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diff --git a/old/61027-0.txt b/old/61027-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index a3e9ff1..0000000 --- a/old/61027-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2086 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of Richmond National Battlefield Park, Virginia, by -Joseph P. Cullen - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: Richmond National Battlefield Park, Virginia - National Park Service Historical Handbook Series No. 33 - -Author: Joseph P. Cullen - -Release Date: December 27, 2019 [EBook #61027] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK RICHMOND NAT. BATTLEFIELD PARK, VIRGINIA *** - - - - -Produced by Stephen Hutcheson and the Online Distributed -Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net - - - - - - - [Illustration: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR · March 3, 1849] - - UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR - Stewart L. Udall, _Secretary_ - - NATIONAL PARK SERVICE - Conrad L. Wirth, _Director_ - - - _HISTORICAL HANDBOOK NUMBER THIRTY-THREE_ - -This publication is one of a series of handbooks describing the -historical and archeological areas in the National Park System -administered by the National Park Service of the United States -Department of the Interior. It is printed by the Government Printing -Office and may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, -Washington 25, D.C. Price 25 cents. - - - - - RICHMOND - National Battlefield Park - Virginia - - - [Illustration: {Sniper}] - - _by Joseph P. Cullen_ - - NATIONAL PARK SERVICE HISTORICAL HANDBOOK SERIES NO. 33 - Washington, D.C., 1961 - - [Illustration: _The National Park System, of which Richmond National - Battlefield Park is a unit, is dedicated to conserving the scenic, - scientific, and historic heritage of the United States for the - benefit and inspiration of its people._] - - - - - _Contents_ - - - _Page_ - - - Richmond 1 - The Army of the Potomac 2 - - - Part One - - - THE PENINSULA CAMPAIGN, SUMMER 1862 - On to Richmond 3 - Up the Peninsula 4 - Drewry’s Bluff 5 - Seven Pines (Fair Oaks) 6 - Lee Takes Command 9 - The Seven Days Begin 12 - Beaver Dam Creek (Ellerson’s Mill) 13 - Gaines’ Mill 16 - Savage Station 18 - Glendale (Frayser’s Farm) 21 - Malvern Hill 22 - End of Campaign 24 - The Years Between 27 - - - Part Two - - - THE FINAL STRUGGLE FOR RICHMOND, 1864-65 - Lincoln’s New Commander 28 - Cold Harbor 29 - Fort Harrison 37 - Richmond Falls 40 - The Park 46 - Administration 46 - - [Illustration: _Richmond, 1858._ From a contemporary sketch.] - - [Illustration: ] - -The American Civil War _was unique in many respects. One of the great -turning points in American history, it was a national tragedy of -international significance. Simultaneously, it was the last of the old -wars and the first of the new. Although it began in a blaze of glamor, -romance, and chivalry, it ended in the ashes of misery, destruction, and -death. It was, as Walt Whitman said, “a strange, sad war.”_ - - -Richmond National Battlefield Park preserves the scenes of some of the -great battles that took place in the vicinity of the Confederate -Capital. When we visit these now quiet, peaceful woods and fields, we -feel an association with our past that is impossible to achieve with the -written or spoken word. Here we are not reminded of the Blue or the Gray -as such, only of the heroic struggle of men—men with two different -beliefs and philosophies, welded together by the blood of battle, to -give us our America of today. - - - - - _Richmond_ - - -In session at Montgomery, Ala., in May 1861, the Confederate Congress -voted to remove the Capital of the Confederate States to Richmond, Va. -This decision, in effect, made Richmond a beleaguered city for 4 years. -Essentially, the move was dictated by political and military -considerations. The prestige of Virginia, richest and most populous -State in the South, was considered necessary for the success of the -Confederacy. For political reasons it was believed that the Capital -should be near the border States and the heavy fighting expected there. - -Second only to New Orleans, Richmond was the largest city in the -Confederacy, having a population of about 38,000. It was also the center -of iron manufacturing in the South. The Tredegar Iron Works, main source -of cannon supply for the Southern armies, influenced the choice of -Richmond as the Confederate Capital and demanded its defense. During the -course of the war, Tredegar made over 1,100 cannon, in addition to -mines, torpedoes, propeller shafts, and other war machinery. It expanded -to include rolling mills, forges, sawmills, and machine shops. The -Richmond Laboratory made over 72 million cartridges, along with -grenades, gun carriages, field artillery, and canteens, while the -Richmond Armory had a capacity for manufacturing 5,000 small arms a -month. - - [Illustration: _Tredegar Iron Works._ Courtesy, Library of - Congress.] - -Thus Richmond became the political, military, and manufacturing center -of the South, and the symbol of secession to the North. - -Situated near the head of the navigable waters of the James River, and -within 110 miles of the National Capital at Washington, Richmond was the -key to the military planning of both sides. For 4 years the city -remained the primary military objective of the Union armies in the east. -As one southern newspaper stated: “To lose Richmond is to lose Virginia, -and to lose Virginia is to lose the key to the Southern Confederacy.” - - - - - _The Army of the Potomac_ - - -In July 1861 the untrained Union Army of the Potomac suffered disaster -at Manassas (Bull Run) in the first attempt to drive into Virginia and -capture Richmond. President Abraham Lincoln then appointed Gen. George -B. McClellan the new commander of the demoralized army. McClellan -reported: “I found no army to command * * * just a mere collection of -regiments cowering on the banks of the Potomac.” - -To this chaotic situation he brought order and discipline. During the -long winter months, the raw recruits were marshalled and drilled into an -efficient fighting machine of over 100,000 men—the largest army ever -commanded by one man in the history of the western hemisphere. By the -spring of 1862 this army was ready for the supreme test—the goal was -Richmond. - - - - - Part One - THE PENINSULA CAMPAIGN, SUMMER, 1862 - - - - - _On To Richmond_ - - -Instead of marching overland, McClellan decided to take advantage of -Union control of the inland waters and transport his army, with its vast -supplies and materiel, down the Potomac River and across Chesapeake Bay -to the tip of the peninsula between the York and James Rivers. Then with -his supply ships steaming up the York, he planned to march northwestward -up the peninsula, join another force under Gen. Irvin McDowell marching -overland from Washington, and together, converge on Richmond. - - [Illustration: _McClellan’s plan of attack._ Painting by Sidney - King.] - -To accomplish this, McClellan undertook the largest amphibious operation -ever attempted in the western world. Over 400 steam vessels, brigs, -schooners, sloops, ferry boats, and barges assembled on the Potomac -River. In March 1862 these vessels ferried the Army of the Potomac, with -its 3,600 wagons, 700 ambulances, 300 pieces of artillery, 2,500 head of -cattle, and over 25,000 horses and mules, to the southeast coast of -Virginia. As Q. M. Gen. Rufus Ingalls reported: “Operations so extensive -and important as the rapid and successful embarkation of such an army, -with all its vast equipment, its transfer to the peninsula, and its -supply while there, had scarcely any parallel in history.” - - - - - _Up The Peninsula_ - - -After landing at Fortress Monroe the Federal troops pushed aside the -thinly held Confederate defenses at Yorktown and Williamsburg and -proceeded up the peninsula according to plan. But progress was slow. -Every day 500 tons of forage and subsistence were required to keep the -army in the field. Early in May it rained and kept raining, day after -dreary day. Federal soldiers had a saying: “Virginia used to be in the -Union—now it’s in the mud.” Dirt roads turned into bottomless -muck—creeks and gullies became swift flowing streams—fields were swamps. -Roads and bridges had to be built and rebuilt, and still the thousands -of wagons, horses, and mules continually stuck in the mud. - - [Illustration: _Sumner’s troops crossing Grapevine Bridge to - reinforce Coach at Seven Pines._ From a contemporary sketch.] - -Realizing that an effective overland pursuit of the retreating -Confederate forces under Gen. Joseph E. Johnston was out of the question -because of the weather and the condition of the roads, McClellan on May -6 sent Gen. William B. Franklin’s division up the York River by -transport to West Point, terminus of the Richmond and York River -Railroad, in an attempt to cut off the Confederate wagon train. Johnston -anticipated the move, however, and on May 7 ordered Gen. W. H. C. -Whiting’s troops to attack Franklin in the battle of West Point, or -Eltham’s Landing. - -The attack was repulsed, but, even so, the wagon train managed to -continue safely to Richmond. McClellan, however, had cleared the way to -his next objective—the landing at White House on the Pamunkey River, a -tributary of the York. Here the railroad crossed the Pamunkey on its way -to West Point. This would be the Union base of supply for the -contemplated attack on Richmond. This battle also cleared the way for -the right wing of the Union army, which would have to stay north and -east of Richmond in order to hook up with McDowell’s anticipated -overland march from Washington. - -General Johnston, falling back steadily in front of McClellan’s slow -advance, was the target of severe criticism from Richmond newspapers for -not making a determined stand. But he wrote to Gen. Robert E. Lee: “We -are engaged in a species of warfare at which we can never win. It is -plain that Gen. McClellan will adhere to the system adopted by him last -summer, and depend for success upon artillery and engineering. We can -compete with him in neither.” - - - - - _Drewry’s Bluff_ - - -After the fall of Norfolk on May 10 to the Union forces under Gen. John -Wool, the crew of the _Virginia_ (_Merrimack_) scuttled their ship. -River pilots had advised that the iron-clad vessel could not navigate -the treacherous channel up the James River to Richmond. Loss of the -_Virginia_ opened the river to Federal gunboats, and McClellan -immediately telegraphed the War Department: “I would now most earnestly -urge that our gunboats and the iron-clad boats be sent as far as -possible up the James river without delay. Instructions have been given -so that the Navy will receive prompt support wherever and whenever -required.” - -Five Union gunboats, including the famous _Monitor_, started up the -James under Comdr. John Rogers in the _Galena_. By May 15 they reached -Drewry’s Bluff, just 7 miles below Richmond. Here, at a sharp bend, the -Confederates had effectively obstructed the river and erected powerful -batteries on a 90-foot bluff. - - [Illustration: _Battle of Drewry’s Bluff._ Diorama, Richmond - National Battlefield Park Visitor Center.] - -At 7 that morning the Federal gunboats opened fire on Fort Darling. The -battle raged for 4 hours while the fate of Richmond hung in the balance, -and near panic spread through the city. However, the accurate fire of -the heavy guns on the bluff, combined with effective sharpshooting along -the riverbanks, finally proved too much for the gunboats, and the -Federal fleet retreated down the river. One Confederate officer -observed: “* * * had Commander Rogers been supported by a few brigades, -landed at City Point or above on the south side, Richmond would have -been evacuated.” - -Although the Secretary of the Navy requested “a cooperating land force” -to help the gunboats pass Fort Darling and take Richmond, McClellan, -despite his earlier promise of cooperation, wired the War Department: -“Am not yet ready to cooperate with them.” He neglected to say when he -would be ready. Richmond was never again seriously threatened by water. - - - - - _Seven Pines_ (_Fair Oaks_) - - -Slowed by the heavy rains and the bad condition of the roads, where -“teams cannot haul over half a load, and often empty wagons are -stalled,” McClellan finally established his base of supply at White -House on May 15. Five days later his advance crossed the Chickahominy -River at Bottoms Bridge. By the 24th the five Federal corps were -established on a front partly encircling Richmond on the north and east, -and less than 6 miles away. Three corps lined the north bank of the -Chickahominy, while the two corps under Generals E. D. Keyes and Samuel -P. Heintzelman were south of the river, astride the York River Railroad -and the roads down the peninsula. - - [Illustration: _Gen. George B. McClellan._ Courtesy, Library of - Congress.] - -With his army thus split by the Chickahominy, McClellan realized his -position was precarious, but his orders were explicit: “General McDowell -has been ordered to march upon Richmond by the shortest route. He is -ordered * * * so to operate as to place his left wing in communication -with your right wing, and you are instructed to cooperate, by extending -your right wing to the north of Richmond * * *.” - -Then, because of Gen. Thomas J. (“Stonewall”) Jackson’s brilliant -operations in the Shenandoah Valley threatening Washington, Lincoln -telegraphed McClellan on May 24: “I have been compelled to suspend -McDowell’s movements to join you.” McDowell wrote disgustedly: “If the -enemy can succeed so readily in disconcerting all our plans by alarming -us first at one point then at another, he will paralyze a large force -with a very small one.” That is exactly what Jackson succeeded in doing. -This fear for the safety of Washington—the skeleton that haunted -Lincoln’s closet—was the dominating factor in the military planning in -the east throughout the war. - -Lincoln’s order only suspended McDowell’s instructions to join -McClellan; it did not revoke them. McClellan was still obliged to keep -his right wing across the swollen Chickahominy. - -Learning of McDowell’s withdrawal, Johnston decided to attack the two -Federal corps south of the river, drive them back and destroy the -Richmond and York River Railroad to White House. Early in the morning on -May 31, after a violent rainstorm that threatened to wash all the -Federal bridges into the river, Johnston fell upon Keyes and Heintzelman -with 23 of his 27 brigades at Seven Pines. - -The initial attack was sudden and vicious. Confederate Gen. James -Longstreet threw Gen. D. H. Hill’s troops against Gen. Silas Casey’s -division of Keyes’ corps, stationed about three-quarters of a mile west -of Seven Pines. Longstreet overwhelmed the Federal division, forcing -Casey to retreat a mile east of Seven Pines. Keyes then put Gen. D. N. -Couch’s division on a line from Seven Pines to Fair Oaks, with Gen. -Philip Kearney’s division on his left flank. Not until 4 that afternoon, -however, did Confederate Gen. G. W. Smith send Whiting’s division -against Couch’s right flank at Fair Oaks. The delay was fatal. Although -Couch was forced back slowly, he drew up a new line of battle facing -south towards Fair Oaks, with his back to the Chickahominy River. Here -he held until Gen. Edwin V. Sumner, by heroic effort, succeeded in -getting Gen. John Sedgwick’s division and part of Gen. I. B. -Richardson’s across the tottering Grapevine Bridge to support him. Led -by Sumner himself, Sedgwick’s troops repulsed Smith’s attack and drove -the Confederates back with heavy losses. - -The battle plan had been sound, but the attack was badly bungled. -Directed by vague, verbal orders instead of explicit, written ones, -whole brigades got lost, took the wrong roads, and generally got in each -other’s way. Nine of the 23 attacking brigades never actually got into -the fight at all. Towards nightfall Johnston was severely wounded in the -chest and borne from the field. The command then fell to G. W. Smith. -Fighting ceased with darkness. - -Early next morning, June 1, Smith renewed the attack. His plan called -for Whiting on the left flank to hold defensively, while Longstreet on -the right swung counterclockwise in a pivot movement to hit Richardson’s -division, which was facing south with its right near Fair Oaks. The -Federal troops repulsed the assault, however, and when Heintzelman sent -Gen. Joseph Hooker’s division on the Federal left on the offensive, the -Confederates withdrew and the battle was over before noon. - -That afternoon President Jefferson Davis appointed his chief military -advisor, Gen. Robert E. Lee, as commander of the Southern forces. Lee -promptly named his new command the Army of Northern Virginia—a name -destined for fame in the annals of the Civil War. - - [Illustration: _McClellan’s troops repairing Grapevine Bridge._ - Courtesy, Library of Congress.] - -Although the battle itself was indecisive, the casualties were heavy on -both sides. The Confederates lost 6,184 in killed, wounded, and missing; -the Federals, 5,031. Undoubtedly the most important result of the fight -was the wounding of Johnston and the resultant appointment of Lee as -field commander. - - - - - _Lee Takes Command_ - - -Lee immediately began to reorganize the demoralized Southern forces, and -put them to work digging the elaborate system of entrenchments that -would eventually encircle Richmond completely. For this the troops -derisively named him the “King of Spades.” But Lee was planning more -than a static defense. When the time came these fortifications could be -held by a relatively small number of troops, while he massed the bulk of -his forces for a counteroffensive. He was familiar with and believed in -Napoleon’s maxim: “* * * to manoeuver incessantly, without submitting to -be driven back on the capital which it is meant to defend * * *.” - -On June 12 Lee sent his cavalry commander, Gen. J. E. B. (“Jeb”) Stuart, -with 1,200 men, to reconnoiter McClellan’s right flank north of the -Chickahominy, and to learn the strength of his line of communication and -supply to White House. Stuart obtained the information, but instead of -retiring from White House the way he had gone, he rode around the Union -army and returned to Richmond on June 15 by way of the James River, -losing only one man in the process. - - [Illustration: _Gen. Robert E. Lee._ Courtesy, National Archives.] - - [Illustration: _Lee’s fortifications east of Mechanicsville - Turnpike._ From a contemporary sketch.] - - [Illustration: _Chickahominy swamps._ Courtesy, National Archives.] - -It was a bold feat, and Stuart assured his chief that there was nothing -to prevent his turning the Federal right flank. But the daring ride -probably helped McClellan more than Lee. Alerted to the exposed position -of his right flank and base of supply, McClellan withdrew his whole army -south of the Chickahominy, with the exception of Gen. Fitz-John Porter’s -corps, which stretched from Grapevine Bridge to the Meadow Bridge west -of Mechanicsville. On June 18 he started the transfer of his enormous -accumulation of supplies with the shipment of 800,000 rations from White -House to Harrison’s Landing on the James River. After Jackson’s success -in the Shenandoah Valley at Cross Keys and Port Republic, it was -becoming apparent even to McClellan that McDowell probably never would -join him, in which case he wanted his base of operations to be the James -rather than the York River. - -Meanwhile, pressure from Washington for an offensive movement against -Richmond was mounting. But because of the wettest June in anyone’s -memory, McClellan was having trouble bringing up his heavy siege guns, -corduroying roads, and throwing bridges across the flooded Chickahominy -swamps. As one bedraggled soldier wrote: “It would have pleased us much -to have seen those ‘On-to-Richmond’ people put over a 5 mile course in -the Virginia mud, loaded with a 40-pound knapsack, 60 rounds of -cartridges, and haversacks filled with 4 days rations.” - -Also, McClellan believed erroneously that the Confederates had twice as -many available troops as he had. Consequently, his plan of action, as he -wrote his wife, was to “make the first battle mainly an artillery -combat. As soon as I gain possession of the ‘Old Tavern’ I will push -them in upon Richmond and behind their works; then I will bring up my -heavy guns, shell the city, and carry it by assault.” - - - - - _The Seven Days Begins_ - - - [Illustration: _Lee’s plan of attack._ Painting by Sidney King.] - -McClellan’s plan probably would have succeeded had Lee been willing to -stand still for it. But the Confederate commander did not intend to let -McClellan fight that type of warfare. As he wrote to Jackson: “Unless -McClellan can be driven out of his entrenchments he will move by -positions under cover of his heavy guns within shelling distance of -Richmond.” It was almost as if Lee had read McClellan’s letter to his -wife. - -Lee’s plan to drive McClellan away from Richmond was bold and daring, -and strategically brilliant. He would bring Jackson’s forces down from -the valley quickly and secretly to turn McClellan’s right flank at -Mechanicsville. At the same time Gen. A. P. Hill’s division would cross -the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge, turn east and clear the Federal -forces from Mechanicsville, thereby opening the Mechanicsville Turnpike -bridge for D. H. Hill and Longstreet’s troops to cross. Then, in -echelon, the four divisions would sweep down the north side of the -Chickahominy, annihilate Porter’s corps, capture the supply base at -White House, then turn and destroy the rest of the Union army. With -Jackson’s forces and other reinforcements from farther south, Lee would -have about 90,000 men, the largest army he would ever command in the -field. - -To protect Richmond, he planned to leave about one-third of his army, -under Generals John B. Magruder and Benjamin Huger, in the entrenchments -around the city to hold back the main part of McClellan’s force, about -70,000 men, from marching into the Confederate Capital. If this force -started to withdraw, then Magruder and Huger would attack. - -Lee apparently believed that McClellan would try to retreat to his base -at White House, or failing that, would retire back down the peninsula. -He assured Jefferson Davis that “any advance of the enemy toward -Richmond will be prevented by vigorously following his rear and -crippling and arresting his progress.” The strategy was just about -perfect, but, unfortunately for Lee, the tactics were not. - -On the morning of June 25 the Seven Days began with the advance of -Hooker’s division along the Williamsburg road at Oak Grove, preparatory -to a general advance McClellan planned for the next day. But Hooker ran -into strong opposition from Huger’s troops, and when McClellan received -intelligence of Jackson’s approach, Hooker was ordered back. McClellan -wired Washington: “I incline to think that Jackson will attack my right -and rear.” He had delayed too long—the next day Lee wrested the -initiative from him. - - - - - _Beaver Dam Creek_ (_Ellerson’s Mill_) - - -According to Lee’s plan, Jackson was to march from Ashland on June 25 -and encamp that night just west of the Central Railroad. At 3 a.m. on -the 26th he was to advance and envelop Porter’s right flank at Beaver -Dam Creek. Then, wrote Lee, “A. P. Hill was to cross the Chickahominy at -Meadow Bridge when Jackson’s advance beyond that point should be known -and move directly upon Mechanicsville.” - - [Illustration: _Confederate attack at Beaver Dam Creek._ From a - contemporary sketch.] - -But from the beginning, unforeseen circumstances upset the operation and -timing of this plan. McClellan suspected Jackson’s approach, so the -element of surprise was lacking. And when the action of the Union -pickets in destroying bridges and felling trees in Jackson’s path, as -well as the fatigue of his weary troops, combined to delay him, the -all-important time element was lost. - -As the day wore on with no word from Jackson, A. P. Hill became -impatient and fearful for the success of Lee’s plan. He decided to -attack regardless. At 3 that afternoon he crossed the Chickahominy and -swept the Union outposts from Mechanicsville, thus clearing the way for -D. H. Hill and Longstreet’s troops to cross. Porter withdrew to a -prepared position behind Beaver Dam Creek, a mile east of -Mechanicsville. This naturally strong position was further fortified by -felled trees and the banks of a millrace. Here, atop the high banks of -the stream, he placed Gen. George McCall’s division, extending from near -the Chickahominy on the south, across Old Church road (now U.S. 360) on -the north. Gen. Truman Seymour’s brigade held the left and Gen. John -Reynold’s the right, with Gen. George G. Meade’s brigade in reserve. The -only approaches to the position were across open fields, commanded by -the Federal artillery, and down the steep banks of the stream, covered -by the soldiers’ muskets. - -Hill recklessly hurled his brigades forward in a hopeless frontal -assault. The gray-clad infantry charged bravely down the steep banks and -up to the stream before the murderous fire of artillery and musketry -from the surrounding slopes forced a bloody withdrawal. Casualties in -killed and wounded were: Confederate 1,485; Union, 258. - -Despite the successful defense, when Jackson’s forces finally appeared -on his right flank later that night, Porter’s position became untenable -and McClellan ordered him to withdraw to a previously prepared position -behind Boatswain Swamp, near Gaines’ Mill. At the same time he ordered -his quartermaster general at White House to reship all the supplies he -possibly could to Harrison’s Landing on the James, and send all the beef -cattle to the vicinity of Savage Station. Early next morning, June 27, -the herd of 2,500 head of cattle started on its drive from White House. - - [Illustration: _Battle of Gaines’ Mill._ From _Battles and Leaders - of the Civil War_.] - - OLD COLD HARBOR - Gaines’s MILL - NEW COLD HARBOR - _CONFEDERATE_ - Lee’s Headq’rs - D. H. HILL - JACKSON - EWELL - A. P. HILL - WHITING - LONGSTREET - _UNION_ - SYKES - McGehee - BUCHANAN - WARREN - LOVELL - MORELL - Porter’s Headq’rs - GRIFFIN - MARTINDALE - BUTTERFIELD - McCALL - REYNOLDS - SEYMOUR - MEADE - J. Martin - W. F. SMITH - SLOCUM _ARRIVING 4 O’CLOCK_ - NEWTON - TAYLOR - BARTLETT - FRENCH & MEACHER _ARRIVING TO COVER RETREAT about 6.30 p.m._ - - [Illustration: _McClellan’s change of base._ Painting by Sidney - King.] - - WHITE HOUSE - MECHANICSVILLE - GAINES MILL - Pomunkey - SAVAGE STATION - Chickahominy - GLENDALE - MALVERN HILL - HARRISON’S LANDING - - - - - _Gaines’ Mill_ - - -The tactical situation was now extremely critical for both Lee and -McClellan. Because of the repulse at Beaver Dam, Lee had not yet -achieved his first objective, which, according to his battle order, was -to “drive the enemy from his position above New Bridge,” about 4 miles -east of Mechanicsville. Lee’s whole plan for the defense of Richmond, in -the event McClellan should elect to march on the city with his main -force south of the Chickahominy, hinged on his ability to cross the -river quickly and attack the Federal rear. Lacking control of New Bridge -this would be impossible. Although the Union position behind Boatswain -Swamp was actually east of New Bridge, the approaches to the bridge -could be covered by Porter’s artillery. - -The situation was equally serious for McClellan. With Jackson enveloping -his right flank and rear, and believing he “had to deal with at least -double” his numbers, White House would have to be abandoned. Having made -the decision to change his base to the James, he desperately needed time -to perfect the arrangements and to get the thousands of wagons and the -herd of cattle safely started. His order to Porter was explicit, “hold -our position at any cost until night * * *.” - -Porter’s corps now occupied a semicircular line of battle along the -crest of the partially wooded plateau behind Boatswain Swamp, with both -extremes resting on the Chickahominy River. It was another naturally -strong position further strengthened by felling trees and digging rifle -pits. The approaches to the position were over an open plain and across -a sharp ravine. Gen. George Morell’s division held the left and Gen. -George Sykes’ right, with McCall’s weary troops in reserve. Gen. Philip -St. George Cooke’s cavalry was on Porter’s extreme left, in the lowlands -bordering the Chickahominy. During the course of the impending battle of -Gaines’ Mill, Porter would be reinforced by Gen. Willard Slocum’s -division, giving him a total strength of about 35,000, as opposed to -about 60,000 for Lee. - -On the Confederate side, Longstreet was on Lee’s right opposite Morell, -A. P. Hill in the center, and Jackson and D. H. Hill on the left. Lee -was convinced that the greater part of the Federal army was in his -front, and he still thought McClellan would try to protect his base and -retreat toward White House. On these erroneous assumptions he made his -plans. - -A. P. Hill would attack the center while Longstreet made a feint on the -Union left. Then when Jackson appeared on the Union right, Lee believed -Porter would shift part of his troops to meet Jackson’s threat in order -to keep him from getting between the Union army and its base at White -House. As soon as Porter did this, Longstreet would turn the feint into -a full assault, and together with Hill drive the Union forces into -Jackson and D. H. Hill, waiting on Lee’s left. - -About 2:30 p.m. Hill attacked the center of the Federal line, but under -a devastating fire of artillery and musketry, “where men fell like -leaves in an autumn wind,” his troops were hurled back with heavy -losses. Longstreet, realizing a feint now would not help Hill, ordered a -full-scale attack, but he too suffered a bloody repulse. Jackson, -sensing that “Porter didn’t drive worth two cents,” as he quaintly put -it, threw D. H. Hill against Sykes on Porter’s right. - -By now A. P. Hill’s division was badly cut up, and on Lee’s request -Jackson sent Whiting’s division, consisting of Gen. E. M. Law’s and John -B. Hood’s brigades, over to support him. Porter then threw in Slocum’s -division of Franklin’s corps, to protect threatened points along the -line. The vicious battle waged furiously for 4 hours. “The noise of the -musketry,” said one veteran, “was not rattling, as ordinarily, but one -intense metallic din.” - -Finally, just as darkness covered the bloody field, Hood’s Texas -brigade, along with Gen. George Pickett’s brigade on Longstreet’s left, -penetrated the right of Morell’s line in a courageous bayonet charge -that broke the morale of the Federal troops. They went streaming back -across the plateau to the safety of the Chickahominy River. In a last -desperate attempt to stem the tide, General Cooke (“Jeb” Stuart’s -father-in-law) sent his cavalry in a wild charge against the pressing -Confederates. But the retreating Union infantry and artillery obstructed -the cavalry and broke its attack. The only result was the loss of -several more artillery pieces in the confusion. - -With darkness closing in and the Confederate troops disorganized after -the breakthrough, Lee did not attempt to pursue the Federals farther. -Porter withdrew the remnants of his corps across the river and rejoined -the main Union army. Total casualties in this crucial battle, the most -costly and vicious of the Seven Days, were: Union, 6,837; Confederate, -8,751. - -In a sense, both sides had achieved their immediate objectives. Porter -had held until night, so McClellan could get his army safely started for -Harrison’s Landing. Lee had cleared the north side of the Chickahominy -of all Federal forces, broken their supply line to White House, -controlled strategic New Bridge, and had turned back McClellan’s advance -on Richmond. - - - - - _Savage Station_ - - - [Illustration: _Battle of Savage Station._ From _Battles and Leaders - of the Civil War_.] - - MAGRUDER’S HEADQUARTERS ON BRIDGE OVER RAILROAD - TOOMB’S BRIGADE - BARKSDALE’S BRIGADE - COBB’S BRIGADE - HART’S BATTERY - RAILROAD BATTERY - KERSHAW’S BRIGADE - SEMMES’S BRIG. - KEMPER’S BATTERY - 17^TH. & 21^ST. MISS. OF BARKESDALE’S BRIG. - - RICHARDSON’S DIVISION - SUMNER’S CORPS - MEAGHER - CALDWELL - FRENCH - FIELD HOSPITAL - SEDGWICK’S DIVISION - BURN’S BRIG. - GORMAN - 1ST-MINN. GORMAN’S BRIG. - DANA - PETTIT, HAZZARD AND OSBORN - SUMNER & FRANKLIN _HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD_ - HANCOCK’S BRIGADE, SMITH’S DIVISION, FRANKLIN’S CORPS - CENTER’S BATTERY - BROOKS’S BRIG., SMITH’S DIV., FRANKLIN’S CORPS - DAVIDSON’S BRIGADE - -McClellan was now engaged in the most difficult move an army can be -called upon to make in the face of an aggressive enemy—a flanking -movement to effect a change of base. There was no thought given to any -offensive movement. President Lincoln telegraphed: “Save your army at -all events.” This was now McClellan’s only objective. - -That McClellan had not tried to fall back on White House surprised Lee, -as he had believed he was facing the main part of the Federal army at -Gaines’ Mill. The next day, June 28, he spent burying the dead, -reorganizing for another offensive movement, and attempting to divine -McClellan’s plans. Lee reported to Jefferson Davis that “the bridges -over the Chickahominy in rear of the enemy were destroyed, and their -reconstruction impracticable in the presence of his whole army and -powerful batteries. We were therefore compelled to wait until his -purpose should be developed.” By nightfall, however, he realized that -McClellan was headed for the James River, and made his plans -accordingly. - -Early next morning, June 29, Longstreet and A. P. Hill were to cross the -Chickahominy at New Bridge and take the Darbytown road to where it met -the Long Bridge road. Huger and Magruder, already on the south side of -the river in front of Richmond, were ordered in pursuit of the Federal -forces—Huger by Charles City road and Magruder by the Williamsburg road. -In the meantime, Jackson would cross Grapevine Bridge and sweep down the -south side of the river to get in McClellan’s rear. - -Again, Lee’s strategy was brilliant. The Charles City road met the Long -Bridge road at a place called Glendale or Frayser’s Farm. Lee planned to -have all his divisions converge there at about the time the middle of -McClellan’s long column should be passing. The impact of the expected -blow would undoubtedly split the Union army, and with Jackson’s corps in -the rear of one half, the other half could be cut off and annihilated. -Once again, however, the staff work and tactics were pitiful. - -McClellan’s rearguard was posted about Savage Station on the Richmond -and York River Railroad, facing west. Richardson’s division, of Sumner’s -corps, was in an open field north of the railroad tracks in back of the -station. Sedgwick’s division held the center in another open field south -of the tracks, with its left resting on the Williamsburg road. Gen. -William F. (“Baldy”) Smith’s division, of Franklin’s corps, took -position in the woods south of the Williamsburg road. - -Magruder reached the vicinity of Savage Station about noon, June 29, but -did not attack as he realized his four brigades were badly outnumbered. -He halted and waited for Jackson, who was supposed to turn the Federal -right flank along the Chickahominy and get in their rear. But Jackson -“was delayed by the necessity of reconstructing Grapevine Bridge.” -Magruder then mistakenly reported McClellan advancing and sent for two -brigades from Huger to support him. Lee cancelled the order when he -realized that what Magruder had hit was only the rearguard covering the -Federal army’s passage across White Oak swamp. What Lee did not realize, -however, was that Jackson was not in position and would not reach Savage -Station until 3 the following morning. Finally, about 5 that afternoon, -Magruder attacked with his four brigades and two regiments, but it was -too late with too little. The Federals withdrew hastily but safely. In -their haste they were forced to leave 2,500 sick and wounded men in the -field hospital at Savage Station and to abandon or destroy a vast amount -of supplies and equipment. - - [Illustration: _Battle of Savage Station._ From a contemporary - sketch.] - - [Illustration: _Battle of Glendale._ From _Battles and Leaders of - the Civil War_.] - - _CONFEDERATE_ - JACKSON’S CORPS & D. H. HILL - HUGER - LONGSTREET - A. P. HILL - _UNION_ - SMITH - RICHARDSON - 1 REG^T., 1 GUN - SLOCUM - KEARNY - McCALL - SEDGWICK - HOOKER - - - - - _Glendale (Frayser’s Farm)_ - - -Lee now ordered Magruder to follow Longstreet and A. P. Hill down the -Darbytown road. The next day, June 30, Longstreet and Hill came upon the -Union troops of McCall and Kearney across the Long Bridge road about a -mile west of the Charles City road intersection at Glendale. Hooker held -the left or south flank, with Slocum on the right guarding the Charles -City road approach. Sedgwick was in the rear in reserve. Longstreet and -Hill halted and waited for Huger, coming down the Charles City road, and -Jackson, supposedly coming on the Federal rear from White Oak Swamp. - -Meanwhile, Gen. T. H. Holmes, who had come from the south side of the -James River with part of his division and Gen. Henry A. Wise’s brigade, -had been sent by Lee down the River, or New Market road in an attempt to -get between McClellan and the James River. McClellan anticipated the -move, however, and Warren of Sykes’ division stopped Holmes south of -Malvern Hill. Lee then ordered Magruder on the Darbytown road to -reinforce him, but Magruder’s forces did not get there in time to help. - -Huger was delayed by obstructions, mostly felled trees, with which the -Federals had blocked his path. Instead of going around the obstructions, -Huger continually halted to clear the road. Thus it resolved itself into -a question of whether Huger could clear the trees as fast as the Union -soldiers cut them down. In this so-called “battle of the axes” Huger -lost, and did not get to Glendale in time to participate in the -engagement. - -About 4 that afternoon, however, Longstreet heard artillery firing from -Huger’s direction which “was supposed to indicate his approach,” and -expecting Jackson’s appearance momentarily, he opened with one of his -batteries and thus brought on the battle. Jackson never did show up, -being held north of White Oak Swamp by the artillery of Richardson and -Smith, and did not get to Glendale until the next day. The fight was -particularly vicious with many pockets of hand-to-hand combat, but, -without the expected support of Huger and Jackson, Longstreet could not -break the Union lines in time to inflict any serious damage or to -interrupt the withdrawal. Lee stated in his report: “Could the other -commands have cooperated in the action the result would have proved most -disastrous to the enemy.” Gone was Lee’s last chance to cut McClellan’s -army in two. - - - - - _Malvern Hill_ - - -McClellan had already selected another naturally strong position, this -time on Malvern Hill, for the last stand before reaching the James -River. On the morning of July 1, Morell and Sykes’ divisions of Porter’s -corps were drawn up on the crest of the hill west of the Quaker road. -East of the road Couch’s division of Keyes’ corps held the front, with -Kearney and Hooker of Heintzelman’s corps flanked to the right and rear. -Sumner’s troops were in the rear in reserve. The position was flanked on -either side by creeks in deep ravines less than a mile apart, and across -this narrow front, Porter placed his batteries with the guns almost hub -to hub. In front, the ground was open, sloping down to woods, marshes, -and swamps, through which the Confederate forces had to form for attack -within range of the Federal artillery. - -Lee had Jackson on his left facing Kearney, Hooker, and Couch’s right. -D. H. Hill was in the center opposite Couch’s left and Morell’s right. -Lee then ordered Magruder to the right of Hill, but Magruder was delayed -by taking the wrong road; so instead two brigades of Huger’s were placed -on Hill’s right. Longstreet and A. P. Hill, their ranks decimated from -the actions at Gaines’ Mill and Glendale, were held in reserve. The -terrain rendered it almost impossible for effective use of Confederate -artillery, and the few batteries that did get into position were quickly -cut to pieces by the massed Union guns. - - [Illustration: _Battle of Malvern Hill._ From _Battles and Leaders - of the Civil War_.] - - _Confederate Forces_ - LONGSTREET’S DIVISIONS - FIELD OF A. P. HILL - THOMAS OF A. P. HILL - BRANCH OF A. P. HILL - COBB OF MAGRUDER - G. T. ANDERSON OF MAGRUDER - RANSOM OF HUGER - JONES OF JACKSON - WINDER OF JACKSON - LAWTON - EARLY OF EWELL - MAHONE OF HUGER - SEMMES OF MAGRUDER - KERSHAW OF MAGRUDER - BARKDALE OF MAGRUDER - TOOMBS OF MAGRUDER - TAYLOR OF EWELL - HAMPTON OF JACKSON - LAW OF WHITING - TRIMBLE OF EWELL - WRIGHT OF HUGER - ARMISTEAD OF HUGER - GORDON OF HUGER - OF D. H. HILL: - E. B. ANDERSON - RIPLEY - GARLAND - COLQUITT - HOOD OF WHITING - HOLMES’ DIVISION - _Union Forces_ - BERDAN’S SHARPSHOOTERS - MEAGHER _after dark_ - QUAKER - PALMER - ABERCROMBIE - HOWE - J. W. Binford - GRIFFIN - McQUADE - MORELL - Crew - West - CALDWELL - NICKLES OF HOOKER - KEARNY - HOOKER - HEINTZELMAN’S CORPS - FRANKLIN - SUMNER’S CORPS - Binford - BUCHANAN - MARTINDALE - BUTTERFIELD - LOVELL - SYKES - HOLMES’ DIVISION - RESERVE BATTERIES - WARREN OF SYKES - Malvern House _HEADQUARTERS OF GEN. PORTER_ - SEYMOUR OF McCALL - Greenwood _(HOSPITAL)_ - GUN-BOAT FIRE FROM JAMES RIVER - -“Owing to ignorance of the country, the dense forests impeding necessary -communications, and the extreme difficulty of the ground,” Lee reported, -“the whole line was not formed until a late hour in the afternoon.” The -first real assault did not take place until after 5, and then it was -uncoordinated and confused. The signal for the attack was to be a yell -from one of Huger’s brigades, after the Confederate artillery had -blasted a hole in the Union lines. This put the responsibility of where -and when to begin the attack on a mere brigade commander. - -The artillery was unable to put concentrated fire in any one spot, but -Huger attacked regardless and was beaten back with heavy losses. Then D. -H. Hill attacked, only to suffer the same fate. Magruder finally sent -his troops in a gallant charge across the open fields right up to the -cannons’ muzzles, only to be mowed down like wheat at harvest time. Late -in the battle Jackson sent his own division to Magruder’s and Hill’s -support, but in the heavily wooded and swampy ground they got lost and -did not arrive in time to help. Darkness finally put an end to these -hopeless attacks. As D. H. Hill declared bitterly, “It was not war—it -was murder.” - - - - - _End of Campaign_ - - - [Illustration: _McClellan’s withdrawal._ From a contemporary - sketch.] - -During the night McClellan continued his withdrawal, and the next day -found the Army of the Potomac safe at Harrison’s Landing under the -protection of the Federal gunboats on the James. The Seven Days were -over. Total casualties: Army of Northern Virginia, 20,614; Army of the -Potomac, 15,849. - - [Illustration: _Army of the Potomac at Harrison’s Landing._ From a - contemporary sketch.] - -In his official report of the campaign Lee stated: “Under ordinary -circumstances the Federal Army should have been destroyed. Its escape -was due to * * * the want of correct and timely information. This fact, -attributable chiefly to the character of the country, enabled Gen. -McClellan skillfully to conceal his retreat and to add much to the -obstructions with which nature had beset the way of our pursuing columns -* * *.” But his other objective had been achieved—Richmond was safe, at -least for the time being. - -While McClellan had successfully changed his base of operations from the -York to the James River and saved his army in the process, he had failed -in his first objective of capturing Richmond and possibly ending the -war. The decision to remove the army from the peninsula, rather than -reinforce it for another attempt on Richmond, was made in Washington -over McClellan’s strong objections. He wrote to Gen. Henry W. Halleck: -“It is here on the banks of the James, that the fate of the Union should -be decided.” - - [Illustration: _McClellan’s cartographers._ Courtesy, Library of - Congress.] - -Although McClellan wisely realized the advantages of another assault on -Richmond on the line of the James, it was his own mistaken view of Lee’s -strength that was the major reason for the withdrawal. As Halleck -explained to him: - - You and your officers at one interview estimated the enemy’s forces in - and around Richmond at 200,000 men. Since then you and others report - that they have received and are receiving large re-enforcements from - the South. General Pope’s army covering Washington is only about - 40,000. Your effective force is only about 90,000. You are 30 miles - from Richmond, and General Pope 80 or 90, with the enemy directly - between you, ready to fall with his superior numbers upon one or the - other, as he may elect. Neither can re-enforce the other in case of - such an attack. If General Pope’s army be diminished to re-enforce - you, Washington, Maryland, and Pennsylvania would be left uncovered - and exposed. If your force be reduced to strengthen Pope, you would be - too weak to even hold the position you now occupy should the enemy - turn around and attack you in full force. In other words, the old Army - of the Potomac is split into two parts * * * and I wish to unite them. - -In August the Army of the Potomac was transported by water back to -Washington to support Pope’s campaign in Northern Virginia. McClellan’s -failure to capture the Confederate Capital, combined with Lee’s failure -to destroy the Union Army, assured the nation a long, bitter war that -became one of the great turning points in American history. - - - - - _The Years Between_ - - - [Illustration: _Richmond, summer of 1862._ From a contemporary - sketch.] - -In August 1862 Lee wrote to Jefferson Davis: “If we are able to change -the theater of the war from the James River to the north of the -Rappahannock we shall be able to consume provisions and forage now being -used in supporting the enemy.” So Lee moved into Northern Virginia to -meet Pope’s threatened overland campaign against Richmond. At Second -Manassas (Bull Run) the Union army was defeated again and withdrew into -the fortifications around Washington. - -Lee took advantage of this opportunity and made his first invasion north -into Maryland, only to be defeated by McClellan at Antietam (Sharpsburg) -in September. Lee then withdrew into Virginia, and at Fredericksburg in -December he severely repulsed Gen. Ambrose Burnside’s move on Richmond. -In the spring of 1863 the Union army, now under Hooker, attempted to -flank Lee’s left and rear to cut him off from Richmond, but it was -decisively defeated at Chancellorsville and driven back across the -Rapidan. Lee then made his second thrust north, penetrating into -Pennsylvania, but was beaten back by Meade at Gettysburg in the summer -of 1863 and, once again, retired into Virginia. - -These gallant armies fought each other across the fields of -Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia before they clashed again in the -outskirts of Richmond 2 years later. - - - - - Part Two - THE FINAL STRUGGLE FOR RICHMOND, 1864-65 - - - - - _Lincoln’s New Commander_ - - -In March 1864 President Lincoln appointed Gen. Ulysses S. Grant as -commanding general of all the Union armies. Said Grant: “In the east the -opposing forces stood in substantially the same relations toward each -other as three years before, or when the war began; they were both -between the Federal and Confederate Capitals. Battles had been fought of -as great severity as had ever been known in war * * * from the James -River to Gettysburg, with indecisive results.” He hoped to change this -situation by putting pressure on all Confederate armies at the same -time, something that had never been done before. - -Grant’s plan called for Gen. Benjamin F. Butler to march up the south -side of the James and attack Petersburg or Richmond or both; Gen. Franz -Sigel to push down the Shenandoah Valley driving Gen. Jubal Early before -him, thereby protecting Washington; Gen. Nathaniel Banks in New Orleans -to march on Mobile; Gen. William T. Sherman to cut across Georgia -driving Johnston before him, take Atlanta, and if necessary swing north -to Richmond; Meade’s Army of the Potomac, with Grant in command, to push -Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia and capture Richmond. As Grant stated: -“Lee, with the Capital of the Confederacy, was the main end to which all -were working.” - -Lee’s objective now was to stop Grant and protect Richmond. Said Lee: -“We must destroy this army of Grant’s before he gets to the James River. -If he gets there it will become a siege, and then it will be a mere -question of time.” - -The campaign started in the spring of 1864 when the Army of the Potomac -crossed the Rapidan River and the Army of Northern Virginia blocked its -path at the Wilderness. After a particularly vicious and costly battle, -Grant instead of retreating to lick his wounds as other Federal -commanders had done, executed a left flank movement, still heading south -and trying to get between Lee and Richmond. A few days later the two -armies clashed again at Spotsylvania in a series of grim battles, but -still indecisive as far as major objectives were concerned. Although -Grant’s losses were staggering, he was slowly but methodically -destroying Lee’s ability to wage offensive war. - - [Illustration: _Gen. Ulysses S. Grant._ From a contemporary sketch.] - -Again Grant executed a left flank movement to get around Lee, and then -by a series of flanking marches, which the Confederate soldiers called -the “sidling movement,” and the Union soldiers the “jug-handle” -movement, Grant gradually worked his way down to Cold Harbor. - - - - - _Cold Harbor_ - - -Where and what was Cold Harbor? Cold Harbor was a seedy-looking tavern, -squatting by a dusty crossroads 8 miles from Richmond, on the flat, -featureless plain, intersected by hundreds of small creeks, gullies, and -swamps, that is characteristic of the land between the Pamunkey and the -Chickahominy Rivers. There wasn’t a harbor for miles and it was anything -but cold. It was the only Cold Harbor in the United States, although -there were many Cold Harbors on the stagecoach routes along the Thames -River in England. The name indicated a place to get a bed for the night -and something cold to drink, but not hot meals. - - [Illustration: _Cold Harbor Tavern._ From a photograph taken in 1885 - as it appears in _Battles and Leaders of the Civil War_.] - -But these dusty crossroads were strategically important if Grant was to -attack Richmond, and both Lee and Grant realized it. Also, it was -Grant’s last chance to continue his strategy of trying to get between -Lee and Richmond—any more flanking movements and Lee would be in the -entrenchments around the Confederate Capital where Grant did not want to -fight him. As Grant stated: “Richmond was fortified and entrenched so -perfectly that one man inside to defend was more than equal to five -outside besieging or assaulting.” - -It is significant that Lee also did not want to fight in the -entrenchments around Richmond. There he would be on the defensive, and -in such a position could not possibly destroy Grant’s army. So both -commanders were willing for the test. - -And what of the lowly foot-soldier, the unsung hero in the ranks, the -poor bloody infantryman? Was he ready for the awful test? - - [Illustration: _Confederate camp._ From a contemporary sketch.] - -To the average soldier, this whole campaign was fast becoming just a -series of hazy, indistinct recollections, like the fragments of a -half-forgotten dream: Long columns of sweat-soaked soldiers marching -over hills and rivers and swamps, across ploughed fields and corn -fields, down endless dusty roads through dark, lonely woods; 30 days of -marching by night and fighting by day, until it must have seemed to them -that the only things left in life were stupefying fatigue, merciless -heat, choking dust, smoke and noise, mud and blood. - -In the Union ranks many of the men began to find out for the first time -what hunger really was. They had moved so fast and so often the ration -wagons were left far behind. Hardtack was selling for a dollar apiece—if -you could find a seller. And here at Cold Harbor the soldiers wrote -their names and regiments on pieces of paper and pinned or sewed them to -the inside of their dirty blouses, with the forlorn hope that if and -when they were killed someone might take the time to find out who they -were. - -To Lee’s barefoot, ragged veterans, hunger had been a constant companion -for a long time, but at Cold Harbor they approached starvation. A -Confederate sergeant recorded in his diary: “When we reached Cold Harbor -the command to which I belonged had been marching almost continuously -day and night for more than fifty hours without food, and for the first -time we knew what actual starvation was.” When scurvy appeared among the -men, owing primarily to a lack of fresh vegetables, Lee advised them to -eat the roots of the sassafras and wild grape, if they could find any. - -In the race for initial possession of the crossroads at Cold Harbor, -Lee’s cavalry won by a few hours. But in the afternoon of May 31 Gen. -Philip Sheridan’s cavalry drove them out and held the crossroads until -relieved by the Federal VI Corps under Gen. Horatio Wright. Most of -Sheridan’s troopers were armed with the new Spencer repeating carbine, -which made dismounted cavalrymen effective infantry. - -The next morning, June 1, Lee threw Gen. Richard Anderson’s corps -(Longstreet’s old corps—Longstreet having been wounded in the -Wilderness) against the Federal VI Corps in a bold attempt to seize the -crossroads and roll up Grant’s left flank before he could reinforce it, -but Anderson was repulsed. Grant then moved the XVIII Corps under -“Baldy” Smith, which he had borrowed from Butler’s army bottled up on -the south side of the James, over to the right of the VI Corps. That -afternoon they attacked Anderson, now supported by Gen. Robert Hoke’s -division. - -The assault failed to break the Confederate line, but it did bend it -back in several places. Grant believed that with a greater concentration -a breakthrough could be achieved. Consequently, he ordered the II Corps -under Gen. Winfield Hancock over to the left of the VI Corps, between it -and the Chickahominy River, and planned an all out attack by the three -corps for the morning of June 2. - -Anticipating the move, Lee put A. P. Hill, supported by Gen. John -Breckinridge’s division, over to his right between Anderson and the -Chickahominy and waited. - -The expected attack failed to materialize, however. Hancock got lost in -the woods and swamps moving to his assigned position, and after an -all-night forced march the men were too exhausted to mount an attack. -Any chance the assault might have had for success was now gone. The -delay was fortunate for Lee because Breckinridge also got lost and was -not in position to support Hill on the morning of June 2. The attack was -then ordered for that afternoon but again postponed until 4:30 the -morning of June 5. And each corps commander received a telegram from -Grant’s headquarters that read: “Corps Commanders will employ the -interim in making examinations of the ground in their front and -perfecting arrangements for the assault.” - -Lee’s veterans took advantage of this fatal 24-hour delay to entrench -themselves quickly and effectively, using every creek, gully, ravine, -and swamp in such fashion that all approaches to their positions could -be covered with a murderous fire. A newspaper reporter present at Cold -Harbor wrote a vivid description of those entrenchments. “They are -intricate, zig-zagged lines within lines, lines protecting flanks of -lines, lines built to enfilade opposing lines * * * works within works -and works outside works, each laid out with some definite design.” - -Lee needed this strong position; he would fight at Cold Harbor without a -reserve. He wrote to Jefferson Davis: “If I shorten my lines to provide -a reserve, he will turn me; if I weaken my lines to provide a reserve, -he will break them.” - -Grant’s battle plan was relatively uncomplicated. It was, essentially, a -simple, frontal assault. Hancock’s II Corps and Wright’s VI Corps, -between the Chickahominy and the Cold Harbor road (now State Route 156), -together with Smith’s XVIII Corps north of the road, were to attack all -out and break the Confederate lines. Gen. Gouverneur Warren’s V Corps, -north of the XVIII, was to be held in reserve, while Burnside’s IX -Corps, on Grant’s extreme right, was not to enter the fight unless Lee -weakened his line in that sector, then it would attack, supported by the -V Corps. Lee did not weaken any part of his line, so these two corps -were not engaged to any appreciable extent. Thus the battle actually -took place on approximately a 2½-mile front, although the armies -stretched for 6 miles from south to north, with the Union army facing -west. Grant’s total strength was over 100,000 men, but less than 50,000 -were actually engaged in the struggle. - -Lee now had A. P. Hill, supported by Breckinridge, on his south flank -next to the Chickahominy opposite Hancock and Wright. Hoke’s division -straddled the Cold Harbor road with Gen. Joseph Kershaw’s division just -north of Hoke, then Anderson and Gen. Richard Ewell’s corps. Lee’s total -strength consisted of less than 60,000 men, but only about half were -involved in the action of June 3. - -It rained all night the night of June 2. Toward morning the heavy rain -died to a soft, sticky mist that held the area in clammy fingers. The -first gray streaks of dawn warned of the approach of a scorching sun -that would turn the rain-soaked plain, with its myriad streams and -swamps, into a steaming cauldron. Promptly at 4:30 the three corps -jumped off to the attack, knowing nothing of the strength of the -Confederate positions they would have to face. The corps commanders had -ignored Grant’s telegraphed order of the previous afternoon and no -proper reconnaissance was made. - -The average soldier saw little in any battle in the Civil War, and even -less at Cold Harbor because of the terrain. But as the first yellow rays -of the sun shifted the gray mists, most of the Union soldiers could see -the main line of Confederate entrenchments across the open spaces in -front of them—a tracing of raw earth that had been turned up like a huge -furrow, along a line of uneven ridges, looking empty but strangely -ominous. Here and there bright regimental colors perched insolently on -the dirt hills. - -Suddenly, it seemed, the line was dotted with black slouch hats and -glistening bayonets. Yellow sheets of flame flashed from end to end, -then disappeared in a heavy cloud of smoke. Regiment after regiment -exploded into action with a metallic roar. Gigantic crashes of artillery -split the air. Shells screamed overhead like a pack of banshees, -exploding in clouds of earth, horses, and men. The noise roared to a -crescendo with a volume of sound that left the men dazed and confused. -One veteran said it was more like a volcanic blast than a battle. - -It was over in less than 30 minutes, but 7,000 killed and wounded Union -soldiers were left lying in the sun between the trenches. Said one -general sadly: “In that little period more men fell bleeding as they -advanced than in any other like period of time throughout the war.” - -Those not already killed or wounded threw themselves on the ground and -desperately heaved up little mounds of earth in front of them with -bayonets, spoons, cups, and broken canteens. They could neither advance -nor retreat—nothing standing could live long in that hail of lead and -iron. They just dug in and stayed there. - -A peculiar thing about the battle came to light afterwards. The three -corps commanders sent identical telegrams to Grant’s headquarters, each -accusing the other of not supporting him in the attack. Later it was -discovered what had actually happened. Hancock, on the left, had veered -to his left because of the heavy fire from there and the peculiarities -of the terrain. Wright, in the center, had gone straight ahead. And -Smith, on the right, bore off to his right because of swamps and -ravines. So the farther they advanced the more separated they became and -the more their flanks were left open to a deadly crossfire. - -No other major assault was attempted by either army, although the troops -stayed in the hot, filthy trenches until June 12, with constant, -nerve-wracking sharpshooting and skirmishing. From June 1 to 12 the -Union losses totaled 12,700; Confederate losses are estimated at between -1,500 and 2,000. - -Cold Harbor proved to be Lee’s last major victory in the field, and -although it was a military zero so far as Grant was concerned, it turned -out to be one of the most important and significant battles fought -during the Civil War. The results of this battle changed the course of -the war in the east from a war of maneuver to a war of siege. It also -influenced the strategy and tactics of future wars by showing that -well-selected, well-manned entrenchments, adequately supported by -artillery, were practically impregnable to frontal assaults. - - [Illustration: _Federal trenches at Cold Harbor._ From a - contemporary sketch.] - - [Illustration: _Federal coehorn mortars at Cold Harbor._ From a - contemporary sketch.] - - [Illustration: _Looking for a friend at Cold Harbor._ From a - contemporary sketch.] - -On June 5, Grant decided to bypass Richmond, cross the James and attack -Petersburg, an important railway center 25 miles south of the -Confederate Capital. This would still keep Lee’s army pinned down, and -if successful would cut communications between Richmond and the rest of -the Confederacy. - -On June 6 he withdrew Warren’s V Corps from the lines and used it to -secure the passages across the Chickahominy and down to the James. On -June 7 he sent Sheridan, with two divisions of cavalry, back into the -Shenandoah Valley against Early. To counter this, Lee was forced to send -Gen. Wade Hampton’s cavalry after Sheridan, which in effect left Lee -without adequate cavalry. During the night of June 12 Grant secretly -moved all the troops out of the trenches at Cold Harbor, without Lee’s -being aware of the move until the following morning, and by June 16 the -Army of the Potomac of over 100,000 men, 5,000 wagons, 2,800 head of -cattle, and 25,000 horses and mules, were all safely across the James -River. Richmond was saved for another 10 months. - - [Illustration: _Pontoon bridge across the James._ Courtesy, National - Archives.] - - - - - _Fort Harrison_ - - -In the pre-dawn darkness of September 29, Grant quietly slipped Gen. -David Birney’s X Corps and Gen. Edward Ord’s XVIII Corps back across the -James in a surprise move against the outer defenses of Richmond. The -primary purpose was to prevent Lee from re-enforcing Early in the -Shenandoah Valley. If, however, any weakness was discovered it could be -exploited fully, and it might force Lee to weaken some part of the -Petersburg line. - -Shortly after daybreak Gen. George Stannard’s division of the XVIII -Corps successfully stormed heavily armed but badly undermanned Fort -Harrison on the Varina road. Gen. Hiram Burnham, commanding the leading -brigade, was killed in the assault and the Union forces renamed the -captured fort for him. A mile and a half farther north, Gen. Adelbert -Ames’ division of the X Corps was repulsed in a similar attack on -another fortification, Fort Gilmer, on the New Market road. - - [Illustration: _Area of the Richmond battlefields._ From _Battles - and Leaders of the Civil War_.] - -General Lee regarded the loss of Fort Harrison as serious enough to -demand his personal attention. The next day, with re-enforcements rushed -from Petersburg, he directed several vigorous assaults against the fort. -However, the Union forces had closed in the rear and strengthened it, -and, armed with new repeating rifles, successfully beat back the attacks -and inflected heavy losses on the Confederates. - - [Illustration: _Members of the 1st Connecticut Artillery at Fort - Brady, 1864._ Courtesy, Library of Congress.] - -The fall of Fort Harrison forced Lee to draw back that part of his outer -line and to build new entrenchments to compensate for the loss. It also -forced him to extend his line north of the James, thus weakening his -already dangerously undermanned defenses in front of Petersburg. The -Union forces, to protect their position further and to neutralize -Confederate gunboats, constructed Fort Brady a few miles south of Fort -Burnham (Harrison) on a high bluff overlooking the James River. - -No further serious efforts were made to enter Richmond from the north -side of the James, and the two armies faced each other in these -respective positions until Grant finally broke Lee’s lines at Petersburg -on April 1, 1865, forcing the Confederates to abandon Richmond. - - - - - _Richmond Falls_ - - -Spring came gently to Richmond that year of 1865. The winter had been -long and hard. After a cold, wet March, Sunday, April 2, dawned mild and -pleasant. The green buds on the trees and the bright new grass put the -breath of seedtime in the air; sap flowed warm in the lilac and the -magnolia. Under a rich blue sky the people strolled leisurely to church -amid the cheerful music of the bells and the soft murmur of the James -River falls. - -In St. Paul’s Episcopal Church, at the corner of Ninth and Grace -streets, Jefferson Davis sat in the family pew listening to the sermon. -The sexton walked up the aisle and handed him a message from General -Lee. - -“I advise that all preparation be made for leaving Richmond tonight.” - -Davis arose quietly and left the church, walked a block down Ninth -street to his office in the War Department and gave the necessary orders -for evacuation. - -Late in the afternoon the official order was posted—then pandemonium -reigned. Trunks, boxes, bundles of every description were piled on the -sidewalks and in the streets. Wagons, carts, buggies, anything that had -wheels and could move, were loaded and raced through the city to fight -their way across Mayo’s Bridge in the mad rush to cross the James and -flee south. - -A frantic mob trampled each other without mercy and jammed the streets -leading to the railroad stations, only to be turned back by soldiers’ -bayonets. The few trains that would manage to leave were reserved for -government officials, archives, the treasury, and military personnel. - -Early in the evening the character of the crowds began to change. From a -city of less than 38,000 before the war, Richmond now had over 100,000 -people jammed into every available nook and cranny. They had come by the -thousands to work for the various government departments and in the -munitions factories. Refugees from the many battles fought in Virginia -had poured in, as well as the sick and wounded, followed inevitably by -deserters, spies, criminals, gamblers, speculators, and derelicts of -every kind. - -And now the cheap hotels, saloons, and gambling dens began to empty -their customers into the streets, many of them half drunk. - -All semblance of law and order disappeared. When the guards at the State -penitentiary fled, the prisoners broke loose to roam the city at will. -The provost guard took the prisoners of war from Libby Prison down the -river to be exchanged. This left only the Local Defense Brigade, -consisting of government and munitions workers. But most of them were -required in government buildings to pack and burn records; some guarded -the railroad depots, while others were engaged in destruction -assignments. The order had been given to burn all tobacco and cotton -that could not be removed by tossing flaming balls of tar into the -warehouses along the riverfront. - -In the meantime, Mayor Mayo and the city council had appointed a -committee in each ward to see that all liquor was destroyed, and shortly -after midnight they set to work. Casks and barrels of the finest -southern bourbons were rolled to the curbs, the tops smashed open and -left to drain. - -Like flies around honey, the mobs swarmed and fought their way into the -streets where the whiskey flowed like water. Men, women, and children, -clawing and screaming, scooped it up with bare hands, or used pails, -cups, basins, bottles, anything that would hold the amber liquid. They -used rags on sticks dipped in whiskey for torches, and went howling -through the city in search of food and plunder like a pack of mad -wolves, looting, killing, burning. - -The soft night sky became pink, then turned a dull red. The blaze from -the Shockhoe Warehouse at Thirteenth and Cary streets, where 10,000 -hogsheads of tobacco was put to the torch, flew skyward as if shot from -a huge blowtorch. The flames quickly spread to the Franklin Paper Mills -and the Gallego Flour Mills, 10 stories high. Higher and higher they -soared, and then widened until it seemed a red hot sea of fire would -engulf the whole city. - - [Illustration: _Evacuation of Richmond._ From a contemporary - engraving] - -A faint hot breeze began to stir from the southeast, scattering burning -embers through the streets and alleys and houses. Powder magazines and -arsenals let go with a whooshing boom. Thousands of bullets and shells -tore through buildings and ploughed up the streets. Shells exploded high -in the smoke cascading a metal spray over the area, followed by the -rattle of bursting cartridges in one great metallic roar. Just before -daybreak a deafening explosion from the James River signalled the -destruction of the Confederate warships and the Navy Yard. - -Richmond was now one vast inferno of flame, noise, smoke, and trembling -earth. The roaring fire swept northwestward from the riverfront, -hungrily devouring the two railroad depots, all the banks, flour and -paper mills, and hotels, warehouses, stores, and houses by the hundreds. - -About dawn a large crowd gathered in front of the huge government -commissary at Fourteenth and Cary streets, on the eastern edge of the -fire. The doors were thrown open and the government clerks began an -orderly distribution of the supplies. Then the drunken mob joined the -crowd. - -Barrels of hams, bacon, flour, molasses, sugar, coffee, and tea were -rolled into the streets or thrown from windows. Women ran screaming -through the flames waving sides of bacon and whole hams. Wheelbarrows -were filled and trundled away. When the building finally caught fire -from the whiskey torches, the mob swarmed into other sections of the -doomed city where the few remaining clothing, jewelry, and furniture -stores were ruthlessly looted and burned. A casket factory was broken -into, the caskets loaded with plunder and carried through the streets, -and the fiendish rabble roared on unchecked. - -As the drunken night reeled into morning the few remaining regiments of -General Kershaw’s brigade, which had been guarding the lines east of -Richmond, galloped into the city on their way south to join Lee in his -retreat to Appomattox. They had to fight their way through the howling -mob to reach Mayo’s Bridge. As the rearguard clattered over, Gen. M. W. -Gary shouted, “All over, good-bye; blow her to hell.” - -The barrels of tar placed along the bridge were promptly put to the -torch. Soon tall flames shot high into the air, and with the two -railroad bridges already burning, the three high-arched structures were -like blazing arrows pointing to the very gates of hell. - -Then down Osborne Turnpike and into Main Street trotted the Fourth -Massachusetts cavalry. When the smoke and heat blocked their path, they -turned into Fourteenth Street past fire engines blazing in the street -and proceeded up the hill to Capitol Square, where a tragic scene -awaited them. - - [Illustration: _Richmond burns._ From a contemporary sketch.] - -Like a green oasis in a veritable desert of fire and destruction, the -sloping lawn around the Capitol was jammed with frightened people -seeking safety from the flames. Family groups, trying desperately to -stay together, huddled under the linden trees for protection from the -burning sparks. Piles of furniture were scattered in every -direction—beds, chairs, settees, paintings, silverware, gilt-framed -mirrors—the few possessions left, the family heirlooms, the treasures -faithfully passed down from generation to generation. In the background -the massive white columns of the Capitol, designed by Thomas Jefferson -as a replica of the famous Maison Carée at Nimes, stood guard over the -huddled masses below. - -The soldiers in blue quickly dispersed the mobs at bayonet point. Guards -were immediately placed to prevent further looting. The fire was -contained by blowing up buildings in its path to create a fire-lane, -leaving the main part to burn itself out. By nightfall everything was -under control, but most of the business and industrial section of the -city was gone. - -The stars shone down that night on the smouldering ruins of more than -700 buildings. Gaunt chimneys stood naked against the black velvet sky. -A Federal officer, picking his way through thousands of pieces of white -granite columns and marble facades that littered the streets to inspect -the guard, noted that the silence of death brooded over the city. -Occasionally a shell exploded somewhere in the ruins. Then it was quiet -again. - -A week later Lee surrendered to Grant at Appomattox Court House, Va. The -war was over. - - [Illustration: _Richmond after the war._ Courtesy, Library of - Congress.] - - [Illustration: _Richmond National Battlefield Park._] - - - - - _The Park_ - - -Richmond National Battlefield Park was established on July 14, 1944, as -authorized by act of Congress. The property was originally acquired by a -group of public-spirited Virginians who donated it to the Commonwealth -of Virginia in 1932. The park occupies nearly 800 acres of land in 10 -widely separated parcels. Included are some 6 acres in Chimborazo Park -on East Broad Street, site of Chimborazo Hospital during the Civil War. - -A complete tour of the battlefields requires a 57-mile drive which is -outlined on the map in this booklet. We suggest that you begin at the -main Visitor Center in Chimborazo Park, 3215 East Broad Street, -Richmond, where museum exhibits and an audio-visual program are -available to enhance your appreciation of this battlefield area. - -Markers, maps, and interpretive devices along the tour will help you to -understand the military operations. You will see parts of the fields of -combat, massive forts, and intricate field fortifications. Two houses on -the battlefields have wartime associations—the Watt House (Gen. -Fitz-John Porter’s headquarters) and the Garthright House (Union field -hospital). - - - - - _Administration_ - - -Richmond National Battlefield Park is administered by the National Park -Service, U.S. Department of the Interior. A superindendent, whose -address is 3215 East Broad Street, Richmond, Va., is in immediate -charge. - - U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1961 OF-588588 - - - - - NATIONAL PARK SERVICE - HISTORICAL HANDBOOK SERIES - - - (PRICE LISTS OF NATIONAL PARK SERVICE PUBLICATIONS MAY BE OBTAINED - FROM THE SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS, WASHINGTON 25, D.C.) - - Antietam - Bandelier - Chalmette - Chickamauga and Chattanooga Battlefields - Custer Battlefield - Custis-Lee Mansion, The Robert E. Lee Memorial - Fort Laramie - Fort McHenry - Fort Necessity - Fort Pulaski - Fort Raleigh - Fort Sumter - George Washington Birthplace - Gettysburg - Guilford Courthouse - Hopewell Village - Independence - Jamestown, Virginia - Kings Mountain - The Lincoln Museum and the House Where Lincoln Died - Manassas (Bull Run) - Montezuma Castle - Morristown, A Military Capital of the Revolution - Ocmulgee - Petersburg Battlefields - Richmond Battlefields - Saratoga - Scotts Bluff - Shiloh - Statue of Liberty - Vanderbilt Mansion - Vicksburg - Yorktown - - [Illustration: _Roll book of 27th N. Y. Regiment punctured by - Confederate bullet_] - - - - - Transcriber’s Notes - - -—Retained publication information from the printed edition: this eBook - is public-domain in the country of publication. - -—Corrected a few palpable typos. - -—In the text versions only, text in italics is delimited by - _underscores_. - - - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Richmond National Battlefield Park, -Virginia, by Joseph P. Cullen - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK RICHMOND NAT. 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