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diff --git a/old/62291-0.txt b/old/62291-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 2c437ba..0000000 --- a/old/62291-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,26940 +0,0 @@ -Project Gutenberg's A History of the Peninsula War Vol. 5., by Charles Oman - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org/license - - -Title: A History of the Peninsula War Vol. 5. - Oct. 1811-Aug. 31, 1812 Valencia, Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, - Salamanca, Madrid - -Author: Charles Oman - -Release Date: May 31, 2020 [EBook #62291] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A HISTORY OF THE PENINSULA *** - - - - -Produced by Brian Coe, Ramon Pajares Box and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This -book was created from images of public domain material -made available by the University of Toronto Libraries at -http://link.library.utoronto.ca/booksonline/). - - - - - - -TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE - - * Italics are denoted by underscores as in _italics_, and small caps - are represented in upper case as in SMALL CAPS. - - * Obvious printer errors have been silently corrected. - - * Original spelling was kept, but variant spellings were made - consistent when a predominant usage was found. - - * To aid referencing places and names in present-day maps and - documents, outdated and current spellings of some proper names - follow: - - Aguilar del Campo, now Aguilar de Campoo, - Albalete, now Albalat, - Albaracin, now Albarracín, - Albuquerque, now Alburquerque, - Alemtejo, now Alentejo, - Almanza, now Almansa, - Arroyo dos Molinos, now Arroyomolinos, Cáceres, - Arzobispo, now El Puente del Arzobispo, - Baccelar (Manuel), now Manuel Pinto de Morais Bacelar, - Ballasteros, now Ballesteros, - Barba del Puerco, now Puerto Seguro, - Bussaco, now Buçaco, - Caçeres, now Cáceres, - Calvarisa de Abaxo, now Calvarrasa de Abajo, - Calvarisa de Ariba, now Calvarrasa de Arriba, - Canizal, now Cañizal, - Cordova, now Córdoba, - Corunna, now La Coruña, - Douro, now Duero (in Spain), - Douro (in Portugal), - Ernani, now Hernani, - Estremadura, now Extremadura (in Spain), - Estremadura (in Portugal), - Estremos, now Estremoz, - Fascinas, now Facinas, - Gibalfaro, now Gibralfaro, - Guadalaviar (river), now Turia (río), - Guarena, now Guareña, - Junialcon, now Gimialcón, - La Baneza, now La Bañeza - La Bispal, now La Bisbal, - Las Rosas, now Las Rozas, - Majalahonda, now Majadahonda, - Majorca, now Mallorca, - Montanches, now Montánchez, - Mozencillo, now Mozoncillo, - Niza, now Nisa, - Pampeluna, now Pamplona, - Peniscola, now Peñíscola, - Puzzol, now Puçol, - Requeña, now Requena, - Ruvielos, now Rubielos de Mora, - Saguntum, now Sagunto, - Sanguessa, now Sangüesa, - Saragossa, now Zaragoza, - Senabria, now Sanabria, - Tagus (river), now Tajo (Spanish), Tejo (Portuguese), - Talarubia, now Talarrubias, - Truxillo, now Trujillo, - Vincente, now Vicente, - Villa Real, now Vila Real, - Villafanes, now Villafamés, - Vittoria, now Vitoria, - Xeres, now Jerez, - Xiloca, now Jiloca, - Zamorra, now Zamarra. - - * Chapter headers and Table of contents have been made consistent. - - * Footnotes have been renumbered into a single series. Each footnote - is placed at the end of the paragraph or the table that includes its - anchor. - - - - -[Illustration: _Marshal Soult, Duke of Dalmatia_ - -_from the portrait by Girardet_] - - - - - A HISTORY OF THE - PENINSULAR WAR - - BY - CHARLES OMAN - - M.A. OXON., HON. LL.D. EDIN. - - FELLOW OF THE BRITISH ACADEMY - CHICHELE PROFESSOR OF MODERN HISTORY - FELLOW OF ALL SOULS COLLEGE - CORRESPONDING MEMBER OF THE REAL ACADEMIA - DE LA HISTORIA OF MADRID, OF THE ACADEMY OF LISBON - AND OF THE ACADEMY OF SAN LUIS OF SARAGOSSA - - VOL. V - - OCT. 1811-AUG. 31, 1812 - - VALENCIA CIUDAD RODRIGO BADAJOZ - SALAMANCA MADRID - - WITH MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS - - OXFORD - AT THE CLARENDON PRESS - 1914 - - - - - OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS - - LONDON EDINBURGH GLASGOW NEW YORK - TORONTO MELBOURNE BOMBAY - - HUMPHREY MILFORD M.A. - - PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY - - - - -PREFACE - - -In this volume Wellington’s campaigning in 1812 is followed no further -than the day (August 31st) on which he set out from Madrid to drive -back Clausel from the Douro. Reasons of space make it impossible to -include the siege of Burgos and the retreat which followed. I had -written the narrative of them, but found it impossible to add six long -chapters to the 620 pages already in print. The fact is that, from -the point of view of Wellington’s army, the year 1812 was much more -tightly packed with military events than any which had gone before. In -1809 there was nothing important to chronicle after August: in 1810 -the Anglo-Portuguese did not come into the forefront of the war till -July, when Masséna had crossed the frontier and laid siege to Almeida. -In 1811 the year opened with a deadlock, which was only ended by the -commencement of Masséna’s retreat on March 9th, and concluded with -a similar deadlock which endured from July to December--interrupted -only by the short campaign of El Bodon and Aldea da Ponte, and this -covered only a week [Sept. 22-9]. In 1812 the great strategical -operations began on the first day of the year with the concentration -for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, and did not end till the last week of -November--which saw Wellington once more encamped under the walls of -that fortress. For eleven months on end he had been on the move, with -only a brief rest in cantonments between April 24th, the day when he -gave up his pursuit of Marmont in Northern Portugal, and the end of -May, when his divisions began to assemble again for the projected march -on Salamanca. But for this short break his operations were continuous, -and the narrative of them must of necessity be lengthy. - -The campaign of 1812 cannot be called the greatest exhibition of -military genius in Wellington’s career: that distinction must be given -to the campaign of 1813. But it included the battle of Salamanca, the -most skilfully fought and the most decisive of all his victories, -‘the beating of forty thousand men in forty minutes.’ And its earlier -episodes, the two sudden strokes which ended in the storming of Ciudad -Rodrigo and of Badajoz, deserve the closest attention, as showing a -marvellous power of utilizing opportunities, and solving time-problems -of the most complicated sort. We shall see how Wellington, in face -of an enemy whose whole force was far superior to his own, so -conducted his operations that he had success in his hands before the -French armies could concentrate to overwhelm him. He would have been -victorious in 1812 even without the assistance that was given him -during the early months of the year by Napoleon’s misguided orders from -Paris, and in the summer by Soult’s repeated and deliberate refusal to -co-operate with King Joseph and Marmont for the general welfare of the -French cause in Spain. The limits of his success were largely extended -by those adventitious circumstances, but even without them he must -have achieved great things by force of the combinations which he had -prepared. - -The reader will find that I have devoted a good deal of space to the -precise working out of the effect of Napoleon’s successive dispatches -to Marmont, with reference to the time at which each was received, and -the influence which it had on the Marshal’s movements. I am bound to -say that careful study has convinced me that Marmont’s justification -of his own actions from January to May, written in the fourth volume -of his _Mémoires_, is in the main fair and sensible, and that his -criticism of his master’s orders is as sound as it is lucid. Napier -held the reverse opinion, but his arguments in support of it are -unconvincing: he is set on proving his idol infallible at all costs, in -this as in so many other cases. - -I find myself equally at variance with Napier’s estimate of the -relative share of responsibility that falls on Soult upon the one -side and King Joseph and Jourdan on the other, for the disasters -of the summer of 1812. Jourdan’s plan of campaign, set out in -his ‘May _Mémoire_’ [see pp. 303-11], is a most clear-headed and -practicable scheme; the adoption of it would have reduced the effect -of Wellington’s strategy, and have set a limit to his successes. -Soult wrecked the whole scheme by wilful disobedience, which sinned -as much against military discipline as against common sense. The -counter-projects which he kept sending to Jourdan and the King were -founded on his own personal desires, not on a consideration of the -general situation in the Peninsula. Soult had been kind and courteous -to Napier while the historian was working at the French archives, and -had placed his own private papers at his disposition. I think that the -obligation was repaid by the mildness of the censures passed on the -Marshal’s strange behaviour in the summer of 1812. - -A smaller proportion of the pages of this volume than of its -predecessors is occupied by the tale of those campaigns in the -Peninsula in which the British took no part. The year 1812 commences -with the surrender of Blake and the occupation of Valencia by the -French. When that great city and the army that had been driven into -it succumbed before Suchet’s attack, there was no longer any large -Spanish force in the field, and the operations of Lacy, Ballasteros, -and the Galicians are of only secondary importance and require no -great attention. Indeed the most effective service done against the -French in 1812 was that of the guerrilleros of Aragon, Cantabria, and -Navarre, whose obstinate resistance immobilized such a large portion of -the 230,000 imperial troops that lay in Spain. It will be noted that I -have had to devote a considerable number of pages to a much-neglected -episode of the summer of 1812--the campaigns against Caffarelli of the -irregular bands of the North, assisted by the fleet of Sir Home Popham. -It cannot be too often repeated that by immobilizing the 35,000 men of -the French Army of the North, they co-operated in the most effective -way with Wellington, and had their share in making the Salamanca -campaign a success for the allies. - -I trust that I may have succeeded in making the topographical details -clear at Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, and more especially Salamanca, all of -which I have visited. I spent many hours going over the ground at the -Arapiles, and found that no mere map could have enabled one to grasp -the situation in a satisfactory fashion. - -I have once more to express my indebtedness to the owners of two -great files of Peninsular War documents, who were good enough to -place them at my disposition and to allow me to bring them to Oxford. -The D’Urban papers, lent to me by Mr. W. S. M. D’Urban, of Newport -House, near Exeter, the grandson of Sir Benjamin D’Urban, Beresford’s -Chief-of-the-Staff, continue to be of immense value all through 1812. -In the first half of the year Sir Benjamin was still at the Portuguese -head-quarters, and his diary and correspondence give the views of those -who had the best opportunity of knowing Wellington’s plans from the -inside. In June he was appointed to another post, that of commanding -the detached Portuguese cavalry brigade which covered Wellington’s left -flank in the Salamanca campaign; his notes as to his operations are -of extreme interest throughout June, July, and August; the narratives -which he drew up concerning his own fortunes at the battle of -Salamanca, and at the unfortunate combat of Majalahonda, have cleared -up several obscure problems, which no published material could have -enabled me to solve. - -The papers of Sir George Scovell, lent me by his great-nephew, Mr. G. -Scovell, of Hove, had already begun to be of use to me in the chronicle -of 1811. But in 1812 they are of far greater importance, since it was -early in that year that Scovell was placed by Wellington in charge -of the toilsome duty of studying and decoding all French captured -dispatches written in cipher. The originals were left in his hands, -and only the interpretations, written out in full, were made over to -the Commander-in-Chief. These originals, often scraps of the smallest -dimensions made to be concealed in secret places about the person of -the bearer, are historical antiquities of the highest interest. Their -importance is so great that I have thought it necessary to give in -Appendix XV a detailed account of them, of the characteristics of the -‘Great Paris Cipher’--as Scovell called it--and of the contents of each -document. - -I must mention, as in previous volumes, much kind help given to me -from abroad. The authorities of the Paris War Office have continued to -facilitate my researches among their bulky _cartons_. I have to notice -with sincere regret the death of my old friend, M. Martinien, who did -so much for me while I was compiling volumes III and IV of this work. I -much missed his guidance while working over the material of 1812 during -the last two autumns. Colonel Juan Arzadun, of the Madrid Artillery -Museum, has continued to send me occasional information, and I am -specially obliged to Don Rafael Farias for procuring for me, and making -me a present of, that very rare document the 1822 ‘Estados de los -ejércitos españoles durante la guerra contra Bonaparte,’ a collection -of morning-states and tables of organization on which I had in vain -tried to lay hands during three successive visits to Madrid. Another -gift of the highest value was the complete set of Beresford’s _Ordens -do Dia_ for the Portuguese army, ranging over the whole war. This most -useful series was presented to me by my friend Mr. Rafael Reynolds, -the companion of my last Portuguese tour, who found a copy of this -almost unprocurable file at Lisbon. I owe the two views of the field -of Salamanca to the camera of Mr. C. J. Armstrong, who sent them to me -along with many other interesting Peninsular photographs. - -Three friends in England have continued to give me help of the most -invaluable kind. Mr. C. T. Atkinson, Fellow of Exeter College, -has looked through the whole of my proofs, and furnished me with -innumerable notes, which enabled me to add to the accuracy of my -narrative. He has also written me an appendix, No. XIV, concerning the -English troops which in 1812 operated on the East coast of Spain--and -the others which formed the garrisons of Gibraltar, Cadiz, and Tarifa. -The Hon. John Fortescue, the historian of the British army, has not -only answered at length my queries on many obscure problems, but has -lent me the file of his transcripts of French dispatches for 1812, a -good many of which, and those of high importance, were unknown to me. -They were especially valuable for Soult’s operations. Our narratives of -the campaigns of 1812 will appear almost simultaneously, and I think it -will be found that all our main opinions are in agreement. Major J. H. -Leslie, R.A., has once more contributed to this volume an ‘Artillery -Appendix’ on the same lines as those for 1810 and 1811 in vols. III and -IV. His researches have always proved exhaustive and invaluable for the -history of his old Corps. - -Lastly, the compiler of the Index, a task executed this summer under -very trying conditions, must receive, for the fifth time, my heartfelt -thanks for her labour of love. - -As in previous volumes, the critic may find some slight discrepancies -between the figures given with regard to strengths of regiments or -losses in action in the text and in the Appendices. This results from -the fact that many official documents contain incorrect arithmetic, -which was only discovered by the indefatigable proof-readers of the -Clarendon Press, who have tested all the figures, and found not -infrequent (if minute) errors. The text was printed off before the -Appendices were finally dealt with: where the numbers differ those -in the Appendices are, of course, to be preferred. But the worst -discrepancies do not get beyond units and tens. - - C. OMAN. - -OXFORD: - _July 27, 1914_. - -NOTE.--When every page of the text, appendices, and index of this -volume has been printed off, and the final proofs of the preface are -passing through my hands, comes the news that Great Britain is most -unexpectedly involved in a war to which there can be no parallel named -save the struggle that ended just a hundred years ago. May her strength -be used as effectively against military despotism in the twentieth as -it was in the nineteenth century. - - _Aug. 5, 1914._ - - - - -CONTENTS - - - SECTION XXX - - SUCHET’S CONQUEST OF VALENCIA, SEPTEMBER 1811-JANUARY 1812 - - CHAPTER PAGE - - I. The Invasion of Valencia. Siege of Saguntum. September-October - 1811 1 - - II. The Battle of Saguntum. October 25, 1811 26 - - III. The Capture of Valencia and of Blake’s Army. November - 1811-January 1812 47 - - IV. Suchet’s Conquest of Valencia: Side-issues and Consequences. - January-March 1812 76 - - - SECTION XXXI - - MINOR CAMPAIGNS OF THE WINTER OF 1811-12 - - I. Catalonia and Aragon 90 - - II. Operations of Soult in Andalusia: the Siege of Tarifa, - December 1811-January 1812 106 - - III. Politics at Cadiz and elsewhere 136 - - - SECTION XXXII - - WELLINGTON’S FIRST CAMPAIGN OF 1812. JANUARY-APRIL - - I. The Capture of Ciudad Rodrigo. January 8th-19th, - 1812 157 - - II. The Consequences of the Fall of Ciudad Rodrigo. - January-March 1812 187 - - III. The Siege of Badajoz. March-April 1812 217 - - IV. The Storm of Badajoz. April 6, 1812 244 - - V. Operations of Soult and Marmont during the Siege of - Badajoz. March-April 1812 265 - - - SECTION XXXIII - - THE SALAMANCA CAMPAIGN. MAY-AUGUST 1812 - - I. King Joseph as Commander-in-Chief 297 - - II. The Bridge of Almaraz. May 19, 1812 315 - - III. Wellington’s Advance into Leon. June 13-19, 1812 335 - - IV. The Salamanca Forts. Ten Days of Manœuvres, June 20-30, - 1812 359 - - V. Marmont takes the Offensive. July 1812 383 - - VI. The Battle of Salamanca, July 22, 1812. The Early Stages 418 - - VII. The Battle of Salamanca: the Main Engagement 446 - - VIII. The Consequences of Salamanca. Garcia Hernandez 475 - - IX. The Pursuit of King Joseph. Majalahonda. Wellington - at Madrid 504 - - X. Affairs in the South. June-August 1812. Soult, Hill, - and Ballasteros 519 - - XI. The Two Diversions: (1) Operations in the North: Sir - Home Popham and Caffarelli. (2) Operations in - the East: Suchet, Joseph O’Donnell, and Maitland. - June-August 1812 548 - - XII. Wellington Returns to the Douro. August 31, 1812. - Finis 576 - - - APPENDICES - - I. Suchet’s Army in Valencia. Morning-state of Oct. 1, - 1811 583 - - II. Strength of Blake’s Army at the Battle of Saguntum, - Oct. 25, 1811 584 - - III. Suchet’s Army at the Siege of Valencia. Morning-state - of Dec. 31, 1811 585 - - IV. Surrender-Roll of Blake’s Army at Valencia, Jan. 9, - 1812 586 - - V. French and Anglo-Spanish Troops employed at the Siege - of Tarifa, Dec. 1811-Jan. 1812 586 - - VI. Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo: (1) Strength of the Garrison; - (2) British Losses during the Siege 587 - - VII. Note on some Points of Controversy regarding the - Storm of Ciudad Rodrigo 589 - - VIII. The French ‘Army of the South.’ Return of March 1, - 1812 590 - - IX. Siege of Badajoz: (1) Strength of the Garrison; (2) - British Losses at the Storm 593 - - X. Wellington’s Army at Salamanca. Strength and Losses 595 - - XI. Marmont’s Army at Salamanca. Strength and Losses 600 - - XII. British Losses at the Combats of Castrejon and Castrillo, - July 18, 1812 607 - - XIII. Spanish Troops on the East Coast of Spain in the Spring of - 1812: (1) Morning-state of March 1; (2) Joseph - O’Donnell’s Strength and Losses at Castalla 608 - - XIV. British Forces on the East Coast of Spain in 1812. A note - by Mr. C. T. Atkinson 609 - - XV. The Scovell Ciphers 611 - - XVI. The British Artillery in the Peninsula, 1812. By Major - John Leslie, R.A. 619 - - INDEX 623 - - -MAPS AND PLANS - - I. GENERAL THEATER OF SUCHET’S OPERATIONS IN EASTERN - SPAIN _To face_ 8 - - II. PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF SAGUNTUM ” 42 - - III. PLAN OF SUCHET’S INVESTMENT OF VALENCIA ” 64 - - IV. GENERAL MAP OF CATALONIA ” 96 - - V. PLAN OF TARIFA ” 128 - - VI. PLAN OF THE SIEGE OPERATIONS AT CIUDAD RODRIGO ” 176 - - VII. PLAN OF THE SIEGE OPERATIONS AT BADAJOZ ” 256 - - VIII. MAP OF THE DISTRICT ROUND ALMARAZ ” 328 - - IX. GENERAL MAP OF CENTRAL SPAIN, TO ILLUSTRATE - THE SALAMANCA CAMPAIGN ” 352 - - X. PLAN OF THE SALAMANCA FORTS ” 376 - - XI. MAP OF THE COUNTRY BETWEEN SALAMANCA - AND TORDESILLAS ” 400 - - XII. GENERAL PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF SALAMANCA ” 448 - - XIII. (1) THE LAST EPISODE AT SALAMANCA; (2) GARCIA - HERNANDEZ ” 480 - - XIV. GENERAL MAP OF ESTREMADURA TO ILLUSTRATE HILL’S - CAMPAIGNS IN MARCH-APRIL AND JUNE-AUGUST 1812 ” 528 - - -ILLUSTRATIONS - - PORTRAIT OF MARSHAL SOULT _Frontispiece_ - - PORTRAIT OF MARSHAL SUCHET _To face_ 80 - - VIEW OF CIUDAD RODRIGO, ON THE MORNING AFTER THE STORM ” 186 - - PORTRAIT OF MARSHAL MARMONT ” 208 - - (1) VIEW OF THE FRENCH ARAPILE, AND (2) VIEW OF THE - GENERAL LIE OF THE GROUND AT SALAMANCA ” 422 - - - - -SECTION XXX - -SUCHET’S CONQUEST OF VALENCIA. SEPTEMBER 1811-JANUARY 1812 - - -CHAPTER I - -THE INVASION OF VALENCIA. SIEGE OF SAGUNTUM. SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1811 - - -In the last volume of this work the chronicle of all the campaigns of -1811 was completed, save in one corner of Spain, where, on the eastern -coast, the fortunes of the French armies have only been pursued down -to the recall of Marshal Macdonald to Paris on October 28th. Already, -before the Duke of Tarentum had been added to the list of the generals -who had been withdrawn and superseded for failure in Catalonia, another -series of operations had been begun in the East, which was destined -to lead directly to one more Spanish disaster, but indirectly to the -ruin of the French cause in Spain. For, as has already been pointed out -in the last pages of the last volume[1], it was to be the diversion -by Napoleon’s orders of French divisions eastward, from the borders -of Portugal to those of Valencia, that was to give Wellington his -long-desired opportunity of opening a successful offensive campaign -against his immediate opponents in the West. The fall of Valencia was -to lead to the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo in January 1812. - - [1] vol. iv. pp. 587-91. - -It will be remembered that the Emperor’s ambitious schemes for the -conquest of the kingdom of Valencia, the last district of eastern -Spain where he had as yet secured no solid foothold, had been deferred -perforce till Figueras fell, on August 19, 1811. As long as that great -fortress, which lies only a few miles from the French frontier, and -blocks the main road from Perpignan to Barcelona, had been maintained -against Macdonald by the resolute Martinez, it was impossible to -take up a new offensive campaign: all the disposable French troops in -Catalonia were immobilized around the stubborn garrison. At length the -remnant of the starving miqueletes had laid down their arms, and the -troops which had been for so long blockading them became disposable for -the assistance of Suchet, whose ‘Army of Aragon’ was to deliver the -main blow against Valencia. - -Six days after the surrender of Figueras the news that the obstacle -to advance had been at last removed reached Paris, on August 25, and -on the same evening Berthier wrote, by his master’s orders, to bid -Suchet move forward: ‘Everything leads us to believe that Valencia is -in a state of panic, and that, when Murviedro has been taken and a -battle in the open field has been won, that city will surrender. If -you judge otherwise, and think that you must wait to bring up your -siege artillery for the attack on the place, or that you must wait -for a better season [i. e. early autumn] to commence the operation, I -must inform you that, in every case, it is the imperative order of the -Emperor that your head-quarters are to be on Valencian territory on or -about September 15th, and as far forward towards the city as possible.’ - -The orders were feasible, and (as we shall see) were duly executed: -but Napoleon had committed his usual mistake of undervaluing the -tenacity of the Spanish enemy, whom he so deeply despised. Suchet set -his troops in motion on September 15th; he took Murviedro--but only -after a desperate siege of two months--he beat the army of Valencia in -a very decisive pitched battle, but the city by no means fulfilled the -Emperor’s prophecy by a prompt surrender. Fighting round its walls went -on for five weeks after Murviedro fell: and it was not till troops had -been brought to aid Suchet from very remote provinces, that he at last -compelled the capitulation of Valencia after the New Year of 1812 had -passed. Before the city yielded Wellington was on the move, far away -on the Portuguese frontier, and it was not many days after Suchet’s -aide-de-camp brought the glorious news of the capitulation of Valencia, -that Marmont’s aide-de-camp followed, with the wholly unexpected and -unwelcome tidings that the British had stormed Ciudad Rodrigo, and -that the hold of the French army on Leon and Castile had been shaken. -The one piece of information was the complement and consequence of the -other. - -Suchet’s invasion of Valencia, in short, was a much harder and more -venturesome enterprise than his master had calculated. It was true that -the Spanish forces in front of him seemed in September wholly incapable -of holding him back. The Army of Catalonia had been reduced by a series -of disasters, culminating in the falls of Tarragona and Figueras, to a -mere remnant of 8,000 men, lurking in the high hills of the interior. -The Army of Valencia had made a miserable exhibition of itself during -the last year: it had brought no effective help to the Catalans, and -whenever any of its detachments came into contact with the French, they -had invariably suffered discreditable defeats, even when their numbers -were far greater than those of the invaders. Of all the armies of Spain -this was undoubtedly the one with the worst fighting reputation. It -was to small profit that the Captain-General was raising yet newer -and rawer battalions than those which already existed, to swell the -numbers, but not the efficiency, of his command. In July the nominal -total of the Valencian army, including the irregulars of the ‘flying -column’ of the Empecinado, had been just 30,000 men. By October there -were 36,000 under arms, including the new ‘Reserve Division[2],’ whose -six battalions of recruits had only 135 officers to 6,000 men--an -allowance of one officer to 45 men, not much more than half of the -proportion that is necessary even among good veteran troops. But in -truth the only valuable fighting force that was present in the kingdom -in September was the infantry of the two weak divisions of the old -Albuera army, under Zayas and Lardizabal, whom Blake had brought round -from Cadiz with him, when he assumed command of the Eastern provinces. -They did not between them muster more than 6,000 bayonets, but were -good old troops, who were to distinguish themselves in the oncoming -campaign. - - [2] ‘The Reserve Division’ consisted of a 3rd battalion from some - of the old regiments of the Valencian army, viz. 1st of Savoya, - Avila, Don Carlos, Volunteers of Castile, Cazadores de Valencia, - Orihuela. They were each about 1,000 strong, but averaged only 22 - officers per battalion. - -In addition, it was possible that Valencia might be able to draw a -few thousand men to her aid from the depleted army of Murcia, which -had suffered so severely at Soult’s hands during the short campaign of -the previous August[3]. But such assistance was purely problematical; -if Soult should stir again from the side of Andalusia, it would be -impossible for General Mahy to bring a single Murcian battalion to the -succour of Blake. If, by good fortune, he should not, only a fraction -of Mahy’s small army would be free, since the greater part of it would -be required to watch the Andalusian frontier, and to protect the great -naval arsenal and fortress of Cartagena. - - [3] See vol. iv. pp. 475-83. - -If the regular troops only in eastern Spain had to be counted, it -was certain that Suchet could dispose of numbers superior to his -adversaries. The gross total of the French Army of Catalonia, where -General Decaen had now taken Macdonald’s place, was 30,000 men. That -of Suchet’s own ‘Army of Aragon’ was nearly 50,000, if garrisons, -sick, and drafts on the march are reckoned in it. With these deducted, -it could still supply about 31,000 men of all arms for the field. -But these were not the only resources available. On the upper Ebro, -in Navarre and western Aragon, were the two newly arrived divisions -of Reille and Severoli, which had entered Spain during the summer, -and had hitherto had no occupation save a little hunting of Mina’s -guerrilleros. These two divisions counted 15,000 fresh troops of good -quality, and Suchet reckoned on their assistance to cover his rear, -when he should begin his march on Valencia. Technically they belonged -to Dorsenne’s ‘Army of the North,’ but Severoli’s Italians had been -promised as a reinforcement for Aragon already, and when Suchet asked -for the grant of Reille’s division also it was not denied him. There -were 70,000 men in all to be taken into consideration when the attack -on Valencia was planned out. - -No such force, of course, could be set aside for the actual invasion. -The reason why not half so many thousands could be utilized for the -projected stroke was that the Spanish War, as we have already had -to point out on many occasions, was not a normal struggle between -regular armies. The French had not only to conquer but to occupy every -province that they overrun. Wherever an adequate garrison was not left, -the guerrilleros and miqueletes inundated the country-side, cut all -communications, and blockaded such small detachments as had been left -far apart from the main army. Suchet’s 70,000 men had to hold down -Aragon and Catalonia, at the same time that they undertook the further -extension of their master’s power on the Valencian side. - -Decaen in Catalonia had 23,000 men fit for service, not including -sick and drafts on the march. Lacy’s little army was not more than -8,000 strong in September: yet Suchet dared not take away a man from -Catalonia. The large garrison of Barcelona, a whole division, and the -smaller garrisons of Gerona, Rosas, and Mont Louis absorbed nearly half -the effective total. The remainder were, as it turned out, not strong -enough to keep the Catalans in check, much less to prosecute active -offensive operations against them. It was in October, after Suchet had -started against Valencia, that Lacy carried out the series of small -successful raids against Igualada, Cervera, and Montserrat, which have -been spoken of in an earlier chapter[4]. We need not wonder, then, that -not a Frenchman was drawn from Catalonia: they were all wanted on the -spot to keep a tight hold on the turbulent principality. The example -of the surprise of Figueras in the last spring was sufficient to prove -the necessity of keeping every point strongly garrisoned, on pain of -possible disaster. - - [4] See vol. iv. pp. 540-1. - -As to the Army of Aragon, it was far stronger than the Army of -Catalonia, but on the other hand it had even more fortresses to -garrison. Saragossa, Tortosa, Tarragona, Lerida, were large places, -each absorbing several battalions. In addition there were the smaller -strongholds of Jaca, Mequinenza, Monzon, Morella, requiring care. All -these were regular fortresses, but they did not exhaust the list of -points that must be firmly held, if the communications of Suchet’s -field-force with its distant base were to be kept free and unhampered. -Southern Aragon and the mountain-ganglion where the borders of that -kingdom and of Valencia and New Castile meet, in the roughest country -of the whole Spanish peninsula, had to be guarded. For in this -region lay the chosen hunting-ground of the guerrillero bands of the -Empecinado, Duran, and many other lesser chiefs: and Mina himself, -from his usual haunts in Navarre, not unfrequently led a raid far to -the south of the Ebro. Suchet had therefore to place garrisons in -Teruel, Daroca, Alcañiz, Calatayud, and Molina, none of which possessed -modern fortifications. The detachments left to hold them had to utilize -a large convent, a mediaeval castle, or some such post of defence, in -case they were attacked by the roving hordes of the enemy. Able to -protect themselves with ease against small parties, and to keep the -roads open under ordinary circumstances, they were exposed to serious -danger if the guerrilleros should mass themselves in force against any -one garrison--more especially if the bands should have been lent a few -cannon and gunners from the regular Spanish armies. For convents or old -castles could not resist artillery fire. - -To cover his rear Suchet was forced to set aside one whole division, -that of Frère, thirteen battalions strong[5], and mustering over 7,000 -men, and immense detachments of the three other French divisions of -the Army of Aragon. The units told off for the field army left no less -than 6,800 able-bodied men (besides sick and convalescents) behind -them, while they took 22,000 to the front. Frère’s division remained -on the side of Western Catalonia, holding Lerida and Tortosa in force, -and the intermediate places with small posts. The detachments from -Musnier’s, Harispe’s, and Habert’s French, and from Palombini’s Italian -divisions, took charge of Southern Aragon, leaving a company here and a -battalion there. But the Marshal selected with great care the men who -were to march on the Valencian expedition: each regiment drafted its -most effective soldiers into the marching units, and left the recruits -and the old or sickly men in the garrisons. Thus the battalions used -in the oncoming campaign were rather weak, averaging not much over -450 men, but were composed entirely of selected veterans. The only -doubtful element taken forward was the so-called ‘Neapolitan Division’ -of General Compère, which was only 1,500 strong--in reality a weak -brigade--and had no great reputation. But what was left of this corps -was its best part--the numerous men who wanted to desert had already -done so, and its weaklings were dead by this time. Of his cavalry -Suchet took forward almost the whole, leaving behind only two squadrons -of the 4th Hussars for the service between the garrisons, and of the -other regiments only the weakly men and horses[6]. Practically all his -horse and field artillery also went forward with him. - - [5] Composed at this time of the 14th and 42nd and 115th Line, - and the 1st Léger, the first two and last each three battalions - strong, the other (115th) with four. - - [6] The 24th Dragoons left about 140 men behind, the 13th - Cuirassiers 50 only, the Italian ‘Dragoons of Napoleon’ 124, but - the 4th Hussars about 500, much more than half their force. - -Of his own Army of Aragon, Suchet, as we have thus seen, left nearly -14,000 men ‘present under arms’ to cover his rear. But this was not -enough to make matters wholly secure, so untameable were the Aragonese -and Catalans with whom he had to deal. Indeed, if this force only had -been left to discharge the appointed task, it is clear, from subsequent -happenings, that he would have suffered a disaster during his absence -in Valencia. He asked from the Emperor the loan of half Reille’s -division from Navarre, as well as the prompt sending to the front of -Severoli’s Italians, who had been promised him as a reinforcement when -first they entered Spain. The petition was granted, and these troops -entered northern Aragon, and took charge of the places along the Ebro, -while the expeditionary army was on its way to Valencia. Most of them -were ultimately brought forward to the siege of the great city, and -without them neither could Aragon have been maintained nor Valencia -captured. Practically we may say that Suchet, at his original start, -took 26,000 men to beat the Valencians and capture their city, but -that he left nearly 30,000 more behind him, to hold down the provinces -already conquered and to deal with the guerrilleros. - -Two main roads lead from the north to Valencia: the one, coming from -Tortosa and Catalonia, hugs the coast of the Mediterranean, from which -it is never more than a few miles distant. The other, far inland, and -starting from Saragossa, follows the valley of the Xiloca among the -hills of Southern Aragon, crosses the watershed beyond Teruel, and -descends to the sea near Murviedro, where it joins the coast-road only -a few miles north of Valencia. There is a third, and much inferior, -route between these two, which starts from Mequinenza on the Lower -Ebro, crosses the mountainous Valencian frontier near Morella, and -comes down to the coast at Castellon de la Plana, twenty miles north of -Murviedro. Of these roads the first was as good as any in Spain, and -was suitable for all manner of traffic: but it had the disadvantage -of being flanked at a distance of only two miles by the small but -impregnable fortress of Peniscola, which lies on a rocky headland -thirty miles beyond Tortosa, and of being absolutely blocked by the -little town of Oropesa, twenty miles further south. Oropesa was no more -than a ruinous mediaeval place, with two castles hastily repaired, -without any modern works: but since the road passed through it, no -heavy guns or wagons starting from Tortosa could get further south till -its forts had been captured. - -The second road, that from Aragon by Teruel and Murviedro, is marked -on contemporary maps as a post-route fit for all vehicles: but it -passed through a very mountainous country, and was much inferior as a -line of advance to the coast-road. It was not blocked by any fortress -in the hands of the Spaniards, but between Teruel and Segorbe it was -crossed by many ridges and ravines highly suitable for defence. The -third track, that by Morella, was unsuitable for wheeled traffic, and -could only be used by infantry and cavalry. Its one advantage was that -Morella, its central point, had been already for some time in French -hands, and contained a garrison and stores, which made it a good -starting-point for a marching column. - -[Illustration: SUCHET’S CAMPAIGNS 1811-12 IN VALENCIA] - -Suchet determined to use all three of these roads, though such a plan -would have been most hazardous against a wary and vigorous enemy: for -though they all converge in the end on the same point, Murviedro, -they are separated from each other by long stretches of mountain, -and have no cross-communications. In especial, the road by Teruel -was very distant from the other two, and any isolated column taking -it might find itself opposed by immensely superior forces, during -the last days of its march; since Valencia, the enemy’s base and -headquarters, where he would naturally concentrate, lies quite close to -the concluding stages of the route Teruel-Murviedro. It must have been -in sheer contempt for his opponent--a contempt which turned out to be -justified--that the Marshal sent a detachment of eleven battalions by -this road, for such a force of 5,000 men might have been beset by -the whole Valencian army, 30,000 strong, and the other columns could -not have helped it. - -Suchet’s arrangements were governed by a single fact--his siege -artillery and heavy stores were parked at Tortosa, and from thence, -therefore, along the coast road, must be his main line of advance, -though it would be necessary to mask Peniscola and to capture Oropesa, -before he could get forward to his objective--the city of Valencia. -It might have seemed rational to move the whole field army by this -route: but some of the troops destined for it were coming from distant -points, and to march them down the Ebro bank to Tortosa would have -taken much time. Moreover if the whole force concentrated there, it -would all have to be fed from the magazines at Tortosa, and those lying -in Aragon would be of no use. The Marshal started himself from this -point, on September 15, with the division of Habert, and an infantry -reserve formed of Robert’s brigade of the division of Musnier, together -with the whole of the cavalry and field artillery of the army. The -siege-train guarded by the other brigade of Musnier’s division--that -of Ficatier--followed: but Musnier himself did not accompany the -expedition, having been left in general charge of the detachments -placed in garrison on the Ebro and in Upper Aragon. The whole column -made up about 11,000 combatants. - -The second column, consisting of the two auxiliary -divisions--Palombini’s eleven Italian battalions and Compère’s 1,500 -Neapolitans--took (without any artillery to hamper them) the mountain -road by Alcañiz and Morella: they were slightly over 7,000 strong, and, -if all went well, were destined to unite with the main body somewhere -near Oropesa or Castellon de la Plana. It was not likely that this -column would meet with much opposition. - -But the third detachment, Harispe’s 5,000 men from Upper Aragon, who -were to take the inland and western road by Teruel, were essaying a -very dangerous task, if the enemy should prove active and enterprising, -more especially as they had no artillery and hardly any cavalry with -them. Blake might have taken the offensive with 20,000 men against -them, while still leaving something to contain--or at least to -observe--Suchet’s main column. - -The Spanish Commander-in-Chief, however, did nothing of the sort, -and met the invasion with a tame and spiritless defensive on all its -points. When Suchet’s advance was reported, Blake had his forces in a -very scattered situation. Of the 36,000 men of whom he could nominally -dispose, the Empecinado’s ‘flying column’ was as usual detached in -the mountains of Molina and Guadalajara, harassing small French -garrisons. Zayas’s division had been left far to the south at Villena, -near Alicante, to work off the contagion of yellow fever which it had -contracted while passing by Cartagena. For in that port the disease was -raging terribly at the time. Obispo’s division was in the high hills on -the borders of Aragon. In the neighbourhood of Valencia were only the -troops of Lardizabal and Miranda, with the main body of the cavalry. -The Army of Murcia, which was destined to send succour if it should not -find itself beset by Soult on the other side, was lying cantoned at -various points in that province. As the French were at this time making -no demonstration from the side of Granada, it now became clear that it -would be able to send certain succours to Blake. But they were not yet -designated for marching, much less assembled, and it was clear that -they would come up very late. - -This dispersion of the available troops did not, in the end, make much -difference to the fate of the campaign, for Blake had from the first -made up his mind to accept the defensive, to draw in his outlying -detachments, and to stand at bay in the neighbourhood of Valencia, -without attempting to make any serious resistance on the frontier. -Since his arrival he had been urging on the construction of a line of -earthworks, forming fortified camps, around the provincial capital. -The ancient walls of Valencia itself were incapable of any serious -resistance to modern artillery, but outside them, all along the banks -of the Guadalaviar river, for some miles inland to the West, and as -far as the sea on the East, batteries, _têtes-de-pont_, trenches, and -even closed works of considerable size had been constructed. It was -by holding them in force and with great numbers that Blake intended -to check the invasion. In front of his chosen position, at a distance -of twenty miles, there was a great advanced work--a newly restored -fortress of crucial importance--the fastness of Saguntum, or ‘San -Fernando de Sagunto’ as it had just been re-christened. This was the -acropolis of one of the most ancient towns of Spain, the Saguntum which -had detained Hannibal so long before its walls at the opening of the -Third Punic War. In the age of the Iberians, the Carthaginians, and -the Romans, and even down to the days of the Ommeyad califs, there had -been a large and flourishing city on this site. But in the later middle -ages Saguntum had declined in prosperity and population, and the modern -town--which had changed its name to Murviedro (_muri veteres_) had -shrunk down to the foot of the hill. It was now a small open place of -6,000 souls, quite indefensible. But above it towered the steep line of -rock which had formed the citadel in ancient days: its narrow summit -was crowned with many ruins of various ages--from cyclopean foundations -of walls, going back to the time of the ancient Iberians, to Moorish -watch-towers and palaces. The empty space of steep slope, from the -acropolis down to the modern town, was also sprinkled with decaying -walls and substructures of all sorts, among which were cisterns and -broken roadways, besides the remains of a large Roman theatre, partly -hewn out of the live rock. - -There had been no fortifications by Murviedro when Suchet last -passed near Valencia, in his abortive raid of March 1810[7]. On that -occasion he had scaled the citadel to enjoy the view and to take a -casual survey of the picturesque ruins upon it[8]. But since then a -great change had taken place. On the advice, as it is said, of the -English general, Charles Doyle[9], Blake had determined to restore the -citadel as a place of strength. This was when he last held command -in Valencia, and before he joined the Cadiz Regency. But his idea -had been carried out after his departure by the Valencian Junta and -the successive Captains-General who had come after him. By means of -more than a year’s work the citadel had been made a tenable fortress, -though one of an irregular and unscientific sort. The old Iberian and -Moorish walls had been repaired and run together in a new _enceinte_, -with material taken from the other ruins all around. In especial the -Roman theatre, hitherto one of the most perfect in Southern Europe, -had been completely gutted, and its big blocks had proved most -useful for building the foundations of weak points of the circuit of -fortification. This was strong at some points, from the toughness and -height of the old ramparts, but very sketchy at others. Where the slope -was absolutely precipitous, a rough wall of dry stone without mortar -alone had been carried along the edge of the cliff. The narrow summit -of the rock formed a most irregular enclosure, varying much in height -from one point to another. It was divided into four separate sections -cut off from each other by cross-walls. The westernmost and lowest, -facing the only point from which there is a comparatively gentle ascent -to the summit, was crowned by a new battery called by the name of _Dos -de Mayo_, to commemorate the Madrid Insurrection of 1808. Rising high -in the centre of this work was an ancient bastion named the Tower of -San Pedro. Much higher, on the extreme peak of the summit, was the -citadel tower, called San Fernando, where the governor’s flag flew, and -from whence the whole fortress could be best surveyed. From this point -the rock descended rapidly, and its long irregular eastern crest was -surrounded by weakly-repaired walls, ending in two batteries called -by the names of Menacho, the gallant governor of Badajoz[10], and -Doyle, the English general who had suggested the fortification of the -place. But the greater part of this eastern end of the works lay above -slopes so precipitous that it seemed unlikely that they would ever be -attacked. The western end, by the Dos Mayo battery, was the obvious -point of assault by an enemy who intended to use regular methods. - - [7] See vol. iii. pp. 284-6. - - [8] Suchet’s _Mémoires_, ii. p. 156. - - [9] See Arteche, xi. p. 123. - - [10] See vol. iv. p. 56. - -The construction was by no means finished when Suchet’s expedition -began: many parts of the new walls were only carried up to half their -intended height, and no regular shelter for the garrison had been -contrived. Instead of proper barracks and casemates there were only -rough ‘leans-to,’ contrived against old walls, or cover made by roofing -in with beams old broken towers, and bastions. The hospital was the -only spacious and regular building in the whole _enceinte_: the powder -magazine was placed deep down in the cellars of the fort San Fernando. -The armament of the place was by no means complete: the guns were being -sent up just as Suchet started. Only seventeen were ready, and of -these no more than three were 12-pounders: the rest were only of the -calibre of field artillery (4- and 8-pounders) or howitzers. A fortress -which has only seventeen guns for an _enceinte_ of 3,000 yards, and -possesses no heavy guns to reply to the 18- or 24-pounders of a -siege-train, is in a state of desperate danger. - -Blake had thrown into the place a brigade under the command of Colonel -Luis Andriani, consisting of five battalions, two each of the regiments -of Savoya and Don Carlos, one of the Cazadores de Orihuela. Of these -two were new ‘third battalions[11]’ from the recently raised ‘Division -of Reserve,’ incomplete in officers, only half drilled, and not yet -fully provided with uniforms. The total force came to 2,663 officers -and men, including about 150 artillerymen and sappers. It is probable -that these troops would have made no better show in the open field -than did the rest of the Valencian army, a few weeks later: but they -showed behind walls the same capacity for unexpected resistance which -had surprised the French on other occasions at Ciudad Rodrigo, Gerona, -and Figueras. Andriani, the governor, seems to have made an honourable -attempt to do his duty at the head of the doubtfully efficient garrison -placed at his disposal. - - [11] The battalions were the 2nd and 3rd of Savoya (the last a - new levy) the 1st and 2nd of Don Carlos, and the 3rd of Orihuela, - this last raw and newly raised like the 3rd of Savoya. - -In addition to Saguntum Blake held two outlying posts in his front, -Peniscola on its lofty headland, garrisoned by about 1,000 men under -General Garcia Navarro, and the half-ruined Oropesa, which he had -resolved to hold, because it blocked the sea-coast road so effectively. -But its only tenable points were two mediaeval towers, one in the town -commanding the high-road, the other by the shore of the Mediterranean. -Their joint garrisons did not amount to 500 men, and it was obvious -that they could not hold out many days against modern artillery. But -the gain of a day or two might conceivably be very valuable in the -campaign that was about to begin. It is clear, however, that his main -hope of resistance lay in the line of entrenched camps and batteries -along the Guadalaviar, in front of Valencia: here he intended to make -his real stand, and he hoped that Saguntum, so little distant from -this line, would prove a serious hindrance to the enemy when he came up -against it. - -Suchet’s three columns all started, as Napoleon had ordered, on -September 15th. The Marshal’s own main body, coming from Tortosa, -reached Benicarlo, the first town across the Valencian frontier, next -day, and on the 17th came level with Peniscola, whose garrison kept -quiet within the limits of its isthmus. The Marshal left a battalion -and a few hussars to observe it, and to see that it did not make -sallies against his line of communication. On the 19th the head of -the marching column reached Torreblanca, quite close to Oropesa. A -reconnaissance found that the place was held, and came into contact -with some Spanish horse, who were easily driven off. This was the first -touch with Blake’s field army that had been obtained. But the enemy was -evidently not in force, and the garrison of Oropesa hastily retired -into the two towers which formed its only tenable positions. On a close -inspection it was found that the tower in the town completely commanded -the high-road, wherefore the Marshal took a slight circuit by suburban -lanes round the place, with his main body and guns, and continued his -advance, after leaving a few companies to blockade the towers. On -the same evening he was joined by Palombini’s column from Morella, -consisting of the two Italian divisions. They had accomplished their -march without meeting any resistance, though the road from Morella by -San Matteo and Cabanes was rough and easily defensible. The united -force, now 16,000 strong, proceeded on its march next day, and the -Marshal was agreeably surprised when, on the morning of the 20th, the -cavalry scouts on his right flank announced to him that they had come -in touch with Harispe’s column from Teruel, which had appeared at the -village of Villafanes a few miles from the main road. Thus the whole -army of invasion was happily united. - -Harispe, as it turned out, had left Teruel on the 15th, in obedience to -his orders, by the post-road to Segorbe and the coast. But hearing on -the second day that a large Valencian force was holding the defile of -Las Barracas, where the road crosses the watershed, he had turned off -by a bad side-path to Ruvielos in the upper valley of the Mijares, in -the hope of joining his chief without being forced to storm a difficult -position. Blake, as a matter of fact, much alarmed at the approach of -a flanking column on the Teruel side, and ignorant of its strength, -had sent the division of Obispo and some other detachments to hold the -pass. But no enemy came this way--Harispe had diverged down the course -of the Villahermosa river, by a country road only practicable for a -force without guns or wheeled transport, and got down by rapid marches -to the coast-plain beyond Alcora, without having seen any enemy save -some scattered guerrillero bands. He had thoroughly distracted Blake’s -attention and had run no danger, because he took an unexpected and -difficult route, in a direction quite different from that by which the -Spaniards expected him to appear[12]. - - [12] Vacani says that the Teruel column was intended by Suchet - as a mere demonstration, and was never intended to follow the - high-road Teruel-Segorbe, but to take a cross-route over the - hills, such as was actually used by it. But Suchet, in his - _Mémoires_, makes no such statement (ii. p. 152), and speaks as - if Harispe had taken the Ruvielos route on his own responsibility. - -The whole army was now concentrated near Villafanes on September 21, -save the detachments left to block Peniscola and Oropesa, and the -brigade of Ficatier, which, escorting the siege-train, had been left -at Tortosa, to await orders for starting when there should be no enemy -left in northern Valencia to molest it. The heavy guns were to come -forward down the coast-road, first to breach the towers of Oropesa, and -when the way past them was clear, to play their part, if necessary, in -the more serious task of battering Saguntum. - -On advancing from Castellon de la Plana on September 22 the French army -found a very small Spanish rearguard--500 or 600 men--covering the -bridge of Villareal over the Mijares. They gave way before the first -attack, which was a very simple affair, since the river was nearly dry -and everywhere fordable. No more was seen of the enemy next day, and -on the 23rd Suchet found himself on the banks of the Palancia stream, -which flows under the foot of the rock of Saguntum. The Spaniards had -retired still further towards Valencia, leaving the fortress to its -own resources. These were unknown to Suchet, who was aware that the -ruinous citadel had been rebuilt, but could not tell without further -reconnaissance what was its strength. In order to invest the place, and -to make closer investigation possible, Harispe’s division crossed the -Palancia to the right of Saguntum, Habert’s to the left. The latter -sent six companies into the town of Murviedro, and drove up some -Spanish pickets from it into the fortress which towered above. The -two divisions then joined hands to the south of Saguntum, completing -its investment, while Palombini’s Italians took post at Petres and -Gillet on the road to Segorbe--to the north-west--in case Blake might -have placed some of his troops on this side-route, with the object of -troubling the siege by attacks from the rear. The cavalry went forward -down the high-road to Valencia, and sent back news that they had -explored as far as Albalete, only six miles from the capital, and had -met no enemy. The division of Lardizabal and the cavalry of San Juan, -which had been the observing force in front of Suchet, had retired -beyond the Guadalaviar river, and had shut themselves up (along with -the rest of Blake’s army) in the entrenchments behind that stream. The -Spanish general was evidently acting on the strictest principles of -passive defence. - -The French marshal determined not to seek his enemy on his chosen -ground, till he should have taken Saguntum and brought up his -siege-train to the front. The former condition he thought would not -prove difficult to accomplish. A survey of the fortress revealed -its extremely irregular and incomplete state of defence. Though the -cliffs were in all parts steep and in some places inaccessible, many -sections of the works above them were obviously unfinished and very -weak. After a close reconnaissance by his engineer officers had been -made, Suchet determined that it would be worth while to try an attempt -at escalade on some of the most defective points, without waiting for -the arrival of the siege-train. He set his sappers and carpenters to -work to make sixty ladders, which were ready in full number on the -third day. The front chosen for the assault was in the _enceinte_ -immediately overhanging the town of Murviedro, where two ancient gaps -in the wall were clearly visible; the new work was not half finished, -and a low structure, roughly completed with beams laid above the -regular foundations, was all that blocked the openings. The masons of -the garrison were heard at night, working hard to raise the height of -the stone wall which was to replace the temporary wooden parapets. -There being no artillery available, they could not be hindered in their -building: but it did not seem to advance very rapidly. - -Suchet set apart for the actual escalade two columns, each composed of -300 volunteers from Habert’s division: they were to be supported by a -reserve of similar strength under Colonel Gudin, which was formed up, -completely under cover, within the streets of Murviedro. At midnight -on September 27th-28th the stormers pushed forward under cover of the -darkness, and in small successive parties, into a large Roman cistern -above the ruined theatre, which was ‘dead ground,’ and not exposed to -fire from any part of the ramparts. Here they were only 120 yards from -the two breaches. Meanwhile, as a diversion, six Italian companies from -Palombini’s division were ordered to make a noisy demonstration against -the distant part of the defences which lay under the tower of San -Pedro[13]. General Habert was to have 2,000 men more under arms, ready -to support the assailing column. - - [13] The complete orders for the attack may be read in the first - _Pièce justificative_ in Belmas’s history of the siege, pp. - 115-17 of vol. iv of his elaborate work. - -The stormers reached their appointed place apparently undiscovered, -and the attack would have been delivered--according to Suchet’s -dispatch--without any preliminary firing, but for an accident. The -Marshal says that the Spaniards had pushed an exploring patrol down the -hillside, which fell in with the French pickets and drew their fire. -Thereupon the assaulting columns in the cistern, thinking themselves -discovered, let off a few shots and charged uphill, a little ahead of -the appointed time, and before the Italian demonstration had begun[14]. -The governor, Andriani, in his dispatch, makes no mention of this, but -merely says that about 2 a.m. his sentinels thought that they detected -movements on the slopes, and that a short time afterwards a fierce -attack was delivered. At any rate the garrison was not surprised as -Suchet had hoped. - - [14] Vacani (v. p. 381) contradicts Suchet, saying that there - was no Spanish patrol, and that the French pickets fired from - nervousness at an imaginary foe. - -Owing to the lowness, however, of the walls blocking the two old -breaches, the assailants had, in their first rush, a fair chance of -breaking in. Many ladders were successfully planted, and repeatedly -small parties of the French got a footing on the wooden parapets. If -the garrison had flinched, the storm might have succeeded: but far -from flinching, they offered a desperate resistance, overthrew the -ladders, slew all who had gained the top of the _enceinte_, and kept -up a furious musketry fire, which laid low many of the soldiers who -kept pressing forward to the breaches. It was to no purpose that the -demonstration by the Italians below San Pedro now began: the Spaniards -fired hard and fast in this direction also, but did not withdraw any -men from the real point of attack, where they maintained themselves -very courageously. It was in vain that Colonel Gudin brought up his -reserve: it could make no head, and the survivors threw themselves down -among the rocks and ruins in front of the wall--unwilling to recede, -but quite unable to advance. Seeing his attack a hopeless failure, -Suchet ordered the stormers back just before daylight began to appear. -They had lost 247 killed and wounded out of 900 men engaged: the -garrison only 15 killed and less than 30 wounded[15]. - - [15] Vacani makes the losses 360 instead of 247, and it is - possible that Suchet has given only the casualties at the main - assault, and not those in the distant demonstrations. Vacani says - that the Italians lost 52 men in their false attack. - -The escalade having come to this disappointing conclusion, the Marshal -saw that the siege of Saguntum would be anything but a quick business. -It would be necessary to bring up the siege-train to the front: orders -were sent back to Ficatier to start it at once from Tortosa; but it had -to batter and take Oropesa before it could even reach Murviedro. There -were some weeks of delay before him, and meanwhile Blake might at last -begin to show some signs of life. Suchet therefore disposed his army so -as to provide both a blockading force and a covering force, to see that -the blockade was not interfered with from without. It being evident -that many days would elapse before the siege artillery arrived, the -French engineer officers got leave to employ many detachments in -preparing roads fit to bear heavy guns up the western slopes of the -hill of Saguntum, from which alone the regular attack on the fortress -could be conducted. Several emplacements for batteries were also -chosen, and work upon them was begun. - -From September 23rd, the day of Suchet’s arrival before Saguntum, -down to October 16, when the heavy guns at last arrived, the French -army was practically ‘marking time’: the idea which the Emperor had -conceived, and which his lieutenant had adopted, that Valencia could be -conquered by a sudden rush, had been proved false. Apparently Suchet -had gained no more by his rapid advance to the foot of the hill of -Saguntum than he would have obtained by marching in more leisurely -fashion, with his siege artillery in company, and taking Oropesa on the -way. The reduction of that place indeed was (as it turned out) only a -single day’s task for heavy guns: and if the Marshal had captured it -on his march, he might have presented himself before Saguntum with his -siege-train, and have begun an active attack on that fortress, some -weeks before he was actually able to get to serious work. In fact he -might have been battering Saguntum on October 1, instead of having to -wait till October 16th. But this is ‘wisdom after the event’: Napoleon -thought that Valencia could be ‘rushed,’ and Suchet was bound to make -the experiment that his master ordered. - -Blake meanwhile, finding, on September 23rd, that the enemy was not -about to advance against his lines, and learning soon after that the -French army had settled down before Saguntum, had to revise his plans, -since it was clear that he was not to be attacked in his entrenchments -as he had supposed. Three courses were now open to him: either he might -collect every man for a decisive battle in the open, and try to raise -the siege; or he might attempt to open up attacks on Suchet’s line of -communications and on his base in Aragon, so as to force him to retire -by indirect operations; or he might remain passive behind the lines of -the Guadalaviar. The last was an almost unthinkable alternative--it -would have ruined his reputation for ever to sit quiet and do nothing, -as Wellington had done during the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo in 1810. -Only a general with an established reputation for courage and ability -could have dared to take such a course; and Blake’s record was a long -series of disasters, while he was detested by the Valencians one and -all--by the army, to whom he rightly preferred his own excellent -troops, no less than by the Captain-General Palacios, and the Junta, -whom he had sent out of the city to sit at Alcira, when they showed a -tendency to hamper his operations. Practically he was forced by his -situation to take some definite offensive move against Suchet. - -He chose that of indirect operations, having a well-rooted distrust -of the fighting powers of a great part of the troops that were at -his disposition. The record of the Valencian army he knew: the state -of the Murcian army, on which he could draw for reinforcements, was -represented to him in the most gloomy colours by Mahy, who had recently -replaced Freire in command. On September 12th Mahy had written to him, -to warn him that the spirit of his troops was detestable: ‘the Army of -Murcia was little better than a phantom: there were only four or five -officers for whom the rank and file had any respect or esteem, the -rest were regarded as timid or incapable: the men had no confidence in -themselves or their chiefs. The best thing to do would be to break up -the whole army, and incorporate it into the “Expeditionary Divisions,” -whose commanders were known as good soldiers, and whose battalions were -trustworthy[16].’ - - [16] See Mahy’s letter to Blake on pp. 109-12 of vol. xi of - Arteche. The General is writing very carefully so as not to speak - too ill of his army: but his views are clear. - -In view of these facts Blake resolved to threaten Suchet’s flanks with -demonstrations, which he had no intention of turning into attacks, but -to endeavour to dislodge him from his forward position by turning loose -the guerrilleros of Aragon on to his rear. With the former purpose he -sent out two detachments from the Valencian lines, Obispo’s division -to Segorbe,--where it cut the French communication with Teruel and -southern Aragon,--Charles O’Donnell with Villacampa’s infantry and San -Juan’s horse to Benaguacil, a point in the plains fifteen miles west -of Saguntum, where his force formed a link between Obispo and the main -body of the Valencian army, which still remained entrenched in the -lines of the Guadalaviar[17]. These two detachments threatened Suchet’s -flank, and even his rear, but there was no intention of turning the -threat into a reality. - - [17] Blake kept under his own hand in the lines the divisions of - Zayas, Lardizabal, Miranda, and the Reserve. - -The real movement on which Blake relied for the discomfiture of the -invaders of Valencia was that of the guerrillero bands of Aragon and -the neighbouring parts of Castile, to whom he had appealed for help -the moment that Suchet commenced his march. He believed that the 6,000 -or 7,000 men which Suchet had left scattered in small garrisons under -General Musnier might be so beset and worried by the _partidas_, that -the Marshal might be compelled to turn back to their aid. Even Mina -from his distant haunts in Navarre had been asked to co-operate. This -was an excellent move, and might have succeeded, if Musnier alone -had remained to hold down Aragon. But Blake had forgotten in his -calculations the 15,000 men of Reille and Severoli, cantoned in Navarre -and along the Upper Ebro, who were available to strengthen the small -force which lay in the garrisons under Musnier’s charge. - -The diversion of the guerrilleros, however, was effected with -considerable energy. On September 26th the Empecinado and Duran -appeared in front of Calatayud, the most important of the French -garrisons in the mountains of western Aragon. They had with them 5,000 -foot and 500 horse--not their full strength, for a large band of the -Empecinado’s men beset at the same time the remote castle of Molina, -the most outlying and isolated of all Suchet’s posts. Calatayud was -held by a few companies of French, to which an Italian flying column of -a battalion had just joined itself. The guerrilleros, coming in with a -rush, drove the garrison out of the town into their fortified post, the -large convent of La Merced, taking many prisoners in the streets. Duran -then beleaguered the main body in the convent, while the Empecinado -took post at the defile of El Frasno on the Saragossa road, to hold off -any succour that Musnier might send up from the Aragonese capital. This -precaution was justified--a column of 1,000 men came out of Saragossa, -but was far too weak to force the pass and had to retire, with the -loss of its commander, Colonel Gillot, and many men. Meanwhile Duran -pressed the besieged in the convent with mines, having no artillery of -sufficient calibre to batter its walls. After blowing down a corner -of its chapel with one mine, and killing many of the defenders, the -guerrillero chief exploded a second on October 3, which made such a -vast breach that the garrison surrendered, still 560 strong, on the -following day[18]. - - [18] Vacani gives a long and interesting account of the siege (v. - pp. 404-13) and attributes the weak defence to quarrels between - the commander of the Italians and the French governor, Müller. - -This success would have gone far to shake the hold of the French -on Aragon, but for the intervention of Reille from Navarre. At the -first news of the blockade of Calatayud, he had dispatched a column, -consisting of the whole brigade of Bourke, 3,500 strong, which would -have saved the garrison if it had had a less distance to march. But it -arrived on the 5th to find the convent blown up, while the Spaniards -had vanished with their prisoners. Bourke thereupon returned to Tudela, -and the guerrilleros reoccupied Calatayud on his departure. - -Meanwhile, however, the whole Italian division of Severoli, over -7,000 strong, marched down the Ebro to reinforce the small garrison -of Saragossa. This large reinforcement restored the confidence of -the French. Musnier himself took charge of it and marched at its -head against Duran and the Empecinado. They wisely refused to fight, -gave way, evacuated Calatayud, and took refuge in the hills (October -12). While the main field-force of the enemy was drawn off in this -direction, Mina took up the game on the other side of the Ebro. -Entering Aragon with 4,000 men he besieged the small garrison of Exea, -which abandoned its post, and cut its way through the guerrilleros, -till it met a column of 800 Italian infantry[19] sent out from -Saragossa to bring it off. Colonel Ceccopieri, the leader of this -small force, underrating the strength of his enemy, then marched to -relieve the garrison of Ayerbe. He was surprised on the way by Mina’s -whole force, and in a long running fight between Ayerbe and Huesca was -surrounded and slain. The column was exterminated, two hundred Italians -were killed, six hundred (including many wounded) were taken prisoners -(October 16th). - - [19] Belonging to the 7th Line of Severoli’s division. - -Musnier returned in haste from Calatayud at the news of this disaster, -but left the bulk of Severoli’s division to occupy western Aragon. -He then set himself, with the help of Reille, to hunt down Mina. But -the latter, marching with ease between the columns that pursued him, -for the peasantry kept him informed day by day of every movement of -the enemy, retreated westward. Easily eluding the French, he made an -extraordinary excursion, right across Navarre, Alava, and Biscay, down -to the sea coast at Motrico, where he handed over his prisoners to -the captain of the British frigate _Isis_, and then returned unharmed -to his familiar haunts. Of such a delusive nature was the hold of the -French on Northern Spain, that a column of 5,000 men could march for -200 miles across it without being intercepted or destroyed. - -All these exploits of the guerrilleros were daring and well planned, -but though they had given Musnier much trouble, and cost the French -many a weary hour of march and countermarch, they had not cleared -Aragon of the enemy, nor shaken Suchet’s position. Indeed, on October -20, the general condition of affairs in Aragon was more favourable for -the invaders than on September 20, for two fresh divisions had been -drawn down into that province, and there were 20,000 French and Italian -troops in it instead of 6,000. The petty disasters at Calatayud and -Ayerbe were irritating rather than important. Suchet never for a moment -felt inclined to relax his hold upon Valencia: that western Aragon was -in an uproar affected him little, when his communication with his two -main dépôts of stores at Tortosa and Morella was not interrupted. - -Blake, it may be mentioned, did not content himself with setting the -Empecinado and Duran in motion, he tried another division in another -quarter with even less result. Rumours had reached him that King -Joseph’s Army of the Centre was about to co-operate with Suchet, by -sending a column across the mountains to Cuenca and Requeña. The news -was false, for though Napoleon had ordered the King to do what he -could to help in the invasion of Valencia, Joseph had replied that -he had not even one brigade to spare for a serious demonstration, -and had not moved--the guerrilleros gave sufficient occupation to -his much-scattered army, of which a large portion was composed of -untrustworthy Spanish _Juramentados_. But, listening to vain reports, -Blake ordered Mahy to collect the best of his Murcian troops and -to march on Cuenca to meet the supposed invaders. His subordinate, -leaving Freire in command in Murcia, took seven selected battalions -of foot under Creagh and the Marquis of Montijo, with 800 horse and -one battery, and moved from his camp at Mula by Hellin and Chinchilla -northward. The distance to be covered was great, the roads after -Chinchilla very bad. Mahy arrived in front of Cuenca on October 15th, -to find that there was only one battalion and two squadrons of Joseph’s -army there. This little force evacuated the high-lying city in haste, -and fled towards Madrid the moment that the Murcians showed themselves. -No other French force could be heard of in any direction. At Cuenca -Mahy received a dispatch from Blake (who had apparently discovered his -mistake about the Army of the Centre), telling him to descend from the -mountains by Moya and Liria, and to join the wing of the main army, -which lay under Obispo at Segorbe. It was only on the 23rd October -that he came in: his troops, the pick of the Murcian army, had been -completely wasted for some twenty days in a circular march against a -non-existent enemy. Meanwhile every man had been wanted in Valencia. - -Suchet, when once he had settled down to the siege of Saguntum, had -not failed to notice Blake’s weak demonstration against his flank by -means of the divisions of Obispo and Charles O’Donnell. He did not -intend to tolerate it, and on September 30 had sent Palombini with his -own Italian division and Robert’s French brigade to beat up Obispo’s -quarters at Segorbe. The Spanish division made a poor attempt to defend -itself on a position in front of that town, but was easily beaten and -retired into the mountains. It was then the turn of Charles O’Donnell; -when Palombini had come back to the camp, Suchet took Harispe’s -division, with Robert’s brigade, and two regiments of cavalry, to evict -the Spanish division from Benaguacil. O’Donnell made a slightly better -fight than Obispo had done, and deployed Villacampa’s infantry behind -an irrigation canal, with San Juan’s cavalry on his flanks. But the -French were superior in numbers as well as in confidence: one fierce -charge broke O’Donnell’s line, and he had to retreat in haste to the -hills behind him, losing 400 men, cut up in the pursuit by Suchet’s -cavalry, while the French casualties barely reached three officers and -sixty men (October 2nd). Blake, who had been quite close enough to -succour O’Donnell if he had chosen, made no attempt to aid him, and -kept quiet behind his lines on the Guadalaviar. There the routed troops -joined him next day. - -Suchet, having thus cleared his flanks, settled down to the siege -of Saguntum, where his heavy artillery was now much needed. The -besieging army had to content itself for another fortnight with making -preparations for the expected train--levelling roads and constructing -approaches on the ground which was destined for the front of attack, at -the west end of the hill of Saguntum. - -Meanwhile the siege-train was lumbering down from Tortosa by the -coast-road. On October 6th Suchet started to meet it, taking with him -the 1,500 Neapolitans of Compère. On the 8th he reached Oropesa, where -he found the small Spanish garrison still holding the two towers which -have before been mentioned. The first guns that came up were turned -against the tower by the high-road; it was easily breached, and on -the 10th surrendered: 215 men and four guns were captured. Next day -came the turn of the other tower, that by the sea; but before the -siege-battery had opened on it, the British 74 _Magnificent_ and a -squadron of Spanish gunboats ran inshore, and took off the garrison of -150 men in their boats, under the ineffective fire of the French. - -The moment that the tower which blocked the high-road had fallen, and -before that on the shore had been evacuated, Suchet began to push the -head of his precious convoy of heavy artillery southward. It made such -a good pace that the first guns arrived at the camp before Saguntum -as early as the night of October 12th. Meanwhile the Marshal himself -returned thither, escorted by Compère’s Neapolitans: the brigade of -Ficatier, which had escorted the train hitherto, was dispersed to cover -the line of communications, placing its five battalions at Oropesa, -Almenara, and Segorbe. - - - - -SECTION XXX: CHAPTER II - -THE BATTLE OF SAGUNTUM. OCTOBER 1811 - - -After Charles O’Donnell and Obispo had been driven away from the -threatening position upon Suchet’s flank, Blake found himself during -the early days of October in a very unpleasant dilemma. It was -clear that his own feeble efforts to molest the French army were -a complete failure. Presently the message reached him that Mahy’s -unlucky expedition to Cuenca had been absolutely useless. But the most -disheartening news was that the attempt to overrun Aragon by means -of the guerrilleros had failed; its initial success, the capture of -Calatayud on October 3, had only led to the inundation of the whole -countryside in that direction by the numerous battalions of Reille and -Severoli. - -As the days wore on, Blake found himself obliged to confess that the -idea of dislodging Suchet by operations in his rear was hopeless. The -only remaining alternative for him was to endeavour to call together -every available man, and to try to beat the French army in a great -pitched battle. Considering the well-known disrepute of both the -Murcian and the Valencian troops, the prospect was not one that the -Spanish general could view with much confidence. But political reasons -forced him to fight--his policy of passive resistance had made him so -unpopular with the Valencians of all ranks, from the members of the -exiled Junta down to the private soldiers, that if he had held back any -longer it is probable that he might have been deposed or murdered by a -conspiracy. Saguntum was holding out most gallantly, and the ignominy -of leaving it to fall, without making any effort for its succour, was -sufficiently evident. He made up his mind about the middle of October -that he must advance and fight. But, being very properly determined -to fight with all available resources, he had to await the descent of -Mahy and the Murcians from Cuenca, and by his own fault that important -column could not be drawn in to the main army before the 23rd. It was -only on that day that an advance in force became possible: for a week -and more Blake anxiously awaited the junction, and until it took place -he would not move. - -Meanwhile Suchet, entirely unmolested, was pressing the siege of -Saguntum with all possible expedition. The first siege-guns from -Tortosa reached his camp, as has been already mentioned, on October -12th. But it was not till four days later that the actual battering -of the place began. Though paths had been traced out, and the -emplacements of batteries settled, long ere the siege-train came up, -the actual getting of the guns into position proved a very tiresome -business, on account of the steep and rocky slopes over which they -had to be dragged. And the construction of approaches and parallels -upon the hillside progressed very slowly, because of the absence of -earth--at last it was found that soil to bind the loose stones of -the ground together would have, for the most part, to be carried up -in sandbags from the valley below, for hardly any could be scraped -together on the spot. The engineer officer who wrote the diary of the -siege confesses that if the Spanish garrison had only been provided -with heavy artillery, the approach-building would have proved almost -impossible[20]. But, as has been already noted, there were but -seventeen guns mounted in the whole fortress, and of these only three -were 12-pounders--the rest being small field-pieces, too weak to batter -down parapets of even modest thickness. Moreover the very steepness of -the slope over which the siege-works were being advanced made much of -it ‘dead ground,’ which guns above could not properly sweep or search -out. - - [20] Belmas, iv. p. 97. - -On the 11th of October the two generals, Vallée and Rogniat, who -had regularly commanded Suchet’s artillery and engineers during his -previous sieges, arrived from the rear--both had been in France on -leave, and they had come forward with the train from Tortosa to -Oropesa. Their arrival added confidence to the subordinates who had -hitherto worked without them, for the reputation of each for success -was very great. Rogniat immediately on his arrival made several -important modifications in the projected batteries, and showed how -the approaches might be pushed forward to within seventy yards of the -fortress, by taking advantage of favourable dips and rocky outcrops in -the hillside. - -On the 16th, five batteries were armed with the guns which had come up, -and fire was opened upon the projecting western angle of the fortress, -the tower of San Pedro. It proved to be made of ancient Moorish stone -and mortar, almost as hard as iron, and crumbled very slowly. But the -modern works below it, which were only a few months old, owned no such -resisting power, and within two days showed signs of serious damage. -The Spanish counter-fire was insignificant--there were very few guns -available, and it was only when the approaches got within easy musket -shot of the walls that the besiegers began to suffer appreciable -casualties. For the Spanish infantry, disregarding the cannonade, kept -up a furious fire against the heads of the saps all day and night. - -On the afternoon of the 18th the engineer and artillery officers -reported to Suchet that they had made a sufficient breach in the -curtain of the work called the Dos Mayo battery, just where it joined -on the tower of San Pedro, and that they regarded it as practicable -for assault. The Marshal ordered that the storm should be fixed for -the same evening, lest the Spaniards should succeed in repairing the -breach during the hours of darkness. The column of assault consisted -of 400 men, picked from Habert’s division, supported by a reserve of -Palombini’s Italians. The fire of the siege artillery was kept up to -the last moment, and did much harm to the garrison, who were very -clearly seen piling gabions, sandbags, and stones on the ruinous lip of -the breach, in disregard of the steady fire that kept pounding it down -[21]. - - [21] See narrative of Vacani, an eye-witness (vol. v. p. 399). - -The assault was duly delivered at five o’clock, and proved a complete -failure. The stormers found the breach most difficult to climb, as -its face was entirely formed of big blocks of stone without earth -or débris. The column won its way half up the ascent, and isolated -officers and men got further, and were bayoneted or shot at close -quarters by the defenders, who clustered very thickly at the top. But -no general rush of men could reach the summit, where (it is said) the -actual gap in the parapet was not more than six or seven feet broad. -After several ineffective attempts to mount, the assailants came to -a stand on the lower part of the slope, and opened a scattering fire -on the Spaniards above them. Whereupon, seeing the opportunity lost, -General Habert, who had been given charge of the operations, ordered -the men to fall back to the trenches, and to abandon the assault. - -This was a most creditable feat of arms for the garrison, who had -hardly a cannon to help them, and held their own almost entirely by -musketry fire, though they rolled some live shells, beams, and large -stones down the breach at intervals. Their casualties were heavy, but -those of the assailants, as was natural, much greater. Suchet lost at -least 300 men, though in his dispatch to the Emperor[22] he gave an -elaborate table of casualties showing a total of only 173. But his -‘returns,’ even the most specious looking of them, should never be -trusted--as will be seen when we are dealing with the second battle of -Castalla in a later volume. This excellent officer was as untrustworthy -as Soult or Masséna in the figures which he sent to his master[23]. - - [22] To be found in print in Belmas, iv. pp. 124-8. - - [23] This indictment of Suchet must be supported by details. In - his elaborate table of casualties by corps at the end of his - dispatch of Oct. 20, he only allows for 3 officers killed and - 8 wounded, 40 men killed and 122 wounded--total 173. But the - lists of officers’ casualties in Martinien show, on the other - hand, _five_ officers killed (Coutanceau, Saint Hilaire, Turno, - Giardini, Cuny), and at least _ten_ wounded (Mathis, Durand, - Gauchet, D’Autane, Adhémar, Gattinara, Lamezan, D’Esclaibes, - Maillard, Laplane), and probably three more. - - Oddly enough, in his _Mémoires_ (ii. p. 173) Suchet gives _by - name_ four officers killed at the breach (out of the five), while - in his official report he had stated that there were only three - killed altogether. We must trust rather Vacani, an eye-witness - and a man much interested in statistics and casualties, when he - gives the total of 300 for the losses, than Suchet’s table. - -After this Suchet resolved to make no more attempts to storm Saguntum. -‘When even the best of soldiers,’ remarks Belmas, ‘have made every -effort to carry a place and have failed, they imagine that the place -is impregnable. And if an attempt is made to lead them once more to an -assault, they will not again act with the confidence which is needed -to secure victory.’ Wellington was to find this out at Burgos, a year -later. Indeed in their early stages the sieges of Saguntum and Burgos -show a rather notable parallelism, though their ends were dissimilar. -General Rogniat easily persuaded the Marshal to drop the heroic method -which had gained so little success, and to fall back on the systematic -work which is slow but certain[24].’ Suchet gave permission to the -engineers to establish more batteries, and to defer all further -attempts to storm till the approaches should have been carried up to -the very foot of the walls, and the whole curtain of the Dos Mayo -redoubt should have been battered down. - - [24] Belmas, iv. p. 96. - -The garrison, much encouraged by their successful effort of the 18th, -continued to make an obstinate resistance: as the enemy sapped uphill -towards them, they kept up such a careful and deadly fire that the -casualties in the trenches amounted every day to 15 or 20 men. For the -next six days nothing decisive happened, though the works continued to -creep slowly forward: they had to be built with parapets consisting -entirely of earth brought from below, and made very high, since the -nearer they got to the works, the more did the plunging fire from above -search them out. - -Meanwhile Blake was preparing, though with no great self-confidence, -to make an attack on Suchet’s siege-lines, and was only awaiting the -arrival of Mahy and the Murcians before striking. He began by trying -a feeble diversion on the flank, sending back Obispo’s division once -more to Segorbe, and getting some of the Empecinado’s bands to threaten -Teruel, the southernmost of the garrisons in Aragon. This so far -annoyed the French marshal that on the 20th of October he sent off -Palombini, with one French and one Italian brigade and 400 horse, to -drive Obispo out of Segorbe, and to open the road to Teruel. By so -doing he placed himself in a dangerous position, for he had detached -4,500 men on an excursion which could not take less than four days, -and if Blake had refused to wait for Mahy, and had let Obispo amuse -Palombini, he could have marched against the siege-lines with 20,000 -men, including all his best troops, and would have found only 12,000, -besides the gunners of the siege artillery, left in the French camp. -If Suchet had left any detachments to maintain the blockade, as he -probably would have done, he could only have fought with odds of less -than one to two. If he had brought up all his battalions, the garrison -would have sallied forth and destroyed his siege-works. - -But Blake did not take his chance--whatever it may have been worth: he -waited for Mahy, who was only due on the 23rd. Meanwhile Palombini made -a rapid raid upon Segorbe: but Obispo, leaving two battalions only to -make a show of resistance, crossed the hills by by-paths and drew in -to Liria, on the flank of the main army, and in close touch with it. -He could have been used for a battle, if Blake had chosen to deliver -one upon the 22nd or 23rd. But the unlucky Spanish general did not so -choose: and Palombini--finding nothing serious in front of him, and -hearing that Teruel had been already relieved by Severoli--rightly -returned by forced marches to Saguntum, which he reached on the -afternoon of the 24th of October. - -Meanwhile the long-expected Mahy arrived at Liria on the night of the -23rd, and found Obispo already lying there. The two forces united, and -marched on the 24th to Betera, but there again divided, the Murcians -going on to join Blake’s main body, while the Valencian division -received orders from the Commander-in-Chief to move as an independent -flanking column, and from Naquera to fall upon the flank or right rear -of Suchet’s position in front of Saguntum. - -On the same day Blake himself broke out of the lines behind the -Guadalaviar, and after issuing a well-worded proclamation, in which he -said that Andriani’s gallant garrison must not perish unassisted, and -declared a confidence which he must have been far from feeling in the -resolution of his troops, advanced for some miles along the high-road, -so as to place himself at nightfall within striking distance of the -enemy. - -His plan of operations, which was clearly set forth in his directions -to Mahy[25], was ambitious in the highest degree, and aimed at the -complete destruction of his enemy. Expecting to find Suchet drawn up to -meet him in the plain south of Saguntum, it appears that he intended -to fight a battle in which an immensely strong left wing was to turn -and break down Suchet’s right, while a weaker right wing (composed, -however, of his best troops) was to attack him frontally, and hold -his main body ‘contained,’ while the turning movement was delivered. -The left wing contained 26 battalions and nearly 20 squadrons, making -nearly 16,000 bayonets and 1,700 sabres[26]. The detached division of -Obispo, from Naquera, was to fall on the extreme French right from -the rear; the two other Valencian infantry divisions (Miranda and -Villacampa), led by Charles O’Donnell, were to tackle it in front. -Mahy’s Murcians were to support O’Donnell, at the same time reaching -out a hand towards Obispo--in order to do this Mahy was directed to -send out two battalions (under a Colonel O’Ronan) to Cabezbort, a -hillside intermediate between the point where Obispo was expected -and the left of the two other Valencian divisions. The left wing had -allotted to it the whole of the Murcian horse, 800 sabres, and one of -the two Valencian cavalry brigades, under General San Juan, which was -of about the same strength. It had also 18 guns. - - [25] Which may be read in full in Arteche, xi. pp. 157-9. - - [26] We are luckily in possession of the exact ‘morning state’ - of Blake’s army, which is printed in the rare Spanish government - publication of 1822, _Estados de la Organizacion y Fuerza de - los Ejércitos Españoles_, pp. 184-7. Obispo had 3,400 men, - Miranda 4,000, Villacampa 3,350, Mahy 4,600 infantry, under - Montijo and Creagh, and 830 horse. This wing had 2 horse- and 2 - field-batteries, 18 guns. - -So much for the left wing. The right wing, conducted by Blake in -person, which had advanced up the high-road from Valencia towards -Murviedro, consisted of the two ‘Expeditionary Divisions’ of Zayas -and Lardizabal, both very weak because of the losses which they -had suffered in the campaign around Baza in August--each was eight -battalions strong; but the former had only 2,500, the latter 3,000 men, -so that the units averaged well under 400 bayonets. But these were good -old troops, which had greatly distinguished themselves at Albuera: they -were the only part of Blake’s army in which any real confidence could -be placed. In support of these veterans the Commander-in-Chief brought -up the Valencian ‘Division of Reserve,’ which consisted entirely of the -newly raised 3rd battalions of the regiments serving with Villacampa -and Miranda. They had only been under arms a few months, were not -fully equipped or clothed, and were dreadfully under-officered; for -five strong battalions, of over 700 bayonets each, there were only -75 officers in all--fifteen per battalion, where there should have -been thirty, and these were the mere leavings of the older units of -each regiment, or else newly gazetted ensigns. As a fighting force -these 3,500 men were nearly useless--and Blake put them where they -were least likely to get into trouble. They were divided into two -brigades: Brigadier-General Velasco seems to have been in command, -_vice_ Acuña, who had the division during the autumn. The right column -was accompanied by the handful of horse belonging to the ‘Expeditionary -Force’--300 sabres under General Loy--and by the second Valencian -Cavalry Brigade under General Caro, some 800 mounted men more. It was -accompanied, like the other wing, by three batteries. Thus, counting -its gunners and sappers, the right wing had under 10,500 men, while the -immensely strong left had over 17,000. But it is quality rather than -mere numbers which counts in war--the weak wing fought a good battle -against equal strength, and looked for a moment as if it might win. The -strong wing disgraced itself, and was routed by a fourth of its own -numbers. - -Suchet had been somewhat troubled by the first news of Blake’s sudden -sally from Valencia, for though he desired a battle, wherein success -would probably win him the immediate surrender of the hard-pressed -garrison of Saguntum, yet he did not wish that matters should be forced -to a crisis in Palombini’s absence. It was only after the well-timed -return of that general to his camp, that he welcomed the approach of a -decisive action. But with Palombini at his disposition again, he was -eager to fight. - -He had at this moment with him, in the lines before Saguntum, 35 -battalions of foot (of which the three Neapolitan units under Compère -were mere skeletons, with little over a thousand men between them), -with 15 squadrons of horse and 36 field-guns. He left behind him, to -maintain the siege-works before the fortress, two battalions of the -117th line from Habert’s division, and Balathier’s Italian brigade, -making four battalions more. The weak Neapolitan brigade of Compère, -only 1,400 men, even with its cavalry included, was placed in support -of the blockading force, at Gillet and Petres, to watch the road from -Segorbe, by which some outlying Spanish detachment might possibly -attempt to communicate with the garrison of Saguntum. This left for the -line of battle 26 battalions--six of Habert’s, eleven of Harispe’s, -four of Palombini’s Italians, and five of Robert’s reserve brigade. -The total amounted to about 12,000 infantry, while the whole of the -cavalry, except the two Neapolitan squadrons, was put in the field -to the amount of some 1,800 sabres. Counting the gunners of the six -batteries of artillery, Suchet’s fighting force was not much over -14,000 men. He had left 4,000, besides the gunners of the siege-train -and the sappers, to deal with the garrison of Saguntum. This was little -more than half of Blake’s numbers, for the Spanish general--as we have -seen--was marching forward with 27,000 men in line. That Suchet gladly -took the risk sufficiently shows his opinion of the quality of the -greater part of the Valencian army. It seems, we must confess, rather -hazardous to have left 4,000 men in the blockading corps, when forces -were so unequal. In a similar case Beresford at Albuera took every -man out of the trenches, and fought with his whole army. Andriani’s -garrison was not numerous enough to execute any really dangerous sally -in the rear, and was so constricted, in its precipitous fastness, that -it could not easily come down or deploy itself. Perhaps Suchet may have -feared, however, that it would take the opportunity of absconding by -some postern, if it were not shut in upon all sides. But there were to -be moments during the battle when the Marshal would gladly have had the -assistance of two or three more battalions of steady troops. - -Suchet had chosen for his fighting-ground the narrow plain south of -Saguntum, extending from the sea to the foot of the hills of the Sancti -Espiritus range--a space of less than three miles in very flat ground. -It was open for the most part, but sprinkled in certain sections with -olives and carob-trees, and contained one or two slight eminences or -mounds, which rose above the general surface, though only by a score -or two of feet, so that they had a certain command over the adjoining -flats. The left of the line, nearest to the sea, was formed of Habert’s -imperfect division, which, having detached two battalions for the -blockade of Saguntum, had only six left--2,500 bayonets--in line. -The right consisted of Harispe’s division, which was stronger than -Habert’s, as it had nine battalions in line, even after setting aside -one regiment (the 44th) for a flank-guard. Its force was about 3,600 -bayonets. This division lay to the right of the road from Murviedro to -Valencia. The reserve consisted of the Italian brigade (that of Saint -Paul), which had not been told off for the siege, and of the three -French cavalry regiments, in all 2,000 bayonets and 1,300 sabres. -It was drawn up half a mile in rear of Habert and Harispe, ready to -support either of them. The batteries, horse and foot, accompanied -their respective divisions. - -We have thus accounted for 10,000 men. The remainder of Suchet’s -fighting force constituted a flank-guard, to prevent his line from -being turned on its right, the side of the hills. It originally -consisted of Robert’s ‘reserve brigade,’ five battalions, or 2,500 -bayonets, and of one cavalry regiment, Schiazzetti’s Italian -dragoons--450 sabres--with one battery. These troops were drawn up on -the higher slopes of the Sancti Espiritus hills, covering the pass of -the same name and the country road which goes over it. To these Suchet -added, at the last moment, one regiment from Harispe’s division, the -44th, under the Brigadier Chlopiski, who, being senior to Robert, -took command of the whole flank-guard. These two battalions--1,200 -men--took post on the hill-slopes to the left of Robert, half-way -between his position and that of Harispe’s right. The whole force, -including the dragoons and the artillery, made about 4,300 men. -Compère’s Neapolitans were too far to their left rear to be reckoned an -appreciable support, and had their own separate task, though they were -never called upon to discharge it. The ground occupied by Chlopiski’s -4,300 men was exceedingly strong, and the Marshal hoped that they might -be relied upon to hold off the turning movement, which he was aware -was to be made against his inland flank. For he knew that Charles -O’Donnell was advancing from the direction of Betera, which could -only mean a projected attack on his own right. Had he realized that -not only O’Donnell, but also Obispo and Mahy’s Murcians, in all some -17,000 men, were about to operate against Chlopiski, he must surely -have strengthened his covering force, for the odds would have been -impossible if the Valencians had made any fight at all. But they did -not! - -On the morning of the 25th of October Suchet was ready to receive the -attack which was impending. He could make out the general dispositions -of the enemy, and the concentric advance of Obispo’s, O’Donnell’s, and -Blake’s own men was duly reported to him. It was on receiving notice of -the heavy appearance of the second, or central, hostile column that he -detached Chlopiski’s two battalions to strengthen Robert’s flank-guard. -Presently, about 7 o’clock, the Spaniards came within touch; the left, -it would seem, somewhat before the right[27], the first shots being -interchanged between the two battalions which Mahy had sent towards -Cabezbort and Robert’s troops. This was only a trifling skirmish, the -Spaniards being completely checked. But soon after a serious attack was -delivered. - - [27] There are terrible difficulties as to the timing of the - battle of Saguntum. Suchet says that the first engagement was - between Obispo’s flanking division, coming over the hills on - the west, and Robert. Schepeler says that Obispo arrived too - late altogether, and was practically not in the fight (p. 472). - I think that the explanation is that Suchet took O’Ronan’s two - battalions for Obispo, because they came from the direction - where he was expected. I follow, in my timing of the battle, - the very clear narrative of Vacani (v. pp. 440-1), who seems - to make it clear that the main fighting on the French right - was well over before that in the centre, and long before that - on the left. Schepeler (who rode with Blake that day) also - makes it certain that Lardizabal and Zayas were fighting long - after Miranda, Villacampa, and Mahy had been disposed of. But - difficulties remain, which could only be cleared up if we had a - report by Obispo. General Arteche thinks that the action began - fairly simultaneously all along the line, and follows Schepeler - in saying that Obispo was late (xi. p. 174), the very reverse of - Suchet’s statement that he came, and was beaten, too early. - -The next advance was that of the two Valencian divisions under Charles -O’Donnell, who were a long way ahead of the main body of Mahy’s -Murcians, their destined reserve. Blake’s intention was apparently -to strike with his left wing first, and to force in the French right -before his own column delivered its blow. Everything depended on the -successful action of the mass of Valencian and Murcian infantry against -the small hostile force posted on the slopes of the Sancti Espiritus -hills. - -The divisions of Miranda and Villacampa duly descended from the lower -opposite heights of the Germanels, crossed the bottom, and began to -mount the opposing slope, Villacampa on the left, somewhat in advance, -Miranda a little to his right rear: behind them in support marched San -Juan’s Valencian cavalry. Beyond the latter there was a considerable -gap to the nearest troops of Blake’s own column, which had not yet -come into action. Mahy, whose orders definitely said that he was to -act as a reserve, and to protect O’Donnell’s flank if the latter were -checked, occupied the Germanels, when the Valencians had gone on, and -was still at the top of his own slope, having to his left front the -two detached battalions at Cabezbort under O’Ronan, when the clash -came. Waiting till the two Valencian divisions and the cavalry in -support were some little way up the hill, and had begun to drive in -his skirmishers, Chlopiski moved down upon them with the whole of his -modest force--Robert’s five battalions in front, to the right of the -pass and the road, his own two battalions of the 44th to its left and -somewhat on the flank. Meanwhile Schiazzetti’s regiment of Italian -dragoons charged down the gap between the two bodies of infantry. As -Villacampa was somewhat ahead of Miranda, the first crash fell upon -him. Robert’s infantry drove him without any difficulty right downhill, -while the Italian dragoons rode at Miranda’s battalions on his right. -Villacampa’s men fell into hopeless confusion, but what was worse was -that Miranda’s division, seeing their comrades break, gave way before -the cavalry without making any resistance whatever, apparently before -the French 44th had even got into touch with them on the flank. This -was a disgraceful business: the 7,000 Valencian infantry, and the -1,700 cavalry in support, were routed in ten minutes by half their own -numbers--one good cavalry regiment of 450 sabres sufficed to upset a -whole division of seven battalions--if a single one of them had formed -a steady square, the Italian horse ought to have been driven off with -ease! - -But this was not the end of the affair. San Juan’s horse were close -behind the routed divisions--O’Donnell ordered them up to save the -wrecks of his infantry: at the same time Mahy hurried forward two -battalions of his Murcians[28] to support San Juan, and began to -advance with the rest of his division down the slope of the Germanels -hill. - - [28] Burgos and Tiradores de Cadiz. - -After making havoc of the Valencian foot, Chlopiski had halted his -troops for a moment, wishing to be sure that matters were going well -with the French main body before he committed himself to any further -enterprise. But the temptation to go on was too great, for the routed -Spanish troops and their supports were weltering together in confusion -at the bottom of the hill. It is said that the dragoon colonel, -Schiazzetti, settled the matter for his superior, by charging at San -Juan’s horse the moment that he had got his squadrons re-formed. The -Valencian cavalry, though it outnumbered the Italians by two to one, -turned tail at once and bolted, riding over the two battalions of -Murcian infantry which were in its immediate rear, and carrying them -away in its panic. Chlopiski then led on his seven battalions against -the disordered mass in front of him, and swept the whole before him. It -gave way and fled uphill, horse and foot, the Murcian cavalry brigade -in reserve going off on the same panic-stricken way as the Valencian. -It was some time before Mahy could get a single regiment to stand--but -at last he found a sort of rearguard of two battalions (one of his -own, one of Villacampa’s[29]) which had kept together and were still -capable of obeying orders. The French were now exhausted; the infantry -could not follow in regular formation so fast as their enemy fled; the -handful of cavalry was dispersed, driving in prisoners on every side. -So Mahy and O’Donnell ultimately got off, with their men in a horde -scattered over the country-side--the cavalry leading the stampede and -the two rallied battalions bringing up the rear[30]. The Spanish left -wing lost over 2,000 prisoners, mainly from Miranda’s division, but -only some 400 killed and wounded; several guns from the divisional -batteries were of course lost. All this was over so early in the day -that the fighting on Blake’s right wing was at its hottest just when -the wrecks of his left were disappearing over the hills. Obispo, who -came up too late to help,[31] and the two detached battalions under -O’Ronan got off separately, more towards the north, retiring on Naquera. - - [29] Cuenca and Molina. - - [30] O’Ronan’s two battalions went off in a separate direction, - unpursued, and joined Obispo, not being in the rout. - - [31] See above, page 36. - -The tale of this part of the battle of Saguntum is lamentable. -There is no record so bad in the whole war: even the Gebora was a -well-contested fight compared with this--and at Belchite the army that -fled so easily gave way before numbers equal or superior to its own, -not inferior in the proportion of one to three. The fact was that the -Valencian troops had a long record of disasters behind them, were -thoroughly demoralized, and could not be trusted for one moment, and -that the Murcians (as Mahy confessed) were not much better. The defeat -was rendered more shameful by the fact that the smaller half of Blake’s -Army, the ‘Expeditionary Force,’ was at the same moment making head -in good style against numbers rather larger than its own, and seemed -for a moment about to achieve a splendid success. If the Spanish left, -17,000 strong, could have ‘contained’ half its own strength, if it -could have kept 8,000 instead of 4,000 French employed for one hour, -Blake might have relieved Saguntum and driven off Suchet. But the story -is disgraceful. Mahy wrote next morning to Blake, ‘I must tell you, -with my usual bluntness, that you had better sell the horses of this -cavalry, and draft the men into the infantry. I could not have believed -in the possibility of such conduct, if I had not seen it with my own -eyes take place and cost us so much[32].’ Blake actually gave orders -for one hussar regiment (a Murcian one) to be deprived of its horses -and drafted out. But did the infantry behave much better? - - [32] Quoted in Arteche, xi. p. 178. - -We may now turn to a less depressing narrative, the story of the -operations of Blake’s own wing. The Commander-in-Chief, as it will -be remembered, had with him the ‘Expeditionary Divisions,’ the -Valencian Reserve Division, and Loy’s and Caro’s 1,100 cavalry. He took -post himself on the height called El Puig, with one brigade of the -Valencians, to the south of the ravine of the Picador, which crosses -the plain in a diagonal direction. The rest of the troops went forward -in two columns: Zayas formed the right near the sea; his flank was -covered by a squadron of gunboats, which advanced parallel with him, -as near the shore as their draught permitted. He was ordered to push -on and get, if possible, round Suchet’s flank, where Habert’s line -was ‘refused,’ because of the guns of the flotilla, whose fire the -French wished to avoid. If successful Zayas was to try to communicate -with the garrison of Saguntum. Further inland Lardizabal’s division, -accompanied by the 1,100 cavalry, and followed by the other brigade -of the Valencian reserve, crossed the Picador at the bridge on the -_chaussée_, and deployed in the plain, directly opposite Harispe’s -division. The whole force was about equal to the French opposed to it. - -The two ‘Expeditionary Divisions’ went forward in good order and with -great confidence: Suchet remarks in his _Mémoires_ that in all his -previous campaigns he had never seen Spanish troops advance with such -resolution or in such good order[33]. Zayas, on the sea-flank, became -immediately engaged with Habert, before the village of Puzzol, in a -heavy fight, with exactly equal numbers--each had about 2,500 men. -Both sides lost heavily, and neither had any advantage: Suchet had -ordered Habert not to take the offensive till matters were settled in -the centre, but the defensive proved costly, and the Spaniards pushed -on--these were the same battalions which had behaved so well on the -hill of Albuera--Irlanda, Patria, and the Spanish and Walloon Guards. - - [33] _Mémoires_, ii. p. 182. - -Further to the left Lardizabal had deployed, after crossing the ravine, -with his two weak brigades in line; the Valencian reserve remained -behind near the bridge, but Loy’s and Caro’s cavalry came forward on -the right in support. Opposite the front brigade (Prieto’s) was a long -low mound, the last outlying spur of the Sancti Espiritus range. This -was soon seen by both sides to be a point of vantage--the army that -could occupy it would have a good artillery position commanding the -hostile line. Suchet ordered up Harispe’s right battalions to seize -it, and galloped thither in person at the head of his escort of fifty -hussars. But the Spaniards had also marked it, and the Marshal had -hardly reached its top when he found Prieto’s skirmishers swarming up -the slope. He had to retire, and rode back to bring up his infantry; -but, by the time that they had come forward, the enemy had formed a -hasty line of battle along the mound, with a battery in its centre. -Suchet had therefore to attack--which he did in full force, the four -battalions of the 7th Line forming a heavy column in the centre, while -those of the 116th and the 3rd of the Vistula deployed on each side -somewhat to the rear--a clear instance of the use of the _ordre mixte_ -which Napoleon loved. The left flank was covered by two squadrons of -the 4th Hussars and one of the 13th Cuirassiers, brought out from the -reserve. - -This was bringing 3,600 bayonets to bear against 1,500, for Prieto’s -brigade counted no more upon the mound. The attack was successful, but -not without severe loss: General Paris, leading on the 7th regiment, -was wounded, as were both his aides-de-camp, and Harispe’s horse was -killed under him; the Spanish artillery fire had been deadly. When -the mound was stormed, the Spanish infantry were forced back, but by -no means in disorder. They formed up again not far from its foot, -and Lardizabal brought up his second brigade to support his first, -placed two batteries in line, and stood to fight again. Suchet, having -re-formed Harispe’s men, found that he had before him a second combat -on the flat ground. The infantry on both sides were heavily engaged, -and six French guns had been brought forward to enfilade Lardizabal’s -right, when a new turn was given to the battle. The Spanish general -ordered Loy’s and Caro’s 1,100 cavalry to charge in mass upon the three -squadrons of hussars and cuirassiers which covered Harispe’s left. -The move was an unexpected one, and was concealed for some time by -scattered carob-trees: the attack was well delivered, and the French -horse, outnumbered by more than two to one, were completely routed and -fled in disorder. Loy then wheeled in upon the French flank, captured -three guns of the battery there placed, and nearly broke the 116th of -the Line, which had only just time to fall back and form itself _en -potence_ to the rest of the division. The remainder of the Spanish -cavalry pursued the retreating hussars. - -The moment looked black for the Marshal: he himself confesses in his -_Mémoires_ that if Harispe’s infantry had given way the battle might -have been lost[34]. But he had still a reserve: he sent back orders to -Palombini to bring up Saint Paul’s four Italian battalions into the -gap, and rode himself to the two squadrons of the 13th Cuirassiers -which had not yet advanced into the fight. They were only 350 sabres, -but the regiment was a fine one, and had won, at Margalef and other -fields, a great confidence in its ability to face long odds. They were -launched straight at the victorious Spanish cavalry, whose main body -was advancing in great disorder, and with its line broken by the groves -of carob-trees, while the remainder had turned inward against the -French infantry. The cuirassiers went straight through the squadrons -opposed to them, and swept them away: whereupon even those units of the -Spanish horse which had not been attacked wheeled round, and retreated -hastily toward the Picador ravine and its bridge. The cuirassiers -followed, upsetting everything in their front, and only halted on -the edge of the ravine, where they were checked by the fire of the -battery attached to the Valencian reserve, and the skirmishers of that -body, who had lined the farther edge of the depression[35]. Both the -Spanish brigadiers, Loy and Caro, had behaved very gallantly; both were -severely wounded, while trying to rally their men, and were left on the -field as prisoners. - - [34] _Mémoires_, ii. p. 185. - - [35] This account of the charge of the cuirassiers comes from - the _Mémoires_ of Colonel de Gonneville, who commanded their - leading squadron. There is a curious point to be settled here. - Marshal Suchet says (_Mémoires_, ii. p. 185) that he rode in - person to the head of the regiment, and harangued it shortly on - Margalef and other ancient glories, before bidding it charge. - While speaking he was struck by a spent ball on the shoulder. - But de Gonneville (who had read Suchet’s book, as he quotes - it in other places) says distinctly (p. 208 of his _Souvenirs - militaires_) that he received no orders, and charged on his own - responsibility. ‘N’ayant là d’ordre à recevoir de personne, - mais comprenant la nécessité d’arrêter cette masse de cavalerie - qui arrivait à nous, &c. ... je donnai le signal.’ Was Suchet - romancing about his little speech? Or was de Gonneville, who - wrote his _Mémoires_ forty years later, oblivious? Either - hypothesis is difficult. - -The defeat of the Spanish horse settled the day, which had for a moment -looked doubtful. At the sight of the French hussars breaking, and the -advance of their own line, the garrison of Saguntum, who had the whole -field in view from their lofty perch, had lined their walls, cheering -and waving their shakos in the air--despite of the shells from the -siege-batteries which continued to play upon them. The cheers died down -as the changed fortunes of the day became visible, and hearts sank in -the fortress. But the fighting was not yet concluded. - -[Illustration: SAGUNTUM] - -The rout of Loy’s and Caro’s horse had not directly affected -Lardizabal’s infantry, for the victorious cuirassiers had galloped -straight before them after the fugitives, though they had also ridden -over and captured a Spanish battery on the right of the line of -deployed battalions. The decisive blow in this quarter was given by -Saint Paul’s Italians, who, issuing from olive groves behind Harispe’s -left, came in upon the unprotected flank of Lardizabal’s troops, which -they rolled up, driving away at the same time a few squadrons which -had not been affected by the charge of the cuirassiers. These last -rode in among their own infantry, which was already hotly engaged -with Harispe’s battalions, and carried confusion down the line. The -division, which had hitherto fought most gallantly, gave way, and -retired in confusion towards the bridge over the Picador, and the -Cartuja where Lardizabal hoped to sustain himself by means of the -battery and the Valencian reserve battalions which he left there. - -Meanwhile Blake, from the summit of the knoll of El Puig, had witnessed -with impotent grief the rout of his right centre. He had placed himself -so far to the rear that no orders which he sent reached Lardizabal in -time, and the reserve which he had kept under his own hand, three raw -Valencian battalions and a battery, would have been too weak to save -the day, even if it had not been so far--two miles--from the central -focus of the fight as to make its arrival in time quite impossible. -The General, from the moment that he had given the original order to -advance, exercised no influence whatever on the operations; one of his -staff says that he sat on his horse in blank and stupid amazement at -the rout, and that some of those who watched him thought him wanting in -personal courage no less than in decision[36]. But at last he roused -himself to issue orders for the retreat of his broken left and centre -towards Valencia, and for the instant withdrawal of his still intact -right wing. - - [36] Schepeler, p. 473. - -Here Zayas’s division stood in a most difficult place, for though -it had been contending on equal terms with Habert’s in front of the -village of Puzzol, it is one thing to keep up a standing fight, and -another to withdraw from it with a victorious enemy pushing in upon the -flank. However, Zayas ordered his battalions back, and though pressed -by Habert, brought them in good order across the ravine and back to -the height of El Puig, where Blake stood waiting him with his small -reserve. Only one corps, the Walloon Guards, had thrown itself into -the houses of Puzzol, could not be extracted from them in time, and -was surrounded and captured. But this small disaster did much to save -the rest of the division, for so many of the French closed in upon the -village, where the Walloons made a good stand, that the pursuit was not -so hotly pushed as it might have been. If Suchet could have pressed -in upon Blake before Zayas joined him, the whole Spanish right column -might have been completely cut off from its retreat. But the Marshal -required some leisure to rearrange his line, after routing Lardizabal; -and by the time that he had sent off the rallied 4th Hussars to help -Chlopiski gather in prisoners, and had turned the Italians aside to -march against Blake, with Harispe in support, nearly two hours had gone -by, and the Spanish right, molested only by Habert, was drawing off -towards safety. Following the road along the sea-shore, it reached the -suburbs of Valencia without any further loss. - -Not so the unfortunate remnant of Lardizabal’s troops. They had halted -at the Cartuja, behind the Picador, while their general strove to -rally them on the reserve there left. This delay, though soldier-like -and proper, enabled Suchet to catch them up: he charged them with his -last fresh regiment, the 24th Dragoons, which had been kept in hand, -apparently behind Habert’s position, till the retreat of the Spanish -right began. Then, attacking along the high-road, these squadrons broke -in upon the half-rallied troops, swept them away, and captured two -guns put in battery across the _chaussée_, and badly supported by the -Valencian reserve battalions. Lardizabal’s column went off in great -disorder, and was hunted as far as the Caraixet stream, losing many -prisoners to the dragoons, as well as four flags. - -So ended the day; the loss of the Spaniards was not very heavy in -killed and wounded--about 1,000 it is said, mainly in Lardizabal’s -and Zayas’s divisions--for the others did not stand to fight. But -of prisoners they lost 4,641, including 230 officers and the two -wounded cavalry brigadiers. Miranda’s division contributed the -largest proportion to the captives, though Zayas lost 400 men of the -Walloon battalion, and Lardizabal a still greater number out of his -weak division of 3,000 bayonets[37]. Twelve guns were left behind, -seven captured in the hard fighting in the right centre, five from -O’Donnell’s easily-routed divisions. The French casualties are given by -Suchet at about 130 killed and 590 wounded--probably an understatement, -as the regimental returns show 55 officers hit, which at the ordinary -rate of casualties should imply over 1,000 rank and file disabled. -As a commentary on the fighting, it may be remarked that Chlopiski -and Robert, in dealing with Obispo, O’Donnell, and Mahy, had only 7 -officers _hors de combat_, while Harispe and Habert lost 41 in the real -fight with Zayas and Lardizabal[38]. - - [37] 2nd of Badajoz (two battalions) was almost exterminated, - losing 17 officers, 21 sergeants, and 500 men, ‘mostly - prisoners,’ out of 800 present. See its history in the Conde de - Clonard’s great work on the Spanish army. - - [38] The 16th Line (three battalions) alone, in fighting Zayas, - lost just double as many officers as the seven battalions of - Chlopiski and Robert in their engagement with Mahy, Miranda, and - Villacampa! - -The actual losses in action were not the worst part of the battle -of Saguntum--the real disaster was the plain demonstration that the -Valencian troops could not stand even against very inferior numbers. -It was to no purpose that the two gallant ‘Expeditionary Divisions’ -had sacrificed themselves, and lost one man in three out of their -small force of 5,500 men in hard fighting. They had been betrayed by -their worthless associates on the left. Blake’s generalship had not -been good--he dispersed his columns in the most reckless way, and kept -no sufficient reserves--but with the odds in his favour of 27,000 -men to 14,000, he ought yet to have won, if the larger half of his -army had consented to fight. They did not: with such troops no more -could be hoped from further battles in the open field--whatever the -numerical odds might be. They could at most be utilized behind walls -and entrenchments, for purely passive defence. And this, as we shall -see, was the deduction that their general made from the unhappy events -of October 25. - -Next morning Suchet sent in a summons to the garrison of Saguntum, and -the governor, Andriani, after short haggling for terms, surrendered. -He is not to be blamed: his garrison had seen the rout of Blake’s army -with their own eyes, and knew that there was no more hope for them. -They were, as we have seen, mainly raw troops, and their good bearing -up to this moment, rather than their demoralization after the battle, -should provoke notice. The French approaches were by this time within -a few yards of the Dos Mayo redoubt and its hastily patched breaches. -The artillery fire of the besiegers was rapidly levelling the whole -work, and the next storm, made on a wide front of shattered curtain, -must have succeeded. It is true that a governor of the type of Alvarez -of Gerona would then have held out for some time in the castle of San -Fernando. But Andriani’s troops were not like those of Alvarez, and he -himself was a good soldier, but not a fanatical genius. Two thousand -three hundred prisoners marched out on the 26th, leaving not quite 200 -men in hospital behind them. The 17 guns of the fortress were many of -them damaged, and the store of shot and shell was very low, though -there were plenty of infantry cartridges left[39]. - - [39] For details see Belmas, iv. pp. 140-3. - - - - -SECTION XXX: CHAPTER III - -THE CAPTURE OF VALENCIA AND OF BLAKE’S ARMY. NOVEMBER 1811-JANUARY 1812 - - -As the result of the disastrous battle of Saguntum Blake had lost the -fortress which had served him so well as an outwork: while his field -army was much decreased in numbers, and still more in self-confidence. -It was obviously impossible that he should ever again attempt to take -the offensive with it. But he was still in possession of Valencia -and all its resources, and his carefully fortified lines along the -Guadalaviar were so strong that even a defeated army could make some -stand behind them. He had still, after all his losses, more than 22,000 -men under arms[40]. Yet it is doubtful whether a resolute push on the -part of the enemy would not have dislodged him, for more than half his -army was in a state of complete demoralization. - - [40] A battalion or two left in Valencia, when the rest of the - army went out to deliver Saguntum, must be added to the 20,000 - men who came back from the battle. These corps were 2nd of Leon - of Lardizabal’s division, and one battalion of Savoya belonging - to Miranda. - -Suchet, however, had made up his mind not to strike at once; and when a -few days had passed, and the Spaniards had been granted time to settle -down into the lines, it would undoubtedly have been hazardous to attack -them with the very modest numbers that the Army of Aragon had still -in line. The chance would have been to press the pursuit hard, on the -very day after the battle. But when the Marshal had counted up his -losses in the trenches and the field, had deducted a small garrison -for Saguntum, and had detached a brigade to escort to Tortosa his -numerous prisoners, he thought himself too weak for a decisive blow. -He would not have had 15,000 men in hand, unless he should call up -Ficatier’s brigade from Segorbe and Oropesa, and this he did not want -to do, as he was entirely dependent for food and stores on the line of -communication which Ficatier was guarding. Accordingly he resolved to -defer his next blow at Blake, till he should have summoned from Aragon -Severoli’s division, and Reille’s too, if the Emperor would give him -leave to requisition that force. He could not utilize Reille without -that leave; but Severoli’s troops belonged to his own army, and were at -his disposition, if he should judge it possible to draw them southward -without endangering the safety of Aragon. This he was prepared to do, -if a sufficient garrison for that province could be provided from -another source. And the only obvious source was the Army of the North: -if the Emperor would consent to order Dorsenne to find troops to make -Saragossa and the line of the Ebro secure, it would not be over rash to -borrow both Severoli and Reille for operations against Valencia. But it -was clear that it would take some weeks for the permission to be sent -from Paris, and for the troops of the Army of the North to be moved, -when and if the permission was granted. We shall see, as a matter of -fact, that it was not till the end of December, two full months after -the battle of Saguntum, that the two divisions were collected on the -desired ground, and the final blow against Blake was delivered. - -Meanwhile Suchet could do no more than place his divisions in the -most favourable position for making the advance that would only be -possible when Severoli, and perhaps Reille also, should arrive. With -this object he pushed them forward on November 3 to the line of the -Guadalaviar, close in front of Blake’s long series of entrenchments. -Harispe on the right advanced to Paterna, Habert on the left to the -close neighbourhood of Valencia. He drove the Spanish outposts from -the outlying suburb of Serranos, which lay beyond the lines and on -the north side of the river, and also from the Grao, or port and mole -which forms the outlet of Valencia to the sea. It was most unlucky for -Blake, in the end, that his natural line of communication with the -Mediterranean and the English fleet lay north of the Guadalaviar, and -outside his line of fortifications. Indeed it looks as if there was a -cardinal fault in the planning of the defences when the Grao was left -outside them, for though rather remote from the city (two miles) it -would be of inestimable importance, supposing that the French were -to succeed in crossing the Guadalaviar and investing Valencia. With -the port safe, the defenders could receive succour and supplies to -any extent, and if finally reduced to extremity could retreat by sea. -Some of the energy which had been expended in throwing up the immense -fortified camp which embraced all the southern suburbs, and in lining -the river westward with batteries, might well have been diverted to -the fortification of the Grao and its connexion with the works of the -city. But probably Blake, in his looking forward to the possible events -of the future, did not contemplate among the contingencies to be faced -that of his being shut up with the greater part of his army within the -walls of Valencia. If he were forced from the lines of the Guadalaviar, -he must have intended to fall back inland or southward, and not to -allow himself to be surrounded in the capital. Otherwise it would -have been absolutely insane for him to leave unfortified, and abandon -without a struggle, Valencia’s sole outlet to the sea. - -Meanwhile finding himself for week after week unassailed in his lines, -Blake had to take stock of his position, and see if there was anything -that he could do to avert the attack which must come one day, and -which would obviously be formidable. For it had become known to him, -ere long, that Severoli’s division, and probably other troops, were -working in towards Valencia, and would certainly join Suchet before -the winter was over. The only expedients of which Blake made use were -to keep masses of men continuously at work strengthening his lines, -and to renew the attempt, which he had made fruitlessly in September, -for loosing Suchet’s hold on Valencia by launching against his rear -the irregulars of Aragon--the bands of the Empecinado, Duran, and the -minor chiefs. To add some solidity to their hordes he detached from -his army the Conde de Montijo, with one of the two brigades which Mahy -had brought from Murcia. This turbulent nobleman, more noted for his -intrigues than for his fighting power, was given a general command -over all the bands, and marched to join them with three battalions[41] -and a few guns--the latter provision was intended to obviate the -difficulty which the irregulars had experienced in October from their -want of artillery. Blake intended to call up Freire from Murcia with -another draft from the depleted ‘Third Army,’ whose best troops Mahy -had already led to Valencia. But, as we shall see, this detachment -was presently distracted to another quarter, and never joined the -main force. The nominal strength of the mass of troops along the -Guadalaviar was, however, increased by degrees, owing to the filling -of the ranks of the divisions cut up at Saguntum by men from the -half-trained reserve and dépôts. Miranda’s division in particular, -which had lost so many prisoners in the battle, was completed to more -than its original strength by absorbing three raw ‘third battalions’ -from the ‘Reserve Division,’ besides other drafts[42]. Blake also -endeavoured to make use of ‘urban guards’ and other levies of irregular -organization and more than doubtful value: the population in the north -of the kingdom, behind Suchet’s lines, were invited to form guerrillero -bands: but the Valencians never showed the zeal or energy of the -Catalans and Aragonese. The bands that appeared were few in numbers, -and accomplished nothing of note. Indeed, it appears that the patriotic -spirit of the province had run low. Mahy, in a letter to Blake of -this month, complains bitterly that the peasantry refuse to convey -letters for him, or even to give him information as to the position -and movements of the French, while he knew that hundreds of them were -visiting Suchet’s camps daily in friendly fashion[43]. It appears that -the people were sick of the war, and discontented with Blake, whose -conduct to the local authorities was even more injurious to him than -the uniform failure of all his military operations. - - [41] One battalion each of Badajoz, Burgos, and Tiradores de - Cuenca--under 2,000 men in all. - - [42] Four thousand strong at Saguntum, it surrendered on January - 8th, 5,513 strong. Of its quality, the less said the better. - - [43] Mahy to Blake quoted at length in Arteche, xi. p. 196, - footnote. - -The diversion to be conducted by Montijo and the irregulars in Aragon -constituted the only real hope of salvation for Blake and the city of -Valencia. But it was, we may say, doomed from the first to failure, -unless some favourable chance should intervene. A couple of thousand -regulars, with the aid of guerrillero bands, hard to assemble, and not -mustering at any time more than 6,000 or 7,000 men collected on one -spot, were sent to paralyse the movements of more than 20,000 French. -For to that figure Reille’s and Severoli’s divisions, together with -the original garrison left in Aragon under Musnier, most certainly -amounted. It cannot be denied that the diversion gave much trouble to -the enemy, but it never prevented him from executing any operation of -primary importance. On October 27th the Italian general, Mazzuchelli, -with one of Severoli’s brigades, drove off the Empecinado, and relieved -the long-besieged garrison of Molina, which he brought off, abandoning -the castle. But as he was returning to his chief, who then lay at -Daroca, the Empecinado fell on his marching column in the Pass of -Cubillejo, and inflicted severe damage upon it[44]. Severoli then sent -out a second column of 800 men, to relieve Almunia, on the road to -Saragossa, another outlying garrison. But Duran surprised and scattered -this party just as it reached its destination, and then captured the -fort with its garrison of 140 men (October 31). This provoked the enemy -to march against him in force, whereupon, after fighting an obstinate -engagement with Mazzuchelli near Almunia, in which the Italians lost -220 men, he turned sideways, and descended upon Daroca, which his -adversary had left weakly manned; he stormed the town and laid siege to -the fort. This brought down upon him Pannetier, with one of Reille’s -brigades: thereupon, wisely refusing to fight, Duran went up into the -mountains of Molina (November 1811). - - [44] For details see Vacani, v. pp. 470-1. - -Here he was joined some weeks later by the regular brigade under the -Conde de Montijo, which Blake had sent up from Valencia. This little -detachment had threaded its way among Reille’s columns, and had -narrowly escaped destruction near Albarracin. The Conde, assuming chief -command at the high-lying village of Mulmarcos, informed the Aragonese -guerrilleros that something desperate must be done, to relieve the -pressure on Valencia; and after sending for the Empecinado, who was -now beyond the mountains, in the province of Guadalajara, marched on -Calatayud. Unfortunately the Partida chiefs, accustomed to conduct -their expeditions on their own responsibility, viewed the advent of -Montijo, a stranger of no great military reputation, with jealousy -and dislike. Duran and the Conde having reached Ateca near Calatayud, -committed themselves to a serious combat with a column of 2,000 men -from its garrison, having every expectation of being succoured by the -Empecinado, who had reached their neighbourhood. He did not appear, -however, and they were repulsed. Thereupon the Spaniards parted, the -Conde and the regulars retiring to Torrehermosa, Duran to Deza, in the -province of Soria. The Empecinado, when all was over, sent in a letter -in which he explained that he had held off ‘because his officers and -soldiers had no confidence save in their own chief:’ but it was clear -that he himself wrecked the expedition out of self-willed indiscipline. - -The month of December was now far advanced, and nothing effective -had been done to help Blake. The Aragonese bands had cost Reille and -Severoli many toilsome marches, and had inflicted on them appreciable -losses--Severoli’s division was now 2,000 men weaker than it had -been in September. But they had failed entirely to stop the larger -movements of the enemy, who was able to move wherever he pleased with -a column of 3,000 men, though any lesser force was always in danger of -being harried or even destroyed. When Suchet determined that he would -again risk trouble in his rear, and would bring both the divisions -from the Ebro down to Valencia, no one could prevent him from doing -so. It is true that Severoli and Reille were leaving behind them a -country-side still infested by an active and obstinate enemy. But if -their generalissimo judged that he was prepared to take this risk, and -was determined to crush Blake before he completed the subjugation of -Upper Aragon, there was nothing that could hinder him from carrying out -his intention. By the middle of December Severoli was on his way to -the Guadalaviar by way of Teruel, and Reille followed not far behind, -though one of his brigades (Bourke’s) had been distracted, by being -ordered to conduct the prisoners from Saguntum to the French frontier, -and the other (Pannetier’s) had been drawn so far northward in hunting -Montijo and Duran that it was several marches behind the leading -columns. - -It was not, however, Reille and Severoli alone who were set in motion -for the ruin of Blake and Valencia. Nor was Suchet’s mind the final -controlling force of the operations which were to spread all over -eastern Spain in the months of December 1811 and January 1812. The -Emperor, when he hurried the Army of Aragon forward in September, had -explained that this was the crucial point of the war, and repeated in -November that ‘l’important, dans ce moment, est la prise de Valence.’ -Portugal could wait--Wellington, with 18,000 men sick, and forced to -remain on the defensive,--was a negligible quantity during the winter: -he should be dealt with in the spring by a general combination of -all the French armies[45]. Acting on this comfortable but erroneous -hypothesis, Napoleon determined to shift eastward and southward not -only Reille and Severoli, but other troops from the armies which were -directly or indirectly opposed to Wellington, so as to alter for a -time the general balance of forces on the Portuguese side of the -Peninsula. On October 18th, before the battle of Saguntum had been -fought and won, Berthier had been directed to write to Marmont that, -for the support of the invasion of Valencia, King Joseph and the Army -of the Centre would be ordered to send troops to Cuenca, to take Blake -in the rear. In consequence the Army of Portugal must ‘facilitate the -task of the King,’ i. e. find detachments to occupy those parts of New -Castile from which Joseph would have to withdraw the normal garrison -for his expedition to Cuenca. But presently it became evident that the -Army of the Centre would have great difficulty in providing a column -strong enough to make this diversion, even if it were relieved in La -Mancha, or the province of Toledo, by units belonging to Marmont. -Napoleon then made the all-important determination to borrow troops -from the Army of Portugal for the Valencian expedition. By this time -he knew of the battle of Saguntum, and had received Suchet’s appeals -for reinforcements. His dispatch to Marmont of November 20th informs -the Marshal that he must provide a division of 6,000 men of all arms, -to join the disposable force which King Joseph can spare for the -assistance of Suchet. The still more important dispatch of the next day -varied the orders in an essential detail, by saying that the Marshal -must send not ‘a detachment of 6,000 men’ but _such a force as, united -to the column supplied by King Joseph, would provide a total of 12,000 -men for the diversion_.’ And it was added that, in addition, the Army -of Portugal would have to find 3,000 or 4,000 men more, to keep up the -communications of the expeditionary force with its base in New Castile. -The detachment might be made without any fear of adverse consequences, -since Wellington had 20,000 men in hospital, and barely as many in -a state to take the field, so no risk would be run in depleting the -force opposed to him [46]. Napoleon, conveniently ignoring the exact -wording of his own dispatch, reproached Marmont (when evil results had -followed) for having detached ‘an army corps and thirty guns’ for the -diversion, instead of ‘a light flying column.[47]’ But it will be seen -that the Marshal was literally obeying the orders given him when he -moved 12,000 men towards Valencia. For the Army of the Centre provided -not much more than 3,000 men under General d’Armagnac for the Cuenca -expedition[48], and Marmont had, therefore, to find 9,000 men to bring -it up to the strength which the Emperor prescribed, as well as the -3,000-4,000 men to cover the line of communications. - - [45] _Correspondance de Napoléon_, 18,267, and cf. pp. 590-2 of - vol. iv of this work. - - [46] See these dispatches printed in full in Marmont’s - _Mémoires_, iv. pp. 256-8. This wording is most important and - should be studied with care. Note that Wellington’s sick have - gone up from 18,000 to 20,000 in twenty-four hours, to oblige the - Emperor. - - [47] Berthier to Marmont, January 23, 1812. Printed in the - latter’s _Mémoires_, iv. pp. 297-9. - - [48] Though King Joseph had said that if Marmont took over the - whole of La Mancha, he could then reinforce d’Armagnac up to - 8,000 men. This he never really accomplished (Joseph to Berthier, - Nov. 26). - -All these dispatches reached Marmont’s head-quarters at Plasencia with -the tardiness that was normal in Spain, where officers bearing orders -had to be escorted by detachments many hundreds strong, supposing -that their certain arrival at their destination was desired. If they -travelled rapidly and unescorted, they became the inevitable prey of -the guerrilleros. The dispatch of October 18th, saying that Marmont -must replace King Joseph’s garrisons in La Mancha, came to hand on -November 11, and the Marshal accordingly directed Foy’s division, then -at Toledo, to break itself up and occupy the various posts which the -German division of the Army of the Centre had been holding. Foy set out -to fulfil these orders on November 22. - -The Emperor’s second and third dispatches, those of November 20-21st, -turned up on December 13th[49], and Marmont found himself under orders -to find 9,000 men for the Cuenca expedition,--since d’Armagnac had -only 3,000 men to contribute--and in addition 3,000-4,000 more for -the line of communications. Now the Marshal was as fully convinced -as his master that Wellington was not in a condition to move, or to -do any serious harm, and under this impression, and being probably -stirred (as Napoleon afterwards remarked)[50] by the desire to increase -his own reputation by a dashing feat of arms, he resolved to take -charge of the expedition in person. He ordered that the divisions -of Foy and Sarrut--both weak units, the one of eight, the other of -nine battalions[51]--and Montbrun’s light cavalry should prepare to -march under his own charge to join d’Armagnac, and move on Valencia. -Another division should come into La Mancha to take up the cantonments -evacuated by Foy, and keep over the line of communications. Clausel -should be left in charge of the remainder of the army, and observe -Wellington. - - [49] Date fixed by Marmont’s letter to Berthier of Feb. 6. - - [50] ‘Sa Majesté (writes Berthier) pense que, dans cette - circonstance, vous avez plus calculé votre gloire personnelle que - le bien de son service,’ Jan. 23, letter quoted above on the last - page. - - [51] Each division had about 4,000 or 4,500 men: the light - cavalry about 1,700, so the whole would have made about 10,000 - sabres and bayonets. - -This scheme was never carried out, for on December 20 Marmont received -another dispatch, ordering him to transfer his head-quarters to -Valladolid, and to move a large part of his army into Old Castile. Of -this more hereafter. But being thus prevented (for his own good fortune -as it turned out) from going on the expedition, he gave over Foy’s and -Sarrut’s divisions to Montbrun, and bade him execute the diversion. He -himself went, as ordered, to Valladolid. If he had received the last -dispatch a little later, or had started a little earlier, he would have -been put in the ignominious position of being absent from his own point -of danger, when Wellington suddenly struck at Ciudad Rodrigo in the -early days of January. - -Montbrun, his substitute, had drawn together his forces in La Mancha by -the 29th of December, but receiving from d’Armagnac, who was already -on the move with 3,000 men, the assurance that the road from Cuenca to -Valencia was practically impassable at midwinter, and that he could -certainly get no guns along it, he resolved to take another route -towards the scene of active operations. Accordingly he set out to march -by the road San Clemente, Chinchilla, Almanza, which runs across the -upland plain of La Mancha and Northern Murcia, and does not cross rough -ground till it nears the descent to the sea-coast on the borders of -Valencia. The column did not leave San Clemente and El Probencio till -January 2, and (as we shall see) was too late to help Suchet, who had -brought matters to a head long before it drew near him. - -Meanwhile d’Armagnac, though his force was trifling[52], had been of -far greater use. He had reoccupied Cuenca, but finding (as he had -informed Montbrun) that the roads in that direction were impracticable, -had swerved southward, avoiding the mountains, and getting to Tarazona -in La Mancha, marched towards the passes of the Cabriel River, and the -road on to Valencia by way of Requeña. His approach being reported to -Blake, who had no troops in this direction save two battalions under -Bassecourt, the Captain-General was seized with a natural disquietude -as to his rear, for he had no accurate knowledge of the French -strength. Wherefore he directed General Freire, with the succours which -he had been intending to draw up from Murcia, to abandon the idea of -reinforcing the main army, and to throw himself between d’Armagnac and -Valencia [November 20]. The French general, beating the country on -all sides, and thrusting before him Bassecourt’s small force and the -local guerrilleros, marched as far as Yniesta, and forced the passage -of the Cabriel at Valdecañas, but finding that he had got far away -from Montbrun, who did not march till many days after he himself had -started, and being informed that Freire, with a very large force, was -coming in upon his rear, he stopped before reaching Requeña and turned -back towards La Mancha[53]. He had succeeded, however, in preventing -Freire from reinforcing Valencia, and the Murcian succours never got -near to Blake. He even for a time distracted troops from the main -Spanish army, for Zayas was sent for some days to Requeña, and only -returned just in time for the operations that began on December 25th. -The net outcome, therefore, of Montbrun’s and d’Armagnac’s operations -was simply to distract Freire’s division from Valencia at the critical -moment--an appreciable but not a decisive result. - - [52] Apparently four or five battalions of the German division - gathered from La Mancha, and a brigade of dragoons. Joseph calls - it in his _Correspondance_ 3,000 men, when describing this - operation (Joseph to Berthier, Nov. 12, 1811). - - [53] D’Armagnac’s obscure campaign will be found chronicled - in detail in the narrative of the Baden officer, Riegel, iii. - pp. 357-60, who shared in it along with the rest of the German - division from La Mancha. - -Meanwhile Suchet found himself able to deliver his decisive blow on the -Guadalaviar. By his orders Severoli and Reille had drawn southward by -way of Teruel, deliberately abandoning most of Aragon to the mercy of -the insurgent bands; for though Caffarelli had moved some battalions -of the Army of the North to Saragossa and the posts along the Ebro, -the rest of the province was left most inadequately guarded by the -small force that had originally been committed to Musnier’s charge, -when first Suchet marched on Valencia. Musnier himself accompanied -Severoli’s division, leaving his detachments under Caffarelli’s orders, -for he had been directed to come to the front and assume the command -of his old brigades, those of Ficatier and Robert, both now with the -main army. When Reille and the Italians marched south, Aragon was -exposed to the inroads of Montijo, Duran, the Empecinado, and Mina, -all of whom had been harried, but by no means crushed, by the late -marches and countermarches of the French. That trouble would ensue both -Napoleon and Suchet were well aware. But the Emperor had made up his -mind that all other considerations were to be postponed to the capture -of Valencia and the destruction of Blake’s army. When these ends were -achieved, not only Reille and Severoli, but other troops as well, -should be drawn northwards, to complete the pacification of Aragon, and -to make an end of the lingering war in Catalonia. - -Severoli had reached Teruel on November 30, but was ordered to await -the junction of Reille’s troops, and these were still far off. Indeed -Reille himself only started from Saragossa with Bourke’s brigade on -December 10th, and Pannetier’s brigade (which had been hunting Duran in -the mountains) was two long marches farther behind. Without waiting for -its junction, Severoli and Reille marched from Teruel on December 20th, -and reached Segorbe unopposed on the 24th. Here they were in close -touch with Suchet, and received orders to make a forced march to join -him, as he intended to attack the lines of the Guadalaviar on the 26th. -To them was allotted the most important move in the game, for they were -to cross the Guadalaviar high up, beyond the westernmost of Blake’s -long string of batteries and earthworks, and to turn his flank and get -in his rear, while the Army of Aragon assailed his front, and held him -nailed to his positions by a series of vigorous attacks. The point on -which Reille and Severoli were to march was Ribaroja, fifteen miles -up-stream from Valencia. - -When the two divisions from Aragon should have arrived, Suchet could -count on 33,000 men in line, but as Pannetier was still labouring up -two marches in the rear, it was really with 30,000 only that he struck -his blow--a force exceeding that which Blake possessed by not more -than 6,000 or 7,000 bayonets. Considering the strength of the Spanish -fortifications the task looked hazardous: but Suchet was convinced, -and rightly, that the greater part of the Army of Valencia was still -so much demoralized that much might be dared against it: and the event -proved him wise. - -On the night of December 25th all the divisions of the Army of Aragon -had abandoned their cantonments, and advanced towards the Spanish -lines--Habert on the left next the sea; Palombini to the west of -Valencia, opposite the village of Mislata; Harispe and Musnier farther -up-stream, opposite Quarte. The cavalry accompanied this last column. -Reille and Severoli, on their arrival, were to form the extreme -right of the line, and would extend far beyond the last Spanish -entrenchments. The weak Neapolitan division alone (now not much over -1,000 strong) was to keep quiet, occupying the entrenched position in -the suburb of Serranos, which faced the city of Valencia. Its only duty -was to hold on to its works, in case Blake should try a sortie at this -spot, with the purpose of breaking the French line in two. That such -a weak force was left to discharge such an important function, is a -sufficient proof of Suchet’s belief in Blake’s incapacity to take the -offensive. - -The lines which the French were about to assail were rather long than -strong, despite of the immense amount of labour that had been lavished -on them during the last three months. Their extreme right, on the side -of the sea, and by the mouth of the Guadalaviar was a redoubt (named -after the Lazaretto hard by) commanding the estuary: from thence a -long line of earthworks continued the defences as far as the slight -hill of Monte Oliveto, which guarded the right flank of the great -entrenched camp of which the city formed the nucleus. Here there was -a fort outside the walls, and connected with them by a ditch and a -bastioned line of earthworks, reaching as far as the citadel at the -north-east corner of the town. From thence the line of resistance -for some way was formed of the mediaeval wall of Valencia itself, -thirty feet high and ten thick. It was destitute of a parapet broad -enough to bear guns: but the Spaniards had built up against its back, -at irregular distances, scaffolding of heavy beams, and terraces of -earth, on which a certain amount of cannon were mounted. The gates were -protected by small advanced works, mounting artillery. Blake had made -Valencia and its three outlying southern and western suburbs of Ruzafa, -San Vincente, and Quarte into a single place of defence, by building -around those suburbs a great line of earthworks and batteries. It was -an immense work consisting of bastioned entrenchments provided with -a ditch eighteen feet deep, and filled in some sections with water. -From the city the line of defence along the river continued as far -as the village of Manises, with an unbroken series of earthworks and -batteries. The Guadalaviar itself formed an outer obstacle, being a -stream running through low and marshy ground, and diverted into many -water-cuts for purposes of irrigation. - -The continuous line of defences from the sea as far as Manises was -about eight miles long. It possessed some outworks on the farther bank -of the Guadalaviar, three of the five bridges which lead from Valencia -northward having been left standing by Blake, with good _têtes-de-pont_ -to protect them from Suchet’s attacks. Thus the Spaniards had the -power to debouch on to the French side of the river at any time that -they pleased. This fact added difficulties to the projected attack -which the Marshal was planning. - -The troops behind the lines of the Guadalaviar consisted of some -23,000 regulars, with a certain amount of local urban guards and -armed peasantry whose number it is impossible to estimate with any -precision--probably they gave some 3,000 muskets more, but their -fighting value was almost negligible. The right of the line, near -the sea, was entirely made over to these levies of doubtful value. -Miranda’s division manned the fort of Monte Oliveto and the whole north -front of the city. Lardizabal garrisoned the earthworks from the end of -the town wall as far as the village of Mislata. This last place and its -works fell to the charge of Zayas. Creagh’s Murcians were on Zayas’s -left at Quarte: finally the western wing of the army was formed by -the Valencian divisions of Obispo and Villacampa; holding San Onofre -and Manises, where the fortifications ended. The whole of the cavalry -was placed so as to cover the left rear of the lines, at Aldaya and -Torrente. A few battalions of the raw ‘Reserve Division’ were held in -the city as a central reserve. The arrangements of Blake seem liable -to grave criticism, since he placed his two good and solid divisions, -those of Lardizabal and Zayas, in the strongest works in the centre of -his line, but entrusted his left flank, where a turning movement by -the French might most easily take place, to the demoralized battalions -of Villacampa and Obispo, who had a consistent record of rout and -disaster behind them. It is clear that lines, however long, can always -be turned, unless their ends rest, as did those of Torres Vedras, on -an impassable obstacle such as the sea. If the French should refuse -to attack the works in front, and should march up the Guadalaviar to -far beyond the last battery, it would be impossible to prevent them -from crossing, all the more so because, after Manises, the network of -canals and water-cuts, which makes the passage difficult in the lower -course of the river, comes to an end, and the only obstacle exposed to -the invader is a single stream of no great depth. Blake, therefore, -should have seen that the critical point was the extreme west end of -his lines, and should have placed there his best troops instead of his -worst. Moreover he appears to have had no proper system of outposts -of either cavalry or infantry along the upper stream, for (as we -shall see) the first passage of the French was made not only without -opposition, but without any alarm being given. Yet there were 2,000 -Spanish cavalry only a few miles away, at Torrente and Aldaya. - -Suchet’s plan of attack, which he carried out the moment that Reille -joined him, and even before the latter’s rearmost brigade had got up -into line, was a very ambitious one, aiming not merely at the forcing -of the Guadalaviar or the investment of Valencia, but at the trapping -of the whole Spanish army. It was conducted on such a broad front, and -with such a dispersion of the forces into isolated columns, that it -argued a supreme contempt for Blake and his generalship. Used against -such a general as Wellington it would have led to dreadful disaster. -But Suchet knew his adversary. - -The gist of the plan was the circumventing of the Spanish lines by two -columns which, starting one above and the other below Valencia, were -to cross the river and join hands to the south of the city. Meanwhile -the main front of the works was to be threatened (and if circumstances -favoured, attacked) by a very small fraction of the French army. Near -the sea Habert’s division was to force the comparatively weak line of -works at the estuary, and then to cut the road which runs from Valencia -between the Mediterranean and the great lagoon of the Albufera. Far -inland the main striking force of the army, composed of the divisions -of Harispe and Musnier, with all the cavalry, and with Reille’s three -brigades following close behind, was to pass the Guadalaviar at -Ribaroja, three or four miles above Manises, and from thence to extend -along the south front of the Spanish lines, take them in the rear, and -push on so as to get into touch with Habert. Compère’s weak Neapolitan -brigade was to block the bridge-heads out of which Blake might make -a sally northward. Palombini’s Italians were to press close up to -Mislata, which Suchet judged to be the weakest point in the Spanish -lines, and to deliver against it an attack which was to be pushed more -or less home as circumstances might dictate. The whole force employed -(not counting Pannetier’s brigade, which had not yet joined Reille) -was just 30,000 men. Of these 25,000 were employed in the flanking -movements; less than 5,000 were left to demonstrate against Blake’s -front along the lines of the Guadalaviar. - -The main and decisive blow was of course to be delivered by Harispe, -Musnier, and Reille, who were to cross the river at a point where the -Spaniards were unlikely to make any serious opposition, since it was -outside their chosen ground of defence, and was clearly watched rather -than held. If 20,000 men crossed here, and succeeded in establishing -themselves south of Valencia by a rapid march, Blake would find his -lines useless, and would be forced to fight in the open, in order to -secure a retreat southward, or else to shut himself and his whole force -up in the entrenched camp around the city. Suchet could accept either -alternative with equanimity: a battle, as he judged, meant a victory, -the breaking up of the Spanish army and the capture of Valencia. If, -on the other hand, Blake refused to fight a general engagement, and -retired within his camp, it would lead to his being surrounded, and -the desired end would only be deferred for a few days. There were only -two dangers--one was that the Spanish general might abscond southward -with the bulk of his army, without fighting, the moment that he heard -that his enemy was across the Guadalaviar. The second was that, waiting -till the French main body was committed to its flank march, he might -break out northward by the three bridges in his hands, overwhelm the -Neapolitans, and escape towards Liria and Segorbe into the mountains. -Suchet judged that his enemy would try neither of these courses; he -would not be timid enough to retreat on the instant that he learnt that -his left wing was beginning to be turned; nor would he be resourceful -enough to strike away northward, as soon as he saw that the turning -movement was formidable and certain of success. Herein Suchet judged -aright. - -At nightfall on the 25th-26th of December two hundred hussars, each -carrying a voltigeur behind him, forded the Guadalaviar at Ribaroja, -and threw out a chain of posts which brushed off a few Spanish cavalry -vedettes. The moment that the farther bank was clear, the whole force -of Suchet’s engineers set to work to build two trestle-bridges for -infantry, and to lay a solid pontoon bridge higher up for guns and -cavalry. A few hours later Harispe’s division began to pass--then -Musnier’s, lastly Boussard’s cavalry. The defile took a long time, -and even by dawn Reille’s three brigades had not arrived or begun to -pass. But by that time ten thousand French were over the river. The -Spanish vedettes had reported, both to their cavalry generals at Aldaya -and to Blake at Valencia, that the enemy was busy at Ribaroja, but -had not been able to judge of his force, or to make out that he was -constructing bridges. Their commanders resolved that nothing could -be done in the dark, and that the morning light would determine the -character of the movement[54]. - - [54] So Suchet’s narrative (_Mémoires_, ii. pp. 214-15). Belmas - says that only one bridge was finished when Harispe and Musnier - passed--the others after dawn only. - -The late December sun soon showed the situation. Harispe’s division -was marching on Torrente, to cut the high-road to Murcia. The cavalry -and one brigade of Musnier were preparing to follow: the other brigade -of the second division (Robert’s) was standing fast by the bridges, to -cover them till Reille should appear and cross. But while this was the -most weighty news brought to Blake, he was distracted by intelligence -from two other quarters. Habert was clearly seen coming down by the -seaside, to attack at the estuary; and Palombini was also approaching -in the centre, in front of Mislata. The daylight was the signal for the -commencement of skirmishing on each of the three far-separated points. -Blake, strange as it may appear, made up his mind at first that the -real danger lay on the side next the sea, and that Habert’s column was -the main striking force[55]. But when it became clear that this wing -of the French army was not very strong, and was coming on slowly, he -turned his attention to Palombini, whose attack on Mislata was made -early, and was conducted in a vigorous style. It was to this point that -he finally rode out from the city, and he took up his position behind -Zayas, entirely neglecting the turning movement on his left--apparently -because it was out of sight, and he could not make the right deduction -from the reports which his cavalry had brought him. - - [55] For Blake’s opinions and actions see the record of his - staff-officer, Schepeler (pp. 502-3). - -Meanwhile Harispe’s column, pushing forward with the object of -reaching the high-road from Valencia to Murcia, the natural route -for Blake’s army to take, if it should attempt to escape southward, -ran into the main body of the Spanish horse, which was assembling in -the neighbourhood of the village of Aldaya. The French infantry were -preceded by a squadron of hussars, who were accompanied by General -Boussard, the commander of Suchet’s cavalry division. This small force -was suddenly encompassed and cut up by several regiments of Martin -Carrera’s brigade. Boussard was overthrown and left for dead--his sword -and decorations were stripped from his body. But more French squadrons -began to come up, and Harispe’s infantry opened fire on the Spaniards, -who were soon forced to retire hurriedly--they rode off southward -towards the Xucar river. They were soon completely out of touch with -the rest of Blake’s army. - -Harispe’s column then continued its way, sweeping eastward towards the -Murcian _chaussée_ in the manner that Suchet had designed; but the rest -of the operations of the French right wing were not so decisive as its -commander had hoped. Mahy, learning of the movement of the encircling -column, and seeing Robert’s brigade massed opposite the extreme flank -of his position at Manises, while some notice of Reille’s near approach -also came to hand, suddenly resolved that he would not be surrounded, -and abandoned all his lines before they were seriously attacked. He -had the choice of directing Villacampa and Obispo to retire towards -Valencia and join Blake for a serious battle in the open, or of bidding -them strike off southward and eastward, and escape towards the Xucar, -abandoning the main body of the army. He chose the second alternative, -and marched off parallel with Harispe’s threatening column, directing -each brigade to get away as best it could. His force at once broke up -into several fractions, for the cross-roads were many and perplexing. -Some regiments reached the Murcian _chaussée_ before Harispe, and -escaped in front of him, pursued by the French cavalry. Others, coming -too late, were forced to forgo this obvious line of retreat, and to -struggle still farther eastward, only turning south when they got -to the marshy borders of the lagoon of Albufera. Obispo, with 2,000 -of his men, was so closely hunted by the hostile cavalry that he -barely found safety by striking along the narrow strip of soft ground -between the lagoon and the sea. On the morning of the 27th he struggled -through to Cullera near the mouth of the Xucar: Mahy, with the greater -part of Villacampa’s division and some of Obispo’s and Creagh’s, -arrived somewhat earlier at Alcira, higher up the same stream, where -he found the fugitive cavalry already established. The divisions were -much disorganized, but they had lost very few killed or wounded, and -not more than 500 prisoners. Mahy rallied some 4,000 or 5,000 men at -Alcira, and Obispo a couple of thousand at Cullera, but they were a -‘spent force,’ not fit for action. Many of the raw troops had disbanded -themselves and gone home. - -[Illustration: VALENCIA The Siege (Dec 1811-Jan 1812)] - -Thus three-sevenths of Blake’s army were separated from Valencia -and their Commander-in-Chief without having made any appreciable -resistance. But it seems doubtful whether Mahy should be blamed--if he -had waited an hour longer in his positions his whole corps might have -been captured. If he had retired towards Valencia he would have been, -in all probability, forced to surrender with the rest of the army a -few days later. And in separating himself from his chief he had the -excuse that he knew that Blake’s intention had been to retire towards -the Xucar if beaten, not to shut himself up in Valencia. He may have -expected that the rest of the army would follow him southward, and -Blake (as we shall see) probably had the chance of executing that -movement, though he did not seize it. - -Meanwhile the progress of the engagement in other quarters must be -detailed. Palombini made a serious attempt to break through the left -centre of the Spanish lines at Mislata. His task was hard, not so -much because of the entrenchments, or of the difficulty of crossing -the Guadalaviar, which was fordable for infantry, but from the many -muddy canals and water-cuts with which the ground in front of him -abounded. These, though not impassable for infantry, prevented guns -from getting to the front till bridges should have been made for -them. The Italians waded through the first canal, and then through -the river, but were brought to a stand by the second canal, that of -Fabara, behind which the Spanish entrenchments lay. After a furious -fire-contest they had to retire as far as the river, under whose bank -many sought refuge--some plunged in and waded back to the farther side. -Palombini rallied them and delivered a second attack; but at only one -point, to the left of Mislata, did the assault break into the Spanish -line. Zayas, aided by a battalion or two which Mahy had sent up from -Quarte, vindicated his position, and repulsed the attack with heavy -loss. But when the news came from the left that Harispe had turned the -lines, and when Mahy’s troops were seen evacuating all their positions -and hurrying off, Zayas found himself with his left flank completely -exposed. - -Blake made some attempt to form a line _en potence_ to Zayas’s -entrenchments, directing two or three of Creagh’s battalions from -Quarte and some of his reserve from the city to make a stand at the -village of Chirivella. But the front was never formed--attacked by some -of Musnier’s troops these detachments broke up, Creagh’s men flying to -follow Mahy, and the others retiring to the entrenched camp. - -Thereupon Blake ordered Zayas and Lardizabal, who lay to his right, to -retreat into Valencia before they should be turned by the approaching -French. The movement was accomplished in order and at leisure, and all -the guns in and about the Mislata entrenchments were brought away. -Palombini had been too hardly handled to attempt to pursue. - -The General-in-Chief seemed stunned by the suddenness of the disaster. -‘He looked like a man of stone,’ says Schepeler, who rode at his side, -‘when any observation was made to him he made no reply, and he could -come to no decision. He would not allow Zayas to fight, and when a -colonel (the author of this work) suggested at the commencement of -the retreat that it would be well to burn certain houses which lay -dangerously close to the entrenched camp, he kept silence. Whereupon -Zayas observed in bitter rage to this officer: “Truly you are dull, -my German friend; do you not see that you cannot wake the man up?”’ -According to the narratives of several contemporaries there would still -have been time at this moment to direct the retreating column southward -and escape, as Obispo did, along the Albufera. For Habert (as we shall -see) had been much slower than Harispe in his turning movement by the -side of the Mediterranean. Some, among them Schepeler, suggest that -the whole garrison might have broken out by the northern bridges and -got away. For Palombini was not in a condition to hinder them, and the -Neapolitans in front of the bridge-heads were but a handful of 1,200 -men. But the General, still apparently unconscious of what was going on -about him, drew back into the entrenched camp, and did no more. - -Habert, meanwhile, finally completed his movement, and joined hands -with Harispe at last. His lateness was to be accounted for not by the -strength of the opposition made by the irregular troops in front of -him, but by the fact that his advance had been much hindered by the -fire of the flotilla lying off the mouth of the Guadalaviar. Here -there was a swarm of gunboats supported by a British 74 and a frigate. -Habert would not commence his passage till he had driven them away, by -placing a battery of sixteen siege-guns on the shore near the Grao. -After much firing the squadron sheered off[56], and about midday the -French division crossed the Guadalaviar, partly by fording, partly -on a hastily constructed bridge, and attacked the line of scattered -works defended by irregulars which lay behind. The Spaniards were -successively evicted from all of them, as far as the fort of Monte -Oliveto. Miranda’s division kept within the entrenched camp, and gave -no assistance to the bands without; but it was late afternoon before -Habert had accomplished his task, and finally got into touch with -Harispe. - - [56] Napier says (iv. p. 30) that the gunboats fled without - firing a shot. Suchet and Schepeler speak of much firing, as does - Arteche. - -Blake was thus shut up in Valencia with the divisions of Miranda, -Zayas, and Lardizabal, and what was left of his raw reserve battalions: -altogether some 17,000 fighting-men remained with him. The loss in -actual fighting had been very small--about 500 killed and wounded -and as many prisoners. The French captured a good many guns in the -evacuated works and a single standard. Suchet returned his total -casualties at 521 officers and men, of whom no less than 50 killed -and 355 wounded were among Palombini’s Italians--the only corps which -can be said to have done any serious fighting[57]. The Marshal’s -strategical combination would have been successful almost without -bloodshed, if only Palombini had not pressed his attack so hard, and -with so little necessity. But the Spanish army, which was drawn out on -a long front of nine miles, without any appreciable central reserve, -and with no protection for its exposed flank, was doomed to ruin the -moment that the enemy appeared in overwhelming force, beyond and behind -its extreme left wing. Blake’s only chance was to have watched every -ford with great vigilance, and to have had a strong flying column of -his best troops ready in some central position, from which it could be -moved out to dispute Suchet’s passage without a moment’s delay. Far -from doing this, he tied down his two veteran divisions to the defence -of the strongest part of his lines, watched the fords with nothing but -cavalry vedettes, and kept no central reserve at all, save 2,000 or -3,000 men of his untrustworthy ‘Reserve Division.’ In face of these -dispositions the French were almost bound to be successful. A disaster -was inevitable, but Blake might have made it somewhat less ruinous if -he had recognized his real position promptly, and had ordered a general -retreat, when Harispe’s successful turning movement became evident. In -this case he would have lost Valencia, but not his army. - - [57] No less than three of the Italian colonels were hit, and - thirty-four officers in all. - -As it was, a week more saw the miserable end of the campaign. Suchet’s -first precaution was to ascertain whether there was any danger from -the fraction of the Spanish army which Mahy and Obispo had carried -off. He was uncertain how strong they were, and whether they were -prepared to attack him in the rear, supposing that he should sit down -to the siege of Valencia. Accordingly he sent out at dawn on the 26th -December two light columns of cavalry and voltigeurs against Alcira -and Cullera, whither he knew that the refugees had retired. These two -reconnaissances in force discovered the enemy in position, but the -moment that they were descried Mahy retreated towards Alcoy, and Obispo -towards Alicante--both in such haste and disorder that it was evident -that they had no fighting spirit left in them. - -Suchet, therefore, was soon relieved of any fear of danger from this -side, and could make his arrangements for the siege. He sent back to -the north bank of the Guadalaviar the whole division of Musnier, which -was there joined three days later by Reille’s belated brigade, that of -Pannetier. Harispe, Habert, Severoli, and Reille’s other French brigade -(that of Bourke) formed the investment on the southern bank. Palombini -lay astride of the river near Mislata, with one brigade on each bank. -The whole force of 33,000 men was sufficient for the task before it. -The decisive blow would have to be given by the siege artillery; the -whole train which had captured Saguntum had long been ready for its -work. And it had before it not regular fortifications of modern type, -but, in part of the circumference of Blake’s position, mediaeval walls -not built to resist artillery, in the rest the ditch and bank of the -entrenched camp, which, though strong as a field-work, could not be -considered capable of resisting a formal attack by a strong siege-train. - -Blake was as well aware of this as Suchet, and he also knew (what -Suchet could not) that the population of 100,000 souls under his charge -had only 10 days’ provision of flour and 19 or 20 of rice and salt -fish. The city, like the army, had been living on daily convoys from -the south, and had no great central reserves of food. If he should sit -down, like Palafox at Saragossa, to make an obstinate defence behind -improvised works, he would be on the edge of starvation in less than -three weeks. But such a defence was impossible in face of the spirit -of the people, who looked upon Blake as the author of all their woes, -regarded him as a tyrant as well as an imbecile, and were as likely to -rise against him as to turn their energies to resisting the French. -Palafox at Saragossa accomplished what he did because the spirit of the -citizens was with him: Blake was despised as well as detested. - -When he recovered his composure he called a council of war, which voted -almost unanimously[58] that the city was indefensible, and that the -army must try to cut its way out on the north side of the Guadalaviar. -If the sally had been made on the 27th it might have succeeded, for -it was not till late on that day that Suchet’s arrangements for the -blockade of the north bank were complete. But the investing line had -been linked up by the night of the 28th-29th, when Blake made his last -stroke for safety. At six in the evening the field army issued from -the gate of St. José and began to cross the bridge opposite it, the -westernmost of the three of which the Spaniards were in possession. -This led not to the great _chaussée_ to Saguntum and Tortosa, which -was known to have been cut and entrenched by the enemy, but to the -by-road to Liria and the mountains. Lardizabal headed the march, Zayas -followed, escorting the artillery and a considerable train, Miranda -brought up the rear. Charles O’Donnell was left to man the walls with -the urban guards and the ‘Reserve Division,’ and was given permission -to capitulate whenever he should be attacked. - - [58] Only Miranda voted against a sortie, and thought that - nothing could be done, except to hold out for a while in the - walls and then surrender. Arteche, xi. p. 241. - -Lardizabal’s vanguard, under a Colonel Michelena, swerved from the -Liria road soon after passing the Guadalaviar, in order to avoid French -posts, and successfully got as far as the canal of Mestalla before it -was discovered or checked. The canal was too broad to be passed by -means of some beams and planks which had been brought up. But Michelena -got his men across, partly by fording and partly over a mill-dam, and -presently got to the village of Burjasort, where the artillery of -Palombini’s division were quartered. These troops, surprised in the -dark, could not stop him, and he pushed on through them and escaped -to the hills with his little force--one squadron, one battalion, and -some companies of Cazadores--some 500 or 600 men[59]. Lardizabal, who -should have followed him without delay, halted at the canal, trying -to build a bridge, till the French all along the line were alarmed by -the firing at Burjasort and began to press in upon him. He opened fire -instead of pushing on at all costs, and presently found himself opposed -by forces of growing strength. Blake thereupon made up his mind that -the sally had failed, and gave orders for the whole column to turn back -and re-enter Valencia. It seems probable that at least a great part of -the army might have got away, if an attempt had been made to push on -in Michelena’s wake, for the blockading line was thin here, and only -one French regiment seems to have been engaged in checking Lardizabal’s -exit. - - [59] Not 5,000 as Napier (probably by a misprint) says on page 31 - of his 4th vol. Apparently a misprint in the original edition has - been copied in all the later fourteen! - -Be this as it may, the sortie had failed, and Blake was faced by -complete ruin, being driven back with a disheartened army into a city -incapable of defence against a regular siege, and short of provisions. -Next morning the despair of the garrison was shown by the arrival of -many deserters in the French camp. The inevitable end was delayed for -only eleven days more. On January 1, most of the siege-guns having -been brought across the Guadalaviar, Suchet opened trenches against -two fronts of the entrenched camp, the fort of Monte Oliveto and the -southern point of the suburb of San Vincente, both salient angles -capable of being battered from both flanks. Seven batteries were built -opposite them by January 4th, and the advanced works in front were -pushed up to within fifty yards of the Spanish works. Thereupon Blake, -before the siege-guns had actually opened, abandoned the whole of his -entrenched camp on the next day, without any attempt at defence. The -French discovering the evacuation, entered, and found eighty-one guns -spiked in the batteries, and a considerable quantity of munitions. - -Blake was now shut up in the narrow space of the city, whose walls -were very unsuited for defence, and were easily approachable in many -places under shelter of houses left undemolished, which gave cover only -fifty yards from the ramparts. For no attempt had been made to clear -a free space round the inner _enceinte_, in case the outer circuit of -the camp should be lost. While fresh batteries were being built in -the newly-captured ground, to breach the city wall, Suchet set all -the mortars in his original works to throw bombs into Valencia. He -gathered that the population was demoralized and probably the garrison -also, and thought that a general bombardment of the place might bring -about a surrender without further trouble. About a thousand shells -were dropped into the city within twenty-four hours, and Suchet then -(January 6th) sent a _parlementaire_ to invite Blake to capitulate. -The Captain-General replied magniloquently that ‘although yesterday -morning he might have consented to treat for terms allowing his army -to quit Valencia, in order to spare the inhabitants the horrors of a -bombardment, now, after a day’s firing, he had learnt that he could -rely on the magnanimity and resignation of the people. The Marshal -might continue his operations if he pleased, and would bear the -responsibility for so maltreating the place.’ - -As a matter of fact the bombardment had been very effective, numerous -non-combatants had perished, and the spirit of the population was -broken. Many openly pressed for a surrender, and only a few fanatical -monks went round the streets exhorting the citizens to resistance. -The bombardment continued on the 7th and 8th, and at the same time -Suchet pushed approaches close to the walls, and in several places -set his miners to work to tunnel under them. Actual assault was never -necessary, for on the 8th Blake held a council of war, which voted for -entering into negotiation with the enemy. The report of this meeting -sets forth that ‘it had taken into consideration the sufferings of the -people under these days of bombardment; the cry of the populace was -that an end must be put to its misery; it was impossible to prolong the -defence with any profit, without exposing the city to the horrors of an -assault, in which the besiegers would probably succeed, considering the -depressed condition of the garrison, and the feebleness of the walls. -The citizens had not only failed to aid in the defence and to second -the efforts of the regular troops, but were panic-stricken and demanded -a surrender. The army itself did not seem disposed to do its duty, and -after hearing the evidence of the commanders of different corps, the -council decided in favour of negotiating to get honourable terms. If -these were refused it might be necessary to continue a hopeless defence -and die honourably among the ruins of Valencia[60]. - - [60] See the long _procès verbal_ of the Council’s proceedings - translated in Belmas, iv. pp. 203-6. - -It is probable that Blake would really have accepted any terms offered -him as ‘honourable,’ for he assented to all that Suchet dictated to -him. A feeble attempt to stipulate for a free departure for the field -army, on condition that the city and all its armaments and resources -were handed over intact, met with the curt refusal that it deserved. A -simple capitulation with the honours of war was granted: one clause, -however, was looked upon by Blake as somewhat of a concession, though -it really was entirely to Suchet’s benefit. He offered to grant an -exchange to so many of the garrison as should be equivalent man for -man, to French prisoners from the dépôts in Majorca and Cabrera, where -the unfortunate remnants of Dupont’s army were still in confinement. -As this was not conceded by the Spanish government, the clause had no -real effect in mitigating the fate of Blake’s army[61]. Other clauses -in the capitulation declared that private property should be respected, -and that no inquiry should be made after the surrender into the past -conduct of persons who had taken an active part in the revolution of -1808, or the subsequent defence of the kingdom of Valencia: also that -such civilians as chose might have three months in which to transport -themselves, their families, and their goods to such destination as they -pleased. These clauses, as we shall see, were violated by Suchet with -the most shocking callousness and shameless want of respect for his -written word. - - [61] The proposal of exchange came first to Mahy at Alicante; he - called a council of generals, which resolved that the release of - so many French would profit Suchet overmuch, because many of them - had been imprisoned at Alicante and Cartagena, and had worked on - the fortifications there. They could give the Marshal valuable - information, which he had better be denied. The proposal must - therefore be sent on to the Regency at Cadiz. That government, - after much debate, refused to ratify the proposal, considering it - more profitable to the enemy than to themselves. - -On January 9 the citadel and the gate adjacent were handed over to the -French; Blake (at his own request) was sent away straight to France, -and did not remain to take part in the formal surrender of his troops -and of the city. It would seem that he could not face the rage of the -Valencians, and was only anxious to avoid even twenty-four hours of -sojourn among them after the disaster. Napoleon affected to regard him -as a traitor, though he had never done even a moment’s homage to Joseph -Bonaparte in 1808, and shut him up in close captivity in the donjon of -Vincennes, where he remained very uncomfortably lodged till the events -of April 1814 set him free[62]. - - [62] Some notes about his captivity may be found in the - _Mémoires_ of Baron Kolli, the would-be deliverer of King - Ferdinand, who was shut up in another tower of the castle. - -The total number of prisoners yielded up by Valencia was 16,270 regular -troops, of whom some 1,500 were sick or wounded in the hospitals. The -urban guards and armed peasants, who were supposed to be civilians -covered by the amnesty article in the capitulation, are not counted in -the total. The regulars marched out of the Serranos gate on January -10, and after laying down their arms and colours were sent prisoners -to France, marching in two columns, under the escort of Pannetier’s -brigade, to Saragossa. Twenty-one colours and no less than 374 cannon -(mostly heavy guns in the defences) were given over, as also a very -large store of ammunition and military effects, but very little food, -which was already beginning to fail in the city when Blake surrendered. - -To prevent unlicensed plunder Suchet did not allow his own troops to -enter Valencia till January 14th, giving the civil authorities four -days in which to make preparations for the coming in of the new régime. -He was better received than might have been expected--apparently -Blake’s maladroit dictatorship had thoroughly disgusted the people. -Many of the magistrates bowed to the conqueror and took the oath of -homage to King Joseph, and the aged archbishop emerged from the village -where he had hidden himself for some time, and ‘showed himself animated -by an excellent spirit’ according to the Marshal’s dispatch. - -This prompt and tame submission did not save Valencia from dreadful -treatment at the victor’s hands. Not only did he levy on the city and -district a vast fine of 53,000,000 francs (over £2,120,000), of which -3,000,000 were sent to Madrid and the rest devoted to the profit of the -Army of Aragon, but he proceeded to carry out a series of atrocities, -which have been so little spoken of by historians that it would be -difficult to credit them, if they were not avowed with pride in his own -dispatches to Berthier and Napoleon. - -The second article of Blake’s capitulation, already cited above, -had granted a complete amnesty for past actions on the part of the -Valencians--‘Il ne sera fait aucune recherche pour le passé contre ceux -qui auraient pris une part active à la guerre ou à la révolution,’ to -quote the exact term. In his dispatch of January 12 to Berthier, Suchet -is shameless enough to write: ‘I have disarmed the local militia: all -guilty chiefs will be arrested, and all assassins punished; _for in -consenting to Article II of the Capitulation my only aim was to get -the matter over quickly_[63].’ ‘Guilty chiefs’ turned out to mean all -civilians who had taken a prominent part in the defence of Valencia: -‘assassins’ was interpreted to cover guerrilleros of all sorts, not -(as might perhaps have been expected) merely those persons who had -taken part in the bloody riots against the French commercial community -in 1808[64]. In his second dispatch of January 17 Suchet proceeds to -explain that he has arrested 480 persons as ‘suspects,’ that a large -number of guerrillero leaders have been found among them, who have -been sent to the citadel and have been already shot, or will be in -a few days. He has also arrested every monk in Valencia; 500 have -been sent prisoners to France: five of the most guilty, convicted of -having carried round the streets a so-called ‘banner of the faith,’ -and of having preached against capitulation, and excited the people -to resistance, have been already executed. Inquiries were still in -progress. They resulted in the shooting of two more friars[65]. But -the most astonishing clause in the dispatch is that ‘all those who -took part in the murders of the French [in 1808] will be sought -out and punished. Already _six hundred_ have been executed by the -firmness of the Spanish judge Marescot, whom I am expecting soon to -meet[66].’ It was a trifling addition to the catalogue of Suchet’s -doings that 350 students of the university, who had volunteered to aid -the regular artillery during the late siege, had all been arrested -and sent off to France like the monks. Two hundred sick or footsore -prisoners who straggled from the marching column directed on Teruel -and Saragossa are said to have been shot by the wayside[67]. It is -probable that innumerable prisoners were put to death in cold blood -after the capitulation of Valencia, in spite of Suchet’s guarantee -that ‘no research should be made as to the past.’ Of this Napier says -no word[68], though he quotes other parts of Suchet’s dispatches, and -praises him for his ‘vigorous and prudent’ conduct, and his ‘care not -to offend the citizens by violating their customs or shocking their -religious feelings.’ - - [63] See the dispatches printed in full in Belmas, Appendix, vol. - iv, pp. 218-20, and 226-7 of his great work. - - [64] For which see vol. i. p. 68. - - [65] The names of all seven friars are given by Toreno and - Schepeler. - - [66] Can the frightful figure of 600 be a mistake for 60? - - [67] See Toreno, iii. p. 28. - - [68] See his pages, iv. 33. - - - - -SECTION XXX: CHAPTER IV - -SUCHET’S CONQUEST OF VALENCIA: SIDE-ISSUES AND CONSEQUENCES. -JANUARY-MARCH 1812 - - -When once Suchet’s long-deferred movements began, on December 26, 1812, -his operations were so rapid and successful that the whole campaign -was finished in fourteen days. The unexpected swiftness of his triumph -had the result of rendering unnecessary the subsidiary operations -which Napoleon had directed the Armies of Portugal, the Centre, and -Andalusia, to carry out. - -D’Armagnac, with his 3,000 men of the Army of the Centre, still lay -at Cuenca when Suchet’s advance began, hindered from further movement -by the badness of the roads and the weather. Opposite him were lying -Bassecourt’s small force at Requeña--not 2,000 men--and the larger -detachment of the Murcian army under Freire, which Blake had originally -intended to draw down to join his main body. This seems to have -consisted of some 4,000 foot and 1,000 horse[69] about the time of the -New Year. - - [69] On February 1st Freire’s infantry division, though it had - suffered much from desertion in the meanwhile, still numbered - 3,300 men present, and his cavalry 850 sabres. See tables in _Los - Ejércitos españoles_, pp. 149-50. - -Far more important was the force under Montbrun, detached from the Army -of Portugal, which had moved (all too tardily) from La Mancha and the -banks of the Tagus, by Napoleon’s orders. Assembled, as we have already -shown[70], only on December 29th, it had started from San Clemente on -January 2 to march against Blake’s rear by the route of Almanza, the -only one practicable for artillery at midwinter. Thus the expedition -was only just getting under way when Suchet had already beaten Blake -and thrust him into Valencia. It consisted of the infantry divisions -of Foy and Sarrut, of the whole of the light cavalry of the Army of -Portugal, and of five batteries of artillery, in all about 10,000 men. -Of the succour which had been promised from d’Armagnac’s division, -to raise the force to the figures of 12,000 men, few if any came to -hand[71]. - - [70] See above, p. 56. - - [71] According to Joseph’s letter to Montbrun (_Correspondence of - King Joseph_, viii. p. 294) a battalion or two may have joined - Montbrun, as he tells that general that he is glad to know that - the troops of his army have given satisfaction. - -Montbrun marched with Sarrut and the cavalry by Albacete and -Chinchilla, leaving Foy as a reserve échelon, to follow by slower -stages and keep up the communication with La Mancha. Between Chinchilla -and Almanza the advanced cavalry fell in with Freire’s Spanish -division, marching across its front. For on the news of Suchet’s -passage of the Guadalaviar on December 26, Freire had moved southward -from his position on the Cabriel river, with the intention of joining -Mahy, and so of building up a force strong enough to do something to -succour Blake and the beleaguered garrison of Valencia. On January 6th -Montbrun’s horse came upon one of Freire’s detachments, dispersed it, -and took some prisoners. But the greater part of the Murcians succeeded -in getting past, and in reaching Mahy at Alicante (January 9th). - -So cowed was the country-side by the disasters about Valencia that -Montbrun at Almanza succeeded in getting a letter carried by one of -his staff to Valencia in two days[72]. It announced to Suchet his -arrival on the rear of the Spanish army, and his intention of pressing -on eastward so as to drive away Freire and Mahy and completely cut off -the retreat of Blake towards Murcia. But when the dispatch was received -Blake was already a prisoner, and his army had laid down its arms on -the preceding day. Suchet, therefore, wrote a reply to Montbrun to -thank him for his co-operation, to inform him that it was no longer -necessary, and to advise him to return as quickly as possible toward -the Army of Portugal and the Tagus, where his presence was now much -more needed than on the coast of the Mediterranean. The Army of Aragon -was strong enough to deal in due course with Mahy and Freire, and to -take Alicante. - - [72] Suchet, _Mémoires_, ii. p. 234, for dates. - -Montbrun, however, refused to accept this advice. He was probably, -as his chief Marmont remarks, desirous of distinguishing himself by -carrying out some brilliant enterprise as an independent commander[73]. -Knowing that Mahy’s and Freire’s troops were in a very demoralized -condition, and underrating the strength of the fortress of Alicante, -he resolved to march against that place, which he thought would make -little or no resistance. Accordingly he called forward Foy to Albacete -and Chinchilla, left the main part of his guns in his charge, and -marched on Alicante with the cavalry and Sarrut’s division, having only -one battery of horse artillery with him. - - [73] Marmont accuses Montbrun exactly as Napoleon accuses Marmont! - -At the news of his approach Mahy, who had been at Alcoy since he -abandoned the line of the Nucar on December 27th, retired into Alicante -with Creagh’s and Obispo’s infantry. Bassecourt also joined him there, -while Freire with his own column, Villacampa’s division, and all the -Murcian and Valencian cavalry, occupied Elche and other places in -the neighbourhood. Over 6,000 regular infantry were within the walls -of Alicante by January 15th. Montbrun on the following day drove -Freire out of Elche westward, and presented himself in front of the -new fortification of Alicante, which had been much improved during -the last year, and included a new line of bastioned wall outside the -old mediaeval _enceinte_ and the rocky citadel. It is probable that -Montbrun had no knowledge of the recent improvements to the fortress, -and relied on old reports of its weakness. After advancing into the -suburbs, and throwing a few useless shells into the place, whose -artillery returned a heavy fire, he retreated by Elche and Hellin to -Albacete[74]. As he went he laid waste the country-side in the most -reckless fashion, and raised heavy requisitions of money in Elche, -Hellin, and other places. This involved him in an angry correspondence -with Suchet, who insisted that no commander but himself had a right -to extort contributions in the region that fell into his sphere of -operations. - - [74] On his first appearance he sent to summon Alicante, and - received the proper negative answer. But Schepeler, who was in - the place, says that the governor, General de la Cruz, showed - signs of yielding. Fortunately the other generals did not. It - would have been absurd to treat seriously a force of 4,000 - infantry and 1,500 horse with only six light guns! (Schepeler, p. - 520.) - -Montbrun’s raid was clearly a misguided operation. Alicante was far too -strong to be taken by escalade, when it was properly garrisoned: the -only chance was that the garrison might flinch. They refused to do so, -and the French general was left in an absurd position, demonstrating -without siege-guns against a regular fortress. His action had two -ill-effects--the first was that it concluded the Valencian campaign -with a fiasco--a definite repulse which put heart into the Spaniards. -The second (and more important) was that it separated him from Marmont -and the Army of Portugal for ten days longer than was necessary. His -chief had given him orders to be back on the Tagus by the 15th-20th of -January, as his absence left the main body too weak. Owing to his late -start he would in any case have overpassed these dates, even if he had -started back from Almanza on January 13th, after receiving the news -of the fall of Valencia. But by devoting nine days to an advance from -Almanza to Alicante and then a retreat from Alicante to Albacete, he -deferred his return to Castile by that space of time. He only reached -Toledo on January 31st with his main column. Foy’s division, sent on -ahead, arrived there on the 29th. Montbrun’s last marches were executed -with wild speed, for he had received on the way letters of the most -alarming kind from Marmont, informing him that Wellington had crossed -the Agueda with his whole army and laid siege to Ciudad Rodrigo. The -Army of Portugal must concentrate without delay. But by the time that -Montbrun reached Toledo, Rodrigo had already been twelve days in the -hands of the British general, and further haste was useless. The troops -were absolutely worn out, and received with relief the order to halt -and wait further directions, since they were too late to save the -fallen fortress. It is fair to Montbrun to remark that, even if he had -never made his raid on Alicante, he would still have been unable to -help his chief. If he had turned back from Almanza on January 13th, he -would have been at Toledo only on the 22nd--and that city is nearly 200 -miles by road from Ciudad Rodrigo, which had fallen on the 19th. The -disaster on the Agueda was attributable not to Montbrun’s presumptuous -action, but to the Emperor’s orders that the Army of Portugal should -make a great detachment for the Valencian campaign. Even if the -raiding column had started earlier, as Napoleon intended, it could not -have turned back till it got news of the capitulation of Blake, which -only took place on January 8th. And whatever might then have been its -exact position, it could not have been back in time to join Marmont -in checking the operations of Wellington, which (as we have already -stated) came to a successful end on January 19th. Wherefore, though -Montbrun must receive blame, the responsibility for the fall of Rodrigo -lay neither with him nor with Marmont, but with their great master. - -Another diversion made by Napoleon’s orders for the purpose of -aiding Suchet was quite as futile--though less from the fault of the -original direction, and more from an unforeseen set of circumstances. -Like Marmont and King Joseph, Soult had also been ordered to lend -Suchet assistance against Valencia, by demonstrating from the side of -Granada against Murcia and its army. This order, issued apparently -about November 19, 1811[75]. and repeated on December 6th, reached -the Duke of Dalmatia just when he had assembled all his disposable -field-forces for the siege of Tarifa, an operation where preparations -began on December 8th and which did not end till January 5th. -Having concentrated 13,000 men in the extreme southern point of his -viceroyalty, Soult had not a battalion to spare for a sally from its -extreme eastern point. He could not give up a great enterprise already -begun; and it was only when it had failed, and the troops from Tarifa -were returning--in a sufficiently melancholy plight--that Soult could -do anything. But by this time it was too late to help Suchet, who had -finished his business without requiring assistance from without. - - [75] It is alluded to in a dispatch of the Emperor to Berthier on - that day. ‘Le duc de Dalmatie a l’ordre d’envoyer une colonne en - Murcie pour faire une diversion.’ St. Cloud, Nov. 19. - -[Illustration: _Marshal Suchet, Duke of Albufera_ - -_from the portrait by Charpentier_] - -Whether Soult was already aware of the surrender of Valencia or not, -when January 20th had arrived, he had before that day issued orders -to his brother, the cavalry general, Pierre Soult, to take the light -horse of the 4th Corps from Granada, and to execute with them a raid -against Murcia, with the object of drawing off the attention of any -Spanish troops left in that direction from Suchet. The General, with -about 800 sabres, pushing on by Velez Rubio and Lorca, arrived -before the gates of Murcia quite unopposed on January 25th. Freire had -left no troops whatever to watch the borders of Granada, and had drawn -off everything, save the garrison of Cartagena, toward the Valencian -frontiers. Pierre Soult summoned the defenceless city, received its -surrender, and imposed on it a ransom of 60,000 dollars. He entered -next day, and established himself in the archbishop’s palace; having -neither met nor heard of any enemy he was quite at his ease, and was -sitting down to dine, when a wild rush of Spanish cavalry came sweeping -down the street and cutting up his dispersed and dismounted troopers. -This was General Martin La Carrera, whose brigade was the nearest force -to Murcia when Soult arrived. Hearing that the French were guarding -themselves ill, he had resolved to attempt a surprise, and, dividing -his 800 men into three columns, assailed Murcia by three different -gates. His own detachment cut its way in with success, did much damage, -and nearly captured the French general. But neither of the other -parties showed such resolution; they got bickering with the French at -the entries of the city, failed to push home, and finally retired with -small loss. The gallant and unfortunate La Carrera, charging up and -down the streets in vain search for his reinforcements, was finally -surrounded by superior numbers, and died fighting gallantly. - -His enterprise warned Soult that Spanish troops were collecting in -front of him, and indeed Villacampa’s infantry was not far off. -Wherefore he evacuated Murcia next day, after raising so much of the -contribution as he could, and plundering many private houses. The -Spaniards reoccupied the place, and Joseph O’Donnell, now placed in -command of the Murcian army in succession to Mahy, gave La Carrera’s -corpse a splendid funeral. Soult retreated hastily to the Granadan -frontier, pillaging Alcantarilla and Lorca by the way. This was the -only part taken by the French Army of Andalusia in the January campaign -of 1812. The siege of Tarifa had absorbed all its energies. - -Montbrun’s and Pierre Soult’s enterprises had little effect on the -general course of events in eastern Spain. It was Suchet’s own -operations which, in the estimation of every observer from the Emperor -downwards, were to be considered decisive. When Valencia had fallen, -every one on the French side supposed that the war was practically -at an end in this region, and that the dispersion of the remnants of -Mahy’s and Freire’s troops and the capture of Peniscola, Alicante, and -Cartagena,--the three fortresses still in Spanish hands,--were mere -matters of detail. No one could have foreseen that the region south -of the Xucar was destined to remain permanently in the hands of the -patriots, and that Suchet’s occupation of Valencia was to last for -no more than eighteen months. Two causes, neither of them depending -on Suchet’s own responsibility, were destined to save the kingdom of -Murcia and the southern region of Valencia from conquest. The first was -Napoleon’s redistribution of his troops in eastern Spain, consequent -on the approach of his war with Russia. The second was the sudden -victorious onslaught of Wellington on the French in the western parts -of the Peninsula. How the former of these causes worked must at once -be shown--the effect of the latter cause did not become evident till a -little later. - -Of the 33,000 men with whom Suchet had conquered Valencia and captured -Blake, no less than 13,000 under Reille had been lent him from the -Army of the North, and were under orders to return to the Ebro as -soon as possible. Indeed, till they should get back, Aragon, very -insufficiently garrisoned by Caffarelli’s division, was out of hand, -and almost as much in the power of the Empecinado, Duran, and Montijo, -as of the French. Moreover, so long as Caffarelli was at Saragossa, -and his troops dispersed in the surrounding region, both Navarre and -Old Castile were undermanned, and the Army of the North was reduced to -little more than Dorsenne’s two divisions of the Young Guard. To secure -the troops for the great push against Valencia, so many divisions -had shifted eastward, that Marmont and Dorsenne between them had, as -the Emperor must have seen, barely troops enough in hand to maintain -their position, if Wellington should make some unexpected move--though -Napoleon had persuaded himself that such a move was improbable. In -spite of this, he was anxious to draw back Reille’s and Caffarelli’s, -no less than Montbrun’s, men to more central positions. - -But this was not all: in December the Emperor’s dispatches begin -to show that he regarded war with Russia in the spring of 1812 as -decidedly probable, and that for this reason he was about to withdraw -all the Imperial Guard from Spain. On December 15th a note to Berthier -ordered all the light and heavy cavalry of the Guard--chasseurs, -grenadiers à cheval, dragoons, Polish lancers--to be brought home, as -also its horse artillery and the _gendarmes d’élite_. All these were -serving in the Army of the North, and formed the best part of its -mounted troops. This was but a trifling preliminary warning of his -intentions: on January 14, 1812--the results of the Valencian campaign -being still unknown--he directed Berthier to withdraw from Spain -the whole of the Infantry of the Guard and the whole of the Polish -regiments in Spain. This was an order of wide-spreading importance, -and created large gaps in the muster-rolls of Suchet, Soult, and -Dorsenne. Suchet’s Poles (three regiments of the Legion of the Vistula, -nearly 6,000 men, including the detachments left in Aragon) formed -a most important part of the 3rd Corps. Soult had the 4th, 6th, and -9th Polish regiments and the Lancers, who had done such good service -at Albuera, a total of another 6,000 men. But Dorsenne was to be the -greatest sufferer--he had in the Army of the North not only the 4th -of the Vistula, some 1,500 bayonets, but the whole of the infantry -of the Young Guard, the two divisions of Roguet and Dumoustier, -twenty-two battalions over 14,000 strong. The dispatch of January 14 -directed that Suchet should send off his battalions of the Legion -‘immediately after the fall of Valencia.’ Soult was to draft away -his Poles ‘within twenty-four hours after the receipt of the order.’ -Dorsenne, of course, could not begin to send off the Guard Divisions -of infantry till the troops lent from the Army of the North (Reille -and Caffarelli) were freed from the duties imposed on them by the -Valencian expedition. A supplementary order of January 27th told him -that he might keep them for some time longer if the English took the -offensive--news of Wellington’s march on Rodrigo was just coming to -hand. ‘Le désir,’ says the Emperor, ‘que j’ai d’avoir ma Garde n’est -pas tellement pressant qu’il faille la renvoyer avant que les affaires -aient pris une situation nouvelle dans le Nord[76].’ As a matter of -fact some Guard-brigades did not get off till March, though by dint -of rapid transport, when they had once passed the Pyrenees, they -struggled to the front in time to take part in the opening of the great -Russian campaign in June. The fourth brigade, eight battalions under -Dumoustier, did not get away till the autumn was over. - - [76] Napoleon to Berthier, Paris, Jan. 27, 1812. - -Thus the Emperor had marked off about 27,000 good veteran troops for -removal from the Peninsula, with the intention of using them in the -oncoming Russian war. The Army of the North was to lose the best of its -divisions--those of the South and of Aragon very heavy detachments. -Nothing was to come in return, save a few drafts and _bataillons de -marche_ which were lying at Bayonne. The Emperor in his dispatch makes -some curious self-justificatory remarks, to the effect that he should -leave the Army of Spain stronger than it had been in the summer of -1811; for while he was withdrawing thirty-six battalions, he had sent -into the Peninsula, since June last, forty-two battalions under Reille, -Caffarelli, and Severoli. This was true enough: but if the total -strength of the troops now dedicated to Spain was not less than it had -been in June 1811, it was left weaker by 27,000 men than it had been in -December 1811. - -Now Suchet, when deprived of Reille’s aid, and at the same time -directed to send back to France his six Polish battalions, was left -with a very inadequate force in Valencia--not much more than half what -he had at his disposition on January 1. It would seem that the Emperor -overrated the effect of the capture of Blake and the destruction of his -army. At any rate, in his dispatches to Suchet, he seemed to consider -that the whole business in the East was practically completed by the -triumph at the New Year. The Marshal was directed ‘to push an advanced -guard towards Murcia, and put himself in communication with the 4th -Corps--the eastern wing of Soult’s army--which would be found at -Lorca[77].’ But the operations of the troops of the Army of Andalusia -in this quarter were limited to the appearance for two days at Murcia -of Pierre Soult’s small cavalry raid, of which Suchet got no news till -it was passed and gone. He was left entirely to his own resources, -and these were too small for any further advance: the Emperor not only -took away both Reille and the Poles, but sent, a few days later, orders -that Palombini’s Italian division, reduced by now to 3,000 men by its -heavy casualties on December 26th, should be sent into southern Aragon -against Duran and Montijo. The departure of Palombini (February 15th) -left Suchet with less than 15,000 men in hand. It must be remembered -that the conquest of a Spanish province always meant, for the French, -the setting aside of a large immobilized garrison, to hold it down, -unless it were to be permitted to drop back into insurrection. It was -clear that with the bulk of the kingdom of Valencia to garrison, not to -speak of the siege of the still intact fortress of Peniscola, Suchet -would have an infinitesimal field-force left for the final move that -would be needed, if Mahy and Freire were to be crushed, and Alicante -and Cartagena--both strong places--to be beleaguered. - - [77] See Suchet’s _Mémoires_, ii. pp. 237-8. - -The Marshal had by the last week in January pushed Harispe’s division -to Xativa, beyond the Xucar, and Habert’s to Gandia near the sea-coast. -These 9,000 men were all his disposable force for a further advance: -Valencia had to be garrisoned; Musnier’s division had gone north, -to cover the high-road as far as Tortosa and the Ebro; some of the -Italians were sent to besiege Peniscola. Suchet might, no doubt, have -pushed Habert and Harispe further forward towards Alicante, but he -had many reasons for not doing so. That fortress had been proved--by -Montbrun’s raid--to be in a posture of defence: besides its garrison -there were other Spanish troops in arms in the neighbourhood. To the -forces of Freire, Obispo, Villacampa, and Bassecourt, there was added -the newly-formed brigade of General Roche, an Irish officer lent by -the British government to the Spaniards, who had been drilling and -disciplining the cadres of the battalions handed over to him[78], -till they were in a better condition than most of the other troops -on this coast. The muster-rolls of the ‘united 2nd and 3rd armies,’ -as these remnants were now officially styled, showed, on February 1, -1812, 14,000 men present, not including Villacampa’s division, which -was moving off to its old haunts in Aragon. By March 1 this figure -had risen to 18,000, many deserters who had gone home after the fall -of Valencia having tardily rejoined the ranks of their battalions. -Over 2,000 cavalry were included in the total--for nearly the whole of -Blake’s squadrons had escaped (not too gloriously) after the disastrous -combats on December 26, 1812. - - [78] These were Chinchilla, 2nd of Murcia, and a new locally - raised battalion called 2nd of Alicante. He was in March handed - over also Canarias, Burgos, and Ligero de Aragon, which had - belonged to Freire till that date. - -If Suchet, therefore, had moved forward with a few thousand men at -the end of January, he would have risked something, despite of the -depressed morale of his enemies. But in addition there was vexatious -news from Catalonia, which presently caused the sending of part of -Musnier’s division beyond the Ebro, and it was reported (only too -correctly) that the yellow fever had broken out with renewed violence -at Murcia and Cartagena. An advance into the infected district might -be hazardous. But most of all was any further initiative discouraged -by the consideration that no help could be expected from Marmont or -Soult. By the end of January Suchet was aware of Wellington’s invasion -of Leon, and of the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. Not only did this move -absorb all the attention of Marmont, Dorsenne, and King Joseph, but -Soult was convinced that it boded evil for him also, and that a new -attack on Badajoz was imminent. Hill’s manœuvres in Estremadura (of -which more elsewhere) attracted all his attention, and he let it be -known that he had neither the wish nor the power to send expeditions -eastward, to co-operate against Murcia. Last, but most conclusive, of -all Suchet’s hindrances was a grave attack of illness, which threw -him on a bed of sickness early in February, and caused him to solicit -permission to return to France for his convalescence. The Emperor -(with many flattering words) refused this leave, and sent two of his -body physicians to Valencia to treat the Marshal’s ailment. But it was -two months before Suchet was able to mount his horse, and put himself -at the head of his army. From February to the beginning of April -operations were necessarily suspended for the Army of Aragon, since its -chief was not one of those who gladly hand over responsibility and the -power of initiative to his subordinates. - -Hence there was a long gap in the story of the war in south-eastern -Spain from January to April 1812. The only events requiring notice -during that period were the occupation by the French of Denia and -Peniscola. The former, a little port on the projecting headland south -of Valencia, was furnished with fortifications newly repaired during -Blake’s régime, and had been an important centre of distribution -for stores and munitions of war, after the Spaniards lost the Grao -of Valencia in November, since it was the nearest harbour to their -positions along the Guadalaviar. In the general panic after Blake’s -surrender Mahy withdrew its garrison, but forgot to order the removal -of its magazines. Harispe seized Denia on January 20, and found sixty -guns mounted on its walls, and forty small merchant vessels, some of -them laden with stores, in its port. He garrisoned the place, and -fitted out some of the vessels as privateers. Mahy’s carelessness in -abandoning these resources was one of the reasons which contributed -most to his removal from command by the Cadiz Regency. It was indeed -a gross piece of neglect, for at least the guns might have been -destroyed, and the ships brought round to Alicante. - -The story of Peniscola, however, was far more disgraceful. This -fortress sometimes called ‘the little Gibraltar’ from its impregnable -situation--it is a towering rock connected with the mainland by a -narrow sand-spit 250 yards long--was one of the strongest places in all -Spain. It had appeared so impregnable to Suchet, that, on his southward -march from Tortosa to Valencia, he had merely masked it, and made no -attempt to meddle with it[79]. Peniscola had suffered no molestation, -and was regularly revictualled by Spanish and British coasting vessels -from Alicante, Cartagena, and the Balearic Isles. The governor, Garcia -Navarro, was an officer who had an excellent reputation for personal -courage--taken prisoner at Falset in 1811[80] he had succeeded in -escaping from a French prison and had reported himself again for -further service. The garrison of 1,000 men was adequate for such a -small place, and was composed of veteran troops. In directing it to be -formally beleaguered after the fall of Valencia, Suchet seems to have -relied more on the general demoralization caused by the annihilation of -Blake’s army than on the strength of his means of attack. On January -20th he ordered Severoli with two Italian and two French battalions to -press the place as far as was possible, and assigned to him part of the -siege-train that had been used at Saguntum. The trenches, on the high -ground of the mainland nearest the place, were opened on the 28th, and -on the 31st the besiegers began to sap downhill towards the isthmus, -and to erect five batteries on the best available points. But it was -clear that the fortress was most inaccessible, and that to reach its -walls across the low-lying sand-spit would be a very costly business. - - [79] See above, p. 14. - - [80] See vol. iii. pp. 503-4. - -Nevertheless, when a summons was sent in to the governor on February -2nd, he surrendered at once, getting in return terms of an unusually -favourable kind--the men and officers of the garrison were given leave -either to depart to their homes with all their personal property, or -to enlist in the service of King Joseph. This was a piece of mere -treachery: Navarro had made up his mind that the cause of Spain -was ruined by Blake’s disaster, and had resolved to go over to the -enemy, while there were still good terms to be got for deserters. As -Suchet tells the story, the affair went as follows. A small vessel, -sailing from Peniscola to Alicante, was taken by a privateer fitted -out by Harispe at Denia. Among letters seized by the captors[81] was -one from the governor, expressing his disgust with his situation, -and in especial with the peremptory advice given him by the English -naval officers who were in charge of the revictualling service and -the communications. He went on to say that he would rather surrender -Peniscola to the French than let it be treated as a British dependency, -whereupon the Marshal asked, and obtained, the surrender of the place. -Napier expresses a suspicion--probably a well-founded one--that the -letter may have been really intended for Suchet’s own eye, and that -the whole story was a piece of solemn deceit. ‘Such is the Marshal’s -account of the affair--but the colour which he thought it necessary -to give to a transaction so full of shame to Navarro, can only be -considered as part of the price paid for Peniscola[82].’ The mental -attitude of the traitor is sufficiently expressed by a letter which -reached Suchet along with the capitulation. ‘I followed with zeal, -with fury I may say, the side which I considered the just one. To-day -I see that to render Spain less unhappy it is necessary for us all to -unite under the King, and I make my offer to serve him with the same -enthusiasm. Your excellency may be quite sure of me--I surrender a -fortress fully provisioned and capable of a long defence--which is the -best guarantee of the sincerity of my promise[83].’ - - [81] Suchet says that the captain of the boat threw his letters - overboard at the last moment, but that they floated and were - picked up by the French. Was this a farce? Or is the whole story - doubtful? - - [82] Napier, _Peninsular War_, iv. p. 38. - - [83] See letter printed in Belmas, iv. p. 248. - -The most astounding feature of the capitulation was that Navarro got -his officers to consent to such a piece of open treachery. If they had -done their duty, they would have arrested him, and sent him a prisoner -to Alicante. Demoralization and despair must have gone very far in this -miserable garrison. - -The capture of Peniscola was Suchet’s last success. He fell sick -not long after, and when he once more assumed the active command -of his troops in April, the whole situation of French affairs in -Spain was changed, and no further advance was possible. The results -of Wellington’s offensive operations in the West had begun to make -themselves felt. - -Meanwhile the remains of the Valencian and Murcian armies were -reorganizing themselves, with Alicante as their base and central port -of supply. Joseph O’Donnell, though not a great general, was at least -no worse than Blake and Mahy--of whom the former was certainly the most -maladroit as well as the most unlucky of commanders, while the latter -had shown himself too timid and resourceless to play out the apparently -lost game that was left to his hand in January 1812. By March there was -once more an army in face of the French, and in view of the sudden halt -of the invaders and the cheerful news from the West, hope was once more -permissible. The main body of O’Donnell’s army remained concentrated -in front of Alicante, but Villacampa’s division had gone off early to -Aragon, to aid in the diversion against Suchet’s communications, which -was so constantly kept up by Duran and the Empecinado. This was a good -move: the weak point of the French occupation was the impossibility -of holding down broad mountain spaces, in which small garrisons were -useless and helpless, while heavy columns could not live for more than -a few days on any given spot. - - - - -SECTION XXXI - -MINOR CAMPAIGNS OF THE WINTER OF 1811-12 - - -CHAPTER I - -CATALONIA AND ARAGON - - -The chronicle of the obstinate and heroic defence made by the Catalans, -even after the falls of Tarragona and Figueras had seemed to make all -further resistance hopeless, was carried in the last volume of this -work down to October 28, 1811, when Marshal Macdonald, like St. Cyr and -Augereau, was recalled to Paris, having added no more to his reputation -than had his predecessors while in charge of this mountainous -principality. We have seen how General Lacy, hoping against hope, -rallied the last remnants of the old Catalan army, and recommenced -(just as Macdonald was departing) a series of small enterprises against -the scattered French garrisons. He had won several petty successes -in evicting the enemy from Cervera, Igualada, and Belpuig--the small -strongholds which covered the main line of communication east and west, -through the centre of the land, between Lerida and Barcelona. The enemy -had even been forced to evacuate the holy mountain of Montserrat, the -strongest post on the whole line. - -Hence when, in November, General Decaen arrived to take over -Macdonald’s task, he found before him a task not without serious -difficulties, though the actual force of Spaniards in the field was far -less than it had been before the disasters at Tarragona and Figueras. -Lacy had a very small field army--he had reorganized 8,000 men by -October, and all through his command the total did not grow very much -greater. When he handed over his office to Copons fifteen months after, -there were no more than 14,000 men under arms, including cadres and -recruits. On the other hand he had a central position, a free range -east and west, now that the line of French posts across Catalonia had -been broken, and several points of more or less safe access to the sea. -Munitions and stores, and occasionally very small reinforcements from -the Balearic Isles, were still brought over by the British squadron -which ranged along the coast. Some of the officers, especially the much -tried and never-despairing Eroles, and the indefatigable Manso, were -thoroughly to be relied upon, and commanded great local popularity. -This Lacy himself did not possess--he was obeyed because of his stern -resolve, but much disliked for his autocratic and dictatorial ways, -which kept him in constant friction with the Junta that sat at Berga. -Moreover he was a stranger, while the Catalans disliked all leaders who -were not of their own blood: and he was strongly convinced that the -brunt of the fighting must be borne by the regular troops, while the -popular voice was all in favour of the _somatenes_ and guerrilleros, -and against the enforcement of conscription. Much was to be said on -either side: the warfare of the irregulars was very harassing to the -French, and had led to many petty successes, and one great one--the -capture of Figueras. On the other hand these levies were irresponsible -and untrustworthy when any definite operation was in hand: they might, -or they might not, turn up in force when they were required: the frank -disregard of their chiefs for punctuality or obedience drove to wild -rage any officer who had served in the old army. With regular troops -it was possible to calculate that a force would be where it was wanted -to be at a given time, and would at least attempt to carry out its -orders: with the _somatenes_ it was always possible, nay probable, -that some petty quarrel of rival chiefs, or some rival attraction of -an unforeseen sort, would lead to non-appearance. To this there was -the easy reply that ever since Blake first tried to make the Catalans -work ‘_militarmente_ and not _paisanmente_’ the regular army for some -two years had never gained a single battle, nor relieved a single -fortress[84]. The best plan would probably have been to attempt to -combine the two systems: it was absolutely necessary to have a nucleus -of regular troops, but unwise to act like Blake and Lacy, who tried -to break up and discourage the _somatenes_, in order that they might -be forced into the battalions of the standing army. The constant -series of defeats on record had been caused rather by the unskilful -and over-ambitious operations of the generals than by their insisting -on keeping up the regular troops, who had behaved well enough on many -occasions. But too much had been asked of them when, half-trained -and badly led, they were brought into collision with the veterans of -France, without the superiority of numbers which alone could make up -for their military faults. - - [84] See notes on discussions of this sort in Sir Edward - Codrington’s _Memoirs_, i. pp. 264 and 277. He had seen much of - the evils of both kinds of organization, and leaned on the whole - to the irregulars, from a personal dislike for Lacy. - -Since the capture of Cervera, Belpuig, and Igualada in October, the -territories held by the French in Catalonia fell into two separate and -divided sections. On the western side, adjacent to Aragon, Frère’s -division, left behind by Suchet, garrisoned Lerida, Tarragona, and -Tortosa: though it was a powerful force of over 7,000 men, it could -do little more than occupy these three large places, each requiring -several battalions. At the best it could only furnish very small -flying columns to keep up the communication between them. It was hard -to maintain touch with the other group of French fortresses, along -the sea-coast road from Tarragona to Barcelona, which were often -obsessed by Spanish bands, and always liable to be molested by Edward -Codrington’s British ships, which sailed up and down the shore looking -for detachments or convoys to shell. The fort of the Col de Balaguer, -twenty miles north of Tortosa, was the look-out point towards Tarragona -and the sole French outpost in that direction. - -In eastern Catalonia the newly-arrived commander, General Decaen (a -veteran whose last work had been the hopeless defence of Bourbon and -Mauritius, where he had capitulated in 1810), had some 24,000 men in -hand. But he was much hampered by the necessity for holding and feeding -the immense Barcelona, a turbulent city which absorbed a whole division -for its garrison. It was constantly on the edge of starvation, and was -only revictualled with great trouble by vessels sailing from the ports -of Languedoc, of which more than half were habitually captured by the -British, or by heavy convoys labouring across the hills from Gerona, -which were always harassed, and sometimes taken wholesale, by the -Spanish detachments told off by Lacy for this end. Gerona and Figueras, -both fortresses of considerable size, absorbed several battalions each. -Smaller garrisons had also to be kept in Rosas, Hostalrich, Mataro, -and Montlouis, and there were many other fortified posts which guarded -roads or passes, and were worth holding. It was with difficulty that -6,000 or 8,000 men could be collected for a movable field-force, even -by borrowing detachments from the garrisons. An additional nuisance -cropped up just as Decaen took over the command: Lacy, seeing that the -Pyrenean passes were thinly manned, sent Eroles with 3,000 men to raid -the valleys of Cerdagne on the French side of the hills. The invaders -beat two battalions of national guards near Puigcerda, and swept far -down the valley (October 29-November 2), returning with thousands -of sheep and cattle and a large money contribution levied from the -villages. This raid (which enraged Napoleon[85]) made it necessary to -guard the Pyrenees better, and to send up more national guards from the -frontier departments. - - [85] Who called the raid an ‘insult’--Napoleon to Berthier, - Paris, Feb. 29, 1812, and compare letter of March 8. - -Thus it came to pass that though Lacy had no more than 8,000 men -available, and no fortress of any strength to serve as his base -(Cardona and Seu d’Urgel, his sole strongholds, were mediaeval -strongholds with no modern works), he paralysed the French force -which, between Lerida and Figueras, could show more than three times -that strength. Such was the value of the central position, and the -resolute hatred of the countryside for its oppressors. Catalonia could -only be held down by garrisoning every village--and if the army of -occupation split itself up into garrisons it was helpless. Hence, -during the winter of 1811-12 and the spring and summer of the following -year, it may be said that the initiative lay with the Catalans, and -that the enemy (despite of his immensely superior numbers) was on the -defensive. The helplessness of the French was sufficiently shown by -the fact that from June to December 1811 Barcelona was completely cut -off from communication with Gerona and France. It was only in the -latter month that Decaen, hearing that the place was on the edge of -starvation, marched with the bulk of Lamarque’s division from Upper -Catalonia to introduce a convoy; while Maurice Mathieu, the governor of -Barcelona, came out with 3,000 men of the garrison to meet him, as far -as Cardadeu. Lacy, determined that nothing short of a vigorous push by -the enemy should make their junction possible, and relieve Barcelona, -offered opposition in the defile of the Trentapassos, where Vives had -tried to stop St. Cyr two years back, showing a front both to Decaen -and to Mathieu. But on recognizing the very superior numbers of the -enemy he wisely withdrew, or he would have been caught between the two -French columns. Decaen therefore was able to enter Barcelona with his -immense convoy. [December 3rd-4th, 1811.] The Spaniards retreated into -the inland; their headquarters on the first day of the New Year were at -Vich. - -There being no further profit in pressing Barcelona for the time being, -Lacy, in January, resolved to turn his attention to the much weaker -garrison of Tarragona, which belonged to Frère’s division and Suchet’s -army, and was not under Decaen’s immediate charge. Its communications -with Lerida and Tortosa were hazardous, and its stores were running -low. The Spanish general therefore (about January 2) sent down Eroles’s -division to Reus, a few miles inland from Tarragona, with orders to -cut all the roads leading into that fortress. The place was already -in a parlous condition for want of food, and its governor had sent -representations to Suchet that he was in need of instant succour. -Therefore the moment that Valencia fell, the Marshal directed Musnier, -whose division he had told off to hold the sea-coast between the Ebro -and Guadalaviar, to march with the bulk of his men to Tortosa, to pick -up what reinforcements he could from its garrison, and to open the road -from thence to Tarragona. - -Lafosse, the governor of Tortosa, was so impressed with the danger of -his colleague in Tarragona, that he marched ahead along the coast-road -before Musnier arrived, and reached the Col de Balaguer with a -battalion of the 121st regiment and one troop of dragoons on January -18. Here he should have waited for the main column, but receiving false -news that Eroles had left Reus and returned to the north, he resolved -to push on ahead and clear the way for Musnier, believing that nothing -but local _somatenes_ were in front of him. He had reached Villaseca, -only seven miles from Tarragona, when he was suddenly surprised -by Eroles descending on his flank with over 3,000 men. He himself -galloped on with the dragoons towards Tarragona, and escaped, with only -twenty-two men, into the fortress. But his battalion, after barricading -itself in Villaseca village and making a good resistance for some -hours, was forced to surrender. Eroles took nearly 600 prisoners, and -over 200 French had fallen. Lafosse, sallying from Tarragona with all -that could be spared from the garrison, arrived too late to help his -men, and had to return in haste [January 19][86]. - - [86] There is an interesting account of the combat of Villaseca - in Codrington’s _Memoirs_, i. pp. 254-6: he was present, having - chanced to come on shore to confer with Eroles as to co-operation - against Tarragona. An odd episode of the affair was that, when - the French surrendered, they were found to have with them as - prisoners Captains Flinn and Pringle, R.N., whom they had - surprised landing at Cape Salou on the previous day. - -Tarragona now seemed in imminent danger, and both Musnier at Tortosa -and Maurice Mathieu at Barcelona saw that they must do their best to -relieve the place, or it would be starved out. Musnier spent so much -time in organizing a convoy that he was late, and the actual opening -of the road was carried out by the governor of Barcelona. That great -city chanced to be crammed with troops at the moment, since Lamarque’s -division, which had escorted the December convoy, was still lying -within its walls. Maurice Mathieu, therefore, was able to collect 8,000 -men for the march on Tarragona. Eroles, unfortunately for himself, was -not aware of this, and believing that the enemy was a mere sally of -the Barcelona garrison, offered them battle at Altafulla on January -24. The French had marched by night, and a fog chanced to prevent -the Catalans from recognizing the strength of the two columns that -were approaching them. Eroles found himself committed to a close -fight with double his own numbers, and after a creditable resistance -was routed, losing his only two guns and the rearguard with which he -tried to detain the enemy. His troops only escaped by breaking up and -flying over the hills, in what a French eye-witness described as _un -sauve-qui-peut général_. About 600 of them in all were slain or taken: -the rest assembled at Igualada three days later. Eroles blamed Lacy -and Sarsfield for his disaster, asserting that the Captain-General -had promised to send the division of the latter to his help. But his -anger appears to have been misplaced, for at this very time Decaen, -to make a division in favour of Maurice Mathieu’s movement, had sent -out two columns from Gerona and Figueras into Upper Catalonia. They -occupied Vich, Lacy’s recent head-quarters, on January 22, two days -before the combat of Altafulla, and Sarsfield’s troops were naturally -sent to oppose them. After wasting the upper valleys, Decaen drew -back to Gerona and Olot on the 29th, having sufficiently achieved his -purpose. Tarragona, meanwhile, was thoroughly revictualled by Musnier, -who brought up a large convoy from Tortosa. Reinforcements were also -thrown into the place, and a new governor, General Bertoletti, who was -to distinguish himself by a spirited defence in the following year. - -In February the whole situation of affairs in Aragon and western -Catalonia (eastern Catalonia was less affected), was much modified by -the return from the south of the numerous troops which had been lent -to Suchet for his Valencian expedition. It will be remembered that -Napoleon had ordered that Reille should march back to the Ebro with his -own and Severoli’s divisions, and that shortly afterwards he directed -that Palombini’s division should follow the other two into Aragon. Thus -a very large body of troops was once more available for the subjection -of Aragon and western Catalonia, which, since Reille’s departure in -December, had been very inadequately garrisoned by Caffarelli’s and -Frère’s battalions, and had been overrun in many districts by the bands -of the Empecinado, Duran, Mina, and the Conde de Montijo. Napoleon’s -new plan was to rearrange the whole of the troops in eastern Spain. - -[Illustration: CATALONIA] - -Reille was to be the chief of a new ‘Army of the Ebro,’ composed of -four field divisions--his own, Palombini’s and Severoli’s Italians, and -a new composite one under General Ferino constructed from so many of -Frère’s troops as could be spared from garrison duty (seven battalions -of the 14th and 115th of the line), and six more battalions (1st Léger -and 5th of the line) taken half from Musnier’s division of Suchet’s -army and half from Maurice Mathieu’s Barcelona garrison[87]. This -last division never came into existence, as Suchet and Maurice Mathieu -both found themselves too weak to give up the requisitioned regiments, -which remained embodied respectively with the Valencian and Catalan -armies. Nevertheless Reille had more than 20,000 men actually in hand, -not including the fixed garrisons of Tarragona, Lerida, and the other -fortresses on the borders of Aragon and Catalonia. This, when it is -remembered that Caffarelli was still holding the Saragossa district, -seemed an adequate force with which to make an end of the guerrilleros -of Aragon, and then to complete, in conjunction with Decaen’s Corps, -the subjection of inland Catalonia. For this last operation was to be -the final purpose of Reille: while Decaen was to attack Lacy from the -eastern side, Reille (with Lerida as his base) was to fall on from the -west, to occupy Urgel and Berga (the seat of the Catalan Junta and the -centre of organized resistance), and to join hands with Decaen across -the crushed remnants of the Spanish army[88]. So sure did the Emperor -feel that the last elements of Catalan resistance were now to be -destroyed, that he gave orders for the issue of the proclamation (drawn -up long before[89]) by which the Principality was declared to be united -to the French empire. It was to be divided into the four departments -of the Ter [capital Gerona], Montserrat [capital Barcelona], -Bouches-de-l’Ebre [capital Lerida], and Segre [capital Puigcerda]. -Prefects and other officials were appointed for each department, and -justice was to be administered in the name of the Emperor. The humour -of the arrangement (which its creator most certainly failed to see) was -that three-fourths of the territory of each department was in the hands -of the patriots whom he styled rebels, and that none of his prefects -could have gone ten miles from his _chef-lieu_ without an escort of 200 -men, under pain of captivity or death. - - [87] Napoleon to Berthier, Paris, Jan. 25, after the receipt of - the news of the fall of Valencia. - - [88] Details may be found in the dispatches of Feb. 29, and May - 1st and 8th. - - [89] See vol. iv. p. 215. - -Reille’s start was much delayed by the fact that one of his French -brigades had been told off to serve as escort to the mass of Blake’s -prisoners from Valencia, and could not get quit of them till, marching -by Teruel, it had handed them over for transference beyond the Pyrenees -to the garrison of Saragossa. Of his two Italian divisions, Palombini’s -was instructed to devote itself to the clearing of southern Aragon, -and the opening up of the communications between the French garrisons -of Daroca, Teruel, and Calatayud. The other, Severoli’s, called off -from the siege of Peniscola, which had originally been entrusted to -it[90], marched for Lerida in two columns, the one by the sea-coast and -Tortosa, the other inland, by way of Morella and Mequinenza. When his -troops had begun to concentrate on the borders of Aragon and Catalonia, -in and about Lerida, Reille began operations by sending a column, one -French brigade and one Italian regiment, to attack the ubiquitous -Eroles, who, since his defeat at Altafulla a month before, had betaken -himself to the inland, and the rough country along the valleys of the -two Nogueras, with the object of covering Catalonia on its western -front. - - [90] See above, p. 88. - -This expedition, entrusted to the French brigadier Bourke, ended in -an unexpected check: Eroles offered battle with 3,000 men in a strong -position at Roda, with a torrent bed covering his front (March 5). -Bourke, having far superior numbers, and not aware of the tenacity of -the Catalan troops, whom he had never before encountered, ordered a -general frontal attack by battalions of the 60th French and 7th Italian -line. It was handsomely repulsed, with such heavy loss--600 casualties -it is said--that the French retreated as far as Barbastro, pursued for -some distance by the troops of Eroles, who thus showed that their late -disaster had not impaired their morale[91]. This was a most glorious -day for the Baron, one of the few leaders of real capacity whom the -war in Catalonia revealed. He had been a civilian in 1808, and had to -learn the elements of military art under chiefs as incapable as Blake -and Campoverde. From a miquelete chief he rose to be a general in the -regular army, purely by the force of his unconquerable pertinacity and -a courage which no disasters could break. As a local patriot he had an -advantage in dealing with his Catalan countrymen, which strangers like -Reding, Blake, Lacy, or Sarsfield never possessed, and their confidence -was never betrayed. A little active man of great vivacity, generally -with a cigar in the corner of his mouth, and never long still, he -was not only a good leader of irregular bands, but quite capable of -understanding a strategical move, and of handling a division in a -serious action. His self-abnegation during his service under chiefs -whose plans were often unwise, and whose authority was often exercised -in a galling fashion, was beyond all praise[92]. - - [91] The exact loss is uncertain, but Bourke himself was wounded, - and Martinien’s lists show 15 other casualties among French and - Italian officers: Vacani (vi. p. 65) says that the 7th Italian - line alone lost 15 killed and 57 wounded. A loss of 16 officers - implies _at least_ 300 men hit. - - [92] For numerous anecdotes of Eroles and lively pictures of his - doings the reader may refer to the Memoirs of Edward Codrington, - with whom he so often co-operated. - -The check at Roda forced Reille to turn aside more troops against -Eroles--practically the whole of Severoli’s division was added to -the column which had just been defeated, and on March 13th such a -force marched against him that he was compelled to retire, drawing -his pursuers after him toward the upper course of the Noguera, and -ultimately to seek refuge in the wilds of Talarn among the foot-hills -of the higher Pyrenees. His operations with a trifling force paralysed -nearly half Reille’s army during two critical months of the spring of -1812. Meanwhile, covered by his demonstration, Sarsfield executed a -destructive raid across the French border, overran the valleys beyond -Andorra, and exacted a ransom of 70,000 dollars from Foix, the chief -town of the department of the Arriège (February 19). This was the best -possible reply to Napoleon’s recent declaration that Catalonia had -become French soil. The Emperor was naturally enraged; he reiterated -his orders to Reille to ‘déloger les insurgents: il n’est que trop -vrai qu’ils se nourrissent de France’--’il faut mettre un terme à ces -insultes [93].’ But though Reille pushed his marches far into the -remote mountainous districts where the borders of Aragon and Catalonia -meet, he never succeeded in destroying the bands which he was set to -hunt down: a trail of burnt villages marked his course, but it had -no permanent result. The inhabitants descended from the hills, to -reoccupy their fields and rebuild their huts, when he had passed by, -and the insurgents were soon prowling again near the forts of Lerida, -Barbastro, and Monzon. - - [93] Napoleon to Berthier, March 8th, 1812. - -Palombini in southern Aragon had equally unsatisfactory experiences. -Coming up from Valencia by the high-road, he had reached Teruel on -February 19th, and, after relieving and strengthening the garrison -there, set out on a circular sweep, with the intention of hunting down -Gayan and Duran--the Conde de Montijo had just returned to the Murcian -army at this moment[94], while the Empecinado was out of the game for -some weeks, being, as we shall presently see, busy in New Castile. -But the movements of the Italian general were soon complicated by the -fact that Villacampa, with the remnants of his division, had started -from the neighbourhood of Alicante and Murcia much at the same time as -himself, to seek once more his old haunts in Aragon. This division had -given a very poor account of itself while serving as regular troops -under Blake, but when it returned to its native mountains assumed a -very different efficiency in the character of a large guerrilla band. -Appearing at first only 2,000 strong, it recruited itself up to a much -greater strength from local levies, and became no mean hindrance to -Palombini’s operations. - - [94] Apparently about the same time that Villacampa and his - division came up to replace him in Aragon. - -On the 29th of February the Italian general relieved Daroca, and a few -days later he occupied Calatayud, which had been left ungarrisoned -since the disaster of the previous October[95]. After fortifying the -convent of Nostra Señora de la Peña as a new citadel for this place, -he split up his division into several small columns, which scoured the -neighbourhood, partly to sweep in provisions for the post at Calatayud, -partly to drive off the guerrilleros of the region. But to risk small -detachments in Aragon was always a dangerous business; Villacampa, who -had now come up from the south, cut off one body of 200 men at Campillo -on March 5, and destroyed six companies at Pozohondon on the 28th of -the same month. Taught prudence by these petty disasters, and by some -less successful attacks on others of his flying columns, Palombini once -more drew his men together, and concentrated them in the upland plain -of Hused near Daroca. From thence he made another blow at Villacampa, -who was at the same time attacked in the rear by a column sent up -by Suchet from Valencia to Teruel. The Spaniard, however, easily -avoided the attempt to surround him, and retired without much loss or -difficulty into the wild Sierra de Albarracin (April 18th). Meanwhile, -seeing Palombini occupied in hunting Villacampa, the guerrillero Gayan -made a dash at the new garrison of Calatayud, and entering the city -unexpectedly captured the governor and sixty men, but failed to reduce -the fortified convent in which the rest of the Italians took refuge -[April 29th]. He then sat down to besiege them, though he had no guns, -and could work by mines alone: but Palombini soon sent a strong column -under the brigadiers Saint Paul and Schiazzetti, who drove off Gayan -and relieved Calatayud [May 9th]. - - [95] See above, page 21. - -Nevertheless three months had now gone by since the attempt to reduce -southern Aragon began, and it was now obvious that it had been wholly -unsuccessful. The hills and great part of the upland plains were still -in the possession of the Spaniards, who had been often hunted but never -caught nor seriously mishandled. Palombini owned nothing more than the -towns which he had garrisoned, and the spot on which his head-quarters -chanced for the moment to be placed. His strength was not sufficient -to enable him to occupy every village, and without such occupation -no conquest could take place. Moreover the time was at hand when -Wellington’s operations in the West were to shake the fabric of French -power all over Spain--even in the remote recesses of the Aragonese -Sierras. Palombini was to be drawn off in July to join the Army of the -Centre and to oppose the English. And with his departure such hold as -the French possessed on the rugged region between Calatayud, Saragossa, -and Teruel was to disappear. - -It will be noted that during these operations of the spring no mention -has been made of the Empecinado, who had been so prominent in this -quarter during the preceding autumn and winter. This chief was now -at the bottom of his fortunes: raiding in New Castile after his -accustomed fashion, he had been completely defeated by General Guy -and a column of King Joseph’s army near Siguenza (February 7). He lost -1,000 men, only saved his own person by throwing himself down an almost -impracticable cliff, and saw his whole force dispersed. This affair -is said to have been the result of treachery: one of the Empecinado’s -lieutenants, a certain guerrillero leader named Albuir (better known -as El Manco from having lost a hand) being taken prisoner a few days -before, saved his neck by betraying his chief’s position and plans: -hence the surprise. El Manco entered the King’s service and raised a -‘counter-guerrilla’ band, with which he did considerable harm for a -space. The Empecinado had only collected 600 men even by April, when he -joined Villacampa and aided him in a raid round Guadalajara[96]. - - [96] For all this see Schepeler, pp. 570-1; King Joseph’s Letters - (Ducasse), viii. pp. 291 and 305; and Toreno, iii. pp. 81-2. - -Mina, on the other hand, the greatest of all the partisans, was doing -some of his best service to the cause of liberty during the early -months of 1812. This was the period when he was conducting his bloody -campaign of reprisals against Abbé, the governor of Navarre, who had -published in December 1811 the celebrated proclamation which not only -prohibited any quarter for guerrilleros, but made their families -and villages responsible for them, and authorized the execution of -‘hostages’ levied on them, as well as the infliction of crushing fines. -Mina replied by the formal declaration of a ‘war of extermination -against all French without distinction of rank,’ and started the system -of shooting four prisoners for every Spaniard, soldier or civilian, -executed by the enemy. This he actually carried out for some months, -till the French proclamation was withdrawn. The most horrid incident -of this reign of terror was the shooting by the French, on March 21, -of the four members of the ‘insurrectional junta’ of the province -of Burgos, all magistrates and civilians, whom they had captured in -a raid, and the counter-execution of eighty French soldiers by the -Curate Merino, one of Mina’s colleagues, a few days later. This time of -atrocities ended shortly after, when Abbé withdrew his proclamation and -Mina followed his example. - -On the departure of Reille’s troops from Valencia it will be -remembered that one of his French brigades, that of Pannetier, had -been sent as escort to the captive Spaniards of Blake’s army. While -the remainder of the new ‘Army of the Ebro’ went off in the direction -of Lerida, as has already been seen, this brigade was turned aside -against Mina. Dorsenne at the same time directed the greater part -of his available field-force to join in the hunt, and all such of -Caffarelli’s troops as were not shut up in garrisons were told off for -the same purpose. These detachments, when added to the normal force -of occupation in Navarre and Biscay, made up in all some 30,000 men. -Divided into many columns, each of which was strong enough to face -the 3,000 or 4,000 irregulars under Mina’s command, they endeavoured -to converge upon him, and to enclose him within the net of their -operations. The chase was very hot in March: on the first of that month -Caffarelli invaded the remote Pyrenean valley of Roncal, where it had -been discovered that Mina kept his dépôts, his ammunition factory, and -his hospitals. The valley was swept clean, but no appreciable number -of the guerrilleros were captured. On the 24th, however, it looked as -if disaster was impending, as three columns under Abbé, Dumoustier -(who had a brigade of the Young Guard), and Laferrière had succeeded -in disposing themselves around Mina’s main body, between Sanguessa and -Ochagavia. The guerrillero, however, saved himself by a night march -of incredible difficulty across impracticable hills, and got away -into Aragon. He was lost to sight, and was believed to have been too -harassed to be formidable for many a day. - -Such was not the true state of affairs. Mina at once came back to his -old haunts, by a circuitous march through southern Navarre, and on -April 9th performed one of his most notable exploits. On that day he -surprised an immense convoy of convalescents, civilians, baggage, and -food-stuffs, which was marching from Vittoria to Mondragon, in the -Pass of Salinas (or Puerto de Arlaban). Though escorted by 2,000 men -(including the whole of the 7th Polish regiment just drawn off from -Soult for the Russian war), it was completely destroyed. Five hundred -of the Poles were slain, 150 captured, and an enormous booty, including -(it is said) several hundred thousand francs in cash, fell into Mina’s -hands. He also delivered 450 Spanish prisoners, who were being -conducted to captivity beyond the Pyrenees. - -Such an exploit naturally drew down once more upon Mina the attention -of all the neighbouring French commanders: Dorsenne and Reille again -sent columns to aid the governor of Navarre, and from the 23rd to -the 28th of April Mina was being hunted by powerful detachments -converging on him from all sides[97]. He himself was very nearly -captured at Robres by General Pannetier--who surprised him at dawn, -helped by treachery on the part of a subordinate guerrillero chief, -and dispersed his followers for the moment[98]. But all who were not -slain or captured rallied around their indomitable leader, and followed -him in a hazardous retreat, in which he threaded his way between the -converging columns of the French and ultimately escaped to the Rioja. -He asserts in his Memoirs, and with truth, that he was at this time of -the highest service to Wellington’s main operations, since he attracted -and detained beyond the Ebro such a large proportion of Dorsenne’s Army -of the North, that in April and May it had not a man to spare to help -Marmont. Even Dumoustier’s Guard division, under orders to return to -France for the Russian war, was put into the pack of pursuers who tried -in vain to hunt him down. - - [97] There seems to be an error of dates in Napier, iv. p. 172, - concerning Mina’s operations, as the surprise of the convoy at - Salinas is put _after_ Mina’s escape from Pannetier at Robres. - But Mina’s own Memoirs fix the date of the latter as April 23rd, - 1812, while the former certainly happened on April 7th. Toreno - (iii. p. 87) has got the sequence right. - - [98] There is a curious and interesting account of this in Mina’s - own Memoirs, pp. 31-2, where he relates his narrow escape, - and tells how he had the pleasure of hanging his treacherous - lieutenant, and three local alcaldes, who had conspired to keep - from him the news of Pannetier’s approach. - -To sum up the results of all the operations in Catalonia, Aragon, -and Navarre, which followed on the release of Reille’s troops from -the Valencian expedition, it may be said that Napoleon’s scheme for -the complete reduction of north-eastern Spain had completely failed -by April. Large forces had been put in motion; toilsome marches had -been executed over many mountain roads in the worst season of the -year; all the bands of the insurgents had been more than once defeated -and dispersed. But the country-side was not conquered: the isolated -garrisons were still cut off from each other by the enemy, wherever -the heavy marching columns had passed on. The communications were no -more safe and free than they had been in December. The loss of men -by sickness and in the innumerable petty combats and disasters had -been immense. The game had yet to be finished, and the spare time in -which it could be conducted was drawing to an end. For Wellington was -on the march, and ere long not a man from the Armies of the North or -the Centre was to be available to aid Reille, Suchet, and Decaen in -their unending and ungrateful task. Gone, too, were the days in which -reserves without end could be poured in from France: the Russian war -was about to open, and when once it began reinforcements were to be -drawn from Spain rather than sent into it. The invasion had reached -its high-water mark in January 1812 before the walls of Valencia and -Alicante. - - - - -SECTION XXXI: CHAPTER II - -OPERATIONS OF SOULT IN ANDALUSIA: THE SIEGE OF TARIFA, DEC. 1811-JAN. -1812 - - -In the south-west no less than in the south-east of Spain the month -of January 1812 was to witness the last offensive movement of the -French armies of invasion. But while Suchet’s advance ended, as we -have seen, in a splendid success, that of Soult was to meet with a -disastrous check. Neither marshal was to have another chance of taking -the initiative--thanks, directly or indirectly, to the working out of -Wellington’s great plan of campaign for the New Year. - -In the previous volume the fortunes of Soult and the Army of Andalusia -were narrated down to the first days of November 1811, when Hill’s raid -into Estremadura, after the surprise of Arroyo dos Molinos, ended with -his retreat within the borders of Portugal. That raid had inflicted -a severe blow on Drouet’s corps of observation, which formed Soult’s -right wing, and covered his communications with Badajoz. But its net -result was only to restrict the activities of the French on this side -to that part of Estremadura which lies south of the Guadiana. Hill -had made no attempt to drive away Drouet’s main body, or to blockade -Badajoz, and had betaken himself to winter quarters about Elvas, -Portalegre, and Estremos. Consequently Drouet was able to settle -down opposite him once more, in equally widespread cantonments, with -his right wing at Merida, and his left at Zafra, and to devote his -attention to sending successive convoys forward to Badajoz, whenever -the stores in that fortress showed signs of running low. Drouet’s -force no longer bore the name of the ‘5th Corps’--all the old corps -distinctions were abolished in the Southern Army this autumn, and no -organization larger than that of the divisions was permitted to remain. -The troops in Estremadura were simply for the future Drouet’s and -Daricau’s divisions of the ‘Armée du Midi.’ The composition of this -‘containing force,’ whose whole purpose was now to observe Hill, was -somewhat changed after midwinter: for the Emperor sent orders that the -34th and 40th regiments, the victims of Girard’s carelessness at Arroyo -dos Molinos, were to be sent home to France to recruit their much -depleted ranks. They duly left Drouet, and marched off northward[99], -but they never got further than Burgos, where Dorsenne detained them -at a moment of need, so that they became attached to the ‘Army of -the North,’ and (after receiving some drafts) were involved in the -operations against Wellington in the valley of the Douro. Two regiments -from Andalusia (the 12th Léger and 45th Line) came up to replace them -in Drouet’s division, but even then the French troops in Estremadura -did not exceed 13,500 men, if the garrison of Badajoz (about 5,000 -strong) be deducted. This constituted a field-force insufficient to -hold back Hill when next he should take the offensive; but all through -November and far into December Hill remained quiescent, by Wellington’s -orders, and his adversary clung to his advanced positions as long as he -could, though much disturbed as to what the future might bring forth. - - [99] Napoleon to Berthier, Dec. 30, 1811, speaks of the order - to march having been _already_ given. The two regiments were - in Castile by March: when precisely they left Drouet I cannot - say--perhaps as late as February. - -Of the remainder of Soult’s army, the troops in front of Cadiz, -originally the 1st Corps, had been cut down to an irreducible minimum, -by the necessity for keeping flank-guards to either side, to watch the -Spanish forces in the Condado de Niebla on the west and the mountains -of Ronda on the south. Even including the marines and sailors of the -flotilla, there were seldom 20,000 men in the Lines, and the Spanish -force in Cadiz and the Isle of Leon, stiffened by the Anglo-Portuguese -detachment which Wellington always retained there, was often not -inferior in numbers to the besiegers. The bombardment from the heavy -Villoutreys mortars, placed in the works of the Matagorda peninsula, -continued intermittently: but, though a shell occasionally fell in -the city, no appreciable harm was done. The inhabitants killed or -injured by many months of shelling could be counted on the fingers of -two hands. The citizens had come to take the occasional descent of a -missile in their streets with philosophic calm, and sang a derisive -street ditty which told how - - ‘De las bombas que tiran los Gavachos - Se hacen las Gaditanas tirabuzones.’ - -‘The splinters of the bombs that the French threw served the ladies of -Cadiz as weights to curl their hair[100].’ - - [100] See Schepeler, p. 172. - -The Fort of Puntales, on the easternmost point of the isthmus that -links Cadiz to the Isle of Leon, felt the bombardment more severely, -but was never seriously injured, and always succeeded in keeping up -an effective return fire. With the artillery of those days--even when -mortars of the largest calibre, specially cast in the arsenal of -Seville, were used--Cadiz was safe from any real molestation. - -Marshal Victor was still in command of the troops in the Lines at the -end of 1811, but the Emperor gave orders for his return to France, -when he ordered the Army of Andalusia to drop its organization into -army-corps, and replaced them by divisions. He directed that the -Marshal should set out at once, unless he was engaged in some serious -enterprise at the moment that the summons arrived. This--as we shall -see--chanced to be the case, and Victor was still hard at work in -January, and did not leave Spain till early in April. - -The third main section of Soult’s troops consisted of the two infantry -and one cavalry divisions which had lately formed the 4th Corps, and -had, since their first arrival in the South, been told off for the -occupation of the kingdom of Granada. The whole of the coast and the -inland from Malaga as far as Baza fell to their charge. The corps had -been a strong one--16,000 foot and 4,000 horse--but was shortly to be -reduced; the order of December 30, recalling troops for the expected -Russian war, took off the whole Polish infantry division of Dembouski, -5,000 bayonets: the regiment of Lancers of the Vistula, who had won -such fame by their charge at Albuera, was also requisitioned, but did -not get off till the autumn. But in the last month of the old year -the Poles were still present and available, and Soult was far from -expecting their departure. Yet even before they were withdrawn the -garrison of the kingdom of Granada was by no means too strong for the -work allotted to it. The greater part of its available field-force -had been drawn to the south-west, to curb the insurrection of the -_Serranos_ of the Ronda mountains, and the inroads of Ballasteros. -The forces left in Granada itself and the other eastern towns were so -modest that Soult protested, and apparently with truth, that he could -not spare from them even a small flying column of all arms, to make the -demonstration against Murcia in assistance of Suchet’s operations which -the Emperor ordered him to execute. Nothing, as it will be remembered, -was done in this direction during December and January, save the -sending out of Pierre Soult’s raid[101], a mere affair of a single -cavalry brigade. - - [101] See above, p. 81. - -The total force of the Andalusian army was still in December as high -as 80,000 men on paper. But after deducting the sick, the garrison -of Badajoz--5,000 men,--the troops of Drouet, entirely taken up with -observing and containing Hill, the divisions in the Lines before Cadiz, -and the obligatory garrisons of Granada, Malaga, Cordova, and other -large towns, the surplus left over for active operations was very -small. At the most ten or twelve thousand men, obtained by borrowing -from all sides, could be formed to act as a central reserve, prepared -to assist Drouet in Estremadura, Victor in the Cadiz region, or Leval -in the East, as occasion might demand. During the two crises when Soult -brought up his reserves to join Drouet, in the winter of 1811-12 and -the spring of 1812, their joint force did not exceed 25,000 men. The -Marshal was resolved to hold the complete circuit of Andalusia, the -viceroyalty which brought him so much pride and profit; and so long as -he persisted in this resolve he could make no offensive move, for want -of a field army of competent strength. - -Soult made some effort to supplement the strength of his garrisons by -raising Spanish levies--both battalions and squadrons of regulars, -and units for local service in the style of urban guards. The former -‘Juramentados’ never reached any great strength: they were composed -of deserters, or prisoners who volunteered service in order to avoid -being sent to France. Occasionally there were as many as 5,000 under -arms--usually less. The men for the most part disappeared at the first -opportunity, and rejoined the national army or the guerrilleros: the -officers were less prone to abscond, because they were liable to -be shot as traitors on returning to their countrymen. Two or three -cases are recorded of such renegades who committed suicide, when they -saw themselves about to fall into the hands of Spanish troops[102]. -The urban guards or ‘escopeteros’ were of a little more service, -for the reason that, being interested in the preservation of their -own families, goods, and houses, they would often prevent the entry -into their towns of any roving Spanish force which showed itself for -a moment. For if they admitted any small band, which went on its -way immediately, and could make no attempt to defend them on the -reappearance of the enemy, they were liable to be executed as traitors -by the French, and their town would be fined or perhaps sacked. Hence -it was to their interest, so long as Soult continued to dominate all -Andalusia, to keep the guerrilleros outside their walls. But their -service was, of course, unwilling; and they were usually ready to -yield on the appearance of any serious Spanish force, whose size was -sufficient to excuse their submission in the eyes of Soult. Often a -town was ostensibly held for King Joseph, but was privately supplying -recruits, provisions, and money contributions to the national cause. -Nevertheless there were real ‘Afrancesados’ in Andalusia, people who -had so far committed themselves to the cause of King Joseph that they -could not contemplate the triumph of the Patriots without terror. When -Soult evacuated Andalusia in September 1812 several thousand refugees -followed him, rather than face the vengeance of their countrymen. - - [102] One case is noted of a captain of the ‘Juramentado’ - detachment at Badajoz who blew himself from a gun when he saw - the place taken (Lamare’s _Défense de Badajoz_, p. 260). Carlos - de España shot the other five Spanish officers captured on that - occasion (Belmas, iv. p. 362). - -During the midwinter of 1811-12 Soult’s main attention was taken up by -a serious enterprise in the extreme south of his viceroyalty, which -absorbed all the spare battalions of his small central reserve, and -rendered it impossible for him to take the offensive in any other -direction. This was the attempt to crush Ballasteros, and to capture -Tarifa, which rendered his co-operation in Suchet’s Valencian campaign -impossible. - -General Ballasteros, as it will be remembered, had landed from Cadiz -at Algeciras on September 4th, 1811, and had been much hunted during -the autumn by detachments drawn both from the troops in the kingdom of -Granada and those of Victor[103]. As many as 10,000 men were pressing -him in October, when he had been forced to take refuge under the cannon -of Gibraltar. But when want of food compelled the columns of Barrois, -Sémélé, and Godinot to withdraw and to disperse, he had emerged -from his refuge, had followed the retiring enemy, and had inflicted -some damage on their rearguards [November 5, 1811]. His triumphant -survival, after the first concentrated movement made against him, had -much provoked Soult, who saw the insurrectionary movement in southern -Andalusia spreading all along the mountains, and extending itself -towards Malaga on the one side and Arcos on the other. The Marshal, -therefore, determined to make a serious effort to crush Ballasteros, -and at the same time to destroy one of the two bases from which he was -wont to operate. Gibraltar was, of course, impregnable: but Tarifa, the -other fortress at the southern end of the Peninsula, was not, and had -proved from time to time very useful to the Spaniards. It was now their -only secure foothold in southern Andalusia, and was most useful as a -port of call for vessels going round from Cadiz to the Mediterranean, -especially for the large flotilla of British and Spanish sloops, brigs, -and gunboats, which obsessed the coast of Andalusia, and made the use -of routes by the seaside almost impracticable for the enemy. Soult -was at this time trying to open up communications with the Moors of -Tangier, from whom he hoped to get horses for his cavalry, and oxen for -the army before Cadiz. But he could not hope to accomplish anything -in this way so long as Tarifa was the nest and victualling-place of -privateers, who lay thick in the straits only a few miles from the -coast of Morocco. - - [103] See vol. iii. pp. 594-5. - -The main reason for attacking Tarifa, however, was that it had recently -become the head-quarters of a small Anglo-Spanish field-force, which -had been molesting the rear of the lines before Cadiz. The place had -not been garrisoned in 1810, when Soult first broke into Andalusia: -but a few months after General Colin Campbell, governor of Gibraltar, -threw into it a small force, that same battalion of flank-companies -of the 9th, 28th, 30th, and 47th Foot, which distinguished itself so -much at Barrosa in the following year, when led by Colonel Brown of the -28th. This hard fighter had moved on with his regiment later in 1811, -but his place had been taken by Major King of the 82nd--a one-legged -officer of great energy and resolution[104]. The garrison was trifling -down to October 1811, when General Campbell threw into Tarifa a brigade -under Colonel Skerrett, consisting of the 2/47th and 2/87th, and some -details[105], making (with the original garrison) 1,750 British troops. -Three days later the Spaniards sent in from Cadiz another brigade[106] -of about the same strength, under General Copons. After the French -expedition against Ballasteros had failed, Copons and Skerrett went -out and drove from Vejer the southernmost outposts of Victor’s corps -in the Lines (November 6th). A fortnight later they marched across the -hills to Algeciras, and prepared to join Ballasteros in an attack on -the French troops in the direction of Ronda, but returned to Tarifa -on the news that Victor was showing a considerable force at Vejer, -and threatening to cut them off from their base[107]. Ballasteros by -himself was a sufficient nuisance to Soult, but when his operations -began to be aided by another separate force, partly composed of -British troops, the Duke of Dalmatia determined that a clean sweep must -be made in southern Andalusia. - - [104] After the 28th went off, the flank-companies were those of - the 2/11th, 2/47th, and 1/82nd, two from each battalion. - - [105] 2/47th (8 companies) 570 men, 2/87th (560 men), 1 company - 95th (75 men), 70 2nd Hussars K.G.L., 1 field-battery (Captain - Hughes) 83 men, or in all 1,358 of all ranks. - - [106] A battalion each of Irlanda and Cantabria, and some - light companies of cazadores, with 120 gunners and 25 cavalry, - amounting to about 1,650 men (sick included). - - [107] For details of these operations see the anonymous _Defence - of Tarifa_ (London, 1812), and letters in Rait’s _Life of Lord - Gough_, i. pp. 69-70. - -The idea of capturing Tarifa did not appear by any means impracticable. -This little decayed place of 6,000 souls had never been fortified in -the modern style, and was surrounded by nothing more than a mediaeval -wall eight feet thick, with square towers set in it at intervals. -There was a citadel, the castle of Guzman El Bueno[108], but this, -too, was a thirteenth-century building, and the whole place, though -tenable against an enemy unprovided with artillery, was reckoned -helpless against siege-guns. It is described by one of its defenders -as ‘lying in a hole,’ for it was completely commanded by a range of -low heights, at no greater distance than 300 yards from its northern -front. In the sea, half a mile beyond it, was a rocky island, connected -with the mainland by a very narrow strip of sand, which was well -suited to serve as a final place of refuge for the garrison, and -which had been carefully fortified. It was furnished with batteries, -of which one bore on the sand-spit and the town: a redoubt (Santa -Catalina) had been erected at the point where the isthmus joined the -mainland: several buildings had been erected to serve as a shelter -for troops, and a great series of caves (Cueva de los Moros) had been -converted into casemates and store-rooms: they were perfectly safe -against bombardment. In the eyes of many officers the island was -the real stronghold, and the city was but an outwork to it, which -might be evacuated without any serious damage to the strength of the -defence. Nevertheless something had been done to improve the weak -fortifications of the place: the convent of San Francisco, seventy -yards from its northern point, had been entrenched and loopholed, to -serve as a redoubt, and some of the square towers in the _enceinte_ had -been strengthened and built up so as to bear artillery. The curtain, -however, was in all parts far too narrow and weak to allow of guns -being placed upon it, and there was no glacis and practically no -ditch, the whole wall to its foot being visible from the heights which -overlook the city on its eastern side. There were only twenty-six -guns available, and of these part belonged to the defences of the -island. In the town itself there were only two heavy guns mounted on -commanding towers, six field-pieces (9-pounders) distributed along the -various fronts, and four mortars. When the siege actually began, the -main defence was by musketry fire. It was clear from the topography of -Tarifa that its northern front, that nearest to and most completely -commanded by the hills outside, would be the probable point of attack -by the enemy; and long before the siege began preparations were made -for an interior defence. The buildings looking on the back of the -ramparts were barricaded and loopholed, the narrow streets were blocked -with traverses, and some ‘entanglements’ were contrived with the iron -window-bars requisitioned from all the houses of the town, which served -as a sort of _chevaux de frise_. The outer _enceinte_ was so weak that -it was intended that the main defence should be in the network of -streets. Special preparations were thought out for the right-centre of -the north front, where the walls are pierced by the ravine of a winter -torrent of intermittent flow, called the Retiro. The point where it -made its passage under the _enceinte_ through a portcullis was the -lowest place in the front, the walls sinking down as they followed -the outline of the ravine. Wherefore palisades were planted outside -the portcullis, entanglements behind it, and all the houses looking -down on the torrent bed within the walls were prepared with loopholes -commanding its course[109]. There was ample time for work, for while -the first certain news that the French were coming arrived in November, -the enemy did not actually appear before the walls till December 20. By -that time much had been done, though the balance was only completed in -haste after the siege had begun. - - [108] This was the famous knight who, holding the place for King - Sancho IV in 1294, refused to surrender it when the Moors brought - his son, captured in a skirmish, before the walls, and threatened - to behead him if his father refused to capitulate. Guzman would - not yield, saw his son slain, and successfully maintained the - fortress. - - [109] For these precautions, the work of Captain Charles Smith, - R.E., see the anonymous _Defence of Tarifa_ (p. 62), and Napier, - iv. pp. 59-60. - -The long delay of the enemy was caused by the abominable condition of -the roads of the district--the same that had given Graham and La Peña -so much trouble in February 1811[110]: moreover, any considerable -concentration of troops in southern Andalusia raised a food problem -for Soult. The region round Tarifa is very thinly inhabited, and it -was clear that, if a large army were collected, it would have to carry -its provisions with it, and secure its communication with its base, -under pain of falling into starvation within a few days. Heavy guns -abounded in the Cadiz lines, and Soult had no trouble in selecting a -siege-train of sixteen pieces from them: but their transport and that -of their ammunition was a serious problem. To complete the train no -less than 500 horses had to be requisitioned from the field artillery -and military wagons of the 1st Corps. While it was being collected, -Victor moved forward to Vejer, near the coast, half-way between -Cadiz and Tarifa, with 2,000 men, in order to clear the country-side -from the guerrillero bands, who made survey of the roads difficult -and dangerous. Under cover of escorts furnished by him, several -intelligence officers inspected the possible routes: there were two, -both passing through the mountainous tract between the sea and the -lagoon of La Janda (which had given Graham so much trouble in the last -spring). One came down to the waterside at the chapel of Virgen de -la Luz, only three miles from Tarifa, but was reported to be a mere -mule-track. The other, somewhat more resembling a road, descended to -the shore several miles farther to the north, and ran parallel with it -for some distance. But in expectation of the siege, the Spaniards, with -help from English ships, had blown up many yards of this road, where -it was narrowest between the water and the mountain. Moreover, ships -of war were always stationed off Tarifa, and their guns would make -passage along this defile dangerous. Nevertheless General Garbé, the -chief French engineer, held that this was the only route practicable -for artillery, and reported that the road could be remade, and that -the flotilla might be kept at a distance by building batteries on -the shore, which would prevent any vessel from coming close enough -to deliver an effective fire. It was determined, therefore, that the -siege-train should take this path, which for the first half of its way -passes close along the marshy borders of the lagoon of La Janda, and -then enters the hills in order to descend to the sea at Torre Peña. - - [110] See vol. iv. pp. 101-2. - -On December 8th the siege-train was concentrated at Vejer, and in -the hope that it would in four days (or not much more) reach its -destination before Tarifa, Victor gave orders for the movement of the -troops which were to conduct the siege. Of this force the smaller -part, six battalions[111] and two cavalry regiments, was drawn from -Leval’s command, formerly the 4th Corps. These two divisions had also -to provide other detachments to hold Malaga in strength, and watch -Ballasteros. The troops from the blockade of Cadiz supplied eight -battalions[112], and three more to keep up communications[113]; one -additional regiment was borrowed from the brigade in the kingdom of -Cordova, which was always drawn upon in times of special need[114]. The -whole force put in motion was some 15,000 men, but only 10,000 actually -came before Tarifa and took part in the siege. - - [111] Two battalions each of 43rd Line and 7th and 9th Poles, and - 16th and 21st Dragoons. - - [112] Three of 16th Léger, two of 54th Line, one each of 27th - Léger and 94th and 95th Line. - - [113] Two of 63rd and one of 8th Line. - - [114] 51st Line. - -The various columns, which were under orders to march, came from -distant points, and had to concentrate. Barrois lay at Los Barrios, -inland from Algeciras, with six battalions from the Cadiz lines, -watching Ballasteros, who had once more fallen back under shelter of -the guns of Gibraltar. To this point Leval came to join him, with the -3,000 men drawn from Malaga and Granada. The third column, under Victor -himself, consisting of the siege-train and the battalions told off for -its escort, came from the side of Vejer. All three were to meet before -Tarifa: but from the first start difficulties began to arise owing to -the bad weather. - -The winter, which had hitherto been mild and equable, broke up into -unending rain-storms on the day appointed for the start, and the sudden -filling of the torrents in the mountains cut the communications between -the columns. Leval, who had got as far as the pass of Ojen, in the -range which separates the district about Algeciras and Los Barrios -from the Tarifa region, was forced to halt there for some days: but -his rear, a brigade under Cassagne, could not come forward to join -him, nor did the convoy-column succeed in advancing far from Vejer. -Victor sent three successive officers with escorts to try to get into -touch with Cassagne, but each returned without having been able to push -through. It was not till the 12th that a fourth succeeded in reaching -the belated column, which only got under way that day and joined on -the following afternoon. The siege-train was not less delayed, and was -blocked for several days by the overflowing of the lagoon of La Janda, -along whose shore its first stages lay. It only struggled through to -the south end of the lagoon on the 14th, and took no less than four -days more to cover the distance of sixteen miles across the hills to -Torre Peña, where the road comes down to the sea. Forty horses, it is -said, had to be harnessed to each heavy gun to pull it through[115]. -Much of the ammunition was spoilt by the rain, which continued to fall -intermittently, and more had to be requisitioned from the Cadiz lines, -and to be brought forward by supplementary convoys. - - [115] For details of this toilsome march see Belmas, iv. pp. - 15-17. - -These initial delays went far to wreck the whole scheme, because of -the food problem. Each of the columns had to bring its own provisions -with it, and, when stopped on the road, consumed stores that had been -intended to serve it during the siege. The distance from Vejer to -Tarifa is only thirty miles, and from Los Barrios to Tarifa even less: -but the columns, which had been ordered to march on December 8th, did -not reach their destination till December 20th, and the communications -behind them were cut already, not by the enemy but by the vile weather, -which had turned every mountain stream into a torrent, and every -low-lying bottom into a marsh. The column with the siege artillery -arrived two days later: it had got safely through the defile of Torre -Peña: the sappers had repaired the road by the water, and had built -a masked battery for four 12-pounders and two howitzers, whose fire -kept off from the dangerous point several Spanish and English gunboats -which came up to dispute the passage. The column from the pass of Ojen -had been somewhat delayed in its march by a sally of Ballasteros, who -came out from the Gibraltar lines on the 17th-18th and fell upon its -rear with 2,000 men. He drove in the last battalion, but when Barrois -turned back and attacked him with a whole brigade, the Spaniard gave -way and retreated in haste to San Roque. Nevertheless, by issuing from -his refuge and appearing in the open, he had cut the communications -between the army destined for the siege and the troops at Malaga. At -the same time that Ballasteros made this diversion, Skerrett, with his -whole brigade and a few of Copons’s Spaniards, had issued from Tarifa -to demonstrate against the head of the approaching French column, and -advanced some distance on the road to Fascinas, where his handful of -hussars bickered with the leading cavalry in the enemy’s front. Seeing -infantry behind, he took his main body no farther forward than the -convent of Nuestra Señora de la Luz, three miles from the fortress. On -the 19th the French showed 4,000 men on the surrounding hills, and on -the 20th advanced in force in two columns, and pushed the English and -Spanish pickets into Tarifa, after a long skirmish in which the British -had 31, the Spaniards about 40 casualties, while the French, according -to Leval’s report, lost only 1 officer and 3 men killed and 27 wounded. -By four in the afternoon the place was invested--the French pickets -reaching from sea to sea, and their main body being encamped behind the -hills which command the northern side of Tarifa. They could not place -themselves near the water, owing to the fire of two British frigates -and a swarm of gunboats, which lay in-shore, and shelled their flanks -all day, though without great effect. - -Copons and Skerrett had divided the manning of the town and island -between their brigades on equal terms, each keeping two battalions in -the town and a third in the island and the minor posts. Of the British -the 47th and 87th had the former, King’s battalion of flank-companies -(reinforced by 70 marines landed from the ships) the latter charge. The -convent of San Francisco was held by a company of the 82nd, the redoubt -of Santa Catalina on the isthmus by one of the 11th. Seeing the French -inactive on the 21st--they were waiting for the siege-train which was -not yet arrived--Skerrett sent out three companies to drive in their -pickets, and shelled the heights behind which they were encamped. On -the following day the sortie was repeated, by a somewhat larger force -under Colonel Gough of the 87th, covered by a flanking fire from the -gunboats. The right wing of the French pickets was driven in with some -loss, and a house too near the Santa Catalina redoubt demolished. The -besiegers lost 3 men killed and 4 officers and 19 men wounded, mainly -from the 16th Léger. The sallying troops had only 1 man killed and 5 -wounded (2 from the 11th, 4 from the 87th). That night the siege-train -arrived, and was parked behind the right-hand hill of the three which -face the northern side of Tarifa. - -The engineer officers who had come up with the siege-train executed -their survey of the fortress next morning, and reported (as might have -been expected) that it would be best to attack the central portion of -the north front, because the ground facing it was not exposed to any -fire from the vessels in-shore, as was the west front, and could only -be searched by the two or three guns which the besieged had mounted -on the towers of Jesus and of Guzman, the one in the midst of the -northern front, the other in a dominating position by the castle, at -the southern corner. However, the 24-pounders on the island, shooting -over the town, could throw shells on to the hillside where the French -were about to work, though without being able to judge of their effect. - -On the night of the 23rd the French began their first parallel, on -their right flank of the central hill, at a distance of 300 yards from -the walls: the approaches to it needed no spadework, being completely -screened by a ravine and a thick aloe hedge. The besieged shelled it on -the succeeding day, but with small effect--only 3 workers were killed -and 4 wounded. On the 24th a minor front of attack was developed on -the left-hand hill, where a first parallel was thrown up about 250 -yards from the walls. The gunboats on the southern shore fired on this -work when it was discovered, but as it was invisible to them, and as -they could only shoot at haphazard, by directions signalled from the -town, they generally failed to hit the mark, and did little to prevent -the progress of the digging. The besiegers only lost 4 killed and 25 -wounded this day, and on the original point of attack were able to -commence a second parallel, in which there was marked out the place for -the battery which was destined to breach the town wall at the lowest -point of its circuit, just south of the bed of the Retiro torrent. - -On the two following days the French continued to push forward with -no great difficulty; they completed the second parallel on the centre -hill, parts of which were only 180 yards from the town. On the left or -eastern hill the trenches were continued down the inner slope, as far -as the bottom of the ravine, so as almost to join those of the right -attack. On the 26th a violent south-east gale began to blow, which -compelled the British and Spanish gunboats to quit their station to -the right of Tarifa, lest they should be driven ashore, and to run -round to the west side of the island which gave them shelter from wind -coming from such a quarter. The French works were, therefore, only -molested for the future by the little 6-pounders on the north-east (or -Corchuela) tower, and the heavy guns firing at a high trajectory from -the island and the tower of Guzman. - -But the gale was accompanied by rain, and this, beginning with -moderate showers on the 26th, developed into a steady downpour on the -27th and 28th, and commenced to make the spadework in the trenches -more laborious, as the sappers were up to their ankles in mud, and -the excavated earth did not bind easily into parapets owing to its -semi-liquid condition. Nevertheless the plans of the engineers were -carried out, and two batteries were finished and armed on the central -hill, one lower down to batter the walls, the other higher up, to deal -with the guns of the besieged and silence them if possible. The French -lined all the advanced parallel with sharpshooters, who kept up a heavy -fire on the ramparts, and would have made it difficult for the garrison -to maintain a reply, if a large consignment of sandbags had not been -received from Gibraltar, with which cover was contrived for the men on -the curtain, and the artillery in the towers. - -At eleven o’clock on the morning of the 29th the two French batteries -opened[116], with twelve heavy guns. The weakness of the old town -wall at once became evident: the first shot fired went completely -through it, and lodged in a house to its rear. Before evening there -was a definite breach produced, just south of the Retiro ravine, -and it was clear that the enemy would be able to increase it to any -extent that he pleased--the masonry fell to pieces the moment that -it was well pounded. The two small field-guns on the tower of Jesus -were silenced by 3 o’clock, and the heavy gun on Guzman’s tower also -ceased firing--of which more anon. By night only the distant guns on -the island, and the ships in the south-western bay, were making an -effective reply to the French. - - [116] The breaching battery on the lower slope with four 16- - and two 12-pounders: the upper battery with four howitzers - for high-trajectory fire against the more distant guns of the - besieged and the island, and two 12-pounders. - -This, from the psychological point of view, was the critical day of the -siege, for on the clear demonstration of the weakness of the walls, -Colonel Skerrett, who had never much confidence in his defences, -proposed to evacuate the city of Tarifa. At a council of officers he -argued in favour of withdrawing the garrison into the island, and -making no attempt to hold the weak mediaeval walls which the French -were so effectively battering. This would have been equivalent, in the -end, to abandoning the entire foothold of the British on this point of -the coast. For there was on the island no cover for troops, save two -or three recently erected buildings, and the recesses of the ‘Cueva de -los Moros.’ Some of the inhabitants had already taken refuge there, -and were suffering great privations, from being exposed to the weather -in tents and hastily contrived huts. It is clear that if 3,000 men, -British and Spanish, had been lodged on the wind-swept rocks of the -island, it would soon have been necessary to withdraw them; however -inaccessible the water-girt rock, with its low cliffs, might be, no -large body of troops could have lived long upon it, exposed as they -would have been not only to wind and wet, but to constant molestation -by heavy guns placed in and about the city and the hills that dominate -it. Meanwhile the French would have possessed the excellent cover of -the houses of Tarifa, and would have effectively blocked the island -by leaving a garrison to watch the causeway, the only possible exit -from it. It is certain that the abandonment of the island would have -followed that of the town within a few days: indeed Skerrett had -already obtained leave from General Cooke, then commanding at Cadiz, -to bring his brigade round to that port as soon as he should feel it -necessary. He regarded the evacuation of the place as so certain, that -he ordered the 18-pounder gun on Guzman’s tower to be spiked this day, -though it was the only piece of heavy calibre in the city[117]--the -reason given was that one of its missiles (spherical case-shot) had -fallen short within the streets, and killed or wounded an inhabitant. -But the real cause was that he had fully decided on abandoning Tarifa -that night or the following day, and thought the moving of such a big -gun in a hurry impossible--it had been hoisted with great difficulty to -its place by the sailors, with cranes and tackle[118]. - - [117] According to some authorities he also spiked a 32-lb. - carronade. See _Defence of Tarifa_, p. 63. - - [118] The author of the _Defence of Tarifa_ pretends not to know - the real story (p. 63), saying that the spiking caused much - ‘indignation, apprehension, and discontent,’ and that ‘whence the - order proceeded is unknown.’ For the explanation see the letter - from an officer of the garrison in Napier, iv, Appendix, p. 438. - -Skerrett stated his decision in favour of the evacuation at the -council of war, produced General Cooke’s letter supporting his plan, -and stated that Lord Proby, his second in command, concurred in the -view of its necessity. Fortunately for the credit of the British arms, -his opinion was boldly traversed by Captain C. F. Smith, the senior -engineer officer, Major King commanding the Gibraltar battalion of -flank-companies, and Colonel Gough of the 87th. The former urged that -the town should be defended, as an outwork of the island, to the last -possible moment: though the breach was practicable, he had already made -arrangements for cutting it off by retrenchments from the body of the -town. The streets had been blocked and barricaded, and all the houses -looking upon the back of the walls loopholed. Tarifa could be defended -for some time in the style of Saragossa, lane by lane. He pointed -out that such was the configuration of the ground that if the enemy -entered the breach, he would find a fourteen-foot drop between its -rear and the ground below, on to which he would have to descend under -a concentric fire of musketry from all the neighbouring buildings. -Even supposing that the worst came, the garrison had the castle to -retire into, and this was tenable until breached by artillery, while a -retreat from it to the island would always be possible, under cover of -the guns of the flotilla. There was no profit or credit in giving up -outworks before they were forced. Major King concurred, and said that -his battalion, being Gibraltar troops, was under the direct orders of -General Campbell, from whom he had received directions to hold Tarifa -till the last extremity. If Skerrett’s brigade should embark, he and -the flank-companies would remain behind, to defend it, along with -Copons’s Spaniards. Gough concurred in the decision, and urged that the -evacuation would be wholly premature and ‘contrary to the spirit of -General Campbell’s instructions’ until it was seen whether the French -were able to effect a lodgement inside the walls[119]. - - [119] Gough speaks of his reply that ‘evacuation would be - contrary to the spirit of General Campbell’s instructions,’ as - if given at an earlier date, but, the 29th seems fixed by King’s - letter to Napier in appendix to the latter’s _Peninsular War_, - iv. pp. 443-4, quoted above. - -Skerrett’s resolve was shaken--he still held to his opinion, but -dismissed the council of war without coming to a decision: he tried -to avoid responsibility by requesting the officers who voted for -further resistance to deliver him their opinions in writing. This -King, Smith, and Gough did, in the strongest wording. The first named -of these three resolute men sent that same night a messenger by boat -to Gibraltar, to inform General Campbell of Skerrett’s faint-hearted -decision, and to observe that, with a few companies more to aid his own -flank-battalion and the Spaniards, he would try to hold first Tarifa -and then the island, even if Skerrett withdrew his brigade. Campbell, -angry in no small degree, sent a very prompt answer to the effect -that the town should not be abandoned without the concurrence of the -commanding officers of artillery and engineers, while the Gibraltar -battalion should be concentrated in the island, in order to ensure its -defence even if Tarifa itself fell. Still more drastic was an order to -the officers commanding the transports to bring their ships back at -once to Gibraltar: this decisive move made it impossible for Skerrett -to carry out his plan[120]. A few days later Campbell sent two more -flank-companies to join the garrison--but they only arrived after the -assault. - - [120] See especially the notes from officers on the spot in - Napier’s appendix to vol. iv. pp. 442-4. - -The idea of evacuating the town without attempting any defence was -all the more ignominious because Copons had declared his intention of -holding it to the last, had protested against the spiking of the heavy -gun in Guzman’s tower, and next morning, when Leval summoned the place -to surrender, sent in a most unhesitating, if somewhat bombastic[121], -note of refusal. If Skerrett had withdrawn into the island, or taken to -his ships, and Copons had been overwhelmed, fighting in the streets, -the disgrace to the British flag would have been very great. As a -sidelight on the whole matter, we may remember that this was the same -officer who had refused to land his troops to defend the breach of -Tarragona six months before. He was no coward, as he showed in many -fights, and he died gallantly at Bergen-op-Zoom in 1814, but he was -undoubtedly a shirker of responsibilities. - - [121] ‘Sin duda ignorará V.S. que me hallo yo en esta plaza, - cuando se prononce á su gubernador que admite una capitulacion. - Á la cabeza de mis tropas me encontrará V.S. y entonces - hableremos.’ See Arteche, appendix to vol. xi. p. 524. - -On the morning of the 30th the besiegers’ batteries opened again, -and enlarged the breach to a broad gap of thirty feet or more; they -also dismounted a field-piece which the besieged had hoisted on the -Jesus tower, to replace those injured on the previous day. At midday -Leval sent in the summons already recorded, and receiving Copons’s -uncompromising reply, directed the fire to continue. It was very -effective, and by evening the breach was nearly sixty feet long, -occupying almost the whole space between the tower at the portcullis -over the ravine, and that next south of it. At dusk the garrison -crept out to clear the foot of the breach, and began also to redouble -the inner defences in the lanes and houses behind it. All work on -both sides, however, was stopped, shortly after nightfall, by a -most torrential downpour of rain, which drove the French from their -batteries and the English and Spaniards from their repairing. The sky -seemed to be falling--the hillsides became cataracts, and the Retiro -ravine was soon filled with a broad river which came swirling against -the walls, bearing with it fascines, planks, gabions, and even dead -bodies washed out of the French lines. Presently the mass of débris, -accumulating against the palisades erected in front of the portcullis, -and urged on by the water, swept away these outer defences, and then, -pressing against the portcullis itself, bent it inwards and twisted -it, despite of its massive iron clamps, so as to make an opening into -the town, down which everything went swimming through the ravine. The -flood also swept away some of the defensive works on each side of the -depression. When the hurricane was over, the rain still continued to -fall heavily, but the garrison, emerging from shelter, commenced to -repair their works, and had undone much of the damage by daylight[122]. - - [122] For this, see Jones, _Sieges of the Peninsula_, ii. p. 477, - from which Napier copies his narrative, iv. p. 55. - -If the besieged had been sorely incommoded by the tempest, the -besiegers on the bare hillsides had been still worse tried. They had -been forced to abandon their trenches and batteries, of which those -high up the slope were water-logged, while those below had been largely -swept away by the flood. The breach had been pronounced practicable -by the engineers, and an assault had been fixed for dawn. But it -was necessary to put it off for some hours, in order to allow the -artillery to reoccupy their batteries, and recommence their fire, and -the infantry to come up from the camps where they had vainly tried -to shelter themselves during the downpour. Nevertheless the French -commanders resolved to storm as soon as the men could be assembled, -without waiting for further preparations. ‘The troops,’ says the French -historian of the siege, ‘unable to dry themselves, or to light fires -to cook their rations, loudly cried out for an assault, as the only -thing that could put an end to their misery.’ A large force had been -set apart for the storm, the grenadier and voltigeur companies of each -of the battalions engaged in the sieges, making a total of over 2,200 -men. They were divided into two columns--the grenadiers were to storm -the breach; the voltigeurs to try whether the gap at the Portcullis -tower was practicable or not: they were to break in if possible, if -not, to engage the defenders in a fusilade which should distract their -attention from the main attack. - -As soon as day dawned, the besieged could detect that the trenches -were filling, and that the storm was about to break. They had time to -complete their dispositions before the French moved: the actual breach -was held by Copons with a battalion of his own troops[123]: the 87th, -under Gough, occupied the walls both to right and left of the breach, -including the Portcullis tower, with two companies in reserve. Captain -Levesey with 100 of the 47th was posted in the south-eastern (Jesus) -tower, which completely enfiladed the route which the enemy would have -to take to the foot of the breach. The rest of the 47th was in charge -of the south front of the town. - - [123] Their part in the defence must not be denied to the - Spaniards. Napier, with his usual prejudice, remarks (iv. p. 60) - that Skerrett ‘assigned the charge of the breach entirely to the - Spaniards, and if Smith had not insisted upon placing British - troops alongside of them this would have ruined the defence, - because hunger and neglect had so broken the spirit of these - poor men that few appeared during the combat, and Copons alone - displayed the qualities of a gallant soldier.’ - -At nine o’clock the column of French grenadiers issued from the -trenches near the advanced breaching battery, and dashed down the side -of the Retiro ravine towards the breach, while the voltigeur companies, -at the same time, running out from the approaches on the eastern hill, -advanced by the opposite side of the ravine towards the Portcullis -tower. Demonstrations to right and left were made by Cassagne’s brigade -on one flank and Pécheux’s on the other. The progress of the storming -column was not rapid--the slopes of the ravine were rain-sodden and -slippery; its bottom (where the flood had passed) was two feet deep -in mud. The troops were forced to move slowly, and the moment that -they were visible from the walls they became exposed to a very heavy -fire of musketry, both from the curtain and the enfilading towers on -each of their flanks. Of guns the besieged had only one available--a -field-piece in the northernmost (or Corchuela) tower, which fired -case-shot diagonally along the foot of the walls. - -Nevertheless the French grenadiers pushed forward across the open space -towards the breach, under a rain of bullets from the 87th which smote -them on both flanks. The Fusiliers were firing fast and accurately, -to the tune of _Garry Owen_, which the regimental band was playing by -order of Gough just behind the breach, accompanied by bursts of shouts -and cheering. On arriving at the foot of the walls, in great disorder, -the French column hesitated for a moment; many men began to fire -instead of pressing on, but some bold spirits scaled the rough slope of -the breach and reached its lip--only to get a momentary glimpse of the -fourteen-foot drop behind it, and to fall dead. The bulk of the column -then swerved away to its right, and fell upon the palisades and other -defences in front of the Portcullis tower, where the hasty repairs -made after the flood of the preceding night did not look effective. -Apparently many of the voltigeurs who had been already engaged in this -quarter joined in their assault, which surged over the outer barricades -and penetrated as far as the portcullis itself. It was found too well -repaired to be broken down, and the stormers, crowded in front of it, -and caught in an angle between the front wall defended by the 87th, and -the flanking Jesus tower from which the 47th were firing, found the -corner too hot for them, and suddenly recoiled and fled. The officer -at the head of the forlorn hope gave up his sword to Gough through the -bars of the portcullis, which alone separated them, and many other -men at the front of the column also surrendered, rather than face the -point-blank fire at close range which would have accompanied the first -stage of their retreat. - -This was a striking instance of an assault on a very broad breach, by -a strong force, being beaten off by musketry fire alone. The French -seem never to have had a chance in face of the steady resistance of -the 87th and their comrades. Their loss is given by the official -French historian at only 48 killed and 159 wounded, which seems an -incredibly low figure when over 2,000 men were at close quarters with -the besieged, in a very disadvantageous position, for some time[124]. -The British lost 2 officers and 7 men killed, 3 officers, 2 sergeants, -and 22 men wounded: the Spaniards had a lieutenant-colonel killed and -about 20 men killed and wounded. - - [124] Skerrett and Copons estimated the loss of the enemy at - nearly 500, no doubt an exaggeration. But Leval’s 207 seems far - too few. The commanding officer of the 51st Ligne reports from - his four flank-companies 7 officers and 81 men hit (Belmas, iv, - Appendix, p. 58). Of the sapper detachment which led the column, - from 50 men 43 were _hors de combat_ (Belmas, iv. p. 31). It - seems incredible that when 23 companies took part in the assault - 5 of them should have suffered 131 casualties out of a total of - 207. Martinien’s tables show 18 officers killed and wounded on - Dec. 31, a figure which proves nothing, for though at the usual - casualty rate of 20 men per officer this would imply a total loss - of 360, yet it is well known that in assaults the officers often - suffer a loss out of all proportion to that of the rank and file. - Eighteen officers hit might be compatible with a loss as low as - 200 or as high as 400 in such a case. - -The assault having failed so disastrously, the spirits of the -besiegers sank to a very low pitch. The rain continued to fall during -the whole day and the following night, and the already water-logged -trenches became quite untenable. On New Year’s Day, 1812, the dawn -showed a miserable state of affairs--not only were the roads to the -rear, towards Fascinas and Vejer, entirely blocked by the swelling -of mountain torrents, but communications were cut even between the -siege-camps. All the provision of powder in the siege-batteries was -found to be spoilt by wet, and a great part of the cartridges of the -infantry. Nearly a third of the horses of the train had perished from -cold combined with low feeding. No rations were issued to the troops -that day, and on the three preceding days only incomplete ones had been -given, because of the impossibility of getting them up from the reserve -dépôt, and many of the men wandered without leave for three miles to -the rear in search of food or shelter. An exploring party of the 47th -pushing out into the trenches found them quite unguarded[125] and full -of water. Leval wrote a formal proposal for the abandonment of the -siege to his chief, Victor, saying that the only choice was to save -the army by retreat, or to see it perish in a few days if it remained -stationary[126]. The Marshal, however, refused to turn back from an -enterprise in which he considered his honour involved, and the tempest -having abated on the night of Jan. 2nd-3rd, ordered the batteries and -approaches to be remanned, and directed that an attempt should be made -to sap forward toward the Jesus tower from the left advanced trenches. -The work done was feeble--the batteries had fired only fifty shots by -evening, and the repairs to the damaged works were very incomplete. - - [125] _Defence of Tarifa_, p. 47. - - [126] See the letter in Belmas, iv. pp. 55-6. - -Even Victor’s obstinacy yielded, however, when on the night of the -3rd-4th January another furious storm arose, and once more stopped all -possibility of continuing operations. No food had now come up from the -base for many days, and the stores at the front being exhausted, the -Marshal saw that it was necessary to march at once. An attempt was -made to withdraw the guns from the batteries, but only one 12-pounder -and two howitzers were got off--the horses were so weak and the -ground so sodden that even when 200 infantry were set to help, most of -the pieces could not be dragged more than a few yards. Wherefore the -attempt was given over, the powder in the batteries was thrown open to -the rain, the balls rolled into the Retiro ravine, the nine remaining -heavy guns spiked. - -[Illustration: TARIFA] - -On the night of the 4th-5th the army crawled off on the road to Vejer, -abandoning nearly all its material in its camps. An attempt was made -to fire a mass of abandoned vehicles, but the rain stopped it. Next -morning the French were passing the defile of Torre Peña, under the -not very effective fire of an English frigate, which kept as close -to the shore as was possible on a very rough day. The four guns from -the battery at this point were brought on, with much toil, and no -wounded were abandoned. On the 6th the column reached Tayvilla, where -it found a convoy and 100 horses, which were of inestimable value, for -those with the field-force were completely spent. Nevertheless the one -12-pounder brought off from Tarifa was abandoned in the mud. On the -7th Vejer was reached, and the expedition was at an end. The troops of -Victor’s division, after a short rest, went back to the Cadiz Lines, -those of Leval’s division marched for Xeres. - -Thus ended the leaguer of Tarifa, which cost the besiegers about 500 -lives, more by sickness than by casualties in the trenches. There -were also some deserters--fifteen Poles came over in a body and -surrendered to Captain Carroll on the 3rd[127], and other individuals -stole in from time to time. But the main loss to the French, beyond -that of prestige, was that the battalions which had formed part of the -expeditionary force were so tired out and war-worn, that for several -weeks they continued to fill the hospitals in the Lines with sick, and -were incapable of further active service. Wherefore Soult could not -send any appreciable detachment to help Suchet on the side of Valencia: -the cavalry brigade, which sacked Murcia on January 26 and killed La -Carrera,[128] was his only contribution to the operations on the east -side of Spain. The field-force which might otherwise have accompanied -Pierre Soult’s cavalry raid had been used up in the Tarifa expedition. - - [127] _Defence of Tarifa_, p. 75. - - [128] See page 8 above. - -Another distraction had come upon Soult while the Tarifa expedition -was in progress. On December 27, six days after Victor and Leval -commenced the siege, General Hill had once more begun to move on the -Estremaduran side, after remaining quiescent for nearly two months -since the surprise of Arroyo dos Molinos. His advance was a diversion -made by Wellington’s direct orders, with the purpose of drawing Soult’s -attention away from the pursuit of Ballasteros and the molesting -of Tarifa[129]. It failed to achieve the latter purpose, since the -operations of Victor had gone so far, before Hill moved, that the -Marshal stood committed to the siege, and indeed only heard that Hill -was on the move after the assault of December 31st had been made and -beaten off. But it caused Soult to cut off all support from Victor, -to turn his small remaining reserves in the direction of Estremadura, -and to welcome as a relief, rather than to deplore as a disaster, the -return of the defeated expeditionary force to the Lines of Cadiz on -January 7th. For about that date Hill was pushing Drouet before him, -and the reserves from Seville were moving northwards, so that Soult -was pleased to learn that the 10,000 men from Tarifa had returned, and -that, in consequence of their reappearance, he could draw off more -men from the direction of Cadiz to replace the troops moved toward -Estremadura. - - [129] See Wellington to Hill, Dec. 18th, _Dispatches_, ix. pp. - 465-6. - -Hill crossed the Portuguese frontier north of the Guadiana on December -27th, with his own division, Hamilton’s Portuguese, two British cavalry -brigades (those of Long and de Grey[130]) and one of Portuguese (4th -and 10th regiments under J. Campbell of the former corps), or about -12,000 men. The small remainder of his force[131] was left about Elvas, -to watch any possible movement of the French from the direction of -Badajoz. His objective was Merida, where it was known that Dombrouski, -with the greater part of the 5th French Division, was lying, in a -position far advanced from the main body of Drouet’s troops, who were -cantoned about Zafra and Llerena. There was some hope of surprising -this force, and a certainty of driving it in, and of throwing Drouet -and Soult into a state of alarm. Wellington directed Hill to keep -to the desolate road north of the Guadiana, because a winter raid -from this direction would be the last thing expected by the enemy. He -bade his lieutenant keep a wary eye in the direction of Truxillo and -Almaraz, from which the divisions of Marmont’s army then in New Castile -might possibly descend upon his rear. But the warning turned out to -be superfluous, since, before Hill moved, Marmont had been forced by -the Emperor’s orders to detach his troops on the Tagus for the ruinous -expedition under Montbrun to Alicante. - - [130] But the last-named officer was absent. - - [131] One Portuguese infantry and one Portuguese cavalry brigade. - -Marching very rapidly Hill reached Albuquerque on the 27th, and La -Rocca, only twenty miles from Merida, on the 28th. On the next day[132] -the prospect of surprising Dombrouski came to an end by the merest of -chances. The French general had sent out that morning a small column -to raise requisitions of food in the villages on this road. A troop -of hussars at its head discovered Hill’s advanced cavalry, near Navas -de Membrillo, and alarmed the infantry, three companies of the 88th -regiment under a Captain Neveux, who formed up and began to retreat -hastily towards Merida. Hill sent two squadrons each of the 13th Light -Dragoons and 2nd Hussars of the King’s German Legion in pursuit, with -orders to head off and capture, if possible, these 400 men. The result -was a combat of the same sort as that of Barquilla in 1810, where -it had already been shown that steady infantry could not be ridden -down by cavalry save under very exceptional circumstances. Neveux, -seeing the dragoons hurrying forward, turned off the road, formed -his men in square, and made for a cork wood on a rising ground. The -cavalry overtook him, and delivered five determined charges, which -were all beaten off with heavy loss. We are told that their order and -impetus were both broken by scattered trees outside the wood, but the -main cause of their defeat was the impossibility of breaking into a -solidly-formed square of determined men, well commanded[133]. After the -final charge the squadrons drew off, and Neveux hastened on through -the wood, fell back again into the road, and reached Merida, though he -lost a few men[134] by shells from Hawker’s battery, which came up late -in the day. The K.G.L. Hussars had 2 men killed and 1 officer and 17 -men wounded: the 13th Light Dragoons 1 killed and 19 wounded. - - [132] Napier (iv. 49) wrongly puts the combat of Navas de - Membrillo on the 28th of December, not the 29th. The diaries - of Stoltzenberg of the 2nd K.G.L. Hussars and Cadell of the - 28th prove that the second date is correct. No force could have - marched from Albuquerque to Navas in one day. - - [133] Hill’s dispatch has a handsome but ungrammatical testimony - to the enemy: ‘the intrepid and admirable way in which the French - retreated, the infantry formed in square, and favoured as he was - by the nature of the country, of which he knew how to take the - fullest advantage, prevented the cavalry alone from effecting - anything against him.’ - - [134] Apparently two killed and nine wounded. - -Dombrouski, warned of the approach of the allies in force, immediately -evacuated Merida, where Hill made prize of 160,000 lb. of wheat, -unground, and a large magazine of biscuit. He found that the French had -been fortifying the town, but the works were too unfinished to allow -them to defend it. On January 1st Hill, continuing his advance, marched -across the bridge of Merida on Almendralejo, thinking that Drouet might -possibly have come up to help Dombrouski, and that he might force him -to fight. This was not to be: the rearguard of the force from Merida -was discovered drawn up in front of Almendralejo, but gave way at the -first push: a small magazine of food was captured in the town. - -It was now clear that Drouet did not intend to make a stand, but would -fall back towards the Andalusian frontier, and wait for aid from Soult. -Hill resolved to move his main body no further, but sent out a small -flying column under Major-General Abercrombie, with orders to press -the French rearguard as long as it would give way, but to halt and -turn back on finding serious forces in front of him. This detachment -(1/50th regiment, two squadrons 2nd Hussars K.G.L., two squadrons -10th Portuguese, three guns) passing Fuente del Maestre neared Los -Santos on January 3rd, and found Dombrouski, with a rearguard of all -arms, disposed to fight. This led to a sharp cavalry combat, between -two squadrons of the 26th French Dragoons and the allied horse. One -squadron of the hussars and one of the Portuguese, gallantly led by -Colonel Campbell, charged the enemy in front, the other squadrons -remaining in reserve. The dragoons, soon broken, lost 6 killed, many -wounded, and 2 officers and 35 men prisoners. Thereupon the French -infantry moved rapidly off southwards, making no attempt to stand. The -victors lost 1 man killed and 14 wounded from the hussars, 1 officer -and 5 men from the Portuguese. - -Drouet was now concentrating at Llerena, and ready to give up all -Estremadura north of that point. He was sending daily appeals for -succour to Soult, who had little to give him, while Victor and the -expeditionary force were away at Tarifa. On January 5th the Duke of -Dalmatia wrote a dispatch which ordered that the siege should be -abandoned--but long ere it came to hand Victor had been forced to -depart, as we have seen, for reasons entirely unconnected with Hill’s -midwinter raid. Wellington’s plan would have worked if the weather had -not already driven Victor away, but had in actual fact no effect on his -proceedings. - -Hill, having accomplished all that could be done in the way of alarming -Soult, held Merida and Almendralejo for a few days, with his advanced -cavalry about Fuente del Maestre: but retired on January 13th to -Albuquerque and Portalegre, to the intense relief of his enemy. The -raising of the siege of Tarifa being known, there was no further reason -for keeping Hill in an advanced position, which might have tempted -Soult to make a great concentration and take the offensive. Wellington -had no desire that he should do so, since the Army of Andalusia, while -dispersed, was harmless, but might become dangerous if it should -evacuate great regions, and so be able to collect in force. Soult did -not wish to make such sacrifices unless he were obliged, and on hearing -of Hill’s retreat countermanded all orders for concentration, and -contented himself with bringing back Drouet to Llerena and Zalamea, and -with reopening his communication with Badajoz, which had been cut while -the allies were at Fuente del Maestre. He did not at this time reoccupy -Merida, partly because the position had been demonstrated to be -dangerous by Hill’s recent raid, partly because its main importance was -that it covered the road to Truxillo and Almaraz and Marmont’s army. -But Marmont having, for the moment, no troops in this direction, owing -to the Alicante expedition, it was useless to try to keep in touch with -him. - -Hill’s expedition, by driving Drouet for some time from the line of -the Guadiana, made possible a sudden irruption of the Spaniards into La -Mancha, where none of their regular troops had been since the battle -of Ocaña two years before. This raid was carried out by Morillo at the -head of a brigade of the Estremaduran army of Castaños. That general -had heard of the way in which the upper valley of the Guadiana had -been denuded of troops, in order that the Army of the Centre might -assist Suchet in the direction of Cuenca and Requeña[135]. Nothing -was left in La Mancha save a few battalions of King Joseph’s German -Division, and a brigade of Treillard’s dragoons, a force which could -only provide garrisons for a few large towns and watch the high-road -from Madrid to Andalusia. Morillo was directed to slip eastward through -the gap made by Hill between the Armies of the South and Portugal, -to endeavour to cut up the French posts, and to collect recruits and -contributions in the country-side. With luck he might even break the -line of communication between Soult and Madrid. His force of 3,000 men -was insufficient for anything more than a raid. - - [135] See page 56 above. - -Starting from Montanches near Caçeres on December 30th--three days -after Hill’s expedition had begun--Morillo crossed the Guadiana, and -after making a fruitless dash at Belalcazar, the isolated French -garrison which protected the northernmost corner of Andalusia, marched -straight on by Agudo and Sarceruela into the heart of La Mancha, where -he seized Ciudad Real, its capital [January 15]. The small French force -quartered there fled at his approach, which was wholly unexpected--no -Spanish army had ever marched up the valley of the Guadiana before. On -the next day Morillo attacked Almagro, where there was a garrison of -500 men; but before he had made any impression he was surprised by the -arrival of General Treillard, with a column hastily gathered from the -posts along the high-road. The Spanish general refused to fight, and, -abandoning Ciudad Real, withdrew with little loss into the passes of -the Sierra de Guadalupe, where his enemy declined to follow. Since Hill -had by this time abandoned Merida and returned to Portugal, Morillo -felt his position to be uncomfortably isolated, and feared that French -troops from Estremadura or from the Tagus valley might intercept his -way homeward. The danger turned out to be imaginary, and on reaching -Truxillo on January 30 the column was able to rest unmolested for a -fortnight at that important strategical point, and then to retire at -leisure to Montanches, its original starting-point. - -Thus ended an extraordinary raid, which, though it had no positive -results whatever, demonstrated two things clearly enough--one was -the marching power of the Spanish infantry, which between December -28 and January 30 covered 250 miles of vile mountain roads in bitter -weather, and came back intact with little loss[136], the other was the -slightness of the French hold on La Mancha, where the appearance of a -small brigade of 3,000 men upset the whole country-side. Morillo was -only driven off by a concentration of many small garrisons, and, when -they were withdrawn, the local guerrillero bands overran the land. -Their chiefs, El Medico [Palarea], Chaleco, and others, did an immense -amount of damage while the French were concentrated, and ravaged up -to the very gates of Madrid. Chaos reigned in New Castile till Foy’s -and Sarrut’s divisions came back from the Alicante expedition, and -dispersed themselves along the valley of the Tagus at the beginning of -February. For, as we have often had occasion to remark before, every -province of Spain required not only to be conquered but to be held -down by a permanent garrison. The moment that it was left too lightly -held, the guerrilleros came down from the hills, occupied all the open -country, and cut all communications. - - [136] Napier (iv. p. 50) overrates the damage that Morillo - suffered. He was not ‘completely defeated’ by Treillard, because - he absconded without fighting. In his elaborate dispatch he gives - his whole loss as two killed and nine wounded. See his life by - Rodriguez Villa, appendices to vol. ii, for an almost daily - series of letters describing his march. - - - - -SECTION XXXI: CHAPTER III - -POLITICS AT CADIZ AND ELSEWHERE - - -The military operations in the South during the winter of 1811-12 -were inconclusive, and only important in a negative way, as showing -that the initiative of the French armies was spent in this direction. -But it must not be forgotten that while Soult had been brought to -a standstill, Suchet’s operations were still progressing: January, -indeed, saw the last great Spanish disaster of the war, the fall of -Valencia, so that the spirits of government and people still ran very -low. It was not till the sudden irruption of Wellington into the -kingdom of Leon had ended in the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo (January -19), that there was any great occasion for hopefulness. And for a long -time after that event its importance was not fully understood. That -the central turning-point of the war had come, that for the future the -allies were to be on the offensive, and the French on the defensive, -was not realized till Badajoz had fallen in April, a blow which shook -the whole fabric of King Joseph’s power throughout the regions where he -seemed to reign. Nor was it only the state of affairs in the Peninsula -which, during the winter of 1811-12, seemed sufficiently gloomy -both for the present and for the future. The news from the Spanish -colonies in America grew steadily worse: in most of the viceroyalties -of the Western world there was now a nucleus of trouble: the name of -Ferdinand VII was still used by the insurgents as a rallying cry, -except in Venezuela, where Miranda had proclaimed an independent -republic in July 1811. But in La Plata and Chili lip-loyalty to the -sovereign was accompanied by practical secession from the Spanish -state: the _Cabildos_ or Juntas paid no attention to orders received -from Cadiz. In Mexico, though the capital and the greater part of the -country were still in the hands of the constituted authorities, there -was a lively insurrection on foot since September 1810, under the -priest Hidalgo--he was captured and executed in 1812, but his death -did not crush his faction. The Viceroyalty of Peru was almost the -only part of Spanish America which still remained loyal. The Cortes -at Cadiz made elaborate attempts to conciliate the Americans, but was -unable to satisfy their expectations or to end their discontents. The -deeply-rooted belief of the Creoles that they and their country were -still being exploited for the benefit of Spain, could not be removed -by any declaration that they were now to be Spanish citizens with full -rights, or by giving them representation in the Cortes. The idea of -autonomy was already abroad in Spanish America, and in every quarter -ambitious men were quoting the precedent of the revolt of the Thirteen -United Colonies from Great Britain in the previous generation. Truly -Spain had committed an unwise act when she joined France in wrecking -the British domination in North America. She revenged an old grudge -successfully, but she taught her own colonists a lesson impossible to -forget and easy to copy. - -The Peninsular War had hitherto been maintained in no small degree by -the money which kept flowing in from America: what would happen if -the treasure-ships with their regular supply of silver dollars from -the mines of Mexico and Peru ceased altogether to come in? Already -affairs were looking so threatening that, despite of all the needs of -the campaign at home, reinforcements were being sent out to the New -World from Cadiz and from Corunna: the Army of Galicia, as we shall -presently see, was nearly put out of action in the spring of 1812 by -the dispatch of an over-great proportion of its trained artillerymen to -America[137]. Some French observers of the situation formed the idea -that the Spaniards, if pressed to a decision between the possible loss -of their colonies and the chance of obtaining a free hand by peace with -Napoleon, might make the choice for empire rather than freedom. By -acknowledging Joseph Bonaparte as king, and coming into the Napoleonic -system, they might be able to turn their whole strength against the -discontented Americans. This idea had one fatal error: any Spaniard -could see that submission to France meant war with Great Britain: -and then the way across the Atlantic would be closed. The British -government would be forced into an alliance with the colonists; it -had already thought of this device in the old days before Napoleon’s -invasion of the Peninsula. Whitelock’s unhappy Buenos Ayres expedition -in 1807 had been sent out precisely to take advantage of the discontent -of the Americans, and in the hope that they would rise against the -mother country if promised assistance. The adventurer Miranda had -spent much time in pressing this policy on the Portland cabinet. -Whitelock’s descent on the Rio de la Plata, it is true, had been as -disappointing in the political as in the military line: he had got no -help whatever from the disaffected colonists. But feeling in America -had developed into much greater bitterness since 1807: in 1812 actual -insurrection had already broken out. British aid would not, this time, -be rejected: the malcontents would buy it by the grant of liberal -trading concessions, which the Cadiz government, even in its worst time -of trouble, had steadily refused to grant. There was every chance, -therefore, that a policy of submission to Napoleon would ensure the -loss of America even more certainly and more rapidly than a persistence -in the present war. It does not seem that any person of importance at -Cadiz ever took into serious consideration the idea of throwing up -the struggle for independence, in order to obtain the opportunity of -dealing with the American question. - - [137] See below, section xxxiii, page 337. - -The idea, however, was in the air. This was the time at which King -Joseph made his last attempt to open up secret negotiation with -the patriots. His own condition was unhappy enough, as has been -sufficiently shown in an earlier chapter: but he was well aware that -the outlook of his enemies was no less gloomy. One of the numerous--and -usually impracticable--pieces of advice which his brother had sent him -was the suggestion that he should assemble some sort of a Cortes, and -then, posing as a national king, try to open up communications with -the Cadiz government, setting forth the somewhat unconvincing thesis -that Great Britain, and not France, was the real enemy of Spanish -greatness. The idea of calling a Cortes fell through: the individuals -whom Joseph could have induced to sit in it would have been so few, -so insignificant, and so unpopular, that such a body could only have -provoked contempt[138]. But an attempt was made to see if anything -could be done at Cadiz: the inducement which Joseph was authorized to -offer to the patriots was that immediately on his recognition as a -constitutional king by the Cortes--and a constitution was to be drawn -up in haste at Madrid--the French army should retire from Spain, and -the integrity of the realm should be guaranteed. Napoleon even made a -half-promise to give up Catalonia, though he had practically annexed it -to his empire in the previous year[139]. - - [138] For all this scheme see the Memoirs of Miot de Melito, iii. - pp. 215-16, beside the Emperor’s own dispatches. Note especially - the instructions which the French ambassador, Laforest, was to - set before Joseph. - - [139] See vol. iv. p. 215. - -Joseph and his ministers had no confidence either in the Emperor’s -sincerity in making these offers, or in the likelihood of their -finding any acceptance among the patriots. He sent, however, to Cadiz -as his agent a certain Canon La Peña, a secret _Afrancesado_, but a -brother of Manuel La Peña, the incapable general who had betrayed -Graham at Barrosa. This officer was on his trial at the moment for his -misbehaviour on that occasion, and the canon pretended to have come -to assist him in his day of trouble on grounds of family affection. -It would seem that he sounded certain persons but with small effect. -Toreno, who was present in Cadiz at the time, and well acquainted -with every intrigue that was in progress, says that the Regency never -heard of the matter, and that very few members of the Cortes knew what -La Peña was doing. It seems that he had conversations with certain -freemasons, who were connected with lodges in Madrid that were under -French influence, and apparently with one member of the ministry. ‘I do -not give his name,’ says the historian, ‘because I have no documentary -proof to bear out the charge, but moral proof I have[140].’ Be this as -it may, the labours of La Peña do not seem to have been very fruitful, -and the assertion made by certain French historians, and by Napoleon -himself in the _Mémorial de Ste-Hélène_, that the Cortes would have -proceeded to treat with Joseph, but for Wellington’s astonishing -successes in the spring of 1812, has little or no foundation. As Toreno -truly observes, any open proposal of the sort would have resulted -in the tearing to pieces by the populace of the man hardy enough to -make it. The intrigue had no more success than the earlier mission -of Sotelo, which has been spoken of in another place[141]. But it -lingered on, till the battle of Salamanca in July, and the flight of -Joseph from Madrid in August, proved, to any doubters that there may -have been, that the French cause was on the wane[142]. One of the most -curious results of this secret negotiation was that Soult, hearing that -the King’s emissary was busy at Cadiz, and not knowing that it was at -Napoleon’s own suggestion that the experiment was being made, came to -the conclusion that Joseph was plotting to abandon his brother, and to -make a private peace with the Cortes, on condition that he should break -with France and be recognized as king. He wrote, as we shall presently -see, to denounce him to Napoleon as a traitor. Hence came no small -friction in the following autumn. - - [140] Toreno, iii. p. 100. - - [141] See vol. ii. p. 168. - - [142] Toreno says that the mistress of the Duke of Infantado was - implicated in the negotiation, after he had become a regent, but - that he himself had no treasonable intentions, being a staunch - supporter of Ferdinand. - -These secret intrigues fell into a time of keen political strife at -Cadiz--the famous Constitution, which was to cause so much bickering -in later years, was being drafted, discussed, and passed through the -Cortes in sections, all through the autumn of 1811 and the winter of -1811-12. The Liberals and the Serviles fought bitterly over almost -every clause, and during their disputes the anti-national propaganda of -the handful of _Afrancesados_ passed almost unnoticed. It is impossible -in a purely military history to relate the whole struggle, and a few -words as to its political bearings must suffice. - -The Constitution was a strange amalgam of ancient Spanish national -tradition, of half-understood loans from Great Britain and America, -and of political theory borrowed from France. Many of its framers -had obviously studied the details of the abortive ‘limited monarchy’ -which had been imposed on Louis XVI in the early days of the French -Revolution. From this source came the scheme which limited within -narrow bounds the sovereign’s power in the Constitution. The system -evolved was that of a king whose main constitutional weapon was that -right of veto on legislation which had proved so unpopular in France. -He was to choose ministers who, like those of the United States of -America, were not to sit in parliament, nor to be necessarily dependent -on a party majority in the house, though they were to be responsible -to it. There was to be but one Chamber, elected not directly by the -people--though universal suffrage was introduced--but by notables -chosen by the parishes in local primary assemblies, who again named -district notables, these last nominating the actual members for the -Cortes. - -The right of taxation was vested in the Chamber, and the Ministry was -placed at its mercy by the power of refusing supply. The regular army -was specially subjected to the Chamber and not to the King, though the -latter was left some power with regard to calling out or disbanding -the local militia which was to form the second line in the national -forces--at present it was in fact non-existent, unless the guerrillero -bands might be considered to represent it. - -The most cruel blows were struck not only at the King’s power but at -his prestige. A clause stating that all treaties or grants made by him -while in captivity were null and void was no doubt necessary--there -was no knowing what documents Napoleon might not dictate to Ferdinand. -But it was unwise to formulate in a trenchant epigram that ‘the nation -is free and independent, not the patrimony of any family or person,’ -or that ‘the people’s obligation of obedience ceases when the King -violates the laws.’ And when, after granting their sovereign a veto on -legislation, the Constitution proceeded to state that the veto became -inoperative after the Cortes had passed any act in three successive -sessions, it became evident that the King’s sole weapon was to be made -ineffective. ‘Sovereignty,’ it was stated, ‘is vested essentially in -the nation, and for this reason the nation alone has the right to -establish its fundamental laws.’ But the most extraordinary attack on -the principle of legitimate monarchy was a highhanded resettlement -of the succession to the throne, in which the regular sequence of -next heirs was absolutely ignored. If King Ferdinand failed to leave -issue, the crown was to go to his brother Don Carlos: if that prince -also died childless, the Constitution declared that the infante Don -Francisco and his sister the Queen of Etruria were both to be passed -over. No definite reasons were given in the act of settlement for -this astonishing departure from the natural line of descent. The real -meaning of the clause concerning Don Francisco was that many suspected -him of being the son of Godoy and not of Charles IV[143]. As to the -Queen of Etruria, she had been in her younger days a docile tool of -Napoleon, and had lent herself very tamely to his schemes. But it is -said that the governing cause of her exclusion from the succession -was not so much her own unpopularity, as the incessant intrigues of -her sister Carlotta, the wife of the regent João of Portugal, who had -for a long time been engaged in putting forward a claim to be elected -as sole regent of Spain. She had many members of the Cortes in her -pay, and their influence was directed to getting her name inserted in -the list above that of her brother in the succession-roll, and to the -disinheritance of her sister also. Her chance of ever reaching the -throne was not a very good one, as both Ferdinand and Carlos were still -young, and could hardly be kept prisoners at Valençay for ever. It is -probable that the real object of the manœvres was rather to place her -nearer to the regency of Spain in the present crisis, than to seat her -upon its throne at some remote date. For the regency was her desire, -though the crown too would have been welcome, and sometimes not only -the anti-Portuguese party in the Cortes, but Wellington and his brother -Henry Wellesley, the Ambassador at Cadiz, were afraid that by patience -and by long intrigue her partisans might achieve their object. - - [143] See Villa Urrutia, i. p. 13 and ii. pp. 355-9. - -Wellington was strongly of opinion that a royal regent at Cadiz -would be most undesirable. The personal influences of a _camarilla_, -surrounding an ambitious but incapable female regent, would add another -difficulty to the numerous problems of the relations between England -and Spain, which were already sufficiently tiresome. - -This deliberate humiliation of the monarchy, by clauses accentuated -by phrases of insult, which angered, and were intended to anger, the -_Serviles_, was only accomplished after long debate, in which protests -of the most vigorous sort were made by many partisans of the old -theory of Spanish absolutism. Some spoke in praise of the Salic Law, -violated by the mention of Carlotta as heiress to the throne, others -(ignoring rumours as to his paternity) defended Don Francisco, as -having been by his youth exempted from the ignominies of Bayonne, and -dwelt on the injustice of his fate. But the vote went against them by a -most conclusive figure. - -The majority in the Cortes, which made such parade of its political -liberalism, did not pursue its theories into the realm of religion. -After reading its fulsome declarations in favour of freedom, it is -astounding to note the black intolerance of the clause which declares -not only, as might naturally be expected, that ‘the religion of the -Spanish nation is, and ever shall be, the Catholic Apostolic Roman, -the one true faith,’ but that ‘the nation defends it by wise laws, -_forbidding the exercise of any other_.’ Schism and unorthodoxy still -remained political as well as ecclesiastical crimes, no less than -in the time of Philip II. The Liberals, despite of murmurs by the -_Serviles_, refused to recreate the Inquisition, but this was as far as -their conception of religious freedom went. - -Contemplating this exhibition of mediaeval intolerance, it is -impossible to rate at any very high figure the ostentatious liberalism -which pervades the greater part of the Constitution. We are bound to -recognize in it merely the work of a party of ambitious politicians, -who desired to secure control of the state-machine for themselves, -and to exclude the monarchy from all share in its manipulation. No -doubt any form of limited government was better than the old royal -bureaucracy. But this particular scheme went much farther than the -needs or the possibilities of the time, and was most unsuited for -a country such as the Spain of 1812. When its meaning began to be -understood in the provinces, it commanded no enthusiasm or respect. -Indeed, outside the Cortes itself the only supporters that it possessed -were the populace of Cadiz and a few other great maritime towns. -Considered as a working scheme it had the gravest faults, especially -the ill-arranged relations between the ministers (who did not form -a real cabinet) and the Chamber, in which they were prohibited from -sitting. In 1814 Lord Castlereagh observed, with great truth, that he -could now say from certain experience, that in practice as well as in -theory the Constitution of 1812 was one of the worst among the modern -productions of its kind[144]. - - [144] The best and most recent account of all this, explaining - many contradictions and some insincere suppression of fact in - Toreno’s great history, is to be found in chapter ix of vol. ii - of Señor Villa Urrutia’s _Relaciones entre España y Inglaterra - 1808-14_. - -Among the many by-products of the Constitution was a change in the -membership of the Regency. The old ‘trinitarian’ body composed of -Blake, Agar, and Cisgar, had long been discredited, and proposals for -its dissolution had been debated, even before its further continuance -was rendered impossible by Blake’s surrender to the French at Valencia -in the earliest days of 1812. A furious discussion in the Cortes had -ended in a vote that no royal personage should be a member of any -new regency, so that the pretensions of the Princess of Portugal -were finally discomfited. The new board consisted of the Duke of -Infantado, Joaquim Mosquera, a member of the Council of the Indies, -Admiral Villavicencio, military governor of Cadiz, Ignacio Rodriguez de -Rivas, and Henry O’Donnell, Conde de la Bispal, the energetic soldier -whose exploits in Catalonia have been set forth in the last volume of -this book. He was the only man of mark in the new regency: Infantado -owed his promotion to his rank and wealth, and the fact that he had -been the trusted friend of Ferdinand VII. He possessed a limited -intelligence and little education, and was hardly more than a cipher, -with a distinct preference for ‘Serviles’ rather than for Liberals. -Villavicencio had no military reputation, but had been an energetic -organizer, and a fairly successful governor during the siege of Cadiz. -Mosquera and Rivas were elected mainly because they were of American -birth--their choice was intended to conciliate the discontented -colonists. Neither of them was entitled by any great personal merit to -the promotion which was thrust upon him. Henry O’Donnell, now at last -recovered from the wound which had laid him on a sick bed for so many -months in 1811[145], was both capable and energetic, but quarrelsome -and provocative: he belonged to that class of men who always irritate -their colleagues into opposition, by their rapid decisions and -imperious ways, especially when those colleagues are men of ability -inferior to their own. The Duke of Infantado was absent for some time -after his election--he had been serving as ambassador in London. Of -the other four Regents two ranked as ‘Serviles,’ two as Liberals, a -fact which told against their efficiency as a board. They had little -strength to stand out against the Cortes, whose jealousy against any -power in the State save its own was intense. On the whole it may be -said that the substitution of the five new Regents for the three old -ones had no great political consequences. The destiny of the patriot -cause was not in the hands of the executive, but of the turbulent, -faction-ridden, and ambitious legislative chamber, an ideally -bad instrument for the conduct of a difficult and dangerous war. -Fortunately it was neither the Regency nor the Cortes whose actions -were to settle the fate of the campaign of 1812, but purely and solely -Wellington and the Anglo-Portuguese army. The intrigues of Cadiz turned -out to be a negligible quantity in the course of events. - - [145] See vol. iv. p. 240. - -In Lisbon at this time matters were much more quiet than they had -been a little while back. The Portuguese government had abandoned any -overt opposition to Wellington, such as had been seen in 1810, when -the Patriarch and the President Souza had given him so much trouble. -The expulsion of Masséna from Portugal had justified the policy of -Wellington, and almost silenced his critics. He had not even found it -necessary to press for the removal of the men whom he distrusted from -the Council of Regency[146], in which the word of his loyal coadjutor, -Charles Stuart, who combined the rather incompatible functions of -British Ambassador and Regent, was now supreme. Open opposition had -ceased, but Wellington complained that while compliance was always -promised, ‘every measure which I propose is frittered away to nothing, -the form and the words remain, but the spirit of the measure is taken -away in the execution[147].’ This was, he remarked, the policy of the -Portuguese government: they no longer refused him anything; but if -they thought that any of his demands might offend either the Prince -Regent at Rio Janeiro or the popular sentiment of the Portuguese -nation, they carried out his proposals in such a dilatory fashion, and -with so many exceptions and excuses, that he failed to obtain what he -had expected. - - [146] Early in 1812, however, Wellington once more spoke of - requiring Souza’s retirement from office. _Dispatches_, ix. p. 88. - - [147] Wellington to Charles Stuart, April 9, 1812. _Dispatches_, - ix. p. 48. - -In this there was a good deal of injustice. Wellington does not always -seem to have realized the abject poverty which four years of war had -brought upon Portugal. The Regency calculated that, on account of -falling revenue caused by the late French invasion, for 1812 they could -only count on 12,000,000 _cruzados novos_ of receipts[148]--this silver -coin was worth about 2_s._ 6_d._ sterling, so that the total amounted -to about £1,500,000. Of this three-fourths, or 9,000,000 cruzados, was -set aside for the army, the remainder having to sustain all the other -expenses of the State--justice, civil administration, roads, navy, &c. -The British subsidy had been raised to £2,000,000 a year, but it was -paid with the utmost irregularity: in one month of 1811 the Portuguese -treasury had received only £6,000, in another only £20,000, instead -of the £166,000 promised[149]. When such arrears accumulated, it was -no wonder that the soldiers starved and the magazines ran low. It -was calculated that to keep the army up to its full numbers, and to -supply all military needs efficiently, 45,000,000 cruzados a year were -required. Taking the British subsidy as equalling 16,000,000, and the -available national contribution at 9,000,000 cruzados, there was little -more than half the required sum available. This Portuguese calculation -appears to be borne out by the note of Beresford’s chief of the staff, -D’Urban, in February 1812. ‘The Marshal at Lisbon finds that, after a -perfect investigation, it appears that the expenditure must be nearly -£6,000,000--the means at present £3,500,000! _Nous verrons._’ - - [148] Napier (iv. p. 212) says that Portugal raised 25,000,000 - cruzados this year. I cannot understand this, comparing it with - Soriano de Luz, iii. p. 523, which quotes 12,000,000 cruzados as - the total receipt of taxes for 1811. Does Napier include loans, - and the inconvertible paper issued by the government? - - [149] See complaints of the Conde de Redondo, the Portuguese - finance minister, in Soriano de Luz, iii. p. 520. - -It is clear that the Portuguese government must have shrunk from many -of Wellington’s suggestions on account of mere lack of resources. -A third of the country had been at one time or another overrun by -the French--the provinces north of the Douro in 1809, the Beira and -northern Estremadura in 1810-11. It would take long years before -they were in a position to make their former contributions to the -expenses of the State. It was impossible to get over this hard fact: -but Wellington thought that a rearrangement of taxes, and an honest -administration of their levy, would produce a much larger annual -revenue than was being raised in 1812. He pointed out, with some -plausibility, that British money was being poured into Portugal by -millions and stopped there: some one--the merchant and contractor for -the most part--must be making enormous profits and accumulating untold -wealth. Moreover he had discovered cases of the easy handling of the -rich and influential in the matter of taxation, while the peasantry -were being drained of their last farthing. Such little jobs were -certain to occur in an administration of the _ancien régime_: fidalgos -and capitalists knew how to square matters with officials at Lisbon. -‘A reform in the abuses of the Customs of Lisbon and Oporto, a more -equal and just collection of the Income Tax on commercial property, -particularly in those large and rich towns [it is scandalous to hear -of the fortunes made by the mercantile classes owing to the war, -and to reflect that they contribute practically nothing to bear its -burdens], a reform of the naval establishment and the arsenal, would -make the income equal to the expenditure, and the government would get -on without calling upon Great Britain at every moment to find that -which, in the existing state of the world, cannot be procured, viz. -money[150].’ So wrote Wellington, who was always being irritated by -discovering that the magazines of Elvas or Almeida were running low, or -that recruits were not rejoining their battalions because there was no -cash to arm or clothe them, or that troops in the field were getting -half-rations, unless they were on the British subsidy list. - - [150] See tables on pp. 324-5 of Halliday’s _Present State of - Portugal_, published in 1812. - -No doubt Wellington was right in saying that there was a certain -amount of jobbery in the distribution of taxation, and that more could -have been raised by a better system. But Portuguese figures of the -time seem to make it clear that even if a supernatural genius had -been administering the revenue instead of the Conde de Redondo, all -could not have been obtained that was demanded. The burden of the war -expenses was too heavy for an impoverished country, with no more than -two and a half million inhabitants, which was compelled to import a -great part of its provisions owing to the stress of war. The state -of Portugal may be estimated by the fact that in the twelve months -between February 1811 and January 1812 £2,672,000 worth of imported -corn, besides 605,000 barrels of flour, valued at £2,051,780 more, -was brought into the country and sold there[151]. On the other hand -the export of wine, with which Portugal used to pay for its foreign -purchases, had fallen off terribly: in 1811 only 18,000 pipes were -sold as against an average of 40,000 for the eight years before the -outbreak of the Peninsular War. An intelligent observer wrote in 1812 -that the commercial distress of the country might mainly be traced to -the fact that nearly all the money which came into the country from -England, great as was the sum, found its way to the countries from -which Portugal was drawing food, mainly to the United States, from -which the largest share of the wheat and flour was brought. ‘As we -have no corresponding trade with America, the balance has been very -great against this country: for the last three years this expenditure -has been very considerable, without any return whatever, as the money -carried to America has been completely withdrawn from circulation.’ - - [151] Halliday’s _Present State of Portugal_, p. 320. - -The shrinkage in the amount of the gold and silver current in Portugal -was as noticeable in these years as the same phenomenon in England, -and (like the British) the Portuguese government tried to make up the -deficiency by the issue of inconvertible paper money, which gradually -fell in exchange value as compared with the metallic currency. The -officers of the army, as well as all civil functionaries, were paid -their salaries half in cash and half in notes--the latter suffered a -depreciation of from 15 to 30 per cent. Among the cares which weighed -on Wellington and Charles Stuart was that of endeavouring to keep the -Regency from the easy expedient of issuing more and more of a paper -currency which was already circulating at far less than its face value. -This was avoided--fortunately for the Portuguese people and army, no -less than for the Anglo-Portuguese alliance. - -After all, the practical results of the efforts made by the Portuguese -government were invaluable. Wellington could not have held his ground, -much less have undertaken the offensive campaign of 1812, without the -aid of the trusty auxiliaries that swelled his divisions to normal -size. Without their Portuguese brigades most of them would have been -mere skeletons of 3,000 or 4,000 men. Beresford’s army was almost up -to its full establishment in January 1812--there were 59,122 men on -the rolls, when recruits, sick, men on detachment, and the regiment -lent for the succour of Cadiz are all counted. Deducting, beyond these, -the garrisons of Elvas, Abrantes, Almeida, and smaller places, as also -the dismounted cavalry left in the rear[152], there were over 30,000 -men for the fighting-line, in ten brigades of infantry, six regiments -of cavalry, and eight field-batteries. Beresford, lately entrusted -by orders from Rio Janeiro with still more stringent powers over the -military establishment, was using them to the full. An iron hand kept -down desertion and marauding, executions for each of those offences -appear incessantly in the _Ordens do Dia_, which give the daily -chronicle of the Portuguese head-quarters. In addition to the regular -army it must be remembered that he had to manage the militia, of which -as many as 52,000 men were under arms at one time or another in 1812. -Counting the first and the second line together, there were 110,000 men -enrolled--a fine total for a people of two and a half million souls. - - [152] The deductions were--sick, 7,500; untrained recruits, - 4,000; dismounted cavalry, 3,000; regiment at Cadiz, 1,500; - garrisons (infantry and artillery) and men on detachment, 10,000; - leaving some 33,000 for the field. By May the gross total had - gone down to 56,674. - -Putting purely Portuguese difficulties aside, Wellington was much -worried at this time by a trouble which concerned the British and not -the local finances. This was the delay in the cashing of the ‘_vales_’ -or bills for payment issued by the Commissary-General for food and -forage bought from the peasantry. As long as they were settled at short -intervals, no difficulty arose about them--they were indeed treated -as negotiable paper, and had passed from hand to hand at a lesser -discount than the inconvertible Portuguese government papers. But all -through the year 1811 the interval between the issue of the ‘_vale_’ -and its payment in cash at Lisbon had been growing longer, and an -uncomfortable feeling was beginning to spread about the country-side. -The peasantry were growing suspicious, and were commencing to sell -the bills, for much less than their face value, to speculators who -could afford to wait for payment. To recoup themselves for their loss -they were showing signs of raising prices all round. Fortunately they -were a simple race, and communication between districts was slow and -uncertain, so that no general tendency of this sort was yet prevalent, -though the symptoms were making themselves visible here and there. -Hence came Wellington’s constant applications for more cash from -England at shorter notice. Late in the spring he devised a scheme by -which interest at 5 per cent. was to be paid by the Commissary-General -on bonds or certificates representing money or money’s worth advanced -to the British army, till the principal was repaid--two years being -named as the period after which the whole sum must be refunded. This -was a desperate measure, an endeavour to throw forward payment on to -a remote future, ‘when it is not probable that there will be the same -difficulty in procuring specie in England to send abroad as there is -at the present moment.’ The plan[153] was never tried, and was not -good: for how could small creditors of the English army be expected -to stand out of their money--representing the price of their crops -or their cattle--for so long a period as two years, even if they -were, in the meantime, receiving interest on what was really their -working capital? Wellington himself remarked, when broaching the -scheme to Lord Liverpool, that there remained the difficulty that no -one could look forward, and say that the British army would still be -in the Peninsula two years hence. If it had left Portugal--whether -victorious and pushing towards the Pyrenees, or defeated and driven -back on to Great Britain--how would the creditors communicate with -the Commissary-General, their debtor? They could only be referred to -London, to which they would have no ready access: indeed many of them -would not know where, or what, London was. That such an idea should -have been set forward only shows the desperate financial situation of -the British army. - - [153] Set forth in detail, and with a sample bond for 1,000 - dollars added, in _Dispatches_, ix. pp. 104-5. - -We shall have to be referring to this problem at several later points -of the history of the campaign of 1812[154]: at the opening of the -invasion of Leon in June it reached its worst point, just before -the great victory of Salamanca. But it was always present, and -when Wellington’s mind was not occupied with deductions as to the -manœuvres of French marshals, it may undoubtedly be said that his -main preoccupation was the normally depleted state of the military -chest, into which dollars and guineas flowed, it is true, in enormous -quantities, but only to be paid out at once, in settling arrears many -months old. These were never fully liquidated, and began to accumulate -again, with distressing rapidity, after every tardy settlement. - - [154] See especially below in chapter iii of section xxxiii. p. - 349. - -Whig historians have often tried to represent Wellington’s financial -difficulties as the fault of the home government, and it is easy to -pick passages from his dispatches in which he seems to assert that -he is not being supported according to his necessities. But a nearer -investigation of the facts will not bear out this easy theory, the -product of party spite. The Whigs of 1811-12 were occupied in decrying -the Peninsular War as a failure, in minimizing the successes of -Wellington, and in complaining that the vast sums of money lavished on -his army were wasted. Napoleon was invincible, peace was the only way -out of disaster, even if the peace must be somewhat humiliating. It -was unseemly for their representatives, twenty years after, to taunt -the Perceval and Liverpool ministries with having stinted Wellington -in his hour of need. We have learnt to estimate at their proper -value tirades against ‘the administration which was characterized -by all the corruption and tyranny of Mr. Pitt’s system, without his -redeeming genius.’ We no longer think that the Napoleonic War was waged -‘to repress the democratic principle,’ nor that the cabinets which -maintained it were ‘the rapacious usurpers of the people’s rights[155].’ - - [155] For these phrases and much more abuse, see Napier, iv. p. - 199, a most venomous and unjust passage. - -Rather, in the spirit of Mr. Fortescue’s admirable volume on _British -Statesmen of the Great War_, shall we be prone to stand amazed at -the courage and resolution of the group of British ministers who -stood out, for long years and against tremendous odds, to defeat the -tyrant of Europe and to preserve the British Empire. ‘On the one side -was Napoleon, an autocrat vested with such powers as great genius -and good fortune have rarely placed in the hands of one man, with -the resources of half Europe at his disposition, and an armed force -unsurpassed in strength and devotion ready to march to the ends of -the world to uphold his will. On the other were these plain English -gentlemen, with not so much as a force of police at their back, with a -population by nature five times as turbulent as it is now, and in the -manufacturing districts inflamed alike by revolutionary teaching and by -real distress, with an Ireland always perilously near revolt, with a -House of Commons unreformed indeed, but not on that account containing -a less factious, mischievous, and obstructive opposition than any -other House of Commons during a great war. In face of all these -difficulties they had to raise armies, maintain fleets, construct and -pursue a military policy, and be unsuccessful at their peril. Napoleon -might lose whole armies with impunity: five thousand British soldiers -beaten and captured would have brought any British minister’s head -perilously near the block. Such were the difficulties that confronted -Perceval, Liverpool, and Castlereagh: yet for their country’s sake they -encountered them without flinching[156].’ - - [156] Fortescue’s _British Statesmen_, pp. 277-8. - -The winter of 1811-12 was not quite the darkest hour: the Russian war -was looming in the near future, and Napoleon was already beginning to -withdraw troops from Spain in preparation for it. No longer therefore, -as in 1810 and the earlier half of 1811, was there a high probability -that the main bulk of the French armies, under the Emperor himself, -might be turned once more against the Peninsula. It was all but certain -that England would soon have allies, and not stand practically alone -in the struggle, as she had done ever since Wagram. Nevertheless, even -with the political horizon somewhat brightened in the East, the time -was a sufficiently anxious one. In Great Britain, as in the rest of -Europe, the harvest of 1811 had been exceptionally bad, and the high -price of bread, coinciding with much unemployment, was causing not only -distress but wide-spread turbulence in the manufacturing districts. -This was the year of the first outbreak of the ‘Luddites,’ and of their -senseless exploits in the way of machine-smashing. The worst stringency -of domestic troubles coincided with the gradual disappearance of the -external danger from the ambition of Napoleon. - -In addition it must be remembered that the Perceval cabinet, on which -all the responsibilities fell, was by no means firmly established in -power. When it first took office many politicians believed that it -could not last for a single year. All through 1811 the Prince Regent -had been in secret negotiation with the Whigs, and would gladly have -replaced his ministers with some sort of a coalition government. And -in January 1812 Lord Wellesley, by far the most distinguished man in -the cabinet, resigned his post as Foreign Minister. He asserted that -he did so because his colleagues had failed to accept all his plans -for the support of his brother and the Peninsular army: and no doubt -this was to a certain extent true. Yet it cannot be said that, either -before or after his resignation, the Ministry had neglected Wellington; -in 1811 they had doubled his force of cavalry, and sent him about a -dozen new battalions of infantry. It was these reinforcements which -made the victories of 1812 possible, and in that year the stream of -reinforcements did not cease--nine more infantry regiments came out, -mostly in time for the great crisis in June[157]. In the autumn the -dispatch of further succours had become difficult, because of the -outbreak of the American war, which diverted of necessity to Canada -many units that might otherwise have gone to Spain. It is impossible to -maintain that Wellington was stinted of men: money was the difficulty. -And even as regards money--which had to be gold or silver, since paper -was useless in the Peninsula--the resources placed at his disposal were -much larger than in previous years, though not so large as he demanded, -nor as the growing scale of the war required. - - [157] _Per contra_ five depleted second battalions went home. - -It is difficult to acquit Wellesley of factiousness with regard to -his resignation, and the most damaging document against him is the -_apologia_ drawn up by his devoted adherent Shawe[158], in the belief -that it afforded a complete justification for his conduct: many of -the words and phrases are the Marquess’s own. From this paper no one -can fail to deduce that it was not so much a quixotic devotion to his -brother’s interests, as an immoderate conception of his own dignity -and importance that made Wellesley resign. He could not stand the free -discussion and criticism of plans and policies which is essential in -a cabinet. ‘Lord Wellesley has always complained, with some justice, -that his suggestions were received as those of a mere novice.... His -opinions were overruled, and the opposition he met with could only -proceed from jealousy, or from a real contempt for his judgement. -It seemed to him that they were unwilling to adopt any plan of his, -lest it might lead to his assuming a general ascendancy in the -Cabinet.... He said that he took another view of the situation: the -Government derived the most essential support from his joining it, -because it was considered as a pledge that the war would be properly -supported.... “The war is popular, and any government that will -support Lord Wellington properly will stand. I do not think the war -is properly supported, and I cannot, as an honest man, deceive the -nation by remaining in office.” ... It is needless to particularize all -the points of difference between Lord Wellesley and his colleagues: -Spain was the main point, but he also disapproved of their obstinate -adherence to the Orders in Council, and their policy towards America -and in Sicily’--not to speak of Catholic Emancipation. - - [158] Printed in Wellington’s _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. - pp. 257-88. - -These are the words of injured pride, not of patriotism. The essential -thing at the moment was that the war in Spain should be kept up -efficiently. By resigning, Wellesley intended to break up the Ministry, -and of this a probable result might have been the return to office of -the Whigs, whose policy was to abandon the Peninsula and make peace -with Napoleon. Wellesley’s _apologia_ acknowledges that his influence -in the Cabinet had brought about, on more occasions than one, an -increase of the support given to his brother, e.g. his colleagues had -given in about additions to the Portuguese subsidy, and about extra -reinforcements to the army. This being so, it was surely criminal in -him to retire, when he found that some of his further suggestions were -not followed. Would the wrecking of the Perceval cabinet, and the -succession of the Whigs to power, have served Wellington or the general -cause of the British Empire? - -Wellington himself saw the situation with clear eyes, and in a letter, -in which a touch of his sardonic humour can be detected, wrote in reply -to his brother’s announcement of his resignation that ‘In truth the -republic of a cabinet is but little suited to any man of taste or of -large views[159].’ There lay the difficulty: the great viceroy loved to -dictate, and hated to hear his opinions criticized. Lord Liverpool, in -announcing the rupture to Wellington in a letter of a rather apologetic -cast, explains the situation in a very few words: ‘Lord Wellesley -says generally that he has not the weight in the Government which he -expected, when he accepted office.... The Government, though a cabinet, -is necessarily _inter pares_, in which every member must expect to -have his opinions and his dispatches canvassed, and this previous -friendly canvass of opinions and measures appears necessary, under -a constitution where all public acts of ministers will be hostilely -debated in parliament.’ The Marquess resented all criticism whatever. - - [159] Wellington to Wellesley, camp before Badajoz, - _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. p. 307. - -The ministers assured Wellington that his brother’s resignation would -make no difference in their relations with himself, and invited him to -write as freely to Lord Castlereagh, who succeeded Wellesley at the -Foreign Office, as to his predecessor. The assurance of the Cabinet’s -good will and continued confidence was received--as it had been -given--in all sincerity. Not the least change in Wellington’s relations -with the Ministry can be detected from his dispatches. Nor can it be -said that the support which he received from home varied in the least, -after his brother’s secession from the Cabinet. Even the grudging -Napier is forced to concede this much, though he endeavours to deprive -the Perceval ministry of any credit, by asserting that their only -chance of continuance in office depended on the continued prosperity -of Wellington. Granting this, we must still conclude that Wellesley’s -resignation, even if it produced no disastrous results--as it well -might have done--was yet an unhappy exhibition of pride and petulance. -A patriotic statesman should have subordinated his own _amour propre_ -to the welfare of Great Britain, which demanded that a strong -administration, pledged to the continuance of war with Napoleon, should -direct the helm of the State. He did his best to wreck Perceval’s -cabinet, and to put the Whigs in power. - -The crisis in the Ministry passed off with less friction and less -results than most London observers had expected, and Lord Liverpool -turned out to be right when he asserted that in his opinion[160] -it would be of no material prejudice to the Perceval government. -Castlereagh, despite of his halting speech and his involved phrases, -was a tower of strength at the Foreign Office, and certainly replaced -Wellesley with no disadvantage to the general policy of Great Britain. - - [160] Liverpool to Wellington, _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. - p. 257. - -Here the jealousies and bickerings in London may be left for a space. -We shall only need to turn back for a moment to ministerial matters -when, at midsummer, the whole situation had been transformed, for -France and Russia were at last openly engaged in war, a great relief -to British statesmen, although at the same time a new trouble was -arising in the West to distract their attention. For the same month -that started Napoleon on his way to Moscow saw President Madison’s -declaration of war on Great Britain, and raised problems, both on -the high seas and on the frontiers of Canada, that would have seemed -heart-breaking and insoluble if the strength of France had not been -engaged elsewhere. But the ‘stab in the back,’ as angry British -politicians called it, was delivered too late to be effective. - - - - -SECTION XXXII - -WELLINGTON’S FIRST CAMPAIGN OF 1812 - - -CHAPTER I - -THE CAPTURE OF CIUDAD RODRIGO - - -It is with no small relief that we turn away from the annals of the -petty warfare in the provinces and of the bickerings of politicians, -to follow the doings of Wellington. All the ‘alarms and excursions’ -that we have been narrating were of small import, compared with the -operations on the frontiers of Portugal and Leon which began at the New -Year of 1812. Here we have arrived at the true backbone of the war, the -central fact which governed all the rest. Here we follow the working -out of a definite plan conceived by a master-mind, and are no longer -dealing with spasmodic movements dictated by the necessities of the -moment. For the initiative had at last fallen into Wellington’s hands, -and the schemes of Soult and Marmont were no longer to determine his -movements. On the contrary, it was he who was to dictate theirs. - -The governing factor in the situation in the end of December 1811 was, -as we have already shown, the fact that Marmont’s army had been so -distracted by the Alicante expedition, undertaken by Napoleon’s special -orders, that it was no longer in a position to concentrate, in full -force and within a reasonably short period of time. It was on December -13th[161] that the Duke of Ragusa received the definitive orders, -written on November 20-1, that bade him to send towards Valencia, for -Suchet’s benefit, such a force as, when joined by a detachment from -the Army of the Centre, should make up 12,000 men, and to find 3,000 -or 4,000 more to cover the line of communications of the expedition. -Accordingly orders were issued to Montbrun to take up the enterprise, -with the divisions of Foy and Sarrut, and his own cavalry; the -concentration of the corps began on December 15th, and on December 29th -it marched eastward from La Mancha[162] on its fruitless raid. - - [161] For this date see Marmont to Berthier, from Valladolid, - Feb. 6, 1812. - - [162] For details, see chapter iii of section xxx above. - -Wellington’s policy at this moment depended on the exact distribution -of the hostile armies in front of him. He lay with the bulk of his army -wintering in cantonments along the frontier of Portugal and Leon, but -with the Light Division pushed close up to Ciudad Rodrigo, and ready to -invest it, the moment that the news should arrive that the French had -so moved their forces as to make it possible for him to close in upon -that fortress, without the danger of a very large army appearing to -relieve it within a few days. On December 28th he summed up his scheme -in a report to Lord Liverpool, in which he stated that, after the El -Bodon-Aldea da Ponte fighting in September, he had ‘determined to -persevere in the same system till the enemy should make some alteration -in the disposition of his forces[163].’ In the meanwhile he judged that -he was keeping Marmont and Dorsenne ‘contained,’ and preventing them -from undertaking operations elsewhere, unless they were prepared to -risk the chance of losing Rodrigo. ‘It would not answer to remove the -army to the frontiers of Estremadura (where a chance of effecting some -important object might have offered), as in that case General Abadia -[and the Spanish Army of Galicia] would have been left to himself, and -would have fallen an easy sacrifice to the Army of the North[164].’ -Therefore Wellington refused to take the opportunity of descending upon -Badajoz and driving Drouet out of Estremadura, though these operations -were perfectly possible. He confined himself to ordering Hill to -carry out the two raids in this direction, of which the first led to -the destruction of Girard at Arroyo dos Molinos in October, and the -second to the occupation of Merida and the expulsion of the French from -central Estremadura at midwinter [December 27, 1811-January 13, 1812]. - - [163] _Dispatches_, viii. p. 516. - - [164] Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Dec. 28. - -In October Wellington had hoped for some time that Rodrigo would be -gravely incommoded for lack of provisions, for it was almost cut -off from the army to which it belonged by the guerrillero bands of -Julian Sanchez, who dominated all the country between the Agueda -and Salamanca, while the Light Division lay on the heights close -above it, ready to pounce on any convoy that might try to pass in. -This expectation, however, had been disappointed, as a large amount -of food had been thrown into the place on November 2nd by General -Thiébault, the governor of Salamanca. This revictualling had only -been accomplished by a mixture of good management and good luck. The -governor saw that any convoy must have a large escort, because of the -guerrilleros, who would have cut off a small one. But a large escort -could not move very fast, or escape notice. Wherefore, taking no mean -risk, Thiébault collected 3,400 men for a guard, stopped all exit of -Spaniards from Salamanca two days before the convoy started, gave out -a false destination for his movement, and sent out requisitions for -rations for 12,000 men in the villages between the starting-place and -Rodrigo. Wellington had been on the look-out for some such attempt, -and had intended that the Light Division, from its lair at Martiago -in the mountain-valleys above the city, should descend upon any force -of moderate size that might approach. But receiving, rather late, the -false news that at least three whole divisions were to serve as escort, -he forbade Craufurd to risk anything till he should have received -reinforcements. The same day the Agueda became unfordable owing to -sudden rains, and no troops could be sent across to join Craufurd. -Wherefore Thiébault got by, ere the smallness of his force was -realized, and retreated with such haste, after throwing in the food, -that the Light Division could not come up with him[165]. Such luck -could not be expected another time! - - [165] For details of this operation see Thiébault’s _Mémoires_, - iv. pp. 538-43, corroborated by Wellington’s _Dispatches_, viii. - pp. 373-5 and 385-6. - -Wellington had begun to hurry up the nearest divisions to support -Craufurd, and had supposed for two days that he would have serious -fighting, since he imagined that 15,000 or 18,000 men at least had been -brought up to guard the convoy. It was a grave disappointment to him -to find that he had been misled, for it was clear that Rodrigo would -not be straitened for food for many a day. He had now to fall back on -his original scheme of reducing the place by a regular siege, when the -propitious instant should come round. - -Meanwhile, waiting for the moment when Marmont and Dorsenne should -disperse their troops into a less concentrated position, he took -preliminary measures to face that eventuality when it should occur. -The main thing was to get the battering-train, with which Ciudad -Rodrigo would have to be attacked, close up to its objective. As we -have already seen[166], it had been collected far to the rear, at the -obscure village of Villa da Ponte near Trancoso. Between that spot and -Rodrigo there were eighty miles of bad mountain roads: if Wellington -had waited till he heard that Marmont had moved, before he began to -bring up his heavy guns, he would have lost many days. Accordingly -he commenced to push them forward as early as November 12th: their -temporary shelter was to be in the fortress of Almeida, which was -already so far restored that it could be regarded as safe against -anything short of a regular siege. It was certain that Marmont would -not come forward at midwinter for any such operation, and against -raids or demonstrations the place was already secure. On December 4th -Wellington reported[167] to Lord Liverpool that it would be completely -‘re-established as a military post’ within a few weeks; and on the -19th he announced that it was now ‘a place of security,’ and could -be trusted to resist any attack whatever. But, long before even the -first of these dates, it was beginning to receive the siege-material -which Alexander Dickson was ordered to bring up from the rear. As -early as November 22nd the first division of heavy guns entered its -gates: it was given out--to deceive French spies--that the pieces -were only intended to arm the walls, and at the same time Dickson -was actively employed in mounting on them a number of guns of heavy -calibre, wrecked in the explosion when Brennier evacuated Almeida in -May 1811. Twenty-five of them were in position before Christmas Day. -The indefatigable artillery commandant had also hunted out of the -ruins no less than 8,000 round shot: it was originally intended that -they should go into the magazines of the garrison; but, when the time -for action came, Wellington sent the greater part of this stock of -second-hand shot to the front, because they were immediately available, -and ordered the Almeida stores to be replenished, as occasion served, -by the later convoys that arrived from Villa da Ponte. - - [166] See vol. iv. p. 549. - - [167] _Dispatches_, viii, Report of Dec. 28 to Lord Liverpool on - the late campaign. - -Nor was it in bringing forward guns and ammunition alone that -Wellington was busy during December: he caused a great quantity of -gabions and fascines to be constructed by the men of the four divisions -nearest the front, giving two vintems (2½_d._) for every fascine -and four for every gabion. He had a very strong trestle-bridge cast -across the Agueda at Marialva, seven miles north of Rodrigo and out of -the reach of its garrison, and he began to collect carts from every -direction. Not only were they requisitioned in Beira, but Carlos de -España, who was lying in a somewhat venturesome position within the -frontiers of Leon, ordered the Spanish peasantry, even as far as -Tamames, to send every available ox-wain west-ward--and many came, -though their owners were risking dire chastisement at the hands of the -governor of the province of Salamanca. - -Marmont, as we have seen, began to move troops eastward for Montbrun’s -Valencian expedition about December 15th. The first news of this -displacement reached Wellington on the 24th, when he heard that -Brennier’s division had evacuated Plasencia and fallen back behind -the Tietar, taking with it all its baggage, sick, and stores. This -might be no more than a change of cantonments for a single division, -or it might be a part of a general strategical move. Wellington wrote -to Hill that evening, ‘some say they are going to Valencia, some that -they are to cross the Tagus. I will let you know if I should learn -anything positive. I have not yet heard whether the movement has been -general, or is confined to this particular division[168].’ The right -deduction was not drawn with certainty, because at the same time false -intelligence was brought that Foy had started from Toledo and gone into -La Mancha, but had returned again. This was a confused account of his -movement; but the rumour of his coming back discounted the certain -news about Brennier’s eastward move[169]. - - [168] Wellington to Hill, _Dispatches_, viii. p. 482, compare - Wellington to Liverpool, viii. pp. 485-6, of the next morning. - - [169] See _Dispatches_, viii. p. 520. See the Dickson MSS., - edited by Major Leslie, for letter from Almeida in December. - -On the 29th came the very important additional information that on the -26th Clausel’s Division, hitherto lying on the Upper Tormes, above -Salamanca, had marched upon Avila, and that the division already at -Avila was moving on some unknown eastward destination. At the same time -Wellington received the perfectly correct information that all the -cavalry of the Imperial Guard in Old Castile had already started for -Bayonne, and that the two infantry divisions of the Young Guard, which -formed the most effective part of Dorsenne’s Army of the North, were -under orders to march northward from Valladolid, and had already begun -to move.[170] This was certain--less so a report sent in by Castaños to -the effect that he had learnt that the whole Army of Portugal was about -to concentrate at Toledo. On this Wellington writes to Graham that ‘he -imagines it is only a report from Alcaldes’--a class of correspondents -on whose accuracy and perspicacity he was not accustomed to rely -over-much[171]. - - [170] Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Jan. 1, _Dispatches_, viii. - p. 524. - - [171] See Wellington to Graham, Dec. 26, _Dispatches_, viii. p. - 521. - -But enough information had come to hand to make it clear that a -general eastward movement of the French was taking place, and that -the troops immediately available for the succour of Ciudad Rodrigo -were both decreased in numbers and removed farther from the sphere of -Wellington’s future operations. He thought that the opportunity given -justified him in striking at once, and had drawn at last the correct -deduction: ‘I conclude that all these movements have for their object -to support Suchet’s operations in Valencia, or even to co-operate with -him[172].’ If Marmont were extending his troops so far east as the -Valencian border, and if Dorsenne were withdrawing divisions northward -from Valladolid, it was clear that they could not concentrate in any -short space of time for the deliverance of Rodrigo. It was possible -that the siege might linger on long enough to enable the Armies of -Portugal and the North to unite; Wellington calculated that it might -take as much as twenty-four or even thirty days--an estimate which -happily turned out to be exaggerated: in the end he stormed it only -twelve days after investment. But even if Rodrigo should resist its -besiegers sufficiently long to permit of a general concentration of -the enemy, that concentration would disarrange all their schemes, and -weaken their hold on many outlying parts of the Peninsula. ‘If I do not -succeed,’ wrote Wellington, ‘I shall at least bring back some of the -troops of the Army of the North, and the Army of Portugal, and shall -so far relieve the Guerrillas [Mina, Longa, Porlier] and the Spanish -Army in Valencia[173].’ The last-named force was, as a matter of fact, -beyond saving, when Wellington wrote his letter to Lord Liverpool. But -he could not know it, and if Blake had behaved with common prudence -and foresight in the end of December, his game ought not to have been -played out to a disastrous end early in January, just when the British -were moving out to the leaguer of Rodrigo. - - [172] Wellington to Lord Liverpool, _Dispatches_, viii. p. 524. - - [173] Another extract from the explanatory dispatch to Lord - Liverpool, written on Jan. 1st, 1812. - -All the divisions cantoned upon or behind the Beira frontier received, -on January 2nd-3rd, the orders which bade them prepare to push up to -the line of the Agueda. Only the 6th Division, which lay farthest off, -as far back as Mangualde and Penaverde near the Upper Mondego, was not -brought up to the front within the next few days. The 1st Division had -a long march from Guarda, Celorico, and Penamacor, the 4th and 5th -Divisions very short ones from Aldea del Obispo and Alameda, Villa de -Ciervo, and other villages near Almeida. The 3rd Division from Aldea -da Ponte and Navas Frias had a journey greater than those of the two -last-named units, but much less than that of the 1st Division. Finally -the Light Division was, it may be said, already in position: its -outlying pickets at Pastores and Zamorra were already within six miles -of Rodrigo, and its head-quarters at Martiago only a short distance -farther back. - -By January 5th the divisions were all at the front, though their march -had been carried out in very inclement weather--heavy snow fell on -the night of the 1st-2nd of the month, and continued to fall on the -third; while on the 4th the wind shifted, the snow turned to sleet, and -the roads grew soft and slushy. The carts with stores and ammunition, -pushing forward from Almeida, only reached Gallegos--ten miles away--in -two days. The troops were well forward--the 1st Division at Espeja and -Gallegos, the 3rd at Martiago and Zamorra, the 4th at San Felices, -beyond the Agueda, the Light Division at Pastores, La Encina and El -Bodon. But Wellington nevertheless had to put off the investment for -three days, because the train was not to the front. On the 6th he -crossed the Agueda with his staff and made a close reconnaissance of -the place, unmolested by the garrison. But it was only on the 8th that -the divisions, who were suffering severely from exposure to the wintry -weather, received orders to close in and complete the investment. - -Of the topography of Ciudad Rodrigo we have already spoken at some -length, when dealing with its siege by Ney in 1810. The French -occupation had made no essential change to its character. The only -additions to its works made during the last eighteen months were the -erection of a small fort on the summit of the Greater Teson, and the -reinforcing by masonry of the three large convents in the suburb of San -Francisco, which the Spaniards had already used as places of strength. -The first-named work was a redoubt (named Redout Renaud, from the -governor whom Julian Sanchez had kidnapped in October): it mounted -three guns, had a ditch and palisades, and was built for a garrison of -seventy men. Its gorge contained a sally-port opening towards the town, -and was closed with palisades only. Four guns on the stone roof of the -fortified convent of San Francisco, and many more in the northern front -of the _enceinte_, bore upon it, and were intended to make access to it -dangerous and costly. - -The breaches made during Ney’s siege, in the walls facing the Tesons, -had been well built up: but the new masonry, clearly distinguishable -by its fresh colour from the older stone, had not set over well, and -proved less hard when battered. - -The garrison, supplied by the Army of the North, was not so numerous -as it should have been, particularly when it was intended to hold not -only the _enceinte_ of the small circular town but the straggling -suburb outside. It consisted of a battalion each of the 34th Léger and -the 113th Line, from the division of Thiébault (that long commanded -in 1810-11 by Serras), making about 1,600 men, with two companies -of Artillery and a small detachment of sappers--the whole at the -commencement of the siege did not amount to quite 2,000 of all ranks, -even including the sick in the hospital. The governor was General -Barrié, an officer who had been thrust into the post much contrary -to his will, because he was the only general of brigade available at -Salamanca when his predecessor Renaud was taken by Julian Sanchez[174]. -The strength of the garrison had been deliberately kept low by -Dorsenne, because of the immense difficulty of supplying it with -provisions. The first convoy for its support had only been introduced -by bringing up 60,000 men, at the time of the fighting about El Bodon -in September: the second only by Thiébault’s risky expedient on -November 2nd. - - [174] For details of this see Thiébault’s _Mémoires_, iv. p. 537, - where Barrié’s frank dismay at his appointment, and the arguments - used to overcome it, are described at length. - -The one thing that was abundant in the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo on -January 8th, 1812, was artillery. Inside the place was lying the whole -siege-train of the Army of Portugal, which Masséna had stored there -when he started on his march into Portugal in September 1811. No less -than 153 heavy guns, with the corresponding stores and ammunition, were -parked there. A small fortress was never so stocked with munitions of -war, and the besieged made a lavish and unsparing use of them during -the defence: but though the shot and shell were available in unlimited -quantities, the gunners were not--a fortunate thing for the besiegers. - -The details of the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo are interesting. This was -the only one of Wellington’s sieges in which everything went without -a serious hitch from first to last--so much so that he took the place -in twelve days, when he had not dared to make his calculation for -less than twenty-four[175]. Even the thing which seemed at first his -greatest hindrance--the extreme inclemency of the weather--turned -out in the end profitable. The sleet had stopped on the 6th, and a -time of light frosts set in, without any rain or snow. This kept the -ground hard, but was not bitter enough to freeze it for even half an -inch below the surface; the earth was not difficult to excavate, and -it piled together well. A persistent north-east wind kept the trenches -fairly dry, though it chilled the men who were not engaged in actual -spade work to the very bones. The worst memory recorded in the diaries -of many of the officers present in the siege is the constant necessity -for fording the Agueda in this cold time, when its banks were fringed -each morning with thin ice. For the camps of all the divisions, except -the 3rd, which lay at Serradilla del Arroyo, some miles south-east of -the city, were on the left bank of the river, and the only bridge was -so far off to the north that it was little used, the short cut across -the ford to the south of the town saving hours of time: ‘and as we were -obliged to cross the river with water up to our middles, every man -carried a pair of iced breeches into the trenches with him[176].’ There -being very few villages in the immediate neighbourhood of Rodrigo, many -of the brigades had to bivouac on the open ground--life being only made -tolerable by the keeping up of immense fires, round which the men spent -their time when off duty, and slept at night. But for the troops in the -trenches there could be no such comfort: they shivered in their great -coats and blankets, and envied those of their comrades who did the -digging, which at any rate kept the blood circulating. It is said that -several Portuguese sentries were found dead at their posts from cold -and exhaustion each morning. - - [175] Wellington to Liverpool, _Dispatches_, viii. p. 536, Jan. - 7th, 1812, ‘I can scarcely venture to calculate the time that - this operation will take, but I should think not less than - twenty-four or twenty-five days.’ - - [176] Kincaid, _Adventures in the Rifle Brigade_, p. 104. - -Wellington’s general plan was to follow the same line which Ney had -adopted in 1810, i. e. to seize the Greater Teson hill, establish a -first parallel there, and then sap down to the lower Little Teson, -on which the front parallel and the breaching batteries were to be -established, at a distance of no more than 200 yards from the northern -_enceinte_ of the city. But he had to commence with an operation which -Ney was spared--there was now on the crest of the Greater Teson the -new Redout Renaud, which had to be got rid of before the preliminary -preparation could be made. - -This little work was dealt with in the most drastic and summary way. -On the same evening on which the army crossed the Agueda and invested -the fortress, the Light Division was ordered to take the redoubt -by escalade, without any preliminary battering. In the dark it was -calculated that the converging fires from the convent of San Francisco -and the northern walls would be of little importance, since the French -could hardly shell the work at random during an assault, for fear of -hitting their own men; and the attacking column would be covered by the -night till the very moment when it reached its goal. - -Colonel Colborne led the storming-party, which consisted of 450 men, -two companies from each British battalion, and one each from the 1st -and 3rd Caçadores[177]. His arrangements have received well-deserved -praise from every narrator of the enterprise. The column was conducted -to within fifty yards of the redoubt without being discovered; then the -two rifle companies and two of the 52nd doubled out to the crest of -the glacis, encircled the work on all sides, and, throwing themselves -on the ground, began a deliberate and accurate fire upon the heads of -the garrison, as they ran to the rampart, roused at last by the near -approach of the stormers. So close and deadly was the fire of this -ring of trained marksmen, that after a few minutes the French shrank -from the embrasures, and crouched behind their parapets, contenting -themselves with throwing a quantity of grenades and live shells at -haphazard into the ditch. Their three cannon were only fired once! Such -casual and ineffective opposition could not stop the veterans of the -Light Division. For three companies of the 43rd and 52nd, forming the -escalading detachment, came rushing up to the work, got into the ditch -by descending the ladders which were provided for them, and then reared -them a second time against the fraises of the rampart, up which they -scrambled without much difficulty, finding the scarp not too steep and -without a _revêtement_. The garrison flinched at once--most of them -ran into their guard-house or crouched under the guns, and surrendered -tamely. At the same time entrance was forced at another point, the -gorge, where a company, guided by Gurwood of the 52nd, got in at the -gate, which was either unlocked by some of the French trying to escape, -or accidentally blown open by a live shell dropped against it[178]. Of -the garrison two captains and forty-eight rank and file were unwounded -prisoners, three were killed, and about a dozen more wounded. No more -than four, it is said, succeeded in getting back into the town[179]. -This sudden exploit only cost the stormers six men killed, and three -officers[180] and sixteen men wounded. Colborne remarks in his report -that all the losses were during the advance or in the ditch, not a man -was hurt in the actual escalade, for the enemy took cover and gave way, -instead of trying to meet the stormers with the bayonet. - - [177] I take Colborne’s own account (see letter in his life by - Moore Smith, p. 166). There were two companies each from the - 1/43rd, 1/52nd, 2/52nd, and 95th, and one from each Caçador - battalion. Jones wrongly says (p. 116) three companies of the - 52nd only, Napier (as usual) omits all mention of the Portuguese. - Cf. Harry Smith’s _Autobiography_, i. p. 55. - - [178] In Moorsom’s _History of the 52nd_ it is stated that a - sergeant of the French artillery, while in the act of throwing - a live shell, was shot dead: the shell fell back within the - parapet, and was kicked away by one of the garrison, on which it - rolled down into the gorge, was stopped by the gate, and then - exploded and blew it open (p. 152). - - [179] So Belmas, iv. p. 266. Barrié’s report says that there were - 60 infantry and 13 gunners inside altogether. It is an accurate - and very modest narrative, in which there is nothing to correct. - - [180] Mein and Woodgate of the 52nd, and Hawkesley of the 95th. - The last named died of his wounds. - -The moment that the redoubt was stormed, the French gunners in the city -and the convent of San Francisco opened a furious fire upon it, hoping -to make it untenable. But this did little harm, for Colborne withdrew -the stormers at once--and the important spot that night was no longer -the work but the ground behind it, which was left unsearched. For here, -by Wellington’s orders, a first parallel 600 yards long was opened, and -approaches to it along the top of the Teson were planned out. So little -was the digging hindered, that by dawn the trenches were everywhere -three feet deep and four broad, sites for three batteries had been -marked out, and a communication had been run from the parallel up to -the redoubt, whose rear wall was broken down into the ditch, so as to -make it easily accessible. - -It had been calculated that if the assault had failed, the redoubt -could only have been reduced by regular battering for five days--that -amount of time, therefore, was saved by the escalade. The operation -contrasts singularly with the fruitless assaults on Fort San Cristobal -at Badajoz during the summer months of the preceding year, to which -it bore a considerable similarity. The difference of results may be -attributed mainly to the superiority of the arrangements made by -Colborne, more especially to the great care that he took to keep down -the fire of the besieged by a very large body of marksmen pushed close -up to the walls, and to the way in which he had instructed each officer -in charge of a unit as to the exact task that was imposed on him. -At San Cristobal there had been much courage displayed, but little -management or intelligence in the command. - -On the morning of January 9th, the first parallel, along the front -of the Great Teson, was not so far advanced as to afford good cover, -and the working parties were kept back till dark, and employed in -perfecting the approaches from the rear: only fifty men were slipped -forward into the dismantled Redout Renaud, to improve the lodgement -there. The garrison fired fiercely all day on the parallel, but as -there was little to shoot at, very small damage was done. At noon the -1st Division relieved the Light Division at the front: for the rest of -the siege the arrangement was that each division took twenty-four hours -at the front in turn, and then returned to its camp. The order of work -was: - -Light Division 8th-9th January, 12th-13th, 16th-17th, and for the storm -on the 19th. - -1st Division 9th-10th, 13th-14th, 17th-18th. - -4th Division 10th-11th, 14th-15th, 18th-19th. - -3rd Division 11th-12th, 15th-16th, and for the storm on the 19th. - -The 1st Division had very responsible work on the second night of the -siege, for when darkness had set in the first parallel had to be made -tenable, and the three batteries in front of it developed. Owing to -the very powerful artillery of the besieged, it was settled that the -batteries were to be made of exceptional strength and thickness--with -a parapet of no less than 18 feet breadth at the top. To procure the -necessary earth it was determined that an exterior ditch should be dug -in front of them, and that their floor (_terre-plain_) should be sunk -3 feet below the level of the hillside within. A row of large gabions -was placed in front of the exterior ditch to give cover to the men -digging it. - -Great progress was made with the work under cover of the night, but -when morning came the besieged, whose fire had been at haphazard during -the night, could see the works and commenced to shoot more accurately. -A curious _contretemps_ was discovered at dawn. By some miscalculation -the locality of the left-hand battery had been laid out a little too -far to the east, so that half its front was blocked by the ruins of -the Redout Renaud. This, of course, was the effect of working in pitch -darkness, when the outline of that work was invisible even from a score -or so of yards away. Possibly the error may have originated from the -fact that, early in the night, the directing engineer officer, Captain -Ross, was killed by a flanking shot from the convent of San Francisco. -Thus the men constructing the battery had been deprived of all superior -direction. In the morning Colonel Fletcher directed that the east end -of the battery should have no guns; the five which should have been -placed there were to be transferred to the right-hand battery, which -thus became designed for sixteen guns instead of eleven[181]. - - [181] This mistake is acknowledged in Jones’s _Sieges_, - i. p. 120, and much commented on by Burgoyne [_Life and - Correspondence_, i. p. 161], who complains that an immense amount - of work was wasted, two nights’ digging put in, the _terre-plain_ - levelled, and even some platforms laid, before the error was - detected. - -On the 10th-11th January, when the 4th Division had charge of the -trenches the first parallel was nearly completed, the batteries -continued to be built up, magazine emplacements were constructed in -them, and a trench of communication between them was laid out. When -daylight revealed to the French the exact situation of the three -batteries, which were now showing quite clearly, a very fierce fire -was opened on them, the rest of the works being neglected. The losses, -which had hitherto been insignificant, began to grow heavy, and so many -men were hit in the exterior trenches, which were being dug in front of -each battery, that Wellington and Colonel Fletcher gave orders that -they should be discontinued. Heavy damage was done to the batteries -themselves--the French adopted a system of firing simultaneous flights -of shells with long fuses at given points, ‘of which several falling -together upon the parapets blew away in an instant the work of whole -hours.’ - -On the 11th-12th, with the 3rd Division in charge, the work was -continued; the platforms were placed in the batteries, and the -splinter-proof timbers laid over the magazine emplacements. But half -the exertion of the men had to be expended in repairs: as each section -of the batteries was completed, part of it was ruined by the besiegers’ -shells. ‘The nights were long and bitter cold, and the men could not -decently be kept working for twelve hours on end[182],’ especially -when it was considered that they had to march four or five miles from -their camps to the trenches before commencing their task of digging, so -that they did not arrive fresh on the ground. Reliefs were therefore -arranged to exchange duty at one hour after midnight, so that no man -was at work for more than half of the cold hours of darkness. - - [182] Burgoyne, i. p. 162. - -On the 12th-13th, with the Light Division doing its second turn at -the front, the batteries were nearly completed, despite of much -heart-breaking toil at repairs. Wellington, before starting the task -of battering, put the problem to Colonel Fletcher as to whether it -would be possible to breach the walls with the batteries in the -first parallel, or whether these would only be useful for subduing -the fire of the besieged, and the actual breaching would have to be -accomplished by another set of batteries, to be placed in a second -parallel which was, as yet, contemplated but not begun. Fletcher, -after some cogitation, replied that he thought it could be done, -though Ney, in the siege of 1810, had failed in such a project, and -had breached the walls with batteries in situations much farther -forward. Wellington’s inquiry was dictated by his doubt as to whether -Marmont and Dorsenne might not be in a position to appear with a heavy -relieving force, before a second parallel could be thrown up. There -were, as yet, no signs of such a danger; the enemy having apparently -been taken completely unawares by the opening of the siege. But if -the second parallel advanced no faster in proportion than the first, -and had to be built on much more dangerous ground, it was clear that -there was a risk of its taking an inordinate time to complete. On -Fletcher’s conclusion being made, Wellington decided that he would try -to breach the walls with his original batteries, but would push forward -a second parallel also: if Marmont and Dorsenne showed signs of rapid -concentration, he would try to storm the place before the trenches were -pressed forward to the neighbourhood of the walls. If they did not, he -would proceed in more regular style, build a second and perhaps a third -parallel, with batteries close to the _enceinte_, and end by blowing in -the counterscarp, and assaulting from close quarters. - -This resolution having been formed, Wellington ordered the second -parallel to be commenced on the night of the 13th-14th, with the 1st -Division in charge. Despite of a heavy fire from the French, who -discovered (by throwing fire-balls) that men were at work in front of -the first parallel, an approach by flying sap was pushed out, from -the extreme right end of the original trenches, down the slope which -separates the Great from the Lesser Teson, and a short length of -excavation was made on the western end of the latter height, enough to -allow of a small guard finding cover. This move brought the besiegers -very close to the fortified convent of Santa Cruz, outside the -north-western walls of the city, and lest it should give trouble during -the succeeding operations Wellington ordered it to be stormed. The -troops employed were 300 volunteers from the Line brigade of the German -Legion and one company of the 5/60th. They broke down the palisades -of the convent with axes, under a heavy fire, and as they entered the -small garrison fled with some loss. That of the stormers was 6 killed -and 1 officer and 33 men wounded[183]. Only by clearing the French out -of this post could the zig-zags leading down from the first to the -second parallel be completed without paying a heavy price in lives, -for the musketry of the convent would have enfiladed them in several -places. The same night the siege-guns, which had reached the camp on -the 11th, were moved into the three batteries. - - [183] See Schwertfeger’s _History of the German Legion_, i. p. - 353. Jones (_Sieges_, i. p. 125) is quite wrong in saying that - the convent was carried ‘with no loss.’ - -Next day (January 14-15) was a very lively one. General Barrié was -convinced that the establishment of a second parallel on the Lesser -Teson, only 200 yards from his walls, must not be allowed at any cost, -and executed a sortie with 500 men, all that he could spare from the -garrison. He (very cleverly) chose for his time the hour (11 a.m.) when -the 4th Division was relieving the workmen of the First, for, as Jones -remarks, ‘a bad custom prevailed that as soon as the division to be -relieved saw the relieving division advancing, the guards and workmen -were withdrawn from the trenches, and the works were left untenanted -for some time during the relief, which the French could observe from -the steeple of the cathedral, where there was always an officer on the -look-out.’ - -The sortie recaptured the convent of Santa Cruz, swept along the second -parallel, where it upset the gabions and shovelled in some of the -earth, and then made a dash at the first parallel, where it might have -done much mischief in the batteries if General Graham and the engineer -officer on duty had not collected a few belated workmen of the 24th -and 42nd, who made a stand behind the parapet, and opened a fire which -checked the advance till the relieving division came running up from -the rear. The French then turned and retired with little loss into the -place. - -The advanced parallel and Santa Cruz were not reoccupied while daylight -lasted, but at about 4.30 in the afternoon the three batteries opened -with the 27 guns, which had been placed in them. Two 18-pounders in the -left battery were directed against the convent of San Francisco, the -rest against the northern part of the city, on the same point where -Ney’s breach had been made in 1810. Of the gunners, 430 in number, -nearly 300 were Portuguese[184]. The fire opened so late in the day -that by the time that it was growing steady and accurate dusk fell, and -it was impossible to judge what its future effect would be. - - [184] See _Dickson Papers_, Jan. 1812. - -Meanwhile, when the big guns were silent, the work of preparing for -the nearer approach was resumed after dark. The most important move -on the night of the 14th-15th was the storming of the convent of San -Francisco by three companies of the 40th regiment. The garrison made -little resistance, and retired, abandoning three guns and two wounded -men. Immediately afterwards the posts in the neighbouring suburb were -all withdrawn by Barrié, who considered that he could not afford to -lose men from his small force in the defence of outlying works, when -his full strength was needed for the holding of the town itself. -Santa Cruz, on the other side, though recovered in the morning, was -abandoned on this same night for identical reasons. The French general -was probably wise, but it was a great profit to the besiegers to be -relieved from the flanking fire of both these convents, which would -have enfiladed the two ends of the second parallel. That work itself -was reoccupied under the cover of the night: the gabions upset during -the sortie of the morning were replaced, and much digging was done -behind them. The zig-zags of the approach from the upper trenches on -the Great Teson were deepened and improved. All this was accomplished -under a heavy fire from the guns on the northern walls, which were so -close to the second parallel that their shells, even in the dark, did -considerable damage. - -When day dawned on the 15th, the breaching batteries on the Great Teson -opened again with excellent effect. Their fire was concentrated on -the rebuilt wall of the _enceinte_, where the French breach of 1810 -had been mended. It was necessary to batter both the town wall proper -and the _fausse-braye_ below it, so as to make, as it were, an upper -and a lower breach, corresponding to each other, in the two stages of -the _enceinte_. It will be remembered that, as was explained in our -narrative of the French siege[185], the mediaeval ramparts of the old -wall showed well above the eighteenth-century _fausse-braye_ which ran -around and below them, while the latter was equally visible above the -glacis, which, owing to the downward slope from the Little Teson, gave -much less protection than was desirable to the work behind it. The -French breach had been carefully built up; but, lime being scarce in -the neighbourhood, the mortar used in its repairs had been of inferior -quality, little better than clay in many places. The stones, therefore, -had never set into a solid mass, even eighteen months after they had -been laid, and began to fly freely under the continuous battering. - - [185] See vol. iii. p. 239. The illustration of Rodrigo on the - morning after the storm, inserted to face page 186 of this - volume, shows the facts excellently. - -The breaching being so successful from the first, Wellington resolved -to hurry on his operations, though there were still no signs that -Marmont or Dorsenne was about to attempt any relief of the garrison. -Yet it was certain that they must be on the move, and every day -saved would render the prospect of their interference less imminent. -Accordingly it was settled that the second parallel should be -completed, and that, if possible, more batteries should be placed in -it, but that it was to be looked upon rather as the base from which -an assault should be delivered than as the ground from which the main -part of the breaching work was to be done. That was to be accomplished -from the original parallel on the Great Teson, and one more battery -was marked out on this hill, close to the Redout Renaud, but a little -lower down the slope, and slightly in advance of the three original -batteries. From this new structure, whose erection would have been -impossible so long as San Francisco was still held by the French, -Wellington proposed to batter a second weak point in the _enceinte_, -a mediaeval tower three hundred yards to the right of the original -breach. All the attention of the French being concentrated on the work -in the second parallel, this new battery (No. 4) was easily completed -and armed in three days, and was ready to open on its objective on -January 18th. - -Meanwhile the completion of the second parallel proved a difficult -and rather costly business. By Wellington’s special orders all the -energies of the British batteries were devoted to breaching, and no -attempt was made to subdue the fire of those parts of the _enceinte_ -which bore upon the trenches, but were far from the points selected -for assault. Hence the French, undisturbed by any return, were able -to shoot fast and furiously at the advanced works, and searched the -second parallel from end to end. It was completed on the 18th, and -two guns were brought down into a battery built on the highest point -of the Little Teson, only 180 yards from the walls. An attempt to sap -forward from the western end of the second parallel, so as to get a -lodgement a little nearer to the place, was completely foiled by the -incessant fire of grape kept up on the sap-head. After many workmen had -been killed, the endeavour to push forward at this point was abandoned, -such an advance forming no essential part of Wellington’s scheme. The -enemy’s fire on the second parallel was made somewhat less effective -on the 16th-18th by digging rifle-pits in front of the parallel, -from which picked marksmen kept up a carefully aimed fusillade on -the embrasures of the guns to left and right of the breach. Many -artillerymen were shot through the head while serving their pieces, and -the discharges became less incessant and much less accurate. But the -fire of the besieged was never subdued, and the riflemen in the pits -suffered very heavy casualties. - -The 18th may be described as the crucial day of the siege. The new -battery (No. 4) on the Greater Teson opened that morning against the -tower which had been chosen as its objective. By noon it was in a very -ruinous condition, and at dusk all its upper part fell forward ‘like -an avalanche,’ as the governor says in his report, and covered all the -platform of the _fausse-braye_ below. Barrié remarks that this point -was admirably chosen by Wellington’s engineers, ‘it was unique in the -_enceinte_ for the facilities which it offered for breaching and the -difficulties for defence. This is the spot where the walls are lowest, -the parapet thinnest, and the platforms both of the ramparts and the -_fausse-braye_ narrowest. Moreover here had been situated the gun which -best flanked the original great breach[186].’ - - [186] See Barrié’s report in appendix to Belmas, iv. p. 299. - -The garrison found it impossible either to repair the breaches or to -clear away the débris which had fallen from them. All that could be -done was to commence retrenchments and inner defences behind them. -This was done with some effect at the great breach, where cuts were -made in the ramparts on each side of the demolished section, parapets -thrown up behind the cuts, and two 24-pounders dragged into position to -fire laterally into the lip of the easy slope of débris which trended -up to the ruined wall. At the second or smaller breach much less was -accomplished--the warning was short, for it had never been guessed that -this tower was to be battered, and the space upon which work could be -done was very limited. It was hoped that the narrowness of the gap -might be its protection--it was but a seam in the wall compared with -the gaping void at the first and greater breach. - -[Illustration: CIUDAD RODRIGO] - -On the morning of the 19th the fire was recommenced, with some little -assistance from the two guns which had now begun to work from the -advanced battery in the second parallel. The breaches continued to -crumble: that at the tower looked as easy in slope (though not nearly -so broad) as that at the original point of attack, and an incessant -fire all day kept the enemy from making any repairs. No more could be -done for the breaches, wherefore Wellington ordered that some of the -siege-guns should turn their attention to silencing the French fire -from the remoter points of the northern wall. Several of their guns -were dismounted: but even by dusk there were many still making reply. - -There was now nothing to prevent the assault from being delivered, -since it had been settled that no attempt was to be made to sap up -nearer the walls, or to blow in the counterscarp. Wellington wrote his -elaborate directions for the storm sitting under cover in a trench of -one of the advanced approaches, to which he had descended in order to -get the closest possible view of the fortress[187]. - - [187] Jones’s _Sieges_, i. p. 137. - -The orders were as follows. The chosen time was seven o’clock, an hour -sufficiently dark to allow the troops to get forward without being seen -as they filled the trenches, yet soon enough after nightfall to prevent -the French from doing any appreciable repairs to the breaches under -cover of the dark. - -The main assaults were to be delivered by the 3rd Division on the great -breach, and by the Light Division on the lesser breach. There were also -to be two false attacks delivered by small bodies of Portuguese troops, -with the purpose of distracting the attention of the besieged to points -remote from the main assault: either of them might be turned into -serious attempts at escalade if the circumstances favoured. - -The two brigades of the 3rd Division were given two separate ways of -approaching the main breach. Campbell’s brigade [2/5th, 77th, 2/83rd, -94th], after detaching the 2/83rd to line the second parallel, and -to keep up a continual fire on the walls, was to assemble behind the -ruined convent of Santa Cruz. Debouching from thence, the 2/5th, -turning to the right, were to make for the place where the counterscarp -(covering the whole north front) joined with the body of the place, -under the castle and not far from the river. They were to hew down the -gate by which the ditch was entered, jump down into it, and from thence -scale the _fausse-braye_ by ladders, of which a dozen, 25 feet long, -were issued to them. It was probable that there would be few French -found here, as the point was 500 yards west of the main breach. After -establishing themselves upon the _fausse-braye_, they were to scour it -eastward, clearing off any parties of the enemy that might be found -upon it, and to push for the breach, where they would meet the main -assaulting column. The 94th were to make a similar dash at the ditch, -half-way between the point allotted to the 5th and the breach, but not -to mount the _fausse-braye_: they were to move to their left along the -bottom of the ditch, clearing away any palisades or other obstacles -that might be found in it, and finally to join the main column. The -77th was to form the brigade-reserve, and support where necessary. - -Mackinnon’s brigade was to undertake the frontal storm of the great -breach. Its three battalions (1/45th, 74th, 1/88th) were to be preceded -by a detachment of 180 sappers carrying hay-bags, which were to be -thrown into the ditch to make the leap down more easy. The head of the -column was to be formed by 300 volunteers from all the battalions, then -came the main body in their usual brigade order, the 1/45th leading. -Power’s Portuguese (9th and 21st Line) formed the divisional reserve, -and were to be brought down to the second parallel when Mackinnon’s -column had ascended the breach. - -A support on the left flank of the breach was to be provided by three -companies of the 95th, detached from the Light Division, who, starting -from beside the convent of San Francisco, were to carry out the same -functions that were assigned to the 94th on the other side, viz. to -descend into the ditch half-way between the two breaches, and proceed -along its bottom, removing any obstacles found, till they joined -Mackinnon’s brigade at the foot of the wall. - -Craufurd, with the rest of the Light Division, which was to move -from the left of San Francisco, was to make the attack on the -lesser breach. The storming-column was to be formed of Vandeleur’s -brigade (1/52nd and 2/52nd, four companies of the 1/95th, and the 3rd -Caçadores). Barnard’s brigade was to form the reserve, and to close in -towards the place when the leading brigade should reach the ditch. The -division was to detach marksmen (four companies of the 95th) who were -to keep up a fire upon the enemy on the walls, just as the 2/83rd did -for the 3rd Division. A provision of hay-bags carried by caçadores was -made, in the same fashion as at the great breach. - -The two subsidiary false attacks were to be made--one by Pack’s -Portuguese (1st and 16th regiments) on the outworks of the gate of -Santiago on the south-east side of the town, the other by O’Toole’s -Portuguese battalion (2nd Caçadores), headed by the light company of -the 2/83rd, on the outwork below the castle, close to the bank of the -Agueda. This column would have to rush the bridge, which the French had -left unbroken, because it was completely commanded by the castle and -other works immediately above it. Both the Portuguese columns carried -ladders, and were authorized to attempt an escalade, if they met little -or no resistance at points so remote from the breaches, as was quite -possible. - -Both the Light and 3rd Divisions were fresh troops that night, as -the 4th Division had been in charge of the trenches on the 19th. -The stormers marched straight up from their distant camps to the -starting-points assigned to them in the afternoon. The news that the -Light Division had moved to the front out of its turn was the clearest -indication to the whole army that the assault was fixed for that night. - -A few minutes before seven o’clock the storm began, by the sudden rush -of the 2/5th, under Major Ridge, from behind the convent of Santa -Cruz, across the open ground towards the ditch on their left of the -castle. The governor had expected no attack from this side, the troops -on the walls were few, and it was only under a very scattering fire -that the battalion hewed down the gate in the palisades, got down into -the ditch, and then planted their ladders against the _fausse-braye_. -They were established upon it within five minutes of their start, and -then, turning to their left, drove along its platform, chasing before -them a few small parties of the enemy. In this way they soon arrived -at the heap of ruins representing the spot where _fausse-braye_ and -inner wall had been wellnigh battered into one common mass of débris. -Here they found the 94th, who had entered the ditch at the same time -as themselves, but a little to their left, and had met with equally -feeble resistance, already beginning to mount the lower slopes of the -breach. Thus by a curious chance these two subsidiary columns arrived -at the crucial point a little before the forlorn hope of the main -storming-column. Mackinnon’s brigade, starting from the parallels, had -to climb over the parapets of the trenches, and to cross rougher ground -than the 5th and 94th: they were also hindered by the tremendous fire -opened upon them: all the attention of the French had been concentrated -on them from the first, as their route and their destination were -obvious. Hence, unlike Campbell’s battalions, they suffered heavily -before they crossed the glacis, and they were delayed a little by -waiting for the hay-bags which were to help their descent. When the -storming-party, under Major Manners of the 74th, reached the breach, -it was already covered by men of the 5th and 94th. The whole, mixed -together, scrambled up the higher part of the débris under a deadly -fire, and reached the lip of the breach, where they found before them -a sixteen-foot drop into the level of the city, on to ground covered -with entanglements, beams, _chevaux de frise_, and other obstacles -accumulated there by the prescience of the governor. On each flank, for -the whole breadth of the wall, was a cutting, surmounted by a parapet, -on which was mounted a 24-pounder firing grape downwards on to them. - -The head of the column had scarcely gained the lip of the breach when -it was raked by the simultaneous discharge of these two guns, which -absolutely exterminated the knot of men at its head. At the same time -an explosion took place lower down, from some powder-bags which the -enemy had left among the débris and fired by means of a train. The -impetus of the column was checked, and it was some little time before -more men fought their way up to the summit: a second discharge from the -two flanking guns made havoc of these, and shut in by the cuts, upon a -space of about 100 feet wide, with the impracticable descent into the -town in front, the assailants came to a stand again. The only way out -of the difficulty was to cross the cuts, and storm the parapets behind -them. This was done at both ends: on the one side a small party of the -88th, throwing down their muskets, so as to have hands to climb with, -scrambled over the gap and slew with their bayonets the gunners at the -left-hand gun, before they could fire a third round: they were followed -by many men of the 5th, and a footing was gained on the ramparts behind -the obstacle[188]. On the right flank Major Wylde, the brigade-major of -Mackinnon’s brigade, found a few planks which the French had been using -to bridge the cut before the storm, and which they had thrown down but -neglected to remove. These were relaid in haste, and a mass of men -of the 45th rushed across them under a dreadful fire, and forced the -right-hand retrenchment. The garrison, giving way at both ends, fired a -mine prepared under a postern of the upper wall as they retired[189]. -This produced an explosion much more deadly than the one at the -commencement of the storm; it slew among others General Mackinnon, the -senior brigadier of the 3rd Division, whose body was found thrown some -distance away and much blackened with powder. - - [188] For a lively account of this exploit see Grattan’s _With - the Connaught Rangers_, p. 154. - - [189] Many narratives speak of General Mackinnon as being killed - by the first explosion, and others (including Wellington’s - dispatch) call the second explosion that of an expense magazine - fired by accident. Barrié’s report, however, settles the fact - that it was a regular mine: and for Mackinnon’s death _after_ the - storming of the cuts I follow the narrative by an eye-witness - appended at the end of the general’s diary. - -Meanwhile, even before the fighting at the great breach was over, the -fate of Ciudad Rodrigo had been settled at another point. The storm -of the lesser breach by the Light Division had been successful, after -a shorter fight and with much less loss of blood. Vandeleur’s brigade -here conducted the assault, headed by 300 volunteers from the three -British regiments of the division under Major George Napier of the -52nd: Lieutenant Gurwood of the same regiment had the forlorn hope of -25 men. The column did not come under fire for some time after leaving -cover, but the assault had been expected, and a keen watch was being -kept. Nevertheless the ditch was reached without any great loss, and -the stormers leaped in, unaided for the most part by the hay-bags which -150 of Elder’s caçadores were to have cast down for them, for the -greater part of the Portuguese were late in arriving[190]. They then -began to plant their ladders, but the forlorn hope went wrong in an -odd way, for moving too far to the left along the _fausse-braye_ they -scrambled up and over a traverse[191] which had been built across it, -so finding themselves still on the same level. The head of the main -storming party was better directed, and poured up the breach, which -was very narrow but clean and clear: the only obstacle at its head -was a disabled gun placed horizontally across the gap. Another piece, -still in working order, had a diagonal view of the whole slope. The -first discharge of this gun, crammed with grape, shattered the head of -the column: Major Napier was dashed down with a mangled arm, Colonel -Colborne, who was leading the 52nd, got a ball in the shoulder, and -several other officers fell. At about the same moment General Craufurd, -who was standing on the glacis above the ditch, directing the movements -of the supports, received a bullet which passed through his arm, broke -two ribs, and finally lodged in his spine. By his mortal hurt and the -almost simultaneous wounding of his senior brigadier, Vandeleur, the -command of the Light Division passed to Andrew Barnard of the 95th, who -was leading the rear brigade. - - [190] Several narrators accuse them of shirking, but Geo. Napier - writes (_Life_, p. 215), ‘Neither Elder nor his excellent - regiment were likely to neglect any duty, and I am sure the blame - rested elsewhere, for George Elder was always ready for any - service.’ Compare George Simmons’s autobiography--possibly he - put things out by ordering the Portuguese company to carry the - ladders, which he clearly was not authorized to do. [_A British - Rifleman_, p. 221.] - - [191] Some narrators say a low ravelin, but the best authority is - in favour of its having been a traverse. - -But the division had been started on its way up the breach, and the -gun on its flank got no second opportunity to fire. After its first -discharge the survivors at the head of the column, now led by Uniacke -and W. Johnston both of the 95th, dashed furiously up the remaining -few feet of débris and reached the summit. The voltigeurs facing them -broke before the onset, and since there were here no traverses or cuts -to prevent the extension of the troops to right or left as they reached -their goal, many hundreds were soon in possession of the ramparts -on each side of the breach. The men of the 52nd wheeled to the left -and swept the ramparts as far as the Salamanca gate, which they found -walled up: the 43rd and Rifles turned to the right, and came upon the -French retreating from the great breach, where the 3rd Division were -just bursting through. Some of them arrived just in time to suffer -from the final explosion which killed Mackinnon and so many of his -brigade[192]. - - [192] The point has often been raised as to whether it was not - the success of the Light Division at the lesser breach which - enabled the 3rd Division to break through at the greater. Some - Light Division diarists (e.g. Harry Smith) actually state that - it was their attack on the rear of the defenders which made them - flinch from a position which they had hitherto maintained. I - think that the case is decided in favour of the 3rd Division by - Belmas’s statement that the French fired the mine at the great - breach only when the 3rd Division had got through, combined with - the fact that the leading men of the Light Division reached - the back of the great breach just in time to suffer from the - explosion, which killed Captain Uniacke of the 95th and a few - others. Apparently, therefore, the breach was forced before the - head of the Light Division stormers had come up, but only just - before. - -With their line forced in two places simultaneously, the garrison could -do no more: there was a little fighting in the streets, but not much. -The majority of the garrison retired to the Plaza Mayor in front of the -castle, and there laid down their arms in mass. At the same time the -two Portuguese subsidiary attacks had succeeded. O’Toole’s caçadores, -headed by the light company of the 2/83rd, had not only captured by -escalade the outwork against which they were directed, but found and -hewed down its sally-port by which they got entrance into the town. -Pack’s brigade, on the other side of the place, stormed the redan in -front of the Santiago gate, and lodged themselves therein, capturing -its small garrison. The governor and his staff had taken refuge in -the castle, a mediaeval building with a lofty square tower commanding -the Agueda bridge. They had hardly any men with them, and wisely -surrendered at the first summons[193]. - - [193] There is considerable controversy as to what officer - received Barrié’s surrender. For the Gurwood-Mackie dispute see - note in Appendix. - -Seven thousand excited and victorious soldiers, with all traces of -regimental organization lost, were now scattered through the streets -of Ciudad Rodrigo. This was the first time on which the Peninsular -Army had taken a place by assault, and the consequent confusion does -not seem to have been foreseen by any one. But while the officers -and the steady men were busy in collecting the French prisoners, -throwing open the gates, and seeing to the transport of the wounded -into houses, the baser spirits--and in every battalion, as Sir John -Colborne remarks[194], there were in those days from fifty to a -hundred incorrigibles--turned to plunder. The first rush was to the -central brandy-store of the garrison, where hundreds got drunk in a -few minutes, and several killed themselves by gorging raw spirits -wholesale. But while the mere drunkards proceeded to swill, and -then turned out into the streets firing objectlessly in the air, -the calculating rascals set themselves to the plunder of private -houses, which was a more profitable task than rummaging the French -magazines. There was an immense amount of unlicensed pillage and -wanton destruction of property--inexcusable in a place where only a -small minority of the people were _Afrancesados_, and the majority -had been getting ready to welcome their deliverers. The officers did -their best to restore order, ‘the voice of Sir Thomas Picton was -heard with the strength of twenty trumpets proclaiming damnation -to all and sundry, while Colonels Barnard and Cameron with other -active officers, seized the broken barrels of muskets, which were -lying about in great abundance, and belaboured misdemeanants most -unmercifully[195].’ But active officers could not be everywhere--three -houses, including the spirit store in the great square, were set on -fire by drunken plunderers, and it was feared that a conflagration -might arise, which fortunately did not happen, for the solid stone -structures were not easily kindled. The disorder, however, did not -reach the shameful pitch which was afterwards seen at Badajoz and St. -Sebastian. A competent observer, present at all three sacks, remarks -that ‘no town taken by assault suffered less than Rodrigo. It is true -that soldiers of all regiments got drunk, pillaged, and made great -noise and confusion in streets and houses, despite of every exertion of -their officers to prevent it. But bad and revolting as such scenes are, -I never heard that either the French garrison, after its surrender, -or the inhabitants suffered personal indignities or cruelty from the -troops[196].’ There were apparently no lives lost, except those of a -few men shot accidentally by their drunken comrades, and of certain -drunkards who perished in the spirit store. The greater part of the -men were under control long before dawn, and were collected by their -officers on the ramparts: they marched out next morning, when the 5th -Division, newly arrived at the front from its distant cantonments in -Beira, came into the town. By an unfortunate accident an explosion -of an unsuspected magazine took place, just as the French prisoners -were being marched out, and some of them and of their escort were -killed[197]. The storming regiments made a strange spectacle as they -left the town. ‘As we marched over the bridge dressed in all varieties -imaginable, some with jack-boots on, others with white French trousers, -others in frock-coats with epaulettes, some even with monkeys on their -shoulders, we met the 5th Division on their way to repair the breaches. -They immediately formed upon the left of the road, presented arms, and -cheered us. I was afterwards told that Lord Wellington, who saw us -pass, inquired of his staff, “Who the devil are _those_ fellows[198]?”’ - - [194] See his _Life and Letters_, p. 396. - - [195] Kincaid, _Adventures in the Rifle Brigade_, p. 117. - - [196] Leach’s _Sketches in the Life of an Old Soldier_, p. 250. - For an amusing story about a plundering Connaught Ranger who came - down a chimney, see Grattan, p. 162. He tried to propitiate the - officer who found him by presenting him with a case of surgical - instruments. Kincaid speaks of worse than plunder--armed violence - and some cases of rape. - - [197] So Napier and most other authorities. John Jones, however, - says that the explosion was not accidental, but deliberate--some - English deserters had hidden themselves in a small magazine - under the rampart. ‘These desperate men, on seeing an officer - approach, deeming discovery and capture inevitable, and assured - that an ignominious death would follow, blew themselves up in - the magazine. The explosion first found vent through the door, - and shot the refugees up into the street, some alive, but so - mutilated, blackened, and distorted, as to be painful to behold.’ - - [198] Costello (a Light Division narrator), pp. 151-2. - -The garrison, out of a little under 2,000 men present when the siege -began, showed 60 officers and 1,300 rank and file of unwounded -prisoners. Eight officers had been killed, 21 wounded, and about 500 -rank and file, mostly on the day of the assault. The artillery and -engineers suffered most--of 8 artillery officers in the place 5 were -killed or wounded, of three engineer officers two fell. - -The British and Portuguese loss during the whole siege was 9 officers -killed and 70 wounded, and of other ranks 186 were killed and 846 -wounded, with 10 missing--apparently deserters. Of these, 59 officers -and 503 rank and file fell in the actual storm. The tables appended at -the end of this volume demonstrate that the 3rd Division suffered far -more heavily than the Light--the battalions with the greatest losses -were the 2/5th and 94th, which were early on the great breach and got -the benefit of the explosion. Of the 9 officers killed or mortally hurt -two were generals, Craufurd and Mackinnon. The death of the former, -who lingered in great agony for four days, though shot through to the -spine, was no small event in the war: his talents were sadly missed in -its latter years: an outpost officer of his capacity would have been -invaluable to Wellington during the fighting in the Pyrenees in 1813, -when the Light Division, though regimentally as good as ever, much -lacked the skilful leading of its old chief. He was a man with many -friends and many enemies: of his merits and defects I spoke at length -in another place[199]. Here I feel compelled to quote nothing more than -the words of his friend, Lord Londonderry--the Charles Stewart of the -Peninsular War. ‘He was an officer of whom the highest expectation had -been formed, and who on every occasion found an opportunity to prove -that, had his life been spared, the proudest hopes of his country -would not have been disappointed, and he was a man to know whom in -his profession without admiring him was impossible. To me his death -occasioned that void which the removal of a sincere friend alone -produces. While the memory of the brave and the skilful shall continue -to be cherished by British soldiers, he will not be forgotten, and the -hand which scrawls this humble tribute to his worth must be cold as his -own, before the mind which dictates it shall cease to think of him with -affection and regret[200].’ - - [199] See vol. iii. pp. 233-7. - - [200] Londonderry’s _Peninsular War_, ii. p. 268. - -[Illustration: CIUDAD RODRIGO ON THE MORNING AFTER THE STORM FROM THE -ADVANCED BATTERY ON THE LESSER TESON - -(A contemporary sketch.)] - - - - -SECTION XXXII: CHAPTER II - -THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE FALL OF CIUDAD RODRIGO - - -The extraordinary speed with which Wellington had in twelve days -reduced Ciudad Rodrigo, a fortress that had held out for twenty-four -days of open trenches when besieged by Ney in 1810, surprised the -captor himself, who had reckoned on taking no shorter time in its -leaguer than had the French. But it absolutely appalled his two -adversaries, Marmont and Dorsenne, whose whole scheme of operations had -rested on the idea that they could count on some three weeks or more -for preparation, when the news that the place was invested got to their -hands. - -Thiébault, the governor of Salamanca, had been warning both the -commander of the Army of the North and the commander of the Army of -Portugal for some weeks that Wellington might move at any moment[201]. -But his reports to the effect that the British were making gabions -and fascines, preparing a bridge over the Agueda, and bringing up -siege-guns to Almeida, made little or no impression on his superiors, -because they had come to the conclusion that it was unlikely that -Wellington would undertake a siege at midwinter. His preparations, they -thought, were probably intended to force his enemies to concentrate, at -a time when roads were bad and food unprocurable: ‘ils n’ont d’autre -but que de nous faire faire de faux mouvements,’ said one of Marmont’s -aides-de-camp. It was only in the spring that the allied army would -become really enterprising and dangerous. - - [201] See Thiébault’s _Mémoires_, iv. pp. 551-2. Extracts from - two of his letters are printed in Marmont’s _Mémoires_, iv. pp. - 280-1, and bear out all that he says in his own book. - -Astonishing as it may appear, though Wellington’s troops started on -January 2nd, and though Rodrigo was invested and the Redout Renaud -stormed on January 8th, the definitive news that the siege had -actually begun only reached Salamanca on January 13th. No better proof -could be given of the precarious nature of the French hold on the -kingdom of Leon. The fact was that the guerrilleros of Julian Sanchez -so obsessed all the roads from Salamanca to Rodrigo, that no messenger -could pass without a very large escort. Barrié only got the news that -he was attacked to Thiébault by entrusting it to a Spanish emissary, -who carried his note in disguise, and by a long détour. Marmont and -Dorsenne only received it on the 14th: King Joseph at Madrid only on -the 25th. On the 13th Marmont was in such a state of blindness as to -the actual situation that he was writing to Berthier that ‘si l’armée -anglaise passait l’Agueda j’attendrais sur la Tormès la division du -Tage et les troupes que le Général Dorsenne pourrait m’amener, _mais -sans doute ce cas n’arrivera pas_. Ciudad Rodrigo sera approvisionné -jusqu’à la récolte, et à moins d’un siège il ne doit pas être l’objet -d’aucune sollicitude[202].’ Wellington, when this was written, had -already passed troops over the Agueda some ten days back, and had been -beleaguering Ciudad Rodrigo for five. Yet Marmont was dating from -Valladolid, which was not much over 100 miles from the hard-pressed -fortress. Truly, thanks to the guerrilleros, the ‘fog of war’ was lying -heavily round the Marshal. - - [202] Marmont to Berthier, Valladolid, Jan. 13, 1812. - -Owing to a circumstance of which Wellington could have no knowledge, -the moment which he chose for his advance was even more propitious than -he guessed. He knew of the march of Montbrun towards Valencia, and had -made it the determining factor in his operations. But he was not, and -could not be, aware of another fact of high importance. On December -29th Marmont, then at Talavera, had received a dispatch from Paris, -dated on the 13th of the same month, informing him that the Emperor -had resolved on making a sweeping change with regard to the respective -duties and stations of the Armies of the North and of Portugal. -Hitherto Dorsenne had been in charge of the whole kingdom of Leon: the -troops stationed in it belonged to his army, and on him depended the -garrisons of Ciudad Rodrigo, Astorga, and its other fortresses. He was, -therefore, responsible for the keeping back of Wellington from all the -ground north of the Sierra de Gata. Marmont, with his Army of Portugal, -had to ‘contain’ the Anglo-Portuguese army south of that range, and had -charge of the valley of the Tagus--northern Estremadura and those parts -of New Castile which had been taken away from King Joseph’s direct -control. From this central position the Duke of Ragusa had hitherto -been supposed to be able to stretch out a hand to Dorsenne, in case of -Wellington’s making a move in the valley of the Douro, to Soult in case -of his showing himself opposite Badajoz. This indeed Marmont had done: -he had brought up his army to Dorsenne’s aid in September, at the time -of El Bodon and Aldea da Ponte: he had carried it down to the Guadiana -and assisted Soult to relieve Badajoz in June. - -Berthier’s dispatch[203], received on December 29th--it had taken -sixteen days to reach its destination--informed Marmont that the -Emperor had resolved to place the task of ‘containing’ Wellington, when -he should operate north of the Tagus, in the hands of one instead of -two commanders-in-chief. ‘Considering the importance of placing the -command on the whole frontier of Portugal under a single general, His -Majesty has decided that the provinces of Avila, Salamanca, Plasencia, -Ciudad Rodrigo, the kingdom of Leon, Palencia, and the Asturias, shall -belong to the Army of Portugal.’ Along with them were to be handed -over to Marmont Souham’s division, then lying in the direction of -Zamora, Benavente, and La Baneza, and Bonnet’s division, then in the -Asturias--whose central parts (as it will be remembered[204]) that -general had reconquered in November 1811. The district of the Army of -the North was for the future to be limited to the eastern parts of -Old Castile, Santander, Biscay, and Navarre. The real cause of this -change, though Berthier’s dispatch lays no stress upon it, was the -order recently sent to Dorsenne, which bade him return to France the -two strong divisions of the Imperial Guard, which had hitherto formed -the most important and effective section of the Army of the North. They -were wanted for the probable Russian war, and without them Napoleon -rightly judged that Dorsenne would be too weak to ‘contain’ Wellington, -hold down all Leon, and observe the Galicians, in addition to hunting -Mina and curbing the incursions of Longa and Porlier. Wherefore he -resolved to confine the activity of the Army of the North to the lands -east and north of Burgos, where its main task would be the crushing of -Mina and his compatriots. Marmont should take upon his shoulders the -entire responsibility for holding back the Anglo-Portuguese. - - [203] Printed in full in Marmont’s _Mémoires_, iv. pp. 271-6. - - [204] See vol. iv. p. 586. - -But, by the Emperor’s orders, the Army of Portugal, though now charged -with a much heavier task than before, was not to get any appreciable -increase in numbers. It is true that Marmont was to take over the -divisions of Souham and Bonnet, along with the regions that they were -occupying. These were strong units, and would have increased his -total strength by 16,000 men. But at the same time he was told that -Thiébault’s division[205], the other force in the kingdom of Leon, was -not to be given him, but to be withdrawn eastward and to remain under -Dorsenne. With it were to go other details belonging to the Army of -the North, employed in garrison duty in the valley of the Douro, such -as the Swiss battalions long garrisoning the city of Leon, Benavente, -and Valladolid[206]. Now it was clear that if these garrisons were -withdrawn, Marmont would have to find other troops from his own -divisions to replace them. Moreover, he was in addition instructed that -Bonnet’s division, though now to be regarded as under his command, was -not on any excuse to be moved out of the Asturias. ‘It is indispensable -that he should remain there, because in that position he menaces -Galicia, and keeps down the people of the mountains. You would have to -use more troops to guard all the edge of the plain from Leon to St. -Sebastian than are required for the Asturias. It is demonstrable in -theory, and clearly proved by experience, that of all operations the -most important is the occupation of the Asturias, which makes the right -of the army rest upon the sea, and continually threatens Galicia.’ - - [205] 34th Léger, 113th Line, 4th Vistula, Neuchâtel. - - [206] Also two cavalry regiments, the 1st Hussars and 31st - Chasseurs. - -If, therefore, Marmont was forbidden to use Bonnet, and had to replace -all the existing garrisons of Leon (including that of Ciudad Rodrigo, -as he was specially informed) by troops drawn from his own force, he -was given a vast increase of territory to watch, but no appreciable -increase of numbers to hold it--no more in fact than the difference -between the strength of Souham’s division (placed on the side of gain) -and that of the new garrisons (placed on the side of loss). The net -profit would be no more than 3,000 or 4,000 men at the most. - -In addition the Marshal was restricted further as to the way in which -he was to dispose of his army. He was told to leave one division (or, -if he chose, two) in the valley of the Tagus, about Plasencia and -Almaraz, for the purpose of keeping up his communication with Madrid -and Andalusia. The rest of his army was to be moved across the Sierra -de Gata into the valley of the Douro, and its head-quarters were to -be placed at Valladolid, or if possible at Salamanca. Therefore, -if Wellington advanced, only four and a half, or five and a half, -divisions out of the eight now comprising the Army of Portugal, could -be concentrated against him with promptitude: Bonnet and the troops -left in the Tagus valley would be long in arriving. So would the -nearest divisions of the Army of the North, of which the most westerly -would be as far off as Burgos, the rest still farther towards the -Pyrenees. Till he had received some of these outlying succours, Marmont -would be too weak to resist Wellington. Five divisions (say 30,000 men) -could not keep the Anglo-Portuguese contained--though eight might very -possibly suffice. - -But on December 29, 1811, Marmont had not eight divisions at his -disposition. The Emperor’s misguided order for the Valencian expedition -was in progress of being executed, and it was precisely on that same -day that Montbrun with two divisions of foot and one of horse was -marching off eastward from La Mancha, in an excentric direction, which -took him to the shore of the Mediterranean. - -Marmont’s available force, after this march began, was as follows: - - (1) Souham’s division at La Baneza, Benavente, and Zamora, - watching Abadia’s Army of Galicia. This unit had yet to be - informed that it had become part of the Army of Portugal. - - (2-3) Brennier’s and Maucune’s divisions at Almaraz and Talavera - in the valley of the Tagus. - - (4) Clausel’s division at Avila. - - (5) Ferey’s division in La Mancha, keeping up communication with - Montbrun’s expeditionary column. - -The other three divisions of the Army of Portugal, as now constituted, -those of Bonnet in the Asturias, and of Foy and Sarrut in march for -Valencia, were hopelessly out of reach. - -Being directed, in very clear and decisive terms, to transfer himself -in person to Valladolid or Salamanca, and to move the bulk of his -troops thither from the valley of the Tagus, the Marshal had to obey. -He directed Brennier’s division alone to remain behind at Almaraz and -Talavera. Maucune and Clausel, with Ferey presently to follow, began -a toilsome march across the mountains to Leon. They had to abandon -the magazines (such as they were) which had been collected for their -subsistence in winter-quarters, and to march across bad roads, in the -most inclement month of the year, through an unpeopled country, for -cantonments where no stores were ready for them. - -While Marmont was marching up in the early days of January to occupy -his newly-designated positions, Dorsenne was employed in withdrawing -his troops eastward, away from the neighbourhood of Wellington, towards -the province of Burgos. He himself stopped behind at Valladolid, to see -Marmont and hand over in person the charge of the districts which he -was ordered to evacuate. His view of the situation at the moment may -be judged by an extract from a letter which he directed to Marmont on -January 5[207]. - - [207] Marmont, _Correspondance_, book xv _bis_, p. 287. - -‘I have the honour to enclose herewith two letters dated on the 1st and -3rd instant from General Thiébault at Salamanca. I attach no credence -to their contents, for during the last six months I have been receiving -perpetually similar reports.... If, contrary to my opinion, the English -have really made some tentative movements on Ciudad Rodrigo, and if -Julian Sanchez has tried to cut our communication with that place, I -can only attribute it to your recent movement on Valencia. In that -case, the unforeseen reappearance of your Excellency here may make the -enemy change his plan of operations, and may prove harmful to him.’ - -Thiébault had cried ‘Wolf!’ too often to please Dorsenne, and the -latter had no real apprehension that Wellington was already on the -move. No more had Marmont. On arriving at Valladolid on January 13th -he wrote to Berthier (five days after the trenches were opened at -Rodrigo!), ‘It is probable that the English may be on the move at the -end of February, and then I shall have need of all my troops: I have, -therefore, told Montbrun to start on his backward march towards me -before the end of January[208].’ By the end of January Rodrigo had -already been for twelve days in the hands of the British army. - - [208] Ibid., p. 291. - -And if Dorsenne and Marmont were blind to the actual situation, so, -most of all, was their master. The dispatch which gave over the charge -of the kingdom of Leon to Marmont contains the following paragraph: - -‘If General Wellington (_sic_) after the rainy season is over (i. -e. after February) should determine to take the offensive, you -can then unite all your eight divisions for a battle: General -Dorsenne from Burgos would support you, by marching up from Burgos -to your assistance. But such a move is not to be expected (_n’est -pas présumable_). The English, having suffered heavy losses, and -experiencing great difficulties in recruiting their army, all -considerations tend to make us suppose that they will simply confine -themselves to the defence of Portugal.... Your various dispatches -seem to prove that it is at present no longer possible for us to take -the offensive against Portugal, Badajoz being barely provisioned, and -Salamanca having no magazines. It is necessary, therefore, to wait till -the crops of the present year are ripe [June!], and till the clouds -which now darken the political situation to the North have disappeared. -His Majesty has no doubt that you will profit by the delay, to organize -and administer the provinces under your control with justice and -integrity, and to form large magazines.... The conquest of Portugal and -the immortal glory of defeating the English are reserved for you. Use -therefore all possible means to get yourselves into good condition for -commencing this campaign, when circumstances permit that the order for -it should be given.... Suggestions have been made that Ciudad Rodrigo -should be dismantled. The Emperor considers that this would be a great -mistake: the enemy, establishing himself in that position, would be -able to intercept the communications between Salamanca and Plasencia, -and that would be deplorable. The English know quite well that if they -press in upon Rodrigo, or invest it, they expose themselves to be -forced to deliver a battle--that is the last thing they want: however, -if they did so expose themselves, it would be your duty to assemble -your whole army and march straight at them[209].’ - - [209] Berthier to Marmont, Dec. 13, as above. - -Such being Napoleon’s views at midwinter, it is strange to find -Napier asserting that the disasters of the French at this time were -caused partly by the jealousies of his lieutenants, partly by their -failing to understand his orders in their true spirit, so that they -neglected them, or executed them without vigour[210]. Without denying -that Marmont, Dorsenne, and Soult were jealous of each other, we may -assert that the real fundamental origin of all their disasters was that -their master persisted in directing the details of the war from Paris, -founding his orders on data three weeks old, and sending those orders -to arrive another fortnight or three weeks after they had been written. -As a fair example of what was perpetually happening we may cite the -following dates. Wellington started to move on January 1st, 1812, as -Thiébault wrote to Dorsenne (on the report of a Spanish spy) on January -3rd: on January 27 the general information that the Anglo-Portuguese -army had crossed the Agueda, without any details, reached the Emperor, -and caused him to dictate a dispatch for Dorsenne, giving him leave to -detain the two divisions of the Imperial Guard under orders for France, -and to support Marmont with them: the Emperor added that he hoped that -by January 18th Montbrun would be nearing Madrid, and that by the end -of the month his column would have joined the Army of Portugal. Eight -days _before_ this dispatch was written Ciudad Rodrigo was already in -Wellington’s hands: the news of its fall on January 19th seems to have -reached Paris on February 11th[211], whereupon, as we shall presently -see, the Emperor dictated another dispatch to Marmont, giving elaborate -instructions on the new condition of affairs. This (travelling quicker -than most correspondence) reached Marmont at Valladolid on February -26[212]: but of what use to the Marshal on that day were orders -dictated upon the basis of the state of affairs in Leon on January -19th? ‘On ne dirige pas la guerre à trois ou quatre cents lieues de -distance,’ as Thiébault very truly observed[213]. - - [210] _Peninsular War_, iv. p. 134. - - [211] Correspondence in King Joseph’s _Letters_, viii. pp. 306-7. - - [212] See Marmont’s letter acknowledging its receipt in his - _Correspondance_, iv. pp. 342-3. - - [213] _Mémoires_, iv. p. 554. - -It was precisely Napoleon’s determination to dictate such operations -as Montbrun’s Alicante expedition, or the transference of Marmont’s -head-quarters from the valley of the Tagus to Valladolid, without any -possible knowledge of the circumstances of his lieutenants at the -moment when his orders would come to hand, that was the fatal thing. -With wireless telegraphy in the modern style he might have received -prompt intelligence, and sent directions that suited the situation. But -under the conditions of Spain in 1812 such a system was pure madness. - -‘The Emperor chose,’ as Marmont very truly observes, ‘to cut down -the numbers of his troops in Spain [by withdrawing the Guards and -Poles] and to order a grand movement which dislocated them for a time, -precisely at the instant when he had increased the dispersion of -the Army of Portugal, by sending a detachment of 12,000 men against -Valencia. He was undoubtedly aware that the English army was cantoned -in a fairly concentrated position on the Agueda, the Coa, and the -Mondego. But he had made up his mind--I cannot make out why--that the -English were not in a condition to take the field: in every dispatch -he repeated this statement.’ In fairness to his master, Marmont should -have added that he was of the same opinion himself, that Dorsenne -shared it, and that both of them agreed to treat the Cassandra-like -prophecies which Thiébault kept sending from Salamanca as ‘wild and -whirling words.’ - -Marmont reached Valladolid, marching ahead of the divisions of Clausel -and Maucune, on the 11th or 12th of January. He found Dorsenne waiting -for him, and they proceeded to concert measures for the exchange of -territory and troops which the Emperor had imposed upon them. After -dinner on the evening of the 14th arrived Thiébault’s definite and -startling news that Wellington, with at least five divisions in -hand, had invested Rodrigo on the 8th, and was bringing up a heavy -battering-train. The siege had already been six days in progress. - -This was very alarming intelligence. The only troops actually in hand -for the relief of Rodrigo were Thiébault’s small division at Salamanca, -Souham’s much larger division about La Baneza and Benavente, and -Clausel’s and Maucune’s divisions, now approaching Valladolid from the -side of Avila. The whole did not make much more than 20,000 men, a -force obviously insufficient to attack Wellington, if he were in such -strength as Thiébault reported. Dorsenne at once sent for Roguet’s -division of the Imperial Guard from Burgos: Marmont ordered Bonnet to -evacuate the Asturias and come down by the route of Leon to join him: -he also directed Brennier to come up from the Tagus, and Ferey to hurry -his march from La Mancha. Aides-de-camp were sent to hunt for Foy, who -was known to be on the borders of the Murcian regions, where Montbrun -had dropped him on his march to Alicante. Montbrun himself, with the -rest of his column, was also to turn back as soon as the orders should -reach him. - -By this concentration Marmont calculated[214] that he would have 32,000 -men in line opposite Wellington by January 26 or 27th, as Bonnet, -Brennier, and Dorsenne’s Guards should have arrived by then. And by -February 1 Ferey and Foy ought also to be up, and more than 40,000 men -would be collected. Vain dates! For Wellington captured Rodrigo on the -19th, seven days before the Marshal and Dorsenne could collect even -32,000 men. - - [214] _Mémoires_, iv. p. 184. - -Meanwhile Marmont pushed on for Salamanca, where the troops were -to concentrate, having with him only the divisions of Clausel and -Maucune. On January 21st he had reached Fuente Sauco, one march -north of Salamanca, when he received the appalling news that Ciudad -Rodrigo had been stormed by Wellington two days before. This was a -thunderstroke--his army was caught not half concentrated, and he -was for the moment helpless. He advanced as far as Salamanca, and -there picked up Thiébault’s division, but even so he had not more -that 15,000 men in hand, and dared not, with such a handful, march -on Rodrigo, to endeavour to recover it before Wellington should have -restored its fortifications. Bonnet had not yet even reached Leon: -Ferey and Dorsenne’s Guard division had not been heard of. As to where -Foy and Montbrun might be at the moment, it was hardly possible to -hazard a guess. The only troops that could be relied upon to appear -within the next few days were the divisions of Souham and Brennier. -Even with their help the army would not exceed 26,000 or 28,000 men. - -Meanwhile Wellington, with seven divisions now in hand, for he had -brought up both the 5th and the 7th to the front, was lying on the -Agueda, covering the repairs of Ciudad Rodrigo. Marmont had at first -thought that, elated by his recent success, the British general might -push his advance towards Salamanca. He made no signs of doing so: all -his troops remained concentrated on the Portuguese frontier, ready -to protect the rebuilding of Rodrigo. Here, on the day after the -storm, all the trenches were filled in, and the débris on the breaches -removed. Twelve hundred men were then turned to the task of mending the -breaches, which were at first built up with fascines and earth only, -so as to make them ready within a few days to resist a _coup-de-main_. -In a very short time they were more or less in a state of defence, and -on February 15th Castaños produced a brigade of Spanish infantry to -form the new garrison of the place. The work was much retarded by the -weather. Throughout the time of the siege it had been bitterly cold -but very dry: but on the 28th the wind shifted to the west, and for -the nine days following there was incessant and torrential rain, which -was very detrimental to the work. It had, however, the compensating -advantage of preventing Marmont from making any advance from Salamanca. -Every river in Leon was over its banks, every ford impassable, the -roads became practically useless. When, therefore, on February 2nd[215] -the Agueda rose to such a height that Wellington’s trestle-bridge was -swept away, and the stone town-bridge of Rodrigo was two feet under -water, so that the divisions cantoned on the Portuguese frontier were -cut off from the half-repaired fortress, there was no pressing danger -from the French, who were quite unable to move forward. - - [215] Napier says Jan. 29. But Jones, then employed in repairing - Rodrigo, gives Feb. 2 in his diary of the work. - -Marmont, as we have seen, had reached Fuente Sauco on January 21st, -and Salamanca on January 22nd. On the following day Souham, coming in -from the direction of Zamora, appeared at Matilla, half way between -Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo, so that he was in touch with his chief -and ready to act as his advanced guard. But no other troops had come -up, and on the 24th the Marshal received a hasty note from Dorsenne, -saying that the division of the Young Guard from Burgos would not -reach the Tormes till February 2[216]. With only four divisions at his -disposition (Clausel, Maucune, Thiébault, Souham) Marmont dared not -yet move forward, since he knew that Wellington had at least six in -hand, and he shrank from committing himself to decisive action with -little more than 20,000 men assembled. On the 28th Dorsenne sent in a -still more disheartening dispatch than his last: he had now ordered -Roguet’s Guards, who had got as far forward as Medina del Campo, to -return to Burgos[217]. The reasons given were that Mina had just -inflicted a severe blow on General Abbé, the commanding officer in -Navarre, by beating him near Pampeluna with a loss of 400 men, that -the Conde de Montijo, from Aragon, had laid siege to Soria, and was -pressing its garrison hard, and that another assembly of guerrillero -bands had attacked Aranda del Duero, and would take it, if it were not -succoured in a few days. ‘I therefore trust that your excellency will -approve of my having called back Roguet’s division, its artillery, and -Laferrière’s horse, to use them for a _guerre à outrance_ against the -guerrillas.’ Nothing serious--he added--would follow, as all reports -agreed that Wellington was sitting tight near Ciudad Rodrigo, and would -make no advance toward Salamanca. - - [216] Dorsenne to Marmont, from Valladolid, Feb. 24. - - [217] Same to same, from Valladolid, Feb. 27. - -No succours whatever, therefore, were to be expected from the Army of -the North: Bonnet had only just recrossed the Cantabrian mountains, -much incommoded by the bad weather in the passes, and Foy and Montbrun -were only expected in the neighbourhood of Toledo early in February. -Therefore Marmont abandoned all hope of attacking Wellington before -Ciudad Rodrigo should be in a state of defence. The desperately rainy -weather of January 28th to February 6th was no doubt the last decisive -fact in making the Marshal give up the game. Before the rain had ceased -falling, he concluded that all chance of a successful offensive move -was gone, for he returned from Salamanca to Valladolid on February 5th. - -On February 6th he wrote to Berthier[218] that he had ordered Montbrun -and Foy, on their return from the Alicante expedition, to remain behind -in the valley of the Tagus, and not to come on to Salamanca. His reason -for abandoning all idea of a general concentration against Wellington -in the kingdom of Leon, was that he was convinced that the next move -of the British general would be to make a dash at Badajoz, and that he -wished to have a considerable force ready in the direction of Almaraz -and Talavera, with which he could succour the Army of the South, -when it should be compelled to march, as in 1811, to relieve that -fortress. His forecast of Wellington’s probable scheme of operations -was perfectly correct, and his idea that the best way to foil it would -be to hold a large portion of his army in the valley of the Tagus was -correct also. But he was not to be permitted to carry out his own plan: -the orders from Paris, which he so much dreaded, once more intervened -to prescribe for him a very different policy[219]. - - [218] Marmont to Berthier, Valladolid, Feb. 6. Not in Marmont’s - _Mémoires_, but printed in King Joseph’s Correspondance, viii. p. - 301. - - [219] I must confess that all Napier’s comment on Marmont’s - doings (vol. iv. pp. 94-5) seems to me to be vitiated by a wish - to vindicate Napoleon at all costs, and to throw all possible - blame on his lieutenant. His statements contain what I cannot - but call a _suggestio falsi_, when he says that ‘Bonnet quitted - the Asturias, Montbrun hastened back from Valencia, Dorsenne - sent a detachment in aid, and on Jan. 25 six divisions of - infantry and one of cavalry, 45,000 men in all, were assembled - at Salamanca, from whence to Ciudad is only four marches.’ This - misses the facts that (1) Marmont had only _four_ divisions - (Souham, Clausel, Maucune, and the weak division of Thiébault); - (2) that Bonnet had not arrived, nor could for some days; (3) - that Dorsenne sent nothing, and on Jan. 27 announced that nothing - would be forthcoming; (4) that Montbrun (who was at Alicante on - Jan. 16) was still far away on the borders of Murcia. With 22,000 - men only in hand Marmont was naturally cautious. - -Wellington during the critical days from January 20th to February 6th -was naturally anxious. He knew that Marmont would concentrate against -him, but he hoped (as indeed he was justified in doing) that the -concentration would be slow and imperfect, and that the Marshal would -find himself too weak to advance from Salamanca. His anxiety was made -somewhat greater than it need have been, by a false report that Foy -and Montbrun were already returned from the Alicante expedition--he -was told that both had got back to Toledo by the beginning of -January[220]--a most mischievous piece of false news. An equally -groundless rumour informed him that Bonnet had left the Asturias, -many days before his departure actually took place. On January 21 he -wrote to Lord Liverpool that Bonnet had passed Benavente on his way -to Salamanca, and that ‘the whole of what had gone eastward’ [i. e. -Foy and Montbrun] was reported to be coming up from the Tagus to -Valladolid, so that in a few days Marmont might possibly have 50,000 -men in hand[221]. To make himself strong against such a concentration -he ordered Hill, on January 22, to bring up three brigades of the 2nd -Division to Castello Branco, with which he might join the main army at -a few days’ notice[222]. At the same time he directed General Abadia to -send a force to occupy the Asturias, which must be empty since Bonnet -had evacuated it. It was not till some days later that he got the -reassuring, and correct, news that Foy and Montbrun, instead of being -already at the front in Castile, were not even expected at Toledo till -January 29th, and that Bonnet had started late, and was only at La -Baneza when February had already begun. But, by the time that he had -received this information, it had already become evident that Marmont -was not about to take the offensive, and Ciudad Rodrigo was already -in a condition to resist a _coup-de-main_; while, since the whole -siege-train of the Army of Portugal had been captured therein, it was -certain that the Marshal could not come up provided with the artillery -required for a regular siege. - - [220] See _Dispatches_, viii. p. 547. - - [221] I fancy that Wellington’s erroneous statement that Marmont - had six divisions collected at Salamanca on the 23rd-24th - [misprinted by Gurwood, _Dispatches_, viii. p. 577, as ‘the 6th - Division!’] was Napier’s source for stating that such a force - was assembled, which it certainly was not, Wellington reckoned - that Marmont had Souham, Clausel, Maucune, Thiébault, and two - divisions from the East, which last had not really come up--and - never were to do so. - - [222] Wellington to Hill, Jan. 22, _Dispatches_, viii. p. 566. - -By February 12th the real state of affairs became clear, ‘the enemy -has few troops left at Salamanca and in the towns on the Tormes, and -it appears that Marshal Marmont has cantoned the right of his army on -the Douro, at Zamora and Toro, the centre in the province of Avila, -while one division (the 6th) has returned to Talavera and the valley -of the Tagus.’ This was nearly correct: Marmont, on February 6th, had -defined his position as follows--two divisions (those just returned -from the Alicante expedition) in the valley of the Tagus; one, the -6th (Brennier), at Monbeltran, in one of the passes leading from the -Tagus to the Douro valley; one (Clausel) at Avila; three on the Douro -and the Esla (Zamora, Toro, Benavente) with a strong advanced guard at -Salamanca. The heavy detachment towards the Tagus, as he explained, was -to provide for the probable necessity of succouring Badajoz, to which -Wellington was certain to turn his attention ere long. - -Marmont was perfectly right in his surmise. Ciudad Rodrigo had hardly -been in his hands for five days, when Wellington began to issue orders -presupposing an attack on Badajoz. On January 25th Alexander Dickson -was directed to send the 24-lb. shot and reserve powder remaining at -the artillery base at Villa da Ponte to be embarked on the Douro for -Oporto, where they were to be placed on ship-board[223]. Next day it -was ordered that sixteen howitzers of the siege-train should start -from Almeida overland for the Alemtejo, each drawn by eight bullocks, -while twenty 24-pounders were to be shipped down the Douro from Barca -de Alva to Oporto, and sent round from thence to Setubal, the seaport -nearest to Elvas[224]. On the 28th Dickson himself was ordered to start -at once for Setubal, in order that he might be ready to receive each -consignment on its arrival, and to make arrangements for its transport -to Elvas[225], while a dispatch was sent to Hill[226] definitely -stating that, if all went well, the siege of Badajoz was to begin in -the second week of March. - - [223] _Dickson Papers_, ii. p. 571. - - [224] Wellington, _Dispatches_, viii. pp. 568-9. - - [225] _Dickson Papers_, ii. p. 576. - - [226] Wellington to Hill, _Dispatches_, viii. p. 571. - -These plans were drawn up long before it was clear that the army might -not have to fight Marmont on the Agueda, for the defence of Ciudad -Rodrigo. ‘If they should move this way, I hope to give a good account -of them,’ Wellington wrote to Douglas (the British officer attached to -the Army of Galicia)[227]: but he judged it more likely that no such -advance would be made. ‘I think it probable that when Marmont shall -have heard of our success, he will not move at all[228].’ Meanwhile -there was no need to march the army southward for some time, since -the artillery and stores would take many weeks on their land or water -voyage, when roads were bad and the sea vexed with winter storms. -So long as seven divisions were cantoned behind the Agueda and Coa, -Marmont could have no certain knowledge that the attack on Badajoz was -contemplated, whatever he might suspect. Therefore no transference -southward of the divisions behind the Agueda was begun till February -19th. But Wellington, with an eye on Marmont’s future movements, -contemplated a raid by Hill on the bridge of Almaraz, the nearest and -best passage which the French possessed on the Tagus. If it could be -broken by a flying column, any succours from the Army of Portugal to -the Army of the South would have to take a much longer route and waste -much time[229]. The project was abandoned, on Hill’s report that he -doubted of its practicability, since a successful _coup-de-main_ on -one of the bridge-head forts might not secure the actual destruction -of the boats, which the French might withdraw to the farther side of -the river, and relay at their leisure[230]. But, as we shall see, the -scheme was postponed and not entirely rejected: in May it was carried -out with complete success. - - [227] Wellington to Sir Howard Douglas, Jan. 22, _Dispatches_, - viii. p. 568. - - [228] Wellington to Hill, _Dispatches_, viii. p. 567, same day as - last. - - [229] Wellington to Hill, Jan. 28, _Dispatches_, viii. pp. 571-2 - and 586-7. - - [230] Wellington to Hill, Feb. 12, _Dispatches_. viii. p. 603. - -While Wellington was awaiting the news that his siege artillery was -well forward on the way to Elvas, Marmont had been undergoing one of -his periodical lectures from Paris. A dispatch sent to him by Berthier -on January 23, and received at Valladolid on February 6th--fourteen -days only having been occupied by its travels--had of course no -reference to Wellington or Ciudad Rodrigo, the news of the investment -of that fortress having only reached Paris on January 27th. It was -mainly composed of censures on Montbrun’s Alicante expedition, which -Napoleon considered to have been undertaken with too large a force--’he -had ordered a flying column to be sent against Valencia, a whole army -corps had marched.’ But the paragraph in it which filled Marmont with -dismay was one ordering him to make over at once 6,000 men to the Army -of the North, whose numbers the Emperor considered to be running too -low, now that the two Guard divisions had been directed to return to -France. - -‘Twenty-four hours after the receipt of this dispatch you will start -off on the march one of your divisions, with its divisional artillery, -and its exact composition as it stands at the moment of the arrival of -this order, and will send it to Burgos, to form part of the Army of -the North. His Majesty forbids you to change any general belonging to -this division, or to make any alterations in it. In return you will -receive three provisional regiments of detachments, about 5,000 men, -whom you may draft into your battalions. They are to start from Burgos -the day that the division which you are ordered to send arrives there. -All the Guards are under orders for France, and can only start when -your division has reached that place.... The Army of the North will -then consist of three divisions: (1) that which you are sending off; -(2) Caffarelli’s division (due at Pampeluna from Aragon); (3) a third -division which General Dorsenne will organize from the 34th Léger, -the 113th and 130th of the line and the Swiss battalions.... By this -arrangement the Army of the North will be in a position to aid you with -two divisions if the English should march against you[231].’ - - [231] The ‘third division’ practically represented Thiébault’s - old division of the Army of the North, which had long held the - Salamanca district. This division was to be deprived of its - Polish regiment (recalled to France with all other Poles) and - to be given instead the 130th, then at Santander. But the 130th - really belonged to the Army of Portugal (Sarrut’s division), - though separated from it at the moment. So Marmont was being - deprived of one regiment more. - -Along with this dispatch arrived another from Dorsenne[232], clamouring -for the division which was to be given him--he had already got the -notice that he was to receive it, as he lay nearer to France than -Marmont. He promised that the three provisional regiments should be -sent off, as the Emperor directed, the moment that the ceded division -should reach him. The Duke of Ragusa could not refuse to obey such -peremptory orders from his master, and ordered Bonnet’s division, from -Benavente and Leon, to march on Burgos. His letter acknowledging the -receipt of the Emperor’s dispatch was plaintive. ‘I am informed that, -according to the new arrangement, the Army of the North will be in -a position to help me with two divisions if I am attacked. I doubt -whether His Majesty’s intentions on this point will be carried out, and -in no wise expect it. I believe that I am justified in fearing that -any troops sent me will have to be long waited for, and will be an -insignificant force when they do appear. Not to speak of the slowness -inevitable in all joint operations, it takes so long in Spain to get -dispatches through, and to collect troops, that I doubt whether I shall -obtain any help at the critical moment. ... The net result of all is -that I am left much weaker in numbers.’ - - [232] Dorsenne to Marmont, from Uñas, Feb. 5. - -Marmont might have added that the three provisional regiments, which he -was to receive in return for Bonnet’s division and the 130th Line, were -no real reinforcement, but his own drafts, long due to arrive at the -front, but detained by Dorsenne in Biscay and Old Castile to garrison -small posts and keep open communications. And he was not destined -to receive them as had been promised: Dorsenne wrote on February 24 -apologizing for not forwarding them at once: they were guarding the -roads between Irun and Vittoria, and could not be spared till other -troops had been moved into their scattered garrisons to relieve them. - -On January 27th the news of the advance of Wellington against Ciudad -Rodrigo had at last reached Paris--eight days after the fortress -had fallen. It caused the issue of new orders by the Emperor, all -exquisitely inappropriate when they reached Marmont’s hands on February -10th. The Marshal had been contemplating the tiresome results of the -storm of the fortress for nearly three weeks, but Napoleon’s orders -presupposed much spare time before Rodrigo would be in any danger: -Dorsenne is to stop the march of the Guards towards France, and to -bring up all the forces he can to help the Army of Portugal: Montbrun -will be back at Madrid by January 18 [on which day he was really in -the middle of the kingdom of Murcia], and at the front in Leon before -February 1st. After his arrival the Army of Portugal will be able to -take up its definitive line of action. Finally, there is a stab at -Marmont, ‘the English apparently have advanced in order to make a -diversion to hamper the siege of Valencia; they only did so because -they had got information of the great strength of the detachment which -the Army of Portugal made in that direction[233].’ - - [233] Napoleon to Berthier, Jan. 27. - -The Marshal could only reply by saying that the orders were all out of -date, that he had (as directed) given up Bonnet’s division to the Army -of the North, and that, Ciudad Rodrigo having fallen far earlier than -any one had expected, and long before any sufficient relieving force -could be collected, he had been unable to save it, and had now cantoned -his army (minus Bonnet) with four divisions in the valley of the Douro -and three in the valley of the Tagus, in expectation of an approaching -move on the part of Wellington towards Badajoz. - -These dispositions had not long been completed when another dispatch -arrived from Paris, dated February 11th, in which the Emperor censured -once more all his lieutenant’s actions, and laid down for him a new -strategical policy from which he was forbidden to swerve. - -‘The Emperor regrets that when you had the division of Souham and three -others united [i. e. on January 23] you did not move on Salamanca, to -make out what was going on. That would have given the English much -to think about, and might have been useful to Ciudad Rodrigo. The -way to help the army under the present circumstances is to place its -head-quarters at Salamanca, and concentrate your force there, detaching -one division to the Tagus valley and also reoccupying the Asturias. -[This concentration] will oblige the enemy to remain about Almeida and -in the North, for fear of an invasion of Portugal. You might even march -on Rodrigo, and, if you have the necessary siege artillery, capture the -place--your honour is bound up with it. If want of the artillery or -of food renders it necessary to put off such an operation, you could -at least make an incursion into Portugal, and advance towards the -Douro and Almeida. This menace would keep the enemy “contained”.... -Your posture should be offensive, with Salamanca as base and Almeida -as objective: as long as the English know that you are in strength -at Salamanca they will not budge: but if you retire to Valladolid -yourself, and scatter divisions to the rear, and above all if you have -not got your cavalry effective by the time that the rainy season ends, -you will expose all the north of Spain to misfortunes. - -‘It is indispensable to reoccupy the Asturias, because more troops are -needed to hold the edge of the plain as far as Biscay than to keep down -that province. Since the English are divided into two corps, one in the -South and the other opposite you, they cannot be in heavy strength: you -ought to outnumber them greatly.... I suppose that you consider the -English mad, for you believe them capable of marching against Badajoz -when you are at Salamanca, i. e. of allowing you to march to Lisbon -before they can get back. They will only go southward if you, by your -ill-devised schemes, keep two or three divisions detached on the Tagus: -that reassures them, and tells them that you have no offensive projects -against them. - -‘To recapitulate, the Emperor’s intentions are that you should stop at -Salamanca, that you should reoccupy the Asturias, that your army should -base itself on Salamanca, and that from thence you should threaten the -English.’ - -It may seem profane to the worshippers of the Emperor to say that this -dispatch was purely wrong-headed, and argued a complete misconception -of the situation. But it is impossible to pass any other verdict -on it. Marmont, since Bonnet’s division had been stolen from him, -had seven divisions left, or about 44,000 men effective, including -cavalry and artillery. The Emperor tells him to keep one division on -the Tagus, to send a second to occupy the Asturias. This leaves him -about 34,000 net to concentrate at Salamanca. With this force he is -to attempt to besiege Rodrigo, or at least to execute a raid as far -as Almeida and the Douro. ‘The English are divided and so must be -much numerically inferior to you.’ But, as a matter of fact, the only -British detachment that was not under Wellington’s hand at the moment -was Hill’s 2nd Division, and he had just brought that up to Castello -Branco, and would have had it with him in five days, if Marmont had -advanced from Salamanca. The Marshal would have seen 55,000 men -falling upon his 34,000 if he had moved on any day before the 20th of -February, and Wellington was ‘spoiling for a fight,’ or, in his own -quiet phraseology, ‘if the French move this way, I hope to give a good -account of them[234].’ Supposing Marmont had, by some evil inspiration, -done what the Emperor had wished him to do before the orders came, -he would have been crushed by almost double numbers somewhere in the -neighbourhood of Rodrigo or Almeida. The battle of Salamanca would have -been fought six months too soon. - - [234] Wellington to Douglas, _Dispatches_, viii. p. 568. - -This is the crucial objection to Napoleon’s main thesis: he underrated -Wellington’s numbers and his readiness to give battle. As to details -we may observe (1) that there was no siege-train to batter Rodrigo, -because the whole of the heavy guns of the Army of Portugal had been -captured in that fortress. (2) That Wellington was ‘mad’ enough to -march upon Badajoz with his whole army, precisely because he knew that, -even if Marmont should invade Portugal, he could never get to Lisbon. -He realized, as the Emperor did not, that an army of five or six -divisions could not march on Lisbon in the casual fashion recommended -in this dispatch, because it would starve by the way. Central Portugal, -still suffering from the blight of Masséna’s invasion, could not -have sustained 30,000 men marching in a mass and trying to live upon -the country in the usual French style. And Marmont, as his adversary -well knew, had neither great magazines at his base, nor the immense -transport train which would have permitted them to be utilized. The -best proof of the impracticability of Napoleon’s scheme was that -Marmont endeavoured to carry it out in April, when nothing lay in front -of him but Portuguese militia, and failed to penetrate more than a -few marches into the land, because he could not feed his army, and -therefore could not keep it concentrated. - -The Marshal knew long beforehand that this plan was hopeless. He wrote -to Berthier from Valladolid on February 26th as follows: - -‘Your Highness informs me that if my army is united at Salamanca the -English would be “mad” to move into Estremadura, leaving me behind -them, and free to advance on Lisbon. But they tried this precise -combination in May 1811, though all my army was then quite close to -Salamanca, and though the Army of the North was then twice as strong as -it is to-day, and though the season was then later and allowed us to -find provender for our horses, and though we were then in possession -of Ciudad Rodrigo. They considered at that time that we could not -undertake such an operation [as a march on Lisbon], and were perfectly -right. Will they think that it is practicable to-day, when all the -conditions which I have just cited are changed to our disadvantage, and -when they know that a great body of troops has returned to France?... -Consequently no movement on this side can help Badajoz. The only -possible course is to take measures directly bearing on that place, if -we are to bring pressure upon the enemy and hope to attain our end. -The Emperor seems to ignore the food question. This is the important -problem; and if it could be ended by the formation of base-magazines, -his orders could be executed with punctuality and precision. But we are -far from such a position--by no fault of mine.... When transferred to -the North in January, I found not a grain of wheat in the magazines, -not a sou in the treasury, unpaid debts everywhere. As the necessary -result of the absurd system of administration adopted here, there -was in existence a famine--real or artificial--whose severity was -difficult to realize. We could only get food for daily consumption in -our cantonments by using armed force: there is a long distance between -this state of affairs and the formation of magazines which would allow -us to move the army freely.... The English army is always concentrated -and can always be moved, because it has an adequate supply of money -and transport. Seven or eight thousand pack-mules bring up its daily -food--hay for its cavalry on the banks of the Coa and Agueda has -actually been sent out from England[235]. His Majesty may judge from -this fact the comparison between their means and ours--we have not -four days’ food in any of our magazines, we have no transport, we -cannot draw requisitions from the most wretched village without sending -thither a foraging party 200 strong: to live from day to day we have to -scatter detachments to vast distances, and always to be on the move.... -It is possible that His Majesty may be dissatisfied with my arguments, -but I am bound to say that I cannot carry out the orders sent me -without bringing about a disaster ere long. If His Majesty thinks -otherwise, I must request to be superseded--a request not made for the -first time: if I am given a successor the command will of course be -placed in better hands[236].’ - - [235] An exaggeration, but hay was actually brought to Lisbon and - Coimbra, and used for the English cavalry brigades, which had - been sent to the rear and cantoned on the Lower Mondego. - - [236] Marmont to Berthier, Valladolid, Feb. 26. Marmont’s - _Mémoires_, iv. pp. 344-5. - -[Illustration: _Marshal Marmont, Duke of Ragusa_] - -This was an admirable summary of the whole situation in Spain, and -might have caused the Emperor to change his policy, if he had not by -this time so hardened himself in his false conceptions as to be past -conviction. As Marmont complains, his master had now built up for -himself an imaginary picture of the state of affairs in the Peninsula, -and argued as if the situation was what he wished it to be, not what -it actually was. ‘Il suppose vrai tout ce qu’il voudrait trouver -existant[237].’ - - [237] Marmont’s ‘Observations on the Imperial Correspondence of - Feb. 1812,’ _Mémoires_, iv. p. 512. - -A subsequent letter from Paris, dated February 21st and received about -March 2nd, contained one small amelioration of Marmont’s lot--he -was told that he might take back Bonnet’s division, and not cede -it to Dorsenne, on condition that he sent it at once to occupy the -Asturias. But it then proceeded to lay down in the harshest terms the -condemnation of the Marshal’s strategy: - -‘The Emperor charges me to repeat to you that you worry too much about -matters with which you have no concern. Your mission was to protect -Almeida and Rodrigo--and you have let them fall. You are told to -maintain and administer the North, and you abandon the Asturias--the -only point from which it can be dominated and contained. You are -getting into a state of alarm because Lord Wellington sends a division -or two towards Badajoz. Now Badajoz is a very strong fortress, and the -Duke of Dalmatia has 80,000 men, and can draw help from Marshal Suchet. -If Wellington were to march on Badajoz [he had done so the day before -this letter was written] you have a sure, prompt, and triumphant means -of bringing him back--that of marching on Rodrigo and Almeida.’ - -Marmont replied, with a suppressed rage that can be read between the -lines even more clearly than in his earlier letters, ‘Since the Emperor -attributes to me the fall of Almeida, which was given up before I had -actually taken over the command of this army[238], I cannot see what I -can do to shelter myself from censures at large: ... I am accused of -being the cause of the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo: it fell because it -had an insufficient garrison of inferior quality and a bad commandant. -Dorsenne was neither watchful nor prescient. Was it for me to take -care of a place not in my command, and separated from me by a chain -of mountains, and by the desert that had been made by the six months’ -sojourn of the Army of Portugal in the valley of the Tagus?... I am -blamed for having cantoned myself in the valley of the Tagus after -repulsing Lord Wellington beyond the Coa [at the time of El Bodon], -but this was the result of the imperative orders of the Emperor, who -assigned me no other territory than the Tagus valley. Rodrigo was -occupied by troops of the Army of the North.... I have ordered General -Bonnet to reoccupy the Asturias at once, and quite see the importance -of the occupying of that province.... I am told that the Emperor thinks -that I busy myself too much about the interests of others, and not -enough about my own. I had considered that one of my duties (and one of -the most difficult of them) was to assist the Army of the South, and -that duty was formally imposed on me in some twenty dispatches, and -specially indicated by the order which bade me leave three divisions -in the valley of the Tagus. To-day I am informed that I am relieved -of that duty, and my position becomes simpler and better! But if the -Emperor relies with confidence on the effect which demonstrations -in the North will produce on the mind of Wellington, I must dare to -express my contrary opinion. Lord Wellington is quite aware that I have -no magazines, and is acquainted with the immensely difficult physical -character of the country, and its complete lack of food resources at -this season. He knows that my army is not in a position to cross the -Coa, even if no one opposes me, and that if we did so we should have to -turn back at the end of four days, unable to carry on the campaign, and -with our horses all starved to death[239].’ - - [238] To be exact, it was on May 10 that Marmont took over the - command from Masséna, and Almeida was evacuated by Brennier that - same night. - - [239] I extract these various paragraphs from Marmont’s vast - dispatch of March 2, omitting much more that is interesting and - apposite. - -This and much more to the same effect had apparently some effect on the -mind of the Emperor. But the result was confusing when formulated on -paper. Berthier replied on March 12: - -‘Your letters of February 27 and 28 and March 2 have been laid before -the Emperor. His Majesty thinks that not only must you concentrate -at Salamanca, but that you must throw a bridge across the Agueda, so -that, if the enemy leaves less than five divisions north of the Tagus, -you may be able to advance to the Coa, against Almeida, and ravage all -northern Portugal. If Badajoz is captured by two divisions of the enemy -its loss will not be imputed to you, the entire responsibility will -fall on the Army of the South. If the enemy leaves only two, three, or -even four divisions north of the Tagus, the Army of Portugal will be -to blame if it does not at once march against the hostile force before -it, invest Almeida, ravage all northern Portugal, and push detachments -as far as the Mondego. Its rôle is simply to “contain” six British -divisions, or at least five: it must take the offensive in the North, -or, if the enemy has taken the initiative, or other circumstances -necessitate it, must dispatch to the Tagus, by Almaraz, the same number -of divisions that Lord Wellington shall have dispatched to conduct the -siege of Badajoz.’ - -This double-edged document reached Salamanca on March 27, _eleven days -after Wellington had invested Badajoz_. The whole allied field army had -marched for Estremadura in the last days of February, and not a single -British division remained north of the Tagus. In accordance with the -Emperor’s dispatches of February 11th and of February 18th, Marmont had -already concentrated the bulk of his resources at Salamanca, drawing -in everything except Bonnet (destined for the Asturias), Souham, who -was left on the Esla to face the Army of Galicia, and the equivalent of -another division distributed as garrisons in Astorga, Leon, Palencia, -Zamora, and Valladolid. With five divisions in hand, or just coming up, -he was on the move, as the Emperor had directed, to threaten Rodrigo -and Almeida and invade northern Portugal. - -The Paris letter of March 12, quoted above, suddenly imposed on Marmont -the choice between continuing the attack on Portugal, to which he was -committed, or of leading his whole army by Almaraz to Badajoz--it must -be the whole army, since he was told to send just as many divisions -southward as Wellington should have moved in that direction, and every -one of the seven units of the allied army had gone off. - -Since Badajoz was stormed on April 6th, only ten days after Marmont -received on March 27 the Emperor’s dispatch of March 12, it is clear -that he never could have arrived in time to help the fortress. In June -1811 he had accomplished a similar movement at a better season of the -year, and when some time had been allowed for preparation, in fifteen -days, but only by making forced marches of the most exhausting sort. It -could not have been done in so short a time in March or April, when the -crops were not ripe, the rivers were full, and the roads were far worse -than at midsummer. Moreover (as we shall presently see) Wellington had -placed a large containing force at Merida, half-way between Almaraz and -Badajoz, which Marmont would have had to drive in--at much expense of -time. - -The Marshal’s perplexity on receiving the dispatch that came in upon -March 27 was extreme. ‘The instructions just received,’ he wrote -to Berthier, ‘are wholly contradictory to those of February 18 and -February 21, imperative orders which forced me, against my personal -conviction, to abandon my own plan, and to make it impossible to do -what I regarded as suitable to the interests of the Emperor. The -letters of February 18 and February 21 told me that his Majesty -thought me a meddler in matters which did not concern me: he told me -that it was unnecessary for me to worry about Badajoz, “a very strong -fortress supported by an army of 80,000 men.” ... He gave me formal -orders to abandon any idea of marching to succour it, and added that -if Lord Wellington went thither, he was to be left alone, because by -advancing to the Agueda I could bring him back at once. The letters of -the 18th and 21st made it quite clear that His Majesty freed me from -all responsibility for Badajoz, provided I made a demonstration on the -Agueda. ... To-day your Highness writes that I _am_ responsible for -Badajoz, if Lord Wellington undertakes its siege with more than two -divisions. The concluding paragraph of your letter seems to give me -permission to succour the place, by bringing up troops to the Tagus. -So, after imperative orders have wrecked my original arrangement, which -had prepared and assured an effective help for Badajoz, and after all -choice of methods has been forbidden to me, I am suddenly given an -option when it is no longer possible to use it.... To-day, when my -troops from the Tagus valley have repassed the mountains, and used up -the magazines collected there at their departure, when it is impossible -to get from Madrid the means to establish a new magazine at Almaraz, my -army, if it started from this point [Salamanca], would consume every -scrap of food that could be procured before it could possibly reach -Badajoz.... The movement was practicable when I was in my original -position: it is almost impracticable now, considering the season of the -year, and the probable time-limit of the enemy’s operations.... After -ripe reflection on the complicated situation, considering that my main -task is to hold down the North, and that this task is much greater -than that of holding the South, taking into consideration the news -that an English force is said to be landing at Corunna (an improbable -story, but one that is being repeatedly brought me), considering that -the Portuguese and Galician troops threaten to take the offensive from -Braganza, remembering that your letters of February 18 and 21 state -that Suchet’s Army of Aragon is reckoned able to reinforce the Army -of the South, and considering that my dispositions have been made (in -spite of immense preliminary difficulties) for a fifteen days’ march on -the Agueda, which is already begun, I decide in favour of continuing -that operation, though I have (as I said before) no great confidence in -its producing any effective result. - -‘Accordingly I am putting the division that came up from the Tagus in -motion for Plasencia, with orders to spread the rumour that it is to -rejoin the army by the pass of Perales and enter Portugal; I start -from here with three more divisions for the Agueda; ... if I fought -on the Tormes I could put one more division in line, five in all: the -number of seven divisions of which the Emperor speaks could only be -concentrated if the Army of the North[240] could send two divisions to -replace my own two now on the lines of communications and the Esla.’ - - [240] Marmont writes the Army of the Centre, evidently in - confusion for the Army of the North. The nearest posts of the - Army of the Centre were 150 miles away from the Esla, while - the Army of the North at Burgos was much closer. Moreover, the - Army of the Centre had not two infantry divisions, but only - one--d’Armagnac’s--and some _Juramentado_ regiments. - -The recapitulation of all this correspondence may seem tedious, but it -is necessary. When it is followed with care I think that one definite -fact emerges. Napoleon was directly and personally responsible for the -fall of Badajoz. Down to March 27th Marmont was strictly forbidden to -take any precautions for the safety of that fortress, and was censured -as a meddler and an alarmist, for wishing to keep a strong force in -the valley of the Tagus, ready to march thither. On March 27 he was -suddenly given an option of marching to Estremadura with his whole -army. It appears to be an option, not a definite order, for Berthier’s -sentence introducing the new scheme is alternative--the Army of -Portugal is ‘to take the offensive in the North _or_, under certain -circumstances, to march for Almaraz.’ But this point need not be -pressed, for if taken as a definite order it was impracticable: Marmont -received it so late that, if he had marched for Badajoz with the -greatest possible speed, he would have reached it some days after the -place was stormed. The fact that he believed that he would never have -got there at all, because lack of food would have stopped him on the -way, is indifferent. The essential point of Napoleon’s responsibility -is that he authorized the march too late, after having most stringently -forbidden it, in successive letters extending over several weeks. - -That a march on Badajoz by the whole Army of Portugal (or so much of it -as was not required to contain the Galicians and to occupy Asturias), -if it had begun--as Marmont wished--in February or early March, would -have prevented Wellington from taking the fortress, is not certain. -A similar march in June 1811 had that effect, at the time of the -operations on the Caya. But Wellington’s position was much better -in February 1812 than it had been eight months earlier. This much, -however, is clear, that such an operation had a possible chance of -success, while Napoleon’s counter-scheme for a demonstration on the -Agueda and an invasion of the northern Beira had no such prospect. -The Emperor, for lack of comprehension of the local conditions, -misconceived its efficacy, as Marmont very cogently demonstrated in his -letters. Northern Portugal was a waste, where the Marshal’s army might -wander for a few days, but was certain to be starved before it was many -marches from the frontier. Napier, in an elaborate vindication of the -Emperor, tries to argue that the Marshal might have taken Rodrigo by -escalade without a battering-train, have assailed Almeida in similar -fashion, have menaced Oporto and occupied Coimbra[241]. He deliberately -ignores one essential condition of the war, viz. that because of the -French system of ‘living on the country,’ Marmont had no magazines, and -no transport sufficient to enable his army to conduct a long offensive -campaign in a devastated and hostile land. His paragraphs are mere -rhetoric of the most unfair kind. For example, he says, ‘Wellington -with 18,000 men[242] escaladed Badajoz, a powerful fortress defended by -an excellent governor and 5,000 French veterans: Marmont with 28,000 -men would not attempt to escalade Rodrigo, although its breaches were -scarcely healed and its garrison disaffected.’ This statement omits the -essential details that Wellington had a large siege-train, had opened -three broad breaches in the walls of Badajoz, and, while the enemy -was fully occupied in defending them, escaladed distant points of the -_enceinte_ with success. Marmont had no siege-train, and therefore -could have made no breaches; he would have had to cope with an -undistracted garrison, holding ramparts everywhere intact. Moreover, -Ciudad Rodrigo and its outworks form a compact fortress, of not half -the circumference of Badajoz and its dependencies. If Ney and Masséna, -with an adequate siege apparatus, treated Rodrigo with respect in 1810, -and proceeded against it by regular operations, Marmont would have been -entirely unjustified in trying the desperate method of escalade in -1812. The fortifications, as Napier grudgingly admits, were ‘healed’: -an escalade against Carlos de España’s garrison would certainly have -met the same fate as Suchet’s assault on Saguntum, a much weaker and -unfinished stronghold. But it is unnecessary to follow into detail -Napier’s controversial statements, which are all part of a wrong-headed -scheme to prove Napoleon infallible on all occasions and at all costs. - - [241] See chapter vii of book iv, _Peninsular War_, iv. pp. - 138-40. - - [242] Why omit the 30,000 men of Graham and Hill? - -The governing facts cannot be disputed: Marmont in February placed -three divisions on the Tagus, which were to form the advanced guard -of an army that was to march to the relief of Badajoz, whose siege he -foresaw. Napoleon told him not to concern himself about Badajoz, and -compelled him to concentrate his army about Salamanca. He instructed -him that the proper reply to an attack on Badajoz by Wellington was -an invasion of northern Portugal, and gave him elaborate instructions -concerning it. Marmont reluctantly obeyed, and was starting on such an -expedition when he was suddenly told that he might move on Badajoz. -But he only received this permission ten days before that fortress -was stormed: it was therefore useless. The Emperor must take the -responsibility. - - - - -SECTION XXXII: CHAPTER III - -THE SIEGE OF BADAJOZ. MARCH-APRIL 1812 - - -In narrating the troubles of the unlucky Duke of Ragusa, engaged -in fruitless strategical controversy with his master, we have been -carried far into the month of March 1812. It is necessary to return to -February 20th in order to take up the story of Wellington’s march to -Estremadura. We have seen that he commenced his artillery preparations -in January, by sending Alexander Dickson to Setubal, and dispatching a -large part of his siege-train southward, partly by sea, partly across -the difficult mountain roads of the Beira. - -The Anglo-Portuguese infantry and cavalry, however, were not moved till -the guns were far on their way. It was Wellington’s intention to show -a large army on the frontier of Leon till the last possible moment. He -himself kept his old headquarters at Freneda, near Fuentes de Oñoro, -till March 5th, in order that Marmont might be led to persist in the -belief that his attention was still concentrated on the North. But, -starting from February 19th, his divisions, one by one, had made their -unostentatious departure for the South: on the day when he himself -followed them only one division (the 5th) and one cavalry brigade (V. -Alten’s) still remained behind the Agueda. The rest were at various -stages on their way to Elvas. Most of the divisions marched by the -route Sabugal, Castello Branco, Villa Velha, Niza. But the 1st Division -went by Abrantes, in order to pick up there its clothing for the new -year, which had been brought up the Tagus in boats from Lisbon to that -point. Some of the cavalry and the two independent Portuguese brigades -of Pack and Bradford, whose winter cantonments had been rather to the -rear, had separate routes of their own, through places so far west as -Thomar[243] and Coimbra. The three brigades of the 2nd Division, under -Hill, which had been brought up to Castello Branco at the beginning of -January, were at the head of the marching army, and reached Portalegre, -via Villa Velha, long before the rest of the troops were across the -Tagus. Indeed, the first of them (Ashworth’s Portuguese) started -as early as February 2nd, and was at Castello de Vide, near Elvas, -by February 8th, before the troops behind the Agueda had begun to -move[244]. - - [243] This was the case with G. Anson’s brigade and Bradford’s - Portuguese infantry. Pack went by Coimbra, Slade’s cavalry - brigade by Covilhão, and the horse artillery of Bull and McDonald - with it. - - [244] Nothing is rarer, as all students of the Peninsular War - know to their cost, than a table of the exact movements of - Wellington’s army on any march. For this particular movement the - whole of the detailed orders happen to have been preserved in the - D’Urban Papers. The starting-places of the units were:-- - - 1st Division--Gallegos, Carpio, Fuentes de Oñoro. - - 3rd Division--Zamorra (by the Upper Agueda). - - 4th Division--San Felices and Sesmiro. - - 5th Division--Ciudad Rodrigo. - - 6th Division--Albergaria (near Fuente Guinaldo). - - 7th Division--Payo (in the Sierra de Gata). - - Light Division--Fuente Guinaldo. - - Bradford’s Portuguese--Barba del Puerco. - - Pack’s Portuguese--Campillo and Ituero. - - The marches were so arranged that the 7th Division passed through - Castello Branco on Feb. 26, the 6th Division on Feb. 29, the - Light Division on March 3, the 4th Division on March 5. All these - were up to Portalegre, Villa Viçosa, or Castello de Vide, in - touch with Elvas, by March 8. The 1st Division, coming by way of - Abrantes, joined on March 10. Pack and Bradford, who had very - circuitous routes, the one by Coimbra, the other by Thomar, were - not up till several days later (16th). The 5th Division did not - leave Rodrigo till March 9. - -The lengthy column of infantry which had marched by Castello Branco and -the bridge of Villa Velha was cantoned in various places behind Elvas, -from Villa Viçosa to Portalegre, by March 8th: the 1st Division, coming -in from the Abrantes direction, joined them on March 10th, and halted -at Monforte and Azumar. Only the 5th Division and the two Portuguese -independent brigades were lacking, and of these the two former were -expected by the 16th, the latter by the 20th. With the exception of -the 5th Division the whole of Wellington’s field army was concentrated -near Elvas by the 16th. Only the 1st Hussars of the King’s German -Legion, under Victor Alten, had been left to keep the outpost line in -front of Ciudad Rodrigo, in order that the French vedettes in Leon -should not detect that all the army of Wellington had disappeared, as -they were bound to do if only Portuguese or Spanish cavalry showed at -the front[245]. Counting Hill’s corps, now long returned to its old -post in front of Badajoz, there were now nearly 60,000 troops nearing -Elvas, viz. of infantry, all the eight old Anglo-Portuguese divisions, -plus Hamilton’s Portuguese division[246], and Pack’s and Bradford’s -independent Portuguese brigades. Of cavalry not only were all the old -brigades assembled (save Alten’s single regiment), but two powerful -units now showed at the front for the first time. These were the -newly-landed brigade of German heavy dragoons under Bock[247], which -had arrived at Lisbon on January 1st, and Le Marchant’s brigade of -English heavy dragoons[248], which had disembarked in the autumn, but -had not hitherto been brought up to join the field army. Of Portuguese -horse J. Campbell’s brigade was also at the front: the other Portuguese -cavalry brigade, which had served on the Leon frontier during the -preceding autumn, had been made over to General Silveira, and sent -north of the Douro. But even after deducting this small brigade of 900 -sabres, Wellington’s mounted arm was immensely stronger than it had -ever been before. He had concentrated it on the Alemtejo front, in -order that he might cope on equal terms with the very powerful cavalry -of Soult’s Army of Andalusia. - - [245] The other regiment of V. Alten’s brigade (11th Light - Dragoons) was on March 12 at Ponte de Sor, on its way to the - South. - - [246] Which lay at Arronches and Santa Olaya. - - [247] 1st and 2nd Heavy Dragoons K.G.L. - - [248] 3rd Dragoons, 4th and 5th Dragoon Guards. They had been - lying during the winter in the direction of Castello Branco. - -The Commander-in-Chief himself, travelling with his wonted speed, left -his old head-quarters at Freneda on March 5th, was at Castello Branco -on the 8th, at Portalegre on the 10th, and had reached Elvas, his -new head-quarters, on the 12th. Before leaving the North he had made -elaborate arrangements for the conduct of affairs in that quarter. -They are contained in two memoranda, given the one to Castaños, who -was still in command both of the Galician and the Estremaduran armies -of Spain, and the other to Generals Baccelar and Silveira, of whom the -former was in charge of the Portuguese department of the North, with -head-quarters at Oporto, and the other of the Tras-os-Montes, with -head-quarters at Villa Real[249]. - - [249] Dated Feb. 24 and 27, _Dispatches_, viii. pp. 629 and 638. - -It was a delicate matter to leave Marmont with nothing save the -Spaniards and Portuguese in his front. Of the former the available -troops were (1) the Army of Galicia, four weak field divisions, making -about 15,000 men, of whom only 550 were cavalry, while the artillery -counted only five batteries. There were 8,000 garrison and reserve -troops in Corunna, Vigo, Ferrol, and other fortified posts to the rear, -but these were unavailable for service[250]. Abadia still commanded -the whole army, under the nominal supervision of Castaños. He had one -division (3,000 men under Cabrera) at Puebla Senabria on the Portuguese -frontier, two (9,000 men under Losada and the Conde de Belveder) at -Villafranca, observing the French garrison of Astorga and Souham’s -division on the Esla, which supported that advanced post, and one -(2,500 men under Castañon) on the Asturian frontier watching Bonnet. -(2) The second Spanish force available consisted of that section of -the Army of Estremadura, which lay north of the Sierra de Gata, viz. -Carlos de España’s division of 5,000 men, of whom 3,000 had been thrown -into Ciudad Rodrigo, so that the surplus for the field was small, and -of Julian Sanchez’s very efficient guerrillero cavalry, who were about -1,200 strong and were now counted as part of the regular army and -formally styled ‘1st and 2nd Lancers of Castille.’ - - [250] These figures are those of January, taken from the ‘morning - state’ in _Los Ejércitos españoles_, the invaluable book of 1822 - published by the Spanish Staff. - -The Portuguese troops left to defend the northern frontier were all -militia, with the exception of a couple of batteries of artillery and -the cavalry brigade of regulars which had been with Wellington in Leon -during the autumn, under Madden, but was now transferred to Silveira’s -charge, and set to watch the frontier of the Tras-os-Montes, with the -front regiment at Braganza. Silveira in that province had the four -local regiments of militia, of which each had only one of its two -battalions actually embodied. Baccelar had a much more important force, -but of the same quality, the twelve regiments forming the divisions -of Trant and J. Wilson, and comprising all the militia of the Entre -Douro e Minho province and of northern Beira. Three of these regiments -were immobilized by having been told off to serve as the garrison of -Almeida. Farther south Lecor had under arms the two militia regiments -of the Castello Branco country, watching their own district. The total -force of militia available on the whole frontier must have been about -20,000 men of very second-rate quality: each battalion had only been -under arms intermittently, for periods of six months, and the officers -were for the most part the inefficient leavings of the regular army. Of -the generals Silveira was enterprising, but over bold, as the record of -his earlier campaigns sufficiently demonstrated--Trant and Wilson had -hitherto displayed equal energy and more prudence: but in the oncoming -campaign they were convicted of Silveira’s fault, over-confidence. -Baccelar passed as a slow but fairly safe commander, rather lacking in -self-confidence. - -Wellington’s very interesting memoranda divide the possibilities -of March-April into three heads, of which the last contains three -sub-sections:-- - -(1) Marmont may, on learning that Badajoz is in danger, march with -practically the whole of his army to succour it, as he did in May-June -1811. If this should occur, Abadia and Carlos de España will advance -and boldly take the offensive, laying siege to Astorga, Toro, Zamora, -Salamanca, and other fortified posts. Silveira will co-operate with -his cavalry and infantry, within the bounds of prudence, taking care -that his cavalry, which may support Abadia, does not lose communication -with, and a secure retreat upon, his infantry, which will not risk -itself. - -(2) Marmont may leave a considerable force, perhaps the two divisions -of Souham and Bonnet, in Leon, while departing southward with the -greater part of his army: ‘this is the operation which it is probable -that the enemy will follow.’ What the Army of Galicia can then -accomplish will depend on the exact relative force of itself and of -the French left in front of it, and on the state of the fortified -places on the Douro and Tormes [Toro, Zamora, Salamanca] and the -degree of equipment with which General Abadia can provide himself for -siege-work. But España and Julian Sanchez must make all the play that -they can, and even Porlier and Longa, from distant Cantabria, must be -asked to co-operate in making mischief. Silveira and Baccelar will -support, but risk nothing. - -(3) Marmont may send to Estremadura only the smaller half of his army, -and keep four or five divisions in the north, a force strong enough to -enable him to take the offensive. He may attack either (_a_) Galicia, -(_b_) Tras-os-Montes, or (_c_) the Beira, including Almeida and Ciudad -Rodrigo. - -(_a_) If Marmont should invade Galicia, Abadia had better retreat, but -in the direction that will bring him near the frontiers of Portugal -(i. e. by Puebla Senabria) rather than on Lugo and Corunna. In that -case Silveira and Baccelar will be on the enemy’s flank and rear, and -will do as much mischief as they can on his communications, always -taking care that they do not, by pushing too far into Leon, lose their -communication with the Galicians or with Portugal. In proportion as the -French may advance farther into Galicia, Baccelar will take measures -to collect the whole of the militia of the Douro provinces northward. -Carlos de España and Julian Sanchez ought to have good opportunities of -making trouble for the enemy in the Salamanca district, if he pushes -far from his base. - -(_b_) If Marmont should invade Tras-os-Montes [not a likely operation, -owing to the roughness of the country], Baccelar and Silveira should -oppose him in front, while Abadia would come down on his flank and -rear, and annoy him as much as possible. ‘Don Carlos and the guerrillas -might do a great deal of mischief in Castille.’ - -(_c_) If Marmont should attack Beira, advancing by Ciudad Rodrigo and -Almeida, both these fortresses are in such a state of defence as to -ensure them against capture by a _coup-de-main_, and are supplied with -provisions to suffice during any time that the enemy could possibly -remain in the country. Baccelar and Silveira will assemble all the -militia of the northern provinces in Upper Beira, and place themselves -in communication with Carlos de España. They will endeavour to protect -the magazines on the Douro and Mondego [at Celorico, Guarda, Lamego, -St. João de Pesqueira], and may live on the last in case of urgent -necessity, but not otherwise, as these stores could not easily be -replaced. An attempt should be made, if possible, to draw the enemy -into the Beira Baixa (i. e. the Castello Branco country) rather than -towards the Douro. Abadia will invade northern Leon; what he can do -depends on the force that Marmont leaves on the Esla, and the strength -of his garrisons at Astorga, Zamora, Toro, &c. Supposing Marmont takes -this direction, Carlos de España will destroy before him all the -bridges on the Yeltes and Huebra, and that of Barba del Puerco, and the -three bridges at Castillejo, all on the Lower Agueda. - -It will be seen that the alternative (2) was Marmont’s own choice, and -that he would have carried it out but for Napoleon’s orders, which -definitively imposed upon him (3_c_) the raid into northern Beira. -With the inconclusive operations resulting from that movement we shall -deal in their proper place. It began on March 27th, and the Marshal -was over the Agueda on March 30th. The last British division had left -Ciudad Rodrigo three weeks before Marmont advanced, so difficult was -it for him to get full and correct information, and to collect a -sufficiently large army for invasion. On the 26th February he was under -the impression that two British divisions only had yet marched for -Badajoz, though five had really started. On March 6th, when only the -5th Division remained in the North, he still believed that Wellington -and a large fraction of his army were in their old positions. This -was the result of his adversary’s wisdom in stopping at Freneda till -March 5th; as long as he was there in person, it was still thought -probable by the French that only a detachment had marched southward. -Hence came the lateness of Marmont’s final advance: for a long time he -might consider that he was, as his master ordered, ‘containing’ several -British divisions and the Commander-in-Chief himself. - -Meanwhile, on taking stock of his situation at Elvas on March 12th, -Wellington was reasonably satisfied. Not only was the greater part -of his army in hand, and the rest rapidly coming up, but the siege -material had escaped all the perils of storms by sea and rocky -defiles by land, and was much where he had expected it to be. The -material which moved by road, the sixteen 24-lb. howitzers which had -marched on January 30th, and a convoy of 24-pounder and 18-pounder -travelling-carriages and stores, which went off on February 2, had -both come to hand at Elvas, the first on February 25th, the second on -March 3, and were ready parked on the glacis. This was a wonderful -journey over mountain roads in the most rainy season of the year. The -sea-borne guns had also enjoyed a surprising immunity from winter -storms; Dickson, when he arrived at Setubal on February 10th, found -that the 24-pounders from Oporto had arrived thirty-six hours before -him, and on the 14th was beginning to forward them by river-boat to -Alcacer do Sal, from where they were drawn by oxen to Elvas, along -with their ammunition[251]. The only difficulty which arose was that -Wellington had asked Admiral Berkeley, commanding the squadron at -Lisbon, to lend him, as a supplementary train, twenty 18-pound ship -guns. The admiral sent twenty Russian guns (leavings of Siniavins’s -squadron captured in the Tagus at the time of the Convention of -Cintra). Dickson protested, as these pieces were of a different calibre -from the British 18-pounder, and would not take its shot. The admiral -refused to disgarnish his own flagship, which happened to be the only -vessel at Lisbon with home-made 18-pounders on board. Dickson had -to take the Russian guns perforce, and to cull for their ammunition -all the Portuguese stores at Lisbon, where a certain supply of round -shot that fitted was discovered, though many thousands had to be -rejected as ‘far too low.’ On March 8th the whole fifty-two guns of -the siege-train were reported ready, and the officer commanding the -Portuguese artillery at Elvas announced that he could even find a small -supplement, six old heavy English iron guns of the time of George II, -which had been in store there since General Burgoyne’s expedition of -1761, besides some Portuguese guns of similar calibre. The old brass -guns which had made such bad practice in 1811 were not this time -requisitioned--fortunately they were not needed. The garrison of Elvas -had for some weeks been at work making gabions and fascines, which -were all ready, as was also a large consignment of cutting-tools from -the Lisbon arsenal, and a train of twenty-two pontoons. Altogether the -material was in a wonderful state of completeness. - - [251] For details see Jones, _Sieges of the Peninsula_, Appendix - in vol. i. pp. 421-5, and the _Dickson Papers_, ed. Leslie, for - Feb. 1812. - -For the service of the siege Wellington could dispose of about 300 -British and 560 Portuguese artillerymen, a much larger force than had -been available at the two unlucky leaguers of 1811. Colonel Framingham -was the senior officer in this arm present, but Wellington had directed -that Alexander Dickson should take charge of the whole service of the -siege, just as he had been entrusted with all the preparations for -it. There were fifteen British, five German Legion, and seventeen -Portuguese artillery officers under his command. The Portuguese gunners -mostly came from the 3rd or Elvas regiment, the British were drawn from -the companies of Holcombe, Gardiner, Glubb, and Rettberg.[252] Under -Colonel Fletcher, senior engineer officer, there were 115 men of the -Royal Military Artificers present at the commencement of the siege, and -an additional party came up from Cadiz during its last days. But though -this was an improvement over the state of things in 1811, the numbers -were still far too small; there were no trained miners whatever, and -the volunteers from the line acting as sappers, who were instructed by -the Artificers, were for the most part unskilful--only 120 men of the -3rd Division who had been at work during the leaguer of Ciudad Rodrigo -were comparatively efficient. The engineer arm was the weak point in -the siege, as Wellington complained in a letter which will have to be -dealt with in its proper place. He had already been urging on Lord -Liverpool the absolute necessity for the creation of permanent units -of men trained in the technicalities of siege-work. Soon after Rodrigo -fell he wrote, ‘I would beg to suggest to your lordship the expediency -of adding to the Engineer establishment a corps of sappers and miners. -It is inconceivable with what disadvantage we undertake a siege, for -want of assistance of this description. There is no French _corps -d’armée_ which has not a battalion of sappers and a company of miners. -We are obliged to depend for assistance of this sort upon the regiments -of the line; and, although the men are brave and willing, they want -the knowledge and training which are necessary. Many casualties occur, -and much valuable time is lost at the most critical period of the -siege[253],’ - - [252] For details see Duncan’s _History of the Royal Artillery_, - ii. pp. 318-19. - - [253] Wellington, _Dispatches_, viii. p. 601. - -The situation on March 12th, save in this single respect, seemed -favourable. It was only fourteen miles from Elvas, where the -siege-train lay parked and the material was ready, to Badajoz. -Sufficient troops were already arrived not only to invest the place, -but to form a large covering army against any attempt of Soult to -raise the siege. There was every reason to believe that the advance -would take the French unawares. Only Drouet’s two divisions were in -Estremadura, and before they could be reinforced up to a strength -which would enable them to act with effect some weeks must elapse. -Soult, as in 1811, would have to borrow troops from Granada and the -Cadiz Lines before he could venture to take the offensive. Unless he -should raise the siege of Cadiz or evacuate Granada, he could not -gather more than 25,000 or 30,000 men at the very most: and it would -take him three weeks to collect so many. If he approached with some -such force, he could be fought, with very little risk: for it was not -now as at the time of Albuera: not three Anglo-Portuguese infantry -divisions, but eight were concentrated at Elvas: there would be nine -when the 5th Division arrived. Not three British cavalry regiments -(the weak point at Albuera), but fourteen were with the army. If Soult -should push forward for a battle, 40,000 men could be opposed to him, -all Anglo-Portuguese units of old formation, while 15,000 men were -left to invest Badajoz. Or if Wellington should choose to abandon the -investment for three days (as Beresford had done in May 1811) he could -bring 55,000 men to the contest, a force which must crush Soult by the -force of double numbers, unless he should raise the siege of Cadiz and -abandon Granada, so as to bring his whole army to the Guadiana. Even if -he took that desperate, but perhaps necessary, measure, and came with -45,000 men, leaving only Seville garrisoned behind him, there was no -reason to suppose that he could not be dealt with. - -The only dangerous possibility was the intervention of Marmont with -five or six divisions of the Army of Portugal, as had happened at the -time of the operations on the Caya in June 1811. Wellington, as we -have seen in his directions to Baccelar and Castaños, thought this -intervention probable. But from the disposition of Marmont’s troops -at the moment of his own departure from Freneda, he thought that he -could count on three weeks, or a little more, of freedom from any -interference from this side. Two at least of Marmont’s divisions -(Souham and Bonnet) would almost certainly be left in the North, to -contain the Galicians and Asturians. Of the other six only one (Foy) -was in the valley of the Tagus: the rest were scattered about, at -Salamanca, Avila, Valladolid, &c., and would take time to collect[254]. -Wellington was quite aware of Marmont’s difficulties with regard to -magazines; he also counted on the roughness of the roads, the fact that -the rivers were high in March, and (most of all) on the slowness with -which information would reach the French marshal[255]. Still, here lay -the risk, so far as Wellington could know. What he could not guess -was that the movement which he feared had been expressly forbidden -to Marmont by his master, and that only on March 27th was permission -granted to the Marshal to execute the march to Almaraz. By that time, -as we have already seen, it was too late for him to profit by the -tardily-granted leave. - - [254] For Wellington’s speculations (fairly correct) as to - Marmont’s distribution of his troops, see _Dispatches_, viii. p. - 618, Feb. 19, to Graham. - - [255] Wellington to Victor Alten, March 5, _Dispatches_, viii. p. - 649, makes a special point of ‘the difficulties which the enemy - experiences in getting intelligence’ as a means of gaining time - for himself. - -But it was the possibility of Marmont’s appearance on the scene, rather -than anything which might be feared from Soult, which made the siege -of Badajoz a time-problem, just as that of Ciudad Rodrigo had been. -The place must, if possible, be taken somewhere about the first week -in April, the earliest date at which a serious attempt at relief was -likely to be made[256]. - - [256] Napier (iv. p. 98) tries to make out that Wellington’s - siege began ten days later than he wished and hoped, by the fault - of the Portuguese Regency. I cannot see how Badajoz could have - been invested on the 6th of March, when (as the route-directions - show) the head of the marching column from the Agueda only - reached Portalegre on the 8th. The movement of the army was not - delayed, so far as I can see, by the slackness of Portuguese - management at Lisbon or Elvas. But Wellington certainly grumbled. - Did he intend that Hill alone should invest Badajoz, before the - rest of the army arrived? - -On March 14th, every preparation being complete, the pontoon train, -with a good escort, moved out of Elvas, and was brought up to a point -on the Guadiana four miles west of Badajoz, where it was laid without -molestation. On the next day Le Marchant’s heavy dragoons crossed, but -(owing to an accident to one of the boats) no more troops. On the 16th, -however, the 3rd, 4th, and Light Divisions passed, and invested Badajoz -without meeting any opposition: the garrison kept within the walls, -and did not even prevent Colonel Fletcher, the commanding engineer, -from approaching for purposes of reconnaissance to the crest of the -Cerro de San Miguel, only 200 yards from the _enceinte_. The investing -corps of 12,000 bayonets was under Beresford, who had just returned -from a short and stormy visit to Lisbon, where he had been harrying -the regency, at Wellington’s request, upon financial matters, and -had been dealing sternly with the Junta de Viveres, or Commissariat -Department[257]. The situation had not been found a happy one. ‘After -a perfect investigation it appears that the expenditure must be nearly -£6,000,000--the means at present are £3,500,000! A radical reform -grounded upon a bold and fearless inquiry into every branch of the -revenue, expenditure, and subsidy, and an addition to the latter -from England, can alone put a period to these evils. To this Lord -Wellington, though late, is now turning his eyes. And when the Marshal, -in conjunction with our ambassador, shall have made his report, it must -be _immediately_ acted upon--for there is no time to lose[258].’ - - [257] D’Urban’s diary, Feb. 7-16: he accompanied Beresford, being - his Chief-of-the-Staff. - - [258] I spare the reader the question of Portuguese paper money - and English exchequer bills, which will be found treated at great - length in Napier, iv. pp. 97-9. Napier always appears to think - that cash could be had by asking for it at London, in despite of - the dreadful disappearance of the metallic currency and spread of - irredeemable bank-notes which prevailed in 1812. - -The investment was only part of the general movements of the army on -the 16th. The covering-force was proceeding to take up its position in -two sections. Graham with the 1st, 6th, and 7th Divisions, and Slade’s -and Le Marchant’s horse, crossed the Guadiana, and began to advance -down the high road to Seville, making for Santa Marta and Villafranca. -Hill with the other section, consisting of his own old troops of the -Estremaduran army, the 2nd Division and Hamilton’s Portuguese, Long’s -British and Campbell’s Portuguese cavalry, marched by the north bank -of the Guadiana, via Montijo, towards Merida, which had not been -occupied by either party since January 17th. These two columns, the -one 19,000, the other 14,000 strong, were to drive in the two French -divisions which were at this moment cantoned in Estremadura--Drouet -was known to be lying about Zafra and Llerena, covering the Seville -_chaussée_, Daricau to have his troops at Zalamea and Los Hornachos, -watching the great passage of the Guadiana at Merida. As each division -with its attendant cavalry was not much over 6,000 strong, there was -no danger of their combining so as to endanger either of the British -columns. Each was strong enough to give a good account of itself. Hill -and Graham were to push forward boldly, and drive their respective -enemies before them as far as the Sierra Morena, so that Soult, when he -should come up from Seville (as he undoubtedly would in the course of a -few weeks), should have no foothold in the Estremaduran plain to start -from, and would have to manœuvre back the containing force in his front -all the way from the summit of the passes to Albuera. - -In addition to these two columns and the investing corps at Badajoz, -Wellington had a reserve of which some units had not yet come up, -though all were due in a few days, viz. the 5th Division, Pack’s and -Bradford’s independent Portuguese brigades, and the cavalry of Bock and -Anson--about 12,000 men--: the last of them would be up by the 21st at -latest. - -There was still one more corps from which Wellington intended to get -useful assistance. This was the main body of the Spanish Army of -Estremadura, the troops of Penne Villemur and Morillo, about 1,000 -horse and 4,000 foot[259], which he destined to play the same part in -this campaign that Blake had played during the last siege of Badajoz. -By Castaños’s leave this little force had been moved from its usual -haunts by Caçeres and Valencia de Alcantara, behind the Portuguese -frontier, to the Lower Guadiana, from whence it was to enter the -Condado de Niebla. It passed Redondo on March 17th on its way towards -San Lucar de Guadiana, feeding on magazines provided by its allies; -Penne Villemur’s orders were that he should establish himself in the -Condado (where there was still a small Spanish garrison at Ayamonte), -and strike at Seville, the moment that he heard that Soult had gone -north towards Estremadura. The city would be found ill-garrisoned by -convalescents, and _Juramentados_ of doubtful loyalty: if it were not -captured, its danger would at any rate cause Soult to turn back, just -as he had in June 1811, for he dared not lose his base and arsenal. It -was hoped that Ballasteros with his roving corps from the mountain of -Ronda would co-operate, when he found that the troops usually employed -to ‘contain’ him had marched off. But Ballasteros was always a ‘law -unto himself,’ and it was impossible to count upon him: he particularly -disliked suggestions from a British quarter, while Castaños was always -sensible and obliging[260]. - - [259] The Conde had 1,114 horse and 3,638 foot on Jan. 1, not - including two of Morillo’s battalions then absent. The total - force used for the raid was probably as above. - - [260] Details in a dispatch to Colonel Austin of March 15, - _Dispatches_, viii, p. 666. General scheme in a letter to - Castaños of Feb. 16. Ibid., p. 614. - -Before dealing with the operations of the actual siege of Badajoz, -which require to be studied in continuous sequence, it may be well to -deal with those of the covering corps. - -Graham marched in two columns, one division by Albuera, two by -Almendral. He ran against the outposts of Drouet at Santa Marta, from -which a battalion and a few cavalry hastily retired to Villafranca, -where it was reported that Drouet himself was lying. Graham judged -that the French general would probably retire towards Llerena by the -main road, and hoped to harass, if not to surprise him, by a forced -night march on that place. This was executed in the night of the -18th-19th, but proved a disappointment: the vanguard of the British -column entered Llerena only to find it empty--Drouet had retired -not southward but eastward, so as to get into touch with Daricau’s -division at Zalamea--he had gone off by Ribera to Los Hornachos. Graham -thereupon halted his main body at Zafra, with the cavalry out as far -as Usagre and Fuente Cantos. A dispatch from Drouet to his brigadier -Reymond was intercepted on the 21st, and showed that the latter, with -four battalions at Fregenal, had been cut off from his chief by the -irruption of the British down the high-road, and was ordered to rejoin -him by way of Llerena. Graham thought that he might catch this little -force, so withdrew his cavalry from Llerena, in order that Reymond -might make his way thither unmolested, and be caught in a trap by -several British brigades converging upon him by a night march. This -operation, executed on the night of the 25th, unfortunately miscarried. -The French actually entered Llerena, but as the columns were closing in -upon them an unlucky accident occurred. Graham and his staff, riding -ahead of the 7th Division, ran into a cavalry picket, which charged -them. They came back helter-skelter on to the leading battalion of -the infantry, which fired promiscuously into the mass, killed two -staff officers, and nearly shot their general[261]. The noise of -this outburst of fire, and the return of their own dragoons, warned -the 1,800 French in Llerena, who escaped by a mountain path towards -Guadalcanal, and did not lose a man. - - [261] ‘Something too like a panic was occasioned at the head of - the 7th by the appearance of the few French dragoons and the - galloping back of the staff and orderlies. A confused firing - broke out down the column without object! Mem.--Even British - troops should not be allowed to load before a night attack.’ - D’Urban’s diary, March 26. - -Improbable as it would have been judged, Drouet had abandoned the -Seville road altogether, and gone off eastward. His only communication -with Soult would have to be by Cordova: clearly he had refused to -be cut off from Daricau: possibly he may have hoped to await in the -direction of Zalamea and Castuera the arrival of troops from the Army -of Portugal, coming down by Truxillo and Medellin from Almaraz. For -Soult and his generals appear to have had no notice of the Emperor’s -prohibition to Marmont to send troops to Estremadura. On the other -hand the Duke of Ragusa had written, in perfect good faith, before -he received the imperial rescript, that he should come to the aid of -Badajoz with four or five divisions, as in June 1811, if the place were -threatened. - -On the 27th Graham resolved to pursue Drouet eastward, even hoping -that he might slip in to the south of him, and drive him northward -in the direction of Merida and Medellin, where he would have fallen -into the arms of Hill’s column. He had reached Llera and La Higuera -when he intercepted another letter--this time from General Reymond -to Drouet; that officer, after escaping from Llerena on the night of -the 25th-26th, had marched to Azuaga, where he had picked up another -detachment under General Quiot. He announced that he was making the -best of his way towards Fuente Ovejuna, behind the main crest of the -Sierra Morena, by which circuitous route he hoped to join his chief. - -Graham thought that he had now another opportunity of surprising -Reymond, while he was marching across his front, and swerving southward -again made a second forced night march on Azuaga. It failed, like that -on Llerena three days before--the French, warned by _Afrancesados_, -left in haste, and Graham’s exhausted troops only arrived in time to -see them disappear. - -Reymond’s column was joined next day at Fuente Ovejuna by Drouet and -Daricau, so that the whole of the French force in Estremadura was -now concentrated--but in an unfavourable position, since they were -completely cut off from Seville, and could only retire on Cordova if -further pressed. Should Soult wish to join them with his reserves, he -would have to march up the Guadalquivir, losing four or five days. - -Graham and his staff were flattering themselves that they had won a -considerable strategical advantage in this matter, when they were -disappointed, by receiving, on March 30, a dispatch from Wellington -prohibiting any further pursuit of Drouet, or any longer stay on the -slopes of the Sierra Morena. The column was ordered to come back and -canton itself about Fuente del Maestre, Almendralejo, and Villafranca. -By April 2nd the three divisions were established in these places. -Their recall would seem to have been caused by Wellington’s knowledge -that Soult had by now concentrated a heavy force at Seville, and that -if he advanced suddenly by the great _chaussée_, past Monasterio and -Fuente Cantos, Graham might be caught in a very advanced position -between him and Drouet, and find a difficulty in retreating to join -the main body of the army for a defensive battle on the Albuera -position[262]. - - [262] For details of this forgotten campaign I rely mainly on - D’Urban’s unpublished diary. As he knew Estremadura well, from - having served there with Beresford in 1811, he was lent to - Graham, and rode with his staff to advise about roads and the - resources of the country. - -Meanwhile Hill, with the other half of the covering army, had been -spending a less eventful fortnight. He reached Merida on March 17 -and found it unoccupied. Drouet was reported to be at Villafranca, -Daricau to be lying with his troops spread wide between Medellin, Los -Hornachos, and Zalamea. Hill crossed the Guadiana and marched to look -for them: his first march was on Villafranca, but Drouet had already -slipped away from that point, avoiding Graham’s column. Hill then -turned in search of Daricau, and drove one of his brigades out of Don -Benito near Medellin. The bulk of the French division then went off to -the south-east, and ultimately joined Drouet at Fuente Ovejuna, though -it kept a rearguard at Castuera. Hill did not pursue, but remained in -the neighbourhood of Merida and Medellin, to guard these two great -passages of the Guadiana against any possible appearance of Marmont’s -troops from the direction of Almaraz and Truxillo. Wellington (it will -be remembered) had believed that Marmont would certainly come down with -a considerable force by this route, and (being ignorant of Napoleon’s -order to the Marshal) was expecting him to be heard of from day to day. -As a matter of fact only Foy’s single division was in the Tagus valley -at Talavera: that officer kept receiving dispatches for his chief from -Drouet and Soult, imploring that Marmont should move south without -delay. This was impossible, as Foy knew; but he became so troubled -by the repeated requests that he thought of marching, on his own -responsibility, to try to join Drouet. This became almost impracticable -when Drouet and Daricau withdrew southward to the borders of Andalusia: -but Foy then thought of executing a demonstration on Truxillo, on his -own account, hoping that it might at least distract Wellington. On -April 4 he wrote to Drouet that he was about to give out that he was -Marmont’s advanced guard, and to march, with 3,000 men only, on that -point, leaving the rest of his division in garrison at Talavera and -Almaraz; he would be at Truxillo on the 9th[263]. If he had started -a week earlier, he would have fallen into the hands of Hill, who was -waiting for him at Merida with four times his force. But the news of -the fall of Badajoz on the 6th reached him in time to prevent him from -running into the lion’s mouth. Otherwise, considering Hill’s enterprise -and Foy’s complete lack of cavalry, there might probably have been -something like a repetition of the surprise of Arroyo dos Molinos. - - [263] The letter may be found in King Joseph’s _Correspondance_, - viii. pp. 345-6. See also Girod de l’Ain’s _Vie militaire du - Général Foy_, pp. 368-9. - -So much for the covering armies--it now remains to be seen how -Wellington dealt with Badajoz, in the three weeks during which Graham -and Hill were keeping the peace for him in southern and eastern -Estremadura. - -On surveying the fortress upon March 16th the British engineers found -that it had been considerably strengthened since the last siege in -June 1811. Fort San Cristobal had been vastly improved--its glacis -and counterscarp had been raised, and a strong redoubt (called by the -French the Lunette Werlé, after the general killed at Albuera) had been -thrown up on the rising slope where Beresford’s breaching batteries -had stood, so that this ground would have to be won before it could be -again utilized. On the southern side of the Guadiana the Castle had -been provided with many more guns, and some parts of the precipitous -mound on which it stood had been scarped. The breach of 1811 had been -most solidly built up. No danger was feared in this quarter--it was -regarded as the strongest part of the defences. The approach toward -the much more accessible bastions just below the Castle had been made -difficult, by damming the Rivillas stream: its bridge near the San -Roque gate had been built up, and the accumulated water made a broad -pool which lay under the bastions of San Pedro and La Trinidad; its -overflow had been turned into the ditch in front of San Pedro, and, by -cutting a _cunette_ or channel, a deep but narrow water obstruction had -been formed in front of the Trinidad also--the broad dry ditch having a -narrow wet ditch sunk in its bottom just below the counterscarp. This -inundation was destined to give great trouble to the besiegers. The -Pardaleras fort had been connected with the city by a well-protected -trench between high earthen banks. Finally the three bastions on the -south side next the river, San Vincente, San José, and Santiago, had -been strengthened by demi-lunes, which they had hitherto lacked, and -also by driving a system of mines from their counterscarps under the -glacis: these were to be exploded if the besiegers should push up their -trenches and breaching batteries close to the walls on this side, -which was one of the weakest in the city, since it was not covered, -as were the other fronts, by outlying works like the Pardaleras and -Picurina forts or the San Roque lunette. The existence of this series -of mines was revealed to the besiegers by a French sergeant-major of -sappers, a skilful draughtsman, who had been employed in mapping out -the works. Having been insulted, as he conceived, by his captain, -and refused redress by the governor, he fled to the British camp in -a rage, and placed his map (where the mines are very clearly shown) -and his services at the disposition of Wellington[264]. The identical -map, a very neat piece of work, lies before me as I write these lines, -having passed into the possession of General D’Urban, the chief of -the Portuguese staff. It was in consequence of their knowledge of -these defences that the British engineers left the San Vincente front -alone[265]. - - [264] This man is mentioned in Wellington’s Dispatches, viii. - p. 609: ‘The _Sergent-major des Sapeurs_ and _Adjudant des - travaux_ and the French miner may be sent in charge of a steady - non-commissioned officer to Estremoz, there to wait till I send - for them.’ - - [265] This renegade’s name must have been Bonin, or Bossin: I - cannot read with certainty his extraordinary signature, with a - _paraphe_, at the bottom of his map. The English engineers used - it, and have roughly sketched in their own works of the third - siege on top of the original coloured drawing. - -The garrison on March 15th consisted of five battalions of French -regulars, one each from certain regiments belonging to Conroux, -Leval, Drouet, and Daricau (2,767 men), of two battalions of the -Hesse-Darmstadt regiment of the Rheinbund division of the Army of the -Centre (910 men), three companies of artillery (261 men), two and a -half companies of sappers (260 men), a handful of cavalry (42 men), a -company of Spanish Juramentados, and (by casual chance) the escort of -a convoy which had entered the city two days before the siege began. -The whole (excluding non-combatants, medical and commissariat staff, -&c.) made up 4,700 men, not more than an adequate provision for such -a large place. The governor, Phillipon, the commandants of artillery -and engineers (the last-named, Lamare, was the historian of the three -sieges of Badajoz), and nearly all the staff had been in the fortress -for more than a year. The battalions of the garrison (though not the -same as those who had sustained the assaults of 1811) had been many -months settled in the place, and knew it almost as well as did the -staff. They were all picked troops, including the German regiment, -which had an excellent record. But undoubtedly the greatest factor -in the defence was the ingenuity and resource of the governor, which -surpassed all praise: oddly enough Phillipon did not show himself a -very skilful mover of troops in the field, when commanding a division -in the Army of Germany in 1813, after his capture and exchange: but -behind the walls of Badajoz he was unsurpassable[266]. - - [266] When he commanded the 1st Division of the 1st Corps - under Vandamme, and was present when that corps was nearly all - destroyed on Aug. 30, 1813, at Culm. - -The scheme of attack which Wellington, under the advice of his -engineers, employed against Badajoz in March 1812 differed entirely -from that of May-June 1811. The fact that the whole was a time-problem -remained the same: the danger that several of the French armies might, -if leisure were granted them, unite for its relief, was as clear as -ever. But the idea that the best method of procedure was to assail -the most commanding points of the fortress, whose capture would make -the rest untenable, was completely abandoned. Fort San Cristobal and -the lofty Castle were on this occasion to be left alone altogether. -The former was only observed by a single Portuguese brigade (first -Da Costa’s and later Power’s). The second was not breached, or even -battered with any serious intent. This time the front of attack was to -be the bastions of Santa Maria and La Trinidad, on the south-eastern -side of the town. The reason for leaving those of San Vincente and -San José, on the south-western side, unassailed--though they were -more accessible, and defended by no outer forts--was apparently the -report of the renegade French sergeant-major spoken of above; ‘they -were countermined, and therefore three or four successive lodgements -would have to be formed against them[267].’ To attack Santa Maria -and the Trinidad a preliminary operation was necessary--they were -covered by the Picurina fort, and only from the knoll on which that -work stands could they be battered with effect. The Picurina was far -weaker than the Pardaleras fort, from whose site a similar advantage -could be got against the bastions of San Roque and San Juan. It must -therefore be stormed, and on its emplacement would be fixed the -batteries of the second parallel, which were to do the main work of -breaching. The exceptional advantage to be secured in this way was that -the counterguard (inner protective bank) within the _glacis_ of the -Trinidad bastion was reputed to be so low, that from the Picurina knoll -the scarp of the bastion could be seen almost to its foot, and could -be much more effectively battered than any part of the defences whose -upper section alone was visible to the besieger. - - [267] Jones, _Sieges of the Peninsula_, i. p. 163. - -Despite, therefore, of the need for wasting no time, and of the fact -that the preliminary operations against the Picurina must cost a day or -two, this was the general plan of attack adopted. The investment had -been completed on the evening of the 16th: on the same day 120 carts -with stores of all kinds marched from Elvas, and on the 17th these were -already being deposited in the Engineers’ Park, behind the Cerro de San -Miguel, whose rounded top completely screened the preparations from the -sight of the garrison. - -The besieged had no notion whatever as to the front which would, on -this third attempt, be selected for the attack of the British. The -elaborate fortifications and improvements made in the Castle and San -Cristobal tend to show that these old points of attack were expected -to be once more assailed. Hence the besiegers got the inestimable -advantage of an unmolested start on the night of March 17th. Colonel -Fletcher had risked the dangers of drawing the first parallel at a very -short distance from the Picurina fort. On a night of tempestuous rain -and high wind, a parallel 600 yards long was picketed out, on a line -ranging only from 160 to 200 yards from the covered-way of the work, -and 1,800 workmen in the course of the night threw up the parallel, and -4,000 feet of a communication-trench, leading backward to the head of -a ravine in the hill of San Miguel, which gave good cover for bringing -men and material up from the rear. Not a shot was fired by the French -all through the night, and at dawn the parallel and approach were -already 3 feet deep and 3 feet 6 inches wide--a good start. - -With daylight the enemy discovered what had been done, and opened a -furious fire both of cannon and musketry upon the trenches. The three -nearest bastions of the fortress joined in with their heavy guns, -but the 18th was a day of such constant rain that even at a distance -of only 500 or 600 yards it was impossible to see much, or take -accurate aim at the trenches. The working parties went on deepening -and improving the parallel and the communication behind it, without -suffering any great loss. - -During the night of the 18th-19th they were able to trace out and begin -two batteries, destined to breach the Picurina, in the line of the -parallel, and to extend it at both ends, from the Rivillas on one side -to the foot of the hill of San Miguel on the other. - -This was visible on the following morning, and Phillipon thought the -prospects of the fort so bad that he resolved to risk a sortie, to -destroy at all costs the trenches which were so dangerously near to -their objective. At midday two battalions--1,000 men--starting from the -lunette of San Roque, dashed up the hill, got into the north end of the -parallel, and drove out the working parties for a distance of some 500 -yards: they carried off many entrenching tools, for which the governor -had offered the _bonus_ of one dollar a piece. But they had no time to -do any serious damage to the parallel, for the guard of the trenches -and the working parties, rallying fifty yards up the hill, came down -on them in force, within a quarter of an hour, and evicted them again -after a sharp tussle. The loss on the two sides was very different--the -British lost 150 men, the besieged 304, of whom many were drowned in -the inundation, while trying to take short cuts through it to the -gates. The effect of the sortie had been practically _nil_, as far as -destroying the works went. During this skirmish Colonel Fletcher was -wounded in the groin by a ball, which hit his purse, and while failing -to penetrate further, forced a dollar-piece an inch into his thigh. He -was confined to his tent for some fourteen days, and his subordinates, -Majors Squire and Burgoyne, had to take up his duty, though Wellington -ordered that he should still retain nominal charge of the work, and -consulted him daily upon it. - -On the next night (March 20th) the parallel and approach against the -Picurina being practically complete, and only the battery emplacements -in it requiring to be finished, the engineers of the besieging army -resolved to continue the line of trenches into the flat ground in -front of the Bastion of San Pedro and the Castle, it being intended -that batteries should be constructed here to play on the Trinidad and -the neighbouring parts of the fortress, when the Picurina should have -fallen. It would save time to have everything ready on this side, when -the fort should have been mastered. Trouble at once began--not only -from the enemy’s fire, which swept all this low ground, but still more -from the continuous bad weather. The rain which had easily run away -from the sloping trenches on the Cerro de San Miguel, lodged in the -new works, could not be drained off, and melted away the earth as fast -as it was thrown up. Mud cast into the gabions ran off in the form of -slimy water, and the parapets could only be kept upright by building -them of sandbags. The men were actually flooded out of the trenches -by the accumulated water, which was almost knee deep. In the rear the -Guadiana rose, and washed away the two bridges which connected the army -with its base at Elvas. The deluge lasted four days and was a terrible -hindrance, it being impossible to finish the parallel in the low -ground, or to begin moving the battering-guns, even those destined for -the long-completed batteries on the Cerro de San Miguel. - -It was not till the afternoon of the 24th that fine weather at last -set in; this permitted the guns to be brought at once into the two -batteries facing the Picurina, and, after herculean efforts, into other -batteries (nos. 4 and 5) in the low ground also. Three days at least -had been lost from the vile weather. - -On the morning of the 25th all the batteries opened simultaneously, -ten guns against the Picurina, eighteen against the parts of the -fortress behind it. The fort was completely silenced, as was the little -lunette of San Roque. Not much damage appeared to have been inflicted -on the Picurina beyond the breaking of many of its palisades, and the -degradation of its salient angle. But Wellington ordered that it should -be stormed that night, in order that he might make up for the lost time -of the 20th-24th. - -The storm was duly carried out by General Kempt and 500 men of the -Light and the 3rd Divisions, at ten o’clock that night. It was a -desperate affair, for the ditch was deep, and not in the least filled -with rubbish, and the scarp was intact save at the extreme salient -angle. Though the garrison’s guns had been silenced, they kept up a -furious fire of musketry, which disabled 100 men before the stormers -reached the ditch. The main hope of the assault had been that two -turning columns might break in at the gorge: but it was found so -strongly closed, with a double row of palisades and a cutting, that all -efforts to force an entrance were repelled with loss. Baffled here, -one party tried the desperate expedient of casting three long ladders, -not into, but _across_ the ditch on the right flank of the fort, which -though deep was not so broad but that a 30-foot ladder would reach from -its lip to the row of fraises, or projecting beams, ranged horizontally -at the top of the scarp some feet below the brim of the parapet. The -ladders sagged down but did not break, and some fifty men headed by -Captain Oates of the 88th ran across on the rungs and got a lodgement -inside the fort. At the same moment General Kempt launched the reserve -of the storming party--100 men, mostly from the 2/83rd and headed by -Captain Powys of that regiment--at the exact salient of the fort, the -only place where it was seriously damaged, and succeeded in breaking -in. The garrison, who made a stubborn resistance, were overpowered--83 -were killed or wounded, the governor, Colonel Gaspard-Thierry, and 145 -taken prisoners, only 1 officer and 40 men escaped into the town. The -losses of the stormers had been over 50 per cent. of the men engaged! -Four officers and 50 rank and file were killed, 15 officers and 250 men -wounded, out of a little over 500 who joined in the assault. Phillipon -tried a sortie from the lunette of San Roque, just as the fort fell, in -hopes to recover it: but the battalion which came out was easily beaten -off by the fire of the men in the trenches to the right, and lost 50 -killed and wounded. - -The last stage of the siege had now been reached. By capturing -the Picurina on its commanding knoll, the British had established -themselves within 400 yards of the Trinidad and 450 yards of the Santa -Maria bastions, which they could batter with every advantage of slope -and ground. But it was a very costly business to make the necessary -lodgement in the ruined fort, to demolish it, and throw its earth in -the reverse direction, and to build in its gorge the two batteries -(nos. 8, 9), which were to breach the body of the place. The fire of -three bastions bore directly on the spot where the batteries were to -be placed, and there was also a most deadly enfilading fire from the -high-lying Castle, and even from the distant San Cristobal. Though the -three batteries in the flat ground (to which a fourth was presently -added) endeavoured to silence this fire, they only succeeded in doing -so very imperfectly, for the French kept replacing one gun by another, -from their ample store, when any were disabled. From the 26th to the -30th four days were employed in building the Picurina batteries, with -great loss of life all the time, which fell mainly on the engineer -officers who were directing the work and on the sappers under their -orders. The French covered the whole of the Picurina knoll with such -a hail of projectiles that no amount of cover seemed to guarantee -those labouring in it from sudden death. When the batteries had been -completed, the bringing forward of the guns and the ammunition cost -many lives more. Twice there were considerable explosions of powder, -while the magazines in the batteries were being filled. - -At last, however, on March 30, one of the two new batteries in the -gorge of the Picurina was able to open, and on the 31st the other -followed suit, supported by a third supplementary battery (no. 7), -planned under the left flank of the fort. The practice was excellent, -but at first the effect was not all that had been hoped: the Trinidad -and the Santa Maria bastions were solidly built and resisted well. On -April 2, however, both began to show considerable and obvious injury, -and it was clear that a few days more would ruin them. But there was -one serious _contretemps_: the inundation between the Picurina and the -fortress showed no signs of going down--it had been swollen by the -rains of the 20th-24th, and could not flow away so long as the dam at -the lunette of San Roque kept it back. While the water was held up, -the breaches, soon about to develop, could only be got at by a narrow -and curved route, between the inundation and the steep slope on which -stands the Pardaleras. It had been intended that the assault should be -delivered from the trenches, but this was impossible till the Rivillas -should have fallen to its usual insignificant breadth and depth. Hence -efforts were made to burst the dam at all costs, but neither did -artillery fire suffice, nor a venturesome expedition on the night of -the 2nd of April by the engineer Lieutenant Stanway and 20 sappers, who -slipped down the ravine and laid powder-bags against the dam, despite -of the French fire. The powder exploded, but did not do its work. For -several days an attempt was made to sap down to the dam from the second -parallel. But it cost so many lives at the head of the sap, and the -zig-zags advanced so slowly, that on the 3rd of April the attempt was -given up, and it was determined that the breaches must be assaulted -from the west bank of the Rivillas only. - -Meanwhile the two breaches, the larger one in the front of the Trinidad -bastion, the smaller in the flank of the Santa Maria, began to be very -apparent, and gave good hope to the besiegers. The French, however, -delayed their progress by the most gallant efforts: 200 men worked in -the ditch after dark, to clear away the débris that was falling into -it. This they did under constant artillery fire from the batteries, -which played on the ditch with grape at intervals in the night, and -killed scores of the workmen. They also deepened the ditch at the foot -of the counterscarp, till it was 18 feet from the covered-way to the -bottom of its level. The ruined parapets were built up every night -with earth and wool-packs, only to be destroyed again every morning. -The garrison began to feel uncomfortable, for not only was the loss of -life great, but the furious fire, by which they strove to keep down the -efficiency of the siege-batteries, had begun to tell so much on their -reserves of ammunition that, by April 3, there was no common shell -left, and very little grape--of the round-shot much more than half had -been expended. Phillipon was obliged to order the artillerymen to be -sparing, or a few days more would leave him helpless. As the French -fire slackened, that of the besiegers grew more intense, and Wellington -put forward the last twelve guns of his siege-park, hitherto reserved, -to form some new supplementary batteries on the right of his line [nos. -10, 11, 12]. - -On April 4th the breaches were both growing practicable, and news from -the South warned Wellington that he must hurry; Soult was at last over -the Sierra Morena with all the troops that he could scrape together -from Andalusia. It was lucky indeed that Marmont was not marching to -join Soult, but was executing a raid into central Portugal, not by -his own wish but by the special orders of the Emperor, as has already -been explained elsewhere. His irruption into the Beira was absolutely -disregarded by Wellington: for as long as the two French armies were -not united, the British commander did not much fear either of them. -Still, if Soult came close up to Badajoz, it would be necessary to send -part of the siege-troops to join the covering force--and this would be -inconvenient. Wherefore Wellington resolved to strike at once, while -Soult was still four or five marches away. - -On the 4th the breaches, both in the Trinidad and in Santa Maria, -looked practicable--on the morning of the 5th they were certainly so. -But the question was raised as to whether the mere practicability of -the breaches was enough to ensure success--it was clearly made out that -the garrisons were building a semicircular inner retrenchment among the -houses of the town, which would cut off the breaches, and give a second -line of resistance. Moreover Colonel Fletcher, who was just out of bed, -his wound of the 19th March being on the mend, reported from personal -observation that it was clear that all manner of obstacles were being -accumulated behind both breaches, and every preparation made for a -desperate defence of them. Wherefore Wellington ordered the storm to -be put off for a day, and turned two batteries on to a new spot, where -Spanish informants reported that the wall of the curtain was badly -built, between Santa Maria and the Trinidad. So true was this report, -that a very few hours battering on the morning of the 6th made a third -breach at this point, as practicable as either of the others. - -To prevent the enemy from getting time to retrench this third opening -into the town, the storm was ordered for 7.30 o’clock on the same -evening--it would have been well if the hour had been kept as first -settled. - - - - -SECTION XXXII: CHAPTER IV - -THE STORM OF BADAJOZ. APRIL 6, 1812 - - -The arrangements which Wellington made for the assault--a business -which he knew would be costly, and not absolutely certain of -success--were as follows. - -The Light and 4th Divisions were told off for the main attack at -the three breaches. They were forced to make it on the narrow front -west of the Rivillas, because the inundation cramped their approach -on the right. The 4th Division, under Colville, was to keep nearest -to that water, and to assail the breach in the Trinidad bastion and -also the new breach in the curtain to its left. The Light Division -was to devote itself to the breach in the flank of Santa Maria. Each -division was to provide an advance of 500 men, with which went twelve -ladders and a party carrying hay-bags to cast into the ditch. For the -counterscarp not being ruined, it was clear that there would be a very -deep jump into the depths. The two divisions followed in columns of -brigades, each with a British brigade leading, the Portuguese in the -centre, and the other British brigade in the rear. Neither division was -quite complete--the 4th having to provide the guard of the trenches -that night, while the Light Division detached some of its rifles, to -distract the attention of the enemy in the bastions to the left, by -lying down on the glacis and firing into the embrasures when their -cannon should open. Hence the Light Division put only 3,000, the 4th -3,500 men into the assault. When the breaches were carried, the Light -Division was to wheel to the left, the 4th to the right, and to sweep -along the neighbouring bastions on each side. A reserve was to be left -at the quarries below the Pardaleras height, and called up when it was -needed. - -In addition to the main assault two subsidiary attacks were to be -made--a third (as we shall see) was added at the last moment. The -guards of the trenches, furnished by the 4th Division, were to try to -rush the lunette of San Roque, which was in a dilapidated condition, -and were to cut away the dam if successful. A much more serious matter -was that, on the express petition of General Picton, he was allowed to -make an attempt to take the Castle by _escalade_. This daring officer -argued that all the attention of the enemy would be concentrated on -the breaches, and that the Castle was in itself so strong that it was -probable the governor would only leave a minimum garrison in it. He had -marked spots in its front where the walls were comparatively low, owing -to the way in which the rocky and grassy slope at its foot ran up and -down. The escalade was to be a surprise--the division was to cross the -Rivillas at a point far below the inundation, where the ruins of a mill -spanned the stream, and was to drag ladders up the steep mound to the -foot of the wall. - -Two demonstrations, or false attacks, were to be made with the -intention of distracting the enemy--one by Power’s Portuguese brigade -beyond the Guadiana, who were to threaten an escalade on the fort -at the bridge-head: the other by the Portuguese of the 5th Division -against the Pardaleras. At the last moment--the order does not appear -in the full draft of the directions for the storm--Leith, commanding -the 5th Division, was told that he might try an escalade, similar to -that allotted to Picton, against the river-bastion of San Vincente, the -extreme north-west point of the defences, and one that had hitherto -been left entirely untouched by the besiegers. For this he was to -employ one of his two British brigades, leaving the other in reserve. - -Every student of the Peninsular War knows the unexpected result of the -storm: the regular assault on the breaches failed with awful loss, but -all the three subsidiary attacks, on San Roque, the Castle, and San -Vincente, succeeded in the most brilliant style, so that Badajoz was -duly taken, but not in the way that Wellington intended. - -The reason why the main assault failed was purely and simply that -Phillipon and his garrison put into the defence of the breaches -not only the most devoted courage, but such an accumulation of -ingenious devices as had never before been seen in a siege of that -generation--apparently Phillipon must share the credit with his -commanding engineer, Lamare, the historian of the siege. The normal -precaution of cutting off the breaches by retrenchments on both sides, -and of throwing up parapets of earth, sandbags, and wool-packs behind -them, was the least part of the work done. What turned out more -effective was a series of mines and explosive barrels planted at the -foot of the counterscarp, and connected with the ramparts by covered -trains. This was on the near side of the ditch, where there was dead -ground unsearched by the besiegers’ artillery. In the bottom of it, -and at the foot of the breaches, had been placed or thrown all manner -of large cumbrous obstacles, carts and barrows turned upside down, -several large damaged boats, some rope entanglements, and piles of -broken gabions and fascines. The slopes of the breaches had been strewn -with crowsfeet, and were covered with beams studded with nails, not -fixed, but hung by ropes from the lip of the breach; in some places -harrows, and doors studded with long spikes, were set upon the slope. -At the top of each breach was a device never forgotten by any observer, -the _chevaux de frise_, formed of cavalry sword-blades[268] set in -foot-square beams, and chained down at their ends. For the defence of -the three breaches Phillipon had told off 700 men, composed of the -light and grenadier companies of each of his battalions, plus the -four fusilier companies of the 103rd Line--about 1,200 men in all. A -battalion of the 88th was in the cathedral square behind, as general -reserve. The two Hessian battalions were on the left, holding the -Castle, the lunette of San Roque, and the San Pedro bastion. The three -other French battalions occupied the long range of bastions from San -Juan to San Vincente. As there had been many casualties, the total of -the available men had sunk to about 4,000, and since nearly half of -them were concentrated at or behind the breaches, the guard was rather -thin at other points--especially (as Picton had calculated) at the -Castle, which, though its front was long, was held by only 250 men, -mostly Hessians. - - [268] These swords were those of the large body of Spanish - dismounted cavalry which had surrendered at the capitulation in - March 1811. - -It was a most unfortunate thing that the time of the assault, -originally fixed for 7.30, was put off till 10--and that the -siege-batteries slacked down after dark. For the two hours thus -granted to the besieged were well spent in repairing and strengthening -all their devices for defence. An earlier assault would have found the -preparations incomplete, especially in the matter of the combustibles -placed in the ditch. - -It would be useless, in the narrative of the doings of this bloody -night, to make any attempt to vie with those paragraphs of lurid -description which make Napier’s account of the storm of Badajoz perhaps -the most striking section of one of the most eloquent books in the -English language. All that will be here attempted is to give a clear -and concise note of what happened between ten and one o’clock on the -night of April 6, 1812, so far as it is possible to secure a coherent -tale from the diaries and memoirs of a number of eye-witnesses. -Burgoyne and Jones of the Royal Engineers, Dickson the commander of the -Artillery, Grattan and McCarthy from the 3rd Division, Leith Hay of -the 5th, and Kincaid, Simmons, and Harry Smith of the Light Division, -along with many more less well-known authorities, must serve as our -instructors, each for the part of the storm in which he was himself -concerned. - -It had been intended, as was said above, that all the columns should -converge simultaneously on their points of attack, and for that reason -the distances between the starting-point of each division and its -objective had been calculated with care. But, as a matter of fact, the -hour of 10 p.m. was not quite accurately kept. On the right Picton’s -division was descried by the French in the Castle as it was lining -the first parallel, and was heavily fired upon at 9.45, whereupon the -general, seeing that his men were discovered, ordered the advance to -begin at once--the 3rd Division was fording the Rivillas under a blaze -of fire from the Castle and the San Pedro bastion before 10 struck -on the cathedral clock. On the other hand, at the western flank, the -officer in charge of the ladder and hay-bag party which was to lead the -5th Division, lost his way along the bank of the Guadiana, while coming -up from the Park to take his place at the head of Leith’s men. The -column had to wait for the ladders, and was more than an hour late in -starting. Only the central attack, on the three breaches, was delivered -with exact punctuality. - -It is perhaps best to deal with this unhappy assault first--it was a -horrible affair, and fully two-thirds of the losses that night were -incurred in it. The two divisions, as ordered, came down the ravine -to the left of the Pardaleras hill without being discovered: the line -of vision from the town was in their favour till they were actually -on the glacis, and heavy firing against Picton’s column was heard as -they came forward. The 4th Division was turning to the right, the Light -Division to the left, just as they drew near the ditch, when suddenly -they were descried, and the French, who were well prepared and had long -been waiting for the expected assault, opened on them with musketry -from all the breaches, and with artillery from the unruined flanking -bastions. The storm began as unhappily as it was to end. The advance -of the 4th Division bearing to the right, came on a part of the ditch -into which the inundation had been admitted--not knowing its depth, -nor that the French had made a six-foot cutting at the foot of the -counterscarp. Many men, not waiting for the ladders, sprang down into -the water, thinking it to be a mere puddle. The leading files nearly -all perished--the regimental record of the Welsh Fusiliers shows -twenty men drowned--that of the Portuguese regiment which was behind -the Fusiliers as many as thirty. Finding the ditch impassable here, -the rest of the 4th Division storming-party swerved to the left, and, -getting beyond the inundation, planted their ladders there: some came -down in this way, more by simply taking a fourteen-foot leap on to the -hay-bags, which they duly cast down. At the same moment the advance -of the Light Division descended in a similar fashion into the ditch -farther to the left, towards Santa Maria. Many men were already at the -bottom, the rest crowded on the edge, where the French engineers fired -the series of fougasses, mines, and powder-barrels which had been laid -in the ditch. They worked perfectly, and the result was appalling--the -500 volunteers who formed the advance of each division were almost all -slain, scorched, or disabled. Every one of the engineer officers set -to guide the column was killed or wounded, and the want of direction, -caused by the absence of any one who knew the topography of the -breaches, had the most serious effect during the rest of the storm. Of -the Light Division officers with the advance only two escaped unhurt. - -There was a horrible check for a minute or two, and then the heads of -the main column of each division reached the edge of the ditch, and -began to leap down, or to make use of those of the ladders which had -not been broken. The gulf below was all ablaze, for the explosions had -set fire to the carts, boats, broken gabions, &c., which the French -had set in the ditch, and they were burning furiously--every man as -he descended was clearly visible to the enemy entrenched on the top -of the breaches. The troops suffered severely as they dribbled over -the edge of the counterscarp, and began to accumulate in the ditch. -From the first there was great confusion--the two divisions got mixed, -because the 4th had been forced to swerve to its left to avoid the -inundation, and so was on ground originally intended for the Light. -Many men mistook an unfinished ravelin in the bottom of the ditch for -the foot of the central breach, and climbed it, only to find themselves -on a mass of earth divided by a wide sunken space from the point -they were aiming at. To get to the foot of the largest breach, that -in the Trinidad bastion, it was necessary to push some way along the -blazing bottom of the ditch, so as to turn and get round the end of the -inundation. The main thrust of the attack, however, went this way, only -part of the Light Division making for the Santa Maria breach, on which -it had been intended that all should concentrate. As to the central -breach in the curtain, it seems that few or none made their way[269] -thither: the disappointment on reaching the top of the ravelin in front -of it, made all who got alive to that point turn right or left, instead -of descending and pushing straight on. Jones records that next morning -there was hardly a single body of an English soldier on the central -breach, while the slopes and foot of each of the two flank breaches -were heaped with hundreds of corpses. This was a misfortune, as the -curtain breach was the easiest of the three, and having been made only -that afternoon was not retrenched like the others. - - [269] This fact, much insisted on by Jones, is disputed by - certain Light Division witnesses, but does not seem to be - disproved by them. - -From ten to twelve the surviving men in the ditch, fed by the coming up -of the rear battalions of each division, and finally by the reserve, -delivered a series of desperate but disorderly attacks on the Trinidad -and Santa Maria breaches. It is said that on no occasion did more -than the equivalent of a company storm at once--each officer as he -struggled to the front with those of his men who stuck to him, tried -the breach opposite him, and was shot down nearer or farther from its -foot. Very few ever arrived at the top, with its _chevaux de frise_ of -sword-blades. The footing among the beams and spikes was uncertain, -and the French fire absolutely deadly--every man was armed with three -muskets. Next morning observers say that they noted only one corpse -impaled on the _chevaux de frise_ of the Trinidad breach, and a few -more under it, as if men had tried to crawl below, and had had their -heads beaten in or blown to pieces. But the lower parts of the ascent -were absolutely carpeted with the dead, lying one on another. - -More than two hours were spent in these desperate but vain attempts -to carry the breaches: it is said that as many as forty separate -assaults were made, but all to no effect--the fire concentrated on the -attacked front was too heavy for any man to face. At last the assaults -ceased: the survivors stood--unable to get forward, unwilling to -retreat--vainly answering the volleys of the French on the walls above -them by an ineffective fire of musketry. Just after twelve, Wellington, -who had been waiting on the hill above, receiving from time to time -reports of the progress of the assault, sent down orders for the recall -of the two divisions. They retired, most unwillingly, and formed up -again, in sadly diminished numbers, not far from the glacis. The only -benefit obtained from their dreadful exertions was that the attention -of the French had been concentrated on the breaches for two hours--and -meanwhile (without their knowledge) the game had been settled elsewhere. - -The losses had been frightful--over one man in four of those engaged: -the Light Division had 68 officers and 861 men killed and wounded out -of about 3,000 present: the 4th Division 84 officers and 841 men out of -3,500. The Portuguese battalions which served with them had lost 400 -men more--altogether 2,200 of the best troops in Wellington’s army had -fallen--and all to no result. - -But while the main stroke failed, each of the subsidiary attacks, -under Picton and Leith, had met with complete success, and despite -of the disaster on the breaches, Badajoz was at Wellington’s mercy by -midnight. The success of either escalade by itself would have been -enough to settle the game. - -Picton’s division, as already mentioned, had been detected by the -French as it was filing into the parallel below the Castle: and since -a heavy fire was at once opened on it, there was no use in halting, -and the general gave the order to advance without delay. The men -went forward on a narrow front, having to cross the Rivillas at the -ruined mill where alone it was fordable. This was done under fire, but -with no great loss. The palisade on the other bank of the stream was -broken down by a general rush, and the storming-party found itself -at the foot of the lofty Castle hill. To get the ladders up it was a -most difficult business--the slope was very steep, almost precipitous -in parts, and the ladders were thirty feet long and terribly heavy. -Though no assault had been expected here, and the preparations were -not so elaborate as at the breaches, yet the besieged were not caught -unprepared, and the column, as it climbed the hill, was torn by cannon -shot and thinned by musketry. The French threw fire-balls over the -wall, and other incandescent stuff (_carcasses_), so there was fair -light by which to see the stormers. Picton was hit in the groin down -by the Rivillas, and the charge of the assault fell to his senior -brigadier, Kempt, and Major Burgoyne of the Engineers. The narrow space -at the foot of the walls being reached, the ladders were reared, one -after the other, toward the south end of the Castle wall. Six being -at last ready in spots close to each other, an attempt was made to -mount, with an officer at the head of each. But the fire was so heavy, -that no man reached the last rungs alive, and the enemy overthrew -all the ladders and broke several of them. One is said to have been -pulled up by main force into the Castle! Meanwhile the besieged cast -heavy stones and broken beams into the mass of men clustering along -the foot of the wall, and slew many. But the 3rd Division was not -spent--Kempt’s brigade had delivered the first rush--Champlemond’s -Portuguese headed the second, when they had climbed the slope--but also -to no effect. Lastly the rear brigade--Campbell’s--came up, and gave -a new impetus to the attack. There was now a very large force, 4,000 -men, striving all along the base of the wall, on a front of some 200 -yards. Wherever footing could be found ladders were reared, now at -considerable distances from each other. The garrison of the Castle was -not large--two Hessian and one French company and the gunners, under -300 men, and when simultaneous attacks were delivered at many points, -some of them were scantily opposed. Hence it came that in more places -than one men at last scrambled to the crest of the wall. A private of -the 45th is said to have been the first man whose body fell inside, -not outside, the battlements--the second, we are told, was an ensign -(McAlpin) of the 88th, who defended himself for a moment on the crest -before he was shot. The third man to gain the summit was Colonel Ridge -of the 5th Fusiliers, who found a point where an empty embrasure made -the wall a little lower, entered it with two or three of his men, and -held out long enough to allow more ladders to be planted behind him, -and a nucleus to gather in his rear. He pushed on the moment that -fifteen or twenty men had mounted, and the thin line of defenders being -once pierced the resistance suddenly broke down--all the remaining -ladders were planted, and the 3rd Division began to stream into the -Castle. Picton was by this time again in command; he had recovered his -strength, and had hobbled up the slope, relieving Kempt, who was by now -also wounded. The time was about eleven o’clock, and the din at the -breaches down below showed that they were still being defended. - -It took some time to dislodge the remainder of the garrison from the -Castle precinct; many took refuge in the keep, and defended it from -stair to stair, till they were exterminated. But by 12 midnight all -was over, and Picton would have debouched from the Castle, to sweep -the ramparts, but for the fact that all its gates, save one postern, -were found to have been bricked up--the French having intended to make -it their last point of resistance if the town should fall. The one -free postern being at last found, the division was preparing to break -out, when the head of its column was attacked by the French general -reserve, a battalion of the 88th, which Phillipon had sent up from the -cathedral square, when he heard that the Castle had been forced. There -was a sharp fight before the French were driven off, in which (most -unhappily) Ridge, the hero of the escalade, was shot dead. By the time -that this was over, Badajoz had been entered at another point, and -Picton’s success was only part of the decisive stroke. But as he had -captured in the Castle all the French ammunition reserve, and nearly -all their food, the town must anyhow have fallen, because of his daring -exploit. The loss of the division was not excessive considering the -difficulties they had overcome, about 500 British and 200 Portuguese -out of 4,000 men engaged. - -Meanwhile, in the valley below the Castle, the guards of the trenches -had stormed the lunette of San Roque, and were hard at work cutting the -dam, so that in an hour or two the inundation was beginning to drain -off rapidly. This also would have been a decisive success, if nothing -else had been accomplished elsewhere. - -The blow, however, which actually finished the business, and caused the -French to fail at the breaches, was delivered by quite another force. -It will be remembered that a brigade--Walker’s--of the 5th Division, -had been directed to escalade the remote river-bastion of San Vincente. -It was nearly an hour late, because of the tiresome mistake made by -the officer charged with the bringing up of the ladders from the Park. -And only at a few minutes past eleven did Leith, heading the column, -arrive before the palisades of the covered way, near the Guadiana. -Walker’s men were detected on the glacis, and a heavy artillery fire -was opened on them from San Vincente and San José, but they threw -down many of the palisades and began to descend into the ditch--a -drop of 12 feet. There was a cut in the bottom, to which water from -the Guadiana had been let in, and the wall in front was 30 feet high. -Hence the first attempts to plant the ladders were unavailing, and many -men fell. But coasting around the extreme north end of the bastion, -close to the river, some officers found that the flank sloped down -to a height of only 20 feet, where the bastion joined the waterside -wall. Three or four ladders were successfully planted here, while the -main attention of the garrison was distracted to the frontal attack, -and a stream of men of the 4th, 30th, and 44th began to pour up them. -The French broke before the flank attack: they were not numerous, for -several companies had been drawn off to help at the breaches, and the -bastion was won. As soon as a few hundred men were formed, General -Walker led them along the ramparts, and carried the second bastion, -that of San José. But the two French battalions holding the succeeding -western bastions now massed together, and made a firm resistance in -that of Santiago. The stormers were stopped, and an unhappy incident -broke their impetus--some lighted port-fires thrown down by the French -artillerymen were lying about--some one called out that they were the -matches of mines. Thereupon the advancing column instinctively fell -back some paces--the French charged and drove them in, and the whole -retired fighting confusedly as far as San Vincente. Here General Leith -had fortunately left a reserve battalion, the 2/38th, which, though -only 230 strong, stopped the panic and broke the French advance. -Walker’s brigade rallied and advanced again--though its commander was -desperately wounded--and once more the enemy were swept all along the -western bastions, which they lost one by one. - -Some of the 5th Division descended into the streets of the town, and -pushing for the rear of the great breaches, by a long détour through -the silent streets, at last came in upon them, and opened a lively fire -upon the backs of the enemy who were manning the retrenchments. The -main body, however, driving before them the garrison of the southern -bastions, hurtled in upon the flank of the Santa Maria. At this moment -the 4th and Light Divisions, by Wellington’s orders, advanced again -towards the ditch, where their dead or disabled comrades were lying so -thick. They thought that they were going to certain death, not being -aware of what had happened inside the city. But as they descended -into the ditch only a few scattering shots greeted them. The French -main body--for 2,000 men had been driven in together behind the -breaches--had just thrown down their arms and surrendered to the 5th -Division. Even when there was no resistance, the breaches proved hard -to mount, and the obstructions at the top were by no means easy to -remove. - -The governor, Phillipon, had escaped into San Cristobal with a few -hundred men, and surrendered there at dawn, having no food and little -ammunition. But he first sent out the few horsemen of the garrison to -run the gauntlet of the Portuguese pickets, and bear the evil news to -Soult. - -Thus fell Badajoz: the best summary of its fall is perhaps that -of Leith Hay, who followed his relative, the commander of the 5th -Division, in the assault on San Vincente:-- - -‘Had Lord Wellington relied on the storming of the breaches alone, the -town would not have been taken. Had General Leith received his ladders -punctually and escaladed at 10, as intended, he would have been equally -successful, and the unfortunate divisions at the breaches would have -been saved an hour of dreadful loss. If Leith had failed, Badajoz would -still have fallen, in consequence of the 3rd Division carrying the -Castle--but not till the following morning; and the enemy might have -given further trouble. Had Picton failed, still the success of the 5th -Division ensured the fall of the place.’ The moral would seem to be -that precautions cannot be too numerous--it was the afterthoughts in -this case, and not the main design, that were successful and saved the -game. - -Wellington himself, in a document--a letter to Lord Liverpool--that -long escaped notice, and did not get printed in its right place in -the ninth volume of his _Dispatches_[270], made a commentary on the -perilous nature of the struggle and the greatness of the losses which -must not be suppressed. He ascribed them to deficiencies in the -engineering department. ‘The capture of Badajoz affords as strong an -instance of the gallantry of our troops as has ever been displayed. But -I greatly hope that I shall never again be the instrument of putting -them to such a test as they were put to last night. I assure your -lordship that it is quite impossible to carry fortified places by _vive -force_ without incurring grave loss and being exposed to the chance of -failure, unless the army should be provided with a sufficient trained -corps of sappers and miners.... The consequences of being so unprovided -with the people necessary to approach a regularly fortified place are, -first, that our engineers, though well-educated and brave, have never -turned their minds to the mode of conducting a regular siege, as it -is useless to think of that which, in our service, it is impossible -to perform. They think that they have done their duty when they have -constructed a battery, with a secure communication to it, which can -breach the place. Secondly, these breaches have to be carried by _vive -force_ at an infinite sacrifice of officers and soldiers.... These -great losses could be avoided, and, in my opinion, time gained in every -siege, if we had properly trained people to carry it on. I declare that -I have never seen breaches more practicable in themselves than the -three in the walls of Badajoz, and the fortress must have surrendered -with these breaches open, if I had been able to “approach” the place. -But when I had made the third breach, on the evening of the 6th, I -could do no more. I was then obliged either to storm or to give the -business up; and when I ordered the assault I was certain that I should -lose our best officers and men. It is a cruel situation for any person -to be placed in, and I earnestly request your lordship to have a corps -of sappers and miners formed without loss of time.’ - - [270] My attention was called to this letter, found among Lord - Liverpool’s papers in 1869, by Mr. F. Turner, of Frome. - -The extraordinary fact that no trained corps of sappers and miners -existed at this time was the fault neither of Wellington nor of the -Liverpool ministry, but of the professional advisers of the cabinets -that had borne office ever since the great French War broke out. The -need had been as obvious during the sieges of 1793-4 in Flanders as in -1812. That the Liverpool ministry could see the point, and wished to -do their duty, was shown by the fact that they at once proceeded to -turn six companies of the existing corps of ‘Royal Military Artificers’ -into sappers. On April 23, less than three weeks after Badajoz fell, -a warrant was issued for instructing the whole corps in military -field-works. On August 4 their name was changed from ‘Royal Military -Artificers’ to ‘Royal Sappers and Miners.’ The transformation was -much too late for the siege of Burgos, but by 1813 the companies were -beginning to join the Peninsular Army, and at San Sebastian they were -well to the front. An end was at last made to the system hitherto -prevailing, by which the troops which should have formed the rank and -file of the Royal Engineers were treated as skilled mechanics, mainly -valuable for building and carpentering work at home stations. - -[Illustration: BADAJOZ] - -One more section, a most shameful one, must be added to the narrative -of the fall of Badajoz. We have already had to tell of the grave -disorders which two months before had followed the storm of Ciudad -Rodrigo. These were but trifling and venial compared with the -offences which were committed by the men who had just gone through the -terrible experiences of the night of April 6th. At Rodrigo there was -much drunkenness, a good deal of plunder, and some wanton fire-raising: -many houses had been sacked, a few inhabitants were maltreated, but -none, it is believed, were mortally hurt. At Badajoz the outrages of -all kinds passed belief; the looting was general and systematic, and -rape and bloodshed were deplorably common. Explanatory excuses have -been made, to the effect that the army had an old grudge against the -inhabitants of the city, dating back to the time when several divisions -were quartered in and about it, after Talavera. It was also said that -all the patriotic inhabitants had fled long ago, and that those who had -remained behind were mainly _Afrancesados_, traitors to the general -cause. There was some measure of truth in both allegations: it was no -doubt true that there had been quarrels in 1809, and that many loyalist -families had evacuated the city after the French occupation, and had -transferred themselves to other parts of Estremadura. The population -at the time of the British storm was not two-thirds of the normal -figure. But these excuses will not serve. There can be no doubt that -the outrages were in no sense reasoned acts of retribution, but were a -simple outburst of ruffianism. - -Old military tradition in all the armies of Europe held that a -garrison which refused to surrender when the breaches had become -practicable was at the mercy of the conqueror for life and limb, -and that a town resisting to extremity was the natural booty of the -stormers. In the eighteenth century there were countless instances of -a fortress, defended with courage up to the moment when an assault -was possible, surrendering on the express plea that the lives of the -garrison were forfeit if it held out, when resistance could no longer -be successful. The attacking party held that all the lives which it -lost after the place had become untenable were lost unnecessarily, -because of the unreasonable obstinacy of the besieged: the latter -therefore could expect no quarter. This was not an unnatural view when -the circumstances are considered. The defender of a wall or a breach -has an immense advantage over the stormer, till the moment when the -latter has succeeded in closing, and in bringing his superior numbers -to bear. In a curious hortatory address which Phillipon published -to his garrison[271], the passage occurs, ‘realize thoroughly that -a man mounting up a ladder cannot use his weapon unless he is left -unmolested: the head comes up above the parapet unprotected, and a -wary soldier can destroy in succession as many enemies as appear at -the ladder-top.’ This is perfectly true: but Phillipon naturally -avoided stating the logical conclusion, viz. that when the stormers -finally succeed in crowning the ramparts, they will be particularly -ill-disposed towards the garrison who have, till the last moment, been -braining their comrades or shooting them through the head at small -risk to themselves. When the assailant, after seeing several of his -predecessors on the ladder deliberately butchered by a man under cover, -gets by some special piece of luck on a level with his adversary, it -will be useless for the latter to demand quarter. If it is a question -of showing mercy, why did not the other side begin? _Que messieurs -les assassins commencent_, as the French humorist remarked to the -humanitarian, who protested against capital punishment for murderers. -There is a grim story of a party of Tuscan soldiers of the 113th Line, -who were pinned into a ravelin on the flank of the lesser breach at -Rodrigo, and after firing to the last minute upon the flank of the -Light Division, threw down their arms, when they saw themselves cut -off, calling out that they were ‘_poveros Italianos_’--’So you’re not -French but _Italians_ are you--then here’s a shot for you,’ was the -natural answer[272]:--reflections as to the absence of any national -enmity towards the victors should have occurred to the vanquished -before, and not after, the breach was carried. The same thing happened -at the Castle of Badajoz to the companies, mainly Hessians, who so long -held down the stormers of the 3rd Division. If the defenders of the -breaches escaped summary massacre, it was because the breaches were not -carried by force, and the main body of the French surrendered some time -after the assault had ceased, and to troops of the 5th Division, who -had not been personally engaged with them. - - [271] Printed in Belmas, iv, Appendix, p. 369, and dated March 26. - - [272] The story may be found in Kincaid, p. 114, and in several - other sources. - -It was universally held in all armies during the wars of the early -nineteenth century that the garrison which resisted to the last moment, -after success had become impossible, had no rights. Ney wrote to the -governor of Ciudad Rodrigo in 1810, ‘further resistance will force -the Prince of Essling to treat you with all the rigour of the laws -of war. You have to choose between honourable capitulation and the -terrible vengeance of a victorious army[273].’ Suchet, in more brutal -words, told the governor of Tortosa that he should put to the sword a -garrison which resisted instead of capitulating ‘when the laws of war -make it his duty to do so, large breaches being opened and the walls -ruined[274].’ A very clear statement of this sanguinary theory is -found in a passage in the Memoirs of Contreras, the unlucky governor -of Tarragona in 1811[275]. ‘The day after the storm General Suchet had -me brought before him on a stretcher [he was severely wounded] and in -presence of his chief officers and of my own, told me in a loud voice -that I was the cause of all the horrors which his troops had committed -in Tarragona, because I had held out beyond the limit prescribed in -the laws of war, and that those laws directed him to have me executed, -for not capitulating when the breach was opened; that having taken the -place by assault he had the right to slay and burn _ad infinitum_.’ -I replied that ‘if it is true that the laws of war state that, if -the besieger gets in, he may deliver to the sword and the flames -town and garrison, and if they therefore suggest as a proper moment -for capitulation that when an assault has become practicable, it is -nevertheless true that they do not prohibit the besieged from resisting -the assault, if he considers that he can beat it off: I had sufficient -forces to hold my own, and should have done so if my orders had been -properly carried out. Therefore I should have been called a coward if -I had not tried to resist, and no law prohibited me from repulsing an -assault if I could.’ - - [273] Document in Belmas, iii. p. 287. - - [274] Ibid., p. 442. - - [275] Published in the collection of _Mémoires sur la guerre - d’Espagne_ in 1821. - -But, as has been pointed out recently[276], Wellington himself may be -quoted in favour of this theory. In a letter written to Canning in -1820 concerning quite another matter, he remarked, ‘I believe that it -has always been understood that the defenders of a fortress stormed -have no claim to quarter, and the practice which prevailed during the -last century of surrendering fortresses when a breach was opened, -and the counterscarp blown in, was founded on this understanding. Of -late years the French availed themselves of the humanity of modern -warfare, and made a new regulation that a breach should stand one -assault at least. The consequence of this regulation of Bonaparte’s -was the loss to me of the flower of my army, in the assaults on Ciudad -Rodrigo and Badajoz. I should have thought myself justified in putting -both garrisons to the sword, and if I had done so at the first, it is -probable that I should have saved 5,000 men at the second. I mention -this to show you that the practice which refuses quarter to a garrison -that stands an assault is not a _useless_ effusion of blood.’ - - [276] By Colonel Callwell, in an article in _Blackwood’s - Magazine_ for September 1913. - -Comparatively few of the garrisons of Rodrigo and Badajoz were shot -down, and those all in hot blood in the moment after the walls were -carried. Suchet’s army was much more pitiless at Tarragona, where a -great part of the Spanish garrison was deliberately hunted down and -slaughtered. But there was, of course, a much more bitter feeling -between French and Spaniards than between English and French. - -The only reason for enlarging on this deplorable theme is that there -was a close connexion in the minds of all soldiers of the early -nineteenth century, from the highest to the lowest ranks, between the -idea that an over-obstinate garrison had forfeited quarter, and the -idea that the town they had defended was liable to sack. This may be -found plainly stated in Lannes’s summons to Palafox at Saragossa in -January 1809[277], in the capitulation-debate before the surrender -of Badajoz in 1811, in Augereau’s address to the inhabitants of -Gerona[278], in Leval’s summons to the governor of Tarifa[279], and -with special emphasis in Suchet’s threatening epistle to Blake on the -day before the fall of Valencia: ‘in a few hours a general assault -will precipitate into your city the French columns: if you delay till -this terrible moment, it will not be in my power to restrain the fury -of the soldiery, and you alone will be responsible before God and man -for the evils which will overwhelm Valencia. It is the desire to avert -the complete destruction of a great town that determines me to offer -you honourable terms of capitulation[280].’ It was hardly necessary -in the Napoleonic era to enlarge on the connexion between storm and -sack--it was presupposed. Every governor who capitulated used to put in -his report to his own government a mention of his ‘desire to spare the -unfortunate inhabitants the horrors of a storm.’ - - [277] See Belmas, ii. p. 381. - - [278] Ibid., ii. pp. 844-5. - - [279] Text in the _Defence of Tarifa_, p. 64, and in Arteche. - - [280] Belmas, iv. p. 202. - -This idea, sad to say, was as deeply rooted in the minds of British as -of French soldiers. It is frankly confessed in many a Peninsular diary. -‘The men were permitted to enjoy themselves (!) for the remainder of -the day,’ says Kincaid in his narrative of the fall of Badajoz, ‘and -the usual frightful scene of plunder commenced, which officers thought -it prudent to avoid for the moment by retiring to the camp[281].’ ‘The -troops were, of course, admitted to the immemorial privilege of tearing -the town to pieces,’ says another writer on another occasion[282]. The -man in the ranks regarded the connexion of storm and sack as so close -that he could write, ‘the prisoners being secured and the gates opened, -we were allowed to enter the town _for the purpose of plundering -it_[283].’ But perhaps the most eye-opening sentence on the subject is -Wellington’s official order of April 7, 1812, issued late in the day, -and when the sack had already been going on for fifteen or eighteen -hours, ‘It is now full time that the plunder of Badajoz should cease; -an officer and six steady non-commissioned officers will be sent from -each regiment, British and Portuguese, of the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and Light -Divisions into the town, at 5 a.m. to-morrow morning, to bring away any -men still straggling there[284].’ - - [281] Kincaid, p. 39. - - [282] Leith Hay, ii. pp. 256-7. - - [283] Memoirs of Donaldson of the 94th, p. 158. - - [284] Wellington, _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. p. 311. - -It was unfortunately the fact that Badajoz was a Spanish and not a -French town, and this adds a special shame to the lamentable outrages -which were perpetrated in its streets for many hours after the storm. -It is comparatively seldom in war that an army takes by assault a town -which does not belong to the hostile power. The only parallel of recent -years to the sack of Badajoz had been that of Lübeck in November -1806. Blücher’s Prussian corps, retiring before the pursuing French, -trespassed on neutral territory by seizing on the old Hanseatic city, -which lay in its way, and endeavouring to defend it. The magistrates -protested, but were powerless, as they had no armed force at their -disposition. Then the French came upon the scene, and, after a fierce -fight, won their way over wall and ditch and took the place. They -sacked it from end to end with every circumstance of atrocity[285]: -Marshal Bernadotte, when importuned by the Burgomaster to stay the -horrors, said that he was sorry, but that his troops only recognized -the fact that they were in a stormed town--he and his officers -could only succeed in calling them off after the city had been half -destroyed. This was sufficiently horrible; but to sack a town belonging -to a friendly nation is a shade worse than to sack a neutral place--and -this the British troops did. - - [285] It is said on good first-hand authority that all the - inmates of an asylum for female lunatics were raped. See - Lettow-Vorbeck, _Geschichte des Krieges von 1806-7_, ii. p. 384. - -Two short quotations from eye-witnesses may serve to show the kind of -scenes that prevailed in Badajoz from the early hours of the morning on -April 7th down to the following night. - -‘Unfortunate Badajoz,’ writes one narrator[286], ‘met with the usual -fate of places taken at the point of the bayonet. In less than an -hour after it fell into our possession it looked as if centuries had -gradually completed its destruction. The surviving soldier, after -storming a town, considers it as his indisputable property, and thinks -himself at liberty to commit any enormity by way of indemnifying -himself for the risking of his life. The bloody strife has made him -insensible to every better feeling: his lips are parched by the -extraordinary exertions that he has made, and from necessity, as well -as inclination, his first search is for liquor. This once obtained, -every trace of human nature vanishes, and no brutal outrage can be -named which he does not commit. The town was not only plundered of -every article that could be carried off, but whatever was useless or -too heavy to move was wantonly destroyed. Whenever an officer appeared -in the streets the wretched inhabitants flocked round him with terror -and despair, embraced his knees and supplicated his protection. But it -was vain to oppose the soldiers: there were 10,000 of them crowding -the streets, the greater part drunk and discharging their pieces in -all directions--it was difficult to escape them unhurt. A couple of -hundred of their women from the camp poured also into the place, when -it was barely taken, to have their share of the plunder. They were, -if possible, worse than the men. Gracious God! such tigresses in the -shape of women! I sickened when I saw them coolly step over the dying, -indifferent to their cries for a drop of water, and deliberately search -the pockets of the dead for money, or even divest them of their bloody -coats. But no more of these scenes of horror. I went deliberately into -the town to harden myself to the sight of human misery--and I have had -enough of it: my blood has been frozen with the outrages I witnessed.’ - - [286] Hodenberg of the K.G.L. See his letters published in - _Blackwood’s Magazine_ for March 1913, by myself. - -Another eye-witness gives a passing glimpse of horrors. ‘Duty being -over, I chanced to meet my servant, who seemed to have his haversack -already well filled with plunder. I asked him where the regiment was: -he answered that he did not know, but that he had better conduct me to -the camp, as I appeared to be wounded. I certainly was hit in the head, -but in the excitement of the escalade had not minded it, nor had I felt -a slight wound in my leg: but, as I began to be rather weak, I took -his advice, and he assisted me on. In passing what appeared to be a -religious house I saw two soldiers dragging out an unfortunate nun, her -clothes all torn: in her agony she knelt and held up a cross. Remorse -seized one of the men, who appeared more sober than the other, and he -swore she should not be outraged. The other soldier drew back a step -and shot his comrade dead. At this moment we found ourselves surrounded -by several Portuguese: they ordered us to halt, and presented their -muskets at us. I said to my servant, “throw them some of your plunder:” -he instantly took off his haversack and threw it among them: some -dollars and other silver coin rolled out. They then let us pass--had -he not done so they would have shot us--as they did several others. We -got safe to the bastion, and my servant carried me on his back to the -camp, where I got a draught of water, fell asleep instantly, and did -not waken till after midday[287].’ - - [287] _Recollections of Col. P. P. Nevill, late Major 63rd_ [but - with the 30th at Badajoz], pp. 15-16. - -‘In justice to the army’--we quote from another authority[288]--’I -must say that the outrages were not general: in many cases they were -perpetrated by cold-blooded villains who had been backward enough in -the attack. Many risked their lives in defending helpless women, and, -though it was rather a dangerous moment for an officer to interfere, -I saw many of them running as much risk to prevent inhumanity as they -did in the preceding night while storming the town.’ The best-known -incident of the kind is the story of Harry Smith of the 95th, who saved -a young Spanish lady in the tumult, and married her two days later, -in the presence of the Commander-in-Chief himself, who gave away the -bride. This hastily-wedded spouse, Juana de Leon, was the Lady Smith -who was the faithful companion of her husband through so many campaigns -in Spain, Belgium, and South Africa, and gave her name to the town in -Natal which, nearly ninety years after the siege of Badajoz, was to be -the scene of the sternest leaguer that British troops have endured in -our own generation. Harry Smith’s narrative of the Odyssey of himself -and his young wife in 1812-14, as told in his autobiography, is one of -the most romantic tales of love and war that have ever been set down on -paper. - - [288] Donaldson of the 94th, p. 159. - -It was not till late in the afternoon of the 7th that Wellington, as -has been already mentioned, came to the rather tardy conclusion that -‘it was now full time that the plunder of Badajoz should cease.’ He -sent in Power’s Portuguese brigade to clear out those of the plunderers -who had not already gone back exhausted to their camps, and erected -a gallows in the cathedral square, for the hanging of any criminals -who might be detected lingering on for further outrages. Authorities -differ as to whether the Provost Marshal did, or did not, put his -power in action: the balance of evidence seems to show that the mere -threat sufficed to bring the sack to an end. The men were completely -exhausted: Napier remarks that ‘the tumult rather subsided than was -quelled.’ - - - - -SECTION XXXII: CHAPTER V - -OPERATIONS OF THE FRENCH DURING THE SIEGE OF BADAJOZ - - -Before proceeding to demonstrate the wide-spreading results of the -fall of the great Estremaduran fortress, it is necessary to follow -the movements of the French armies which had been responsible for its -safety. - -Soult had been before Cadiz when, on March 11, he received news from -Drouet that troops were arriving at Elvas from the North, and on March -20 the more definite information that Wellington had moved out in -force on the 14th, and invested Badajoz on the 16th. The Marshal’s -long absence from his head-quarters at Seville at this moment, when -he had every reason to suspect that the enemy’s next stroke would be -in his own direction, is curious. Apparently his comparative freedom -from anxiety had two causes. The first was his confidence that Badajoz, -with its excellent governor and its picked garrison, could be relied -upon to make a very long defence. The second was that he was fully -persuaded that when the time of danger arrived he could count on -Marmont’s help--as he had in June 1811. On February 7 he wrote to his -colleague[289] that he had just heard of the fall of Rodrigo, that -Wellington’s next movement would naturally be against Badajoz, and that -he was glad to learn that Montbrun’s divisions, on their return from -Alicante, were being placed in the valley of the Tagus. ‘I see with -pleasure that your excellency has given him orders to get in touch -with the Army of the South. As long as this communication shall exist, -the enemy will not dare to make a push against Badajoz, because at -his first movement we can join our forces and march against him for -a battle. I hope that it may enter into your plans to leave a corps -between the Tagus and the Guadiana, the Truxillo road, and the Sierra -de Guadalupe, where it can feed, and keep in touch with the troops -which I keep in the Serena [the district about Medellin, Don Benito, -and Zalamea, where Daricau was cantoned]. I am persuaded that, when -the campaigning season begins, the enemy will do all he can to seize -Badajoz, because he dare attempt nothing in Castille so long as that -place offers us a base from which to invade Portugal and fall upon his -line of communications.... I am bound, therefore, to make a pressing -demand that your left wing may be kept in a position which makes the -communication between our armies sure, so that we may be able, by -uniting our disposable forces, to go out against the enemy with the -assurance of success.’ - - [289] The letter is printed in Marmont’s _Correspondance_, iv. - pp. 304-5. - -This was precisely what Marmont had intended to do. He was convinced, -like Soult, that Wellington’s next move would be against Badajoz, and -he placed Montbrun and the divisions of Foy, Brennier, and Sarrut about -Talavera, Monbeltran, and Almaraz, precisely in order that they might -be in easy touch with Drouet. On February 22 he wrote to his colleague -explaining his purpose in so doing, and his complete acquiescence in -the plan for a joint movement against Wellington, whenever the latter -should appear on the Guadiana[290]. His pledge was quite honest and -genuine, and in reliance on it Soult made all his arrangements. These, -however, appear to have been rather loose and careless: the Marshal -seems to have felt such complete confidence in the combination that he -made insufficient preparations on his own side. No reinforcements were -sent either to Badajoz or to Drouet, whose 12,000 men were dispersed -in a very long front in Estremadura, reaching from Medellin and Don -Benito on the right to Fregenal on the left. This is why Graham, when -he moved forward briskly on March 17th, found no solid body of the -enemy in front of him, but only scattered brigades and regiments, which -made off in haste, and which only succeeded at last in concentrating -so far to the rear as Fuente Ovejuna, which is actually in Andalusia, -and behind the crest of the Sierra Morena. We may add that having been -advised by Drouet as early as March 11th[291] that British troops were -accumulating behind Elvas, Soult ought to have taken the alarm at once, -to have moved back to Seville from Santa Maria by Cadiz, where he lay -on that date, and to have issued orders for the concentration of his -reserves. He did none of these things, was still in front of Cadiz on -March 20[292], and did not prescribe any movement of troops till, on -that day, he received Drouet’s more definite and alarming news that -Wellington was in person at Elvas, and had moved out toward Badajoz on -the 16th. Clearly he lost nine days by want of sufficient promptness, -and had but himself to blame if he could only start from Seville -with a considerable field-force on March 30. All that he appears to -have done on March 11 was to write to Marmont that the long-foreseen -hypothesis of a move of Wellington on Badajoz was being verified, and -that they must prepare to unite their forces. Jourdan has, therefore, -some justification for his remark that he does not see why Soult should -have been before Cadiz, amusing himself by throwing shells into that -place[293] as late as March 20th. - - [290] This Soult quotes in his recriminatory letter to Marmont of - April 8, and in his angry dispatch to Berthier of the same date - (printed in King Joseph’s _Correspondance_, viii. p. 355). - - [291] The date is proved by the letter from Soult to Marmont of - March 11, printed in Marmont’s _Mémoires_, iv. p. 359. - - [292] The date is proved by Soult’s letter to the Emperor of - that date from Santa Maria, in which he announces his intention - to start, and says that he is writing to Marmont, to get him to - unite the armies as soon as possible. - - [293] See his _Mémoires_, p. 377. - -From the 20th to the 30th of that month Soult was busily engaged in -organizing the relief-column which, after picking up Drouet on the -way, was to march to the succour of Badajoz. He could not venture -to touch the divisions of Conroux and Cassagne, which together were -none too strong to provide for the manning of the Cadiz Lines and the -fending off of Ballasteros from their rear. But he called off the -whole division of Barrois, nearly 8,000 strong[294], Vichery’s brigade -of infantry from Leval’s division in the province of Granada[295], -and six regiments of Digeon’s and Pierre Soult’s dragoons. This, with -the corresponding artillery, made a column of some 13,000 men, with -which the Marshal started from Seville on the 30th March, crossed -the Guadalquivir at Lora del Rio next day, and moved on Constantina -and Guadalcanal. An interesting complication would have been caused -if Graham had been allowed to stop with his 19,000 men at Azuaga and -Llerena, where he was directly between Soult and Drouet’s position at -Fuente Ovejuna, and if Hill from Merida had moved against Drouet’s -corps. But as Wellington had withdrawn Graham’s column to Villafranca -on March 31, there was nothing left to prevent Drouet from coming in -from his excentric position, and joining his chief at Llerena on April -4th, with the 12,000 men of his own and Daricau’s divisions. This -gave the Marshal some 25,000 men[296] in hand, a force which would be -manifestly incapable of raising the siege of Badajoz, for he knew that -Wellington had at least 45,000 men in hand, and, as a matter of fact, -the arrival of the 5th Division and other late detachments had raised -the Anglo-Portuguese army to something more like 55,000 sabres and -bayonets. - - [294] To be exact, 7,776 officers and men on March 1. He also - brought with him some ‘bataillons d’élite’ of grenadier companies - from Villatte’s division. - - [295] The 55th, three battalions about 1,500 strong, the fourth - being left at Jaen. Soult says in his dispatch of April 8 that - he took a whole _brigade_ from Leval, but the states of April 14 - show the 32nd and 58th regiments of Leval’s division, and three - of the four battalions of the 43rd, all left in the kingdom of - Granada. Apparently three battalions of the 55th and one of the - 43rd marched, about 2,200 strong. - - [296] Though he calls them only 21,000 in his dispatches. But the - figures [see Appendix no. VIII] show 23,500. The total in the - monthly reports indicate 25,000 as more likely. - -Wellington’s orders, when he heard that Soult was in the passes, and -that Drouet was moving to join him, directed Graham to fall back on the -Albuera position, and Hill to join him there by the route of Lobon and -Talavera Real, if it should appear that all the French columns were -moving directly to the relief of Badajoz, and none of them spreading -out eastward towards the Upper Guadiana[297]. These conditions were -realized, as Soult moved in one solid body towards Villafranca and -Fuente del Maestre: so Hill evacuated Merida, after destroying its -bridge, and joined Graham on the old Albuera ground on April 6th. They -had 31,000 men, including four British divisions and four British -cavalry brigades, and Wellington could have reinforced them from the -lines before Badajoz with two divisions more, if it had been necessary, -while still leaving the fortress adequately blockaded by 10,000 or -12,000 men. But as Soult did not appear at Fuente del Maestre and -Villafranca till the afternoon of April 7th, a day after Badajoz had -fallen, this need did not arise. The Marshal, learning of the disaster, -hastily turned back and retired towards Andalusia, wisely observing -that he ‘could not fight the whole English army.’ It is interesting to -speculate what would have happened if he had lingered five days less -before Cadiz, had issued his concentration orders on the 14th or 15th -instead of the 20th March, and had appeared at Villafranca on the 2nd -instead of the 7th of the next month. His dispatch of April 17 states -that he had intended to fight, despite of odds, to save Badajoz: if he -had done so, and had attacked 40,000 Anglo-Portuguese with his 25,000 -men, he must inevitably have suffered a dreadful disaster. He must -have fought a second battle of Albuera with much the same strength -that he had at the first, while his enemy would have had six British -divisions instead of two, and an equal instead of a wholly inferior -cavalry. The result of such a battle could hardly have failed to be -not only a crushing defeat for the French, but the prompt loss of all -Andalusia; for thrown back on that kingdom with a routed army, and -unable to gather in promptly reserves scattered over the whole land, -from the Cadiz Lines to Granada and Malaga, he must have evacuated his -viceroyalty, and have retreated in haste either on La Mancha or on -Valencia. - - [297] The orders to Hill issued by Wellington on April 4 and 5 - (_Dispatches_, ix. p. 30) contemplate two possibilities: (1) - Soult is marching with his whole force on Villafranca, and Foy is - remaining far away: in this case Hill is to move _en masse_ on - Albuera. This is the case that actually occurred; (2) if Foy is - moving toward the Upper Guadiana, and Soult is showing signs of - extending to join him, Howard’s British and Ashworth’s Portuguese - brigades and Campbell’s Portuguese horse will stay at Merida as - long as is prudent, in order to prevent the junction, and will - break the bridge at the last moment and then follow Hill. - - Wellington, when he wrote his first orders of the 4th to - Hill, was intending to storm Badajoz on the 5th, and knew, by - calculating distances, that Soult could not be in front of - Albuera till the 7th. He ultimately chanced another day of - bombardment, running the time limit rather fine. But there was no - real risk with Graham and Hill at Albuera: Soult could not have - forced them. - -It is most improbable, however, that Soult would really have ventured -to attack the Albuera position[298], in spite of the confident -language of his ex-post-facto dispatches. His whole plan of operations -depended on his being joined by the Army of Portugal, in accordance -with Marmont’s promise of February 22nd. And he was well aware, by a -letter sent by Foy to Drouet on March 31st, and received on April 6th, -that he could expect no help from the North for many weeks, if any -came at all. That Badajoz was never relieved was due, not to Soult’s -delay in concentrating (though this was no doubt unwise), nor to his -over-confidence in Phillipon’s power of resistance, which was (as it -turned out) misplaced. He wrote to Berthier that ‘the garrison wanted -for nothing--it had still food for two months, and was abundantly -provided with munitions: its total strength was 5,000 men: it had -victoriously repulsed three assaults: the men were convinced that, -however great a hostile force presented itself before the breaches, -it would never carry them: Phillipon had been informed on March 28th -that I was marching to his help: the troops were in enthusiastic -spirits, though they had already lost 500 men in successful sorties: my -advanced guard was at only one long day’s march from the place, when it -succumbs!’ It was indeed an _évènement funeste_! - - [298] He says in his letter to Berthier of April 8 that he had - intended (but for the fall of Badajoz) to move by his right that - morning, to the lower course of the Guadajira river--which would - have brought on an action near Talavera Real, lower down the - stream of the Albuera than the battle-spot of May 1811. - -But Soult’s late arrival and miscalculation of the time that the -siege would take, were neither of them the causes of the fall of -Badajoz. It would have fallen none the less if he had arrived on the -Albuera upon April 2nd. The fate of the place was really settled -by Napoleon’s dispatches to Marmont, with which we dealt at great -length in an earlier chapter[299]. The orders of February 11 and -February 21 (received by the Duke of Ragusa on February 26 and March -2 respectively) forbade him to worry about Badajoz, ‘a very strong -fortress supported by an army of 80,000 men,’ and told him to withdraw -to Salamanca two of the three divisions which he was keeping in the -valley of the Tagus, and to reply to any movement of Wellington into -Estremadura by invading Northern Portugal. The plan which Soult and -Marmont had concerted for a joint relief of Badajoz was expressly -forbidden by their master, on his erroneous hypothesis that a thrust at -Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida must bring Wellington home again. Marmont’s -promise of co-operation, sent off on February 22nd to Seville, was -rendered impossible--through no fault of his--by the imperial dispatch -received four days later, which expressly forbade him to stand by it. -‘The English will only go southward if you, by your ill-devised scheme, -keep two or three divisions detached on the Tagus: that reassures them, -and tells them that you have no offensive projects against them.’ So -Marmont, protesting and prophesying future disaster, was compelled to -withdraw two divisions from the central position on the Tagus, and to -leave there only Foy’s 5,000 men--a negligible quantity in the problem. -Nor was this all--he was not even allowed to send them back, since the -whole Army of Portugal was ordered to march into the Beira. - - [299] See chapter ii above, pp. 54, 55. - -Soult, therefore, was justified in his wrath when he wrote to Marmont -that he had been given a promise and that it had been broken, ‘if there -had been the least attempt to concert operations between the armies of -Portugal and the South, the English army would have been destroyed, and -Badajoz would still be in the power of the Emperor. I deplore bitterly -the fact that you have not been able to come to an arrangement with me -on the subject.’ But the wrath should have been directed against the -Emperor, not against his lieutenant, who had so unwillingly been forced -to break his promise. The only censure, perhaps, that can be laid upon -Marmont is that he should have made it more clear to Soult that, by -the new directions from Paris, he was rendered unable to redeem his -pledge. Soult was not, however, without warnings that something of the -kind might happen: Berthier had written to him on February 11th, and -the letter must have arrived by the middle of March, that the Emperor -was displeased to find him appealing for troops of the Army of Portugal -to be moved to Truxillo, and that he ought to be more dependent on his -own strength[300]. It would have been better if the Emperor’s trusty -scribe had explained to Soult that Marmont was expressly forbidden, in -a dispatch written that same day, to keep more than one division on the -Tagus, or to worry himself about the danger of Badajoz. - - [300] Berthier to Soult, Feb. 11. The same date as the fatal - dispatch sent to Marmont, who was given a copy of that to Soult - as an enclosure. - -Marmont’s original plan for joining Soult via Almaraz might have -failed--he himself confesses it in one of his replies to Berthier. But -it was the only scheme which presented any prospect of success. By -making it impossible Napoleon rendered the fall of Badajoz certain. For -it is no defence whatever to point out that his dispatch of March 12th, -which reached Salamanca on March 27, finally gave Marmont the option -of going southward. By that time it was too late to try the move:--if -the Duke of Ragusa had marched for Almaraz and Truxillo next morning, -he would still have been many days too late to join Soult before April -6th, the date on which Badajoz fell. - -Summing up the whole operation, we must conclude that Wellington’s -plan, which depended for its efficacy on the slowness with which -the French always received information, and the difficulty which -they always experienced in concentrating and feeding large bodies of -troops in winter or early spring, was bound to be successful, unless -an improbable conjunction of chances had occurred. If Marmont and -Soult had both taken the alarm at the earliest possible moment, and -had each marched with the strongest possible field army, Soult with -the 25,000 men that he actually collected, Marmont with the three -divisions that lay on the Tagus on March 1st, and three more from -Castile[301], they might have met east of Merida somewhere about the -last days of March. In that case their united strength would have been -from 50,000 to 55,000 men: Wellington had as many, so that he would -not have been bound down to the mere defensive policy that he took -up on the Caya in June-July 1811, when his numbers were decidedly -less than now. But the chance that both Marmont and Soult would do -the right thing in the shortest possible time was unlikely. They -would have had terrible difficulties from the torrential rains that -prevailed in the last ten days of March, and the consequent badness of -the roads. Marmont’s (if not Soult’s) food-problem would have been a -hard one, as he himself shows in several of his letters. Soult got his -first definite alarm on March 11th: Marmont could hardly move till -he had learnt that Wellington had started for Estremadura in person: -till this was certain, he could not be sure that the main body of the -Anglo-Portuguese army was not still behind the Agueda. Wellington only -left Freneda on March 5th, and Marmont did not know of his departure -till some days later. If the two marshals had each issued prompt -concentration orders on March 11, it still remains very doubtful if -they would have met in time to foil Wellington’s object. As a matter of -fact Soult (as we have seen) delayed for nine days before he determined -to concentrate his field-force and march on Badajoz, and this lateness -would have wrecked the combination, even if Marmont had been more ready -than his colleague. - - [301] More probably he would have brought only _two_ divisions - from north of the mountains, as he had to leave Bonnet to look - after the Asturians, and Souham’s single division would hardly - have sufficed to contain the Galicians, the Portuguese, and the - Guerrilleros. - -Still there was some chance that the armies might have joined, if -Napoleon had not intervened with his misguided refusal to allow Marmont -to keep three divisions in the valley of the Tagus or to ‘worry about -affairs that did not concern him.’ Wellington could not know of these -orders: hence came his anxieties, and his determination to hurry the -siege of Badajoz to a conclusion at the earliest possible date. He was -never--as it turned out--in serious danger, but he could not possibly -be aware of the fact that Marmont was fettered by his instructions. It -was only the gradual accumulation of reports proving that the Army of -Portugal was moving against Ciudad Rodrigo, and not on Almaraz, that -finally gave him comparative ease of mind with regard to the situation. -As to Soult, he somewhat over-estimated his force, taking it at 30,000 -or even 35,000 men rather than the real 25,000: this was, no doubt, -the reason why he resolved to fight with his ‘covering army’ ranged on -the Albuera position, and not farther forward. If he had known that -on April 1 Soult had only 13,000 men at Monasterio, and was still -separated from Drouet, he might possibly have been more enterprising. - -No signs of Marmont’s arrival being visible, Wellington could afford -to contemplate with great equanimity Soult’s position at Villafranca -on April 7th. If the Marshal moved forward he would be beaten--but it -was almost certain that he would move back at once, for, as it will -be remembered, precautions had been taken to give him an alarming -distraction in his rear, by means of the operations of Penne Villemur -and Ballasteros[302]. This combination worked with perfect success, -far more accurately than Blake’s similar raid on Seville had done in -June 1811. Ballasteros, it is true, did much less than was in his -power. He started from his refuge under the guns of Gibraltar, passed -down from the Ronda mountains, and reached Utrera, in the plain of the -Guadalquivir less than twenty miles from Seville, on April 4. But he -then swerved away, having done more to alarm than to hurt the French, -though he had a force of 10,000 infantry and 800 horse[303], sufficient -to have put Seville in serious peril. But Penne Villemur and Morillo, -though they had not half the numbers of Ballasteros, accomplished all -that Wellington required: having slipped into the Condado de Niebla -almost unobserved, they pushed rapidly eastward, and occupied San Lucar -la Mayor, only twelve miles from Seville, on April 4, the same day -that Ballasteros appeared at Utrera. Their cavalry pushed up so boldly -toward the suburbs that they had to be driven off by cannon-shot from -the _tête-de-pont_ at the bridge of Triana. General Rignoux, governor -of Seville, had a very motley and insufficient garrison, as Wellington -had calculated when he sent Penne Villemur forth. The only organized -units were a battalion of ‘Swiss’ Juramentados--really adventurers -of all nations--and a regiment of Spanish horse, making 1,500 men -altogether: the rest consisted of convalescents and weakly men -belonging to the regiments in the Cadiz Lines, and of 600 dismounted -dragoons. These made up some 2,000 men more, but many were not fit to -bear arms. In addition there were some companies of the recently raised -‘National Guards.’ The enormous size of Seville, and the weakness -of its old wall, compelled Rignoux to concentrate his force in the -fortified Cartuja convent, leaving only small posts at the gates and -the bridge. He sent at once, as Wellington had hoped, pressing appeals -to Soult, saying that he was beset by 14,000 men, and that the citizens -would probably rise and let in the enemy. - - [302] See above, p. 229. - - [303] Infantry divisions of Cruz Murgeon (5,400 men) and the - Prince of Anglona (4,300 men) and five squadrons of horse, - besides irregulars. - -On the 6th Ballasteros received false news that Conroux was marching -against him with the troops from the Cadiz Lines, and drew back into -the mountains. It is said that he was wilfully deceived by persons in -the French interest; at any rate he must have been badly served by his -cavalry and intelligence officers, who ought to have been able to tell -him that there was no foundation for the report. Penne and Morillo, -however, though disappointed at failing to meet their colleague’s army, -made a great parade of their small force under the walls of Seville, -and skirmished with the French at the bridge-head of Triana, and under -the walls of the Cartuja, so boldly that Rignoux expected a serious -attack. They could only have accomplished something more profitable if -the people of Seville had risen, but no disturbance took place. After -remaining in front of the place all the 7th and 8th of April, they -disappeared on the 9th, having received news of the fall of Badajoz, -and drawn the correct deduction that Soult would turn back to hunt them -when freed from his other task. Wellington, indeed, had written to give -them warning to that effect on the very morning that they retired[304]: -but they anticipated the danger, and were safely behind the Rio Tinto -when Soult turned up in hot haste at Seville on the 11th, after four -days of exhausting forced marches. - - [304] Wellington to Col. Austin from Badajoz, April 9. - -The Marshal had left the two divisions of Drouet and Daricau with -Perreymond’s cavalry in Estremadura, to act as an observing force, -and had marched with his remaining 13,000 men to save Seville, which -owing to Ballasteros’s timidity had never been in any real danger. But -the Spanish diversion had nevertheless had precisely the effect that -Wellington had expected and desired. During Soult’s short absence of -twelve days great part of the open country of Andalusia had fallen out -of his control, the communications with La Mancha and King Joseph had -been cut off, and the guerrilleros had blockaded all the smaller French -posts. The hold of the invaders upon the kingdom was never so secure as -it had been before the fall of Badajoz. - -Ballasteros, after his fiasco in front of Seville, made two fruitless -attempts against isolated French garrisons. He failed at the Castle -of Zahara on April 11th. One of his columns in an assault on Osuna -two days later got into the town and killed or captured 60 of the -defenders, but failed to take the citadel, where the remainder defended -themselves till Pierre Soult was reported to be at hand, and the -Spaniards withdrew[305]. He ended his campaign of raids, however, with -a more successful stroke. Hearing that the brigadier Rey, with three -battalions and some dragoons, was marching from Malaga to relieve -the garrison of Ronda, he fell upon him at Alhaurin on the 14th with -his main body, encompassed him with fourfold strength, and drove him -in rout back to Malaga, capturing his two guns and inflicting more -than 200 casualties upon him[306]. Ballasteros then hoped to seize -on Malaga, where the French were much alarmed, and prepared to shut -themselves up in the citadel of Gibalfaro. But the news that Pierre -Soult and Conroux were approaching with a strong column caused the -Spaniards to retire to the mountains above Gibraltar [April 19th]. Thus -the operations in Andalusia, which had opened with Soult’s march to -Badajoz, came to an end, with no ruinous disaster to the French, but -with a diminution of their prestige, and a distinct weakening of their -hold on the kingdom. In the Condado de Niebla Soult made no attempt -to reoccupy lost ground, and east of Granada his line of posts had -recoiled considerably on the Murcian side: Baza and Ubeda had been -abandoned for good. It was but a vain boast when the Marshal wrote to -Berthier that, after he had set all things to rights in the central -parts of Andalusia, he intended to organize a general concentration to -crush Ballasteros, and that his next task would be to lay siege for a -second time to Tarifa, ‘the loss of which place would be more injurious -to the English and the Insurgents than that of Alicante, or even that -of Badajoz--against which last-named fortress I ought to make no -attack till I shall have finished matters on the Tarifa side, and so -have nothing to fear on my left flank[307].’ - - [305] Napier, I know not on what authority, says that Osuna was - only defended by ‘Juramentados’ who made a gallant resistance - against their own countrymen. But Soult, in a letter to Berthier - dated April 21 from Seville, says that Osuna was held by some - companies of the 43rd Line and a detachment of the 21st Dragoons. - He cannot be wrong. Moreover, the 43rd shows losses at Osuna, - April 13, in Martinien’s tables. - - [306] Martinien’s tables show three officers killed and nine - wounded at ‘Alora near Malaga’ on this date, in the 43rd, 58th - Line, and 21st Dragoons. Soult’s dispatch makes out that only - Rey’s advanced guard under Maransin was cut up, and that the - main body defeated the Spaniards. If so, why did they retreat on - Malaga? - - [307] Soult to Berthier from Seville, April 17, 1812. - -To complete the survey of the fortunes of the Army of the South in -April, it only remains that we should mention the doings of Drouet, -now left once more with his two old divisions to form the ‘corps of -observation’ opposite the Anglo-Portuguese. Soult during his retreat -had dropped his lieutenant at Llerena, with orders to give back on -Seville without fighting any serious action, if the enemy should -pursue him in force, but if he were left alone to hold his ground, -push his cavalry forward, and keep a strong detachment as near the -Upper Guadiana as possible. For only by placing troops at Campanario, -Medellin, and (if possible) Merida, could communication be kept up via -Truxillo and Almaraz with the Army of Portugal. - -As it turned out, Drouet was not to be permitted to occupy such a -forward position as Soult would have liked. He was closely followed -by Stapleton Cotton, with Le Marchant’s and Slade’s heavy and -Ponsonby’s[308] light cavalry brigades, who brought his rearguard -to action at Villagarcia outside Llerena on April 11th. This was -a considerable fight. Drouet’s horse was in position to cover the -retirement of his infantry, with Lallemand’s dragoons in first line, -and Perreymond’s hussars and chasseurs in support. Lallemand evidently -thought that he had only Ponsonby’s brigade in front of him, as Le -Marchant’s was coming up by a side-road covered by hills, and Slade’s -was far out of sight to the rear. Accordingly he accepted battle on an -equal front, each side having three regiments in line. But, just as the -charge was delivered, the 5th Dragoon Guards, Le Marchant’s leading -regiment, came on the ground from the right, and, rapidly deploying, -took the French line in flank and completely rolled it up[309]. The -enemy went to the rear in confusion, and the pursuit was continued -till, half-way between Villagarcia and Llerena, the French rallied on -their reserve (2nd Hussars) behind a broad ditch. Cotton, who had not -let his men get out of hand, re-formed Anson’s brigade and delivered -a second successful charge, which drove the French in upon Drouet’s -infantry, which was in order of battle to the left of Llerena town. It -was impossible to do more, as three cavalry brigades could not attack -12,000 men of all arms in a good position. But a few hours later the -whole French corps was seen in retreat eastward: it retired to Berlanga -and Azuaga on the watershed of the Sierra Morena, completely abandoning -Estremadura. - - [308] This officer was in command of the brigade of Anson, then - absent on leave, which at this time consisted of the 12th, 14th, - and 16th Light Dragoons. - - [309] There is a good account of all this in the admirable diary - of Tomlinson of the 16th, which I so often have had to cite. He - has an interesting note that the 16th in their charge found a - stone wall in their way, and that the whole regiment took it in - their stride, and continued their advance in perfect order (p. - 150). - -The French (outnumbered, if Slade’s brigade be counted, but it was far -to the rear and never put in line) lost 53 killed and wounded and 4 -officers and 132 rank and file taken prisoners. Cotton’s casualties -were 14 killed and 2 officers and 35 men wounded: he insisted that -his success would have been much greater if Ponsonby had held back a -little longer, till the whole of Le Marchant’s squadrons came on the -field--Lallemand would then have been cut off from Llerena and his line -of retreat, and the greater part of his brigade ought to have been -captured, though the light cavalry in the second line might have got -off[310]. However, the affair was very creditable to all concerned. - - [310] Soult only acknowledges a loss of three officers and - about 110 men in his dispatch of April 21 to Berthier, adding - the ridiculous statement that the British had 100 killed and - many more wounded, and that the 5th Dragoon Guards had been - practically destroyed. Martinien’s tables show four French - officers wounded and one killed, but (of course) take no account - of unwounded prisoners. The British lost two missing, men who had - ridden ahead in the pursuit into the French infantry. - -Hill’s infantry did not follow the retreating French, and had halted -about Almendralejo and Villafranca, only the cavalry having gone on in -pursuit to Llerena. The rest of the Anglo-Portuguese army was already -in movement for the North, as Wellington had given up the idea, which -had somewhat tempted him at first, of pursuing Soult to Seville and -trying to upset the whole fabric of French power in Andalusia. Of this -more in its due place. Suffice it to say here that he fell back on his -old partition of forces, leaving Hill in Estremadura as his ‘corps of -observation’, with precisely the same force that he had been given in -1811, save that one British cavalry brigade (that of Slade) was added. -The rest of the corps consisted of the 2nd Division, Hamilton’s two -Portuguese brigades, Long’s British and John Campbell’s Portuguese -horse[311]. The whole amounted to about 14,000 men, sufficient not -only to hold Drouet in check, but also to keep an eye upon the French -troops in the valley of the Tagus, against whom Wellington was now -meditating a raid of the sort that he had already sketched out in his -correspondence with Hill in February. - - [311] This was the brigade formerly under Barbaçena, 4th and 10th - regiments. - -So much for the Army of Andalusia and its fortunes in April 1812. We -must now turn to those of Marmont and the Army of Portugal during the -same critical weeks. - -The Duke of Ragusa, as it will be remembered, had been caught at -Salamanca, on March 27th, by Napoleon’s dispatch giving him an -over-late option of detaching troops to the relief of Badajoz. But -being already committed to the invasion of Portugal prescribed by -the Emperor’s earlier letters, and having his field-force and his -magazines disposed for that project, he had resolved to proceed with -it, though he had no great belief in the results that would follow -from his taking the offensive[312]. As he informed his master, there -was nothing at which he could strike effectively. ‘It would seem that -His Majesty thinks that Lord Wellington has magazines close behind the -frontier of northern Portugal. Not so. These magazines are at Abrantes, -or in Estremadura. His hospitals are at Lisbon, Castello Branco, and -Abrantes. There is nothing of any importance to him on the Coa.’ And -how was Almeida or Ciudad Rodrigo to be assailed in such a way as to -cause Wellington any disquietude, when the Army of Portugal had not a -single heavy gun left? ‘General Dorsenne had the happy idea of leaving -in Rodrigo, a fortress of inferior character on the front of our line, -the whole siege-train prepared for this army at great expense, so that -new guns of large calibre must actually be brought up from France.’ - - [312] Mes dispositions étant faites pour une marche de quinze - jours sur l’Agueda, déjà commencée, je continue ce mouvement, - sans cependant (je le répète) avoir une très grande confiance - dans les résultats qu’il doit donner.’ Marmont to Berthier, March - 27. - -Marmont’s striking force was not so large as he would have wished. -Bonnet was, by the Emperor’s orders, beginning his advance for the -reoccupation of the Asturias. Foy was in the valley of the Tagus. -Souham had to be left on the Esla, to observe the Army of Galicia. -This left five divisions for active operations: but the Marshal came -to the conclusion that he must split up one more (Ferey’s) to hold -Valladolid, Salamanca, Zamora, Toro, Avila, Benavente, and other -places, which in an elaborate calculation sent to Berthier he showed -to require 4,910 men for their garrisons. He therefore marched with -four infantry divisions only [Clausel, Maucune, Sarrut, Brennier] -and 1,500 light cavalry, about 25,000 men in all: his division of -dragoons was left behind in Leon, to keep open communication between -his various garrisons. A rather illusory help was sought by sending to -Foy, who then lay at Almaraz, orders to the effect that he might push -a detachment to Plasencia, and give out that he was about to join the -main army by the pass of Perales. But Foy’s real concern, as he was -told, was to keep up communication with the Army of the South, and to -give any help that was possible on the side of Truxillo, if (by some -improbable chance) the Army of the Centre should be able to lend him -the aid of any appreciable number of battalions. - -On the 30th the French army appeared in front of Rodrigo, and Carlos -de España, leaving 3,000 men as garrison there, under General Vives, -retired with the small remainder of his division towards the Portuguese -frontier. He was pursued and molested by the enemy’s cavalry, not -having been covered or assisted, as Wellington had directed, by Victor -Alten’s regiment of German Hussars. That officer, neglecting his -orders in the most flagrant fashion, did not retire slowly and in a -fighting posture, when the French drove in his line of vedettes in -front of Rodrigo, but collected his regiment and rode hard for Castello -Branco, without concerning himself in the least as to the safety of the -Spanish and Portuguese forces in his neighbourhood, or the procuring of -intelligence as to the strength and the purpose of the French army. His -carelessness or shirking of responsibility, which was to be displayed -in still worse form as the campaign went on, drew on him such a sharp -and bitter rebuke from Wellington that it is a wonder that he was not -sent home forthwith[313]. - - [313] Wellington to V. Alten, April 18, ‘You were desired “not to - be in a hurry,” to give them (España and General Baccelar) your - countenance so far as might be in your power, and to tell them - that you were left in the front for a particular object.... I - beg you to observe that if you had assembled the 1st Hussars at - Pastores on March 30 and April 1, the Agueda being then scarcely - fordable for cavalry, you could have kept open the communications - between Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo.... You wrote on the seventh - from Castello Branco that you knew nothing about the enemy! and - instead of receiving from you (as I had expected) a daily account - of their operations, you knew nothing, and, from the way in which - you made your march, all those were driven off the road who might - have given me intelligence, and were destined to keep up the - communication between me and Carlos de España.’ - -Marmont looked at Rodrigo, but refused to attempt anything against -it, though he was informed that the garrison was undisciplined and -dispirited. Without siege artillery he held that it was useless -to attack the place. After sending in a formal summons to Vives -(who gave the proper negative answer in round terms), and throwing -into the streets a few shells from the howitzers attached to his -field-batteries, he told off Brennier’s division to blockade Rodrigo, -as also to guard a flying bridge which he cast across the Agueda at La -Caridad, a few miles up-stream. - -His next move was to send forward Clausel with two divisions to -investigate the state of Almeida. He had heard that its walls were -unfinished, and thought that there might be some chance of executing a -_coup-de-main_ against it. The general, however, came back next day, -reporting that he thought the scheme impossible. He had apparently been -deterred from pressing in upon the place both by the defiant attitude -of the governor, Le Mesurier, whose outposts skirmished outside the -walls for some time before allowing themselves to be driven in, and -still more by the sight of a considerable force of Portuguese troops -encamped close to the town on the other side of the Coa. This was -Trant’s militia, the first detachment that had got to the front of the -various bodies of troops which Wellington had told off for the defence -of the Beira. They had taken up the strong position behind the bridge -of the Coa, which Craufurd had so obstinately defended against Ney in -July 1810. - -On the alarm being given on March 29th that Marmont was marching -against that province, and not against Galicia or the Tras-os-Montes, -Wellington’s orders suiting that contingency were carried out with more -or less accuracy. Silveira, with the Tras-os-Montes militia and his -small body of regular cavalry, began to move on Lamego, where Baccelar, -the chief commander in the North, had concentrated the regiments from -the Oporto region and the Beira Alta, even before Marmont had left -Salamanca. General Abadia had been requested to press forward against -the French on the Esla, so as to threaten the flank and rear of the -invading army. He did not accomplish much, being convinced that the -forces left opposite him were too strong to be lightly meddled with. -But he directed a raid to be made from the Western Asturias towards -the city of Leon, and the division at Puebla de Senabria threatened -Benavente. Both movements were executed too late to be of any -importance in affecting the course of the campaign. - -Baccelar had been ordered to avoid committing himself to a general -action with any large body of the enemy, but to show such a mass of -troops concentrated that Marmont would have to keep his main body -together, and to act cautiously on the offensive. His primary duty was -to cover, if possible, the large magazines at São João de Pesqueira and -Lamego on the Douro, and the smaller ones at Villa da Ponte, Pinhel, -and Celorico. To these Wellington attached much importance, as they -were the intermediate dépôts from which his army drew its sustenance -when it was on the northern frontier, and he knew that he would be -requiring them again ere many weeks had passed. As long as Marmont -remained near Almeida, it was necessary to keep a force as far forward -as possible, behind the very defensible line of the Coa, and Trant -was advanced for this purpose, though he was directed not to commit -himself. His presence so close to Almeida was very valuable, as he -would have to be driven off before the Marshal formally invested the -place. Le Mesurier, the governor, was not at all comfortable as to -his position: though he had a proportion of British artillery left -with him, the whole of the infantry of the garrison consisted of Beira -militia, who had no experience under arms. On taking over charge of the -place, on March 18, the governor had complained that though the walls -were in a sufficient state of repair, and there were plenty of guns -forthcoming, yet few or none of them were mounted ready for service, -the powder magazines were insufficiently sheltered, and many details -of fortification (palisades, platforms, &c.) had to be completed in a -hurry[314]. However, the place looked so sound for defence when Clausel -reconnoitred it, that--as we have seen--he made no attempt to invest -it, and promptly withdrew, reporting to his chief that Almeida was not -to be taken by a _coup-de-main_. - - [314] For complaints by Le Mesurier as to the defects of the - place when he took over charge of it on March 18, see his letter - of the 28th of the same month, to Wellington, in the Appendix to - Napier, iv. pp. 450-1. - -Marmont then made the move which Wellington had most desired, and -which in his dispatch to Baccelar he had specified as the happiest -thing that could come about. Instead of sitting down before Almeida or -Ciudad Rodrigo, or making a push against the dépôts on the Douro, he -turned southward towards the Lower Beira, and (leaving Brennier behind -to guard communications) marched with three divisions to Sabugal via -Fuente Guinaldo. This policy could have no great results--the Marshal -might ravage the country-side, but such a movement with such a force -could not possibly alarm Wellington overmuch, or draw him away from -the siege of Badajoz if he were determined to persevere in it. There -was nothing of importance to him in central Beira--only minor dépôts -at Celorico and Castello Branco, much less valuable than the larger -ones at Lamego and São João de Pesqueira on the Douro. ‘He can do no -more,’ as an acute observer on the Portuguese staff remarked, ‘than -drive off some cattle, burn some cottages, and ruin a few wretched -peasants[315].’ For the country about the sources of the Zezere and -round Castello Branco is one of the most thinly peopled districts of -Portugal. - - [315] The observation comes from D’Urban’s unpublished Journal. - -To meet Marmont’s southern move Baccelar brought up Trant’s and -Wilson’s militia by a parallel march to Guarda, while Le Cor, with -the two regiments of the Beira Baixa, held on at Castello Branco till -he should be evicted from it. To Wellington’s intense disgust[316], -Victor Alten, whose orders directed him to fall back no farther than -that town, continued his precipitate retreat with the German Hussars -to the bridge of Villa Velha on the Tagus, and began to take measures -to destroy that all-important link of communications between north and -south. Fortunately he was stopped before he had done the damage. The -bridge was only taken over to the south bank, not committed to the -flames. - - [316] Wellington to Alten, _Dispatches_, ix. p. 69. ‘You were - positively ordered by your instructions to go to Castello Branco - and no farther. The reason for this instruction was obvious. - First the militia of Lower Beira would be there in the case - supposed [that of Marmont’s making an invasion south of the - Douro], and they _were_ there. Secondly, as soon as I should - be informed of the enemy’s approach to the Coa, it would be - necessary for me to assemble a force at Castello Branco--of - which the foundation would be the 1st Hussars K.G.L. Yet - notwithstanding my orders you marched from Castello Branco on - the 8th, and crossed the Tagus on the 9th. Till I received your - letter I did not conceive it possible that you could so far - disregard your instructions.’ - -Halting at Sabugal, on April 8th, Marmont sent out flying columns, -which ravaged the country-side as far as Penamacor, Fundão, and -Covilhão, and dispatched Clausel with a whole division against Castello -Branco, the one important place in the whole region. Le Cor evacuated -it on April 12th, after burning such of the magazines as could not be -removed in haste: and Clausel--who occupied it for two days--did not -therefore get possession of the stores of food which his chief had -hoped to find there. In revenge the town and the small proportion of -its inhabitants who did not take to the hills were badly maltreated: -many buildings, including the bishop’s palace, were burnt. - -Hearing that Marmont had dispersed the larger portion of his army with -flying columns, and was lying at Sabugal, on the 12th, with only a few -thousand men, Trant conceived the rash idea that it would be possible -to surprise him, at his head-quarters, by a night march of his own -and Wilson’s combined divisions from Guarda. The distance was about -twenty miles over mountain roads, and the scheme must have led to -disaster, for--contrary to the information which the militia generals -had gathered--the Marshal’s concentrated main body was still stronger -than their own, despite of all his detachments[317]. ‘You could not -have succeeded in your attempt, and you would have lost your division -and that of General Wilson[318],’ wrote Wellington to Trant, when -the scheme and its failure were reported to him a week later. It was -fortunately never tried, owing to Baccelar’s having made objections to -his subordinate’s hare-brained plan. - - [317] I cannot resist quoting here, as an example of Trant’s - over-daring and reckless temperament, his letter to Wilson, - urging him to co-operate in the raid, which was lent me by - Wilson’s representative of to-day:-- - - GUARDA, 11th _April_, 1812. - - MY DEAR WILSON,--I arrived last night. Hasten up your division: - there never was a finer opportunity of destroying a French corps, - in other words and in my opinion, their 2nd Division: but I have - no certainty of what force is the enemy. At any rate send me - your squadron of cavalry, or even _twenty_ dragoons. I am very - ill-treated by Baccelar in regard to cavalry. Push on yourself - personally. You know how happy I shall be in having you once more - as the partner of my operations. Order up everything you can from - Celorico to eat: here there is _nothing_.--Yrs. N. T. - - The French 2nd Division was Clausel’s, as it chanced, the one - that was precisely _not_ at Sabugal, but executing the raid on - Castello Branco. - - [318] Wellington to Trant, _Dispatches_, ix. p. 73. - -But the best comment on the enterprise is that on the very night -(April 13-14) which Trant had fixed for his march, he was himself -surprised by Marmont, so bad had been his arrangements for watching the -country-side. The Marshal had learnt that there was an accumulation -of militia at Guarda threatening his flank, and resolved to give it -a lesson. He started with a brigade each from Sarrut’s and Maucune’s -divisions and five squadrons of light cavalry--about 7,000 men--and -was, at dawn, on the 14th, at the foot of the hill of Guarda, where -he had the good luck to cut off all Trant’s outposts without their -firing a shot--so badly did the militia keep their look-out. ‘Had he -only dashed headlong into the town he might have captured Wilson’s and -my divisions without losing probably a single man,’ wrote Trant. But -the ascent into Guarda was long and steep, and Marmont, who had only -cavalry up, did not guess how careless were his adversaries. He took -proper military precautions and waited for his infantry: meanwhile the -Portuguese were roused, almost by chance as it seems. ‘My distrust of -the militia with regard to the execution of precautions,’ continues -Trant, ‘had induced me at all times to have a drummer at my bedroom -door, in readiness to beat to arms. This was most fortunately the case -on the night of April 13, 1812, for the first intimation that I had of -the enemy being near at hand was given me by my servant, on bringing me -my coffee at daybreak on the 14th. He said that there was such a report -in the street, and that the soldiers were assembling at the alarm -rendezvous. I instantly beat to arms, and the beat being as instantly -taken up by every drummer in the place, Marmont, who was at that very -moment with his cavalry at the entrance of the town, held back. I was -myself the first man out of the town, and he was not then 400 yards -away[319].’ - - [319] Narrative of Trant in Napier’s Appendix to vol. iv. p. 451. - -The Marshal, in his account of the affair, says that the Portuguese -formed up on the heights by the town, apparently ready to fight, but -drew off rapidly so soon as he had prepared for a regular attack on -the position. Wise not quite in time, the two militia generals sent -their men at a trot down the steep road at the back of the place, with -the single troop of regular dragoons that they possessed bringing -up the rear. It had now begun to rain in torrents, and Trant and -Wilson having obtained two or three miles start, and being able to -see no distance owing to the downpour, thought that they had got -off safe. This was not the case: Marmont realized that his infantry -could not catch them, but seeing their hurry and disorder ordered his -cavalry--his own escort-squadron and the 13th Chasseurs--to pursue -and charge the rearguard of the retreating column. They overtook it -by the bridge of Faya, three miles outside Guarda, where the road to -Celorico descends on a steep slope to cross the river. The leading -French squadron scattered the forty dragoons at the tail of Trant’s -division, and rode on, mixed with them, against the rearguard battalion -(that of Oporto). The militiamen, startled and caught utterly by -surprise, tried to form across the road and to open fire: but the rain -had damped their cartridges, and hardly a musket gave fire. Thereupon -the battalion went to pieces, the men nearest the French throwing -down their guns and asking for quarter, while those behind scattered -uphill or downhill from the road, seeking safety on the steep slopes. -The charge swept downhill on to the battalion of Aveiro, and the other -successive units of the Oporto brigade, which broke up in confusion. -Five of their six colours were taken, and 1,500 prisoners were cut off, -while some tumbled into the Mondego and were drowned, by losing their -footing on the steep hillside. Hardly a Frenchman fell, and not very -many Portuguese, for the _chasseurs_, finding that they had to deal -with helpless militiamen who made no resistance, were sparing with -the sabre[320]. The greater part of the prisoners were allowed, in -contempt, to make off, and only a few hundred and the five flags were -brought back to Marmont at Guarda. The pursuit did not penetrate so -far as Wilson’s division, which got across the Mondego while Trant’s -was being routed, and formed up behind the narrow bridge, where the -_chasseurs_, being a trifling force of 400 men, did not think fit to -attack them. The French infantry had marched over twenty miles already -that day, and were dead beat: Marmont did not send them down from -Guarda to pursue, in spite of the brilliant success of his cavalry. - - [320] There is an account of this rout from the French side in - the _Mémoires_ of Parquin, of the 13th Chasseurs, an officer - mentioned in Marmont’s dispatch as having taken one of the flags. - Parquin calls it that of the regiment of _Eurillas_. There was - no such corps: those which lost standards were Aveiro, Oliveira, - and Penafiel. A lengthy account may be found also in Beresford’s - _Ordens do Dia_ for May 7, where blame and praise are carefully - distributed, and the curious order is made that the disgraced - regiments are to leave their surviving flags at home, till they - have washed out the stain on their honour by good service in the - field. - -The day after the ‘Rout of Guarda’ Marmont pushed an advanced guard -to Lagiosa, half-way to Celorico, where Trant and Wilson had taken -refuge, with their ranks short of some 2,000 men scattered in the -hills. Thereupon the militia generals set fire to the stores, and -evacuated Celorico, falling back into the hills towards Trancoso. But -finding that the French were not coming on, they halted; and when they -ascertained that the enemy was actually returning to Guarda, they came -back, extinguished the fires, and rescued great part of the magazines. -Marmont’s unexpected forbearance was caused by the fact that the news -of the fall of Badajoz reached him on the 15th, along with a report -from Clausel (who had just evacuated Castello Branco) that Wellington’s -army had already started northward, and that its advanced guard was -across the Tagus at Villa Velha. - -This was startling, nay appalling, intelligence. Badajoz had been -reckoned good for a much longer resistance, and the news had come -so slowly--it had taken nine days to reach Marmont--that it was -possible that the British army was already in a position to cut off -his expeditionary force from its base on the Agueda. Wherefore Marmont -hastily evacuated Guarda, and was back at Sabugal by the 16th, where -Clausel and the other dispersed fractions of his army joined him. Here -he regarded himself as reasonably safe, but determined to retire behind -the Spanish frontier ere long, raising the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo. -‘My troops,’ he wrote to Berthier on that day, ‘have used up the little -food to be gathered between the Tagus and the Zezere; and now that -the enemy is on the Tagus I cannot possibly remain on the Mondego, as -I should be leaving him on my line of communications. I shall fall -back to the right bank of the Agueda. If the enemy resolves to pursue -me thither I shall fight him. If not I shall fall back on Salamanca, -because of the absolute impossibility of feeding an army between the -Agueda and the Tormes.’ - -Marmont remained at Sabugal and its neighbourhood for nearly a week--by -the 22nd he had drawn back a few miles to Fuente Guinaldo--with about -20,000 men. His position was more dangerous than he knew; for on the -18th the heavy rains, which began on the day of the combat of Guarda, -broke his bridge over the Agueda at La Caridad, so that he was cut off -from Brennier and from Salamanca. He was under the impression that -Wellington had only brought up a couple of divisions against him, and -that these were still south of Castello Branco[321], whereas as a -matter of fact seven had marched; and on the day that he wrote this -incautious estimate Wellington’s headquarters were at Penamacor, the -Light and 3rd Divisions were closing in on Sabugal, the 4th and 5th -were a full march north of Castello Branco, and the 1st, 6th, and 7th -were at Losa, quite close to that city. Thirty-six hours more of delay -would have placed Marmont in the terrible position of finding himself -with a broken bridge behind him, and 40,000 enemies closing in upon his -front and flank. - - [321] Marmont to Berthier: Fuente Guinaldo, April 22. ‘Les - rapports des prisonniers sont que trois divisions de l’armée - anglaise reviennent sur le Coa. Mais cette nouvelle ayant été - donnée avec affectation par les parlementaires, et n’ayant vu - jamais autre chose que le seul 1er de Hussards Allemands, qui - était précédemment sur cette rive, et point d’infanterie, ni rien - qui annonce la présence d’un corps de troupes, je suis autorisé - à croire que c’est un bruit qu’on a fait courir à dessein, et - qu’il n’y a pas d’Anglais en présence. Je suis à peu près certain - qu’il a parti de Portalègre deux divisions, qui se sont portées - à Villa Velha: mais il me paraît évident qu’elles ne se sont - beaucoup éloignées du Tage.’ The actual situation was 1st Hussars - K.G.L. Quadraseyes in front of Sabugal: Light Division, Sabugal: - 3rd Division, Sortelha: 4th Division, Pedrogão, 5th Division, - Alpedrinha; 1st, 6th, 7th Divisions, Losa: Pack’s Portuguese, - Memoa. The map will show what a fearful situation Marmont would - have been in had he halted for another day. - -To explain the situation, Wellington’s movements after the capture -of Badajoz must now be detailed. It had been his hope, though not -his expectation, that Soult might have remained at Villafranca after -hearing of the disaster of the 6th April; in this case he had intended -to fall upon him with every available man, crush him by force of -numbers, and then follow up his routed army into Andalusia, where the -whole fabric of French occupation must have crumpled up. But Soult -wisely retreated at a sharp pace; and the idea of following him as far -as Seville, there to find him reinforced for a general action by all -the troops from the Cadiz Lines and Granada, was not so tempting as -that of bringing him to battle in Estremadura. On the day after the -fall of Badajoz Wellington formulated his intentions in a letter to -Lord Liverpool. ‘It would be very desirable that I should have it in -my power to strike a blow against Marshal Soult, before he could be -reinforced.... But it is not very probable that he will risk an action -in the province of Estremadura, which it would not be difficult for -him to avoid; and it is necessary for him that he should return to -Andalusia owing to the movements of General Ballasteros and the Conde -de Penne Villemur ... if he should retire into Andalusia I must return -to Castille[322].’ - - [322] Wellington to Liverpool, April 7, _Dispatches_, ix. p. 43. - -The reason given by Wellington for his resolve to turn north again was -that Carlos de España had informed him that Ciudad Rodrigo, though -otherwise tenable enough, had only provisions for twenty-three -days, partly from what Wellington called the general policy of -‘Mañana’[323]--of shiftless procrastination--partly from the definite -single fact that a very large convoy provided from the British -magazines on the Douro had been stopped at Almeida on March 30th. This, -in Wellington’s estimation, was the fault of Victor Alten, who, if he -had held the outposts beyond the Agueda for a day longer, might have -covered the entry of the convoy into Ciudad Rodrigo[324]. Marmont’s -operations on the Coa and the Agueda would have been quite negligible -from the strategic point of view but for this one fact. He might -ravage as far as Guarda or Castello Branco without doing any practical -harm, but it could not be permitted that he should starve Rodrigo into -surrender: even allowing for a firm resistance by the garrison, and a -judicious resort to lessened rations, the place would be in danger from -the third week of April onward. Wherefore, unless Marmont withdrew into -Spain by the middle of the month, he must be forced to do so, by the -transference of the main body of the Anglo-Portuguese Army to the North. - - [323] Wellington to Henry Wellesley, April 4, _Dispatches_, ix. - p. 29. - - [324] Wellington to Alten, April 18, _Dispatches_, ix. p. 68, - ‘I beg to observe that if you had assembled the 1st Hussars at - Pastores on the 30th March and 1st April ... you would have kept - open the communication between Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, and - the convoy would probably have got into the latter place.’ - -The Marshal, during the critical days following the fall of Badajoz, -showed no such intention. Indeed he advanced to Sabugal on the 8th, -seized Castello Branco on the 12th, and executed his raid on Guarda -upon the 13th-14th. Ignorant of the fall of Badajoz, he was naturally -extending the sphere of his operations, under the belief that no -serious force was in his front. While he was overrunning Beira Baixa, -Ciudad Rodrigo continued to be blockaded by Brennier, and its stores -were now running very low. - -On April 11th[325] Wellington made up his mind that this state of -things must be brought to an end, and he determined that no mere -detachment should march, but a force sufficient to overwhelm Marmont -if he could be brought to action. The movement began with the march -of the 11th Light Dragoons and Pack’s and Bradford’s Portuguese to -Elvas on the afternoon of the 11th April, all being ordered to move -on Arronches and Portalegre. On the 12th a larger force started off -from the camps around Badajoz and on the Albuera position: the 3rd -and Light Divisions moved (following Pack and Bradford) on Portalegre -via Arronches, the 4th and 5th, making a shorter move, to Campo Mayor -on the same road, the 7th from Valverde to Elvas. The 1st and 6th -under Graham, bringing up the rear, went off on the 13th from Valverde -and Elvas northward. Orders were sent to Stapleton Cotton, then in -pursuit of Drouet in southern Estremadura, to come with Anson’s and Le -Marchant’s cavalry brigades to join the main army, leaving only Slade’s -and Long’s to Hill. Bock’s Heavy Dragoon brigade of the King’s German -Legion was also directed to take part in the general movement. - - [325] The date can be fixed from D’Urban’s Journal: ‘Marmont has - blockaded Rodrigo, reconnoitred Almeida, and has now made an - inroad as far as Fundão: all this obliges a movement toward him. - April 11.’ - -Only Hill, with the troops that had served under him since the summer -of 1811, plus one new cavalry brigade, was left behind in Estremadura -to ‘contain’ Drouet. It was highly unlikely that Soult would be heard -of in that province, as he had his own troubles in Andalusia to keep -him employed. Indeed Wellington in his parting message to this trusty -lieutenant told him that it was ‘impossible’ that the enemy could -assemble enough troops to incommode him at present, and explained that -his chief duty would be to cover the repairing of Badajoz, into which -three Portuguese line regiments[326] under Power, hitherto forming the -garrisons of Elvas and Abrantes, were thrown, to hold it till Castaños -should provide 3,000 Spaniards for the purpose. - - [326] 5th and 17th from Elvas, 22nd from Abrantes. - -The movement of the army marching against Marmont was rapid and -continuous, though it might have been even more swift but for the fact -that the whole long column had to pass the bridge of Villa Velha, the -only passage of the Tagus that lay straight on the way to the Lower -Beira: to send troops by Abrantes would have cost too much time. On -the 16th the Light and 3rd Divisions crossed the bridge, on the 17th -some cavalry and Pack’s and Bradford’s Portuguese, while the 4th, 5th, -and 6th Divisions were now close to the river at Castello de Vide and -Alpalhão, and only the 1st was rather to the rear at Portalegre[327]. -Alten’s German Hussars, picked up at Castello Branco on the 18th by the -head of the column, were the only cavalry which Wellington showed in -his front. This was done on principle: Marmont knew that this regiment -was in his neighbourhood, and if it pressed in upon his outposts, it -told him nothing as to the arrival of new troops opposite him. As we -have already seen, when quoting one of his dispatches[328], he drew the -inference that Wellington intended, and so late as the 22nd believed -that his adversary’s main army was still behind the Tagus, and that at -most two divisions had come up to Villa Velha--but probably no further. - - [327] All these movements are taken from the elaborate tables in - D’Urban’s Journal for these days. - - [328] See above, p. 288. - -Steadily advancing, the column, with the 3rd and Light Divisions -leading, reached Castello Branco on the 17th. They found that it had -been reoccupied on the 15th by Alten’s Hussars and Le Cor’s militia; -but it was in a dreadful state of dilapidation owing to the ravages -of Clausel’s troops during the two days of their flying visit. Clear -information was received that Marmont was still at Sabugal, and his -vedettes lay as far south as Pedrogão. The British staff were in hopes -that he might be caught. ‘His ignorance (as we hope) of the real force -in march against him may end in his destruction,’ wrote D’Urban to -Charles Stewart on the 18th, ‘for he has put the Agueda in his rear, -which the late rains have made impassable: his situation is very -critical. If he discovers his error at once, he may get off by his -left down the Perales road, and so reach Plasencia: but if he does -not, and waits to be _driven_ out of the ground he holds, I don’t see -how he is to get away. Lord Wellington will be all closed up by the -21st; meanwhile he shows little to his front, and avoids giving serious -alarm: the fairest hopes may be entertained of a decisive blow[329].’ - - [329] Letter in the D’Urban Papers. - -It looked indeed as if Marmont was waiting over-long: on the 17th-18th -his exploring parties came as far south as Idanha Nova, where by an ill -chance they captured Wellington’s most famous intelligence-officer, -Major Colquhoun Grant, who there commenced that extraordinary -series of adventures which are told in detail in the life of his -brother-in-law, Dr. McGrigor, Wellington’s chief medical officer. He -escaped at Bayonne, and returned to England via Paris and the boat of a -Breton fisherman[330]. - - [330] See the _Life of Surgeon-General Sir Jas. McGrigor_, pp. - 284-96. I have before me, among the Scovell papers, Grant’s - original signed parole as far as Bayonne, witnessed by General - Lamartinière, the chief of Marmont’s staff. It was captured by - _Guerrilleros_ in Castile, and sent to Wellington. Accompanying - it is the General’s private letter, commending Grant to the - attention of the French police, with the explanation that he was - only not treated as a spy because he was captured in British - uniform, though far in the rear of the French outpost line. - -The rear of the column had dropped behind somewhat, owing to the -incessant rains which had set in from April 14th, and which had broken -Marmont’s bridge four days later. Wellington had given the 4th Division -leave to halt for a day, because of the state of the roads and the -entire want of cover for the night in the desolate tract between -Villa Velha and Abrantes[331]. It reached Castello Branco, however, -on the 20th, on which day only (by some extraordinary mismanagement) -Wellington got the tardy news of Trant’s disaster at Guarda on the -morning of the 14th. And this news was brought not by any official -messenger, but by a fugitive ensign of militia, who garnished it with -all manner of untrue additions--whereupon Beresford had him tried -and shot, for deserting his troops and spreading false intelligence. -Clearly Trant, Wilson, and Baccelar between them should have got the -true narrative to head-quarters before six days had elapsed. - - [331] Wellington to Graham, Castello Branco, April 18, - _Dispatches_, ix. p. 70. - -The 21st April was the critical day of this campaign. Marmont was -still at Fuente Guinaldo, on the wrong side of the Agueda, and his -bridge at La Caridad was still broken and not relaid. Though unaware -that Wellington was close upon him with an overwhelming force, whose -existence he denied (as we have seen) in a letter sent off so late as -the 22nd, he was yet feeling uncomfortable, both because of his broken -communications, and because he had used up his food. Wherefore he gave -orders that his artillery, using very bad side-roads, should pass the -Agueda by the bridge of Villarubia, a small mountain crossing quite -near its source, which would take it, not by the ordinary route past -Ciudad Rodrigo, but by Robledo to Tamames, through a very difficult -country.[332] He himself with the infantry stood fast on the 21st and -22nd, unaware of his dangerous position. - - [332] Marmont to Berthier, Fuente Guinaldo, April 22 [original - intercepted dispatch in Scovell Papers]: ‘J’ai eu la plus grande - peine à faire arriver mon artillerie sur la rive droite de cette - rivière. Les ponts que j’avais fait construire sur l’Agueda - ayant été détruits par les grandes crues d’eau, et n’ayant pas - la faculté de les rétablir, je n’ai su d’autre moyen que de la - diriger par les sources de cette rivière, et les contreforts - des montagnes.’ The wording of Wellington’s intercepted copy - differs slightly from that of the duplicate printed in Ducasse’s - _Correspondence of King Joseph_, viii. pp. 404-10. - -For the allies were closing in upon him--the head-quarters of -Wellington were on the 21st at Pedrogão, the 1st German Hussars, -covering the advance, had reached Sabugal, and the Light and 3rd -Divisions were close behind, as were Pack’s and Bradford’s Portuguese, -while the 4th and 5th were both beyond Castello Branco. On the morning -of the 22nd the head of the infantry column had passed Sabugal, and the -Hussars were in front of them, pushing in Marmont’s vedettes. A delay -of twenty-four hours more on the part of the French would have brought -the armies into collision, when Marmont gave orders for his infantry -to retreat across the Agueda by the fords near Ciudad Rodrigo, where -the water on that day had at last fallen enough to render the passage -possible, though difficult and dangerous. The leading division marched -on the 22nd, the rest on the 23rd: by the night of the latter day all -were across the river, and retiring rapidly on Salamanca; for, as -Marmont truly observed, there was not a ration of food to be got out of -the devastated country between Rodrigo and the Tormes. - -The odd part of this sudden, if long-deferred, retreat was that it -was made without the slightest knowledge that it was imperative, -owing to Wellington’s near approach; in the letter announcing it -to Berthier the Marshal reiterates his statement that he does not -believe that Wellington has a man north of Castello Branco save the -1st Hussars K.G.L. The retreat is only ordered because it is clear -that, with 20,000 men only in hand, it is useless to continue the -tour of devastation in the Beira. ‘Your highness may judge that the -result of the diversion which I have sought to make in favour of the -Army of the South has been practically nil. Such a movement could only -be effective if carried out with a force great enough to enable me -to march against the enemy with confidence, and to offer him battle, -even if he had every available man collected. With 18,000 or 19,000 -men (reduced to 15,000 or 16,000 because I have to leave detachments -to keep up communications) I could not move far into Portugal without -risk, even if I have no one in front of me, and the whole hostile -army is on the farther bank of the Tagus. For if I passed the Zezere -and marched on Santarem, the enemy--master of Badajoz and covered by -the Guadiana--could pass the Tagus behind me, and seize the defiles -of Zarza Major, Perales, and Payo, by which alone I could return.... -There are several places at which he could cross the Tagus, above and -below Alcantara, and so place himself by a rapid and secret movement -that my first news of him would be by the sound of cannon on my line of -communications--and my position would then be desperate[333].’ - - [333] Intercepted dispatch in the Scovell Papers, Fuente - Guinaldo, April 22, quoted above. - -The real danger that was threatening him, on the day that he wrote this -dispatch, Marmont did not suspect in the least, indeed he denied its -existence. But he moved just in time, and was across the Agueda when, -on the 24th, Wellington had his head-quarters at Alfayates, and three -divisions at Fuente Guinaldo, which the French had only evacuated on -the preceding day, with three more close behind. Only the 1st and 6th, -under Graham, were still at Castello Branco and Losa. Evidently if the -fords of the Agueda had remained impassable for another twenty-four -hours, Marmont’s four divisions would have been overwhelmed by superior -numbers and driven against the bridgeless river, over which there would -have been no escape. As it was, he avoided an unsuspected danger, and -returned to Salamanca with his army little reduced in numbers, but with -his cavalry and artillery almost ruined: his dispatch of the 22nd says -that he has lost 1,500 horses, and that as many more needed a long rest -if they were ever again to be fit for service. - -On the 24th Wellington bade all his army halt, the forced marches -which they had been carrying out for the last ten days having failed -to achieve the end of surprising and overwhelming Marmont, who had -obtained an undeserved escape. On the 26th he paid a flying visit to -Ciudad Rodrigo, whose safety he had at least secured, and commended -General Vives for his correct attitude during the three weeks of -the late blockade. The next movements of the allied army belong to -a different series of operations, and must be dealt with in a new -section. - - - - -SECTION XXXIII - -THE SALAMANCA CAMPAIGN - - -CHAPTER I - -KING JOSEPH AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF - - -On March 16, 1812, the day on which Wellington opened his trenches -before Badajoz, the Emperor Napoleon took a step of no small importance -with regard to the control of his armies in Spain. He had now made up -his mind that the long-threatened war with Russia must begin within a -few months, and that he must leave Paris ere long, and move forward -to some central point in Germany, from which he could superintend the -preparations for a campaign, the greatest in scale of any which he -had hitherto undertaken. He was persuaded that war was inevitable: -the Czar Alexander had dared to dispute his will; and in the state of -megalomania, to which his mind had now accustomed itself, he could -tolerate no opposition. Yet he was aware, in his more lucid moments, -that he was taking a great risk. On March 7th Colonel Jardet, Marmont’s -confidential aide-de-camp, was granted an interview, in which he -set forth all the difficulties of the Army of Portugal. The Emperor -heard him out, and began, ‘Marmont complains that he is short of many -resources--food, money, means, &c.... Well, here am I, about to plunge -with an immense army into the heart of a great country which produces -_absolutely nothing_.’ And then he stopped, and after a long silence -seemed suddenly to rouse himself from a sombre reverie, and looking -the colonel in the face asked, ‘How will it all end?’ Jardet, thrown -off his balance by such a searching query, stammered that it would of -course end in the best possible fashion. But he went out filled with -gloomy forebodings, inspired by his master’s evident lack of confidence -in the future[334]. - - [334] See Marmont’s _Mémoires_, iv. p. 202. Jardet’s long report - to Marmont was captured on its journey out to Salamanca from - Paris, and lies among the Scovell Papers. - -Some weeks were yet to elapse before the Emperor’s actual departure -from France; but, ere he went, he had to set in good working order the -conduct of his policy during his absence, and of all its complicated -machinery the Spanish section was one of the most puzzling and the -most apt to get out of order. It was clearly impossible that he should -continue to send from Dresden or Wilna elaborate orders every five -or ten days, as he had been wont to do from Paris. If it took three -weeks to get an order to Seville in February, it might take five or -six in July, when the imperial head-quarters might be in some obscure -Lithuanian hamlet. Something must be done to solve the problem of -continuous policy, and of co-operation between the five armies of -Spain, and after much consideration the Emperor dictated to Berthier -the solution which he thought least bad--’Send by special messenger a -dispatch to the King of Spain, informing him that I confide to him the -command of all my Spanish armies, and that Marshal Jourdan will serve -as his Chief-of-the-Staff. You will send, at the same time, a similar -intimation to that marshal. You will inform the King that I shall keep -him advised of my political intentions through my ambassador at Madrid. -You will write to Marshal Suchet, to the Duke of Dalmatia, and the -Duke of Ragusa that I have entrusted the King with the charge of all -my armies in his realm, and that they will have to conform to all the -orders which they may receive from the King, to secure the co-operation -of their armies. You will write, in particular, to the Duke of Ragusa -that the necessity for obtaining common action between the Armies of -the South, of Valencia, and of Portugal, has determined me to give -the King of Spain control over all of them, and that he will have to -regulate his operations by the instructions which he will receive. -To-morrow you will write in greater detail to the King, but the special -messenger must start this very night for Bayonne[335].’ - - [335] King Joseph had been prepared for the formal proposal by a - tentative letter sent off to him about three weeks earlier, on - February 19, inquiring whether it would suit him to have Jourdan - as his Chief-of-the-Staff, supposing that the Emperor went off to - Russia and turned over the command in Spain to him. See Ducasse’s - _Correspondence_, ix. p. 322. - -Of the bundle of dispatches that for the King was delivered at Madrid -on March 28th, after twelve days of travel. Marmont got his a little -later, as he had started on his Portuguese expedition when it reached -Salamanca. Communication between his field-force and his base being -difficult, owing to the activity of Julian Sanchez, it appears to have -been on March 30, when before Ciudad Rodrigo, that he became aware -that he had a new commander-in-chief[336]. Soult was apprised of the -situation much later, because, when preparing for his expedition to -relieve Badajoz, he had ordered his posts in the Sierra Morena to be -evacuated, and the communication with La Mancha to be broken off for -the moment. It seems that he must have got Berthier’s dispatch quite -late in April, as on the 17th of that month he was only acknowledging -Paris letters of February 23rd[337], and the first courier from Madrid -got through only some time later. Suchet would appear also to have been -advised of the change of command very late--he published the imperial -decree in his official gazette at Valencia only on May 10, giving as -its date the 29th instead of the 16th of March[338], which looks as -if the first copy sent to him had miscarried, and the repetition made -thirteen days later had alone reached him. These dates are only worth -giving as illustrations of the extreme difficulty of getting orders -from point to point in Spain during the French occupation, even when -Andalusia and Valencia were supposed to be thoroughly subdued. - - [336] This is proved by Berthier’s letter to King Joseph of April - 16 (Ducasse’s _Correspondence of King Joseph_, viii. p. 382), - which says that he has just received Marmont’s dispatch of March - 30 acknowledging his own of March 16, and that the Marshal now - knows that he must obey orders from Madrid. - - [337] Soult to Berthier from Seville, April 17. - - [338] A copy of this print is among the Scovell Papers: it does - credit to the Valencian press by its neat appearance. - -It will be noted that in Napoleon’s instructions to Berthier no mention -is made of either the Army of Catalonia or the Army of the North[339]; -and it might have been thought that, clinging to the theory of his -paper annexation of Spain north of the Ebro, he was deliberately -exempting from the King’s control the troops in the districts on which -he had resolved to lay hands for his own benefit. But a supplementary -dispatch of April 23rd placed Decaen and the garrison of Catalonia -under the general charge of Suchet, and as that marshal had been -directed to obey King Joseph’s military instructions, the four new -‘French’ departments on the Ebro were now theoretically under the same -general command as the rest of Spain. As to the Army of the North, -Dorsenne wrote (April 19th), with evident glee, to say that he was -exempted from obedience to the King, by not being included in the list -of recipients of the dispatch of March 16, and that he regretted his -inability to carry out a series of orders which Jourdan had sent him. -But he had not many more days to serve in his present capacity, and his -successor, Caffarelli, though equally recalcitrant in spirit, presently -received a formal notice that he was under King Joseph’s command. - - [339] The question about the Army of the North is a very curious - one. The authorized copy of the dispatch of May 16, printed in - Napoleon’s correspondence and in Ducasse’s _Correspondence of - King Joseph_, certainly omits its name. But the King declared - that in his original copy of it Dorsenne and his army were - mentioned as put under his charge. In one of the intercepted - dispatches in the Scovell Papers, Joseph writes angrily to - Berthier, giving what purports to be a verbatim duplicate of the - document, and in this duplicate, which lies before my eyes as I - write this, the Army of the North _is_ cited with the rest. - -Napoleon’s general policy in placing the supreme control of all the -Spanish armies in the hands of one chief, and bringing to an end (in -theory at least) the system of separate viceroyalties was undoubtedly -the right one. And it cannot be disputed that one second-rate -commander-in-chief is more effective than four good ones, working each -for his own private and local profit and glory. But in this particular -case the new arrangement was not likely to bring about any great change -for the better, owing to the personal equation. During the last three -years Napoleon had been inflicting affronts at short intervals upon his -brother, had annexed integral portions of his realm, had disregarded -most of his complaints and suggestions, and had allowed him to become -the butt of the viceroys, whose insults and injuries he had never -been allowed to resent. They had raided the districts assigned to his -personal governance[340], had plundered his magazines, imprisoned his -officials, and set up courts of justice of their own to supersede the -regular magistracy of the land. The Emperor had never punished such -proceedings; at the most he had ordered that they should cease, when -they were injurious to the progress of the French arms in Spain. It -was useless to issue a sudden order that for the future the marshals -were under Joseph’s control, and that ‘he must make them obey him,’ -as the phrase ran in one letter to Madrid. As the King’s minister, -Miot de Melito, wrote, ‘What chance was there of success when all -the individuals concerned were at variance with each other? The -marshals had been accustomed for three years to absolute independence. -The new Chief-of-the-Staff, in spite of his acknowledged capacity, -was known to be out of favour with the Emperor, and in consequence -could exercise no moral authority over the masters of the armies. -The apparent testimonial of confidence which was given to the King, -by making him Commander-in-Chief, was a matter to cause disquietude -rather than satisfaction[341].’ The plain fact was that Napoleon was -over-busy, worried with other problems, and he merely took the easiest -and simplest method of throwing the burden of the Spanish war on to the -shoulders of another. The consequences, be they what they might be, -were now of little importance, compared with the success or failure of -the impending Russian campaign. - - [340] One of Marmont’s colonels in the province of Segovia was - at this moment threatening to use armed force against the King’s - troops for resisting his requisitions. See Miot, iii. p. 222. - - [341] See Miot de Melito’s _Mémoires_, iii. p. 215. - -Jourdan sums up the situation in much the same terms. ‘The King -for two years had been allowed to have no direct relations with -the generals-in-chief: he had no exact knowledge of the military -situation in each of their spheres of command, nor was he better -informed as to the strength, organization, and distribution of the -troops under their orders. Unable to use his new authority till he had -got together detailed statements as to these data, he directed his -chief-of-the-staff to ask for reports. Dorsenne replied that he should -not send any at present, because Berthier, when announcing to him that -the Armies of the South, of Portugal, and of Aragon had been put under -the King’s orders, had informed him that the Emperor would let him know -in due course what was to be done with the Army of the North. Marshal -Suchet demonstrated that he had received special instructions from the -Emperor, which presently were seen to make the King’s authority over -the Army of Aragon quite illusory. Soult had removed all the posts -on the lines of communication when he marched to relieve Badajoz, and -showed so little zeal in reopening them, that even in May it was not -known at Madrid whether he was yet aware that he was under the King’s -orders. Marmont was the only one who sent without delay the report -which had been asked for--but he announced at the same time that, in -obedience to the Emperor’s earlier orders, he was already operating -beyond the Agueda, to make a diversion for the relief of Badajoz[342].’ - - [342] Jourdan’s _Mémoires_, p. 384. - -Of what use was it to send orders to the marshals, when they -could plead that the execution of them was rendered impossible by -instructions received directly from the Emperor, which prescribed a -different policy? Unfortunately for King Joseph each commander-in-chief -still preserved his direct communication with the Minister of War at -Paris: even after the Emperor had started for Poland in May, each -continued to send in his own plans, and to demonstrate how far superior -they were to those prescribed by King Joseph. Soult, in particular, -generally commenced a dispatch by demonstrating that the directions -received from Madrid could not possibly be executed, and then produced -an elaborate scheme of his own, which would be beneficial for the Army -of Andalusia, but impracticable for those of Portugal, Valencia, and -the Centre. When his suggestions were rejected, he wrote privately to -Paris, declaring that Joseph and Jourdan were absolutely incapable, -and sometimes adding that the King was trying to serve his private -interests rather than those of his brother and suzerain. It was the -accidental receipt by Joseph of an intercepted letter of Soult’s to the -Minister of War, in which he was accused of absolute treason to the -Emperor, that brought about the final rupture between the King and the -Marshal, and led to the recall of the latter to France[343]. - - [343] Oddly enough this letter was in duplicate, and while - one copy fell into Joseph’s hands, the other was captured by - guerrilleros and sent to Wellington. The cipher was worked out - by Scovell, and the contents gave Wellington useful information - as to the relations between Soult and the King. See below, pages - 530-39. - -King Joseph, though liable to fits of depression and despair, was, on -the whole, of a mercurial and self-sufficient temperament. A few weeks -before the receipt of the Emperor’s dispatch granting him the command -of the Spanish armies, all his letters had been full of complaints and -threats of abdication. But the decree of March 16th filled him with a -sudden confidence--at last his military talents should be displayed and -recognized; he would, as his brother desired, ‘make the marshals obey -him;’ for the future the armies should all act together for a single -end, and not be guided by the selfish interests of their leaders. He -accepted the position of Commander-in-Chief with undisguised pleasure, -and proceeded to draw out schemes of his own, with Jourdan as his -adviser in technical matters of military logistics. - -It cannot be denied that the ‘_Mémoire_ of May 1812[344],’ in which -Jourdan set forth the situation after the fall of Badajoz, and -the policy which he considered that it demanded, is a document of -much greater merit than might have been expected. It is by far the -best summary of the position of the French power in Spain that was -ever drawn up, and it recognizes with great clearness the two main -limitations of that power, which were (1) that the imperial troops -were an army of occupation rather than a genuine field army, and (2) -that the Napoleonic system, by which hosts were supposed to ‘live -on the countryside,’ might be applicable for a short campaign in -Lombardy or Bavaria, but was impossible for protracted manœuvres in an -exhausted and thinly-peopled land like central Spain. Jourdan’s note -on the _Mémoire_ sums up the situation in a few lines--’Two measures -were indispensable: one was to render the army mobile, by giving it -ample transport, and by establishing large magazines on all lines of -communication: without these all permanent concentration of heavy -forces, and all continuous operations were impossible. The second was -to abandon the deplorable system of occupying as much territory as -possible--of which the real object was double: firstly, to enable the -armies to live on the country-side; secondly, to appear in the eyes of -Europe to be dominant over the whole of Spain.’ - - [344] Printed whole in Jourdan’s _Mémoires_, pp. 386-94. - -The _Mémoire_ itself is worth analysing. Its gist runs as follows:-- - -‘(1) The recent departure of the Imperial Guards, the Poles, and other -troops, and the lack of any adequate system of transport or magazines, -renders the Imperial Army--though still 230,000 men strong--incapable -of undertaking any offensive operations. The present situation is -exceptionally trying, because of the successes of Wellington, and the -deplorable effect on Spanish public opinion of the recent annexation -[Catalonia], the arbitrary government of the generals, and the famine -which has lately prevailed. The discontent thereby engendered has led -to the enormous increase in the number of the guerrillero bands. It has -also encouraged the government at Cadiz to multiply its levies and its -military energy. - -(2) It is not yet certain whether the Emperor intends the Army of the -North to be at the King’s disposal. General Dorsenne refuses to send in -reports or to accept orders. But since its recent reduction in numbers -[by the departure of the Imperial Guard, and the transfer of Souham’s -and Bonnet’s divisions to the Army of Portugal] it is believed that -it has not more than 48,000 men under arms, and it appears to be a -fact that it can do no more than hold down the wide regions committed -to its charge, and guard the line of communications with France. Even -if placed at the King’s disposition, it can furnish no important -reinforcements to other armies. Nevertheless it should be put under his -control, as it might under certain circumstances be called upon to lend -a moderate force for a short time. - -(3) As to the Army of Aragon [60,000 men, including the divisions in -Catalonia]: the King was informed that Marshal Suchet was placed under -his command, and that if he needed reinforcements he might draw on the -troops in Valencia. He therefore [during the siege of Badajoz] ordered -the Marshal to send a division to join the Army of the Centre for an -indispensable operation[345]. The Marshal sent a formal declaration in -reply, to the effect that he could not execute this order, and that -he was even about to withdraw from Cuenca the regiment that he had -placed there, as its absence imperilled the safety of Valencia. He -says that the Emperor has placed Catalonia under his charge, and that -he is authorized to employ his whole force for the protection of the -provinces entrusted to him. Apparently, then, the Army of Aragon cannot -co-operate in operations outside its own sphere, and the Marshal’s -special instructions place him in an exceptional position. His -relations with the King consist in a polite exchange of views, not in -the giving and taking of orders--his Majesty’s control over this army -is purely illusory. - - [345] i. e. for the collection of troops in the valley of the - Tagus, to join Foy and operate for the relief of Badajoz. - -(4) As to the Army of the South, Marshal Soult has about 54,000 men -effective [not including _Juramentados_, &c.]. The Cadiz Lines and the -garrisons pin down a large force to fixed stations. The Marshal has -also to keep a considerable flying column in hand, to hunt Ballasteros -and other partisans. For operations outside the bounds of Andalusia he -can only collect a field-force of 24,000 men; this is the total figure -of the corps that tried to relieve Badajoz, and in its absence Seville -was nearly lost. The posts in the Sierra Morena were called in at that -time, and have never come back: correspondence with the Army of the -South is therefore precarious and slow. - -(5) The Army of Portugal has 52,000 men effective. It holds the front -line against Wellington; its divisions are much scattered, because it -has to live on the country, and has also to furnish several important -garrisons. One division of 6,000 men is fixed down in the Asturias by -the Emperor’s special orders. The garrisons of Astorga, Valladolid, -Salamanca, Leon, Palencia, &c., absorb 6,000 or 7,000 men more. Only -29,000 infantry [or a total of 35,000 of all arms] are available -as a field-force to use against the English, if they attack on the -front of the Tormes. If Marshal Marmont has to march out of his own -sphere, to join in a combined operation against Wellington [e. g. in -Estremadura], he can bring a still smaller force--say 25,000 men. -The Army of Portugal is many months in arrear of its pay, and has -hardly any transport or magazines: the troops have become terrible -marauders--largely from necessity. - -(6) Lastly we come to the Army of the Centre. It consists of 9,500 men -borne on the Imperial muster-rolls, and 5,800 troops belonging to the -King [his Guards and Hugo’s _Juramentados_, horse and foot]. There -are also at present in Madrid 3,200 drafts for the Army of the South, -temporarily retained--so that the whole makes up 18,500 men. But only -15,000 are effective, the remainder consisting of dépôts, dismounted -cavalry, train, &c. Having to hold down the extensive provinces of -Madrid, Segovia, Guadalajara, Toledo, La Mancha, and Cuenca, this -force is a mere “army of occupation.” It can provide no troops for -expeditions outside its own territory, and is spread so thin that even -Madrid would be in danger without the Royal Guards. The pay is eight -months in arrear. - -(7) Civil administration is still localized: the commanders of the -armies levy their own taxes, and nothing comes to Madrid. The King has -to feed the Army of the Centre, and to maintain his civil service, -from the revenues of New Castile alone. None of the marshals will help -another with money or stores. The claim of the King to rule all Spain -seems absurd to the people, so long as he cannot exercise any civil -control outside the _arrondissement_ of the Army of the Centre. - -(8) Conclusion. All offensive operations are impossible, as long as -the imperial armies have to hold down the entirety of the occupied -provinces. If Lord Wellington concentrates all his forces, he can march -with 60,000 men [not including Spaniards] against either the Army of -Portugal or the Army of the South. Neither of them can assemble a -sufficient force to resist him, unless they abandon whole provinces. -The King has ordered Soult and Marmont to march to each other’s aid if -either is attacked. But they have to unite, coming from remote bases, -while the enemy can place himself between them and strike at one or the -other. The lines of communication between them are long and circuitous. -It is easily conceivable that one of them may be attacked and beaten -before the other is even aware of the danger. A catastrophe is quite -possible if Lord Wellington should throw himself suddenly, with his -whole force, upon either the Army of Portugal or that of the South. - -The only possible way of dealing with this danger is to collect -a central reserve of 20,000 men at Madrid, which can be promptly -transferred to right or left, to join either Soult or Marmont as -the conditions of the moment dictate. The Army of the Centre cannot -serve this purpose--it is not a field-force, but an immovable army of -occupation. If the Emperor could send a new corps of this size from -France, Marmont could be reinforced up to a strength sufficient to -enable him to face Wellington, and to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo. - -But the present posture of European affairs [the Russian war] -probably makes it impossible to draw such a corps from France. This -being so, the central reserve must be obtained from troops already -existing in the Peninsula. The only way to find them is for the Emperor -to consent to the evacuation of Andalusia. Thirty thousand men of the -Army of the South can then be placed to cover Madrid, in La Mancha: -this force would be ample against any Spanish levies that might come -up to the Sierra Morena from Cadiz and elsewhere. The remainder of -the Army of the South must form the central reserve, and prepare to -reinforce Marmont. The Army of Portugal would then be so strong that -Wellington could not dare to take the offensive--he would be hopelessly -outnumbered. If this scheme is approved by the Emperor, he may be -certain that, when he comes back from Poland, his Spanish armies will -be in the same secure defensive position in which he leaves them now. -The right wing rests on the Bay of Biscay in the Asturias: the left on -the Mediterranean in Valencia. - -When Andalusia is evacuated, the remaining provinces in French -occupation will not be able to pay or feed the 54,000 men of the Army -of the South, in addition to the armies already stationed in them; a -liberal subsidy from Paris will be necessary. In addition the King -must, for the sake of his prestige, be given real civil authority over -all the provinces. - -It will only be when all authority, civil, military, and -administrative, is concentrated in one hand, that of the King, and when -His Majesty shall have received from the Emperor instructions suiting -the present posture of affairs, that he can be fully responsible for -Spain.’ - -On the whole this is a very well-reasoned document. It was perfectly -true that the offensive power of the French in the Peninsula had shrunk -to nothing, because no province could be held down without a large -garrison. If left unoccupied, it would burst into revolt and raise an -army. This was the inevitable nemesis for a war of annexation directed -against a proud and patriotic people. There were 230,000 French -troops in Spain; but so many of them were tied down to occupation -duty, that only about 50,000 or 60,000 could be collected to curb -Wellington, unless some large province were evacuated. Either Andalusia -or else Valencia must be abandoned. The former was the larger and the -more wealthy; but it was more remote from the strategical centre of -operations in Madrid, much more infested by the bands of the patriots, -and it lay close to the sphere of operations of Wellington--the great -disturbing element in French calculations. Moreover its evacuation -would set free a much larger field army. Against this was to be set -the adverse balance in loss of prestige: as long as Cadiz appeared to -be beleaguered, the national government of Spain looked like a handful -of refugees in a forlorn island. To abandon the immense lines in front -of it, with their dependent flotilla (which must be burnt, since it -could not be removed), would be a conclusive proof to all Europe that -the main frontal offensive against the Spanish patriots had failed. -Seville and Granada, great towns of world-wide fame, would also have to -be abandoned. Andalusia was full of _Afrancesados_, who must either be -shepherded to Madrid, or left to the vengeance of their countrymen. - -But to weigh prestige against solid military advantage, though it might -appeal to Napoleon--whose reputation as universal conqueror was part -of his political stock-in-trade--did not occur to the common-sense -intellect of Jourdan. He voted for the evacuation of Andalusia: so did -his friend and master, King Joseph. Possibly their decision was not -rendered more unwelcome by the fact that it would certainly be most -distasteful to Soult, whom they both cordially detested. The Viceroy -should pay at last for the selfish policy of the General: his realm, -for the last two years, had been administered with much profit and -glory to himself, but with little advantage to the King at Madrid, or -the general prosperity of the French cause in Spain. Whether personal -motives entered into the decision of Joseph and Jourdan we need not -trouble to consider: it was certainly the correct one to take. - -Permission to evacuate Andalusia was therefore demanded from the -Emperor: King Joseph did not dare to authorize it on his own -responsibility. Meanwhile, long before the _Mémoire_ of May 1812 had -been completed or sent off, to Napoleon, he issued the orders which -he thought himself justified in giving in the interim, to act as a -stop-gap till the permission should be granted. Marmont was told to -fall back on his own old policy of keeping a large detachment in the -Tagus valley, in order that he might get into touch with Drouet and -Soult’s Estremaduran corps of observation. He was directed to send -two divisions of infantry and a brigade of light cavalry to join Foy, -who was still in the direction of Almaraz and Talavera. They were to -be ready to act as the advance of the Army of Portugal for a march on -Truxillo and Merida, if Wellington’s next move should turn out to be -an attack on Soult in Andalusia. In a corresponding fashion, Soult was -ordered to reinforce Drouet up to a force of 20,000 men, and to push -him forward to his old position about Almendralejo, Zalamea, Merida, -and Medellin, in order that he might march via Truxillo to join the -Army of Portugal, in case the Anglo-Portuguese army should choose -Salamanca, not Seville, as its next objective. The small part of the -Army of the Centre that could be formed into a field-force--three -battalions and two cavalry regiments, under General d’Armagnac--was -directed to move to Talavera, to relieve Foy there if he should be -called to move either north to join Marmont on the Tormes, or south -to join Soult on the Guadiana[346]. To replace these troops, drawn -from the provinces of Cuenca and La Mancha, Joseph--as we have already -seen[347]--requested Suchet to send ‘a good division’ from Valencia by -Cuenca, on to Ocaña in La Mancha[348]. In this way the King and Jourdan -thought they would provide for active co-operation between the Armies -of Portugal and Andalusia, whether Wellington should make his next move -to the South or the North. - - [346] See Jourdan to Berthier of April 3, 1812. - - [347] See Jourdan’s _Mémoire_, quoted above, p. 304. - - [348] Jourdan to Suchet, April 9, 1812. - -It is curious, but perhaps not surprising, to find that these orders, -the first-fruits of Joseph’s new commission as Commander-in-Chief, were -obeyed neither by Suchet, by Soult, nor by Marmont. - -The former, as we have already seen, when analysing Jourdan’s _Mémoire_ -of May 1812, not only refused to send a division to Ocaña, but stated -that he should be obliged to withdraw the regiment that he was keeping -at Cuenca, because he was authorized by the Emperor to reserve all his -own troops for the defence of his own sphere of action, in Valencia, -Aragon, and Catalonia. Soult declared that it was impossible for him -to reinforce Drouet--‘he could not keep 20,000 men on the Guadiana -unless he received large reinforcements: all that he could promise -was that the force in Estremadura should move up again to Medellin -and Villafranca, possibly even to Merida, if Wellington had really -gone northward with his main army. Drouet, with his 10,000 or 12,000 -men, might serve to “contain” Hill and the British detachment in -Estremadura, and his position would prevent the enemy from making any -important movement in the valley of the Tagus. Meanwhile he himself -must, as an absolute necessity, lay siege to Tarifa for the second -time, and make an end of Ballasteros: no more troops, therefore, could -be sent to Drouet: but when Tarifa and Ballasteros had been finished -off, the siege of Cadiz should be pressed with vigour.’ This reply -is not only a blank refusal to obey the King’s orders, but amounts -to a definite statement that the local affairs of Andalusia are more -important than the general co-operation of the French armies in Spain. -As we shall presently see, Soult was ready to formulate this startling -thesis in the plainest terms--he was, ere long, to propose that the -King and the Army of the Centre should evacuate Madrid and retire upon -Andalusia, when things went wrong with the Army of Portugal. - -As to Marmont, his reply to King Joseph’s dispatch was couched in -terms of less open disobedience, but it was by no means satisfactory. -He wrote from Salamanca, on April 29th, after his return from the -raid to Sabugal and Guarda, that he had now learnt (what he did not -know ten days before), that Wellington had been pursuing him with -five divisions. This force was still in the Beira, and the British -general himself had been at Ciudad Rodrigo on the 26th. It was, -therefore, quite clear that Soult had not ‘the whole English army on -his shoulders.’ This being so, it was not necessary to send into the -valley of the Tagus such a large force as was asked. But one division -should move to Avila at once, and could drop down on to Talavera -in two days, if it turned out to be necessary. Two more should be -cantoned about Arevalo and the Pass of Piedrahita [20 miles north-west -of Avila] respectively, points from which they could be transferred -to the valley of the Tagus in a few days. Marmont then proceeded to -warn Jourdan against any scheme for concentrating any considerable -force in the direction of La Mancha, urging that he must be able to -collect as many of his divisions opposite Wellington as possible, in -case of an advance by the Anglo-Portuguese army towards the Tormes. All -that was necessary on the Tagus was to have the forts at Almaraz well -garrisoned and provided with stores, so that troops dropping down from -Avila on a southward march should find a base and magazines ready for -them. Summing up, he ends with a dictum that ‘if we defend Andalusia -by sacrificing the Army of Portugal, we may save that province for -the moment, but the North will be in danger: if a disaster occurs -there, Andalusia will soon be lost also. If, on the contrary, we make -its defence in the North, the South may be lost, but the North still -remains secure.’ By these somewhat cryptic words, Marmont seems to mean -that, looking at the affairs of Spain at large, Andalusia may be lost -without any shock to the imperial domination in Leon and Old Castile. -But a disaster in Leon or Old Castile entails inevitably the loss of -Andalusia also. This was true enough, though Soult refused to see it. - -But the result of Marmont’s very partial fulfilment of Joseph’s -orders, and of Soult’s and Suchet’s entire neglect of them, was that -Jourdan’s main design of providing for close and speedy co-operation -between the Armies of Portugal and Andalusia was completely foiled. -When, on May 17th-19th, Hill made his celebrated irruption into the -valley of the Tagus, with the object of destroying the bridge and -forts of Almaraz, the point where the interests of Soult and Marmont -were linked together, he found no French troops within fifty miles -of his objective, save the single division of Foy and D’Armagnac’s -3,000 men from the Army of the Centre. Marmont’s nearest division in -support was at Avila, Soult’s in the Sierra Morena; both lay so far -off from Almaraz that Hill could not only deliver his blow, but could -depart at leisure when it was struck, without any risk of being beset -by superior forces. If King Joseph’s orders of April had been carried -out, Wellington’s stroke in May would have been impossible--or risky -to the verge of rashness. Indeed we may be certain, on Wellington’s -record, that he would not have made it, if three French divisions, -instead of one, had been about Talavera and Almaraz. We may add that -his self-reliance during the Salamanca campaign rested largely on the -fact that Soult could not succour Marmont, within any reasonable space -of time, even if he wished to do so, because the bridge of Almaraz was -broken. Wherefore Jourdan and King Joseph must be pronounced to have -been wise in their foresight, and the Dukes of Ragusa and Dalmatia -highly blameworthy for their disregard of the orders given them. They -looked each to their own local interests, not to the general strategic -necessities of the French position in Spain, which the King and his -Chief-of-the-Staff were keeping in mind. - -So far their precautions were wise: to blame them for not taking the -tremendous step of evacuating Andalusia without the Emperor’s leave, -and concentrating such a force in central Spain as would have paralysed -Wellington’s offensive, would be unjust. They dared not have given such -an order--and if they had, Soult would have disobeyed it. - -Napoleon himself, indeed, would have agreed with Soult at this time. -For not long after Jourdan’s _Mémoire_ of May 1812, with its request -for leave to abandon Andalusia, had started on its journey for Dresden, -there arrived at Madrid a dispatch from Berthier, setting forth the -final instructions left by the Emperor before he started from Paris -on May 9th. It was of a nature to strike dismay into the heart of the -level-headed and rather despondent Jourdan; for it ignored all the -difficulties which his recently dispatched appeal set forth with such -clearness. The King was directed to keep a grip on all the conquered -provinces of Spain, and to extend their limits till the enemy should -be extirpated. The conquest of Portugal might be postponed till ‘les -événements détermineraient absolument cette mesure.’ The region to -which the Emperor devoted most attention was the sphere of the Army of -the North. ‘This is the part on which it is indispensable to keep a -firm hold, never to allow the enemy to establish himself there, or to -threaten the line of communications. Wherefore a most active war must -be waged upon the “Brigands” [Mina, Porlier, Longa, &c.]: it is of -no use to hunt and scatter them, leaving them power to reunite and to -renew their incursions. As to the English, the present situation seems -rather to require a defensive posture: but it is necessary to maintain -an imposing attitude in face of them, so that they may not take any -advantage of our position. The strength of the forces at the King’s -disposition enables him to do, in this respect, all that circumstances -may demand. Such are the principal ideas which the Emperor, before -departing, has expressed on the Spanish problem.’ - -This was a heart-breaking document. Just when the King and Jourdan had -demonstrated that they had no available field army left to hold back -Wellington, they were informed that their forces were ample for the -purpose. When they had asked leave to evacuate Andalusia they are told -to ‘conserver les conquêtes et les étendre successivement.’ They had -been wishing to concentrate at all costs a central reserve--now they -were directed to spread the already scattered army of occupation over -a still greater surface--presumably the Emperor’s phrase meant that he -wished to see Murcia, the Catalonian inland, the whole of the Asturias, -and the Condado de Niebla garrisoned, in addition to all that was held -already. The one central problem to Joseph and Jourdan was how to face -Wellington’s expected onslaught by making the armies co-operate--the -Emperor forbids concentration, and recommends ‘the assumption of an -imposing attitude!’ As if Wellington, whose knowledge of the movements -and plans of his adversaries was beginning to appear almost uncanny to -them, was to be contained by ‘attitudes,’ imposing or otherwise. - -The unhappy Commander-in-Chief and Chief-of-the-Staff of the united -armies of Spain were reduced to a sort of apathetic despair by the -Emperor’s memorandum. Jourdan, in his _Mémoires_, appears to shrug the -shoulders of resignation in commenting on its effect. ‘If only instead -of “hold all you have, and conquer the rest bit by bit,” we had been -told that we might evacuate some provinces and concentrate the troops, -there would have been much good in the instructions. The King might -have dared to abandon the South in order to keep down the North, if he -had not received this dispatch. But he could not take that portentous -step without the imperial permission. All that he could now do, was to -reiterate his directions to Soult and Marmont that they must so place -their troops as to be able to succour each other. We shall see how they -obeyed those orders[349].’ - - [349] Jourdan’s _Mémoires_, pp. 395-6. - -So, by the special and deliberate directions of the Emperor, the -230,000 effective men ‘present under arms,’ forming the five imperial -armies of Spain, were placed at the mercy of Lord Wellington and his -modest force of eight divisions of Anglo-Portuguese. In a flight of -angry rhetoric, Berthier, writing under Napoleon’s dictation, had once -asked whether it was reasonable ‘_que quarante mille Anglais gâtent -toutes les affaires d’Espagne_.’ The reply of the fates was to be that -such a contingency was perfectly possible, under the system which the -Emperor had instituted, and with the directions which he persisted in -giving. - - - - -SECTION XXXIII: CHAPTER II - -THE BRIDGE OF ALMARAZ. MAY 1812 - - -On April 24th Wellington halted his pursuing army at Fuente Guinaldo -and Sabugal, on hearing that Marmont had escaped him by a margin of -twenty-four hours. The French were in full march for Salamanca, and it -was impossible to pursue them any further, firstly because the allied -army needed a few days of rest after the forced march from Badajoz, and -secondly because its train had dropped behind, food was nearly out, and -convoys had to be brought up from Lamego and São João de Pesqueira. -There was, of course, nothing to be got out of the unhappy region in -which Marmont’s locusts had just been spread abroad. The only fortunate -thing was that the Duke of Ragusa had turned his raid against the Beira -Baixa, and left the great dépôts on the Douro unmolested. From them -ample sustenance could be got up, in a week, to the positions behind -the Agueda and Coa where the army had halted. - -Wellington, as it will be remembered, had contemplated an attack on -Andalusia after Badajoz fell. But the necessity for seeing to the -relief and revictualling of Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo had brought -him up to the frontiers of Leon with the main body of his host. In -the position where he now lay, he was well placed for an advance -on Salamanca, and an attack on the Army of Portugal. To return to -Estremadura would involve a long and weary countermarch. Moreover -there was no doubt that operations in Leon would be more decisive -than operations in Andalusia. As Marmont was to write to Berthier a -few days later, a victory of the allies in the North would involve -the evacuation of the South by Soult, while a victory in Andalusia -would leave the French power in the valleys of the Douro and Tagus -unshaken[350]. Advancing from the line of the Agueda against Salamanca -and Valladolid, Wellington would have his base and his main line of -communications in his direct rear, safe against any flank attack. A -raid against Andalusia, even if successful, would separate him from -Lisbon, and compel him to take up a new base at Cadiz--a doubtful -expedient. But what seems, in the end, to have been the main cause for -Wellington’s choosing Leon rather than Andalusia as his next sphere of -operations, was that Marmont (as he judged) had the larger available -army for field movements outside his own ground. Soult was more pinned -down to his viceroyalty by local needs: he would not raise the siege of -Cadiz or evacuate Granada and Cordova. Therefore he could not collect -(as his movement at the time of the fall of Badajoz had shown) more -than 24,000 men for an offensive operation. This was the absolute limit -of his power to aid Marmont. But the latter, if he chose to evacuate -Asturias and other outlying regions, could bring a much larger force to -help Soult. Therefore an attack on Andalusia would enable the enemy to -concentrate a more numerous defensive force than an attack on Leon. ‘Of -the two armies opposed to us that of Portugal can produce the larger -number of men for a distant operation. Marmont has nothing to attend to -but the British army, as he has been repeatedly told in [intercepted] -time he may lose some plunder and contributions, but he loses nothing -that can permanently affect his situation, or which he could not -regain as soon as he has a superiority, particularly of cavalry, in -the open plains of Castille. Marmont’s, then, being what may be called -of the two the _operating_ army, the movement which I might make into -Andalusia would enable the enemy to bring the largest body of men to -act together on one point. It would be a false movement, and this must -by all means be avoided[351].’ - - [350] See above, p. 311. - - [351] _Dispatches_, ix. p. 173. - -This decision was not made immediately on Marmont’s retreat of April -24th: for some days after the British headquarters settled down at -Fuente Guinaldo, Wellington had not quite made up his mind between the -two operations: his letters to Lord Liverpool, to Hill, and Graham, -are full of the needs of the moment, and do not lay down any general -strategical plan. The staff, in their discussions with each other, -canvassed the situation. ‘While Marmont remains in Old Castile he -[Wellington] must leave a certain force near the frontier of the Beira. -But leaving the 3rd, 4th, 5th Divisions, and Pack’s and Bradford’s -Portuguese (perhaps 18,000 men) for that purpose, he can move upon -Andalusia, if he wishes, with the 1st, 6th, 7th, and Light Divisions, -afterwards picking up Power’s Portuguese brigade and all General Hill’s -_corps d’armée_--perhaps 36,000 infantry. This would do.’ So wrote -D’Urban the chief of the Portuguese staff in his private diary, on -May 5, evidently after discussion with Beresford, and others of those -who were nearest the centre of decision. Wellington, however, was -pondering over alternatives: he could not move for a week or two at the -best, for he had to replenish his stores at the front, and to see that -the repairs and revictualling of Almeida and Rodrigo were completed, -before he could start on any offensive movement. In that time, too, -he would be able to learn how Marmont was disposing of his army, and -whether Soult was showing any tendency to reinforce Drouet’s force in -Estremadura. - -It seems that an insight into his enemies’ purposes was made specially -easy for Wellington at this moment by the successive capture of a -great deal of French correspondence. When Marmont was in Portugal, -between the 1st and 23rd of April, three of the duplicates of his -dispatches were captured, one by Portuguese Ordenança, the others by -Julian Sanchez between Rodrigo and Salamanca[352]. They were all in -cipher, but the ingenuity of Captain Scovell, the cipher-secretary at -head-quarters, was capable of dealing with them, and from them could -be made out a great deal about the strength of the Marshal’s army, and -his general views on the campaign. If they had been taken and sent in -a little earlier, they might have enabled Wellington to complete that -surprise and dispersion of the French expeditionary force which had -been in his mind. - - [352] The cipher-originals are all in the Scovell papers, - worked out into their interpretation by that ingenious officer: - Wellington only kept the fair copies for himself. The dispatches - are dated Sabugal, 11 April (to Brennier about the Agueda - bridge); Sabugal, April 16 (to Berthier); Fuente Guinaldo, April - 22 (to Berthier). The last two are full of the most acrimonious - criticism of Napoleon’s orders for the invasion of Beira. Scovell - made out much, but not all, of the contents of these letters. - -But though they arrived too late for this purpose, they were valuable, -as showing Marmont’s dislike of the imperial orders that he had been -sent to carry out, and his preference for his own schemes. They were -also full of bitter complaints of the neglect in which the Army of -Portugal was left as to pay, stores, and transport. Wellington might -reasonably deduce from them that any reconcentration of that army would -be slow, and that if it had to march to reinforce Soult in the South, -the effort would be a severe one. - -But shortly after Marmont’s return to Salamanca, his adversary got -an even more valuable insight into his plans. The guerrilleros -carried off, between Salamanca and Valladolid, an officer bearing -five dispatches, dated April 28 and April 30th. One was directed to -Dorsenne, two to Berthier, one to Jourdan, the fifth contained the -parole to Bayonne of the great scout, Colquhoun Grant[353]. The first, -couched in very peremptory terms, asked for food--the Army of Portugal -must absolutely receive 8,000 quintals of wheat, once promised, -without delay--it was in a state of danger and penury, and could not -keep concentrated to face the British. Of the letters to Berthier one -announced that Bonnet’s division was duly in march for the Asturias, -and that without it the Marshal thought his own strength dangerously -low. The other asked for 4,000,000 francs owing to the Army of Portugal -for pay and sustenance, and declared that, unless money came to hand at -once, it was impossible to see how the troops were to be kept alive in -the two months still remaining before harvest. A postscript asked for a -siege-train to be sent on at all costs--the Marshal had heard that one -was on the way from Bayonne: but nothing was known about it at Burgos. -The letter to Jourdan was the most important of all[354]: it was the -document, already quoted in the previous chapter, in which the Marshal -detailed his intentions as to the dispersion of his army, protested -against being obliged to send too many men into the valley of the -Tagus, and explained the importance of the bridge-forts and magazines -at Almaraz, by which his troops at Avila, &c., would debouch southward -whenever they were ordered to concentrate for a junction with Soult. -‘On ne peut agir que par Lugar Nuevo [the name by which Marmont always -designates the Almaraz forts] ... il faut bien se garder de jeter trop -de troupes sur le Tage, et se contenter de bien assurer une défense de -huit jours pour les forts de Lugar Nuevo et Mirabete, temps suffisant -pour que les troupes rassemblées à Avila débouchent.... Un dépôt de -400 à 500 mille fanegas (qui n’est pas au delà de ce que Madrid et La -Manche peuvent fournir) donnerait les moyens d’agir sans compromettre -la subsistance des troupes.’ - - [353] All the originals are in the Scovell Papers. - - [354] It is the one printed in Ducasse’s _Correspondence of King - Joseph_, viii. pp. 413-17. - -Undoubtedly it was the deciphering of the greater part of this letter, -which set forth so clearly the importance of the Almaraz bridge, -and showed at the same time that only one French division [Foy’s at -Talavera] was anywhere near it, that determined Wellington to make the -sudden stroke at that central strategical point which he had thought -of in February[355]. At that time he had refused to try it, because -there were three French divisions on the Tagus. Now there was only one -at Talavera, two marches from Almaraz, and the nearest reinforcements -at Avila were two very long marches from Talavera. The possibility -presented itself that a column might strike at Almaraz from somewhere -on the Portuguese frontier, and take the place by a _coup-de-main_, -with or without first beating Foy, whose strength of 5,000 men was -perfectly known to Wellington. - - [355] See above, p. 202. - -Hill could count on two or three days of undisturbed operations before -the nearest reinforcing division, that of Foy, could reach Almaraz: on -four or five more, before troops from Avila could come up. It must be -noted that everything would depend on the absolute secrecy that could -be preserved as to the start of the expedition: but on this Wellington -thought that he could count. The Spanish peasantry seldom or never -betrayed him: the French had no outlying posts beyond Almaraz which -might give them warning. The garrison was in a normal state of blockade -by guerrillero bands haunting the Sierra de Guadalupe. - -It may be added that a blow at Almaraz was just as useful as a means -for keeping Soult from joining Marmont as Marmont from joining Soult. -It would be profitable if Wellington’s final decision should be -given in favour of an Andalusian expedition. But his mind was by now -leaning towards an attack on Leon rather than on the South. The final -inclination may have been given by the receipt of another intercepted -dispatch--Soult’s to Jourdan of April 17[356], sent in by guerrilleros -who had probably captured the bearer in the Sierra Morena about April -20th. This document, which we have already had occasion to quote for -another purpose[357], was full of angry denunciations of Marmont for -letting Badajoz fall unaided, and served to show that, if Soult had -to help the Army of Portugal, he would do so with no good will to -its commander. Moreover it was largely occupied by proposals for the -circumventing of Ballasteros and the siege of Tarifa--movements which -would disperse the Army of the South even more than it was already -dispersed, and would clearly prevent it from succouring Marmont within -any reasonable space of time. - - [356] Original in the Scovell Papers. Place of capture uncertain, - but clearly taken by guerrilleros between Seville and Madrid. - - [357] See above, pp. 269-70. - -The decision that Hill should make his long-deferred _coup-de-main_ -upon Almaraz first appears in Wellington’s dispatches on May 4th[358], -but Hill had been warned that the operation was likely to be sanctioned -some days earlier, on April 24, and again more definitely on April -30th[359]. That the final judgement of Wellington was now leaning -in favour of the advance on Salamanca rather than the Andalusian -raid appears to emerge from a note of D’Urban dated May 6th--’The -retirement of Marmont within a given distance--the slow progress of the -Spaniards at Rodrigo, which renders it unsafe to leave that place and -this frontier--the retiring altogether of Soult, and the state of his -army not making him dangerous now--these and other combining reasons -determine Lord Wellington to make his offensive operation _north_ of -the Tagus, and to move upon Marmont. All necessary preparations making, -but secretly: it will be very feasible to keep the movement unforeseen -till it begins. Meanwhile General Hill is to move upon and destroy -everything at Almaraz[360].’ - - [358] Wellington to Graham, Fuente Guinaldo, May 4, _Dispatches_, - ix. p. 114. - - [359] Ibid., p. 101. - - [360] D’Urban’s unpublished diary, under May 6. - -The orders for Hill’s move were given out on May 7th. He was to march -from his head-quarters at Almendralejo with two British brigades -(Howard’s and Wilson’s) of the 2nd Division, and the Portuguese brigade -attached to the division (Ashworth’s), one British cavalry regiment -(13th Light Dragoons), and to cross the Guadiana at Merida. Beyond the -Guadiana he would pick up Campbell’s Portuguese cavalry brigade, which -was lying at Arroyo dos Molinos. The march was then to be as rapid as -possible, via Jaraicejo and Miravete. The expeditionary force made up -7,000 men in all. - -There were left in Estremadura to ‘contain’ Drouet the two English -cavalry brigades of Hill’s force (Slade’s and Long’s)[361], one British -infantry brigade (Byng’s) of the 2nd Division, Hamilton’s Portuguese -division, and Power’s unattached Portuguese brigade (late the garrison -of Elvas, and more recently acting as that of Badajoz). The whole would -make up 11,000 men. Power, or at least some of his regiments, was now -disposable, because the Spaniards destined to hold Badajoz had begun to -arrive, and more were daily expected[362]. - - [361] Minus, of course, the 13th Light Dragoons. - - [362] Erskine was the senior officer left with the corps--a - dangerous experiment. One marvels that Wellington risked it after - previous experience. - -But this was not the only precaution taken against Drouet, who had -recently been reported as a little inclined to move northward from -Fuente Ovejuna--detachments of his cavalry had been seen as far north -as Zalamea[363]. Wellington determined to move down towards the -Guadiana the southern or right wing of his main army--the 1st and 6th -Divisions under Graham. First one and then the other were filed across -the bridge of Villa Velha and sent to Portalegre. Here they would be -in a position to support the force left in front of Drouet, if Soult -should unexpectedly reinforce his Estremaduran corps. Wellington -acknowledged that he disliked this wide extension of his army, but -justified himself by observing that, if he had now his left wing almost -touching the Douro, and his right wing almost touching the Sierra -Morena, he might risk the situation, because he was fully informed as -to Marmont’s similar dispersion. The Army of Portugal was scattered -from the Asturias to Talavera, and from its want of magazines and -transport, which Marmont’s intercepted dispatches made evident, would -be unable to concentrate as quickly as he himself could. - - [363] Wellington to Graham, May 7, _Dispatches_, ix. p. 128. - -The movement of Graham’s two divisions from the Castello Branco region -to south of the Tagus had an additional advantage. If reported to the -French it would tend to make them believe that the next offensive -operation of the allied army would be in the direction of Andalusia, -not towards the Tormes. If Soult heard of it, he would begin to prepare -to defend his own borders, and would not dream that Marmont was really -the enemy at whom Wellington was about to strike; while Marmont, on the -other hand, thinking that Soult was to be the object of Wellington’s -attentions, might be less careful of his own front. The expedition to -Almaraz would not undeceive either of them, since it was well suited -for a preliminary move in an attack on Andalusia, no less than for one -directed against Leon. - -Hill’s column reached Merida on May 12th, but was delayed there -for some hours, because the bridge, broken in April, had not yet -been repaired, as had been expected, the officers sent there having -contented themselves with organizing a service of boats for the -passage. The bridge was hastily finished, but the troops only passed -late in the day; they picked up in the town the artillery and engineers -told off for the expedition, Glubb’s British and Arriaga’s Portuguese -companies of artillery, who brought with them six 24-pounder howitzers, -a pontoon train, and wagons carrying some 30-foot ladders for -escalading work. The importance attached to the raid by Wellington is -shown by the fact that he placed Alexander Dickson, his most trusted -artillery officer, in charge of this trifling detachment, which came up -by the road north of the Guadiana by Badajoz and Montijo to join the -main column. - -Once over the Guadiana, Hill reached Truxillo in three rapid marches -[May 15], and there left all his baggage-train, save one mule for each -company with the camp-kettles. The most difficult part of the route had -now been reached, three successive mountain ranges separating Truxillo -from the Tagus. On the 16th, having crossed the first of them, the -column reached Jaraicejo: at dawn on the 17th, having made a night -march, it was nearing the Pass of Miravete, the last defile above the -river. Here, as Hill was aware, the French had outlying works, an old -castle and two small forts, on very commanding ground, overlooking the -whole defile in such a way that guns and wagons could not possibly -pass them. The British general’s original intention was to storm the -Miravete works at dawn, on the 17th, and at the same time to attack -with a separate column the forts at the bridge. With this purpose he -divided his troops into three detachments. Ashworth’s Portuguese and -the artillery were to keep to the _chaussée_, and make a demonstration -of frontal attack on the Castle: General Tilson-Chowne [interim -commander of the 2nd Division at the moment[364]] was, with Wilson’s -brigade and the 6th Caçadores, to make a détour in the hills to the -left and to endeavour to storm the Castle from its rear side. General -Howard, with the other British brigade, was to follow a similar bridle -path to the right, and to descend on to the river and attack the forts -by the bridge. - - [364] This was the Tilson of 1809: he had lengthened his name. - -A miscalculation had been made--the by-paths which the flanking -columns were to take proved so far more steep and difficult than had -been expected, that by dawn neither of them had got anywhere near its -destination. Hill ordered them to halt, and put off the assault. This -was fortunate, for by a long and close reconnaissance in daylight it -was recognized that the Castle of Miravete and its dependent outworks, -Forts Colbert and Senarmont, were so placed on a precipitous conical -hill that they appeared impregnable save by regular siege operations, -for which the expeditionary force had no time to spare. The most -vexatious thing was that the garrison had discovered the main column -on the _chaussée_, and it could not be doubted that intelligence must -have been sent down to the lower forts, and most certainly to Foy -at Talavera also. After a thorough inspection of the ground, Hill -concluded that he could not hope to master Miravete, and, while it was -held against him, his guns could not get through the pass which it so -effectively commanded. It remained to be seen what could be done with -the forts at the bridge. - -The Almaraz forts crowned two hills on each side of the Tagus. The -stronger, Fort Napoleon, occupied the end of a long rising ground, -about 100 yards from the water’s edge; below it, and connecting -with it, was a masonry _tête-de-pont_ covering the end of the -pontoon-bridge. The weaker work, Fort Ragusa, was on an isolated -knoll on the north bank, supporting the other end of the bridge. Fort -Napoleon mounted nine guns, had a good but unpalisaded ditch around -its bastioned front, and a second retrenchment, well palisaded, with -a loopholed stone tower within. Fort Ragusa was an oblong earthwork -mounting six guns, and also provided with a central tower. It had as -outwork a _flèche_ or lunette, commanding the north end of the bridge. -The small _tête-de-pont_ mounted three guns more. Half a mile up-stream -was the ruined masonry bridge which had formed the old crossing, -with the village of Almaraz on the north bank behind it. Between the -_tête-de-pont_ and the old bridge were the magazines and storehouses in -the village of Lugar Nuevo. - -The garrison of the works consisted of a depleted foreign corps, the -_régiment de Prusse_ or 4th Étranger, mustering under 400 bayonets, of -a battalion of the French 39th of the Line, and of two companies of -the 6th Léger, from Foy’s division, with a company of artillery and -another of sappers. The whole may have amounted to 1,000 men, of whom -300 were isolated in the high-lying Castle of Miravete, five miles from -the bridge-head. The governor, a Piedmontese officer named Aubert, -had manned Fort Napoleon with two companies of the 6th and 39th. The -foreign corps and one company of the 6th were in Fort Ragusa and the -bridge-head; Miravete was held by the centre companies of the 39th. - -Though delay after the French had got the alarm was dangerous, Hill -spent the whole of the 17th in making fruitless explorations for -vantage-ground, from which Miravete might be attacked. None was found, -and on the 18th he made up his mind to adopt a scheme hazardous beyond -his original intention. It would be possible to mask the Castle by a -false attack, in which all his artillery should join, and to lead part -of his infantry over the hills to the right, by a gorge called the Pass -of La Cueva, for a direct attack by escalade, without the help of guns, -upon the Almaraz forts. - -The detachment selected for this purpose was Howard’s brigade (1/50th, -1/71st, 1/92nd), strengthened by the 6th Portuguese Line from -Ashworth’s brigade, and accompanied by 20 artillerymen in charge of the -ladders. So rough was the ground to be covered, that the long 30-foot -ladders had to be sawn in two, being unwieldy on slopes and angles, as -was soon discovered when they were taken off the carts for carriage -by hand. The route that had to be followed was very circuitous, and -though the forts were only five miles, as the crow flies, from the -place where the column left the road, it took the whole night to reach -them. An eye-witness[365] describes it as a mazy sheep-walk among -high brushwood, which could not have been used without the help of -the experienced peasant-guide who led the march. The men had to pass -in Indian file over many of its stretches, and it resulted from long -walking in the darkness that the rear dropped far behind the van, and -nearly lost touch with it. Just before dawn the column reached the -hamlet of Romangordo, a mile from the forts, and rested there for some -time before resuming its march. - - [365] Captain MacCarthy of the 50th. - -The sun was well up when, at 6 o’clock, the leading company, coming -to the edge of a thicket, suddenly saw Fort Napoleon only 300 yards -in their front. The French had been warned that a column had crossed -the hills, and had caught some glimpse of it, but had lost sight of -its latest move: many of the garrison could be seen standing on the -ramparts, and watching the puffs of smoke round the Castle of Miravete, -which showed that the false attack on that high-lying stronghold -had begun. General Tilson-Chowne was making a noisy demonstration -before it, using his artillery with much ostentation, and pushing up -skirmishers among the boulders on the sides of the castle-hill[366]. - - [366] The statement in Jones’s _Sieges_, i. p. 259, that the - enemy were unaware of the turning column is disproved by the - official reports of the surviving French officers Sêve and Teppe. - -Hill was anxious to assault at once, before the sun should rise higher, -or the garrison of the forts catch sight of him. But some time had -to be spent to allow a sufficient force to accumulate in the cover -where the head of the column was hiding. So slowly did the companies -straggle in, that the General at last resolved to escalade at once with -the 50th and the right wing of the 71st, all that had yet come up. -Orders were left behind that the left wing of the 71st and the 92nd -should attack the bridge-head entrenchment when they arrived, and the -6th Portuguese support where they were needed. - -At a little after 6 o’clock the 900 men available, in three columns of -a half-battalion each, headed by ladder parties, started up out of the -brake on the crest of the hillside nearest Fort Napoleon, and raced for -three separate points of its _enceinte_. The French, though taken by -surprise, had all their preparations ready, and a furious fire broke -out upon the stormers both from cannon and musketry. Nevertheless all -three parties reached the goal without any very overwhelming losses, -jumped into the ditch, and began to apply their ladders to such points -of the rampart as lay nearest to them. The assault was a very daring -one--the work was intact, the garrison adequate in numbers, the -assailants had no advantage from darkness, for the sun was well up and -every man was visible. All that was in their favour was the suddenness -of their onslaught, the number of separate points at which it was -launched, and their own splendid dash and decision. Many men fell in -the first few minutes, and there was a check when it was discovered -that the ladders were over-short, owing to their having been sawn up -before the start. But the rampart had a rather broad berm[367], a fault -of construction, and the stormers, discovering this, climbed up on -it, and dragging some of the ladders with them, relaid them against -the upper section of the defences, which they easily overtopped. By -this unexpected device a footing was established on the ramparts at -several points simultaneously--Captain Candler of the 50th is said to -have been the first man over the parapet: he was pierced by several -balls as he sprang down, and fell dead inside. The garrison had kept -up a furious fire till the moment when they saw the assailants swarm -over the parapet--then, however, there can be no doubt that most of -them flinched[368]: the governor tried to lead a counter-charge, but -found few to follow him; he was surrounded, and, refusing to surrender -and striking at those who bade him yield, was piked by a sergeant of -the 50th and mortally wounded. So closely were the British and French -mixed that the latter got no chance of manning the inner work, or the -loopholed tower which should have served as their rallying-point. -Many of the garrison threw down their arms, but the majority rushed -out of the rear gate of the fort towards the neighbouring redoubt -at the bridge-head. They were so closely followed that pursuers and -pursued went in a mixed mass into that work, whose gunners were unable -to fire because their balls would have gone straight into their own -flying friends. The foreign garrison of the _tête-de-pont_ made little -attempt to resist, and fled over the bridge[369]. It is probable that -the British would have reached the other side along with them if the -centre pontoons had not been sunk: some say that they were struck by -a round-shot from Fort Ragusa, which had opened a fire upon the lost -works; others declare that some of the fugitives broke them, whether by -design or by mischance of overcrowding[370]. - - [367] The berm is the line where the scarp of the ditch meets - the slope of the rampart: the scarp should be perpendicular, the - rampart-slope tends backward, hence there is a change on this - line from the vertical to the obtuse in the profile of the work. - The berm should have been only a foot or so wide and was three. - - [368] The official report of the French captain, Sêve of the - 6th Léger, accuses the grenadiers of the 39th of giving way and - bolting at the critical moment, and this is confirmed by the - report of the _chef de bataillon_ Teppe of the 39th, an unwilling - witness. - - [369] According to Teppe’s narrative they left the walls, and - many hid in the bakehouses, while most of the officers headed the - rush for the bridge. - - [370] Foy says that the centre link of the bridge was not a - regular pontoon but a river boat, which could be drawn out when - the garrison wanted to open the bridge for any purpose, and being - light it collapsed under the feet of the flying crowd (p. 163). - -This ought to have been the end of Hill’s sudden success, since passage -across the Tagus was now denied him. But the enemy were panic-stricken; -and when the guns of Fort Napoleon were trained upon Fort Ragusa by -Lieutenant Love and the twenty gunners who had accompanied Hill’s -column, the garrison evacuated it, and went off with the rest of the -fugitives in a disorderly flight towards Naval Moral. The formidable -works of Almaraz had fallen before the assault of 900 men--for the -tail of Hill’s column arrived on the scene to find all over[371]. -Four grenadiers of the 92nd, wishing to do something if they had been -disappointed of the expected day’s work, stripped, swam the river, -and brought back several boats which had been left moored under Fort -Ragusa. By means of these communication between the two banks was -re-established, and the fort beyond the river was occupied[372]. - - [371] The 92nd and the right wing of the 71st reached the - _tête-de-pont_ just as the fugitives from Fort Napoleon entered - it, and swept away the garrison. They only lost two wounded. - - [372] Gardyne’s history of the 92nd gives the names of two of - these gallant men, Gauld and Somerville. - -The loss of the victors was very moderate--it fell mostly on the 50th -and 71st, for Chowne’s demonstration against Miravete had been almost -bloodless--only one ensign and one private of the 6th Caçadores were -wounded. But the 50th lost one captain and 26 men killed, and seven -officers and 93 men wounded, while the half-battalion of the 71st had -five killed and five officers and 47 men wounded[373]. The 92nd had two -wounded. Thus the total of casualties was 189. - - [373] Hill’s total of casualties is 2 officers and 31 men killed: - 13 officers and 143 wounded. The second officer killed was - Lieutenant Thiele of the Artillery of the K.G.L., accidentally - blown up by a mine on the day of the evacuation. But two of the - wounded officers died. - -Of the garrison the 4th Étranger was pretty well destroyed--those who -were neither killed nor taken mostly deserted, and its numbers had gone -down from 366 in the return of May 15 to 88 in that of July 1. The -companies of the 39th and 6th Léger also suffered heavily, since they -had furnished the whole of the unlucky garrison of Fort Napoleon. Hill -reports 17 officers and 262 men taken prisoners, including the mortally -wounded governor and a _chef de bataillon_ of the 39th[374]. It is -probable that the whole loss of the French was at least 400. - - [374] Teppe by name, whose narrative, written in captivity, is - our best source for the French side. It is a frank confession of - misbehaviour by the troops--particularly the 4th Étranger. - -The trophies taken consisted of a colour of the 4th Étranger, 18 guns -mounted in the works, an immense store of powder and round-shot, -120,000 musket cartridges, the 20 large pontoons forming the bridge, -with a store of rope, timbers, anchors, carriages, &c., kept for its -repair, some well-furnished workshops, and a large miscellaneous -magazine of food and other stores. All this was destroyed, the -pontoons, &c., being burnt, while the powder was used to lay many mines -in the forts and bridgehead, which were blown up very successfully -on the morning of the 20th, so that hardly a trace of them remained. -Thiele of the German artillery, the officer charged with carrying -out the explosions, was unfortunately killed by accident: a mine had -apparently failed; he went back to see to its match, but it blew up -just as he was inspecting it. - -[Illustration: ALMARAZ] - -Having accomplished his purpose with complete success, Hill moved -off without delay, and by two forced marches reached Truxillo and -his baggage on the 21st. Here he was quite safe: Foy, being too weak -to pursue him to any effect, followed cautiously, and only reached -Miravete (whose garrison he relieved) on the 23rd and Truxillo on the -25th, from whence he turned back, being altogether too late. He had -received news of Hill’s movement rather late on the 17th, had been -misinformed as to his strength, which report made 15,000 men instead -of the real 7,000, and so had been disposed to act cautiously. He had -ordered a battalion of the 6th Léger from Naval Moral to join the -garrison of Almaraz, but it arrived on the afternoon of the 19th, -only in time to hear from fugitives of the disaster[375]. He himself -was confident that the forts could hold out eight days even against -artillery, which was also Marmont’s calculation. Hence their fall -within 48 hours of Hill’s appearance was a distressing surprise: Foy -had calculated on being helped not only by D’Armagnac from Talavera but -by the division of Clausel from Avila, before moving to fight Hill and -relieve them. - - [375] D’Armagnac also sent the battalion of Frankfort for the - same purpose, which arrived late with less excuse. See Foy, p. - 375. - -Wellington appears to have been under the impression that this -expedition, which Hill had executed with such admirable celerity and -dispatch, might have been made even more decisive, by the capture of -the castle of Miravete, if untoward circumstances had not intervened. -In a letter to Lord Liverpool, written on May 28[376], he expresses -the opinion that Tilson-Chowne might have taken it on the night of the -16th--which must appear a hazardous decision to those who look at the -precipitous position of the place and the strength of its defences. -He also says that Hill might have stopped at Almaraz for a few days -more, and have bombarded Miravete with Dickson’s heavy howitzers, if -he had not received false news from Sir William Erskine as to Drouet’s -movements in Estremadura. There can be no doubt, as we shall see, about -the false intelligence: but whether the bombardment would have been -successful is another thing. Probably Wellington considered that the -garrison would have been demoralized after what had happened at Almaraz. - - [376] _Dispatches_, ix. p. 189. - -As to Drouet’s movements, having received rather tardy notice of -Hill’s northward march from Merida, he had resolved to make a push to -ascertain what was left in his front. Lallemand’s dragoons, therefore, -pressed out in the direction of Zafra, where they came into contact -with Slade’s outposts and drove them in. At the same time Drouet -himself, with an infantry division and some light cavalry, advanced -as far as Don Benito, near Medellin, on the 17th May, from whence he -pushed patrols across the Guadiana as far as Miajadas. This movement, -made to ascertain whether Hill had departed with his whole corps, or -whether a large force had been left in Estremadura, was reported to Sir -William Erskine, the commander of the 2nd cavalry division, along with -rumours that Soult was across the Sierra Morena and closely supporting -Drouet. Erskine sent on the news to Graham at Portalegre, and to Hill, -who was then before Miravete, with assertions that Soult was certainly -approaching. This, as Wellington knew, was unlikely, for the Marshal -had been before Cadiz on the 11th, and could not possibly have crossed -the Sierra Morena by the 17th. As a matter of fact he only learnt on -the 19th, at Chiclana, that Hill had started, and Drouet’s move was -made purely to gain information and on his own responsibility. But -Graham, naturally unaware of this, brought up his two divisions to -Badajoz, as he had been directed to do if Estremadura were attacked -during Hill’s absence. And Hill himself was certainly induced to return -promptly from Almaraz by Erskine’s letter, though it is doubtful -whether he would have lingered to besiege Miravete even if he had not -received it. For Foy might have been reinforced by D’Armagnac and the -Avila division up to a strength which would have made Hill’s longer -stay on the Tagus undesirable. - -Drouet did no more; indeed, with his own force he was quite helpless -against Hill, since when he discovered that there was a large body -of allied troops left in Estremadura, and that more were coming up, -it would have been mad for him to move on Merida, or take any other -method of molesting the return of the expedition from Almaraz. Though -Soult spoke of coming with a division to his aid, the succours must be -many days on the way, while he himself could only act effectively by -marching northward at once. But if he had taken his own division he -would have been helpless against Hill, who could have beaten such a -force; while if he had crossed the Guadiana with his whole 12,000 men, -he would have been cut off from Soult by the ‘uncontained’ allied force -left in Estremadura, which he knew to be considerable. - -But to move upon Almaraz on his own responsibility, and without Soult’s -orders, would have been beyond Drouet’s power: he was a man under -authority, who dared not take such a step. And when Soult’s dispatches -reached him, they directed him not to lose touch with Andalusia, but to -demonstrate enough to bring Hill back. The Marshal did not intend to -let Drouet get out of touch with him, by bidding him march toward the -Tagus. - -Hill’s column, then, was never in any danger. But Wellington, who had -for a moment some anxiety in his behalf, was deeply vexed by Erskine’s -false intelligence, which had given rise to that feeling, and wrote in -wrath to Henry Wellesley and Graham[377] concerning the mischief that -this very incapable officer had done. He was particularly chagrined -that Graham had been drawn down to Badajoz by the needless alarm, as he -was intending to bring him back to join the main army within a short -time, and the movement to Badajoz had removed him three marches from -Portalegre, so that six days in all would be wasted in bringing him -back to his original starting-point. It is curious that Wellington did -not harden his heart to get rid of Erskine after this mishap: but -though he wrote bitterly about his subordinate’s incapacity, he did -not remove him. ‘Influence’ at home was apparently the key to his long -endurance: it will be remembered that this was by no means the first of -Erskine’s mistakes[378]. - - [377] To both on June 1. _Dispatches_, ix. p. 197. Erskine’s name - is the blank to be filled up. - - [378] See vol. iv. pp. 133 and 191. - -The fall of the Almaraz forts, as might have been expected, was -interpreted by Marmont and Soult each from his own point of view. The -former, rightly as it turned out, wrote to Foy that he must be prepared -to return to Leon at short notice, and that the Army of the Centre -and Drouet must guard the valley of the Tagus on his departure[379]. -Soult, on the other hand, having heard of Graham’s arrival at Badajoz -and Hill’s return to Merida, argued that the allies were massing on -the Guadiana for an advance into Andalusia. He made bitter complaints -to Jourdan that he had violated the rules of military subordination by -sending a letter to Drouet warning him that he might be called up to -the Tagus. It was unheard of, he said, to communicate directly with a -subordinate, who ought to be written to only through the channel of -his immediate superior. He even threatened to resign the command of -the Army of the South[380]--but when Joseph showed no signs of being -terrified by this menace, no more was heard of it. The viceroyalty of -Andalusia was not a thing to be lightly given up. - - [379] Marmont to Foy, June 1. - - [380] See Jourdan’s _Mémoires_, pp. 399-400. - -It soon became evident to Wellington that the surprise of Almaraz was -not to be resented by the enemy in any practical form. Foy was not -reinforced, nor was Drouet brought up to the Tagus: it was clear that -the French were too weak to take the offensive either in the North or -the South, even under such provocation. They could not even rebuild -the lost bridge: the transport from Madrid of a new pontoon train as a -substitute for the lost boats was beyond King Joseph’s power. One or -two boats were finally got to Almaraz--but nothing that could serve as -a bridge. Nor were the lost magazines ever replaced. - -It was at this same time that Wellington took in hand a scheme for -facilitating his communications north and south, which was to have a -high strategical importance. As long as Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz -were in the enemy’s hands, the most eastern crossing of the Tagus -practicable for the Anglo-Portuguese army was the boat-bridge of Villa -Velha. But when these two fortresses were regained, it was possible -to open up a line farther east, which had not been available for two -years. Since Mayne blew up the ancient Roman bridge of Alcantara in -June 1809[381], the Middle Tagus had been impassable for both sides. -The allies had usually been in possession of both banks of the Tagus -in this direction, but so intermittently that it had never been worth -their while to restore the passage, which would have been lost to them -whenever the French (as not unfrequently happened) extended their -operations into the Coria-Zarza Mayor country on the north bank, or the -Caçeres-Albuquerque country on the other. But when the enemy had lost -both Badajoz and Rodrigo, and had no posts nearer to Alcantara than the -Upper Tormes, the forts of Miravete, and Zalamea, when, moreover, he -had adopted a distinctly defensive attitude for many months, Wellington -thought it worth while to recover possession of a passage which would -shorten the route from Estremadura to the frontiers of Leon by a -hundred miles, and would therefore give him an advantage of six marches -over the enemy in transferring troops from north to south. Whether -Almaraz were again seized and reoccupied by the French mattered little: -the restoration of Alcantara would be safe and profitable. - - [381] See vol. ii. p. 444. - -Accordingly, on May 24th, Colonel Sturgeon[382] and Major Todd -of the Royal Staff Corps were sent to Alcantara to report on the -practicability of restoring the broken arch, which, owing to the -immense depth of the cañon of the Tagus, overhung the river by no less -than 140 feet. It was intended that if the engineering problem should -prove too hard, a flying bridge of rafts, boats, or pontoons should -be established at the water level[383]. But Sturgeon and Todd did -more than Wellington had expected, and succeeded in a very few days -in establishing a sort of suspension-bridge of ropes between the two -shattered piers of Trajan’s great structure. The system adopted was -that of placing at each end of the broken roadway a very large and -solid beam, clamped to the Roman stones, by being sunk in channels cut -in them. These beams being made absolutely adhesive to the original -work, served as solid bases from which a series of eighteen cables were -stretched over the gap. Eight more beams, with notches cut in them -to receive the cables, were laid at right angles across the parallel -ropes, and lashed tight to them. The long cables were strained taut -with winches: a network of rope yarn for a flooring was laid between -the eight beams, and on this planks were placed, while a screen of -tarpaulins supported on guide-ropes acted as parapets. The structure -was sound enough to carry not only infantry and horses, but heavy -artillery, yet could always be broken up in a short time if an enemy -had ever appeared in the neighbourhood[384]. Several times it was -rolled up, and then replaced. - - [382] An officer probably better remembered by the general reader - as the husband of Sarah Curran, Robert Emmet’s sometime fiancée, - than as the executor of some of Wellington’s most important - engineering works. He fell before Bayonne in 1814. - - [383] See Wellington to Graham, 23rd and 24th May. _Dispatches_, - ix. pp. 163-5. - - [384] The best and most elaborate account of this is in Leith - Hay, i. pp. 300-1. - -When the completion of the repairs of Alcantara and the destruction of -the French bridge of Almaraz are taken together, it must be concluded -that Wellington’s work in May gave him an advantage over the French of -at least ten or twelve marches in moving troops from north to south -or vice versa. For the route from Ciudad Rodrigo to Merida, now open -to him, had at least that superiority over the only itinerary of the -enemy, which would be that by Avila, Talavera, Toledo, and the eastern -passes of the Sierra Morena. Though the narrow bridge of Arzobispo on -the Middle Tagus still remained in French hands, it did not lead on to -any good road to Estremadura or Andalusia, but on to the defiles of the -Mesa d’Ibor and the ravines of the Sierra de Guadalupe. No large force -could march or feed in those solitudes. - -All was now ready for the advance upon the Tormes, which Wellington had -made up his mind to execute. - - - - -SECTION XXXIII: CHAPTER III - -WELLINGTON’S ADVANCE INTO LEON - - -It was not till June 13th that Wellington crossed the Agueda and began -his march upon Salamanca, the first great offensive movement against -the main fighting army of the French since the advance to Talavera in -1809. But for many days beforehand his troops were converging on Fuente -Guinaldo and Ciudad Rodrigo from their widely-spread cantonments. -Graham’s divisions quitted Portalegre on May 30th, and some of the -other troops, which had been left on the western side of the Beira, -had also to make an early start. Every available infantry unit of the -Anglo-Portuguese army had been drawn in, save the 2nd Division and -Hamilton’s Portuguese--left as usual with Hill in Estremadura--and -Power’s new Portuguese brigade--once the garrisons of Elvas and -Abrantes--which had become available for the field since the fall -of Badajoz made it possible to place those fortresses in charge of -militia. Its arrival made Hill stronger by 2,000 in infantry than he -had ever been before, and he was also left the three brigades (Long’s -and Slade’s British and John Campbell’s Portuguese) of Erskine’s -cavalry division. The total was 18,000 men. Wellington’s own main army, -consisting of the seven other infantry divisions, Pack’s and Bradford’s -Portuguese brigades, and the cavalry of Anson, Bock, Le Marchant, -and Victor Alten, made up a force of 48,000 men, of which 3,500 were -cavalry: there were only eight British and one Portuguese batteries -with the army--a short allowance of 54 guns. - -But though these 48,000 men constituted the striking force, which was -to deal the great blow, their action was to be supported by a very -elaborate and complicated system of diversions, which were intended -to prevent the French armies of the South, North, Centre, and Aragon -from sending any help to Marmont, the foe whom Wellington was set -on demolishing. It is necessary to explain the concentric scheme -by which it was intended that pressure should be brought to bear -on all the outlying French armies, at the same moment at which the -Anglo-Portuguese main body crossed the Agueda. - -Soult had the largest force--over 50,000 men, as a recently captured -morning-state revealed to his adversary[385]. But he could not -assemble more than some 24,000 men, unless he abandoned the siege of -Cadiz and the kingdom of Granada--half his army was pinned down to -occupation-work. Wherefore Wellington judged that his field-force -could be ‘contained’ by Hill, if only means were found of preventing -him from reinforcing Drouet’s divisions in Estremadura by any -appreciable succours. This means lay to hand in the roving army of -Ballasteros, whose random schemes of campaign were often irrational, -but had the solitary advantage of being quite inscrutable. He might do -anything--and so was a most tiresome adversary for Soult to deal with, -since his actions could not be foreseen. At this moment Wellington had -urged the Cadiz Regency to stir up Ballasteros to activity, and had -promised that, if Soult concentrated against him, Hill should press -in upon Drouet, and so call off the Marshal’s attention. Similarly -if Soult concentrated against Hill, Ballasteros was to demonstrate -against Seville, or the rear of the Cadiz Lines. There was always the -possibility that the Spanish general might refuse to obey the orders of -his Government, or that he might commit himself to some rash enterprise -and get badly beaten. Both these chances had to be risked. The one that -occurred was that Ballasteros took up the idea desired, but acted too -early and too incautiously, and sustained a severe check at the battle -of Bornos (June 1). Fortunately he was ‘scotched but not slain,’ and -kept together a force large enough to give Soult much further trouble, -though he did not prevent the Marshal from sending reinforcements to -Drouet and putting Hill upon the defensive. Of this more in its due -place. - - [385] See Wellington to Henry Wellesley at Cadiz, June 7. - _Dispatches_, ix. p. 219. - -So much for the diversion against Soult. On the other flank Wellington -had prepared a similar plan for molesting the French in the Asturias, -and threatening Marmont’s flank and rear, at the same moment that his -front was to be assailed. The force here available was Abadia’s Army of -Galicia, which nominally counted over 24,000 men, but had 6,000 of them -shut up in the garrisons of Corunna, Ferrol, and Vigo. About 16,000 -could be put into the field by an effort, if only Abadia were stirred -up to activity. But there were many hindrances: this general was (like -most of his predecessors) at strife with the Galician Junta. He was -also very jealous of Sir Howard Douglas, the British Commissioner at -Corunna, who was in favour with the Junta and people, and was inclined -to resent any advice offered by him[386]. His army was not only (as in -1810-11) very short of cavalry--there were only about 400 effective -sabres--but also of artillery. For the Cadiz government, searching -for troops to send against the rebels of South America, had recently -drafted off several batteries, as well as several foot regiments, to -the New World. The most effective units had been taken, to the wild -indignation of the Galicians, who wanted to keep the troops that -they had raised for their own protection. There were only about 500 -trained artillerymen left in Galicia, and when deduction was made for -the garrisons of Ferrol, Vigo, and Corunna, very few remained for the -active army. Abadia had, therefore, many excuses to offer for taking -the field late, and with insufficient equipment[387]. It was fortunate -that his superior, Castaños, who commanded (as Captain-General both -of Estremadura and Galicia) all the troops in western Spain, fell in -completely with Wellington’s plan, and brought pressure to bear upon -his subordinate, coming up to Santiago in person to expedite matters. - - [386] An extraordinary case of Abadia’s ill will occurred in this - spring: a damaged transport, carrying British troops to Lisbon, - having put in to Corunna to repair, permission was refused for - the men to land: apparently it was suspected that they were - trying to garrison Corunna. - - [387] For all this Galician business see the _Life of Sir Howard - Douglas_, pp. 120-60. - -The part which the Army of Galicia was to play in the general scheme -was that of marching upon Astorga, and laying siege to the considerable -French garrison which was isolated in that rather advanced position. If -Marmont should attempt to succour it, he would be left weak in front -of the oncoming British invasion. If he did not, its fall would turn -and expose his right flank, and throw all the plains of northern Leon -into the power of the allies. A move in force upon Astorga would also -have some effect on the position of General Bonnet in the Asturias, and -ought certainly to keep him uneasy, if not to draw him away from his -conquests. - -It will be remembered that Bonnet had been directed to reoccupy the -Asturias by Napoleon’s special command, and by no means to Marmont’s -liking[388]. He marched from Leon on May 15, by the road across -the pass of Pajares, which he had so often taken before on similar -expeditions. The Asturians made no serious resistance, and on May 17-18 -Bonnet seized Oviedo and its port of Gijon. But, as in 1811, when he -had accomplished this much, and planted some detachments in the coast -towns, his division of 6,000 men was mainly immobilized, and became -a string of garrisons rather than a field-force. It was observed -by Porlier’s Cantabrian bands on its right hand, and by Castañon’s -division of the Army of Galicia on its left, and was not strong enough -to hunt them down, though it could prevent them from showing themselves -anywhere in the neighbourhood of Oviedo. - - [388] See above, p. 210. - -But if the Galicians should lay siege to Astorga, and push advanced -guards beyond it, in the direction of the city of Leon, it was clear -that Bonnet’s position would be threatened, and his communications with -his chief, Marmont, imperilled. Wellington, who knew from intercepted -dispatches the importance attached by the Emperor to the retention of -the Asturias, judged that Bonnet would not evacuate it, but would spend -his energy in an attempt to hold back the Galicians and keep open his -connexion with Leon. He thus hoped that the French division at Oviedo -would never appear near Salamanca--an expectation in which he was to -be deceived, for Marmont (disregarding his master’s instructions) -ordered the evacuation of the Asturias the moment that he discovered -the strength of the attack that was being directed against his front -on the Tormes. Hence Wellington’s advance cleared the Asturias of the -enemy, and enabled the Galicians to besiege Astorga unmolested for two -months--good results in themselves, but not the precise benefits that -he had hoped to secure by putting the Galician army in motion. - -No item of assistance being too small to be taken into consideration, -Wellington also directed Silveira to advance from the Tras-os-Montes, -with the four militia regiments of that province[389], to cross the -Spanish frontier and blockade Zamora, the outlying French garrison on -the Douro, which covered Marmont’s flank, as Astorga did his rear. -To enable this not too trustworthy irregular force to guard itself -from sudden attacks, Wellington lent it a full brigade of regular -cavalry[390], which was entrusted to General D’Urban, who dropped the -post of Chief-of-the-Staff to Beresford to take up this small but -responsible charge. His duty was to watch the country on each side -of the Douro in Silveira’s front, so as to prevent him from being -surprised, and generally to keep Wellington informed about Marmont’s -right wing, when he should begin to concentrate. Toro, only 20 miles -farther up the Douro than Zamora, was another French garrison, and a -likely place for the Marshal to use as one of his minor bases. Silveira -being as rash as he was enterprising, it was D’Urban’s task to see that -he should be warned betimes, and not allowed to get into trouble. He -was to retreat on Carvajales and the mountains beyond the Esla if he -were attacked by a superior force. - - [389] Chaves, Braganza, Miranda, Villa Real. - - [390] Silveira already had Nos. 11 and 12, D’Urban brought up No. - 1, which had not hitherto operated on this frontier. - -A much more serious diversion was prepared to distract the free -movement of the French Army of the North, from which Caffarelli -might naturally be expected to send heavy detachments for Marmont’s -assistance, when the British striking-force should advance on -Salamanca. Caffarelli’s old enemies were the patriot bands of Cantabria -and Navarre, who had given his predecessor, Dorsenne, so much trouble -earlier in the year. Mina, on the borders of Navarre, Aragon, and -Old Castile, was very far away, and not easy to communicate with or -to bring into the general plan, though his spirit was excellent. But -the so-called ‘Seventh Army,’ under Mendizabal, was near enough to be -treated as a serious factor in the general scheme. This force consisted -of the two large bands under Porlier in Cantabria, and Longa in the -mountains above Santander, each of which was several thousands strong: -these were supposed to be regular divisions, though their training -left much to be desired: in addition there were several considerable -guerrilla ‘partidas’ under Merino, Salazar, Saornil, and other chiefs, -who lived a hunted life in the provinces of Burgos, Palencia, and -Avila, and were in theory more or less dependent on Mendizabal. The -chief of the Seventh Army was requested to do all that he could to keep -Caffarelli employed during the month of June--a task that quite fell in -with his ideas--he executed several very daring raids into Old Castile, -one of which put the garrison of Burgos in great terror, as it was -surprised at a moment when all its better items chanced to be absent, -and nothing was left in the place but dépôts and convalescents[391]. - - [391] See Thiébault, _Mémoires_, v. p. 561. - -But the main distraction contrived to occupy the French Army of the -North was one for which Wellington was not primarily responsible, -though he approved of it when the scheme was laid before him. This -was a naval expedition to attack the coast-forts of Cantabria and -Biscay, and open up direct communication with Mendizabal’s bands -from the side of the sea. The idea was apparently started by Sir -Howard Douglas and Sir Home Popham, the former of whom was a great -believer in the _guerrilleros_, and the latter a strong advocate of -the striking power of the navy. Nothing serious had been done on the -Biscay coast since the two expeditions of 1810, of which the former -had been very successful, but the latter had ended in the disastrous -tempest which wrecked Renovales’s flotilla on that rocky shore[392]. -Lord Liverpool consented to give Popham two battalions of marines and -a company of artillery, to add to the force provided by the crews of -the _Venerable_, his flagship, five frigates (_Surveillante_, _Rhin_, -_Isis_, _Diadem_, _Medusa_), and several smaller vessels. The plan was -to proceed eastward along the coast from Gijon, to call down Longa and -Porlier to blockade each isolated French garrison from the land side, -and to batter it with heavy ship guns from the water. The opportunity -was to be taken at the same time of making over to the Cantabrian bands -a large store of muskets and munitions which had been prepared for -them. The arrangements were made in May, and Popham’s squadron was -ready to move precisely at the same moment that Wellington crossed the -Agueda. Its first descent was made on June 17th, a day exactly suitable -for alarming the Army of the North at the same time that Marmont’s -first appeals for help were likely to reach Caffarelli. The plan, as -we shall see, worked exceedingly well, and the fact that the Army of -Portugal got no reinforcements from Burgos or Biscay was due entirely -to the dismay caused to Caffarelli by this unexpected descent on his -rear. He conceived that the squadron carried a large landing force, and -that he was about to see Biscay slip out of his hands. The tale of this -useful diversion will be told in its due place. - - [392] See vol. iii. pp. 486-7. - -There was yet one more item in the long list of outlying distractions -on which Wellington relied for the vexing of the French. He was -strongly of opinion that Suchet would spare troops to reinforce King -Joseph at Madrid, if his own invasion of Leon had a prosperous start. -Indeed, he somewhat overvalued the Duke of Albufera’s will and power to -interfere in central Spain, his idea being that King Joseph had a much -more direct control over the Valencian and Aragonese armies than was -really the case. One of the king’s intercepted dispatches, directing -Suchet to send troops into La Mancha, had fallen into his hands, and -he was unaware that the Marshal had refused to obey it, and had found -plausible reasons to cloak his disobedience[393]. - - [393] See above, p. 304. The intercepted cipher is in the Scovell - Papers. - -The opportunity of finding means to harass Suchet depended on the -general posture of affairs in the Mediterranean caused by the outbreak -of the Russian war. As long as Napoleon kept a large army in Italy, -there was always a possibility that he might some day try a descent on -Sicily, where the authority of King Ferdinand rested on the bayonets -of a strong British garrison. There were a dozen red-coated battalions -always ready in Sicily, beside the rather inefficient forces of King -Ferdinand. In September 1810 Murat had massed a Franco-Neapolitan army -at Reggio, and tried an actual invasion, which ended ignominiously in -the capture of the only two battalions that succeeded in landing. But -by the early spring of 1812 it was known that nearly all the French -troops in Italy had been moved northward, and a great part of Murat’s -Neapolitan army with them. By April, indeed, there was only one French -division left in the whole Peninsula, nearly all the old ‘Army of -Italy’ having marched across the Alps. Lord William Bentinck, the -commander of the British forces in Sicily, had early notice of these -movements, and being a man of action and enterprising mind, though -too much given to wavering councils and rapid changes of purpose, was -anxious to turn the new situation to account. He was divided between -two ideas--the one which appealed to him most was to make a bold -descent on the under-garrisoned Italian peninsula, either to stir up -trouble in Calabria--where the ruthless government of Murat’s military -satraps had barely succeeded in keeping down rebellion, but had not -crushed its spirit--or, farther away, in the former dominions of the -Pope and the small dukes of the Austrian connexion. But the memory -of the fruitless attempt against the Italian mainland in 1809 under -Sir John Stuart survived as a warning: it was doubtful whether the -occasional adventurers who came to Palermo to promise insurrection -in northern Italy had any backing[394], and though Calabria was a -more promising field, it was to be remembered that such troops as -the enemy still retained were mainly concentrated there. Thus it -came to pass that Lord William Bentinck at times despaired of all -Italian expeditions, and thought of sending a force to Catalonia or -Valencia to harass Suchet. ‘I cannot but imagine,’ he wrote, ‘that the -occasional disembarkation at different points of a large regular force -must considerably annoy the enemy, and create an important diversion -for other Spanish operations[395].’ But when he wrote this, early in -the year, he was hankering after descents on Elba and Corsica--the -latter a most wild inspiration! These schemes the ministry very wisely -condemned: Lord Liverpool wrote in reply that ‘though there might be a -considerable degree of dissatisfaction, and even of ferment, pervading -the greater part of Italy,’ there was no evidence of any systematic -conspiracy to shake off the yoke of France. Corsica and Elba, even if -conquered, would only be of secondary importance. A diversion to be -made upon the east coast of Spain would be far the best way in which -the disposable force in Sicily could be employed. Wellington had been -informed of the proposal, and might probably be able to lend part of -the garrison of Cadiz, to make the expedition more formidable. Sir -Edward Pellew, the admiral commanding on the Mediterranean station, -would be able to give advice, and arrange for the co-operation of the -fleet[396]. Lord Liverpool wrote on the next day (March 4) to inform -Wellington of the answer that had been made to Bentinck, but pointed -out that probably the aid could only be given from May to October, as -the expedition would depend on the fleet, and naval men thought that -it would be impossible to keep a large squadron in attendance on the -Sicilian force during the winter months. The troops would probably have -to return to their old quarters at the close of autumn[397]. - - [394] See Lord Wellesley to Lord W. Bentinck, December 27, 1811, - in Wellington’s _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. p. 249. - - [395] Bentinck to Lord Liverpool, January 25, 1812, ibid., pp. - 290-1. - - [396] Liverpool to Bentinck, March 4. Wellington’s _Supplementary - Dispatches_, vii. p. 300. - - [397] Liverpool to Wellington, March 5, ibid., p. 301. - -Wellington, as it chanced, was already in communication with Bentinck, -for the latter had sent his brother, Lord Frederick, to Lisbon, with -a dispatch for the Commander-in-Chief in Portugal, in which he stated -that he leaned himself to the Corsican scheme, but that if the home -government disliked it, he would be prepared to send in April or May -an expedition of 10,000 men to operate against Suchet[398]. The letter -from London reached Wellington first, about March 20th[399], and was -a source of great joy to him, as he saw that the Cabinet intended to -prohibit the Italian diversion, and wished to direct Bentinck’s men -towards Spain. He wrote to London and to Palermo, to state that a -descent upon the coast of Catalonia seemed to him ‘the most essential -object.’ It should be aimed at Barcelona or Tarragona: it might not -succeed so far as its immediate object was concerned, but it would -have the infallible result of forcing Suchet to come up with all his -available forces from Valencia, and would prevent him from interfering -in the affairs of western and central Spain during the next campaign. -Ten thousand men, even with such aid as Lacy and the Catalan army -might give, were probably insufficient to deal with a place of such -strength as Barcelona; but Tarragona, which was weakly garrisoned, -might well be taken. Even if it were not, a great point would be gained -in opening up communication with the Catalans, and throwing all the -affairs of the French in eastern Spain into confusion. Bentinck was -advised in the strongest terms to land north of the Ebro, and not in -Valencia: an attack on Catalonia would draw Suchet out of Valencia, -which would then fall of its own accord. Wellington added, writing -to Lord Liverpool only, not to Bentinck, that he did not see how any -appreciable aid could be got from the Cadiz garrison, or those of -Tarifa or Cartagena[400]: the British regiments there had been cut down -to a necessary minimum, but there were 1,400 Portuguese and two foreign -regiments, of whom some might possibly be spared. The government must -give him a definite order to detach such and such battalions, and it -should be done--the responsibility being their own. Lord Frederick -Bentinck arrived from Palermo at Badajoz just after that place fell: -Wellington charged him with additional advices for his brother, to the -effect that he would send him a siege-train and officers and gunners -to work it, which might serve to batter Tarragona, if that proved -possible. Though he could himself spare no British troops, the Spanish -Regency should be urged to lend, for an expedition to Catalonia, two -divisions, one under Roche at Alicante, the other under Whittingham -in Majorca, which consisted each of 3,000 men recently entrusted -for training to those British officers. Their aid was hardly likely -to be refused, and they had been better trained, fed, and clothed -of late than other Spanish troops. Wellington was not deceived in -this expectation, the Regency very handsomely offered to place both -divisions at Bentinck’s disposition[401], and they turned out to have -swelled in numbers of late, owing to vigorous recruiting of dispersed -men from Blake’s defunct army. The available figure was far over the -6,000 of which Wellington had spoken. - - [398] Bentinck to Wellington, February 23, ibid., p. 296. - - [399] The answer to Lord Liverpool went off on March 20, that to - Bentinck on March 24th. - - [400] Whither the 2/67th, a company of artillery, and five - companies of De Watteville’s Swiss regiment had been sent, on the - news of Blake’s disasters before Valencia. _Dispatches_, viii. p. - 448. - - [401] The best source of information about these subsidized - corps is the life of Sir Samford Whittingham, who raised and - disciplined one of them in Majorca, on the skeletons of the old - regiments of Cordova, Burgos, and 5th Granaderos Provinciales. - He had only 1,500 men on January 1, 1812, and 2,200 on February - 21, but had worked them up to over 3,000 by April. Roche, who - had to work on the cadres of Canarias, Alicante, Chinchilla, - Voluntarios de Aragon, 2nd of Murcia, and Corona, had 5,500 men - ready on March 1, and more by May. Whittingham maintains that his - battalions always did their duty far better than other divisions, - commanded by officers with unhappy traditions of defeat, and - attributes the previous miserable history of the Murcian army to - incapacity and poor spirit in high places. - -There seemed, therefore, in May to be every probability that a force of -some 17,000 men might be available for the descent on Catalonia which -Wellington advised: and both Admiral Pellew and Roche and Whittingham -made active preparations to be found in perfect readiness when Lord -William Bentinck should start off the nucleus of the expeditionary -force from Palermo[402]. Wellington had fixed the third week in June -as the date at which the appearance of the diversion would be most -effective[403]. On June 5th he was able to state that two separate -divisions of transports had already been sent off from Lisbon, one to -Alicante and one to Majorca, to pick up the two Spanish divisions. - - [402] Henry Wellesley to Wellington. _Supplementary Dispatches_, - vii. p. 320. - - [403] See as evidence of eagerness Whittingham’s letter to Pellew - of May 28 in the former’s _Memoirs_, p. 161. - -Now, however, came a deplorable check to the plan, which only became -known to Wellington when he had already committed himself to his -campaign against Marmont. Bentinck could never get out of his head the -original idea of Italian conquest which he had laid before the Cabinet -in January. There was no doubt that it had been discouraged by the -home government, and that he had received very distinct instructions -that Spain was to be the sphere of his activity, and that he was to -take Wellington into his councils. But Lord Liverpool’s dispatch had -contained the unfortunate phrase that ‘unless the project of resistance -to the French power in Italy should appear to rest upon much better -grounds than those of which we are at present apprised,’ the diversion -to Catalonia was the obvious course[404].’ This gave a discretionary -power to Bentinck, if he should judge that evidence of discontent in -Italy had cropped up in unexpected quantity and quality since March. -It does not appear, to the unprejudiced observer, that such evidence -was forthcoming in May. But Bentinck, with his original prejudice -in favour of a descent on Italy running in his brain, chose to take -certain secret correspondence received from the Austrian general -Nugent, and other sources, as justification for holding back from -the immediate action in eastern Spain, on which Wellington had been -led to rely. No troops sailed from Palermo or Messina till the very -end of June, and then the numbers sent were much less than had been -promised, and the directions given to Maitland, the general entrusted -with the command, were by no means satisfactory[405]. The underlying -fact would appear to be that, since March, Bentinck had begun to be -alarmed at the intrigues of the Queen of Sicily, and feared to send -away British troops so far afield as Spain. That notorious princess and -her incapable spouse had been deprived in the preceding autumn of their -ancient status as absolute sovereigns, and a Sicilian constitution and -parliament, somewhat on the British model, had been called into being. -For some time it had been supposed that Caroline, though incensed, -was powerless to do harm, and the native Sicilians were undoubtedly -gratified by the change. But Bentinck presently detected traces of a -conspiracy fostered by the Queen among the Italian and mercenary troops -employed by the Sicilian government: and, what was more surprising, -it was suspected (and proved later on) that the court had actually -opened up negotiations with Napoleon and even with Murat, in order -to get rid of the English from Sicily at all costs[406]. In view of -the fact that there were 8,000 Italian and foreign troops of doubtful -disposition quartered in Sicily, Bentinck was seized with qualms -at the idea of sending away a large expedition, mainly composed of -British regiments. In the end he compromised, by detaching only three -British and two German Legion battalions, along with a miscellaneous -collection of fractions of several foreign corps, making 7,000 men in -all[407]. They only arrived off the coast of Catalonia on July 31st, -and Maitland’s freedom of operations was hampered by instructions to -the effect that ‘the division of the Sicilian army detached has for -its first object the safety of Sicily; its employment on the Spanish -coast is temporary.’ He was told that he was liable to be withdrawn at -any moment, if complications arose in Sicily or Italy, and was not to -consider himself a permanent part of the British army in Spain. Yet at -the same time that Bentinck had given these orders, the home government -had told Wellington to regard the expeditionary force as placed at his -disposal, and authorized him to send directions to it. - - [404] Liverpool to Bentinck, 4th March, quoted above. - - [405] See Wellington to Lord W. Bentinck in _Dispatches_, ix. pp. - 60-1. - - [406] That veritable ‘stormy petrel of politics,’ Sir Robert - Wilson, was passing through Sicily in May, and seems to have - acted a mischievous part in visiting the Queen, and allowing her - to set before him all her grievances against Bentinck, and the - ‘Jacobin Parliament’ that he was setting up. She told Wilson that - Bentinck ‘went to jails and took evidence of miserable wretches, - actual malefactors or suspects, inducing them to say what he - wished for his plans, and acting without any substantiating - facts.’ As to the army Wilson gathered that ‘the Neapolitan - soldiery hate us to a man, the Germans would adhere to us, the - native Sicilians at least not act against us.’ But there were - only 2,000 Sicilians and 1,900 Germans, and 8,000 Neapolitans - and other Italians, eminently untrustworthy. [So untrustworthy - were they, indeed, that the Italian corps sent to Spain in the - autumn deserted by hundreds to the French.] See Wilson’s _Private - Diary_, 1812-15, pp. 35-62. - - [407] For details, see table in Appendix no. XIII. - -All this worked out less unhappily than might have been expected; for -though Wellington got little practical military help from the Sicilian -corps, and though Maitland’s operations were most disappointing and -started far too late, yet the knowledge that great transport squadrons -were at Alicante and Majorca, and the rumour that a large force was -coming from Sicily, most certainly kept Suchet in a state of alarm, -and prevented him from helping Soult or King Joseph. It is interesting -to find from his correspondence[408] that in the earliest days of -July he was anxiously watching the ships at Alicante, and expecting a -descent either on Valencia or on Catalonia, though Maitland was yet -far away, and did not appear off Palamos till July 31. The fear of -the descent was an admirable help to Wellington--perhaps more useful -than its actual appearance at an early date might have been, since the -expeditionary troops were decidedly less in numbers than Wellington -had hoped or Suchet had feared. At the same time the news that the -Sicilian force had not sailed, and perhaps might never appear, reached -Salamanca at one of the most critical moments of the campaign, and -filled Wellington with fears that the Army of Valencia might already be -detaching troops against him, while he had calculated upon its being -entirely distracted by the projected demonstration[409]. The news that -Maitland had sailed at last, only came to hand some time after the -battle of Salamanca had been won, when the whole position in Spain had -assumed a new and more satisfactory aspect. - - [408] Suchet’s correspondence (in the Archives of the French War - Ministry) begins to be anxious from July 6 onward. On that date - he hears that ships are at Alicante to take Roche on board, who - is to join a very large English force, and 15,000 (!) men from - Majorca. On July 13th he hears that Maitland is to have 17,000 - men, though only 3,000 British regulars. - - [409] Wellington to Lord Bathurst, July 14: ‘I have this day - received a letter from Lord W. Bentinck of the 9th of June, from - which I am concerned to observe that his Lordship does not intend - to carry into execution the operation on the east coast of the - Peninsula, until he shall have tried the success of another plan - on the coast of Italy. I am apprehensive that this determination - may bring upon us additional forces of the Army of Aragon: - but I still hope that I shall be able to retain at the close - of this campaign the acquisitions made at its commencement.’ - _Dispatches_, ix. p. 285. - -Such were the subsidiary schemes with which Wellington supported his -main design of a direct advance against Marmont’s army. Some of them -worked well--Hill, Home Popham, and Mendizabal did all, and more than -all, that had been expected of them, in the way of containing large -French forces. Others accomplished all that could in reason have been -hoped--such was the case with Silveira and Ballasteros. Others fell far -below the amount of usefulness that had been reckoned upon--both the -Galician army and the Sicilian army proved most disappointing in the -timing of their movements and the sum of their achievements. But on the -whole the plan worked--the French generals in all parts of Spain were -distracted, and Marmont got little help from without. - -It is certain that, at the moment of Wellington’s starting on his -offensive campaign, the thing that gave him most trouble and anxiety -was not the timing or efficacy of the various diversions that he had -planned, but a purely financial problem. It was now a matter of years -since the money due for the pay and maintenance of the army had been -coming in with terrible unpunctuality. Officers and men had grown to -regard it as normal that their pay should be four or six months in -arrears: the muleteers and camp followers were in even worse case. And -the orders for payment (_vales_ as they were called) issued by the -commissariat to the peasantry, were so tardily settled in cash, that -the recipients would often sell them for half or two-thirds of their -face value to speculators in Lisbon, who could afford to wait many -months for the money. - -This state of things was deplorable: but it did not proceed, as Napier -usually hints, and as Wellington himself seems sometimes to have felt, -from perversity on the part of the home government. It was not the case -that there was gold or silver in London, and that the ministers did -not send it with sufficient promptness. No one can be so simple as to -suppose that Lord Liverpool, Mr. Perceval, the Marquess of Wellesley, -or Lord Castlereagh, did not understand that the Army of Portugal must -have cash, or it would lose that mobility which was its great strength. -Still less would they wittingly starve it, when the fortunes of the -ministry were bound up with the successful conduct of the war. - -But the years 1811-12, as has been already pointed out in the last -volume of this work, were those of the greatest stringency in the -cash-market of Great Britain. The country was absolutely drained dry -of metallic currency in the precious metals: no silver had been coined -at the Mint since the Revolutionary war began: no guineas since 1798. -England was transacting all her internal business on bank-notes, and -gold was a rare commodity, only to be got by high prices and much -searching. This was the time when the Jews of Portsmouth used to -board every home-coming transport, to offer convalescents or sailors -27_s._, or even more, in paper for every guinea that they had on -them. The Spanish dollar, though weighing much less than an English -five-shilling piece (when that valuable antiquity could be found[410]), -readily passed for six shillings in paper. And even this coin could -not now be got so easily as in 1809 or 1810, for the growing state of -disturbance in the Spanish-American colonies was beginning to affect -the annual import of silver from the mines of Mexico and Peru, which -had for a long time been the main source from which bullion for Europe -was procured. To buy dollars at Cadiz with bills on London was becoming -a much more difficult business. In May 1812 a special complication -was introduced--Lord William Bentinck wishing to provide Spanish coin -for the expedition which was about to sail for Catalonia, sent agents -to Gibraltar, who bought with Sicilian gold all the dollars that -they could procure, giving a reckless price for them, equivalent to -over six shillings a dollar, and competing with Wellington’s regular -correspondents who were at the same moment offering only 5_s._ 4_d._ -or 5_s._ 6_d._ for the coin. Of course the higher offer secured the -cash, and Wellington made bitter complaints that the market had been -spoilt, and that he suddenly found himself shut out from a supply on -which he had hitherto reckoned with security[411]. But the competition -was only transient, though very tiresome at a moment when silver coin -was specially wanted for payments in Leon. For, as Wellington remarked, -the people about Salamanca had never seen the British army before, -and would be wanting to do business on a prompt cash basis, not being -accustomed to credit, as were the Portuguese. - - [410] No silver crowns had been coined since 1760 at the Mint. - They weighed 463 grains: the Spanish dollar only 415 grains. - - [411] See Wellington to Lord Bathurst. _Dispatches_, vii. p. 370. - -The army started upon the campaign with a military chest in the most -deplorable state of depletion. ‘We are absolutely bankrupt,’ wrote -Wellington, ‘the troops are now five months in arrears instead of one -month in advance. The staff have not been paid since February; the -muleteers not since June 1811! and we are in debt in all parts of -the country. I am obliged to take money sent me by my brother [Henry -Wellesley, British Minister at Cadiz] for the Spaniards, in order to -give my own troops a fortnight’s pay, who are really suffering for want -of money[412].’ Some weeks before this last complaint Wellington had -sounded an even louder note of alarm. ‘We owe not less than 5,000,000 -dollars. The Portuguese troops and establishments are likewise in the -greatest distress, and it is my opinion, as well as that of Marshal -Beresford, that we must disband part of that army, unless I can -increase the monthly payments of the subsidy. The Commissary-General -has this day informed me that he is very apprehensive that he will not -be able to make good his engagements for the payment for the meat for -the troops. If we are obliged to stop that payment, your Lordship may -as well prepare to recall the army, for it will be impossible to carry -up salt meat (as well as bread) to the troops from the sea-coast.... -It is not improbable that we may not be able to take advantage of -the enemy’s comparative weakness in this campaign _for sheer want of -money_[413].’ One almost feels that Wellington is here painting the -position of the army in the blackest possible colours, in order to -bring pressure on his correspondent at home. But this dismal picture -was certainly reflected in the language of his staff at the time: a -letter from his aide-de-camp, Colin Campbell, speaks (on May 30) of -the depleted state of the military chest being a possible curb to the -campaign: ‘Lord W. cannot take supplies with him to enable him to do -more than demonstrate towards Valladolid, when so good an opportunity -offers, and an inconsiderable addition would suffice. The harvest -is ripening, the country round Salamanca is full of all requisite -supplies, but they are not procurable without cash[414].’ - - [412] Ibid., vii. p. 319. - - [413] Wellington to Lord Liverpool, April 22. _Supplementary - Dispatches_, vii. p. 318. - - [414] Campbell to Shawe. _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. p. 362. - -Yet it is hard to be over-censorious of the home government. They were -in the most bitter straits for money. Gold and silver were simply -not to be got in the quantities that Wellington required. The amount -actually sent was very large: it would have been larger if economic -conditions had not been desperate. The rupture with the United States -of America which took place in June (fortunately too late to serve -Napoleon’s purpose), had just added a new source of anxiety to the -troubles of the Cabinet: both money and men were now wanted for Canada. -There can be no doubt that when Lord Bathurst wrote, in the middle -of the Salamanca campaign, that ‘£100,000 in cash, chiefly gold, had -been sent off,’ and that ‘I wish to God we could assist you more in -money,’ he was writing quite honestly, and amid most adverse financial -circumstances. Great Britain was at the most exhausting point of her -long struggle with Napoleon. The Russian war had begun--but there -was no sign as yet that it was to be the ruin of the Emperor: his -armies seemed to be penetrating towards Moscow in the old triumphant -style: many politicians spoke of a humiliating peace dictated to Czar -Alexander in the autumn as the probable end of the campaign, and -speculated on Napoleon’s appearance at Madrid in 1813 as a possible -event. Wheat had risen in this spring to 130_s._ the quarter. The -outbreak of the long-threatened but long-averted American war looked -like the last blow that was to break down the British Empire. It was no -wonder that the national credit was low in June 1812. There was nothing -to revive it till Wellington’s Salamanca triumph in July: nor did any -one understand that Napoleon’s star had passed its zenith, till the -news of the disasters of the Moscow retreat began to drift westward in -November and December. - -[Illustration: CENTRAL SPAIN] - -Meanwhile, if the financial outlook was gloomy, the actual military -situation was more promising than it had ever been before. Well aware, -from intercepted dispatches, of the quarrels of his adversaries, -and perfectly informed as to their numbers and their cantonments, -Wellington considered with justice that he had such a game in his hands -as he had never before had set before him. On June 13th he crossed -the Agueda with his army in three parallel columns. The left was -under charge of Picton, and consisted of the 3rd Division, Pack’s and -Bradford’s Portuguese, and Le Marchant’s brigade of heavy dragoons. -The centre, which Beresford conducted, was composed of the Light, 4th, -and 5th Divisions. It was preceded by Alten’s German hussars, and -accompanied by Bock’s dragoons. The right column, under Graham, had -the 1st, 6th, and 7th Divisions, with a regiment of Anson’s horse for -purposes of exploration. It is to be noted that both Picton and Graham -were destined to remain only a few weeks with the army: the former had -taken the field ere his Badajoz wound was properly healed: it broke -open again, he fell into a high fever, and had to be sent to the rear. -Wellington’s brother-in-law, Pakenham, took over charge of the 3rd -Division on June 28th. Graham had been suffering for some months from -an affection of the eyes, which the physicians told him might at any -time grow worse and threaten his sight. He persisted on staying with -the army till the last possible moment, but became more blind each day, -and was compelled to throw up his command on July 6th and to return to -England for skilled medical advice. Thus, during the greater part of -the Salamanca campaign, Wellington was working without his best-trusted -lieutenants--Craufurd was dead, both Picton and Graham invalided. In -consequence of Graham’s departure a very difficult point was raised. -If some illness or wound should disable the Commander-in-Chief, to -whom would the charge of operations fall[415]? Wellington considered -that Beresford was entitled to expect the succession, and deprecated -the sending out of some senior officer from England with a commission -to act as second in command. He observed that no one coming fresh from -home would have a real grasp of the conditions of the war: that he -would probably start with _a priori_ views, and have to unlearn them -in a time of imminent danger. Moreover, a second-in-command was, when -his superior was in good health, either an unnecessary person or else -a tiresome one, if he presumed on his position to offer advice or -remonstrances. Fortunately the question remained a wholly academic one, -since Wellington’s iron physique, and unbroken luck when bullets were -flying, never failed him. An understudy turned out to be superfluous. - - [415] Wellington to Bathurst. _Dispatches_, ix. p. 277. - -The three columns of the allied army advanced on a very narrow front of -not more than ten miles, though the cavalry spread out considerably to -the flanks. On the 13th the columns bivouacked on the Guadapero river, -in front of Ciudad Rodrigo, between Santi Espiritus and Tenebron. On -the 14th they advanced four leagues to the Huebra, and camped on each -side of San Muñoz, with head-quarters at Cabrillas. On the 15th a -rather longer march took them to Matilla and Cayos. Nothing had yet -been seen of any enemy. It was only on the 16th, in the morning, that -the advanced cavalry of the centre column, after crossing the Valmusa -river, came into contact with two squadrons of French _chasseurs_, not -more than two leagues outside of Salamanca. These outposts gave way -when pushed, and retired across the Tormes. The British army bivouacked -in sight of Salamanca that night, and received the information that -Marmont had already evacuated the city, save for a garrison left in its -three new forts[416]. - - [416] The itinerary of this march in detail may be found in the - excellent Diary of Tomkinson of the 16th Light Dragoons. - -The Army of Portugal had been caught, just as Wellington had hoped, -in a condition of wide dispersion. It was not that Marmont did not -expect the attack, but that, till the day when it should be actually -delivered, he dared not concentrate, because of his want of magazines -and the paucity of transport. He had resolved that he must be content -to abandon all the land west of Salamanca, in order that his point of -concentration should be out of reach of his enemy’s first stroke. It -was fixed at Bleines and Fuente Sauco, twenty miles north of Salamanca -on the road to Toro. On the morning of the 14th, when the news that -Wellington was over the Agueda first reached him, the Marshal issued -orders to all his divisions to march on this point, not even excepting -that of Bonnet in the Asturias. For, despite of the Emperor’s wish to -keep a hold upon that province, Marmont held, and rightly, that it -was more important to place in front of the Anglo-Portuguese every -possible bayonet, and he could not spare a solid division of 6,500 -men. Unfortunately for him, however, it was clear that Bonnet could -not arrive for fifteen or twenty days. The other seven divisions were -concentrated by the fifth night from the giving of the alarm[417]. They -formed a mass of 36,000 infantry, with 80 guns, but only 2,800 horse. -This total does not include either Bonnet, nor three battalions of -Thomières’s division left to hold Astorga, nor small garrisons placed -in Toro, Zamora, the Salamanca forts, and certain other posts farther -east[418]. Nor does it take account of a dépôt of 3,000 men, including -many dismounted dragoons, at Valladolid. The total of the field army, -including artillery, sappers, &c., was about 40,000 of all arms. - - [417] Foy, who had been drawn away from the Tagus after the - affair at Almaraz, had to march from Avila, Clausel from - Peñaranda, Ferey from Valladolid, Sarrut from Toro, Maucune and - Brennier had been at Salamanca, Thomières came from Zamora. - Boyer’s dragoons were at Toro and Benavente, Curto’s light - cavalry division had been with Maucune and Brennier at Salamanca. - Valladolid, Avila, and Benavente were the most distant points: - but the troops from them were all up by the 19th. Nor was it - possible for Wellington to interfere with the concentration, - though possibly he might have forced Foy from Avila to make a - détour, if he had followed Marmont very close. - - [418] Nor do we reckon the regiment of Sarrut’s division (130th) - permanently detached at Santander. - -This force was distinctly inferior in number to that of the -Anglo-Portuguese, who, without counting three infantry battalions on -their way to the front from Lisbon, or D’Urban’s Portuguese horse -on the side of Zamora, had some 40,000 infantry in line, and 3,500 -excellent cavalry, in which arm Wellington, for the first time in his -life, had a slight advantage over the enemy. Carlos de España was also -approaching, with the 3,000 Spanish infantry that were available after -the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo had been completed, and in all the -allied army must have had 48,000 men at the front[419]. The balance -of numbers, of which each general was pretty well informed, was such -as to make both sides careful--Marmont was 8,000 men short of his -adversary’s power, and was particularly depressed by the knowledge of -his inferiority in cavalry, an arm on which the French had hitherto -relied with confidence. But the horse of the Army of Portugal had -never recovered from the consequences of Masséna’s retreat in the last -spring, and all the regiments were very weak: while Wellington was -at last profiting from the liberal way in which the home government -had reinforced his mounted arm during the autumn of 1811. He had ten -British regiments with him, whereas at Fuentes de Oñoro he had owned -but four. - - [419] See tables of the armies of both sides in the Appendix no. - IX. - -On the other hand Wellington, among his 48,000 men, had only 28,000 -British; there were 17,000 Portuguese and 3,000 Spaniards with him, and -excellent though the conduct of the former had been during the late -campaign, it would be hypocrisy to pretend that their commander could -rely upon them under all circumstances, as he would have done upon a -corresponding number of British infantry. He was ready to give battle, -but it must be a battle under favourable conditions. Marmont felt much -the same: it was necessary to beat Wellington if the French domination -in Spain was to be preserved. But it would be rash to attack him -in one of his favourite defensive positions: there must be no more -Bussacos. And every available man must be gathered in, before a general -action was risked. The only justification for instant battle would be -the unlikely chance of catching the Anglo-Portuguese army in a state -of dispersion or some other unlucky posture--and Wellington’s known -caution did not make such a chance very probable. - -Marmont’s main purpose, indeed, was to hold Wellington ‘contained’ till -he should have succeeded in bringing up Bonnet, and also reinforcements -from the Armies of the North and Centre--if not even from some distant -forces. On Bonnet’s eventual arrival he could rely--but not on any -fixed date for his appearance, for it was difficult to get orders -promptly to the Asturias, and there might be many unforeseen delays in -their execution. But Marmont was also counting on aid from Caffarelli, -which would presumably reach him even before Bonnet appeared. In -expectation of Wellington’s advance, he had written to the Commander -of the Army of the North on May 24th and 30th, and again on June -5th, asking for assurances of help, and reminding his colleague of -the Emperor’s directions. The answers received were, on the whole, -satisfactory: the last of them, dated at Vittoria on June 14th, said -that the disposable field-force was 8,000 men, including a brigade of -light cavalry and 22 guns. They should march from Vittoria as soon -as some troops of Abbé’s division arrived from Pampeluna to replace -them, and they should be écheloned along the high-road from Burgos -to Valladolid ready to move up when called upon[420]. It must be -remembered that on this date Caffarelli was answering a hypothetical -inquiry as to his exact power to help, not a definite demand for men, -since Wellington had only crossed the Agueda on the previous day, and -nothing was known at Vittoria of his actual start. But the dispatch was -encouraging, as it seemed to show a good spirit, and named the exact -force available, and the route that it would take. Marmont received -it upon the 19th, just as he had completed his own concentration at -Fuente Sauco. It seemed to justify him in believing that before July 1 -he would have 8,000 men from Caffarelli at his disposition, including, -what was specially valuable, 1,000 horse. - - [420] See Caffarelli to Marmont of June 10 and June 14th in - Marmont’s _Mémoires_, iv. pp. 408-10. - -The dispatches from King Joseph and Jourdan were less satisfactory. At -this moment they were in a state of hesitation caused by contradictory -intelligence. ‘Your letter of June 6th,’ wrote Jourdan to Marmont, -‘says that Wellington will soon fall upon you. But we have similar -letters from Soult, declaring that the blow is to be delivered against -him: he encloses two notes of June 2nd and 5th from General Daricau -in Estremadura, declaring that 60,000 of the allies are just about -to begin an invasion of Andalusia. We are too far off from the scene -of operations to determine whether it is you or the Duke of Dalmatia -who is deceived. We can only tell you, meanwhile, not to be misled by -demonstrations, and to be ready to start off three divisions to Soult’s -help without a moment’s delay, if Lord Wellington’s real objective is -Andalusia. Similarly we have sent Soult express orders that he shall -move Drouet to the north bank of the Tagus, if Wellington has called up -Hill to join him, and is making the true attack on you. Caffarelli has -stringent orders to support you with what troops he can collect, when -you are able to tell him definitely that you are the person threatened, -not Soult[421].’ - - [421] Jourdan to Marmont, June 14th, in _Mémoires_, iv. pp. - 411-12. - -It is clear that the hallucinations of the Duke of Dalmatia were most -valuable to Wellington, who had foreseen them long ago by a study of -intercepted dispatches. Whatever happened, Soult could not refrain from -believing that he had the great rôle to play, and that his Andalusian -viceroyalty was the centre of all things. At this moment his picture -of Wellington about to move on Cordova with 60,000 men seems to have -been a belated conception caused by Graham’s march to Elvas on May 20. -He had not yet realized that ten days later Graham’s corps had gone -northward again, and had joined Wellington on the Agueda about the -time that he was writing his alarmist letters. There was nothing in -front of him save Hill’s 18,000 men: but he refused to see the facts, -and deceived Joseph and Jourdan for some days by the definite and -authoritative restatement of absolutely erroneous intelligence. Hence -it was not till Marmont was able to say, without any possible chance -of error, that Wellington was across the Agueda, and had advanced to -Salamanca at the head of at least 40,000 men, that the King and his -Chief-of-the-Staff at last recognized the true seat of danger. Long -after they had detected it, they continued (as we shall see) to receive -preposterous dispatches from Soult, still maintaining that they were -mistaken, and still discovering excuses for not obeying the peremptory -orders that they sent him. - - - - -SECTION XXXIII: CHAPTER IV - -THE SALAMANCA FORTS. TEN DAYS OF MANŒUVRES, JUNE 20TH-30TH, 1812 - - -Wellington’s conduct on reaching Salamanca was not that which might -have been expected. When a general has, by a careful and well-arranged -concentration, collected all his own troops into one solid mass, and -then by a rapid advance has thrown himself into the midst of the -scattered cantonments of an enemy who has no superiority to him in -numbers, it is natural for him to press his pursuit vigorously. Far the -most effective way of opening the campaign would have been to cut up -the two divisions which Marmont had just led out of Salamanca, or at -least to follow them so closely that they could be brought to action -before all the outlying divisions had come in. This would certainly -have been Napoleon’s method. - -Wellington, however, wanted to fight a battle in one of his favourite -defensive positions, and he thought that he had a means of compelling -Marmont to attack him, by laying siege to the Salamanca forts. After -Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, no French marshal would like to see a -third important post captured ‘under his nose.’ The British general -judged that Marmont would fight him, in order to save his prestige and -his garrison. And since he believed that Bonnet would not evacuate -the Asturias, and that Caffarelli would send help late, if at all, -he thought that he could count upon a superiority of numbers which -rendered victory certain. - -This seems to be the only rational way of explaining Wellington’s -conduct on June 17th. On arriving in front of Salamanca his army made -a majestic encircling movement, Picton’s column crossing the Tormes -by the fords of El Canto below the city, Beresford’s and Graham’s by -those of Santa Marta above it. The use of the unbroken town-bridge was -made impossible by Marmont’s forts. The heads of the two columns met -on the north side, and they then moved three miles on, and took up a -long position below the heights of San Cristobal, which lie outside -Salamanca on its northern and eastern front. These formed the chosen -defensive fighting-ground which Wellington had already in his mind. - -Only the 14th Light Dragoons and Clinton’s infantry of the 6th Division -turned into Salamanca by the Toro gate, and acted as Wellington’s -escort, while he was received by the municipality and made his -arrangements for the attack on the forts, which, though they commanded -the bridge, had no outlook on the spacious arcaded Plaza Mayor, where -the reception took place. It was a lively scene. ‘We were received with -shouts and _vivas_,’ writes an eye-witness. ‘The inhabitants were out -of their senses at having got rid of the French, and nearly pulled Lord -Wellington off his horse. The ladies were the most violent, many coming -up to him and embracing him. He kept writing orders upon his sabretash, -and was interrupted three or four times by them. What with the joy -of the people, and the feeling accompanying troops about to attack a -fortress, it was a half-hour of suspense and anxiety, and a scene of -such interest as I never before witnessed[422].’ - - [422] Tomkinson’s _Diary_, p. 162. - -Head-quarters were established that night in the city, and Clinton’s -division invested the forts, which looked formidable enough to require -close study before they were attacked. The rest of the army took up -its bivouacs, with the cavalry out in front, and remained practically -without movement on the ground now selected, for the next two days, -till Marmont came to pay his expected visit. - -The three Salamanca forts were built on high ground in the south-west -corner of the city, which overlooks the long Roman bridge. To make -them Marmont had destroyed a great part of the old University quarter -of the place, levelling the majority of the colleges--for Salamanca, -till 1808, had been a university of the English rather than the usual -continental type, and had owned a score of such institutions. Nearly -all the buildings on the slopes had been pulled down, leaving a wide -open glacis round three massive convents, which had been transformed -into places of strength. San Vincente occupied the crest of the knoll -overlooking the river, and lay in the extreme angle of the old city -wall, which enclosed it on two sides. The smaller strongholds, San -Cayetano and La Merced, were separated from San Vincente by a narrow -but steep ravine, and lay close together on another rising-ground of -about the same height. The three formed a triangle with crossing fires, -each to a large extent commanding the ground over which the others -would have to be approached. The south and west sides of San Vincente -and La Merced overhung precipitous slopes above the river, and were -almost inaccessible. The north sides of San Cayetano and San Vincente -were the only fronts that looked promising for attack, and in each -elaborate preparations had been made in view of that fact. Marmont -had originally intended to enclose all three forts and many buildings -more--such as the Town Hospital, the convent of San Francisco, and the -colleges of Ireland and Cuenca, in an outer _enceinte_, to serve as -a large citadel which would contain several thousand men and all his -magazines. But money and time had failed, and on the slopes below the -forts, several convents and colleges, half pulled to pieces, were still -standing, and offered cover for besiegers at a distance of some 250 -yards from the works. The garrison consisted of six flank-companies -from the 15th, 65th, 82nd, and 86th of the line and the 17th Léger, -and of a company of artillery, under the _chef de bataillon_ Duchemin -of the 65th. They made up a total of 800 men, and had thirty-six guns -in position, of which, however, the greater part were only light -field-pieces: two guns (commanding the bridge) were in La Merced, -four in San Cayetano, the remaining thirty in San Vincente, the most -formidable of the three. - -Wellington had come prepared to besiege ‘three fortified convents,’ -and had been sent a confused sketch of them drawn by an amateur’s -hand[423]. They turned out much stronger than he had been led to -expect, owing to the immense amount of hewn stone from the demolished -colleges and other buildings that was available to build them up. The -walls had been doubled in thickness, the windows stopped, and scarps -and counterscarps with solid masonry had been thrown around them. The -roofs of the two minor forts had been taken off, and the upper stories -casemated, by massive oak beams with a thick coating of earth laid -upon them. This surface was so strong that guns, protected by sandbag -embrasures, had been mounted on it at some points. There was also an -ample provision of palisades, made from strong oak and chestnut beams. -Altogether it was clear that the works would require a systematic -battering, and were not mere patched-up mediaeval monasteries, as had -been expected. - - [423] Jones, _Sieges_, i. p. 269. - -It was, therefore, most vexatious to find that the very small -battering-train which Wellington had brought with him from Ciudad -Rodrigo was obviously insufficient for the task before it; there were -no more than four iron 18-pounder guns, with only 100 rounds of shot -each, at the front; though six 24-pound howitzers, from the train that -had taken Badajoz, were on their way from Elvas to join, and were due -on the 20th. It was not, however, howitzers so much as more heavy 18-or -24-pounders that were required for battering, and the lack of them at -the moment was made all the more irksome by the known fact that there -were plenty of both sorts at Rodrigo and Almeida, five or six marches -away. The mistake was precisely the same that was to be made again at -Burgos in the autumn--undervaluation of the means required to deal -with works of third-class importance. Whether Wellington himself or -his artillery and engineer advisers were primarily responsible is not -clear[424]. - - [424] At any rate Dickson was not, as he was with the howitzers - that were coming up from Elvas, and had not started from Rodrigo - with the army. - -The responsibility for the working out of the little siege with -inadequate means fell on Lieut.-Colonel Burgoyne, as senior engineer -(he had with him only two other officers of that corps and nine -military artificers!), and Lieut.-Colonel May, R.A., who was in charge -of the four 18-pounders. The latter borrowed three howitzers from -field-batteries to supplement his miserable means, and afterwards two -6-pounder field-guns, which, of course, were only for annoying the -garrison, not for battering. - -It looked at first as if the only practicable scheme was to build a -battery for the 18-pounders on the nearest available ground, 250 yards -from San Vincente to the north, and lower down the knoll on which -that fort stood. There was good cover from ruined buildings up to -this distance from the French works. On the night of the occupation -of Salamanca 400 workmen of the 6th Division commenced a battery on -the selected spot and approaches leading to it from the cover in the -ruins. The work done was not satisfactory: it was nearly full moon, -the night was short, and the enemy (who knew well enough where the -attack must begin), kept up a lively fire of artillery and musketry -all night. Unfortunately the 6th Division workmen had no experience -of sieges--they had never used pick or shovel before, and there were -only two engineer officers and nine artificers to instruct them. ‘Great -difficulty was found in keeping the men to work under the fire: the -Portuguese in particular absolutely went on hands and knees, dragging -their baskets along the ground[425].’ By daylight the projected line of -the battery was only knee-high, and gave no cover, so that the men had -to be withdrawn till dusk. An attempt had been made during the night to -ascertain whether it were possible to creep forward to the ditch, and -lay mines there, to blow in the counterscarp. But the party who tried -to reach the ditch were detected by the barking of a dog, who alarmed -the French out-picket, and the explorers had to retire with several men -wounded. - - [425] Burgoyne’s diary in his _Life_, i. p. 192. - -Seeing that the fire of the garrison was so effective, the officers -in charge of the siege asked for, and obtained from Wellington, three -hundred marksmen to keep down the _tiraillade_. They were taken from -the Light Brigade of the King’s German Legion, and spread among the -ruins to fire at the embrasures and loopholes of the French. They also -hoisted, with some difficulty, two field-guns on to the first floor of -the convent of San Bernardo, which lies north-west of San Vincente, -and kept up a lively discharge ‘out of the drawing-room window, so to -speak. We fired for some hours at each other, during which time an -unlucky shot went as completely through my captain’s (Eligé’s) heart as -possible. But considering how near we were, I am much surprised that -our loss was so slight--one killed and one wounded at my own gun[426].’ -But the fire of the San Vincente artillery was by no means silenced. - - [426] Letter of F. Monro, R.A., lent me by his representative. - See _Fortnightly Review_ for July 1912. - -On the night of June 18th-19th the working party of the 6th Division -succeeded in finishing the battery which was to breach the main fort, -and also commenced two smaller batteries, to right and left, in places -among the ruins, one by the College of Cuenca, the other below San -Bernardo[427]. On the morning of the 19th the four 18-pounders and -three howitzers opened, and brought down the upper courses of the -masonry of that part of San Vincente on which they were trained. -But they could not move its lower part, or reach the counterscarp. -Wherefore two howitzers were put into the second battery, near the -College of Cuenca, which could command the counterscarp. The play of -these guns proved insufficient, however, to shake it, and the garrison -concentrated such a fire upon them, mainly from musketry at loopholes, -that twenty gunners were killed or hurt while working the two howitzers. - - [427] Nos. 2 and 3 in the map respectively. - -Next morning Dickson’s six howitzers from Elvas came up, and served to -replace those borrowed from the field companies, wherefore there was -only an addition of three pieces net to the battering-train. Two of the -18-pounders were moved round to the battery (No. 2) which had been so -hard hit on the preceding day: their fire proved much more effective -than that of the howitzers, and brought down an angle of the upper wall -of San Vincente and part of its roof, which fell on and crushed many of -the French. - -But on the 21st it was impossible to continue the battering, for the -ignominious reason that there were hardly any more shot left to fire. -Only sixty balls remained in store for the 18-pounders, and a little -over one hundred for the howitzers[428]. The calculations of the -besiegers had been so erroneous that they had used up their stock just -as the critical moment had arrived. On the previous day Wellington, -seeing what was coming, had sent a hurried message to Almeida for more -shot and powder--but the convoy, though urged on with all possible -speed, did not arrive at Salamanca till the 26th. - - [428] Of course a few rounds more for the howitzers could have - been borrowed from the field-batteries with the divisions. For - the 18-pounders, the really important guns, there was no such - resource for borrowing. - -Meanwhile the general engagement for which Wellington had prepared -himself seemed likely to come off. Marmont had all his army, save -Bonnet alone, collected by the 19th, at Fuente Sauco. On the following -day he came boldly forward and drove in the British cavalry vedettes. -He showed three columns moving on a parallel front, which observers -estimated at 18,000 foot and 2,000 horse--but there were more behind, -still invisible. At four in the afternoon he was drawing so close that -Wellington assumed his battle position. Five divisions and the two -independent Portuguese brigades formed the fighting-line, from San -Cristobal southward to Cabrerizos on the bank of the Tormes: the order -was (from right to left) 1st-7th-4th-Light-3rd-Pack and Bradford. The -reserve was composed of the 5th Division, of Hulse’s brigade of the -6th (of which the remainder was left to blockade the Salamanca forts), -and of Carlos de España’s 3,000 Spaniards. Alten’s cavalry covered the -British right, Ponsonby’s[429] the left, Bock’s and Le Marchant’s heavy -squadrons were in reserve. - - [429] Acting vice G. Anson, absent. - -It looked at first as though Marmont intended to force on the battle -that Wellington desired. Moving with great order and decision, his -three columns deployed opposite the heights, and advanced to within a -very moderate distance of them--not more than 800 yards at one point. -They were extremely visible, as the whole country-side below the -British position was a fine plain covered with ripening wheat. The -only breaks in the surface were the infrequent villages--in this part -of Spain they are all large and far apart--and a few dry watercourses, -whose line could be detected winding amid the interminable cornfields. -Warning to keep off the position was given to the French by long-range -fire from several of the British batteries on salient points of the -line. The enemy replied noisily and with many guns: Wellington’s -officers judged that he was doing his best to make his approach audible -to the garrison of the besieged forts. - -At dusk the French occupied the village of Castellanos de Morisco, in -front of the right centre of the heights, and then advanced a regiment -to attack Morisco, which was absolutely at the foot of them, and had -been occupied by Wellington as an advanced post. It was held by the -68th regiment from the 7th Division, a battalion which had come out -from England in the preceding autumn, but had, by chance, never been -engaged before. It made a fine defence, and beat off three attacks -upon the village: but after dark Wellington called it back uphill to -the line of the position, abandoning Morisco[430]. Apparently he was -glad to see the French pressing in close, and looked for an attack upon -his position next morning. Standing on the sky-line above Castellanos -at dusk, with a map in his hand, he demonstrated to all the assembled -generals commanding divisions the exact part which they were to play, -till several French round-shot compelled him to shift his position a -little farther back[431]. The whole army slept that night in order of -battle, with strong pickets pushed down to the foot of the slopes. - - [430] The 68th lost four officers and 46 men killed and wounded, - and one officer taken prisoner. For a good account of the fight - see the Memoirs of Green of the 68th, pp. 89-90. - - [431] See Tomkinson’s _Diary_, p. 165. - -There was, however, no attack at dawn. Marmont’s two rear divisions -(those of Foy and Thomières) and a brigade of dragoons were not yet on -the ground, and only got up in the course of the afternoon: hence he -was naturally unwilling to move, as he had a certain knowledge that -he was outnumbered. It would seem that Wellington had, that morning, -an opportunity of crushing his enemy, which he must have regretted to -have lost on many subsequent days of the campaign. Marmont’s position -was one of very great risk: he had pushed in so close to the British -heights, that he might have been attacked and brought to action in half -an hour, and could not have got away without fighting. His position -was visible from end to end--it had no flank protection, and its only -strong points were the two villages of Morisco and Castellanos de -Morisco on its left centre. Behind was an undulating sea of cornfields -extending to the horizon. Wellington (after deducting the two missing -brigades of the 6th Division) could have come down in a general charge -from his heights, with 37,000 Anglo-Portuguese infantry, and 3,500 -horse--not to speak of Carlos de España’s 3,000 Spaniards. Marmont -had only five divisions of infantry (about 28,000 bayonets) on the -ground at daybreak, and less than 2,000 horse. He was in a thoroughly -dominated position, and it is hard to see what he could have done, -had Wellington strengthened his left wing with all his cavalry and -delivered a vigorous downhill assault on the unprotected French right. -The opportunity for an attack was so favourable that Wellington’s staff -discussed with curiosity the reasons that might be preventing it, and -formed varying hypotheses to account for his holding back[432]. As a -matter of fact, as his dispatch to Lord Liverpool explains[433], the -British Commander-in-Chief was still hoping for a second Bussaco. He -saw that Marmont was not going to attack till his rear had come up, -but hoped that he might do so that afternoon or next morning, when he -had all his men in hand. The daring way in which the Marshal continued -to hold on to an untenable position, within cannon shot of his enemy’s -line, seemed to argue an ultimate intention to bring on an action. - - [432] Tomkinson’s _Diary_, p. 166. - - [433] Wellington to Liverpool, Salamanca, June 25, in - _Dispatches_, ix. p. 252. - -Nor was Wellington very far out in his ideas: Marmont was in a state of -indecision. When the missing 10,000 men came up he called a council of -war--the regular resort of generals in a difficulty. We have concerning -it only the evidence of Foy, who wrote as follows in his diary. - -‘At dusk on the 21st there was a grand discussion, on the problem as -to whether we should or should not give battle to the English. The -Marshal seemed to have a desire to do so, but a feeble and hesitating -desire. Remembering Vimeiro, Corunna, and Bussaco, I thought that it -would be difficult to beat the English, our superiors in number, on -such a compact position as that which they were occupying. I had not -the first word: I allowed Maucune, Ferey[434], and La Martinière to -express their views, before I let them see what I thought. Then Clausel -having protested strongly against fighting, I supported his opinion. -Because we had left a small garrison in the Salamanca forts, we were -not bound to lose 6,000 killed and wounded, and risk the honour of the -army, in order to deliver them. The troops were in good spirits, and -that is excellent for the first assault: but here we should have a long -tough struggle: I doubted whether we had breath enough to keep it up -to the end. In short, I saw more chances of defeat than victory. I -urged that we ought to keep close to the English, “contain” them, and -wait for our reinforcements; this could be done by manœuvring along the -left bank of the Tormes above and below Salamanca. Clausel and I set -forth this policy from every aspect. The Marshal was displeased: he -fancied that his generals were plotting to wreck his plan: he wanted to -redeem the blunder which he saw that he had made in leaving a garrison -in Salamanca: he dreads the Emperor and the public opinion of the army. -He would have liked a battle, but he had not determination enough to -persist in forcing it on[435].’ - - [434] The first two were great fire-eaters, and always urged - action. - - [435] Foy’s _Vie militaire_, ed. Girod de l’Ain, pp. 165-6. - -It seems, therefore, certain that Wellington nearly obtained the -defensive general action that he had desired and expected, and was only -disappointed because Marmont was talked down by his two best divisional -generals. If the Marshal had made his attack, it is clear that his -disaster would have been on a far more complete and awful scale than -the defeat which he was actually to endure on July 22. For he would -have had behind him when repulsed (as he must have been) no friendly -shelter of woods and hills, such as then saved the wrecks of his army, -but a boundless rolling plain, in which routed troops would have been -at the mercy of a cavalry which exceeded their own in the proportion of -seven to five (or slightly more). - -On the morning of the 22nd, the British general, who had now kept his -army in position for thirty-six hours on end, began to guess that he -was not to be attacked. Was it worth while to advance, since the enemy -refused to do so? The conditions were by no means so favourable as at -the dawn of the 21st, when Marmont had been short of 10,000 men. But -the allied army still possessed a perceptible superiority in numbers, -a stronger cavalry, and a dominating position, from which it would be -easy to deliver a downhill attack under cover of their artillery. - -Wellington, however, made no decisive movement: he threw up some -_flèches_ to cover the batteries in front of the 1st and 7th Divisions, -of which the latter was pushed a little nearer to the Tormes. He -brought up the six heavy howitzers which had been used against the -forts, and placed them on this same right wing of his position. Then -he commenced a partial offensive movement, which was apparently -designed to draw Marmont into a serious bickering, if he were ready -to stand. The 7th Division began to make an advance towards Morisco: -the skirmishers of the Light Brigade of the King’s German Legion moved -down, and began to press in the pickets opposite them, their battalions -supporting. Soon after the 51st and 68th, from the other brigade of -the division, that of De Bernewitz, were ordered to storm a knoll -immediately above Morisco, which formed the most advanced point of the -enemy’s line. Wellington directed Graham to support them with the whole -1st and Light Divisions, if the enemy should bring up reinforcements -and show fight. But nothing of the kind happened: the two battalions -carried the knoll with a single vigorous rush, losing some 30 killed -and wounded[436]. But the French made no attempt to recapture it, drew -back their skirmishing line, and retired to the village, only 200 yards -behind, where they stood firm, evidently expecting a general attack. It -was not delivered: Wellington had been willing to draw Marmont into a -fight, but was not intending to order an advance of the whole line, and -to precipitate a general offensive battle. - - [436] The 51st lost 3 killed and an officer and 20 men wounded: - the 68th 2 killed and 6 wounded, the K.G.L. Light Battalions 3 - killed and 3 officers and 17 men wounded. There are narratives of - the combat in the Memoirs of Green of the 68th, and Major Rice - and Private Wheeler of the 51st. - -There was no more fighting that day, and next morning the whole French -army had disappeared save some cavalry vedettes. These being pressed -in by Alten’s hussars, it was discovered that Marmont had gone back -six miles, to a line of heights behind the village of Aldea Rubia, and -was there in a defensive position, with his left wing nearly touching -the Tormes near the fords of Huerta. Wellington made no pursuit: only -his cavalry reconnoitred the new French position. He kept his army on -the San Cristobal heights, only moving down Anson’s brigade of the -4th Division to hold Castellanos, and Halkett’s of the 7th Division -to hold Morisco. Hulse’s brigade of the 6th Division was sent back -to Salamanca, as were also Dickson’s six howitzers, and Clinton was -directed to press the siege of the forts--notwithstanding the unhappy -fact that there was scarcely any ammunition left in the batteries. - -Marmont had undoubtedly been let off easily by Wellington: yet he -hardly realized it, so filled was his mind with the idea that his -adversary would never take the offensive. His report to King Joseph -shows a sublime ignorance of his late danger. As the document has never -been published and is very short, it may be worth quoting. - -‘Having concentrated the greater part of this army on the evening of -the 19th, I marched on Salamanca the same day. I seized some outlying -posts of the enemy, and my army bivouacked within half cannon-shot of -the English. Their army was very well posted, and I did not think it -right to attack yesterday (June 21) without making a reconnaissance of -it. The result of my observations has convinced me that as long as my -own numbers are not _at least equal_ to theirs, I must temporize, and -gain time for the arrival of the troops from the Army of the North, -which General Caffarelli has promised me. If they arrive I shall -be strong enough to take an enterprising course. Till then I shall -manœuvre round Salamanca, so as to try to get the enemy to divide his -army, or to move it out of its position, which will be to my advantage. -The Salamanca forts are making an honourable defence. Since we came up -the enemy has ceased to attack them, so that I have gained time, and -can put off a general action for some days if I think proper[437].’ - - [437] Marmont to Joseph, night of the 22nd June, from bivouac - before San Cristobal. Intercepted dispatch in the Scovell Papers. - -Marmont’s plan for ‘manœuvring around Salamanca’ proved (as we shall -see) quite ineffective, and ended within a few days in a definite -retreat, when he found that the succours promised by Caffarelli were -not about to appear. - -Meanwhile the siege of the Salamanca forts had recommenced, on the -23rd, under the depressing conditions that the artillery had only -60 rounds (15 apiece!) for the four heavy 18-pounders, which were -their effective weapons, and 160 for the six howitzers, which had -hitherto proved almost useless. The two light field-guns (6-pounders) -were also replaced on the first floor of San Bernardo to shell the -enemy’s loopholes--they were no good at all for battering. This time -the besiegers placed one of their heavy guns in the right flanking -battery near San Bernardo, to get an oblique enfilading fire against -the gorge of the San Cayetano fort. The new idea was to leave San -Vincente alone, as too hard a nut to crack with the small supply of -shot available, and to batter the lesser fort from flank and rear with -the few rounds remaining. The entire stock, together with a hundred -rounds of shell, was used up by the afternoon, when no practicable -breach had been made, though the palisades of San Cayetano had been -battered down, and its parapet much injured. Nevertheless Wellington -ordered an attempt to storm (or rather to escalade) the minor fort at -10 p.m. on the same evening. It was to be carried out by the six light -companies of Bowes’s and Hulse’s brigades of the 6th Division, a force -of between 300 and 400 men. ‘The undertaking was difficult, and the men -seemed to feel it,’ observes the official historian of the Peninsular -sieges[438]. The major of one of the regiments engaged remarks, ‘the -result was precisely such as most of the officers anticipated--a -failure attended with severe loss of life.’ The storming-column, -starting from the ruins near the left flanking battery, had to charge -for the gorge of San Cayetano, not only under the fire of that work, -but with musketry and artillery from San Vincente taking them in the -rear. The casualties from the first moment were very heavy--many men -never got near the objective, and only two ladders out of twenty -were planted against the fort[439]. No one tried to ascend them--the -project being obviously useless, and the stormers ran back under cover -after having lost six officers and 120 men, just a third of their -numbers[440]. Among the killed was General Bowes, commanding the -second brigade of the division, who had insisted on going forward with -his light companies--though this was evidently not brigadier’s work. -Apparently he thought that his personal influence might enable his -men to accomplish the impossible. He was hit slightly as the column -started, but bound up his wound, and went forward a second time, only -to be killed at the very foot of the ladders, just as his men broke and -retired. - - [438] Jones, i. p. 281. - - [439] The regimental history of the 53rd says that the ladders - were so badly made, of green wood, that many of them came to - pieces in the hands of their carriers long before they got near - the fort. - - [440] The loss has got exaggerated in many reports, because the - casualties in the 7th Division at Morisco on the preceding day - are added to the total. - -This, as all engaged in it agreed, was a very unjustifiable enterprise; -the escalade was impracticable so long as San Vincente was intact, and -able to cover the gorge of San Cayetano with an effective fire from -the rear. The siege now had a second period of lethargy, all the shot -having been used up. It was only on the morning of the 26th, three -days later, that the convoy from Almeida, ordered up on the 20th by -Wellington, arrived with 1,000 rounds carried by mules, and enabled the -battering to begin once more. - -Meanwhile Marmont had been making persistent but ineffective diversions -against Wellington. The advantage of the position to which he had -withdrawn was that it commanded the great bend, or elbow, of the -Tormes, where (at the ford of Huerta) that river turns its general -course from northward to westward. Troops sent across the river -here could threaten Salamanca from the south, and, if in sufficient -strength, might force Wellington to evacuate part of the San Cristobal -position, in order to provide a containing force to prevent them from -communicating with and relieving the besieged forts. The Marshal’s -own statement of his intention[441] was that he hoped, by manœuvring, -to get Wellington either to divide his army or to leave his strong -ground, or both. He aimed, no doubt, at obtaining the opportunity for -a successful action with some isolated part of Wellington’s force, but -was still too much convinced of the danger of fighting a general action -to be ready to risk much. Moreover he was expecting, from day to day, -the 8,000 men of the Army of the North whom Caffarelli had promised -him: and it would be reckless to give battle before they arrived--if -only they were really coming. - - [441] See above, p. 370. - -Wellington could see, by his own eyes no less than by the map, for he -rode along Marmont’s new front on the 23rd, that the French position -gave good possibilities for a passage of the elbow of the Tormes at -Huerta: wherefore he detached Bock’s brigade of German Dragoons to the -south of the river, with orders to watch the roads debouching from the -fords, and to act as a detaining force if any hostile cavalry crossed -them. He also threw forward Alten’s hussars to Aldea Lengua, a village -and ford half-way between Cabrerizos and Aldea Rubia, with the object -of keeping a similar close watch on any attempt of Marmont’s to move -north of the river. One brigade of the Light Division came forward to -support Alten--the other was écheloned a little back, on hills above -Aldea Lengua. - -On the late evening of the 23rd Marmont sent a squadron or two across -the Huerta fords, which turned back after running into Bock’s vedettes. -This was merely an exploring party to test the practicability of -the passage; but next morning, in a heavy fog, skirmishing fire and -occasional reports of cannon told Wellington that some more important -detachment was across the Tormes, and engaged with the Germans. The -British head-quarters staff rode to the hill above Aldea Lengua, which -commands a wide view over the south bank, and, when the morning vapours -rolled up at 7 o’clock, saw Bock retiring across the rolling plain in -very good order, pressed by a heavy force of all arms--two divisions -of infantry headed by a light cavalry brigade with a horse artillery -battery, which was doing some harm to the two dragoon regiments as they -retired in alternate échelons across the slopes. - -Fortunately there was excellent defensive fighting-ground south of the -Tormes, in prolongation of the San Cristobal position north of it. -The ravine and brook[442] called the Ribera de Pelagarcia with wooded -heights above them, run in front of Santa Marta and its ford, for some -miles southward from the Tormes. There was a similar line of high -ground facing it, with the villages of Pelabravo and Calvarisa de Ariba -on its top, which the French might occupy, but on passing down from -them they would run against a formidable position. Along these hills, -indeed, Wellington’s first line of defence was to be formed a month -later, on the day of the battle of Salamanca. On seeing Bock’s careful -retreat in progress, the Commander-in-Chief ordered Graham to cross the -Tormes at Santa Marta with the 1st and 7th Divisions, and to occupy the -ground in front of him. This was a short move, and easily accomplished -while the French detachment was pushing the German dragoons slowly -backward. The 4th and 5th Divisions moved down to the north bank of the -Tormes, ready to follow if Marmont should support his advanced guard, -by sending more men over the Huerta fords. Le Marchant’s heavy brigade -crossed the river with a horse artillery battery, and went to reinforce -Bock, whom the French could now only push in by bringing forward -infantry. Their advance continued as far as the village of Calvarisa -de Abaxo, and a little beyond, where the whole 9,000 or 10,000 men -deployed, as if intending to attack Graham. But just as observers on -the Aldea Lengua heights were beginning to think that serious fighting -was probable[443], the whole fell back into column of march, and, -retiring to Huerta covered by their _chasseurs_, recrossed the river. - - [442] I find the name Ribera de Pelagarcia only in the more - modern Spanish maps: contemporary plans do not give it. - - [443] Tomkinson, p. 170: ‘Just before they began to retire, I - thought that their advance looked serious. Our position was good, - and if they had fought with what had crossed, our force would - have been the greater.’ - -The state of affairs at nightfall was just what it had been at dawn. -Graham and Le Marchant went back to their old ground north of the -river, and south of it cavalry alone was left--this time Alten’s -brigade, for Bock’s had had a heavy day, and needed rest. So ended a -spectacular but almost bloodless manœuvre--the German dragoons lost -three killed and two wounded: the French light horse probably no more. - -In a dispatch written the same night Marmont frankly owns that he was -foiled by Wellington’s counter-move. This hitherto unpublished document -is worth quoting. It is addressed to General Caffarelli, and runs as -follows[444]. ‘The movement which I have made toward Salamanca has -caused the enemy to suspend his attack on the forts of that town. [An -error, as it was not the movement but the lack of ammunition which -stopped the bombardment.] This consideration, and the way in which I -found him posted to keep me off, and not least your assurance that your -powerful reinforcements would reach me very soon, have determined me -to suspend the attack which I was about to deliver against him. I stop -here with the object of gaining time, and in the expectation of your -arrival.’ From this it is clear that if Graham had not been found so -well posted, in a position where he could readily be reinforced from -San Cristobal, Marmont would have followed up his advanced guard with -the rest of his army, and have struck at Salamanca from the South. But -finding the ground on the left bank of the river just as unfavourable -to him as that on the north, he gave up the game and retired. He risked -a serious check, for Wellington might have ordered Graham to follow and -attack the retreating divisions, who would have had great difficulty -in recrossing the Tormes without loss, if they had been pursued and -attacked while jammed at the fords. But Wellington was still in his -defensive mood, and took no risks, contented to have foiled most -effectively his enemy’s manœuvre. - - [444] This is one of the many cipher dispatches in the Scovell - Papers, which I have found so illuminating in a period when - Marmont’s writings, printed or in the French archives, are very - few. - -On the 25th Marmont remained stationary, waiting for further advices -from Caffarelli, which failed to come to hand. Nor did Wellington make -any move, save that of sending orders that the siege of the forts was -to be pressed as early and as vigorously as possible. The guns were -back in their batteries, waiting for the ammunition which was yet to -appear. All that could be done without shot was to push forward a -trench along the bottom of the ravine between San Vincente and the -other two forts, to cut off communication between them. The French -fired fiercely at the workers, where they could look down into the -ravine, and killed some of them. But there was much ‘dead ground’ which -could not be reached from any point in the forts, and by dawn on the -26th the trench was far advanced, and a picket was lodged safely in it, -close under the gorge of San Cayetano. - -On the morning of the 26th the convoy of powder and shot from Almeida -reached the front, and at three in the afternoon the besiegers -recommenced their fire. This time no guns were placed in the original -battery opposite the north front of San Vincente; the four 18-pounders -all went into the right flank attack, and were concentrated on the -gorge of San Cayetano. Four of the howitzers were placed in the left -flank battery, near the College of Cuenca, and directed to fire red-hot -shot into the roof and upper story of San Vincente. The field-guns in -San Bernardo, aided by one howitzer, took up their old work of trying -to keep down the fire of the forts. - -The battering in of the gorge of San Cayetano made considerable -progress, but the most effective work was that of the red-hot shot, -which before night had set the tower of San Vincente and several points -of its roof in flames. By heroic exertions the garrison succeeded in -extinguishing them, but the besiegers’ fire was kept up all night, and -from time to time new conflagrations burst out. The governor afterwards -informed the British engineers that eighteen separate outbreaks were -kept down within the twenty-four hours before his surrender[445]. The -fort was very inflammable, owing to the immense amount of timber that -had been used for casemating, traverses, barricades, and parapets, -inside its walls. Still it was holding out at daybreak, though the -garrison was nearly exhausted: the governor signalled to Marmont that -he could not resist for more than three days--a sad over-estimate of -his power, as was to be shown in a few hours. As a subsidiary aid to -the work of the guns two mines were commenced, one from the ravine, -destined to burrow under San Cayetano, the other from the cliff by the -river, intended to reach La Merced. But neither was fated to be used, -other means sufficing. - - [445] Jones, _Sieges of the Peninsula_, i. p. 285. - -After four hours’ pounding on the morning of the 27th, the gorge of San -Cayetano had been battered into a real and very practicable breach, -while a new fire had broken out in San Vincente, larger than any one -which had preceded it. It reached the main store of gabions and planks -within the fort, and threatened the powder magazine. The garrison were -evidently flinching from their guns, as the counter-fire from the -place, hitherto very lively, began to flag, and the whole building was -wrapped in smoke. - -Thereupon Wellington ordered San Cayetano to be stormed for the second -time. The column charged with the operation crept forward along the -trench at the bottom of the ravine, fairly well covered till it had -reached the spot immediately below the gorge of the fort. Just as the -forlorn hope was about to start out of the trench, a white flag was -shown from the breach. The captain commanding in San Cayetano asked for -two hours’ truce, to enable him to communicate with his chief in San -Vincente, promising to surrender at the end of that time. Wellington -offered him five minutes to march out, if he wished to preserve his -garrison’s lives and baggage. As the Frenchmen continued to haggle and -argue, he was told to take down his white flag, as the assault was -about to be delivered. When the stormers ran in, San Cayetano made -practically no defence, though a few shots were fired, which caused six -casualties in the assaulting column: the greater part of the garrison -threw down their muskets and made no resistance. - -[Illustration: SALAMANCA FORTS] - -At the same moment the white flag went up on San Vincente also: here -the conflagration was now burning up so fiercely that the French had -been able to spare no attention for the storming-party that captured -San Cayetano. The governor, Duchemin, asked for three hours’ suspension -of arms, and made a proposal of terms of surrender. Wellington, here -as at the smaller fort, refused to grant time, as he thought that the -fire would be subdued and the defence prolonged, if he allowed hours -to be wasted in negotiations. He sent in the same ultimatum as at San -Cayetano--five minutes for the garrison to march out, and they should -have all the ‘honours of war’ and their baggage intact. Duchemin, like -his subordinate, returned a dilatory message, but while his white flag -was still flying, the 9th Caçadores pushed up out of the ravine and -entered the battery on the east side of the work. They were not fired -on, no one in San Vincente being prepared to continue the defence, and -the French standard came down without further resistance. - -Not quite 600 unwounded men of the garrison were captured. They had -lost just 200 during the siege, including 14 officers[446]. The -casualties among the British were, as might have been expected, much -heavier, largely owing to the unjustifiable assault of June 23rd. They -amounted to 5 officers and 94 men killed, and 29 officers and 302 -men wounded. A considerable store of clothing, much powder, and 36 -guns of all sorts were found in the three forts. The powder was made -over to Carlos de España, one of whose officers, having moved it into -the town on the 7th July, contrived to explode many barrels, which -killed several soldiers and twenty citizens, besides wrecking some -houses[447]. The three forts were destroyed with care, when they had -been stripped of all their contents. - - [446] The total given by the governor to Warre of Beresford’s - staff (see his _Letters_, ed. Dr. Warre, p. 270) were 3 officers - and 40 men killed, 11 officers and 140 men wounded. Martinien’s - lists show 12 officers hit, 5 in the 65th, 2 each in the 15th and - 17th Léger, 1 each in 86th, artillery, and engineers. But these - admirable lists are not quite complete. - - [447] This is said to have been the result of the escort’s - smoking round the store! - -The fall of the Salamanca forts happened just in time to prevent -Marmont from committing himself to a serious offensive operation -for their succour. It will be remembered that, on June 24th, he had -used the plea that Caffarelli’s troops must be with him, ere many -days had passed, as a justification for not pushing on to attack the -British divisions in front of Santa Marta. And this expectation was -reasonable, in view of that general’s last dispatch from Vittoria of -June 14th[448], which spoke of his appearance with 8,000 men as certain -and imminent. On the 26th, however, the Marshal received another letter -from the Army of the North, couched in a very different tone, which -upset all his plans. Caffarelli, writing on the 20th, reported the -sudden arrival on the Biscay coast of Sir Home Popham’s fleet, whose -strength he much exaggerated. In co-operation with the English, Longa, -Renovales, and Porlier had all come down from their mountains, and -Bilbao was in danger from their unexpected and simultaneous appearance. -It would probably be necessary to march to drive off the ‘7th Army’ and -the British expedition without delay. At any rate the transference of -any infantry towards the Douro for the succour of the Army of Portugal -had become impossible for the moment. The brigade of light cavalry and -the guns might still be sent, but the infantry division had become -indispensable elsewhere. ‘I am sorry,’ ended Caffarelli, ‘but I could -not have foreseen this development, and when I spoke of marching -towards you I was far from suspecting that it could arise.’ - - [448] Printed in Marmont’s _Mémoires_, iv. p. 410. - -This epistle changed the whole aspect of affairs: if the infantry -division from Vittoria had been diverted into Biscay for an indefinite -period, and if even the cavalry and guns (an insignificant force so -far as numbers went, yet useful to an army short of horse) had not -even started on June 20th, it was clear that not a single man would -be available from the North for many days. Meanwhile the governor of -the forts signalled at dawn on the 27th that seventy-two hours was -the limit of his power of resistance. Thereupon Marmont came to the -desperate resolve to attempt the relief of San Vincente with no more -than his own 40,000 men. He tells us that he intended to move by the -south side of the Tormes, crossing not at Huerta (as on the 24th) but -at Alba de Tormes, seven miles higher up, where he had a small garrison -in the old castle, which protected the bridge. This move would have -brought him precisely on to the ground where he ultimately fought the -disastrous battle of July 22nd. He would have met Wellington with -7,000 men less than he brought to the actual battle that was yet to -come, while the Anglo-Portuguese army was practically the same in July -as it was in June[449]. The result could not have been doubtful--and -Marmont knew that he was taking a serious risk. But he did not fathom -its full danger, since he was filled with an unjustifiable confidence -in his adversary’s aversion to battle, and thought that he might be -manœuvred and bullied out of his position, by a move against his -communications[450]. He would have found out his error in front of the -Arapiles on June 29th if he had persevered. - - [449] If Marmont had marched for Alba de Tormes on the 28th, as - he intended to do, Wellington would have had the 6th Division - in hand, as well as the rest of his troops, for a battle on the - 29th: for the forts fell early on the 27th June. - - [450] See his explanation of his intentions in _Mémoires_, iv. - pp. 219-20. - -But he did not persevere: in the morning of June 27 the firing at -Salamanca ceased, and a few hours later it was known that the forts had -fallen. Having now no longer any reason for taking risks, the Marshal -changed his whole plan, and resolved to remove himself in haste from -Wellington’s neighbourhood, and to take up a defensive position till -he should receive reinforcements. Two courses were open to him--the -first was to retire due eastward toward Arevalo, and put himself in -communication, by Avila and Segovia, with the Army of the Centre and -Madrid. The second was to retire north-eastward toward Valladolid, and -to go behind the strong defensive line of the Douro. Taking this line -the Marshal would sacrifice his touch with Madrid and the South, but -would be certain of picking up the reinforcement under Bonnet which he -was expecting from the Asturias, and would also be able to receive -with security whatever succour Caffarelli might send--even if it turned -out to be no more than cavalry and guns. - -This alternative he chose, probably with wisdom, for in a position on -the Douro he threatened Wellington’s flank if he should advance farther -eastward, and protected the central parts of the kingdom of Leon from -being overrun by the Army of Galicia and Silveira’s Portuguese, who -would have had no containing force whatever in front of them if he had -kept south of the Douro and linked himself with Madrid. His retreat, -commenced before daybreak on the 28th, took him behind the Guarena -river that night: on the 29th he crossed the Trabancos, and rested for -a day after two forced marches. On the 30th he passed the Zapardiel, -and reached Rueda, close to the Douro, on the following morning. From -thence he wrote to King Joseph a dispatch which explains sufficiently -well all his designs: it is all the more valuable because its details -do not entirely bear out the version of his plans which he gives in his -_Mémoires_. - -‘The Salamanca forts,’ he said, ‘having surrendered, there was no -reason for lingering on the Tormes; it was better to fall back on his -reinforcements. If he had not done so, he would have been himself -attacked, for Wellington was preparing to strike, and pursued promptly. -He had detached one division [Foy] towards Toro and the Lower Douro to -keep off Silveira, who had passed that river at Zamora. Moreover the -Galicians had blockaded Astorga, and crossed the Orbigo. He felt that -he could defend the line of the Douro with confidence, being aided by -the line of fortified posts along it--Zamora, Toro, and Tordesillas. -But to take the offensive against Wellington he must have 1,500 more -cavalry and 7,000 more infantry than he actually had in hand--since -the Anglo-Portuguese army was nearly 50,000 strong, and included 5,000 -English horse.’ This reinforcement was precisely what Caffarelli had -promised, but by the 28th not one man of the Army of the North had -reached Valladolid. ‘If the general can trump up some valid excuse -for not sending me the infantry, there is none for keeping back the -cavalry--which is useless among his mountains--or the artillery, which -lies idle at Burgos.’ Would it not be possible for the Army of the -Centre to lend the Army of Portugal Treillard’s division of dragoons -from the valley of the Tagus, since Caffarelli sent nothing? If only -the necessary reinforcements, 1,500 horse and 7,000 foot, came to hand, -the Army of Portugal could take the offensive with a certainty of -success[451]; in eight days Wellington’s designs could be foiled, and -Salamanca could be recovered. But without that succour the Marshal must -keep to the defensive behind the Douro--’I can combat the course of -events, but cannot master them[452].’ - - [451] In this dispatch and that of July 6 following, Marmont - seems to understate his own force at the moment, saying that - he can dispose of only 30,000 infantry, and 2,000 cavalry or a - trifle over. Allowing for the artillery, engineers and sappers, - gendarmerie and train, which the monthly returns show, this would - give an army of some 35,000 or 36,000 in all. But the returns - (see Appendix) indicate a higher figure for the infantry; after - all deductions for detachments, garrisons, and sick have been - made, it looks as if there must have been 33,000 or even 34,000 - available. Generals with a ‘point to prove’ are always a little - easy with their figures. - - [452] This is again one of the Scovell intercepted - cipher-dispatches, captured and brought to Wellington a day or - two after it was written. It was a duplicate, and presumably the - other copy reached Madrid. - -This interesting dispatch explains all that followed. Marmont was -prepared to fight whenever he could show a rough numerical equality -with Wellington’s army. He obtained it a few days later, by the arrival -of Bonnet with his 6,500 infantry, and the increase of his cavalry by -800 or 900 sabres owing to measures hereafter to be described. On July -15th he had got together nearly 50,000 men of all arms, and at once -took the offensive, according to the programme which he had laid down. -It is, therefore, unfair to him to say that he declared himself unable -to fight till he should have got reinforcements either from Caffarelli -or from Madrid, and then (in despite of his declaration) attacked -Wellington without having received them. He may have been presumptuous -in acting as he did, but at least he gave his Commander-in-Chief fair -notice, a fortnight beforehand, as to his intentions. It was the -misfortune of the French that some of their dispatches miscarried, -owing to the activity of the guerrilleros, while others came to -hand very late. Marmont and King Joseph--as we shall see--were very -imperfectly and intermittently informed as to each other’s doings. But -the Marshal cannot reasonably be accused of betraying or deluding -the King out of jealousy or blind ambition. When he had collected a -force very nearly equal to Wellington’s in numbers, and far superior -in national homogeneity, he cannot be blamed over-much for attacking a -foe whose fighting spirit and initiative he much undervalued. That his -conception of Wellington’s character and capacity was hopelessly wrong -cannot be denied: the estimate was to prove his ruin. But it had not -been formed without much observation and experiment: after what he had -seen on the Caya, and at Aldea da Ponte, and recently on the heights of -San Cristobal, he thought he could take liberties with his opponent. He -was to be undeceived in a very rude fashion before July was out. - - - - -SECTION XXXIII: CHAPTER V - -MARMONT TAKES THE OFFENSIVE. JULY 1812 - - -On July 2nd Wellington had arrived at the end of the first stage of -his campaign. He had cleared the French out of the whole of southern -Leon as far as the Douro, had taken the Salamanca forts, and had beaten -off with ease Marmont’s attempts to meddle with him. All this had been -accomplished with the loss of less than 500 men. But the success, -though marked, was not decisive, since the enemy’s army had not been -beaten in the open field, but only manœuvred out of the considerable -region that it had evacuated. The most tangible advantage secured was -that Marmont had been cut off from Madrid and the Army of the Centre: -he could now communicate with King Joseph only by the circuitous line -through Segovia. All the guerrilleros of Castile, especially the bands -of Saornil and Principe, were thrown on the Segovia and Avila roads, -where they served Wellington excellently, for they captured most of the -dispatches which were passing between King Joseph and Marmont, who were -really out of touch with each other after the Marshal’s retreat from -the Tormes on June 27th. - -But till Marmont had been beaten in action nothing was settled, and -Wellington had been disappointed of his hope that the Army of Portugal -would attack him in position, and allow him to deal with it in the -style of Bussaco. The Marshal had retired behind the Douro with his -host intact: it was certain that he would be joined there by Bonnet’s -division from the Asturias, and very possible that he might also -receive succour from the Army of the North. The junction of Bonnet -would give him a practical equality in numbers with the British army: -any considerable reinforcement from Caffarelli would make him superior -in force. And there was still a chance that other French armies might -intervene, though hitherto there were no signs of it. For it was only -during the first fortnight of the campaign that Wellington could reckon -on having to deal with his immediate adversary alone. He was bound to -have that much start, owing to the wide dispersion of the French, and -their difficulty in communicating with each other. But as the weeks -wore on, and the enemy became more able to grasp the situation, there -was a growing possibility that outlying forces might be brought up -towards the Douro. If Marmont had only been defeated on June 21st this -would have mattered little: and Wellington must have regretted more -and more each day that he had not taken the obvious opportunity, and -attacked the Army of Portugal when it placed itself, incomplete and in -a poor position, beneath the heights of San Cristobal. - -Now, however, since Marmont had got away intact, everything depended -on the working of the various diversions which had been prepared to -distract the other French armies. One of them, Sir Home Popham’s, -had succeeded to admiration, and had so scared Caffarelli that not -a man of the Army of the North was yet in motion toward the Douro. -And this fortunate expedition was to continue effective: for another -three weeks Marmont got no succours from the army that was supposed -to constitute his supporting force by the instructions of the Emperor -and of King Joseph. But Wellington--not having the gift of prophecy, -though he could see further into the fog of war than other men--was -unable to rely with certainty on Caffarelli’s continued abstinence from -interference. As to Soult, there were as yet no signs of any trouble -from Andalusia. The Duke of Dalmatia had somewhat reinforced D’Erlon’s -corps in Estremadura, but not to such an extent as threatened any -real danger to Hill, who reported that he could keep D’Erlon in check -on the Albuera position, and was not certain that he might not be -able to attack him at advantage--a move for which he had his chief’s -permission[453]. If only Wellington had been fortunate enough to -receive some of Soult’s letters to King Joseph, written in the second -half of June, he would have been much reassured: for the Marshal was -(as we shall see) refusing in the most insubordinate style to carry -out the orders sent him to move troops northward. Two minor pieces -of intelligence from the South were of no primary importance--though -vexatious enough--one was that Ballasteros had ventured on a battle at -Bornos on June 1, and got well beaten: but his army was not destroyed. -The second was that General Slade had suffered a discreditable check at -Maguilla on June 11th in a cavalry combat with Lallemand’s dragoons. -But neither of these events had much influence on Soult’s general -conduct at the time, as we shall show in the proper place. - - [453] See Wellington to Lord Liverpool, June 25. _Dispatches_, - ix. pp. 253-4, and to Hill, ix. pp. 256-7, and again to Lord - Liverpool, ix. pp. 261-2. - -There remained one quarter from which Wellington had received -information that was somewhat disturbing. An intercepted letter from -King Joseph to D’Erlon showed that the latter had been directed to move -towards the Tagus, and that the King himself was evidently thinking of -bringing succour to Marmont, so far as his modest means allowed[454]. -But since this projected operation seemed to depend on assistance being -granted by Soult, and since it was doubtful in the highest degree -whether Soult would give it, Wellington was not without hopes that it -might come to nothing. ‘I have requested the Empecinado,’ he writes -to Lord Liverpool, ‘to alarm the King for the safety of his situation -about Madrid, and I hope that Marshal Soult will find ample employment -for his troops in the blockade of Cadiz, the continued operations of -General Ballasteros, and those in Estremadura of Lieut.-General Hill, -whose attention I have called to the probable march of this corps of -the Army of the South through Estremadura.’ As a matter of fact Soult -prevented D’Erlon from giving any help to the King or Marmont; but a -contingency was to arise of which Wellington, on July 1st, could have -no expectation--viz. that, though refused all help from the South, -Joseph might come to the desperate but most soldier-like determination -to march with his own little army alone to the Douro, in order to bring -to bear such influence as he possessed on what was obviously a critical -moment in the war. The King and Jourdan were the only men in Spain who -showed a true appreciation of the crisis: but they made their move too -late: the fault was undoubtedly Soult’s alone. However, on July 1st, -Wellington was justified in doubting whether any danger would arise on -the side of Madrid. Joseph could not move the Army of the Centre to -the Douro, without risking his capital and abandoning all New Castile. -As late as July 11th Wellington suspected that he would not make this -extreme sacrifice, but would rather push a demonstration down the -Tagus to alarm central Portugal, a hypothesis which did not much alarm -him[455]. The King and Jourdan knew better than to make this indecisive -move, and marched where their 14,000 men might have turned the whole -course of the campaign--but marched too late. - - [454] See Wellington to Lord Liverpool, June 18. _Dispatches_, - ix. p. 241, and June 25, p. 253. There was also in Wellington’s - hands an intercepted letter of Joseph to Soult of May 26, - distinctly saying that if Marmont is attacked in June, D’Erlon - must pass the Tagus and go to his help. This is in the Scovell - ciphers. - - [455] Wellington to Hill, July 11. _Dispatches_, ix. p. 281. - The idea that Joseph might operate on his own account begins to - emerge in the correspondence on the 14th. _Dispatches_, ix. p. - 283. - -There was still a chance that Suchet might be helping the King--this -depended entirely on an unknown factor in the game, the diversion -which Lord William Bentinck had promised to execute on the coast of -Catalonia. If it had begun to work, as it should have done, by the -second half of June, there was little chance that any troops from the -eastern side of Spain would interfere in the struggle on the Douro. But -no information of recent date was yet forthcoming: it was not till July -14th that the vexatious news arrived that Lord William was faltering -in his purpose, and thinking of plans for diverting his expeditionary -force to Italy. - -The situation, therefore, when Marmont went behind the Douro on -July 1st, had many uncertain points: there were several dangerous -possibilities, but nothing had yet happened to make ultimate success -improbable. On the whole the most disappointing factor was the conduct -of the Army of Galicia. It will be remembered that Wellington had -arranged for a double diversion on Marmont’s flank and rear. Silveira, -with the militia of the Tras-os-Montes and D’Urban’s Portuguese cavalry -brigade, was to cross the Esla and besiege Zamora. Santocildes, with -the Army of Galicia, had been directed to attack Astorga with part of -his force, but to bring the main body forward to the Esla and overrun -the plains of northern Leon. Silveira had but a trifling force, and the -task allotted to him was small: but on July 1st he had not yet reached -Zamora with his infantry, and was only at Carvajales on the Esla[456]. -On the other hand D’Urban’s cavalry had pushed boldly forward in front -of him, had swept the whole north bank of the Douro as far as Toro, -and reported that all the French garrisons save Astorga, Zamora, and -Toro had been drawn in--that Benavente, Leon, and all the northern -plain were unoccupied. On July 2 D’Urban was at Castronuevo, north of -Toro, right in the rear of Marmont’s flank--a very useful position, -since it enabled him to keep up communication between Silveira and -the Galicians, as well as to report any movement of the French right. -Moreover, though his force was very small, only 800 sabres, it was -enough to prevent any foraging parties from Marmont’s rear from -exploiting the resources of the north bank of the Douro. Some such -appeared, but were driven in at once, so that the Marshal had to live -on his magazines and the villages actually within his lines: in the end -these resources would be exhausted, and the old choice--starvation or -dispersion--would once more be presented to the Army of Portugal[457]. - - [456] By no fault of his own, according to D’Urban. The orders - for him to move were, by some delay at head-quarters, only - forthcoming on June 8th. Only two of the four Tras-os-Montes - militia regiments were then mobilized, and it took a long time to - collect the rest and the transport needed for moving across the - frontier. - - [457] D’Urban’s manœuvres on both sides of the Douro are detailed - at great length in his very interesting diary, and his official - correspondence, both of which have been placed at my disposal. He - worked on both sides of the Douro, but went definitely north of - it after July 1. - -But as a military body neither D’Urban’s 800 horse nor Silveira’s 4,000 -militia had any threatening power against Marmont’s rear. They might -almost be neglected, while the real pressure which Wellington had -intended to apply in this quarter was not forthcoming. He had hoped -that, by the time that he and Marmont were at close quarters, the -Army of Galicia would have been taking a useful part in the campaign. -It was not that he intended to use it as a fighting force: but if it -could have appeared in the French rear 15,000 strong, it would have -compelled Marmont to make such a large detachment for the purpose of -‘containing’ it, that he would have been left in a marked numerical -inferiority on the Douro. - -Unfortunately the Galicians moved late, in small numbers, and with -marked timidity. They exercised no influence whatever on the course of -the campaign, either in June or in July. Yet after Bonnet evacuated -the Asturias and went off eastward on June 15th, the Army of Galicia -had no field-force of any kind in front of it. The only French left in -its neighbourhood were the 1,500 men[458] who formed the garrison of -Astorga. Castaños, who had moved up to Santiago in June, and assumed -command, did not take the field himself, but handed over the charge of -the troops at the front to Santocildes. The latter sat down in front -of Astorga with his main body, and only pushed forward a weak division -under Cabrera to Benavente, where it was still too remote from Marmont -to cause him any disquiet. The siege of Astorga was only a blockade -till July 2nd, as no battering-train was brought up till that date. -First Abadia, and later Castaños had pleaded that they had no means for -a regular siege, and it was not till Sir Howard Douglas pointed out a -sufficient store of heavy guns in the arsenal of Corunna, that Castaños -began to scrape together the battering-train that ultimately reached -Astorga[459]. But this was not so much the weak point in the operations -of the Galician army, as the fact that, of 15,000 men brought together -on the Orbigo, only 3,800 were pushed forward to the Esla, while the -unnecessarily large remainder conducted a leisurely siege of the small -garrison of Astorga. Wellington had reckoned on having an appreciable -force, 10,000 or 12,000 men, at the front, molesting Marmont’s flank; -this would have forced the Marshal to make a large detachment to keep -it off. But not a man appeared on the east bank of the Esla, and the -operations of D’Urban’s small brigade were of far more service to the -main army than that of the whole of the Galicians. Marmont ignored the -presence of the few thousand men pushed forward to Benavente, and was -justified in so doing. Meanwhile Santocildes, with an optimism that -proved wholly unjustifiable, sent messages that Astorga would be taken -within a few days, and that he would then move forward with his main -body. As a matter of fact the place held out till the 18th of August. - - [458] Two battalions of 23rd Léger and one of 1st Line from - Thomières’s division. - - [459] For the curious story of their ignorance of their own - resources see Sir Howard Douglas’s _Life_, pp. 156-7. - -Wellington, therefore, was building on a false hypothesis when he wrote -to Lord Bathurst, on July 7, that he was surveying all the fords of the -Douro, and waiting till the river should have fallen a little and made -them more practicable. ‘By that time I hope that the Army of Galicia -under General Santocildes will have been able to advance, the siege of -Astorga having been brought to a conclusion[460].’ Two days later he -added, ‘it would not answer to cross the river at all in its present -state, unless we should be certain of having the co-operation of the -Galician troops[461].’ His delay in making an attempt to force the line -of the Douro, therefore, may be attributed in the main to the tiresome -conduct of Santocildes, who played to him much the same part that -Caffarelli played to Marmont. - - [460] _Dispatches_, ix. p. 274. - - [461] Ibid., ix. p. 276. - -While remaining in this waiting posture, Wellington placed his troops -opposite the various passages of the Douro, on a line of some fifteen -miles. His left, consisting of the 3rd Division, Pack’s and Bradford’s -Portuguese, and Carlos de España’s Spaniards, with Le Marchant’s and -Bock’s heavy dragoons, lay near the point where the Trabancos falls -into the Douro, holding the ford of Pollos, where the favourable -configuration of the ground enabled them to be sure of the passage, the -enemy’s line being perforce drawn back to some distance on the north -bank. It was always open to Wellington to use this ford, when he should -determine on a general advance. The Light, 4th, 5th, and 6th Divisions, -forming the right wing, lay opposite Tordesillas, with Rueda and La -Seca behind them. Their front was covered by Alten’s cavalry brigade, -their right (or outer) flank by Anson’s. The reserve was formed by the -1st and 7th Divisions quartered at Medina del Campo, ten miles to the -rear. The whole could be assembled for an offensive or a defensive move -in a day’s march. - -Marmont was drawn up, to face the attack that he expected, in an almost -equally close and concentrated formation: his front, extending from the -junction of the Pisuerga with the Douro near Simancas on his left, to -the ground opposite the ford of Pollos on his right, was very thickly -held[462]; but on the 5th he rightly conceived doubts as to whether it -would not be easy for Wellington to turn his western flank, by using -the ford of Castro Nuño and other passages down-stream from Pollos. He -then detached Foy’s division to Toro and the neighbourhood, to guard -against such a danger: but this was still an insufficient provision, -since Toro is fifteen miles from Pollos, and a single division of 5,000 -men would have to watch rather than defend such a length of river-line, -if it were attacked in force. Therefore when Bonnet, so long expected -in vain, arrived from the North on July 7th, Marmont placed him in this -portion of his line, for the assistance of Foy. He still retained six -divisions massed around Tordesillas, whose unbroken bridge gave him -a secure access to the southern bank of the Douro. With this mass of -35,000 men in hand, he could meet Wellington with a solid body, if the -latter crossed the Douro at or below Pollos. Or he might equally well -take the more daring step of assuming a counter-offensive, and marching -from Tordesillas on Salamanca against his adversary’s communications, -if the allies threatened his own by passing the river and moving on -Valladolid. - - [462] An interesting dispatch from D’Urban to Beresford describes - the information he had got on the 5th by a daring reconnaissance - along Marmont’s rear: there was not that morning any French force - west of Monte de Cubillos, six miles down-stream from Pollos. - -A word to explain the tardiness of Bonnet’s arrival in comparison with -the earliness of his start is perhaps required. He had evacuated Oviedo -and Gijon and his other posts in the Asturias as early as June 14th, -the actual day on which Wellington commenced his offensive campaign. -This he did not in consequence of Marmont’s orders, which only reached -him when he had begun to move, but on his own responsibility. He had -received correct information as to the massing of the allied army round -Ciudad Rodrigo, and of the forward movement of the Galicians towards -Astorga. He knew of the dispersed state of Marmont’s host, and saw the -danger to himself. Should the Marshal concentrate about Salamanca, -he could never join him, if the whole Army of Galicia threw itself -between. Wherefore not only did he resolve to retreat at once, but he -did not move by the pass of Pajares and Leon--the obvious route to -rejoin the Army of Portugal. For fear that he might be intercepted, -he took the coast-road, picking up the small garrisons that he had -placed in one or two small ports. He reached Santander on the 22nd, -not molested so much as he might have been by the bands of Porlier and -Longa (whose haunts he was passing), because the bulk of them had gone -off to help in Sir Home Popham’s raid on Biscay. From Santander he -turned inland, passed Reynosa, in the heart of the Cantabrian Sierras, -on the 24th June, and arrived at Aguilar del Campo, the first town -in the province of Palencia, on the 29th. From thence he had a long -march of seven days in the plains, before he reached Valladolid on the -6th, and reported himself at Marmont’s head-quarters on the 7th of -July. He brought with him a strong division of 6,500 infantry, a light -field-battery, and a single squadron of Chasseurs--even 100 sabres[463] -were a welcome reinforcement to Marmont’s under-horsed army. It was an -odd fact that Bonnet’s division had never before met the English in -battle, though one of its regiments had seen them during the last days -of Sir John Moore’s retreat in January 1809[464]. For the three years -since that date they had always been employed in the Asturias. - - [463] Ninety-four to be exact. See 28th Chasseurs in table of - Marmont’s army in Appendix. - - [464] The 122nd Line had been in Mermet’s division, in January - 1809, but they had been in reserve at Corunna, and had not fired - a shot in that battle. - -The arrival of Bonnet brought up the total of Marmont’s infantry -to 43,000 men, and his guns to 78. The cavalry still remained the -weak point: but by a high-handed and unpopular measure the Marshal -succeeded, during his stay on the Douro, in procuring nearly 1,000 -horses for the dismounted dragoons who were encumbering his dépôt -at Valladolid. In the French, as in the British, Peninsular army it -had become common for many of the junior officers of the infantry -to provide themselves with a riding-horse; most captains and many -lieutenants had them. And their seniors, _chefs de bataillon_ and -colonels, habitually had several horses more than they were entitled -to. Marmont took the heroic measure of proclaiming that he should -enforce the regulations, and that all unauthorized horses were -confiscated. He paid, however, a valuation for each beast on a moderate -scale--otherwise the act would have been intolerable. In this way, -including some mounts requisitioned from doctors, commissaries, and -suttlers, about 1,000 horses in all were procured. The number of -cavalry fit for the field had gone up by July 15th from about 2,200 to -3,200--a total which was only 300 less than Wellington’s full strength -of British sabres. It occurs to the casual observer that the horses, -having never been trained to squadron drill or to act in mass, must -have been difficult to manage, even though the riders were competent -horsemen. This may have something to do with the very ineffective part -played by the French cavalry in the next fortnight’s campaigning. - -A quaint anecdote of the time shows us General Taupin, an old -Revolutionary veteran, with all the officers of his brigade called -together in a village church. ‘He ascended the pulpit and thundered -against the abuse of horses in the infantry: he would make an end of -all baggage carried on mules or asses, but most especially of the -officers’ riding-horses. “Gentlemen,” he cried, “in 1793 we were -allowed a haversack as our only baggage, a stone as our only pillow.” -Well--it was a long time since 1793: we were in 1812, and the speaker, -this old and gallant soldier, had _six_ baggage mules himself[465].’ - - [465] _Mémoires_ of Lemonnier-Delafosse of the 31st Léger, pp. - 177-8. - -During the first ten days after the deadlock on the Douro began, the -French were much puzzled by Wellington’s refusal to continue his -advance. Foy, the ablest of them, noted in his diary that he must -conclude either that the enemy was not numerous enough to take the -offensive--his strength might have been over-valued--or else that he -was waiting for Hill to bring up his corps from Estremadura. This last -idea, indeed, was running in the brains of many French strategists: -it obsessed Jourdan and King Joseph at Madrid, who were well aware -that Hill, marching by Alcantara and the passes of the Sierra de Gata, -could have got to the Douro in half the time that it would have taken -his opponent, D’Erlon, who would have had to move by Toledo, Madrid, -and Segovia. But the simple explanation is to be found in Wellington’s -dispatch to Lord Bathurst of July 13. ‘It is obvious that we could -not cross the Douro without sustaining great loss, and could not -fight a general action under circumstances of greater disadvantage.... -The enemy’s numbers are equal, if not superior, to ours: they have in -their position thrice the amount of artillery that we have, and we are -superior in cavalry alone--which arm (it is probable) could not be used -in the sort of attack we should have to make[466].’ He then proceeds -to demonstrate the absolute necessity of bringing forward the Army of -Galicia against Marmont’s rear. Its absence was the real cause of the -deadlock in which he found himself involved. All offensive operations -were postponed--meanwhile the enemy might receive reinforcements and -attack, since he had not been attacked. ‘But I still hope that I shall -be able to retain, at the close of this campaign, those acquisitions -which we made at its commencement.’ - - [466] Wellington to Bathurst. _Dispatches_, ix. p. 284. - -Meanwhile Marmont, having had a fortnight to take stock of his -position, and having received reinforcements which very nearly reached -the figure that he had named to King Joseph as the minimum which would -enable him to take the offensive, was beginning to get restless. -He had now realized that he would get no practical assistance from -Caffarelli, who still kept sending him letters exaggerating the terrors -of Sir Home Popham’s raid on Biscay. They said that there were six -ships of the line engaged in it, and that there was a landing-force of -British regulars: Bonnet’s evacuation of the Asturias had allowed all -the bands of Cantabria to turn themselves loose on Biscay--Bilbao was -being attacked--and so forth. This being so, it was only possible to -send a brigade of cavalry and a horse artillery battery--anything more -was useless to ask[467]. This was written on June 26th, but by July -11th not even the cavalry brigade had started from Vittoria, as was -explained by a subsequent letter, which only reached Marmont after he -had already started on an offensive campaign[468]. As a matter of fact, -Caffarelli’s meagre contribution of 750 sabres[469] and one battery -actually got off on July 16th[470]. Marmont may be pardoned for having -believed that it would never start at all, when it is remembered that a -month had elapsed since he first asked for aid, and that every two days -he had been receiving dispatches of excuse, but no reinforcements. He -had no adequate reason for thinking that even the trifling force which -did in the end start out would ever arrive. - - [467] Caffarelli to Marmont, in the latter’s _Mémoires_, iv. p. - 417. - - [468] Ibid., pp. 421-2. - - [469] He sent finally only two regiments, not three as he had - originally promised. - - [470] Caffarelli to Marmont, in the latter’s _Mémoires_, iv. p. - 425, announcing their departure. - -Nor, as he demonstrates clearly enough in his defence of his -operations, had he any more ground for believing that Joseph and -Jourdan would bring him help from Madrid. They resolved to do so in -the end, and made a vigorous effort to collect as large a force as was -possible. But the announcement of their intention was made too late -to profit Marmont. The dispatch conveying it was sent off from Madrid -only on July 9th[471], and never reached the Marshal at all, for the -two copies of it, sent by separate messengers, were both captured by -guerrilleros between Madrid and Valladolid, and came into Wellington’s -instead of into Marmont’s hands. This was a consequence of the -insecurity of the communication via Segovia, the only one route open -when the Army of Portugal retired behind the Douro. On July 12th the -last piece of intelligence from Madrid which Marmont had received was a -dispatch from Jourdan dated June 30th--it had taken twelve days to get -150 miles, which shows the shifts to which its bearer had been exposed. -This letter is so important, as showing what the King and Jourdan -opined at the moment, that its gist is worth giving. - - [471] Original is in the Scovell ciphers. It seems to be - unpublished. - -Jourdan begins by complaining that on June 30 the last dispatch from -the Army of Portugal to hand was sixteen days old, of the date of -June 14th. It is clear, then, that no copies of the reports sent by -Marmont on June 22 and June 24 had got to Madrid--a circumstance to -be explained by the fact that Wellington had them instead of their -destined recipient[472]. Jourdan then proceeds to say that he is -informed that Wellington has 50,000 men, but only 18,000 of them -British. ‘The King thinks that if this is so, you are strong enough to -beat his army, and would like to know the motives which have prevented -you from taking the offensive. He charges me to invite you to explain -them by express messenger.’ In the South it was known that Hill, with -18,000 men, was advancing on June 18th against D’Erlon. That officer -was to be reinforced from Seville, and was probably at close quarters -with Hill. The King had sent orders that D’Erlon was to move northward -into the valley of the Tagus, if Hill marched up to join Wellington. -But, it being probable that the order would not be very promptly -executed, ‘his Majesty would like you to take advantage of the moment, -when Wellington has not all his forces in hand, to fight him. The King -has asked for troops from Marshal Suchet, but they will never be sent. -All that His Majesty can do at present is to reinforce the garrison of -Segovia, and order its governor, General Espert, to help the garrison -of Avila, if necessary, and to supply it with food.’ - - [472] They are both in the Scovell ciphers, and quoted above, p. - 370. - -This letter, which clearly gives no hope of immediate help for the -Army of Portugal from Madrid, and which might be taken as a direct -incitement to bring Wellington to action at once, must be read in -conjunction with the last epistle that Marmont had received from the -same quarter. This was a letter of the King’s dated June 18. The -important paragraph of it runs as follows:-- - -‘If General Hill has remained with his 18,000 men on the left (south) -bank of the Tagus, you ought to be strong enough to beat the English -army, more especially if you have received any reinforcements from the -Army of the North. You must choose your battlefield, and make your best -dispositions. But if Hill joins the main English army, I fancy they -are too strong for you. In that case you must manœuvre to gain time. I -should not hesitate to give you a positive order to defer fighting, if -I were certain that Count D’Erlon and his 15,000 men, and a division -from the Army of Aragon, were on their way to you: for on their arrival -the English army would be seriously compromised. But being wholly -uncertain about them, I must repeat to you that if General Hill is -still on the south side of the Tagus, you should choose a good position -and give battle with all your troops united: but if General Hill joins -Lord Wellington, you must avoid an action as long as possible, in -order to pick up the reinforcements which will certainly reach you in -the end[473].’ - - [473] Joseph to Marmont, June 18, in Ducasse’s _Correspondance_, - ix. pp. 28-39. - -I think that there can be no doubt in the mind of any honest -critic that on the strength of these two dispatches from his -Commander-in-Chief, Marmont was justified in taking the offensive -against Wellington, without waiting for that help from Madrid which the -King had not offered him. Hill being far away, and Wellington having -no more than his own seven divisions of Anglo-Portuguese, Marmont is -decidedly authorized to bring him to action. The sole factor which the -second Madrid dispatch states wrongly, is the proportion of British -troops in the allied army: Jourdan guesses that there are 50,000 men, -but only 18,000 British. As a matter of fact there were 49,000 men at -the moment[474], but about 30,000 were British. This made a difference, -no doubt, and Marmont, if he had been determined to avoid a battle, -might have pleaded it as his justification. But he was not set on any -such timid policy: he had wellnigh attacked Wellington at San Cristobal -on June 21st, when he had not yet received his own reinforcements. -When Bonnet had come up, and the British had obtained no corresponding -addition to their strength, he was eager to take the offensive, and -Joseph’s and Jourdan’s dispatches distinctly authorized him to do so. - - [474] Two battalions, the 1/38 and 1/5th, joined before the - battle of the 22nd, bringing up the total force by 1,500 bayonets - more. - -After the disaster of Salamanca, Napoleon drew up an indictment of -Marmont, of which the three chief heads were: - -(1) He took the offensive without waiting for reinforcements which were -to join him. - -(2) He delivered battle without the authorization of his -Commander-in-Chief. - -(3) He might, by waiting only two days longer, before he committed -himself to a general action, have received at least the cavalry and -guns which he knew that Caffarelli had sent him[475]. - - [475] See the letter of Clarke to Marmont enclosing the Emperor’s - indictment, in Marmont’s _Mémoires_, iv. pp. 453-4. - -The very complete answer to these charges is that: - -(1) When the Marshal took the offensive he had no reason to suppose -that any reinforcements were coming. Caffarelli had excused himself: -the King had promised succour only if Hill joined Wellington, not -otherwise. Hill had never appeared: therefore no help was likely to -come from the southward. - -(2) He had clear permission from Joseph to give battle, unless Hill -should have joined Wellington. - -(3) The succours from Caffarelli, a weak cavalry brigade and one -battery, were so small that their arrival would have made no practical -difference to the strength of the army. But to have waited two days for -them, after the campaign had commenced, would have given Wellington -the opportunity of concentrating, and taking up a good position. It -was only after the manœuvring had begun [July 15th] that this little -brigade started from Vittoria, on July 16th. The Army of Portugal had -already committed itself to offensive operations, and could not halt -for two days in the midst of them, without losing the initiative. - -From his own point of view, then, Marmont was entirely justified in -recrossing the Douro and assuming the offensive. He had got all the -reinforcements that he could count upon: they made his army practically -equal to Wellington’s in numbers: in homogeneity it was far superior. -If he had waited a little longer, he might have found 12,000 men of the -Army of Galicia at his back, setting all Old Castile and Leon aflame. -Moreover Astorga was only victualled up to August 1st, and might fall -any day. He could not have foreseen King Joseph’s unexpected march to -his aid, which no dispatch received before July 12th rendered likely. -His misfortune (or fault) was that he undervalued the capacity of -Wellington to manœuvre, his readiness to force on an offensive battle, -and (most of all) the fighting value of the Anglo-Portuguese army. - -It cannot be denied that Marmont’s method of taking the offensive -against Wellington was neat and effective. It consisted in a feint -against his adversary’s left wing, followed by a sudden countermarch -and a real attack upon his right wing. - -On July 15th Foy and Bonnet, with the two divisions forming the French -right, received orders to restore the bridge of Toro, to drive in -Wellington’s cavalry screen in front of it, and to cross to the south -bank of the Douro. At the same time the divisions of the French -centre, opposite the fords of Pollos, made an ostentatious move -down-stream towards Toro, accompanied by the Marshal himself, and those -on the left, near Tordesillas, shifted themselves towards Pollos. -Almost the whole French army was clearly seen marching westward, and -the two leading divisions were actually across the river next morning, -and seemed to be heading straight for Salamanca by the Toro road. - -Wellington was deceived, exactly as Marmont had intended. He drew the -obvious conclusion that his adversary was about to turn his left flank, -and to strike at Salamanca and his line of communications. It would -have been in his power to make a corresponding move against Valladolid, -Marmont’s base. But his own line of communications meant much more -to him than did Marmont’s. There was a great difference between the -position of an army living by transport and magazines, and that of an -army living on the country by plunder, like that of the French marshal. -Wellington had always been jealous of his left wing, and as early as -July 12 had drawn up an elaborate order of march, providing for the -contingency of the enemy crossing the Douro at Toro and the ford of -Castro Nuño. If his entire force seemed on the move, the whole British -army would make a corresponding shift westward--if only a division -or two, the mass transferred would be less in similar proportion. He -had no idea of defending the actual course of the river: in a letter -written a few days later to Lord Bathurst, he remarked that ‘it was -totally out of my power to prevent the enemy from crossing the Douro -at any point at which he might think it expedient, as he had in his -possession all the bridges [Toro and Tordesillas] and many of the -fords[476].’ His plan was to concentrate against the crossing force, -and fight a defensive action against it, wherever a good position might -be available. - - [476] See _Supplementary Dispatches_, xiv. p. 68. - -There were two reasons for which Wellington regarded a genuine -offensive move of Marmont by Toro and Castro Nuño as probable. The -first was that he had received King Joseph’s dispatch of July 9th, -captured by guerrilleros, which gave him the startling news that the -King had resolved to evacuate all New Castile save Madrid and Toledo, -and to march with his field-force of some 14,000 men to join the Army -of Portugal[477]. Wellington wrote to Graham (who was now on his way -home) early on the 16th, that either the Galicians’ approach on his -rear had induced Marmont to collect his troops near Toro, or he had -heard that Joseph was gathering the Army of the Centre at Madrid, and -was threatening the allied left ‘in order to prevent us from molesting -the King.’ It was clear that if Wellington had to shift westward to -protect his line of communications, he could make no detachment to -‘contain’ King Joseph, who would be approaching from the south-east. -Another letter, written an hour or so later, says, ‘these movements of -Marmont are certainly intended to divert our attention from the Army -of the Centre (which is collecting at Madrid), if he knows of this -circumstance, _which I doubt_[478].’ The doubt was well grounded. - - [477] See _Dispatches_, ix. p. 294. - - [478] Wellington to Clinton, July 16, 7 a.m. _Dispatches_, ix. p. - 291. - -That the whole movement on Toro was a feint did not occur to -Wellington, but his orders of the 16th, given in the evening, after he -had heard that two French divisions were actually across the Douro on -his left, provide for the possibility that some serious force may still -remain at Tordesillas and may require observation. - -The orders direct the transference of the great bulk of the allied -army to a position which will cover the road Toro-Salamanca. They were -issued in the evening to the following effect. The reserve (1st and -7th Divisions) was to march from Medina del Campo to Alaejos beyond -the Trabancos river, and subsequently to Canizal and Fuente la Peña -behind the Guarena river. The left wing, which was watching the fords -of Pollos (3rd Division, Bock’s cavalry, Bradford’s and Carlos de -España’s infantry), to Castrillo on the Guarena. Of the right wing -the 6th Division and two regiments of Le Marchant’s horse were to -move on Fuente la Peña, the 5th Division on Canizal. Alten’s cavalry -brigade was to follow the 1st Division. This left the 4th and Light -Divisions and Anson’s cavalry still unaccounted for. They were set -aside to act as a sort of rearguard, being directed to move westward -only as far as Castrejon on the Trabancos river, ten miles short of the -concentration-point on the Toro road, to which the rest of the army -was ordered to proceed. It is clear (though Wellington does not say -so) that they would serve as a containing force, if the enemy had left -any troops at Tordesillas, and brought them over the Douro there, or at -the fords of Pollos. - -All these moves were duly executed, and on the morning of the 17th -Wellington’s army was getting into position to withstand the expected -advance of the enemy on Salamanca by the Toro road. This attack, -however, failed to make itself felt, and presently news came that the -two divisions of Foy and Bonnet, which had crossed the Douro at Toro, -had gone behind it again, and destroyed their bridge. What Marmont had -done during the night of the 16th-17th was to reverse the marching -order of his whole army, the rear suddenly becoming the head, and the -head the rear. The divisions to the eastward, which had not yet got -near Toro, countermarched on Tordesillas, and crossed its bridge, -with the light cavalry at their head. Those which had reached Toro -brought up the rear, and followed, with Foy and Bonnet, at the tail -of the column. This was a most fatiguing march for all concerned, the -distance from Toro to Tordesillas being about twenty miles, and the -operation being carried out in the night hours. But it was completely -successful--during the morning of the 17th the vanguard, consisting of -Clausel’s and Maucune’s divisions and Curto’s _chasseurs à cheval_, -was pouring over the bridge of Tordesillas and occupying Rueda and La -Seca, which the British had evacuated fifteen hours before. The rest -followed, the two rear divisions cutting a corner, and saving a few -miles, by crossing the ford of Pollos. This was a safe move, when the -cavalry had discovered that there were none of Wellington’s troops -left east of the Trabancos river. By night on the 17th the bulk of the -French army was concentrated at Nava del Rey, ten miles south-west -of Tordesillas. In the afternoon Wellington’s rearguard, the 4th and -Light Divisions, and Anson’s cavalry had been discovered in position at -Castrejon, where their commander had halted them, when he discovered -that he had been deceived as to his adversary’s purpose. The rest of -the British army had concentrated, according to orders, in the triangle -Canizal-Castrillo-Fuente la Peña, behind the Guarena river and in front -of the Toro-Salamanca road. - -[Illustration: THE SALAMANCA CAMPAIGN] - -Wellington’s first task was to drawback his rearguard to join his main -body, without allowing it to become seriously engaged with the great -mass of French in its front. This he undertook in person, marching at -daylight with all his disposable cavalry, the brigades of Bock and Le -Marchant, to join the force at Castrejon, while he threw out the 5th -Division to Torrecilla de la Orden to act as a supporting échelon on -the flank of the retiring detachment. The remaining divisions (1st, -3rd, 6th, 7th) took up a position in line of battle on the heights -above the Guarena, ready to receive their comrades when they should -appear. - -The charge of the rearguard this day was in the hands of Stapleton -Cotton, the senior cavalry officer with the army, who outranked Cole -and Charles Alten, the commanders of the 4th and Light Divisions. -He had received no orders during the night, and his last, those of -the preceding afternoon, had directed him to halt, till his chief -should have discovered the true position and aim of the French army. -Wellington explained, in his next dispatch home, that the various -details of intelligence, which enabled him to grasp Marmont’s whole -plan, did not reach him till so late on the 17th that it was useless to -send Cotton orders to start. They could only be carried out at dawn, -and he himself intended to be present with the rearguard before the sun -was far above the horizon. He arrived at seven o’clock in the morning, -in time to find his lieutenant already engaged with the French van, but -not committed to any dangerous close fighting. Cotton had, very wisely, -sent out patrols before daylight to discover exactly what was in front -of him; if it was only a trifling body he intended to drive it in, and -advance towards La Nava and Rueda[479]; if Marmont was in force he -would take up a defensive position at Castrejon, and wait for further -orders. - - [479] See report of one of the officers commanding patrols, - Tomkinson of the 16th L.D. in the latter’s _Memoirs_, p. 180. - -The patrols soon ran into French cavalry advancing in force, and were -driven back upon Anson’s brigade, which was drawn up on a long front in -advance of the village of Castrejon. On seeing it, the enemy brought up -two batteries of horse artillery, and began to play upon the scattered -squadrons. Bull’s and Ross’s troops[480] were ordered out to reply, and -did so with effect, but the total strength of the French cavalry was -too great, and Anson’s regiments had presently to give way, though not -so much owing to the pressure on their front as to the sight of a large -column of French infantry turning the left of their line, and marching -on Alaejos, with the obvious intention of getting round to their left -rear and molesting their retreat towards the Guarena, where the main -body of the British army was awaiting them. - - [480] Belonging one to the cavalry, the other to the Light - Division. - -Wellington was involved in person in the end of the cavalry bickering, -and in no very pleasant fashion. He and Beresford, with their staffs, -had arrived on the field about seven o’clock, in advance of the two -heavy cavalry brigades, who were coming up to reinforce Cotton. He -rode forward to the left of the skirmishing line, where two squadrons, -one of the 11th and one of the 12th Light Dragoons, were supporting -two guns of Ross’s troop, on high ground above the ravine of the -Trabancos river. Just as the Commander-in-Chief came on the scene, -a squadron of French cavalry, striking in from the flank, rode at -the guns, not apparently seeing the supporting troops. They met and -broke the squadron of the 12th Light Dragoons, which came up the hill -to intercept them. ‘Some of Marshal Beresford’s staff, seeing this, -and conceiving the guns to be in danger, rode up to the retiring -squadron calling “Threes about[481]!”’ This unfortunately was heard by -the supporting squadron of the 11th, who, imagining the order to be -directed to themselves, went about and retired, instead of advancing -to relieve their broken comrades above. Therefore the mass of pursuers -and pursued from the combat on the flank, came hurtling down on the -guns, and on the head-quarters staff just behind them. Wellington and -Beresford and their followers were swept away in the rout, and had to -draw their swords to defend themselves. Fortunately the misdirected -squadron of the 11th soon saw their mistake; they halted and turned, -and falling on the scattered and exhausted French dragoons drove them -back with great loss; few, it is said, except their _chef d’escadron_, -who showed uncommon gallantry, got away[482]. It was a dangerous moment -for the allied army--a chance thrust in the _mêlée_ might have killed -or disabled Wellington, and have thrown the command into the hands of -Beresford or Stapleton Cotton. - - [481] Tomkinson, p. 188. - - [482] Compare Tomkinson’s narrative of this incident (pp. - 180-1) with Napier’s vivid and well-told tale (iv. pp. 254-5). - Both agree that the French were inferior in numbers to the two - squadrons, and that there was deplorable confusion. - -Wellington had no sooner detected the flank movement of Marmont’s -infantry towards Alaejos, than he ordered the 4th and Light Divisions -to retire towards the Guarena, covered by G. Anson’s brigade, while -Bock’s and Le Marchant’s heavy dragoons, farther to the left, drew -up in front of the infantry of the turning column, and detained it, -retiring, when pressed, by alternate brigades. Marmont’s whole army was -now visible, moving on in two long columns, of which the more southern -followed the 4th and Light Divisions, in the direction of Torrecilla -de la Orden, and tried to come up with their rear, while the other, -passing through Alaejos, made by the high-road for Castrillo on the -Guarena, where the British reserves were posted. - -There was a long bickering fight across the eight miles of rolling -ground between the Trabancos and the Guarena, not without some exciting -moments for Wellington’s rearguard. After passing Torrecilla de la -Orden, and picking up there the 5th Division, which had been waiting -as a supporting échelon to cover their southern flank, all the British -infantry had to march very hard, for troops diverging from the northern -French column got close in upon their right, and, moving parallel with -them, bid fair to reach the Guarena first. In the retreat the 4th -Division moved on the right, and was therefore most exposed, the Light -Division next them, the 5th Division farther south and more distant -from the turning column of the French. The cavalry pursuit in the rear -of the retreating force was never really dangerous: it was held off -by Le Marchant’s Heavy and Anson’s Light Dragoons without any great -difficulty, and the 5th and Light Divisions only suffered from some -distant shelling by the French horse artillery. But the 4th Division, -though covered from the pursuit in their direct rear by Bock’s German -squadrons, found a dangerous point about a mile on the near side of -the Guarena, where two batteries from the French turning column had -galloped forward to a knoll, commanding the ground over which they -had to pass, and opened a teasing fire upon the flank of the brigades -as they marched by. General Cole, however, threw out his divisional -battery and all his light companies to form a screen against their -attack, and moved on, protected by their fire, without turning from -his route. The covering force fell in to the rear when the defiling -was over, and the division suffered small loss from its uncomfortable -march[483]. - - [483] See Vere’s _Marches and Movements of the 4th Division_, p. - 28. Napier’s statement that the Light Division was more exposed - than the 4th or 5th during the retreat, seems to be discounted - by the fact that it had not one man killed or wounded--the 5th - Division had only two (in the 3rd Royal Scots), the 4th Division - over 200; and though most of them fell in the last charge, a good - number were hit in the retreat. - -Wellington allowed all the three retreating divisions to halt for a -moment on the farther side of the stream, at the bottom of the trough -in which it runs. ‘The halt near the water, short as it was, gave -refreshment and rest to the troops, after a rapid march over an arid -country in extremely hot weather[484].’ But it could not be allowed -to last for more than a very few minutes, for the pursuing enemy soon -appeared in force at several points on the heights above the eastern -bank of the Guarena, and many batteries opened successively on the -three divisions, who were of necessity compelled to resume their march -up the slope to the crest, on their own side of the water. Here they -fell into position on Wellington’s chosen defensive fighting-ground, -the 4th Division forming the extreme northern section of the battle -array, by the village of Castrillo, the Light and 5th Divisions falling -in to the line of troops already drawn up in front of Canizal, while -the 1st and 7th Divisions were extended to the south, to form the new -right wing, and took their place on the heights of Vallesa, above the -village and ford of El Olmo. - - [484] Vere’s _Marches and Movements of the 4th Division_, p. 28. - -Some anxious hours had been spent while the retreat was in progress, -but Wellington was now safe, with every man concentrated on an -excellent position, where he was prepared to accept the defensive -battle for which he had been waiting for the last month. It seemed -likely at first that his wish might be granted, for the French made a -vigorous attack upon his left wing, almost before it had got settled -down into its appointed ground. It would appear that General Clausel, -who commanded the more northerly of the two great columns in which the -French army was advancing (while Marmont himself was with the other), -thought that he saw his chance of carrying the heights above Castrillo -and turning the allied left, if he attacked at once, before the 4th -Division had been granted time to array itself at leisure. Accordingly, -without wasting time by sending to ask permission from his chief, he -directed a brigade of dragoons to outflank Cole’s left by crossing the -Guarena down-stream, while Brennier’s division passed it at Castrillo -and assailed the front of the 4th Division. Clausel’s own division -advanced in support of Brennier’s. - -This move brought on very sharp fighting: the turning movement of the -French dragoons was promptly met by Victor Alten’s brigade [14th Light -Dragoons, 1st Hussars K.G.L.], whose squadrons had been watching the -lower fords of the Guarena all day. Alten allowed the hostile cavalry -to cross the river and come up the slope, and then charged suddenly, -in échelon of squadrons, the left squadron of the 1st Hussars K.G.L. -leading[485]. The enemy had only begun to deploy when he was attacked, -Alten’s advance having been too rapid for him. The two French regiments -(15th and 25th Dragoons) were, after a stiff fight, completely routed -and driven downhill with great loss, till they finally found refuge -behind a half-battery and an infantry battalion which formed their -supports. General Carrié, commanding the two regiments, was taken -prisoner by a German hussar, having got cut off from his men in the -flight. The French lost in all 8 officers and more than 150 men, of -whom 94 were prisoners--mostly wounded. How sharp the clash was may be -seen from the fact that Alten’s victorious brigade had not much fewer -casualties--the 14th Light Dragoons lost 75 killed and wounded, the -German hussars 60[486]. But no doubt some of these losses were suffered -not in the cavalry combat, but a little later in the day, when Alten -charged the French infantry[487]. - - [485] Brotherton of the 14th L.D. says with the _right_ échelon - advanced (Hamilton’s _History of the 14th_, p. 107), but I fancy - that the German Hussars’ version that the _left_ échelon led is - correct, as the right squadron of their regiment would have been - in the middle of the brigade, not on a flank. See narrative in - Schwertfeger, i. pp. 368-9. - - [486] These are the official returns. The regimental histories - give only 45 and 56 respectively. - - Martinien’s lists show six casualties in officers in the two - French regiments, and two more were taken prisoners, General - Carrié and a lieutenant of the 25th Dragoons. - - [487] Brotherton says that the first two squadrons which charged - the French dragoons made no impression, and that it was the - impact of the third, led by himself, which broke them. - -While this lively fight was in progress on the flank, Brennier’s -division had crossed the Guarena in a mass, and on a very short front, -apparently in three columns of regiments, battalion behind battalion. -They were ascending the lower slopes below Cole’s position, when -Wellington, who was present here in person, suddenly took the offensive -against them, sending W. Anson’s brigade (3/27th and 1/40th) against -them in line, with Stubbs’s Portuguese (11th and 23rd regiments) -supporting, in columns of quarter distance. The French division halted, -apparently with the intention of deploying--but there was no time for -this. The line of Anson’s brigade enveloped both the hostile flanks -with its superior frontage, and opened fire: after a short resistance -the French gave way in great disorder, and streamed down to the -Guarena. As they fled Alten let loose part of his brigade against their -flank: the horsemen rode in deep among the fugitives, and cut off 6 -officers and 240 men as prisoners. Clausel had to bring up a regiment -of his own division to cover the broken troops as they repassed the -river; it suffered severely from Cole’s artillery, losing 6 officers -killed and wounded, and many men[488]. - - [488] This was the 25th Léger. - -The attempt to take liberties with Wellington’s army, when it had -assumed the defensive on favourable ground, had thus failed in the -most lamentable style, and with very heavy loss--at least 700 men -had been killed, wounded, or taken in Marmont’s army that day, and -all but a few scores belonged to the four infantry and two cavalry -regiments which Clausel sent to attack the heights by Castrillo[489]. -The corresponding British loss that day was 525, including about 50 -stragglers taken prisoners during the retreat from the Trabancos to -the Guarena, because they had fallen behind their regiments--foot-sore -infantry, or troopers whose horses had been shot. The cavalry, which -had so successfully covered the long march across the open, had a -certain amount of casualties, but the only units that had suffered -heavily were the four regiments--horse and foot--that dealt with -Clausel’s attack, who lost 276 men between them. - - [489] The exact figures, save for officers, are as usual missing. - But Martinien’s invaluable lists show that of 41 French officers - killed, wounded, or taken that day, 35 belonged to the four - infantry regiments (17th and 25th Léger, 22nd and 65th Line) and - the two cavalry regiments (15th and 25th Dragoons) which fought - at Castrillo. - -Wellington must have felt much disappointment at seeing Clausel’s -offensive move at Castrillo unsupported by the rest of the French -divisions, who were lining the farther bank of the Guarena parallel -with the whole of his front. But Marmont, unlike his venturesome -subordinate, nourished no illusions about the advisability of attacking -a British army in position. He made no move in the afternoon; in his -memoirs he points out that the infantry was absolutely exhausted, -having been continuously on the march for three days and one night. - -This day had been a disappointing one for the French marshal also. He -had failed to cut off Wellington’s two detached divisions, so that all -the advantage which he had obtained by his marches and countermarches -between Toro and Tordesillas was now exhausted. The allied army -had succeeded in concentrating, and was now drawn up in his front, -covering Salamanca and its own line of communications in a very tenable -position. Napier truly remarks that, since the attempt to isolate and -destroy Cotton’s detachment had miscarried, Marmont had gained no more -by his elaborate feint and forced marches than he would have obtained -by continuing his original advance across Toro bridge on the 16th. He -had got the whole Anglo-Portuguese army arrayed in a defensive position -in front of him, on the line of the Guarena, instead of somewhere in -the neighbourhood of Fuente Sauco, a few miles farther east. - -On the morning of the 19th July it seemed as if a new deadlock was -to bring the campaign to a standstill, for the two armies continued -to face each other across the Guarena, Wellington hoping rather than -expecting to be attacked, Marmont looking in vain for a weak point -between Castrillo and Vallesa, where it would be worth while to try a -forward thrust. While he was reconnoitring, his weary infantry got a -much-needed rest. At about four o’clock in the afternoon, however, the -whole French army was seen falling into column, and presently edged off -southward till it lay between Tarazona and Cantalapiedra. Wellington -thereupon made a corresponding movement, evacuating Castrillo to -the north, and extending his line of battle beyond Vallesa to the -south. There was a little distant cannonading across the valley of -the Guarena, and some of the shells set fire to the vast fields of -ripe wheat which covered the whole country-side in this region. The -conflagration went rolling on for a long way across the plain, leaving -a trail of smoke behind. - -The situation on this evening had nothing decisive about it. It was -clear that neither side intended to fight save at an advantage. Marmont -had shown himself more cautious than had been expected. Wellington -had at this moment every motive for risking nothing, unless the -enemy proved more obliging than he had shown himself hitherto. He -had reasons for self-restraint at this moment of which his adversary -knew nothing. The first was that he was aware (from intercepted -dispatches) of King Joseph’s intention to march from Madrid to join -the Army of Portugal: with a possible 15,000 men about to appear on -his flank, he must look to the future with care. The second was that -he had received a few days before the untoward news that Lord William -Bentinck’s long-promised expedition to Catalonia might not ever take -place. The Commander-in-Chief in Sicily wrote that he had found new -opportunities in Italy, which it might be his duty to seize. His troops -had been embarked, but they were not to be expected for the present off -the coast of Spain. This was a disheartening piece of intelligence: -Wellington had been told to count upon this support both by Bentinck -himself and by the Home Government. If it should fail, Marshal -Suchet, left undisturbed by this diversion, might send considerable -reinforcements to Madrid[490]. - - [490] For dismay expressed by Wellington at this news see - dispatches to Henry Wellesley dated Rueda, July 15, and to Lord - Bathurst (_Dispatches_, ix. pp. 285 and 287). - -As a matter of fact he did not--being, like Soult, a general of much -too self-centred a type of mind to help a neighbour if he could avoid -it. Only one regiment of the Valencian army ever got to Madrid, and -that came too late for King Joseph’s purpose. But so far as Wellington -could guess on July 19, it was quite possible that Suchet might find -10,000 men, to add to the disposable 15,000 of the Army of the Centre. - -There was also the possibility that D’Erlon, obeying the orders which -King Joseph kept sending to him, might make up his mind to cross the -Guadiana and Tagus, and come north by Arzobispo and Madrid. If so, Hill -was to make a parallel march by Alcantara, and would certainly arrive -many days before D’Erlon. This was a mere possibility; there were good -reasons for holding that Soult might forbid any such move; and till -D’Erlon started northward, Hill must remain behind to contain him. The -problem was not pressing: it could not develop for many days[491]. - - [491] See Wellington to Hill, _Dispatches_, ix. p. 290. - -On the other hand there was news that the Galicians were at last on -the move. Santocildes had been prevailed upon to leave a smaller force -to besiege Astorga, and had come down with a second division to join -Cabrera at Benavente. This force, advancing up the Douro valley, would -find absolutely no enemy in front of it, and must obviously disturb -Marmont’s operations, since it might be at the gates of Valladolid, -his base and storehouse, in a few days. He would then be forced to -detach a division or so to save his dépôts, and he could not spare -even a brigade if he wished to continue on the offensive. Certain -intelligence that there was not a Frenchman left behind on the Douro, -save the trifling garrisons of Toro, Zamora, and Tordesillas, had been -brought in by General D’Urban. That officer, after conducting a very -daring exploration round the rear of Marmont’s army, almost to the -gates of Valladolid, had recrossed the Douro by Wellington’s orders -at the ford of Fresno de Ribera, and fell in upon the left flank of -the allied army near Fuente Sauco on July 18th[492]. For the rest of -the campaign his 700 sabres were at Wellington’s disposal[493]. His -report showed that Marmont’s rear was absolutely undefended, and that -the Galicians could march up the Douro, if desired, without finding any -opponents: it would be perfectly possible for them to cut all Marmont’s -communications with Valladolid and Burgos, without being in any danger -unless the Marshal detached men against them. - - [492] Not July 17th, as Napier says. D’Urban’s diary proves that - he recrossed the Douro on the 18th. - - [493] He left one squadron near Zamora, to serve as covering - cavalry for Silveira’s militia, who remained waiting for - Santocildes’s advance, which they were to observe and support. - His force was therefore reduced to 700 men. - -The 20th of July proved to be a most interesting day of manœuvring, -but still brought no decisive results. Early in the morning the whole -French army was seen in march, with its head pointing southward, -continuing the movement that it had begun on the previous day. Marmont -had made up his mind to proceed with the hitherto unsuccessful scheme -for turning his adversary’s right wing[494], in the hope of either -cutting him off from his communication with Salamanca, or of catching -him with his army strung out on too long a line from continuous and -rapid movement. The character of this day’s march differed from that -of the 19th, because the single well-marked Guarena valley ceased -after a time to separate the two hostile armies. That little river is -formed by three tributaries which meet at and above the village of -El Olmo: each of them is a paltry brook, and their courses lie along -trifling irregularities of the broad tableland from which they descend. -It is only after their junction that they flow in a deep well-marked -valley, and form a real military obstacle. Of the three brooks, that -which keeps the name of Guarena lies most to the east: up its right -bank and towards its source Marmont’s march was directed. Wellington’s -parallel movement southward, on the other hand, was directed along the -left bank of the Poreda, the middle brook of the three. Between them -there was at first a narrow triangular plateau, on which neither party -trespassed save with cavalry scouts. - - [494] He adds in his _Mémoires_, iv. pp. 251-2, that if he had - not succeeded in getting ahead of Wellington’s van, he had a - counter-project of trying to get round his rear, but the British - marched so exactly parallel with him that he got no chance of - this. - -After a few miles of marching Marmont ordered his advanced guard to -cross the Guarena, which they could do with ease, no British being -near, save a few cavalry vedettes. He then turned the head of his -column south-westward, instead of keeping to his original direction -due south. Having crossed the Guarena he came in sight of the British -column marching on the other side of the Poreda brook from Vallesa. The -movements of the two armies tended to converge, the point on which both -were moving being the village of Cantalpino. It seemed likely that the -heads of the marching columns must collide, and that a combat, if not -a general action, would ensue. Each army was marching in an order that -could be converted into a battle line by simply facing the men to right -or to left respectively. Wellington had his troops in three parallel -columns, the first one, that nearest to the French, being composed -of the 1st, 4th, 5th, and Light Divisions, the second, which would -have formed the supporting line if the army had fronted and gone into -action, contained the 6th and 7th and Pack’s and Bradford’s brigades: -the 3rd Division and España’s Spaniards formed a reserve, moving -farthest from the enemy. The light cavalry were marching ahead of the -column, the heavy cavalry and D’Urban’s Portuguese brought up their -rear. Marmont was clearly seen to be moving in a similar formation, -of two columns each composed of four infantry divisions, with Curto’s -_chasseurs_ ahead, and Boyer’s dragoons at the tail of the line of -march[495]. - - [495] Marmont describes the formation (_Mémoires_, iv. p. 252) as - ‘gauche en tête, par peloton, à distance entière: les deux lignes - pouvaient être formées en un instant par _à droite en bataille_.’ - -The day was warm but clouded, so that the sun did not shine with full -July strength, or the long march which both armies carried out would -have been brought to an end by exhaustion at a much earlier hour than -was actually the case. As the long morning wore on, the two hostile -forces gradually grew closer to each other, owing to the new westward -turn which Marmont had given to his van. At last they were within -long artillery range; but for some time no shot was fired, neither -party being willing to take the responsibility of attacking an enemy -in perfect order and well closed up for battle. Either general could -have brought on a fight, by simply fronting to flank, in ten minutes; -but neither did so. Marmont remarks in his _Mémoires_ that in his long -military service he never, before or after, saw such a magnificent -spectacle as this parallel march of two bodies of over 40,000 men each, -at such close quarters. Both sides kept the most admirable order, no -gaps occurred in either line, nor was the country one that offered -advantage to either: it was very nearly flat, and the depression of the -Poreda brook became at last so slight and invisible that it was crossed -without being noticed. The ground, however, on which the French were -moving was a little higher than that on which the allies marched[496]. - - [496] There is an excellent description of the parallel march in - Leith Hay, ii. pp. 38-40, as well as in Napier. - -The converging lines of advance at last almost touched each other at -the village of Cantalpino: the light cavalry and the 1st Division, at -the head of Wellington’s front (or eastern) column of march had just -passed through it, when Marmont halted several batteries on a roll of -the ground a few hundred yards off, and began to shell the leading -battalions of the 4th Division, which was following closely behind the -1st. Wellington ordered Cole not to halt and reply, nor to attack, but -to avoid the village and the French fire by a slight westerly turn, to -which the other divisions conformed, both those in the first and those -in the second line[497]. This amounted to the refusing of battle, and -many officers wondered that the challenge of Marmont had been refused: -for the army was in perfect order for fighting, and in excellent -spirits. But Wellington was taking no risks that day. - - [497] This swerve and its consequence are best stated in Vere’s - _Marches of the 4th Division_, p. 30. - -The slight swerve from the direct southerly direction at Cantalpino -made by the allied army, distinctly helped Marmont’s plan for turning -its right, since by drawing back from its original line of movement it -allowed the enemy to push still farther westward than his original -line of march had indicated. This meant that he was gradually getting -south of Wellington’s vanguard, and would, if not checked, ultimately -arrive at the Tormes river, near the fords of Huerta, from which he -would have been edged off, if both armies had continued in their -original direction. During the early afternoon the parallel move -continued, with a little skirmishing between cavalry vedettes, and an -occasional outbreak of artillery fire, but no further developments. The -baggage in the English rear began to trail behind somewhat, owing to -the long continuance of the forced marching, and D’Urban’s Portuguese, -who shepherded the stragglers, had great difficulty in keeping them -on the move. A few score sick and foot-sore men, and some exhausted -sumpter-beasts, fell behind altogether, and were abandoned to the -French[498]. - - [498] Marmont says that if he had possessed a superior cavalry - he could have made great captures, but he dared attempt nothing - for want of sufficient numbers: he alleges that he took 300 - stragglers--certainly an exaggeration as the British returns show - very few ‘missing.’ _Mémoires_, iv. p. 233. - -Late in the afternoon the armies fell further apart, and all save the -outlying vedettes lost sight of each other. This was due to the fact -that Wellington had made up his mind to settle down for the night -on the heights of Cabeza Vellosa and Aldea Rubia, where Marmont had -taken up his position a month before, when he retired from before San -Cristobal. This was good fighting-ground, on which it was improbable -that the French would dare to deliver an attack. The 6th Division and -Alten’s cavalry brigade were detached to the rear, and occupied Aldea -Lengua and its fords. - -This had been a most fatiguing day--the British army had marched, -practically in battle formation, not less than four Spanish leagues, -the French, by an extraordinary effort, more than five. When the -camp-fires were lighted up at night, it was seen that the leading -divisions of the enemy were as far south as Babila Fuente, quite -close to the Tormes and the fords of Huerta: the main body lay about -Villaruela, opposite the British bivouacs at Aldea Rubia and Cabeza -Vellosa. An untoward incident terminated an unsatisfactory day: -D’Urban’s Portuguese horse coming in very late from their duty of -covering the baggage-train, were mistaken for prowling French cavalry -by the 3rd Division, and shelled by its battery, with some little loss -of men and horses. The mistake was caused by a certain similarity in -their uniform to that of French dragoons--the tall helmets with crests -being worn by no other allied troops[499]. - - [499] The heavy cavalry in the British army were still wearing - the old cocked hat, the new-pattern helmet with crest was not - served out till 1813. The light dragoons were still wearing the - black-japanned leather headdress with the low fur crest: in 1813 - they got shakos, much too like those of French _chasseurs_. - -The net result of the long parallel march of July 20th was that -Marmont had practically turned Wellington’s extreme right, and was -in a position to cross the Upper Tormes, if he should choose, in -prolongation of his previous movement. The allied army was still -covering Salamanca, and could do so for one day more, if the marching -continued: but after that limit of time it would be forced either to -fight or to abandon Salamanca, the main trophy of its earlier campaign. -There remained the chance of falling upon Marmont’s rear, when his army -should be occupied in crossing the Tormes, and forcing him to fight -with his forces divided by the river. If this offensive move were not -taken, and the parallel march were allowed to continue, the next day -would see the armies both across the Tormes, in the position where -Graham and Marmont had demonstrated against each other on June 24th. -Wellington could not, however, begin his southward move till he was -certain that the enemy was about to continue his manœuvre on the same -plan as that of the last two days. If he started too early, Marmont -might attack the San Cristobal position when it was only held by a -rearguard, and capture Salamanca. Till an appreciable fraction of the -French were seen passing the Tormes it was necessary to wait. - -It appeared to Wellington that his adversary’s most probable move would -be the passage of the Tormes by the fords at and just above Huerta. -That he would abandon his previous tactics, and attack the British -army, was inconsistent with the caution that he had hitherto displayed. -That he would continue his march southward, and cross the river -higher up, was unlikely; for the obvious passage in this direction, -by the bridge of Alba de Tormes, was commanded by the castle of that -town, which had been for some time occupied by a battalion detached -from Carlos de España’s division. Wellington looked upon this route -as completely barred to the French: he was unaware that the Spanish -general had withdrawn his detachment without orders on the preceding -afternoon. This astonishing move of his subordinate was made all the -worse by the fact that he never informed his chief that he had taken -upon himself to remove the battalion. Indeed Wellington only heard -of its disappearance on the 23rd, when it was too late to remedy the -fault. He acted on the 21st and 22nd as if Alba de Tormes were securely -held. It would appear that Carlos de España thought the castle too weak -to be held by a small force, and moved his men, in order to secure -them from being cut off from the main army, as they clearly might be -when the French had reached Babila Fuente. But the importance of his -misplaced act was not to emerge till after the battle of Salamanca had -been fought. - -At dawn on the 21st Wellington withdrew his whole army on to the San -Cristobal position[500], and waited for further developments, having -the fords of Aldea Lengua and Santa Marta conveniently close if Marmont -should be seen crossing the Tormes. This indeed was the move to which -the Marshal committed himself. Having discovered at an early hour that -Alba de Tormes was empty, and that there was no allied force observing -the river bank below it, he began to cross in two columns, one at the -fords of Huerta, the other three miles higher up-stream at the ford of -La Encina. Lest Wellington should sally out upon his rear, when the -greater part of his army had got beyond the Tormes, he left a covering -force of two divisions in position between Babila Fuente and Huerta. -This, as the day wore on, he finally reduced to one division[501] and -some artillery. As long as this detachment remained opposite him, -Wellington could not be sure that the French might not attack him on -both sides of the Tormes. - - [500] Napier says that this move was made on the night of the - 20th, under cover of the smoke of the already-lighted camp-fires - of the army. This is contradicted by Vere’s journal of march of - the 4th Division, by Leith Hay’s Journal [’at daylight we marched - to the Heights of San Cristoval’], by Tomkinson’s diary, and - D’Urban, Geo. Simonds, and many others who speak of the move as - being early on the 21st. - - [501] This was the division of Sarrut. - -The defile of the French army across the fords naturally took a long -time, and Wellington was able to allow his weary infantry some hours -of much-needed rest in the morning. Only cavalry was sent forward at -once, to form a screen in front of the hostile force that was gradually -accumulating on the near side of the fords. In the afternoon, however, -when the greater part of the French were over the water, nearly the -whole allied army received orders to cross the Tormes, and occupy the -heights to the south of it. It moved practically in battle order, -in two lines, of which the front passed by the ford of Cabrerizos, -the second by that of Santa Marta. Only a reserve, now consisting -of the 3rd Division and D’Urban’s Portuguese horse, remained on the -north side of the river near Cabrerizos, to contain the French force -which was still visible at dusk on the slopes by Babila Fuente. Till -this detachment had disappeared, Wellington was obliged to leave a -corresponding proportion of his men to contain it, lest the enemy -might try a dash at Salamanca by the north bank. Marmont made no such -attempt, and in the morning it was obvious that this rearguard was -following the rest of his army across the Tormes. - -During the night the French advanced cavalry were holding Calvarisa -de Ariba on their left and Machacon on their right: the infantry -were bivouacked in a concentrated position in the wooded country -south of those villages. The British cavalry screen held Calvarisa de -Abaxo[502], Pelabravo, and the height of Nuestra Señora de la Peña, -close in to the corresponding front line of the enemy’s vedettes. The -infantry were encamped in two lines behind the Ribera de Pelagarcia, -the ravine, which runs north from Nuestra Señora de la Peña to the -Tormes, between Santa Marta and Cabrerizos. This was Graham’s old -position of June 24th, and excellent for defence. The right was on -well-marked high ground, the centre was covered by woods. Only the -left, near Santa Marta, was on lower slopes. - - [502] That the British cavalry were still at dawn so far forward - as Calvarisa de Abaxo is shown by Tomkinson’s diary (p. 185), - the best possible authority for light cavalry matters. The 4th - Division camped in the wood just west of Nuestra Señora de la - Peña (Vere, p. 31), the 5th on high ground in rear of Calvarisa - de Ariba (Leith Hay, p. 45), the 7th a little farther south, also - in woody ground (diary of Wheeler of the 51st). - -About an hour after nightfall the hills where French and English -lay opposite each other were visited by an appalling tempest. ‘The -rain fell in torrents accompanied by vivid flashes of lightning, and -succeeded by instantaneous peals of thunder:’ writes one annalist: -‘a more violent crash of the elements has seldom been witnessed: its -effects were soon apparent. Le Marchands brigade of cavalry had halted -to our left: the men, dismounted, were either seated or lying on the -ground, holding their horses’ bridles. Alarmed by the thunder, the -beasts started with a sudden violence, and many of them breaking loose -galloped across the country in all directions. The frightened horses, -in a state of wildness, passing by without riders, added to the awful -effect of the tempest[503].’ The 5th Dragoon Guards suffered most by -the stampede--eighteen men were hurt, and thirty-one horses were not -to be found. Another diarist speaks of the splendid effect of the -lightning reflected on the musket-barrels of belated infantry columns, -which were just marching to their camping-ground. Before midnight the -storm had passed over--the later hours of sleep were undisturbed, and -next morning a brilliant sun rose into a cloudless sky[504]. The last -day of manœuvring was begun, and the battle which both sides had so -long avoided was at last to come. - - [503] Leith Hay, ii. p. 46. - - [504] Diary of Green of the 68th, p. 98. - - - - -SECTION XXXIII: CHAPTER VI - -THE BATTLE OF SALAMANCA, JULY 22, 1812. THE EARLY STAGES - - -The decisive moment of the campaign of 1812 had now been -reached--though Marmont was wholly unaware of it, and was proposing -merely to continue his manœuvring of the last five days, and though -Wellington hardly expected that the 22nd of July would turn out -more eventful than the 21st. Both of them have left record of their -intentions on the fateful morning. The Duke of Ragusa wrote to Berthier -as follows: ‘My object was, in taking up this position, to prolong -my movement to the left, in order to dislodge the enemy from the -neighbourhood of Salamanca, and to fight him at a greater advantage. I -calculated on taking up a good defensive position, against which the -enemy could make no offensive move, and intended to press near enough -to him to be able to profit from the first fault that he might make, -and to attack him with vigour[505].’ He adds in another document, ‘I -considered that our respective positions would bring on not a battle, -but an advantageous rearguard action, in which, using my full force -late in the day, with a part only of the British army left in front -of me, I should probably score a point[506].’ It is clear that he -reckoned that his adversary would continue his policy of the last five -days; Wellington, if his flank were once more turned, would move on as -before--always parrying the thrusts made at him, but not taking the -offensive himself. - - [505] Marmont to Berthier, July 31, printed in _Mémoires_, iv. p. - 443. - - [506] Marmont, _Mémoires_, iv. p. 237. - -Nor was he altogether wrong in his expectation. Writing to Lord -Bathurst on the evening of July 21st, the British Commander-in-Chief -summed up his intentions in these words. ‘I have determined to cross -the Tormes, if the enemy should: to cover Salamanca as long as I -can: and above all not to give up our communication with Ciudad -Rodrigo: and not to fight an action unless under very advantageous -circumstances, or if it should become absolutely necessary[507].’ This -determination is re-stated in a dispatch which Wellington wrote three -days later, in a very different frame of mind. ‘I had determined that -if circumstances should not permit me to attack him on the 22nd, I -should move toward Ciudad Rodrigo without further loss of time[508].’ -Wellington was therefore, it is clear, intending simply to continue -his retreat without delivering battle, unless Marmont should give him -an opportunity of striking a heavy blow, by putting himself in some -dangerous posture. He desired to fight, but only if he could fight -at advantage. Had Marmont continued to turn his flank by cautious -movements made at a discreet distance, and with an army always ready -to form an orderly line of battle, Wellington would have sacrificed -Salamanca, and moved back toward the Agueda. He was not prepared to -waste men in indecisive combats, which would not put the enemy out of -action even if they went off well. ‘It is better that a battle should -not be fought, unless under such favourable circumstances that there -would be reason to hope that the allied army would be able to maintain -the field, while that of the enemy would not[509].’ For if the French -were only checked, and not completely knocked to pieces, Wellington -knew that they would be reinforced within a few days by the 14,000 men -whom King Joseph (unknown to Marmont) was bringing up from Madrid. -Retreat would then again become necessary, since the enemy would be -superior in numbers to a hopeless extent. Wellington added that the -22nd was his best day of advantage, since within thirty-six hours -Marmont would have been reinforced by the cavalry brigade under General -Chauvel, which Caffarelli had at last sent forward from Burgos. It -had reached the Douro at Valladolid on the 20th, and would be up at -the front on the 23rd: this he well knew, and somewhat overrated its -strength[510]. - - [507] _Dispatches_, ix. p. 299, July 21st. - - [508] Wellington to Bathurst, July 24. _Dispatches_, ix. p. 300. - - [509] Again from dispatch to Bathurst, July 21st. _Dispatches_, - ix. p. 296. - - [510] Supposing it, apparently, to be over 1,000 strong, while it - was really not 800 sabres. - -But though ready to take his advantage, if it were offered him, -Wellington evidently leaned to the idea that it would not be given. -He prepared for retreat, by sending off his whole baggage-train on -the Ciudad Rodrigo road at dawn, escorted by one of D’Urban’s three -Portuguese cavalry regiments. This was a clear expression of his -intention to move off. So is his letter of July 24 to Graham in which, -writing in confidence to a trusted subordinate, he remarks, ‘Marmont -ought to have given me a _pont d’or_, and then he would have made a -handsome operation of it.’ Instead of furnishing the proverbial bridge -of gold to the yielding adversary, the Marshal pressed in upon him in -a threatening fashion, yet with his troops so scattered and strung -out on a long front, that he was not ready for a decisive action when -Wellington at last saw his opportunity and dashed in upon him. - -At dawn on the 22nd each party had to discover the exact position of -his adversary, for the country-side was both wooded and undulating. -Wellington’s army, on the line of heights reaching southward from Santa -Marta, was almost entirely masked, partly by the woods in the centre of -his position, but still more by his having placed all the divisions far -back from the sky-line on the reverse slope of the plateau. The front -was about three miles long, but little was visible upon it. Foy, whose -division was ahead of the rest of the French army, describes what he -saw as follows:-- - -‘The position of San Cristobal had been almost stripped of troops: -we could see one English division in a sparsely-planted wood within -cannon-shot of Calvarisa de Ariba, on the Salamanca road: very far -behind a thin column was ascending the heights of Tejares: nothing more -could be made out of Wellington’s army: all the rest was hidden from -us by the chain of heights which runs from north to south, and ends -in the high and precipitous knolls of the Arapiles. Wellington was on -this chain, sufficiently near for us to recognize by means of the staff -surrounding him[511].’ - - [511] _Vie militaire_, edited by Girod de l’Ain, p. 173. - -All, then, that Foy, and Marmont who was riding near him, actually -saw, was the 7th Division in the wood opposite Nuestra Señora de la -Peña, and the distant baggage-column already filing off on the Ciudad -Rodrigo road, which ascends the heights beyond Aldea Tejada four miles -to the rear. - -The French army was a little more visible to Wellington, who could not -only make out Foy’s division behind Calvarisa de Ariba, but several -other masses farther south and east, in front of the long belt of -woods which extends on each side of the village of Utrera for some -two miles or more. It was impossible to see how far the French left -reached among the dense trees: but the right was ‘refused:’ no troops -were opposite Wellington’s left or northern wing, and the villages of -Pelabravo and Calvarisa de Abaxo, far in advance of it, were still -held by British cavalry vedettes. In short, only the allied right and -centre had enemies in front of them. This indicated what Wellington -had expected--an attempt of Marmont to continue his old policy of -outflanking his adversary’s extreme right: clearly the British left was -not in danger. - -Marmont, as his exculpatory dispatch to Berthier acknowledges, was -convinced that Wellington would retire once more the moment that his -flank was threatened. ‘Everything led me to believe,’ he writes, -‘that the enemy intended to occupy the position of Tejares [across -the Zurgain] which lay a league behind him, while at present he was a -league and a half in front of Salamanca[512].’ Foy’s diary completely -bears out this view of Marmont’s conception of the situation. ‘The -Marshal had no definite plan: he thought that the English army was -already gone off, or at least that it was going off, to take position -on the heights of Tejares on the left [or farther] bank of the river -Zurgain. He was tempted to make an attack on the one visible English -division, with which a skirmishing fire had already begun. He was -fearing that this division might get out of his reach! How little -did he foresee the hapless lot of his own army that day! The wily -Wellington was ready to give battle--the greater part of his host -was collected, but masked behind the line of heights: he was showing -nothing on the crest, lest his intention should be divined: he was -waiting for our movement[513].’ - - [512] Correspondence in _Mémoires_, iv. p. 254. - - [513] Foy, p. 174. - -The skirmish to which Foy alludes was one begun by the _voltigeurs_ -of his own division, whom Marmont had ordered forward, to push back -the English pickets on the height of Nuestra Señora de la Peña. These -belonged to the 7th Division, which was occupying the wood behind. Not -wishing his position to be too closely examined, Wellington sent out -two whole battalions, the 68th and the 2nd Caçadores, who formed a -very powerful screen of light troops, and pushed back the French from -the hill and the ruined chapel on top of it. Marmont then strengthened -his firing line, and brought up a battery, which checked the further -advance of the allied skirmishers. The two screens continued to -exchange shots for several hours, half a mile in front of Wellington’s -position. The _tiraillade_ had many episodes, in one of which General -Victor Alten, leading a squadron of his hussars to protect the flank -of the British skirmishers, received a ball in the knee, which put him -out of action, and threw the command of his brigade into the hands of -Arentschildt, colonel of the 1st Hussars K.G.L. After much bickering, -and when noon had long passed, the 68th and Caçadores were relieved -by some companies of the 95th from the Light Division, as Wellington -wished to employ the 7th Division elsewhere. He had at first thought -it possible that Marmont was about to make a serious attack on this -part of his front; but the notion died away when it was seen that -the Marshal did not send up any formed battalions to support his -_voltigeurs_, and allowed the light troops of the allies to cling to -the western half of the slopes of Nuestra Señora de la Peña. - -[Illustration: THE GREATER OR FRENCH ARAPILE SEEN FROM THE FOOT OF THE -LESSER ARAPILE.] - -[Illustration: GENERAL VIEW OF THE BRITISH AND FRENCH POSITIONS, TAKEN -FROM THE REAR OF THE FORMER, THE NEARER HILL WAS THE POSITION OF THE -5TH DIVISION. THE VILLAGE OF ARAPILES TO THE LEFT. THE DISTANT RIDGE, -ALONG WHICH SMOKE IS ROLLING, IS THE FRENCH POSITION. - -From photographs by Mr. C. Armstrong.] - -It was soon evident that the French were--as so often before during the -last six days--about to extend their left wing. The right or southern -flank of Wellington’s line rested on the rocky knoll, 400 feet high, -which is known as the ‘Lesser Arapile.’ Six hundred yards from it, -and outside the allied zone of occupation, lay the ‘Greater Arapile,’ -which is a few feet higher and much longer than its fellow. These two -curious hills, sometimes called the ‘Hermanitos’ or ‘little brothers,’ -are the most striking natural feature in the country-side. They rise -a hundred and fifty feet above the valley which lies between them, -and a hundred feet above the heights on either side. Their general -appearance somewhat recalls that of Dartmoor ‘Tors,’ rough rock -breaking out through the soil. But their shapes differ: the Greater -Arapile shows crags at each end, but has a comparatively smooth ascent -to its centre on its northern front--so smooth that steep ploughed -fields have been laid out upon it, and extend almost to the crest. The -Lesser Arapile is precipitous on its southern front, where it faces its -twin, but is joined at its back (or northern) side by a gentle slope -to the main line of the heights where Wellington’s army lay. It is in -short an integral part of them, though it rises far above their level. -The Greater Arapile, on the other hand, is an isolated height, not -belonging to the system of much lower knolls which lies to its south. -These, three-quarters of a mile away, are covered with wood, and form -part of the long forest which reaches as far as the neighbourhood of -Alba de Tormes. - -Wellington had left the Greater Arapile outside his position, partly -because it was completely separated from the other heights that he -held, partly (it is said) because he had surveyed the ground in the -dusk, and had judged the knoll farther from the Lesser Arapile than -was actually the case; they were within easy cannon-shot from each -other[514]. At about eight o’clock, French skirmishers were observed -breaking out from the woods to the south of the Arapile and pushing -rapidly toward it. They were followed by supporting columns in -strength--indeed Marmont had directed the whole of Bonnet’s division -to move, under cover of the trees, to the point where the woods -approach nearest to the hill, and from thence to carry it if possible. -Wellington, now judging that it was uncomfortably near to his right -flank, ordered the 7th Caçadores--from the 4th Division, the unit that -lay nearest--to race hard for the Greater Arapile and try to seize it -before the French had arrived. They made good speed but failed: the -enemy was on the crest first, and repulsed them with some loss. They -had to fall back to behind the Lesser Arapile, which was held by the -first British brigade of their division (W. Anson’s). - - [514] So says Vere, in his _Marches of the 4th Division_, p. 31. - -Marmont had seized the Greater Arapile, as he tells us, to form -a strong advanced post, behind which he could move his main body -westward, in pursuance of his old design of turning Wellington’s right. -It was to be the ‘pivot on which the flanking movement should be made,’ -the ‘_point d’appui_ of the right of his army’ when it should reach -its new position[515]. Bonnet’s troops being firmly established on -and behind it, he began to move his divisions to their left. On his -original ground, the plateau of Calvarisa de Ariba, he left Foy’s -division in front line--still bickering with the skirmishing line of -the allies--Ferey’s division in support, and Boyer’s dragoons to cover -the flank against any possible attack from the British cavalry, who -were in force on Wellington’s left, and still had detachments out on -the plateau by Pelabravo, beyond Foy’s extreme right. Having made this -provision against any possible attempt to attack him in the rear while -he was executing his great manœuvre, Marmont marched his five remaining -divisions[516], under cover of Bonnet’s advanced position, to the edge -of the wooded hills in rear of the Great Arapile, where they remained -for some time in a threatening mass, without further movement. - - [515] Marmont, _Mémoires_, iv. p. 255. - - [516] Clausel, Brennier, Maucune, Thomières, and Sarrut also, - when the latter arrived late from Babila Fuente, and joined the - main body. - -Wellington, clearly discerning from the summit of the Lesser Arapile -this general shift of the enemy to the left, now made great alterations -in the arrangement of his troops, and adopted what may be called -his second battle-position. The 4th Division, about and around that -height, was placed so as to serve for the allied army the same purpose -that Bonnet was carrying out for the French on the other Hermanito. -Of Cole’s three brigades, that of Anson occupied the Arapile--the -3/27th on the summit, the 1/40th in support on the rear slope. Pack’s -independent Portuguese brigade was placed beside Anson. The Fusilier -brigade (under Ellis of the 1/23rd) and Stubbs’s Portuguese, the -remaining units of the 4th Division, were formed up to the right of the -hill, extending as far as the village which takes its name of Arapiles -from the two strange knolls. Two guns of Cole’s divisional battery -(that of Sympher[517]) were hoisted up with some difficulty to the -level of the 3/27th. The other four were left with the Fusiliers near -the village[518]. Thus the little Arapile became the obtuse angle of a -formation ‘en potence,’ with Pack and two brigades of the 4th Division -on its right, and the 7th Division (still engaged at a distance with -Foy) and the 1st and Light Divisions on its left. At the same time -Wellington moved down the troops which had originally formed his -left wing (5th and 6th Divisions, España’s Spaniards, and Bradford’s -Portuguese) to a supporting position behind his centre, somewhere near -the village of Las Torres, where they could reinforce either his right -or his left, as might prove necessary in the end. As a further general -reserve G. Anson’s and Le Marchant’s cavalry brigades, and the greater -part of Victor Alten’s, were brought away from the original left, and -placed in reserve near the 6th Division; but Bock and two of Victor -Alten’s squadrons[519] remained on the left, opposite Boyer’s dragoons. - - [517] A K.G.L. unit--the only German artillery present at - Salamanca. - - [518] All this from Vere’s _Marches of the 4th Division_, p. 32. - - [519] From the 14th Light Dragoons. - -In connexion with this same general move, Wellington sent a most -important order to the troops which he had left till this moment on -the north bank of the Tormes, covering Salamanca, in the position by -Cabrerizos. These consisted of the 3rd Division--which was under the -temporary command of Edward Pakenham (Wellington’s brother-in-law) -during Picton’s sickness--and the 500 sabres that remained of -D’Urban’s Portuguese horse, after one regiment had been sent off on -escort-duty with the baggage-train. These corps were directed to march -over the town-bridge of Salamanca, and take up a position between -Aldea Tejada and La Penilla, to the east of the high-road to Ciudad -Rodrigo. There placed, they were available either as a reserve to the -newly-formed right wing, or as a supporting échelon, if the whole -army should ultimately fall back for a retreat along the high-road, -or as a detached force placed so far to the right that it could -outflank or throw itself in front of any French troops which might -continue Marmont’s advance from the Arapiles westward. It is probable -that Wellington, at the moment when he gave the orders, would have -been quite unable to say which of these three duties would fall to -Pakenham’s share. The 3rd Division marched from Cabrerizos at noon, -passing through the city, which was at this moment full of alarms and -excursions. For the sight of Marmont close at hand, and of the British -baggage-train moving off hastily toward Rodrigo, had filled the -inhabitants with dismay. Some were hiding their more valuable property, -others (who had compromised themselves by their friendly reception of -the allied army) were preparing for hasty flight. Some used bitter -language of complaint--the English were retreating without a battle -after betraying their friends. - -Pakenham and D’Urban reached their appointed station by two -o’clock,[520] and halted in a dip in the ground, well screened by -trees, between La Penilla and Aldea Tejada, where they could barely -be seen from the highest slopes of Wellington’s position, and not at -all from any other point. For some time they were left undisturbed, -listening to a growing noise of artillery fire to their left front, -where matters were evidently coming to a head. - - [520] The hours are taken from D’Urban’s diary. - -At about eleven o’clock Marmont had climbed to the summit of the French -Arapile, from whence he obtained for the first time a partial view into -the British position; for looking up the dip in the ground between the -Lesser Arapile and the heights occupied by the Fusilier brigade of the -4th Division, he could catch a glimpse of some of the movements that -were going on at the back of Wellington’s first line. Apparently he saw -the 1st and Light Divisions behind the crest of their destined fighting -position, and the 5th and 6th and Bradford’s Portuguese taking ground -to their right. Pack’s Portuguese on the flank and rear of the British -Arapile must also have been visible at least in part. The conclusion to -which he came was that his adversary was accumulating forces behind the -Lesser Arapile with the object of sallying out against Bonnet, whose -post was very far advanced in front of the rest of the French army, and -against Foy and Ferey, who were left in a somewhat isolated position on -the plateau by Calvarisa, when the main body of the army had moved so -far to the west. - -Some such intention seems for a moment to have been in Wellington’s -mind, though he says nothing of it in his dispatch. ‘About twelve -o’clock,’ writes one of the most trustworthy British diarists, ‘the -troops were ordered to attack, and the 1st Division moved forward -to gain the other Arapile, which the French had taken.... There was -something singular, I think, in Lord Wellington’s ordering the 1st and -Light Divisions to attack early in the day, and then counter-ordering -them after they had begun to move. Marshal Beresford, no doubt, was the -cause of the alteration, by what he urged. Yet at the same time Lord -W. is so little influenced (or indeed allows any person to say a word) -that his attending to the Marshal was considered singular. From all I -could collect and observe “the Peer” was a little nervous: it was the -first time he had ever attacked. When he _did_ finally determine on the -attack it was well done, in the most decided manner. There was possibly -some little trouble in arriving at that decision[521].’ Oddly enough -this contemporary note is exactly borne out by Marmont’s statement in -his _Mémoires_, that meeting Wellington years after, he inquired about -the point, and was frankly told that an attack had been projected -at this moment, but that it had been put off in consequence of the -representation of Beresford, who had counselled delay[522]. There was -a heavy mass of troops available behind the Lesser Arapile and to both -sides of it--the 4th Division, Pack’s Portuguese, and the 1st, 7th, and -Light Divisions, with the 5th and 6th and Bradford and the cavalry in -reserve. The blow might have succeeded--but undoubtedly that delivered -four hours later was much more effective. - - [521] Tomkinson’s _Diary_, pp. 187-9. - - [522] Marmont, _Mémoires_, iv. p. 256. - -The idea of an attack at noon having been finally rejected Wellington -turned his mind to another possibility. If Marmont should commit no -blunders, and should continue his turning movement at a safe distance, -and with his whole army well concentrated, it was quite possible that -a retreat might become necessary. The Commander-in-Chief called up -Colonel Delancey, then acting as Adjutant-General[523], and directed -him to draft a comprehensive scheme for the order in which the troops -should be withdrawn, and the route which each division would take in -the event of an evacuation of the position. The next stand was to be -made, as Marmont had supposed, on the heights above Aldea Tejada, -behind the river Zurgain[524]. Such a move would have involved the -abandonment of the city of Salamanca to the French. The news spread -from the staff round the commanding officers of divisions, and so -downwards to the ranks, where it caused immense discontent. Every one -was ‘spoiling for a fight,’ and the cautious tactics of the last six -days had been causing murmurs, which were only kept from becoming acute -by the long-tried confidence that the army felt in its chief. - - [523] Charles Stewart (Lord Londonderry), who had held the post - for the last three years had just gone home, and his successor - had not yet come out to Spain. - - [524] The note concerning Delancey is from Vere’s _Marches of the - 4th Division_, p. 31. - -At this very moment Marmont began to act in the fashion that Wellington -most desired, by making an altogether dangerous extension of his left -wing, and at the same time pressing in so close to his adversary -that he could not avoid a battle if it were thrust upon him. His own -explanation is that he took the putting off of Wellington’s tentative -movement against Bonnet as a sign that the allied army was actually -commencing its retreat. ‘Wellington renounced his intention of -fighting, and from that moment he had to prepare to draw away, for if -he had remained in his present position I should from the next day -have threatened his communications, by marching on to my left. His -withdrawal commenced at midday.... He had to retreat by his right, and -consequently he had to begin by strengthening his right. He therefore -weakened his left, and accumulated troops on his right. Then his more -distant units and his reserves commenced to move, and in succession -drew off towards Tejares [Aldea Tejada]. His intention was easy to -discern.... The enemy having carried off the bulk of his force to -his right, I had to reinforce my left, so as to be able to act with -promptness and vigour, without having to make new arrangements, when -the moment should arrive for falling upon the English rearguard[525].’ - - [525] _Mémoires_, iv. p. 257. - -It is clear that the Duke of Ragusa had drawn his conclusion that -Wellington was about to retreat at once, and had argued, from -partly-seen motions in his adversary’s rear, that the whole allied -army was moving off. But this was not yet the case: Wellington was -taking precautions, but he was still not without hope that the French -would commit themselves to some unwise and premature movement. He had -still every man in hand, and the supposed general retreat on Aldea -Tejada, which the Marshal thought that he saw, was in reality only the -shifting of reserves more to the right. - -Unwitting of this, Marmont, a little before two o’clock, began his -extension to the left. To the westward of the woods on whose edge the -five divisions composing his main body were massed, is a long plateau -facing the village of Arapiles and the heights behind it. It is about -three-quarters of a mile broad and three miles long, gently undulating -and well suited for marching: in 1812 it seems to have been open -waste: to-day it is mainly under the plough. Its front or northern -side slopes gently down, toward the bottom in which lies the village -of Arapiles: at its back, which is steeper, are woods, outlying parts -of the great forest which extends to Alba de Tormes. It ends suddenly -in a knoll with an outcrop of rock, called the Pico de Miranda, above -the hamlet of Miranda de Azan, from which it draws its name. Along -this plateau was the obvious and easy route for a force marching to -turn Wellington’s right. It was a very tempting piece of ground, with -a glacis-like slope towards the English heights, which made it very -defensible--a better artillery position against a force advancing -from the village of Arapiles and the ridges behind it could not be -conceived. The only danger connected with it seemed to be that it was -over-long--it had more than two miles of front, and a very large force -would be required to hold it securely from end to end. From the Pico -de Miranda, if the French should extend so far, to Foy’s right wing by -Calvarisa de Ariba was a distance of six miles in all--far too much for -an army of 48,000 men in the battle-array of the Napoleonic period. - -Marmont says that his first intention was only to occupy the nearer end -of the plateau, that part of it which faces the village of Arapiles. -In his apologetic dispatch to Berthier, he declares that he wished to -get a lodgement upon it, lest Wellington might seize it before him, -and so block his way westward. ‘It was indispensable to occupy it, -seeing that the enemy had just strengthened his centre, from whence he -could push out _en masse_ on to this plateau, and commence an attack -by taking possession of this important ground. Accordingly I ordered -the 5th Division (Maucune) to move out and form up on the right end of -the plateau, where his fire would link on perfectly with that from -the [Great] Arapile: the 7th Division [Thomières] was to place itself -in second line as a support, the 2nd Division (Clausel) to act as a -reserve to the 7th. The 6th Division (Brennier) was to occupy the high -ground in front of the wood, where a large number of my guns were still -stationed. I ordered General Bonnet at the same time to occupy with the -122nd regiment a knoll intermediate between the plateau and the hill -of the [Great] Arapile, which blocks the exit from the village of the -same name. Finally, I directed General Boyer to leave only one regiment -of his dragoons to watch Foy’s right, and to come round with the other -three to the front of the wood, beside the 2nd Division. The object of -this was that, supposing the enemy should attack the plateau, Boyer -could charge in on their right flank, while my light cavalry could -charge in on their left flank[526].’ - - [526] Dispatch to Berthier, _Mémoires_, iv. pp. 445-6. - -All this reads very plausibly and ingeniously, but unfortunately -it squares in neither with the psychology of the moment, nor with -the manœuvres which Maucune, Thomières, and Clausel executed, under -the Marshal’s eye and without his interference. He had forgotten -when he dictated this paragraph--and not unnaturally, for he wrote -sorely wounded, on his sick-bed, in pain, and with his head not too -clear--that he had just before stated that Wellington was obviously -retreating, and had begun to withdraw towards Aldea Tejada. If this -was so, how could he possibly have conceived at the moment that his -adversary, far from retreating, was preparing an offensive movement -_en masse_ against the left flank of the French position? The two -conceptions cannot be reconciled. The fact was, undoubtedly, that he -thought that Wellington was moving off, and pushed forward Maucune, -Thomières, and Clausel, with the object of molesting and detaining what -he supposed to be the rearguard of his adversary. The real idea of the -moment was the one which appears in the paragraph of his _Mémoires_, -already quoted on an earlier page: ‘I hoped that our respective -positions would bring on not a battle but an advantageous rearguard -action, in which, using my full force late in the day, with a part -only of the British army left in front of me, I should probably score -a point.’ Jourdan, a severe critic of his colleague, puts the matter -with perfect frankness in his _Guerre d’Espagne_. After quoting -Marmont’s insincere dispatch at length, he adds, ‘it is evident that -the Marshal, in order to menace the point of retreat of the allies, -extended his left much too far[527].’ Napoleon, after reading Marmont’s -dispatch in a Russian bivouac[528], pronounced that all his reasons and -explanations for the position into which he got himself had ‘as much -complicated stuffing as the inside of a clock, and not a word of truth -as to the real state of things.’ - - [527] Jourdan’s _Mémoire sur la Guerre d’Espagne_, p. 418. - - [528] ‘Il y a plus de fatras et de rouages que dans une horloge, - et pas un mot qui fasse connaître l’état réel des choses.’ For - more hard words see Napoleon to Clarke, Ghiatz, September 2. - -What happened under the eyes of Marmont, as he took a long-delayed -lunch on the top of the Greater Arapile[529], was as follows. Maucune, -with his strong division of nine battalions or 5,200 men, after -breaking out from the position in front of the woods where the French -main body was massed, marched across the open ground for about a mile -or more, till he had got well on to the central part of the plateau -which he was directed to occupy. He then drew up opposite the village -of Arapiles, and sent out his voltigeur companies to work down the -slope toward that place, which lay well in front of the British line. -The position which he took up was on that part of the plateau which -sweeps forward nearest to the opposite heights, and is little more -than half a mile from them. A fierce artillery engagement then set in: -Maucune’s divisional battery began to shell the village of Arapiles. -Sympher’s battery, belonging to the 4th Division, replied from the -slope behind the village and from two guns on the Lesser Arapile. The -French pieces which had been dragged up on to the Greater Arapile then -started shelling the Lesser, and silenced the two guns there, which -were drawn off, and sent to rejoin the rest of the battery, on a less -exposed position. The 3/27th on the hilltop had to take cover behind -rocks as best it could. Soon after at least two more French batteries, -from the artillery reserve, took ground to the right of Maucune, and -joined in the shelling of the village of Arapiles. Wellington presently -supported Sympher’s battery with that of Lawson, belonging to the -5th Division, which turned on to shell Maucune’s supporting columns -from ground on the lower slopes, not far to the right of Sympher’s -position. The effect was good, and the columns shifted sideways to get -out of range. But one [or perhaps two] of the French batteries then -shifted their position, and began to play upon Lawson diagonally from -the left, so enfilading him that he was ordered to limber up and move -higher on the hill behind the village, from whence he resumed his fire. -Wellington also, a little later, brought up the horse-artillery troop -belonging to the 7th Division [’E’, Macdonald’s troop] and placed it on -the Lesser Arapile--two guns on the summit, four on the lower slopes -near the 1/40th of W. Anson’s brigade. The British fire all along the -heights was effective and accurate, but quite unable to cope with that -of the French, who had apparently six batteries in action against -three. Marmont, indeed, had all along his line an immense superiority -of guns, having 78 pieces with him against Wellington’s 54. His -artillery-reserve consisted of four batteries--that of his adversary of -one only--Arriaga’s Portuguese 24-pounder howitzers[530]. - - [529] See Memoirs of Parquin, who commanded his escort, p. 299. - But he states the hour as 11 o’clock, much too early. - - [530] For this artillery business see especially the six - narratives of artillery officers printed by Major Leslie in his - _Dickson Papers_, ii. pp. 685-97. Also for doings of the 5th - Division battery (Lawson’s), Leith Hay, ii. pp. 47-8, and of the - 4th Division battery (Sympher’s), Vere’s _Marches of the 4th - Division_, pp. 33-4. - -While Maucune and the French artillery were making a very noisy -demonstration against the British line between the Lesser Arapile and -the village of the same name, which looked like the preliminaries of -a serious attack, more troops emerged from the woods of Marmont’s -centre, and began to file along the plateau, under cover of Maucune’s -deployed line. These were Thomières’s division, succeeded after a long -interval by that of Clausel. ‘During the cannonade column followed -column in quick and continued succession along the heights occupied -by the enemy: Marmont was moving his army in battle-order along his -position, and gaining ground rapidly to his left[531].’ According -to the Marshal’s own account of his intentions, he had proposed to -place Maucune on the (French) right end of the plateau, Thomières and -Clausel in support of him. What happened, however, was that Maucune -went well forward on to the right-centre of the plateau, and that -Thomières marched along past Maucune’s rear, and continued moving in a -westerly direction along the summit of the plateau, though Clausel soon -halted: before Thomières stopped he had gone nearly three miles. It is -clear that if Marmont had chosen, he could have checked the manœuvres -of his subordinates, the moment that they passed the limit which he -alleges that he had set them. An aide-de-camp sent down from the back -of the Greater Arapile could have told Maucune not to press forward -toward the English position, or Thomières to stop his march, within a -matter of twenty minutes or half an hour. No such counterorders were -sent--and the reason clearly was that Marmont was satisfied with the -movements that he saw proceeding before him, until the moment when he -suddenly realized with dismay that Wellington was about to deliver a -counter-stroke in full force. - - [531] Vere’s _Marches of the 4th Division_, p. 33. - -We must now turn to the movements of the allied army. The instant that -Maucune deployed on the plateau in front of the village of Arapiles, -and that the cannonade began, Wellington judged that he was about to -be attacked--the thing that he most desired. A very few orders put his -army in a defensive battle-position. The 5th Division was sent from -the rear side of the heights to occupy the crest, continuing the line -of the 4th Division. The 6th Division was brought up from the rear -to a position behind the 4th. The 7th Division, abandoning the long -bickering with Foy in which its light troops had been engaged, was -drawn back from the left wing, and took post in second line parallel to -the 6th and in rear of the 5th Division. The place of its skirmishers -on the slopes in front of Nuestra Señora de la Peña was taken by some -companies of the 95th, sent out from the Light Division. That unit and -the 1st Division now formed the total of the allied left wing, with -Bock’s heavy dragoons covering their flank. They were ‘containing’ an -equivalent French force--Foy’s and Ferey’s infantry divisions, and the -single regiment of Boyer’s dragoons which Marmont had left in this -quarter. - -There still remained in reserve, near the village of Las Torres, -Bradford’s Portuguese and España’s Spanish battalions, with the bulk -of the allied cavalry--all Anson’s and Le Marchant’s and the greater -part of Arentschildt’s squadrons, and in addition Pakenham and D’Urban -were available a little farther to the right, near Aldea Tejada. If the -French were going to attack the heights on each side of the village of -Arapiles, as seemed probable at the moment, all these remoter reserves -could be used as should seem most profitable. - -But the battle did not go exactly as Wellington expected. The cannonade -continued, and Maucune’s skirmishing line pushed very boldly forward, -and actually attacked the village of Arapiles, which was defended by -the light companies of the Guards’ brigade of the 1st Division and of -the Fusilier brigade of the 4th Division. The _voltigeurs_ twice seized -the southern outlying houses of the straggling village, and were twice -driven out. But the battalions in support of them did not come forward, -nor did Bonnet attack on the right of them, nor Thomières on the left. -The former remained stationary, on and about the Great Arapile: the -latter continued to march westward along the plateau: a perceptible gap -began to appear between him and Maucune. - -Wellington at this moment was toward the right rear of his own -line--occupied according to some authorities in snatching a late -and hasty lunch[532] while matters were developing, but not yet -developed--according to others in giving orders concerning the cavalry -to Stapleton Cotton, near Las Torres--when he received an urgent -message from Leith. It said that Maucune had ceased to advance, but -that the French extreme left was still in march westward. ‘On being -made acquainted with the posture of affairs,’ writes the officer who -bore Leith’s report[533], ‘Lord Wellington declared his intention of -riding to the spot and directed me to accompany him. When he arrived at -the ground of the 5th Division--now under arms and perfectly prepared -to receive the attack, his Lordship found the enemy still in the same -formation, but not displaying any intention of trying his fortune, by -crossing the valley at that point. He soon became satisfied that no -operation of consequence was intended against this part of the line. He -again galloped off toward the right, which at this time became the most -interesting and important scene of action.’ - - [532] The traditional story may be found in Greville’s _Memoirs_, - ii. p. 39. Wellington is said to have been in the courtyard of a - farmhouse, where some food had been laid out for him, ‘stumping - about and munching,’ and taking occasional peeps through his - telescope. Presently came the aide-de-camp with Leith’s message. - Wellington took another long look through his glass, and cried, - ‘By God! that will do!’ his mouth still full. He then sprang on - his horse and rode off, the staff following. Another version may - be found in Grattan, pp. 239-40: ‘Lord W. had given his glass to - an aide-de-camp, while he himself sat down to eat a few mouthfuls - of cold beef. Presently the officer reported that the enemy were - still extending to their left. “The devil they are! give me - the glass quickly,” said his lordship--and then, after a long - inspection, “This will do at last, I think--ride off.”’ - - [533] His nephew, Leith Hay, whose memoir I have so often had to - quote, here ii. p. 49. - -The critical moment of the day was the short space of time when -Wellington was surveying the French army, from the height where -Leith’s men were lying prostrate behind the crest, above the village -of Arapiles, under a distant but not very effective artillery fire. -The whole plateau opposite was very visible: Maucune could be seen -halted and in line, with much artillery on his flank, but no infantry -force near--there was half a mile between him and Bonnet. Thomières -was still pushing away to his left, already separated by some distance -from Maucune. Clausel had apparently halted after the end of his march -out of the woods. Foy and Ferey were at least two miles off to the -French right. The enemy, in short, were in no solid battle order, -and were scattered on an immense arc, which enveloped on both sides -the obtuse angle _en potence_ formed by the main body of the allied -army. From Foy’s right to Thomières’s left there was length but no -depth. The only reserves were the troops imperfectly visible in the -woods behind the Great Arapile--where lay Brennier in first line, and -Sarrut who was now nearing Marmont’s artillery-park and baggage. Their -strength might be guessed from the fact that Marmont was known to have -eight infantry divisions, and that six were clearly visible elsewhere. -Wellington’s determination was suddenly taken, to turn what had been -intended for a defensive into an offensive battle. Seeing the enemy so -scattered, and so entirely out of regular formation, he would attack -him with the whole force that he had in position west of the little -Arapile, before Marmont could get into order. Leith, Cole, and Pack in -front line, supported by the 6th and 7th Divisions in second line, -and with Bradford, España, and Stapleton Cotton’s cavalry covering -their right flank in a protective échelon, should cross the valley and -fall upon Bonnet, Maucune, Clausel, and Thomières. Meanwhile Pakenham -and D’Urban, being in a hidden position from which they could easily -outflank Thomières, should ascend the western end of the plateau, get -across the head of his marching column, and drive it in upon Maucune, -whom Leith would be assailing at the same moment. Pakenham’s turning -movement was the most delicate part of the plan; wherefore Wellington -resolved to start it himself. He rode like the wind across the ground -behind the heights, past Las Torres and Penilla, and appeared all -alone before D’Urban’s Portuguese squadrons. It was only some time -later that first Colonel Delancey and then others of his staff, quite -outdistanced, came dropping in with blown horses. The orders to D’Urban -were short and clear: Pakenham was about to attack the western end of -the plateau where Thomières was moving--near the Pico de Miranda. It -would be D’Urban’s duty to cover his right flank[534]. A minute later -Wellington was before the 3rd Division, which had just received orders -to stand to its arms. - - [534] D’Urban’s unpublished diary gives the fact that he got his - order from Wellington personally before Pakenham was reached. - -‘The officers had not taken their places in the column, but were in a -group together, in front of it. As Lord Wellington rode up to Pakenham -every eye was turned towards him. He looked paler than usual; but, -notwithstanding the sudden change he had just made in the disposition -of his army, he was quite unruffled in his manner, as if the battle -to be fought was nothing but a field-day. His words were few and his -orders brief. Tapping Pakenham on the shoulder, he said, “Edward, move -on with the 3rd Division, take those heights in your front--and drive -everything before you.” “I will, my lord,” was the laconic reply of the -gallant Sir Edward. A moment after, Lord Wellington was galloping on to -the next division, to give (I suppose) orders to the same effect, and -in less than half an hour the battle had commenced[535].’ The time was -about a quarter to four in the afternoon. - - [535] Grattan’s _With the Connaught Rangers_, pp. 241-2. - -Having set Pakenham and D’Urban in motion, Wellington rode back to the -ground of the 5th Division, sending on his way orders for Arentschildt -to leave the cavalry reserve, and join D’Urban with the five squadrons -that remained of Victor Alten’s brigade[536]. Bradford, España, and -Cotton at the same time were directed to come forward to Leith’s right -flank. On reaching the hilltop behind the village of Arapiles, the -Commander-in-Chief gave his orders to Leith: the 5th Division was to -advance downhill and attack Maucune across the valley, as soon as -Bradford’s Portuguese should be close up to support his right, and as -Pakenham’s distant movement should become visible. Wellington then rode -on to give the corresponding orders to Cole, more to the left[537]. - - [536] Two of 14th Light Dragoons, three of 1st Hussars K.G.L. - - [537] All this from Leith Hay, ii. pp. 51-2. - -The 5th Division thereupon sent out its light companies in skirmishing -line, and came up to the crest: the two neighbouring brigades of the -4th Division followed suit, and then Pack’s Portuguese, opposite the -Greater Arapile. Considerable loss was suffered in all these corps -from the French artillery fire, when the battalions rose from their -lying posture behind the crest and became visible. Some thirty or forty -minutes elapsed between Wellington’s arrival on the scene and the -commencement of the advance: the delay was caused by the necessity for -waiting for Bradford, who was coming up as fast as possible from Las -Torres. The attack did not begin till about 4.40 p.m. - -By the time that Leith and Cole came into action the French army had -been deprived of its chief. Somewhere between three and four o’clock -in the afternoon[538], and certainly nearer the latter than the former -hour, Marmont had been severely wounded. According to his own narrative -he had begun to be troubled by seeing Maucune pressing in too close to -the village of Arapiles, and Thomières passing on too far to the left, -and had been roused to considerable vexation by getting a message -from the former that he observed that the troops in front of him were -retiring, and therefore would ask leave to support his _voltigeurs_ -and attack the British position with his whole division. Marmont -says that it was his wish to stop Maucune from closing that induced -him to prepare to depart from his eyrie on the Great Arapile, and to -descend to take charge of his left wing. Be this as it may, there is -no doubt that he was starting to climb down and mount his horse, when -a shell from one of Dyneley’s two guns on the British Arapile burst -near him, and flung him to the ground with a lacerated right arm, and -a wound in his side which broke two ribs[539]. He himself says that -there was nothing irremediable in the state of his army at the moment -that he was disabled. His critic, Foy, held otherwise. ‘The Duke of -Ragusa,’ he wrote, ‘insinuated that the battle of the 22nd was lost -because, after his own wounding, there was a gap in the command, -anarchy, and disorder. But it was the Duke who forced on the battle, -and that contrary to the advice of General Clausel. His left was -already beaten when he was disabled: already it was impossible either -to refuse a battle or to give it a good turn. It was only possible to -attenuate the disaster--and that was what Clausel did[540].’ Foy also -insinuates that Maucune’s advance, at least in its early stages, was -consonant with Marmont’s intentions. ‘He had made his arrangements for -a decisive blow: when the English were seen to take up their position, -the heads of the columns were turned to the left, so as to occupy the -elevations which dominate the plain, and swell up one after another. -The occupation of one led to the temptation to seize the next, and so -by advance after advance the village of Arapiles was at last reached. -Maucune’s division actually held it for some minutes. Nevertheless we -had not yet made up our minds to deliver battle, and the necessary -dispositions for one had not been made. My division was still occupying -the plateau of Calvarisa, with the 3rd and 4th Divisions (Ferey and -Sarrut) and the dragoons supporting me in the rear. Here, then, was -a whole section of the army quite out of the fight: and the other -divisions were not well linked together, and could be beaten one after -the other.’ - - [538] Marmont says that it was ‘environ trois heures du soir.’ - But I think that about 3.45 should be given as the hour, since - Maucune only left the woods at 2 o’clock, and had to march - on to the plateau, to take up his position, to send out his - _voltigeurs_, and to get them close in to Arapiles before he - would have sent such a message to his chief. Foy says ‘between 3 - and 4 p.m.’ - - [539] Many years after, when Marmont, now a subject of Louis - XVIII, was inspecting some British artillery, an officer had the - maladroit idea of introducing to him the sergeant who had pointed - the gun--the effect of the shot in the middle of the French staff - had been noticed on the British Arapile. - - [540] _Vie militaire de Foy_, p. 177. - -Foy is certainly correct in asserting that, at the moment of the -Marshal’s wound, he himself and Ferey were too far off to be brought -up in time to save Maucune, and that Bonnet, Maucune, Clausel, and -Thomières were in no solid connexion with each other. This indeed -was what made Wellington deliver his attack. It is probable that the -Marshal’s wound occurred just about the moment (3.45) when Pakenham -and D’Urban were being directed by Wellington to advance. Even if it -fell a trifle earlier, the French left wing was already too dislocated -to have time to get into a good position before it was attacked. -Marmont, it must be confessed, rather gave away his case when, in his -reply to Napoleon’s angry query why he had fought a battle on the -22nd, he answered that he had not intended to deliver a general action -at all--it had been forced on him by Wellington[541]. If so, he was -responsible for being caught by his adversary with his army strung out -in such a fashion that it had a very poor chance of avoiding disaster. -If it be granted that the unlucky shell had never struck him, it would -not have been in ‘a quarter of an hour[542]’ (as he himself pretends), -nor even in a whole hour, that he could have rearranged a line six -miles long[543], though he might have stopped Maucune’s attack and -Thomières’s flank march in a much shorter time. - - [541] Marmont to Berthier, _Mémoires_, iv. p. 468. - - [542] Ibid., ‘la gauche eut été formée en moins d’un quart - d’heure’! - - [543] The exact moment of Marmont’s wound is very difficult to - fix, as also that of Wellington’s attack. The Marshal himself - (as mentioned above, p.438) says that he was hit ‘environ les - trois heures,’ and that Leith and Cole advanced ‘peu après, sur - les quatre heures.’ Foy places the wound merely ‘between 3 and - 4 p.m.’ Parquin, who commanded Marmont’s escort of _chasseurs_, - says that the Marshal had been carried back to Alba de Tormes - by 4 o’clock--impossibly early. On the other hand Napier gives - too late an hour, when saying that Marmont was wounded only at - the moment when Leith and Cole advanced, 4.45 or so, and was - running down from the Arapile because of their movement. This - is, I imagine, much too late. But it is supported by _Victoires - et Conquêtes_, sometimes a well-documented work but often - inaccurate, which places the unlucky shot at 4.30. Grattan places - the order to the British infantry (Leith and Cole) to prepare to - attack at 4.20--Leith Hay at ‘at least an hour after 3 o’clock.’ - Gomm, on the other hand, makes Wellington move ‘at 3 o’clock - in the afternoon.’ Tomkinson (usually very accurate) places - Pakenham’s and Leith’s success at ‘about 5 p.m.’ D’Urban thinks - that he met Lord Wellington and received his orders _after_ 4 - p.m.--probably he is half an hour too late in his estimate. - -On Marmont’s fall, the command of the army of Portugal fell to Bonnet, -the senior general of division. He was within a few yards of his -wounded chief, since his division was holding the Great Arapile, and -took up the charge at once. But it was an extraordinary piece of -ill-luck for the French that Bonnet also was wounded within an hour, so -that the command passed to Clausel before six o’clock. As Foy remarks, -however, no one could have saved the compromised left wing--Marmont had -let it get into a thoroughly vicious position before he was disabled. - -Since the main clash of the battle of Salamanca started at the western -end of the field, it will be best to begin the narrative of the British -advance with the doings of Pakenham and D’Urban. These two officers -had some two miles of rough ground to cover between the point where -Wellington had parted from them, and the point which had now been -reached by the head of the French advance. They were ordered to move -in four ‘columns of lines,’ with D’Urban’s cavalry forming the two -outer or right-hand columns, the third composed of Wallace’s brigade -(1/45th, 1/88th, 74th) and of Power’s Portuguese (9th and 21st Line -and 12th Caçadores), while the fourth consisted of Campbell’s brigade -(1/5th, 2/5th, 94th, 2/83rd). The object of this formation was that -the division, when it came into action, should be able to deploy into -two lines, without the delay that would have been caused if the third -brigade had followed in the wake of the other two[544]. - - [544] Wellington in his dispatch (ix. p. 302) speaks of the four - columns, D’Urban makes it clear that his own squadrons formed the - outer two, but the fact that Power’s Portuguese followed Wallace - in the 3rd column only emerges in the Regimental History of the - 45th (Dalbiac), p. 103. This is quite consistent with the other - information. - -The way in which the two sides came into collision was rather peculiar. -Thomières’s column was accompanied by the whole, or nearly the whole, -of Curto’s light cavalry division, which, as one would have supposed, -would naturally have been keeping a squadron or so in advance to -explore the way, as well as others on the flanks to cover the -infantry. But it appears that this simple precaution was not taken, -for Pakenham and D’Urban met no French cavalry at all, till they had -got well in touch with the hostile infantry. Curto, we must suppose, -was marching parallel with the centre, not certainly with the head, -of Thomières’s division, without any vedettes or exploring parties in -front. For D’Urban describes the first meeting as follows:-- - -‘The enemy was marching by his left along the wooded heights, which -form the southern boundary of the valley of the Arapiles, and the -western extremity of which closes in a lower fall, which descends upon -the little stream of the Azan, near the village of Miranda. As the head -of our column approached this lower fall, or hill, skirting it near its -base, and having it on our left, we became aware that we were close to -the enemy, though we could not see them owing to the trees, the dust, -and the peculiar configuration of the ground. Anxious, therefore, to -ascertain their exact whereabouts I had ridden out a little in front, -having with me, I think, only my brigade-major Flangini and Da Camara, -when upon clearing the verge of a small clump of trees, a short way -up the slope, I came suddenly upon the head of a French column of -infantry, having about a company in front, and marching very fast -by its left. It was at once obvious that, as the columns of the 3rd -Division were marching on our left, the French must be already beyond -their right, and consequently I ought to attack at once[545].’ - - [545] All this from D’Urban’s unpublished narrative in the - D’Urban papers. - -This was apparently the leading battalion of the French 101st, marching -with its front absolutely uncovered by either cavalry vedettes or -any exploring parties of its own. D’Urban galloped back, unseen by -the enemy, and wheeled his leading regiment, the 1st Portuguese -dragoons--three weak squadrons of little over 200 sabres--into line, -with orders to charge the French battalion, before it should take the -alarm and form square. The 11th Portuguese, and two squadrons of the -British 14th Light Dragoons, which had only just arrived on the ground, -being the foremost part of Arentschildt’s brigade, followed in support. -The charge was successful--the French were so much taken by surprise -that the only manœuvre they were able to perform was to close their -second company upon the first, so that their front was six deep. The -two squadrons of the Portuguese which attacked frontally suffered -severe loss, their colonel, Watson, falling severely wounded among the -French bayonets. But the right-hand squadron, which overlapped the -French left, broke in almost unopposed on the unformed flank of the -battalion, which then went to pieces, and was chased uphill by the -whole of the Portuguese horsemen, losing many prisoners[546]. - - [546] All this is from D’Urban’s narrative, and letters from - Colonel Watson to D’Urban. The colonel bitterly resented Napier’s - account of the charge (_Peninsular War_, iv. p. 268). - -This sudden assault on his leading unit, which seems to have been -acting as an advanced guard, and was considerably ahead of the next, -must have been sufficiently startling to Thomières, who was taken -wholly unawares. But the next moment brought worse trouble: the first -brigade of the 3rd Division--Wallace’s--emerged almost simultaneously -with the cavalry charge from the scattered trees which had hitherto -covered its advance, and was seen coming uphill in beautiful order -against him. He was caught in a long column--battalion marching behind -battalion, with considerable intervals between the regiments, of which -there were three (101st, three battalions; 62nd, two battalions; 1st, -three battalions)[547]. If he was able to see Pakenham’s supporting -lines, which is a little doubtful, Thomières must have known that -he was considerably outnumbered: the British division had 5,800 -men against his 4,500, while Curto’s 1,800 light cavalry were not -forthcoming at the critical moment to save the situation. - - [547] The division was marching left in front, so that the senior - regiment was in the rear. The fourth unit of the division (23rd - Léger) was absent, garrisoning Astorga, as was also the 2nd - battalion of the 1st, which was a very strong four-battalion - corps. Hence there were only 8 battalions out of 11 present, or - 4,300 men out of 6,200. - -The space between the advancing line of Wallace’s brigade and the head -of the French column, when they came in sight of each other, was about -1,000 yards--the time that it took to bring them into collision just -sufficed to enable Thomières to make some sort of hasty disposition -of his battalions: those in the rear pushed out on to the flanks -of the leading regiment, and made an irregular line of columns -badly spaced. The _voltigeurs_ of each battalion had time to run to -the front: ‘their light troops,’ says a witness from the Connaught -Rangers, ‘hoping to take advantage of the time which our deploying -from column into line would take, ran down the face of the hill in a -state of great excitement.’ Pakenham appears to have sent out against -them his three companies of the 5/60th and the whole of the 12th -Caçadores, a skirmishing line of superior strength. Wallace’s three -battalions formed line from open column without halting, when they had -got to within 250 yards of the enemy: ‘the different companies, by -throwing forward their right shoulders, were in line without the slow -manœuvre of a deployment.’ The French fire is said to have been rather -ineffective, because delivered downhill. The most serious loss was that -caused by Thomières’s divisional battery, which got up and into action -very promptly. It was answered by Douglas’s battery, the divisional -artillery of the 3rd Division, which unlimbered on a knoll at the edge -of the wood, and sent a raking discharge uphill, against the right -of the French division, shelling it over the heads of the brigade -advancing up the slope. The two Portuguese line regiments, from the -rear of Wallace’s brigade, formed in support of him: Campbell’s brigade -followed as a third line. - -The main body of the French[548] stood in a group, rather than a line, -of battalion columns near the brow of the hill, while Wallace’s brigade -continued to press upwards with a front which outflanked the enemy -at both ends. ‘Regardless of the fire of the _tirailleurs_, and the -shower of grape and canister, the brigade continued to press onward. -The centre (88th regiment) suffered, but still advanced, the right -and left (l/45th and 74th) continued to go forward at a more rapid -pace, and as the wings inclined forward and outstripped the centre, -the brigade assumed the form of a crescent[549].’ They were nearly at -the brow, when Thomières directed the French columns to charge down -in support of his _tirailleurs_. The mass, with drums beating and -loud shouts of _Vive l’Empereur_, ran forward, and the leading files -delivered a heavy fire, which told severely on the 88th. But on coming -under fire in return the French halted, and then wavered: ‘their second -discharge was unlike the first--it was irregular and ill-directed, -the men acted without concert or method: many fired in the air.’ The -three British battalions then cheered and advanced, when the enemy, -his columns already in much confusion and mixed with the wrecks of his -_tirailleurs_, gave way completely, and went off in confusion along the -top of the plateau. - - [548] It is not certain that the whole of the rear regiment (the - 1st Line) was in the group: possibly one or two of its battalions - were not yet on the ground. - - [549] Grattan, p. 245. - -Just at this moment Curto’s _chasseurs_ at last appeared--where they -had been up to this moment does not appear, but certainly not in -their proper place. Now, however, six or seven squadrons of them came -trotting up on the outer flank of the broken division, of whom some -charged the two battalions which formed the right of Pakenham’s first -and third lines--the 1/45th and 1/5th respectively. The former, feebly -attacked, threw back some companies _en potence_ and beat off their -assailants easily. The latter fell back some little way, and had many -men cut up, but finally rallied in a clump and were not broken[550]. -Their assailants disappeared a moment after, being driven off by -Arentschildt, who had just come up on Pakenham’s right with the five -squadrons of the 1st Hussars K.G.L. and 14th Light Dragoons[551]. -D’Urban’s Portuguese were now a little to the rear, rallying after -their successful charge and collecting prisoners: their commander says -in his narrative of this part of the battle that he never saw any -French cavalry till later in the day, but does not dispute that the -5th may have been attacked by them without his knowledge. - - [550] The 1/5th lost 126 men, more than any other 3rd Division - regiment except the 88th. Sergeant Morley of the 5th, its only - Salamanca diarist, writes (p. 113): ‘There was a pause--a - hesitation. Here I blush--but I should blush more if I were - guilty of a falsehood. We retired--slowly, in good order, not - far, not 100 paces. General Pakenham approached, and very - good-naturedly said “re-form,” and after a moment “advance--there - they are, my lads--let them feel the temper of your bayonets.” - We advanced--rather slowly at first, a regiment of dragoons - which had retired with us again accompanying ... and took our - retribution for our repulse.’ The dragoon regiment was presumably - part of D’Urban’s brigade. - - [551] This comes from the report of Arentschildt on the doings - of his brigade: it is not mentioned by Napier, nor is there - anything about it in Wellington’s dispatch. The time is fixed by - Arentschildt speaking of it as ‘during the attack on the first - hill.’ He says that he closed with the main body of the French - horse and drove it off. - -Curto’s cavalry being driven off, the 3rd Division and its attendant -squadrons pursued the broken French division of infantry along the top -of the plateau, and very nearly annihilated it. Thomières was killed, -his divisional battery was captured whole; of his two leading regiments -the 101st Line lost 1,031 men out of 1,449 present: its colonel and -eagle were both taken with many hundred unwounded prisoners: the 62nd -Line lost 868 men out of 1,123. The rear regiment, the 1st Line, got -off with the comparatively trifling casualty-list of 231 out of 1,743: -it was possibly not up in time to take part in resisting Pakenham’s -first attack, and may perhaps have done no more than cover the retreat -of the wrecks of the two leading regiments. The whole division was -out of action as a fighting body for the rest of the day, having lost -2,130 men out of a little over 4,500.[552] The victorious British 3rd -Division, whose casualties had not amounted to more than 500 of all -ranks, continued to press the fugitives before it, till it had gone a -mile, and came in on the flank of Maucune’s division, the next unit in -the French line; D’Urban’s cavalry accompanied it close on its right -flank, Arentschildt’s squadrons lay farther out, watching Curto’s -defeated first brigade of _chasseurs_, which rallied upon a reserve, -his second brigade, and made head once more against the pursuers, just -about the same time that Pakenham’s infantry began again to meet with -resistance. - - [552] The losses in officers of the three regiments were, taking - killed and wounded only, not unwounded prisoners, 25 for the - 101st, 15 for the 62nd, 5 for the 1st, by Martinien’s lists. - The British returns of prisoners sent to England, at the Record - Office, show 6 officers from the 101st, 2 from the 62nd, and 1 - from the 1st, received after the battle. I presume that nearly - all the wounded, both officers and rank and file, count among the - prisoners. The 1st entered in its regimental report 176 _tués - ou pris_, 22 _blessés_, 29 _disparus_: here the only people who - got away would be the 22 _blessés_. The regimental return of the - 101st shows 31 officers wanting--which seems to correspond to the - 25 killed and wounded plus the 6 prisoners sent to England. - - - - -SECTION XXXIII: CHAPTER VII - -THE BATTLE OF SALAMANCA: THE MAIN ENGAGEMENT - - -We must now turn from the exploits of Pakenham and the 3rd Division to -deal with the great central attack of Wellington’s frontal striking -force, the 5th and 4th Divisions, under Leith and Cole, upon the French -left centre. They had been told to move on when Bradford’s Portuguese -brigade should be sufficiently near to cover the right flank of the -5th Division, and the necessity of waiting for this support caused -their attack to be delivered perceptibly later than that of Pakenham. -Leith had drawn out his division in two lines, the first consisting -of Greville’s brigade (3/1st, 1/9th, and both battalions of the -38th) and the first battalion of the 4th, brought up from the rear -brigade (Pringle’s) to equalize the front of the two lines: the second -consisted of the rest of that brigade (the second battalion of the -4th, the 2/30th, and 2/44th) and the Portuguese of Spry (3rd and 15th -Line). There was a heavy skirmishing line in front, composed of all the -British light companies and the 8th Caçadores[553]. Cole had a smaller -force, as his left brigade (Anson’s) had been told off to the defence -of the British Arapile: the 3/27th was holding that rocky knoll, the -1/40th was at its foot in support. Only therefore the Fusilier brigade -(under Ellis of the 23rd) and Stubbs’s Portuguese formed the attacking -force. They were in a single line of seven battalions, with a heavy -skirmishing screen composed of four light companies and the whole of -the 7th Caçadores[554]. The Fusilier brigade of the 4th Division went -through the end of the village of Arapiles, which it did by files from -the right of companies, the companies forming up again on the east side -of the place, upon their sergeants regularly sent out as markers. This -defile delayed the advance of the division, which therefore attacked -decidedly later than Leith’s men, the joint movement being in an -échelon, with the right leading and the left considerably refused. It -was obvious that when the 4th Division drew near to the French line -on the plateau, it would be exposing its left flank to the hostile -division (Bonnet’s) which was massed on and near the Greater Arapile. -Wellington had noted this, and had given special discretionary orders -to Pack, directing him to use his independent brigade for the sole -purpose of protecting the near flank of the 4th Division; he might -attack the Arapile, as the best means of holding back Bonnet from -descending against Cole’s line, or might manœuvre below the knoll for -the same purpose. When the dangerous moment came, Pack, as we shall -see, took the bull by the horns, and assailed the precipitous height in -front with his whole 2,000 men. - - [553] All this from Leith Hay, ii. p. 53. The 1/38th had joined - from Lisbon only twelve hours back. - - [554] This is proved by the narrative of the Brunswick captain, - Wachholz, who commanded the company of that corps attached to the - Fusilier brigade. - -In the rear of the 4th Division the 6th was now coming up the back -slope of the hill behind the Arapile in second line: similarly the 7th -Division was following the 5th. To the right of the 7th, Stapleton -Cotton was moving up from Las Torres with the cavalry reserve, now -consisting only of the six regiments of Le Marchant and G. Anson. -Bradford, more to the right still, and not yet in line with Leith and -Cole, moved with España’s small Spanish division behind him. - -Of Wellington’s front line Leith with the 5th Division had Maucune in -front of him: Cole would have to deal with Clausel, who had arrived -late on the ground, and was only just taking up his position on the -extreme right end of the French plateau. Pack and W. Anson’s detached -brigade from the 4th Division, with the Lesser Arapile in their -power, looked across the valley at Bonnet, massed around its greater -twin-hill. The British attacking line was amply provided with reserves: -the defensive line of the French was still very thin, though Brennier’s -division was hurrying up from the head of the wood to support Maucune. -Sarrut’s division was still invisible in the forest far to the rear: -Ferey’s was better seen--it was hastening up across the open ground on -its way from the extreme French right, but must obviously be too late -to join in meeting Wellington’s first attack. - -The roar of the cannon and musketry away in the direction of the Pico -de Miranda had been announcing for some time that Pakenham was at -close grips with Thomières, before Leith marched down from his heights -to cross the valley that separated him from Maucune’s position. Soon -after five, however, the 5th Division was in close contact with the -enemy, having suffered a considerable amount of casualties in reaching -him, mainly from the very superior French artillery fire, which swept -every yard of the glacis-like slope that ascends from the bottom of -the Arapiles valley to the brow of the plateau that forms its southern -limit. - -‘The ground,’ writes Leith Hay, ‘between the advancing force and that -which it was to assail was crowded by the light troops of both sides in -extended order, carrying on a very incessant _tiraillade_. The general -desired me to ride forward, to make our light infantry press up the -heights to cover his line of march, and to bid them, if practicable, -make a rush at the enemy’s guns. Our light troops soon drove in those -opposed to them: the cannon were removed to the rear: every obstruction -to the general advance of our line vanished. In front of the centre -of that beautiful line rode General Leith, directing its movements. -Occasionally every soldier was visible, the sun shining bright upon -their arms, though at intervals all were enveloped in a dense cloud of -dust, from whence at times issued the animating cheer of the British -infantry. - -[Illustration: SALAMANCA] - -‘The French columns, retired from the crest of the heights, were formed -in squares, about fifty yards behind the line at which, when arrived, -the British regiments would become visible. Their artillery, although -placed more to the rear, still poured its fire upon our advancing -troops. We were now near the summit of the ridge. The men marched with -the same orderly steadiness as at the first: no advance in line at a -review was ever more correctly executed: the dressing was admirable, -and the gaps caused by casualties were filled up with the most perfect -regularity. General Leith and the officers of his staff, being on -horseback, first perceived the enemy, and had time to observe his -formation, before our infantry line became so visible as to induce him -to commence firing. He was drawn up in contiguous squares, the front -rank kneeling, and prepared to fire when the drum should beat. All -was still and quiet in these squares: not a musket was discharged until -the whole opened. Nearly at the same instant General Leith ordered our -line to fire and charge. At this moment the last thing I saw through -the smoke was the plunge of the horse of Colonel Greville, commanding -the leading brigade, who, shot through the head, reared and fell back -on his rider. In an instant every individual present was enveloped in -smoke and obscurity. No serious struggle for ascendancy followed, for -the French squares were penetrated, broken, and discomfited, and the -victorious 5th Division pressed forward no longer against troops formed -up, but against a mass of disorganized men flying in all directions.... -When close to the enemy’s squares Leith had been severely wounded and -reluctantly forced to quit the field; at the same moment I was hit -myself, and my horse killed by a musket-ball: thus removed, I cannot -detail the further movements of the division[555].’ - - [555] Leith Hay, ii. pp. 57-8. - -In this clear and simple narrative the most remarkable point is Leith -Hay’s distinct statement that the French received the charge of the -5th Division in a line of squares, a most strange formation to adopt -against infantry advancing deployed, even when it was supplemented by -a strong screen of _tirailleurs_, and flanked by several batteries -of artillery. It is possible that Maucune adopted it because, from -his commanding position on the plateau, he could see a considerable -body of cavalry coming up on Leith’s right rear. This was composed -of the brigades of Le Marchant and G. Anson, which Stapleton Cotton -was bringing up to the front by Wellington’s orders. While Leith -was advancing they pressed forward, Le Marchant leading, and passed -up the hill in the interval between the 5th Division and Pakenham’s -front--leaving behind them Bradford, who had crossed the valley -parallel to, but much behind, the right of Leith. Bradford had no -solid body of troops in front of him, being outside Maucune’s extreme -left, and suffered practically no loss--the total casualty list of his -brigade that day was only seventeen men. This contrasts marvellously -with the loss of Leith’s front line, where Greville’s brigade in their -triumphant advance lost 350 men--mainly from the artillery fire -endured while the long slope of the French plateau was being mounted: -for there were at least four batteries aligned on Maucune’s right, and -their guns had been worked till the last possible minute. - -Whatever was the cause of the formation in square adopted by the French -division, it would have been fortunate if only it could have preserved -that formation a little longer; for precisely when it had lost its -order, and fallen back before Leith’s shattering volleys of musketry, -Le Marchant’s heavy dragoons arrived upon the crest of the plateau. No -better opportunity for the use of cavalry could have been conceived, -than that which existed at this moment. Infantry already engaged with, -and worsted by, other infantry is the destined prey of cavalry coming -on the scene from the flank in unbroken order. Le Marchant had received -his instructions directly from Wellington, who had told him to ‘charge -in at all hazards[556],’ when he saw the French battalions on the -plateau hotly engaged. He had formed his 1,000 sabres in two lines, -the 5th Dragoon Guards and 4th Dragoons in front, the 3rd Dragoons -in support, and had come over the sky-line and trotted down into the -valley just as Leith’s division got to close quarters with Maucune. -Passing Bradford on his right, he came to the crest to find all -confusion in front of him. The squares that Leith had just broken were -rolling back in disorder: directly behind a new division (Brennier’s), -only just arriving upon the field, was beginning to form up, to cover -and support the shaken battalions. Some distance to their left rear the -remains of Thomières’s division, in a disorderly crowd, were falling -back in front of the triumphant advance of Pakenham. - - [556] See Le Marchant’s _Life_, from notes supplied by his son, - in Cole’s _Peninsular Generals_, ii. p. 281. - -Le Marchant charged in diagonally upon the flank of Maucune’s left -brigade, and caught the two battalions of the 66th regiment falling -back from the crest. The Frenchmen were courageous enough to make a -desperate attempt to club themselves together in a solid mass: their -rear ranks faced about and opened a heavy fire upon the advancing -squadrons. But it was given with uncertain aim and trifling effect, and -before they could reload the dragoons were among them. A desperate -minority attempted to resist with the bayonet, and were sabred: some -hundreds cast down their muskets, raised their hands, and asked -quarter. The rear ranks scattered and fled southward across the -plateau. Leaving the gathering up of the prisoners to the infantry of -Leith, Le Marchant led his brigade, so soon as some order could be -restored, against the next regiment of Maucune’s division, the 15th -Line; they were better prepared for resistance than the 66th, which -had been caught quite unawares, they showed a regular front, and gave -a more effective fire. Many of the dragoons fell; but nevertheless -their impetus carried them through the mass, which went to pieces and -dispersed into a disorderly crowd: it fled in the same direction as the -wrecks of the 66th. - -Le Marchant’s brigade had now lost its formation, ‘the three regiments -had become mixed together, the officers rode where they could find -places: but a good front, without intervals, was still maintained, and -there was no confusion[557].’ In front of them there was now a fresh -enemy--the 22nd Line, the leading regiment of the division of Brennier, -which had just arrived on the field, and was getting into order to -save and support Maucune’s routed battalions. It would seem that in -the midst of the dust and smoke, and surrounded and interfered with by -the fugitives of the broken regiments, the 22nd had either no time or -no good opportunity for forming squares: they were found in _colonne -serrée_, in good order, partly covered by a clump of trees, an outlying -thicket from the great forest to their rear. They reserved their fire, -with great composure, till the dragoons were within ten yards distance, -and poured a volley so close and well aimed upon the leading squadron -[5th Dragoon Guards] that nearly a fourth of them fell. Tremendous -as was the effect of the discharge, the dragoons were not arrested: -they broke in through the opposing bayonets, and plunged into the -dense masses of the enemy. In the combat which ensued, broadsword -and bayonet were used against each other with various results: the -French, hewn down and trampled under the horses’ feet, offered all the -resistance that brave men could make. Le Marchant himself had some -narrow escapes--he fought like a private, and had to cut down more -than one of the enemy. It was only after a fierce struggle that the -French yielded, and he had the satisfaction of seeing them fly before -him in helpless confusion. The brigade had now lost all order: the -dragoons, excited by the struggle, vied with each other in the pursuit, -and galloped recklessly into the crowd of fugitives, sabring those who -came within their reach. To restrain them at such a moment was beyond -the power of their officers[558].’ - - [557] _Life of Le Marchant_, p. 285. - - [558] _Life of Le Marchant_, pp. 286-7. - -Le Marchant endeavoured to keep a few men in hand, in order to guard -against any attempt of the French to rally, but he had only about -half a squadron of the 4th Dragoons with him, when he came upon some -companies which were beginning to re-form in the edge of the great -wood. He led his party against them, and drove them back among the -trees, where they dispersed. But at the moment of contact he was shot -dead, by a ball which entered his groin and broke his spine. Thus fell -an officer of whom great things had been expected by all who knew him, -in the moment when he had just obtained and used to the full his first -chance of leading his brigade in a general action. One of the few -scientific soldiers in the cavalry arm whom the British army owned, Le -Marchant had been mainly known as the founder and administrator of the -Royal Military College at High Wycombe, which was already beginning to -send to the front many young officers trained as their predecessors -had never been. He was the author of many military pamphlets, and -of a new system of sword exercise which had lately been adopted for -the cavalry[559]. On his promotion to the rank of Major-General, in -1811, he had been unexpectedly sent to the Peninsula in command of -the heavy brigade, which reinforced Wellington during that autumn. As -an executive commander in the field he had given the first proofs of -his ability at the combat of Villagarcia[560]--but this was a small -affair--at Salamanca he proved himself a born commander of cavalry, and -his services would have been invaluable to Wellington in later fields -but for the disastrous shot that ended his career. He was a man of a -lofty and religious spirit, ill to be spared by his country[561]. - - [559] Le Marchant was also an admirable artist in water colours. - I saw many of his pleasing sketches of Peninsular landscapes when - his grandson, Sir Henry Le Marchant, allowed me to look through - his correspondence and notes. - - [560] See p. 277 above. - - [561] I have read with respect his admirable letters to his - family. ‘I never go into battle,’ he said, ‘without subjecting - myself to a strict self-examination: when, having (as I hope) - humbly made my peace with God, I leave the result in His hands, - with perfect confidence that He will determine what is best for - me.’ - -Le Marchant’s charge made a complete wreck of the left wing of the -French army. The remnants of the eight battalions which he had broken -fled eastward in a confused mass, towards the edge of the woods, -becoming blended with the separate stream of fugitives from Thomières’s -division. The 5th Division swept in some 1,500 prisoners from them, as -also the eagle of the 22nd Line, which the heavy brigade had broken in -their last effort, while five guns were taken by the 4th Dragoons[562]. -The French, flying blindly from the pursuit, were so scattered that -some of them actually ran in headlong among D’Urban’s Portuguese horse, -on the back side of the plateau. ‘We were so far in their rear,’ -writes that officer, ‘that a mass of their routed infantry (to our -astonishment, since we did not know the cause) in the wildness of their -panic and confusion, and throwing away their arms, actually ran against -our horses, where many of them fell down exhausted, and incapable of -further movement.’ The same happened in the front of the 3rd Division, -where, according to a narrator in the Connaught Rangers, ‘hundreds of -men frightfully disfigured, black with dust, worn out with fatigue, -and covered with sabre-cuts and blood, threw themselves among us for -safety.’ - - [562] It is vexatious to find that neither the 22nd nor the 66th - was among the fourteen Salamanca regiments of which detailed - casualty lists survive. The 15th Line returned 15 officers and - 359 men as their loss. Martinien’s tables show 21 officers - lost in the 22nd, and 17 in the 66th. The deficits of these - two regiments as shown by the muster-rolls of August 1 were - respectively about 750 and 500, but these do not represent their - total losses, as all the regiments present at the battle had - picked up many men at their dépôts at Valladolid, and from the - small evacuated posts, before August 1, e.g. the 15th had 52 - officers present on July 15, lost 15 at Salamanca, but showed 46 - present on August 1; 9 officers must have joined from somewhere - in the interim. So the 66th had 38 officers present on July 15, - lost 17, but showed 34 present on August 1. Thirteen more must - have arrived, and accompanied of course by the corresponding rank - and file. - -The 3rd Division had now, in its advance along the plateau, come in -contact with the right flank of the fifth, and both of them fell into -one line reaching across the whole breadth of the heights, while in -front of them were recoiling the wrecks of Thomières, Maucune, and -Brennier. The four French regiments which had not been caught in Le -Marchant’s charge were still keeping together, and making occasional -attempts at a stand, but were always outflanked on their left by the -3rd Division and Arentschildt’s and D’Urban’s horse. Curto’s French -light cavalry had rallied, and picked up their second brigade, and were -now doing their best to cover the southern flank of the retreating -multitude[563]. An officer of one of their regiments speaks in his -memoirs of having charged with advantage against red dragoons--these -must apparently have been scattered parties of Le Marchant’s brigade, -pursuing far and furiously, since no other red-coated cavalry was in -this part of the field[564]. But Curto’s squadrons had mainly to do -with Arentschildt and D’Urban, both of whom report sharp fighting with -French horse at this moment. The 3rd French Hussars charged the 1st -Hussars K.G.L., while the latter were employed in gleaning prisoners -from the routed infantry, and were only driven off after a severe -combat[565]. The pursuit then continued until the disordered French -masses were driven off the plateau, and on to the wooded hills parallel -with the Greater Arapile, where Marmont had massed his army before his -fatal move to the left. - - [563] The regiments of Maucune’s brigade, which did not get - caught in the cavalry charge (82nd and 86th), lost only 8 and 3 - officers respectively, as against the 15 and 17 lost by the 66th - and 15th. Of Brennier’s division the 22nd Line had 21 casualties - among officers, while the 65th and 17th Léger had only 3 and 9 - respectively. - - [564] So Parquin of the 13th Chasseurs in his _Mémoires_, p. 302. - The only other red-coated dragoons in Wellington’s army, Bock’s - brigade, were far away to the left. - - [565] Arentschildt reports that his and D’Urban’s men were all - mixed and busy with the French infantry, when the French hussars - charged in, and that he rallied, to beat them off, a body - composed mostly of his own Germans, but with Portuguese and 14th - Light Dragoons among them. - -Meanwhile the 4th Division and Pack’s Portuguese had fought, with much -less fortunate results, against the French divisions of Clausel and -Bonnet. There are good narratives of their advance from three officers -who took part in it, all so full and clear that it is impossible -to have any doubts about its details. One comes from the Assistant -Quarter-Master-General of the 4th Division, Charles Vere: the second -is from the captain commanding one of the four light companies of the -Fusilier brigade, Ludwig von Wachholz of the Brunswick-Oels Jägers: -the third is the narrative of Pack’s aide-de-camp, Charles Synge, -who was with the front line of the Portuguese in their vigorous but -unsuccessful attack on the Greater Arapile. The three narratives have -nothing contradictory in them. - -The sequence of events was as follows. After deploying the three -battalions of the Fusilier brigade (1/7th, 1/23rd, 1/48th) beyond the -end of the village of Arapiles, and Stubbs’s Portuguese brigade to -their left, Cole started to cross the valley, having a very strong -skirmishing line, composed of the whole of the 7th Caçadores and of the -four light companies of the British brigade. During the first stage of -the advance, which started at 5.45[566], a perceptible time after that -of the 5th Division, the two brigades suffered severely from French -artillery fire, but had no infantry opposed to them. Their objective -was the division of Clausel, which had by this time come into line on -the extreme eastern end of the plateau occupied by Maucune. When the -advancing line had reached the trough of the valley which separated it -from the French heights, Cole saw that his left front was faced by a -detached French force[567] on a low rocky ridge half-way between the -end of the plateau and the Great Arapile, and also that behind the -Arapile, and in a position to support this detachment, were several -other French battalions. Pack was deploying to assault the Arapile, -but even if he won a first success there was visible a considerable -mass of troops behind it. After the valley was crossed Stubbs’s -Portuguese brigade, coming first into action, with the caçadores in -front, attacked the French regiment on the knoll and drove it back. -It retired towards the Arapile and the bulk of Bonnet’s division, to -which it belonged. Cole detached his caçador battalion to follow it, -hoping that Pack might succeed in ‘containing’ the rest of the French -force in this direction. The remainder of his line pushed on, with -the light companies of the Fusilier brigade acting as its screen, and -attacked Clausel on the plateau. The advance was steady, but cost many -lives, and the line was enfiladed by a tiresome flank fire from the -French guns on the top of the Great Arapile. Nevertheless the crest -was reached--on it lay the front line of the French division--five -battalions--which engaged in a furious frontal combat of musketry with -the Fusiliers and their Portuguese comrades, but was beaten in it, and -fell back some 200 yards on to its reserves. The impetus of the attack -was exhausted, Cole had just been wounded, so that there was a gap -in the command, and the troops were re-forming and recovering their -breath, when it was seen that things were going very badly behind and -to the left. The attack on the Arapile had by this time been delivered, -and had failed completely. - - [566] The moment is fixed by Wachholz, who says that he looked at - his watch, to fix the hour. - - [567] This was the 122nd (three battalions), of Bonnet’s - division, which Marmont says (see above, p. 430) that he had - placed as a connecting-link between the Arapile and the troops on - the plateau. - -Pack had grasped the fact that when the 4th Division had crossed -the valley, it would be much at the mercy of Bonnet’s troops in the -direction of the Arapile, which were now on its flank, and would -presently be almost in its rear. He therefore resolved to use the -option of attacking that Wellington had given him. He deployed the 4th -Caçadores as a skirmishing line, gave them as an immediate support -the four grenadier companies of his line regiments, and followed with -the rest in two columns, the 1st Line on the right, the 16th on the -left. The caçadores went up the comparatively level field which formed -the central slope between the two rocky ends of the Arapile--it was -sown with rye some three feet high that year. French skirmishers in -small numbers gave way before them, but the main opposition of the -enemy was from his battery placed on the summit. The skirmishing line -got four-fifths of the way to the crest, and then found an obstacle -before it, a bank of some four feet high, where the field ended. It was -perpendicular, and men scrambling up it had to sling their muskets, or -to lay them down, so as to be able to use both hands. The caçadores -were just tackling the bank--a few of them were over it--when the -French regiment on top, the 120th, which had been waiting till the -Portuguese should reach the obstacle, delivered a shattering volley -and charged. The caçadores were quite helpless, being more engaged -in climbing than in using their arms[568]. They were swept off in a -moment, and the French, jumping down into the field, pursued them -vigorously, and overthrew first the supporting grenadier companies, -and then the two regiments, which were caught half-way up the slope. -As Napier truly observes, ‘the Portuguese were scoffed at for their -failure--but unjustly: no troops could have withstood that crash upon -such steep ground, and the propriety of attacking the hill at all seems -questionable.’ Pack made the attempt purely because he thought that it -was the only way of taking off the attention of the French from Cole’s -flank. The brigade suffered heavily, losing 386 men in ten minutes. It -took refuge at the foot of the British Arapile, where it was covered by -the 1/40th of Anson’s brigade, which was standing there in reserve. - - [568] All this from the journal of Chas. Synge, Pack’s - aide-de-camp, who was with the caçadores, and was desperately - wounded at the bank, in the first clash. It was printed in the - _Nineteenth Century_ for July 1912. - -The French brigadier in command on the Greater Arapile wisely made -little attempt to pursue Pack’s fugitives, but having his front now -clear of any danger, sallied out from behind his hill with three -regiments, the 118th and 119th and the re-formed 122nd, against the -flank and rear of the British 4th Division. There was nothing in front -of him save the 7th Caçadores, which Cole had detached as a covering -force, when he stormed the heights with the remainder of the brigades -of Ellis and Stubbs. This isolated battalion behaved very well, it -stood its ground in line, but was absolutely overwhelmed and broken up -by the superior numbers converging on it[569]. - - [569] See Vere’s _Marches of the 4th Division_, p. 36. - -Nearly at the same moment Clausel’s whole force in column charged the -two brigades of the 4th Division which had carried the heights. The -French were in superior numbers--ten battalions to seven--and their two -reserve regiments were fresh troops, acting against men who had just -won a dearly-bought success by a great effort. The Anglo-Portuguese -line gave way, from the left first, where the 23rd Portuguese began -the movement. But it spread down the whole front, and the Fusiliers, -no less than Stubbs’s brigade, recoiled to the very foot of the -plateau[570]. - - [570] All this from Wachholz, who was now with the 7th Fusiliers. - -This reverse gave Clausel, who was now in command since Bonnet’s wound, -an opportunity that looked unlikely a few minutes before. He could -either withdraw the Army of Portugal in retreat, covering the three -disorganized divisions with those which were still intact--his own, -Bonnet’s, and the two reserve divisions of Ferey and Sarrut, which had -just come on the ground--Foy was far off and otherwise engaged--or -he might adopt a bolder policy, and attempt to take advantage of the -disaster to Pack and Cole, by bursting into the gap between Leith and -the British Arapile, and trying to break Wellington’s centre. Being an -ambitious and resolute man he chose the latter alternative--though it -was a dangerous one when Leith and Pakenham were bearing in hard upon -his routed left wing. Accordingly he left Sarrut to rally and cover the -three beaten divisions, and attacked with his right centre. His own -division followed the retreating brigades of Ellis and Stubbs down the -heights, while the three disposable regiments of Bonnet came into line -to its right, and Boyer’s three regiments of dragoons advanced down the -depression between the Greater Arapile and the recovered plateau. Ferey -was left in second line or reserve on the crest. - -At first the advance had considerable success. Bonnet’s regiments -pushed forward on the right, driving in the 1/40th[571], which had -come forward to cover Pack’s routed battalions, and pressing quite -close to the British Arapile, whose battery was turned upon them with -much effect. Clausel’s own division pushed the Fusiliers some way -down the slope and right into the valley at its foot. The dragoons -charged Stubbs’s retreating Portuguese, and cut up many of them, -though the 11th regiment finally succeeded in forming square with what -remained solid of its companies, and beat off the main attack. Part -of the French horsemen, however, pushed on, and reached the front of -Wellington’s reserve line, the 6th Division, which had now descended -the heights to relieve the broken 4th. One battalion of Hulse’s -brigade, the 2/53rd, was charged by several squadrons, but formed -square in time and repulsed them. Some little way to the right the -Fusiliers and the Portuguese 23rd formed a large parti-coloured square, -expecting a similar attack, but it did not come their way[572]. - - [571] See Vere’s _Marches of the 4th Division_, p. 36. The 3/27th - on top of the hill was not brought forward, as some wrongly say. - - [572] This from Wachholz’s narrative, very clearly explained. The - Fusiliers were _not_ relieved by the advance of the 1/40th and - 3/27th, as some authorities state. - -Wellington, thanks to his own prescience, had ample reserves with which -to parry Clausel’s desperate stroke. Setting aside the Light Division, -which now paired off against Foy on the extreme left of the field, -there were the 1st, 6th, and 7th Divisions, not to speak of Bradford’s -Portuguese and España’s Spaniards, all of them perfectly intact. And -of these, such was his strength, only one fresh unit, Clinton’s 6th -Division, required to be brought up to turn the day. It was now coming -over the valley where the 4th had preceded it, in a long majestic line, -Hulse’s brigade on the right, Hinde’s on the left, the Portuguese of -the Conde de Rezende in second line. The 1st Division, if it had been -needed, could have supported Clinton, from its post just to the north -of the Lesser Arapile, but had not yet got under way. - -The repulse of the new French attack was carried out with no great -difficulty, if not without serious fighting. The advance of Clausel’s -own division was checked by Marshal Beresford, who took Spry’s -Portuguese brigade out of the second line of the victorious 5th -Division, and led it diagonally along the southern slope of the plateau -to fall upon Clausel’s flank. This it did effectively, for the French -division could not dare to press on against the Fusiliers, and had to -throw back its left, and form up opposite Spry, with whom it became -engaged in a lively musketry fight. It could no longer move forward, -and was immobilized, though it held its own: Beresford was wounded in -the chest and taken to the rear, but Spry’s five battalions had served -the desired purpose, and stopped the French advance in this quarter. - -But the decisive check to Clausel’s offensive was given by Clinton and -the 6th Division, who advancing straight before them--over the ground -previously traversed by Cole--fell upon, overlapped at both ends, -and thoroughly discomfited in close musketry duel the nine battalions -of Bonnet’s division, which had pressed forward close to the Lesser -Arapile, as if to insert a wedge in the British line. Unsupported by -Boyer’s dragoons, who had shot their bolt too early, and were now -re-forming far to the rear, this French division was badly cut up. Each -of the three regiments which had taken part in its advance lost more -than 500 men in the struggle[573]: they fell back in disorder towards -the hill behind them, and their rout compelled Clausel’s division to -give way also, since it exposed its flank to the oncoming line of -Hulse’s brigade on Clinton’s right. Moreover the Great Arapile had to -be evacuated, for while the routed troops passed away to its left rear, -the 1st British Division was soon after seen steadily advancing towards -its right. The regiment on the hill (the 120th) was exposed to be cut -off and surrounded, and hastily ran down the back of the mount: while -retreating it was much molested by the skirmishers of the German Legion -Brigade of the 1st Division. It lost heavily, and the battery that had -been on the summit was captured before it could get away. - - [573] The 122nd lost 21 officers and 508 men, the 118th and - 119th probably as many or more--they had respectively 20 and - 26 officers hit. The 120th, the regiment on the Great Arapile, - lost only 8 officers--but 580 men, an almost inexplicable - disproportion. The 118th claimed to have taken a flag--perhaps - one of the 7th Portuguese Caçadores, who were badly cut up when - Bonnet first advanced. - -Thus Clausel’s brief half-hour of triumph ended in complete disaster, -and the two divisions with which he had made his stroke were flung back -against the slope in front of the woods in their rear, where they took -refuge behind the intact division of Ferey, the sole available reserve -in this part of the field. They were now as badly beaten as Thomières -and Maucune had been earlier in the day[574]. - - [574] The losses of three of Clausel’s four regiments chance to - have been preserved--the 25th Léger lost 16 officers and 322 men: - the 27th Ligne 7 officers and 159 men: the 59th Ligne 17 officers - and 253 men. The 50th, which had 26 officers hit, must have - had more casualties than any of the other three, so the total - divisional loss must have been well over 1,200. But Bonnet’s - division, much worse mauled, lost at least 2,200. - -While this lively action was in progress, the 5th and 3rd Divisions, -supported by the 7th and by Bradford’s Portuguese, in second line, -and assisted on their flanks by Arentschildt’s, D’Urban’s, and Anson’s -horse, had been driving in the wrecks of the French left wing towards -the woods. There was much resistance: on Sarrut’s intact battalions -many of the broken regiments had rallied. ‘These men, besmeared with -blood, dust, and clay, half naked, and some carrying only broken -weapons, fought with a fury not to be surpassed,’ says a 3rd Division -narrator of the battle. But the tide of battle was always moving -backward, towards the woods from which the French had originally -issued, and though it sometimes seemed about to stop for a minute or -two, a new outflanking manœuvre by the troops of Pakenham, D’Urban, and -Arentschildt, sufficed on each occasion to set it in motion again. - -The last stage of the conflict had now been reached: the French centre -was as thoroughly beaten as their left had been earlier in the day: -many of the battalions had gone completely to pieces, and were pouring -into the woods and making their way to the rear, with no thought -except for their personal safety. Of intact troops there were only -two divisions left, Ferey’s in the centre, and Foy’s on the extreme -right near Calvarisa de Ariba. It was generally considered that Foy -ought to have been overwhelmed by the much superior British force -in front of him, for not only was he opposed by the Light Division, -whose skirmishers had been bickering with him all the afternoon, but -the 1st Division became available for use against him the moment that -it was clear that the French offensive against the 4th Division had -been shattered, by the advance of Clinton and Spry. Wellington, it is -said[575], dispatched orders for the 1st Division to move forward and -strike in between Foy and the Greater Arapile, at the moment that he -saw that the 6th Division had broken Bonnet’s troops. If so, the order -was not executed, and General Campbell led out his three brigades much -too late, and not in time either to cut off Foy or to encircle the -right of the disordered mass of the enemy now retiring into the woods. -He seems to have acted simply as a link between the 6th Division on his -right, and the Light Division on his left, for the latter alone pressed -Foy vigorously. The only part of Campbell’s division which suffered -any appreciable loss at this time of the day were the light companies -of Löwe’s brigade--that which was composed of the King’s German Legion: -they fell on the flank of the French regiment that was evacuating the -Greater Arapile, and did it considerable harm[576]. - - [575] This is stated by Napier, iv. p. 273, and seems reasonable. - See also Tomkinson, p. 186. - - [576] The losses in Campbell’s Guards’ brigade (62 men) were in - the companies which defended the village of Arapiles earlier in - the day--those in his line brigade (Wheatley’s) were trifling--16 - wounded and no killed. The K.G.L. brigade lost 60 or so, all in - the light companies, during the advance. - -Meanwhile the last and not the least bloody fighting of the day was -beginning, on the hillside just outside the head of the forest, where -Marmont had deployed his main body at midday, and where Ferey’s -division was now standing in reserve, while the broken troops both from -its front and from its flank were streaming by to the rear. Clausel -had given Ferey orders to cover the retreat at all costs, warning him -that unless he could hold back the advancing enemy for some time the -disaster would be complete. The general to whom this unenviable task -was assigned carried it out with splendid courage, and by his constancy -gave time for the escape of the whole of the confused mass behind him. -He drew out his nine battalions in a single line, the centre a little -advanced to suit the shape of the hillside, the flanks a little thrown -back. The extreme battalions at each end were in square, to guard -against possible attacks by cavalry, but the seven central units were -deployed _en bataille_ in three-deep line, a formation which had not -been seen in the other episodes of the battle, and which made their -fire much more effective than that of regiments fighting in ‘column of -divisions,’ as most of their comrades had done[577]. - - [577] All this from Lemonnier-Delafosse of Ferey’s division, pp. - 158-9. - -Against the orderly front thus disposed Clinton came up with the 6th -Division, pursuing his victorious advance. He was flanked on the -left by the Fusilier brigade of the 4th Division, which had long ago -rallied and come up to the front since its disaster of an hour back. -On Clinton’s right were the 5th and 3rd Divisions, but both were at -the moment re-forming, after their long struggle with Sarrut and the -wrecks of the French left wing. Anson’s cavalry had at last got to the -front in this direction, and replaced D’Urban and Arentschildt--whose -squadrons were quite worn out--upon the extreme right of the allied -line. - -Clinton, it is said[578], refused to wait till the troops on his right -were re-formed, and hurried on the attack: it was growing dark, and -a few more minutes of delay would allow the French to make off under -cover of the night. Therefore he advanced at once, and found himself -engaged at once in a most desperate musketry contest, whose deadly -results recalled Albuera, so heavy were the losses on both sides. But -here the French had the advantage of being deployed, and not (as at -Albuera) wedged in deep columns. The first fire of the French line, -as Clinton’s brigades closed in, was particularly murderous, and -swept away whole sections of the attacking force. ‘The ground over -which we had to pass,’ writes an officer in Hinde’s brigade[579], -‘was a remarkably clear slope, like the glacis of a fortress, most -favourable for the defensive fire of the enemy, and disadvantageous -for the assailant. The craggy ridge, on which the French were drawn -up, rose so abruptly that the rear ranks could fire over the heads of -the front. But we had approached within two hundred yards before the -musketry began: it was far the heaviest fire that I have ever seen, and -accompanied by constant discharges of grape. An uninterrupted blaze was -thus maintained, so that the crest of the hill seemed one long streak -of flame. Our men came down to the charging position, and commenced -firing from that level, at the same time keeping touch to the right, so -that the gaps opened by the enemy’s fire were instantly filled up. At -the first volley about eighty men of our right wing fell to the rear in -one group. Our commanding officer rode up to know the cause, and found -that they were every one wounded!’ But heavy as was the loss of this -regiment (137 out of 600 present), it was trifling compared to that of -its neighbours to the right, in Hulse’s brigade, where the right and -centre regiments in the line, the 1/11th and 1/61st, lost respectively -340 men out of 516 and 366 out of 546--a proportion to which only -Albuera could show a parallel. For many minutes--one observer calls it -nearly an hour, but the stress of the struggle multiplied time--the two -hostile lines continued blazing at each other in the growing dusk. ‘The -glare of light caused by the artillery, the continued fire of musketry, -and by the dry grass which had caught fire, gave the face of the hill -a terrific appearance: it was one sheet of flame, and Clinton’s men -seemed to be attacking a burning mountain, whose crater was defended by -a barrier of shining steel[580].’ The French, so far as losses went, -probably suffered no more, or perhaps less, than their assailants: but -their casualties were nevertheless appalling. And at last they gave -way: ‘the cruel fire cost us many lives,’ writes an officer of the 31st -Léger, ‘and at last, slowly, and after having given nearly an hour’s -respite to the remainder of the army, Ferey gave back, still protected -by his flanking squares, to the very edge of the forest, where he -halted our half-destroyed division. Formed in line it still presented a -respectable front, and halted, despite of the English batteries, which -enfiladed us with a thundering fire. Here Ferey met the form of death -which the soldier prefers to all others, he was slain outright by a -round-shot[581].’ - - [578] But not on the best authority: regimental diaries are not - always safe to follow on such points. - - [579] Ross Lewin of the 32nd, ii. pp. 25-6. - - [580] Grattan, p. 253. - - [581] Lemonnier-Delafosse, p. 159. This note about Ferey’s being - slain outright does not agree with the usual statement that he - was mortally wounded, and died two days later, given by several - English diarists. But Lemonnier-Delafosse is first-hand authority. - -Clinton’s English regiments were so disordered and reduced by the awful -fire through which they had passed in their victorious march, that he -put into front line for a final assault on the enemy his Portuguese -brigade, that of the Conde de Rezende, which was still intact, as -it had hitherto been in reserve. Its five battalions deployed, and -advanced against the now much contracted line of Ferey’s division: they -were supported on the left by the Fusilier brigade of the 4th Division, -on the right by the 5th Division, which was now re-formed and well to -the front. Anson’s cavalry was also in this direction. - -The dying effort of Ferey’s division was worthy of its previous hard -fighting. ‘Formed right up against the trees,’ writes the French -officer, whom we have already quoted, ‘no longer with any artillery to -help, we saw the enemy marching up against us in two lines, the first -of which was composed of Portuguese. Our position was critical, but we -waited for the shock: the two lines moved up toward us; their order -was so regular that in the Portuguese regiment in front of us we could -see the company intervals, and note the officers behind keeping the -men in accurate line, by blows with the flat of their swords or their -canes. We fired first, the moment that they got within range: and the -volleys which we delivered from our two first ranks were so heavy and -so continuous that, though they tried to give us back fire for fire, -the whole melted away. The second line was coming up behind--this -was English, we should have tried to receive it in the same way, -still holding our ground though under a flank fire of artillery, when -suddenly the left of our line ceased firing and fell back into the -wood in complete disorder. The 70th Ligne had found itself turned by -cavalry; it broke; the rout spread down the front to the 26th and 77th; -only our two battalions of the 31st Léger held firm, under the fire of -the enemy, which continued so long as we showed outside the edge of the -forest. We only gave back as the day ended, retiring some 250 yards -from our original position, and keeping our _voltigeur_ companies still -in a skirmishing line in front[582].’ - - [582] Lemonnier-Delafosse, pp. 161-2. - -This vigorous account of the last stand of the French reserve is not -far from being accurate. It is quite true that the Portuguese brigade -of the 6th Division suffered terribly in its attack, and was completely -checked. It lost 487 men during the fifteen minutes in which it was -engaged--the heaviest casualty list in any of the brigades of its -nation, even heavier than that of Stubbs’s troops in the 4th Division. -The only point that requires to be added is that it was not so much a -panic caused by a partial cavalry charge which broke the 70th Ligne, -and finally dispersed Ferey’s regiments[583], as the pressure of the -5th Division upon the whole of the left of their line, which collapsed -almost simultaneously. But they had done their work--before they -dispersed, leaving only the 31st Léger to act as a most inadequate -rearguard, they had detained the allies for a half-hour or more, and -night had set in. Wellington ordered the 6th Division to pursue, but -it was so much cut up and fatigued that it only advanced a hundred -yards into the forest, and then halted and settled down for the night. -Why the intact 7th Division was not rather used for the pursuit it is -hard to understand. Still more so is the fact that no cavalry was sent -forward in this direction: the woods, no doubt, looked uninviting and -dangerous, but the enemy was in a state of absolute panic, and ready to -disperse at the least pressure. ‘But,’ says the most intelligent of the -British diarists with the mounted arm, ‘the cavalry during the assault -on the last hill was ordered back to the point on the left where we -assembled before the attack, leaving the infantry to pursue without -us. Had this not been done (though it might not have been prudent to -pursue with both in the night), yet by their being at hand there was a -greater chance of accomplishing more. The order came from Sir Stapleton -Cotton himself. The infantry moved in pursuit by moonlight.... I have -heard from an officer in the 6th Division that although they had been -marching all day, and were so tired, when ordered to halt for the -night, that they could not possibly have marched much farther, yet they -sat up through the night, talking over the action, each recalling to -his comrade the events that happened[584].’ - - [583] Ferey’s four regiments probably lost somewhat over 1,100 - men--the 31st Léger had 380 casualties, the 47th Ligne (with - 18 officers killed and wounded) something like 500; the 70th - suffered least, it returned only 111 casualties; the 26th - slightly more, perhaps 150. The whole forms a moderate total, - considering the work done. - - [584] Tomkinson (of Anson’s brigade), p. 187. - -Some part of the slackness of the pursuit is to be explained by an -unfortunate misconception by which Wellington (through no fault of -his own) was obsessed that night. He was under the impression that -the Castle of Alba de Tormes was still held by the Spanish garrison -which he had left there, and that the bridge and the neighbouring ford -were therefore unavailable for the retreat of the French, who (as he -supposed) must be retiring by the fords of Huerta and Villa Gonzalo, -which they had used to reach the field. Unhappily--as has been already -mentioned--Carlos de España had withdrawn the battalion at Alba -without making any mention of the fact to his Commander-in-Chief[585]. -Wellington therefore put more thought to urging the pursuit in the -direction of the East than of the South, and it was not till late in -the night, and when nothing but stragglers had been picked up on the -Huerta road, that he discovered what had really occurred. - - [585] Tomkinson in his diary (p. 188) has a curious story to the - effect that ‘the Spanish general, before the action, asked if he - should not take his troops out of Alba--after he had done it. - Lord Wellington replied, “Certainly not,” and the Don was afraid - to tell what he had done, Lord W. therefore acted, of course, as - if the place had been in our possession still.’ - -It remains to relate the unimportant happenings on this front during -the evening. At the moment when the French attack on Wellington’s -centre failed, about 7 o’clock or soon after, Clausel sent to Foy, -whose division still lay behind Calvarisa de Ariba, covering the way to -the Huerta fords, the order to retire. His instructions were to cover -the flank of the line of retreat of the broken army, and to take up -successive detaining positions on its right, on the eastern side of the -brook and ravine which lie between the two Arapiles and the village -of Utrera. These orders Foy carried out skilfully and well. He fended -off the Light Division, which had moved out in pursuit of him, with -a heavy rearguard of light troops, always giving way when pressed. -His concern was almost entirely with this British unit, for the 1st -Division had started too late to get near him. The Light Division and -its battery kept him on the run, but never came up with his main body. -‘Night alone saved my division, and the troops that I was covering,’ -wrote Foy, ‘without it I should probably have been crushed, and the -enemy would have arrived at Alba de Tormes before the wrecks of our -seven routed divisions got there. An hour after dark the English -cavalry was still pushing charges home against my regiments, which I -had placed in alternate chequers of line and column. I had the luck to -keep the division in hand till the last, and to steer it in the right -direction, though many routed battalions kept pressing in upon my left, -and threatened to carry disorder into my ranks. The pursuit ceased near -Santa Maria de Utrera[586].’ - - [586] Foy, _Vie militaire_, pp. 176-7. - -It is difficult to make out what became of the heavy dragoons of -Bock during this long retrograde movement of Foy’s division: they -were certainly not the cavalry of which the French general speaks as -charging him during his retreat, for they returned no single man or -horse killed or wounded that day[587]. Perhaps, far away to the left, -they may have been driving in from position to position, the one -regiment of Boyer’s dragoons which had been left to cover Foy’s extreme -outer flank. More probably they may have been pushing their march -towards the fords of Huerta, in the vain hope of finding masses of -disbanded enemies on the way, and ultimately cutting them off from the -river. This hypothesis is borne out by the fact that the bivouac of the -heavy German brigade was that night in front of Pelabravo, much to the -north-east of the resting-places of the rest of the army, and in the -general direction of the fords[588]. - - [587] This cavalry _may_ have been the two detached squadrons - of the 14th Light Dragoons, which had not followed the rest of - Arentschildt’s brigade to the right. - - [588] See Schwertfeger’s _History of the German Legion_, i. p. - 378. - -That the pursuit was misdirected was a most lamentable chance for -Wellington. If it had been urged in the right direction, the Army of -Portugal would have been annihilated as a fighting-body, and would -never have been able to make head again in the autumn. For the forest -of Alba de Tormes was full of nothing but a disorderly crowd, making -the best of its way towards the bridge, with no proper rearguard and -no commander in charge of the retreat. Clausel, wounded in the foot, -was being looked after by the surgeons in Alba, and was barely able -to mount his horse next day. The rout was complete: ‘a shapeless -mass of soldiery was rolling down the road like a torrent--infantry, -cavalry, artillery, wagons, carts, baggage-mules, the reserve park of -the artillery drawn by oxen, were all mixed up. The men, shouting, -swearing, running, were out of all order, each one looking after -himself alone--a complete stampede. The panic was inexplicable to one -who, coming from the extreme rear, knew that there was no pursuit by -the enemy to justify the terror shown. I had to stand off far from the -road, for if I had got near it, I should have been swept off by the -torrent in spite of myself[589].’ So writes the officer, already twice -quoted for the narrative of the end of the battle, whose regiment, -still hanging together in the most creditable fashion, brought up -the rear of the retreat. It is clear that any sort of a pursuit would -have produced such a general block at the bridge-head that a disaster -like that of Leipzig must have followed, and the whole of the rear of -the Army of Portugal, brought up against the river Tormes, must have -surrendered _en masse_. - - [589] Lemonnier-Delafosse, p. 164. - -From eight o’clock at night till three in the morning the routed army -was streaming across the bridge and the ford. Once covered by the -Tormes some regiments regained a certain order, but many thousands of -fugitives, pressing on ahead in unthinking panic, were scattered all -over the country-side, and did not come back to their colours for many -days, or even weeks. - -The actual loss of the Army of Portugal would appear to have been some -14,000 to 15,000 men, not including the ‘missing,’ who afterwards -turned up and came back to the ranks. Marmont in his dispatch had the -effrontery to write that he lost only 6,000 men[590], and 9 guns: a -statement only equalled in mendacity by Soult’s assertion that Albuera -had cost him but 2,800 casualties[591]. No general list of losses by -regiments was ever given to Napoleon, though he demanded it: but a -return proposing to include the casualties not only of Salamanca but -of the minor combats of Castrillo and Garcia Hernandez was drawn up, -giving a total of 12,435[592]. On the whole, however, it would be safe -to allow for 14,000 men as the total loss, exclusive of stragglers. -Among officers of rank the Commander-in-Chief was wounded: Ferey -and Thomières were killed: the latter died inside the English lines -after the battle. Clausel and Bonnet were both wounded, the former -slightly, the latter severely, so that four of the eight divisional -generals of infantry were hit. Of the brigadiers, Desgraviers (division -Thomières) was mortally and Menne (division Foy) severely wounded. -The trophies lost were 2 eagles (those of the 22nd and 101st), 6 -other colours[593], and 20 guns[594]. Of these last 12 represented -the divisional batteries of Thomières and Bonnet, which were taken -whole, and the other 8, as it would seem, pieces captured from the -long line of batteries on Maucune’s flank, which was rolled up when Le -Marchant and Leith swept the plateau in their triumphant advance. Of -the eight French divisions those of Thomières and Bonnet would appear -to have lost about 2,200 men apiece, Maucune nearly 2,000, Clausel, -Brennier, and Ferey above 1,200 each, Sarrut perhaps 500: Foy’s very -heavy losses nearly all fell on the next day. The cavalry, with 43 -officers hit, must account for at least 500 more of the total[595], and -the artillery must have lost, along with their 20 guns, at least 300 -or 400 gunners[596]. Of prisoners (wounded and unwounded), there were -according to Wellington’s dispatch 137 officers[597] and nearly 7,000 -men. - - [590] Marmont to Berthier, Tudela, July 31, in his _Mémoires_, - iv. p. 448. - - [591] See vol. iv. p. 295. - - [592] viz. killed or prisoners--officers 162, men 3,867; - wounded--officers 232, men 7,529; _traînards_, 645 men; 12 guns - and 2 eagles missing. This return is in the Paris archives. It - is certainly incomplete: 60 officers were killed, 137 prisoners, - which makes 197 _tués ou pris_ instead of 162. And 20 guns were - lost. - - [593] A regiment whose 1st battalion was elsewhere carried not - an eagle but a simple standard per battalion instead. Of such - regiments, wanting their senior battalion and therefore their - eagle, there were with Marmont three. Two, the 66th and 82nd, - were in Maucune’s division, one, the 26th, in Ferey’s. The - colours probably belonged to some of these, of which several were - much cut up, especially the 66th. - - [594] The returns of the Army of Portugal show a deficiency of - 20 guns between July 15 and August 1, of which 12 represent - the divisional batteries of Thomières and Bonnet, which have - completely disappeared. Wellington says, ‘official returns - account for only 11 guns taken, but it is believed that 20 have - fallen into our hands.’ This was correct. - - [595] The deficiency in cavalry rank and file shown by the muster - rolls between July 15 and August 1 was 512. - - [596] Perhaps more: for the Reserve Artillery and Park alone show - 1,450 rank and file on July 15 and only 707 on August 1. - - [597] Sixty-three officers arrived in England as the Salamanca - batch of prisoners; of these some were wounded, for their - names occur both in Martinien’s tables as _blessés_, and in - the Transport Office returns at the Record Office as prisoners - shipped off. The remainder of the 137 were badly wounded, and - came later, or died in hospital. - -Wellington returned his loss in the British units as 3,129, in the -Portuguese as 2,078: of España’s Spaniards 2 were killed and 4 wounded. -This makes up the total of 5,173, sent off immediately after the -battle. The separate Portuguese return forwarded by Beresford to Lisbon -gives the loss of the troops of that nation as somewhat less--1,637 -instead of 2,078: the difference of 441 is partly to be accounted -for by the reappearance of stragglers who were entered as ‘missing’ -in the first casualty-sheet, but cannot entirely explain itself in -that fashion. Which of the returns is the more accurate it is hard -to be sure, but a prima facie preference would naturally be given to -the later and more carefully detailed document. Taking British and -Portuguese together, it is clear that the 6th Division, which lost -1,500 men, was far the hardest hit. The 3rd and 5th, which decided the -day on the right, got off easily, with a little more than 500 each: the -4th Division, owing to the mishap to the Fusilier brigade and Stubbs’s -Portuguese, had very nearly 1,000 casualties. Pack’s five battalions -lost 386 men in the one short episode of the battle in which they were -engaged, the unsuccessful attack on the Great Arapile, and were lucky -to fare no worse. The cavalry total of 173 killed and wounded was -also very moderate considering the good work that the brigades of Le -Marchant, D’Urban, and Arentschildt performed. In the 1st, 7th, and -Light Divisions, the trifling losses were all in the flank-companies -sent out in skirmishing line: of the battalions none was engaged as -a whole[598]. The artillery were overmatched by the French guns all -through the day, and it is surprising to find that they returned only -four men killed, and ten wounded. The casualty list of officers of high -rank was disproportionately large--not only was Le Marchant killed, but -Marshal Beresford, Stapleton Cotton, commanding the cavalry[599], and -Leith and Cole, each a divisional general, were disabled. Of officers -in the Portuguese service, Collins, commanding a brigade of the 7th -Division, was mortally hurt, and the Conde de Rezende, who led the -Portuguese of the 6th Division, was wounded. - - [598] The 7th Division would have had practically no loss but - for the skirmishing in the early morning near Nuestra Señora de - la Peña, and the heaviest item in the 1st Division casualties - was the 62 men of the Guards’ flank-companies who were hit while - defending the village of Arapiles. - - [599] Cotton was shot after the battle was over by a caçador - sentry, whose challenge to halt he had disregarded while riding - back from the pursuit. - -The victory of Salamanca was certainly an astonishing feat of rapid -decision and instantaneous action. The epigrammatic description of it -as ‘the beating of 40,000 men in forty minutes’ hardly over-states its -triumphant celerity: before that time had elapsed, from the moment when -Pakenham and Leith struck the French left, the battle was undoubtedly -in such a condition that the enemy had no chance left--he could only -settle whether his retreat should be more or less prompt. Clausel chose -to make a hopeless counter-offensive move, and so prolonged the fight -till dark--he would probably have been wiser to break off at once, and -to retreat at six o’clock, covering his routed left with his intact -reserve divisions. He would certainly have lost several thousand men -less if he had retired after repulsing Cole and Pack, and had made no -attempt to press the advantage that he had gained over them. It may be -argued in his defence that the last hour of battle, costly though it -proved to him, prevented Wellington’s pursuit from commencing in the -daylight, an undoubted boon to the defeated army. But at the most the -victor would have had only one hour at his disposition before dusk; the -French were taking refuge in a forest, where orderly pursuit would have -been difficult; and looking at Wellington’s usual methods of utilizing -a victory (e. g. Vittoria) we may feel doubtful whether the beaten -enemy--if covered by Sarrut, Ferey, and Foy, as a regular rearguard, -would have suffered more than he actually did. For Wellington’s whole -idea of pursuit turned on the false notion that the castle, bridge, -and ford of Alba de Tormes were still blocked by the Spaniards whom he -had left there. By the time that he had discovered that the enemy was -not retreating towards Huerta and Villa Gonzalo, but escaping over the -Tormes in some other way, the hour would have been late. - -Undoubtedly the best summary and encomium of Wellington’s tactics on -this eventful day is that of an honest enemy, the very capable and -clear-sighted Foy, who wrote in his diary six days after the fight[600]: - - [600] Diary in _Vie militaire_, ed. Girod de l’Ain, p. 178. - -‘The battle of Salamanca is the most masterly in its management, -the most considerable in the number of troops engaged, and the most -important in results of all the victories that the English have gained -in these latter days. It raises Lord Wellington almost to the level of -Marlborough. Hitherto we had been aware of his prudence, his eye for -choosing a position, and his skill in utilizing it. At Salamanca he -has shown himself a great and able master of manœuvres. He kept his -dispositions concealed for almost the whole day: he waited till we -were committed to our movement before he developed his own: he played -a safe game[601]: he fought in the oblique order--it was a battle in -the style of Frederic the Great. As for ourselves, we had no definite -intention of bringing on a battle, so that we found ourselves let in -for it without any preliminary arrangements having been made. The -army was moving without much impulse or supervision, and what little -there was stopped with the wounding of the Marshal.’ In another note -he adds: ‘The Duke of Ragusa committed us to the action--he brought -it on contrary to Clausel’s advice. The left was already checked when -he received his wound: after that moment it was impossible either to -refuse to fight, or to give the fight a good direction: all that could -be done was to attenuate the sum of the disaster--that Clausel did. -There was no gap in the command--we should have been no better off if -the Marshal had never been hurt. He is not quite honest on that point -in his dispatch[602].’ - - [601] _Il a joué serré._ This idiom is explained in the - Dictionary of the Academy as ‘jouer sans rien hasarder.’ - - [602] Note in same volume, p. 177. - -With this criticism we may undoubtedly agree. Foy has hit upon the -main points in which Salamanca was a startling revelation to the -contemporary observer--no one on the French side, and but few upon -the British, had yet realized that Wellington on the offensive could -be no less formidable and efficient than Wellington on the defensive. -After July 22, 1812, no opponent could dare to take liberties with -him, as Soult, Masséna, and Marmont, each in his turn, had done up -till that date. The possible penalty was now seen to be too great. -Moreover, the prestige of the British general was so much enhanced -that he could safely count upon it as not the least of his military -assets--as we shall see him do in the Pyrenees, a little more than a -year after Salamanca had been won. To the other thesis that Foy lays -down--the statement that Marmont had, by his initial movement, made -disaster inevitable before he was wounded--we may also give our assent. -Jourdan came to the same conclusion--the Emperor Napoleon also fixed -the responsibility in the same way. The Marshal’s ingenious special -pleading, to the effect that but for his personal misadventure he -would yet have won the day, will convince none but blind enemies of -Wellington. Of some of the charges which Napoleon laid to his charge -he must be acquitted: he did not know in the least that King Joseph -was on his way to join him from Madrid with 15,000 men. The dispatches -sent to warn him of this fact had all miscarried, and the last news -from the Army of the Centre which had reached him had intimated that -no immediate help was to be expected from that quarter. Nor was he -wrong in not waiting for the succours from Caffarelli: these were so -trifling--800 sabres and one horse battery--that their presence or -absence could make little difference in the battle. - -But the Marshal’s flagrant and irreparable fault was that, having made -up his mind that Wellington would not fight under any provocation--a -conclusion for which the earlier episodes of the campaign gave him some -justification--he got his army into a position in which he had battle -suddenly forced upon him, at a moment when he was not in a position to -accept it with advantage. The attempt to turn Wellington’s right wing -on the afternoon of July 22nd was an unpardonable liberty, only taken -because the Marshal had come to despise his opponent. The liberty was -resented in the most forcible way--and there was no means of avoiding -disaster when Thomières and Maucune had once started out on their rash -turning movement. - - - - -SECTION XXXIII: CHAPTER VIII - -THE CONSEQUENCES OF SALAMANCA - - -The dawn of July 23rd revealed to Wellington that the French army had -passed the Tormes at the bridge and forts of Alba, and that nothing -remained on the western bank of the river save small parties of -fugitives and wounded, who had lost their way in the forest. Some of -these were gleaned up by Anson’s and Bock’s brigades of cavalry, who -were pushed forward to search the woods and seek for the enemy. Anson’s -patrols reached the bridge, and found a French rearguard watching it. -This was composed of Foy’s division, to whom Clausel had committed the -covering of his retreat. It cleared off, after firing a few shots. Foy -had been told to block the passage till 9 o’clock, but went off long -before, when the disordered main body had got a good start. On the -report that he was gone, Wellington sent Anson’s squadrons across the -bridge of Alba de Tormes, while Bock forded the river lower down at La -Encina. The state of the roads, strewn with baggage and wounded men, -showed that the French had used all the three roads leading east from -Alba[603], and were on their way to Arevalo, not towards their base at -Valladolid: to have marched in that direction would have brought them -right across the front of the advancing British army. Wellington sent -out detachments on all the roads which the enemy had taken, but urged -the main pursuit by the central and most important road, that by Garcia -Hernandez on Peñaranda. Contrary to his wont, he pushed on this day -with great celerity, riding himself with the head of the column formed -by the main body of Anson’s light dragoons. This vanguard was followed, -at some distance, by the 1st and Light Divisions. Those infantry units -which had fought hard on the previous day were allowed a rest. About -seven miles beyond Alba de Tormes Anson’s patrols came upon a regular -rearguard of the enemy, behind the Caballero brook (a tributary of the -Almar), in and about the village of Garcia Hernandez. This was, of -course, Foy and the French 1st Division, the only troops in Clausel’s -army which had not been seriously engaged in the battle. They were -accompanied by a battery and a brigade of Curto’s _chasseurs_. Around -and about the formed troops scattered parties were visible--the village -was full of men drawing water from the wells. On the approach of the -British cavalry column--the infantry were still miles behind--Foy -prepared to resume his retreat, the cavalry drew up on a rising ground, -to the north of Garcia Hernandez, to cover the movement: the leading -regiments of the foot started off at once along the high-road, the -others halted for a space, to the right of the _chasseurs_, out of -sight of the British, whose view of them was intercepted by the slope -on which the French cavalry were drawn up. - - [603] See Tomkinson’s _Diary_, p. 190. He gives the three roads - used as (1) Alba, Mancera de Abaxo, Junialcon; (2) Alba, Garcia - Hernandez, Peñaranda; (3) Encina, Zorita, Cebolla [names all badly - spelled]. It is doubtful whether the troops on the last road were - not disorderly masses of fugitives only. The bulk of the army - certainly went by Peñaranda. - -Wellington, as it seems, saw only the hostile squadrons, and resolved -to drive them off without delay, in order to be able to press in upon -the infantry columns which were retiring farther away. He directed -Anson to attack the _chasseurs_ with so much of his brigade as was -up at the front: several squadrons were absent, some guarding the -prisoners of yesterday, others exploring on distant roads. Two -squadrons each of the 11th and 16th Light Dragoons delivered the -frontal attack on the French brigade, while the leading squadrons of -Bock’s brigade, which was coming up rapidly from the flank, and was not -yet formed in line, were to turn its right wing. - -The French light cavalry, which had been much mauled on the preceding -day, and was evidently in no fighting mood, gave way precipitately -before the attack of the Light Dragoons, and rode off in confusion to -their own right rear. There was no time for Bock’s Germans to come up -with them: but the leading squadrons of the 1st Heavy Dragoons of the -Legion, pushing on in pursuit, received, to their surprise, a heavy -volley in their flank from a French battalion in square, which they had -not noticed in their advance. - -There were, in fact, two regiments of infantry to the right of the -routed _chasseurs_, and by the sudden flight of their comrades they -found themselves suddenly uncovered and engaged. They were the 6th -Léger and 76th Line, each two battalions strong, and counting together -about 2,400 bayonets. Of these the unit nearest the cavalry was a -battalion of the 76th in square: it was the fire of this body which -had struck the leading German squadron in flank, and thrown it into -disorder as it was charging the routed French horse. Farther to the -east were the other battalion of the 76th and the two of the 6th Léger, -on the slopes above the road, which here winds below the small eminence -which the French cavalry had occupied and the hill of La Serna, a long -and fairly steep height, which gives its name in many histories to the -combat that ensued. - -What followed on the unexpected discovery of the French infantry was -the effect not of Wellington’s direct orders, nor of the leading of -the short-sighted Bock, who had hardly realized the situation when his -subordinates were already making their decision. It was entirely the -exploit of the gallant squadron-leaders of the two regiments of German -dragoons. They were coming up in a sort of échelon of squadrons, the -first regiment leading, so that when the fire of the French square -struck and disordered the leading unit, the responsibility for action -fell on the officers commanding the others. Captain von der Decken -who led the 3rd squadron determined without hesitation to charge the -French square--his men were already getting up speed, and the enemy -was but a short distance from him. Shouting to the squadron to throw -forward its right wing and ride home, he led it straight at the French. -The first fire of the square, delivered at eighty yards, brought down -several men and horses, and wounded (mortally as it proved in the end) -von der Decken himself. He kept his saddle, however, and only fell -when the second fire was given, at twenty yards range. This volley -was destructive, but did not break the impetus of the squadron, which -charged right home. In most cases where cavalry reached the bayonets of -a square during the Peninsular War, it had proved unable to break in, -and had recoiled with loss--like Craufurd’s squadrons at the combat -of Barquilla[604], and Montbrun’s at Fuentes de Oñoro. Here, however, -the rare feat of riding down well-formed infantry was performed--it is -said by several eye-witnesses that the breach was originally made by -a mortally-wounded horse, which reared right on top of the kneeling -front rank of the French, and then rolled over kicking, and bore down -six or eight men at once. Several dragoons leapt the bank of struggling -and overthrown soldiers, and broke into the rear ranks--thereupon the -whole square fell to pieces in disorder. Many of the Frenchmen were -hewn down, but the majority dropped their muskets and surrendered -unhurt. The lists of prisoners at the Record Office give the names of -sixteen officers of the 76th sent to England, of whom only two were -wounded. Of the rank and file not more than fifty, it is said, got -away[605]. Observers who came on the field later in the day noted with -curiosity the long lines of muskets laid down in orderly rows. This was -an astonishing achievement for a single squadron of 120 men--they had -captured or cut down five times their own numbers of veteran troops of -Ney’s old 6th Corps. - - [604] See vol. iii. p. 255. - - [605] I took the trouble to work out the names from the immense - list of prisoners at the Record Office, in order to test the - truth of the statement that the whole battalion was captured. - The following names appear from the 76th--Bailly, Cavie, Catrin, - Demarest, Denis, Duclos, Dupin, Dupont, Dusan, Gautier, Guimblot, - L’Huissier, Richard, Ravenal, besides two wounded officers, - Lambert and Martinot. In addition, one officer (Lebert) was - killed, and in Martinien’s _Liste des officiers tués et blessés_ - we have five more down as wounded, Dessessard, Lanzavecchia, - Massibot, Norry, Rossignol. These may have died of their wounds, - and so never have reached England; or they may have escaped, - though wounded. The twenty-two names must represent practically - the whole of the officers of the battalion. - -Some way to the right of this unlucky battalion were two more, forming -the 6th Léger. Seeing the havoc made of his comrades, and noting the -remaining squadrons of the Germans sweeping across the slope toward -him, the colonel of this regiment ordered his men to retreat uphill -and climb the steep slope behind. He hoped to get upon ground where -cavalry could not easily follow. The two battalions, still in column, -for they had not (like the 76th) formed square, moved hastily upwards: -the voices of officers were heard shouting, ‘_allongez le pas, gagnons -la hauteur_[606].’ The nearest enemy to them was the second squadron -of the 1st Dragoons K.G.L., led by Captain von Reizenstein, who put on -the pace when he saw the French scrambling higher, and came up with the -rearmost battalion before it was very far from the road. The two rear -companies faced about when the dragoons drew near, and delivered a fire -that was fairly effective, when it is considered that the men had been -going as hard as they could trot, and were halted and put into action -at a second’s notice. But it did not suffice to stop the dragoons, -who rode in, at the cost of many killed and wounded, and cut up the -companies that had stood to meet them: many men were sabred, more taken -prisoners. The rear of the column, however, scrambled uphill in a mass, -and there joined the other battalion of the 6th Léger, which formed -square on the sky-line. They had on their flank a squadron or so of -_chasseurs_, apparently a fragment of the brigade that had given way so -easily before Anson’s attack twenty minutes before. - - [606] All this from Schwertfeger, i. p. 381. - -Against this mass charged the leading squadrons of the 2nd Heavy -Dragoons K.G.L., which had at last come up to the front, and some -of the officers and men of the 1st, who had already done such good -work lower down the hill. The French square was not perfect or -regular--apparently it was disordered by the fugitives from the broken -battalion, who ran in for shelter, and formed up as best they could. -The charge of the Germans was delivered with splendid impetus--though -the regiment had been galloping for 300 yards uphill--and was -completely successful. The French _chasseurs_ rode off without -engaging: the ill-formed square crumpled up: many of the men threw -down their arms and surrendered, the rest dispersed and ran in coveys -along the slopes of the plateau, towards the nearest friendly troops. -These were the four battalions of the 39th and 69th Line, the surviving -regiments of the division. Foy himself was in one of the squares; his -surviving brigadier, Chemineau, in the other. - -Intoxicated with the glorious successes that they had gained, a -large but disordered mass of the victorious dragoons rode after the -fugitives, and charged the nearest of the French squares--one of the -69th Line. The enemy held firm, their fire was given with effect, and -killed the officer who led this last effort (Captain von Uslar) and -many of his men. The rest swerved back, and rode away under a pelting -fire from the battalion that they had attacked and from the other -three, which lay close on its flank. - -So ended the charge of Garcia Hernandez, the most dashing and -successful attack made by any of Wellington’s cavalry during the -whole war, as Foy--the best of witnesses--formally states in his -history[607]. Though not more destructive in its results than Le -Marchant’s onslaught on Maucune at Salamanca, it was a far more -difficult affair. For Le Marchant had charged troops not in square, -and already shaken by conflict with Leith’s division; while the -Germans attacked without any infantry support, and fell upon intact -battalions, of which two at least had formed square. Moreover, the -French were supported by artillery and cavalry, though the former -cleared off promptly, and the latter allowed themselves to be routed -very easily by Anson’s squadrons. Altogether it was a glorious first -experience of war for the Heavy Dragoons--neither of the regiments -had ever charged before, and they had seen but a little skirmishing -during the six months since their arrival at Lisbon. They were duly -granted the battle-honour, ‘Garcia Hernandez,’ which they continued to -bear on their guidons as long as Hanover was an independent state. Two -Hanoverian cavalry regiments of to-day in the Prussian army continue -to show it, as theoretical heirs of the old Heavy Dragoons. The most -astonishing feature of the exploit was that it was the sole work of -the squadron-leaders--Wellington had only given the general order to -attack--Bock had been with the fraction of the 1st Dragoons which -charged along with Anson, and was not directing the marvellous uphill -ride. It was a regimental triumph, not an exhibition of cavalry tactics -by the Commander-in-Chief or the brigadier[608]. - - [607] Foy, _Guerre de la Péninsule_, i. pp. 290-1. - - [608] I have used for the narrative of this interesting fight - not only the numerous and valuable K.G.L. sources printed or - quoted by Beamish and Schwertfeger, but the letters of von - Hodenberg, aide-de-camp to Bock, lent me by his representative, - Major von Hodenberg, now resident in Hanover. For this officer’s - interesting career see _Blackwood_ for May 1912, where I - published large sections from these letters. - -[Illustration: SALAMANCA. - -Part of the field, showing approximate position at the moment of the -advance of the 6th Division about 7 p.m.] - -[Illustration: Combat of GARCIA HERNANDEZ (July 23 1812)] - -The losses of the victors were very heavy--the 1st Regiment had 2 -officers and 28 men killed, 2 other officers wounded (one--von der -Decken--mortally), and 37 men. The 2nd Regiment lost 1 officer (von -Uslar) killed, with 21 men, and 1 officer and 29 men wounded. In -this total the striking figure is the high proportion of killed to -wounded--52 to 69--which bears witness to the murderous power of the -old musket-ball when delivered point-blank, into the bodies of men -who were pressing right up to the muzzles of the infantry in square. -There were six men missing to be added to the total of losses--127 in -all--whether these were individuals who were taken prisoners in the -last attempt to break the square of the 69th, or whether they were -mortally wounded men, whose horses carried them far from the scene of -action and whose bodies were not found, it is impossible to say. The -loss of 127 officers and men out of about 770 present was, however, by -no means disproportionately heavy, when the results of the charge are -considered. - -Of the two French regiments engaged, a whole battalion of the 76th was -captured or destroyed--of the 27 officers with it one was killed, 5 -wounded, 16 taken prisoners: taking the same proportion of its rank -and file, very few out of 650 can have escaped. The 6th Léger was less -completely annihilated, but it had its colonel (Molard) and 6 other -officers taken prisoners[609], and 8 more wounded, with about 500 -rank and file taken or hurt. Allowing for some small losses to the -_chasseurs_, the total casualties of the French must have been about -1,100. - - [609] Their names were the colonel, Molard (who died, a prisoner, - of his wounds, August 4), Baudart, Paulin, Piancet, Turpin, - Paris, Bouteille; they were verified in the prisoners-rolls at - the Record Office by me. - -When the last charge of the Heavy Dragoons was over, Foy led his -surviving battalions off, followed at a distance by Anson’s brigade, -when it had re-formed. The Germans were too fatigued to do more: the -leading British infantry, the Light Division, was only just coming in -sight far to the rear. The pursuit, therefore, by the four British -squadrons had no further results--if they had chanced to have a horse -battery with them it might have been much more effective. Six miles -from Garcia Hernandez, Foy was relieved to find, waiting for him by -the roadside, the long-expected cavalry brigade from the Army of the -North--Chauvel’s 1st Hussars and 31st Chasseurs: these fresh squadrons -took up the rearguard duty for the rest of the day, and covered the -march of the infantry to Peñaranda. - -From this day onward Wellington’s pursuit cannot be said to have been -urged with any great vigour. On the morning of the 24th the vanguard -entered Peñaranda, to find that the French had started off before -dawn. G. Anson’s brigade followed, accompanied this time by Bull’s -and Ross’s horse artillery, which had come up from the rear. The tail -of the enemy’s column was found at Aldea Seca, a few miles beyond -Peñaranda: he started off without firing a shot, and was out of sight -before more than two guns had been brought to shell him. It seems that -opportunities were lost this day--an intelligent observer remarks that -‘if only the whole brigade and twelve guns had come up, we might have -taken 500 of them--great part of the infantry were without arms[610].’ - - [610] Tomkinson’s _Diary_, p. 191. - -That night the British head-quarters and vanguard were at Flores de -Avila, but the enemy were quite out of sight. ‘How they get on their -troops at such a rate I cannot conceive,’ wrote Wellington, ‘but they -left this about two in the morning, and they will arrive in Valladolid -to-morrow[611].’ He gave up all attempt at close or rapid pursuit -on the 25th, reporting to Lord Bathurst, ‘I find the troops so much -fatigued by the battle and their previous and subsequent marches, and -the enemy have got so far before our infantry, that I halted this -day, and have sent on only the light cavalry and guerrillas.’ After -this there was no prospect of doing any further harm to Clausel, or -of scattering his demoralized army before it had time to recover its -cohesion. ‘This does not look like the quick advance following up a -great victory,’ wrote a critical dragoon[612], ‘and I think they will -be let off too easily. The peasants report them as in a dreadful state: -all their cavalry, except a few for their rearguard, is employed in -carrying their sick.’ It may be taken for certain that a general of the -Napoleonic school would have urged on his cavalry at all costs--there -was plenty of it, and none save Le Marchant’s and Bock’s brigades had -suffered any serious loss. Nor can it be doubted that such a hunt would -have been richly rewarded by captures. Clausel wrote on the 25th that -he could only rally 22,000 men[613]; and as some 48,000 had fought at -Salamanca, and the actual losses seem to have been about 14,000, it is -clear that he must be allowing for over 12,000 stragglers and unarmed -fugitives--whom an active pursuit might have swept up. - - [611] Wellington to Lord Bathurst, night of July 24. - _Dispatches_, ix. p. 309. - - [612] Tomkinson, p. 191. - - [613] Clausel to King Joseph from Arevalo. Joseph’s - _Correspondence_, ix. p. 54. - -Wellington’s defence for the slowness of his movement would undoubtedly -have been that a headlong chase might have cost him over-much--he -would have lost too many men, and--what was even more important--too -many horses by forcing the pace. Clausel’s army had been put out of -action for some weeks by the battle of Salamanca--to smash it up -still further would give him no such profit as would justify the -expenditure of several thousands of his precious British troops. He -was looking forward to the possibility of having to fight Soult and -Suchet--not to speak of King Joseph--and wished to be as strong as -possible for the present. It is probable that he made a mistake in -holding back--Clausel, being left practically unmolested, was able -to rally his army somewhat sooner than his adversary calculated. By -August it was again able to give trouble: in October its strength was -sufficient to wreck the Burgos campaign. If it had been well hunted -in the last days of July, it would seem that no such reorganization -would have been possible--only negligible fragments of it should have -reached Valladolid or Burgos. Yet it must always be remembered that -economy of men was the cardinal necessity for Wellington--his total -British force was so small, the difficulty of getting up drafts and -reinforcements was so enormous, the total number of the enemy’s armies -in the Peninsula was so overpowering, that he could not afford to -thin down his regiments by the exhausting forced marches that were -necessary in an active pursuit. It would have been little profit to -him if he had exterminated the Army of Portugal, only to find himself -left victorious, indeed, but with a force so weak and so tired out that -further exertion was impossible. As it was, many of his battalions in -August showed only 300 bayonets in line[614], and only recovered their -strength, by the reappearance of Badajoz and Salamanca convalescents, -and the arrival of drafts, during the following winter. - - [614] Already on the day of Salamanca there were eight battalions - in the army with less than 400 men present. See the tables in - Appendix. - -It was at Flores de Avila on July 25th that Wellington received the -news that a new factor had come into the game. King Joseph had left -Madrid four days earlier with the Army of the Centre, and was marching -northward by the Guadarrama Pass and Villa Castin, with the obvious -intention of joining Marmont. This move would have been all-important -if it had taken place ten days earlier: but when the Army of Portugal -was in absolute rout, and flying by forced marches towards the Douro, -the appearance of the King was too late to be dangerous. He could not -strengthen the beaten army sufficiently to enable it to fight--and he -would expose himself to some peril if he continued his forward march, -and came any nearer to the British line of advance. - -Joseph’s long hesitation and tardy start require a word of explanation. -It will be remembered[615] that his last communication which had -got through to Marmont was a dispatch dated June 30, in which he -had expressed his surprise that the Army of Portugal was refusing -battle, and stated that he could offer no immediate help. If Hill, -from Estremadura, should march to join Wellington, he had directed -that D’Erlon should move up in a similar fashion northward, and he -himself would come also, with all or part of the Army of the Centre. -But supposing that Hill should remain in the far south, beyond the -Guadiana, Joseph gave no promise of coming to Marmont’s aid. Indeed -he never mentioned this contingency at all, except to say that if -Wellington had not been joined by his lieutenant, ‘you should choose a -good position and give battle with all your troops united.’ - - [615] See chapter v above, pp. 394-5. - -Since writing this epistle Joseph had experienced many searchings -of heart. On the very day on which it was sent off he had received -a dispatch from Soult, which filled him with dismay: the Duke of -Dalmatia said that he had forbidden D’Erlon to cross to the north -bank of the Tagus, even if it were certain that Hill and his corps -had gone to join Wellington. Writing in high wrath, the King, on July -2nd, threatened to remove Soult from his command in Andalusia. ‘If you -have formally forbidden D’Erlon to pass the Tagus, in case the English -force in Estremadura goes off to join the enemy’s main body, you have -given him orders contradictory to those which I sent both to him and -to you. You set your authority above mine, you refuse to recognize me -as Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of Spain. Consequently, placed as -I may be between the two alternatives--of either depriving myself of -the service of your talent and military experience, or of allowing the -powers confided to me by the Emperor to be broken in my hand almost as -soon as given--I can have no hesitation.... Painful as it is to me, -therefore, I accept the offer which you formerly made me, to resign -your command if I do not revoke my original order; for not only do I -refuse to revoke it, but I hereby repeat it again both to you and to -Comte d’Erlon. If you prefer to take this extreme step of disobedience, -resign your command to D’Erlon, as your senior general of division, and -he will take it up till the Emperor shall nominate your successor[616].’ - - [616] Joseph to Soult, Madrid, June 30. _Correspondence_ of - Joseph, ix. p. 42. - -This angry dispatch was followed by another, written on July 6th, which -varied the original order to Soult in an important feature. For instead -of speaking of a northern movement of D’Erlon’s troops as consequent on -a similar transference of Hill’s corps to Castile, it makes no mention -of Hill, but prescribes a definite manœuvre without any reference to -the action of that British general. ‘Send at once to Toledo a force of -10,000 men: 8,000 infantry, 2,000 horse, with the men and horses for 12 -guns. By leaving the guns behind, the march of the corps will be made -more rapid, and the roads are good.... I authorize you to evacuate any -part of the occupied territory that you may choose, in order to hasten -the departure of these 10,000 men, whose arrival I await with great -impatience[617].’ - - [617] _Correspondence_ of Joseph, ix. pp. 44-5. - -Clearly it would take many days for these orders to get to Soult, who -was at this time before Cadiz. As a matter of fact they only reached -his hands on July 16th, and long before that date Joseph was becoming -very anxious at the state of affairs on the Douro. He got news that -Caffarelli, scared by Home Popham’s diversion, had sent no succours -to Marmont, and he received letters from Suchet, which showed him -that he could not count on any reinforcement from Valencia[618]. It -was certain that, even if Soult yielded to the peremptory orders sent -on July 2 and July 6, the detachment under D’Erlon could not reach -Toledo till somewhere about the 1st August. That it would start at all -seemed doubtful, in face of a letter of July 3 from D’Erlon, stating -that he was being ‘contained’ by no less than 30,000 men under Hill--a -scandalous perversion of fact, for Hill had not over two-thirds of that -force[619]. - - [618] Joseph to Clarke, July 13, _Correspondence_, ix. p. 45. - - [619] For d’Erlon’s letter see Joseph to Clarke of July 17th; - _Correspondence_, ix. p. 48. - -The days were running on, Marmont was still unsuccoured: it seemed -likely that neither from the North, from Valencia, nor from Andalusia, -would any help come to hand. The King grew more and more anxious--all -the more so because he had ceased to receive reports from Marmont, -since the line of communication with him had been cut by the -guerrilleros. Finally, on July 9th[620], he made up his mind that, -since no other help could be got for the Army of Portugal, he would -march himself with the Army of the Centre, even though to concentrate -it he must evacuate all New Castile and La Mancha, and even imperil the -safety of Madrid. On that day he issued orders to Treillard to evacuate -the valley of the Tagus--all the Talavera and Almaraz region--and to -the Rheinbund Germans to abandon La Mancha. All the small posts in -the direction of the eastern mountains were also drawn in, even those -watching the passes of the Somosierra and the Guadarrama. Only in -Toledo, Guadalajara, and Segovia, were small garrisons left behind. By -the morning of the 19th July[621] the most distant detachments had all -come in, and the Army of the Centre was concentrated at Madrid, about -14,000 strong, and able to spare 10,000 for the field when the capital -had been garrisoned. But the King resolved to wait two days longer -before marching, because he had just received news of the approach -of an unexpected but most welcome reinforcement. Early in the month -he had heard that Palombini’s Italian division of the Army of Aragon -was hunting the Empecinado and Mina in the direction of Calatayud and -Tudela. He had sent out a Spanish emissary with a letter to Palombini, -bidding him to draw in towards Madrid, if he had not already marched -to join Marmont, who had hoped to get his assistance. It does not seem -that the King had built much upon the results of this letter: orders -sent to Suchet’s troops had generally been disregarded. But it chanced -to reach the Italian general at Alfaro on the Ebro on July 12th, and -Palombini, having no opportunity of referring the responsibility to his -immediate commander, who was 200 miles away at Valencia, resolved to -obey. He marched for Soria and Siguenza, brushing off guerrillero bands -that strove to molest him, and sent to Joseph the news that he might be -expected at Madrid on the 21st. These tidings came to hand on the 18th, -and filled the King with such high satisfaction that he resolved to -wait for the Italian division. It arrived on the appointed day, having -made a most creditable forced march of 150 miles by mountain roads, -through a burnt-up and desolate country. Without leaving it even one -night’s rest at Madrid, the King started it off in company with his own -troops, which had been awaiting all day the signal for departure[622]. - - [620] This date is fixed by a letter of Joseph to Marmont, of - that day, in the Scovell ciphers. It never got to Marmont. - - [621] Jourdan in his _Mémoires_ (p. 419) says that the - concentration took place on the 17th, but Joseph’s letter to - Clarke of July 18 says that Treillard’s dragoons would only reach - Naval Carnero on the 19th, which is conclusive. - - [622] All this from Vacani, vi. p. 110, where the movements of - Palombini are very carefully detailed. - -Joseph’s expeditionary force, thus increased to 14,000 men, consisted -of his Guards, horse and foot, one French brigade (28th and 75th -Ligne), D’Armagnac’s Germans (five battalions and one cavalry -regiment), Treillard’s strong division of dragoons, and part of -Hugo’s division of Spanish _Juramentados_, together with Palombini’s -detachment, which amounted to six battalions and a regiment of -dragoons. The garrisons of Madrid, Toledo, Segovia, and Guadalajara -were made up partly of _Juramentados_, and partly of the large body -of drafts for the Army of Andalusia, which had accumulated at Madrid -since the posts in the Sierra Morena had been given up in April. The -King had been in no hurry to send them on to Soult, and now found them -very useful. The command of the garrison was left to General Lafon -Blaniac, who was acting as governor of Madrid and Captain-General of -New Castile. A few days after Joseph’s departure a welcome addition -turned up, in the shape of Suchet’s garrison of Cuenca, under General -Maupoint, consisting of two battalions of the 16th regiment and a -squadron of _chasseurs_. On getting the King’s order to evacuate -Cuenca, this officer (like Palombini) had obeyed it, and, instead of -retiring on Valencia, had come on to Madrid, with his 1,000 men and -three millions of reals, representing the provincial treasury[623]. - - [623] Maupoint’s letter to the King, announcing his arrival at - Madrid on the 29th-30th July, was captured by guerrilleros, and - is in the Scovell collection of ciphers. - -Having once collected his army, the King marched with great speed, -passed the defiles of the Guadarrama on the 22nd, and reached Espinar, -the great junction of roads in the province of Avila, next day. The -cavalry that night were at Villa Castin, eight miles farther to the -front, on the road to Arevalo and Valladolid. Here the news came to -hand, not from any authorized source but from the rumours of the -country-side, that Marmont had crossed the Douro on the 17th, and -was closely engaged with Wellington somewhere in the direction of -Salamanca. On receiving this information Joseph and Jourdan resolved -not to continue their march towards Valladolid, but to swerve westward, -with the intention of joining the Duke of Ragusa on the Tormes. Turning -off from the main road, the cavalry reached Villanueva de Gomez on the -night of the 24th; the King and the infantry got to Blasco Sancho. -Orders were issued for the whole army to march on Peñaranda next -morning. But during the hours of darkness rumours of the battle of -Salamanca and its results came to hand, and on the following morning -they were confirmed by the arrival of two Spanish emissaries, one -bearing a letter from the wounded Marmont, the other a second from -Clausel. The Marshal’s letter was insincere and inconclusive--after -giving a long account of the battle, which threw all the blame on -Maucune, he said that he had lost 5,000 men, the enemy infinitely -more (!), and that the army was falling back to take a position behind -the Eresma river[624], or perhaps behind the Douro. Clausel’s epistle -was a far more honest document; it said that he was in a state of -incapacity to resist Wellington, that he could not put even 20,000 men -in line for some days, that he must retreat as fast as possible on -Valladolid, to pick up his dépôts and magazines, which he must send -off without delay, and that he would then fall back on the Army of the -North. He distinctly told the King that, even if the Army of the Centre -joined him, they would be unable to resist Wellington for a moment. -He recommended Joseph to call up succours from Soult and Suchet: if -Wellington and the English main body marched on Madrid the Army of -Portugal would remain on the Douro, but only in that case. If pursued -by Wellington he must retire towards Burgos. He evidently regarded -any junction between his troops and the King’s as impracticable and -useless[625]. - - [624] Which falls into the Adaja near Olmedo, twenty miles south - of Valladolid. - - [625] Clausel to Joseph, _Correspondance_, ix. pp. 54-5. - -Confronted by this new and unpromising situation, Joseph and Jourdan -had to choose between two policies--they might retire towards Madrid -and cover the capital, in the hope that Soult might conceivably -have carried out the orders given him on July 6th, and have sent -a detachment toward Toledo and Madrid. Or they might, despite of -Clausel’s advice and warning, move northward towards the Douro and try -to get into communication with the Army of Portugal. If the direct road -by Arevalo to Valladolid was too dangerous, there remained another and -more circuitous route by Cuellar, which Wellington was too far off to -reach. - -The King and Jourdan chose the first alternative without a moment’s -hesitation[626]: if they joined the Army of Portugal, they had -Clausel’s assurance that they could effect nothing. They would be -driven back on Burgos; Madrid would be exposed to a raid by any small -detachment that Wellington might send against it, and touch with Soult -and Suchet would be lost. The King, therefore, marched back by the -way that he had come, and had reached on the 26th the Venta de San -Rafael, at the foot of the Guadarrama pass. He had got so rapidly out -of Wellington’s way that their armies did not touch--save indeed that -a patrol of Arentschildt’s brigade surprised and captured near Arevalo -2 officers and 25 men of the King’s light cavalry[627]--Juramentado -_chasseurs_. - - [626] ‘Certainement, c’était le meilleur,’ says Jourdan, - commenting on the choice years after. - - [627] For this business see Hamilton’s _History of the 14th Light - Dragoons_, p. 109. The leader of the patrol, a Corporal Hanley of - that regiment, had only eight men, but surprised the _chasseurs_ - in an inn, and bluffed them into surrender. - -When informed that the Army of the Centre had fallen back in haste -toward Madrid, Wellington resolved that his duty was to continue -pushing Clausel northward, and away from the King. The latter might be -disregarded; his strength was known, and it was almost certain that he -would not be reinforced. For Hill had just sent in a report, which had -come through in four days, that Drouet was showing no signs of moving -toward Toledo; and he enclosed an intercepted dispatch of Soult’s, -which proved that the latter had no intention whatever of carrying -out the King’s oft-repeated orders[628]. Accordingly the British -head-quarters were moved on to Arevalo on the 27th of July, and to -Olmedo on the 28th. Anson’s and Arentschildt’s light cavalry went on in -front: they reported that the enemy was still in a complete state of -disorganization. He was burning the villages as he went, and leaving -many stragglers dead in the cornfields beside the road, for the wounded -were sinking by the way, and any marauders who went far from the main -column were being killed by the peasantry and the guerrilleros[629]. - - [628] See Wellington to Hill of July 26. _Dispatches_, ix. p. - 314. The Soult letter is in the Scovell collection of ciphers. - - [629] For details, see Tomkinson, p. 192. - -Clausel crossed the Douro by the two bridges of Tudela and Puente de -Douro on the 27th-28th, leaving only some light troops to the south -of the river, and entered Valladolid, where he set to work at once to -evacuate all the more valuable stores, and so many of the sick and -wounded as could find transport, along the high-road to Palencia and -Burgos. The Anglo-Portuguese infantry was already approaching Medina -del Campo and Olmedo, while Santocildes, with the section of the -Army of Galicia which was not employed on the siege of Astorga, was -ordered to march past Toro and Tordesillas to threaten Valladolid from -the north bank of the Douro, and Silveira was directed to resume the -blockade of Zamora with his militia-division. - -On the 29th the Light and 1st Divisions, Wellington’s infantry -vanguard, drove in the screen of light troops which Clausel had left -in front of the Douro: the French retired and blew up the bridges. But -this was of little avail, for the British cavalry forded the river at -Boecillo and continued their advance. Thereupon the enemy evacuated -the city of Valladolid, and withdrew along the direct road to Burgos, -save one division (Foy’s), which retreated excentrically, up the north -bank of the river toward Aranda. In Valladolid were found 17 guns, -800 sick and wounded, whose condition had rendered it impossible for -them to travel, and a large magazine filled with artillery material, -besides other stores. The people received Wellington with every -mark of enthusiasm, though they had the reputation of including a -greater proportion of _Afrancesados_ than any other city of northern -Spain[630]. They treated him to illuminations, a ball, and copious -harangues of congratulation. Meanwhile Anson’s brigade swept the -country to the east and north, and reported no enemy visible; while the -guerrillero Marquinez entered Palencia, and captured 300 stragglers -from Clausel’s rearguard. The French had gone back beyond the Arlanza -river, and were lying at Lerma, Torquemada, and Santa Maria del Campo, -ready to retreat to Burgos itself if any further pressure was applied. -It was not forthcoming--much to Clausel’s surprise--and he halted and -began to reorganize his shattered army. What survived of his train -and stores, his sick, and the _cadres_ of several skeleton battalions -were sent back to Burgos. The rest stood still, awaiting further -developments. - - [630] See von Hodenberg’s letter concerning this in _Blackwood_ - for June 1912. - -Wellington, meanwhile, had brought none of his infantry north of the -Douro, though all were now near at hand, and the Light Division had -repaired the bridge of Tudela. He had resolved to turn his attention to -King Joseph and Madrid. Only Santocildes and his two Galician divisions -were ordered up to Valladolid (where they arrived on August 6th) to -support Anson’s cavalry, who took up cantonments at various villages -in front and to the flank of the city. - -The movements of the King and his army on July 27th-31st had been -somewhat puzzling to the British general. On arriving at the foot of -the Guadarrama pass, they had halted, and then (instead of pursuing -the straight road to Madrid) had swerved off to Segovia, which lies on -the northern slope of the mountains, as if they had abandoned their -original intention of leaving the Army of Portugal to its own devices. -This flank march was the result of the receipt of letters borne by -Marmont’s aide-de-camp, Fabvier, which said that Clausel was no longer -being pursued with energy, and that it was possible that he might stop -on the Adaja and cover Valladolid[631]. It was a momentary inspiration, -with no reality behind it, for Clausel was in full retreat again before -the King reached Segovia. But misled by its fallacious cheerfulness, -Joseph had made a move which rendered it possible for him to join the -Army of Portugal, if it had really halted. He was soon undeceived, and -after remaining three days at Segovia in some peril, for Wellington had -now turned against him, he evacuated that high-lying city on August -1st, and made his final retreat on Madrid by the Guadarrama pass. - - [631] Printed in Joseph’s _Correspondence_, ix. pp. 46-7. - -Just after he had left Segovia[632] King Joseph received a dispatch -from Soult, dated July 16. It was a reply to the peremptory orders sent -him on July 6th, which had directed him to evacuate part of Andalusia -and to send a large detachment to Toledo. This was a strange document, -which amounted to an absolute refusal to obey instructions. After -stating (quite falsely) that Hill was advancing with 30,000 men in -Estremadura, and that in consequence he was himself about to repair -thither, he announced that the evacuation of Andalusia would be ruinous -to the French cause in Spain. ‘We could not find means to subsist -either on the Tagus or in Estremadura, and from one position to another -we should retreat as far as the Ebro. There is a way to avoid this; -by taking the initiative we can save 6,000 sick and maimed men whom -I should probably have to abandon, as well as 200,000 Spaniards (who -have declared for your Majesty, and will be lost without hope), also -2,000 guns, and the only artillery arsenal now existing in Spain. A -single order by your Majesty can effect this, and shorten the Spanish -war by six campaigns. Let your Majesty come to Andalusia in person, -with every man that can be collected: if the number is large we can -increase the expeditionary force in Estremadura to 25,000 or 30,000 -men, and transfer the seat of war to the left bank of the Tagus. The -Army of Portugal, being relieved of pressure, will be able to come into -line again. Whatever occurs, your Majesty will find yourself at the -head of a splendid army, ready to deliver battle. If the worst came, -and we were unlucky, there is always the resource of retiring on the -Army of Aragon [in Valencia] and so keeping the field.... I have the -honour to repeat to your Majesty that I cannot send any detachments -beyond the Sierra Morena or the Guadiana, save by evacuating all -Andalusia and marching with my whole army. I must have a positive order -from your Majesty to that effect[633].’ - - [632] On the next day, August 2, the letter came to hand at - Galapagar. - - [633] Soult to Joseph, _Correspondance_, ix. pp. 45-7. - -This was an astonishing letter for a Commander-in-Chief to receive -from a subordinate. Instead of obeying a very definite order to move -a certain number of troops to a certain point, Soult replies by -sending to the King an alternative plan of campaign. And this plan, -it is not too much to say, was an absolutely perverse and insane one. -It must be remembered that, when Soult was writing, the battle of -Salamanca was still six days in the future, and the Army of Portugal -was known to be at close quarters with Wellington and in urgent need -of reinforcements. Soult urges his master to abandon Marmont to the -enemy, to evacuate Madrid, to give up his communication with France, -and to retire into Andalusia, where he would be cut off from all the -other imperial armies, for it was not possible even to communicate with -Suchet and Valencia, since the Spanish Army of Murcia blocked the way. -The cardinal sin of this project was that if the French were to hold -Spain at all, it was necessary for them to be strong in the North: -Soult proposed to deliver over the North to Wellington, by leaving -Marmont in the lurch. As Napoleon had observed, five months earlier, -‘a check to the Army of Portugal would be a calamity which would make -itself felt all over Spain. A check to the Army of the South might -force it back on Madrid or Valencia, but would be of a very different -degree of importance[634].’ He had said much the same thing four -years before, when first his armies were invading Spain; for he then -expressed the opinion that a disaster to Bessières in Castile would -be the one ruinous possibility: defeats in the South or East mattered -comparatively little. Soult, blinded by his own interest in the -viceroyalty of Andalusia, refused to see this obvious fact. Long after -he had received the news of Salamanca, he persisted in maintaining that -the true policy was to hold on to Seville, even when the British army -was at Madrid, and the wrecks of Marmont’s forces were retiring on -Burgos. Of this we shall hear more presently. - - [634] Berthier to Marmont--writing from the Emperor’s personal - direction--of February 18th, 1812, printed in Marmont’s - _Correspondence_, iv. p. 332. - -King Joseph on receiving Soult’s letter returned answer: ‘You will see -by my letter of the 29th July the errors that you have been labouring -under as to Lord Wellington’s real designs. Hasten, therefore, to -carry out the orders which I give you--viz. to evacuate Andalusia and -march with your whole army on Toledo[635].’ Even so the King did not -obtain exact obedience to his commands, but received a second series -of counter-projects: and in the end Soult marched not on Toledo but on -Valencia, and only many days after he had been instructed to commence -his movement. - - [635] Joseph to Soult of 29 July and August 2, _Correspondence_, - ix. pp. 60-1. - -Wellington was, of course, unaware of the exact motives which had -induced King Joseph to make his flank march to Segovia, but he -considered that it might mean that there was some intention on the part -of Clausel to bring the Army of Portugal to join the Army of the Centre -by way of the Upper Douro [i. e. via Aranda]. He therefore resolved -to make such a conjunction impossible, by driving the King over the -mountains and towards Madrid[636]. - - [636] Wellington to Bathurst, Olmedo, July 28: ‘I think it - probable that they [the Army of Portugal] will endeavour to join - the King on the Upper Douro, if the King should continue on this - side of the mountains, unless I should previously have it in my - power to strike a blow against his corps.’ - -While Anson’s and Arentschildt’s cavalry continued the pursuit of -Clausel on the 29th-30th, and the 1st and Light Divisions were brought -up to the neighbourhood of Tudela, opposite Valladolid, the rest of -the army was turned against King Joseph. It was necessary to find out, -as a preliminary, whether he was really making a stand at Segovia. To -ascertain this point D’Urban’s Portuguese horse pushed out from Olmedo -on the 29th, and found the King’s cavalry in Santa Maria de Nieva, ten -miles in front of Segovia. Deserters from the Spanish Guards here came -in to D’Urban, and gave him useful information as to the exact strength -of the Army of the Centre. On the 30th Wellington placed at D’Urban’s -disposal the German Heavy Dragoons, a battalion of Halkett’s brigade -of the 7th Division, and a British battery, telling him to drive in -the enemy’s screen. The French gave way reluctantly, and on hearing -of their attitude Wellington ordered the whole 7th Division to follow -D’Urban’s detachment, and other divisions to make ready to move in -succession. But the report that Segovia was being firmly held, as the -_point de rassemblement_[637] for Clausel, turned out to be false, for -when the flying column approached that city it learnt that the main -body of the enemy had left it in the morning for the Guadarrama pass. -A considerable rearguard, under General Espert[638], however, was left -to guard Segovia till the King should have got a fair start; and its -mediaeval walls made it defensible for a short time against a force -without heavy artillery. D’Urban could do nothing with his cavalry, -but sent to Wellington a request that the 7th Division might move -round to intercept Espert’s retreat towards the Guadarrama by a forced -march. His chief replied that he had no great faith in the success of -any of these attempts to ‘cut the French off,’ and that it did not -appear to him more practicable at Segovia than elsewhere. ‘The result -of such attempts would merely be to fatigue the troops in getting into -Segovia, and it might as well be done without fatiguing them.’ And -so it was, for Espert decamped by night on August 3 unmolested, and -D’Urban entered the place next morning, followed some time later by -the infantry. He at once explored the mountain road toward the pass, -and found that the French had completely disappeared: not even at the -‘Puerto’ of the Guadarrama was a vedette to be seen. - - [637] This was the term that D’Urban used when describing, on - July 30, the position of the French. - - [638] Apparently two battalions of the Baden regiment, some - _Juramentados_, and a regiment of dragoons, about 1,800 men. - -Wellington had now to revise his whole plan of campaign, since it -had become clear that the two armies opposed to him had retreated in -different directions, and could not possibly combine. While it was -still conceivable that Clausel might defend the line of the Douro, he -had brought up the main body of his infantry to Olmedo. But after his -entry into Valladolid on the 30th, and the precipitate retreat of the -Army of Portugal toward Burgos, he had been for two days under the -impression that King Joseph might stand at Segovia. Not only had he -sent on the German dragoons and the 7th Division to follow D’Urban, -but on July 31st he moved his own head-quarters and the 3rd Division -to Cuellar, while the 4th, 5th, and 6th Divisions were at El Pino on -the Cega river, a few miles behind. He wrote next morning (August -1st) that he was in such a position that Joseph and Clausel could not -possibly join, and that if the King lingered any longer at Segovia, ‘I -can move upon him, and make him go quicker than he will like[639].’ But -he imagined that the Army of the Centre would fall back instantly on -Madrid--as indeed it was doing at the very moment that he was writing -his dispatch. - - [639] All these details are from dispatches of Wellington to - D’Urban in the unpublished D’Urban papers, dated between July 30 - and August 2, or from D’Urban’s report to Wellington. - -On receiving the information that Joseph had vanished, Wellington -halted for three whole days [August 2nd, 3rd, 4th] with his -head-quarters at Cuellar, and his infantry gathered round him in its -neighbourhood. The 1st and Light Divisions, which had marched as far -as the Douro, came southward to join the rest. But it was only on the -5th that orders were issued for the march of nearly the whole army on -Segovia, by the road to Mozencillo. During these three days of halt -Wellington had made up his mind as to his general policy. Clausel, -whose army was harmless for the present, was to be ignored: only a -small containing force was to be left in front of him, while the main -body of the Anglo-Portuguese host marched on Madrid. - -The strategical purpose that determined this decision was never set -forth in full by Wellington. His contemporary dispatches to Lord -Bathurst and to Hill are short, and lack explanatory detail--he states -his decision, but says little of his reasons for making it. Nor did he, -at the end of the campaign, write any long official narrative of his -doings, as he had done in 1810 and 1811. The causes that governed his -action have to be deduced from scattered opinions expressed in many -different documents. We need hardly take seriously the common French -dictum, found in many a book written by his exasperated opponents, -that he ‘wished to parade himself as conqueror and liberator in the -Spanish capital.’ That was not the sort of motive which any serious -student of Wellington’s character would dream of imputing to him. Nor, -if we translate it into less offensive terms, would it be true to say -that it was the political advantage of expelling the King from Madrid, -and so demonstrating to all Europe the weakness of the French hold -on the Peninsula, that was the determining cause of the march into -New Castile and the abandonment of the campaign on the Douro. We must -rather look for definite military reasons. And of these the predominant -one was that he conceived that the most probable result of the battle -of Salamanca would be to force the King to call up Soult and Suchet to -Madrid, in order to check the Anglo-Portuguese army, even at the cost -of abandoning great tracts of conquered land in Andalusia and Valencia. -Such indeed, as we have already seen, was Joseph’s purpose. The order -to Soult to evacuate his viceroyalty and to march on Toledo with his -whole army had been issued a day or two before Wellington had made up -his mind to turn southward. Suchet had been directed at the same time -to send all that he could spare toward Madrid. Though the pursuit of -Clausel to the Ebro offered many advantages, it would be a ruinous move -if the enemy should concentrate 70,000 men at Madrid, and then march -on Valladolid, to take the allied army in the rear and cut it off from -Portugal. - -It was quite uncertain whether Soult or Suchet would make this move. -But that it was the correct one is certain. Wellington was aware that -Soult had been summoned to send troops northward. Hitherto he had found -excuses for refusing to obey, as his last intercepted dispatch of July -8th sufficiently showed. But the results of Salamanca might probably -render further disobedience impossible: and the moment that Soult -should hear of that tremendous event, it was reasonable to suppose that -he would abandon his viceroyalty, and march to join the King with every -available man. If he found Joseph and his army still in possession of -Madrid, they would have a central base and magazines from which to -operate, and a very favourable strategic position. It was true that -Wellington could call up Hill’s 18,000 men, but this was the only -succour on which he could count: neither Ballasteros nor the numerous -garrison of Cadiz would ever appear in New Castile, if old experience -was to be trusted. If some Spaniards did arrive, they would be very -uncertain aid. Granted, therefore, that Soult marched on Toledo and -Madrid to join the King, Wellington must take almost every man of the -Salamanca army to face them, even allowing for the certain junction of -Hill. He could only afford to leave a small ‘containing force’ to look -after Clausel. - -But there was another possibility which made the situation still more -doubtful. Would Suchet also push up to join King Joseph with the -Army of Valencia, or the greater part of it? If he should do so, the -odds would be too great, and a defensive campaign to cover Portugal, -and so much as was possible of the newly regained Spanish provinces, -would be the only resource. But Suchet’s action depended upon a factor -over which Wellington had some influence, though not a complete and -dominating control. When he had started on the Salamanca campaign he -had been relying on Lord William Bentinck’s Sicilian expedition to -keep the French in Valencia engaged: an attack on Catalonia would draw -Suchet northward with all his reserves, and nothing would be left -which O’Donnell and the Spanish army of Murcia could not ‘contain.’ It -will be remembered that a few days before the battle of Salamanca[640] -Wellington had received the disheartening news that Bentinck had -countermanded his expedition, and was turning himself to some -chimerical scheme for invading Italy. This had left Suchet’s attention -free for the moment, and he might conceivably have sent troops to -join the Army of the Centre. Fortunately he had not done so--only -Palombini’s division and the small garrison of Cuenca had been swept up -by King Joseph, without the Marshal’s consent and much to his disgust. - - [640] See above, p. 408. - -Now, however, the whole prospect in eastern Spain had been transformed -by the cheering news, received on July 30th near Valladolid[641], -that Bentinck had once more changed his mind, and that a considerable -expeditionary force under General Maitland had been sent to Majorca, to -pick up the Spaniards of Whittingham and Roche, and to execute, after -all, the projected diversion. Maitland’s own dispatch arrived four -days later; it had travelled with extraordinary celerity from Palma to -Cuellar in fifteen days, and announced his arrival on the Spanish coast -and his intention to operate at once. This being so, Suchet would be -‘out of the game’ if all went well, and only the King and Soult need be -taken into consideration for the next month. But it was all-important -that the diversion on the East Coast should be executed with firmness -and decision. - - [641] See _Dispatches_, ix. p. 320. - -The best summary of Wellington’s views at this moment is to be found in -his letter to Lord William Bentinck[642], explaining the importance of -Maitland’s action in August. - - [642] Ibid., p. 321. - -‘I have lately, on the 22nd, beaten Marshal Marmont in a general -action near Salamanca, and I have pursued him beyond the Douro and -entered Valladolid. The King is at Segovia with 12,000 or 15,000 -men, and, having driven Marmont from the lower Douro, my next object -is to prevent him and Marmont (if possible) from joining: this I am -about to attempt. Either the French [i. e. King Joseph] must lose all -communication with their troops in the north of Spain, or they must -oblige me to withdraw towards the frontiers of Portugal. This they -cannot effect without bringing against me either Suchet’s army, or -Soult’s army, or both. I cannot but think, therefore, that it is very -important that the attention of Suchet should be diverted from his -possible operations against me by the Sicilian army, which will go -to such important objects as Tarragona and Valencia.... If Suchet’s -attention cannot be diverted from me, and (notwithstanding Marmont’s -defeat) the French become too strong for me, I shall at least have -the satisfaction of reflecting, while I am retiring, that General -Maitland’s progress will be unopposed, and we shall take Tarragona and -Valencia.’ - -A few days later Wellington was pleased to find that Suchet had been -duly scared. An intercepted dispatch from him to King Joseph showed -that he was thinking of nothing but the appearance of an English fleet -off the Valencian coast, and that it was most unlikely that he would -send any serious succours to the King [643]. There remained therefore -only Soult to be considered. The natural thing for him to do would -be to evacuate Andalusia: as Wellington wrote a fortnight later, -‘any other but a modern French army would now leave that province -[644].’ Hill was writing at the same time, ‘Lord Wellington continues -advancing, and if he is able to keep his forward position, Soult will -be ordered to reinforce the King. Indeed I think that he _must_ quit -this part of the country entirely, if matters do not go better with -them’ [the French][645]. - - [643] Wellington to Maitland, Cuellar, August 3rd, _Dispatches_, - ix. p. 327. - - [644] Wellington to Bathurst, _Dispatches_, ix. p. 370. - - [645] Letter in Sidney’s _Life of Hill_, p. 211. - -What neither Wellington nor Hill could foresee, in early August, was -that the Marshal would still hang on to Andalusia, and renew, in a more -pressing form, his proposal of July 16th that Joseph and the Army of -the Centre should take refuge with him beyond the Sierra Morena. But -whether King Joseph received, or did not receive, succours from the -South or East, it was clearly good military policy to turn him out of -Madrid, while the Army of Portugal was still completely negligible as -a factor in the game. The loss of Madrid would be ruinous to him if -he was left without reinforcements: if he received them, the enemy -would find the problem of subsistence much more difficult if he had -not Madrid to rely upon as his central base and magazine. Toledo would -not serve him half so well. And the political effects of the recovery -of the Spanish capital, even if only for a time, must be well worth -gaining. It would shake the confidence of the _Afrancesado_ party all -over the Peninsula, and it would be noted all round Europe. - -Accordingly Wellington resolved to leave only a small containing -detachment on the Douro, to look after Clausel, whose recuperative -power he somewhat underrated, and to march on Madrid with a force that -would enable him, if joined by Hill, to fight Soult and King Joseph in -combination. The containing body was put in charge of Clinton, who was -almost the only divisional general of the old stock who still remained -with the army. Graham and Picton were invalided, Leith and Lowry Cole -had been wounded at Salamanca, along with Beresford and Stapleton -Cotton. Nearly all the divisions were under interim commanders. -Another reason for choosing Clinton for the detached duty was that -his division, the 6th, had suffered more than any other unit at the -recent battle. It was very low in numbers, only 3,700 men, including -its Portuguese brigade, and needed to pick up convalescents and drafts -before it could be considered effective for field service. Along with -the 6th Division there were left the five battalions[646] that had -recently joined the army from England or the Mediterranean stations: -they were all Walcheren regiments, and still riddled with sickness; and -all had suffered from the forced marches which had brought them to the -front just before. Wellington was discontented with their condition. -‘The truth is, neither officers nor soldiers are accustomed to march. -The men are very irregular, and owing to their irregularities not able -to bear the labour of marching in the heat of the sun[647].’ They -were left to strengthen Clinton, and to acclimatize themselves to the -Spanish summer: if taken on to Madrid they would have sown the roadside -with broken-down stragglers. - - [646] viz. the 2/4th, 1/5th, 1/38th, 1/42nd, which had arrived in - time for the battle of Salamanca, the 1/38th on the very battle - morning, and the 1/82nd which came up after the battle. They were - all Walcheren regiments: 1/82nd came from Gibraltar, 2/4th from - Ceuta, the other three from England direct. The 1/5th and 2/82nd - went on to Madrid in September. - - [647] Wellington to Bathurst, Cuellar, August 4. _Dispatches_, - ix. p. 339. - -The five newly-arrived battalions brought Clinton’s strength up to -7,000 infantry. The whole of this force was cantoned in and about -Cuellar, while the cavalry allotted to it, Anson’s brigade, took a -more advanced position, along and beyond the Douro, covering not only -its own infantry but the two Spanish divisions of Santocildes, who -had occupied Valladolid on August 6th. The remainder of the Army -of Galicia was still occupied in the interminable siege of Astorga, -which to Wellington’s disgust still lingered on. The heavy guns had at -last come up from Corunna, but the bombardment seemed to have little -effect. Silveira had resumed the blockade of Zamora, but having no -siege artillery could only wait till starvation should compel its -garrison of 700 men to submit. Toro and Tordesillas were the only other -places where Marmont had left a detachment; the latter surrendered to -Santocildes on his march to Valladolid--about 300 French were taken -there. The former was still holding out, observed by a small Spanish -force. The task of keeping a close look-out upon Clausel was handed -over to the guerrilleros--the Castilian chiefs Saornil, Marquinez, and -Principe. An English officer, who spent some days with the two last at -this juncture, describes them as ‘bandits, but very troublesome ones -for the French.’ Deducting the Spaniards left before Astorga, and the -Portuguese left before Zamora, there were some 18,000 men in all told -off to ‘contain’ Clausel. The orders left behind[648] were that they -should remain in their cantonments unless the enemy should move--which -Wellington did not think a likely contingency, ‘as they have nothing -but their cavalry in a state fit for service.’ But if, rallying sooner -than he expected, the French should march by Palencia to try to rescue -the garrisons of Astorga and Zamora, Santocildes was to retire, and -to endeavour to defend the line of the Esla, while Silveira was to -raise the blockade of Zamora and fall back behind that same river. If, -instead of making a raid westward to save the garrisons, Clausel should -move against Valladolid and the line of the Douro, Anson’s cavalry was -to retire and join Clinton at Cuellar; and if the enemy came on against -them in full force, both were then to fall back on Segovia. Santocildes -was then directed to endeavour to move round Clausel’s rear, and -to cut his communication with Burgos. Contrary to Wellington’s -expectation[649], as we shall presently see, the French general made -both the moves suggested--he sent a column to relieve Astorga and -Zamora, and marched with his main body on Valladolid. The consequences -of his advance will be related in their due place. - - [648] Memorandum for General Clinton, to be communicated to - General Santocildes. _Dispatches_, ix. pp. 344-6. - - [649] It is curious to find that while in the ‘Memorandum’ of - August 4 Wellington states that it is ‘not very probable’ that - Clausel will move, in a letter to Santocildes sent off the very - next day, he remarks that an advance from Burgos into the kingdom - of Leon, to relieve Astorga, is ‘most likely.’ I fancy that the - former was his real opinion, and that the latter was spoken of - with some stress in the directions to Santocildes, mainly because - Wellington wished to impress on the Spaniard the duty of being - cautious and retiring to the Esla without offering battle. - - - - -SECTION XXXIII: CHAPTER IX - -THE PURSUIT OF KING JOSEPH. MAJALAHONDA. WELLINGTON AT MADRID - - -Having thus made all his arrangements for ‘containing’ Clausel, and for -dealing with what he considered the unlikely chance of an offensive -move by the Army of Portugal, Wellington was at liberty to carry out -his new strategical move. The mass of troops collected at Cuellar and -its neighbourhood was at last set in motion, and, after his short -halt and time of doubting, he himself marched against Madrid with the -whole remaining force at his disposal--the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 7th, -and Light Divisions, Arentschildt’s, Bock’s, and Ponsonby’s [late Le -Marchant’s] cavalry brigades, the Portuguese infantry of Pack and -Bradford, with D’Urban’s horse of that same nation, as also Carlos de -España’s Spanish infantry and Julian Sanchez’s lancers. The whole, -allowing for Salamanca losses and the wear and tear of the high-roads, -amounted to about 36,000 men[650]. It was ample for the hunting of -King Joseph, and sufficient, if Hill were called up, to face the King -and Soult in conjunction, supposing that the latter should at last -evacuate Andalusia and march on Toledo. Santocildes and Clinton were -informed that it was the intention of the Commander-in-Chief to return -to Castile when affairs in the South had been settled in a satisfactory -fashion. No date, of course, could be assigned: all would depend on -Soult’s next move. - - [650] The 1st and 7th Divisions alone were up to their usual - strength. The 4th and Light Divisions were still showing very - weak battalions, owing to their dreadful Badajoz losses; and the - former had also suffered very severely (1,000 casualties) at - Salamanca. The 5th and 3rd had comparatively moderate casualties - at each of these fights, but the combination of the two - successive sets of losses had reduced them very considerably. - -On August 7th the vanguard, consisting of the force that had occupied -Segovia--D’Urban’s Portuguese squadrons, the heavy German dragoons, -Macdonald’s horse artillery troop, and one light battalion of the -German Legion--marched forward six leagues, ‘five of them against the -collar,’ remarks an artillery officer. The steep route lay past the -royal summer-palace of San Ildefonso, ‘a beautiful place, and most -magnificently fitted up: what is very singular, the French have not -destroyed a single stick of it: the rooms are hung as thick as can be -with paintings _of sorts_[651].’ No hostile vedettes were discovered -on the Guadarrama, and a reconnoitring party pushed as far as the -Escurial, and reported that the enemy’s most outlying picket was at -Galapagar, three or four miles to the south-east of that melancholy -pile. Meanwhile the main body, a march behind the vanguard, started -from Segovia on the 8th, Ponsonby’s dragoons and the 7th Division -leading; then came Alten’s brigade, the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Divisions, -and Pack. The rear was brought up by the 1st and Light Divisions and -Bradford, who only started from the neighbourhood of Segovia on the 9th -[652]. The necessity for moving the whole army by a single mountain -road--though it was a well-engineered one--caused the column to be of -an immoderate length, and progress was slow. Head-quarters were at San -Ildefonso on the 8th and 9th August, at Nava Cerrada (beyond the summit -of the Guadarrama) on the 10th, at Torre Lodones near the Escurial on -the 11th. - - [651] Dyneley’s diary in _R. A. Journal_, vol. xxiii. p. 454. - - [652] Many of the brigades did not march through Segovia, but by - crossroads around it: steep gradients and fatigue were thereby - avoided. One route was by the deserted palace of Rio Frio, an old - royal hunting-box. - -Meanwhile D’Urban, far ahead of the main body, occupied the Escurial -on the 9th, and pushed on cautiously to Galapagar, from whence the -enemy had vanished. His rearguard was discovered at Las Rosas and -Majalahonda, five miles nearer to Madrid. Wellington’s orders were that -his vanguard was to keep well closed up, the Germans close behind the -Portuguese, and that nothing was to be risked till support from the -leading divisions of the army was close at hand. Wherefore on the 10th -D’Urban, finding the French in force at Las Rosas, only advanced a few -miles, and bivouacked on the Guadarrama river at the bridge of Retamar. -He received news from the peasantry that King Joseph was preparing to -evacuate Madrid, that convoys had already started, and that the main -body of the Army of the Centre was to march by the road of Mostoles on -Toledo, where Soult was expected in a few days. The information--true -as regards the evacuation, false as regards the approach of Soult--was -duly sent back to Wellington, who lay that night at Nava Cerrada, -fifteen miles to the rear, with the 7th Division and Ponsonby’s cavalry -[653]. - - [653] All this from D’Urban’s unpublished diary, as are also most - of the details about the movements of the troops. - -Madrid was at this moment a scene of tumult and despair. The King had -retired from Segovia still in a state of uncertainty as to whether -Wellington intended to turn against him, or whether he would pursue -Clausel. He quite recognized the fact that, even if Soult obeyed the -last dispatch sent to him on August 2nd, it would be too late for -him to arrive in time to save Madrid. But there was a pause of some -days, while Wellington was making up his mind at Cuellar, and it was -only on the morning of the 8th that the news arrived that a strong -column (D’Urban and the advanced guard) had started from Segovia on -the preceding day, and that more troops were following. The orders to -make ready for departure were issued at once, and a veritable panic -set in among the French residents and the _Afrancesados_. ‘Every one,’ -wrote a keen observer on the 9th August, ‘is packing up his valuables -and making ready for a flitting. Not to speak of the many Spaniards of -birth and fortune who have committed themselves to the King’s cause, -there is an infinite number of minor officials and hangers-on of the -palace, who by preference or by force of habit stuck to their old -places. All these poor wretches dare not stay behind when the King -goes--their lot would be undoubtedly a dreadful one, they would fall -victims to the ferocious patriotism of their fellow-citizens, who have -never forgiven their desertion. Since the word for departure went -round, every one has been hunting for a vehicle or a saddle-beast, to -get off at all costs. Add to this crowd a swarm of valets, servants, -and dependants of all sorts. Most of the merchants and officials are, -as is natural, taking their families with them: the caravan will be -interminable. All night the noise of carriages, carts, and wagons, -rolling by without a moment’s cessation under my windows, kept me from -sleep.’ On the next morning he adds, ‘More than 2,000 vehicles of one -sort and another, loaded with bundles and bales and furniture, with -whole families squatting on top, have quitted Madrid. Adding those who -follow on foot or on horseback, there must be easily 10,000 of them. -They are mostly without arms, there are numbers of women, old people, -and children: it is a lamentable sight: they take the Aranjuez road, -guarded by a considerable escort[654].’ - - [654] Reiset’s _Souvenirs_, ii. pp. 358-60. - -The King, after resigning himself to the retreat, and giving orders for -the departure of the convoy and the greater part of his infantry, had -still one troublesome point to settle. Should he, or should he not, -leave a garrison behind, to defend the great fortified _enceinte_ on -the Retiro heights, outside the eastern gate of the city, which his -brother had constructed, to serve as a citadel to hold down Madrid, -and an arsenal to contain the assortment of stores of all kinds. Heavy -material, especially in the way of artillery--had been accumulating -there since the French occupation began. Here were parked all the guns -captured at Ucles, Almonaçid, and Ocaña, and tens of thousands of -muskets, the spoil of those same fields. There was a whole convoy of -clothing destined for the Army of the South, and much more that Joseph -had caused to be made for his skeleton army of _Juramentados_. There -were 900 barrels of powder and some millions of rounds of infantry -cartridges, not to speak of much arsenal plant of all kinds. All this -would have either to be blown up or to be defended. The fortifications -were good against guerrilleros or insurgents: there was a double -_enceinte_ and a star-fort in the interior. But against siege-guns -the place could obviously hold out for not more than a limited number -of days. After twenty-four hours of wavering, Joseph--contrary to -Jourdan’s advice--resolved to garrison the Retiro, on the chance that -it might defend itself till Soult reached Toledo, and a counter-attack -upon Madrid became possible. If Soult should not appear, the place -was doomed clearly enough: and the previous behaviour of the Duke of -Dalmatia made it by no means likely that he would present himself -in time. However, the King directed Lafon Blaniac, the governor of -the province of La Mancha, to shut himself in the works, with some -2,000 men, consisting mainly of the drafts belonging to the Army -of Andalusia: he would not leave any of the Army of the Centre. -Probably he considered that Soult would feel more interest in the -fate of the Retiro if his own men formed its garrison. They were a -haphazard assembly, belonging to some dozen different regiments[655], -under-officered and mostly conscripts. But they were all French troops -of the line; no _Juramentados_ were among them. To their charge were -handed over some 500 non-transportable sick of the Army of the Centre, -mostly men who had collapsed under the recent forced marches to and -from Blasco Sancho. They were not in the Retiro, but at the military -hospital in the Prado, outside the fortifications. - - [655] The surrender-rolls show that there were also some small - leavings of Marmont’s troops in the Retiro, notably from the 50th - Line [of which there were no less than six officers]. Of the Army - of the South the 12th and 27th Léger, and 45th and 51st Line were - strongly represented. - -Having sent off towards Aranjuez his convoy and the larger part of -his troops, the King was suddenly seized with a qualm that he might -be flying from an imaginary danger. What if the column that had been -heard of on the Guadarrama was simply a demonstration--perhaps half a -dozen squadrons and a few battalions of infantry? He would be shamed -for ever if he evacuated his capital before a skeleton enemy. Obsessed -by this idea, he ordered General Treillard to take the whole of his -cavalry--over 2,000 sabres--and drive in Wellington’s advanced guard -at all costs: Palombini’s Italian division marched out from Madrid to -support the reconnaissance. Treillard was ordered to use every effort -to take prisoners, from whom information could probably be extracted by -judicious questioning. - -On the morning of the 11th the French outpost-line outside of Madrid -had been held only by Reiset’s brigade of dragoons (13th and 18th -regiments), about 700 sabres. It was these troops that D’Urban had -discovered on the previous night at Las Rosas: at dawn he proceeded -to drive them in, making sure that they would retire, as they had -regularly done hitherto. His own force was much the same as that of -the enemy, his three weak regiments (seven squadrons) amounting to a -little over 700 men. But he had with him Macdonald’s horse artillery, -and the French were gunless. Demonstrating against Reiset’s front with -two regiments, D’Urban turned him with the third and two guns. The -flank movement had its due effect, and the dragoons gave back, when -shelled diagonally from a convenient slope. They retired as far as -the village of Las Rosas, and made a stand there: but on the flanking -movement being repeated, they again drew back, and passing a second -village--Majalahonda--went out of sight, taking cover in woods in the -direction of Mostoles and Boadilla. D’Urban was now within seven miles -of Madrid, and thought it well to write to Wellington to ask whether -he should endeavour to enter the city or not. The reply sent to him -was that he was to go no farther than Aravaca--three miles outside the -walls--till he should be supported; the head of the main column, headed -by Ponsonby’s heavy dragoons, would be up by the evening. - -Long before this answer reached him D’Urban was in terrible trouble. -The manœuvring of the morning had taken up some four hours; it was -about 10 when the French disappeared. While waiting for orders, the -brigadier directed his regiments to quarter themselves in Majalahonda, -water their horses, and cook their midday meal. After the pickets had -been thrown out, all went quietly for five hours, and most of the men -were enjoying a siesta at 3.30. They had now support close behind them, -as the heavy German brigade, and the 1st Light Battalion of the K.G.L. -had come up as far as Las Rosas, only three-quarters of a mile to their -rear. The advance was to be resumed when the worst heat of the day -should be over. - -But a little before four o’clock masses of French cavalry were seen -debouching from the woods in front of Boadilla. This was Treillard, -who had come up from the rear with four fresh regiments (19th and -22nd Dragoons, Palombini’s Italian _Dragons de Napoléon_, and the 1st -Westphalian Lancers[656]), and had picked up Reiset’s brigade on the -way. The whole force was over 2,000 strong, and was advancing in three -lines at a great pace, evidently prepared to attack without hesitation. -D’Urban had barely time to form a line in front of Majalahonda, when -the enemy were upon him. - - [656] Treillard calls them only _les lanciers_ in his report. - Dyneley in his narrative calls them Polish lancers, but they were - really the Westphalian _Chevaux-légers-lanciers_ of the Army of - the Centre. - -It is certain that the wise policy would have been to make a running -fight of it, and to fall back at once on the Germans at Las Rosas, -for the Portuguese were outnumbered three to one. But D’Urban was a -daring leader, honourably ambitious of distinction, and the excellent -behaviour of his brigade at Salamanca had inspired him with an -exaggerated confidence in their steadiness. He sent back messengers -to hurry up the German dragoons, and took position in front of -Majalahonda, throwing out one squadron in skirmishing line[657], -deploying five more in line of battle (1st and 12th regiments), and -keeping one in reserve on his left flank to cover four horse artillery -guns there placed. Here also were placed a party of forty of the German -Dragoons, who had been sent out on exploring duty, and joined the -Portuguese in time for the fight. - - [657] This was a squadron of the 11th, whose other squadron - formed the reserve. - -Treillard came on in three successive lines of brigades, each composed -of six squadrons, Reiset’s dragoons (13th and 18th) forming the front -line, the other dragoon brigade (19th and 22nd) the second, and the -two foreign regiments the reserve. The clash came very quickly, before -the British guns had time to fire more than three or four rounds. The -Portuguese rode forward briskly enough till they were within a few -yards of the enemy, when they checked, wavered, and went about, leaving -their brigadier and their colonels, who were riding well in front, -actually in the French ranks. D’Urban cut his way out--the Visconde -de Barbaçena and Colonel Lobo were both severely wounded and taken -prisoners. The broken line shivered in all directions, and went to the -rear pursued by the French: some of the fugitives rode into and carried -away the reserve squadron, which abandoned the guns on the left as they -were limbering up. There was a wild chase for the mile that intervened -between the battle spot in front of Majalahonda and the village of Las -Rosas. In it three of the four horse artillery guns were captured--one -by a wheel breaking, the other two by their drivers being cut down by -the pursuing dragoons. Captain Dyneley, commanding the left section -of the battery, and fourteen of his men were taken prisoners--mostly -wounded. The small party of German dragoons, under an officer named -Kuhls, who chanced to be present, made a desperate attempt to save the -guns. ‘Oh, how those poor fellows behaved!’ wrote Dyneley, ‘they were -not much more than twenty in number, but when they saw the scrape our -guns were in, they formed up to support us, which they had no sooner -done than down came at least 150 dragoons and lancers: the poor fellows -fought like men, but of course they were soon overpowered, and every -soul of them cut to pieces.’ - -The main body of the leading French brigade rode, without a check, -up to the first houses of Las Rosas, where they found the German -heavy brigade only just getting into order, so swift had the rout -been. When D’Urban’s first alarm came to hand, the horses were all -unsaddled, the men, some asleep, some occupied in grooming their -mounts or leading them to water. The trumpets blew, but the squadrons -were only just assembling, when in a confused mass and a cloud of -dust flying Portuguese and pursuing French hurtled in among them. -That no irreparable disaster took place was due to two causes--two -captains[658], who had got a few of these men already together, -gallantly charged the head of the French to gain time, and some of the -light infantry opened a spattering fire upon them from the houses. -Reiset called back his regiments to re-form them, and meanwhile the -Germans came pouring out of the village and got into line anyhow, ‘some -on barebacked horses, some with bare heads, others in forage-caps, many -in their shirt-sleeves.’ By the time that the French were advancing -again, all the four squadrons of the heavies were more or less in -line, and D’Urban had rallied the greater part of his Portuguese on -their left. The fight in front of Las Rosas was very fierce, though -the Portuguese soon had enough of it and retired. But the Germans -made a splendid resistance, and ended by beating back the front line -of the enemy. Treillard then put in his second line, and under the -charge of these fresh squadrons the dragoons of the Legion, still -fighting obstinately, were pressed back to the entrance of the village: -Colonel Jonquières, commanding the brigade in Bock’s absence, was -taken prisoner with a few of his men. The salvation of the overmatched -cavalry was that the light infantry battalion of the Legion had now -lined the outskirts of the village, and opened such a hot fire that the -enemy had to draw back. - - [658] Reizenstein and Marshalk. - -What Treillard would have done had he been left undisturbed it is -impossible to say, but just at this moment Ponsonby’s cavalry brigade -and the head of the infantry column of the 7th Division came in sight -from the rear, hurrying up to support the vanguard. The French drew -off, and retired in mass, with such haste that they did not even bring -off the captured guns, which were found by the roadside not much -damaged, though an attempt had been made to destroy their carriages. - -In this fierce fight, which was so honourable to the Germans and so -much the reverse to the Portuguese, the vanguard lost nearly 200 men. -The heavy brigade had 1 officer and 13 men killed, 5 officers and 35 -men wounded, 1 officer (Colonel Jonquières) and 6 men prisoners. The -Portuguese naturally suffered much more--by their own fault, for it -was in the rout that they were cut up. They had 3 officers and 30 men -killed, 3 officers and 49 men wounded, and 1 officer[659] and 22 men -missing. Macdonald’s unfortunate battery lost 6 killed, 6 wounded, and -its second captain (Dyneley) and 14 men missing: most of the latter -were more or less hurt. The K.G.L. light battalion had 7 wounded. The -total casualty list, therefore, was 15 officers and 182 men. It is -probable that the French did not suffer much less, for they had as -many as 17 officers disabled, including Reiset, the brigadier who led -the first line, and 11 more of the officers of his two regiments: the -supporting corps lost only 5 officers wounded among the four of them -[660]. But a loss of 17 officers must certainly imply that of at least -150 men: the Germans had used their broadswords most effectively. -Treillard sought to diminish the effect of his loss by making the -preposterous statement that he had killed 150 of the allies, wounded -500, and carried off 60 prisoners; he forgot also to mention that he -left the three captured guns behind him. - - [659] Colonel Lobo: the other colonel (the Visconde de Barbaçena) - who was taken, had been so severely wounded that the French left - him behind. - - [660] Three in the 19th Dragoons, one in the 22nd, one in the - Italian regiment. Oddly enough, of seventeen officers in the - casualty list, only one (a _chef d’escadron_ of the 13th) was - killed. The sabre disables, but does not usually slay outright. - -After this affair Wellington made the memorandum: ‘the occurrences of -the 22nd of July [Salamanca] had induced me to hope that the Portuguese -dragoons would have conducted themselves better, or I should not have -placed them at the outposts of the army. I shall not place them again -in situations in which, by their misconduct, they can influence the -safety of other troops[661].’ It is fair to D’Urban’s men, however, -to remember that they were put into action against superior numbers, -and with a knowledge that they themselves were unsupported, while the -enemy had two lines of reserve behind him. To be broken under such -circumstances was perhaps inevitable. But the second rout, in the -vicinity of Las Rosas, was much more discreditable. Their brigadier, -very reticent in his dispatch to Wellington, wrote in a private letter: -‘The same men who at Salamanca followed me into the French ranks like -British dragoons, on this 11th of August at the first charge went -just far enough to leave me in the midst of the enemy’s ranks. In the -second, which, having got them rallied, I attempted, I could not get -them within ten yards of the enemy-they left me alone, and vanished -from before the helmets like leaves before the autumn wind[662].’ - - [661] _Dispatches_, ix. p. 354. - - [662] There are very full narratives of Majalahonda to be - got from D’Urban’s correspondence, Reiset’s memoirs, and the - letters of Dyneley, who was lucky enough to escape a few days - later and rejoin his troop. Schwertfeger’s _History of the - German Legion_ gives the facts about the part taken by the - K.G.L. Light Battalion, whose service Wellington ignored in his - dispatch--wrongly stating that it was not engaged. Treillard’s - dispatch is a fine piece of exaggeration, but useful as giving - the official French view of the affair. - -Treillard brought back to King Joseph the news that Wellington in -person was certainly marching on Madrid with the greater part of his -army. Indeed his prisoners had tried to scare him by saying that 8,000 -horse were coming down on him, and otherwise exaggerating the numbers -of the allies. The cavalry brigades fell back to form the rearguard -of the King’s army, which moved on Valdemoro and Aranjuez, not toward -Toledo, for certain information had come that none of Soult’s troops -were anywhere near that ancient city. The convoy had been turned -towards Ocaña, and the road to Valencia. - -Wellington entered Madrid unopposed next day--vexed that his arrival -should have been marred by the untoward business at Majalahonda, ‘a -devil of an affair,’ as he called it in a private letter to Stapleton -Cotton[663]. But the inhabitants of the Spanish capital took little -heed of the mishap--the departure of the French was the only thing that -mattered. Their enthusiasm was unbounded. - - [663] _Dispatches_, ix. p. 351. - -‘I never witnessed,’ wrote an intelligent observer in the ranks[664], -‘such a scene before. For a distance of five miles from the gates -the road was crowded with the people who had come out to meet us, -each bringing something--laurel boughs, flowers, bread, wine, grapes, -lemonade, sweetmeats, &c. The road was like a moving forest from the -multitude who carried palms, which they strewed in the way for us to -march over. Young ladies presented us with laurel, and even fixed it in -our caps: others handed us sweetmeats and fruit. Gentlemen had hired -porters to bring out wine, which they handed to us as we passed by: -every individual strove to outvie each other in good nature. On the -other hand the feelings of each British soldier were wound up to the -highest pitch--Wellington himself rode at the head of our regiment, -we were flushed with victory, and a defeated enemy was flying in -our front: proud of the honour paid us by the people, we entered -Madrid, the air rent with cries of “Long live Wellington, Long live -the English.” The crowd and shouts and ringing of bells was beyond -description. The men on the flanks were involuntarily dragged out of -their subdivisions into houses, and treated with the best that could be -found for them. It was with difficulty that Lord Wellington could keep -his seat on horseback-every one was pressing round him.’ They kissed -his hands, his sword, even his horse and the ground he had passed -over. It would have been a moment of intoxicating exultation to most -men: but Wellington looked beyond the laurels and the shouting. ‘It -is impossible to describe the joy of the inhabitants on our arrival:’ -he wrote, in his rather ponderous style, ‘I hope that the prevalence -of the same sentiment of detestation of the French yoke which first -induced them to set the example of resistance to the usurper, will -again induce them to make exertions in the cause of their country, -which, being more wisely directed, will be more efficacious than those -they formerly made[665].’ But hope is not the same as expectation. - - [664] Journal of Wheeler of the 51st, p. 27. - - [665] To Lord Bathurst, August 13. _Dispatches_, ix. 355. - -That evening the whole city was illuminated, and the streets were so -full, till long after midnight, of crowds tumultuously joyful, that -some cautious officers feared that the French garrison of the Retiro -might sally out to make mischief in the confusion. Lafon-Blaniac, -however, kept quiet--he was already quailing over two discoveries--the -one that his water supply was very short, the other that the inner -_enceinte_ of the works was so full of miscellaneous combustible stuff, -shot in at the last moment, that nothing was more probable than a -general conflagration if he were to be bombarded. It had also begun -to strike him that his outer line of defences was very weak, and his -second one very constricted for the amount of men and material that -he had in charge. The larger _enceinte_, indeed, only consisted, for -the greater part of its extent, of the loopholed wall of the Retiro -Park, with some _flèches_ placed in good flanking positions. On the -side facing the Prado were buildings--the Retiro Palace and the -Museum, which had been barricaded and made tenable: they formed the -strongest section of the exterior line. The inner _enceinte_ was a more -formidable affair--with ten bastioned fronts on the scale of a powerful -field-work. The star-fort, which constituted the final refuge for the -garrison, was built around the solid building that had once been the -royal porcelain manufactory (where the celebrated Buen Retiro china was -made): it had a ditch twelve feet deep and twenty-four wide, and was -formidably palisaded. - -Wellington reconnoitred the works on the 13th, and directed that the -outer line should be stormed that night. Three hundred men of the -3rd Division were told off to break into the Park wall on the north, -near the Bull-Ring: 300 more from the 51st and 68th regiments of the -7th Division were to attack the south-west angle of the _enceinte_, -which was formed by the wall of the Botanical Garden. Both assaults -were completely successful--the walls were so flimsy that they -were easily hewn through with picks, or beaten in with beams used -as battering-rams, and the 68th found and broke open a postern. The -resistance was very weak--only ten of the storming-parties were killed -or wounded, and the enemy retired almost at once into his second line, -abandoning the Palace and other fortified buildings. - -Lafon-Blaniac was now in a deplorable position, for there was only one -well of moderate capacity within the second _enceinte_ to serve the -whole garrison. He had lost those in the Palace at the foot of the -hill: and the old porcelain manufactory, within the star-fort, had been -wont to be supplied by a little aqueduct, which had of course been -cut by the British. It was clear that a lack of water would soon be a -serious problem: but a superfluity of fire was a still more probable -one--the garrison was crowded up among buildings and stores, and the -large factory inside the star-fort was specially dangerous--a very -few shells would suffice to kindle it and to smoke out or smother its -defenders. - -On the morning of the 14th Lafon-Blaniac sent out a flag of truce, -ostensibly to deliver a threat to fire upon the town if he were -pressed, really to see if he could get tolerable terms, before the -British had begun to batter him, for he could note preparations to -bring up heavy guns being made. Wellington saw the _parlementaire_ -in person, and a conclusion was arrived at in a very few minutes. -Tolerable conditions of surrender were granted--the garrison to march -out with honours of war, the officers to keep their swords, horses, -and baggage, the men their knapsacks unsearched. All arms and stores -were to be handed over intact. At four o’clock the French marched out, -‘most of them drunk, and affecting a great rage against the governor -for surrendering so tamely.’ Yet it is clear that he could not have -held out for more than a day or two, with great loss of life and no -strategical profit, since there was absolutely no chance of the place -being relieved. The prisoners were sent off under escort to Lisbon. -On the way they were joined by the garrison of Guadalajara, which -had surrendered with equal facility to the Empecinado--this was a -force of _Juramentados_ and foreigners--regiments Royal-Étranger and -Royal-Irlandais, about 900 strong, under a General de Prieux, of the -Spanish not the French service. They feared for their necks if they -resisted the guerrilleros, and made practically no resistance. - -The stores in the Retiro proved most useful--nearly every regiment at -Madrid was supplied with new shoes from them: the stock of blue French -regimental coats was issued to the artillery and light dragoons, to be -cut up into jackets; Joseph’s _Juramentado_ uniforms served to reclothe -Carlos de España’s and Julian Sanchez’s men. The most unexpected find -in the fort was the eagles of the 51st Line and 12th Léger, which -had somehow got into the Retiro, though the bulk of those corps were -with Soult’s army, and only detachments of them were at Madrid. They -were sent to the Prince Regent, and now hang in the chapel of Chelsea -Hospital[666]. The garrison was found to consist of 4 _chefs de -bataillon_, 22 captains, 42 other officers, and 1,982 men--the latter -including some 200 non-military employés. In addition, 6 officers and -429 rank and file had been surrendered in the hospital, which was -outside the Retiro, before the attack on the place began[667]. - - [666] The second eagle is in error described in Wellington’s - dispatch as that of the 13th--which was in Russia at the time. - - [667] For the ‘siege’ of the Retiro see (besides the official - sources) Burgoyne’s _Diary_, i. pp. 208-9, and the narratives of - Green of the 68th and Wheeler of the 51st. For the use of the - French uniforms see the _Dickson Papers_, ed. Major Leslie, ii. - pp. 738-9. - -Here we must leave Wellington for a space, triumphant in the Spanish -capital, and much worried by the polite and effusive attentions of -the authorities and inhabitants, who lavished on him and his officers -banquets, balls, and bull-fights for many days, in spite of the penury -which had been prevailing for years in the half-ruined city. Never was -an army better treated--wine could be had for the asking, and at last -the men had to be confined to their quarters for many hours a day, lest -they should be killed by kindness. The Constitution was proclaimed -in state, a patriotic municipality elected, and Carlos de España was -made governor. He signalized his appointment by arresting a good many -_Afrancesados_ and garotting with much ceremonial the priest Diego -Lopez, who had been one of King Joseph’s most noted spies.[668] - - [668] Grattan’s _With the Connaught Rangers_, p. 275. - - NOTE.--For the garrison of the Retiro I can find no regular - details; Wellington gives only totals of the surrendered force. - But a paper of Jourdan’s (at Paris), though dated so far back as - July 17th, speaks of the Madrid garrison as containing 230 men - of the 3/12th Léger, 250 of the 3/45th, and a whole _bataillon - de marche_ more of Soult’s army, 750 strong, together with 200 - _hommes isolés_, and a considerable number of dismounted cavalry. - I suspect that these formed the Retiro garrison in August as well - as in July. The other troops noted as left at Madrid on July - 18th--a battalion of Nassau, the dépôts of the Royal Guard, 28th - and 75th, and three Spanish battalions, were certainly _not_ in - the surrender, and had marched off on August 10th with the King. - But a good many scores of the 50th, belonging to Marmont’s army, - were among the prisoners. I suspect that these were the garrison - of Avila, which retired on Madrid on getting the news of the - battle of Salamanca. - - - - -SECTION XXXIII: CHAPTER X - -AFFAIRS IN THE SOUTH. JUNE-AUGUST 1812. SOULT, HILL, AND BALLASTEROS - - -Two months elapsed between Wellington’s passage of the Agueda on his -offensive march into the kingdom of Leon, and his triumphal entry -into Madrid. During this critical time there had been constant alarms -and excursions in Andalusia and Estremadura, but nothing decisive had -occurred. This was all that Wellington wanted: if employment were -found for the French Army of the South, so that it got no chance of -interfering with the campaign on the Douro, he was perfectly satisfied, -and asked for nothing more. - -It will be remembered that his instructions to Hill, before he started -on the march to Salamanca, were that Soult must be diverted as far -as possible from sending troops northward. The main scheme was that -Ballasteros and Hill should, if possible, combine their operations so -as to bring pressure upon the enemy alternately[669]. The Cadiz Regency -had readily agreed to stir up the Spanish general to activity: if he -would demonstrate once more (as in April) against Seville, so as to -attract Soult’s attention, and cause him to concentrate, Hill should -press in upon Drouet and the French troops in Estremadura, so as to -force the Marshal to draw off from the Spaniard. Similarly, if Soult -should concentrate against Hill, Ballasteros was to strike again at -Seville, or the rear of the Cadiz Lines, which would infallibly bring -the Marshal southward again in haste[670]. - - [669] Wellington to Henry Wellesley at Cadiz, _Dispatches_, - ix. p. 169, same to same of June 1, _Dispatches_, ix. p. 197, - Wellington to Hill (June 6th), _Dispatches_, ix. p. 215, and more - especially the last paragraph of Wellington to Henry Wellesley - of June 7th, _Dispatches_, ix. p. 219, and same to same of June - 10th, _Dispatches_, ix. p. 224. - - [670] To quote Wellington’s own rather heavy but quite explicit - phrases: ‘I am certain that the enemy will move into Estremadura - upon Hill, as soon as it is known that _I_ have moved: and I - hope everything will then be done by Ballasteros, and the Army - of Murcia, and the troops in Cadiz, to divert the enemy from - their intentions upon Hill.’ And, on the other hand, in a letter - differing in date from that first cited by three days, ‘The - Spanish government have desired that in case of a movement by - Marshal Soult on General Ballasteros, General Hill should make - a movement to divert his attention from Ballasteros. I have - directed this movement, in the notion that the Conde de Villemur - [the Spanish commander in Estremadura] will also co-operate - in it.’ The see-saw of alternate distractions is clearly laid - down--but Ballasteros (as usual) proved a difficult factor to - manage. - -When Wellington crossed the Agueda [June 13] Hill had his corps -collected in central Estremadura--head-quarters at Almendralejo, the -troops cantoned about Ribera, Villafranca, Fuente del Maestre, and Los -Santos, with Penne Villemur’s Spanish horse in front at Zafra. Hill -had in hand his old force--the 2nd Division and Hamilton’s Portuguese, -with two (instead of the usual one) British and one Portuguese cavalry -brigades. He could also call up, if needed, the three strong Portuguese -infantry regiments (5th, 17th, 22nd) which were holding Badajoz till -a sufficient native garrison should be provided for it. At present -only a few hundred Spaniards [Tiradores de Doyle] had appeared. Far -away, to the north of the Guadiana, observing the French posts on the -Tagus, there was a detached Portuguese cavalry regiment at Plasencia. -This outlying unit was also put under Hill’s charge: its object was to -give early notice of any possible stir by the French, in the direction -of Almaraz or the recently restored bridge of Alcantara. Morillo’s -infantry division of Castaños’s army was lying on the right of Hill, -in south-western Estremadura: Wellington suggested that the Spanish -general might be willing to throw it into Badajoz, and so liberate -the Portuguese regiments lying there, if Soult should advance before -the regular garrison intended for the great fortress should arrive -from Cadiz. The whole force watching Soult amounted to nearly 19,000 -men, not including the Spaniards. Of this total about 7,500 sabres -and bayonets were British--something over 11,000 were Portuguese. -In addition, Morillo and Penne Villemur had not quite 4,000 Spanish -horse and foot. Supposing that a minimum garrison were thrown into -Badajoz--Morillo’s infantry for choice--Hill could dispose of 18,000 -Anglo-Portuguese for field-operations, not including the Portuguese -cavalry by the Tagus, who had the separate duty of watching the Army of -the Centre. - -The French in Estremadura still consisted of the old contingent which -D’Erlon had been administering since the year began, viz. his own -and Daricau’s infantry divisions, with Lallemand’s and Perreymond’s -cavalry--altogether not more than 12,000 men, for several of the -infantry regiments had lost a battalion apiece when Badajoz fell. Since -his excursion to Don Benito and Medellin at the time of Hill’s raid on -Almaraz, D’Erlon had drawn back, abandoning all southern and most of -eastern Estremadura to the allies. He himself was lying at Azuaga and -Fuente Ovejuna, on the slopes of the Sierra Morena, while Daricau was -more to the north, about Zalamea, rather too far off to give his chief -prompt support. Daricau’s detachment in this direction seems to have -been caused by a desire to make communication with the Army of Portugal -easy, if the latter should ever come southward again from the Tagus, -and push to Truxillo as in 1811. It was clear that unless Soult should -reinforce his troops to the north of the mountains, Hill need fear -nothing: indeed he had a distinct superiority over D’Erlon. - -Early in June, however, there was no danger that any troops from -Seville would come northward, for Ballasteros’s diversion had taken -place somewhat earlier than Wellington had wished, and the disposable -reserve of the Army of Andalusia was far away in the extreme southern -point of the province. After his success at Alhaurin in April, and his -subsequent pursuit by Soult’s flying columns, Ballasteros had taken -refuge--as was his wont when hard pressed--under the guns of Gibraltar. -The French retired when they had consumed their provisions, and fell -back to their usual stations at Malaga and Ronda, and along the line -of the Guadalete. When they were gone, the Spanish general emerged in -May, and recommenced his wonted incursions, ranging over the whole -of the mountains of the South. Having received the dispatches of the -Regency, which directed him to execute a diversion in favour of the -allied army in Estremadura, he obeyed with unexpected celerity, and -took in hand a very bold enterprise. General Conroux, with the column -whose task it was to cover the rear of the Cadiz Lines, was lying at -Bornos, behind the Guadalete, in a slightly entrenched camp. He had -with him about 4,500 men[671]. Ballasteros resolved to attempt to -surprise him, on the morning of June 1. Having got together all his -disposable troops, 8,500 infantry and a few squadrons of horse[672], -he made a forced march, and, favoured by a heavy mist at dawn, fell -upon the enemy’s cantonments and surprised them. He won a considerable -success at first: but the French rallied, and after a hard fight broke -his line by a general charge, and drove him back across the Guadalete. -Conroux was too exhausted to pursue, and Ballasteros remained in -position, apparently meditating a second attack, when on seeing some -cavalry detachments coming up to join the enemy, he sullenly retired. -He had lost 1,500 men and 4 guns, the French over 400[673]. The first -note of alarm from Bornos had caused Soult to send what reserves he -could collect from the Cadiz Lines and Seville--six battalions and -two cavalry regiments, and since Ballasteros had been beaten, but -not routed, he thought it necessary to give prompt attention to him. -Thereupon the Spaniard retreated first to Ubrique, and when threatened -in that position, to his old refuge in the lines of San Roque before -Gibraltar. - - [671] 9th Léger, 96th Ligne, a battalion of the 16th Léger, and - the 5th Chasseurs. - - [672] Figures in _Los Ejércitos españoles_, p. 128. - - [673] Possibly more--the casualty list of officers in Martinien’s - admirable tables is very heavy--9 officers hit in the 9th Léger, - 13 in the 96th Ligne, 3 in the 16th Léger, 5 in the 5th Chasseurs - à cheval. Thirty officers hit might very probably (but not - certainly) mean 600 casualties in all. - -Soult would have liked to make an end of him, and would also have been -glad to direct a new attack upon Tarifa, which served as a second base -to the roving Spanish corps; he mentions his wish to capture it in more -than one of his dispatches of this summer. But his attention was drawn -away from Ballasteros and the South by the prompt advance of Hill, who -(as had been settled) pressed in upon Drouet at the right moment. On -the 7th June he moved forward his head-quarters from Almendralejo to -Fuente del Maestre, and two days later to Zafra. On the 11th, Penne -Villemur’s cavalry pushed out from Llerena towards Azuaga, while -Slade’s brigade, advancing parallel with the Spanish general, pressed -forward from Llera on Maguilla, a village some fifteen miles in front -of Drouet’s head-quarters at Fuente Ovejuna. This reconnaissance in -force brought on the most unlucky combat that was ever fought by the -British cavalry during the Peninsular War, the skirmish of Maguilla. - -Slade, an officer whose want of capacity we have before had occasion -to notice[674], after some hours of march began to get in touch -with French dragoon vedettes, and presently, after driving them in, -found himself facing Lallemand’s brigade. Their forces were nearly -equal--each having two regiments, Slade the 1st Royals and 3rd Dragoon -Guards, Lallemand the 17th and 27th Dragoons--they had about 700 -sabres a side: if anything Slade was a little the stronger. The French -general showed considerable caution and retired for some distance, -till he had nearly reached Maguilla, where he turned to fight. Slade -at once charged him, with the Royals in front line and the 3rd Dragoon -Guards supporting. The first shock was completely successful, the -French line being broken, and more than 100 men being taken. But Slade -then followed the routed squadrons with headlong recklessness, ‘each -regiment,’ as he wrote in his very foolish report of the proceedings, -‘vying with the other which should most distinguish itself.’ The -pursuit was as reckless as that of the 13th Light Dragoons at Campo -Mayor in the preceding year, and resolved itself into a disorderly -gallop of several miles. After the French had passed a defile beyond -Maguilla a sudden cry was heard, ‘Look to your right’--a fresh squadron -which Lallemand had left in reserve was seen bearing down on the flank -of the disordered mass. Charged diagonally by a small force, but one -in good order, the British dragoons gave way. Lallemand’s main body -turned upon them, and ‘the whole brigade in the greatest disorder, and -regardless of all the exertions and appeals of their general and their -regimental officers, continued their disgraceful flight till victors -and fugitives, equally overcome and exhausted by the overpowering heat -and the clouds of thick dust, came to a standstill near Valencia de las -Torres, some four miles from Maguilla, where at last Slade was able to -collect his regiments, and to retire to the woods beyond Llera[675].’ - - [674] See vol. iv. pp. 187 and 437. - - [675] See Ainslie’s _History of the 1st Royals_, p. 133. - -In this discreditable affair Slade lost 22 killed, 26 wounded, and -no less than 2 officers and 116 men taken prisoners--most of the -latter wounded--a total casualty list of 166. Lallemand acknowledges -in his report a loss of 51 officers and men[676]. The defeated general -irritated Wellington by a very disingenuous report, in which he merely -wrote that ‘I am sorry to say our loss was severe, as the enemy brought -up a support, and my troops being too eager in pursuit, we were obliged -to relinquish a good number of prisoners that we had taken, and to -fall back on Llera.’ He then added, in the most inappropriate phrases, -‘nothing could exceed the gallantry displayed by both officers and men -on this occasion, in which Colonels Calcraft and Clinton, commanding -the two regiments, distinguished themselves, as well as all the other -officers present[677].’ - - [676] Including one officer killed and four wounded. - - [677] See Slade’s report in _Dispatches_, ix. pp. 242-3. - Tomkinson (p. 174) says that Slade’s report to Cotton, commanding - the cavalry, was ‘the _best_ I ever saw. He made mention of his - son having stained his maiden sword!’ - -Wellington’s scathing comment, in a letter to Hill, was: ‘I have never -been more annoyed than by Slade’s affair, and I entirely concur with -you in the necessity of inquiring into it. It is occasioned entirely -by the trick our officers of cavalry have acquired, of galloping -at everything--and then galloping _back_ as fast as they galloped -_on_ the enemy. They never consider their situation, never think of -manœuvring before an enemy--so little that one would think they cannot -manœuvre except on Wimbledon Common: and when they use their arm as it -ought to be used, viz. offensively, they never keep nor provide for a -reserve.... The Royals and 3rd Dragoon Guards were the best cavalry -regiments in this country, and it annoys me particularly that the -misfortune has happened to them. I do not wonder at the French boasting -of it: it is the greatest blow they have struck[678].’ It is curious -to find that Slade retained command of his brigade till May 1813. One -would have expected to find him relegated to Great Britain at a much -earlier date. But Wellington was not even yet in full control of the -removal or promotion of his senior officers. Other generals with whom -he was equally discontented, such as Erskine and Long, were also left -upon his hands after he had set a black mark against their names. - - [678] Wellington to Hill, _Dispatches_, ix. p. 238. - -The combat of Maguilla, however unsatisfactory in itself, made no -difference to the general strategy of the campaign. Drouet, having -drawn back on Hill’s advance, sent messages to Soult, to the effect -that unless he were strongly reinforced he must retire from the Sierra -Morena, and cover the roads to Cordova on the Andalusian side of the -mountains. He reported that he had only 6,000 men in hand, and that -Hill was coming against him with 30,000, including the Spaniards. Both -these figures were fantastic--for reasons best known to himself D’Erlon -did not include Daricau’s division in his own total, while he credited -Hill with 15,000 men in the 2nd British division alone [which was -really 8,000 strong, including its Portuguese brigade], and reported -with circumstantial detail that the 7th Division had come down from -Portalegre and joined the 2nd[679]. - - [679] Letters of D’Erlon to Jourdan on June 9th, and of Soult to - King Joseph June 12, copies from the Paris archives--lent me by - Mr. Fortescue. - -Soult sent on D’Erlon’s dispatch to Madrid, with the comment that -Hill’s advance showed that the main intention of Wellington was -certainly to attack Andalusia, and not to fall upon Marmont. But that -he did not consider such an attack very imminent is sufficiently shown -by the fact that he detached to Drouet’s aid only one division of -infantry, that of Barrois--which composed his central reserve--and -one of cavalry, that of Pierre Soult, or a total of 6,000 infantry -and 2,200 cavalry: such a reinforcement would have been futile if he -had really believed that Wellington was marching against Seville. -His real view may be gathered from his estimate of Hill’s force at -15,000 Anglo-Portuguese and 5,000 Spaniards--a total very remote -from the alarmist reports of Drouet, and not far from the truth. The -reinforcement sent under Barrois would give the Estremaduran detachment -a practical equality in numbers with Hill, and a great superiority in -quality. The orders sent to Drouet were that he was to advance against -Hill, to strive to get him to an engagement, at any rate to ‘contain’ -him, so that he should not detach troops north of the Guadiana to join -Wellington or to demonstrate against Madrid. If things went well, -Drouet was to invest Badajoz, and to occupy Merida, from whence he -would try to get into communication via Truxillo with the troops of the -Army of the Centre. The final paragraph of his directions stated that -Drouet’s main object must be to make such a formidable diversion that -Wellington would have to reinforce Hill. ‘When the Army of Portugal -finds that it has less of the English army in front of it, we may -perhaps persuade it [i. e. Marmont] that the enemy’s plan is certainly -to invade the provinces of the south of Spain before he acts directly -against the North: then, no doubt, changed dispositions will be made.’ -Unfortunately for the strategical reputation of Soult, Wellington -crossed the Agueda with seven of his eight divisions to attack Marmont, -on the very day after this interesting dispatch was written. - -D’Erlon had been promised that Barrois should march to his aid on the -14th, but it was not till the 16th that the column from Seville started -to join him, and then it marched not by the route of Constantina and -Guadalcanal, as D’Erlon had requested, but by the high-road from -Andalusia to Badajoz, via Monasterio. If Hill had been pressing the -troops in front of him with vigour, the French would have been in an -awkward position, since they were on separate roads, and might have -been driven apart, and kept from junction by a decisive movement from -Llerena, where Hill’s cavalry and advanced guard lay. But the British -general had orders to attract the attention of Soult and to ‘contain’ -as many of the enemy as possible, rather than to risk anything. He -resolved, when he heard of the approach of Barrois, to retire to the -heights of Albuera, which Wellington had pointed out to him as the -most suitable position for standing at bay, if he were pressed hard. -Accordingly he drew back by slow stages from Zafra towards Badajoz, -covering his rear by his cavalry, which suffered little molestation. -Barrois joined Drouet at Bienvenida near Zafra on the 19th, and their -united force, since Daricau had come in to join them from the direction -of Zalamea, with the greater part of his division, must have amounted -to over 18,000 men, though Drouet in a report to King Joseph states it -at a decidedly lower figure[680]. They advanced cautiously as far as -Villafranca and Fuente del Maestre, which their infantry occupied on -June 21, while their numerous cavalry lay a little way in front, at -Villalba, Azeuchal, and Almendralejo. On the same day Hill had taken up -the Albuera position, on which several points had been entrenched. - - [680] In this report (the copy of which I owe to Mr. Fortescue’s - kindness) Drouet says that Soult had told him to expect - reinforcements to the total of some 15,000 men, but that Barrois - brought him only 3,500 infantry and 1,500 horse, and Daricau - 4,500 infantry and 1,000 horse, so that his reinforcements were - only 10,500 men instead of 15,000. Drouet stated his own force, - horse and foot (his own division and Lallemand’s cavalry) in a - preceding letter of June 9th at 6,000 of all arms, so that the - concentration would only give 16,000 men. I fancy that he is - deliberately understating Barrois, for that general had 7,000 - men in March, and 5,000 still in October at the end of a long - and fatiguing campaign, and Pierre Soult too. Drouet’s object - in giving these figures to Joseph was to prove that he was so - weak that he could make no detachment towards the Tagus, as the - King had directed him to do. Was it for the same purpose that he - always over-stated Hill’s army? Or did he really believe that the - latter had 30,000 men arranged opposite him, as he repeatedly - told Soult? - -As Hill had just called out the three garrison regiments of Portuguese -from Badajoz, he had now between 18,000 and 19,000 of his own army in -position, besides Villemur’s Spanish cavalry. This last, together with -Long’s and Slade’s squadrons, were thrown out in front of the Albuera -river, with their vedettes in Santa Marta, Almendral, and Corte de -Peleas, only a mile or two from the French advanced posts. They were -directed not to give way till they were severely pressed, as Hill -wished to avoid at all costs the kind of surprise that had befallen -Beresford in 1811, when Long had retired so precipitately before the -French horse that he could give no account of their strength, nor of -the position of Soult’s infantry. But the expected advance of the enemy -hung fire--from the 21st onwards Hill was waiting to be attacked, and -sending almost daily accounts of the situation to Wellington: but the -main body of the French moved no farther forward. This was all the more -surprising to the English general because he had intercepted a letter -written on May 31 from King Joseph to Drouet, in which the latter was -directed to ‘passer sur le corps à Hill[681],’ and then to come up to -the Tagus to join the Army of the Centre. Not knowing how entirely -Soult and D’Erlon were ignoring all orders from Madrid, both Wellington -and his trusty lieutenant thought that such instructions must almost -certainly bring about an action. The former wrote to the latter on -June 28th, after receiving several statements of the situation: ‘if -you should find that Drouet separates his troops, or if he pretends -to hold you in check with a smaller body of men than you think you can -get the better of, fall upon him, but take care to keep a very large -proportion of your troops in reserve.... I should prefer a partial -affair to a general one, but risk a general affair--keeping always -a large body of reserve, particularly of cavalry--rather than allow -Drouet to remain in Estremadura and keep you in check.’ But the enemy -neither came on for a general action, nor scattered his troops so -widely as to induce Hill to risk an attack on any point of his line. -He remained with his infantry massed about Villafranca and Fuente del -Maestre, and only demonstrated with his cavalry. - - [681] Cf. Wellington to Hill of July 11th. _Dispatches_, ix. p. - 280. - -The cause of this inactivity on Drouet’s part was partly, perhaps, his -over-estimate of Hill’s strength, but much more Soult’s unwillingness -to obey the orders sent him from Madrid. He was determined not to -detach a third part of his army to the Tagus, to join the Army of -the Centre. He was by this time fully embarked on his long course of -insubordinate action, with which we have already dealt when writing -of the King’s desires and their frustration[682]. On the 26th May -Joseph had sent him the dispatch which directed that D’Erlon must come -up northward, if Wellington’s main attack turned out to be directed -against Marmont and the Army of Portugal: ‘his corps is the pivot on -which everything turns: he is the counterpoise which can be thrown -into the balance in one scale or the other, according as our forces -have to act on the one side or the other[683].’ Drouet himself had -at the same time received that order to the same effect, sent to -him directly and not through his immediate superior, which so much -scandalized Soult’s sense of hierarchical subordination[684]. On -getting the Madrid dispatch of May 26 upon June 8th, Soult had written -to say that Wellington’s real objective was Andalusia and not the -North, that Marmont was utterly misled if he supposed that he was to be -attacked by the main body of the allies, that Graham, with two British -divisions, was still at Portalegre in support of Hill, and that Drouet -had therefore been forbidden to lose touch with the Army of the South -by passing towards the Tagus. If he departed, the whole fabric of -French power in the South would go to pieces, ‘I should have to pack -up and evacuate Andalusia after the smallest check.’ Drouet should -‘contain’ Hill, but could do no more. In a supplementary dispatch of -June 12, provoked by the receipt of Joseph’s direct orders to Drouet, -Soult went further, definitely stating that the troops in Estremadura -should not go to the Tagus, ‘where they would be lost to the Army -of the South, but would never arrive in time to help the Army of -Portugal.’ If Drouet passed the Tagus, Hill would march on Seville, -and on the sixth day would capture that insufficiently garrisoned -capital, put himself in communication with Ballasteros, and raise the -siege of Cadiz. ‘I repeat that the Army of the South cannot carry -out its orders, and send Count D’Erlon and 15,000 men to the valley -of the Tagus, without being compelled to evacuate Andalusia within -the fortnight.... If your Majesty insists, remove me from command, I -do not wish to be responsible for the inevitable disaster that must -follow[685].’ - - [682] See chapter i above, pp. 309-10. - - [683] Joseph to Soult, May 26, intercepted dispatch in the - Scovell ciphers. - - [684] See above, p. 332. - - [685] Soult to Joseph, printed in Joseph’s _Correspondence_, ix. - pp. 31-3. - -[Illustration: ESTREMADURA] - -At the same time Drouet, much vexed at having personal responsibility -thrown upon his shoulders, by the King’s direct orders to him to march -without consulting Soult, wrote to Madrid that he was very weak, that -Hill was in front of him with a superior force, and that Barrois and -Pierre Soult, who had just joined him, were under strict orders not to -go beyond the Guadiana, so that if he himself marched towards the Tagus -it would be with a very small force. But he dare not make that move: -‘I am absolutely obliged to stop where I am [Villafranca] in presence -of Hill, who still remains concentrated on the Albuera position, which -he has entrenched, with at least 25,000 men.’ Indeed an attack by Hill -was expected day by day: ‘at the moment of writing there is lively -skirmishing going on at the outposts, and news has come in that the -whole allied army is advancing[686].’ Drouet, in short, was determined -to evade responsibility, and summed up the situation by the conclusion -that he was acting for the best in ‘containing’ Hill and his very -large detachment, who could be of no use to Wellington in the campaign -which the latter was now reported to have begun against Marmont in the -North. He could do no more. - - [686] Drouet to Joseph, Villafranca, July 3, Paris Archives - [paper communicated to me by Mr. Fortescue]. Cf. Drouet to - Jourdan to much the same general effect, of June 18, in King - Joseph’s _Correspondence_, ix. pp. 36-7. - -The deadlock in front of the Albuera position lasted for many -days--from June 21st till July 2nd. This was a very trying time for -Hill’s corps--the weather was excessively hot, the ground was hideous -with the insufficiently buried corpses of the battle of last year, and -sickness was very prevalent in some regiments. For the first day or two -after the arrival of the French at Villafranca and Almendralejo, an -attack was expected each morning, but nothing in particular happened. -Drouet kept quiet behind his cavalry screen, and did no more than send -foraging parties out on his flanks, which ravaged the countryside as -far as Merida and Feria. Over-valuing Hill’s strength, he dreaded to -commit himself to an attack on a superior force, covered by field-works -and in a fine position. Nothing was seen of him for ten days, save that -on the 26th he felt the posts of the allies at Corte de Peleas and -Santa Marta, and retired after a little cavalry skirmishing. On July -1, however, he executed a more searching reconnaissance, with three -brigades of cavalry under the direction of Pierre Soult, Vinot’s in -the centre, Sparre’s on the right, Lallemand’s on the left. Barrois’s -infantry division came up in support. Vinot drove in a Portuguese -cavalry regiment of J. Campbell’s brigade from Corte de Peleas[687], -but retired when he found it supported by Long’s light dragoons in -front of the Albuera position. Lallemand found Santa Marta held by -Penne Villemur’s cavalry, and turned them out of it with considerable -loss, for the Spanish general unwisely offered battle, and was routed -after a very short contest. He retired into the wood of Albuera, whose -edge was occupied by Slade’s heavy dragoons, supported by the pickets -of Byng’s infantry brigade. A troop of the 3rd Dragoon Guards made a -gallant charge to cover the retreat of the Spaniards, and suffered some -loss in bringing them off. Lallemand at dusk pressed forward, and cut -off a small party of the Buffs, who would have been taken prisoners if -a troop of the 2nd Hussars K.G.L. had not rescued them by a sudden -counter-attack. Sparre’s brigade on the right did no more than skirmish -with the allied outposts along the lower course of the river Albuera. -At night all the French cavalry retired, and D’Erlon wrote to Soult -that his reconnaissance had ‘completely fulfilled its object,’ by -making him certain that Hill had 25,000 foot, 3,000 horse, and a very -strong force of artillery in position, so that it would be insane to -attack him[688]. - - [687] Espinchal says that the 2nd Hussars captured a Portuguese - gun: I have no corroboration for this. - - [688] Details of all this in Soult’s dispatch to Joseph of July - 10, in Espinchal’s _Mémoires_ (he served in Vinot’s brigade), and - in the diaries of Swabey of the R.A. and of Stoltzenberg of the - 2nd Hussars K.G.L., printed in full in Schwertfeger’s _History of - the K. G. Legion_, ii. pp. 257-8. - -On the next morning, July 2nd, Hill determined to make use of -Wellington’s permission to bring on an action, if he should judge that -Drouet was not strong enough to face him. The weakness of the French -demonstration had convinced him that the enemy was not ready to fight. -Collecting the whole of his army, he advanced from the Albuera position -towards Santa Marta, thus challenging Drouet to a fight. The enemy’s -vedettes made no stand and retired when pushed. On reaching Santa Marta -Hill halted for the night in battle order, and on the morning of the -3rd resumed his movement, which was directed to cutting off Drouet from -the great road to Seville. While Erskine with the light cavalry (Long, -and J. Campbell’s Portuguese) advanced down the high-road to Villalba, -supported by one British and one Portuguese brigade of infantry, Hill -himself, with the rest of his army, executed a flank march to Feria, -and, having got behind the French left wing, turned inward and moved -toward Los Santos. The enemy’s main body, at Villafranca and Fuente -del Maestre, were thus prevented from using the high-road to Seville, -and placed in a position which compelled Drouet either to fight, or to -retire south-eastward towards Usagre and Llerena. - -Next morning (July 4) Hill expected a battle, for Barrois’s division -and all Pierre Soult’s cavalry were found in a strong position at -Fuente del Maestre, and the rest of the French were close behind at -Almendralejo. But when he continued his movement toward the right, -outflanking Barrois instead of attacking him, the enemy gave way and -retired, protected by his cavalry, retreating on Ribera, Hinojosa, -and Usagre[689]. There was lively skirmishing between the squadrons of -the British advanced guard, and those of the French rearguard, but no -serious engagement. - - [689] All this from Hill’s dispatch to Wellington of July 4, from - Los Santos. - -The same general plan of action continued on the 5th. Hill, keeping -his army well concentrated, moved in two columns on Usagre and -Bienvenida, the bulk of his cavalry riding at the head of his left-hand -column and pressing in the French horse. Drouet took up a position at -Valencia de las Torres, where he had found strong ground, and thought -on the 6th that he would risk a defensive action. But Hill, instead -of marching in upon him, continued his flanking movement towards -Llerena. Thereupon Drouet, finding that he would be cut off from -Andalusia if he remained in his chosen position, evacuated it and fell -back by Maguilla on Berlanga and Azuaga [July 7]. The two armies had -thus got back into exactly the same positions in which they had lain -on June 19th, before Hill’s retreat to Albuera. The tale of their -manœuvres bears a curious resemblance to the contemporary movements of -Wellington and Marmont between Salamanca and Tordesillas. In each case -one combatant, when pressed, retired, and took up a strong position -(Marmont at Tordesillas-Pollos-Toro, Hill at Albuera). He then issued -from it after some days, and by persistent flank movements dislodged -his opponent, and drove him back to the same position from which he -had started, so that the situation came back to that which it had been -three weeks before. But here the parallel ended--Marmont pressed his -advantage too far, and got entangled in the disastrous manœuvre of -July 22, which brought on the battle of Salamanca and his own ruin. -Hill, contented with what he had achieved, halted at Llerena, and did -not push matters to a decisive action. He had done all that Wellington -desired in keeping Soult’s attention diverted from Marmont’s peril, and -in ‘containing’ a hostile force as great as his own. Moreover he had -driven it off the road to Seville, and if it retreated on Andalusia it -would have to be on Cordova, by the road of Constantina, since no other -remained available. - -But a new development of this complicated and indecisive campaign -began on July 10th. Drouet, thinking apparently that Hill’s farther -advance might be stopped as effectively by assuming a position on -his flank as by direct opposition in front, shifted his right wing -(Daricau’s division and Sparre’s and Vinot’s cavalry) back to Zalamea -and its neighbourhood, where Daricau had lain in May and June. He -himself resumed his old head-quarters at Fuente Ovejuna. Now just at -this time Hill received an intercepted letter of King Joseph to Drouet, -dated June 21st, which repeated in angry terms the long-ignored orders -that the Estremaduran detachment of the Army of the South was to march -on Toledo without delay. ‘Vous aurez sans doute reçu les renforts que -j’ai donné l’ordre au duc de Dalmatie de vous envoyer. Vous devez avoir -quinze mille hommes. Agissez avec ce corps, et tout ce qui est sous -le commandement du général Daricau. Rapprochez-vous de moi: passez le -Tage, et mettez-vous en état d’agir suivant les événements; n’attendez -aucun ordre[690].’ - - [690] See Wellington to Hill of July 11 (_Dispatches_, ix. p. - 280) and Hill to Wellington of July 9. The text of the order is - in Joseph’s _Correspondence_, ix. p. 41. - -The capture of this dispatch coincided with the news that Drouet had -pushed Daricau and a large body of cavalry towards Zalamea. Hill drew -the natural deduction that the French opposite him were at last about -to obey the King’s orders, and to march to the Tagus, via Zalamea, -Medellin, and Truxillo. ‘The intelligence that I have of the enemy’s -movements’ (he wrote to Wellington) ‘indicates his intention of -carrying Joseph’s instructions into execution.... I have received -information [false as it chanced] that Drouet was yesterday at Zalamea, -with his main body, having sent troops by Berlanga and Azuaga. I shall -move immediately in the direction of Zalamea.’ That is to say that if -Drouet was going off northward towards the King, Hill was prepared to -carry out the original instructions which Wellington had left him, and -if he could not stop the enemy, would move parallel to him, so as to -join his chief before Drouet could transfer himself to the northern -sphere of operations. His route would be by Badajoz or Merida and the -newly-restored bridge of Alcantara on Ciudad Rodrigo, a much shorter -one than that of his opponent. He had just begun to move his left wing -in the direction of Merida, when he received a letter from Wellington -exactly conforming to his own ideas. If Drouet is making for the Tagus -in full force, wrote Wellington, you must take all the cavalry except -one English regiment and Campbell’s Portuguese, along with Byng’s and -Howard’s brigades of the 2nd Division, and Hamilton’s division, and -send orders to have all preparations made at Alcantara to lay down the -bridge: your route across the mountains will be by the pass of Perales: -you will find elaborate instructions for the further movement at Ciudad -Rodrigo. If Drouet only takes a small force, more allied troops may -be left in Estremadura; Zafra had better be their head-quarters. Hill -would conduct the marching column as far as Perales, and then return to -take charge of whatever is left in the South to watch Soult[691]. - - [691] Wellington to Hill, Rueda, July 11. - -A few days later it became evident that no general movement of the -French towards the Tagus was in progress. Daricau’s infantry and the -attached cavalry settled down at and about Zalamea, and pushed nothing -but reconnaissances in the direction of the Guadiana--parties of -horse appeared about Don Benito and Medellin, but no solid columns in -support[692]. Hill therefore halted, with his head-quarters at Zafra -and his rearguard (which had but a moment before been his advanced -guard) at Llerena: only a few of J. Campbell’s Portuguese squadrons -moved to Merida, though some Spanish infantry came up to the same -direction[693]. Things then remained very quiet till July 24th, when -Drouet at last appeared to be on the move with some definite purpose. -On that day Lallemand’s dragoons appeared at Hinojosa, pressed in -a Portuguese cavalry regiment, and seemed inclined to push towards -Ribera, but retired when Long’s brigade came up against them: the -losses on both sides were trifling. Three days later (July 27) a -brigade of Daricau’s infantry advanced to Medellin and drove off -the observing force of the Spanish infantry, while Vinot’s cavalry -executed a raid on Merida, expelled the Portuguese detachment there, -and exacted a requisition of food from the town. They then retired in -haste; but Hill thought it well for the future to strengthen his left, -and moved up Byng’s British and A. Campbell’s Portuguese infantry -brigades to Merida. But Drouet was only feinting, and had no serious -intentions of drawing up to the Guadiana, or crossing that river -northward. His main purpose was simply the raising of requisitions; for -his detachments in the mountains of the Serena were living on the edge -of famine, and could only feed themselves by keeping constantly on the -move. It is curious to find from the dispatches of the two opposing -generals at this time that both were fairly satisfied with themselves: -each thought that he was ‘containing’ a somewhat superior force of the -enemy, and was doing his duty by keeping it from interfering in the -more important theatre of war. Hill knew that he was detaining Drouet, -when he was much wanted at Madrid: Drouet knew that he was preventing -Hill from joining Wellington on the Douro. But the real balance of -advantage was on the side of the allies: Hill, with only 8,000 British -and 11,000 Portuguese was claiming the attention of three veteran -divisions of the infantry of the Army of the South, and of the major -part of Soult’s cavalry. The French in Andalusia were left so weak by -the absence of 18,000 men beyond the Sierra Morena, that they could -neither molest Cadiz nor the Army of Murcia. Indeed, Ballasteros, -though his forces were less than they had been at the time of his -defeat at Bornos, was able to provide employment for all the troops -that Soult could spare for operations in the open field. - - [692] There is plenty of detail about these quite unimportant - movements in Espinchal, ii. pp. 26-33. - - [693] Not, however, the bulk of Morillo’s division, which was at - Medina de las Torres near Zafra, as the general’s correspondence - of that date shows [Villa’s _Life of Morillo_, ii. p. 224]. - -Six weeks after his disaster of June 1st, that enterprising, if -irresponsible, general started out again from the lines of San Roque -with between 5,000 and 6,000 men. Keeping to mountain roads and -concealing his march, he surprised, on July 14, the great harbour-city -of Malaga, though he failed to capture its citadel, Gibalfaro, into -which the wrecks of the garrison escaped. Ballasteros got money, -stores, and recruits from the captured town, but knew that he dare not -tarry there for long. For Soult, naturally enraged at such a bold and -successful raid, turned troops toward him from all sides. Leval, the -governor of Granada, marched against him with every spare battalion -that could be got together from the eastern side of Andalusia, some -5,000 bayonets. Villatte, in command before Cadiz, came from the other -quarter with 6,000 men; they had orders to catch Ballasteros between -them, to intercept his retreat upon Gibraltar, and annihilate him. - -In order to cut off the Spaniard from his usual place of refuge, -Villatte took a turn to the south, appeared in sight of Gibraltar on -July 20, and then, keeping himself between the British fortress and -Ballasteros, advanced northward to wait for him. Leval was to have -driven him into Villatte’s arms, advancing from Antequera and pressing -the hunt southward. But the raider, instead of retreating in the -expected direction, slipped unseen across Villatte’s front by Alora, -and made off into the plains of central Andalusia. On the 25th at dawn -he appeared, most unexpectedly, at Osuna and surprised the small French -garrison there. The governor, Colonel Beauvais, cut his way through the -streets to a fortified convent, where he held out. But Ballasteros, -satisfied with having captured a quantity of stores, mules, and -baggage, and a few prisoners, vanished. Leval was on his track, and -he had to evade his pursuer by a flank march, first to Grazalema and -then to Ubrique. This was bringing him dangerously near to Villatte’s -position. But that general had no accurate knowledge of what was going -on to the north, and having waited for ten days in the mountains beyond -Gibraltar for a prey that never appeared, found himself starved out. On -the 30th he started on his enforced return towards the Cadiz Lines, and -had reached Medina Sidonia when Ballasteros, who had quite outmarched -Leval, came down in safety to Ximena on August 1, and placed himself -in touch with Gibraltar once more. Thereupon Leval, seeing that it was -no use to push the Spaniard (for about the tenth time) under the guns -of the British fortress, and finding his column utterly worn out, went -home to Granada[694]. - - [694] The best account of all this is in Schepeler, pp. 661-3. - -Thus Ballasteros gave no small help to the allied cause by distracting -some 11,000 or 12,000 French troops for a long fortnight, while Hill -was detaining Drouet in Estremadura. By the time that the hunt after -the evasive Spaniard had come to an end, the battle of Salamanca -had been fought, and the aspect of affairs in the Peninsula had been -completely changed. Even Soult, who had so long shut his eyes to the -obvious, had at last to acknowledge that a new situation had arisen. - -The news of Salamanca had reached Hill on July 29th, and caused a -general expectation that the French in Estremadura would retreat -at once, and that Soult would be retiring from Andalusia also in a -few days. No such results followed--the intelligence was late in -penetrating to the French camps; and Soult, still hoping to induce -King Joseph to join him, lingered for many days in his old posture. On -August 4 Hill wrote that the ‘recent glorious event’ appeared to have -had very little effect on his immediate opponent, who continued in a -strong position in his front. ‘Therefore for the present I shall remain -where I am, and watch for a favourable opportunity of acting[695].’ -Soult at Seville had, as late as August 8, no official news of -Marmont’s defeat, and only knew of it by Spanish rumours, which he--of -set purpose--discounted. ‘Les relations qu’ils ont publiées exagèrent -sans doute les avantages: mais il paraît que quelque grand événement -s’est passé en Castille[696].’ He continued to urge King Joseph to come -to Seville, join him, and attack Hill with such superior forces that -Wellington would be forced to fly to the aid of his subordinate. It -was only on August 12th that certain information regarding the battle -of July 22nd reached the head-quarters of the Duke of Dalmatia, in -the form of Joseph’s Segovia dispatch of July 29th, containing the -orders for the complete evacuation of Andalusia, and the march of the -whole Army of the South upon Toledo. Even then Soult did not think it -too late to make a final appeal to the King: ‘the loss of a battle by -the Army of Portugal was nothing more than a great duel, which can -be undone by another similar duel. But the loss of Andalusia and the -raising of the siege of Cadiz would be events whose effects would be -felt all round Europe and the New World.... What does it matter if the -enemy is left in possession of the whole space between Burgos and the -Sierra Morena, until the moment when great reinforcements come from -France, and the Emperor has been able to make his arrangements? But -this sacrifice of Andalusia once made, there is no way of remedying -it. The imperial armies in Spain will have to repass the Ebro--famine -perhaps will drive them still farther[697],’ &c. - - [695] Letter of August 4 in Sidney’s _Life of Hill_, p. 210. - - [696] Soult to Joseph, August 8, Paris Archives (lent me by Mr. - Fortescue). - - [697] Soult to Joseph, Seville, August 12, in Joseph’s - _Correspondence_, ix. pp. 67-8. - -On reflection, however, Soult did not venture to disobey, and, before -his last appeal could possibly have reached the King’s hands, began to -issue orders for evacuation. But so great was his rage that he wrote an -extraordinary letter to Clarke, the Minister of War at Paris, in which -he made the preposterous insinuation that Joseph was about to betray -his brother the Emperor, and to come to an agreement with the Cadiz -Cortes. The evidence which he cited for this strange charge was flimsy -in the extreme. ‘I have read in the Cadiz newspapers the statement that -His Majesty’s Ambassador in Russia has joined the Russian army: that -the King has opened intrigues with the Insurrectional Government[698]. -Sweden has made peace with England, and the Hereditary Prince -(Bernadotte) has begun to treat with the Regency at Cadiz[699].... I -draw no deduction from all these facts, but I am all the more attentive -to them. I have thought it necessary to lay my fears before six -generals of my army, after having made them take an oath not to reveal -what I told them save to the Emperor himself, or to some one specially -commissioned by him. But it is my duty to inform your Excellency that -I have a fear that all the bad arrangements made [by the King] and -all the intrigues that have been going on, have the object of forcing -the imperial armies to retreat to the Ebro, or farther, and then of -representing this event as the “last possible resource” (an expression -used by the King himself in a letter of July 20), in the hope of -profiting by it to come to some compromise[700]. - - [698] There _had_ been such intrigues between the King and - persons in Cadiz (see above, p. 140), but they had been opened by - Napoleon’s own advice, in order to sow seeds of dissension among - the patriots. - - [699] The point of this insinuation is that Bernadotte and Joseph - were brothers-in-law, having married the two sisters Clary. - - [700] Printed in Joseph’s _Correspondence_, ix. pp. 68-70. - -This letter, as obscurely worded as it was malicious, was not sent -to France by the usual channels, lest the King should get wind of it, -but consigned to the captain of a French privateer, who was about to -sail from Malaga to Marseilles. By an ill chance for Soult, the vessel -was chased by a British ship, and compelled to run for shelter into -the harbour of Valencia. There the King had recently arrived, on his -retreat from Madrid. The privateer-captain, who did not know what he -was carrying, sent the letter in to the royal head-quarters. Hence came -an explosion of wrath, and a series of recriminations with which we -shall have to deal in their proper place. - -The evacuation of Andalusia commenced from the western end, because -the retreat of the army was to be directed eastwards. The evacuation -of the Castle of Niebla on August 12th was its first sign--the troops -in the Condado had retired to San Lucar near Seville by the 15th. A -little later the garrisons in the extreme south, at Ronda and Medina -Sidonia, blew up their fortifications and retired. These were small -movements, but the dismantling of the Cadiz Lines was a formidable -business, and took several days. Soult covered it by ordering a furious -bombardment of the city and the Puntales fort from his batteries across -the bay; during each salvo of the heavy guns one or two of them were -disabled, others being fired at an angle against their muzzles, so as -to split them. More were burst by intentional over-loading, others -had their trunnions knocked off, but a good many were only spiked or -thrown into the water. The ammunition remaining after two days of -reckless bombardment was blown up; the stores set on fire; the flotilla -of gunboats was sunk, but so carelessly that thirty of them were -afterwards raised with no difficulty and found still seaworthy. This -orgy of destruction continued for the whole of the 24th: at night the -sky was red all round the bay, from Rota to Chiclana, with burning huts -and magazines, and the explosions were frequent. - -This was the moment when the large allied force in Cadiz might well -have made a general sortie, for the purpose of cutting up the enemy -while he was engrossed in the work of destruction. Wellington had -written a week before, to General Cooke, then in command of the British -contingent in the Isla de Leon, to bid him fall upon the enemy when -opportunity should offer, considering that the French troops in the -Lines were reduced to a minimum by the detachment of the division -that had gone out to hunt Ballasteros. He suggested that the allies -should cross the Santi Petri river and attack Chiclana, taking care, -however, not to be cut off from their retreat. Unfortunately this -letter of August 16th came too late, for Cooke (after conferring with -the Spanish authorities) had committed himself to another and a more -circuitous expedition to molest the French. General Cruz Murgeon, with -a Spanish division of 4,000 men (which had originally been intended -for the reinforcing of Ballasteros) had landed at the port of Huelva, -in the Condado de Niebla, on August 11th. Cooke reinforced him with -the pick of the British contingent--six companies of Guards, half -of the 2/87th[701], two companies of Rifles[702], part of the 20th -Portuguese, and the squadron of the 2nd Hussars K.G.L., which was the -only cavalry at his disposition. These, placed under the charge of -Colonel Skerrett, made up 1,600 men in all[703]; they landed at Huelva, -joined Cruz Murgeon, and advanced with him against Seville. On the 24th -they discovered the French outposts at San Lucar la Mayor, and drove -them out of that town. But they hesitated over the idea of attacking -Seville, where French troops were collecting from all quarters, though -the divisions of Conroux and Villatte from the Cadiz Lines had not yet -come up. - - [701] Minus four companies left at Tarifa. - - [702] Two from the 2/95th, those of Cadoux and Jenkins. - - [703] Skerrett in his dispatch (Wellington, _Supplementary - Dispatches_, xiv. p. 108), speaks of attacking San Lucar with 800 - men: but this was not his whole force. - -On the night of August 26th-27th, however, Soult, apprised of the near -approach of his column from the Lines, evacuated Seville with the main -part of his force, escorting a vast horde of Spanish refugees, who -feared to remain behind to face their countrymen, and a long train -of wagons and carriages loaded with the accumulated spoils of three -years of tyrannous misrule in Andalusia. He left a rearguard to occupy -the outworks of the city, which was to be picked up and taken on by -Villatte when he should appear on the next day. - -On hearing of the departure of the Marshal, Cruz Murgeon and Skerrett -resolved to attack Seville, knowing that the troops left behind to -guard it were insufficient to man effectively all its long line of -defences. Being on the western side of the Guadalquivir, they had first -to win the large transpontine suburb of Triana, the home of potters -and gipsies, through which alone access could be got to the city. It -was attacked at several points and stormed, but the enemy then held -to the great bridge over the river linking Triana and Seville, and -made a long resistance there. The bridge had been barricaded, part of -its planks had been pulled up, and artillery had been trained on it -from the farther side. Notwithstanding these obstacles the Spaniards -attacked it; the well-known Irish adventurer Colonel Downie charged -three times at the head of his Estremaduran Legion. Repelled twice by -the heavy fire, he reached the barricade at the third assault, and -leaped his horse over the cut which the French had made in front of it, -but found himself alone within the work, and was bayoneted and made -prisoner[704]. But soon after the allies brought up guns through the -streets of Triana, and so battered the barricade that the French were -compelled to evacuate it. Skerrett sent the Guards across: they passed -by the beams which had been left unbroken, and many Spanish troops -followed. After a running fight in the streets of the city, in which -some of the inhabitants took part, the garrison was completely driven -out, and fled by the Carmona Gate towards Alcala. The victors captured -two field-pieces, about 200 prisoners[705], and a rich convoy of -plunder, which was to have been escorted by the French rearguard[706]. -Villatte’s column, approaching the city in its march from the Cadiz -Lines and Xeres, found it in the hands of the allies, so swerved off -eastward and followed Soult, picking up the expelled garrison by the -way. - - [704] Toreno (iii. p. 151) and other historians tell the tale how - Downie, finding that none of his men had followed him, though - they had reached the other side of the cut, flung back to them - his sword, which was the rapier of the _Conquistador_ Pizarro, - presented to him by a descendant of that great adventurer. It was - caught and saved, and he recovered it, for he was left behind by - the French a few miles from Seville, because of his wounds. They - stripped him and left him by the wayside, where he was found and - cared for by the pursuing Spaniards. - - [705] The defence of Seville seems mainly to have been by the - French 63rd Ligne, which lost eight officers in the fight. - - [706] For a curious story of the contents of a captured carriage, - which turned out to be stuffed with silver plate, see the Memoirs - of Harley of the 47th, ii. p. 24. - -Cruz Murgeon and Skerrett did not pursue, not thinking themselves -strong enough to meddle with the French, but only sent their cavalry -forward to watch their retreat. They stayed in Seville, where the Cadiz -Constitution was proclaimed with great enthusiasm on August 29th. On -the other flank of the French Ballasteros was trying at this moment to -molest the column formed by the garrisons retiring from Ronda, Malaga, -and Antequera on Granada. He followed them for ten days, and fought -their rearguard at Antequera on September 3rd, and at Loja on September -5th; but though he captured many stragglers and some baggage, as also -three guns, he was unable to do any material harm to the main body, -which General Sémélé brought in to join Leval at Granada on September -6th. - -Soult, meanwhile, with the troops from Cadiz and Seville, had to halt -at Cordova for some days, to allow of the junction of Drouet from -Estremadura; for that general had to collect his troops and to bring -down detachments from places so far away as Don Benito and Zalamea, -before he could concentrate and march across the Sierra Morena to join -his chief. Drouet had kept up a bold countenance in front of Hill -to the last moment, even after he had received orders from Soult to -prepare for a sudden retreat. Indeed one of the most lively of the -many cavalry affairs fought in Estremadura during the summer of 1812 -took place in August. On the 1st of that month, when Hill was already -expecting that the news of Salamanca would have driven his opponent -away, Pierre Soult tried a raid upon Ribera, with two regiments of -cavalry and two battalions, and drove in the 2nd Hussars of the Legion, -who maintained a long and gallant skirmishing fight, till General -Erskine came up with Long’s brigade, when the French retreated. Erskine -was thought to have missed a fine opportunity of cutting up the raiding -detachment by his slow and tentative pursuit[707]. On the 18th Soult -made another reconnaissance in force, with four regiments, in the -same direction, on a false report that Hill had moved from Ribera and -Almendralejo. This brought on another long day of bickering, with no -definite result: it was mainly remembered afterwards for the courteous -behaviour of Drouet in sending back unharmed Erskine’s aide-de-camp -Strenowitz, the most daring officer for raids and reconnaissance work -in the German Legion. He had been captured while scouting, and a -general fear prevailed that he would be shot, for he had served for -a short time in the French army, and might have been treated as a -deserter. Drouet most handsomely dispatched him to the British camp on -parole, with a request that he might be exchanged for an officer of -his own, who had been taken a few days before. ‘A most courteous and -liberal enemy!’ wrote a diarist in Hill’s camp, ‘Strenowitz’s exploits -are well known: certainly in strict law he might have been hung[708].’ - - [707] ‘Confound all spiritless and dilatory generals,’ writes - Swabey of the R.A. in his diary, ‘... Sir W. E. actually halted - while four squadrons and 400 infantry were doing what they liked - in Ribera, though he had the Hussars, the 9th and 13th Light - Dragoons, the 3rd Dragoon Guards and our guns, and he might have - had the 71st regiment also, though it did not arrive till all was - over. The transaction was calculated to dispirit the soldier, to - discontent the officers, and to take away all confidence in the - general.’ - - [708] Swabey’s diary, p. 307. There is an interesting account of - Strenowitz’s capture and release in Espinchal’s _Mémoires_, ii. - pp. 36-40, as also of the long skirmish of this day. - -It was not till August 26th that all the French troops in front of Hill -suddenly vanished, Drouet having had orders to keep his position till -Seville was ready to be evacuated; for Soult feared that if he withdrew -his forces in Estremadura too early, in the direction of Cordova, the -allied troops might make a forced march on Seville, and arrive there -before the divisions from the Cadiz Lines had gone by. Wherefore Drouet -was in evidence before Hill till the precise day when Soult left -Seville. He then retired through the Sierra Morena, going by the remote -mountain road by Belalcazar with such speed that he reached Cordova on -the fourth day (August 30). He was not pursued by Hill, whose orders -from Wellington were to come up to the Tagus and join the main army, -and not to involve himself in operations in Andalusia. Only some of -Penne Villemur’s Spanish horse, under the German colonel Schepeler--one -of the best historians of the war--followed on Drouet’s track, and saw -him join Soult at Cordova[709]. The united French force then marched -on Granada, where the garrisons of eastern Andalusia, under Leval, had -concentrated to meet the Marshal. Up to this moment Soult had been -uncertain whether he should retreat by way of La Mancha, or across the -kingdom of Murcia. His decision was settled for him by news brought by -Drouet, who had heard in Estremadura of King Joseph’s evacuation of -Madrid and Toledo. Since the Army of the Centre was now known to be on -the road for Valencia, to join Suchet, it would be too dangerous to -cross La Mancha in search of it. Wellington might descend from Madrid -in force, upon an enemy who dared to march across his front. Wherefore -Soult resolved that his retreat must be made across the kingdom of -Murcia. It was true that O’Donnell’s army was in occupation of the -inland in that direction, but it was weak and disorganized. Moreover, -Suchet had lately inflicted a severe defeat upon it at Castalla (on -July 21st), and O’Donnell was practically a negligible quantity in the -problem. A far more important factor in determining Soult’s exact route -was the news that the yellow fever had broken out at Cartagena and was -spreading inland: it had reached the city of Murcia. Wherefore the -French army avoided the coast, and took the inferior roads across the -northern part of the province. - - [709] Schepeler says that he scared the French rearguard out - of Cordova on September 3 by lighting fires along the mountain - slopes, and giving out that Hill was behind him with his army. - See p. 666 of his history. - -Soult, when once he had concentrated 45,000 men at Granada, had nothing -to fear from any enemy. The gloomy picture of ‘a retreat harrassed by -60,000 foes,’ with which he had tried to scare King Joseph a month -before, turned out to be a work of pure imagination. Hill had turned -off towards the Tagus: Cruz Murgeon and Skerrett remained at Seville, -awaiting the appearance of the 10,000 men left in Cadiz. But these were -slow to move, because they had been on garrison duty for long years, -and had to provide themselves with transport. Only Ballasteros hung -about Granada, bickering with the outposts of the French army, and as -he had no more than 5,000 or 6,000 men he was not dangerous, but only -tiresome. - -Soult therefore was able to spend many days at Granada, making -deliberate preparations for the toilsome march that was before him. He -only started out, after destroying the fortifications of the Alhambra -and other posts, on September 16th. His route was by Baza, Huescar, -Caravaca, and Hellin, through a mountainous and thinly-peopled country, -where his troops suffered considerable privations. But these were -nothing compared to the misery of the immense convoy of _Afrancesados_ -of all ages and both sexes, who had joined themselves to his train, and -had to be brought through to a place of safety. Nor did the 6,000 sick -and wounded whom he was dragging with him enjoy a pleasant journey. Yet -it was only the September heat and the mountain roads that harassed the -army and its train: Ballasteros did not pursue farther than the borders -of Andalusia: the Murcians were cowed by the approach of a force which -could have destroyed them with ease if it had lingered within their -borders. Some of them shifted north toward Madrid, others south toward -Alicante: none did anything to attract the notice of such a formidable -enemy. Touch with Suchet’s outposts was secured before September was -quite ended, and by the appearance of the whole Army of Andalusia -near Valencia, a new military situation was produced by October 1st. -With this we shall have to deal in its proper place--the fortunes of -Wellington and the main army of the allies have not been followed -beyond the middle of August. - -Summing up the events of June-July-August 1812 in southern Spain, it -is impossible to avoid the conclusion that Soult’s personal interests -wrecked any chance that the French might have had of retaining their -dominant position in the Peninsula, when once Wellington had committed -himself to his offensive campaign upon the Tormes and the Douro. If the -Duke of Dalmatia had obeyed in June King Joseph’s peremptory orders -to send Drouet to Toledo, he would have had, no doubt, to evacuate -certain parts of Andalusia. But Joseph and Jourdan could have marched -many weeks earlier, and with a doubled force, to interfere with -Wellington’s campaign against Marmont. It is true that Hill would have -made a corresponding movement by Alcantara, and would have joined the -main allied army under his chief many days before the King and Drouet -would have been able to link up with Marmont. But Hill, on leaving -Estremadura, would have removed the larger and more efficient part of -his corps from Soult’s vicinity, and the Marshal might easily have -held Seville and the Cadiz Lines, when faced by no stronger enemies -than Ballasteros and the garrison in the Isla. If Soult had made up his -mind to sacrifice Andalusia, and had marched with his whole army on -Toledo, in June or even early in July, Wellington’s whole game would -have been wrecked. It was, perhaps, too much to expect that the Marshal -would consent to such a disinterested policy. But if, without making -this sacrifice, he had merely obeyed King Joseph, and reinforced the -Army of the Centre at an early date, he would have made the Salamanca -campaign impossible. Wellington would probably have retired behind the -Agueda and abandoned his conquests in Leon, without risking a battle, -if the French forces in contact with him had been 25,000 men stronger -than they actually were. The junction of Hill and some 12,000 men of -the best of his Estremaduran detachment would have given him the power -to fight out a defensive campaign on the Portuguese frontier, but -hardly to deliver an offensive battle like Salamanca. The net results -of all his manœuvres in June would then have been no more than an -indirect success--the delivery of eastern Andalusia from Soult. Seville -and the Cadiz Lines might still have remained occupied by the French. - -It is scarcely necessary to repeat once more that Soult’s counter-plan -of inviting the King and the Army of the Centre to retire to Andalusia, -throwing up all communication with France and the imperial armies -beyond the Douro, was wrongheaded in the extreme, though Napier calls -it ‘grand and vigorous[710].’ Joseph could have brought no more than -the 15,000 men that he owned, and they, when added to the 50,000 men -of the Army of the South, would not have provided a force large enough -to make a decisive move. For, as we have already seen, half the French -in Andalusia were necessarily pinned down to garrison duties, and the -‘containing’ of Ballasteros and other partisans. Soult could never -bring more than 25,000 men of his own into Estremadura: if 15,000 more -are added for King Joseph’s troops[711], only 40,000 in all would have -been available for a demonstration (or a serious invasion) in the -direction of Portugal. Such a force would have given Wellington no -very great alarm. It would have had to begin by besieging Badajoz and -Elvas, in face of the existing ‘containing’ army under Hill, a delicate -business, and one that would have taken time. Meanwhile Wellington -could have come down, with reinforcements strong enough to make up -a total sufficient to fight and beat 40,000 men, since he had the -advantage of a central position and the shorter roads. At the worst -he would have blocked the French advance by taking up an unassailable -position, as he had before on the Caya in June 1811. But now he would -have had a far superior game in his hands, since Badajoz was his and -not his enemy’s, and his total disposable force was considerably larger -than it had been in 1811. - - [710] Napier, iv. p. 371. - - [711] Soult suggested that the less efficient of Joseph’s troops - should go on garrison duty, and set free a corresponding number - of his own best battalions. - -Thus, if Soult’s plan had been carried out, all central Spain, -including the capital, would have been lost just as much as it was by -the actual campaign of July-August 1812, and the disorganized Army of -Portugal could have done nothing. For Wellington could have left not -Clinton’s one division (as he actually did) but three at least to look -after it--not to speak of the Galicians and the _partidas_. Isolated -and cut off from all communication with other French armies, Soult and -the King would have had to evacuate Andalusia in the end, if they did -not suffer a worse fate--a crushing defeat in a position from which -there would have been no retreat possible. Hypothetical reconstructions -of campaigns which might have happened are proverbially futile--but it -is hard to see how any final profit to the French could have come from -Soult’s extraordinary plan. - - - - -SECTION XXXIII: CHAPTER XI - - THE TWO DIVERSIONS: (1) OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH: SIR HOME POPHAM - AND CAFFARELLI. (2) OPERATIONS IN THE EAST: SUCHET, O’DONNELL, - AND MAITLAND. JUNE-AUGUST 1812 - - -It has already been made clear that the whole of Wellington’s -victorious advance, from Ciudad Rodrigo to Madrid, was rendered -possible by the fact that he had only to deal with the Army of -Portugal, succoured when it was too late by the Army of the Centre. -If Caffarelli and his 35,000 men of the Army of the North had been -able to spare any help for Marmont, beyond the single cavalry brigade -of Chauvel, matters must have taken a very different turn from the -first, and the Douro (if not the Tormes) must have been the limit -of the activity of the Anglo-Portuguese army. How Caffarelli was to -be detained, according to Wellington’s plan, has been explained in -an earlier chapter[712]. The working out of the scheme must now be -described. - - [712] See above, pp. 340-1. - -The essential duty of the French Army of the North was twofold, -according to Napoleon’s general conception of the Spanish war. It was -Marmont’s reserve, bound to assist him in time of trouble; but it was -also the force of occupation for the Biscayan provinces, Navarre, -Santander, and Burgos. Of its 35,000 men more than half were at all -times immobilized in the innumerable garrisons which protected the -high-road from Bayonne to Burgos, and the small harbours of the coast, -from San Sebastian to Santoña. The system of posts was complicated -and interdependent. Since the great guerrillero Mina started on his -busy career in 1810, it had been necessary that there should be -fortified places at short intervals, in which convoys moving to or -from France (whether by Vittoria and San Sebastian, or by Pampeluna -and Roncesvalles) could take refuge when attacked by the bands. -And since a convoy, when it had sought shelter in one of the minor -garrisons, might be blockaded there indefinitely, unless the high-road -were cleared betimes, large movable columns had to be ready in three -or four of the larger places. Their duty was to march out on the -first alarm, and sweep the guerrilleros away from any post that they -might have beset. Such bodies were to be found at Bayonne, where the -‘Reserve of the Army of Spain’ kept a brigade of 3,500 men under -General D’Aussenac to watch for any exceptional outbreak of trouble in -Guipuzcoa; at Pampeluna, where General Abbé had the head-quarters of -his division; and at Vittoria, where the General-in-Chief, Caffarelli -himself, normally lay with the brigade of Dumoustier--the last unit of -the Imperial Guard still remaining in Spain--ready to keep the line of -the Ebro under surveillance, and to communicate when necessary with -the three large outlying garrisons of Santoña, Santander, and Burgos. -Each of these last consisted of some 1,300 or 1,500 men[713]; even -so, they were only strong enough to provide for their own safety in -normal times, and might require assistance from head-quarters in face -of any specially large and threatening combination of the insurgents. -But the larger half of Caffarelli’s army was locked up in small towns, -forts, and blockhouses, in bodies ranging down from a battalion to -half a company. Every one of the dozen little ports on the Biscay -coast had to be held, in order to prevent the bands of the inland from -communicating with the English cruisers, which occasionally appeared -in the offing to throw weapons and ammunition ashore. And similarly -all the little towns along the Ebro had to be garrisoned, in order to -keep touch with Reille at Saragossa; wherever there was a gap Mina’s -Navarrese slipped in between. - - [713] In and about Santander, 2 battalions of the 130th, 2 - squadrons of gendarmes, &c. In Santoña, 93 officers and 1,382 men - of the 28th, 75th, and 34th. In Burgos, 2 battalions of 34th Line. - -Since the autumn of 1810, when Porlier and Renovales had made their -vain attempt, with British naval aid, to break up the line of -communication along the coast,[714] there had been no general attempt -to shake the French occupation of Biscay and Cantabria. The Spanish -resources were at a low ebb whenever Bonnet held the Asturias, and -(as we have seen) he was generally in possession of that province, or -at least of its capital and its chief harbours, from 1810 down to the -summer of 1812. The idea of attacking the harbour-fortresses of the -northern coast with a considerable naval force, which should get into -regular touch with the patriot forces of the inland, and establish -posts to be held permanently on suitable points of the northern -littoral, had been started by Sir Home Popham, approved by Sir Howard -Douglas, the British Commissioner in Galicia, and warmly adopted by -Wellington himself, who at once realized the pressure which such a -policy would bring upon Caffarelli. He counted upon this diversion as -one of his most valuable assets, when he drew up his scheme for the -invasion of Leon in May 1812. It more than fulfilled his expectation. - - [714] See vol. iii. pp. 486-7. - -On June 17th, four days after the Anglo-Portuguese army crossed -the Agueda, Sir Home Popham sailed from Corunna with two line of -battleships[715], five frigates[716], two sloops[717], and one or -two smaller vessels, carrying two battalions of marines, and several -thousand stand of small-arms for the insurgents. Popham had credentials -from Castaños, as captain-general of Galicia, for Mendizabal, the -officer who was supposed to exercise authority over all the bands of -Cantabria and Biscay. These scattered forces consisted in the more -or less organized brigades of Porlier in the Eastern Asturias, and -Longa in Cantabria--both of which were reckoned part of the national -army--and in addition of the guerrilleros of Jauregui [’El Pastor’] in -Guipuzcoa, Renovales in Biscay, Marquinez, Saornil, the Curé Merino, -and others in the mountains between the Douro and the sea. These -were bands of varying strength, often scattered by the French, but -always reassembled after a space, who roamed from region to region -according as the enemy was stronger or weaker at one point or another. -Occasionally Mendizabal was in touch with Mina and the Navarrese, but -generally the French were in too great force about the high-road from -Burgos to Pampeluna to make co-operation practicable. - - [715] The _Venerable_ (his flag-ship) and the _Magnificent_. The - _Magnificent_ went home with prisoners some weeks later, and - was replaced for a time by the _Abercrombie_, from the Brest - blockading squadron. - - [716] _Medusa_, _Isis_, _Diadem_, _Surveillante_, and _Rhin_. The - _Belle Poule_ looked in for a short time later in the season. - - [717] _Sparrow_ and _Lyra_. - -At the moment of Popham’s start matters were exceptionally favourable -along the Biscay coast, because Bonnet was just evacuating the -Asturias, in order to join his chief Marmont in the plains of Leon. -His departure isolated Santoña and Santander, which had been the links -by which he was joined to Caffarelli’s army. It also gave Porlier and -Longa an open communication with Galicia, from which they had hitherto -been cut off by Bonnet’s presence in Asturias, and a safe retreat -thitherward if they should be pressed. In addition Marmont had called -up all the small garrisons and detached columns from his rear, for -the main struggle with Wellington; so that the Upper Douro valley and -the Soria country were much more free from the French than they had -been for a long time. The opportunity for molesting Caffarelli and his -much-scattered Army of the North was unique. - -The idea which lay at the back of Popham’s plan was that a fleet -furnished with the heaviest ship guns, and with a landing-force of -over 1,000 men, could operate at its choice against any one of the -long chain of posts which the French held, calling in to its aid the -local bands in each case. The insurgents had never been able to capture -any of these places because they lacked a battering-train. The fleet -supplied this want, and with few exceptions the French strongholds -were not suited for resistance against heavy guns. They were mediaeval -castles, fortified convents, or the patched-up walls of little towns, -all defensible against irregular bands without cannon, but most -vulnerable to 18-or 24-pounders. The number of the French garrisons -gave ample liberty of choice between one and another: individually -they were generally weak--not over 300, 500, or 1,000 men. There were -succouring columns, no doubt, ready to relieve them, at Bayonne and -Vittoria and elsewhere. But the squadron had the power of misleading -these forces to any extent--of drawing them from one remote port to -another by false attacks and demonstrations, and then of attacking -some third point when the enemy had been lured as far as possible -from it. Here lay the beauty of naval operations--the squadron could -appear to threaten any objective that it chose, could attract the enemy -thither, and then could vanish, and be fifty miles away next day. The -relieving column could only follow slowly over mountain roads, and -would invariably be late in learning what new direction the squadron -had taken. It was something like the advantage that the Danes had in -their attacks on England in the ninth century: a defending army cannot -guard all points of a coast-line at once against a movable landing -force on shipboard. The weaker points of the scheme were, firstly, the -dependence of all operations on fine weather--contrary winds could in -those days delay a fleet for whole weeks on end; secondly, the want of -a base nearer than Corunna, till some good and defensible haven should -have been captured; and third and greatest of all, the difficulty of -inducing the local chiefs to combine: they paid a very limited amount -of obedience to their nominal chief, Mendizabal: they had private -grievances and jealousies against each other: and each of them disliked -moving far from the particular region where his men were raised, and -where every inch of the mountain roads was known to him. - -However, all these dangers were known and were chanced, and the game -was well worth the risk. The operations began with the appearance of -the squadron before Lequeitio on June 21st. Popham landed a heavy -gun and some marines, and the band of El Pastor [’Don Gaspar’ as -the English dispatches call him] appeared to co-operate from the -inland. The defences consisted of a fort and a fortified convent: -the 24-pounder breached the former, which was then stormed by the -guerrilleros in a very handsome fashion[718]: its garrison was slain or -captured. The gun was then brought up against the fortified convent, -whose commander, the _chef de bataillon_ Gillort, surrendered without -further fighting; the prisoners amounted to 290 men, a half-battalion -of the 119th regiment (June 22). Popham then moved off to Bermeo and -Plencia, both of which the French evacuated in haste, leaving guns -unspiked and some useful stores of provisions. The British force had -set the wildest rumours abroad, and Renovales, the Spanish commander -in Biscay, appeared at Orduna with his bands and threatened Bilbao, the -capital of the province. It was these reports which made Caffarelli -suddenly break off his project for sending reinforcements to Marmont, -and prepare rather to march northward when he was most wanted on the -Douro[719]. - - [718] So says Popham in his dispatch at the Record Office: though - Napier (iv. p. 246) says that the Spaniards attacked and were - repulsed. But Popham must have known best! Sir Howard Douglas - corroborates him, _Life_, p. 168. - - [719] See above, p. 378. - -Popham’s next blow was at Guetaria, a most important post, owing to -its nearness to the great _chaussée_ leading to Bayonne, which passes -quite close to it between Tolosa and Ernani. If it had fallen, the main -road from France to Spain would have been blocked for all practical -purposes. But being far to the East and near the French border, it was -remote from the haunts of the guerrilleros: few of them turned up: -after a few days Popham had to re-embark guns and men, and to take his -departure, owing to the arrival in his neighbourhood of a strong French -flying column. He then sailed off to Castro Urdiales, where he had much -better luck: Longa had left the Upper Ebro with his brigade and joined -him there on July 6th, by Mendizabal’s orders. Their united force drove -off on the 7th a small French column which came up from Laredo to raise -the siege. The governor of Castro then surrendered with some 150 men, -and 20 guns on his walls fell into Popham’s hands (July 8). The place -seemed so strong that the commodore resolved to keep it as a temporary -base, and garrisoned it with some of his marines. - -Three days later Popham appeared before Portugalete, the fortified -village at the mouth of the Bilbao river, and bombarded it from the -side of the sea, while Longa (who had marched parallel with the -squadron along the shore), demonstrated against its rear. But a French -flying column happened just to have arrived at Bilbao, and the force -which marched out against the assailants was so powerful that they -made off, each on his own element [July 11th.] Popham now turned his -attention for a second time to the important strategical post of -Guetaria; he had enlisted the support of the Guipuzcoan bands under -Jauregui, and the distant Mina had promised to send a battalion to his -aid from Navarre. Popham got heavy guns on shore, and began to batter -the place, while Jauregui blockaded it on the land side. This move -drew the attention of D’Aussenac, commanding the flying column which -belonged to the Bayonne reserve: he marched with 3,000 men towards -Guetaria, and drove off Jauregui, whereupon Popham had to re-embark in -haste, and lost two guns which could not be got off in time and thirty -men [July 19], Mina’s battalion came up a day too late to help the -discomfited besiegers. - -This petty disaster was in the end more favourable than harmful -to Popham’s general plan, for he had succeeded in drawing all -the attention of the French to the eastern end of their chain of -coast-fortresses, between Santoña and San Sebastian. But now he used -his power of rapid movement to attack unexpectedly their most important -western stronghold. On July 22nd he appeared in front of the harbour of -Santander, while (by previous arrangement) Campillo--one of Porlier’s -lieutenants--invested it on the land side. Porlier himself, with his -main body, was blockading at the moment the not very distant and still -stronger Santoña. - -There was very heavy fighting round Santander between the 22nd July -and August 2. Popham landed guns on the water-girt rock of Mouro, and -bombarded from it the castle at the mouth of the port: when its fire -was subdued, he ran his squadron in battle order past it, and entered -the harbour, receiving little damage from the other French works (July -24). The enemy then evacuated the castle, which the marines occupied: -but an attempt to storm the town with the aid of Campillo’s men failed, -with a rather heavy casualty list of two British captains[720] and many -marines and seamen disabled (July 27th). However, Popham and Campillo -held on in front of Santander, and Mendizabal came up on August 2nd -to join them, bringing a captured French dispatch, which proved that -the enemy intended to evacuate the place, a strong relieving column -under Caffarelli himself being at hand to bring off the garrison. And -this indeed happened: the General-in-Chief of the Army of the North -had marched with all the disposable troops at Vittoria to save his -detachment. The governor Dubreton--the same man who afterwards defended -Burgos so well--broke out of the place with his 1,600 men on the night -of the 2nd-3rd and joined his chief in safety: he left eighteen guns -spiked in his works. Caffarelli then drew off the garrison of the -neighbouring small post of Torrelavega, but threw a convoy and some -reinforcements into Santoña, which he had determined to hold as long as -possible. He then hastened back to Vittoria, being under the impression -at the moment that Wellington was in march against him from Valladolid, -in pursuit of the routed host of Clausel. But the Anglo-Portuguese main -army--as will be remembered--had really followed the retreating French -no farther than Valladolid, and no longer than the 30th July. Instead -of finding himself involved in the affairs of the Army of Portugal, -Caffarelli had soon another problem in hand. - - [720] One of them, Sir George Collier, commanding the _Medusa_. - -The capture of Santander by the allies was the most important event -that had happened on the north coast of Spain since 1809, for it gave -the squadron of Popham possession of the sole really good harbor--open -to the largest ships, and safe at all times of the year--which lies -between Ferrol and the French frontier. At last the Spanish ‘Seventh -Army’ had a base behind it, and a free communication with England for -the stores and munitions that it so much needed. It might be developed -into a formidable force if so strengthened, and it lay in a position -most inconvenient for the French, directly in the rear of Clausel and -Caffarelli. Popham saw what might be made of Santander, and drew up for -Wellington’s benefit a report on the possibilities of the harbour, in -which he details, from the information given by Porlier and his staff, -the state of the roads between it and Burgos, Valladolid, and other -points. Six weeks before the siege of Burgos began, he wrote that by -all accounts six or eight heavy guns would be required to take that -fortress, and that he could manage that they should be got there--a -distance of 115 miles--by ox-draught, if they were wanted[721]. But -Wellington, at the moment that this useful information was being -compiled, was turning away from Valladolid and Burgos toward Madrid; -and when his attention was once more drawn back to Burgos, he made no -use of Popham’s offers till it was too late. Of this more in its proper -place. - - [721] Popham’s prescience is shown by the fact that his papers - relating to Burgos began to be drawn up as early as July 26. He - cross-questioned not only Porlier but other Spanish officers. - Their answers did not always tally with each other. See all - Popham’s dispatches of the time, in the Admiralty Section at the - Record Office--under the general head ‘Channel Fleet!’ They have - this misleading heading because Popham was under Lord Keith, then - commanding that fleet. - -Having brought all his squadron into Santander, and made himself a -fixed base in addition to his floating one, Popham began to concert -plans for further operations with Mendizabal, whom he described as -a man of ‘vacillating councils,’ and hard to screw up to any fixed -resolution. The scheme which the commodore most recommended to the -general was one for a general concentration of all his scattered forces -against Bilbao, in which the squadron should give its best help. But -he suggested as an alternative the sending of Porlier to join Longa, -who had already gone south to the Upper Ebro after the failure at -Portugalete on July 11th. Porlier and Longa would together be strong -enough to cut the road between Burgos and Vittoria, and so divide -Clausel from Caffarelli. If the two French generals combined against -them, they could always escape north-westward into their usual mountain -refuges. - -According to Popham’s notes Mendizabal first seemed to incline to the -second scheme, and then decided for the first. He even in the end -ordered up Longa--then very usefully employed against Clausel’s rear -about Pancorbo and Cubo--to join in the attack upon Bilbao. But Longa -came late, being busy in operations that he liked better than those -which his chief imposed on him. After waiting a few days for him in -vain, Mendizabal marched against Bilbao by land with two battalions -belonging to Porlier and one recently raised in Alava, while Popham -took three Biscayan battalions belonging to Renovales on board his -squadron and sailed for Lequeitio, where he put them ashore. He himself -then made for Portugalete, at the mouth of the Bilbao river. The triple -attack, though made with no very great total force was successful. -The officer commanding in Bilbao, went out to meet Mendizabal, and in -order to collect as many men as possible, drew off the garrison of -Portugalete. The British squadron, arriving in front of the port, found -it undefended and threw the marines ashore. Hearing of this descent in -his rear the French general, then indecisively engaged with Mendizabal -and Renovales, thought that he was in danger of being surrounded, and -retired hastily toward Durango, abandoning Bilbao altogether [August -13]. - -Learning next day that they had overrated the enemy’s force, the -French returned and tried to reoccupy the Biscayan capital, but were -met outside by all Mendizabal’s troops, arrayed on the position of -Ollorgan. An attack entirely failed to move them, and the French -fell back to Durango. General Rouget, the commanding officer in the -province, then drew in all his minor garrisons, and sent Caffarelli -notice that all Biscay was lost, unless something could be done at -once to check Mendizabal’s progress [August 14]. Indeed the situation -looked most threatening, for Longa had at last come up and joined his -chief with 3,000 men, and the Biscayans were taking arms on every side. -A general junta of the Basque provinces was summoned by Mendizabal to -meet at Bilbao, and the French had for the moment no foothold left save -in San Sebastian and Guetaria. Thereupon Caffarelli, collecting every -man that he could at Vittoria, marched to join Rouget. Their united -forces, making some 7,000 men, attacked Bilbao on August 27th-29th, -and after much confused fighting drove Mendizabal and Longa out of -the place, only a fortnight after it had come into Spanish hands. The -defeated troops dispersed in all directions, each section seeking the -region that it had come from--Porlier’s men retired towards Cantabria, -Longa’s toward the Upper Ebro. Renovales and his Biscayan battalions -were caught in their retreat, and badly cut up at Dima. - -While this fighting was going on around Bilbao, Popham was trying a -last attack on Guetaria, with his own resources only, as nearly all the -Spaniards were engaged elsewhere. He had accomplished nothing decisive -when he heard of Mendizabal’s defeat, and had to reship his guns and -take his departure before the victorious Caffarelli came up. He retired -to Santander, and heard there that Wellington was leaving Madrid, and -once more marching on Burgos. He determined to open up communications -with the British army without delay, and on August 31 sent off -Lieutenant Macfarlane to seek for the head of the approaching columns. -That officer, skirting the flank of Clausel’s retreating host, reached -Valladolid betimes, and explained to Wellington that the Santander road -would be open and available for the transport of ammunition, guns, and -even food, so soon as he should have driven the French past Burgos. -And--as will be seen--it was so used during the unlucky siege of that -fortress again and again--but not (as Popham recommended) for the -bringing up of the heavy artillery that Wellington so much lacked. - -By September 1st Caffarelli had patched up matters for a time on the -side of Biscay, but though he had recovered Bilbao and preserved -Guetaria, all the other coast-towns were out of his power save Santoña, -and that important place was cut off from the nearest French garrison -by a gap of some sixty miles. Even now Popham’s useful diversion had -not ceased to have its effect. But its further working belongs to a -later chapter. - -So much for the annals of the war in northern Spain from June -to August. The diversion which Wellington had planned had been -brilliantly successful. A very different story must be told of the -equally important scheme that he had concerted for keeping his enemies -distracted on the eastern side of the Peninsula, by means of the -Anglo-Sicilian expedition and the Spanish Army of Murcia. - -Suchet, it will be remembered[722], had been stayed from further -conquests after the fall of Valencia partly by the indirect results -of Wellington’s operations on the Portuguese frontier--starting with -the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo--partly by Napoleon’s action in drawing -back to the Ebro the two divisions of Reille, and calling out of Spain -the numerous Polish battalions serving in the Army of Aragon. But -not the least of the hindering causes was a purely personal one--the -long illness which kept Suchet confined to his bed for ten weeks in -February, March, and April. By the time that he was in the saddle again -a notable change had come over the aspect of the war all over the -Peninsula. During his sickness his lieutenants, Habert and Harispe, -maintained their position in front of the Xucar river, and observed -the wrecks of the Valencian and Murcian divisions that had escaped -from Blake’s disaster in January. The whole force remaining under -Suchet--excluding the troops left behind in Catalonia and Aragon--was -not above 15,000 men, and of these nearly 4,000 were locked up in -garrisons, at Valencia, Saguntum, Peniscola, Morella, and other places. -It is not surprising, therefore, that no farther advance was made -against the Spaniards. Joseph O’Donnell, the successor of the unlucky -Mahy, was able during the spring to reorganize some 12,000 men on the -_cadres_ of his old battalions. In addition he had Roche’s reserve at -Alicante, 4,000 strong, which had now been profiting for many months -by the British subsidy and training, and was reckoned a solid corps. -He had also Bassecourt’s few battalions in the inland--the troops -that D’Armagnac had hunted in December and January in the district -about Requeña[723]. Cartagena, the only fortress on the coast still -in Spanish hands save Alicante, had been strengthened by the arrival -of a British detachment[724]. Altogether there were some 20,000 -enemies facing Suchet in April, and he regarded it as impossible to -think of attacking Alicante, since he had not nearly enough men in -hand to besiege a place of considerable size, and at the same time -to provide a sufficient covering army against Joseph O’Donnell. So -little was the Murcian army molested that General Freire, O’Donnell’s -second-in-command, ignoring Suchet altogether, took advantage of -Soult’s absence in Estremadura, at the time of the fall of Badajoz, -to alarm eastern Andalusia. He occupied Baza on April 18th, and when -driven away after a time by Leval, governor of Granada, turned instead -against the coast-land of the South. On May 11th an expedition, aided -by English war-ships from Alicante, landed near Almeria, and cleared -out all the French garrisons from the small towns and shore batteries -as far west as Almunecar. Already before this (on May 1-3) an English -squadron had made a descent on Malaga, seized and destroyed the -harbour-works, and carried off some privateers and merchant vessels -from the port. But naught could be accomplished against the citadel -of Gibalfaro. Soult did little or nothing to resent these insults, -because he was at the time obsessed with his ever-recurring idea -that Wellington was about to invade Andalusia, and his attention was -entirely taken up with the movements of Hill and Ballasteros in the -West and North, so that the East was neglected. Leval at Granada had a -troublesome time, but was in no real danger, since Freire’s raids were -executed with a trifling force. - - [722] See above, p. 86. - - [723] See above, p. 56. - - [724] The 2/67th and a part of the foreign Regiment of de - Watteville, also a British battery, from Cadiz. - -Suchet was occupied at this time more with civil than with military -affairs: for some time after his convalescence he was engaged in -rearranging the administration of the kingdom of Valencia, and in -raising the enormous war-contribution which Napoleon had directed him -to exact--200,000,000 reals, or £2,800,000--in addition to the ordinary -taxes. The Marshal in his _Mémoires_ gives a most self-laudatory -account of his rule; according to his rose-coloured narrative[725], -the imposts were raised with wisdom and benevolence, the population -became contented and even loyal, the roads were safe, and material -prosperity commenced at once to revive. Napier has reproduced most of -Suchet’s testimonials to his own wisdom and integrity, without any hint -that the Spanish version of the story is different. The Marshal who -drove the civil population of Lerida under the fire of the cannon[726], -and who signalized his entry into Valencia by wholesale executions of -combatants and non-combatants[727], was not the benevolent being of -his own legend. Since that legend has been republished in many a later -volume, it may be well to give as a fair balance the version of an -enemy--not of a Spaniard, but of a Prussian, that Colonel Schepeler -whose authority on the war of Valencia we have so often had occasion to -quote. - - [725] See _Mémoires_, ii. pp. 283-99. - - [726] See vol. iii. p. 307. - - [727] See above, p. 75. - -‘Napoleon Bonaparte looked upon Valencia as the prey of France, and -Suchet did not fall behind in his oppressive high-handedness. The -long-desired goal, the wealthy city, now lay open to their rapacity, -and the riches that the clergy had denied to the needs of the nation -went to fill the plunder-bag of the conqueror. The miraculous statue -of Our Lady of Pity was stripped of her ancient jewelled robe: only -a light mantle now draped her, and showed the cut of the nineteenth -century. The silver apostles of the cathedral took their way to France -with many other objects of value, and the Chapter was forced to pay -ransom for hidden treasures. The magnanimous marshal imposed on the -new French province, as a sort of “benevolence,” six million dollars -(ten had been spoken of at first), with an additional million for the -city of Valencia. The churches had to buy off their bells with another -60,000 dollars. Suchet, in his moderation, contented himself with -exacting 500 dollars a day for his own table and household expenses. - -‘Political persecution began with a decree of March 11, which ordered -the judges of the local _Audiencia_ [Law Court] to meet as before, -but to administer justice in the name of Napoleon _Empereur et Roi_. -The patriots refused to serve and fled; whereupon their goods were -confiscated, their families were harried, and when some of them -were captured they were threatened with penal servitude or death. A -decree drawn up in words of cold ferocity, declared every Spaniard -who continued to oppose the French to be a rebel and a brigand, and -therefore condemned to capital punishment. Several villages were -punished with fire and sword, because they were too patriotic to -arrest and deliver up insurgents. Contrary to the promise made at the -capitulation in January[728], many patriots were arrested and executed, -under the pretence that they had been concerned in the murder of -Frenchmen in 1808, even though they might actually have saved the lives -of certain of those unfortunates at that time. - - [728] See p. 73 above. - -‘Valencia produces little wheat: there was much lack of it, and the -French would not accept rice. Their requisitions were exacted with -cruel disregard of consequences, even from the poorest, and quickly -brought back to the patriotic side the mutable Valencian people, who -had already been sufficiently embittered when they found that they -were annexed to France. All over the province there began to appear -slaughter, rebellion, and finally guerrillero bands[729].’ - - [729] Schepeler, pp. 609-10. - -The point which Schepeler makes as to Valencia being practically -annexed to France--as shown by the administration of justice in the -name of Napoleon, not of King Joseph--should be noted. It illustrates -Suchet’s determination to consider himself as a French viceroy, rather -than as the general of one of the armies recently placed by the -Emperor under the King as Commander-in-Chief in the Peninsula. We have -already noted the way in which he contrived to plead special orders -from Paris, exempting him from the royal control, whenever Joseph -tried to borrow some of his troops for use against Wellington[730]. -At the same time it must be conceded that he had a much better excuse -than Soult for his persistent disobedience to such orders--his whole -available force was so small, that if he had sent 6,000 men to San -Clemente or Ocaña, as Joseph directed, there would have been little or -nothing left in Valencia save the garrisons, and the Spaniards from -Alicante and Murcia could have taken their revenge for the disasters -of the past winter[731]. He represented to the King that to draw off -such a body of troops to La Mancha implied the abandonment of all his -recent conquests, and that if something had to be evacuated, it was -better that Soult should begin the process, since Andalusia was a more -outlying possession than Valencia--’les provinces du sud devaient -être évacuées avant celles de l’est.’ And here he was no doubt right: -as we have been remarking again and again, the only solution for the -situation created by Wellington’s successes was to concentrate a great -mass of troops at all costs, and the Army of the South could best -provide that mass. It had 50,000 men under arms at the moment--Suchet -had not in Valencia more than 15,000. - - [730] See above, pp. 304-5. - - [731] This is Suchet’s own view, see his _Mémoires_, ii. p. 251. - -Hitherto we have spoken of those parts of the east coast of Spain -which lie south of the Ebro. But if the situation in Valencia had not -altered much between February and June, the same was also the case in -Catalonia. Since Eroles’s victory over Bourke at Roda in March[732] -there had been much marching and counter-marching in that principality, -but nothing decisive. Lacy, the unpopular captain-general, was at -odds with the Junta, and especially with Eroles, the best of his -divisional officers, who was the most influential man in Catalonia, -owing to his local connexions and his untiring energy. Lacy was a -stranger, an enemy of the ‘Somaten’ system, and a pronounced Liberal. -The political tendencies of the Catalans were distinctly favourable -to the other or ‘Servile’ party. The captain-general was also accused -of nourishing jealousy against Sarsfield, his second-in-command: and -it is certain that both that officer and Eroles believed him capable -of any mean trick toward them. But though divided counsels and mutual -suspicions often hindered the co-operation of the commanders and the -people, all were equally bitter enemies of the invader, and none of -them showed any signs of slackening in their grim resolve to hold -out to the end. The Catalan army did not now count more than 8,000 -men in the field, but its central position in the mountains of the -interior, round which the French garrisons were dispersed in a long -semicircle, gave it advantages that compensated to a certain extent for -its lack of numbers. It could strike out at any isolated point on the -circumference, and, whether its blow failed or succeeded, generally -got off before the enemy had concentrated in sufficient numbers to do -it much harm. On the other hand, Decaen, now commanding in Catalonia, -and Maurice Mathieu, the governor of Barcelona, though they had some -three times as many men under arms as Lacy, were reduced to a position -that was little more than defensive. It is true that they occasionally -collected a heavy column and struck into the inland: but the enemy -avoided them, and replied by counter-attacks on depleted sections of -the French circle of garrisons. On April 9th, for example, 4,800 men -marched from Gerona against Olot: the local levies under Claros and -Rovira skirmished with them, giving ground, and finally losing the -town. But though they did not stop the advance of the enemy, Milans, -with a larger force, moved on the important harbour of Mataro, and laid -siege to the garrison there (April 22), a stroke which soon brought the -bulk of French troops back from Olot to drive him off. At the same time -Sarsfield’s division pressed in upon the garrison of Tarragona, and cut -off its communications with Barcelona. - - [732] See above, p. 98. - -This forced Decaen to march to open the road, with all the men that -Maurice Mathieu could spare from Barcelona (April 28). Letting them go -by, Lacy at once renewed the attack on Mataro, bringing up the forces -of Sarsfield and Milans, and borrowing four ship-guns from Commodore -Codrington to batter the fort, in which the French had taken refuge -after evacuating the town [May 3]. Decaen and Lamarque promptly turned -back, and on the third day of the siege came hastily to break it up. -The Spaniards dispersed in various directions, after burying the guns, -which (much to Codrington’s regret) were discovered and exhumed by the -enemy. The net result of all this marching and counter-marching was -that much shoe-leather had been worn out, and a few hundred men killed -or wounded on each side: but certainly no progress had been made in -the conquest of Catalonia. Indeed, Manso, at the end of the campaign, -established himself at Molins de Rey, quite close to Barcelona, and -Sarsfield occupied Montserrat, so that between them they once more cut -off the communications from Barcelona southward and westward. Both had -to be driven off in June, in order that the roads might again be opened. - -Early in July Lacy devised a scheme which made him more hated than ever -in Catalonia. He concerted with some Spanish employés in the French -commissariat service a plan for blowing up the powder magazine of the -great fortress of Lerida, and arranged to be outside its walls on the -day fixed for the explosion, and to storm it during the confusion that -would follow. Eroles and Sarsfield both protested, pointing out that a -whole quarter of the city must be destroyed, with great loss of life. -Lacy replied that the results would justify the sacrifice, persisted -in his scheme, and moved with every available man towards Lerida to be -ready on the appointed day. He miscalculated his hours, however; and, -though he left hundreds of stragglers behind from over-marching, his -column arrived too late. The explosion took place on the 16th, with -dreadful success; not only did a hundred of the garrison perish, but a -much larger number of the citizens; many houses and one of the bastions -fell. The governor Henriod, a very firm-handed man whose record in -Lerida was most tyrannical[733], had been entirely unaware of the -approach of the Spaniards, but proved equal to the occasion. He put his -garrison under arms, manned the breach, and showed such a firm front, -when Lacy appeared, that the captain-general, having tired troops and -no cannon, refused to attempt the storm. He went off as quickly as he -had come, having caused the death of several hundred of his countrymen -with no profit whatever. If he was ready to adopt such terrible means, -he should at least have had his plans correctly timed. The Catalans -never forgave him the useless atrocity[734]. - - [733] See notes in Vidal de la Blache’s _L’Evacuation d’Espagne_, - 1914, which reaches me just as this goes to press, for anecdotes - concerning his doings. - - [734] About the same time a still more dreadful plot was said - to have been formed in Barcelona, with the knowledge and - approval of Lacy--arsenic was to be mixed with the flour of the - garrison’s rations by secret agents. [See Suchet’s _Mémoires_, - ii. p. 256, and Arteche, xii. p. 353.] How far the plan was a - reality is difficult to decide. There is a large file of papers - in the Paris War Office concerning experiments carried out by a - commission of army-doctors, in consequence of a sudden outbreak - of sickness among the troops in July. One or two soldiers died, - a great number were seized with vomiting and stomach-cramps; - poison being suspected, the doctors took possession of the flour, - attempted to analyse it, and tried its effects on a number of - street dogs. A few of the animals died: most were violently sick, - but got over the dose. Poison was not definitely proved, and - dirty utensils and bad baking might conceivably have been the - cause of the outbreak. Some Catalan writers say that there was a - poisoning-plot, or I should have doubted the whole story. See the - Appendix to Arteche, xii. p. 483. - -Operations in Catalonia and Valencia were thus dragging on with no -great profit to one side or the other, when Wellington’s great scheme -for the Anglo-Sicilian diversion on the east coast began at last to -work, and--as he had expected--set a new face to affairs. Unfortunately -the expedition was conducted very differently from his desire. We have -already shown how, by Lord William Bentinck’s perversity, it started -too late, and was far weaker than was originally intended[735]. But on -July 15th General Maitland arrived at Port Mahon with a fleet carrying -three English[736] and two German battalions, and parts of three -foreign regiments, with a handful of cavalry, and two companies of -artillery. He sent messengers across Spain to announce to Wellington -his arrival, and his purpose of landing in Catalonia, as had been -directed. At Majorca he picked up Whittingham’s newly-organized -Balearic division, and after some delay he set sail on July 28 for -Palamos, a central point on the Catalan coast, off which he arrived on -the morning of July 31st with over 10,000 men on board. - - [735] See above, p. 347. - - [736] 1/10th, 1/81st, 1/58th, 4th and 6th Line battalions K.G.L., - and parts of the foreign battalions of De Roll, Dillon, and the - Calabrian Free Corps. See table in Appendix XIV. The total was - 248 officers, and 6,643 rank and file. - -Owing to Bentinck’s unhappy hesitation in May and June, after the -expedition had been announced and the troops ordered to prepare for -embarkation, French spies in Sicily had found the time to send warning -to Paris, and Suchet had been advised by the Minister of War that a -fleet from Palermo might appear in his neighbourhood at any moment. -He received his warning in the end of June, a month before Maitland’s -arrival[737], and this turned out in the end profitable to the allied -cause; for, though the fleet never appeared, he was always expecting -it, and used the argument that he was about to be attacked by an -English force as his most effective reply to King Joseph’s constant -demands for assistance in New Castile. The arrival at Alicante of -transports intended to carry Roche’s division to Catalonia, and of some -vessels bearing the battering-train which Wellington had sent round for -Bentinck’s use, was duly reported to him: for some time he took this -flotilla to be the Anglo-Sicilian squadron. Hence he was expecting all -through June and July the attack which (through Bentinck’s perversity) -was never delivered. The threat proved as effective as the actual -descent might have been, and Wellington would have been much relieved -if only he could have seen a few of Suchet’s many letters refusing to -move a man to support the King[738]. - - [737] Clarke’s dispatch with the information was dated June 9th. - - [738] Two of them dated July 22 and August 12 did ultimately fall - into his hands, but only after the victory of Salamanca. See - below, pp. 617-18. - -Suchet’s great trouble was that he could not tell in the least whether -the Sicilian expedition would land in Catalonia or in Valencia. It -might come ashore anywhere between Alicante and Rosas. He prepared a -small movable central reserve, with which he could march northward if -the blow should fall between Valencia and Tortosa, or southward--to -reinforce Habert and Harispe--if it should be struck in the South. -Decaen was warned to have a strong force concentrated in central -Catalonia, in case the descent came in his direction, and Suchet -promised him such assistance as he could spare. On a rumour that the -Sicilian fleet had turned northward--as a matter of fact it was not -yet in Spanish waters--the Marshal thought it worth while to make a -rapid visit to Catalonia, to concert matters with Decaen. He marched -by Tortosa with a flying column, and on July 10th met Decaen at Reus. -Here he learned that there were no signs of the enemy to be discovered, -and after visiting Tarragona, inspecting its fortifications, and -reinforcing its garrison, returned southward in a more leisurely -fashion than he had gone forth. - -During Suchet’s absence from his Valencian viceroyalty the -captain-general of Murcia took measures which brought about one of -the most needless and gratuitous disasters that ever befell the -ever-unlucky army of which he was in charge. Joseph O’Donnell knew -that the Sicilian expedition was due, and he had been warned that -Roche’s division would be taken off to join it; he was aware that -Maitland’s arrival would modify all Suchet’s arrangements, and would -force him to draw troops away from his own front. He had been requested -by Wellington to content himself with ‘containing’ the French force -in his front, and to risk nothing. But on July 18th he marched out -from his positions in front of Alicante with the design of surprising -General Harispe. He knew that Suchet had gone north, and was not aware -of his return; and he had been informed, quite truly, that Harispe’s -cantonments were much scattered. Unfortunately he was as incapable as -he was presumptuous, and he entirely lacked the fiery determination of -his brother Henry, the hero of La Bispal. According to contemporary -critics he was set, at this moment, on making what he thought would be -a brilliant descent on an unprepared enemy, without any reference to -his orders or to the general state of the war[739]. And he wished to -fight before Roche’s troops were taken from him, as they must soon be. - - [739] See Schepeler, pp. 617 and 623. - -Harispe had only some 5,000 men--his own division, with one stray -battalion belonging to Habert[740], and Delort’s cavalry brigade[741]. -He had one infantry regiment in reserve at Alcoy[742], another at -Ibi[743], the third[744]--with the bulk of Delort’s horsemen--in -and about Castalla, the nearest point in the French cantonments to -Alicante. O’Donnell’s ambitious plan was to surround the troops in -Castalla and Ibi by a concentric movement of several columns marching -far apart, and to destroy them before Harispe himself could come up -with his reserve from the rear. Bassecourt and his detachment from the -northern hills was ordered to fall in at the same time on Alcoy, so as -to distract Harispe and keep him engaged--a doubtful expedient since -he lay many marches away, and it was obvious that the timing of his -diversion would probably miscarry. - - [740] Of the 44th Line. - - [741] The 13th Cuirassiers and 24th Dragoons. - - [742] The 116th Line, 2 battalions. - - [743] The 1st Léger, 3 battalions. - - [744] The 7th Line, 2 battalions. - -O’Donnell marched in three masses: on the right Roche’s division went -by Xixona with the order to surprise the French troops in Ibi. The -main body, three weak infantry brigades under Montijo, Mijares, and -Michelena, with two squadrons of cavalry and a battery, moved straight -upon Castalla. The main body of the horse, about 800 strong, under -General Santesteban, went out on the left on the side of Villena, -with orders to outflank the enemy and try to cut in upon his rear. -The whole force made up 10,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry, not taking -into account the possible (but unlikely) advent of Bassecourt, so that -Harispe was outnumbered by much more than two to one. As an extra -precaution all the transports ready in Alicante were sent out--with -only one battalion on board--along the coast, to demonstrate opposite -Denia and the mouth of the Xucar, in order to call off the attention of -Habert’s division, which lay in that direction. - -Having marched all night on the 20th July, the Spanish columns found -themselves--in a very fatigued condition--in front of the enemy at -four o’clock on the morning of the 21st. They were out of touch with -each other, Roche being separated from the centre by the mountain-spur -called the Sierra de Cata, and the cavalry having been sent very far -out on the flank. General Mesclop was opposed to Roche at Ibi, with -four battalions and a squadron of cuirassiers--General Delort, at -Castalla, had only one squadron of the cuirassiers, two battalions, and -a battery, but was expecting the arrival of the 24th Dragoons from the -neighbouring town of Biar, some way to his right, and of the remaining -two squadrons of the 13th Cuirassiers from Onil on his left. Meanwhile -he evacuated Castalla, but took up a position on a hillside covered by -a stream and a ravine crossed by a narrow bridge, with his trifling -force. He had already sent orders to Mesclop at Ibi to come in to his -aid, leaving only a rearguard to hold off as long as possible the -Spanish column in front of him. The latter did as he was bid; he threw -into the Castle of Ibi a company of the 44th and two guns, and left the -rest of that battalion and a troop of cuirassiers to support them. With -the rest of his force, the three battalions of the 1st Léger and the -remaining troop of cuirassiers, he set off in haste for Castalla. - -O’Donnell assailed Delort in a very leisurely way after occupying the -town of Castalla--his troops were tired, and four of his six guns had -fallen behind. But Montijo’s brigade and the two pieces which had kept -up with it were developing an attack on the bridge, and Michelena and -Mijares had passed the ravine higher up, when the French detached -troops began to appear from all directions. The first to get up were -the 400 men of the 24th Dragoons, who--screened by an olive wood--came -in with a tremendous impact, and quite unforeseen, upon Mijares’s -flank, and completely broke up his three battalions. They then, after -re-forming their ranks, formed in column and charged across the narrow -bridge in front of O’Donnell’s centre, though it was commanded by -his two guns. An attack delivered across such a defile, passable by -only two horses abreast, looked like madness--but was successful! The -guns only fired one round each before they were ridden over, and the -brigade supporting them broke up. Delort then attacked, with his two -battalions and with the cuirassiers who had just come up from Onil. -Montijo’s brigade, the only intact Spanish unit left, was thus driven -from the field and scattered. The 6,000 infantry of O’Donnell’s centre -became a mass of fugitives--only one regiment out of the whole[745] -kept its ranks and went off in decent order. Of the rest nearly half -were hunted down and captured in droves by the French cuirassiers -and dragoons. Mesclop with the three battalions from Ibi arrived too -late to take any part in the rout. Delort sent him back at once to -relieve the detachment that he had left in front of Roche. The latter -had driven it out of the village of Ibi after some skirmishing, when -he saw approaching him not only Mesclop’s column, but Harispe coming -up from Alcoy with the 116th of the Line. He at once halted, turned -to the rear, and retired in good order towards Xixona: the enemy’s -cavalry tried to break his rearguard but failed, and the whole -division got back to Alicante without loss. The same chance happened -to Santesteban’s cavalry, which, marching from Villena at 7 o’clock, -had reached Biar, in the enemy’s rear, only when the fighting--which -had begun at 4--was all over. O’Donnell tried to throw blame on this -officer; but the fact seems to be that his own calculation of time -and distance was faulty: he had sent his cavalry on too wide a sweep, -separated by hills from his main body, and had kept up no proper -communication with it. Nor does it appear that if Santesteban had come -up to Biar a little earlier he would have been able to accomplish -anything very essential. Bassecourt’s diversion, as might have been -expected, did not work: before he got near Alcoy the main body had been -cut to pieces: he retired in haste to Almanza on hearing the news. - - [745] Cuenca, of Montijo’s brigade. Schepeler, p. 619. - -O’Donnell’s infantry was so shattered that his army was reduced to as -bad a condition as it had shown in January, after Blake’s original -disaster at Valencia. He had lost over 3,000 men, of whom 2,135 were -unwounded prisoners, three flags, and the only two guns that had got -to the front. The survivors of the three broken brigades had dispersed -all over the countryside, and took weeks to collect. It was fortunate -that Roche’s division had reached Alicante intact, or that city itself -might have been in danger. The French had lost, according to their own -account, no more than 200 men[746]: only the two cavalry regiments, -two battalions of the 7th Line, and one of the 44th had been put into -action. As Suchet truly remarks in his _Mémoires_[747] the total -numbers engaged--3,000 men[748]--on his side were somewhat less than -the casualty list of the enemy. - - [746] This is the figure given by Suchet in his contemporary - dispatch to King Joseph, of which a copy lies in the Scovell - papers. In some French accounts the number is cut down to 70. - - [747] Vol. ii. p. 260. - - [748] 7th Line, about 1,200; 13th Cuirassiers and 24th Dragoons, - about 1,000; one battalion 44th, about 650; artillery, &c., about - 150 = 3,000 in all. The 1st Léger and 116th Line were practically - not engaged. - -The rout of Castalla put the Murcian army out of action for months--a -lucky thing for Suchet, since the force of the allies at Alicante -was just about to be increased by the arrival there of Maitland’s -expedition, and if O’Donnell’s army had been still intact, a very -formidable body of troops would have been collected opposite him. -It remains to explain the appearance of the Anglo-Sicilians in this -direction, contrary to the orders of Wellington, who had expressed his -wish that they should land in Catalonia, join Lacy, and lay siege to -Tarragona--an operation which he thought would force Suchet to evacuate -Valencia altogether, in order to bring help to Decaen. - -We left Maitland anchored in the Bay of Palamos on July 31. The moment -that he appeared Eroles went on board his ship, to urge his immediate -disembarkation, and to promise the enthusiastic assistance of the -Catalans. The energetic baron gave a most optimistic picture of the -state of affairs, he declared that the whole country would rise at the -sight of the red-coats, that Tarragona was weakly held, and that the -total force of the French, including Suchet’s column near Tortosa, was -only 13,000 men. Lacy and Sarsfield appeared later, and gave much less -encouraging information: they rated the enemy at a far higher figure -than Eroles, and were right in so doing, for Decaen had some 25,000 -men, and could by an effort have concentrated 15,000, exclusive of -succours from Suchet. The Spanish Army of Catalonia could only furnish -7,000 foot and 300 horse, of whom many were so far off at the moment -that Lacy declared that it would take six or eight days to bring them -up. By the time that they were all arrived, the French would have -concentrated also, and would be equal in numbers to the whole force -that the allies could collect. Tarragona was reported to be in a better -state of defence than Eroles allowed, and the engineers declared that -it might take ten days to reduce it. But the greatest problem of all -was that of provisions: Lacy declared that the country could furnish -little or nothing: he could not undertake to keep his own small army -concentrated for more than a week. The Anglo-Sicilians must be fed from -the fleet, and he could provide no transport. Evidently the expedition -would be tied down to the shore, and the siege of Tarragona was the -only possible operation. Since the Anglo-Sicilian army could not -manœuvre at large or retire into the inland, it would have to fight -Decaen, to cover the investment of Tarragona, within a few days of its -landing. On the other hand if, as Eroles promised, the _somatenes_ -rose on every side at the news of the disembarkation, the outlying -French troops might not be able to get up to join Decaen, the roads -would be blocked, the enemy might never be able to concentrate, and the -force about Barcelona, his only immediately available field army, was -not more than 8,000 strong, and might be beaten. - -There were those who said that Lacy never wished to see the expedition -land, because he was jealous of Eroles, and thought that a general -rising which ended in success would have meant the end of his own power -and tenure of office[749]. It is at least certain that the views which -he expressed caused Maitland much trouble, and made him to flinch from -his original idea of landing without delay and attacking Tarragona, -according to Wellington’s desire. The English general took refuge in a -council of war--the usual resource of commanders of a wavering purpose. -His lieutenants all advised him to refuse to land, on the ground that -his forces were too small and heterogeneous, that Lacy could give no -prompt assistance, and that there was no sign as yet of the general -rising which Eroles promised. Moreover, some of the naval officers told -him that anchorage off the Catalan coast was so dangerous, even in -summer, that they could not promise him that the army could be taken -safely on board in case of a defeat. To the intense disgust of Eroles -and the other Catalan leaders, but not at all to Lacy’s displeasure, -Maitland accepted the advice of his council of war, and resolved to -make off, and to land farther south. The original idea was to have -come ashore somewhere in the midst of the long coast-line south of -the Ebro, between Tortosa and Valencia, with the object of breaking -Suchet’s line in the middle. But the news of Joseph O’Donnell’s -gratuitous disaster at Castalla, which obviously enabled the Marshal -to use his whole army against a disembarking force, and the suggestion -that Alicante itself might be in danger, induced Maitland in the end -to order his whole armament to steer southward. He arrived at Alicante -on August 7th, and commenced to send his troops ashore--both his own -6,000 men and Whittingham’s 4,000 auxiliaries of the Balearic division. -Since Roche was already there, with his troops in good order, there -were 14,000 men collected in Alicante, over and above the wrecks of -O’Donnell’s force. If only the Murcians had been intact, the mass -assembled would have caused Suchet serious qualms, since it would have -outnumbered the French corps in Valencia very considerably, and there -was in it a nucleus of good troops in Maitland’s British and German -battalions. The news of Salamanca had also come to hand by this time, -and had transformed the general aspect of affairs in Suchet’s eyes: -King Joseph was again demanding instant help from him, in the hope of -retaining Madrid, and had called in (without his knowledge or consent) -the division of Palombini from Aragon, and the garrison of Cuenca[750]. -If Wellington should advance--as he actually did--against the King, -and should drive him from his capital, it was possible that the main -theatre of the war might be transferred to the borders of Valencia. - - [749] This seems to have been Codrington’s view, see his - _Memoirs_, i. p. 278, and he knew Lacy and the Catalans well. - - [750] See above, pp. 487 and 488. - -The Marshal therefore resolved to concentrate: he ordered Habert and -Harispe to fall back behind the Xucar with their 8,000 men, abandoning -their advanced positions in front of Alicante, and placed them at -Jativa; here he threw up some field-works and armed a _tête-de-pont_ on -the Xucar at Alberique. He ordered Paris’s brigade to come down from -northern Aragon to Teruel, and he warned the generals in Catalonia that -he might ask for reinforcements from them. - -Maitland therefore, after his landing, found that the French had -disappeared from his immediate front. He was joined by Roche, and by -the 67th regiment from Cartagena, and proposed to drive Harispe from -Castalla and Ibi. But he marched against him on August 16th-18th, only -to find that he had already retired behind the Xucar. Farther than -Monforte he found himself unable to advance, for want of transport -and food. For the expedition from Sicily had not been fitted out for -an advance into the inland. It had been supposed by Bentinck that -the troops would be able to hire or requisition in Spain the mules -and carts that they would require for a forward movement. But the -country-side about Alicante was already exhausted by the long stay -of the Murcian army in that region; and O’Donnell--before Maitland -had come to know the difficulties of his position, got from him a -pledge that he would not take anything from it either by purchase or -by requisition. The British general had hired mules to draw his guns, -but found that he could not feed them on a forward march, because the -resources of the district were denied him. He himself had to stop at -Elda, Roche at Alcoy, because the problem of transport and food could -not be solved. All that he could do was to feel the French line of -outposts behind the Xucar with a flying column composed of his own -handful of cavalry--200 sabres--and a detachment of Spanish horse lent -him by Elio, the successor of O’Donnell [August 20th-21st]. - -But even the thought of farther advance had now to be given up, for the -news arrived that King Joseph had evacuated Madrid on the 14th, and -was marching on Valencia with the 15,000 men that he had collected. To -have tried any further attack on Suchet, when such an army was coming -in from the flank to join the Marshal, would have been insane. The -French force in this region would be doubled in strength by the King’s -arrival. Wherefore Maitland drew back his own division to Alicante, -and brought Roche back to Xixona, not far in front of that fortress, -expecting that he might ere long be pushed back, and perhaps besieged -there. Wellington in the end of the month, having the same idea, sent -him elaborate directions for the defence of the place, bidding him to -hold it as long as possible, but to keep his transports close at hand, -and to re-embark if things came to the worst[751]. - - [751] See Wellington to Maitland, _Dispatches_, ix. p. 386, dated - Aug. 30. - -On the 25th King Joseph’s army and its vast convoy of French and -Spanish refugees, joined Suchet’s outposts at Almanza, and the -dangerous combination which Maitland and Wellington had foreseen came -to pass. But what was still more threatening for the army at Alicante -was the rumour that Soult was about to evacuate Andalusia, and to -bring the whole of the Army of the South to Valencia. This would mean -that nearly 80,000 French troops would ere long be collected within -striking distance of the motley force over which Maitland and Elio now -held command, and it seemed probable that Soult in his march might -sweep over the whole country-side, disperse the Spanish forces on the -Murcian border, and perhaps besiege and take Cartagena and Alicante -as a _parergon_ on the way. We have seen in chapter X that nothing -of this kind happened: Soult hung on to Andalusia for a month longer -than Wellington or any one else deemed probable: he only left Granada -on September 17th, and when he did move on Valencia he took the bad -inland roads by Huescar, Calasparra, and Hellin, leaving Murcia and -Cartagena and the whole sea-coast undisturbed. The reason, as has been -already pointed out, was the outbreak of yellow fever at Cartagena, -which caused the Duke of Dalmatia so much concern that he preferred to -keep away from the infection, even at the cost of taking inferior and -circuitous roads. - -For the whole of September, therefore, Suchet on the one side and -Maitland and the Spaniards on the other, were waiting on Soult: in the -expectation of his early arrival both sides kept quiet. Thus tamely -ended the first campaign of the Anglo-Sicilian army, on whose efforts -Wellington had so much counted. And its later operations, as we shall -presently see, were to be wholly in keeping with its unlucky start. - - - - -SECTION XXXIII: CHAPTER XII - -WELLINGTON RETURNS TO THE DOURO. FINIS - - -The garrison of the Retiro had surrendered on August 14th: Wellington -remained for seventeen days longer in Madrid, and did not leave it, -to take the field again, until August 31st. His stay in the Spanish -capital was not due, in the first instance, to the causes which might -seem most plausible--a desire to give his war-worn infantry a rest -during the hottest weeks of the year, or a determination to reorganize -the military resources of Madrid and New Castile for the profit of -the allied cause[752]. Both these ideas existed, and the latter in -especial absorbed much of his attention--he spent long hours in trying -to concert, with Carlos de España, measures for the utilization of -the captured munitions of the Retiro, and for the recruiting of the -regiments of the Spanish ‘Fifth Army.’ In this he accomplished less -than he had hoped, partly because of the dreadful exhaustion of the -central provinces of Spain after the famine of the preceding year, -partly because of the inefficiency of most of the Spanish officials -with whom he had to deal. He was much discontented with the list of -persons appointed by the new Regency to take up authority in the -reconquered provinces; and Castaños, whom he most trusted, and desired -to have with him, was lingering in Galicia[753]. - - [752] Wellington to Henry Wellesley, _Dispatches_, ix. p. 364. - - [753] Same to same, _Dispatches_, ix. p. 373. He was particularly - indignant at the supersession of Mexia, Intendant of Castile, by - Lozano de Torres, with whom he had quarrelled in Estremadura in - 1809, ‘the most useless and inefficient of all God’s creatures, - and an impediment to all business.’ - -But the main reason for the halt at Madrid was the uncertainty as to -the movements of Soult. Was the Duke of Dalmatia about, as would seem -reasonable, to evacuate Andalusia? And if so, would he pick up King -Joseph and the Army of the Centre in La Mancha, and march on Madrid -with the 65,000 men whom they could collect? Or would he retire on -Valencia and join Suchet? Or again, would he persist in his intention, -expressed in dispatches to Joseph, which had fallen into Wellington’s -hands, of holding on to Andalusia and making it a separate base of -French power, despite of the fact that he had been cut off from -communication with the imperial armies of the East and North? - -‘Any other but a modern French army would now leave the province [of -Andalusia],’ wrote Wellington to Lord Bathurst on July 18[754], ‘as -they have now absolutely no communication of any kind with France or -with any other French army; and they are pressed on all sides by troops -not to be despised, and can evidently do nothing. Yet I suspect that -Soult will not stir till I force him out by a direct movement upon him: -and I think of making that movement as soon as I can take the troops -to the South without injuring their health.’ All military reasons were -against the probability of Soult’s holding on in Andalusia, yet he had -certainly expressed his intention of doing so as late as the middle of -July, and, what was more important still in judging of his plans, he -had not made a sudden movement of retreat when the news of Salamanca -reached him. Hill writing on August 4th, six days after the receipt of -the tidings of Marmont’s disaster, had to report[755] that ‘the recent -glorious event’ seemed to have had very little effect on the enemy, who -‘continued in a strong position in his front.’ And this was true, for -Soult, after hearing the news of Salamanca, had made his last frantic -appeal to King Joseph to fall back on Andalusia, and make his base at -Seville if Madrid were lost. Wellington was right in suspecting that, -if the Marshal had got his desire, the South would have been maintained -against him, and he would have had to march thither in person, to pick -up Hill, and to bring matters to an issue by another pitched battle. -It was only on August 12th that Soult reluctantly resolved to evacuate -Andalusia: his first precautionary movements for retreat were made -on August 15th, but it was not till the 24th that the Cadiz Lines -were destroyed, or till the 26th that all the French troops in front -of Hill suddenly vanished. Wellington was therefore kept for more -than a fortnight in a state of complete uncertainty as to whether he -might not have to march southward in the end, to evict Soult from his -viceroyalty. It was only on the 24th that he got information from -Hill (written on the 17th) which gave the first premonitory warning -that the French seemed to be on the move[756]. Next day confirming -evidence began to come to hand: ‘it is generally reported, and I have -reason to believe, that the Army of the South is about to make a -general movement ... it is supposed in the direction of Granada and -Valencia[757].’ On August 30, ‘though Sir Rowland Hill on the 17th -instant had no intelligence that the march was commenced, there was -every appearance of it.’ The fact that seemed to make it incredible -that Soult could be proposing to hold Andalusia any longer, was precise -information that King Joseph and the Army of the Centre had marched -upon Valencia to join Suchet, and had passed Chinchilla on August 24th, -going eastward[758]. If the King had gone by the passes of the Sierra -Morena southward, to join Soult, doubt might still have been possible: -but since he had made Valencia his goal, and was crawling slowly along -in that direction with his immense convoy of refugees and baggage, -Soult--left entirely to his own resources--could not retain his present -position. He must march on Valencia also, and it would be many weeks -before he could place himself in touch with Suchet, and produce a -threatening combination on the Mediterranean coast. - - [754] _Dispatches_, ix. p. 370. - - [755] See above, p. 537. - - [756] _Dispatches_, ix. p. 377. - - [757] Ibid., ix. pp. 380-1. - - [758] News from Joseph O’Donnell commanding the Spanish army of - Murcia. _Dispatches_, ix. p. 388. - -On August 31st, therefore, with no absolutely certain news yet to hand -as to Soult’s retreat, but with every military probability in favour -of its having been begun, Wellington resolved to leave Madrid and to -return to the valley of the Douro, where the movements of Clausel and -the French Army of Portugal demanded his attention. He never thought -for a moment of endeavouring to march through La Mancha to intercept or -molest Soult’s retreat. The distance was too great, the roads unknown, -the problem of feeding the army in the desolate and thinly-peopled -country about the Murcian and Andalusian borders too difficult. -Wellington made up his mind that he had some time to spare: he would -march against Clausel and then ‘return to this part of the country -[Madrid] as soon as I shall have settled matters to my satisfaction -on the right of the Douro. And I hope I shall be here [Madrid] and -shall be joined by the troops under Sir Rowland Hill, before Soult -can have made much progress to form his junction with the King[759].’ -It is important, therefore, to realize that, in Wellington’s original -conception, the operations in Old Castile, which we may call the -Burgos campaign, were to be but a side-issue, an intermediate and -secondary matter. The real danger in Spain, as he considered, was the -approaching, but not immediate, junction of Soult, Suchet, and King -Joseph at Valencia. And the Commander-in-Chief evidently proposed to -be at Madrid, to face this combination, by October 1st. How and why he -failed to carry out this intention must be explained at length in the -next volume. - - [759] Wellington to Lord Bathurst, August 30, from Madrid. - _Dispatches_, ix. p. 390. - -Meanwhile, when he marched off to the Douro with part of his army, -he had to make provisions for the conduct of affairs in the South -during his absence. Hill, as has been shown in another chapter, had -been told to march on Madrid, as soon as Soult’s forces had made their -definitive departure for the East. As Drouet only disappeared from -Hill’s front on August 26th, the northward march of the army from -Estremadura began late: it had not commenced to cross the Guadiana -on September 1: its progress to and along the Tagus valley was slow, -owing to the difficulty of procuring food, and its main body had not -reached Almaraz and Talavera before the 20th September, and was only -concentrated about and behind Toledo at the end of the month. But -though Hill’s movement was not rapid, it was made in sufficiently good -time to face the danger that was brewing on the side of Valencia. And -there can be no doubt that if he had received orders to hurry, he -could have been in line some days before he actually appeared[760]. He -brought up all his force[761] except Buchan’s Portuguese brigade[762], -which was left at Truxillo and Merida, to keep up his communication -with Elvas. Estremadura, so long the contending ground of armies, had -now no solid body of troops left in it save the Spanish garrison of -Badajoz. For Penne Villemur and Morillo, with the division which had -so long operated in Hill’s vicinity, moved with him into New Castile. -They went by the rugged roads through the mountains of the province of -Toledo[763], and took post at Herencia, on the high-road from Madrid to -the Despeñaperros pass, in front of the British 2nd Division. - - [760] The cavalry at the head of the column were at Truxillo - on the 15th September, Almaraz on the 19th, Talavera on the - 21st. The infantry in the rear of the division only crossed the - Guadiana at Medellin on September 14th, was at Truxillo on the - 17th, Almaraz on the 20th, Talavera on the 26th, Toledo on the - 30th (Swabey’s diary). - - [761] Hill brought up the 2nd Division--British, 7,000; - Portuguese, 2,900; Hamilton’s Portuguese, 5,300; Long’s and - Slade’s cavalry, about 1,900; artillery, about 400 = 17,500 of - all ranks. - - [762] Late Power’s brigade: The 5th and 17th, the old garrison of - Elvas, and the 22nd. - - [763] They marched from Cabeza del Buey, on the borders of - Andalusia and Estremadura, via Talarubia and Mazarambros to - Herencia. ‘Journal of Regiment of Leon,’ in Clonard, vol. iv. - -In the rear of Hill’s column, and separated from it by many days’ -march, was another small British force toiling up to Madrid from a very -distant point. This was the force under Colonel Skerrett, which had -taken part in the fighting round Seville. It consisted of the battalion -of the Guards from Cadiz, the 2/47th and 2/87th, two companies of the -2/95th, a squadron of the 2nd Hussars K.G.L., the 20th Portuguese -Line, and a battery. By Wellington’s orders no British troops were now -left in Cadiz save the 2/59th, part of de Watteville’s regiment, the -‘battalion of foreign recruits,’ soon to become the 8/60th, and a few -artillery. Skerrett’s column, some 4,000 strong, marched by Merida -and Truxillo, and reached Toledo in time to join Hill for the autumn -campaign in front of Madrid. Hill’s corps, when joined by Skerrett, -provided a force of over 20,000 men, about equally divided between -British and Portuguese. - -It would have been profitable to Wellington, as matters went in the -end, if he had handed over the entire task of observing Soult’s -operations to Hill. But being under the impression that he would return -ere long to Madrid, he left there and in the neighbourhood nearly -half the force that he had brought from Salamanca. He only took with -him to oppose Clausel the 1st, 5th, and 7th Divisions, with Pack’s and -Bradford’s Portuguese, and Bock’s and Ponsonby’s (late Le Marchant’s) -brigades of heavy dragoons, a force of some 21,000 men[764]. He -left the 3rd and Light Divisions at Madrid, the 4th Division at the -Escurial, and Carlos de España’s Spaniards at Segovia. The cavalry of -Victor Alten and D’Urban were assigned to this force, and remained, -the former at Madrid, the latter at the Palacio de Rio Frio, near -Segovia. The British infantry divisions had all suffered heavily at -Badajoz, and the 4th at Salamanca also--they were weak in numbers, but -were expecting ere long to be joined by numerous convalescents. The -total force left behind amounted to about 17,000 men, including the -Spaniards[765]. Thus when Hill and Skerrett came up from the South, -there was a mass of nearly 40,000 men accumulated round Madrid, while -Wellington himself, after picking up Clinton and the 6th Division, and -the other troops left on the Douro, had a little under 30,000. This -proved in the autumn campaign an ideally bad partition of the army, for -on each wing the Anglo-Portuguese force was decidedly less numerous -than that which the French could bring against it. If Wellington had -taken his full strength to the North, he could have defied Clausel -and Caffarelli, and they could never have made head against him, or -pressed him away from Burgos. Hill, on the other hand, in front of -Madrid, would have been no more helpless with 22,000 men than he -actually was with 38,000 men, when Soult and King Joseph brought 60,000 -against him in October. In either case he could only retreat without -offering battle. But Wellington, if the three additional divisions -left in New Castile had been brought to the North, would have had such -a superiority over the French in Old Castile that he could have dealt -with them as he pleased. The only explanation of the unfortunate -proportional division of his army, is that Wellington undervalued the -task he had to execute beyond the Douro, thought that he could finish -it more quickly than was to be the case, and calculated on being back -at Madrid in October before Soult could give trouble. - - [764] There marched with Wellington--1st Division, 5,980 of - all ranks; 5th Division, 4,726; 7th Division, 4,841; Pack and - Bradford, 3,954; Bock and Ponsonby, 1,673; artillery, &c., about - 500 = 21,674. - - [765] There remained at Madrid, the Escurial, &c.--Arentschildt’s - cavalry, 515; D’Urban’s Portuguese cavalry, 552; 3rd Division, - 4,234; 4th Division, 4,548; Light Division, 3,462; artillery, - about 350; Carlos de España’s Spaniards, about 3,000 = 16,661. - -Yet when he started he was not comfortable in his mind about the -general situation. If the French drew together, their total strength -in Spain was far too great for him. In a moody moment he wrote to -his brother Henry: ‘though I still hope to be able to maintain our -position in Castile, and even to improve our advantages, I shudder when -I reflect upon the enormity of the task which I have undertaken, with -inadequate powers myself to do anything, and without assistance of any -kind from the Spaniards.... I am apprehensive that all this may turn -out ill for the Spanish cause. If by any cause I should be overwhelmed, -or should be obliged to retire, what will the world say? What will the -people of England say? What will those in Spain say?[766]’ - - [766] _Dispatches_, ix. p. 375. - -Wellington’s forebodings were, only too soon, to be justified. But the -tale of the campaign against Clausel and Caffarelli, of the advance to -and retreat from Burgos, must be told in another volume. - - - - -APPENDICES - - - - -I - -SUCHET’S ARMY IN VALENCIA. MORNING STATE OF OCT. 1, 1811 - - - 1st Division (Musnier): _Officers._ _Men._ _Total._ - Robert’s { 114th Line (3 batts.) 58 1,579 1,637 - Brigade { 1st of the Vistula (2 batts.) 27 836 863 - Ficatier’s { 121st Line (3 batts.) 44 1,156 1,200 - Brigade { 2nd of the Vistula (2 batts.) 26 1,103 1,129 = 4,829 - - 2nd Division (Harispe): - Paris’s { 7th Line (4 batts.) 55 1,584 1,639 - Brigade { 116th Line (3 batts.) 42 1,105 1,147 - Chlopiski’s { 44th Line (2 batts.) 35 1,191 1,226 - Brigade { 3rd of the Vistula (2 batts.) 26 724 750 = 4,762 - - 3rd Division (Habert): - Montmarie’s { 5th Line (2 batts.) 31 771 802 - Brigade { 16th Line (3 batts.) 56 1,261 1,317 - Bronikowski’s Brigade, 117th Line (3 batts.) 49 1,291 1,340 = 3,459 - - Palombini’s Italian Division: - Saint Paul’s{ 2nd Léger (3 batts.) 59 2,141 2,200 - Brigade { 4th Line (3 batts.) 57 1,603 1,660 - Balathier’s { 5th Line (2 batts.) 37 893 930 - Brigade { 6th Line (3 batts.) 51 1,378 1,429 = 6,219 - - Compère’s Neapolitan Division: - 1st Léger (1 batt.) 27 419 446 - 1st Line (1 batt.) 24 536 560 - 2nd Line (1 batt.) 27 358 385 = 1,391 - - Cavalry (General Boussard): - 4th Hussars (4 squadrons) 30 720 750 - 24th Dragoons (2 squadrons) 17 419 436 - 13th Cuirassiers (4 squadrons) 27 557 584 - Italian ‘Dragoons of Napoleon’ 24 442 466 - Neapolitan Chasseurs 13 156 169 = 2,405 - - Artillery (General Vallée) 48 1,757 1,805 - Engineers (General Rogniat) 16 584 600 - Équipages Militaires and Gendarmerie 10 653 663 = 3,068 - --- ------ ------ ------ - 916 25,217 26,133 26,133 - -N.B.--Ficatier’s Brigade, 3 battalions of Palombini’s division, and two -squadrons of 4th Hussars were not present at the battle of Saguntum, -being on the line of communications, and blockading Peniscola and -Oropesa. - -This return, lent me by Mr. Fortescue who found it in the Paris -Archives, differs by over 2,000 men from Suchet’s figures given in -his _Mémoires_, p. 436 of vol. ii. The Marshal has left out the 3 -battalions and 2 squadrons on the line of communications, mentioned -above. - - - - -II - -STRENGTH OF BLAKE’S ARMY AT THE BATTLE OF SAGUNTUM - - -I. ‘THE EXPEDITIONARY CORPS.’ - _Officers._ _Men._ _Total._ - - Lardizabal’s Division: Africa (2 batts.), Murcia - (2 batts.), 2nd of Badajoz (2 batts.), Campo - Mayor (1 batt.), Tiradores de Cuenca (1 batt.) 149 2,823 2,972 - - Zayas’s Division: 2nd Spanish Guards, 4th ditto, - 1st Walloon Guards, Voluntarios de la Patria, - Toledo, Ciudad Rodrigo, Legion Estrangera (1 - batt. each), Companies of Cazadores 177 2,373 2,550 - - Loy’s Cavalry: Granaderos (2 squadrons), Rey - (1 ditto), Husares de Castilla (1 ditto) 50 244 294 - - Horse Artillery: two batteries 11 214 225 - --- ----- ----- - Total of the ‘Expeditionary Corps’ 387 5,654 6,041 - - -II. VALENCIAN TROOPS (‘SECOND ARMY’). - - Miranda’s Division: Valencia (3 batts.), Voluntarios - de Castilla (2 batts.), 1st of Avila (1 batt.), - 2nd Cazadores de Valencia (1 batt.) 120 3,844 3,964 - - Obispo’s Division: Cariñena (2 batts.) 2nd of Avila - (1 batt.), 1st Voluntarios de Aragon (1 batt.), - Daroca (1 batt.), Tiradores de Doyle (1 batt.) 110 3,290 3,400 - - Villacampa’s Division: Princesa (2 batts.), Soria - (2 batts.), 2nd Voluntarios de Aragon (1 batt.), - 1st Cazadores de Valencia (1 batt.), Molina - (1 batt.) 162 3,190 3,352 - - Reserve (General Velasco): 3rd Battalions of - Voluntarios de Castilla, Don Carlos, Avila, Cazadores - de Valencia, and Voluntarios de Orihuela 75 3,595 3,670 - - San Juan’s Cavalry: Cuenca, Dragones del Rey, - Reina, Numancia, Husares de Aragon, Cazadores - de Valencia, Alcantara, Husares Españoles, - Husares de Granada (none over two squadrons - strong) 111 1,610 1,721 - - Artillery: 1 horse, 2 field batteries 21 340 361 - --- ------ ------ - Total ‘2nd Army’ 599 15,869 16,468 - - -III. MURCIAN TROOPS (‘3RD ARMY’). - - _Officers._ _Men._ _Total._ - Creagh’s Brigade: Corona, Alcazar, - Tiradores de Cadiz (1 batt. each) 97 2,121 2,218 - - Montijo’s Brigade: 1st of Badajoz, 1st of - Cuenca, Voluntarios de Burgos, Sappers - (1 batt. each) 108 2,302 2,410 - - Cavalry: Reina (2 squadrons), Pavia (2 - squadrons), Granada (2 squadrons), - Madrid (1 squadron), Husares de Fernando - 7me (1 squadron) 83 743 826 - - Horse Artillery: 1 battery 3 78 81 - --- ----- ----- - Total ‘3rd Army’ 291 5,244 5,535 - -General Total of the Army: 1,277 officers, 26,767 men = Total, 28,044. - - - - -III - -SUCHET’S ARMY AT THE SIEGE OF VALENCIA. MORNING STATE OF DEC. 31 - - -N.B.--The regiments of the Army of Aragon are the same as in Appendix I. - -I. ARMY OF ARAGON (officers and men). - - Musnier’s Division (10 battalions) 3,727 - Harispe’s Division (10 battalions) 4,828 - Habert’s Division (8 battalions) 3,150 - Palombini’s Division (10 battalions) 3,591 - Compère’s Division (3 battalions) 1,092 - Boussard’s Cavalry (13 squadrons) 1,839 - Artillery 1,511 - Engineers, &c. 857 - ------ - Total Army of Aragon 20,595 - -II. REILLE’S CORPS (officers and men). - - Pannetier’s { 10th and 81st Line (7 battalions) 2,834 - Brigade { - - Bourke’s { 20th and 60th Line (7 battalions) 3,961 - Brigade { - - Severoli’s Italian { 1st Line (3 batts.) } - { 7th Line (2 batts.) } 4,370 - Division { 1st Léger (3 batts.) } - - Cavalry { 9th Hussars 543 - { 1st Italian Chasseurs 262 - - Artillery 1,153 - ------ - Total Reille’s Corps 13,123 - - General Total of combined forces, 33,718. - - - - -IV - -SURRENDER-ROLL OF BLAKE’S ARMY OF VALENCIA, JAN. 9, 1812 - - - _Officers._ _Rank - and file._ - Zayas’s Division 96 1,319 - Lardizabal’s Division 165 3,385 - Miranda’s Division 237 5,513 - Division of Reserve, &c. 130 3,171 - Cavalry 77 818 - Artillery 73 1,581 - Engineers and Sappers 38 383 - --- ------ - Total 816 16,170 - -General total, 16,986 of all ranks, not including 62 officers in staff -or administrative employments, 23 chaplains, and 19 surgeons. - -Of the remainder of Blake’s army there had rallied at Alicante by -January 14 of infantry 361 officers and 5,125 men, of cavalry 164 -officers and 671 men, of artillery 30 officers and 720 men--total of -all arms, 7,071. - - - - -V - -FRENCH TROOPS EMPLOYED AT THE SIEGE OF TARIFA (DEC. 1811-JAN. 1812) - - - [From the table in Belmas, iv. pp. 40-2.] _Of all - ranks._ - From Leval’s Division, 43rd Line, 7th and 9th Poles (2 batts. - each) 3,000 - - From Barrois’s Division, 16th Léger (3 batts.), 51st Ligne (2 - batts.), 54th Ligne (2 batts.) 4,200 - - From Villatte’s Division, 27th Léger (1 batt.), 94th and 95th - Ligne (1 batt. each) 1,800 - - Cavalry, 16th Dragoons, and one squadron 21st Dragoons 585 - - Artillery 469 - - Engineers, Sappers, Marines, &c. 385 - ------ - Total 10,439 - -In addition three battalions of the 8th and 63rd line and two squadrons -of the 2nd Dragoons were occupied on the lines of communications, -between Vejer and Fascinas. - - -ANGLO-SPANISH GARRISON OF TARIFA - - _Of all - British (Colonel Skerrett): ranks._ - 2/47th 570 - 2/87th 560 - Battalion of Flank Companies 400 - 1 company 95th regiment 75 - 1 troop 2nd Hussars K.G.L. 70 - Artillery (Hughes’s Company R.A.) 83 - ----- - Total 1,758 - - Spanish (General Copons): - Cantabria (1 batt.) 450 - Irlanda (1 batt.) 357 - Cazadores 333 - Artillery 106 - Sappers 83 - Cavalry 17 - ----- - Total 1,346 - -N.B.--Another return makes the total of the British part of the -garrison 67 officers and 1,707 men, a total of 1,774. - - - - -VI - -CIUDAD RODRIGO - - -A. THE FRENCH GARRISON - -The garrison, according to Belmas, iv. pp. 282-3, stood on the day of -the investment as follows: - - 34th Léger, one battalion 975 officers and men effective. - 113th Ligne, one battalion 577 ” ” - Artillery, 2 companies 168 ” ” - Engineers 15 ” ” - Non-combatants (Civil officers, &c.) 36 ” ” - Sick in Hospital 163 - Staff 3 - ----- - Total 1,937 - - -B. BRITISH LOSSES DURING THE SIEGE - -The British losses between the investment and the storm were, according -to the official returns at the Record Office, 1 officer and 69 men -killed, 19 officers and 462 men wounded, 2 men (both Portuguese) -missing, or a total of 553. These figures added to the 568 lost in the -storm (for details see below), make altogether 1,121, which does not -agree with the statement in Wellington _Dispatches_, viii. p. 557; -this gives as the total for the siege 9 officers and 169 men killed, -70 officers and 748 men wounded, 7 men missing, or only 1,003, over a -hundred less than the total from the return quoted above. Napier gives -1,290 as the casualties for the whole siege, which much exceeds the -return in the Record Office; he also makes the total for the storm 60 -officers and 650 killed and wounded, while the official return here -printed makes it only 59 officers and 509 men. Lord Londonderry and Sir -John Jones also give figures agreeing with no others. I prefer to take -the total of the official report, which is here appended. - - -C. BRITISH LOSSES AT THE STORM OF CIUDAD RODRIGO. JANUARY 19, 1812 - - _Killed._ _Wounded._ - _Officers._ _Men._ _Officers._ _Men._ _Total._ - Staff 1[767] -- 2[768] -- 3 - Engineers -- -- 2 2 4 - - 3rd Division: - {1/45th 3 14 4 27 48 - Mackinnon’s {5/60th -- 1 1 3 5 - Brigade {74th -- 4 4 13 21 - {1/88th -- 7 4 23 34 - - {2/5th 1 33 8 52 94 - Campbell’s {77th -- 14 5 31 50 - Brigade {2/83rd -- 1 -- 4 5 - {94th 2 13 6 48 69 - --- - Divisional Total 326 - - Light Division: - Vandeleur’s {1/52nd 1 2 2 23 28 - Brigade {2/52nd -- 1 1 7 9 - {3/95th -- -- -- 9 9 - - Barnard’s {1/43rd -- 7 3 31 41 - Brigade {1/95th -- 1 3 16 20 - {2/95th -- -- 2 4 6 - --- - Divisional Total 113 - - Portuguese -- 19 4 91 114 - -- --- -- --- --- - Grand Total 8 117 51 384 560 - -Adding 5 British and 3 Portuguese missing, the total loss is 568 in the -storm. - - [767] General Mackinnon. - - [768] Generals Craufurd and Vandeleur. - - - - -VII - -NOTE ON SOME POINTS OF CONTROVERSY REGARDING THE STORM OF CIUDAD RODRIGO - - -Beside the controversy alluded to on page 183 about the exact amount -of co-operation by the Light Division in helping the 3rd to clear -the French from behind the Greater Breach, there are several other -vexed points concerning the storm of Ciudad Rodrigo. The one on which -most dispute arose was that concerning the capture of General Barrié. -Gurwood of the 52nd claimed to have been the first officer to enter -the Castle, and to receive the surrender of the governor and his -staff. He is mentioned as doing so in Wellington’s Rodrigo dispatch, -and generally had the credit at the time. But Lieutenant Mackie of -the 88th, who had led the forlorn hope of the 3rd Division, also put -in a claim, and had many supporters. Many years after the war was -over, Maxwell (the author of one of the several _Lives of the Duke -of Wellington_, which came out in early Victorian times) championed -Mackie’s claim with such vehemence that Gurwood issued a pamphlet -defending his own credit. Considerable controversy arose in the _United -Service Journal_ for 1843, and elsewhere. Mackie’s story was that -he, with some of the 88th, arrived first at the Castle, summoned the -governor to surrender, and was received by several French officers, -who handed him over a sword and announced that the general yielded. -Some moments after, according to Mackie, Gurwood came up, spoke to the -governor himself, and obtained his sword, which, when the prisoners -were brought before Wellington, he presented to his commander, who -gave it him back, telling him to retain it as a trophy, and entered -Gurwood’s name in his dispatch as the officer who had received the -surrender. Gurwood’s story, told with as much detail and circumstance -as Mackie’s, is that he, with two soldiers of the 52nd, arrived at the -citadel, got the gate opened by threatening the officer in charge that -no quarter would be given if resistance were made, and was received by -Barrié, who in a great state of nervousness, threw his arms round his -neck, kissed him, and said, ‘_je suis le Gouverneur de la place--je -suis votre prisonnier_,’ handing over his sword at the same time. -He accompanied the captive staff-officers to Wellington’s presence, -and presented them to him. It is difficult to come to any certain -conclusion in face of two such contradictory tales, but there is a -bare possibility of reconciling them, by supposing that Mackie entered -first, that the door was closed behind him and his party, and that -Gurwood was let in a moment later, and spoke to the governor, while -Mackie had been dealing only with his aide-de-camp, whose sword he had -received. But if so, it is odd that Gurwood never saw Mackie: Mackie is -quite positive that he saw Gurwood, and that he came in some minutes -later than himself. The dispute tended to become a controversy between -Light Division and 3rd Division veterans, each backing their own man. A -synopsis of the papers may be found in the last two chapters of vol. i -of Grattan’s second series of _Adventures with the Connaught Rangers_ -(London, 1853). Napier, who was much interested in the discussion, -put in his final definitive edition the non-committal statement that -‘the garrison fled to the Castle, where Lieutenant Gurwood, who -though severely wounded had entered among the foremost at the Lesser -Breach, received the governor’s sword’ (iv. p. 90). Harry Smith says -(i. p. 58): ‘Gurwood got great credit here unfairly. Johnstone and poor -Uniacke were the first on the ramparts, Gurwood having been knocked -down in the breach, and momentarily stunned. However, Gurwood’s a sharp -fellow, and he cut off in search of the governor and brought his sword -to the Duke. He made the _most_ of it.’ - -Another controversy is as to which troops of the 3rd Division got first -into the body of the town. The 88th claimed the priority, but also the -94th. The late Mr. Andrew Lang lent me a very interesting letter of his -kinsman, William Lang of the 94th, very clearly stating that a solid -body of 200 men of his regiment were the first troops that penetrated -in force to the Plaza Mayor, and received the surrender of the garrison -there. - -Still another controversy, about which there is much in the Rice Jones -papers, in the possession of Commander Hon. Henry Shore, R.N., is as to -what engineer officers conducted the storming-columns. Apparently some -credit has been misplaced among individuals here, but to decide upon -the point would take more space than a book like this can afford. - - - - -VIII - -ARMY OF THE SOUTH - -REORGANIZED AFTER THE DEPARTURE OF THE POLES AND OTHER REGIMENTS - - -RETURN OF MARCH 1, 1812 - -[From the returns in the _Archives Nationales_. Lent me by Mr. -Fortescue.] - - _Officers._ _Men._ - 1st Division: Conroux. Head-quarters: Villamartin - (near Bornos). - 1st Brigade, Meunier; 9th Léger (2 batts.)*, 24th - Ligne (3 batts.). - 2nd Brigade, Mocquery; 96th Ligne (3 batts.). - - Total, including artillery 182 5,263 - - 2nd Division: Barrois. Head-quarters: Puerto Real - (near Cadiz). - 1st Brigade, Cassagne: 16th Léger, 8th Ligne (3 - batts. each). - 2nd Brigade, Avril: 51st Ligne, 54th Ligne (3 - batts. each). - - Total, including artillery 225 7,551 - - 3rd Division: Villatte. Head-quarters: Santa Maria - (near Cadiz). - 1st Brigade, Pécheux: 27th Léger, 63rd Ligne (3 - batts. each). - 2nd Brigade, Lefol: 94th Ligne, 95th Ligne (3 - batts. each). - - Total, including artillery 244 7,115 - - 4th Division: Leval. Head-quarters: Granada. - 1st Brigade, Rey: 32nd Ligne, 43rd Ligne (4 batts. - each). - 2nd Brigade, Vichery: 55th Ligne (4 batts.), 58th - Ligne* (3 batts.). - - Total, including artillery 273 9,131 - - 5th Division: Drouet D’Erlon. Head-quarters: Zafra - (Estremadura). - 1st Brigade, Dombrowski: 12th Léger, 45th Ligne - (3 batts. each). - 2nd Brigade, Reymond: 64th Ligne* (2-2/3 batts.), - 88th Ligne* (2 batts.) - - Total, including artillery 192 5,927 - - 6th Division: Daricau. Head-quarters: Zalamea - (Estremadura). - 1st Brigade, Quiot: 21st Léger, 100th Ligne (3 - batts. each). - 2nd Brigade, St. Pol: 28th Léger*, 103rd Ligne* - (2 batts. each). - - Total, including artillery 174 4,854 - ----- ------ - Total of six divisions 1,290 39,841 - -The regiments marked * had each one battalion in garrison at Badajoz, -except the 64th, which had two companies there only [9th Léger, 28th -Léger, 58th, 88th, 103rd Ligne]. The total of these 5-1/3 battalions -was 2,951 officers and men. Adding these to the six divisions the total -was 44,082 French infantry present under arms. - - -CAVALRY. - - 1st Division. Head-quarters: Ribera (Estremadura). - 1st Brigade, Perreymond: 2nd Hussars, 21st - Chasseurs, 26th Dragoons. - 2nd Brigade, Bonnemain: 5th Chasseurs, 27th - Chasseurs. - - Total 116 1,840 - - 2nd Division. Head-quarters: Cordova. - 1st Brigade, Digeon: 2nd, 4th, 5th Dragoons. - 2nd Brigade, Lallemand: 14th, 17th, 27th Dragoons. - - Total 170 3,307 - - 3rd Division, Pierre Soult. Head-quarters: Granada. - 1st Brigade, Boille: 10th Chasseurs, 12th - Dragoons. - 2nd Brigade, Ormancey: 16th Dragoons, 21st - Dragoons. - - Total 135 2,203 - --- ----- - Total Cavalry 421 7,350 - -N.B.--7th Lancers, a Polish regiment, is omitted here, but actually -stayed with the Army of the South till the end of 1812. - - Spanish Troops [by return of April 1]: _Officers._ _Men._ - Infantry 218 2,732 - Cavalry 163 2,358 - --- ----- - Total _Juramentados_ 381 5,090 - - Artillery (deducting divisional batteries) 100 2,800 - Engineers and Sappers 20 900 - Three naval battalions (43rd and 44th _équipages de - flotte_, and a battalion of _ouvriers de - marine_) 60 1800 - Gendarmerie, &c. 10 600 - ----- ------ - General Total of army 2,282 58,381 - -Or adding the garrison of Badajoz (2,951 infantry, 268 artillery, 265 -sappers, 42 cavalry, of the Army of the South, _not_ including 910 -Hessians of the Army of the Centre), a total of 64,189, without sick, -&c. - -When Soult on April 1st, 1812 marched to attempt the relief of Badajoz, -he drew up the following statistics as to the strength of his army, -_omitting the naval troops, and the gunners of the Cadiz Lines_: - - (1) Marched for Badajoz: _Officers._ _Men._ - Infantry 600 17,964 - Cavalry 237 3,944 - Artillery 26 613 - Engineers 2 116 - --- ------ - Total 865 22,637 = 23,502 - - (2) Left before Cadiz and in Granada, &c.: - Infantry 611 18,312 - Cavalry 152 2,555 - --- ------ - Total 763 20,867 = 21,630 - - (3) Garrisons of the Provinces of Cordova, - Jaen, Granada, and Seville: - Infantry 90 2,547 - Cavalry 57 1,654 - --- ----- - Total 147 4,201 = 4,348 - - (4) Spanish troops: - Infantry 218 2,732 - Cavalry 163 2,358 - --- ----- - Total 381 5,090 = 5,471 - -Adding up these four totals we get officers 2,156, rank and file 52,795 -= 54,951. This total omits the artillery in the Cadiz Lines and other -fortified places, and the three marine regiments, and such sappers, -gendarmes, military train, &c., as did not form part of the expedition -that marched with Soult to relieve Badajoz. Adding these, at their -strength of March 1, we get a total of about 59,000 of all ranks, not -including the garrison of Badajoz. This agrees well enough with the -March total of 60,663, allowing for a month’s wear and tear. - - - - -IX - -THE SIEGE OF BADAJOZ, MARCH 15-APRIL 6, 1812 - - -(A) STRENGTH OF THE FRENCH GARRISON ON MARCH 15 - -[See the Tables in Belmas, iv. pp. 364-5 and in Jones, i. p. 229.] - - Staff 25 - Infantry: - 3/9th Léger officers and men 580 - 1/28th Léger ” ” 597 - 1/58th Ligne ” ” 450 - 3/88th Ligne ” ” 600 - 3/103rd Ligne ” ” 540 - 64th Ligne (2 companies) ” ” 130 - Hesse-Darmstadt (2 batts.) ” ” 910 - _Juramentados_ 54 = 3,861 infantry. - Cavalry 42 - Artillery 261 - Engineers and Sappers 260 - Sick in Hospital 300 - Civil Departments, non-combatants, &c. 254 - ----- - 5,003 - -A report of the governor at noon on April 5, found among his papers -after the storm, gave the following as surviving under arms (sick -excluded)--infantry 3,403, artillery 282, engineers 217, cavalry -50, _Juramentados_ 86. This report, printed in Jones, i. p. 230, -implies a higher original total than Belmas allows--the artillery and -_Juramentados_ are actually more numerous on April 5 than on March 15! -And the infantry are only 458 less, despite of losses of a considerably -higher figure, for another paper of the commandant shows (Jones, i. p. -230)--Sortie of March 19: killed 30, wounded 287=317[769]. Storm of -Picurina Fort: killed or prisoners, 8 officers, 278 men = 286. We have -thus 603 casualties in these two affairs only, beside the ordinary wear -and tear of the siege. - - [769] Phillipon’s report to Clarke, drawn up on June 12, gives - 273 instead of 317 for the loss in this sally (see Belmas, iv. p. - 414). - -Noting the considerable number of ‘round figures’ in Belmas’s table, I -am inclined to think that the total of the garrison must have been a -few hundreds over what he allows. - - -(B) LOSSES AT STORM OF BADAJOZ, APRIL 6, 1811 - -[From the Returns at the Record Office.] - - _Killed._ _Wounded._ _Missing._ - _Officers._ _Men._ _Officers._ _Men._ _Officers._ _Men._ _Total._ - General Staff 1 -- 16 -- -- -- 17 - Royal Artillery 1 6 1 9 -- -- 17 - Royal Engineers 2 -- 3 5 -- -- 10 - Assistant Engineers -- -- 3 -- -- -- 3 - - THIRD DIVISION. - Kempt’s Brigade: - 1/45th Foot 6 19 8 64 -- -- 97 - 3/60th Foot 1 4 4 26 -- -- 35 - 74th Foot -- 12 7 33 -- 2 54 - 1/88th Foot 3 28 7 106 -- -- 144 - J. Campbell’s Brigade: - 2/5th Foot 1 11 3 28 -- -- 43 - 77th Foot -- -- 3 11 -- -- 14 - 2/83rd Foot 1 22 7 39 -- -- 69 - 94th Foot 1 12 1 51 -- -- 65 - -- --- -- --- -- -- --- - Total 3rd Division 13 108 40 358 -- 2 521 - - FOURTH DIVISION. - Kemmis’s Brigade: - 3/27th Foot 4 37 12 132 -- -- 185 - 1/40th Foot 2 51 13 170 -- -- 236 - Bowes’s Brigade: - 1/7th Foot 5 44 12 119 -- -- 180 - 1/23rd Foot 3 22 14 92 -- 20 151 - 1/48th Foot 3 32 16 122 -- -- 173 - -- --- -- --- -- -- -- - Total 4th Division 17 186 67 635 -- 20 925 - - FIFTH DIVISION. - Hay’s Brigade: - 3/1st Foot -- -- -- -- -- -- -- - 1/9th Foot -- -- -- -- -- -- -- - 2/38th Foot 1 12 3 26 -- -- 42 - Walker’s Brigade: - 1/4th Foot 2 40 15 173 -- -- 230 - 2/30th Foot -- 38 6 86 -- -- 130 - 2/44th Foot 2 37 7 88 -- -- 134 - -- --- -- --- -- -- -- - Total 5th Division 5 127 31 373 -- -- 536 - - LIGHT DIVISION: - 1/43rd Foot 3 74 15 249 -- -- 341 - 1/52nd Foot 5 53 14 248 -- -- 320 - 1/95th Foot 3 27 10 154 -- -- 194 - 3/95th Foot 4 9 4 47 -- -- 64 - -- --- -- --- -- -- --- - Total Light Division 15 163 43 698 -- -- 919 - - Brunswick Oels, dispersed - in companies in 4th and - 5th Divisions -- 7 2 26 -- -- 35 - -- --- --- ----- -- -- ----- - Total British loss 54 597 206 2,104 -- 22 2,983 - - PORTUGUESE 8 147 45 500 -- 30 730 - -- --- --- ----- -- -- ----- - General Total 62 744 251 2,604 -- 52 3,713 - -- --- --- ----- -- -- ----- - Losses during previous - operations 10 219 54 661 -- 13 957 - -The total loss during the siege and storm would therefore appear to -have been 4,670. - - - - -X - -WELLINGTON’S ARMY AT SALAMANCA. STRENGTH AND LOSSES - - -N.B.--Strength by the morning state of July 15, 1812. Losses of the -British by the return annexed to Wellington’s dispatch: those of the -Portuguese from the official returns at Lisbon. The fighting strength -on July 22, owing to losses at Castrejon and Castrillo, and to weary -men falling out during the retreat, may have been perhaps 1,000 less. - - -I. BRITISH TROOPS - - _Losses._ - _Strength._ _Killed._ _Wounded._ _Missing._ - _Officers._ _Men._ _Total._ _Officers._ _Men._ _Officers._ _Men._ _Men._ _Total Loss._ - CAVALRY - (Stapleton Cotton): - Le Marchant’s Brigade - 3rd Dragoons 17 322 339 1 6 -- 11 2 20 - 4th Dragoons 22 336 358 -- 7 1 21 -- 29 - 5th Dragoon Guards 22 313 325 -- 9 2 42 3 56 - - G. Anson’s Brigade - 11th Light Dragoons 30 361 391 -- -- -- -- -- -- - 12th Light Dragoons 19 321 340 1 2 -- 2 -- 5 - 16th Light Dragoons 14 259 273 -- -- -- -- -- -- - - V. Alten’s Brigade - 14th Light Dragoons 23 324 347 -- 1 -- 2 -- 3 - 1st Hussars K.G.L. 23 376 399 -- 2 5 16 -- 23 - - Bock’s Brigade - 1st Dragoons K.G.L. 25 339 364 -- -- -- -- -- -- - 2nd Dragoons K.G.L. 23 384 407 -- -- -- -- -- -- - --- ----- ----- -- -- -- -- -- --- - Total British Cavalry 218 3,335 3,543 2 27 8 94 5 136 - --- ----- ----- -- -- -- -- -- --- - - INFANTRY. - 1st Division (H. Campbell): - Fermor’s Brigade - 1st Coldstream Guards 26 928 954 -- 7 1 22 8 38 - 1st Third Guards 23 938 961 -- 1 1 20 2 24 - 1 comp. 5/60th Foot 1 56 57 -- -- -- -- -- -- - - Wheatley’s Brigade - 2/24th Foot 23 398 421 -- -- -- 5 -- 5 - 1/42nd Foot 40 1,039 1,079 -- -- -- 3 -- 3 - 2/58th Foot[770] 31 369 400 -- -- -- 3 1 4 - 1/79th Foot 40 634 674 -- -- -- 1 3 4 - 1 comp. 5/60th 1 53 54 -- -- -- -- -- -- - - Löwe’s Brigade - 1st Line Battalion - K.G.L. 26 615 641 -- 1 -- 8 -- 9 - 2nd Line Battalion - K.G.L. 26 601 627 -- 1 2 40 4 47 - 5th Line Battalion - K.G.L. 30 525 555 -- 1 1 17 -- 19 - --- ----- ----- -- -- -- --- -- --- - Total 1st Division 267 6,156 6,423 -- 11 5 119 18 153 - --- ----- ----- -- -- -- --- -- --- - 3rd Division (Pakenham): - - Wallace’s Brigade - 1/45th Foot 26 416 442 -- 5 5 45 -- 55 - 74th Foot 23 420 443 -- 3 2 40 4 49 - 1/88th Foot 21 642 663 2 11 4 110 8 135 - 3 comps. 5/60th Foot 11 243 254 -- 6 3 24 3 36 - - J. Campbell’s Brigade - 1/5th Foot 32 870 902 -- 10 6 110 -- 126 - 2/5th Foot 19 289 308 -- 1 2 21 -- 24 - 2/83rd Foot 24 295 319 -- 2 2 30 -- 34 - 94th Foot 24 323 347 1 3 3 21 -- 28 - --- ----- ----- -- -- -- --- -- --- - Total 3rd Division 180 3,498 3,678 3 41 27 401 15 487 - --- ----- ----- -- -- -- --- -- --- - 4th Division (Lowry Cole): - - W. Anson’s Brigade - 3/27th Foot 19 614 633 -- -- 1 7 -- 8 - 1/40th Foot 24 558 582 -- 12 5 115 -- 132 - 1 comp. 5/60th 2 44 46 -- -- -- -- -- -- - - Ellis’s Brigade - 1/7th Foot 24 471 495 1 19 10 165 -- 195 - 1/23rd Foot 19 427 446 1 9 6 90 -- 106 - 1/48th Foot 22 404 426 -- 9 10 60 -- 79 - 1 comp. Brunswick - Oels[771] 1 53 54 -- -- -- -- -- -- - --- ----- ----- -- -- -- --- -- --- - Total 4th Division 111 2,571 2,682 2 49 32 437 -- 520 - --- ----- ----- -- -- -- --- -- --- - 5th Division (Leith): - - Greville’s Brigade - { 3/1st Foot 32 729 761 -- 23 8 129 -- 160 - { 1/9th Foot 31 635 666 -- 3 1 42 -- 46 - { 1/38th Foot[772] 36 764 800 2 14 12 115 -- 143 - { 2/38th Foot 20 281 301 -- 9 2 40 1 52 - { 1 comp. Brunswick - { Oels[2] 2 76 78 -- -- -- -- -- -- - - Pringle’s Brigade - { 1/4th Foot 36 421 457 -- -- 1 17 -- 18 - { 2/4th Foot 27 627 654 -- 2 -- 23 6 31 - { 2/30th Foot 20 329 349 -- 3 1 22 1 27 - { 2/44th Foot 20 231 251 2 4 -- 23 -- 29 - { 1 comp. Brunswick - { Oels[2] 3 66 69 -- -- -- -- -- -- - --- ----- ----- -- -- -- --- -- --- - Total 5th Division 227 4,159 4,386 4 58 25 411 8 506 - --- ----- ----- -- -- -- --- -- --- - 6th Division (Clinton): - - Hulse’s Brigade - { 1/11th Foot 31 485 516 1 44 14 281 -- 340 - { 2/53rd Foot 25 316 341 -- 26 11 105 -- 142 - { 1/61st Foot 29 517 546 5 39 19 303 -- 366 - { 1 comp. 5/60th 2 59 61 -- -- -- -- -- -- - - Hinde’s Brigade - { 2nd Foot 27 381 408 1 13 6 77 12 109 - { 1/32nd Foot 33 576 609 2 15 9 111 -- 137 - { 1/36 Foot 29 400 429 4 16 5 74 -- 99 - --- ----- ----- -- --- -- --- -- ----- - Total 6th Division 176 2,734 2,910 13 153 64 951 12 1,193 - --- ----- ----- -- --- -- --- -- ----- - 7th Division (Hope): - - Halkett’s Brigade - { 1st Light Batt. K.G.L. 25 544 569 -- -- 2 7 -- 9 - { 2nd Light Batt. K.G.L. 21 473 494 1 5 1 9 -- 16 - { Brunswick Oels[773] (9 - { companies) 23 573 596 -- 4 2 42 1 49 - - De Bernewitz’s Brigade - { 51st Foot 27 280 307 -- -- -- 2 -- 2 - { 68th Foot 21 317 338 1 3 2 14 -- 20 - { _Chasseurs_ - { _Britanniques_ 27 686 713 -- 5 -- 10 14 29 - --- ----- ----- -- -- -- -- -- --- - Total 7th Division 144 2,873 3,017 2 17 7 84 15 125 - --- ----- ----- -- -- -- -- -- --- - Light Division (Chas. Alten): - - Barnard’s Brigade - { 1/43rd Foot 30 718 748 -- -- 1 15 -- 16 - { Detachments 2/95th and - { 3/95th Rifles 19 373 392 -- -- -- 5 -- 5 - - Vandeleur’s Brigade - { 1/52nd Foot. 28 771 799 -- -- -- 2 -- 2 - { 8 comps. 1/95th 27 515 542 -- -- -- 2 2 4 - --- ----- ----- -- -- -- -- -- -- - Total Light Division 104 2,377 2,481 -- -- 1 24 2 27 - --- ----- ----- -- -- -- -- -- -- - - Royal Horse Artillery - (troops of Ross, - Macdonald, and Bull, - and drivers) 18 403 421 -- 1 -- 2 -- 3 - Field Artillery - (companies of Lawson, - Gardiner, Greene, - Douglas, May, and - drivers) 35 650 685 -- 1 -- 4 -- 5 - King’s German Legion - Artillery (battery of - Sympher) 5 75 80 -- 2 -- 4 -- 6 - -- ----- ----- -- -- -- -- -- -- - Artillery Total 58 1,128 1,186 -- 4 -- 10 -- 14 - -- ----- ----- -- -- -- -- -- -- - ENGINEERS 12 9 21 -- -- -- -- -- -- - - STAFF CORPS 5 81 86 -- -- -- -- -- -- - - WAGON TRAIN 24 115 139 -- -- -- -- -- -- - - [770] The 2/58th though properly belonging to the 5th Division, - appears to have acted on this day with the 1st Division. - - [771] The losses of the attached companies of Brunswick Oels are - only to be found under its regimental total in 7th Division. - - [772] This battalion only joined the division on the - battle-morning. - - [773] The losses of the attached companies of Brunswick Oels are - only to be found under its regimental total in 7th Division. - -BRITISH TOTAL - - Infantry 1,209 24,368 25,577 24 329 159 2,387 69 2,968 - Cavalry 218 3,335 3,553 2 27 8 94 5 136 - Artillery 58 1,128 1,186 -- 4 -- 10 -- 14 - Engineers 12 9 21 -- -- -- -- -- -- - Staff Corps 5 81 86 -- -- -- -- -- -- - Train 24 115 139 -- -- -- -- -- -- - General Staff ? ? ? 2 -- 9 -- -- 11 - ----- ------ ------ -- --- --- ----- -- ----- - Total 1,526 29,036 30,562 28 360 176 2,491 74 3,129 - - -II. PORTUGUESE TROOPS - - CAVALRY: - D’Urban’s Brigade: 1st - and 11th Dragoons (12th - Dragoons absent)[774] 32 450 482 2 5 2 18 10 37 - INFANTRY: - Power’s Brigade, 3rd - Division: 9th and 21st - Line, 12th Caçadores 90 2,107 2,197 1 29 9 23 14 76 - Stubbs’s Brigade, 4th - Division: 11th and 23rd - Line, 7th Caçadores 137 2,417 2,554 3 177 18 267 11 476 - Spry’s Brigade, 5th - Division: 3rd and 15th - Line, 8th Caçadores 156 2,149 2,305 3 45 4 64 7 123 - Rezende’s Brigade, 6th - Division: 8th and 12th - Line, 9th Caçadores 134 2,497 2,631 8 113 10 336 20 487 - Collins’s Brigade, 7th - Division: 7th and 19th - Line, 2nd Caçadores 132 2,036 2,168 -- 5 1 10 1 17 - Pack’s Independent - Brigade: 1st and 16th - Line, 4th Caçadores 85 2,520 2,605 5 97 15 242 17 376 - Bradford’s Independent - Brigade: 13th and 14th - Line, 5th Caçadores 112 1,782 1,894 -- 8 -- 3 6 17 - Attached to Light - Division: 1st and 3rd - Caçadores 30 1,037 1,067 -- 5 -- 12 -- 17 - ARTILLERY: - Arriaga’s battery 4 110 114 -- -- -- 1 -- 1 - --- ------ ------ -- --- -- --- -- ----- - Total 912 17,105 18,017 22 484 59 976 86 1,627 - - [774] The 12th Dragoons were marching to the rear in charge of - the baggage-train. - - -III. SPANISH TROOPS - - Carlos de España’s - Division: 2nd of - Princesa, Tiradores de - Castilla, 2nd of Jaen, - 3rd of 1st Seville, - Caçadores de Castilla, - Lanceros de Castilla 160 3,200 3,360 -- 2 -- 4 -- 6 - - -GENERAL TOTAL - - BRITISH 1,526 29,036 30,562 28 360 176 2,491 74 3,129 - PORTUGUESE 912 17,105 18,017 22 484 59 976 86 1,627 - SPANISH 160 3,200 3,360 -- 2 -- 4 -- 6 - ----- ------ ------ -- --- --- ----- --- ----- - Total 2,598 49,341 51,939 50 846 235 3,471 160 4,762 - - - - -XI - -STRENGTH AND LOSSES OF MARMONT’S ARMY AT SALAMANCA - - -To fix the fighting strength of Marmont’s army at Salamanca is -comparatively easy. It consisted of the 49,636 officers and men -accounted for by the return of July 15th printed on the next page, -minus some 700 men lost at the combats of Castrillo and Castrejon [also -called ‘combat of the Guarena’] on July 18, and such few hundreds -more as may have fallen behind from fatigue during the long marches -of July 20-1. Roughly speaking, it must have counted some 48,500 men, -as opposed to Wellington’s 50,000. The French translators of Napier’s -_Peninsular War_ (Mathieu Dumas and Foltz) only give a table of June -15, which is of course a month out of date for Salamanca, and append -a note that ‘deducting artillery, engineers, _équipages militaires_, -officers, sergeants, and garrisons, as also losses between June 15 and -July 15 they find the result of about 42,000 sabres and bayonets for -the battle.’ Why any sane person _should_ deduct officers, sergeants, -and artillerymen from a fighting total I am unable to conceive, though -contemporary British writers, including Wellington himself, often did -so. But the results of adding to their ‘42,000 sabres and bayonets’ -the list of 1,925 officers, 3,244 artillerymen and artillery train -(both in the divisions and in the reserve), 332 engineers, and 742 -_équipages militaires_, is to give the figure 48,343, which practically -agrees with the total that I state above; if sergeants are added it -would much exceed that total. We may take this, therefore, as fairly -correct--bearing in mind that the 26 officers and 742 men of the -_équipages militaires_ cannot be counted as combatants. - -These totals do not include the 23rd Léger (2 batts.) and the 2/1st -Line, both from Thomières’s division, which were garrisoning Astorga, -about 1,500 strong. Nor do they include the minor garrisons left at -Toro, Zamora, Olmedo, Valdestillas, Tordesillas, Simancas, Cabezon, -Medina del Campo, Puente de Duero, Tudela de Douro, Amagro, &c., which -appear to have been altogether about 4,184 strong, nor the dépôts at -Valladolid, 3,307 strong on June 15, but probably much less on July -15, when Marmont had remounted nearly 1,000 dismounted dragoons and -picked up all detachments and convalescents that he could gather. Nor -do they include the sick, who had been 8,633 on June 15th, and 8,332 -on May 15th--probably the total in hospital was a trifle more on July -15, owing to the fatigues of the campaigns round San Cristobal in the -latter days of June. - -Parallel with the return of July 15th, I have printed that of August -1. The difference between the two--211 officers and 10,124 men--might -be supposed to represent the losses in the campaign between those -dates. It does not, however, because the total of August 1 represents -not only the survivors from the battle of Salamanca, but all the men -from garrisons evacuated after it, and from the Valladolid dépôt, who -joined the colours after the disaster of July 22, in consequence of the -district in which they were lying having been evacuated by the army. -The garrisons of Toro and Zamora held out till they were relieved, that -of Tordesillas surrendered to the Galicians: but the men from the other -smaller garrisons and from the dépôts fell in to their respective corps -before August 1. I imagine that we may take these additions to be some -5,000 men at least, but cannot give the exact figures, through being -unable to say what the Valladolid dépôts (3,307 strong on June 15) -amounted to on July 15. - -After comparing the totals of the brigades and regiments shown under -July 15 and August 1, we must proceed to show the reasons why, in -individual cases, the regimental differences between the two sets of -figures cannot be taken to represent the sum of the losses in the -Salamanca campaign. The proof is clear. - - -THE ARMY OF PORTUGAL BEFORE AND AFTER THE BATTLE OF SALAMANCA - -From two returns of effectives in the Archives of the Ministry of War, -Paris, dated July 15 and August 1, respectively. - - _July 15._ _August 1._ - _Officers._ _Men._ _Officers._ _Men._ - 1st DIVISION (Foy): - - Brigade { 6th Léger (2 batts.) 46 1,055 41 684 - Chemineau { 69th Ligne (2 batts.) 50 1,408 47 1,322 - - Brigade { - Desgraviers- { 39th Ligne (2 batts.) 49 918 49 872 - Berthelot { 76th Ligne (2 batts.) 56 1,351 45 887 - - Artillery Train, &c. 7 207 7 207 - --- ----- --- ----- - Divisional Total 208 4,939 189 3,972 - --- ----- --- ----- - 2nd DIVISION (Clausel): - - Brigade { 25th Léger (3 batts.) 54 1,485 43 1,222 - Berlier { 27th Ligne (2 batts.) 40 1,637 31 1,248 - - Brigade { 50th Ligne (3 batts.) 52 1,490 46 1,177 - Barbot { 59th Ligne (2 batts.) 47 1,531 38 1,278 - - Artillery Train, &c. 7 219 7 216 - --- ----- --- ----- - Divisional Total 200 6,362 165 5,141 - --- ----- --- ----- - - Brigade { 31st Léger (2 batts.) 46 1,359 45 1,325 - Menne { 26th Ligne (2 batts.) 44 1,145 43 1,116 - - { 47th Ligne (3 batts.) 67 1,558 62 1,650 - ? { 70th Ligne (2 batts.) 49 1,114 36 1,061 - - Artillery Train, &c. 5 302 3 193 - --- ----- --- ----- - Divisional Total 211 5,478 189 5,345 - --- ----- --- ----- - 4th DIVISION (Sarrut): - - Brigade { 2nd Léger (3 batts.) 66 1,772 68 1,702 - Fririon { 36th Ligne (3 batts.) 69 1,570 71 1,514 - - Brigade { 4th Léger (3 batts.) 63 1,219 63 989 - ? { 130th Ligne (absent) -- -- -- -- - - Artillery Train, &c. 5 238 5 214 - --- ----- --- ----- - Divisional Total 203 4,799 207 4,419 - --- ----- --- ----- - 5th DIVISION (Maucune): - - Brigade { 15th Ligne (3 batts.) 52 1,615 46 1,229 - Arnaud { 66th Ligne (2 batts.) 38 1,131 34 661 - - Brigade { 82nd Ligne (2 batts.) 41 966 39 729 - Montfort { 86th Ligne (2 batts.) 30 1,155 28 961 - - Artillery Train, &c. 4 212 4 212 - --- ----- --- ----- - Divisional Total 165 5,079 151 3,792 - --- ----- --- ----- - 6th DIVISION (Brennier): - - Brigade { 17th Léger (2 batts.) 46 1,074 42 855 - Taupin { 65th Ligne (3 batts.) 59 1,527 52 1,302 - - { 22nd Ligne (3 batts.) 61 1,486 40 716 - ? { Régiment de Prusse (remnant - { of) 9 79 9 79 - - Artillery Train, &c. 4 213 4 213 - --- ----- --- ----- - Divisional Total 179 4,379 147 3,165 - --- ----- --- ----- - 7th DIVISION (Thomières): - - Brigade { 1st Line (3 batts.)[775] 80 1,683 79 1,454 - Bonté { 62nd Line (2 batts.) 47 1,076 45 1,048 - - { 23rd Léger (absent)[776] -- -- -- -- - ? { 101st Line (3 batts.) 61 1,388 29 412 - - Artillery Train, &c. 5 203 nil nil - --- ----- --- ----- - Divisional Total 193 4,350 153 2,914 - --- ----- --- ----- - 8th DIVISION (Bonnet): - - Brigade { 118th Line (3 batts.) 53 1,584 37 1,024 - Gautier { 119th Line (3 batts.) 64 1,265 48 831 - - { 120th Line (3 batts.) 63 1,745 66 1,152 - ? { 122nd Line (3 batts.) 55 1,582 40 1,000 - - Artillery train, &c. 3 107 nil nil - --- ----- --- ----- - Divisional Total 238 6,283 191 4,007 - --- ----- --- ----- - LIGHT CAVALRY DIVISION (Curto): - - { 3rd Hussars (3 squadrons) 17 231 14 165 - { 22nd Chasseurs (2 squadrons) 17 236 18 233 - ? { 26th Chasseurs (2 squadrons) 16 278 18 225 - { 28th Chasseurs (1 squadron) 7 87 3 39 - - { 13th Chasseurs (5 squadrons) 20 496 28 426 - ? { 14th Chasseurs (4 squadrons) 14 308 18 332 - { Escadron de marche 11 141 9 52 - --- ----- --- ----- - Divisional Total 102 1,777 108 1,472 - --- ----- --- ----- - HEAVY CAVALRY DIVISION (Boyer): - - { 6th Dragoons (2 squadrons) 19 376 19 332 - ? { 11th Dragoons (2 squadrons) 19 411 18 359 - - Brigade { 15th Dragoons (2 squadrons) 15 328 16 294 - Carrié { 25th Dragoons (2 squadrons) 18 314 18 282 - - Artillery attached to cavalry 3 193 3 148 - --- ----- --- ----- - Divisional Total 74 1,622 74 1,415 - --- ----- --- ----- - Total Cavalry Divisions 176 3,399 182 2,887 - --- ----- --- ----- - Artillery Reserve, Park, &c. 50 1,450 22 707 - Engineers and Sappers 17 332 16 345 - Gendarmerie 6 129 6 186 - _Équipages militaires_ 26 742 22 707 - État-Major Général 54 -- 54 -- - ----- ------ ----- ------ - { Infantry Divisions 1,597 41,669 1,392 32,755 - General Total { Cavalry Divisions 176 3,399 182 2,887 - { Auxiliary Arms 153 2,653 120 1,945 - ----- ------ ----- ------ - 1,925 47,721 1,694 37,587 - - [775] Not including 2nd battalion, about 450 strong, at Astorga - in garrison. - - [776] In garrison at Astorga. - -N.B.--Guns, July 15, 78; August 1, 58; lost 7 12-pounders, 3 -8-pounders, 9 4-pounders, 1 3-pounder. Horses, July 15, 4,278; August -1, 3,231. Draught horses, July 15, 2,037; August 1, 1,847. _Équipages -militaires_, horses, July 15, 800; August 1, 331. - -To these two tables we must append, as a side-light, the results of a -compilation of the totals of officers killed and wounded at Salamanca, -from Martinien’s admirable _Liste des officiers tués et blessés pendant -les guerres de l’Empire_. This of course does not include unwounded -prisoners. - - _Killed._ _Wounded._ - Foy’s Division (including - losses at Garcia Hernandez - on July 23rd): - 6th Léger 1 10 = 11 - 69th Line 2 8 = 10 - 39th Line -- 2 = 2 - 76th Line 1 7 = 8 - -- - Total 31 - - Clausel’s Division: - 25th Léger 4 10 = 14[777] - 27th Line 2 5 = 7 - 50th Line 9 17 = 26 - 59th Line 4 15 = 19 - -- - Total 66 - - Ferey’s Division: - 31st Léger 1 6 = 7 - 26th Line -- 6 = 6 - 47th Line 5 13 = 18 - 70th Line 2 3 = 5 - -- - Total 36 - - Sarrut’s Division: - 2nd Léger -- 3 = 3 - 36th Line -- 3 = 3 - 4th Léger -- 2 = 2 - -- - Total 8 - - Maucune’s Division: - 15th Line 4 12 = 16 - 66th Line 2 15 = 17 - 82nd Line 1 7 = 8 - 86th Line -- 3 = 3 - -- - Total 44 - - Brennier’s Division: - 17th Léger 1 3 = 4[778] - 65th Line 1 8 = 9[779] - 22nd Line 2 19 = 21[780] - -- - Total 34 - - Thomières’s Division: - 1st Line -- 4 = 4 - 62nd Line 1 14 = 15 - 101st Line 6 19 = 25 - -- - Total 44 - - Bonnet’s Division: - 118th Line 2 18 = 20 - 119th Line 3 23 = 26 - 120th Line -- 8 = 8 - 122nd Line 3 13 = 16 - -- - Total 70 - - Curto’s Light Cavalry: - 3rd Hussars -- 2[781] - 13th Chasseurs -- 7 - 14th Chasseurs -- 5[782] - 22nd Chasseurs -- 5 - 26th Chasseurs -- 4 - 28th Chasseurs -- 2 - -- - Total 25 - - Boyer’s Division of Dragoons: - 6th Dragoons -- 9 - 11th Dragoons -- 2[783] - 15th Dragoons -- 1[784] - 25th Dragoons -- 6[785] - -- - Total 18 - - Artillery, Horse -- 1 - ” Field -- 5 - ” Train -- 1 - -- - Total 7 - - Engineers -- 3 = 3 - Staff 3 17[786] = 20 - Miscellaneous - officers, whose - regiments were - not present at - Salamanca -- 2 = 2 - - [777] Plus 1 killed and 5 wounded at the combat of the Guarena, - July 18. - - [778] Plus 2 killed 6 wounded at the Guarena. - - [779] Plus 2 killed 1 wounded at the Guarena. - - [780] Plus 5 wounded at the Guarena. - - [781] Plus 1 killed 1 wounded at Castrejon. - - [782] Plus 3 wounded at Castrejon. - - [783] Plus 1 wounded on July 21, and 2 wounded at Garcia - Hernandez, July 23. - - [784] Plus 1 killed 1 wounded at the Guarena, July 18. - - [785] Plus 4 wounded at the Guarena. - - [786] Plus 1 general wounded July 16, died next day (Dembouski), - and 1 general wounded and taken July 18 (at the Guarena), Carrié, - and 1 officer wounded at Garcia Hernandez. - -General total 60 officers killed, 347 wounded at Salamanca and Garcia -Hernandez; plus 7 officers killed and 27 wounded at the Guarena on July -18, and 2 wounded in minor engagements. - -Loss in killed and wounded, not including unwounded prisoners, during -the campaign, 67 killed, 376 wounded = 443 officers in all. - -After arriving at this general loss in killed and wounded officers, -so far as is possible from Martinien’s tables, which are not quite -complete for all corps, it only remains to estimate the unwounded -prisoners. I searched the immense volumes of rolls of French officers -in captivity at the Record Office, and found 63 names of prisoners -taken at Salamanca, the Guarena, and Garcia Hernandez. A few of these -duplicate the names of wounded officers to be found in Martinien’s -tables, the remainder must represent the unwounded prisoners. -Wellington in his Salamanca dispatch wrote that he had 137 French -officers prisoners--evidently the larger number of them must have been -wounded, as only 63 were sent off to England that autumn. Probably many -died in hospital. Prisoners are most numerous from the 101st, 22nd, and -from Foy’s two regiments cut up at Garcia Hernandez, the 76th and 6th -Léger. - -In the Library of the _Archives de la Guerre_ at the Paris Ministry of -War I went through the regimental histories of all the French infantry -regiments present at Salamanca. Like our own similar compilations, they -differ much in value--some are very full and with statistics carefully -worked out from regimental reports and pay-books; others are very thin -and factless. Fourteen units give their losses, which I herewith annex: - - Clausel’s Division: 25th Léger, 336; 27th Line, 159; 59th Line, 350. - Ferey’s Division: 70th Line, 111; 31st Léger, 340. - Sarrut’s Division: 2nd Léger, 202. - Maucune’s Division: 15th Line, 359. - Brennier’s Division: 17th Léger, 264; 65th Line, 359. - Thomières’s Division: 1st Line, 227; 62nd Line, 868; 101st Line, 1,000. - Bonnet’s Division: 120th, 458; 122nd, 527. - -The total of this makes 5,560 for these fourteen corps; we leave -fifteen others unaccounted for. As a rough calculation I suppose that -we may hold that as these regiments lost, as we know from Martinien’s -lists [which are not _quite_ complete], at least 152 officers out of -5,560 of all ranks, then the other fifteen regiments with 181 officers -killed or wounded must have lost something like 6,000. The vagaries -of the proportion between officers and men hit are extraordinary in -individual units, but these tend to rectify themselves on a large -total consisting of many regiments. I therefore believe that 11,560 -would be something very like the total loss _killed and wounded_ in the -French infantry. We have then to allow for some 40 unwounded officers -taken prisoners, and corresponding to them perhaps 1,200 unwounded men. -The total loss for the infantry would thus be 12,800. For cavalry and -artillery, &c., 53 officers hit--as by Martinien’s tables--must imply -something over a thousand men lost. We should thus arrive at a total of -14,000 for the casualties--the sum which I suggest in my text (p. 469). - -To show the worthlessness of any attempt to deduce the French losses -by a mere comparison of the official ‘morning states’ of July 15 and -August 1, the following instances may suffice. - -The 65th Line shows 59 officers and 1,527 men present on July 15, 52 -officers and 1,302 men on August 1. The apparent loss is 7 officers and -225 men. But this unit’s regimental report shows 3 officers killed, -5 officers wounded, 204 men killed or prisoners, 106 men wounded, 39 -missing; total, 8 officers and 349 men. Therefore, as is obvious, -one officer and 124 men must have joined from somewhere (dépôt at -Valladolid?) between the two dates, or the deficiency would be 125 -greater between the ‘present under arms’ of the two dates than is shown. - -A more striking case is the 62nd Line, of Thomières’s Division. It -shows present on July 15, 47 officers and 1,076 men, on August 1st 45 -officers and 1,048 men--the apparent loss is only 2 officers and 28 -men. But Martinien’s lists show us that the regiment lost at least -15 officers, killed and wounded, and the regimental report gives 20 -officers and 848 men killed, wounded, or missing! The real loss is 868 -not 30! Therefore 18 officers and about 800 men, the equivalent of a -strong battalion, must have joined between July 15 and August 1. This -corresponds to the fact that the 62nd showed only 2 battalions[787] -at Salamanca, while the ‘morning state’ of June 15th showed it as -having at the front three battalions and 1,900 rank and file. Clearly -the third battalion rejoined the colours after the battle--having -presumably been quartered in the small garrisons of Castile evacuated -after the disaster of July 22. Many men must also have rejoined the -other two battalions. - - [787] And one odd company of its 3rd battalion, 61 of all ranks, - while in the return of August 1, the 3rd battalion has 13 - officers and 480 men. - -But the most absurd case of all is that of the 47th Line, whose total -figures actually _go up_ from 1,625 to 1,712 of all ranks between -July 15th and August 1st--in despite of the fact that it lost (as -Martinien’s lists show), 18 officers and not less therefore than 360 -rank and file (20 men per officer is a low allowance) at Salamanca. It -must have picked up from Valladolid and the small garrisons 13 officers -and 452 men at least[788]. - - [788] The 2/47th shows on July 15, 310 of all ranks, on August 1, - 513. - -Clausel, writing to King Joseph on July 25, said that of the whole -Army of Portugal he could not yet show in the field on that day 20,000 -men. This tallies well enough with the conclusion that we have already -drawn, that the total loss from the army, which on July 15 had about -48,000 men, must have been some 14,000 killed, wounded, and prisoners, -and over 10,000 men dispersed who were only just rallying. - - - - -XII - -BRITISH LOSSES AT THE COMBATS OF CASTREJON AND CASTRILLO[789], JULY 18, -1812 - - [789] The fight at Castrillo is often called the ‘Combat of the - Guarena’. - - - _Officers._ _Men._ _Missing_ _Total._ - _Killed._ _Wounded._ _Killed._ _Wounded._ _Men._ - - G. Anson’s Brigade: - 11th Lt. Dragoons -- 2 3 10 -- 15 - 12th Lt. Dragoons -- 1 5 11 1 18 - 16th Lt. Dragoons -- -- -- -- -- -- - - V. Alten’s Brigade: - 1st Hussars K.G.L. -- 4 7 45 4 60 - 14th Lt. Dragoons -- 3 14 49 9 75 - - Bock’s Brigade: - 1st Dragoons K.G.L. -- -- -- 1 -- 1 - 2nd Dragoons K.G.L. -- -- 5 1 1 7 - - Le Marchant’s Brigade: - 3rd Dragoons -- 1 -- 9 -- 10 - - 4th DIVISION. - - W. Anson’s Brigade: - 3/27th Foot 2 1 11 58 -- 72 - 1/40th Foot -- 1 8 59 1 69 - - Ellis’s Brigade: - 1/7th Foot -- 1 1 14 3 19 - 1/23rd Foot -- -- -- 2 2 4 - 1/48th Foot -- -- -- 5 1 6 - - 5th DIVISION. - - Greville’s Brigade: - 3/1st -- -- -- 2 -- 2 - Detached Companies - of 5/60th -- -- -- 1 2 3 - Horse Artillery -- 1 2 2 -- 5 - German Artillery -- -- -- 2 -- 2 - Portuguese 1 6 33 90 27 157 - -- -- -- --- -- --- - Total 3 21 89 361 51 525 - - - - -XIII - -SPANISH TROOPS ON THE EAST COAST OF SPAIN IN THE SPRING OF 1812 - - -(A) REMAINS OF THE 2ND (VALENCIAN) AND 3RD (MURCIAN) ARMIES, MARCH 1 - - _Officers._ _Men._ - 1st Division: Conde de Montijo, 1st of Badajoz (2 - batts.), Cuenca (2 batts.), 2 squadrons cavalry 110 2,049 - 2nd Division: General Luis Riquelme, 2nd Walloon - Guards, Guadalajara (3 batts.), 1st of Burgos (3 - batts.), Guadix (2 batts.), Baden (1 batt.), - Alpujarras (1 batt.), dismounted cavalry (1 batt.) 335 5,214 - Reserve Division: General Philip Roche. Voluntarios - de Aragon, Canarias, Alicante, 2nd of Murcia, - Alcazar de San Juan, Chinchilla (1 batt. each), 2 - squadrons of Husares de Fernando 7º 300 5,576 - Cavalry: General A. Rich. Principe (2 squadrons), - España (2 squadrons), Reina (2 squadrons), - Carabineros Reales, Farnesio, Montesa, Dragones del - Rey, Cazadores de Valencia, Pavia, Rey, Granaderos - a caballo, Husares de Castilla (one squadron - each), three provisional squadrons 321 1,565 - Cadres of dispersed battalions, now reorganizing: - Lorca, Velez Malaga, Almanza, America 98 1,079 - Artillery (Field) 38 651 - Artillery (Garrison) in Alicante and Cartagena 17 582 - Engineers 8 202 - ----- ------ - Total 1,227 16,918 - - -(B) JOSEPH O’DONNELL’S ARMY, JULY 21, 1812, AND ITS LOSSES AT CASTALLA - -[The figures of the former from _Los Ejércitos españoles_. The list of -prisoners from Suchet’s dispatch in the Paris _Archives de la Guerre_.] - - _Unwounded - _Strength._ prisoners - _Officers._ _Men._ _Total._ reported - by Suchet._ - Michelena’s {Corona (1 Batt.) 24 630} 255 - Brigade {Velez Malaga (1 batt.) 36 834} 2,035 -- - {Guadix 24 487} 337 - - Montijo’s {2nd Walloon Guards (1 batt.) 20 569} 350 - Brigade {Cuenca (2 batts.) 33 890} 2,152 112 - {1st of Badajoz (1 batt.) 27 613} -- - - {Bailen (1 batt.) 32 708} 405 - Mijares’s {Alcazar de San Juan (1 batt.) 31 855} 2,187 434 - Brigade {Lorca (1 batt.) 25 536} 242 - - Cavalry (Provisional Regiment, 2 squadrons) 29 207 -- - Engineers 26 325 -- - - Roche’s Division: - 1st of Burgos (2 batts.) 27 786 -- - Canarias (1 batt.) 34 818 -- - Alicante (2 batts.) 35 1,110 -- - Chinchilla (2 batts.) 26 918 -- - --- ------ ----- - Total 429 10,286 2,135 - -Suchet also reports 697 wounded prisoners, of whom 56 died of their -wounds. - -No figures are given for the detached cavalry division of Santesteban, -which was not in action at Castalla. - - - - -XIV - -THE BRITISH FORCES ON THE EAST COAST OF SPAIN IN 1812 - -[A NOTE BY MR. C. T. ATKINSON] - - -I. MAITLAND’S FORCE, EMBARKATION RETURN, JUNE 25, 1812 - -(War Office: _Secretary of State’s Original Correspondence_, Series I, -vol. 311.) - - _Officers._ _N.C.O.’s - and Men._ - 20th Light Dragoons 9 158 - Foreign Troop of Hussars 3 68 - R.A. (including drivers) 8 73 - Marine Artillery 1 29 - R.E. 5 42 - Staff Corps 1 13 - 1/10th Foot 33 902 - 1/58th Foot 31 840 - 1/81st Foot 44 1,230 - 4th Line Battalion, K.G.L. 36 953 - 6th Line Battalion, K.G.L. 33 1,041 - De Roll’s Regiment (3 companies) 11 320 - Dillon’s Regiment (5 companies) 18 536 - Calabrian Free Corps (1 division)[790] 14 338 - --- ----- - Total 247 6,543 - - [790] This corps was organized in five ‘divisions,’ each of three - companies. - - -II. CAMPBELL’S CORPS, EMBARKATION RETURN, PALERMO, NOVEMBER 14, 1812 - -(Ibid., vol. 312.) - - - _Officers._ _N.C.O.’s - and Men._ - 20th Light Dragoons -- 13 - Guides -- 14 - R.A. (including drivers) 4 131 - Grenadier Battalion[791] 35 924 - Light Infantry Battalion[792] 21 582 - 1/27th Foot 25 828 - 2nd Battalion, Anglo-Italian Levy[793] 33 1,184 - Sicilian Artillery -- 155 - Sicilian Grenadiers[794] -- 605 - --- ----- - Total 118 4,436[795] - - [791] From 2/10th, 1/21st, 1/31st, 1/62nd, 1/75th, 3rd, 7th, and - 8th K.G.L. - - [792] Schwertfeger, i. pp. 480-1, says it was composed of the - light companies of De Roll’s, Dillon’s, De Watteville’s (this is - inaccurate, as De Watteville’s regiment had moved to Cadiz before - the end of 1811), and the 3rd, 7th, and 8th K.G.L. - - [793] 150 men were left behind from lack of room but sent later. - - [794] 140 men were left behind from lack of room but sent later. - - [795] A ‘division’ of the Calabrian Free Corps, 300 strong, was - left behind for want of room, as well as the Sicilian Regiment de - Presidi, 1,200 strong. - - -III. SUBSEQUENTLY EMBARKED, DECEMBER 25[796] - - [796] In a letter to Lord Bathurst of December 9 Bentinck - announces his intention to add to this force 2/27th Foot and - 1st Anglo-Italians, who had been 28 officers and 823 men and 40 - officers and 1,153 men respectively, in the ‘state’ of October - 25, but are not present in the ‘state’ of December 10 (except for - 288 men of 1st Anglo-Italians). - - _Officers._ _N.C.O.’s - and Men._ - 20th Light Dragoons 8 223 - R.A. -- 60 - 2nd Anglo-Italians 2 176 - Calabrian Free Corps (1 division) 14 325 - Sicilian Cavalry 22 204 - Sicilian Infantry (the Estero Regiment) 77 1,185 - --- ----- - Total 123 2,173 - -It may be well to give here the garrisons of Cadiz and Gibraltar in -1812, as both of them supplied troops to the field army during that -year. - -In Gibraltar, under General Campbell, there were the 2/9th, 2/11th, -37th, and the 4th and 7th Veteran Battalions throughout the year. The -1/82nd was there till the summer, when it was relieved by the 1/26th, -sent back from Portugal by Wellington. The 1/82nd sailed for Lisbon and -marched up to the front, but arrived just too late for the battle of -Salamanca. - -At Cadiz General Cooke commanded, at the commencement of the year, the -3/1st Guards (which had arrived and relieved the ‘composite battalion -of Guards’ before the end of 1811), also the 2/47th, 2/67th, 2/87th, -two companies of the _Chasseurs Britanniques_, De Watteville’s regiment -(which arrived before the end of 1811), the strange corps sometimes -called the ‘battalion of Foreign Deserters,’ sometimes the ‘battalion -of Foreign Recruits,’ two companies of the 2/95th, and a squadron of -the 2nd Hussars K.G.L., also the 20th Portuguese. - -Early in the year the 2/67th and five companies of De Watteville’s -regiment were sent off to Cartagena. - -In September the 3/1st Guards, 2/47th, 2/87th, two companies 95th, and -20th Portuguese marched to join Hill at Madrid, taking with them the -German squadron and two field-batteries: they were just 4,000 strong. - -The 2/59th came out from home about the same time, and was in October -the only _British_ battalion at Cadiz. With them remained the ‘Foreign -Deserters,’ seven companies of De Watteville, and two companies of -_Chasseurs Britanniques_, as also some artillerymen. - - - - -XV - -THE SCOVELL CIPHERS - - -By the very great kindness of Mr. G. Scovell of Brighton, I have had -placed at my disposition the papers of his great-uncle, General Sir -George Scovell, G.C.B., who served during the Peninsular War in the -Intelligence branch of the Quartermaster-General’s department. In -the beginning of 1812 the number of intercepted French dispatches -in cipher which came into Wellington’s hands, through the happy -activity of Julian Sanchez and other guerrillero chiefs, began to be -so considerable that the Commander-in-Chief thought it worth while to -detail a member of his staff to deal with them. Captain Scovell was -selected because of his ingenuity in this line, and became responsible -for attempting to interpret all the captured documents. They were made -over to him, and, having done what he could with them, he placed the -fair-copy of the ‘decoded’ result in Wellington’s hands, but seems -to have been allowed to keep the originals--which were, of course, -unintelligible because of their form, and therefore useless to his -chief. The file of documents which thus remained with him is most -interesting: they range in size from formal dispatches of considerable -bulk--eight or ten folio pages long--down to scraps of the smallest -size written on thin paper, and folded up so as to go into some secret -place of concealment on the bearer’s person. Some of them look as if -they had been sewed up in a button, or rolled under the leather of a -whip handle, or pushed along the seam of a garment. I take it that -these must all have been entrusted to emissaries sent in disguise, -_Afrancesados_ or peasants hired by a great bribe. Presumably each of -these scraps cost the life of the bearer when it was discovered--for -the guerrillero chiefs did not deal mildly with Spaniards caught -carrying French secret orders. The large folio dispatches, on the -other hand, must no doubt have been carried by French aides-de-camp or -couriers, whose escorts were dispersed or captured by the _partidas_ at -some corner of the mountain roads between Madrid and the head-quarters -of the Armies of Portugal and Andalusia. - -The cipher letters are of two sorts--in the first (and more numerous) -class only the names of persons and places, and the most important -sentences are in cipher--invariably a numerical cipher of arbitrary -figures. In the other class the whole dispatch is written in figures, -not merely its more weighty clauses. The reason for adopting the former -method was that it saved much time; the transliterating of unimportant -parts of the dispatch (such as compliments, and personal remarks of -no strategical import) would have taken many extra hours, when it was -necessary to get a letter sent off in a hurry. But, as we shall see -later on, there was grave danger in using this system, because the -context might sometimes allow the decipherer to make a good guess at -the disguised words, after reading that part of the letter which was -not so guarded. - -Occasionally a French dispatch is ciphered after the same infantile -system that readers of romances will remember in Poe’s _Gold Bug_ or -Conan Doyle’s _Sherlock Holmes_, where letters or numbers are merely -substituted for each other--where, for example, 2 always means letter -_e_, or 25 letter _r_. This sort of cipher is dangerously easy to -an expert reader, especially if the words are separated from each -other, so that the number of letters in each can be counted. Take, -for example, a letter sent to Soult in 1813 by Cassan, the blockaded -governor of Pampeluna[797]. Only one precaution had been taken in this -cipher-epistle, viz. that elaborate care has been taken to defeat the -attempt of the reader to arrive at results by counting what figures -appear most frequently, and so deducing by their repetition that these -must be _e_ (the most frequently used letter in French, as in English), -_s_, _i_, _a_, _t_, and other common letters. This is done by having -six alternative numbers for _e_, four each for _a_ and _i_, three for -_t_, _s_, and _n_. Taking the simple phrase - - 47.50.40.41.14.26 - 58.24 - 3.51.10.36.44.23.17.24.10.50.53.27 - 47.46 - 11.18.39.17.46.21, - -which deciphers into ‘depuis le commencement du blocus,’ we see that -_e_ appears five times, but is represented by both 50, 24, and 44; _u_ -three times, but varied as 14 and 46; _m_ thrice, varied as 10 and -36. This made the reader’s work harder, but not nearly so difficult -as that required for certain other ciphers: for the whole set of -signs, being not much over 60 in number, there was a limited amount -of possibilities for each figure-interpretation. And the words being -separated by spaces, there was a certainty that some of the two-letter -units must represent _et_, _de_, _ce_, _eu_, _du_, and similar common -French two-letter words. As a matter of fact this particular dispatch -was deciphered in a few hours owing to the lucky guess that its initial -words - - 10.45.23.21.16.2.41.25 - 5.24 - 10.4.25.24.3.9.8.5 - -might be ‘Monsieur le Maréchal,’ the preliminary address to the -intended recipient. This hypothesis was verified at once by finding -that this rendering made good sense for the two-letter words 23.24 = -_ne_, and 10.2 = _me_, lower down in the letter. After this all was -plain sailing. - - [797] This particular letter is _not_ one of the Scovell file. - -But the usual French cipher, the ‘Great Paris Cipher’ as Scovell called -it, was a very much more complicated and difficult affair, as the list -of figures, instead of being only a few score, ran to many hundreds. -And of these only some few represented individual letters, more were -parts of a syllabary: _ma_, _me_, _mi_, _mo_, _mu_, for example, had -each a figure representing them, and so had _ab_- _ac_- _ad_- _af_- -_ag_- &c. Moreover, there was a multitude of arbitrary numbers, -representing under a single figure words that must often be used in a -dispatch, such as _hommes_, _armée_, _général_, _marche_, _ennemi_, -_corps d’armée_, _canons_. In addition there was a code of proper -names, e.g. 1216 meant the River Douro, 93 Portugal, 1279 Talavera, -585 King Joseph, 1391 General Dorsenne, 1327 the Army of the South, -1280 Soult, 1300 Wellington, 400 Ciudad Rodrigo, &c. If the King wished -the Duke of Dalmatia to send 9,000 men of the Army of the South to -Talavera, he had only to write - - ‘585 désire que 1280 dirige 1156 (neuf) 692 (mille) 1102 (hommes) - de 1327 sur 1279.’ - -He would then cut up _désire_ and _dirige_ into the syllables -_de-si-re_ and _di-ri-ge_, for each of which the syllabary had set -figures; there were also arbitrary numbers for _sur_, _de_, and _que_. -So the whole sentence would take up only fourteen numbers when written -out. - -It would seem at first sight that to interpret such a dispatch would be -a perfectly hopeless task, to any one who had not the key to the cipher -before him. That the admirably patient and ingenious Scovell at last -made out for himself a key from the laborious comparison of documents, -was nevertheless the fact. He was started on the track by the fortunate -circumstance that most of the intercepted dispatches were only _partly_ -in cipher. Marmont would write - - ‘Avec les moyens que j’ai, et 798, 1118, 602, 131, - 1112.663.1135.502 au delà de Sabugal,’ - -or - - ‘J’avais donné l’ordre que 1003, 497, 1115, 1383, 69,711, 772, - 530, de descendre cette rivière et de se mettre en communication - avec moi.’ - -Clearly the cipher-figures in the first case have something to do with -a march on Sabugal, in the second with orders to some general or body -of troops (to be identified hereafter) to march down a river which the -context shows must be the Tagus. This is not much help, and the task -looked still very hopeless. But when intercepted dispatches accumulated -in quantities, and the same cipher-figures kept occurring among -sentences of which part was written out in full, it became evident -that various cryptic figures must mean places and persons who could -be guessed at, with practical certainty. Occasionally a French writer -completely ‘gives himself away’ by carelessness: e.g. Dorsenne wrote on -April 16 to Jourdan, - - ‘Vous voulez de renseignement sur la situation militaire et - administrative de 1238:’ - -obviously the probable interpretation of this number is ‘the Army of -the North,’ and this is rendered almost certain by passages lower down -the same letter. Equally incautious is King Joseph when he writes to -Marmont, - - ‘J’ai donné l’ordre au général Treillard de 117.8.7 la vallée du - 1383, afin de marcher à 498.’ - -Considering the situation of the moment 117.8.7 must almost certainly -mean _evacuate_, 1383 _Tagus_, and 498 some large town.[798] [The -particular dispatch in which this occurs is on a most curious piece of -paper, half an inch broad, a foot long, and excessively thin. It is -bent into twelve folds, and would fit into any small receptacle of one -inch by half an inch. I fear the bearer who had it on his person must -have come to a bad end.] Suchet also made Scovell the present of some -useful words when he wrote on September 17 to Soult, - - ‘Le Général Maitland commande l’expédition anglaise venue de 747: - O’Donnell peut réunir 786 692 1102 en y comprenant le corps de - l’Anglais Roche. Le 19 août je n’avais que 135 692 1102 à lui - opposer.’ - -Here it is quite clear that ‘747’ means _Sicily_; that ‘692.1102’ in -the two statements of forces means _thousand men_. A little guessing -and comparison with other cryptic statements of forces would soon show -that 135 meant 7 and 786 meant 12. - - [798] Wellington wrongly guessed Plasencia: it was Aranjuez. - -Notwithstanding much useful help it was still a marvellous feat of -Scovell to work out by the end of 1812 no less than _nine hundred_ -separate cipher-numbers, ranging in complexity from the simple vowel -a to the symbol that represented ‘train des équipages militaires’! He -must have had a most ingenious brain, and unlimited patience. Down -to the end there remained numbers of unsolved riddles, figures that -represented persons or places so unfrequently mentioned that there was -no way of discovering, by comparison between several documents, what -the number was likely to mean. - -Sometimes very small fish came into the net of the guerrilleros, -and were sent on to Wellington; take, for example, the tiny scrap -containing the pathetic letter of the young wife of General Merlin, of -the cavalry of the Army of the Centre--I fear that the bearer must have -fallen into the hands of Julian Sanchez or one of his lieutenants, and -have had short shrift:-- - -‘Mon cher Ami,--Depuis ton départ je n’ai reçu qu’un seul mot de -toi--pendant qu’il arrive des courriers (c’est-à-dire des paysans) -du quartier général. Mon oncle qui écrit régulièrement dit toujours -qu’on se porte bien, mais tu peux te mettre à ma place! Je crains que -ta goutte ne soit revenue, je crains tant de choses, qui peut-être -passent le sens commun, mais qui me tourmentent. Je ne dors plus, et -n’ai d’autre plaisir que celui de regarder ma fille, qui se porte -bien. Encore si elle pouvait m’entendre et me consoler! Adieu! Je -suis d’une tristesse insupportable, parce que je t’aime plus que -moi-même.--Mercédes.’ - -It may suffice to show the general character of a typical -cipher-dispatch if we give a few lines of one, with the interpretation -added below--the following comes from a dispatch of Marmont written on -April 22, 1812, to Berthier, from Fuente Guinaldo:-- - - Le roi après m’avoir donné l’ordre - - 1060 462 810 195 1034 1282 - de faire par- tir deux divisions - - 971 216 13 192 614 20 90 92 - et plus de la moi- ti- é de la - - 1265 582 637 851 809 388 177 - cavalerie dis- po- ni- ble, et avoir - - 669 112 923 2 786 692 1102 - ré- du- it à douze mille hommes - - le nombre de troupes que j’ai disponible m’ordonne - - 13 1040 1003 370 860 400 817 69 862 718 1100 - de chercher à pren-dre Ciudad Rodrigo lors que je ne ai - - 423 815 591 710 850 - pas un canon de siège! - -It will be noted that of all the words only _partir_, _moitié_, -_disponible_, _réduit_, _prendre_, required to be spelled out in the -syllabary: single fixed numbers existing for all the common words, and -for the military terms _siège_, _cavalerie_, and _division_. - -It was, of course, only by degrees that Scovell succeeded in making out -the bulk of the French phrases. In Wellington’s dispatches there is -often, during the spring and summer of 1812, an allusion to information -only partly comprehensible, obtained from captured letters. On June 18 -(_Dispatches_, ix. p. 241) Wellington writes to Lord Liverpool that he -‘is not able entirely to decipher’ the intercepted papers that have -been passing between King Joseph and Soult and Marmont. On June 25th -he sends to the same recipient the happy intelligence that he has now -the key to King Joseph’s cipher. Yet again, on July 16th (_Dispatches_, -ix. p. 290)--with No. 36 of the file catalogued below before him--he -says: ‘I have this day got a letter from the King to Marmont of the -9th inst. in cipher, which I cannot entirely decipher: it appears, -however, that he thinks Drouet will not cross the Tagus, and I suspect -he orders General Treillard to collect some troops in the valley of -the Tagus, and to move on Plasencia.’ The interpretation was correct, -save that Treillard was to move not on Plasencia but on Aranjuez. The -code-numbers for the two places were neither of them known as yet. But -by September all essential words were discovered, and Wellington could -comprehend nearly everything, unless Joseph or Soult was writing of -obscure places or distant generals. - -A list of the whole of Scovell’s file of 52 French dispatches may be -useful: those whose number is marked with a star are wholly or partly -in cipher, the remaining minority are in plain French without disguise. -It is clear that Wellington had many more French papers not in cipher, -which did not get into Scovell’s portfolio. - - _Date._ _Sender._ _Recipient._ _Contents._ - 1. Mar. 6, 1812 Col. Marmont Long interview with - Jardet Berthier. He says you - must ‘contain’ - Wellington in the - North. All else in Spain - matters comparatively - little. - 2*. April 11 ” Marmont Brennier See that Silveira does not - molest my communications. - 3*. April 14 ” Soult Berthier Marmont has betrayed me, and - caused the loss of Badajoz. - Synopsis of Andalusian affairs. - 4*. April 16 ” Marmont Berthier As I prophesied, my raid into - Portugal produces no effect: - we begin to starve. - 5*. April 16 ” Dorsenne Jourdan I refuse to acknowledge the king - as controlling my army. - 6*. April 17 ” Soult Berthier Details of the fall of Badajoz, - ‘événement funeste.’ - 7*. April 22 ” Marmont Berthier I have been starved out of - Portugal. Have seen no - British troops, save a few - cavalry. - - 8*. April 23 ” Foy Jourdan Send me food. My division is - nearly starved. - - 9*. April 25 ” King Dorsenne I am your Commander-in-Chief. - Joseph Send me a report of your army. - - 10. April 26 ” Gen. Lafon- Gen. News from Andalusia at last: - Blaniac[799] Treillard[800] Soult has failed to save - Badajoz. - - 11*. April 28 ” Marmont Dorsenne Send me 8,000 quintals of wheat - at once. - - 12*. April 28 ” Marmont Berthier I have sent Bonnet, as ordered, - to invade the Asturias. - - 13. April 28 ” Gen. Clarke I send parole of Colquhoun - Lamar- Grant, a suspicious character. - tinière[801] The police should look to - him[802]. - - 14*. April 29 ” Marmont Jourdan If I keep troops on the Tagus, - I am too weak on the Douro - and Tormes. I must draw my - divisions northward. - - 15*. April 29 ” Marmont Berthier I find that five British divisions - were chasing me last week. - Wellington is very strong in - the North. - - 16*. April 30 ” Marmont Berthier Send me a siege-train, I am - helpless without one: also - plenty of money. - - 17. April 30 ” Marmont Gen. Come up at once to join my - Tirlet[803] army. - - 18*. May 1 ” Jourdan Marmont We will keep unhorsed guns for - you at Talavera, so when - moving South bring gunners - and horses only. - - 19*. May 1 ” King Dorsenne You are placed under my command. - Joseph Obey my orders. - - 20*. May 1 ” Jourdan Dorsenne Send a division to Valladolid, - to support Marmont. - - 21*. May 1 ” Jourdan Marmont You must send more troops to - the Tagus: Drouet is hard - pressed in Estremadura. - - 22*. May 1 ” Jourdan Berthier Wellington is advancing in - Estremadura. Marmont must - send troops southward. - - 23*. May 1 ” King Berthier Observations on the - Joseph military situation. - - 24. May 1 ” Col. Gen. Technical artillery - Bousseroque Doguerau[804] matters. - - 25. May 20 ” Proclamation by Suchet The King is appointed - Commander-in-Chief in Spain. - - 26*. May 26 ” King Soult Hill has stormed Almaraz. - Joseph Why was not Drouet - near enough to save it? - - 27*. May 26 ” Jourdan Soult Hill has stormed Almaraz. Try - to re-open communications - with Foy. - - 28*. June 1 ” Marmont Jourdan The fall of Almaraz means that - Wellington will attack me next. - He is not threatening Soult, - but me. - - 29*. June 22 ” Marmont King I stop in front of Salamanca - Joseph manœuvring. I dare not attack - Wellington till Caffarelli’s - reinforcements arrive. - - 30*. June 24 ” Marmont Caffarelli I am manœuvring opposite - Wellington. Your reinforcements - are required _at once_. - - 31*. July 1 ” Marmont King When the Salamanca forts fell, - Joseph I retreated to the Douro. - I cannot fight Wellington till - I get 1,500 more horse and 7,000 - more infantry. - - 32. July 1 ” Suchet King Narrative of guerrilla war - Joseph in Aragon. - - 33. July 1 ” Suchet King Favour shall be shown to - Joseph _Afrancesados_. - - 34*. July 6 ” Marmont Jourdan I had to retreat to the Douro - because Caffarelli sent no - help. Can you lend me - Treillard’s cavalry division? - - 35*. July 7 ” King Soult Send 10,000 men to Toledo - Joseph _at once_. - - 36*. July 9 ” King Marmont I shall march to your aid in a - Joseph few days, when my troops are - collected. - - 37*. July 22 ” Suchet King I am much worried by Maitland’s - Joseph approach. Have beaten Joseph - O’Donnell at Castalla. - - 38. July 29 ” Gen. Lafon- King Madrid remains tranquil. - Blaniac[805] Joseph - - 41*. July 30 ” Marmont King We can never hope to unite. - Joseph My army retires via Lerma on - Burgos. - - 42. Aug. 2 ” Gen. King Wellington is marching on - Espert[806] Joseph Segovia. - - 43*. Aug. 7 ” King Marmont Communicate with me by the - Joseph Somosierra Pass. - - 44*. Aug. 12 ” Suchet King I am much alarmed at the possible - Joseph results of Maitland’s landing. - - 45*. Aug. 12 ” Soult Clarke The King is betraying the Emperor - and negotiating with the Cadiz - Cortes[807]. - - 46*. Sept. 17 ” Suchet Soult Explains situation in Valencia. - - 47*. Dec. 9 ” King Napoleon Plans for reorganizing - Joseph the armies. - - 48*. Dec. 22 ” King Napoleon Plans for next year. Should I - Joseph make Burgos my capital, and hold - Madrid only as an outpost? - - 49*. Jan. 8, 1813 King Napoleon Soult is intolerable. Let D’Erlon - Joseph replace him. Send us money. - - 50*. Jan. 28 ” King Napoleon Your decision about Soult shocks - Joseph me. I shall send him away on - my own authority. - - 51*. Mar. 14 ” King Gen. D’Erlon shall look after Salamanca. - Joseph Reille Send two divisions to hunt the - guerrilleros. - - 52. Mar. 16 ” Col. King Discouraging news from Paris. No - Lucotte Joseph men or money for Spain! - - [799] Governor of La Mancha. - - [800] Commanding cavalry on the Tagus. - - [801] Marmont’s Chief-of-the-Staff. - - [802] See above, p. 293. - - [803] Commanding artillery of the Army of Portugal, on leave. - - [804] Commanding artillery of the Army of the Centre. - - [805] Now governor of Madrid. - - [806] Governor of Segovia. - - [807] For the story of this letter see above, pp. 538-9. - -In addition to the ciphers, the Scovell papers consist of short diaries -of Major Scovell for the Corunna Campaign, and for 1809-10-11-12-13, -as also a large bundle of reports and maps of roads and passes in -Portugal, all the papers concerning the raising of the Corps of Guides, -a number of notes and reports on suggested travelling forges for the -artillery and engineers, and some whole or mutilated contemporary -Spanish newspapers. There is some curious and interesting information -scattered through all of them. - - - - -XVI - -BRITISH AND PORTUGUESE ARTILLERY IN THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1812 - -[DETAILS COLLECTED BY MAJOR J. H. LESLIE, R.A.] - - -I. ROYAL HORSE ARTILLERY - -The following troops were serving in the Peninsula in 1812:-- - - _Troop._ _Under Command of_ _Arrived in _Designation in 1914._ - Peninsula._ - A Brevet Major H. D. Ross July 1809 ‘A’ Battery, R.H.A. - D Captain G. Lefebure[808] March 1810 ‘V’ Battery, R.H.A. - [Later 2nd Captain E. C. - Whinyates] - E Captain R. Macdonald August 1811 ‘E’ Battery, R.H.A. - I Brevet Major R. Bull August 1809 ‘I’ Battery, R.H.A. - - [808] Lefebure died of sickness in October, and the battery was - commanded till next spring by Whinyates. - -A, E, and I were serving with Wellington’s main army in 1812, attached -respectively to the Light Division, the 7th Division, and the 1st -Division of Cavalry (Stapleton Cotton). All three were present at -Salamanca, but A was left at Madrid in August with the Light Division, -and did not take part in the Burgos Campaign. D was attached to -Erskine’s ‘2nd Cavalry Division,’ and served under Hill in Estremadura -from the beginning of the year till Hill marched up to Madrid in -October. - - -II. ROYAL (FOOT) ARTILLERY - - -A. - -The seven companies shown in the following tables were serving in the -Peninsula in 1812 with the field army. - -NOTE.--In 1812 there were ten battalions of Royal (Foot) Artillery, the -companies of which were always designated by the name of the commanding -officer, whether he was actually present with his company or no. - - _Bat- _Under Command of_ _Arrived in _Designation in 1914._ - talion._ Peninsula._ - - 1st Captain J. May[809] March 1809 2nd Battery, R.F.A. - 4th Captain S. Maxwell October 1810 72 Company, R.G.A. - 5th Captain F. Glubb[810] March 1809 48 Company, R.G.A. - 8th Brevet Major R. W. April 1811 78 Company, R.G.A. - Gardiner - 8th Captain R. Lawson August 1808 87th Battery, R.F.A. - 8th Captain J. P. Eligé[811] October 1810 Reduced in 1819. - [Later, Captain T. A. - Brandreth] - 9th Captain R. Douglas March 1812 45th Battery, R.F.A. - - [809] Actually under command of 2nd Captain H. Baynes. - - [810] Actually under command of 2nd Captain W. G. Power. - - [811] Eligé was shot through the heart on the second day of the - siege of the Salamanca forts. 2nd Captain W. Greene commanded the - company at the battle of Salamanca. - -Of these, Gardiner’s company was attached to the 1st Division, -Maxwell’s to the 2nd, Douglas’s to the 3rd, Lawson’s to the 5th, -Eligé’s to the 6th. May’s company accompanied the main army without -guns, in charge of the Reserve ammunition train. - -Glubb’s company was attached to the heavy 18-pounders and 24-pounder -howitzers of the Reserve Artillery. - -Gardiner’s, Douglas’s, Lawson’s, and Eligé’s [now temporarily under 2nd -Captain W. Greene, Eligé having been killed at the Salamanca forts] -companies were present at Salamanca, as was also the Reserve Artillery, -but the last-named was not engaged. - -Maxwell’s company was with Hill in Estremadura from January till the -march to Madrid in September-October. Part of it was present at the -capture of Almaraz on 19 May. - - -B. - -The following additional companies were in Portugal in 1812, but did -not join the field army:-- - - _Bat- _Under Command of_ _Arrived in _Designation in 1914._ - talion._ Peninsula._ - 6th Brevet Major H. F. April 1811 102 Company, R.G.A. - Holcombe - 1st Captain A. Bredin September 1808 37th Battery, R.F.A. - 6th Captain G. Thompson March 1809 18th Battery, R.F.A. - 5th Captain H. Stone March 1812 92 Company, R.G.A. - 6th Captain W. Morrison October 1812 51 Company, R.G.A. - -Of these Holcombe’s company was employed at the sieges of Ciudad -Rodrigo and Badajoz. The other companies present at these leaguers were -Glubb’s and Lawson’s at Rodrigo, and Glubb’s and Gardiner’s at Badajoz. - -In June Holcombe’s and Thompson’s companies were sent round by sea to -the east coast of Spain, and there joined the Anglo-Sicilian expedition -of General Maitland, with which they continued to serve. - - -C. - -At the beginning of 1812, there were present at Cadiz, Cartagena, and -Tarifa, doing garrison duty, the following companies under Lieut.-Col. -A. Duncan:-- - - _Bat- _Under Command of_ _Arrived in _Designation in 1914._ - talion._ Peninsula._ - 2nd Captain P. Campbell[812] March 1810[813] 62 Company, R.G.A. - 5th Captain H. Owen January 1810 60 Company, R.G.A. - 9th Captain P. J. Hughes January 1810 Reduced in 1819. - 10th Captain W. Roberts March 1810 63 Company, R.G.A. - 10th Major A. Dickson April 1810 21 Company, R.G.A. - 10th Captain W. Shenley April 1810 11 Company, R.G.A. - - [812] This company went to Cartagena from Cadiz at the end - of January 1812, where it remained until the end of the war. - Campbell was not with it, having command of an infantry regiment - in the Spanish Army. - - [813] From Gibraltar. - -Of these Hughes’s company was detached to Tarifa, and took a brilliant -part in its defence in Dec. 1811-Jan. 1812. The rest were in Cadiz and -the Isle of Leon. Owen’s and Dickson’s companies (the latter until July -1812 being commanded by Captain R. H. Birch, whose own company of the -10th battalion was at Gibraltar, as Dickson, with the rank of Major, -was serving with the Portuguese Army) marched from Cadiz to Madrid -with Skerrett’s column at the end of September 1812, and in October -joined Wellington’s main field army. Hughes’s, Roberts’s, and Shenley’s -companies remained in garrison at Cadiz, and Campbell’s was divided -between Cartagena and Tarifa. - - -D. - -At Alicante, under General Maitland, there were present during the -later months of the year not only Holcombe’s and Thompson’s companies, -which had come round from Lisbon, but also the two following British -companies from Sicily:-- - - _Bat- _Under Command of_ _Arrived in _Designation in 1914._ - talion._ Peninsula._ - 8th Captain J. S. Williamson August 1812 40th Battery, R.F.A. - 4th Captain R. G. Lacy December 1812 25 Company, R.G.A. - - -III. KING’S GERMAN LEGION ARTILLERY - -Of the three companies of the Legionary Artillery in the Peninsula -only one (No. 4) was with the field army, that of Captain F. Sympher, -attached to the 4th Division. This unit was present at the siege of -Ciudad Rodrigo, and also at the battle of Salamanca. - -Captain K. Rettberg’s (No. 1) and Captain A. Cleeves’s (No. 2) -companies were doing garrison duty in the Lisbon forts; but Rettberg -himself, with a detachment of two officers and thirty men of his -company, came up to the siege of Badajoz in March-April. - - -IV. PORTUGUESE ARTILLERY - -[The details are taken from Major Teixeira Botelho’s _Subsidios_.] - -Only three field batteries accompanied the allied field army during the -campaign of 1812, though seven had been at the front in 1811. These -batteries were:-- - -Captain J. da Cunha Preto’s 6-pounder [from the 1st regiment] and -Captain W. Braun’s 9-pounder [from the 2nd regiment] batteries, both -attached to General Hamilton’s Portuguese division, which always acted -with Hill in Estremadura, and Major S. J. de Arriaga’s 24-pounder -howitzer battery, which formed part of the Artillery Reserve, and -accompanied Wellington’s own army to Badajoz, Salamanca, and Burgos. -This company came from the 1st (Lisbon) regiment. - -But in addition the 2nd or Algarve regiment supplied one company, under -Captain J. C. Pereira do Amaral for the siege of Badajoz. - -The 4th or Oporto regiment gave two companies (200 men) under Captain -J. V. Miron for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, and one (70 men) under -Captain William Cox for the siege of Badajoz. Cox’s company was sent -round to Alicante in June, along with the British companies of Holcombe -and Thompson, and joined Maitland’s Anglo-Sicilian corps for the rest -of the war. - -Another company of the 4th regiment under Captain D. G. Ferreri formed -the divisional artillery of Silveira’s Militia corps, and was present -at the blockade of Zamora in June-July 1812. - -The 1st or Lisbon regiment sent a company under Captain M. A. Penedo to -Alicante, along with the company of Cox mentioned above from the 4th -regiment. It also supplied one company under Lieutenant A. da Costa e -Silva for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. - -The 3rd or Elvas regiment supplied three companies, under the command -of Major A. Tulloh[814], for the siege of Badajoz--they were those of -Captains A. V. Barreiros, J. Elizeu, and J. M. Delgado. - - [814] Captain R.A., but now serving in the Portuguese Artillery, - with the rank of Major. - - - - -INDEX - - - Abadia, Francisco Xavier, general, orders for, 220; - tiresome conduct of, 337. - - Abbé, general, governor of Navarre, his proclamation against - guerrilleros, 102; - defeated by Mina, 198. - - Alba de Tormes, Carlos de España fails to hold castle of, 415, 466. - - Albuera, Hill in position at, 269; - combats in front of, 527-30. - - Alcantara, bridge of, restored by Wellington, 333. - - Aldaya, combat of, 64. - - Alicante, occupied by Mahy, repulses Montbrun, 78, 79; - Maitland lands at, 573. - - Almaraz, forts of, stormed by Hill, 322-30. - - Almeida, re-fortified by Wellington, 160; - repulses the attack of Clausel, 281. - - Almendralejo, seized by Hill, 132. - - Altafulla, combat of, 96. - - Alten, Victor, general, fails to assist Carlos de España at Rodrigo, 280; - retreats to Villa Velha, 284; - results of his action, 290; - with Wellington’s advance into Spain, 352; - at Salamanca, 365, 369, 372-3; - at Pollos, 389, 399, 401; - his successful charge at Castrillo, 405-6; - wounded at Salamanca, 422. - - America, Spanish colonies in, troubles of, 136-8, 337. - - Andalusia, position of Soult in, 80, 108, 109, 110, 274, 305; - evacuation of, proposed by Jourdan, 307, 308; - resisted by Soult, 309-10; - operations in, during June-August, 521, 522, 535, 536; - evacuation of, by Soult, 539-43. - - Andriani, Luis, colonel, defends Saguntum, 13, 17-30; - surrenders, 45-6. - - Anson, George, major-general, operations of his cavalry, 401, 402; - at Salamanca, 449, 461; - at Garcia Hernandez, 501. - - Anson, William, major-general, his brigade at Castrillo, 406; - at Salamanca, 457, 458. - - Aragon, French army of, 5; - Suchet’s garrisons in, 6; - operations of Duran and the guerrilleros in, 21-3; - French reinforcements for, 51-2; - Palombini’s and Severoli’s campaigns in, 98-101. - - Arentschildt, Friedrich, colonel, takes command of a brigade at - Salamanca, 442-5, 454, 461, 494; - marches on Madrid, 504. - - Artificers, Royal Military, at siege of Badajoz, 225, 255-6; - converted into Royal Sappers and Miners, 256. - - Artillery, the allied, table of the, in 1812, Appendix, pp. 619-22. - - Astorga, siege of, 337-8, 388, 502. - - Asturias, the, evacuated by Bonnet, 196-8; - reconquered by him, 338; - evacuated again, 390, 391. - - Aubert, colonel, governor of Almaraz, slain there, 324-6. - - Ayerbe, skirmish at, 22. - - - Baccelar, Manuel, general, commands Portuguese of the North, 219-21; - concentrates to keep off Marmont, 282-3; - dissuades Trant from attacking Marmont, 285. - - Badajoz, siege of, 217-56; - disgraceful sack of, 256-64. - - Ballasteros, Francisco, general, harasses Soult in south Andalusia, 111; - harasses the besiegers of Tarifa, 116-17; - unwilling to receive orders from British, 230; - threatens Seville, 274; - retires prematurely, 275; - his ineffective raids on Zahara and Osuna, 275; - routs Rey at Alhaurin, 276; - checked at battle of Bornos, 336, 348, 385; - instructed by Wellington to threaten Seville, 519; - defeated at Bornos, 521, 522; - surprises Malaga, 535; - and Osuna, 536; - harasses retreating French, 542, 544. - - Barcelona, alleged poisoning plot at, 565. - - Barnard, Andrew, colonel, at the storm of Ciudad Rodrigo, 179; - becomes commander of the Light Division on Craufurd’s death, 182, 184. - - Barrié, general, governor of Ciudad Rodrigo, 165, 173, 188. - - Barrois, general, takes part in siege of Tarifa, 116; - sent to Drouet’s aid by Soult, 525, 531. - - Bathurst, Henry, second earl, his correspondence with Wellington on - financial difficulties, 350, 351. - - Bentinck, Lord Frederick, negotiates with Wellington, 344. - - Bentinck, Lord William, commander of British forces in Sicily, - proposes expedition against east coast of Spain, 342, 343; - sends only a small force, 346, 347; - his indecision, 386, 408; - the expedition starts, 499, 565. - - Beresford, William Carr, marshal, his strict discipline for Portuguese - army, 149; - at siege of Badajoz, 217, 228; - leads centre of army advancing into Leon, 352; - nominated by Wellington second in command in event of his being - disabled, 353; - before Salamanca, 359; - with Wellington involved in skirmish of Castrejon, 402; - urges delay in attack at Salamanca, 427; - in the battle, 459; - wounded, 471. - - Berkeley, admiral, sends Russian guns for siege of Badajoz, 224. - - Berthier, Louis Alexander, marshal, his dispatch to Marmont on - reorganization of army of Portugal, 189; - sends news of Joseph’s appointment as Commander-in-Chief to the - marshals in the Peninsula, 298-9. - - Bertoletti, general, governor of Tarragona, 96. - - Bilbao, taken by Popham and Mendizabal, 556; - recaptured by Caffarelli, 557. - - Blake, Joaquim, general, Spanish commander-in-chief in Valencia, - assumes defensive against Suchet, 10; - his plans, 19-23; - advances against Suchet, 31; - defeated at battle of Saguntum, 36-43; - besieged by Suchet in Valencia, 47-72; - surrenders, 73; - imprisoned at Vincennes, 73. - - Blaniac, H. Lafon, general, appointed governor of Madrid on Joseph’s - departure, 488; - defends the Retiro against Wellington, 507; - surrenders, 516. - - Bock, Eberhard, major-general, commanding Heavy Dragoons K.G.L. at - Badajoz, 219, 229; - with army advancing into Leon, 352; - at Salamanca, 365, 372, 373; - at Pollos, 389; - at Castrillo, 399; - at Salamanca, 403, 425; - at Garcia Hernandez, 476-7; - marches on Madrid, 504; - goes north with Wellington, 581. - - Bonnet, general, his expedition into the Asturias, 338; - summoned by Marmont before Salamanca, 354; - joins him, 381, 390, 391; - his feigned advance against Wellington, 397; - at Salamanca, 424-39; - assumes command on Marmont’s being disabled, 440; - wounded, 440, 469. - - Bornos, battle of, 336, 385. - - Bourke, general, defeated by Eroles at Roda, 98. - - Boussard, general, wounded at Aldaya, 64. - - Brennier, Antoine François, general, blockades Rodrigo, 281; - beaten at Castrillo, 405, 406; - his division routed at Salamanca, 451. - - Burgoyne, John, major of engineers, takes charge of assault on - castle of Badajoz, 251; - besieges the forts of Salamanca, 362. - - - Cadiz, bombardment of by the French, 167, 168; - politics at, 137-44; - siege of, raised, 539, 540. - - Caffarelli, Louis Marie, general, occupies Saragossa, 57; - troubles of, in Aragon, 82; - vainly pursues Mina, 103; - Wellington’s plans against, 339, 340; - promises help to Marmont, 356, 372; - fails to send it, 378, 393, 394; - sends cavalry brigade under Chauvel, 419; - relieves Santander, 554; - retakes Bilbao from Mendizabal, 556, 557. - - Calatayud, captured by Duran, 21, 22; - attacked by Montijo, 51-2; - captured by Gayan, 101. - - Campbell, Colin, general, governor of Gibraltar, garrisons Tarifa, 112; - forbids abandonment of the town, 123. - - Campbell, John, colonel, commands brigade of Portuguese horse in - Estremadura, 219, 530, 531, 534. - - Caro, José, general, at battle of Saguntum, 33, 41, 42. - - Caroline, queen of the Two Sicilies, her intrigues against the - British, 346, 347. - - Carrera, La, Martin, brigadier, encompasses Boussard’s cavalry at - Aldaya, 64; - his gallant raid on Murcia, 81; - death, 81. - - Carrié, general, beaten and captured at Castrillo, 405. - - Castalla, battle of, 567-70. - - Castaños, Francis Xavier, general, in command in Galicia, 197, 219, - 337, 388. - - Castello Branco, sacked by Clausel, 284. - - Castlereagh, Lord, succeeds Canning at the Foreign Office, 155, 349. - - Castrejon, combat of, 401, 402. - - Castrillo, combat of, 405, 406. - - Castro Urdiales, taken by Popham, 553. - - Catalonia, French army of, 4, 5; - operations of Lacy, Eroles, and Decaen in, 90-9; - formally annexed by Napoleon, 97; - projected British landing in, 344; - Lacy’s summer campaign in, 562-4; - Maitland refuses to land in, 571. - - Ceccopieri, colonel, slain near Ayerbe, 22. - - Cerdagne, ravaged by Eroles, 93; - by Sarsfield, 99. - - Chauvel, general, arrives after Salamanca, and covers retreat of - French army, 482. - - Chlopiski, general, commands flank-guard at Saguntum, 35; - his victorious charge, 37. - - Chowne, Christopher Tilson, general, makes false attack on castle of - Miravete, 324-8. - - Ciudad Real, seized by Morillo, 134. - - Clausel, Bertrand, general, fails to attack Almeida, 281; - occupies Castello Branco, 284; - dissuades Marmont from attacking at Salamanca, 367, 368; - his unsuccessful attack at Castrillo, 405, 406; - at battle of Salamanca, 430, 435; - assumes command after Marmont and Bonnet are disabled, 440; - advances on Wellington’s centre, 458; - repulsed, 460; - wounded, 469; - his dispatch to Joseph, 489; - continues to retreat north, 491. - - Clinton, Henry, general, his victorious advance at Salamanca, 459-60; - left to contain Clausel, 501. - - Codrington, Edward, captain R.N., operations of, on the coast of - Catalonia, 92, 563, 564; - his views on Lacy and Eroles, 572. - - Colborne, John, colonel, leads storming-party at Ciudad Rodrigo, 167; - wounded, 182, 184. - - Cole, Hon. Lowry, general, his operations on June 10, 403-6; - his advance at Salamanca, 455; - wounded, 456. - - Conroux, Nicolas, general, surprised by Ballasteros, 522. - - Constitution, the Spanish, drawn up by the Cortes, 140, 144. - - Copons, Francisco, general, at the siege of Tarifa, 112, 118; - opposes evacuation of the town, 123, 125. - - Cortes, the, at Cadiz, Constitution drawn up by, 140. - - Cotton, Stapleton, general, routs Drouet’s rearguard at Villagarcia, - 278; - commands rearguard on retreat to Salamanca, 401; - in the battle, 434-47, 449; - wounded there, 471. - - Craufurd, Robert, general, observing Ciudad Rodrigo, 159; - mortally wounded in storm of Ciudad Rodrigo, 182; - Charles Stewart’s high estimate of him, 186. - - Creagh, Juan, general, at Valencia, 60, 65. - - Cruz Murgeon, Juan, general, storms Seville, 540, 541. - - Cuenca, occupied by Mahy, 24; - taken by D’Armagnac, 56; - evacuated by Maupoint, 488. - - - Daricau, general, operations of, in Estremadura, 233, 275, 521, 526, - 533. - - D’Armagnac, general, goes to aid Suchet in Valencia, 56-76; - co-operates with Montbrun, 478. - - Decaen, Charles, general, commands in Catalonia, 4, 5, 90; - his difficulties with Barcelona, 92; - relieves Barcelona, 94; - harassed by the Catalan army under Lacy, 563. - - Decken, Gustav von der, captain, his gallant charge and mortal wound - at Garcia Hernandez, 477. - - Delort, colonel, defeats O’Donnell at Castalla, 568, 569. - - D’Erlon, _see_ Drouet. - - Denia, captured by General Harispe, 87. - - Dickson, Alexander, colonel, brings up siege-guns to Ciudad Rodrigo, - 160; - prepares for siege of Badajoz, 201, 224; - his account of the storm, 247; - with Hill’s expedition to Almaraz, 322; - at Salamanca, 364. - - Dombrouski, general, driven from Merida, 131, 132. - - Dorsenne, Jean Marie, general, ignores the danger of Ciudad Rodrigo, - 187, 188, 194; - meets Marmont at Valladolid, 192; - declines to obey Jourdan’s orders, 300, 304. - - Downie, John, colonel, his gallant conduct at Seville, 541. - - Doyle, Charles, general, suggests fortification of Saguntum - (Murviedro), 11, 12. - - Drouet, Jean Baptiste, Comte d’Erlon, in Estremadura, observing Hill, - 106, 107; - driven from Almendralejo by Hill, 132; - retires before Graham, 230, 231; - sends pressing summons to Soult, 267; - routed by Le Marchant at Villagarcia, 277; - fails to intercept Hill after Almaraz, 330, 331; - threatened by Hill, 525; - his manœuvres against Hill, 531-5; - retreats suddenly to join Soult, 543. - - Duran, José, chief of guerrilleros, seizes Calatayud, 21; - attacks Suchet’s rear, 49; - seizes Almunia, and retires to Molina, 51. - - D’Urban, Benjamin, colonel, chief of the Portuguese staff, his views - on Wellington’s advance into Leon, 317; - with Silveira on the Douro, 339; - his activity, 386, 387, 409; - joins Wellington before Salamanca, 410-13; - in the battle, 426-36; - his charge, 441-5, 453, 454, 461; - in pursuit of Joseph at Segovia, 495; - enters the town, 496; - marches on Madrid, 504; - routed by Treillard at Majalahonda, 509-13. - - - ‘El Manco,’ guerrillero chief, 102. - - Empecinado, Juan Martin, the, his co-operation with the army of - Valencia, 3, 5, 10; - seizes Calatayud, 21; - attacks Suchet’s rear, 49; - attacks Mazzuchelli, 51; - his jealousy of Montijo, 52; - his disaster at Siguenza, 102; - captures the garrison of Guadalajara, 516. - - Engineers, Wellington’s demand for sappers and miners, 255, 256. - - Eroles, General Baron, raids French frontier, 93; - destroys a French column at Villaseca, 95; - defeated at Altafulla, 96; - defeats Bourke at Roda, 98; - his differences with Lacy, 562-3. - - Erskine, Sir William, lieut.-general, sends false intelligence of - French advance to Hill, 330; - Wellington’s comments on, 331-2; - his slack pursuit of Pierre Soult, 542. - - España, Carlos de, general, 220; - retires from Rodrigo before Marmont’s advance, 280, 281; - reports lack of provisions to Wellington, 290; - joins Wellington before Salamanca, 355, 365; - at the ford of Pollos, 389; - at Castrillo, 399; - at Salamanca, 411; - fails to hold castle of Alba de Tormes, 415, 466; - marches on Madrid, 504; - governor of Madrid, 517, 567. - - Estremadura, invaded by Hill, 133, 134; - operations by Hill and Graham in, 228-33; - campaign of Hill and Drouet in, June-August, 520-33. - - - Ferey, general, advises Marmont to fight at San Cristobal, 367; - covers retreat of French at Salamanca, 462-5; - slain, 464, 469. - - Figueras, fall of, 1. - - Fletcher, Richard, colonel, engineer officer directing siege of - Ciudad Rodrigo, 170; - at Badajoz, 228, 237; - wounded, 238; - again on duty, 243. - - Fortescue, Hon. John, his estimate of the British Ministers and their - dealings with Wellington, 152. - - Foy, Maximilien, general, moves with Montbrun against Valencia, 52-78; - attempts to divert British from Badajoz, 233, 266; - fails to help Almaraz, 329; - his description of Marmont’s plans at San Cristobal, 367; - at Toro, 390; - makes feigned advance against Wellington, 397; - describes opening of battle of Salamanca, 420, 421, 424, 433; - criticism of Marmont, 438, 461; - successfully covers French retreat, 467; - his account of battle of Salamanca, 472-3; - defeated at Garcia Hernandez, 475-8. - - Freire, Manuel, general, prevented from joining Blake at Valencia, 57; - with Mahy’s force, 77, 78; - his raid on eastern Andalusia, 559. - - Frère, general, protects Suchet’s rear in Catalonia, 6, 92. - - - Galicia, state of, in 1812, 220, 337, 338. - - Garcia Hernandez, combat of, 467-8. - - Gaspard-Thierry, colonel, governor of Picurina fort at Badajoz, taken - prisoner, 240. - - Gayan, guerrillero chief, seizes Calatayud, 101. - - Gijon, occupied by the French, 338. - - Gough, Hugh, colonel, takes part in defence of Tarifa, 118; - opposes its evacuation, 122-7. - - Graham, Thomas, general, overruns Estremadura, 228; - fails to catch Reymond, 230-2; - falls back on Albuera, 268; - obliged to throw up his command, 352-3; - before Salamanca, 359, 369, 373-5. - - Granada, evacuated by Soult, 544, 545. - - Grant, Colquhoun, major, captured at Idanha Nova, 292, 318. - - Guarda, Trant’s disaster at, 285-6. - - Guarena, combat of the, 404-5. - - Gudin, colonel, at the storming of Saguntum, 17, 18. - - Guetaria, attacked by Home Popham, 553, 557. - - Gurwood, lieutenant, J., leads forlorn hope at storm of Ciudad - Rodrigo, 181; - controversy concerning, 589. - - - Habert, general, at storming of Saguntum, 17, 28, 33, 39; - at capture of Valencia, 58-63; - joins Harispe, 67; - at Gandia, 85. - - Hamilton, general A., commands a Portuguese division under Hill, 130, - 520. - - Harispe, general, in invasion of Valencia, 14; - at battle of Saguntum, 34, 40; - at capture of Valencia, 58, 61-4; - moves toward Alicante, 85; - defeats O’Donnell at Castalla, 567-70; - retires behind the Xucar, 573. - - Hay, Andrew Leith, captain, his account of the storming of Badajoz, - 255; - of the battle of Salamanca, 448-9. - - Henriod, governor of Lerida, repulses Lacy, 564. - - Hill, Rowland, General, his advance into Estremadura, 86: - retires into Portugal, 106; - seizes Merida, 130-2; - forms covering force for siege of Badajoz, 218, 228, 233; - joins Graham at Albuera, 268; - contains Drouet in Estremadura, 291; - his raid on Almaraz, 311-29, 348; - Wellington’s instructions to him to harass Drouet, 519; - advances to Zafra, 522; - awaits Drouet’s attack, 527; - his manœuvres against Drouet, 531-5; - does not pursue when Drouet joins Soult, 543; - warns Wellington of Soult’s evacuation of Andalusia, 578; - marches on Madrid, 579. - - Hodenberg, Karl, captain in the K.G.L., his account of the sack of - Badajoz, 262; - of Garcia Hernandez, 480. - - - Infantado, J. de Silva, Duke of, created a member of the Regency 144, - 145. - - - Jones, John, colonel R.E., his remarks on the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, - 173; - on the storming of Badajoz, 247; - on the siege of the Salamanca forts, 371. - - Joseph Bonaparte, King of Spain, Napoleon’s instructions to him to - send troops to Valencia, 53; - he negotiates with the Cortes at Cadiz, 138; - receives news of the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, 188; - appointed commander-in-chief by Napoleon, 298; - difficulties of his situation, 301, 302; - determines to march to Marmont’s aid, 385; - authorizes Marmont to give battle, 395; - marches north to join Marmont, 484; - receives news of the defeat of Salamanca, 488; - retreats to Madrid, 489; - halts at Segovia, 492; - evacuates Madrid, 505; - orders Drouet to join him, 533; - marches on Valencia, 574-8. - - Jourdan, Jean Baptiste, marshal, appointed Chief-of-the-Staff to - Joseph, 298; - his comments on the situation, 301; - his _Mémoire_ of May 1812, 303-7; - urges Marmont to attack Wellington, 394, 395; - his criticism of Marmont’s failure at Salamanca, 430, 473; - marches with Joseph to aid Marmont, 488; - and retreats, 489; - urges evacuation of the Retiro, 507. - - - Kempt, James, major-general, leads assault on castle of Badajoz, - 239-40; - takes command when Picton is disabled, 251; - wounded, 252. - - Kincaid, John, his account of the sack of Badajoz, 261. - - King, Henry, major, takes part in defence of Tarifa, 112, 118; - opposes its evacuation, 122, 123. - - - La Carrera, _see_ Carrera. - - Lacy, Luis, general, his raids against Igualada, Cervera, and - Montserrat, 5; - his quarrels with the Catalan Junta, 91; - endeavours to starve out Barcelona and Tarragona, 94; - his unpopularity, 91, 562, 563; - his fruitless attack on Lerida, 564; - dissuades Maitland from landing at Palamos, 571. - - Lafosse, general, governor of Tortosa, surprised and routed by Eroles, - 95. - - Lallemand, general, defeats Slade at Maguilla, 523, 524; - skirmishes with Hill’s cavalry, 530, 531. - - Lamare, commandant of engineers at Badajoz, 235; - his able conduct in the defence, 246. - - La Peña, Canon, secret agent of King Joseph, 139, 140. - - Lardizabal, José, general, commanding a division in Valencia, 3; - at battle of Saguntum, 32, 40, 44; - at siege of Valencia, 60, 66; - fails to cut his way out, 70; - surrender of, 73. - - Leith, James, general, commanding 5th Division, his successful - escalade at Badajoz, 245, 253, 254; - at Salamanca, 434, 435; - leads central attack, 446, 448; - wounded, 449, 471. - - Le Marchant, John Gaspard, general, commanding heavy dragoons, 219, - 228; - routs Drouet’s rearguard at Villagarcia, 277; - with Wellington’s advance into Leon, 352; - at Salamanca, 365, 374; - at Pollos, 389; - to Fuente la Peña, 399; - at Salamanca, 403, 425, 447, 449; - charges Maucune’s division, 450, 451; - fatally wounded, 452; - founder of Military College at High Wycombe, 452. - - Le Mesurier, Haviland, general, governor of Almeida, repulses Clausel, - 281; - his report on the defences of the city, 283. - - Leval, Jean François, general, besieges Tarifa, 116-29; - fails to catch Ballasteros, 536; - harassed by Freire, 559, 560. - - Liverpool, Lord, his support of Wellington, 152-6, 349; - sanctions Sir Home Popham’s naval expedition on coast of Biscay, - 340; - and Bentinck’s scheme for attacking Catalonian coast, 342, 343. - - Llerena, Graham’s operations round, 230, 231. - - Longa, Juan, guerrillero chief, 340; - joins Popham’s raid on Biscayan coast, 553; - joins Mendizabal at Bilbao, 557. - - Lübeck, sack of, by Bernadotte’s troops a parallel to that of Badajoz, - 262. - - Luddites, the, riots of, 153. - - - Macdonald, Étienne, marshal, Duke of Tarentum, recall of, 1. - - Mackinnon, Henry, major-general, at siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, 178, 180; - killed in the storm, 181. - - Madrid, Wellington marches on, 497; - evacuated by Joseph, 506, 507; - Wellington’s triumphal entry, 513, 514. - - Maguilla, combat of, 385, 523, 524. - - Mahy, Nicolas, general, commands Murcian army, 20; - his abortive expedition against Cuenca, 23; - joins Blake in attacking Suchet, 31; - at battle of Saguntum, 36-8; - his comments, 39; - opinion of Valencians, 50; - abandons Valencia, escapes to the south, 64, 68; - occupies Alicante, 78; - abandons Denia, 87; - removed from his command, 87. - - Maitland, Frederick, general, leads Sicilian expedition against - Catalonia, 346, 347, 499, 565; - arrives at Palamos, 571; - at Alicante, 572; - threatens Harispe, 573; - withdraws to Alicante, 574. - - Majalahonda, combat of, 509-13. - - Malaga, surprised by Ballasteros, 535; - seized by English squadron, 559. - - Marmont, Auguste Frédéric, marshal, Duke of Ragusa, sends expedition - to Valencia, 53, 157, 161; - receives news of fall of Ciudad Rodrigo, 187, 188; - reorganization of his army by Napoleon, 190, 191; - warned by Thiébault of Wellington’s advance on Ciudad Rodrigo, 192, - 195; - concentrates troops to oppose him, 196; - retires to Valladolid 199; - deprived of some troops by the Emperor, 203, 204; - severely criticized by Napoleon, 203-6, 221-6; - makes a raid on central Portugal, 243; - concerts joint action with Soult against Wellington, 266; - masks Rodrigo and Almeida, and marches to Sabugal, 283; - surprises Trant at Guarda, 285; - returns to Sabugal, 288; - and Fuente Guinaldo, 288; - escapes from Wellington at Fuente Guinaldo, 290-5; - receives news of Joseph’s appointment as commander-in-chief, 298-9; - sends in report to Joseph, 302; - his partial compliance with Joseph’s orders, 310-11; - his intercepted dispatches, 318-19; - evacuates Salamanca, 354; - his dispatch to Joseph, 370; - waits vainly for Caffarelli, 370-8; - retreats on to the Douro, 380; - requisitions horses, 391; - advances against Wellington, 397; - long strategical movements, 398-417; - opens battle of Salamanca, 421-37; - wounded, 437; - his dispatch, 469; - criticism of his actions, 472-4; - his report to Joseph, 488. - - Mathieu, Maurice, general, operations of, in Catalonia, 94-6, 563. - - Maucune, general, at Salamanca, 430-7. - - May, John, brevet-major, R.A., in charge of siege of forts of - Salamanca, 362. - - Mazzuchelli, general, his skirmishes with Aragonese guerrilleros, 51. - - Melito, André, Miot de, Joseph’s minister, his comments on his - master’s situation, 301. - - Mendizabal, Gabriel, general, commanding 7th army, employed by - Wellington to harass Caffarelli, 339, 348; - comes to aid Popham, 554; - in conjunction with Popham captures Bilbao, 550-7; - driven out by Caffarelli, 557. - - Merida, seized and evacuated by Hill, 130-2; - reoccupied, 233; - raided by the French, 535. - - Merino, guerrillero chief, his cruelty, 102. - - Mina, Francisco, guerrilla chief, 4, 6, 21; - destroys Ceccopieri, 22; - eludes Musnier, 23; - his reprisals against the governor of Navarre, 102; - escapes into Aragon, 103; - seizes French convoy in the Pass of Salinas, 103; - escapes from Pannetier, 104; - his activity in the North, 190; - defeats Abbé near Pampeluna, 198; - his activity 548, 549; - sends aid to Popham, 553. - - Miranda, José, general, at battle of Saguntum 36-44; - at Valencia, 60. - - Mislata, combat of, 65-6. - - Montbrun, Louis Pierre, general, leads expedition against Valencia, 53, - 76; - advances on Alicante, 77; - retires, 78; - returns to Toledo, 79, 265. - - Montijo, conde de, commands irregular troops against Suchet, 49, 52; - besieges Soria, 198; - with O’Donnell at rout of Castalla, 568-9. - - Morillo, Pablo, general, his raid on La Mancha, 134, 135; - with Penne-Villemur threatens Seville, 274; - co-operates with Hill, 520; - marches with Hill on Madrid, 580. - - Mosquera, Joaquim, member of the Council of the Indies, created member - of the Spanish Regency, 144. - - Murat, Joachim, King of Naples, failure of his expedition against - Sicily, 341. - - Murcia, captured and evacuated by Pierre Soult, 80, 81. - - Murviedro, _see_ Saguntum. - - Musnier, general, 9; - opposed by guerrilleros, 21-3; - marches on Valencia, 57; - attacks Valencia, 61, 69: - relieves Tarragona, 94-6. - - - Napier, George, major, at the storm of Ciudad Rodrigo, 181; - wounded, 182. - - Napier, Sir William, historian, his remarks on the surrender of - Peniscola, 88; - comments on the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo, 194; - account of the storming of Badajoz, 247; - of Salamanca, 407, 457; - comments on Soult’s plan for retiring on Andalusia, 546; - accepts Suchet’s version of his administration in Valencia, 560, 561. - - Napoleon, Emperor, his plans for the invasion of Valencia, 2; - arrangements for reinforcing Suchet, 53-5, 80; - withdraws troops from Spain for the Russian War, 83-4, 189; - his plan for the subjection of Catalonia, 96-7; - fails to foresee Wellington’s advance on Ciudad Rodrigo, 193, 194; - withdraws troops from Marmont, 203: - his criticism on the fall of Badajoz, 270; - his forebodings about the Russian campaign, 297; - appoints Joseph commander-in-chief of forces in the Peninsula, 298; - further instructions to Joseph, 312, 313; - his condemnation of Marmont’s failure at Salamanca, 396, 397, 431, - 439, 473. - - Navarro, Garcia, treacherously surrenders Peniscola, 87; - deserts to the French, 89. - - Navas de Membrillo, combat of, 131. - - Neveux, captain, exploit of, at Navas de Membrillo, 131. - - Nevill, P. P., colonel, his account of the sack of Badajoz, 263, 264. - - Ney, Michel, marshal, Duke of Elchingen, his views on the treatment of - a garrison that held out to the last, 259. - - Niebla, the Condado of (western Andalusia), operations in, 107, 274, - 539. - - - Obispo, José, general, cuts French communications, 20; - driven away by Palombini, 24; - returns to Segorbe, 30; - advances on Saguntum, 32, 35; - arrives too late for the battle, 36, 38; - at Valencia, 60; - retires to Cullera, 65. - - O’Donnell, Charles, general, threatens Suchet’s flank, 20, 21; - forced to retire from Benaguacil by Suchet, 24, 25; - at battle of Saguntum, 35, 544. - - O’Donnell, Henry, conde de la Bispal, made member of the Regency, 144. - - O’Donnell, Joseph, general, captain-general of Murcia, reorganizes - Mahy’s troops, 559; - routed by Harispe at Castalla, 567-70. - - Ollorgan, combat of, 557. - - O’Ronan, colonel, at battle of Saguntum, 32, 37. - - Oropesa, garrisoned by Blake, 13, 14; - taken by Suchet, its garrison escapes, 25. - - O’Toole, Bryan, major, commanding Portuguese caçadores at Ciudad - Rodrigo, 179, 183. - - Oviedo, captured by Bonnet, 338; - evacuated by him, 381. - - - Pack, Denis, general, commanding Portuguese brigade at Ciudad Rodrigo, - 179, 183; - sent to Badajoz, 217, 229; - to Portalegre, 291; - with Wellington’s advance into Leon, 352; - at Salamanca, 365; - at Pollos, 389; - at Salamanca, 411, 424, 425; - his attack on the Greater Arapile, 455, 457; - marches on Madrid, 504; - with Wellington’s army moves North, 581. - - Pakenham, Hon. Edward, major-general, takes command of the 3rd - Division before Salamanca, 352, 353; - in battle, 425, 426; - executes turning movement, 436; - routs Thomières, 443, 445, 461. - - Palacio, Marquis, captain-general of Valencia, 20. - - Palamos, Maitland at, 571. - - Palombini, general, sent against Obispo, 24, 30; - at siege and battle of Saguntum, 28, 33, 41; - at capture of Valencia, 63, 65, 66; - moved to southern Aragon, 85; - checked by Villacampa, 100; - summoned by Joseph to Madrid, 487; - at Majalahonda, 509. - - Peña La, Canon, employed by Joseph to negotiate with Cortes at Cadiz, - 139. - - Peniscola, held by General Garcia Navarro, 13; - treacherously surrendered by him, 87, 88. - - Penne-Villemur, Conde de, threatens Seville, 229, 230; - with Morillo makes a raid on Seville, 274; - co-operates with Hill, 520, 522; - routed by Lallemand at Santa Marta, 530; - pursues Drouet, 543; - marches with Hill on Madrid, 580. - - Perceval, Spencer, Prime Minister, his troubles, 151-6. - - Phillipon, Armand, general, governor of Badajoz, 235; - his energy and ability, 236, 240, 242; - his gallant defence at the storm of the city, 45, 246; - surrenders, 254; - Soult’s over-confidence in him, 270. - - Picurina, fort at Badajoz, stormed, 239, 240. - - Ponsonby, Hon. William, commanding cavalry brigade at Villagarcia, - 278; - at Salamanca, 365; - marches on Madrid, 504; - drives away Treillard from Majalahonda, 512; - goes north with Wellington’s army, 58. - - Popham, Sir Home, leads naval expedition against coast-forts of - Cantabria and Biscay, 340-8; - prevents Caffarelli from joining Marmont, 378, 384, 393; - his descent on the Biscayan coast, 550; - his successes, 552, 553; - captures Santander, 554, 555; - captures Bilbao, 556, 557. - - Porlier, Juan Diaz, guerrillero leader, in Cantabria, 338, 339, 340, - 555, 556. - - Regency, the, of Portugal, its financial difficulties, 145, 350-51. - - Regency, the, of Spain, its composition changed, 144. - - Reille, Honoré Charles, general, commands division on Upper Ebro, 4; - joins Suchet, 7, 48, 52, 57; - attacks Valencia, 61; - appointed chief of the army of the Ebro, 96; - his plan for the subjection of Catalonia, 98; - fails to capture Mina, 104. - - Reizenstein, August von, captain K.G.L., leads charge at Garcia - Hernandez, 479. - - Renaud Redoute, at Rodrigo, stormed by Colborne, 167, 168. - - Renovales, Colonel, his operation in Biscay, 556-7. - - Reymond, general, escapes from Graham, 230, 231. - - Ridge, Henry, lieut.-colonel, killed at the storm of Badajoz, 252. - - Rignoux, general, governor of Seville, alarmed by raids of - guerrilleros, 274, 275. - - Rivas, Ignacio Rodriguez de, member of the Cadiz Regency, 144. - - Roche, Philip K., general, organizes a Spanish division at Alicante, - 85; - his operations at the battle of Castalla, 567-70; - joins Maitland at Alicante, 572. - - Roda, combat of, 98. - - Rodrigo, Ciudad, siege of, 158, 161-86; - defies Marmont, 281; - blockaded by Brennier, 281. - - Rogniat, general, at the storm of Saguntum, 27. - - Ross, captain, killed at Ciudad Rodrigo, 170. - - Rouget, general, his campaign about Bilbao, 557. - - Russia, Napoleon’s war with, causes withdrawal of French troops from - the Peninsula, 83. - - - Saguntum (_or_ Murviedro), its defences, 11, 16, 17; - ineffectually stormed by Suchet, 17-19; - battle of, 26-45; - surrender of, 45. - - Salamanca, evacuated by Marmont, 354; - Wellington enters, 360; - its forts besieged, 361-79; - Marmont and Wellington manœuvre before, 402-17; - battle of, 421-70. - - Salinas (Puerto de Arlaban), Mina’s victory at, 102. - - Sanchez, Julian, guerrillero chief, his activity in the neighbourhood - of Salamanca, 188, 220, 299; - marches with Wellington on Madrid, 504. - - San Juan, José, general, rout of his Valencian cavalry at Saguntum, - 37. - - Santander, captured by Popham, 554-5. - - Santesteban, general, in the Castalla campaign, 568, 570. - - Santocildes, José Maria, general, his half-hearted attack on Astorga, - 386-9; - comes to Benavente, 409; - sent to threaten Valladolid, 490; - occupies the town, 502, 503. - - Santoña, French garrison at, 551, 555, 558. - - Sarrut, general, joins expedition against Valencia, 53; - guards the fords of Huerta, 415-16; - his action at Salamanca, 458-61. - - Sarsfield, Pedro, general, his raid on Foix, 99; - Lacy’s jealousy of, 563. - - Schepeler, colonel, his account of Blake at Saguntum, 43; - and at Valencia, 66; - seizes Cordova, 543; - his notes on Suchet’s tyranny, in Valencia, 560, 561. - - Scovell, George, captain, his ingenuity as cipher-secretary to - Wellington, 317; - account of his file of ciphers, Appendix, 611-18. - - Segovia, Joseph, halts at, 492; - occupied by D’Urban, 495. - - Severoli, general, commands a division on Upper Ebro, 4; - joins Suchet, 4; - occupies western Aragon, 22, 23; - summoned to Valencia, 48, 52, 57. - - Seville, attacked by Penne Villemur, 274, 275; - stormed by Cruz Murgeon and Skerrett, 540, 541. - - Silveira, Francisco, general, commanding Portuguese in Tras-os-Montes, - 219, 220; - moves on Lamego to protect Beira, 282; - told off by Wellington to blockade Zamora, 339, 348, 386, 387, 491, - 502. - - Slade, John, general, defeated at Maguilla, 385, 523, 524. - - Smith, Charles F., captain R.E., opposes evacuation of Tarifa, 122. - - Smith, Harry, 95th regiment, his romantic marriage at Badajoz, 264. - - Souham, Joseph, general, put under Marmont’s orders, 189; - summoned by Marmont to Salamanca, 198. - - Soult, Nicolas, marshal, Duke of Dalmatia, Napoleon orders him to - assist Suchet, 80; - failure of his expedition to Tarifa, 78; - disposition of his troops in Andalusia, 106-10; - sends Victor to besiege Tarifa, 115; - denounces King Joseph to Napoleon, 140; - moves toward Badajoz, 243, 268; - concerts action with Marmont against Wellington, 265, 266; - retires on hearing of the fall of Badajoz, 269; - reproaches Marmont, 271; - summoned back to Seville, 274, 275; - receives news of Joseph’s appointment as commander-in-chief, 299; - his recalcitrance, 302, 309; - threatens to give up command of Army of the South, 332; - believes Wellington is about to attack him, 357; - refuses to obey Joseph, 485, 492, 493, 495, 528; - denounces Joseph to Napoleon, 538; - begins to evacuate Andalusia, 539, 540, 557; - at Granada, 544; - joins Suchet, 545; - results of his insubordination, 545. - - Soult, Pierre, general, seizes Murcia, 80, 81; - marches against Ballasteros, 276; - sent to Drouet’s help, 525, 531; - his raid on Ribera, 542. - - Stewart, Charles (Lord Londonderry), his estimate of Craufurd, 186. - - Stuart, Charles, British Ambassador in Lisbon, 145, 148. - - Sturgeon, Henry, colonel, restores bridge of Alcantara, 333. - - Suchet, Louis Gabriel, marshal, invades Valencia, 2; - takes Murviedro and Valencia, 2; - estimate of his forces, 4-9; - crosses Valencian frontier, 14; - fails to storm Saguntum, 17-19; - besieges Saguntum, 26-30; - wins battle, 34-45; - attacks and takes Valencia, 57-73; - violates treaty of capitulation, 74, 75; - deprived of troops for the Russian War, 84; - his illness, 86; - his threats to the governor of Tortosa, and governor of Tarragona, 259; - and Blake, 260; - receives news of Joseph’s appointment as commander-in-chief, 299; - refuses obedience, 304, 309, 341; - alarmed by reports of the Sicilian expedition, 345, 346, 500, 566; - weakness of his position, 559; - raises a war-contribution, 560; - Schepeler’s account of his methods, 561. - - Synge, Charles, his narrative of Pack’s attack on the Greater - Arapile, 455. - - - Tarifa, garrisoned by General Colin Campbell, 112; - siege of, 114-29. - - Tarragona, blockaded by the Catalans, 94, 95, 563; - Wellington’s designs against, 344. - - Taupin, general, anecdote concerning, 392. - - Thiébault, Paul, general, governor of Salamanca, revictuals Ciudad - Rodrigo, 159; - warns Marmont and Dorsenne of Wellington’s movement on Ciudad - Rodrigo, 187, 192, 194. - - Thomières, general, his division at Salamanca, 432; - his rout and death, 445, 469. - - Todd, Alex., major, restores bridge of Alcantara, 333, 334. - - Tordesillas, captured by Santocildes, 502. - - Toreno, conde de, his account of Joseph’s negotiations with the Cortes - at Cadiz, 139. - - Trant, Nicholas, general, protects Almeida, 281; - moves to Guarda, 283; - his rash scheme for attacking Marmont, 284, 285; - surprised and routed at Guarda, 285. - - Treillard, general, routs D’Urban’s force at Majalahonda, 508-13. - - - Uslar, Frederich von, captain, leads the last charge at Garcia - Hernandez, 486. - - - Valencia, kingdom of, invasion of by Suchet, 2; - Napoleon’s opinion of the importance of its subjection, 53; - Suchet’s campaign of conquest in, 8-67; - Suchet’s levy of a war-contribution on, 560, 561. - - Valencia, city of, 10; - fortified by Blake, 48, 49; - attacked by Suchet, 61-9; - siege of, 70-3; - surrendered by Blake, 73; - oppression of by Suchet, 560. - - Valladolid, abandoned by French, entered by Wellington, 491. - - Vallée, general, at the siege of Saguntum, 27. - - Vandeleur, J. Ormsby, general, commands brigade at the storm of Ciudad - Rodrigo, 179, 181; - wounded, 182. - - Vere, Charles, A.Q.M.G., his account of the battle of Salamanca, 455-6. - - Victor, Claude Perrin, marshal, Duke of Belluno, his unsuccessful siege - of Tarifa, 115-29. - - Villacampa, Pedro, general, rout of his infantry at Saguntum, 37; - at Valencia, 60; - moves to Aragon, 89; - his activity in southern Aragon, 100, 101. - - Villagarcia, combat of, 277, 278. - - Villa Velha, bridge of, its importance, 284, 333. - - Villavicencio, admiral, member for the Cadiz Regency, 144. - - Vives, general, governor of Ciudad Rodrigo, refuses Marmont’s summons - to surrender, 280, 281; - commended by Wellington, 296. - - - Wachholz, Ludwig von, Captain Brunswick-Oels Jägers, his account of - Salamanca, 455, 456. - - Wellesley, Richard, marquis, resignation of, 153-6, 349. - - Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, Marquis of, takes Ciudad Rodrigo, 2; - his relations with the Portuguese Regency, 145; - financial difficulties, 146-50; - his support by the Home Government, 151-6; - prepares for siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, 161-7, 186; - prepares to be attacked by Marmont, 199; - plans attack on Badajoz, 201-17; - moves to Elvas, 219; - his memorandum on Marmont’s probable action, 221-3; - comments on fall of Badajoz, 255; - his views on giving quarter to a resisting garrison, 260; - soundness of his plan for taking Badajoz, 272; - determines to march on Marmont, 290; - his plan for Hill’s raid on Almaraz, 320, 321; - advances into Leon, 335; - approves Bentinck’s plan for attacking French on Catalonian coast, - 343-8; - his financial difficulties, 348-52; - advances on Salamanca, 353-8; - his adventure with French cavalry skirmishers, 402; - long strategical movements, 402-17; - battle of Salamanca, 421-70; - summary of, 470-4; - urges on pursuit of enemy, 475; - gives up pursuit, 483; - enters Valladolid, 491; - marches on Madrid, 497; - his letter to Bentinck, 499; - triumphal entry into Madrid, 514; - his comments on Slade’s defeat at Maguilla, 524; - leaves Madrid for the valley of the Douro, 578; - division of his forces on advancing toward Burgos, 582. - - Whigs, their factious opposition to the Peninsular War, 151. - - Whittingham, Samuel Ford, general, leads Balearic division to descent - on coast of Catalonia, 565; - at Alicante, 572. - - Wilson, John, general, brings Portuguese militia to Guarda, 283; - surprised by Marmont at Guarda, 285. - - - Zamora, besieged by Silveira, 386-7, 502. - - Zayas, José, general, commanding a division in Valencia, 3; - at battle of Saguntum, 32, 39; - at siege of Valencia, 60-6. - - -END OF VOL. 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