diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'old/60975-0.txt')
| -rw-r--r-- | old/60975-0.txt | 10278 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 10278 deletions
diff --git a/old/60975-0.txt b/old/60975-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 9ba7d10..0000000 --- a/old/60975-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10278 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Russian army and the Japanese War, -Volume II, by Aleksei Nicolaevich Kuropatkin - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: The Russian army and the Japanese War, Volume II - Being historical and critical comments on the military - policy and power of Russia and on the campaign in the Far - East - -Author: Aleksei Nicolaevich Kuropatkin - -Translator: Alexander Bertram Lindsay - -Release Date: December 20, 2019 [EBook #60975] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK RUSSIAN ARMY AND THE JAPANESE WAR *** - - - - -Produced by Brian Coe, David Tipple and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive) - - - - - -Transcriber’s Notes: - - A small number of obvious typos have been corrected. Except for - these corrections, the spelling and punctuation of the book have - not been changed. - - Underscores are used for italic markup; the three words that - end this sentence _are in italics_. - - There are 113 footnotes in the source book marked by characters - such as * and †. In this e-book each footnote has a unique marker - that consists of a number enclosed by square brackets. All the - footnotes have been moved to the end of the main text where each - footnote is headed by its marker. - - - - - THE RUSSIAN ARMY AND THE - JAPANESE WAR - - - - -[Illustration: GENERAL KUROPATKIN REVIEWING HIS TROOPS.] - - - - - THE RUSSIAN ARMY AND - THE JAPANESE WAR, - - BEING HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL COMMENTS ON - THE MILITARY POLICY AND POWER OF RUSSIA - AND ON THE CAMPAIGN IN THE FAR EAST, - - BY GENERAL KUROPATKIN. - - - TRANSLATED BY - CAPTAIN A. B. LINDSAY, - 2ND KING EDWARD’S OWN GURKHA RIFLES - TRANSLATOR OF “THE BATTLE OF TSU-SHIMA”; - “THE TRUTH ABOUT PORT ARTHUR,” ETC. - - EDITED BY - MAJOR E. D. SWINTON, D.S.O., R.E., - AUTHOR OF “THE DEFENCE OF DUFFER’S DRIFT”; - AND EDITOR OF “THE TRUTH ABOUT PORT ARTHUR.” - - - WITH MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS - - IN TWO VOLUMES: VOL. II. - - - NEW YORK - E. P. DUTTON AND COMPANY - 1909 - - - - - PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN - - - - - CONTENTS TO VOL. II - - CHAPTER IX - - PAGES - Reasons for our reverses (_continued_): The insufficient - tactical preparation of our troops—Measures taken - to improve it 1–25 - - - CHAPTER X - - Reasons for our reverses (_conclusion_): Particular - difficulties of the strategic situation—Defects in - organization and _personnel_—Absence of a military - spirit in the army, and lack of determination in - carrying operations to a finish—Breakdown of our - organization under the strain of active service 26–97 - - - CHAPTER XI - - Suggested measures for the improvement of the senior - ranks; for the improvement of the regulars and - reservists; for the reorganization of the reserve - troops; for increasing the number of combatants - in infantry regiments—Machine-guns—Reserve - troops—Troops on the communications—Engineers - —Artillery—Cavalry—Infantry—Organization generally 98–176 - - - CHAPTER XII - - Summary of the war 177–204 - - - CHAPTER XIII - - Introduction and conclusion to Volume III. 205–305 - - - APPENDIX I - - The Royal Timber Company 306–313 - - - APPENDIX II - - Breakdown of the unit organization and distribution 314–335 - - - INDEX 336–348 - - - - - ILLUSTRATIONS TO VOL. II. - - - GENERAL KUROPATKIN REVIEWING HIS TROOPS _Frontispiece_ - - OPPOSITE PAGE - GENERAL LINIEVITCH 18 - - GENERAL BARON KITEN NOGI 40 - - GENERAL GRIPPENBERG 100 - - FIELD-MARSHAL MARQUIS IWAO OYAMA 206 - - - MAPS - - SKETCH-MAP OF MANCHURIA, SHOWING MAIN PLACES - ALONG RAILWAY SOUTH OF HARBIN 27 - - DIAGRAM SHOWING THE POSITION OF THE THEATRE OF - WAR RELATIVELY TO RUSSIA AND JAPAN 34 - - SKETCH-MAP OF AREA CONTAINING THE BATTLE-FIELDS - OF LIAO-YANG, THE SHA HO, HEI-KOU-TAI, AND - MUKDEN, SHOWING SOME OF THE MORE IMPORTANT - PLACES MENTIONED _At the end_ - - MAP OF THE THEATRE OF OPERATIONS SOUTH OF - MUKDEN _At the end_ - - - - - THE RUSSIAN ARMY AND THE JAPANESE WAR - - - CHAPTER IX - - REASONS FOR OUR REVERSES (_continued_) - - The insufficient tactical preparation of our troops—Measures - taken to improve it. - - -I have touched upon the fact of how our want of tactical training was -shown up in the Crimean and second Turkish Wars. Especially conspicuous -was the inability of our senior commanders—relying as they usually -did upon quite inadequate information as to the enemy’s strength and -dispositions—to co-ordinate the operations of the different arms -towards one end, and their ignorance of where to deliver the main -attack. The minor part played by our cavalry and our comparatively -great power of defence were also remarked. Finally, attention was drawn -to the fact that our lack of the power of manœuvre compelled us to -place superior numbers in the field against the Turks, a course which -had not formerly been necessary. - -After the war of 1877–78 we set to work to study our weak points, in -order to eliminate our faults. Much must have been accomplished since -then, for the tactical training of the army at the beginning of the -recent war was undoubtedly of a higher standard than it was twenty-five -years ago. Still, in some matters we had not progressed, while in -others we had actually gone back. The duty of training the troops rests -with commanding officers of all ranks, and the responsibility for this -extends right up to those in command of military districts. Although -the same drill-books and manuals are used by the whole army, there -is considerable variety in the way that the tactical instruction is -imparted, owing to the diverse views held by the district commanders. -I have taken part in many manœuvres, and was in command of the army -at the grand manœuvres at Kursk in 1902, and I noted down what I -considered to be our principal failings in this respect. In October, -1903, I submitted a report on the subject to the Tsar, in which my -conclusions on certain points were as follows: - - - “1. _Staff Work with the Main Army and with Detached Columns at - the Grand Manœuvres._ - - “Generally speaking, the staff work cannot be characterized - as entirely satisfactory. The principal reasons for this were - the somewhat unhappy selection of the officers appointed to - be chiefs of the different staffs, the poor organization of - the staffs themselves, due to a limited personnel and to an - insufficient supply of the means of communication [telegraph - and telephone equipment] for both the troops and staffs, and - the neglect to arrange proper intercommunication between units - by making use of mounted orderlies, automobiles, or cyclists. - Intelligence of the enemy as well as of the disposition - of other units was always received late by those whom it - concerned, because the cavalry was badly organized, and could - not carry out its orders properly. - - “The amount of writing done by the various staff-officers was - colossal. They worked the whole evening and all night; their - effusions were lithographed or printed, and were sent off in - all directions; but the orders were rarely received by the - troops in proper time. At the manœuvres of the Warsaw Military - District in 1899, cases came under my notice of general - officers commanding divisions receiving the order to move in - the morning two hours after the time appointed for them to - start. - - “In many instances staff-officers with troops seemed ignorant - of how a reconnaissance should be carried out, and consequently - did not gauge the dispositions of the enemy’s forces with - sufficient accuracy. This reacted in turn on the dispositions - made by the chief commanders, more particularly in their - employment of the reserves (Kursk manœuvres and those at Pskoff - and Vlodava). Similarly, they did not know how to arrange for - the maintenance of touch along the front and to the rear, - a defect which caused a delay in the receipt of orders and - information which was quite avoidable. - - - “2. _Work of the Cavalry at Manœuvres._ - - “The increased importance now attached to the strategic or - independent duties of cavalry has, in my opinion, acted - detrimentally upon the cavalry work with the troops. The - spirit of the strategic rôle was in most cases not properly - grasped, and the chief idea of the masses of mounted troops of - both sides appeared to be to meet each other. They therefore - neglected to furnish the commanders of their sides with the - information of the enemy, so necessary before an action, and - left the infantry without their co-operation during the actual - combat; this was the same whether they were acting in attack or - defence. Long-distance patrols often did useful work, but owing - to the lack of proper means for the quick transmission of the - information collected, it reached the troops to whom it might - be useful after the enemy’s dispositions had been changed. - The near patrols did not work in with the long-distance ones. - Our mounted troops were frequently allowed to lose touch with - the enemy at night under the pretext that the men and horses - required rest, and the employment of a dozen troopers was - grudged after dark, when by day whole divisions and corps were - futilely marched and countermarched, and sent upon duties which - were not always in accordance with the general idea of the - operations. - - “The cavalry work should be more strictly in co-operation with - that of the other arms than it is at present, and all officers - in command of mounted units should remember that their rôle is - auxiliary, and largely consists in assisting the General in - command to come to a proper decision by the completeness and - accuracy of the information they send back; that the cavalry - should help the commanders, firstly, to frame a plan of action, - then to crush the enemy on the field of battle. - - - “3. _Attack and the Defence._ - - “Here again information was wanting. When commanders made up - their minds either to attack or to stand on the defensive, they - were never able to feel, from their information of the enemy - and the locality, that they thoroughly knew what they were - doing, or that it really was in accordance with the spirit of - the general idea. We were strong in the defence, but we rarely - delivered a soundly conceived or executed attack. In the attack - column commanders did not always take pains to obtain enough - accurate information as to the dispositions and strength of the - enemy, so as to be able to appreciate the situation properly - and draw up a reasoned plan of battle, to select the direction - of the main attack, to allot the troops for it, and take steps - to deceive the enemy as to its precise direction. When they had - massed sufficient first-line troops for the main attack, they - did not also move up the reserves of all arms. - - “In particular, we did not know how to conduct the advance, and - then deliver the assault with proper preparation by artillery - and rifle fire. Many commanders seem, unfortunately, to be - wedded to the idea of carrying out a continuous advance without - making any use of the rifle. If we ever encounter an enemy, - such as the Germans, who systematically train their troops to - advance under cover of their own heavy rifle-fire, we shall be - worsted, for in peace we often advance almost without firing a - rifle to a range of 1,000 or even 800 paces of the position. - - “The guns also frequently ceased fire at the same critical - period—_i.e._, when their attacking infantry are nearing the - enemy. My inquiries as to the reason for this were usually - met with the reply that their ammunition was expended. If - the absolute necessity for keeping in hand a considerable - number of rounds for the assistance of the decisive infantry - attack is not realized now that we have quick-firing guns, our - artillery will in war become useless at the very moment when - its co-operation is most vital. - - “In defence we are better than in the attack, and we know how - to make the most of the fire effect of both guns and rifles. - The ranges in front of a position are usually measured and - clearly marked. But proper use is not made of reserves. We do - not, as we should, throw them into the firing-line, so as to - increase the volume of fire after the enemy’s main attack has - developed, nor do we launch them in a fierce counter-attack - after he has come within decisive range. The reserves are - often kept in mass, and thrown against the attack without any - supporting rifle-fire. Many regiments and brigades told off as - reserves to a defensive position go through the whole manœuvres - without firing a single round. - - - “4. _The Revival of the Column Formation in the Attack._ - - “Other European armies are now doing everything possible to - minimize the murderous effect of modern rifle and artillery - fire on themselves, and are, at the same time, endeavouring - to develop their own fire to the utmost, both in the attack - and defence; indeed, the Germans, in their efforts to this - end, have gone the extreme length of deploying all their - troops—sometimes even to the sacrifice of their reserves—in - long thin lines. We, on the other hand, judging by the last - manœuvres, are going to the other extreme, for our decisive - attack is delivered almost without any fire preparation, and - with men massed in quarter column! - - “If a stop is not put to the increasing density of our attack - formations, we shall suffer for it heavily. It is all the more - dangerous for us, as we do not assist our assaulting infantry - properly with supporting gun and rifle fire. - - - “5. _The Work of the Artillery._ - - “Artillery positions were in most cases skilfully chosen, but - the fire discipline was often bad. As batteries can only carry - a limited number of rounds in the field, it is vital that the - gunners should be taught to economize every round; this is, of - course, particularly important with quick-firing guns. But we - often fired more rounds than were necessary: fire was opened - too hurriedly, at quite unimportant targets, with the result - that, at the critical moment of the attack, batteries had to - signal that they were in action, for all their ammunition had - been expended.[1] - - “6. _The Work of the Sappers._ - - “The bloody lessons of Plevna and Gora Dubniak put fresh life - into our military engineering, which lasted for a certain - time after the Turkish War. Our sappers became skilful at - constructing trenches and redoubts, and the other troops were - also trained in field-works, and began to like entrenching - themselves. But a reaction soon set in. This was largely due - to General Dragomiroff, who did much to bring about a return - to the old order of things, when it was held that everything - was decided by the bayonet. He was quite opposed to the use of - cover, and carried his orders on this subject to the height of - absurdity, even forbidding his men to lie down while advancing - to attack! - - “To dig oneself into the ground means labour, and takes much - time. Moreover, instructions used to be issued that all - trenches dug had to be filled in again, and all redoubts - dismantled. This at once limited the scope of trench-work in - the army. The entrenching tool, which after the Turkish War had - been valued next to cartridges and biscuits, was relegated to - the mobilization store, and never brought out for use or even - for inspection. At many manœuvres the men were not practised at - all in the fortification of positions; at others the alignment - of trenches was traced only. While giving the sapper units full - credit for their excellent training, I cannot but express my - fear that they specialize far too much in a mass of detail, and - ignore the fact that their main duty in war is to co-operate in - every way with the infantry, both in strengthening defensive - positions and in the attack of them. - - “7. _Criticism by Commanders._ - - “It is gradually becoming the custom to omit all criticisms[2] - at grand manœuvres. Mistakes, therefore, pass unnoticed, are - repeated, and tend to become chronic. I remember some very - instructive manœuvre criticisms made by General Gurko, and - I have listened with interest and advantage to others made - by General Roop. Discussions after the operations are always - held in the Kieff and St. Petersburg Military Districts, - but nowadays some officers in command of districts neither - make any remarks themselves when present at manœuvres, nor - expect them to be made by the officers commanding sides or - the other seniors. Orders issued after a long period—though - they may enumerate the various points noticed—and the reports - eventually printed of large concentrations and manœuvres, are - comparatively useless for instruction. To be of use, criticisms - must be made by the commanders, and made on the spot. - - “It is, however, important to realize how rare the power of - good criticism is. The remarks usually made are either quite - colourless or too highly pitched. Some of our most capable - general officers also seem peculiarly ‘unlucky’ in the way - they manage unnecessarily to hurt the feelings of commanding - officers by their harsh way of putting things. They forget - that to lower the prestige of a senior in the presence of his - juniors always produces a bitter harvest, especially in war. - They forget the infinite variety of the conditions of different - tactical situations, and that at peace manœuvres there is - no need for one side to win or lose. Again, independent - action, though certainly not wrong in itself, is often put - down as a mistake and adjudged to be wrong because the senior - commander has his own opinion in the matter. Such narrow-minded - criticism deprives officers in command of units of the - spirit of independence, of initiative, and of the desire for - responsibility. Instead, they try to discover the fads of the - officer in command, in order to ‘play up’ to them. - - - “8. _Conclusion as to the Tactical Instruction of our Troops._ - - “Although the opinion of the generals in command of military - districts in all matters pertaining to military training - should, and do, carry great weight, yet there must be some - limit to individual action. It is impossible, for instance, to - permit each of them to train the troops in his command entirely - in accordance with his own views as to what is most important - in war; for the instruction of attack and defence should not - be carried out on entirely different lines in the different - districts. Yet this is more or less what has been done. We at - headquarters are partly to blame, owing to the delay in the - publication of the field-service manuals and the instructions - for the combined training of all arms. As an example of what I - refer to: General Dragomiroff has trained the troops under him - in the Kieff Military District to attack according to a system - of his own, of which the soundness is open to doubt. If some of - his theories are carried out in war, they will result in heavy - loss, and therefore their inculcation in peace seems entirely - wrong. His order that the skirmishers escorting artillery - should be on a line with the guns themselves would only cause - the premature silencing of the latter; and another, that the - lines of skirmishers advancing to attack should not lie down - when halted, is simply impossible of execution. When bullets - are flying, a line lies down of its own accord as soon as it - halts, and quite rightly so, as men get cover more easily when - lying than standing. And now, following General Dragomiroff’s - example, in the Vilna Military District General Grippenberg has - begun to act according to his own theories, and depart from - the textbook. In his District Orders this year,[3] in which - were published his criticisms on the work done at manœuvres, he - recommends that infantry in close order should receive cavalry - with independent fire[4] instead of with volleys. He insists, - also, that when a line is advancing by short rushes, these - rushes should begin from the flanks. - - “Unfortunately, much that I saw when inspecting the troops in - the different districts and on grand manœuvres led me to the - conclusion that the tactical training, especially in command, - of officers commanding units, from regiments upwards, is - neither sound nor uniform.” - -My strictures on the peace tactical training of the army were, -unfortunately, only too well confirmed during the war. - -The theatre of war in Manchuria presented many peculiarities of -climate, topography, and inhabitants. It was unlike any of the -“probable” theatres of operations we had studied, and was, therefore, -quite new to the troops who came from European Russia. The Japanese -were not only new and practically unknown foes, but the nature of the -information that we did possess about them tended to show our great -superiority, and therefore incited us to contempt. The existing edition -of our “Field Service Regulations” was obsolete, and the revised -edition was still in the Press. Special instructions, therefore, had to -be issued, in order to assist our troops to grapple with the entirely -strange conditions under which they were placed. These were compiled -and printed under my direction, and distributed to officers in command -of all units, from companies and squadrons upwards, and to all chief -staff-officers. In them I emphasized the necessity of getting to know -something about the enemy, enumerated their strong and weak points, -and drew attention to their patriotism and traditional indifference to -death. I stated that their strong points predominated, and that in the -Japanese we should find a very powerful opponent, even when reckoned by -European standards. I continued: - - “It is most important that in the first engagements, in which - they will certainly be in superior strength, we should not give - the Japanese the satisfaction of victory, for that will only - still further elevate their spirit. - - “No particular or new tactics need be adopted against our - present enemy, but we must not repeat the mistakes in - manœuvring which cost us so dear in the Turkish War of 1877–78.” - -I then mentioned the causes of our reverses at Plevna, and commented -in detail on the most important. After capturing Nicopolis, our troops -moved on Plevna in ignorance of the strength and dispositions of the -enemy. As far as obtaining this information was concerned, our cavalry -was not well handled. In the first fight at Plevna (July 20, 1877) -we attacked with too few men and in detail. We did the same in the -fights of July 31 and September 12, but to an even greater extent, -and the attacks were carried out in too dense a formation, were not -sufficiently prepared by fire-effect, and our own numerous cavalry -and that of the Roumanians did practically nothing. The attacks on -September 10 and 11, 1877, failed because our troops were badly -distributed and untrained. I attached an appreciation of the work of -our troops in the Turkish War as follows: - - “In this war the staff work was not always successful. The - troops often received orders too late, and time was wasted - waiting for their receipt before commencing a move. Units - arriving at night on the positions allotted to them did not - always find the officers who should have been waiting their - arrival to guide them. Officers in command of troops were - often not informed by the staff as to the enemy’s strength - and dispositions, or as to our own neighbouring columns. Lack - of information was the principal cause of our disasters; we - sometimes attacked in entire ignorance of the enemy’s strength - and dispositions, and even partially so of our own. - - “As an example of what our troops can do in an attack may be - quoted the capture of Kars; it is a very instructive case. - Though the weak field-works of Plevna resisted our efforts for - five months, at Kars neither strong parapets nor deep ditches - could check our onslaught. Our gallant Caucasians advanced on - the fortress by night; they were well led, and always had a - body of scouts skilfully thrown out in front, and they captured - strongholds that had been termed ‘impregnable’ with great - bravery. - - “In the defence our troops have always fought well. Let us - remember the defence of the Shipka Pass, and imitate it.” - -After a short review of our errors in the Turkish War, I enumerated -those which were still noticeable in our peace manœuvres. - -As operations developed the enemy’s peculiarities became as well known -as our own, so I was able in August, September, October, and December, -1904, to issue supplementary instructions. - -Notwithstanding the number of our cavalry, and what our scouts had -been able to do, we had not ascertained the general dispositions -and strength of the enemy. The information brought in by spies was -exaggerated and unreliable. The result was that, when we had carried -out any offensive operations, we had advanced without knowing anything -of the enemy. My instructions ran: - - - _Instructions issued in August._ - - “In our attacks we have started the advance too rapidly, - without strengthening positions already occupied, and without - full artillery co-operation, and we have stopped the action at - a period when we still had large numbers both in the general - and regimental reserves. In retirements we have withdrawn to - positions previously occupied by us without having taken steps - to hold our ground on any of them, which preparation would not - only have greatly assisted the retirement itself, but, what was - far more important, would have enabled us to renew the attack. - - “Another point is, that many of our defensive positions have - not corresponded to the numbers, when extended, told off to - defend them. Nevertheless, the enemy’s frontal attacks, even if - we hold quite chance positions, usually fail, and we have been - obliged to abandon our ground owing to the turning movements - which their superior numbers have made possible. - - “In attacking, especially among hills, the infantry must wait - so that the assault may be prepared by fire, in order to get - breath or to give time for the co-operation of a turning - movement. There is also another and involuntary reason for - halting—namely, the enemy’s fire. Owing to this, units halt, - or, what is worse, begin to retire without orders; what then - usually happens is this: A few men begin to trickle back from - some company that has come under a particularly hot fire; they - are followed by their own company, which is in turn followed - by the companies on either side, even though the latter may - perhaps be holding strong ground. Such a moment is, indeed, - critical, and unless some brilliant officer appears who - possesses the secret of rallying retreating men and succeeds - in making the company hold its ground, the action is lost. But - besides setting a personal example to the men, a commanding - officer must at once push forward some of his reserves to - stop the rot among those retreating. The most important thing - at such a crisis is the example set by the officers or the - steadiest men, particularly by Cavaliers of the Order of St. - George.[5] A company commander’s example is everything to his - company. Therefore, however deserving he may be in peace, a - company commander who does not display personal gallantry in - action should be instantly removed from his command. - - “The most effective method of guarding against a sudden - emergency either in attack or defence—and this is particularly - true in hilly country—is to have in hand a strong reserve, - and not to make use of it too lightly. This we have not done - in recent actions; we have told off weak reserves, and used - them up too quickly. Whole regiments have sometimes been sent - in support where two companies or a battalion would have been - ample.[6] - - “In all kinds of operations officers in command must keep the - forces on either flank, as well as their seniors, informed of - everything that happens. We are, unfortunately, not accustomed - to do this. Before an action the smallest details are reported, - but as soon as an action begins we become so preoccupied with - the fight that the most obvious duties are forgotten. Chief - staff-officers of all grades will in future be held responsible - for the frequent transmission of reports during an action.” - -The special attention of commanding officers was also called to the -necessity for providing their men with hot food during action, and to -the excessive expenditure of ammunition in our fights. - - - _Instructions issued during September._ - -The following were the main instructions given by me while preparing -for an advance after the fighting in August: - - “It is a regrettable fact that so far, whenever we have taken - the offensive, we have met with reverse. Owing to our lack - of information, to which I have already drawn attention, - instead of delivering a confident attack according to a - clearly-thought-out plan, we have acted in a half-hearted - manner. We often deliver our main attack too soon, and - regardless of the enemy’s intentions. Instances have occurred - where we have detailed attacking columns as small as a - battalion; in others we have operated without any definite - plan of action. Finally, there have been cases where not - enough determination has been shown in pressing forward to the - objective.” - -The importance of gaining even slight successes over the enemy’s -advanced troops at the beginning of a forward movement, the fact that -in the attack of positions turning movements should always be made -in combination with frontal attacks, and the advantage of pushing on -energetically when once an advance had commenced, were all points -specially noted. The necessity of holding on determinedly to every -yard of ground gained was accentuated, and leading units in a frontal -attack were warned not to deliver the assault until the synchronous -turning movement had been fully developed. Every use was to be made of -fire-effect of every sort. I wrote: - - “A glaring case of that lack of co-operation from which we - suffer so much was the fight of September 2,[7] when the left - column began the action far too soon, and therefore finished by - retiring in disorder. This had the worst results on the success - of the whole operation. - - “I must again remind all ranks of the great necessity for - economizing ammunition, especially gun ammunition. At Liao-yang - we used up in two days our special artillery reserve of more - than 100,000 rounds. The conveyance of gun ammunition to the - front is very difficult, and batteries which have expended - theirs become mere dead-weight to the army.” - -[Illustration: GENERAL LINIEVITCH.] - -The peculiarities attendant on operations in a country covered with -such crops as _kao-liang_ were also reviewed in detail: - - “Any men leaving the ranks in action under pretext of - accompanying or carrying away wounded men will be severely - punished. - - “Companies and squadrons must be as strong as possible for - an attack. To this end the most strict precautions must be - taken to limit the number of men employed on extraneous duties - and for transport work. The Cossacks are not to be employed - as orderlies and escorts by the officers under whom they may - be temporarily serving. Sound horses in possession of sick - Cossacks should be taken from them, and made over to those who - are horseless, but fit for duty. - - “It is to be regretted—and I have more than once commented on - it—that commanding officers do not pay proper attention to the - order that the soldier’s emergency biscuit ration, carried on - the person, should remain untouched. This reserve ration is - constantly being eaten, and no steps are taken immediately to - replace it. Many commanding officers calmly allow the whole of - the men’s portable reserve to be consumed under the pleasing - conviction that it is the duty of someone else to bring up - fresh supplies to the regimental commissariat. - - “The above instructions only touch on a few details of - field-work. The main guide for action is the ‘Field Service - Regulations,’ but these cannot, of course, meet every case - which may arise in the entirely new circumstances under which - we are now operating. I expect commanding officers of all - ranks, therefore, to show greater initiative in the performance - of their duties.” - -My instructions issued in October included remarks on our offensive -operations during the end of September. Amongst other things, I said: - - “I still notice faults in the method of conducting attacks. - Thick lines of skirmishers are too closely followed by the - supports and reserves. The formations have generally been - ill adapted to the ground, and have been such as to form an - excellent target. If this close-order formation had been - assumed in these cases just before a bayonet charge, then, - despite the heavy sacrifices entailed, there would have been - some point in it, because of the additional force and impetus - given to the assault; but it was adopted when the attack was - still at long range, and so caused useless and heavy loss. - We should in such cases imitate the Japanese, and do what we - used to in the Caucasus—make every use of cover. Every effort - must be made to reconnoitre well, in order that advantage may - be taken of every fold of the ground, and of every stick and - stone, and the attack may be enabled to advance as close as - possible to the enemy with the least possible loss. The way to - do this is for individual men, or groups of men, to advance - by short rushes till the attacking units are able to collect. - On open ground, if the attacking infantry has to wait for the - artillery preparation, it should entrench itself as rapidly as - possible. - - “In retreating, the movement to the rear of large masses - together afforded the enemy a splendid target, for which we - suffered. Again, to avoid unnecessary loss in retirement, - portions of a position have often been stubbornly held until a - withdrawal could be effected under cover of darkness. If the - portion of ground on either side happens to have been already - abandoned, and the Japanese are sufficiently mobile to make use - of it, such isolated defence of any one section of a position - might cost very dear. We must learn how to retire by day—by the - same methods as laid down above for the attack (by rushes), and - avoid close formations in doing it. - - “I and other senior officers have noticed during an action - hundreds and thousands of unwounded men leaving the ranks, - carrying wounded to the rear. In the fights of October 12 - to 15[8] I personally saw wounded men being carried to the - rear by as many as nine others. This abuse must be put down - with the utmost rigour, and until an action is over only the - stretcher-bearers should take wounded to the rear. - - “The Japanese are fortifying the positions along our front, - converting villages, knolls, and hill-tops into strong, - defensible points, and strengthening their positions with - obstacles. These positions should be carefully studied, their - strong points noted, and in every section of our line a plan of - possible operations against the corresponding portions of the - enemy’s position should be made. The early organization of the - artillery preparation of any attack on these selected points is - important. - - “Detachments of sappers and scouts should be sent ahead of the - assault to destroy the obstacles round fortified villages, - which should be well shelled. Till the assault is made the - advance should be under cover, and if the leading troops find - they are not strong enough to capture the point on which they - have been directed, they must hold on to a point as near to - the enemy as possible, in order to press forward again when - reinforced.” - -Finally, in my instructions issued in December, 1904, I recapitulated -the most important points brought out by our recent experiences, such -as— - - “1. The necessity, in order to avoid loss, for our attack - formations to be better adapted to the ground. - - “2. Economy in artillery ammunition. - - “3. The more intelligent employment of rifle-fire, and the - necessity for volley-firing at night. - - “4. The great value of night operations. - - “5. Proper communication between all senior commanders. - - “6. The necessity for the mutual co-operation of all arms, and - the maintenance of touch in battle. - - “The surest road to success is the determination to continue - fighting, even when the last reserve has been exhausted, for - the enemy may be in the same, if not in worse plight, and what - is not possible in daylight may be accomplished at night. - Unfortunately, in recent fights, some commanders even of large - forces have confessed themselves unable to carry out the - operation entrusted to them, at a moment when they still had in - hand big reserves which had not fired a shot.” - -Of course, as soon as our disasters began, the papers started to accuse -our troops of insufficient training, and they were not far wrong. In -the first place, most of the men were reservists who had forgotten -a great deal. In the second, this war was our first experience of -smokeless powder, of quick-firing artillery, of machine-guns, and of -all the recent developments in means of destruction, and much was -strange and unexpected. Our preconceived notions were upset, and we -were baffled by the deadly nature of indirect artillery-fire, by the -new attack formations—when advancing infantry is rarely visible, and -one man at a time crawls up almost unseen, taking advantage of every -inch of cover. Our troops had been instructed, but what they had -learned varied according to the personal idiosyncrasies of this or that -district commander. The stronger the officer commanding a district, the -less did he feel bound to abide by the authorized method of instruction -and training laid down in the existing drill-books. General Grippenberg -was no exception to this. In spite of the regulation as to the use of -volleys for repulsing night attacks; in spite of war experience which -in every way confirmed the necessity and value of volley-firing; in -spite of the Commander-in-Chief’s instructions on this point, he made -up his mind some days before a battle to re-teach the force under his -command. He ordered the employment of independent fire at night. His -“Instructions for the Operations of Infantry in Battle” [signed by -him on January 4, 1905], printed and issued to the troops, aroused -consternation and amusement throughout the army. In this book it -was actually laid down that volleys were only to be resorted to if -the enemy suddenly appeared at close quarters, and that immediately -after a volley a bayonet attack should be made. While condemning the -method in which our troops operated at the Ya-lu, he, in the above -“Instructions,” gives a recipe for action whereby two of our battalions -might destroy a Japanese division. After a summary of the amount of -small-arm ammunition expended, he said: - - “If our two battalions had been deployed and had opened rapid - independent fire, the Japanese division would have been - destroyed, and we should have won the day.” - -Such a simple matter did General Grippenberg consider the annihilation -of a Japanese division! But a few days later, when he moved against -the Hei-kou-tai position with a strong force of 120 battalions, his -own prescription proved to be valueless. In the first few days, when -he was opposed by not more than two divisions, he was unable to take -San-de-pu, got his troops into confusion, gave the enemy time to bring -up strong reinforcements, and retired—to St. Petersburg. - -As to the attack formation adopted by the troops arriving from Russia, -the 41st Division had in particular been taught to work in very close -formation, and not taught to make use of the ground. It came from -the Vilna district, which was commanded before the war by General -Grippenberg. Our gunners also arrived at the front with only one idea -of artillery tactics—to place their batteries in the open and make use -of direct fire. For this we paid dearly in our very first fight. - - - - - CHAPTER X - - REASONS FOR OUR REVERSES (_conclusion_) - - Particular difficulties of the strategic situation—Defects in - organization and _personnel_—Absence of a military spirit in - the army, and lack of determination in carrying operations to a - finish—Breakdown of our organization under the strain of active - service. - - -It is the duty of every Headquarter Staff to work out all -possibilities, and, regardless of existing international relations, to -provide for war in every probable quarter. Accordingly, our general -line of operation in case of war with Japan had been duly drawn up in -conjunction with the staffs of the Pri-Amur and Kuan-tung districts, -and had been approved. The following is an extract from the paper -dealing with the subject: - - “Taking advantage of her military position—for she will be more - ready for war than we are, and will therefore possess in the - first period of the campaign a great numerical superiority both - by sea and land—Japan can afford to define her objectives only - generally. She may (1) confine her attention to the occupation - of Korea, and not take the offensive against us (which will most - probably be the case); or (2) occupy Korea and also assume the - offensive— - - (_a_) In Manchuria. - (_b_) Against Port Arthur. - (_c_) In the Southern Ussuri district (Vladivostok). - - “Should Japan decide on the first alternative, then, taking - into consideration the number of reinforcements we shall need, - and the adverse conditions under which they will have to be - conveyed to the front, we shall be forced at first to allow her - to seize Korea—without retaliative action on our part, if only - she will confine herself to occupying that country, and not - develop plans against Manchuria and our territory. Should she - choose the second alternative, we should be obliged to fight, - and ought at once to make up our minds not to end the war until - we have utterly destroyed her army and fleet. In view, however, - of her numerical superiority and greater readiness during - the first period of the struggle, we shall have to assume a - generally defensive rôle. Any troops we may have within the - theatre of operations should as far as possible keep clear of - decisive actions, in order to avoid being defeated in detail - before we can concentrate in force. - - “The numerical superiority of the Japanese fleet will probably - prevent our squadron from any major active operations, and it - will have to confine its action to the comparatively modest - task of delaying the enemy’s landing as much as possible. The - defence of our own possessions should be carried out by the - forces in the Southern Ussuri and the Kuan-tung districts, - which are formed for that particular object, and based on the - fortresses of Vladivostok and Port Arthur. All the remaining - troops, except those allotted to the line of communications and - to maintain order in Manchuria, should be concentrated in the - area Mukden-Liao-yang-Hsiu-yen. As the Japanese advance, these - troops, while delaying them as much as possible, will gradually - be compelled to retire on Harbin. If it becomes evident in the - first period of the campaign that the whole Japanese effort is - being directed against us in Manchuria, then the force which - would be concentrated first of all in the Southern Ussuri - district (1st Siberian Corps) would be transferred there.” - -[Illustration: Sketch Map of MANCHURIA showing main places - along railway south of Harbin] - -The two years succeeding the date on which this paper was written saw -great alterations in the strength, dispositions, and readiness of our -military and naval forces in the Far East. There was also considerable -change in the political conditions in Manchuria and in Northern Korea -in consequence of the active policy which we had begun to assume. It -was therefore found necessary in 1903 to consider a revision of the -above scheme in accordance with these altered conditions. During those -two years our strength in the Far East had grown by the increase in our -land forces and fleet, and the improved efficiency of the railways. -We have already seen what was done to improve the latter. It will -suffice to say here that, instead of the twenty waggons available over -the whole Chinese line in 1901, the War Department in 1903 received -seventy-five in the twenty-four hours, and hoped, on the strength of -promises made, to have five through military trains by the beginning of -1904. The fleet, which in 1901 was considered inferior to the Japanese, -was, at the end of 1903, stated, on the authority of the Viceroy, -Admiral Alexeieff, to be so strong that any possibility of its defeat -by the Japanese was inadmissible. But in those same two years Japan -had not been idle, and had been unceasingly increasing her naval and -military forces. In consequence of this the relative local strengths -of the two nations were still much the same in 1903 as they had been -in 1901, and it was thought prudent to adhere to the same general plan -of operations as had been drawn up and approved two years previously. -To give an official opinion of that time, I quote an extract from a -memorandum I submitted to the Tsar on August 6, 1903: - - “In the report which will be sent in from the Headquarter - Staff, the conclusion arrived at after a careful appreciation - of the resources of both nations is the same as that reached - two years ago—namely, that in the event of war with Japan, - we should act on the defensive; that the concentration - and general distribution of our troops should remain the - same; that although we may move troops on to the line - Mukden-Liao-yang-Hsiu-yen, we cannot hold our ground in - Southern Manchuria in the first period of the war if that - region be invaded by the whole Japanese army. We should - therefore still count upon Port Arthur being cut off for a - considerable period, and in order to avoid defeat in detail, - should withdraw towards Harbin until reinforcements from - Russia enable us to assume the offensive. But I may add that, - while accepting the same plan of operations as we did two - years ago, we can now have far greater confidence in the - issue of a struggle. Our fleet is stronger than the Japanese, - and as reinforcements will arrive now more quickly than they - could have formerly, it will take less time for us to be in a - position to advance.” - -In a memorandum by the Chief of the Headquarter Staff, submitted to me -on February 12, 1904—_i.e._, a few days after the enemy had attacked -our fleet at Port Arthur—General Sakharoff described the Japanese -intentions as follows: - - “The Japanese plan appears to be— - - “1. To inflict a crushing blow upon our fleet so as to paralyze - its activity once and for all, and thus guarantee freedom of - movement to their transports. To attain this end they have not - hesitated to attack us before the declaration of war (_vide_ - the night operations of February 8 and 9). The transfer to - them by the British of Wei-hai-wei also has given them an - advantageous naval base right on the flank of any operations - undertaken by our squadron. - - “2. To capture Port Arthur in order to attain the same - object—the destruction of our fleet. - - “3. To advance on and capture Harbin, so as to isolate the - Pri-Amur district from the rest of Russia, and to destroy the - railway.” - -Our hopes as to the promised improvement of the railway were -unfortunately not realized, while our fleet, damaged by the enemy’s -onslaught before the declaration of war, was not only weaker than the -enemy’s, but failed even to perform the modest task expected of it in -1901. Consequently the concentration of our troops was a far slower -business than we thought it would be, while the Japanese, having -gained command of the sea, threw the whole of their army on to the -continent. Thus, gaining the initiative on land as well as on the sea, -and fired as they were with immense patriotism, the enemy commenced -the war superior to us morally as well as materially. However, though -the task before us was one of extreme difficulty, our resources were -immensely superior to the enemy’s, and the moment when we should become -completely ready for the struggle was only postponed. Notwithstanding -the unfavourable conditions under which we started, after fifteen -months’ fighting we were holding the Hsi-ping-kai positions, and, -although we had not actually assumed the offensive, we had by no means -retired as far as Harbin, which had been accepted as a possibility -in the original scheme. If we had only possessed the determination -necessary to carry this scheme right through, we ought not to have -ended the war until we had utterly defeated the enemy. Therefore, -whatever we did accomplish can only be looked upon as preparatory to -the decisive struggle. One of the assumptions of our original scheme -of operations was that, if a strong Japanese force invaded Southern -Manchuria, we should not be able, in the first period of the war, to -hold it. In the event the whole Japanese army invaded that area, but -the opposition shown by our troops at Liao-yang, on the Sha Ho, and -at Mukden, was so effectual that, though the enemy gained possession -of the greater portion of Southern Manchuria, they did not reassume -the offensive against us for six months. The difficulties which the -Japanese surmounted in advancing from Ta-shih-chiao to Tieh-ling -cannot be compared to those which would have faced them, in the three -defensive lines which we had constructed on the way to Harbin,[9] had -they attempted to drive us to that place. I reiterate what I have so -often said in the preceding chapters: though the war was brought to an -end, the army was not beaten. Of the great force which lay ready on the -Hsi-ping-kai position in August, 1905, one-half had never been under -fire. Further on I will explain how it was that we never acquired the -material and moral superiority necessary to defeat the enemy during the -fifteen months that the war did last. - -In the diary I kept when in Japan[10] I drew a diagram, with -explanatory notes, to illustrate the Japanese question and show the -possibility of our being able to defend our interests in Manchuria and -Korea by force. I reproduce the diagram[11] and the notes _in extenso_: - - “This diagram shows Japan’s comparatively favourable situation - with regard to the theatre of operations. Her base—indeed, her - whole country—is only about 600 miles by sea from our shores, - and 135 from Korea. - - “Our territory in Asia is so vast and so thinly populated that - we shall be compelled to make European Russia, which is 3,400 - to 6,000 miles distant, our base. For a protracted war with - Japan it is evident that the single-line Siberian Railway will - not suffice; we shall be obliged to lay a second track, and - to increase the number of trains in the twenty-four hours. - Also, as it runs for a considerable distance along the Chinese - frontier and through Chinese territory, it cannot be relied on - in the event of war with both China and Japan together.” - -We were glued to the railway, and could not move away without risk of -being left without supplies. Our field artillery and heavy four-wheeled -transport carts were unable to travel over most of the hill roads. The -summer rains made the movements of the army, with its heavy baggage -trains and parks, extremely difficult; teams of twenty horses were -harnessed to guns, and even empty carts had to be man-handled. - -[Illustration: DIAGRAM SHOWING THE POSITION OF THE THEATRE OF WAR -RELATIVELY TO RUSSIA AND JAPAN.] - -But of all our difficulties, the complete command of the sea obtained -by the Japanese right at the beginning of the war caused the greatest. -With their three armies they cut off Port Arthur, and began an advance -from an enveloping base against our army, which was still tied to a -railway-line. Our southward advance for the relief of Port Arthur -was threatened by Kuroki’s army based on Korea. Any movement against -him was out of the question, especially for those corps which had -arrived from Russia, as they were quite unused to hilly country. Our -communications through Manchuria were only weakly defended, and might -be cut at any moment by the Chinese, while those further west were -liable to interruption (bridges destroyed, strikes, frost, etc.). -The feeding of the army depended on local resources, which a hostile -population could easily conceal, carry away, or even destroy; and as -the amount of supplies obtained from Russia was extremely small and -uncertain, the army might very easily have been starved. The chance -actions at the Ya-lu and Te-li-ssu, in which our most reliable troops -were worsted, still further improved the enemy’s _moral_, and lowered -ours. - -With the absence of a proper military spirit among our troops, and -the evil influence of the many seditious manifestoes against the -war circulating amongst them; with the unsteadiness shown by many -units in the first fights, and with all the other defects above -mentioned, a great numerical superiority was necessary—I must speak -perfectly plainly—in order to defeat an enemy worked up to a pitch of -fanatical excitement. But we did not obtain this superiority until -it was too late—when we were waiting on the Hsi-ping-kai position, -and negotiations for peace were being carried on at Portsmouth. Up -to December we were fighting with what seemed a fairly large force, -according to a tally of battalions; but these were greatly under -strength, for in the most important early period of the war—from May -to October inclusive—we lost very many men, and received but few -drafts. In many cases the Japanese battalions were twice as strong as -ours. While all our actions were hampered by insufficient information -regarding the enemy, the intelligence we received as to what was -happening in our rear—in Mongolia and in the Manchurian provinces—was -so alarming as to compel us to detach a large force to protect our -communications. Again, when the enemy became complete masters of the -sea, we had to detail sufficient troops to guard against a landing in -the Vladivostok and the Ussuri districts. All these things combined -to complicate our position and give the enemy the initiative at the -start, and right manfully did their whole nation strive to seize -their advantage. Their land communications were safe; their sea -communication with their base was quick and sure. We, on the contrary, -could only put in the field a fraction of our land forces, and, till we -could concentrate sufficient men for an offensive, were tied down to a -definite course of action. We had— - -1. To make certain of and protect the concentration of the -reinforcements which were arriving, so as not to allow them to be -destroyed as they came up. - -2. To take steps to relieve Port Arthur. - -3. To maintain order in our rear, and to guard the railway. - -4. To feed the army—mainly on local supplies. - -5. To guard the Ussuri district. - -Had the Japanese got possession of our communications, a catastrophe -unprecedented in military history might have resulted. Without any -victory in the field, the mere destruction of the railway in our -rear, combined with the cutting off of local resources, would have -threatened us with starvation—and disaster. Such were the unfavourable -conditions under which we fought for fifteen months, and our army was -not only _not_ completely defeated, but grew in strength, while our -communication with Russia gradually became better secured and more -efficient. We had always recognized the possibility of being driven -back to Harbin and beyond; but this never happened, and we held on to -Hsi-ping-kai. The situation could only have been improved in one way—by -a rapid concentration of sufficient troops for, and an assumption of, -an offensive all along the line. While these troops were collecting, -each fight—quite independent of its actual result—would have really -helped us if it had at all weakened the enemy. But our departure from -our accepted plan of operations began at the commencement of the war, -when, instead of fighting a rearguard action, General Zasulitch got -seriously engaged against the whole of Kuroki’s army at the Ya-lu, and -was defeated. - -In May, when the 3rd Siberian Division[12] had alone arrived at -Liao-yang (besides the troops of the Pri-Amur Military District), the -Viceroy, fearing for the fate of Port Arthur, instructed me to assume -the offensive towards the Ya-lu against Kuroki’s army, or southwards -for the relief of the fortress of Port Arthur. But the inadequate force -with which General Shtakelberg pushed forward, owing to ignorance -of the fact that the Japanese were in superior strength, got drawn -into a serious engagement at Te-li-ssu, and was defeated. With the -arrival of all the units of the 4th Siberian Corps and one division -of the 10th Army Corps, it seemed possible to contain Kuroki’s army, -to concentrate fifty to sixty battalions rapidly in the direction of -Ta-shih-chiao, and to attempt to hurl back Oku to the south. It seemed -as if our army had a splendid chance of operating on interior lines. -The enemy was strung along three lines of advance—Dalny, Kai-ping, -Ta-shih-chiao (Oku); Ta-ku-shan, Hsiu-yen, Ta-ling, Hai-cheng (Nodzu); -Ya-lu, Feng-huang-cheng, Fen-shui-ling, Liao-yang (Kuroki). We occupied -the central position—Liao-yang, Hai-cheng, Ta-shih-chiao—with advance -guards thrown forward on to the Fen-shui-ling heights. We might have -been able, by containing two armies and deceiving the enemy by a -demonstration, to strike the third army in force. A blow delivered at -Kuroki or Nodzu did not promise success, owing to our lack of training -in, and unpreparedness for, hill warfare [we had no mountain artillery, -our baggage was heavy, and we were uncertain of receiving supplies, -owing to the insufficiency of transport material]. The only other -course was to strike at Oku, who was based on the railway, but such an -operation was risky, because Kuroki and Nodzu might have driven back -our screens and fallen on our communications. On June 26 and 27, when -only one brigade of the 31st Division of the 10th Army Corps[13] had -arrived at Liao-yang, the Japanese on the eastern front (Kuroki and -Nodzu) themselves took the offensive and seized the passes (Fen-shui -Ling, Mo-du Ling, Da Ling) on the Fen-shui-ling heights. We opposed -them in insufficient strength, and did not even make them disclose -their numbers. The troops of the eastern force withdrew towards -Tkhavuop, and General Levestam’s force to Hsi-mu-cheng. Our screens -were thus situated as follows: on Kuroki’s line of advance, only two -marches from Hai-cheng; on Oku’s line of advance at Ta-shih-chiao, four -marches from Liao-yang.[14] Our position was critical, particularly -if the information we had received as to the Japanese collecting in -considerable force to operate against Hai-cheng was confirmed. Still, -if we were able to strike a rapid blow at Oku, we might rob the enemy -of the initiative, and after forcing back Oku’s army, have fallen on -Nodzu. After we had driven back these troops, Kuroki’s position would -have been so far forward and so far separated from the other groups -that the danger of his breaking through to Liao-yang would have been -minimized. But for such decisive operations the first requisite was the -concentration of sufficient troops for offensive operations against Oku. - -[Illustration: GENERAL BARON KITEN NOGI.] - -At the end of June we had altogether available against the three -Japanese armies 120 battalions, and were inferior to the enemy both -in the number of battalions and the number of men. Our position was -made worse by an epidemic of dysentery which broke out amongst the -troops at Ta-shih-chiao, and swept off a considerable number of men. -The Krasnoyarsk Regiment[15] was the greatest sufferer, having as many -as 1,500 men down with the disease at the end of the month. But the -main thing which delayed any advance on our part was the rain, which -made all moves difficult, and some places absolutely impassable for -transport. It was even difficult to convey supplies to our various -stationary forces over distances of less than a march. In spite of the -lack of pack-saddles, wheeled transport had to be given up for pack -transport, and not even pack-animals could do more than seven to eleven -miles in the twenty-four hours. On the Liao-yang–Lang-tzu-shan road -things were still worse, for the bridges over the mountain streams had -been carried away, and communication between the eastern force (3rd -Siberian Corps, under Count Keller) and Liao-yang was interrupted for -some time. Far, therefore, from being ready to advance, the officers -commanding the 1st and 4th Siberian Corps found the greatest difficulty -in rationing their troops, and on June 29 asked that they might be -withdrawn towards the positions near the railway at Ta-shih-chiao, and -that the country east of the line might be left to the cavalry, with a -few infantry units in support.[16] - -General Count Keller was persistent in his demands that communication -should be maintained between his force and Liao-yang, but we had -neither the material, the means, nor the time to comply with his -wishes, which would have meant the laying of a light railway and the -strengthening of the road bridges. As I feared that the Japanese might -make a fresh forward movement on Hai-cheng, I ordered thirty-nine -battalions to concentrate near Hsi-mu-cheng on June 29. The short march -from Hai-cheng was accomplished on the 28th with great difficulty -through a sea of mud, and on the 29th Hsi-mu-cheng was temporarily -cut off by the mountain streams in flood. The feeding of the troops -collected there was found to be so difficult that as soon as it was -known that the enemy, instead of advancing, had retired towards the -Fen-shui Ling (Pass), certain units were ordered to return to the -railway. Taking advantage, on July 18, of the screen formed by a -portion of the 17th Army Corps, we attempted to advance against part -of Kuroki’s army in the hope of forcing our way forward and gaining -a partial success. For this Count Keller had under his command -forty-three battalions, but the attempt failed. He stopped the action -before any large number of our troops had become engaged. On the 29th -Oku’s army took the offensive; we had to evacuate Ta-shih-chiao and -Newchuang after a feeble resistance, and allowed Oku and Nodzu to -join hands. When on July 23 I inspected the units of the 10th Army -Corps, who were holding the position near Hu-chia-tzu, I found out -how absolutely incapable of operating in hilly country the troops -newly arrived from Russia were. Before sending them forward, it was -necessary to train them in hill fighting, and to provide them with -pack transport. On July 31 all three Japanese armies advanced, and we -concentrated after a series of battles round Liao-yang. Here, in spite -of our resistance, the three armies were able to join hands. Their -attacks on the left bank of the Tai-tzu Ho were repulsed, but owing -to the unfortunate nature of our operations on the right bank, the -conditions became so unfavourable to us that I was obliged to order a -retirement to Mukden. The withdrawal was conducted without the loss -of a single gun or transport cart, while the enemy lost in men more -heavily than we did. In the detailed accounts I have given in the first -three volumes of the operations at Liao-yang, on the Sha Ho and at -Mukden, our difficulties and the causes of our defeats are explained. -The course of events showed that our original scheme of operations was -quite a correct forecast, for in it the probable necessity of retiring -towards Harbin had been foreseen. Indeed, matters at Liao-yang, on the -Sha Ho, and especially at Mukden, might have been very much worse for -us than they were, and might have necessitated our retirement on Harbin -early in October, 1904, when, as a matter of fact, we remained in -Southern Manchuria. - -Clausewitz has truly laid down that an army should be inseparably -connected with its base, but our base was Russia, more than 5,000 miles -away. The way that this one difficulty alone was overcome will perhaps -be eventually appreciated at its true worth. The very complicated -attendant circumstances demanded great and patient efforts on the -part of the whole nation in order to turn them to our advantage. Our -reverses were explicable, and even in our defeat we exhausted our -enemy, while ourselves increasing in strength. It was inevitable that a -different complexion would have been put on the face of things as soon -as circumstances became more favourable to us. - - - DIFFICULTIES IN ORGANIZATION. - -The war showed that our army organization gave us too small a -percentage of actual combatants as compared with the total numbers -whom we rationed. By this I mean that, in spite of the immense numbers -that we maintained in the face of great difficulties, we were unable -to put enough men into action to win. Our establishments of all arms, -of parks, hospitals, transport corps, field bakeries, staffs, and all -offices and institutions, include a large percentage of non-combatants, -which was swollen in the last war by the absence of any organized line -of communication troops, the necessity of carrying out a large amount -of railway construction, and of appointing officers and men to newly -formed supply and transport units. Even so the number of non-combatants -laid down in the establishments for each unit was not sufficient -to perform the duties that fell to them, and it became necessary, -for reasons which will be mentioned later, to detail combatants for -domestic duties. As but few non-combatants were wounded in action, -the proportion of them to the combatant element became still greater -after every big fight. It was usual, when a battle was imminent, to -order back to their units all men who were on extra-regimental duties, -but in spite of all the steps taken, the fighting number was never -more than 75 per cent. of the number of men on the strength. In the -beginning of April, 1905, when we were preparing the theatre of war up -to the River Sungari, the combatant element of the 1st Manchurian Army -actually fell to 58 per cent. of the strength. As in previous wars, the -infantry, of course, did most of the fighting, and also carried out by -far the greater number of fatigues and extra duties. As they also lost -more men in action, their fighting strength was proportionately more -reduced than that of the other arms.[17] In April, 1905, the percentage -of rifles in the 1st Manchurian Army to the total number of men that -had to be rationed was 51·9 per cent. When the convalescents returned -to the ranks, its strength amounted by the beginning of December to -192,000 men, of whom 105,879 carried rifles; but we could only put a -much smaller number in action owing to various duties, fatigues, etc. -In August, 1905, the number of rifles was 58·9 per cent. of the total -of men rationed. - -To obviate this state of affairs, and to insure that companies should -be as strong as possible in action, I gave orders on June 9, 1905 -[when I was commanding the 1st Manchurian Army], that out of each of -the four battalion regiments, not more than 369 combatants should be -detailed for extra duties. This figure included 128 stretcher-bearers, -35 bandsmen, and 48 men for baggage guards. In addition to this, a -large number of men were required for road and bridge work on the -communications, for guards for the different stores, for working -parties to assist the supply and medical services, for policing -villages, for duty with the improvised transport units, etc. True, this -had its compensations, for we were able thus to get rid of the 2nd -Category reservists from the ranks; but we felt the loss in the number -of rifles we could place in the firing-line. Of course, there were, in -addition, the sick, the wounded, and the convalescents with units and -in hospital. In this way the total of all ranks classed as combatants -but absent from the firing-line, or not doing combatant work, amounted -on the average to 800 men out of every four-battalion regiment, or -about one-quarter of its strength. To carry on the campaign without -properly organized units on the communications, without sufficient camp -guards, without making roads and bridges, without allowing men for -transport and baggage duties, was impossible. Notwithstanding the good -payment we offered, the native population did not come forward to work -freely, especially when fighting was imminent. A certain number were -employed on transport, but they were very unreliable, and bolted at the -first alarm, often taking their horses and carts with them. During the -battle of Mukden, for instance, the whole of the hired transport of the -1st Army, consisting of 400 carts, entirely disappeared. Our attempts -to obtain Russian hired labour were a failure, though the rates of pay -offered were liberal enough. - -The extent to which transport duties were responsible for weakening the -fighting strength of the army can be seen from the fact that, during -the fifteen months of war, 122 transport units were formed, and 8,656 -carts, 51,000 horses, and 20,000 pack-animals purchased. For duty with -these, 328 officers, 22,000 men, 1,700 hired civilians (Russians), and -9,850 Chinamen were employed. These 122 units were improvised under -adverse conditions and from small cadres, and, as they had to be raised -in a hurry, there was nothing for it but to appoint to them men and -officers from the army. - -The strength of units also decreased most marvellously in action. -This was partly due to losses, but often also due to the habit of -men leaving the firing-line to carry wounded to the rear. This was -sometimes done with permission, sometimes without. Very often the men -who retired did not have this excuse. - -I have pointed out (in Chapter VII.) that the army did not receive -its drafts in time, and that we had to fight below strength; this -shortage was still further increased for the following reasons: The war -establishment of a company was 220 rifles; but from this number had to -be deducted the shortage with which units arrived at the front,[18] -the sick, and those detailed for camp and other duties—a procedure -which, though unprovided for by Regulations, was permitted by officers -in command. Accordingly companies often went into the very first -fight at a strength of only 160 to 170 rifles. For a long time the -personal supervision exercised by commanding officers to insure that -units took the field as strong as possible was very slack. It seemed, -on the contrary, as if their efforts tended all the other way, for -they left men behind whenever they possibly could, particularly those -who were most necessary—_i.e._, those on whom depended the payment -and regular rationing of the men. Thus, with the exception of the -regimental adjutant, the staff of a regiment rarely went into action; -while of the men who are classed as combatants, the company clerks, -armourer-sergeant, cooks, officers’ servants, the butcher, the cattle -guards and the officers’ grooms, were always left behind. The formation -of a force of mounted scouts took away a certain number of men, and -stretcher-bearers and bandsmen of course did not fight. Finally, owing -to the peculiar nature of the country, donkeys for carrying water were -provided for each company, and these required men to look after them, -and one or two entire companies from each regiment had to be detached -as baggage guard owing to the insecurity of our communications. -Commanding officers thought it necessary to leave behind so many men -for the above purposes that the orders given for them to accompany the -firing-line were either quite neglected, or only half carried out. It -was soon found that eight bearers per company were far too few for -carrying wounded, and men from the ranks were allowed to help their -wounded comrades to the rear. From this cause companies often literally -melted away during a fight. There were many instances where unwounded -men went to the rear under pretext of carrying away the wounded, at the -rate of six, eight, or ten sound soldiers to one wounded! The return -of these willing helpers to the front was not so prompt as it might -have been, and was difficult to control. The result was that a company -hotly engaged usually only had 100 or less rifles after a few hours’ -fighting, although its losses might have been inconsiderable. - -Meanwhile, as we only asked for drafts strong enough to bring companies -up to the established war strength, without taking into account the -above extraordinary leakage, the drafts we received did not bring -companies up to their proper strength in action. - -The reason why the lines of communication in the field[19] took -so large a number away from our fighting-line was that we had no -proper communication units, and the large working parties necessary -for the light railway, road and bridge work had to be drawn from the -fighting troops. It was entirely owing to the care with which the -commanding officers on the line of communications—especially those -in the engineers—had been selected that we were able to fight, and -at the same time to make roads of some hundreds of miles’ length for -intercommunication between corps. For instance, at the end of 1904 -and the beginning of 1905, when the 1st Army was south of the Hun Ho, -out of 180,000 men, 7,000 were on the line of communications. At the -beginning of July, 1905, when the strength of the 1st Army had gone up -to 250,000, and the communications stretched back a length of 150 miles -to the River Sungari, there were 10,000 men employed on them—_i.e._, -4 per cent. of the army’s strength. The length of the road made on the -Hsi-ping-kai positions by the 1st Army alone amounted to 1,000 miles, -with bridges of more than 20 feet breadth and 50 feet span, and nearly -40 miles of embankment. Though the greater part of this was done by -hired Chinese labour, even in this comparatively quiet period the -troops of the 1st Army were on “works” for a period of 30,000 working -“man days.”[20] - -The supply service, also, as has been mentioned, absorbed a large -number of men. The field commissariat were unable, at the beginning of -the campaign, to work the bakeries owing to the lack of men. All the -bakeries, therefore, were taken over by the troops, who had to build -the ovens, buy flour, and bake the bread themselves. Thus the eight -field bakeries (of which four were in Liao-yang) which arrived in -Harbin and Liao-yang without transport or men had at first to be taken -over by the troops. But from May, 1904, onwards the Governor-General -insisted on most of the work being handed back to the Commissariat -Department. The energy of General Gubur, the Field Intendant of the -army, in obtaining supplies locally rescued it from the difficult -position in which it was beginning to find itself owing to the -constantly increasing number of mouths and to the inadequate number -of supply trains. Assisted by Generals Bachinski and Andro, General -Gubur took full advantage of all the resources of the country. For -this, again, officers and men were necessary to guard supply depôts and -collect and escort herds of cattle, and were taken from the combatant -troops. A large part of the forage and meat the troops obtained for -themselves, but this entailed the provision of strong foraging parties, -which went far afield and often remained away a considerable time, and -of permanent guards to tend the regimental cattle. When the troops of -the Pri-Amur district were concentrated in Manchuria, they left a -number of men behind as “base details” to look after their buildings -and property. Touch was maintained between these base details and the -units at the front during the whole war; from them the troops received -their warm clothing in winter, and to them it was sent back in the -summer of 1905. This all meant the employment of soldiers. Finally, -men had to be told off for topographical work, reconnaissance, and as -escorts for officers and other persons, etc. - -The number for all the above duties taken together, with the wounded -and sick present with units, constituted on an average 400 to 500 men -per regiment. This, added to the 369 authorized “employed” men above -mentioned, brought the total up to 800. Obviously such a loss of -numbers must be taken into consideration in appreciating the fighting -work of the army. - -Other things which contributed to the same result were the immense -development of the different staffs and administrations, the auxiliary -institutions, such as supply parks and hospitals, the congestion on -the roads caused by the masses of baggage which had collected, and -the fact that both our wheeled and pack transport carried less than -it was supposed to owing to the hilly country and the all-prevailing -mud. After heavy fighting our army corps, especially those consisting -of three-battalion regiments, amounted to less than 10,000 to 15,000 -rifles, and yet the immense organization, military parks, baggage, and -transport, etc., for a full corps had still to be guarded. Even the -regimental standards, which should have been a source of strength and -encouragement in the fight, were in many cases prematurely taken to the -rear under a guard of a company or half a company, the troops at the -front being weakened by this number at the most important moment of an -action. I was obliged to make a ruling that in action the standards -should be kept with the regimental reserves, and that steps should be -taken that they should be a symbol of victory in the most critical -phases of a fight (as used to be the case in former wars), and a source -of strength instead of weakness to the units which possessed them. - -In September and October, 1905, instead of one Manchurian army, -three were formed (the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd); they were all intended -for operations in the Mukden area, and were based on the one railway -which constituted their common line of communications. The powers -of the army commanders were as laid down by regulation. Officers in -command of armies were given (Field Service Regulations, 1890) almost -all the powers formerly vested in the Commander-in-Chief. As regards -fighting, it was laid down that “in conducting military operations the -officer commanding an army should be guided by the instructions of -the Commander-in-Chief, but should act independently.” This latitude -would be very convenient in operating in Europe, where each army -would have its own independent line of communications; but in the -conditions which existed at Mukden—one common position and one line of -communications for all—and with a difference of views existing between -the army commanders as regards the conduct of affairs, the arrangement -was, to say the least of it, extremely unsuitable. A difference of -opinion upon some vital matter might easily arise, when it might be -necessary either to order the army commander to carry out an operation -which he thought unnecessary, inopportune, or even dangerous, or -else to ask for him to be replaced. For instance, a fortnight before -we assumed the offensive on January 25, after everything had been -settled and all plans drawn up, General Grippenberg suddenly surprised -me by his opinion—that the campaign was lost; that we should retire -towards Harbin, hold that point and Vladivostok, and thence move with -two armies in other directions. In which directions, he was unable -to explain. The Commander-in-Chief’s instructions on many essential -points, such as the danger of holding non-continuous lines[21] and -the necessity for having strong army reserves, were not carried out -because the responsibility for holding the defensive positions occupied -by the armies rested on the army commanders. Thus my endeavours to -send at least twenty-four battalions—if not the whole of the 17th -Army Corps—from the 3rd Army into the reserve failed, as the officer -commanding that army thought that his position in the centre would not -be safe if the regiments of the 17th Corps, which was in advance, were -replaced by reserve regiments of the 6th Siberians. As mentioned in the -account of the operations of the 14th Infantry Division at Hei-kou-tai, -notwithstanding my instructions to conceal our intention of attacking -the enemy’s left flank as long as possible, General Grippenberg, for -no apparent reason, and without even asking permission, assumed the -offensive almost two weeks before the time that I had fixed by moving -the 14th Division towards Ssu-fang-tai (on the heights by San-de-pu) -on January 13, and by moving the 10th Army Corps into the advanced -lines between the right flank of the 3rd Army and the River Hun on the -16th. By this the enemy was informed of our intentions before we began -our forward movement, and the front of the 2nd Army was spread over -thirteen miles. - -With the exception of General Linievitch, our army commanders were -unnecessarily sensitive to interference with their powers, and in -cases where orders would formerly have been issued to corps commanders -it now became necessary to reckon with the personal opinions of army -commanders, and to guard against offending their susceptibilities. -After the pomp and parade of General Grippenberg’s departure from -the army, the relationship between the army commanders and the -Commander-in-Chief became still more strained. How jealously they -looked after their rights, and how strangely they interpreted their -own powers, is illustrated by the following incident: On February 19 -I sent for the three army commanders and their chief staff officers, -in order to ascertain their views as to the plan of operations which -should be undertaken under the unfavourable conditions brought about -by the fall of Port Arthur and General Grippenberg’s unsuccessful -operations at Hei-kou-tai. The following courses were open to Nogi’s -army, no longer required in the Kuan-tung Peninsula: it might join -the four armies already in the field against us; it might, together -with the divisions formed in Japan and the troops in Korea, form a -force of seventy to eighty strong battalions for operations against -Vladivostok, or, landing at Possiet Bay, it might march against Kirin -and Harbin, so as to outflank our position at Mukden. I had also been -continually receiving reports from General Chichagoff to the effect -that the enemy had invaded Mongolia, and, aided by numerous bands of -Hun-huses, had begun to attack the railway in our rear, which had forced -me to weaken the army by detailing an infantry brigade and four Cossack -regiments to reinforce the railway guard and safeguard our position. In -spite of these reports, Generals Linievitch and Kaulbars expressed the -opinion that we ought not to change our plans, and should carry out the -orders I had issued on January 25—namely, to fall on the enemy’s left -flank. But when my Chief of Staff asked the officer commanding the 2nd -Army—who was to commence the operation—how he proposed to employ his -cavalry, Kaulbars,[22] looking upon the question as an interference -with his authority, became annoyed, and said much that was unnecessary -and quite beside the point. As it turned out, the Chief of the Staff -had every reason to be anxious as to the employment of this Army, for -its work in the battle of Mukden was anything but satisfactory. - -The very large powers vested in army commanders in the matter of -bestowing distinctions was both unnecessary and harmful. They were -authorized to award the fourth class Order of St. George on the -recommendations of committees convened by them; they could give the -Distinguished Service Cross to private soldiers, and award the Orders -of St. Anne, second, third, and fourth classes, and St. Stanislav, -second and third classes, with swords and ribbons. As the forces -were lying so close together, it was very soon noticed that the -distribution of decorations in the different armies varied very much, -being in accordance with the personal predispositions of the different -commanders. In one army they were so lavishly bestowed as to excite -general derision, and their value was much lowered in consequence. By -far the worst offender in this respect was one well-known general, -who for one and the same engagement [Hei-kou-tai] decorated divers -officers with two Orders apiece, while, contrary to regulations, he -bestowed the Distinguished Service Cross to fifteen and more men per -company and battery. I jotted down in my diary my impressions after -inspecting units of the 2nd Army. Amongst other things, I noted that he -had awarded thirty Distinguished Service Crosses to a battery, of which -only seventy men had been in action and even then scarcely under fire. -Indeed, to my astonishment, as they stood on parade almost the whole -of the front rank were wearing crosses. The officer in command told -me that he had been ashamed to announce these rewards to the men, and -to have to try and select certain specific acts for them. I told the -men I hoped that they would show themselves worthy of these marks of -distinction in the fights to come! - -The large independent powers possessed by the army commanders in -matters of supply were also superfluous in a case where there was only -one railway and one tract of country in which to procure supplies. The -only result was that prices were raised all round by the fact that -the different armies were bidding against each other. In this respect -General Grippenberg’s behaviour was most incomprehensible. As meat was -very scarce in December, I advised him to cut down the meat ration from -1 pound to 1/2 pound. Instead of this, by an order issued on January 3, -he increased it to 1-1/2 pounds per man per day. With the conditions -that obtained generally on the Sha Ho, and if our army corps had been -organized on a broader basis, there would have been no necessity -whatever for three separate army commanders with their special powers; -but they were appointed. And yet, after the disaster of Mukden, it -was the Commander-in-Chief who was generally held responsible for -everything. - - - DEFECTS IN _PERSONNEL_. - -As regards the _personnel_, I will give in full the impressions -recorded in my report on the 1st Manchurian Army at a time when the -experiences of the war were fresh in my mind; my opinion in the main -agrees with those of other senior commanders. - -(_a_) _The Command._—No appreciation of the senior commanders—that is -to say, of the work done by individual corps, divisional, and brigade -commanders—can or, indeed, ought to be made at present. The personal -element is too prominent. We must wait till personal feelings have -died away, so as to be able to draw impartial conclusions based on -authenticated facts, and on facts alone, as to what happened and who -was to blame. All the same, it may be said that the most pronounced -weak points amongst our senior commanders, especially in the first -period of the campaign, were their lack of initiative, their ignorance -of the method in which an attack should be conducted, and their want -of determination. There was never any co-ordination in the operations -of large units, which were really quite remarkable for their absolute -disconnection. Indifference as to the position of neighbouring forces -was the rule, and a tendency to accept defeat before a fight was really -lost was painfully evident. Even our best commanders preferred their -neighbour to be told off for the attack, while they themselves remained -in support. If a column were retiring under difficulties, any other -forces close at hand would withdraw also, instead of coming to its -assistance; and there was practically no instance of a bold forward -movement. The work of the regimental commanders was certainly better -than that of those higher up, but it was impossible not to notice that -they did not possess the power of making the most of a situation and -finding their way about. A regimental commander detached on special -duty could rarely make his arrangements without the assistance of -an officer of the General Staff; he could not, as a rule, read a -map himself, much less teach those under him how to do so. This was -especially the case at the beginning of the war, and had considerable -influence on the conduct of operations, as regiments often either -arrived late at their rendezvous or went to points where they were -not wanted. The lack of eye for country is partly explained by the -fact that our officers were quite unused to hills. Though this defect -certainly became less marked as time went on, it was still perceptible -in the operations round Mukden, and even afterwards. - -Though the officers lacked a proper military spirit, they were -generally good in other ways, particularly those of the regular army. -The best proof of their gallantry is furnished by the number of losses -sustained by the 1st Army from November, 1904, to September, 1905, from -which it will be seen that their proportion of killed and wounded was -considerably higher than that of the men. - - +-------+-------------------+-------------------+ - | | Officers. | Rank and File. | - +-------+--------+----------+--------+----------+ - | | |Percentage| |Percentage| - | |Numbers.|to Average|Numbers.|to Average| - | | | Strength.| | Strength.| - +-------+--------+----------+--------+----------+ - |Killed | 167 | 4·1 | 4,779 | 2·5 | - |Wounded| 905 | 23·8 | 27,425 | 14·6 | - |Missing| 89 | 2·1 | 5,684 | 2·9 | - | +--------+----------+--------+----------+ - | | 1,151 | 30 | 37,888 | 20 | - +-------+--------+----------+--------+----------+ - -The losses in this army for the whole period of the war were somewhat -higher: - - Officers. Rank and - File. - Killed 396 10,435 - Wounded 1,773 56,350 - -With the exception of those who had volunteered for the front, the -officers of the reserve were not nearly so well qualified as those of -the regulars; they were much behind them in tactical training, and did -not always perform their duties with the zeal which should be shown on -active service. Many ensigns of the reserve turned out unsatisfactory, -having accepted this rank purely to escape becoming private soldiers -upon mobilization; they had no sympathy with the military profession, -and hated soldiering. They were absolutely without training, and some -of them had no authority whatever over the men. The ensigns and -acting ensigns[23] promoted from the ranks for distinguished service -were excellent in every respect. Having been selected from the rank -and file, they usually appreciated their rank, and had considerable -authority amongst the men; they got on well with the officers, and -proved efficient and hard-working assistants to the company commanders. -The extent to which the acting ensigns sacrificed themselves to duty -is evinced by the fact that of 680 in the 1st Army in February, 192 -were killed and wounded in the Mukden battle—_i.e._, more than 28 per -cent. The moral tone of the officers was quite satisfactory; during the -whole period of the war only nineteen were dismissed for unbecoming -conduct. In reporting on the work done by the officers of the General -Staff, the majority of the senior officers in command of troops -expressed the opinion that their theoretical training and intelligence -stood very high, and that their work was unselfish, but that they were -not sufficiently in touch with the troops, and lacked the personal, -practical knowledge required to enable them to judge properly how much -might be expected of men, and in what way an order would be carried -out—a knowledge which is necessary if small errors are to be avoided in -the transmission of orders, etc. They recommended that, to give these -staff-officers the necessary practical training, they should do most -of their service with troops of all three Arms, and only a part of -their service on the staff; while, to prevent them being looked upon -by the troops as mere clerks, they should be relieved of the mass of -clerical work that now falls to the General Staff. As in other bodies -of men, so amongst these officers are to be found some specially fitted -for field-work, and others, again, who prefer purely staff duties, and -in my opinion the two classes should be separated. Generally speaking, -the General Staff officers in the 1st Army did everything that was -required of them. From November, 1904, to September, 1905, their losses -in killed and wounded amounted to 12 per cent. of their strength; if -the casualties which occurred before the formation of the 1st Army are -taken into account, the percentage works out as much as 25·7. During -the whole of the above time only four were sent back to Russia on -account of sickness, while the majority of the wounded returned to the -front. - -As regards the senior commanders, many general officers who had -commanded independent units with great success in peace-time were -quite unfitted to take command of large units under the stress of war. -Few had even had sufficient peace practice in the actual command of -divisions and corps, and many were not up-to-date in their knowledge of -modern war requirements. The general characteristic displayed by most -was their lack of the power of forming a decision and a disinclination -to accept responsibility. Some arrived at the front actually holding -important commands for which they were—either through ill-health or -for other reasons—quite unfitted. From three army corps, composed of -veteran regiments which had arrived earlier than others in the theatre -of war, there retired, or were sent back, after the first fights, one -corps, four divisional, and several brigade commanders. Amongst the -reasons which contributed to complicate the conduct of operations were -the frequent changes in the Commander-in-Chief, of whom there were -three in nineteen months. From the beginning of the war till the end -of October, 1904—for eight and a half months—Admiral Alexeieff was -in supreme command; from the end of October to the middle of March, -1905—four and a half months—I was in command; from the middle of March -till the end of the operations—six months—General Linievitch was in -command. - -The fact that I only commanded for four and a half months out of -nineteen, and that this period was in the middle of operations, was not -taken into account by those who last year flooded Russia with pamphlets -and newspaper articles, apparently written with the sole object of -proving that I, both as Commander-in-Chief and as War Minister, was -the person mainly responsible for our misfortunes. In a letter to the -Tsar, dated February 21, 1906, from the village of Shuan-chen-pu, I -wrote on this point as follows: - - “I am aware of the serious accusations levelled against me - in the Press. Though there are among them many to which I - would scorn to reply, I should be happy to accept entire - responsibility for the disasters which have overtaken us, but - that such a course would be historically incorrect. It would - also be a mistake, because it would lessen the general desire - of the whole army for a thorough investigation of all the - causes of our partial defeats, so that we may be able to avoid - them in the future. - - “I venture to say ‘partial’ defeats, because there could be no - possible suggestion that our land forces in Manchuria suffered - defeat similar to that sustained by the fleet. When peace was - concluded we had an army of almost one million men, still - holding positions occupied by us after the Mukden battle, - and ready, not only for the defensive, but for a most active - advance. - - “Information that reached us from Japan showed that the sources - from which she had been drawing the men for her armies were - drained dry, that her finances had been completely exhausted, - that discontent at the long-drawn-out war was already making - itself felt among her people, and that for these reasons her - army could not reckon on further success against our superior - numbers. Therefore, the most searching and exhaustive study of - all our weak points cannot shake the belief prevalent in the - army that our troops in Manchuria would have been victorious if - only the war had been continued. - - “It will be for the future historian to decide whether the - troops we put into the field before March, 1905, would have - sufficed for victory. - - “Nowadays, with the complicated machinery of modern armies, the - personality of the supreme commander is less important than it - was. Without trusty, able, and energetic subordinates, without - a spirit of initiative amongst all ranks, without a superiority - in numbers, and, what is most important, without a military - spirit amongst the troops and patriotism in the whole nation, - the duty of a Commander-in-Chief is so difficult that it is - far too much for a merely talented leader. It may be said that - a military genius would have overcome the moral and physical - difficulties we had to encounter. Possibly; but an Alexeieff, - a Kuropatkin, a Linievitch, a Grippenberg, a Kaulbars, and a - Bilderling were unable to do so. - - “I venture to remind Your Imperial Highness that, on receiving - the orders appointing me to be Commander-in-Chief, I did not - joyfully express my gratitude. I replied to the effect that - it was only a dearth of commanders which led Your Majesty to - select me. If I still firmly believed in victory after the - Mukden battle, I had, indeed, good grounds for so doing.” - -The author of the cleverly written article entitled “All about -Commanders” writes as follows: - - “The absence of initiative, the habit of always relying upon - superiors, and only acting when ordered to from above, are - characteristics of junior commanders which made the work of - those at the head of the army more difficult. The value of the - time element in war also was forgotten.” - -The modern theorist in strategy, Blume, says: “Even the greatest genius -in a supreme commander cannot replace independent action by individual -leaders.” - -Even during actual operations numerous newspaper articles appeared, -well calculated to discredit the officers. They were represented as -overbearing, rude, dishonourable drunkards. Indeed, one of the most -gifted of our writers—Menshikoff—went very far in this respect, for -he wrote of the “blunted sense of duty, intemperance, moral laxity, -and inveterate laziness” of a large body of men who never spared their -lives and performed their duty almost religiously. In a diatribe -against military life by M. Kuprin, called “The Duel,” private soldiers -were represented as being treated with the greatest cruelty, and it was -implied that it was the custom for our officers to slap and beat their -men on company parades. The writer concluded by saying that the time -would come when the officers would be caught and beaten in byways, when -women would deride them, and soldiers refuse to obey their orders. In -the great family of officers—as in other classes—there are, of course, -bad specimens, but no generalization can be made from this as to the -class as a whole. If some officers were seen drunk on the lines of -communications or at Harbin, it is not fair to jump to the conclusion -that all officers got drunk. They should be judged after they have been -seen in action, in the trenches, and on the line of march, not only, as -they often were, by what happened in the rear. But it is much easier -to sit in St. Petersburg or Harbin and hurl abuse than it is to watch -matters at the front. I have alluded to the large proportion of killed -and wounded amongst the officers, which shows that their gallantry has -not grown less than it used to be, and they certainly looked after the -welfare of the soldier in a way that was unprecedented. The men were -fed, clothed, cheered up, and kept in good fettle. The junior officers -were zealous, soon found their feet under new and strange conditions, -and as they grew accustomed to the local topography, became good -map-readers. The most severe critic must acknowledge that the standard -of our officers, both staff and regimental, has been much raised since -the Russo-Turkish War. - -But, according to the opinion of these same observers, the private -soldier has, on the contrary, deteriorated during these twenty-seven -years, for, though a better man physically, he is morally a worse man -than he used to be. As I have remarked, the men with the colours were -quite reliable, but many of the reservists—especially the 2nd Category -men—required much supervision both in action and out of it, the most -difficult material to handle being that from the manufacturing centres -and large towns. Soldiers nowadays require more looking after than they -did formerly, when but few were literate. Up to the present, thank -God, our officers still have a good hold upon the men, based on mutual -respect; but great endeavours were made at the beginning of the war to -undermine this. - -Kirilloff and others have made a dead set against the behaviour of the -officers of our General Staff in the late war, but the majority worked -most unselfishly, and did good service commanding units or on the -staff. A large number distinguished themselves by their professional -zeal and gallantry, while some found a glorious death in action. At -their head may be mentioned General Kondratenko, the hero of Port -Arthur. Among the killed also were the gallant General Count Keller, -Staff-Officers Zapolski, Naumenko, Jdanoff, Pekuti, Vasilieff, Mojeiko; -and of those who died from wounds were Andreeiff and Yagodkin. Among -the wounded were four divisional commanders—Lieutenant-Generals -Rennenkampf and Kondratovitch, Major-Generals Laiming and Orloff; also -Staff-Officers Markoff, Klembovski, Gutor, Rossiski, Gurko, Inevski, -etc. Altogether, about twenty officers of the General Staff were -killed and forty wounded. The hostile attitude of the Press towards the -officers, the endeavour of divers persons to undermine their authority, -the indifference of the intelligent classes in Russia to what was -happening in Manchuria, and especially the anti-Government campaign, -which was conducted with the object of creating a mutiny among the -troops, was hardly calculated to raise the soldiers’ _moral_, or to -encourage them to perform acts of heroism. There was no military spirit -in the army. - - - _The Rank and File._ - -The rank and file, like the officers, were of two classes: those -serving with the colours, and the reservists. The former were in every -respect good; they were steady in action, enduring and well trained; -but the reservists were on a much lower plane altogether. In the first -place, the older men were unable to stand the arduous conditions of -field service, coupled with the rigours of the Manchurian climate. -They suffered greatly from sunstroke and heart affections when -marching among the hills, and during the hot weather. At the battles -of Ta-shih-chiao, Hai-cheng, and Liao-yang, these men fell out in -such numbers that their units became quite immobile, and absolutely -useless for any offensive operations. Moreover, the 2nd Category -reservists did not know the rifle, and had forgotten everything they -had once learnt when with the colours, and it required real hard work -to instruct and train them up to the level of the serving soldiers. I -have mentioned their unsteadiness. Units which were almost entirely -composed of these men—that is to say, those units which had been formed -by expanding the reserve regiments—were very unsatisfactory: it was -almost impossible to get them into action. The regiments of the 4th -Siberian Corps, which did so splendidly at Ta-shih-chiao, Hai-cheng, -and Liao-yang, were an exception; they were composed entirely of -Siberian reservists, who, though surly fellows and poor marchers, were -men of character and very steady in action. The drafts composed of -young soldiers were magnificent. Most of them had only just done their -recruits’ course, were single men, and possessed both staying power and -activity, and, being regular soldiers, were accustomed to field-service -conditions. Unfortunately, it was only after the battle of Mukden that -these drafts began to arrive. But these young soldiers who did so well -in small actions would have done still better in a decisive engagement. - -The general feeling of discontent which already prevailed in all -classes of our population made the war so hateful that it aroused -no patriotism whatever. Many good officers hastened to offer their -services—which was only natural—though all ranks of society remained -indifferent. A few hundreds of the common people volunteered, -but no eagerness to enter the army was shown by the sons of our -high dignitaries, of our merchants, or of our scientific men. -Out of the tens of thousands of students who were then living in -idleness,[24] many of them at the expense of the Empire, only a -handful volunteered,[25] while at that very time, in Japan, sons of -the most distinguished citizens—even boys fourteen and fifteen years -of age—were striving for places in the ranks. Japanese mothers, as I -have already said, killed themselves through shame when their sons were -found to be physically unfit for military service. The indifference -of Russia to the bloody struggle which her sons were carrying on—for -little-understood objects, and in a foreign land—could not fail to -discourage even the best soldiers. Men are not inspired to deeds of -heroism by such an attitude towards them on the part of their country. -But Russia was not merely indifferent. Leaders of the revolutionary -party strove, with extraordinary energy, to multiply our chances of -failure, hoping thus to facilitate the attainment of their own unworthy -ends. There appeared a whole literature of clandestine publications, -intended to lessen the confidence of officers in their superiors, -to shake the trust of soldiers in their officers, and to undermine -the faith of the whole army in the Government. In an “Address to the -Officers of the Russian Army,” published and widely circulated by the -Social Revolutionists, the main idea was expressed as follows: - - “The worst and most dangerous enemy of the Russian people—in - fact, its only enemy—is the present Government. It is this - Government that is carrying on the war with Japan, and you are - fighting under its banners in an unjust cause. Every victory - that you win threatens Russia with the calamity involved in the - maintenance of what the Government calls ‘order,’ and every - defeat that you suffer brings nearer the hour of deliverance. - Is it surprising, therefore, that Russians rejoice when your - adversary is victorious?” - -But persons who had nothing in common with the Social Revolutionary -party, and who sincerely loved their country, aided Russia’s enemies -by expressing the opinion, in the Press, that the war was irrational, -and by criticizing the mistakes of the Government that had failed -to prevent it. In a brochure entitled “Thoughts Suggested by Recent -Military Operations,” M. Gorbatoff referred to such persons as follows: - - “But it is a still more grievous fact that while our heroic - soldiers are carrying on a life-and-death struggle, these - so-called friends of the people whisper to them: ‘Gentlemen, - you are heroes, but you are facing death without reason. You - will die to pay for Russia’s mistaken policy, and not to defend - Russia’s vital interests.’ What can be more terrible than the - part played by these so-called friends of the people when they - undermine in this way the intellectual faith of heroic men who - are going to their death? One can easily imagine the state - of mind of an officer or soldier who goes into battle after - reading, in newspapers or magazines, articles referring in this - way to the folly and uselessness of the war. It is from these - self-styled friends that the revolutionary party gets support - in its effort to break down the discipline of our troops.” - -Reservists, when called out, were furnished by the anti-Government -party with proclamations intended to prejudice them against their -officers, and similar proclamations were sent to the army in Manchuria. -Troops in the field received letters apprising them of popular -disorders in Russia, and men sick in hospitals, as well as men on -duty in our advanced positions, read in the newspapers articles -that undermined their faith in their commanders and their leaders. -The work of breaking down the discipline of the army was carried -on energetically, and, of course, it was not altogether fruitless. -The ideal at which the leaders in the movement aimed was the state -of affairs brought about by the mutinous sailors on the battleship -_Potemkin_. These enemies of the army and the country were aided by -certain other persons who were simply foolish and unreasonable. One -can imagine the indignation that the M―s, the K―s, and the K―s would -feel if they were told that they played the same part in the army -that was played by the persons who incited the insubordination on the -_Potemkin_; yet such was the case. Firm in spirit though Russians might -be, the indifference of one class of the population, and the seditious -incitement of another, could hardly fail to have upon many of them an -influence that was not favourable to the successful prosecution of war. - -Commanding officers in the Siberian military districts reported, -as early as February, that detachments of supernumerary troops and -reservists had plundered several railway-stations, and later on regular -troops, on their way to the front, were guilty of similar bad conduct. -The drifting to the rear of large numbers of soldiers—especially -the older reservists—while battles were in progress was due not so -much to cowardice as to the unsettling of the men’s minds, and to a -disinclination on their part to continue the war. I may add that the -opening of peace negotiations at Portsmouth, at a time when we were -preparing for decisive operations, unfavourably affected the _moral_ of -the best in the army. - -M. E. Martinoff, in an article entitled “Spirit and Temper of the Two -Armies,” points out that - - “... even in time of peace, the Japanese people were so - educated as to develop in them a patriotic and martial spirit. - The very idea of war with Russia was generally popular, and - throughout the contest the army was supported by the sympathy - of the nation. In Russia, the reverse was true. Patriotism was - shaken by the dissemination of ideas of universal brotherhood - and disarmament, and in the midst of a difficult campaign - the attitude of the country toward the army was one of - indifference, if not of actual hostility.” - -This judgment is accurate, and it is evident, of course, that with -such a relation between Russian society and the Manchurian army it -was impossible to expect from the latter any patriotic spirit, or -any readiness to sacrifice life for the sake of the Fatherland. In -an admirable article, entitled “The Feeling of Duty and the Love of -Country,” published in the _Russki Invalid_ in 1906, M. A. Bilderling -expressed certain profoundly true ideas as follows: - - “Our lack of success may have been due, in part, to various - and complicated causes, to the misconduct of particular - persons, to bad generalship, to lack of preparation in the - army and the navy, to inadequacy of material resources, and to - misappropriations in the departments of equipment and supply; - but the principal reason for our defeat lies deeper, and is to - be found in lack of patriotism, and in the absence of a feeling - of duty toward and love for the Fatherland. In a conflict - between two peoples, the things of most importance are not - material resources, but moral strength, exaltation of spirit, - and patriotism. Victory is most likely to be achieved by the - nation in which these qualities are most highly developed. - Japan had long been preparing for war with us; all her people - desired it; and a feeling of lofty patriotism pervaded the - whole country. In her army and her fleet, therefore, every - man, from the Commander-in-Chief to the last soldier, not - only knew what he was fighting for, and what he might have - to die for, but understood clearly that upon success in the - struggle depended the fate of Japan, her political importance, - and her future in the history of the world. Every soldier - knew also that the whole nation stood behind him. Japanese - mothers and wives sent their sons and husbands to the war with - enthusiasm, and were proud when they died for their country. - With us, on the other hand, the war was unpopular from the - very beginning. We neither desired it nor anticipated it, - and consequently we were not prepared for it. Soldiers were - hastily put into railway-trains, and when, after a journey that - lasted a month, they alighted in Manchuria, they did not know - in what country they were, nor whom they were to fight, nor - what the war was about. Even our higher commanders went to the - front unwillingly, and from a mere sense of duty. The whole - army, moreover, felt that it was regarded by the country with - indifference; that its life was not shared by the people; and - that it was a mere fragment, cut off from the nation, thrown to - a distance of 6,000 miles, and there abandoned to the caprice - of Fate. Before decisive fighting began, therefore, one of - the contending armies advanced with the full expectation and - confident belief that it would be victorious, while the other - went forward with a demoralizing doubt of its own success.” - -Generally speaking, the man who conquers in war is the man who is -least afraid of death. We were unprepared in previous wars, as well -as in this, and in previous wars we made mistakes; but when the -preponderance of moral strength was on our side, as in the wars with -the Swedes, the French, the Turks, the Caucasian mountaineers, and -the natives of Central Asia, we were victorious. In the late war, for -reasons that are extremely complicated, our moral strength was less -than that of the Japanese; and it was this inferiority, rather than -mistakes in generalship, that caused our defeats, and that forced us -to make tremendous efforts in order to succeed at all. Our lack of -moral strength, as compared with the Japanese, affected all ranks of -our army, from the highest to the lowest, and greatly reduced our -fighting power. In a war waged under different conditions—a war in -which the army had the confidence and encouragement of the country—the -same officers and the same troops would have accomplished far more -than they accomplished in Manchuria. The lack of martial spirit, of -moral exaltation, and of heroic impulse, affected particularly our -stubbornness in battle. In many cases we did not have sufficient -resolution to conquer such antagonists as the Japanese. Instead of -holding with unshakable tenacity the positions assigned them, our -troops often retreated, and in such cases our commanding officers of -all ranks, without exception, lacked the power or the means to set -things right. Instead of making renewed and extraordinary efforts to -wrest victory from the enemy, they either permitted the retreat of -the troops under their command, or themselves ordered such retreat. -The army, however, never lost its strong sense of duty; and it was -this that enabled many divisions, regiments, and battalions to -increase their power of resistance with every battle. This peculiarity -of the late war, together with our final acquisition of numerical -preponderance and a noticeable decline of Japanese ardour, gave us -reason to regard the future with confidence, and left no room for doubt -as to our ultimate victory. - -In both Russian and foreign papers numerous articles have appeared -in which the Commander-in-Chief has been accused of a lack of -determination in the conduct of various battles. Without any real -basis for their statements, critics have represented that orders to -retire were for some unknown reason more than once given by him at a -moment when victory lay in our hands. Comments upon his indecision and -frequent change of orders were so common that the idea became universal -that it was Kuropatkin, and Kuropatkin alone, who prevented the army -and corps commanders from defeating the enemy. - -My first three volumes supply the answer to the most serious of these -accusations: in them are described the tremendous efforts we had to -make to prevent our operations ending worse than they did. I have never -been one of those who believe that an order once given should not be -countermanded or modified. In war circumstances change so quickly, and -information received so frequently turns out to be false, that it would -be fundamentally unsound to insist, in spite of changed conditions, on -keeping exactly to an order once issued. An excellent example of this -is given by the operations at Hei-kou-tai. The order received by the -officer commanding the 1st Siberians to rest his troops on January 27, -and to occupy the line Hei-kou-tai–Su-ma-pu–Pei-tai-tzu, was founded -on the incorrect supposition of the commander of the 2nd Manchurian -Army that San-de-pu had been captured. The former was more than once -told not to attack. Yet, even though news was received that San-de-pu -had not been taken, he insisted in carrying out the orders given, in -which, by a mistake, a village held in force by the enemy was appointed -as our halting-place. The result is known: we fought all day, lost -7,000 men, and at daybreak on January 28 were compelled to retire. -With regard to the accusation that the late Commander-in-Chief[26] -constantly countermanded his own orders, it is interesting to note that -General Grippenberg, in his article, “The Truth about the Battle of -Hei-kou-tai,” points out that, although he did not agree with him as to -the necessity for retiring the right flank of the 2nd Army to take up -a more concentrated position, he did not express this opinion to the -Commander-in-Chief, because he and all his staff knew that Kuropatkin -would never countermand an order once given. - -Upon the point as to whether we might have defeated the Japanese at -Liao-yang or Mukden we shall remain unenlightened, in spite of the -publication of my book, till we know in detail the actual movements of -the Japanese in these actions. As regards Liao-yang, I can only express -my personal opinion. An important decision, such as that leading to -an order for troops to retire, cannot be given upon the inspiration -of a moment. All the attendant circumstances have to be taken into -account—the results of the previous engagements; the physical and -mental condition of the troops; the strength and dispositions of the -enemy; the results which he may attain if the fight is continued; the -reports from the front, flanks, and rear; the extent to which the -reserves have been depleted, their readiness for action; the amount of -ammunition in hand, etc. At the battle of Liao-yang Kuroki’s army, in -addition to Nodzu’s, might easily have been pushed across to the right -bank of the Tai-tzu Ho, just as the Japanese boldly threw the greater -part of Oku’s army, in addition to Nogi’s, across on to the right bank -of the Hun Ho at Mukden. This was all the more possible because our -attempt to assume the offensive with the troops stationed on the left -bank on September 2 ended disastrously. If there is no hope of worsting -an enemy by an offensive counter-stroke, it is very important for a -defending force, circumstanced as we were,[27] to retire in good time, -and not to hold on until an orderly retirement becomes impossible to -carry out. We retired under very difficult conditions along roads deep -in mud, but not a single trophy was left behind, not a prisoner, not a -gun, not a transport cart. - -If we had delayed a single day, our retirement might have resembled -that of the 2nd and 3rd Armies, which were in so awkward a plight at -Mukden. For the reasons explained in my third volume, the 2nd Army was, -on March 7, almost surrounded on flanks and rear. Great efforts were -necessary in order that we might extricate ourselves from the position -in which we were placed without being utterly defeated. But these -efforts were not made, and the situation of our whole force on March 7, -8, and 9 became worse, and the danger of a considerable part of the 2nd -Army being surrounded by Nogi’s troops still more imminent. Comparing -the condition of our men with that of the Japanese on March 7 and 8, as -well as the positions occupied by the two forces on the 8th, and taking -into account the moral superiority of the Japanese, I should have given -up hope of a victorious issue from the battle on the 7th and 8th, and -have arranged for a retirement to Tieh-ling before the army became -disorganized. The future historian will probably accuse me of having -held on too long. I did not give the order to retire till March 10, and -according to events and the opinion of my staff, the order should have -been given a day earlier. If we had retired on the 9th, the army would -probably have fallen back in complete order without losing anything -(except wounded); indeed, we might have taken with us a fairly large -number of prisoners and captured guns and machine-guns. In my report -upon the battle of Mukden to His Majesty the Tsar, I acknowledged that -I was primarily responsible for our reverse, and admitted that I should -have more accurately gauged the difference between the men of the two -forces and the qualifications of the commanders, and that I should -have been more careful in making my decisions. Hoping against hope to -defeat the enemy, despite the disastrous operations of the 2nd Army, -between March 2 and 7, I gave the order to retreat too late. I should -have abandoned all hope of eventual victory at Mukden a day sooner than -I did, and our withdrawal would have been effected in good order. Thus, -the general conclusion regarding the battles of Liao-yang and Mukden -could, in my opinion, be expressed as follows: If we had retired from -Liao-yang a day later than we did, the result would have been much the -same as at Mukden; if we had retired from Mukden a day sooner, the -result would have been much the same as at Liao-yang.[28] - -I might also have been blamed for not holding on longer to Tieh-ling -and fighting there, and for ordering the troops to retire on to the -Hsi-ping-kai position. My reply is given in detail in my third volume. -It is sufficient to say here that, when it was decided to retire from -Tieh-ling on March 12 and 13, according to the officers commanding -those units of the 2nd and 3rd Armies which suffered most in the battle -of Mukden, we only had an effective strength of 16,390 rifles in 114 -battalions.[29] If I had accepted battle there under such conditions, -it would have been most dangerous, as we might have completely lost the -cadres of many units. How long it would have taken us to re-form for -a new battle can be judged from the fact that the officer commanding -the 3rd Army stated before a committee assembled as late as May 17 -[two months after the retreat] that he thought the acceptance of a -general action even then on the Hsi-ping-kai position itself was -inadvisable.[30] - -I will bring the present chapter to a close by quoting literally my -farewell address to the officers of the 1st Manchurian Army. In this -address, with fresh impressions of all that we had gone through and had -actually felt during the war, I outlined those of our defects which -prevented us defeating the enemy in the time at our disposal. But while -indicating our weaknesses, I also brought out the strong points of -the troops which I had commanded—points which gave every reason for a -belief that we should have won in the end. - - -“_To the Officers of the 1st Manchurian Army._ - -“In a few days the 1st Manchurian Army will be broken up, and I must -now bid farewell to the glorious troops which I have had the great -honour to command for two years. Upon you fell the arduous duty, in -the beginning of the war, of withstanding the attack of a numerically -superior enemy, so as to gain time for our reinforcements coming from -Russia to concentrate. You had the good fortune to be present at -the battles of the Ya-lu, Te-li-ssu, Ta-shih-chiao, Yang-tzu Ling, -Lang-tzu-shan, and also at the long-drawn struggles of Liao-yang, the -Sha Ho, and Mukden, and by your conduct during those fights you earned -the praise of the rest of the army. - -“With a comparatively weak establishment of five and a half corps (160 -battalions), or an average fighting strength of 100,000 rifles and -2,200 officers, the 1st Manchurian Army lost up to March 14, 1905: - - Officers. Rank and File. - Killed 395 10,435 - Wounded 1,773 56,350 - -or a percentage of killed and wounded amongst the officers of 91, and -amongst the rank and file of 67, per cent. of the average war strength. -In the independent units the losses in killed and wounded were: - - Officers. Rank and File. - 34th East Siberian Rifle Regiment 89 3,243 - 36th East Siberian Rifle Regiment 73 2,531 - 3rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment 102 2,244 - 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment 61 2,170 - 23rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment 50 2,290 - 1st East Siberian Rifle Regiment 71 1,920 - -“The particularly gallant conduct in action of the officers is apparent -from the fact that the percentage of killed and wounded is considerably -higher than that of the men, while many single units proved that it -is possible to continue fighting after a loss of two-thirds of the -fighting strength. And yet, despite these sacrifices, despite all our -efforts, we were unable to beat the enemy. Undoubtedly we had to fight -against a very brave, energetic, and most martial foe. So careless were -the Japanese of life that they piled the bodies of their comrades on -our obstacles, and endeavoured to reach our positions by climbing over -these masses of corpses. For a long time also they were able to bring -superior forces against us. But we became tempered by misfortune, and -gained wisdom by experience, and our numbers grew until we finally -became so strong in mind and spirit last summer that victory seemed -assured. - -“The intervals of comparative peace between the great battles were -employed in strengthening the army, and many positions up to and -including Mukden were fortified with immense trouble. After that battle -the defence of the left flank of the whole force was entrusted to -you, and three very strong defensive lines were constructed by your -labours up to the River Sungari. These lines, particularly the first -and second, were, on account of their fortifications and the nature -of the ground, in every way suited either for a desperate defence or -for the attack. Although our army was not quite ready to assume the -offensive by last May, it would have welcomed orders to advance. The -enemy, shaken by their losses at Mukden, kept their positions for -six months, and waited for us to move forward. We inaugurated many -improvements based upon our previous experiences in the war, and the -tactical training of the troops made immense progress. We not only -filled up our weakened ranks by means of the drafts which reached us, -but expanded all the rifle regiments into four battalions. In the way -of reinforcements, the 1st Army received the 53rd Infantry Division, -the Cossack Infantry Brigade, and the Don Cossack Division. - -“The firing-line of the 1st Army was in August last stronger than it -was at the beginning of the war, before the September battles on the -Sha Ho, and, thanks to the great exertions of those in command, and -the unselfish work of the medical services, the health of the army -remained excellent throughout. It was, indeed, fortunate, for if any -great sickness had broken out we should, owing to the few drafts -then arriving, only have had very weak cadres for the field. It was -absolutely essential, therefore, that no expense or efforts should be -spared in order to keep every man fit for the ranks, and I am happy -to say that our common efforts met with unusual success, for our -losses from sickness were less than in killed and wounded. In the 1st -Manchurian Army we had lost up to August 14, 1905, 2,218 officers and -66,785 other ranks killed and wounded in action, and 2,390 officers and -58,093 other ranks from sickness. I draw your attention to the fact -that while the percentage of losses from action should naturally be -higher among the officers than the men, they ought, on account of their -better living, to lose less from sickness. The converse was the case -with us, which shows that our officers were not sufficiently hardy, -and did not know how to preserve their health. To this we must pay -particular attention. - -“In material matters the army was also excellently situated in August. -Clothing and equipment of all sorts were on the spot and plentiful, -while all technical supplies had accumulated. Never have we been such -a formidable force in every sense as we had become by the summer of -1905, when we were suddenly informed of the unhappy negotiations -at Portsmouth, and that peace had been concluded. Doubtless this -was necessitated by the state of the interior of Russia; but it was -heart-breaking for the army. I remember with what grief the news was -received by all ranks. Life seemed to die out of our bivouacs, and all -our minds were filled by one sad thought—that the war had ended before -the enemy had been beaten. Looking back on the trials we have recently -gone through, we can find consolation in the feeling that we have done -our duty to Tsar and country as far as has lain in our power; but for -many reasons the time given us has turned out to be insufficient. These -reasons we must fearlessly search out, and discover what—beyond mere -numerical inferiority—prevented our success before peace was concluded. -Before all others, I, your senior commander, am guilty because I did -not succeed in rectifying our many moral and material defects during -the war, and in making the most of the undoubted strong points of our -troops. The material defects are known to all of us—the small number -of rifles in the firing-line per company [partly owing to lack of care -to put as many men as possible into action], the insufficiency [at the -beginning] of mountain artillery, the lack of high explosive shells, -of machine-guns, and of technical stores of all sorts. By last August -the majority of these deficiencies had, through the great exertions -of the War Ministry, been made good. Our moral defects I attribute to -the different standards of training among the troops, their inferior -technical preparation, and the great numerical weakness of units in -action. We also suffered much from inadequate reconnaissance of the -enemy’s position before a battle, and the resulting vagueness as to -how to conduct the action [particularly in the attack]; and, most -important, from the lack of initiative and independent thought in -individual commanders, the absence of the military spirit in officers -and men, of dash, of mutual co-operation between units, and of a -general determination to carry out a task to a finish at any sacrifice. -The tendency to accept defeat too soon—after only the advanced troops -had suffered—and of retiring instead of repeating the attack and -setting an example, was highly detrimental. Such retirement, instead of -calling forth increased efforts from the neighbours, in most cases only -served as a signal for their own retreat. - -“Generally speaking, there was in all ranks a great dearth of men -of strong military character, with nerves tough enough to enable -them to stand the strain of an almost continual battle lasting for -several days. It is evident that neither our educational system nor -our national life during the last forty to fifty years has been of -a nature to produce men of strong independent characters, or more -would have appeared in our army when wanted. Now the Tsar has given -us the blessing of freedom. The nation has been released from the -leading-strings of a bureaucracy, and can now develop freely, and -direct its energies to the good of the country. Let us hope that this -blessing of freedom, coupled to a well-thought-out system of education, -will raise the material and moral forces of the Russian nation, -and produce in every sphere of national activity stalwarts who are -enterprising, independent, possessed of initiative, and strong in body -and soul. By an infusion of such the army will be enriched. But it is -not possible for the army idly to await results which are the work of a -generation. Knowing now our strong and weak points, we can, and ought -to, start on self-improvement without delay. The war has brought out -many men [especially amongst all ranks of the 1st Army], from modest -company officers up to corps commanders, on whose energy, zeal, and -ability the Russian nation can rely; and I notice with pleasure that -not a few of those amongst the 1st Army have received good appointments -in the Far East and in Russia. This should serve as a fresh proof that -the Tsar is diligently watching our efforts, and is losing no time in -employing the most worthy of you to the advantage of the whole army. - -“You have first-hand knowledge of the difficult conditions generally -under which war is now conducted, and of the moral and physical effort -that is required to carry on an almost continuous battle for several -days. You also know by experience the exact value in action of all -kinds of technical equipment. All this makes it necessary for you -to endeavour to perfect yourselves. With the exception of the cadet -corps, our schools take no pains about the physical development of -children; consequently, many of our officers, as was evident in the -war, are physically feeble. Pay attention to gymnastics, to fencing, -to singlesticks, and to musketry. An officer should not be a mere -spectator of the physical exercises of the men—a thing I have often -noticed—but should himself set the example to those under him. - -“The relations between officers and men have always been of the -closest. Like fathers to the men, our officers have won their -affectionate respect. Remember that to our soldiers the word -‘father-commander’ is not merely an empty phrase; they believe in it. -Remember, also, that a commander only wins the heart of his soldiers -when he is their father-commander. It is quite possible to be strict -and at the same time look after the men’s welfare, for our soldiers are -not afraid of severity, but respect it; in the majority of cases a just -severity is a deterrent against crime. But the simple-minded soldier -is particularly sensitive to injustice, and soon sees through any -deceit practised on him. You who shared with the men all the hardships -and dangers of field service are very favourably situated. The men -having seen you in action—always in your place, giving an example of -unselfishness—will forgive much, and will follow you through fire and -water. These links which bind the ranks must be carefully maintained, -and officers who have been in the field with units must not be removed -from them unless absolutely necessary. Guard the military traditions -acquired by regiments, and do your best to preserve the memory of the -gallant deeds done by companies, squadrons, or batteries collectively, -or by individual members of them. Keep in close touch with the private -soldier; try to win his full confidence. You will gain it by your -constant care of and your affection for him; by your strict, and at the -same time fatherly, relations to him; by knowing your work; and by your -own example. Only by these will you be able to take advantage of all -his good points, to correct his defects, and guard him from the harmful -influences which will be more numerous in the future than ever. The -recent cases of military mutinies should be constantly in our memories. -I turn to you officers in command of regiments in particular. You know -the great responsibility which falls upon you in action. How often has -the issue of the battle depended on the way a regiment has been led. It -has often been enough for an energetic, gallant, capable man to get the -command of a regiment to change its character utterly. The selection -of men for these appointments must, therefore, be carefully made, and -those chosen must work incessantly to educate all those under them. - -“Up to the present our regimental commanders have, unfortunately, been -too much taken up with routine and office work, and have been unable to -give sufficient time to the practical military side of their duties, -to that intercourse between officers and men which is so valuable. -Some seem to think that their chief duty is to look after such details -as the colour and the repainting of the transport carts, and not the -training of the men. The constant strain of how to make both ends meet -with the money granted, how to maintain the clothing and other funds, -has increased to such an extent, and worries some commanders so much, -that they scarcely get to know their own officers, and do positive -harm to their men by trying to increase funds at the expense of their -rations, and therefore of their health. In the late war the Supply -Department carried out their difficult duties so well that they have -proved that they deserve to be implicitly trusted in peace-time; we can -therefore give over to this department much of the work of supplying -the troops (clothing, equipment, transport, food). Then regimental and -company commanders will stand out as real flesh and blood commanders -in the true sense, and will cease to be “office” automatons and mere -inspectors of stores and depôts, and the work of training and education -will progress. - -“I would invite the special attention of all commanding officers to the -necessity for thoroughly studying the characters of those under them. -With us, men of independent character and initiative are rare. Search -out such men, encourage them, promote them, and so encourage the growth -of the qualities which are essential for all soldiers. Men of strong -individuality are with us, unfortunately, often passed over, instead of -receiving accelerated promotion. Because they are a source of anxiety -to some officers in peace, they get repressed as being headstrong. -The result is that they leave the service, while others, who possess -neither force of character nor convictions, but who are subservient, -and always ready to agree with their superiors, are promoted. Remember -how much our inattention to the opinions and evidence of those under us -has cost us. - -“The greater part of the 1st Army is to remain in the Far East, and I -am convinced that the glorious Siberian regiments of the 1st Manchurian -Army, which have been such a tower of strength in action, will now, -under the new conditions of peace, still be Russia’s bulwark in that -quarter. - -“In bidding you farewell, my dear comrades in the field, I sincerely -hope that the war experience you have gained will be of great advantage -to the army and the country. Devoted to Crown and country, always -ready to maintain law and order, and to uphold the authority of the -Government, holding yourselves aloof from the intrigues of political -parties, and knowing your own weak and strong points as shown up -by the struggle we have all been through, you will, I believe, -quickly heal your wounds, and lead the army in its struggle towards -perfection. Although in the future you may be denied the recollection -of victories won, you can remember—and this should be a consolation -and an encouragement—that you were ready, without fear of sacrifice, -to continue the struggle with the gallant enemy till you had beaten -him. You, officers, believed that you would win, and you succeeded in -instilling this belief into our grand soldiers. - -“May God assist you in the duties that lie before you, which are as -important for our dear country as any we have already performed, even -though they be in peace. Farewell. Accept my sincere gratitude for -all your self-denying service in the field, and express to the men my -thanks for their services, and for the many proofs they have given of -devotion and loyalty to the Tsar and Fatherland. - - “SHUAN-CHEN-PU, - “_February 18, 1906_.” - - - - - CHAPTER XI - - Suggested measures for the improvement of the senior - ranks; for the improvement of the regulars and - reservists; for the reorganization of the reserve troops; - for increasing the number of combatants in infantry - regiments—Machine-guns—Reserve troops—Troops on the - communications—Engineers—Artillery—Cavalry—Infantry—Organization - generally. - - -Our recent experiences have furnished ample material by which we may -be guided in our efforts to improve the war training and increase -the efficiency of our forces. The War Ministry, assisted by officers -who served in Manchuria, and by articles which have appeared in the -military Press, has already embarked upon numerous reforms. I shall -here merely express my own opinion upon the points I consider most -important, and which should be settled first of all. Amongst these are -measures for— - -1. The improvement of the senior ranks. - -2. The improvement of the regular soldiers and reservists. - -3. Reforms in the organization of the reserve troops. - -4. Increasing the number of actual combatants in our infantry regiments. - -5. Enlarging the war establishment of regiments, brigades, divisions, -and corps, and, by means of decentralization, making them more -independent. - -As regards the first: Our three wars of the last fifty years have -disclosed many shortcomings in our officers. Most of these have -undoubtedly been due to the undeveloped state of the nation, and to -the general conditions of life and labour, which have affected the -army as an integral part of the whole population. Any serious attempt -to improve our officers as a body, therefore, is only likely to be -successful if and when a general improvement sets in in our social -conditions. It has pleased the Tsar to inaugurate many fundamental -reforms for the betterment of the civil status of all classes of our -population in every walk of life, and reforms in the officer class -should be instituted at the same time. - -Why is it that, with so many capable, keen, and intelligent men as -we possess among our junior officers and those in comparatively -subordinate positions, we have so few original-minded, keen, and -competent seniors? As I have said, the standard of all ranks of the -army entirely depends on that of the nation. With the growth of the -moral and mental faculties of the people at large there will be a -corresponding growth in that of the military class; but so long as -the nation suffers from a paucity of well-informed, independent, and -zealous men, the army cannot well be expected to be an exception. If -the uniform attracted the pick of the population, out of a nation of -many millions, however backward, there would be at least hundreds of -the very best men—in every sense—quite capable of commanding troops in -war. It would therefore seem necessary— - -1. To adopt a military uniform such as will attract the flower of our -youth. - -2. To insist that the best of those privileged to wear the uniform -should serve in the army, and there acquire the military knowledge and -strength of character necessary for war. - -[Illustration: GENERAL GRIPPENBERG.] - -In the first of these two particulars we have succeeded, for in -Russia the military uniform has been particularly honoured for years; -but we have by no means approached near the second desideratum. The -majority of the best men wearing military uniform have not only never -served in the army, but are absolutely unconnected with it. In the -eighteenth century a custom crept in of dressing the sons of grandees -in military clothes, and they could get promotion at an age when they -were riding toy horses round drawing-rooms. Then, little by little, -military uniform, military rank, even that of General, ceased to become -the absolute prerogative of the army, or, indeed, to denote any -connection with war. The members of the Church were the only people -not arrayed in it. Members of the Imperial Council, Ambassadors, -Senators, Ministers of the different departments and their assistants, -Governor-Generals, Governors, Mayors, Superintendents of Police, -officials in the various Government departments and in the military -institutions, all wore military uniform, and were graded in different -ranks. With few exceptions, all that they had to do with the army was -to be a source of weakness to it. Amongst the many names in the long -list of generals, only a few belong to officers on the active list, -and, what is worse, those who are serving in the army get superseded -in rank by, and receive less emoluments than, those who are not. -Consequently, the best elements in the service are naturally anxious -to leave. The posts of Minister of the Interior, of Finance, of Ways -and Communications, of Education, and of State Control, used to be held -by generals and admirals, as well as the appointments of Ambassador -at Constantinople, Paris, London, and Berlin. Service uniforms were -therefore conspicuous at all diplomatic and ministerial gatherings. -Military clothes also had a great attraction for other departments, and -several of them tried to assimilate their uniforms as much as possible -to those of army officers. The worst offender in this respect was the -Ministry of the Interior, which adopted a uniform for police-officers -and even for constables which could hardly be distinguished from that -worn by military officers. The private soldiers were naturally unable -to make anything of this multitude of uniforms, and never knew whom to -salute or obey; indeed, the police-officers’ great-coats and caps with -cockades were enough to puzzle the most discriminating. This all seems -incomprehensible; but the ambition to wear military uniform is easily -explained. It is largely due to the ignorance of the people. Not long -ago, anyone wearing even a hat with a cockade was taken in the country -for a person in authority; caps were doffed to him, and in winter -heavily laden sledges would be turned into snow-drifts to give him the -road, while his vulgar abuse would be patiently accepted. - -Thirty years ago, when a young officer, I spent about a year on -service with the French in Algiers, and travelled a great deal. I was -astonished to find that it was found convenient, even under republican -rule, to keep to a system of semi-military government for the native -population—Arabs and Kabyles. It was, in this case, entrusted mainly to -army officers, and those civilians who were also appointed had to adopt -a uniform similar to that worn by the military. These officials told -me in all seriousness that their spurs and the gold braid round their -caps assisted them in their dealings with the Arabs, in collecting -taxes, settling land questions, and other matters. It was so in our -case. Undoubtedly the wearing of military clothes did facilitate the -difficult work which our police-officers have to do; but a great -change has recently come over the country, and a uniform alone is not -now enough to command obedience. It is sometimes a drawback, if not a -danger. It is, of course, to be hoped that such an unnatural state of -affairs will not last; but it is very desirable to take advantage of -the present indifference displayed by the civil population to uniform -to take it from all who are not actually serving in the army. The -time has come when the prestige appertaining to our uniform should be -restored, and the status of those serving in the army should be raised. - -With the same object in view, we must continue to try and improve the -material position and prospects of the corps of officers. An important -matter, and one to which I have given much attention—so far without -entire success—is that service on the staff, in offices and in branches -of the War Department, should not pay better than service with the -troops. Many of the officers now so employed in semi-civil duties can -well be replaced by civilian officials. It is, moreover, essential that -service in the Frontier Guards, in the Customs, police, gendarmerie, -on the railway, and as tax-collectors, should cease to be financially -preferable to service in the army. - -As senior officers get on in the service, they must not be allowed to -forget what they have previously learnt, a thing which is now only -too common. It is essential that they should be practised in peace -in commanding troops, and not be mere administrators, inspectors, -spectators, and umpires. They should therefore be in a position to -spend most of their time with troops in the field and in cantonments. -With our military system the command of troops is at present almost -entirely in the hands of the regimental, brigade, divisional, corps and -district commanders.[31] Thus our infantry and cavalry regiments used -to be under five masters. But, in the words of the proverb, too many -cooks spoil the broth, and in war all was not for the best in all our -regiments. Often while the ingredients and the fire left nothing to be -desired, the cooks did not know what to do. How can such a state of -things be explained? It will be said that the selection of commanders -was not always happy. That is true; but it must be remembered that -selections had to be made from those men who were qualified according -to the regulations and the reports drawn up by various commanding -officers. In some cases seniority was considered to be by itself -a qualification for promotion. Efforts of a sort were undoubtedly -made to get the best men we had, but they were insufficient. All -the commanders in the five degrees of our military hierarchy are so -occupied with their daily work of routine and correspondence, while -many are so overburdened with the administrative details of their -appointments, that they have little time to attend to the business of -actual war. Yet, as they get on in the service, more knowledge of war -is required of them. The short periods of concentration in summer, -with only a few days of instructional work on both sides, give little -practice in command, and at other times the number of responsible -duties connected with administration places that art on a far higher -plane than mere soldiering. And what is most important is that the -whole of our service—of our lives almost—is spent doing things which -do not go to form character. Of the five posts above mentioned, only -two—the divisional and corps commanders—are in any way independent, -and their occupants are immersed in office work. The relative amount -of time spent on the different sorts of duties tends to turn the -regimental commander into an administrator rather than a fighter, -while a brigade commander has absolutely no independence; in fact, his -absence or presence is scarcely noticed. Finally, the same tendency -to produce office men and bureaucrats is noticeable even in the work -of those on the highest rungs of the ladder—the general officers in -command of military districts. Instances might be multiplied of men -who, though long in charge of military districts, never once commanded -troops on manœuvres, and for several years never even got astride a -horse. How can this impossible state of affairs be remedied, and a body -of leaders, constantly practised in the execution of those duties in -command of troops that would be required of them in war, be formed? - - I. - -On active service the rôle of the regimental commander is both wide -and important. To issue successfully from the test of modern war, he -must have character, experience, and facility in manœuvring his unit -in the field, must know his men well, and therefore have found the -time both for intercourse with his officers and for perfecting himself -in his profession. In battle it is men he has to deal with, and not -files of papers and storehouses. But, situated as he is at present, he -is so overburdened with important administrative details that most of -his time is passed dealing with requisitions and inventories instead -of with flesh and blood. The penalties he incurs by neglect of his -administrative duties are far heavier and more tangible than those -incurred by neglecting the tactical training of his regiment. The -greater part of these duties—those such as are connected with clothing, -transport, and rationing—should be removed from his shoulders. He -should be made the controller of these sections of duty, and not the -person actually responsible. Nor is his position easy in respect -to the _personnel_. The great shortage of officers, especially in -those units quartered in inferior barracks, is the cause of many -difficulties. When mobilization is ordered, some of the already too -small number of officers are told off for the innumerable miscellaneous -duties and detachments; commanders of battalions and of companies are -interchanged; many of the men are transferred to other units, a mass -of reservists join, and, if there is not time for the new arrivals to -settle down with the few old hands, the commander has to lead into -action a regiment which he does not know, and which does not know -itself. Our mobilization schemes, therefore, require revision in this -respect, and every regiment should have in peace-time a permanent -establishment of officers and men who would accompany the regiment on -service. The company commanders in particular should not be removed -from their companies. But to make such an arrangement possible, it is -essential that one of the senior captains (who might be appointed to -the staff) should run the regimental school. It is also important to -keep the regimental commander as a man apart as far as possible; he -should be made to realize upon all occasions the peculiar importance of -the duties entrusted to him, and the respect due to himself personally -by reason of these duties. - - - II. - -In Manchuria, just as in the wars of the second half of last century, -the great value of the infantry brigade as an independent fighting -unit came out strongly in all the large battles; as also did the great -influence of its commander on the result of the fight. - -The advance and rear guards of army corps generally consisted of -brigades. A brigade commander usually began the attack; a brigade -commander usually finished it (by commanding the rearguard). And yet -the post of Brigadier is not considered one of importance; his powers -are insignificant, and his position does not allow him sufficient -independence to enable him to train either himself or his unit. -Divisional commanders and their chief staff-officers in peace-time -often ignore the brigadiers as if they were not wanted, and were fifth -wheels to the coach; and their absence for whole years, building -barracks and roads, etc., is not considered to have any adverse effect -on the successful training of the regiments under them. In such -circumstances even the zealous ones, and those anxious to do their -duty, become dulled, slack, and lose capacity for work. There can -be only one way out of this unnatural state of things, which, from -a military point of view, is most harmful: _brigade commanders must -in peace-time be given independent command of those units which they -will have to command independently in war_. This applies to cavalry as -well as to infantry. Every brigade should have a small staff such as -exists in independent brigades—namely, two adjutants, one an officer -of the General Staff for operations, and one for administration. Each -brigade commander should have powers in both these branches of their -duty equal to that now delegated to divisional commanders, while their -disciplinary powers should remain as at present. - - - III. - -Our divisional commanders are independent and in direct touch with -troops; but they also are overburdened with routine correspondence, -and as they are frequently appointed to command the summer camps, it -happens that they are more often present at the exercises of the troops -as spectators than actually in command. In field operations where -there are two sides, the divisional general rarely finds it possible -to take command of one, partly owing to an exaggerated idea of his -own abilities, and partly to the scarcity of officers of sufficient -seniority to be umpires. Consequently, he only gets practice in -commanding troops in the field during concentrations of large bodies -of men. This is not enough. Commanders of infantry divisions, in -particular, do not know nearly enough about the other arms, owing to -the little practice they get in commanding mixed forces. So, while -giving greater powers to brigade commanders, it will be also advisable -to delegate to divisional generals the powers now exercised by corps -commanders (with the exception of disciplinary powers). Divisional -commanders should always remember that the 16,000 rifles which they -command are a number that can decide the fate of any action. With the -inclusion, in divisions, of artillery, sapper, and cavalry units, -exceedingly instructive exercises can be arranged within these units -both in summer and winter, and the troops and their commanders thereby -trained for war under modern war conditions. The four[32] officers of -the General Staff who would be with each division should be relieved of -all routine, except that relating to operations, and they should devote -the whole of their time and energies to preparing work for the brigade -and divisional commanders in the training of the troops for battle. - - - IV. - -Army corps commanders are quite independent, but, like the divisional -commanders, are overburdened with routine correspondence, etc., and do -not get sufficient practice in commanding troops in the field. Some, -during a tour of duty of several years, have never commanded troops -on manœuvres; and it is impossible for all of them to have sufficient -acquaintance with cavalry, as some corps do not include this arm. -They and their staff, especially the General Staff officers, have no -practice at all, or else very little, in the use of technical equipment -and the modern aids to warfare (telegraphs, telephones, mines, motors, -balloons, etc.). The experience of the late war showed up the necessity -of increasing the establishment of the army corps, and the actions -of their commanders will have such an important, and in many cases -deciding, influence, that extremely careful selection is necessary for -these posts; the men appointed must be capable of teaching others as -well as of learning themselves. As with the divisional generals, so -should the powers of corps commanders be extended at the expense of -those now exercised by officers in command of military districts. - - - V. - -The commanders of military districts are the senior officers actually -in charge of troops, and have at the same time important duties as -administrative heads of districts. Here again administrative work, -together with correspondence connected with the troops, occupies the -greater part of their time, and only in exceptionally favourable -circumstances (the large manœuvres with concentrations of troops from -different districts) can they get any practice in commanding in the -field. But as they also have to perform the duties of Governor-General, -they are not able to devote sufficient time to the troops, even in -inspecting them, or to improving themselves. I am absolutely convinced -that, however much such a combination of two appointments—each of which -requires a man of exceptional ability and character—may be desirable -from the political point of view, it has the gravest disadvantages for -the army. There is a limit to human power. As our governor-generals -devote the greater part of their time and energies to civil matters, -they entrust a large part of their military duties to the chief -staff-officers of the districts. It can easily be understood that such -an arrangement is not in the interests of the army. For instance, the -most important military district—that of Warsaw—was, as far as the army -was concerned, neglected in the time of several governor-generals. -Indeed, at one time, much to the subversion of the authority of -officers in command of districts and corps, the troops in this area -were controlled by the chief of the district staff! Therefore, if -we wish that the commanders of military districts—our most natural -selections for the command of armies in war—should have time to prepare -themselves for this important duty, _we should free them from civil -duties_; otherwise we shall get no improvement. They must also be -relieved of the numerous and responsible cares with respect to all -those questions which in war mainly fall to the officer in command of -the communications. - -The inspection of hospitals, of supply depôts, engineer and artillery -units, of parks, of offices—everything that takes too much time -from the exercises for the actual training of the troops and of -themselves—should be eliminated from their duties. These have become -so heavy with the complications of modern war, and are fraught with -such importance to army and country, that the men who will have to -perform them must unceasingly prepare themselves in peace; but, for -the reasons I have already given, few officers have time to follow up -the developments in their profession. That is why in the recent war -we were left behind in knowledge of the employment of artillery, of -the utility of the various technical means of intercommunication, in -appreciating relative value of different attack formations, etc. _Our -senior officers must be given_ _sufficient leisure, while improving -the troops under them, at the same time to improve themselves._ - - - IMPROVEMENT OF THE REGULARS. - -I have more than once pointed out how excellent the regulars were -as regards military qualifications, and how much more reliable in -the first fights than the reservists, especially the older ones. But -we must look to the nation itself for the cause of the shortcomings -of both. The lack of education in the peasant is reflected in the -private soldier, and the non-existence of a martial spirit amongst the -masses, coupled to the dislike for the war, resulted in the absence -of a military spirit in our troops in Manchuria. Their ignorance -made the conduct of modern war, which demands a much greater spirit -of combination and initiative from the individual than formerly, -very difficult for us. Consequently, while behaving with the utmost -gallantry when in close order—in mass—our men, when left to themselves -without officers, were more inclined to retire than to advance. In -the mass they were formidable; but very few of them were fit for -individual action, and this is a point in which the Japanese had a -great advantage. Their non-commissioned officers in particular were -better educated than ours, and on many prisoners—private soldiers -as well as non-commissioned officers—we found diaries written not -only grammatically, but with a general knowledge of what was going on -and of what the Japanese were trying to do. Many of them drew well. -One prisoner—a private—drew on the sand an excellent diagram of our -position and that of the enemy. - -It is never easy to turn in a short time an ignorant, illiterate -recruit into an intelligent and keen soldier, capable of individual -action; and the recent reduction[33] of the term of service has made -the task still harder. The greatest difficulty, however, is to get good -non-commissioned officers; even with the four to five year period with -the colours we were not able to do this satisfactorily. The mass of -our recruits are so illiterate, and so much book knowledge is required -in the schools from our non-commissioned officers, that there is a -natural tendency to pick the men for these posts on account of their -education and outward sharpness. This is a mistake, as these qualities -are often superficial. The simple recruits of the deepest and strongest -characters are usually slow and uncouth and do not shine externally; -consequently many of them never become selected for non-commissioned -rank, and finish their service as private soldiers. But a surly man -of some character often makes a better soldier than his smarter -comrade. With the reduced term of service we can do nothing without -a considerable number of time-expired men. The present conditions -under which these men are kept on in the ranks are sound enough, but -the men dislike doing time-expired, or what they characterize as -“mercenary,” service. We must get over this dislike, and therefore -as much as possible raise the position of sergeant-major and other -non-commissioned officers. - -Another burning question, and one with which we shall be confronted -more and more in the future, is how to keep the destructive tenets of -the revolutionary parties out of our barracks. Drastic action will of -course be taken, but if we do not succeed in crushing these parties -among the people, we can hardly expect to be able to keep the army from -infection. - -One of the most important requirements with our short term of service -is that our men should not be taken away from their work for police -duties. The part so frequently taken by the troops in putting down -civil disorders by force of arms is particularly harmful to discipline. -To turn to another point, owing to the inadequate funds allotted, our -soldiers have always been treated worse than those of other armies. -The Germans, for instance, spend twice as much per head upon the -maintenance of their army as we do. Some improvement in this direction -has already been made, especially in the feeding. With a serviceable -cadre of time-expired sergeant-majors and non-commissioned officers, -and with the living conditions of the men improved, we can face the -future calmly even with a three-year term of service. But we shall -only succeed if we relieve the troops of the large amount of extra -regimental work which falls to them (tailoring, shoemaking, and other -workshop work, care of reserve stores, etc.), and if we lighten their -guard duties. Our recruits are free from this work and from guards only -in the first year of service. - - - IMPROVEMENT OF THE RESERVISTS. - -Our infantry in the recent war can be classified in four groups, -according to the relative number of old regular soldiers and reservists: - -1. The East Siberian Rifle Regiments, which were maintained almost on a -war footing[34] in peace. - -2. The infantry in the 1st Brigades of the 31st and 35th Divisions, -which were filled up to war strength with regulars at the beginning of -the war. - -3. The infantry of the regular army corps brought up to war strength -with reservists. - -4. The infantry units formed from reserve troops. - -According to the opinion of competent officers who served in the war -(which I fully share), other conditions being equal, _the more regular -soldiers there were in a unit, the more it could be relied on in -battle_. The best troops we had were the East Siberian Rifle Regiments, -and after them the brigades of the 31st and 35th Divisions. In the case -of the army corps, which proceeded to the front direct from Russia, -sufficient care was not taken to regulate the proportion of regulars -to reservists. Some units—the 10th Army Corps, for instance—arrived at -the front 20 per cent. below strength in men, and more in officers. -In the first fight in which it was engaged, several companies of this -corps had only sixty regular soldiers—thirty trained men and thirty -recruits—who had not _even passed their recruit’s musketry course_. All -the remainder were reservists, among whom were a large number of 2nd -Category men. These regular units consequently were, to all intents and -purposes, nothing but reserve units. Finally, our reserve units arrived -almost without any permanent peace cadres, so swallowed up were they in -the great mass of reservists. In the early fighting these reservists, -particularly those of the 2nd Category, were vastly inferior to the -regulars; many of them took advantage of every opportunity to leave -the ranks with or without permission. There is little doubt that if -the war had been a national one, and if the country had supported its -sons at the front instead of doing the opposite, these men would have -done better in the first fights; but it is also quite certain that, -other conditions being equal, the man with the colours must be better -than the other as a soldier. He is not torn from his family at a time -when he has begun to think that his military liability is over; he is -better trained, and possesses _esprit de corps_. Therefore, the best -way of improving our infantry is to maintain it with a stronger peace -establishment than at present. - -In Manchuria a peace establishment of 100 men per company became -so weak from the various causes incidental to active service that -companies went into action with one-third regulars to two-thirds -reservists. Nominally regular forces, they were in reality more like -reserve troops. Regulars should be in the majority in every company, -but the great difficulties and expense of maintaining troops on a -strong peace footing compel us to pay special attention to the question -of improving our reserve men. Modern war must be fought mainly with men -temporarily called up from amongst the people. - -The only thing that will insure devotion to their country among -reservists proceeding to the front is the existence of a spirit of -patriotism in the nation. Discontent and feelings of oppression -among the people are naturally reflected in the minds of those of -them leaving for war. But, independent of such all-important general -considerations, there are certain definite things that can be taken to -improve the tone of the reservists. According to the present system, -when a man passes from the colours into the reserve his connection with -his own unit—in fact, with the Service generally—almost ceases. The -practice concentrations are not carried out on a large enough scale, -and though valuable, are often dispensed with altogether on account of -financial considerations. So it happens that a man passing into the -reserve takes his uniform with him, but, with rare exceptions, never -even wears his forage-cap; this he generally gives to some neighbour or -relation—hardly ever a soldier—to wear out. The reservist himself only -too gladly dons peasant’s clothes or other mufti; he is glad to feel -that he is a peasant again. He starts in business, takes up peaceful -occupations, and raises a family. When he reaches the age of forty, -he begins to put on flesh. And it is under these conditions that he -is suddenly torn from the bosom of his family, and sent to fight in a -strange, “hired”[35] land for a cause for which he feels no sympathy, -and which he does not understand. To this are added the general -discontent all around him, and a flood of revolutionary proclamations. -The separation of the reservist from all touch with the army once he -has left it does not tend to his rapid retransformation from “mujik” -into trained soldier. In the case of Manchuria he certainly became a -good man after some months in the school of war, but so long a period -of grace cannot be counted on in the future. - -Coming here into the heart of the country as I did nine months ago, and -staying here continuously, I have been in a position to observe our -reservists returning from the war. When the return stream first began -in March, April, and May, there were large numbers. Sometimes when I -passed they would fall in—in line—and receive me after the military -fashion. They wore fur caps, very often military great-coats, and -looked, as they were, a fine body of young soldiers. Nine months of -hard work in the fields soon turned them again into peasants, and now, -when they come to me, on business or otherwise, instead of saluting, -they take off their caps and call me “Barin.”[36] - -In Japan mothers counted it a dishonour if their sons were rejected as -medically unfit to go to the front. With us how different it was! Women -often came to thank me heartily for having “had pity” on their sons -and husbands, because these latter happened to have been told off for -duty with transport units or with hospitals, etc., instead of being -sent into action,[37] and they did the same when their men returned -safe and sound. In Japan, Germany, and other countries, some endeavour -is made in education to inculcate patriotism into the people. A love -of country and pride in the Fatherland is created in the children. As -has been said before, the schools in Japan do everything they can to -create and foster a martial spirit in the youth of the nation, and to -practise them in military matters. There and in other countries the -formation of various patriotic societies is approved, and all kinds of -physical sport are encouraged. The authorities are not afraid to issue -thousands of rifles to the people for rifle practice, etc. We do not do -this; we are afraid for political reasons. Little is done to inculcate -patriotism by education in our schools, and the great gulf between -Church, rural, and Government schools makes matters worse. Students in -the highest educational establishments have long ago abandoned study -for politics; it has for long been the fashion to abuse everything -Russian, and military service is thought to be dishonourable. Our -infantry soldier is undersized and overloaded; he is usually untidy, -often dirty, and wears an ugly and ill-fitting uniform. Is it a wonder -that, as he slouches along, he excites more pity than pride in the man -in the street? And yet it is on this undersized man that the integrity -of the Empire depends. Money is tight, as we all know, but still, we -do not keep the soldier clean and smart enough when he is serving, and -when we pass him into the reserve we give him a dress which he can -display with no pride to his neighbours or even his own family. Under -such conditions, how can we hope that he will then suddenly turn into a -martial warrior? - -Only by the reformation of our schools, and the introduction into the -life of the lower classes of reforms, which, besides increasing their -comfort, will develop in them a love for, and pride in, their country, -and a deep sense of the necessity for some sacrifice for it, shall we -get in the reserve a thorough soldier of the right sort. The attainment -of such a result cannot depend entirely on any actions of the War -Department, which must, after all, be secondary; but the things that -can be effected by it are nevertheless important, and I will enumerate -those which seem to be the most pressing. - -In an army discipline is the foundation of all efficiency; but to -maintain discipline in an army is impossible when the mass of the -nation have no respect for authority, and where the authorities -actually fear those under them. The term of service with the colours -is now so short that there is no time to overcome in the soldier -the disorderliness of the people from whom he comes, yet to effect -improvement in the reservist demands an iron military discipline. It -must not be allowed for a moment that a soldier need not be afraid of -his officer. The present greatest enemy to discipline is the employment -of soldiers in the political struggle now going on. On the one hand, -the force is corrupted by propaganda; on the other, men are taken -away from military duties and detailed for almost continual police -work, in putting down disorder not only of a military nature, such as -mutiny, where the situation can only be saved by the assistance of -reliable troops, but riots which should be dealt with by the police -and the gendarmes. Officers are taken away to sit on field courts,[38] -to judge, shoot, and hang political and other criminals. These duties -make the populace hate the troops, and among the soldiers who suffer -in killed and wounded it arouses a feeling of hatred not only for the -civilians who shoot at them, but against the officers who order them -to kill the civilians. The result is demoralizing to a degree. What -impression can the man passing into the reserve take home with him -if, during the two or three years of his colour service, he has been -“maintaining order” in various ways with the aid of his rifle? The -army can and must do all that is necessary to suppress mutinies, and -to break down all organized opposition, but it should then return at -once to its ordinary work. If this sort of duty becomes frequent, if -the soldier sees that the Government is powerless to restore order -even with the aid of troops, doubts will creep into his mind as to the -expediency of the Government’s policy and as to his own commanders. -According to what I hear, it seems that the heavy task which has -recently fallen to the lot of the army is now coming to an end, and -that order is beginning once more to be restored in our great country. -Please God may it soon be the case, as otherwise the force must -deteriorate instead of improving. - -Under ordinary conditions our work should tend to make the man passed -into the reserve arrive in his native village or town well disciplined, -knowing his work, taking a pride in his old corps, and respecting -those under whom he has served. We must therefore endeavour to prevent -him from losing touch with the Service and quickly forgetting what he -has learned in it. In some armies to obviate this they have what is -called the territorial system, by which reservists maintain touch -to the end of their term with those units in which they have served. -This system is not possible for us in its entirety, but it might be -applied partially and adopted on a fairly large scale. One of its great -advantages would be that reservists would on mobilization at once -join the units in which they had previously served. They would not be -strangers, but would be known to the cadre of time-expired, but still -serving, non-commissioned officers and the officers, and would soon -settle down. Men of the same district would be more inclined to hold -together under fire, and every man would feel that if he behaved badly -his comrade would send news of it to his home. Units territorially -connected with the people would be more dashing than corps collected -from anywhere. There would, of course, be many difficulties, which -would have to be overcome before the system could be adopted. For -instance, men taken from a certain locality would, if employed to -suppress disorders in that place, be more likely to waver than men from -another unit and district. Cases have been known where non-commissioned -officers who had been strict with their men have requested, on being -passed into the reserve, not to be sent off in the same compartment -of a train with their late subordinates, who had threatened to “make -things even” so soon as they both passed into the reserve together. -With us such a settling up of old scores might easily be effected under -a territorial system, by which both officers and soldiers would, after -their service, come together in one district. - -It must be more frequently impressed on the reservists that they still -are soldiers. Local concentrations should be organized for them so that -they may get some training, and these should be arranged at such a time -of the year as to interfere as little as possible with the crops. This -would vary, of course, according to locality. Our recruiting officers -are now mainly occupied, like everyone else, with office work; they -should be more in touch with the reservists, who should look to them -as their commanding officer, adviser, and protector. The relationship -now is too purely official. An important matter also is the division of -reservists in peace-time. In my opinion it is essential to have three -classes. For the first two years after the man leaves the colours he -should be considered on furlough; he should be made to wear uniform, -and always be ready to be recalled in case of partial or general -mobilization. The men of the last two classes should be on a different -footing, and should be used on mobilization to fill up services in -rear, hospitals, bakeries, parks, transport units, and to guard camps -on the communications, etc. - - - REFORMS IN THE ORGANIZATION OF THE RESERVE TROOPS. - -We have already seen (Chapter VI.) how, when the war began, we found -it necessary, in the absence of any assurance arranged by diplomacy -against other contingencies, to be ready for any military eventuality -on our Western frontier. Consequently, too great a number of reserve -units were included amongst the troops told off to take the field in -the Far East. Another reason for this was that we did not really know -the qualities of different sections of our army. Our crack troops, -taking both officers and men together, of three Guard and three -Grenadier divisions, six divisions in all, were left in European -Russia, while newly formed corps composed of reserve units were sent -into the field. I have already mentioned how my recommendation to -mobilize the reinforcements being sent to us immediately after Easter -was for various reasons rejected, how they were mobilized a month -later than they should have been, and arrived in Manchuria unsettled, -untrained, knowing scarcely anything of the new rifle, without having -fired a course of musketry, and not having done any combined tactical -operations with the other arms. - -The troops of the 6th Siberians, which certainly had been in camp for -a short time before starting, had not been given a gun or a squadron -to enable them to practise combined operations. Of the 4th Siberian -Corps, which mobilized under most favourable conditions, only the -Omsk Regiment had been trained in artillery, and this was of an old -pattern; yet it had to go into action with quick-firing guns. Cavalry -were hardly seen. Indeed, if we consider the haphazard selection of -commanding officers, the lack of any community of thought amongst the -officers generally, the almost complete absence of proper tactical -training, the large number of 2nd Category reservists, general dislike -of the war, and, finally, the absence of military spirit, it will be -evident why some units of the reserve troops failed. In the first -battles the troops of the 4th Siberian Corps won a good reputation in -the army. The reasons for this were: - -1. The splendid character of the men in them. Bluff, surly fellows of -Siberia, they were strong in body and stout of heart, and understood -better than others the reasons for which we were fighting in the Far -East. - -2. The careful selection of those in command. - -3. The bravery of the officers. - -4. The long time they had, compared with other troops, to train and -acquire cohesion. - -But, after the reserve troops which came out from European Russia had -received their baptism of fire, they also did well. It is sufficient -to call to mind the behaviour of the regiments of the 54th and 71st -Divisions at Mukden, as well as those of the 55th and 61st Divisions. -But this result was not reached till late, and cost many lives. In -a European conflict the fate of a campaign will be far more rapidly -decided than it was in Manchuria, for the first battles fought after -the declaration of hostilities will have a deciding influence. In the -recent war, owing to the slow concentration possible on a single-track -railway, the reserve troops might have been collected sooner and given -several months to settle down, and have thus arrived at the front more -ready for battle. In a European war they will have to be transported -into the theatre of operations in a very short time after mobilization. -We made a great mistake in forming the reserve troops into separate -army corps. In my opinion, it would have been much better to have -put them into existing corps—either as third divisions or separate -brigades. This would have improved our corps organization, which is too -unwieldy and too big for a strength of only twenty-four battalions. -With strong corps consisting of efficient self-contained brigades the -confusion of units in battle would be minimized. - -Before the war no army corps organization had been worked out for -the reserve troops; everything had been arranged for a divisional -organization. In my opinion, neither corps nor divisions are -necessary. It would be more advantageous to form the reserve units -into independent brigades of eight battalions, and to use them as army -troops, or possibly as corps troops. The mobilization of the reserve -artillery, sapper, and cavalry, should take place together with that of -the infantry. Every reserve brigade of eight battalions (8,000 rifles) -should have, with two batteries of twelve guns, one company of sappers -and one reserve squadron of cavalry or a _sotnia_ of Cossacks. This -arrangement would permit of reserve troops being employed on secondary -objects without the organization of the army being broken up, and it -would no longer be necessary to find so many divisional and corps -commanders, with their numerous staffs. - - - STEPS TO AUGMENT THE COMBATANT ELEMENT IN OUR INFANTRY. - -Amongst the causes of our disasters has been mentioned (Chapter -VI.) the small number of rifles per company we had in action as -compared with the Japanese. We often had more battalions than they, -but fewer men. The various reasons for this I have already enumerated. -To lessen the number of subsidiary duties which take men away from -the fighting-line of the regular army, we must create cadres for the -troops of the rear services; we must also arrange that the casualties -are quickly made good from the reserve troops, which should be kept -up permanently and closely connected with the regular troops. (Every -regular regiment should have one reserve or depôt battalion.) To -augment the numbers fighting compared with the numbers fed, and, in -particular, to increase the number of men in the firing-line, we must -bring up the combatant establishment of our companies from 220 to 250 -rifles. With 220 rifles on the roll of a company, we were never able -to put even 200 in action; and in bringing the strength of these units -up to 250, we must take steps to see that they all really can take the -field. According to the “War Establishments,” a line infantry regiment -has an establishment of 3,838 combatants and 159[39] non-combatants -(total 3,997), which gives 235 rifles per company. But in this -number are included 35 bandsmen, 33 drummers, 1 bugler, 3 regimental -quartermaster-sergeants, 1 sergeant-major of the non-combatant company, -5 baggage non-commissioned officers, and, moreover, another 240 (15 -per company) detailed for supply work, etc. Excluding these, 3,520 -combatants are left, which gives 220 per company; but experience has -shown that there is much leakage from this number. - -The peculiarities of Manchuria necessitated the employment of men on -duties that would have been quite unnecessary, or less necessary, in -a European war. Thus, in addition to the authorized transport, we had -pack transport, which swallowed up fifty men per regiment. The large -herds of cattle with regiments required twenty-four men to look after -and guard them. There were nine regimental butchers. Two or three -donkeys were told off to each company. (Indeed, they were of such -great use in taking water and ammunition up into the firing-line that -I consider they should be included in the establishments of troops -in European Russia.) In each company one man was told off to these -animals. The number of officers on the regimental rolls included those -who had been wounded and were away convalescent, and many of these took -their orderlies with them on leaving the front. The expenditure in -these orderlies alone amounted to more than 100 men. For the special -pack transport which was formed for the scout sections for carriage -of ammunition and supplies, thirteen men per regiment were required. -Judging by the experience of the war, I consider the following -duties ought to be allowed for in every regiment in addition to the -establishment of 159 non-combatants: - - Company clerks 16 - Mess caterers 18 - Officers’ mess cooks 4 - Men’s cooks 18[40] - Butchers and cattle guard 12 - Officers’ grooms 27 - Transport drivers with scout sections 13 - Instructors 4 - Stretcher-bearers 128 - Baggage guard 48[41] - With water donkeys 16 - Officers’ orderlies 80 - Sergeant-major of non-combatant company 1 - Transport driver non-commissioned officers 5 - Despatch riders 20 - Bandsmen 35 - Drummers 33 - Reserve in case of sickness and wounded 13 - ――― - Total 491 - -All these must be classed as non-combatants. Adding to these the -prescribed establishment of 159 non-combatants, we shall get a total of -650 with each regiment of four battalions. They should all be armed, -and be ready to fight either in the advanced lines or with the baggage. - -The value of machine-guns is now so great that we cannot afford to be -without them. In my opinion, each company should have one gun, and six -men should be detailed to carry it and its ammunition. Thus, there -would be 100 men with the machine-guns in a regiment (including four -reserve men). The scout sections also did such useful service in the -recent war that we ought certainly to have dismounted and small mounted -scout sections in each regiment. This would take up 200 more men. -Finally, the strength of every company, exclusive of all these extras, -should be fixed at 250 rifles, which would make 4,000 in the regiment. -The strength of a regiment would, therefore, total as follows: - - Combatants (in sixteen companies) 4,000 - Scout sections 200 - Machine-gun sections 150 - Non-combatants 650 - ――――― - Total 5,000 - -The present establishment of a four-battalion regiment is 3,838 -combatants and 159 non-combatants; total, 3,997. Therefore a total -increase of 1,003 per regiment is desirable. Including fifteen men in -every company for supply duties, the authorized non-combatant element -works out at: - - Non-combatants 159 - Bandsmen, drummers, buglers 69 - Regimental quartermaster-sergeants 3 - Sergeant-majors and baggage non-commissioned officers 6 - For supply duties 240 - ――― - Total 477 - -Fixing the total number of non-combatants required at 650, I thus add -to the expenditure authorized by existing establishments 173. These, -including stretcher-bearers, would never go into action. Thus, the -addition necessary to bring the fighting element of a regiment up to -5,000 comes out as follows: - - Increase of thirty rifles per company (so - as to have 250 instead of 220) 480 - Scout sections 200 - Machine-gun sections 150 - ――― - Total 830 - -This increase would greatly add to its present strength. - - - MACHINE-GUNS. - -At the beginning of the war the army had only a small number of -machine-guns. Recognizing the value of this weapon, the Japanese -quickly introduced it, and furnished their field troops with a large -number. We did the same, and several machine-gun companies and sections -arrived from Russia during the summer of 1905. But the type of weapon -did not satisfy tactical requirements—(1) as regards its weight; and, -(2) adaptability to the ground. A pattern must be invented that can be -carried even into the outpost line. Our high, unwieldy weapons, with -their shields, more resembled light field-guns; and their unsuitable -construction, combined with the difficulty of adapting them to the -ground, was responsible for the decision that these guns should be -organized into batteries, and be treated and used as artillery. Such an -opinion is absolutely wrong, for the great volume of fire which they -can deliver calls for their distribution at the most important points -along the firing-line, and, therefore, a capability of advancing with -assaulting columns. The organization of machine-gun companies did not -meet the above tactical requirements. Each battalion should have four -guns. - - - RESERVE (OR DEPÔT) TROOPS. - -The reserve or depôt troops should be developed and given an -organization which will permit of the wastage in units, both in -officers and men, being made good from them immediately after a battle -or during a long series of battles. Each infantry regiment should have -its reserve (depôt) battalion, which should be formed on mobilization -at a strength of 40 per cent. of the combatant establishment of a -regiment—_i.e._, at 1,600 men.[42] Of these, 400, or 10 per cent. of -the regiment’s strength, should be in the theatre of war. This number -should be formed into one company, and should constitute the reserve -depôt company of its particular regiment, and be continually feeding -it. With every division these companies should be organized together -into a reserve battalion of 1,600 men for the immediate replacement of -casualties in the regiments of the division. All wounded and sick who -are not sent to the base should be attached to this battalion till they -are passed as fit. After great battles this reserve would be depleted, -and would require filling up from the base depôt. The establishment of -the other arms should be kept up to strength by a parallel arrangement. -The casualties amongst non-combatants are less, but in their case a -reserve is necessary, distinct from the combatant reserve, to make good -their wastage. It should be mainly composed of 2nd Category reservists -and those of the convalescent combatants not considered fit enough for -the ranks. - -The war shows very clearly the immense importance of rapidly repairing -the wastage in units directly after an action. The Japanese succeeded -in doing this, with the result that they were greatly superior to -us in numbers. It was more important for us to be able to replace -casualties by drafts than to receive reinforcements, and it would have -made us stronger. For instance, with five troop trains available in the -twenty-four hours, a complete army corps with its baggage and parks -took twenty days to reach the front, and increased our strength by some -25,000 rifles. If drafts had been sent up during those twenty-days -instead of an army corps, we should have received 90,000 to 100,000 -men. In place of cavalry, baggage, artillery, parks, and a small number -of infantry, we should have got a large number of the latter. It was -infantry we wanted, for in our big battles it was the infantry that -suffered so heavily. The number of guns per 1,000 rifles was too large, -and the amount of transport and baggage was prodigious, with the result -that the 10,000 to 12,000 rifles left in corps resembled an escort to -the artillery, parks, baggage, etc.,[43] more than anything else. - - TROOPS IN REAR—COMMUNICATION TROOPS. - -By troops in rear I mean those at rest camps, railway troops, road -working parties, telegraph sections, motor troops, transport of various -kinds, all of which should be under the general officer commanding -communications. There is also a large number of men in the departments, -institutions, and depôts of all the field administrations, but as in -Manchuria these were mostly fixed by the authorized establishment, -I will not refer to them. The absence of any prepared organization -of troops for the line of communication, however, led to their being -formed at the expense of the fighting strength of the infantry. While -officers commanding regiments complained of the great wastage of their -men on duties in the rear, those in rear complained that the numbers -they had were insufficient. Troops for the duties in rear should of -course be formed on mobilization. In the part of my report upon the 1st -Army which deals with the organization of the communications there is -much valuable material which is based on war experience, and may be a -useful guide for the future. By the end of August, 1905, the strength -of the 1st Army alone was 300,000. Its own communications in rear -had a depth of 150 miles and a frontage of 330 miles, including the -detachments guarding the extreme left flank and the left flank corps -under General Rennenkampf, with which we permanently occupied a front -of about 70 miles. Under the general commanding the communications of -the 1st Army, which consisted of six army corps, were 650 officers -and officials, 12,000 men, and 25,000 horses, and this number was -considered inadequate. In my report, I gave as my estimate for the -numbers required for one army corps per day’s march in length of -communications— - - Men. - 1. Half company infantry 120 - 2. Transport 320 - 3. Road troops 25 - 4. Postal telegraph working parties 5 - ――― - Total 470 - - - ENGINEER TROOPS. - -The great development of science in warfare is very marked, but the -late war did not display the employment of scientific forces that will -be made in a struggle between two European Powers. In this respect -the Japanese were much better served than we were, but even they were -not technically equipped in the way that will soon be necessary. The -speedy construction of strong fortifications, the laying of railways -(especially of field railways) and construction of metalled roads, -the organization of aerial and wireless telegraphy, of signalling by -heliograph, lamps, and flags, the employment of balloons, motors, and -bicycles, are all duties for which the demand increases every day, -while the great quantity also of artificial obstacles, wire, mines, -hand-grenades, explosives, reserves of entrenching tools, etc., now -required must exist ready for use in large quantities. A much larger -number of engineer troops, including sappers, telegraph and railway -units, than we had available in Manchuria is necessary, in order -that all this technical equipment may be used to the best advantage. -Without touching here upon the railway troops necessary for the proper -service of the communications, the number of which must depend upon the -length of the existing lines, and of those proposed to be laid during -operations, let us consider the question of the number of sapper and -telegraph troops required for one army corps of three divisions. - -The spade, which had been forgotten since the Turkish War, has once -more regained its true position. With the volume and murderous -effectiveness of modern fire, neither the attack nor the defence can be -conducted without enormous losses, unless proper and intelligent use is -made of digging. For a protracted defence strong fortified positions -with both open and closed works and all possible kinds of artificial -obstacles are absolutely necessary. Consequently, for the attack of -such positions, special troops are required trained in the use of -explosives and the destruction of obstacles, and in road-making, for -heavy artillery demands good roads and strong bridges. - -While every Japanese division of twelve infantry battalions had one -strong sapper battalion, we had on an average only one company of -sappers with each division. This proved to be too small a proportion. -Our sappers worked nobly in the construction of earthworks and roads, -but they did little in actual contact with the enemy, and, strange as -it may appear, were often forgotten when an action began, even when we -attacked the enemy’s strongly fortified positions. In the 2nd Army we -had several sapper battalions, and yet in the assault on San-de-pu[44] -not a single company was told off to accompany the storming columns. -As our sappers were so scarce, we took the greatest care of them, as -their small number of casualties as compared with those of the infantry -proves. To get the best results from this arm, it seems to me necessary -to associate them more with other troops, and therefore _to attach -them to divisions_, instead of including them in the corps troops. If -we succeed in getting strong regiments of 4,000 rifles, I consider -it essential that every regiment should have attached to it, for -offensive as well as defensive operations, one sapper company of 250 -men, which would mean a four-company sapper battalion, 1,000 strong, -for every division. They should be trained to put up obstacles very -rapidly, and should possess the necessary tools and equipment for their -destruction. A large supply of wire is also very important; it may be -taken that every division should have a sufficient supply of wire for -two defensive points, say 1 ton for each. - -Moreover, there should be attached to each division a field-telegraph -company of six sections, in order to organize rapid communication -between each party of troops thrown out in front and the divisional -staff. Each regiment should have with it a section which should be -equipped to establish communication by telephone,[45] flag, cycle -or motor. With every three-division army corps there should be a -sapper brigade of three battalions, a field-telegraph battalion of -five companies, a mining company, a balloon section, and a railway -battalion. Two of the telegraph companies should keep up communication -from the corps to army headquarters, to other corps, to its own -divisions, to the parks, the baggage, and reserves. - -One of our principal failings, as I have repeatedly mentioned, was -lack of information. Owing to this, and the consequent loss of touch, -commanders could not conduct operations intelligently or keep corps -and army commanders and the Commander-in-Chief informed of what was -happening. Every Japanese regiment laid down telephones as it advanced; -we used to find their dead operators in our _trous de loup_, which -showed that they were right up with the firing-line. With us touch -was not infrequently lost even between whole corps and armies! The -necessity for remedying this grave defect is obvious, and we must -practise how to do this in peace. Not a regiment should be allowed to -advance at manœuvres without at once being connected up by telephone -with its brigade commander and the divisional staff, and it is -essential that, as the information comes in by telegraph and telephone, -the divisional corps and army staffs should at once fix on the maps -the positions of both forces. Formerly commanders could watch the -whole battlefield through a telescope from an eminence, could see their -own troops, and could trace the position of the hostile infantry and -artillery from the smoke. Now there is nothing to be seen. Often the -troops are out of sight, and all that meets the eye are the puffs of -smoke from the bursting shrapnel. Therefore orders and dispositions -have to be worked out on the map, and we must learn how to keep these -maps constantly up to time. In order that all intelligence may be at -once noted, a “service of communication,” by means of motors, cyclists, -and particularly of telegraph and telephone, might be organized, in -addition to the ordinary reports brought in by mounted men. To attain -these important results, considerable expense must be incurred in the -creation of this “service of communication” or “service of information” -of such a nature as to meet in every way the requirements of battle, of -movement, and of rest. - -An adequate number of sapper units with regiments will not only help us -in the capture of fortified positions strengthened by obstacles, but -will assist us rapidly to adapt them for defence when taken. The work -of the mining company in future wars will be great both in attack and -defence, especially in defence. It should have charge of all explosives -required for demolitions, including mines, pyroxyline bombs, and -hand-grenades. The great effect of the bombs thrown by revolutionaries -and anarchists points to their extensive use in war in the future. If -fanatics can be found who will rush to certain death in order to kill -peaceful citizens, it should certainly be possible to find devoted -soldiers who will advance ahead of the firing-line and throw bombs into -the enemy’s obstacles. - -Besides supply of field railway material for the army, each corps -should have enough for thirty miles of line (steam or horse draught, -according to circumstances). - - - ARTILLERY. - -We have learnt by experience that skill in the employment of guns is -more important than their number. Under modern battle conditions, when -the position of a battery cannot be seen, a great deal of ammunition -is fired during the artillery duel without any result. Two to four -well-concealed guns cleverly moved from one position to another can -hold their own with a brigade of artillery, and, if they can only -range on the enemy’s guns first, rapid fire gives them the power of -inflicting heavy loss. Our keenest and most experienced gunners got -on to the enemy on many occasions with great effect, but as a rule -our artillery did little damage. One occasion when very ineffective -results were obtained by us was at Hei-kou-tai, where, in our -endeavour to get possession of San-de-pu, we fired 70,000 rounds into -every square,[46] except the one which actually contained the village. -Our immense expenditure of ammunition also emphasized how carefully -the question of the right proportion of guns in a force must be -considered. In this war, owing to the great delay in sending up drafts -to repair wastage, we were often actually handicapped by having too -many guns! We frequently had to fight with divisions containing only -some 6,000 to 8,000 men in the four regiments and the full forty-eight -guns—a proportion of six to eight guns per 1,000 rifles, which is far -too many. And our guns were literally an embarrassment, especially -when they had run out of ammunition. Even assuming that we shall be -able (as I have suggested) to place in the field regiments with a -strength of 4,000 rifles, I consider it will be quite sufficient if we -maintain the proportion of guns at forty-eight per division, or three -guns per 1,000 rifles. The fire from quick-firing guns is nowadays -quite powerful and effective enough for four guns to be considered a -tactically independent fighting unit; but the formation of batteries -of such a size is expensive, and requires too many men. It appears -to be preferable, therefore, to abandon the artillery divisional -organization, and return to the former twelve-gun battery, dividing -it into three companies, each of which would be in a tactical sense -independent. The 48 guns—_i.e._, four batteries—with an infantry -division, would then be organized into an artillery regiment under the -command of the divisional general. Each company would be commanded by a -captain, the battery by a lieutenant-colonel, the regiment by a colonel. - -We found that for mutual and smooth co-operation in battle it is most -important that batteries should operate as far as possible with the -same regiments of infantry. Close touch is established, and each arm -unselfishly supports the other. I often heard the expression, “our -battery,” “our regiment,” and in these simple words a deep, underlying -sentiment was expressed. Each battery should be capable of acting -independently of the artillery regiment to which it belongs. For hill -warfare mountain artillery should be allotted to infantry in the same -proportion as I have suggested for field artillery. - -Our gun proved an excellent weapon; but our shrapnel, which was very -effective against objects and troops in the open, was of no use against -invisible targets, earthworks, and mud walls. Our artillery fire -against villages held by the enemy, therefore, produced very little -result. I consider that a new pattern of shell should be introduced -with thicker walls and a heavier bursting charge; but even then the -effect of such light projectiles as our field-guns fire will not be -great against the earthworks which are nowadays so quickly thrown up on -positions. To prepare the way for the assault on such fortifications, -and to obtain any speedy result in attacking defended localities, we -must have field howitzers of a modern type. They should be organized -in regiments of two batteries (twenty-four howitzers), and attached to -a corps as corps artillery. Finally, it is essential that every army -should have a light siege-train to assist in the capture of strongly -defended posts and heavy works. - -The organization of park units was well conceived, but the vehicles -were unsuited to the Manchurian roads. I am afraid to express an -opinion in favour of a further increase of mobile parks, because we -were so overburdened with baggage of different kinds. I think it is -preferable to improvise local parks at railway-stations and junctions, -as we did in Manchuria. - -Small-arm ammunition rarely ran short, but there was often a great lack -of gun ammunition, and after the battles of Liao-yang, the Sha Ho, -and Mukden, our reserves for filling up battery and park stocks were -exhausted. The average expenditure of rifle ammunition worked out as -follows: For a whole-day battle for one battalion, 21,000 rounds, with -a maximum of 400,000; an hour’s fighting for one battalion, 1,700, -with a maximum of 67,000. The total reserve taken with a four-battalion -infantry regiment was 800,000. The average expenditure per quick-firing -field-gun in a one-day battle worked out at 55 rounds, with a maximum -of 522; an hour’s fighting, 10 rounds, with a maximum of 210. - -In the earlier fights the work of the artillery varied a good deal, and -was not very successful; but as they gained experience, many batteries -fought splendidly, not only against guns, but against rifle-fire. -Compared with the work of our artillery in 1877–78 (in the European -theatre of operations), we have made considerable progress in skill, -and the very heavy losses in killed and wounded in many batteries prove -that our gunners know how to die. The horse artillery work depended -entirely on the commanders of the cavalry units to which the batteries -were attached, and when these commanders really meant fighting the -batteries did good work. As a proof of this, it is enough to recall -the gallant conduct of the 1st Trans-Baikal Cossack Horse Artillery -Battery attached to Mischenko’s Trans-Baikal Cossack Brigade. This -battery and its young commander were known to the whole army; more -than once it successfully fought several of the enemy’s batteries, -and yet its losses were insignificant. Sometimes our cavalry leaders -were unnecessarily anxious to retire, as was the case in the cavalry -of the 2nd Army at the battle of Mukden, when the two batteries which -were with it lost _only two men wounded and one missing in eleven -days’ fighting_. One six-gun battery was sufficient for four mounted -regiments of such strength as we had. As said above, there should be -one artillery regiment of four batteries (48 guns) with each infantry -division, or a total of 144 guns for the three divisions. These three -regiments would be organized in a brigade. There should also be one -regiment of 24 howitzers with each corps. - - - CAVALRY. - -Though our cavalry was numerous, its work hardly came up to our -expectations, but where it was properly commanded it did well enough. -In my opinion, the main reform that is necessary in the cavalry is to -improve their training. Till it is educated to feel that it should -fight as _obstinately as infantry_, the money expended on our mounted -Arm will be thrown away. If infantry can still continue fighting after -losing 50 per cent. of their strength, cavalry should be able to do -the same. In action we nursed the cavalry too much; out of action we -did not take sufficient care of it. Though they had not lost a man, -whole regiments were moved to the rear as soon as the first shrapnel -began bursting near them. The four regiments of cavalry—two dragoon -and two Cossack—on whom fell the most difficult but the most honourable -duty of obtaining information and opposing the leading units of Nogi’s -enveloping forces at the battle of Mukden, lost in killed and wounded: - - Men. - February 25 2 - March 2 1 - March 4 1 - March 5 7 - March 6 2 - March 7 6 - March 8 1 - March 9 1 - March 10 1 - ―― - Total 22 - -Which works out at less than one man per squadron and _sotnia_. The -casualties in almost every company of infantry were more than in these -twenty-four squadrons and _sotnias_. It is quite plain that these units -did not fight, but merely avoided the enemy; and it is equally plain -that, by avoiding battle, the cavalry neither checked the enemy’s -movement nor got any information about him. The material of which our -cavalry was composed was excellent, but everything depended on those in -command. In the battle of Te-li-ssu the infantry of the 1st Siberian -Corps lost 2,500 men; the Primorsk Dragoon Regiment, belonging to the -same corps, lost one! - -But I repeat that where their leaders meant fighting the cavalry did -their duty and suffered heavily. Take, for example, the Trans-Baikal -Cossacks, which did so well under Mischenko, and the Caucasian Brigade. -The Siberian Cossacks, under Samsonoff, fought at Liao-yang and the -Yen-tai Mines with greater bravery than was displayed by some of -Orloff’s infantry, while the independent _sotnias_ of the Don and -Orenburg Voiskos, and the dragoons under Stakhovitch, were no whit -behind them. Indeed, the men of the Primorsk Dragoon Regiment were good -enough; it was the officers who failed in not getting the best out -of them. The independent units of all the Cossacks did well, but it -was out of the question to expect martial ardour or a keen desire to -perform feats of gallantry in old men such as formed the 3rd Category -Cossack regiments. But even these 3rd Category regiments could do good -work when skilfully handled. The Cossack horses generally, and the -Trans-Baikal horses in particular, were too small; while those of the -Don regiments were sturdy, but rather soft. The Trans-Baikal Cossacks -on their shaggy little ponies reminded one more of mounted infantry -than cavalry. On the whole, however, our cavalry worked far better -than in the Russo-Turkish War under Generals Kuiloff and Loshkareff at -Plevna. The great difficulty now is to find and train cavalry leaders; -in Manchuria, according to most accounts, the juniors were good, the -field officers moderate, and the general officers, with few exceptions, -bad. - -The personality of the officer in command of a regiment of cavalry is a -very important factor, as his merits and weak points are very quickly -known, and as soon as a man in such a post shows himself unsuitable he -should be removed. (This also applies to the general officers.) But I -rarely found a divisional or corps commander who would report on the -unsuitability of senior commanders under them; they even concealed -cases of cowardice. It was only at the conclusion of hostilities that -it transpired that several had not only shown a lack of keenness, but -even of personal courage. Some of the regimental commanders were very -old; at fifty-five a man is too old for the command of a regiment. As -in the infantry, the post of cavalry brigadier should be improved, and -made a more important appointment. To it should be given the executive -and administrative powers now wielded by divisional generals. - -Three brigades should be formed into a division, the divisional -general being given the powers of an army corps commander. There is no -necessity for a higher organization. To the division of three brigades -should be allotted a twelve-gun battery of horse artillery (three -companies of four guns each). To every three-division army corps -should be added one cavalry or Cossack brigade. One of the regiments -of this brigade should act as divisional cavalry, two squadrons -or _sotnias_ with each division. If it is thought desirable that -commanders of infantry divisions become acquainted with cavalry in -peace-time, then two squadrons should be stationed in the area of the -divisions under them. - - - INFANTRY. - -As in former wars, so in Manchuria was the heat and burden of the day -borne by our infantry, and there is no doubt that, in the future, -infantry will retain its name as the principal Arm. The importance -of other Arms depends entirely on the extent to which they assist -infantry to defeat the enemy, for the latter is the final arbiter of -victory or defeat. But infantry cannot work alone, and nowadays, if -it is not assisted in action by artillery, cavalry, and sappers, if -every resource of modern science is not brought into play to lighten -its heavy task, it will either fail or will buy victory at too high a -price. It is to infantry, as the principal Arm, that we must pay our -chief attention. _And yet with us service in the Line is not considered -so honourable as service in the other branches!_ From the moment of -the selection of its recruits we do everything to weaken it. Even -the pattern of uniform worn by our Line infantryman is particularly -ugly. In his old-fashioned, badly fitting tunic, overburdened with -haversacks and equipment of all sorts, he is anything but a martial -sight. This is an aspect of the case which cannot be ignored, and it -is almost as important that a man’s uniform should be comfortable and -attractive as that it should meet all the purely military requirements. -All ranks should be enabled to admire their own dress and be proud of -it. Up to the present, the majority of Line officers have not been -given a good enough general or military education. Officers of all arms -should receive a general education not lower than the intermediate -standard of the national educational establishments, and a military -education not lower than that of the military schools. We should teach -the line officer to have a love and respect for the Arm in which he -serves, as well as a knowledge of its particular rôle in battle, -and must therefore raise his social position so that he may be a -welcome guest in any society. We must provide him with a comfortable, -inexpensive, and smart uniform. We must protect him from being abused -by his seniors in the presence of his juniors, and in every possible -manner encourage the development in him of an independent spirit. -Bravery alone is not sufficient nowadays to attain victory; knowledge, -initiative, and willingness to accept responsibility are also required. -Infantry have always had a hard part in action, and have always -suffered great loss, but the modern battle which lasts for days makes -greater demands upon their mental and physical endurance than ever -before. With a large proportion of reservists and short-service men, -we cannot rely on perfection in the soldier; it is therefore all the -more necessary that we should take steps to obtain it in our officers, -and for this purpose we are lucky in having excellent and responsive -material. Under all the arduous conditions under which the majority of -our regiments had to fight, the greatest trials fell to the infantry -officer, and right well he did his duty. It is quite enough to compare -the casualties amongst those officers with those of their brothers -in the cavalry, artillery, and sappers to see on whom fell the chief -hardships and dangers. In some regiments the whole set of officers was -changed several times. The following figures serve as an illustration -of how they suffered: - - Killed and - Wounded. - The 3rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment lost 102 - The 34th East Siberian Rifle Regiment lost 89 - The 36th East Siberian Rifle Regiment lost 73 - The 1st East Siberian Rifle Regiment lost 71 - The 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment lost 61 - The 23rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment lost 50 - -It is impossible to recall the gallant war services of these and of the -officers of many other regiments without profound respect and emotion. - -It must always be borne in mind that the infantry of the Line is the -backbone of our Service in peace as well as in war. Consequently, we -should make much more of those who serve in it than we do, and give -them a better chance. At present the list of regimental commanding -officers includes far too many Guardsmen or officers of the General -Staff. I am convinced that if the importance of service in the Line is -to be maintained, we must put an end to the present unfair acceleration -of promotion amongst Guards and General Staff officers as compared with -that of their brothers. The latter produce a great many men capable -of being good regimental commanders; all that is wanted is to know -how to select them. Since the last Turkish War they have undoubtedly -made considerable progress, and it is for us to arrange that this -improvement is continued by fostering it in every way. - -Owing to casualties, the company commanders were changed too often -for efficiency, but they generally performed good service, lack of -initiative being, as usual, their chief fault. It is most important -for the good of the Service that captains (of all arms) displaying -distinguished military qualifications should be quickly promoted to -field rank. Yet recommendations sent to St. Petersburg were not acted -on for a very long time, if ever. In such a matter some discretion -should be allowed the Commander-in-Chief, and he should be empowered -to promote junior officers to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel for -distinguished service in the field. Special men would thus arrive -at the command of independent units and regiments, posts where the -personality of the man in command is so important. It often happened -that a regiment which had done badly absolutely changed its character -with a change of commanding officers. Seniority should not be the -only guide for promotion, and the establishment of field-officers -in Manchuria constituted a quite adequate number from which good -regimental commanders could have been liberally selected. During the -period when we were occupying the Hsi-ping-kai positions, many of -the regimental commanders in all the armies were good men, and the -1st Army was particularly lucky in this respect. Though many of the -infantry brigadiers who came out to the war proved failures, amongst -the regimental commanders were many capable field-officers, whose -advancement to the rank of General gave us some first-class brigade -commanders. In the 1st Army alone were Major-Generals Lechitski, -Stelnitski, Dushkevitch, Lesha, Riedko, Dobotin, etc. Thus, even under -the unfavourable conditions under which they served, we found enough -good material amongst our infantry officers to give us some confidence -for the future. Had the war been continued, many of the colonels -promoted to generals for distinguished service would have commanded -divisions. This is as it should be, for it ought to be possible for a -regimental commander to rise within a year to the command even of an -army corps, if he be sufficiently brilliant. - -I repeat that the tasks which fall upon infantry in battle nowadays are -of such exceptional difficulty that the promotion of its officers for -distinguished field service should be made exceptionally rapid. I am -aware that even a good regimental commander may make a bad divisional -general; but I also maintain that a regimental commander who has -successfully commanded in several fights, has shown a knowledge of -his work, keenness, enterprise, and personal bravery, and has won the -confidence of his men, should be promoted as quickly as possible. He -may find it difficult at first to get his bearings under the new and -more complicated conditions of a high command, where he has to rely -upon maps and the reports of others instead of upon the direct evidence -of his own eyes and ears, but still he will grapple with the situation, -even of an army corps commander, far better than some general whose -experience has been confined to office-work and peace manœuvres. - -Finally, in order to give due importance to the principal Arm—infantry -(infantry of the Line in particular)—I consider the following measures -necessary: - -1. To give a better education to the officers entering it. - -2. To improve their material and social position. - -3. To provide officers and men with a smarter uniform. - -4. To accelerate their promotion and put an end to the system by which -Guardsmen and officers of the General Staff get more rapid advancement, -and so block the way of their unfortunate brothers to regimental and -divisional commands. - -5. To facilitate as much as possible the special promotion in war of -distinguished company officers to field rank. - -6. To award regimental commanders who display particular merit on -service rapid advancement to the rank of General, without regard to -their seniority or the speed of their promotion. - -The two last of these recommendations also obviously apply to officers -of the other Arms. - - - ORGANIZATION. - -In my opinion, our experiences in the recent war have shown the -necessity for such an organization in our army as I will now describe: - -_Infantry Regiment_: To consist of 4 battalions, each of 4 companies. -Each company to have a strength of 250 combatants. In addition to the -16 combatant companies per regiment, there should be scout sections -(mounted and dismounted), and machine-gun sections with 16 portable -guns. Strength of regiment, 5,000 men. - -_Cavalry and Cossack Regiments_: As at present. - -_Infantry Brigade_: 2 regiments, 8 battalions. - -_Cavalry Brigade_: 2 regiments, 12 squadrons or _sotnias_. - -All brigades should be capable of acting independently. - -_Infantry Division_: To consist of 2 infantry brigades, 1 regiment of -artillery,[47] 1 sapper battalion, 1 telegraph company, 2 squadrons or -_sotnias_ of cavalry, transport company, parks, bakeries, hospitals. -Total, 17 battalions, 48 guns, and 2 squadrons or _sotnias_. - -_Cavalry Division_: To consist of 3 separate brigades, 1 horse -artillery battery. Total, 36 squadrons or _sotnias_, and 12 guns. - -_Army Corps_: To consist of 3 infantry divisions, 1 artillery brigade, -including a regiment of howitzers, 1 cavalry brigade,[48] 1 sapper -brigade,[49] 1 transport battalion, 1 battalion for camps on the line -of communication. Total, 48 battalions, 169 guns, 12 squadrons or -_sotnias_, and 3 sapper battalions. - -_Reserve Troops_: To be formed into independent brigades, to which -the reserve units of artillery, cavalry, and sappers should be -attached. Each brigade to consist of 8 battalions, 2 batteries (24 -guns), 1 squadron or _sotnia_, 2 sapper companies, half a company of -telegraphists, transport, hospitals, and bakeries. These brigades, -being organized on an independent footing, would be attached to the -armies; they would be detailed either as part of the army reserve or -for independent work in guarding the flanks and rear, or be joined to -corps, according to circumstances. - -This, I think, will give great independence to all units, and the -creation of independent reserve brigades, outside of the divisional -and corps organization, would often prevent the breaking up of this -organization when a battle was in progress. To organize reserve field -troops beforehand in field formations, such as divisions of three -brigades, or corps, is not a convenient or suitable arrangement, as -they will not be ready to take part in the fighting as soon as the -regulars. - - * * * * * * - -Amongst steps which will raise the status of regimental service, and -so attract the best men to it, I consider it necessary, in addition -to providing an attractive uniform, to establish ranks distinct from -those borne by officers on the staff, in administrative offices, and -in departments. According to the scale of our military hierarchy, the -various commands (exclusive of the Cossack troops) carry ranks as -follows: - -Sub-Lieutenant, Cornet, Lieutenant, and Staff-Captain in the different -Arms are the ranks given to the junior officers in companies, -squadrons, and batteries. - -A Captain commands a company or a squadron. - -A Lieutenant-Colonel commands a battalion, a battery, and a cavalry -division.[50] - -A Colonel commands a regiment and a division of artillery. - -A Major-General commands a brigade. - -A Lieutenant-General commands a division. - -A Lieutenant-General or a full General commands an army corps or a -military district. - -All these ranks are also conferred on officers serving on the staff -and in departments. Thus, the rank of Colonel, which ought only to -be given to men in command of regiments, is also borne by those on -the administrative and police staffs, while generals of all grades, -who have never held command of troops or even of small units, fill -up our Generals list. At the time I framed the regulation to limit -the number of promotions to General’s rank of men not actually in the -army I was much bothered by numerous officers who feared that their -further promotion might be blocked. The present large number of ranks -amongst the officer class is not required. It is quite possible to -reduce them, and to give to these their old Russian names (to which -the Cossack[51] troops still adhere), for officers of all Arms doing -regimental service—namely, _Khorunji_, _Sotnik_, and _Esaoul_. The -rank of _Pod-esaoul_, which was adopted later, might be excluded. -_Esaouls_ would command companies, squadrons, _sotnias_, and companies -(of artillery); _Sotniks_ would command half-companies, half-squadrons; -and _Khorunjis_ would command sections. The normal establishment of a -company would be one _Esaoul_, two _Sotniks_, and four _Khorunjis_. The -same should be done in the cavalry. For those not serving regimentally -the ranks of Ensign, Lieutenant, and Captain might be maintained, -those of Sub-Lieutenant and Staff-Captain being abolished. The present -ranks of field-officers might be conferred on those officers not -doing regimental service, and the titles of _Voiskovoi Starshina_ and -Colonel on those with regiments. The first would command a battalion, -a division of cavalry or artillery; the second, regiments of all Arms. -The rank of Lieutenant-Colonel to be kept for staff and departmental -officers, and the rank of Major should be introduced instead of that -of Colonel. The names of the ranks of those serving with troops to -correspond generally to the nature of the appointment; thus, officers -commanding brigades should be called Brigadiers, those in charge of -divisions, Divisional Generals, of an army corps, Corps Generals. The -latter rank should also be given to commanders of military districts -and their assistants. The only officers not actually serving with -troops who should be allowed to have the title of Corps General -should be three: the War Minister and the chiefs of the General and -Headquarter Staffs. For service away from troops only two ranks of -General should be maintained—Major-General and Lieutenant-General. The -titles Generals of Infantry and Cavalry, etc., should be abolished. The -grading would then be as follows: - - A.—FOR REGIMENTAL SERVICE. - - Commander of section Khorunji. - Commander of half-company, half-squadron, - half-_sotnia_ Sotnik. - Commander of company, squadron, _sotnia_, - artillery company Esaoul. - Commanding battalion, battery, - division of cavalry Voiskovoi Starshina. - Commanding regiment Colonel. - Commander of brigade Brigadier. - Commander of division Divisional General. - Commander of corps Corps General. - - - B.—FOR EXTRA REGIMENTAL SERVICE. - - Ensign, Lieutenant, Captain, Lieutenant-Colonel, Major, - Major-General, and Lieutenant-General. - -Except in the case of the chief staff-officers of districts, the -transfer of general officers not with troops to service with troops -should be forbidden. The appointments of Corps Chief Staff-officers -and Quartermaster-Generals on the staffs of districts should carry -the rank of Major. Officers going into other departments should take -purely civil rank, and promotion on retirement should be abolished. -To accelerate the advancement of specially distinguished colonels, -it should be possible to appoint them to brigades with the rank of -Brigadier. There is at present great confusion in this matter of -accelerated promotion in deserving cases, for colonels can be given the -command of independent brigades, and yet not of non-independent ones. - -As war is a greater strain on the officers than on the men, it is -important, when granting special privileges for regimental service to -the latter, that great care should be taken to insure their physical -fitness. A particularly bad form of unfitness is that caused by -corpulence, and, unfortunately, many even of our company officers -suffered from this in Manchuria. One of our regimental commanders was -so stout that he was practically helpless, and was taken prisoner at -Te-li-ssu, though unwounded! As to the rank and file, hill-climbing -with an 80-pound equipment makes campaigning very arduous for those -of forty years of age or over. Company and field officers can well -serve up to fifty, but commanding officers of cavalry should not be -over fifty, and of infantry regiments over fifty-five. The age-limit -for generals in command of brigades and divisions should be sixty, -and of corps sixty-three. The necessity for the age regulations we -now have became apparent during the war, for as a result of them our -field-officers were relatively young; but our experience proves that -the limit should be still further lowered in the direction I have -mentioned. - -The proposals set forth above, which it is thought would tend to -increase our fighting efficiency, are, after all, only details of -organization and of preparation. The main factors contributing to -insure victory are the same as they always have been—a high _moral_ -and the power of rapid concentration in superior strength. Diplomacy -must prepare for the struggle so as to enable all the armed forces of -the Empire to be put into the field if necessary, and we must have -numerous efficient railways to facilitate the rapid massing of superior -numbers. On these two most important factors will depend the plan -of campaign. The ability to assume the offensive bestows an immense -superiority, for it gives the initiative to the side which undertakes -it. The defender’s leading troops are compelled to fall back, his -less prepared troops are perhaps crushed, while his reinforcements -are destroyed piecemeal. The result is that the _moral_ of the -attacker increases, while that of the enemy inevitably diminishes. To -re-establish a balance under such conditions is not only a matter of -time, but is extremely difficult. With a defensive plan of operations, -unshakeable belief in eventual success and immense patience are -necessary in order to overcome all difficulties, and to defeat the foe -with a final assumption of the offensive. - -From the short sketch I have given of what was accomplished by the -Russian armed forces in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it -is seen that we took the offensive in the majority of the wars we -were engaged in. Without railways, but with a large peace standing -army (period of service twenty-five years with the colours), with -equality and often a superiority[52] in armament and training, Russia -was able to commence operations, and to force her will upon the -enemy—_i.e._, to assume the offensive. Nowadays we have been left -behind by our Western neighbours in readiness for hostilities, and -the recent war disclosed the fact that we had been outdistanced by -our Eastern neighbour also. Russia will, no doubt, in time find the -strength and means once more to take her former place amongst other -Powers as regards fighting efficiency; but it will take years of -unceasing effort, for rapid concentration and an offensive strategy are -impossible without great developments in our railway system. No one can -say whether we shall be allowed to wait for everything to be perfected, -or whether we shall again be drawn into war before we are ready. It is -therefore absolutely necessary to prepare without loss of time to make -war under conditions as unfavourable as those of the recent conflict. - -Without referring here to the necessity for diplomatic preparation for -hostilities, and the proper attitude of all grades of Russian society -during war, I will comment in the most general lines on those measures -which should, in my opinion, be taken for the more useful employment -of resources already at our disposal. The principle which is of such -importance in field operations, that troops once engaged will not be -relieved, must be finally accepted. Therefore, every unit going into -action should know that it will be supported, but not replaced. The -principle in its broadest sense applies without distinction to all -ranks who join the field army, and till victory has been attained not -a soul should be able to return home or receive another appointment -outside the theatre of operations. Those who prove themselves unfit -for their appointments at the actual front should be given other -employments for which their bodily and mental qualifications are -fitted. In such a serious business as war in defence of country no -personal ambition should or can have place, and the removal of a -person from the field army should be considered the greatest possible -disgrace—a stain which the service of a lifetime cannot efface. -Officers thus removed should be deprived of their military rank, -dismissed the Service, and should forfeit all rights and privileges -gained in the Service, and officers and men so removed should be -deprived of the right to hold any Government post whatever, whether -under the War Department or not. - -The punishment for cowardice should be death. - -I have touched upon the question of accelerated promotion for good -service in the field, and the converse applies. Senior commanders -who show themselves unfit for their appointments ought to be at once -removed from their commands and given posts corresponding to their -capabilities. Commanders of corps and divisions considered unfit -may, in order to guard their military honour, request to be allowed -to remain in the army in command of divisions or brigades. Only one -kind of seniority can be acknowledged in war—namely, the ability to -gain the victory. General officers incompetent for field service can -do very useful work on the lines of communications, in the direction -and training of the reserve troops, the management of hospitals, the -administration of the inhabitants of the country, etc. If we ever mean -to be capable of defeating a powerful enemy, we must not allow an army -corps commander who is struck off from the command of his corps, and -who does not even display personal courage, to become a member of the -Committee of Imperial Defence; nor must we allow junior commanders who -fail when tested by war to receive appointments in non-mobilized units, -nor permit hundreds of officers who leave the front on account of -ill-health, and under various pretexts, to remain away and not return. -I say nothing of the case where an army commander leaves his army -during active hostilities without even reporting his departure to the -Commander-in-Chief. - -If courts of honour are found to be a necessity in peace-time, how -much more are they necessary in war? In addition to being formed in -regiments, they should be formed in corps and armies to adjudicate -upon the conduct in action of senior commanders up to the rank of -Divisional General. It is vital that the existing immunity of men who -show cowardice in action, or who are guilty of disgraceful conduct out -of action, should at once cease. For this purpose I consider we should -form soldiers’ courts of honour in every company and independent unit, -as a means for suppressing the worst elements found in the ranks. For, -with the lack of moral development of the modern man in the street, -it is absolutely necessary to have some such tribunals upon whose -verdict corporal punishment can be awarded to private soldiers. To -leave the field under the pretext of assisting or carrying away the -wounded—except for the men specially detailed for this duty—should be -punished with the utmost rigour. And to fight an action to a finish, -officers must not hesitate to sacrifice their last reserves, if -necessary, and also themselves. It is necessary to draw attention to -this, as instances occurred in the war where officers, having given -orders for a retirement, were themselves the first to go. Such an -example is always infectious, and leads to disorganization of units -and loss of confidence in the commander. Commanders of forces who do -not in battle support neighbouring units when able to do so should be -deprived of their appointments, tried, and, if necessary, punished by -death. Commanders of all ranks should be thoroughly alive to the value -of every man in the ranks. Therefore, every endeavour should be made to -keep units as strong as possible during an action. - -Finally, I will touch briefly on several points. I will permit myself -to express the opinion that the existing regulations as to rewards -in war require revision and considerable alteration. At present far -too many honours are bestowed. Another point that demands attention -is that of malingering. As we have seen, sickness was more prevalent -amongst the officers, in spite of their better living, than among -the men. Unfortunately, also, the medical officers more than once -called my attention, when I was inspecting hospitals, to cases of -malingering amongst officers as well as men. The great majority of -patients, of course, were really ill, but much of the sickness was due -to the individual not taking proper care of himself. Officers must -realize that, however honourable a thing it is to be wounded, it is as -dishonourable to remain in hospital when their comrades are fighting. -It should be ruled for all ranks that in such cases the period of -sickness should not count as service, and that during it pay should -be forfeited. All officers and officials absenting themselves for -more than two months should be removed from their appointments, and -appointed to the reserve or depôt troops. Amongst the many regrettable -things to be noted in the late war was the disgraceful conditions -under which both men and officers were often taken prisoner. The -existing regulations, which lay down that all the circumstances of -a case of capture should be investigated, were not complied with. -Officers who returned straight to Russia from being prisoners in Japan -were appointed by the War Department even to the command of divisions. -There is only one thing which justifies capture—the fact of being -wounded. All those who surrender when they have not been wounded should -be tried by court-martial for not fighting to the last. - -The regulations regarding fortresses should be revised, and the -occasions upon which a fortress is allowed to surrender should be -absolutely cut out, for fortresses may be taken, but should never, -under any circumstances, surrender. Commandants of fortresses who -surrender them, captains who surrender their ships, officers in command -of units that lay down their arms, should be considered as forfeiting -all rights, and should be condemned to be shot without trial, and all -those not in command who surrender unwounded should be deprived of -their military rank from the day of their surrender. During the war -the Press did much to undermine the authority of officers in command, -and to lower the _moral_ of the men, by indiscriminate revelations. -In the next war only such events should be allowed to appear in the -newspapers as may help to encourage the men. When active operations -are over, the circumstances are changed, and it is then essential for -the good of the Service to have a thorough investigation into all -shortcomings. - -But it is not sufficient that all ranks of the army should be -imbued with the spirit of fighting on till victory is won; it is -necessary that the whole nation should have the same feeling, and -to the best of their ability assist towards a happy issue of the -struggle being carried on by the army. In our state of backwardness -(especially as regards railways) we are doomed in our next war to a -slow concentration, and therefore to a protracted campaign. Being -unable at once to put large forces into the field, and to seize the -initiative, we may again be compelled to bear the consequences of our -unreadiness—frequent reverses, and retirement; but we must, without -wavering, firmly believe in eventual success, however unfavourable the -conditions at the start. The moral and material resources of Russia are -immense, and the fixed determination on the part of the army and the -whole nation to win is our principal guarantee of victory. - - - - - CHAPTER XII - - SUMMARY OF THE WAR - - -I have already reviewed[53] (in Chapters VIII., IX., X., and XI.) -the causes of our failure. They can be summarized in three groups: - -1. Those causes independent of the War Ministry. - -2. Those dependent on the War Ministry, for which officers in the field -had no responsibility. - -3. Those for which officers in the field were alone responsible. - -The first group comprises— - -(_a_) The absence of any diplomatic arrangement which would have -enabled us to despatch and distribute our whole army freely as -circumstances dictated (similar to that which in 1870–71 made it -possible for the Prussians to move the whole of their armed forces -against France). - -(_b_) The subordinate part played by the fleet during the war. - -(_c_) The inferiority of the Siberian and Eastern Chinese Railways. - -(_d_) The internal disorders in Russia, which affected the spirit of -the army. - -The second group comprises— - -(_a_) The delay in mobilizing the reinforcements for the Far East. - -(_b_) The transfer into the reserve during the war of well-trained -soldiers—men who were still liable for colour service—from the military -districts in European Russia, while untrained elderly reservists were -being sent to the front. - -(_c_) The belated despatch of drafts to the front. (The reason of this -was also the inefficiency of the railways.) - -(_d_) The delay in promoting those who particularly distinguished -themselves in the field. (Many recommendations were ignored.) - -(_e_) The deficiencies in our technical equipment. - -(_f_) The faults of organization (absence of troops for protecting -communications, dearth of transport, unwieldiness of the army and corps -organizations). - -(_g_) Deficiencies in the _personnel_ both of officers and men. - -The third group comprises— - -(_a_) The absence of a true military feeling among the troops. - -(_b_) The poor spirit in action shown by some of them. - -(_c_) The lack of determination on the part of commanders of all -degrees to carry out the tasks entrusted to them. - -(_d_) The breakdown of the organization under the stress of war. - -The weak points of our forces, which were so noticeable in the wars -waged in the second half of the last century, had not been entirely -eliminated during the fifty years which intervened since the Crimea, -and were again evident in the recent struggle—namely: - -1. We were inferior to our enemy in technical troops and equipment. - -2. The “command” was unsatisfactory. - -3. The army was insufficiently trained tactically. - -4. We did not insure victory by having considerable superiority in -numbers. - -We did not have before us any clear idea of our object, and -consequently did not show sufficient determination in its prosecution. - -So many different reasons have been advanced for our failure that the -question naturally arises as to what foundation there really is for my -opinion—shared by the greater part of the army in the field—that if we -had not concluded peace so hastily victory would have crowned our arms. - -My belief that we could, and ought to, have issued victorious from the -struggle is based upon— - - I. The steady growth of our material forces. - - II. The growth of our moral forces. - - III. The gradual deterioration of the enemy - in both respects. - - - I. - -We have already seen how fatal the inefficiency of our railways was for -us. Yet, though six months before the outbreak of war only two pairs -of short trains were available for military purposes, when peace was -concluded we had ten and even twelve pairs of full trains running in -the twenty-four hours. Thus, during hostilities the carrying capacity -of the railway grew sixfold, and was capable of still further increase. -Notwithstanding all our reverses, the army continued to grow in -numbers, and was 1,000,000 strong when peace was concluded, and more -than two-thirds of this number (including the newly arrived drafts, -the new corps, and the Pri-Amur troops) had not been under fire. -Moreover, owing to improved rail transport and the proper exploitation -of all local resources, the whole number was assured of everything -necessary, both for fighting and subsistence, to an extent that had -never previously been the case. We had received a proper proportion -of artillery of every nature, reserves of light railway material, -telegraph and wireless telegraph stores, and entrenching and technical -tools and equipment of all sorts. We had constructed three strong -lines of defence at Hsi-ping-kai, Kung-chu-ling, and Kwang-cheng-tzu; -our communications in rear were safe; almost every army corps was in -possession of its own line of rails; and the Sungari and other rivers -were crossed by many bridges. The war strength of all units had been -considerably augmented. Russia’s resources for continuing the struggle -were greater than those of Japan, for not only had our Guards and -Grenadiers not been drawn upon, but the greater part of the army was -still at home. - - - II. - -Though an improvement of _moral_ is by no means as easy to bring about -in an army as that of its material condition, the officers who were -most in touch with our men were convinced that it was done in our -case. It may possibly be a peculiarity of the Russian soldier that -he possesses latent moral strength of the kind which is developed -slowly, and not destroyed by any trials to which the individual is -subjected; but to those who made a study of the war it appeared -perfectly clear that our men showed an increasing spirit of stubborn -determination as the campaign progressed. In the early fights before -the battle of Liao-yang—at Te-li-ssu and Ta-shih-chiao—we withdrew -after comparatively small losses. At the latter fight two army corps, -and at Yang-tzu-ling one corps, retired, though they together did not -collectively lose as many men as the 1st East Siberian Rifle Regiment -alone lost in the battle of Mukden. At Liao-yang our men fought better -than in the previous fights; on the Sha Ho they showed a better spirit -than at Liao-yang; while at Mukden many units showed a still further -improvement. We were all convinced, therefore, that in a defence of, -or an offensive advance from, the Hsi-ping-kai position, the men would -fight even better than at Mukden, for the improvement in spirit shown -by our troops had been progressive and steady. They had learned much, -particularly during their long stay in direct touch with the enemy -on the Sha Ho. Even the reserve units, which failed in the early -fights, fought with great bravery and steadiness at Mukden. To prove -this, it is only necessary to recall the exploits of the 71st and -54th Divisions, the later arrived reserve units of the 55th and 61st -Divisions at Mukden, and of many regiments of the 10th, 17th, and 1st -Army Corps. The regiments of the 4th Siberian Corps and the East -Siberian Rifles, indeed, were an example throughout the war. - -The Tsar, in his Order to the army and fleet of January 14, -1905, predicted this improvement in the _moral_ of the troops, -notwithstanding their reverses, with great foresight. His belief in the -spirit of the army was expressed in the following memorable words: - - “Though we may be sore at heart on account of the disasters and - losses that have befallen us, do not let us be discouraged. By - them Russia’s strength is renewed, and her power increased.” - -As operations continued we made corresponding progress in our tactics. -We learned how to attack and make use of the ground, and how to -employ artillery, and learned by heart the lesson of keeping strong -reserves in hand [at the Hsi-ping-kai position the reserve of the 1st -Manchurian Army alone consisted of eighty battalions]. We also learned -how to obtain intelligence of hostile forces. At the close of the war -our knowledge of the Japanese dispositions was more complete than -it had ever been; indeed, we had accurate information of the exact -whereabouts, not only of their main bodies, but also of many individual -units. (This was chiefly obtained from prisoners.) - -We received as reinforcements 300,000 regular soldiers then with -the colours, most of whom had volunteered for the front, and the -1905 recruits. These young soldiers were ready to face any danger; -they arrived in the highest spirits, and their cheerfulness and -evident keenness to see some fighting did one’s heart good. The -older reservists were mostly employed on duties in the rear. As a -result, volunteers were always forthcoming for the numerous raids and -reconnaissances made by the 1st Manchurian Army from the Hsi-ping-kai -position, or for any other adventurous work. The mainspring of the -improvement in our spirit, however, was the more careful selection made -of the officers appointed to command units. Many of these now began to -display military qualifications of a high order. The fighting round -Mukden had produced generals of a calibre upon which we could have -fully relied in any subsequent battles. As regards the general question -of the readiness of the 1st Manchurian Army for renewed fighting after -the Mukden battle, I concluded my report on this force as follows: - - “With the occupation of the Hsi-ping-kai position the army - found itself confronted with a great work. - - “No map of the neighbouring country existed, and the little - information we had of the enemy was chiefly remarkable for - its absolute vagueness. There were no roads to the rear, no - local depôts for the supply of the army, and no fords over - the Sungari River, which was a standing menace, as the usual - Spring floods were still ahead of us. - - “The co-ordinated and willing efforts of all ranks, however, - soon changed all this. The fortified line of works from - Hsi-ping-kai Station to the village of Kung-chu-ling became - practically invincible, and the order was given to use it as a - _place d’armes_ and accumulate strong reserves there. In May - there were eighty battalions in reserve behind the left flank; - practically one-half of the five army corps was located here. - - “A two-verst[54] map was made, showing not only the country - in our rear, but the strip of ground right up to the enemy’s - positions. - - “By means of reconnaissances and the employment of spies, - we gradually sifted our inaccurate intelligence till our - information was correct. We were able first to locate the - disposition of the enemy’s armies, then of his divisions, and, - finally, of small units. - - “The services to the rear were carried out with similar energy; - roads were laid out, the Sungari was bridged, and storehouses - were built. - - “At the beginning of July the army was almost ready to advance; - the only thing lacking was the equipment for light railways for - horse traction. Without this it was impossible to advance in - any great strength. - - “During the last few months a horse railway was laid to - Ya-mu-tzu, and the carriage of supplies for a forward movement - was thus assured. - - “A connected series of reconnaissances were carried out in - order to gain knowledge of the ground in front. - - “The army was brought almost up to full strength by the drafts - and new units which had joined. - - “In August it was quite ready for battle, and its now - recuperated and reinforced veteran corps waited the order for a - forward movement in complete confidence.” - -General Bilderling, who commanded the 2nd Manchurian Army (which -suffered the most heavily at Mukden), finishes his report on this army -as follows: - - “The army occupied the Hsi-ping-kai position, shattered and - disorganized by the battle of Mukden; but it has recovered with - extraordinary rapidity. With the arrival of the young soldiers - and reservists, all the units have been brought up to full war - strength, and it is only in the officers that there is still - a great deficiency. The mounted units have been reinforced by - fresh squadrons and by horses from the artillery reserve; the - guns and waggons which were lost or had become unserviceable - have been replaced. Every division has been strengthened by - mounted and dismounted machine-gun sections, and howitzer - batteries have been formed; a light railway for horse-draught - has been laid along the whole length of the position and in - rear of it; and, profiting by recent experience, the troops are - now thoroughly proficient in all exercises and manœuvres. Thus - the army, by reason of its numbers, material composition, and - training, has become really better prepared for hostilities at - the close of the war than it was at the beginning, and again - constitutes a menace to the enemy.” - -The 3rd Manchurian Army, which, under the command of General Batianoff, -formed a reserve for the 1st and 2nd Armies, and contained corps which -had arrived latest and had not been in action, was also a large and -reliable body of men. - -Of course, there is a skeleton in every cupboard, and naturally in such -a large force as the three armies constituted there were weak spots. -Thus, there were to be found amongst the men, and even the officers, -a certain number of poor-spirited creatures who disbelieved in the -possibility of victory. But even such characters would have plucked up -their spirits and done good service at the first success. - -From the moment I joined the army in Manchuria, I invariably told every -unit that I met or reviewed that the war could only end after we had -been victorious; that till then none of us would be allowed to return -home; and that victory was certain when sufficient reinforcements -reached us. And belief in these facts sank into the hearts of officers -and private soldiers. Both before and after Mukden, I more than once -heard the men themselves—particularly those in hospital—say that they -could not return home till the enemy had been defeated. “The women -will laugh at us,” were their words. Another important factor, and -one which the Russian especially values, is constant and affectionate -care for his bodily needs and his health. For anyone who has not been -on active service it is difficult to appreciate how troops who have -been disorganized and badly shaken by hard fighting can regain heart -if they suddenly find hot food ready for them. A night’s rest, a full -stomach, ammunition replenished, a quiet calling of the roll, and the -calm demeanour of their officers—all assisted to make our splendid -soldiers once more ready for the fray. As regards the army’s _moral_ -generally, I should mention that the nearer our men were to the enemy, -the better were their spirits and the fewer the carping comments and -criticisms which always do so much harm; there was no time to read the -papers. When I visited the advanced units of the 1st Army (those of -the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Siberians, and of the 1st Army Corps commanded -by Colonels Prince Trubetski, Tikhomiroff, Redkin, and General -Kashtalinski), I found universal keenness to advance. The men were well -looked after, discipline was strict, and the attitude of both men and -officers was one of quiet and steady determination. But in proportion -as the distance from the advanced lines increased, and direct touch -with the enemy was lost, there was time for talk and gossip. It was on -the lines of communication (particularly at Harbin) that drunkenness -and gambling took place, besides other forms of dissipation that -disgraced the army. It was here that the white-livered brigade -collected, leaving the front under any excuse even when fighting was in -progress, and, indeed, what else could be expected of them? It is much -to be regretted that some of our pressmen judged the army by what they -saw at Harbin, and that we were judged by this standard even in Russia. -Many officers and others in authority who had failed to pass the -“ordeal by fire” lived on in Russia, and from them a correct opinion -as to the self-sacrifice and devotion of the army and its readiness to -continue the war could hardly have been expected. Unfortunately for -us, also there happened to be on the Committee of Imperial Defence two -general officers who had been at the front. One had left it; the other -had been deprived of his command of an army corps. Clearly, such men -as these could not have much assisted this new and important body to -insist on the necessity of continuing the struggle. - -A step taken by me to raise and to maintain the spirit of the army -was the rapid promotion of those officers who had most distinguished -themselves in the field. We obtained a number of our best senior -regimental officers by promoting captains, and, what is more important, -we appointed many distinguished officers to the command of regiments -without regard to their lack of seniority, or to the fact that some -of them were only lieutenant-colonels. In a very short time these -commanding officers improved their regiments almost beyond recognition, -and fully proved how important a careful selection is in war. By -promoting to Major-General those colonels who had most distinguished -themselves on service, we began to get at the head of brigades leaders -who were worthy of every confidence, and offered a splendid selection -from which to choose divisional and corps commanders. - -A further step which I took to woo victory was to enforce the humane -treatment of the Chinese population of Manchuria. I, and those -immediately under me, insisted on their being protected (as far as war -conditions permitted) from unnecessary hardships, and on their property -being guarded, and I made a point of their being promptly paid in -cash for everything they brought in. This assisted us considerably in -getting supplies, and, notwithstanding the great hardships we ourselves -occasionally suffered, I invariably insisted on these relations being -maintained. Consequently, not once was I forced to have recourse to -requisitioning supplies or transport, nor had I to use force to get -local labour. The results surpassed all my expectations, for, in spite -of the great efforts made by the enemy to raise the Chinese population -against us, and in spite of the unfriendly feeling towards us of -many of the Chinese authorities themselves, the mass of the people -appreciated our attitude, remained quiet, and, by freely bringing in -their products, saved us from hunger. Although they might have easily -kept us in a perpetual state of alarm by killing isolated officials, -attacking small detachments, destroying the telegraphs and the roads, -they—with very few exceptions—lived on peacefully in the theatre of -war, in some instances even joining with us in fighting the Hun-huses. - -Thus, besides the plan of campaign for carrying on the war—in which the -possibility of retiring even behind Harbin was foreseen—the principal -means taken by me to secure victory were: - -1. To instil in all ranks a firm belief that the war could only be -brought to a close with victory, and that till victory had crowned our -efforts not one of us would return home. - -2. To foster a constant fatherly endeavour on the part of all in -authority to attend, as far as the exigencies of the Service permitted, -to the comfort and preserve the health of the troops. - -3. To assist in all ways the readiness and preparation of the troops, -particularly by accelerating, irrespective of mere seniority, the -promotion of the most distinguished of the officers. - -4. To maintain a uniformly humane attitude towards the Chinese -population of Manchuria. - - - III. - -The enemy’s army began to weaken in the moral as well as the material -sense. - -To drive back our army northwards to Hsi-ping-kai called for immense -efforts and many sacrifices on the part of the Japanese. I have -stated (in Chapter VII.) that our Headquarter Staff estimated the -total peace establishment of their army at 110,000 men [of which -13,000 were always absent on furlough and leave], and the reserve and -territorial forces at only 315,000, so that the total number available -for service was, as we thought, not more than 425,000. But, according -to the figures of the Japanese army medical authorities, more than -1,000,000 men were called up to the colours, which must have demanded -a great effort on the part of the nation. It was found necessary also, -during the war, to alter the existing laws so as to catch those men -who had already completed their time in the reserve for a further -period of service in the regular army, and to draft into the ranks -in 1904 and 1905 the recruit contingent of 1906 as well as that of -1905. (Towards the end we began to find old men and boys amongst our -prisoners.) Their casualties were very high; in the Cemetery of Honour -in Tokio alone 60,600 men killed in battle were buried, and to these -must be added more than 50,000 who died of wounds. Thus it appears -from these two sources alone that they lost 110,000—a figure equal to -the whole peace establishment of the army. Taking into account our -standing peace army of 1,000,000 men, our losses were comparatively far -lighter than those of the Japanese. In all some 554,000 men passed -through their hospitals during the war, of whom 220,000[55] were wound -cases. Altogether they lost 135,000 men killed and died of wounds and -sickness. Their losses in officers were particularly heavy, and the -men fought with such stubborn bravery that whole regiments, and even -brigades, were on certain occasions almost wiped out of existence. This -happened, for instance, in the fight for Putiloff Hill,[56] on October -15; also during the February fighting for the position held by the 3rd -Siberians on the Kiao-tu Ling [Pass]; in the battle of March 7, at -Tu-hung-tun[57] and other points. At Liao-yang and Mukden the majority -of the enemy’s troops suffered very heavily in their frontal attack of -our positions, and failed to take them. The fate of these battles was -decided by turning movements. In the fighting on the Sha Ho they tried -hard to force us back towards Mukden, and many of their units were -again and again driven off our positions, and only occupied them after -we had abandoned them of our own accord. The spirit of these Japanese -troops who had thus seen no success attend their individual efforts -could not but be shaken. Again, the ever-increasing determination -displayed by our men must have affected their spirit. Their regulars -had been placed _hors de combat_ in considerable numbers, and however -quickly the recruits might be called up and trained, it was not to be -expected that they would be able to develop the same stubbornness in -defence, and the same dash in attack, that their comrades had possessed -in the first campaign. This was noticeable in the fighting in front of -Mukden, but especially near Hsi-ping-kai. While our scouting parties, -and the troops of the advanced posts, were pressing the enemy more and -more boldly, we began to notice a comparative lack of enterprise on -their part, coupled with a want of their former daring, and even their -watchfulness. Perhaps the strain of war was beginning to tell on the -Southern temperament. Indeed, for six whole months they gave us time -to strengthen ourselves and fortify, without once attempting to attack -and press us back on the Sungari, and so inflict a crushing defeat. -While we remained at Hsi-ping-kai the number of prisoners taken by us -began to increase, and they ceased to display the fanaticism shown by -those captured in 1904. Many openly acknowledged that they were weary -of the war, and from the nature of numerous letters from Japan found -on the killed and prisoners, it was evident that this weariness was -general. These letters also told of the heavy increase in taxation -during the war, of the increased cost of the necessities of life, -and of the dearth of employment. Once an entire company surrendered -in front of the positions held by the 1st Siberians, a thing that had -never happened before. Nor were the enemy well situated as regards -material. Money became more and more scarce, while the requirements of -the growing army increased. Particular difficulty was found in quickly -replenishing artillery ammunition. This was very noticeable on the Sha -Ho. - -But what must have been the most serious source of anxiety to Japan -was the indifference which Europe and America were beginning to show -to her successes. At first it had seemed profitable to Great Britain -and Germany that Russia and Japan should be drawn into war, for when -they were exhausted the hands of both would be tied—ours in Europe, and -Japan’s in Asia. Nevertheless, it was not to the interest of Europe -generally to allow the triumph of the Japanese in the battlefields of -Manchuria to become absolute. A victorious Japan might join with China, -and raise the standard of “Asia for the Asiatics.” The extinction -of all European and American enterprises in Asia would be the first -object of this new great Power, and the expulsion of Europeans from -Asia would be the end. There is already little enough room on the -Continent of Europe. Without the markets of the wide world she could -not exist, and the cries of “America for the Americans,” “Asia for the -Asiatics,” “Africa for the Africans,” are of serious import for her. -But the danger is approaching, and is so imminent that the Powers of -Europe will be forced to sink their differences and unite in order to -withstand the attempt of the young nations[58] to drive old Europe home -into the narrow shell which she has long since outgrown. We might have -taken advantage of this change in international feeling, and have tried -to close the money markets of the world to Japan. Only one decisive -victory on our part was wanted to bring about a very serious reaction -both in Japan and in the army in the field. If we had exhausted her -financial resources, and had continued the war, we might soon have -compelled her to seek an honourable peace, which would have been -advantageous to us. - -At Mukden we fought with a shortage in establishment of 300,000 men; -we began the war with inconsiderable forces; we conducted it under the -most unfavourable conditions, and without the support of the country; -we were, moreover, weakened by disturbances in the interior, and were -connected with Russia only by a single-track weak line. In these -impossible conditions we put 300,000 of the enemy _hors de combat_, -and had 600,000 rifles ready at Hsi-ping-kai at a time when they were -beginning to flag. If we attained such results, can it be said that -our army accomplished but little? Is it fair to continue applying -the epithet “Disgraceful” to the war? It cannot be denied that both -the troops and their leaders did less in the time at their disposal -than they might have done if properly supported by the country; but -by the summer of 1905 conditions had begun to change in our favour. -The conquered are always judged severely, and the leaders should -naturally be the first to bear the responsibility for disaster to the -troops under them. We can only be judged as acquitted because of our -readiness to continue the struggle—a readiness which was created, and -grew stronger in the army in spite of disaster. We believed in the -possibility and certainty of victory, and if it had not been for the -serious internal disturbances in Russia, we should have undoubtedly -been able to prove the truth of our belief in battle. - -Even the inhabitants of Moscow, where, in all the difficult times the -nation has passed through, a manly and determined voice has always -been raised in support of the honour and dignity of Russia, showed -that their spirits had on this occasion fallen. It was with amazement -and sorrow that we read of a certain action of the Moscow Town Council -on June 7, 1905. The news had immense effect on the army, and on -hearing of it I sent the following letter[59] to Prince Trubetski, the -President of the Moscow nobility: - - “An overwhelming impression has been produced throughout - the army by the news which has reached us from home that - many poor-spirited people are trying to bring about an early - peace. It is forgotten that a peace made before victory has - been won cannot be honourable, and will not therefore be - permanent. Never has our army been so strong and so ready for - serious battle as now. Victory is nearer than seems likely - to those at a distance. The troops have great belief in the - new Commander-in-Chief;[60] they are assured of everything - necessary to their wants, and their health is excellent. We - would welcome news of the enemy’s advance, and are ready to - move against them, when ordered to, with full faith in our - strength. The troops have become war-seasoned. Even those units - which were for various reasons not as steady as they should - have been in the early fights are now thoroughly reliable. - Numbers of wounded officers and men are hastening to rejoin, - though not completely convalescent. Though we have lost the - fleet, the army remains to us, and, I repeat, it is more - powerful than it ever was before. Our position is altogether - stronger and, tactically, better placed than those we held at - Liao-yang or Mukden, for the Japanese do not envelop us in - the same way. Though their forces have also been growing in - numbers, there are many indications that their strength is on - the wane: their ranks are being filled with men who formerly - would not have been accepted, and the whole spirit of the army - has undergone a change. More men allow themselves to be taken - prisoners than before; their artillery and cavalry are weaker - than ours, and they are short of gun ammunition. Letters from - Japan, which we have found on the men, show that a general - feeling of dissatisfaction with the war is growing among the - people, for prices have gone up, and they are enduring great - privations. These are the conditions under which I to-day - read in letters from Moscow that on June 7 the Town Council - discussed the advisability of inviting the representatives of - the people to consider the question of putting an end to the - war. Last February, on my departure for the front, you, in the - name of all the representatives of Moscow, bade me farewell - with words full of courage and of faith in the might of Russia. - I therefore consider it my duty to send this letter to you. - If the Muscovites do not feel as able as before to send their - worthiest sons to us to help us overcome the foe, let them at - least not prevent us from doing our duty in Manchuria. - - “Although there is nothing of a secret nature in this letter, - its publication in the Press over my signature is very - undesirable.” - -In reply, Prince Trubetski wrote to me on June 14 as follows: - - “I have handed over your telegram, which greatly touched me, - to the Mayor and Zemstvo; I will communicate its contents to - as many as I can, and I will do everything that is possible to - get action taken on it. If it may be considered necessary by - the Tsar to end the war, I do not think it should be discussed - beforehand in committees. May God help you! My whole heart is - with you.” - -But the efforts of individuals were powerless to check the march -of events. The serious state of Russia’s internal affairs and the -hostile—to put the best construction on it—indifference of the people -resulted in peace being prematurely concluded. The consequences -of making such a peace, by which Japan was recognized as Russia’s -conqueror in Asia, will have serious results not only for us, but for -all the Powers who have possessions or interests on that continent. -The “Yellow peril,” the appearance of which has only recently been -foreseen, is now a reality. Notwithstanding her victorious issue from -the war, Japan is hurriedly increasing her forces, while China is -forming a large army under the guidance of Japanese officers and on the -Japanese model. In a very short space of time she and Japan will be -able to pour an army of more than 1,500,000 into Manchuria, which, if -directed against us, could proceed to take a great deal of Siberia from -Russia, and reduce her to a second-rate Power. - -We have seen above how the absence of any previous diplomatic -arrangements forced us to keep the greater part of our armed forces -in European Russia during the war, which fact constituted one of the -reasons of our reverses (the Guards and Grenadiers Corps remained -in Russia, while the reserve troops fought in Manchuria). We have -one consolation in that we now know that our Western neighbours are -not pursuing any policy of aggression against us, for they had an -excellent opportunity in the years 1905 and 1906[61] to alter the -existing frontier had they wished to do so. We may hope, therefore, -to be able to come to some understanding with the Powers of Europe by -which, should we be again attacked in the Far East, we shall be able -to throw the whole of our armed forces into a struggle with either -Japan or Japan and China combined. Another reason for our failure is -the fact that we were unable rapidly to make full use of such forces -as were available, because of the weakness of railway communication -between Russia and Manchuria. It is clear that, as matters now stand in -the Far East, the laying of a second track over the Siberian line and -the construction of a railway along the bank of the Amur are so vital -for us that no time should be lost in doing these things. The mere -construction of a line along the Amur can help us but little, while -a double-track line, even with forty-eight trains in the twenty-four -hours, cannot, of course, satisfy all the requirements of the great -army we should have to put in the field in the event of a fresh war. -In future we shall only be able to rely to a small extent upon the -vast supplies of food in Manchuria, and shall be obliged to convey -the greater portion not only of our munitions of war, but of our -food-supplies, from European Russia and Siberia. It will therefore be -necessary to make use of our water communications, for the failure of -the attempt to transport supplies in 1905 by the Arctic Ocean and the -River Yenissei cannot be considered final. Particular assistance also -could be afforded to the army by increasing the population of Siberia, -and so at the same time augmenting the local resources necessary for an -army. The rich reserves of metals, coals, and timber in that part will -assist us in bringing nearer to the Far East not only our food-supply -base, but also our war base (for ordnance, ammunition, explosives, -etc.). - -Among the main reasons for our disasters must be mentioned the -indifferent, even hostile attitude of the people to the late war; but -the menace to our nation from the Far East is now so clear that all -grades of society ought to prepare—in case of a fresh attack on Russia -by Japan or China—to rise like one man to defend the integrity and the -greatness of our Fatherland. - -Thus, to attain success in any such future war, which is by no means an -improbable contingency, we should strive— - -1. To be in a position to make use of all our troops; - -2. To have thorough railway communication between the Pri-Amur and -Russia; - -3. To prepare the waterways of Siberia for the carriage of heavy goods -in bulk from west to east; - -4. To move the army’s base as far as possible from Russia into Siberia; -and, what is most important— - -5. To make ready to carry on a new war not only with the army, but with -the whole of a patriotic nation. - -History had apparently destined Russia to undergo a bitter trial from -1904 to 1906, both on the field of battle and at home. Our great nation -has issued renewed and strengthened from still heavier trials, and let -us not doubt now but that Russia, summoned by the Tsar to a new life, -will quickly recover from the temporary blows which she has sustained, -and will not fall from her high place among the other nations of the -world. As regards the army, its bitter experiences should not on this -occasion fail to bear fruit, and the most detailed, thorough, and -fearless study of all its defects can only bring about a renewal and -increase of strength. We must remember one point—and it is the main -point: our officers and many of the men conducted themselves most -unselfishly in most difficult circumstances. Given this, all our other -faults can be comparatively quickly mended; but before all else, we -must not be afraid of openly acknowledging them. - -Strength lies—in the truth. - -In this important work of rejuvenation which is now beginning in Russia -for the good of the people and the army, we must remember the great -words of the Tsar to the Army and Fleet almost two years ago: - - “Russia is mighty. During the thousand years of her existence - there have been years of still greater suffering—years when - greater danger menaced. Yet she has every time issued from the - struggle with fresh glory, with added might. - - “Though we may be sore at heart on account of the disasters and - losses that have befallen us, do not let us be discouraged. By - them Russia’s strength is renewed and her power increased. - - “A. N. KUROPATKIN, GENERAL. - - “SHESHURINO,[62] - “_November 30, 1906_.” - - - END OF VOLUME IV. OF THE ORIGINAL - - - - - CHAPTER XIII - - INTRODUCTION AND CONCLUSION TO VOLUME III.[63] - -When war seemed likely, the following scheme for the strategical -distribution of the troops in the Far East in the event of hostilities -was agreed to by the Viceroy, Alexeieff: - -1. The major portion of the troops, consisting of 60 infantry -battalions, 65 squadrons, 2 sapper battalions, and 160 guns (total, -65,000 rifles and sabres), were to be sent into Southern Manchuria. The -main body was to be concentrated in the area Hai-cheng–Liao-yang, and -the advance guard[64] moved forward to the Ya-lu. - -2. The garrison of Port Arthur was to consist of the 7th East Siberian -Rifle Division (12 battalions), 2 battalions of fortress artillery, and -1 company of sappers. The 5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, consisting -of 4 battalions with 6 guns, was also detailed for the defence of -the Kuan-tung district, to augment the strength of the garrison if -necessary. - -3. The garrison of Vladivostok was to consist of the 8th East Siberian -Rifle Division (8 battalions of infantry), with 2 battalions of -fortress artillery, 2 sapper companies, and 1 mining company. - -4. That of Nikolaievsk was to be 1 fortress infantry battalion, 1 -fortress artillery company, and 1 mining company. - -This scheme, by which the force detailed for the defence of Port Arthur -and the whole Kuan-tung Peninsula was limited to sixteen battalions, -was due to our exaggerated idea of the strength and invincibility of -our Pacific Ocean Fleet. According to the Viceroy, it was founded -on the following opinion, expressed by Admiral Witgeft, Chief of -Alexeieff’s temporary naval staff: - - “According to the present relative strengths of the two fleets, - the possibility of ours being defeated is a contingency that - need not be considered, and until it has been destroyed it is - inconceivable that the Japanese can land at Newchuang or any - other spot on the Gulf of Korea.” - -[Illustration: FIELD-MARSHAL MARQUIS IWAO OYAMA.] - -But such an attenuation of our force in this quarter was contrary -to the opinion of a committee—attended by me in my capacity of War -Minister—which sat in Port Arthur in June, 1903. The Viceroy and senior -commanders of the garrison were present at the meeting when it was -resolved and recorded as “essential” that the 3rd Siberian Corps should -be formed for the defence of Kuan-tung, in addition to the 7th East -Siberian Rifle Division, its permanent garrison, and that this corps -should be composed of the 3rd and 4th East Siberian Rifle Divisions, -each of twelve battalions. In fact, it was considered necessary to have -thirty-six battalions of infantry, exclusive of reserve battalions, -for the defence of Port Arthur and the Peninsula. This formation of a -special army corps for Kuan-tung was thought to be necessitated by the -existence so close to Port Arthur of Dalny, a magnificently equipped -port, connected by railway to the fortress, and a most convenient base -for operations against it. - -Feeling that the force allotted to the defence of the Peninsula was -inadequate, on February 11 I telegraphed as War Minister to Alexeieff -that I considered it imperative that the 9th East Siberian Rifle -Division—then under formation—should be sent there in place of the 3rd -East Siberian Rifle Division, ordered to the Ya-lu. The Viceroy did not -concur in this view, but he temporarily retained the 13th and 14th East -Siberian Rifle Regiments. - -On February 20, 1904, I was appointed to the command of the Manchurian -Army. In my first communication to the Viceroy (No. 1 of February 24) -I again expressed the opinion that, in view of the possibility of it -being besieged by four or five Japanese divisions, our first efforts -should be directed to strengthening Port Arthur. And I further stated: - - “If Port Arthur is weakly garrisoned, and should be besieged, - I might be tempted by that fact to assume the offensive before - there has been sufficient time to concentrate our forces. It is - for this reason that I have already advised the concentration - of the 9th Division in Kuan-tung to replace the 3rd.” - -However, the Viceroy again disagreed with me, and wrote in a despatch -of March 1: - - “Separate operations against the fortress would only be really - worth undertaking if the enemy could make certain of seizing it - by a _coup de main_, and the moment for this has passed. The - land front is becoming more formidable every day, and, though - not complete, the works are now well advanced; 200 additional - guns have been mounted in Port Arthur itself, and more than - forty at Chin-chou; the strength of the garrison is being - brought up by the reservists arriving from Trans-Baikalia, - and the stocks of supplies are being increased. All the bays - nearest the fortress, as well as the port of Dalny, have been - mined, and for the rest—the oft-proved stubbornness of the - Russian soldier in defence can be relied on.” - -He had already reported to the Tsar that— - - “Although separate operations against Port Arthur would - threaten the fortress itself with all the hardships of a siege - or blockade, they would be rather advantageous to our arms - as a whole, for they would entail a division of the enemy’s - forces.” - -As regards my own recommendations upon the plan of operations to be -followed against Japan, I drew up two memoranda, which I submitted to -the Tsar on February 15 and March 4. In the former I stated: - - “In the first phase of the campaign our main object should - be to prevent the destruction of our forces in detail. The - apparent importance of any single locality or position - (fortresses excepted) should not lead us into the great error - of holding it in insufficient force, which would bring about - the very result we are so anxious to prevent. While gradually - growing in numbers and preparing to take the offensive, we - should only move forward when sufficiently strong, and when - supplied with everything necessary for an uninterrupted advance - lasting over a fairly long period.” - -Against this the Tsar was pleased to note in his own handwriting the -words “Quite so.” - -I left St. Petersburg on March 12, and arrived at Liao-yang on the -28th. On this date there were collected in the concentration area in -Southern Manchuria 59 battalions,[65] 39 squadrons and _sotnias_, and -140 guns. The distribution was as follows: - -The _Southern Force_ (under General Sakharoff) of the 1st and 9th East -Siberian Rifle Divisions—20 battalions, 6 squadrons, and 54 guns—was in -the area Hai-cheng—Ta-shih-chiao—Newchuang—Kai-ping. - -The _Eastern (Advance) Force_ (under General Kashtalinski) of the 3rd -East Siberian Rifle Division—8 battalions, 24 guns, 8 mountain and 8 -machine-guns—was moved to the Ya-lu. - -The _Mounted Force_ (under General Mischenko) of 18 squadrons and 6 -guns was operating in Northern Korea. - -The _Main Body_ was divided into two groups: - - At An-shan-chan: 5th East Siberian Rifle Division - of 8 battalions and 24 guns. - - At Liao-yang: 2nd Brigades of the 31st and 35th Infantry - Divisions, 22nd and 24th East Siberian Rifle Regiments—21 - battalions, 10 squadrons, and 24 guns. - -In addition to these, the 23rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment—3 -battalions and 4 guns—was allotted to the protection of the Viceroy’s -Headquarters. - -In _Port Arthur_ were the 7th East Siberian Rifle Division—12 -battalions, 2 reserve battalions, 3-1/2 battalions of fortress -artillery, and a sapper and mining company. - -In _Kuan-tung_ were the 5th, 13th, 14th, and 15th East Siberian Rifle -Regiments, 1 battalion of the 16th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, 2 -battalions of the 18th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, and 1 reserve -battalion—12 battalions, 20 guns, and 1 _sotnia_ of Cossacks. - -On my arrival I approved the following scheme of engineering works: -The fortification of the positions on the Fen-shui Ling (Passes), and -at Liao-yang, Mukden, and Tieh-ling; the construction of roads across -the passes to the Ya-lu, and of three parallel roads from Kai-ping to -Mukden; the construction of crossings over the Liao River, and the -hutting of three army corps. I at once took steps also to strengthen -our advance guard on the Ya-lu, which was some 133 miles distant. Two -regiments of the 6th East Siberian Rifle Division were sent there, in -addition to the third battalions for the regiments of the 3rd East -Siberian Rifle Division. By the time, therefore, that the enemy began -crossing the Ya-lu, the Eastern (Advance) Force had been increased -to eighteen battalions, besides which the 21st East Siberian Rifle -Regiment had been moved towards Ta-shih-chiao. The advance guard was -under General Zasulitch. Meanwhile the units of the 1st Siberian -Division were detained by Alexeieff in Harbin, so that, from the middle -of March to the middle of April, the Manchurian Army did not receive a -single battalion from the rear. - -Notwithstanding the orders Zasulitch had received to avoid a decisive -engagement with the enemy, who had the superiority in numbers, on -May 1 part of his force became hotly engaged in what developed into a -serious fight at the Ya-lu, and after a disastrous finish his eastern -force was withdrawn to the passes of the greater Fen-shui-ling range, -which they reached on May 7. In this action only nine of our eighteen -battalions took any active part, those of the 11th and 12th East -Siberian Rifle Regiments showing great gallantry and determination. -When asked why he had disobeyed the orders repeatedly given to him -not to become entangled in a serious engagement, but to fall back on -Feng-huang-cheng, Zasulitch gave as his reason that he had hoped to -defeat the enemy. On May 5 the Japanese began debarking at Pi-tzu-wo, -and a small force of all arms under General Zikoff was detached -from the southern force in order to reconnoitre and ascertain the -importance of this landing. The advance of this column incidentally -enabled us to repair temporarily the portion of the line which the -enemy had destroyed, and so to run a train-load of mélinite shells, -machine-guns, and ammunition through to Port Arthur. The Emperor was -fully alive to the danger of the situation caused by the dispersion -of the Manchurian Army, and on May 11 telegraphed his orders for an -immediate concentration. This was completed by the 14th, and the force -was grouped on two points—Hai-cheng and Liao-yang. The former group -consisted of twenty-seven battalions, twelve squadrons and _sotnias_, -and eighty guns; the latter of twenty-eight battalions, six _sotnias_, -and eighty-eight guns. The passes over the Fen-shui-ling range were -guarded by small columns of infantry with guns, and advance and flank -guards were thrown out. The independent cavalry, operating on our -flanks east of the passes, was divided in two bodies, under Mischenko -and Rennenkampf. West of Liao-yang was a small force under General -Kossagovski, while five and a half battalions of the 1st Siberian -Division lay at Mukden. At this time also, when the Viceroy returned to -Port Arthur (after Admiral Makharoff’s death of April 13), the weakness -of the place began to be shown up, and Alexeieff’s apprehensions as to -its safety became acute. In a despatch of May 16 he questioned whether -the place “would be able to hold out for more than two or three months, -in spite of all the steps taken to strengthen its defences.” On April -25 the Chief of the Viceroy’s Staff telegraphed to me that, owing to -the inadequacy of the garrison, Alexeieff considered it essential that -if the fortress were attacked, the field army should support it as -energetically and rapidly as possible. Alexeieff was not singular in -his pessimistic views, for Stössel also gave up hope of a successful -defence of Port Arthur directly after he had so unnecessarily -abandoned the Chin-chou position on May 27. On the 28th I received a -telegram from him urging me to support him speedily and in strength. -This opinion was again endorsed by Alexeieff, who telegraphed on June -5 that “Port Arthur cannot strictly be called a storm-proof fortress, -and it is a question whether it can even stand a siege of the length -indicated in my telegram of May 16.” - -The result of this _volte-face_ on the part of Alexeieff as to the -powers of resistance of the place was that he pressed me to send part -of the army at once to assist it, though we were by no means ready for -such an enterprise. On May 21 he wrote that he considered the moment -in every way favourable for the army to assume the offensive in one of -two directions—either towards the Ya-lu, with the object of defeating -and throwing Kuroki back across the river, detaching a force to contain -him there, and then moving on to relieve Port Arthur, or else direct on -that place. - -It should be borne in mind that these instructions were given at a time -when the position of only two of the hostile armies had been fixed. Of -these, one—of three divisions and three reserve brigades—had forced -the crossing of the Ya-lu, and the other—of three divisions—had landed -near Pi-tzu-wo. Moreover, a landing, of the extent of which we had no -information, was then being carried out at Ta-ku-shan. Consequently -we did not know the destination of one-half of the enemy’s army, and -were thus not in possession of two important pieces of knowledge which -were necessary before any operations of a decisive character could be -undertaken—namely, the position of the enemy’s main forces and their -probable plan of operations. It was incumbent on us, therefore, to -exercise great caution, and to keep our forces as far as possible -concentrated, so as to be ready to meet the attack of two or even three -armies. Concerning the two directions in which the Viceroy advocated -an advance, the following few points suggest themselves. For any -operations towards the Ya-lu—bearing in mind the necessity for guarding -our flank and rear against one hostile force landing at Pi-tzu-wo, -and possibly others landing near Kai-ping or Newchuang—not more than -sixty to seventy battalions were available of the ninety-four which -in the middle of May constituted the army; the whole of the food for -these troops had to be brought up by rail, owing to the exhaustion of -the local resources—never very plentiful—in the hilly country between -Liao-yang and Feng-huang-cheng: we had not got the transport to do -this, for our ten transport trains could only have carried a three or -four days’ supply for a force of this size; the usual May and June -rains would have made the movement of our guns and baggage at first -difficult, and then impossible, and we had at that time no mountain -artillery or pack transport; we were by no means well placed in the -matter of artillery parks: the horses for those of the 5th, 6th, and -9th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Divisions were still _en route_ to -Harbin, while the 1st and 2nd Siberian Divisions had arrived without -any. Finally, if Kuroki should fall back behind the Ya-lu without -accepting battle, we should have been obliged to retire and leave at -least an army corps to contain him. When the rainy season came on, this -corps itself would have been obliged to withdraw, as with interrupted -communications it would have been seriously threatened by Kuroki’s -far larger force, well provided with both mountain artillery and -pack transport. For these reasons an offensive towards the Ya-lu was -impracticable. - -Under the conditions laid down by the Viceroy as to keeping screens on -the Fen-shui Ling (Passes), and leaving a reserve at Hai-cheng[66] -until such time as fresh reinforcements had been received, a direct -advance on Port Arthur could only be made with one corps of twenty-four -battalions. In view of the possibility of Kuroki taking the offensive -in superior force (after reinforcement by the troops already beginning -to land at Ta-ku-shan) against our cordon, which extended along the -Fen-shui-ling range for more than sixty-six miles, and in view of the -possibility of the Japanese cutting off any detachment moving on Port -Arthur by landing somewhere in its rear, the despatch of this corps -130 miles to the south could not but be considered a most risky and -difficult operation. - -As our numerical weakness absolutely precluded a general assumption -of the offensive on our part, I pointed out that by such a movement -for the relief of Port Arthur we risked disorganizing the whole army. -I also drew attention to the fact that, according to the report of -Captain Gurko, who had just arrived from the fortress, its combatant -strength amounted to at least 45,000 men (including sailors), and that -the enemy could not therefore have any very overwhelming superiority. -My views upon the inexpediency of any movement towards Port Arthur were -communicated to the War Minister in my telegrams (Nos. 692 and 701) -of May 28 and 30. But in a telegram of the 31st the Viceroy urgently -requested me to advance to the relief of the fortress, and expressed -the wish that four divisions should be detailed for the operation; -while on June 6 he quoted to me a message from St. Petersburg in which -it was stated that the time was “ripe for the Manchurian Army to assume -the offensive.” - -At the end of May the first reinforcements—the 3rd Siberian -Division—began to arrive in the concentration area. This enabled me to -increase the force detailed for the advance into Kuan-tung up to 32 -battalions,[67] 22 squadrons and _sotnias_, and 100 guns. As a reserve -to this force, the 2nd Brigade of the 31st Division was placed in the -area Kai-ping—Hsiung-yao-cheng, and to a brigade of the 3rd Siberians -was allotted the duty of watching the coast from Newchuang to the -latter place. To hold Kuroki and the troops under Nodzu that had landed -at Ta-ku-shan in check, 40 battalions, 52 _sotnias_, and 94 guns were -left on the Fen-shui Ling (Passes), distributed over a length of more -than sixty-six miles. The general reserve consisted of the 5th East -Siberian Rifle Division at Liao-yang, and a brigade of the 3rd Siberian -Division at Hai-cheng. Early in June the force detailed under General -Shtakelberg for the operations towards Port Arthur began to concentrate -at Te-li-ssu, with its advance guard at Wa-fang-tien. On the 13th the -Japanese themselves began to advance from Pu-lan-tien, and by the -evening of that day we had been able to rail two regiments of the 9th -East Siberian Rifle Division into Te-li-ssu. On the 14th the enemy’s -attack of our position there was repulsed, and on the following day -Shtakelberg proposed to make a counter attack, having been reinforced -at noon by the Tobolsk Regiment. However, the battle ended in our -defeat, and we were forced to fall back. General Gerngross, who was -in command of the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division, was wounded, but -remained in action. Shtakelberg’s orders gave him freedom of action, -but he was instructed not to accept decisive battle if the enemy were -in superior numbers. Simultaneously with the enemy’s advance from the -south, Kuroki moved forward on the 14th to the Ta Ling[68] (Pass) -from Hsiu-yen, where three (according to some reports four) Japanese -divisions were concentrated. Their 12th Division and three reserve -brigades were left to watch our eastern force, and a further movement -on Kai-ping, Ta-shih-chiao, or Hai-cheng was quite likely. - -In order to be in a position to check the combined advance of the -two Japanese groups, I thought it advisable to strengthen our -southern force, and therefore so rearranged our dispositions that -87 out of 110 battalions were massed on the southern front, in the -area Kai-ping—Hai-cheng, against Oku and Nogi. Fortunately for us, -the critical position of our eastern front during the operations at -Te-li-ssu was not appreciated by Kuroki, which fact favoured Count -Keller’s demonstration towards Feng-huang-cheng in the middle of June. -Otherwise Kuroki might have seized Liao-yang. On the 25th the enemy’s -advance against our eastern force was commenced. On the 27th Keller -withdrew some of his troops from the Fen-shui Ling (Passes) without -opposition, and by July 1 the main body was concentrated seven miles -east of Lang-tzu-shan and twenty-seven from Liao-yang. On June 27, -without any serious engagement, but under pressure from the enemy, we -abandoned the Fen-shui Ling (Passes), which they at once occupied. -A few days previously—on June 23—about a division of the enemy had -been located by Rennenkampf to the east of Sai-ma-chi. Believing that -Hai-cheng constituted our greatest danger, as the enemy might, if they -gained a success there, cut off Shtakelberg’s force close by, on the -29th I concentrated forty-one battalions and eighteen _sotnias_ under -Zasulitch at Hsi-mu-cheng, intending with them to hurl back the enemy -on to their Hai-cheng line of advance. However, on the same day we -discovered that those of the enemy who had moved at first from the Ta -Ling (Pass) along the Hsi-mu-cheng road had again retired to it. - -This danger being temporarily averted, I ordered the 31st Infantry -Division back to Hai-cheng. As the defence of Liao-yang from the east -was the next most urgent matter, a brigade of the 9th Division, which -had just arrived from Russia, was moved to Lang-tzu-shan to act as -a reserve to the eastern force, which had been previously augmented -by the return to it of two regiments of the 3rd East Siberian Rifle -Division. The other brigade was sent, under General Hershelman, who -commanded the division, to Hsi-kei-an village [at the junction of the -Liao-yang and Mukden roads], so as to cover the left flank of the -eastern force and guard the road to Mukden. Taking into consideration -the considerable increase of the eastern force, I ordered Count Keller -to take the offensive, so as again to get possession of the passes. -He did so, but although he had forty battalions under his command, -he advanced with only twenty-four. Though our troops were successful -in the early hours of July 17, thanks to the gallant conduct of the -24th East Siberian Rifles under Colonel Lechitski, the result of the -day’s action was not favourable. Keller stopped the advance before -even bringing into action his strong reserves, with the result that at -nightfall the eastern force was once more on its former positions on -the Yang-tzu Ling (Pass). On the 19th the brigade of the 9th Division -was driven from its position at Chiao-tou, and fell back towards -Hu-chia-tzu.[69] - -By the middle of July the disposition of the enemy’s forces was -approximately as follows: Kuroki, with three field divisions and -reserves, had captured the three Fen-shui Ling and Mo-Tien Ling -(Passes), and, with his outposts thrown out on the roads to Liao-yang, -had reached the valley of the Tang Ho, a tributary of the Tai-tzu Ho. -Nodzu, with an army of approximately the same strength, had captured -the passes on the Kai-ping, Ta-shih-chiao, and Hai-cheng roads, and -had two divisions and a brigade in reserve on the Hai-cheng line of -advance and one on the Ta-shih-chiao line. Oku, having moved up from -Kuan-tung with his army of some four divisions, had driven back our -outposts and occupied Kai-ping. Two brigades were left in reserve on -the line Feng-huang-cheng—Kuan-tien-chang. Thus, according to our -information, two armies of about 90 to 100 battalions had advanced -against us from the east, and one of about 50 to 60 battalions from -the south, whilst Nogi’s army of 3 divisions and 2 reserve brigades -had been left to operate against Port Arthur. Our dispositions were -briefly: 44 battalions against Kuroki’s army; 28 battalions on the -line Fen-shui-ling—Hai-cheng against 2 divisions and 1 reserve brigade -of Nodzu’s army; 48 battalions against Oku’s army, and 1 division of -Nodzu’s; 16 battalions were in the general reserve at Hai-cheng, and -four in garrison at Liao-yang. It must, however, be borne in mind that -the effective strength of our battalions was very far short of the -prescribed establishment.[70] From the beginning of the war up to July -only 3,600 men were received in the way of drafts. - -With the above dispositions of the opposing forces, we should, -according to the theory of the art of war, have been able to operate -on “interior lines.” But for us this was extremely difficult, as, -in the first place, we had not enough men to attain the necessary -superiority over any one of the hostile groups without laying ourselves -open to defeat by the other two; and, in the second, the rains had so -seriously damaged the roads as to prevent the rapid movement (as we -had heavy guns and baggage) necessary for successful action even on -interior lines. Finally, as their bases (Korea, Ta-ku-shan, Pi-tzu-wo) -were enveloping it was possible for each of their groups to refuse an -unequal battle, and fall back without exposing its communications. -Still, notwithstanding these unfavourable conditions, it was proposed -to attack Kuroki, who menaced our communications most, at the earliest -favourable moment. The troops which could be employed to strike him -were distributed in two directions: twenty-four battalions of the -eastern force on the main road from Liao-yang to Lang-tzu-shan, with -its outposts on the Yang-tzu-ling heights; and twenty-four battalions -of the 10th Army Corps on the line Liao-yang—Sai-ma-chi, with its -outposts five miles short of Chiao-tou. Twenty-four battalions of the -17th Corps were told off to remain as a reserve to these two groups at -Liao-yang, while to prevent our left flank being turned, and to cover -the Mukden road, the 11th Pskoff and 2nd Dagestan Regiments, which -had just arrived from Russia, were ordered to Pen-hsi-hu. But on July -23, when I inspected the 10th Corps, I found that it was absolutely -incapable of operating in the hills, as it had no pack-animals. In -fact, those companies on outpost duty on steep or high ground had -actually to remain all day without food or water. As the units of the -17th Corps were in a similar condition, it was impossible even to think -of at once assuming the offensive. - -Meanwhile, on the 23rd and 24th, the enemy themselves took the -initiative by attacking the 1st and 4th Siberian Corps south of -Ta-shih-chiao. In spite of the fact that the position held by these -corps was very extended (eleven miles), and was divided in the centre -by a rocky ridge, and that its left flank could have been easily -turned, all the enemy’s efforts were repulsed. The regiments of the 4th -Siberians, who bore the heat and burden of the day, behaved splendidly, -but “in view of the great superiority of the enemy and the development -of an attack from the direction of Ta-ling,” Zarubaeff, who was given -general instructions but allowed freedom of action, decided early -on the morning of the 25th to withdraw his force towards Hai-cheng. -On learning of this, I ordered General Sluchevski to make immediate -preparations for offensive operations, and, if Kuroki should cross the -Tai-tzu Ho and move towards Mukden, at once to advance, whether his -troops were prepared for operating in the hills or not, and endeavour -to strike Kuroki’s communications. However painful the abandonment -of the port of Newchuang was for us after our tactical success at -Ta-shih-chiao—for the enemy could now make use of it as a new base—the -strategical position of our army was improved. With the departure of -the southern force towards Hai-cheng, our greatly extended front was -diminished by twenty miles. - -On July 31 the enemy advanced all along the line. As far as our -southern group was concerned, their blow was directed against -Zasulitch, who was holding a position west of Hsi-mu-cheng, especially -against his right flank, which was driven back in spite of the devoted -efforts of the Voronej and Kozloff Regiments. As any further success -on their part threatened to cut off the 2nd Siberians from the main -body of the southern group, I withdrew Zasulitch’s force to Hai-cheng. -On the same day, the enemy’s operations on the eastern front were -directed against both our groups. In the action on the Yang-tzu Ling -(Pass) General Count Keller was killed, and the unexpected death of -this gallant commander, together with the abandonment without orders -by the 23rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment[71] of the position which -protected his left flank, greatly influenced Kashtalinski (Keller’s -successor) in coming to his too hasty decision to withdraw the force -to Lang-tzu-shan. At the same time the 10th Corps was taken partly by -surprise,[72] and driven from its advanced posts towards Hu-chia-tzu. -Sluchevski, learning of the retirement of the eastern force towards -Lang-tzu-shan, and fearing for his right flank, then withdrew his corps -to An-ping. In these operations the corps commander displayed a lack of -energy, and several regiments showed great unsteadiness, especially the -reservists, many of whom actually left the ranks during the progress of -the fight. - -The complicated nature of the situation now necessitated extreme -caution on our part, lest anything should prevent our concentration in -strength at Liao-yang, and there fighting a decisive battle against all -three Japanese armies with some hope of success. From Liao-yang to our -position on the eastern front, An-ping–Lang-tzu-shan, was twenty miles, -and to Hai-cheng forty miles. In order to insure the movement of the -troops on the southern front to their positions at Liao-yang in good -time, it was necessary to move them from Hai-cheng to the position at -An-shan-chan—fifteen miles from Liao-yang—which was fortified at the -beginning of the war. The retirement began early on August 2, and on -the following day the troops were concentrated on the position. In my -report to the Tsar of August 4, I gave the following general reasons -for withdrawing to the line An-shan-chan–Lang-tzu-shan–An-ping after -the July fighting: - -1. The Japanese superiority in numbers. - -2. They were accustomed to hills and hot weather; they were younger, -carried lighter loads, and had numerous mountain artillery and pack -transport. - -3. Their energetic and intelligent leadership. - -4. The extraordinary patriotism and military spirit of their troops; and - -5. The lack of such a spirit on our side (caused by general ignorance -of what we were fighting for). - -Every moment gained at the beginning of August was of great importance -to us, as the units of the 5th Siberians, which the Viceroy agreed -to send to the front—instead of into the Pri-Amur district, as was -proposed earlier—should have been beginning to arrive in Liao-yang. -Orders were therefore issued to fortify an advanced position half a -march from Liao-yang in addition to the main position at that place, -and for this time was required. Still, in spite of the obvious and -immense importance of every day we gained by delaying the enemy’s -advance, General Bilderling, who had taken over the command of our -eastern front from July 31, wrote that it was necessary to withdraw -his troops immediately without fighting to Liao-yang itself, while -Sluchevski urged that the army should be concentrated still further -north—in the area Liao-yang–Mukden. These officers reiterated the same -opinions still more forcibly early in August, when the difficulty of -moving their troops towards Liao-yang became greatly increased by the -heavy rains. The Viceroy, who was much perturbed about the fate of Port -Arthur by the news of the unfortunate result of the naval operations -on August 10, and whose fears were increased by Stössel’s highly -alarmist reports, was at the same time urging me (August 15) to assist -the fortress and make an advance of some sort—though it were only a -demonstration—towards Hai-cheng. - -On August 25 the enemy again advanced, and on the 26th attacked us -on the eastern front, but their onslaught on the 3rd Siberians at -Lang-tzu-shan and the attempt made to turn our right flank failed. -Ivanoff (who was in command of the corps) handled his artillery most -skilfully, and all units of this corps behaved well. The reserves -sent up by Bilderling arrived in good time, but the enemy obtained a -position on the left of the 10th Corps which enabled them to menace the -retirement of this corps along the Tang Ho. In the hot fight on the -26th again several units of the 10th Corps did splendidly. At this time -a strong turning movement was discovered being developed against the -left flank of our An-shan-chan position; but by delaying and inflicting -heavy loss on the enemy on the Lang-tzu-shan and An-ping positions, -all the corps were able to fall back on the advanced positions at -Liao-yang, where the army was concentrated on August 29. At the -beginning of the action there the army was short of its prescribed -strength by 350 officers and 14,800 men. Excluding the men detailed for -extra duty (on the communications, etc.), the average strength of our -companies was only 140 to 150 rifles, and those companies that lost -most heavily in the previous fights could muster less than 100. - -The detailed account of the battle of Liao-yang has long ago been -submitted to Headquarters. The following is a general description of -it: On August 30 and 31 the enemy attacked our advanced positions with -great determination, especially that of the 1st and 3rd Siberians, but -were repulsed everywhere with heavy loss. In this fight the regiments -of the 1st, 9th, 3rd, 6th, and 5th East Siberian Rifle Divisions -rivalled each other in steadiness and gallantry, while the dispositions -made by Shtakelberg and Ivanoff were good. Our success, however, was -by no means lightly gained. Our artillery expended as much as 100,000 -rounds of ammunition, leaving us with only 10,000 rounds in the army -reserve. Moreover, excluding eight battalions furnishing guards and -holding the works of the main Liao-yang position, on September 1 only -sixteen battalions were left in the general reserve. During the 31st -we observed that large bodies of Kuroki’s army were crossing on to -the right bank of the Tai-tzu Ho. And, as the position held by the -10th Corps (against which Kuroki should have been operating in full -strength) had not for two days been subjected to any such determined -attacks as that held by the 1st and 3rd Siberians, there was every -reason to suppose that Kuroki’s main body was moving round to operate -against our communications. Accordingly a decision had to be made of -one of two alternatives: either— - -1. To contain Kuroki with a small force and advance to the south -against Oku and Nodzu; or— - -2. To fall back on the main Liao-yang position, leave as few troops -as possible to defend it, and then attack in force that portion of -Kuroki’s army which was moving round our left, and endeavour to crush -it by driving it back on the Tai-tzu Ho, which at that time of the year -was unfordable except at a few points. - -As regards the first, even if we were successful against Oku and Nodzu, -they could always fall back on their communications if in difficulties, -and so draw us away from Liao-yang, while any success by Kuroki which -might lead to an attack by him on our communications would threaten -us with catastrophe.[73] In order to collect sufficient force to -move against the two armies, it would have been necessary to have -contained Kuroki with only such troops as were on the right bank of the -river—namely, the 17th Corps and two regiments of the 54th Division -(total, forty battalions) under Bilderling. But as these troops were -not yet seasoned, it was impossible to rely on their performing such an -extremely difficult task as that of holding in check Kuroki’s superior -numbers on the necessarily extended position they would have to occupy -[this fear was justified by subsequent events]. These considerations -led to the adoption of the second alternative. - -On the 31st, under cover of darkness and without being pressed, we -began the evacuation of the advanced positions, which had already been -of value to us, inasmuch as the enemy had been weakened by the losses -incurred in attacking them. By the following morning as many as 100 -battalions, with artillery and cavalry, had crossed on to the right -bank of the river. The Japanese did not occupy our abandoned positions -till the evening of that date, when they began to shell Liao-yang. -The general disposition of the army was as follows: 56 battalions, 10 -_sotnias_, and 144 guns (under Zarubaeff) were still on the left bank; -30 battalions, 5 _sotnias_, and 84 guns were on the right for the -defence of Liao-yang itself. In addition to the small columns detailed -to guard our flanks and rear, the remainder of the army, totalling -93 battalions, 73 squadrons and _sotnias_, and 352 guns, were told -off to attack Kuroki. But in making this calculation as to the number -of battalions available, it is essential to explain a very important -factor. During the whole period of the war from its commencement -till August only 6,000 men had been received at the front as drafts -to repair wastage, and, as I have said, we began the fighting round -Liao-yang with a shortage of 15,000 men. The result of this, taken -in connection with the great number of men that had to be detached -for various non-combatant duties, and also our losses in the fighting -that had already taken place in the neighbourhood, was that the actual -strength of the ninety-three battalions was, on September 1, only from -50,000 to 55,000 rifles. For instance, the twenty-one battalions -comprising the 10th Corps (which took part in the affair of September -2) only numbered 12,000 rifles, and the total of the twenty-four -battalions of the 1st Siberians only amounted to 10,000. Kuroki’s army, -on the other hand, was calculated to number approximately from 65,000 -to 70,000 men. The plan of operations for the troops crossing on to the -right bank was as follows: The force was to deploy between the position -held by the 17th Corps near the village of Hsi-kuan-tun and the heights -near the Yen-tai mines, which were to have been held by Orloff’s force -of thirteen battalions. Using the Hsi-kuan-tun position as a pivot, -the army was to throw its left forward so as to strike the Japanese in -flank. The position for the 17th Corps near this village was chosen by -Bilderling in preference to that which had been prepared for defence -beforehand on the right bank on the line San-chia-tzu–Ta-tzu-pu, and -sufficient attention was not paid to its fortification. All that was -done was to dig a few trenches, and no field of fire had even been -cleared in the _kao-liang_ crops. The consequence was that, in the -early morning of September 2, the enemy drove the 137th Niejinsk -Regiment from the peak north-east of this place, which constituted the -left flank position of the 17th Corps, and to regain this hill became -the first thing we had to do. For this Bilderling was given forty-four -battalions, with the 3rd Siberians in reserve, while the 1st Siberians -and Orloff’s column were to assist by threatening the Japanese right. -Both Bilderling and Shtakelberg had been instructed as to what was -expected of them, but they were given an absolutely free hand as to -their dispositions. Notwithstanding the large force under Bilderling’s -command, the operations failed in their object. Although the peak was -recaptured on the evening of the 2nd, we were again driven off during -the night, and had to fall back some two miles, only halting on the -Erh-ta-ho heights. - -Orloff, on the other hand, moved from his position on the heights south -of the Yen-tai mines before he ought to have done, without waiting for -the arrival of the 1st Siberians. His troops became at once immersed -in a perfect sea of _kao-liang_, and were fired on from front and -flank; parts of the column were seized with panic, and the whole force -retreated in disorder towards Yen-tai station. A large portion even -went as far as the station itself. This sudden and unexpected departure -from the field of 12,000 men had a disastrous result on this flank. We -lost an excellent position, which should have served as the support for -our advance from the left, and the enemy, spreading away to the north, -had by 5 p.m., in spite of the gallant efforts of Samsonoff and his -Siberian Cossacks, occupied the whole range of heights and the Yen-tai -mines. With the occupation of these heights the whole of our left was -endangered. At midnight Shtakelberg reported that, owing to his heavy -losses in the preceding battles, he would not be able to take the -offensive, or even to accept battle on the following day. - -Meanwhile the armies of Oku and Nodzu had advanced in force against -Liao-yang, but had been driven back by Zarubaeff. Here the main burden -of the fighting fell on the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division, which -behaved extremely well, as did the regiments of the 4th Siberians. On -the night of the 3rd, however, Zarubaeff reported that, though the -enemy had been repulsed, he had only three battalions left in reserve, -and needed reinforcements and gun ammunition. At the same time a -message came in from Lubavin, who was covering the Pen-hsi-hu–Mukden -line, informing me of his retirement to the Tung-chia-fen Ling (Pass), -sixteen miles from Mukden. From this it is evident that if, choosing -the first alternative, we had marched against Oku and Nodzu, Kuroki -could most certainly have driven back the 17th Corps and 54th Division, -and have seized the railway in rear of our troops moving southwards. -As we knew, however, that Kuroki was not operating against us with his -main body during the battle of the 2nd, we realized it might have been -sent to turn our left. Such being the situation, we had to decide -whether to maintain our hold on the river, or to abandon Liao-yang -and retire to the position on the left bank of the Hun Ho in front of -Mukden, which had been already fortified. - -As regards the first alternative, it seemed possible that we might, -by an immense effort and skilful manœuvring, be able to hold on to -Liao-yang and throw Kuroki behind the Tai-tzu Ho. But for this it was -essential to draw in the force that had crossed to the right bank, and -to deploy it on a fresh line farther to the north, so that we might be -able to attack the enemy’s position on the heights near the Yen-tai -mines from the north as well as from the west. Such a movement would -have exposed our right, and would have isolated the position still -held by the 17th Corps on the right bank of the river. The Japanese -might drive it in and issue in rear of the troops at Liao-yang, for -that place was only eleven miles distant from the position to which -the 17th Corps would have had to retire if it were driven back. The -defenders of Liao-yang, being then attacked by Oku and Nodzu combined, -would be in a critical situation. As regards the second alternative, -a retirement on Mukden presented great disadvantages and dangers. It -increased the distance to Port Arthur; it would have to be carried out -under pressure from the enemy in front and on the left, and the roads -had been so much damaged by rain that it was doubtful whether we -should succeed in getting our transport or even artillery to Mukden. -The abandonment of Liao-yang could not fail both to depress the troops -who had so gallantly defended it and encourage the enemy. But, on -the other hand, we should be extricated by such a retirement from a -situation in which we were threatened in front and flank. A successful -withdrawal would also give time for the 1st Army Corps to come up, and, -what was not less important, for us to replenish artillery ammunition, -of which we were very short. Besides this, the banks of the Tai-tzu Ho -were specially unsuited for our troops, as they were almost entirely -covered with _kao-liang_. Our men were unused to this, lost their heads -whenever they got into it, and were very liable to panic. - -On the whole, our past experiences of the offensive did not inspire any -confidence that we should be able to cope with the difficult situation -implied by a retention of Liao-yang. I decided, therefore, on the -retirement towards Mukden, which was carried out by September 7. The -most difficult work, especially on the early morning of the 5th, fell -to the lot of the 1st Siberians, who had to beat off Kuroki’s force -attacking from the east; this they did with success, and without losing -a single trophy, in spite of the difficulties in which we were placed. - -A general account of the operations round Liao-yang, and a statement -of all the considerations which led to our retirement, were telegraphed -to the Emperor on September 11. On the 14th the army was made happy by -the following gracious message, which I received from His Majesty: - - “From your reports of the fighting at Liao-yang, I appreciate - that it was impossible for you to have held that position - longer without risk of being completely cut off from your - communications. Under such conditions, and in face of the - existing difficulties, the retirement of the whole force across - country without the loss of guns or baggage was a brilliant - feat of arms. I thank you and the gallant troops under your - command for their heroic conduct and enduring self-sacrifice. - May God help you all!” - -Upon retirement, our troops were grouped in two principal bodies— - -1. The defence of the main position on the left bank of the Hun Ho was -entrusted to the 10th and 17th Corps under Bilderling, to whom was -subordinated Dembovski’s force of 10 battalions of the 5th Siberians, -which was guarding the near right flank of the main position. -Altogether, the troops under Bilderling’s command amounted to 75 -battalions, 53 squadrons and _sotnias_, 190 guns, 24 mortars, and 3 -sapper battalions. - -2. The protection of the left flank from Fu-shun to the west was -entrusted to Ivanoff’s force, consisting of the 2nd and 3rd Brigades of -the 4th and some units of the 5th Siberians (total, 62 battalions, 26 -_sotnias_, 128 guns, and 2 sapper battalions). - -3. To keep touch between these two main groups were the 1st Siberians -under Shtakelberg (total, 24 battalions, 10 squadrons and _sotnias_, 56 -guns, and 1 sapper battalion). To his force was entrusted the defence -of the portion of the Hun Ho from Chiu-tien to Pu-ling. - -4. The general reserve was disposed in two groups— - -(_a_) 4th Siberians (24 battalions, 6 squadrons, 96 guns, 12 mortars, -and 1 sapper battalion) on the line Erh-tai-tzu–Khou-kha.[74] - -(_b_) 1st Army Corps, which concentrated in Mukden early in -September[75] (32 battalions, 6 squadrons, 96 guns, 1 sapper -battalion), along the Mandarin road on the line Pu-ho–Ta-wa. - -5. The protection of the extreme right was entrusted to Kossagovski -(6-1/2 battalions, 9 squadrons, 14 guns), the main body of which was at -Kao-li-tun on the Liao. - -6. A brigade of the 6th Siberians (8 battalions and 1-1/2 _sotnias_) -was concentrated at Tieh-ling to protect our communications. - -7. The Trans-Baikal and Ural Cossack Brigades which did not belong to -any corps were joined together under the command of Mischenko (21 -_sotnias_ and 8 guns). - -Besides putting the finishing touches to the main position at Mukden, -which had already been fortified, the defensive work consisted of -strengthening the Fu-liang and Fu-shun positions, and throwing up some -works on the right bank of the Hun Ho between Mukden and Fu-liang. The -object of these was to check the enemy crossing until our reserves -could come up. In addition to this, much was done to improve the -communications towards Tieh-ling. On September 20 I learned by telegram -from the Viceroy of the formation of the 2nd Manchurian Army. This was -to comprise the 6th Siberians and 8th Army Corps, five Rifle brigades -from Russia, a Cossack infantry brigade, the 4th Don and 2nd Caucasian -Cossack Divisions, and three dragoon regiments of the 10th Cavalry -Division. General Grippenberg was appointed to the command of this -force on September 24. - -Our position at Mukden had some very grave defects. - -1. Its left flank (Fu-liang–Fu-shun) was, owing to the bend in the Hun -Ho to the north-east of Mukden, thrown much too far back. If the enemy -were successful on this flank, and came out on to our communications, -we should be compelled to abandon the main position prematurely. - -2. Almost immediately in rear of the position was the River Hun, which -was at the time unfordable, and could only be crossed by bridges. -Behind the river was the town itself. - -3. The Fu-shun coal-mines, which were most necessary to us (for railway -fuel), were right in front of the position. - -These drawbacks, as well as our great desire to prevent any of the -enemy’s forces being detached for the reinforcement of Nogi’s besieging -army, drove us to try and take the offensive as soon as possible. - -Meanwhile the drafts whereby to replace our losses were still arriving -at the front very slowly; during July and August only 4,200 men were -received. On September 29 the eight corps composing the Manchurian Army -could only muster 151,000 rifles, the deficit in officers being 670. -Besides these corps, the Viceroy put the 6th Siberian Corps[76] under -my command, with the proviso that it should not be included in the -army, and should not be split up.[77] It was concentrated at Mukden on -October 8. My requests that the units of the 1st Siberian Division—some -ten battalions—which were not included in the army, might be made over -to me were not acceded to. But although we were really too weak, an -advance seemed more advantageous than waiting for the enemy to attack, -for there seemed little chance of our being able to hold our ground on -the Mukden positions. - -According to our information, the Japanese main forces had crossed -on to the right bank of the Tai-tzu Ho, between Liao-yang and -Pen-hsi-hu, and were disposed approximately as follows: In the -centre, behind the line Yen-tai station–Yen-tai mines, six divisions -with brigades in reserve; on the right, écheloned along the line -Pan-chia-pu-tzu–Pen-hsi-hu, two divisions with brigades in reserve; -on the left, more or less along the line San-de-pu–Sha-tai-tzu, two -divisions with their reserves. The enemy had fortified their positions -on the Yen-tai heights and at Pan-chia-pu-tzu. It was decided, -therefore, that the first object of our advance was to hurl the -Japanese back on to the left bank of the Tai-tzu Ho. To do this we -were to deliver a frontal attack, and at the same time endeavour to -turn their right, so that, if successful, we should dislodge them from -the hills. Orders were issued for the forward movement to commence on -October 5. The following was the plan of advance decided upon by me: - -1. _Western Force._—This force, under Bilderling, consisting of the -10th and 17th Corps (total, 64 battalions, 40 squadrons and _sotnias_, -196 guns, and 2 sapper battalions), was to make a demonstration in -front against the enemy’s main force. - -2. _Eastern Force._—This force, under Shtakelberg, consisting of -the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Siberians (total, 73 battalions, 29 squadrons -and _sotnias_, 142 guns, 6 mortars, 32 machine-guns, and 3 sapper -battalions), was to attack the right flank of the enemy, moving round -it from the east. The first objective of this force was the enemy’s -positions at Pan-chia-pu-tzu.[78] - -3. _The General Reserve._—This, consisting of the 1st Army Corps and -4th Siberians, with Mischenko’s brigade (total, 56 battalions, 20 -_sotnias_, 208 guns, 30 mortars, and 2 sapper battalions), was to move -up in rear of the interval between the western and eastern forces. - -4. _The 6th Siberians_ (32 battalions, 6 _sotnias_, 96 guns, and 1 -sapper battalion) was to remain temporarily in Mukden (with a brigade -at Tieh-ling), so that it might either be moved to a flank or added to -the reserve, according as the operations developed. - -5. _Flank Guards._—A force of 30-1/2 battalions, 39 _sotnias_, 82 guns, -and 1 sapper battalion was told off to protect the flanks. Of this, -19-1/2 battalions, 25 _sotnias_, 64 guns, and the sapper battalion were -to take part in the attack of the enemy’s position while keeping touch -with Dembovski’s and Rennenkampf’s columns of the eastern and western -forces respectively. - -6. Should the enemy concentrate towards their right, an endeavour -was to be made to break through their centre in the direction of the -Yen-tai mines by the 6th Siberians, with Bilderling’s force and the -general reserve. - -The advance began on October 5, and meeting with no determined -opposition, we on the 9th occupied the following positions: - -_Western Force._—The line Shih-li-ho–Ta-pu. - -_Eastern Force._—The line San-chia-tzu–Shang-shan-tzu–Ununin. - -_In the Centre._—By the range of hills south of Khaamatan (with the -assistance of a portion of the general reserve). - -The 4th Siberians, especially the Tomsk, Barnaul, and Irkutsk -Regiments, did excellent work, as did Mischenko’s mounted force, -reinforced by the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment. Rennenkampf’s -column moved out into the Tai-tzu Ho Valley, and worked along both -banks of the river towards Pen-hsi-hu. Though the independent -regiments of the 1st and 3rd Siberians suffered heavily, overcame -the difficulties of the locality, and made altogether a gallant bid -for success, they failed in their object, mainly owing to the lack -of co-ordination in the plan of operations, and of cohesion in its -execution. On the evening of the 10th the Japanese themselves took the -offensive, having concentrated their main forces opposite our right and -centre. Bilderling’s western force, after fighting desperately against -heavy odds and losing forty-six guns, fell back on the 12th on to the -main position on the Sha Ho. Our centre, augmented by the 1st Corps, -found itself, in consequence, too far forward, and was obliged on the -evening of the 13th to commence a retirement on to the high ground near -the position of the western force, and occupied the heights south of -Erh-ta-ho. From the 10th to the 12th Shtakelberg’s eastern force made a -gallant but vain endeavour to get possession of the almost inaccessible -ridges to the north of the road from Pen-hsi-hu to the Yen-tai mines. -His dangerous position, thirteen miles in advance, and the necessity -for collecting enough troops in our centre to repulse the further -attacks of the enemy’s main body, compelled me on the 12th to order him -to withdraw to the high ground of the position occupied by the rest of -the army, and to move a portion of his force in support of our centre. -The enemy’s further attempts to drive us from the ground we were -holding were unsuccessful, though we were hard pressed on the Sha Ho, -and the general desire to retire on our Mukden positions became very -great. In a night attack on the 15th the enemy succeeded in dislodging -two regiments of the 22nd Division from the “One Tree Peak,” which they -were holding on the left bank of the Sha Ho between the villages of -Sha-ho-pu and Sha-ho-tung. The loss of this height, which commanded us -on the right bank of the river, and constituted, so to speak, the key -of our position, by no means improved the situation. On the evening of -the 16th, therefore, I concentrated a force of twenty-five battalions -under Putiloff, whom I ordered to attack the enemy in front and flank. -After desperate hand-to-hand fighting, he succeeded on the morning of -the 17th in driving them off the heights, and captured eleven guns, one -machine-gun, many limbers and waggons. This episode put the finishing -touch to the major operations of both sides, and we now proceeded to -pass the winter in our respective positions in close touch with one -another. - -The reasons of the indecisive issue to the battle were: - -1. Shtakelberg’s unskilful disposition of the large force put under his -command, which was (as we discovered later) almost three times the size -of that opposed to him. - -2. The absence of proper control and generalship among senior -commanders of the western force. - -3. The abortive operations of, and lack of energy displayed by the -officer commanding the 10th Corps. (Among other things, he not only -retired quite unnecessarily on October 12 from his position on the left -bank of the Sha Ho, but also neglected to warn his neighbour in command -of the 1st Corps, who was in consequence placed in a critical position.) - -4. The useless manœuvres of the officer commanding the 31st Division, -who several times ordered one of his brigades to retire without due -cause. - -5. The unsteadiness of many units.[79] - -6. The lack of cohesion in the operations of the 6th Siberians (on the -right of the western force). - -During this battle of the Sha Ho the senior commanders—Generals -Bilderling and Shtakelberg—were given instructions as to what was -required of them generally, but were left to make their dispositions -independently. - -As will be seen from the above brief sketch of events, the September -fighting had no decisive results. The two sides suffered equally, and -lost about 50,000 men each. Still, our assumption of the offensive, -even with inadequate numbers, greatly improved our strategical -position by moving our general front thirteen miles forward in front of -Mukden, and afforded us a matter of four and a half months of time. As -soon as we occupied the positions on the Sha Ho from Shou-lin-tzu on -the right flank to Kao-tu-ling on the left, we set to work fortifying -them. Besides ten battalions of the 1st Corps, the whole of the 1st -Siberians and twenty-four battalions of the 6th Corps were moved into -the general reserve in rear of the centre, and we were confident that -we would be able to hold our ground. We still had, however, a very -small number of men—indeed, in some units the shortage was alarming. -The total strength of the 252 battalions comprising our army on October -25 was only 140,000 rifles, which works out at an average strength of -550 per battalion, while many battalions could not even muster 400 -men. Not less disquieting was the lack of officers, which now amounted -in the infantry alone to over 2,700, or an average deficiency per -battalion of eleven. Meanwhile the drafts to repair wastage were still -coming up in driblets. In October and November we only received some -13,000 men. It was not till December 8 that they began to reach us in -any quantity; during that month and the first half of January 72,000 -arrived. I reported upon this vital question in my letters to the Tsar -of October 26 and November 5. - -In his despatches of October 23 and 26 His Majesty was pleased to -inform me that I had been appointed to the supreme command of all the -forces in the Far East, that General Linievitch was appointed to the -command of the 1st, and General Baron Kaulbars to the command of the -3rd Army.[80] My first act was to augment the army by adding to it the -whole of the 1st Siberian and 61st Divisions, the latter of which was -intended by Alexeieff for the Pri-Amur district. This at once added -20,000 rifles to the field army; the leading units also of the 8th -Corps began to arrive at the beginning of November, and at the end of -the month were concentrated at Mukden. But the main thing which still -remained to be done was the improvement of our railway communication -with Russia, which became more than ever necessary on account of the -increased army to be supplied. - -On November 28 the effective strength of all three armies, including -the 8th Corps, amounted to 210,000 men. Our information as to the enemy -put their strength at this date at about 200,000. Although we were -rather superior in numbers, our superiority was too slight to insure -a successful offensive under the particularly difficult conditions -offered by the intense cold weather, and the fact that the enemy’s -positions were strongly fortified. The low temperature rendered the -lightest trench work practically impossible, and made the provision of -a large amount of warm clothing an absolute necessity. Our preparations -for the offensive, as regards making Mukden an intermediate base and -our engineering work, began in November. In addition to the branch -railway to the Fu-shun mines, which was completed that month, a branch -was laid to the right flank of our dispositions,[81] and a field line -to Rennenkampf’s force on the left.[82] But still, when December came -we were not ready to advance, mainly owing to the delay in railway -construction, largely caused by the weather. Although I was informed -by the War Minister, in a communication dated November 8, that the -running capacity of the Siberian and Trans-Baikal lines would from -October 28 be brought up to twelve pairs of military trains, we never -received as many right up to the end of the war. The result of this was -that the expected drafts, as well as the three Rifle brigades, arrived -about ten days later than we had calculated on receiving them, and -there was great delay in the distribution of warm clothing to the men, -particularly felt boots. Very great difficulty also was experienced in -collecting the food-supplies necessary for the forward movement, and -in organizing new transport units. - -When, in the middle of December, I summoned a meeting of the three -army commanders and consulted them as to the possible date of an -advance, in view of the critical state of affairs at Port Arthur, they -unanimously stated that it was essential to await the arrival of the -whole of the 16th Corps. On receiving the news of the surrender of -the fortress, I again asked their opinions as to whether—in view of -Oyama’s armies being probably augmented by that of Nogi—they did not -consider it desirable to commence an advance at an earlier date. But -they still adhered to their former opinion, modifying it only to the -extent that we should begin our advance while this corps was arriving, -and not wait until its concentration was completed. As regards the -actual plan of the offensive operations, the opinions of the three -army commanders were the same—namely, that we should deliver the -main blow with as large a force as possible at the enemy’s left, and -envelop it. The only difference of opinion was as to the depth of this -envelopment. The boldest and most original plan was that proposed by -Grippenberg—namely, that he should undertake, with the 2nd Army, a -wide turning movement—almost an envelopment—of the enemy’s left in the -direction of Yen-tai station, and cut himself free from the 3rd Army. -He considered it necessary to have seven corps under his command for -this operation. This, however, was impracticable, as, even without -leaving any troops as a general reserve, besides the 16th Corps then -arriving, only four corps could be given him—namely, the 8th, 10th, -1st Siberian, and the Composite Rifle Corps. General Linievitch, who -was apprehensive that the enemy might attack the 1st Army, thought -it dangerous to give Grippenberg the 1st Siberians. Kaulbars, in his -turn, thought it impossible, without grave risk of the 3rd Army being -driven from its positions, to detach any portion of it to the 2nd Army. -Finally, Grippenberg’s plan, though it promised great advantages in the -event of success, seemed very risky, for it extended our already long -front still more, and made it so attenuated that it would be liable to -be broken by a determined attack at any point. Moreover, no general -reserve would be left at my disposal with which to deal with any -unforeseen emergency. - -After proposing the above bold plan, Grippenberg suddenly went to the -other extreme, and became pessimistic. For instance, on January 13, -he informed me that the campaign was as good as lost, that we ought -to retire to Harbin, hold on to that point and Vladivostok, and from -thence move with two armies “in other directions.” On my asking him -which were the directions in which we should move, he gave no clear -explanation. The same idea was expressed also in a report received on -the same day (dated January 12) from General Ruzski, the Chief of the -Staff of the 2nd Army. In it was contained Grippenberg’s opinion that -it was impossible for us to dream of being successful after Nogi’s -arrival, and that— - - “The officer commanding the Army accordingly inclines to the - conclusion that, under the circumstances, the best solution of - the question would be to fall back to Mukden, or further if - necessary, and there to await a favourable opportunity to take - the offensive.” - -However, it was finally decided, in accordance with the opinions of -Linievitch and Kaulbars, and with the consent of Grippenberg, to take -the offensive in January, on the condition that complete and direct -touch was maintained between all three armies. - -According to our information, the strength of the Japanese armies was -approximately as follows: - - Kuroki’s Army 68 battalions, 21 squadrons, - and 204 guns - Nodzu’s Army 50 battalions, 11 squadrons, - and 168 guns - Oku’s Army 60 battalions, 29 squadrons, - and 234 guns - -or a total in all three armies under Oyama of 178 battalions, 61 -squadrons, and 606 guns. It was calculated that they could put 200,000 -rifles in the field against us on January 14, 1905. As a matter of -fact, we underestimated the number. From the prisoners we took we knew -accurately what was going on in their 1st Army, but we were unable to -ascertain with sufficient accuracy and in good time what was happening -in the rear, or what reinforcements were being received. Their -fortified positions were as follows: The left flank up to the village -of Hsiao-tung-kou was held by Oku. In the centre was Nodzu’s army. On -the right was Kuroki. Opposite Rennenkampf, on our extreme left, was a -force under Kavamura amounting to about 15,000 to 20,000 men. Nogi’s -army was estimated at 72 battalions, 5 squadrons, and 156 guns; but -which units had reached Oyama, and how they were grouped, we did not -know. - -In order to induce the enemy to detach as many men as possible for -their line of communications, and so weaken their front, to handicap -their supply arrangements, and to stop the rail transport of Nogi’s -units to the front, a raid by a mounted force[83] was organized against -their line of communications. The objects of this raid, which was under -Mischenko, were: - -1. To seize Newchuang station, and destroy the large stocks of -food-supplies collected there; and— - -2. To blow up the railway-bridges and destroy the track on the portion -of the line from Ta-shih-chiao to Kai-ping. - -Neither object was fully attained, chiefly owing to the slowness with -which the force moved. Individual episodes that occurred are, however, -very instructive, and show that our cavalry is quite fitted to perform -the most self-sacrificing duties. - -The plan agreed upon for the main advance was explained in my orders of -January 19. Just as it had been in September, our primary object was to -drive the enemy behind the Tai-tzu Ho, and to inflict on him as much -damage as possible. The force selected for our first attentions was -Oku’s left-flank army, the left wing of which was to be enveloped. The -advance of the 1st and 3rd Armies against the positions held by Nodzu -and Kuroki were to be started and developed in accordance with, and -depending upon, the measure of success attending the efforts of the 2nd -and 3rd Armies to capture the enemy’s left-flank positions on the Sha -Ho. The armies were given the following tasks: - -1. The 2nd Army was to gain possession of the line of Japanese -works San-de-pu–Lita-jen-tun–Ta-tai–San-chia-tzu, and then the line -Tsun-lun-ian-tun–Ta-ta-san-pu along the Sha Ho. And, conformably to -the enemy’s action and the success attained by the 3rd Army, it was, -while throwing a strong containing force to the south, to develop its -operations towards the line San-tia-tzu–Shih-li-ho, and on the heights -south of the last village. - -2. The 3rd Army was to capture the line of works Chang-ling-pu–Ling- -shen-pu, and then the line along the Sha Ho from the latter point to -Hun-ling-pu inclusive. And, conformably to the enemy’s action and the -successes attained by the 2nd Army, it was to develop its operations -towards the line Hei-te-kai Peak–Hung-pao Shan Peak. - -3. The 1st Army was to co-operate in the capture of Hou-te-kai -Peak, and seize the heights near the villages of Cheng-san-lin-tzu -and Shih-shan-tzu. And according to the action of the enemy and -the successes attained by the 2nd and 3rd Armies, it was, with the -assistance of the 3rd Army, to develop its operations towards the -positions near the villages Ta-pu, San-chia-tzu, Shan-lu-ho-tzu, which -we had occupied on the 10th to 12th October. - -In my orders of January 21 it was clearly defined that the above scheme -would require modification dependent on the line of action adopted by -the Japanese. - -If, contrary to our calculations, the enemy preferred to contain our -2nd and 3rd Armies, and to fall with the rest of their forces on the -1st, or on the interval between the 1st and 3rd Armies, the position -would call for a very energetic advance against their flank by the 2nd -and 3rd Armies. - -If they should at once fall back on their second line of positions -without holding on to their first line, we should endeavour to turn -their retirement into a disordered retreat. - -January 25 was the day fixed for the commencement of our advance, -but, owing to the action of Grippenberg, who should have started the -movement, the arrangements had to be altered. Almost a fortnight before -our operations began our chances of success had been unfortunately -reduced by certain dispositions made by him. The corps to be attached -to his army were disposed as follows: - - 8th Corps South of the River Hun on - both sides of the railway. - 10th Corps At Bai-ta-pu village on the - Mandarin road. - 1st Siberians Behind the right flank of the - 1st Army. - -The right of the 2nd Army between the 5th Siberians and the River -Hun was only protected by cavalry, while a separate column of five -battalions and two cavalry regiments under Kossagovski was on the right -bank of the river. Notwithstanding the instructions issued that these -dispositions were to hold good as long as possible, in order that we -might conceal our intentions from the enemy, and also that the 10th -Corps—intended to act as a reserve in the event of their striking at -our centre—was not to be moved from its place without my knowledge, on -January 14 Grippenberg transferred the 14th Division over on to the -left bank of the Hun, and on the 16th, without letting me know, moved -the 10th Corps closer to the right of the 3rd Army. These movements, -of course, at once disclosed our intentions, and information soon came -in that the enemy had, in their turn, commenced moving their troops -westwards and fortifying opposite our new dispositions. - -The strength of the army was: - - +--------+-------+----------+-----+-------+-----+-------+-------+ - | | Bat- |Squadrons |Field|Mortars|Siege|Machine| Sapper| - | |talions| and |-Guns| |-Guns| -Guns | Bat- | - | | | Sotnias | | | | |talions| - +--------+-------+----------+-----+-------+-----+-------+-------+ - |2nd Army| 120 | 92 | 412| 24 | 4 | 20 | 3 | - |3rd Army| 72 | 18 | 294| 54 | 56 | 12 | 3 | - |1st Army| 127 | 43 | 360| 12 | -- | 8 | 5 | - |General | | | | | | | | - | Reserve| 42 | -- | 120| -- | -- | 4 | -- | - | +-------+----------+-----+-------+-----+-------+-------+ - | Total| 361 | 153 |1,186| 90[84]| 60 | 44 | 11 | - +--------+-------+----------+-----+-------+-----+-------+-------+ - -By the middle of January our numbers were, as regards rank and file, -almost up to the authorized war strength, except in the Composite -Rifle, 8th and 16th Corps, which had arrived short, so that the total -of our forces was about 300,000 rifles. Although the establishment in -officers was not fully complete, we now had some 5,600 in the infantry, -which gave us on the average 15 per battalion. - -The advance began on January 25, as ordered, the 1st Siberians first -seizing the village of Huan-lo-to-tzu, and later, after a hot fight -lasting all day, the village of Hei-kou-tai;[85] Kossagovski’s -column gained possession of Chi-tai-tzu and Ma-ma-kai without much -difficulty. San-de-pu was not attacked that day. Of the 14th Division, -which was intended for this attack, three regiments were sent on -the 22nd to join Mischenko’s force, in order to strike a separate -blow at a small Japanese force of all arms, which, according to -spies, was in occupation of A-shih-niu. Mischenko moved against this -place with his infantry, but found no enemy there, and so the 14th -Division was marched forty miles on a fool’s errand, and only arrived -at Chang-tan on the morning of the 26th, thoroughly exhausted. The -action of the 25th for the village of Hei-kou-tai, which we only -seized with great difficulty and after heavy loss, in spite of our -overwhelming superiority, indicated that such strongly fortified -points as San-de-pu and Lita-jen-tun could not be attacked without -proper previous preparation, for we could not afford to waste men. I -particularly underlined the necessity for this in my directions—“For -the operations of the 2nd Army in capturing the enemy’s fortified -line San-de-pu–Lita-jen-tun–Ta-tai,” dated January 15, and also in -my instructions with regard to the 2nd Army’s operations against the -Lita-jen-tun portion, dated January 16. Notwithstanding this, in the -orders for the dispositions of the 2nd Army on January 26, it was to -operate on the line from Hou-leng-tai to the Hun—over a distance of -ten miles against a fortified position—and to capture the two strongly -defended points, San-de-pu and Lita-jen-tun. Grippenberg, moreover, -came to no understanding with Kaulbars as to co-operation, and it was -only upon a request made by the commander of the 10th Corps that the -commander of the 3rd Army arranged to co-operate with his artillery, -and so prepare the assault of the 5th Siberians. Being by chance in -Hsui-tun just at the time when the 10th Corps was making ready to carry -out its allotted task, I was able to avert a dispersed attack (over a -stretch of thirteen miles), and to prevent the employment of troops in -an unprepared assault on strongly fortified positions. The attack to -be made by the left flank of the 2nd Army on the morning of January 26 -was countermanded by Grippenberg himself, but the order was delayed -in transmission, and if I had not been in Hsui-tun it would have taken -place. - -The attack of the village of San-de-pu by the 14th Division alone -failed, and it could hardly have done otherwise in the absence of -any artillery preparation. Neither the ground round it nor the -fortifications of the place itself had been studied, and no sketch-plan -of it had been made or issued to the troops. The result was that our -guns shelled a village called Pei-tai-tzu, north-east of San-de-pu, -all day instead of the place itself, which they did not touch, while -the 14th Division attacked and captured Pao-tai-tzu (to the west of -San-de-pu), and reported to me they had taken San-de-pu. The outer -enclosure of San-de-pu village was mistaken by this division for that -of a _reduit_ inside the village, and acting upon the assumption that -they were not strong enough to seize this _reduit_, they were ordered -back to their former positions, and abandoned Pao-tai-tzu. Meanwhile, -having received the report that San-de-pu had been taken, Grippenberg -gave orders for the heavy guns and mortars with the 8th Corps to be -sent at once to the 10th Corps, in order to prepare the assault of -Lita-jen-tun next day. At the same time, as his men, who had had no -sleep for three nights, were utterly exhausted, he asked permission -to rest his army on the 27th. Accordingly, the 1st Siberians were -ordered to halt in the area south-east of Hei-kou-tai; but as we -had not yet taken this area, the order led to this corps having to -fight a separate action on the 27th for the possession of Su-ma-pu -and Piao-tsao. When it became known on the morning of the 27th that -San-de-pu had not been taken, Grippenberg was obliged to give up all -idea of repeating the attack on the 27th, as he had sent his heavy -guns to the 10th Corps. The decision was also necessitated by the fact -that the Japanese had sent up strong reinforcements. When Shtakelberg -was informed that San-de-pu had not been taken, he did not consider -it possible to carry out Grippenberg’s twice repeated order to cease -his attack, and late in the evening, after a hot fight, he seized the -greater part of Su-ma-pu by a disconnected attack with four regiments. -But being counter-attacked at dawn on the 28th by superior numbers both -in front and on the left, he was forced to fall back with great loss -(6,000 men). By that evening the 1st Siberians were holding a position -on the line Tou-pao–Chu-san-ho-tzu, which the Japanese continued to -assault with great fury till the early morning. The despatch of troops -towards Su-ma-pu in no way met the circumstances: it led to a needless -digression from the main objective of the whole operations—_i.e._, -San-de-pu—and generally to a still greater extension of the already -too long front occupied by the 2nd Army. In order to divert the enemy’s -attention from our right flank by a demonstration, the villages of -Hsia-tai-tzu and La-pa-tai were attacked and seized on January 27 by -part of the 10th Corps under Tserpitski; but as we were not ready to -storm San-de-pu, these places were abandoned. - -The cavalry of the 2nd Army, under Mischenko, made a bold dash at the -enemy’s rear, and succeeded in killing and capturing a good many; -but their success would have been far greater had the Don regiments -under Teleshoff not been late in arriving. Mischenko, who was at the -head of the advanced _sotnias_, was severely wounded, and Teleshoff, -who succeeded in the command, failed to carry out the task entrusted -to him. He neither sent word that the Japanese were receiving -reinforcements, nor helped the Siberians when they were fighting for -Su-ma-pu. - -By evening on the 28th the situation in the 2nd Army was roughly as -follows: The positions north of San-de-pu, along a front of eight -miles—from the positions occupied by the 3rd Army up to the River -Hun—were held by the 10th Corps and 15th Division; sixteen battalions -of the former had been brought closer to the river, and behind them -was the reserve of the 3rd Army, a brigade of the 17th Corps. The -Composite Rifle Corps and 1st Siberians were distributed along a front -west of San-de-pu, on the line Chan-chua-tzu–Tou-pao. Kossagovski’s -force was at San-chia-tzu. The reserve of the 2nd Army consisted of -only one regiment of the 14th Division,[86] and Grippenberg had (26th -to 28th) three times asked for reinforcements to be sent him from the -general reserve. The front of the 2nd Army was spread over twenty -miles. Thus, by the evening of the 28th the greater part of that army -was separated from the 3rd Army by San-de-pu village, which was still -in the enemy’s hands, and was dispersed over a long line fronting -south-east. Whilst so distributed, not only was it difficult to assist -it with troops from the 3rd Army in the event of its being attacked, -but there was the danger, if the enemy reinforced heavily, of their -being in a position to employ San-de-pu as a pivot, force back the -Rifle Corps, and break through on to the communications of the 1st -Siberians. Meanwhile reports came in which showed that only a portion -of the enemy’s available forces were operating against Grippenberg, -while the movement of Kuroki’s and Nodzu’s troops to the west showed -that the enemy could still throw another six divisions into the fight. -They might be moved against the weakened and extended front of the 3rd -Army, thrust into the interval between the 3rd Army and the Hun Ho, or -used as reinforcements to the troops operating against our positions -west of San-de-pu. - -About 7 p.m. Kaulbars reported to me that the enemy had at 4 p.m. begun -a movement in great strength towards their advanced positions. At the -same time this movement became disclosed, and we opened artillery and -rifle fire. As the reserve of the 3rd Army had already been given -to the 2nd, I was obliged, as a temporary measure, to give Kaulbars -the 72nd Division from my reserve. This left me with only thirty -battalions of the 16th Corps, which had just arrived. Although the -positions held by the Composite Rifle Corps and 1st Siberians had -behind them an ice-covered river with steep frozen banks that hindered -the crossing of all three arms, and were therefore inconvenient, yet -the situation of the 2nd Army—enveloping San-de-pu, as it did—offered -us certain advantages if we could only drive back the troops attacking -the 1st Siberians and succeed in storming that place on the 29th. -When, therefore, the above report came in from Kaulbars, the Chief of -Staff of the 2nd Army was asked on the telephone when it was proposed -to start the assault on San-de-pu. To this Ruzski replied that it -certainly could not take place next day, as it had not been properly -prepared by artillery, and that it was impossible then to fix a time -for it. On account of the vagueness of this reply, he was instructed -to report to Grippenberg the information sent in by Kaulbars, and also -the orders in which the 2nd Army was instructed to take up a more -concentrated position in the early hours of the 29th, assuming as their -first task the defence of the line Ssu-fang-tai—Chang-tan—Ta-man-ta-pu. -Grippenberg, who was in a neighbouring apartment with a telephone, -did not say a single word to this message,[87] and these orders -were carried out. All the enemy’s attacks on the positions -Tou-pao–Chu-san-ho-tzu were repulsed by the 1st Siberians before -retiring. - -Thus ended our first attempt at the offensive, and it cost us 10,000 -men. The chief cause of our failure was, of course, our neglect to -prepare properly the assault on San-de-pu, which again was a sign that -we did not yet sufficiently respect our foe. Though a contempt of the -enemy was all through the war evinced by the senior officers when -they first arrived at the front, yet after our first actions it was -generally, and perhaps unfortunately, replaced by an exaggerated idea -of their merits. The absence of proper touch between Grippenberg and -the corps under him was also responsible for much, as, owing to it, the -transmission of orders and of information was greatly delayed. The -whole of the 8th and Composite Rifle Corps, again, did not shine in -action. For instance, on the 28th, certain units of the 15th Division, -though not at all pressed, began to retire without permission. By -doing so they exposed the siege battery they were covering, which was -preparing to destroy its guns and blow up its ammunition preparatory to -retiring itself. - -On January 30 Grippenberg reported himself sick by letter, and by the -Tsar’s permission left on February 3 for St. Petersburg. This action -of his set a fatal example both to those under him and to the rest of -the army, and was most harmful to all discipline. The opinions, also, -that he had expressed, to the effect that the campaign was virtually -over, and that we should retire to Mukden and Harbin, had a dangerously -disturbing effect on our weaker members. It was in the long-run more -harmful than any single defeat of a portion of our force would have -been. - -When the right flank of the 2nd Army fell back, the army held a -line from Fu-cha-chuang-tzu to Ssu-fang-tai. The enemy made several -unsuccessful attempts to drive us from those of their advanced -positions that we had captured, their main efforts being directed -towards the recapture of Pei-tai-tzu and Chang-tan-ho-nan. We, on our -side, made energetic preparation to continue the advance we had begun -so unluckily. Fresh siege batteries were brought up, the approaches to -the enemy’s defended posts were carefully reconnoitred, and detailed -plans were made. On February 16 we received some drafts, which were -used to make good the casualties in the 1st Siberians and the Composite -Rifle Corps, both of which had suffered so heavily at Hei-kou-tai. - -On February 10 General Kaulbars assumed command of the 2nd Army, -and Bilderling temporarily took over command of the 3rd. Meanwhile, -early in this month, information kept coming in that large bodies of -Japanese cavalry with guns, together with bands of Hun-huses, were -collecting in Mongolia, especially near the portion of the railway -between Kung-chu-ling and Kuang-cheng-tzu, and early on the morning -of the 12th the enemy raided the line north of the station of the -former name and blew up a railway-bridge. The same day a reconnoitring -party of the Frontier Guards suddenly came on a Japanese force of two -cavalry regiments, a battalion, and some 2,000 Hun-huses near the -Mongolian frontier. In the ensuing action we lost a number of men and -one gun. General Chichagoff continued to report with great insistence -that large bodies of the enemy—over 10,000 strong—were collecting in -Mongolia for the purpose of cutting our communications. Believing these -reports, I detailed a brigade of the 41st Division and the whole of -the Don Cossack Division to reinforce our protective troops on the -railway itself, upon which, of course, we were dependent for supplies, -drafts, and reinforcements. In addition to this, I also put some 15,000 -reservists[88] under the command of General Nadaroff, to strengthen the -Frontier Guards and the line-of-communication troops generally. - -The rumours that we heard at this same time also of the landing of a -large Japanese force in Northern Korea (assumed to be in connection -with the liberation of Nogi’s army by the surrender of Port Arthur), -part of which might be detailed for operations against Vladivostok, -compelled me to take in hand the strengthening of our forces in the -Primorsk district, and of the Vladivostok garrison in particular. With -this end in view, a mixed brigade of six battalions, formed from men -of the 1st Army, was sent to the fortress. In order to enable this -brigade to be expanded into a division, and each of the Rifle regiments -in the Primorsk district into regiments of four battalions, it was -necessary, first of all, to divide the drafts which had come up for the -army between the field army and the troops in the Primorsk district. -Although forced to reduce the strength of the field army to the above -extent, I made a mistake in not insisting upon a sufficiently strong -general reserve being formed. To do this I should have taken the whole -of the 17th Corps into my reserve, though such a course would have been -against the opinion of General Bilderling (who considered it dangerous -to weaken the 3rd Army, as he had no reliance in the steadiness of the -reserve troops of that army, the 5th and 6th Siberians). Instead of the -thirty-two battalions, which would have been thus obtained, only one -division, the 6th Siberians,[89] was added to the general reserve. - -In my orders issued after our disastrous action at Hei-kou-tai, it was -laid down that as many units as possible should be taken out of the -firing-line, so that strong army reserves might be formed. In order -to render this possible, it was pointed out that defensive positions -should not be held in equal strength along the whole front; that it -was sufficient to prepare and hold the most important portions of a -line as strongly as possible; and that, by holding on to these at all -costs, time would be gained in which reserves could be pushed up to any -threatened section. Unfortunately, I left too much to the experience -and discretion of the army commanders, and did not sufficiently insist -on exact compliance with my instructions. - -Adhering to the original plan of offensive operations decided upon in -accordance with the opinions of all the army commanders, I requested -Kaulbars to fix the first day for the advance. He first chose February -23, but owing to the troops of the 2nd Army being worn out with the -very heavy work they had done in connection with the fortification of -the positions, the advance was, at his own request, postponed till -the 25th. On the 24th, however, Kaulbars heard that the date for -the assault of San-de-pu was known to the enemy. He therefore lost -hope of success, and asked that the assault might be indefinitely -postponed. Meanwhile, on the 23rd, the enemy advanced in force against -the Ching-ho-cheng column, and this body fell back from its fortified -position next day after fighting an unsuccessful engagement. - -At the commencement of the Japanese advance our armies were distributed -as follows: - -_Right Flank._—2nd Army, consisting of the 1st Siberians, Composite -Rifle, 8th and 10th Corps, a brigade of the 3rd and a mixed brigade -of the 5th Siberians (total, 126 battalions), occupying the line -Ssu-fang-tai–Chang-tan–Hou-lien-tai, a length of sixteen miles. - -_Centre._—3rd Army, consisting of the 5th Siberians (less -two regiments), 17th Corps, and one division of the 6th -Siberians (total, 72 battalions), occupying the line Hou-lien-tai–Ling- -shen-pu–Sha-ho-pu–Shan-lan-tzu, a length of eleven miles. - -_Left Flank._—Here were the 1st Army (less one regiment), 4th, 2nd, -and 3rd Siberians (the latter less one brigade), 71st Division, -Independent Siberian Reserve Brigade, and two Trans-Baikal -infantry battalions (total, 128 battalions), occupying the line -Shan-lan-tzu–Lu-chiang-tun–Erh-ta-kou–Lia-cheng-wu-tun, and further -along the right bank of the Sha Ho, having its left flank three miles -east of the Kao-tai Ling (Pass), a length of thirty miles. The 1st Army -also had independent columns at Ching-ho-cheng and Hsin-tsin-tin. - -_The General Reserve_ consisted of forty-four battalions—namely, the -16th Corps (less one brigade) on the railway six miles south of Mukden -station, 72nd Division, and 146th Tsaritsin Regiment, behind the right -flank of the 1st Army at Huang-shan. - -On February 23 the shortage in the infantry (rank and file) of all -three armies was 49,000. - -A “Short Account of the Operations round Mukden in February, 1905,” was -submitted to His Majesty the Tsar with a letter from me dated May 13, -1905. A detailed description of these operations has been completed, -and has now also been submitted to His Majesty. The whole of the -Mukden operations can be divided into three phases: - -1. From February 23 to 28, till the turning movement against our right -flank developed. - -2. From February 28 to March 9—the period of our concentration on the -right bank of the Hun Ho, and our attempts to drive back the enemy who -were enveloping us. - -3. From March 9 to 16—our final attempt to hold on to Mukden, and our -forced abandonment of it. - - - FIRST PHASE. - -During this the enemy directed their attention exclusively to the left -flank of the 1st Army—to Rennenkampf’s force, the 3rd, and (partly) the -2nd Siberians. Amongst the troops operating against Rennenkampf was the -11th Japanese Division from Port Arthur, and from this it was surmised -that other portions of Nogi’s army were also acting on that flank. The -widely extended position of the 1st Army, bearing in mind the absence -of an adequate army reserve; the concentration of large bodies of -the enemy against the 2nd and 3rd Siberians, disclosed on February -24; the retirement of the Ching-ho-cheng force; the possibility of a -turning movement against it; and, finally, the decision of the officer -commanding the 2nd Army to postpone the attack indefinitely—all these -made me decide to reinforce the 1st Army quickly from my general -reserve, not only in order to check the enemy, but also in order -to operate actively ourselves. The first reinforcements despatched -were: a brigade of the 6th East Siberian Rifle Division on February -24 to protect the left flank of the Ching-ho-cheng force, and the -146th Regiment and 2nd Brigade of the 72nd Division on February 25 -to reinforce the left flank of the 1st Army. Finally, when it was -discovered that the enemy were operating in great strength against the -left flank of the Kao-tai Ling position, the 1st Siberians and 1st -Brigade of the 72nd Division were sent on February 27 to assist the -1st Army in its projected advance. On this day, also, the 85th Viborg -Regiment was sent to reinforce Daniloff’s force. When the 1st Army -received these additions, amounting in all to fifty-four battalions, -the advance of Kuroki’s army and of the right flank force of Kavamura -was checked; but still our intended advance did not take place (owing -to the exaggerated reports as to the enemy’s strength), and the 1st -Siberians were sent back to the right flank to rejoin the general -reserve. - - - SECOND PHASE. - -The first report of large bodies of Japanese infantry appearing near -Ka-liao-ma, on the left bank of the Liao, was received on February 28. -News came in also of the enemy moving along the right bank, and of the -appearance of their columns at Hsin-min-tun. It was essential to take -immediate steps to meet them on the way to Mukden in their turning -movement. I thought it was possible, by using the positions of the 3rd -Army as a pivot of manœuvre, and withdrawing its right flank on to -the line Ling-shen-pu–Shua-lin-tzu–Lan-shan-pu, to leave[90] for the -defence of the section between the 3rd Army and the Hun Ho, and of that -on the right bank, a total of forty-eight battalions, and to transfer -on to the right bank the remainder of the 2nd Army (forty-eight -battalions), and, after reinforcing them with twenty-four battalions -of the 16th Corps and thirty-two battalions collected from the 3rd and -1st Armies, to detail them for operations against Nogi. The command -of the troops collected on the right bank of the Hun was entrusted -to Kaulbars, and I pointed out to him several times the particular -importance of rapid and energetic action against the turning movement -which threatened Mukden and our communications. - -The first units sent from the main reserve at Mukden to the west were: - -1. Towards Kao-li-tun, on the river, to operate against the wide -turning movement along the River Liao, a brigade of the 41st Division -under Birger. - -2. To Sha-ling-pu, the 25th Division, under General Topornin, -commanding the 16th Corps. - -3. Simultaneously the 2nd Brigades of the 9th and 31st Divisions were -concentrated under the command of Topornin, south of the 25th Division, -on March 2. - -The successive arrangements made by Kaulbars, in view of the enemy’s -advance—already commenced on the right of the 2nd Army; the abandonment -of Ssu-fang-tai; the withdrawal of troops from the right bank; the -relief of corps that had been engaged, and the retention of troops -which had already started towards Mukden, not only disclosed to the -Japanese the possibility of free movement along the right bank of the -river, but delayed the arrival on the western front of reinforcements -from the 2nd Army. General Topornin therefore received no support -either on March 2 or 3; still, he successfully continued on March 3 -the attack commenced the day before on the village of Sha-ling-pu. -However, in view of the turning movement that had now become quite -clear against our right flank, Kaulbars ordered a retirement—though the -enemy were in no way pressing us—to the western Mukden fortifications. -The troops took up a line fronting on Ma-tuan-tzu–Wu-kuan-tun, and, -in spite of the orders given, did not occupy either the old railway -embankment or the fortified position west of Lin-min-shan-tzu. -This direct withdrawal towards Mukden placed our troops in a very -disadvantageous position, and enabled the enemy both to continue their -turning movement, and make it wider and more dangerous. Immediately -after our retirement from Sha-ling-pu, they moved forward quickly -and enveloped our western front, and, moving on March 3 across on to -the main Hsin-min-tun road, began to threaten Mukden from the north. -Birger’s brigade, which had now returned from Kao-li-tun, fell back on -Hu-shih-tai station. - -The protection of Mukden on the west and north was placed under -Kaulbars, and was undertaken by units joining the general reserve. - -1. The composite divisions of three regiments of the 17th Corps under -De Witte took up the fortified position at Khou-kha[91] on the morning -of March 3. - -2. A force of seven battalions under Colonel Zapolski was sent to -Hu-shih-tai station. - -3. The 10th Rifle Regiment was concentrated at siding No. 97. - -4. Eighteen battalions of the 1st Siberians came up as a reserve to -these on March 3. - -The concentration which I had ordered of the units of the 2nd Army on -the right bank of the Hun was taking place extremely slowly. Indeed, -some regiments which had already assembled had been sent back to the -left bank. When I reached Mukden on the 3rd, I impressed on Kaulbars -the necessity of not losing any time, and told him to attack the -following day, but gave him a free hand as to the direction of attack. -He did not carry out the order, owing to the concentration of his -army on the right bank not having been completed. Meanwhile, in the -early hours of March 4, the important hamlet of Ssu-hu-chia-pu was -evacuated by the 2nd Army, and at the same time Ivanoff withdrew the -15th Division from the position behind the Hun and the right flank -of the 3rd Army, which he had been told to defend, without fighting. -The latter thus became exposed. A brigade of the 5th Siberians and -nine _sotnias_ of cavalry, which had remained on the right bank near -Tung-chen-tzu, were moved across to the left. - -During March 4, which was thus lost to us for offensive operations, -Nogi continued his turning movement, which was now becoming enveloping -and dangerous. Accordingly, after discussing the matter with Kaulbars, -I ordered him on the 5th to concentrate sufficient troops for the -purpose, and to attack the enemy’s left, and I again emphasized the -fact that our main chance of success lay in the rapidity and energy -with which he struck. In an order of the 2nd Army of March 5, a force -of forty-nine battalions was organized to make the attack under the -command of Gerngross. Here again the concentration was too slow, and -the right column only moved out from the line Sha-ho-tzu–Khou-kha about -2 p.m. Its right flank might have been strengthened by a brigade of the -41st Division with Zapolski’s column, and the left flank by sixteen -battalions of the 25th Division. We therefore might have contained the -enemy on the Yang-hsin-tun–Hsiao-sha-ho-tzu line with a force under -Tserpitski, and have attacked with a mass of seventy-seven battalions. - -Kaulbars, alarmed at Tserpitski’s exaggerated reports as to the nature -of the attacks made on his left by some three divisions, moved a -brigade from Gerngross’s force behind the left flank, sent another -on to the left bank of the river, and stopped Gerngross’s attack -till such time as the result of Tserpitski’s action should be known. -The net result of these proceedings, of the late commencement of the -operations, and of their half-hearted nature, was that, although we -met with no opposition, on the 5th we moved our right only on to the -line Pao-ta-tun–Fang-hsin-tun–San-chia-fen; and so another day was -lost. In accordance with my orders for energetic action, the advance -of the right was continued on the 6th, but it was carried out with -less men than on the previous day (thirty-three battalions), without -energy or cohesion, and met with determined opposition at the village -of Liu-chia-kan. Then, before the whole of Gerngross’s force had -become engaged, Kaulbars stopped the advance, and gave orders to take -up the defensive. That day we got possession only of Tsuang-fang-chih. -In short, notwithstanding the great strength of the 2nd Army, with its -reinforcements of more than fifty battalions, on March 4, 5, and 6—the -three most important days—we moved our right only a few miles forward, -and took to defensive measures even on the western front. - -Owing to the ill success of the operations of the 2nd Army on March -5, I issued orders to all the armies to send back their divisional -baggage along their respective lines of communication towards the -north of Mukden. On the 5th the Japanese began a series of attacks -on our northern and western fronts. On the left flank of our west -front they were everywhere repulsed by Tserpitski and Hershelman, -whose forces amounted to forty-nine battalions. In the centre of -the western front they won a partial success, on March 7 compelling -units of the 25th Division to retire temporarily from Wu-kuan-tun. -But on the northern front, which was the most dangerous for us, -they won great successes, on the 7th and 8th getting possession of -several villages. From there they repeatedly attacked our northern -force of twenty-five battalions under Launits, which was holding the -line Ta-heng-tun–San-tai-tzu–Kung-chia-tun. At the same time their -columns moved still farther to the north, and threatened Hu-shih-tai -station. To protect this, I despatched a force of six battalions of -the 4th Siberians to Tsu-erh-tun under Colonel Borisoff. To secure our -retirement to Tieh-ling, in case we should not succeed in beating off -Nogi’s army, on the evening of March 7 I gave orders to the 1st and 3rd -Armies, who were too far forward, to retire early on the 8th to our -fortified positions south of Mukden—at Fu-liang and Fu-shun. With their -retirement and the concentration of the whole of the 2nd Army on the -right bank it became possible to allot forty-eight battalions from the -1st and 3rd Armies to operate against Nogi, and to collect seventeen -battalions into the reserve of the 2nd Army. Of these reinforcements, -General Artamonoff’s force of ten battalions alone arrived under my -command on the 8th. - - - THIRD PHASE. - -Having failed in our attempts to stop Nogi’s army, which was moving -round our right flank, first on the line from Sha-ling-pu to the -old railway embankment, and then on the line of the Hsin-min-tun -main road, I decided to try once more to block it on the line -Ku-san-tun–Tsu-erh-tun, and, if a favourable opportunity occurred, to -assume the offensive from this line. On the 9th we had the following -troops available for the purpose: - -1. Borisoff’s column of 6 battalions holding the villages of -Tung-chan-tzu, Ku-san-tun, and Hsia-hsin-tun. - -2. Artamonoff’s column of 9 battalions[92] at Tsu-erh-tun. - -3. Hershelman’s column of 14 battalions, sent from the reserve of the -2nd Army to that place. Total, 29 battalions. - -On March 9 I ordered Lieutenant-General Muiloff, to whom was given -the command of these troops, to co-operate with Launits’ force in an -attack on the village of Hei-ni-tun. The operation was carried out in -a disjointed manner, without careful reconnaissance, and without any -arrangement for co-operation having been made with Launits; a bad storm -and clouds of sand also impeded us, and the attack failed. The Japanese -continued their advance to the north-west. Thus, by the 9th, the enemy -was still not driven back on the side where they were most dangerous; -part of the village of San-tai-tzu, taken from us in the early hours -of that day, remained in their hands. The situation, indeed, appeared -critical, for we received news on the same evening of the Japanese -advance to the Hun Ho against the section Fu-liang–Hsiao-fang-shen, -which was held by weak units of the 1st Army, 4th and 2nd Siberians. -Indeed, if we delayed the withdrawal on Tieh-ling longer there was -great danger that some of our most advanced forces in the south and -south-west might be cut off. Therefore orders were given that same -evening for a retirement to Tieh-ling early on the 10th, and for this -operation roads were allotted as follows: The 2nd Army was to proceed -along both sides of the railway and west of the Mandarin road; the 3rd -Army along the Mandarin road and others to the east of it, as far as -the Fu-liang–Hsi-chui-chen–Hui-san–Shu-lin-tzu road; the 1st Army along -the latter, and the roads to the east of it. - -Meanwhile the enemy had on the 9th broken through the 1st Army near -Chiu-tien, driving back part of the 4th Siberians from this point -to Leng-hua-chi. The officer commanding the 2nd Siberians (next -to them) did nothing but merely hold his position on the River -Hun at Hsiao-fang-chen, and the enemy spread out along the valley -Hsiao-hsi-chua–Hu-shan-pu. The attempt made to drive them back at night -by the Tsaritsin Regiment failed. - -During the early morning of the 10th our position became yet worse; -on the right flank the Japanese drove back Borisoff’s force to -Hsiao-kou-tzu and opposite San-tai-tzu, and penetrated as far as the -grove of the Imperial tombs. On the east large bodies of them appeared -in sight of the Mandarin road. One was opposite Levestam’s force, while -another began shelling the Mandarin road near Ta-wa from the heights -near Hsin-chia-kou. The orders given on March 5 for the baggage to -be sent back in good time had not been carried out, and part of the -impedimenta of the 2nd and 3rd Armies, which was stretching along the -road near Mukden early on the 10th, blocked the passage of the 5th and -6th Siberians and 17th Corps. On this morning also the Japanese, who -had broken through near Chiu-tien on the 9th, began to press our left -flank under Meyendorff. The troops sent as reinforcements did not act -together, and were driven back north-west. By 10 a.m. Meyendorff was in -full retreat—not north-east, but north-west towards the Mandarin road, -which he crossed between Ta-wa and Pu-ho. The 6th Siberians now began -to retire prematurely, and by so doing exposed the right of the 1st -Corps and the left of the 17th. This unnecessarily sudden retirement -of more than forty battalions under Meyendorff and Soboleff placed the -17th Corps and the 5th Siberians in a difficult position. Instead of -fronting south, they had to front south-east. After a hot fight this -force, consisting of thirty battalions, was also obliged to move to -the rear prematurely. They did not go to Ta-wa, but west and south of -the Mandarin road. This opened out a way for the enemy to that road, -and also to the railway north—further on the portion between Mukden -and Wen-ken-tun. By seizing this section about 2 p.m., before the -rearguards or even the tail of the main body had passed Wa-tzu, they -took our troops in flank. We had evacuated the village of San-tai-tzu -prematurely, and it was quickly occupied by the Japanese. Between -Wa-tzu and this village there is a defile, less than three miles long, -through which a large part of the 2nd Army had to force its way under -attack from both sides. Portions of the rearguards under Hanenfeld and -Sollogub, which tried to get round to the east of it, were captured or -destroyed. - -I instructed General Dembovski to organize the defence of the Mandarin -road at Ta-wa, and for that purpose to utilize the troops retiring -along it. By 10 a.m. the distance between the portions of the enemy on -the west and east of the railway was only seven miles. It was vital -to stop any further contraction of the area of retirement of the 2nd -Army. This might be done by blocking the Japanese advance to the -railway from the west and north-west. As I was more anxious about the -latter direction than any other, I moved out the eighteen battalions -under Zarubaeff, which had joined my reserve from the 1st Army, on -to the line Ma-kou-chia-tzu–Yang-tzu-tun, and ten battalions of the -72nd Division on the front Tung-shan-tzu–Hsiao-hsin-tun. The first -force covered the railway between Hu-shih-tai and San-tai-tzu, and the -second barred the enemy’s advance and supported the right flank of -Artamonoff’s column. As a reserve to these troops, in case of pressure -from the east, a brigade of the 1st Siberian Division was left near -Hu-shih-tai station. By 4 p.m. the state of affairs on the Mandarin -road became worse, as, immediately after General Levestam’s force had -retired behind Pu-ho, Dembovski also abandoned his positions near -Ta-wa, and moved off to the west. The fighting ceased as darkness came -on. The last of the 2nd Army to fall back were portions of the 1st, -2nd, and 3rd Rifle Regiments under Lieutenant-Colonel Korniloff; they -broke through near Wa-tzu in the pitch dark, though hemmed in by the -enemy on three sides. - -We continued to retire during the night, covered by the rearguard under -Muiloff and that of Zarubaeff’s column. On the 11th several units of -the 1st and 3rd Armies collected at the village of Yi-lu; but the -greater part of the 3rd Army fell back direct on Tieh-ling. Bilderling -was unable to carry out his proposal of remaining on the River Yi-lu -till the 12th, and, having taken command of Shileiko’s force, after -slight opposition retired northwards from Yi-lu village. By doing -this he placed the rearguards of the 2nd Army that were still south -of this point in a very precarious position. The main bodies of all -the armies began on the 11th to occupy a position eight miles south -of Tieh-ling on the Fan Ho. The 2nd Army took up a line to the west -and the first one to the east of the Mandarin road, the 3rd remaining -in reserve. Everything possible was done to restore order amongst the -troops, transport, and parks. On the 13th the enemy’s advanced troops -reached our positions, and on the 14th they attacked, directing their -main effort on the line between the sections held by the 2nd Siberians -and 72nd Division. All their attacks were repulsed with great loss, and -many hundreds of dead were left in front of our position. Our losses -were 900. - -The two-weeks battle had badly disorganized several units, especially -those of the 2nd and 3rd Armies. The men who had got separated from -their own units and attached to others had to be sorted out and -restored, baggage, transport, and parks had to be separated, and -ammunition replenished. To carry this out made it essential that we -should not be in direct touch with the enemy—that there should be -some space between us. For this reason, and on account of the turning -movement against our right flank along the River Liao, discovered by -the cavalry, I decided not to accept battle at Tieh-ling, but to order -a general retirement of all the armies on the 14th to the Hsi-ping-kai -position, which was the best one between Tieh-ling and the River -Sungari. The 1st and 2nd Armies began to move out of Tieh-ling on March -16, and by the 22nd were on the heights of Hsi-ping-kai. - - - CONCLUSIONS UPON THE BATTLE OF MUKDEN[93] - -Both the nearness of the events related above and our ignorance -about the enemy make it impossible for any detailed and absolutely -impartial judgment to be formed upon the reasons for our defeat in -this great battle. The records that have been collected so far, -however, are sufficient to throw light upon a few facts—upon certain -of our dispositions that did not correspond to the requirements of the -case. Those made by the commander of the 2nd Army, to which force was -entrusted the duty of stopping Nogi’s turning movement towards our -rear, are of particular interest, and certain of them which had a very -important bearing on the issue of the operations are now described. - -General Kaulbars made neither a sufficient nor a clever use of his -cavalry. This fact, coupled with the unfortunate selection of its -leaders, was the reason why the mounted branch did such bad work,[94] -and behaved in a manner that can hardly be called “devoted” during the -Mukden operations. In the instructions given on March 1 to Grekoff’s -cavalry to operate against Nogi, the object to be attained was plainly -set forth, but how it was to be attained was not clearly defined. The -execution of its most important task was also made the more difficult -by the fact that Grekoff’s force was, on the same day as the orders -were issued, split up into two almost equal groups, of which the -eastern was found to be fighting Oku instead of Nogi. To rectify this, -the cavalry under Pavloff was ordered on the same day by Kaulbars -to undertake a special task against the turning columns, but on the -2nd the order was changed, and eight of Pavloff’s _sotnias_ were put -under the command of Launits, who was operating against Oku. No touch -was maintained between their different groups, and the greater part -of the mounted forces clung to the infantry, and did practically no -fighting (the losses suffered by this Arm during the twenty-three days’ -operations in February and March were quite insignificant). Yet most of -our regiments were quite capable of performing the most difficult tasks -of war. The action of the infantry of the 2nd Army on the positions -which they had taken up was completely passive. They did not try to get -into touch with the enemy to ascertain their strength and dispositions -(by taking prisoners), or to occupy advanced posts where these would -be advantageous. The reconnoitring patrols of this army also did but -little work. The consequence of such unsatisfactory performance of -their duties by the cavalry and advanced infantry units of the 2nd Army -was that information of the enemy was so meagre that the appearance of -a great mass of Nogi’s army on and to the east of the Hsin-min-tun road -came as a complete surprise to Kaulbars. - -Owing to the appearance of large hostile bodies near Ka-liao-ma, I -had on February 28 already ordered him[95] to take immediate steps -to ascertain their exact strength, the direction in which they were -moving, and their intentions. I repeated this order[96] on March 2, -instructing him to find out their strength and dispositions more -accurately if possible, and to frame some plan of action. I pointed -out the necessity for energetic steps to ascertain the whereabouts of -Nogi’s main body—whether it was opposite Sha-ling-pu, or whether it was -executing a wider turning movement. On the morning of March 5 I for -the third time[97] asked Kaulbars to find out where Nogi’s left flank -was. Not one of these orders was carried out, with the result that I -had inadequate and incorrect information upon which to form a decision -as to the strength and whereabouts of the enemy operating on the right -bank of the Hun. Tserpitski’s alarmist reports to the effect that more -than three divisions were opposed to him made the fog worse. Kaulbars, -who had been ordered to stop Nogi’s flanking movement, on the strength -of incorrect information, all the time turned his chief attention -towards the western front to Oku, whom he took for Nogi. The latter, -owing to the 2nd Army’s inaction on March 3, 4, 5 and 6, was made a -present of four days in which to complete his sweeping movement to the -north-east,[98] and Kaulbars continued to see danger only on the west, -paying insufficient attention to what was happening on the Hsin-min-tun -road, north-west of Mukden. On March 1 he conceived a most complicated -“castling” manœuvre, which he endeavoured to carry out when in direct -touch with the enemy. The Composite Rifle Corps was ordered to cross -from the right bank of the Hun on to the left, and the 8th Corps from -the left to the right. The Rifle regiments crossed over the river, -and by so doing evacuated the most important section near Chang-tan, -but the 8th Corps was unable to get across. The enemy at once took -advantage of this, and, rapidly throwing their 8th Division forward -along the right bank of the river, drove back the relatively weak force -of ours still on that side. Kaulbars, moreover, stopped the movement on -Sha-ling-pu (of the Composite Division under Golembatovski), which had -already been started, and by so doing deprived us of the possibility -of checking the heads of the enemy’s columns on March 2. Finally, the -5th Rifle Brigade under Churin—which was moving by my orders to operate -against Nogi—was stopped on March 3 by Kaulbars in the valley on the -right bank of the Hun, and found itself among the troops opposing Oku. - -After weakening Topornin by sixteen battalions, Kaulbars, on reaching -his force, countermanded the advance on Sha-ling-pu, which had been -begun on the morning of the 3rd, and suddenly withdrew thirty-two -battalions to Mukden without fighting. This made our position -distinctly worse. He took no steps to establish and maintain touch -with Birger’s brigade on the Hsin-min-tun road, and never informed -the latter of the order to retire he had given to Topornin on the -3rd. In telling Launits on the morning of March 3 of his decision (to -withdraw Topornin’s force to Mukden), he stated that “Grekoff’s column -and Birger’s brigade are probably cut off from Mukden,” but he made -no attempt to help Birger. And yet up to 2 p.m. on the 3rd Birger’s -brigade was not even engaged. Our attempt to retake Ssu-hu-chia-pu on -March 4 was stopped by Launits, owing to the receipt of orders from -Kaulbars not to attack if it was likely to be a costly operation. -Kaulbars did nothing that day, although he had under his command -119 battalions[99] on the right bank of the Hun, and although I -had ordered him to assume the offensive. Moreover, he did not even -know the whereabouts of the troops under him. Although he had 113 -battalions under his command on the right bank on March 5, he again -did nothing. He did not carry out my orders to attack the enemy’s left -energetically, and permitted these troops, which were at Khou-kha—next -to Gerngross’s force—to deploy very slowly, and stopped their advance -before they had got in touch with the enemy. Moreover, yielding to -the preconceived idea of the main danger lying in the west, he moved -sixteen splendid battalions of the 10th Corps from Gerngross’s force, -operating towards Hsin-min-tun, on to the left flank of the army. Yet -again on the 6th, although he had 116 battalions on the right bank, -he effected scarcely anything, for our active operations towards -Hsin-min-tun were conducted with an insufficient force, and therefore -failed. - -The result of his dispositions from March 2 to 5 was that on the 6th -we did not have a single battalion of the 2nd Army operating against -Nogi, whereas we should have had forty.[100] All ninety-six battalions -of the 2nd Army were on that day distributed on the defensive against -Oku. This distribution of troops, which in no way met either the -general requirements or the definite task given to Kaulbars—to stop -Nogi’s army—constituted one of the main reasons of the failure of our -operations at Mukden. - -On the 2nd and 3rd the following troops were given to Kaulbars from my -reserve for his operations against Nogi: - - Battalions. - 16th Corps 24 - 1st Siberians 18 - De Witte’s column (3rd Army) 15 - Zapolski’s column 4 - ―― - Total 61 - -Moreover, sixteen battalions of the 10th Corps (2nd Army) were by my -orders concentrated opposite Sha-ling-pu on the 2nd, and on the 7th -the 10th Rifle Regiment and two battalions of the 4th Siberians were -sent from my reserve to join Kaulbars’ army—_i.e._, he was given in all -eighty-one battalions, of which sixty-five had not previously belonged -to the 2nd Army. Of these, as transpired later, as many as thirty-five -battalions did not take part, or only took very little part, in any -fighting up to the 10th—_i.e._: - - Battalions. - 1st Siberians 13 - De Witte’s column 13 - 2nd Brigade, 9th Division 8 - 10th Rifle Brigade 2 - ―― - Total 35 - -These units either occupied defensive positions, and merely watched -the Japanese making a flank march past them,[101] or were moved for no -reason from one place to another (2nd Brigade of the 9th Division). -Their losses from the 3rd to 9th were trifling. - -On the 4th, when I ordered Kaulbars to “move every available man on to -the right flank near the Hsin-min-tun road,” the reverse was done. Two -regiments (Tambov and Zamost) were moved from the right bank of the -river on to the left; the 2nd Brigade of the 9th Division was ordered -to move away from the Hsin-min-tun road, and crossed from Huang-ku-tun -to Liu-kou-tun, and the Primorsk Dragoons from an important position -on this road were sent to the rear to Hu-shih-tai.[102] On March 5 we -were able to collect more than 100 battalions for operations against -Nogi, 70 being concentrated by my instructions. But although Kaulbars -had received orders to send an army corps on to the right bank of the -Hun to engage Nogi, he not only did not carry out the order, but lost -five days (March 2 to 6), and thus allowed the turning movement to -develop so far that part of the force I had collected (25th Division) -was on the 7th operating, not against Nogi, but against Oku’s left -flank. Moreover, as he had on the 5th also weakened the force collected -by me to act against Nogi by sending 16 battalions to the left flank of -the 2nd Army, the result of these dispositions and our inaction during -these five days was that on the 7th only 37 battalions operated against -Nogi instead of 100. The loss of time, and the weakness of the force -that actually opposed Nogi, were largely contributory to our failure. - -Having so far employed only a very small part of the troops entrusted -to him for offensive operations, on the 7th Kaulbars definitely and -finally assumed the defensive. He did not even seize the opportunity -of the repulses suffered by the enemy at Wu-kuan-tun and against -Tserpitski’s force to attack. On the 7th, 8th, and 9th, with 140 -battalions at his disposal, he assumed a passive rôle everywhere. -While allowing a great confusion of units, he did not take proper -steps, which he was quite able to do, to re-establish the corps, -divisional and brigade organization, and on the 8th he did not take -advantage of the possibility of forming a reserve from the entire 10th -Corps, which would have enabled him to re-establish the organization -of the other corps. On the 4th he removed Generals Muiloff, Topornin, -and Kutnevich from the command of their corps for no reason, and as -he did not replace them by other officers, the staffs of these corps -were headless. The employment of the reserves in the 2nd Army was -neither carried out by arrangement, nor in accordance with the actual -necessities of the situation, so that there were instances of reserves -being sent up when not required (Gerngross on March 8). In spite of -my order, which he received on the 5th, to send back the baggage and -transport to the north, Kaulbars only obeyed this instruction in regard -to Tserpitski’s and Gerngross’s columns on the 9th, and thus made -our retirement, especially that of our rearguards, most difficult. -He failed to observe the appearance or concentration of the enemy -on the northern front, and took no steps to avert this danger. The -concentration of our forces on this side was carried out under my own -orders. Had it not been for this, the enemy would have seized the -village of San-tai-tzu and the grove of the Imperial tombs on the 7th. - -One occasion when Kaulbars did issue orders that met the case was -when he ordered Launits to attack the enemy on March 10 at Hei-ni-tun -so as to assist the retirement, and he got together a strong force -for this purpose. But then, when these troops were on the point of -commencing the attack, he went to Launits and countermanded it, without -even informing me of this most important change in his previous -dispositions. Yet, had this attack been only partially successful, it -would have greatly relieved the situation. Right up to March 13 not one -of the arrangements made by him was fully carried out, and it is clear -that he did not even then in the least appreciate the conditions. In -addition to wasting time, extending his front, and acting only on the -defensive, he did not realize the danger of Nogi’s appearance at such -a moment north of Mukden, nor of his movement round our flank. In a -letter to me of August 11, he wrote that on March 8 and 9, “although we -had been retiring for a week, circumstances were going very well for -us, as, the further the enemy moved northwards, the nearer they were -getting to their Poltava.” - -From the above it can be seen that Kaulbars’ dispositions, his -inaction, and his misunderstanding of the whole situation, could not -lead the 2nd Army to Poltava. On the contrary, on March 8 and 9, 1905, -it was nearly a case of Tsushima. - -It only remains for me to conclude with a few pages out of the short -report on the war which I submitted to His Majesty the Emperor. - - “Of the many causes contributing to the disastrous issue to the - Battle of Mukden, I will only mention the following: - - “1. The fall of Port Arthur liberated Nogi’s army, the whole - of which took part in the battle. The formation of the new - divisions in Japan was completed at the same time, and, judging - by the prisoners we captured, two of these also took part in - the battle. The immediate making good of wastage in their ranks - presented no particular difficulty to the enemy, owing to the - relative proximity of Japan to the theatre of war, and the - resultant ease with which she was able to transport her troops - by sea. Judging by the muster rolls found on the dead and - wounded, the effective strength of their companies was between - 200 and 250 rifles, and all casualties were at once replaced. - - “The liberation of Nogi’s army and the landing of troops in - Northern Korea compelled us to increase the force detailed - for the defence of the Primorsk district and Vladivostok, - and the appearance of bodies of Japanese cavalry, together - with artillery and numerous bands of Hun-huses in Mongolia, - coupled with the raids on the railway, which were becoming - more frequent, necessitated steps being taken to increase the - railway guard along its 1,350 miles’ length in Manchuria. - - “These two measures took fourteen battalions and twenty-four - _sotnias_ from the field army, and also a large number of the - 80,000 reservists then being sent to the front as drafts. - - “All these things combined enabled the Japanese at the battle - of Mukden to be as strong as, if not stronger than, we were in - the number of rifles. - - “2. The tardy discovery by our cavalry of the enemy’s movement - round our right flank, when ‘strong columns of Japanese - infantry’ had already appeared at Ka-liao-ma. - - “3. The complete lack of energy displayed by the officer in - command of the 2nd Army in repulsing Nogi’s force which was - moving round us, with the result that we lost seven most - important days (March 1 to 8). - - “4. His complete ignorance of the strength and whereabouts of - the enemy moving round his right. The lack of information and - the inaccuracy of what was received rendered some of my own - dispositions not only unnecessary, but wrong. As a particular - instance, I may mention that I only knew for certain when - it was too late that the enemy were not making (as had been - reported) a wider turning movement on both banks of the Liao - towards Tieh-ling. - - “5. The lack of energy displayed by senior officers of the - 3rd Army on March 10 in overcoming the difficulties of the - retirement. Their passive attitude with regard to the enemy’s - movements towards the Mandarin road—illustrated by the - diversion of the various columns (on encountering the enemy) - towards the west on to the line of retirement of the 2nd Army, - instead of forcing back the enemy away from the Mandarin road. - - “The inaction of the 55th Division of the 6th Siberians was - remarkable. The commander of this unit, who only had this one - division under his command, decided to place it directly under - the officer in command of the 1st Corps. Having done so, he - rode away from his division to Ta-wa village. When he reached - the railway on the morning of the 11th, he was unable to inform - me where his division[103] was! - - “6. The failure of the commanders of the 2nd and 3rd Armies - to carry out the orders I had given some days before the - retirement began to send back the baggage and transport - northwards. It was the disorder and panic which occurred - amongst these auxiliary services on the retirement that caused - the loss of so many guns and limbers, and ammunition and - baggage waggons. - - “7. The inertia displayed by the officers commanding the 2nd - Siberian Division and the 2nd Siberians, when an attempt was - made to prevent the enemy breaking through near Chiu-tien, and - when later they spread north of the Mandarin road. Besides the - twenty-four battalions of the 1st Corps and the 4th Siberians, - which did remain on the right flank of the 1st Army, the 55th - Division might have been used in this operation. But the - officer commanding the 2nd Siberians received the enemy’s - advance passively, merely throwing back his right flank, and - thus presenting the enemy with an opening for their advance on - to the Mandarin road. - - “8. Nevertheless, I consider that I myself am the person - principally responsible for our defeat, for the following - reasons: - - “(_a_) I did not sufficiently insist on the concentration of - as large a general reserve as possible before the operations - commenced. - - “(_b_) I weakened myself just before an important battle by a - brigade of infantry and a Cossack division (believing General - Chichagoff’s reports). If I had not sent one brigade of the - 16th Corps for duty on the communications, and had insisted - on the 1st Siberians being sent back from the 1st Army at - full strength, I should have had two full corps available for - operations against Nogi’s turning movement. - - “(_c_) I did not take adequate measures to prevent the - confusion of units. Indeed, during the battle I was myself - compelled to contribute to the disintegration of corps. - - “(_d_) I should have made a better appreciation of the - respective spirit of both sides, as well as of the - characteristics and qualifications of the commanders, and I - should have exercised more caution in my decisions. Although - the operations of the 2nd Army from March 2 to 7 failed in - their object, my firm belief in ultimate victory resulted in my - ordering a general retirement later than I ought to have done. - I should have abandoned all hope of the 2nd Army defeating the - enemy a day sooner than I did; the retirement would then have - been effected in complete order. - - “(_e_) When convinced of Kaulbars’ inertia and passive tactics, - I should have taken command of the troops on the right bank of - the Hun personally. On March 9 I should similarly have taken - command of Muiloff’s force, and acted as a corps commander.” - -In my letters of March 31 and May 13, 1905, to His Majesty the Emperor, -I reviewed generally the factors which made the war extraordinarily -difficult for us.[104] - -Has the army survived its Tsushima? No; it went through nothing -nearly so bad as that. We fought hard everywhere, and we inflicted -greater losses on the enemy than they on us. We were weaker in numbers -than they were, and we retired. Even the Mukden reverse owes its -reputation as a decisive Japanese victory to the impressions of our -own correspondents, who were with the baggage and in rear. Can one say -that the Russian land forces were defeated, when in the first important -battles (at Liao-yang and on the Sha Ho) we only put into action a -fourteenth part of our armed forces, and at Mukden, at a time when the -Japanese had already put forth their greatest efforts, we had less than -a sixth of our force? Nor must it be forgotten that we fought against a -nation of 50,000,000 martial and ardent souls, who, hand in hand with -their Emperor, were able to grasp victory by fearing no sacrifice. To -defeat such a foe in such a distant theatre of war, great and continued -efforts were required of the whole of our country as well as of the -army. In the beginning of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries we -waged great wars with such leaders as Charles XII. and Napoleon. In -these we also experienced defeat, but in the end we issued absolute -victors. In the eighteenth century, between defeat at Narva and victory -at Poltava nine years elapsed; in the nineteenth, between defeat at -Austerlitz and our entry into Paris there was also nine years’ interval. - -The events which happened in the Far East in 1904–05 can, owing to -their historical importance and their significance for Russia and the -whole world, be placed alongside those through which Russia passed -in the early years of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In -the struggle with Charles XII. and Napoleon the Russian people was -at one with the Tsar, and bravely bore all trials and sacrifices, -strengthening and improving the army, treating it with kindness, -believing in it, wishing it well, and profoundly respecting it for its -gallant deeds. The people realized the necessity for success, hesitated -at no sacrifice, and were not troubled by the time required to gain it, -and the harmonious efforts of Tsar and people gave us complete victory. -The way to victory is in the present day by the same road which our -ancestors followed in the early years of the last two centuries. - -If mighty Russia, headed by the Tsar, had been permeated by a brave -and single-minded desire to defeat the Japanese, and had not stinted -the sacrifices and time necessary to preserve Russia’s integrity and -dignity, our glorious army, supported by the trust of its ruler and a -united people, would have fought until the enemy had been vanquished. - - - - - APPENDICES - - - APPENDIX I - - THE ROYAL TIMBER COMPANY[105] - - -Among the first questions suggested by General Kuropatkin’s narrative -and the editorials, reports, and official proceedings that he quotes, -are: Who was State Councillor Bezobrazoff? How did he acquire the -extraordinary power that he evidently exercised in the Far East? Why -was “everybody”—including the Minister of War—“afraid of him”? Why -did even the Viceroy respond to his calls for troops? and why was his -Korean timber company allowed to drag Russia into a war with Japan, -apparently against the opposition and resistance of the Tsar, the -Viceroy, the Minister of War, the Minister of Finance, the Minister -of Foreign Affairs, the Port Arthur Council, and the diplomatic -representatives of Russia in Peking, Tokio, and Seoul? - -No replies to these questions can be found in General Kuropatkin’s -record of the events that preceded the rupture with Japan, but -convincing answers are furnished by certain confidential documents -found in the archives of Port Arthur, and published at Stuttgart,[106] -just after the close of the war, in the Liberal Russian review -_Osvobojdenie_. Whether General Kuropatkin was aware of the existence -of these documents or not I am unable to say; but as they throw a -strong sidelight on his narrative, I shall append them thereto, and -tell briefly, in connection with them, the story of the Ya-lu timber -enterprise as it is related in St. Petersburg. - -In the year 1898, a Vladivostok merchant named Briner obtained from -the Korean Government, upon extremely favourable terms, a concession -for a timber company that should have authority to exploit the great -forest wealth of the upper Ya-lu River.[107] As Briner was a promoter -and speculator who had little means and less influence, he was unable -to organize a company, and in 1902 he sold his concession to Alexander -Mikhailovich Bezobrazoff, another Russian promoter and speculator, who -had held the rank of State Councillor in the Tsar’s Civil Service, -and who was high in the favour of some of the Grand Dukes in St. -Petersburg. - -Bezobrazoff, who seems to have been a most fluent and persuasive -talker, as well as a man of fine presence, soon interested his Grand -Ducal friends in the fabulous wealth of the Far East generally, and in -the extraordinary value of the Korean timber concession especially. -They all took shares in his enterprise, and one of them, with a view -to getting the strongest possible support for it, presented him to -the Tsar. Bezobrazoff made an extraordinarily favourable impression -upon Nicholas II., and in the course of a few months acquired an -influence over him that nothing afterward seemed able to shake. That -the Tsar became financially interested in Bezobrazoff’s timber company -is certain; and it is currently reported in St. Petersburg that the -Emperor and the Empress Dowager together put into the enterprise -several million roubles. This report may, or may not, be trustworthy; -but the appended telegram (No. 5), sent by Rear-Admiral Abaza, of -the Tsar’s suite, to Bezobrazoff in November, 1903, indicates that -the Emperor was interested in the Ya-lu enterprise to the extent, at -least, of the two million roubles mentioned. Bezobrazoff’s “Company,” -in fact, seems to have consisted of the Tsar, the Grand Dukes, certain -favoured noblemen of the Court, Viceroy Alexeieff probably, and the -Empress Dowager possibly. Bezobrazoff had made them all see golden -visions of wealth to be amassed, power to be attained, and glory to be -won, in the Far East, for themselves and the Fatherland. It was this -known influence of Bezobrazoff with the Tsar that made “everybody” in -the Far East “afraid of him”; that enabled him to enlist in the service -of the timber company even officers of the Russian General Staff; -that caused Alexeieff to respond to his call for troops to garrison -Feng-huang-cheng and Sha-ho-tzu; and that finally changed Russia’s -policy in the Far East, and stopped the withdrawal of troops from -Southern Manchuria. - -General Kuropatkin says that the Russian evacuation of the province of -Mukden “was suddenly stopped by an order of Admiral Alexeieff, whose -reasons for taking such action have not to this day been sufficiently -cleared up.” The following telegram from Lieutenant-Colonel Madridoff, -of the Russian General Staff, to Rear-Admiral Abaza, the Tsar’s -personal representative in St. Petersburg, may throw some light on the -subject: - - - (No. 1.) - - TO ADMIRAL ABAZA, - HOUSE NO. 50, FIFTH LINE, - VASSILI OSTROFF, ST. PETERSBURG. - - Our enterprises in East constantly meet with opposition from - Dzan-Dzun of Mukden and Taotai of Feng-huang-cheng. Russian - officer merchants have been sent East to make reconnaissances - and examine places on Ya-lu. They are accompanied by Hun-huses, - whom I have hired. The Dzan-Dzun, feeling that he is soon to - be freed from guardianship of Russians, has become awfully - impudent, and has even gone so far as to order Yuan to begin - hostile operations against Russian merchants and Chinese - accompanying them, and to put latter under arrest. Thanks to - timely measures taken by Admiral, this order has not been - carried out; but very fact shows that Chinese rulers of - Manchuria are giving themselves free rein, and, of course, - after we evacuate Manchuria their impudence and their - opposition to Russian interests will have no limit. _Admiral - (Alexeieff) took it upon himself to order that Mukden and - Yinkow (Newchuang) be not evacuated._[108] To-day it has been - decided to hold Yinkow, but, unfortunately, to move the troops - out of Mukden. _After evacuation of Mukden, state of affairs, - so far as our enterprises are concerned, will be very, very - much worse,[108] which, of course, is not desirable._ To-morrow - I go to the Ya-lu myself. - - (Signed) MADRIDOFF. - -Shortly before Lieutenant-Colonel Madridoff sent this telegram to -Admiral Abaza, Bezobrazoff, who had been several months in the Far -East, started for St. Petersburg with the evident intention of seeing -the Tsar and persuading him to order, definitely, a suspension of -the evacuation of the province of Mukden, for the reason that “it -would inevitably result in the liquidation of the affairs of the -timber company.” From a point on the road he sent back to Madridoff -the following telegram, which bears date of April 8, 1903, the very -day when the evacuation of the province of Mukden should have been -completed, in accordance with the Russo-Chinese agreement of April 8, -1902: - - - (No. 2.) - - TO MADRIDOFF, - PORT ARTHUR. - - There will be an understanding attitude toward the affair after - I make my first report. I am only afraid of being too late, as - I shall not get there until April 16, and the Chief leaves for - Moscow on April 17. I will do all that is possible, and shall - insist on manifestation of energy in one form or another. Keep - me advised, and don’t get discouraged. There will soon be an - end of the misunderstanding. - - (Signed) BEZOBRAZOFF. - -On April 24, 1903, Bezobrazoff sent Madridoff from St. Petersburg a -telegram written, evidently, after he had made his first “report” to -“the Chief.” It was as follows: - - - (No. 3.) - - TO MADRIDOFF, - PORT ARTHUR. - - Everything is all right with me. I hope to get my views adopted - in full as conditions imposed by existing situation and force - of circumstances. I hope that if they ask the opinion of the - Admiral (Alexeieff), he, I am convinced (_sic_), will give me - his support. That will enable me to put many things into his - hands. - - (Signed) BEZOBRAZOFF. - -General Kuropatkin says that Admiral Alexeieff gave him “repeated -assurances that he was wholly opposed to Bezobrazoff’s schemes, and -that he was holding them back with all his strength”; but the Admiral -was evidently playing a double part. While pretending to be in full -sympathy with Kuropatkin’s hostility to the Ya-lu enterprise, he -was supporting Bezobrazoff’s efforts to promote that enterprise. -Bezobrazoff rewarded him, and fulfilled his promise to “put many things -into his hands” by getting him appointed Viceroy. Kuropatkin says that -this appointment was a “complete surprise to him”; and it naturally -would be, because the Tsar acted on the advice of Bezobrazoff, Von -Plehve, Alexeieff, and Abaza, and not on the advice of Kuropatkin, -Witte, and Lamsdorff. It will be noticed that Von Plehve—the -powerful Minister of the Interior—is never once mentioned by name in -Kuropatkin’s narrative. Everything seems to indicate that Von Plehve -formed an alliance with Bezobrazoff, and that together they brought -about the dismissal of Witte, who ceased to be Minister of Finance on -August 29, 1903. Anticipating this result of his efforts, and filled -with triumph at the prospect opening before him, Bezobrazoff wrote to -Lieutenant-Colonel Madridoff on August 25, 1903, as follows: - - - (No. 4.) - - “The great saw-mill and the principal trade in timber will - be transferred to Dalny, and this in co-partnership with the - Ministry of Finance. The Manchurian Steamship Line will have - all our ocean freight, amounting to 25,000,000 feet of timber, - and the business will become international. From this you will - understand how I selected my base and my lines of operation.” - -In view of the complete defeat of such clear-sighted statesmen and sane -counsellors as Kuropatkin, Witte, and Lamsdorff, there can be no doubt -that Bezobrazoff’s “base and lines of operation” were well “selected.” - -The document that most clearly shows the interest of the Tsar in the -Ya-lu timber enterprise is a telegram sent to Bezobrazoff at Port -Arthur in November, 1903, by Rear-Admiral Abaza, who was then Director -of the Special Committee on Far Eastern Affairs, over which the Tsar -presided, and who acted as the latter’s personal representative in -all dealings with Bezobrazoff and the timber company. In the original -of this telegram significant words, such as “Witte,” “Emperor,” -“millions,” “garrison,” “reinforcement,” etc., were in cipher; but when -Bezobrazoff read it he (or possibly his private secretary) interlined -the equivalents of the cipher words, and also, in one place, a query -as to the significance of _artels_—did it mean mounted riflemen or -artillery? The following copy was made from the interlined original: - - - (No. 5.) - - FROM PETERSBURG, - _November 14–27, 1903_. - - TO BEZOBRAZOFF, - PORT ARTHUR. - - Witte has told the Emperor that you have already spent the - whole of the two millions. Your telegram with regard to - expenditure has made it possible for me to report on this - disgusting slander, and at the same time contradict it. - Remember that the Chief counts on your not touching a rouble - more than the three hundred without permission in every - case. Yesterday I reported again your ideas with regard to - the reinforcement of the garrison, and also with regard to - the _artels_ (mounted Rifles or artillery?) in the basin. - The Emperor directed me to reply that he takes all that you - say into consideration, and that in principle he approves. - In connection with this the Emperor again confirmed his - order that the Admiral telegraph directly to him. He expects - a telegram soon, and immediately upon the receipt of the - Admiral’s statement arrangements will be made with regard to - the reinforcement of the garrison, and at the same time with - regard to the mounted Rifles in the basin. In the course of the - conversation the Emperor expressed the fullest confidence in - you. - - (Signed) ABAZA. - -General Kuropatkin refers again and again to the Tsar’s “clearly -expressed desire that war should be avoided,” and he regrets that His -Imperial Majesty’s subordinates “were unable to execute his will.” -It is more than likely that Nicholas II. did wish to avoid war—if he -could do so without impairing the value of the family investment in -the Korean timber company—but from the above telegram it appears that -as late as November 27, 1903, only seventy days before the rupture -with Japan, he was still disregarding the sane and judicious advice -of Kuropatkin, was still expressing “the fullest confidence” in -Bezobrazoff, and was still ordering troops to the valley of the Ya-lu. - - - - - APPENDIX II - - BREAKDOWN OF THE UNIT ORGANIZATION AND DISTRIBUTION[109] - - -Amongst the causes which added to our difficulties must be mentioned -the frequent breakdown in action of the normal organization of the -troops. It began when war was declared, and though efforts were made -to rectify things as far as possible, it was not till after the battle -of the Sha Ho that we were really able to re-establish our formations. -But both the corps and divisional organization again disappeared during -the battle of Mukden, and the resulting confusion to a certain extent -contributed to our defeat. - -When war began the corps organization of the troops stationed in the -Far East was not complete, and one corps was formed of the independent -Rifle brigades. When the Rifle regiments were brought up to a strength -of twelve battalions, the normal composition of the 1st and 3rd -Siberian Divisions was twenty-four battalions. The 2nd Siberian Corps -was supposed to consist of one Rifle division and one reserve division -formed in the Trans-Baikal district. Before hostilities commenced, -a division of the 3rd Siberian Corps (the 3rd East Siberian Rifle -Division) was moved by the Viceroy to the Ya-lu; the 4th East Siberian -Rifle Division, with the corps staff, remained in Kuan-tung. The 1st -Reserve Division, which constituted part of the 2nd Siberian Corps, -I kept at Harbin, and this corps remained with only one division -till I was appointed Commander-in-Chief. When the operations began, I -endeavoured to reform the dislocated corps organization. I therefore -collected on the line Liao-yang–Feng-huang-cheng the 3rd and 6th -Siberian Rifle Divisions, and formed with them a corps which I called -the 3rd Siberians. At first I did not succeed in sending to this corps -the 23rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment—it being stationed in Mukden as -a guard on the Viceroy’s Headquarters—and my subsequent request that -it might be sent to the Ya-lu to join the corps there was refused; -it was only sent forward after the battle of the Ya-lu. The line -Liao-yang–Ta-shih-chiao–Port Arthur was guarded by the 1st Siberian -Corps, at full strength. The 2nd Siberian Corps, in which was included -the 2nd Brigades of the 31st and 35th Divisions, which had arrived in -the Far East in 1903, composed my reserve, and was divided between -Liao-yang and Hai-cheng. - -At first, owing to our paucity of numbers, the 3rd Siberians had to -defend a large tract of country. Six regiments of this corps were -on the line River Ya-lu–Feng-huang-cheng–Fen-shui-ling–Liao-yang; -one regiment was on the line Ta-ku-shan (sea and mouth of -Ya-lu)–Hsui-yen–Ta Ling–Hai-cheng. One regiment was on the line -Kuan-tien-cheng–Sai-ma-chi–An-ping–Liao-yang. When the 4th Siberians -arrived, the line Ta-ku-shan–Ta Ling–Hai-cheng was occupied by one -of its brigades, because a considerable number of Japanese had made -their appearance in this direction. The remaining three brigades -were concentrated near the station of Ta-shih-chiao,[110] as a -reserve either for the 1st Siberians to the south or the brigade -of the 4th Siberians on the Ta Ling (Pass). All the units of the -10th Army Corps which arrived from Russia were collected on the line -Sai-ma-chi–An-ping–Liao-yang, where Kuroki’s army was in force. As -soon as the units of the 4th Siberians and 10th Army Corps occupied -the above-mentioned lines, the regiments[111] belonging to the 3rd -Siberians were moved off to join their own corps. On arriving from -European Russia, the units of the 17th Army Corps were concentrated -near Liao-yang, and formed my main reserve. - -The two brigades of the 10th and 17th Army Corps, which arrived in the -Far East in 1903, were organized as independent brigades, and, till the -troops concentrated at Liao-yang, operated with the advanced forces. -The brigade of the 35th Division fought with the 1st Siberians, to -which it was sent up as a reinforcement in the battle of Te-li-ssu. The -brigade of the 31st Division sent to reinforce the troops operating -on the line Ta-ku-shan–Ta-Ling–Hai-cheng, together with the 5th East -Siberian Rifle Division, became part of the 2nd Siberians. When the -Japanese advanced with all their three armies on July 31, the general -disposition of our troops was as follows: - -1. To the south, opposite Oku’s army, were the 1st and 4th Siberian -Corps, total forty-eight battalions (the 1st Siberians at full -strength, the 4th Siberians consisting of three brigades), under the -command of General Zarubaeff. - -2. On the line Ta-ku-shan–Ta Ling–Hai-cheng, opposite Nodzu’s army, -were the 2nd Siberians and a brigade of the 4th Siberians, total -twenty-eight battalions, under the command of Lieutenant-General -Zasulitch. - -3. On the line Ya-lu–Fen-shui-ling–Liao-yang, opposite Kuroki’s army, -were the 3rd Siberians, and the 10th and 17th Army Corps, total eighty -battalions, under the command of General Bilderling. At this time the -5th Siberians were, by the Viceroy’s orders, detrained at Mukden, -and told off to protect the rear and the line Pen-hsi-hu–Mukden, and -to act at the same time as a reserve for the advanced corps. When we -moved towards Hai-cheng the brigade of the 4th Siberians operating on -the line Hai-cheng–Ta Ling–Ta-ku-shan, returned to its own corps. In -retiring towards Liao-yang, the two brigades of the 10th and 17th Army -Corps, which had been sent out to the Far East in 1903, joined these -corps. - -During the first days of the battle of Liao-yang the 1st, 3rd, and -4th Siberians and 10th Army Corps took part at their full strength of -units. The 2nd Siberians had only one division, and the 17th Army Corps -concentrated on the right bank of the Tai-tzu Ho, and was not at first -engaged. When we crossed on to the right bank of the river, in order -to operate against Kuroki, the corps organization became in several -instances quite dissolved. In addition to the 2nd and 4th Siberians, -we had to leave a brigade from both the 3rd Siberians and the 10th -Army Corps for the defence of the immense fortified camp at Liao-yang -itself. At the time of our advance at the beginning of October, I did -everything possible to keep the corps organization intact. The 1st -and 3rd Siberians and the 1st, 10th, and 17th Army Corps operated at -full strength, while the 4th and 6th Siberians had three brigades -each, one brigade of the 4th Siberians being sent to strengthen the -3rd, which had a particularly difficult task allotted to it, and -one brigade of the 6th Siberians (which was under me) being left by -the Viceroy’s orders to protect our rear. The 2nd Siberians, which -consisted of the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division, was strengthened by -five reserve battalions. The 5th Siberians was alone (for good reasons) -split up into two groups, one operating under the command of the corps -commander on the extreme right flank, the other on the extreme left -under General Rennenkampf. The account of the September operations -of the Eastern and Western Forces, given in Chapter IX., shows -to what an extent the units became mixed by the mere course of the -fighting. As soon as I was appointed Commander-in-Chief, I did my best -to prevent this in the future. The 61st Reserve Division, which did -not belong to an army corps, and had been detailed by the Viceroy to -strengthen the Vladivostok District, was sent by me to the field army -and incorporated in the 5th Siberians, in place of the 71st Division, -which was concentrated on the extreme left flank under the command of -General Rennenkampf. All the regiments of the 1st Siberian Division -were sent to join the 2nd Siberian Corps, and the 1st Siberian and -10th Army Corps were moved at full strength from the first line to my -main reserve. The 3rd, 4th, and 6th Siberian and the 1st and 17th Army -Corps were at full strength—distributed along the first lines and in -reserve. The 2nd and 5th Siberian Corps had each only three brigades, -one brigade of the latter having been left on the right bank of the -Hun Ho to protect our extreme right. A brigade of the 5th Division -holding Putiloff Hill was left, at the special request of the officer -commanding the 1st Manchurian Army, on the positions which had been -captured by the splendid regiments of this brigade (19th and 20th East -Siberian Rifle Regiments). As soon as the 8th and 16th Army Corps -arrived they were posted to my main reserve; the three Rifle Brigades -were formed into a Composite Rifle Corps. - -Early in January, 1905, I concentrated all three corps of the 2nd -Army—_i.e._, the 8th, 10th, and Mixed Rifle Corps in reserve, and I -had in my main reserve the 1st Siberians with a division of the 16th -Army Corps (the other was still on the railway). We had altogether -128 battalions in reserve, and our position was most favourable. It -might, however, have been still better if I had insisted on strong army -reserves being formed in the 1st and 3rd Armies. My proposal to move -the 17th Army Corps back from the advanced lines met with a strongly -worded request that the distribution of the 3rd Army might be left as -it was. In the 1st Army I might have insisted on the whole of the 4th -Siberian Corps being sent to join the reserve after the transfer of -the Rifle Brigade from Putiloff Hill to the strong Erh-ta-ho position. -I made a mistake also in forming three Rifle Brigades together into -one corps. If I had kept them as independent brigades, it would have -been unnecessary to take brigades from army corps whenever independent -brigades were required. Although the Japanese had fewer battalions -than we had, these were much stronger than ours; they also had more -independent units than we had. Their divisions were not organized in -corps, their small armies being made up of divisions and independent -brigades, and our corps organization was not sufficiently flexible -to meet the thirteen to fifteen Japanese divisions, and a similar -number of independent brigades. The enemy were able to take divisions -and brigades from the advanced positions and transfer them, without -upsetting their existing organization, and with far greater ease than -we could move our corps. When an independent brigade operated against -us—as, for instance, on the line Sai-ma-chi–An-ping—we were obliged to -break up our corps organization in order to meet it with one of our -brigades; this happened in the 10th Army Corps. - -Again, owing to the general course of events and other reasons over -which I had no control, our corps organization had to be broken up -before the operations at Hei-kou-tai, but was restored as soon as -possible. It also occurred during the February fighting round Mukden, -where the circumstances, indeed, did not in every case warrant it. -After General Grippenberg’s disastrous operations at Hei-kou-tai our -strategical position was altered much for the worse. Four army corps, -which had until then been standing in reserve, were sent up into the -fighting-line, and three of them became hopelessly mixed up in the -process. At the time I thought it only possible to keep one corps (the -1st Siberians) in reserve, but the 16th Army corps, the 72nd Division, -a brigade of the 6th East Siberian Rifle Division, and the Tsaritsin -Regiment were available, as it turned out. This made a total reserve of -eighty-two battalions. With such a strong main reserve I hoped to be -able to meet the enemy successfully, if, on being reinforced by Nogi’s -army from Port Arthur, they took the offensive. - -According to our estimates, the fall of Port Arthur might reinforce -the Japanese field army by some fifty battalions altogether, but we -thought that the greater portion of Nogi’s army would be sent to -operate against Vladivostok, or via Possiet towards Kirin, so as -to take us in the rear. The possibility of this made us extremely -sensitive, both as to our rear and as regards Vladivostok. The first -thing we did, therefore, on Nogi’s army being set free, was to -strengthen the garrison of the latter place, which was very weakly held -for the extent of the defences. I sent there from all three armies -cadres of a strength of six battalions, which were to expand into four -regiments so as to form the 10th East Siberian Rifle Division. It was -thought that, upon a general assumption of the offensive, the Japanese -would simultaneously try to bring about a rising of the local native -population, and to destroy the railway bridges behind us. To give -colour to our fears, a whole series of reports, each more alarming than -the last, were received from General Chichagoff. In these he described -the large numbers of the enemy that had appeared behind us with the -intention of seizing Harbin as well as of destroying the railway. I -mentioned (Vol. III.) how this officer calculated the strength of the -enemy in our rear at tens of thousands, and how persistent he was in -his demands that the troops guarding the line might be strengthened. -As a proof of the urgency of the circumstances, he reported the -defeat, with a loss of guns, of some Frontier Guards sent out by him -to reconnoitre east of the Kuan-cheng-tzu station. Later information -corroborated these reports in so far that parties of the enemy, -accompanied by bands of Hun-huses, had penetrated far in rear, broken -through our line of posts between Kuan-cheng-tzu and Bei-tu-ne, and -were threatening the latter point, which, being our central corn-supply -depôt, was of immense importance to us. Large bodies of Japanese and -Hun-huses were also reported as moving in the direction of Tsit-si-har -with the intention of blowing up the important railway-bridge across -the River Nonni, and thus cutting our railway communication. One of the -large bridges near the station of Kung-chu-ling was, after a skirmish -with our guards, destroyed. In the face of such “circumstantial -evidence” as the loss of guns and the destruction of bridges, it was -impossible not to credit General Chichagoff’s reports (the extent of -their exaggeration we did not find out till later), and to refuse him -assistance. The security of our communications was literally vital, -for even their temporary disorganization meant catastrophe. Not only -the flow of reinforcements to the front, but the collection and -distribution of local supplies would have ceased. As we were over 5,300 -miles away from our base (Russia), we had been forced to form a local -supply base, and the loss of this would have threatened the army with -starvation. As, therefore, the actual numbers guarding the railway were -small, I increased them by one brigade of the 16th Army Corps and four -Cossack regiments. My staff inclined to the opinion, indeed, that six -Cossack regiments should have been sent. - -In February the Japanese moved forward in strength, carrying out a -frontal attack combined with simultaneous turning movements against -both our flanks. To carry out such an operation successfully implies -great numerical superiority on the side of the attackers, or else -great attenuation along their front; and relying, apparently, on the -strength of their positions, the Japanese did weaken their front to a -very great extent. Our best plan would accordingly have been to have -attacked them in the centre in the hope of breaking through there, and -then operating afterwards against the outflanking movements. But this -might have been disastrous, for if they succeeded in holding their -frontal positions with comparatively small numbers stiffened by extra -artillery and machine guns and well reinforced by reserves [which -were in their case splendidly organized], we might still have been -outflanked by the turning movements. - -The special difficulty of frontal attacks was amply confirmed during -the Mukden battles, for, although our troops there held very extended -positions, they repulsed the Japanese whenever the latter made only a -frontal attack. When, therefore, the Japanese assumed the offensive, -and Kavamura’s movement round our left flank developed, I determined to -check it by attacking Kuroki in front and flank. The situation on our -left had become very alarming, for by losing the strong Ching-ho-cheng -position and retiring towards Ma-chun-tan we had exposed the left -flank of the 3rd Siberian Corps on the Kao-tai Ling (Pass). A still -wider turning movement threatened to throw the 71st Division back on -Fu-shun, but the reinforcements rapidly sent to the 1st Army from the -main reserve were able to arrest Kavamura’s movement, largely owing -to the behaviour of General Rennenkampf’s and Daniloff’s 71st and 6th -East Siberian Rifle Divisions, which fought with great gallantry and -stubbornness. If the 1st Army, which had a strength of 175 battalions, -had made a successful advance, it ought to have influenced the -operation then under way against our right. Being anxious to take the -offensive, I gave Linievitch, commanding the 1st Army, the chance -of selecting the main point of attack, and he decided to strike the -point where Kuroki’s and Kavamura’s armies joined. The orders had been -issued, and the movement had actually begun, when certain unconfirmed -reports as to the movement of some Japanese divisions round the left -flank of the 3rd Siberians unfortunately led him to stop the attack -and send back such units of the 1st Siberian Corps as had been lent to -the 1st Army for the operation. We had lost several days in collecting -troops for this offensive movement, and large bodies of the enemy had -meanwhile been moving round our right. I have described in detail (Vol. -III.) the steps taken to avert this danger, and the results achieved. -Here I will only mention them briefly. Against the 2nd Army, which -consisted of ninety-six battalions, and which was mostly located on the -left bank of the Hun Ho, Oku was operating with the greater part of -his army. His right flank was, according to our information, operating -against the 5th Siberians, and part, probably, against the 17th Army -Corps of the 3rd Army. Thus, opposed to the troops under General -Kaulbars’ command at the time when Nogi’s advance developed, there -were, according to our calculations, not more than thirty-six to forty -Japanese battalions. As the 2nd Army was reinforced by twenty-four -battalions of the 16th Army Corps from the main reserve, theoretically -we should have driven Oku’s army south by an energetic offensive, and, -having thus cut it off from Nogi’s force, should have fallen on the -latter. To do this we should have had to seize the fortified positions -with strong defensive points near the village of San-de-pu by frontal -attack. Practically, in the much more favourable conditions of a month -previous, 120 battalions of the 2nd Army had been unable to drive the -enemy southwards and get possession of this village after six days’ -continuous fighting. There was every reason to fear, therefore, that -even if we gained possession of these points, and succeeded in forcing -back Oku’s army, so many men would have been expended in the effort -that we should have been in no condition to oppose Nogi, who could then -have captured Mukden, and cut off the 2nd and 3rd Armies from their -communications. - -Whatever course was decided upon, our weakness in power of manœuvre, -the strength of the Japanese divisions, and their great powers of -defence, had to be borne in mind. On the whole, a consideration of -these points rather led to the conclusion that it was probably a -distinct advantage to them to engage as many of us as possible in a -frontal attack on their positions, so that they might be the more -certain of success in their turning movement. After looking at the -question from all sides, I decided to stand on the defensive in the -front of the 2nd and 3rd Armies, and to move as quickly as possible -sufficient troops to the right bank of the Hun Ho to check and then -drive back Nogi’s army, which was executing the turning movement. The -first troops to be used for this were those of the 2nd Army, whose duty -it was to protect the right flank of our whole force. For this purpose -I first took one corps from this army, calculating that the sixty-four -remaining battalions could without difficulty withstand any onset by -Oku (of from thirty to forty battalions). General Baron Kaulbars was -ordered to move this corps as quickly as possible towards the village -of Sha-ling-pu, where I proposed to concentrate the units to oppose -Nogi. To operate against him I then moved up twenty-four battalions -of the 16th Corps together, putting them also under the command of -General Kaulbars, while as a reserve to these advanced troops I took -twelve battalions from the 3rd and the 1st Siberian Corps, which I -ordered to move towards Mukden and rejoin my reserve as soon as news -was received of the attack being stopped, and of the departure of -the 1st Army to Chi-hui-cheng. Thus, arrangements were made for the -concentration of ninety-two battalions, which by March 3 should easily -have been able to cover our right flank, check Nogi’s army, and drive -it back. Unfortunately, our hopes of what was going to be effected on -this flank were not fulfilled. In order to move this army corps against -Nogi, Kaulbars essayed a most complicated manœuvre—namely, to move the -Composite Rifle Corps from the right bank of the Hun Ho on to the left, -and to replace it on to the right bank by the 8th Army Corps, which was -to move on Sha-ling-pu. The first part of this plan was carried out—the -Rifle Corps crossed on to the left bank, but, owing to the Japanese -pressure, the 8th Army Corps remained on that side. Thus the units -of the two Corps became mixed up. Of the 2nd Army, only two brigades -(of the 10th Army Corps), which had been sent there under my orders, -together with the 25th Infantry Division, arrived at Sha-ling-pu. -Meanwhile the whole of the 10th Army Corps, or at least twenty-four -battalions of it, might have been moved there, for it was opposed by -very few of the enemy. The transfer from the right—the threatened—flank -of the Rifles had, as is now known, very serious consequences, for by -it the right flank of the 2nd Army was uncovered too soon, and the -units there, being attacked in front and flank, began to retreat, which -caused the adjacent troops to do the same. - -From the information I received as to the enemy’s movements, I decided -to move the 16th Army Corps in two directions—one portion direct on -Hsin-min-tun, and the 25th Division on Sha-ling-pu. When it became -apparent that the enemy were not advancing behind the Liao Ho, but -between it and the Hun Ho, Kaulbars very properly gave orders for a -brigade of the 41st Division to be sent up towards the 25th Division -at Sha-ling-pu. We should have thus had the 16th Corps, consisting -of twenty-four battalions, all together; and to this it was General -Kaulbars’ intention to add the 8th Army Corps at full strength. As -this force would have been reinforced by me by another Siberian corps, -we should have had three army corps against Nogi. Unfortunately, -however, Kaulbars countermanded the orders already issued to General -Birger (to join the 25th Division), and this brigade continued to -act independently, and added to the existing confusion of troops, -especially when it split up and retired in two directions—towards -Mukden and Hu-shih-tai station. Instead of the 8th Army Corps arriving -to reinforce the 25th Division, two brigades of the 10th Army Corps -turned up. Finally, Linievitch did not consider it possible to carry -out his orders (to send the 1st Siberian Corps to Mukden at full -strength), and asked permission to detain two regiments of it, and so -the divisions of the 1st Siberian Corps arrived in Mukden with only -three regiments each. Fully recognizing the danger of our position on -the right flank, the commander of the 3rd Army sent his army reserve -of three regiments of the 17th Army Corps to Mukden, and on his own -initiative added to them the Samara Regiment (three battalions), which -had been sent to him the day before with a view to strengthening his -left. Meanwhile the different orders given during the fighting between -February 23 and March 4 by the commanders of the 1st and 2nd Armies -resulted in an inextricable confusion of lesser units, which added -to that caused by the breakdown of the corps organization. As there -were insufficient army reserves, Linievitch reinforced the troops that -were being attacked from the corps reserves of those corps which had -not been attacked. For instance, when the enemy’s advance against the -left flank of the 1st Army began, certain units of the 3rd Siberian -Corps, by moving eastwards along the front, were able to strengthen -Rennenkampf’s force. When the Kao-tai Ling position—defended by the 3rd -Siberians—was attacked, this corps was supported by portions of the 2nd -and 4th Siberian Corps to the west of them; when the 2nd Siberians were -attacked they were reinforced by units of the 4th. - -Thus the reinforcements sent up by me only served to heighten the -general confusion of units caused by the orders of the officer -commanding the 1st Army and of the corps commanders. Against Kavamura -on March 1 and 2 there were in the 1st Army the 71st Division, -consisting of three regiments, the whole of the 6th East Siberian Rifle -Division, one regiment of the 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division, and -one regiment of the 1st Army Corps—total twenty-nine battalions.[112] -Against Kuroki were the 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division, consisting -of three regiments, one regiment of the 71st Division, two of the 4th -Siberians, and one of the 2nd Siberians—total twenty-five battalions. -On the assumption that we should attack, I sent to these troops the -72nd Division and the 1st Siberians at full strength, as well as one -regiment of the 1st Army Corps—total forty-four battalions. Thus -sixty-nine battalions were concentrated on and behind the positions -of the 3rd Siberian Corps. Farther west, on the positions of the 2nd -Siberian Corps, there remained of this corps fourteen battalions, -which, reinforced by a regiment of the 4th Siberians, successfully -repulsed all attacks, including an assault made by the Japanese Guards. -Still farther west, on the positions of the 4th Siberians, which were -not attacked, there were twenty to twenty-four battalions of this same -corps. Finally, against Nodzu’s right twenty-four battalions of the -1st Army Corps not only completely repulsed all attacks, but pressed -forward very successfully. Generally speaking, although the units of -the 1st Army were considerably mixed up, the corps organization of the -1st, 2nd, and 4th Siberians and the 1st Army Corps was not very much -disturbed. - -In the 2nd Army matters were worse. The unsuccessful attempt to -“castle” two corps (the Composite Rifle and 8th Army Corps) was the -start of the break-up of the army corps organization, and in beating -off the enemy these two corps, together with the 10th, became still -more involved. Throughout the fighting of the night of March 4 no -touch was kept between the different units of the 8th Army Corps. The -14th Division (three regiments) and one regiment of the 15th Division -crossed on to the right bank of the Hun Ho and moved westwards, while -the 15th Division (three regiments) arrived behind the left flank of -the 3rd Army after a night march to the north-east. On the morning of -the 4th mingled portions of all these corps took up fresh positions on -both banks of the Hun Ho. - -Sufficient efforts were not made to readjust matters either in the -divisions or corps. The commander of the 10th Army Corps maintained -under his command only two brigades of the 9th and 31st Divisions -(consisting of sixteen battalions), which had been moved by my order -towards Sha-ling-pu; the commander of the 16th Army Corps was with the -25th Infantry Division, which had sixteen battalions; while neither -the commanders of the 8th or Composite Rifle Corps had got so many -troops directly under them. By General Kaulbars’ orders, Tserpitski was -appointed to command the left wing of the troops moved on to the right -bank of the Hun Ho; among these was only one regiment of the 10th Army -Corps, the remainder belonging to the 8th Army, Composite Rifle, and -5th Siberian Corps. At the same time as Kaulbars appointed Tserpitski, -he removed the commanders of the 8th, Composite Rifle, and 16th Corps -from the direct command of troops. This gave the _coup de grâce_ to -the corps organization of this army. It was now completely destroyed. -As I have mentioned (Vol. III.), there was an opportunity on March 6 of -withdrawing the whole of the 10th Army Corps from the first line, and -so reorganizing the 8th Corps and the Composite Rifles properly, but -the commander of the 2nd Army did not seize it. - -The inaction of the 2nd Army on March 4, its passive and disastrous -operations on the 5th and 6th, placed our right flank in a very -difficult position. Nogi was moving not only along the flank, but to -the rear of the 2nd Army. The commander of this army, continuing to -see danger where there was none, paid particular attention to Oku’s -operations, and left Nogi to move round to our rear without hindrance. -Indeed, had I not interfered on March 7, Nogi’s force would have seized -Shan-tai-tzu, the Imperial Tombs, and Mukden, and moved in rear of the -2nd Army. By my orders the defence of the positions near Shan-tai-tzu, -Ta-heng-tun, and Wen-ken-tun was organized so as to face to the north -and west. The movement of the 3rd Army towards the Hun Ho contracted -our position, and enabled me to withdraw to my main reserve portions of -the 9th, 15th, and 54th Divisions, and by means of this concentration -the danger of Nogi’s movement to our rear was temporarily averted, -but in the section held by the 2nd Army we were fighting on three -fronts—west, south, and north. Under such conditions I naturally sent -into action those units which were nearest. Still, the defence of the -northern front was entrusted to a brigade of the 41st Division, the -Volinsk Regiment, and to the 9th Rifle Regiment. Near Tsu-erh-tun were -concentrated three regiments of the 9th and three of the 54th Divisions. - -On the 6th and 7th I made a final attempt to wrest victory from the -Japanese. Hoping that Kuroki had suffered heavily on the preceding -days, and relying on the splendid material in the 1st Army, I made -up my mind, after considerable discussion of the matter with its -commander on the telephone, to weaken that army considerably, so as to -make certain of having sufficient men at Tsu-erh-tun. I augmented my -main reserve by the whole of the 72nd Division, a brigade of the 2nd -Siberian, and eighteen battalions from the 1st Army and 4th Siberian -Corps. The commander of the 1st Army was of opinion that if we did not -soon have a success on the right this weakening of the 1st Army might -be a danger, but though fully realizing the force of his contention, I -considered it necessary to take the risk for the following reasons: - -1. One hundred and five splendid battalions were still left under the -command of General Linievitch. - -2. The enemy in front of the 1st Army must, according to the reports -sent in by its commander, have lost very heavily. - -3. The Japanese had transferred almost the whole of Oku’s army to -the right bank of the Hun Ho, immediately after Nogi’s, and we had -either to break through this disposition or strengthen those of our -forces on the right bank of the Hun Ho by a lateral movement. As I -have described already (Vol. III.), our hopes were not realized. The -movement of the reserves to Tsu-erh-tun was effected very much more -slowly than we had counted upon, and, taking advantage of our reduction -in strength on the front held by the 1st Army, the enemy broke through -there. At the point of our position (Chiu-tien) where the enemy broke -through, _there should have been, according to the arrangements of the -officer commanding the 1st Army, four regiments of the troops under -his command, but as a matter of fact there were only ten companies -of the Barnaul Regiment_.[113] Taking all the circumstances into -consideration, our retirement was, in my opinion, a day too late, and -instead of throwing all the reinforcements which arrived at Tsu-erh-tun -into the fight, some of them (General Zarubaeff’s force) had to be kept -as a last reserve in case the enemy attempted to close us in with a -ring of fire. - -In the last fights at Mukden, the 4th Siberian Corps was scattered -along the whole front, but the enemy being at that spot in -inconsiderable strength, did not attack its strong position at -Erh-ta-ho. Thirty-two splendid battalions of this corps might have -been used by the commander of the 1st Army for a local counter-attack, -or, together with the troops of the 1st Army Corps or those of the 2nd -Siberians, for a greater effort at the counter-offensive, for which a -very favourable opportunity presented itself when the enemy attacked -the 2nd Siberians. By advancing we could have taken the attacking -forces in flank and rear, and the Japanese Imperial Guards would have -been threatened with disaster. But the opportunity was not seized. -Hence the 4th Siberian Corps, having no force opposed to it, only -formed, so to speak, a reserve to the 1st and 2nd Armies. - -On the whole, the confusion was at its greatest between March 8 and 10 -on the northern front of the 2nd Army, but the energetic and gallant -General Launits was in command, and he not only beat back all attacks, -but rescued the inert units of the 2nd Army, whose rear Nogi was -threatening. On March 10 General Muiloff, in command of the rearguard -(composed only of the Lublin Regiment), gallantly and successfully -carried out the difficult duty of covering the retirement of the 2nd -and 3rd Armies. - -It must be remembered that, though the corps organization mostly -broke down, the regimental organization was preserved, and this -gave a cohesion in action which, when taken advantage of, served us -right well. The preservation of the regimental organization was also -important on account of the rationing of the troops. The first line -transport (with field kitchens and two-wheeled ammunition carts) were -kept with regiments, and so ammunition and food were in many cases -most opportunely forthcoming in spite of the mixing up of units. The -nearness of our supplies also at Mukden enabled us easily to refill -regimental reserves. Against the 1st Siberian Corps at the bloody -action at Su-no-pu (near San-de-pu) on January 27—a fight that was more -or less unpremeditated on both sides—units of five different Japanese -divisions were engaged, though the enemy had a comparatively small -force in the field. The enemy, therefore, must also have suffered from -confusion. - -I have endeavoured to give some explanation of how it was that -units got mixed up; but I consider that it was in many cases quite -unnecessary. Consequently, when I reported to the Tsar that I was -mainly responsible for our disaster at Mukden, I pointed out that one -of my mistakes was that I did not sufficiently legislate to prevent -this confusion, and that, as a matter of fact, I was forced by -circumstances to add to it. - - - - INDEX - - - ABAZA, Admiral, his connection with the Royal Timber Company, - ii. 309–313 - - Abdur Rahman, and Afghanistan, i. 84, 85 - - Adabash, Colonel, his information on Japanese reserve forces, i. 206 - - Afghanistan: - her frontier, i. 62; - Britain’s advance, i. 63, 84; - and Russia, i. 64–66, 87; - a buffer State, i. 85; - Boundary Commission, i. 86 - - Alexander I., Emperor of Russia: - more freedom for the army, i. 14; - his example, i. 20 - - Alexander II., Emperor of Russia: - the clamour for peace, i. 22; - the emancipation of the serfs, i. 23; - military economy, i. 87; - the Siberian Railway, i. 149 - - Alexander III., Emperor of Russia, military economy, i. 87 - - Alexeieff, Admiral: - stops work at Port Arthur, i. 126, 128; - the Boxer rebellion, i. 154; - stops the evacuation of Mukden, i. 169; - his connection with Bezobrazoff and the Royal Timber Company, - i. 173–185, ii. 306–313; - becomes Viceroy of the Far East, i. 187; - his negotiations with Japan, i. 188–198; - disperses his troops and fleet, i. 225; - his opinion of the fleet, i. 237, 238; - report on the Eastern Chinese Railway, i. 246; - presses for relief, i. 257; - strategical distribution of troops, ii. 205–211; - the weakness of Port Arthur, ii. 213, 229 - - Alien population, dangers of an, i. 102 - - Alma, battle of the, i. 17 - - America, Russia hands over her possessions in, i. 35 - - Ammunition: - defects in gun, i. 137; - average expenditure of rifle, ii. 149, 150 - - Amur district, Russia’s annexation of, i. 35 - - Armament (see Army): - inferior, i. 15; - moral effect of, i. 107, 108; - artillery, i. 121, 135; - for Port Arthur, i. 129; - test of a new field-gun, i. 136; - defects in gun ammunition, i. 137 - - Army, Russian: - the Great Northern War, i. 5, 6; - reductions in, i. 8; - distribution of, i. 9; - struggle with France, i. 10; - annexation of Finland, i. 12; - in the Crimean War, i. 13–21; - in the Turkish wars, i. 24–34; - casualties in the two main struggles, i. 36; - peace and war establishments, i. 38; - relative speed of mobilization, i. 88–90, 272–284; - losses in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, i. 99; - incapacity of generals, i. 101; - improvement of, i. 113, 119–124; - value of the Siberian Corps, i. 125; - want of railway transport, i. 131–134, 156, 242–268; - re-armament of the artillery, i. 135, 136; - defects in gun ammunition, i. 137; - numbers in the Pri-Amur district, i. 144; - its distribution, i. 225, ii. 209, 210; - its favourable state when peace declared, i. 230–234; - defeats at Yalu, Chin-chou, and Te-li-ssu, i. 257, 258; - loss at Sha Ho, i. 259; - the reservists, i. 278–290; - shortage and capabilities of officers, i. 290–294, 300–305; - discipline, i. 295, 296; - corporal punishment, i. 297–299; - want of sappers, i. 305; - machine-guns, i. 306–309; - criticism of staff work, ii. 2, 3; - cavalry at manœuvres, ii. 4; - attack and defence, ii. 5; - column formation, ii. 6; - work of the artillery, ii. 7; - work of the sappers, ii. 7, 8; - criticism by commanders, ii. 9; - tactical instruction, ii. 10–25; - relative positions of, ii. 33, 34, 37–40; - absence of military spirit and patriotism, ii. 35, 183; - adverse conditions, ii. 37, 39; - effect of the rainy season and dysentery, ii. 41; - difficulties in organization, ii. 44–60; - defects in the command, ii. 60–72; - in the rank and file, ii. 72–80; - Kuropatkin’s final address to, ii. 88–97; - suggestions for the improvement of: - (1) the senior rank, ii. 98–114; - (2) the regulars and reservists, ii. 114–127; - (3) reserve organization, ii. 128–131; - (4) augmenting the combatant infantry, ii. 131–136; - (5) machine-guns, ii. 136; - (6) depôt troops, ii. 137–139; - (7) communication troops, ii. 139, 140; - (8) engineer troops, ii. 141–146; - (9) artillery, ii. 146–151; - (10) cavalry, ii. 151–155; - (11) infantry, ii. 155–161; - (12) organization, ii. 161–176; - summary of the war, ii. 177–204; - gradual improvement in spirit, ii. 183, 188, 189; - strategical distribution of, ii. 205, 271; - Kuropatkin’s narrative of the war, ii. 205–305; - strength of, ii. 258; - breakdown of the unit organization and distribution, ii. 314–335 - - Artamonoff, General, ii. 281, 282 - - Artillery: - rearmament of the, i. 121, 135; - machine, i. 306–309, ii. 136, 137; - suggested improvements, ii. 146–155, 162 - - Asia: - Russia’s war with Turkey, i. 26; - Russia’s position in, i. 34; - Russia’s frontiers, i. 40–46; - opposition to Russia’s expansion in, i. 147 - - _Asia for the Asiatics_, ii. 195, 196 - - Austerlitz, Russia’s heavy loss at, i. 98 - - Austria: - war with Napoleon, i. 10; - Crimean War, i. 16; - her frontier with Russia, i. 51–54; - her strategic railways, i. 55; - her speed of mobilization, i. 90; - her perfected organization, i. 103 - - Austro-Hungary: - Russian frontiers, i. 44, 50–52; - trade with Russia, i. 52; - possibility of war with Russia, i. 53, 54 - - Azov, surrender of, i. 6 - - - Baikal, Lake, great obstacle to the Siberian Railway, i. 149, 248, 254 - - Balasheff, Acting State Councillor: - his warlike despatch, i. 178; - investigation of the Royal Timber Company, i. 181 - - Baltic Sea: Russian aims, i. 5, 9; - defence of, i. 114 - - Batianoff, General, Commander of the 3rd Manchurian Army, ii. 186 - - Batoum, i. 32 - - Bayazet, the defence of, i. 26 - - Berlin: - Congress, i. 32; - Treaty of, i. 82 - - Bessarabia, Russian annexation of, i. 13, 24 - - Bezobrazoff, State Councillor: - his connection with the Royal Timber Company, i. 169, ii. 306–313; - his propositions, i 172–174; - Kuropatkin’s report on, i. 177–179; - investigation of the Royal Timber Company, i. 180, 184 - - Bilderling, General, Commander of the 2nd Manchurian Army: - his report, ii. 186; - criticism on, ii. 228, 234, 247; - his force, ii. 242; - withdraws to position on the Sha Ho, ii. 245, 286 - - Black Sea, the: - Russian progress towards, i. 6, 12, 13; - Russia deprived of a war fleet in, i. 19, 24, 33; - coast defence on, i. 114 - - Blume, M., theorist in strategy, ii. 69 - - Borisoff, Colonel, at Mukden, ii. 281, 283 - - Borodino, Russian loss at, i. 98 - - Boskey, General, surprises the Russians at the battle of the Alma, - i. 17 - - Bothnia, Gulf of, Russian aims, i. 9, 41, 42 - - Boxer Rebellion, i. 136, 154, 155 - - Bulgaria: - Turko-Servian War, i. 24, 25; - Russian behaviour in, i. 29, 30 - - Burun, M., on the Russian fleet, i. 236, 237, 240, 241 - - - Caucasus, the: - her Russian frontier, i. 5, 8, 33, 34, 57, 58; - her troops, i. 26, 114 - - Cavalry: - not sufficiently used, ii. 151, 152; - failure of the officers, ii. 153–155, 288; - details of units, ii. 162 - - Censorship, necessity for press, ii. 176 - - Charles XII., King of Sweden, war with Russia, i. 5 - - Cherniaeff, General, Geok Tepe, i. 32 - - Chichagoff, General, his alarmist reports, ii. 302, 321, 322 - - China: - peaceful attitude of, i. 5; - Peking Treaty, i. 35; - Russian frontier and trade, i. 67, 68; - war with Japan, i. 69, 151, 201–204; - Russian policy, i. 72, 157; - the awakening of, i. 91; - Boxer Rebellion and treaty with Russia, i. 154–162; - her alarm at Russia’s policy, i. 170; - Russian treatment of the Chinese, ii. 190, 191 - - Chin-chou, battle of, i. 257 - - Civil disorder, repression of, ii. 125 - - Constantinople, Russian advance to walls of, i. 30, 82 - - Cossacks. See Cavalry - - Crimean War: - strength of Russian army, i. 13; - Russia’s unpreparedness, i. 16, 101, 109; - Inkerman, i. 18; - siege of Sevastopol, i. 19; - a premature peace, i. 20–22 - - - Dalny: - Russian annexation of, i. 69; - Japanese use of, i. 127; - its fortifications, i. 172, ii. 207; - commerce, i. 190; - coal storage at, i. 246 - - Danube, the, Russian acquisition and loss of the mouths of, - i. 13, 16, 19, 24, 32 - - Defence schemes, ii. 26–30 - - Dembovski, General, at Mukden, ii. 285, 286 - - Demchinski, M., _Were we Ready for War?_ i. 111 - - Djam, Russian force at, i. 84 - - Dragomiroff, General, and quick-firing artillery, i. 136; - his theories, ii. 8, 10, 11 - - Dubniak Hill, capture of, i. 25 - - Dukhovski, General, Governor-General and Commander - in the Pri-Amur district, and the Siberian Railway, i. 151, 171 - - Dushkevitch, Colonel, i. 302 - - - Eastern Chinese Railway: - the bad condition of, i. 131, 132, 182–242; - a parallel in Persia, i. 193; - suggested sale to China, i. 221; - capacity of, i. 243–256 - - Emmanuel, Major, his appreciation of the Japanese army, i. 222 - - Engineers, ii. 141–146; - details of units, ii. 162 - - Essen, Admiral, his daring sally from Vladivostok, i. 239 - - Esthonia, Russian annexation of, i. 5 - - Eupatoria, the Allies’ disembarkation at, i. 17 - - - Feng-huang-cheng, Russian occupation of, i. 170–174, 184 - - Finance Minister, dual capacity of, i. 139 - - Finland, Russian annexation of, i. 5, 12, 41; - Russian frontier, i. 8 _n._, 9; - her aims for autonomy, i. 42 - - Fortresses, work on the, i. 126–130 - - France: - her struggles with Russia, i. 10; - strength of her army, i. 15; - cause of Franco-Russian _entente_, i. 46; - lessons from the Franco-German War, i. 78–81 - - Friederichsham, Treaty of, i. 40, 41 - - Frontiers (see Russia), Russian, i. 8 _n._, 35, 40–77 - - - Galicia, strategic value of, i. 54, 55 - - Geok Tepe, Russian attack on, i. 31, 85, 148 - - Georgia, Russian annexation of, i. 8 - - Germany: - war with Napoleon, i. 10; - her Russian frontier, i. 44, 45; - her Russian trade, i. 45, 59; - her strategic preparations, i. 46–49; - possibilities of war, i. 49, 50; - trade in Persia, i. 59, 60; - lessons from the Franco-German War, i. 79, 80; - her relative speed of mobilization, i. 90; - her perfect organization, i. 103, 113; - her military expenditure, i. 112, 113 - - Gerngros, General: - the Boxer Rebellion, i. 155; - wounded at Te-li-ssu, i. 219; - the battle near Mukden, ii. 278, 279, 293, 297 - - Giers, M., Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, - on the cession of Kuldja, i. 93 - - Glinski, M., _The Resurrected Dead_, i. 292 - - Godunoff, Boris, and the Caspian Sea, i. 4 - - Goltz, Von der, a distinguished German writer, - his dictum on war, i. 88 - - Gorbatoff, M., _Thoughts Suggested by Recent Military Operations_, - ii. 75, 76 - - Great Britain: - strength of her army, i. 15; - the Crimean War, i. 16–20; - her trade with Persia, i. 59, 60; - Russia and Afghanistan, i. 62–67, 84, 85; - Afghan Boundary Commission, i. 86; - treaty with Japan, i. 269 - - Grieg, Admiral, Russian Minister of Finance, - on the cession of Kuldja, i. 93 - - Grippenberg, General, Commander of the 2nd Army: - his peculiar theories and behaviour, i. 299, - ii. 11, 23–25, 55–60, 251–253, 257, 260, 261, 264–267, 320; - _The Truth about the Battle of Hei-kou-tai_, ii. 83 - - Grodekovi, General, i. 154, 155 - - Guber, General, ii. 52 - - Gulistan, Treaty of, i. 60 - - Guns. See Artillery - - Gurieff, M., _The Outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War_, i. 146 - - Gurko, General, siege of Plevna, i. 26; criticisms by, ii. 9 - - - Hamilton, General Sir Ian, an appreciation of the Japanese army, - i. 223 - - Harbin: - concentration at, i. 155, 160; - railway difficulties, i. 245, 254, 261, 268; - drunkenness at, ii. 188 - - Hei-kou-tai, operations at, ii. 82, 83, 271, 320 - - Hei-ni-tun, Russian attack on, ii. 282 - - Herat, proposed railway, i. 67; - and Russia, i. 86 - - Hershelman, General, i. 279 - - Hsi-mu-cheng, concentration at, ii. 42 - - Hsi-ping-kai positions: - Russian occupation of, i. 229, ii. 32, 182, 287; - handed over to Japan, i. 232; - preparations near, ii. 184, 185, 194 - - Hun-huses, raids by, i. 158, 159 - - - Imeretinski, General, at Plevna, i. 28 - - India and Russia’s policy, i. 64–67 - - Infantry (see Army): - the chief arm, ii. 155; - improvement in, ii. 156; - officers’ casualties, ii. 157, 158; - promotion in the field, ii. 159; - _field_ v. _office_ training, ii. 160; - organization and details of units, ii. 161–170; - penalties on active service, ii. 171–175 - - Istomin, Admiral, his heroic death, i. 18, 21 - - Ivanovitch, Tsar Theodore, i. 4 - - - Japan: - peaceful attitude of, i. 5; - Russia and Saghalien, i. 35; - Peking Treaty, i. 35; - war with China, i. 69, 151, 202–204; - events leading up to the war with Russia, i. 123–130, 151, 157–166, - 170, 177–179; - the Royal Timber Company, i. 172; - Kuropatkin’s visit to, and impressions of, i. 174, 175, 217–223; - progress of negotiations, i. 188, 193; - Russia’s bluff, i. 193–198; - her early history, i. 199; - birth of her army, i. 200–202; - expedition to China, i. 203; - her estimated strength, i. 203, 208, ii. 192; - expansion for war, i. 204–206; - her loss in the war with Russia, i. 207, ii. 192; - her sea-transport, i. 209; - Russian criticisms on the army of, i. 210; - her officers in Russian employ, i. 212; - her reserve troops, i. 213; - the _samurai_ spirit, i. 214; - her resentment with Russia, i. 215; - her system of education, i. 217–219; - Korea a vital question, i. 219; - German and English appreciations of, i. 222, 223; - her disembarkations on Liao-tung Peninsula and Kuan-tung unhindered, - i. 225; - her advantages, i. 226; - their moral tone, i. 227; - the nation with the army, i. 228; - partial exhaustion, i. 230, 235, ii. 194, 195; - strength of the fleets in the Far East, i. 236, 237; - the naval battles near Port Arthur and Vladivostok, i. 238–241; - her victories at the Yalu, Chin-chou and Te-li-ssu, i. 257, 258, - ii. 38, 83; - her treaty with Great Britain, i. 269; - relative positions after fifteen months’ war, ii. 31–35, 39–44; - her losses, ii. 192, 193; - Kuropatkin’s summary of the war, ii. 217–287, 314–335 - - Jassy, Treaty of, i. 6 - - Jilinski, General, Headquarter Staff, i. 206, 256 - - - Ka-liao-ma, ii. 274, 290 - - Kamchatka, Russian annexation of, i. 35 - - Kao-li-tun, ii. 275 - - Kars, the capture of the fortress of, i. 26, 30, 32, ii. 14 - - Kashgaria, i. 70; - Chinese take possession of, i. 92 - - Kaufmann, General, i. 32; - and Afghanistan, i. 85; - the cession of Kuldja, i. 92, 93; - the Bokhara Khanate, i. 147 - - Kaulbars, General, ii. 58; - in command of the 3rd Army, ii. 249, 265; - in command of the 2nd Army, ii. 268; - the assault of San-de-pu, ii. 271; - battles near Mukden, ii. 272–287; - criticisms on, ii. 288–305, 324–335 - - Keller, General Count, ii. 42, 221; - his death, ii. 71, 226 - - Khanates, the, i. 147, 148 - - Khilkoff, Prince, Minister of Ways and Communications, - and the Siberian Railway, i. 246, 248, 250, 254 - - Khiva, Russian failure to gain possession of, i. 5 - - Kipke, Surgeon-General, list of Japanese casualties, i. 207, 208 - - Kirghiz tribes and Russia, i. 4 _n._, 5, 8 _n._ - - Kirin, capture of, i. 155 - - Kondratenko, General, the hero of Port Arthur, i, 300, ii. 71 - - Korea: - independence of, i. 69; - necessity for quiet in, i. 72, 73; - Russian activity in, i. 153, 178; - timber concession, i. 170; - council at Port Arthur on, i. 180, 181; - the Treaty of Peking, i. 199; - a vital question, i. 219 - - Korniloff, Admiral, siege of Sevastopol, i. 18; - heroic death, i. 21 - - Korniloff, Lieutenant-Colonel, ii. 286 - - Kronstadt, fortifications of, i. 126 - - Kruimoff, Captain, i. 303 - - Kuan-tung Peninsula: Russian annexation of, i. 35, 69; - Japanese land and fortify, i. 127, 257; - Russian defence force, ii. 206, 207 - - Kuang-cheng-tzu, seizure by rebels, i. 155 - - Kuldja, province of, i. 70; - the cession to China of, i. 92–95, 148, 149 - - Kuprin, M., _The Duel_, ii. 69 - - Kuroki, General: - in command of the 1st Japanese Army, i. 257, 258; - his opinion of the Russian shells, i. 306; - his victory at Te-li-ssu, ii. 38; - his positions, ii. 39, 40, 216, 222; - his turning movement, ii. 230–232, 264; - strength of his army, ii. 253; - battle of Liao-yang, ii. 317; - at Mukden, ii. 323,329, 332 - - Kuropatkin, General, Minister of War, afterwards Commander-in-Chief: - his report on the possibilities of the twentieth century, i. 39; - his report on the Russian frontiers and their suitability, i. 40–77; - deductions from the work of the army as a guide to future wars, - i. 96–110; - the work before the War Department, i. 111–144; - his opinion on the Manchurian and Korean questions, i. 145–198; - difference of opinion with Admiral Alexeieff, i. 167–169; - the Royal Timber Company, i. 172–184, ii. 306; - his impressions on visiting Japan, i. 174, 175, 217–223; - his reports on the Manchurian position, i. 176–179, 189–193; - his responsibility for the rupture with Japan, i. 177–179; - his pyramid of Russian interests, i. 185, 186; - resignation on the establishment of the Viceroyalty, i. 187; - his proposal to give way, i. 189; - his report on strength of Japanese army, i. 242; - on necessity for Russian railway improvements, i. 252–254, 263–268; - on mobilization, i. 271–289; - on reserve of officers, i. 293, 294; - his recommendations as to officers, i. 301–305; - on machine-guns and ammunition, i. 306–309; - his criticisms of staff work, ii. 2, 3; - of cavalry, ii. 4; - of attack and the defence, ii. 5, 6; - of column formation in attack, ii. 6; - on the work of the artillery and sappers, ii. 7, 8; - on criticism by commanders, ii. 9; - on tactical instruction of our troops, ii. 10; - his supplementary and monthly instructions, ii. 12, 13, 15–22; - reasons for the reverses at Plevna, ii. 13, 14; - his diagram of, and opinion on, the relative positions in Manchuria, - ii. 33–44; - on difficulties in organization, ii. 44–60; - on defects in _personnel_, ii. 60–72; - on the rank and file and Social Revolutionists, ii. 72–81; - on the countermanding of orders, ii. 81–84; - takes the blame for the defeat at Mukden, ii. 85, 86, 335; - his farewell address, ii. 87–97; - his suggested improvements in the senior ranks and all arms, - ii. 98–176; - his summary of the war, and conclusions, ii. 177–305; - breakdown of the unit organization and distribution, ii. 314–335 - - Kushk, proposed railway to, i. 67; - defeat of Afghans at, i. 86 - - Kutnevitch, General, ii. 297 - - - Lamsdorff, M., Minister for Foreign Affairs, - and the Royal Timber Company, i. 173, 174, ii. 306, 311, 312 - - Launits, General, his gallantry, ii. 334 - - Lessar, Acting State Councillor, Russian Minister in China, - council at Port Arthur on the Yalu enterprise, i. 175, 180 - - Levestam, General: - withdrawal to Hsi-mu-cheng, ii. 40; - the battle near Mukden, ii. 283, 286 - - Liao-tung Peninsula, Japanese land at, i. 225, 257 - - Liao-yang: - seizure by rebels, i. 155; - Russian concentration at, i. 225, 242, 258; - battle at, ii. 18, 83, 229, 230, 317; - Russian retirement, ii. 86; - Japanese losses at, ii. 193; - Kuropatkin’s arrival at, ii. 209 - - Linievitch, General: - capture of Peking, i. 155; - in command of the 1st Army, i. 230, ii. 249, 324; - Commander-in-Chief, i. 301, ii. 198; - and Kuropatkin, ii. 56, 58 - - Livonia, Russia’s annexation of, i. 5 - - Lomakin, General, his disastrous expedition against the Turcomans, - i. 31 - - Losses, Russian, in the two main struggles, i. 36; - in past wars, i. 98; - in the future, i. 99 - - - Madridoff, Lieutenant-Colonel, and the timber concession, - i. 175, 181, 184, ii. 309 - - Makharoff, Admiral, i. 225, 238 - - Maksheef, Professor, on military expenditure, i. 111–113 - - Malakhoff Hill, capture of, i. 19 - - Malingering, i. 174 - - Maloshevitch, N. S., _Memoirs of a Sevastopol Man_, i. 16 - - Manchuria (see also Railways): - Russian movements in, i. 35; - the question of annexation, i. 71, 105, 157–179; - expansion of Russian garrison, i. 122; - the rising in, i. 126; - the War Minister’s opinion on, i. 145; - investigation of the timber concession, i. 180–184; - pyramid of Russian interests, i. 185, 186; - negotiations, i. 187–198; - Japanese invade Southern, ii. 32–44; - summary of the war, and conclusions, ii. 177–305 - - Martinoff, M. E., _Spirit and Temper of the Two Armies_, ii. 77, 78 - - Menshikoff, M., Russian writer, ii. 69 - - Menshikoff, Prince, Commander-in-Chief, Crimean War, i. 17; - battle of Inkerman, i. 18; - superseded, i. 19 - - Meyendorff, General Baron, Commander of 1st Army Corps, i. 302; - retreat of, ii. 284 - - Milutin, General: - the emancipation of the serfs, i. 24; - Plevna, i. 25; - cession of Kuldja, i. 93; - the improvement of the army, i. 113 - - Mischenko, General: - retirement of the local railway guards, i. 155; - his cavalry successes, ii. 150 - - Mobilization, relative speed of, i. 90; - inconveniences of, i. 272–286 - - Moscow, a poor spirit in, i. 198, 199 - - Muiloff, Lieutenant-General, ii. 282; - removal of, ii. 297; - his gallantry, ii. 334 - - Mukden: - seized by the rebels, i. 154; - recaptured, i. 155; - battles round, i. 229 _n._, 260, ii. 43, 246, 272–305, 314–335; - Japanese losses at, ii. 193, 194; - Russia’s unfavourable position at, ii. 196, 197, 240, 241 - - - Nakhimoff, Admiral, i. 18; - his heroic death, i. 21 - - Namangan, occupation of, i. 148 - - Narbut, General, member of the military council, i. 293 - - Narva, reasons for Russian defeat at, i. 5 - - _Nasha Jizu_, newspaper, _The Viceroy Alexeieff’s Firm Policy_, i. 109 - - _Navarin_, Russian battleship, terrible loss on, i. 240 - - Navy, Russian: - state of, i. 15; - disadvantages of, i. 107; - its uselessness at Port Arthur, i. 131; - the Pacific Squadron, i. 224; - minor part played by, i. 236; - strength of Japanese and, i. 236, 237; - battles at Port Arthur and Vladivostok, i. 238–241 - - Newchuang: - Russian intentions, i. 157; - evacuation of, ii. 43 - - Nicholas II., Tsar of Russia, on improvements in the army, i. 120–122; - his efforts against war, i. 145, 187; - railway transport, i. 245, 252, 263–268; - mobilization, i. 272; - orders concentration, ii. 212; - on Kuropatkin’s retirement at Liao-yang, ii. 238; - his connection with the Royal Timber Company and Bezobrazoff, - ii. 306–313 - - Nicolaeff, Grand-Duke Michael, operations in Asia, i. 26 - - Nicolai-Pavlovitch, the late Emperor, his warning, i. 16 - - Nishtabtski, Treaty of, i. 5 - - Nodzu, General, lands on the Liao-tung Peninsula, i. 236; - his advance, ii. 222; - summary of the war, ii. 177–305, 314–335 - - Nogi, General, lands on the Liao-tung Peninsula, i. 236; - on the fall of Port Arthur, i. 260; - at Mukden, ii. 84, 152, 281; - summary of the war, ii. 177–305, 314–335 - - Norway, her frontiers, i. 40 - - - Obrucheff, General, Chief of Headquarter Staff: - cession of Kuldja, i. 93; - the improvement of the army, i. 113 - - Offensive, advantages of strategic, ii. 169 - - Officers, Russian: - incapacity of, i. 101, ii. 1–11; - the shortage of, i. 290–295; - General Grippenberg’s resignation, i. 299, ii. 57; - quality of, i. 300–303; - _The Resurrected Dead_, i. 305; - the susceptibilities of, ii. 57, 58; - defects in, ii. 61–72, 95–97; - suggested improvements, ii. 98–113; - casualties among, ii. 157; - line officers have no fair chance, ii. 158; - promotion in the field, ii. 159; - _field_ v. _office_ training, ii. 160, 161; - suggested changes in rank of, ii. 164–168; - removal of incompetent, ii. 172 - - Oku, General: - his landing on the Liao-tung Peninsula, i. 236, 256; - joins General Nodzu’s army, ii. 43; - battle of Liao-yang, ii. 84; - summary of the war, ii. 177–305, 314–335 - - Organization, Russian: - defects in, i. 26, 27, 88, 89, 119; - difficulties in, ii. 44–60; - Kuropatkin’s proposals on, ii. 161–176; - breakdown of, ii. 314–320 - - Orenburg-Tashkent Railway, i. 86 _n._ - - Orloff, General, at Liao-yang, i. 279; - retreat to Yen-tai, ii. 234 - - Osaka, great exhibition at, i. 219 - - Ostolopoff, Colonel, i. 302 - - _Osvobojdenie_, the Royal Timber Company, ii. 307 - - - Pacific Ocean, opposition to Russian access to, i. 146, 147 - - Patriotism in Japan and Russia, ii. 78–80, 121–123, 227 - - Paul II., Emperor of Russia, and the army, i. 8 - - Pavloff, Chamberlain, Russian Minister in Korea, Yalu enterprise, - i. 175, 180 - - Pavlovski, M., engineer of Siberian Railway, i. 253 - - Peking, Treaty of, i. 35, 199; - capture of, i. 155 - - Penalties on active service, ii. 171, 173 - - Persia: - war with Russia, i. 33; - frontier and trade with Russia, i. 58, 59; - the cockpit of the Middle East, i. 59; - Great Britain and Germany in, i. 60; - Russian aims in, i. 61 - - _Personnel_, defects in, ii. 60–72 - - Peter the Great: - war with Sweden, i. 5; - war with Turkey, i. 6; - founder of the Russian fleet, i. 7; - his struggles with Charles XII. and Napoleon, i. 10, 11; - his counsel, i, 20; - his influence, i. 41 - - Petroff, General, i. 245 - - Petrovitch, Paul, Emperor, his reforms, i. 38 - - Plancon, M., diplomat, investigation of the Timber Company, i. 180 - - Plehve, Von, Minister of the Interior, and the Timber Company, ii. 311 - - Plevna, battle at, i. 25–30; - the cause of the Russian reverses at, ii. 13 - - Poland, Russia’s neighbour, i. 3; - her struggles with Russia, i. 7; - the problem of, i. 10, 11; - rebellion, i. 23 - - Poltava, Russian victory at, i. 5, 11, 41 - - Port Arthur: - Russian aims, i. 69; - work at, i. 126, 127; - armament for, i. 128, 129; - the council on the timber concession, i. 180–184; - Kuropatkin’s advice as to, i. 189, 190; - Chino-Japanese War, i. 202; - naval battles at, i. 238–241; - fall of, i. 260; - garrison at, ii. 205, 208; - weakness of, ii. 211, 213, 214; - result of fall of, ii. 299 - - Pri-Amur district and Russia, i. 77; - increase of troops in, i. 121, 122, 144, 151 - - Punishment, corporal, ii. 173 - - Putiloff Hill: - Japanese losses at, ii. 193; - movement of troops from, ii. 319 - - - Railways, the Siberian, i. 123, 149, 156; - as a factor in the Japanese War, i. 131–134, 198; - the problem of, i. 242–254, ii. 31; - necessity for guarding, ii. 37 - - _Razsvet_, newspaper, on Kuropatkin’s responsibility, i. 177 - - _Razviedchik_ (_The Resurrected Dead_), i. 292 - - Rediger, Lieutenant-General, War Minister, his report, i. 138, 139 - - Rennenkampf, General: - capture of Tsitsihar and Kirin, i. 155; - in the Tai-tzu Ho Valley, ii. 244, 254, 273; - Liao-yang, ii. 318, 328; - the gallantry of his troops, ii. 323 - - Reservists, Russian, i. 275–286, ii. 73, 163 - - Revenue, Russian, i. 142 - - Revolutionists, Social, ii. 75–80 - - Roop, General, criticisms by commanders, ii. 9. - - Roslavleff, M., on Kuropatkin’s responsibility, i. 176, 177; - the council at Port Arthur, i. 184 - - Roumania: - Russian frontier, i. 44, 56; - her aspirations, i. 57. - - Rozhdestvenski, Admiral, result of his defeat at Tsushima, i. 241, 242 - - Rusin, Captain, Russian naval attaché, his report on the Japanese - navy, i. 206, 207 - - _Ruski Viestnik_, article on the fleets in the Far East, i. 236, 237 - - Russia: - extent of, in the eighteenth century, i. 2, 3; - her neighbours, i. 3; - her aims, i. 4; - the Great Northern War and its result, i. 5–7; - extension of, in the nineteenth century, i. 8, 35; - reductions in the army, i. 8; - closer touch with Europe, i. 9; - struggles with France, i. 10; - Polish problem, i. 11; - annexation of Finland, i. 12; - further wars with Turkey, i. 13, 24; - deterioration of the army, i. 14; - her navy, i. 15; - her unpreparedness, i. 16; - Crimean War commences, i. 16; - Allies’ disembarkation permitted, i. 17; - battle of the Alma, i. 17, 18; - Inkerman, i. 18; - siege of Sevastopol, i. 18, 19; - a premature peace, i. 20–22, 81, 82; - emancipation of the serfs, i. 23; - Plevna, i. 25; - failure of assaults, i. 26; - her slow concentration and shortcomings, i. 27–29; - her ultimate success, i. 30; - Geok Tepe, i. 31; - Kushk, i. 32; - her position, i. 33–35; - losses in the two centuries, i. 36, 37, 98, 99; - peace and war establishments, i. 38; - her future, i. 39; - her Swedish frontier, i. 40–44; - her German frontier and trade, i. 44–50; - her Austro-Hungarian frontier, i. 50–55; - Austria’s strategic railways, i. 55; - her Roumanian frontier, i. 56; - her Turkish frontier and trade, i. 57; - her Persian frontier and trade, i. 58, 59; - her aims in Persia, i. 61; - her frontier with Afghanistan, i. 62; - her policy versus Great Britain, i. 63–66; - no wish for India, i. 67; - her Chinese frontier, trade, and policy, i. 67–73; - her position, i. 73–77; - lessons from Franco-German War, i. 79, 80; - _National_ wars, i. 80, 81; - her isolation in 1878, i. 83; - her lever against Great Britain, i. 84; - Afghan Boundary Commission, i. 85, 86; - military economy, i. 187; - her disabilities, i. 188, 189; - relative speed of mobilization, i. 90; - the awakening of China, i. 91; - cession of Kuldja, i. 92–94; - her complications, i. 95; - deductions from the past, i. 96; - strain of armed peace, i. 97; - probable losses in the future, i. 99; - dangers of alien population, i. 102; - the chief duty of the twentieth century, i. 103; - her handicap on the west, i. 104, 114; - her forward movement in Manchuria, i. 105; - the disadvantages of a navy, i. 106, 107; - military expenditure, i. 112, 118; - expansion of forces in the Pri-Amur district, i. 121–123; - commencement and causes of the war with Japan, - i. 123, 151, 156, 157; - work at Port Arthur, i. 127, 130; - railway factor, i. 131–149; - line of communications 5,400 miles long, i. 135; - dual capacity of Finance Minister, i. 139, 140; - her finance and revenue, i. 141–144; - War Minister’s opinion on the Manchurian and Korean questions, - i. 145; - inception of the Siberian Railway, i. 149–155; - Boxer Rebellion, i. 154, 155; - her intentions as to Manchuria, and the result, i. 157–170; - treaty with China, i. 158, 160; - influence of M. de Witte, i. 171; - the Royal Timber Company, i. 172–184, 306–313; - pyramid of her interests, i. 185, 186; - establishment of a Viceroyalty in the Far East, i. 187; - Kuropatkin’s special reports, i. 188–193; - her bluff, i. 194–198; - reasons for her reverses in the war with Japan, i. 229–309, - ii. 1–97; - suggested improvements in the army, ii, 98–176; - summary of the war, ii. 177–287; - conclusions upon the battle of Mukden, i. 288–305; - breakdown of the unit organization and distribution, ii. 314–335 - - _Russki Invalid_, article on military expenditure, i. 111, 112; - on duty and love of country, ii. 78–80 - - Russo-Chinese Bank, De Witte’s influence over the, i. 172 - - - Saghalien, Russian garrison at, i. 148, 200; - part concession of, to Japan, i. 232 - - St. George, the Cross of, ii. 16 - - St. Petersburg Convention, i. 40 _n._ - - Sakharoff, General, Chief of the Headquarter Staff, i. 115, 207; - War Minister, i. 252; - the Siberian Railway, i. 261; - mobilization, i. 272, 273, 276, 277; - unfitness of generals, i. 300; - his description of the Japanese plans, ii. 30; - commands the Southern Force, ii. 209 - - Samoiloff, Lieutenant-Colonel, military attaché in Japan, - his views on Japanese strength, i. 208 - - Samsonoff, General, and his Siberian Cossacks, ii. 234 - - Sappers. See Engineers - - Serfs, emancipation of the, i. 23, 24 - - Servia, war with Turkey, i. 24 - - Sevastopol, siege of, i. 18, 19, 83; - Russian loss at, i. 98 - - Sha Ho, Russian strength at battle of, i. 242, ii. 182; - Japanese loss at, ii. 193 - - Shipka Pass, defence of the, i. 26, 30 - - Shtakelberg, General: - on the Yalu, ii. 38; - concentration at Te-li-ssu, ii. 218, 219; - battle near the Yen-tai Mines, ii. 234; - strength of his force, ii. 243 _n._; - faulty disposition of his troops, ii. 246, 247; - his attack on Su-ma-pu, ii. 262 - - Siberian Railway. See Railways - - Siberian Rifle Regiments, East, expansion and value of, i. 124–126, - ii. 183, 207 - - Sinope, Russian victory at, i. 15, 16, 107 - - Skobeleff, General, at Plevna, i. 26, 28; - seizes Geok Tepe, i. 31, 85, 148 - - Solovieff, M., historian, the Crimean War, i. 21, 22 - - Sosnovski, Lieutenant-Colonel, and the Chinese, i. 92 - - Spade, revival in the army of the use of the, i. 142 - - Stössel, General: - defence of Port Arthur, ii. 213; - his alarmist reports, ii. 229 - - Subotin, General, capture of Mukden, i. 155 - - Sungari River, Russian withdrawal to, i. 232 - - Surrender, the question of, ii. 175 - - _Suvoroff_, Russian battleship, gallantry on the, i. 240 - - Suvoroff, General, his campaigns, i. 8, 10 - - Sviatosloff, Grand-Duke, i. 4 - - Sweden as Russia’s neighbour, i. 3; - war with Russia, i. 12, 36; - her Russian frontier, i. 40–44 - - - Tartars as Russia’s neighbours, i. 3 - - Ta-shih-chiao, battle of, ii. 182 - - Tashkent, Russian occupation of, i. 87, 147 - - Tchernaya, battle of the, i. 18 - - Telegraph and telephones, need for, ii. 143, 144, 162 - - Te-li-ssu, Russian disaster at, i. 257, 258 - - Territorial system, the, ii. 126 - - Tieh-ling, retirement from, ii. 86 - - Timber Company, the Royal: - its importance, i. 169; - Bezobrazoff’s propositions, i. 172; - investigation of, i. 173–184; - history of, ii. 306–313 - - Todleben, General: - Crimean War, i. 21; - assault on Plevna, i. 26 - - Togo, Admiral: - naval battle at Port Arthur, i. 238, 240 - - Topornin, General, ii. 276, 292, 297 - - Trans-Baikal Railway to Vladivostok, i. 69; - capacity of, i. 247–256 - - Trans-Baikal Cossack, success of, ii. 153 - - Triple Alliance, the, i. 46, 51, 87, 113 - - _Trous de loup_, i. 215, 216 - - Trubetski, Prince, President of the Moscow nobility, - correspondence with Kuropatkin, ii. 198–200 - - Tserpitski, General, ii. 279, 280, 290, 296, 297, 330 - - Tsitsihar, capture of, i. 155, ii. 322 - - Tsushima, defeat of Russian fleet at, i. 238–241 - - Turkey, and Russia, i. 3; - wars with Russia, i. 6, 81–83; - her army, i. 15; - her peace strength, i. 15; - Crimean War, i. 16; - war with Servia and Russia, i. 24; - Plevna, i. 25; - Russian loss, i. 36; - possibility of trouble with Russia, i. 58 - - Turkomans, Russian expedition against the, i. 30–32, 85, 86 - - - Ujin, Colonel, his pack telephone system, ii. 143 _n._ - - Uniform, value of, ii. 100–103 - - Units, proposed details of, ii. 161–163; - breakdown of, ii. 314–335 - - _Ushakoff_, Russian ironclad, total loss of, at Tsushima, i. 240 - - Ussuri districts, Russian annexation of, i. 35, 69, 200 - - - Vannovski, General, War Minister: - the improvement of the army, i. 113; - succeeded by General Kuropatkin, i. 115; - on the allotment of funds, i. 117 - - Velichko, Major-General, armament for Port Arthur, i. 128 - - Viceroyalty, establishment of the, i. 187 - - Vladivostok: - Trans-Baikal Railway, i. 69; - fortification of, i. 126, 148, 151, 200; - Russian fleet at, i. 237; - daring sally from, i. 239; - garrison at, ii. 206 - - Vogak, Major-General, council at Port Arthur, i. 180 - - - War Department (see also Army), problems for the Russian, i. 1–39; - expansion of the army, and growing complications of defence - problems, i. 78–96; - the chief duty of the twentieth century, i. 102–104; - taken by surprise, i. 105; - estimate procedure and inadequacy of funds allotted, - i. 116–122, 138, 139; - ready by September, 1905, i. 134; - lines of communication 5,400 miles long, i. 135; - dual capacity of Finance Minister, i. 139; - Manchurian and Korean questions, i. 145–198; - reasons for the Russian reverses, i. 229–309, ii. 1–97; - measures for the improvement of the army, ii. 98–176; - the causes of Russian failure summarized, ii. 177–204 - - Wei-hai-wei, Japanese occupation of, ii. 30 - - Witgeft, Admiral, his death while attacking the Japanese fleet, i. 238 - - Witte, Sergius de, Minister of Finance, and Dalny, i. 127, 172; - his dual capacity, i. 139; - his influence, i. 171; - and the Russo-Chinese Bank, i. 172; - and the evacuation of Manchuria, i. 173; - and the Royal Timber Company, i. 173–184, ii. 306–313 - - - Yakub Beg, death of, i. 92 - - Yalu, battles on the, i. 125, 257, ii. 38; - the timber concession, i. 169–184, ii. 306–313; - naval engagement at the mouth of the, i. 202 - - _Yellow Peril_, the, a reality, ii. 200 - - Yen-tai mines, battle at the, ii. 234–236 - - - Zarubaeff, General, i. 303; - withdraws his troops towards Hai-cheng, ii. 225; - the retreat from Mukden, ii. 232, 285, 286, 333 - - Zasulitch, General, his defeat, ii. 38, 211, 212, 225 - - Zikoff, ii. 212 - - - THE END - - - BILLING AND SONS, LTD., PRINTERS, GUILDFORD - -[Illustration: Sketch map of area containing the battlefields of -LIAO-YANG, THE SHA-HO, HEI-KOU-TAI & MUKDEN showing some of the more -important places mentioned] - -[Illustration: MAP OF THEATRE OF OPERATIONS SOUTH OF MUKDEN] - - - - - _JUST OUT._ - - ARTILLERY AND EXPLOSIVES. - - ESSAYS AND LECTURES WRITTEN AND DELIVERED AT VARIOUS TIMES. - - By Sir ANDREW NOBLE, K.C.B., D.C.L., F.R.S. - - With Numerous Diagrams and Illustrations. Medium 8vo. 21s. net. - -“The experience of Sir Andrew Noble covers such a wide field, and so -many important changes have taken place in connection with rifled guns, -their ammunition and projectiles, during the long period dealt with, -that the views of so eminent an expert are of an incalculable value. -He is therefore to be congratulated on his decision to bring into -one volume the mass of important information and invaluable details -respecting the progress in naval and artillery science.”—_Broad Arrow._ - - - THE FRONTIERSMAN’S POCKET BOOK. - - Compiled and Edited by ROGER POCOCK, on behalf of the Council of the - Legion of Frontiersmen. - - With Illustrations. Leather, 5s. net. - -“A very handy and well-packed little volume.... It brings -together a large amount of well-digested practical information -about camping, means of travel, signals, shooting, first-aid, -and, in short, everything that a pioneering, handy man ought to -know.... May be heartily recommended to all classes of scouts and -frontiersmen.”—_Scotsman._ - - - FORTIFICATION: - - ITS PAST ACHIEVEMENTS, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, FUTURE PROGRESS. - - By Colonel Sir GEORGE S. CLARKE, R.E., K.C.M.G., F.R.S., - - Governor of Bombay. - - New Edition Enlarged. With numerous Illustrations. - - Medium 8vo. 18s. net. - -“The reflections of this great soldier-statesman will be found as -fascinating as they are instructive, and that reasonable intelligence -is the only essential qualification for reading them with profit as -well as with interest and pleasure.”—_Westminster Gazette._ - - - THE BATTLE OF WAVRE AND GROUCHY’S RETREAT. - - A STUDY OF AN OBSCURE PART OF THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN. - - By W. HYDE KELLY, R.E. - - With Maps and Plans. Demy 8vo. 8s. net. - -“... brings forward, with a vividness and brilliancy which compel -attention throughout one of the most obscure pages in the story of the -famous struggle.”—_Birmingham Post._ - - - OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR, 1878–1880. - - PRODUCED IN THE INTELLIGENCE BRANCH, ARMY HEAD QUARTERS, INDIA - - Abridged Official Account. With numerous Maps and Illustrations. - - Medium 8vo. 21s. net. - -“An excellent compendium of the whole war, clearly written and -amply illustrated by photographs, maps, and diagrams.... It is -a narrative that will fascinate the many who love to read about -warlike movements.... It is a story of wise and patient preparation, -carefully arranged generalship, supreme daring, amazing tenacity. -Undoubtedly the right thing has been done in giving to the world a -stirring story, which has remained too long, many will think, a secret -record.”—_Sheffield Independent._ - - - THE GERMAN OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA - -PREPARED IN THE HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF, BERLIN. - - With Maps and Plans. Demy 8vo. 15s. net each. - -PART I.—From its Commencement in 1899 to the Capture of General - Cronje’s Forces at Paardeburg. Translated by Colonel W. H. H. - WATERS, R.A., C.V.O. PART II.—The Advance to Pretoria, the - Upper Tugela Campaign, etc., etc. Translated by Colonel HUBERT - DU CANE, R.A., M.V.O. - -“The most valuable work in which, since its close, the war has been -discussed. It stands alone, because it is the only work in which the -war has been surveyed by trained and competent students of war, the -only one of which the judgments are based on a familiarity with the -modern theory of war. The best book that has yet appeared on the South -African War.”—_Morning Post._ - - - THE BOOK OF WAR. - - Translated into English by Captain E. F. CALTHROP, R.A. - - Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d. net. - -This work, the writings of Suntzu and Wutzu, Chinese strategists of -about the fifth century B.C., is the most famous work on the art of war -in the Far East. It deals with operations of war, statecraft, moral -and training of troops, stratagem, the use of spies, etc., and for -twenty-five centuries it has been the bible of the Chinese or Japanese -ruler. The book is distinguished alike by the poetry and grandeur of -its language and the modernity of its spirit. - - - A WEEK AT WATERLOO IN 1815. - - LADY DE LANCEY’S NARRATIVE. - - BEING AN ACCOUNT OF HOW SHE NURSED HER HUSBAND, - COLONEL SIR WILLIAM H. D. LANCEY, MORTALLY WOUNDED - IN THE GREAT BATTLE. - - With Photogravure Portraits and other Illustrations. - - Square crown 8vo. 6s. net. - -“Pages of writing of terrible beauty, subtlety, delicacy, and power -describe her nursing of him and his death. It is not a jagged series of -poignant notes.... There is no heroine in English history or literature -more worshipful than Lady de Lancey.”—_World._ - - - THE STORY OF THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. - - By the Rev. G. R. GLEIG. With Map and Illustrations. - - - MOLTKE IN HIS HOME. - - By FRIEDRICH AUGUST DRESSLER. - - Authorized Translation by Mrs. C. E. BARRETT-LENNARD. - - With an Introduction by Lieut.-General LORD METHUEN. - - With Illustrations. Demy 8vo. - -This does not attempt to give a biography of the great Field-Marshal, -but contains a series of sketches and incidents of his life, and of the -characteristics and surroundings of one of the greatest soldiers of the -nineteenth century. - - - THE MILITARY LIFE OF H.R.H. THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE. - -WRITTEN UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE LATE DUKE FROM DOCUMENTS IN HIS OWN - POSSESSION. - - By Colonel WILLOUGHBY VERNER, - - Late Rifle Brigade. - - Assisted by Captain ERASMUS DARWIN PARKER, - - Late Manchester Regiment. - - With Portraits. 2 Vols. Medium 8vo. 36s. net. - -“We congratulate the authors on the manner in which they have -accomplished their task, and send our hearty good wishes after the -volumes they have launched.”—_Saturday Review._ - - - LUMSDEN OF THE GUIDES. - - A SKETCH OF THE LIFE OF SIR HARRY LUMSDEN, HIS - SERVICES IN THE AFGHAN VALLEY, PUNJAB AND FRONTIER - CAMPAIGNS, AND OF THE RAISING OF THE FAMOUS - CORPS OF GUIDES. - - By Sir P. LUMSDEN and G. R. ELSMIE. - - Portraits, Maps, and Illustrations. Demy 8vo. 7s. 6d. net. - - - THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF SIR HARRY SMITH. - -INCLUDING HIS SERVICES IN SOUTH AMERICA—IN THE PENINSULA AND FRANCE—AT - NEW ORLEANS—AT WATERLOO—IN NORTH AMERICA AND JAMAICA—IN SOUTH AFRICA -DURING THE KAFFIR WAR—IN INDIA DURING THE SIKH WAR—AND AT THE CAPE, ETC. - - Edited by G. C. MOORE SMITH. - - With some additional Chapters supplied by the EDITOR. - - With Portraits and Illustrations. - - Cheap Edition in 1 Vol. 10s. 6d. net. - - - THE LIFE OF JOHN COLBORNE, FIELD-MARSHAL LORD SEATON. - - By G. C. MOORE SMITH. - - With Maps, Portraits, and other Illustrations. Demy 8vo. 16s. net. - - - THE LIFE OF JOHN NICHOLSON, SOLDIER AND ADMINISTRATOR. - - By Captain LIONEL J. TROTTER. - - With Portrait and 3 Maps. - - - THE LIFE OF HENRY PELHAM, FIFTH DUKE OF NEWCASTLE. - - SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES, 1852–54 AND 1859–64, - AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR, 1852–55 - - By JOHN MARTINEAU, - - Author of “The Life of Sir Bartle Frere.” - - With Portraits. Demy 8vo. 12s. net. - -“Among the most interesting and absorbing books of the moment may -safely be named The Life of Henry Pelham.”—_M.A.P._ - -“Mr. Martineau’s work is a model of painstaking research and lucid -expression. He has the true historian’s temperament, his perspective -and his judgment are unimpeachable.”—_Western Mail._ - - - LONDON: JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W. - - - -FOOTNOTES - -[1] [To economize ammunition at manœuvres, batteries sometimes signal -that they are firing instead of actually doing so.—ED.] - -[2] [What in the British Army are colloquially known as “Pow-wows.”—ED.] - -[3] [1903.—ED.] - -[4] Independent fire is difficult to control, and almost impossible to -stop in action. - -[5] [The Cross of St. George corresponds to our Victoria Cross, but is -more easily won.—ED.] - -[6] [Russian regiments in Europe, as a rule, consist of four -battalions. East Siberian Rifle regiments in the late war had -three.—ED.] - -[7] [Liao-yang.—ED.] - -[8] [The Sha Ho.—ED.] - -[9] [Hsi-ping-kai, Kung-chu-ling, and Kuang-cheng-tzu.—ED.] - -[10] [1903.—ED.] - -[11] [See next page.—ED.] - -[12] It was followed by the 2nd Infantry Division; 10th and 17th Army -Corps; 5th Siberian Corps; 1st Army Corps, and 6th Siberian Corps. - -[13] The leading units of the 10th Army Corps arrived on June 30. - -[14] Sixty miles by a road which the rains had made very difficult. - -[15] [A European Russian regiment contains four battalions.—ED.] - -[16] My report of June 20. - -[17] The officer commanding the 2nd Manchurian Army stated that the -whole war strength of his force (total of rifles, sabres, guns, with -twenty-five men to a gun, and ten to a machine-gun) constituted, on an -average, only half the actual numbers. - -[18] This amounted in some units to as much as 20 per cent. in men, and -30 per cent. in officers. - -[19] [Behind and between armies.—ED.] - -[20] [One man on one full day’s work.—ED.] - -[21] [General Kuropatkin’s views on this point appear to have changed, -see p. 270.—ED.] - -[22] [Who had succeeded Grippenberg in the command of the 2nd Army.—ED.] - -[23] Or sergeant-majors. - -[24] [On account of student disorders that had led to the closing of -the Universities.—ED.] - -[25] Medical students. - -[26] [General Kuropatkin himself.—ED.] - -[27] Our communications were threatened, and the Yen-tai Mines on the -flank were in the enemy’s hands. - -[28] The retirement from Liao-yang was orderly, while that from Mukden -more nearly approached a rout; but it is not certain that the Russians -were really beaten at the former place when the decision to retire was -made.—ED. - -[29] [_Sic._ This seems almost incredible.—ED.] - -[30] [The portion of this chapter which immediately follows deals in -great detail with the breakdown of the unit organization. It has been -separated from the text, and is given in Appendix II.—ED.] - -[31] When the appointments of Inspector-Generals were created, some -confusion resulted between the powers of these and that of the district -commanders. - -[32] Two in the two brigades, and two on the divisional staff. - -[33] [Service with the colours in Russia has been reduced generally -from five to three years.—ED.] - -[34] The transport was not fully horsed. - -[35] [By this expression is meant a land not belonging to Russia.—ED.] - -[36] [The term used by common folk in Russia when addressing men of -higher birth.—ED.] - -[37] Owing to famine in the Kholm district in the years just before -the war, the reservists in it were called up later than those in the -neighbouring districts, and the majority of them were consequently -stationed on the line of communications. - -[38] [Summary courts-martial under martial law.—ED.] - -[39] With two-wheeled baggage-carts, the number has to be increased by -an additional fifty-four men. - -[40] Cooks and mess caterers, eighteen of each—_i.e._, sixteen per -company, and two with scout sections, one mounted, one dismounted. - -[41] Three per company. - -[42] [This is taking a regiment at 4,000—_i.e._, the men actually in -the firing-line and not employed specially—for scout sections, etc.—ED.] - -[43] I several times reported to the War Minister that the despatch of -drafts to fill up wastage in the units already at the front was much -more necessary than the despatch to us of fresh units. - -[44] [Battle of Hei-kou-tai.—Ed.] - -[45] Colonel Ujin’s pack-telephone system, which I tried in Manchuria, -is a very good one. - -[46] [Presumably squares on a map.—ED.] - -[47] Artillery regiments to be subordinate in all respects as regards -command to the divisional commander. The commander of an artillery -brigade must technically superintend and inspect all batteries with an -army corps. - -[48] One cavalry regiment per division. - -[49] One sapper battalion and one company of sappers per division; one -mining and two telegraph companies as corps troops. - -[50] [_Sic._ This word is rather misleading. Some formation less than a -regiment is meant.—ED.] - -[51] - - Voiskovoi Starshina = Lieutenant-Colonel } - Esaoul = Captain } Of - Sotnik = Lieutenant } Cossacks. - Khorunji = Cornet } - - -[52] In the wars with Turkey and Persia, in the Caucasus and Central -Asia. - -[53] [The first portion of this chapter, which is a recapitulation -of what has already been written in Chapters I. to VII., has been -omitted from this translation. What is now given touches more upon the -war itself.—ED.] - -[54] [About 1–1/3 miles to the inch.—ED.] - -[55] [_Sic._ Killed and wounded (see p. 207, Vol I.).—ED.] - -[56] [At the Sha Ho.—ED.] - -[57] [At Mukden.—ED.] - -[58] [Possibly the author refers to China, Japan, and India being young -in a national sense.—ED.] - -[59] [? Telegram.—ED.] - -[60] [General Linievitch.—ED.] - -[61] [? 1904 and 1905 also.—ED.] - -[62] [The name of General Kuropatkin’s country estate in the province -of Pskoff.—ED.] - -[63] [This chapter is composed of the introduction and conclusion to -Volume III. of the original, which have been translated, as they add -some light on points not touched upon in Volume IV.—ED.] - -[64] Eighteen infantry battalions, 25 squadrons, 86 guns total, 19,000 -rifles and sabres. - -[65] Two of them sapper battalions. The third battalions formed in -Russia for all the East Siberian Rifle Regiments were only then -beginning to arrive. - -[66] The Viceroy’s letter (No. 2,960) of June 6 called attention to the -necessity of “bearing in mind measures to guard against the event of an -advance by Kuroki.” - -[67] 1st and 9th East Siberian Rifle Divisions, and 2nd Brigade of the -35th Division. - -[68] [There are several passes of this name.—ED.] - -[69] [This action is apparently what is elsewhere known as that of -Chiao-tou.—ED.] - -[70] [The reasons for this are given in great detail in Volume -IV.—_i.e._, Chapters I. to XII. of this book.—ED.] - -[71] This regiment did splendidly in later fights. - -[72] The 122nd Tamboff Regiment was attacked when bivouacking. - -[73] The positions held on August 31 by the portion of Kuroki’s army -that crossed the river were only eleven miles from the railway. - -[74] [? Houton.—ED.] - -[75] The corps also arrived at the front with a shortage of about 400 -men per regiment—_i.e._, 1,600 per division. - -[76] Less one brigade garrisoning Tieh-ling. - -[77] [Presumably because it was destined for the 2nd Army.—ED.] - -[78] Including Rennenkampf’s column, Shtakelberg had under him 85 -battalions, 43 _sotnias_, 174 guns, and 3 sapper battalions. - -[79] A very large number of men, particularly of the 1st Corps, left -the ranks without reason. At Mukden, however, this corps fought with -great gallantry and steadiness. - -[80] [Grippenberg had already been appointed to the command of the 2nd -Army.—ED.] - -[81] From Ssu-chia-tun station to Ta-wang-chiang-pu. - -[82] From Fu-shun to Ma-chia-tun. - -[83] Of 72 squadrons and _sotnias_, 4 mounted scout parties, and 22 -guns. - -[84] Including thirty siege-guns. - -[85] Its garrison was not more than two battalions. - -[86] Two regiments of the four in this division had been sent to -reinforce the Composite Rifle Corps, and one regiment to reinforce the -1st Siberians. - -[87] General Grippenberg could not use the telephone himself, as he was -somewhat deaf. - -[88] Out of the 80,000 men of the drafts which had arrived. - -[89] According to the programme of the arrival of the troops, I -calculated on increasing my reserve by three and four Rifle brigades, -but they arrived more than ten days late. - -[90] For operations against Oku. - -[91] [? Houton.—ED.] - -[92] One was ordered to support General Launits. - -[93] [The body of Vol III. in the original deals in great detail with -the battle of Mukden, and is omitted in this translation.—ED.] - -[94] Except from February 27 to March 1. - -[95] 12.20 p.m., February 28. - -[96] 3.25 p.m., March 2. - -[97] 6.45 a.m., March 5. - -[98] [Query north-west.—ED.] - -[99] In addition to five and a half battalions of the 41st Division. - -[100] Sixteen battalions of the 19th Corps, concentrated at Sha-ling-pu -under my orders on March 2; sixteen battalions of Golembatovski’s; and -eight battalions of Churin’s division, detained by Kaulbars on the way -to join the troops operating against Nogi. - -[101] Major-General Krauze’s report. - -[102] And fifty battalions collected towards Hsin-min-tun were thus -left with two squadrons of the Niejinsk Dragoons. - -[103] In the afternoon of the 11th this division began to move on -Tieh-ling; it had only suffered small loss during the battle. - -[104] [Only the concluding portion of what follows in the original is -given here; the remainder is an exact repetition of what has been more -than once recapitulated.—ED.] - -[105] [This extract is, by the kind permission of the editor, reprinted -from _McClure’s Magazine_, where it appeared as an editorial note upon -the article on these memoirs, published in September, 1908.—ED.] - -[106] _Osvobojdenie_, No. 75, Stuttgart, August 10, 1905. No question -has ever been raised, I think, with regard to the authenticity of these -letters and telegrams; but if there were any doubt of it, such doubt -would be removed by a comparison of them with General Kuropatkin’s -memoirs.—G. K. - -[107] Asakawa, who seems to have investigated this matter carefully, -says that the original contract for this concession dated as far back -as August 26, 1896, when the Korean King was living in the Russian -Legation at Seoul as a refugee.—“The Russo-Japanese Conflict,” by K. -Asakawa, London, 1905, p. 289. - -[108] The italics are mine.—G. K. - -[109] [Extracted from Chapter X.—ED.] - -[110] At the junction of roads near Newchuang. - -[111] The 21st and 23rd East Siberian Rifle Regiments. - -[112] Of these a brigade of the 6th East Siberian Rifle Division and -one regiment of the 1st Army Corps were sent by my orders. - -[113] The Omsk Regiment lost its way, and for a long time could not be -found, and the Krasnoyarsk and Tsaritsin Regiments were kept with the -2nd Siberian Corps. - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Russian army and the Japanese War, -Volume II, by Aleksei Nicolaevich Kuropatkin - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK RUSSIAN ARMY AND THE JAPANESE WAR *** - -***** This file should be named 60975-0.txt or 60975-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/6/0/9/7/60975/ - -Produced by Brian Coe, David Tipple and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive) - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part -of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm -concept and trademark. Project Gutenberg is a registered trademark, -and may not be used if you charge for the eBooks, unless you receive -specific permission. If you do not charge anything for copies of this -eBook, complying with the rules is very easy. You may use this eBook -for nearly any purpose such as creation of derivative works, reports, -performances and research. They may be modified and printed and given -away--you may do practically ANYTHING in the United States with eBooks -not protected by U.S. copyright law. Redistribution is subject to the -trademark license, especially commercial redistribution. - -START: FULL LICENSE - -THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE -PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK - -To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free -distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work -(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full -Project Gutenberg-tm License available with this file or online at -www.gutenberg.org/license. - -Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works - -1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to -and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property -(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all -the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or -destroy all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your -possession. If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a -Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound -by the terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the -person or entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph -1.E.8. - -1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be -used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who -agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few -things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See -paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this -agreement and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works. See paragraph 1.E below. - -1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the -Foundation" or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection -of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual -works in the collection are in the public domain in the United -States. If an individual work is unprotected by copyright law in the -United States and you are located in the United States, we do not -claim a right to prevent you from copying, distributing, performing, -displaying or creating derivative works based on the work as long as -all references to Project Gutenberg are removed. Of course, we hope -that you will support the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting -free access to electronic works by freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm -works in compliance with the terms of this agreement for keeping the -Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with the work. You can easily -comply with the terms of this agreement by keeping this work in the -same format with its attached full Project Gutenberg-tm License when -you share it without charge with others. - -1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern -what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are -in a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, -check the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this -agreement before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, -distributing or creating derivative works based on this work or any -other Project Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no -representations concerning the copyright status of any work in any -country outside the United States. - -1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: - -1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other -immediate access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear -prominently whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work -on which the phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the -phrase "Project Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, -performed, viewed, copied or distributed: - - This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and - most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no - restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it - under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this - eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the - United States, you'll have to check the laws of the country where you - are located before using this ebook. - -1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is -derived from texts not protected by U.S. copyright law (does not -contain a notice indicating that it is posted with permission of the -copyright holder), the work can be copied and distributed to anyone in -the United States without paying any fees or charges. If you are -redistributing or providing access to a work with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the work, you must comply -either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 or -obtain permission for the use of the work and the Project Gutenberg-tm -trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted -with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution -must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any -additional terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms -will be linked to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works -posted with the permission of the copyright holder found at the -beginning of this work. - -1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm -License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this -work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. - -1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this -electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without -prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with -active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project -Gutenberg-tm License. - -1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, -compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including -any word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access -to or distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format -other than "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official -version posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site -(www.gutenberg.org), you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense -to the user, provide a copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means -of obtaining a copy upon request, of the work in its original "Plain -Vanilla ASCII" or other form. Any alternate format must include the -full Project Gutenberg-tm License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. - -1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, -performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works -unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing -access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -provided that - -* You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from - the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method - you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is owed - to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he has - agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the Project - Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments must be paid - within 60 days following each date on which you prepare (or are - legally required to prepare) your periodic tax returns. Royalty - payments should be clearly marked as such and sent to the Project - Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the address specified in - Section 4, "Information about donations to the Project Gutenberg - Literary Archive Foundation." - -* You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies - you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he - does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm - License. You must require such a user to return or destroy all - copies of the works possessed in a physical medium and discontinue - all use of and all access to other copies of Project Gutenberg-tm - works. - -* You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of - any money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the - electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days of - receipt of the work. - -* You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free - distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. - -1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work or group of works on different terms than -are set forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing -from both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and The -Project Gutenberg Trademark LLC, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm -trademark. Contact the Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. - -1.F. - -1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable -effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread -works not protected by U.S. copyright law in creating the Project -Gutenberg-tm collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may -contain "Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate -or corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other -intellectual property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or -other medium, a computer virus, or computer codes that damage or -cannot be read by your equipment. - -1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right -of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project -Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all -liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal -fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT -LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE -PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE -TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE -LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR -INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH -DAMAGE. - -1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a -defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can -receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a -written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you -received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium -with your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you -with the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in -lieu of a refund. If you received the work electronically, the person -or entity providing it to you may choose to give you a second -opportunity to receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If -the second copy is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing -without further opportunities to fix the problem. - -1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth -in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS', WITH NO -OTHER WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT -LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. - -1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied -warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of -damages. If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement -violates the law of the state applicable to this agreement, the -agreement shall be interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or -limitation permitted by the applicable state law. The invalidity or -unenforceability of any provision of this agreement shall not void the -remaining provisions. - -1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the -trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone -providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in -accordance with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the -production, promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works, harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, -including legal fees, that arise directly or indirectly from any of -the following which you do or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this -or any Project Gutenberg-tm work, (b) alteration, modification, or -additions or deletions to any Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any -Defect you cause. - -Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm - -Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of -electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of -computers including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It -exists because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations -from people in all walks of life. - -Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the -assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's -goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will -remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure -and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future -generations. To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation and how your efforts and donations can help, see -Sections 3 and 4 and the Foundation information page at -www.gutenberg.org - - - -Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation - -The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit -501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the -state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal -Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification -number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent permitted by -U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. - -The Foundation's principal office is in Fairbanks, Alaska, with the -mailing address: PO Box 750175, Fairbanks, AK 99775, but its -volunteers and employees are scattered throughout numerous -locations. Its business office is located at 809 North 1500 West, Salt -Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email contact links and up to -date contact information can be found at the Foundation's web site and -official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact - -For additional contact information: - - Dr. Gregory B. Newby - Chief Executive and Director - gbnewby@pglaf.org - -Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg -Literary Archive Foundation - -Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide -spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of -increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be -freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest -array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations -($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt -status with the IRS. - -The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating -charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United -States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a -considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up -with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations -where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To SEND -DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any particular -state visit www.gutenberg.org/donate - -While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we -have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition -against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who -approach us with offers to donate. - -International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make -any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from -outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. - -Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation -methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other -ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. To -donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate - -Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works. - -Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project -Gutenberg-tm concept of a library of electronic works that could be -freely shared with anyone. For forty years, he produced and -distributed Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of -volunteer support. - -Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed -editions, all of which are confirmed as not protected by copyright in -the U.S. unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not -necessarily keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper -edition. - -Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search -facility: www.gutenberg.org - -This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, -including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to -subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. - |