the capture of the -strongly wired position of Alberta would have cost the -39th Division dear, and that on the Steenbeek near -Ferdinand Farm the enemy, who had bolted at the mere -sight of a Tank, had been “dealt with” at ease with a -machine-gun by infantry of the 51st Division.</p> - -<p>Upon these Summaries and upon later failures the -Commander of the 5th Army was subsequently to base -a generally unfavourable report upon Tanks.</p> - -<p>The report may be condensed into a simple <span class="locked">syllogism:—</span></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>1. Tanks were unable to negotiate bad ground.</p> - -<p>2. The ground on a battlefield will always be bad.</p> - -<p>3. Therefore Tanks are no good on a battlefield.</p></div> - -<p>He added to this, that being no longer a surprise<span class="pagenum" id="Page_146">146</span> -to the enemy, he considered that Tanks had lost their -moral effect, and had no value used in masses.</p> - -<p>This report was not officially presented for some -weeks, but the Higher Tank Command must early have -perceived the drift of affairs. The events of the first -day and the manner in which those events were interpreted -gave only too much data to the prophetic spirit. -The junior Tank personnel knew little of what was going -on. Like Burns’s mouse, they were only touched by -the present, the throwing away of what had cost them -so many weeks of toil. To the Higher Tank Command -was reserved Burns’s own fate:</p> - -<div class="poetry-container pw18"> -<div class="poetry"> - <div class="stanza"> - <div class="verse indentq">“But, och! I backward cast my ee</div> - <div class="verse indent14">On prospects drear!</div> - <div class="verse indent0">And forward, tho’ I canna see,</div> - <div class="verse indent14">I guess and fear.”</div> - </div> -</div> -</div> - -<p>What would be the results of the initial ill-success of -the battle, and of the further Tank failures which seemed -only too probable when an advance which had begun so -ill was continued, after perhaps two or three inches more -rain?</p> - -<p>How were the final arbiters, G.H.Q. and the War -Cabinet, going to regard such failures? Tanks had been -employed under grotesque conditions, and after all, they -had failed in common with every other arm. Were the -events of the next few weeks to be disastrous enough to -consign them irrevocably to Bottomless Perdition?</p> - -<p>At best their hopes of expansion would most probably -be nipped. Their establishment would be reduced, and -Tanks would be used in <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">petits paquets</i> again, by ones -and twos as they had been in the past, because, once -more, there would never be enough machines for an -effective action.</p> - -<p>As the days wore on, and the rain continued (at the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_147">147</span> -rate often of an inch a day), one of these alternative -fates seemed inevitable.</p> - -<p>The gloomy surmises of the Tank Headquarters Staff -were only too well founded. The authorities were in -fact suffering from one of the worst cold fits which the -pilots of the Tank Corps at home and abroad ever endured.</p> - -<p>Tank Corps Headquarters heard it all. They knew -well enough that in well-informed but irresponsible -London circles the remark, “I hear the Tanks are going -to be abolished,” was a common one; that often in -such gossip circumstances of person and date would be -added.</p> - -<p>For all this they had no certain refutation. If only -Tanks could even now do something that would catch -the eye of authority. Some little “show” exploit. Something -that would at least make a summary condemnation -unlikely. The battle would have to be continued -some day. Tanks would have to play their part, but in -that intolerable swamp was it likely that they would -do anything except engulf themselves—literally and -metaphorically—yet deeper than before?</p> - -<p>There, however, lay the Tanks’ best hope. Chance -and their own exertions might bring them a success -even in Flanders.</p> - -<h3>III</h3> - -<p>Thirty-six Tanks belonging to the 1st Brigade had remained -in Army Reserve. On August 16, the weather -having been less wet for a day or two, the first and most -considerable of a series of renewed attacks was to be -made.</p> - -<p>Twelve Tanks were to co-operate with the infantry on<span class="pagenum" id="Page_148">148</span> -the Langemarck-St. Julien front.</p> - -<p>On the night of the 13th the Tanks began to move -up. The roads were already congested with other traffic, -and the Tanks were not to be allowed to make use of -them.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_37" href="#Footnote_37" class="fnanchor">37</a>“The country they had to traverse was all very -deep in mud, and the Tanks wallowed on their bellies -in ground too soft for the tracks to hold. The approach -was continued during the following night, but in spite -of the repeated use of unditching beams, the mutual -help of Tanks in towing each other, and the valuable -assistance of a Tunnelling Company, it was recognised -on the 15th that none but the four leading Tanks could -hope to reach the line in time to take part in the battle. -These four made strenuous efforts to complete the journey -the next night, but without success. None of them -could overcome the difficulties of the ground, and the -infantry had to go into attack without them.”</p></div> - -<p>The infantry attacked, and after the action a nest of -pill-box strongholds north-east of St. Julien still remained -untaken.</p> - -<p>Like most of these little fortresses, they had been -extremely skilfully placed. An unwary advance would -be trapped in their wire just within convenient range of -their machine-guns.</p> - -<p>They were so small, scattered, and well concealed as -to be almost impossible targets for heavy guns, and as -they were built of reinforced concrete at least three feet -thick, the ordinary high-explosive shell thrown by a field -gun had no effect upon them.</p> - -<p>This particular nest consisted of four pill-boxes of -more than average size.</p> - -<p>Three of them were hidden in the ruins of farmsteads.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_149">149</span> -That in the Mont du Hibou was manned by a garrison -of about eighty men, and the Cockcroft was still more -strongly held. Triangle Farm and Hillock Farm were -slightly smaller. It was essential that they should be -taken, and General Sir Ivor Maxse, commanding the -18th Corps, was informed by the Brigadiers concerned -that their capture would probably cost us 600 to 1000 -casualties. He and Colonel Baker-Carr (commanding -1st Brigade of Tanks) then considered the possibility -of a Tank attack.</p> - -<p>Colonel Baker-Carr, admirably undismayed by the -dismal events of the 16th, optimistically guaranteed the -fortresses at half the estimated cost to the infantry, and -the attack was arranged. One innovation he specially -asked for. There was to be no shelling, but he was to -be granted the concealment of a smoke barrage. Having -once decided to entrust the affair to the Tanks, General -Maxse was zealous to give them every possible chance -of success and did not hesitate to modify his orders to -suit their considered demands. Only twelve Tanks were -to be employed, and they and their infantry were to -use the roads for as far as these served them. Colonel -Baker-Carr decided to form a composite Company from -“G” (7th) Battalion under the command of Major -Broome.</p> - -<p>The resulting action, small as were the numbers engaged, -will ever find a place in the annals of the Tank -Corps.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_38" href="#Footnote_38" class="fnanchor">38</a>“In spite of the appalling condition of the ground, -for it had now been raining steadily for three weeks, -a very memorable feat of arms was achieved.”</p></div> - -<p>The four strong points were triumphantly captured.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_150">150</span></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_39" href="#Footnote_39" class="fnanchor">39</a>“Phenomenal results were obtained at very little -cost, for instead of 600 to 1000 casualties, the infantry -following the Tanks only sustained fifteen!”</p></div> - -<p>At 4.45 a.m. on the morning of August 19, the artillery -isolated the doomed strongholds in clouds of dense -smoke.</p> - -<p>The action had been carefully rehearsed. Two Tanks -were to be used against each pill-box, and they were to -take them in rear, so striking where the forts were most -vulnerable, and at the same time cutting off the garrison’s -retreat.</p> - -<p>Just before six o’clock the enveloping manœuvre was -complete, and the first pill-box—Hillock Farm—fell, -nearly all its garrison having fled.</p> - -<p>At 6.15 two Tanks reached the Mont du Hibou, and -fired forty rounds from their 6-pounder guns into the -back door of the stronghold. Sixty of the garrison fled, -of whom about half escaped or were shot down, and -the rest surrendered to the infantry as soon as it came -up.</p> - -<p>Triangle Farm fell ten minutes afterwards. The garrison -had put up a fight against the Tanks and our -infantry killed them all, mostly with the bayonet.</p> - -<p>At the Cockcroft the attacking Tank<a id="FNanchor_40" href="#Footnote_40" class="fnanchor">40</a> got ditched -within fifty yards of its victim. But at sight of it the -garrison of over 100 “withdrew.” The Tank and its -infantry immediately opened fire with their Lewis guns, -and more than half the fugitives fell.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_41" href="#Footnote_41" class="fnanchor">41</a>“Our infantry then consolidated the Cockcroft. -This completed the capture of all objectives.</p></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_151">151</span></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“The Tanks waited till consolidation was well forward -before returning.</p> - -<p>“<i>Casualties</i>—Infantry: no killed, 15 wounded.</p> - -<p>“Tank Personnel—Killed: Officers, none; other -Ranks, 2. Wounded: Officers, 2; other Ranks, 10.”</p></div> - -<p>In one of the strong points we found a German officer -who had been hanged by his men.</p> - -<p>The St. Julien attack, as it was afterwards called, -proved a sufficient counterblast to the 5th Army report.</p> - -<p>The friends of the Tank Corps made the most of it. -It was a brilliant little exploit, and once brought to -notice, the casualty figures pleaded too loudly to be -ignored.</p> - -<p>It is probably no exaggeration to say that it was in -some measure to the Tanks which won the little Battle -of St. Julien that the Tank Corps owed the opportunity -of winning the Battle of Cambrai.</p> - -<h3>IV</h3> - -<p>From August 22 till October 9, by which time hope of -British success at Ypres had been more or less abandoned, -the Tanks fought in about a dozen minor actions. -They made almost as many more unavailing attempts -to fight. Like the rest of the Army, they spent much -vain labour and knew the weariness of much frustrated -effort. They made elaborate and toilsome movements in -preparation for attacks which were never launched. -They struggled night after night to get up to some battle -which eventually had to take place without them. Tanks -had now invariably to move upon the roads, as the -ground between had finally and definitely been reduced -to impassable swamp. The roads naturally formed -standing targets for the German gunners. We lost -heavily in men and machines. General Elles had originally<span class="pagenum" id="Page_152">152</span> -estimated that one machine in two would get into -effective action. Now, in view of the appalling ground -conditions, he revised this, only reckoning on one machine -in ten getting into effective contact with the -enemy. This modest estimate was as a matter of fact -seldom exceeded.</p> - -<p>Whenever Tanks did get into action, however, they -usually did well, though rarely decisively, in spite of -the standard of extraordinary courage which was steadfastly -maintained by the crews.</p> - -<p>The briefest review of most of these depressing little -engagements is all that need be given. They were remarkable -for nothing except the heroic patience shown -day after day by every arm of our attacking forces.</p> - -<p>On August 22 a minor attack was launched by all -three Corps. Small parties of Tanks fought with each.</p> - -<p>With the <i>2nd Corps</i> in Glencorse Wood four Tanks -of the 2nd Brigade were of some service, and did considerable -execution.</p> - -<p>With the <i>19th Corps</i> eighteen Tanks of the 3rd Brigade -were used on the off-chance of their being able to -reach the objectives. The going was more than ordinarily -atrocious, the whole of the Frezenberg-Zonnebeke -road having been shot away. One Tank fought a -very remarkable action, engaging the enemy near “Gallipoli” -for sixty-eight hours.</p> - -<p>With the <i>18th Corps</i> twelve Tanks of the 1st Brigade -headed an attack on Bülow Farm, Vancouver, Winnipeg, -and other strong points. They proved useful, and -several Tanks were in action for longish periods.</p> - -<p>Two things are remarkable about this operation: first, -that every Tank which ventured to leave the road instantly -bellied. One was “drowned” in six or seven -feet of water.</p> - -<p>Secondly, the remarkable way in which they affected<span class="pagenum" id="Page_153">153</span> -enemy <em>moral</em>. In several instances parties of the enemy -surrendered at the sight of them. Prisoners in their -examination said that they could have held up infantry, -but “felt helpless against Tanks.”</p> - -<p>Next day, on August 23, four 2nd Brigade Tanks went -into action near Inverness Copse. The operation had -had to be undertaken in a hurry, liaison was bad, and -the attack a failure.</p> - -<p>On August 26 four Tanks fought with the 33rd Division -in the neighbourhood of Jerk House (near Glencorse -Wood). The morning was misty, and an enemy -shell unfortunately exploded a dump of smoke bombs -just behind our lines. The attack was a failure. That -night an inch of rain fell, and four Tanks which were to -have operated with the 14th Division next day, August -27th, never reached their starting-point. Thirteen men -were wounded and an officer killed on the way up.</p> - -<p>Nearly three weeks elapsed before Tanks were again -in action, and several battalions from the 2nd and 3rd -Brigades were moved back to a new training area near -Arras. A certain number of “Replacement Tanks” -were issued to remaining battalions. The 1st Brigade -stood ready in case they should be wanted at short -notice, but no attacks of any sort were launched, probably -partly on account of weather, and partly because -a section of the 5th Army front was in process of transfer -to the 2nd Army.</p> - -<p>By the middle of September the relief had been completed, -and again we endeavoured to press on.</p> - -<p>On September 20 a fairly successful assault was made -along the whole line. 2nd Brigade Tanks took part near -Inverness Copse, and 1st Brigade Tanks near Triangle -and Wurst Farms. But the ground being known to be<span class="pagenum" id="Page_154">154</span> -unusually appalling in both areas, they had been given -minor parts. These parts they played with fair success, -and they undoubtedly scared the enemy a good deal. -On the 18th Corps front 3rd Battalion Tanks had rather -better luck.</p> - -<p>The efforts made by the crews to get to the battle -at all were superhuman.</p> - -<p>Trees had been felled across the road by the enemy, -resting breast high on their branches and the tall stumps -from which they were not completely severed. At -Wurst Farm also this kind of obstacle had been opposed -to the Tanks—the butts of the trees lying obliquely and -at a slope, forming a barrier very difficult to surmount.</p> - -<p>If one leading machine got into difficulties struggling -in the dark through or over these obstacles, the whole -string of Tanks behind would be hung up, the deep -swamps on either hand making it impossible to leave the -road.</p> - -<p>The Tanks, however, arrived, and are reported to -have “inflicted many casualties.”</p> - -<p>On September 26 fifteen Tanks operated near Zonnebeke -Village. The attack was not a success, though the -Tanks did a great deal of good work.</p> - -<p>On October 4 took place the last two actions of this -battle in which Tanks succeeded in playing a part. The -first was fought by twelve Tanks of the 1st Brigade, who -had the honour of taking part in the capture of Poelcapelle. -It was a most successful little attack, and after -reducing three strong points which guarded the outskirts, -the Tanks hunted through the main street and -out beyond the village.</p> - -<p>In the other action four Tanks of the 1st Battalion -were to take part in an attack upon Juniper Cottage on -the line of the Reutelbeek.</p> - -<p>Not only was this, like the other, a successful little<span class="pagenum" id="Page_155">155</span> -action, it was ennobled by affording the background to -one of the most patiently courageous actions of the -War.</p> - -<p>It was on October 4 that Captain Robertson fell upon -completing a service for which he was posthumously -awarded the V.C.</p> - -<p>Tanks and infantry were to endeavour to cross the -Reutelbeek and drive the enemy from the positions which -they held on the further bank.</p> - -<p>There was only one bridge over the marshy stream. -If, in the half-light of the early morning and in the -confusion of battle, they missed this crossing-place, their -one chance of success was gone.</p> - -<p>Captain Robertson, the officer commanding the section -of Tanks, early realised that here lay the crux of -the little operation for whose success he was responsible. -For three days and nights he and his servant, Private -Allen (subsequently awarded the D.C.M.), went carefully -backwards and forwards over the ground under -heavy fire, taping the routes for the Tanks.</p> - -<p>Working without a break, this task took him until -half-past nine on the night before the action.</p> - -<p>It was time to get the machines up.</p> - -<p>He started out at once again with his Tanks. The -weather was dark and misty, and from inside a Tank it -was impossible to see the way over the heavily shelled -ground. Captain Robertson therefore walked ahead; -they reached the assembly point in good time, and at -6 a.m. on October 4 he led them into action.</p> - -<p>In imagining the rest of the story we are to remember -that Captain Robertson had already been continuously -under fire and without sleep for three days and nights.</p> - -<p>The roads and every other landmark had all been<span class="pagenum" id="Page_156">156</span> -wiped out by the shelling, but the bridge still stood. -Captain Robertson still led his Tanks on foot, facing -besides the shells an intense close-range machine-gun -and rifle fire. He must have known that to go forward -on foot means certain death.</p> - -<p>He and his convoy were by now well ahead of the -infantry. Still he led his Tanks on, carefully and patiently -guiding them at a foot’s pace towards their objective.</p> - -<p>They reached the bridge, and one by one the Tanks -crossed over. He led them on towards a road that would -take them straight up to the enemy positions, the machine-gun -fire growing more and more intense as they -advanced.</p> - -<p>They reached the road, and as they reached it, Captain -Robertson at last fell, shot through the head.</p> - -<p>But the Tanks went on, and succeeded in their mission. -The object for which Captain Robertson had so -deliberately sacrificed his life was achieved.</p> - -<p>The 2nd and 3rd Brigades had by now gone back to -Arras to refit their machines, and to replenish their -ranks. The 1st Brigade, however, made two more efforts -to take part in the fighting. The battle was by now -recognised as a serious British check. The Germans’ -“elastic tactics” and the weather had together delayed -us for so long that they had defeated us.</p> - -<p>We had inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, and had -in the act suffered still more severely ourselves.</p> - -<p>Our hopes of clearing the coast were gone.</p> - -<p>At the end of ten weeks we had achieved gains which -had been on the programme for the first fortnight.</p> - -<p>The whole plan of campaign had to be reconsidered, -and to take Passchendaele must now be our ultimate ambition.</p> - -<p>On October 7 two Tanks were to operate ahead of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_157">157</span> -their infantry and endeavour to capture two fortified -farms. Halfway to their objective a derelict Tank -blocked the way, and the two advancing machines became -ditched on trying to make a détour. By the -time they had been unditched it was too late to -go on.</p> - -<p>On the 9th eight Tanks were to have attacked strong -points on the Poelcapelle Road. At midnight on the -night of the 8th-9th they started for their objectives.</p> - -<p>The road was everywhere encumbered with blown-up -limbers and the bodies of dead teams.</p> - -<p>Large shell-holes had been blown in it.</p> - -<p>The Tanks managed to get on as far as the Poelcapelle -cross-roads, but the enemy then began to shell the road -heavily. The leading Tank ditched in a new shell-hole, -the second Tank as it waited to pass was set on fire by -a direct hit.</p> - -<p>These two wrecks formed a complete barrier to the -advance of the rest of the column.</p> - -<p>No way being found by which the surviving Tanks -could circumvent the obstacle, and the shelling having -grown hotter, it was decided to return.</p> - -<p>But they had not gone far on the return journey when -they discovered that on the way up the last machine of -the column had somehow fouled an old derelict Tank. -The remaining machines were trapped, and could -neither go forward nor back.</p> - -<p>The efforts of their crews proved vain, and they were -all five lost, some being hit by enemy shells and the crews -killed or wounded, and some ditched in vain efforts to -make their escape across country.</p> - -<p>The enemy continued to shell the road, which was one -we were obliged to use, and it was a work of extreme<span class="pagenum" id="Page_158">158</span> -hazard and difficulty to clear it of the wrecks by which -it was completely blocked.</p> - -<p>The work was, however, performed. Every night for -a week Major G. L. Wilkes,<a id="FNanchor_42" href="#Footnote_42" class="fnanchor">42</a> the 1st Brigade Engineer, -used to go up the road as far as he could in a Tank. -Then he would get out and work till morning. Most of -the wrecks he blew up, some he and his small party of -men were able to tip over into the swamp.</p> - -<p>The scene on the first of these expeditions is thus described -by an engineer officer who accompanied him:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“I left St. Julien in the dark, having been informed -that our guns were not going to fire. I waded up the -road, which was swimming in a foot or two of slush; -frequently I would stumble into a shell-hole hidden by -the mud. The road was a complete shambles and strewn -with débris, broken vehicles, dead and dying horses and -men; I must have passed hundreds of them as well as -bits of men and animals littered everywhere. As I -neared Poelcapelle our guns started to fire; at once the -Germans replied, pouring shells on and around the road; -the flashes of the bursting shells were all round me. I -cannot describe what it felt like; the nearest approach -to a picture I can give is that it was like standing in the -centre of the flame of a gigantic Primus stove. As I -neared the derelict Tanks, the scene became truly appalling: -wounded men lay drowned in the mud, others -were stumbling and falling through exhaustion, others -crawled and rested themselves up against the dead to -raise themselves a little above the mud. On reaching -the Tanks I found them surrounded by the dead and -dying; men had crawled to them for what shelter they -would afford. The nearest Tank was a Female. Her -left sponson doors were open. Out of these protruded -four pairs of legs; exhausted and wounded men had -sought refuge in this machine and dead and dying lay -in a jumbled heap inside.”</p></div> - -<p>So ended the tragedy of October 9, the last of a series<span class="pagenum" id="Page_159">159</span> -of hopeless adventures.</p> - -<p>A few Tanks were later moved up to a new railhead, -with the hope that better weather might enable them to -take part in the final attack on Passchendaele, the attack -which was to end the Flanders offensive. But the -weather did not mend, and it was without the help of -Tanks that by a final effort the heights of Passchendaele -were stormed and taken in the first week of November. -We held our gains. The high ground was -ours, the weary armies might rest, and the tragic nightmare -of the Third Battle of Ypres was over at last.</p> - -<p>When time brought the verdict of the Official Despatch -upon the work of the Tanks, it was neither an unjust -nor an unkindly <span class="locked">one:—</span></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_43" href="#Footnote_43" class="fnanchor">43</a>“Although throughout the major part of the Ypres -battle, and especially in its later stages, the condition -of the ground made the use of Tanks difficult or impossible, -yet whenever circumstances were in any way favourable, -and even when they were not, very gallant and -valuable work has been accomplished by Tank Commanders -and crews on a great number of occasions. -Long before the conclusion of the Flanders offensive -these new instruments had proved their worth, and -amply justified the labour, material and personnel diverted -to their construction and development.”</p></div> - -<p>It was not to be long before the Corps had an opportunity -of proving their worth indeed.</p> -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_160">160</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_X">CHAPTER X</h2> - -<p class="subhead">THE FIRST BATTLE OF CAMBRAI</p> -</div> - -<div class="poetry-container pw25"> -<div class="poetry"> - <div class="stanza"> - <div class="verse indent34">“On they move</div> - <div class="verse indent0">Indissolubly firm; nor obvious hill</div> - <div class="verse indent0">Nor straightening vale, nor wood nor stream divides</div> - <div class="verse indent0">Their perfect ranks.”</div> - </div> - <div class="attrib"><cite>Paradise Lost.</cite></div> -</div> -</div> - -<h3 class="larger">PART I</h3> - -<h3>I</h3> - -<p><span class="firstword">All</span> through the later part of the Ypres struggle the -Tank Corps had turned their eyes towards certain -other parts of the line with a longing as for The Delectable -Mountains.</p> - -<p>They imagined places in dry rolling chalk country -where a Tank could travel on the surface of the ground. -They dreamed of battles in which the artillery had -neither given the enemy weeks of warning nor helped -him to reduce the ground to a swamp or the likeness of -an ash heap.</p> - -<p>A starving man does not picture every circumstance -of a meal, a drowning man the sensations of warmth -and solidity, more vividly than did the Tank Corps call -up their dream battle.</p> - -<p>General Elles and his Staff had several places in mind -in which such a battle might be fought. Perhaps they -dwelt most affectionately on the thoughts of some sector -of the Hindenburg line, some high rolling chalk plateau -anywhere south of Arras.</p> - -<p>Several such delightful spots lay in the domain of -General Sir Julian Byng’s 3rd Army. Perhaps he had<span class="pagenum" id="Page_161">161</span> -some sort of operation in view already! In September -General Elles hopefully paid him a visit as he lay at -Albert. They conferred.</p> - -<p>The Army Commander had, indeed, an idea of attacking.</p> - -<p>More, he had already independently worked out the -place, and many of the details, of just such an attack -as the Tank Corps had been sighing for.</p> - -<p>Together the two Generals worked at the scheme and -a draft plan was forwarded to G.H.Q.</p> - -<p>G.H.Q., however, could not allow the attack for the -present. The Ypres affair must first be thrashed out, -but when that was ended, say by early November, then -such an attack would have their blessing.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the two conspirators waited eagerly, all -the while working out and perfecting their plans.</p> - -<p>At last, on October 20, the scheme was finally sanctioned, -and Z day was fixed for November 20. Still only -four members of the Tank Corps Staff knew of the project, -and these four immediately stole off to our lines -near Havrincourt to make a preliminary survey of the -new site.</p> - -<h3>II</h3> - -<p>The First Battle of Cambrai was to be a single-minded -battle. It was to fulfil in the simplest way the prime -function of war, that is, to destroy the forces of the -enemy.</p> - -<p>To attain this end it was to rely upon surprise, audacity, -and rapidity of movement.</p> - -<p>Its main action was to be completed in about twenty-four -hours, during which time it was proposed to penetrate -the Hindenburg Line, which here consisted of four -systems of trenches. Territorial gains were not to be<span class="pagenum" id="Page_162">162</span> -so much considered as were the destruction and capture -of enemy personnel and material. In other words, we -were out to kill and chivvy Germans. The system of -attack was to be one completely new for a full-dress -battle. There was to be no artillery preparation whatever. -To all appearance the front line was to be perfectly -normal up to the very moment of attack, when -two Army Corps and three Brigades of Tanks were -suddenly to hurl their whole weight against the -enemy.</p> - -<p>Such tactics demanded that the most complete secrecy -should be maintained up to zero hour itself, and for the -second time in the history of the Tanks a vital secret -was successfully kept.</p> - -<p>The area to be raided lay just south of Cambrai. It -was an open rolling chalk plateau, which had lain uncultivated -for two years, and was now covered with a -thin growth of wan grey grass.</p> - -<p>From north-west to south-east the low ridges ran, -save where the dominating hump of Bourlon’s wood-crowned -Hill ran across the grain of the country.</p> - -<p>On either flank of this area, sometimes at right angles -to the curve of our lines, sometimes running parallel -to the German lines, ran the Canal du Nord and the -Canal de l’Escaut.</p> - -<p>The slopes were nowhere very steep, but the levels -were everywhere varied by spurs and—so-called—“ravines.” -One of these, which lay just within the German -lines, and parallel to our front, for some time gave grave -concern both to the Tanks and to other arms, who apparently -coupled it in their minds with the Grand Cañon -of Colorado. Its name sounded so formidable, and it -was marked so large on the map! It might well prove -a serious obstacle to the progress of Tanks. A series of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_163">163</span> -exhaustive reconnaissances carried out by the Tank -Corps, however, dispelled this alarming legend and the -“Grand Ravine” stood revealed as being no more than -a shallow dry field ditch which could be jumped by any -rabbit of reasonable activity.</p> - -<p>The German defences, the famous Hindenburg Line, -lay wide and strong across the spurs. The main line of -resistance had been everywhere well placed on the reverse -slopes of the main ridges, and was invisible from -our lines. Only from the air and from rare posts of -vantage could we see a length of it. There were three -lines of trenches, each trench anything up to 15 ft. wide, -with an outpost line thrown forward to screen these -main defences. In front of the main line lay band upon -band and acre upon acre of dense wire; nowhere was -it less than 50 yards deep, and here and there it jutted -out in great salients flanked by batteries of machine-guns. -Never had we before been faced with such a -wilderness of wire.</p> - -<p>It was calculated that to cut it with artillery would -have taken five weeks and cost twenty millions of money.</p> - -<p>Not only was the actual “ditch” of the trench believed -to be in most places some 12 ft. wide and 18 ft. -deep, but at either side, the parados and parapet (each -about 2 ft. 6 in. high) were, we had reason to believe, -so sloped as to increase the effective width to about 16 -to 18 ft.</p> - -<p>These were the dimensions of some trenches captured -by us at Arras, and for such trenches we had to be prepared.</p> - -<p>The space to be cleared was too wide for a Tank. A -special means of crossing was, however, devised by the -Staff of the Central Workshops at Erin.</p> - -<p>This was a special huge fascine made of about seventy-five<span class="pagenum" id="Page_164">164</span> -ordinary bundles of brushwood, strongly compressed -and bound by heavy chains.</p> - -<p>It was carried on the nose of the machine, and could -be released by a touch from inside the Tank by a specially -ingenious releasing gear, and dropped neatly into -the trench.</p> - -<p>The manufacture of the 350 fascines and the fitting -of the Tanks with the releasing gear was a piece of -work of which the Central Workshops have reason to -be proud. They received the order for 350 fascines and -110 Tank sledges on October 24, when they had already -for some months been working at high pressure, chiefly -upon Tanks salved from the Salient.</p> - -<p>To fulfil the new order the shops worked day and -night for three weeks.</p> - -<p>To make the fascines, 21,000 ordinary stout bundles -of brushwood, such as are used for road repairing, were -unloaded at the Central Workshops.</p> - -<p>Here eighteen Tanks had been specially fitted up, for -binding and fastening these into bundles of sixty or -seventy.</p> - -<p>The Tanks acted in pairs, pulling in opposite directions -at steel chains which had been previously wound -round and round the bundles.</p> - -<p>So great was the pressure thus exerted that, months -afterwards, an infantryman in search of firewood, who -found one of these fascines and gaily filed through its -binding chain, was killed by the sudden springing open -of the bundle.</p> - -<p>When they were ready, each bundle weighed a ton -and a half, and it took twenty of the Chinese coolies -employed at the Central Workshops to roll one of them -through the mud. On one occasion 144 fascines had to -be loaded on to trucks within twenty-four hours. Concurrently<span class="pagenum" id="Page_165">165</span> -with the fascines the Central Workshops -achieved the making of the 110 Tank sledges. The whole -of the timber needed for this work had to be sawn out -of logs. Besides this they repaired and issued 127 -Tanks.</p> - -<h3>III</h3> - -<p>Each Tank could only carry one fascine, and once it -had dropped it into a trench had no means of picking -it up again. There were, however, three broad trenches -to be crossed.</p> - -<p>This circumstance had to be taken into account in the -general scheme of attack. Every detail of this plan had -been most ably worked out either by Lieut-Colonel Fuller -himself (G.S.O.I. to the Tank Corps), or by the Staff -whom he inspired. Every movement and formation -which we are going to describe had been reduced to an -exact drill, several special exercises being evolved for -the occasion. One of them, a simple platoon drill for -the infantry, was, we are told by an official historian, -based upon a drill described by Xenophon in the <cite>Cyropædia</cite>, -and attributed by him to Cyrus of Persia (<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">circa</i> -500 <span class="allsmcap">B.C.</span>).</p> - -<p>Very briefly the main plan was as <span class="locked">follows:—</span></p> - -<p>The whole line of attack was divided into areas for -three Tanks who formed a section and worked together.</p> - -<p>Of these one was an “Advance Guard Tank,” and the -other two were “Infantry Tanks.”</p> - -<p>The advance guard Tank was to go straight forward -through the enemy’s wire, and, turning to the left without -crossing it, to shoot along the fire trench which lay -in front of it.</p> - -<p>Its object was to keep down the enemy and protect -the two infantry Tanks. These the while both made for<span class="pagenum" id="Page_166">166</span> -one selected spot in the trench; the left-hand one cast -in its fascine, crossed the trench on it, turned to the left -and worked down the fire trench; the right-hand Tank -crossed the fire trench on the first Tank’s fascine, and -made for the second trench, dropped in its fascine, and -crossing, worked down this second trench. Meanwhile -the advance guard Tank had swung round and crossed -over the first and second trenches on the fascines of the -two infantry Tanks, and it therefore moved forward -with its own fascine still in position for the third -line.</p> - -<p>The infantry were also divided into three forces and -worked in single file. The first force were “Trench -Clearers.” They worked with the Tanks, and helped to -clear up trenches and dug-outs. They carried small -red flags with which they marked the paths which the -Tanks had made through the wire. The second were the -“Trench Stops,” who, as it were, played the net over -the rabbit hole to the Tank’s ferret. The third force -were the “Trench Garrisons,” who took over the -trenches as they were captured.</p> - -<p>One feature of the combined Tank and infantry training -for this battle was particularly interesting.</p> - -<p>They had not very long to work together, yet it was -essential that the infantry should have confidence in the -trench-spanning and wire-cutting power of the Tanks.</p> - -<p>Infantry units were therefore invited by the Tank -Corps to build their own defences and entanglements, -the Tanks guaranteeing to cross the trenches and chew -up the wire of their best efforts.</p> - -<p>Some very formidable and ingenious defences were -made.</p> - -<p>The Tanks, however, everywhere carried out their -guarantee, to the great edification of the infantry.</p> - -<p>The following table gives briefly the allocation of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_167">167</span> -Tanks and infantry to the various objectives:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p class="p1 b0 center larger"><span class="smcap">Allocation of Fighting Tanks</span></p> - -<div class="p1 b1 center"> -<table class="narrow25" summary="1st brigade battalions"> - <tr> - <td class="tdc"><i>1st Brigade Battalions.</i></td> - <td class="tdc"><i>Tanks (No.)</i></td> - <td class="tdc"><i>3rd Corps Divisions.</i></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">D (4)</td> - <td class="tdc">42</td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="in1">On Right: 51st.</span></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">E (5)</td> - <td class="tdc">42</td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="in1">51st and 62nd.</span></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">G (7)</td> - <td class="tdc">42</td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="in1">On Left: 62nd.</span></td></tr> -</table> -</div> - -<p><i>Objectives</i>: Havrincourt, Flesquières.</p> - -<p>Of each battalion: thirty-six Tanks for 1st, 12 (plus -survivors) for 2nd Objective.</p> - -<p><i>Exploitation towards</i> Fontaine, Bourlon Wood, the -Bapaume-Cambrai Road, Bourlon Village and Graincourt. -Bridges over Canal du Nord.</p> - -<div class="p1 b1 center"> -<table class="narrow25" summary="2nd brigade battalions"> - <tr> - <td class="tdc"><i>2nd Brigade Battalions.</i></td> - <td class="tdc"><i>Tanks (No.)</i></td> - <td class="tdc"><i>4th Corps Divisions.</i></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">B (2)</td> - <td class="tdl">42 on Right.</td> - <td class="tdc">6th.</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">H (8)</td> - <td class="tdl">42 on Left.</td> - <td class="tdc">6th.</td></tr> -</table> -</div> - -<p><i>Objectives</i>: Beaucamp, Villers, Plouich Road.</p> - -<p><i>Exploitation towards</i> Marcoing, Preny Chapel, and -Nine Wood.</p> - -<div class="p1 b1 center"> -<table class="narrow25" summary="3rd brigade battalions"> - <tr> - <td class="tdc"><i>3rd Brigade Battalions.</i></td> - <td class="tdc"><i>Tanks (No.)</i></td> - <td class="tdc"><i>4th Corps Divisions.</i></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="in3">C (3)</span></td> - <td class="tdc">42</td> - <td class="tdc">12th.</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="in3">F (6)</span></td> - <td class="tdc">42</td> - <td class="tdc">”</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="in3">I (9)</span></td> - <td class="tdc">42</td> - <td class="tdc">20th.</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="in3">A<a id="FNanchor_44" href="#Footnote_44" class="fnanchor">44</a> (1)</span></td> - <td class="tdc">42</td> - <td class="tdc">”</td></tr> -</table> -</div> - -<p><i>Objective</i>: La Vacquerie.</p> - -<p><i>Exploitation towards</i> Crèvecœur, Masnières, and Marcoing.</p></div> - -<p>The part to be played by the artillery was carefully -worked out. There was to be no preliminary bombardment, -but as soon as the attack was launched the heavy -guns were to begin counter-battery work and were to -shrapnel the bridges along the Canal.</p> - -<p>At the same time a jumping barrage of smoke shells<span class="pagenum" id="Page_168">168</span> -and H.E. was to cover the advance of the Tanks and -infantry.</p> - -<p>The secrecy of the attack made it impossible for any -registering shots to be fired, and the ranges could be -worked out in theory only.</p> - -<p>Several squadrons of the R.A.F. were to co-operate, -flying low; their especial work being to bomb enemy -Headquarters.</p> - -<p>The cavalry were also billed to co-operate.</p> - -<p>Special wire-pulling Tanks fitted with grapnels were -employed to clear convenient broad lanes through the -wire for them, and their needs were throughout carefully -considered.</p> - -<p>For one reason and another, however, the cavalry did -not, after all, find it possible to take much part in the -fighting.</p> - -<p>The preparations for the battle were of the thorough -and laborious kind always requisite for a “full-dress” -attack.</p> - -<p>An immense amount of railway movement was necessary -in order to bring up the three Tank Brigades, whose -component parts were a good deal scattered. Thirty-six -trainloads of twelve Tanks each had to be dealt with, -and their stores besides.</p> - -<p>For the sake of secrecy all this movement was done -after dark. There were only two minor accidents, otherwise -the whole scheme was worked out exactly to programme.</p> - -<p>The usual huge dumps of petrol and grease and -special stores had to be formed. Most of them were made -in neighbouring woods, where the Tanks also lay up. -Havrincourt Wood and Desert Wood were, for instance, -used for main dumps, and as lying-up places for the 1st<span class="pagenum" id="Page_169">169</span> -and 2nd Brigades, for in these woods the hornbeam -undergrowth had not yet shed its leaves and the Tanks -and their stores could lie in perfect secrecy.</p> - -<p>For the 3rd Brigade, however, there was no wood -conveniently near, and the Tanks lay out in a village -with camouflage clothes thrown over them, painted to -represent bricks and tiles.</p> - -<p>For the forward dumps splendid work was done by -the 3rd Army’s light railways, who handled astonishing -masses of stores; for example, 165,000 gallons of -petrol, 541,000 rounds of 6-pounder ammunition, and -5,000,000 rounds of S.A.A.</p> - -<p>Beyond the light railways the Tank fills were transported -by supply Tanks.</p> - -<p>All these preparations had to be carried out as secretly -as possible. Moves were made after dark.</p> - -<p>No new wheel tracks must be made. There must be -no reference to the battle over the telephone. There -must be no extra horse or mechanical transport seen -about in daylight.</p> - -<p>The concentration of Tanks in the background was -explained by the establishment of an alleged new training -area. Tank Corps Headquarters established with -the army at Albert was disguised under the plausible -alias of “The Tank Corps Training Office.”</p> - -<p>There must be no increase in aeroplane activity for -reconnaissance purposes.</p> - -<p>The same troops were to continue to hold the line, the -attacking forces passing through them, and those in the -line were as far as possible to be kept in the dark as -to the new operations. There was always a danger of -men in the trenches being taken prisoner in some raid, -and the less they knew the better. Oosthoek Wood had -not been forgotten.</p> - -<p>All the Reconnaissance Officers and the Tank Staff<span class="pagenum" id="Page_170">170</span> -who had to frequent the line wore non-committal burberries -and discreet tin hats; one well-known Staff -Officer even went to the length of affecting blue glasses; -in fact, in the matter of disguise the line was only -drawn at ginger whiskers. The cars they came in had -their distinguishing badges taken off, and their drivers -were carefully primed with cock-and-bull stories with -which to explain their presence. Staff and Reconnaissance -Officers slunk about, above all avoiding Headquarters -and those other social centres which etiquette -enjoins must be first called upon by all who visit other -people’s trenches. Friends were stealthily avoided, and -a curious jumble of assorted and obvious lies was -gradually put into circulation.</p> - -<p>At the Lyceum the villain conducts his affairs in this -sort of way without arousing the least suspicion in any -one, but in real life, and particularly in the line where -a look-out must constantly be kept for spies, such conduct -is apt to cause remark.</p> - -<p>Before Cambrai embarrassing situations frequently -arose which could be elucidated only by the drawing -aside of some justly indignant Commanding Officer for -a few minutes’ whispered conversation.</p> - -<p>At the 1st Brigade Headquarters in Arras there was -a locked room with “No admittance” written large -upon the door. Here were ostentatiously hung spoof -maps of other topical districts and a profusion of plans -lay spread about.</p> - -<p>The Reconnaissance Officer always hoped that this -room was duly ransacked by the “unauthorised person,” -for whose visit he had taken such pains to prepare.</p> - -<p>One more precaution was most carefully observed in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_171">171</span> -the line itself. Exactly the amount of artillery fire to -which the enemy was accustomed must be continued, -and from guns of the calibre which he expected. It was -considered that more or less shooting, or the use of -guns to which he was not accustomed, would be sure -to alarm him.</p> - -<p>For more than a week before the battle there was -no rain. Low, creeping mists screened our movements -and made it almost impossible that the enemy should -have seen us from the air.</p> - -<p>But the time was, nevertheless, an anxious one.</p> - -<p>On the night of the 18th-19th the enemy raided our -line and captured some of our men.</p> - -<p>We were uncertain how much these men knew, and -how much information they would give under examination.</p> - -<p>If under prompt examination they gave away the -gist of our plans the enemy would have twenty-four -hours in which to bring up reserves. There was, however, -nothing to be done except to await the event.</p> - -<p>There was yet one other particular in which the -Battle of Cambrai was to differ from other battles.</p> - -<p>In modern warfare the place of the General commanding -any considerable body of troops is almost invariably -in the rear at some point where communications -are good and whence he can effectively control his -reserves.</p> - -<p>His leadership is more a matter of the spirit and -<em>moral</em> which he can infuse into his troops, than of his -actual presence in the forefront of the battle. But -General Elles had determined to lead his Tanks in person. -All the available machines were to be used, there -would be no reserves for him to handle. He would be -best placed, he argued, in his Flag Tank where he could<span class="pagenum" id="Page_172">172</span> -keep his hand on the pulse of the battle. It must have -been with great satisfaction that he perceived that he -would here once more be able to indulge his remarkable -penchant for battles, a penchant from whose gratification -his responsibilities as a commander had now long -(officially) debarred him.</p> - -<p>On the evening before the attack he issued his Special -Order to the Tank Corps. It was not the incitement -to “do their damnedest” which the contemporary -Press fathered upon him. That spurious fosterling he -hated the worse, the more he perceived its popularity.</p> - -<p>His authentic Order was as <span class="locked">follows:—</span></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p class="center b1">“<i>Special Order, No. 6</i></p> - -<p>“1. To-morrow the Tank Corps will have the chance -for which it has been waiting for many months, to -operate on good going in the van of the battle.</p> - -<p>“2. All that hard work and ingenuity can achieve -has been done in the way of preparation.</p> - -<p>“3. It remains for unit commanders and for Tank -crews to complete the work by judgment and pluck in -the battle itself.</p> - -<p>“4. In the light of past experience I leave the good -name of the Corps with great confidence in your hands.</p> - -<p>“5. I propose leading the attack of the Centre Division.</p> - -<p class="in0"> -November 19, 1917.</p> - -<p class="sigright"> -<span class="l6">(<i>Signed</i>) <span class="smcap">Hugh Elles</span>,</span><br /> -“B.-G. Commanding Tank Corps.”</p> -</div> - -<p>The statement that the G.O.C. was to lead the attack -came as a great surprise to every one; it was probably -a greater surprise to some of the authorities than it was -even to the Tank Corps themselves. This decision was -generally accepted with pleasure by the fighting troops, -but many of the more thoughtful were filled with very<span class="pagenum" id="Page_173">173</span> -great anxiety. It was clear that the General’s Tank, -the “Hilda,” was going to be thrust close behind the -barrage in a conspicuous position flying the flag; the -dangers that it ran were, therefore, greater than those -run by any of the other Tanks. On the other hand, it -was generally realised that the Tank Corps had, in this -action, a very great deal at stake; it risked not merely -machines and the lives of its officers and men, but its -very existence. If the Tanks failed to make good this -time there is little doubt that this type of mechanical -warfare would have been abandoned for some time at -least. On November 20, therefore, the Tank Corps was -“all in” in every sense of the word.</p> - -<h3>IV</h3> - -<p>At 4.30 on the morning of the 20th a heavy burst of -firing from the enemy made us fear for the integrity -of our secret, but to our great relief it died away, and -for an hour before zero (6 a.m.) quiet reigned along -almost the whole front of attack.</p> - -<p>From documents captured during the battle we found -that up to the 18th the Germans had issued such reports -as “The enemy’s work is confined to the improvement -of his trenches and wire.” But the prisoners -whom the Germans had taken on the night of the 18th -had yielded more interesting information. On the -strength only of their preliminary examination the -Germans moved reserve machine-guns up to Flesquières.</p> - -<p>At the last moment a higher enemy authority seems -to have again examined the prisoners, and, too late, an -urgent warning was sent down to all units in the line -to maintain a sharp lookout and to issue armour-piercing -bullets immediately.</p> - -<p>This message we found half transcribed in a front-line<span class="pagenum" id="Page_174">174</span> -signal dug-out.</p> - -<p>Six o’clock had struck.</p> - -<p>Under cover of the mist the whole line of 350 Tanks -moved forward, led by General Elles’ Flag Tank, the -“Hilda.” As they moved a thousand concealed guns -hailed down their fire upon the German line. Even -through the din of the barrage and the clamour of their -own engines the Tank crews could hear, as they advanced, -the tearing and snapping of the German wire -as they trampled it under them. The bewildered enemy -was overwhelmed. He had only one last hope. Perhaps -the wide trenches themselves would hold back this -inexorable company!</p> - -<p>But when each of the second line of Tanks stopped, -ducked its head, laid its “stepping stone” in the trench -and crawled easily over it, the enemy completely lost -his balance.</p> - -<p>All along the line men fled in panic. Only at a few -tactical points did our onrush meet with any real opposition. -The surprise, the novel tactics, the crushing -onrush of the Tanks proved too much in those first -confounding minutes for one of the best fighting armies -the world had ever seen.</p> - -<p>The “Hilda” reached the outposts line in the van -of the battle; the resistance here was only slight, but -General Elles succeeded in picking up a few targets -which he pointed out to the gunners. It is reported that -he did most of his observing with his head thrust up -through the hatch in the roof of the Tank, using his -feet in the gunner’s ribs to indicate targets.</p> - -<p>Once the Tanks were astride the enormous Hindenburg -ditch, the enemy only offered resistance in a few -places. The “Hilda,” still carrying the flag which had<span class="pagenum" id="Page_175">175</span> -been several times hit but not brought down, went on -to her first objective line, which included the main -Hindenburg front, and support lines.</p> - -<p>But the General’s holiday was over. The great problem -had been triumphantly solved.</p> - -<p>The next most pressing need would be for reorganisation.</p> - -<p>If any of the Tanks were required to operate again -the next day, that reorganisation must be begun at -once. So reluctantly leaving the “Hilda” to carry on -to further objectives, the General came back on foot, -somewhat impeded by various parties of “unmopped -up” Germans who insisted on surrendering to him. By -the afternoon, General Elles was back at his Headquarters, -functioning by telephone and shorthand-typist -in the manner usual to Generals.</p> - -<p>Here and there, after the first rush, a desperate -handful of the enemy would be rallied by their officers -to defend some point of vantage.</p> - -<p>At Lateau Wood on the right of the attack heavy -fighting took place, including a duel between a Tank -and a 5.9 in. howitzer. Turning on the Tank the -howitzer fired, shattering and tearing off most of the -right-hand sponson of the approaching machine, but -fortunately not injuring its vitals; before the German -gunners could reload, the Tank was upon them, and in -a few seconds the great gun was crushed in a jumbled -mass amongst the brushwood surrounding it.</p> - -<p>A little to the west of this wood the Tanks of “F” -(the 6th) Battalion, which had topped the ridge, were -speeding down on Masnières. One approached the -bridge, the key to the Rumilly-Seranvillers ridge, upon -the capture of which so much depended. The bridge -had, as the Tank Commander knew, been damaged<span class="pagenum" id="Page_176">176</span> -either by shell-fire or by the German sappers. It was, -however, most important that he should cross, and he -very pluckily, therefore, went for it. As the Tank -neared the centre of the bridge, there was a rending of -steel girders—the bridge had broken, and as it collapsed -the Tank disappeared into the waters of the canal. -Other Tanks arriving, and not being able to cross, assisted -the infantry to do so by opening a heavy covering -fire.</p> - -<p>The Tank that had fallen into the canal had been let -down quite gradually into the water as the bridge slowly -subsided.</p> - -<p>There was but one loss. The wig of one of the crew -got knocked off as his head emerged from the manhole, -and it floated away down the canal and was never seen -again. Lost to view, its memory was kept green for -many months by its injured owner’s claims for compensation.</p> - -<p>The dilemma which most cruelly racked the official -mind was the question whether a wig came under the -heading of “Field Equipment,” “Loss of a Limb,” -“Medical Comfort,” “Clothing,” “Personal Effects,” -or “Special Tank Stores.” Finally, however, its owner -did receive monetary compensation for his loss.</p> - -<p>But the genius of Comedy had not done with the -Tanks.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_45" href="#Footnote_45" class="fnanchor">45</a>“The town had been evacuated so suddenly by the -enemy that some civilian population still remained.</p> - -<p>“Two cows belonging to the German Town Major -were solemnly presented by their French civilian keeper -to Major Hammond as a token of the joy that the inhabitants -felt at their liberation.”</p></div> - -<p>These absurd camp followers remained for long the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_177">177</span> -most cherished possessions of the Battalion, and accompanied -them wherever they went.</p> - -<div id="ip_177" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 42em;"> - <img src="images/i_176a.jpg" width="657" height="319" alt="" /> - <div class="caption">PREPARING FOR THE CAMBRAL. A TRAIN OF TANKS WITH FASCINES IN POSITION</div></div> - -<div id="ip_177b" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 43em;"> - <img src="images/i_176b1.jpg" width="677" height="463" alt="" /> - <div class="caption">THE BAPAUME-CAMBRAI ROAD</div></div> - -<div id="ip_177c" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 43em;"> - <img src="images/i_176b2.jpg" width="688" height="414" alt="" /> - <div class="caption">A TANK CRUSHING DOWN THE ENEMY’S WIRE</div></div> - -<p>At Flesquières the 51st Highland Division, which -was using an attack formation of its own, was held up; -it appears that the Tanks outdistanced the infantry, or -that the tactics adopted did not permit of the infantry -keeping close enough up to the Tanks. As the Tanks -topped the crest, they came under direct artillery fire -at short range and suffered heavy casualties.</p> - -<p>No less than sixteen Tanks were knocked out by a -single field gun.</p> - -<p>This gun was at the west end of the village, and from -its position the Tanks were each outlined against the -sky as they topped the ridge. Its story is told in Sir -Douglas Haig’s Despatch, with a generosity which -might well have encouraged what the Tank crews considered -a most undesirable spirit in enemy gunners:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“Many of the hits upon our tanks at Flesquières -were obtained by a German artillery officer who, remaining -alone at his battery, served a field gun single-handed -until killed at his gun. The great bravery of -this officer aroused the admiration of all ranks.”</p></div> - -<p>There was stiff fighting at Havrincourt, and before -nightfall the 62nd Division and its Tanks had captured -Graincourt. Several Tanks even pushed on beyond -towards Bourlon Wood and the Cambrai road, but by -this time the infantry were too exhausted to follow.</p> - -<p>By 4 p.m. on November 20 one of the most astonishing -battles in all history had been won, and as far as -the Tank Corps was concerned, tactically finished.</p> - -<p>There were no reserves of Tanks, and the crews that -had fought all day were now very spent and weary.</p> - -<p>The infantry were still more exhausted and a further<span class="pagenum" id="Page_178">178</span> -advance was impossible. The night was spent by Tank -crews and infantry in resting, and by the Staff in planning -a renewed attack for the next day.</p> - -<p>A letter home from a Tank officer describes a typical -scene:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“We had captured the village of Havrincourt that -morning, or rather its ruins, and it was in the one remaining -room of the once magnificent Château that -General John Ponsonby, commanding the 40th Division, -established his Headquarters and convened a conference -for ten o’clock in the evening.</p> - -<p>“The road thither had already been sufficiently restored -to permit of cars getting through, granted skilful -driving and good luck.</p> - -<p>“Felled trees, wire, breastworks, and other barriers -had been cleared aside, trenches and craters on both -sides of No Man’s Land had been roughly filled in, -whilst the notorious ‘Grand Ravine’ had been made -passable for carriage folk by the judicious placing of a -few fascines.</p> - -<p>“There were a round dozen of us at the conference, a -muddy, rather blear-eyed party, some in tin hats and -trench coats, revolver girt—some in honorific red and -gold—all with slung gas-masks.</p> - -<p>“General Ponsonby and his G.S.O.I. sat on an old -packing-case with a map spread out before them on -another, lit by the dancing flicker of two guttering candles -stuck into German beer bottles. General Elles and -Colonel Baker-Carr were there with a chorus of Commanding -Officers, Company Commanders and Reconnaissance -Officers from the 1st Tank Brigade.</p> - -<p>“An armed sentry stood at the breach in the wall -that served for doorway—signallers and orderlies entered -and left the little circle of yellow light, stirring -up the dust from the fallen débris on the broken -floor.</p> - -<p>“One felt uneasily conscious of forming part of a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_179">179</span> -Graphic picture entitled ‘Advanced Headquarters,’ or -‘Planning the Battle.’</p> - -<p>“Anyway, the battle <em>was</em> eventually planned and to -the satisfaction of all parties present. The G.S.O.I. -finished writing his operation orders for the morning’s -attack, the conference dissolved, and we stumbled out -once more into the night, each of us with some job -to get done before the dawn.</p> - -<p>“To me it fell to push on to the advanced Headquarters -of the Infantry Brigades concerned to explain -the plans for the morrow’s battles and to deliver certain -necessary maps to the Tank Commanders who would be -co-operating.</p> - -<p>“I slung the maps for easier porterage along a pole -that I and my orderly shouldered and from which they -dangled in swaying white packages to the great interest -and mystification of passing troops, to whom the -bearers and the pole were invisible in the inky dark.</p> - -<p>“It was a weary way up to Graincourt with nothing -but gun flashes and infrequent star-shells to light the -way, but at last we reached it.</p> - -<p>“Two of the Infantry Brigades had, we found, established -their Headquarters in a sort of catacomb underneath -the ruined church—a wonderful place, part -mediæval and part the work of the industrious -Hun.</p> - -<p>“Down and down you went—the old vaulted brickwork -giving place to stout German timbering—until at -the very bottom, some hundred feet below the floor of -the church, the steep stairway ended in a gallery off -which opened a whole street of little chambers.</p> - -<p>“The place was insufferably hot and stuffy to one -fresh in from the cold of the outer night; there was haze -and reek of tobacco smoke and cooking, half drowning -the stale dank smell, inseparable from a deep dug-out -that has been long occupied—especially by Germans.</p> - -<p>“Graincourt had been taken by surprise and had -changed hands so quickly that we had taken over these -very eligible Headquarters as a going concern ‘ready -furnished for immediate occupation.’</p></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_180">180</span></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“So sudden, indeed, had been the change of tenancy -that the two Boche engineers whose job it was to run -the electric lighting plant had been captured in their -own subterranean engine-room and were even now -stolidly carrying on their old duties, seemingly but little -concerned by the fact that they were now ‘under entirely -new management.’</p> - -<p>“As it turned out, it was very well for us that we -did capture and retain this precious pair, for when they -found that they were going to be kept on to run the -lighting as before, they quite shamelessly said:</p> - -<p>“‘Well, if that’s the case, there’s just one little point -we ought to warn you about, and that is, if any one -moves what looks like the main switch—as any one -would who didn’t know, when starting up the plant—the -demolition charges would be blown. If you would -like these removed in case of accidents, we can show -you where to dig for them—we know exactly where to -find them, as it was our job to lay them.’</p> - -<p>“Even whilst I was there, I saw these ruffians superintending -the removal of case after case of high-explosive -from cunningly concealed chambers behind -the timber linings and under floors.</p> - -<p>“The cramped stairways, galleries and cubby-holes -were crowded with odd specimens of all ranks and arms, -some eating or talking, others huddled uneasily asleep, -with the constant tide of traffic pouring over their -sprawling limbs.</p> - -<p>“Electric lights burned brilliantly, and the engine -sent a steady shiver through the timbered walls like -the vibrations of a steamer.</p> - -<p>“Like a ship breasting the waves, too, were the intermittent -thud and tremor of bursting shells in the village -high overhead, or the replies of our own artillery.</p> - -<p>“Telephones buzzed, a typewriter rattled away, and -the clatter of plates being washed in a bucket made one -wonder wistfully whether it would occur to any one to -suggest that you might be hungry.</p> - -<p>“One Brigadier, presumably the first come, sat in the -utmost pomp and luxury in a sumptuous arm-chair of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_181">181</span> -crimson plush, a ci-devant drawing-room table before -him, on which was spread a large-scale detailed map of -Bourlon Wood—a very valuable legacy left behind by -the over-hasty Boches.</p> - -<p>“On the walls were framed oleographs of Hindenburg -and the Kaiser, whilst a gilt clock still kept German -time as it ticked above the door.</p> - -<p>“Two tiers of wire rabbit-net bunks lined one side -of the little chamber, and a smart little stove surmounted -by a fine old mirror adorned the other.</p> - -<p>“They are pretty sound on Home Comforts are the -Boches, and they don’t think twice about pinching anything -they fancy from the unfortunate natives.</p> - -<p>“Like another much advertised system of furnishing, -‘It’s so simple’! ‘Deferred Payment,’ if they will -have it so—deferred, but payment at the last—payment -good and plenty or I’ll eat my tin hat—including visor -and lining.”</p></div> - -<h3>V</h3> - -<p>The next day (November 21) saw composite companies -of Tanks fighting in co-operation with new infantry.</p> - -<p>But though the infantry was new, it was unfortunately -not fresh. Sir Julian Byng had no rested troops -at all at his disposal. It may be said that the whole -of the subsequent history of the battle and its sequel -hinges upon these two points. All our infantry was -weary in the extreme, and most of it had never co-operated -with Tanks before.</p> - -<p>Consequently many strong points, though they were -finally captured, gave us more trouble than they should.</p> - -<p>On the 21st, Tanks attacked several villages and -strong points with success.</p> - -<p>Thirteen Tanks of “B” (2nd) Battalion surrounded -the village of Cantaing. They met with a stubborn resistance -as they closed in upon it. To this they replied<span class="pagenum" id="Page_182">182</span> -vigorously with machine-gun and 6-pounder fire, and -by noon the enemy had been driven out.</p> - -<p>Two Tanks also, of “B” Battalion, were sent for by -the infantry, who were held up by heavy machine-gun -fire outside Noyelles. In half an hour they succeeded -in crushing all resistance, setting fire to an ammunition -dump and patrolling the village till the infantry took -over.</p> - -<p>Neither Tank was in the least hurt, and there were -no casualties among the crews.</p> - -<p>Twelve Tanks of “H” (8th) Battalion received -orders soon after 8 a.m. to attack Fontaine-Notre-Dame.</p> - -<p>The village was six miles distant, and the Tanks came -in for severe fighting on the way there.</p> - -<p>They reached their objective at about 4.30. By 5.30 -they had captured it and were withdrawn after handing -it over to the infantry.</p> - -<p>But next day a furious German counter-attack dislodged -our garrison.</p> - -<p>We were determined to possess it, and on the 23rd -attacked again in force.</p> - -<p>The enemy was prepared, and a desperate battle -ensued among the houses. Twenty-four Tanks from -“B” and “H” Battalions had entered the village first, -whereupon the enemy retired to the tops of the houses -and rained down bombs and bullets upon the roofs of -the machines.</p> - -<p>The Germans were in force, and in the narrow streets -it was difficult for the Tanks to bring an effective fire -to bear upon them.</p> - -<p>The infantry was too weary to clear the place, and -after patrolling the streets the Tanks withdrew, as soon -as darkness covered their retreat.</p> - -<p>On the same day thirty-four Tanks of the 1st Brigade<span class="pagenum" id="Page_183">183</span> -supported a brilliant attack made by the 40th Division -upon Bourlon Wood. The wood was captured after a -sharp struggle. The Tanks then pressed on towards the -village, but as at Fontaine, the infantry, who had suffered -severe casualties in the taking of the wood, was -too exhausted to follow up.</p> - -<p>On November 25 and 26 we renewed our attack upon -Fontaine-Notre-Dame and again tried to capture -Bourlon Village.</p> - -<p>In the end, however, both these important points remained -in enemy hands.</p> - -<p>A week had now elapsed since the launching of the -battle.</p> - -<p>According to the original scheme, the action should -not have been continued for more than three days, but -in spite of our original “Self-Denying Ordinance” as -to ground, when desirable posts of vantage were actually -in our hands, we had fallen a prey to “land -hunger,” and had still fought on and continued to advance -in order to consolidate these new and delightful -possessions.</p> - -<p>But now we held the extremely important tactical -point formed by the heights of Bourlon Wood, and it -was plain that to take Fontaine and Bourlon Village -would cost us more than they were worth to us.</p> - -<p>We had done all and more than all we set out to do. -The troops urgently needed resting. They had had no -proper rest before the battle, and now despite their -sense of victory they were extraordinarily spent.</p> - -<p>The Tanks’ crews, too, were almost fought to a standstill, -and owing to the constant daily necessity there -had been for hurrying composite companies into action, -their units had become inconveniently disorganised.</p> - -<p>So on November 27 we rested from our labours and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_184">184</span> -counted the spoil.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_46" href="#Footnote_46" class="fnanchor">46</a>“Whatever may be the future historian’s dictum as -to its value, the First Battle of Cambrai must always -rank as one of the most remarkable battles ever fought. -On November 20, from a base of some 13,000 yards in -width, a penetration of no less than 10,000 yards was -effected in twelve hours (at the Third Battle of Ypres -a similar penetration took three months), 8000 prisoners -and 100 guns were captured, and these prisoners -alone were nearly double the casualties suffered by the -3rd and 4th Armies during the first day of the battle. -It is an interesting point to remember that in this battle -the attacking infantry were assisted by 690 officers and -3500 other ranks of the Tank Corps, a little over 4000 -men, or the strength of a strong brigade, and that these -men replaced artillery for wire-cutting, and rendered -unnecessary the old preliminary bombardment. More -than this, by keeping close to the infantry, they effected -a much higher co-operation than had ever before been -attainable with artillery. When on November 21 the -bells of London pealed forth in celebration of the victory -of Cambrai, consciously or unconsciously to their -listeners they tolled out an old tactics and rang in a -new—Cambrai had become the Valmy of a new epoch -in war, the epoch of the mechanical engineer.”</p></div> - -<p>It was a weary but satisfied body of men that General -Elles inspected at Havrincourt on November 29 when -the party broke up.</p> - -<p>The 1st and 3rd Brigades were entraining immediately -for Mult and Bray respectively, and the 2nd was -to follow them in a few days’ time.</p> - -<p>Good-byes were exchanged, and, as every one thought, -the curtain rung down upon the First Battle of -Cambrai.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_185">185</span></p> - -<h3><span class="smcap larger">Part II</span><br /> - -<span class="subhead">(<i>November 30</i>)</span></h3> - -<p>In order to understand the events that followed, we -have to imagine a victorious but very weary British -Army holding a newly consolidated salient against an -enemy whom they have just roused to a revengeful fury -by a sudden stinging slap in the face.</p> - -<p>The enemy had been horribly frightened, and now -that he had recovered he realised how urgently his prestige -demanded signal vindication. We were, it would -seem, half expecting in a tired unimaginative sort of -way that he might hit at us on the new Bourlon Wood -flank of our salient. On the Gouzeaucourt side were -old-established defences. These we held thinly—it -never entering our heads apparently that he would attack -an old piece of the line.</p> - -<p>But the German Army Commander, General von der -Marwitz, had an ambitious scheme in his mind. He -meant to pinch off our salient and, if possible, to capture -the entire third and fourth Corps, who held it. His -right wing was to operate from Bourlon southward, and -his left from Masnières westwards, the two attacks -converging on Havrincourt and Metz.</p> - -<p>The attack was launched shortly after daylight on -November 30, and failed completely on the right -against Bourlon Wood; here the enemy was caught by -our artillery and machine-guns and mown down by -hundreds. On the left, however, the attack succeeded; -first, it came as a surprise; secondly, the Germans -heralded their assault by lines of low-flying aeroplanes, -which made our men keep down and so lose observation. -Under the protection of this aeroplane barrage<span class="pagenum" id="Page_186">186</span> -and a very heavy trench mortar bombardment the German -infantry advanced and speedily captured Villers -Guislain and Gouzeaucourt.</p> - -<p>It was not till nearly ten o’clock on November 30 -that Brigadier-General Courage of the 2nd Tank Brigade -received a telephone message warning him of the -attack.</p> - -<p>The Tanks had been definitely “dismissed,” and were -busy refitting, and at that moment every machine was -in complete <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">déshabillé</i>. Many of the engines were in -process of being tinkered with, and not a single Tank -was filled up or contained its battle equipment. Those -whom some emergency has obliged to get out an -ordinary car on a cold winter’s morning when it has -neither petrol, oil, nor water in it, and has half its -engine strewn about the garage, will understand the -difficulties that faced the Tank Corps. They will realise -that when no less than twenty-two Tanks of “B” -(2nd) Battalion had started for the battle by 12.40, -a very smart piece of work had been done. Very soon -fourteen Tanks of “A” (1st) Battalion followed them, -and by two o’clock twenty Tanks of “H” (8th) Battalion -were able to move up in support.</p> - -<p>In the words of Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatch, “Great -credit is due to the officers and men of the (2nd) Tank -Brigade for the speed with which they brought their -Tanks into action.”</p> - -<p>By the time the first twenty Tanks reached Gouzeaucourt, -however, the Guards, who had been hurried up -with all speed, had managed to retake it, and the Tanks -were therefore pushed out as a screen to cover their -consolidation.</p> - -<p>Here they remained all day, beating off enemy -counter-attacks.</p> - -<p>All day along both sides of the salient the enemy<span class="pagenum" id="Page_187">187</span> -hammered fiercely at our lines. Here and there he penetrated -them. Cooks, servants, and signallers, every -available man, was given a rifle and put into the line, -and the Despatch tells of wonderful individual deeds -that were done as the battle surged and eddied confusedly. -We did not propose to allow the Germans to -hold their new possessions, the points of vantage out of -which they had hustled us.</p> - -<p>On December 1, Tanks, Guards, and dismounted -Indian cavalry hit back against Villers Guislain and -Gauche Wood.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“Tanks were,” the Despatch notes, “in great measure -responsible for the capture of the wood. Heavy fighting -took place for this position, which it is clear that the -enemy had decided to hold at all costs. When the -infantry and cavalry finally took possession of the wood, -great numbers of German dead and smashed machine-guns -were found. In one spot four German machine-guns, -with dead crews lying round, were discovered -within a radius of twenty yards. Three German field -guns, complete with teams, were also captured in this -wood.</p> - -<p>“Other Tanks proceeded to Villers Guislain, and in -spite of heavy direct artillery fire three reached the -outskirts of the village, but the fire of the enemy’s -machine-guns prevented our troops advancing from the -south from supporting them, and the Tanks ultimately -withdrew.”</p></div> - -<p>For two more days the enemy pressed on against us, -and the battle raged round Bourlon, Fontaine, Marcoing, -and La Vacquerie.</p> - -<p>Everywhere he dented in our line, and by December 4 -the outline of our front showed an impossible series of -irregularities. We must either renew the attack on a -big scale, or make up our minds</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_188">188</span></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_47" href="#Footnote_47" class="fnanchor">47</a>“to withdraw to a more compact line on the Flesquières -Ridge.</p> - -<p>“Although this decision involved giving up important -positions most gallantly won, I had no doubt as to -the correct course under the conditions. Accordingly, -on the night of December 4–5 the evacuation of the -positions held by us north of the Flesquières Ridge was -commenced. On the morning of December 7 this withdrawal -was completed successfully without interference -from the enemy.”</p></div> - -<p>It is as well that the enemy did not “interfere,” for -through some oversight the Tanks did not receive due -notice of the intended withdrawal, and certain salvage -parties, busily at work on disabled Tanks, in forward -positions, knew nothing of the evacuation until, to their -astonishment, they found our infantry streaming back -past them in the darkness. There was then nothing -for it but to abandon the wrecks and to get back themselves -with such gear as they could carry.</p> - -<p>So ended the second phase of the battle.</p> - -<p>It had been an exceedingly vexatious business.</p> - -<p>Putting the best construction we could upon it, we -had to admit to having been caught napping. The German -attack had thrown us into complete, if momentary, -confusion. But afterwards, when the situation could -be calmly reviewed, contemporary criticism was unanimously -agreed that we had, after all, suffered little but -moral damage. And from that sort of damage the -British have the art of deriving wholesome instruction -in a unique degree. We braced ourselves up, and determined -that this sharp rap over the knuckles should do -us good.</p> - -<p>But to the Tank Corps the exploits of the 2nd Brigade -were more directly advantageous.</p> - -<p>Amid the hubbub and confusion the Tank crews, like<span class="pagenum" id="Page_189">189</span> -the Guards and the 2nd Cavalry Division, had known -but one impulse—they had gone straight east against -the enemy. That was the pole to which their compass -pointed.</p> - -<p>While everything had been doubt and hesitation they -had had but one thought, to fill and adjust their machines -and hurry them forward. At 9 a.m. the Tank -crews had been peacefully preparing to break camp and -leave for their training area. By four in the afternoon -seventy-three Tanks had been launched with decisive -effect against the enemy.</p> - -<p>To many High Commanders who had believed that -Tanks could only be used in a “full-dress” attack after -weeks of preparation, the events of November 30 came -as a joyful revelation.</p> - -<p>So for the Tanks ended the 1917 campaign.</p> -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_190">190</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_XI">CHAPTER XI</h2> - -<p class="subhead">THREE NEW TYPES OF TANK—THE DEPOT—CENTRAL -WORKSHOPS</p> -</div> - -<h3>I</h3> - -<p><span class="firstword">The</span> “Fighting Side” had now been for many months -almost exclusively engaged with “operations,” and having -fought themselves nearly to a standstill at the -Battle of Cambrai, were now in as urgent need of reorganisation -as were their machines of overhaul and -repair.</p> - -<p>The present chronicle has also for long followed their -fortunes, with not a glance to spare for the activities -of the manufacturing and other organisations which -played the supporting parts “Aaron and Hur” to the -Fighting Side’s “Moses.”</p> - -<p>At the period we have reached it is high time to pick -up the dropped histories of the other persons of the -drama. For while the Tank Corps had been fighting, -manufacturers had been busy, and a huge network of -auxiliary services and organisations had grown up, by -means of which the whole Corps was to rise rejuvenated -from its ashes.</p> - -<p>Before the Tanks fought their next pitched battle the -Mark V. had come into being, Whippet Tanks had been -issued, a heavy type of infantry-carrying Tank had been -designed, and for fast work on good roads a Battalion -of Armoured Cars had grown up.</p> - -<p>Besides this, a complete system of Supply Tanks and -Field Maintenance Companies for salvage and supplies<span class="pagenum" id="Page_191">191</span> -had been gradually evolved during the course of the -last campaign.</p> - -<p>The Tank Corps Depot had been enormously enlarged, -and had moved to its final “location” on the -coast near Le Tréport.</p> - -<p>The Home Depot at Wool had also increased, and -there had been changes and developments at the Ministry -of Munitions and in the Tank production side -generally.</p> - -<p>It is in fact impossible in a single chapter to give -more than a brief indication of this universal and increasing -“back area” activity.</p> - -<p>To begin with the changes in the home organisation -and in the production of Tanks.</p> - -<p>The “New” Tank Committee was, as we have already -related, a success.</p> - -<p>In December 1917 and January 1918 it saw a rather -interesting new phase, when Majors Drain and Alden, -of the U.S. Tank Corps, attended certain of its meetings, -and when the manufacture for the British and -American Armies of the Mark VIII. or “Allied Tank” -was decided upon. This Tank was never fought, but its -projection is perhaps interesting as an example of inter-Allied -solidarity.</p> - -<p>By January 1918 proposals for an expansion from -nine to eighteen Battalions and for a reorganisation of -Tank control had been put forward.</p> - -<p>These proposals were eventually (in April 1918) -discussed by the Inter-Allied Tank Committee, a sort -of sub-committee of the Versailles Conference, on which -the British, French and American Tank Corps were -represented.</p> - -<p>But neither men nor really constructive thought -could then be spared from the immediate needs of meeting<span class="pagenum" id="Page_192">192</span> -the German onrush, and nothing was done to -realise their proposals until that onrush was finally -stemmed.</p> - -<p>But in July 1918 the business was taken up again. -It was decided to expand the Tank Corps to thirty-four -Battalions armed with about six thousand machines.</p> - -<h3>II</h3> - -<p>In December 1917 the manufacturing situation was -not particularly satisfactory. As late as August 20 the -Commander-in-Chief had, it will be remembered, laid -down, in an official letter, an order of priority in which -there were four categories preferred to Tanks.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“The manufacture of Tanks should not be allowed to -interfere in any way with:</p> - -<p>“(1) The output of aeroplanes.</p> - -<p>“(2) The output of guns and ammunition.</p> - -<p>“(3) The provision of mechanical transport, spare -parts therefor, and petrol tractors up to the scale demanded.</p> - -<p>“(4) The provision of locomotives up to the scale -demanded.</p></div> - -<p>And though by December the views of the authorities -had changed considerably, the sudden expansion of the -Tank building programme was not easy.</p> - -<p>In October 1917, 700 Mark IV. Tanks had already -been delivered in France, and a balance of about 500 -was still due. But the Fighting Side was anxious that -these should not all be of the unimproved Mark IV. -pattern. For up to now no change in the design had -been made since the first Mark IV. had been delivered. -It was decided, therefore, that some of the 500 should -be given Ricardo engines and Epicyclic gears, and that -others should be fitted as Supply Tanks.</p> - -<p>The M.W.S.D. hoped to build about 1600 new Heavy<span class="pagenum" id="Page_193">193</span> -Tanks, 800 of which were to be of the Mark V. type and -ready by May 1, and the others to be of other heavy -types, probably Mark V. star and Mark VI., while 385 -Whippet (“Medium A”) Tanks were also to be ready -by May 1918.</p> - -<p>Further, there was to be a small cadre of Salvage -Tanks and of special infantry Supply Tanks, two of the -latter being able to carry complete supplies for an -infantry Brigade for one day.</p> - -<p>A large number of these Tanks were as before to be -built by the Metropolitan Carriage and Wagon Company.</p> - -<p>A very brief account of most of these new types of -Tank has already been given in Chapter I., and it is not -necessary to repeat here the details of their speeds, -armament, and so forth.</p> - -<p>Salvage Tanks were usually Mark IV. Tanks on which -special gear, such as winches and small cranes, had been -fitted for hoisting wrecks out of the mud, or for towing.</p> - -<p>The Supply Tank was a Mark IV. fitted with very -capacious sponsons. In order to save weight these carriers -were not made as fully armoured as the fighting -Tanks.</p> - -<p>The Gun Carrier Tank was a machine with an elongated -tail which formed a platform whence it was intended -that a 60-pounder gun or a 6-in. howitzer could -be fired.</p> - -<p>The Tank Corps Armoured Cars were of the usual -turreted pattern, and were armed with machine-guns.</p> - -<p>But more important than any other new development -was the improvement in the main issue of heavy Tanks, -an improvement which is very well described by the -historian of the 13th Battalion:</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_194">194</span></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“The old Mark IV. type had serious disadvantages. -Its engine power on bad ground was insufficient, and -the clumsy secondary gears made turning slow and difficult -as well as requiring the services of at least two -members of the crew in addition to the driver. This, -in battle, became a heavy handicap upon the fighting -powers of the Tank. The officer was hampered by the -need to attend to brakes, and a gunner called upon suddenly -to help alter gears would lose the fleeting chance -of firing at favourable targets. In the new Mark V. -Tank these troubles largely disappeared. An engine of -new design gave both greater speed and greater turning -power, while a system of epicyclic gears made turning -easy and under the sole control of the driver. The -officer was free to supervise his crew, the gunner was -free to use his weapons to the best advantage. Add that -a greatly increased field of view was obtained by the -addition of an observer’s turret, and it will be understood -that an immense advance in type had been -secured.”</p></div> - -<p>The Mark V. had, however, one serious drawback. -Its ventilation was extremely faulty. We shall see later -how serious a disadvantage this was to prove.</p> - -<h3>III</h3> - -<p>There were also to be changes in the technical and -mechanical engineering side of the Tank Corps itself, -by which an economy of man-power was to be effected.</p> - -<p>When the Tank Corps was first formed each Company -had its own workshops, and this system lasted to -the end of 1916. Then in the course of the winter reorganisation, -Company Workshops were abolished and -Battalion Workshops were substituted.</p> - -<p>By the autumn of 1917 the experiment was tried of -centralising still further and merging Battalion into -Brigade Workshops, and early in 1918 it was decided<span class="pagenum" id="Page_195">195</span> -to take the last step and to concentrate all repairs in -the Central Workshops.</p> - -<p>This system, which achieved a great economy of -skilled men, was made possible by a very clear line of -demarcation being drawn between Repairs and Maintenance, -a principle which had been laid down by -Colonel F. Searle, D.S.O., the chief engineer of the -Corps and the head of the whole mechanical side of the -Tanks.</p> - -<p>No damaged part was ever to be repaired on the field; -mechanical efficiency was to be maintained by the -broken bit of mechanism being immediately replaced by -a complete new part.</p> - -<p>This replacement was carried out by the crew, whose -efficiency as mechanics was enormously increased by -being thus made responsible for their own machines.</p> - -<p>One point had, of course, to be carefully attended to -in carrying out this system. There had to be a very efficient -supply organisation by which the necessary spares -were quickly available in the field.</p> - -<p>When the crew had removed the damaged part from -the Tank, it was sent back to the Central Workshops -to be repaired.</p> - -<p>Here a specially skilled man would be always employed -upon damages to one particular part.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_48" href="#Footnote_48" class="fnanchor">48</a>“For example, broken unions of petrol pipes commonly -occur in all petrol engines, and if a small unit -workshop exists, the brazing out and repair of such -broken unions can be carried out there. But in order to -do this a coppersmith must be kept at the unit workshop, -and only part of his time will be employed in this -work of brazing petrol unions. If now, however, all -broken unions, from every unit, are sent back to a Central<span class="pagenum" id="Page_196">196</span> -Workshop for repair, there is a sufficient amount of -work of this description to keep one man, or possibly -two or three men fully employed all their time.</p> - -<p>“These men become absolute experts in brazing -broken unions, and before very long can do in a few -minutes a job which would take a coppersmith with the -unit workshop an hour or two to carry out.”</p></div> - -<p>It is interesting to trace what might have been the -itinerary of a Tank from the time it left the manufacturers -in about Midsummer 1917, till after going into -action in, say, the Third Battle of Ypres.</p> - -<p>On completion every Tank was first sent to testing -grounds at Newbury, where it was manned by No. 20 -Squadron R.N.A.S. From here it was forwarded to -Richborough, whence it was shipped by the Channel -ferry and received at Le Havre by another detachment -of Squadron 20. Thence it went to Bermicourt, was -again tested, this time by Tank Corps personnel, and -then handed on to the Central Stores at Erin. These -stores were first established in 1917, and eventually consisted -of over seven acres of railway siding and six acres -of buildings. The Central Workshops were at one time -also installed here, but as more accommodation became -necessary they were moved to Teneur, about a mile and -a half away.</p> - -<p>From the Central Stores the Tanks would be issued -to Battalions as needed.</p> - -<p>For example, during the Third Battle of Ypres a -large number of Tanks were supplied to Companies -actually in the line. We will suppose that a particular -Tank was so supplied, and received a bullet through its -carburettor during one of the small actions of the end -of October.</p> - -<p>The crew would immediately draw a new carburettor<span class="pagenum" id="Page_197">197</span> -from the neighbouring mobile advanced store, which -was run by one of the two Tank Salvage or Field Companies.</p> - -<p>Thus re-equipped the Tank would again go into -action, perhaps within a day of being damaged.</p> - -<p>This time we will suppose that the Tank got knocked -out between the first and second objective by a direct -hit, the unwounded members of the crew going forward -with their Lewis guns and leaving the Tank stranded -and immovable.</p> - -<p>The position of the derelict having been reported, -men from a Tank Salvage Company would go up that -night, probably under shell-fire, and possibly in full -view of the enemy whenever a Véry light went up.</p> - -<p>The experts would arrive at the wreck with their -favourite set of repairing tools, possibly consisting of -the specially designed Tank-repairing outfit, but more -probably of a few pet spanners, some odd lengths of -tubing and a coil of copper wire. They would toil at -the Tank till dawn.</p> - -<p>Sometimes after one or more nights spent like this -they would induce the Tank to go. In the Ypres area -Tanks were sometimes salved that had completely disappeared -into the mud. Sometimes it was possible to -tow a machine away, particularly after the special salvage -Tanks with their hoisting gear came into use. -Sometimes only <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">disjecta membra</i>, such as engine parts, -6-pounders, or parts of the gears or transmissions, could -be saved.</p> - -<p>During the two years of their existence the Field -Companies, at the lowest computation, saved two or -three million pounds’ worth of stores, a work which -they did not accomplish without heavy cost to themselves.</p> - -<p>We will suppose that the Tank whose history we have<span class="pagenum" id="Page_198">198</span> -followed was salved whole.</p> - -<p>The next step would be that it would be entrained -by the Field Company and sent back to the Central -Workshops at Teneur.</p> - -<p>This was really a vast engineering works covering -about twenty acres of ground, where, besides a very -large number of trained and expert mechanics, more -than a thousand Chinese coolies worked.</p> - -<p>These coolies often became very dexterous artisans.</p> - -<p>Here, in endless ranks down the long shops, they -would toil indefatigably, in the summer stripped to the -waist, their brown bodies gleaming in the white light of -the arc lamps or in the glow of the forges, or in the -winter dressed in their loose blue quilted jackets and -close caps with curious rabbits’ fur ear-lappets.</p> - -<p>Possibly the shattered or burnt-out Tank would have -to be almost entirely rebuilt, two wrecked Tanks providing, -perhaps, parts enough to make one good one. -Here, finally, the reconstructed Tank would be tested -and sent back to the Central Stores.</p> - -<p>Possibly it would have been reduced to a sort of -“C. III.” category, and made into a Supply Tank. -Possibly it would have been fitted with all the latest -gadgets, and come out from its reforging a better -weapon than it was originally.</p> - -<p>For the activities of the Central Workshops were not -confined to mere repair. It will be remembered how -they distinguished themselves in the matter of the -lightning delivery of fascines, releasing gear, and supply -sledges for the Battle of Cambrai.</p> - -<p>A large proportion, too, of the experiments which led -to improvements in the design of Tanks were carried -out here; for example, the long Tank and the unditching<span class="pagenum" id="Page_199">199</span> -beam were of Central Workshops origin, and here -the officers who fought the Tanks could have their ideas -for gadgets sympathetically reviewed and put to practical -proof by the band of expert engineers that Lieut.-Colonel -Brocklebank had brought together. But they -were more than mere experts; they were enthusiasts -whose unflagging zeal had created the marvel of Central -Workshops where there had been bare ploughland -so short a time before.</p> - -<h3>IV</h3> - -<p>We have traced a Tank from its setting forth from -home with unscratched paint through the vicissitudes -of battle to its remoulding as a greatly improved machine -or to its relegation to “Permanent Base.”</p> - -<p>How would the military history run of a member of -a Tank crew which had fought, say, at the Battle of -Cambrai?</p> - -<p>We have already related how the Tank Corps was -chiefly recruited in early days, that is, either from -among mechanical experts or from volunteers from -other branches of the Service. Later men with no special -qualifications were taken by direct enlistment. We -will suppose, however, that 1234 Pte. John Smith got -his transfer from the West Surreys when in the line -in about June 1917, and that at that moment the training -schools in France had no vacancies. To their great -joy, therefore, Pte. Smith and his batch would be sent -home for training to the Tank Depot at Wool.</p> - -<p>Here was a huge camp where men like themselves, -who had seen fighting, and also men fresh from the -Recruiting Depots, were being formed into the new -Tank Battalions. By July about nine of these new -Battalions were in training. The men went through<span class="pagenum" id="Page_200">200</span> -the usual recruits’ curriculum. First of all, drill, discipline -and physical training; then individual courses in -Tank Gunnery, Driving and Maintenance. Then they -would go through the Signalling, Revolver and -Compass Schools, the Gas and Reconnaissance -Schools.</p> - -<p>There was also here an Officer Cadet Preliminary -Training Company where the same sort of instruction -was given. Gunners at this time did all their firing -practice with 6-pounders at the Naval School of Gunnery, -Chatham, or rather, to be exact, on “H.M.S. -Excellent,” Whale Island. All the other courses were -gone through in and around the camp.</p> - -<p>Practically, only individual instruction was given at -Wool, and their collective and tactical training was -done by the men at Bermicourt, after their arrival in -France. At Wool it was reckoned that, with this important -omission, nearly four months would usually be occupied -in raising and training a Tank Battalion. It -would, therefore, be towards the end of September that -Pte. Smith found himself in France.</p> - -<p>He was, he found, to be detailed to one of the old -Battalions, and was, therefore, despatched to the Training -and Reinforcement Depot, then established at Erin, -and later to be moved to Le Tréport.</p> - -<p>Here he was attached to a Reception Company, put -through a kind of examination in the subjects he had -studied at Wool, but passing satisfactorily and his -records being duly completed, he was issued with his -kit and equipment and posted to his Company. He -was soon sent to join it at an improvised training area -where it was at this moment “resting” from the Battle -of Ypres. It was not actually having a particularly -restful time, as tactical training with the infantry was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_201">201</span> -in progress, and there was more than enough night -work in the programme.</p> - -<div id="ip_201" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 44em;"> - <img src="images/i_200a1.jpg" width="689" height="304" alt="" /> - <div class="caption">SLEDGE-TOWING TANK TAKING UP SUPPLIES</div></div> - -<div id="ip_201b" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 43em;"> - <img src="images/i_200a2.jpg" width="681" height="404" alt="" /> - <div class="caption">BERMICOURT CHATEAU NEAR ST. POL.<br /> - TANK CORPS MAIN HEADQUARTERS</div></div> - -<div id="ip_201c" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 43em;"> - <img src="images/i_200b1.jpg" width="687" height="381" alt="" /> - <div class="caption">GUN-CARRYING TANK TAKING UP A HOWITZER</div></div> - -<div id="ip_201d" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 42em;"> - <img src="images/i_200b2.jpg" width="672" height="386" alt="" /> - <div class="caption">A WHIPPET GOING IN</div></div> - -<p>This phase did not last long, however, for the Company -was soon sent back to join its Battalion in the -Salient, where they executed an astonishing number of -moves and were considerably shelled, but never succeeded -in getting into action.</p> - -<p>After that they were hurried off to do intensive training -for Cambrai. Then came the battle, in the last -three days of which a very much exhausted 2nd Driver -Smith was wounded in the face by a bullet splash. The -trouble was not serious enough to get him to England, -and on his return from an all too brief stay in a Hospital -in France, he again found himself at the Depot. -This time, after only a day in the Reception Company -and after a medical examination, he was posted for -fourteen days to the Seaside Rest Camp at Merlimont.</p> - -<p>This Rest Camp consisted of rows and rows of rather -pretty bungalows built among the sand dunes. Here -both men and officers were given a very pleasant time, -though they were still under military discipline and had -a certain number of parades to keep. For the officers -there was a comfortable club, and for the men an exceedingly -well-run Y.M.C.A. hut, where there were concerts -or pierrot shows almost nightly—either home-grown -or imported.</p> - -<p>Games and, in summer, swimming and bathing were -great features. There is no doubt, first, that the Camp -was immensely popular, and, secondly, that the Tank -Corps owed a good deal of its cheerful spirit and high -<em>moral</em> to the refreshment which the Camp afforded to -many a weary body and mind.</p> - -<p>After this fortnight by the sea Smith rejoined his<span class="pagenum" id="Page_202">202</span> -Battalion, and was, with the rest of the Tank world, -plunged into winter training.</p> - -<h3>V</h3> - -<p>The general organisation of the 1917–18 training, -though, of course, on a much larger scale, was very -much like that of the previous winter. New training -centres had been established and old centres extended.</p> - -<p>But perhaps a chronicle of the numbers who passed -through these courses of instruction at Wailly, Le -Tréport, Bermicourt and Merlimont, and of the sequence -in which the different Brigades took their turns -at the different areas, might prove less interesting than -a brief account of what was actually taught and of the -sort of way a syllabus would be carried out.</p> - -<p>In the official “Instructions for the Training of the -Tank Corps in France” these are the sort of general -principles we find laid down:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“All work must be carried out at high pressure. -Every exercise and movement should, if possible, be -reduced to a precise drill.</p> - -<p>“Games will be organised as a definite part of training -(see S.S. 137, ‘Recreational Training’).</p> - -<p>“Order is best cultivated by carrying out all work -on a fixed plan. Order is the foundation of discipline. -Small things like marching men always at attention to -and from work, making them stand to attention before -dismissing them, assist in cultivating steadiness and -discipline. Each day should commence with a careful -inspection of the billets and the men, or some similar -formal parade. Strict march discipline to and from -the training grounds must be insisted upon.</p> - -<p>“It is an essential part of training for war that the -men are taught to care for themselves, so as to maintain -their physical fitness. To this end the necessity -for taking the most scrupulous care of their clothing,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_203">203</span> -equipment and accoutrements will be explained to -them.”</p></div> - -<p>The following is the syllabus (slightly condensed) of -a Maintenance Course for Tank Commanders:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>How to drive a Tank.</p> - -<p>How to set a magneto.</p> - -<p>When an engine is misfiring or overheating.</p> - -<p>When an engine is knocking too badly to continue -working or is not pulling.</p> - -<p>When carburation is bad.</p> - -<p>When a Tank is at such an angle that it is dangerous -to run the engine.</p> - -<p>The causes of engine failures and how to correct -them.</p> - -<p>How the autovac works.</p> - -<p>The correct tension for fan belts.</p> - -<p>When an engine bed is loose.</p> - -<p>How much petrol, oil, grease, and water should be -used during average hour’s run.</p> - -<p>When road chain sprocket wheels or pinions should -be changed.</p> - -<p>How long it takes to change a set of sprocket wheels -and pinions.</p> - -<p>When a track or the Coventry driving chains are too -slack.</p> - -<p>When a clutch is too fierce, and how to correct it.</p> - -<p>When a clutch is slipping, and how to adjust it.</p> - -<p>When secondary gears are too much worn for further -service, and what is the effect of their not being fully -in mesh.</p> - -<p>How long it takes to change such gears.</p> - -<p>When tracks or secondary gears are over or under -lubricated.</p> - -<p>When brakes are operative or not.</p> - -<p>How long it takes to prepare a Tank for a day’s run.</p> - -<p>How long it takes thoroughly to clean and adjust a -Tank after a day’s work.</p></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_204">204</span></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>How long it takes to detrain Tanks and adjust -sponsons.</p> - -<p>How the equipment of a Tank should be stowed.</p> - -<p>The appliances which are necessary to dismantle -various sections of a Tank, and how it should be done.</p> - -<p>That it is just as necessary for a Company Commander -to inspect Tanks daily as it is for a Cavalry -Squadron Commander to inspect his horses.</p></div> - -<p>For an interesting “Immediate Action Course,” <i>i.e.</i>, -first aid to the engine, the following directions are -given to instructors:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“In order to inspire confidence at the outset, particular -stress should be laid upon the fact that in a -Tank there are practically only three causes of engine -failure—Valves—Ignition—Petrol.</p> - -<p>“If this is borne in mind, a very little experience -in the simple operations connected with these three -functions, coupled with a little training in diagnosis, -will enable students to deal very easily with troubles -as they occur.</p> - -<p>“Drivers should know by the ‘feel’ of their engine -whether it is firing correctly or not, and any member -of a crew ought to be able to detect and report at once -any irregularity in the sound of an exhaust from outside -the machine.</p> - -<p>“When the students have been through a course -(using the book) of what to do when:</p> - -<p>“1. The Engine won’t start,</p> - -<p>“2. Engine starts and stops after a few Revs,</p> - -<p>“3. Irregular sound of exhaust—machine will not -climb,</p> - -<p>“4. Popping back of Carburettor,</p> - -<p>“5. Overheating and knocking,</p> - -<p class="in0">the Instructor is to set up faults for the students to -remedy.”</p></div> - -<p>He is given ideas for nearly fifteen ways of producing<span class="pagenum" id="Page_205">205</span> -the symptom “Engine won’t start.”</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“It is suggested that the Instructor should insert a -piece of paper between the platinum points in the little -magneto, or fit a faulty contact breaker with a stiff -rocker in the big magneto, or smear segments and outside -of the distributor with a little dirty oil; if he desires -to queer the plugs, he may insert one with its gap -closed up or bridged with dirt or with a cracked insulation. -To produce symptom No. 2, he may insert a punctured -float in the Carburettor or insert a piece of rag in -the passage between the float chamber and the jets, or -block a cock under the Autovac. Or in order to produce -an irregular sound in the exhaust and to make the -machine refuse to climb, he may remove the roller and -pin from one or more inlet valves; or place two faulty -plugs in the engine. To make the engine overheat, he -is to insert an extra link in the Radiator Fan Bolt, -open the Air Slide, or start a leak in one or more of -the water outlet elbows. He may make the engine tap -and rattle by adjusting the valves with abnormal clearances, -and so on with the number of other defects, which -each student in turn is to be called upon to diagnose -and remedy.”</p></div> - -<p>For the conduct of a “Refresher” Battle Practice -Course the following points are suggested for the guidance -of instructors:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“The ammunition required for each man firing will -be 20 rounds of shell, 5 rounds of case shot, and 250 -rounds of S.A.A.</p> - -<p>“Before beginning a Battle Practice, the following -points must be seen to:</p> - -<p>“That each practice or scheme is of a practical -nature, <i>i.e.</i>, that it should bring out certain lessons -under as near battle conditions as possible.</p> - -<p>“All ports, etc., in the Tanks will be closed during -the practice. Targets should represent as nearly as possible -those met with in action. The practice must not -be hurried and the Tank must never contain more than<span class="pagenum" id="Page_206">206</span> -the normal crew. Students should be allowed to ride -on the top of the Tanks, in order to observe the fire -effect. In this way, by observing the faults of others, -they should be able to avoid committing the same errors -themselves, when their turn comes to fire.</p> - -<p>“Battle Practice exercises must be regarded by the -Tank Crews as what the Field firing practices are to the -Infantry.</p> - -<p>“Vizors and Gas-Masks must frequently be worn -during a Battle Practice Course.</p> - -<p>“Before the Battle Practice begins, Crews and Gunners -will form up outside the Tanks and the scheme of -attack will be explained to them; also how it is intended -to carry out the attack and what are their objectives. -All drivers and gunners must fully understand the -scheme of attack and what is expected of them; they -must be told to ask their Tank Commander to explain -any point that does not appear clear to them. Positions -where Anti-Tank guns are expected must be -pointed out to them on a map, and other information of -this type may be given. This will add to the keenness -and interest of the men.</p> - -<p>“Drivers must be reminded that the goodness or badness -of the shooting will probably depend upon their -driving.</p> - -<p>“The Gunnery Officer must see that the targets are -sited properly; he should always go over the Course in -a Tank previous to the practice to satisfy himself on -these points.</p> - -<p>“If flashes are to be used, or moving targets employed, -he must see that the fatigue men know their -work, and the Gunnery Officer should always give these -fatigue men one rehearsal before a Battle Practice -Course, as it is most important for everything to go -smoothly on the day.</p> - -<p>“N.C.O. Instructors must be told off, one to each gun -in the Tank which is firing, and their duty will be to -see that points taught in the elementary training are -brought into play and that the necessary safety precautions -are adhered to.</p></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_207">207</span></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“There will always be a conference at the end of each -Battle Practice exercise. All members of the crews, -students, instructors, etc., will attend. Constructive -criticism and encouragement should be the tone of the -conference. Faults brought to light should be carefully -explained so that all can hear, learn and correct, in the -future. The Gunner is as anxious to learn and to improve -his shooting as is the Instructor to have a pupil -who will do him credit.”</p></div> - -<p>Very excellent courses were also arranged in the -Reconnaissance Schools. But almost the most interesting -of the Reconnaissance Side’s activities was the -series of improvised courses—outdoor schemes, indoor -practices and lectures which they arranged during the -weary time while the Tank Corps “stood to quarters” -through January, February and early March 1918.</p> - -<p>The events of this time we propose to chronicle in the -next chapter but one.</p> - -<p>There had by this time been many other Tank activities -which we have not at present chronicled at all. The -French had trained and equipped a Tank Corps. The -Americans were busy with Tanks, and a Detachment of -our own Corps had fought in two engagements in -Palestine.</p> - -<p id="note207" class="center p2 b1"><i>Note to Chapter XI</i></p> - -<p>Stories of the early days of Wool are related in the -6th Battalion History.</p> - -<p>When the first few consignments of Tanks were sent -to the Camp at Bovington from Wool Station the most -elaborate precautions were taken to secure the machines -from the eyes of the profane.</p> - -<p>The route was guarded by military policemen marshalled<span class="pagenum" id="Page_208">208</span> -by A.P.M.’s. All civilian traffic was stopped, -and—as if the Tanks had been so many Lady Godivas—all -the blinds in the front rooms of the farms and cottages -which bordered the roads had to be drawn, and -all the inhabitants were relegated to the back rooms.</p> - -<p>This ritual was observed every time a batch of Tanks -arrived.</p> - -<p>One farmer remarked that he was delighted to help -keep the secret in any manner that seemed good to the -authorities, but he thought they might like to know that -a day or two before a Tank had broken down and that -he and his horses had helped to tow it into his yard, -where it had remained for forty-eight hours.</p> -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_209">209</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_XII">CHAPTER XII</h2> - -<p class="subhead">THE FRENCH TANK CORPS—AMERICAN TANKS AND -BRITISH TANKS IN EGYPT</p> -</div> - -<p><span class="firstword">It</span> is said that there is something in the Anglo-Saxon -mind which has a special affinity for committees.</p> - -<p>“Enough,” said the logical Asiatic when the doctrine -of the Trinity was being explained to him by the English -missionary, “I understand you perfectly. It is a -Committee of three.”</p> - -<p>At least, there is no doubt that the British Tank -sprang from committees, and was matured and licked -into shape entirely by a large assortment of these excellent -bodies.</p> - -<p>So with the American Tank Corps. Three or four -names are equally illustrious in its early annals.</p> - -<p>But with the French, one man, and one man only, -stands out as the Father and Mother of Tanks. He -was the General Swinton, the Sir Albert Stern, and the -General Elles of the French Tanks. That is to say, he -was first the principal independent inventor, deriving -his inspiration (in early 1915) from Holt Tractors which -he saw at work with the British. Then he was for long -the principal “propellant” of the Tank idea in official -quarters, and was the Commander-in-Chief’s delegate to -the Ministry of Munitions in the matter of Tanks. -Finally, on September 30, 1916, he was gazetted “Commandant -de l’Artillerie d’Assaut<a id="FNanchor_49" href="#Footnote_49" class="fnanchor">49</a> aux Armées.”</p> - -<p>So much did the personality of this remarkable man -permeate and vitalise the French Tank Corps that we<span class="pagenum" id="Page_210">210</span> -offer no apology to the reader in setting forth the -following delightful miniature biography of General -Estienne by the hand of Major Robert Spencer, the -British Liaison Officer to the French Tank Corps:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“Jean Baptiste Eugène Estienne was born at Condé -en Barrois (Lorraine) on November 7, 1860. Owing to -the trend of events during the Franco-Prussian War of -1870–71 his school, the Lycée of Bar le Duc, was forced -to shut, and it was whilst enjoying an enforced holiday -at the age of ten years at Condé with his parents that -his idea of embracing a military career was born. He -was one day an interested spectator of the passage of -a column of Prussian artillery through the paved streets -of his native town, and was lost in youthful admiration -of this display of military power. He hastened back to -tell his parents of his decision one day to enter as a -conqueror into a town with his guns clattering behind -him.</p> - -<p>“From this hour he became wedded to an artillery-man’s -life, and in due course passed in and out of the -famous École Polytechnique, where his mathematical -ability enjoyed full scope.</p> - -<p>“In due course, too, he passed through the artillery -school of Fontainebleau, and in 1884 entered the garrison -town of Vannes as a Second Lieutenant.</p> - -<p>“Promoted Captain in 1891, he completed his studies -in the use of the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">collimateur</i><a id="FNanchor_50" href="#Footnote_50" class="fnanchor">50</a> and became the apostle -of the use of direct fire for field artillery, which he eventually -succeeded in introducing in the French Army. -In 1909 he was summoned to Vincennes with a view to -determining if any use could be made of aeroplanes in -conjunction with field artillery, and succeeded in establishing -a part for F.A. aircraft service. This, however, -was transferred to the R.E. and Lieut.-Colonel Estienne -consequently asked to be returned to regimental duty.</p> - -<p>“In 1913 he was again summoned to Vincennes to -continue his research, and was here at the outbreak of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_211">211</span> -war, when he obtained command of the 22nd Regiment -of Artillery. This he commanded in Belgium and -throughout the retreat from Charleroi to the Seine. He -had with him his two experimental aeroplanes, which -rendered invaluable service during the Battle of the -Marne, where he served under General Pétain.</p> - -<p>“It was during the retreat that Colonel Estienne first -spoke to members of his Staff of the future which would -attend a machine capable of crossing ploughed fields -and trenches, transporting arms and men. With this -thought in his mind he was wont to invite his casual -visitors and members of his Staff to assume all manner -of peculiar attitudes under tables, etc., with a view -to determining how many human beings could conveniently -be crammed in a certain cubic area.</p> - -<p>“His last command before being selected to father -the future <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Chars d’Assaut</i> was at Verdun, when he did -not hesitate to employ a barrage of his heavy guns to -break up a threatening German attack.</p> - -<p>“As a man he appears to enjoy perpetual youth. He -is short of stature, with no neck and a large round head. -His hair is white, plentiful and worn <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">en brosse</i>, and he -appears to be clean-shaven, so short is his clipped white -moustache.</p> - -<p>“Two things strike one immediately, the charm of -his perennial smile and the quick brilliance of his brown -eyes.</p> - -<p>“As a raconteur he is inimitable, whilst as a lecturer -his marvellous power of expression, his command of -vocabulary and his convincing use of simile make it possible -for him to communicate to his less erudite audiences -a certain measure of his vast knowledge. This is -by no means confined to military subjects, and his power -of quotation from the classics is marked, whilst he has -at least once published a lengthy poem in a volume -dealing with the mathematics of gunnery.</p> - -<p>“As an ardent philologist, he bristles all over at the -sound of the word ‘Tancque’ from French lips, and -opens a violent crusade against the use of foreign words -as a substitute for good French equivalents.</p> - -<p>“His voice is loud and resonant and his speech accompanied<span class="pagenum" id="Page_212">212</span> -by frequent gestures, his favourite being the -placing of his left hand flat upon his chest as if he implies -that his utterances emanate from his heart.</p> - -<p>“He possesses many characteristic attitudes, and -when in conversation is often to be seen tossing his <em>képi</em> -from one side of his head to the other. In fact it is -scarcely ever to be seen except jauntily tilted over one -ear.</p> - -<p>“His admiration for the cavalryman at the head of -a triumphal entry into a town is reduced to nothingness -by his conviction that he is useless in modern war. He -would prefer to see a victorious General enter a town -on foot, escorted by a section of <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Chars d’Assaut</i>, as -being more typical of the present-day battlefield.</p> - -<p>“He is himself a great walker, and may frequently be -seen alone, wearing, as is his wont, a pair of pale blue -spats or gaiters, a relic of the Empire uniform, and in -summer no socks.</p> - -<p>“This latter habit was recommended to him by a -friend, and its adoption by him is typical of the man -in that he is always prepared to give careful thought -and personal trial to any scheme laid before him.</p> - -<p>“To this quality, added to his immense personal -charm and vast experience, is due his undoubted right to -rank amongst the big men of this war, a successful issue -to which has ever been the dream of his life.”</p></div> - -<p>On December 1, 1915, Colonel Estienne wrote an official -letter to the Commander-in-Chief of the French -Armies in which he outlined the idea of a new engine of -war exactly as Colonel Swinton had done earlier in the -year to our own War Office. A few days later he was -given an interview at French General Headquarters, -when he was able to enlarge upon his theories as to the -new arm. Here he must, one conjectures, have received -some encouragement, for about a week afterwards he -visited the Schneider Engineering Works in Paris<span class="pagenum" id="Page_213">213</span> -and discussed mechanical details with the management.</p> - -<p>But the good seed which Colonel Estienne had sown -at Headquarters would, he knew, take some time to -germinate. He returned to his command, now the artillery -of the 3rd Corps, at that time before Verdun. All -the while he kept unofficially in touch with the Schneider -Works.</p> - -<p>At last, about February 25, 1916, he learned that the -Under-Secretary’s Department for Artillery had decided -to place an order for 400 armoured vehicles with -Schneider’s.</p> - -<p>But about two months later, at the end of April, he -heard a more surprising piece of news.</p> - -<p>The Under-Secretary’s Department had, without the -approval of the Commander-in-Chief or any notice to -him, Estienne, placed an order for a further 400 vehicles -of a different and heavier type, driven by a petrol-electric -motor.</p> - -<p>Curious as was their parentage, these 400 machines -were actually made and were known as the St. Chamond -Tanks. It is said to have been upon stolen drawings -of this type that the Germans afterwards based their -still heavier, “Hagens” and “Schultzes.”</p> - -<p>In the course of the summer, the new French Ministry -of Munitions formed an experimental and instructional -area at Marly-le-Roi, and in the early autumn, -Colonel Estienne was gazetted to the command of the -French Tanks, and, as we have said, to be delegate, as -far as this arm was concerned, from the Commander-in-Chief -to the Ministry of Munitions.</p> - -<p>Like the British, the French were beginning to need -a name for their new engine of war.</p> - -<p>But more logical than we, instead of an absurd, if<span class="pagenum" id="Page_214">214</span> -pleasant, nickname, they chose “Artillerie d’Assaut,” -which they contracted into the letters “A.S.,” as being -more agreeable to the ear than “A.A.”</p> - -<p>Apparently Colonel Estienne had no preliminary -inkling of what our activities had been in the “Land -Cruiser” direction.</p> - -<p>It is interesting to conjecture how eagerly he must -have read of what was happening on the Somme during -the fortnight before he was finally gazetted to his new -post. His “heart” must, indeed, have been “at our -festival” when the British Tanks were everywhere acclaimed -by the public, and when even the most conservative -soldiers had to admit that the new weapon -had at least earned a right to further trial.</p> - -<p>In October 1916 a training centre for personnel was -established at Champlieu, on the southern edge of the -Forest of Compiègne, and here in December the first -lot of sixteen Schneider Tanks were delivered, other -batches both of Schneiders and St. Chamonds following -them during the succeeding months, until, in April 1917, -nine Schneider Companies and one St. Chamond Company -and their crews were ready for action.</p> - -<p>On April 16, 1917, French Tanks took part in their -first battle, fighting with the 5th French Army in the -attempted penetration of the Chemin des Dames.</p> - -<p>Of the eight Schneider Companies employed, five succeeded -in reaching their third and final objectives, but -owing to lack of previous training with the infantry, the -attack as a whole was not very successful, and the -Tanks, though they played an exceedingly gallant part, -suffered severely.</p> - -<p>A week or two later, one St. Chamond and two -Schneider Companies took part in a hurriedly prepared -operation with the 6th Army.</p> - -<p>The Schneiders did extremely well, but of sixteen St.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_215">215</span> -Chamond machines, only one managed to cross the German -trenches. All through the summer months, the 6th -French Army was preparing another attack on the west -of the Chemin des Dames, and for this battle, warned -by their previous experiences, infantry and Tanks -trained diligently together, special detachments known -as <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">troupes d’accompagnement</i> being taught how to help -the Tanks over trenches.</p> - -<p>But the agile mind of Colonel Estienne was not content. -He had had another idea. This time his mind had -worked at the idea of the armoured attacking force from -a slightly different standpoint.</p> - -<p>He envisaged waves of armoured skirmishers attacking -in open order, each man possessing besides his -armour a quick-firing weapon with which he could shoot -as he advanced.</p> - -<p>Now, armour which will protect from machine-gun -and rifle fire is too heavy for human legs. The armour -must be independently propelled. More, if its occupant -is to fire as he advances, it must carry him as well as -itself. This postulates an engine, and if there is an -engine, there must be a second man to look after it. -This set of propositions he laid before the Rénault firm -in July 1916, and the design of the famous Rénault Tank -was evolved.</p> - -<p>But the Ministry would have none of it.</p> - -<p>However, the designs were worked out in greater detail, -and at the end of November 1916 Colonel Estienne -proposed to the Commander-in-Chief that a number of -such machines should be constructed. A few, he explained, -had already been ordered to act as “Command” -Tanks for the heavy Battalions. The Commander-in-Chief -consented to a trial.</p> - -<p>This, however, was not held until March 1917, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_216">216</span> -when it had been held, the Ministry were still not convinced.</p> - -<p>Therefore, still further demonstrations were arranged -in May, when at last they ceased to doubt, and finally, -in June 1917, ordered 3500 of the new machines.</p> - -<p>In October the five Companies of heavy Tanks, which -had been in training all summer, were launched when -the 6th Army delivered its blow at Malmaison.</p> - -<p>As before, the Schneider Companies were successful, -and again the St. Chamond Tanks were nearly all unable -so much as to get into action.</p> - -<p>Still, at the end of October the general verdict was -that the French heavies had justified themselves, though -many soldiers of the old school still doubted their -utility.</p> - -<p>But in November the British Tanks fought the Battle -of Cambrai, and all doubts were finally dispelled from -the French mind.</p> - -<p>It is to be imagined that Colonel Estienne did not fail -to rub in the facts proved by that engagement.</p> - -<p>They were facts which it was impossible to deny or to -overlook. The Ministry removed its hold from the -brakes, and from that moment life behind the scenes of -the French Tank Corps became happy. It was decided -to form thirty light Tank Battalions, each Battalion to -consist of seventy-five machines, and the firms of -Schneider, Rénault and Berliet were all set to work -upon their manufacture, while over a thousand -machines were ordered in America.</p> - -<p>All the winter of 1917–18, the French Tank Corps, -like the British, continued to train and to organise.</p> - -<p>For the future of the French Tanks was to be a brilliant -one.</p> - -<p>Those matchless givers of “unsolicited testimonials,”<span class="pagenum" id="Page_217">217</span> -the German General Staff, attributed the great victories -which the late summer of 1918 brought to the French -arms, chiefly to the employment of “masses of Tanks.”</p> - -<p>Naturally the annals of the French Tank Corps are -full of stories of individual deeds of gallantry.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p class="p1 b1 center"><i>Chevrel, R. C., Brigadier, 505th Regt., Chars Légers.</i></p> - -<p>“In the course of an attack he refused to abandon -his Tank, which remained isolated in the German lines. -Protected by his turret, he ceaselessly opened machine-gun -fire on the surrounding enemy, and shot down with -his revolver those who succeeded in approaching the -Tank and who called upon him to surrender. For -thirty-six hours he never slackened. Finally rescued by -our advancing troops, he immediately undertook the -unditching of his Tank and volunteered to support the -further advance of the infantry, and then brought his -Tank to the rallying point.</p> - -<p>Médaille militaire and Croix de Guerre with Palm.”—Official -Gazette, dated October 26, 1918.</p></div> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p class="p1 b1 center"><i>Cellier, Pierre, Brigadier in 35th Co., 11th Heavy -Battery.</i></p> - -<p>“This soldier, on July 18, when his Tank had been -hit by a shell, placed himself at the head of fifteen American -soldiers and stalked a position whence the Germans -were using many machine-guns to resist the attack. -These he engaged with an automatic rifle and forced the -Germans to surrender after an hour’s struggle. This -act resulted in the capture of fifteen officers, including -one Colonel, guns and numerous machine-guns.</p> - -<p>Chevalier de la Légion d’Honneur and Croix de Guerre -with Palm.”—Official Gazette.</p></div> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p class="p1 b1 center"><i>Dr. Gilles, Raoul Jules Gustave, Cte. in the 506th Regt., -Chars Légers.</i></p> - -<p>“Although blinded by wounds, brought his Tank back -into French lines guided (by signals tapped on his<span class="pagenum" id="Page_218">218</span> -shoulders) by the Tank Commander Maréchal de -logis Joseph, who was himself wounded in the -stomach.</p> - -<p>Médaille militaire and Croix de Guerre with Palm.”—Official -Gazette, No. 2127 “D,” July 26, 1918.</p></div> - -<p>Colonel Estienne was promoted to the rank of General -of Division and received the Cravat de la Légion -d’Honneur, and the Commander-in-Chief of the French -Armies issued the following special Order of the Day to -the French Tank Corps:</p> - -<p class="center">“Vous avez bien mérite (de) la Patrie.”</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">American Tanks</span></h3> - -<p>By the time the United States of America declared -War (April 1917) the value of Tanks had already been -demonstrated in battle by the British in the Somme Offensive, -and by the end of October 1916 the French were -already training with their first machines. It is not, -therefore, surprising that the Americans, with their -great experience of Tractors (it was, the reader will -remember, an American Tractor that was the chief ingredient -in the make-up of the Mark I.) had a strong -desire to include this new arm in their Expeditionary -Force.</p> - -<p>Colonel Rockenbach, who was later to command the -American Tank Corps in the field, was detailed to initiate -preliminaries. He arrived in France in June -1917, and followed General Pershing to Chaumont, the -United States General Headquarters, where he immediately -occupied himself with the future organisation -of the Corps.</p> - -<p>By September 23, 1917, the provisional American -Tank Corps establishment had been approved. It was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_219">219</span> -to be of a size to match the original Expeditionary -Force, which was to be limited to twenty Divisions and -ten replacement Divisions—that is to say, to one Army. -The American Tank Corps in France was to consist of -five Heavy and twenty Light Battalions, with the usual -complement of Headquarters Units, Depot Companies, -instructors and Workshops; and, in the United States, -a Training Centre, accommodating two Heavy and two -Light Battalions, was to be maintained. When the -American Expeditionary Force was increased to three -Armies, a new Tank Establishment was authorised to -match it. There were to be five Brigades per Army. -These Brigades were to consist of one Heavy and two -Light Battalions. The Light Tanks were to be of the -French Rénault type, and the Heavy were to be of the -British pattern. The first Tanks with which the Americans -were equipped were, in fact, actually of French or -British manufacture, but as soon as an establishment -was sanctioned, Tank manufacture was pushed forward -in America, and by the time the Armistice was signed, -there were several thousand American-made machines -ready for shipment.</p> - -<p>So keen on the Tanks were Americans, that private -enterprise was not idle, and early in October 1918 a -three-and-a-half-ton Ford Tank arrived in France. This -tank, indeed, had the honour to be the first American-made -Tank to appear in France. But though it was -extremely agile and handy, its designers had not quite -succeeded in producing a genuine fighting machine. It -could, however, be turned out quickly and in great quantities, -and in spite of its defects, it was thought in -America that it would be worth while to continue its -construction, and tradition has it that no less than -10,000 of these little Ford Tanks were ordered.</p> - -<p>In the autumn of 1917, a number of American officers<span class="pagenum" id="Page_220">220</span> -who were later on to have charge of the organising -and training of the new Tank Corps were sent on visits -to the British and French Brigades, to learn as much -as they could, both from the mistakes and successes of -the two older Corps. By February 1918, there were a -large number of volunteers for the American Tank -Corps, some in England at Wool, who were to form the -American Heavy Section, and others (about 500) at -Burg in France, where a Training Centre was being -formed for instruction in the Light French Rénault -machines. At Burg were ten French Tanks which were -used for training purposes, and in the course of the -summer, as the personnel to be trained increased, this -number was added to, and at the end of August 124 -Rénault Tanks were delivered to the Training Centre -for impending operations.</p> - -<p>Two Light Battalions were formed into a Brigade -under Colonel G. S. Patton, Junr., and they proceeded to -the St. Mihiel Salient. Here they went into action with -the First American Army on September 12, the first -occasion on which United States Forces fought independently.</p> - -<p>But, alas, it was our First Battle of the Somme over -again! Nobody quite understood the habits of the new -beasts, and unfortunately both Battalions were called -upon to trek over twenty kilometres to their lying-up -places from the railhead, and, the ground in the back -area being very difficult, they did not succeed in catching -up the infantry at all on the first day. The enemy -resistance was, however, very feeble, as they had already -decided to give up the Salient, but misfortune still -dogged the unhappy Tanks. They had run out of -petrol, and no supplies being immediately available,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_221">221</span> -they were not able to get into action on the second -day.</p> - -<p>On the third day, however, they did get into the fight, -but by this time the enemy had been thoroughly demoralised -by the American infantry, and there was little -more for them to do than to receive the surrender of a -number of prisoners. The two Battalions suffered -hardly at all in casualties and were withdrawn practically -intact.</p> - -<p>The American Light Tanks next appeared at the beginning -of October in the Argonne, in operations where -they fought side by side with French Tank Units. This -time the two Battalions had much better luck, and -though they must have been a good deal handicapped by -the fact that they and the infantry with whom they -were to co-operate had had no opportunity of training -together, the Tanks rendered good service. All the -machines were launched on the first day, although in -the original plan of the battle, it had been proposed to -hold back a reserve for the second day; but the infantry -had been held up, and the reserve Tanks had, instead, -to go to the rescue in the afternoon of the first day. -From this time to October 13 these two Battalions were -continuously at the disposal of the infantry. But, as -with us in the early days, the infantry do not seem to -have had a very clear idea of the uses and limitations of -the Tanks, and the Battalions were frequently called -upon to traverse many weary miles—much to the detriment -of their machines—without finally being ordered -into action. On one or two occasions they were used -for independent reconnaissance and for unsupported -assaults upon positions which the infantry had failed -to capture. By the middle of October the long distance -covered and losses in battle had caused the numbers of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_222">222</span> -the two Battalions to dwindle exceedingly, and they -were formed into a provisional Company, which accompanied -the advance of the American Forces right up to -the Armistice.</p> - -<p>A Third Light Battalion had also been mobilised and -supplied by the French with seventy-two Tanks. Recruiting, -too, had been continued and there were no -less than 7000 officers and men awaiting admission to -the Corps at Burg alone.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, on August 24, 1918, the 301st U. S. -Heavy Battalion had left Wool for France, and was -almost immediately sent to the forward area, where it -was attached to begin with to the 1st and later to the -4th and 2nd British Tank Brigades. With the 4th Brigade -and still later with the 2nd Tank Brigade the -301st was, as we shall see in Chapters XX and XXI, -destined to take part in several successful actions.</p> - -<p>The 301st had based its methods of training almost -entirely upon British lines, and though the American -Tank Corps would undoubtedly have struck out improvements -and methods of its own had the war gone on, the -301st, being throughout its active service brigaded with -British Tanks, very wisely adopted a battle organisation -practically uniform with the British. Only in minor -details did their habits vary. Their reconnaissance procedure, -for instance, was almost exactly like ours, except -for one improvement. Special Reconnaissance -N.C.O.’s relieved Reconnaissance Officers, Tank Commanders -and Section Commanders from the work of -guiding the machines on approach marches. From the -tankodromes to the lining-up points the Tanks were in -charge of these N.C.O.’s, who were directly under the -orders of the Battalion Reconnaissance Officer. This -system worked out extremely well.</p> - -<p>In later chapters we shall see how worthy a representative<span class="pagenum" id="Page_223">223</span> -both of the arms of the United States and of -the best traditions of the British Tank Corps the 301st -Battalion proved themselves in the supreme test of -battle.</p> - -<p>In February 1919, to the regret of their British colleagues, -the men of the 301st sailed for America, when -General Elles expressed the sentiments of all ranks of -his Corps in a special order.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> -<p class="sigright">“<i>February 15, 1919.</i></p> - -<p>“1. On the departure of the 301st American Tank -Battalion, I wish to place on record my appreciation of -the services it has rendered.</p> - -<p>2. The Battalion has practically formed part of the -British Tank Corps since April 1918, and while fully -maintaining its national identity, has co-operated with -British troops and adapted itself to British methods -with a spirit that deserves fullest recognition.</p> - -<p>3. In the field the 301st Battalion, after experiencing -heavy casualties in its first engagement at -Bony, which might have deterred less determined -troops, volunteered for the next action, in which, as in -subsequent ones, it inflicted heavy casualties upon the -enemy at Brancourt, the Selle and Catillon.</p> - -<p>4. I feel I am voicing the opinion of all commanders -and troops who have been associated with them, in expressing -sincere regret at the departure of our American -comrades and in wishing them all good fortune in -the future.</p> - -<p class="sigright"> -<span class="l4">(<i>Signed</i>) <span class="smcap">H. J. Elles</span>,</span><br /> -<span class="l5">Major-General,</span><br /> -Commanding Tank Corps in the Field.” -</p></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_224">224</span></p> - -<h3 class="p4"><span class="smcap">Tanks in Palestine</span><br /> -<span class="subhead"><i>The Second and Third Battles of Gaza, April and -November 1917</i></span></h3> - -<div class="poetry-container pw20"> -<div class="poetry"> - <div class="stanza"> - <div class="verse indentq">“Gaza yet stands, but all her sons are fallen,</div> - <div class="verse indent0">All in a moment overwhelmed and fallen.”</div> - </div> - <div class="attrib"><cite>Samson Agonistes.</cite></div> -</div> -</div> - -<p>The Tanks that had fought in the Battle of the Somme, -in the autumn of 1916, had proved successful enough for -the authorities to consider that a test ought to be made -of their capabilities in some other theatre of war.</p> - -<p>Accordingly a small—a very small—detachment of -Tanks was sent to “assist our troops in the Sinai -Peninsula.”</p> - -<p>Unfortunately only eight Tanks were ultimately sent, -and further,<a id="FNanchor_51" href="#Footnote_51" class="fnanchor">51</a>“through an unfortunate error, old experimental -machines were sent out instead of new ones -as intended.”</p> - -<p>The experiment was thus upon so extremely miniature -a scale that it cannot be said to have proved anything -save what was already clear, that is, the general proposition -that with a few mechanical modifications Tanks -are perfectly suitable to desert warfare.</p> - -<p>The Tanks were, of course, too few to exert any influence -upon the fortunes of war in Palestine, and the -two actions in which they fought amid palms and cactuses -and lay up in groves of fig trees, form a curious, -rather than an important, little incident in their -history.</p> - -<p>The field on which they fought was like the plain of -Flanders, one of those ominous lands which seem predestined -for ever to witness the strife of men.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_225">225</span></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_52" href="#Footnote_52" class="fnanchor">52</a>“The land from the Wadi el Arish—the ancient -‘River of Egypt’—to the Philistian plain had for -twenty-six hundred years been a cockpit of war. Sometimes -a conqueror from the north like Nebuchadnezzar, -Napoleon and Mehemet Ali, or from the south like Ali -Bey, met the enemy in Egypt or Syria, but more often -the decisive fight was fought in the gates. Ascalon, -Gaza, Rafa, El Arish, are all names famous in history. -Up and down the strip of seaward levels marched the -great armies of Egypt and Assyria, while the Jews -looked fearfully on from their barren hills.... In -this gate of ancient feuds it had now fallen to Turkey’s -lot to speak with her enemy.”</p></div> - -<p>In December 1916 a little company of 22 officers and -226 other ranks, under Major Nutt, embarked with their -eight Tanks at Devonport and Avonmouth and landed -in Egypt in January.</p> - -<p>The first business was to show the Staffs of the various -fighting units, with whom they were to co-operate, exactly -what Tanks could and could not do.</p> - -<p>Demonstrations were therefore given among the sand -dunes near Kilban, a village which lies between Port -Said and El Kantara on the Suez Canal.</p> - -<p>One day in February—the exact date seems uncertain<a id="FNanchor_53" href="#Footnote_53" class="fnanchor">53</a>—the -detachment received orders to entrain immediately -for the fighting zone, and within three hours -of receiving the message, the whole little force with its -Tanks and accessories was travelling towards the forward -area. A delay occurred half-way, at El Arish, -which had only recently been captured, but next morning -the Tank Train arrived at its destination, Khan<span class="pagenum" id="Page_226">226</span> -Yunus, an old Crusaders’ stronghold, surrounded by fig -groves and lying inland about fifteen miles south-west -of Gaza.</p> - -<p>Here the detachment remained for about ten days.</p> - -<p>During these ten days the First Battle of Gaza had -come to an end.</p> - -<p>Gaza had not been captured, as, though we had fought -in its streets, we had just not been able to keep up the -attack long enough to keep what we had gained owing -to lack of water.</p> - -<p>In his despatch, General Murray, the Commander-in-Chief -of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, characterised -it as a most successful operation which only the -waterless nature of the country had prevented from being -“a complete disaster to the enemy.”</p> - -<p>We had been obliged to withdraw again to our water -supplies, but we immediately began to prepare a second -attack in greater force.</p> - -<p>This time great cisterns were set up forward, and -filled with rail-borne water. Three weeks of careful -preparation were allowed for what was to prove one -of the most hotly contested actions fought in the Eastern -theatre.</p> - -<p>We were to attack a Turkish force of about 30,000 -men which lay upon a front of some sixteen miles, between -Gaza on the north and Hereira and Sheria to the -south-east.</p> - -<p>Two ridges, Sheikh Abbas and Mansura, run almost -at right angles to the coast and command the town of -Gaza from the south, and the capture of these heights -was allotted to the 52nd, 53rd, and 54th Divisions.</p> - -<p>On their left flank was the sea, and their right, on the -Hereira front, was protected by the Desert Column, -consisting of cavalry units and of the Imperial Camel<span class="pagenum" id="Page_227">227</span> -Corps which was manned by Australian, New Zealand, -and British personnel.</p> - -<p>The eight Tanks were to be widely spaced along the -crucial five miles of attack. The 53rd Division nearest -to the sea was to have two Tanks, which were to be held -in reserve until the infantry had taken their first objective. -Next to them the 52nd Division was to have -four Tanks, which were to support the infantry in the -attack on the Mansura Ridge. With the 54th Division, -two Tanks were to support the attack on the Sheikh -Abbas Ridge. The battle was to be in two phases; the -Turkish outer defences were to be taken in the first -phase, and in the second his inner ring was to be broken -through and Gaza itself taken.</p> - -<p>It was a country of sand dunes, deep nullahs, and -criss-cross ridges, a labyrinth admirably adapted to defence -and containing endless natural machine-gun positions. -Between Gaza and the sea the enemy had built -a double line of trenches and redoubts<a id="FNanchor_54" href="#Footnote_54" class="fnanchor">54</a>“strongly held -by infantry and machine-guns well placed and concealed -in impenetrable cactus hedges built on high mud banks -and enclosing orchards and gardens on the outskirts of -the town.”</p> - -<p>The Tank Detachment had been able to do little or no -reconnaissance; routes had been arranged to the starting-places, -and petrol and ammunition dumps had been -formed in convenient places, but no forward preparations -had been possible.</p> - -<p>All eight Tanks reached their assembly places before -daybreak on April 17, and at zero hour, the dawn of -what promised to be a day of scorching heat, the first -phase of the attack was successfully launched.</p> - -<p>The advance of the 53rd and 52nd Divisions came as<span class="pagenum" id="Page_228">228</span> -a complete surprise to the Turks, and the six Tanks did -not come into action at all on the first day, as the enemy -fled from his trenches and strongholds in complete confusion, -and the slow Mark I.’s and Mark II.’s had no -chance of getting in at him. The outer defence line had -fallen by seven that morning. The two Tanks, however, -on the 54th Division’s front saw a good deal of fighting. -One received a direct hit and was destroyed, but the -other did admirable work in clearing the enemy out of -his trenches, north-west of the Abbas Ridge. The Tank -inflicted heavy casualties, and our infantry had only to -come up and occupy the defences which the Turks had -abandoned.</p> - -<p>By the evening the three attacking Divisions found -themselves in satisfactory positions on high ground, and -proceeded to entrench themselves and to prepare for the -second phase.</p> - -<p>On the morning of April 19 we again attacked, this -time upon a wider front, a French man-of-war and two -British monitors supporting on the left, and the Australians -on the right. The three original Divisions were, -however, once more to deliver the main blow.</p> - -<p>A very stiff programme was outlined for the seven -surviving Tanks.</p> - -<p>The four with the 52nd in the centre had finally four -lines of defence to attack, and their orders were changed -during the night before the action.</p> - -<p>With the 53rd Division two Tanks were to work -separately, each having a succession of objectives, while -with the 54th the single Tank had only one redoubt -allotted to it.</p> - -<p>This time the Turks were ready for us.</p> - -<p>One of the Tanks with the 53rd Division, the “Tiger,”<span class="pagenum" id="Page_229">229</span> -led the infantry advance on its sector. The enemy was -quickly driven from our first objective, Samson Ridge. -The Tank went on to the second objective, the El Arish -redoubt, but the infantry being unable to follow, after -being in action for six hours and having fired 27,000 -rounds from its machine-guns, the Tank withdrew, all -its crew being wounded.</p> - -<p>On the front of the 52nd Division, our advance was -hotly contested.</p> - -<p>The Turks had massed hundreds of machine-guns -along their entire front, but on this sector their fire was -particularly intense. One tank was able to do good -service at Outpost Hill, which it helped to clear before -receiving a direct hit.</p> - -<p>Of the other three Tanks, one fell into a gully, the -sides of which unexpectedly crumbled under its weight; -another was put out of action by a direct hit, while the -third eventually rallied.</p> - -<p>The objective of the Tank fighting with the 54th Division -was a particularly strong redoubt. The work was -held in force, but the garrison soon surrendered on the -advance of the Tank. Our infantry immediately took -over the position, which the Turks forthwith proceeded -to shell.</p> - -<p>It was not long before the Tank was hit and one of its -tracks broken, and the Turks, counter-attacking, -eventually captured Tank, infantry and redoubt.</p> - -<p>By nightfall our position all along the line was unfavourable. -The left of the 54th Division was more or -less in the air. We had, in several parts of the line, -been forced off the lately won main ridges. We had -lost 7000 men, and our troops were worn out by the dust -and heat, and were once more short of water. The -battle had to be admitted as a failure. The Tanks had<span class="pagenum" id="Page_230">230</span> -been too few and of too old a type for the work they had -been given.</p> - -<p>Their co-operation was, however, much appreciated, -and they were considered to have given a good deal of -protection to the infantry.</p> - -<p>It is interesting to note that by the time the battle -was over these antiquated machines are said, on an -average, each to have covered forty miles of country.</p> - -<h3><i>The Third Battle of Gaza</i></h3> - -<p>The Second Battle of Gaza had been so completely -unsuccessful that the troops who had been engaged -in it had to be withdrawn from their advanced positions.</p> - -<p>The Tanks were concentrated in a fig grove to the -rear. Here, no work being found for them, they stayed -till October, being reinforced by three Mark IV. -machines.</p> - -<p>General Allenby had now succeeded to the command, -and there was to be another attack upon Gaza, for the -town and its defences effectually barred our further advance -along the coast or towards Jerusalem.</p> - -<p>We were this time to operate upon a still wider front. -The usual shock troops, the same three Divisions and -their eight Tanks, were to attack nearest the coast.</p> - -<p>Next to them, a mixed force of French, Italian and -West Indian troops were to make feint raids near Outpost -Hill.</p> - -<p>Opposite Gaza itself several cavalry Divisions, -mounted and dismounted, were to attack, and from -Hereira to Beersheba a synchronised assault was to be -made by the Australians. The position was, in fact, to -be turned by an extensive flanking movement.</p> - -<p>On October 23, 1917, the Tanks moved up to a new<span class="pagenum" id="Page_231">231</span> -station on the beach.</p> - -<p>From here, on horseback and by boat, the new area -was thoroughly reconnoitred. This was the special -country of cactus hedge and strong mud bank, and in -it had been dug a veritable labyrinth of trenches. It -had been a country of small fig groves and of little irrigated -gardens, and its close boundaries afforded unending -cover to the enemy. However, it was divided into -Tank sectors, and by dint of patient toil, the Tank Commanders -at last formed a more or less coherent picture -of the intricacies. Tank Officers and N.C.O.’s were attached -to each Brigade with which they were to work, -for ten days before the battle.</p> - -<p>Most of the Tanks were detailed to bring up R.E. -stores, such as wire, pickets, shovels and sandbags for -their infantry. These things they were to carry on their -roofs.</p> - -<p>The first phase of the attack, timed in consideration -of a full moon for an hour before midnight, was to be -independent of Tanks, and was to consist of an infantry -attack protected by a creeping barrage. While this attack -was going on, six of the Tanks were to move to their -starting-points, in order to be ready to advance at -3 a.m. Two Tanks were held in reserve. It will be -observed that the plans, preparations and liaison were -in general much more complete than for the Second -Battle of Gaza, but unfortunately one mistake of that -battle was repeated.</p> - -<p>The six first-line Tanks were given among them no -less than twenty-nine objectives to attack.</p> - -<p>At eleven o’clock on the night of November 1–2, the -first phase of the battle began.</p> - -<p>The 156th Infantry Brigade attacked Umbrella Hill,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_232">232</span> -the first objective. The Turks were taken completely -by surprise, there was little resistance, and even their -artillery seemed too startled to fire.</p> - -<p>Unfortunately, however, the smoke of the battle and -a dense haze made so thick an atmosphere that not a -ray of the expected moonlight reached the combatants, -and the infantry had to fight and the Tanks to manage -their approach march in profound darkness.</p> - -<p>Also, when the enemy’s artillery at last woke up, it -was to open a heavy fire on our back areas, where the -second wave was gathering. All the Tanks, however, -came safely through and were at their stations half an -hour before the second zero at 3 a.m.</p> - -<p>The Turkish resistance had by now stiffened, and -when the Tanks and the fresh infantry advanced behind -a heavy barrage it was to meet with dogged opposition.</p> - -<p>The two Tanks detailed to the El Arish redoubt were, -after a stiff fight, successful in driving the enemy out -of the enclosed stronghold, and were making their way -through the maze of trenches, cactus hedges and gardens -beyond, when one received a direct hit and the -other got ditched in the darkness. Both crews at once -joined the infantry. Slowly, scrambling up the mud -banks, often fighting hand to hand in the darkness, we -advanced. The Turks were fighting stubbornly, but inch -by inch we pushed them back. The remaining Tanks -lumbered slowly on.</p> - -<p>At last all along the coast all the objectives were -taken. No. 6 Tank captured Sea Post, and, followed by -the infantry, moved along the enemy’s trenches, crushing -down the wire as far as Beach Post. It successively -attacked three other strong points and deposited its -R.E. stores at the appointed place. It was again moving -forward to attack a certain isolated Turkish trench<span class="pagenum" id="Page_233">233</span> -when one track broke, so ending a brilliant innings. The -crew went on, but the Tank had to be temporarily -abandoned.</p> - -<p>The two reserve Tanks both caught fire through the -empty sandbags with which their roofs were loaded -being set ablaze by the heat of their exhaust pipes.</p> - -<p>The coastal attack had done its work, and the Turks’ -hold upon Gaza had been loosened.</p> - -<p>The other attackers, the troops who had advanced -from Beersheba, broke through the enemy’s resistance -completely, and drove them back for nine miles on an -eight-mile front.</p> - -<p>The battle was decisive, and after about three days’ -fighting our troops at last entered Gaza. Our persistency -in attack was well rewarded. The <cite>Spectator</cite>, commenting -on the battle, said, “Samson took away the -gates of Gaza, but General Allenby has secured the -gates of Palestine.”</p> - -<p>On the whole the Tanks had been a success.</p> - -<p>All machines except one reached their first objectives; -four reached their second, third, and fourth, -and one Tank reached its fifth.</p> - -<p>All five damaged machines were afterwards salved.</p> - -<p>This was the last Tank action fought with the Army -of Palestine, for, for some reason or other, the repaired -and renovated Tanks were never used again.</p> - -<p>Later, however, during the Turkish retreat, we had -great trouble in rounding up the tattered and wandering -Turkish rearguard.</p> - -<p>We felt the need of some sort of sheep-dog, so a mission -was sent to France to ask for a number of Whippet -Tanks.</p> - -<p>By an ironical chance, this mission reached Tank -Headquarters in France on March 21, the very day the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_234">234</span> -German offensive was launched. It need not be added -that no Whippets were sent.</p> - -<p>There seemed no work left for the heavies, and the -Tank Detachment, therefore, handed over their -machines to the Ordnance Department at Alexandria, -and returned to England.</p> -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_235">235</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_XIII">CHAPTER XIII</h2> - -<p class="subhead">SUSPENSE—THE “SAVAGE RABBITS” EPISODE—THE -ENEMY’S INTENTIONS</p> -</div> - -<p><span class="firstword">The</span> story of the Tank Corps from the beginning of -February to nearly the end of March 1918 is one of -waiting and expectancy, of strategic moves to unexpected -places, of diligent rehearsal for first nights upon -which the curtain never rose, of endless preparations -for events which never happened.</p> - -<p>And through all the moves, in all the odd billets, or -in the open fields, when—in hourly expectation of the -German attack—Tanks and their crews lay ready -under the hedges, run the Tank Corps’ Pinkerton-like -efforts at self-improvement, its determination to finish -its winter training.</p> - -<p>From before the middle of January we had been perfectly -aware that the enemy meant to strike and to -strike hard. He held a wasting security. We were waxing -and he was waning. He was still our superior, still -had more men available, but by Midsummer he knew -that the Allies would outnumber him.</p> - -<p>He had troubles, we knew, at home too, troubles for -which the only salve was victory.</p> - -<p>We had besides long known that before the war ended, -whenever and however that end might come, we must -expect a last desperate struggle. It would be the last -spring of the wounded beast in which he might still find -our throats, the last staggering blast of the hurricane -by which the ship might still be confounded and overwhelmed.</p> - -<p>Every sign spoke of the coming storm, but none told<span class="pagenum" id="Page_236">236</span> -from which quarter we must expect it. The Germans -were concentrating in such a way—at the base of the -great salient formed by their line—that they could plant -their blow wherever it might at the last moment seem -good to them.</p> - -<p>For better or worse, it was decided that our available -forces were to be impartially distributed all along the -line. Not that we had very much choice, as with our -limited resources a concentration at any one strategic -point must imply virtual gaps in our defence elsewhere.</p> - -<p>For we had in January taken over an additional forty -miles of line, and the men for whom the High Command -in France had so frequently pleaded had not been -sent out to them.</p> - -<p>We were in for a lean three months, and to hold the -extended line was as much as we could hope to -accomplish.</p> - -<p>The British and French Spring Campaign must be a -defensive one. There was no longer a Russian front, -and till the Americans were ready—which could not be -till Midsummer at earliest—the Germans would have a -numerical preponderance of nearly a quarter of a million -men. Besides this, their position on interior lines and -their superior lateral railway communications could at -any moment give them an overwhelming local -superiority.</p> - -<p>However, we had faced worse odds before. We could -form a strong line and cunning schemes of defence -against which the enemy would hammer in vain. Our -first defence was a deep forward zone. It consisted first -of an outpost line and second of a “line of resistance.”</p> - -<p>The line of resistance was extremely carefully laid -out. About every mile redoubts of special strength were<span class="pagenum" id="Page_237">237</span> -so arranged that on this sector an attack would be entrapped -into our wire and held exposed to a cross-fire -from our machine-guns.</p> - -<p>The line was, in fact, to offer “patches” of resistance, -and so break up the ordered advance of the -enemy, who was to arrive at the next line, the “battle -zone,” weakened and disorganised.</p> - -<p>Here the main fight was to take place, and upon this -zone we lavished all our skill and industry, and, having -faith, we prepared no serious positions in rear of it.</p> - -<p>The Tanks were spaced out all along a sixty-mile -front.</p> - -<p>Near Lens in the 1st Army area was the 1st Tank -Brigade.</p> - -<p>The 2nd Brigade was in 3rd Army Reserve at Haplincourt, -near Bapaume.</p> - -<p>The 3rd Brigade—which was in process of being -equipped with Whippet Tanks—was also in 3rd Army -Reserve.</p> - -<p>The 4th Brigade was attached to the 5th Army and -established itself in camps near Péronne.</p> - -<p>The 5th Brigade was in process of forming, and therefore -had no definite task allotted to it, though, as we -shall see, the 13th (its nucleus) Battalion actually saw -a considerable amount of fighting.</p> - -<p>Each Tank Brigade got out a defence scheme in conjunction -with the Army to which it was attached. As a -rule the Tanks—which had been moved up as secretly -as possible—were to lie in ambush till the last moment, -and then, emerging—as General Elles described it—“like -Savage Rabbits from their holes,” were to fall -upon the Germans in flank or rear.</p> - -<p>His phrase struck the fancy of the Tank Corps, and -the whole of this period is frequently referred to <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">tout<span class="pagenum" id="Page_238">238</span> -court</i> as “Savage Rabbits,” somewhat to the bewilderment -of the uninitiated.</p> - -<h3>II</h3> - -<p>Their schemes prepared, their Tanks in position, after -an exhaustive reconnaissance, the Tank Corps waited, a -process which all troops find both tedious and demoralising, -unless some really profitable means can be found -of employing their time.</p> - -<p>For the Tank Corps the need of the moment was -further training. Several of the Battalions had been -dragged untimely from half-finished courses, several -were almost fresh from Wool, and had still most of their -tactical training to do. Everywhere there were units and -individuals who had lost “school attendances” to make -up.</p> - -<p>The great difficulty was that Battalions and even -Companies were so spread out and scattered that it was -almost impossible to collect the students for instruction.</p> - -<p>The regular curriculums were out of the question, so -the directors of Tank training immediately set to work -to evolve new courses that would fit the altered circumstances.</p> - -<p>In some ways the Reconnaissance Side fared best.</p> - -<p>Their chief instructional material—the actual country -to be fought over—was there for their students to -study, and even when the pupils were so scattered that -a sufficient audience could not be collected for a formal -lecture, many ingenious little practical schemes could -be carried out and written work could always be done.</p> - -<p>They had a fairly definite standard to aim at. Had -the battalions remained in the training areas, every -officer and man would have been put through a five<span class="pagenum" id="Page_239">239</span> -days’ course in Reconnaissance. Under normal conditions -such courses were arranged more or less as follows:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><i>On the first day</i>, the students heard an introductory -lecture, practised chalk layering, heard a short discourse -on map reading, did a practical comparison of -map and country upon which they had to answer -questions.</p> - -<p><i>On the second day</i>, visualising country from a map -was taught, and practice indoors was gone through with -a model. In the afternoon panorama sketching was -practised, a short lecture heard, some visualising was -done and the characterisation of landmarks was practised, -the day being finished up by night guiding.</p> - -<p><i>On the third morning</i>, close observation of a certain -sector, involving sketches and notes, was undertaken, -and visibility practices carried out. Later, the students -were taken for an “observation march,” and having described -the features of the country they had traversed, -they had to write a report upon the new sector which -they had observed in the morning, and upon this report -they were later questioned.</p> - -<p><i>On the fourth day</i>, a new sector was visited, upon -which they had previously made notes from a map. -These notes they had to compare with reality, and to -notice whether their imagination had been faulty. A -lecture on obstacles commonly found on approach -marches followed, and one on aerial photographs with -practical work. Night work followed, with special reference -to the study of the stars.</p> - -<p><i>On the fifth day</i>, oblique and other aerial photographs -were compared with the actual ground, and a -lecture was delivered summing up the special points of -the course.</p></div> - -<p>Sometimes, however, during the “Savage Rabbit” -period, lectures were possible, and for these occasions a -rather new type of discourse was evolved, in which the -broader aspects of Reconnaissance and of the study of -country were dealt with.</p> - -<p>Local history was recalled:—how men had lived and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_240">240</span> -fought in the villages and cornfields that lay immediately -about them; how that great abbey church that -stood alone was erected by a group of pious merchants -as a thankoffering for their town’s escape from the -plague; how to this little town the Revolution had -brought a Committee of Public Safety, and how it had -held its red assize in the coffee-room of the Hôtel de -l’Europe, or how Bonaparte had lain at this or that -château on his way to the Camp at Boulogne.</p> - -<p>Or again, the lecture might be more strictly military -and concern the place of Reconnaissance amongst the -arts of war, and the action and reaction of one arm of -the Service upon another—the ever-present trilogy of -wire, trench and machine-gun, new theories of artillery -work, the latest fashions in tactics or the effects of the -latest poison-gas.</p> - -<p>Then, where some isolated Tank Company or even -section lay ready day and night by its machines and -lectures were impossible, an itinerant instructor would -set the exiles little schemes to carry out.</p> - -<p>The two following exercises are <span class="locked">typical:—</span></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“Two small parties of officers go at different times to -positions from which a good view is obtainable. They -pick out landmarks, etc., and their peculiarities, taking -notes or making sketches. From these notes or sketches -each party writes out three or four questions on landmarks, -general observation, routes taken, etc. On their -return the two parties exchange their questions, -answers are written, and these answers returned to the -writers of the questioners to correct.</p> - -<p>“Catch questions, such as ‘How many windows had -such and such a house?’ will, of course, be discountenanced, -and only useful tests permitted.</p> - -<p>“Exercise II.—The student was asked to sketch the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_241">241</span> -outline of a cottage from about 800 yards distant. He -then had to consider from the position of the house on -the map, and the contour lines of the ground, what the -appearance of that cottage would be likely to be from -a different point of view. Of this hypothetical elevation -he had then to make an outline sketch, and finally -to walk over the ground and compare his imaginings -with actuality.”</p></div> - -<p>Practices for approach marches were also given by -means of an exercise on tape laying and the taking of -compass bearings.</p> - -<h3>III</h3> - -<p>And still the Germans stayed their hands, and still -we waited and speculated upon what the coming campaign -might hold for us. For the Tank Corps it seemed -certainly to portend a new form of warfare—the Tank -duel.</p> - -<p>All sorts of things were rumoured concerning the -German preparations, and the sheets of the Tank Corps -Intelligence Summary for late February are full of -little items of information of a perfectly new kind.</p> - -<p>Tanks of some sort were certainly being made at -Krupp’s.</p> - -<p>Prisoners had been caught who described them as -larger and heavier than the British machines. We had -reason to believe that men were being withdrawn from -certain other units to form Tank crews.</p> - -<p>Then, in the next day’s Summary, it would be reported -that airmen had found out that in certain Regimental, -Brigade, and Divisional training schemes which -were being carried out by the enemy, horses and wagons -were being used, representing Tanks. Combined infantry -and Tank attacks of all sorts appeared to be being -rehearsed. Again, some recently captured prisoners<span class="pagenum" id="Page_242">242</span> -said that a few derelict Tanks, which the Germans had -taken at Cambrai, were being put into order, they -seemed to think, as training rather than as fighting -machines.</p> - -<p>It is to be imagined that the notion of the new warfare, -of meeting their kind in combat for the first time, -was exceedingly interesting to all ranks of the Tank -Corps; and there was not a single hut in a single camp -where wonderful new ideas for tactics and manœuvres -wherewith to annihilate the new enemy, were not really -elaborated.</p> - -<p>We did not know that the bitterness and anxiety of a -long retreat lay before us; a retreat whose gall and -wormwood were to enter into our very souls, and of -whose confused events it is even now almost impossible -to write either with accuracy or impartiality.</p> -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_243">243</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_XIV">CHAPTER XIV</h2> - -<p class="subhead">THE MARCH RETREAT</p> -</div> - -<div class="poetry-container pw20"> -<div class="poetry"> - <div class="stanza"> - <div class="verse indentq">“A mile around the city,</div> - <div class="verse indent2">The throng stopped up the ways;</div> - <div class="verse indent0">A fearful sight it was to see</div> - <div class="verse indent2">Through two long nights and days.</div> - </div> - <div class="stanza"> - <div class="verse indentq">“For aged folks on crutches,</div> - <div class="verse indent2">And women great with child,</div> - <div class="verse indent0">And mothers sobbing over babes</div> - <div class="verse indent2">That clung to them and smiled,</div> - <div class="verse indent0">And sick men borne in litters</div> - <div class="verse indent2">High on the necks of slaves,</div> - <div class="verse indent0">And troops of sun-burned husbandmen</div> - <div class="verse indent2">With reaping-hooks and staves.</div> - </div> - <div class="stanza"> - <div class="verse indentq">“And droves of mules and asses</div> - <div class="verse indent2">Laden with skins of wine,</div> - <div class="verse indent0">And endless flocks of goats and sheep,</div> - <div class="verse indent2">And endless herds of kine,</div> - <div class="verse indent0">And endless trains of waggons</div> - <div class="verse indent2">That creaked beneath the weight</div> - <div class="verse indent0">Of corn-sacks and of household goods,</div> - <div class="verse indent2">Choked every roaring gate.</div> - </div> - <div class="stanza"> - <div class="verse indentq">“Now, from the rock Tarpeian,</div> - <div class="verse indent2">Could the wan burghers spy</div> - <div class="verse indent0">The line of blazing villages</div> - <div class="verse indent2">Red in the midnight sky.</div> - <div class="verse indent0">The Fathers of the City,</div> - <div class="verse indent2">They sat all night and day,</div> - <div class="verse indent0">For every hour some horseman came</div> - <div class="verse indent2">With tidings of dismay.”</div> - </div> - <div class="attrib"><span class="smcap">Lord Macaulay.</span></div> -</div> -</div> - -<h3>I</h3> - -<p><span class="firstword">About</span> March 14 the 3rd and 5th Armies were warned -by their aerial reconnaissance that a new and ominous -concentration was taking place behind the enemy’s -lines.</p> - -<p>These two Armies, to which the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th -Tank Brigades were, it will be remembered, attached,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_244">244</span> -held the line which lay between Bullecourt to the north -and St. Quentin to the south.</p> - -<p>Behind them lay the old Somme battlefields, and -about them was a dry, rather bare, downland country -with few woods and divided up by broad valleys that -ran east and west across it. It was a part of the line -upon which we had long considered the blow might -probably fall.</p> - -<p>The 3rd and 5th Armies, now on the alert, immediately -set about raiding the enemy and, having captured -the desired prisoners and examined them, were -consistently told the same story.</p> - -<p>Thursday, March 21, was to be the day of attack.</p> - -<p>The weather, which had been clear and bright for a -week or two, broke on Tuesday, the 19th, and all day it -rained heavily. On the night of the 20th a thick mist -came up and lay densely over the downs. Such weather -conditions only made an attack the more certain, and all -along the line Tanks were moved forward into their -allotted positions.</p> - -<p>At two o’clock in the morning of the 21st the British -line was warned to expect an attack. The forward zone -was already fully manned, but at 4.30 an order was -sent out to man the battle zone. Nor was the order -premature. The mist still lay heavily over the lines, and -under its cover the Germans had secretly pushed up -their troops until all along the front between Bullecourt -and La Fère, they had massed thirty-seven divisions on -a line little more than a mile from our outposts.</p> - -<p>The drama was about to begin. At a quarter to five -every German battery from the Marne to Dunkirk -opened fire. Such a bombardment had never been -known before, and it reached its zenith on the fronts -of the 3rd and 5th Armies.</p> - -<p>Torrents of gas shells and high explosives were<span class="pagenum" id="Page_245">245</span> -poured out upon our forward and battle lines, upon -our Headquarters, upon our artillery positions, and -upon all our lines of communication.</p> - -<p>The batteries of the 3rd and 5th Armies replied as -best they could, but owing to the mist our artillery observers -were helpless. It was impossible to see fifty -yards ahead, and the German fire seemed to crash upon -us out of some alien planet.</p> - -<p>By 8 or 9 o’clock the first parties of Germans had -begun to advance, to cut our wire here and there along -the front of attack, and to filter unobtrusively through -our outpost line.</p> - -<p>We began to perceive that the enemy was behaving in -a most unaccountable way. Even by 10 o’clock—as far -as we could learn in the confusion—he seemed in some -places to have made no attempt at an infantry attack -at all. In others compact but apparently isolated little -parties of Guards or Cockchafers, or men from some -other picked regiment, had pushed right through our -forward zone and were away beyond the places where -the cross-fire from our machine-guns was to have -checked them, before the men in the redoubts, half-blind -amid the clouds of gas, had realised that any Germans -had crossed No Man’s Land. Again and again the garrisons -were overwhelmed from the rear before they -could send back any warning to the men behind in the -battle zone. When they did endeavour to signal, the -S.O.S. would be blanketed in the mist.</p> - -<p>Only too often the first news of the attack to reach -our batteries was the appearance of German infantry -on their flank and rear.</p> - -<p>There would be nothing left but to mow down the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_246">246</span> -enemy at point-blank range, till finally the gun crews -were overwhelmed by the in-flooding tide.</p> - -<p>As at Ypres, we had begun amazedly to feel that we -were up against a type of tactics against which we had -never fought before. Our conjecture was perfectly -right. It was a system of surprise, and of the theory of -<i xml:lang="de" lang="de">Sturmtruppen</i> carried to its extreme conclusion. Mr. -Buchan has likened the new method to the advance of -a hand whose finger-tips are shod with steel pushing -its way into a soft substance.</p> - -<p>In practice the assault was conducted as follows: -The infantry attack was preceded by a short but extremely -intense bombardment in which a large proportion -of gas was used.</p> - -<p>This was followed by the advance at irregular intervals -of clusters of highly trained assault troops, carrying -light trench mortars or machine-guns (each cluster -really constituting a kind of human Tank. It was well, -indeed, for us that they were no more than mere flesh -and blood, and neither armoured nor engined.) These -clusters, which were closely followed and supported by -the field batteries, made gaps through which the line -troops poured, guided by an elaborate system of flares -and rockets.</p> - -<p>Each section of the defence might thus find itself -caught between the “fingers”—outflanked and encircled.</p> - -<p>Each body of the advancing enemy was under the -command of a specially trained officer, whose leadership -generally proved a model of skill and initiative; each -detachment was instructed to push on as far as its -strength allowed, and every man carried iron rations -for several days.</p> - -<p>When a regiment had advanced as far as it was able,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_247">247</span> -another took its place, the waves of the advance thus -leapfrogging over each other in an endless chain.</p> - -<p>The dangers of such tactics are obvious, but on -March 21 the system was portentously successful.</p> - -<h3>II</h3> - -<p>As in all disasters, events seemed to move with a -terrible rapidity.</p> - -<p>A moment before the motor accident you are a free -man; a moment after and you are involved in an endless -line of consequences which have sprung up while -you could hold your breath, and amid whose mushroom -growth you may wander for the rest of your life.</p> - -<p>Five hours after the opening of the German cannonade -the world seemed to have changed for the two -armies which had stood in the path of the hurricane.</p> - -<p>In the course of the next fourteen days the Germans -were to sweep forward for forty miles, and their advance -was even then to be checked, not by the British -Army, but by the gradual attenuation of their supply -system.</p> - -<p>The whole fourteen days of the retreat were completely -confused. Units were inextricably mixed, and -communications were impossible.</p> - -<p>Some sort of immediate action was always having to -be taken by junior Commanders on information which -they justly believed to be untrustworthy. There were -often more Germans to the flank of any given body than -to its front. When we try to form any general conception -of the events of this period, we seem to see the -actors moving in a kind of mist from which they emerge -for a moment, perform some action which may or may -not appear relevant, and then disappear again into the -confusion, leaving us to guess at the meaning of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_248">248</span> -play. As far as the events of such a time can be -chronicled, we propose for this fortnight to follow -separately the doings of the three Tank Battalions -chiefly involved, and to make no effort to present a -coherent picture of this return to the reign “of Chaos -and old Night.”</p> - -<p>The 4th and 5th Battalions (4th Brigade) lay near -Cartigny (south of Péronne).</p> - -<p>On the morning of the 21st the two Battalions of -Tanks were moved up into the line, two Tanks of the -4th Battalion counter-attacking at Peizière and clearing -a railway cutting of the enemy.</p> - -<p>On the 22nd all the Tanks were ordered into action. -The infantry were retreating, and their chief duty was -to gain time and to cover that retreat.</p> - -<p>Twelve Tanks of the 5th Battalion attacked the enemy -at Hervilly Wood, and several from the 4th Battalion -near Epehy. Both detachments suffered rather -severely.</p> - -<p>At this point the two Battalions seem to have more -or less parted company.</p> - -<p>Seventeen Tanks belonging to the 5th Battalion rallied -at Cartigny that night, and next day (the 23rd) -were ordered to retire over the Somme.</p> - -<p>The only available crossing place was the bridge at -Brie, a few miles to the south.</p> - -<p>They set off immediately, but the enemy advance was -too rapid for them. They were unable to cross the -bridge, and, lest they should fall into the hands of the -enemy, all the machines were destroyed by their crews.</p> - -<p>The story of one of these Tanks is told in the 5th -Battalion History:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“Second Lieutenant T. E. Van Zeller’s Tank was -covering the withdrawal of the infantry across the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_249">249</span> -Somme, moving from Cartigny to Brie on the east side -of the river. He inflicted severe casualties on the -enemy, and was under heavy and continuous shell-fire. -On arriving at Brie late in the afternoon of the 23rd, -he found that the bridge was about to be blown up, and -that his Tank could not cross. He accordingly destroyed -his Tank, and then directed his crew in assisting to -carry wounded across the bridge. Finding two men -seriously wounded who had been left behind, he decided, -with three of his crew, to make an effort to rescue them -at the last moment.</p> - -<p>“When half-way across, the bridge was blown up in -front and behind them. Second Lieutenant Van Zeller, -however, succeeded in getting the whole party across -the débris under heavy shell-fire, and finally brought -them back behind our lines on the west side of the -river.</p> - -<p>“For this he was awarded the M.C., and the three -members of his crew who assisted in the last plucky -effort were each awarded the Military Medal.”</p></div> - -<p>There were other places where the now “dismounted” -Tank crews could cross the river.</p> - -<p>But they had no means of transport, and were, therefore, -obliged to burn or otherwise destroy most of their -stores and kit.</p> - -<p>Indeed, as a rule, the Lewis guns from the Tanks -were their only salvage.</p> - -<p>One Staff Sergeant, however, hid away or buried a -number of his tools, and six months later, when the -British advance swept back again, they were recovered.</p> - -<p>By March 24 the Battalion had lost all its Tanks. -But in almost every case the Lewis guns had been -salved.</p> - -<p>As the crews fell back they were immediately organised -as Lewis gun detachments, and distributed -along the line wherever their help was most needed.</p> - -<p>Colonel O’Kelly, Commanding the 5th Tank Battalion,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_250">250</span> -had to use his own initiative in the matter, as -communications were by this time hopelessly disorganised -and the need was instant.</p> - -<p>Once, too, a detachment had been sent off, as it were -disappeared, and each party had to rely upon its individual -Commander.</p> - -<p>Tank crews had had no training in this kind of warfare, -but the strange dilemmas in which a Tank frequently -finds itself had accustomed them to the unexpected, -and thus left alone they displayed plenty of -initiative.</p> - -<p>The chief work which fell to them was that of forming -rearguards and of protecting the retreat of the -infantry.</p> - -<p>Food and ammunition were both short, and they, like -the other troops, suffered many hardships.</p> - -<p>Each of these Lewis gun detachments was made up of -about four officers and forty men, and they ordinarily -had twelve Lewis guns with them.</p> - -<p>Three such detachments fought near Masvillers and -Merlaincourt, others near Villers Bretonneux, Caix, -Harbonnières and Marcourt, the general retreat carrying -them back almost to Amiens.</p> - -<p>Again and again small parties failed to get the orders -to retire in time, and had to fight their way back after -being surrounded and cut off by the enemy.</p> - -<p>Sometimes they fought with French infantry, but -chiefly with the Sherwoods, Queen’s and Royal Fusiliers -of the 19th Corps.</p> - -<p>Extraordinarily good individual work was done, as -the list of honours shows. The story of a 5th Battalion -detachment gives a typical picture:</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_251">251</span></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_55" href="#Footnote_55" class="fnanchor">55</a>“The 5th detachment under the command of Lieutenant -Pitt, consisted of Second Lieutenants Whyte and -Storm, forty-one men and seven guns. On March 28 -this detachment was attached to ‘Carey’s Force’ and -ordered to hold the line on each side of the Villers -Bretonneux—Warfusée—Abancourt Road, a position -which was to be held for two days at all costs.</p> - -<p>“While placing his guns, Lieutenant Pitt was -wounded and Second Lieutenant Whyte took over the -command.</p> - -<p>“A Vickers gun section was in position north of the -road, so Second Lieutenant Whyte posted his guns on -the south side. The infantry holding the line at this -point were all low category men and convalescents, and -not more than twenty men had any experience of holding -a rifle.</p> - -<p>“At 6 p.m. on the 28th, word was received that the -enemy were about to attack and, at close range, machine-gun -fire was opened on them.</p> - -<p>“The infantry began to fall back, but were rallied by -Second Lieutenant Whyte and Captain Bingham, M.C., -and taken back to their former position.</p> - -<p>“Second Lieutenant Whyte then assumed command -of this section. At 10 p.m. the enemy again attacked, -but were again driven back by the Lewis gun -fire.</p> - -<p>“On the following day (29th) the enemy launched -an attack on the right, but it was completely broken up -by enfilade fire from Second Lieutenant Whyte’s guns, -the enemy suffering extremely heavy casualties. Some -relief was afforded on the night of 29th-30th by cavalry, -who came up on the right of this sector.</p> - -<p>“Enemy machine-guns and snipers were very active, -but two of the former and three snipers were accounted -for by Lewis gun fire. Second Lieutenant Whyte held -the line until 10.30 p.m. on the 31st, when he was relieved -by Australian troops.</p> - -<p>“For his gallant defence of this position Second -Lieutenant Whyte was awarded the M.C.</p></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_252">252</span></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“Corporal S. Archbold working under Second Lieutenant -Whyte showed conspicuous gallantry throughout -these trying days. Single-handed he worked his Lewis -gun, carrying it and its ammunition to a new position, -firing it and loading his magazines without assistance -for twenty-four hours. During this period he helped -in breaking two enemy attacks.</p> - -<p>“On the 30th he was wounded in the head by a -sniper, but continued to work his gun all day until he -was ordered by his officer to the dressing-station. This -devotion to duty gained for him the D.C.M. Another -member of this party, Pte. W. Lyon, was awarded the -M.M. for carrying important messages in broad daylight -across the open under heavy machine-gun and -rifle fire at 200 yards range.”</p></div> - -<p>Between March 24 and April 2 the 5th Battalion had -sent a total of eighty-four Lewis guns and crews into -the line.</p> - -<p>Every available man had gone, cooks, officers’ servants, -clerks and orderlies. They had suffered heavy -casualties, and on April 4 the Battalion, or what was -left of it, was taken to Auchy by lorry.</p> - -<p>Here they drew Hotchkiss guns, and began to train -again. But they were not to be left long in peace.</p> - -<p>On April 12 they had orders to form again as a Lewis -gun Battalion, and next day found them once more in -the forward area, this time at Meteren, not far from -Hazebrouck, where they relieved an infantry Battalion -which had held a switch line through the village and an -isolated point near Meteren Church. On April 15 they -got news that the enemy had captured high ground between -Neuve Eglise and Bailleul, and on the 16th the -enemy advanced on Meteren.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“Breaking through a section of trench which had -been left unmanned, they forced back the infantry on<span class="pagenum" id="Page_253">253</span> -the right and also ‘B’ Company, and got behind the -latter. No. 8 section was entirely cut off and lost.</p> - -<p>“Second Lieutenant Carter showed great presence of -mind at this juncture. He was Reconnaissance Officer -of his Company. On seeing the position caused by the -enemy break-through, he immediately rallied and reorganised -the various parties as they fell back and took -up a line in rear. He was all the time under heavy -shell-fire.</p> - -<p>“The position of ‘C’ Company had then become -precarious.</p> - -<p>“Second Lieutenant Dawson, assisted by Second -Lieutenant Bayliss, immediately placed four of his guns -in the open, covered the now exposed flank and held up -the attack. During the night of the 27th-28th he dug -a trench, connecting these isolated posts with our -original line, and posted his guns in this new trench. -The enemy mounted two guns behind a hedge about 200 -yards in front of the position. These two guns, however, -were knocked out before firing a shot. The Germans -also tried to assemble behind this same hedge for -an attack; but they were driven back with heavy -casualties. This well-thought-out defence performed -throughout under frontal and enfiladed fire, saved the -company from an attack which would have endangered -the entire position.”</p></div> - -<p>On April 17 the Battalion, except for twenty guns, -was relieved by the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. -After helping to hold back one more serious attack, the -remaining gun crews were finally withdrawn and joined -the rest of the Battalion at the Mont des Cats.</p> - -<p>On April 24 detachments of the 5th Battalion, which -were helping to man the line before Kemmel, were -heavily in action.</p> - -<p>The enemy attacked after a fierce bombardment, and -Kemmel Hill was taken.</p> - -<p>On the 29th the enemy opened a heavy gas and H.E.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_254">254</span> -barrage and attacked Mont Rouge in force. They were -driven away, but returned again and again, always -being beaten off.</p> - -<p>At last in the first days of May the Battalion was -relieved, and was sent back to the training and rest -area at Blangy, the Divisional General having complimented -the gun crews upon their conduct in the -field.</p> - -<p>The story of the 4th Battalion is very like that of the -5th. All through the last days of March there was the -same heartbreaking destruction of machines that had -run out of petrol or grease, or were suffering from some -slight defect which there was no time to rectify. Again -kits and orderly-room material had to be burnt, and -again the Lewis guns were salved. The usual Lewis -gun detachments were formed, but this time did not -have quite so much fighting, their chief battle being on -March 26, on the Bray-Albert road, where they did -exceedingly well.</p> - -<p>The 2nd Battalion was near Maricourt when the crash -came, and twenty-five of their Tanks went into action -on the afternoon of March 22.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_56" href="#Footnote_56" class="fnanchor">56</a>“The Tanks had to come into view when they -crossed the Bapaume-Cambrai road, and as soon as the -enemy spotted them coming into action, very heavy machine-gun -fire was brought to bear upon them, to be -followed in a few minutes by heavy direct artillery fire. -Several Tanks were knocked out by shells almost as -soon as they arrived amongst the enemy infantry, who -were found to be very numerous, as if massing for a -further advance.</p> - -<p>“The appearance of the Tanks seems to have been -a complete surprise to the enemy infantry, who became -disorganised and retired some distance in confusion.</p></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_255">255</span></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“The Tanks carried out the attack without any infantry, -and practically no artillery, co-operation.</p> - -<p>“The casualties both in Tanks and personnel were -heavy, but the attack achieved its object, in that it -upset the plans of the enemy and delayed any further -attack on their part for nearly twenty-four hours. It -was known at the time by the Staff that the enemy was -massing for an attack at once, and the appearance of -the Tanks rendered this impossible.</p> - -<p>“The first Tanks came out of action about 7.30 p.m.”</p></div> - -<p>Of the twenty-five Tanks which went into action only -six came out undamaged, and the Battalion was not -really in a fit state to fight again without reorganisation.</p> - -<p>But the enemy were still advancing, and the Albert-Bapaume -road had to be defended at all costs.</p> - -<p>So on the 24th the surviving Tanks were manned and -sent forward again, and the Tankless crews were -formed into Lewis gun detachments.</p> - -<p>They waited all through the night of the 24th expecting -to be sent forward.</p> - -<p>No orders came till midday on March 25, when -they were sent to the 3rd Tank Brigade Camp near -Bray, which they later in the day were ordered to -burn to prevent it from falling into the hands of the -enemy.</p> - -<p>All next day the infantry fell back, and with them -the Lewis gun teams.</p> - -<p>Some idea of the confusion may be gathered from -the fact that at this moment the 2nd Battalion was -separated into no less than eight parts, none of which -could communicate quickly enough with its fellows to -make any combined action possible.</p> - -<p>The 8th and 10th Battalions still had some Tanks<span class="pagenum" id="Page_256">256</span> -in going order, and, on the day when the 3rd Army was -forced across the old Somme battlefield, they fought an -exceedingly good rearguard action on either side of the -Albert-Bapaume road. The Tanks received a special -message of commendation from the General Commanding -the 3rd Army.</p> - -<p>Another incident—of which the authors have not been -able to obtain many particulars—was the action fought -by a scratch Tank force formed out of all the fighting -Tanks from the driving school, Aveluy.</p> - -<p>The 7th Battalion was one of several which were not -in the path of the hurricane, and consequently lost no -Tanks.</p> - -<p>A certain number of its men were, however, organised -as Lewis gun detachments, and by mid-April saw a considerable -amount of fighting.</p> - -<p>One such detachment was attached to the 61st Division -near Nieppe Forest, and with them manned a line -of fortified shell-holes.</p> - -<p>There were no trenches and the country was absolutely -flat. The whereabouts of the enemy was extremely -uncertain. The Tank Lewis gunners held -about a mile and a half of improvised line, their headquarters -being a little farmhouse not far from Merville. -Hardly had the detachment taken over than the enemy -put down a hot barrage. A Reconnaissance Officer who -was present described the events that followed in a -letter home:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“I went out of the northern door of the farm. A -beastly sniper’s bullet whizzed past my head, and then -another and another. The bullets were all coming from -the north, and it seemed as though Fritz had made his -way through the town and would get us from the rear. -This is what he did do. A sergeant was killed next to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_257">257</span> -me, and Norton<a id="FNanchor_57" href="#Footnote_57" class="fnanchor">57</a> told me to go back to Divisional -Headquarters and report the situation. After I had -been there about an hour, a runner came back to say -Norton had been wounded, and soon after we heard that -the enemy had broken through to the north of the -Canal. Just at that moment General Elles came up -and asked what the situation was, and having heard -that there were some Tanks and men of another Battalion -on the northern side of the Canal, said he would -go up and see for himself. He had his A.D.C. with -him, and took me along as well. We motored right up -to where we came in touch with our men, who were -being pushed back on the north of the Canal. We then -got out of the car and went forward on foot. The -General had not even his tin hat on, but his red and -gold. He went out beyond the withdrawing infantry -and taking out his map, held a council of war, a council -not uninterrupted by machine-gun bullets.</p> - -<p>“He then sent me back a couple of hundred yards -and told me to stop every man on a certain cross-road, -reorganise them and make them take up fresh positions. -This I did, and we thus re-established a line. -The General took command and made his Headquarters -in a small house until shelled out of it and into a neighbouring -ditch. I was sent back to Divisional Headquarters -to report and get some more ammunition. -When I returned the situation was pretty well the -same, and we were holding on all right. The General -then suggested that we might see in which houses the -enemy really were. During these investigations Ian -Stewart went forward by himself on our flank, and had -a private battle with a company of Germans, killing, -amongst others, one who was on a bicycle, and himself -returning on the captured machine, the original rider’s -papers in his pocket.</p> - -<p>“We were relieved about 7 p.m. by a new Division, -and I got back to Divisional Headquarters about 9. The -next morning the C.O. turned up with the rest of the -Battalion.”</p></div> - -<p>The 3rd Tank Battalion, whose camp at Bray had<span class="pagenum" id="Page_258">258</span> -been destroyed, were now a fully fledged Whippet unit.</p> - -<p>During the first few days the Whippets saw no -actual fighting but were subject to plenty of alarms, -and made a great number of fruitless excursions from -place to place.</p> - -<p>At the Bray Camp there had been, unfortunately, a -certain number of Whippet machines which were temporarily -laid up with engine trouble.</p> - -<p>But there were no spare parts and no time for repairs, -and a good many machines had to be blown up -“unblooded.”</p> - -<p>On March 26 two Companies of the 3rd Battalion -were moved to Mailly-Maillet Wood.</p> - -<p>As soon as the machines had arrived the Company -Commanders went out to reconnoitre the position near -the village (Mailly-Maillet).</p> - -<p>The result of their investigations is typical of the -whole retreat:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_58" href="#Footnote_58" class="fnanchor">58</a>“The position on the front between Beaumont-Hamel -and Hébuterne proved to be very obscure, a gap -in our line appearing to exist between these two places. -The only troops of ours to be found consisted of two -small posts of about one platoon each on the outskirts -of Colincamps, the ground to the front and between -them being occupied by enemy patrols and machine-gunners.”</p></div> - -<p>About noon the Whippets arrived at the village. The -situation was explained to the Section Commanders, -and half the Tanks proceeded down the main street -while the rest guarded the two flanks.</p> - -<p>A small body of our infantry which was holding the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_259">259</span> -village had been on the point of falling back before the -rapidly advancing enemy when the Tanks arrived.</p> - -<p>The Tanks had gone forward almost beyond the village, -when suddenly, round the edge of the wood, they -met 300 of the enemy advancing in close formation.</p> - -<p>The Germans were too much surprised to attempt to -resist, and fled in disorder.</p> - -<p>A number of them were shot down by the Whippet’s -machine-guns, and many surrendered to the infantry -who had by now arrived.</p> - -<p>The remnant scattered, and were pursued by the -Tanks right on to the outskirts of Auchonvillers.</p> - -<p>The two Whippets remained out on patrol for about -an hour, but no further attack was attempted, and they -returned to the village about 3 p.m. Later in the afternoon -the gap in our lines was filled by the arrival of -a New Zealand Division. This successful little action -is interesting as the first ever fought by the Whippets.</p> - -<p>There were several other sections of Whippets and -heavy Tanks out on patrol on this and the following -days.</p> - -<p>Several Tanks of the 10th Battalion fought in Rossignol -Wood on two occasions, and Whippets of the 2nd -Battalion were in action near Bouzencourt in a blinding -rainstorm.</p> - -<p>Everywhere it was the same story of villages the question -of whose ownership was “obscure” of gaps in the -line which the Tanks had to bridge for a critical hour -or two, often firing their machine-guns into the advancing -waves of the enemy until the guns grew hot and -jammed and the Tanks had to retreat. Often they -would go back till their petrol gave out, and the crews -had to blow up their machines.</p> - -<p>The new Medium A machines (the Whippets) acquitted<span class="pagenum" id="Page_260">260</span> -themselves extremely well, and there were -astonishingly few cases of mechanical trouble.</p> - -<p>The Battalion histories describe many pitiful scenes -which took place during the retreat, the fate of the -inhabitants, for whom our withdrawal meant complete -ruin, striking the eye-witnesses as the most distressing -feature of the whole business.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_59" href="#Footnote_59" class="fnanchor">59</a>“During the withdrawal the condition of the villagers -was pitiful. Women and children and old men -crazed with fright with liveliest memories of the conduct -of the Germans in the area occupied by them, were -to be seen streaming westwards from their homes, pushing -their meagre possessions before them in hand-carts -and alternately invoking the aid of their Saints and -calling down their wrath upon the hated Boche.”</p></div> - -<p>Nor was the retreat only tragic to those of the Tank -Corps who had to witness the supreme misery of these -processions of the Cross. There was a lesser unhappiness -for the tacticians of the Tank Corps in the contemplation -of the appalling waste of Tank machines and -men.</p> - -<p>The Tanks had been far too scattered ever to pull -their weight.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_60" href="#Footnote_60" class="fnanchor">60</a>“To hit with them as they were distributed on -March 21 was like hitting out with an open hand instead -of with a clenched fist.</p> - -<p>“When the German blow fell there was no time to -hit and simultaneously to close the fingers.”</p></div> - -<p>Out of 370 Tanks which were fit to fight, only 180 -saw any action, a great many machines running out of -supplies or being incapacitated by some temporary mechanical -trouble, and so lost without having fired a shot.</p> - -<p>The fault lay in the fact that the infantry Commanders<span class="pagenum" id="Page_261">261</span> -under whom they were acting did not fully -understand the functions and limitations of the Tank, -or realise that as the final loss of a good many Mark -IV. machines in such a retreat was inevitable, it would -have been much better to give the Tanks a run for -their money.</p> - -<h3>III<br /> - -<span class="subhead"><i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Villers Bretonneux</i></span></h3> - -<p>It was not till the German offensive had lasted for -more than a month that opposing Tanks at last met in -battle.</p> - -<p>The enemy had pushed us back to within six or seven -miles of Amiens, and he now planned a more or less -full-dress attack upon positions on high ground, which -were, in fact, the outer defences not only of the town, -but of the vital Amiens-Paris railway. A break through -on this sector would be a serious disaster, and the situation -was an anxious one. The weather was unsettled, -and the mornings often still misty in the Somme -country.</p> - -<p>At 6.30 on April 23 the river fog lay thick, and under -cover of this mist the Germans attacked the whole of -the line south of the Somme after a short and particularly -intense bombardment.</p> - -<p>A company of heavy Tanks of the 1st and seven Whippets -of the 3rd Battalion had been hastily moved up into -the domain of the 3rd Corps, north and south of Villers -Bretonneux, where it was rumoured that the Germans -were going to use Tanks, and, in fact, when at last the -first little knots of German infantry appeared through -the fog, three huge forms accompanied them.</p> - -<p>It was over Tanks of this type, the “Schultz” and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_262">262</span> -the “Hagan,” that the little boys of London scrambled -so delightedly on the Horse Guards Parade in the -spring of 1919. Now all we could see of them, as they -lumbered slowly through the fog, was that they were -a good deal larger and heavier than the heavy British -Tanks, and that they were rather tortoise shaped, the -armoured “shell” everywhere coming down over the -tracks like a sort of crinoline.</p> - -<p>They broke right through our line, opening a way -for the infantry which was following them. But three -of our Tanks, under Captain F. C. Brown, M.C., happened -to be on their way to the very spot (Cachy) where -the German Tanks had attacked. Unfortunately two of -the three were females, whose machine-guns were not -of much use against the new thick-skinned enemy.</p> - -<p>However, they went on, hoping for chinks in their -opponents’ armour, but in spite of their superior power -of manœuvre both the females were soon knocked out -by shells from the German Tanks.</p> - -<p>The one male Tank, under Lieutenant Mitchell, was -now opposed to three undamaged enemy machines, each -more heavily armoured than the British Tank. Lieutenant -Mitchell, however, immediately engaged them -and, after some dodging of the salvos of his three -antagonists, who seemed to be trying to close upon him, -he managed to obtain a direct hit with one of his six-pounders -upon the leading German. Twice again he -fired, each time hitting the same machine. The third -shot completed its discomfiture; in its efforts to get -away it fell into a sandpit, where it lay on its side, its -tracks still rattling round ineffectively.</p> - -<p>With its first enemy definitely out of action, the -British Tank turned upon the other two.</p> - -<p>But they had not waited, and had already discreetly<span class="pagenum" id="Page_263">263</span> -turned tail, leaving Lieutenant Mitchell master of the -situation.</p> - -<p>Such was the rather inglorious end of the Germans’ -first endeavour to meet the British Tank Corps with its -own weapons.</p> - -<p>It was not far from the scene of this strange encounter -that about half an hour later seven Whippets -came into action, debouching from north of Cachy, -attacking the enemy on the ridge between Villers -Bretonneux and Hangard Wood. The ridge was held by -machine-gun groups concealed in shell-holes, while on -the eastern slopes two German Battalions were forming -up in the open ready to attack. The Whippets -moved from shell-hole to shell-hole, destroying the machine-gun -groups, and then proceeded to deal with the -infantry. Their success was terrible. They got right -in among the enemy, who had absolutely no cover, and -mowed the unhappy Germans down in ranks as they -stood. At least 400 of the enemy are estimated to have -been killed, and the rest at last fled in confusion, the -threatened attack being completely broken up.</p> - -<p>Not only were these two Battalions disposed of, but -by nightfall it was clear that for the time being at -least some circumstance had definitely held up the German -advance. We did not know it, but our defences -had withstood and survived the last hungry lickings of -the great spring tide.</p> - -<p>Its impulse was too far spent to overflow the frail -dam of our Villers Bretonneux positions. The German -advance had reached slack water.</p> - -<p>There had been one incident which had genuinely -cheered the hard pressed men of the Tank Corps. At -the very blackest moment of the retreat, when machines<span class="pagenum" id="Page_264">264</span> -were being sacrificed by the dozen, and when the grey -waves of the German infantry seemed to pursue our -weary men with endless, tireless iteration, General -Elles received a telegram from Mr. Docker, the chairman -of the Metropolitan Carriage Company of <span class="locked">Birmingham:—</span></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“A resolution has been passed unanimously by the -Works people of the Metropolitan Carriage Company -to forgo any holidays, and to do their utmost to expedite -delivery of Tanks to assist their comrades in the -Field.”</p></div> -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_265">265</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_XV">CHAPTER XV</h2> - -<p class="subhead">THE EQUILIBRIUM—MINOR ACTIONS—HAMEL—THE -BALLON D’ESSAI</p> -</div> - -<p><span class="firstword">It</span> is not perhaps too fanciful to envisage the battles -of April 24, 25 and 26, though they were by no means -uniformly satisfactory little actions, as belonging to a -different and a happier era than the action of Villers -Bretonneux itself. On the 23rd we had been fighting -for our lives. Through the three subsequent days’ fighting, -it began to be more and more obvious that a change -had taken place. Either through our desperate efforts -to save Amiens, or by the workings of some deeper -cause, spent and disorganised as we were, we had begun -to pull level with the Germans again. The change was -slight, but none the less palpable.</p> - -<p>On the 25th, a few Tanks of the 1st and 3rd Battalions -fought with the 3rd Corps in a counter-attack -against the most advanced of the new German positions -in the Bois d’Aquenne. The Tanks did a good deal of -execution, and we succeeded in driving in some of the -forward German posts.</p> - -<p>On the 26th, four Tanks of the 1st Brigade had an -interesting experience.</p> - -<p>The Allied forces on this part of the line consisted of -a most curious mixture of arms and races.</p> - -<p>The scene, for example, in a neighbouring wood about -ten days before is thus described by the historian of the -1st Battalion:</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_266">266</span></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“The Bois d’Abbé presented a most picturesque -spectacle, and any one taking the trouble to walk -through it could have had the unique experience of seeing -practically every branch of both the British and -French Armies represented. In this wood were to be -found Tanks of all descriptions, Mark IV.’s, V’s, Whippets -and French Rénaults, heavy and light artillery, -British infantry, Australians, French cavalry and infantry, -Moroccans, and lastly a detachment of the Legion -of Frontiersmen mounted on little Arab ponies, -which presented a strange contrast to the heavy Percherons -of the artillery.”</p></div> - -<p>On April 26, it was in company with the Moroccan -Division that the 1st Battalion fought.</p> - -<p>The enemy had launched a strong attack against the -Front held by these troops at 6 a.m. on the morning of -the 26th, under cover of the usual heavy mist. Very -soon, however, a section of Tanks under Captain Groves -got right in amongst the advancing Germans and inflicted -heavy casualties upon them. The French -Colonial infantry, who had been obliged to fall back, -immediately rallied and brought the German assault to -a standstill. In the course of the action Second Lieutenant -Wilson’s Tank found itself among some German -heavy guns, which it attacked with case shot<a id="FNanchor_61" href="#Footnote_61" class="fnanchor">61</a> and -machine-gun fire, wounding most of their crews and killing -the rest. Mr. Wilson then patrolled up and down -some trenches held by the enemy and cost them very -heavy losses by his enfilading fire. Eventually, having -fired every round of ammunition in his Tank, he decided -to go back, but while he was on his way, his magneto -broke down. However, he sent back a messenger to -fetch a new magneto, and after this had been fitted,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_267">267</span> -he returned to the rallying point, his Tank having suffered -the total casualties of two men slightly wounded.</p> - -<p>On the 28th, another Company of the same Battalion -again co-operated with the Moroccan Division. This -time it was the Allies who were the attackers, their objective -being the Hangard Wood. Owing to a mistake, -the four Tanks did not get into action until rather late. -Second Lieutenant Jones’ Tank, however, fought a very -good action, clearing out a great number of machine-gun -nests in the Wood, and generally giving a great -deal of help to the Moroccan infantry in their advance. -The Tank stayed in the Wood, until all its ammunition -had been expended, and then, the infantry deciding not -to make a further attack, it was withdrawn and rejoined -its Company.</p> - -<p>Except a small action of the 1st Battalion on May 2, -the Tank Corps saw no fighting for the next six weeks, -and it was not till July 4 that they fought again in any -considerable action.</p> - -<h3>II</h3> - -<p>The general situation in May was still such as to -cause our High Command a certain anxiety. It is easy -to be wise after the event and say that the Germans -must obviously have outrun their transport and overtaxed -the limited road capacity of the devastated area -which lay behind them. In early May this, though true, -was not obvious. Meanwhile, we had been too much -weakened by the disasters of the last six weeks to be -able to counter-attack. Consequently, the enemy had -the same opportunities for reconstruction as we had -ourselves, and although we felt confident that after such -a hurricane of battles there must be a breathing space -for both Armies, we were by no means certain what<span class="pagenum" id="Page_268">268</span> -would be the respective rôles of the two opposing sides -when the struggle came to be resumed. Our most pressing -need was the filling of the gaps in our Divisions and -the closing of the huge breaches which the German advance -had made in our defensive systems. The greatest -need was for men. We had, it is true, to lay out new -trench lines and reconstruct such old systems as already -existed, but it was not likely that the enemy would -afford us time to establish new defences comparable -with those which he had already proved his power of -overrunning. Therefore it was to procuring new and -well-trained troops that our chief efforts must be directed. -The men procured, there must be railways upon -which to move them.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_62" href="#Footnote_62" class="fnanchor">62</a>“The depth to which the enemy had penetrated in -the Somme and Lys valleys had disrupted important -lateral lines of railway, and had created a situation of -extreme gravity with regard to the maintenance of communications -in Northern France. At Amiens, Béthune, -and Hazebrouck, much-used railway junctions had been -brought under the effective fire of the enemy’s guns, -while the railway centre at St. Pol was threatened. To -relieve the situation a comprehensive programme of -railway construction was undertaken.”</p></div> - -<p>Some 200 miles of broad-gauge track was laid between -April and July and a complete series of new defences -were built, involving, incredible as it may seem, 5000 -miles of trench. Nor were Tanks left out of the scheme -of reorganisation. But, alas! owing to the extreme need -of infantry reinforcements, and the difficulty of immediately -re-arming Battalions which had lost their Tanks -during the Retreat, this “reconstruction” all but took -the form, not of augmentation, but of diminution. It<span class="pagenum" id="Page_269">269</span> -was proposed to reduce the number of Tank Brigades -from six to four. The appearance of enemy Tanks, however, -soon quashed this project. Not only had the Corps -lost heavily in machines, but the fighting done by the -Lewis gun Units had been of a particularly strenuous -kind, and several Battalions had sustained such casualties -in trained and experienced men as to cause great -anxiety at Tank Headquarters. However, the Tank -Corps were only in the same predicament as the rest of -the British Army, and there was nothing for it but -to gather up the bits with as much grace as possible -and to start away as quickly as might be on the work -of reconstruction. All through May, Mark V. machines -were arriving in France at the rate of about sixty a -week. Some of the Battalions which had not taken any -part in the Retreat had been left in their original areas, -in case the Germans should attack, so that we find Battalions -(for example of the 1st Brigade) doing “Savage -Rabbit” as late as the middle of May. For the most -part, however, the Corps was gathered together undergoing -intensive training in the Bermicourt area. All -Tank Units were to be ready for action—re-armed, re-equipped -and re-trained—by August 1.</p> - -<p>The Central Workshops set to work in early June to -prepare sledges for supply haulage, bridges upon which -the Whippets could cross wide obstacles, and “Cribs” -for the heavy Tanks. There “Cribs” were big hexagonal -oaken crates, reinforced with steel, which were -an improved and lighter version of the fascines which -were improvised for the Battle of Cambrai. Training -grounds and workshops hummed with the preparations, -and when, in the last days of July, the call came, it was, -as we shall see, found possible to launch 400 Tanks at -little over a week’s notice.</p> - -<p>It was while the Corps was training at Bermicourt<span class="pagenum" id="Page_270">270</span> -that the foundation of the excellent relations which ever -afterwards existed between Tanks and the French infantry -was laid. A great number of French troops happened -to be billeted in and around the Tank Corps area, -and their keenness to learn all they could about our -machines and their tactics afforded great pleasure to -the men of the British Tank Corps. General Le -Maistre, commanding the 10th French Army, particularly -asked that Tank demonstrations should be held for -the Units of his command. This was done, and all -through May and June two or three of these demonstrations -were given weekly. Besides French troops, representatives -from a number of British and Colonial -Corps, and the Canadian and Australian Corps, also -came to watch, to their great edification.</p> - -<h3>III</h3> - -<p>We have said that only a few minor Tank actions -were fought during the last part of May and the month -of June. Two of these small encounters, however, were -rather interesting. To begin with, the 17th Armoured -Car Battalion fought its first action in company with -the French on June 11. At 9.30 on the morning of -June 10 orders were received by Colonel Carter, commanding -the Battalion, to report to the 1st French -Army at Contay. At Contay instructions were issued -for the Battalion to proceed to Ravenel, near St. Just. -The Battalion got this order by telephone, and although -the night was very dark and wet, and the roads crowded -with traffic, it reached Ravenel after a sixty miles’ -journey by five in the morning of June 11. That same -day it went into action with the 10th French Army in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_271">271</span> -its counter-attack at Belloy. Two sections of the Armoured -Cars engaged the enemy with machine-gun fire, -but unfortunately the roads here were piled high with -every sort of débris. This prevented the cars from -being as active as they were to prove themselves -later.</p> - -<p>The second small action was a night raid, interesting -as the first in which Tanks had ever been engaged. -Here the 10th Battalion fought in conjunction with the -4th Corps. We were endeavouring to capture a series -of posts near Bucquoy, only five Platoons of infantry -and five female Tanks being employed. The raid began -at about half-past eleven at night. We were met with -a heavy barrage from trench mortars and machine-guns, -and the infantry were held up. The Tanks, however, -managed to push forward, and carried on the attack in -the pitch dark by themselves. As they advanced they -met with a number of large parties of Germans, into -the “brown” of which they fired. The Tanks certainly -accounted for a great many of the enemy, though it -being, as we have said, extremely dark, it was impossible -to make a very exact computation of the “bag.” -Curiously enough, not a single Tank was damaged by -the trench mortar barrage, which was extremely heavy. -One Tank was swarmed over by a particularly bold -party of the enemy and the crew shot them down with -their revolvers. Later on this same Tank managed to -rescue a wounded infantry officer who had earlier been -taken prisoner by the Germans. The raid is interesting -as it demonstrated the possibility of manœuvring Tanks -in the dark through the enemy’s lines—not a single machine -lost direction—and also showed how much protection -was afforded to the machines by their invisibility.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_272">272</span></p> - -<h3>IV</h3> - -<p>By the middle of June the British High Command -had grown anxious to make some test of the position -of things on the enemy’s side of the line. This they -proposed to do by a more or less limited and tentative -attack, an attack which might, if it was successful, be -utilised as a dress rehearsal for larger ventures, or -which, if it failed, would not commit us too deeply. -The Australians had been constantly harassing their -<i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">vis à vis</i> on the Villers Bretonneux Front, and the High -Command gave out that for this and other reasons they -considered that a better place than the sector opposite -Villers Bretonneux could hardly be found from which -to launch our <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">ballon d’essai</i>. What those “other reasons” -were did not appear for nearly a month after the -battle had been fought. It was proposed that between -sixty and seventy Tanks belonging to the 5th Brigade -should be employed. Our attack was to have a strictly -limited objective, its ostensible purpose being to capture -the spur running from the main Villers Bretonneux -plateau towards the Somme, on the east side of Hamel, -and thus to gain important observation and incidentally -a useful jumping-off place for any subsequent advance. -“Z” day was to be on July 4.</p> - -<p>Directly the attack had been decided upon, Tanks -and Australians began their combined training in the -area of the 5th Tank Brigade. Tank units were at once -permanently affiliated to corresponding Australian infantry -units with whom they were to fight, and by this -means a very close comradeship was cultivated. It was -(tradition relates), most necessary that some special -steps should be taken to ensure the confidence of the -Australian infantry in the Tank Corps, for, in the absence<span class="pagenum" id="Page_273">273</span> -of artillery preparation, upon the Tanks would -almost entirely depend the success and prestige of the -Australians in this first Allied offensive since the March -disaster.</p> - -<p>Now the Australians, though having, as it were, a -natural affinity for the activity and surprise of a Tank -as against a prepared artillery attack, were not inclined -to bestow their approval on the Tanks without due -cause being given.</p> - -<p>They still had vivid memories of the tragedy of errors -of the Bullecourt incident in 1917.</p> - -<p>They were, however, very open-minded, and the battle -partners had not long been in training together before -their relations were particularly cordial.</p> - -<p>Coy and hard to please as were the Australians in -the beginning, the triumphant success of their partnership -in battle left them no memory of their earlier shyness, -and made them vociferous in their praises of a -combination that the Tanks had long felt would prove -notably effective.</p> - -<p>The plan of the attack soon took exact shape. It is -worth more or less detailed consideration, as it was -upon the lines of the Battles of Cambrai and Hamel -that all set Tank attacks were afterwards based.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_63" href="#Footnote_63" class="fnanchor">63</a>“The operation was to be conducted as a direct -advance of infantry and Tanks in two waves, under -cover of a rolling artillery barrage. From a Brigade -point of view, the points of chief interest lay, first, in -the preliminary arrangements with the Australian -Corps and the infantry concerned; secondly, in the -somewhat intricate plans for assembling Tanks at their -start lines with due provision for concealment; and, -thirdly, in the methods devised for bringing up large<span class="pagenum" id="Page_274">274</span> -quantities of infantry supplies to the final objective. At -a conference held by the Australian Corps three days -prior to the action the plans were finally settled and no -alteration in these was permitted after that date. Thus -infantry and Tank officers were able to confer in perfect -faith that their mutual arrangements would be carried -out without change, and this method was adhered -to in all subsequent operations of a prepared type with -the Australian Corps. Tanks were employed on a scale -that was large in proportion to the front attacked, the -saving of casualties to the infantry being made the most -important factor in the plan.”</p></div> - -<p>The main tactical features of the attack were the -strongholds of Vaire Wood, Hamel Wood, Pear-shaped -Trench and Hamel Village. There was no defined system -of trench, except the old British lines just east of -Hamel which the enemy now occupied, and which had, -of course, been originally sited to face east. For the -rest, the German defensive consisted in machine-gun -nests.</p> - -<p>The attacking forces were the 4th Australian Division -and four companies of American infantry. The Artillery -was to provide a rolling barrage, behind which the -infantry were to advance, followed by the Tanks, which -were only to pass ahead of them when resistance was -encountered. This last arrangement did not prove a -good one.</p> - -<p>The going was good, and the fertile country lay still -and smiling in its Midsummer pride. The camp allotted -to the Tanks lay five miles behind the line in the angle -formed by the meeting of the Somme and the Luce.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_64" href="#Footnote_64" class="fnanchor">64</a>“It was an ideal spot in which to spend the summer -months. In the cool of the evening, looking toward -the west over the uncut cornfields, we could obtain a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_275">275</span> -wonderful view of the old city of Amiens, its large -cathedral, with the numbers of smaller church spires -and smokeless chimneys clustering around it, being outlined -against the setting sun. Toward the east one saw -the ruined village of Villers Bretonneux standing on -Hill 104, its château dominating the surrounding wreck -of houses. It was hard to believe that the line was so -close until the view was suddenly obliterated by the -familiar sight of bursting shrapnel and the heavy smoke -of the gas shells.”</p></div> - -<p>The sixty fighting Tanks which were employed in the -attack were divided into two waves, the first of forty-eight, -and the second of twelve machines. As the advance -intended was but a short one, the usual gigantic -system of supply dumps was not necessary. On the -contrary, each fighting Tank carried forward ammunition -and water for the infantry, and the four supply -Tanks were detailed to carry up R.E. supplies and other -stores.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_65" href="#Footnote_65" class="fnanchor">65</a>“Each of these four machines eventually delivered -a load of about 12,500 lbs. within 500 yards of the final -objective and within half an hour of its capture. The -total amount of supplies delivered on July 4 at 40 lbs. -per man represented the loads of a carrying party 1,250 -men strong. The number of men used in the supply -Tanks was twenty-four.”</p></div> - -<p>No precise information as to time and place had been -given to the Tank Corps till just a week before the battle; -but as the area had been carefully reconnoitred for -the last two months, very little had to be done to complete -this side of the preparations.</p> - -<p>On the night of July 1–2, the Tanks were moved up -to the assembly point, an early move which was the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_276">276</span> -result of the Australians’ last lingering doubts as to the -capacity of the Tanks for arriving in time at <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">rendezvous</i>. -No chance was thus given to any Tank of being -late in the starting line.</p> - -<p>Machines of “C” flight of No. 8 Squadron of aeroplanes -were to make their début as honorary members -of the Tank Corps on the morrow, for the wonderful -potentialities of aeroplane and Tank co-operation were -now fully realised, and the Tank Corps had been -allotted a squadron of its own.</p> - -<h3>VI</h3> - -<p>At three o’clock on the morning of July 4, almost -before the sky had begun to lighten, the Tank engines -were swung up all along our line, and at two minutes -past the hour sixty graceful Mark V.’s slid forward -after their infantry, two low-flying aeroplanes escorting -them. As the Tanks moved along, the crew’s blessed the -sweet running of their new machines, for there had not -been a single mechanical hitch of any sort, and they -knew that the shrewd eyes of the Australians had been -fixed like gimlets upon them.</p> - -<p>But the whole day was to be one long triumph for -the Mark V.</p> - -<p>Here and there as the attack surged forward the -Tanks were leading, following close behind the bursting -shells. Here and there the Australians were ahead. -The enemy’s infantry put up little or no fight, but their -machine-gunners resisted us with the tenacious courage -which we had learned to expect.</p> - -<p>But our onrush was inexorable. The new Tanks were -possessed, the Germans found, of a deadly power of -manœuvre which they used to the full, expending little -ammunition upon machine-gun nests, but, even when<span class="pagenum" id="Page_277">277</span> -they had passed an emplacement by in the first rush, -swinging swiftly round on the wretched gunners and -crushing guns and crews beneath them. As a Tank -chronicler somewhat grimly remarks: “This method -eliminated all chance of the enemy coming to life again -after the attack had passed by.”</p> - -<p>Over 200 machine-guns were accounted for during -the day. There were also other and rarer little groups -of picked men which the Tanks here and there routed -out of the standing crops.</p> - -<p>These little parties, generally consisting of three -men, were armed with a special rifle of gigantic size -designed to be fired—like our Lewis gun—from a bipod. -Its projectile was a heavy steel-cored armour-piercing -bullet.</p> - -<p>It was a new anti-Tank weapon, a weapon from which -the Germans hoped great things.</p> - -<p>With the 13th Battalion, a Tank which had advanced -ahead of the infantry, came upon some enemy dug-outs, -on the far side of a trench too broad for their machine -to cross. From these dug-outs the enemy were keeping -up a hot fire.</p> - -<p>The Tank Commander, Second Lieutenant Edwards, -and Private Benns, immediately got out of their Tank -and attacked the garrison on foot. Between them the -two killed seven of the enemy with their revolvers, and -the rest they took prisoners, and handed over to the -infantry at the first opportunity.</p> - -<p>There were many fine pieces of individual work, especially -instances of Tanks helping each other under -heavy fire, and there is little doubt that it was to this -friendly co-operation, this towing of lame Tanks out -of hot corners, the astonishingly low casualties in machines -were partly due.</p> - -<p>The despatch tells how the battle fared all along the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_278">278</span> -line.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“Moving up and down behind the barrage, the Tanks -either killed the enemy or forced him to take shelter in -dug-outs, where he became an easy prey to the infantry. -Hamel was taken by envelopment from the flanks and -rear, the enemy was driven from Vaire Wood, and at -the end of the day our troops had gained all their objectives -and over 1500 prisoners.”</p></div> - -<p>Our little success had been complete and triumphant.</p> - -<p>No less than fifty-seven of the sixty fighting Tanks -came through the day without a scratch, the infantry -killed and wounded amounted to less than half the -German prisoners who passed through our cages; and -as we have seen, the battle between Tanks and machine-guns -being <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">à l’outrance</i>, the proportion of Germans -killed to those made prisoners had been unusually high.</p> - -<p>As for the Tank crews, they suffered only thirteen -men wounded. To our great satisfaction also, the five -damaged machines were all salved, and thus the armament -of the Mark V.’s could not be investigated by the -enemy.</p> - -<p>But at first almost the most striking characteristic of -the victory seemed the perfect co-operation between -Tanks and infantry.</p> - -<p>The Tanks and the Australians were equally enthusiastic -over one another’s performances. The Australians -were surprised and delighted at the weight and solidity -which the sixty Tanks had lent their impact, and at the -sense of support and comradeship which their men had -experienced.</p> - -<p>The Tank Corps were equally impressed by the -superb <em>moral</em> of the Australians,<a id="FNanchor_66" href="#Footnote_66" class="fnanchor">66</a> “who never considered<span class="pagenum" id="Page_279">279</span> -that the presence of Tanks exonerated them from -fighting, and who took instant advantage of any opportunity -created by the Tanks.”</p> - -<p>A generous and lasting friendship had been established. -The 5th Tank Brigade and their Australians -were destined throughout their coming partnership to -prove an almost invincible combination.</p> - -<p>But it was not alone the battle partners who were -pleased and surprised.</p> - -<p>The whole Allied front rang with the news of victory.</p> - -<p>We had sent up our tentative <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">ballon d’essai</i>, and behold -it had sailed up, high above our highest expectations -and now hung, a token in the sky. All men might -know that though Apollyon had straddled all across the -way, we had beaten him and were at last come out of -the Valley of Humiliation.</p> -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_280">280</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_XVI">CHAPTER XVI</h2> - -<p class="subhead">WITH THE FRENCH—THE BATTLE OF MOREUIL</p> -</div> - -<p><span class="firstword">The</span> 5th Brigade and the Australians had sworn -eternal friendship with a refreshing enthusiasm.</p> - -<p>They were like two schoolgirl friends, not to be separated, -and at Vaux, whither they had retired for combined -training, metaphorically went about all day with -their arms round each other’s waists.</p> - -<p>Therefore, when on July 17 orders reached the 5th -Tank Brigade that they were to send a Battalion south -to fight with the French, consternation reigned.</p> - -<p>If anybody went it would have to be the 2nd Battalion, -which had not fought at Hamel at all.</p> - -<p>But surely some way out could be found by which the -Australians’ own Brigade of Tanks should not be thus -cruelly dismembered?</p> - -<p>And the authorities, with positively avuncular benevolence—after -a little humming and hahing—were -actually induced to make another arrangement; as the -friends firmly believed, solely upon their representations. -There were, however, other more military considerations.</p> - -<p>The attack was still to be under Brigadier-General -Courage, but an extra Battalion, the 9th, should be -added to the Brigade for the occasion.</p> - -<p>This apparently whimsical outcry of the new-found -affinities, and the yielding of the authorities, were to -be justified thrice over in the events of the next few -months.</p> - -<p>For at this early period a little thing might upset the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_281">281</span> -forging of a weapon which was to prove the two-edged -sword with which we were to “smite Amalek hip and -thigh.”</p> - -<p>As soon as it had been decided that the 9th Battalion -was to go, preparations were at once begun.</p> - -<p>The French plans were already well advanced before -the Tanks came upon the scene at all. The attacking -troops had indeed been in the area since April, but the -Tanks felt that they would be eternally disgraced if -they were obliged so much as to hint that they would -like even a day’s postponement of this, their first battle -with the French.</p> - -<p>Indeed in this battle we see the first instance of the -wonderful “speeding up” which the Allied Army underwent -almost as soon as the joint command was concentrated -in the hands of Marshal Foch.</p> - -<p>An officer who was present throughout the battle and -its preliminaries writes:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“On a certain Wednesday General Elles and General -Courage had an interview at 3 p.m. with the 4th Army -Commander and were consulted as to the project.</p> - -<p>“At 4.30 they saw General Debeney (the French -Army Commander) and the French Corps Commander, -when railheads and a general scheme of movement were -decided upon.</p> - -<p>“That night the 9th Battalion was warned, and the -battle took place at dawn on the following Tuesday.”</p></div> - -<p>Practice makes perfect, and we gradually discovered -that the kind of full-dress attacks for which we had -always, as a matter of course, allowed a month of preparation, -could, in fact, be staged in half that time.</p> - -<p>We see in the huge Battle of Amiens, of which only -ten days’ notice was given to the troops who took part, -how great a reform we managed to accomplish.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_282">282</span></p> - -<h3>II</h3> - -<p>The attack was to be at dawn on July 23, and was to -be—like Hamel—a more or less limited and experimental -battle.</p> - -<p>Its immediate object was to seize St. Ribert Wood in -order to outflank Mailly Raineval from the south, to -abolish certain highly objectionable German batteries -which lay near St. Ribert, and to advance the French -field guns eastward in such a way that they would bear -upon the high ridges which dominate the right bank of -the river Avre.</p> - -<p>The country here was undulating and the soil well -drained, and, except for a number of large and -very dense woods, there were very few Tank obstacles.</p> - -<p>There were to be three objectives. The first was a -line which ran through the Bois des Sauvillers, Adelpare -Farm, and Les-Trois-Boqueleaux. Twelve Tanks -and four Battalions of French infantry were detailed -for its capture.</p> - -<p>The second objective included the clearing of the -plateau to the north of the Bois des Sauvillers, and the -capture of a corner of the Bois de Harpan. Twenty-four -Tanks were allotted to this objective and four infantry -Battalions.</p> - -<p>The third was a line of German posts, known as the -“Blue Line,” covering the second objective, and was to -be attacked by a strong force of infantry and all the -surviving Tanks. The whole attack was to be preceded -by a short intense bombardment, including heavy -counter-battery work, and the creeping barrage was to -consist of a mixture of high explosive and smoke. The -Tanks were to attack in sections of three, two in front<span class="pagenum" id="Page_283">283</span> -and one in immediate support, the infantry advancing -in small groups close behind the Tanks.</p> - -<p>Three days before the battle the officers of the 9th -Battalion and some of the Staff of the 5th Brigade came -down to the battle site, and, helped by the Staff of the -French 3rd Division, made a pretty thorough reconnaissance -of the ground. That same evening the Tanks -detrained at Contay.</p> - -<p>The 9th Battalion had been busy doing such tactical -training as was possible with its new colleagues on the -5th Brigade training ground. The time was short and -the difficulties of language great, but in spite of this a -very friendly understanding had been come to.</p> - -<p>Besides this, it had had an unusual amount of -trekking to do.</p> - -<p>It had had over eight miles to travel across country -to its place of entrainment. From Contay, the rail terminus, -the Tanks moved in all over another eight miles -before they got into action.</p> - -<p>At ten o’clock on the night before the battle the Tanks -were informed that the attack, which was to have been -at dawn, was postponed until 5.30. By this time it -would, the Tank crews somewhat ruefully reflected, be -broad daylight.</p> - -<p>However, there was nothing to be done but to hope -that the wind would help our smoke screens.</p> - -<p>The weather had for some time been fine, but on the -morning of attack heavy rain began to fall, driven up -by a south wind.</p> - -<p>The prospect of a really effective smoke cloud did not -seem very great.</p> - -<p>However, it was in the best of fighting spirits that -the Tanks and their infantry went forward at zero hour—indeed, -though it was no walk-over and all arms suffered<span class="pagenum" id="Page_284">284</span> -fairly heavily, high spirits seem to have particularly -characterised both French and British in this -battle.</p> - -<p>A member of the Tank Corps testifies naïvely to the -way in which the Tanks had got their tails up.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“Brigadier-General Courage, who was much in evidence, -was continually visiting the Battalion and conversing -with the officers. From the nature of his suggestions -and advice, a very ordinary thinker could -easily come to the conclusion that he did not care for -the Germans.”</p></div> - -<p>As the first wave Tanks and infantry advanced, they -found that the enemy was putting down a fairly heavy -barrage in many places. However, moving ahead of the -infantry, the Tanks cleared Arrachis Wood, destroying -a number of machine-guns, and after a slight resistance, -captured the first objective—Sauvillers Village, Adelpare -Farm and Les-Trois-Boqueleaux—fifteen minutes -before the infantry arrived. Two Tanks were knocked -out by shells.</p> - -<p>In the second phase, the Tanks of “B” and “C” -Companies moved forward in support of their infantry -on either side of Sauvillers Wood. As they swept forward, -they outstripped the French patrols, but after a -while turned back to maintain touch. It was by now -about 9.30 a.m. The Tanks could not immediately find -their partners, and unfortunately, as they were thus -cruising about, no less than six Tanks were put out of -action, one after another, by a single battery, apparently -one of those lurking to the south of St. Ribert -Wood, and whose destruction was one of the objects of -the attack.</p> - -<p>In another sector a Battalion Commander in the 51st<span class="pagenum" id="Page_285">285</span> -Regiment of French Infantry, which was moving up in -support, determined that if possible he would attack -Harpon Wood, and asked the officer commanding “B” -Company of Tanks for assistance. The Company Commander -immediately entered into the scheme with -alacrity and between them a plan of attack for the -French infantry and the seven Tanks was rapidly arranged. -This little improvised action was a great success, -Tanks and infantry duly capturing the Wood and -at least one hostile battery. Only two Tanks were -damaged.</p> - -<p>It was not far from Harpon that Captain Dalton’s -Tank, in the confusion due to the smoke, got some distance -ahead of its infantry. Near the Wood, Captain -Dalton located an enemy battery. After a little -manœuvring he managed to get a direct hit upon one of -the guns and drove off the crews of the other pieces with -machine-gun fire, thus silencing the whole battery. He -then manœuvred his Tank into position to tow back one -of the enemy guns, but at this moment his machine received -a direct hit, and shortly after, a second shell -added to the damage. Captain Dalton evacuated his -crew, and, having done so, made every effort to get back -to the derelict Tank, for it must be remembered that as -yet no Mark V. had ever fallen into German hands. He -was under intense machine-gun fire and in direct view -of the enemy, but, realising the importance of blowing -up the remains of his Tank, he still attempted the adventure. -But it was in vain, for as he was thus trying -to crawl up, he was severely wounded in the thigh. He -managed, however, to drag himself back into the French -lines.</p> - -<p>Nor was Second Lieutenant C. Mecredy, a Section -Commander, less anxious that his knocked-out Tank<span class="pagenum" id="Page_286">286</span> -should be completely destroyed rather than fall into the -hands of the enemy.</p> - -<p>He had been advancing ahead of his infantry, when a -shell from a concealed field gun hit the Tank in which -he was leading the attack. At once seizing up a number -of smoke bombs, he got out of his machine, went back, -and, throwing down his bombs, put up a smoke curtain -to cover the Tanks that were following him, lest they -should share the fate of his own machine. His -manœuvre was perfectly successful, for under cover of -the smoke the other Tanks changed their direction and -escaped the guns. With some difficulty Mr. Mecredy -managed to dodge his way back to his Tank, under -heavy hostile shelling and machine-gun fire, successfully -blew it up, and was preparing to go back when he discovered -that one of his crew was lying wounded in the -leg in a very exposed place. This man he managed to -bring back with him to safety.</p> - -<p>By the evening all the three objectives had been -gained, and the French Command were very well satisfied -with the success of the action.</p> - -<p>Especially delighted was the General Commanding -the 3rd Division—General Bourgon—who was a great -friend of the British Tank Corps, and who had been as -anxious as we that no hitch should mar this first combined -battle.</p> - -<p>Both French and British had suffered rather heavy -casualties, the French 3rd Division, with whom we -had acted, losing over seven hundred officers and -men.</p> - -<p>Fifteen Tanks out of thirty-six had been knocked out -by direct hits, and of the fifteen rather a large proportion -were beyond salving.</p> - -<p>However, the enemy’s losses were also heavy. The<span class="pagenum" id="Page_287">287</span> -prisoners totalled over eighteen hundred, and we took -5 field guns, 45 trench mortars and 275 machine-guns.</p> - -<p>Before the 9th Battalion went back to the training -area it had the honour of being inspected by General -Debeney, commanding the 1st French Army.</p> - -<p>He was kind enough to express extreme pleasure at -the way in which the Tanks fought, and in his special -Order of the Day gave the Battalion praise of which -they will ever be proud.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“Finally, I owe a special tribute of thanks to the Battalion -of British Tanks, whose powerful and devoted -assistance has aided and assured our success.</p> - -<p>“Commanded by an experienced and skilful leader, -the Tanks have again added to that rich harvest of -laurels which this new arm has not ceased to gather -since its first appearance in September 1916. They -have given to the Division the finest example of bravery, -of energy, of comradeship in action, and of training for -war carried to the highest degree of perfection. Their -assistance has enabled the infantry to gain a brilliant -victory in which they themselves share largely.”</p></div> - -<p>Finally, as a token of comradeship between the -French troops of the 3rd Division and the 9th Tank Battalion, -this Battalion had the honour of being presented -with the badge of the 3rd French Division. Since that -day they have worn it proudly on their left sleeve.</p> -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_288">288</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_XVII">CHAPTER XVII</h2> - -<p class="subhead">THE BATTLE OF AMIENS, OR BATTLE OF AUGUST 8</p> -</div> - -<h3>I</h3> - -<p><span class="firstword">The</span> ambitious offensive which the Germans had -launched on July 15 had collapsed. Our somewhat -tentative counter-offensive at Hamel had been surprisingly -successful, and there had been a complete change -in the general military situation.</p> - -<p>The German reserves were, it would seem, nearly used -up, while ours—fresh troops which had become available -during the spring and early summer—had now been incorporated -and trained. Better still, the American -Army was growing rapidly.</p> - -<p>We were at last ready again to take the offensive on -a grand scale.</p> - -<p>On July 23, when the success of the battles of the 18th -was well assured, a conference was held in which General -Foch asked that the British, French, and American -Armies should each simultaneously take the offensive.</p> - -<p>Their assaults were to be immediate.</p> - -<p>On the British front, after some consideration of the -rival merits of various battle sites, it was decided that -the attack was to be delivered to the east of Amiens on -a front extending from Albert to Montdidier, and was to -have for its immediate object the freeing of the Paris-Amiens -railway, whose proximity to the German lines -had proved so exceedingly hampering to our transport -arrangements.</p> - -<p>If the battle was successful, our advance could be -exploited in a second attack directed towards the St.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_289">289</span> -Quentin-Cambrai line. This line was one whose integrity -was of vital importance to the enemy, as he had -long ago confessed in the labour and money which he -had poured out upon the vast elaborations of the -Hindenburg defences.</p> - -<p>For, twenty miles behind the Hindenburg Line lay -the great railway centres round Maubeuge, the key position -of his whole system of lateral communication.</p> - -<p>If we could once penetrate so far, we should cut the -only communications by which the German forces to the -south in Champagne could be supplied and maintained, -and should sever these troops completely from the -group of German Armies operating in Flanders.</p> - -<p>Of this great enterprise the first step was the ever -memorable Battle of Amiens.</p> - -<h3>II</h3> - -<p>Preparations for the great attack were instantly begun. -The battle plans were first made known in the last -days of July to the commanders who were to take part, -“Z” day being fixed for August 8.</p> - -<p>The three Brigades of Tanks which were to fight, (the -5th, 3rd, and 4th) had their first intimation of what -was afoot on July 27, and their orders were confirmed -on August 4.</p> - -<p>Briefly, these were the general lines on which the -battle was to be fought.</p> - -<p>Preparations were to be rushed through. They were -to be as secret as brief.</p> - -<p>The battle itself was to be in two phases.</p> - -<p>First, an attack without artillery preparation, but -under the protection of a creeping barrage. The whole -action was to be very much on the lines of the First -Battle of Cambrai, save that this time (1) an even<span class="pagenum" id="Page_290">290</span> -larger number of Tanks—about 430 including Whippets—were -to head the battle; (2) that light skirmishing -lines of infantry were to be used; and that (3) as -at Hamel we were this time attacking a more or less -improvised defence line. The second phase of the attack, -which was to be made by a fresh wave of troops, -was to start about four hours after zero, that is, after -the first objective had been taken.</p> - -<p>During this second phase, the artillery was to be -moved up and we were to advance without a barrage.</p> - -<p><i>On the right</i> was to be the Canadian Corps, and with -them the 4th Brigade<a id="FNanchor_67" href="#Footnote_67" class="fnanchor">67</a> of Tanks was to fight.</p> - -<p><i>In the centre</i>, with the Australian Corps its usual -battle partner, the 5th Tank Brigade,<a id="FNanchor_68" href="#Footnote_68" class="fnanchor">68</a> was again to -operate.</p> - -<p><i>On the left</i>, north of the Somme, two Divisions of the -3rd Corps were to have the 10th Tank Battalion attached -to them.</p> - -<p>Behind these three bodies three cavalry Divisions, the -3rd Brigade of Whippet Tanks, and the 17th Battalion -of Armoured Cars, were to be concentrated.</p> - -<p>Their work was chiefly the exploitation of the second -phase. The Armoured Car Battalion had only just returned -from operations with the French.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_69" href="#Footnote_69" class="fnanchor">69</a>“When the 6th French Cavalry Division was withdrawn -to rest, the 17th Battalion proceeded to Senlis, -and at 9 a.m., having just entered this town, it received -orders to proceed forthwith to Amiens and report to the -Headquarters of the Australian Corps. Amiens, which -was nearly 100 miles distant, was reached the same -night.</p> - -<p>“On arriving, Lieut.-Colonel Carter was informed<span class="pagenum" id="Page_291">291</span> -that his unit was to take part in the projected attack -east of that town. The chief difficulty foreseen in an -armoured car action in this neighbourhood was the -crossing of the trenches. Although only one day was -available wherein to find a solution to this difficulty, -it was accomplished by attaching a small force of Tanks -to the Battalion. These Tanks were used to tow the -armoured cars over the obstacles, or rather along the -tracks the Tanks formed through them. This solution -proved eminently successful.”</p></div> - -<p>Short as was the time for preparations, an elaborate -deceptive scheme was planned and carried out, to make -it seem that we intended to fight in Flanders. Canadians -were put into the line on the Kemmel front, where -in due course the enemy identified them. Ostentatious -Headquarters and Casualty Clearing Stations were conspicuously -disposed about the area. Throughout the -1st Army sector our wireless stations hummed with -messages about the concentration of troops, and arrangements -were made to make it seem that a great -assembling of Tanks was taking place near St. Pol. -Here, indeed, Tanks elaborately trained with infantry -on fine days—days, that is to say, on which the enemy’s -long-distance reconnaissance and photographic aeroplanes -were likely to be at work behind our lines.</p> - -<p>The ruse was perfectly successful and—as we found -out afterwards—the news of our “great projected attack -in Flanders” soon spread, and by the time we -were ready to strike on the Somme the enemy was -momentarily expecting to be attacked in force in the -north.</p> - -<h3>III</h3> - -<p>Meanwhile, hectic days and still more hectic nights -were being passed near Amiens.</p> - -<p>The reader is to imagine that elaborate preparations<span class="pagenum" id="Page_292">292</span> -such as were described as the preliminaries to Cambrai -and which took a month to carry out, had now to be -executed in a little over a week.</p> - -<p>Reconnaissance had to be carried out, details of plans -and liaison arranged, and dumps had to be made, the -last on an unprecedentedly large scale, so great a number -of Tanks never having gone into action together -before.</p> - -<p>In the centre (the Australian sector) certain units in -the 5th Brigade had been newly equipped with Mark V. -star infantry-carrying Tanks. No one was very familiar -with these machines, and so, in addition to other preparations, -such units had infantry-carrying to practise -with their Australians. One circumstance greatly added -to the fraternal feeling of the 5th Brigade towards -their familiar battle partners. As soon as the final -conference was ended, General Monash laid down the -principle that on no consideration should any alteration -be allowed in the plans as then approved. It -was therefore possible for all the Tank units to work -out the details of their schemes in perfect confidence.</p> - -<p>The battlefield lay on either bank of the river Somme, -which ran to the north of the area of attack, and as far -as Péronne, almost at right angles to the lines of the -two armies.</p> - -<p>South of it, a number of gullies, roughly parallel to -the battle front, ran down to the river from high ground -which formed the watershed between the Somme and -the small river Luce.</p> - -<p>Two of these steep gullies, the Cérisy Valley, and -another which ran from Morcourt almost to Harbonnières, -were to be great features in the battle, forming<span class="pagenum" id="Page_293">293</span> -as they did admirable cover for the concealment of batteries -or for the assembling of troops for a counter-attack.</p> - -<p>The following notes on the Luce were given to the -author by Major <span class="locked">Hotblack:—</span></p> - -<p>“The river Luce, though only a small marshy stream, -formed <em>the</em> great difficulty of the plan of operations.</p> - -<p>“Part of it was in the French lines, and as to put up -fresh bridges would have attracted the enemy’s attention, -the attacking troops had to cross it in a few places -and deploy afterwards in the dark.</p> - -<p>“In that sector where the Luce flowed within the -enemy’s lines, it ran diagonally across the front of attack -of the Canadian Division.</p> - -<p>“A great deal of trouble was taken in finding out all -possible details of this little river, and it caused anxiety -to every one concerned from the Field-Marshal himself -downwards.</p> - -<p>“The Luce sector of the front lay within the lines then -held by the French, and in addition to various Reconnaissance -Officers, Major-General Lipsett, commanding -the 3rd Canadian Division, and Brig.-General Hankey, -commanding the 4th Tank Brigade, carried out personal -reconnaissance of the river in general and Domarat -Bridge in particular.</p> - -<p>“Both these General Officers had great reputations -for personal gallantry, and always endeavoured to see -for themselves what the conditions really were before -committing their troops.</p> - -<p>“The French troops then holding the line, knowing -nothing beyond the fact that they were to be relieved -by the British, expressed the greatest astonishment and -admiration for our thoroughness and for the remarkable -conscientiousness and pertinacity of our Generals and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_294">294</span> -General Staff Officers, in so frequently visiting the forward -positions of an unhealthy sector. We had no -choice but blandly to assure them that this was their -unvarying practice whenever a relief of any sort was -contemplated.”</p> - -<p>As another result of the great secrecy that had been -imposed, no officer knew who else was in the secret, and -on one occasion Major Hotblack and another British -officer met on the banks of the Luce and each made -lengthy explanations which explained everything except -the real reason why they were there. Two days -later these officers met at a conference on the operations, -and congratulated each other on the plausibility -of their several explanations. It had been no easy -matter to pretend that it was quite a normal thing for -them to paddle in the Luce in close proximity to the -enemy.</p> - -<p>On the day all went well, however, and the information -about the river proved to be correct to the last -detail, and as had been anticipated, though the bridges -in the enemy lines had been blown up, the gaps were -sufficiently small for Tanks to cross on the abutments.</p> - -<p>Generally speaking, the going was good, and the fact -that the weather had been reasonably fine for some time -before the day of attack made our preparations the -easier.</p> - -<p>All night, for four or five nights before the battle, -the carrying Tanks had plied up and down, forming -dumps of tens of thousands of gallons of petrol and -water and millions of rounds of ammunition.</p> - -<p>At last the time came for the final moving up of both -the fighting and supply Tanks to their assembly positions, -about two miles behind the lines.</p> - -<p>No. 1 Gun Carrier Company of Tanks had been allotted<span class="pagenum" id="Page_295">295</span> -to the 5th Australian Division, and lay up in an -orchard north of Villers-Bretonneux.</p> - -<p>All went well till the late afternoon of August 7, -when a chance shot from the enemy set one of these -Tanks blazing.</p> - -<p>The enemy promptly began to shell the area heavily, -and destroyed nearly the whole Company of Tanks and -their loads. It was on this occasion that Second Lieutenant -Henderson Smith was awarded the Military -Cross.</p> - -<p>The following account of his action appears in the -list of “Honours and <span class="locked">Awards”:—</span></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“As soon as the first Tank was hit, Second Lieutenant -Smith rushed to the scene and collected men to -aid him, and so initiated the work of rescuing the -Tanks. He showed the utmost skill in organising the -withdrawal of Tanks from the blaze.</p> - -<p>“Although several of his helpers were men from other -units and inexperienced in Tank work, this gallant officer -succeeded in moving two Tanks away from the heart -of the fire. This bold action undoubtedly enabled the -people on his right to save three Tanks. Unfortunately -these two Tanks were hit and set on fire by the explosions -on other Tanks. On each occasion Second Lieutenant -Smith was the last to leave the blazing machine. -The Tanks were loaded with explosives for the infantry, -gun-cotton, bombs, trench mortars, etc., besides two fills -of petrol each.”</p></div> - -<p>The shelling was an uncomfortable incident, not only -because of the loss at the last moment of the machines -and of the masses of stores which they carried, but because -such a bombardment might be an indication that -the enemy suspected the presence of Tanks.</p> - -<p>However, as at Cambrai, there was nothing to be -done, and it remained only to try to hurry forward<span class="pagenum" id="Page_296">296</span> -more stores to replace those which had been burnt. This -was successfully accomplished.</p> - -<p>Final lying-up places for the 300 heavy Tanks had -been arranged all along the front at about 4000 yards -from the front line.</p> - -<p>At about the time when the Tanks were moving up to -these “jumping-off places” the enemy may have been -somewhat puzzled to observe that a number of large -aeroplanes with exceedingly noisy engines kept flying -about between the lines. In any case, what he did not -observe was the noise made by 300 advancing Tanks.</p> - -<h3>IV</h3> - -<p>The night of the 7th-8th was damp and still, and at -about four o’clock on the 8th a dense ground mist had -begun to drift up the river valley. Soon the whole air -was one silent white sea of vapour. So thick was it that -the assaulting infantry and Tanks had immediately to -prepare to move entirely by compass, for it was impossible -to see a yard ahead through the dense silent -blanket.</p> - -<p>Nothing, it would seem, was further from the Germans’ -thoughts than that the steaming quiet of the early -autumn morning was to be so terribly broken. At a -quarter past four his lines were perfectly silent. He -was far from being in a truculent mood in this sector, -and for a week his attitude had been unobtrusive. Here -and there a German sentry, his grey greatcoat silvered -like gossamer by the pearls of the mist, would cough, -stamping his feet as he peered listlessly through the fog -for stray trespassers in No Man’s Land.</p> - -<p>Suddenly at 4.20 our massed artillery opened an intense -fire along the eleven miles of front.</p> - -<p>The German front line was drenched in a hurricane of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_297">297</span> -shells, and behind, his unprepared batteries were for -some time completely smothered by the violence of our -fire.</p> - -<p>Before the Germans had had time to recover their -wits, all along the line the Tanks emerged by tens and -twenties upon them out of the fog.</p> - -<p>The forward positions were completely overwhelmed, -the Tanks not so much destroying the enemy with their -fire as simply running down his machine-gun emplacements -and crushing crews and guns beneath them.</p> - -<p>Our first wave was soon out beyond the enemy’s -lightly held front-trench system, and the survivors and -the second wave were fighting their way through his -scattered machine-gun emplacements towards the first -phase objective.</p> - -<p>With the Australians in the centre, a Company of the -13th Battalion advanced rapidly over undulating country, -apparently “swallowing the ground” of both first -and second phases at a run.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_70" href="#Footnote_70" class="fnanchor">70</a>“The method of attack was adapted to suit the -ground; leaving the infantry established on a crest, -Tanks would go forward across the valley, maintaining -fire on isolated machine-gun posts, and gain positions -on the forward ridge. In all cases this induced the -enemy to give themselves up, and enabled the infantry -to advance to the next crest. On the right of this sector -‘B’ Company quickly placed their infantry in their -final first phase objective north of the main road. ‘C’ -Company on the left had more trouble; a field gun placed -on the high ground across the river near Chipilly was in -position to enfilade the advance, and knocked out three -Tanks. This for some time caused a withdrawal by the -infantry. By noon, however, the remaining Tanks had -placed their infantry in the required final positions, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_298">298</span> -all active opposition had ceased. Throughout the operation -there was abundant evidence of the hasty retreat -of the enemy. In the gully south-east of Morcourt a -transport-park, complete with wagons and harness, was -left behind, and at the southern end of the same gully -a field canteen was found well stocked with light wines -and German beer.”</p></div> - -<p>With the Canadians also the advance was rapid, but -here the mist was so thick that Tank sections got completely -mixed up and fought cheerfully all over each -other’s areas.</p> - -<p>The carefully planned and methodical assault had to -give place to a more or less primitive <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">mêlée</i> in which -each Tank generally sought out and slew Germans wherever -they might happen to find them.</p> - -<p>Though far from scientific, this method when allied -with the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">élan</i> of the Canadian infantry proved highly -successful.</p> - -<p>With the 3rd Corps the fighting was heavier, and -more difficulty was experienced in advancing. The -heavy Tanks and infantry, however, soon everywhere -held the line whose capture was to mark the end of the -first phase (<i>i.e.</i>, Marcelcave, and the Cérisy Valley to -south of Morlancourt).</p> - -<h3>V</h3> - -<p>The second phase of the attack, which started four -hours after zero, was very different from the first. The -mist which had hampered but concealed our approach -had now given place to brilliant sunshine. The enemy -had had ample warning and had time to dispose his -“stout-hearted artillery and machine-gunners” to meet -the advance. In these conditions his resistance stiffened. -With the Australians,<a id="FNanchor_71" href="#Footnote_71" class="fnanchor">71</a> “Enemy field batteries firing<span class="pagenum" id="Page_299">299</span> -over open sights engaged and knocked out Tanks, some -in the neighbourhood of Bayonvillers and near Cérisy -Village. The crews were, however, in many cases able -to move forward with their Hotchkiss guns and put the -hostile batteries out of action. The surviving Tanks -pressed on to the final objective, the Australian infantry -being quick to seize the openings that had been made.”</p> - -<p>The final objective allotted to the 2nd Tank Battalion -was Harbonnières Village.</p> - -<p>The machine-gun and artillery fire had been heavy. -However, the first-wave Tanks rallied at the Cérisy Valley -and with the rest of the Battalion launched the -attack on the second objective.</p> - -<p>Lieut.-Colonel Bryce led his Tanks triumphantly to -the successive capture of all the objectives allotted to -them—Warfusée, Lamotte, Bayonvillers, and a number -of other villages.</p> - -<p>At last they reached Harbonnières, their last objective, -and, still on foot, Colonel Bryce entered the -place with his leading Tanks and ran up an Australian -flag over the village.</p> - -<p>In the naïve words of “Honours and Awards,” “This -had a most stimulating effect on every one.”</p> - -<p>In the same sector, Lieutenant Percy Eade and his -Tank (of the 2nd Battalion) appear to have captured -a village single-handed, and, best of all, to have solemnly -demanded a receipt upon handing it over to the -Australians.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_72" href="#Footnote_72" class="fnanchor">72</a>“During the attack on the 8th inst. this officer -showed great initiative, skill and bravery in dealing -with unexpected resistance by the enemy.</p> - -<p>“On being informed by the infantry that Marcelcave -was still holding out and was endangering their right<span class="pagenum" id="Page_300">300</span> -flank, he arranged a scheme of attack with the infantry -commander and proceeded to quell the opposition. He -destroyed at least six machine-guns with their crews, -besides taking many prisoners. He then handed over -the village to the infantry, from whom he took a receipt. -After regaining his position and during the second -phase of the attack, he heard opposition coming -from Bayonvillers, so he proceeded towards that village. -As he was approaching it from the south-west he discovered -a group of three light field guns, two of which -were firing at him at short range. These guns had already -knocked out several Tanks. With great gallantry -and determination he manœuvred his Tank in -their direction, and so directed the fire of his own guns -that he dispersed the gunners. After running over one -of the field guns, he proceeded into the village, where -his Tank was directly responsible for capturing at least -forty of the enemy.</p> - -<p>“Throughout the whole of the operation, this Tank -Commander set his crew a magnificent example of courage -and determination. (Immediate Reward.)”</p></div> - -<p>The 13th Battalion History is particularly full of allusions -to the excellence of their relations with their -battle partners, the Australians.</p> - -<p>All Tanks of this Battalion displayed on a painted -board the colours of their own infantry, of whom one -N.C.O. stayed with each crew and rode as an observer -in the Tank on the day of battle. It may here be noted -that these Australian N.C.O.’s were of the greatest use -in keeping touch with the infantry, and incidentally -returned to their units with a largely enhanced opinion -of the courage and endurance of the Tank Corps -personnel.</p> - -<p>In the second phase one Tank was of service in keeping -touch between two Companies of infantry, until a -gap in the line could be closed.</p> - -<p>With the Canadians, the second phase was equally<span class="pagenum" id="Page_301">301</span> -hot. A typical action was fought by a machine belonging -to the 14th Battalion.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_73" href="#Footnote_73" class="fnanchor">73</a>“Second Lieutenant Gould’s Tank was pushing on -towards the Red Line, which overlooked the valley running -south. Here the enemy were found to be organising -for a counter-attack. Enemy transport with a large -number of stragglers, estimated at 1000, was in full retreat -up the road, and in the valley itself a force estimated -at half a battalion was forming up and being -reinforced by other parties coming over the hill in rear. -All the time this Tank was under heavy fire from -machine-guns and snipers from the left flank and rear. -Fire was opened with 6-pounders on the transport and -direct hits observed. M.G. fire was also directed with -good effect on the excellent targets in the valley, causing -confusion and disorganisation in the enemy ranks. With -the prolonged running at high speed the interior of the -Tank rapidly became unbearable through heat and -petrol fumes, and the crew were forced to evacuate it -and to take cover underneath. At this moment two of -the crew were wounded, one was sick, one fainted and -one was delirious. Fortunately, before the enemy could -take advantage of the lull, two Whippet Tanks and a -body of cavalry came up, and the enemy in the valley -began to retreat over the hill.”</p></div> - -<p>The 1st Tank Battalion, with the Canadians, suffered -extremely severely.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_74" href="#Footnote_74" class="fnanchor">74</a>“Owing to the French having been held up, the -British were subjected to a heavy enfilade fire from the -villages of Beaucourt and Le Quesneu and nine of the -eleven Tanks belonging to ‘A’ Company received direct -hits from a field battery firing over open sights from -Le Quesneu. The majority caught fire and were burnt<span class="pagenum" id="Page_302">302</span> -out, and very severe casualties resulted, three out of -the four Section Commanders being killed and the remaining -one wounded and captured. This disaster was -followed by a particularly heroic action on the part of -Second Lieutenant Cassell, who observed the destructive -fire of the battery, and, passing through the burning -victims of its shells, steered straight on to it, in an attempt -to avenge the destruction of his comrades. His -heroism was in vain, for before he had proceeded many -yards he received a shell through the front of his Tank -which put it out of action and killed Second Lieutenant -Cassell and most of his crew.”</p></div> - -<p>Meanwhile, the Whippets and the cavalry had pushed -forward.</p> - -<p>They and the armoured cars were to press on beyond -the limits of the infantry and heavy Tank attack.</p> - -<p>Generally the Whippets were to precede the cavalry, -in order to silence machine-guns, deal with wire, if any, -and generally to pave the way.</p> - -<p>In practice, however:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_75" href="#Footnote_75" class="fnanchor">75</a>“Difficulty was found in maintaining touch with -cavalry owing to the impossibility of keeping up with -galloping horsemen on the one hand, and to the impossibility -of a mounted advance in the face of heavy -machine-gun fire on the other hand. Thus, two sections -of ‘C’ Company, 3rd Battalion lost touch with their -cavalry in climbing a steep hill out of Ignaucourt -Valley.”</p></div> - -<p>There were, in fact, innumerable instances of liaison -difficulties.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“Another Company was ordered to obtain touch with -3rd Cavalry Brigade, but on reporting to the rendezvous, -no cavalry was seen.</p> - -<p>“Zero hour had been postponed three hours, but this<span class="pagenum" id="Page_303">303</span> -was not known till later.</p> - -<p>“Being unable to obtain touch with the cavalry, assistance -was rendered about noon to Canadian infantry -attacking Beaufort and Warvillers. This attack was -successful and Whippets rendered great assistance.”</p></div> - -<p>Far happier was the lot of certain Whippets which -played an independent part. The following is a first-hand -account of the adventures of one such machine, -the ever-to-be-remembered Whippet, “Musical Box.”</p> - -<div id="ip_303" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 43em;"> - <img src="images/i_304a1.jpg" width="683" height="410" alt="" /> - <div class="caption">SMOKE SCREEN AND SEMAPHORE</div></div> - -<div id="ip_303b" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 43em;"> - <img src="images/i_304a2.jpg" width="684" height="422" alt="" /> - <div class="caption">A TANKADROME</div></div> - -<p>As the story will show, for many months no news was -obtained of the fate of the machine or of her crew of one -officer, Lieutenant C. B. Arnold, and two men, Gunner -Ribbans and Driver Carney, and it was not till January -1919 that the following amazing tale appeared in -<cite>Weekly Tank Notes</cite>:—</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“On August 8, 1918, I commanded Whippet ‘Musical -Box’ in ‘B’ Company, 6th Battalion. We left the -lying-up point at zero (4.20 p.m.) and proceeded across -country to the south side of the railway at Villers-Bretonneux. -We crossed the railway, in column of sections, -by the bridge on the eastern outskirts of the town. -I reached the British front line and passed through the -Australian infantry and some of our heavy Tanks (Mark -V.), in company with the remainder of the Whippets of -‘B’ Company. Four sections of ‘B’ Company proceeded -parallel with the railway (Amiens-Ham) across -country due east. After proceeding about 2000 yards -in this direction I found myself to be the leading -machine, owing to the others having become ditched, -etc. To my immediate front I could see more Mark V. -Tanks being followed very closely by Australian infantry. -About this time we came under direct shell-fire -from a 4-gun field battery, of which I could see the -flashes, between Abancourt and Bayonvillers. Two -Mark V. Tanks, on my right, were knocked out. I saw<span class="pagenum" id="Page_304">304</span> -clouds of smoke coming out of these machines and the -crews evacuate them. The infantry following the heavy -machines were suffering casualties from this battery. I -turned half-left and ran diagonally across the front of -the battery, at a distance of about 600 yards. Both my -guns were able to fire on the battery, in spite of which -they got off about eight rounds at me without damage, -but sufficiently close to be audible inside the cab, and I -could see the flash of each gun as it fired. By this time -I had passed behind a belt of trees running along a -roadside. I ran along this belt until level with the battery, -when I turned full-right and engaged the battery -in rear. On observing our appearance from the belt of -trees, the gunners, some thirty in number, abandoned -their guns and tried to get away. Gunner Ribbans and -I accounted for the whole lot. I cruised forward, making -a detour to the left, and shot a number of the enemy, -who appeared to be demoralised, and were moving -about the country in all directions. This detour brought -me back to the railway siding N.N.W. of Guillaucourt. -I could now see other Whippets coming up and a few -Mark V.’s also. The Australian infantry, who followed -magnificently, had now passed through the battery position -which we had accounted for and were lying in a -sunken road about 400 yards past the battery and -slightly to the left of it. I got out of my machine and -went to an Australian full Lieutenant and asked if he -wanted any help. Whilst talking to him, he received a -bullet which struck the metal shoulder title, a piece of -the bullet-casing entering his shoulder. While he was -being dressed, Major Rycroft (horse) and Lieutenant -Waterhouse (Tanks) and Captain Strachan of ‘B’ -Company, 6th Battalion, arrived and received confirmation -from the Australian officer of our having knocked -out the field battery. I told Major Rycroft what we had -done, and then moved off again at once, as it appeared -to be unwise for four machines (Lieutenant Watkins -had also arrived) to remain stationary at one spot. I -proceeded parallel with the railway embankment in an -easterly direction, passing through two cavalry patrols<span class="pagenum" id="Page_305">305</span> -of about twelve men each. The first patrol was receiving -casualties from a party of enemy in a field of corn. -I dealt with this, killing three or four, the remainder -escaping out of sight into the corn. Proceeding further -east, I saw the second patrol pursuing six enemy. The -leading horse was so tired that he was not gaining appreciably -on the rearmost Hun. Some of the leading -fugitives turned about and fired at the cavalryman when -his sword was stretched out and practically touching -the back of the last Hun. Horse and rider were brought -down on the left of the road. The remainder of the -cavalrymen deployed to right, coming in close under -the railway embankment, where they dismounted and -came under fire from the enemy, who had now taken up -a position on the railway bridge, and were firing over -the parapet, inflicting one or two casualties. I ran the -machine up until we had a clear view of the bridge, and -killed four of the enemy with one long burst, the other -two running across the bridge and on down the opposite -slope out of sight. On our left I could see, about three-quarters -of a mile away, a train on fire being towed by -an engine. I proceeded further east, still parallel to -the railway, and approached carefully a small valley -marked on my map as containing Boche hutments. As -I entered the valley (between Bayonvillers and Harbonnières) -at right angles, many enemy were visible -packing kits and others retiring. On our opening fire -on the nearest, many others appeared from huts, making -for the end of the valley, their object being to get -over the embankment and so out of our sight. We -accounted for many of these. I cruised round, Ribbans -went into one of the huts and returned, and we counted -about sixty dead and wounded. There were evidences -of shell-fire amongst the huts, but we certainly accounted -for most of the casualties counted there. I -turned left from the railway and cruised across country, -as lines of enemy infantry could be seen retiring. We -fired at these many times at ranges of 200 yards to 600 -yards. These targets were fleeting, owing to the enemy -getting down into the corn when fired on. In spite of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_306">306</span> -this, many casualties must have been inflicted, as we -cruised up and down for at least an hour. I did not see -any more of our troops or machines after leaving the -cavalry patrols already referred to. During the cruising, -being the only machine to get through, we invariably -received intense rifle and machine-gun fire. I -would here beg to suggest that no petrol be carried on -the outside of the machine, as under orders we were -carrying nine tins of petrol on the roof, for refilling purposes -when well into the enemy lines (should opportunity -occur). The perforated tins allowed the petrol -to run all over the cab. These fumes, combined with -the intense bullet splash and the great heat after being -in action (by this time) nine to ten hours, made it -necessary at this point to breathe through the mouth-piece -of the box respirator, without actually wearing -the mask.</p> - -<div id="ip_306" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 43em;"> - <img src="images/i_304b1.jpg" width="683" height="446" alt="" /> - <div class="caption">MOVING UP. BATTLE OF AMIENS</div></div> - -<div id="ip_306b" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 44em;"> - <img src="images/i_304b2.jpg" width="692" height="472" alt="" /> - <div class="caption">THE ARMOURED CARS GOING UP</div></div> - -<p>“At 2 p.m. or thereabouts I again proceeded east, -parallel to the railway and about 100 yards north of it. -I could see a large aerodrome and also an observation -balloon at a height of about 200 ft. I could also see -great quantities of motor and horse transport moving -in all directions. Over the top of another ridge on my -left I could see the cover of a lorry coming in my direction; -I moved up out of sight and waited until he topped -the bridge, when I shot the driver. The lorry ran into a -right-hand ditch. The railway had now come out of the -cutting in which it had rested all the while, and I could -see both sides of it. I could see a long line of men retiring -on both sides of the railway, and fired at these at -ranges of 400 to 500 yards, inflicting heavy casualties. -I passed through these and also accounted for one horse -and the driver of a two-horse canvas-covered wagon on -the far side of the railway. We now crossed a small -road which crossed the main railway, and came in view -of large horse and wagon lines—which ran across the -railway and close to it. Gunner Ribbans (R.H. gun) -here had a view of south side of railway and fired continuously -into motor and horse transport moving on -three roads (one north and south, one almost parallel<span class="pagenum" id="Page_307">307</span> -to the railway, and one diagonally between these two). -I fired many bursts at 600 to 800 yards at transport -blocking roads on my left, causing great confusion. -Rifle and machine-gun fire was not heavy at this time, -owing to our sudden appearance, as the roads were all -banked up in order to cross the railway. There were -about twelve men in the middle aisle of these lines. I -fired a long burst at these. Some went down and others -got in amongst the wheels and undergrowth. I turned -quarter-left towards a small copse, where there were -more horses and men, about 200 yards away. On the -way across we met the most intense rifle and machine-gun -fire imaginable from all sides. When at all possible, -we returned the fire, until the L.H. revolver port -cover was shot away. I withdrew the forward gun, -locked the mounting and held the body of the gun -against the hole. Petrol was still running down the inside -of the back door. Fumes and heat combined were -very bad. We were still moving forward and I was -shouting to Driver Carney to turn about, as it was impossible -to continue the action, when two heavy concussions -closely followed one another and the cab burst -into flames. Carney and Ribbans got to the door and -collapsed. I was almost overcome, but managed to get -the door open and fell out on to the ground, and was -able to drag out the other two men. Burning petrol -was running on to the ground where we were lying. The -fresh air revived us, and we all got up and made a short -rush to get away from the burning petrol. We were all -on fire. In this rush Carney was shot in the stomach -and killed. We rolled over and over to try to extinguish -the fumes. I saw numbers of the enemy approaching -from all round. The first arrival came for me with -a rifle and bayonet. I got hold of this, and the point of -the bayonet entered my right forearm. The second -man struck at my head with the butt end of his rifle, -hit my shoulder and neck, and knocked me down. When -I came to, there were dozens all round me, and any one -who could reach me did so and I was well kicked. They -were furious. Ribbans and I were taken away and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_308">308</span> -stood by ourselves about twenty yards clear of the -crowd. An argument ensued, and we were eventually -marched to a dug-out where paper bandages were put -on our hands. Our faces were left as they were. We -were then marched down the road to the main railway. -There we joined a party of about eight enemy, and -marched past a field kitchen, where I made signs for -food. We had had nothing since 8.30 p.m. on the night -previous to the action, and it was 3.30 p.m. when we -were set on fire. We went on to a village where, on -my intelligence map, a Divisional Headquarters had -been marked. An elderly stout officer interrogated me, -asking if I was an officer. I said ‘Yes.’ He then asked -various other questions, to which I replied, ‘I do not -know.’ He said, ‘Do you mean you do not know or you -will not tell me?’ I said, ‘You can take it whichever -way you wish.’ He then struck me in the face, and -went away. We went on to Chaulone to a canvas hospital, -on the right side of the railway, where I was injected -with anti-tetanus. Later I was again interrogated, -with the same result as above, except that instead -of being struck, I received five days’ solitary confinement -in a room with no window, and only a small -piece of bread and a bowl of soup each day. On the -fifth day I was again interrogated, and said the same as -before. I said that he had no right to give me solitary -confinement, and that unless I were released, I should, -at first opportunity, report him to the highest possible -authority. The next day I was sent away, and -eventually reached the camp at Freiburg, when I found -my brother, Captain A. E. Arnold, M.C., Tank Corps. -The conduct of Gunner Ribbans and Driver Carney was -beyond all praise throughout. Driver Carney drove -from Villers-Bretonneux onwards.</p> - -<p class="sigright"> -<span class="l4">“(<i>Signed</i>) <span class="smcap">C. B. Arnold</span>, Lieut.,</span><br /> -“6th Tank Battalion. -</p> - -<p class="p0 in0 smaller">“<i>January 1, 1919.</i>”</p></div> - -<p>The Tank was found close to the small railway on the -eastern side of the Harbonnières-Rosières Road.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_309">309</span></p> - -<h3>VI</h3> - -<p>The final stage of the day’s battle had been reached by -early afternoon.</p> - -<p>The armoured cars, moving rapidly east along the -main roads, did much to complete the demoralisation -of the enemy.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_76" href="#Footnote_76" class="fnanchor">76</a>“The enemy, once in retreat, became completely -demoralised. One heard from the commanders of the -armoured cars which were returning on the main -Villers-Bretonneux road, how they chased excited German -Staff cars and officers through the ruined village -of Faucourt, and eventually had been held up, because -the enemy’s traffic was so congested on the roads behind -his lines that they could penetrate no further. The Air -Force were then reported to have completed this confusion, -by obtaining some excellent results in flying low -over these roads....</p> - -<p>“The cars which had turned northwards entered -Proyart and Chuignolles, two moving up to the river -Somme. At Proyart the cars found the German troops -at dinner; these they shot down and scattered in all -directions, and then moving westwards met masses of -the enemy driven from their trenches by the Australians. -In order to surprise these men who were moving -eastwards, the cars hid in the outskirts of Proyart -and only advanced when the enemy was between fifty -and one hundred yards distant, when they moved forward, -rapidly shooting down great numbers. Scattering -from before the cars at Proyart, the enemy made -across country towards Chuignolles, only to be met by -the cars which had proceeded to this village, and they -were once again fired on and dispersed. Near Chuignolles -one armoured car obtained ‘running practice’ -with its machine-guns at a lorry full of troops, and kept -up fire until the lorry ran into the ditch. There were<span class="pagenum" id="Page_310">310</span> -also several cases of armoured cars following German -transport vehicles, without anything unusual being suspected, -until fire was opened at point-blank range.</p> - -<p>“Although more than half the cars were out of action -by the evening of the 8th, there were no casualties -amongst their personnel sufficiently serious to require -evacuation.”</p></div> - -<p>The Mark V. star Tanks successfully reached the -day’s final objective and delivered their infantry machine-gunners -on the line which was to be the limit of -our advance.</p> - -<p>That they were duly “delivered” is, however, about -as much as can be said of many of these unfortunates.</p> - -<p>The motion, the heat, and the fumes of the inside of -a Tank closed for action, almost invariably proved too -much for all but the Tank’s own well-salted crew.</p> - -<p>Consequently where little fire had been met with, the -machine-gunners had come up either riding or walking -behind it.</p> - -<p>Where the fire had been heavy and they had been -sternly ordered in and the Tank closed up, they had -been delivered flushed, feverish, and either vomiting or -extremely faint and quite unfit for duty until they had -been given at least a couple of hours’ rest.</p> - -<p>The Australian Corps and their Tanks had alone -taken about 7900 prisoners, and our total captures -amounted to over 13,000 prisoners, and more than 300 -guns, besides all kinds of stores and ammunition. -Along the eleven miles of attack we had advanced to a -depth of nearly seven miles, and (except Le Quesnoy, -which we captured before dawn on the 9th) the whole -of the outer defences of Amiens had been taken. The -armoured cars and some of the cavalry had, as we have -seen, been in action far beyond. It was north of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_311">311</span> -Somme that our advance had been most hotly contested, -but even here we had pushed forward considerably and -the enemy’s casualties had been particularly heavy.</p> - -<p>The Paris-Amiens railway was completely disengaged, -and the Despatch characterises the first day’s -fighting as a “sweeping success.”</p> - -<h3>VII</h3> - -<p>All night, to the east beyond the limit of our advance, -we could hear the enemy blowing up his ammunition -dumps.</p> - -<p>All night his transport and limbers streamed eastwards, -and all night our airmen hung upon his retreating -columns.</p> - -<p>Next morning we attacked again along the whole -line, no less than 155 Tanks being actually engaged.</p> - -<p>The Australians advanced upon Lihons, Framerville -and Vauxvillers, while on their right the Canadians -continued the attack south of the Amiens-Chaulnes -railway.</p> - -<p>In the attack on Framerville, out of thirteen Tanks -engaged, only one was hit.</p> - -<p>This fact was attributable to the admirable co-operation -between the infantry and Tanks.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_77" href="#Footnote_77" class="fnanchor">77</a>“Riflemen working hand in hand with the machines -picking off the enemy’s field gunners, as soon as the -Tanks came into observation. At Vauxvillers, seven -Tanks went into action just before noon, unaccompanied -by infantry and without artillery support. After the -Tanks had gone forward a little way, the 5th Australian -Division followed up and not only captured the high -ground, but the village itself, which was not included -in their original objective.”</p></div> - -<p>Near Rosières the opposition stiffened, and here no<span class="pagenum" id="Page_312">312</span> -less than eight Tanks were knocked out by a German -battery which came into action near Lihons. It was -not until 5 p.m. that this battery was silenced, and we -did not reach Lihons that night.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_78" href="#Footnote_78" class="fnanchor">78</a>“The day’s operations were especially interesting -through the rapidity with which the enemy got his field -batteries into action from commanding positions against -Tanks advancing in broad daylight. He also employed -a number of low-flying aeroplanes against the infantry, -but as these did not carry bombs their fire had no effect -upon the Tanks. The resistance put up by his riflemen -and machine-gunners was feeble, and showed clearly the -moral effect of the victorious advance of the previous -day.”</p></div> - -<p>With the Canadians as many Tanks as possible were -rallied and about fifty-five went into action. They went -forward, as before, in waves, the same Tank Battalions -working with the same Infantry Divisions as on the -previous day.</p> - -<p>North of the Somme, with the 3rd Corps (which included -the 33rd American Division) the 10th Tank Battalion -put sixteen Tanks into action.</p> - -<p>They had a hard task round Chipilly, where the -enemy had a large number of machine-guns cleverly -concealed in woods and gullies. By the early evening, -however, all the objectives were taken, and our positions -advanced in line with those which we held south -of the river, an advance achieved at a cost of five -casualties to the sixteen machines engaged.</p> - -<p>The Whippets’ action, in as far as they were billed -to act with the cavalry, was disappointing. By some -fault of liaison they were kept too long at Brigade -Headquarters.</p> - -<p>At Beaufort and Warvillers, however, they were able<span class="pagenum" id="Page_313">313</span> -to give great help to the infantry by chasing hostile -machine-gunners out of the standing corn and shooting -them down as they fled.</p> - -<p>On the whole August 9th was a successful day, for -we continued to push forward steadily all along our -line.</p> - -<h3>VIII</h3> - -<p>We had, in fact, pushed forward so far that all along -the line during the next day’s fighting we reached the -old trench systems of the First Battle of the Somme. -And it was this fact, combined with the usual and -inevitable petering out of all attacks which are not supported -by immense reserves, that now slowed our rate -of advance down to nothing. Two days later we left -off hammering.</p> - -<p>The 10th proved an unfortunate day for the Tanks, -for though we advanced, the eighty-five Tanks engaged -suffered heavily in every sector.</p> - -<p>With the Canadians, owing to orders having been -issued late, the hour of attack had to be altered, and it -finally took place in daylight without smoke.</p> - -<p>A stubborn resistance was encountered, and of the -forty-three Tanks engaged no less than twenty-three -received direct hits.</p> - -<p>Before Warvillers the cavalry and Whippets had a -particularly poor time of it, the old trench systems and -the old shelled area, of which the enemy had taken -ingenious and thorough advantage, proving too much -for both arms.</p> - -<p>With the Australians a rather remarkable night attack -was arranged.</p> - -<p>During the three previous days’ fighting it had been<span class="pagenum" id="Page_314">314</span> -found very inconvenient to have the Somme Valley as -an inter-corps boundary, and General Monash was -allowed to extend his territory northward in such a -way that the Australians should hold both sides of the -valley.</p> - -<p>An encircling movement was, therefore, undertaken, -of which Captain Denny, M.C., M.P., gives the following -account in his article on the work of the Australians -which appeared in the <cite>Daily Telegraph</cite> of April 1919:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“The 3rd and 4th Australian Divisions were ordered -to carry out an encircling operation on the night of -August 10–11 in order to cut off the Etinehem spur -north of the Somme and the ridge east of Proyart, south -of the Somme. The general lines of the operation both -to the north and the south of the river were similar. -Columns were to move along defined roads leaving the -objectives well to the flanks, and then encircle the -enemy positions. Each column was accompanied by -Tanks, and was to move in an easterly direction, and -then to wheel inwards towards the Somme. It was recognised -that this action involved certain risks, as Tanks -had never been tried by night in this way, but in -view of the condition of the enemy’s <em>moral</em> at this stage -it was considered that the effect of the advance of the -Tanks and infantry would lead immediately to the collapse -of the defence.</p> - -<p>“The action north of the river was entirely successful. -South of the river the enemy bombed the forward -area heavily early in the night, causing considerable -delay in the preparations for the attack. Progress was -at first slow owing to heavy enemy artillery and machine-gun -fire and the disorganisation caused by the -bombing. Two of the Tanks allotted for the operations -were destroyed or put out of action very soon after -zero hour.”</p></div> - -<p>Almost from the outset of the attack heavy enemy<span class="pagenum" id="Page_315">315</span> -machine-gun fire was encountered from the large enemy -dump by the side of the main road. Tanks were unable -in the dark to locate these machine-guns, and could not -do much to assist the infantry. It was therefore decided -to abandon the operation and withdraw the infantry -under cover of unaimed fire from the Tanks, who -were themselves recalled when the infantry had got -clear away.</p> - -<p>It was not till the evening of August 12 that Tanks -and infantry were able to advance in this sector, and -that we gained the positions east of Proyart.</p> - -<p>By August 11 the Tank Corps reserves were used up, -and the Tanks and their crews were almost fought to a -standstill. They had had three days of continuous fighting -and marching, and of the thirty-eight Tanks which -went into action on the 11th there was not one but -badly needed overhauling. The crews were completely -exhausted. We have already described the conditions -under which the men fought in the Mark V. Tank, and -how after an average of three hours in a closed Tank -whose guns are in action, all men begin to suffer from -severe headache and giddiness, and most from sickness, -a high temperature and heart disturbance.</p> - -<p>After the Battle of Amiens the crews of most of the -surviving Tanks had fought for three days, not three -hours, and 50 per cent. of them were on the verge of -collapse. However, as we have said, thirty-eight machines -and crews were scraped together, and on -August 11 ten Tanks of the 2nd Battalion helped in -the taking of Lihons by the Australians. These Tanks -had an approach march of eight miles before they -reached their jumping-off places.</p> - -<p>With the Canadians, Tanks attacked Domeny and -twice entered the village, but the 4th Canadian Division<span class="pagenum" id="Page_316">316</span> -could not get forward to consolidate, owing to lack of -support on the right.</p> - -<p>On the 12th, while six Tanks were still thrashing -out the Proyart affair north of the Somme, the 4th and -5th Brigades were withdrawn, to be followed next day -by the remainder of the Tanks.</p> - -<h3>IX</h3> - -<p>We called a halt, and the Battle of Amiens was -at an end, for it was again at last the Allies who -chose the time and the place where they would offer -battle.</p> - -<p>Commanders who had the bitter taste of the forced -actions of the March retreat in their mouths, must have -savoured this easy choice extraordinarily. There is -something thrilling in the assured words of the Despatch. -We did not care for the new battle site! We -would change it and fight elsewhere!</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“The derelict battle area which now lay before our -troops, seared by old trench lines, pitted with shell-holes, -and crossed in all directions with tangled belts -of wire, the whole covered by the wild vegetation of -two years, presented unrivalled opportunities for stubborn -machine-gun defences....</p> - -<p>“I therefore determined to break off the battle on -this front, and transferred the front of attack from -the 4th Army to the sector north of the Somme, where -an attack seemed unexpected by the enemy. My intention -was for the 3rd Army to operate in the direction -of Bapaume so as to turn the line of the old Somme -defences from the north.”</p></div> - -<p>We struck at once. Only four days were given to the -Tanks for overhauling machines and patching up the -crews, for on August 21 we opened the new battle.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile it was hard to realise how great was the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_317">317</span> -moral and physical blow which we had dealt the Germans. -The July attacks had been tentative, but the -Battle of Amiens was the decisive victory, the sure proof -that the Germans had lost all hope of winning the War -by force of arms.</p> - -<p>But at the time we could not read the thundering -sign of our deliverance with certainty. We could see -only what were the more immediate results of the battle.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_79" href="#Footnote_79" class="fnanchor">79</a>“Within the space of five days the town of Amiens -and the railway centring upon it had been disengaged. -Twenty German Divisions had been heavily defeated by -thirteen British Infantry Divisions and three Cavalry -Divisions, assisted by a regiment of the 33rd American -Division and supported by some 400 Tanks. Nearly -22,000 prisoners and over 400 guns had been taken by -us, and our line had been pushed forward to a depth -of some twelve miles in a vital sector. Further, our -deep advance, combined with the attacks of the French -Armies on our right, had compelled the enemy to -evacuate hurriedly a wide extent of territory to the -south of us.</p> - -<p>“The effect of this victory—following so closely after -the Allied victory on the Marne—upon the <em>moral</em> both -of the German and British troops was very great. -Buoyed up by the hope of immediate and decisive victory, -to be followed by an early and favourable peace, -constantly assured that the Allied reserves were exhausted, -the German soldiery suddenly found themselves -attacked on two fronts and thrown back with -heavy losses from large and important portions of their -earlier gains. The reaction was inevitable and of a -deep and lasting character.</p> - -<p>“On the other hand, our own troops felt that at last -their opportunity had come, and that, supported by a -superior artillery and numerous Tanks they could now -press forward resolutely to reap the reward of their<span class="pagenum" id="Page_318">318</span> -patient, dauntless, and successful defence in March and -April.”</p></div> - -<p>We knew, however, that we had still hard fighting before -us, and we were careful to analyse every phase of -the action to see if we could not learn some practical -lesson from it that should help us in the coming months.</p> - -<p>The Tank Command noted several points “for reference.” -In the first place, the battle would have been -ended the quicker if the Tanks had had a larger general -reserve.</p> - -<p>Then neither the Mark V. nor the Whippet was fast -enough for open warfare.</p> - -<p>Had we then possessed machines such as we have -now,<a id="FNanchor_80" href="#Footnote_80" class="fnanchor">80</a> of double the speed of the Mark V., and having -a radius of action of 100 miles and more, we should, at -a modest estimate, have finished the battle on the first -day.</p> - -<p>Last, we had not used our Whippets to the best advantage.</p> - -<p>The 3rd (Light) Brigade Commander, Brig.-General -Hardress-Lloyd, thus admirably summarised the lessons -of the battle, and laid down alternative principles upon -which the light machines might be used:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“I do not think it advisable to attempt to use the -present Whippet in conjunction with cavalry. Better -results would have been obtained during these operations -if Whippets had been working in close liaison with -Mark V. Tanks and infantry.</p> - -<p>“The Whippet is not fast enough to conform to -cavalry tactics in the early stages of a battle.</p> - -<p>“The Whippets’ rôle should be to push on amongst -the retreating enemy and prevent him from reorganising, -engage reinforcements coming up, eventually<span class="pagenum" id="Page_319">319</span> -enabling the infantry to make a further advance, capture -prisoners, guns, etc.</p> - -<p>“... They must move forward in close touch with -the heavy Tanks so as to be near enough up to go -though when required. If kept back with the cavalry -the speed of the Whippet is not sufficient to enable the -machine to be in the forward position at the required -moment, and its offensive power will be seriously -diminished.”</p></div> - -<p>But it was not for us that the battle of August 8 -had its chief lessons.</p> - -<p>The German High Command waxed eloquent with indignant -exhortation, and demanded passionately that -the experiences of the German Army should be utilised, -and that such things as had occurred on the 8th should -never happen again.</p> - -<p>On August 11 General Ludendorff issued a secret -Order:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“Troops allowed themselves to be surprised by a -mass attack of Tanks, and lost all cohesion when the -Tanks suddenly appeared behind them, having broken -through under cover of a mist, natural and artificial. -The defensive organisation, both of the first line and -in the rear, was insufficient to permit of a systematic -defence.... As a weapon against Tanks, the prepared -defence of the ground must play a larger part -than ever, and the aversion of the men to the pick and -shovel must be overcome at all hazards.... Especially -there must be defences against Tanks. It was -absolutely inadmissible that the Tanks, having penetrated -into our advance line without meeting with -obstacles or anything, should be able to push on along -the roads or beside them for miles.... The principle -that a body of troops even when surrounded must -defend their ground, unless otherwise ordered, to the -last man and the last cartridge, seems to have fallen -into oblivion ... a large proportion of our ranks<span class="pagenum" id="Page_320">320</span> -fight unskilfully against Tanks. A Tank is an easy -prey for artillery of all calibres....”</p></div> - -<p>An account follows of measures for the proper disposition -of artillery against Tanks, and the rest of the -Order is occupied with directions to the infantry concerning -the question at what range the anti-Tank rifle -and gun are most effective. The consideration of these -points is long and exhaustive. Ludendorff further -hopes much from “the active and inventive genius of -the lower ranks of the non-commissioned officers to arrange -Tank traps, and demands that every encouragement -should be shown to those who show any inventive -talent.”</p> - -<p>These were but peddling remedies. When, as at -Amiens, the understanding between infantry and Tanks -is almost perfect, and when the magnificent <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">élan</i> of an -assault by Australians and Canadians is supported by -the weight of 400 Tanks, not even the troops of what -was the best-trained Army in the world can stand the -concerted shock of their attack.</p> - -<p>A Special Order was issued on August 16 by General -Sir Henry Rawlinson, the 4th Army Commander:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“<i>Tank Corps.</i>—The success of the operations of -August 8 and succeeding days was largely due to the -conspicuous part played by the 3rd, 4th and 5th Brigades -of the Tank Corps, and I desire to place on record -my sincere appreciation of the invaluable services rendered -both by the Mark V. and the Mark V. star and -the Whippets.</p> - -<p>“The task of secretly assembling so large a number -of Tanks entailed very hard and continuous work by -all concerned for four or five nights previous to the -battle.</p> - -<p>“The tactical handling of the Tanks in action made -calls on the skill and physical endurance of the detachments<span class="pagenum" id="Page_321">321</span> -which were met with a gallantry and devotion -beyond all praise.</p> - -<p>“I desire to place on record my appreciation of the -splendid success that they achieved, and to heartily congratulate -the Tank Corps as a whole on the completeness -of their arrangements and the admirable prowess -exhibited by all ranks actually engaged on this occasion. -There are many vitally important lessons to be -learned from their experiences. These will, I trust, be -taken to heart by all concerned and made full use -of when next the Tank Corps is called upon to go into -battle.</p> - -<p>“The part played by the Tanks and Whippets in the -battle on August 8 was in all respects a very fine performance.</p> - -<p class="sigright"> -<span class="l2">“(<i>Signed</i>) <span class="smcap">H. Rawlinson</span>, <i>General</i>,</span><br /> -“Commanding 4th Army. -</p> - -<p> -“Headquarters, 4th Army,<br /> -<span class="in3">“<i>August 16, 1918</i>.”</span> -</p></div> - -<p>Nor were the Australians less generous.</p> - -<p>The following message is typical of many. It was -sent to Brig.-General Courage (commanding 5th Tank -Brigade) by the 4th Australian Divisional Commander:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> -<p class="in0 in1"> -“G.O.C. 5th Tank Brigade. -</p> - -<p>“I wish to express to you and the command associated -with us on August 8 and following days, on -behalf of the 4th Australian Division, our deep appreciation -of the most gallant service rendered during our -offensive operations by the Tank Corps. The consistent -skill and gallantry with which the Tanks, individually -and collectively, were handled during the battle, was -the admiration of all ranks of the infantry with whom -they were so intimately associated, and our success was -due in a very large measure to your efforts.</p> - -<p>“We hope sincerely, that in future offensive operations -in which we may take part, we shall have the -honour to be associated with the same units of the Tank<span class="pagenum" id="Page_322">322</span> -Corps as during the operations on August 8 and following -days.</p> - -<p class="sigright"> -<span class="l2">“(<i>Signed</i>) <span class="smcap">E. G. Sinclair McLagan</span>,</span><br /> -<span class="l4">“Major-General,</span><br /> -“Commanding 4th Australian Division.” -</p></div> - -<p>Finally, in a congratulatory telegram after the battle, -the Commander-in-Chief paid a high tribute to the skill -and bravery displayed by the Tank Corps in the gaining -of this signal victory.</p> -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_323">323</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_XVIII">CHAPTER XVIII</h2> - -<p class="subhead">THE GERMAN ATTITUDE—“MAN-TRAPS AND GINS”—THE -BATTLE OF BAPAUME</p> -</div> - -<h3>I</h3> - -<p><span class="firstword">We</span> had, as we have said, called a halt to the Battle -of Amiens.</p> - -<p>But the pause was to be only one of a few days.</p> - -<p>The new battle was to be fought in the area which lay -between the rivers Somme and Scarpe, and for his selection -of this particular place Sir Douglas Haig in his -Despatch gives two reasons.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“The enemy did not seem prepared to meet an attack -in this direction, and, owing to the success of the Fourth -Army, he occupied a salient, the left flank of which was -already threatened from the south. A further reason -for my decision was that the ground north of the Ancre -River was not greatly damaged by shell-fire, and was -suitable for the use of Tanks. A successful attack between -Albert and Arras in a south-easterly direction -would turn the line of the Somme south of Péronne, and -gave every promise of producing far-reaching results. -It would be a step forward towards the strategic objective -St. Quentin-Cambrai.”</p></div> - -<p>It is interesting to see how high a place Tanks now -held in the estimation of the General Staff, and how -carefully their peculiarities were considered.</p> - -<p>But it was not only the British High Command which -had begun to busy itself with the natural history of the -Tank.</p> - -<p>Since the lesser battles of July and the greater battle<span class="pagenum" id="Page_324">324</span> -of August 8, the attitude of the German G.H.Q. had -entirely changed.</p> - -<p>When we first began to use Tanks it will be remembered -that the Germans, though perfunctorily alluding -to them as “cruel and detestable,” had in effect sneered -at them as makeshifts by which we hoped to supplement -our scanty supply of more legitimate munitions of war.</p> - -<p>Besides, their contempt for all we did being sincere, -the Tanks’ British parentage damned them without -further investigation.</p> - -<p>“Search and see, for out of Galilee cometh no good -thing.”</p> - -<p>The Germans themselves made their attitude perfectly -clear.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“The use of 300 British Tanks at Cambrai (1917) -was a ‘battle of material,’ and the German Higher -Command decided from the very outset <em>not</em> to fight a -‘battle of material.’”</p></div> - -<p>Their policy was masses of men rather than mechanism, -quantity rather than quality.</p> - -<p>The best men went to machine-gun units and to assault -troops. In many cases the remainder of the -infantry were of little fighting value, though many of -the men might have been otherwise usefully employed -in a war which, if not one of material, was at least one -in which economic factors played a large part.</p> - -<p>The German Higher Command was able, however, to -look at an order of battle, showing some 250 Divisions -on paper.</p> - -<p>But the Germans were thus naturally not in a position -to find the labour for the construction of additional -material, such as Tanks; they were, besides, concentrating<span class="pagenum" id="Page_325">325</span> -any labour and any suitable material they possessed -upon the work of submarine making.</p> - -<p>It seems clear that the whole policy, at least as far as -Tanks was concerned, was regretted before the end of -the War.</p> - -<p>The following now well known extracts from German -documents indicate the effect of our Tanks on the German -Army:</p> - -<p>“Staff officers sent from G.H.Q. report that the reasons -for the defeat of the Second Army<a id="FNanchor_81" href="#Footnote_81" class="fnanchor">81</a> are as follows:</p> - -<p>“1. The fact that the troops were surprised by the -massed attack of Tanks, and lost their heads when the -Tanks suddenly appeared behind them, having broken -through under cover of natural and artificial fog.</p> - -<p>“2. Lack of organised defences.</p> - -<p>“3. The fact that the artillery allotted to reserve infantry -units at the disposal of the Higher Command -was wholly insufficient to establish fresh resistance with -artillery support against the enemy who had broken -through and against his Tanks.</p> - -<p class="sigright b2">“<span class="smcap">Ludendorff</span>, 11. 8. 18.”</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> -<p class="sigright"> -“<i>Crown Prince’s Group of Armies.</i><br /> -<span class="l4">“12. 8. 18.</span> -</p> - -<p>“G.H.Q. reports that during the recent fighting on -the fronts of the 2nd and 18th Armies, large numbers -of Tanks broke through on narrow fronts and pushing -straight forward, rapidly attacked battery positions and -the headquarters of divisions.</p> - -<p>“In many cases no defence could be made in time -against the Tanks, which attacked them from all sides.</p> - -<p>“Anti-Tank defence must now be developed to deal -with such situations.”</p></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_326">326</span></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>Signal <span class="locked">Communication—</span></p> - -<p>“Messages concerning Tanks will have priority over -all other messages or calls whatsoever.”</p> - -<p class="sigright">“Order dated 8. 9. 18.”</p></div> - -<h3>II</h3> - -<p>The first efforts at combating Tanks made by the German -High Command were half contemptuously instituted -chiefly to reassure their infantry, who seemed to -them, for no particular reason, liable to extraordinary -fits of nerves and panic upon the approach of their new -assailants.</p> - -<p>The measures of defence were ill devised and carelessly -used.</p> - -<p>In the autumn of 1917, it will be remembered that the -Germans had captured a number of our Mark IV. -machines.</p> - -<p>These they used for the purposes of propaganda, -parading them in the streets of Berlin and showing -them to the Army, as a man might demonstrate the -harmless nature of snakes by the aid of a tame cobra.</p> - -<p>The infantry were lectured to about the miseries endured -by the crews who manned Tanks, as to their -mechanical defects, their vulnerability and general -worthlessness. For example, the following passage appeared -in an Order issued to the 7th German Cavalry -Division. It will be gathered from the text that the -Order was illustrated by detailed drawings.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“7th Cavalry ‘Schützen’ Div. Div. H.Q. 26.9.18.</p> - -<p>“Subject:—Anti-Tank Defence.</p> - -<p class="p1 b1 center">“<i>Divisional Order</i></p> - -<p>“1. <i>General.</i></p> - -<p>“The infantry must not let itself be frightened by<span class="pagenum" id="Page_327">327</span> -Tanks. The fighting capacity of the Tank is small -owing to the bad visibility, and the shooting of the -machine-guns and guns is cramped and inaccurate as -the result of the motion.</p> - -<p>“It has been proved that the Tank crews are nervous -and are inclined to turn back, or leave the Tank, even -in the case of limited fire effects, such as a light T.M. -(Trench Mortar) barrage at 800–1000 yards. In order -to make it more difficult for the artillery, the Tanks -pursue a zigzag course towards their objective.</p> - -<p>“The hostile infantry follows Tanks only half-heartedly. -Experience shows that hostile attacks are -soon checked by aimed machine-gun and artillery fire. -Co-operation between the Tanks and their infantry detachments -must be hindered as much as possible. The -arms should be separated and destroyed in detail. All -projectiles which do not hit the armour-plating at right -angles ricochet off instead of penetrating. Artillery, -light trench mortar and anti-Tank rifle fire is effective -against all portions of the Tank, especially against the -broadside and the cab (framed in red in the illustrations). -Machine-gun and rifle fire with A.P. bullets, on -the other hand, should be aimed especially at the observation -and machine-gun loopholes (framed in green -and blue in the illustrations).”</p></div> - -<p>But the enemy was not content with a merely dialectical -defence. Among other practical measures the -Germans, with curious inconsequence, decided to form -a small Tank Corps of their own, partly armed with -new Tanks of German manufacture and partly with -captured British machines.</p> - -<p>But here a little unexpected awkwardness arose. The -infantry from whom they now wished to recruit their -Tank crews, had unfortunately been completely convinced -by the unanswerable arguments which they had -just heard, and now thoroughly believed in the perfect -uselessness, the extreme vulnerability, of Tanks.</p> - -<p>Thus it came about that the German Tank Corps was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_328">328</span> -made up of a quite astonishingly reluctant and half-hearted -body of men. Altogether, only fifteen German -Tanks were ever manufactured, and only twenty-five -captured British Mark IV. Tanks were repaired, so that -the whole affair amounted to but little.</p> - -<p>The German Tanks were, as we have said, much -heavier and larger than the British or French heavy -Tanks, though, as we have noted, they rather resembled -the French St. Chamond. They could not cross large -trenches or heavily shelled ground, owing to their shape, -and the lack of clearance between the ground and the -body. On smooth ground, their speed was good—being -about eight miles an hour.</p> - -<p>Their armour was thick and tough, capable of withstanding -armour-piercing bullets, and, at a long range, -even direct hits from field guns not firing armour-piercing -shells. Only the front of the Tank was, however, -sufficiently strong for this, and the roof was scarcely -armoured at all.</p> - -<p>They were very vulnerable to the splash of ordinary -small arms ammunition, owing to the numerous crevices -and joints left in the armour-plate.</p> - -<p>The most interesting feature of these otherwise exceedingly -bad machines was the fact that they ran on a -spring track. The use of springs for so heavy a Tank -was the one progressive departure in the German -design.</p> - -<p>Their crew consisted of an officer and no less than -fifteen other ranks. This huge crew, twice that of a -heavy British Tank, actually went into action in a Tank -24 feet long by 10 feet wide. However, the close association -of the crew was merely physical, for they were -composed of no less than three distinct arms, and appear<span class="pagenum" id="Page_329">329</span> -to have done little or no training together as a -crew.</p> - -<p>There were the drivers who were mechanics, there -were the gunners who were artillerymen, and the -machine-gunners who were infantrymen. Members of -the British Tank Corps were at one time much puzzled -by German Tank prisoners’ statements, that on such -or such an occasion the infantry had spoiled their shooting, -or that the artillery had not backed them up, in -circumstances when there was no particular question -of co-operation with other arms. They came afterwards -to understand that the anathema’d representatives -of rival arms were inside the machine, not out.</p> - -<p>But in reality rival machines constituted but a small -part of the German anti-Tank measures, for, as we have -said, after the victories of July and early August, -these begin to be panic-stricken in their elaboration, and -after the Battle of Amiens, we find Ludendorff himself -pouring out his soul on the subject.</p> - -<p>He obviously realised that anti-Tank defences had -been neglected, and he probably saw also that this neglect -was going to be difficult to explain to an Army and -a public which, as the result of failures, were about to -become extremely critical of their leaders.</p> - -<p>After the Battle of Amiens, therefore, the Germans -began feverishly to set their house in order, and we find -special Staff Officers appointed at the Army, Corps, -Divisional and Brigade Headquarters, whose sole duty -it was to organise the anti-Tank defences within their -formation.</p> - -<p>A special artillery was told off and divided into two -sections. The first was to provide a few forward silent -guns in each divisional sector. They were to remain -hidden till the moment of our attack, and then to concentrate<span class="pagenum" id="Page_330">330</span> -upon our Tanks. These guns, however, proved -apt to be smothered by our barrage, or not to be able -to distinguish their prey in the half-light of our dawn -attacks. Secondly, there were to be reserve guns whose -duty it was to go forward and take up previously reconnoitred -positions after the Tank attack had been -launched. It was generally from these pieces that the -Tanks had most to fear. Finally, all German batteries, -including howitzers, had general instructions to plan -their positions in such a way that advancing Tanks -would be subject to a direct fire at about 500 or 600 -yards range. In the event of a Tank attack, the engagement -of our machines was now to be the first call -upon the artillery, to the exclusion of counter-battery -or any other work. As for the infantry, the chief rôle -allotted to them was “to keep their heads,” and “to -keep calm.” Other Orders instructed them to move to -a flank in the event of a Tank attack. “No advice was -given, however, as to how this was to be done when -Tanks were attacking on a frontage of twenty or thirty -miles.”</p> - -<p>A large armoury of special anti-Tank weapons arose, -and of these the most important was the anti-Tank rifle, -of which we have spoken before.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_82" href="#Footnote_82" class="fnanchor">82</a> “The weapon weighed 36 lb. and was 5½ feet long. -It had no magazine and fired single shots, using A.P. -ammunition of .530 calibre. It was obviously too conspicuous -and too slow a weapon to be really effective -against Tanks, though the steel core could penetrate -the armour of British Tanks at several hundred yards -range.</p> - -<p>“The chief disadvantage of the anti-Tank rifle, however, -was that the German soldier would not use it.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_331">331</span> -He was untrained in its use, afraid of its kick, and still -more afraid of the Tanks themselves. It is doubtful if -one per cent. of the A.T. rifles captured in our Tank -attacks had ever been fired.”</p></div> - -<p>Road obstacles, such as carts full of stones, linked up -with wire cables, concrete stockades and mines, provided -a good deal of the rest of the enemy anti-Tank -stock-in-trade. Of mines there was a considerable -variety. They ranged from elaborate specially made -pieces of apparatus to high explosive shells, buried and -hastily fitted with a device by which the weight of the -Tank exploded them.</p> - -<p>They were sometimes buried in lines across roads, and -sometimes extensive minefields were laid. Their singular -ineffectiveness always seemed somewhat mysterious -to members of the Tank Corps, the proportion of effort -to result seeming always many tons of mine to each -Tank damaged.</p> - -<p>However, we always thought we might some day encounter -a really effective type of mine, and possibly the -Germans were satisfied if their efforts so much as made -our monsters walk delicately, for in an elaborate document, -giving every kind of anti-Tank defence instructions, -they somewhat pathetically conclude: “Every -obstacle, even if it only checks the hostile Tank temporarily, -is of value.”</p> - -<p>But there was one form of weapon which was, we -felt sure, bound to be evolved by the Germans. It was -one which we were not at all anxious to encounter. We -imagined a weapon which should practically be the -machine-gun version of the anti-Tank rifle; that is to -say, a weapon which could pour out a stream of high-velocity, -large-calibre bullets at the rate of two hundred -a minute. Actually it was almost precisely such<span class="pagenum" id="Page_332">332</span> -an engine that the Germans had got in their “Tuf” -machine-gun, of which an interesting account is given -in <cite>Weekly Tank Notes</cite>.</p> - -<p>The name was an abbreviation for “<i xml:lang="de" lang="de">Tank und -Flieger</i>” (tank and aeroplane), for it was against these -enemies that this machine-gun was intended. It was to -consist of no less than 250 pieces, which were made by -sixty different factories, of which the <i xml:lang="de" lang="de">Maschinen Fabrik -Augsburg Nürnberg</i>, was the only one entrusted with -the assembling and mounting. The projectile fired was -to be 13 millimetres in diameter. From experiments -made with captured Tanks, the Germans ascertained -that these bullets could pierce steel plates of 30 millimetres -in thickness. No less than six thousand of these -guns were to be in the field by April 1919, and delivery -was to begin early in the previous December—just a -month too late.</p> - -<p>However, when the Armistice was signed, the firms -were already in possession of the greater part of the -stores and raw material for the manufacture of the -guns, a quantity of which were by then well on the way -to completion. Immediately after the signing of the -Armistice, all the factories were instructed by telephone -to continue manufacturing the “Tuf,” and about November -20 they received confirmation in writing of this -order, and were instructed to keep on their workmen at -all costs. Our occupation of the left bank of the Rhine -proved a serious drawback to a continuation of the -manufacture, as it completely interrupted communication -between several of the factories. The Pfaff Works -of Kaiserlautern (Palatinate) and the great Becker steel -works of Frefeld, which played an important part in -the manufacture of the guns, had to close down, both -being on the left bank of the Rhine.</p> - -<p>The Minister of War throughout the period of its<span class="pagenum" id="Page_333">333</span> -manufacture asked for daily and minute reports as to -the progress of the “Tuf,” and it was given priority over -both submarines and aeroplanes. But once more, as -ever in all that concerned Tanks, the Germans were several -months too late. We were never destined to face -this particular weapon with the Mark V. The modern -Tank fears it not at all.</p> - -<h3>III</h3> - -<p>Our chronicle has now reached the three last, and the -decisive months of the war.</p> - -<p>It was a period of continuous fighting, in which a -battle begun in any particular sector would spread -along the front on either hand, until at last, by the -middle of October, the whole line was in roaring conflagration; -and by the second week in November the -blaze had swept on almost to the borders of Germany, -and the forces of the enemy had withered and shrivelled -before it.</p> - -<p>At first we made a series of more or less set attacks. -Then came the break through the Hindenburg Line -after the Second Battle of Cambrai, and the hastily-organised -running fights of October, which culminated in -the complete overthrow of German arms.</p> - -<p>The whole period is at the moment of writing exceedingly -difficult to dissect and to classify into definite -battles, it being usually a matter of opinion when one -engagement can be said to have ended and another to -have begun. The nomenclature even is still fluid. Take, -for example, the vast inchoate battle which raged from -August 21 and 23 and culminated on September 2. It -was fought by three separate armies. There were at -least three principle “Z” days, and the battle seems<span class="pagenum" id="Page_334">334</span> -to be indifferently known as the Battle of Bapaume, the -Second Battle of Arras, or even as the Battle of Amiens. -Nor if the historian were to attempt to name it by date -would it be clearly more proper to call it the Battle of -August 23 or 21. There is a good deal to be said for -the German plan of christening their battles by some -fancy name, or dubbing them “Kaiserchlact” or “Clarence,” -according to one’s taste. A campaign of nameless -battles is apt to defy Clio’s efforts at dissection and -tidy arrangement, and to defeat her longing to see a -neat row of actions dried, classified, and labelled in her -<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">Hortus Siccus</i>.</p> - -<p>We have indicated the changes which had taken place -in the attitude of our own and the German High Commands -toward Tanks. Much had been learnt by the -Tank Corps themselves, and much had been regularised -and systematised in their methods. We find that by -August, Tank Corps preparation for a battle had been -so completely reduced to a routine that to attempt to -chronicle the preparation for any of our set attacks -would be to make a mere <i xml:lang="it" lang="it">cento</i>, whose pieces might be -culled from particulars already recorded for Cambrai, -for Hamel and for Amiens. We therefore trust that the -reader, without hearing any enumeration of gallons of -petrol, tons of grease, or acres of maps, will understand -that each of these “formal” battles was preceded by -the usual herculean tasks of preparation.</p> - -<h3>IV</h3> - -<p>The Battle of Bapaume was, as we have already said, -to constitute a sequel to the Battle of Amiens (August -8). On August 21 the 3rd Army was to launch an attack -to the north of the Ancre with the general object -of pushing the enemy back towards Bapaume. Meanwhile<span class="pagenum" id="Page_335">335</span> -the 4th Army was to continue its pressure on the -enemy south of the river. August 22 was to be a -“slack” day and was to be used to get troops and guns -into position on the 3rd Army front. The principal -attack was to be delivered on the 23rd by the 3rd Army, -and those divisions of the 4th Army which lay to the -north of the Somme, the rest of the 4th Army fighting -a covering action on the flank of the main operation. -Afterwards, if our efforts were successful, the whole of -both Armies were to press forward with their utmost -vigour and exploit any advantage we might have gained. -If our success was such as to force the enemy back from -the high ground he held, thus securing our southern -flank, the 1st Army was further to make another attack -immediately to the north. This gradual extension of the -front of assault was intended to mislead the enemy as -to where the main blow would fall and cause him to -throw in his reserves piecemeal.</p> - -<p>A large number of Tanks were to be concentrated in -the 3rd Army area. They were to attack between -Moyenneville and Bucquoy with the 4th and 6th Corps. -With them the 1st and 2nd Brigades were to operate.</p> - -<p>With the 4th Army the 3rd Corps was to attack on -August 23, between Bray and Albert, and the 4th Tank -Brigade was to assist in this assault. Then, with the -portion of the 4th Army which operated south of the -Somme, namely, the Australians, the 5th Tank Brigade -was as usual to co-operate, their action also taking place -on the 23rd. In the course of the two days’ operations -the 3rd, 6th, 7th, 14th, 15th, 11th, 12th, 10th and 17th -Battalions were to be employed.</p> - -<p>The total of 280 machines seems at first sight a curiously -small one, considering the number of battalions involved, -but it must be remembered that most units had<span class="pagenum" id="Page_336">336</span> -been hotly in action at Amiens ten days before, and -that some battalions could not muster more than sixteen -fighting Tanks, pending repairs and a fresh issue -of machines.</p> - -<p>Supply Tanks and aeroplanes were to co-operate as -usual, the latter in greater strength than before; for -just before the battle No. 73 Squadron, armed with Sopwith -Camels, was attached to the Tank Corps, in addition -to No. 8 Squadron for counter-gun work.</p> - -<p>One of the most prominent features of the whole sector -of attack was the Albert-Arras railway, which lay -some distance behind the enemy’s front line. It proved -to have been carefully prepared for defence by the -enemy, being commanded at point-blank range by a -large number of field guns, which had been specially and -secretly withdrawn from more forward positions, and -all the sections of the line where it would be possible -for the Tanks to cross—that is to say, the “neutral” -portions where the line was neither embanked nor in a -cutting—were not only carefully registered, but were -blocked by concrete and iron anti-Tank stockades.</p> - -<p>The attack was to be opened at 4.55 a.m. on the 21st -by the 4th and 6th Corps and their Tanks.</p> - -<h3>V</h3> - -<p>The morning dawned in the inevitable white blanket -of mist which now always seemed to accompany our -attacks. Till nearly 11 a.m. it was impossible to see -more than a few yards ahead, and it was with the greatest -difficulty that the Tanks kept their direction. If, -however, the mist was confusing to us, it was doubly -so to the enemy. The Germans were completely taken -by surprise; we even found candles still burning in the -trenches when we crossed them, and papers and equipments<span class="pagenum" id="Page_337">337</span> -were scattered broadcast, bearing witness to a -hurried flight.</p> - -<div id="ip_337" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 44em;"> - <img src="images/i_336a1.jpg" width="690" height="455" alt="" /> - <div class="caption">GERMAN ANTI-TANK GUNNERS<br /> - (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH FOUND ON A PRISONER)</div></div> - -<div id="ip_337b" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 42em;"> - <img src="images/i_336a2.jpg" width="672" height="513" alt="" /> - <div class="caption">AN ANTI-TANK GUN IN A STEEL CUPOLA (VPRES)</div></div> - -<div id="ip_337c" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 43em;"> - <img src="images/i_336b1.jpg" width="682" height="375" alt="" /> - <div class="caption">A CAPTURED GERMAN TANK</div></div> - -<div id="ip_337d" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 43em;"> - <img src="images/i_336b2.jpg" width="682" height="498" alt="" /> - <div class="caption">A GERMAN ANTI-TANK RIFLE</div></div> - -<p>We carried the front line so easily that we soon realised -we must be up against a system of defence rather -like that which the Germans had adopted at Ypres. He -was keeping his reserves well in rear of a lightly-held -outpost line, and, as we have said, unknown to us, his -guns had been withdrawn in such a way as to cover the -railway.</p> - -<p>The Armoured Cars and the Whippets both took an -active part in the attack on Bucquoy. At the entrance -of the village a large crater had been blown in the road -over which the armoured cars were hauled, after a -smooth path had been beaten down across it by a Whippet. -The cars then sped on through the enemy’s lines, -reaching Achiet-le-Petit ahead of our infantry, and -silenced a number of machine-guns. Two of the cars -received direct hits, one of them being burnt and completely -destroyed.</p> - -<p>During the attack on Courcelles, Captain Richard -Annesley West of the 6th Battalion took charge of some -infantry who had lost their bearings in the dense fog. -He gathered up all the scattered men he could find. He -was mounted, and in the course of the morning he had -two horses shot under him; but after the second horse -had been shot he went on with his work on foot. Having -rallied the infantry, he continued his original task -of leading forward his Tanks, and our capture of -Courcelles was chiefly due to his individual initiative -and gallantry. He was awarded a bar to his -D.S.O.</p> - -<p>About eleven o’clock the greater number both of Mark -V. Tanks and Whippets had reached the line of the railway. -A few leading Tanks had even crossed it, when<span class="pagenum" id="Page_338">338</span> -all in a moment the mist lifted with the suddenness of a -withdrawn curtain. A blazing sun appeared, and each -advancing Tank stood out clearly under its bright light. -The German artillery, which was covering the railway, -immediately directed a deadly fire on the Tanks, and -each individual machine became the centre of a zone of -bullets and bursting shells. The infantry as they advanced -had to avoid these little whirlwinds of fire. It -was at this time that most of the thirty-seven Tanks -which were hit by shells during the day were -accounted for.</p> - -<p>It was a good day for the enemy from an anti-Tank -point of view, such a day indeed as they were never to -repeat.</p> - -<p>Second Lieutenant Hickson of the 3rd Tank Battalion -was one of the few who had got his Tank across the line -just before the mist lifted. As the sun came out he found -himself right in front of the enemy’s batteries at point-blank -range. His Whippet was immediately hit, but he -managed to get his two men away in safety. The artillery -and machine-gun fire was extremely heavy, but -without any thought of his own safety, he at once went -back on foot to warn a number of other Tanks which -were about to cross the railway at the same place. In -this he was successful and undoubtedly saved a large -number of machines from being knocked out. Later, -though the spot was still under heavy fire, he made several -ineffectual efforts to salve his Tank.</p> - -<p>The weather could hardly have done us a worse turn. -Had the mist lasted for half an hour longer the Tanks -would have been able to overrun the artillery positions -without being seen. However, the lifting of the fog at -least enabled the aeroplanes attached to the Tanks to go -up. The counter-gun machines at once flew out to attack<span class="pagenum" id="Page_339">339</span> -the hostile batteries, and a good deal of execution -was done.</p> - -<p>All the rest of the day we fought under a blazing sun.</p> - -<p>The German resistance was curiously patchy; here -and there we found every inch of our advance disputed, -the machine-gunners and artillerymen fighting their -weapons till the last moment, and the reserves launching -small counter-attacks whenever opportunity offered.</p> - -<p>Here and there large parties, a hundred and more -strong, would surrender before the Tanks had time to -open fire.</p> - -<p>The Tank crews,—especially of the Mark V.’s and the -Whippets, whose ventilation was less adequate than the -old Mark IV.’s—suffered greatly from the terrific heat.</p> - -<p>In one or two instances the whole crew of a Mark V. -seems to have become unconscious through the appalling -heat, the fumes from their own engines, and the gas -used by the enemy, the unconsciousness being followed -by temporarily complete loss of memory and extreme -prostration.</p> - -<p>Inside the Whippets, though the men fared slightly -better, the lack of ventilation was equally fatal to -efficiency.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_83" href="#Footnote_83" class="fnanchor">83</a>“The heat temporarily put several Whippets out of -action as fighting weapons.</p> - -<p>“On a hot summer’s day one hour’s running with -door closed renders a Whippet weaponless except for -revolver fire.</p> - -<p>“The heat generated is so intense that it not only -causes ammunition to swell so that it jams the gun, -but actually in several cases caused rounds to explode -inside the Tank.</p> - -<p>“Guns became too hot to hold, and in one case the -temperature of the steering wheel became unbearable.”</p></div> - -<p>But evening came at last, and with the darkness the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_340">340</span> -two armies disengaged.</p> - -<p>We had suffered more casualties than we had quite -bargained for—chiefly owing to the accident of the mist—but -upon the whole we were well satisfied with the -events of the day.</p> - -<p>We had reached the general line of the railway practically -along the whole front of attack. We had captured -Achiet-le-Petit and Longeast Wood, Courcelles -and Moyenneville. Most important of all, the position -we needed for the launching of our principal attack had -been successfully gained and we had taken over 2000 -prisoners.</p> -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_341">341</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_XIX">CHAPTER XIX</h2> - -<p class="subhead">BREAKING THE DROCOURT-QUÉANT LINE—THE BATTLE -OF EPEHY</p> -</div> - -<h3>I</h3> - -<p><span class="firstword">We</span> have said that August 22 had, in the original plan, -been devoted to consolidation and to the moving up of -guns. Only the 3rd Corps in the 4th Army area, with -its twenty-four Tanks of the 4th and 5th Battalions, -launched an interim attack on the Bray-Albert -front.</p> - -<p>We gained all our objectives. The 18th Division -crossed the river Ancre, captured Albert by an enveloping -movement from the south-east, and our line between -the Somme and the Ancre was now advanced well to the -east of the Bray-Albert road.</p> - -<p>The left of the 4th Army was taken forward in conformity -with the rest of our line.</p> - -<p>The way had now been cleared for what was really -the main attack, though it was not the attack in which -the greatest number of Tanks were employed.</p> - -<p>The assault opened on August 23 by a series of -attacks on the whole of a thirty-three-mile front, that -is to say, from our junction with the French, north of -Lihons, to the spot near Mercatel, where the Hindenburg -Line from Quéant and Bullecourt joined the old -Arras-Vimy defence of 1916.</p> - -<p>The hundred Tanks which went into action on this -day were nearly all fresh machines which had not -fought on the 21st.</p> - -<p>They were distributed in groups along the fronts of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_342">342</span> -both the 3rd and 4th Armies.</p> - -<p>South of the Somme, with the Australians near -Chuignolles, the largest group of nearly sixty Tanks -went into action. They were machines belonging to the -2nd, 8th and 13th Battalions.</p> - -<p>The enemy had withdrawn their anti-Tank guns to -the top of the ridge, which it was impossible for Tanks -to climb except at one spot. Upon this one crossing-place -they had trained their guns, and here several -Tanks suffered direct hits.</p> - -<p>We attacked as usual without a preliminary bombardment -and met with a desperate resistance, the German -machine-gunners defending their posts with extraordinary -heroism, and often firing their guns till the very -moment when they and their weapons were crushed to -the earth by an attacking Tank.</p> - -<p>A particularly interesting account of the action is -given in the 13th Battalion <span class="locked">History—</span></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“It was soon evident that the enemy were prepared -to make a stout resistance; there was no definite trench -system, but nests of machine-guns were encountered in -organised shell-holes almost from the start; while Saint -Martin’s Wood and the gully to the east of this, Herleville -Wood, and the quarry at its southern end, were all -strongly held by machine-guns in prepared emplacements. -As before, the German gunners fought with -magnificent pertinacity and courage; one Tank Commander -claimed to have knocked out over thirty -machine-guns, and this claim was supported by the -infantry with him; the estimates of several other Tanks -were almost as high. These machine-guns were provided -with armour-piercing bullets, and Tanks were -pitted all over and in many places penetrated by these. -There is no doubt that by themselves becoming the targets -for these batteries, the Tanks saved many casualties<span class="pagenum" id="Page_343">343</span> -among the infantry. With the machine-guns well -in hand, the Australian infantry were quick to seize the -chances of advance, and by 6.30 a.m. were all established -in their final objectives. After sunrise the heat -of the day became oppressive in the open air, and in the -Tanks intolerable. Several cases were reported of men -becoming delirious during the action. The cause appears -to be three-fold: the weather conditions were trying -even to fresh men; in many cases the composite -crew had recently endured the strain of action without -a complete rest to follow; and a third disadvantage, -which was inherent in the design of the Mark V. Tank, -was now for the first time becoming evident. In these -engines the heat generated by the explosion of the propelling -gases is very great, and the exhaust pipes -speedily become red, and even white hot. In a new -engine this is merely an inconvenience, but after a certain -period of use the joints of the exhaust pipes tend -to warp, and thus to release into the inner air the carbon -gases of the explosion. These gases, if breathed -continuously, even in small quantities, produce exhaustion, -mental confusion and finally unconsciousness. -Further, the effect is cumulative, and a man once poisoned -by the fumes becomes more quickly affected by -further exposure to them. The study of these conditions -and the remedy for them became henceforward -a matter of the first importance.</p> - -<p>“Of the twelve Tanks of the 13th Battalion which -started in this action, seven reached their final objectives. -Five Tanks received direct hits from enemy field -guns, the crews in these cases going on with their -Hotchkiss guns and assisting the infantry forward.</p> - -<p>“Eventually nine Tanks rallied to Company Headquarters, -two of these being towed out of action by their -friends.”</p></div> - -<p>Altogether in this part of the battle 2000 prisoners -and the important villages of Chuignolles, Herleville -and Chuignes had fallen to us before nightfall.</p> - -<p>It was the same story all along the line.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_344">344</span></p> - -<p>In the 3rd Army area, where altogether sixty-five -Tanks fought in several fairly widely separated groups, -the battle was opened rather earlier by a moonlight -attack, which began just before 4 a.m. against the village -of Gomiécourt. In the 6th Corps’ domain, the 3rd -Division was supported by ten Mark IV. Tanks of the -12th Battalion. They attacked Gomiécourt, carried it -triumphantly and captured 500 prisoners. To the north -of them, in the second phase, the Guards Division, with -four Mark IV.’s, captured the village of Hamelincourt. -At Bihucourt, just beyond Achiet-le-Grand, 300 of the -enemy were forced by Tanks to surrender to the infantry. -In one Whippet Tank, the officer and the -sergeant were both killed, and the private drove his -Tank into action by himself, when a target presented -itself, locking his back axle and firing his Hotchkiss -gun.</p> - -<p>Later in the morning, some of the Whippets of the -6th Battalion were operating with the infantry of the -4th Corps to the east of Courcelles. It was suddenly -noticed that the artillery barrage table had been altered, -and that the rate of progress of the barrage was now -100 yards in four minutes, that is to say, considerably -slower than it had been originally intended. The Tanks -were therefore obliged to manœuvre and wheel about, in -order to let the barrage keep ahead. They were constantly -under anti-Tank gun fire at this time. Seven -of the Whippets, however, did not wait, but passed -through our barrage, and getting beyond it, surprised -and scattered large numbers of the enemy who had -taken cover. As the Germans ran, the Whippet machine-gunners -were able to inflict heavy casualties upon them. -Meanwhile, these seven Tanks were played upon by a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_345">345</span> -perfect hail of machine-gun fire, especially from the -direction of Achiet-le-Grand. Changing their direction, -they advanced upon the troublesome machine-guns and -succeeded in cutting off several hundred of the enemy -north of the village, who had been holding up an attack -by our infantry. The Whippets headed and drove them -neatly towards our lines, where the King’s Royal Rifles -immediately took them prisoners. Achiet-le-Grand was -captured with extraordinary small losses.</p> - -<p>Owing to the better weather conditions, aeroplane co-operation -was much more successful throughout the day -than it had been on August 21.</p> - -<p>Messages dropped by aeroplanes were invaluable in -keeping the whole straggling action in hand, and in giving -information, by means of which commanders could -send up reserves where they were wanted.</p> - -<p>The following will give the reader an idea of the sort -of information that the aeroplanes were constantly -furnishing.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p class="center b1">“<i>Messages dropped on H.Q., 1st Brigade.</i></p> - -<p class="center b1">“Lieutenant Wittal (pilot). Lieutenant Mitchell -(observer). <i>12 noon.</i></p> - -<p>“Four Whippets seen in G. 21, two Mark IV. and -several Whippets seen in G. 15d, all moving S.E.</p> - -<p>“Several Whippets and Mark V. seen in G. 16a, G. 10 -and 11d, proceeding S.E.</p> - -<p>“We do not hold Bihucourt.”</p></div> - -<p>The counter-Tank gun work done on this day was -also exceedingly successful, the following is the report -of an action fought by a counter Gun Machine:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“<i>No. 73 Squadron.</i></p> - -<p>“At 1.15 p.m. batteries were observed unlimbering<span class="pagenum" id="Page_346">346</span> -and coming into action near Béhagnies. Twenty-four -bombs were dropped and nearly 2000 rounds fired at -these batteries, causing the greatest confusion. Several -limbers were overturned, and horses stampeded, -and the personnel scattered in all directions.”</p></div> - -<p>Altogether we had every reason to be satisfied by the -events of the day, and we prepared to continue the -action with all possible vigour on the morrow.</p> - -<h3>II</h3> - -<p>But by August 24, there were only fifty-three Tanks -of the 1st, 3rd and 4th Brigades fit for action, and -nearly all the units which went in on this day were -motley collections from various Battalions. One composite -unit of the 11th Battalion fought a very successful -action in conjunction with the 4th Corps, in spite -of the fact that their orders reached them late and that -they had an approach march of six or seven miles. -They managed to catch up the infantry and all their -objectives were taken.</p> - -<p>In the course of the afternoon, Tanks belonging to -the 9th Battalion attacked and met with very stubborn -resistance opposite Mory Copse, where the Hindenburg -Line was strongly held. Here more than one enemy -garrison refused to surrender and had all to be killed. -One party of about sixty was accounted for by four -rounds of 6-pounder case shot.</p> - -<p>One machine, which was doing a piece of reconnaissance -work near Croisilles later in the day, had a particularly -exciting experience. The crew was forced to -evacuate the Tank on account of the phosphorus bombs -with which the enemy had drenched it. Before leaving -it, the officer in command turned the head of his machine -towards home and started the Tank on its lonely<span class="pagenum" id="Page_347">347</span> -way; then, almost choked with the fumes, he got out -and walked between the front horns of the moving -machine till the inside of the Tank was clear of phosphorus. -All the while, he and the machine were completely -surrounded by the enemy. In the end, he got his -Tank home in safety.</p> - -<p>On the 4th Army front, five Tanks of the 1st Battalion -attacked at dawn with the 47th Division in an effort to -recapture Happy Valley, which had been lost by us on -the previous afternoon. The attack was exceedingly -successful, and besides our original objective, the large -village of Bray was added to our gains.</p> - -<p>For the next week, the fighting consisted of a series -of small local engagements for the most part improvised -on the spot by the Divisions concerned.</p> - -<p>Tanks fought every day in one part of the line or -another, and every day we forced a stubbornly resisting -enemy further and further back.</p> - -<p>We propose only to give a short account of most of -the actions of this period.</p> - -<p>On August 25, about forty-two Tanks were again in -action in little “blobs,” strung out on the fronts of the -4th and 6th Corps. Tanks from the 3rd, 7th, and 10th -Battalions went into action, the 9th Battalion attacking -with the Guards Division, north of Mory. Owing to the -dense mist, co-operation between Tanks and infantry -was phenomenally difficult and the attack was not very -successful. During the engagement one Tank had five -of its crew wounded by anti-Tank rifle bullets.</p> - -<p>On the Canadian Corps front an attack was carried -out on August 26, near Fampoux and Neuville-Vitasse, -with the help of Tanks of the 9th and 11th Battalions.</p> - -<p>Near Monchy several Tanks were knocked out, the -crews joining the infantry to repel a local counter-attack.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_348">348</span> -The sergeant of one crew hearing that the enemy -had captured his Tank, collected his men and charged -forward to recover it, arriving at one sponson door of -the machine as the enemy were scrambling out of the -opposite one.</p> - -<p>The Tank Corps records characterise August 27 as -“an uneventful day.” Fourteen Tanks of the 9th and -11th Battalions were used for mopping up points of resistance.</p> - -<p>On the 28th no Tanks went into action at all.</p> - -<p>But the 29th was more memorable, for on this day -the enemy evacuated Bapaume, and in a minor attack -on Frémicourt Lieutenant C. H. Sewell won the -V.C.</p> - -<p>It was a very small engagement south-west of -Beugnâtre, in which only four Whippet Tanks took -part.</p> - -<p>The following is extracted from the report of the engagement -sent in by Lieutenant Sewell’s Commanding -Officer:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“At about 2 p.m. on the afternoon of August 29, -‘Whippets’ of the 3rd (Light) Tank Battalion reached -the Quarry near the ‘Monument Comémoratif,’ south-west -of Favreuil. Acting under instructions received -from the New Zealand Division, one Section of ‘Whippets’ -under Lieutenant C. H. Sewell was ordered forward -to clear up the situation on the front of the 3rd -New Zealand Rifle Brigade before Frémicourt and the -Bapaume-Cambrai road, where the infantry were reported -to be held up by machine-gun fire.</p> - -<p>“On reaching the railway line south-east of Beugnâtre -in advance of our infantry, enemy batteries and -machine-guns opened heavy fire on the Section of -‘Whippets.’ In manœuvring to avoid the fire and to -retain formation, Car No. A.233, commanded by Lieutenant -O. L. Rees-Williams, side-slipped in a deep shell<span class="pagenum" id="Page_349">349</span> -crater and turned completely upside down, catching -fire at the same time.</p> - -<p>“Lieutenant Sewell, in the leading ‘Whippet,’ on -seeing the plight of Lieutenant Rees-Williams’ car, immediately -got out of his own ‘Whippet’ and came to -the rescue; with a shovel he dug an entrance to the -door of the cab, which was firmly jammed and embedded -in the side of the shell-hole, forced the door open -and liberated the crew.</p> - -<p>“Had it not been for Lieutenant Sewell’s prompt and -gallant action, the imprisoned crew might have been -burnt to death, as they were helpless to extricate themselves -without outside assistance.</p> - -<p>“During the whole of this time ‘Whippets’ were -being very heavily shelled and the ground swept by -machine-gun fire at close range. On endeavouring to -return to his own car, Lieutenant Sewell was unfortunately -hit several times, his body being subsequently -found lying beside that of his driver, Gunner Knox. W., -also killed, just outside the Tank, which at that time -was within short range of several machine-guns and -infantry gun-pits.”</p></div> - -<p>The rescued men were emphatic in their praise of -the gallant manner in which Lieutenant Sewell had -saved them from a peculiarly horrible form of death.</p> - -<p>On the 30th, the 3rd Division was to undertake operations -designing to seize the villages of Ecoust and -Longâtte with the trench system beyond. Six Tanks of -the 12th Battalion were to operate, and in anticipation -of their orders had already moved forward to the head -of the Sensée Valley. Unfortunately their orders did -not reach the Battalion till 9 p.m. on the night before -the battle. The night was intensely dark, and as luck -would have it, the Reconnaissance Officer who alone -knew the ground had been recalled to England that day, -and there still remained nearly four miles by the -shortest route before the Tanks reached the jumping-off<span class="pagenum" id="Page_350">350</span> -place. It was clear the machines would have their -work cut out if they were to reach the place in time. -The whole operation was dogged by misfortune. The -taping party took the wrong direction in the pitch dark, -and when at last the Tanks reached the point where -the infantry guides were to lead them the rest of the -way, the guide for the left-hand section lost himself and -the Tanks completely before they had gone half the -distance. For an hour the Tanks and their conductor -wandered about the devastated wastes about Ecoust. -The guide could not even point out on the map where -the infantry were formed up. At last the Section -Commander went forward by himself and managed to -discover the whereabouts of the front line and his own -position, but only to find he was nearly a mile away -and it wanted five minutes to “zero.” It was impossible -that he should reach the battle in time, and he -withdrew his Section according to instructions as he -was in an exposed position. Thus the unfortunate infantry -went over the top unaccompanied by a single -Tank. The assault was a complete failure and the -infantry suffered heavy casualties.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_84" href="#Footnote_84" class="fnanchor">84</a>“On August 31 a further action took place. ‘C’ -Company of the 15th Battalion under Captain G. A. -Smith assisting the 185th Brigade in attacking Vaulx-Vraucourt -from the south.</p> - -<p>“Five Tanks reached their objectives, one failing -owing to mechanical trouble; these Tanks did considerable -execution and rendered great assistance to the -infantry. Again heavy machine-gun and anti-Tank -rifle fire were encountered. After the show the Tanks -themselves bore mute witness to what they had been -through. In particular the Tank ‘Opossum,’ commanded -by Lieutenant C. F. Uzielli, had very little<span class="pagenum" id="Page_351">351</span> -paint left on its sides because of bullet marks. The -infantry suffered heavily. In one case the strength of -a platoon on reaching its objective was only three men.”</p></div> - -<h3>III</h3> - -<p>But we had reached a stage of the battle when it was -clear that another considerable effort on our part would -be well worth the making.</p> - -<p>The enemy’s resistance showed him passionately -anxious to gain time. He retreated with extreme reluctance.</p> - -<p>It was the moment to redouble our blows.</p> - -<p>The actual small operations carried out by the -Tanks during these last few days were only a minor -consideration. Tanks and infantry were busy preparing -for a considerable attack which was to take place -on September 2. On this day, the whole vast battle -reached its zenith and we broke the famous Drocourt-Quéant -Line which we had failed to reach in April -1917. This line was a switch which joined on to the -Hindenburg system. Though we had had scant time -for elaborate preparation, the attack was to be practically -a full-dress affair, eighty-one Tanks being put in -on a comparatively small area. We were expecting a -heavy resistance and our dispositions were very carefully -made. The order of our attack was as follows, -starting from the south:</p> - -<p>With the 4th Corps near Villers-au-Flos the 7th -Tank Battalion.</p> - -<p>With the 6th Corps near Lagnicourt and Moreuil the -12th and 6th Battalions of the 1st Brigade, and against -the actual Drocourt-Quéant Line with the Canadians -and the 17th Corps as many Tanks as the 9th, 11th and -14th Battalions of the 3rd Brigade could muster (about -forty in all).</p> - -<p>The battle was to be fought in the intricate country<span class="pagenum" id="Page_352">352</span> -of the Sensée Valley, and active operations were taking -place throughout the time of preparation for the renewed -battle. It was, therefore, under conditions of exceptional -difficulty that the Tanks assembled, some of -them being obliged to travel along our front across -areas which were far from healthy. The enemy’s defences -had been built in the Spring of 1917. They were -remarkable for extremely strong belts of wire, and we -expected that every effort would be made by the Germans -to hold these defences at all cost.</p> - -<p>Zero was at 5.30 a.m. and a clear dawn was just -breaking when we launched our attack.</p> - -<p>On the Lagnicourt sector, Tanks of the 12th Battalion -immediately came under tremendous fire from field -guns and anti-Tank rifles.</p> - -<p>As it grew lighter, we discovered that a number of -the heavy rifles were being fired with great effect from -a derelict Whippet. This nest was soon dealt with by -a male Tank.</p> - -<p>One female Tank in this sector fired over 4000 rounds -of S.A.A., until, having all its Lewis guns except one -disabled, and five of its crew severely wounded, it -endeavoured to return, its Commander, Lieutenant -Saunders, alternately driving, working the brakes and -firing the remaining gun. As the Tank was thus being -successfully withdrawn, a direct hit set it on fire and -the wounded men were rescued with great difficulty.</p> - -<p>It was not far from Lagnicourt that the Whippets -of the 6th Battalion operated.</p> - -<p>They were commanded by Lieut.-Colonel West, of -whose action on August 21 we have already told the -story:</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_353">353</span></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_85" href="#Footnote_85" class="fnanchor">85</a>“On the night of September 1–2, nine Whippets, -under Captain C. H. Strachan, left Gomiécourt to -attack in the direction of Lagnicourt. Owing to the -pressure at which the Tanks had been working for the -last five weeks, little time had been available for overhauling, -and as the Tanks were running badly, it was -impossible to get them up in time for zero hour. The -Commanding Officer, Lieut.-Colonel R. A. West, D.S.O., -M.C., left camp early on the morning of September 2, -with two mounted orderlies. It was his intention to -get up with the Whippets before they went into action, -by Lagnicourt. He went as far as the infantry on -horseback, in order to watch the progress of the battle, -and to ascertain when to send the Whippets forward. -He arrived at the front line when the enemy were in -process of delivering a strong local counter-attack. -The infantry battalion had suffered heavy officer casualties, -and its flanks were exposed. Realising that there -was a danger of the Battalion giving way, he at once -rode in front of them, under extremely heavy machine-gun -and rifle fire, and rallied the men. In spite of the -fact that the enemy were now close upon him, he took -charge of the situation, and detailed N.C.O.’s to replace -officer casualties. He then rode up and down in front -of the men, in face of certain death, encouraging all, and -calling upon them to ‘Stick it, men and show them -fight.’ His last words were ‘For God’s sake put up -a good fight.’ He fell, riddled by machine-gun -bullets.”</p></div> - -<p>The infantry had been inspired to redoubled efforts -by Colonel West’s example and the hostile attack was -defeated. He had originally come to the Battalion as -a Company Commander, and had been awarded the -D.S.O. for his work in the Arras battle. Between -August 8 and September 2, he was awarded the M.C., -a bar to his D.S.O., and, for his last action, the V.C.</p> - -<p>Elsewhere the fighting was not so heavy, and on the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_354">354</span> -whole we met with less opposition than we had expected.</p> - -<p>In the Canadian sector, the armoured cars were -working in close conjunction with Tank Corps aeroplanes. -At one moment a number of cars were going -along a road, when four machines were hit by shells -from hidden batteries. Their accompanying aeroplanes, -however, immediately attacked the German guns so -vigorously that the crews of the disabled cars, though -completely surrounded by the enemy, were able to -escape capture.</p> - -<p>By noon, on the Canadian section, the whole elaborate -maze of wire, trenches and strong points, which constituted -the Drocourt-Quéant Line, was in our hands, but -elsewhere there was hard fighting until dusk, especially -on the reverse slopes of Dury Ridge. Dury itself we -took, capturing the Town Major. Our task had not, -however, we considered, been quite completed that day, -and next morning Tanks and infantry prepared to “tidy -up” the line, especially Maricourt Wood.</p> - -<p>But long before zero hour, at 5.20, a glare of burning -dumps in the east seemed to show that the enemy were -already withdrawing, and, in fact, when the Tanks went -over just after dawn, they encountered scarcely any opposition -at all, save a perfunctory fire from rearguard -machine-gunners. Small parties of the enemy were -found in dug-outs, waiting to be captured. His infantry -and guns were already well on their way back to -the Canal du Nord.</p> - -<h3>IV</h3> - -<p>The Second Battle of Arras was over and we had -pierced the renowned Drocourt-Quéant Line and had<span class="pagenum" id="Page_355">355</span> -delivered a blow from which the enemy’s <em>moral</em> never -quite recovered.</p> - -<p>Since August 21, in all, some 500 Tanks had been in -action, and except for one or two minor failures every -attack had culminated in a cheap success. We had -pushed forward for fifteen or twenty miles along about -thirty miles of front.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_86" href="#Footnote_86" class="fnanchor">86</a>“During the night of September 2–3, the enemy fell -back rapidly on the whole front of the 3rd Army and -the right of the 1st Army. By the end of the day, he -had taken up positions along the general line of the -Canal du Nord, from Péronne to Ypres, and thence east -of Hermies, Inchy-en-Artois and Ecoust St. Quentin to -the Sensée, east of Lecluse. On the following day he -commenced to withdraw also from the east bank of the -Somme, south of Péronne, and by the night of September -8 was holding the general line Vermand—Epehy—Havrincourt, -and thence along the east bank of the -Canal du Nord.</p> - -<p>“The withdrawal was continued on the front of the -French forces on our right.</p> - -<p>“Throughout this hasty retreat our troops followed -up the enemy closely. Many of his rearguards were cut -off and taken prisoner; on numerous occasions our forward -guns did great execution among his retiring -columns, while our airmen took full advantage of the -remarkable targets offered them. Great quantities of -material and many guns fell into our hands.”</p></div> - -<p>But the Tank Brigades were, all of them, in such -urgent need of refitting, of new machines and of fresh -crews, that after the 3rd they had to be withdrawn into -G.H.Q. reserve, and, “faint with pursuing,” were unable -to take any further part in the battle for just over -a fortnight.</p> - -<p>Even so, that fortnight was spent, not in rest, but in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_356">356</span> -feverish preparation of the most arduous kind. We had -begun to practise the fitting of Cribs, for we were getting -back to the Hindenburg Line.</p> - -<p>The other dogs of war were in full cry. The Tanks -did not propose to waste time.</p> - -<p>By September 18, the 5th Brigade was able to put -a few machines into the field. They belonged to the -2nd Battalion, which had not fought since the earlier -stages of the last battle.</p> - -<h3>V</h3> - -<p>This time the Tanks were to be put in the south, in -the 4th Army area.</p> - -<p>There were to be about twenty Tanks, and they were -to work with the Australians and the 9th and 3rd Corps -on a wide front between Epehy and Villeret.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_87" href="#Footnote_87" class="fnanchor">87</a>“The operations about to be undertaken by the 4th -Army aimed at the capture of the Hindenburg Outpost -Line in order (1) to secure direct observation over the -main Hindenburg Line, and (2) to allow our artillery -positions to be advanced in preparation for the assault -on the main positions.”</p></div> - -<p>The area attacked had a front of about fourteen -miles, thus a Battalion of twenty Tanks could merely -be employed against certain known strong points.</p> - -<p>Eight Tanks were allotted to the 3rd Corps on the -left, eight Tanks in the centre were to work with the -1st and 4th Divisions of the Australian Corps.</p> - -<p>On the 9th Corps sector on the right, four Tanks were -allotted to the 6th Division.</p> - -<p>The night had been fine, but when zero hour came<span class="pagenum" id="Page_357">357</span> -(5.20) it was raining heavily, and all day the weather -was dull and cloudy, visibility being often bad enough -to make the Tank Commanders glad of their compasses.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_88" href="#Footnote_88" class="fnanchor">88</a>“The company operating with the 3rd Corps had -for their two main objectives the villages of Epehy and -Ronssoy. The former place was taken with no great -resistance, the enemy surrendering in numbers on the -appearance of the Tanks. Ronssoy was more stoutly -defended; here machine-gun fire with armour-piercing -bullets was very heavy, and anti-Tank rifles were also -freely used. Two Tanks had for their objective the very -strong organisation of trenches and fortified cottages -known as the Quadrilateral, which formed the key to -the German Defensive System between Fresnoy and -Selency.”</p></div> - -<p>During the attack two Tanks belonging to “C” Company -fought an extremely gallant action.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_89" href="#Footnote_89" class="fnanchor">89</a>“Fresnoy was the line of the first objective, but in -going forward, the infantry came under heavy machine-gun -fire from the Quadrilateral on their right flank. -Both officers, unseen by one another in the mist and -smoke, headed their Tanks straight for the thickest of -the fire. Second Lieutenant G. F. Smallwood arrived -first and encountered terrific resistance, with which he -was successfully dealing when his Tank became ditched -while crossing a sunken road, all guns but one being -covered. It was impossible to use the unditching beam -owing to the intense fire from short range. At this moment -Second Lieutenant W. R. Hedges, driving his own -Tank, as the driver had been killed and the second driver -badly wounded, appeared from the mist heading for the -Quadrilateral with all guns firing. Captain Hamlet, -the Section Commander, was also inside this Tank. -Just as Second Lieutenant Hedges was appearing to get -the upper hand of the enemy his Tank burst into flames.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_358">358</span> -Desperate efforts were apparently made to put these -out, but after five minutes Captain Hamlet and the -crew jumped out of the Tank on the right-hand side -straight into the arms of the Huns, who had surrounded -the Tank. Second Lieutenant Hedges, however, sprang -out from the other side and darted through them though -subject to a heavy fire. Though hit two or three times -he reached the shelter of the sunken road about fifty -yards from Second Lieutenant Smallwood’s Tank. The -latter left the Tank and brought Second Lieutenant -Hedges back with him. Heavy shelling all round the -Tank compelled its evacuation, and Second Lieutenant -Smallwood and crew took up a position with their -machine-guns and successfully held off the enemy. -Later on, the infantry, who had been held up some 200 -yards behind, were able to come up and take over the -post. Meanwhile Second Lieutenant Hedges had been -sent to a Dressing Station, but he never arrived there. -This very gallant officer’s fate is still unknown.”</p></div> - -<p>On the 9th Corps front progress was slow, but by the -end of the day we held Ronssoy and Hargicourt.</p> - -<p>A good idea is given of the minor mechanical difficulties -of this part of the campaign in the 2nd Battalion -History:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“Liaison, reconnaissance and Tank maintenance -were rendered far more difficult than usual owing to -the lack of transport, which was in such a state that no -car, box-body, lorry or motor-cycle could be relied upon. -The nearest M.T. Park for repairs was twenty-five miles -away. Long treks by night meant work on Tanks by -day. Reconnaissance and liaison had often to be carried -out on foot with consequent loss of time. There -was very little rest or sleep for any one between September -13 and 18.”</p></div> - -<p>We did not renew the advance till the 21st, when nine -Tanks helped the attack on the 3rd Corps front against<span class="pagenum" id="Page_359">359</span> -the Knoll and Guillemont and Quennemont Farms. -Two of these Tanks were of the Mark V. Star pattern -and carried forward infantry machine-gunners.</p> - -<p>But we were up against a desperate enemy resistance, -machine-guns firing armour-piercing bullets, anti-Tank -rifles, field guns and land mines all being used against -us.</p> - -<p>The attack did not succeed in gaining us the coveted -positions, and we were to pay dearly for this failure.</p> - -<p>Again two days elapsed, and meanwhile (on the 20th) -the 8th, 16th and 13th Battalions, and the 5th Supply -Co. had been brought forward.</p> - -<p>There was a big enterprise in view.</p> - -<p>This hitherto more or less isolated sector of attack -was to be “federated” with the new vast projected -attack which was to be made by no fewer than three -Armies, their blows timed to fall in rapid succession.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile a piece of ground which we coveted remained -in enemy hands.</p> - -<p>We were anxious to hold the high ground north of -Selency and to clear up the formidable Quadrilateral -south of Fresnoy.</p> - -<p>The 9th Corps, therefore, was to attack on a two-division -front with the aid of twenty Tanks of the newly -arrived 13th Battalion.</p> - -<p>The plans were discussed at a conference held on -September 22, and the Tanks brought up to the assembly -points by skeleton crews that same night.</p> - -<p>The fighting crews were brought up by lorry the following -afternoon, according to the wise practice which -was now beginning to be generally employed, whenever -there was enough personnel to make it possible. The -final approach march was begun at 8.30 p.m. the night -of the 23rd.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_360">360</span></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_90" href="#Footnote_90" class="fnanchor">90</a>“After Clearing St. Quentin Wood, in which some -delay was caused by overhead signal wires, which had -to be passed from hand to hand to avoid catching the -semaphore standards, Tanks had to pass through a -heavy harassing fire in which gas shell was largely employed. -Thus the latter part of the march was made -with Tanks closed and gas masks often worn; in consequence -the crews, especially of the company working on -the left, suffered greatly from gas and petrol fumes. -While waiting on the Start Lines, Tanks were heavily -shelled, and enemy ’planes twice during the night -dropped flares exactly over the sections with the 6th -Division on the right.”</p></div> - -<p>Anti-Tank guns were extremely active throughout the -operation.</p> - -<p>Three Tanks, which with their infantry penetrated -right into the Quadrilateral, were all put out of action -by a single gun.</p> - -<p>Altogether, the Tanks suffered a 50 per cent. loss of -machines in this action.</p> - -<p>However, we won some of the points of observation -that were needed for the next attack, and though we -failed to hold the Quadrilateral we had practically outflanked -and sterilised it by the end of the day.</p> - -<p>So ended the little Battle of Epehy.</p> - -<p>Our advance had not been a long one, for the enemy -had contested every yard with a desperate valour.</p> - -<p>His losses had been enormous, and this minor battle -added no less than 12,000 prisoners and 100 guns to the -Allied “bag.”</p> -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_361">361</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_XX">CHAPTER XX</h2> - -<p class="subhead">THE SECOND BATTLE OF CAMBRAI, OR THE BATTLE OF -CAMBRAI-ST. QUENTIN</p> -</div> - -<p><span class="firstword">The</span> enemy was in full retreat, but we had every reason -to suppose that once he had got “home,” back to -the Hindenburg Line, he would resist our further attempts -to advance with all his strength.</p> - -<p>If we attacked the line and our assault was successful, -and we could break his defences, the way, as we -have said, lay clear to the heart of his great system of -lateral railway communications. We could cut his -forces completely in two. But besides this, if we could -beat him here on his chosen battleground, if we could -wound him, even behind the rampart upon which he -had for years spent such an infinity of toil, where, in the -open unprepared country behind, could he hope to withstand -us? The lists were set for a struggle <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">à outrance</i>, -the two forces faced each other grimly, for upon the -fortunes of the champions in this combat hung the fate -of the German nation. It was to be a Tank attack. We -were to make the assault on a very wide front, and were -to continue our system of hitting in rapid succession in -alternate Army areas. The last blow had been delivered -by the 4th Army on September 18. The new battle was -to be begun by the 1st and 3rd Armies.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_91" href="#Footnote_91" class="fnanchor">91</a>“On the 1st and 3rd Army fronts, strong positions -covering the approaches to Cambrai between the Nord<span class="pagenum" id="Page_362">362</span> -and Schelde Canals, including the section of the Hindenburg -Line itself north of Gouzeaucourt, were still in the -enemy’s possession. His trenches in this sector faced -south-west, and it was desirable that they should be -taken in the early stages of the operation, so as to render -it easier for the artillery of the 4th Army to get into -position.”</p></div> - -<p>To the south, as soon as certain points of vantage, -Quennemont Farm, the Knoll and Bellicourt, were in -our hands, there was to be a lull, and the 4th Army was -to attack in strength on the 29th, two days later—as -soon, that is, as the Germans had had time thoroughly -to involve their reserves in the first mêlée.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the Tank Brigades had to be rapidly reorganised -and redistributed, the Battalions being almost -all reshuffled. About one-third of the available machines -were to be put in on the northern part of the front, and -the other two-thirds were to fight with the 4th Army on -the 29th.</p> - -<p>For the sake of clarity, it is simpler to treat the two -halves of the battle separately, for though they were -completely interdependent and formed part of one strategic -conception, each offered very distinct tactical -problems of its own. In each the ground had very -marked topographical features, features that gave to -each half a special character.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap larger">Part I</span></h3> - -<h3>I</h3> - -<p>We have said that the 1st and 3rd Armies were to -strike first. Tanks belonging to the 7th and 11th Battalions -of the 1st Brigade were to fight with the Canadians -and the 4th Corps opposite Bourlon and Gouzeaucourt,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_363">363</span> -and the 2nd Brigade was to contribute the 15th -Battalion, which was to co-operate with the 17th Corps -opposite Graincourt and Flesquières.</p> - -<p>Altogether fifty-three fighting Tanks were to be -employed.</p> - -<p>As in the 4th Army sector, the peculiar lie of the -country was the chief influence which shaped our battle -tactics, as in the 4th Army area a canal was the central -feature of the attack.</p> - -<p>In the First Battle of Cambrai the Tanks had all attacked -from south of the northward bend of the Canal -du Nord near Havrincourt, and so worked up the -enemy’s side of this great obstacle.</p> - -<p>Now we were in a better position to force a direct -crossing, both strategically and mechanically, and the -hazardous venture was to be attempted. Direct ground -reconnaissance of the Canal itself was impossible, as -the enemy held the hither bank in strength, but every -conceivable source of information was exhaustively exploited -in the endeavour to find crossing-places for the -Tanks, that might offer at least a possibility of success.</p> - -<p>Daring flights were made by special observers in low-flying -aeroplanes, and a wonderful mosaic was pieced -together from successive sets of air-photographs.</p> - -<p>This was annotated, re-photographed, enlarged, and -circulated to all concerned for further amplification and -annotation as additional information was collected; -Major Macavity of the Canadian Corps Intelligence, -and Captain Oswald Birly of 1st Army Headquarters, -being largely responsible for the thoroughness of this, -as well as of several previous “over-the-line” surveys.</p> - -<p>In addition, the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Garde Champêtre</i>, the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Ponts et Chaussées</i> -service, and the engineers’ working drawings for -the Canal, were all laid under contribution, as well as<span class="pagenum" id="Page_364">364</span> -the evidence of a number of prisoners, refugees and -<i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">repatriés</i>.</p> - -<p>From such sources and on such evidence the requisite -number of crossings were at length determined on, and -the Tanks definitely and severally allotted to them, for -good or ill.</p> - -<p>But when all had been done, there were one or two -points about which there still remained a disquieting -element of doubt.</p> - -<p>At one of these, where aerial photographs showed a -breach through the retaining banks of the dry Canal -that just might, or that just might not, allow sufficient -width for Tanks to cross, a crossing was imperative for -the local success of the attack. Somehow, a passage had -to be positively assured—and there seemed but one sure -way of keeping our contract with the infantry, who -were to storm the Canal at that place.</p> - -<p>A bridge was to be formed of three old and obsolete -Tanks, upon the broad backs of which their juniors and -betters might scramble across and get to close quarters -with the enemy. Four elderly machines, warranted unsound, -were accordingly sought out, specially stiffened -up with internal timber struts, and allotted the self-sacrificing -task of slithering down into the Canal bed, -and there swinging and shunting until they lay side -by side ready for the fighters to crawl over them.</p> - -<p>Under the heading “<span class="smcap">A Bridge of Tanks</span>,” the actual -crossing was very vividly described in the Press.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> -<p class="sigright">“<i>Paris, September 28.</i></p> - -<p>“A French correspondent relates the following interesting -episode which happened in the battle yesterday.</p> - -<p>“It had been decided that a Tank detachment of the -older types should lead the attack, expose themselves to -the enemy fire, and, on arriving at the brink of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_365">365</span> -Canal, drop themselves into the bed so as to form an -improvised bridge from one Tank to the other. The -fast Tanks were to follow, and this new rapid type was -to pass over the backs of their older comrades, opening -out a path for the infantry. Volunteers were asked for -this post of danger, and for one crew wanted ten crews -offered themselves. Lots had to be drawn finally to -choose the heroic winners of this contest of honour. The -wonderful feat was accomplished. The old scarred -Tanks, covered with ancient gashes and wounds proudly -gained in the fighting on the Somme, and in the fighting -of over a year ago before Cambrai, took for the last time -their slow and massive way, and plunged with noble -abnegation over the edge. Over their bodies the new -strong Tanks passed with giant strides, our soldiers -followed them to victory, and shortly after eight o’clock -they penetrated Flesquières.”</p></div> - -<p>As a matter of fact, the actuality fell somewhat short -of this description. The veteran machines found themselves -quite unequal to the long trek, and even the least -decrepit of the four finally doddered to a standstill -whilst yet miles away from the Canal.</p> - -<p>So there was no “Bridge of Tanks” after all, -though, as things turned out, its absence embarrassed -no one, with the possible though unlikely exception of -the “close-up” correspondent.</p> - -<p>Most fortunately the doubtful crossing proved practicable, -and all machines, save one that struck a land-mine, -passed safely over.</p> - -<h3>II</h3> - -<p>The attack was, as usual, at dawn, and, as the first-wave -Tanks and infantry went over the top, they met -with fierce resistance. On the right we encountered -particularly strong opposition near Beaucamp Ridge.</p> - -<p>The 11th Battalion History remarks upon the extraordinarily<span class="pagenum" id="Page_366">366</span> -gallant fighting of the enemy on this -sector.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“In some cases they even attempted to pull the -machine-guns and 6-pounders out of the Tanks. We inflicted -many casualties by actually running over -machine-guns and infantry, as well as by our fire.”</p></div> - -<p>Indeed, the Germans here constantly counter-attacked -throughout the day, so important did they deem the position. -In spite of them, however, we successfully established -our right flank.</p> - -<p>Just to the north of them the Guards and the 3rd Division -forced a crossing of the Canal in face of their heavy -machine and field gun fire, captured Ribecourt and -Flesquières, the Guards taking Arival Wood and pushing -north of Premy Chapel, where the 2nd Division took -up the advance.</p> - -<p>The 15th Battalion History tells the story of four -Tanks which were co-operating with the Guards Division. -It is typical of this part of the battle. On the -northern outskirts of Flesquières they awaited the arrival -of the 1st Grenadiers, filling in the interval by -helping the Gordons in their occupation of the village.</p> - -<p>When the Guards arrived the situation was still somewhat -obscure, and Major Skeggs, commanding the -Tanks, made a daring forward reconnaissance from -Flesquières towards Premy Chapel.</p> - -<p>The Tanks were brought round north of the village -immediately, engaging a number of machine and field -guns, which were firing from Arival Wood. In order -to cover the advance of the infantry, the Tanks had to -come up over a bare stretch of country, exposed to direct -fire from a number of field pieces.</p> - -<p>Two Tanks, “Orchid” and “Othello,” were soon<span class="pagenum" id="Page_367">367</span> -knocked out, and 2nd Lieutenant Riddle’s “Orestes” -and Sergeant Whatley’s “Oribi” only were left.</p> - -<p>But it was in the centre that the Tanks fought their -chief battle. Under cover of darkness, the Canadians -and the 63rd Division had moved down the west bank of -the Canal near Mœuvres and Sains-lez-Marquion. In the -half light of dawn they stormed the Canal itself. The -resistance here was far from well organised.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_92" href="#Footnote_92" class="fnanchor">92</a>“Silkem Chapel and Wood Switch were packed -with enemy infantry, who were in great confusion, unable -to move one way or the other. The Tank ‘Odetta,’ -commanded by Second Lieutenant C. W. Luck, did great -execution there, bringing all his guns to bear on the -enemy, and using case shot at point-blank range.”</p></div> - -<p>All day the 15th Battalion fought.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“About 4.30 p.m. the G.S.O.3, 63rd Division, brought -up a Brigadier-General (brigade not ascertained), who -asked if Tanks could go forward with his Brigade, who -were then about to resume the advance. He was informed -that they had very little petrol left, but would -go on if he (the Brigadier-General) would accept responsibility -for Tanks being stranded right forward -without petrol. The Brigadier-General agreed to this, -and said he wanted to get his Brigade on to the Marquion -Line.</p> - -<p>“The two Tanks went forward and picked up the -infantry north of Graincourt. From this point they -preceded the infantry, encountering practically no opposition.</p> - -<p>“Beyond Anneux, the Tanks came under a lot of -machine-gun fire from the direction of Fontaine-Notre-Dame. -Both Tanks were turned broadside on, and fire -was brought to bear on the German machine-guns in -order to support the infantry advancing on the left.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_368">368</span> -Parties of the enemy, who were seen coming over the -crest towards the Marquion Line, were engaged by all -Tank guns which could be brought to bear. The enemy -ran away and many casualties were caused.</p> - -<p>“Soon after this some heavy shells, believed to have -been fired from trench mortars, fell very close to the -Tanks. These two Tanks reached a point about 1000 -yards from Cantaing before completing their work.</p> - -<p>“Petrol was then almost finished, crews were much -exhausted, having left the final lying-up place at about -twelve midnight, on September 26–27. The work required -of the Tanks was completed, so they were withdrawn -to a point well east of the Canal.”</p></div> - -<p>Meanwhile our line had been pushed on east of Anneux -to Fontaine-Notre-Dame. Bourlon Village had -been carried by the 7th Tank Battalion and the Canadians. -We had passed through Bourlon Wood, which -was now wholly in our possession.</p> - -<p>On the extreme left a Division of the 22nd Corps had -also crossed the Canal, cleared Sauchy-Lestrée and had -moved on northward.</p> - -<p>The air co-operation had been particularly effective -throughout the day. The work of the 8th Squadron had, -however, been a good deal hampered, as they had concentrated -on the 4th Army front for the recent fighting -there, and therefore had a long flight and difficult signal -communications when ordered to work with the 3rd and -1st Armies. However, their arrangements with their -Tank partners were, as usual, admirable. With the 7th -Battalion, who, with the Canadians, had been set the -task of crossing the Canal du Nord opposite Inchy, and -then taking Bourlon Village, co-operation was particularly -good; not only were vital messages dropped at -Battalion Headquarters, but a gun which was firing on -three of our Tanks from Bourlon Wood was effectively<span class="pagenum" id="Page_369">369</span> -bombed, and twice the airman chased its crew away with -his machine-gun.</p> - -<div id="ip_369" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 41em;"> - <img src="images/i_368a.jpg" width="654" height="325" alt="" /> - <div class="caption">INFANTRY ADVANCING BEHIND TANKS. A PRACTICE ATTACK AT BERMICOURT</div></div> - -<div id="ip_369b" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 43em;"> - <img src="images/i_368b1.jpg" width="684" height="453" alt="" /> - <div class="caption">THE ST. QUENTIN CANAL TUNNEL, BELLICOURT</div></div> - -<div id="ip_369c" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 43em;"> - <img src="images/i_368b2.jpg" width="678" height="442" alt="" /> - <div class="caption">CARRIER PIGEON BEING RELEASED</div></div> - -<p>On September 28 Tanks of the 7th and 11th Battalions -fought again at Baillencourt. Seven Tanks of -the 11th Battalion with the 5th Corps captured Villers -Guislain and Gonnelieu.</p> - -<p>By the evening of the 28th we had taken all our objectives, -and had advanced beyond our old high-water -line of the First Battle of Cambrai. Fontaine-Notre-Dame, -Bourlon Village, Epinoy and Haynecourt were -all ours, and we had captured over 10,000 prisoners and -200 guns. The Tanks had suffered heavy casualties, but -they had not suffered them in vain.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap larger">Part II</span></h3> - -<h3>I</h3> - -<p>We have said that in the original battle scheme, certain -points of vantage, Quennemont, the Knoll, and -Bellicourt, were assumed to be in our hands a day or -so before the main attack on the 4th Army front was -launched.</p> - -<p>These fortified heights were of importance owing to -the singular geography of this sector of the line.</p> - -<p>All along this piece of the front, more or less parallel -to the lines of the armies, runs—deep and broad—the -St. Quentin Canal.</p> - -<p>For three and a half miles, however, between Bellicourt -and Vendhuille it runs underground through a -tunnel.</p> - -<p>We have seen how, in the northern part of the line, -the enemy had relied upon the Canal du Nord to form -the principal obstacle to an attack.</p> - -<p>In August we had captured a document which proved<span class="pagenum" id="Page_370">370</span> -that he realised that if we attacked at all in the south, -and whether we attacked with Tanks or not, it would be -in that three-and-a-half-mile gap that our heaviest blow -would fall.</p> - -<p>The photograph gives an excellent notion why we had -to avoid certain sectors of the Canal at all costs, and -Sir Douglas Haig, in his Despatch, gives an admirable -idea of some of the complex features which the topography -here possessed.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“The general configuration of the ground through -which this sector of the Canal runs, produces deep cuttings -of a depth in places of some sixty feet; while between -Bellicourt and the neighbourhood of Vendhuille -the Canal passes through a tunnel for a distance of -6000 yards. In the sides of the cuttings the enemy had -constructed numerous tunnelled dug-outs and concrete -shelters. Along the top edge of them he had concealed -well-sited concrete or armoured machine-gun emplacements. -The tunnel itself was used to provide living -accommodation for troops, and was connected by -shafts with the trenches above. South of Bellicourt the -Canal cutting gradually becomes shallow, till at -Bellenglise the Canal lies almost at ground level. South -of Bellenglise the Canal is dry.</p> - -<p>“On the western side of the Canal, south of Bellicourt, -two thoroughly organised and extremely heavily -wired lines of continuous trench run roughly parallel -to the Canal, at average distances from it of 2000 and -1000 yards respectively. The whole series of defences, -with the numerous defended villages contained in it, -formed a belt of country varying from 7000 to 10,000 -yards in depth, organised by the employment of every -available means into a most powerful system, well meriting -the great reputation attached to it.”</p></div> - -<p>On the three and a half miles of front, where alone -Tanks and artillery could cross the line of the Canal,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_371">371</span> -the outpost system which everywhere protected the -Hindenburg Line, was doubly reinforced, and gained a -natural strength from its position on the heights, beneath -which the Canal had burrowed.</p> - -<p>Only a very “full dress” attack on so highly organised -a system as the Hindenburg Line was likely to be -successful, and in order to launch such an attack it was -essential that we should already hold the Knoll and -Guillemont and Quennemont Farms.</p> - -<p>We have seen how in the last day or two of the battle -of Epehy we assaulted the line again and again, duly -captured the sector opposite Bellicourt, but how, two -days before the main attack was to be launched, the -Knoll and Quennemont were still in the hands of the -enemy.</p> - -<p>This state of affairs caused grave anxiety, as the whole -set-piece attack was based on the idea of using this line -as a “jumping-off” position.</p> - -<p>It had been intended that the two American Divisions, -which were to fight on this sector, should only be put in -when this line had been secured.</p> - -<p>It was now decided that they must themselves make -a final effort to capture the outpost line before the main -assault, which was due for dawn on September 29.</p> - -<p>Therefore, at dawn on the 27th, the 27th American -Division, assisted by twelve Tanks of the 4th Battalion, -again attacked under cover of a creeping barrage.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_93" href="#Footnote_93" class="fnanchor">93</a>“The attack met with strong opposition, and the -final position reached was the subject of conflicting reports -from the troops engaged and from the air observers. -Subsequent events showed that small parties -of Americans and Tanks had reached the vicinity of -their objective, and had very gallantly maintained<span class="pagenum" id="Page_372">372</span> -themselves there; but the line as a whole was not materially -advanced by the day’s operations.... The -barrage could not now be brought back on this flank -owing to the knowledge that parties of American troops, -as well as a number of American wounded, would be -exposed to our own fire. Also any alteration in the -barrage plans, which had already been issued, would -inevitably lead to confusion.”</p></div> - -<p>Either, therefore, the whole main attack must be delayed, -or the American divisions and some of the British -troops north of them must start some 1000 yards behind -their barrage, and from a very indefinite jumping-off -line.</p> - -<p>The latter course was decided upon.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_94" href="#Footnote_94" class="fnanchor">94</a>“The artillery start line, as originally planned, was -to hold good, and the troops of the 27th American Division -would form up for the attack on a line as far forward -as possible, and would be assisted by an additional -number of Tanks. The strength in Tanks was augmented -to such an extent as should easily overwhelm the -enemy resistance west of the start line. It was thought -that this, with the slow rate of barrage, would enable -the Americans to carry out their task.”</p></div> - -<p>But there was yet one more difficulty, a serious obstacle -of which we were serenely unaware. A British -anti-Tank minefield, consisting of rows of buried heavy -trench-mortar bombs, each holding 50 lb. of ammonal, -had been put down just prior to our loss of the area in -March 1918, and of this minefield no information had -reached the Tanks.</p> - -<p>It will thus be seen that the dice were very heavily -loaded against success on this part of the front before -day dawned on the eventful 29th of September, 1918.</p> - -<p>The whole attack was to be on a twelve-mile front.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_373">373</span> -The infantry were to take advantage of a number of -foot-bridges, which our bombardment had prevented the -enemy from getting out to destroy, and in some places -our men were prepared to wade or swim through the -water.</p> - -<p>It was expected, however, that the chief resistance -would be offered on the famous three and a half miles.</p> - -<p>Altogether about 175 Tanks, including the new American -Battalion, were to be launched, and four Corps were -to be involved.</p> - -<p>To the 9th Corps on the right, the 5th, 6th and 7th -Tank Battalions of the 3rd Brigade were allotted.</p> - -<p>In the centre, with the Australian and American -Corps, the 1st, 4th and 301st American Battalions of -the 4th Brigade were to fight.<a id="FNanchor_95" href="#Footnote_95" class="fnanchor">95</a></p> - -<p>The 8th, 13th and 16th Battalions of the 5th Tank -Brigade were to be held in 4th Army Reserve.</p> - -<p>Almost up to zero hour on the 29th we still hoped to -get news that we held the Knoll and Quennemont. But -no reassuring message came through.</p> - -<p>It was thus in a very singular world that the 301th -American Tank Battalion was destined to make its -debut.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_96" href="#Footnote_96" class="fnanchor">96</a>“The 301st’s reconnaissance before the battle was -very efficiently carried out in spite of many disadvantages. -The taping especially was a classic example of -pluck and efficiency. It must be borne in mind that -this was no quiet front, and that the attempts to take -his outpost line had made the Boche exceedingly nervous -and alert. In consequence, the nights preceding the -battle were some of the dirtiest I’ve experienced. The<span class="pagenum" id="Page_374">374</span> -Battalion R.O. (I’ve forgotten his name), one Company -R.O. (Lieutenant T. C. Naedale) and a sergeant were -knocked out whilst supervising the taping. Lieutenant -Naedale got his wounds dressed and continued his work -up till zero hour. It is worthy of mention, in connection -with this incident, that each American Tank had -its own tape laid out over our front line towards the -Boche by the Company R.O.’s. Tank Commanders told -me afterwards that they had to start fighting before the -end of their tape was reached.”</p></div> - -<h3>II</h3> - -<p>When the dawn broke the usual mist lay thick and -added its quota of confusion to the uncertainties of the -morning.</p> - -<p>All along the line, the battle swayed confusedly, developing -into what was perhaps the most complete -“mix-up” of any battle of the War.</p> - -<p>To the north, the fighting was extremely heavy.</p> - -<p>Owing to the employment of an effective barrage -having been impossible, the American 27th Division suffered -severely from the fire of massed hostile machine-guns -from the moment the attack began.</p> - -<p>Just as the Tanks of the 301st were moving up in -support, ready to deal with the machine-guns which -were, as an eye-witness describes it, by now “mowing -down the other Americans in swathes,” no less than -ten machines struck upon the forgotten minefield.</p> - -<p>The American Tanks experienced the bitterest of -war’s accidents, useless destruction at the hands of their -own colleagues.</p> - -<p>The explosions were terrific, the whole bottom of -many machines being torn out and a large proportion -of the crews being killed.</p> - -<p>A little further to the south our attack was progressing -well.</p> - -<p>Tanks of the 4th and 5th Battalions and their infantry<span class="pagenum" id="Page_375">375</span> -had pushed forward. The intricate trench system -and the confusion of wire and dug-outs, however, -were responsible for a certain loss of cohesion, so that by -the time the village of Bellicourt had been reached the -attacking troops were some distance behind the barrage, -and a good deal of the weight had gone out of the -assault.</p> - -<p>But though several large parties of the enemy still -held out, we had, on this sector, actually penetrated the -Hindenburg Line before noon.</p> - -<p>But now the mist began to lift. The enemy still held -Quennemont Farm and the land to the north of it in -great strength, and from that high ground they were -now beginning to be able to see well enough to pour a -devastating fire into the backs of the troops who were -advancing in the Bellicourt Sector. The situation was -critical and called for immediate action.</p> - -<p>Major Hotblack, the Head of the Tank Corps Intelligence, -who was watching the progress of the battle near -this point, luckily realised the situation before the -enemy and rushed to try to improvise a diversion. He -fortunately found two Tanks<a id="FNanchor_97" href="#Footnote_97" class="fnanchor">97</a> which were waiting, -ready to take part in a later stage of the attack. With -the permission of the Battalion Commander, the two -machines were hastily set going, and Major Hotblack -jumped into the leading Tank. The machines were -driven rapidly towards Quennemont Ridge. There was -no body of infantry immediately available, and with the -weather in its present mood, there was no time to wait; -so the two Tanks without artillery or infantry support -attacked what afterwards proved to be an unbroken -sector of the enemy’s front.</p> - -<p>But if confusion reigned in the British line, there is<span class="pagenum" id="Page_376">376</span> -no doubt that the Germans, though fighting exceedingly -well, were far from clear about the actual position. In -the confusion, they appear to have mistaken the two -isolated machines for a considerable force. The two -Tanks successfully made their way on to the heretofore -impregnable Ridge, and actually succeeded in driving -the enemy off it, killing large numbers of the defenders -and capturing a quantity of machine-guns. Then at last -the German field gunners awoke to the situation, and -being otherwise unharassed, opened a devastating fire -upon the two presumptuous machines. They succeeded -in hitting and setting fire to both of them, the crews -being obliged to evacuate, having suffered considerable -casualties.</p> - -<p>Major Hotblack, though partially blinded, was able to -carry on, but the only other officer was severely -wounded, and a derisory little force—one officer and -five or six men, was thus left to hold the Ridge. Quite -undaunted, they immediately set to work to prepare for -the German counter-attack which, now that the Tanks -were out of action and ablaze, seemed imminent. There -was an abundance of enemy machine-guns lying about, -and some of these were got ready for action, for the -Tanks’ own guns had been destroyed when the machines -were knocked out.</p> - -<p>While these guns were being turned round ready for -their late owners, the tiny garrison was joined, first by -an Australian and then by an American officer, each -with an orderly, who had each separately come out to -try and find out the position of affairs. The situation -was rapidly explained to them, and was soon made -clearer still by the expected counter-attack from the -Germans. Twice during the previous week’s fighting,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_377">377</span> -the enemy had regained this Ridge when it was held in -force. This time less than a dozen men successfully -held it against them, and although almost every one of -the defenders was wounded, they held out until relief -came, several hours later.</p> - -<p>For his part in this action Major Hotblack was -awarded a bar to his Military Cross. This was his last -action in the war, as the wounds he received on this -occasion incapacitated him till the Armistice had been -signed.</p> - -<p>It is rather interesting to note that this officer was -wounded five times during the course of the war—on -four occasions in the head; but so admirable is our hospital -system that he is now practically none the worse -for his experiences.</p> - -<p>On the extreme right of the battle the attack of the -9th Corps was a complete success, the 46th Division -particularly distinguishing itself in the capture of -Bellenglise.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_98" href="#Footnote_98" class="fnanchor">98</a>“Equipped with lifebelts, and carrying mats and -rafts, the 46th Division stormed the western arm of the -Canal at Bellenglise and to the north of it, some crossing -the Canal on foot bridges, which the enemy was -given no time to destroy, others dropping down the sheer -sides of the Canal wall, and, having swum or waded to -the far side, climbing up the farther wall to the German -trench lines on the eastern bank.”</p></div> - -<p>The Tanks were, of course, unable to cross with their -infantry. They moved on Bellicourt, crossed over the -tunnel at the nearest point, and swung south, working -down the further bank of the Canal and arriving just -in time to take part in the attack on Monchy.</p> - -<p>Our success here was so complete that one division<span class="pagenum" id="Page_378">378</span> -alone captured 4000 prisoners and seventy guns.</p> - -<p>Many of these batteries were taken from the rear by -Tanks and infantry while they were still in action, the -enemy not realising in the least that they had been outflanked.</p> - -<h3>III</h3> - -<p>At the end of the day it was pretty clear what must -be the ultimate result of the battle. But our front was -extremely ragged and the breaches we had driven in -the Hindenburg Line but narrow.</p> - -<p>So for some days our attacks continued on all fronts; -from north of Cambrai, where the 7th Battalion Tanks -and the Canadians met with a desperate resistance, -right down to our junction with the French 1st Army -south of St. Quentin.</p> - -<p>With the exception of a party of six machines belonging -to the 1st Brigade, who helped in an attack just -north of Cambrai, all the Tank actions of this period -were fought in the 4th Army area, where we were busied -in driving in the wedge whose thin end we had inserted -with so much effort on September 29.</p> - -<p>On the 30th, twenty Tanks belonging to the 5th, 6th, -13th and 7th Battalions fought in different groups, none -with striking success, in one or two cases owing to the -fact that the fresh infantry who had been brought up -were unaccustomed to Tanks, and that liaison was -therefore defective.</p> - -<p>The village of Bony, which had just been entered by -the Armoured Cars on the 29th, still held out stubbornly.</p> - -<p>On October 1, Tanks of the 9th Battalion were engaged -with the 32nd Division in an attack on a part of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_379">379</span> -the line near Joncourt. In this action the Tanks made -very successful use of smoke screens.</p> - -<p>On the 2nd no Tanks fought, but on October 3 about -forty machines went into action.</p> - -<p>As on the previous days, we met with stubborn resistance, -and as on the previous days, foot by foot, inch -by inch, we pushed our line forward, always patiently -enlarging the width of the holes we had pierced.</p> - -<p>A new attack on a large scale was now contemplated, -and for this assault the Tank Corps had to furnish between -eighty and ninety machines, some on the 3rd, -some on the 4th Army front. Preparations were immediately -begun, and no Tanks fought on the 4th.</p> - -<p>Our line, however, had just reached the outskirts of -two large villages, Montbrehain and Beaurevoir, and -we were anxious not to begin the day of our new attack -with street fighting—of all forms of warfare the most -incalculable.</p> - -<p>Therefore, the Australians and the 16th Tank Battalion -attacked Montbrehain, and after fighting a strenuous -but brilliant little action, captured it.</p> - -<p>The last phase of the Cambrai-St. Quentin battle was -at hand; nay more, the last phase of the warfare we had -known for nearly four years.</p> - -<p>The next day we were to match our strength against -that torn and breached, but still formidable ruin, that -had once been the Hindenburg Line.</p> -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_380">380</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_XXI">CHAPTER XXI</h2> - -<p class="subhead">THE SECOND BATTLE OF LE CATEAU—THE RUNNING FIGHT</p> -</div> - -<h3>I<br /> - -<span class="subhead">“<span class="smcap">Tank Corps Intelligence Summary, October 8th</span>”</span></h3> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><span class="firstword">“An</span> attack was launched this morning between Cambrai -and St. Quentin on a front of eighteen miles, which -was entirely successful—all objectives being gained—in -spite of obstinate machine-gun defence.</p> - -<p>“Heavy Tanks and Whippets co-operated.</p> - -<p>“The line now runs N. and E. of Niergnies—E. of -Seranvillers and La Targette—Esnes Mill—E. edge of -Esnes—through Briseux Wood—Walincourt—Audigny -trench line to Walincourt Wood—W. of Walincourt—N. -and E. of Serain—E. of Prémont—E. of Brancourt—E. -of Beauregard.</p> - -<p>“Depth of penetration varies, the maximum being -6000 yards.</p> - -<p>“The French continued the attack on the southern -portion of the battle front and made progress in the -vicinity of Fontaine Utetre and Essigny le Petit.</p> - -<p>“A large number of prisoners have been taken, but -the actual numbers are not yet known.</p> - -<p>“The enemy made a heavy counter-attack from the -direction of Awoingt against our line between Niergnies -and Seranvillers, and the situation at Forenville is not -quite clear.</p> - -<p>“In this counter-attack the enemy used captured -British Tanks. Seven appeared in the sunken road N.E. -of Niergnies without any infantry support. Our infantry -used enemy anti-Tank rifles, and four or five -enemy Tanks are reported to have been put out of -action.”</p></div> - -<p>This was the form in which the news of what proved<span class="pagenum" id="Page_381">381</span> -the last set action of the war reached resting Tank Battalions, -and the great Tank organisation behind the -lines.</p> - -<p>The whole action had somehow seemed unusually -dramatic. There was now everywhere a sense of -momentousness of events. We knew in our hearts that -the hour had come. Still, the enemy had so often revealed -unexpected strengths, we had so often been -tricked into optimism, and now we fought with a sort -of surprised joy in thrusting home, of feeling the -German resistance really crumble under our -blows.</p> - -<p>Every time we struck we were feverishly impatient at -our own weariness, a weariness which delayed the next -blow. We longed to be sure, to strike again and again, -no matter how, and so end the long nightmare.</p> - -<p>All through that last month we hurried on, blind with -fatigue, too eager for the next battle to have been -fought, too deeply concerned with the culmination of -the great drama, to care what had been the details of -our achievements in the last action.</p> - -<p>It is difficult in attempting any chronicle of this -period not to feel again the impatience of the hour, or -to achieve enough detachment to describe the individual -threads out of which the great pattern of victory was -woven.</p> - -<h3>II</h3> - -<p>To return to the attack of October 8.</p> - -<p>Besides the very good action fought by Whippets of -the 3rd and 6th Battalions near Serain and Prémont, -there were two particularly interesting features in the -attack: first, the action fought by the 301st American<span class="pagenum" id="Page_382">382</span> -and 1st Tank Battalions; and, second, the German -counter-attack with Tanks which is mentioned in the -Summary.</p> - -<p>Nineteen Tanks of the 301st went into action opposite -Serain, doing great execution.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_99" href="#Footnote_99" class="fnanchor">99</a>“In one railway cutting near Brancourt, which -was a mass of machine-guns, I counted nearly fifty -mangled Boches who had been caught in enfilade with -case shot as the Tanks crossed the line. The infantry -casualties were very low, and all agreed on the masterly -way the American Tank gunners had dealt with M.G. -opposition.</p> - -<p>“The <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">pièce de résistance</i> of the battle was the performance -of Major Sasse, D.S.O., for which he received -his decoration.</p> - -<p>“As on a former occasion, he went into action in the -Wireless Tank. After the capture of Brancourt he left -his Tank this side of the village and went forward to -reconnoitre. He eventually ascended the church tower -in order to get a forward view of the battle. While doing -this a very heavy bombardment of the village commenced, -and Major Sasse noticed that the infantry had -begun to retire. He accordingly descended and tried to -find the officer in charge of the troops on the spot. Not -being able to do this he assumed command himself, -stopped the retirement and organised the troops as a -defensive force round the outskirts of the village. Lewis -guns were posted and the men ordered to resist any attempt -on the part of the Boche to retake the village, -should this be made. As was expected, a determined -counter-attack developed, which was successfully beaten -off by Major Sasse’s detachment. This occurred a second -time, and Major Sasse sent off a wireless message -for help. He was rescued some hours later from a somewhat -precarious position by American reinforcements.”</p></div> - -<p>It was to Tanks of the 12th Battalion that the interesting -lot fell of meeting captured British Mark IV. -Tanks in action.</p> - -<p>Four Tanks belonging to “A” Company were in the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_383">383</span> -neighbourhood of Niergnies when the enemy launched -a strong counter-attack. The battlefield was thick with -smoke and it was not yet fully light, and when in the -half-dark the Tank crews and infantry saw four Tanks -advancing to meet them, they supposed that the -strangers belonged to “C” Company, who had been sent -to execute an encircling movement, and who had, they -imagined, somehow been able to outflank the enemy with -extraordinary speed. “L 16,” commanded by Captain -Rowe, was near a farm named Mont St. Meuve when the -Tanks appeared in sight, and the foremost was within -fifty yards before Captain Rowe realised that it was an -enemy machine. He immediately fired a 6-pounder shot -at it which disabled it, but almost at the same time -“L 16” was hit by two shells, one of which came -through the cab, wounding Captain Rowe and killing -his driver. The Tank Commander immediately got his -crew out and crossed over to “L 19,” which was near at -hand, and led it forward towards the German machines, -of whose presence it was still unaware. “L 19” had -already had five men wounded, had been on fire, and -having no gunners left, could not use its 6-pounders. -Its Commander, Second Lieutenant Worsap, however, -nothing daunted, immediately engaged the enemy with -his Lewis guns until the Tank received a direct hit -which set it on fire a second time. There was nothing -now to be done but to evacuate the machine, and as the -German counter-attack seemed to be succeeding, Mr. -Worsap blew up the wreck of his Tank.</p> - -<p>“L 12,” the third Tank, a male, was hit and finally -disabled before its Commander and crew had discovered -that the strange Tanks did not belong to “C” -Company. There remained “L 8” under Lieutenant -Martell, but this Tank had a leaky radiator and was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_384">384</span> -almost out of water. It, too, had been hit, and three of -its Lewis guns put out of action. Lieutenant Martell, -however, sent his crew back, and he and an artillery -officer managed to get up to a captured German field -gun, which the two turned round and used against the -enemy’s Tanks, almost immediately obtaining a direct -hit on one of them. Two of the German machines were -now accounted for. And now at last a genuine “C” -Company Tank—a female—appeared and finally drove -or scared away the two remaining German machines. -The situation was restored, and the infantry, who had -retired before the counter-attack, went forward again -and reoccupied the ridge beyond Niergnies. A comparison -of the British and German accounts of this -action is not unentertaining.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p class="center"><cite>German Wireless News</cite></p> - -<p>“During the heavy fighting south of Cambrai on October -8, German ... Tanks and a column of infantry -advanced ... behind a wall of artificial fog. The -German Tanks, which were feeling their way forward, -surprised a large number of Englishmen who were -standing in disordered groups. By means of machine-gun -fire and Tank gunfire the English were driven -back. The English troops on the eastern outskirts of -Niergnies took to flight and evacuated. On the Cambrai-Crévecœur -Road there were five English Tanks advancing -in support of their own infantry. As they came -into sight of the German Tanks the English Tanks -stopped, and they were set on fire by their own crews.”</p></div> - -<p>By the end of the day we had advanced and widened -our line along the whole front of the attack, and the -next day was devoted to exploitation.</p> - -<div id="ip_384" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 29em;"> - <img src="images/i_384a.jpg" width="450" height="578" alt="" /> - <div class="caption">HIS MAJESTY THE COLONEL-IN-CHIEF AND GENERAL ELLES</div></div> - -<div class="p4 b4"> -<div class="blockquot narrow"> - -<p class="center sans bold wspace">SPECIAL ORDER NO. 18.</p> - -<p class="center">By Major-General H. J. Elles, C.B., D.S.O., Commanding TANK CORPS in the Field.</p> - -<p class="sigright">18th October, 1918.</p> - -<p class="hang">1. His Majesty the King was graciously pleased to become COLONEL-IN-CHIEF of -the Tank Corps on the 17th instant.</p> - -<p class="hang">2. The following telegram was sent on behalf of the TANK CORPS:</p> - -<div class="in0"> -<p>“To H. M. the King,</p> - -<div class="in0 in4"> -<p>“The news that your Majesty has graciously consented to become Colonel-in-Chief -of the Tank Corps has just been received here. All ranks are deeply -sensible of this signal honour conferred upon the Corps and are determined to -continue worthy of it.</p> - -<p class="sigright">GENERAL ELLES.</p> - -<p class="in0">“Advanced H. Q. Tank Corps.<br /> -In the Field. 17th October.”</p> -</div> - -<p class="hang">3. The following reply has been received:</p> - -<p class="in0 in2">“To MAJOR-GENERAL H. J. ELLES.<br /> -<span class="in2">H. Q. Tank Corps, In the Field.</span></p> - -<div class="in0 in4"> -<p>“I sincerely thank you for the message which you have conveyed to me in -the name of all ranks of the Tank Corps.</p> - -<p>“I am indeed proud to be Colonel-in-Chief of this great British organization -invented by us which has played so prominent a part in our recent victories.</p> - -<p>“I wish you all every possible good luck.</p> -</div> - -<p class="sigright">GEORGE R. I., Colonel-in-Chief.</p> - -<p class="in0 in2">Buckingham Palace.<br /> -LONDON, 18th October.”</p> -</div> - -<p class="sigright"> -<span class="l2">(Signed) H. J. ELLES, Major-General.</span><br /> -Commanding Tank Corps in the Field.</p> -</div> -</div> - -<p>The enemy was in full retreat and a rapid advance<span class="pagenum" id="Page_385">385</span> -met with the feeblest opposition. The contemporary -record in the Tank Corps Intelligence Summary remarks -this feature.</p> - -<div id="ip_385" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 41em;"> - <img src="images/i_384b.jpg" width="652" height="354" alt="" /> - <div class="caption">MANUFACTURE</div></div> - -<div class="blockquot"> -<p class="sigright">“<i>October 9.</i></p> - -<p>“A penetration of over six miles has been made -towards Le Cateau, and in the area gained, twenty-six -villages have been occupied.</p> - -<p>“Tanks again co-operated.</p> - -<p>“Shortly after midnight our troops commenced the -attack N. of Cambrai, capturing Ramillies and securing -a bridgehead over the Escaut Canal at Pont D’Aire.</p> - -<p>“The whole of Cambrai was occupied this morning....</p> - -<p>“Air reports state that there is great confusion on -roads N.E. and S.E. of Le Cateau, and that our -low-flying scouts have been shooting at record targets....</p> - -<p>“The number of prisoners taken in yesterday’s attack -by the British Armies amounted to 6300, and by the -French in the St. Quentin area 1200. No detail yet received -of captures to-day.”</p></div> - -<p>The Battle of Cambrai-St. Quentin was at an end, -and the Hindenburg Line had now to all intents and -purposes ceased to exist, broken as it was on a front of -nearly thirty miles.</p> - -<p>Before the whole British forces in France, from north -of Menin to Bohain, seven miles north-west of Guise, -open country stretched, uncut by trench, unhung by -wire. The time for exploitation had arrived.</p> - -<p>Considering our comparative numerical weakness, the -lateness of the season and the nature of the country, to -have fought their way so far had been a notable performance. -Now to carry out a rapid pursuit was beyond -even the endeavours of the infantry. For the German -Army, though beaten, was not yet broken.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_386">386</span></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_100" href="#Footnote_100" class="fnanchor">100</a>“A pursuit by cavalry was unthinkable, for the -German rearguards possessed many thousands of -machine-guns, and as long as these weapons existed, -pursuit, as cavalry dream it to be, was utterly impossible. -One arm alone could have turned the present defeat -into a rout—the Tank, but few of these remained, -for since August 8 no less than 819 machines had been -handed over to salvage by the Tank Battalions, and -these Battalions themselves had lost in personnel 550 -officers and 2557 other ranks, out of a fighting state of -some 9500.”</p></div> - -<p>The 3rd, 4th, 5th, 7th and 15th Battalions—or what -was left of them—had all to be withdrawn into G.H.Q. -reserve on October 12.</p> - -<h3>III<br /> - -<span class="subhead"><span class="smcap">The Battle of the Selle</span></span></h3> - -<p>As fast, however, as the weariness of our infantry and -the fewness of our Tanks allowed, we pursued the flying -but still coherent German Divisions.</p> - -<p>Again and again the enemy tried to turn, to stand -just so long behind some natural defence as should enable -him to organise his retreat. He still had a hope -that a shortened line might enable him to make a final -rally, if only, meantime, too headlong a flight had not -reduced his army to a mob, and if the advance of the -Allies could be stemmed for a little before the vital -centre of Maubeuge.</p> - -<p>Seven Tanks of the 5th Battalion had advanced with -the French and the 9th Corps near Riquerval Wood; but -the first action of this new type, in which any considerable -number of machines took part, was the Battle of the -Selle River, which began in the 4th Army area on -October 17.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_387">387</span></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_101" href="#Footnote_101" class="fnanchor">101</a>“Our operations were opened on October 17 by an -attack by the 4th Army on a front of about ten miles -from Le Cateau southwards, in conjunction with the -French 1st Army operating west of the Sambre and -Oise Canal. The assault, launched at 5.20 a.m., was -delivered by the 9th, 2nd American and 13th Corps.... -The enemy was holding the difficult wooded -country east of Bohain, and the line of the Selle north -of it, in great strength, his infantry being well supported -by artillery.”</p></div> - -<p>The 4th was the Tank Brigade concerned.</p> - -<p>The 1st Battalion was allotted to the 9th Corps on -the right.</p> - -<p>The 2nd American Corps in the centre fought as usual -with the 301st American Battalion.</p> - -<p>On the left the 13th Corps had the 16th Battalion, -while the 6th Tank Battalion was in Army reserve.</p> - -<p>The Germans had chosen their battle ground with -great skill. They held the right bank of the Selle, and -the river itself, therefore, threaded No-Man’s-Land. -This particular choice of a defence was undoubtedly -dictated by a fear of Tanks. There had been heavy -rain, and the river was in flood.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_102" href="#Footnote_102" class="fnanchor">102</a>“Very little was known of the stream, except that -it varied every few yards in nature, breadth and depth; -and the only way of establishing safe crossing-places -for the Tanks, was by personal reconnaissance.</p> - -<p>“This work was done successfully by the R.O.’s of -the 1st and 301st Battalions, which were fighting alongside -each other.</p> - -<p>“The reconnaissance necessary on the front of the -301st promised to be extremely dangerous and the success -rather doubtful, owing to the presence of several<span class="pagenum" id="Page_388">388</span> -unlocated Boche posts on our side of the stream. It -was a question of slipping through these unobserved, -gaining the necessary information, and coming back -again through their lines.</p> - -<p>“Lieutenant T. C. Naedale, Battalion R.O., undertook -to do this in the company of an infantry guide from the -sector. This officer walked down the stream 500 yards, -literally under the noses of the Boche posts, and returned -to our lines with the requisite intelligence. He -was thus able to pick safe crossings for all his Tanks.”</p></div> - -<p>At 5.30 a.m. on October 17, the fog was so thick that -Tanks had to move forward on compass bearings. The -infantry could see nothing, and had, in many cases, to -rely almost entirely on the Tanks as guides. Every -Tank of the forty-eight carried a crib, and with their -help, north of St. Souplet and of Molain, both Tank -Battalions crossed the river in safety at the previously -selected fords.</p> - -<p>The Germans had clearly relied almost entirely upon -the flooded river for their defence, and it was only here -and there that we met with any opposition. Isolated -posts would, however, occasionally hold out with great -vigour, and what with the fog and the irregular speed -of our advance, the whole battle was an exceedingly -confused one. The enemy was well supplied with artillery, -and wherever the fog permitted made good use of it.</p> - -<p>At about 10 a.m. the infantry, who were badly held -up by machine-guns near Demilieue, summoned Whippets -of the 6th Battalion to their help. A number of -machines immediately hurried up, but even then, so -heavy was the machine-gun fire, that it was only with -great difficulty that the infantry could advance even -under cover of the Whippets. Just as they were approaching -the village, three Whippets were knocked out -in rapid succession by a single field gun. Deprived of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_389">389</span> -the cover of these machines, the infantry had to retire -again. It was not till considerably later that the village -was taken.</p> - -<p>On the 18th and 19th the infantry managed to make -good progress, and at 2 p.m. on the 20th we made -another attack, still on the line of the Selle, north of -Le Cateau.</p> - -<p>Only four Tanks of the 11th Battalion were employed. -The enemy’s resistance was serious, for he had been -able to erect strong wire entanglements along the -greater part of the line. This time, there being no -available fords, the Tanks successfully crossed the river -by means of an under-water sleeper bridge, which the -Sappers had secretly constructed at night, the enemy -being quite unaware of its existence, until, to their dismay, -they saw the Tanks crossing over it.</p> - -<p>There was severe fighting round Neuvilly, Solesmes -and Haspres, but we gained all our objectives on the -high ground east of the Selle, all the four Tanks successfully -reaching their final goal.</p> - -<p>Our capture of these positions on the river Selle was -immediately followed up by a larger bid, this time for -the general line running from the Sambre Canal along -the edge of Mormal Forest to the neighbourhood of -Valenciennes. We were to make a night attack on a -fifteen-mile line in the 4th Army area, the 9th, 5th and -13th Corps being supported by thirty-seven Tanks from -the 10th, 11th, 12th and 301st (American) Battalions.</p> - -<p>Zero hour was 1.30 a.m. Unfortunately the hoped-for -moonlight was shrouded, and the night misty and -dark. To add to our difficulties, the enemy was shelling -freely with gas. Gas-masks had to be worn, and -through them it was impossible to see anything. Consequently -we did not make much progress until dawn.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_390">390</span> -But directly it was light we went ahead, the Tanks had -fine shooting at “ground game,” and a great amount -of case shot was fired, and both Tanks and infantry -ultimately won through to their objectives.</p> - -<p>Next day the 17th Corps took up the attack in the -1st Army area, so extending our line of assault a further -five miles north to the Schele. No Tanks, however, -operated at this stage of the 1st Army’s offensive, -but six machines belonging to the 10th Battalion attacked -near Robewsart. One of these Tanks managed -to explode a German ammunition dump with a lucky -shot from one of its 6-pounders. This threw the enemy -into great confusion, whilst the explosion of his own -shells helped us considerably with the killing.</p> - -<h3>IV</h3> - -<p>We had now reached another—the last—stage of the -battle. The nature of the terrain had begun to change, -for we were travelling at last.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_103" href="#Footnote_103" class="fnanchor">103</a>“Despite the unfavourable weather and the determined -opposition at many points from the German -machine-gunners, in two days our infantry and Tanks -had realised an advance of five or six miles over difficult -country.”</p></div> - -<p>We had now reached the half wooded, half pasture -and orchard country which lay on the outskirts of the -Forest of Mormal, “like fringe upon a petticoat,” and -the last of our battles had been fought amid the trees -of the Bois L’Evêque and of Pommereuil.</p> - -<p>We were within a mile of Le Quesnoy, which lay in -a clearing in the Forest.</p> - -<p>There was no chance of giving our machines an overhaul.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_391">391</span> -It was therefore in a state of mechanical “efficiency,” -which a little while before we should have -said made any sort of fighting out of the question, that -most of the remaining Tanks gaily tackled this difficult -piece of the advance.</p> -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_392">392</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_XXII">CHAPTER XXII</h2> - -<p class="subhead">THE ROUT—MORMAL FOREST—THE BATTLE OF THE SAMBRE—THE -ARMISTICE</p> -</div> - -<h3>I</h3> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p class="b0">“Some greater issue was at stake, some mightier cause, than ever -before the sword had pleaded or the trumpet had proclaimed.”</p> - -<p class="p0 sigright l4"> -<span class="smcap">De Quincey.</span> -</p></div> - -<p><span class="firstword">On</span> November 4, the 1st, 3rd and 4th Armies were to -deliver an attack on a combined front of about thirty -miles, from the Sambre to the north of Oisy and -Valenciennes. The country across which our advance -was to be made was exceedingly difficult: in the south, -the river Sambre had to be crossed almost at the outset. -In the centre the great Forest of Mormal, though here -and there thinned by German foresters, still presented -a formidable obstacle. In the north lay the strongly -fortified town of Le Quesnoy, which was defended -naturally by several streams which ran parallel to the -line of our advance, offering the enemy repeated opportunities -for a successful defence.</p> - -<p>On November 2, we fought a small action west of -Landrecies. We were anxious to improve our position -near Happegarbes before the big attack on the -4th.</p> - -<p>Only three Tanks of the 10th Battalion took part.</p> - -<p>Unfortunately, although we took all our objectives, -the Germans suddenly plucked up heart, launched a -surprise attack, and we lost them again before nightfall.</p> - -<p>The Battle of Mormal Forest was the last set Tank<span class="pagenum" id="Page_393">393</span> -attack of the War, and for it we could only scrape together -just thirty-seven machines.</p> - -<p>Tank units were bled almost white. Sections took the -place of companies, companies of battalions, and Tanks -were parcelled out in such a way that the very most -might be made of their scanty numbers.</p> - -<p>At dawn, after an intense bombardment, Tanks and -infantry moved forward to the assault under a heavy -barrage, and it was not long before they had penetrated -the enemy’s positions on the whole battle front.</p> - -<p>On the right of the attack, zero was at 5.45. The 9th -Corps, which, it will be remembered, was supported by -four sections of the 10th Tank Battalion, pushed forward -and captured Catillon, where the Tanks fought a -particularly good action. The infantry were able to -cross the Sambre at this place, capturing a lock some -two miles to the south of it. By two hours after zero -two battalions of infantry were east of the river.</p> - -<p>The Tanks with the 13th Corps were also extremely -successful, especially in the neighbourhood of Hecq, -Preux and the north-western edge of the Forest of -Mormal.</p> - -<p>An account of the fighting on this central part of -the line is given in the Tank Corps Intelligence Summary.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“The early morning was fine and clear, but a dense -mist came up with the dawn and persisted until about -8.30. In addition, the country S.W. of Mormal Forest -is peculiarly enclosed with thick orchards, quick-set -fences and hedgerow trees, confining visibility to no -more than fifty yards or so, under the best conditions. -The infantry largely depended on the Tanks to give -them their direction, and many of the latter had to -steer exclusively by compass. By this means they were<span class="pagenum" id="Page_394">394</span> -able to keep approximately to their allotted routes, and -were of considerable help to the infantry in breaking -through the dense hedges (some wired) and in dealing -with machine-guns. In places the enemy barrage came -down heavily with a high proportion of gas, whilst elsewhere -it was inconsiderable. Resistance also was unusually -‘patchy,’ some few M.G. posts holding out well, -whilst many others, though well sited and camouflaged, -were found not to have fired a round. A show of resistance -was put up at Landrecies bridge by some 300 German -infantry and machine-gunners, but they gave in -when outflanked by the crossing of the canal on rafts -further to the south. The enemy had lined some of the -hedges with deep and very well camouflaged rifle-pits, -which here and there were held in strength. The main -body of the enemy, however, appears to have been withdrawn -a kilometre or so in rear of his forward positions -just prior to our attack. French inhabitants of the -most forward villages state that he started withdrawing -at five o’clock this morning. In a number of instances -the enemy was found hiding, unarmed, awaiting an -opportunity to surrender. In one village over fifty -Germans emerged from the house cellars where they -had been hiding together with the inhabitants. Other -Germans attempted to hide themselves in trees and -were dealt with with case shot. A number of anti-Tank -rifles were found in rifle-pits, etc., but appear to have -been made little or no use of. There were instances -of detached field guns being sited to enfilade hedges and -cover crests, but so far no reports have come in as to -their effect—if any. One Brigade operating with -Tanks is reported to have had over 350 prisoners -through its cage before 11 a.m., including a Regimental -Commander and part of his Staff, whilst one Division -reported over 1000 prisoners by 12.30. A German -pigeon loft (complete with birds) was captured in -Landrecies. Air visibility was nil until after 9 a.m., -and communication therefore difficult.</p> - -<p>“<i>Later.</i>—Prisoners now reported 10,000 with 200 -guns.”</p></div> - -<p>It was at Landrecies that three supply Tanks managed,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_395">395</span> -despite their almost complete lack of arms or -armour, to take a most gallant and effective part in the -battle.</p> - -<p>These three Tanks were working for the 25th Division, -and were carrying up material to rebuild one of -the numerous bridges that the Germans had destroyed; -as they drew near their rendezvous they found that the -enemy was still holding the place in some strength, and -had succeeded in stopping the advance of our infantry. -As the Tanks approached they began to draw fire and -their situation became precarious. With great pluck -and resource the Tanks decided to go on, and rely on -their appearance (which was similar to that of the fighting -Tanks) to drive the enemy from his position. One -Tank became a casualty, but the other two went straight -for the enemy. Even when the Tanks got close up, the -Germans were still under the impression that they were -being faced by fighters, and part of the garrison put up -their hands, whilst the remainder fled.</p> - -<p>With the 5th Corps, the 1st Company of the 9th Battalion -encountered stiff resistance, but nevertheless they -pushed forward far into the Forest of Mormal.</p> - -<p>The Tanks were particularly active in the attack on -Jolimetz, just south of Le Quesnoy, when they and the -37th Division took upwards of 1000 prisoners, and later -in the afternoon and evening pushed on into the heart -of the Forest. North of them the New Zealanders had -surrounded Le Quesnoy by 8 a.m. Here also Tanks -were operating.</p> - -<p>By the end of the day we had made a five-mile advance, -reaching the general line Fesny-Landrecies—centre -of Mormal Forest—and five miles beyond -Valenciennes.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_396">396</span></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_104" href="#Footnote_104" class="fnanchor">104</a>“In these operations and their developments twenty -British Divisions utterly defeated thirty-two German -Divisions, and captured 19,000 prisoners and more than -450 guns. On our right the French 1st Army, which -had continued the line of attack southwards to the -neighbourhood of Guise, kept pace with our advance, -taking 5000 prisoners and a number of guns.</p> - -<p>“By this great victory the enemy’s resistance was -definitely broken. On the night of November 4–5 his -troops began to fall back on practically the whole battle -front.”</p></div> - -<h3>II</h3> - -<p>But the Tank Corps was at last at an end of its -resources both in machines and in men.</p> - -<p>Pending reinforcements from England, they could at -the moment muster but eight machines that could be -sent after the flying enemy, and therefore, though the -Armoured Cars went on, it was on November 5 that the -last Tank action of the War was fought, when eight -Whippets of the 6th Battalion took part in an attack -of the 3rd Guards Brigade, on the northern outskirts -of the Forest of Mormal.</p> - -<p>The weather was atrocious and the country most difficult -for a combined operation, for it was intersected -by numerous ditches and fences, which rendered it ideal -for the rearguard actions which the Germans were now -fighting all along their front.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_105" href="#Footnote_105" class="fnanchor">105</a>“At 10 a.m. on the morning of November 5 the -3rd Guards Brigade, having pushed through the 1st -and 2nd Brigades, were ordered to continue the advance -by bounds.”</p></div> - -<div id="ip_396" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 40em;"> - <img src="images/i_396a.jpg" width="635" height="489" alt="" /> - <div class="caption">THE WESTERN EDGE OF MORMAL FOREST</div></div> - -<div id="ip_396b" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 20em;"> - <img src="images/i_396b.jpg" width="314" height="446" alt="" /> - <div class="caption">A “WIRELESS” TANK</div></div> - -<p>No definite orders had reached the Whippets’ Company<span class="pagenum" id="Page_397">397</span> -Commander as to what part—if any—his machines -were to play.</p> - -<p>He and the General commanding the 3rd Guards -Brigade, however, came to the conclusion that in view -of the nature of the ground and the fact that the -Bultiaux River would have to be crossed in the first -stage of the battle, the Whippets should lead the attack -upon the second, third and final objectives only.</p> - -<p>Two Tanks proved unfit for action, owing to mechanical -trouble. The three Tanks which covered the -advance of the Grenadiers found themselves in a country -of small orchards divided by extremely high hedges, -where it was most difficult to locate the enemy -machine-guns whose fire was here considerable.</p> - -<p>The Whippets therefore worked up and down the -hedges like ratting terriers, being ordered to<a id="FNanchor_106" href="#Footnote_106" class="fnanchor">106</a>“fire -short bursts along them for moral effect even when no -enemy were visible.” This they did, and found a few -fleeting targets before returning to get in touch with -the infantry.</p> - -<p>Two Whippets which were co-operating with the -Scots Guards met with a good deal of opposition. -Twice had they and the infantry attempted to capture -and consolidate high ground beyond the village of -Buvignies.</p> - -<p>The driver of the first Tank was hit as he was endeavouring -to put right a minor mechanical trouble, -and the second Tank went on alone.</p> - -<p>In attempting to run over an enemy rifle-pit, it ran -on to a jagged tree stump and was damaged, finally -breaking down in the enemy’s lines beyond Buvignies. -<a id="FNanchor_107" href="#Footnote_107" class="fnanchor">107</a> -From accounts of civilians, who were behind the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_398">398</span> -enemy’s lines, it appears that the crew held out till -midnight, the Tank being then blown up.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“They also reported that after the Tanks had been -through Buvignies the enemy hurriedly departed, and -also vacated the railway, which had been holding up -the Grenadiers.”</p></div> - -<p>The 3rd Guards Brigade pushed forward unopposed -for a mile and a half during the night, but when darkness -came the four remaining Whippets were ordered -to rally.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“It was decided not to use these four on the following -day, and work was concentrated on getting fit the -six Whippets which might be made available to trek -or fight.”</p></div> - -<p>For, though that through all this period we knew -well enough that the end had come, in these last few -days of the War we acquired a new tradition. It became -the magnificent custom of the British Army to act -as though the War would go on for ever.</p> - -<p>The spirit that says, “I’ve been lucky so far. Why -tempt Providence with the War won, anyway?” must -have reared its head in every man. But it was rigorously -kept down, and never among the attacking troops -in these last tense days was there found any inclination -to spare themselves or to spoil our victory by -undue chariness of life and limb. Not only in the racking -circumstances of the battlefield, but also behind the -lines, this new tradition was manifest, and after the -5th the Tank crews were everywhere feverishly engaged, -day and night, in refitting and furbishing up their machines -on the complete assumption that they would -surely be called upon to fight again. Everywhere, too,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_399">399</span> -the Staffs were busy endeavouring to build up an -organised fighting force from the scarred, battle-weary -remnants of the Corps.</p> - -<p>The Tank Corps’ record since August 8 was indeed -a remarkable one. There had been ninety-six days of -almost continuous battle since that great Tank attack, -and in these ninety-six days about two thousand Tanks -and Armoured Cars had been engaged.</p> - -<p>Nearly half this number of machines had been handed -over to salvage. Of these, 313 had been sufficiently -badly damaged to be sent to Central Workshops, who -had repaired no less than 204 of them and reissued -them to battalions. Of the whole 887, only fifteen -machines had been struck off the strength as beyond -repair.</p> - -<p>The personnel, too, had been lamentably reduced. -However, the total strength of the Tank Corps on -August 7, 1918, had been considerably under that of -a single infantry division, and in the old days of the -artillery battles, such as the First Battle of the Somme, -an infantry division often sustained 4000 casualties in -twelve hours. In comparison, the Tanks’ losses of just -3000 in three months, out of a fighting strength of under -10,000, seem comparatively light. They were heavy -enough, however, effectually to cripple the Corps for -several weeks.</p> - -<h3>III</h3> - -<p>Meanwhile the last act of the great drama was being -played out.</p> - -<p>Though there were for the moment no Tanks to share -in the culminating glories, our forces were pushing forward -along the whole front. On November 6 and 7 the -enemy’s resistance had very much weakened. Early on<span class="pagenum" id="Page_400">400</span> -the morning of the 7th the Guards entered Bavay; next -day Avesnes fell. Six cars of the Tank 17th Armoured -Car Battalion here did excellent service in conjunction -with “Bethell’s Force,” the cars, “full out,” putting -roadside machine-guns out of action and in many cases -preventing the flying enemy from blowing up the crossroads -behind his rearguards. Hautmont was captured, -and our troops reached the outskirts of Maubeuge, the -goal upon which our eyes had for so long been fixed. -To the north of Mons the enemy was now rapidly withdrawing. -All through the night of November 7–8 we -could see the glare of burning dumps behind the German -lines, and could hear the irregular clamour of their -detonations. At Tournai the enemy abandoned his -bridgehead without a fight.</p> - -<p>On the 9th the enemy was in full retreat on the whole -front; the Guards entered Maubeuge at the moment -when the Canadians were approaching Mons. The -whole of our 2nd Army crossed the Schelde, and next -day all five British Armies advanced in line, preceded -by cavalry, cyclists and Armoured Cars.</p> - -<p>Only round Mons was any opposition met with, and -at dawn on November 11 the Third Canadian Division -captured the town, killing or taking prisoner the whole -of the German garrison.</p> - -<p>It was the last of the tasks of slaughter to which our -hands were to be forced.</p> - -<p>For four days there had been a coming and going of -envoys and of messages. For four days men and women -in England had listened and waited, restless and -sick with expectancy, with a sudden realisation of -their longing to emerge from the long nightmare.</p> - -<p>On November 11, just after eleven in the morning, the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_401">401</span> -church bells were rung in every town and village at -home; and in France the expected message was quietly -passed from mouth to mouth. There is no need to -describe a moment which no reader of this book will -ever forget.</p> -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_402">402</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="EPILOGUE">EPILOGUE</h2> -</div> - -<h3>I</h3> - -<p><span class="firstword">And</span> what, the reader will ask, is the conclusion of -the whole matter?</p> - -<p>First, how far did Tanks really contribute to our -overthrow of the Germans?</p> - -<p>Secondly, what would be the place of the Tank if -another war broke out within the next generation; and, -thirdly, what place are Tanks going to be given in the -reconstituted British Army?</p> - -<p>As far as they can be answered, we will reply to -these questions in order. For upon the performances -of the Tanks in this war, will be—or should be—based -the answers to the other questions, and on this point -we propose to call the evidence of three or four expert -witnesses.</p> - -<p>For the rest, the reader has had an opportunity of -studying a large mass of evidence for himself.</p> - -<p>He has seen how, when the line from Switzerland to -the sea had been formed, both armies sought some means -of putting an end to the stalemate.</p> - -<p>How to both the Allies and the Germans the solution -by artillery was the first to occur. How, secondly, we -and the Germans each according to our national habits -of mind, thought of another solution. The Germans—who -were chemists—of gas, used treacherously in -despite of signed undertakings to the contrary; we, who -were mechanics, of a self-propelled shield, from behind -which we could direct an effective fire.</p> - -<p>He knows how gas was countered, after the first surprise,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_403">403</span> -by means of various air-filtering devices; but how -the Tank gradually revolutionised warfare, because -there was no particular specific or antidote to the Tank, -which depended not so much upon surprise as on the -simple factors of its enormous fire power, and its ability -to surmount obstacles. For whether the troops attacked -had fought against Tanks before or no, the Tank -crushed down wire and smothered machine-gun fire just -the same.</p> - -<p>Marshal Foch is the first of our witnesses.</p> - -<p>He sketches the evolution of the Tank, and describes -the circumstances which called it into being, in his foreword -to the English translation of his republished -<cite>Principles of War</cite>. He has dealt with the old slowness -of “digging in.”</p> - -<p>We translate his words literally:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“The machine-gun and the barbed-wire entanglement -have permitted defences to be organised with indisputable -rapidity. These have endowed the trench, -or natural obstacle, with a strength which has permitted -offensive fronts to be extended over areas quite impracticable -until this time.... The offensive for the time -was powerless, new weapons were sought for, and, after -a formidable artillery had been produced Tanks were -invented—<i>i.e.</i> machine-guns or guns protected by -armour, and rendered mobile by petrol, capable, over -all types of ground, to master the enemy’s entanglements -and his machine-guns....</p> - -<p>“Thus it is the industrial power of nations that has -alone permitted armies to attack, or the want of this -power has reduced them to the defensive.”</p></div> - -<p>Monsieur Loucheur—in January 1919 French Minister -of Munitions—was a strong advocate for Tanks -in the French Army.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_404">404</span></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“There are two kinds of infantry: men who have -gone into action with Tanks, and men who have not; -and the former never want to go into action without -Tanks again.”</p></div> - -<p>Sir Douglas Haig’s summing up in his Despatch, -though necessarily conservative, is not therefore the less -significant:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“Since the opening of our offensive on <i>August 8</i> -Tanks have been employed in every battle, and the importance -of the part played by them in breaking the -resistance of the German infantry can scarcely be exaggerated. -The whole scheme of the attack of <i>August 8</i> -was dependent upon Tanks, and ever since that date -on numberless occasions the success of our infantry has -been powerfully assisted or confirmed by their timely -arrival. So great has been the effect produced upon the -German infantry by the appearance of British Tanks -that in more than one instance, when for various reasons -real Tanks were not available in sufficient numbers, -valuable results have been obtained by the use of -dummy Tanks painted on frames of wood and canvas.</p> - -<p>“It is no disparagement of the courage of our infantry -or of the skill and devotion of our artillery, to -say that the achievements of those essential arms would -have fallen short of the full measure of success achieved -by our armies had it not been for the very gallant and -devoted work of the Tank Corps, under the command of -Major-General H. J. Elles.”</p></div> - -<p>Lastly, what is the opinion of the enemy?</p> - -<p>Herr Maximilian Harden in a speech upon the causes -of the German defeat, gave first place to the “physical -shock of the Tank,” at which “Ludendorff had -laughed.”</p> - -<p>Speaking for the Minister of War in the Reichstag, -General Wrisberg said:</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_405">405</span></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“The attack on August 8 between the Avre and the -Ancre was not unexpected by our leaders. When, -nevertheless, the English succeeded in achieving a great -success the reasons are to be sought in the massed employment -of Tanks and surprise under the protection -of fog....</p> - -<p>“The American Armies should not terrify us.... -More momentous for us is the question of Tanks.”</p></div> - -<p>The G.O.C. of the 51st German Corps, in an Order -dated July 23, 1918, remarks: “As soon as the Tanks -are destroyed the whole attack fails.”</p> - -<p>On October 23 the German Wireless published the following -statement by General Scheuch, Minister of War:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“Germany will never need to make peace owing to -a shortage of war material.</p> - -<p>“The superiority of the enemy at present is principally -due to their use of Tanks.</p> - -<p>“We have been actively engaged for a long period -in working at producing this weapon (which is recognised -as important), in adequate numbers.</p> - -<p>“We shall thus have an additional means for the -successful continuance of the war, if we are compelled -to continue it.”</p></div> - -<p>The following passage occurred in a German Order -issued on August 12, 1918:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“It has been found that the enemy’s attacks have -been successful solely because the Tanks surprised our -infantry, broke through our ranks, and the infantry -thought itself outflanked.”</p></div> - -<p>The German Press was also very generally inclined -to attribute the German failure to the Allied use of -Tanks, and their attitude is well illustrated by the following -paragraph which appeared early in October, a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_406">406</span> -time when German journalists seem to have been most -carefully instructed from official quarters. It was their -task to prepare the German people for surrender.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“The successes which the Allies have gained since -the First Battle of Cambrai do not rest on any superior -strategy on the part of Foch or on superiority in numbers, -although the latter has undoubtedly contributed -to it. The real reason has been the massed use of Tanks. -Whereas the artillery can only cut wire and blot out -trenches with an enormous expenditure of ammunition, -the Tank takes all these obstacles with the greatest of -ease, and will make broad paths in which the advancing -infantry can follow. They are the most dangerous -foe to hostile machine-guns. They can approach machine-gun -nests and destroy them at close range. The -great danger of the Tank is obvious when one considers -that the defence of the front battle zone chiefly relies -on the defensive value of the machine-guns, and that -the armour of the Tank renders it invulnerable to rifle -fire, and that only seldom and in exceptional cases is -machine-gun fire effective. The infantry is therefore -opposed to an enemy to whom it can do little or no -harm.”</p></div> - -<h3>II</h3> - -<p>The question of the place of Tanks in the next war -has been answered with the greatest emphasis by some -enthusiastic advocates of this arm.</p> - -<p>The possession of a superior weapon, they say, ensures -victory to the army which possesses it. In war, -any army, even if led by a mediocre General, can safely -meet an army of the previous century, though the old -force be led by the greatest military genius of his age.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_407">407</span></p><div class="blockquot"> - -<p><a id="FNanchor_108" href="#Footnote_108" class="fnanchor">108</a>“Napoleon was an infinitely greater general than -Lord Raglan, yet Lord Raglan would, in 1855, have -beaten any army Napoleon could have brought against -him, because Lord Raglan’s men were armed with the -Minie rifle.</p> - -<p>“Eleven years after Inkerman Moltke would have -beaten Lord Raglan’s army hollow, not because he was -a greater soldier than Lord Raglan, but because his -men were armed with the needle gun.</p> - -<p>“Had Napoleon, at Waterloo, possessed a company of -Vickers machine-guns, he would have beaten Wellington, -Blücher, and Schwartzenburg combined, as completely -as Lord Kitchener beat the Soudanese at -Omdurman. It would have been another ‘massacre of -the innocents.’”</p></div> - -<p>In every case, they say, the superior weapon would -have defeated the great tactician before he had had -time to show his mettle. To repeat the words of the -German journalist: “Their infantry would be opposed -to an enemy to whom it could do little or no harm.”</p> - -<p>We shall not discuss here the materialistic argument, -except to say that if it were entirely true, savages and -badly-equipped Tribesmen would never have completely -beaten well-armed civilised troops. Yet they have done -so on frequent occasions. Witness the First Afghan -War, the Zulu Wars, the American-Indian Wars, and a -host of minor actions. Material only wins hands down -when the <em>moral</em> of the side possessing it is at least fairly -comparable to that of its opponents. Otherwise -Byzantium with its “Greek Fire” would have ruled -the world.</p> - -<p>According to this “material” school of thought, we -have in Tanks our superior weapon. They will be developed -upon more than one line, and we shall have -cross-country equivalents for all arms and services except -heavy artillery, the Navy and the Air Force.</p> - -<p>Mr. Hugh Pollard, writing in the <cite>English Review</cite> of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_408">408</span> -January 1919 states the case of the mechanical warfare -and Tank enthusiasts, with great vigour and ingenuity.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“Even at present there is no effective answer to -Tanks but possibly other Tanks, and in the Tank we -have rediscovered a modern application of a very old -principle. The Tank is the most economical method of -using man-power in war, and it also affords the highest -possible percentage of invulnerability to the soldiers -engaged.</p> - -<p>“The armament problems of the future will be limited -to three fleets of armoured machines, in which a -very limited highly specialised number of men operate -the largest possible number of weapons in the most -effective way. Armoured fleets at sea, armoured aeroplanes, -and armoured landships, or Tanks—these will -be our forces for war.”</p></div> - -<p>Tanks of various speeds and carrying various -weapons, will replace both infantry and cavalry, for -one full size modern heavy Tank holding eight men -has the aggressive power of a hundred infantry with -rifles, bayonets, bombs and Lewis guns. The Whippet -has about the same speed and radius as cavalry, and -one Whippet holding two men “could withstand the -onslaught of a cavalry regiment and kill it off to the -last man and the last horse without being exposed to -the least danger or inconvenience.” We shall soon regard -the heroic tale of how men once exposed their -defenceless bodies to machine-gun fire and shells, and -depended for the élan of their assault upon the weight -of human limbs and the endurance of human muscles -as almost legendary.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“Most people think of a Tank as a rather ludicrous -but effective engine of war. They look upon it as a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_409">409</span> -mechanical novelty, and are content to assume that the -Tank of to-day is not much of an improvement upon the -earliest Tanks of the Somme battle, and that it is a war -implement of indifferent importance. The real facts -are entirely different, for the Tank of to-day is simply -an infant, a lusty two-year-old, and there is no mechanical -limit to its future. This may seem the remark -of a fanatic, but it is perfectly true....</p> - -<p>“The Tank of to-day is a little thing compared with -the obvious developments which will result in the Tank -of the future, but even as it stands to-day it is the most -economical fighting machine yet devised. A Tank uses -petrol instead of muscle, and it extracts the highest -possible fighting or killing value out of the men inside -it; they can give their blows without being exposed to -injury in return, and, above all things, they can fight -while moving—a thing outside the powers of the infantry -or guns of the land forces.”</p></div> - -<p>The arguments of those who maintain that the Tank -must always be dependent upon the older arms are -nearly all based upon the assumption that the Tank is -already limited. “It is pointed out that they cannot -cross rivers, that they are not proof against shell-fire, -against mines, against special forms of attack. The -answer is that the Tank of to-day may be subject to -casualties, but all the skill and resources of the German -nation have failed to produce an effective answer to -Tanks, that river after river has been crossed, that line -after line of ‘impregnable’ defences have fallen, that -deeply écheloned artillery particularly arranged to -fight Tanks has failed before Tank and aeroplane attack. -We come to a war of sea, air, and land fleets -acting in co-operation. Anti-Tank artillery is vulnerable -to armoured planes. The big commercial -freight-carrying planes of the future might even fly -light Tanks into the heart of hostile territory. The unprotected<span class="pagenum" id="Page_410">410</span> -men and arms of the present day must -disappear.”</p> - -<p>And here another question is suggested—a question -upon which the civilian ought to satisfy himself. Let -us for the moment assume that it is superiority -in weapons, not better generalship, not a more stubborn -“will to win,” that decides the fate of -war.</p> - -<p>What reason have we to suppose that it will be -superiority in Tanks and not in some other weapon, in -aeroplanes for example, that will decide the next conflict?</p> - -<p>At present, when we try to imagine war upon a foreign -army waged on one side by air alone, we encounter -a dozen mechanical difficulties even in our attempted -picture of the first stages: the enormous paraphernalia -of bases, the ground-staff, fuel, weather conditions, difficulties -of landing, and finally, what is perhaps the fundamental -difficulty.</p> - -<p>The aeroplane alone, like the big gun, is not an engine -by whose means it is possible to come into decisive contact -with an enemy who chooses to remain on the -ground. The rabbits can always go to earth when they -see the gliding shadow of the hawk.</p> - -<p>Till both sides are equipped solely for air combat, -Tanks or infantry will still be needed to play the part -of ferret.</p> - -<p>But these difficulties will almost certainly some day -be overcome.</p> - -<p>When they have been solved, then the day of the -comparatively cumbersome Tank, with its dependence -upon shipping and rail transport will be over. But that -will not be in our time we are assured. To us, therefore, -“War in the Air” remains of a somewhat<span class="pagenum" id="Page_411">411</span> -academic interest. We have got to see to it that we -survive the present.</p> - -<p>For can the most optimistic of us truthfully declare, -as he casts his eye over the world, as he looks from -Middle Europe to the Far East, from Russia to Mexico, -from the Balkans to Egypt, or from Asia Minor to the -confines of India, that we need not even consider the -possibility of a war within his own generation? -Alas, no!</p> - -<p>Now having for the moment dismissed the purely air -war from our calculations, we can be pretty certain -that a war between civilised countries fought within -that period would not differ utterly from the war which -is just over, and that a war between a civilised and an -uncivilised country would differ from it only along -well-known lines.</p> - -<p>We have heard a good deal of evidence which makes -it appear certain that, every other factor having cancelled -out, the fact that the French and British possessed -Tanks and the Germans did not, was just enough -to win the last war for the Allies. Let us then -sedulously cultivate the grub of the present that we -may survive to see the more glorious butterfly of the -future—perhaps the aerial Tank. Shall we neglect the -Tank because it seems likely that in this (as please -Heaven in most other affairs) our sons will go one -better?</p> - -<p>The British and French led, and in 1919 still lead, -absolutely with Tanks.</p> - -<p>If we like to carry on, we have such a start both in -design and manufacturing experience, that we could -easily make it impossible for any other nation to draw -abreast of us during the period after which we are -assuming the “Tank Age” in military evolution may -conceivably be over.</p> - -<p>It is, of course, impossible to be too discreet as to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_412">412</span> -the new machines which have already been made and -tested, or as to the new projects which exist.</p> - -<p>Perhaps the position can be best indicated by saying -that progress has been so rapid of late that those who -know, would probably be delighted to sell any number -of Mark V. Tanks to a prospective enemy.</p> - -<h3>III</h3> - -<p>The present writers are ignorant whether we have determined -to keep our lead or no. Shall we have the -foresight, when it comes to the remodelling of the -Army, to give to Tanks the place they ought to hold in -it? Shall we be willing to spend money on experiments, -money which we must spend if we want to keep that -lead? Will the Tanks be given the facilities for both -mechanical and tactical training that they ought to -have? We may so easily slide back into our old groove. -It is always hard to turn to new ways, and to give a -preponderating place in the “New Model” to Tanks, -would certainly be to effect a very radical change. -There does seem to be a certain fear that the Army and -the public may feel that the Tanks are all right for War, -but hardly the thing for soldiering.</p> - -<p>And yet how well the requirements of a strong force -of Tanks would in reality fit the kind of framework -which the wisest minds seem agreed should be our -Army of the future. We ought to have, they say, a -small and highly specialised Standing Army, and behind -that a vast Citizen Army on the basis of the Territorial -system. What weapon could be more suitably -added to the gun and the aeroplane than the Tank in -the Regular Army? Our Standing Army would thus -consist of a nucleus of mechanical experts.</p> - -<p>Nor need the question of finance ever rise spectre-like<span class="pagenum" id="Page_413">413</span> -between us and the idea of a strong force of Tanks, -for the Tank is an absurdly cheap weapon compared -with its co-efficient of infantry.</p> - -<p>But there is another direction in which, if it claim any -considerable place in our Standing Army, the Tank -must make good. That army may at any moment be -called upon to undertake police work in any part of -the world.</p> - -<p>The Tank, even the old Mark I., is, as we saw at -Gaza, suitable for desert warfare. The Mark V. and -Whippets with General Denikin’s force in Russia have -been prodigiously successful, and there are probably -few species of campaign against a semi-civilised enemy -in which the newer “Medium” Tanks would not do -admirably.</p> - -<p>Another point is that “minor wars” are fought by -us with as much avoidance of bloodshed as is compatible -with the bringing of our opponents to reason.</p> - -<p>A weapon which admittedly affected the <em>moral</em> even -of admirably disciplined troops like the Germans to a -phenomenal degree, is particularly well adapted to this -purpose.</p> - -<p>It is infinitely more humane to appal a rioter or a -savage by showing him a Tank than to shoot him down -with an inoffensive looking machine-gun.<a id="FNanchor_109" href="#Footnote_109" class="fnanchor">109</a></p> - -<p>There is yet one final consideration.</p> - -<p>The reader may still very properly object: “Though -the Tank may, as it rather begins to appear, have been -the decisive factor in the last War, and though it might -be very convenient to use it again, before we put our -money on it, literally and metaphorically, for the -future, are we sure that it is a weapon which suits the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_414">414</span> -British soldier? Time was when at the direction of -Military Experts we spent a great deal of money upon -the building of forts at home and abroad which were -never of the slightest use to any one, because they did -not suit our style of fighting. What reason have we to -suppose that we shall like the Tank as a permanent -addition on a large scale to the equipment of our -Army?” The present authors consider this line of -criticism a very proper one. They differ from the -“hardshell” advocates of the superior weapon in considering -it of the greatest importance that the balance -and poise of the broadsword should suit the hand that -is to wield it. But they believe that the Tank, like -the ship and the aeroplane, is a weapon peculiarly -suited to the British temperament, and that fundamentally -it was for that reason that we, and not some -other nation, first evolved it. For good or ill, our Commanders -both on land and sea have certain peculiarities. -Our men dislike standing on the defensive. They hate -digging, and in the present War were beaten by the -Germans every time at this particularly unpopular -form of activity. Also, almost worse than digging, do -they hate carrying things on their backs, and we are -noted among all nations as the least tolerant of burdens. -All these peculiarities have filled the ranks of -the Navy and of the Cavalry, and all these peculiarities -are suited by the aeroplanes and the Land Ships. Our -Commanders, like their men, prefer to be the attackers, -and like a war of movement. Almost the whole creed -of Nelson, our most popular fighting-hero, was expressed -in his assertion that the first and last duty of -an Admiral was to find out the enemy’s fleet and to -attack it, and in his famous signal, “Engage the enemy -more closely.”</p> - -<p>Further, our leaders particularly and temperamentally<span class="pagenum" id="Page_415">415</span> -dislike a large butcher’s bill. It was, indeed, their -extreme reluctance to send unprotected men to meet the -hail of bullets from German machine-guns, that lay behind -most of the ostensible reasons for which the Tanks -were first given a trial. It was a deciding factor. We -may even perhaps say without seeming fantastic that -it was their inhumanity which cost the Germans the -War. They had no bowels of compassion, and were just -as ready to send the “infantry equivalent” (say seventy -unprotected men) over the top as they were to put in -seven men enclosed in armour. To them it was the -coldest question of military expediency. Purely upon -military considerations they decided against the seven -clad in armour. Our Commanders, though in theory -they were inclined to agree with the German Higher -Command, though they recognised the ultimate cruelty -of the policy of “cheap war,” and knew, with Nelson, -that they had not come to the Western Front to preserve -their lives, were yet tempted by the idea of using -steel and petrol in place of flesh and blood. More than -once in the course of the chequered career of the Tanks -it was this consideration which saved the Corps from -extinction.</p> - -<p>But it is not, of course, enough that the Tank offers -protection to those who fight in it. A trench or a hole -in the ground will do the same. But the Tank is essentially -a mobile weapon of <em>offence</em>. It is the weapon for -the nation which does not fight willingly, but when it -fights, fights to win, and to win quickly with as little -bloodshed as possible. It is the weapon for men who, -if they must fight, like to fight like intelligent beings -still subjecting the material world to their will, and -who are most unwillingly reduced to the rôles of mere -marching automata, bearers of burdens and diggers of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_416">416</span> -the soil, rôles from which the patient German did not -seem averse.</p> - -<h3>IV</h3> - -<p>The creed of the present writers can be very briefly -summarised. A considerable amount of evidence points -to the conclusion that in the phase at which military -science has arrived, and at which it will probably remain -for at least a generation, a superior force of Tanks -can always tip the scales of the military balance of -power.</p> - -<p>Within the period of a generation, a time may again -come when we shall have to defend our lives and our -liberties. We lead the world in the design and manufacture -of Tanks. Let us not abandon that lead in the -production and use of a vital weapon.</p> - -<p>We know too well the tragic cost of one day of war, -and it has been said that had we been visibly prepared -the Germans would not have attacked.</p> - -<p>Obviously we cannot be going to fall again so quickly -into an old error. We certainly intend to be armed, -but who can say that through sheer absence of mind -it will not be with arquebuses? Surely not for the sake -of Army precedent, for the sake of emphasising our -pacific intentions, for the sake of saving a little money, -or even—dearest of all—for the luxury of “not bothering” -about our Army, must we lose our present unparalleled -position of advantage. This advantage is not -only a material one. The Tanks are accustomed to win. -Do not let us throw away a fine tradition of victory.</p> - -<p>Of all that, in our agony of striving we gained by the -way, let us lose nothing.</p> - -<hr /> - -<div id="ip_416" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 50em;"> - <img src="images/i_416.jpg" width="791" height="573" alt="" /> - <p class="p0 b1 center"><a id="ip_416large" href="images/i_416large.jpg"><i>(Larger)</i></a></p> - <div class="caption center narrow416"> - <p class="larger sans underline bold">TANK OPERATIONS.</p> - <p class="vspace smaller">AUGUST, SEPTEMBER, OCTOBER<br /> - & NOVEMBER, 1918.</p> - - <p class="p1 sans underline">NOTE.</p> - - <div class="hang"> - <p>Thick black lines indicate position of British line on dates noted.</p> - <p>Red wash indicates areas in which Tanks operated, with numbers - of Tanks operating and date.</p> - <p>Red lines indicate the ground gained on day of Tank operations.</p> - <p>Thick black dotted lines indicate army boundaries.</p> - </div> - - <p class="right"> - <span class="l2">Headquarters</span><br /> - Tank Corps</p> -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"><div class="index"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_417">417</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak p1" id="INDEX">INDEX</h2> - -<ul class="index"> -<li class="ifrst">Acheux, <a href="#Page_72">72</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Achicourt, <a href="#Page_94">94</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Achiet-le-Grand, <a href="#Page_344">344</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Achiet-le-Petit, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Adelpare Farm, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, <a href="#Page_284">284</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Albert, <a href="#Page_255">255</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a>, <a href="#Page_341">341</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Allenby, General, <a href="#Page_230">230</a></li> - -<li class="indx">American Tanks, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218–223</a></li> -<li class="isub1">in Second Battle of Cambrai, <a href="#Page_371">371–374</a></li> -<li class="isub1">in Battle of the Selle, <a href="#Page_386">386–390</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Amiens, Battle of, <a href="#Page_288">288–322</a></li> -<li class="isub1">the town, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>, <a href="#Page_268">268</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Anneux, <a href="#Page_367">367</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Archbald, Corporal, S., D.C.M., <a href="#Page_252">252</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Arival Wood, <a href="#Page_366">366</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Armin, General von, <a href="#Page_126">126</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Arnold, Lieutenant C. B., <a href="#Page_303">303–309</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Arrachis Wood, <a href="#Page_284">284</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Arras, Battle of, <a href="#Page_89">89–109</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Auchonvillers, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_259">259</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Auchy, <a href="#Page_252">252</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Australians, and the Tanks, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272–289</a>, <a href="#Page_297">297–300</a>, <a href="#Page_310">310–314</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Australian co-operation with the French, <a href="#Page_280">280</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Aveluy Driving School, <a href="#Page_256">256</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Avesnes, <a href="#Page_400">400</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Bacon, Admiral, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Bailleul, <a href="#Page_252">252</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Baker-Carr, Colonel, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Ballon d’Essai</i>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Bapaume, Battle of, <a href="#Page_334">334–340</a></li> -<li class="isub1">the town, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_348">348</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="Battalion_Histories"></a>Battalion Histories, quotations from:</li> -<li class="isub1">“B” 3rd Battalion, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">3rd Battalion, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">7th Battalion, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">“F” 6th Battalion, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">13th Battalion, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">5th Battalion, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">2nd Battalion, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">1st Battalion, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">8th Battalion, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">13th Battalion, <a href="#Page_297">297</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">14th and 1st Battalions, <a href="#Page_301">301</a>,</li> -<li class="isub1">A Battalion History, <a href="#Page_311">311</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">13th Battalion, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">15th Battalion, <a href="#Page_350">350</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">6th Battalion, <a href="#Page_353">353</a>, <a href="#Page_396">396–397</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">11th Battalion, <a href="#Page_366">366</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">15th Battalion, <a href="#Page_367">367</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">(<i>See also</i> <a href="#Brigade_Histories">Brigade and Unit Histories</a>.)</li> - -<li class="indx">Bavay, <a href="#Page_400">400</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Bayliss, Second Lieutenant, <a href="#Page_253">253</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Bayonvillers, <a href="#Page_299">299</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Beaucamp Ridge, <a href="#Page_365">365</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Beaucourt, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_301">301</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Beaufort, <a href="#Page_303">303</a>, <a href="#Page_313">313</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Beaumont-Hamel, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_258">258</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Beaurevoir, <a href="#Page_379">379</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Bellenglise, <a href="#Page_370">370</a>, <a href="#Page_377">377</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Bellicourt, <a href="#Page_362">362</a>, <a href="#Page_370">370</a>, <a href="#Page_371">371</a>, <a href="#Page_375">375</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Belloy, <a href="#Page_271">271</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Bermicourt, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_269">269</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Béthune, <a href="#Page_268">268</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Beugnâtre, <a href="#Page_348">348</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Bihucourt, <a href="#Page_344">344</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Bingham, Captain, M.C., <a href="#Page_251">251</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Birly, Captain, Oswald, <a href="#Page_363">363</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Blangy, <a href="#Page_254">254</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Bohain, <a href="#Page_385">385</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Bois d’Abbé, <a href="#Page_266">266</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Bois d’Aquenne, <a href="#Page_265">265</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Bois de Harpon, <a href="#Page_282">282</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Bony, <a href="#Page_378">378</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Bourgon, General, <a href="#Page_286">286</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Bourlon, Wood and Village, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183–185</a>, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>, <a href="#Page_362">362</a>, <a href="#Page_368">368</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Bouzencourt, <a href="#Page_259">259</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Bradley, Colonel, <a href="#Page_46">46–59</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Brancourt, <a href="#Page_382">382</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Bray, <a href="#Page_255">255</a>, <a href="#Page_341">341</a>, <a href="#Page_347">347</a></li> - -<li class="indx">“Bridge of Tanks,” <a href="#Page_364">364</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Brie, <a href="#Page_249">249</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="Brigade_Histories"></a>Brigade Histories, quotations from:</li> -<li class="isub1">5th Brigade, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_298">298</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">A Brigade, <a href="#Page_356">356</a>, <a href="#Page_357">357–360</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">(<i>See also</i> <a href="#Battalion_Histories">Battalion and Unit Histories</a>.)</li> - -<li class="indx">Broome, General, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Brough, Colonel, <a href="#Page_58">58</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Brown, Captain F. C., M.C., <a href="#Page_262">262</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Bryce, Lieut.-Colonel, <a href="#Page_299">299</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Buchan, Colonel: <cite>History of the War</cite>, quotations from, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125–127</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Bucquoy, <a href="#Page_271">271</a>, <a href="#Page_335">335</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Bullecourt, <a href="#Page_105">105–108</a>, <a href="#Page_244">244</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Bultiaux River, <a href="#Page_397">397</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Buvignies, <a href="#Page_398">398</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Bung, General Sir Julian, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_181">181</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Cachy, <a href="#Page_262">262</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Caix, <a href="#Page_250">250</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Cambrai, First Battle of, <a href="#Page_160">160–184</a></li> -<li class="isub1">German Counter-attack at, <a href="#Page_185">185–189</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Second Battle of, <a href="#Page_361">361–379</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Canal du Nord, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>, <a href="#Page_363">363–368</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Cantaing, <a href="#Page_181">181</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Capper, General, <a href="#Page_86">86</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Carney, driver, <a href="#Page_303">303–308</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Carter, Colonel, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Carter, Second Lieutenant, <a href="#Page_253">253</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Cartigny, <a href="#Page_248">248</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Cassell, Second Lieutenant, <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Cérisy Valley, <a href="#Page_292">292</a>, <a href="#Page_298">298</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Ching, Second Lieut. S. S., <a href="#Page_103">103</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Chipilly, <a href="#Page_312">312</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_418">418</span>Chuignies, <a href="#Page_343">343</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Chuignolles, <a href="#Page_309">309</a>, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>, <a href="#Page_343">343</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Churchill, Mr., <a href="#Page_34">34–36</a>, <a href="#Page_38">38</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Cockcroft, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Colincamps, <a href="#Page_258">258</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Contay, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_283">283</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Courage, Brigadier-General, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_280">280–283</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Courcelles, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>, <a href="#Page_344">344</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Croisilles, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_346">346</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Dalton, Captain, <a href="#Page_285">285</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Dawson, Second Lieutenant, <a href="#Page_253">253</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Debeney, General, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Demilieue, <a href="#Page_388">388</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Deniken, General, <a href="#Page_413">413</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Denny, Colonel, M. C., M. P., <a href="#Page_314">314</a>, <a href="#Page_371">371</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Desert Wood, <a href="#Page_168">168</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Diplock, Mr., <a href="#Page_31">31–34</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Domeny, <a href="#Page_315">315</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Drocourt-Quéant Line, breaking, <a href="#Page_341">341–355</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Duel between Tanks, First, <a href="#Page_263">263</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Dummy Tanks, <a href="#Page_110">110</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Dury Ridge, <a href="#Page_354">354</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Eade, Lieutenant Percy, <a href="#Page_299">299</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Ecoust, <a href="#Page_350">350</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Edwards, Second Lieutenant, <a href="#Page_277">277</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Elles, General, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171–175</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_237">237</a> <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>, <a href="#Page_404">404</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Epehy, Battle of, <a href="#Page_356">356–360</a></li> -<li class="isub1">the Town, <a href="#Page_248">248</a>, <a href="#Page_356">356</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Epinoy, <a href="#Page_369">369</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Erin, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Estienne, General, <a href="#Page_210">210–218</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Etinehem, <a href="#Page_314">314</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Exploits of Individual Tanks, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139–142</a>, <a href="#Page_248">248</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>, <a href="#Page_301">301–308</a>, <a href="#Page_348">348</a>, <a href="#Page_367">367</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Fampoux, <a href="#Page_347">347</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Fanny’s Farm, <a href="#Page_114">114</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Faucourt, <a href="#Page_309">309</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Favreuil, <a href="#Page_348">348</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Fesny, <a href="#Page_395">395</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Fifth Army Headquarters, adverse report of, <a href="#Page_145">145–146</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Fighting Side, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Flers, <a href="#Page_63">63</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Flesquières, <a href="#Page_173">173</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>, <a href="#Page_363">363</a>, <a href="#Page_365">365</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Fleury Redobut, <a href="#Page_99">99</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Foch, Marshal, on the Tanks, <a href="#Page_403">403</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Fontaine-Notre-Dame, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>, <a href="#Page_367">367</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Forsyth-Major, Major, <a href="#Page_225">225</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Framerville, <a href="#Page_311">311</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Frémicourt, <a href="#Page_348">348</a></li> - -<li class="indx">French Tanks Corps, <a href="#Page_209">209–218</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Fresnoy, <a href="#Page_357">357</a>, <a href="#Page_359">359</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Frezenberg, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Fuller, Lieut.-Colonel, <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Gauche Wood, <a href="#Page_187">187</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Gaza, Second and Third Battles of, <a href="#Page_224">224–234</a></li> - -<li class="indx">German Press, and the Tanks, <a href="#Page_405">405</a></li> - -<li class="indx">German Tanks, fights with, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>, <a href="#Page_383">383</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Germans and the Tanks, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_323">323–333</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Ginchy, <a href="#Page_61">61</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Glencorse Wood, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Gomiécourt, <a href="#Page_344">344</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Gonnelieu, <a href="#Page_369">369</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Gould, Second Lieutenant, <a href="#Page_301">301</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Gouzeaucourt, <a href="#Page_185">185</a>, <a href="#Page_362">362</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Graincourt, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, <a href="#Page_363">363</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Groves, Captain, <a href="#Page_266">266</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Gueudecourt, <a href="#Page_70">70</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Guillemont, <a href="#Page_359">359</a>, <a href="#Page_371">371</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Guise, <a href="#Page_385">385</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Haig, Sir Douglas, despatches of, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>, <a href="#Page_316">316</a>, <a href="#Page_323">323</a>, <a href="#Page_355">355</a>, <a href="#Page_361">361</a>, <a href="#Page_370">370</a>, <a href="#Page_377">377</a>, <a href="#Page_387">387</a>, <a href="#Page_390">390</a>, <a href="#Page_396">396</a>, <a href="#Page_404">404</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Haldane, Lieut.-General Aylmer, <a href="#Page_108">108</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Hamelincourt, <a href="#Page_344">344</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Hamel Wood and Village, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Hangard Wood, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>, <a href="#Page_267">267</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Hankey, Brigadier-General, <a href="#Page_293">293</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Hankey, Colonel Sir Maurice, <a href="#Page_34">34</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Happegarbes, <a href="#Page_392">392</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Happy Valley, <a href="#Page_347">347</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Harbonnières, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Harden, Herr Maximilian, on the Tanks, <a href="#Page_404">404</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Hardress-Lloyd, Brigadier-General, <a href="#Page_318">318</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Hargicourt, <a href="#Page_358">358</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Harpon Wood, <a href="#Page_282">282</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Harp, the, <a href="#Page_97">97</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Haspres, <a href="#Page_389">389</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Hatton-Hall, Captain, <a href="#Page_373">373</a>, <a href="#Page_382">382</a>, <a href="#Page_387">387</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Hautmont, <a href="#Page_400">400</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Havrincourt, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Haynecourt, <a href="#Page_369">369</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Hazebrouck, <a href="#Page_268">268</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Hébuterne, <a href="#Page_258">258</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Hecq, <a href="#Page_393">393</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Hedecourt, <a href="#Page_105">105</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Hedges, Second Lieutenant, W. R., <a href="#Page_358">358</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Henriques, Captain, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Herleville Wood, <a href="#Page_342">342</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Hervilly Wood, <a href="#Page_248">248</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Hetherington, Major, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Hickson, Second Lieutenant, <a href="#Page_338">338</a></li> - -<li class="indx">High Wood, <a href="#Page_66">66</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Hillock Farm, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Hotblack, Major, D.S.O., M.C., <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>, <a href="#Page_375">375</a></li> - -<li class="indx">“Hush Operation,” proposed, on the Belgian coast, <a href="#Page_118">118–123</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Ignaucourt Valley, <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Inchy, <a href="#Page_368">368</a></li> - -<li class="indx">“Instructions for Training of Tank Corps in France,” <a href="#Page_202">202–207</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Inverness Copse, <a href="#Page_153">153</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Jerk House, <a href="#Page_153">153</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Johnson, Lieut. Col. Philip, <a href="#Page_120">120</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Jolimetz, <a href="#Page_395">395</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_419">419</span>Jones, Second Lieutenant, <a href="#Page_267">267</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Juniper Cottage, <a href="#Page_154">154</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Kemmel, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_291">291</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Knoll, The, <a href="#Page_359">359</a>, <a href="#Page_362">362</a>, <a href="#Page_369">369</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">La Fère, <a href="#Page_244">244</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Lagnicourt, <a href="#Page_352">352</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Lamotte, <a href="#Page_299">299</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Landrecies, <a href="#Page_392">392–395</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Langemarck, <a href="#Page_148">148</a></li> - -<li class="indx">La Signy Farm, <a href="#Page_72">72</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Lateau Wood, <a href="#Page_175">175</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Latham, Sergeant F., M.M., <a href="#Page_102">102</a></li> - -<li class="indx">La Vacquerie, <a href="#Page_187">187</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Le Cateau, Second Battle of, <a href="#Page_380">380–386</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Le Maistre, General, <a href="#Page_270">270</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Le Quesneu, <a href="#Page_301">301</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Le Quesnoy, <a href="#Page_310">310</a>, <a href="#Page_390">390</a>, <a href="#Page_395">395</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Les-Trois-Boqueleaux, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, <a href="#Page_284">284</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Le Tréport, <a href="#Page_200">200</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Lewis Gun Detachments, <a href="#Page_251">251</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Lihons, <a href="#Page_312">312</a>, <a href="#Page_315">315</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Lipsett, Major-General, <a href="#Page_293">293</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Littledale, Sergeant: Account of Tank Training at Bermicourt, <a href="#Page_77">77–80</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Logeast, Wood, <a href="#Page_340">340</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Longâtte, <a href="#Page_349">349</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Loop, The, <a href="#Page_57">57–60</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Losses of the Tank Corps, <a href="#Page_268">268–269</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Loucheur, M., on the Tanks, <a href="#Page_403">403</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Luce River, <a href="#Page_292">292</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Luck, Second Lieutenant C. W., <a href="#Page_367">367</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Ludendorff, General, and the Tanks, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a></li> - -<li class="indx">“Lusitania” Tank, Exploit of, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Lyon, Private W., M.M., <a href="#Page_252">252</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Macavity, Major, <a href="#Page_363">363</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Machine Gun Corps, Heavy Section of, <a href="#Page_50">50</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Heavy Branch of, <a href="#Page_80">80</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Mailly-Raineval, <a href="#Page_282">282</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Mailly-Maillet Wood, <a href="#Page_258">258</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Marcelcave, <a href="#Page_298">298</a></li> - -<li class="indx">March, 1918, British Retreat of, <a href="#Page_243">243–264</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Marcoing, <a href="#Page_187">187</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Marcourt, <a href="#Page_250">250</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Maricourt, <a href="#Page_254">254</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Martell, Lieutenant, <a href="#Page_384">384</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Martinpuich, <a href="#Page_61">61</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Marwitz, General von der, <a href="#Page_185">185</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Masnières, <a href="#Page_175">175</a>, <a href="#Page_185">185</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Masvillers, <a href="#Page_250">250</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Maubeuge, <a href="#Page_289">289</a>, <a href="#Page_386">386</a>, <a href="#Page_400">400</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Maxse, General, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li> - -<li class="indx">McFee, Mr., <a href="#Page_34">34</a></li> - -<li class="indx">McLagan, Major-General E. G. S., <a href="#Page_321">321–322</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Mecredy, Second Lieutenant C., <a href="#Page_286">286</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Menin, <a href="#Page_385">385</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Mercatel, <a href="#Page_341">341</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Merlaincourt, <a href="#Page_250">250</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Merlimont, <a href="#Page_202">202</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Merville, <a href="#Page_256">256</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Messines, Battle of, <a href="#Page_110">110–117</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Meteren, <a href="#Page_252">252</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Metz, <a href="#Page_185">185</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Mitchell, Lieutenant, <a href="#Page_262">262</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Molain, <a href="#Page_388">388</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Monash, General, <a href="#Page_292">292</a>, <a href="#Page_314">314</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Monchy, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_347">347</a>, <a href="#Page_377">377</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Mons, <a href="#Page_400">400</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Montbrehain, <a href="#Page_379">379</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Mont des Cats, <a href="#Page_253">253</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Montdidier, <a href="#Page_288">288</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Mont du Hibou, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Mont Rouge, <a href="#Page_254">254</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Morcourt, <a href="#Page_292">292</a>, <a href="#Page_298">298</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Moreuil, Battle of, <a href="#Page_280">280–287</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Mormal Forest, <a href="#Page_389">389–396</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Moroccans, and Tanks, <a href="#Page_267">267</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Mory Copse, <a href="#Page_347">347</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Moyenneville, <a href="#Page_335">335</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Murray, General, <a href="#Page_226">226</a></li> - -<li class="indx">“Musical Box” Tank, adventures of, <a href="#Page_303">303–308</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Naedale, Lieutenant T. C., <a href="#Page_374">374</a>, <a href="#Page_388">388</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Neuve Eglise, <a href="#Page_252">252</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Neuville-Vitasse, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_347">347</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Neuvilly, <a href="#Page_389">389</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Nieppe Forest, <a href="#Page_256">256</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Niergnies, <a href="#Page_383">383</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Noel, Sergeant J., D.C.M., <a href="#Page_107">107</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Norton, Major, <a href="#Page_256">256</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Nutt, Major, <a href="#Page_225">225</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Oisy, <a href="#Page_392">392</a></li> - -<li class="indx">O’Kelly, Colonel, <a href="#Page_250">250</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Oosthoek Wood, <a href="#Page_130">130</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Oosttaverne, <a href="#Page_114">114</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Palestine, Tanks in, <a href="#Page_224">224–234</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Pankhurst, Mrs., <a href="#Page_38">38</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Passchendaele, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Pear-Shaped Trench, <a href="#Page_274">274</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Peizière, <a href="#Page_248">248</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Péronne, <a href="#Page_292">292</a></li> - -<li class="indx">“Pill-Boxes,” <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148–151</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Pitt, Lieutenant, <a href="#Page_251">251</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Poelcapelle Village, <a href="#Page_154">154–158</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Poelcapelle Road, Disaster on, <a href="#Page_157">157</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Pollard, Hugh, on the Future of Tanks, <a href="#Page_408">408</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Ponsonby, General John, <a href="#Page_178">178</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Pozières, <a href="#Page_61">61</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Prémont, <a href="#Page_381">381</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Premy Chapel, <a href="#Page_366">366</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Preux, <a href="#Page_393">393</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Proyart, <a href="#Page_309">309</a>, <a href="#Page_314">314</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Quadrilateral, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_357">357</a>, <a href="#Page_359">359</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Quennemont Farm and Ridge, <a href="#Page_359">359</a>, <a href="#Page_362">362</a>, <a href="#Page_369">369</a>, <a href="#Page_375">375</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Ravenel, <a href="#Page_270">270</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Rawlinson, General Sir Henry, <a href="#Page_320">320</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Reconnaissance Branch, <a href="#Page_29">29</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Reconnaissance Officer, Narrative of, <a href="#Page_256">256</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Reconnaissance Service, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_133">133</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Rees-Williams, Lieutenant O. L., <a href="#Page_348">348</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_420">420</span>Renouf, Major, <a href="#Page_46">46</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Reutelbeek, <a href="#Page_154">154</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Ribbans, gunner, <a href="#Page_303">303–308</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Ribecourt, <a href="#Page_360">360</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Riddle, Second Lieutenant, <a href="#Page_367">367</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Riencourt, <a href="#Page_105">105</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Riquerval Wood, <a href="#Page_386">386</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Robertson, Captain, V.C., <a href="#Page_155">155</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Roeux, <a href="#Page_107">107</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Ronssoy, <a href="#Page_357">357</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Rosières, <a href="#Page_312">312</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Rossignol, <a href="#Page_259">259</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Rowe, Captain, <a href="#Page_383">383</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Rumilly, <a href="#Page_175">175</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">St. Julien, the town, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Tanks’ Success at, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li> - -<li class="indx">St. Léger, <a href="#Page_107">107</a></li> - -<li class="indx">St. Martin’s Wood, <a href="#Page_342">342</a></li> - -<li class="indx">St. Pol, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>, <a href="#Page_291">291</a></li> - -<li class="indx">St. Quentin, <a href="#Page_244">244</a></li> - -<li class="indx">St. Quentin Canal, <a href="#Page_369">369–373</a></li> - -<li class="indx">St. Quentin Wood, <a href="#Page_360">360</a></li> - -<li class="indx">St. Ribert Wood, <a href="#Page_282">282</a></li> - -<li class="indx">St. Souplet, <a href="#Page_388">388</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Sambre and Oise Canal, <a href="#Page_387">387</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Sambre, the River, <a href="#Page_392">392</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Sasse, Major, D.S.O., <a href="#Page_382">382</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Sauchy-Lestrée, <a href="#Page_368">368</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Saunders, Lieutenant, <a href="#Page_352">352</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Sauvillers, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, <a href="#Page_284">284</a></li> - -<li class="indx">“Savage Rabbits,” <a href="#Page_237">237</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Schele, The, <a href="#Page_390">390</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Scheuch, General, on the Tanks, <a href="#Page_405">405</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Selency, <a href="#Page_357">357</a>, <a href="#Page_359">359</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Selle, Battle of the, <a href="#Page_386">386–391</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Sensée Valley, <a href="#Page_349">349</a>, <a href="#Page_252">252</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Serain, <a href="#Page_381">381</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Seranvillers, <a href="#Page_175">175</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Sewell, Lieutenant C. H., V.C., <a href="#Page_349">349</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Skeggs, Major, <a href="#Page_366">366</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Smallwood, Second Lieutenant G. F., <a href="#Page_358">358</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Smith, Captain G. A., <a href="#Page_350">350</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Smith, Second Lieutenant Henderson, M.C., <a href="#Page_295">295</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Soldier’s Treachery, a, <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Solesmes, <a href="#Page_389">389</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Somme, Battle of the, <a href="#Page_57">57–65</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><cite>Spectator</cite>, on the Battle of Gaza, <a href="#Page_233">233</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Staden, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Steenbeek, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Stern, Sir Albert, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_87">87</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Stewart, Ian, <a href="#Page_257">257</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Storm, Second Lieutenant, <a href="#Page_251">251</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Strachan, Captain C. H., <a href="#Page_353">353</a> <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Swinton, General E. D., <a href="#Page_31">31–34</a>, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_39">39</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Tactics, new, <a href="#Page_246">246</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Tanks, inception of the, <a href="#Page_25">25</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Different types of, <a href="#Page_26">26</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Uses of, <a href="#Page_27">27–28</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Training of the crews of, <a href="#Page_30">30</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Pre-1914 designs for, <a href="#Page_31">31</a></li> -<li class="isub1">First steps in designing of, <a href="#Page_32">32</a></li> -<li class="isub1">War Office and the, <a href="#Page_33">33–39</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Admiralty and the, <a href="#Page_33">33–41</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Further steps in progress of, <a href="#Page_41">41–56</a></li> -<li class="isub1"><a href="#Page_150">150</a> sanctioned, <a href="#Page_53">53</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Production, problem of, <a href="#Page_81">81</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Mechanical War Supply Department, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Tank Committees, <a href="#Page_86">86</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Mark I. Tanks, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Mark II. Tanks, <a href="#Page_114">114</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Mark IV. Tanks, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Mark V. Tanks, the uses of, <a href="#Page_27">27–30</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_269">269</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Mark VI. Tanks, <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Whippets, <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Fascines, manufacture of, <a href="#Page_164">164</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Cribs, <a href="#Page_269">269</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Central workshops, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_199">199</a>, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>, <a href="#Page_399">399</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Tank actions, minor, <a href="#Page_270">270</a></li> - -<li class="indx">“Tank Corps Intelligence Summary,” <a href="#Page_380">380</a>, <a href="#Page_385">385</a>, <a href="#Page_393">393</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Tank Commanders, Maintenance Course, etc., for, <a href="#Page_203">203–207</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Tank Crew, Military History of Member of, <a href="#Page_199">199–202</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Tank, itinerary of a, <a href="#Page_196">196–199</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Tank Officers, narrative by, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178–181</a>, <a href="#Page_284">284</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Tanks: destroying, <a href="#Page_249">249</a></li> -<li class="isub1">future of, <a href="#Page_402">402–416</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Tennyson-d’Eyncourt, Sir Eustace, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_87">87</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Thetford, <a href="#Page_48">48</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Thiepval, <a href="#Page_68">68</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Tournai, <a href="#Page_400">400</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Triangle Farm, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_153">153</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Tritton, Mr., <a href="#Page_36">36</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Tulloch, Major, <a href="#Page_31">31–35</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Tunnelling Company (184th), work of, <a href="#Page_131">131</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">“Unditching Beam,” <a href="#Page_131">131</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Unit Histories, quotations from, <a href="#Page_357">357–360</a></li> -<li class="isub1">(<i>See also</i> <a href="#Battalion_Histories">Battalion and Brigade Histories</a>.)</li> - -<li class="indx">Uzielli, Lieutenant, C. F., <a href="#Page_350">350</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Vaire Wood, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Valenciennes, <a href="#Page_389">389</a>, <a href="#Page_392">392</a>, <a href="#Page_395">395</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Van Zeller, Second Lieutenant, T. E., M.C., <a href="#Page_249">249</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Vaulx-Vraucourt, <a href="#Page_350">350</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Vauvillers, <a href="#Page_311">311</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Vaux, <a href="#Page_280">280</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Vendhuille, <a href="#Page_370">370</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Villeret, <a href="#Page_356">356</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Villers Bretonneux, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261–265</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_295">295</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Villers Guislain, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>, <a href="#Page_369">369</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Vimy, the village, <a href="#Page_98">98</a></li> -<li class="isub1">Canadians at, <a href="#Page_98">98</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Wailly, the town, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_202">202</a></li> -<li class="isub1">training ground at, <a href="#Page_108">108</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Wanbeke, <a href="#Page_116">116</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_421">421</span>Warfusée, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Warvillers, <a href="#Page_303">303</a>, <a href="#Page_313">313</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Watson, Major, on Battle of Bullecourt, <a href="#Page_106">106</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Weber, Second lieutenant, <a href="#Page_99">99</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><cite>Weekly Tank Notes</cite>, quotations from, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>, <a href="#Page_303">303–309</a>, <a href="#Page_330">330</a>, <a href="#Page_386">386</a>, <a href="#Page_406">406</a></li> - -<li class="indx">West, Captain Richard Annesley, D.S.O. <a href="#Page_337">337</a></li> - -<li class="indx">West, Lieut.-Colonel R. A., D.S.O., M.C., <a href="#Page_352">352</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Westhoek, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Whatley, Sergeant, <a href="#Page_367">367</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Whyte, Second Lieutenant, M.C., <a href="#Page_251">251</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Wig, Comedy of a, <a href="#Page_176">176</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Wilkes, Major G. L., D.S.O., <a href="#Page_158">158</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Williams, Major-General, <a href="#Page_108">108</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Wilson, Lieutenant, <a href="#Page_266">266</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Wilson, Major, <a href="#Page_36">36</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Wool, <a href="#Page_199">199</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Worsap, Second Lieutenant, <a href="#Page_383">383</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Wrisberg, General, on the Tanks, <a href="#Page_404">404–405</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Wurst Farm, <a href="#Page_154">154</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Wytschaete, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Ypres Salient, sand model of, <a href="#Page_134">134</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Ypres, Third Battle of, <a href="#Page_124">124–159</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Yvrench, training center at, <a href="#Page_57">57</a></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Zonnebeke, <a href="#Page_152">152</a></li> -</ul> -</div></div> - -<div class="chapter"><div class="footnotes"> -<h2 class="nobreak p1" id="FOOTNOTES">FOOTNOTES</h2> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_1" href="#FNanchor_1" class="fnanchor">1</a> “I am building secure and covered chariots which are invulnerable, -and when they advance with their guns into the midst of the foe even -the largest enemy masses must retreat, and behind them the infantry -can follow in safety and without opposition.”</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_2" href="#FNanchor_2" class="fnanchor">2</a> It differed from an ordinary chariot in that the two little fat -hollow-backed horses, which are depicted as providing the motive power, -were like the crew, enclosed within the wooden armour.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_3" href="#FNanchor_3" class="fnanchor">3</a> It appears to have been the Committee which investigated Mr. -Diplock’s machine, with some additional members.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_4" href="#FNanchor_4" class="fnanchor">4</a> Although the appeal was necessarily tentative and unofficial, and -no details of the nature of the work could be given, sixty women -immediately volunteered.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_5" href="#FNanchor_5" class="fnanchor">5</a> Major Renouf.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_6" href="#FNanchor_6" class="fnanchor">6</a> Major Renouf.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_7" href="#FNanchor_7" class="fnanchor">7</a> Most of these Tanks were training machines, in the sense that their -“armour” was boiler-plate instead of hardened steel.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_8" href="#FNanchor_8" class="fnanchor">8</a> Colonel Swinton.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_9" href="#FNanchor_9" class="fnanchor">9</a> Captain Henriques.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_10" href="#FNanchor_10" class="fnanchor">10</a> From <cite>Weekly Tank Notes</cite>, a confidential official periodical for private -circulation.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_11" href="#FNanchor_11" class="fnanchor">11</a> <cite>W.T.N.</cite></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_12" href="#FNanchor_12" class="fnanchor">12</a> See Plate, Chapter VIII. (An unannotated air photograph of -badly crumped ground.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_13" href="#FNanchor_13" class="fnanchor">13</a> Among other Army Commanders was General Sir H. S. Rawlinson, -who was later to be so good a friend to the Tanks. On this occasion, -however, it is said that their performances left him completely cold and -unconvinced.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_14" href="#FNanchor_14" class="fnanchor">14</a> Captain Henriques.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_15" href="#FNanchor_15" class="fnanchor">15</a> Sergeant Littledale of the Tank Corps writing in the <cite>Atlantic -Monthly</cite>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_16" href="#FNanchor_16" class="fnanchor">16</a> Sergeant Littledale of the Tank Corps writing in the <cite>Atlantic -Monthly</cite>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_17" href="#FNanchor_17" class="fnanchor">17</a> The progress of this decision has been slightly telescoped, the -“operative” resolutions only being recorded, and the story of a good -deal of proposal and counter-proposal omitted.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_18" href="#FNanchor_18" class="fnanchor">18</a> The list was as follows: -</p> - -<p class="in0 in4"> -<i>Chairman.</i>—Major-General Sir J. Capper.<br /> -<i>War Office.</i>—Lieut.-Colonel Sir J. Keane.<br /> -<span class="in18a">Lieut.-Colonel Mathew-Lannaw.</span><br /> -<i>Ministry of Munitions.</i>—Lieut.-Colonel Stern.<br /> -<span class="in18b">Sir Eustace Tennyson d’Eyncourt.</span> -</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_19" href="#FNanchor_19" class="fnanchor">19</a> Achicourt.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_20" href="#FNanchor_20" class="fnanchor">20</a> Letter from a Tank officer dated “April 9, evening.”</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_21" href="#FNanchor_21" class="fnanchor">21</a> Letter from an eye-witness written on the evening of April 9.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_22" href="#FNanchor_22" class="fnanchor">22</a> The Harp.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_23" href="#FNanchor_23" class="fnanchor">23</a> Major Watson, the Tank Company Commander, writing in <cite>Blackwood’s -Magazine</cite>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_24" href="#FNanchor_24" class="fnanchor">24</a> “B” (2) Battalion History.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_25" href="#FNanchor_25" class="fnanchor">25</a> <cite>W.T.N.</cite></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_26" href="#FNanchor_26" class="fnanchor">26</a> Official paper.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_27" href="#FNanchor_27" class="fnanchor">27</a> Indirect fire may be defined as fire directed towards the spot where -you believe the enemy to be. Fire is called “direct” when the target -can be seen.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_28" href="#FNanchor_28" class="fnanchor">28</a> Mr. Buchan’s <cite>History of the War</cite>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_29" href="#FNanchor_29" class="fnanchor">29</a> <cite>W.T.N.</cite></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_30" href="#FNanchor_30" class="fnanchor">30</a> Mr. Buchan’s <cite>History of the War</cite>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_31" href="#FNanchor_31" class="fnanchor">31</a> <cite>W.T.N.</cite></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_32" href="#FNanchor_32" class="fnanchor">32</a> Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatch.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_33" href="#FNanchor_33" class="fnanchor">33</a> The size of these dumps was now always computed in “Tank Fills.” -</p> -<p class="in0 in4"> -1 fill consisting of:<br /> -<span class="in2">60 galls. of Petrol.</span><br /> -<span class="in2">10 galls. of Oil.</span><br /> -<span class="in2">20 galls. of Water.</span><br /> -<span class="in2">10 lb. of Grease.</span><br /> -<span class="in2">10,000 rounds of S.A. Ammunition for a Female Tank,</span><br /> -or<br /> -<span class="in2">200 rounds of 6-pdr. Ammunition</span><br /> -and<br /> -<span class="in2">6000 rounds of S.A. Ammunition for a Male.</span> -</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_34" href="#FNanchor_34" class="fnanchor">34</a> <cite>W.T.N.</cite></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_35" href="#FNanchor_35" class="fnanchor">35</a> 3rd Battalion History.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_36" href="#FNanchor_36" class="fnanchor">36</a> From Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatch.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_37" href="#FNanchor_37" class="fnanchor">37</a> From the History of 7th Battalion.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_38" href="#FNanchor_38" class="fnanchor">38</a> <cite>W.T.N.</cite></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_39" href="#FNanchor_39" class="fnanchor">39</a> <cite>W.T.N.</cite></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_40" href="#FNanchor_40" class="fnanchor">40</a> The second Tank detailed for this strong point had—in common -with the two reserve Tanks—bellied or become ditched on the way up.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_41" href="#FNanchor_41" class="fnanchor">41</a> Official Summary.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_42" href="#FNanchor_42" class="fnanchor">42</a> Major Wilkes was awarded the D.S.O. for this piece of work.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_43" href="#FNanchor_43" class="fnanchor">43</a> Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatch.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_44" href="#FNanchor_44" class="fnanchor">44</a> “A” Battalion was borrowed from 2nd Brigade.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_45" href="#FNanchor_45" class="fnanchor">45</a> From “F” (6th) Battalion History.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_46" href="#FNanchor_46" class="fnanchor">46</a> <cite>W.T.N.</cite></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_47" href="#FNanchor_47" class="fnanchor">47</a> Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatch.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_48" href="#FNanchor_48" class="fnanchor">48</a> <cite>W.T.N.</cite></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_49" href="#FNanchor_49" class="fnanchor">49</a> Artillery of Assault, <i>i.e.</i>, Tanks.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_50" href="#FNanchor_50" class="fnanchor">50</a> An aiming instrument.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_51" href="#FNanchor_51" class="fnanchor">51</a> <cite>W.T.N.</cite></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_52" href="#FNanchor_52" class="fnanchor">52</a> Mr. Buchanan’s <cite>History of the War</cite>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_53" href="#FNanchor_53" class="fnanchor">53</a> Major Forsyth-Major (the Second in Command of the E.T.D.), on -whose report through Colonel Fuller this summary is largely based, -was torpedoed on his return to England in 1918 and all his maps and -documents were lost.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_54" href="#FNanchor_54" class="fnanchor">54</a> General Murray’s Despatch.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_55" href="#FNanchor_55" class="fnanchor">55</a> 5th Battalion History.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_56" href="#FNanchor_56" class="fnanchor">56</a> 2nd Battalion History.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_57" href="#FNanchor_57" class="fnanchor">57</a> Major Norton, commanding the Lewis gun detachment.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_58" href="#FNanchor_58" class="fnanchor">58</a> 3rd Battalion History.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_59" href="#FNanchor_59" class="fnanchor">59</a> 1st Battalion History.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_60" href="#FNanchor_60" class="fnanchor">60</a> <cite>W.T.N.</cite></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_61" href="#FNanchor_61" class="fnanchor">61</a> Case shot: bullets not enclosed in a shell, but fired direct from a -6-pounder and scattering like the charge of a shot gun.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_62" href="#FNanchor_62" class="fnanchor">62</a> Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatch.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_63" href="#FNanchor_63" class="fnanchor">63</a> 5th Brigade History.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_64" href="#FNanchor_64" class="fnanchor">64</a> 8th Battalion History.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_65" href="#FNanchor_65" class="fnanchor">65</a> <cite>W.T.N.</cite></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_66" href="#FNanchor_66" class="fnanchor">66</a> <cite>W.T.N.</cite></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_67" href="#FNanchor_67" class="fnanchor">67</a> The 1st, 4th, 5th, and 14th Battalions.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_68" href="#FNanchor_68" class="fnanchor">68</a> The 8th, 13th, 2nd, and 15th Battalions.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_69" href="#FNanchor_69" class="fnanchor">69</a> From <cite>W.T.N.</cite></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_70" href="#FNanchor_70" class="fnanchor">70</a> 13th Battalion History.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_71" href="#FNanchor_71" class="fnanchor">71</a> From the 5th Brigade History.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_72" href="#FNanchor_72" class="fnanchor">72</a> Honours and Awards.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_73" href="#FNanchor_73" class="fnanchor">73</a> From 14th Battalion History.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_74" href="#FNanchor_74" class="fnanchor">74</a> From 1st Battalion History.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_75" href="#FNanchor_75" class="fnanchor">75</a> From 3rd Battalion History.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_76" href="#FNanchor_76" class="fnanchor">76</a> From 8th Battalion History</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_77" href="#FNanchor_77" class="fnanchor">77</a> From a Battalion History.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_78" href="#FNanchor_78" class="fnanchor">78</a> From a Battalion History.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_79" href="#FNanchor_79" class="fnanchor">79</a> Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatch.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_80" href="#FNanchor_80" class="fnanchor">80</a> Summer, 1919.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_81" href="#FNanchor_81" class="fnanchor">81</a> <i>i.e.</i>, In the Battle of Amiens, 8.8.18.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_82" href="#FNanchor_82" class="fnanchor">82</a> <cite>W.T.N.</cite></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_83" href="#FNanchor_83" class="fnanchor">83</a> 3rd Battalion History.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_84" href="#FNanchor_84" class="fnanchor">84</a> 15th Battalion History.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_85" href="#FNanchor_85" class="fnanchor">85</a> 6th Battalion History and “Honours and Awards.”</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_86" href="#FNanchor_86" class="fnanchor">86</a> Despatch.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_87" href="#FNanchor_87" class="fnanchor">87</a> A Brigade History.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_88" href="#FNanchor_88" class="fnanchor">88</a> Unit History.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_89" href="#FNanchor_89" class="fnanchor">89</a> <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_90" href="#FNanchor_90" class="fnanchor">90</a> Unit History.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_91" href="#FNanchor_91" class="fnanchor">91</a> Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatch.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_92" href="#FNanchor_92" class="fnanchor">92</a> 15th Battalion Tank History.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_93" href="#FNanchor_93" class="fnanchor">93</a> Captain Denny, <cite>Daily Telegraph</cite>, April 1, 1919.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_94" href="#FNanchor_94" class="fnanchor">94</a> Captain Denny, <cite>Daily Telegraph</cite>, April 1, 1919.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_95" href="#FNanchor_95" class="fnanchor">95</a> The 301st was attached to the 27th American Division.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_96" href="#FNanchor_96" class="fnanchor">96</a> From information specially given to the author by Captain Hatton-Hall, -Reconnaissance Officer of the Brigade.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_97" href="#FNanchor_97" class="fnanchor">97</a> 16th Battalion.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_98" href="#FNanchor_98" class="fnanchor">98</a> Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatch.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_99" href="#FNanchor_99" class="fnanchor">99</a> Captain Hatton-Hall.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_100" href="#FNanchor_100" class="fnanchor">100</a> <cite>W.T.N.</cite></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_101" href="#FNanchor_101" class="fnanchor">101</a> Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatch.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_102" href="#FNanchor_102" class="fnanchor">102</a> Captain Hatton-Hall.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_103" href="#FNanchor_103" class="fnanchor">103</a> Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatch.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_104" href="#FNanchor_104" class="fnanchor">104</a> Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatch.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_105" href="#FNanchor_105" class="fnanchor">105</a> 6th Battalion History.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_106" href="#FNanchor_106" class="fnanchor">106</a> 6th Battalion History.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_107" href="#FNanchor_107" class="fnanchor">107</a> <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_108" href="#FNanchor_108" class="fnanchor">108</a> <cite>W.T.N.</cite></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_109" href="#FNanchor_109" class="fnanchor">109</a> Tradition relates that had General Swinton had his way, the Tanks -for Palestine would have had hideous faces and minatory texts from the -Koran painted upon them.</p></div> -</div></div> - -<div class="chapter"><div class="transnote"> -<h2 class="nobreak" id="Transcribers_Notes">Transcriber’s Notes</h2> - -<p>Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made -consistent when a predominant preference was found -in the original book; otherwise they were not changed.</p> - -<p>Simple typographical errors were corrected; unbalanced -quotation marks were remedied when the change was -obvious, and otherwise left unbalanced.</p> - -<p>Illustrations in this eBook have been positioned -between paragraphs and outside quotations. In versions -of this eBook that support hyperlinks, the page -references in the List of Illustrations lead to the -corresponding illustrations.</p> - -<p>The text always uses “moral”, not “morale”.</p> - -<p>The index was not checked for proper alphabetization -or correct page references.</p> - -<p><a href="#CHAPTER_XV">Chapter XV</a> does not have a Section “V”; the -section after “IV” is “VI”; no pages or text are missing.</p> -</div></div> - - - - - - - - -<pre> - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Tank Corps, by -Clough Williams-Ellis and Amabel Williams-Ellis - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE TANK CORPS *** - -***** This file should be named 62881-h.htm or 62881-h.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/6/2/8/8/62881/ - -Produced by Brian Coe, Charlie Howard, and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This -book was produced from images made available by the -HathiTrust Digital Library.) - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part -of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm -concept and trademark. Project Gutenberg is a registered trademark, -and may not be used if you charge for the eBooks, unless you receive -specific permission. If you do not charge anything for copies of this -eBook, complying with the rules is very easy. You may use this eBook -for nearly any purpose such as creation of derivative works, reports, -performances and research. They may be modified and printed and given -away--you may do practically ANYTHING in the United States with eBooks -not protected by U.S. copyright law. Redistribution is subject to the -trademark license, especially commercial redistribution. - -START: FULL LICENSE - -THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE -PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK - -To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free -distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work -(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full -Project Gutenberg-tm License available with this file or online at -www.gutenberg.org/license. - -Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works - -1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to -and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property -(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all -the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or -destroy all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your -possession. If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a -Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound -by the terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the -person or entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph -1.E.8. - -1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be -used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who -agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few -things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See -paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this -agreement and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works. See paragraph 1.E below. - -1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the -Foundation" or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection -of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual -works in the collection are in the public domain in the United -States. If an individual work is unprotected by copyright law in the -United States and you are located in the United States, we do not -claim a right to prevent you from copying, distributing, performing, -displaying or creating derivative works based on the work as long as -all references to Project Gutenberg are removed. Of course, we hope -that you will support the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting -free access to electronic works by freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm -works in compliance with the terms of this agreement for keeping the -Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with the work. You can easily -comply with the terms of this agreement by keeping this work in the -same format with its attached full Project Gutenberg-tm License when -you share it without charge with others. - -1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern -what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are -in a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, -check the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this -agreement before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, -distributing or creating derivative works based on this work or any -other Project Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no -representations concerning the copyright status of any work in any -country outside the United States. - -1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: - -1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other -immediate access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear -prominently whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work -on which the phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the -phrase "Project Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, -performed, viewed, copied or distributed: - - This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and - most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no - restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it - under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this - eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the - United States, you'll have to check the laws of the country where you - are located before using this ebook. - -1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is -derived from texts not protected by U.S. copyright law (does not -contain a notice indicating that it is posted with permission of the -copyright holder), the work can be copied and distributed to anyone in -the United States without paying any fees or charges. If you are -redistributing or providing access to a work with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the work, you must comply -either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 or -obtain permission for the use of the work and the Project Gutenberg-tm -trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted -with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution -must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any -additional terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms -will be linked to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works -posted with the permission of the copyright holder found at the -beginning of this work. - -1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm -License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this -work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. - -1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this -electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without -prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with -active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project -Gutenberg-tm License. - -1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, -compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including -any word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access -to or distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format -other than "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official -version posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site -(www.gutenberg.org), you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense -to the user, provide a copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means -of obtaining a copy upon request, of the work in its original "Plain -Vanilla ASCII" or other form. Any alternate format must include the -full Project Gutenberg-tm License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. - -1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, -performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works -unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing -access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -provided that - -* You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from - the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method - you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is owed - to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he has - agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the Project - Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments must be paid - within 60 days following each date on which you prepare (or are - legally required to prepare) your periodic tax returns. Royalty - payments should be clearly marked as such and sent to the Project - Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the address specified in - Section 4, "Information about donations to the Project Gutenberg - Literary Archive Foundation." - -* You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies - you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he - does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm - License. You must require such a user to return or destroy all - copies of the works possessed in a physical medium and discontinue - all use of and all access to other copies of Project Gutenberg-tm - works. - -* You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of - any money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the - electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days of - receipt of the work. - -* You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free - distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. - -1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work or group of works on different terms than -are set forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing -from both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and The -Project Gutenberg Trademark LLC, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm -trademark. Contact the Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. - -1.F. - -1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable -effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread -works not protected by U.S. copyright law in creating the Project -Gutenberg-tm collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may -contain "Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate -or corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other -intellectual property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or -other medium, a computer virus, or computer codes that damage or -cannot be read by your equipment. - -1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right -of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project -Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all -liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal -fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT -LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE -PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE -TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE -LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR -INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH -DAMAGE. - -1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a -defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can -receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a -written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you -received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium -with your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you -with the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in -lieu of a refund. If you received the work electronically, the person -or entity providing it to you may choose to give you a second -opportunity to receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If -the second copy is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing -without further opportunities to fix the problem. - -1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth -in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS', WITH NO -OTHER WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT -LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. - -1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied -warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of -damages. If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement -violates the law of the state applicable to this agreement, the -agreement shall be interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or -limitation permitted by the applicable state law. The invalidity or -unenforceability of any provision of this agreement shall not void the -remaining provisions. - -1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the -trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone -providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in -accordance with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the -production, promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works, harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, -including legal fees, that arise directly or indirectly from any of -the following which you do or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this -or any Project Gutenberg-tm work, (b) alteration, modification, or -additions or deletions to any Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any -Defect you cause. - -Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm - -Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of -electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of -computers including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It -exists because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations -from people in all walks of life. - -Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the -assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's -goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will -remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure -and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future -generations. To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation and how your efforts and donations can help, see -Sections 3 and 4 and the Foundation information page at -www.gutenberg.org - - - -Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation - -The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit -501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the -state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal -Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification -number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent permitted by -U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. - -The Foundation's principal office is in Fairbanks, Alaska, with the -mailing address: PO Box 750175, Fairbanks, AK 99775, but its -volunteers and employees are scattered throughout numerous -locations. Its business office is located at 809 North 1500 West, Salt -Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email contact links and up to -date contact information can be found at the Foundation's web site and -official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact - -For additional contact information: - - Dr. Gregory B. Newby - Chief Executive and Director - gbnewby@pglaf.org - -Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg -Literary Archive Foundation - -Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide -spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of -increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be -freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest -array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations -($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt -status with the IRS. - -The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating -charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United -States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a -considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up -with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations -where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To SEND -DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any particular -state visit www.gutenberg.org/donate - -While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we -have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition -against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who -approach us with offers to donate. - -International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make -any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from -outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. - -Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation -methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other -ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. To -donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate - -Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works. - -Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project -Gutenberg-tm concept of a library of electronic works that could be -freely shared with anyone. For forty years, he produced and -distributed Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of -volunteer support. - -Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed -editions, all of which are confirmed as not protected by copyright in -the U.S. unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not -necessarily keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper -edition. - -Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search -facility: www.gutenberg.org - -This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, -including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to -subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. - - - -</pre> - -</body> -</html> diff --git a/old/62881-h/images/cover.jpg b/old/62881-h/images/cover.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index 332b018..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h/images/cover.jpg +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/62881-h/images/i_000.jpg b/old/62881-h/images/i_000.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index d437cba..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h/images/i_000.jpg +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/62881-h/images/i_001.png b/old/62881-h/images/i_001.png Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index 593f5af..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h/images/i_001.png +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/62881-h/images/i_005.jpg b/old/62881-h/images/i_005.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index f9df652..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h/images/i_005.jpg +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/62881-h/images/i_028a.jpg b/old/62881-h/images/i_028a.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index 199d22f..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h/images/i_028a.jpg +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/62881-h/images/i_028b.jpg b/old/62881-h/images/i_028b.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index 6b69550..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h/images/i_028b.jpg +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/62881-h/images/i_028c.jpg b/old/62881-h/images/i_028c.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index b7d75c8..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h/images/i_028c.jpg +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/62881-h/images/i_028d.jpg b/old/62881-h/images/i_028d.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index 5c19b06..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h/images/i_028d.jpg +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/62881-h/images/i_064a.jpg b/old/62881-h/images/i_064a.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index 00e2a3f..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h/images/i_064a.jpg +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/62881-h/images/i_064b.jpg b/old/62881-h/images/i_064b.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index 67653a6..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h/images/i_064b.jpg +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/62881-h/images/i_096a1.jpg b/old/62881-h/images/i_096a1.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index 2c75a4b..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h/images/i_096a1.jpg +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/62881-h/images/i_096a2.jpg b/old/62881-h/images/i_096a2.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index 6f5e78b..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h/images/i_096a2.jpg +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/62881-h/images/i_096b1.jpg b/old/62881-h/images/i_096b1.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index 9edef26..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h/images/i_096b1.jpg +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/62881-h/images/i_096b2.jpg b/old/62881-h/images/i_096b2.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index eb9a0ee..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h/images/i_096b2.jpg +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/62881-h/images/i_132a.jpg b/old/62881-h/images/i_132a.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index 9597a8a..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h/images/i_132a.jpg +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/62881-h/images/i_132b.jpg b/old/62881-h/images/i_132b.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index 1bb7d49..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h/images/i_132b.jpg +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/62881-h/images/i_132c.jpg b/old/62881-h/images/i_132c.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index 9d780df..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h/images/i_132c.jpg +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/62881-h/images/i_132d.jpg b/old/62881-h/images/i_132d.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index e9ea18b..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h/images/i_132d.jpg +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/62881-h/images/i_144a.jpg b/old/62881-h/images/i_144a.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index 4771654..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h/images/i_144a.jpg +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/62881-h/images/i_144b1.jpg b/old/62881-h/images/i_144b1.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index 823fd49..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h/images/i_144b1.jpg +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/62881-h/images/i_144b2.jpg b/old/62881-h/images/i_144b2.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index 5cceb79..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h/images/i_144b2.jpg +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/62881-h/images/i_176a.jpg b/old/62881-h/images/i_176a.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index c9154c6..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h/images/i_176a.jpg +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/62881-h/images/i_176b1.jpg b/old/62881-h/images/i_176b1.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index d4e465f..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h/images/i_176b1.jpg +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/62881-h/images/i_176b2.jpg b/old/62881-h/images/i_176b2.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index 4b4e52d..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h/images/i_176b2.jpg +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/62881-h/images/i_200a1.jpg b/old/62881-h/images/i_200a1.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index 037d167..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h/images/i_200a1.jpg +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/62881-h/images/i_200a2.jpg b/old/62881-h/images/i_200a2.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index fc0a397..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h/images/i_200a2.jpg +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/62881-h/images/i_200b1.jpg b/old/62881-h/images/i_200b1.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index 308b741..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h/images/i_200b1.jpg +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/62881-h/images/i_200b2.jpg b/old/62881-h/images/i_200b2.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index 57f771a..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h/images/i_200b2.jpg +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/62881-h/images/i_304a1.jpg b/old/62881-h/images/i_304a1.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index 6ecedf2..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h/images/i_304a1.jpg +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/62881-h/images/i_304a2.jpg b/old/62881-h/images/i_304a2.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index 95776b2..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h/images/i_304a2.jpg +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/62881-h/images/i_304b1.jpg b/old/62881-h/images/i_304b1.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index 2ce91a0..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h/images/i_304b1.jpg +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/62881-h/images/i_304b2.jpg b/old/62881-h/images/i_304b2.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index a0cbbdf..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h/images/i_304b2.jpg +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/62881-h/images/i_336a1.jpg b/old/62881-h/images/i_336a1.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index b53ef32..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h/images/i_336a1.jpg +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/62881-h/images/i_336a2.jpg b/old/62881-h/images/i_336a2.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index 4fe569e..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h/images/i_336a2.jpg +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/62881-h/images/i_336b1.jpg b/old/62881-h/images/i_336b1.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index 95c4806..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h/images/i_336b1.jpg +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/62881-h/images/i_336b2.jpg b/old/62881-h/images/i_336b2.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index f39173b..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h/images/i_336b2.jpg +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/62881-h/images/i_368a.jpg b/old/62881-h/images/i_368a.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index ce99b6f..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h/images/i_368a.jpg +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/62881-h/images/i_368b1.jpg b/old/62881-h/images/i_368b1.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index 42b1725..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h/images/i_368b1.jpg +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/62881-h/images/i_368b2.jpg b/old/62881-h/images/i_368b2.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index a805ffb..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h/images/i_368b2.jpg +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/62881-h/images/i_384a.jpg b/old/62881-h/images/i_384a.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index 5bf0639..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h/images/i_384a.jpg +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/62881-h/images/i_384b.jpg b/old/62881-h/images/i_384b.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index f5cb8ff..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h/images/i_384b.jpg +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/62881-h/images/i_396a.jpg b/old/62881-h/images/i_396a.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index a0524bf..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h/images/i_396a.jpg +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/62881-h/images/i_396b.jpg b/old/62881-h/images/i_396b.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index 9e3e5e2..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h/images/i_396b.jpg +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/62881-h/images/i_416.jpg b/old/62881-h/images/i_416.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index c93e485..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h/images/i_416.jpg +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/62881-h/images/i_416large.jpg b/old/62881-h/images/i_416large.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index 8ef9cc6..0000000 --- a/old/62881-h/images/i_416large.jpg +++ /dev/null |
