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diff --git a/old/62413-0.txt b/old/62413-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 7c78aff..0000000 --- a/old/62413-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3868 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of Cowpens, by Thomas J. Fleming - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: Cowpens - Downright Fighting: The Story of Cowpens - -Author: Thomas J. Fleming - -Release Date: June 17, 2020 [EBook #62413] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK COWPENS *** - - - - -Produced by Stephen Hutcheson and the Online Distributed -Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net - - - - - - - - - - Handbook 135 Cowpens - - - - - “Downright Fighting” - The Story of Cowpens - - - _by Thomas J. Fleming_ - - - A Handbook for - Cowpens National Battlefield - South Carolina - - Produced by the - Division of Publications - National Park Service - - U.S. Department of the Interior - Washington, D.C. 1988 - - - _About this book_ - -The story of Cowpens, as told in these pages, is ever fresh and will -live in memory as long as America’s wars are studied and talked about. -The author is Thomas Fleming, a biographer, military historian, and -novelist of distinction. His works range from an account of the -Pilgrims’ first year in America to biographies of Jefferson and Franklin -and novels of three American wars. _Downright Fighting, The Story of -Cowpens_ is a gripping tale by a master storyteller of what has been -described as the patriot’s best fought battle of the Revolutionary War. - -The National Park System, of which Cowpens National Battlefield is a -unit, consists of more than 340 parks totaling 80 million acres. These -parks represent important examples of the nation’s natural and cultural -inheritance. - - - _National Park Handbooks_ - -National Park handbooks, compact introductions to the natural and -historical places administered by the National Park Service, are -designed to promote public understanding and enjoyment of the parks. -Each handbook is intended to be informative reading and a useful guide -to park features. More than 100 titles are in print. They are sold at -parks and by mail from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government -Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. - - - _Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data_ - - - Fleming, Thomas J. - Cowpens: “downright fighting.” - (Handbook: 135) - “A Handbook for Cowpens National Battlefield, South Carolina.” - Bibliography: p. - Includes index. - Supt. of Docs. no.: I29.9/5:135 - 1. Cowpens, Battle of, 1781. I. Title. II. Series: Handbook (United - States. National Park Service. Division of Publications); 135. - E241.C9F58 1988 973.3’37 87-600142 - _ISBN 0-912627-33-6_ - ★GPO: 1988—201-939/60005 - - - Prologue 4 - _George F. Scheer_ - Part 1 “Downright Fighting” 10 - The Story of Cowpens - _Thomas J. Fleming_ - Part 2 Cowpens and the War in the South 86 - A Guide to the Battlefield and Related Sites - Cowpens Battleground 88 - The Road to Yorktown 91 - Savannah, 1778-79 91 - Charleston, 1780 91 - The Waxhaws, 1780 91 - Camden, 1780 92 - Kings Mountain, 1780 92 - Guilford Courthouse, 1781 92 - Ninety Six, 1781 93 - Eutaw Springs, 1781 93 - Yorktown, 1781 93 - For Further Reading 94 - Index 95 - - - - - Prologue - - - [Illustration: On the morning of January 15, 1781, Morgan’s army - looked down this road at Tarleton’s legion deploying into a line of - battle. Locally it was known as the Green River Road. Four or five - miles beyond the position held by Morgan, the road crossed the Broad - River at Island Ford. For opposite reasons, Morgan and Tarleton each - thought this field and its relationship to the Broad River gave him - the advantage.] - - - - - Splendid Antagonists - - -As battlefields go, this one is fairly plain: a grassy clearing in a -scrub-pine forest with no obvious military advantages. There are a -thousand meadows like it in upstate South Carolina. This one is -important because two centuries ago armies clashed here in one of the -dramatic battles of the Revolutionary War. - -In January 1781, this clearing was a frontier pasturing ground, known -locally as the Cowpens. The name came from the custom of upcountry stock -raisers wintering their cattle in the lush vales around Thicketty -Mountain. It was probably squatters’ ground, though one tradition says -that it belonged to a person named Hannah, while another credits it to -one Hiram Saunders, a wealthy loyalist who lived close by. - -The meadow was apparently well known to frontiersmen. The previous -October, a body of over-mountain men, pursuing Patrick Ferguson and his -loyalist corps, made camp here and, according to another tradition, -hauled the Tory Saunders out of bed at night seeking information on -Ferguson’s whereabouts. Finding no sign of an army passing through, they -butchered some cattle and after refreshing themselves took up the trail -again. - -When the troops of Continental General Daniel Morgan filed onto this -field on a dank January day in 1781, they were an army on the run, -fleeing an implacable and awesome enemy, the dreaded British Legion of -Col. Banastre Tarleton. Their patrols reported that they were -substantially outnumbered, and by any military measure of the time, they -were clearly outclassed. They were a mixed force of some 830 -soldiers—320 seasoned Continentals, a troop of light dragoons, and the -rest militia. Though some of the militia were former Continentals, known -to be stalwarts in battle, most were short-term soldiers whose -unpredictable performance might give a commander pause when battle lines -were drawn. Their foe, Tarleton’s Legion, was the best light corps in -the British army in America, and it was now reinforced by several -hundred British regulars and an artillery company. - -On this afternoon of January 16, 1781, the men of Morgan’s army had run -long enough. They were spoiling for a fight. They knew Tarleton as the -enemy whose troopers at the Waxhaws had sabered to death Americans in -the act of surrendering. From him they had taken their own merciless -victory cry, “Tarleton’s quarter.” In the months after the infamous -butchery, as Tarleton’s green-jacketed dragoons attacked citizens and -soldiers alike and pillaged farms and burned homes, they had come to -characterize him as “Bloody Tarleton.” He was bold, fearless, often rash -and always a savage enemy, and they seethed to have a go at him. - -Morgan chose this ground as much for its tactical advantages as from -necessity. Most of his militia lacked bayonets and could not stand up to -bayonet-wielding redcoats in a line of battle. Morgan saw advantage in -this unlikely field: a river to the rear to discourage the ranks from -breaking, rising ground on which to post his regulars, a scattering of -trees to hinder the enemy’s cavalry, and marsh on one side to thwart -flanking maneuvers. It was ground on which he could deploy his troops to -make the most of their abilities in the kind of fighting that he -expected Tarleton to bring on. - -In the narrative that follows, Thomas Fleming, a historian with the -skills of a novelist, tells the authentic, dramatic story that climaxed -on the next morning. In his fully fleshed chronicle, intimate in detail -and rich in insights, he relates the complex events that took shape in -the Southern colonies after the War of the Revolution stalemated in the -north. He describes the British strategy for conquering the rebel -Americans and the Americans’ counterstrategy. An important part of this -story is an account of the daringly unorthodox campaign of -commander-in-chief George Washington’s trusted lieutenant Nathanael -Greene, who finally “flushed the bird” that Washington caught at -Yorktown. Upon reading _Downright Fighting_, one understands why the -Homeric battle between two splendid antagonists on the morning of -January 17, 1781, became the beginning of the end of the British hold on -America. - - —George F. Scheer - - [Illustration: Scattered hardwoods gave Morgan’s skirmishers - protection and helped deflect Tarleton’s hard-riding dragoons sent - out to drive them in. The battle opened at sunrise, in light similar - to this scene.] - - - - - Part 1 - “Downright Fighting” - The Story of Cowpens. - - - _by Thomas J. Fleming_ - - [Illustration: British and Continental dragoons clash in the opening - minutes of battle. From Frederick Kimmelmeyer’s painting, “The - Battle of Cowpens,” 1809.] - - - - - The Anatomy of Victory - - - 1 - -All night the two men rode northwest along the muddy winding roads of -South Carolina’s back country. Twice they had to endure bone-chilling -swims across swollen creeks. Now, in the raw gray cold of dawn, they -faced a more formidable obstacle—the wide, swift Pacolet River. They -rode along it until they found the ford known as Grindal Shoals. -Ordinarily, it would have been easy to cross. But the river was high. -The icy water lapped at their thighs as the weary horses struggled to -keep their feet in the rushing current. “Halt,” snarled a voice from the -river bank. “Who goes there?” - -“Friend,” said the lead rider, 25-year-old Joseph McJunkin. - -The sentry barked the password for the night. McJunkin and his -companion, James Park, did not know the countersign. McJunkin told the -sentry he had an important message for General Morgan. The sentry told -him not to move or he would put a hole through his chest. He called for -the captain of the guard. The two riders had to sit there in the icy -river while the captain made his way to the bank. Once more McJunkin -insisted he had a message for General Morgan. It was from Colonel -Pickens. It was very important. - -The captain invited the two men onto the north bank of the Pacolet. -Above them, on a wooded hill, was the camp of Brig. Gen. Daniel Morgan -of the Continental Army of the United States. Around Morgan’s tent, -about 830 men were lighting fires and beginning to cook their -breakfasts, which consisted largely of cornmeal. From a barrel in a -wagon, a commissary issued a gill (four ounces) of rum. Most added water -to it and put it in their canteens. A few gulped the fiery liquid -straight, in spite of the frowns of their officers. Some 320 of the men -still wore pieces of uniforms—a tattered blue coat here, a ragged white -wool waistcoat there, patched buff breeches. In spite of the rainy, cold -January weather, few had shoes on their feet. These men were -Continentals—the names by which patriot regular army soldiers, usually -enlisted for three years, were known. - -The rest of the army wore a varied assortment of civilian clothing. -Hunting shirts of coarse homespun material known as linsey-woolsey, -tightly belted, or loose wool coats, also homespun, leather leggings, -wool breeches. These men were militia—summoned from their homes to serve -as emergency soldiers for short periods of time. Most were from western -districts of the Carolinas. About 120 were riflemen from Virginia, -committed to serving for six months. Most of these were former -Continentals. They were being paid by other Virginians who hired them as -substitutes to avoid being drafted into the army. After five years of -war, patriotism was far from universal in America. - -In his tent, Morgan listened to the message McJunkin brought from Col. -Andrew Pickens: the British were advancing in force. Morgan whirled and -roused from a nearby camp cot a small groggy man who had managed to -sleep through McJunkin’s bad news. His name was Baron de Glaubech. He -was one of the many French volunteers who were serving with the -Americans. “Baron,” Morgan said. “Get up. Go back and tell Billy that -Benny is coming and he must meet me tomorrow evening at Gentleman -Thompson’s on the east side of Thicketty Creek.” - -Sixty-three years later, when he was 80, Joseph McJunkin remembered -these words with their remarkable combination of informality and -decision. It was part of the reason men like young McJunkin trusted -Daniel Morgan. It was somehow reassuring to hear him call Lt. Col. -William Washington, commander of the American cavalry and second cousin -to Gen. George Washington, “Billy.” It was even more reassuring to hear -him call Lt. Col. Banastre Tarleton, commander of the British army that -was coming after them, “Benny.” - -Adding to this reassurance was 45-year-old Daniel Morgan’s appearance -and reputation. He was over six feet tall, with massive shoulders and -arms, toughened from his youthful years as a wagonmaster in western -Virginia. In his younger days he had been one of the champion sluggers -and wrestlers of the Shenandoah Valley. His wide volatile face could -still flash from cheerfulness to pugnacity in an instant. In the five -years of the Revolution, Morgan had become a living legend: the man who -led a reckless assault into the very mouths of British cannon on the -barricaded streets of Quebec in 1775, whose corps of some 570 riflemen -had been the cutting edge of the American army that defeated the British -at Saratoga in 1777. - - [Illustration: The victor at Saratoga, Gen. Horatio Gates (top) came - south in July 1780 to command the Southern Department after the main - Continental army in the South was surrendered at Charleston. Charles - Willson Peale shows Gates at 49 with an open face and a steady - gaze.] - - [Illustration: A month later he himself was routed at Camden by - Cornwallis. Cornwallis was only 45, two years after Yorktown, when - he sat for Gainsborough. Both generals are portrayed in their - prime.] - - - Daniel Morgan, Frontiersman - - [Illustration: Daniel Morgan] - - He was a giant of a man, 6 feet 2 inches, with a full face, blue eyes, - dark hair, and a classic nose. As a youth in western Virginia, he had - drifted into wagoneering along the roads of the frontier. His - education was slight. Good-natured and gregarious, he was, like his - companions of the road, rowdy and given to drink, gambling, and - fighting. In time, he married, settled down, went into farming, and - became a man of substance in his community. - - He was already a hero of the Revolution when he took command of - Greene’s light troops in late 1780. His rifle corps had fought with - distinction at Quebec (1775) and Saratoga (1777). But after being - passed over for promotion, unfairly he thought, he retired to his - Virginia farm. When the South fell to British armies in 1780, he put - aside his feelings and welcomed a new command. - - Morgan was at home in the slashing, partisan warfare in the South. At - Cowpens the mixed force of regulars and militia that he led so ably - destroyed Tarleton’s dreaded Legion, depriving Cornwallis of a wing of - swift-moving light troops essential to his army’s operation. - - [Illustration: Woodcuts of the gold medal Congress awarded Morgan - for his victory at Cowpens. The original medal is lost.] - - [Illustration: Morgan’s fine stone house, which he named “Saratoga,” - still stands near Winchester, Virginia.] - - - The War in the South - - [Illustration: Map] - - - NORTH CAROLINA - New Bern• - Edenton• - Brunswick• - Gilbert Town• - SOUTH CAROLINA - Georgetown• - GEORGIA - Augusta• - Moores Creek 27 Feb 1776 - Sullivans Island 28 June 1776 - Kettle Creek 14 Feb 1779 - Brier Creek 3 March 1779 - Lenuds Ferry 6 May 1780 - Waxhaws 29 May 1780 - Williamson Plantation 12 July 1780 - Kings Mountain 7 Oct 1780 - Ninety Six• - Besieged by Greene May-June 1781; - evacuated by the British July 1781 - Hobkirks Hill 25 Apr 1781 - Charleston• - Captured by the British 12 May 1780 - Eutaw Springs 8 Sept 1781 - Fort Watson - HIGH HILLS OF SANTEE - Cornwallis routs Gates at Camden and advances into North Carolina - Camden• - Hanging Rock 6 Aug 1780 - Camden 16 Aug 1780 - Fishing Creek 18 Aug 1780 - Great Savannah 20 Aug 1780 - Charlotte• - Greene divides his army sending Morgan to the west and the main army - into winter quarters at Cheraw Hills. 20-26 Dec 1780 - Cheraw Hills• - Greene’s winter quarters 1780-1781 - Grindal Shoals - Morgan’s camp 25 Dec 1780 to 14 Jan 1781 - Cornwallis turns back after Ferguson’s defeat at Kings Mountain and - goes into winter quarters at Winnsborough. - Winnsborough• - Cornwallis’s winter quarters 1780-1781 - Tarleton - Musgroves Mill 18 Aug 1780 - Fishdam Ford 9 Nov 1780 - Blackstocks 20 Nov 1780 - Hammonds Store 28 Dec 1780 - Easterwood Shoals - Cowpens 17 Jan 1781 - Hamiltons Ford - Cornwallis pursues Morgan. - Morgan’s line of retreat after Cownpens. - Green River Road - Island Ford - Beatties Ford - Island Ford - Ramsour’s Mill - Cornwallis burns his baggage. 24 Jan 1781 - Salisbury• - Salem• - Guilford Courthouse• - Cheraw Hills• - Coxs Mill - Greene races for the Dan River with Cornwallis in pursuit. - Boyds Ferry - Greene crosses the Dan River and is resupplied and reinforced. 13 - Feb 1781 - Cornwallis halts south of the Dan River. - Hillsborough• - Guilford Courthouse 15 March 1781 - Ramseys Mill• - Greene breaks off pursuit of Cornwallis after Guilford. - Cross Creek• - Elizabethtown• - Cornwallis retreats to Wilmington - Wilmington• - Cornwallis marches into Virginia April-May 1781 - Halifax• - Petersburg• - Richmond• - Williamsburg• - Yorktown• - Cornwallis surrenders 19 Oct 1781 - - -The lower South became the decisive theatre of the Revolutionary War. -After the struggle settled into stalemate in the north, the British -mounted their second campaign to conquer the region. British -expeditionary forces captured Savannah in late 1778 and Charleston in -May 1780. By late in that summer, most of South Carolina was pacified, -and a powerful British army under Cornwallis was poised to sweep across -the Carolinas into Virginia. - -This map traces the marches of Cornwallis (red) and his wily adversary -Nathanael Greene (blue). The campaign opened at Charleston in August -1780 when Cornwallis marched north to confront Gen. Horatio Gates moving -south with a Continental army. It ended at Yorktown in October 1781 with -Cornwallis’s surrender of the main British army in America. In between -were 18 months of some of the hardest campaigning and most savage -fighting of the war. - -On this 14th of January, 1781, a great many people in South Carolina and -North Carolina were badly in need of the reassurance that Daniel Morgan -communicated. The year just completed had been a series of military and -political disasters, with only a few flickering glimpses of hope for the -Americans who had rebelled against George III and his Parliament in -1776. In 1780 the British had adopted a new strategy. Leaving enough -troops to pin down George Washington’s main American army near New York, -the British had sent another army south to besiege Charleston. On May -12, 1780, the city and its defending army, under the command of a -Massachusetts general named Benjamin Lincoln, surrendered. Two hundred -and forty-five regular officers and 2,326 enlisted men became captives -along with an equal number of South Carolina militia; thousands of -muskets, dozens of cannon, and tons of irreplaceable gunpowder and other -supplies were also lost. - - [Illustration: Gen. Nathanael Greene (1742-86) served with - distinction in two roles: as quartermaster general of the army after - others had failed in the post, and as the strategist of the decisive - Southern Campaign.] - -It was the worst American defeat of the war. The Continental Congress -responded by sending south Gen. Horatio Gates, commander of the army -that had beaten the British at Saratoga. Gates brought with him about -1,200 Maryland and Delaware Continentals and called on the militia of -North Carolina and Virginia to support him. On August 16, 1780, outside -the village of Camden, S.C., the Americans encountered an army commanded -by Charles, Earl Cornwallis, the most aggressive British general in -America. Cornwallis ordered a bayonet charge. The poorly armed, -inexperienced militia panicked and fled. The Continentals fought -desperately for a time but were soon surrounded and overwhelmed. - -Both North and South Carolina now seemed prostrate. There was no patriot -army in either state strong enough to resist the thousands of British -regulars. Georgia had been conquered by a combined British naval and -land force in late 1778 and early 1779. There were rumors that America’s -allies, France and Spain, were tired of the war and ready to call a -peace conference. Many persons thought that the Carolinas and Georgia -would be abandoned at this conference. In the Continental Congress, some -already considered them lost. “It is agreed on all hands the whole state -of So. Carolina hath submitted to the British Government as well as -Georgia,” a Rhode Island delegate wrote. “I shall not be surprised to -hear N. Carolina hath followed their example.” - - [Illustration: Thomas Sumter (1732-1832), a daring and energetic - partisan leader, joined the patriot side after Tarleton’s dragoons - burned his Santee home. His militia harassed and sometimes defeated - the British in the savage civil war that gripped the South Carolina - backcountry in 1780-81.] - -British spokesmen eagerly promoted this idea. They were more numerous in -the Carolinas than most 20th-century Americans realize. The majority of -them were American born—men and women whom the rebel Americans called -tories and today are usually known as loyalists. Part of the reason for -this defection was geographical. The people of the back country had long -feuded with the wealthier lowlanders, who controlled the politics of the -two States. The lowlanders had led the Carolinas into the war with the -mother country, and many back-country people sided with the British in -the hope of humbling the haughty planters. Some of these -counter-revolutionists sincerely believed their rights would be better -protected under the king. Another large group thought the British were -going to win the war and sided with them in the hope of getting rich on -the rebels’ confiscated estates. A third, more passive group simply -lacked the courage to oppose their aggressive loyalist neighbors. - -The British set up forts, garrisoned by regulars and loyalists, in -various districts of South Carolina and told the people if they swore an -oath of allegiance to the king and promised to lay down their weapons, -they would be protected and forgiven for any and all previous acts of -rebellion. Thousands of men accepted this offer and dropped out of the -war. - -But some South Carolinians refused to submit to royal authority. Many of -them were Presbyterians, who feared that their freedom to worship would -be taken away from them or that they would be deprived of the right to -vote, as Presbyterians were in England. Others were animated by a -fundamental suspicion of British intentions toward America. They -believed there was a British plot to force Americans to pay unjust taxes -to enable England’s aristocratic politicians and their followers to live -in luxury. - -Joseph McJunkin was one of the men who had refused to surrender. He had -risen from private to major in the militia regiment from the Union -district of South Carolina. After the fall of Charleston, he and his -friends hid gunpowder and ammunition in hollow logs and thickets. But in -June 1780, they were badly beaten by a battalion of loyalist neighbors -and fled across the Broad River. They were joined by men from the -Spartan, Laurens, and Newberry districts. At the Presbyterian Meeting -House on Bullocks Creek, they debated whether to accept British -protection. McJunkin and a few other men rose and vowed they would fight -on. Finally someone asked those who wanted to fight to throw up their -hats and clap their hands. “Every hat went up and the air resounded with -clapping and shouts of defiance,” McJunkin recalled. - - [Illustration: Short, disciplined to the life of a soldier, yet - plain and gentle in manner, Francis Marion (the figure at left) was - equally brilliant as an officer of regulars and a partisan leader of - militia. To the British he was as elusive as a fox, marching his - brigade at night, rarely sleeping twice in the same camp, and - vanishing into the swamps when opposed by a larger force.] - -A few days later, these men met Thomas Sumter, a former colonel in the -South Carolina Continentals. He had fled to western South Carolina after -the British burned his plantation. The holdouts asked him his opinion of -the situation. “Our interests are the same. With me it is liberty or -death,” he said. They elected him their general and went to war. - -Elsewhere in South Carolina, other men coalesced around another former -Continental officer, Francis Marion. Still others followed Elijah -Clarke, who operated along the border between South Carolina and -Georgia. These partisans, seldom numbering more than 500 men and often -as few as 50, struck at British outposts and supply routes and attacked -groups of loyalists whom the British were arming and trying to organize -into militia regiments. The British and loyalists grew exasperated. -After the battle of Camden, Lord Cornwallis declared that anyone who -signed a British parole and then switched sides would be hanged without -a trial if captured. If a man refused to serve in the loyalist militia, -he would be imprisoned and his property confiscated. At a convention of -loyalist militia regiments on August 23, 1780, the members resolved that -these orders should be ruthlessly applied. They added one other -recommendation. Anyone who refused to serve in the king’s militia should -be drafted into the British regulars, where he would be forced to fight -whether he liked it or not. - -For the rest of 1780, a savage seesaw war raged along the Carolina -frontier. Between engagements both sides exacted retaliation on -prisoners and noncombatants. Elijah Clarke besieged Augusta with a mixed -band of South Carolinians and Georgians. Forced to retreat by British -reinforcements, he left about two dozen badly wounded men behind. The -loyalist commander of Augusta, Thomas Browne, wounded in the siege, -hanged 13 of them in the stairwell of his house, where he could watch -them die from his bed. A rebel named Reed was visiting a neighbor’s -house when the landlady saw two loyalists approaching. She advised Reed -to flee. Reed replied that they were old friends; he had known them all -his life. He went outside to shake hands. The loyalists shot him dead. -Reed’s aged mother rode to a rebel camp in North Carolina and displayed -her son’s bloody pocketbook. The commander of the camp asked for -volunteers. Twenty-five men mounted their horses, found the murderers, -and executed them. - -In this sanguinary warfare, the rebels knew the side roads and forest -tracks. They were expert, like Marion’s men, at retreating into swamps. -But the British also had some advantages. The rebels could do little to -prevent retaliation against their homes and property. If a man went into -hiding when the British or loyalists summoned him to fight in their -militia, all his corn and livestock were liable to seizure, and his -house might even be burned, leaving his wife and children destitute. -This bitter and discouraging truth became more and more apparent as the -year 1780 waned. Without a Continental army to back them up, Sumter and -the other partisan leaders found it difficult to persuade men to fight. - -Not even the greatest militia victory of the war, the destruction of a -loyalist army of over a thousand men at Kings Mountain in October 1780, -significantly altered the situation. Although loyalist support declined, -the British army was untouched by this triumph. Moreover, many of the -militiamen in the rebel army had come from remote valleys deep in the -Appalachians, and they went home immediately, as militiamen were -inclined to do. The men of western South Carolina were left with the -British regulars still dominating four-fifths of the State, still ready -to exact harsh retaliation against those who persisted in the rebellion. - - [Illustration: Elijah Clarke, a colonel of Georgia militia, fought - at a number of important actions in the civil war along the Southern - frontier in 1780-81.] - -George Washington understood the problem. In an earlier campaign in the -north, when the New Jersey militia failed to turn out, he had said that -the people needed “an Army to look the Enemy in the Face.” To replace -the disgraced Horatio Gates, he appointed Nathanael Greene of Rhode -Island as the commander of the Southern army. A 38-year-old Quaker who -walked with a slight limp, Greene had become Washington’s right-hand man -in five years of war in the north. On December 2 he arrived in -Charlotte, N.C., where Horatio Gates was trying to reorganize the -remnants of the army shattered at Camden. Neither the numbers nor the -appearance of the men were encouraging. There were 2,046 soldiers -present and fit for duty. Of these, only 1,173 were Continentals. The -rest were militia. Worse, as Greene told his friend the Marquis de -Lafayette, if he counted as fit for duty only those soldiers who were -properly clothed and equipped, he had fewer than 800 men and provisions -for only three days in camp. There was scarcely a horse or a wagon in -the army and not a dollar of hard money in the military chest. - -Among Greene’s few encouraging discoveries in the army’s camp at -Charlotte was the news that Daniel Morgan had returned to the war and at -that very moment was within 16 miles of the British base at Camden with -a battalion of light infantry and what was left of the American cavalry -under Lt. Col. William Washington. Angered by Congress’s failure to -promote him, Morgan had resigned his colonel’s commission in 1779. The -disaster at Camden and the threat of England’s new southern strategy had -persuaded him to forget his personal grievance. Congress had responded -by making him a brigadier general. - -Studying his maps, and knowing Morgan’s ability to inspire militia and -command light infantry, Nathanael Greene began to think the Old Wagoner, -as Morgan liked to call himself, was the key to frustrating British -plans to conquer North Carolina. Lord Cornwallis and the main British -army were now at Winnsborough, S.C., about halfway between the British -base at Camden and their vital back-country fort at Ninety Six. The -British general commanded 3,324 regulars, twice the number of Greene’s -motley army, and all presumably well trained and equipped. Spies and -scouts reported the earl was preparing to invade North Carolina for a -winter campaign. North Carolina had, if anything, more loyalists than -South Carolina. There was grave reason to fear that they would turn out -at the sight of a British army and take that State out of the shaky -American confederacy. - -To delay, if not defeat, this potential disaster, Greene decided to -divide his battered army and give more than half of it to Daniel Morgan. -The Old Wagoner would march swiftly across the front of Cornwallis’s -army into western South Carolina and operate on his left flank and in -his rear, threatening the enemy’s posts at Ninety Six and Augusta, -disrupting British communications, and—most important—encouraging the -militia of western South Carolina to return to fight. “The object of -this detachment,” Greene wrote in his instructions to Morgan, “is to -give protection to that part of the country and spirit up the people.” - -This was the army that Joseph McJunkin had ridden all night to warn. -Lord Cornwallis had no intention of letting Nathanael Greene get away -with this ingenious maneuver. Cornwallis had an answer to Morgan. His -name was Banastre Tarleton. - - - 2 - -Daniel Morgan might call him “Benny.” Most Americans called him “the -Butcher” or “Bloody Tarleton.” A thick-shouldered, compact man of middle -height, with bright red hair and a hard mouth, he was the most feared -and hated British soldier in the South. In 1776 he had come to America, -a 21-year-old cornet—the British equivalent of a second lieutenant. He -was now a lieutenant colonel, a promotion so rapid for the British army -of the time that it left older officers frigid with jealousy. Tarleton -had achieved this spectacular rise almost entirely on raw courage and -fierce energy. His father had been a wealthy merchant and Lord Mayor of -Liverpool. He died while Tarleton was at Oxford, leaving him £5,000, -which the young man promptly gambled and drank away, while ostensibly -studying for the law in London. He joined the army and discovered he was -a born soldier. - -In America, he was a star performer from the start. In the fall of 1776, -while still a cornet, he played a key role in capturing Maj. Gen. -Charles Lee, second in command of the American army, when he unwisely -spent the night at a tavern in New Jersey, several miles from his -troops. Soon a captain, Tarleton performed ably for the next two years -and in 1778 was appointed a brigade major of the British cavalry. - - [Illustration: Charles Lee, an English general retired on half-pay - at the outbreak of the war, threw in with Americans and received - several important commands early in the war. His capture in late - 1776 at a New Jersey tavern by dragoons under Banastre Tarleton was - a celebrated event.] - -Tarleton again distinguished himself when the British army retreated -from Philadelphia to New York in June 1778. At Monmouth Court House he -began the battle by charging the American advance column and throwing it -into confusion. In New York, sorting out his troops, the new British -commander, Sir Henry Clinton, rewarded Tarleton with another promotion. -While the British were in Philadelphia, various loyalists had recruited -three troops of dragoons. In New York, officers—some loyalist, some -British—recruited companies of infantry and more troops of dragoons from -different segments of the loyalist population. One company was Scottish, -two others English, a third American-born. Clinton combined these -fragments into a 550-man unit that he christened the British Legion. -Half cavalry, half infantry, a legion was designed to operate on the -fringe of a main army as a quick-strike force. Banastre Tarleton was -given command of the British Legion, which was issued green coats and -tan breeches, unlike other loyalist regiments, who wore red coats with -green facings. - - - Banastre Tarleton, Gentleman - - [Illustration: Banastre Tarleton] - - Banastre Tarleton, only 26, was a short, thick-set, rather handsome - redhead who was tireless and fearless in battle. Unlike Morgan, he had - been born to privilege. Scion of a wealthy Liverpool mercantile - family, he was Oxford educated and might have become a barrister - except that he preferred the playing field to the classroom and the - delights of London theatres and coffee houses to the study of law. - After squandering a modest inheritance, he jumped at the chance to buy - a commission in the King’s Dragoons and serve in America. Eventually - he came into command of the British Legion, a mounted and foot unit - raised among American loyalists. Marked by their distinctive green - uniforms, they soon became known as Tarleton’s Green Horse. It was - their ruthless ferocity that earned Tarleton the epithet, “Bloody - Tarleton.” - - After the war, Tarleton fell in love with the beautiful Mary Robinson, - a poet, playwright, and actress. Tarleton’s memoir, _The Campaigns of - 1780 and 1781 in the Southern Provinces_, owes much to her gifted pen. - - [Illustration: Mary Robinson] - - [Illustration: Tarleton’s birthplace on Water Street in Liverpool.] - - [Illustration: Under Gen. Benjamin Lincoln, the patriots suffered - their worst defeat of the war. Bottled up by Sir Henry Clinton in - the peninsula city of Charleston, he surrendered the entire - Continental Army in the South—more than 5,000 men—in May 1780.] - -Sailing south with the royal army that besieged and captured Charleston, -Tarleton and his Legion acted as a mobile screen, protecting the British -rear against attacks by American cavalry and militia from the interior -of the State. The young officer soon demonstrated a terrifying ability -to strike suddenly and ferociously when the Americans least expected -him. On May 6, 1780, at Lenuds Ferry, he surprised and virtually -destroyed the American cavalry, forcing William Washington and many -other officers and men to leap into the Santee River to escape him. - -After Charleston surrendered, there was only one unit of regular -American troops left in South Carolina, the 3d Virginia Continentals -commanded by Col. Abraham Buford. He was ordered to retreat to North -Carolina. Cornwallis sent Tarleton and his Legion in pursuit. Covering -105 miles in 54 hours, Tarleton caught up with the Americans at Waxhaws. -The 380 Virginians were largely recruits, few of whom had seen action -before. Tarleton and the Legion charged from front, flank, and rear. -Buford foolishly ordered his men to hold their fire until the -saber-swinging dragoons were on top of them. The American line was torn -to fragments. Buford wheeled his horse and fled. Tarleton reportedly -sabered an American officer as he tried to raise a white flag. Other -Americans screamed for quarter, but some kept firing. A bullet killed -Tarleton’s horse and he crashed to the ground. This, he later claimed, -aroused his men to a “vindictive asperity.” They thought their leader -had been killed. Dozens of Americans were bayonetted or sabered after -they had thrown down their guns and surrendered. - - [Illustration: The contemporary map shows the patriot defenses north - of the city, the British siege lines, and warships of the Royal Navy - that controlled the harbor waters.] - -One hundred and thirteen Americans were killed and 203 captured at -Waxhaws. Of the captured, 150 were so badly wounded they were left on -the battlefield. Throughout the Carolinas, the word of the -massacre—which is what Americans called Waxhaws—passed from settlement -to settlement. It did not inspire much trust in British benevolence -among those who were being urged to surrender. - - [Illustration: Tarleton’s slaughter of Col. Abraham Buford’s command - at the Waxhaws gave the patriots a rallying cry—“Tarleton’s - quarter”—remembered to this day.] - -After helping to smash the American army at Camden with another -devastating cavalry charge, Tarleton was ordered to pursue Thomas Sumter -and his partisans. Pushing his men and horses at his usual pace in spite -of the tropical heat of August, he caught up with Sumter’s men at -Fishing Creek. Sabering a few carelessly posted sentries, the British -Legion swept down on the Carolinians as they lay about their camp, their -arms stacked, half of them sleeping or cooking. Sumter leaped on a -bareback horse and imitated Buford, fleeing for his life. Virtually the -entire American force of more than 400 men was killed or captured. When -the news was published in England, Tarleton became a national hero. In -his official dispatches, Cornwallis called him “one of the most -promising officers I ever knew.” - -But Sumter immediately began gathering a new force and Francis Marion -and his raiders repeatedly emerged from the lowland swamps to harass -communications with Charleston and punish any loyalist who declared for -the king. Tarleton did not understand this stubborn resistance and liked -it even less. A nauseating bout with yellow fever deepened his saturnine -mood. Pursuing Marion along the Santee and Black Rivers, Tarleton -ruthlessly burned the farmhouses of “violent rebels,” as he called them. -“The country is now convinced of the error of the insurrection,” he -wrote to Cornwallis. But Tarleton failed to catch “the damned old fox,” -Marion. - -The British Legion had scarcely returned from this exhausting march when -they were ordered out once more in pursuit of Sumter. On November 9, -1780, with a new band of partisans, Sumter fought part of the British -63d Regiment, backed by a troop of Legion dragoons, at Fishdam Ford on -the Broad River and mauled them badly. “I wish you would get three -Legions, and divide yourself in three parts,” Cornwallis wrote Tarleton. -“We can do no good without you.” - -Once more the Legion marched for the back country. As usual, Tarleton’s -pace was almost supernaturally swift. On November 20, 1780, he caught -Sumter and his men as they were preparing to ford the Tyger River. But -this time Tarleton’s fondness for headlong pursuit got him into serious -trouble. He had left most of his infantry far behind him and pushed -ahead with less than 200 cavalry and 90 infantry, riding two to a horse. -Sumter had close to a thousand men and he attacked, backwoods style, -filtering through the trees to pick off foot soldiers and horsemen. -Tarleton ordered a bayonet charge. The infantry was so badly shot up, -Tarleton had to charge with the cavalry to extricate them, exposing his -dragoon to deadly rifle fire from other militiamen entrenched in a log -tobacco house known as Blackstocks. The battle ended in a bloody draw. -Sumter was badly wounded and his men abandoned the field to the -green-coated dragoons, slipping across the Tyger in the darkness. -Without their charismatic leader, Sumter’s militia went home. - - [Illustration: This portrait of Tarleton and the illustration - beneath of a troop of dragoons doing maneuvers appeared in a - flattering biography shortly after he returned to England in 1782.] - -“Sumter is defeated,” Tarleton reported to Cornwallis, “his corps -dispersed. But my Lord I have lost men—50 killed and wounded.” The war -was becoming more and more disheartening to Tarleton. Deepening his -black mood was news from home. His older brother had put him up for -Parliament from Liverpool. The voters had rejected him. They admired his -courage, but the American war was no longer popular in England. - -While Cornwallis remained at Winnsborough, Tarleton returned from -Blackstocks and camped at various plantations south of the Broad River. -During his projected invasion of North Carolina, Cornwallis expected -Tarleton and his Legion to keep the dwindling rebels of South Carolina -dispersed to their homes. Thus the British commander would have no -worries about the British base at Ninety Six, the key to the back -country. The fort and surrounding settlement had been named by an early -mapmaker in the course of measuring distances on the Cherokee Path, an -ancient Indian route from the mountains to the ocean. The district -around Ninety Six was the breadbasket of South Carolina; it was also -heavily loyalist. But a year of partisan warfare had made their morale -precarious. The American-born commander of the fort, Col. John Harris -Cruger, had recently warned Cornwallis that the loyalists “were wearied -by the long continuance of the campaign ... and the whole district had -determined to submit as soon as the rebels should enter it.” The mere -hint of a threat to Ninety Six and the order it preserved in its -vicinity was enough to send flutters of alarm through British -headquarters. - -There were flutters aplenty when Cornwallis heard from spies that Daniel -Morgan had crossed the Broad River and was marching on Ninety Six. -Simultaneously came news that William Washington, the commander of -Morgan’s cavalry, had routed a group of loyalists at Hammonds Store and -forced another group to abandon a fort not far from Ninety Six. At 5 -a.m. on January 2, Lt. Henry Haldane, one of Cornwallis’s aides, rode -into Tarleton’s camp and told him the news. Close behind Haldane came a -messenger with a letter from Cornwallis: “If Morgan is ... anywhere -within your reach, I should wish you to push him to the utmost.” Haldane -rushed an order to Maj. Archibald McArthur, commander of the first -battalion of the 71st Regiment, which was not far away, guarding a ford -over the Broad River that guaranteed quick communication with Ninety -Six. McArthur was to place his men under Tarleton’s command and join him -in a forced march to rescue the crucial fort. - - [Illustration: The little village of Ninety Six was a center of - loyalist sentiment in the Carolina backcountry. Cornwallis - mistakenly thought Morgan had designs on it and therefore sent - Tarleton in pursuit, bringing on the battle of Cowpens. This map - diagrams the siege that Gen. Nathanael Greene mounted against the - post in May-June of 1781.] - -Tarleton obeyed with his usual speed. His dragoons ranged far ahead of -his little army, which now numbered about 700 men. By the end of the day -he concluded that there was no cause for alarm about Ninety Six. Morgan -was nowhere near it. But his scouts reported that Morgan was definitely -south of the Broad River, urging militia from North and South Carolina -to join him. - -Tarleton’s response to this challenge was almost inevitable. He asked -Cornwallis for permission to pursue Morgan and either destroy him or -force him to retreat over the Broad River again. There, Cornwallis and -his army could devour him. - -The young cavalry commander outlined the operation in a letter to -Cornwallis on January 4. He realized that he was all but giving orders -to his general, and tactfully added: “I feel myself bold in offering my -opinion [but] it flows from zeal for the public service and well -grounded enquiry concerning the enemy’s designs and operations.” If -Cornwallis approved the plan, Tarleton asked for reinforcements: a troop -of cavalry from the 17th Light Dragoons and the infantrymen of the 7th -Regiment of Royal Fusiliers, who were marching from Camden to reinforce -Ninety Six. - -Cornwallis approved the plan, including the reinforcements. As soon as -they arrived, Tarleton began his march. January rain poured down, -swelling every creek, turning the roads into quagmires. Cornwallis, with -his larger army and heavy baggage train, began a slow advance up the -east bank of the Broad River. As the commander in chief, he had more to -worry about than Tarleton. Behind him was another British general, Sir -Alexander Leslie, with 1,500 reinforcements. Cornwallis feared that -Greene or Marion might strike a blow at them. The earl assumed that -Tarleton was as mired by the rain and blocked by swollen watercourses as -he was. On January 12, Cornwallis wrote to Leslie, who was being delayed -by even worse mud in the lowlands: “I believe Tarleton is as much -embarrassed with the waters as you are.” The same day, Cornwallis -reported to another officer, the commander in occupied Charleston: “The -rains have put a total stop to Tarleton and Leslie.” On this assumption, -Cornwallis decided to halt and wait for Leslie to reach him. - -Tarleton had not allowed the August heat of South Carolina to slow his -pace. He was equally contemptuous of the January rains. His scouts -reported that Morgan’s army was at Grindal Shoals on the Pacolet River. -To reach the patriots he had to cross two smaller but equally swollen -streams, the Enoree and the Tyger. Swimming his horses, floating his -infantry across on improvised rafts, he surmounted these obstacles and -headed northeast, deep into the South Carolina back country. He did not -realize that his column, which now numbered over a thousand men, was -becoming more and more isolated. He assumed that Cornwallis was keeping -pace with him on the east side of the Broad River, cowing the rebel -militia there into staying home. - - [Illustration: Gen. Alexander Leslie, veteran commander in America. - His service spanned actions from Salem Bridge in February 1775 to - the British evacuation of Charleston in December 1782.] - -Tarleton also did not realize that this time, no matter how swiftly he -advanced, he was not going to take the patriots by surprise. He was -being watched by a man who was fighting with a hangman’s noose around -his neck. - - - 3 - -_Skyagunsta_, the Wizard Owl, was what the Cherokees called 41-year-old -Andrew Pickens. They both feared and honored him as a battle leader who -had defeated them repeatedly on their home grounds. Born in -Pennsylvania, Pickens had come to South Carolina as a boy. In 1765 he -had married the beautiful Rebecca Calhoun and settled on Long Canes -Creek in the Ninety Six district. Pickens was no speechmaker, but -everyone recognized this slender man, who was just under 6 feet tall, as -a leader. When he spoke, people listened. One acquaintance declared that -he was so deliberate, he seemed at times to take each word out of his -mouth and examine it before he said it. Pickens had been one of the -leaders who repelled the British-inspired assaults on the back country -by the Cherokee Indians in 1776 and carried the war into the red men’s -country, forcing them to plead for peace. By 1779 he was a colonel -commanding one of the most dependable militia regiments in the State. -When the loyalists, encouraged by the British conquest of Georgia in -1778-79, began to gather and plot to punish their rebel neighbors, -Pickens led 400 men to assault them at Kettle Creek on the Savannah -River. In a fierce, hour-long fight, he whipped them although they -outnumbered him almost two to one. - -After Charleston surrendered, Pickens’ military superior in the Ninety -Six district, Brig. Gen. Andrew Williamson, was the only high-ranking -official left in South Carolina. The governor John Rutledge had fled to -North Carolina, the legislature had dispersed, the courts had collapsed. -Early in June 1780, Williamson called together his officers and asked -them to vote on whether they should continue to resist. Only eight -officers opposed immediate surrender. In Pickens’ own regiment only two -officers and four enlisted men favored resistance. The rest saw no hope -of stopping the British regular army advancing toward them from -Charleston. Without a regular army of their own to match the British, -they could envision only destruction of their homes and desolation for -their families if they resisted. - -Andrew Pickens was among these realists who had accepted the surrender -terms offered by the British. At his command, his regiment of 300 men -stacked their guns at Ninety Six and went home. As Pickens understood -the terms, he and his men were paroled on their promise not to bear arms -against the king. They became neutrals. The British commander of Ninety -Six, Colonel Cruger, seemed to respect this opinion. Cruger treated -Pickens with great deference. The motive for this delicate treatment -became visible in a letter Cruger sent Cornwallis on November 27. - -“I think there is more than a possibility of getting a certain person in -the Long Canes settlement to accept of a command,” Cruger wrote. “And -then I should most humbly be of opinion that every man in the country -would declare and act for His Majesty.” - -It was a tribute to Pickens’ influence as a leader. He was also a man of -his word. Even when Sumter, Clarke, and other partisan leaders -demonstrated that there were many men in South Carolina ready to keep -fighting, Pickens remained peaceably at home on his plantation at Long -Canes. Tales of Tarleton’s cruelty at Waxhaws, of British and loyalist -vindictiveness in other districts of the State undoubtedly reached him. -But no acts of injustice had been committed against him or his men. The -British were keeping their part of the bargain and he would keep his -part. - -Then Cornwallis’s aide, Haldane, appeared at Ninety Six and summoned -Pickens. He offered him a colonel’s commission in the royal militia and -a promise of protection. There were also polite hints of the possibility -of a monetary reward for switching sides. Pickens agreed to ride down to -Charleston and talk over the whole thing with the British commander -there. The visit was delayed by partisan warfare in the Ninety Six -district, stirred by the arrival of Nathanael Greene to take command of -the remnant of the American regular army in Charlotte. Greene urged the -wounded Sumter and the Georgian Clarke to embody their men and launch a -new campaign. Sumter urged Pickens to break his parole, call out his -regiment, and march with him to join Greene. Pickens refused to leave -Long Canes. - - [Illustration: Andrew Pickens, a lean and austere frontiersman of - Scotch-Irish origins, ranked with Francis Marion and Thomas Sumter - as major partisan leaders of the war.] - -In desperation, the rebels came to him. Elijah Clarke led a band of -Georgians and South Carolinians to the outskirts of Long Canes, on their -march to join Greene. Many men from Pickens’ old regiment broke their -paroles and joined them. Clarke ordered Maj. James McCall, one of -Pickens’ favorite officers and one of two who had refused to surrender -at Ninety Six, to kidnap Pickens and bring him before an improvised -court-martial board. Accused of preparing to join the loyalists, Pickens -calmly admitted that the British were making him offers. So far he had -refused them. Even if former friends made good on their threat to -court-martial and hang him, he could not break his pledged word of honor -to remain neutral. - -The frustrated Georgians and South Carolinians let Pickens go home. On -December 12, Cruger sent a detachment of regulars and loyalist militia -to attack the interlopers. The royalists surprised the rebels and routed -them, wounding Clarke and McCall and scattering the survivors. Most of -the Georgians drifted back to their home state and the Carolinians -straggled toward Greene in North Carolina. - -The battle had a profound effect on Andrew Pickens. Friends, former -comrades-in-arms, had been wounded, humiliated. He still hesitated to -take the final step and break his parole. His strict Presbyterian -conscience, his soldier’s sense of honor, would not permit it. But he -went to Ninety Six and told Colonel Cruger that he could not accept a -commission in the royal militia. Cruger sighed and revealed what he had -been planning to do since he started wooing Pickens. In a few days, on -orders from Cornwallis, the loyalist colonel was going to publish a -proclamation which would permit no one to remain neutral. It would -require everyone around Ninety Six to come to the fort, swear allegiance -to the king, and enlist in the royal militia. - -Pickens said his conscience would not permit him to do this. If the -British threatened him with punishment for his refusal, it would be a -violation of his parole and he would consider himself free to join the -rebels. One British officer, who had become a friend and admirer of the -resolute Pickens, warned him: “You will campaign with a halter around -your neck. If we catch you, we will hang you.” - -Pickens decided to take the risk. He rode about Long Canes calling out -his regiment. The response was somewhat discouraging. Only about 70 men -turned out. Coordinating their movements with Colonel Washington’s raid -on the loyalists at Hammonds Store, they joined the patriot cavalry and -rode past Ninety Six to Morgan’s camp on the Pacolet. - -The numbers Pickens brought with him were disappointing. But he and his -men knew the back country intimately. They were the eyes and ears -Morgan’s little army desperately needed. Morgan immediately asked -Pickens to advance to a position about midway between Fair Forest Creek -and the Tyger River and send his horsemen ranging out from that point in -all directions to guard against a surprise attack by Banastre Tarleton. - -The Wizard Owl and his men mounted their horses and rode away to begin -their reconnaissance. General Morgan soon knew enough about the enemy -force coming after him to make him fear for his army’s survival. - - - 4 - -Daniel Morgan might call Banastre Tarleton “Benny” for the entertainment -of young militiamen like Joseph McJunkin. But Morgan had been fighting -the British for five years. He was as close to being a professional -soldier as any American of his time. He knew Banastre Tarleton was no -joke. In fact, the casual style of his decision to reunite his cavalry -and infantry at the Thompson plantation on Thicketty Creek disguised a -decision to retreat. The march to Thicketty Creek put an additional 10 -miles between him and the aggressive British cavalryman. Behind the mask -of easy confidence Morgan wore for his men, there was a very worried -general. - -As soon as he crossed the Broad River and camped at Grindal Shoals on -the north bank of the Pacolet on December 25, 1780, Morgan began sending -messengers to the men of western Georgia, South Carolina, and North -Carolina, urging them to turn out and support him. The response had been -disheartening. Pickens, as we have seen, was unable to muster more than -a fraction of his old regiment. From Georgia came only a small -detachment of about 100 men under the command of Lt. Col. James Jackson -and Maj. John Cunningham. Because their leader Elijah Clarke was out of -action from his wound at Long Canes, the Georgians were inclined to stay -home. Sumter, though almost recovered from his wound, sulked on the east -side of the Broad River. He felt Greene had sent Morgan into his sphere -of command without properly consulting him. - - - Arms and Tactics - - The armies fought the way they did—on open ground in long lines of - musket-wielding infantry standing two and three ranks deep—because - that was the most rational way to use the weapons they had. - - The main weapon of this combat was the muzzle-loading, smooth-bore, - flint-lock musket, equipped with a 16-inch bayonet. It hurled a - one-ounce lead ball of .70 to .80 calibre fairly accurately up to 75 - yards, but distance scarcely mattered. The object was to break up the - enemy’s formations with volleys and then rout them with cold steel. - The British were masters of these linear tactics, and Washington and - his commanders spent the war trying to instill the same discipline in - their Continentals so that they could stand up to redcoats on equal - terms in battle. - - The American rifle was not the significant weapon legend later made it - out to be. Though accurate at great distances, it was slow to load and - useless in open battle because it was not equipped with a bayonet. But - in the hands of skirmishers the rifle could do great damage, as the - British found out at Cowpens. - - [Illustration: French musket, calibre .69] - - [Illustration: British Brown Bess, calibre .75] - - [Illustration: British dragoon carbine] - - [Illustration: American rifle] - - Pistols _Cavalrymen and mounted officers nearly always carried a brace - of pistols. Though wildly inaccurate, they were useful in emergencies - when formal combat broke down and a foe was only a few feet away._ - - [Illustration: Officer’s Pistol] - - [Illustration: American dragoon pistol] - - [Illustration: Powder horns of the type used by rifle-carrying - militia at Cowpens: each was usually made by the man who carried - it.] - - Edged Weapons _came in many varieties. The most important for - hand-to-hand fighting were bayonets and swords. For cavalrymen, the - sword was more useful than firearms. It was “the most destructive and - almost the only necessary weapon a Dragoon carries,” said William - Washington. They used two types: the saber and the broadsword. Both - are shown here._ - - _Officers, foot as well as mounted, carried swords, often for - fighting, sometimes only for dress. The small-sword (shown at left - below) was popular with Continental officers._ - - [Illustration: Officers’ swords] - - [Illustration: American dragoon sabre] - - [Illustration: British dragoon sabre, model 1768] - - Pole Arms _were in common use. Washington wanted his foot officers to - direct their men and not be distracted by their own firearms. He - therefore armed them with a spear-like weapon called a spontoon. It - became a badge of rank as well as a weapon._ - - [Illustration: American officers’ spontoons] - -Morgan’s highest hopes had been focused on North Carolina, which had -thus far been relatively untouched by the British. The commander of the -militia in the back country was Brig. Gen. William Davidson, a former -Continental officer whom Morgan had known at Valley Forge. An energetic, -committed man, popular with the militia, Davidson had been expected to -muster from 600 to 1,000 men. Instead, Morgan got a letter from him with -the doleful report: “I have not ninety men.” An Indian incursion on the -western frontier had drawn off many of the militia and inclined others -to stay home to protect their families. On December 28, Davidson rode -into Morgan’s camp with only 120 men. He said that he hoped to have -another 500 mustered at Salisbury in the next week and rode off to find -them, leaving Morgan muttering in dismay. - -Morgan had eagerly accepted this independent command because he thought -at least 2,500 militiamen would join his 500 Continentals and Virginia -six-months men. With an army that size, he could have besieged or even -stormed the British stronghold at Ninety Six. His present force seemed -too small to do the enemy any damage. But it was large enough to give -its commander numerous headaches. In addition to the major worry of -annihilation by the enemy, food was scarce. The country along the -Pacolet had been plundered and fought over for so long, there was -nothing left to requisition from the farms. On December 31, in a letter -to Greene, Morgan predicted that in a few days supplies would be -“unattainable.” - -What to do? The only practical move he could see for his feeble army was -a march into Georgia. The British outpost at Augusta was weaker and more -isolated than Ninety Six. Even here, Morgan was cautious. “I have -consulted with General Davidson and Colonel Pickens whether we could -secure a safe retreat, should we be pushed by a superior force. They -tell me it can be easily effected,” he wrote Greene, asking his approval -of this plan. - -Morgan was reluctant to advance beyond the Pacolet. The reason was -rooted in his keen understanding of the psychology of the average -militiaman. He wanted to come out, fight and go home as soon as -possible. He did not want to fight if the regular army that was supposed -to look the enemy in the face seemed more interested in showing the -enemy their backs. “Were we to advance, and be constrained to retreat, -the consequences would be very disagreeable,” Morgan told Greene, -speaking as one general to another. The militia, he was saying, would go -home. - -Greene was equally anxious about Morgan. Writing from Cheraw Hills on -the Pee Dee River on December 29, the southern commander told Morgan of -the arrival of Gen. Alexander Leslie in Charleston with reinforcements. -This news meant the British would almost certainly advance soon. “Watch -their motions very narrowly and take care to guard against a surprise,” -he wrote. A week later, in another letter, he repeated the warning. “The -enemy and the Tories both will try to bring you into disgrace ... to -prevent your influence upon the militia, especially the weak and -wavering.” - -Greene vetoed Morgan’s expedition into Georgia. He did not think Morgan -was strong enough to accomplish much. “The enemy ... secure in their -fortifications, will take no notice of your movement,” he predicted. -Greene was persuaded that Cornwallis would strike at his half of the -army in their camp at Cheraw Hills, and he did not want Morgan in -Georgia if this threat materialized. Ignoring Morgan’s worries about -feeding his men, Greene told him to stay where he was, on the Pacolet or -“in the neighborhood,” and await an opportunity to attack the British -rear when they marched into North Carolina. - -Morgan replied with a lament. He reiterated his warning that “forage -[for the horses] and provisions are not to be had.” He insisted there -was “but one alternative, either to retreat or move into Georgia.” A -retreat, he warned, “will be attended with the most fatal consequences. -The spirit which now begins to pervade the people and call them into the -field, will be destroyed. The militia who have already joined will -desert us and it is not improbable but that a regard for their own -safety will induce them to join the enemy.” - -That last line is grim evidence of the power of the British policy of -forcing everyone to serve in the loyalist militia. But Nathanael Greene -remained adamant. He reported to Morgan more bad news, which made a -march into Georgia even more inadvisable. Another British general, with -2,500 men, had landed in Virginia and was attacking that vital State, -upon which the southern army depended for much of its supplies. It made -no sense to send some of the army’s best troops deeper into the South, -when Virginia might call on Greene and Morgan for aid. Almost casually -Greene added: “Col. Tarleton is said to be on his way to pay you a -visit. I doubt not but he will have a decent reception and a proper -dismission.” - -This was a strange remark for a worried general to make. From other -letters Greene wrote around this time, it is evident that he had -received a number of conflicting reports about Tarleton’s strength and -position. The American commander was also unsure about British -intentions. He assumed that Cornwallis and Tarleton were moving up the -opposite sides of the Broad River in concert. Since the main British -column under Cornwallis had all but stopped advancing, Greene assumed -Tarleton had stopped too and that Morgan was in no immediate danger. - -Around this time, a man who had known Daniel Morgan as a boy in Virginia -visited his camp. Richard Winn, after whom Winnsborough was named—and -whose mansion Cornwallis was using as his headquarters—discussed -Tarleton’s tactics with his old friend. Winn told Morgan that Tarleton’s -favorite mode of fighting was by surprise. “He never brings on [leads] -his attacks himself,” Winn said. He prefers to send in two or three -troops of horse, “whose goal is to throw the other party into confusion. -Then Tarleton attacks with his reserve and cuts them to pieces.” - -Much as he dreaded the thought of a retreat, Morgan was too experienced -a soldier not to prepare for one. He sent his quartermaster across the -Broad River with orders to set up magazines of supplies for his army. -This officer returned with dismaying news. General Sumter had refused to -cooperate with this request and directed his subordinates to obey no -orders from Morgan. - -Adding to Morgan’s supply woes was a Carolina military custom. Every -militiaman brought his horse to camp with him. This meant that Morgan -had to find forage for over 450 horses (counting William Washington’s -cavalry), each of whom ate 25 to 30 pounds of oats and hay a day. “Could -the militia be persuaded to change their fatal mode of going to war,” -Morgan groaned to Greene, “much provision might be saved; but the custom -has taken such deep root that it cannot be abolished.” - -Bands of militiamen constantly left the army to hunt for forage. This -practice made it impossible for Morgan to know how many men he had in -his command. In desperation, he ordered his officers, both Continental -and militia, to call the roll every two hours. This measure only gave -him more bad news. On January 15, after retreating from the Pacolet to -Thicketty Creek, he reported to Greene that he had only 340 militia with -him, but did not expect “to have more than two-thirds of these to assist -me, should I be attacked, for it is impossible to keep them collected.” - -Making Morgan feel even more like a military Job was a personal problem. -The incessant rain and the damp January cold had awakened an illness -that he had contracted fighting in Canada during the winter of 1775-76, -a rheumatic inflammation of the sciatic nerve in his hip. It made riding -a horse agony for Morgan. - -In his tent on Thicketty Creek, where he had rendezvoused with William -Washington and his 80 cavalrymen, who had been getting their horses shod -at Wofford’s iron works, Morgan all but abandoned any hope of executing -the mission on which Greene had sent him. “My force is inadequate,” he -wrote. “Upon a full and mature deliberation I am confirmed in the -opinion that nothing can be effected by my detachment in this country, -which will balance the risks I will be subjected to by remaining here. -The enemy’s great superiority in numbers and our distance from the main -army, will enable Lord Cornwallis to detach so superior a force against -me, as to render it essential to our safety to avoid coming to action.” - -It would be best, Morgan told Greene, if he were recalled with his -little band of Continentals and Andrew Pickens or William Davidson left -to command the back-country militia. Without the regulars to challenge -them, the British were less likely to invade the district and under -Pickens’ leadership the rebels would be able to keep “a check on the -disaffected”—the Tories—“which,” Morgan added mournfully, “is all I can -effect.” - -When he wrote these words on January 15, Morgan was still unaware of -what was coming at him. From the reports of Pickens’ scouts, he had -begun to worry that Tarleton might have more than his 550-man British -Legion with him. With the help of Washington’s cavalry, he felt -confident that he could beat off an attack by the Legion. But what if -Tarleton had additional men? “Col. Tarleton has crossed the Tyger at -Musgrove’s Mill,” Morgan told Greene. “His force we cannot learn.” - -Into Morgan’s camp galloped more scouts from Pickens. They brought news -that Morgan made the last sentence of his letter. - -“We have just learned that Tarleton’s force is from eleven to twelve -hundred British.” - -The last word was the significant one. _British._ Twelve hundred -regulars, trained troops, saber-swinging dragoons and bayonet-wielding -infantry like the men who had sent the militia running for their lives -at Camden and then cut the Continentals to pieces. Gen. Daniel Morgan -could see only one alternative—retreat. - - - 5 - -Until he got this information on the numbers and composition of -Tarleton’s army, Morgan seems to have toyed with the possibility of -ambushing the British as they crossed the Pacolet. He left strong -detachments of his army at the most likely fords. At the very least, he -may have wanted to make the crossing a bloody business for the British, -perhaps killing some of their best officers, even Tarleton himself. If -he could repulse or delay Tarleton at the river, Morgan hoped he could -gain enough time to retreat to a ford across the upper Broad, well out -of reach of Cornwallis on the other side of the river. Pickens had kept -Morgan well informed of the sluggish advance of the main British army. -He knew they were far to the south, a good 30 miles behind Tarleton. - -North of the Broad, Morgan reasoned they could be easily joined by the -500 North Carolina militia William Davidson had promised him as well as -South Carolina men from that district. If Tarleton continued the -pursuit, they could give battle on the rugged slopes of Kings Mountain, -where the cavalry of the British Legion would be useless. - -Morgan undoubtedly discussed this plan with the leaders of the -militiamen who were already with him—Joseph McDowell of North Carolina, -whose men had fought at Kings Mountain, James Jackson and John -Cunningham of Georgia, James McCall, Thomas Brandon, William Bratton and -other South Carolinians, perhaps also Andrew Pickens. They did not have -much enthusiasm for it. They warned Morgan that at least half the -militia, especially the South Carolinians, would be inclined to go home -rather than retreat across the Broad. In the back country, men perceived -rivers as dividing lines between districts. Most of the South Carolina -men in camp came from the west side of the Broad. Moreover, with Sumter -hostile, there was no guarantee that they would be able to persuade many -men on the other side of the river to join them. - -In this discussion, it seems likely that these militia leaders mentioned -the Cowpens as a good place to fight Tarleton on the south side of the -river. The grazing ground was a name familiar to everyone in the back -country. It was where the militia had assembled before the battle of -Kings Mountain the previous fall. Messengers could be sent into every -district within a day’s ride to urge laggards to join them there. - -Morgan mulled this advice while his men guarded the fords of the -Pacolet. As dusk fell on January 15, Tarleton and his army appeared on -the south bank of the river. He saw the guards and wheeled, marching up -the stream toward a ford near Wofford’s iron works. On the opposite -bank, Morgan’s men kept pace with him, step for step. Then, with no -warning, the British disappeared into the night. Retreating? Making -camp? No one knew. It was too risky to venture across the swollen river -to follow him. The British Legion cavalry always guarded Tarleton’s -flanks and rear. - -On the morning of the 16th, a militia detachment miles down the river in -the opposite direction made an alarming discovery. Tarleton was across! -He had doubled back in the dark and marched most of the night to cross -at Easterwood Shoals. He was only 6 miles from Morgan’s camp on -Thicketty Creek. Leaping on their horses, the guards galloped to Morgan -with the news. - -Morgan’s men were cooking breakfast. Out of his tent charged the general -to roar orders at them, the wagoners, the infantry, the cavalrymen. -Prepare to march immediately! The men grabbed their half-cooked cornmeal -cakes and stuffed them into their mouths. The militia and the cavalry -ran for their horses, the wagoners hitched their teams, the Continentals -formed ranks, and the column got underway. Morgan pressed forward, -ignoring the pain in his hip, demanding more and more speed from his -men. He headed northwest, toward Cowpens, on the Green River Road, a -route that would also take him to the Island Ford across the Broad -River, about 6 miles beyond Cowpens. - -All day the men slogged along the slick, gooey roads, Morgan at the head -of the column setting a relentless pace. His sciatic hip tormented him. -Behind him, the militiamen were expending “many a hearty curse” on him, -one of them later recalled. As Nathanael Greene wryly remarked, in the -militia every man considered himself a general. - -But Daniel Morgan was responsible for their lives and the lives of his -Continentals, some of whom had marched doggedly from battlefield to -battlefield for over four years. In the company of the Delaware -Continentals who served beside the Marylanders in the light infantry -brigade, there was a lieutenant named Thomas Anderson who kept track of -the miles he had marched since they headed south in May 1780. At the end -of each day he entered in his journal the ever-growing total. By January -16, it was 1,435. No matter what the militia thought of him, Daniel -Morgan was not going to throw away such men in a battle simply to prove -his courage. - -Seldom has there been a better example of the difference between the -professional and the amateur soldier. In his letters urging militiamen -to join him, Morgan had warned them against the futility of fighting in -such small detachments. He had asked them to come into his camp and -subject themselves to “order and discipline ... so that I may be enabled -to direct you ... to the advantage of the whole.” - -In the same letters, Morgan had made a promise to these men. “I will ask -you to encounter no dangers or difficulties, but what I shall -participate in.” If he retreated across the Broad, he would be exposing -the men who refused to go with him to Tarleton’s policy of extermination -by fire and sword. If they went with him, their families, their friends, -their homes would be abandoned to the young lieutenant colonel’s -vengeance. - -This conflict between prudence and his promise must have raged in -Morgan’s mind as his army toiled along the Green River Road. It was hard -marching. The road dipped into hollows and looped around small hills. -Swollen creeks cut across it. The woods were thick on both sides of it. -At dusk, the Americans emerged from the forest onto a flat, lightly -wooded tableland. At least, it looked flat at first glance. As Morgan -led his men into it, he noted that the ground rose gradually to a slight -crest, then dipped and rose to another slightly higher crest. Oak and -hickory trees were dotted throughout the more or less rectangular area, -but there was practically no underbrush. This was the Cowpens, a place -where back-country people pastured their cattle and prepared them to be -driven to market. - -In the distance, Morgan could see the Blue Ridge Mountains, which rise -from the flat country beyond the Broad like a great rampart. They were -30 miles away. If they could reach them, the army was safe. But militia -scouts brought in grim news. The river was rising. It would be a -difficult business crossing at Island Ford in the dark. The ford was -still 6 miles away, and the men were exhausted from their all-day march. -If they rested at Cowpens and tried to cross the river the next morning, -Banastre Tarleton, that soldier who liked to march by night, would be -upon them, ready to slash them to pieces. - -Perhaps it was that report which helped Morgan make his decision. One -suspects he almost welcomed the news that the army was, for all -practical purposes, trapped and fighting was the only alternative. There -was enough of the citizen-soldier in Morgan to dislike retreating almost -as much as the average militiaman. - -The more Morgan studied the terrain around him, the more he liked it. -The militia leaders were right. This was the best place to fight -Tarleton. Sitting on his horse, looking down the slope to the Green -River Road, Morgan noted the way the land fell off to the left and right -toward several creeks. The Cowpens was bordered by marshy ground that -would make it difficult for Tarleton to execute any sweeping flank -movements with his cavalry. As his friend Richard Winn had told him, -that was not Tarleton’s style, anyway. He was more likely to come -straight at the Americans with his infantry and cavalry in a headlong -charge. Experience told Morgan there were ways to handle such an -assault—tactics that 26-year-old Banastre Tarleton had probably never -seen. - -Now the important thing was to communicate the will to fight. Turning to -his officers, Morgan said, “On this ground I will beat Benny Tarleton or -I will lay my bones.” - - - 6 - -_Eleven to twelve hundred British_, Daniel Morgan had written. -Ironically, as Morgan ordered another retreat from this formidable foe, -the British were barricading themselves in some log houses on the north -bank of the Pacolet River, expecting an imminent attack from the -patriots. Their spies had told them that Morgan had 3,000 men, and -Tarleton was taking no chances. After seizing this strong point, only a -few miles below Morgan’s camp, he sent out a cavalry patrol. They soon -reported that the Americans had “decamped.” Tarleton immediately -advanced to Morgan’s abandoned campsite, where his hungry soldiers were -delighted to find “plenty of provisions which they had left behind them, -half cooked.” - -Nothing stirred Banastre Tarleton’s blood more than a retreating enemy. -British soldiers, famed for their tenacity in war, have often been -compared to the bulldog. But Tarleton was more like the bloodhound. A -fleeing foe meant the chance of an easy victory. It was not only -instinct, it was part of his training as a cavalryman. - -“Patrols and spies were immediately dispatched to observe the -Americans,” Tarleton later recalled. The British Legion dragoons were -ordered to follow Morgan until dark. Then the job was turned over to -“other emissaries”—loyalists. Tarleton had about 50 with him to act as -scouts and spies. Early that evening, January 16, probably around the -time that Morgan was deciding to fight at Cowpens, a party of loyalists -brought in a militia colonel who had wandered out of the American line -of march, perhaps in search of forage for his horse. Threatened with -instant hanging, the man talked. He told Tarleton that Morgan hoped to -stop at Cowpens and gather more militia. But the captive said that -Morgan then intended to get across the Broad River, where he thought he -would be safe. - -The information whetted Tarleton’s appetite. It seemed obvious to him -that he should “hang upon General Morgan’s rear” to cut off any militia -reinforcements that might show up. If Morgan tried to cross the Broad, -Tarleton would be in a position to “perplex his design,” as he put it—a -stuffy way of saying he could cut him to pieces. Around midnight, other -loyalist scouts brought in a rumor of more American reinforcements on -their way—a “corps of mountaineers.” This sent a chill through the -British, even through Tarleton. It sounded like the return of the -mountain men who had helped destroy the loyalist army at Kings Mountain. -It became more and more obvious to Tarleton that he should attack Morgan -as soon as possible. - -About three in the morning of the 17th of January, Tarleton called in -his sentries and ordered his drummers to rouse his men. Leaving 35 -baggage wagons and 70 Negro slaves with a 100-man guard commanded by a -lieutenant, he marched his sleepy men down the rutted Green River Road, -the same route Morgan had followed the previous day. The British found -the marching hard in the dark. The ground, Tarleton later wrote, was -“broken, and much intersected by creeks and ravines.” Ahead of the -column and on both flanks scouts prowled the woods to prevent an ambush. - -Describing the march, Tarleton also gave a precise description of his -army. Three companies of light infantry, supported by the infantry of -the British Legion, formed his vanguard. The light infantry were all -crack troops, most of whom had been fighting in America since the -beginning of the war. One company was from the 16th Regiment and had -participated in some of the swift, surprise attacks for which light -infantry was designed. They had been part of the British force that -killed and wounded 150 Americans in a night assault at Paoli, Pa., in -the fall of 1777. The light company of the 71st Regiment had a similar -record, having also been part of the light infantry brigade that the -British organized early in the war. - - [Illustration: Music made the soldier’s life more tolerable on the - march and in camp. But the most important use was in battle. Both - the drum and the fife conveyed signals and orders over the din and - confusion far better than the human voice. This iron fife is an - original 18th-century instrument. The drum, according to tradition, - was carried in the war.] - -With these regulars marched another company of light infantry whose -memories were not so grand—the green-coated men of the Prince of Wales -Loyal American Volunteers. Northern loyalists, they had been in the war -since 1777. They had seen little fighting until they sailed south in -1780. After the fall of Charleston, Cornwallis had divided them into -detachments and used them to garrison small posts, with disastrous -results. In August 1780 at Hanging Rock, Sumter had attacked one -detachment, virtually annihilating it. The colonel of the regiment was -cashiered for cowardice. Another detachment was mauled by Francis Marion -at Great Savannah around the same time. It was hardly a brilliant -record. But this company of light infantry, supposedly the boldest and -best of the regiment, might be eager to seek revenge for their lost -comrades. - - - Tarleton’s Legion - - Tarleton gave the Carolinas a foretaste of modern war. His Legion was - a fast-moving, hard-hitting combat team, accounted the best in the - British army at that stage of the war. Its specialty was relentless - pursuit followed by all-out attack. In Tarleton’s hands, the Legion - became a weapon of terror directed at civilian and soldier alike. As - in modern war, this tactic spawned as much partisan resistance as fear - and was ultimately self-defeating. - - The figures across these pages represent the main units of the cooly - efficient battle machine that Tarleton led onto the field that winter - day. - - [Illustration: 17th Dragoons • Private, 16th Light Infantry • Legion - cavalry • Private, 7th Fusiliers • Royal Artillery • Private, 71st - Highlanders] - -Behind the light infantry marched the first battalion of the Royal -Fusiliers of the 7th Regiment. This was one of the oldest regiments in -the British army, with a proud history that went back to 1685. Known as -the “City of London” regiment, it had been in America since 1773. A -detachment played a vital part in repulsing the December 31, 1775, -attack on Quebec, which wrecked American plans to make Canada the 14th -State. Among the 426 Americans captured was Daniel Morgan. Few if any of -the men in Tarleton’s ranks had been in that fight. The 167-man -battalion were all new recruits. When they arrived in Charleston early -in December, the British commander there had described them to -Cornwallis as “so bad, not above a third can possibly move with a -regiment.” - -The British government was having problems recruiting men for America. -It had never been easy to persuade Englishmen to join the army and -endure its harsh discipline and low pay. Now, with the war in America -growing more and more unpopular, army recruiters were scouring the jails -and city slums. Cornwallis had decided to use these new recruits as -garrison troops at Ninety Six. Tarleton, as we have seen earlier, had -borrowed them for his pursuit. Although the 7th’s motto was _Nec aspera -terrent_ (“hardships do not frighten us”), it must have been an -unnerving experience for these men, little more than a month after a -long, debilitating sea voyage, to find themselves deep in the backwoods -of South Carolina, marching through the cold, wet darkness to their -first battle. - -Undoubtedly worsening the Fusiliers’ morale was the low opinion their -officers had of Banastre Tarleton. The commander of the regiment, Maj. -Timothy Newmarsh, had stopped at a country house for the night about a -week ago, during the early stage of the pursuit, and had not been -discreet in voicing his fears for the safety of the expedition. He said -he was certain they would be defeated, because almost every officer in -the army detested Tarleton, who had been promoted over the heads of men -who had been in the service before he was born. - -Behind the Royal Fusiliers trudged a 200-man battalion of the 71st -Scottish Highlanders (Fraser’s), who probably did not find the night -march through the woods as forbidding as the city men of the Fusiliers. -At least half were relatively new recruits who had arrived in America -little more than a year ago. The rest were veterans who had been -campaigning in the rebellious colonies since 1776. They had sailed south -to help the British capture Georgia in 1778 and had fought well in one -of the most devastating royal victories of the southern campaign, the -rout of the Americans at Briar Creek, Ga., in early 1779. They were -commanded by Maj. Archibald McArthur, a tough veteran who had served -with the Scottish Brigade in the Dutch army, considered one of the -finest groups of fighting men in Europe. - -Between the 71st and the 7th Regiments plodded some 18 blue-coated royal -artillerymen, leading horses carrying two brass cannon and 60 rounds of -round shot and case shot (also known as canister because each “case” was -full of smaller bullet-size projectiles that scattered in flight). These -light guns were considered an important innovation when they were -introduced into the British army in 1775. Because they could be -dismantled and carried on horses, they could be moved over rough terrain -impassable to ordinary artillery with its cumbersome ammunition wagons. -The two guns Tarleton had with him could also be fitted with shafts that -enabled four men to carry them around a battlefield, if the ground was -too muddy or rough for their carriages. With the shafts, they resembled -grasshoppers, and this was what artillerymen, fond of nicknames for -their guns, called them. - -The cannon added to Tarleton’s confidence. They could hurl a 3-pound -round shot almost 1,000 yards. There was little likelihood that Morgan -had any artillery with him. All the southern army’s artillery had been -captured at Camden. These guns with Tarleton may have been two of the -captured pieces, which had originally been captured from the British at -Saratoga in 1777. - - - John Eager Howard, Citizen-soldier - - [Illustration: John Eager Howard] - - Few field officers served the Continental Army with greater skill or - devotion to duty than John Eager Howard. When the revolution broke - out, he was 23, the son of a landed Maryland family, brought up in an - atmosphere of ease and comfort. He saw his first hostile fire as a - captain of militia at White Plains (1776). The next year, as a major - in the regulars, he helped lead the 4th Maryland at Germantown. In the - Southern Campaign of 1780-81, regiments he led fought with great - courage at Camden, Cowpens, Guilford Courthouse, Hobkirks Hill, and - Eutaw Springs. Nathanael Greene considered Howard “as good an officer - as the world affords.” After the war, ‘Light-Horse Harry’ Lee - described Howard as “always to be found where the battle raged, - pressing into close action to wrestle with fixed bayonet.” - - [Illustration: The silver medal awarded by Congress to Howard for - service at Cowpens.] - - [Illustration: J E Howard] - - [Illustration: Belvidere, the elegant estate that John Eager Howard - built after the Revolution, stood in what is now downtown Baltimore. - It was torn down a century ago and the land is now occupied by row - houses.] - -Behind the infantry and artillery rode the cavalry of the British Legion -and a 50-man troop of the 17th Light Dragoons, giving Tarleton about 350 -horsemen. In scabbards dangling from straps over their shoulders were -the fearsome sabers that could lop off a man’s arm with a single stroke. -The Legion cavalry were, relatively speaking, amateurs, with only their -courage and belief in their cause to animate them. The 17th Dragoons -were regulars to the core, intensely proud of their long tradition. On -their brass helmets they wore a death’s head and below it a scroll with -the words “or glory.” They and their officers were somewhat disdainful -of the British Legion. - - [Illustration: A helmet of the 17th Light Dragoons, c. 1780.] - -Although their reputation among the patriots was good, the Legion had -several times exhibited cowardice unthinkable to a 17th dragoon. When -the British army advanced into Charlotte in the fall of 1780, they had -been opposed by 75 or 80 back-country riflemen. Tarleton was ill with -yellow fever and his second in command, Maj. George Hanger, had ordered -them to charge the Americans. The Legion refused to budge. Not even the -exhortations of Cornwallis himself stirred them until infantry had -dislodged the riflemen from cover. They apparently remembered the -punishment they had taken at Blackstocks, when Tarleton’s orders had -exposed them to sharpshooters. - -As dawn began turning the black night sky to charcoal gray, Tarleton -ordered a select group of cavalry to the front of his infantry. They -soon collided with American scouts on horseback and captured two of -them. These captives told them that Morgan and his men were only a few -miles away. Tarleton immediately ordered two troops of the Legion -cavalry, under one of his best officers, Capt. David Ogilvie, to -reinforce his vanguard. Ogilvie galloped into the murky dawn. Within a -half hour, one of his troopers came racing back with unexpected news. -The patriots were not retreating! They were drawn up in an open wood in -battle formation. - -Tarleton halted his army and summoned his loyalist guides. They -instantly recognized the place where Morgan had chosen to fight—the -Cowpens. It was familiar to everyone who had visited or lived in the -South Carolina back country. They gave Tarleton a detailed description -of the battleground. The woods were open and free from swamps. The Broad -River was about six miles away. - -The ground, Tarleton decided, was made to order for the rebels’ -destruction. In fact, America could not produce a place more suitable to -his style of war. His bloodhound instinct dominant, Banastre Tarleton -assumed that Morgan, having run away from him for two days, was still -only trying to check his advance and gain time to retreat over the Broad -River. Morgan failed to stop him at the Pacolet. He would fail even more -disastrously here. With six miles of open country in the Americans’ -rear, Tarleton looked forward to smashing Morgan’s ranks with an -infantry attack and then unleashing his Legion horsemen to hunt down the -fleeing survivors. Tarleton never dreamt that Daniel Morgan was planning -to fight to the finish. - - - 7 - -While Tarleton’s troops spent most of the night marching along the -twisting, dipping Green River Road, Daniel Morgan’s men had been resting -at Cowpens and listening to their general’s battle plan. First Morgan -outlined it for his officers, then he went from campfire to campfire -explaining it to his men. - -The plan was based on the terrain at Cowpens and on the knowledge of -Tarleton’s battle tactics that Morgan had from such friends as Richard -Winn. Morgan probably told his men what he repeated in later years—he -expected nothing from Tarleton but “downright fighting.” The young -Englishman was going to come straight at them in an all-out charge. - -To repel that charge, Morgan adopted tactics he had himself helped -design at Saratoga. There was a similarity between the little army he -commanded at Cowpens and the men he led in northern New York. Like his -old rifle corps, his militia were crack shots. But they could not stand -up against a British bayonet charge. It took too long to load and fire a -rifle, and it was not equipped with a bayonet. - -He had complete confidence in his Continentals. No regiment in the -British army had a prouder tradition than these men from Maryland and -Delaware. They and their comrades in arms had demonstrated their heroism -on a dozen battlefields. Above all, Morgan trusted their commander, Lt. -Col. John Eager Howard of Maryland. At the battle of Germantown in 1777, -he had led his 4th Maryland Regiment in a headlong charge that drove the -British light infantry in panicky flight from their battle line back to -their tents. After the American defeat at Camden, Howard had rounded up -the survivors of his own and other regiments and led them on a three-day -march to Charlotte through swamps and forests to elude British pursuit. -Someone asked what they had to eat during that time. “Some peaches,” -Howard said. - - [Illustration: An American canteen of the type used by militia at - Cowpens.] - -Morgan was equally sure of the steadiness of the ex-Continentals who -made up the bulk of his two companies of Virginia six-months militiamen. -He told them that he was going to station them on either side of the -Maryland and Delaware regulars, on the first crest of the almost -invisibly rising slope that constituted Cowpens. A professional soldier -would consider this the “military crest” because it was the high ground -from which the best defense could be made. Behind this crest, the land -sloped off to a slight hollow, and then rose to another slightly higher -hump of earth, which was the geographical crest of the battleground. -Here Morgan planned to post William Washington and his 80 dragoons. To -make them more of a match for Tarleton’s 300 horsemen, he called for -volunteers to serve with Washington. About 40 men stepped forward, led -by Andrew Pickens’ friend, James McCall. Morgan gave them sabers and -told them to obey Washington’s orders. - -There was nothing unusual or brilliant about this part of Morgan’s -battle plan. It was simply good sense and good tactics to select the -most advantageous ground for his infantry and keep Washington’s cavalry -out of the immediate reach of Tarleton’s far more numerous horsemen. It -was in his plan for the militia that Morgan demonstrated his genius. At -Camden, Horatio Gates had tried to use the militia as if they were -regulars, positioning them in his battle line side by side with the -Continentals. They swiftly demonstrated that they could not withstand a -British bayonet charge. - -Morgan decided that he would use his militia in a different way. He put -the backwoodsmen under the command of Andrew Pickens and carefully -explained what he wanted them to do. They were going to form a line -about 150 yards ahead of Howard and the Continentals. They were to hold -their fire until the British were within “killing distance.” They were -to get off two or three shots and retreat behind the Continentals, who -would carry on the battle while the militiamen re-formed and came back -into the fight on the British flanks. - -A select group of riflemen, considered the best shots in the army, were -to advance another hundred yards on both sides of the Green River Road -and begin skirmishing with the British as soon as they appeared. This -was the tactic Sumter had used at Blackstocks to tempt Tarleton into a -reckless charge, and it had cost the British heavy casualties. - -His plan complete, Morgan did not retire to his tent, in the style of -more autocratic generals, and await the moment of battle. He understood -the importance of personal leadership. Above all, he knew how to talk to -the militia. He was a man of the frontier, like them. Although he was -crippled from his sciatica, he limped from group to group while they -cooked their suppers and smoked their pipes, telling them how sure he -was that they could whip “Benny.” Sixteen-year-old Thomas Young was -among the cavalry volunteers. He remembered how Morgan helped them to -fix their sabers, joked with them about their sweethearts, told them to -keep up their courage and victory was certain. - -“Long after I laid down,” Young recalled, “he was going among the -soldiers encouraging them and telling them that the ‘Old Wagoner’ would -crack his whip over Ben in the morning, as sure as they lived.” - -“Just hold up your heads, boys, give them three fires, and you will be -free,” Morgan told them. “Then when you return to your homes, how the -old folks will bless you, and the girls will kiss you.” “I don’t believe -that he slept a wink that night,” Young said later. - -Many of these young militiamen had something else to motivate them—a -fierce resentment of the way the British and loyalists had abused, and -in some cases killed, their friends and relatives. Thomas Young’s -brother, John, had been shot down in the spring of 1780 when loyalist -militia attacked the Youngs’ regiment. “I do not believe I had ever used -an oath before that day,” Young said. “But then I tore open my bosom and -swore that I would never rest until I had avenged his death.” - - [Illustration: A powder horn and linstock like these were essential - tools for artillerymen. They primed the cannon by pouring powder - into a vent leading to the charge and fired it by touching the - burning hemp on the tip of the linstock to the vent. The gunners - serving the two 3-pounder “grasshoppers” at Cowpens used such - equipment.] - -Another South Carolinian, 17-year-old James Collins, had fought with -Sumter and other militia leaders since the fall of Charleston. He -remembered with particular anger the swath of desolation left by -loyalists when they plundered rebel Americans on the east side of the -Broad. “Women were insulted and stripped of every article of decent -clothing they might have on and every article of bedding, clothing or -furniture was taken—knives, forks, dishes, spoons. Not a piece of meat -or a pint of salt was left. They even entered houses where men lay sick -of the smallpox ... dragged them out of their sick beds into the yard -and put them to death in cold blood in the presence of their wives and -children. We were too weak to repel them....” - - - Morgan’s Army - - On paper Morgan’s army was inferior. The British numbered some 1100, - all regulars and most of them tested in battle. Morgan had at best a - little over 800 troops, and half of them were militia. Numbers, - though, deceive, for Morgan’s army was in fact a first-rate detachment - of light infantry, needing only leadership to win victories. - - The core of Morgan’s army was a mixed brigade of Maryland and Delaware - Continentals under Col. John Eager Howard, about 320 men. They were - supported by 80 or so Continental dragoons under Col. William - Washington. - - [Illustration: Maryland Continental • Dragoon, 3rd Continentals] - - These Continentals were tough and experienced. Morgan’s militia were - better material than the green troops who folded at Camden and later - ran away at Guilford. Some 200 were ex-Continentals from Virginia. - Morgan thought enough of them to employ them in the main battle line. - The other militia were recruited by that wily partisan leader, Andrew - Pickens, and William Davidson, a superb militia general. It’s unlikely - that such able commanders would have filled their ranks with the - wavering and shiftless. - - Morgan knew the worth of these troops and deployed them in a way that - made the most of their strengths and minimized their weakness. They - rewarded him with a victory still marveled at two centuries later. - - These figures represent the units in Morgan’s command. - - [Illustration: Virginia militiaman • Carolina militiaman] - -Collins and his friends had joined Sumter, only to encounter Tarleton at -Fishing Creek. “It was a perfect rout and an indiscriminate slaughter,” -he recalled. Retreating to the west, Collins described how they lived -before Morgan and his regulars arrived to confront the British and -loyalists. “We kept a flying camp, never staying long in one place, -never camping near a public road ... never stripping off saddles.” When -they ate, “each one sat down with his sword by his side, his gun lying -across his lap or under the seat on which he sat.” It soon became -necessary “for their safety,” Collins said, to join Morgan. At Cowpens, -men like James Collins were fighting for their lives. - -Equally desperate—and angry—were men like Joseph Hughes, whose father -had been killed by the loyalists. Hughes had been living as an -“out-lier,” hiding in the woods near his home with a number of other men -who remained loyal to militia colonel Thomas Brandon. One day he -ventured out to visit his family. As he approached the house, three -loyalists sprang out of the door with leveled guns, shouting: “You -damned Rebel, you are our prisoner!” Hughes wheeled his horse and leaped -the gate to escape the hail of bullets. - -At Cowpens, Hughes, though still in his teens, was given command of a -company of militia. Probably by his side was his close friend, William -Kennedy, considered one of the best shots in South Carolina. His prowess -with the rifle had discouraged loyalists from venturing into the rebel -settlement at Fairforest Shoals. His gun had a peculiar _crack_ which -his friends recognized. When they heard it, they often said: “There is -another Tory less.” - -The men who had turned out to fight for Andrew Pickens had no illusions -about what would happen to them if they were captured. Like their -leader, they were violators of their paroles, liable to instant -execution if captured. On the night of the 16th, Cornwallis, in his camp -at Turkey Creek on the other side of the Broad, demonstrated what else -would happen to their families. He wrote out an order for Cruger at -Ninety Six. “If Colonel Pickens has left any Negroes, cattle or other -property that may be useful ... I would have it seized accordingly and I -desire that his houses may be burned and his plantations as far as lies -in your power totally destroyed and himself if ever taken instantly -hanged.” The order was executed the moment it was received at Ninety -Six. Rebecca Pickens and her children were hurried into the January cold -to watch their house, barns, and other outbuildings become bonfires. - -The 200 Georgians and South Carolinians in Morgan’s army were all -veterans of numerous battles, most of them fought under Elijah Clarke’s -command. With their leader wounded, they were now commanded by James -Jackson and John Cunningham. Morgan had largely relied on Jackson to -rally them. Like most of Morgan’s men, he was young, only 23. He had -fought Tarleton at Blackstocks, where he had ducked bullets to seize the -guns of dead British to continue the fight after his men ran out of -ammunition. In one respect, Jackson was unusual. He had been born in -England. He arrived in America in 1774 and seems to have become an -instant Georgian, right down to extreme pugnacity and a prickly sense of -honor. He had recently quarreled with the rebel lieutenant governor of -Georgia, challenged him to a duel, and killed him. Morgan appointed -Jackson brigade major of the militia, making him Pickens’ second in -command. - -At least as formidable as Jackson’s veterans were the 140 North -Carolinians under Maj. Joseph McDowell. They had fought at Musgrove’s -Mill and in other battles in the summer of 1780 and had scrambled up the -slopes of Kings Mountain to help destroy the loyalist army entrenched -there. - -Well before dawn, Morgan sent cavalry under a Georgian, Joshua Inman, to -reconnoiter the Green River Road. They bumped into Tarleton’s advance -guard and hastily retreated. Into the Cowpens they pounded to shout the -alarm. - -Morgan seemed to be everywhere on his horse, rousing the men. “Boys, get -up, Benny is coming,” he shouted. Quickly militia and Continentals got -on their feet and bolted down cold hominy they had cooked the night -before. Morgan ordered the baggage wagons to depart immediately to a -safe place, about a mile in the rear. The militiamen’s horses were tied -to trees, under a guard, closer to the rear of the battle line. - -Morgan rode down to the picked riflemen who were going to open the fight -and told them he had heard a lot of tall tales about who were the better -shots, the men of Georgia or Carolina. Here was the chance to settle the -matter and save their country in the bargain. “Let me see which are most -entitled to the credit of brave men, the boys of Carolina or those of -Georgia,” he roared. By positioning Georgians on the left of the road -and Carolinians on the right, Morgan shrewdly arranged to make his -competition highly visible. - -To Pickens’ men Morgan made a full-fledged speech, reminding them of -what the British had already done to their friends and many of their -families. He pounded his fist in his hand and told them that this was -their moment of revenge. He also praised the courage with which they had -fought the British in earlier skirmishes, without the help of regulars -or cavalry. Here they had the support of veterans in both departments. -He had not the slightest doubt of victory if they obeyed their orders -and fought like men. He told them his experiences with his rifle -regiment at Saratoga and other battles, where they had beaten the flower -of the British army, generals far more distinguished than Benny Tarleton -and regiments far more famous than the units Tarleton was leading. - -To his Continentals, Morgan made an even more emotional speech. He -called them “my friends in arms, my dear boys,” and asked them to -remember Saratoga, Monmouth, Paoli, Brandywine. “This day,” he said, -“you must play your parts for honor and liberty’s cause.” He restated -his battle plan, reminding them that after two or three rounds the -militia would retreat under orders. They would not be running away. They -would be falling back to regroup and harry the enemy’s flanks. - -A Delaware soldier watching Morgan’s performance said that by the time -he was through, there was not a man in the army who was not “in good -spirits and very willing to fight.” - -The blood-red rising sun crept above the hills along the slopes of -Thicketty Mountain to the east. The men stamped their feet and blew on -their hands to keep warm. It was cold, but the air was crisp and clear. -The mighty ramparts of the Blue Ridge were visible, 30 miles away. Much -too distant for a refuge now, even if the swollen Broad River did not -lie between them and Morgan’s men. - -Suddenly the British army was emerging from the woods along the Green -River Road. The green-coated dragoons at their head slowed and then -stopped. So did the red-coated light infantry behind them. An officer in -a green coat rode to the head of the column and studied the American -position. Everyone in the rebel army recognized him. It was Banastre -Tarleton. - - - 8 - -Tarleton soon found his position at the head of the column was -hazardous. The Georgia and Carolina riflemen drifted toward him through -the trees on either side of the road. _Pop pop_ went their rifles. -Bullets whistled close to Tarleton’s head. He turned to the 50 British -Legion dragoons commanded by Captain Ogilvie and ordered them to “drive -in” the skirmishers. With a shout the dragoons charged. The riflemen -rested their weapons against convenient trees and took steady aim. Again -the long barrels blazed. Dragoons cried out and pitched from their -saddles, horses screamed in pain. The riflemen flitted back through the -open woods, reloading as they ran, a trick that continually amazed the -British. Some whirled and fired again, and more dragoons crashed to -earth. In a minute or two the riflemen were safely within the ranks of -Pickens’ militia. The dragoons recoiled from this array of fire power -and cantered back toward the British commander. They had lost 15 out of -their 50 men. - -Tarleton meanwhile continued studying the rebel army. At a distance of -about 400 yards he was able to identify Pickens’ line of militia, whose -numbers he guessed to be about a thousand. He estimated the Continentals -and Virginia six-month militia in the second line at about 800. -Washington’s cavalry on the crest behind the Continentals he put at 120, -his only accurate figure. - - [Illustration: Few officers saw more combat than William Washington. - a distant cousin of George. He was a veteran of many battles—among - them Long Island and Trenton in 1776, Charleston in 1780, and - Cowpens, Guilford, Hobkirks Hill, and Eutaw Springs in 1781—and - numerous skirmishes. Thrice he was wounded, the last time at Eutaw - Springs, where he was captured. His fellow cavalryman, ‘Light-Horse - Harry’ Lee described him as of “a stout frame, being six feet in - height, broad, strong, and corpulent ... in temper he was - good-humored.... Bold, collected, and persevering, he preferred the - heat of action to the collection and sifting of intelligence, to the - calculations and combinations of means and measures....”] - - [Illustration: The British carried at least two flags into battle: - the King’s standard and the colors of the 7th Fusiliers (below). - Both were captured by Morgan’s troops.] - - [Illustration: Colors of the 7th Fusiliers] - -Tarleton was not in the least intimidated by these odds, even though his -estimates doubled Morgan’s actual strength. He was supremely confident -that his regular infantry could sweep the riflemen and militia off the -field, leaving only the outnumbered Continentals and cavalry. The ground -looked level enough to repeat the Waxhaws rout. In his self-confidence -and growing battle fever, he did not even bother to confer on a tactical -plan with Newmarsh of the Fusiliers or McArthur of the Highlanders. He -simply issued them orders to form a line of battle. The infantry was -told to drop their heavy packs and blanket rolls. The light infantry -companies were ordered to file to the right, until they extended as far -as the flank of the militia facing them. The Legion infantry was ordered -into line beside them. Next came a squad of blue-coated artillerymen -with their brass grasshopper. They unpacked their gun and ammunition -boxes and mounted them on the wheeled carriage with professional speed. -In the Royal Artillery school at Woolrich the men who designed the gun -estimated this task should take no more than two minutes. - -The light infantry and Legion infantry were now told to advance a -hundred yards, while the Fusiliers moved into line on their left. The -other grasshopper was placed on the right of this regiment, no doubt to -bolster the courage of the raw recruits. The two guns began hurling shot -into the woods, firing at the riflemen who were filtering back to -potshot the tempting red and green targets. - -On each flank, Tarleton posted a captain and 50 dragoons, more than -enough, he thought, to protect his infantry from a cavalry charge. - -Tarleton ordered the Highlanders to form a line about 150 yards in the -rear of the Fusiliers, slightly to their left. These veteran Scots and -200 Legion cavalry were his reserve, to be committed to the fight when -they were most needed. - -Everywhere Tarleton looked, he later recalled, he saw “the most -promising assurance of success.” The officers and men were full of fire -and vigor. Every order had been obeyed with alacrity. There was not a -sign of weariness, though his men had marched half the night. They had -been chasing these Americans for two weary weeks. They knew that if they -beat them here, the war in South Carolina would be over. To make this a -certainty, Banastre Tarleton issued a cruel order. They were to give no -quarter, take no prisoners. - - [Illustration: The only reasonably sure patriot flag on the field - was a damask color, cut from the back of a chair, that Washington’s - dragoons carried. The original, which measures only 18 inches by 18, - is in the collection of the Washington Light Infantry Corps of - Charleston.] - -The order might have made some gruesome sense as far as the militia was -concerned. Almost every one of them was considered a criminal, fighting -in direct violation of the law as laid down by His Majesty’s officers in -numerous proclamations. Killing them would save the trouble of hanging -them. But to order his men to give no quarter to Morgan’s Continentals -was a blatant violation of the rules of war under which both sides had -fought for the past five years. It was graphic glimpse of the rage which -continued American resistance was igniting in Englishmen like Banastre -Tarleton. - -One British officer in the battle later said that Major Newmarsh was -still posting the officers of the Fusiliers, the last regiment into -line, when Tarleton ordered the advance to begin. With a tremendous -shout, the green- and red-coated line surged forward. - -From the top of the slope, Morgan called on his men to reply. “They give -us the British haloo, boys,” he cried. “Give them the Indian haloo.” A -howl of defiance leaped from 800 American throats. Simultaneously, the -Georgians and North Carolinians opened fire behind the big trees. Some -of the new recruits of the Fusiliers regiment revealed their nervousness -by firing back. Their officers quickly halted this tactical violation. -British infantry fired by the volley, and the riflemen were out of -musket range anyway. Rifles outshot muskets by 150 yards. - -Morgan watched the riflemen give the British infantry “a heavy and -galling fire” as they advanced. But the sharpshooters made no pretense -of holding their ground. Morgan had ordered them to fall back to -Pickens’ militia and join them for serious fighting. On the British -came, their battle drums booming, their fifes shrilling, the two brass -cannon barking. The artillerymen apparently did not consider the -militiamen an important target. They blasted at the Continentals on the -crest. Most of their rounds whizzed over the heads of the infantry and -came dangerously close to Colonel Washington and his horsemen. He led -his men to a safer position on the slope of the geographical crest, -behind the left wing of the main American line. - -Andrew Pickens and his fellow colonels, all on horseback, urged the -militia to hold their fire, to aim low and pick out “the epaulette -men”—the British officers with gold braid on their shoulders. - - - - - Tarleton’s Order of Battle - _Legion dragoons (two troops)_ - _Light infantry companies of the 16th, 71st, and Prince of Wales - regiments_ - _Legion infantry_ - _7th Fusiliers_ - _Royal artillery_ - _71st Highlander regulars_ - _17th Light Dragoons_ - _Legion dragoons_ - - -_This is the order in which Tarleton deployed his units on the -battlefield._ - -It was no easy task to persuade these men not to fire while those -16-inch British bayonets bore down on them, glistening wickedly in the -rising sun. The closer they got, the more difficult it would be to -reload their clumsy muskets and get off another shot before the British -were on top of them. But the musket was a grossly inaccurate weapon at -anything more than 50 yards. This was the “killing distance” for which -Pickens and Morgan wanted the men to wait. The steady fire of the -grasshoppers, expertly served by the British artillerymen, made the wait -even more harrowing. - -Then came the moment of death. “Fire,” snarled Andrew Pickens. “Fire,” -echoed his colonels up and down the line. The militia muskets and rifles -belched flame and smoke. The British line recoiled as bullets from over -300 guns hurtled among them. Everywhere officers, easily visible at the -heads of their companies, went down. It was probably here that Newmarsh -of the Fusiliers, who had been so pessimistic about fighting under -Tarleton, fell with a painful wound. But confidence in their favorite -weapon, the bayonet, and the knowledge that they were confronting -militia quickly overcame the shock of this first blow. The red and green -line surged forward again. - -Thomas Young, sitting on his horse among Washington’s cavalry, later -recalled the noise of the battle. “At first it was _pop pop pop_ (the -sound of the rifles) and then a whole volley,” he said. Then the -regulars fired a volley. “It seemed like one sheet of flame from right -to left,” Young said. - -The British were not trained to aim and fire. Their volley firing was -designed to intimidate more than to kill. It made a tremendous noise and -threw a cloud of white smoke over the battlefield. Most of the musket -balls flew high over the heads of the Americans. Decades later, visitors -to Cowpens found bullets embedded in tree trunks as high as 30 feet from -the ground. - -Out of the smoke the regulars came, bayonets leveled. James Collins was -among the militiamen who decided that the two shots requested by Morgan -was more than they could manage. “We gave the enemy one fire,” he -recalled. “When they charged us with their bayonets we gave way and -retreated for our horses.” - -Most of the militia hurried around Morgan’s left flank, following -Pickens and his men. A lesser number may have found the right flank more -convenient. The important thing, as far as they were concerned, was to -escape those bayonets and reach the position where Morgan promised them -they would be protected by Howard’s Continentals and Washington’s -cavalry. Watching from the military crest, Sgt. William Seymour of the -Delaware Continentals thought the militia retreated “in very good order, -not seeming to be in the least confused.” Thus far, Morgan’s plan was -working smoothly. - -Tarleton ordered the 50 dragoons on his right flank to pursue Pickens -and the bulk of the militia. If, as he later claimed, the British -commander had seen William Washington and his 120 cavalry at the -beginning of the battle, this order was a blunder. With 200 cavalrymen -in reserve, waiting a summons to attack, Tarleton sent 50 horsemen to -face twice their number of mounted Americans. He may have assumed that -Morgan was using standard battle tactics and regarded Washington’s -cavalry as his reserve, which he would not commit until necessity -required it. The British commander never dreamt that the Old Wagoner had -made a solemn promise to the militiamen that he would protect them from -the fearsome green dragoons at all costs. - -As the militia retreated. Tarleton’s cavalry thundered down on them. -their deadly sabers raised. “Now,” thought James Collins, “my hide is in -the loft.” A wild melee ensued, with the militiamen dodging behind -trees, parrying the slashing sabers with their gun barrels. “They began -to make a few hacks at some,” Collins said, “thinking they would have -another Fishing Creek frolic.” As the militiamen dodged the swinging -sabers, the British dragoons lost all semblance of a military formation -and became “pretty much scattered,” Collins said. - -At that moment, “Col. Washington’s cavalry was among them like a -whirlwind,” Collins exultantly recalled. American sabers sent dragoons -keeling from their horses. “The shock was so sudden and violent, they -could not stand it, and immediately betook themselves to flight.” -Collins said. “They appeared to be as hard to stop as a drove of wild -Choctaw steers, going to Pennsylvania market.” Washington’s cavalry -hotly pursued them and “in a few minutes the clashing of swords was out -of hearing and quickly out of sight.” - -Thomas Young was one of the South Carolina volunteers in this ferocious -charge. He was riding a “little tackey”—a very inferior horse—which put -him at a disadvantage. When he saw one of the British dragoons topple -from his saddle, he executed “the quickest swap I ever made in my life” -and leaped onto “the finest horse I ever rode.” Young said the American -charge carried them through the 50 dragoons, whereupon they wheeled and -attacked them in the rear. On his new steed he joined Washington’s -pursuit of the fleeing British. - -In spite of William Washington’s victorious strike, many militiamen -decided that Cowpens was unsafe and leaped on their horses and departed. -Among the officers who took prompt action to prevent further panic was -young Joseph Hughes. Although blood streamed from a saber cut on his -right hand, he drew his sword and raced after his fleeing company. -Outrunning them, he whirled and flailed at them with the flat of his -blade, roaring. “You damned cowards, halt and fight—there is more danger -in running than in fighting.” - -Andrew Pickens rode among other sprinters, shouting. “Are you going to -leave your mothers, sisters, sweethearts and wives to such unmerciful -scoundrels, such a horde of thieves?” - -On the battlefield, volley after volley of musketry thundered, cannon -boomed. The Continentals and the British regulars were slugging it out. -Daniel Morgan rode up to the milling militiamen, waving his sword and -roaring in a voice that outdid the musketry: “Form, form, my brave -fellows. Give them one more fire and the day is ours. Old Morgan was -never beaten.” - -Would they fight or run? For a few agonizing moments, the outcome of the -battle teetered on the response of these young backwoodsmen. - - - 9 - -On the other side of the crest behind which Morgan and Pickens struggled -to rally the militia, Banastre Tarleton was absorbed in pressing home -the attack with his infantry. He seems to have paid no attention to the -rout of his cavalry on the right. Nor did any of his junior officers in -the Legion attempt to support the fleeing dragoons with reinforcements -from the 200-man cavalry reserve. At this point in the battle, Tarleton -badly needed a second in command who had the confidence to make -on-the-spot decisions. One man cannot be everywhere on a battlefield. -Unfortunately for Tarleton, Maj. George Hanger, his second in command, -was in a hospital in Camden, slowly recovering from yellow fever. - -With the militia out of the way, the British infantry had advanced on -the Continentals and begun blasting volleys of musketry at them. The -Continentals volleyed back. Smoke enveloped the battlefield. Tarleton -later claimed the fire produced “much slaughter,” but it is doubtful -that either side could see what they were shooting at after the first -few rounds. The British continued to fire high, hitting few -Continentals. - -To Tarleton, the contest seemed “equally balanced,” and he judged it the -moment to throw in his reserve. He ordered Major McArthur and his 71st -Highlanders into the battle line to the left of the Fusiliers. This gave -Tarleton over 700 infantrymen in action to the rebels’ 420. -Simultaneously, Tarleton ordered the cavalry troop on the left to form a -line and swing around the American right flank. - -These orders, shouted above the thunder of musketry and the boom of the -cannon, were promptly obeyed. On the crest of the hill, Howard saw the -British threat developing. Once men are outflanked and begin to be hit -with bullets from two sides, they are in danger of being routed. Howard -ordered the Virginia militia on his right to “change their front” to -meet this challenge. This standard battlefield tactic requires a company -to wheel and face a flanking enemy. - - [Illustration: An officer of the Maryland Regiment. He carries a - spontoon, which is both a badge of office and in close combat a - useful weapon.] - -A battlefield is a confusing place, and the Virginians, though mostly -trained soldiers, were not regulars who had lived and drilled together -over the previous months. Their captain shouted the order given him by -Howard, and the men wheeled and began marching toward the rear. The -Maryland and Delaware Continentals, seeing this strange departure, -noting that it was done in perfect order and with deliberation, assumed -that they had missed an order to fall back. They wheeled and followed -the Virginians. On the opposite flank, the other company of Virginians -repeated this performance. In 60 seconds the whole patriot line was -retreating. - -Behind the geographical crest of the hill, Morgan and Pickens had -managed to steady and reorganize the militia. Morgan galloped back -toward the military crest on which he assumed the Continentals were -still fighting. He was thunderstruck to find them retreating. In a fury, -he rode up to Howard and cried: “Are you beaten?” - -Howard pointed to his unbroken ranks and told Morgan that soldiers who -retreated in that kind of order were not beaten. Morgan agreed and told -him to stay with the men and he would ride back and choose the place -where the Continentals should turn and rally. The Old Wagoner spurred -his horse ahead toward the geographical crest of the hill, about 50 -paces behind their first line. - -On the British side of the battlefield, the sight of the retreating -Continentals revived hopes of an easy victory. Major McArthur of the -71st sought out Tarleton and urged him to order the cavalry reserve to -charge and turn the retreat into a rout. Tarleton claimed that he sent -this order to the cavalry, who were now at least 400 yards away from the -vortex of the battle. Perhaps he did. It would very probably have been -obeyed if it had arrived in time. The dragoons of the British Legion -liked nothing so much as chopping up a retreating enemy. - -But events now occurred with a rapidity that made it impossible for the -cavalry to respond. The center of Tarleton’s line of infantry surged up -the slope after the Continentals, bayonets lowered, howling for American -blood. With almost half their officers dead or wounded by now, they lost -all semblance of military formation. - -Far down the battlefield, where he had halted his pursuit of the British -cavalry, William Washington saw what was happening. He sent a horseman -racing to Morgan with a terse message. “They are coming on like a mob. -Give them another fire and I will charge them.” Thomas Young, riding -with Washington, never forgot the moment. “The bugle sounded,” he said. -“We made a half circuit at full speed and came upon the rear of the -British line shouting and charging like madmen.” - -Simultaneously, Morgan reached the geographical crest of the slope, with -the Continentals only a few steps behind him. He roared out an order to -turn and fire. The Continentals wheeled and threw a blast of -concentrated musketry into the faces of the charging British. Officers -and men toppled. The line recoiled. - -“Give them the bayonet,” bellowed John Eager Howard. - -With a wild yell, the Continentals charged. The astonished British -panicked. Some of them, probably the Fusiliers, flung themselves faced -down on the ground begging for mercy. Others, Thomas Young recalled, -“took to the wagon road and did the prettiest sort of running away.” - -At almost the same moment, the Highlanders, whose weight, if they had -joined the charge, would probably have been decisive, received an -unexpected blast of musketry from their flank. Andrew Pickens and the -militia had returned to the battle. The backwoodsmen blazed at the -Scotsmen, the riflemen among them concentrating on the screen of the -cavalrymen. The cavalry fled and McArthur’s men found themselves -fighting a private war with the militia. - -Astonished and appalled, Tarleton sent an officer racing to the British -Legion cavalry with orders for them to form a line of battle about 400 -yards away, on the left of the road. He rode frantically among his -fleeing infantry, trying to rally them. His first purpose was “to -protect the guns.” To lose a cannon was a major disgrace in 18th-century -warfare. The artillerymen were the only part of the British center that -had not succumbed to the general panic. They continued to fire their -grasshoppers, while the infantry threw down their muskets or ran past -them helter skelter. Part of the artillery’s tradition was an absolute -refusal to surrender. They lived by the code of victory or death. - -Once past the surrendering infantry, the Continentals headed for the -cannon. Like robots—or very brave men—the artillerymen continued to fire -until every man except one was shot down or bayonetted. - -The last survivor of the other gun crew was the man who touched the -match to the powder vent. A Continental called on him to surrender this -tool. The artilleryman refused. As the Continental raised his bayonet to -kill him, Howard came up and blocked the blow with his sword. A man that -brave, the colonel said, deserved to live. The artilleryman surrendered -the match to Howard. - -Up and down the American line on the crest rang an ominous cry. “Give -them Tarleton’s quarter.” Remembering Waxhaws, the regulars and their -Virginia militia cousins were ready to massacre the surrendered British. -But Daniel Morgan, the epitome of battle fury while the guns were -firing, was a humane and generous man. He rode into the shouting -infantrymen, ordering them to let the enemy live. Junior officers joined -him in enforcing the order. - -Discipline as well as mercy made the order advisable. The battle was not -over. The Highlanders were still fighting fiercely against Pickens’ men. -Tarleton was riding frantically toward his Legion cavalry to bring them -back into the battle. But the militia riflemen were back on the field -and Tarleton was their prime target. Bullets whistled around him as he -rode. Several hit his horse. The animal crashed to the ground. Tarleton -sprang up, his saber ready. Dr. Robert Jackson, assistant surgeon of the -71st, galloped to the distraught lieutenant colonel and offered him his -horse. Tarleton refused. For a moment he seemed ready to die on the -chaotic battlefield with his men. Dr. Jackson urged him again. Springing -off his horse, he told Tarleton, “Your safety is of the highest -importance to the army.” - -Tarleton mounted Jackson’s horse and rode to rally his troops. Fastening -a white handkerchief to his cane, Jackson strolled toward the -all-but-victorious Americans. No matter how the battle ended, he wanted -to stay alive to tend the wounded. - -Looking over his shoulder at the battlefield, Tarleton clung to a shred -of hope. An all-out charge by the cavalry could still “retrieve the -day,” he said later. The Americans were “much broken by their rapid -advance.” - -But the British Legion had no appetite for another encounter with the -muskets of Andrew Pickens’ militia. “All attempts to restore order, -recollection [of past glory] or courage, proved fruitless,” Tarleton -said. No less than 200 Legion dragoons wheeled their horses and galloped -for safety in the very teeth of Tarleton’s harangue. Fourteen officers -and 40 dragoons of the 17th Regiment obeyed his summons and charged with -him toward the all-but-disintegrated British battle line. Their chief -hope was to save the cannon and rescue some small consolation from the -defeat. - - - Stages of the Battle - -Because the battle was a continuous flow of action from the opening -skirmish to the pell-mell flight of the Legion dragoons at the end, the -important maneuvers cannot all be shown on a single map. This sequence -of maps diagrams the main stages of the battle. - - [Illustration: 1.] - -Skirmishers drive back Tarleton’s cavalry, sent forward to examine the -enemy’s lines, and then withdraw into Pickens’ line of militia. Without -pausing, Tarleton forms his line of battle. - - - Green River Road - Route 11 - Morgan’s camp - Washington’s cavalry - Visitor Center - Howard’s Continentals - Pickens’ militia - Skirmishers - 17th dragoons - Legion dragoons - Tarleton’s main line - 71st Highlanders - Scruggs House - - - [Illustration: 2.] - -The British advance on Pickens’ militia, who deliver the promised two -shots each and fall back on the flanks. When they are pursued by British -dragoons, Washington’s cavalry charges into action and drives them off. - - - Green River Road - Route 11 - Morgan’s camp - Washington’s cavalry - Visitor Center - Howard’s Continentals - Pickens’ militia - 17th dragoons - Tarleton’s main line - Legion dragoons - 71st Highlanders - Scruggs House - - - [Illustration: 3.] - -Howard’s Continentals rout the British in the center, supported by -cavalry on the left and militia on the right. - - - Green River Road - Route 11 - Morgan’s camp - Howard’s Continentals - Washington’s cavalry - Visitor Center - Tarleton’s main line - Pickens’ militia - 71st Highlanders - 17th dragoons - Legion dragoons - Scruggs House - - - How to read these battle diagrams - -British positions are shown in RED, American in BLUE. Open boxes show -former positions, arrows movement. Clashes are shown by stars. Modern -features, included for orientation, appear in gray. - - [Illustration: This perspective by the artist Richard Schlecht - compresses the whole battle into one view. The open woods in the - foreground (A) is littered with British shot down by Pickens’ - skirmishers. At the far right (B) Washington’s cavalry drive back - the British dragoons pursuing Pickens’ militia. Along the third line - (C) Howard’s Continentals repulse the attacking British regulars - with volleys and bayonets. On Tarleton’s left (D) the 71st is - engaged in a hot contest with militia, some of whom had returned to - the battle after firing their two shots and withdrawing. They hit - Tarleton’s left flank hard while Howard’s troops rout the British in - the center, giving Morgan the victory. A gem of tactical planning - and maneuver, it was by far the patriot’s best fought battle of the - war. - - The painting conveys a close sense of the original terrain with its - scattered hardwoods and undulating ground that Morgan turned to good - use. The axis of the battlefield, then as now, is the old Green - River Road, which runs diagonally across the scene. The diverging - road at left was not there at the time of the battle.] - -They never got there. Instead, they collided with William Washington’s -cavalry that had wheeled after their assault on the rear of the infantry -and begun a pursuit of the scampering redcoats, calling on them to -surrender, sabering those who refused. Washington shouted an order to -meet the British charge. Most of his horsemen, absorbed in their pursuit -of the infantry, did not hear him. Washington, leading the charge, did -not realize he was almost unsupported. The burly Virginian, remembering -his humiliating defeat at Lenuds Ferry in May 1780, had a personal score -to settle with Banastre Tarleton. He headed straight for him. - -Tarleton and two officers accepted Washington’s challenge. The Virginian -slashed at the first man, but his saber snapped at the hilt. As the -officer stood up in his stirrups, his saber raised for a fatal stroke, -Washington’s bugler boy rode up and fired at the Englishman. The second -officer was about to make a similar stroke when the sergeant-major of -the 3d Continental Dragoons arrived to parry the blow and slash this -assailant’s sword arm. Tarleton made a final assault. Washington parried -his blow with his broken sword. From his saddle holsters, Tarleton drew -two pistols in swift succession and fired at Washington. One bullet -wounded Washington’s horse. - -By this time Tarleton saw that the battle was totally lost. The riflemen -were running toward his horsemen, and their bullets were again whistling -close. The Highlanders were being methodically surrounded by Pickens’ -militia and Morgan’s Continentals. Summoning his gallant 54 supporters, -Tarleton galloped down the Green River Road, a defeated man. - -On the battlefield, the Highlanders were trying to retreat. But Howard’s -Continentals and Washington’s cavalry were now between them and safety. -Through the center of their line charged Lt. Col. James Jackson and some -of his Georgians to try to seize their standard. Bayonet-wielding -Scotsmen were about to kill Jackson when Howard and his Continentals -broke through the 71st’s flank and saved him. Howard called on the -Highlanders to surrender. Major McArthur handed his sword to Pickens and -so did most of the other officers. Pickens passed the major’s sword to -Jackson and ordered him to escort McArthur to the rear. - -Captain Duncasson of the 71st surrendered his sword to Howard. When -Howard remounted, the captain clung to his saddle and almost unhorsed -him. “I expressed my displeasure,” Howard recalled, “and asked him what -he was about.” Duncasson told Howard that Tarleton had issued orders to -give no quarter and they did not expect any. The Continentals were -approaching with their bayonets still fixed. He was afraid of what they -might do to him. Howard ordered a sergeant to protect the captain. - -Around the patriots main position, a happy chaos raged. In his -exultation, Morgan picked up his 9-year-old drummer boy and kissed him -on both cheeks. - -Others were off on new adventures. Cavalryman Thomas Young joined half a -dozen riders in pursuit of prisoners and loot down the Green River Road. -They must have embarked on this foray shortly after most of Tarleton’s -cavalry had deserted him and before Tarleton himself quit the -battlefield after the encounter with Washington. - -“We went about twelve miles,” Young said in his recollections of the -battle, “and captured two British soldiers, two negroes and two horses -laden with portmanteaus. One of the portmanteaus belonged to a paymaster -... and contained gold.” The other riders decided this haul was too good -to risk on the road and told Young to escort the prisoners and the money -back to Cowpens. Young had ridden several miles when he collided with -Tarleton and his 54 troopers. Abandoning his captures, Young tried to -escape. He darted down a side road, but his horse was so stiff from the -hard exercise on the battlefield, the British overtook him. - -“My pistol was empty so I drew my sword and made battle,” the young -militiaman said. “I never fought so hard in my life.” He was hopelessly -outnumbered. In a few clanging seconds, a saber split a finger on his -left hand, another slashed his sword arm, a third blade raked his -forehead and the skin fell over his eyes, blinding him. A saber tip -speared his left shoulder, a blade sank deep into his right shoulder, -and a final blow caught him on the back of the head. Young clung to his -horse’s neck, half conscious. - - - Washington and Tarleton Duel - - One of the battle’s most colorful incidents occurred at the very end. - As defeat enveloped his army, Tarleton tried to rally his cavalry to - the support of the infantry. His Legion dragoons, ignoring his orders - and threats, stampeded off the field. Only the disciplined veterans of - the 17th Dragoons followed him into battle. They ran head-on into the - Continental dragoons of Lt. Col. William Washington. As sabers - flashed, Washington found himself far in advance of his unit. What - happened next is described in a passage from John Marshall’s famous - _Life of George Washington_, written when the event still lingered in - the memory of contemporaries: “Observing [Washington about 30 yards in - front of his regiment], three British officers wheeled about and - attacked him; the officer on his left was aiming to cut him down, when - a sergeant came up and intercepted the blow by disabling the - sword-arm, at the same instant the officer on his right was about to - make a stroke at him, when a waiter, too small to wield a sword, saved - him by wounding the officer with a pistol. At this moment, Tarleton - made a thrust at him, which he parried, upon which the officer - [Tarleton] retreated a few paces and discharged his pistol at him....” - - It is this account that probably inspired the artist William Ranney in - 1845 to paint the vigorous battle scene spread across these pages. - Washington and Tarleton (on the black horse) raise their swords in the - center while Washington’s servant boy levels his pistol at the far - dragoon. While the painting errs in details of costume—Washington and - his sergeant should be dressed in white coats, not green, and the - British should be in green, not red—it catches the spirit of the duel. - - [Illustration: Washington-Tarleton duel] - -He was battered and bleeding, but his courage saved his life. With the -peculiar sportsmanship that the British bring to war, they took him off -his horse, bandaged his wounds, and led him back to the main road, where -they rejoined Tarleton and the rest of his party. One of the Tory guides -that had led the British through the back country to Cowpens recognized -Young and announced he was going to kill him. He cocked his weapon. “In -a moment,” Young said, “about twenty British soldiers drew their swords, -cursed him for a coward wishing to kill a boy without arms and a -prisoner, and ran him off.” - -Tarleton ordered Young to ride beside him. He asked him many questions -about Morgan’s army. He was particularly interested in how many dragoons -Washington had. “He had seventy,” Young said, “and two volunteer -companies of mounted militia. But you know, they [the militia] won’t -fight.” - -“They did today,” Tarleton replied. - - - 10 - -On the battlefield at Cowpens, Surgeons Robert Jackson of the 71st -Highlanders and Richard Pindell of the 1st Maryland were doing their -limited best to help the wounded of both sides. There were 62 patriots -and 200 British in need of medical attention, which consisted largely of -extracting musket balls, if possible, bandaging wounds, and giving -sufferers some opium or whiskey, if any was available. The battle had -also cost the British 110 dead, including 10 officers. Only 12 patriots -were killed in the battle, though many more died later of wounds. But it -was the number of prisoners—some 530—that underscored the totality of -the American victory. - -Even as prisoners, the British, particularly the Scots, somewhat awed -the Americans. Joseph McJunkin said they “looked like nabobs in their -flaming regimentals as they sat down with us, the militia, in our -tattered hunting shirts, black-smoked and greasy.” - -Other patriots were not content to inspect their exotic captives. -William Washington was having a terse conference with Andrew Pickens. -They agreed that there was still a good chance to catch Tarleton. But -they needed enough men to overwhelm his 54-man squadron. Washington -changed his wounded horse for a healthy mount and rounded up his -scattered dragoons. Pickens summoned some of his own men and ordered -James Jackson to follow him “with as many of the mounted militia as he -could get.” - - [Illustration: Among the equipment captured from the British was a - “Travelling Forge,” used by artificers to keep horses shod and - wagons in repair.] - -Down the Green River Road they galloped, sabers in hand. But Tarleton -the cavalryman was not an easy man to catch. He rode at his usual -horse-killing pace. A few miles above William Thompson’s plantation on -Thicketty Creek, they found the expedition’s baggage wagons abandoned, -35 in all, most of them belonging to the 7th Regiment. The fleeing -cavalry of the Legion had told the 100-man guard of the defeat. The -officer in command had set fire to all the baggage that would burn, cut -loose the wagon horses, mounted his infantry two to a horse, and ridden -for the safety of Cornwallis’s army. Abandoned with the baggage were -some 70 black slaves. A short time later, a party of loyalists, -fugitives from the battlefield, reached the baggage train and began to -loot it. They were not long at this work before Tarleton and his -heartsick officers and troopers came pounding down the road. They did -not ask questions about loyalty. They cut down the looters without -mercy. - -Tarleton too was riding for Cornwallis’s camp, but he had more than -safety on his mind. He assumed the British commander was just across the -Broad River at Kings Mountain in a position to rescue the 500 or so men -Morgan had taken prisoner. Perhaps Tarleton met a loyalist scout or -messenger somewhere along the road. At any rate, he heard “with infinite -grief and astonishment” that the main army was at least 35 miles away, -at Turkey Creek. - -This news meant a change of route. The British decided they needed a -guide. Near Thicketty Creek they stopped at the house of a man named -Goudelock. He was known as a rebel. But Tarleton probably put a saber to -his throat and told him he would be a dead man if he did not lead them -to Hamiltons Ford across the Broad River, near the mouth of Bullocks -Creek. Goudelock’s terrified wife watched this virtual kidnapping of her -husband. - -About half an hour after Tarleton and his troopers departed to the -southeast, Washington, Pickens, and their dragoons and militia troopers -rode into Goudelock’s yard. They had stopped to extinguish the fires the -British started in the baggage wagons and collect some of the slaves the -enemy had abandoned. The Americans asked Mrs. Goudelock if she had seen -the British fugitives. Yes, she said. What road did they take? She -pointed down the Green River Road, which led to Grindal Shoals on the -Pacolet. Like a great many people in every war, she was more interested -in personal survival than national victory. If the Americans caught up -to Tarleton, there was certain to be a bloody struggle, in which her -husband might be killed. Mrs. Goudelock preferred a live husband to a -dead or captured British commander. - - [Illustration: Congress awarded this silver sword to Colonel Pickens - for his part in the battle.] - -The Americans galloped for the Pacolet. Not until they had traveled 24 -miles on this cold trail did they turn back. By then, it was much too -late. Tarleton was safely across the Broad River at Hamiltons Ford. But -the American pursuit helped save Thomas Young, the captured militiaman. -When Tarleton and his men, guided by the reluctant Goudelock, reached -the ford, it was almost dark. Someone told them the river was -“swimming.” Someone else, perhaps a loyalist scout, rode up with word -that Washington and his cavalry were after them. Considerable confusion -ensued, as Tarleton and his officers conferred on whether to flee down -the river to some other ford, attempt to swim the river in the dark, or -stand and fight. Everyone stopped thinking about Thomas Young and -another prisoner, a Virginian whom the British had scooped up along the -road. The two Americans spurred their horses into the darkness, and no -one noticed they were gone. - -Tarleton crossed the Broad River that night and spent the next morning -collecting his runaway dragoons and other stragglers before riding down -to Cornwallis’s camp at Turkey Creek. The British commander already knew -the bad news. Some of the Legion cavalry had drifted into camp the -previous night. But Tarleton, as the field commander, was required to -make a detailed report. - -According to Joseph McJunkin, whose father had been taken prisoner by -the British and was an eyewitness, Cornwallis grew so agitated he -plunged his sword into the ground in front of his tent and leaned on it -while listening to the details of the disaster. By the end of Tarleton’s -account, the earl was leaning so hard on the hilt that the sword snapped -in half. He threw the broken blade on the ground and swore he would -recapture the lost light infantry, Fusiliers, and Highlanders. - -The general exonerated Tarleton of all culpability for the defeat at -Cowpens. “You have forfeited no part of my esteem, as an officer,” he -assured Tarleton. Cornwallis blamed the loss on the “total misbehavior -of the troops.” But he confided to Lord Rawdon, the commander at Camden, -that “the late affair has almost broke my heart.” - - [Illustration: Of the three medals awarded by Congress—a gold medal - to Morgan and silver medals to Washington and Howard—only the Howard - medal has survived. The Latin inscription reads: “The American - Congress to John Eager Howard, commander of a regiment of infantry.” - The medal is in the collection of the Maryland Historical Society.] - -On the same morning that Tarleton was making his doleful report, -Washington and Pickens returned to Cowpens. On their ride back, they -collected several dozen—some versions make it as many as 100—additional -British soldiers straggling through the woods. At the battlefield they -found only the two surgeons caring for the wounded and a handful of -Pickens’ men guarding them. Daniel Morgan, knowing Cornwallis would make -a determined effort to regain the prisoners, had crossed the Broad River -on the afternoon of the battle and headed northwest toward Gilbert Town. -Pickens and Washington caught up to him there, and Morgan gave Pickens -charge of the prisoners, with orders to head for an upper ford of the -Catawba River. Decoying Cornwallis, Morgan led his Continentals toward a -lower ford of the same river. In an exhausting five-day march, often in -an icy rain, both units got across this deep, swift-running stream ahead -of the pursuing British. The prisoners were now beyond Cornwallis’s -reach. They were soon marched to camps in Virginia, where the men Morgan -helped capture at Saratoga were held. - -This final retreat, a vital maneuver that consolidated the field victory -at Cowpens, worsened Morgan’s sciatica. From the east bank of the -Catawba, he warned Greene that he would have to leave the army. “I grow -worse every hour,” he wrote. “I can’t ride or walk.” As the rain -continued to pour down, Morgan had to abandon his tent and seek the -warmth of a private house. Greene immediately rode from Cheraw Hills and -took personal command of the army. By the time Morgan departed for -Virginia on February 10, he was in such pain that he had to be carried -in a litter. - -A grateful Congress showered the Cowpens victors with praise and -rewards. Morgan was voted a gold medal, and Howard and Washington were -voted silver medals. Pickens received a silver sword. Perhaps the most -immediate result of the battle was in the minds of the people of the -South. The victory sent a wave of hope through the Carolinas and -Georgia. It also changed attitudes in Congress toward the southern -States. John Mathews of South Carolina told Greene that “the -intelligence ... seems to have had a very sensible effect on _some -folks_, for as this is a convincing proof that something is to be done -in that department ... they seem at present to be well disposed to give -it every possible aid.” - -The news had an exhilarating effect on Greene’s half of the southern -army. He ordered a celebration and praised Morgan extravagantly in the -general orders announcing the victory. A friend on Greene’s staff sent a -copy to Morgan, adding, “It was written immediately after we heard the -news, and during the operation of some cherry bounce.” To Francis -Marion, Greene wrote, “After this, nothing will appear difficult.” - -This optimism soon faded. To the men in the field, Cowpens did not seem -particularly decisive. Banastre Tarleton was soon back in action at the -head of the British cavalry. On February 1, from his sick bed, Morgan -wrote a despairing letter to Gov. Thomas Jefferson of Virginia, -describing the retreat of the Southern army before Cornwallis. “Our men -[are] almost naked,” still too weak to fight him. “Great God what is the -reason we can’t have more men in the field? How distressing it must be -to an anxious mind to see the country over run and destroyed for want of -assistance.” - -The civil war between the rebels and the loyalists continued in South -Carolina, marked by the same savage fratricidal strife. “The scenes were -awful,” Andrew Pickens recalled. Young James Collins, in his simple, -honest way, told the militiaman’s side of this story. Summing up his -role at Cowpens, Collins said he fired his “little rifle five times, -whether with any effect or not, I do not know.” The following day, he -and many other militiamen received “some small share of the plunder” -from the captured British wagons. Then, “taking care to get as much -powder as we could, we [the militia] disbanded and returned to our old -haunts, where we obtained a few days rest.” Within a week, Collins was -again on his horse, risking his life as a scout and messenger. - -Only years later, with a full perspective of the war, did the importance -of Cowpens become clear. By destroying Tarleton’s Legion, Daniel Morgan -crippled the enemy’s power to intimidate and suppress the militia. -Cornwallis was never able to replace the regulars he lost at Cowpens. He -had to abandon all thought of dividing his field army—which meant that -British power did not extend much beyond the perimeter of his camp. When -he pursued Greene’s army deep into North Carolina, the partisans in -South Carolina rose in revolt. Eventually, Cornwallis was forced to -unite his decimated, half-starved regiments with the British troops in -Virginia, where they were trapped by Gen. George Washington’s army at -Yorktown in October 1781. - -In South Carolina, meanwhile, Nathanael Greene combined militia with his -small regular army in the style Morgan had originated at Cowpens. Though -Greene was forced to retreat without victory at Guilford Courthouse -(March 15, 1781), Hobkirks Hill (April 25, 1781), and Eutaw Springs -(September 8, 1781), the British army suffered such heavy losses in -these and other encounters that they soon abandoned all their posts in -the back country, including the fort at Ninety Six, and retreated to a -small enclave around Charleston. There they remained, impotent and -besieged, until the war was almost over. - -It took nine years for the U.S. Treasury to scrape together the cash to -buy Daniel Morgan the gold medal voted him by Congress for Cowpens. In -the spring of 1790, this letter came to the Old Wagoner at his home near -Winchester, Virginia: - - _New York, March 25, 1790_ - - Sir: _You will receive with this a medal, struck by the order of the - late Congress, in commemoration of your much approved conduct in the - battle of the Cowpens and presented to you as a mark of the high sense - which your country entertains of your services on that occasion._ - - _This medal was put into my hands by Mr. Jefferson, and it is with - singular pleasure that I now transmit it to you._ - - _I am, Sir &c., - George Washington_ - - - - - Part 2 Cowpens and the War in the South - A Guide to the Battlefield and Related Sites - - - [Illustration: On the 75th anniversary of the battle, the Washington - Light Infantry—a Charleston militia company—marched to the - battlefield and erected this monument to the victors.] - - - - - Cowpens Battleground - - -Cowpens was one of the most skillfully fought battles in the annals of -the American military. It pitted a young and ruthless commander of -British dragoons—a man widely feared and hated in the South—against a -brilliant tactician and experienced leader of American militia. The -fighting was short and decisive. In less than an hour, three-fourths of -the British were killed or captured, many of them the best light troops -in the army. For Cornwallis, the rout was another in a series of -disasters that led ultimately to final defeat at Yorktown. - -The park that preserves the scene of this battle is located in upstate -South Carolina, 11 miles northwest of Gaffney by way of S.C. 11. The -original park on this site was established in 1929 on an acre of ground -marking the point of some of the hardest fighting. For the bicentennial -of the battle, the park was expanded to over 842 acres, and many new -facilities—among them a visitor center, roads, trails, and waysides—were -built. - -The battlefield is small enough for visitors to stroll around and replay -the maneuvers of the opposing commanders. A 1¼-mile trail loops through -the heart of the park. Two of the first stops are at the lines held by -Howard’s Continentals and Pickens’ militia. Farther along the trail you -can stand where Tarleton formed his troops into a line of battle. From -this point, the trail up the Green River Road covers ground over which -the British advanced at sunrise that cold January morning. The pitched -fighting between Continentals and redcoats that decided the contest -occurred just beyond the bend in the road. - -The land is currently being restored to its appearance at the time of -the battle. In 1781, this field was a grassy meadow dotted with tall -hardwoods. A locally known pasturing ground, it was used by Carolina -farmers to fatten cattle before sending them to low-country markets. - -Tarleton in his memoirs described it as an “open wood ... -disadvantageous for the Americans, and convenient for the British.” He -expected to break through the rebel lines, as he had so often done in -the past, and ride down the fleeing remnants with his cavalry. - -Morgan saw the same ground as favoring him and based his plan of battle -on a shrewd appraisal of both his foe and his own men. He was happy -enough that there was no swamp nearby for his militia to flee to and -unconcerned that there were no natural obstacles covering his wings from -cavalry. He knew his adversary, he claimed, “and was perfectly sure I -should have nothing but downright fighting. As to retreat, it was the -very thing I wished to cut off all hope of.... When men are forced to -fight, they will sell their lives dearly.” So Morgan deployed his men -according to their abilities and handled them in battle with rare skill. -They rewarded him, militia and regular alike, with what was probably the -patriots’ best-fought battle of the war. - -Cowpens was only one battle in a long campaign. For perspective, nine -other sites of the War in the South are described on the following -pages. Several of them are administered by public agencies; a few are -barely marked and may be hard to find. Travelers will find two works -useful: _Landmarks of the American Revolution_ by Mark M. Boatner III -(1975) and _The Bicentennial Guide to the American Revolution, Volume 3, -The War in the South_ by Sol Stember (1974). - - [Illustration: This monument was erected by the government in 1932 - to commemorate the battle. It originally stood in the center of - Morgan’s third line but was moved to this location when the new - visitor center was built for the Bicentennial.] - - [Illustration: These hardwoods along the patriots’ third line - suggest the open woods that contemporaries agree covered the Cowpens - at the time of the battle.] - - [Illustration: Map] - - - VIRGINIA - Appalachian National Scenic Trail - Blacksburg - Roanoke - Lynchburg - James River - To Yorktown and Colonial National Historical Park - Blue Ridge Parkway - NORTH CAROLINA - Danville - Winston-Salem - Guilford Courthouse National Military Park - Burlington - High Point - Greensboro - Durham - Chapel Hill - Raleigh - Hickory - Salisbury - Fayetteville - Moores Creek National Battlefield - Kannapolis - Gastonia - Charlotte - Wilmington - SOUTH CAROLINA - Cowpens National Battlefield - Gaffney - Kings Mountain National Military Park - Spartanburg - Rock Hill - Waxhaws - Ninety Six National Historic Site - Camden Battlefield - Camden - Florence - Columbia - Eutaw Springs Historical Area - Charleston - GEORGIA - Augusta - - - The Road to Yorktown - - - Savannah 1778-79 - - [Illustration: The British opened their campaign against the South - with the capture of this city in late 1778. They went on to conquer - Georgia and threaten the Carolinas. To retake the city, French and - American infantry opened a siege in the fall of 1779. The British - repulsed the allied attacks with great losses. Some of the hardest - fighting swirled around Spring Hill Redoubt. Nothing remains of this - earthwork. A plaque on Railroad Street is the only reminder of the - battle.] - - - Charleston 1780 - - [Illustration: The British laid siege to this city in spring 1780. - Trapped inside was the entire Southern army, 5,000 troops under Gen. - Benjamin Lincoln. When Lincoln surrendered, it was one of the most - crushing defeats of the war for the Continentals. Only a few - evidences of the war remain, among them a tabby wall (part of the - patriots’ defensive works) in Marion Square and a statue of William - Pitt, damaged in the shelling, in a park in the lower city.] - - - Waxhaws 1780 - - [Illustration: The only sizable force not trapped inside Charleston - was a regiment of Continentals under Abraham Buford. Pursuing hard, - Tarleton caught them on May 29, 1780, in a clearing. His dragoons - and infantry swarmed over Buford’s lines. The result was a - slaughter. Many Continentals were killed trying to surrender. The - massacre inspired the epithet “Bloody” Tarleton. - - Site located 9 miles east of Lancaster, S.C., on Rt. 522. Marked by - a monument and common grave.] - - - Camden 1780 - - [Illustration: After the fall of Charleston, Congress sent Gates - south to stop the British. On August 16 he collided with Cornwallis - outside this village. The battle was another American disaster. The - militia broke and ran, and the Continentals were overwhelmed. This - defeat was the low point of the war in the South. Historic Camden - preserves remnants of the Revolutionary town. The battlefield is - several miles north of town. This stone marks the place where the - heroic DeKalb fell.] - - - Kings Mountain 1780 - - [Illustration: When Cornwallis invaded North Carolina in autumn - 1780, he sent Patrick Ferguson ranging into the upcountry. A band of - “over-mountain” men—tired of his threats and depredations—trapped - him and his American loyalists on this summit. In a savage battle on - October 7, they killed or wounded a third of his men and captured - the rest. The defeat was Cornwallis’s first setback in his campaign - to conquer the South. Administered by NPS.] - - - Guilford Courthouse 1781 - - [Illustration: Armies under Nathanael Greene and Cornwallis fought - one of the decisive battles of the Revolutionary War here on March - 15. In two hours of hard fighting, Cornwallis drove Greene from the - field, but at such cost that he had to break off campaigning and - fall back to the coast. - - Located on the outskirts of Greensboro, N.C. Administered by the - National Park Service.] - - - Ninety Six 1781 - - [Illustration: Located on the main trading route to the Cherokees, - this palisaded village was the most important British outpost in the - South Carolina back country. Greene laid siege to the garrison here - from May 22 to June 19, 1781, but could not subdue the post. A - relief force raised the siege, which was soon evacuated and burned. - The star fort and some buildings have been reconstructed. - - Park administered by the National Park Service.] - - - Eutaw Springs 1781 - - [Illustration: The last major battle in the lower South (September - 8, 1781), Eutaw Springs matched Greene with 2,200 troops against - 1,900 redcoats. The outcome was a draw. The British retreated to - Charleston, and there they remained the rest of the war. - - A memorial park stands on Rt. 6. just east of Eutawville, S.C. The - original battlefield is under the waters of Lake Marion.] - - - Yorktown 1781 - - [Illustration: Cornwallis’s surrender at this little port town on - October 19, 1781, brought the war to an effective end. The victory - was a consequence of the Franco-American alliance. French ships - blockaded the harbor and prevented resupply, while Washington’s - powerful force of Continentals and French regulars besieged the - British by land. After a long bombardment and a night attack that - captured two redoubts, Cornwallis asked for terms. - - Administered by NPS.] - - - For Further Reading - -For those who wish to explore the story of Cowpens in more depth, the -following books will be helpful. _Daniel Morgan, Revolutionary Rifleman_ -by Don Higgenbotham (1961) is a well-paced, solidly researched narrative -of the Old Wagoner’s adventurous life. Still valuable, especially for -its wealth of quotations from Morgan’s correspondence, is James Graham’s -_Life of General Morgan_ (1856). On the struggle for the South Carolina -back-country, _Ninety Six_ by Robert D. Bass (1978) is the best modern -study. Edward McCrady’s two-volume work, _A History of South Carolina in -the Revolution_ (1901), is also useful. For personal anecdotes about the -savage civil war between rebels and loyalists, _Traditions and -Reminiscences, Chiefly of the American Revolution in the South_ by -Joseph Johnson, M.D. (1851) is a basic source book. Equally illuminating -is James Collins’ _Autobiography of a Revolutionary Soldier_, published -in _Sixty Years in the Nueces Valley_ (1930). Biographies of other men -who participated in Cowpens are not numerous. _Skyagunsta_ by A. L. -Pickens (1934) mingles legend and fact about Andrew Pickens. _Piedmont -Partisan_ by Chalmers G. Davidson (1951) is a balanced account of -William Lee Davidson. _James Jackson, Duelist and Militant Statesman_ by -William O. Foster (1960) is a competent study of the fiery Georgia -leader. _The Life of Major General Nathanael Greene_ by George -Washington Greene (1871) gives the reader a look at the battle from the -viewpoint of the American commander in the South. For the British side -of the story, one of the best accounts is Banastre Tarleton’s _A History -of the Campaign of 1780 and 1781 in the Southern Provinces of North -America_ (1787), available in a reprint edition. _The Green Dragoon_ by -Robert D. Bass (1957) gives a more objective view of Tarleton’s meteoric -career. Two other useful books are _Strictures on Lt. Col. Tarleton’s -History_ by Roderick Mackenzie (1788), an officer who fought at Cowpens -with the 71st Regiment, and _The History of the Origin, Progress and -Termination of the American War_ by Charles Stedman (1794), a British -officer who was extremely critical of Tarleton. Both are available in -reprint editions. _Cornwallis, the American Adventure_ by Franklin and -Mary Wickwire (1970) has an excellent account of Cowpens—and the whole -war in the South—from the viewpoint of Tarleton’s commander. _Rise and -Fight Again_ by Charles B. Flood (1976) ably discusses the influence of -Cowpens and other Southern battles on the ultimate decision at Yorktown. - - —_Thomas J. Fleming_ - - - - - Index - - - A - Anderson, Lt. Thomas, 44 - - - B - Backcountry, British strategy in, 19 - Blackstocks: battle of, 29, 54, 57, 61 - Brandon, Thomas, 42, 60 - Bratton, William, 42 - Briar Creek (Ga.); battle of, 51 - British Legion, 26, 28, 41, 47, 54, 70, 72 - Broad River, 28, 30, 31, 40, 46, 54, 82; - tactical importance of, 44 - Browne, Thomas, 20 - Buford, Col. Abraham, 26 - - - C - Camden (S.C.), 20, 22, 51; - battle of, 18 - Charleston (S.C.), 18, 26, 50; - map, 27 - Cheraw Hills, 39, 83 - Civil war in the South, 19ff, 84 - Clarke, Elijah, 20, _21_, 33ff, 61 - Collins, James, 57, 60, 66, 67, 84 - Cornwallis, Charles, Earl, _13_, 18, 20, 29, 30, 33, 40, 50, 61, - 82; - army under, 22 - Cowpens, nature of terrain, 55ff; - significance of battle, 84ff - Cruger, Col. John H., 29, 33, 34 - Cunningham, Maj. John, 35, 42, 61 - - - D - Davidson, Col. William, 38, 41, 42 - Duncasson, Capt., 77 - - - E - Easterwood Shoals, 43 - - - F - Fair Forest Creek, 35 - Fairforest Shoals, 60 - Fishdam Ford, battle of, 28 - Fishing Creek, battle of, 28, 60, 67 - - - G - Gates, Gen. Horatio, _13_, 18, 21, 56 - Glaubech, Baron de, 13 - Goudelock, the rebel, 81ff. - Great Savannah, battle of, 50 - Green River Road, 44, 45, 47, 61, 63, 76, 82 - Greene, Gen. Nathanael, _18_, 21, 23, 33, 39, 40, 83, 84 - Grindal Shoals, 12, 31, 35, 82 - - - H - Haldane, Lt. Henry, 30, 33 - Hamiltons Ford, 81, 82 - Hammonds Store, 30, 34 - Hanger, Maj. George, 54, 69 - Hanging Rock, 47 - Howard, Lt. Col. John Eager, _52_, 55, 70ff, 83 - Hughes, Joseph, 60, 68 - - - I - Inman, Joshua, 61 - Island Ford, 44, 45 - - - J - Jackson, Lt. Col. James, 35, 42, 61, 72, 76 - Jackson, Dr. Robert, 72, 80 - - - K - Kennedy, William, 60 - Kettle Creek, 32 - Kings Mountain, 42, 43, 61, 81 - - - L - Lee, Gen. Charles, 23 - Legion dragoons, 26, 28, 43, 69, 72 - Lenuds Ferry, 26, 76 - Leslie, Sir Alexander, _31_, 39 - Lincoln, Gen. Benjamin, 18, _26_ - Long Canes, 32, 33, 34 - Loyalists, 20, 21, 84 - - - M - Marion, Francis, _20_, 21, 28, 50, 84 - Maryland and Delaware Continentals, 18, 55, 70, 71, 76 - Mathews, John, 84 - McArthur, Maj. Archibald, 30, 51, 64, 69, 70, 76 - McCall, James, 34, 42, 56 - McDowell, Maj. Joseph, 42, 61 - McJunkin, Joseph, 12, 13, 19, 20, 23, 80, 82 - Militia, 13, 18, 35, 40, 43; - at Cowpens, 65ff, 72, 80 - Morgan, Gen. Daniel; 12, _14_, 22, 23, 30, 35, 38, 39, 41, 42ff; - youth and reputation, 13; - nickname, 22; - characterized, 15; - battle plan, 45, 55-7; - urges militia to join him, 44; - exhorts troops before battle, 62; - in battle, 65ff; - leads final retreat, 83; - voted gold medal, 83; - letter from Washington, 85 - Musgrove’s Mill, 42, 61 - - - N - Newmarsh, Maj. Timothy, 50, 64-6 - Ninety Six (S.C.), 22, 23, 29, 32, 38, 61, 85; - map, 30 - - - O - Ogilvie, Capt. David, 54, 63 - - - P - Pacolet River, 12, 34, 35, 38, 42, 43, 55 - Pickens, Col. Andrew, 13, _33_, 34, 35, 41, 60, 61; - characterized, 32; - his command at Cowpens, 56; - in battle, 65ff, 80ff; - receives silver sword, 83 - Pindell, Dr. Richard, 80 - Prince of Wales Regt., 47 - - - R - Riflemen at Cowpens, 57, 62 - Royal Artillery, 51, 71ff - - - S - Saratoga, Morgan’s tactics at, 55 - Seymour, Sgt. William, 67 - 7th Fusiliers, 31, 50, 65, 69 - 17th Light Dragoons, 31, 54, 72 - 71st Highlanders, 51, 64, 69 - 16th Light Infantry, 47 - Sumter, Col. Thomas, _19_, 20, 21, 28, 33, 35, 40, 57 - - - T - Tarleton, Col. Banastre, 13, _24_; - characterized, 25; - career, 23-29; - pursues Morgan, 30, 42, 46; - composition of army, 47ff; - battle plan, 54-55, 63ff; - in battle, 67, 71ff, 80; - escapes with Legion dragoons, 81; - reports to Cornwallis, 82 - Thicketty Creek, 35, 41, 43, 81 - Thicketty Mountain, 63 - Thompson’s Plantation, 35, 81 - Turkey Creek, 61, 81, 82 - - - W - Washington, George, 13, 21, 85 - Washington, Col. William, 13, 30, 34, 56, _63_, 67, 70, 80; - duels with Tarleton, 76, _78_-79; - voted silver medal, 83 - Waxhaws, 26, 28, 33 - Williamson, Gen. Andrew, 32 - Winn, Richard, 40, 45, 55 - Wofford’s iron works, 41, 43 - - - Y - Young, John, 57 - Young, Thomas, 57, 66, 68, 70, 71, 77, 80, 82 - - - - - Credits - - - 4-5, 8-9: William A. Bake - 10-11: “The Battle of Cowpens,” by Francis Kimmelmeyer, 1809. Yale - University. - 13: Portrait of Gates by Charles Willson Peale. Collection of - Independence National Historical Park. - Cornwallis by Thomas Gainsborough, National Portrait Gallery, - London. - 14: Daniel Morgan by CWPeale. Independence NHP. - 18: Nathanael Greene by CWPeale. Independence NHP. - 19: Thomas Sumter by Rembrandt Peale. Independence NHP. - 20: Francis Marion, a detail from a painting by John B. White. Anne - S.K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library. - 21: Elijah Clarke, Georgia Department of Archives and History. - 23: New-York Historical Society. - 24: Banastre Tarleton by Sir Joshua Reynolds. National Portrait - Gallery, London. - 25: Mary Robinson, an engraving after a painting by Reynolds. - Collection of Sir John Tilney. Tarleton birthplace. Liverpool - City Libraries. - 26: Benjamin Lincoln by CW Peale. Independence NHP. - 27: Library of Congress - 28: Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library. - 29: Library of Congress - 30: Map from Francis V. Greene, _General Greene_ (1893). - 31: Alexander Leslie by Gainsborough. Scottish National Portrait - Gallery, Edinburgh. - 33: National Portrait Gallery, Smithsonian Institution. - 36-37 (except pistols), 47 (fife), 56-57: The George C. Neumann - Collection, a gift of the Sun Company to Valley Forge National - Historical Park, 1978. - Dragoon pistol: The Smithsonian Institution. - Officer’s pistol: Fort Pitt Museum. - 48-49: all by Don Troiani except the 17th Light Dragoon, which is by - Gerry Embleton. - 52-53: Maryland Historical Society - 54: Musée du L’Empéri, Bouche du Rhône, France. - 58-59: Don Troiani. - 63: CW Peale. Independence NHP. - 64-65: Don Troiani. - 69: Don Troiani. - 74-75: Artist, Richard Schlecht. Courtesy, National Geographic - Society. - 83: Maryland Historical Society - 86-87, 89, 93 (Ninety Six), William A. Bake. - - - - - National Park Service - U.S. Department of the Interior - - -As the Nation’s principal conservation agency, the Department of the -Interior has responsibility for most of our nationally owned public -lands and natural resources. This responsibility includes fostering the -wisest use of our land and water resources, protecting our fish and -wildlife, preserving the environmental and cultural values of our -national parks and historical places, and providing for the enjoyment of -life through outdoor recreation. The Department assesses our energy and -mineral resources and works to assure that their development is in the -interest of all our people. The Department also has a major -responsibility for American Indian reservation communities and for -people who live in island territories under U.S. administration. - - - - - Transcriber’s Notes - - -—Retained publication information from the printed edition: this eBook - is public-domain in the country of publication. - -—Relocated all image captions to be immediately under the corresponding - images, removing redundant references like ”preceding page”. - -—Silently corrected a few palpable typos. - -—In the text versions only, text in italics is delimited by - _underscores_. - - - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Cowpens, by Thomas J. 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