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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7b82bc --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +*.txt text eol=lf +*.htm text eol=lf +*.html text eol=lf +*.md text eol=lf diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4a5019a --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #62266 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/62266) diff --git a/old/62266-0.txt b/old/62266-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 31e7db5..0000000 --- a/old/62266-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2336 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Road Past Kennesaw, by Richard M. McMurry - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: The Road Past Kennesaw - The Atlanta Campaign of 1864 - -Author: Richard M. McMurry - -Release Date: May 28, 2020 [EBook #62266] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ROAD PAST KENNESAW *** - - - - -Produced by Stephen Hutcheson and the Online Distributed -Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net - - - - - - - - - - THE ROAD PAST KENNESAW - THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN OF 1864 - - -_RICHARD M. McMURRY_ - -_Foreword by Bell I. Wiley_ - - Office of Publications - National Park Service - U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR - Washington, D. C. 1972 - - - For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing - Office - Washington, D.C. 20402—Price $1.70 - Stock No. 024-005-00288-O/Catalog No. I 29.2:K39 - -The author: _Richard M. McMurry, a long-time student of the Army of -Tennessee and the Atlanta Campaign, is associate professor of history at -Valdosta State College, Valdosta, Ga._ - - - - - NATIONAL PARK SERVICE HISTORY SERIES - - -Publication of this volume was made possible by a grant from the -Kennesaw Mountain Historical Association. - - -This publication is one of a series of booklets describing the -significance of historical and archeological areas in the National Park -System administered by the National Park Service, U.S. Department of the -Interior. It is printed by the Government Printing Office and can be -purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, Washington, DC 20402. -Price $1.70. - - Stock Number 024-005-00288-O Catalog Number I 29.2:K 39 - - - - - FOREWORD - - -The turning point of the Civil War is a perennial matter of dispute -among historians. Some specify the Henry-Donelson-Shiloh operation of -early 1862 as the pivotal campaign; others insist that Antietam was the -key event; still others are equally sure that Gettysburg and Vicksburg -marked the watershed of military activities. Regardless of when the tide -turned, there can be little doubt that the Federal drive on Atlanta, -launched in May 1864, was the beginning of the end for the Southern -Confederacy. And Sherman’s combination assault-flanking operation of -June 27 at Kennesaw Mountain may very well be considered the decisive -maneuver in the thrust toward Atlanta. For when Joseph E. Johnston found -it necessary to pull his forces back across the Chattahoochee, the fate -of the city was sealed. - -The Atlanta Campaign had an importance reaching beyond the immediate -military and political consequences. It was conducted in a manner that -helped establish a new mode of warfare. From beginning to end, it was a -railroad campaign, in that a major transportation center was the prize -for which the contestants vied, and both sides used rail lines to -marshal, shift, and sustain their forces. Yanks and Rebs made some use -of repeating rifles, and Confederate references to shooting down “moving -bushes” indicate resort to camouflage by Sherman’s soldiers. The Union -commander maintained a command post under “signal tree” at Kennesaw -Mountain and directed the movement of his forces through a net of -telegraph lines running out to subordinate headquarters. Men of both -armies who early in the war had looked askance at the employment of pick -and shovel, now, as a matter of course, promptly scooped out protective -ditches at each change of position. - -The campaign was also tremendously important as a human endeavor, and -one of the most impressive features of Richard McMurry’s account is the -insight—much of it gleaned from unpublished letters and diaries—into the -motivations, experiences, and reactions of the participants. The -officers and men who endured the heat and the mud of what must have been -one of the wettest seasons in the history of Georgia and who lived in -the shadow of death day after day for 4 months of as arduous campaigning -as occurred during the whole conflict, stand out as flesh and blood -human beings. This time of severe testing led to the undoing of some of -the generals, including Joseph E. Johnston and John Bell Hood. Others, -notably William Tecumseh Sherman, capitalized on the opportunities -afforded by the campaign to prove their worth and carve for themselves -lasting niches in the military hall of fame. Still others had their -careers cut short by hostile bullets, among them Leonidas Polk, a leader -whose Civil War experience makes inescapable the conclusion that he -should never have swapped his clerical robes for a general’s stars. In -marked contrast stood James B. McPherson, great both as a man and a -combat commander, whose premature passing elicited moving statements of -grief from leaders on both sides. - -Human aspects of the campaign found most vivid and revealing expression -in the letters of the lesser officers and the men whom they led. Robert -M. Gill, a Mississippi lieutenant promoted from the ranks, poured out in -full and frequent letters to his wife his homesickness, his hopes, his -fears, and his spiritual concern; in so doing, he revealed his virtues -and his frailties and his ups and downs of morale until a Yankee -fusillade snuffed out his life at Jonesborough. On June 22, 1864, he -wrote from near Marietta: “I saw a canteen on which a heavy run was made -during and after the charge. I still like whiskey but do not want any -when going into a charge for I am or at least was drunk enough yesterday -without drinking a drop.” Lieutenant Gill tried very hard to live up to -his wife’s admonitions against “the sins of the camp,” but he had great -difficulty with profanity, especially in the excitement of battle. After -the action at Resaca, he wrote apologetically: “The men did not move out -to suit me, and I forgot everything and began to curse a cowardly scamp -who got behind.” Six weeks later he reported another lapse, and -following the Battle of Atlanta he wrote: “I done some heavy swearing, I -am told.... I try to do right but it seems impossible for me to keep -from cursing when I get under fire. I hope I will do better hereafter. I -do not wish to die with an oath on my lips.” Gill’s morale remained -relatively good until after the fall of Atlanta. Shortly after that -event, he wrote: “I think this cause a desperate one ... there is no -hope of defeating Lincoln.... I wish I could be sanguine of success.” - -John W. Hagan, a stalwart sergeant of Johnston’s army, in poorly spelled -words and awkwardly constructed paragraphs addressed to his wife, -demonstrated the character and strength of the lowly men who were the -backbone of both armies. From near Marietta on June 17, 1864, Hagan -wrote: “the yankees charged us ... & we finelly drove them back we all -had as much to do as we could do. James & Ezekiel acted very brave the -boys Say Ezekiel went to shooting like he was spliting rails; in fact -all the Regt acted there parts.” The combat performance of Hagan and his -men contrasted markedly with that of one of the officers who was the -acting company commander, a Lieutenant Tomlinson. On June 21, Hagan -wrote his wife: “I have been in command of our company 3 days. Lieut. -Tomlinson stays along but pretends to be so sick he can not go in a -fight but so long as I Keepe the right side up Co. ‘K’ will be all -right.” Hagan’s morale remained high, despite the fact that he had not -received any pay for more than a year. On July 4, he wrote that “some of -our troops grow despondent but it is only thoes who are all ways -despondent,” and added: “all good soldiers will fight harder the harder -he is prest but a coward is allways ready to want an excuse to run or -say they or we are whiped. I never Knew there was so many cowards untill -Since we left Dalton. I do not Speak of our Regt but some troops have -behaved very badly.” - -Sergeant Hagan and other Rebs who fought in the Atlanta Campaign had a -wholesome respect for the men in blue who opposed them; and rightfully -so, for the Union rank and file, mostly lads and young adults from the -farms of the Midwest, were admirable folk, deeply devoted to the cause -of Union. One of them, Pvt. John F. Brobst of the 25th Wisconsin -Regiment, wrote his sweetheart before the campaign was launched: “Home -is sweet and friends are dear, but what would they all be to let the -country go to ruin and be a slave. I am contented with my lot ... for I -know that I am doing my duty, and I know that it is my duty to do as I -am now a-doing. If I live to get back, I shall be proud of the freedom I -shall have, and know that I helped to gain that freedom. If I should not -get back, it will do them good who do get back.” - -Despite the publication during the past century of many studies on the -subject, the Atlanta Campaign—overshadowed both during the war and later -by the engagements in Virginia—has not received anything like its due -share of attention. Now for the first time, thanks to Richard McMurry’s -thoroughness as a researcher and skill as a narrator, students of the -Civil War have a clear, succinct, balanced, authoritative, and -interesting account of the tremendously important Georgia operations of -May to September 1864. This excellent work should be as comprehensible -and appealing to those who read history and tour battle areas for fun as -it is to those who have achieved expertness in Civil War history. - - Bell I. Wiley - - - - - CONTENTS - - - Foreword by Bell I. Wiley i - Spring 1864 1 - Resaca 7 - To the Etowah 14 - New Hope Church 18 - Kennesaw Mountain 23 - Across the Chattahoochee 29 - Johnston Removed From Command 32 - In the Ranks 34 - Peachtree Creek 42 - The Battle of Atlanta 46 - Ezra Church 48 - The Month of August 51 - Jonesborough 54 - Epilogue 57 - Sherman in Atlanta: A Photographic Portfolio 59 - For Further Reading 70 - Civil War Sites in Georgia 71 - - [Illustration: {uncaptioned}] - - - - - SPRING 1864 - - -One of the most important military campaigns of the American Civil War -was fought in northwestern Georgia during the spring and summer of 1864 -between Northern forces under Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman and -Confederates commanded first by Gen. Joseph E. Johnston and then by Gen. -John B. Hood. This campaign resulted in the capture of Atlanta by the -Unionists, prepared the way for Sherman’s “March to the Sea,” and, in -the opinion of many historians, made inevitable the reelection of -Abraham Lincoln and the consequent determination of the North to see the -war through to final victory rather than accept a compromise with -secession and slavery. - -Spring 1864 marked the beginning of the war’s fourth year. In the -eastern theater, 3 years of fighting had led to a virtual stalemate, -with the opposing armies hovering between Washington and Richmond—about -where they had been when the war began in 1861. However, the situation -was quite different in the vast area between the Appalachian Mountains -and the Mississippi River, a region known in the 1860’s as “the West.” -There in 1862 Federal armies had driven the Southerners out of Kentucky -and much of Tennessee. In the following year the Northerners secured -control of the Mississippi River and captured the important city of -Chattanooga. By early 1864, Union armies were poised for what they hoped -would be a quick campaign to dismember the Confederacy and end the war. -This feeling was well illustrated by an Illinois soldier who wrote his -sister on April 22, “I think we can lick the Rebs like a book when we -start to do it & hope we will Clean Rebeldom out this summer so we will -be able to quit the business.” - -To realize these hopes, Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, commander of the -Northern armies, planned a simultaneous move on all fronts, with the -greatest efforts devoted to Virginia, where he would personally direct -operations, and to the region between the Tennessee and Chattahoochee -Rivers, where the Federals would be led by Sherman and Maj. Gen. -Nathaniel P. Banks. Grant hoped that Banks would move from New Orleans, -seize Mobile, and advance northward toward Montgomery, while Sherman’s -force struck southward from Chattanooga. Had these plans succeeded, the -Confederacy would have been reduced to a small area along the coast of -Georgia, the Carolinas, and Virginia. Confederate victories in -Louisiana, however, made Banks’ projected campaign infeasible, and -Sherman’s drive southward into Georgia, with Atlanta as the initial -goal, became the major Union effort in the West. - - [Illustration: _Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman_] - -Leaders on both sides had long recognized the importance of Atlanta, -located a few miles south of the Chattahoochee and about 120 miles from -Chattanooga. In 1864, only Richmond was more important to the South. -Atlanta’s four railroads were not only the best means of communication -between the eastern and western parts of the Confederacy but they were -also the major lines of supply for the Southern armies in Virginia and -north Georgia. The city’s hospitals cared for the sick and wounded and -her factories produced many kinds of military goods. In the words of a -Northern editor, Atlanta was “the great military depot of Rebeldom.” In -addition, the city’s capture would give the Union armies a base from -which they could strike further into Georgia to reach such vital -manufacturing and administrative centers as Milledgeville, Macon, -Augusta, and Columbus. All of these things were clear to the men who led -the opposing armies. - -William Tecumseh Sherman was a thin, nervous, active man, with a wild -shock of reddish or light-brown hair. A 44-year-old native of Ohio, he -had been graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1840 and, after -several years’ service in the Army, had resigned his commission to go -into banking and later into education. The outbreak of war had found him -serving as superintendent of a military college in Louisiana. He -resigned this position and returned to the North, where he entered -Federal service. Rising rapidly in the Army, he was chosen as supreme -commander in the West in early 1864. His soldiers liked him and -affectionately called him “Uncle Billy.” An officer who was with him in -1864 described the Federal commander as “tall and lank, not very erect, -with hair like a thatch, which he rubs up with his hands, a rusty beard -trimmed close, a wrinkled face, prominent red nose, small bright eyes, -coarse red hands ... he smokes constantly.” Sherman was also a dogged -fighter unawed by obstacles that would have broken lesser men, and Grant -knew he could be counted on to carry out his part of the grand -strategical plan for 1864. - -Sherman’s assignment was to break up the Confederate army in north -Georgia and “to get into the interior of the enemy’s country as far as -you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources.” -To accomplish this mission, he had almost 100,000 men organized into -three armies—the Army of the Cumberland, commanded by Maj. Gen. George -H. Thomas; the Army of the Tennessee, commanded by Maj. Gen. James B. -McPherson; and the Army of the Ohio, commanded by Maj. Gen. John M. -Schofield. By early May, Sherman had assembled these troops around -Chattanooga and was prepared to march with them into Georgia. - -Opposed to Sherman’s host was the Confederate Army of Tennessee, -commanded by Gen. Joseph E. Johnston. Johnston was a Virginian and, like -Sherman, a graduate of West Point (Class of 1829). He had served in the -U.S. Army until Virginia seceded in the spring of 1861, when he resigned -and entered Confederate service. In December 1863 he was named commander -of the major Confederate force in the West and given the mission of -defending the area against further Northern advance. Johnston had an -almost uncanny ability to win the loyal support of his subordinates. An -Arkansas officer who met the Southern commander in early 1864 noted in -his diary: “General Johnston is about 50 years of age—is quite gray—and -has a spare form, an intelligent face, and an expressive blue eye. He -was very polite, raising his cap to me after the introduction.” - -Unfortunately for the Confederacy, Johnston was also secretive, stubborn -when dealing with his superiors, petulant, and too prone to see -difficulties rather than opportunities. He constantly worried about -defeat and retreat, and was hesitant to act. In sum, he was a man whose -personality prevented him from effectively utilizing his many abilities. - -At the beginning of May, the 55,000 men of Johnston’s army were -concentrated around Dalton, Ga., 35 miles southeast of Chattanooga. The -Southern force consisted of two infantry corps commanded by Lt. Gens. -William J. Hardee and John Bell Hood, and a cavalry corps led by Maj. -Gen. Joseph Wheeler. What Johnston would do with these troops was still -very much in doubt. The Confederate government wanted him to march into -Tennessee and reestablish Southern authority over that crucial State. -Johnston, however, believed that conditions for such an offensive were -not favorable and that he should await Sherman’s advance, defeat it, and -then undertake to regain Tennessee. At the opening of the campaign in -early May, this issue had not been settled. The lack of understanding -and cooperation between the government in Richmond and the general in -Georgia, illustrated by this incident, was to hamper Confederate efforts -throughout the campaign. - - [Illustration: _Gen. Joseph E. Johnston_] - - [Illustration: ATLANTA CAMPAIGN - 1864] - - - - - RESACA - - -Three major rivers—the Oostanaula, the Etowah, and the -Chattahoochee—flow from northeast to southwest across northern Georgia, -dividing the area into four distinct geographical regions. Between -Chattanooga and the Oostanaula, several parallel mountain ridges slice -across the State in such a manner as to hamper military movements. The -most important of these was Rocky Face Ridge which ran from near the -Oostanaula to a point several miles north of Dalton. This ridge rose -high above the surrounding valleys and was the barrier between -Johnston’s army at Dalton and Sherman’s forces at Chattanooga. There -were three important gaps in this ridge: Mill Creek Gap west of Dalton, -Dug Gap a few miles to the south, and Snake Creek Gap west of the little -village of Resaca near the Oostanaula. - -Dalton is on the eastern side of Rocky Face Ridge. The Western and -Atlantic Railroad, which connected Chattanooga and Atlanta and served as -the line of supply for both armies, crossed the Oostanaula near Resaca, -ran north for 15 miles to Dalton, then turned westward to pass through -Rocky Face Ridge at Mill Creek Gap, and continued on to Chattanooga. -During the winter, the Confederates had fortified the area around Dalton -to such an extent that they believed it to be secure against any attack. -Johnston hoped that the Federals would assault his lines on Rocky Face -Ridge, for he was confident that he could hurl the Northerners back with -heavy loss. - -Sherman, however, had no intention of smashing his army against what one -of his soldiers called the “Georgian Gibraltar.” Northern scouts had -found Snake Creek Gap unguarded and the Federal commander decided to -send McPherson’s Army of the Tennessee through this gap to seize the -railroad near Resaca. Meanwhile, Thomas and Schofield would engage the -Confederates at Dalton to prevent their sending men to oppose McPherson. -Sherman hoped that when Johnston discovered his line of supply in -Federal hands, he would fall back in disorder and his army could be -routed by the Northerners. By May 6, the Federals were ready to begin -the campaign. Sherman moved Thomas and Schofield toward Dalton while -McPherson prepared to strike for Snake Creek Gap. - - [Illustration: _Maj. Gen. James B. McPherson_] - -Johnston had not been idle. He had deployed his men in strong positions -to block the expected advance. He had also requested reinforcements, and -these were on the way. Some coastal garrisons had been withdrawn from -their posts and were being sent to join Johnston. More important, -though, was the large body of troops from Mississippi that was moving -across Alabama toward Dalton. These men, numbering about 15,000, -constituted the Army of Mississippi and were commanded by Lt. Gen. -Leonidas Polk. A West Point graduate (1827), Polk had resigned from the -Army to enter the Episcopal ministry. In 1861 he was Bishop of Louisiana -and entered the Confederate service where he was known as the -Bishop-General. When Polk joined Johnston the Confederate strength would -be raised to about 70,000. - -Before Polk arrived, however, Sherman sent Thomas and Schofield against -Johnston’s position. On May 7 and 8, there was heavy fighting all along -the lines from the area north of Dalton south along Rocky Face Ridge to -Dug Gap. The Federals made no real headway, but the demonstration served -its purpose, for McPherson reached Snake Creek Gap on the evening of the -8th and found it open. - -James Birdseye McPherson, who stood at Snake Creek Gap on the morning of -May 9 with an opportunity to strike Johnston a crippling blow, was one -of the Civil War’s most attractive leaders. Like Sherman, he was an -Ohioan and a West Pointer (1853). In 1864 he was only 35 years old. His -entire adult life had been spent in the Army, and in the Civil War his -abilities had carried him from captain to major general in slightly more -than a year’s time. Both Sherman and Grant looked upon him as an -outstanding leader—a belief shared by the Confederate editor who called -McPherson “the most dangerous man in the whole Yankee army.” He was -handsome, with flowing hair and whiskers, and he had a special reason -for wanting the war to end: when it was over he would be able to marry -the beautiful girl who was waiting for him in Baltimore. He was -courteous to men of all ranks, and his adoring soldiers remembered long -afterwards his habit of riding in the fields to leave the roads open for -them. - - [Illustration: OPENING BATTLES OF THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN] - - [Illustration: _For four long and bloody months, officers and men - alike endured the heat and mud of what must have been one of the - wettest seasons in the history of Georgia._] - -On May 9, while skirmishing continued about Dalton, McPherson led his -army eastward, hoping to reach the railroad near Resaca and break -Johnston’s communications with Atlanta. Unknown to the Federals, there -were some 4,000 Confederates in Resaca. These included the advance -elements of Polk’s army, as well as infantry and cavalry units assigned -to guard the Oostanaula bridges and to protect the area. - -The Northern advance met these Southerners near the town. McPherson, -surprised at finding so large a force in his front, moved with great -caution. Late in the afternoon, he became worried that Johnston might -rush troops southward and cut him off from Sherman. This fear, and the -fact that some of his men were without food, led him to break off the -engagement and fall back to a position at Snake Creek Gap which he -fortified that night. - -In the following days, both armies shifted to the Resaca area. Sherman -began by sending a division of Thomas’ army to aid McPherson. Soon -orders followed for almost all of the Federals to march southward, with -only a small detachment left to watch Johnston. All day on the 11th the -roads west of Rocky Face were crowded with troops, wagons, and guns. -Although the march was slowed by a heavy rain, nightfall of the 12th -found the Northern army concentrated at Snake Creek Gap. Johnston -discovered the Federal move and during the night of May 12-13 ordered -his men to Resaca where Polk’s troops had been halted. - -Skirmishing on the 13th developed the positions of the armies. Johnston -had posted his men on the high ground north and west of Resaca. Polk’s -Corps (as the Army of Mississippi was called) held the Confederate left, -Hardee’s men occupied the center, and Hood was on the right, with his -right flank curved back to the Conasauga River. The Federal advance, -McPherson’s army, had moved directly toward Resaca. When the advance was -slowed, Thomas moved to the north and formed his army on McPherson’s -left. Schofield moved into position on Thomas’ left. - -The Battle of Resaca, fought May 13-15, was the first major engagement -of the campaign. The 13th was spent in skirmishing and establishing the -positions of the two armies. The 14th saw much heavy fighting. Sherman -delivered a major attack against the right center of Johnston’s line and -was hurled back with a heavy loss. One Northerner described the -Confederate fire as “_terrific and deadly_.” Later, Hood made a -determined assault on the Federal left and was prevented from winning a -great victory when Union reinforcements were hurried to the scene from -other sectors of the line. Late in the day, troops from McPherson’s army -made slight gains against the Confederate left. Fighting ceased at dark, -although firing continued throughout the night. There was no time for -the men to rest, however; both Johnston and Sherman kept their soldiers -busy digging fortifications, caring for the wounded, moving to new -positions, and preparing for the next day’s battle. - -The heaviest fighting on the 15th occurred at the northern end of the -lines. There, both sides made attacks that achieved some local success -but were inconclusive. Meanwhile, a Federal detachment had been sent -down the Oostanaula to attempt a crossing. At Lay’s Ferry, a few miles -below Resaca, it got over the river and secured a position from which to -strike eastward against Johnston’s rail line. The Southern commander -believed that this left him no choice but to retreat. Accordingly, -during the night of May 15-16, the Confederates withdrew and crossed to -the southern bank of the Oostanaula, burning the bridges behind them. - -As is the case with many Civil War battles, no accurate casualty figures -are available for the engagement at Resaca. Federal losses were probably -about 3,500; Confederate casualties were approximately 2,600. - - - - - TO THE ETOWAH - - -South of the Oostanaula, steep ridges and heavy woods give way to gently -rolling hills with only a light cover of vegetation. The area was almost -without defensible terrain and thus afforded a great advantage to -Sherman, whose larger forces would have more opportunities for maneuver -than they had found in the mountainous region to the north. - -Once across the Oostanaula, Johnston sought to make a stand and draw the -Federals into a costly assault. He expected to find favorable terrain -near Calhoun, but in this he was disappointed and during the night of -May 16-17 he led the Confederates on southward toward Adairsville. The -Federals followed—Sherman dividing his forces into three columns and -advancing on a broad front. There were skirmishes all along the route -during the 16th and 17th, but the main bodies were not engaged. - -At Adairsville Johnston again hoped to find a position in which he could -give battle, but there too the terrain was unsuitable for defense and -the Confederate commander was forced to continue his retreat. As he fell -back, however, Johnston devised a stratagem that he hoped would lead to -the destruction of a part of Sherman’s forces. There were two roads -leading south from Adairsville—one south to Kingston, the other -southeast to Cassville. It seemed likely that Sherman would divide his -armies so as to use both roads. This would give Johnston the opportunity -to attack one column before the other could come to its aid. - -When the Southerners abandoned Adairsville during the night of May -17-18, Johnston sent Hardee’s Corps to Kingston while he fell back -toward Cassville with the rest of his army. He hoped that Sherman would -believe most of the Southerners to be in Kingston and concentrate the -bulk of his forces there. Hardee would then hold off the Northerners at -Kingston while Johnston, with Polk and Hood, destroyed the smaller -Federal column at Cassville. - -Sherman reacted as Johnston hoped, ordering McPherson and the bulk of -Thomas’ army toward Kingston while sending only Schofield and one corps -of Thomas’ army along the road to Cassville. On the morning of May 19, -Johnston ordered Hood to march along a country road a mile or so east of -the Adairsville-Cassville Road and form his corps for battle facing -west. While Polk attacked the head of the Federal column, Hood was to -assail its left flank. As Hood was moving into position, he found -Northern soldiers to the east. This was a source of great danger, for -had Hood formed facing west, these Federals would have been in position -to attack the exposed flank and rear of his corps. After a brief -skirmish with the Northerners, Hood fell back to rejoin Polk. Johnston, -believing that the opportunity for a successful battle had passed, -ordered Hood and Polk to move to a new line east and south of Cassville, -where they were joined by Hardee who had been pushed out of Kingston. -Johnston formed his army on a ridge and hoped that Sherman would attack -him there on May 20. As usual, the Southern commander was confident of -repulsing the enemy. - - [Illustration: TO THE ETOWAH] - -That night the Confederate leaders held a council of war. Exactly what -happened at the council is a matter of dispute. According to Johnston, -Polk and Hood reported that their lines could not be held and urged that -the army retreat. Believing that the fears of the corps commanders would -be communicated to their men and thus weaken the army’s confidence, -Johnston yielded to these demands, even though he thought the position -to be defensible. According to Hood, whose recollection of the council -differs markedly from Johnston’s, he and Polk told Johnston that the -line could not be held against an attack but that it was a good position -from which to move against the enemy. Johnston, however, was unwilling -to risk an offensive battle and decided to fall back across the Etowah. -No definite resolution of this dispute is possible, but most of the -available evidence supports Hood’s version of the conference. Certainly -Johnston was not obligated to allow the advice of subordinates to -overrule his own judgment. The responsibility for abandoning the -Cassville position rests on the Southern commander. - -During the night, the Confederates withdrew across the Etowah. As they -fell back, their feelings were mixed. They had lost a very strong -position at Dalton, and had fallen back from Resaca, Calhoun, and -Adairsville. Now they were retreating again under cover of darkness. -That morning as they prepared for battle, their spirits had been high. -Now their disappointment was bitter. Although morale would revive in the -next few days, many Southern soldiers would never again place as much -confidence in Johnston’s abilities as they once had. - -By contrast, morale in the Federal ranks soared. In a short time of -campaigning, the Northerners had “driven” their enemy from one position -after another. Sherman was satisfied with the progress his armies had -made and, after learning that the Confederates were south of the Etowah, -he decided to give his men a short rest. On May 20, one of the Northern -generals summarized the situation in a letter to his wife: - - Thus far our campaign has succeeded though it must be confessed the - rebels have retreated in very good order and their army is still - unbroken. Our hard work is still before us. We are still 53 miles from - Atlanta and have to pass over a rugged Country. We will have some - bloody work before we enter that place. - - [Illustration: _After a council with Hood and Polk, Johnston - abandoned the Cassville position._] - - - - - NEW HOPE CHURCH - - -The region south of the Etowah was one of the wildest parts of north -Georgia. The area was sparsely settled, hilly, heavily wooded, and, in -1864, little known and poorly mapped. Sherman expected to push through -this region with little delay. On May 23 he wrote, “The Etowah is the -Rubicon of Georgia. We are now all in motion like a vast hive of bees, -and expect to swarm along the Chattahoochee in a few days.” His optimism -was ill-founded, for the rough terrain and heavy rains favored -Johnston’s smaller force and helped delay the Federal advance for 5 -weeks. - -Johnston posted his army around Allatoona Pass, a gap in the high hills -south of the Etowah through which the railroad ran on its way southward -to Marietta. He had again occupied a strong position hoping that Sherman -would attack it. The Federal commander, however, aware of the natural -strength of the terrain, was determined to avoid a direct assault and -crossed the river to the west where the country was more open. Dallas, a -small town about 14 miles south of the river and about the same distance -west of the railroad, was the first objective. - -The Northerners began their advance on the 23d. McPherson swung far to -the west through Van Wert and then moved eastward toward Dallas. Thomas -was in the center moving via Stilesboro and Burnt Hickory. Schofield was -on the left, closest to the Etowah. The day was hot and the men suffered -greatly from thirst. Nevertheless, the Federals made progress toward -their objective and, on the 24th, were closing in on Dallas. - -Confederate cavalry soon discovered Sherman’s movement and Johnston took -steps to meet it. By evening of the 24th, the Southerners held a line -east of Dallas which ran from southwest to northeast. The key to the -position was a crossroads at a Methodist church named New Hope. Hood’s -Corps held this part of the line. Polk and Hardee were to his left. - -On May 25, some troops of Thomas’ army ran up against Hood’s line at New -Hope Church. In a late afternoon battle fought under dark skies and -rolling bursts of thunder, Thomas’ men made a series of gallant assaults -against the Southern line. The Federals met a withering hail of bullets -and shells that quickly halted each advance. In this short engagement, -Thomas lost about 1,500 men. The Confederates suffered little during the -battle and were elated at their success. - - [Illustration: BATTLES AROUND NEW HOPE CHURCH] - - [Illustration: {uncaptioned}] - -Sunrise on the 26th found both commanders working to position their men -in the woods east of Dallas. Except for skirmishing, there was little -fighting during the day. - -On the following day, Sherman attempted to defeat the right of the -Southern line by a surprise attack. In a battle known as Pickett’s Mill, -the Northerners were hurled back with about 1,500 casualties. For the -Federals, this engagement was one of the most desperate of the campaign. -One company of the 41st Ohio Regiment lost 20 of its 22 men. The 49th -Ohio carried slightly over 400 men into the battle and lost 203 of them. -The commander of another regiment wrote that he lost a third of his men -in the first few yards of the advance. “The rebel fire ... swept the -ground like a hailstorm,” wrote another Unionist, adding, “this is -surely not war it is butchery.” A third Northerner noted in his diary -that evening, “our men were slaughtered terribly 2 brigades of infantry -were almost cut to pieces.” The Southerners lost about 500 men. - -Over the next few days fighting continued almost incessantly. Both sides -made assaults with strongly reinforced skirmish lines, seeking to hold -the enemy in position. This type of combat was very tiring on the men. -One soldier wrote after a night battle, “O God, what a night. They may -tell of hell and its awful fires, but the boys who went thru the fight -at Dallas ... are pretty well prepared for any event this side of -eternity.” - -The days spent in the jungles near New Hope Church were among the most -arduous of the war for the soldiers of both armies. In addition to the -normal dangers of combat, the men had to undergo unusual physical -hardships. Rain, heat, constant alarms, continuous sharpshooting, the -stench of the dead, the screams of the wounded, and a serious shortage -of food all added to the normal discomforts of life in the field. One -Federal soldier described the time spent near Dallas as “Probably the -most wretched week” of the campaign. Another wrote of it as “a wearisome -waste of life and strength.” A third Northerner, referring to an -unsuccessful foray against the Confederate lines, wrote, “We have struck -a hornet nest at the business end.” So severe had the fighting been that -Sherman’s men would ever afterward refer to the struggle around New Hope -Church as the “Battle of the Hell Hole.” - -When it became clear that no decisive battle would be fought at Dallas, -Sherman gradually sidled eastward to regain the railroad. On June 3, -advance elements of the Federal forces reached the little town of -Acworth, and within a few days, almost all the Northern troops were in -that general area. Sherman had outmaneuvered Johnston and bypassed the -strong Confederate position at Allatoona, but he had not seriously -weakened his opponent. Once again the Federal commander ordered a short -halt to rest his troops and allow time to repair the railroad and for -reinforcements to arrive. - - [Illustration: {uncaptioned}] - - - - - KENNESAW MOUNTAIN - - -By June 10, Sherman was ready to resume the advance. The Southerners had -taken up a line north of Marietta that ran from Brush Mountain on the -east to Pine Mountain in the center to Lost Mountain on the west. -McPherson moved against the right flank of this line, Thomas against the -center, and Schofield against the left. Rain fell almost every day and -hampered the Northern advance. For several days there was heavy -skirmishing in which the Federals captured Pine Mountain and made gains -at other points. Bishop-General Polk was killed on Pine Mountain by a -Union artillery shell on June 14, when he foolishly exposed himself to -enemy fire. Maj. Gen. William W. Loring commanded Polk’s Corps for -several weeks until a permanent replacement, Lt. Gen. Alexander P. -Stewart, took command. - -By the 16th, Schofield’s advance had been so successful that the -Southerners were forced to give up Lost Mountain. For several days, -Johnston tried to hold a new line that ran west from Brush Mountain and -then turned southward. This line was enfiladed by the Federal artillery, -however, and during the night of June 18-19 the Confederates abandoned -it and took up a new position extending along the crest of Kennesaw -Mountain and off to the south. Hardee’s Corps held the left of this -line, Loring’s was in the center, and Hood’s was on the right. - -When Sherman encountered this strong position, he extended his lines to -the south to try to outflank Johnston. He moved most of McPherson’s army -to the area directly in front of Kennesaw Mountain and placed Thomas’ -army in line on McPherson’s right with orders to extend to the right. In -the days that followed, McPherson and Thomas were engaged in what -amounted to a siege of the Southern position. Little progress could be -made on the ground but the artillery on both sides was used in attempts -to batter and weaken the enemy. Day after day, the big Union guns -pounded the Southern line, their fire being answered by Confederate -cannon high on Kennesaw Mountain. - -Meanwhile, Sherman drew Schofield’s army in from the Lost Mountain area -and ordered it to move south on the Sandtown Road, which ran west of the -Federal position toward the Chattahoochee. After a long and muddy march, -Schofield’s men reached Nose’s Creek at dark on June 19. On the -following day, they crossed the swollen stream and drove the Southerners -away. The bridge was rebuilt; on the 21st their advance was resumed. -That same day, the right of Thomas’ army established contact with -Schofield near Powder Springs Road. - -Johnston had seen the Federal right being extended and was aware of the -dangers it presented to his line of communications. To meet this threat -the Confederate commander shifted Hood’s Corps from the right of his -line to the left during the night of June 21-22. By early afternoon of -the 22d, Hood’s men were in position on Hardee’s left. - -Early on the 22d, the right of the Northern line resumed its advance. -The XX Corps of Thomas’ army moved east on Powder Springs Road, -supported by some of Schofield’s troops. By midafternoon, they reached -the vicinity of Valentine Kolb’s farm. The rest of Schofield’s army -continued down Sandtown Road to the Cheney farm, where it occupied a -position overlooking Olley’s Creek. - -In the early part of the afternoon, the Federals captured several -Southerners from whom they learned that Hood had moved to the -Confederate left. From this they concluded that an attack upon the -Federal line was imminent. Quickly the Northern commanders closed up -their units and began to construct protecting works, using fence rails -or whatever material was at hand. Skirmishers were thrown out, and they -soon encountered an advancing line of Southerners. Just what brought -about this attack is not clear. Perhaps the activities of the Northern -skirmishers led the Confederates to think that the Federals were -attacking. Hood may have believed that when the skirmishers fell back he -had defeated an assault on his new position and decided to pursue the -beaten enemy. At any rate, the Southern advance precipitated a battle at -the Kolb farmhouse in which several Confederate attacks were hurled back -by the Federals. Hood lost about 1,000 men. Northern casualties were -about 300. After the battle, Hood fell back to his original position, -extending the Southern line southward to Olley’s Creek. For several -days, there was relative calm along the lines which now ran from the -railroad north of Marietta to Olley’s Creek southwest of the town. -Meanwhile, the rains ceased and the June sun began to dry the land. - -Several days after the battle at Kolb’s farm, Sherman decided on a -change in tactics—he would make a direct assault on Johnston’s lines. It -was a bold decision that offered the possibility of a great victory. The -Southern line was thinly held and a successful attack could lead to the -isolation and destruction of a large part of Johnston’s army. The -Federal commander decided to strike the Confederates at three points: -McPherson would assault the southern end of Kennesaw Mountain, Thomas -would move against a salient known as the “Dead Angle” (on what is now -called Cheatham’s Hill) several miles to the south, and Schofield would -push south on Sandtown Road and attempt to cross Olley’s Creek. June 27 -was set as the date for the assault, but Schofield was to begin -demonstrations on the 26th to draw Southerners away from other portions -of the line. - - [Illustration: KENNESAW MOUNTAIN] - -Early on the 27th, the Federals began to probe at various points along -the Confederate trenches to distract the defenders. At 8 a.m. the -Northern artillery opened a brief but heavy fire to prepare the way for -the assaults. A few minutes later, the Federal infantry moved forward. -McPherson’s troops, advancing on both sides of Burnt Hickory Road, swept -over the Southern outposts and moved rapidly across the broken ground -toward the main Confederate trenches. Although their lines were -disordered, the blue-clad soldiers scrambled over rocks and fallen trees -until they were finally halted by the heavy fire from their entrenched -enemies. A few reached the Confederate line and were killed or captured -while fighting in their opponents’ works. Southerners on Little Kennesaw -added to the Northerners’ discomfort by rolling huge rocks down the -mountainside at them. When the Union troops realized that their attack -could not reach the Confederate lines, they broke off the engagement. -Some were able to find protection in the advanced Confederate rifle-pits -they had overrun and some managed to reach the positions from which they -had begun the assault. A few were forced to seek shelter among the trees -and large rocks on the slopes of the mountain where they remained until -darkness offered a chance to return to their own lines. - -To the south, Thomas fared no better. Two columns were directed against -the Southern position—one at Cheatham’s Hill, the other a short distance -to the north. The Southerners expected no attack. Many of them were off -duty and others were relaxing in the lines. The Federal artillery, -however, alerted them to the danger and when Thomas’ infantry started -forward, the Confederates were ready. - -As soon as the dense blue columns appeared in the cleared area between -the lines, the Confederates opened what one Northerner called a -“terrible” fire upon them. Men dropped rapidly but the columns continued -up the long slope toward the Southern position. “The air,” one Federal -remembered, “seemed filled with bullets, giving one the sensation -experienced when moving swiftly against a heavy rain or sleet storm.” As -the Union soldiers neared the crest of the ridge, they met the full fury -of the defenders’ fire. To one Federal it seemed as if the Confederate -trenches were “veritable volcanoes ... vomiting forth fire and smoke and -raining leaden hail in the face of the Union boys.” - -Most of the attackers never reached the Confederate line. Those who did -were too few to overpower the defenders and were quickly killed or -captured. For a few brief seconds, two Northern battle flags waved on -the breastworks, but the bearers were soon shot down and within a short -time the attack had failed. - -As Thomas’ left assaulting column struck that portion of the Southern -line held by the consolidated 1st and 15th Arkansas Regiments, the -gunfire ignited the underbrush and many wounded Federals faced the -terrifying prospect of being burned to death. In one of the notable acts -of the war, Lt. Col. William H. Martin, commanding the Arkansans, jumped -from his trenches waving a white handkerchief and shouting to the -Northerners to come and get the wounded men. For a few minutes, fighting -was suspended along that short stretch of the line and some of Martin’s -soldiers went to assist in moving their helpless enemies away from the -flames. When the wounded had been removed to safety, the two sides -resumed hostilities, but here too it was clear that the attack would not -be able to break Johnston’s lines. - -At the Dead Angle, some of the attacking Northerners remained under the -crest of the ridge within a few yards of the Confederate trenches. There -they dug rifle pits of their own and started to burrow under the hill, -hoping to fill the tunnel with gunpowder and blow up the salient. -However, before this project had progressed very far, the Southerners -abandoned the position and thus rendered the subterranean attack -unnecessary. - -While the attacks of McPherson and Thomas were being repulsed, Schofield -was gaining a clear success at the extreme right of the Union line. On -the 26th, one of his brigades crossed Olley’s Creek north of Sandtown -Road and, on the following day, cleared their opponents from the area, -securing a position several miles to the south which placed the right of -their line closer to the Chattahoochee than was the left of Johnston’s -army. From this position the Northerners could strike at the Confederate -line of supply and perhaps cut Johnston off from all sources of help by -breaking the railroad. - -Exact casualty figures for the battles of June 27 are not available. -However, the best estimates place Northern losses at about 3,000 men. -The Southerners lost at least 750 killed, wounded, or captured. - -Sherman has been criticized for ordering the frontal attack on -Johnston’s lines, but it now seems that his decision was not unwise. Had -the assault succeeded, he would have won a great victory. As it was, he -did not continue the attacks when it was clear that they would fail, and -he had managed to secure a position from which he could easily pry -Johnston out of the Kennesaw line. - - [Illustration: _Lt. Col. William H. Martin jumped from the trenches - waving a white handkerchief and shouting to the Northerners to come - and get the wounded men._] - - - - - ACROSS THE CHATTAHOOCHEE - - -The success won by Schofield at Olley’s Creek indicated the direction -for the next Federal movement. Sherman quickly decided to shift troops -to his right, knowing that such a move would force Johnston to choose -between giving up the Kennesaw line or being cut off from Atlanta. -Accordingly, he began to reinforce Schofield by moving McPherson from -the left to the right. By the afternoon of July 2, Federal troops were -pushing southward on Sandtown Road against only light opposition from -small Confederate detachments. - -Johnston was aware of what was happening—in fact, he had expected such a -movement since the failure of the assault on the 27th. Believing that it -would be unwise to stretch his lines further and realizing that the -troops opposing the Federal advance could do no more than delay it, -Johnston decided to abandon his Kennesaw Mountain position and fall back -to a previously prepared line near Smyrna, 4 miles to the south. -Accordingly, during the night of July 2-3, the Confederates filed out of -their trenches around Marietta and marched southward. - -When Sherman discovered that the Southerners were gone, he pushed -forward in pursuit, hoping to strike while the enemy was retreating. In -the late afternoon of the 3d, the Northerners reached the new -Confederate line. The 4th was spent in skirmishing, but before a serious -battle could develop, the Federal right secured a strategic position -from which it threatened to slice in between Johnston’s army and -Atlanta. Again, the threat to his left forced Johnston to retreat. -During the night of July 4-5, the Southerners fell back to a heavily -fortified position on the north bank of the Chattahoochee. - -On the 5th, the Federals pushed forward until they reached the new -Southern line. Skirmishing that day convinced Sherman that the position -was too strong to be carried by a headlong assault. He dispatched a -cavalry force to seize Roswell, an important little manufacturing town -about 16 miles upriver from Johnston’s fortifications, and allowed his -men a few days’ rest while he planned the next move. - - [Illustration: ACROSS THE CHATTAHOOCHEE RIVER] - -After carefully studying the situation, the Federal commander decided to -attempt a crossing near the mouth of Soap Creek, above Johnston’s right -flank. On July 8, he moved Schofield’s Army of the Ohio into position -for the crossing. In a brilliant movement, Schofield, utilizing pontoon -boats and the ruins of a submerged fish dam, got over the river and -drove away the small group of Southerners defending the area. Other -troops were rushed across, bridges were built, trenches were dug, and by -nightfall the Northerners held a secure bridgehead on the southern bank. -On the following day, the Federal cavalry got over the river at Roswell. -Sherman had successfully crossed the last major barrier between -Chattanooga and Atlanta and had carried the fighting into the open -country south of the Chattahoochee where the terrain would favor him. - -During the night of July 9-10, Johnston retreated across the river and -took up a position on the southern bank of Peachtree Creek only a few -miles from Atlanta. The Confederate commander seems to have been -optimistic at this time. Once again he believed that he had reached a -position from which he could not be driven and he expected to fight the -decisive battle of the campaign along Peachtree Creek. - -Sherman, meanwhile, had decided upon his next step. He would swing north -and east of Atlanta to cut Johnston off from Augusta and possible -reinforcements from Virginia. McPherson was to strike eastward from -Roswell to the Georgia Railroad at some point near Stone Mountain. As -this force advanced, the rest of the Federals would move closer to the -river. The line would thus become a great swinging movement, with -McPherson on the far left, Schofield in the center as the pivot, and -Thomas on the right along Peachtree Creek. This movement began on the -17th. The next day, McPherson reached the Georgia Railroad near Stone -Mountain. - - - - - JOHNSTON REMOVED FROM COMMAND - - -The Confederate government had been displeased by Johnston’s conduct of -the campaign. President Jefferson Davis and other civilian officials had -hoped that the Confederates would be able to regain Tennessee or at -least to draw Sherman into a situation in which a severe defeat would be -inflicted upon him. Instead, after 10 weeks of campaigning, Johnston was -backed up against Atlanta and there was no assurance that he would even -try to hold that important center. These circumstances led Davis to -remove Johnston from command of the army and to replace him with John B. -Hood, who was promoted to the temporary rank of full general. - -Davis’ replacement of Johnston with Hood is one of the most -controversial acts of the war. Relations between the President and -Johnston had not been friendly since a dispute over the general’s rank -in 1861. Disagreements over strategy and tactics as well as the -personalities of the two men exacerbated matters in 1862 and 1863. -During Johnston’s tenure as commander of the Army of Tennessee, the -situation became worse as communications between the two broke down -almost completely. Davis promoted officers in the army without -consulting Johnston, who maneuvered in the field without informing the -government of his plans and operations in any meaningful detail. - -Davis saw that Johnston had yielded much valuable territory to the -enemy. Important officials in the government began to urge that the -general be removed from command. On July 9, Davis sent his military -adviser, Gen. Braxton Bragg, to report on the situation in Georgia. -Bragg visited Johnston, learned nothing of the general’s plans, and -reported that it appeared the city would be abandoned. Other evidence -brought to the President’s attention—such as Johnston’s suggestion that -prisoners held in south Georgia be sent to safer points—seemed to -confirm Bragg’s assessment that Atlanta would not be defended. On July -16, Davis telegraphed Johnston: “I wish to hear from you as to present -situation and your plan of operations so specifically as will enable me -to anticipate events.” The general’s reply of the same date read in -part: - - As the enemy has double our numbers, we must be on the defensive. My - plan of operations must, therefore, depend upon that of the enemy. - - It is mainly to watch for an opportunity to fight to advantage. We are - trying to put Atlanta in condition to be held for a day or two by the - Georgia militia, that army movements may be freer and wider. - -This vague reply did not satisfy Davis and on July 17 he issued the -order that removed Johnston from command. In great haste, Johnston wrote -out an order relinquishing his position and thanking the soldiers for -their courage and devotion. By the afternoon of the 18th he had left -Atlanta and the Army of Tennessee in the none-too-steady hands of John -Bell Hood. - -Much debate has swirled around Davis’ decision. Johnston and his -partisans have argued that the general’s removal made inevitable the -loss of Atlanta, the reelection of Lincoln, and the defeat of the -Confederacy. They contend that had Johnston remained in command, the -city would have been held, or that if it were surrendered, the army at -least would not have been weakened and would have continued as an -effective unit. - -Hood and Davis maintained that Johnston’s long retreat had demoralized -the army, that Johnston would not have held Atlanta, and that the -Confederacy’s only chance for success lay in replacing Johnston with a -bold commander who could strike Sherman a blow that would send the -Northerners reeling back to Chattanooga. - -Most historians have tended to accept Johnston’s position. There can be -no definite answer, of course, but it does seem that Johnston would have -evacuated the city rather than lose a large portion of his army fighting -for it. This would have saved the army but, coming after the long -retreat from Dalton, might have so demoralized it that desertion and -disgust would have ended its career as an effective fighting force. If -the retention of Atlanta was essential to the life of the Confederacy, -President Davis seems justified in his decision to remove Johnston. It -was the Confederacy’s misfortune that no bold, intelligent, and lucky -general was available to take his place. But one thing was certain—with -Hood leading the Southerners, the pattern of the campaign would change. - - - - - IN THE RANKS - - -Historians have long been in the habit of dealing with the past as if it -were nothing more than the story of a small number of great men who -moved about shaping the world as they saw fit. In reality, leaders are -not long successful without followers—the great mass of the common -people who do the work, bear the burdens, and suffer the consequences of -their leaders’ policies. The Civil War offers a unique opportunity to -study the common people of America because during that conflict large -numbers of people were directly involved in the great events of the -times. For most of them, the war was the single most important event of -their lives. Consequently they wrote about it in great detail in their -letters and diaries and saved these documents after the conflict ended. -It is therefore possible to see the Civil War armies as groups of -humans, not masses of automata. The men who followed Sherman, Johnston, -and Hood in 1864 left behind information that adds much to an -understanding of the campaign. - -Records kept by the Federal Government show that the typical Northern -soldier was 5 feet 8¼ inches tall and weighed 143½ pounds. Doubtless the -Southerners were of a similar stature. The same records also indicate -that before the war 48 percent of the men had been farmers. Among the -Confederates the percentage of farmers was more than half. Relatively -few immigrants served in either western army—perhaps one-fifth to -one-sixth of the men were of foreign birth. More than half the units in -Sherman’s armies were from Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio. Iowa, Kentucky, -Missouri, and Wisconsin also furnished large contingents. Such Eastern -States as New York, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania were -represented, but their contributions were small. More than two-thirds of -the units in the Southern army were from Tennessee, Alabama, -Mississippi, and Georgia. Other States with significant numbers of -troops in the Confederate ranks were Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana. -Alabama, Kentucky, Missouri, and Tennessee were represented by units on -both sides. Most of the men in the armies that struggled for Atlanta had -volunteered for military service in 1861 or 1862. By 1864 they had -become veterans, inured to the hardships of military life. Nevertheless, -they found the Atlanta Campaign a severe trial. - -Unlike many Civil War military operations in which fighting occurred at -infrequent intervals, the struggle for Atlanta was virtually a -continuous battle. Sometimes, as at Resaca, almost all of the opposing -forces were engaged; at other times, action was limited to the desultory -firing of skirmishers. But only on rare occasions were the soldiers able -to escape the sounds and dangers of combat. - -The weather—whether a freak cold wave in mid-June, the unusually heavy -rains of late May and June, or the normal heat of July and -August—affected every man and often hampered troop movements as well. -Frequently units on the march lost men who could not stand the pace. The -soldiers would drop by the roadside until they had recovered their -strength, then move on to overtake their comrades. For example, the heat -on July 12 was so bad that only 50 of the men in an Illinois regiment -could keep up on a 3-mile march. When the armies were in fortified -positions, as they were at Kennesaw Mountain, the men often stretched -blankets or brush across the trenches to protect themselves from the -sun. On rainy days, fence rails or rocks in the trenches served to keep -soldiers out of the water. - -Clothing was also a problem. As a rule, Sherman’s men were better -supplied than their opponents, but the wool uniforms they wore were -unsuited to the hot Georgia summer. The Confederates had almost no new -clothing after the campaign began and their uniforms deteriorated -rapidly. A Texan summed up their plight in early June when he wrote: “In -this army one hole in the seat of the breeches indicates a captain, two -holes a lieutenant, and the seat of the pants all out indicates that the -individual is a private.” - -Rarely did the men of either army have a chance to wash and almost all -of them were affected by body lice and other vermin. A sense of humor -helped them to survive these trials—soldiers who were pinned down in a -water-filled trench by enemy fire consoled themselves with the thought -that they were at least drowning the lice. The Federals complained that -the retreating Southerners infested the country with lice that attacked -the advancing Northerners. Other pests included chiggers, ticks, snakes, -scorpions, flies, and ants. - - [Illustration: _By 1864 most of the men in the armies that struggled - for Atlanta had become veterans, inured to the hardships of military - life._] - - [Illustration: _Soldiers in both armies had no scruples about - supplementing their rations with whatever could be taken from - surrounding farms and homes._] - -Soldiers in both armies suffered from a shortage of food and had no -scruples about supplementing their rations with whatever could be taken -from the surrounding farms and homes. Corn, pork, chickens, geese, hams, -potatoes, apples, and onions disappeared as the armies moved through a -neighborhood. Wild berries and fish were also eaten. Nevertheless, there -were many times when food was in short supply. One Federal wrote, “most -of the time we are on the move and cannot get such as is fit for a man -to eat.” - -The Atlanta Campaign, like many of the later Civil War campaigns, saw -the development of trench warfare on a large scale. Protecting works -were built from loose rocks, fence rails, tombstones, or even the bodies -of dead comrades. By the third or fourth week of the campaign, both -sides had mastered the art of field fortification—a trench, with the -dirt piled on the side toward the enemy and surmounted by a headlog -under which were small openings for firing. Such works left “little but -the eyes ... exposed” to enemy fire. In front of the trenches the -underbrush would be cleared away and young trees cut so they fell toward -the foe. The trees were left partly attached to the stump so that they -could not be dragged aside. Telegraph wire was sometimes strung between -them to create further obstacles. - -From behind their fortifications soldiers could pour out such a volume -of fire that there was no chance for a successful massed attack—unless -complete surprise could be achieved or overwhelming numbers brought -against a weak part of the enemy’s line. Much of the fighting was -therefore done by small patrols and snipers, especially in heavily -wooded country such as the area around New Hope Church and Kennesaw -Mountain. - -The soldier who died in battle could expect no elaborate funeral. -Usually the armies were too busy to do more than bury the dead as -quickly as possible and they would probably be put in a mass grave near -the place where they had fallen. Later the bodies might be exhumed and -moved to a cemetery where they would be listed as “unidentified” and -reinterred in a numbered but nameless grave. - -The soldier who was wounded or who was disabled by disease suffered -greatly. As a rule, the Northerner who was sent to an army hospital -fared better than his opponent because the Federals were better equipped -and provisioned than the Confederates. Field hospitals treated men whose -wounds were either very slight or too serious to permit further -movement. Others were sent by wagon and rail to hospitals in the -rear—Rome, Chattanooga, and Knoxville for the Federals; Atlanta and the -small towns along the railroads south of that city for the Southerners. - -Transportation in crowded hospital wagons over rutted roads or in slow -hospital trains was an indescribable horror. The hospitals themselves -were better but, by modern standards, uncomfortable and dirty. For -painful operations, Northern soldiers often enjoyed the blessing of -chloroform. Many Southerners, however, especially those in the hospitals -in smaller towns, frequently endured major surgery without the benefit -of any opiate except, perhaps, whiskey. In such cases the hospitals -echoed with the screams of men undergoing amputations or such treatments -as that calling for the use of nitric acid to burn gangrene out of their -wounds. - - [Illustration: {uncaptioned}] - -No precise figures as to the number of men who were killed, wounded, or -sick during the campaign are available. However, it is known that for -the war as a whole, disease killed about twice as many men as did the -weapons of the enemy. Sickness brought on by exposure and unsanitary -camps undoubtedly accounted for many lives among the soldiers in -Georgia. Diseases that were especially common were smallpox, scurvy, -dysentery, diarrhea (also known as “dierear” and the “Tennessee quick -step”), and various types of fevers. - -Religion provided a great source of comfort for many soldiers. Chaplains -accompanied both armies but were too few to serve all the troops. Some -chaplains preferred to spend the campaign in the rear where they would -be safe, while others, of far more influence with the men, braved -hardships and dangers with the units they served. At least three of the -latter group were killed in battle during the campaign—either while -helping the wounded or fighting in the ranks. When chaplains were not -available the men sometimes organized and conducted their own religious -services. On the other hand, many soldiers ignored religion altogether -and continued such “sinful” practices as cursing, drinking, and -gambling. Nevertheless, what one soldier called “the missionary -influence of the enemy’s cannon” and the constant presence of death and -suffering led many to seek comfort in religion. - -Throughout the campaign, when the armies were in a relatively stable -situation, the men sometimes agreed not to shoot at one another. -Instead, they would meet between the lines to talk, swim, drink, bathe, -enjoy the sun, pick blackberries, exchange newspapers, swap Northern -coffee for Southern tobacco, play cards, wrestle, eat, sing, rob the -dead, and argue politics. Officers on both sides tried to prohibit this -fraternization, but the men in the ranks had the good sense to ignore -their orders. These informal truces would usually be respected by all, -and when they were over, fighting would not resume until every man had -gotten back to his own trenches. Much of the tragedy of the war was -reflected in a letter written by a Wisconsin soldier on June 24: - - We made a bargain with them that we would not fire on them if they - would not fire on us, and they were as good as their word. It seems - too bad that we have to fight men that we like. Now these Southern - soldiers seem just like our own boys, only they are on the other side. - They talk about their people at home, their mothers and fathers and - their sweethearts, just as we do among ourselves. - -However, regardless of the soldiers’ feelings about each other during -those times of truce, the war was being run by the generals and the -generals said it must go on. - - - - - PEACHTREE CREEK - - -John Bell Hood, the new commander of the Confederate forces, found -himself in a difficult position on the morning of July 18, 1864. Hood -was young—only 33—and relatively inexperienced in handling large bodies -of troops. After graduation from West Point (in the same class with the -Federal generals McPherson and Schofield) he had served with the U.S. -Army until the spring of 1861, when he resigned and cast his lot with -the Confederacy. In the early years of the war Hood had risen rapidly in -rank—a rise more than justified by his outstanding leadership at the -brigade and division level. - -Until the summer of 1863, Hood had been physically one of the most -magnificent men in the Confederate Army. A woman who knew him in 1861 -described him as “six feet two inches in height, with a broad, full -chest, light hair and beard, blue eyes, with a peculiarly soft -expression, commanding in appearance, dignified in deportment, -gentlemanly and courteous to all.” By the time he took command of the -Army of Tennessee, Hood’s appearance had undergone some changes. His -left arm dangled uselessly at his side, smashed by a Federal bullet at -Gettysburg in July 1863. His right leg was gone, cut away at the hip -following a wound received at the Battle of Chickamauga in September -1863. Hood suffered great pain from these wounds, and no doubt he should -have been retired from field command; but he was not the kind of man who -could stay away from the army during a war. - -After recovering from his second wound, he was sent to the Army of -Tennessee as a corps commander and had served in that capacity until -Davis selected him to succeed Johnston. He may have been taking a -derivative of laudanum to ease his pain and some students of the war -believe that this affected his judgment. Many soldiers in the army -distrusted Hood’s ability. Some officers resented his promotion over the -heads of generals who had served with the army since the beginning of -the war. Hood himself believed that the army had been demoralized by -Johnston’s long retreat and hence was unlikely to fight well. - -Nor could the tactical situation have brought Hood any encouragement. -Thomas’ Army of the Cumberland was advancing southward directly toward -Atlanta, while the armies of McPherson and Schofield were east of the -city, advancing westward. Two of the four railroads that connected -Atlanta with the rest of the Confederacy were in Federal hands. Unless -Hood could keep the remaining lines open, the city was doomed. - - [Illustration: BATTLES AROUND ATLANTA] - - Battle of Peachtree Creek JULY 20 - Battle of Ezra Church, JULY 28 - Battle of Atlanta JULY 22 - -On July 19, the Army of the Cumberland crossed Peachtree Creek, but as -it advanced, it drifted toward the west. Thus by the afternoon a gap had -developed in the Northern line between Thomas on the right and Schofield -in the center. Hood decided to concentrate the corps of Hardee and -Stewart against Thomas. The Confederate commander hoped to overwhelm the -isolated Army of the Cumberland before help could arrive from McPherson -and Schofield. Hood relied upon his former corps, temporarily commanded -by Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham, and the cavalry to defend the area -east of Atlanta. The attack on Thomas was set for 1 p.m., July 20. - -Early in the morning of the 20th, while the Southerners were preparing -to assail the right of the Federal line, the Northerners east of Atlanta -moved west along the Georgia Railroad toward the city. Their progress -was so rapid that Hood felt it necessary to shift his army to the right -in an effort to strengthen the forces defending the eastern approaches -to Atlanta. This movement led to such confusion in the Confederate ranks -that the attack against Thomas was delayed for about 3 hours. When the -Southerners were finally ready to strike, Thomas’ men had had time to -establish and partly fortify a position on the south side of Peachtree -Creek. - -What Hood had planned as a quick blow against an unprepared Northern -army thus developed into a headlong assault against a partially -fortified line. For several hours the Southerners threw themselves -against the Federals. Most of the attacks were halted before they -seriously threatened the Union position, but for a short while it -appeared that some of Hardee’s men would sweep around the left of -Thomas’ line and win a great victory. Hastily, Thomas assembled -artillery batteries and directed their fire against the Southerners. -Eventually the Confederates were driven back. - -While fighting raged along Peachtree Creek, McPherson continued to push -toward Atlanta from the east. By 6 p.m., Hood was forced to call upon -Hardee for troops to reinforce the Southern lines east of the city. This -order drew from Hardee the reserve division that he was preparing to -throw into the assault against Thomas and forced him to abandon the -attack. The first of Hood’s efforts to cripple the Federal army had -failed, although at the time some Southerners saw it as a blow that -slowed Federal progress. - -Northern casualties in the Battle of Peachtree Creek were reported at -1,600. Estimates of Southern losses (mostly from Federal sources) range -from 2,500 to 10,000. It seems now that 4,700 is a reliable estimate of -Confederate casualties. - - [Illustration: _Gen. John B. Hood_] - -The battle later became a source of controversy between Hood and Hardee. -Hood, smarting under the criticism of Joseph E. Johnston and others, -blamed the failure to crush Thomas on Hardee. The corps commander, Hood -charged, had failed to attack at the proper time and had not driven home -the assault. Hardee, who had outranked Hood when they were both -lieutenant generals and who may have been disgruntled at serving under -his former junior, replied that the delay was caused by Hood’s decision -to shift the line to the right and that the assault had not been as -vigorously executed as it normally would have been because Hood’s -late-afternoon order to send reinforcements to the right had deprived -the attackers of the unit that was to deliver the final blow. Postwar -commentators mostly favor Hardee and a careful examination of the -evidence supports this view. - - - - - THE BATTLE OF ATLANTA - - -After the Battle of Peachtree Creek, attention shifted to the eastern -side of the city. Hood determined to strike McPherson who, on July 20 -and 21, had moved past Decatur and entrenched a line running north and -south a few miles east of Atlanta. The Confederate commander realized -that he might march troops around the left of McPherson’s position and -attack him from the flank and rear. He chose Hardee’s Corps to be the -flanking column and planned to have Cheatham’s men attack the front of -McPherson’s army from the west while Hardee struck from the south and -east. With luck, this sensible plan could result in the defeat of a -large part of Sherman’s forces. - -Late on the 21st, Hardee’s men withdrew from their advanced position -north of Atlanta and by midnight they were marching out of the city. -They were to move southward, then turn and swing eastward and northward. -Meanwhile, the other Southerners fell back to shorter lines where, it -was hoped, they would be able to hold off the Federals while Hardee -outflanked them. - -On the morning of July 22, Sherman found the Southerners gone from his -immediate front and concluded that Atlanta had been abandoned. However, -as his armies pushed forward, they discovered that the defenders had -only fallen back to a new position. The Northern advance contracted the -Federal lines and the XVI Corps of McPherson’s army was crowded out of -place. McPherson ordered it to move to his extreme left. Thus at the -time Hardee was moving to that area, McPherson, by chance, was sending -in reinforcements. - -Hardee’s march was long and hard. Poor roads, inept guides, and the July -heat combined to delay the Southerners. It was not until noon that -Hardee had his men in position, and at 1 p.m. he sent them forward. The -Confederates made their way through heavy underbrush and emerged facing -the Federal XVI Corps which had halted in a perfect position to meet the -charge which broke upon them. - -Poor coordination also weakened the force of the Confederate offensive. -Cheatham’s men, who assailed the XVII Corps, did not join the assault -until about 3:30, by which time Hardee’s attack had lost much of its -force. Nevertheless, the fighting was severe. One Federal brigadier -wrote of the attackers: - - They burst forth from the woods in truly magnificent style in front of - my right.... Hardly had the enemy made his appearance in my front when - [the artillery] ... opened on them a deadly fire, which rather - staggered their line, yet on came the advancing rebels, and hotter - grew the fire of ... [our artillery]. At the same time the ... - infantry ... opened on them with cool and deadly aim. Still on came - the charging columns, more desperate than ever, those in front urged - up by those in rear. - -The first charge was driven back, but the Southerners returned to the -attack again and again throughout the long afternoon. Several times they -swarmed over the Federal positions, capturing men and cannon, but each -time they were driven back. In one of the early charges, McPherson was -killed by advancing Confederate skirmishers as he rode forward to rally -his men. Finally, about 7 p.m., the Southerners abandoned the attack and -fell back. Their losses have been estimated at about 8,000. Union -casualties were reported at 3,722. - -For the second time Hood had lashed out at his opponent and had been -thrown back. Later he tried to shift the blame to Hardee whom he accused -of failing to be in the proper place at the proper time. In post-war -years, a bitter verbal battle raged over the question. Most present-day -authorities feel that Hardee did all that could reasonably have been -asked of him. His troops were worn from the battle on Peachtree Creek, -the bad roads slowed his march, and the fateful positioning of the XVI -Corps was a matter over which he had no control. - -In the summer of 1864, however, many Confederates saw the battle as a -splendid victory. One artilleryman wrote on July 23: - - We gained a great victory yesterday of which I suppose you know [from - newspapers] as much as I do. We left before much was accomplished but - hear that our corps captured 3,500 prisoners and 22 pieces of - artillery & the enemies killed & wounded amounted to twice our own. - - - - - EZRA CHURCH - - -For several days after the Battle of Atlanta, there was a lull in -military activities around the city. Both sides were reorganizing. -Sherman selected Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard to command the army that -McPherson had led. On the Confederate side, Lt. Gen. Stephen D. Lee -replaced Cheatham as commander of the corps that had originally been -Hood’s. - -By July 26, Sherman had decided upon his next maneuver. His goal was the -railroads south and west of Atlanta—the last links between that city and -the rest of the Confederacy—and to reach them he would swing Howard’s -Army of the Tennessee around from his extreme left to his extreme right. -The movement began that afternoon and by nightfall on the 27th, Howard’s -men were west of Atlanta. Early the following day the advance was -resumed. The only effective opposition came from a small body of -Confederate cavalry. - -Hood was aware of Sherman’s new maneuver and determined to block it by -sending the corps of Lee and Stewart west along the road to the little -settlement of Lickskillet. By noon the opposing forces were in the area -of a meetinghouse known as Ezra Church, about 2½ miles west of Atlanta. -The Confederates had been ordered to attack and prevent the Northerners -from crossing the road, and Lee and Stewart sent their men forward in a -series of assaults against the XV Corps. The Federals had not had time -to entrench, but they had piled up barricades of logs and church -benches, and these afforded some protection. - -“Our skirmishers, overpowered by numbers, were compelled to fall back to -the main line,” wrote a Union officer, - - followed at an interval of but a few paces by dense columns of the - enemy, which, covered as they were by the undergrowth, advanced within - forty or fifty paces of our lines, when a terrific and destructive - fire was opened upon them, and was continued steadily until their - advance was checked, at the distance of some twenty to thirty paces. - Their lines were cut down, disordered, and driven back some distance, - when they rallied and again came boldly forward to the charge, but - under the murderous fire of our rifles were no more able to disorder - or discompose our lines than before. They gained a little ground - several times, only to lose it inch by inch, after the most terrible - fighting on both sides.... After a very short interval, which did not - amount to a cessation of the battle, new and largely augmented columns - of the enemy came pouring in upon us, with the same results, however, - as before, although their colors were planted within twenty paces. - -For 4 or 5 hours the assaults continued, but the Confederates attacked -piecemeal—separate units rushing forward—rather than striking a unified -blow, and all their desperate courage was not enough to overcome this -handicap. The Southern army is estimated to have suffered about 5,000 -casualties in this battle. Federal losses were reported at 600. - - [Illustration: {uncaptioned}] - - [Illustration: {uncaptioned}] - - - - - THE MONTH OF AUGUST - - -Although he had inflicted heavy losses on the Southerners, Sherman seems -to have become convinced that he would not be able to capture Atlanta by -his customary tactics. Hood had constructed a line of trenches that ran -from Atlanta southward to East Point, protecting the railroads. The -Confederate fortifications were too strong to be attacked and too long -to be encircled. Sherman brought up a battery of siege guns and shelled -the city. The Southern artillery in Atlanta replied and for several -weeks helpless citizens lived in their cellars and scurried about amid -bursting shells as the artillery duels started fires and smashed -buildings, killing soldiers and civilians indiscriminately. - -The Federal commander also decided to try cavalry raids in the hope that -his horsemen could reach the railroads below Atlanta and, by cutting -them, force Hood to evacuate the city. Late in July, two expeditions -were launched. One under Brig. Gen. George Stoneman was to swing to the -east to McDonough, Lovejoy Station, and Macon, tearing up the railroad -and destroying supplies as it went. These cavalrymen were then to strike -southwest to Americus where they hoped to free the 30,000 Northerners -held in the prisoner of war camp at Andersonville. The other expedition, -under Brig. Gen. Edward M. McCook, was to operate to the west and join -Stoneman in attacking the Confederate lines of communication south of -Atlanta. - -From the start both raids were badly managed. Much of the blame must -rest upon Stoneman who chose to go directly to Macon rather than follow -orders. The scattered Federals were faced by a well-handled Confederate -force led by Wheeler. Except for Stoneman’s column, the Northern -horsemen were driven back to Sherman’s lines after destroying some -Confederate supplies. Stoneman reached the vicinity of Macon where on -July 31 he was attacked by the Southerners and captured along with 500 -of his men. - -Somehow during these busy weeks, Sherman found time to write a letter to -Miss Emily Hoffman of Baltimore, the fiancée of the dead McPherson. “I -owe you heartfelt sympathy,” he wrote, adding, “I yield to none of Earth -but yourself the right to excell me in lamentations for our Dead Hero. -Better the bride of McPherson dead than the wife of the richest Merchant -of Baltimore.” Sherman described the fallen leader of the Army of the -Tennessee who had been a close friend as well as a trusted subordinate -as “the impersonation of Knighthood” and added that “while Life lasts I -will delight in the Memory of that bright particular star.” - -On August 10, Hood, perhaps thinking that the defeat of Stoneman and -McCook had weakened Sherman’s cavalry, struck out at his opponent’s line -of supply. He sent cavalry commander Wheeler with 4,000 men to destroy -the railroad north of Marietta and to disrupt Sherman’s communications -with the North. Although Wheeler was able to make some temporary breaks -in the line, he was unable to reduce substantially the flow of supplies -to Sherman’s armies. The Federal commander had built strong -fortifications at the most strategic points on the railroad and his -efficient repair crews quickly rebuilt those parts of the track that -Wheeler could reach and damage. Eventually, the Confederate cavalry -drifted into Tennessee and did not rejoin Hood until the campaign was -over. Many students of the war regard Wheeler’s mission as a mistake -because the absence of the cavalry deprived Hood of the best means of -keeping posted on Sherman’s activities and thus proved fatal to the army -at Atlanta. - -Wheeler’s departure led Sherman to send out a third cavalry expedition, -commanded by Brig. Gen. Judson Kilpatrick. The Northerners reached the -railroads below Atlanta and on August 18-20 succeeded in tearing up -sections of the track. On the 20th they were driven away. Kilpatrick -reported to Sherman that the railroad had been so thoroughly wrecked -that it would take at least 10 days to repair it. However, on the -following day, the Federals saw trains bringing supplies into the city -from the south. Clearly the Northern cavalry was not strong enough to -destroy Hood’s lines of supply. New plans would have to be tried if the -Unionists were to capture Atlanta. - -Meanwhile, a curious kind of optimism was developing in the Southern -ranks. Many Confederates did not see the hard battles of late July as -defeats. Rather they viewed them as successful efforts to halt the -progress of flanking columns that had threatened the city’s lines of -supply. One officer wrote on August 4 about the battles of Atlanta and -Ezra Church: “General Hood watches his flanks closely and has twice -whipped the flanking columns.” When Sherman made no new efforts to flank -the city and when the Northern cavalry raids were beaten off one after -another, many men came to believe that Atlanta had been saved. In -mid-August a Texan informed his homefolk that “affairs are brightening -here. People and army seem more confident of success.” At about the same -time, a Mississippian wrote that “The enemy seems checked in his -flanking operations on our left, as he has made no progress in that -direction for the last four or five days.” On August 28, an Alabamian -wrote his wife that “It required hard fighting to check the enemy here -after having pursued us so far.” - -At the very end of August there came exciting news for the Southerners. -Sherman had fallen back! The Northerners were gone from in front of -Atlanta! Many thought Wheeler’s cavalry had cut off Sherman’s supplies -and that this had forced the Federal commander to lift the siege. Joyous -Confederates swarmed out of the city to romp over the abandoned Northern -trenches. “The scales have turned in favor of the South,” wrote Capt. -Thomas J. Key of Arkansas, “and the Abolitionists are moving to the -rear.” - - [Illustration: CAVALRY OPERATIONS - JULY-AUGUST 1864] - - - - - JONESBOROUGH - - -Some Southerners suspected in 1864 what we now know—Sherman had not -retreated. Rather, he had concluded that only his infantry could -effectively break Hood’s lines of supply and had resolved to move almost -all of his force to the southwest of the city. The movement began on -August 25. One corps was sent back to the Chattahoochee bridgehead to -guard the railroad that connected Sherman with the North. The remaining -Federal troops pulled out of their trenches and marched away to the west -and south. By noon on the 28th, Howard’s Army of the Tennessee had -reached Fairburn, a small station on the Atlanta and West Point -Railroad, 13 miles southwest of East Point. Later that afternoon, -Thomas’ troops occupied Red Oak, on the railroad 5 miles to the -northeast. The Northerners spent the rest of the 28th and the 29th -destroying the tracks. The rails were torn up, heated, and twisted so -that they were useless. Only one railroad, the Macon and Western, -running southeast from East Point to Macon, now remained in Confederate -hands. Sherman soon moved to cut it. - -By August 29, Hood had learned of the activities of the Federals at -Fairburn. It was clear that the railroad to Macon would be Sherman’s -next objective and the Southern commander acted to defend that line. -However, he badly misjudged the situation and thought that only two -corps of Sherman’s army were to the southwest. Late on August 30, Hood -ordered Hardee to take two corps of the Southern army, move against the -raiding column, and drive it away. Both armies were soon closing in on -Jonesborough, 14 miles below East Point on the Macon railroad. By that -evening, advance elements of the Union forces had crossed the Flint -River and entrenched a position 1 mile west of Jonesborough. During the -night, Hardee’s Southerners moved into the town by rail; by morning they -were deploying in front of the Federal line. - -Hardee had his own corps (temporarily led by Maj. Gen. Patrick R. -Cleburne) and Lee’s. It took until mid-afternoon to complete -preparations for an attack. The Confederates advanced about 3 p.m., -their assault falling mostly on an entrenched salient on the east bank -of the Flint held by the Army of the Tennessee. The attack was fierce -but uncoordinated and failed to drive back the Northerners. When the -fighting ceased that night, the relative positions of the armies were -unchanged. - -Meanwhile, Schofield’s Army of the Ohio had managed to break the Macon -railroad near Rough-and-Ready, a small station between Jonesborough and -East Point. This movement led Hood to conclude that Sherman’s main force -was attacking Atlanta from the south. The Confederate commander, -therefore, ordered Lee’s Corps to leave Hardee at Jonesborough and move -toward Atlanta to help defend the city. Lee began this movement at 2 -a.m. the next morning. - -At dawn on September 1, Sherman with almost all of his troops was south -of Atlanta. The Federals were concentrating at Jonesborough where they -had encountered the bulk of the Southern army on the preceding day and -where it seemed a decisive battle would be fought. The Confederates were -widely separated. Hood, with one corps, was in Atlanta; Hardee, with his -corps, was at Jonesborough; and Lee, with the remaining corps, was near -East Point. - -At Jonesborough, Hardee had taken up a defensive position north and west -of the town. During the afternoon he was attacked by the overwhelming -force of Northerners concentrated there. Although suffering many -casualties, especially in prisoners, Hardee’s Corps fought well and held -its position until night offered a chance to fall back to Lovejoy’s -Station, 7 miles to the south. - -By this time Hood had realized what was happening and knew that Atlanta -could not be held any longer. During the night of September 1-2, he -evacuated the city. Supplies that could not be carried away were burned. -Hood’s forces moved far to the east of the city to pass around -Jonesborough and join Hardee at Lovejoy’s Station. On September 2, Mayor -James M. Calhoun surrendered Atlanta to a party of Federal soldiers. - -On the following day, Sherman sent a telegram to the authorities in -Washington announcing that “Atlanta is ours, and fairly won.” He added -that he would not pursue the Confederates, who were then fortified at -Lovejoy’s Station, but would return to Atlanta so that his men could -enjoy a brief respite from fighting. “Since May 5,” he wrote, “we have -been in one constant battle or skirmish, and need rest.” - -A few days later another Federal wrote from his camp near Atlanta: “Here -we will rest until further orders.... The campaign that commenced May 2 -is now over, and we will rest here to recruit and prepare for a new -campaign.” - -Some writers have been critical of Sherman’s decision not to press after -Hood’s army. They maintain that the enemy force and not the city of -Atlanta was the true objective of the Unionists. It may have been that -Sherman’s action was determined by the question of supplies or it may -have been that his men were too exhausted for immediate operations south -of the city. At any rate, the capture of Atlanta delighted and heartened -Northerners. News of Sherman’s victory was greeted with ringing bells -and cannon fire all over the North. - - [Illustration: {uncaptioned}] - - - - - EPILOGUE - - -Sherman soon turned Atlanta into an armed camp. Houses were torn down -and the lumber used for fortifications or soldiers’ huts. Civilians -could not be fed by the army and were ordered out of the city with the -choice of going north or south. In mid-September a truce was declared -and the citizens who chose to remain in the Confederacy were transported -by the Northerners to Rough-and-Ready, where they were handed over to -Hood’s men who conveyed them farther south. - -After completion of this unpleasant task, Hood determined to reverse -Sherman’s strategy and to move with his whole army around Atlanta to -draw Sherman after him into Alabama or Tennessee. In late September the -Confederates crossed the Chattahoochee and marched northward over many -of the summer’s battlefields. Sherman left a strong garrison in Atlanta -and followed Hood northward for several weeks. Unable to bring his -opponent to bay, Sherman detached a strong force to deal with the -Confederates and returned to Atlanta. Hood’s army was virtually -destroyed in several battles fought in Tennessee in November and -December. Sherman, meanwhile, reorganized his armies and on November 15 -burned Atlanta and marched out of the city on his way to the sea. - -The final importance of the Atlanta Campaign may lie more in its -psychological impact than in any military results. Essentially, in early -September, the Confederate military forces were in the same position -relative to the Northern armies that they had held early in the spring. -Psychologically, however, there had been a great shift. The news that -Atlanta had fallen meant that the average Northerner had at last a -tangible military victory that made it possible for him to see the end -of the war in the future. There would be more months of marching, -fighting, and dying, but Sherman’s capture of Atlanta convinced many -that the Confederacy was doomed. - - [Illustration: {uncaptioned}] - - - - - SHERMAN IN ATLANTA: A Photographic Portfolio - - -On September 3, 1864, President Abraham Lincoln telegraphed the -commanding officer of the Federal Military Division of the Mississippi: -“The national thanks are rendered ... to Major-General W. T. Sherman and -the officers and soldiers of his command before Atlanta, for the -distinguished ability and perserverence displayed in the campaign in -Georgia which, under Divine favor, has resulted in the capture of -Atlanta. The marches, battles, sieges and other military operations that -have signalized the campaign, must render it famous in the annals of -war, and have entitled those who have participated therein to the -applause and thanks of the nation.” - -The Union soldiers had, in Sherman’s words, “completed the grand task -which has been assigned us by our Government.” Atlanta, chief rail hub -of the Confederacy and one of the South’s principal distributing, -industrial, commercial, and cultural centers, was in Federal hands at -last. It was a choice prize. - -The city was founded in 1837 as Terminus, so-named because a rail line -ended there. It was incorporated as Marthasville in 1845; two years -later it was renamed Atlanta. Only a few dozen people lived there in the -1840’s, but by 1861, when the Civil War began, some 10,000 people called -it home. By 1864, when Sherman’s armies started south from Chattanooga, -Atlanta’s population was double that number. The city boasted factories, -foundries, stores, arsenals, government offices, and hospitals, which, -as the war progressed and drew closer, were hard pressed to handle the -mounting number of casualties needing treatment. So strategic was -Atlanta that Confederate President Jefferson Davis proclaimed that “Its -fall would open the way for the Federal armies to the Gulf on one hand, -and to Charleston on the other, and close up those granaries from which -Gen. Robert E. Lee’s armies are supplied. It would give them control of -our network of railroads and thus paralyze our efforts.” Now, with -Federal soldiers in Atlanta, Davis’ fears would be realized. - -Sherman’s troops occupied Atlanta for more than 2 months. The -photographs and captions that follow highlight aspects of that -occupation. - - [Illustration: _National Archives_ - _Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman, conqueror of Atlanta._] - - [Illustration: _Library of Congress_ - _Confederate palisades and cheveaux-de-frise around the Potter house - northwest of Atlanta. Near here, Mayor James M. Calhoun surrendered - the city to Sherman’s forces._] - - [Illustration: _Library of Congress_ - _Union soldiers lounge inside one of the abandoned Confederate field - forts defending Atlanta._] - - [Illustration: _Library of Congress_ - _Atlanta, October 1864: “solid and business-like, wide streets and - many fine houses.”_] - - [Illustration: _Atlanta Historical Society_ - _Federal officers commandeered many of Atlanta’s houses for staff - headquarters. Col. Henry A. Barnum and his staff moved into General - Hood’s former headquarters, described as the “finest wooden building - in the city.”_] - - [Illustration: _Library of Congress_ - _After Sherman turned Atlanta into an armed camp, wagon trains, like - this one on Whitehall Street, rumbled through the city day and - night._] - - [Illustration: _Atlanta Historical Society_ - _The 2d Massachusetts Infantry, the “best officered regiment in the - Army,” set up camp in City Hall Square. When this photograph was - taken, near the end of the occupation, the soldiers’ tents had been - replaced by more substantial wooden huts built from demolished - houses._] - - [Illustration: _Library of Congress_ - _Atlanta residents, evicted from the city by General Sherman, await - the departure of the baggage-laden train that will take them south - beyond Union lines._] - - [Illustration: _Library of Congress_ - _Federal soldiers pry up the city’s railroad tracks before leaving - on their march to the sea._] - - [Illustration: _Library of Congress_ - _The railroad depot after it was blown up by Federal demolition - squads._] - - [Illustration: _National Archives_ - _This desolate scene marks the site where retreating Confederate - soldiers blew up their ordnance train early on the morning of - September 1, 1864. Sherman’s soldiers left similar scenes of - destruction in their wake as they marched across Georgia in the - closing months of the war._] - - - - - FOR FURTHER READING - - -The only published book-length study of the Atlanta Campaign is Jacob D. -Cox’s _Atlanta_ (New York, 1882; new edition, 1963). More detailed -accounts may be found in two doctoral dissertations: Richard M. McMurry, -“The Atlanta Campaign, December 23, 1863, to July 18, 1864,” and Errol -MacGregor Clauss, “The Atlanta Campaign, 18 July-2 September 1864.” Both -were written at Emory University, the former in 1967 and the latter in -1965, and both are available on microfilm from University Microfilms, -Ann Arbor, Mich. In addition, the _Georgia Historical Quarterly_ and -_Civil War Times Illustrated_ have published numerous articles dealing -with specialized aspects of the campaign. - -Good books by participants include Paul M. Angle, ed., _Three Years in -the Army of the Cumberland: The Letters and Diary of Major James A. -Connolly_ (Bloomington, 1959); John B. Hood, _Advance and Retreat: -Personal Experiences in the United States and Confederate Armies_ (New -Orleans, 1880; new edition, Bloomington, 1959); Joseph E. Johnston, -_Narrative of Military Operations During the Late War Between the -States_ (New York, 1874; new edition, Bloomington, 1959); Albert D. -Kirwan, ed., _Johnny Green of the Orphan Brigade: The Journal of a -Confederate Soldier_ (Lexington, Ky., 1956); Milo M. Quaife, ed., _From -the Cannon’s Mouth: The Civil War Letters of General Alpheus S. -Williams_ (Detroit, 1959); John M. Schofield, _Forty-Six Years in the -Army_ (New York, 1897); William T. Sherman, _Memoirs of General William -T. Sherman, by Himself_ (2 vols., New York, 1875; new, 1-vol. edition, -Bloomington, 1957); U.S. War Department, comp., _War of the Rebellion: -Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies_ (128 vols., -Washington, D.C., 1880-1901), Series 1, vol. 38; Sam R. Watkins, “Co. -Aytch,” _Maury Grays, First Tennessee Regiment; or, A Side Show of the -Big Show_ (Chattanooga, 1900; new edition, Jackson, Tenn., 1952); and -Charles W. Wills, _Army Life of an Illinois Soldier ..._ (Washington, -D.C., 1906). - - - - - CIVIL WAR SITES IN GEORGIA - - -Listed below are several of the major Civil War sites in Georgia. A good -source on other areas is the booklet _Georgia Civil War Historical -Markers_, published by the Georgia Historical Commission. - -ANDERSONVILLE: This is now a national historic site. It was the site of -the notorious Civil War prison where, in the summer of 1864, more than -30,000 captured Federals were held. On U.S. 49 at Andersonville, near -Americus. - -ATLANTA: Goal of the 1864 campaign. Most of the area in which the -fighting occurred has been built over, but Grant Park contains the -trenches of Fort Walker, the Cyclorama of the Battle of Atlanta, and a -museum. - -CHICKAMAUGA: On U.S. 278 near Rossville. A national military park where -the great battle of September 19-20, 1863, was fought. - -COLUMBUS: Site of the raised Confederate gunboat _Muscogee_ and a naval -museum on Fourth Street, west of U.S. 27. - -CRAWFORDSVILLE: On U.S. 278 west of Augusta. Liberty Hall, the home of -Confederate Vice President Alexander H. Stephens, has been restored and -is open to the public. - -FORT PULASKI: A national monument on U.S. 80 east of Savannah. Site of -an engagement in 1862 when Northern forces attacked and captured the -fort. - -IRWINVILLE: Off Ga. 107 in the south-central portion of the State. -Museum at the site where President Jefferson Davis was captured by -Federal forces in 1865. - -KENNESAW MOUNTAIN: A national battlefield park on U.S. 41 north of -Marietta. This park preserves much of the area where fighting occurred -in 1864. Museum, slide show, and hiking trails. - -MILLEDGEVILLE: On U.S. 441 in east-central Georgia. Capital of Georgia -during the war. Occupied by the Federals during the “March to the Sea.” -Many old buildings remain. - -SAVANNAH: Terminus of the “March to the Sea.” Fort McAllister, east of -the city on U.S. 17, was a Confederate defense post. Factors Walk Museum -at 222 Factors Walk houses many wartime relics. - - -Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park is administered by the -National Park Service, U.S. Department of the Interior. A -superintendent, whose address is Box 1167, Marietta, GA 30060, is in -immediate charge. - -As the Nation’s principal conservation agency, the Department of the -Interior has basic responsibilities for water, fish, wildlife, mineral, -land, park, and recreational resources. Indian and Territorial affairs -are other major concerns of America’s “Department of Natural Resources.” -The Department works to assure the wisest choice in managing all our -resources so each will make its full contribution to a better United -States—now and in the future. - - [Illustration: Department of the Interior • March 1, 1849] - - United States Department of the Interior - Thomas S. Kleppe, Secretary - - National Park Service - George B. Hartzog, Jr., Director - - ★ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1976 224-506 - - - - - Transcriber’s Notes - - -—Silently corrected a few typos. - -—Retained publication information from the printed edition: this eBook - is public-domain in the country of publication. - -—In the text versions only, text in italics is delimited by - _underscores_. - - - - - - - -End of Project Gutenberg's The Road Past Kennesaw, by Richard M. 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text-indent:0em; text-align:justify; } -span.attr { font-size:80%; font-family:sans-serif; } -span.pn { display:inline-block; width:4.7em; text-align:left; margin-left:0; text-indent:0; } -</style> -</head> -<body> - - -<pre> - -The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Road Past Kennesaw, by Richard M. McMurry - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: The Road Past Kennesaw - The Atlanta Campaign of 1864 - -Author: Richard M. McMurry - -Release Date: May 28, 2020 [EBook #62266] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ROAD PAST KENNESAW *** - - - - -Produced by Stephen Hutcheson and the Online Distributed -Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net - - - - - - -</pre> - -<div id="cover" class="img"> -<img id="coverpage" src="images/cover.jpg" alt="The Road Past Kennesaw: The Atlanta Campaign of 1864" width="500" height="804" /> -</div> -<div class="box"> -<h1><span class="small">THE ROAD PAST KENNESAW</span> -<br /><span class="smallest">THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN OF 1864</span></h1> -<p><i>RICHARD M. McMURRY</i></p> -<p><i>Foreword by Bell I. Wiley</i></p> -<div class="verse"> -<p class="t0">Office of Publications</p> -<p class="t0">National Park Service</p> -<p class="t0">U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR</p> -<p class="t0">Washington, D. C. 1972</p> -</div> -<hr class="dwide" /> -<p class="center smaller">For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office -<br />Washington, D.C. 20402—Price $1.70 -<br /><span class="small">Stock No. 024-005-00288-O/Catalog No. I 29.2:K39</span></p> -</div> -<p>The author: <i>Richard M. McMurry, a long-time student of the Army of -Tennessee and the Atlanta Campaign, is associate professor of history at -Valdosta State College, Valdosta, Ga.</i></p> -<h2><span class="small">NATIONAL PARK SERVICE HISTORY SERIES</span></h2> -<p>Publication of this volume was made possible by a grant from the Kennesaw -Mountain Historical Association.</p> -<p class="tb">This publication is one of a series of booklets describing the significance of -historical and archeological areas in the National Park System administered -by the National Park Service, U.S. Department of the Interior. It is printed -by the Government Printing Office and can be purchased from the Superintendent -of Documents, Washington, DC 20402. Price $1.70.</p> -<p class="center">Stock Number 024-005-00288-O <span class="hst">Catalog Number I 29.2:K 39</span></p> -<div class="pb" id="Page_i">i</div> -<h2 id="c1"><span class="small">FOREWORD</span></h2> -<p>The turning point of the Civil War is a perennial matter of -dispute among historians. Some specify the Henry-Donelson-Shiloh -operation of early 1862 as the pivotal campaign; -others insist that Antietam was the key event; still others -are equally sure that Gettysburg and Vicksburg marked the watershed -of military activities. Regardless of when the tide turned, -there can be little doubt that the Federal drive on Atlanta, -launched in May 1864, was the beginning of the end for the -Southern Confederacy. And Sherman’s combination assault-flanking -operation of June 27 at Kennesaw Mountain may very -well be considered the decisive maneuver in the thrust toward -Atlanta. For when Joseph E. Johnston found it necessary to pull -his forces back across the Chattahoochee, the fate of the city was -sealed.</p> -<p>The Atlanta Campaign had an importance reaching beyond the -immediate military and political consequences. It was conducted -in a manner that helped establish a new mode of warfare. From -beginning to end, it was a railroad campaign, in that a major -transportation center was the prize for which the contestants -vied, and both sides used rail lines to marshal, shift, and sustain -their forces. Yanks and Rebs made some use of repeating rifles, -and Confederate references to shooting down “moving bushes” -indicate resort to camouflage by Sherman’s soldiers. The Union -commander maintained a command post under “signal tree” at -Kennesaw Mountain and directed the movement of his forces -through a net of telegraph lines running out to subordinate headquarters. -Men of both armies who early in the war had looked -askance at the employment of pick and shovel, now, as a matter -of course, promptly scooped out protective ditches at each change -of position.</p> -<p>The campaign was also tremendously important as a human -endeavor, and one of the most impressive features of Richard -McMurry’s account is the insight—much of it gleaned from unpublished -letters and diaries—into the motivations, experiences, -and reactions of the participants. The officers and men who endured -the heat and the mud of what must have been one of the -wettest seasons in the history of Georgia and who lived in the -shadow of death day after day for 4 months of as arduous campaigning -<span class="pb" id="Page_ii">ii</span> -as occurred during the whole conflict, stand out as flesh -and blood human beings. This time of severe testing led to the -undoing of some of the generals, including Joseph E. Johnston -and John Bell Hood. Others, notably William Tecumseh Sherman, -capitalized on the opportunities afforded by the campaign to -prove their worth and carve for themselves lasting niches in the -military hall of fame. Still others had their careers cut short by -hostile bullets, among them Leonidas Polk, a leader whose Civil -War experience makes inescapable the conclusion that he should -never have swapped his clerical robes for a general’s stars. In -marked contrast stood James B. McPherson, great both as a man -and a combat commander, whose premature passing elicited moving -statements of grief from leaders on both sides.</p> -<p>Human aspects of the campaign found most vivid and revealing -expression in the letters of the lesser officers and the men whom -they led. Robert M. Gill, a Mississippi lieutenant promoted from -the ranks, poured out in full and frequent letters to his wife his -homesickness, his hopes, his fears, and his spiritual concern; in so -doing, he revealed his virtues and his frailties and his ups and -downs of morale until a Yankee fusillade snuffed out his life at -Jonesborough. On June 22, 1864, he wrote from near Marietta: “I -saw a canteen on which a heavy run was made during and after -the charge. I still like whiskey but do not want any when going -into a charge for I am or at least was drunk enough yesterday -without drinking a drop.” Lieutenant Gill tried very hard to -live up to his wife’s admonitions against “the sins of the camp,” -but he had great difficulty with profanity, especially in the excitement -of battle. After the action at Resaca, he wrote apologetically: -“The men did not move out to suit me, and I forgot everything -and began to curse a cowardly scamp who got behind.” Six -weeks later he reported another lapse, and following the Battle of -Atlanta he wrote: “I done some heavy swearing, I am told.... I -try to do right but it seems impossible for me to keep from -cursing when I get under fire. I hope I will do better hereafter. I -do not wish to die with an oath on my lips.” Gill’s morale -remained relatively good until after the fall of Atlanta. Shortly -after that event, he wrote: “I think this cause a desperate one ... -there is no hope of defeating Lincoln.... I wish I could be -sanguine of success.”</p> -<div class="pb" id="Page_iii">iii</div> -<p>John W. Hagan, a stalwart sergeant of Johnston’s army, in -poorly spelled words and awkwardly constructed paragraphs addressed -to his wife, demonstrated the character and strength of -the lowly men who were the backbone of both armies. From near -Marietta on June 17, 1864, Hagan wrote: “the yankees charged -us ... & we finelly drove them back we all had as much to do as -we could do. James & Ezekiel acted very brave the boys Say -Ezekiel went to shooting like he was spliting rails; in fact all the -Regt acted there parts.” The combat performance of Hagan and -his men contrasted markedly with that of one of the officers who -was the acting company commander, a Lieutenant Tomlinson. On -June 21, Hagan wrote his wife: “I have been in command of our -company 3 days. Lieut. Tomlinson stays along but pretends to be -so sick he can not go in a fight but so long as I Keepe the right -side up Co. ‘K’ will be all right.” Hagan’s morale remained high, -despite the fact that he had not received any pay for more than a -year. On July 4, he wrote that “some of our troops grow despondent -but it is only thoes who are all ways despondent,” and added: -“all good soldiers will fight harder the harder he is prest but a -coward is allways ready to want an excuse to run or say they or -we are whiped. I never Knew there was so many cowards untill -Since we left Dalton. I do not Speak of our Regt but some troops -have behaved very badly.”</p> -<p>Sergeant Hagan and other Rebs who fought in the Atlanta -Campaign had a wholesome respect for the men in blue who opposed -them; and rightfully so, for the Union rank and file, mostly -lads and young adults from the farms of the Midwest, were admirable -folk, deeply devoted to the cause of Union. One of them, -Pvt. John F. Brobst of the 25th Wisconsin Regiment, wrote his -sweetheart before the campaign was launched: “Home is sweet -and friends are dear, but what would they all be to let the country -go to ruin and be a slave. I am contented with my lot ... for I -know that I am doing my duty, and I know that it is my duty to -do as I am now a-doing. If I live to get back, I shall be proud of -the freedom I shall have, and know that I helped to gain that -freedom. If I should not get back, it will do them good who do get -back.”</p> -<p>Despite the publication during the past century of many studies -on the subject, the Atlanta Campaign—overshadowed both -<span class="pb" id="Page_iv">iv</span> -during the war and later by the engagements in Virginia—has not -received anything like its due share of attention. Now for the first -time, thanks to Richard McMurry’s thoroughness as a researcher -and skill as a narrator, students of the Civil War have a clear, -succinct, balanced, authoritative, and interesting account of the -tremendously important Georgia operations of May to September -1864. This excellent work should be as comprehensible and appealing -to those who read history and tour battle areas for fun as -it is to those who have achieved expertness in Civil War history.</p> -<p><span class="lr">Bell I. Wiley</span></p> -<div class="pb" id="Page_v">v</div> -<h2 id="toc" class="center">CONTENTS</h2> -<dl class="toc"> -<dt><a href="#c1">Foreword by Bell I. Wiley</a> i</dt> -<dt><a href="#c2">Spring 1864</a> 1</dt> -<dt><a href="#c3">Resaca</a> 7</dt> -<dt><a href="#c4">To the Etowah</a> 14</dt> -<dt><a href="#c5">New Hope Church</a> 18</dt> -<dt><a href="#c6">Kennesaw Mountain</a> 23</dt> -<dt><a href="#c7">Across the Chattahoochee</a> 29</dt> -<dt><a href="#c8">Johnston Removed From Command</a> 32</dt> -<dt><a href="#c9">In the Ranks</a> 34</dt> -<dt><a href="#c10">Peachtree Creek</a> 42</dt> -<dt><a href="#c11">The Battle of Atlanta</a> 46</dt> -<dt><a href="#c12">Ezra Church</a> 48</dt> -<dt><a href="#c13">The Month of August</a> 51</dt> -<dt><a href="#c14">Jonesborough</a> 54</dt> -<dt><a href="#c15">Epilogue</a> 57</dt> -<dt><a href="#c16">Sherman in Atlanta: A Photographic Portfolio</a> 59</dt> -<dt><a href="#c17">For Further Reading</a> 70</dt> -<dt><a href="#c18">Civil War Sites in Georgia</a> 71</dt> -</dl> -<div class="pb" id="Page_vi">vi</div> -<div class="img"> -<img src="images/p01.jpg" alt="{uncaptioned}" width="500" height="712" /> -</div> -<div class="pb" id="Page_1">1</div> -<h2 id="c2"><span class="small">SPRING 1864</span></h2> -<p>One of the most important military campaigns of the -American Civil War was fought in northwestern Georgia -during the spring and summer of 1864 between Northern -forces under Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman and Confederates -commanded first by Gen. Joseph E. Johnston and then by Gen. -John B. Hood. This campaign resulted in the capture of Atlanta -by the Unionists, prepared the way for Sherman’s “March to the -Sea,” and, in the opinion of many historians, made inevitable the -reelection of Abraham Lincoln and the consequent determination -of the North to see the war through to final victory rather than -accept a compromise with secession and slavery.</p> -<p>Spring 1864 marked the beginning of the war’s fourth -year. In the eastern theater, 3 years of fighting had led to a -virtual stalemate, with the opposing armies hovering between -Washington and Richmond—about where they had been when -the war began in 1861. However, the situation was quite different -in the vast area between the Appalachian Mountains and the -Mississippi River, a region known in the 1860’s as “the West.” -There in 1862 Federal armies had driven the Southerners out of -Kentucky and much of Tennessee. In the following year the -Northerners secured control of the Mississippi River and captured -the important city of Chattanooga. By early 1864, Union armies -were poised for what they hoped would be a quick campaign to -dismember the Confederacy and end the war. This feeling was -well illustrated by an Illinois soldier who wrote his sister on April -22, “I think we can lick the Rebs like a book when we start to do -it & hope we will Clean Rebeldom out this summer so we will be -able to quit the business.”</p> -<p>To realize these hopes, Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, commander -of the Northern armies, planned a simultaneous move on all -fronts, with the greatest efforts devoted to Virginia, where he -would personally direct operations, and to the region between the -Tennessee and Chattahoochee Rivers, where the Federals would -be led by Sherman and Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks. Grant -hoped that Banks would move from New Orleans, seize Mobile, -and advance northward toward Montgomery, while Sherman’s -force struck southward from Chattanooga. Had these plans succeeded, -the Confederacy would have been reduced to a small area -along the coast of Georgia, the Carolinas, and Virginia. Confederate -victories in Louisiana, however, made Banks’ projected campaign -infeasible, and Sherman’s drive southward into Georgia, -with Atlanta as the initial goal, became the major Union effort in -the West.</p> -<div class="pb" id="Page_2">2</div> -<div class="img" id="fig1"> -<img src="images/p02.jpg" alt="" width="500" height="715" /> -<p class="pcap"><i>Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman</i></p> -</div> -<div class="pb" id="Page_3">3</div> -<p>Leaders on both sides had long recognized the importance of -Atlanta, located a few miles south of the Chattahoochee and -about 120 miles from Chattanooga. In 1864, only Richmond was -more important to the South. Atlanta’s four railroads were not -only the best means of communication between the eastern and -western parts of the Confederacy but they were also the major -lines of supply for the Southern armies in Virginia and north -Georgia. The city’s hospitals cared for the sick and wounded and -her factories produced many kinds of military goods. In the words -of a Northern editor, Atlanta was “the great military depot of -Rebeldom.” In addition, the city’s capture would give the Union -armies a base from which they could strike further into Georgia -to reach such vital manufacturing and administrative centers as -Milledgeville, Macon, Augusta, and Columbus. All of these things -were clear to the men who led the opposing armies.</p> -<p>William Tecumseh Sherman was a thin, nervous, active man, -with a wild shock of reddish or light-brown hair. A 44-year-old -native of Ohio, he had been graduated from the U.S. Military -Academy in 1840 and, after several years’ service in the Army, -had resigned his commission to go into banking and later into -education. The outbreak of war had found him serving as superintendent -of a military college in Louisiana. He resigned this position -and returned to the North, where he entered Federal service. -Rising rapidly in the Army, he was chosen as supreme commander -in the West in early 1864. His soldiers liked him and -affectionately called him “Uncle Billy.” An officer who was with -him in 1864 described the Federal commander as “tall and lank, -not very erect, with hair like a thatch, which he rubs up with his -hands, a rusty beard trimmed close, a wrinkled face, prominent -red nose, small bright eyes, coarse red hands ... he smokes -constantly.” Sherman was also a dogged fighter unawed by obstacles -that would have broken lesser men, and Grant knew he could -be counted on to carry out his part of the grand strategical plan -for 1864.</p> -<div class="pb" id="Page_4">4</div> -<p>Sherman’s assignment was to break up the Confederate army -in north Georgia and “to get into the interior of the enemy’s -country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can -against their war resources.” To accomplish this mission, he had -almost 100,000 men organized into three armies—the Army of the -Cumberland, commanded by Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas; the -Army of the Tennessee, commanded by Maj. Gen. James B. -McPherson; and the Army of the Ohio, commanded by Maj. Gen. -John M. Schofield. By early May, Sherman had assembled these -troops around Chattanooga and was prepared to march with them -into Georgia.</p> -<p>Opposed to Sherman’s host was the Confederate Army of Tennessee, -commanded by Gen. Joseph E. Johnston. Johnston was a -Virginian and, like Sherman, a graduate of West Point (Class of -1829). He had served in the U.S. Army until Virginia seceded in -the spring of 1861, when he resigned and entered Confederate -service. In December 1863 he was named commander of the major -Confederate force in the West and given the mission of defending -the area against further Northern advance. Johnston had an almost -uncanny ability to win the loyal support of his subordinates. -An Arkansas officer who met the Southern commander in early -1864 noted in his diary: “General Johnston is about 50 years of -age—is quite gray—and has a spare form, an intelligent face, and -an expressive blue eye. He was very polite, raising his cap to me -after the introduction.”</p> -<p>Unfortunately for the Confederacy, Johnston was also secretive, -stubborn when dealing with his superiors, petulant, and too -prone to see difficulties rather than opportunities. He constantly -worried about defeat and retreat, and was hesitant to act. In sum, -he was a man whose personality prevented him from effectively -utilizing his many abilities.</p> -<p>At the beginning of May, the 55,000 men of Johnston’s army -were concentrated around Dalton, Ga., 35 miles southeast of -Chattanooga. The Southern force consisted of two infantry corps -commanded by Lt. Gens. William J. Hardee and John Bell Hood, -and a cavalry corps led by Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler. What -Johnston would do with these troops was still very much in -doubt. The Confederate government wanted him to march into -Tennessee and reestablish Southern authority over that crucial -<span class="pb" id="Page_5">5</span> -State. Johnston, however, believed that conditions for such an -offensive were not favorable and that he should await Sherman’s -advance, defeat it, and then undertake to regain Tennessee. At -the opening of the campaign in early May, this issue had not been -settled. The lack of understanding and cooperation between the -government in Richmond and the general in Georgia, illustrated -by this incident, was to hamper Confederate efforts throughout -the campaign.</p> -<div class="img" id="fig2"> -<img src="images/p03.jpg" alt="" width="500" height="573" /> -<p class="pcap"><i>Gen. Joseph E. Johnston</i></p> -</div> -<div class="pb" id="Page_6">6</div> -<div class="img" id="fig3"> -<img src="images/p04.jpg" alt="" width="517" height="800" /> -<p class="pcap"><span class="ss">ATLANTA CAMPAIGN<br />1864</span></p> -</div> -<div class="pb" id="Page_7">7</div> -<h2 id="c3"><span class="small">RESACA</span></h2> -<p>Three major rivers—the Oostanaula, the Etowah, and the -Chattahoochee—flow from northeast to southwest across -northern Georgia, dividing the area into four distinct geographical -regions. Between Chattanooga and the Oostanaula, several -parallel mountain ridges slice across the State in such a -manner as to hamper military movements. The most important of -these was Rocky Face Ridge which ran from near the Oostanaula -to a point several miles north of Dalton. This ridge rose high -above the surrounding valleys and was the barrier between Johnston’s -army at Dalton and Sherman’s forces at Chattanooga. -There were three important gaps in this ridge: Mill Creek Gap -west of Dalton, Dug Gap a few miles to the south, and Snake -Creek Gap west of the little village of Resaca near the Oostanaula.</p> -<p>Dalton is on the eastern side of Rocky Face Ridge. The Western -and Atlantic Railroad, which connected Chattanooga and Atlanta -and served as the line of supply for both armies, crossed the -Oostanaula near Resaca, ran north for 15 miles to Dalton, then -turned westward to pass through Rocky Face Ridge at Mill Creek -Gap, and continued on to Chattanooga. During the winter, the -Confederates had fortified the area around Dalton to such an -extent that they believed it to be secure against any attack. -Johnston hoped that the Federals would assault his lines on -Rocky Face Ridge, for he was confident that he could hurl the -Northerners back with heavy loss.</p> -<p>Sherman, however, had no intention of smashing his army -against what one of his soldiers called the “Georgian Gibraltar.” -Northern scouts had found Snake Creek Gap unguarded and the -Federal commander decided to send McPherson’s Army of the -Tennessee through this gap to seize the railroad near Resaca. -Meanwhile, Thomas and Schofield would engage the Confederates -at Dalton to prevent their sending men to oppose McPherson. -Sherman hoped that when Johnston discovered his line of supply -in Federal hands, he would fall back in disorder and his army -could be routed by the Northerners. By May 6, the Federals were -ready to begin the campaign. Sherman moved Thomas and Schofield -toward Dalton while McPherson prepared to strike for Snake -Creek Gap.</p> -<div class="pb" id="Page_8">8</div> -<div class="img" id="fig4"> -<img src="images/p05.jpg" alt="" width="400" height="402" /> -<p class="pcap"><i>Maj. Gen. James B. McPherson</i></p> -</div> -<p>Johnston had not been idle. He had deployed his men in strong -positions to block the expected advance. He had also requested -reinforcements, and these were on the way. Some coastal garrisons -had been withdrawn from their posts and were being sent to -join Johnston. More important, though, was the large body of -troops from Mississippi that was moving across Alabama toward -Dalton. These men, numbering about 15,000, constituted the -Army of Mississippi and were commanded by Lt. Gen. Leonidas -Polk. A West Point graduate (1827), Polk had resigned from the -Army to enter the Episcopal ministry. In 1861 he was Bishop of -Louisiana and entered the Confederate service where he was -known as the Bishop-General. When Polk joined Johnston the -Confederate strength would be raised to about 70,000.</p> -<p>Before Polk arrived, however, Sherman sent Thomas and Schofield -against Johnston’s position. On May 7 and 8, there was -heavy fighting all along the lines from the area north of Dalton -south along Rocky Face Ridge to Dug Gap. The Federals -made no real headway, but the demonstration served its purpose, -for McPherson reached Snake Creek Gap on the evening of the -8th and found it open.</p> -<p>James Birdseye McPherson, who stood at Snake Creek Gap on -<span class="pb" id="Page_9">9</span> -the morning of May 9 with an opportunity to strike Johnston a -crippling blow, was one of the Civil War’s most attractive leaders. -Like Sherman, he was an Ohioan and a West Pointer (1853). In -1864 he was only 35 years old. His entire adult life had been -spent in the Army, and in the Civil War his abilities had carried -him from captain to major general in slightly more than a year’s -time. Both Sherman and Grant looked upon him as an outstanding -leader—a belief shared by the Confederate editor who called -McPherson “the most dangerous man in the whole Yankee -army.” He was handsome, with flowing hair and whiskers, and he -had a special reason for wanting the war to end: when it was over -he would be able to marry the beautiful girl who was waiting for -him in Baltimore. He was courteous to men of all ranks, and his -adoring soldiers remembered long afterwards his habit of riding -in the fields to leave the roads open for them.</p> -<div class="img" id="fig5"> -<img src="images/p05a.jpg" alt="" width="600" height="650" /> -<p class="pcap"><span class="ss">OPENING BATTLES OF THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN</span></p> -</div> -<div class="pb" id="Page_10">10</div> -<div class="img" id="fig6"> -<img src="images/p06.jpg" alt="" width="800" height="318" /> -<p class="pcap"><i>For four long and bloody months, officers and men alike endured -the heat and mud of what must have been one of the -wettest seasons in the history of Georgia.</i></p> -</div> -<div class="pb" id="Page_12">12</div> -<p>On May 9, while skirmishing continued about Dalton, McPherson -led his army eastward, hoping to reach the railroad near -Resaca and break Johnston’s communications with Atlanta. Unknown -to the Federals, there were some 4,000 Confederates in -Resaca. These included the advance elements of Polk’s army, as -well as infantry and cavalry units assigned to guard the Oostanaula -bridges and to protect the area.</p> -<p>The Northern advance met these Southerners near the town. -McPherson, surprised at finding so large a force in his front, -moved with great caution. Late in the afternoon, he became worried -that Johnston might rush troops southward and cut him off -from Sherman. This fear, and the fact that some of his men were -without food, led him to break off the engagement and fall back -to a position at Snake Creek Gap which he fortified that night.</p> -<p>In the following days, both armies shifted to the Resaca area. -Sherman began by sending a division of Thomas’ army to aid -McPherson. Soon orders followed for almost all of the Federals to -march southward, with only a small detachment left to watch -Johnston. All day on the 11th the roads west of Rocky Face were -crowded with troops, wagons, and guns. Although the march was -slowed by a heavy rain, nightfall of the 12th found the Northern -army concentrated at Snake Creek Gap. Johnston discovered the -Federal move and during the night of May 12-13 ordered his men -to Resaca where Polk’s troops had been halted.</p> -<p>Skirmishing on the 13th developed the positions of the armies. -Johnston had posted his men on the high ground north and west -of Resaca. Polk’s Corps (as the Army of Mississippi was called) -held the Confederate left, Hardee’s men occupied the center, and -Hood was on the right, with his right flank curved back to the -Conasauga River. The Federal advance, McPherson’s army, had -moved directly toward Resaca. When the advance was slowed, -Thomas moved to the north and formed his army on McPherson’s -left. Schofield moved into position on Thomas’ left.</p> -<p>The Battle of Resaca, fought May 13-15, was the first major -engagement of the campaign. The 13th was spent in skirmishing -<span class="pb" id="Page_13">13</span> -and establishing the positions of the two armies. The 14th saw -much heavy fighting. Sherman delivered a major attack against -the right center of Johnston’s line and was hurled back with a -heavy loss. One Northerner described the Confederate fire as -“<i>terrific and deadly</i>.” Later, Hood made a determined assault on -the Federal left and was prevented from winning a great victory -when Union reinforcements were hurried to the scene from other -sectors of the line. Late in the day, troops from McPherson’s -army made slight gains against the Confederate left. Fighting -ceased at dark, although firing continued throughout the night. -There was no time for the men to rest, however; both Johnston -and Sherman kept their soldiers busy digging fortifications, caring -for the wounded, moving to new positions, and preparing for the -next day’s battle.</p> -<p>The heaviest fighting on the 15th occurred at the northern end -of the lines. There, both sides made attacks that achieved some -local success but were inconclusive. Meanwhile, a Federal detachment -had been sent down the Oostanaula to attempt a crossing. -At Lay’s Ferry, a few miles below Resaca, it got over the river -and secured a position from which to strike eastward against -Johnston’s rail line. The Southern commander believed that this -left him no choice but to retreat. Accordingly, during the night of -May 15-16, the Confederates withdrew and crossed to the southern -bank of the Oostanaula, burning the bridges behind them.</p> -<p>As is the case with many Civil War battles, no accurate casualty -figures are available for the engagement at Resaca. Federal -losses were probably about 3,500; Confederate casualties were -approximately 2,600.</p> -<div class="pb" id="Page_14">14</div> -<h2 id="c4"><span class="small">TO THE ETOWAH</span></h2> -<p>South of the Oostanaula, steep ridges and heavy woods -give way to gently rolling hills with only a light cover of -vegetation. The area was almost without defensible terrain -and thus afforded a great advantage to Sherman, whose -larger forces would have more opportunities for maneuver than -they had found in the mountainous region to the north.</p> -<p>Once across the Oostanaula, Johnston sought to make a stand -and draw the Federals into a costly assault. He expected to find -favorable terrain near Calhoun, but in this he was disappointed -and during the night of May 16-17 he led the Confederates on -southward toward Adairsville. The Federals followed—Sherman -dividing his forces into three columns and advancing on a broad -front. There were skirmishes all along the route during the 16th -and 17th, but the main bodies were not engaged.</p> -<p>At Adairsville Johnston again hoped to find a position in which -he could give battle, but there too the terrain was unsuitable for -defense and the Confederate commander was forced to continue -his retreat. As he fell back, however, Johnston devised a stratagem -that he hoped would lead to the destruction of a part of Sherman’s -forces. There were two roads leading south from Adairsville—one -south to Kingston, the other southeast to Cassville. It seemed -likely that Sherman would divide his armies so as to use both -roads. This would give Johnston the opportunity to attack one -column before the other could come to its aid.</p> -<p>When the Southerners abandoned Adairsville during the night -of May 17-18, Johnston sent Hardee’s Corps to Kingston while -he fell back toward Cassville with the rest of his army. He hoped -that Sherman would believe most of the Southerners to be in -Kingston and concentrate the bulk of his forces there. Hardee -would then hold off the Northerners at Kingston while Johnston, -with Polk and Hood, destroyed the smaller Federal column at -Cassville.</p> -<p>Sherman reacted as Johnston hoped, ordering McPherson and -the bulk of Thomas’ army toward Kingston while sending only -Schofield and one corps of Thomas’ army along the road to Cassville. -On the morning of May 19, Johnston ordered Hood to -march along a country road a mile or so east of the Adairsville-Cassville -Road and form his corps for battle facing west. While -<span class="pb" id="Page_15">15</span> -Polk attacked the head of the Federal column, Hood was to assail -its left flank. As Hood was moving into position, he found Northern -soldiers to the east. This was a source of great danger, for had -Hood formed facing west, these Federals would have been in -position to attack the exposed flank and rear of his corps. After a -brief skirmish with the Northerners, Hood fell back to rejoin -Polk. Johnston, believing that the opportunity for a successful -battle had passed, ordered Hood and Polk to move to a new line -east and south of Cassville, where they were joined by Hardee -who had been pushed out of Kingston. Johnston formed his -army on a ridge and hoped that Sherman would attack him there -on May 20. As usual, the Southern commander was confident of -repulsing the enemy.</p> -<div class="img" id="fig7"> -<img src="images/p07.jpg" alt="" width="700" height="701" /> -<p class="pcap"><span class="ss">TO THE ETOWAH</span></p> -</div> -<div class="pb" id="Page_16">16</div> -<p>That night the Confederate leaders held a council of war. Exactly -what happened at the council is a matter of dispute. -According to Johnston, Polk and Hood reported that their lines -could not be held and urged that the army retreat. Believing that -the fears of the corps commanders would be communicated to -their men and thus weaken the army’s confidence, Johnston -yielded to these demands, even though he thought the position to -be defensible. According to Hood, whose recollection of the -council differs markedly from Johnston’s, he and Polk told Johnston -that the line could not be held against an attack but that it -was a good position from which to move against the enemy. -Johnston, however, was unwilling to risk an offensive battle and -decided to fall back across the Etowah. No definite resolution of -this dispute is possible, but most of the available evidence supports -Hood’s version of the conference. Certainly Johnston was -not obligated to allow the advice of subordinates to overrule his -own judgment. The responsibility for abandoning the Cassville -position rests on the Southern commander.</p> -<p>During the night, the Confederates withdrew across the Etowah. -As they fell back, their feelings were mixed. They had lost a -very strong position at Dalton, and had fallen back from Resaca, -Calhoun, and Adairsville. Now they were retreating again under -cover of darkness. That morning as they prepared for battle, their -spirits had been high. Now their disappointment was bitter. Although -morale would revive in the next few days, many Southern -soldiers would never again place as much confidence in Johnston’s -abilities as they once had.</p> -<p>By contrast, morale in the Federal ranks soared. In a short -time of campaigning, the Northerners had “driven” their enemy -from one position after another. Sherman was satisfied with the -progress his armies had made and, after learning that the Confederates -were south of the Etowah, he decided to give his men a -short rest. On May 20, one of the Northern generals summarized -the situation in a letter to his wife:</p> -<blockquote> -<p>Thus far our campaign has succeeded though it must be confessed the -rebels have retreated in very good order and their army is still -unbroken. Our hard work is still before us. We are still 53 miles from -Atlanta and have to pass over a rugged Country. We will have some -bloody work before we enter that place.</p> -</blockquote> -<div class="pb" id="Page_17">17</div> -<div class="img" id="fig8"> -<img src="images/p08.jpg" alt="" width="500" height="483" /> -<p class="pcap"><i>After a council with Hood and Polk, Johnston -abandoned the Cassville position.</i></p> -</div> -<div class="pb" id="Page_18">18</div> -<h2 id="c5"><span class="small">NEW HOPE CHURCH</span></h2> -<p>The region south of the Etowah was one of the wildest parts -of north Georgia. The area was sparsely settled, hilly, -heavily wooded, and, in 1864, little known and poorly -mapped. Sherman expected to push through this region with little -delay. On May 23 he wrote, “The Etowah is the Rubicon of Georgia. -We are now all in motion like a vast hive of bees, and expect -to swarm along the Chattahoochee in a few days.” His optimism -was ill-founded, for the rough terrain and heavy rains favored -Johnston’s smaller force and helped delay the Federal advance for -5 weeks.</p> -<p>Johnston posted his army around Allatoona Pass, a gap in the -high hills south of the Etowah through which the railroad ran on -its way southward to Marietta. He had again occupied a strong -position hoping that Sherman would attack it. The Federal commander, -however, aware of the natural strength of the terrain, -was determined to avoid a direct assault and crossed the river to -the west where the country was more open. Dallas, a small town -about 14 miles south of the river and about the same distance -west of the railroad, was the first objective.</p> -<p>The Northerners began their advance on the 23d. McPherson -swung far to the west through Van Wert and then moved eastward -toward Dallas. Thomas was in the center moving via Stilesboro -and Burnt Hickory. Schofield was on the left, closest to the -Etowah. The day was hot and the men suffered greatly from -thirst. Nevertheless, the Federals made progress toward their -objective and, on the 24th, were closing in on Dallas.</p> -<p>Confederate cavalry soon discovered Sherman’s movement and -Johnston took steps to meet it. By evening of the 24th, the -Southerners held a line east of Dallas which ran from southwest -to northeast. The key to the position was a crossroads at a Methodist -church named New Hope. Hood’s Corps held this part of the -line. Polk and Hardee were to his left.</p> -<p>On May 25, some troops of Thomas’ army ran up against -Hood’s line at New Hope Church. In a late afternoon battle -fought under dark skies and rolling bursts of thunder, Thomas’ -men made a series of gallant assaults against the Southern line. -The Federals met a withering hail of bullets and shells that -quickly halted each advance. In this short engagement, Thomas -lost about 1,500 men. The Confederates suffered little during the -battle and were elated at their success.</p> -<div class="pb" id="Page_19">19</div> -<div class="img" id="fig9"> -<img src="images/p09.jpg" alt="" width="514" height="795" /> -<p class="pcap"><span class="ss">BATTLES AROUND NEW HOPE CHURCH</span></p> -</div> -<div class="pb" id="Page_20">20</div> -<div class="img"> -<img src="images/p10.jpg" alt="{uncaptioned}" width="500" height="632" /> -</div> -<div class="pb" id="Page_21">21</div> -<p>Sunrise on the 26th found both commanders working to position -their men in the woods east of Dallas. Except for skirmishing, -there was little fighting during the day.</p> -<p>On the following day, Sherman attempted to defeat the right of -the Southern line by a surprise attack. In a battle known as -Pickett’s Mill, the Northerners were hurled back with about 1,500 -casualties. For the Federals, this engagement was one of the most -desperate of the campaign. One company of the 41st Ohio Regiment -lost 20 of its 22 men. The 49th Ohio carried slightly over -400 men into the battle and lost 203 of them. The commander of -another regiment wrote that he lost a third of his men in the first -few yards of the advance. “The rebel fire ... swept the ground -like a hailstorm,” wrote another Unionist, adding, “this is surely -not war it is butchery.” A third Northerner noted in his diary -that evening, “our men were slaughtered terribly 2 brigades of -infantry were almost cut to pieces.” The Southerners lost about -500 men.</p> -<p>Over the next few days fighting continued almost incessantly. -Both sides made assaults with strongly reinforced skirmish lines, -seeking to hold the enemy in position. This type of combat was -very tiring on the men. One soldier wrote after a night battle, “O -God, what a night. They may tell of hell and its awful fires, but -the boys who went thru the fight at Dallas ... are pretty well -prepared for any event this side of eternity.”</p> -<p>The days spent in the jungles near New Hope Church were -among the most arduous of the war for the soldiers of both armies. -In addition to the normal dangers of combat, the men had -to undergo unusual physical hardships. Rain, heat, constant -alarms, continuous sharpshooting, the stench of the dead, the -screams of the wounded, and a serious shortage of food all added -to the normal discomforts of life in the field. One Federal soldier -described the time spent near Dallas as “Probably the most -wretched week” of the campaign. Another wrote of it as “a wearisome -waste of life and strength.” A third Northerner, referring to -an unsuccessful foray against the Confederate lines, wrote, “We -have struck a hornet nest at the business end.” So severe had the -fighting been that Sherman’s men would ever afterward refer to -<span class="pb" id="Page_22">22</span> -the struggle around New Hope Church as the “Battle of the Hell -Hole.”</p> -<p>When it became clear that no decisive battle would be fought -at Dallas, Sherman gradually sidled eastward to regain the railroad. -On June 3, advance elements of the Federal forces reached -the little town of Acworth, and within a few days, almost all the -Northern troops were in that general area. Sherman had outmaneuvered -Johnston and bypassed the strong Confederate position -at Allatoona, but he had not seriously weakened his opponent. -Once again the Federal commander ordered a short halt to rest -his troops and allow time to repair the railroad and for reinforcements -to arrive.</p> -<div class="img"> -<img src="images/p11.jpg" alt="{uncaptioned}" width="500" height="534" /> -</div> -<div class="pb" id="Page_23">23</div> -<h2 id="c6"><span class="small">KENNESAW MOUNTAIN</span></h2> -<p>By June 10, Sherman was ready to resume the advance. The -Southerners had taken up a line north of Marietta that -ran from Brush Mountain on the east to Pine Mountain in -the center to Lost Mountain on the west. McPherson moved -against the right flank of this line, Thomas against the center, -and Schofield against the left. Rain fell almost every day and -hampered the Northern advance. For several days there was -heavy skirmishing in which the Federals captured Pine Mountain -and made gains at other points. Bishop-General Polk was killed -on Pine Mountain by a Union artillery shell on June 14, when he -foolishly exposed himself to enemy fire. Maj. Gen. William W. -Loring commanded Polk’s Corps for several weeks until a permanent -replacement, Lt. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart, took command.</p> -<p>By the 16th, Schofield’s advance had been so successful that -the Southerners were forced to give up Lost Mountain. For several -days, Johnston tried to hold a new line that ran west from -Brush Mountain and then turned southward. This line was enfiladed -by the Federal artillery, however, and during the night of -June 18-19 the Confederates abandoned it and took up a new -position extending along the crest of Kennesaw Mountain and off -to the south. Hardee’s Corps held the left of this line, Loring’s -was in the center, and Hood’s was on the right.</p> -<p>When Sherman encountered this strong position, he extended -his lines to the south to try to outflank Johnston. He moved most -of McPherson’s army to the area directly in front of Kennesaw -Mountain and placed Thomas’ army in line on McPherson’s right -with orders to extend to the right. In the days that followed, -McPherson and Thomas were engaged in what amounted to a -siege of the Southern position. Little progress could be made on -the ground but the artillery on both sides was used in attempts to -batter and weaken the enemy. Day after day, the big Union guns -pounded the Southern line, their fire being answered by Confederate -cannon high on Kennesaw Mountain.</p> -<p>Meanwhile, Sherman drew Schofield’s army in from the Lost -Mountain area and ordered it to move south on the Sandtown -Road, which ran west of the Federal position toward the Chattahoochee. -After a long and muddy march, Schofield’s men reached -<span class="pb" id="Page_24">24</span> -Nose’s Creek at dark on June 19. On the following day, they -crossed the swollen stream and drove the Southerners away. The -bridge was rebuilt; on the 21st their advance was resumed. That -same day, the right of Thomas’ army established contact with -Schofield near Powder Springs Road.</p> -<p>Johnston had seen the Federal right being extended and was -aware of the dangers it presented to his line of communications. -To meet this threat the Confederate commander shifted Hood’s -Corps from the right of his line to the left during the night of -June 21-22. By early afternoon of the 22d, Hood’s men were in -position on Hardee’s left.</p> -<p>Early on the 22d, the right of the Northern line resumed -its advance. The XX Corps of Thomas’ army moved east on -Powder Springs Road, supported by some of Schofield’s troops. -By midafternoon, they reached the vicinity of Valentine Kolb’s -farm. The rest of Schofield’s army continued down Sandtown -Road to the Cheney farm, where it occupied a position overlooking -Olley’s Creek.</p> -<p>In the early part of the afternoon, the Federals captured several -Southerners from whom they learned that Hood had moved -to the Confederate left. From this they concluded that an attack -upon the Federal line was imminent. Quickly the Northern commanders -closed up their units and began to construct protecting -works, using fence rails or whatever material was at hand. Skirmishers -were thrown out, and they soon encountered an advancing -line of Southerners. Just what brought about this attack is -not clear. Perhaps the activities of the Northern skirmishers led -the Confederates to think that the Federals were attacking. Hood -may have believed that when the skirmishers fell back he had -defeated an assault on his new position and decided to pursue the -beaten enemy. At any rate, the Southern advance precipitated a -battle at the Kolb farmhouse in which several Confederate attacks -were hurled back by the Federals. Hood lost about 1,000 -men. Northern casualties were about 300. After the battle, Hood -fell back to his original position, extending the Southern line -southward to Olley’s Creek. For several days, there was relative -calm along the lines which now ran from the railroad north of -Marietta to Olley’s Creek southwest of the town. Meanwhile, the -rains ceased and the June sun began to dry the land.</p> -<div class="pb" id="Page_25">25</div> -<p>Several days after the battle at Kolb’s farm, Sherman decided -on a change in tactics—he would make a direct assault on Johnston’s -lines. It was a bold decision that offered the possibility of a -great victory. The Southern line was thinly held and a successful -attack could lead to the isolation and destruction of a large part -of Johnston’s army. The Federal commander decided to strike -the Confederates at three points: McPherson would assault the -southern end of Kennesaw Mountain, Thomas would move -against a salient known as the “Dead Angle” (on what is now -called Cheatham’s Hill) several miles to the south, and Schofield -would push south on Sandtown Road and attempt to cross -Olley’s Creek. June 27 was set as the date for the assault, but -Schofield was to begin demonstrations on the 26th to draw Southerners -away from other portions of the line.</p> -<div class="img" id="fig10"> -<img src="images/p12.jpg" alt="" width="700" height="448" /> -<p class="pcap"><span class="ss">KENNESAW MOUNTAIN</span></p> -</div> -<p>Early on the 27th, the Federals began to probe at various -points along the Confederate trenches to distract the defenders. -At 8 a.m. the Northern artillery opened a brief but heavy fire to -prepare the way for the assaults. A few minutes later, the Federal -infantry moved forward. McPherson’s troops, advancing on both -sides of Burnt Hickory Road, swept over the Southern outposts -and moved rapidly across the broken ground toward the -main Confederate trenches. Although their lines were disordered, -<span class="pb" id="Page_26">26</span> -the blue-clad soldiers scrambled over rocks and fallen trees until -they were finally halted by the heavy fire from their entrenched -enemies. A few reached the Confederate line and were killed or -captured while fighting in their opponents’ works. Southerners on -Little Kennesaw added to the Northerners’ discomfort by rolling -huge rocks down the mountainside at them. When the Union -troops realized that their attack could not reach the Confederate -lines, they broke off the engagement. Some were able to find -protection in the advanced Confederate rifle-pits they had overrun -and some managed to reach the positions from which they -had begun the assault. A few were forced to seek shelter among -the trees and large rocks on the slopes of the mountain where -they remained until darkness offered a chance to return to their -own lines.</p> -<p>To the south, Thomas fared no better. Two columns were directed -against the Southern position—one at Cheatham’s Hill, -the other a short distance to the north. The Southerners expected -no attack. Many of them were off duty and others were relaxing -in the lines. The Federal artillery, however, alerted them to the -danger and when Thomas’ infantry started forward, the Confederates -were ready.</p> -<p>As soon as the dense blue columns appeared in the cleared area -between the lines, the Confederates opened what one Northerner -called a “terrible” fire upon them. Men dropped rapidly but the -columns continued up the long slope toward the Southern position. -“The air,” one Federal remembered, “seemed filled with -bullets, giving one the sensation experienced when moving swiftly -against a heavy rain or sleet storm.” As the Union soldiers neared -the crest of the ridge, they met the full fury of the defenders’ fire. -To one Federal it seemed as if the Confederate trenches were -“veritable volcanoes ... vomiting forth fire and smoke and raining -leaden hail in the face of the Union boys.”</p> -<p>Most of the attackers never reached the Confederate line. -Those who did were too few to overpower the defenders and were -quickly killed or captured. For a few brief seconds, two Northern -battle flags waved on the breastworks, but the bearers were soon -shot down and within a short time the attack had failed.</p> -<p>As Thomas’ left assaulting column struck that portion of the -Southern line held by the consolidated 1st and 15th Arkansas -<span class="pb" id="Page_27">27</span> -Regiments, the gunfire ignited the underbrush and many wounded -Federals faced the terrifying prospect of being burned to death. -In one of the notable acts of the war, Lt. Col. William H. Martin, -commanding the Arkansans, jumped from his trenches waving a -white handkerchief and shouting to the Northerners to come and -get the wounded men. For a few minutes, fighting was suspended -along that short stretch of the line and some of Martin’s soldiers -went to assist in moving their helpless enemies away from the -flames. When the wounded had been removed to safety, the two -sides resumed hostilities, but here too it was clear that the attack -would not be able to break Johnston’s lines.</p> -<p>At the Dead Angle, some of the attacking Northerners remained -under the crest of the ridge within a few yards of the -Confederate trenches. There they dug rifle pits of their own and -started to burrow under the hill, hoping to fill the tunnel with -gunpowder and blow up the salient. However, before this project -had progressed very far, the Southerners abandoned the position -and thus rendered the subterranean attack unnecessary.</p> -<p>While the attacks of McPherson and Thomas were being repulsed, -Schofield was gaining a clear success at the extreme right -of the Union line. On the 26th, one of his brigades crossed Olley’s -Creek north of Sandtown Road and, on the following day, -cleared their opponents from the area, securing a position several -miles to the south which placed the right of their line closer to the -Chattahoochee than was the left of Johnston’s army. From this -position the Northerners could strike at the Confederate line of -supply and perhaps cut Johnston off from all sources of help by -breaking the railroad.</p> -<p>Exact casualty figures for the battles of June 27 are not available. -However, the best estimates place Northern losses at about -3,000 men. The Southerners lost at least 750 killed, wounded, or -captured.</p> -<p>Sherman has been criticized for ordering the frontal attack on -Johnston’s lines, but it now seems that his decision was not -unwise. Had the assault succeeded, he would have won a great -victory. As it was, he did not continue the attacks when it was -clear that they would fail, and he had managed to secure a position -from which he could easily pry Johnston out of the Kennesaw -line.</p> -<div class="pb" id="Page_28">28</div> -<div class="img" id="fig11"> -<img src="images/p13.jpg" alt="" width="435" height="795" /> -<p class="pcap"><i>Lt. Col. William H. Martin jumped from the -trenches waving a white handkerchief and -shouting to the Northerners to come and -get the wounded men.</i></p> -</div> -<div class="pb" id="Page_29">29</div> -<h2 id="c7"><span class="small">ACROSS THE CHATTAHOOCHEE</span></h2> -<p>The success won by Schofield at Olley’s Creek indicated the -direction for the next Federal movement. Sherman quickly -decided to shift troops to his right, knowing that such a -move would force Johnston to choose between giving up the Kennesaw -line or being cut off from Atlanta. Accordingly, he began to -reinforce Schofield by moving McPherson from the left to the -right. By the afternoon of July 2, Federal troops were pushing -southward on Sandtown Road against only light opposition from -small Confederate detachments.</p> -<p>Johnston was aware of what was happening—in fact, he had -expected such a movement since the failure of the assault on the -27th. Believing that it would be unwise to stretch his lines further -and realizing that the troops opposing the Federal advance could -do no more than delay it, Johnston decided to abandon his Kennesaw -Mountain position and fall back to a previously prepared -line near Smyrna, 4 miles to the south. Accordingly, during the -night of July 2-3, the Confederates filed out of their trenches -around Marietta and marched southward.</p> -<p>When Sherman discovered that the Southerners were gone, he -pushed forward in pursuit, hoping to strike while the enemy was -retreating. In the late afternoon of the 3d, the Northerners -reached the new Confederate line. The 4th was spent in skirmishing, -but before a serious battle could develop, the Federal right -secured a strategic position from which it threatened to slice in -between Johnston’s army and Atlanta. Again, the threat to his -left forced Johnston to retreat. During the night of July 4-5, the -Southerners fell back to a heavily fortified position on the north -bank of the Chattahoochee.</p> -<p>On the 5th, the Federals pushed forward until they reached the -new Southern line. Skirmishing that day convinced Sherman that -the position was too strong to be carried by a headlong assault. -He dispatched a cavalry force to seize Roswell, an important little -manufacturing town about 16 miles upriver from Johnston’s fortifications, -and allowed his men a few days’ rest while he planned -the next move.</p> -<div class="pb" id="Page_30">30</div> -<div class="img" id="fig12"> -<img src="images/p14.jpg" alt="" width="514" height="797" /> -<p class="pcap"><span class="ss">ACROSS THE CHATTAHOOCHEE RIVER</span></p> -</div> -<div class="pb" id="Page_31">31</div> -<p>After carefully studying the situation, the Federal commander -decided to attempt a crossing near the mouth of Soap Creek, -above Johnston’s right flank. On July 8, he moved Schofield’s -Army of the Ohio into position for the crossing. In a brilliant -movement, Schofield, utilizing pontoon boats and the ruins of a -submerged fish dam, got over the river and drove away the small -group of Southerners defending the area. Other troops were -rushed across, bridges were built, trenches were dug, and by -nightfall the Northerners held a secure bridgehead on the southern -bank. On the following day, the Federal cavalry got over the -river at Roswell. Sherman had successfully crossed the last major -barrier between Chattanooga and Atlanta and had carried the -fighting into the open country south of the Chattahoochee where -the terrain would favor him.</p> -<p>During the night of July 9-10, Johnston retreated across the -river and took up a position on the southern bank of Peachtree -Creek only a few miles from Atlanta. The Confederate commander -seems to have been optimistic at this time. Once again he -believed that he had reached a position from which he could not -be driven and he expected to fight the decisive battle of the -campaign along Peachtree Creek.</p> -<p>Sherman, meanwhile, had decided upon his next step. He would -swing north and east of Atlanta to cut Johnston off from Augusta -and possible reinforcements from Virginia. McPherson was to -strike eastward from Roswell to the Georgia Railroad at some -point near Stone Mountain. As this force advanced, the rest of -the Federals would move closer to the river. The line would thus -become a great swinging movement, with McPherson on the far -left, Schofield in the center as the pivot, and Thomas on the right -along Peachtree Creek. This movement began on the 17th. The -next day, McPherson reached the Georgia Railroad near Stone -Mountain.</p> -<div class="pb" id="Page_32">32</div> -<h2 id="c8"><span class="small">JOHNSTON REMOVED FROM COMMAND</span></h2> -<p>The Confederate government had been displeased by Johnston’s -conduct of the campaign. President Jefferson Davis -and other civilian officials had hoped that the Confederates -would be able to regain Tennessee or at least to draw Sherman -into a situation in which a severe defeat would be inflicted -upon him. Instead, after 10 weeks of campaigning, Johnston was -backed up against Atlanta and there was no assurance that he -would even try to hold that important center. These circumstances -led Davis to remove Johnston from command of the army -and to replace him with John B. Hood, who was promoted to the -temporary rank of full general.</p> -<p>Davis’ replacement of Johnston with Hood is one of the most -controversial acts of the war. Relations between the President -and Johnston had not been friendly since a dispute over the -general’s rank in 1861. Disagreements over strategy and tactics as -well as the personalities of the two men exacerbated matters in -1862 and 1863. During Johnston’s tenure as commander of the -Army of Tennessee, the situation became worse as communications -between the two broke down almost completely. Davis -promoted officers in the army without consulting Johnston, who -maneuvered in the field without informing the government of his -plans and operations in any meaningful detail.</p> -<p>Davis saw that Johnston had yielded much valuable territory -to the enemy. Important officials in the government began to urge -that the general be removed from command. On July 9, Davis -sent his military adviser, Gen. Braxton Bragg, to report on the -situation in Georgia. Bragg visited Johnston, learned nothing of -the general’s plans, and reported that it appeared the city would -be abandoned. Other evidence brought to the President’s attention—such -as Johnston’s suggestion that prisoners held in south -Georgia be sent to safer points—seemed to confirm Bragg’s assessment -that Atlanta would not be defended. On July 16, Davis -telegraphed Johnston: “I wish to hear from you as to present -situation and your plan of operations so specifically as will enable -me to anticipate events.” The general’s reply of the same date -read in part:</p> -<blockquote> -<p>As the enemy has double our numbers, we must be on the defensive. -My plan of operations must, therefore, depend upon that of the enemy.</p> -</blockquote> -<blockquote> -<div class="pb" id="Page_33">33</div> -<p>It is mainly to watch for an opportunity to fight to advantage. We are -trying to put Atlanta in condition to be held for a day or two by the -Georgia militia, that army movements may be freer and wider.</p> -</blockquote> -<p>This vague reply did not satisfy Davis and on July 17 he issued -the order that removed Johnston from command. In great haste, -Johnston wrote out an order relinquishing his position and thanking -the soldiers for their courage and devotion. By the afternoon -of the 18th he had left Atlanta and the Army of Tennessee in the -none-too-steady hands of John Bell Hood.</p> -<p>Much debate has swirled around Davis’ decision. Johnston and -his partisans have argued that the general’s removal made inevitable -the loss of Atlanta, the reelection of Lincoln, and the defeat -of the Confederacy. They contend that had Johnston remained in -command, the city would have been held, or that if it were surrendered, -the army at least would not have been weakened and -would have continued as an effective unit.</p> -<p>Hood and Davis maintained that Johnston’s long retreat had -demoralized the army, that Johnston would not have held Atlanta, -and that the Confederacy’s only chance for success lay in -replacing Johnston with a bold commander who could strike -Sherman a blow that would send the Northerners reeling back to -Chattanooga.</p> -<p>Most historians have tended to accept Johnston’s position. -There can be no definite answer, of course, but it does seem that -Johnston would have evacuated the city rather than lose a large -portion of his army fighting for it. This would have saved the -army but, coming after the long retreat from Dalton, might have -so demoralized it that desertion and disgust would have ended its -career as an effective fighting force. If the retention of Atlanta -was essential to the life of the Confederacy, President Davis -seems justified in his decision to remove Johnston. It was the -Confederacy’s misfortune that no bold, intelligent, and lucky general -was available to take his place. But one thing was certain—with -Hood leading the Southerners, the pattern of the campaign -would change.</p> -<div class="pb" id="Page_34">34</div> -<h2 id="c9"><span class="small">IN THE RANKS</span></h2> -<p>Historians have long been in the habit of dealing with the -past as if it were nothing more than the story of a small -number of great men who moved about shaping the -world as they saw fit. In reality, leaders are not long successful -without followers—the great mass of the common people who do -the work, bear the burdens, and suffer the consequences of their -leaders’ policies. The Civil War offers a unique opportunity to -study the common people of America because during that conflict -large numbers of people were directly involved in the great events -of the times. For most of them, the war was the single most -important event of their lives. Consequently they wrote about it in -great detail in their letters and diaries and saved these documents -after the conflict ended. It is therefore possible to see the Civil -War armies as groups of humans, not masses of automata. The -men who followed Sherman, Johnston, and Hood in 1864 left -behind information that adds much to an understanding of the -campaign.</p> -<p>Records kept by the Federal Government show that the typical -Northern soldier was 5 feet 8¼ inches tall and weighed 143½ -pounds. Doubtless the Southerners were of a similar stature. The -same records also indicate that before the war 48 percent of the -men had been farmers. Among the Confederates the percentage of -farmers was more than half. Relatively few immigrants served in -either western army—perhaps one-fifth to one-sixth of the men -were of foreign birth. More than half the units in Sherman’s -armies were from Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio. Iowa, Kentucky, -Missouri, and Wisconsin also furnished large contingents. Such -Eastern States as New York, Connecticut, New Jersey, and -Pennsylvania were represented, but their contributions were -small. More than two-thirds of the units in the Southern army -were from Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, and Georgia. Other -States with significant numbers of troops in the Confederate -ranks were Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana. Alabama, Kentucky, -Missouri, and Tennessee were represented by units on both sides. -Most of the men in the armies that struggled for Atlanta had -volunteered for military service in 1861 or 1862. By 1864 they -had become veterans, inured to the hardships of military life. -Nevertheless, they found the Atlanta Campaign a severe trial.</p> -<div class="pb" id="Page_35">35</div> -<p>Unlike many Civil War military operations in which fighting -occurred at infrequent intervals, the struggle for Atlanta was -virtually a continuous battle. Sometimes, as at Resaca, almost all -of the opposing forces were engaged; at other times, action was -limited to the desultory firing of skirmishers. But only on rare -occasions were the soldiers able to escape the sounds and dangers -of combat.</p> -<p>The weather—whether a freak cold wave in mid-June, the unusually -heavy rains of late May and June, or the normal heat of -July and August—affected every man and often hampered troop -movements as well. Frequently units on the march lost men who -could not stand the pace. The soldiers would drop by the roadside -until they had recovered their strength, then move on to overtake -their comrades. For example, the heat on July 12 was so bad that -only 50 of the men in an Illinois regiment could keep up on a -3-mile march. When the armies were in fortified positions, as they -were at Kennesaw Mountain, the men often stretched blankets or -brush across the trenches to protect themselves from the sun. On -rainy days, fence rails or rocks in the trenches served to keep -soldiers out of the water.</p> -<p>Clothing was also a problem. As a rule, Sherman’s men were -better supplied than their opponents, but the wool uniforms they -wore were unsuited to the hot Georgia summer. The Confederates -had almost no new clothing after the campaign began and their -uniforms deteriorated rapidly. A Texan summed up their plight in -early June when he wrote: “In this army one hole in the seat of -the breeches indicates a captain, two holes a lieutenant, and the -seat of the pants all out indicates that the individual is a private.”</p> -<p>Rarely did the men of either army have a chance to wash and -almost all of them were affected by body lice and other vermin. A -sense of humor helped them to survive these trials—soldiers who -were pinned down in a water-filled trench by enemy fire consoled -themselves with the thought that they were at least drowning the -lice. The Federals complained that the retreating Southerners -infested the country with lice that attacked the advancing Northerners. -Other pests included chiggers, ticks, snakes, scorpions, -flies, and ants.</p> -<div class="pb" id="Page_36">36</div> -<div class="img" id="fig13"> -<img src="images/p15.jpg" alt="" width="800" height="552" /> -<p class="pcap"><i>By 1864 most of the men in the armies that struggled for -Atlanta had become veterans, inured to the hardships of military life.</i></p> -</div> -<div class="pb" id="Page_38">38</div> -<div class="img" id="fig14"> -<img src="images/p16.jpg" alt="" width="500" height="682" /> -<p class="pcap"><i>Soldiers in both armies had no scruples -about supplementing their rations with -whatever could be taken from surrounding -farms and homes.</i></p> -</div> -<div class="pb" id="Page_39">39</div> -<p>Soldiers in both armies suffered from a shortage of food and -had no scruples about supplementing their rations with whatever -could be taken from the surrounding farms and homes. Corn, -pork, chickens, geese, hams, potatoes, apples, and onions disappeared -as the armies moved through a neighborhood. Wild berries -and fish were also eaten. Nevertheless, there were many times -when food was in short supply. One Federal wrote, “most of the -time we are on the move and cannot get such as is fit for a man to -eat.”</p> -<p>The Atlanta Campaign, like many of the later Civil War campaigns, -saw the development of trench warfare on a large scale. -Protecting works were built from loose rocks, fence rails, tombstones, -or even the bodies of dead comrades. By the third or -fourth week of the campaign, both sides had mastered the art of -field fortification—a trench, with the dirt piled on the side toward -the enemy and surmounted by a headlog under which were small -openings for firing. Such works left “little but the eyes ... -exposed” to enemy fire. In front of the trenches the underbrush -would be cleared away and young trees cut so they fell toward the -foe. The trees were left partly attached to the stump so that they -could not be dragged aside. Telegraph wire was sometimes strung -between them to create further obstacles.</p> -<p>From behind their fortifications soldiers could pour out such a -volume of fire that there was no chance for a successful massed -attack—unless complete surprise could be achieved or overwhelming -numbers brought against a weak part of the enemy’s line. -Much of the fighting was therefore done by small patrols and -snipers, especially in heavily wooded country such as the area -around New Hope Church and Kennesaw Mountain.</p> -<p>The soldier who died in battle could expect no elaborate funeral. -Usually the armies were too busy to do more than bury the -dead as quickly as possible and they would probably be put in a -mass grave near the place where they had fallen. Later the bodies -might be exhumed and moved to a cemetery where they would be -listed as “unidentified” and reinterred in a numbered but nameless -grave.</p> -<p>The soldier who was wounded or who was disabled by disease -suffered greatly. As a rule, the Northerner who was sent to an -army hospital fared better than his opponent because the Federals -were better equipped and provisioned than the Confederates. -<span class="pb" id="Page_40">40</span> -Field hospitals treated men whose wounds were either very -slight or too serious to permit further movement. Others were -sent by wagon and rail to hospitals in the rear—Rome, Chattanooga, -and Knoxville for the Federals; Atlanta and the small -towns along the railroads south of that city for the Southerners.</p> -<p>Transportation in crowded hospital wagons over rutted roads -or in slow hospital trains was an indescribable horror. The hospitals -themselves were better but, by modern standards, uncomfortable -and dirty. For painful operations, Northern soldiers often -enjoyed the blessing of chloroform. Many Southerners, however, -especially those in the hospitals in smaller towns, frequently endured -major surgery without the benefit of any opiate except, -perhaps, whiskey. In such cases the hospitals echoed with the -screams of men undergoing amputations or such treatments as -that calling for the use of nitric acid to burn gangrene out of their -wounds.</p> -<div class="img"> -<img src="images/p17.jpg" alt="{uncaptioned}" width="500" height="327" /> -</div> -<p>No precise figures as to the number of men who were killed, -wounded, or sick during the campaign are available. However, it -is known that for the war as a whole, disease killed about twice as -many men as did the weapons of the enemy. Sickness brought on -by exposure and unsanitary camps undoubtedly accounted for -<span class="pb" id="Page_41">41</span> -many lives among the soldiers in Georgia. Diseases that were -especially common were smallpox, scurvy, dysentery, diarrhea -(also known as “dierear” and the “Tennessee quick step”), and -various types of fevers.</p> -<p>Religion provided a great source of comfort for many soldiers. -Chaplains accompanied both armies but were too few to serve all -the troops. Some chaplains preferred to spend the campaign in -the rear where they would be safe, while others, of far more -influence with the men, braved hardships and dangers with the -units they served. At least three of the latter group were killed in -battle during the campaign—either while helping the wounded or -fighting in the ranks. When chaplains were not available the men -sometimes organized and conducted their own religious services. -On the other hand, many soldiers ignored religion altogether and -continued such “sinful” practices as cursing, drinking, and gambling. -Nevertheless, what one soldier called “the missionary influence -of the enemy’s cannon” and the constant presence of death -and suffering led many to seek comfort in religion.</p> -<p>Throughout the campaign, when the armies were in a relatively -stable situation, the men sometimes agreed not to shoot at one -another. Instead, they would meet between the lines to talk, -swim, drink, bathe, enjoy the sun, pick blackberries, exchange -newspapers, swap Northern coffee for Southern tobacco, play -cards, wrestle, eat, sing, rob the dead, and argue politics. Officers -on both sides tried to prohibit this fraternization, but the men in -the ranks had the good sense to ignore their orders. These informal -truces would usually be respected by all, and when they were -over, fighting would not resume until every man had gotten back -to his own trenches. Much of the tragedy of the war was reflected -in a letter written by a Wisconsin soldier on June 24:</p> -<blockquote> -<p>We made a bargain with them that we would not fire on them if they -would not fire on us, and they were as good as their word. It seems too -bad that we have to fight men that we like. Now these Southern -soldiers seem just like our own boys, only they are on the other side. -They talk about their people at home, their mothers and fathers and -their sweethearts, just as we do among ourselves.</p> -</blockquote> -<p>However, regardless of the soldiers’ feelings about each other -during those times of truce, the war was being run by the generals -and the generals said it must go on.</p> -<div class="pb" id="Page_42">42</div> -<h2 id="c10"><span class="small">PEACHTREE CREEK</span></h2> -<p>John Bell Hood, the new commander of the Confederate -forces, found himself in a difficult position on the morning -of July 18, 1864. Hood was young—only 33—and relatively -inexperienced in handling large bodies of troops. After -graduation from West Point (in the same class with the Federal -generals McPherson and Schofield) he had served with the U.S. -Army until the spring of 1861, when he resigned and cast his lot -with the Confederacy. In the early years of the war Hood had -risen rapidly in rank—a rise more than justified by his outstanding -leadership at the brigade and division level.</p> -<p>Until the summer of 1863, Hood had been physically one of the -most magnificent men in the Confederate Army. A woman who -knew him in 1861 described him as “six feet two inches in height, -with a broad, full chest, light hair and beard, blue eyes, with a -peculiarly soft expression, commanding in appearance, dignified in -deportment, gentlemanly and courteous to all.” By the time he -took command of the Army of Tennessee, Hood’s appearance had -undergone some changes. His left arm dangled uselessly at his -side, smashed by a Federal bullet at Gettysburg in July 1863. His -right leg was gone, cut away at the hip following a wound received -at the Battle of Chickamauga in September 1863. Hood -suffered great pain from these wounds, and no doubt he should -have been retired from field command; but he was not the kind of -man who could stay away from the army during a war.</p> -<p>After recovering from his second wound, he was sent to the -Army of Tennessee as a corps commander and had served in that -capacity until Davis selected him to succeed Johnston. He may -have been taking a derivative of laudanum to ease his pain and -some students of the war believe that this affected his judgment. -Many soldiers in the army distrusted Hood’s ability. Some officers -resented his promotion over the heads of generals who had served -with the army since the beginning of the war. Hood himself believed -that the army had been demoralized by Johnston’s long -retreat and hence was unlikely to fight well.</p> -<p>Nor could the tactical situation have brought Hood any encouragement. -Thomas’ Army of the Cumberland was advancing -southward directly toward Atlanta, while the armies of McPherson -and Schofield were east of the city, advancing westward. Two -of the four railroads that connected Atlanta with the rest of the -Confederacy were in Federal hands. Unless Hood could keep the -remaining lines open, the city was doomed.</p> -<div class="pb" id="Page_43">43</div> -<div class="img" id="fig15"> -<img src="images/p18.jpg" alt="" width="600" height="667" /> -<p class="pcap"><span class="ss">BATTLES AROUND ATLANTA</span></p> -</div> -<dl class="undent pcap"><dt>Battle of Peachtree Creek JULY 20</dt> -<dt>Battle of Ezra Church, JULY 28</dt> -<dt>Battle of Atlanta JULY 22</dt></dl> -<p>On July 19, the Army of the Cumberland crossed Peachtree -Creek, but as it advanced, it drifted toward the west. Thus by the -afternoon a gap had developed in the Northern line between -Thomas on the right and Schofield in the center. Hood decided to -concentrate the corps of Hardee and Stewart against Thomas. -The Confederate commander hoped to overwhelm the isolated -Army of the Cumberland before help could arrive from McPherson -<span class="pb" id="Page_44">44</span> -and Schofield. Hood relied upon his former corps, temporarily -commanded by Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham, and the cavalry -to defend the area east of Atlanta. The attack on Thomas -was set for 1 p.m., July 20.</p> -<p>Early in the morning of the 20th, while the Southerners were -preparing to assail the right of the Federal line, the Northerners -east of Atlanta moved west along the Georgia Railroad toward -the city. Their progress was so rapid that Hood felt it necessary -to shift his army to the right in an effort to strengthen the forces -defending the eastern approaches to Atlanta. This movement led -to such confusion in the Confederate ranks that the attack -against Thomas was delayed for about 3 hours. When the Southerners -were finally ready to strike, Thomas’ men had had time to -establish and partly fortify a position on the south side of Peachtree -Creek.</p> -<p>What Hood had planned as a quick blow against an unprepared -Northern army thus developed into a headlong assault against a -partially fortified line. For several hours the Southerners threw -themselves against the Federals. Most of the attacks were halted -before they seriously threatened the Union position, but for a -short while it appeared that some of Hardee’s men would sweep -around the left of Thomas’ line and win a great victory. Hastily, -Thomas assembled artillery batteries and directed their fire -against the Southerners. Eventually the Confederates were driven -back.</p> -<p>While fighting raged along Peachtree Creek, McPherson continued -to push toward Atlanta from the east. By 6 p.m., Hood was -forced to call upon Hardee for troops to reinforce the Southern -lines east of the city. This order drew from Hardee the reserve -division that he was preparing to throw into the assault against -Thomas and forced him to abandon the attack. The first of -Hood’s efforts to cripple the Federal army had failed, although at -the time some Southerners saw it as a blow that slowed Federal -progress.</p> -<p>Northern casualties in the Battle of Peachtree Creek were reported -at 1,600. Estimates of Southern losses (mostly from Federal -sources) range from 2,500 to 10,000. It seems now that 4,700 -is a reliable estimate of Confederate casualties.</p> -<div class="pb" id="Page_45">45</div> -<div class="img" id="fig16"> -<img src="images/p19.jpg" alt="" width="500" height="309" /> -<p class="pcap"><i>Gen. John B. Hood</i></p> -</div> -<p>The battle later became a source of controversy between Hood -and Hardee. Hood, smarting under the criticism of Joseph E. -Johnston and others, blamed the failure to crush Thomas on -Hardee. The corps commander, Hood charged, had failed to -attack at the proper time and had not driven home the assault. -Hardee, who had outranked Hood when they were both lieutenant -generals and who may have been disgruntled at serving under -his former junior, replied that the delay was caused by Hood’s -decision to shift the line to the right and that the assault had not -been as vigorously executed as it normally would have been because -Hood’s late-afternoon order to send reinforcements to the -right had deprived the attackers of the unit that was to deliver -the final blow. Postwar commentators mostly favor Hardee and a -careful examination of the evidence supports this view.</p> -<div class="pb" id="Page_46">46</div> -<h2 id="c11"><span class="small">THE BATTLE OF ATLANTA</span></h2> -<p>After the Battle of Peachtree Creek, attention shifted to -the eastern side of the city. Hood determined to strike -McPherson who, on July 20 and 21, had moved past -Decatur and entrenched a line running north and south a few -miles east of Atlanta. The Confederate commander realized that -he might march troops around the left of McPherson’s position -and attack him from the flank and rear. He chose Hardee’s Corps -to be the flanking column and planned to have Cheatham’s men -attack the front of McPherson’s army from the west while Hardee -struck from the south and east. With luck, this sensible plan -could result in the defeat of a large part of Sherman’s forces.</p> -<p>Late on the 21st, Hardee’s men withdrew from their advanced -position north of Atlanta and by midnight they were marching -out of the city. They were to move southward, then turn and -swing eastward and northward. Meanwhile, the other Southerners -fell back to shorter lines where, it was hoped, they would be able -to hold off the Federals while Hardee outflanked them.</p> -<p>On the morning of July 22, Sherman found the Southerners -gone from his immediate front and concluded that Atlanta had -been abandoned. However, as his armies pushed forward, they -discovered that the defenders had only fallen back to a new -position. The Northern advance contracted the Federal lines and -the XVI Corps of McPherson’s army was crowded out of place. -McPherson ordered it to move to his extreme left. Thus at the -time Hardee was moving to that area, McPherson, by chance, was -sending in reinforcements.</p> -<p>Hardee’s march was long and hard. Poor roads, inept guides, -and the July heat combined to delay the Southerners. It was not -until noon that Hardee had his men in position, and at 1 p.m. he -sent them forward. The Confederates made their way through -heavy underbrush and emerged facing the Federal XVI Corps -which had halted in a perfect position to meet the charge which -broke upon them.</p> -<p>Poor coordination also weakened the force of the Confederate -offensive. Cheatham’s men, who assailed the XVII Corps, did not -join the assault until about 3:30, by which time Hardee’s attack -had lost much of its force. Nevertheless, the fighting was severe. -One Federal brigadier wrote of the attackers:</p> -<blockquote> -<div class="pb" id="Page_47">47</div> -<p>They burst forth from the woods in truly magnificent style in front of -my right.... Hardly had the enemy made his appearance in my front -when [the artillery] ... opened on them a deadly fire, which rather -staggered their line, yet on came the advancing rebels, and hotter grew -the fire of ... [our artillery]. At the same time the ... infantry ... -opened on them with cool and deadly aim. Still on came the charging -columns, more desperate than ever, those in front urged up by those -in rear.</p> -</blockquote> -<p>The first charge was driven back, but the Southerners returned -to the attack again and again throughout the long afternoon. -Several times they swarmed over the Federal positions, capturing -men and cannon, but each time they were driven back. In one of -the early charges, McPherson was killed by advancing Confederate -skirmishers as he rode forward to rally his men. Finally, -about 7 p.m., the Southerners abandoned the attack and fell -back. Their losses have been estimated at about 8,000. Union -casualties were reported at 3,722.</p> -<p>For the second time Hood had lashed out at his opponent and -had been thrown back. Later he tried to shift the blame to Hardee -whom he accused of failing to be in the proper place at the -proper time. In post-war years, a bitter verbal battle raged over -the question. Most present-day authorities feel that Hardee did -all that could reasonably have been asked of him. His troops were -worn from the battle on Peachtree Creek, the bad roads slowed -his march, and the fateful positioning of the XVI Corps was a -matter over which he had no control.</p> -<p>In the summer of 1864, however, many Confederates saw the -battle as a splendid victory. One artilleryman wrote on July 23:</p> -<blockquote> -<p>We gained a great victory yesterday of which I suppose you know -[from newspapers] as much as I do. We left before much was accomplished -but hear that our corps captured 3,500 prisoners and 22 pieces -of artillery & the enemies killed & wounded amounted to twice our -own.</p> -</blockquote> -<div class="pb" id="Page_48">48</div> -<h2 id="c12"><span class="small">EZRA CHURCH</span></h2> -<p>For several days after the Battle of Atlanta, there was a lull -in military activities around the city. Both sides were reorganizing. -Sherman selected Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard -to command the army that McPherson had led. On the Confederate -side, Lt. Gen. Stephen D. Lee replaced Cheatham as commander -of the corps that had originally been Hood’s.</p> -<p>By July 26, Sherman had decided upon his next maneuver. His -goal was the railroads south and west of Atlanta—the last links -between that city and the rest of the Confederacy—and to reach -them he would swing Howard’s Army of the Tennessee around -from his extreme left to his extreme right. The movement began -that afternoon and by nightfall on the 27th, Howard’s men were -west of Atlanta. Early the following day the advance was resumed. -The only effective opposition came from a small body of -Confederate cavalry.</p> -<p>Hood was aware of Sherman’s new maneuver and determined -to block it by sending the corps of Lee and Stewart west along -the road to the little settlement of Lickskillet. By noon the opposing -forces were in the area of a meetinghouse known as Ezra -Church, about 2½ miles west of Atlanta. The Confederates had -been ordered to attack and prevent the Northerners from crossing -the road, and Lee and Stewart sent their men forward in a series -of assaults against the XV Corps. The Federals had not had time -to entrench, but they had piled up barricades of logs and church -benches, and these afforded some protection.</p> -<p>“Our skirmishers, overpowered by numbers, were compelled to -fall back to the main line,” wrote a Union officer,</p> -<blockquote> -<p>followed at an interval of but a few paces by dense columns of the -enemy, which, covered as they were by the undergrowth, advanced -within forty or fifty paces of our lines, when a terrific and destructive -fire was opened upon them, and was continued steadily until their -advance was checked, at the distance of some twenty to thirty paces. -Their lines were cut down, disordered, and driven back some distance, -when they rallied and again came boldly forward to the charge, but -under the murderous fire of our rifles were no more able to disorder -or discompose our lines than before. They gained a little ground -several times, only to lose it inch by inch, after the most terrible -fighting on both sides.... After a very short interval, which did not -<span class="pb" id="Page_49">49</span> -amount to a cessation of the battle, new and largely augmented -columns of the enemy came pouring in upon us, with the same results, -however, as before, although their colors were planted within twenty -paces.</p> -</blockquote> -<p>For 4 or 5 hours the assaults continued, but the Confederates -attacked piecemeal—separate units rushing forward—rather than -striking a unified blow, and all their desperate courage was not -enough to overcome this handicap. The Southern army is estimated -to have suffered about 5,000 casualties in this battle. Federal -losses were reported at 600.</p> -<div class="img"> -<img src="images/p20.jpg" alt="{uncaptioned}" width="500" height="504" /> -</div> -<div class="pb" id="Page_50">50</div> -<div class="img"> -<img src="images/p21.jpg" alt="{uncaptioned}" width="490" height="800" /> -</div> -<div class="pb" id="Page_51">51</div> -<h2 id="c13"><span class="small">THE MONTH OF AUGUST</span></h2> -<p>Although he had inflicted heavy losses on the Southerners, -Sherman seems to have become convinced that he would -not be able to capture Atlanta by his customary tactics. -Hood had constructed a line of trenches that ran from Atlanta -southward to East Point, protecting the railroads. The Confederate -fortifications were too strong to be attacked and too long to -be encircled. Sherman brought up a battery of siege guns and -shelled the city. The Southern artillery in Atlanta replied and for -several weeks helpless citizens lived in their cellars and scurried -about amid bursting shells as the artillery duels started fires and -smashed buildings, killing soldiers and civilians indiscriminately.</p> -<p>The Federal commander also decided to try cavalry raids in the -hope that his horsemen could reach the railroads below Atlanta -and, by cutting them, force Hood to evacuate the city. Late in -July, two expeditions were launched. One under Brig. Gen. -George Stoneman was to swing to the east to McDonough, Lovejoy -Station, and Macon, tearing up the railroad and destroying -supplies as it went. These cavalrymen were then to strike southwest -to Americus where they hoped to free the 30,000 Northerners -held in the prisoner of war camp at Andersonville. The other -expedition, under Brig. Gen. Edward M. McCook, was to operate -to the west and join Stoneman in attacking the Confederate lines -of communication south of Atlanta.</p> -<p>From the start both raids were badly managed. Much of the -blame must rest upon Stoneman who chose to go directly to -Macon rather than follow orders. The scattered Federals were -faced by a well-handled Confederate force led by Wheeler. Except -for Stoneman’s column, the Northern horsemen were driven back -to Sherman’s lines after destroying some Confederate supplies. -Stoneman reached the vicinity of Macon where on July 31 he was -attacked by the Southerners and captured along with 500 of his -men.</p> -<p>Somehow during these busy weeks, Sherman found time to -write a letter to Miss Emily Hoffman of Baltimore, the fiancée of -the dead McPherson. “I owe you heartfelt sympathy,” he wrote, -adding, “I yield to none of Earth but yourself the right to excell -me in lamentations for our Dead Hero. Better the bride of -McPherson dead than the wife of the richest Merchant of Baltimore.” -<span class="pb" id="Page_52">52</span> -Sherman described the fallen leader of the Army of the -Tennessee who had been a close friend as well as a trusted subordinate -as “the impersonation of Knighthood” and added that -“while Life lasts I will delight in the Memory of that bright -particular star.”</p> -<p>On August 10, Hood, perhaps thinking that the defeat of -Stoneman and McCook had weakened Sherman’s cavalry, struck -out at his opponent’s line of supply. He sent cavalry commander -Wheeler with 4,000 men to destroy the railroad north of Marietta -and to disrupt Sherman’s communications with the North. Although -Wheeler was able to make some temporary breaks in the -line, he was unable to reduce substantially the flow of supplies to -Sherman’s armies. The Federal commander had built strong fortifications -at the most strategic points on the railroad and his -efficient repair crews quickly rebuilt those parts of the track that -Wheeler could reach and damage. Eventually, the Confederate -cavalry drifted into Tennessee and did not rejoin Hood until the -campaign was over. Many students of the war regard Wheeler’s -mission as a mistake because the absence of the cavalry deprived -Hood of the best means of keeping posted on Sherman’s activities -and thus proved fatal to the army at Atlanta.</p> -<p>Wheeler’s departure led Sherman to send out a third cavalry -expedition, commanded by Brig. Gen. Judson Kilpatrick. The -Northerners reached the railroads below Atlanta and on August -18-20 succeeded in tearing up sections of the track. On the 20th -they were driven away. Kilpatrick reported to Sherman that the -railroad had been so thoroughly wrecked that it would take at -least 10 days to repair it. However, on the following day, the -Federals saw trains bringing supplies into the city from the south. -Clearly the Northern cavalry was not strong enough to destroy -Hood’s lines of supply. New plans would have to be tried if the -Unionists were to capture Atlanta.</p> -<p>Meanwhile, a curious kind of optimism was developing in the -Southern ranks. Many Confederates did not see the hard battles -of late July as defeats. Rather they viewed them as successful -efforts to halt the progress of flanking columns that had threatened -the city’s lines of supply. One officer wrote on August 4 -about the battles of Atlanta and Ezra Church: “General Hood -watches his flanks closely and has twice whipped the flanking -<span class="pb" id="Page_53">53</span> -columns.” When Sherman made no new efforts to flank the city -and when the Northern cavalry raids were beaten off one after -another, many men came to believe that Atlanta had been saved. -In mid-August a Texan informed his homefolk that “affairs are -brightening here. People and army seem more confident of -success.” At about the same time, a Mississippian wrote that -“The enemy seems checked in his flanking operations on our left, -as he has made no progress in that direction for the last four or -five days.” On August 28, an Alabamian wrote his wife that “It -required hard fighting to check the enemy here after having pursued -us so far.”</p> -<p>At the very end of August there came exciting news for the -Southerners. Sherman had fallen back! The Northerners were -gone from in front of Atlanta! Many thought Wheeler’s cavalry -had cut off Sherman’s supplies and that this had forced the Federal -commander to lift the siege. Joyous Confederates swarmed -out of the city to romp over the abandoned Northern trenches. -“The scales have turned in favor of the South,” wrote Capt. -Thomas J. Key of Arkansas, “and the Abolitionists are moving to -the rear.”</p> -<div class="img" id="fig17"> -<img src="images/p22.jpg" alt="" width="700" height="518" /> -<p class="pcap"><span class="ss">CAVALRY OPERATIONS<br />JULY-AUGUST 1864</span></p> -</div> -<div class="pb" id="Page_54">54</div> -<h2 id="c14"><span class="small">JONESBOROUGH</span></h2> -<p>Some Southerners suspected in 1864 what we now know—Sherman -had not retreated. Rather, he had concluded that -only his infantry could effectively break Hood’s lines of -supply and had resolved to move almost all of his force to the -southwest of the city. The movement began on August 25. One -corps was sent back to the Chattahoochee bridgehead to guard -the railroad that connected Sherman with the North. The remaining -Federal troops pulled out of their trenches and marched away -to the west and south. By noon on the 28th, Howard’s Army of -the Tennessee had reached Fairburn, a small station on the Atlanta -and West Point Railroad, 13 miles southwest of East Point. -Later that afternoon, Thomas’ troops occupied Red Oak, on the -railroad 5 miles to the northeast. The Northerners spent the rest -of the 28th and the 29th destroying the tracks. The rails were -torn up, heated, and twisted so that they were useless. Only one -railroad, the Macon and Western, running southeast from East -Point to Macon, now remained in Confederate hands. Sherman -soon moved to cut it.</p> -<p>By August 29, Hood had learned of the activities of the Federals -at Fairburn. It was clear that the railroad to Macon would be -Sherman’s next objective and the Southern commander acted to -defend that line. However, he badly misjudged the situation and -thought that only two corps of Sherman’s army were to the -southwest. Late on August 30, Hood ordered Hardee to take two -corps of the Southern army, move against the raiding column, and -drive it away. Both armies were soon closing in on Jonesborough, -14 miles below East Point on the Macon railroad. By that evening, -advance elements of the Union forces had crossed the Flint -River and entrenched a position 1 mile west of Jonesborough. -During the night, Hardee’s Southerners moved into the town by -rail; by morning they were deploying in front of the Federal line.</p> -<p>Hardee had his own corps (temporarily led by Maj. Gen. Patrick -R. Cleburne) and Lee’s. It took until mid-afternoon to complete -preparations for an attack. The Confederates advanced -about 3 p.m., their assault falling mostly on an entrenched salient -on the east bank of the Flint held by the Army of the Tennessee. -The attack was fierce but uncoordinated and failed to drive back -the Northerners. When the fighting ceased that night, the relative -<span class="pb" id="Page_55">55</span> -positions of the armies were unchanged.</p> -<p>Meanwhile, Schofield’s Army of the Ohio had managed to -break the Macon railroad near Rough-and-Ready, a small station -between Jonesborough and East Point. This movement led Hood -to conclude that Sherman’s main force was attacking Atlanta -from the south. The Confederate commander, therefore, ordered -Lee’s Corps to leave Hardee at Jonesborough and move toward -Atlanta to help defend the city. Lee began this movement at 2 -a.m. the next morning.</p> -<p>At dawn on September 1, Sherman with almost all of his troops -was south of Atlanta. The Federals were concentrating at Jonesborough -where they had encountered the bulk of the Southern -army on the preceding day and where it seemed a decisive battle -would be fought. The Confederates were widely separated. Hood, -with one corps, was in Atlanta; Hardee, with his corps, was at -Jonesborough; and Lee, with the remaining corps, was near East -Point.</p> -<p>At Jonesborough, Hardee had taken up a defensive position -north and west of the town. During the afternoon he was attacked -by the overwhelming force of Northerners concentrated -there. Although suffering many casualties, especially in prisoners, -Hardee’s Corps fought well and held its position until night offered -a chance to fall back to Lovejoy’s Station, 7 miles to the -south.</p> -<p>By this time Hood had realized what was happening and knew -that Atlanta could not be held any longer. During the night of -September 1-2, he evacuated the city. Supplies that could not be -carried away were burned. Hood’s forces moved far to the east of -the city to pass around Jonesborough and join Hardee at Lovejoy’s -Station. On September 2, Mayor James M. Calhoun surrendered -Atlanta to a party of Federal soldiers.</p> -<p>On the following day, Sherman sent a telegram to the authorities -in Washington announcing that “Atlanta is ours, and fairly -won.” He added that he would not pursue the Confederates, who -were then fortified at Lovejoy’s Station, but would return to Atlanta -so that his men could enjoy a brief respite from fighting. -“Since May 5,” he wrote, “we have been in one constant battle -or skirmish, and need rest.”</p> -<p>A few days later another Federal wrote from his camp near -<span class="pb" id="Page_56">56</span> -Atlanta: “Here we will rest until further orders.... The campaign -that commenced May 2 is now over, and we will rest here to -recruit and prepare for a new campaign.”</p> -<p>Some writers have been critical of Sherman’s decision not to -press after Hood’s army. They maintain that the enemy force and -not the city of Atlanta was the true objective of the Unionists. It -may have been that Sherman’s action was determined by the -question of supplies or it may have been that his men were too -exhausted for immediate operations south of the city. At any -rate, the capture of Atlanta delighted and heartened Northerners. -News of Sherman’s victory was greeted with ringing bells and -cannon fire all over the North.</p> -<div class="img"> -<img src="images/p23.jpg" alt="{uncaptioned}" width="500" height="370" /> -</div> -<div class="pb" id="Page_57">57</div> -<h2 id="c15"><span class="small">EPILOGUE</span></h2> -<p>Sherman soon turned Atlanta into an armed camp. Houses -were torn down and the lumber used for fortifications or -soldiers’ huts. Civilians could not be fed by the army and -were ordered out of the city with the choice of going north or -south. In mid-September a truce was declared and the citizens -who chose to remain in the Confederacy were transported by the -Northerners to Rough-and-Ready, where they were handed over -to Hood’s men who conveyed them farther south.</p> -<p>After completion of this unpleasant task, Hood determined to -reverse Sherman’s strategy and to move with his whole army -around Atlanta to draw Sherman after him into Alabama or -Tennessee. In late September the Confederates crossed the Chattahoochee -and marched northward over many of the summer’s -battlefields. Sherman left a strong garrison in Atlanta and followed -Hood northward for several weeks. Unable to bring his -opponent to bay, Sherman detached a strong force to deal with -the Confederates and returned to Atlanta. Hood’s army was virtually -destroyed in several battles fought in Tennessee in November -and December. Sherman, meanwhile, reorganized his armies -and on November 15 burned Atlanta and marched out of the city -on his way to the sea.</p> -<p>The final importance of the Atlanta Campaign may lie more in -its psychological impact than in any military results. Essentially, -in early September, the Confederate military forces were in the -same position relative to the Northern armies that they had held -early in the spring. Psychologically, however, there had been a -great shift. The news that Atlanta had fallen meant that the -average Northerner had at last a tangible military victory that -made it possible for him to see the end of the war in the future. -There would be more months of marching, fighting, and dying, -but Sherman’s capture of Atlanta convinced many that the Confederacy -was doomed.</p> -<div class="pb" id="Page_58">58</div> -<div class="img"> -<img src="images/p24.jpg" alt="{uncaptioned}" width="500" height="719" /> -</div> -<div class="pb" id="Page_59">59</div> -<h2 id="c16"><span class="small">SHERMAN IN ATLANTA: A Photographic Portfolio</span></h2> -<p>On September 3, 1864, President Abraham Lincoln telegraphed -the commanding officer of the Federal Military -Division of the Mississippi: “The national thanks are -rendered ... to Major-General W. T. Sherman and the officers -and soldiers of his command before Atlanta, for the distinguished -ability and perserverence displayed in the campaign in Georgia -which, under Divine favor, has resulted in the capture of Atlanta. -The marches, battles, sieges and other military operations that -have signalized the campaign, must render it famous in the -annals of war, and have entitled those who have participated -therein to the applause and thanks of the nation.”</p> -<p>The Union soldiers had, in Sherman’s words, “completed the -grand task which has been assigned us by our Government.” -Atlanta, chief rail hub of the Confederacy and one of the South’s -principal distributing, industrial, commercial, and cultural centers, -was in Federal hands at last. It was a choice prize.</p> -<p>The city was founded in 1837 as Terminus, so-named because -a rail line ended there. It was incorporated as Marthasville in -1845; two years later it was renamed Atlanta. Only a few dozen -people lived there in the 1840’s, but by 1861, when the Civil -War began, some 10,000 people called it home. By 1864, when -Sherman’s armies started south from Chattanooga, Atlanta’s -population was double that number. The city boasted factories, -foundries, stores, arsenals, government offices, and hospitals, -which, as the war progressed and drew closer, were hard pressed -to handle the mounting number of casualties needing treatment. -So strategic was Atlanta that Confederate President Jefferson -Davis proclaimed that “Its fall would open the way for the -Federal armies to the Gulf on one hand, and to Charleston on -the other, and close up those granaries from which Gen. Robert -E. Lee’s armies are supplied. It would give them control of our -network of railroads and thus paralyze our efforts.” Now, with -Federal soldiers in Atlanta, Davis’ fears would be realized.</p> -<p>Sherman’s troops occupied Atlanta for more than 2 months. -The photographs and captions that follow highlight aspects of -that occupation.</p> -<div class="pb" id="Page_60">60</div> -<div class="img" id="fig18"> -<img src="images/p25.jpg" alt="" width="524" height="800" /> -<p class="pcap"><span class="jri"><i>National Archives</i></span> -<br /><i>Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman, conqueror of Atlanta.</i></p> -</div> -<div class="pb" id="Page_61">61</div> -<div class="img" id="fig19"> -<img src="images/p25a.jpg" alt="" width="800" height="618" /> -<p class="pcap"><span class="jri"><i>Library of Congress</i></span> -<br /><i>Confederate palisades and cheveaux-de-frise around the Potter house -northwest of Atlanta. Near here, Mayor James M. Calhoun surrendered -the city to Sherman’s forces.</i></p> -</div> -<div class="img" id="fig20"> -<img src="images/p25c.jpg" alt="" width="800" height="411" /> -<p class="pcap"><span class="jri"><i>Library of Congress</i></span> -<br /><i>Union soldiers lounge inside one of -the abandoned Confederate field forts defending Atlanta.</i></p> -</div> -<div class="pb" id="Page_62">62</div> -<div class="img" id="fig21"> -<img src="images/p26.jpg" alt="" width="800" height="183" /> -<p class="pcap"><span class="jri"><i>Library of Congress</i></span> -<br /><i>Atlanta, October 1864: “solid and business-like, wide streets -and many fine houses.”</i></p> -</div> -<div class="img" id="fig22"> -<img src="images/p26a.jpg" alt="" width="700" height="700" /> -<p class="pcap"><span class="jri"><i>Atlanta Historical Society</i></span> -<br /><i>Federal officers commandeered many of -Atlanta’s houses for staff headquarters. Col. Henry A. Barnum and his -staff moved into General Hood’s former headquarters, described as the -“finest wooden building in the city.”</i></p> -</div> -<div class="pb" id="Page_63">63</div> -<div class="img" id="fig23"> -<img src="images/p26c.jpg" alt="" width="800" height="598" /> -<p class="pcap"><span class="jri"><i>Library of Congress</i></span> -<br /><i>After Sherman turned -Atlanta into an armed camp, wagon trains, like this one on Whitehall -Street, rumbled through the city day and night.</i></p> -</div> -<div class="pb" id="Page_64">64</div> -<div class="img" id="fig24"> -<img src="images/p27.jpg" alt="" width="800" height="514" /> -<p class="pcap"><span class="jri"><i>Atlanta Historical Society</i></span> -<br /><i>The 2d Massachusetts Infantry, the “best officered regiment in the Army,” -set up camp in City Hall Square. When this photograph was taken, near -the end of the occupation, the soldiers’ tents had been replaced by more -substantial wooden huts built from demolished houses.</i></p> -</div> -<div class="pb" id="Page_66">66</div> -<div class="img" id="fig25"> -<img src="images/p28.jpg" alt="" width="545" height="800" /> -<p class="pcap"><span class="jri"><i>Library of Congress</i></span> -<br /><i>Atlanta residents, evicted from the city by General Sherman, await -the departure of the baggage-laden train that will take them south beyond -Union lines.</i></p> -</div> -<div class="pb" id="Page_67">67</div> -<div class="img" id="fig26"> -<img src="images/p28a.jpg" alt="" width="800" height="485" /> -<p class="pcap"><span class="jri"><i>Library of Congress</i></span> -<br /><i>Federal soldiers pry up the city’s railroad tracks -before leaving on their march to the sea.</i></p> -</div> -<div class="img" id="fig27"> -<img src="images/p28c.jpg" alt="" width="800" height="501" /> -<p class="pcap"><span class="jri"><i>Library of Congress</i></span> -<br /><i>The railroad depot after -it was blown up by Federal demolition squads.</i></p> -</div> -<div class="pb" id="Page_68">68</div> -<div class="img" id="fig28"> -<img src="images/p29.jpg" alt="" width="800" height="514" /> -<p class="pcap"><span class="jri"><i>National Archives</i></span> -<br /><i>This desolate scene marks the site where retreating Confederate soldiers -blew up their ordnance train early on the morning of September 1, 1864. -Sherman’s soldiers left similar scenes of destruction in their wake as they -marched across Georgia in the closing months of the war.</i></p> -</div> -<div class="pb" id="Page_70">70</div> -<h2 id="c17"><span class="small">FOR FURTHER READING</span></h2> -<p>The only published book-length study of the Atlanta Campaign -is Jacob D. Cox’s <i>Atlanta</i> (New York, 1882; new -edition, 1963). More detailed accounts may be found in -two doctoral dissertations: Richard M. McMurry, “The Atlanta -Campaign, December 23, 1863, to July 18, 1864,” and Errol MacGregor -Clauss, “The Atlanta Campaign, 18 July-2 September -1864.” Both were written at Emory University, the former in -1967 and the latter in 1965, and both are available on microfilm -from University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Mich. In addition, the -<i>Georgia Historical Quarterly</i> and <i>Civil War Times Illustrated</i> -have published numerous articles dealing with specialized aspects -of the campaign.</p> -<p>Good books by participants include Paul M. Angle, ed., <i>Three -Years in the Army of the Cumberland: The Letters and Diary of -Major James A. Connolly</i> (Bloomington, 1959); John B. Hood, -<i>Advance and Retreat: Personal Experiences in the United States -and Confederate Armies</i> (New Orleans, 1880; new edition, -Bloomington, 1959); Joseph E. Johnston, <i>Narrative of Military -Operations During the Late War Between the States</i> (New York, -1874; new edition, Bloomington, 1959); Albert D. Kirwan, ed., -<i>Johnny Green of the Orphan Brigade: The Journal of a Confederate -Soldier</i> (Lexington, Ky., 1956); Milo M. Quaife, ed., <i>From -the Cannon’s Mouth: The Civil War Letters of General Alpheus -S. Williams</i> (Detroit, 1959); John M. Schofield, <i>Forty-Six Years -in the Army</i> (New York, 1897); William T. Sherman, <i>Memoirs of -General William T. Sherman, by Himself</i> (2 vols., New York, -1875; new, 1-vol. edition, Bloomington, 1957); U.S. War Department, -comp., <i>War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union -and Confederate Armies</i> (128 vols., Washington, D.C., 1880-1901), -Series 1, vol. 38; Sam R. Watkins, “Co. Aytch,” <i>Maury -Grays, First Tennessee Regiment; or, A Side Show of the Big -Show</i> (Chattanooga, 1900; new edition, Jackson, Tenn., 1952); -and Charles W. Wills, <i>Army Life of an Illinois Soldier ...</i> (Washington, -D.C., 1906).</p> -<div class="pb" id="Page_71">71</div> -<h2 id="c18"><span class="small">CIVIL WAR SITES IN GEORGIA</span></h2> -<p>Listed below are several of the major Civil War sites in -Georgia. A good source on other areas is the booklet <i>Georgia -Civil War Historical Markers</i>, published by the Georgia -Historical Commission.</p> -<p>ANDERSONVILLE: This is now a national historic site. It -was the site of the notorious Civil War prison where, in the -summer of 1864, more than 30,000 captured Federals were held. -On U.S. 49 at Andersonville, near Americus.</p> -<p>ATLANTA: Goal of the 1864 campaign. Most of the area in -which the fighting occurred has been built over, but Grant Park -contains the trenches of Fort Walker, the Cyclorama of the Battle -of Atlanta, and a museum.</p> -<p>CHICKAMAUGA: On U.S. 278 near Rossville. A national military -park where the great battle of September 19-20, 1863, was -fought.</p> -<p>COLUMBUS: Site of the raised Confederate gunboat <i>Muscogee</i> -and a naval museum on Fourth Street, west of U.S. 27.</p> -<p>CRAWFORDSVILLE: On U.S. 278 west of Augusta. Liberty -Hall, the home of Confederate Vice President Alexander H. Stephens, -has been restored and is open to the public.</p> -<p>FORT PULASKI: A national monument on U.S. 80 east of Savannah. -Site of an engagement in 1862 when Northern forces -attacked and captured the fort.</p> -<p>IRWINVILLE: Off Ga. 107 in the south-central portion of the -State. Museum at the site where President Jefferson Davis was -captured by Federal forces in 1865.</p> -<p>KENNESAW MOUNTAIN: A national battlefield park on U.S. -41 north of Marietta. This park preserves much of the area where -fighting occurred in 1864. Museum, slide show, and hiking trails.</p> -<p>MILLEDGEVILLE: On U.S. 441 in east-central Georgia. Capital -of Georgia during the war. Occupied by the Federals during the -“March to the Sea.” Many old buildings remain.</p> -<p>SAVANNAH: Terminus of the “March to the Sea.” Fort McAllister, -east of the city on U.S. 17, was a Confederate defense post. -Factors Walk Museum at 222 Factors Walk houses many wartime -relics.</p> -<div class="pb" id="Page_72">72</div> -<hr class="dwide" /> -<p>Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park is administered by the -National Park Service, U.S. Department of the Interior. A superintendent, -whose address is Box 1167, Marietta, GA 30060, is in immediate charge.</p> -<p>As the Nation’s principal conservation agency, the Department of the -Interior has basic responsibilities for water, fish, wildlife, mineral, land, -park, and recreational resources. Indian and Territorial affairs are other -major concerns of America’s “Department of Natural Resources.” The -Department works to assure the wisest choice in managing all our resources -so each will make its full contribution to a better United States—now and -in the future.</p> -<div class="img"> -<img src="images/p30.jpg" alt="Department of the Interior • March 1, 1849" width="163" height="165" /> -</div> -<div class="verse"> -<p class="t0">United States Department of the Interior</p> -<p class="t0">Thomas S. Kleppe, Secretary</p> -</div> -<div class="verse"> -<p class="t0">National Park Service</p> -<p class="t0">George B. Hartzog, Jr., Director</p> -</div> -<p><span class="lr"><span class="smaller"><span class="ssn">★ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1976 224-506</span></span></span></p> -<h2>Transcriber’s Notes</h2> -<ul> -<li>Silently corrected a few typos.</li> -<li>Retained publication information from the printed edition: this eBook is public-domain in the country of publication.</li> -<li>In the text versions only, text in <i>italics</i> is delimited by _underscores_.</li> -</ul> - - - - - - - -<pre> - - - - - -End of Project Gutenberg's The Road Past Kennesaw, by Richard M. 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