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-Project Gutenberg's History of Greece, Volume 12 (of 12), by George Grote
-
-This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and
-most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
-whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms
-of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at
-www.gutenberg.org.  If you are not located in the United States, you'll
-have to check the laws of the country where you are located before using
-this ebook.
-
-
-
-Title: History of Greece, Volume 12 (of 12)
-
-Author: George Grote
-
-Release Date: November 26, 2019 [EBook #60786]
-
-Language: English
-
-Character set encoding: UTF-8
-
-*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF GREECE, VOLUME 12 ***
-
-
-
-
-Produced by Henry Flower, Ramon Pajares Box and the Online
-Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This
-file was produced from images generously made available
-by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.)
-
-
-
-
-
-
-TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE
-
-  * Italics are denoted by underscores as in _italics_.
-  * Small caps are represented in upper case as in SMALL CAPS.
-  * Letter spaced Greek text is enclosed in tildes as in ~καὶ τὰ λοιπά~.
-  * Footnotes have been renumbered. Each footnote is placed at the end
-    of the paragraph that includes its anchor.
-  * Obvious printer errors have been silently corrected, after
-    comparison with a later edition of this work. Greek text has also
-    been corrected after checking with this later edition and with
-    Perseus, when the reference was found.
-  * Original spelling, have been kept, but variant spellings were made
-    consistent when a predominant usage was found.
-  * Nevetherless, no attempt has been made at normalizing proper names
-    (i.e. Agrianes and Agriânes, Onchestus and Onchêstus, Megalêpolis
-    and Megalê-Polis, Mantinea and Mantineia, Crête and Krête,
-    Phenicians and Phœnicians, etc.). The author established at the
-    beginning of the first volume of this work some rules of
-    transcription for proper names, but neither he nor his publisher
-    follow them consistently.
-  * In the Table of Contents, some page numbers have been emended so
-    that they refer to the actual pages where chapters begin and end.
-
-
-
-
-  HISTORY OF GREECE.
-
-  BY
-
-  GEORGE GROTE, ESQ.
-
-  VOL. XII.
-
-  REPRINTED FROM THE LONDON EDITION.
-
-  NEW YORK:
-  HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS,
-  329 AND 331 PEARL STREET.
-  1875.
-
-[Illustration: AFRICAN TERRITORY OF CARTHAGE.]
-
-[Illustration: PLAN to illustrate the BATTLE OF ISSUS.]
-
-
-
-
-CONTENTS.
-
-VOL. XII.
-
-
-  CHAPTER XCI.
-
-  FIRST PERIOD OF THE REIGN OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT — SIEGE AND
-  CAPTURE OF THEBES.
-
-  State of Greece at Alexander’s accession — dependence on the
-  Macedonian kings. — Unwilling subjection of the Greeks —
-  influence of Grecian intelligence on Macedonia. — Basis of
-  Alexander’s character — not Hellenic. — Boyhood and Education
-  of Alexander. — He receives instruction from Aristotle. — Early
-  political action and maturity of Alexander — his quarrels
-  with his father. Family discord. — Uncertainty of Alexander’s
-  position during the last year of Philip. — Impression produced
-  by the sudden death of Philip. — Accession of Alexander — his
-  energy and judgment. — Accomplices of Pausanias are slain by
-  Alexander — Amyntas and others are slain by him also. — Sentiment
-  at Athens on the death of Philip — language of Demosthenes
-  — inclination to resist Macedonia, yet without overt act. —
-  Discontent in Greece — but no positive movement. — March of
-  Alexander into Greece — submission of Athens. — Alexander is
-  chosen Imperator of the Greeks in the convention at Corinth —
-  continued refusal of concurrence by Sparta. — Conditions of the
-  vote thus passed — privileges granted to the cities. — Authority
-  claimed by Alexander under the convention — degradation of the
-  leading Grecian states. — Encroachments and tyranny of the
-  Macedonian officers in Greece — complaints of the orators at
-  Athens. — Violations of the convention at sea by Macedonian
-  officers. — Language of the complaining Athenians — they insist
-  only on strict observance of the convention. Boldness of their
-  language. — Encouragements held out by Persia to the Greeks.
-  — Correspondence of Demosthenes with Persia — justifiable and
-  politic. — March of Alexander into Thrace. He forces his way
-  over Mount Hæmus. — His victory over the Triballi. — He crosses
-  the Danube, defeats the Getæ, and returns back. — Embassy of
-  Gauls to Alexander. His self-conceit. — Victories of Alexander
-  over Kleitus and the Illyrians. — The Thebans declare their
-  independence against Macedonia. — They are encouraged by
-  Alexander’s long absence in Thrace, and by reports of his death.
-  — The Theban exiles from Athens get possession of Thebes. —
-  They besiege the Macedonians in the Kadmeia, and entreat aid
-  from other Greeks. Favorable sympathies shown towards them,
-  but no positive aid. — Chances of Thebes and liberation, not
-  unfavorable. — Rapid march and unexpected arrival of Alexander
-  with his army before Thebes. His good fortune as to the time of
-  hearing the news. — Siege of Thebes. Proclamation of Alexander.
-  Determination of the Thebans to resist. — Capture of Thebes by
-  assault. Massacre of the population. — Thebes is razed; the
-  Theban captives sold as slaves; the territory distributed among
-  the neighboring cities. — The Kadmeia is occupied as a Macedonian
-  Military post. Retribution upon the Thebans from Orchomenus and
-  Platæa. — Sentiments of Alexander, at the time and afterwards,
-  respecting the destruction of Thebes. — Extreme terror spread
-  throughout Greece. Sympathy of the Athenians towards the
-  Theban exiles. — Alexander demands the surrender of the chief
-  anti-Macedonian leaders at Athens. Memorable debate at Athens.
-  The demand refused. — Embassy of the Athenians to Alexander. He
-  is persuaded to acquiesce in the refusal, and to be satisfied
-  with the banishment of Charidemus and Ephialtes. — Influence
-  of Phokion in obtaining these milder terms — his increased
-  ascendency at Athens. — Alexander at Corinth — obedience of
-  the Grecian synod — interview with the philosopher Diogenes. —
-  Reconstitution of Orchomenus and Platæa. Return of Alexander to
-  Pella. — Military operations of Parmenio in Asia Minor against
-  Memnon.
-                                                                  1-49
-
-
-  CHAPTER XCII.
-
-  ASIATIC CAMPAIGNS OF ALEXANDER.
-
-  During Alexander’s reign, the history of Greece is nearly a
-  blank. To what extent the Asiatic projects of Alexander belonged
-  to Grecian history. — Pan-hellenic pretences set up by Alexander.
-  The real feeling of the Greeks was adverse to his success. —
-  Analogy of Alexander’s relation to the Greeks — with those
-  of the Emperor Napoleon to the Confederation of the Rhine. —
-  Greece an appendage, but a valuable appendage, to Macedonia. —
-  Extraordinary military endowments and capacity of Alexander.
-  — Changes in Grecian warfare, antecedent and contributory to
-  the military organization of Macedonia. — Macedonian military
-  condition before Philip. Good and firm cavalry: poor infantry.
-  — Philip re-arms and reorganizes the infantry. Long Macedonian
-  pike or sarissa. — Macedonian phalanx — how armed and arrayed.
-  — It was originally destined to contend against the Grecian
-  hoplites as organized by Epaminondas. — Regiments and divisions
-  of the phalanx — heavy-armed infantry. — Light infantry of
-  the line — Hypaspistæ, or Guards. — Light troops generally —
-  mostly foreigners. — Macedonian cavalry — its excellence — how
-  regimented. — The select Macedonian Body-guards. The Royal Pages.
-  — Foreign auxiliaries — Grecian hoplites — Thessalian cavalry —
-  Pæonians — Illyrians — Thracians, etc. — Magazines, war-office,
-  and depôt, at Pella. — Macedonian aptitudes — purely military
-  — military pride stood to them in lieu of national sentiment.
-  — Measures of Alexander previous to his departure for Asia.
-  Antipater left as viceroy at Pella. — March of Alexander to
-  the Hellespont. Passage across to Asia. — Visit of Alexander
-  to Ilium. — Analogy of Alexander to the Greek heroes. — Review
-  and total of the Macedonian army in Asia. — Chief Macedonian
-  officers. — Greeks in Alexander’s service — Eumenes of Kardia.
-  — Persian forces — Mentor and Memnon the Rhodians. — Succession
-  of the Persian crown — Ochus — Darius Codomannus. — Preparations
-  of Darius for defence. — Operations of Memnon before Alexander’s
-  arrival. — Superiority of the Persians at sea: their imprudence
-  in letting Alexander cross the Hellespont unopposed. — Persian
-  force assembled in Phrygia, under Arsites and others. — Advice of
-  Memnon, to avoid fighting on land, and to employ the fleet for
-  aggressive warfare in Macedonia and Greece. — Arsites rejects
-  Memnon’s advice, and determines to fight. — The Persians take
-  post on the river Granikus. — Alexander reaches the Granikus, and
-  resolves to force the passage at once, in spite of the dissuasion
-  of Permenio. — Disposition of the two armies. — Battle of the
-  Granikus. — Cavalry battle. — Personal danger of Alexander. His
-  life saved by Kleitus. Complete victory of Alexander. Destruction
-  of the Grecian infantry on the side of the Persians. — Loss
-  of the Persians — numbers of their leading men slain. — Small
-  loss of the Macedonians. — Alexander’s kindness to his wounded
-  soldiers, and severe treatment of the Grecian prisoners. —
-  Unskilfulness of the Persian leaders. Immense impression produced
-  by Alexander’s victory. — Terror and submission of the Asiatics
-  to Alexander. Surrender of the strong fortress of Sardis. — He
-  marches from Sardis to the coast. Capture of Ephesus. — He finds
-  the first resistance at Miletus. — Near approach of the Persian
-  fleet. Memnon is made commander-in-chief of the Persians. — The
-  Macedonian fleet occupies the harbor of Miletus, and keeps out
-  the Persians. Alexander declines naval combat. His debate with
-  Parmenio. — Alexander besieges Miletus. Capture of the city. —
-  The Persian fleet retires to Halikarnassus. Alexander disbands
-  his own fleet. — March of Alexander to Halikarnassus. Ada
-  queen of Karia joins him. Strong garrison, and good defensive
-  preparation, at Halikarnassus. — Siege of Halikarnassus. Bravery
-  of the garrison, under Ephialtes the Athenian. — Desperate sally
-  of Ephialtes — at first successful, but repulsed — he himself is
-  slain. — Memnon is forced to abandon Halikarnassus, and withdraw
-  the garrison by sea, retaining only the citadel. Alexander enters
-  Halikarnassus. — Winter campaign of Alexander along the southern
-  coast of Asia Minor. — Alexander concludes his winter campaign at
-  Gordium. Capture of Kelænæ. — Appendix on the Macedonian Sarissa.
-                                                                49-104
-
-
-  CHAPTER XCIII.
-
-  SECOND AND THIRD ASIATIC CAMPAIGNS OF ALEXANDER — BATTLE OF ISSUS
-  — SIEGE OF TYRE.
-
-  Alexander cuts the Gordian knot. — He refuses the liberation of
-  the Athenian prisoners. — Progress of Memnon and the Persian
-  fleet — they acquire Chios and a large part of Lesbos — they
-  besiege Mitylene. Death of Memnon. Capture of Mitylene. — Hopes
-  excited in Greece by the Persian fleet, but ruined by the death
-  of Memnon. — Memnon’s death an irreparable mischief to Darius. —
-  Change in Darius’s plan caused by this event. He resolves to take
-  the offensive on land. His immense land-force. — Free speech and
-  sound judgment of Charidemus. He is put to death by Darius. —
-  Darius abandoned Memnon’s plans, just at the time when he had the
-  best defensive position for executing them with effect. — Darius
-  recalls the Grecian mercenaries from the fleet. — Criticism
-  of Arrian on Darius’s plan. — March of Alexander from Gordium
-  through Paphlagonia and Kappadokia. — He arrives at the line of
-  Mount Taurus — difficulties of the pass. — Conduct of Arsames,
-  the Persian satrap. Alexander passes Mount Taurus without the
-  least resistance. He enters Tarsus. — Dangerous illness of
-  Alexander. His confidence in the physician Philippus, who cures
-  him. — Operations of Alexander in Kilikia. — March of Alexander
-  out of Kilikia, through Issus, to Myriandrus. — March of Darius
-  from the interior to the eastern side of Mount Amanus. Immense
-  numbers of his army: great wealth and ostentation in it: the
-  treasure and baggage sent to Damascus. — Position of Darius on
-  the plain eastward of Mount Amanus. He throws open the mountain
-  passes, to let Alexander come through and fight a pitched battle.
-  — Impatience of Darius at the delay of Alexander in Kilikia.
-  He crosses Mount Amanus to attack Alexander in the defiles of
-  Kilikia. — He arrives in Alexander’s rear, and captures Issus.
-  — Return of Alexander from Myriandrus: his address to his army.
-  — Position of the Macedonian army south of the river Pinarus.
-  — Position of the Persian army north of the Pinarus. — Battle
-  of Issus. — Alarm and immediate flight of Darius — defeat of
-  the Persians. — Vigorous and destructive pursuit by Alexander —
-  capture of the mother and wife of Darius. — Courteous treatment
-  of the regal female prisoners by Alexander. — Complete dispersion
-  of the Persian army — Darius recrosses the Euphrates — escape
-  of some Perso-Grecian mercenaries. — Prodigious effect produced
-  by the victory of Issus. — Effects produced in Greece by the
-  battle of Issus. Anti-Macedonian projects crushed. — Capture
-  of Damascus by the Macedonians, with the Persian treasure and
-  prisoners. Capture and treatment of the Athenian Iphikrates.
-  Altered relative position of Greeks and Macedonians. — Alexander
-  in Phenicia. Aradus, Byblus, and Sidon open their gates to him.
-  — Letter of Darius soliciting peace and the restitution of the
-  regal captives. Haughty reply of Alexander. — Importance of
-  the voluntary surrender of the Phenician towns to Alexander.
-  — Alexander appears before Tyre — readiness of the Tyrians to
-  surrender, yet not without a point reserved — he determines
-  to besiege the city. — Exorbitant dispositions and conduct
-  of Alexander. — He prepares to besiege Tyre — situation of
-  the place. — Chances of the Tyrians — their resolution not
-  unreasonable. — Alexander constructs a mole across the strait
-  between Tyre and the mainland. The project is defeated. —
-  Surrender of the princes of Cyprus to Alexander — He gets hold
-  of the main Phenician and Cyprian fleet. — He appears before
-  Tyre with a numerous fleet, and blocks up the place by sea. —
-  Capture of Tyre by storm — desperate resistance by the citizens.
-  — Surviving males, 2000 in number, hanged by order of Alexander
-  — The remaining captives sold. — Duration of the siege for seven
-  months. Sacrifice of Alexander to Herakles. — Second letter from
-  Darius to Alexander, who requires unconditional submission. — The
-  Macedonian fleet overpowers the Persian and becomes master of
-  the Ægean with the islands. — March of Alexander towards Egypt
-  — siege of Gaza. — His first assaults fail — he is wounded — he
-  erects an immense mound round the town. — Gaza is taken by storm,
-  after a siege of two months. — The garrison are all slain, except
-  the governor Batis, who becomes prisoner, severely wounded. —
-  Wrath of Alexander against Batis, whom he causes to be tied to a
-  chariot, and dragged round the town. — Alexander enters Egypt,
-  and occupies it without resistance — He determines on founding
-  Alexandria. — His visit to the temple and oracle of Ammon. The
-  oracle proclaims him to be the son of Zeus. — Arrangements made
-  by Alexander at Memphis. — Grecian prisoners brought from the
-  Ægean. — He proceeds to Phenicia — message from Athens. Splendid
-  festivals. Reinforcements sent to Antipater. — He marches to
-  the Euphrates — crosses it without opposition at Thapsakus. —
-  March across from the Euphrates to the Tigris. Alexander fords
-  the Tigris above Nineveh, without resistance. — Eclipse of the
-  moon. Alexander approaches near the army of Darius in position. —
-  Inaction of Darius since the defeat at Issus. — Paralyzing effect
-  upon him produced by the captivity of his mother and wife. — Good
-  treatment of the captive females by Alexander — necessary to keep
-  up their value as hostages. — Immense army collected by Darius,
-  in the plains eastward of the Tigris — near Arbela. — He fixes
-  the spot for encamping and awaiting the attack of Alexander — in
-  a level plain near Gaugamela. — His equipment and preparation —
-  better arms — numerous scythed chariots — elephants. — Position
-  and battle array of Darius. — Preliminary movements of Alexander
-  — discussions with Parmenio and other officers. His careful
-  reconnoitring in person. — Dispositions of Alexander for the
-  attack — array of the troops. — Battle of Arbela. — Cowardice of
-  Darius — he sets the example of flight — defeat of the Persians.
-  — Combat on the Persian right between Mazæus and Parmenio.
-  Flight of the Persian host — energetic pursuit by Alexander. —
-  Escape of Darius. Capture of the Persian camp, and of Arbela.
-  — Loss in the battle. Completeness of the victory. Entire and
-  irreparable dispersion of the Persian army. — Causes of the
-  defeat — cowardice of Darius. Uselessness of his immense numbers.
-  — Generalship of Alexander. — Surrender of Babylon and Susa, the
-  two great capitals of Persia. Alexander enters Babylon. Immense
-  treasures acquired in both places. — Alexander acts as king of
-  Persia, and nominates satraps. He marches to Susa. He remodels
-  the divisions of his army. — Alexander marches into Persis
-  proper — he conquers the refractory Uxii, in the intermediate
-  mountains. — Difficult pass called the Susian Gates, on the way
-  to Persepolis. Ariobarzanes the satrap repulses Alexander, who
-  finds means to turn the pass, and conquer it. — Alexander enters
-  Persepolis. Mutilated Grecian captives. — Immense wealth, and
-  national monuments of every sort, accumulated in Persepolis. —
-  Alexander appropriates and carries away the regal treasures,
-  and then gives up Persepolis to be plundered and burnt by the
-  soldiers. — Alexander rests his troops, and employs himself in
-  conquering the rest of Persis. — Darius a fugitive in Media.
-                                                               104-178
-
-
-  CHAPTER XCIV.
-
-  MILITARY OPERATIONS AND CONQUESTS OF ALEXANDER, AFTER HIS WINTER
-  QUARTERS IN PERSIS, DOWN TO HIS DEATH AT BABYLON.
-
-  The first four Asiatic campaigns of Alexander — their direct
-  bearing and importance in reference to Grecian history. — His
-  last seven years, farther eastward, had no similar bearing upon
-  Greece. — Darius at Ekbatana — seeks escape towards Baktria,
-  when he hears of Alexander approaching. — Alexander enters
-  Ekbatana — establishes there his depôt and base of operations.
-  — Alexander sends home the Thessalian cavalry — necessity for
-  him now to pursue a more desultory warfare. — Alexander pursues
-  Darius to the Caspian Gates, but fails in overtaking him. —
-  Conspiracy formed against Darius by Bessus and others, who seize
-  his person. — Prodigious efforts of Alexander to overtake and get
-  possession of Darius. He surprises the Persian corps, but Bessus
-  puts Darius to death. — Disappointment of Alexander when he
-  missed taking Darius alive. Regal funeral bestowed upon Darius.
-  His fate and conduct. — Repose of Alexander and his army at
-  Hekatompylus in Parthia. Commencing alteration in his demeanor.
-  He becomes Asiatized and despotic. — Gradual aggravation of
-  these new habits, from the present moment. — Alexander conquers
-  the mountains immediately south of the Caspian. He requires the
-  Greek mercenaries to surrender at discretion. Envoys from Sparta
-  and other Greek cities brought to him — how treated. — March of
-  Alexander farther Eastward — his successes in Asia and Drangiana.
-  — Proceedings against Philotas, son of Parmenio, in Drangiana.
-  Military greatness and consideration of the family. — Revelation
-  of an intended conspiracy made by Kebalinus to Philotas, for
-  the purpose of being communicated to Alexander. Philotas does
-  not mention it to Alexander. It is communicated to the latter
-  through another channel. — Alexander is at first angry with
-  Philotas, but accepts his explanation, and professes to pass
-  over the fact. — Ancient grudge against Philotas — advantage
-  taken of the incident to ruin him. — Kraterus and others are
-  jealous of Parmenio and Philotas. Alexander is persuaded to put
-  them both to death. — Arrest of Philotas. Alexander accuses him
-  before the assembled soldiers. He is condemned. — Philotas is
-  put to the torture, and forced to confess, both against himself
-  and Parmenio. — Parmenio is slain at Ekbatana, by order and
-  contrivance of Alexander. Mutiny of the soldiers when they learn
-  the assassination of Parmenio — appeased by the production of
-  Alexander’s order. — Fear and disgust produced by the killing
-  of Parmenio and Philotas. — Conquest of the Paropamisadæ, etc.
-  Foundation of Alexandria _ad Caucasum_. — Alexander crosses the
-  Hindoo-Koosh, and conquers Baktria. Bessus is made prisoner.
-  — Massacre of the Branchidæ and their families, perpetrated
-  by Alexander in Sogdiana. — Alexander at Marakanda and on the
-  Jaxartes. — Foundation of Alexandria _ad Jaxartem_. Limit of
-  march northward. — Alexander at Zariaspa in Baktria — he causes
-  Bessus to be mutilated and slain. — Farther subjugation of
-  Baktria and Sogdiana. Halt at Marakanda. — Banquet at Marakanda.
-  — Character and position of Kleitus. — Boasts of Alexander and
-  his flatterers — repugnance of Macedonian officers felt but
-  not expressed. — Scene at the banquet — vehement remonstrance
-  of Kleitus. — Furious wrath of Alexander — he murders Kleitus.
-  — Intense remorse of Alexander, immediately after the deed. —
-  Active and successful operations of Alexander in Sogdiana. —
-  Capture of two inexpugnable positions — the Sogdian rock — the
-  rock of Choriênes. Passion of Alexander for Roxana. — Alexander
-  at Baktra — marriage with Roxana. His demand for prostration
-  or worship from all. — Public harangue of Anaxarchus during a
-  banquet, exhorting every one to render this worship. — Public
-  reply of Kallisthenes, opposing it. Character and history of
-  Kallisthenes. — The reply of Kallisthenes is favorably heard by
-  the guests — the proposition for worship is dropped. — Coldness
-  and disfavor of Alexander towards Kallisthenes. — Honorable
-  frankness and courage of Kallisthenes. — Kallisthenes becomes
-  odious to Alexander. — Conspiracy of the royal pages against
-  Alexander’s life — it is divulged — they are put to torture, but
-  implicate no one else; they are put to death. — Kallisthenes is
-  arrested as an accomplice — antipathy manifested by Alexander
-  against him and against Aristotle also. — Kallisthenes is
-  tortured and hanged. — Alexander reduces the country between the
-  Hindoo-Koosh and the Indus. — Conquest of tribes on the right
-  bank of the Indus — the rock of Aornos. — Alexander crosses the
-  Indus — forces the passage of the Hydaspes, defeating Porus —
-  generous treatment of Porus. — His farther conquests in the
-  Punjab. Sangala the last of them. — He reaches the Hyphasis
-  (Sutledge), the farthest of the rivers of the Punjab. His army
-  refuses to march farther. — Alexander returns to the Hydaspes.
-  — He constructs a fleet and sails down the Hydaspes and the
-  Indus. Dangerous wound of Alexander in attacking the Malli. —
-  New cities and posts to be established on the Indus — Alexander
-  reaches the ocean — effect of the first sight of tides. — March
-  of Alexander by land westward through the desert of Gedrosia —
-  sufferings and losses in the army. — Alexander and the army come
-  back to Persis. — Conduct of Alexander at Persepolis. Punishment
-  of the satrap Orsines. — He marches to Susa — junction with
-  the fleet under Nearchus, after it had sailed round from the
-  mouth of the Indus. — Alexander at Susa as Great King. Subjects
-  of uneasiness to him — the satraps — the Macedonian soldiers.
-  — Past conduct of the satraps — several of them are punished
-  by Alexander — alarm among them all — flight of Harpalus. —
-  Discontents of the Macedonian soldiers with the Asiatizing
-  intermarriages promoted by Alexander. — Their discontent with
-  the new Asiatic soldiers levied and disciplined by Alexander. —
-  Interest of Alexander in the fleet, which sails up the Tigris to
-  Opis. — Notice of partial discharge to the Macedonian soldiers
-  — they mutiny — wrath of Alexander — he disbands them all. —
-  Remorse and humiliation of the soldiers — Alexander is appeased
-  — reconciliation. — Partial disbanding — body of veterans
-  placed under command of Kraterus to return — New projects of
-  conquests contemplated by Alexander — measures for enlarging
-  his fleet. — Visit to Ekbatana — death of Hephæstion — violent
-  sorrow of Alexander. — Alexander exterminates the Kossæi. —
-  March of Alexander to Babylon. Numerous embassies which met him
-  on the way. — Alexander at Babylon — his great preparations
-  for the circumnavigation and conquest of Arabia. — Alexander
-  on shipboard, on the Euphrates and in the marshes adjoining.
-  His plans for improving the navigation and flow of the river.
-  — Large reinforcements arrive, Grecian and Asiatic. New array
-  ordered by Alexander, for Macedonians and Persians in the same
-  files and companies. — Splendid funeral obsequies of Hephæstion.
-  — General feasting and intemperance in the army. Alexander is
-  seized with a dangerous fever. Details of his illness. — No hope
-  of his life. Consternation and grief in the army. Last interview
-  with his soldiers. His death — Effect produced on the imagination
-  of contemporaries by the career and death of Alexander. — Had
-  Alexander lived, he must have achieved things greater still. —
-  Question raised by Livy, about the chances of Alexander if he
-  had attacked the Romans. — Unrivalled excellence as a military
-  man. — Alexander as a ruler, apart from military affairs — not
-  deserving of esteem. — Alexander would have continued the system
-  of the Persian empire, with no other improvement except that of
-  a strong organization. — Absence of nationality in Alexander —
-  purpose of fusing the different varieties of mankind into one
-  common type of subjection. — Mistake of supposing Alexander to
-  be the intentional diffuser of Greek civilization. His ideas
-  compared with those of Aristotle. — Number of new cities founded
-  in Asia by Alexander. — It was not Alexander, but the Diadochi
-  after him, who chiefly hellenized Asia. — How far Asia was ever
-  really hellenized — the great fact was, that the Greek language
-  became universally diffused. — Greco-Asiatic cities. — Increase
-  of the means of communication between various parts of the world.
-  — Interest of Alexander in science and literature — not great.
-                                                               178-274
-
-
-  CHAPTER XCV.
-
-  GRECIAN AFFAIRS FROM THE LANDING OF ALEXANDER IN ASIA TO THE
-  CLOSE OF THE LAMIAN WAR.
-
-  State of the Grecian world when Alexander crossed the Hellespont.
-  — Grecian spirit might have been called into action if the
-  Persians had played their game well. — Hopes raised in Greece,
-  first by the Persian fleet in the Ægean, next by the two great
-  Persian armies on land. — Public acts and policy at Athens —
-  decidedly pacific. — Phokion and Demades were leading ministers
-  at Athens — they were of macedonizing politics. — Demosthenes
-  and Lykurgus, though not in the ascendent politically, are
-  nevertheless still public men of importance. Financial activity
-  of Lykurgus. — Position of Demosthenes — his prudent conduct
-  — Anti-Macedonian movement from Sparta — King Agis visits the
-  Persian admirals in the Ægean. His attempts both in Krete and
-  in the Peloponnesus. — Agis levies an army in Peloponnesus,
-  and makes open declaration against Antipater. — Agis, at first
-  partially successful, is completely defeated by Antipater, and
-  slain. — Complete submission of all Greece to Antipater — Spartan
-  envoys sent up to Alexander in Asia. — Untoward result of the
-  defensive efforts of Greece — want of combination. — Position
-  of parties at Athens during the struggle of Agis — reaction of
-  the macedonizing party after his defeat. — Judicial contest
-  between Æschines and Demosthenes. Preliminary circumstances as
-  to the proposition of Ktesiphon, and the indictment by Æschines.
-  — Accusatory harangue of Æschines, nominally against the
-  proposition of Ktesiphon, really against the political life of
-  Demosthenes. — Appreciation of Æschines, on independent evidence,
-  as an accuser of Demosthenes. — Reply of Demosthenes — oration De
-  Coronâ. — Funeral oration of extinct Grecian freedom. — Verdict
-  of the Dikasts — triumph of Demosthenes — exile of Æschines. —
-  Causes of the exile of Æschines — he was the means of procuring
-  coronation for Demosthenes. — Subsequent accusation against
-  Demosthenes, in the affair of Harpalus. — Flight of Harpalus
-  to Athens — his previous conduct and relations with Athens. —
-  False reports conveyed to Alexander, that the Athenians had
-  identified themselves with Harpalus. — Circumstances attending
-  the arrival of Harpalus at Sunium — debate in the Athenian
-  assembly — promises held out by Harpalus — the Athenians
-  seem at first favorably disposed towards him. — Phokion and
-  Demosthenes both agree in dissuading the Athenians from taking
-  up Harpalus. — Demand by Antipater for the surrender of Harpalus
-  — the Athenians refuse to comply, but they arrest Harpalus and
-  sequestrate his treasure for Alexander. — Demosthenes moves the
-  decree for arrest of Harpalus, who is arrested, but escapes. —
-  Conduct of Demosthenes in regard to the treasure of Harpalus —
-  deficiency of the sum counted and realized, as compared with
-  the sum announced by Harpalus. — Suspicions about this money —
-  Demosthenes moves that the Areopagus shall investigate the matter
-  — the Areopagites bring in a report against Demosthenes himself,
-  with Demades and others, as guilty of corrupt appropriation.
-  Demosthenes is tried on this charge, condemned, and goes into
-  exile. — Was Demosthenes guilty of such corrupt appropriation?
-  Circumstances as known in the case. — Demosthenes could not have
-  received the money from Harpalus, since he opposed him from first
-  to last. — Had Demosthenes the means of embezzling, after the
-  money had passed out of the control of Harpalus? Answer in the
-  negative. Accusatory speech of Deinarchus — virulent invective
-  destitute of facts. — Change of mind respecting Demosthenes,
-  in the Athenean public, in a few months. — Probable reality of
-  the case, respecting the money of Harpalus, and the sentence of
-  the Areopagus. — Rescript of Alexander to the Grecian cities,
-  directing that the exiles should be recalled in each. — Purpose
-  of the rescript — to provide partisans for Alexander in each of
-  the cities. Discontents in Greece. — Effect produced in Greece,
-  by the death of Alexander. The Athenians declare themselves
-  champions of the liberation of Greece, in spite of Phokion’s
-  opposition. — The Ætolians and many other Greeks join the
-  confederacy for liberation — activity of the Athenian Leosthenes
-  as General. — Athenian envoys sent round to invite co-operation
-  from the various Greeks. — Assistance lent to the Athenian envoys
-  by Demosthenes, though in exile. — He is recalled to Athens, and
-  receives an enthusiastic welcome. — Large Grecian confederacy
-  against Antipater — nevertheless without Sparta. Bœotia strongly
-  in the Macedonian interest. Leosthenes with the confederate
-  army marches into Thessaly. — Battle in Thessaly — victory of
-  Leosthenes over Antipater, who is compelled to throw himself
-  into Lamia, and await succors from Asia — Leosthenes forms the
-  blockade of Lamia: he is slain. — Misfortune of the death of
-  Leosthenes. Antiphilus is named in his place. Relaxed efforts
-  of the Grecian army. — Leonnatus, with a Macedonian army from
-  Asia, arrives in Thessaly. His defeat and death. — Antipater
-  escapes from Lamia, and takes the command. — War carried on by
-  sea between the Macedonian and Athenian fleets. — Reluctance
-  of the Greek contingents to remain on long-continued service.
-  The army in Thessaly is thinned by many returning home. —
-  Expected arrival of Kraterus to reinforce Antipater. Relations
-  between the Macedonian officers. — State of the regal family,
-  and of the Macedonian generals and soldiery, after the death of
-  Alexander. — Philip Aridæus is proclaimed king: the satrapies
-  are distributed among the principal officers. — Perdikkas the
-  chief representative of central authority, assisted by Eumenes
-  of Kardia. — List of projects entertained by Alexander at the
-  time of his death. The generals dismiss them as too vast. —
-  Plans of Leonnatus and Kleopatra. — Kraterus joins Antipater in
-  Macedonia with a powerful army. Battle of Krannon in Thessaly.
-  Antipater gains a victory over the Greeks though not a complete
-  one. — Antiphilus tries to open negotiations with Antipater, who
-  refuses to treat except with each city singly. Discouragement
-  among the Greeks. Each city treats separately. Antipater grants
-  favorable terms to all, except Athenians and Ætolians. Antipater
-  and his army in Bœotia — Athens left alone and unable to resist.
-  Demosthenes and the other anti-Macedonian orators take flight.
-  Embassy of Phokion, Xenokrates, and others to Antipater. — Severe
-  terms imposed upon Athens by Antipater. — Disfranchisement and
-  deportation of the 12,000 poorest Athenian citizens. — Hardship
-  suffered by the deported poor of Athens — Macedonian garrison
-  placed in Munychia. — Demosthenes, Hyperides, and others, are
-  condemned to death in their absence. Antipater sends officers
-  to track and seize the Grecian exiles. He puts Hyperides to
-  death. — Demosthenes in sanctuary at Kalauria — Archias with
-  Thracian soldiers comes to seize him — he takes poison, and
-  dies. — Miserable condition of Greece — life and character of
-  Demosthenes. — Dishonorable position of Phokion at Athens under
-  the Macedonian occupation.
-                                                               275-331
-
-
-  CHAPTER XCVI.
-
-  FROM THE LAMIAN WAR TO THE CLOSE OF THE HISTORY OF FREE HELLAS
-  AND HELLENISM.
-
-  Antipater purges and remodels the Peloponnesian cities. He
-  attacks the Ætolians, with a view of departing them across to
-  Asia. His presence becomes necessary in Asia: he concludes a
-  pacification with the Ætolians. — Plans of Perdikkas — intrigues
-  with the princesses at Pella. — Antigonus detects the intrigues,
-  and reveals them to Antipater and Kraterus. — Unpropitious turn
-  of fortune for the Greeks, in reference to the Lamian war. —
-  Antipater and Kraterus in Asia — Perdikkas marches to attack
-  Ptolemy in Egypt, but is killed by a mutiny of his own troops.
-  Union of Antipater, Ptolemy, Antigonus, etc. New distribution of
-  the satrapies, made at Triparadeisus. — War between Antigonus and
-  Eumenes in Asia. Energy and ability of Eumenes. He is worsted
-  and blocked up in Nora. — Sickness and death of Antipater. The
-  Athenian orator Demades is put to death in Macedonia — Antipater
-  sets aside his son Kassander, and names Polysperchon viceroy.
-  Discontent and opposition of Kassander. — Kassander sets up
-  for himself, gets possession of Munychia, and forms alliance
-  with Ptolemy and Antigonus against Polysperchon. Plans of
-  Polysperchon — alliance with Olympias in Europe, and with Eumenes
-  in Asia — enfranchisement of the Grecian cities. — Ineffectual
-  attempts of Eumenes to uphold the imperial dynasty in Asia: his
-  gallantry and ability: he is betrayed by his own soldiers, and
-  slain by Antigonus. — Edict issued by Polysperchon at Pella, in
-  the name of the imperial dynasty — subverting the Antipatrian
-  oligarchies in the Grecian cities, restoring political exiles,
-  and granting free constitutions to each. — Letters and measures
-  of Polysperchon to enforce the edict. State of Athens: exiles
-  returning: complicated political parties: danger of Phokion.
-  — Negotiations of the Athenians with Nikanor, governor of
-  Munychia for Kassander. — Nikanor seizes Peiræus by surprise.
-  Phokion, though forewarned, takes no precautions against it.
-  — Mischief to the Athenians, as well as to Polysperchon, from
-  Nikanor’s occupation of Peiræus; culpable negligence, and
-  probable collusion, of Phokion. — Arrival of Alexander (son of
-  Polysperchon): his treacherous policy to the Athenians; Kassander
-  reaches Peiræus. — Intrigues of Phokion with Alexander — he tries
-  to secure for himself the protection of Alexander against the
-  Athenians. — Return of the deported exiles to Athens — public
-  vote passed in the Athenian assembly against Phokion and his
-  colleagues. Phokion leaves the city, is protected by Alexander,
-  and goes to meet Polysperchon, in Phokis. — Agnonides and others
-  are sent as deputies to Polysperchon, to accuse Phokion and to
-  claim the benefit of the regal edict. — Agnonides and Phokion
-  are heard before Polysperchon — Phokion and his colleagues are
-  delivered up as prisoners to the Athenians. Phokion is conveyed
-  as prisoner to Athens, and brought for trial before the assembly.
-  Motion of his friends for exclusion of non-qualified persons.
-  — Intense exasperation of the returned exiles against Phokion
-  — grounds for that feeling. — Phokion is condemned to death —
-  vindictive manifestation against him in the assembly, furious
-  and unanimous. — Death of Phokion and his four colleagues. —
-  Alteration of the sentiment of the Athenians towards Phokion, not
-  long afterwards. Honors shown to his memory. — Explanation of
-  this alteration. Kassander gets possession of Athens and restores
-  the oligarchical or Phokionic party. — Life and character of
-  Phokion. — War between Polysperchon and Kassander, in Attica
-  and Peloponnesus. Polysperchon is repulsed in the siege of
-  Megalopolis, and also defeated at sea. — Increased strength of
-  Kassander in Greece — he gets possession of Athens. — Restoration
-  of the oligarchical government at Athens, though in a mitigated
-  form, under the Phalerean Demetrius. — Administration of the
-  Phalerean Demetrius at Athens, in a moderate spirit. Census taken
-  of the Athenian population — Kassander in Peloponnesus — many
-  cities join him — the Spartans surround their city with walls.
-  — Feud in the Macedonian imperial family — Olympias puts to
-  death Philip Aridæus and Eurydikê — she reigns in Macedonia: her
-  bloody revenge against the partisans of Antipater. — Kassander
-  passes into Macedonia — defeats Olympias, and becomes master
-  of the country — Olympias is besieged in Pydna, captured, and
-  put to death. — Great power of Antigonus in Asia. Confederacy
-  of Kassander, Lysimachus, Ptolemy, and Seleukus against him. —
-  Kassander founds Kassandreia, and restores Thebes. — Measures of
-  Antigonus against Kassander — he promises freedom to the Grecian
-  cities — Ptolemy promises the like. Great power of Kassander in
-  Greece. — Forces of Antigonus in Greece. Considerable success
-  against Kassander. — Pacification between the belligerents.
-  Grecian autonomy guaranteed in name by all. Kassander puts
-  to death Roxana and her child. — Polysperchon espouses the
-  pretensions of Herakles, son of Alexander, against Kassander.
-  He enters into compact with Kassander, assassinates the young
-  prince, and is recognized as ruler of Southern Greece. —
-  Assassination of Kleopatra, last surviving relative of Alexander
-  the Great, by Antigonus. — Ptolemy of Egypt in Greece — after
-  some successes, he concludes a truce with Kassander. Passiveness
-  of the Grecian cities. — Sudden arrival of Demetrius Poliorketes
-  in Peiræus. The Athenians declare in his favor. Demetrius
-  Phalereus retires to Egypt. Capture of Munychia and Megara. —
-  Demetrius Poliorketes enters Athens in triumph. He promises
-  restoration of the democracy. Extravagant votes of flattery
-  passed by the Athenians towards him. Two new Athenian tribes
-  created. — Alteration of tone and sentiment in Athens, during
-  the last thirty years. — Contrast of Athens as proclaimed free
-  by Demetrius Poliorketes, with Athens after the expulsion of
-  Hippias. — Opposition made by Demochares, nephew of Demosthenes,
-  to these obsequious public flatteries. — Demetrius Phalereus
-  condemned in his absence. Honorable commemoration of the deceased
-  orator Lykurgus. Restrictive law passed against the philosophers
-  — they all leave Athens. The law is repealed next year, and
-  the philosophers return to Athens. — Exploits of Demetrius
-  Poliorketes. His long siege of Rhodes. Gallant and successful
-  resistance of the citizens. — His prolonged war, and ultimate
-  success in Greece, against Kassander. — Return of Demetrius
-  Poliorketes to Athens — his triumphant reception — memorable
-  Ithyphallic hymn addressed to him. — Helpless condition of
-  the Athenians — proclaimed by themselves. — Idolatry shown to
-  Demetrius at Athens. He is initiate in the Eleusinian mysteries,
-  out of the regular season. — March of Demetrius into Thessaly —
-  he passes into Asia and joins Antigonus — great battle of Ipsus,
-  in which the four confederates completely defeat Antigonus, who
-  is slain and his Asiatic power broken up and partitioned. —
-  Restoration of the Kassandrian dominion in Greece. Lachares makes
-  himself despot at Athens, under Kassander. Demetrius Poliorketes
-  returns, and expels Lachares. He garrisons Peiræus and Munychia.
-  — Death of Kassander. Bloody feuds among his family. — Demetrius
-  acquires the crown of Macedonia. — Antigonus Gonatas (son of
-  Demetrius) master of Macedonia and Greece. Permanent rule of
-  the Antigonid dynasty in Macedonia, until the conquest of that
-  country by the Romans. — Spirit of the Greeks broken — isolation
-  of the cities from each other by Antigonus. — The Greece of
-  Polybius cannot form a subject of history by itself, but only as
-  an appendage to foreign neighbors. — Evidence of the political
-  nullity of Athens — public decree in honor of Demochares — what
-  acts are recorded as his titles to public gratitude.
-                                                              331-393
-
-
-  CHAPTER XCVII.
-
-  SICILIAN AND ITALIAN GREEKS — AGATHOKLES.
-
-  Constitution established by Timoleon at Syracuse — afterwards
-  exchanged for an oligarchy. — Italian Greeks — pressed upon
-  by enemies from the interior — Archidamus king of Sparta
-  slain in Italy. — Growth of the Molossian kingdom of Epirus,
-  through Macedonian aid — Alexander the Molossian king brother
-  of Olympias. — The Molossian Alexander crosses into Italy to
-  assist the Tarentines. His exploits and death. — Assistance
-  sent by the Syracusans to Kroton — first rise of Agathokles. —
-  Agathokles distinguishes himself in the Syracusan expedition —
-  he is disappointed of honors — becomes discontented and leaves
-  Syracuse. — He levies a mercenary force — his exploits as
-  general in Italy and Sicily. — Change of government at Syracuse
-  — Agathokles is recalled — his exploits against the exiles —
-  his dangerous character at home. — Farther internal changes at
-  Syracuse — recall of the exiles — Agathokles readmitted — swears
-  amnesty and fidelity. — Agathokles, in collusion with Hamilkar,
-  arms his partisans at Syracuse, and perpetuates a sanguinary
-  massacre of the citizens. — Agathokles is constituted sole
-  despot of Syracuse. — His popular manners, military energy,
-  and conquests. Progress of Agathokles in conquering Sicily.
-  The Agrigentines take alarm and organize a defensive alliance
-  against him. — They invite the Spartan Akrotatus to command
-  — his bad conduct and failure. — Sicily the only place in
-  which a glorious Hellenic career was open. Peace concluded by
-  Agathokles with the Agrigentines — his great power in Sicily.
-  — He is repulsed from Agrigentum — the Carthaginians send an
-  armament to Sicily against him. — Position of the Carthaginians
-  between Gela and Agrigentum — their army reinforced from home.
-  — Operations of Agathokles against them — his massacre of
-  citizens at Gela. — Battle of the Himera, between Agathokles
-  and the Carthaginians. — Total defeat of Agathokles by the
-  Carthaginians. — The Carthaginians recover a large part of
-  Sicily from Agathokles. His depressed condition at Syracuse. —
-  He conceives the plan of attacking the Carthaginians in Africa.
-  — His energy and sagacity in organizing this expedition. His
-  renewed massacre and spoliation. — He gets out of the harbor, in
-  spite of the blockading fleet. Eclipse of the sun. He reaches
-  Africa safely. — He burns his vessels — impressive ceremony
-  for affecting this, under vow to Demeter. — Agathokles marches
-  into the Carthaginian territory — captures Tunês — richness and
-  cultivation of the country. — Consternation at Carthage — the
-  city force marches out against him — Hanno and Bomilkar named
-  generals. — Inferior numbers of Agathokles — his artifices to
-  encourage the soldiers. — Treachery of the Carthaginian general
-  Bomilkar — victory of Agathokles. — Conquests of Agathokles among
-  the Carthaginian dependencies on the eastern coast — Religious
-  terror and distress of the Carthaginians. Human sacrifice. —
-  Operations of Agathokles on the eastern coast of Carthage —
-  capture of Neapolis, Adrumetum, Thapsus, etc. — Agathokles
-  fortifies Aspis — undertakes operations against the interior
-  country — defeats the Carthaginians again. — Proceedings of
-  Hamilkar before Syracuse — the city is near surrendering — he
-  is disappointed, and marches away from it. — Renewed attack of
-  Hamilkar upon Syracuse — he tries to surprise Euryalus, but is
-  totally defeated, made prisoner, and slain. — The Agrigentines
-  stand forward as champions of Sicilian freedom against Agathokles
-  and the Carthaginians. — Mutiny in the army of Agathokles at
-  Tunês — his great danger, and address in extricating himself.
-  — Carthaginian army sent to act in the interior — attacked by
-  Agathokles with some success — his camp is pillaged by the
-  Numidians. — Agathokles invites the aid of Ophellas from Kyrênê.
-  — Antecedent circumstances of Kyrênê. Division of coast between
-  Kyrênê and Carthage. — Thimbron with the Harpalian mercenaries is
-  invited over to Kyrênê by exiles. His checkered career, on the
-  whole victorious, in Libya. — The Kyrenæans solicit aid from the
-  Egyptian Ptolemy, who sends Ophellas thither. Defeat and death of
-  Thimbron. Kyrenaica annexed to the dominions of Ptolemy, under
-  Ophellas as viceroy. — Position and hopes of Ophellas. He accepts
-  the invitation of Agathokles. He collects colonists from Athens
-  and other Grecian cities. — March of Ophellas, with his army,
-  and his colonists, from Kyrênê to the Carthaginian territory
-  — sufferings endured in the march. — Perfidy of Agathokles —
-  he kills Ophellas — gets possession of his army — ruin and
-  dispersion of the colonists. — Terrible sedition at Carthage —
-  Bomilkar tries to seize the supreme power — he is overthrown and
-  slain. — Farther successes of Agathokles in Africa — he captures
-  Utica, Hippo-Zarytus, and Hippagreta. — Agathokles goes to
-  Sicily, leaving Archagathus to command in Africa. Successes of
-  Archagathus in the interior country. — Redoubled efforts of the
-  Carthaginians — they gain two great victories over Archagathus.
-  — Danger of Archagathus — he is blocked up by the Carthaginians
-  at Tunis. — Agathokles in Sicily. His career at first prosperous.
-  Defeat of the Agrigentines. — Activity of Agathokles in Sicily
-  — Deinokrates in great force against him. — Agrigentine army
-  under Xenodokus — opposed to the mercenaries of Agathokles —
-  superiority of the latter. — Defeat of Xenodokus by Leptines
-  — Agathokles passes over into Africa — bad state of his army
-  there — he is defeated by the Carthaginians. — Nocturnal panic
-  and disorder in both camps. — Desperate condition of Agathokles
-  — he deserts his army and escapes to Sicily. — The deserted
-  army kill the two sons of Agathokles, and capitulate with the
-  Carthaginians. — African expedition of Agathokles — boldness of
-  the first conception — imprudently pushed and persisted in. —
-  Proceedings of Agathokles in Sicily — his barbarities at Egesta
-  and Syracuse. — Great mercenary force under Deinokrates in
-  Sicily — Agathokles solicits peace from him, and is refused —
-  he concludes peace with Carthage. — Battle of Torgium — victory
-  of Agathokles over Deinokrates. — Accommodation and compact
-  between Agathokles and Deinokrates. — Operations of Agathokles in
-  Liparæ, Italy, and Korkyra — Kleonymus of Sparta. — Last projects
-  of Agathokles — mutiny of his grandson Archagathus — sickness,
-  poisoning, and death of Agathokles. — Splendid genius of action
-  and resource — nefarious dispositions — of Agathokles. — Hellenic
-  agency in Sicily continues during the life of Agathokles, but
-  becomes then subordinate to preponderant foreigners.
-                                                               393-452
-
-
-  CHAPTER XCVIII.
-
-  OUTLYING HELLENIC CITIES. — 1. IN GAUL AND SPAIN. — 2. ON THE
-  COAST OF THE EUXINE.
-
-  Massalia—its situation and circumstances.—Colonies planted by
-  Massalia—Antipolis, Nikæa, Rhoda, Emporiæ—peculiar circumstances
-  of Emporiæ.—Oligarchical government of Massalia—prudent
-  political administration.—Hellenizing influence of Massalia
-  in the West—Pytheas, the navigator and geographer.—Pontic
-  Greeks—Pentapolis on the south-west coast.—Sinôpê—its envoys
-  present with Darius in his last days—maintains its independence
-  for some time against the Mithridatic princes—but become
-  subject to them ultimately—The Pontic Herakleia—oligarchical
-  government—the native Mariandyni reduced to serfs.—Political
-  discord at Herakleia—banishment of Klearchus—partial democracy
-  established.—Continued political troubles at Herakleia—assistance
-  invoked from without.—Character and circumstances of Klearchus—he
-  makes himself despot of Herakleia—his tyranny and cruelty.—He
-  continues despot for twelve years—he is assassinated at a
-  festival.—Satyrus becomes despot—his aggravated cruelty—his
-  military vigor.—Despotism of Timotheus, just and mild—his energy
-  and ability.—Despotism of Dionysius—his popular and vigorous
-  government—his prudent dealing with the Macedonians, during the
-  absence of Alexander in the East.—Return of Alexander to Susa—he
-  is solicited by the Herakleotic exiles—anger of Dionysius,
-  averted by the death of Alexander.—Prosperity and prudence of
-  Dionysius—he marries Amastris—his favor with Antigonus—his
-  death.—Amastris governs Herakleia—marries Lysimachus—is divorced
-  from him—Klearchus and Oxathres kill Amastris—are killed by
-  Lysimachus.—Arsinoê mistress of Herakleia. Defeat and death
-  of Lysimachus. Power of Seleukus.—Herakleia emancipated from
-  the despots, and a popular government established—recall of
-  the exiles—bold bearing of the citizens towards Seleukus—death
-  of Seleukus.—Situation and management of Herakleia as a free
-  government—considerable naval power.—Prudent administration of
-  Herakleia, as a free city, among the powerful princes of Asia
-  Minor—general condition and influence of the Greek cities on the
-  coast.—Grecian Pentapolis on the south-west of the Euxine—Ovid
-  at Tomi.—Olbia—in the days of Herodotus and Ephorus—increased
-  numbers, and multiplied inroads of the barbaric hordes.—Olbia in
-  later days—decline of security and production.—Olbia pillaged and
-  abandoned—afterwards renewed.—Visit of Dion the Rhetor—Hellenic
-  tastes and manners—ardent interest in Homer.—Bosporus or
-  Pantikapæum.—Princes of Bosporus—relations between Athens and
-  Bosporus.—Nymphæum among the tributary cities under the Athenian
-  empire—how it passed under the Bosporanic princes.—Alliance and
-  reciprocal good offices between the Bosporanic princes Satyrus,
-  Leukon, etc. and the Athenians. Immunities of trade granted to
-  the Athenians.—Political condition of the Greeks of Bosporus—the
-  princes called themselves archons—their empire over barbaric
-  tribes.—Family feuds among the Bosporanic princes—war between
-  Satyrus and Eumelus—death of Satyrus II.—Civil war between
-  Prytanis and Eumelus—victory of Eumelus—he kills the wives,
-  children, and friends, of his brother.—His victorious reign and
-  conquests—his speedy death.—Decline of the Bosporanic dynasty,
-  until it passed into the hands of Mithridates Eupator.—Monuments
-  left by the Spartokid princes of Bosporus—sepulchral tumuli near
-  Kertch (Pantikapæum).—Appendix on the Localities near Issus.
-                                                               453-495
-
-
-  INDEX                                                            497
-
-[Illustration: MAP SHEWING THE MARCHES OF ALEXANDER.]
-
-
-
-
-HISTORY OF GREECE.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER XCI.
-
-FIRST PERIOD OF THE REIGN OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT — SIEGE AND CAPTURE
-OF THEBES.
-
-
-My last preceding volume ended with the assassination of Philip of
-Macedon, and the accession of his son Alexander the Great, then
-twenty years of age.
-
-It demonstrates the altered complexion of Grecian history, that we
-are now obliged to seek for marking events in the succession to
-the Macedonian crown, or in the ordinances of Macedonian kings. In
-fact, the Hellenic world has ceased to be autonomous. In Sicily,
-indeed, the free and constitutional march, revived by Timoleon,
-is still destined to continue for a few years longer; but all the
-Grecian cities south of Mount Olympus have descended into dependents
-of Macedonia. Such dependence, established as a fact by the battle
-of Chæroneia and by the subsequent victorious march of Philip over
-Peloponnesus, was acknowledged in form by the vote of the Grecian
-synod at Corinth. While even the Athenians had been compelled to
-concur in submission, Sparta alone, braving all consequences,
-continued inflexible in her refusal. The adherence of Thebes was not
-trusted to the word of the Thebans, but ensured by the Macedonian
-garrison established in her citadel, called the Kadmeia. Each
-Hellenic city, small and great,—maritime, inland, and insular—(with
-the single exception of Sparta), was thus enrolled as a separate unit
-in the list of subject-allies attached to the imperial headship of
-Philip.
-
-Under these circumstances, the history of conquered Greece loses its
-separate course, and becomes merged in that of conquering Macedonia.
-Nevertheless, there are particular reasons which constrain the
-historian of Greece to carry on the two together for a few years
-longer. First, conquered Greece exercised a powerful action on her
-conqueror—“Græcia capta ferum victorem cepit”. The Macedonians,
-though speaking a language of their own, had neither language for
-communicating with others, nor literature, nor philosophy, except
-Grecian and derived from Greeks. Philip, while causing himself to be
-chosen chief of Hellas, was himself not only partially hellenized,
-but an eager candidate for Hellenic admiration. He demanded the
-headship under the declared pretence of satisfying the old antipathy
-against Persia. Next, the conquests of Alexander, though essentially
-Macedonian, operated indirectly as the initiatory step of a series
-of events, diffusing Hellenic language (with some tinge of Hellenic
-literature) over a large breadth of Asia,—opening that territory to
-the better observation, in some degree even to the superintendence,
-of intelligent Greeks—and thus producing consequences important in
-many ways to the history of mankind. Lastly, the generation of free
-Greeks upon whom the battle of Chæroneia fell, were not disposed
-to lie quiet if any opportunity occurred for shaking off their
-Macedonian masters. The present volume will record the unavailing
-efforts made for this purpose, in which Demosthenes and most of the
-other leaders perished.
-
-Alexander (born in July 356 B. C.), like his father Philip,
-was not a Greek, but a Macedonian and Epirot, partially imbued with
-Grecian sentiment and intelligence. It is true that his ancestors,
-some centuries before, had been emigrants from Argos; but the kings
-of Macedonia had long lost all trace of any such peculiarity as might
-originally have distinguished them from their subjects. The basis of
-Philip’s character was Macedonian, not Greek: it was the self-will of
-a barbarian prince, not the _ingenium civile_, or sense of reciprocal
-obligation and right in society with others, which marked more or
-less even the most powerful members of a Grecian city, whether
-oligarchical or democratical. If this was true of Philip, it was
-still more true of Alexander, who inherited the violent temperament
-and headstrong will of his furious Epirotic mother Olympias.
-
-A kinsman of Olympias, named Leonidas, and an Akarnanian named
-Lysimachus, are mentioned as the chief tutors to whom Alexander’s
-childhood was entrusted.[1] Of course the Iliad of Homer was among
-the first things which he learnt as a boy. Throughout most of his
-life, he retained a passionate interest in this poem, a copy of
-which, said to have been corrected by Aristotle, he carried with him
-in his military campaigns. We are not told, nor is it probable, that
-he felt any similar attachment for the less warlike Odyssey. Even as
-a child, he learnt to identify himself in sympathy with Achilles,—his
-ancestor by the mother’s side, according to the Æakid pedigree. The
-tutor Lysimachus won his heart by calling himself Phœnix—Alexander,
-Achilles—and Philip, by the name of Peleus. Of Alexander’s boyish
-poetical recitations, one anecdote remains, both curious and of
-unquestionable authenticity. He was ten years old, when the Athenian
-legation, including both Æschines and Demosthenes, came to Pella to
-treat about peace. While Philip entertained them at table, in his
-usual agreeable and convivial manner, the boy Alexander recited for
-their amusement certain passages of poetry which he had learnt—and
-delivered, in response with another boy, a dialogue out of one of the
-Grecian dramas.[2]
-
-  [1] Plutarch, Alexand. c. 5, 6.
-
-  [2] Æschines cont. Timarch. p. 167.
-
-At the age of thirteen, Alexander was placed under the instruction of
-Aristotle, whom Philip expressly invited for the purpose, and whose
-father Nikomachus had been both friend and physician of Philip’s
-father Amyntas. What course of study Alexander was made to go
-through, we unfortunately cannot state. He enjoyed the teaching of
-Aristotle for at least three years, and we are told that he devoted
-himself to it with ardor, contracting a strong attachment to his
-preceptor. His powers of addressing an audience, though not so well
-attested as those of his father, were always found sufficient for his
-purpose: moreover, he retained, even in the midst of his fatiguing
-Asiatic campaigns, an interest in Greek literature and poetry.
-
-At what precise moment, during the lifetime of his father, Alexander
-first took part in active service, we do not know. It is said that
-once, when quite a youth, he received some Persian envoys during the
-absence of his father; and that he surprised them by the maturity of
-his demeanor, as well as by the political bearing and pertinence of
-his questions.[3] Though only sixteen years of age, in 340 B.
-C., he was left at home as regent while Philip was engaged in
-the sieges of Byzantium and Perinthus. He put down a revolt of the
-neighboring Thracian tribe called Mædi, took one of their towns, and
-founded it anew under the title of Alexandria; the earliest town
-which bore that name, afterwards applied to so many other towns
-planted by him. In the march of Philip into Greece (338 B.
-C.), Alexander took part, commanded one of the wings at the
-battle of Chæroneia, and is said to have first gained the advantage
-on his side over the Theban sacred band.[4]
-
-  [3] Plutarch, Alex. 5.
-
-  [4] Plutarch, Alex. 9. Justin says that Alexander was the
-  companion of his father during part of the war in Thrace (ix. 1).
-
-Yet notwithstanding such marks of confidence and coöperation, other
-incidents occurred producing bitter animosity between the father and
-the son. By his wife Olympias, Philip had as offspring Alexander
-and Kleopatra: by a Thessalian mistress named Philinna, he had a
-son named Aridæus (afterwards called Philip Aridæus:) he had also
-daughters named Kynna (or Kynanê) and Thessalonikê. Olympias, a
-woman of sanguinary and implacable disposition, had rendered herself
-so odious to him, that he repudiated her, and married a new wife
-named Kleopatra. I have recounted in the preceding volume[5] the
-indignation felt by Alexander at this proceeding, and the violent
-altercation which occurred during the conviviality of the marriage
-banquet; where Philip actually snatched his sword, threatened his
-son’s life, and was only prevented from executing the threat by
-falling down through intoxication. After this quarrel, Alexander
-retired from Macedonia, conducting his mother to her brother
-Alexander king of Epirus. A son was born to Philip by Kleopatra.
-Her brother or uncle Attalus acquired high favor. Her kinsmen and
-partisans generally were also promoted, while Ptolemy, Nearchus, and
-other persons attached to Alexander, were banished.[6]
-
-  [5] Vol. XI. Ch. xc. p. 513.
-
-  [6] Plutarch, Alex. 10. Arrian, iii. 6, 8.
-
-The prospects of Alexander were thus full of uncertainty and peril,
-up to the very day of Philip’s assassination. The succession to the
-Macedonian crown, though transmitted in the same family, was by no
-means assured as to individual members; moreover, in the regal house
-of Macedonia[7] (as among the kings called Diadochi, who acquired
-dominion after the death of Alexander the Great), violent feuds and
-standing mistrust between father, sons, and brethren, were ordinary
-phænomena, to which the family of the Antigonids formed an honorable
-exception. Between Alexander and Olympias on the one side, and
-Kleopatra with her son and Attalus on the other, a murderous contest
-was sure to arise. Kleopatra was at this time in the ascendent;
-Olympias was violent and mischievous; and Philip was only forty-seven
-years of age. Hence the future threatened nothing but aggravated
-dissension and difficulties for Alexander. Moreover his strong
-will and imperious temper, eminently suitable for supreme command,
-disqualified him from playing a subordinate part, even to his own
-father. The prudence of Philip, when about to depart on his Asiatic
-expedition, induced him to attempt to heal these family dissensions
-by giving his daughter Kleopatra in marriage to her uncle Alexander
-of Epirus, brother of Olympias. It was during the splendid marriage
-festival, then celebrated at Ægæ, that he was assassinated—Olympias,
-Kleopatra, and Alexander, being all present, while Attalus was in
-Asia, commanding the Macedonian division sent forward in advance,
-jointly with Parmenio. Had Philip escaped this catastrophe, he
-would doubtless have carried on the war in Asia Minor with quite as
-much energy and skill as it was afterwards prosecuted by Alexander:
-though we may doubt whether the father would have stretched out to
-those ulterior undertakings which, gigantic and far-reaching as
-they were, fell short of the insatiable ambition of the son. But
-successful as Philip might have been in Asia, he would hardly have
-escaped gloomy family feuds; with Alexander as a mutinous son, under
-the instigations of Olympias,—and with Kleopatra on the other side,
-feeling that her own safety depended upon the removal of regal or
-quasi-regal competitors.
-
-  [7] See the third chapter of Plutarch’s life of Demetrius
-  Poliorkêtês; which presents a vivid description of the feelings
-  prevalent between members of regal families in those ages.
-  Demetrius, coming home from the chase with his hunting javelins
-  in his hand, goes up to his father Antigonus, salutes him, and
-  sits down by his side without disarming. This is extolled as an
-  unparalleled proof of the confidence and affection subsisting
-  between the father and the son. In the families of all the other
-  Diadochi (says Plutarch) murders of sons, mothers, and wives,
-  were frequent—murders of brothers were even common, assumed to be
-  precautions necessary for security. Οὕτως ἄρα πάντη δυσκωνοίνητον
-  ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ μεστὸν ἀπιστίας καὶ δυσνοίας, ὥστε ἀγάλλεσθαι τὸν
-  μέγιστον τῶν Ἀλεξάνδρου διαδόχων καὶ πρεσβύτατον, ὅτι μὴ φοβεῖται
-  τὸν υἱὸν, ἀλλὰ προσίεται τὴν λόγχην ἔχοντα τοῦ σώματος πλήσιον.
-  Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ μόνος, ὡς εἰπεῖν, ~ὁ οἶκος οὗτος~ ἐπὶ πλείστας
-  διαδοχὰς τῶν τοιούτων κακῶν ἐκαθάρευσε, μᾶλλον δὲ ~εἷς μόνος~ τῶν
-  ἀπ᾽ Ἀντιγόνου Φίλιππος ἀνεῖλεν υἱόν. ~Αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι σχεδὸν ἁπᾶσαι~
-  διαδοχαὶ πολλῶν μὲν ἔχουσι παίδων, πολλῶν δὲ μητέρων φόνους καὶ
-  γυναικῶν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀδελφοὺς ἀναιρεῖν, ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι τὰ
-  αἰτήματα λαμβάνουσιν, οὕτω ~συνεχωρεῖτο κοινόν τι νομιζόμενον
-  αἴτημα καὶ βασιλικὸν~ ὑπὲρ ἀσφαλείας.
-
-  Compare Tacitus, Histor. v. 8, about the family feuds of the
-  kings of Judæa; and Xenoph. Hieron. iii. 8.
-
-  In noticing the Antigonid family as a favorable exception, we
-  must confine our assertion to the first century of that family.
-  The bloody tragedy of Perseus and Demetrius shortly preceded the
-  ruin of the empire.
-
-From such formidable perils, visible in the distance, if not
-immediately impending, the sword of Pausanias guaranteed both
-Alexander and the Macedonian kingdom. But at the moment when the blow
-was struck, and when the Lynkestian Alexander, one of those privy
-to it, ran to forestall resistance and place the crown on the head
-of Alexander the Great[8]—no one knew what to expect from the young
-prince thus suddenly exalted at the age of twenty years. The sudden
-death of Philip in the fulness of glory and ambitious hopes, must
-have produced the strongest impression, first upon the festive crowd
-assembled,—next throughout Macedonia,—lastly, upon the foreigners
-whom he had reduced to dependence, from the Danube to the borders
-of Pæonia. All these dependencies were held only by the fear of
-Macedonian force. It remained to be proved whether the youthful son
-of Philip was capable of putting down opposition and upholding the
-powerful organization created by his father. Moreover Perdikkas,
-the elder brother and predecessor of Philip, had left a son named
-Amyntas, now at least twenty-four years of age, to whom many looked
-as the proper successor.[9]
-
-  [8] Arrian, i. 25, 2; Justin, xi. 2. See Vol. XI. p. 517.
-
-  [9] Arrian, De Rebus post Alexandrum, Fragm. ap. Photium, cod.
-  92. p. 220; Plutarch, De Fortunâ Alex. Magn. p. 327. πᾶσα δὲ
-  ὕπουλος ἦν ἡ Μακεδονία (after the death of Philip) πρὸς Ἀμύνταν
-  ἀποβλέπουσα καὶ τοὺς Ἀερόπου παῖδας.
-
-But Alexander, present and proclaimed at once by his friends, showed
-himself both in word and deed, perfectly competent to the emergency.
-He mustered, caressed, and conciliated, the divisions of the
-Macedonian army and the chief officers. His addresses were judicious
-and energetic, engaging that the dignity of the kingdom should be
-maintained unimpaired,[10] and that even the Asiatic projects already
-proclaimed should be prosecuted with as much vigor as if Philip still
-lived.
-
-  [10] Diod. xvii. 2.
-
-It was one of the first measures of Alexander to celebrate with
-magnificent solemnities the funeral of his deceased father. While
-the preparations for it were going on, he instituted researches
-to find out and punish the accomplices of Pausanias. Of these
-indeed, the most illustrious person mentioned to us—Olympias—was
-not only protected by her position from punishment, but retained
-great ascendency over her son to the end of his life. Three
-other persons are mentioned by name as accomplices—brothers and
-persons of good family from the district of Upper Macedonia called
-Lynkêstis—Alexander, Heromenes, and Arrhabæus, sons of Aëropus. The
-two latter were put to death, but the first of the three was spared,
-and even promoted to important charges, as a reward for his useful
-forwardness in instantly saluting Alexander king.[11] Others also,
-we know not how many, were executed; and Alexander seems to have
-imagined that there still remained some undetected.[12] The Persian
-king boasted in public letters,[13] with how much truth we cannot
-say, that he too had been among the instigators of Pausanias.
-
-  [11] Arrian, i. 25, 2; Curtius, vii. 1, 6. Alexander son
-  of Aëropus was son-in-law of Antipater. The case of this
-  Alexander—and of Olympias—afforded a certain basis to those who
-  said (Curtius, vi. 43) that Alexander had dealt favorably with
-  the accomplices of Pausanias.
-
-  [12] Plutarch, Alexand. 10-27; Diodor. xvii. 51; Justin, xi. 11.
-
-  [13] Arrian, ii. 14, 10.
-
-Among the persons slain about this time by Alexander, we may number
-his first-cousin and brother-in-law Amyntas—son of Perdikkas (the
-elder brother of the deceased Philip): Amyntas was a boy when his
-father Perdikkas died. Though having a preferable claim to the
-succession, according to usage, he had been put aside by his uncle
-Philip, on the ground of his age and of the strenuous efforts
-required on commencing a new reign. Philip had however given in
-marriage to this Amyntas his daughter (by an Illyrian mother) Kynna.
-Nevertheless, Alexander now put him to death,[14] on accusation of
-conspiracy: under what precise circumstances, does not appear—but
-probably Amyntas (who besides being the son of Philip’s elder
-brother, was at least twenty-four years of age, while Alexander
-was only twenty) conceived himself as having a better right to the
-succession, and was so conceived by many others. The infant son of
-Kleopatra by Philip is said to have been killed by Alexander, as a
-rival in the succession; Kleopatra herself was afterwards put to
-death by Olympias during his absence, and to his regret. Attalus,
-also, uncle of Kleopatra and joint commander of the Macedonian army
-in Asia, was assassinated under the private orders of Alexander, by
-Hekatæus and Philotas.[15] Another Amyntas, son of Antiochus (there
-seems to have been several Macedonians named Amyntas) fled for safety
-into Asia:[16] probably others, who felt themselves to be objects of
-suspicion, did the like—since by the Macedonian custom, not merely a
-person convicted of high treason, but all his kindred along with him,
-were put to death.[17]
-
-  [14] Curtius, vi. 9, 17. vi. 10, 24. Arrian mentioned this
-  Amyntas son of Perdikkas (as well as the fact of his having been
-  put to death by Alexander before the Asiatic expedition), in
-  the lost work τὰ μετὰ Ἀλέξανδρον—see Photius Cod. 92. p. 220.
-  But Arrian, in his account of Alexander’s expedition, _does not
-  mention_ the fact; which shows that his silence is not to be
-  assumed as a conclusive reason for discrediting allegations of
-  others.
-
-  Compare Polyænus, v. 60; and Plutarch, Fort. Alex. Magn. p. 327.
-
-  It was during this expedition into Thrace and Illyria, about
-  eight months after his accession, that Alexander promised to
-  give his sister Kynna in marriage to Langarus prince of the
-  Agrianes (Arrian, Exp. Al. M. i. 5, 7). Langarus died of sickness
-  soon after; so that this marriage never took place. But when
-  the promise was made, Kynna must have been a widow. Her husband
-  Amyntas must therefore have been put to death during the first
-  months of Alexander’s reign.
-
-  [15] See my last preceding volume, Chap. xc. p. 518; Diod. xvii.
-  2; Curtius, vii. 1, 6; Justin, ix. 7 xi. 2. xii. 6; Plutarch,
-  Alexand. 10; Pausanias, viii. 7, 5.
-
-  [16] Arrian, i. 17 10; Plutarch, Alex. 20, Curtius, iii. 28, 18.
-
-  [17] Curtius, vi. 42, 20. Compare with this custom, a passage in
-  the Ajax of Sophokles, v. 725.
-
-By unequivocal manifestations of energy and address, and by
-despatching rivals or dangerous malcontents, Alexander thus speedily
-fortified his position on the throne at home. But from the foreign
-dependents of Macedonia—Greeks, Thracians, and Illyrians—the like
-acknowledgment was not so easily obtained. Most of them were disposed
-to throw off the yoke; yet none dared to take the initiative of
-moving, and the suddenness of Philip’s death found them altogether
-unprepared for combination. By that event the Greeks were discharged
-from all engagement, since the vote of the confederacy had elected
-him personally as Imperator. They were now at liberty, in so far
-as there was any liberty at all in the proceeding, to elect any
-one else, or to abstain from reëlecting at all, and even to let
-the confederacy expire. Now it was only under constraint and
-intimidation, as was well known both in Greece and Macedonia, that
-they had conferred this dignity even on Philip—who had earned it by
-splendid exploits, and had proved himself the ablest captain and
-politician of the age. They were by no means inclined to transfer
-it to a youth like Alexander, until he had shown himself capable
-of bringing the like coercion to bear, and extorting the same
-submission. The wish to break loose from Macedonia, widely spread
-throughout the Grecian cities, found open expression from Demosthenes
-and others in the assembly at Athens. That orator (if we are to
-believe his rival Æschines), having received private intelligence of
-the assassination of Philip, through certain spies of Charidemus,
-before it was publicly known to others—pretended to have had it
-revealed to him in a dream by the gods. Appearing in the assembly
-with his gayest attire, he congratulated his countrymen on the death
-of their greatest enemy, and pronounced high encomiums on the brave
-tyrannicide of Pausanias, which he would probably compare to that
-of Harmodius and Aristogeiton.[18] He depreciated the abilities of
-Alexander, calling him Margites (the name of a silly character in
-one of the Homeric poems), and intimating that he would be too much
-distracted with embarrassments and ceremonial duties at home, to have
-leisure for a foreign march.[19] Such, according to Æschines, was
-the language of Demosthenes on the first news of Philip’s death. We
-cannot doubt that the public of Athens, as well as Demosthenes, felt
-great joy at an event which seemed to open to them fresh chances of
-freedom, and that the motion for a sacrifice of thanksgiving,[20]
-in spite of Phokion’s opposition, was readily adopted. But though
-the manifestation of sentiment at Athens was thus anti-Macedonian,
-exhibiting aversion to the renewal of that obedience which had been
-recently promised to Philip, Demosthenes did not go so far as to
-declare any positive hostility.[21] He tried to open communication
-with the Persians in Asia Minor, and also, if we may believe
-Diodorus, with the Macedonian commander in Asia Minor, Attalus. But
-neither of the two missions was successful. Attalus sent his letter
-to Alexander; while the Persian king,[22] probably relieved by the
-death of Philip from immediate fear of Macedonian power, despatched
-a peremptory refusal to Athens, intimating that he would furnish no
-more money.[23]
-
-  [18] Æschines adv. Ktesiphont. c. 29. p. 469. c. 78 p. 608;
-  Plutarch, Demosth. 22.
-
-  [19] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 547. c. 50.
-
-  [20] Plutarch, Phokion, 16.
-
-  [21] We gather this from Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 551. c. 52.
-
-  [22] Diodorus (xvii. 5) mentions this communication of
-  Demosthenes to Attalus; which, however, I cannot but think
-  improbable. Probably Charidemus was the organ of the
-  communications.
-
-  [23] This letter from Darius is distinctly alluded to, and even
-  a sentence cited from it, by Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 633, 634.
-  c. 88. We know that Darius wrote in very different language
-  not long afterwards, near the time when Alexander crossed into
-  Asia (Arrian, ii. 14, 11). The first letter must have been sent
-  shortly after Philip’s death, when Darius was publicly boasting
-  of having procured the deed, and before he had yet learnt to fear
-  Alexander. Compare Diodor. xvii. 7.
-
-Not merely in Athens, but in other Grecian States also, the death
-of Philip excited aspirations for freedom. The Lacedæmonians, who,
-though unsupported, had stood out inflexibly against any obedience
-to him, were now on the watch for new allies; while the Arcadians,
-Argeians, and Eleians, manifested sentiments adverse to Macedonia.
-The Ambrakiots expelled the garrison placed by Philip in their city;
-the Ætolians passed a vote to assist in restoring those Akarnanian
-exiles whom he had banished.[24] On the other hand, the Thessalians
-manifested unshaken adherence to Macedonia. But the Macedonian
-garrison at Thebes, and the macedonizing Thebans who now governed
-that city,[25] were probably the main obstacles to any combined
-manifestation in favor of Hellenic autonomy.
-
-  [24] Diodor. xvii. 3.
-
-  [25] Diodorus (xvii. 3) says that the Thebans passed a vote to
-  expel the Macedonian garrison in the Kadmeia. But I have little
-  hesitation in rejecting this statement. We may be sure that
-  the presence of the Macedonian garrison was connected with the
-  predominance in the city of a party favorable to Macedonia. In
-  the ensuing year, when the resistance really occurred, this was
-  done by the anti-Macedonian party, who then got back from exile.
-
-Apprised of these impulses prevalent throughout the Grecian world,
-Alexander felt the necessity of checking them by a demonstration
-immediate, as well as intimidating. The energy and rapidity of his
-proceedings speedily overawed all those who had speculated on his
-youth, or had adopted the epithets applied to him by Demosthenes.
-Having surmounted, in a shorter time than was supposed possible,
-the difficulties of his newly-acquired position at home, he marched
-into Greece at the head of a formidable army, seemingly about two
-months after the death of Philip. He was favorably received by the
-Thessalians, who passed a vote constituting Alexander head of Greece
-in place of his father Philip; which vote was speedily confirmed by
-the Amphiktyonic assembly, convoked at Thermopylæ. Alexander next
-advanced to Thebes, and from thence over the isthmus of Corinth
-into Peloponnesus. The details of his march we do not know; but
-his great force, probably not inferior to that which had conquered
-at Chæroneia, spread terror everywhere, silencing all except his
-partisans. Nowhere was the alarm greater than at Athens. The
-Athenians recollecting both the speeches of their orators and the
-votes of their assembly,—offensive at least, if not hostile, to the
-Macedonians—trembled lest the march of Alexander should be directed
-against their city, and accordingly made preparation for standing
-a siege. All citizens were enjoined to bring in their families and
-properties from the country, insomuch that the space within the walls
-was full both of fugitives and of cattle.[26] At the same time, the
-assembly adopted, on the motion of Demades, a resolution of apology
-and full submission to Alexander: they not only recognized him as
-chief of Greece, but conferred upon him divine honors, in terms
-even more emphatic than those bestowed on Philip.[27] The mover,
-with other legates, carried the resolution to Alexander, whom they
-found at Thebes, and who accepted their submission. A young speaker
-named Pytheas is said to have opposed the vote in the Athenian
-assembly.[28] Whether Demosthenes did the like—or whether, under the
-feeling of disappointed anticipations and overwhelming Macedonian
-force, he condemned himself to silence,—we cannot say. That he did
-not go with Demades on the mission to Alexander, seems a matter of
-course, though he is said to have been appointed by public vote to
-do so, and to have declined the duty. He accompanied the legation
-as far as Mount Kithæron, on the frontier, and then returned to
-Athens.[29] We read with astonishment that Æschines and his other
-enemies denounced this step as a cowardly desertion. No envoy could
-be so odious to Alexander, or so likely to provoke refusal for the
-proposition which he carried, as Demosthenes. To employ him in such
-a mission would have been absurd; except for the purpose probably
-intended by his enemies, that he might be either detained by the
-conqueror as an expiatory victim,[30] or sent back as a pardoned and
-humiliated prisoner.
-
-  [26] Demadis Fragment. ὑπὲρ τῆς δωδεκαετίας, p. 180.
-
-  [27] Arrian, i. 1, 4.
-
-  [28] Plutarch, Reipub. Ger. Præcept. p. 804.
-
-  [29] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 564. c. 50; Deinarchus cont.
-  Demosth. p. 57; Diodor. xvii. 4; Plutarch, Demosth. c. 23
-  (Plutarch confounds the proceedings of this year with those of
-  the succeeding year). Demades, in the fragment of his oration
-  remaining to us, makes no allusion to this proceeding of
-  Demosthenes.
-
-  The decree, naming Demosthenes among the envoys, is likely enough
-  to have been passed chiefly by the votes of his enemies. It was
-  always open to an Athenian citizen to accept or decline such an
-  appointment.
-
-  [30] Several years afterwards, Demades himself was put to death
-  by Antipater, to whom he had been sent as envoy from Athens
-  (Diodor. xviii. 48).
-
-After displaying his force in various portions of Peloponnesus,
-Alexander returned to Corinth, where he convened deputies from the
-Grecian cities generally. The list of those cities which obeyed
-the summons is not before us, but probably it included nearly all
-the cities of Central Greece. We know only that the Lacedæmonians
-continued to stand aloof, refusing all concurrence. Alexander asked
-from the assembled deputies the same appointment which the victorious
-Philip had required and obtained two years before—the hegemony or
-headship of the Greeks collectively for the purpose of prosecuting
-war against Persia.[31] To the request of a prince at the head of an
-irresistible army, one answer only was admissible. He was nominated
-Imperator with full powers, by land and sea. Overawed by the presence
-and sentiment of Macedonian force, all acquiesced in this vote except
-the Lacedæmonians.
-
-  [31] Arrian, i. 1, 2. αἰτεῖν παρ᾽ αὐτῶν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τῆς ἐπὶ
-  τοὺς Πέρσας στρατείας, ἥντινα Φιλίππῳ ἤδη ἔδοσαν· καὶ αἰτήσαντα
-  λαβεῖν παρὰ πάντων, πλὴν Λακεδαιμονίων, etc.
-
-  Arrian speaks as if this request had been addressed only to the
-  Greeks _within_ Peloponnesus; moreover he mentions no assembly
-  at Corinth, which is noticed (though with some confusion) by
-  Diodorus, Justin, and Plutarch. Cities out of Peloponnesus,
-  as well as within it, must have been included; unless we
-  suppose that the resolution of the Amphiktyonic assembly, which
-  had been previously passed, was held to comprehend all the
-  extra-Peloponnesian cities, which seems not probable.
-
-The convention sanctioned by Alexander was probably the same as that
-settled by and with his father Philip. Its grand and significant
-feature was, that it recognized Hellas as a confederacy under the
-Macedonian prince as imperator, president, or executive head and
-arm. It crowned him with a legal sanction as keeper of the peace
-within Greece, and conqueror abroad in the name of Greece. Of its
-other conditions, some are made known to us by subsequent complaints;
-such conditions as, being equitable and tutelary towards the members
-generally, the Macedonian chief found it inconvenient to observe,
-and speedily began to violate. Each Hellenic city was pronounced,
-by the first article of the convention, to be free and autonomous.
-In each, the existing political constitution was recognized as it
-stood; all other cities were forbidden to interfere with it, or to
-second any attack by its hostile exiles.[32] No new despot was to
-be established; no dispossessed despot was to be restored.[33] Each
-city became bound to discourage in every other, as far as possible,
-all illegal violence—such as political executions, confiscation,
-spoliation, redivision of land or abolition of debts, factious
-manumission of slaves, etc.[34] To each was guaranteed freedom of
-navigation; maritime capture was prohibited, on pain of enmity from
-all.[35] Each was forbidden to send armed vessels into the harbor of
-any other, or to build vessels or engage seamen there.[36] By each,
-an oath was taken to observe these conditions, to declare war against
-all who violated them, and to keep them inscribed on a commemorative
-column. Provision seems to have been made for admitting any
-additional city[37] on its subsequent application, though it might
-not have been a party to the original contract. Moreover, it appears
-that a standing military force, under Macedonian orders, was provided
-to enforce observance of the convention; and that the synod of
-deputies was contemplated as likely to meet periodically.[38]
-
-  [32] Demosthenes (or Pseudo-Demosthenes), Orat. xvii. De
-  Fœdere Alexandrino, p. 213, 214. ἐπιτάττει ἡ συνθήκη εὐθὺς ἐν
-  ἀρχῇ, ἐλευθέρους εἶναι καὶ αὐτονόμους τοὺς Ἕλληνας.—Ἐστὶ γὰρ
-  γεγραμμένον, ἐάν τινες τὰς πολιτείας τὰς παρ᾽ ἑκάστοις οὔσας, ὅτε
-  τοὺς ὅρκους τοὺς περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης ὤμνυσαν, καταλύσωσι, πολεμίους
-  εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς τῆς εἰρήνης μετέχουσιν....
-
-  [33] Demosthen. Orat. de Fœdere Alex. p. 213.
-
-  [34] Demosth. ib. p 215.
-
-  [35] Demosth. ib. p. 217. ἔστι γὰρ δήπου ἐν ταῖς συνθήκαις, τὴν
-  θάλατταν πλεῖν τοὺς μετέχοντας τῆς εἰρήνης, καὶ μηδένα κωλύειν
-  αὐτοὺς μηδὲ κατάγειν πλοῖον μηδενὸς τούτων· ἐὰν δέ τις παρὰ ταῦτα
-  ποιῇ, πολέμιον εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς τῆς εἰρήνης μετέχουσιν....
-
-  [36] Demosth. ib. p. 218, 219. Böhnecke, in his instructive
-  comments on this convention (Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der
-  Attischen Redner, p. 623), has treated the prohibition here
-  mentioned as if it were one specially binding the Macedonians
-  not to sail with armed ships into the Peiræus. This undoubtedly
-  is the particular case on which the orator insists; but I
-  conceive it to have been only a particular case under a general
-  prohibitory rule.
-
-  [37] Arrian, ii. 1, 7; ii. 2, 4. Demosth. de Fœd. Alex, p. 213.
-  Tenedos, Mitylênê, Antissa, and Eresus, can hardly have been
-  members of the convention when first sworn.
-
-  [38] Demosth. Orat. de Fœd. Alex. p. 215. ἐστὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς
-  συνθήκαις ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ~τοὺς συνεδρεύοντας καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ τῇ
-  κοινῇ φυλακῇ τεταγμένους~, ὅπως ἐν ταῖς κοινωνούσαις πόλεσι μὴ
-  γίγνωνται θάνατοι μηδὲ φυγαὶ παρὰ τοὺς κειμένους ταῖς πόλεσι
-  νόμους.... Οἱ δὲ τοσοῦτον δέουσι τούτων τι κωλύειν, ὥστε καὶ
-  συγκατασκευάζουσιν, etc. (p. 216).
-
-  The persons designated by οἱ δὲ, and denounced throughout this
-  oration generally, are, Alexander or the Macedonian officers and
-  soldiers.
-
-  A passage in Deinarchus cont. Demosth. p. 14, leads to the
-  supposition, that a standing Macedonian force was kept at
-  Corinth, occupying the Isthmus. The Thebans, however, declared
-  against Macedonia (in August or September 335 B. C.),
-  and proceeding to besiege the Macedonian garrison in the Kadmeia,
-  sent envoys to entreat aid from the Arcadians. “These envoys
-  (says Deinarchus) got with difficulty by sea to the Arcadians”—οἳ
-  κατὰ θάλασσαν ~μόλις~ ἀφίκοντο πρὸς ἐκείνους. Whence should this
-  difficulty arise, except from a Macedonian occupation of Corinth?
-
-Such was the convention, in so far as we know its terms, agreed
-to by the Grecian deputies at Corinth with Alexander; but with
-Alexander at the head of an irresistible army. He proclaimed it as
-the “public statute of the Greeks”,[39] constituting a paramount
-obligation, of which he was the enforcer, binding on all, and
-authorizing him to treat all transgressors as rebels. It was set
-forth as counterpart of, and substitute for, the convention of
-Antalkidas, which we shall presently see the officers of Darius
-trying to revive against him—the headship of Persia against that of
-Macedonia. Such is the melancholy degradation of the Grecian World,
-that its cities have no alternative except to choose between these
-two foreign potentates—or to invite the help of Darius, the most
-distant and least dangerous, whose headship could hardly be more than
-nominal, against a neighbor sure to be domineering and compressive,
-and likely enough to be tyrannical. Of the once powerful Hellenic
-chiefs and competitors—Sparta, Athens, Thebes—under each of whom the
-Grecian world had been upheld as an independent and self-determining
-aggregate, admitting the free play of native sentiment and character,
-under circumstances more or less advantageous—the two last are now
-confounded as common units (one even held under garrison) among the
-subject allies of Alexander; while Sparta preserves only the dignity
-of an isolated independence.
-
-  [39] Arrian, i. 16, 10. παρὰ τὰ κοινῇ δόξαντα τοῖς Ἕλλησιν.
-  After the death of Darius, Alexander pronounced that the Grecian
-  mercenaries who had been serving with that prince, were highly
-  criminal for having contravened the general vote of the Greeks
-  (παρὰ τὰ δόγματα τὰ Ἑλλήνων), except such as had taken service
-  before that vote was passed, and except the Sinopeans, whom
-  Alexander considered as subjects of Persia and not partakers τοῦ
-  κοινοῦ τῶν Ἑλλήνων (Arrian, iii. 23, 15; iii. 24, 8, 9).
-
-It appears that during the nine months which succeeded the swearing
-of the convention, Alexander and his officers (after his return to
-Macedonia) were active, both by armed force and by mission of envoys,
-in procuring new adhesions and in re-modelling the governments of
-various cities suitably to their own views. Complaints of such
-aggressions were raised in the public assembly of Athens, the only
-place in Greece where any liberty of discussion still survived.
-An oration, pronounced by Demosthenes, Hyperides, or one of the
-contemporary, anti-Macedonian politicians (about the spring or early
-summer of 335 B. C.),[40] imparts to us some idea both of
-the Macedonian interventions steadily going on, and of the unavailing
-remonstrances raised against them by individual Athenian citizens. At
-the time of this oration, such remonstrances had already been often
-repeated. They were always met by the macedonizing Athenians with
-peremptory declarations that the convention must be observed. But
-in reply, the remonstrants urged, that it was unfair to call upon
-Athens for strict observance of the convention, while the Macedonians
-and their partisans in the various cities were perpetually violating
-it for their own profit. Alexander and his officers (affirms this
-orator) had never once laid down their arms since the convention was
-settled. They had been perpetually tampering with the governments
-of the various cities, to promote their own partisans to power.[41]
-In Messênê, Sikyon, and Pellênê, they had subverted the popular
-constitutions, banished many citizens, and established friends of
-their own as despots. The Macedonian force, destined as a public
-guarantee to enforce the observance of the convention, had been
-employed only to overrule its best conditions, and to arm the
-hands of factious partisans.[42] Thus Alexander in his capacity of
-Imperator, disregarding all the restraints of the convention, acted
-as chief despot for the maintenance of subordinate despots in the
-separate cities.[43] Even at Athens, this imperial authority had
-rescinded sentences of the dikastery, and compelled the adoption of
-measures contrary to the laws and constitution.[44]
-
-  [40] This is the oration περὶ τῶν πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον συνθηκῶν
-  already more than once alluded to above. Though standing among
-  the Demosthenic works, it is supposed by Libanius as well as by
-  most modern critics not to be the production of Demosthenes—upon
-  internal grounds of style, which are certainly forcible. Libanius
-  says that it bears much resemblance to the style of Hyperides.
-  At any rate, there seems no reason to doubt that it is a genuine
-  oration of one of the contemporary orators. I agree with
-  Böhnecke (Forschungen, p. 629) in thinking that it must have
-  been delivered a few months after the convention with Alexander,
-  before the taking of Thebes.
-
-  [41] Demosthenes (or Pseudo-Demosth.), Orat. De Fœdere Alex. p.
-  216. Οὕτω μὲν τοίνυν ῥᾳδίως τὰ ὅπλα ἐπήνεγκε ὁ Μακεδὼν, ὥστε οὐδὲ
-  κατέθετο πώποτε, ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι καὶ νῦν περιέρχεται καθ᾽ ὅσον δύναται,
-  etc.
-
-  [42] Demosth. ib. p. 214, 215.
-
-  [43] Demosth. (or Pseudo-Demosth.) Orat. De Fœdere Alex. p.
-  212, 214, 215, 220, where the orator speaks of Alexander as the
-  τύραννος of Greece.
-
-  The orator argues (p. 213) that the Macedonians had recognized
-  despotism as contrary to the convention, in so far as to expel
-  the despots from the towns of Antissa and Eresus in Lesbos. But
-  probably these despots were in correspondence with the Persians
-  on the opposite mainland, or with Memnon.
-
-  [44] Demosth. ib. p. 215. τοὺς δ᾽ ἰδίους ὑμᾶς νόμους ἀναγκάζουσι
-  λύειν, τοὺς μὲν κεκριμένους ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἀφιέντες, ἕτερα
-  δὲ παμπλήθη τοιαῦτα βιαζόμενοι παρανομεῖν....
-
-At sea, the wrongful aggressions of Alexander or his officers had
-been not less manifest than on land. The convention, guaranteeing
-to all cities the right of free navigation, distinctly forbade each
-to take or detain vessels belonging to any other. Nevertheless the
-Macedonians had seized, in the Hellespont, all the merchantmen coming
-out with cargoes from the Euxine, and carried them into Tenedos,
-where they were detained, under various fraudulent pretences, in
-spite of remonstrances from the proprietors and cities whose supply
-of corn was thus intercepted. Among these sufferers, Athens stood
-conspicuous; since consumers of imported corn, ship-owners, and
-merchants, were more numerous there than elsewhere. The Athenians,
-addressing complaints and remonstrances without effect, became at
-length so incensed, and perhaps uneasy about their provisions,
-that they passed a decree to equip and despatch 100 triremes,
-appointing Menestheus (son of Iphikrates) admiral. By this strenuous
-manifestation, the Macedonians were induced to release the detained
-vessels. Had the detention been prolonged, the Athenian fleet would
-have sailed to extort redress by force; so that, as Athens was more
-than a match for Macedon on sea, the maritime empire of the latter
-would have been overthrown, while even on land much encouragement
-would have been given to malcontents against it.[45] Another incident
-had occurred, less grave than this, yet still dwelt upon by the
-orator as an infringement of the convention, and as an insult to
-Athenians. Though an express article of the convention prohibited
-armed ships of one city from entering the harbor of another, still
-a Macedonian trireme had been sent into Pieræus to ask permission
-that smaller vessels might be built there for Macedonian account.
-This was offensive to a large proportion of Athenians, not only as
-violating the convention, but as a manifest step towards employing
-the nautical equipments and seamen of Athens for the augmentation of
-the Macedonian navy.[46]
-
-  [45] Demosth. (or Pseudo-Demosth.) Orat. De Fœdere Alex. p. 217.
-  εἰς τοῦτο γὰρ ὑπεροψίας ἦλθον, ὥστε εἰς Τένεδον ἅπαντα τὰ ἐκ τοῦ
-  Πόντου πλοῖα κατήγαγον, καὶ σκευωρούμενοι περὶ αὐτὰ οὐ πρότερον
-  ἀφεῖσαν, πρὶν ὑμεῖς ἐψηφίσασθε τριήρεις ἕκατον πληροῦν καὶ
-  καθέλκειν εὐθὺς τότε—ὃ παρ᾽ ἐλάχιστον ἐποίησεν αὐτοὺς ἀφαιρεθῆναι
-  δικαίως τὴν κατὰ θάλασσαν ἡγεμονίαν.... p. 218. Ἕως γὰρ ἂν ἐξῇ
-  τῶν κατὰ θάλασσαν καὶ μόνοις ἀναμφισβητήτως εἶναι κυρίοις (the
-  Athenians), τοῖς γε κατὰ γῆν πρὸς τῇ ὑπαρχούσῃ δυνάμει ἐστὶ
-  προβολὰς ἑτέρας ἰσχυροτέρας εὑρέσθαι, etc.
-
-  We know that Alexander caused a squadron of ships to sail round
-  to and up the Danube from Byzantium (Arrian, i. 3, 3), to meet
-  him after his march by land from the southern coast of Thrace.
-  It is not improbable that the Athenian vessels detained may have
-  come loaded with a supply of corn, and that the detention of the
-  corn-ships may have been intended to facilitate this operation.
-
-  [46] Demosth. (or Pseudo-Demosth.) Orat. De Fœdere Alex. p. 219.
-
-“Let those speakers who are perpetually admonishing us to observe
-the convention (the orator contends), prevail on the imperial chief
-to set the example of observing it on his part. I too impress upon
-you the like observance. To a democracy nothing is more essential
-than scrupulous regard to equity and justice.[47] But the convention
-itself enjoins all its members to make war against transgressors; and
-pursuant to this article, you ought to make war against Macedon.[48]
-Be assured that all Greeks will see that the war is neither directed
-against them nor brought on by your fault.[49] At this juncture, such
-a step for the maintenance of your own freedom as well as Hellenic
-freedom generally, will be not less opportune and advantageous than
-it is just.[50] The time is come for shaking off your disgraceful
-submission to others, and your oblivion of our own past dignity.[51]
-If you encourage me, I am prepared to make a formal motion—To declare
-war against the violators of the convention, as the convention itself
-directs.”[52]
-
-  [47] Demosth. ib. p. 211. οἶμαι γὰρ οὐδὲν οὕτω τοῖς
-  δημοκρατουμένοις πρέπειν, ὡς περὶ τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον
-  σπουδάζειν.
-
-  I give here the main sense, without binding myself to the exact
-  phrases.
-
-  [48] Demosth. ib. p. 213. καὶ γὰρ ἔτι προσγέγραπται ἐν ταῖς
-  συνθήκαις, πολέμιον εἶναι, τὸν ἐκεῖνα ἅπερ Ἀλέξανδρος ποιοῦντα,
-  ἁπᾶσι τοῖς τῆς εἰρήνης κοινωνοῦσι, καὶ τὴν χώραν αὐτοῦ, καὶ
-  στρατεύεσθαι ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸν ἅπαντας. Compare p. 214 init.
-
-  [49] Demosth. ib. p. 217. οὐδεὶς ὑμῖν ἐγκαλέσει ποτε τῶν Ἑλλήνων
-  ὡς ἄρα παρέβητέ τι τῶν κοινῇ ὁμολογηθέντων, ἀλλὰ καὶ χάριν
-  ἕξουσιν ὅτι μόνοι ἐξηλέγξατε τοὺς ταῦτα ποιοῦντας, etc.
-
-  [50] Demosth. ib. p. 214. νυνὶ δ᾽, ὅτ᾽ εἰς ταὐτὸ δίκαιον ἅμα καὶ
-  ὁ καιρὸς καὶ τὸ σύμφερον συνδεδράμηκεν, ἄλλον ἄρα τινὰ χρόνον
-  ἀναμενεῖτε τῆς ἰδίας ἐλευθερίας ἅμα καὶ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων
-  ἀντιλαβέσθαι;
-
-  [51] Demosth. ib. p. 220. εἰ ἄρα ποτὲ δεῖ παύσασθαι αἰσχρῶς
-  ἑτέροις ἀκολουθοῦντας, ἀλλὰ μηδ᾽ ἀναμνησθῆναι μηδεμιᾶς φιλοτιμίας
-  τῶν ἐξ ἀρχαιοτάτου καὶ πλείστου καὶ μάλιστα πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἡμῖν
-  ὑπαρχουσῶν.
-
-  [52] Demosth. (or Pseudo-Demosth.) Orat. De Fœdere Alex. ἐὰν οὖν
-  κελεύητε, γράψω, καθάπερ αἱ συνθῆκαι κελεύουσι, πολεμεῖν τοῖς
-  παραβεβηκόσιν.
-
-A formal motion for declaring war would have brought upon the
-mover a prosecution under the Graphê Paranomôn. Accordingly, though
-intimating clearly that he thought the actual juncture (what it was,
-we do not know) suitable, he declined to incur such responsibility
-without seeing beforehand a manifestation of public sentiment
-sufficient to give him hopes of a favorable verdict from the
-Dikastery. The motion was probably not made. But a speech so bold,
-even though not followed up by a motion, is in itself significant
-of the state of feeling in Greece during the months immediately
-following the Alexandrine convention. This harangue is only one among
-many delivered in the Athenian assembly, complaining of Macedonian
-supremacy as exercised under the convention. It is plain that the
-acts of Macedonian officers were such as to furnish ample ground for
-complaint; and the detention of all the trading ships coming out of
-the Euxine, shows us that even the subsistence of Athens and the
-islands had become more or less endangered. Though the Athenians
-resorted to no armed interference, their assembly at least afforded
-a theatre where public protest could be raised and public sympathy
-manifested.
-
-It is probable too that at this time Demosthenes and the other
-anti-Macedonian speakers were encouraged by assurances and subsidies
-from Persia. Though the death of Philip, and the accession of an
-untried youth of twenty, had led Darius to believe for the moment
-that all danger of Asiatic invasion was past, yet his apprehensions
-were now revived by Alexander’s manifested energy, and by the renewal
-of the Grecian league under his supremacy.[53] It was apparently
-during the spring of 335 B. C., that Darius sent money to sustain
-the anti-Macedonian party at Athens and elsewhere. Æschines affirms,
-and Deinarchus afterwards repeats (both of them orators hostile
-to Demosthenes)—That about this time, Darius sent to Athens 300
-talents, which the Athenian people refused, but which Demosthenes
-took, reserving however 70 talents out of the sum for his own
-private purse: That public inquiry was afterwards instituted on the
-subject. Yet nothing is alleged as having been made out;[54] at
-least Demosthenes was neither condemned, nor even brought (as far
-as appears) to any formal trial. Out of such data we can elicit no
-specific fact. But they warrant the general conclusion, that Darius,
-or the satraps in Asia Minor, sent money to Athens in the spring of
-335 B. C., and letters or emissaries to excite hostilities against
-Alexander.
-
-  [53] Diodorus, xvii. 7.
-
-  [54] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 634; Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s.
-  11-19, p. 9-14. It is Æschines who states that the 300 talents
-  were sent to the Athenian people, and refused by them.
-
-  Three years later, after the battle of Issus, Alexander in his
-  letter to Darius accuses that prince of having sent both letters
-  and money into Greece, for the purpose of exciting war against
-  him. Alexander states that the Lacedæmonians accepted the money,
-  but that all the other Grecian cities refused it (Arrian, ii. 14,
-  9). There is no reason to doubt these facts; but I find nothing
-  identifying the precise point of time to which Alexander alludes.
-
-That Demosthenes, and probably other leading orators, received such
-remittances from Persia, is no evidence of that personal corruption
-which is imputed to them by their enemies. It is no way proved
-that Demosthenes applied the money to his own private purposes. To
-receive and expend it in trying to organize combinations for the
-enfranchisement of Greece, was a proceeding which he would avow as
-not only legitimate but patriotic. It was aid obtained from one
-foreign prince to enable Hellas to throw off the worse dominion of
-another. At this moment, the political interests of Persia coincided
-with that of all Greeks who aspired to freedom. Darius had no chance
-of becoming master of Greece; but his own security prescribed to
-him to protect her from being made an appendage of the Macedonian
-kingdom, and his means of doing so were at this moment ample, had
-they been efficaciously put forth. Now the purpose of a Greek patriot
-would be to preserve the integrity and autonomy of the Hellenic world
-against all foreign interference. To invoke the aid of Persia against
-Hellenic enemies,—as Sparta had done both in the Peloponnesian war
-and at the peace of Antalkidas, and as Thebes and Athens had followed
-her example in doing afterwards—was an unwarrantable proceeding: but
-to invoke the same aid against the dominion of another foreigner, at
-once nearer and more formidable, was open to no blame on the score
-either of patriotism or policy. Demosthenes had vainly urged his
-countrymen to act with energy against Philip, at a time when they
-might by their own efforts have upheld the existing autonomy both for
-Athens and for Greece generally. He now seconded or invited Darius,
-at a time when Greece single-handed had become incompetent to the
-struggle against Alexander, the common enemy both of Grecian liberty
-and of the Persian empire. Unfortunately for Athens as well as for
-himself, Darius, with full means of resistance in his hands, played
-his game against Alexander even with more stupidity and improvidence
-than Athens had played hers against Philip.
-
-While such were the aggressions of Macedonian officers in the
-exercise of their new imperial authority, throughout Greece and the
-islands—and such the growing manifestations of repugnance to it at
-Athens—Alexander had returned home to push the preparations for his
-Persian campaign. He did not however think it prudent to transport
-his main force into Asia, until he had made his power and personal
-ascendency felt by the Macedonian dependencies, westward, northward,
-and north-eastward of Pella—Illyrians, Pæonians, and Thracians.
-Under these general names were comprised a number[55] of distinct
-tribes, or nations, warlike and for the most part predatory. Having
-remained unconquered until the victories of Philip, they were not
-kept in subjection even by him without difficulty: nor were they at
-all likely to obey his youthful successor, until they had seen some
-sensible evidence of his personal energy.
-
-  [55] Strabo speaks of the Thracian ἔθνη as twenty-two in number,
-  capable of sending out 200,000 foot, and 15,000 horses (Strabo,
-  vii. Fragm. Vatic. 48).
-
-Accordingly, in the spring, Alexander put himself at the head of a
-large force, and marched in an easterly direction from Amphipolis,
-through the narrow Sapæan pass between Philippi and the sea.[56] In
-ten days’ march he reached the difficult mountain path over which
-alone he could cross Mount Hæmus (Balkan.) Here he found a body of
-the free Thracians and of armed merchants of the country, assembled
-to oppose his progress; posted on the high ground with waggons
-in their front, which it was their purpose to roll down the steep
-declivity against the advancing ranks of the Macedonians. Alexander
-eluded this danger by ordering his soldiers either to open their
-ranks, so as to let the waggons go through freely—or where there was
-no room for such loose array, to throw themselves on the ground with
-their shields closely packed together and slanting over their bodies;
-so that the waggons, dashing down the steep and coming against the
-shields, were carried off the ground, and made to bound over the
-bodies of the men to the space below. All the waggons rolled down
-without killing a single man. The Thracians, badly armed, were then
-easily dispersed by the Macedonian attack, with the loss of 1500 men
-killed, and all their women and children made prisoners.[57] The
-captives and plunder were sent back under an escort to be sold at the
-seaports.
-
-  [56] Strabo, vii. p. 331 (Fragm.); Arrian, i. 1, 6; Appian, Bell.
-  Civil. iv. 87, 105, 106. Appian gives (iv. 103) a good general
-  description of the almost impassable and trackless country to the
-  north and north-east of Philippi.
-
-  [57] Arrian, i. 1, 12, 17. The precise locality of that steep
-  road whereby Alexander crossed the Balkan, cannot be determined.
-  Baron von Moltke, in his account of the Russian campaign in
-  Bulgaria (1828-1829), gives an enumeration of four roads,
-  passable by an army, crossing this chain from north to south (see
-  chap. i. of that work). But whether Alexander passed by any one
-  of these four, or by some other road still more to the west, we
-  cannot tell.
-
-Having thus forced the mountain road, Alexander led his army over the
-chain of Mount Hæmus, and marched against the Triballi: a powerful
-Thracian tribe,—extending (as far as can be determined) from the
-plain of Kossovo in modern Servia northward towards the Danube,—whom
-Philip had conquered, yet not without considerable resistance and
-even occasional defeat. Their prince Syrmus had already retired with
-the women and children of the tribe into an island of the Danube
-called Peukê, where many other Thracians had also sought shelter. The
-main force of the Triballi took post in woody ground on the banks of
-the rivet Zyginus, about three days’ march from the Danube. Being
-tempted however, by an annoyance from the Macedonian light-armed, to
-emerge from their covered position into the open plain, they were
-here attacked by Alexander with his cavalry and infantry, in close
-combat, and completely defeated. Three thousand of them were slain,
-but the rest mostly eluded pursuit by means of the wood, so that
-they lost few prisoners. The loss of the Macedonians was only eleven
-horsemen and forty foot slain; according to the statement of Ptolemy,
-son of Lagus, then one of Alexander’s confidential officers, and
-afterwards founder of the dynasty of Greco-Egyptian kings.[58]
-
-  [58] Arrian, i. 2.
-
-Three days’ march, from the scene of action, brought Alexander to the
-Danube, where he found some armed ships which had been previously
-ordered to sail (probably with stores of provision) from Byzantium
-round by the Euxine and up the river. He first employed these ships
-in trying to land a body of troops on the island of Peukê; but his
-attempt was frustrated by the steep banks, the rapid stream, and
-the resolute front of the defenders on shore. To compensate for
-this disappointment, Alexander resolved to make a display of his
-strength by crossing the Danube and attacking the Getæ; tribes,
-chiefly horsemen armed with bows,[59] analogous to the Thracians
-in habits and language. They occupied the left bank of the river,
-from which their town was about four miles distant. The terror of
-the Macedonian successes had brought together a body of 4000 Getæ,
-visible from the opposite shore, to resist any crossing. Accordingly
-Alexander got together a quantity of the rude boats (hollowed out of
-a single trunk) employed for transport on the river, and caused the
-tent-skins of the army to be stuffed with hay in order to support
-rafts. He then put himself on shipboard during the night, and
-contrived to carry across the river a body of 4000 infantry, and 1500
-cavalry; landing on a part of the bank where there was high standing
-wheat and no enemy’s post. The Getæ, intimidated not less by this
-successful passage than by the excellent array of Alexander’s army,
-hardly stayed to sustain a charge of cavalry, but hastened to abandon
-their poorly fortified town and retire father away from the river.
-Entering the town without resistance, he destroyed it, carried away
-such movables as he found, and then returned to the river without
-delay. Before he quitted the northern bank, he offered sacrifice to
-Zeus the Preserver—to Hêraklês—and to the god Ister (Danube) himself,
-whom he thanked for having shown himself not impassable.[60] On the
-very same day, he recrossed the river to his camp; after an empty
-demonstration of force, intended to prove that he could do what
-neither his father nor any Grecian army had ever yet done, and what
-every one deemed impossible—crossing the greatest of all known rivers
-without a bridge and in the face of an enemy.[61]
-
-  [59] Strabo, vii. p. 303.
-
-  [60] Arrian, i. 4, 2-7.
-
-  [61] Neither the point where Alexander crossed the Danube,—nor
-  the situation of the island called Peukê,—nor the identity of the
-  river Lyginus—nor the part of Mount Hæmus which Alexander forced
-  his way over—can be determined. The data given by Arrian are too
-  brief and too meagre to make out with assurance any part of his
-  march after he crossed the Nestus. The facts reported by the
-  historian represent only a small portion of what Alexander really
-  did in this expedition.
-
-  It seems clear, however, that the main purpose of Alexander
-  was to attack and humble the Triballi. Their locality is known
-  generally as the region where the modern Servia joins Bulgaria.
-  They reached eastward (in the times of Thucydides, ii. 96) as
-  far as the river Oskius or Isker, which crosses the chain of
-  Hæmus from south to north, passes by the modern city of Sophia,
-  and falls into the Danube. Now Alexander, in order to conduct
-  his army from the eastern bank of the river Nestus, near its
-  mouth, to the country of the Triballi, would naturally pass
-  through Philippopolis, which city appears to have been founded
-  by his father Philip, and therefore probably had a regular road
-  of communication to the maritime regions. (See Stephanus Byz.
-  v. Φιλιππόπολις.) Alexander would cross Mount Hæmus, then,
-  somewhere north-west of Philippopolis. We read in the year 376
-  B. C. (Diodor. xv. 36) of an invasion of Abdêra by the
-  Triballi; which shows that there was a road, not unfit for an
-  army, from their territory to the eastern side of the mouth of
-  the river Nestus, where Abdêra was situated. This was the road
-  which Alexander is likely to have followed. But he must probably
-  have made a considerable circuit to the eastward; for the route
-  which Paul Lucas describes himself as having taken direct from
-  Philippopolis to Drama, can hardly have been fit for an army.
-
-  The river Lyginus may perhaps be the modern Isker, but this is
-  not certain. The Island called Peukê is still more perplexing.
-  Strabo speaks of it as if it were near the mouth of the Danube
-  (vii. p. 301-305). But it seems impossible that either the range
-  of the Triballi, or the march of Alexander, can have extended so
-  far eastward. Since Strabo (as well as Arrian) copied Alexander’s
-  march from Ptolemy, whose authority is very good, we are
-  compelled to suppose that there was a second island called Peukê
-  higher up the river.
-
-  The Geography of Thrace is so little known, that we cannot wonder
-  at our inability to identify these places. We are acquainted, and
-  that but imperfectly, with the two high roads, both starting from
-  Byzantium or Constantinople. 1. The one (called the King’s Road,
-  from having been in part the march of Xerxes in his invasion
-  of Greece, Livy, xxxix. 27; Herodot. vii. 115) crossing the
-  Hebrus and the Nestus, touching the northern coast of the Ægean
-  Sea at Neapolis, a little south of Philippi, then crossing the
-  Strymon at Amphipolis, and stretching through Pella across Inner
-  Macedonia and Illyria to Dyrrachium (the Via Egnatia). 2. The
-  other, taking a more northerly course, passing along the upper
-  valley of the Hebrus from Adrianople to Philippopolis, then
-  through Sardicia (Sophia) and Naissus (Nisch), to the Danube near
-  Belgrade; being the high road now followed from Constantinople to
-  Belgrade.
-
-  But apart from these two roads, scarcely anything whatever is
-  known of the country. Especially the mountainous region of
-  Rhodopê, bounded on the west by the Strymon, on the north and
-  east by the Hebrus, and on the south by the Ægean, is a Terra
-  Incognita, except the few Grecian colonies on the coast. Very few
-  travellers have passed along, or described the southern or King’s
-  Road, while the region in the interior, apart from the high
-  road, was absolutely unexplored until the visit of M. Viquesnel
-  in 1847, under scientific mission from the French government.
-  The brief, but interesting account, composed by M. Viquesnel,
-  of this rugged and impracticable district, is contained in the
-  “Archives des Missions Scientifiques et Litteraires”, for 1850,
-  published at Paris. Unfortunately, the map intended to accompany
-  that account has not yet been prepared; but the published data,
-  as far as they go, have been employed by Kiepert in constructing
-  his recent map of Turkey in Europe; the best map of these regions
-  now existing, though still very imperfect. The Illustrations
-  (Erläuterungen) annexed by Kiepert to his map of Turkey, show
-  the defective data on which the chartography of this country is
-  founded. Until the survey of M. Viquesnel, the higher part of the
-  course of the Strymon, and nearly all the course of the Nestus,
-  may be said to have been wholly unknown.
-
-The terror spread by Alexander’s military operations was so great,
-that not only the Triballi, but the other autonomous Thracians
-around, sent envoys tendering presents or tribute, and soliciting
-peace. Alexander granted their request. His mind being bent upon war
-with Asia, he was satisfied with having intimidated these tribes so
-as to deter them from rising during his absence. What conditions he
-imposed, we do not know, but he accepted the presents.[62]
-
-  [62] Arrian, i. 4, 5; Strabo, vii. p. 301.
-
-While these applications from the Thracians were under debate, envoys
-arrived from a tribe of Gauls occupying a distant mountainous region
-westward towards the Ionic Gulf. Though strangers to Alexander,
-they had heard so much of the recent exploits, that they came with
-demands to be admitted to his friendship. They were distinguished
-both for tall stature and for boastful language. Alexander readily
-exchanged with them assurances of alliance. Entertaining them at a
-feast, he asked, in the course of conversation, what it was that they
-were most afraid of, among human contingencies? They replied, that
-they feared no man, nor any danger, except only, lest the heaven
-should fall upon them. Their answer disappointed Alexander, who had
-expected that they would name him, as the person of whom they were
-most afraid; so prodigious was his conceit of his own exploits. He
-observed to his friends that these Gauls were swaggerers. Yet if we
-attend to the sentiment rather than the language, we shall see that
-such an epithet applies with equal or greater propriety to Alexander
-himself. The anecdote is chiefly interesting as it proves at how
-early an age the exorbitant self-esteem, which we shall hereafter
-find him manifesting, began. That after the battle of Issus he should
-fancy himself superhuman, we can hardly be astonished; but he was as
-yet only in the first year of his reign, and had accomplished nothing
-beyond his march into Thrace and his victory over the Triballi.
-
-After arranging these matters, he marched in a south-westerly
-direction into the territory of the Agriânes and the other Pæonians,
-between the rivers Strymon and Axius in the highest portion of their
-course. Here he was met by a body of Agriânes under their prince
-Langarus, who had already contracted a personal friendship for him
-at Pella before Philip’s death. News came that the Illyrian Kleitus,
-son of Bardylis, who had been subdued by Philip, had revolted at
-Pelion (a strong post south of lake Lychnidus, on the west side of
-the chain of Skardus and Pindus, near the place where that chain is
-broken by the cleft called the Klissura of Tzangon or Devol[63])—and
-that the western Illyrians, called Taulantii, under their prince
-Glaukias, were on the march to assist him. Accordingly Alexander
-proceeded thither forthwith, leaving Langarus to deal with the
-Illyrian tribe Autariatæ, who had threatened to oppose his progress.
-He marched along the bank and up the course of the Erigon, from a
-point near where it joins the Axius.[64] On approaching Pelion, he
-found the Illyrians posted in front of the town and on the heights
-around, awaiting the arrival of Glaukias their promised ally. While
-Alexander was making his dispositions for attack, they offered their
-sacrifices to the gods: the victims being three boys, three girls,
-and three black rams. At first they stepped boldly forward to meet
-him, but before coming to close quarters, they turned and fled into
-the town with such haste that the slain victims were left lying
-on the spot.[65] Having thus driven in the defenders, Alexander
-was preparing to draw a wall of circumvallation round the Pelion,
-when he was interrupted by the arrival of Glaukias with so large a
-force as to compel him to abandon the project. A body of cavalry,
-sent out from the Macedonian camp under Philotas to forage, were in
-danger of being cut off by Glaukias, and were only rescued by the
-arrival of Alexander himself with a reinforcement. In the face of
-this superior force, it was necessary to bring off the Macedonian
-army, through a narrow line of road along the river Eordaikus, where
-in some places there was only room for four abreast, with hill or
-marsh everywhere around. By a series of bold and skilful manœuvres,
-and by effective employment of his battering-train or projectile
-machines to protect the rear-guard, Alexander completely baffled
-the enemy, and brought off his army without loss.[66] Moreover these
-Illyrians, who had not known how to make use of such advantages of
-position, abandoned themselves to disorder as soon as their enemy had
-retreated, neglecting all precautions for the safety of their camp.
-Apprised of this carelessness, Alexander made a forced night-march
-back, at the head of his Agrianian division and light troops
-supported by the remaining army. He surprised the Illyrians in their
-camp before daylight. The success of this attack against a sleeping
-and unguarded army was so complete, that the Illyrians fled at once
-without resistance. Many were slain or taken prisoners; the rest,
-throwing away their arms, hurried away homeward, pursued by Alexander
-for a considerable distance. The Illyrian prince Kleitus was forced
-to evacuate Pelion, which place he burned, and then retired into the
-territory of Glaukias.[67]
-
-  [63] For the situation of Pelion, compare Livy, xxxi. 33, 34, and
-  the remarks of Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol.
-  iii. ch. 28. p. 310-324.
-
-  [64] Assuming Alexander to have been in the Territory of the
-  Triballi, the modern Servia, he would in this march follow mainly
-  the road which is now frequented between Belgrade and Bitolia;
-  through the plain of Kossovo, Pristina, Katschanik (rounding
-  on the north-eastern side the Ljubatrin, the north-eastern
-  promontory terminating the chain of Skardus), Uschkub, Kuprili,
-  along the higher course of the Axius or Vardar, until the point
-  where the Erigon or Tscherna joins that river below Kuprili. Here
-  he would be among the Pæonians and Agrianes, on the east—and the
-  Dardani and Autariatæ, seemingly on the north and west. If he
-  then followed the course of the Erigon, he would pass through
-  the portions of Macedonia then called Deuripia and Pelagonia:
-  he would go between the ridges of the mountains, through which
-  the Erigon breaks, called Nidje on the south, and Babuna on the
-  north. He would pass afterwards to Florina, and not to Bitolia.
-
-  See Kiepert’s map of these regions—a portion of his recent map of
-  Turkey in Europe—and Griesbach’s description of the general track.
-
-  [65] Arrian, i. 5, 12.
-
-  [66] Arrian, i. 6, 3-18.
-
-  [67] Arrian, i. 6, 19-22.
-
-Just as Alexander had completed this victory over Kleitus and the
-Taulantian auxiliaries, and before he had returned home, news reached
-him of a menacing character. The Thebans had declared themselves
-independent of him, and were besieging his garrison in the Kadmeia.
-
-Of this event, alike important and disastrous to those who stood
-forward, the immediate antecedents are very imperfectly known to
-us. It has already been remarked that the vote of submission on the
-part of the Greeks to Alexander as Imperator, during the preceding
-autumn, had been passed only under the intimidation of a present
-Macedonian force. Though the Spartans alone had courage to proclaim
-their dissent, the Athenians, Arcadians, Ætolians, and others, were
-well known even to Alexander himself, as ready to do the like on
-any serious reverse to the Macedonian arms.[68] Moreover the energy
-and ability displayed by Alexander had taught the Persian king that
-all danger to himself was not removed by the death of Philip, and
-induced him either to send, or to promise, pecuniary aid to the
-anti-Macedonian Greeks. We have already noticed the manifestation
-of anti-Macedonian sentiment at Athens—proclaimed by several of
-the most eminent orators—Demosthenes, Lykurgus, Hyperides, and
-others; as well as by active military men like Charidemus and
-Ephialtes,[69] who probably spoke out more boldly when Alexander was
-absent on the Danube. In other cities, the same sentiment doubtless
-found advocates, though less distinguished; but at Thebes, where
-it could not be openly proclaimed, it prevailed with the greatest
-force.[70] The Thebans suffered an oppression from which most of
-the other cities were free—the presence of a Macedonian garrison
-in their citadel; just as they had endured, fifty years before,
-the curb of a Spartan garrison after the fraud of Phœbidas and
-Leontiades. In this case, as in the former, the effect was to arm the
-macedonizing leaders with absolute power over their fellow-citizens,
-and to inflict upon the latter not merely the public mischief of
-extinguishing all free speech, but also multiplied individual insults
-and injuries, prompted by the lust and rapacity of rulers, foreign
-as well as domestic.[71] A number of Theban citizens, among them
-the freest and boldest spirits, were in exile at Athens, receiving
-from the public indeed nothing beyond a safe home, but secretly
-encouraged to hope for better things by Demosthenes and the other
-anti-Macedonian leaders.[72] In like manner, fifty years before,
-it was at Athens, and from private Athenian citizens, that the
-Thebans Pelopidas and Mellon had found that sympathy which enabled
-them to organize their daring conspiracy for rescuing Thebes from
-the Spartans. That enterprise, admired throughout Greece as alike
-adventurous, skilful, and heroic, was the model present to the
-imagination of the Theban exiles, to be copied if any tolerable
-opportunity occurred.
-
-  [68] Arrian, i. 7, 5.
-
-  [69] Ælian, V. H. xii. 57.
-
-  [70] Demades, ὑπὲρ τῆς δωδεκαετίας, s. 14. Θηβαῖοι δὲ μέγιστον
-  εἶχον δεσμὸν τὴν τῶν Μακεδόνων φρουρὰν, ὑφ᾽ ἧς οὐ μόνον τὰς
-  χεῖρας συνεδέθησαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν παῤῥησίαν ἀφῄρηντο....
-
-  [71] The Thebans, in setting forth their complaints to the
-  Arcadians, stated—ὅτι οὐ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας φιλίαν Θηβαῖοι
-  διαλῦσαι βουλόμενοι, τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐπανέστησαν, οὐδ᾽ ἐναντίον
-  τῶν Ἑλλήνων οὐδὲν πράξοντες, ~ἀλλὰ τὰ παρ’ αὐτοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν
-  Μακεδόνων ἐν τῇ πόλει γινόμενα φέρειν οὐκέτι δυνάμενοι, οὐδὲ τὴν
-  δούλειαν ὑπομένειν, οὐδὲ τὰς ὕβρεις ὁρᾷν τὰς εἰς τὰ ἐλεύθερα
-  σώματα γινομένας~.
-
-  See Demades περὶ τῆς δωδεκαετίας, s. 13, the speech of Cleadas,
-  Justin, xi. 4; and (Deinarchus cont. Demosth. s. 20) compare
-  Livy, xxxix. 27—about the working of the Macedonian garrison at
-  Maroncia, in the time of Philip son of Demetrius.
-
-  [72] Demades περὶ τῆς δωδεκαετίας, Fragm. ad fin.
-
-Such was the feeling in Greece, during the long absence of Alexander
-on his march into Thrace and Illyria; a period of four or five
-months, ending at August 335 B. C. Not only was Alexander
-thus long absent, but he sent home no reports of his proceedings.
-Couriers were likely enough to be intercepted among the mountains and
-robbers of Thrace; and even if they reached Pella, their despatches
-were not publicly read, as such communications would have been read
-to the Athenian assembly. Accordingly we are not surprised to hear
-that rumors arose of his having been defeated and slain. Among these
-reports, both multiplied and confident, one was even certified by a
-liar who pretended to have just arrived from Thrace, to have been
-an eye-witness of the fact, and to have been himself wounded in
-the action against the Triballi, where Alexander had perished.[73]
-This welcome news, not fabricated, but too hastily credited, by
-Demosthenes and Lykurgus,[74] was announced to the Athenian assembly.
-In spite of doubts expressed by Demades and Phokion, it was believed
-not only by the Athenians and the Theban exiles there present, but
-also by the Arcadians, Eleians, Ætolians and other Greeks. For a
-considerable time, through the absence of Alexander, it remained
-uncontradicted, which increased the confidence in its truth.
-
-  [73] Arrian, i. 7, 3. Καὶ γὰρ καὶ πολὺς ὁ λόγος (of the death of
-  Alexander) καὶ παρὰ πολλῶν ἐφοίτα, ὅτι τε χρόνον ἀπῆν οὐκ ὀλίγον
-  καὶ ὅτι οὐδεμία ἀγγελία παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἀφῖκτο, etc.
-
-  [74] Demades περὶ τῆς δωδεκαετίας, ad fin. ἡνίκα Δημοσθένης
-  καὶ Λυκοῦργος τῷ μὲν λόγῳ παραταττόμενοι τοὺς Μακεδόνας ἐνίκων
-  ἐν Τριβάλλοις, μόνον δ᾽ οὐχ ὁρατὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος νεκρὸν τὸν
-  Ἀλέξανδρον προέθηκαν ... ἐμὲ δὲ στυγνὸν καὶ περίλυπον ἔφασκον
-  εἶναι μὴ συνευδοκοῦντα, etc.
-
-  Justin, xi. 2. “Demosthenem oratorem, qui Macedonum deletas omnes
-  cum rege copias à Triballis affirmaverit, producto in concionem
-  auctore, qui in eo praelio, in quo rex ceciderit, se quoque
-  vulneratum diceret.”
-
-  Compare Tacitus, Histor. i. 34. “Vix dum egresso Pisone, occisum
-  in castris Othonem, vagus primum et incertus rumor, mox, ut _in
-  magnis mendaciis, interfuisse se quidam, et vidisse affirmabant_,
-  credulà famâ inter gaudentes et incuriosos.... Obvius in
-  palatio Julius Atticus, speculator, cruentum gladium ostentans,
-  occisum _à se_ Othonem exclamavit.”
-
-  It is stated that Alexander was really wounded in the head by a
-  stone, in the action with the Illyrians (Plutarch, Fortun. Alex.
-  p. 327).
-
-It was upon the full belief in this rumor, of Alexander’s defeat and
-death, that the Grecian cities proceeded. The event severed by itself
-their connection with Macedonia. There was neither son nor adult
-brother to succeed to the throne: so that not merely the foreign
-ascendency, but even the intestine unity, of Macedonia, was likely
-to be broken up. In regard to Athens, Arcadia, Elis, Ætolia, etc.,
-the anti-Macedonian sentiment was doubtless vehemently manifested,
-but no special action was called for. It was otherwise in regard
-to Thebes. Phœnix, Prochytes, and other Theban exiles at Athens,
-immediately laid their plan for liberating their city and expelling
-the Macedonian garrison from the Kadmeia. Assisted with arms and
-money by Demosthenes and other Athenian citizens, and invited by
-their partisans at Thebes, they suddenly entered that city in arms.
-Though unable to carry the Kadmeia by surprise, they seized in the
-city, and put to death, Amyntas, a principal Macedonian officer, with
-Timolaus, one of the leading macedonizing Thebans.[75] They then
-immediately convoked a general assembly of the Thebans, to whom they
-earnestly appealed for a vigorous effort to expel the Macedonians,
-and reconquer the ancient freedom of the city. Expatiating upon the
-misdeeds of the garrison and upon the oppressions of those Thebans
-who governed by means of the garrison, they proclaimed that the happy
-moment of liberation had now arrived, through the recent death of
-Alexander. They doubtless recalled the memory of Pelopidas, and the
-glorious enterprise, cherished by all Theban patriots, whereby he had
-rescued the city from Spartan occupation, forty-six years before. To
-this appeal the Thebans cordially responded. The assembly passed a
-vote, declaring severance from Macedonia, and autonomy of Thebes—and
-naming as Bœotarchs some of the returned exiles, with others of
-the same party, for the purpose of energetic measures against the
-garrison in the Kadmeia.[76]
-
-  [75] Arrian, i. 7, 1: compare Deinarchus cont. Demosthenes, s.
-  75. p. 53.
-
-  [76] Arrian, i. 7, 3-17.
-
-Unfortunately for Thebes, none of these new Bœotarchs were men of
-the stamp of Epaminondas, probably not even of Pelopidas. Yet
-their scheme, though from its melancholy result it is generally
-denounced as insane, really promised better at first than that of
-the anti-Spartan conspirators in 380 B. C. The Kadmeia was instantly
-summoned; hopes being perhaps indulged, that the Macedonian commander
-would surrender it with as little resistance as the Spartan harmost
-had done. But such hopes were not realized. Philip had probably
-caused the citadel to be both strengthened and provisioned. The
-garrison defied the Theban leaders, who did not feel themselves
-strong enough to give orders for an assault, as Pelopidas in his
-time was prepared to do, if surrender had been denied.[77] They
-contented themselves with drawing and guarding a double line of
-circumvallation round the Kadmeia, so as to prevent both sallies
-from within and supplies from without.[78] They then sent envoys in
-the melancholy equipment of suppliants, to the Arcadians and others,
-representing that their recent movement was directed, not against
-Hellenic union, but against Macedonian oppression and outrage,
-which pressed upon them with intolerable bitterness. As Greeks and
-freemen, they entreated aid to rescue them from such a calamity.
-They obtained much favorable sympathy, with some promise and even
-half-performance. Many of the leading orators at Athens—Demosthenes,
-Lykurgus, Hyperides, and others—together with the military men
-Charidemus and Ephialtes—strongly urged their countrymen to declare
-in favor of Thebes and send aid against the Kadmeia. But the citizens
-generally, following Demades and Phokion, waited to be better assured
-both of Alexander’s death and of its consequences, before they
-would incur the hazard of open hostility against Macedonia, though
-they seem to have declared sympathy with the Theban revolution.[79]
-Demosthenes farther went as envoy into Peloponnesus, while the
-Macedonian Antipater also sent round urgent applications to the
-Peloponnesian cities, requiring their contingents, as members of the
-confederacy under Alexander, to act against Thebes. The eloquence of
-Demosthenes, backed by his money, or by Persian money administered
-through him, prevailed on the Peloponnesians to refuse compliance
-with Antipater and to send no contingents against Thebes.[80] The
-Eleians and Ætolians held out general assurances favorable to the
-revolution at Thebes, while the Arcadians even went so far as to send
-out some troops to second it, though they did not advance beyond the
-isthmus.[81]
-
-  [77] Xenoph. Hellen. v. 4, 11. See Volume X. Ch. lxxvii. p. 81 of
-  this History.
-
-  [78] Arrian, i. 7, 14.
-
-  [79] Diodor. xvii. 8.
-
-  [80] Deinarchus cont. Demosth. p. 14. s. 19. καὶ Ἀρκάδων ἡκόντων
-  εἰς εσθμὸν, καὶ τὴν μὲν παρὰ Ἀντιπάτρου πρεσβείαν ἄπρακτον
-  ἀποστειλάντων, etc.
-
-  In the vote passed by the people of Athens some years afterwards,
-  awarding a statue and other honors to Demosthenes, these
-  proceedings in Peloponnesus are enumerated among his titles
-  to public gratitude—καὶ ὡς ἐκώλυσε Πελοποννησίους ἐπὶ Θήβας
-  Ἀλεξάνδρῳ βοηθῆσαι, χρήματα δοὺς καὶ αὐτὸς πρεσβεύσας, etc.
-  (Plutarch, Vit. X. Orator. p. 850).
-
-  [81] Arrian, i. 10, 2; Æschines adv. Ktesiphont. p. 634.
-
-Here was a crisis in Grecian affairs, opening new possibilities
-for the recovery of freedom. Had the Arcadians and other Greeks
-lent decisive aid to Thebes—had Athens acted even with as much
-energy as she did twelve years afterwards during the Lamian war,
-occupying Thermopylæ with an army and a fleet—the gates of Greece
-might well have been barred against a new Macedonian force, even
-with Alexander alive and at its head. That the struggle of Thebes
-was not regarded at the time, even by macedonizing Greeks, as
-hopeless, is shown by the subsequent observations both of Æschines
-and Deinarchus at Athens. Æschines (delivering five years afterwards
-his oration against Ktesiphon) accuses Demosthenes of having by his
-perverse backwardness brought about the ruin of Thebes. The foreign
-mercenaries forming part of the garrison of the Kadmeia were ready
-(Æschines affirms) to deliver up that fortress, on receiving five
-talents: the Arcadian generals would have brought up their troops
-to the aid of Thebes, if nine or ten talents had been paid to
-them—having repudiated the solicitations of Antipater. Demosthenes
-(say these two orators) having in his possession 300 talents from the
-Persian king, to instigate anti-Macedonian movements in Greece, was
-supplicated by the Theban envoys to furnish money for these purposes,
-but refused the request, kept the money for himself, and thus
-prevented both the surrender of the Kadmeia and the onward march
-of the Arcadians.[82] The charge here advanced against Demosthenes
-appears utterly incredible. To suppose that anti-Macedonian movements
-counted for so little in his eyes, is an hypothesis belied by his
-whole history. But the fact that such allegations were made by
-Æschines only five years afterwards, proves the reports and the
-feelings of the time—that the chances of successful resistance to
-Macedonia on the part of the Thebans were not deemed unfavorable. And
-when the Athenians, following the counsels of Demades and Phokion,
-refused to aid Thebes or occupy Thermopylæ—they perhaps consulted the
-safety of Athens separately, but they receded from the generous and
-Pan-hellenic patriotism which had animated their ancestors against
-Xerxes and Mardonius.[83]
-
-  [82] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 634; Deinarch. adv. Demosth. p.
-  15, 16. s. 19-22.
-
-  [83] See Herod. viii. 143. Demosthenes in his orations frequently
-  insists on the different rank and position of Athens, as compared
-  with those of the smaller Grecian states—and of the higher and
-  more arduous obligations consequent thereupon. This is one grand
-  point of distinction between his policy and that of Phokion. See
-  a striking passage in the speech De Coronâ, p. 245. s. 77; and
-  Orat. De Republ. Ordinand. p. 176. s. 37.
-
-  Isokrates holds the same language touching the obligations of
-  Sparta,—in the speech which he puts into the mouth of Archidamus.
-  “No one will quarrel with Epidaurians and Phliasians, for looking
-  only how they can get through and keep themselves in being. But
-  for Lacedæmonians, it is impossible to aim simply at preservation
-  and nothing beyond—by any means, whatever they may be. If we
-  cannot preserve ourselves with honor, we ought to prefer a
-  glorious death.” (Isokrates, Orat. vi. Archid. s. 106.)
-
-  The backward and narrow policy, which Isokrates here proclaims
-  as fit for Epidaurus and Phlius, but not for Sparta—is precisely
-  what Phokion always recommended for Athens, even while Philip’s
-  power was yet nascent and unsettled.
-
-The Thebans, though left in this ungenerous isolation, pressed
-the blockade of the Kadmeia, and would presently have reduced the
-Macedonian garrison, had they not been surprised by the awe-striking
-event—Alexander arriving in person at Onchêstus in Bœotia, at the
-head of his victorious army. The first news of his being alive was
-furnished by his arrival at Onchêstus. No one could at first believe
-the fact. The Theban leaders contended that it was another Alexander,
-the son of Aëropus, at the head of a Macedonian army of relief.[84]
-
-  [84] Arrian, i. 7, 9.
-
-In this incident we may note two features, which characterized
-Alexander to the end of his life; matchless celerity of movement,
-and no less remarkable favor of fortune. Had news of the Theban
-rising first reached him while on the Danube or among the distant
-Triballi,—or even when embarrassed in the difficult region round
-Pelion,—he could hardly by any effort have arrived in time to save
-the Kadmeia. But he learnt it just when he had vanquished Kleitus and
-Glaukias, so that his hands were perfectly free—and also when he was
-in a position peculiarly near and convenient for a straight march
-into Greece without going back to Pella. From the pass of Tschangon
-(or of the river Devol), near which Alexander’s last victories were
-gained, his road lay southward, following downwards in part the
-higher course of the river Haliakmon, through Upper Macedonia or the
-regions called Eordæa and Elymeia which lay on his left, while the
-heights of Pindus and the upper course of the river Aous, occupied
-by the Epirots called Tymphæi and Parauæi, were on the right. On the
-seventh day of march, crossing the lower ridges of the Cambunian
-mountains (which separate Olympus from Pindus and Upper Macedonia
-from Thessaly), Alexander reached the Thessalian town of Pelinna. Six
-days more brought him to the Bœotian Onchestus.[85] He was already
-within Thermopylæ, before any Greeks were aware that he was in march,
-or even that he was alive. The question about occupying Thermopylæ by
-a Grecian force was thus set aside. The difficulty of forcing that
-pass, and the necessity of forestalling Athens in it by stratagem or
-celerity, was present to the mind of Alexander, as it had been to
-that of Philip in his expedition of 346 B. C., against the
-Phokians.
-
-  [85] Arrian, i. 7. 6. See, respecting this region, Colonel
-  Leake’s Travels in Northern Greece, ch. vi. p. 300-304; ch.
-  xxviii. p. 303-305, etc.; and for Alexander’s line of march, the
-  map at the end of the volume.
-
-His arrival, in itself a most formidable event, told with double
-force on the Greeks from its extreme suddenness. We can hardly doubt
-that both Athenians and Thebans had communications at Pella—that
-they looked upon any Macedonian invasion as likely to come from
-thence—and that they expected Alexander himself (assuming him to
-be still living, contrary to their belief) back in his capital
-before he began any new enterprise. Upon this hypothesis—in itself
-probable, and such as would have been realized if Alexander had not
-already advanced so far southward at the moment when he received the
-news[86]—they would at least have known beforehand of his approach,
-and would have had the option of a defensive combination open. As it
-happened, his unexpected appearance in the heart of Greece precluded
-all combinations, and checked all idea of resistance.
-
-  [86] Diodorus (xvii. 9) incorrectly says that Alexander came back
-  unexpectedly from _Thrace_. Had this been the fact, he would have
-  come by Pella.
-
-Two days after his arrival in Bœotia, he marched his army round
-Thebes, so as to encamp on the south side of the city; whereby he
-both intercepted the communication of the Thebans with Athens, and
-exhibited his force more visibly to the garrison in the Kadmeia.
-The Thebans, though alone and without hope of succor, maintained
-their courage unshaken. Alexander deferred the attack for a day or
-two, in hopes that they would submit; he wished to avoid an assault
-which might cost the lives of many of his soldiers, whom he required
-for his Asiatic schemes. He even made public proclamation,[87]
-demanding the surrender of the anti-Macedonian leaders Phœnix and
-Prochytes, but offering to any other Theban who chose to quit the
-city, permission to come and join him on the terms of the convention
-sworn in the preceding autumn. A general assembly being convened,
-the macedonizing Thebans enforced the prudence of submission to
-an irresistible force. But the leaders recently returned from
-exile, who had headed the rising, warmly opposed this proposition,
-contending for resistance to the death. In them, such resolution
-may not be wonderful, since (as Arrian[88] remarks) they had gone
-too far to hope for lenity. As it appears however that the mass of
-citizens deliberately adopted the same resolution, in spite of
-strong persuasion to the contrary,[89] we see plainly that they had
-already felt the bitterness of Macedonian dominion, and that sooner
-than endure a renewal of it, sure to be yet worse, coupled with
-the dishonor of surrendering their leaders—they had made up their
-minds to perish with the freedom of their city. At a time when the
-sentiment of Hellas as an autonomous system was passing away, and
-when Grecian courage was degenerating into a mere instrument for the
-aggrandizement of Macedonian chiefs, these countrymen of Epaminondas
-and Pelopidas set an example of devoted self-sacrifice in the cause
-of Grecian liberty, not less honorable than that of Leonidas at
-Thermopylæ, and only less esteemed because it proved infructuous.
-
-  [87] Diodor. xvii. 9; Plutarch. Alexand. 11.
-
-  [88] Arrian, i. 7, 16.
-
-  [89] Diodor. xvii. 9.
-
-In reply to the proclamation of Alexander, the Thebans made from
-their walls a counter-proclamation, demanding the surrender of his
-officers Antipater and Philotas, and inviting every one to join
-them, who desired, in concert with the Persian king and the Thebans,
-to liberate the Greeks and put down the despot of Hellas.[90] Such
-a haughty defiance and retort incensed Alexander to the quick.
-He brought up his battering engines and prepared everything for
-storming the town. Of the murderous assault which followed, we find
-different accounts, not agreeing with each other, yet not wholly
-irreconcilable. It appears that the Thebans had erected, probably
-in connection with their operations against the Kadmeia, an outwork
-defended by a double palisade. Their walls were guarded by the least
-effective soldiers, metics and liberated slaves; while their best
-troops were bold enough to go forth in front of the gates and give
-battle. Alexander divided his army into three divisions; one under
-Perdikkas and Amyntas, against the outwork—a second, destined to
-combat the Thebans who sallied out—and a third, held in reserve.
-Between the second of these three divisions, and the Thebans in front
-of the gates, the battle was so obstinately contested, that success
-at one time seemed doubtful, and Alexander was forced to order up his
-reserve. The first Macedonian success was gained by Perdikkas,[91]
-who, aided by the division of Amyntas and also by the Agrianian
-regiment and the bowmen carried the first of the two outworks, as
-well as a postern gate which had been left unguarded. His troops
-also stormed the second outwork, though he himself was severely
-wounded and borne away to the camp. Here the Theban defenders fled
-back into the city, along the hollow way which led to the temple of
-Herakles, pursued by the light troops, in advance of the rest. Upon
-these men, however, the Thebans presently turned, repelling them
-with the loss of Eurybotas their commanding officer and seventy men
-slain. In pursuing these bowmen, the ranks of the Thebans became
-somewhat disordered, so that they were unable to resist the steady
-charge of the Macedonian guards and heavy infantry coming up in
-support. They were broken, and pushed back into the city; their rout
-being rendered still more complete by a sally of the Macedonian
-garrison out of the Kadmeia. The assailants being victorious on this
-side, the Thebans who were maintaining the combat without the gates
-were compelled to retreat, and the advancing Macedonians forced
-their way into the town along with them. Within the town, however,
-the fighting still continued; the Thebans resisting in organized
-bodies as long as they could; and when broken, still resisting even
-single-handed. None of the military population sued for mercy; most
-of them were slain in the streets; but a few cavalry and infantry cut
-their way out into the plain and escaped. The fight now degenerated
-into a carnage. The Macedonians with their Pæonian contingents were
-incensed with the obstinate resistance; while various Greeks serving
-as auxiliaries—Phokians, Orchomenians, Thespians, Platæans,—had
-to avenge ancient and grievous injuries endured from Thebes. Such
-furious feelings were satiated by an indiscriminate massacre of
-all who came in their way, without distinction of age or sex—old
-men, women, and children, in houses and even in temples. This
-wholesale slaughter was accompanied of course by all the plunder and
-manifold outrage with which victorious assailants usually reward
-themselves.[92]
-
-  [90] Diodor. xvii. 9.
-
-  [91] The attack of Perdikkas was represented by Ptolemy, from
-  whom Arrian copies (i. 8, 1), not only as being the first
-  and only attack made by the Macedonian army on Thebes, but
-  also as made by Perdikkas _without orders from Alexander_,
-  who was forced to support it in order to preserve Perdikkas
-  from being overwhelmed by the Thebans. According to Ptolemy
-  and Arrian, therefore, the storming of Thebes took place both
-  without the orders, and against the wishes, of Alexander; the
-  capture moreover was effected rapidly with little trouble to
-  the besieging army (ἡ ἅλωσις δι᾽ ὀλίγου τε καὶ ~οὐ ξὺν πόνῳ τῶν
-  ἑλόντων~ ξυνενεχθεῖσα, Arr. i. 9, 9): the bloodshed and pillage
-  was committed by the vindictive sentiment of the Bœotian allies.
-
-  Diodorus had before him a very different account. He affirms that
-  Alexander both combined and ordered the assault—that the Thebans
-  behaved like bold and desperate men, resisting obstinately and
-  for a long time—that the slaughter afterwards was committed by
-  the general body of the assailants; the Bœotian allies being
-  doubtless conspicuous among them. Diodorus gives this account at
-  some length, and with his customary rhetorical amplifications.
-  Plutarch and Justin are more brief; but coincide in the same
-  general view, and not in that of Arrian. Polyænus again (iv. 3
-  12) gives something different from all.
-
-  To me it appears that the narrative of Diodorus is (in its
-  basis, and striking off rhetorical amplifications) more credible
-  than that of Arrian. Admitting the attack made by Perdikkas,
-  I conceive it to have been a portion of the general plan of
-  Alexander. I cannot think it probable that Perdikkas attacked
-  without orders, or that Thebes was captured with little
-  resistance. It was captured by _one_ assault (Æschines adv.
-  Ktesiph. p. 524), but by an assault well-combined and stoutly
-  contested—not by one begun without preparation or order, and
-  successful after hardly any resistance. Alexander, after having
-  offered what he thought liberal terms, was not the man to shrink
-  from carrying his point by force; nor would the Thebans have
-  refused those terms, unless their minds had been made up for
-  strenuous and desperate defence, without hope of ultimate success.
-
-  What authority Diodorus followed, we do not know. He may have
-  followed Kleitarchus, a contemporary and an Æolian, who must have
-  had good means of information respecting such an event as the
-  capture of Thebes (see Geier, Alexandri M. Historiarum Scriptores
-  ætate suppares, Leips. 1844, p. 6-152; and Vossius, De Historicis
-  Græcis. i. x. p. 90, ed. Westermann). I have due respect for the
-  authority of Ptolemy, but I cannot go along with Geier and other
-  critics who set aside all other witnesses, even contemporary,
-  respecting Alexander, as worthy of little credit, unless where
-  such witnesses are confirmed by Ptolemy or Aristobulus. We must
-  remember that Ptolemy did not compose his book until after he
-  became king of Egypt, in 306 B. C.; nor indeed until
-  after the battle of Ipsus in 301, according to Geier (p. 1);
-  at least twenty-nine years after the sack of Thebes. Moreover,
-  Ptolemy was not ashamed of what Geier calls (p. 11) the “pious
-  fraud” of announcing, that two speaking serpents conducted the
-  army of Alexander to the holy precinct of Zeus Ammon (Arrian,
-  iii. 3). Lastly, it will be found that the depositions which are
-  found in other historians, but not in Ptolemy and Aristobulus,
-  relate principally to matters discreditable to Alexander. That
-  Ptolemy and Aristobulus _omitted_, is in my judgment far more
-  probable, than that other historians _invented_. Admiring
-  biographers would easily excuse themselves for refusing to
-  proclaim to the world such acts as the massacre of the Branchidæ,
-  or the dragging of the wounded Batiz at Gaza.
-
-  [92] Arrian, i. 8; Diodor. xvii. 12, 13.
-
-More than five hundred Macedonians are asserted to have been
-slain, and six thousand Thebans. Thirty thousand captives were
-collected.[93] The final destiny of these captives, and of Thebes
-itself, was submitted by Alexander to the Orchomenians, Platæans,
-Phokians, and other Grecian auxiliaries in the assault. He must
-have known well beforehand what the sentence of such judges would
-be. They pronounced, that the city of Thebes should be razed to the
-ground: that the Kadmeia alone should be maintained, as a military
-post with Macedonian garrison: that the Theban territory should be
-distributed among the allies themselves: that Orchomenus and Platæa
-should be rebuilt and fortified: that all the captive Thebans,
-men, women, and children, should be sold as slaves—excepting only
-priests and priestesses, and such as were connected by recognized
-ties of hospitality with Philip or Alexander, or such as had been
-_proxeni_ of the Macedonians; that the Thebans who had escaped should
-be proclaimed outlaws, liable to arrest and death, wherever they
-were found; and that every Grecian city should be interdicted from
-harboring them.[94]
-
-  [93] Diodorus (xvii. 14) and Plutarch (Alexand. 11) agree in
-  giving the totals of 6000 and 30,000.
-
-  [94] Arrian, i. 9; Diodor. xvii. 14.
-
-This overwhelming sentence, in spite of an appeal for lenity by a
-Theban[95] named Kleadas, was passed by the Grecian auxiliaries
-of Alexander, and executed by Alexander himself, who made but one
-addition to the excepting clauses. He left the house of Pindar
-standing, and spared the descendants of the poet. With these
-reserves, Thebes was effaced from the earth. The Theban territory was
-partitioned among the reconstituted cities of Orchomenus and Platæa.
-Nothing, except the Macedonian military post at the Kadmeia, remained
-to mark the place where the chief of the Bœotian confederacy had
-once stood. The captives were all sold, and are said to have yielded
-440 talents; large prices being offered by bidders from feelings of
-hostility towards the city.[96] Diodorus tells us that this sentence
-was passed by the general synod of Greeks. But we are not called upon
-to believe that this synod, subservient though it was sure to be when
-called upon to deliberate under the armed force of Alexander, could
-be brought to sanction such a ruin upon one of the first and most
-ancient Hellenic cities. For we learn from Arrian that the question
-was discussed and settled only by the Grecian auxiliaries who had
-taken part with Alexander;[97] and that the sentence therefore
-represents the bitter antipathies of the Orchomenians, Platæans, etc.
-Without doubt, these cities had sustained harsh and cruel treatment
-from Thebes. In so far as they were concerned, the retribution upon
-the Thebans was merited. Those persons, however, who (as Arrian tells
-us) pronounced the catastrophe to be a divine judgment upon Thebes
-for having joined Xerxes against Greece[98] a century and a half
-before,—must have forgotten that not only the Orchomenians, but even
-Alexander of Macedon, the namesake and predecessor of the destroying
-conqueror, had served in the army of Xerxes along with the Thebans.
-
-  [95] Justin, xi. 4.
-
-  [96] Diodor. xvii. 14; Justin, xi. 4: “pretium non ex ementium
-  commodo, sed ex inimicorum odio extenditur.”
-
-  [97] Arrian, i. 9, 13. Τοῖς δὲ μετασχοῦσι τοῦ ἔργου ξυμμάχοις,
-  οἷς δὴ καὶ ἐπέτρεψεν Ἀλέξανδρος τὰ κατὰ τὰς Θήβας διαθεῖναι,
-  ἔδοξε, etc.
-
-  [98] Arrian, i. 9, 10. He informs us (i. 9, 12) that there were
-  many previous portents which foreshadowed this ruin: Diodorus
-  (xvii. 10) on the contrary, enumerates many previous signs, all
-  tending to encourage the Thebans.
-
-Arrian vainly endeavors to transfer from Alexander to the minor
-Bœotian towns the odium of this cruel destruction—unparalleled in
-Grecian history (as he himself says), when we look to the magnitude
-of the city; yet surpassed in the aggregate by the subversion, under
-the arms of Philip, of no less than thirty-two free Chalkidic cities,
-thirteen years before. The known antipathy of these Bœotians was
-invoked by Alexander to color an infliction which satisfied at once
-his sentiment, by destroying an enemy who defied him—and his policy,
-by serving as a terrific example to keep down other Greeks.[99] But
-though such were the views which governed him at the moment, he came
-afterwards to look back upon the proceeding with shame and sorrow.
-The shock to Hellenic feeling, when a city was subverted, arose not
-merely from the violent extinction of life, property, liberty, and
-social or political institutions—but also from the obliteration of
-legends and the suppression of religious observances, thus wronging
-and provoking the local gods and heroes. We shall presently find
-Alexander himself sacrificing at Ilium,[100] in order to appease the
-wrath of Priam, still subsisting and efficacious, against himself and
-his race, as being descended from Neoptolemus the slayer of Priam.
-By his harsh treatment of Thebes, he incurred the displeasure of
-Dionysus, the god of wine, said to have been born in that city, and
-one of the principal figures in Theban legend. It was to inspirations
-of the offended Dionysus that Alexander believed himself to owe
-that ungovernable drunken passion under which he afterwards killed
-Kleitus, as well as the refusal of his Macedonian soldiers to follow
-him farther into India.[101] If Alexander in after days thus
-repented of his own act, we may be sure that the like repugnance
-was felt still more strongly by others; and we can understand the
-sentiment under which, a few years after his decease, the Macedonian
-Kassander, son of Antipater, restored the destroyed city.
-
-  [99] Plutarch, Alex. 11. ἡ μὲν πόλις ἥλω καὶ διαρπασθεῖσα
-  κατεσκάφη, τὸ μὲν ὅλον προσδοκήσαντος αὐτοῦ τοὺς Ἕλληνας πάθει
-  τηλικούτῳ ἐκπλαγέντας καὶ πτήξαντας ἀτρεμήσειν, ἄλλως δὲ καὶ
-  καλλωπισαμένου χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς τῶν συμμάχων ἐγκλήμασιν.
-
-  [100] Arrian, i. 11, 13. To illustrate farther the feeling of
-  the Greeks, respecting the wrath of the gods arising from the
-  discontinuance of worship where it had been long continued—I
-  transcribe a passage from Colonel Sleeman’s work respecting the
-  Hindoos, whose religious feelings are on so many points analogous
-  to those of the Hellênes:—
-
-  “Human sacrifices were certainly offered in the city of Saugor
-  during the whole Mahratta government, up to the year 1800—when
-  they were put a stop to by the local governor, Assa Sahib, a very
-  humane man. I once heard a learned Brahmin priest say, that he
-  thought the decline of his (Assa Sahib’s) family and government
-  arose from this innovation. ‘There is (said he) no sin in not
-  offering human sacrifices to the gods, where none have been
-  offered; _but where the gods have been accustomed to them, they
-  are very naturally annoyed when the rite is abolished, and visit
-  the place and the people with all kinds of calamity_.’ The priest
-  did not seem to think that there was anything singular in this
-  mode of reasoning: perhaps three Brahmin priests out of four
-  would have reasoned in the same manner.” (Sleeman, Rambles and
-  Recollections of an Indian Official, vol. i. ch. xv. p. 130).
-
-  [101] Plutarch, Alex. 13: compare Justin, xi. 4; and Isokrates ad
-  Philipp. (Or. v. s. 35), where he recommends Thebes to Philip on
-  the ground of pre-eminent worship towards Herakles.
-
-  It deserves notice, that while Alexander himself repented of
-  the destruction of Thebes, the macedonizing orator at Athens
-  describes it as a just, though deplorable penalty, brought by the
-  Thebans upon themselves by reckless insanity of conduct (Æschines
-  adv. Ktesiph. p. 524).
-
-At the time, however, the effect produced by the destruction of
-Thebes was one of unmitigated terror throughout the Grecian cities.
-All of them sought to make their peace with the conqueror. The
-Arcadian contingent not only returned home from the Isthmus, but even
-condemned their leaders to death. The Eleians recalled their chief
-macedonizing citizens out of exile into ascendency at home. Each
-tribe of Ætolians sent envoys to Alexander, entreating forgiveness
-for the manifestations against him. At Athens, we read with surprise
-that on the very day when Thebes was assaulted and taken, the great
-festival of Eleusinian Dêmêtêr, with its multitudinous procession
-of votaries from Athens to Eleusis, was actually taking place,
-at a distance of two days’ march from the besieged city. Most
-Theban fugitives who contrived to escape, fled to Attica as the
-nearest place of refuge, communicating to the Athenians their own
-distress and terror. The festival was forthwith suspended. Every
-one hurried within the walls of Athens,[102] carrying with him his
-movable property into a state of security. Under the general alarm
-prevalent, that the conqueror would march directly into Attica,
-and under the hurry of preparation for defence,—the persons both
-most alarmed and most in real danger were, of course, Demosthenes,
-Lykurgus, Charidemus, and those others who had been loudest in speech
-against Macedonia, and had tried to prevail on the Athenians to
-espouse openly the cause of Thebes. Yet notwithstanding such terror
-of consequences to themselves, the Athenians afforded shelter and
-sympathy to the miserable Theban fugitives. They continued to do this
-even when they must have known that they were contravening the edict
-of proscription just sanctioned by Alexander.
-
-  [102] Arrian, i. 10, 4.
-
-Shortly afterwards, envoys arrived from that monarch with a menacing
-letter, formally demanding the surrender of eight or ten leading
-citizens of Athens—Demosthenes, Lykurgus, Hyperides, Polyeuktus,
-Mœroklês, Diotimus,[103] Ephialtes, and Charidemus. Of these the
-first four were eminent orators, the last two military men; all
-strenuous advocates of an anti-Macedonian policy. Alexander in his
-letter denounced the ten as the causes of the battle of Chæroneia,
-of the offensive resolutions which had been adopted at Athens after
-the death of Philip, and even of the recent hostile proceedings
-of the Thebans.[104] This momentous summons, involving the right
-of free speech and public debate at Athens, was submitted to the
-assembly. A similar demand had just been made upon the Thebans, and
-the consequences of refusal were to be read no less plainly in the
-destruction of their city than in the threats of the conqueror. That
-even under such trying circumstances, neither orators nor people
-failed in courage—we know as a general fact; though we have not the
-advantage (as Livy had in his time) of reading the speeches made in
-the debate.[105] Demosthenes, insisting that the fate of the citizens
-generally could not be severed from that of the specific victims, is
-said to have recounted in the course of his speech, the old fable—of
-the wolf requiring the sheep to make over to him their protecting
-dogs, as a condition of peace—and then, devouring the unprotected
-sheep forthwith. He, and those demanded along with him, claimed the
-protection of the people, in whose cause alone they had incurred
-the wrath of the conqueror. Phokion on the other hand—silent at
-first, and rising only under constraint by special calls from the
-popular voice—contended that there was not force enough to resist
-Alexander, and that the persons in question must be given up. He
-even made appeal to themselves individually, reminding them of the
-self-devotion of the daughters of Erechtheus, memorable in Attic
-legend—and calling on them to surrender themselves voluntarily for
-the purpose of perverting public calamity He added, that he (Phokion)
-would rejoice to offer up either himself, or his best friend, if
-by such sacrifice he could save the city.[106] Lykurgus, one of
-the orators whose extradition was required, answered this speech
-of Phokion with vehemence and bitterness; and the public sentiment
-went along with him, indignantly repudiating Phokion’s advice. By a
-resolute patriotism highly honorable at this trying juncture, it was
-decreed that the persons demanded should not be surrendered.[107]
-
-  [103] The name of Diotimus is mentioned by Arrian (i. 10, 6),
-  but not by Plutarch; who names Demon instead of him (Plutarch,
-  Demosth. c. 23) and Kallisthenes instead of Hyperides. We know
-  nothing about Diotimus, except that Demosthenes (De Coronâ, p.
-  264) alludes to him along with Charidemus, as having received
-  an expression of gratitude from the people, in requital for a
-  present of shields which he had made. He is mentioned also, along
-  with Charidemus and others, in the third of the Demosthenic
-  epistles, p. 1482.
-
-  [104] Arrian, i. 10, 6; Plutarch, Vit. X. Orat. p. 847. ἐξῄτει
-  αὐτὸν (Demosthenes) ἀπειλὼν εἰ μὴ δοίησαν. Diodor. xvii. 15;
-  Plutarch, Demosth. 23.
-
-  [105] Livy; ix. 18. “(Alexander), adversus quem Athenis, in
-  civitate fractâ Macedonum armis, cernente tum maxime prope
-  fumantes Thebarum ruinas, concionari libere ausi sint homines,—id
-  quod ex monumentis orationum patet”, etc.
-
-  [106] Plutarch, Phokion, 9-17; Diodor. xvii. 15.
-
-  [107] Diodor. xvii. 15. Ὁ δὲ δῆμος τοῦτον μὲν (Phokion) τοῖς
-  θορύβοις ἐξέβαλε, προσάντως ἀκούων τοὺς λόγους.
-
-On the motion of Demades, an embassy was sent to Alexander,
-deprecating his wrath against the ten, and engaging to punish them
-by judicial sentence, if any crime could be proved against them.
-Demades, who is said to have received from Demosthenes a bribe of
-five talents, undertook this mission. But Alexander was at first
-inexorable; refusing even to hear the envoys, and persisting in his
-requisition. It was only by the intervention of a second embassy,
-headed by Phokion, that a remission of terms was obtained. Alexander
-was persuaded to withdraw his requisition, and to be satisfied with
-the banishment of Charidemus and Ephialtes, the two anti-Macedonian
-military leaders. Both of them accordingly, and seemingly other
-Athenians with them, passed into Asia, where they took service under
-Darius.[108]
-
-  [108] Arrian, i. 10, 8; Diodor. xvii. 15; Plutarch, Phokion, 17;
-  Justin, xi. 4; Deinarchus cont. Demosth. p. 26.
-
-  Arrian states that the visit of Demades with nine other Athenian
-  envoys to Alexander, occurred _prior_ to the demand of Alexander
-  for the extradition of the ten citizens. He (Arrian) affirms
-  that immediately on hearing the capture of Thebes, the Athenians
-  passed a vote, on the motion of Demades, to send ten envoys,
-  for the purpose of expressing satisfaction that Alexander had
-  come home safely from the Illyrians, and that he had punished
-  the Thebans for their revolt. Alexander (according to Arrian)
-  received this mission courteously, but replied by sending a
-  letter to the Athenian people, insisting on the surrender of the
-  ten citizens.
-
-  Now both Diodorus and Plutarch represent the mission of Demades
-  as _posterior_ to the demand made by Alexander for the ten
-  citizens; and that it was intended to meet and deprecate that
-  demand.
-
-  In my judgment, Arrian’s tale is the less credible of the two.
-  I think it highly improbable that the Athenians would by public
-  vote express satisfaction that Alexander had punished the Thebans
-  for their revolt. If the macedonizing party at Athens was strong
-  enough to carry so ignominious a vote, they would also have been
-  strong enough to carry the subsequent proposition of Phokion—that
-  the ten citizens demanded should be surrendered. The fact, that
-  the Athenians afforded willing shelter to the Theban fugitives,
-  is a farther reason for disbelieving this alleged vote.
-
-It was indeed no part of Alexander’s plan to undertake a siege of
-Athens, which might prove long and difficult, since the Athenians had
-a superior naval force, with the sea open to them, and the chance
-of effective support from Persia. When therefore he saw, that his
-demand for the ten orators would be firmly resisted, considerations
-of policy gradually overcame his wrath, and induced him to relax.
-
-Phokion returned to Athens as the bearer of Alexander’s concessions,
-thus relieving the Athenians from extreme anxiety and peril. His
-influence—already great and of long standing, since for years past
-he had been perpetually re-elected general—became greater than ever,
-while that of Demosthenes and the other anti-Macedonian orators must
-have been lowered. It was no mean advantage to Alexander, victorious
-as he was, to secure the incorruptible Phokion as leader of the
-macedonizing party at Athens. His projects against Persia were mainly
-exposed to failure from the possibility of opposition being raised
-against him in Greece by the agency of Persian money and ships.
-To keep Athens out of such combinations, he had to rely upon the
-personal influence and party of Phokion, whom he knew to have always
-dissuaded her from resistance to the ever-growing aggrandizement
-of his father Philip. In his conversation with Phokion on the
-intended Asiatic expedition, Alexander took some pains to flatter
-the pride of Athens by describing her as second only to himself,
-and as entitled to the headship of Greece, in case any thing should
-happen to him.[109] Such compliments were suitable to be repeated in
-the Athenian assembly: indeed the Macedonian prince might naturally
-prefer the idea of Athenian headship to that of Spartan, seeing that
-Sparta stood aloof from him, an open recusant.
-
-  [109] Plutarch, Phokion, 17; Plutarch, Alexand. 13.
-
-The animosity of Alexander being appeased, Athens resumed her
-position as a member of the confederacy under his imperial authority.
-Without visiting Attica, he now marched to the Isthmus of Corinth,
-where he probably received from various Grecian cities deputations
-deprecating his displeasure, and proclaiming their submission to
-his imperial authority. He also probably presided at a meeting of
-the Grecian synod, where he would dictate the contingents required
-for his intended Asiatic expedition in the ensuing spring. To the
-universal deference and submission which greeted him, one exception
-was found—the Cynic philosopher Diogenes, who resided at Corinth,
-satisfied with a tub for shelter, and with the coarsest and most
-self-denying existence. Alexander approached him with a numerous
-suite, and asked him if he wished for anything; upon which Diogenes
-is said to have replied,—“Nothing, except that you would stand a
-little out of my sunshine.” Both the philosopher and his reply
-provoked laughter from the bystanders, but Alexander himself was
-so impressed with the independent and self-sufficing character
-manifested, that he exclaimed,—“If I were not Alexander, I would be
-Diogenes.”[110]
-
-  [110] Plutarch, Alex. 14.
-
-Having visited the oracle of Delphi, and received or extorted
-from the priestess[111] an answer bearing favorable promise for
-his Asiatic schemes, he returned to Macedonia before the winter.
-The most important permanent effect of his stay in Greece was the
-reconstitution of Bœotia; that is, the destruction of Thebes, and
-the reconstitution of Orchomenus, Thespiæ, and Platæa, dividing
-between them the Theban territory; all guarded and controlled by a
-Macedonian garrison in the Kadmeia. It would have been interesting
-to learn some details about this process of destruction and
-restitution of the Bœotian towns; a process not only calling forth
-strong manifestations of sentiment, but also involving important and
-difficult questions to settle. But unfortunately we are not permitted
-to know anything beyond the general fact.
-
-  [111] Plutarch, Alex. 14.
-
-Alexander left Greece for Pella in the autumn of 335 B. C.,
-and never saw it again.
-
-It appears, that during this summer, while he was occupied in
-his Illyrian and Theban operations, the Macedonian force under
-Parmenio in Asia had had to contend against a Persian army, or Greek
-mercenaries, commanded by Memnon the Rhodian. Parmenio, marching into
-Æolis, besieged and took Grynium; after which he attacked Pitanê,
-but was compelled by Memnon to raise the siege. Memnon even gained
-a victory over the Macedonian force under Kallas in the Troad,
-compelling them to retire to Rhœteum. But he failed in an attempt to
-surprise Kyzikus, and was obliged to content himself with plundering
-the adjoining territory.[112] It is affirmed that Darius was engaged
-this summer in making large preparations, naval as well as military,
-to resist the intended expedition of Alexander. Yet all that we hear
-of what was actually done implies nothing beyond a moderate force.
-
-  [112] Diodor. xvi. 7.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER XCII.
-
-ASIATIC CAMPAIGNS OF ALEXANDER.
-
-
-A year and some months had sufficed for Alexander to make a first
-display of his energy and military skill, destined for achievements
-yet greater; and to crush the growing aspirations for freedom
-among Greeks on the south, as well as among Thracians on the north,
-of Macedonia. The ensuing winter was employed in completing his
-preparations; so that early in the spring of 334 B. C., his army
-destined for the conquest of Asia was mustered between Pella and
-Amphipolis, while his fleet was at hand to lend support.
-
-The whole of Alexander’s remaining life—from his crossing the
-Hellespont in March or April 334 B. C., to his death at Babylon in
-June 323 B. C., eleven years and two or three months—was passed in
-Asia, amidst unceasing military operations, and ever-multiplied
-conquests. He never lived to revisit Macedonia; but his achievements
-were on so transcendent a scale, his acquisitions of territory so
-unmeasured, and his thirst for farther aggrandizement still so
-insatiate, that Macedonia sinks into insignificance in the list
-of his possessions. Much more do the Grecian cities dwindle into
-outlying appendages of a newly-grown Oriental empire. During all
-these eleven years, the history of Greece is almost a blank, except
-here and there a few scattered events. It is only at the death of
-Alexander that the Grecian cities again awaken into active movement.
-
-The Asiatic conquests of Alexander do not belong directly and
-literally to the province of an historian of Greece. They were
-achieved by armies of which the general, the principal officers,
-and most part of the soldiers, were Macedonian. The Greeks who
-served with him were only auxiliaries, along with the Thracians
-and Pæonians. Though more numerous than all the other auxiliaries,
-they did not constitute, like the Ten Thousand Greeks in the army
-of the younger Cyrus, the force on which he mainly relied for
-victory. His chief-secretary, Eumenes of Kardia, was a Greek, and
-probably most of the civil and intellectual functions connected
-with the service were also performed by Greeks. Many Greeks also
-served in the army of Persia against him, and composed indeed a
-larger proportion of the real force (disregarding mere numbers) in
-the army of Darius than in that of Alexander. Hence the expedition
-becomes indirectly incorporated with the stream of Grecian history
-by the powerful auxiliary agency of Greeks on both sides—and still
-more, by its connection with previous projects, dreams, and legends,
-long antecedent to the aggrandizement of Macedon—as well as by the
-character which Alexander thought fit to assume. To take revenge on
-Persia for the invasion of Greece by Xerxes, and to liberate the
-Asiatic Greeks, had been the scheme of the Spartan Agesilaus, and of
-the Pheræan Jason; with hopes grounded on the memorable expedition
-and safe return of the Ten Thousand. It had been recommended by the
-rhetor Isokrates, first to the combined force of Greece, while yet
-Grecian cities were free, under the joint headship of Athens and
-Sparta—next, to Philip of Macedon as the chief of united Greece, when
-his victorious arms had extorted a recognition of headship, setting
-aside both Athens and Sparta. The enterprising ambition of Philip was
-well pleased to be nominated chief of Greece for the execution of
-this project. From him it passed to his yet more ambitious son.
-
-Though really a scheme of Macedonian appetite and for Macedonian
-aggrandizement, the expedition against Asia thus becomes thrust
-into the series of Grecian events, under the Pan-hellenic pretence
-of retaliation for the long past insults of Xerxes. I call it a
-_pretence_, because it had ceased to be a real Hellenic feeling, and
-served now two different purposes; first, to ennoble the undertaking
-in the eyes of Alexander himself, whose mind was very accessible
-to religious and legendary sentiment, and who willingly identified
-himself with Agamemnon or Achilles, immortalized as executors of the
-collective vengeance of Greece for Asiatic insult—next, to assist in
-keeping the Greeks quiet during his absence. He was himself aware
-that the real sympathies of the Greeks were rather adverse than
-favorable to his success.
-
-Apart from this body of extinct sentiment, ostentatiously rekindled
-for Alexander’s purposes, the position of the Greeks in reference to
-his Asiatic conquests was very much the same as that of the German
-contingents, especially those of the Confederation of the Rhine, who
-served in the grand army with which the Emperor Napoleon invaded
-Russia in 1812. They had no public interest in the victory of the
-invader, which could end only by reducing them to still greater
-prostration. They were likely to adhere to their leader as long as
-his power continued unimpaired, but no longer. Yet Napoleon thought
-himself entitled to reckon upon them as if they had been Frenchmen,
-and to denounce the Germans in the service of Russia as traitors
-who had forfeited the allegiance which they owed to him. We find him
-drawing the same pointed distinction between the Russian and the
-German prisoners taken, as Alexander made between Asiatic and Grecian
-prisoners. These Grecian prisoners the Macedonian prince reproached
-as guilty of treason against the proclaimed statute of collective
-Hellas, whereby he had been declared general, and the Persian king a
-public enemy.[113]
-
-  [113] Arrian, i. 16, 10; i. 29, 9, about the Grecian prisoners
-  taken at the victory of the Granikus—ὅσους δὲ αὐτῶν αἰχμαλώτους
-  ἔλαβε, τούτους δὲ δήσας ἐν πέδαις, εἰς Μακεδονίαν ἀπέπεμψεν
-  ἐργάζεσθαι, ὅτι παρὰ τὰ κοινῇ δόξαντα τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, Ἕλληνες
-  ὄντες, ἐναντία τῇ Ἑλλάδι ὑπὲρ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐμάχοντο. Also iii.
-  23, 15, about the Grecian soldiers serving with the Persians, and
-  made prisoners in Hyrkania—Ἀδικεῖν γὰρ μεγάλα (said Alexander)
-  τοὺς στρατευομένους ἐναντία τῇ Ἑλλάδι παρὰ τοῖς βαρβάροις παρὰ τὰ
-  δόγματα τῶν Ἑλλήνων.
-
-  Toward the end of October 1812, near Moscow, General
-  Winzingerode, a German officer in the Russian service,—with his
-  aide-de-camp a native Russian, Narishkin,—became prisoner of the
-  French. He was brought to Napoleon—“At the sight of that German
-  general, all the secret resentments of Napoleon took fire. ‘Who
-  are you (he exclaimed)? a man without a country! When I was at
-  war with the Austrians, I found you in their ranks. Austria has
-  become my ally, and you have entered into the Russian service.
-  You have been one of the warmest instigators of the present
-  war. Nevertheless, you are a native of the Confederation of the
-  Rhine: _you are my subject_. You are not an ordinary enemy:
-  you are a rebel: I have a right to bring you to trial. _Gens
-  d’armes_, seize this man!’ Then addressing the aide-de-camp of
-  Winzingerode, Napoleon said, ‘As for you, Count Narishkin, I have
-  nothing to reproach you with: you are a Russian, you are doing
-  your duty.’” (Ségur’s account of the Campaign in Russia, book ix.
-  ch. vi. p. 132.)
-
-  Napoleon did not realize these threats against Winzingerode;
-  but his language expresses just the same sentiment as that of
-  Alexander towards the captive Greeks.
-
-Hellas, as a political aggregate, has now ceased to exist, except
-in so far as Alexander employs the name for his own purposes.
-Its component members are annexed as appendages, doubtless of
-considerable value, to the Macedonian kingdom. Fourteen years
-before Alexander’s accession, Demosthenes, while instigating the
-Athenians to uphold Olynthus against Philip, had told them[114]—“The
-Macedonian power, considered as an appendage, is of no mean value;
-but by itself, it is weak and full of embarrassments.” Inverting the
-position of the parties, these words represent exactly what Greece
-herself had become, in reference to Macedonia and Persia, at the time
-of Alexander’s accession. Had the Persians played their game with
-tolerable prudence and vigor, his success would have been measured by
-the degree to which he could appropriate Grecian force to himself,
-and withhold it from his enemy.
-
-  [114] Demosth. Olynth. ii. p. 14 Ὅλως μὲν γὰρ ἡ Μακεδονικὴ
-  δύναμις καὶ ἀρχὴ ~ἐν μὲν προσθήκῃ μερίς~ ἐστὶ τις οὐ σμικρὰ, οἷον
-  ὑπῆρξέ ποθ᾽ ὑμῖν ἐπὶ Τιμοθέου πρὸς Ὀλυνθίους ... αὐτὴ δὲ καθ᾽
-  αὑτὴν ἀσθενὴς καὶ πολλῶν κακῶν ἐστὶ μεστὴ.
-
-Alexander’s memorable and illustrious manifestations, on which we
-are now entering, are those, not of the ruler or politician, but
-of the general and the soldier. In this character his appearance
-forms a sort of historical epoch. It is not merely in soldier-like
-qualities—in the most forward and even adventurous bravery—in
-indefatigable personal activity, and in endurance as to hardship
-and fatigue,—that he stands pre-eminent; though these qualities
-alone, when found in a king, act so powerfully on those under his
-command, that they suffice to produce great achievements, even
-when combined with generalship not surpassing the average of his
-age. But in generalship, Alexander was yet more above the level of
-his contemporaries. His strategic combinations, his employment of
-different descriptions of force conspiring towards one end, his
-long-sighted plans for the prosecution of campaigns, his constant
-foresight and resource against new difficulties, together with
-rapidity of movement even in the worst country—all on a scale of
-prodigious magnitude—are without parallel in ancient history. They
-carry the art of systematic and scientific welfare to a degree of
-efficiency, such as even successors trained in his school were unable
-to keep up unimpaired.
-
-We must recollect however that Alexander found the Macedonian
-military system built up by Philip, and had only to apply and enlarge
-it. As transmitted to him, it embodied the accumulated result and
-matured fruit of a series of successive improvements, applied by
-Grecian tacticians to the primitive Hellenic arrangements. During
-the sixty years before the accession of Alexander, the art of war
-had been conspicuously progressive—to the sad detriment of Grecian
-political freedom. “Everything around us (says Demosthenes addressing
-the people of Athens in 342 B. C.), has been in advance for
-some years past—nothing is like what it was formerly—but nowhere is
-the alteration and enlargement more conspicuous than in the affairs
-of war. Formerly, the Lacedæmonians as well as other Greeks did
-nothing more than invade each other’s territory, during the four or
-five summer months, with their native force of citizen hoplites: in
-winter they stayed at home. But now we see Philip in constant action,
-winter as well as summer, attacking all around him, not merely with
-Macedonian hoplites, but with cavalry, light infantry, bowmen,
-foreigners of all descriptions, and siege-batteries.”[115]
-
-  [115] Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 123, 124: compare Olynth. ii. p.
-  22. I give here the substance of what is said by the orator, not
-  strictly adhering to his words.
-
-I have in my last two volumes dwelt upon this progressive change in
-the character of Grecian soldiership. At Athens, and in most other
-parts of Greece, the burghers had become averse to hard and active
-military service. The use of arms had passed mainly to professional
-soldiers, who, without any feeling of citizenship, served wherever
-good pay was offered, and became immensely multiplied, to the
-detriment and danger of Grecian society.[116] Many of these
-mercenaries were lightly armed—peltasts served in combination
-with the hoplites.[117] Iphikrates greatly improved and partly
-re-armed the peltasts; whom he employed conjointly with hoplites so
-effectively as to astonish his contemporaries.[118] His innovation
-was farther developed by the great military genius of Epaminondas;
-who not only made infantry and cavalry, light-armed and heavy-armed,
-conspire to one scheme of operations, but also completely altered
-the received principles of battle-manœuvring, by concentrating an
-irresistible force of attack on one point of the enemy’s line, and
-keeping the rest of his own line more on the defensive. Besides these
-important improvements, realized by generals in actual practice,
-intelligent officers like Xenophon embodied the results of their
-military experience in valuable published criticisms.[119] Such were
-the lessons which the Macedonian Philip learnt and applied to the
-enslavement of those Greeks, especially of the Thebans, from whom
-they were derived. In his youth, as a hostage at Thebes, he had
-probably conversed with Epaminondas, and must certainly have become
-familiar with the Theban military arrangements. He had every motive,
-not merely from ambition, of conquest, but even from the necessities
-of defence, to turn them to account: and he brought to the task
-military genius and aptitude of the highest order. In arms, in
-evolutions, in engines, in regimenting, in war-office arrangements,
-he introduced important novelties; bequeathing to his successors the
-Macedonian military system, which, with improvements by his son,
-lasted until the conquest of the country by Rome, near two centuries
-afterwards.
-
-  [116] Isokrates, in several of his discourses, notes the gradual
-  increase of these mercenaries—men without regular means of
-  subsistence, or fixed residence, or civic obligations. Or. iv.
-  (Panegyr.) s. 195; Or. v. (Philippus), s. 112-142; Or. viii. (De
-  Pace), s. 31-56.
-
-  [117] Xenoph. Magist. Equit. ix. 4. Οἶδα δ᾽ ἐγὼ καὶ
-  Λακεδαιμονίοις τὸ ἱππικὸν ἀρξάμενον εὐδοκιμεῖν, ἐπεὶ ξένους
-  ἱππέας προσέλαβον· καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι πανταχοῦ τὰ ξενικὰ
-  ὁρῶ εὐδοκιμοῦντα.
-
-  Compare Demosth. Philippic. i. p. 46; Xenoph. Hellenic. iv. 4,
-  14; Isokrates, Orat. vii. (Areopagit.), s. 93.
-
-  [118] For an explanation of the improved arming of peltasts
-  introduced by Iphikrates, see Vol. IX. Ch. lxxv. p. 335 of this
-  History. Respecting these improvements, the statements both
-  of Diodorus (xv. 44) and of Nepos are obscure. MM. Rüstow and
-  Köchly (in their valuable work, Geschichte des Griechischen
-  Kriegswesens, Aarau, 1852, B. ii. p. 164) have interpreted the
-  statements in a sense to which I cannot subscribe. They think
-  that Iphikrates altered not only the arming of peltasts, but also
-  that of hoplites; a supposition, which I see nothing to justify.
-
-  [119] Besides the many scattered remarks in the Anabasis, the
-  Cyropædia is full of discussion and criticism on military
-  phænomena. It is remarkable to what an extent Xenophon had
-  present to his mind all the exigencies of war, and the different
-  ways of meeting them. See as an example, Cyropæd. vi. 2; ii. 1.
-
-  The work on sieges, by Æneas (Poliorketica), is certainly
-  anterior to the military improvements of Philip of Macedon:
-  probably about the beginning of his reign. See the preface
-  to it by Rüstow and Köchly, p. 8, in their edition of Die
-  Griechischen Kriegs-schriftsteller, Leips. 1853. In this work,
-  allusion is made to several others, now lost, by the same
-  author—Παρασκευαστικὴ βίβλος, Ποριστικὴ Βίβλος, Στρατοπεδευτικὴ,
-  etc.
-
-The military force of Macedonia, in the times anterior to Philip,
-appears to have consisted, like that of Thessaly, in a well-armed
-and well-mounted cavalry, formed from the substantial proprietors
-of the country—and in a numerous assemblage of peltasts or light
-infantry (somewhat analogous to the Thessalian Penestæ): these latter
-were the rural population, shepherds or cultivators, who tended
-sheep and cattle, or tilled the earth, among the spacious mountains
-and valleys of Upper Macedonia. The Grecian towns near the coast,
-and the few Macedonian towns in the interior, had citizen-hoplites
-better armed; but foot-service was not in honor among the natives,
-and the Macedonian infantry in their general character were hardly
-more than a rabble. At the period of Philip’s accession, they were
-armed with nothing better than rusty swords and wicker shields, noway
-sufficient to make head against the inroads of their Thracian and
-Illyrian neighbors; before whom they were constantly compelled to
-flee for refuge up into the mountains.[120] Their condition was that
-of a poor herdsman, half-naked or covered only with hides, and eating
-from wooden platters: not much different from that of the population
-of Upper Macedonia three centuries before, when first visited by
-Perdikkas the ancestor of the Macedonian kings, and when the wife
-of the native prince baked bread with her own hands.[121] On the
-other hand, though the Macedonian infantry was thus indifferent, the
-cavalry of the country was excellent, both in the Peloponnesian war,
-and in the war carried on by Sparta against Olynthus more than twenty
-years afterwards.[122] These horsemen, like the Thessalians, charged
-in compact order, carrying as their principal weapon of offence, not
-javelins to be hurled, but the short thrusting-pike for close combat.
-
-  [120] See the striking speech addressed by Alexander to the
-  discontented Macedonian soldiers, a few months before his death,
-  at Opis or Susa (Arrian, vii).
-
-  ... Φίλιππος γὰρ παραλαβὼν ὑμᾶς πλανήτας καὶ ἀπόρους, ἐν
-  διφθέραις τοὺς πολλοὺς νέμοντας ἀνὰ τὰ ὄρη πρόβατα κατὰ ὄλιγα,
-  καὶ ὑπὲρ τούτων κακῶς μαχομένους Ἰλλυριοῖς τε καὶ Τριβαλλοῖς καὶ
-  τοῖς ὁμόροις Θρᾳξὶ, χλαμύδας μὲν ὑμῖν ἀντὶ τῶν διφθερῶν φορεῖν
-  ἔδωκε, κατήγαγε δὲ ἐκ τῶν ὀρῶν ἐς τὰ πεδία, ἀξιομάχους καταστήσας
-  τοῖς προσχώροις τῶν βαρβάρων, ὡς μὴ χωρίων ἔτι ὀχυρότητι
-  πιστεύοντας μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ οἰκείᾳ ἀρετῇ σώζεσθαι....
-
-  In the version of the same speech given by Curtius (x. 10,
-  23), we find, “Modo sub Philippo seminudis, amicula ex purpurâ
-  sordent, aurum et argentum oculi ferre non possunt: lignea enim
-  vasa desiderant, et ex cratibus scuta rubiginemque gladiorum”,
-  etc.
-
-  Compare the description given by Thucydides, iv. 124, of the
-  army of Brasidas and Perdikkas, where the Macedonian foot are
-  described as ἄλλος ὅμιλος τῶν βαρβάρων πολύς.
-
-  [121] Herodot. viii. 137.
-
-  [122] Thucyd. ii. 100; Xenoph. Hellen. v. 2, 40-42.
-
-Thus defective was the military organization which Philip found.
-Under his auspices it was cast altogether anew. The poor and hardy
-Landwehr of Macedonia, constantly on the defensive against predatory
-neighbors, formed an excellent material for soldiers, and proved
-not intractable to the innovations of a warlike prince. They were
-placed under constant training in the regular rank and file of heavy
-infantry: they were moreover brought to adopt a new description
-of arm, not only in itself very difficult to manage, but also
-comparatively useless to the soldier when fighting single-handed,
-and only available by a body of men in close order, trained to
-move or stand together. The new weapon, of which we first hear the
-name in the army of Philip, was the sarissa—the Macedonian pike or
-lance. The sarissa was used both by the infantry of his phalanx,
-and by particular regiments of his cavalry; in both cases it was
-long, though that of the phalanx was much the longer of the two.
-The regiments of cavalry called Sarissophori or Lancers were a sort
-of light-horse, carrying a long lance, and distinguished from the
-heavier cavalry intended for the shock of hand combat, who carried
-the xyston or short pike. The sarissa of this cavalry may have been
-fourteen feet in length, as long as the Cossack pike now is; that of
-the infantry in phalanx was not less than twenty-one feet long. This
-dimension is so prodigious and so unwieldy, that we should hardly
-believe it, if it did not come attested by the distinct assertion of
-an historian like Polybius.
-
-The extraordinary reach of the sarissa or pike constituted the
-prominent attribute and force of the Macedonian phalanx. The
-phalangites were drawn up in files generally sixteen deep, each
-called a Lochus; with an interval of three feet between each two
-soldiers from front to rear. In front stood the lochage, a man of
-superior strength, and of tried military experience. The second and
-third men in the file, as well as the rearmost man who brought up the
-whole, were also picked soldiers, receiving larger pay than the rest.
-Now the sarissa, when in horizontal position, was held with both
-hands (distinguished in this respect from the pike of the Grecian
-hoplite, which occupied only one hand, the other being required
-for the shield), and so held that it projected fifteen feet before
-the body of the pikeman; while the hinder portion of six feet so
-weighted as to make the pressure convenient in such division. Hence,
-the sarissa of the man standing second in the file, projected twelve
-feet beyond the front rank; that of the third man, nine feet; these
-of the fourth and fifth ranks, respectively six feet and three feet.
-There was thus presented a quintuple series of pikes by each file,
-to meet an advancing enemy. Of these five, the three first would be
-decidedly of greater projection, and even the fourth of not less
-projection, than the pikes of Grecian hoplites coming up as enemies
-to the charge. The ranks behind the fifth, while serving to sustain
-and press onward the front, did not carry the sarissa in a horizontal
-position, but slanted it over the shoulders of those before them, so
-as to break the force of any darts or arrows which might be shot over
-head from the rear ranks of the enemy.[123]
-
-  [123] Respecting the length of the pike of the Macedonian
-  phalanx, see Appendix to this Chapter.
-
-The phalangite (soldier of the phalanx) was farther provided
-with a short sword, a circular shield of rather more than two
-feet in diameter, a breast-piece, leggings, and a kausia or
-broad-brimmed-hat—the head-covering common in the Macedonian army.
-But the long pikes were in truth the main weapons of defence as well
-as of offence. They were destined to contend against the charge
-of Grecian hoplites with the one-handed pike and heavy shield;
-especially against the most formidable manifestation of that force,
-the deep Theban column organized by Epaminondas. This was what Philip
-had to deal with, at his accession, as the irresistible infantry
-of Greece, bearing down everything before it by thrust of pike and
-propulsion of shield. He provided the means of vanquishing it, by
-training his poor Macedonian infantry to the systematic use of the
-long two-handed pike. The Theban column, charging a phalanx so
-armed, found themselves unable to break into the array of protended
-pikes, or to come to push of shield. We are told that at the battle
-of Chæroneia, the front rank Theban soldiers, the chosen men of the
-city, all perished on the ground; and this is not wonderful, when
-we conceive them as rushing, by their own courage as well as by the
-pressure upon them from behind, upon a wall of Pikes double the
-length of their own. We must look at Philip’s phalanx with reference
-to the enemies before him, not with reference to the later Roman
-organization, which Polybius brings into comparison. It answered
-perfectly the purposes of Philip, who wanted mainly to stand the
-shock in front, thus overpowering Grecian hoplites in their own mode
-of attack. Now Polybius informs us, that the phalanx was never once
-beaten, in front and on ground suitable for it; and wherever the
-ground was fit for hoplites, it was also fit for the phalanx. The
-inconveniences of Philip’s array, and of the long pikes, arose from
-the incapacity of the phalanx to change its front or keep its order
-on unequal ground; but such inconveniences were hardly less felt by
-Grecian hoplites.[124]
-
-  [124] The impression of admiration, and even terror, with which
-  the Roman general Paulus Emilius was seized, on first seeing the
-  Macedonian phalanx in battle array at Pydna—has been recorded by
-  Polybius (Polybius, Fragm. xxix. 6, 11; Livy, xliv. 40).
-
-The Macedonian phalanx, denominated the Pezetæri[125] or Foot
-Companions of the King, comprised the general body of native
-infantry, as distinguished from special _corps d’armée_. The largest
-division of it which we find mentioned under Alexander, and which
-appears under the command of a general of division, is called a
-Taxis. How many of these Taxeis there were in all, we do not know;
-the original Asiatic army of Alexander (apart from what he left at
-home) included six of them, coinciding apparently with the provincial
-allotments of the country: Orestæ, Lynkestæ, Elimiotæ, Tymphæi,
-etc.[126] The writers on tactics give us a systematic scale of
-distribution (ascending from the lowest unit, the Lochus of sixteen
-men, by successive multiples of two, up to the quadruple phalanx of
-16,384 men) as pervading the Macedonian army. Among these divisions,
-that which stands out as most fundamental and constant, is the
-Syntagma, which contained sixteen Lochi. Forming thus a square of
-sixteen men in front and depth, or 256 men, it was at the same time
-a distinct aggregate or permanent battalion, having attached to it
-five supernumeraries, an ensign, a rear-man, a trumpeter, a herald,
-and an attendant or orderly.[127] Two of these Syntagmas composed
-a body of 512 men, called a Pentakosiarchy, which in Philip’s time
-is said to have been the ordinary regiment, acting together under a
-separate command; but several of these were doubled by Alexander when
-he reorganized his army at Susa,[128] so as to form regiments of 1024
-men, each under its Chiliarch, and each comprising four Syntagmas.
-All this systematic distribution of the Macedonian military force
-when at home, appears to have been arranged by the genius of Philip.
-On actual foreign service, no numerical precision could be observed;
-a regiment or a division could not always contain the same fixed
-number of men. But as to the array, a depth of sixteen, for the
-files of the phalangites, appears to have been regarded as important
-and characteristic,[129] perhaps essential to impart a feeling of
-confidence to the troops. It was a depth much greater than was common
-with Grecian hoplites, and never surpassed by any Greeks except the
-Thebans.
-
-  [125] Harpokration and Photius, v. Πεζέταιροι, Demosth. Olynth.
-  ii. p. 23; Arrian, iv. 23, 1. τῶν πεζεταίρων καλουμένων τὰς
-  Τάξεις, and ii. 23, 2, etc.
-
-  Since we know from Demosthenes that the pezetæri date from the
-  time of Philip, it is probable that the passage of Anaximenes
-  (as cited by Harpokration and Photius) which refers them to
-  Alexander, has ascribed to the son what really belongs to the
-  father. The term ἑταῖροι, in reference to the kings of Macedonia,
-  first appears in Plutarch, Pelopidas, 27, in reference to
-  Ptolemy, before the time of Philip; see Otto Abel, Makedonien
-  vor König Philip, p. 129 (the passage of Ælian referred to by
-  him seems of little moment). The term Companions or Comrades had
-  under Philip a meaning purely military, designating foreigners as
-  well as Macedonians serving in his army: see Theopompus, Frag.
-  249. The term, originally applied only to a select few, was by
-  degrees extended to the corps generally.
-
-  [126] Arrian, i. 14, 3; iii. 16, 19; Diodor. xvii. 57. Compare
-  the note of Schmieder on the above passage of Arrian; also
-  Droysen, Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen, p. 95, 96, and the
-  elaborate note of Mützel on Curtius, v. 2, 3. p. 400.
-
-  The passage of Arrian (his description of Alexander’s army
-  arrayed at the Granikus) is confused, and seems erroneous in some
-  words of the text; yet it may be held to justify the supposition
-  of six Taxeis of pezetæri in Alexander’s phalanx on that day.
-  There seem also to be six Taxeis at Arbêla (iii. 11, 16).
-
-  [127] Arrian. Tactic. c. 10; Ælian. Tactic. c. 9.
-
-  [128] Curtius, v. 2, 3.
-
-  [129] This is to be seen in the arrangement made by Alexander
-  a short time before his death, when he incorporated Macedonian
-  and Persian soldiers in the same lochus; the normal depth of
-  sixteen was retained; all the front ranks or privileged men being
-  Macedonians. The Macedonians were much hurt at seeing their
-  native regimental array shared with Asiatics (Arrian, vii. 11, 5;
-  vii. 23, 4-8).
-
-But the phalanx, though an essential item, was yet only one among
-many, in the varied military organization introduced by Philip.
-It was neither intended, nor fit, to act alone; being clumsy in
-changing front to protect itself either in flank or rear, and unable
-to adapt itself to uneven ground. There was another description of
-infantry organized by Philip called the Hypaspists—shield-bearers
-or Guards;[130] originally few in number, and employed for personal
-defence of the prince—but afterwards enlarged into several distinct
-_corps d’armée_. These Hypaspists or Guards were light infantry
-of the line;[131] they were hoplites, keeping regular array and
-intended for close combat, but more lightly armed, and more fit for
-diversities of circumstance and position, than the phalanx. They seem
-to have fought with the one-handed pike and shield, like the Greeks;
-and not to have carried the two-handed phalangite pike or sarissa.
-They occupied a sort of intermediate place between the heavy infantry
-of the phalanx properly so called—and the peltasts and light troops
-generally. Alexander in his later campaigns had them distributed into
-Chiliarchies (how the distribution stood earlier, we have no distinct
-information), at least three in number, and probably more.[132] We
-find them employed by him in forward and aggressive movements; first
-his light troops and cavalry begin the attack; next, the hypaspists
-come to follow it up; lastly, the phalanx is brought up to support
-them. The hypaspists are used also for assault of walled places, and
-for rapid night marches.[133] What was the total number of them, we
-do not know.[134]
-
-  [130] The proper meaning of ὑπασπισταὶ, as guards or personal
-  attendants on the prince, appears in Arrian, i. 5, 3; vii. 8, 6.
-
-  Neoptolemus, as ἀρχιυπασπιστὴς to Alexander, carried the shield
-  and lance of the latter, on formal occasions (Plutarch, Eumenes,
-  1).
-
-  [131] Arrian, ii. 4, 3, 4; ii. 20, 5.
-
-  [132] Arrian, iv. 30, 11; v. 23, 11.
-
-  [133] Arrian, ii. 20, 5; ii. 23, 6; iii. 18, 8.
-
-  [134] Droysen and Schmieder give the number of hypaspists in
-  Alexander’s army at Issus, as 6000. That this opinion rests on no
-  sufficient evidence, has been shown by Mützel (ad Curtium, v. 2,
-  3. p. 399). But that the number of hypaspists left by Philip at
-  his death was 6000 seems not improbable.
-
-Besides the phalanx, and the hypaspists or Guards, the Macedonian
-army as employed by Philip and Alexander included a numerous
-assemblage of desultory or irregular troops, partly native
-Macedonians, partly foreigners, Thracians, Pæonians, etc. They were
-of different descriptions; peltasts, darters, and bowmen. The best
-of them appear to have been the Agriânes, a Pæonian tribe expert in
-the use of the javelin. All of them were kept in vigorous movement
-by Alexander, on the flanks and in front of his heavy infantry, or
-intermingled with his cavalry,—as well as for pursuit after the enemy
-was defeated.
-
-Lastly, the cavalry in Alexander’s army was also admirable—at
-least equal, and seemingly even superior in efficiency, to his
-best infantry.[135] I have already mentioned that cavalry was the
-choice native force of Macedonia, long before the reign of Philip;
-by whom it had been extended and improved.[136] The heavy cavalry,
-wholly or chiefly composed of native Macedonians, was known by the
-denomination of the Companions. There was besides a new and lighter
-variety of cavalry, apparently introduced by Philip, and called the
-Sarissophori, or Lancers, used like Cossacks for advanced posts or
-scouring the country. The sarissa which they carried was probably
-much shorter than that of the phalanx; but it was long, if compared
-with the xyston or thrusting pike used by the heavy cavalry for the
-shock of close combat. Arrian, in describing the army of Alexander at
-Arbêla, enumerates eight distinct squadrons of this heavy cavalry—or
-cavalry of the Companions; but the total number included in the
-Macedonian army at Alexander’s accession, is not known. Among the
-squadrons, several at least (if not all) were named after particular
-towns or districts of the country—Bottiæa, Amphipolis, Apollonia,
-Anthemus, etc.;[137] there was one or more, distinguished as the
-Royal Squadron—the Agêma or leading body of cavalry—at the head of
-which Alexander generally charged, himself among the foremost of the
-actual combatants.[138]
-
-  [135] See Arrian, v. 14, 1; v. 16, 4; Curtius, vi. 9, 22.
-  “Equitatui, optimæ exercitûs parti”, etc.
-
-  [136] We are told that Philip, after his expedition against the
-  Scythians about three years before his death, exacted and sent
-  into Macedonia 20,000 chosen mares, in order to improve the breed
-  of Macedonian horses. The regal haras were in the neighborhood of
-  Pella (Justin, ix. 2; Strabo, xvi. p. 752, in which passage of
-  Strabo, _the details_ apply to the _haras_ of Seleukus Nikator at
-  Apameia, not to that of Philip at Pella).
-
-  [137] Arrian, i. 2, 8, 9 (where we also find mentioned τοὺς ἐκ
-  τῆς ἄνωθεν Μακεδονίας ἱππέας), i. 12, 12; ii. 9, 6; iii. 11, 12.
-
-  About the ἱππεῖς σαρισσόφοροι, see i. 13, 1.
-
-  It is possible that there may have been sixteen squadrons of
-  heavy cavalry, and eight squadrons of the Sarissophori,—each
-  squadron from 180 to 250 men—as Rüstow and Köchly conceive (p.
-  243). But there is no sufficient evidence to prove it; nor can I
-  think it safe to assume, as they do, that Alexander carried over
-  with him to Asia _just half_ of the Macedonian entire force.
-
-  [138] Arrian, iii. 11, 11; iii. 13, 1; iii. 18, 8. In the first
-  of these passages, we have ἴλαι βασιλικαὶ in the plural (iii. 11,
-  12). It seems too that the different ἴλαι alternated with each
-  other in the foremost position, or ἡγεμονία for particular days
-  (Arrian, i. 14, 9).
-
-The distribution of the cavalry into squadrons was that which
-Alexander found at his accession; but he altered it, when he
-remodelled the arrangements of his army (in 330 B. C.), at Susa, so
-as to subdivide the squadron into two Lochi, and to establish the
-Lochus for the elementary division of cavalry, as it had always been
-of infantry.[139] His reforms went thus to cut down the primary body
-of cavalry from the squadron to the half-squadron or Lochus, while
-they tended to bring the infantry together into larger bodies—from
-cohorts of 500 each to cohorts of 1000 men each.
-
-  [139] Arrian, iii. 16, 19.
-
-Among the Hypaspists or Guards, also, we find an Agêma or chosen
-cohort, which was called upon oftener than the rest to begin the
-fight. A still more select corps were, the Body-Guards; a small
-company of tried and confidential men, individually known to
-Alexander, always attached to his person, and acting as adjutants
-or as commanders for special service. These Body-Guards appear
-to have been chosen persons promoted out of the Royal Youths or
-Pages; an institution first established by Philip, and evincing the
-pains taken by him to bring the leading Macedonians into military
-organization as well as into dependence on his own person. The Royal
-Youths, sons of the chief persons throughout Macedonia, were taken by
-Philip into service, and kept in permanent residence around him for
-purposes of domestic attendance and companionship. They maintained
-perpetual guard of his palace, alternating among themselves the
-hours of daily and nightly watch; they received his horse from the
-grooms, assisted him to mount, and accompanied him if he went to
-the chase: they introduced persons who came to solicit interviews,
-and admitted his mistresses by night through a special door. They
-enjoyed the privilege of sitting down to dinner with him, as well
-as that of never being flogged except by his special order.[140]
-The precise number of the company we do not know; but it must have
-been not small, since fifty of these youths were brought out from
-Macedonia at once by Amyntas to join Alexander and to be added to the
-company at Babylon.[141] At the same time the mortality among them
-was probably considerable; since, in accompanying Alexander, they
-endured even more than the prodigious fatigues which he imposed upon
-himself.[142] The training in this corps was a preparation first for
-becoming Body-guards of Alexander,—next, for appointment to the great
-and important military commands. Accordingly, it had been the first
-stage of advancement to most of the Diadochi, or great officers of
-Alexander, who after his death carved kingdoms for themselves out of
-his conquests.
-
-  [140] Arrian, iv. 13, 1. Ἐκ Φιλίππου ἦν ἤδη καθεστηκὸς, τῶν ἐν
-  τέλει Μακεδόνων τοὺς παῖδας, ὅσοι ἐς ἡλικίαν ἐμειρακίσαντο,
-  καταλέγεσθαι ἐς θεραπείαν τοῦ βασιλέως. Τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν ἄλλην
-  δίαιταν τοῦ σώματος διακονεῖσθαι βασιλεῖ, καὶ κοιμώμενον
-  φυλάσσειν, τούτοις ἐπετέτραπτο· καὶ ὁπότε ἐξελαύνοι βασιλεὺς,
-  τοὺς ἵππους παρὰ τῶν ἱπποκόμων δεχόμενοι ἐκεῖνοι προσῆγον, καὶ
-  ἀνέβαλον οὗτοι βασιλέα τὸν Περσικὸν τρόπον, καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ θήρᾳ
-  φιλοτιμίας βασιλεῖ κοινωνοὶ ἦσαν, etc.
-
-  Curtius, viii. 6. 1. “Mos erat principibus Macedonum adultos
-  liberos regibus tradere, ad munia haud multum servilibus
-  ministeriis abhorrentia. Excubabant servatis noctium vicibus
-  proximi foribus ejus ædis, in quâ rex aquiescebat. Per hos
-  pellices introducebantur, alio aditu quam quem armati obsidebant.
-  Iidem acceptos ab agasonibus equos, quum rex ascensurus esset,
-  admovebant; comitabanturque et venantem, et in præliis,
-  omnibus artibus studiorum liberalium exculti. Præcipuus honor
-  habebatur, quod licebat sedentibus vesci cum rege. Castigandi eos
-  verberibus nullius potestas præter ipsum erat. Hæc cohors velut
-  seminarium ducum præfectorumque apud Macedonas fuit: hinc habuere
-  posteri reges, quorum stirpibus post multas ætates Romani opes
-  ademerunt.” Compare Curtius, v. 6, 42; and Ælian, V. H. xiv. 49.
-
-  This information is interesting, as an illustration of Macedonian
-  manners and customs, which are very little known to us. In the
-  last hours of the Macedonian monarchy, after the defeat at Pydna
-  (168 B. C.), the _pueri regii_ followed the defeated
-  king Perseus to the sanctuary at Samothrace, and never quitted
-  him until the moment when he surrendered himself to the Romans
-  (Livy, xlv. 5).
-
-  As an illustration of the scourging, applied as a punishment to
-  these young Macedonians of rank, see the case of Dekamnichus,
-  handed over by king Archelaus to Euripides, to be flogged
-  (Aristotle, Polit. v. 8, 13).
-
-  [141] Curtius, v. 6, 42; Diodor. xvii. 65.
-
-  [142] We read this about the youthful Philippus, brother of
-  Lysimachus (Curtius, viii. 2, 36).
-
-It was thus that the native Macedonian force was enlarged and
-diversified by Philip, including at his death—1. The phalanx,
-Foot-companions, or general mass of heavy infantry, drilled to
-the use of the long two-handed pike or sarissa—2. The Hypaspists,
-or lighter-armed corps of foot-guards—3. The Companions, or heavy
-cavalry, the ancient indigenous force consisting of the more opulent
-or substantial Macedonians—4. The lighter cavalry, lancers, or
-Sarissophori.—With these were joined foreign auxiliaries of great
-value. The Thessalians, whom Philip had partly subjugated and partly
-gained over, furnished him with a body of heavy cavalry not inferior
-to the native Macedonian. From various parts of Greece he derived
-hoplites, volunteers taken into his pay, armed with the full-sized
-shield and one-handed pike. From the warlike tribes of Thracians,
-Pæonians, Illyrians, etc., whom he had subdued around him, he levied
-contingents of light troops of various descriptions, peltasts,
-bowmen, darters, etc., all excellent in their way, and eminently
-serviceable to his combinations, in conjunction with the heavier
-masses. Lastly, Philip had completed his military arrangements by
-organizing what may be called an effective siege-train for sieges as
-well as for battles; a stock of projectile and battering machines,
-superior to anything at that time extant. We find this artillery used
-by Alexander in the very first year of his reign, in his campaign
-against the Illyrians.[143] Even in his most distant Indian marches,
-he either carried it with him, or had the means of constructing new
-engines for the occasion. There was no part of his military equipment
-more essential to his conquests. The victorious sieges of Alexander
-are among his most memorable exploits.
-
-  [143] Arrian, i. 6, 17.
-
-To all this large, multifarious, and systematized array of actual
-force, are to be added the civil establishments, the depôts,
-magazines of arms, provision for remounts, drill officers and
-adjutants, etc., indispensable for maintaining it in constant
-training and efficiency. At the time of Philip’s accession, Pella
-was an unimportant place;[144] at his death, it was not only strong
-as a fortification and place of deposit for regal treasure, but
-also the permanent centre, war-office, and training quarters, of
-the greatest military force then known. The military registers as
-well as the traditions of Macedonian discipline were preserved there
-until the fall of the monarchy.[145] Philip had employed his life in
-organizing this powerful instrument of dominion. His revenues, large
-as they were, both from mines and from tributary conquests, had been
-exhausted in the work, so that he had left at his decease a debt of
-500 talents. But his son Alexander found the instrument ready made,
-with excellent officers, and trained veterans for the front ranks of
-his phalanx.[146]
-
-  [144] Demosthenes, De Coronâ, p. 247.
-
-  [145] Livy. xlii. 51; xliv. 46, also the comparison in Strabo,
-  xvi. p. 752, between the military establishments of Seleukus
-  Nikator at Apameia in Syria, and those of Philip at Pella in
-  Macedonia.
-
-  [146] Justin, xi. 6. About the debt of 500 talents left by
-  Philip, see the words of Alexander, Arrian, vii. 9, 10. Diodorus
-  affirms (xvi. 8) that Philip’s annual return from the gold mines
-  was 1000 talents; a total not much to be trusted.
-
-This scientific organization of military force, on a large scale and
-with all the varieties of arming and equipment made to co-operate
-for one end, is the great fact of Macedonian history. Nothing of the
-same kind and magnitude had ever before been seen. The Macedonians,
-like Epirots and Ætolians, had no other aptitude or marking quality
-except those of soldiership. Their rude and scattered tribes manifest
-no definite political institutions and little sentiment of national
-brotherhood; their union was mainly that of occasional fellowship
-in arms under the king as chief. Philip the son of Amyntas was the
-first to organize this military union into a system permanently and
-efficaciously operative, achieving by means of it conquests such as
-to create in the Macedonians a common pride of superiority in arms,
-which served as substitute for political institutions or nationality.
-Such pride was still farther exalted by the really superhuman career
-of Alexander. The Macedonian kingdom was nothing but a well-combined
-military machine, illustrating the irresistible superiority of the
-rudest men, trained in arms and conducted by an able general, not
-merely over undisciplined multitudes, but also over free, courageous,
-and disciplined, citizenship with highly gifted intelligence.
-
-During the winter of 335-334 B. C., after the destruction of
-Thebes and the return of Alexander from Greece to Pella, his final
-preparations were made for the Asiatic expedition. The Macedonian
-army with the auxiliary contingents destined for this enterprise were
-brought together early in the spring. Antipater, one of the oldest
-and ablest officers of Philip, was appointed to act as viceroy of
-Macedonia during the king’s absence. A military force, stated at
-12,000 infantry and 1500 cavalry,[147] was left with him to keep
-down the cities of Greece, to resist aggressions from the Persian
-fleet, and to repress discontents at home. Such discontents were
-likely to be instigated by leading Macedonians or pretenders to the
-throne, especially as Alexander had no direct heir: and we are told
-that Antipater and Parmenio advised postponement of the expedition
-until the young king could leave behind him an heir of his own
-lineage.[148] Alexander overruled these representations; yet he did
-not disdain to lessen the perils at home by putting to death such men
-as he principally feared or mistrusted, especially the kinsmen of
-Philip’s last wife Kleopatra.[149] Of the dependent tribes around,
-the most energetic chiefs accompanied his army into Asia, either by
-their own preference or at his requisition. After these precautions,
-the tranquillity of Macedonia was entrusted to the prudence and
-fidelity of Antipater, which were still farther ensured by the fact
-that three of his sons accompanied the king’s army and person.[150]
-Though unpopular in his deportment,[151] Antipater discharged the
-duties of his very responsible position with zeal and ability;
-notwithstanding the dangerous enmity of Olympias, against whom he
-sent many complaints to Alexander when in Asia, whilst she on her
-side wrote frequent but unavailing letters with a view to ruin him in
-the esteem of her son. After a long period of unabated confidence,
-Alexander began during the last years of his life to dislike and
-mistrust Antipater. He always treated Olympias with the greatest
-respect; trying however to restrain her from meddling with political
-affairs, and complaining sometimes of her imperious exigencies and
-violence.[152]
-
-  [147] Diodor. xvii. 17.
-
-  [148] Diodor. xvii. 16.
-
-  [149] Justin, xi. 5. “Proficiscens ad Persicum bellum, omnes
-  novercæ suæ cognatos, quos Philippus in excelsiorem dignitatis
-  locum provehens imperiis præfecerat, interfecit. Sed nec suis,
-  qui apti regno videbantur, pepercit; ne qua materia seditionis
-  procul se agente in Macedoniâ remaneret.” Compare also xii. 6,
-  where the Pausanias mentioned as having been put to death by
-  Alexander is not the assassin of Philip. Pausanias was a common
-  Macedonian name (see Diodor. xvi. 93).
-
-  I see no reason for distrusting the general fact here asserted by
-  Justin. We know from Arrian (who mentioned the fact incidentally
-  in his work τὰ μετὰ Ἀλέξανδρον, though he says nothing about it
-  in his account of the expedition of Alexander—see Photius, Cod.
-  92. p. 220) that Alexander put to death, in the early period of
-  his reign, his first cousin and brother-in-law Amyntas. Much less
-  would he scruple to kill the friends or relatives of Kleopatra.
-  Neither Alexander nor Antipater would account such proceeding
-  anything else than a reasonable measure of prudential policy.
-  By the Macedonian common law, when a man was found guilty of
-  treason, all his relatives were condemned to die along with him
-  (Curtius, vi. 11, 20).
-
-  Plutarch (De Fortunâ Alex. Magn. p. 342) has a general allusion
-  to these precautionary executions ordered by Alexander. Fortune
-  (he says) imposed upon Alexander δεινὴν πρὸς ἄνδρας ὁμοφύλους
-  καὶ συγγενεῖς διὰ φόνου καὶ σιδήρου καὶ πυρὸς ἀνάγκην ἀμύνης,
-  ἀτερπέστατον τέλος ἔχουσαν.
-
-  [150] Kassander commanded a corps of Thracians and Pæonians:
-  Iollas and Philippus were attached to the king’s person (Arrian,
-  vii. 27, 2; Justin, xii. 14; Diodor. xvii. 17).
-
-  [151] Justin, xvi. 1, 14. “Antipatrum—amariorem semper ministrum
-  regni, quam ipsos reges, fuisse”, etc.
-
-  [152] Plutarch, Alexand. 25-39; Arrian, vii. 12, 12. He was wont
-  to say, that his mother exacted from him a heavy house-rent for
-  his domicile of ten months.
-
-  Kleopatra also (sister of Alexander and daughter of Olympias)
-  exercised considerable influence in the government. Dionysius,
-  despot of the Pontic Herakleia, maintained himself against
-  opposition in his government, during Alexander’s life, mainly by
-  paying assiduous court to her (Memnon. Heracl. c. 4. ap. Photium,
-  Cod. 224).
-
-The army intended for Asia, having been assembled at Pella, was
-conducted by Alexander himself first to Amphipolis, where it crossed
-the Strymon; next along the road near the coast to the river Nestus
-and to the towns of Abdêra and Maroneia; then through Thrace
-across the rivers Hebrus and Melas; lastly, through the Thracian
-Chersonese to Sestos. Here it was met by his fleet, consisting of 160
-triremes, with a number of trading vessels besides;[153] made up in
-large proportions from contingents furnished by Athens and Grecian
-cities.[154] The passage of the whole army, infantry, cavalry, and
-machines, on ships, across the strait from Sestos in Europe to Abydos
-in Asia,—was superintended by Parmenio, and accomplished without
-either difficulty or resistance. But Alexander himself, separating
-from the army at Sestos, went down to Elæus at the southern extremity
-of the Chersonese. Here stood the chapel and sacred precinct of the
-hero Protesilaus, who was slain by Hektor; having been the first
-Greek (according to the legend of the Trojan war) who touched the
-shore of Troy. Alexander, whose imagination was then full of Homeric
-reminiscences, offered sacrifice to the hero, praying that his own
-disembarkation might terminate more auspiciously.
-
-  [153] Arrian, i. 11, 9.
-
-  [154] The Athenians furnished twenty ships of war. Diodor. xvii.
-  22.
-
-He then sailed across in the admiral’s trireme, steering with his
-own hand, to the landing place near Ilium called the Harbor of the
-Achæans. At mid-channel of the strait, he sacrificed a bull, with
-libations out of a golden goblet, to Poseidon and the Nereids.
-Himself too in full armor, he was the first (like Protesilaus)
-to tread the Asiatic shore; but he found no enemy like Hektor to
-meet him. From hence, mounting the hill on which Ilium was placed,
-he sacrificed to the patron-goddess Athênê; and deposited in her
-temple his own panoply, taking in exchange some of the arms said
-to have been worn by the heroes in the Trojan war, which he caused
-to be carried by guards along with him in his subsequent battles.
-Among other real or supposed monuments of this interesting legend,
-the Ilians showed to him the residence of Priam with its altar of
-Zeus Herkeios, where that unhappy old king was alleged to have been
-slain by Neoptolemus. Numbering Neoptolemus among his ancestors,
-Alexander felt himself to be the object of Priam’s yet unappeased
-wrath; and accordingly offered sacrifice to him at the same altar,
-for the purpose of expiation and reconciliation. On the tomb and
-monumental column of Achilles, father of Neoptolemus, he not only
-placed a decorative garland, but also went through the customary
-ceremony of anointing himself with oil and running naked round it:
-exclaiming how much he envied the lot of Achilles, who had been blest
-during life with a faithful friend, and after death, with a great
-poet to celebrate his exploits. Lastly, to commemorate his crossing,
-Alexander erected permanent altars, in honor of Zeus, Athênê, and
-Hêraklês; both on the point of Europe which his army had quitted, and
-on that of Asia where it had landed.[155]
-
-  [155] Arrian, i. 11; Plutarch, Alexand. 15; Justin, xi. 5. The
-  ceremony of running round the column of Achilles still subsisted
-  in the time of Plutarch—ἀλειψάμενος λίπα καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἑταίρων
-  συναναδραμὼν γυμνὸς, ~ὥσπερ ἔθος ἔστιν~, etc. Philostratus,
-  five centuries after Alexander, conveys a vivid picture of the
-  numerous legendary and religious associations connected with the
-  plain of Troy and with the tomb of Protesilaus at Elæus, and of
-  the many rites and ceremonies performed there even in his time
-  (Philostrat. Heroica, xix. 14, 15. p. 742, ed. Olearius—δρόμοις
-  δ᾽ ἐῤῥυθμισμένοις συνηλάλαζον, ἀνακαλοῦντες τὸν Ἀχιλλέα, etc.,
-  and the pages preceding and following).
-
-  Dikæarchus (Fragm. 19, ed. Didot. ap. Athenæum, xiii. p. 603)
-  had treated in a special work about the sacrifices offered to
-  Athênê at Ilium (Περὶ τῆς ἐν Ἰλίῳ θυσίας) by Alexander, and
-  by many others before him; by Xerxes (Herodot. vii. 43), who
-  offered up 1000 oxen—by Mindarus (Xenoph. Hellen. i. 1, 4), etc.
-  In describing the proceedings of Alexander at Ilium, Dikæarchus
-  appears he have dwelt much on the warm sympathy which that prince
-  exhibited for the affection between Achilles and Patroklus: which
-  sympathy Dikæarchus illustrated by characterizing Alexander as
-  φιλόπαις ἐκμανῶς, and by recounting his public admiration for the
-  eunuch Bagôas: compare Curtius, x. i. 25—about Bagôas.
-
-The proceedings of Alexander, on the ever-memorable site of Ilium,
-are interesting as they reveal one side of his imposing character—the
-vein of legendary sympathy and religious sentiment wherein alone
-consisted his analogy with the Greeks. The young Macedonian prince
-had nothing of that sense of correlative right and obligation,
-which characterized the free Greeks of the city-community. But he
-was in many points a reproduction of the heroic Greeks,[156] his
-warlike ancestors in legend, Achilles and Neoptolemus, and others
-of that Æakid race, unparalleled in the attributes of force—a man
-of violent impulse in all directions, sometimes generous, often
-vindictive—ardent in his individual affections both of love and
-hatred, but devoured especially by an inextinguishable pugnacity,
-appetite for conquest, and thirst for establishing at all cost his
-superiority of force over others—“Jura negat sibi nata, nihil non
-arrogat armis”—taking pride, not simply in victorious generalship
-and direction of the arms of soldiers, but also in the personal
-forwardness of an Homeric chief, the foremost to encounter both
-danger and hardship. To dispositions resembling those of Achilles,
-Alexander indeed added one attribute of a far higher order. As a
-general, he surpassed his age in provident and even long-sighted
-combinations. With all his exuberant courage and sanguine temper,
-nothing was ever omitted in the way of systematic military
-precaution. Thus much be borrowed, though with many improvements of
-his own, from Grecian intelligence as applied to soldiership. But the
-character and dispositions, which he took with him to Asia, had the
-features, both striking and repulsive, of Achilles, rather than those
-of Agesilaus or Epaminondas.
-
-  [156] Plutarch, Fort. Al. M. ii. p. 334. Βριθὺς ὁπλιτοπάλας,
-  δαΐος ἀντιπάλοις—ταύτην ἔχων τέχνην προγονικὴν ἀπ᾽ Αἰακιδῶν, etc.
-
-    Ἄλκην μὲν γὰρ ἔδωκεν Ὀλύμπιος Αἰακίδησι,
-    Νοῦν δ᾽ Ἀμυθαονίδαις, πλοῦτον δ᾽ ἔπορ᾽ Ἀτρεΐδῃσιν.
-
-  (Hesiod. Fragment. 223, ed. Marktscheffel.)
-
-  Like Achilles, Alexander was distinguished for swiftness of foot
-  (Plutarch, Fort. Al. M. i. p. 331).
-
-The army, when reviewed on the Asiatic shore after its crossing,
-presented a total of 30,000 infantry, and 4500 cavalry, thus
-distributed:—
-
-                    INFANTRY.
-
-  Macedonian phalanx and hypaspists                          12,000
-      Allies                                                  7,000
-      Mercenaries                                             5,000
-                                                             ------
-  Under the command of Parmenio                              24,000
-  Odryssians, Triballi (both Thracians), and Illyrians        5,000
-  Agriânes and archers                                        1,000
-                                                             ------
-                Total Infantry                               30,000
-
-                    CAVALRY.
-
-  Macedonian heavy—under Philotas son of Parmenio             1,500
-  Thessalian (also heavy)—under Kallas                        1,500
-  Miscellaneous Grecian—under Erigyius                          600
-  Thracian and Pæonian (light)—under Kassander                  900
-                                                             ------
-                Total Cavalry                                 4,500
-
-Such seems the most trustworthy enumeration of Alexander’s first
-invading army. There were however other accounts, the highest of
-which stated as much as 43,000 infantry with 4000 cavalry.[157]
-Besides these troops, also, there must have been an effective train
-of projectile machines and engines, for battles and sieges, which
-we shall soon find in operation. As to money, the military chest of
-Alexander, exhausted in part by profuse donatives to his Macedonian
-officers,[158] was as poorly furnished as that of Napoleon Buonaparte
-on first entering Italy for his brilliant campaign of 1796. According
-to Aristobulus, he had with him only seventy talents; according to
-another authority, no more than the means of maintaining his army
-for thirty days. Nor had he even been able to bring together his
-auxiliaries, or complete the outfit of his army, without incurring a
-debt of 800 talents, in addition to that of 500 talents contracted by
-his father Philip.[159] Though Plutarch[160] wonders at the smallness
-of the force with which Alexander contemplated the execution of such
-great projects, yet the fact is, that in infantry he was far above
-any force which the Persians had to oppose him;[161] not to speak
-of comparative discipline and organization, surpassing even that of
-the Grecian mercenaries, who formed the only good infantry in the
-Persian service; while his cavalry, though inferior as to number, was
-superior in quality and in the shock of close combat.
-
-  [157] Diodor. xvii. 17. Plutarch (Alexand. 15) says that the
-  highest numbers which he had read of, were,—43,000 infantry with
-  5000 cavalry: the lowest numbers, 30,000 infantry with 4000
-  cavalry (assuming the correction of Sintenis, τετρακισχιλίους
-  in place of πεντακισχιλίους, to be well founded, as it probably
-  is—compare Plutarch, Fort. Alex. M. i. p. 327).
-
-  According to Plutarch (Fort. Al. M. p. 327), both Ptolemy and
-  Aristobulus stated the number of infantry to be 30,000; but
-  Ptolemy gave the cavalry as 5000, Aristobulus, as only 4000.
-  Nevertheless, Arrian—who professes to follow mainly Ptolemy and
-  Aristobulus, whenever they agree—states the number of infantry
-  as “not much more than 30,000; the cavalry as more than 5000”
-  (Exp. Al. i. 11, 4). Anaximenes alleged 43,000 infantry, with
-  5500 cavalry. Kallisthenes (ap. Polybium. xii. 19) stated
-  40,000 infantry, with 4500 cavalry. Justin (xi. 6) gives 32,000
-  infantry, with 4500 cavalry.
-
-  My statement in the text follows Diodorus, who stands
-  distinguished, by recounting not merely the total, but the
-  component items besides. In regard to the total of infantry, he
-  agrees with Ptolemy and Aristobulus: as to cavalry, his statement
-  is a mean between the two.
-
-  [158] Plutarch, Alexand. 15.
-
-  [159] Arrian, vii. 9, 10—the speech which he puts in the mouth of
-  Alexander himself—and Curtius, x. 2, 24.
-
-  Onesikritus stated that Alexander owed at this time a debt of 200
-  talents (Plutarch, Alex. 15).
-
-  [160] Plutarch, Fort. Alex. M. i. p. 327; Justin, xi. 6.
-
-  [161] Arrian, i. 13, 4.
-
-Most of the officers exercising important command in Alexander’s army
-were native Macedonians. His intimate personal friend Hephæstion,
-as well as his body-guards Leonnatus and Lysimachus, were natives
-of Pella: Ptolemy the son of Lagus, and Pithon, were Eordians from
-Upper Macedonia; Kraterus and Perdikkas, from the district of Upper
-Macedonia called Orestis;[162] Antipater with his son Kassander,
-Kleitus son of Drôpides, Parmenio with his two sons Philôtas and
-Nikanor, Seleukus, Kœnus, Amyntas, Philippus (these two last names
-were borne by more than one person), Antigonus, Neoptolemus,[163]
-Meleager, Peukestes, etc., all these seem to have been native
-Macedonians. All or most of them had been trained to war under
-Philip, in whose service Parmenio and Antipater, especially, had
-occupied a high rank.
-
-  [162] Arrian, vi. 28, 6; Arrian, Indica, 18; Justin, xv. 3-4.
-  Porphyry (Fragm. ap. Syncellum, Frag. Histor. Græc. vol. iii. p.
-  695-698) speaks of Lysimachus as a Thessalian from Kranon; but
-  this must be a mistake: compare Justin, xv. 3.
-
-  [163] Neoptolemus belonged, like Alexander himself, to the Æakid
-  gens (Arrian, ii. 27, 9).
-
-Of the many Greeks in Alexander’s service, we hear of few in
-important station. Medius, a Thessalian from Larissa, was among his
-familiar companions; but the ablest and most distinguished of all
-was Eumenes, a native of Kardia in the Thracian Chersonese. Eumenes,
-combining an excellent Grecian education with bodily activity and
-enterprise, had attracted when a young man the notice of Philip
-and had been appointed as his secretary. After discharging these
-duties for seven years until the death of Philip, he was continued
-by Alexander in the post of chief secretary during the whole of that
-king’s life.[164] He conducted most of Alexander’s correspondence,
-and the daily record of his proceedings, which was kept under the
-name of the Royal Ephemerides. But though his special duties were
-thus of a civil character, he was not less eminent as an officer in
-the field. Occasionally entrusted with high military command, he
-received from Alexander signal recompenses and tokens of esteem. In
-spite of these great qualities—or perhaps in consequence of them—he
-was the object of marked jealousy and dislike[165] on the part of the
-Macedonians,—from Hephæstion the friend, and Neoptolemus the chief
-armor-bearer, of Alexander, down to the principal soldiers of the
-phalanx. Neoptolemus despised Eumenes as an unwarlike penman. The
-contemptuous pride with which Macedonians had now come to look down
-on Greeks, is a notable characteristic of the victorious army of
-Alexander, as well as a new feature in history; retorting the ancient
-Hellenic sentiment in which Demosthenes, a few years before, had
-indulged towards the Macedonians.[166]
-
-  [164] Plutarch, Eumenes, c. 1; Cornelius Nepos, Eumen. c. 1.
-
-  [165] Arrian, vii. 13, 1; Plutarch, Eum. 2, 3, 8, 10.
-
-  [166] Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 19, respecting Philip—οὐ μόνον
-  οὐχ Ἕλληνος ὄντος, οὐδὲ προσήκοντος οὐδὲν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ
-  βαρβάρου ἐντεῦθεν ὅθεν καλὸν εἰπεῖν, ~ἀλλ᾽ ὀλέθρου Μακεδόνος~,
-  ὅθεν οὐδ᾽ ἀνδράποδον σπουδαῖον οὐδὲν ἦν πρότερον πρίασθαι.
-
-  Compare this with the exclamations of the Macedonian soldiers
-  (called Argyraspides) against their distinguished chief Eumenes,
-  calling him Χεῤῥονησίτης ὄλεθρος (Plutarch, Eumenes, 18).
-
-Though Alexander has been allowed to land in Asia unopposed, an army
-was already assembled under the Persian satraps within a few days’
-march of Abydos. Since the reconquest of Egypt and Phenicia, about
-eight or nine years before, by the Persian king Ochus, the power of
-that empire had been restored to a point equal to any anterior epoch
-since the repulse of Xerxes from Greece. The Persian successes in
-Egypt had been achieved mainly by the arms of Greek mercenaries,
-under the conduct and through the craft of the Rhodian general
-Mentor; who, being seconded by the preponderant influence of the
-eunuch Bagôas, confidential minister of Ochus, obtained not only
-ample presents, but also the appointment of military commander on the
-Hellespont and the Asiatic seaboard.[167] He procured the recall of
-his brother Memnon, who with his brother-in-law Artabazus had been
-obliged to leave Asia from unsuccessful revolt against the Persians,
-and had found shelter with Philip.[168] He farther subdued, by force
-or by fraud, various Greek and Asiatic chieftains on the Asiatic
-coast; among them, the distinguished Hermeias, friend of Aristotle,
-and master of the strong post of Atarneus.[169] These successes of
-Mentor seem to have occurred about 343 B. C. He, and his brother
-Memnon after him, upheld vigorously the authority of the Persian king
-in the regions near the Hellespont. It was probably by them that
-troops were sent across the strait both to rescue the besieged town
-of Perinthus from Philip, and to act against that prince in other
-parts of Thrace;[170] that an Asiatic chief, who was intriguing
-to facilitate Philip’s intended invasion of Asia, was seized and
-sent prisoner to the Persian court; and that envoys from Athens,
-soliciting aid against Philip, were forwarded to the same place.[171]
-
-  [167] See, in reference to these incidents, my last preceding
-  volume, Vol. XI. Ch. xc. p. 441 _seq._
-
-  [168] Diodor. xvi. 52; Curtius, vi. 4, 25; vi. 5, 2. Curtius
-  mentions also Manapis, another Persian exile, who had fled from
-  Ochus to Philip.
-
-  [169] Diodor. xvi. 52. About the strength of the fortress of
-  Athens, see Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 2, 11; Diodor. xiii. 64. It had
-  been held in defiance of the Persians, even before the time of
-  Hermeias—Isokrates. Compare also Isokrates, Or. iv. (Panegyr.) s.
-  167.
-
-  [170] Letter of Alexander, addressed to Darius after the battle
-  of Issus, apud Arrian, ii. 14, 7. Other troops sent by the
-  Persians into Thrace (besides those despatched to the relief of
-  Perinthus), are here alluded to.
-
-  [171] Demosthenes, Philippic. iv. p. 139, 140; Epistola Philippi
-  apud Demosthen. p. 160.
-
-Ochus, though successful in regaining the full extent of Persian
-dominion, was a sanguinary tyrant, who shed by wholesale the blood
-of his family and courtiers. About the year 338 B. C., he
-died, poisoned by the eunuch Bagôas, who placed upon the throne
-Arses, one of the king’s sons, killing all the rest. After two
-years, however, Bagôas conceived mistrust of Arses, and put him to
-death also, together with all his children; thus leaving no direct
-descendant of the regal family alive. He then exalted to the throne
-one of his friends named Darius Codomannus (descended from one of the
-brothers of Artaxerxes Memnon), who had acquired glory, in a recent
-war against the Kadusians, by killing in single combat a formidable
-champion of the enemy’s army. Presently, however, Bagôas attempted to
-poison Darius also; but the latter, detecting the snare, forced him
-to drink the deadly draught himself.[172] In spite of such murders
-and change in the line of succession, which Alexander afterwards
-reproached to Darius[173]—the authority of Darius seems to have been
-recognized, without any material opposition, throughout all the
-Persian empire.
-
-  [172] Diodor. xvii. 5; Justin, x. 3; Curtius, x. 5, 22.
-
-  [173] Arrian, ii. 14, 10.
-
-Succeeding to the throne in the early part of B. C. 336,
-when Philip was organizing the projected invasion of Persia, and when
-the first Macedonian division under Parmenio and Attalus was already
-making war in Asia—Darius prepared measures of defence at home,
-and tried to encourage anti-Macedonian movements in Greece.[174]
-On the assassination of Philip by Pausanias, the Persian king
-publicly proclaimed himself (probably untruly) as having instigated
-the deed, and alluded in contemptuous terms to the youthful
-Alexander.[175] Conceiving the danger from Macedonia to be past, he
-imprudently slackened his efforts and withheld his supplies during
-the first months of Alexander’s reign, when the latter might have
-been seriously embarrassed in Greece and in Europe by the effective
-employment of Persian ships and money. But the recent successes of
-Alexander in Thrace, Illyria, and Bœotia, satisfied Darius that
-the danger was not past, so that he resumed his preparations for
-defence. The Phenician fleet was ordered to be equipped: the satraps
-in Phrygia and Lydia got together a considerable force, consisting
-in part of Grecian mercenaries; while Memnon, on the seaboard, was
-furnished with the means of taking 5000 of these mercenaries under
-his separate command.[176]
-
-  [174] Diodor. xvii. 7.
-
-  [175] Arrian, ii. 14, 11.
-
-  [176] Diodor. xvii. 7.
-
-We cannot trace with any exactness the course of these events,
-during the nineteen months between Alexander’s accession and his
-landing in Asia (August 336 B. C., to March or April 334 B. C.) We
-learn generally that Memnon was active and even aggressive on the
-north-eastern coast of the Ægean. Marching northward from his own
-territory (the region of Assus or Atarneus skirting the Gulf of
-Adramyttium[177]) across the range of Mount Ida, he came suddenly
-upon the town of Kyzikus on the Propontis. He failed, however, though
-only by a little, in his attempt to surprise it, and was forced to
-content himself with a rich booty from the district around.[178]
-The Macedonian generals Parmenio and Kallas had crossed into Asia
-with bodies of troops. Parmenio, acting in Æolis, took Grynium, but
-was compelled by Memnon to raise the siege of Pitanê; while Kallas,
-in the Troad, was attacked, defeated, and compelled to retire to
-Rhœteium.[179]
-
-  [177] Diodor. xvii. 7: compare Arrian, i. 17, 9. ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν
-  τὴν Μέμνονος ἔπεμψεν—which doubtless means this region, conquered
-  by Mentor from Hermeias of Atarneus.
-
-  [178] Diodor. xvii. 7; Polyænus, v. 34, 5.
-
-  [179] Diodor. xvii. 7. We read also of military operations near
-  Magnesia between Parmenio and Memnon (Polyænus, v. 34, 4).
-
-We thus see that during the season preceding the landing of
-Alexander, the Persians were in considerable force, and Memnon both
-active and successful even against the Macedonian generals, on the
-region north-east of the Ægean. This may help to explain that fatal
-imprudence, whereby the Persians permitted Alexander to carry over
-without opposition his grand army into Asia, in the spring of 334
-B. C. They possessed ample means of guarding the Hellespont,
-had they chosen to bring up their fleet, which, comprising as it
-did the force of the Phenician towns, was decidedly superior to
-any naval armament at the disposal of Alexander. The Persian fleet
-actually came into the Ægean a few weeks afterwards. Now Alexander’s
-designs, preparations, and even intended time of march, must have
-been well known not merely to Memnon, but to the Persian satraps in
-Asia Minor, who had got together troops to oppose him. These satraps
-unfortunately supposed themselves to be a match for him in the field,
-disregarding the pronounced opinion of Memnon to the contrary, and
-even overruling his prudent advice by mistrustful and calumnious
-imputations.
-
-At the time of Alexander’s landing, a powerful Persian force was
-already assembled near Zeleia in the Hellespontine Phrygia, under
-command of Arsites the Phrygian satrap, supported by several
-other leading Persians—Spithridates (satrap of Lydia and Ionia),
-Pharnakes, Atizyes, Mithridates, Rhomithres, Niphates, Petines,
-etc. Forty of these men were of high rank (denominated kinsmen of
-Darius), and distinguished for personal valor. The greater number
-of the army consisted of cavalry, including Medes, Baktrians,
-Hyrkanians, Kappadokians, Paphlagonians, etc.[180] In cavalry they
-greatly outnumbered Alexander; but their infantry was much inferior
-in number,[181] composed however, in large proportion, of Grecian
-mercenaries. The Persian total is given by Arrian as 20,000 cavalry,
-and nearly 20,000 mercenary foot; by Diodorus as 10,000 cavalry, and
-100,000 infantry; by Justin even at 600,000. The numbers of Arrian
-are the more credible; in those of Diodorus, the total of infantry is
-certainly much above the truth—that of cavalry probably below it.
-
-  [180] Diodor. xvii. 18, 19; Arrian, i. 12, 14; i. 16, 5.
-
-  [181] Arrian, i. 12, 16; i. 13, 4.
-
-Memnon, who was present with his sons and with his own division,
-earnestly dissuaded the Persian leaders from hazarding a battle.
-Reminding them that the Macedonians were not only much superior in
-infantry, but also encouraged by the leadership of Alexander—he
-enforced the necessity of employing their numerous cavalry to destroy
-the forage and provisions, and if necessary, even towns themselves—in
-order to render any considerable advance of the invading force
-impracticable. While keeping strictly on the defensive in Asia, he
-recommended that aggressive war should be carried into Macedonia;
-that the fleet should be brought up, a powerful land-force put
-aboard, and strenuous efforts made, not only to attack the vulnerable
-points of Alexander at home, but also to encourage active hostility
-against him from the Greeks and other neighbors.[182]
-
-  [182] Compare the policy recommended by Memnon, as set forth in
-  Arrian (i. 12, 16), and in Diodorus (xvii. 18). The superiority
-  of Diodorus is here incontestable. He proclaims distinctly
-  both the defensive and the offensive side of Memnon’s policy;
-  which, when taken together, form a scheme of operations no less
-  effective than prudent. But Arrian omits all notice of the
-  offensive policy, and mentions only the defensive—the retreat and
-  destruction of the country; which, if adopted alone, could hardly
-  have been reckoned upon for success, in starving out Alexander,
-  and might reasonably be called in question by the Persian
-  generals. Moreover, we should form but a poor idea of Memnon’s
-  ability, if in this emergency he neglected to avail himself of
-  the irresistible Persian fleet.
-
-  I notice the rather this point of superiority of Diodorus,
-  because recent critics have manifested a tendency to place too
-  exclusive a confidence in Arrian, and to discredit almost all
-  allegations respecting Alexander except such as Arrian either
-  certifies or countenances. Arrian is a very valuable historian;
-  he has the merit of giving us plain narrative without rhetoric,
-  which contrasts favorably both with Diodorus and with Curtius;
-  but he must not be set up as the only trustworthy witness.
-
-Had this plan been energetically executed by Persian arms and money,
-we can hardly doubt that Antipater in Macedonia would speedily have
-found himself pressed by serious dangers and embarrassments, and that
-Alexander would have been forced to come back and protect his own
-dominions; perhaps prevented by the Persian fleet from bringing back
-his whole army. At any rate, his schemes of Asiatic invasion must for
-the time have been suspended. But he was rescued from this dilemma
-by the ignorance, pride, and pecuniary interests of the Persian
-leaders. Unable to appreciate Alexander’s military superiority,
-and conscious at the same time of their own personal bravery, they
-repudiated the proposition of retreat as dishonorable, insinuating
-that Memnon desired to prolong the war in order to exalt his own
-importance in the eyes of Darius. This sentiment of military dignity
-was farther strengthened by the fact, that the Persian military
-leaders, deriving all their revenues from the land, would have been
-impoverished by destroying the landed produce. Arsites, in whose
-territory the army stood, and upon whom the scheme would first take
-effect, haughtily announced that he would not permit a single house
-in it to be burnt.[183] Occupying the same satrapy as Pharnabazus had
-possessed sixty years before, he felt that he would be reduced to
-the same straits as Pharnabazus under the pressure of Agesilaus—“of
-not being able to procure a dinner in his own country”.[184] The
-proposition of Memnon was rejected, and it was resolved to await the
-arrival of Alexander on the banks of the river Granikus.
-
-  [183] Arrian, i. 12, 18.
-
-  [184] Xenophon, Hellenic. iv. 1, 33.
-
-This unimportant stream, commemorated in the Iliad, and immortalized
-by its association with the name of Alexander, takes its rise
-from one of the heights of Mount Ida near Skêpsis,[185] and flows
-northward into the Propontis, which it reaches at a point somewhat
-east of the Greek town of Parium. It is of no great depth: near the
-point where the Persians encamped, it seems to have been fordable in
-many places; but its right bank was somewhat high and steep, thus
-offering obstruction to an enemy’s attack. The Persians, marching
-forward from Zeleia, took up a position near the eastern side of
-the Granikus, where the last declivities of Mount Ida descend into
-the plain of Adrasteia, a Greek city situated between Priapus and
-Parium.[186]
-
-  [185] Strabo, xiii. p. 602. The rivers Skamander, Æsepus, and
-  Granikus, all rise from the same height, called Kotylus. This
-  comes from Demetrius, a native of Skepsis.
-
-  [186] Diodor. xvii. 18, 19. Οἱ βάρβαροι, τὴν ὑπώρειαν
-  κατειλημμένοι, etc. “prima congressio in campis Adrastiis fuit.”
-  Justin, xi. 6: compare Strabo, xiii. p. 587, 588.
-
-Meanwhile Alexander marched onward towards this position, from Arisbê
-(where he had reviewed his army)—on the first day to Perkôtê, on the
-second to the river Praktius, on the third to Hermôtus; receiving
-on his way the spontaneous surrender of the town of Priapus. Aware
-that the enemy was not far distant, he threw out in advance a body of
-scouts under Amyntas, consisting of four squadrons of light cavalry
-and one of the heavy Macedonian (Companion) cavalry. From Hermôtus
-(the fourth day from Arisbê) he marched direct towards the Granikus,
-in careful order, with his main phalanx in double files, his cavalry
-on each wing, and the baggage in the rear. On approaching the river,
-he made his dispositions for immediate attack, though Parmenio
-advised waiting until the next morning. Knowing well, like Memnon on
-the other side, that the chances of a pitched battle were all against
-the Persians, he resolved to leave them no opportunity of decamping
-during the night.
-
-In Alexander’s array, the phalanx or heavy infantry formed the
-central body. The six Taxeis or divisions, of which it consisted,
-were commanded (reckoning from right to left) by Perdikkas, Kœnus,
-Amyntas son of Andromenes, Philippus, Meleager, and Kraterus.[187]
-Immediately on the right of the phalanx, were the hypaspistæ,
-or light infantry, under Nikanor son of Parmenio—then the light
-horse or lancers, the Pæonians, and the Apolloniate squadron of
-Companion-cavalry commanded by the Ilarch Sokrates, all under
-Amyntas son of Arrhibæus—lastly the full body of Companion-cavalry,
-the bowmen, and the Agrianian darters, all under Philôtas (son of
-Parmenio), whose division formed the extreme right.[188] The left
-flank of the phalanx was in like manner protected by three distinct
-divisions of cavalry or lighter troops—first, by the Thracians,
-under Agathon—next, by the cavalry of the allies, under Philippus,
-son of Menelaus—lastly, by the Thessalian cavalry, under Kallas,
-whose division formed the extreme left. Alexander himself took the
-command of the right, giving that of the left to Parmenio; by right
-and left are meant the two halves of the army, each of them including
-three Taxeis or divisions of the phalanx with the cavalry on its
-flank—for there was no recognized centre under a distinct command. On
-the other side of the Granikus, the Persian cavalry lined the bank.
-The Medes and Baktrians were on their right, under Rheomithres—the
-Paphlagonians and Hyrkanians in the centre, under Arsites and
-Spithridates—on the left were Memnon and Arsamenes, with their
-divisions.[189] The Persian infantry, both Asiatic and Grecian, were
-kept back in reserve; the cavalry alone being relied upon to dispute
-the passage of the river.
-
-  [187] Arrian, i. 14, 3. The text of Arrian is not clear. The name
-  of Kraterus occurs twice. Various explanations are proposed.
-  The words ἔστε ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον τῆς ξυμπάσης τάξεως seem to prove
-  that there were three τάξεις of the phalanx (Kraterus, Meleager,
-  and Philippus) included in the left half of the army—and three
-  others (Perdikkas, Kœnus, and Amyntas) in the right half; while
-  the words ἐπὶ δὲ, ἡ Κρατέρου τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου appear wrongly
-  inserted. There is no good reason for admitting two distinguished
-  officers, each named Kraterus. The name of Philippus and his
-  τάξις is repeated twice; once in counting from the right of the
-  τάξεις,—once again in counting from the left.
-
-  [188] Plutarch states that Alexander struck into the river with
-  thirteen squadrons (ἴλαι) of cavalry. Whether this total includes
-  all then present in the field, or only the Companion-cavalry—we
-  cannot determine (Plutarch, Alex. 16).
-
-  [189] Diodor. xvii. 19.
-
-In this array, both parties remained for some time, watching each
-other in anxious silence.[190] There being no firing or smoke, as
-with modern armies, all the details on each side were clearly visible
-to the other; so that the Persians easily recognized Alexander
-himself on the Macedonian right from the splendor of his armor and
-military costume, as well as from the respectful demeanor of those
-around him. Their principal leaders accordingly thronged to their
-own left, which they reinforced with the main strength of their
-cavalry, in order to oppose him personally. Presently he addressed
-a few words of encouragement to the troops, and gave the order for
-advance. He directed the first attack to be made by the squadron of
-Companion-cavalry whose turn it was on that day to take the lead—(the
-squadron of Apollonia, of which Sokrates was captain—commanded on
-this day by Ptolemæus son of Philippus) supported by the light horse
-or Lancers, the Pæonian darters (infantry), and one division of
-regularly armed infantry, seemingly hypaspistæ.[191] He then himself
-entered the river, at the head of the right half of the army, cavalry
-and infantry, which advanced under sound of trumpets and with the
-usual war-shouts. As the occasional depths of water prevented a
-straightforward march with one uniform line, the Macedonians slanted
-their course suitably to the fordable spaces; keeping their front
-extended so as to approach the opposite bank as much as possible in
-line, and not in separate columns with flanks exposed to the Persian
-cavalry.[192] Not merely the right under Alexander, but also the left
-under Parmenio, advanced and crossed in the same movement and under
-the like precautions.
-
-  [190] Arrian, i. 14, 8. Χρόνον μὲν δὴ ἀμφότερα τὰ στρατεύματα,
-  ἐπ᾽ ἀκροῦ τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἐφεστῶτες, ὑπὸ τοῦ τὸ μέλλον ὀκνεῖν ἡσυχίαν
-  ἦγον· καὶ σιγὴ ἦν πολλὴ ἀφ᾽ ἑκατέρων.
-
-  [191] Arrian, i. 14, 9. τοὺς προδρόμους ἱππέας mean the same
-  cavalry as those who are called (in 14, 2) σαρισσοφόρους ἱππέας,
-  under Amyntas son of Arrhibæus.
-
-  [192] Arrian, i. 14, 10. Αὐτὸς δὲ (Alexander) ἄγων τὸ δέξιον
-  κέρας ... ἐμβαίνει ἐς τὸν πόρον, λοξὴν ἀεὶ παρατείνων τὴν τάξιν,
-  ᾗ παρεῖλκε τὸ ῥεῦμα, ἵνα δὴ μὴ ἐκβαίνοντι αὐτῷ οἱ Πέρσαι κατὰ
-  κέρας προσπίπτοιεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς, ὡς ἀνυστὸν, τῇ φάλαγγι
-  προσμίξῃ αὐτοῖς.
-
-  Apparently, this passage λοξὴν ἀεὶ παρατείνων τὴν τάξιν, ᾗ
-  παρεῖλκε τὸ ῥεῦμα is to be interpreted by the phrase which
-  follows describing the purpose to be accomplished.
-
-  I cannot think that the words imply a movement _in échelon_,
-  as Rüstow and Köchly contend (Geschichte des Griechischen
-  Kriegswesens, p. 271)—nor a crossing of the river against the
-  stream, to break the force of the current, as is the opinion of
-  others.
-
-The foremost detachment under Ptolemy and Amyntas, on reaching the
-opposite bank, encountered a strenuous resistance, concentrated as it
-was here upon one point. They found Memnon and his sons with the best
-of the Persian cavalry immediately in their front; some on the summit
-of the bank, from whence they hurled down their javelins—others
-down at the water’s-edge, so as to come to closer quarters. The
-Macedonians tried every effort to make good their landing, and push
-their way by main force through the Persian horse, but in vain.
-Having both lower ground and insecure footing, they could make no
-impression, but were thrust back with some loss, and retired upon the
-main body which Alexander was now bringing across. On his approaching
-the shore, the same struggle was renewed around his person with
-increased fervor on both sides. He was himself among the foremost,
-and all near him were animated by his example. The horsemen on both
-sides became jammed together, and the contest was one of physical
-force and pressure by man and horse; but the Macedonians had a great
-advantage in being accustomed to the use of the strong close-fighting
-pike, while the Persian weapon was the missile javelin. At length
-the resistance was surmounted, and Alexander with those around him,
-gradually thrusting back the defenders, made good their way up the
-high bank to the level ground. At other points the resistance was not
-equally vigorous. The left and centre of the Macedonians, crossing
-at the same time on all practicable spaces along the whole line,
-overpowered the Persians stationed on the slope, and got up to the
-level ground with comparative facility.[193] Indeed no cavalry could
-possibly stand on the bank to offer opposition to the phalanx with
-its array of long pikes, wherever this could reach the ascent in
-any continuous front. The easy crossing of the Macedonians at other
-points helped to constrain those Persians, who were contending with
-Alexander himself on the slope, to recede to the level ground above.
-
-  [193] Arrian, i. 15, 5. Καὶ περὶ αὐτὸν (Alexander himself)
-  ξυνειστήκει μάχη καρτερὰ, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἄλλαι ἐπ᾽ ἄλλαις τῶν
-  τάξεων τοῖς Μακεδόσι διέβαινον οὐ χαλεπῶς ἤδη.
-
-  These words deserve attention, because they show how incomplete
-  Arrian’s description of the battle had before been. Dwelling
-  almost exclusively upon the personal presence and achievements
-  of Alexander, he had said little even about the right half of
-  the army, and nothing at all about the left half of it under
-  Parmenio. We discover from these words that _all_ the τάξεις of
-  the phalanx (not only the three in Alexander’s half, but also the
-  three in Parmenio’s half) passed the river nearly at the same
-  time, and for the most part, with little or no resistance.
-
-Here again, as at the water’s edge, Alexander was foremost in
-personal conflict. His pike having been broken, he turned to a
-soldier near him—Aretis, one of the horseguards who generally aided
-him in mounting his horse—and asked for another. But this man, having
-broken his pike also, showed the fragment to Alexander, requesting
-him to ask some one else; upon which the Corinthian Demaratus,
-one of the Companion-cavalry close at hand, gave him his weapon
-instead. Thus armed anew, Alexander spurred his horse forward against
-Mithridates (son-in-law of Darius), who was bringing up a column
-of cavalry to attack him, but was himself considerably in advance
-of it. Alexander thrust his pike into the face of Mithridates, and
-laid him prostrate on the ground: he then turned to another of the
-Persian leaders, Rhœsakes, who struck him a blow on the head with
-his scymetar, knocked off a portion of his helmet, but did not
-penetrate beyond. Alexander avenged this blow by thrusting Rhœsakes
-through the body with his pike.[194] Meanwhile a third Persian
-leader, Spithridates, was actually close behind Alexander, with hand
-and scymetar uplifted to cut him down. At this critical moment,
-Kleitus son of Dropides—one of the ancient officers of Philip, high
-in the Macedonian service—struck with full force at the uplifted
-arm of Spithridates and severed it from the body, thus preserving
-Alexander’s life. Other leading Persians, kinsmen of Spithridates,
-rushed desperately on Alexander, who received many blows on his
-armor, and was in much danger. But the efforts of his companions
-near were redoubled, both to defend his person and to second his
-adventurous daring. It was on that point that the Persian cavalry
-was first broken. On the left of the Macedonian line, the Thessalian
-cavalry also fought with vigor and success;[195] and the light-armed
-foot, intermingled with Alexander’s cavalry generally, did great
-damage to the enemy. The rout of the Persian cavalry, once begun,
-speedily became general. They fled in all directions, pursued by the
-Macedonians.
-
-  [194] Arrian, i. 15, 6-12; Diodor. xvi. 20; Plutarch, Alex. 16.
-  These authors differ in the details. I follow Arrian.
-
-  [195] Diodor. xvii. 21.
-
-But Alexander and his officers soon checked this ardor of pursuit,
-calling back their cavalry to complete his victory. The Persian
-infantry, Asiatics as well as Greeks, had remained without movement
-or orders, looking on the cavalry battle which had just disastrously
-terminated. To them Alexander immediately turned his attention.[196]
-He brought up his phalanx and hypaspistæ to attack them in front,
-while his cavalry assailed on all sides their unprotected flanks and
-rear; he himself charged with the cavalry, and had a horse killed
-under him. His infantry alone was more numerous than they, so that
-against such odds the result could hardly be doubtful. The greater
-part of these mercenaries, after a valiant resistance, were cut to
-pieces on the field. We are told that none escaped, except 2000 made
-prisoners, and some who remained concealed in the field among the
-dead bodies.[197]
-
-  [196] Arrian, i. 16, 1. Plutarch says that the infantry, on
-  seeing the cavalry routed, demanded to capitulate on terms with
-  Alexander; but this seems hardly probable.
-
-  [197] Arrian, i. 16, 4; Diodor. xvii. 21. Diodorus says that on
-  the part of the Persians more than 10,000 foot were killed, with
-  2000 cavalry; and that more than 20,000 men were made prisoners.
-
-In this complete and signal defeat, the loss of the Persian cavalry
-was not very serious in mere number—for only 1000 of them were slain.
-But the slaughter of the leading Persians, who had exposed themselves
-with extreme bravery in the personal conflict against Alexander,
-was terrible. There were slain not only Mithridates, Rhœsakes,
-and Spithridates, whose names have been already mentioned,—but
-also Pharnakes, brother-in-law of Darius, Mithrobarzanes satrap of
-Kappadokia, Atizyes, Niphates, Petines, and others; all Persians
-of rank and consequence. Arsites, the satrap of Phrygia, whose
-rashness had mainly caused the rejection of Memnon’s advice, escaped
-from the field, but died shortly afterwards by his own hand, from
-anguish and humiliation.[198] The Persian or Perso-Grecian infantry,
-though probably more of them individually escaped than is implied in
-Arrian’s account, was as a body irretrievably ruined. No force was
-either left in the field, or could be afterwards reassembled in Asia
-Minor.
-
-  [198] Arrian, i. 16, 5, 6.
-
-The loss on the side of Alexander is said to have been very small.
-Twenty-five of the Companion-cavalry, belonging to the division under
-Ptolemy and Amyntas, were slain in the first unsuccessful attempt
-to pass the river. Of the other cavalry, sixty in all were slain;
-of the infantry, thirty. This is given to us as the entire loss on
-the side of Alexander.[199] It is only the number of killed; that
-of the wounded is not stated; but assuming it to be ten times the
-number of killed, the total of both together will be 1265.[200] If
-this be correct, the resistance of the Persian cavalry, except near
-that point where Alexander himself and the Persian chiefs came into
-conflict, cannot have been either serious or long protracted. But
-when we add farther the contest with the infantry, the smallness of
-the total assigned for Macedonian killed and wounded will appear
-still more surprising. The total of the Persian infantry is stated
-at nearly 20,000, most part of them Greek mercenaries. Of these only
-2000 were made prisoners; nearly all the rest (according to Arrian)
-were slain. Now the Greek mercenaries were well armed, and not likely
-to let themselves be slain with impunity; moreover Plutarch expressly
-affirms that they resisted with desperate valor, and that most of the
-Macedonian loss was incurred in the conflict against them. It is not
-easy therefore to comprehend how the total number of slain can be
-brought within the statement of Arrian.[201]
-
-  [199] Arrian, i. 16, 7, 8.
-
-  [200] Arrian, in describing another battle, considers that the
-  proportion of twelve to one, between wounded and killed, is above
-  what could have been expected (v. 24, 8). Rüstow and Köchly (p.
-  273) state that in modern battles, the ordinary proportion of
-  wounded to killed is from 8:1 to 10:1.
-
-  [201] Arrian, i. 16, 8; Plutarch, Alexand. 16. Aristobulus
-  (apud Plutarch. _l. c._) said that there were slain, among the
-  companions of Alexander (τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον) thirty-four
-  persons, of whom nine were infantry. This coincides with Arrian’s
-  statement about the twenty-five companions of the cavalry, slain.
-
-After the victory, Alexander manifested the greatest solicitude for
-his wounded soldiers, whom he visited and consoled in person. Of the
-twenty-five Companions slain, he caused brazen statues, by Lysippus,
-to be erected at Dium in Macedonia, where they were still standing
-in the time of Arrian. To the surviving relatives of all the slain
-he also granted immunity from taxation and from personal service.
-The dead bodies were honorably buried, those of the enemy as well as
-of his own soldiers. The two thousand Greeks in the Persian service
-who had become his prisoners, were put in chains, and transported
-to Macedonia, there to work as slaves; to which treatment Alexander
-condemned them on the ground that they had taken arms on behalf
-of the foreigner against Greece, in contravention of the general
-vote passed by the synod at Corinth. At the same time, he sent
-to Athens three hundred panoplies selected from the spoil, to be
-dedicated to Athênê in the acropolis with this inscription—“Alexander
-son of Philip, and the Greeks, except the Lacedæmonians (_present
-these offerings_), out of the spoils of the foreigners inhabiting
-Asia.”[202] Though the vote to which Alexander appealed represented
-no existing Grecian aspiration, and granted only a sanction which
-could not be safely refused, yet he found satisfaction in clothing
-his own self-aggrandizing impulse under the name of a supposed
-Pan-hellenic purpose: which was at the same time useful, as
-strengthening his hold upon the Greeks, who were the only persons
-competent, either as officers or soldiers, to uphold the Persian
-empire against him. His conquests were the extinction of genuine
-Hellenism, though they diffused an exterior varnish of it, and
-especially the Greek language, over much of the Oriental world. True
-Grecian interests lay more on the side of Darius than of Alexander.
-
-  [202] Arrian, i. 16, 10, 11.
-
-The battle of the Granikus, brought on by Arsites and the other
-satraps contrary to the advice of Memnon, was moreover so unskilfully
-fought by them, that the gallantry of their infantry, the most
-formidable corps of Greeks that had ever been in the Persian service,
-was rendered of little use. The battle, properly speaking, was
-fought only by the Persian cavalry;[203] the infantry was left to be
-surrounded and destroyed afterwards.
-
-  [203] Arrian usually calls the battle of the Granikus an
-  ἱππομαχία (i. 17, 10 and elsewhere).
-
-  The battle was fought in the Attic month Thargelion: probably the
-  beginning of May (Plutarch, Camillus, 19).
-
-No victory could be more decisive or terror-striking than that of
-Alexander. There remained no force in the field to oppose him. The
-impression made by so great a public catastrophe was enhanced by two
-accompanying circumstances; first, by the number of Persian grandees
-who perished, realizing almost the wailings of Atossa, Xerxes, and
-the Chorus, in the Persæ of Æschylus,[204] after the battle of
-Salamis—next, by the chivalrous and successful prowess of Alexander
-himself, who, emulating the Homeric Achilles, not only rushed
-foremost into the _mélée_, but killed two of these grandees with his
-own hand. Such exploits, impressive even when we read of them now,
-must at the moment when they occurred have acted most powerfully upon
-the imagination of contemporaries.
-
-  [204] Æschylus, Pers. 950 _seqq._
-
-Several of the neighboring Mysian mountaineers, though mutinous
-subjects towards Persia, came down to make submission to him, and
-were permitted to occupy their lands under the same tribute as they
-had paid before. The inhabitants of the neighboring Grecian city
-of Zeleia, whose troops had served with the Persians, surrendered
-and obtained their pardon; Alexander admitting the plea that
-they had served only under constraint. He then sent Parmenio
-to attack Daskylium, the stronghold and chief residence of the
-satrap of Phrygia. Even this place was evacuated by the garrison
-and surrendered, doubtless with a considerable treasure therein.
-The whole satrapy of Phrygia thus fell into Alexander’s power,
-and was appointed to be administered by Kallas for his behalf,
-levying the same amount of tribute as had been paid before.[205] He
-himself then marched, with his main force, in a southerly direction
-towards Sardis—the chief town of Lydia, and the main station of the
-Persians in Asia Minor. The citadel of Sardis—situated on a lofty
-and steep rock projecting from Mount Tmolus, fortified by a triple
-wall with an adequate garrison—was accounted impregnable, and at
-any rate could hardly have been taken by anything less than a long
-blockade,[206] which would have allowed time for the arrival of the
-fleet and the operations of Memnon. Yet such was the terror which now
-accompanied the Macedonian conqueror, that when he arrived within
-eight miles of Sardis, he met not only a deputation of the chief
-citizens, but also the Persian governor of the citadel, Mithrines.
-The town, citadel, garrison, and treasure Were delivered up to him
-without a blow. Fortunately for Alexander, there were not in Asia
-any Persian governors of courage and fidelity such as had been
-displayed by Maskames and Boges after the repulse of Xerxes from
-Greece.[207] Alexander treated Mithrines with courtesy and honor,
-granted freedom to the Sardians and to the other Lydians generally,
-with the use of their own Lydian laws. The betrayal of Sardis by
-Mithrines was a signal good fortune to Alexander. On going up to
-the citadel, he contemplated with astonishment its prodigious
-strength; congratulating himself on so easy an acquisition, and
-giving directions to build there a temple of Olympian Zeus, on the
-spot where the old palace of the kings of Lydia had been situated.
-He named Pausanias governor of the citadel, with a garrison of
-Peloponnesians from Argos; Asander, satrap of the country; and
-Nikias, collector of tribute.[208] The freedom granted to the
-Lydians, whatever it may have amounted to, did not exonerate them
-from paying the usual tribute.
-
-  [205] Arrian, i. 17, 1, 2.
-
-  [206] About the almost impregnable fortifications and position
-  of Sardis, see Polybius, vii. 15-18; Herod. i. 84. It held out
-  for nearly two years against Antiochus III. (B. C. 216),
-  and was taken at last only by the extreme carelessness of the
-  defenders; even then, the citadel was still held.
-
-  [207] Herodot. vii. 106, 107.
-
-  [208] Arrian, i. 17, 5-9; Diodor. xvii. 21.
-
-From Sardis, he ordered Kallas, the new satrap of Hellespontine
-Phrygia—and Alexander son of Aëropus, who had been promoted in place
-of Kallas to the command of the Thessalian cavalry—to attack Atarneus
-and the district belonging to Memnon, on the Asiatic coast opposite
-Lesbos. Meanwhile he himself directed his march to Ephesus, which he
-reached on the fourth day. Both at Ephesus and at Miletus—the two
-principal strongholds of the Persians on the coast, as Sardis was
-in the interior—the sudden catastrophe at the Granikus had struck
-unspeakable terror. Hegesistratus, governor of the Persian garrison
-(Greek mercenaries) at Miletus, sent letters to Alexander offering to
-surrender the town on his approach; while the garrison at Ephesus,
-with the Macedonian exile Amyntas, got on board two triremes in the
-harbor, and fled. It appears that there had been recently a political
-revolution in the town, conducted by Syrphax and other leaders, who
-had established an oligarchical government. These men, banishing
-their political opponents, had committed depredations on the temple
-of Artemis, overthrown the statue of Philip of Macedon dedicated
-therein, and destroyed the sepulchre of Heropythus the liberator
-in the agora.[209] Some of the party, though abandoned by their
-garrison, were still trying to invoke aid from Memnon, who however
-was yet at a distance. Alexander entered the town without resistance,
-restored the exiles, established a democratical constitution, and
-directed that the tribute heretofore paid to the Persians should now
-be paid to the Ephesian Artemis. Syrphax and his family sought refuge
-in the temple, from whence they were dragged by the people and stoned
-to death. More of the same party would have been despatched, had not
-the popular vengeance been restrained by Alexander; who displayed an
-honorable and prudent moderation.[210]
-
-  [209] Arrian, i. 17, 12. Respecting these commotions at Ephesus,
-  which had preceded the expedition of Alexander, we have no
-  information: nor are we told who Heropythus was or under what
-  circumstances he had liberated Ephesus. It would have been
-  interesting to know these facts, as illustrating the condition of
-  the Asiatic Greeks previous to Alexander’s invasion.
-
-  [210] Arrian, i. 17, 10-13.
-
-Thus master of Ephesus, Alexander found himself in communication with
-his fleet, under the command of Nikanor; and received propositions
-of surrender from the two neighboring inland cities, Magnesia and
-Tralleis. To occupy these cities, he despatched Parmenio with 5000
-foot (half of them Macedonians) and 200 of the Companion-cavalry;
-while he at the same time sent Antimachus with an equal force in a
-northerly direction, to liberate the various cities of Æolic and
-Ionic Greeks. This officer was instructed to put down in each of
-them the ruling oligarchy, which acted with a mercenary garrison
-as an instrument of Persian supremacy—to place the government in
-the hands of the citizens—and to abolish all payment of tribute.
-He himself—after taking part in a solemn festival and procession
-to the temple of Ephesian Artemis, with his whole army in battle
-array—marched southward towards Miletus; his fleet under Nikanor
-proceeding thither by sea.[211] He expected probably to enter
-Miletus with as little resistance as Ephesus. But his hopes were
-disappointed: Hegesistratus, commander of the garrison in that town,
-though under the immediate terror of the defeat at the Granikus
-he had written to offer submission, had now altered his tone, and
-determined to hold out. The formidable Persian fleet,[212] four
-hundred sail of Phenician and Cyprian ships of war with well-trained
-seamen, was approaching.
-
-  [211] Arrian, i. 18, 5, 6.
-
-  [212] Arrian, i. 18, 10-13.
-
-This naval force, which a few weeks earlier would have prevented
-Alexander from crossing into Asia, now afforded the only hope of
-arresting the rapidity and ease of his conquests. What steps had been
-taken by the Persian officers since the defeat at the Granikus, we do
-not hear. Many of them had fled, along with Memnon, to Miletus;[213]
-and they were probably disposed, under the present desperate
-circumstances, to accept the command of Memnon as their only hope
-of safety, though they had despised his counsel on the day of the
-battle. Whether the towns in Memnon’s principality of Atarneus had
-attempted any resistance against the Macedonians, we do not know. His
-interests however were so closely identified with those of Persia,
-that he had sent up his wife and children as hostages, to induce
-Darius to entrust him with the supreme conduct of the war. Orders
-to this effect were presently sent down by that prince;[214] but at
-the first arrival of the fleet, it seems not to have been under the
-command of Memnon, who was however probably on board.
-
-  [213] Diodor. xvii. 22.
-
-  [214] Diodor. xvii. 23.
-
-It came too late to aid in the defence of Miletus. Three days before
-its arrival, Nikanor the Macedonian admiral, with his fleet of one
-hundred and sixty ships, had occupied the island of Ladê, which
-commanded the harbor of that city. Alexander found the outer portion
-of Miletus evacuated, and took it without resistance. He was making
-preparations to besiege the inner city, and had already transported
-4000 troops across to the island of Ladê, when the powerful Persian
-fleet came in sight, but found itself excluded from Miletus, and
-obliged to take moorings under the neighboring promontory of Mykalê.
-Unwilling to abandon without a battle the command of the sea,
-Parmenio advised Alexander to fight this fleet, offering himself to
-share the hazard aboard. But Alexander disapproved the proposition,
-affirming that his fleet was inferior not less in skill than in
-numbers; that the high training of the Macedonians would tell for
-nothing on shipboard; and that a naval defeat would be the signal for
-insurrection in Greece. Besides debating such prudential reasons,
-Alexander and Parmenio also differed about the religious promise of
-the case. On the sea-shore, near the stern of the Macedonian ships,
-Parmenio had seen an eagle, which filled him with confidence that
-the ships would prove victorious. But Alexander contended that this
-interpretation was incorrect. Though the eagle doubtless promised to
-him victory, yet it had been seen on land—and therefore his victories
-would be on land: hence the result signified was, that he would
-overcome the Persian fleet, by means of land-operations.[215] This
-part of the debate, between two practical military men of ability,
-is not the least interesting of the whole; illustrating as it does,
-not only the religious susceptibilities of the age, but also the
-pliancy of the interpretative process, lending itself equally well
-to inferences totally opposite. The difference between a sagacious
-and a dull-witted prophet, accommodating ambiguous omens to useful or
-mischievous conclusions, was one of very material importance in the
-ancient world.
-
-  [215] Arrian, i. 18, 9-15; i. 20, 2.
-
-Alexander now prepared vigorously to assault Miletus, repudiating
-with disdain an offer brought to him by a Milesian citizen named
-Glaukippus—that the city should be neutral and open to him as well as
-to the Persians. His fleet under Nikanor occupied the harbor, blocked
-up its narrow mouth against the Persians, and made threatening
-demonstrations from the water’s edge; while he himself brought up
-his battering-engines against the walls, shook or overthrew them
-in several places, and then stormed the city. The Milesians, with
-the Grecian mercenary garrison, made a brave defence, but were
-overpowered by the impetuosity of the assault. A large number of
-them were slain, and there was no way of escape except by jumping
-into little boats, or swimming off upon the hollow of the shield.
-Even of these fugitives, most part were killed by the seamen of the
-Macedonian triremes; but a division of 300 Grecian mercenaries got on
-to an isolated rock near the mouth of the harbor, and there prepared
-to sell their lives dearly. Alexander, as soon as his soldiers were
-thoroughly masters of the city, went himself on shipboard to attack
-the mercenaries on the rock, taking with him ladders in order to
-effect a landing upon it. But when he saw that they were resolved
-on a desperate defence, he preferred admitting them to terms of
-capitulation, and received them into his own service.[216] To the
-surviving Milesian citizens he granted the condition of a free city,
-while he caused all the remaining prisoners to be sold as slaves.
-
-  [216] Arrian, i. 19; Diodor. xvii. 22.
-
-The powerful Persian fleet, from the neighboring promontory of
-Mykalê, was compelled to witness, without being able to prevent, the
-capture of Miletus, and was presently withdrawn to Halikarnassus.
-At the same time Alexander came to the resolution of disbanding his
-own fleet; which, while costing more than he could then afford, was
-nevertheless unfit to cope with the enemy in open sea. He calculated
-that by concentrating all his efforts on land-operations, especially
-against the cities on the coast, he should exclude the Persian fleet
-from all effective hold on Asia Minor, and ensure that country to
-himself. He therefore paid off all the ships, retaining only a
-moderate squadron for the purposes of transport.[217]
-
-  [217] Arrian, i. 20, 1-4; Diodor. xvii. 22. At the same time,
-  the statement of Diodorus can hardly be correct (xvii. 24),
-  that Alexander sent his battering engines from Miletus to
-  Halikarnassus by sea. This would only have exposed them to be
-  captured by the Persian fleet. We shall see that Alexander
-  reorganized his entire fleet during the ensuing year.
-
-Before this time, probably, the whole Asiatic coast northward of
-Miletus—including the Ionic and Æolic cities and the principality of
-Memnon—had either accepted willingly the dominion of Alexander, or
-had been reduced by his detachments. Accordingly he now directed his
-march southward from Miletus, towards Karia, and especially towards
-Halikarnassus, the principal city of that territory. On entering
-Karia, he was met by Ada, a member of the Karian princely family,
-who tendered to him her town of Alinda and her other possessions,
-adopting him as her son, and entreating his protection. Not many
-years earlier, under Mausôlus and Artemisia, the powerful princes
-of this family had been formidable to all the Grecian islands. It
-was the custom of Karia that brothers and sisters of the reigning
-family intermarried with each other: Mausôlus and his wife Artemisia
-were succeeded by Idrieus and his wife Ada, all four being brothers
-and sisters, sons and daughters of Hekatomnus. On the death of
-Idrieus, his widow Ada, was expelled from Halikarnassus and other
-parts of Karia by her surviving brother Pixodarus; though she still
-preserved some strong towns, which proved a welcome addition to the
-conquests of Alexander. Pixodarus, on the contrary, who had given his
-daughter in marriage to a leading Persian named Orontobates, warmly
-espoused the Persian cause, and made Halikarnassus a capital point of
-resistance against the invader.[218]
-
-  [218] Arrian, i. 23, 11, 12; Diodor. xvii. 24; Strabo, xiv. p.
-  657.
-
-But it was not by him alone that this city was defended. The Persian
-fleet had repaired thither from Miletus; Memnon, now invested by
-Darius with supreme command on the Asiatic coast and the Ægean, was
-there in person. There was not only Orontobates with many other
-Asiatics, but also a large garrison of mercenary Greeks, commanded by
-Ephialtes, a brave Athenian exile. The city, strong both by nature
-and by art, with a surrounding ditch forty-five feet broad and
-twenty-two feet deep,[219] had been still farther strengthened under
-the prolonged superintendence of Memnon;[220] lastly, there were two
-citadels, a fortified harbor, with its entrance fronting the south,
-abundant magazines of arms, and good provision of defensive engines.
-The siege of Halikarnassus was the most arduous enterprise which
-Alexander had yet undertaken. Instead of attacking it by land and sea
-at once, as at Miletus, he could make his approaches only from the
-land, while the defenders were powerfully aided from seaward by the
-Persian ships with their numerous crews.
-
-  [219] Arrian, i. 20, 13.
-
-  [220] Arrian, i. 20, 5. ξύμπαντα ταῦτα Μέμνων τε αὐτὸς παρὼν ἐκ
-  πολλοῦ παρεσκευάκει, etc.
-
-His first efforts, directed against the gate on the north or
-north-east of the city, which led towards Mylasa, were interrupted
-by frequent sallies and discharges from the engines on the walls.
-After a few days thus spent without much avail, he passed with a
-large section of his army to the western side of the town, towards
-the outlying portion of the projecting tongue of land, on which
-Halikarnassus and Myndus (the latter farther westward) were situated.
-While making demonstrations on this side of Halikarnassus, he at
-the same time attempted a night-attack on Myndus, but was obliged
-to retire after some hours of fruitless effort. He then confined
-himself to the siege of Halikarnassus. His soldiers, protected from
-missiles by movable penthouses (called Tortoises), gradually filled
-up the wide and deep ditch round the town, so as to open a level road
-for his engines (rolling towers of wood) to come up close to the
-walls. The engines being brought up close, the work of demolition
-was successfully prosecuted; notwithstanding vigorous sallies from
-the garrison, repulsed; though not without loss and difficulty,
-by the Macedonians. Presently the shock of the battering-engines
-had overthrown two towers of the city-wall, together with two
-intermediate breadths of wall; and a third tower was beginning to
-totter. The besieged were employed in erecting an inner wall of
-brick to cover the open space, and a wooden tower of the great
-height of 150 feet for the purpose of casting projectiles.[221] It
-appears that Alexander waited for the full demolition of the third
-tower, before he thought the breach wide enough to be stormed; but
-an assault was prematurely brought on by two adventurous soldiers
-from the division of Perdikkas.[222] These men, elate with wine,
-rushed up single-handed to attack the Mylasean gate, and slew
-the foremost of the defenders who came out to oppose them, until
-at length, reinforcements arriving successively on both sides, a
-general combat took place at a short distance from the wall. In the
-end, the Macedonians were victorious, and drove the besieged back
-into the city. Such was the confusion, that the city might then
-have been assaulted and taken, had measures been prepared for it
-beforehand. The third tower was speedily overthrown; nevertheless,
-before this could be accomplished, the besieged had already completed
-their half-moon within, against which accordingly, on the next day,
-Alexander pushed forward his engines. In this advanced position,
-however, being as it were within the circle of the city-wall, the
-Macedonians were exposed to discharges not only from engines in their
-front, but also from the towers yet standing on each side of them.
-Moreover, at night, a fresh sally was made with so much impetuosity,
-that some of the covering wicker-work of the engines, and even
-the main wood-work of one of them, was burnt. It was not without
-difficulty that Philôtas and Hellanikus, the officers on guard,
-preserved the remainder; nor were the besieged finally driven in,
-until Alexander himself appeared with reinforcements.[223] Though his
-troops had been victors in these successive combats, yet he could not
-carry off his dead, who lay close to the walls, without soliciting
-a truce for burial. Such request usually counted as a confession of
-defeat: nevertheless Alexander solicited the truce, which was granted
-by Memnon, in spite of the contrary opinion of Ephialtes.[224]
-
-  [221] Compare Arrian, i. 21, 7, 8; Diodor. xvii. 25, 26.
-
-  [222] Both Arrian, (i. 21, 5) and Diodorus (xvii. 25) mention
-  this proceeding of the two soldiers of Perdikkas, though Diodorus
-  says that it occurred at night, which cannot well be true.
-
-  [223] Arrian, i. 21, 7-12.
-
-  [224] Diodor. xvii. 25.
-
-After a few days of interval, for burying his dead and repairing the
-engines, Alexander recommenced attack upon the half-moon, under his
-own personal superintendence. Among the leaders within, a conviction
-gained ground that the place could not long hold out. Ephialtes
-especially, resolved not to survive the capture, and seeing that the
-only chance of preservation consisted in destroying the besieging
-engines, obtained permission from Memnon to put himself at the head
-of a last desperate sally.[225] He took immediately near him 2000
-chosen troops, half to encounter the enemy, half with torches to
-burn the engines. At daybreak, all the gates being suddenly and
-simultaneously thrown open, sallying parties rushed out from each
-against the besiegers; the engines from within supporting them by
-multiplied discharges of missiles. Ephialtes with his division,
-marching straight against the Macedonians on guard at the main
-point of attack, assailed them impetuously, while his torch-bearers
-tried to set the engines on fire. Himself distinguished no less for
-personal strength than for valor, he occupied the front rank, and
-was so well seconded by the courage and good array of his soldiers
-charging in deep column, that for a time he gained advantage. Some of
-the engines were successfully fired, and the advanced guard of the
-Macedonian troops, consisting of young troops, gave way and fled.
-They were rallied partly by the efforts of Alexander, but still
-more by the older Macedonian soldiers, companions in all Philip’s
-campaigns; who, standing exempt from night-watches, were encamped
-more in the rear. These veterans, among whom one Atharrias was the
-most conspicuous, upbraiding the cowardice of their comrades,[226]
-cast themselves into their accustomed phalanx-array, and thus both
-withstood and repulsed the charge of the victorious enemy. Ephialtes,
-foremost among the combatants, was slain, the rest were driven back
-to the city, and the burning engines were saved with some damage.
-During this same time, an obstinate conflict had also taken place at
-the gate called Tripylon, where the besieged had made another sally,
-over a narrow bridge thrown across the ditch. Here the Macedonians
-were under the command of Ptolemy (not the son of Lagus), one of the
-king’s body-guards. He, with two or three other conspicuous officers,
-perished in the severe struggle which ensued, but the sallying party
-were at length repulsed and driven into the city.[227] The loss of
-the besieged was severe, in trying to get again within the walls,
-under vigorous pursuit from the Macedonians.
-
-  [225] The last desperate struggle of the besieged, is what stands
-  described in i. 22 of Arrian, and in xvii. 26, 27 of Diodorus;
-  though the two descriptions are very different. Arrian does
-  not name Ephialtes at Halikarnassus. He follows the Macedonian
-  authors, Ptolemy and Aristobulus; who probably dwelt only on
-  Memnon and the Persians as their real enemies, treating the
-  Greeks in general as a portion of the hostile force. On the other
-  hand, Diodorus and Curtius appear to have followed, in great
-  part, Grecian authors; in whose view eminent Athenian exiles,
-  like Ephialtes and Charidemus, counted for much more.
-
-  The fact here mentioned by Diodorus, that Ephialtes drove back
-  the young Macedonian guard, and that the battle was restored only
-  by the extraordinary efforts of the old guard—is one of much
-  interest, which I see no reason for mistrusting, though Arrian
-  says nothing about it. Curtius (v. 2; viii. 1) makes allusion to
-  it on a subsequent occasion, naming Atharrias: the part of his
-  work in which it ought to have been narrated, is lost. On this,
-  as on other occasions, Arrian slurs over the partial reverses,
-  obstructions, and losses, of Alexander’s career. His authorities
-  probably did so before him.
-
-  [226] Diodor. xvi. 27; Curtius, v. 1. viii. 2. ... οἱ γὰρ
-  πρεσβύτατοι τῶν Μακεδόνων, διὰ μὲν τὴν ἡλικίαν ἀπολελυμένοι
-  τῶν κινδύνων, συνεστρατευμένοι δὲ Φιλίππῳ ... τοῖς μὲν
-  φυγομαχοῦσι νεωτέροις πικρῶς ὠνείδισαν τὴν ἀνανδρίαν, αὐτοὶ δὲ
-  συναθροισθέντες καὶ συνασπίσαντες, ὑπέστησαν τοὺς δοκοῦντας ἤδη
-  νενικηκέναι....
-
-  [227] Arrian, i. 22, 5.
-
-By this last unsuccessful effort, the defensive force of
-Halikarnassus was broken. Memnon and Orontobates, satisfied that
-no longer defence of the town was practicable, took advantage
-of the night to set fire to their wooden projectile engines and
-towers, as well as to their magazines of arms, with the houses near
-the exterior wall, while they carried away the troops, stores,
-and inhabitants, partly to the citadel called Salmakis—partly to
-the neighboring islet called Arkonnesus—partly to the island of
-Kos.[228] Though thus evacuating the town, however, they still kept
-good garrisons well-provisioned in the two citadels belonging to it.
-The conflagration, stimulated by a strong wind, spread widely. It
-was only extinguished by the orders of Alexander, when he entered
-the town, and put to death all those whom he found with firebrands.
-He directed that the Halikarnassians found in the houses should be
-spared, but that the city itself should be demolished. He assigned
-the whole of Karia to Ada, as a principality, doubtless under
-condition of tribute. As the citadels still occupied by the enemy
-were strong enough to require a long siege, he did not think it
-necessary to remain in person for the purpose of reducing them; but
-surrounding them with a wall of blockade, he left Ptolemy and 3000
-men to guard it.[229]
-
-  [228] Arrian, i. 23, 3, 4; Diodor. xvii. 27.
-
-  [229] Arrian, i. 23, 11; Diodor. xvii. 7; Strabo, xiv. p. 657.
-
-Having concluded the siege of Halikarnassus, Alexander sent back his
-artillery to Tralles, ordering Parmenio, with a large portion of the
-cavalry, the allied infantry, and the baggage waggons, to Sardis.
-
-The ensuing winter months he employed in the conquest of Lykia,
-Pamphylia, and Pisidia. All this southern coast of Asia Minor is
-mountainous; the range of Mount Taurus descending nearly to the sea,
-so as to leave little or no intervening breadth of plain. In spite
-of great strength of situation, such was the terror of Alexander’s
-arms, that all the Lykian towns—Hyparna, Telmissus, Pinara, Xanthus,
-Patara, and thirty others—submitted to him without a blow.[230] One
-alone among them, called Marmareis, resisted to desperation.[231]
-On reaching the territory called Milyas, the Phrygian frontier of
-Lykia, Alexander received the surrender of the Greek maritime city,
-Phasêlis. He assisted the Phaselites in destroying a mountain fort
-erected and garrisoned against them by the neighboring Pisidian
-mountaineers, and paid a public compliment to the sepulchre of their
-deceased townsman, the rhetorician Theodektes.[232]
-
-  [230] Arrian, i. 24, 6-9.
-
-  [231] Diodor. xvii. 28.
-
-  [232] Arrian, i. 24, 11; Plutarch, Alexand. 17.
-
-After this brief halt at Phasêlis, Alexander directed his course to
-Pergê in Pamphylia. The ordinary mountain road, by which he sent
-most of his army, was so difficult as to require some leveling by
-Thracian light troops sent in advance for the purpose. But the king
-himself, with a select detachment, took a road more difficult still,
-under the mountains by the brink of the sea, called Klimax. When the
-wind blew from the south, this road was covered by such a depth of
-water as to be impracticable; for some time before he reached the
-spot, the wind had blown strong from the south—but as he came near,
-the special providence of the gods (so he and his friends conceived
-it) brought on a change to the north, so that the sea receded and
-left an available passage, though his soldiers had the water up to
-their waists.[233] From Pergê he marched on to Sidê, receiving on his
-way envoys from Aspendus, who offered to surrender their city, but
-deprecated the entrance of a garrison; which they were allowed to
-buy off promising fifty talents in money, together with the horses
-which they were bringing up as tribute for the Persian king. Having
-left a garrison at Sidê, he advanced onward to a strong place called
-Syllium, defended by brave natives with a body of mercenaries to
-aid them. These men held out, and even repulsed a first assault;
-which Alexander could not stay to repeat, being apprised that the
-Aspendians had refused to execute the conditions imposed, and had put
-their city in a state of defence. Returning rapidly, he constrained
-them to submission, and then marched back to Pergê; from whence he
-directed his course towards the greater Phrygia,[234] through the
-difficult mountains, and almost indomitable population, of Pisidia.
-
-  [233] Arrian, i. 26, 4. οὐκ ἄνευ τοῦ θείου, ὡς αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ
-  ἀμφ᾽ αὐτὸν ἐξηγοῦντο, etc. Strabo, xiv. p. 666; Curtius, v. 3, 22.
-
-  Plutarch’s words (Alexand. 17) must be taken to mean that
-  Alexander did not boast so much of this special favor from the
-  gods, as some of his panegyrists boasted for him.
-
-  [234] Arrian, i. 27, 1-8
-
-  After remaining in the Pisidian mountains long enough to reduce
-  several towns or strong posts, Alexander proceeded northward
-  into Phrygia, passing by the salt lake called Askanius to the
-  steep and impregnable fortress of Kelænæ, garrisoned by 1000
-  Karians, and 100 mercenary Greeks. These men, having no hope of
-  relief from the Persians, offered to deliver up the fortress,
-  unless such relief should arrive before the sixtieth day.[235]
-  Alexander accepted the propositions, remained ten days at Kelænæ,
-  and left there Antigonus (afterwards the most powerful among his
-  successors) as satrap of Phrygia, with 1500 men. He then marched
-  northward to Gordium on the river Sangarius, where Parmenio
-  was directed to meet him, and where his winter-campaign was
-  concluded.[236]
-
-  [235] Curtius. iii. 1, 8.
-
-  [236] Arrian, i. 29, 1-5.
-
-
-APPENDIX.
-
-ON THE LENGTH OF THE MACEDONIAN SARISSA OR PIKE.
-
-The statements here given about the length of the sarissa carried
-by the phalangite, are taken from Polybius, whose description is on
-all points both clear and consistent with itself. “The sarissa (he
-says) is sixteen cubits long, according to the original theory; and
-fourteen cubits as adapted to actual practice”—τὸ δὲ τῶν σαρισσῶν
-μέγεθός ἐστι, κατὰ μὲν τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπόθεσιν, ἑκκαίδεκα πηχῶν, κατὰ
-δὲ τὴν ἁρμογὴν τὴν πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν, δεκατεσσάρων. Τούτων δὲ τοὺς
-τέσσαρας ἀφαιρεῖ τὸ μεταξὺ ταῖν χεροῖν διάστημα, καὶ τὸ κατόπιν
-σήκωμα τῆς προβολῆς (xviii. 12).
-
-The difference here indicated by Polybius between the length in
-theory, and that in practice, may probably be understood to mean,
-that the phalangites, when in exercise, used pikes of the greater
-length; when on service, of the smaller: just as the Roman soldiers
-were trained in their exercises to use arms heavier than they
-employed against an enemy.
-
-Of the later tactic writers, Leo (Tact. vi. 39) and Constantine
-Porphyrogenitus, repeat the double measurement of the sarissa as
-given by Polybius. Arrian (Tact. c. 12) and Polyænus (ii. 29, 2)
-state its length at sixteen cubits—Ælian (Tact. c. 14) gives fourteen
-cubits. All these authors follow either Polybius, or some other
-authority concurrent with him. None of them contradict him, though
-none state the case so clearly as he does.
-
-Messrs. Rüstow and Köchly (Gesch. des Griech. Kriegswesens, p. 238),
-authors of the best work that I know respecting ancient military
-matters, reject the authority of Polybius as it here stands. They
-maintain that the passage must be corrupt, and that Polybius must
-have meant to say that the sarissa was sixteen _feet_ in length—not
-sixteen _cubits_. I cannot subscribe to their opinion, nor do I think
-that their criticism on Polybius is a just one.
-
-First, they reason as if Polybius had said that the sarissa of actual
-service was _sixteen_ cubits long. Computing the weight of such a
-weapon from the thickness required in the shaft, they pronounce that
-it would be unmanageable. But Polybius gives the actual length as
-only _fourteen_ cubits: a very material difference. If we accept the
-hypothesis of these authors—that corruption of the text has made us
-read _cubits_ where we ought to have read _feet_,—it will follow that
-the length of the sarissa, as given by Polybius, would be _fourteen
-feet_, not _sixteen feet_. Now this length is not sufficient to
-justify various passages in which its prodigious length is set forth.
-
-Next, they impute to Polybius a contradiction in saying that the
-Roman soldier occupied a space of three feet, equal to that occupied
-by a Macedonian soldier—and yet that in the fight, he had two
-Macedonian soldiers and ten pikes opposed to him (xviii. 13). But
-there is here no contradiction at all: for Polybius expressly says
-that the Roman, though occupying three feet when the legion was drawn
-up in order, required, when fighting, an expansion of the ranks and
-an increased interval to the extent of three feet behind him and
-on each side of him (χάλασμα καὶ διάστασιν ἀλλήλων ἔχειν δεήσει
-τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐλάχιστον τρεῖς πόδας κατ᾽ ἐπιστάτην καὶ παραστάτην) in
-order to allow full play for his sword and shield. It is therefore
-perfectly true that each Roman soldier, when actually marching up to
-attack the phalanx, occupied as much ground as two phalangites, and
-had ten pikes to deal with.
-
-Farther, it is impossible to suppose that Polybius, in speaking of
-_cubits_, really meant _feet_; because (cap. 12) he speaks of _three
-feet_ as the interval between each rank in the file, and these _three
-feet_ are clearly made equal to _two cubits_. His computation will
-not come right, if in place of _cubits_ you substitute _feet_.
-
-We must therefore take the assertion of Polybius as we find it: that
-the pike of the phalangite was fourteen cubits or twenty-one feet in
-length. Now Polybius had every means of being well informed on such
-a point. He was above thirty years of age at the time of the last war
-of the Romans against the Macedonian king Perseus, in which war he
-himself served. He was intimately acquainted with Scipio, the son of
-Paulus Emilius, who gained the battle of Pydna. Lastly, he had paid
-great attention to tactics, and had even written an express work on
-the subject.
-
-It might indeed be imagined, that the statement of Polybius, though
-true as to his own time, was not true as to the time of Philip and
-Alexander. But there is nothing to countenance such a suspicion—which
-moreover is expressly disclaimed by Rüstow and Köchly.
-
-Doubtless twenty-one feet is a prodigious length, unmanageable,
-except by men properly trained, and inconvenient for all evolutions.
-But these are just the terms under which the pike of the phalangite
-is always spoken of. So Livy, xxxi. 39, “Erant pleraque silvestria
-circa, incommoda phalangi maximè Macedonum: quæ, nisi ubi _prælongis
-hastis_ velut vallum ante clypeos objecit (quod ut fiat, libero campo
-opus est) nullius admodum usus est.” Compare also Livy, xliv. 40, 41,
-where, among other intimations of the immense length of the pike, we
-find, “Si carptim aggrediendo, circumagere _immobilem longitudine et
-gravitate hastam_ cogas, confusâ strue implicatur:” also xxxiii. 8, 9.
-
-Xenophon tells us that the Ten Thousand Greeks in their retreat had
-to fight their way across the territory of the Chalybes, who carried
-a pike _fifteen cubits_ long, together with a short sword; he does
-not mention a shield, but they wore greaves and helmets (Anab. iv.
-7, 15). This is a length greater than what Polybius ascribes to
-the pike of the Macedonian phalangite. The Mosynœki defended their
-citadel “with pikes so long and thick that a man could hardly carry
-them” (Anabas. v. 4, 25). In the Iliad, when the Trojans are pressing
-hard upon the Greek ships, and seeking to set them on fire, Ajax is
-described as planting himself upon the poop, and keeping off the
-assailants with a thrusting-pike of twenty-two cubits or thirty-three
-feet in length (ξυστὸν ναύμαχον ἐν παλάμῃσιν—δυωκαιεικοσίπηχυ, Iliad,
-xv. 678). The spear of Hektor is ten cubits, or eleven cubits, in
-length—intended to be hurled (Iliad vi. 319; viii. 494)—the reading
-is not settled whether ἔγχος ἔχ᾽ ἑνδεκάπηχυ, or ἔγχος ἔχεν δεκάπηχυ.
-
-The Swiss infantry, and the German Landsknechte, in the sixteenth
-century, were in many respects a reproduction of the Macedonian
-phalanx: close ranks, deep files, long pikes, and the three or
-four first ranks, composed of the strongest and bravest men in the
-regiment—either officers, or picked soldiers receiving double pay.
-The length and impenetrable array of their pikes enabled them to
-resist the charge of the heavy cavalry or men at arms: they were
-irresistible in front, unless an enemy could find means to break in
-among the pikes, which was sometimes, though rarely, done. Their
-great confidence was in the length of the pike—Macciavelli says of
-them (Ritratti dell’ Alamagna, Opere t. iv. p. 159; and Dell’ Arte
-della Guerra, p. 232-236), “Dicono tenere tale ordine, che non é
-possibile entrare tra loro, né accostarseli, quanto é la picca lunga.
-Sono ottime genti in campagna, à far giornata: ma per espugnare terra
-non vagliono, e poco nel difenderlo: ed universalmente, dove non
-possano tenere l’ ordine loro della milizia, non vagliono.”
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER XCIII.
-
-SECOND AND THIRD ASIATIC CAMPAIGNS OF ALEXANDER — BATTLE OF ISSUS —
-SIEGE OF TYRE.
-
-It was about February or March 333 B. C., when Alexander
-reached Gordium; where he appears to have halted for some time,
-giving to the troops who had been with him in Pisidia a repose
-doubtless needful. While at Gordium, he performed the memorable
-exploit familiarly known as the cutting of the Gordian knot. There
-was preserved in the citadel an ancient waggon of rude structure,
-said by the legend to have once belonged to the peasant Gordius and
-his son Midas—the primitive rustic kings of Phrygia, designated as
-such by the gods, and chosen by the people. The cord (composed of
-fibres from the bark of the cornel tree), attaching the yoke of
-this waggon to the pole, was so twisted and entangled as to form
-a knot of singular complexity, which no one had ever been able to
-untie. An oracle had pronounced, that to the person who should untie
-it the empire of Asia was destined. When Alexander went up to see
-this ancient relic, the surrounding multitude, Phrygian as well
-as Macedonian, were full of expectation that the conqueror of the
-Granikus and of Halikarnassus would overcome the difficulties of the
-knot, and acquire the promised empire. But Alexander, on inspecting
-the knot, was as much perplexed as others had been before him, until
-at length, in a fit of impatience, he drew his sword and severed the
-cord in two. By every one this was accepted as a solution of the
-problem, thus making good his title to the empire of Asia; a belief
-which the gods ratified by a storm of thunder and lightning during
-the ensuing night.[237]
-
-  [237] Arrian, ii. 3; Curtius, iii. 2, 17; Plutarch, Alex. 18;
-  Justin, xi. 7.
-
-At Gordium, Alexander was visited by envoys from Athens, entreating
-the liberation of the Athenian prisoners taken at the Granikus, who
-were now at work chained in the Macedonian mines. But he refused this
-prayer until a more convenient season. Aware that the Greeks were
-held attached to him only by their fears, and that, if opportunity
-occurred, a large fraction of them would take part with the Persians,
-he did not think it prudent to relax his hold upon their conduct.[238]
-
-  [238] Arrian, i. 29, 8.
-
-Such opportunity seemed now not unlikely to occur. Memnon, excluded
-from efficacious action on the continent since the loss of
-Halikarnassus, was employed among the islands of the Ægean (during
-the first half of 333 B. C.), with the purpose of carrying war into
-Greece and Macedonia. Invested with the most ample command, he had a
-large Phenician fleet and a considerable body of Grecian mercenaries,
-together with his nephew Pharnabazus and the Persian Autophradates.
-Having acquired the important island of Chios, through the
-co-operation of a part of its inhabitants, he next landed on Lesbos,
-where four out of the five cities, either from fear or preference,
-declared in his favor; while Mitylênê, the greatest of the five,
-already occupied by a Macedonian garrison, stood out against him.
-Memnon accordingly disembarked his troops and commenced the blockade
-of the city both by sea and land, surrounding it with a double
-palisade wall from sea to sea. In the midst of this operation he died
-of sickness; but his nephew Pharnabazus, to whom he had consigned
-the command provisionally, until the pleasure of Darius could be
-known, prosecuted his measures vigorously, and brought the city to
-a capitulation. It was stipulated that the garrison introduced by
-Alexander should be dismissed; that the column, recording alliance
-with him, should be demolished; that the Mityleneans should become
-allies of Darius, upon the terms of the old convention called by the
-name of Antalkidas; and that the citizens in banishment should be
-recalled, with restitution of half their property. But Pharnabazus,
-as soon as admitted, violated the capitulation at once. He not only
-extorted contributions, but introduced a garrison under Lykomêdes,
-and established a returned exile named Diogenes as despot.[239] Such
-breach of faith was ill calculated to assist the farther extension of
-Persian influence in Greece.
-
-  [239] Arrian, ii. 1, 4-9.
-
-Had the Persian fleet been equally active a year earlier, Alexander’s
-army could never have landed in Asia. Nevertheless, the acquisitions
-of Chios and Lesbos, late as they were in coming, were highly
-important as promising future progress. Several of the Cyclades
-islands sent to tender their adhesion to the Persian cause; the fleet
-was expected in Eubœa, and the Spartans began to count upon aid for
-an anti-Macedonian movement.[240] But all these hopes were destroyed
-by the unexpected decease of Memnon.
-
-  [240] Diodor. xvii. 29.
-
-It was not merely the superior ability of Memnon, but also his
-established reputation both with Greeks and Persians, which rendered
-his death a fatal blow to the interests of Darius. The Persians had
-with them other Greek officers—brave and able—probably some not
-unfit to execute the full Memnonian schemes. But none of them had
-gone through the same experience in the art of exercising command
-among Orientals—none of them had acquired the confidence of Darius
-to the same extent, so as to be invested with the real guidance of
-operations, and upheld against court-calumnies. Though Alexander had
-now become master of Asia Minor, yet the Persians had ample means,
-if effectively used, of defending all that yet remained, and even of
-seriously disturbing him at home. But with Memnon vanished the last
-chance of employing these means with wisdom or energy. The full value
-of his loss was better appreciated by the intelligent enemy whom
-he opposed, than by the feeble master whom he served. The death of
-Memnon lessening the efficiency of the Persians at sea, allowed full
-leisure to reorganize the Macedonian fleet,[241] and to employ the
-undivided land-force for farther inland conquest.[242]
-
-  [241] Arrian, ii. 2, 6; Curtius, iii. 3, 19; iii. 4, 8. “Nondum
-  enim Memnonem vitâ excessisse cognoverat (Alexander)—satis
-  gnarus, cuncta in expedito fore, si nihil ab eo moveretur.”
-
-  [242] Diodor. xvi. 31.
-
-If Alexander was a gainer in respect to his own operations by the
-death of this eminent Rhodian, he was yet more a gainer by the change
-of policy which that event induced Darius to adopt. The Persian
-king resolved to renounce the defensive schemes of Memnon, and to
-take the offensive against the Macedonians on land. His troops,
-already summoned from the various parts of the empire, had partially
-arrived, and were still coming in.[243] Their numbers became greater
-and greater, amounting at length to a vast and multitudinous host,
-the total of which is given by some as 600,000 men; by others, as
-400,000 infantry and 100,000 cavalry. The spectacle of this showy
-and imposing mass, in every variety of arms, costume, and language,
-filled the mind of Darius with confidence; especially as there were
-among them between 20,000 and 30,000 Grecian mercenaries. The Persian
-courtiers, themselves elate and sanguine, stimulated and exaggerated
-the same feeling in the king himself, who became confirmed in his
-persuasion that his enemies could never resist him. From Sogdiana,
-Baktria, and India, the contingents had not yet had time to arrive;
-but most of those between the Persian Gulf and the Caspian sea had
-come in—Persians, Medes, Armenians, Derbikes, Barkanians, Hyrkanians,
-Katdakes, etc.; all of whom, mustered in the plains of Mesopotamia,
-are said to have been counted, like the troops of Xerxes in the
-plain of Doriskus, by paling off a space capable of containing
-exactly 10,000 men, and passing all the soldiers through it in
-succession.[244] Neither Darius himself, nor any of those around him,
-had ever before seen so overwhelming a manifestation of the Persian
-imperial force. To an Oriental eye, incapable of appreciating the
-real conditions of military preponderance,—accustomed only to the
-gross and visible computation of numbers and physical strength,—the
-king who marched forth at the head of such an army appeared like a
-god on earth, certain to trample down all before him—just as most
-Greeks had conceived respecting Xerxes,[245] and by stronger reason
-Xerxes respecting himself, a century and a half before. Because all
-this turned out a ruinous mistake, the description of the feeling,
-given in Curtius and Diodorus, is often mistrusted as baseless
-rhetoric. Yet it is in reality the self-suggested illusion of
-untaught men, as opposed to trained and scientific judgment.
-
-  [243] Diodor. xvii. 30, 31. Diodorus represents the Persian king
-  as having begun to issue letters of convocation for the troops,
-  _after_ he heard the death of Memnon; which cannot be true. The
-  letters must have been sent out before.
-
-  [244] Curtius, iii. 2.
-
-  [245] Herodot. vii. 56—and the colloquy between Xerxes and
-  Demaratus, vii. 103, 104—where the language put by Herodotus into
-  the mouth of Xerxes is natural and instructive. On the other
-  hand, the superior penetration of Cyrus the younger expresses
-  supreme contempt for the military inefficiency of an Asiatic
-  multitude—Xenophon, Anabas. i. 7, 4. Compare the blunt language
-  of the Arcadian Antiochus—Xen. Hellen. vii. i. 38; and Cyropæd.
-  viii. 8, 20.
-
-But though such was the persuasion of Orientals, it found no response
-in the bosom of an intelligent Athenian. Among the Greeks now near
-Darius, was the Athenian exile Charidemus, who having incurred the
-implacable enmity of Alexander, had been forced to quit Athens
-after the Macedonian capture of Thebes, and had fled together
-with Ephialtes to the Persians. Darius, elate with the apparent
-omnipotence of his army under review, and hearing but one voice of
-devoted concurrence from the courtiers around him, asked the opinion
-of Charidemus, in full expectation of receiving an affirmative
-reply. So completely were the hopes of Charidemus bound up with
-the success of Darius, that he would not suppress his convictions,
-however unpalatable, at a moment when there was yet a possibility
-that they might prove useful. He replied (with the same frankness as
-Demaratus had once employed towards Xerxes), that the vast multitude
-now before him were unfit to cope with the comparatively small number
-of the invaders. He advised Darius to place no reliance on Asiatics,
-but to employ his immense treasures in subsidizing an increased
-army of Grecian mercenaries. He tendered his own hearty services
-either to assist or to command. To Darius, what he said was alike
-surprising and offensive; in the Persian courtiers, it provoked
-intolerable wrath. Intoxicated as they all were with the spectacle
-of their present muster, it seemed to them a combination of insult
-with absurdity, to pronounce Asiatics worthless as compared with
-Macedonians, and to teach the king that his empire could be defended
-by none but Greeks. They denounced Charidemus as a traitor who
-wished to acquire the king’s confidence in order to betray him to
-Alexander. Darius, himself stung with the reply, and still farther
-exasperated by the clamors of his courtiers, seized with his own
-hands the girdle of Charidemus, and consigned him to the guards for
-execution. “You will discover too late (exclaimed the Athenian), the
-truth of what I have said. My avenger will soon be upon you.”[246]
-
-  [246] Curtius, iii. 2, 10-20; Diodor. xvii. 30.
-
-Filled as he now was with certain anticipations of success and glory,
-Darius resolved to assume in person the command of his army, and
-march down to overwhelm Alexander. From this moment, his land-army
-became the really important and aggressive force, with which he
-himself was to act. Herein we note his distinct abandonment of the
-plans of Memnon—the turning-point of his future fortune. He abandoned
-them, too, at the precise moment when they might have been most
-safely and completely executed. For at the time of the battle of the
-Granikus, when Memnon’s counsel was originally given, the defensive
-part of it was not easy to act upon; since the Persians had no very
-strong or commanding position. But now, in the spring of 333 B.
-C., they had a line of defence as good as they could possibly
-desire; advantages, indeed, scarcely to be paralleled elsewhere.
-In the first place, there was the line of Mount Taurus, barring
-the entrance of Alexander into Kilikia; a line of defence (as will
-presently appear) nearly inexpugnable. Next, even if Alexander had
-succeeded in forcing this line and mastering Kilikia, there would yet
-remain the narrow road between Mount Amanus and the sea, called the
-Amanian Gates, and the Gates of Kilikia and Assyria—and after that,
-the passes over Mount Amanus itself— all indispensable for Alexander
-to pass through, and capable of being held, with proper precautions,
-against the strongest force of attack. A better opportunity, for
-executing the defensive part of Memnon’s scheme, could not present
-itself; and he himself must doubtless have reckoned that such
-advantages would not be thrown away.
-
-The momentous change of policy, on the part of the Persian king, was
-manifested by the order which he sent to the fleet after receiving
-intelligence of the death of Memnon. Confirming the appointment of
-Pharnabazus (made provisionally by the dying Memnon) as admiral, he
-at the same time despatched Thymôdes (son of Mentor and nephew of
-Memnon) to bring away from the fleet the Grecian mercenaries who
-served aboard, to be incorporated with the main Persian army.[247]
-Here was a clear proof that the main stress of offensive operations
-was henceforward to be transferred from the sea to the land.
-
-  [247] Arrian, ii. 2, 1; ii. 13, 3. Curtius, iii. 3, 1.
-
-It is the more important to note such desertion of policy, on the
-part of Darius, as the critical turning-point in the Greco-Persian
-drama—because Arrian and the other historians leave it out of sight,
-and set before us little except the secondary points in the case.
-Thus, for example, they condemn the imprudence of Darius, for coming
-to fight Alexander within the narrow space near Issus, instead of
-waiting for him on the spacious plains beyond Mount Amanus. Now,
-unquestionably, granting that a general battle was inevitable, this
-step augmented the chances in favor of the Macedonians. But it was a
-step upon which no material consequences turned; for the Persian army
-under Darius was hardly less unfit for a pitched battle in the open
-plain; as was afterwards proved at Arbela. The real imprudence—the
-neglect of the Memnonian warning—consisted in fighting the battle at
-all. Mountains and defiles were the real strength of the Persians,
-to be held as posts of defence against the invader. If Darius erred,
-it was not so much in relinquishing the open plain of Sochi, as in
-originally preferring that plain with a pitched battle, to the strong
-lines of defence offered by Taurus and Amanus.
-
-The narrative of Arrian, exact perhaps in what it affirms, is not
-only brief and incomplete, but even omits on various occasions to put
-in relief the really important and determining points.
-
-While halting at Gordium, Alexander was joined by those newly-married
-Macedonians whom he had sent home to winter, and who now came back
-with reinforcements to the number of 3000 infantry and 300 cavalry,
-together with 200 Thessalian cavalry, and 150 Eleians.[248] As soon
-as his troops had been sufficiently rested, he marched (probably
-about the latter half of May) towards Paphlagonia and Kappadokia.
-At Ankyra he was met by a deputation from the Paphlagonians, who
-submitted themselves to his discretion, only entreating that he
-would not conduct his army into their country. Accepting these
-terms, he placed them under the government of Kallas, his satrap of
-Hellespontine Phrygia. Advancing farther, he subdued the whole of
-Kappadokia, even to a considerable extent beyond the Halys, leaving
-therein Sabiktas as satrap.[249]
-
-  [248] Arrian, i. 29. 6.
-
-  [249] Arrian, ii. 4, 2; Curtius, iii. 1, 22; Plutarch, Alex. 18.
-
-Having established security in his rear, Alexander marched southward
-towards Mount Taurus. He reached a post called the Camp of Cyrus,
-at the northern foot of that mountain, near the pass Tauri-pylæ,
-or Kilikian Gates, which forms the regular communication, between
-Kappadokia on the north side, and Kilikia on the south, of this great
-chain. The long road ascending and descending was generally narrow,
-winding, and rugged, sometimes between two steep and high banks; and
-it included, near its southern termination, one spot particularly
-obstructed and difficult. From ancient times, down to the present,
-the main road from Asia Minor into Kilikia and Syria has run through
-this pass. During the Roman empire, it must doubtless have received
-many improvements, so as to render the traffic comparatively easier.
-Yet the description given of it by modern travellers represents
-it to be as difficult as any road ever traversed by an army.[250]
-Seventy years before Alexander, it had been traversed by the younger
-Cyrus with the 10,000 Greeks, in his march up to attack his brother
-Artaxerxes; and Xenophon,[251] who then went through it, pronounces
-it absolutely impracticable for an army, if opposed by any occupying
-force. So thoroughly persuaded was Cyrus himself of this fact,
-that he had prepared a fleet, in case he found the pass occupied,
-to land troops by sea in Kilikia in the rear of the defenders; and
-great indeed was his astonishment, to discover that the habitual
-recklessness of Persian management had left the defile unguarded. The
-narrowest part, while hardly sufficient to contain four armed men
-abreast, was shut in by precipitous rock on each side.[252] Here, if
-anywhere, was the spot in which the defensive policy of Memnon might
-have been made sure. To Alexander, inferior as he was by sea, the
-resource employed by the younger Cyrus was not open.
-
-  [250] Respecting this pass, see Vol. IX. Ch. lxix. p. 20 of the
-  present History. There are now two passes over Taurus, from
-  Erekli on the north side of the mountain—one, the easternmost
-  descending upon Adana in Kilikia—the other, the westernmost, upon
-  Tarsus. In the war (1832) between the Turks and Ibrahim Pacha,
-  the Turkish commander left the westernmost pass undefended,
-  so that Ibrahim Pacha passed from Tarsus along it without
-  opposition. The Turkish troops occupied the easternmost pass, but
-  defended themselves badly, so that the passage was forced by the
-  Egyptians (Histoire de la Guerre de Mehemed Ali, par Cadalvène et
-  Barrault, p. 243).
-
-  Alexander crossed Taurus by the easternmost of the two passes.
-
-  [251] Xenoph. Anabas. i. 2. 21; Diodor. xiv. 20.
-
-  [252] Curtius, iii. 4, 11.
-
-Yet Arsames, the Persian satrap commanding at Tarsus in Kilikia,
-having received seemingly from his master no instructions, or worse
-than none, acted as if ignorant of the existence of his enterprising
-enemy north of Mount Taurus. On the first approach of Alexander,
-the few Persian soldiers occupying the pass fled without striking
-a blow, being seemingly unprepared for any enemy more formidable
-than mountain-robbers. Alexander thus became master of this almost
-insuperable barrier, without the loss of a man.[253] On the ensuing
-day, he marched his whole army over it into Kilikia, and arriving
-in a few hours at Tarsus, found the town already evacuated by
-Arsames.[254]
-
-  [253] Curtius, iii. 4, 11. “Contemplatus locorum situm
-  (Alexander), non alias dicitur magis admiratus esse felicitatem
-  suam”, etc.
-
-  See Plutarch, Demetrius, 47, where Agathokles (son of Lysimachus)
-  holds the line of Taurus against Demetrius Poliorkêtes.
-
-  [254] Arrian, ii. 4, 3-8; Curtius, iii. 4. Curtius ascribes to
-  Arsames the intention of executing what had been recommended by
-  Memnon before the battle of Granikus—to desolate the country in
-  order to check Alexander’s advance. But this can hardly be the
-  right interpretation of the proceeding. Arrian’s account seems
-  more reasonable.
-
-At Tarsus Alexander made a long halt; much longer than he intended.
-Either from excessive fatigue—or from bathing while hot in the
-chilly water of the river Kydnus—he was seized with a violent fever,
-which presently increased to so dangerous a pitch that his life was
-despaired of. Amidst the grief and alarm with which this misfortune
-filled the army, none of the physicians would venture to administer
-remedies, for fear of being held responsible for what threatened
-to be a fatal result.[255] One alone among them, an Akarnanian
-named Philippus, long known and trusted by Alexander, engaged to
-cure him by a violent purgative draught. Alexander directed him to
-prepare it; but before the time for taking it arrived, he received
-a confidential letter from Parmenio, entreating him to beware of
-Philippus, who had been bribed by Darius to poison him. After reading
-the letter, he put it under his pillow. Presently came Philippus with
-the medicine, which Alexander accepted and swallowed without remark,
-at the same time giving Philippus the letter to read, and watching
-the expression of his countenance. The look, words, and gestures of
-the physician were such as completely to reassure him. Philippus,
-indignantly repudiating the calumny, repeated his full confidence
-in the medicine, and pledged himself to abide the result. At first
-it operated so violently as to make Alexander seemingly worse, and
-even to bring him to death’s door; but after a certain interval, its
-healing effects became manifest. The fever was subdued, and Alexander
-was pronounced out of danger, to the delight of the whole army.[256]
-A reasonable time sufficed, to restore him to his former health and
-vigor.
-
-  [255] When Hephæstion died of fever at Ekbatana, nine years
-  afterwards, Alexander caused the physician who had attended him
-  to be crucified (Plutarch, Alexand. 72; Arrian, vii. 14).
-
-  [256] This interesting anecdote is recounted, with more or less
-  of rhetoric and amplification, in all the historians—Arrian, ii.
-  4; Diodor. xvii. 31; Plutarch, Alexand. 19; Curtius, iii. 5;
-  Justin, xi. 8.
-
-  It is one mark of the difference produced in the character of
-  Alexander, by superhuman successes continued for four years—to
-  contrast the generous confidence which he displayed towards
-  Philippus, with his cruel prejudgment and torture of Philôtas
-  four years afterwards.
-
-It was his first operation, after recovery, to send forward Parmenio,
-at the head of the Greeks, Thessalians, and Thracians, in his army,
-for the purpose of clearing the forward route and of securing the
-pass called the Gates of Kilikia and Syria.[257] This narrow road,
-bounded by the range of Mount Amanus on the east and by the sea on
-the west, had been once barred by a double cross-wall with gates for
-passage, marking the original boundaries of Kilikia and Syria. The
-Gates, about six days’ march beyond Tarsus,[258] were found guarded,
-but the guard fled with little resistance. At the same time Alexander
-himself, conducting the Macedonian troops in a south-westerly
-direction from Tarsus, employed some time in mastering and
-regulating the towns of Anchialus and Soli, as well as the Kilikian
-mountaineers. Then, returning to Tarsus, and recommencing his forward
-march, he advanced with the infantry and with his chosen squadron of
-cavalry, first to Magarsus near the mouth of the river Pyramus, next
-to Mallus; the general body of cavalry, under Philôtus, being sent by
-a more direct route across the Alëian plain. Mallus, sacred to the
-prophet Amphilocus as a patron-hero, was said to be a colony from
-Argos; on both these grounds Alexander was disposed to treat it with
-peculiar respect. He offered solemn sacrifice to Amphilocus, exempted
-Mallus from tribute, and appeased some troublesome discord among the
-citizens.[259]
-
-  [257] Arrian, ii. 5, 1; Diodor. xvii. 32; Curtius, iii. 7, 6.
-
-  [258] Cyrus the younger was five days in marching from Tarsus to
-  Issus, and one day more from Issus to the gates of Kilikia and
-  Syria.—Xenoph. Anab. i. 4, 1; Vol. IX. Chap. lxix. p. 27 of this
-  history.
-
-  [259] Arrian, ii, 5, 11.
-
-It was at Mallus that he received his first distinct communication
-respecting Darius and the main Persian army; which was said to be
-encamped at Sochi in Syria, on the eastern side of Mount Amanus,
-about two days’ march from the mountain pass now called Beylan.
-That pass, traversing the Amanian range, forms the continuance of
-the main road from Asia Minor into Syria, after having passed first
-over Taurus, and next through the difficult point of ground above
-specified (called the Gates of Kilikia and Syria), between Mount
-Amanus and the sea. Assembling his principal officers, Alexander
-communicated to them the position of Darius, now encamped in a
-spacious plain with prodigious superiority of numbers, especially
-of cavalry. Though the locality was thus rather favorable to the
-enemy, yet the Macedonians, full of hopes and courage, called upon
-Alexander to lead them forthwith against him. Accordingly Alexander,
-well pleased with their alacrity, began his forward march on the
-following morning. He passed through Issus, where he left some sick
-and wounded under a moderate guard—then through the Gates of Kilikia
-and Syria. At the second day’s march from those Gates, he reached the
-seaport of Myriandrus, the first town of Syria or Phenicia.[260]
-
-  [260] Arrian, ii. 6.
-
-Here, having been detained in his camp one day by a dreadful storm,
-he received intelligence which altogether changed his plans. The
-Persian army had been marched away from Sochi, and was now in
-Kilikia, following in his rear. It had already got possession of
-Issus.
-
-Darius had marched out of the interior his vast and miscellaneous
-host, stated at 600,000 men. His mother, his wife, his harem, his
-children, his personal attendants of every description, accompanied
-him, to witness what was anticipated as a certain triumph. All the
-apparatus of ostentation and luxury was provided in abundance, for
-the king and for his Persian grandees. The baggage was enormous: of
-gold and silver alone, we are told, that there was enough to furnish
-load for 600 mules and 300 camels.[261] A temporary bridge being
-thrown over the Euphrates, five days were required to enable the
-whole army to cross.[262] Much of the treasure and baggage, however,
-was not allowed to follow the army to the vicinity of Mount Amanus,
-but was sent under a guard to Damascus in Syria.
-
-  [261] Curtius, iii. 3, 24.
-
-  [262] Curtius, iii. 7, 1.
-
-At the head of such an overwhelming host, Darius was eager to bring
-on at once a general battle. It was not sufficient for him simply
-to keep back an enemy, whom, when once in presence, he calculated
-on crushing altogether. Accordingly, he had given no orders (as we
-have just seen) to defend the line of the Taurus; he had admitted
-Alexander unopposed into Kilikia, and he intended to let him enter in
-like manner through the remaining strong passes—first, the Gates of
-Kilikia and Syria, between Mount Amanus and the sea—next, the pass,
-now called Beylan, across Amanus itself. He both expected and wished
-that his enemy should come into the plain to fight, there to be
-trodden down by the countless horsemen of Persia.
-
-But such anticipation was not at once realized. The movements of
-Alexander, hitherto so rapid and unremitting, seemed suspended.
-We have already noticed the dangerous fever which threatened his
-life, occasioning not only a long halt, but much uneasiness among
-the Macedonian army. All was doubtless reported to the Persians,
-with abundant exaggerations: and when Alexander, immediately after
-recovery, instead of marching forward towards them, turned away
-from them to subdue the western portion of Kilikia, this again was
-construed by Darius as an evidence of hesitation and fear. It is even
-asserted that Parmenio wished to await the attack of the Persians in
-Kilikia, and that Alexander at first consented to do so.[263] At any
-rate, Darius, after a certain interval, contracted the persuasion,
-and was assured by his Asiatic councillors and courtiers, that
-the Macedonians, though audacious and triumphant against frontier
-satraps, now hung back intimidated by the approaching majesty
-and full muster of the empire, and that they would not stand to
-resist his attack. Under this impression Darius resolved upon an
-advance into Kilikia with all his army. Thymôdes indeed, and other
-intelligent Grecian advisers—together with the Macedonian exile
-Amyntas—deprecated his new resolution, entreating him to persevere in
-his original purpose. They pledged themselves that Alexander would
-come forth to attack him wherever he was, and that too, speedily.
-They dwelt on the imprudence of fighting in the narrow defiles of
-Kilikia, where his numbers, and especially his vast cavalry, would be
-useless. Their advice, however, was not only disregarded by Darius,
-but denounced by the Persian councillors as traitorous.[264] Even
-some of the Greeks in the camp shared, and transmitted in their
-letters to Athens, the blind confidence of the monarch. The order
-was forthwith given for the whole army to quit the plains of Syria
-and march across Mount Amanus into Kilikia.[265] To cross, by any
-pass, over such a range as that of Mount Amanus, with a numerous
-army, heavy baggage, and ostentatious train (including all the
-suite necessary for the regal family), must have been a work of no
-inconsiderable time; and the only two passes over this mountain were,
-both of them, narrow and easily defensible.[266] Darius followed the
-northernmost of the two, which brought him into the rear of his enemy.
-
-  [263] Curtius, iii. 7, 8.
-
-  [264] From Æschines (cont. Ktesiphont. p. 552) it seems that
-  Demosthenes, and the anti-Macedonian statesmen at Athens,
-  received letters at this moment written in high spirits,
-  intimating that Alexander was “caught and pinned up” in Kilikia.
-  Demosthenes (if we may believe Æschines) went about showing
-  these letters, and boasting of the good news which was at
-  hand. Josephus (Ant. Jud. xi. 8, 3) also reports the confident
-  anticipations of Persian success, entertained by Sanballat at
-  Samaria, as well as by all the Asiatics around.
-
-  [265] Arrian, ii. 6; Curtius, iii. 8, 2; Diodor. xvii. 32.
-
-  [266] Cicero, Epist. ad Famil. xv. 4. See the instructive
-  commentary of Mützel ad Curtium, iii. 8, p. 103, 104. I have
-  given in an Appendix to this Volume, some explanatory comments on
-  the ground near Issus.
-
-Thus at the same time that the Macedonians were marching southward
-to cross Mount Amanus by the southern pass, and attack Darius in
-the plain—Darius was coming over into Kilikia by the northern pass
-to drive them before him back into Macedonia.[267] Reaching Issus,
-seemingly about two days after they had left it, he became master of
-their sick and wounded left in the town. With odious brutality, his
-grandees impelled him to inflict upon these poor men either death or
-amputation of hands and arms.[268] He then marched forward—along the
-same road by the shore of the Gulf which had already been followed by
-Alexander—and encamped on the banks of the river Pinarus.
-
-  [267] Plutarch (Alexand. 20) states this general fact correctly;
-  but he is mistaken in saying that the two armies missed one
-  another in the night, etc.
-
-  [268] Arrian, ii. 7, 2; Curtius, iii. 8, 14. I have mentioned,
-  a few pages back, that about a fortnight before, Alexander
-  had sent Parmenio forward from Tarsus to secure the Gates of
-  Kilikia and Syria, while he himself marched backward to Soli
-  and Anchilaus. He and Parmenio must have been separated at this
-  time by a distance, not less than eight days of ordinary march.
-  If during this interval, Darius had arrived at Issus, he would
-  have been just between them, and would have cut them off one
-  from the other. It was Alexander’s good luck that so grave an
-  embarrassment did not occur.
-
-The fugitives from Issus hastened to inform Alexander, whom they
-overtook at Myriandrus. So astonished was he, that he refused to
-believe the news, until it had been confirmed by some officers whom
-he sent northward along the coast of the Gulf in a small galley,
-and to whom the vast Persian multitude on the shore was distinctly
-visible. Then, assembling the chief officers, he communicated to
-them the near approach of the enemy, expatiating on the favorable
-auspices under which a battle would now take place.[269] His address
-was hailed with acclamation by his hearers, who demanded only to be
-led against the enemy.[270]
-
-  [269] Arrian, ii. 7, 8.
-
-  [270] Arrian, ii. 7; Curtius, iii. 10; Diodor. xvii. 33.
-
-His distance from the Persian position may have been about eighteen
-miles.[271] By an evening march, after supper, he reached at midnight
-the narrow defile (between Mount Amanus and the sea) called the Gates
-of Kilikia and Syria, through which he had marched two days before.
-Again master of that important position, he rested there the last
-portion of the night, and advanced forward at daybreak northward
-towards Darius. At first the breadth of practicable road was so
-confined, as to admit only a narrow column of march, with the cavalry
-following the infantry; presently it widened, enabling Alexander
-to enlarge his front by bringing up successively the divisions of
-the phalanx. On approaching near to the river Pinarus (which flowed
-across the pass), he adopted his order of battle. on the extreme
-right he placed the hypaspists, or light division of hoplites; next
-(reckoning from right to left), five Taxeis or divisions of the
-phalanx, under Kœnus, Perdikkas, Meleager, Ptolemy, and Amyntas. Of
-these three last or left divisions, Kraterus had the general command;
-himself subject to the orders of Parmenio, who commanded the entire
-left half of the army. The breadth of plain between the mountains on
-the right, and the sea on the left, is said to have been not more
-than fourteen stadia, or about one English mile and a half.[272] From
-fear of being outflanked by the superior numbers of the Persians,
-he gave strict orders to Parmenio to keep close to the sea. His
-Macedonian cavalry, the Companions, together with the Thessalians,
-were placed on his right flank; as were also the Agrianes, and the
-principal portion of the light infantry. The Peloponnesian and allied
-cavalry, with the Thracian and Kretan light infantry, were sent on
-the left flank to Parmenio.[273]
-
-  [271] Kallisthenes called the distance 100 stadia (ap. Polyb.
-  xii. 19). This seems likely to be under the truth.
-
-  Polybius criticises severely the description given by
-  Kallisthenes of the march of Alexander. Not having before us the
-  words of Kallisthenes himself, we are hardly in a condition to
-  appreciate the goodness of the criticism; which in some points is
-  certainly overstrained.
-
-  [272] Kallisthenes ap. Polybium, xii. 17.
-
-  [273] Arrian, ii. 8, 4-13.
-
-Darius, informed that Alexander was approaching, resolved to fight
-where he was encamped, behind the river Pinarus. He, however, threw
-across the river a force of 30,000 cavalry, and 20,000 infantry,
-to ensure the undisturbed formation of his main force behind the
-river.[274] He composed his phalanx or main line of battle, of 90,000
-hoplites; 30,000 Greek hoplites in the centre, and 30,000 Asiatics
-armed as hoplites (called Kardakes), on each side of these Greeks.
-These men—not distributed into separate divisions, but grouped in one
-body or multitude[275]—filled the breadth between the mountains and
-the sea. On the mountains to his left, he placed a body of 20,000
-men, intended to act against the right flank and rear of Alexander.
-But for the great numerical mass of his vast host, he could find no
-room to act; accordingly they remained useless in the rear of his
-Greek and Asiatic hoplites, yet not formed into any body of reserve,
-or kept disposable for assisting in case of need. When his line was
-thoroughly formed, he recalled to the left bank of the Pinarus the
-30,000 cavalry and 20,000 infantry which he had sent across as a
-protecting force. A part of this cavalry were sent to his extreme
-left wing, but the mountain ground was found unsuitable for them
-to act, so that they were forced to cross the right wing, where
-accordingly the great mass of the Persian cavalry became assembled.
-Darius himself in his chariot was in the centre of the line, behind
-the Grecian hoplites. In the front of his whole line ran the river or
-rivulet Pinarus; the banks of which, in many parts naturally steep,
-he obstructed in some places by embankments.[276]
-
-  [274] Compare Kallisthenes ap. Polyb. xii. 17.; and Arrian, ii.
-  8, 8. Considering how narrow the space was, such numerous bodies
-  as these 30,000 horse and 20,000 foot must have found little
-  facility in moving. Kallisthenes did not notice them, as far as
-  we can collect from Polybius.
-
-  [275] Arrian, ii. 8, 9. Τοσούτους γὰρ ~ἐπὶ φάλαγγος ἁπλῆς~
-  ἐδέχετο τὸ χωρίον, ἵνα ἐτάσσοντο.
-
-  The depth of this single phalanx is not given, nor do we know the
-  exact width of the ground which it occupied. Assuming a depth of
-  sixteen, and one pace in breadth to each soldier, 4000 men would
-  stand in the breadth of a stadium of 250 paces; and therefore
-  80,000 men in a breadth of twenty stadia (see the calculation of
-  Rüstow and Köchly, p. 280, about the Macedonian line). Assuming
-  a depth of twenty-six, 6500 men would stand in the stadium, and
-  therefore 90,000 in a total breadth of 14 stadia, which is that
-  given by Kallisthenes. But there must have been intervals left,
-  greater or less, we know not how many; the covering detachments,
-  which had been thrown out before the river Pinarus, must have
-  found some means of passing through to the rear, when recalled.
-
-  Mr. Kinneir states that the breadth between Mount Amanus and the
-  sea varies between one mile and a half (English) and three miles.
-  The fourteen stadia of Kallisthenes are equivalent to nearly one
-  English mile and three-quarters.
-
-  Neither in ancient nor in modern times have Oriental armies ever
-  been trained, by native officers, to regularity of march or
-  array—see Malcolm, Hist. of Persia, ch. xxiii. vol. ii. p. 498;
-  Volney, Travels in Egypt and Syria, vol. i. p. 124.
-
-  [276] Arrian, ii. 10, 2. Kallisthenes appears to have reckoned
-  the mercenaries composing the Persian phalanx at 30,000—and the
-  cavalry at 30,000. He does not seem to have taken account of the
-  Kardakes. Yet Polybius in his criticism tries to make out that
-  there was not room for an array of even 60,000; while Arrian
-  enumerates 90,000 hoplites, not including cavalry (Polyb. xii.
-  18).
-
-As soon as Alexander, by the retirement of the Persian covering
-detachment, was enabled to perceive the final dispositions of Darius,
-he made some alteration in his own, transferring his Thessalian
-cavalry by a rear movement from his right to his left wing, and
-bringing forward the lancer-cavalry or sarissophori, as well as the
-light infantry, Pæonians, and archers, to the front of his right. The
-Agrianians, together with some cavalry and another body of archers,
-were detached from the general line to form an oblique front against
-the 20,000 Persians posted on the hill to outflank him. As these
-20,000 men came near enough to threaten his flank, Alexander directed
-the Agrianians to attack them, and to drive them farther away on the
-hills. They manifested so little firmness, and gave way so easily,
-that he felt no dread of any serious aggressive movement from them.
-He therefore contented himself with holding back in reserve against
-them a body of 300 heavy cavalry; while he placed the Agrianians and
-the rest on the right of his main line, in order to make his front
-equal to that of his enemies.[277]
-
-  [277] Arrian, ii. 9; Kallisthenes ap. Polyb. xii. 17. The
-  slackness of this Persian corps on the flank, and the ease with
-  which Alexander drove them back—a material point in reference to
-  the battle—are noticed by Curtius, iii. 9, 11.
-
-Having thus formed his array, after giving the troops a certain
-halt after their march, he advanced at a very slow pace, anxious
-to maintain his own front even, and anticipating that the enemy
-might cross the Pinarus to meet him. But as they did not move, he
-continued his advance, preserving the uniformity of the front,
-until he arrived within bowshot, when he himself, at the head of
-his cavalry, hypaspists, and divisions of the phalanx on the right,
-accelerated his pace, crossed the river at a quick step, and fell
-upon the Kardakes or Asiatic hoplites on the Persian left. Unprepared
-for the suddenness and vehemence of this attack, these Kardakes
-scarcely resisted a moment, but gave way as soon as they came to
-close quarters, and fled, vigorously pressed by the Macedonian right.
-Darius, who was in his chariot in the centre, perceived that this
-untoward desertion exposed his person from the left flank. Seized
-with panic, he caused his chariot to be turned round, and fled with
-all speed among the foremost fugitives.[278] He kept to his chariot
-as long as the ground permitted, but quitted it on reaching some
-rugged ravines, and mounted on horseback to make sure of escape; in
-such terror, that he cast away his bow, his shield, and his regal
-mantle. He does not seem to have given a single order, nor to have
-made the smallest effort to repair a first misfortune. The flight
-of the king was the signal for all who observed it to flee also; so
-that the vast host in the rear were quickly to be seen trampling one
-another down, in their efforts to get through the difficult ground
-out of the reach of the enemy. Darius was himself not merely the
-centre of union for all the miscellaneous contingents composing the
-army, but also the sole commander; so that after his flight there was
-no one left to give any general order.
-
-  [278] Arrian, ii. 11, 6. εὐθὺς, ὡς εἶχεν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἅρματος, ξὺν
-  τοῖς πρώτοις ἔφευγε, etc.
-
-  This simple statement of Arrian is far more credible than the
-  highly wrought details given by Diodorus (xvii. 34) and Curtius
-  (iii. 11, 9) about a direct charge of Alexander upon the chariot
-  of Darius, and a murderous combat immediately round that chariot,
-  in which the horses became wounded and unmanageable, so as to
-  be on the point of overturning it. Chares even went so far
-  as to affirm that Alexander had come into personal conflict
-  with Darius, from whom he had received his wound in the thigh
-  (Plutarch, Alex. 20). Plutarch had seen the letter addressed by
-  Alexander to Antipater, simply intimating that he had received a
-  slight wound in the thigh.
-
-  In respect to this point, as to so many others, Diodorus and
-  Curtius have copied the same authority.
-
-  Kallisthenes (ap. Polyb. xii. 22) stated that Alexander had
-  laid his plan of attack with a view to bear upon the person of
-  Darius, which is not improbable (compare Xenoph. Anab. i. 8, 22),
-  and was in fact realized, since the first successful charge of
-  the Macedonians came so near to Darius as to alarm him for the
-  safety of his own person. To the question put by Polybius—How
-  did Alexander know in what part of the army Darius was?—we may
-  reply, that the chariot and person of Darius would doubtless be
-  conspicuous: moreover the Persian kings were habitually in the
-  centre—and Cyrus the younger, at the battle of Kunaxa, directed
-  the attack to be made exactly against the person of his brother
-  Artaxerxes.
-
-  After the battle of Kunaxa, Artaxerxes assumed to himself the
-  honor of having slain Cyrus with his own hand, and put to death
-  those who had really done the deed, because they boasted of it
-  (Plutarch, Artax. 16).
-
-This great battle—we ought rather to say, that which ought to have
-been a great battle—was thus lost,—through the giving way of the
-Asiatic hoplites on the Persian left, and the immediate flight of
-Darius,—within a few minutes after its commencement. But the centre
-and right of the Persians, not yet apprised of these misfortunes,
-behaved with gallantry. When Alexander made his rapid dash forward
-with the right, under his own immediate command, the phalanx in his
-left centre (which was under Kraterus and Parmenio) either did not
-receive the same accelerating order, or found itself both retarded
-and disordered by greater steepness in the banks of the Pinarus.
-Here it was charged by the Grecian mercenaries, the best troops in
-the Persian service. The combat which took place was obstinate, and
-the Macedonian loss not inconsiderable; the general of division,
-Ptolemy son of Seleukus, with 120 of the front rank men or choice
-phalangites, being slain. But presently Alexander, having completed
-the rout on the enemies’ left, brought back his victorious troops
-from the pursuit, attacked the Grecian mercenaries in flank, and gave
-decisive superiority to their enemies. These Grecian mercenaries
-were beaten and forced to retire. On finding that Darius himself
-had fled, they got away from the field as well as they could, yet
-seemingly in good order. There is even reason to suppose that a part
-of them forced their way up the mountains or through the Macedonian
-line, and made their escape southward.[279]
-
-  [279] This is the supposition of Mr. Williams, and it appears
-  to me probable though Mr. Ainsworth calls it in question, in
-  consequence of the difficulties of the ground southward of
-  Myriandrus towards the sea. [See Mr. Ainsworth’s Essay on the
-  Cilician and Syrian Gates, Journal of the Geograph. Society,
-  1838, p. 194]. These Greeks, being merely fugitives with arms in
-  their hands—with neither cavalry nor baggage—could make their way
-  over very difficult ground.
-
-Meanwhile on the Persian right, towards the sea, the heavy-armed
-Persian cavalry had shown much bravery. They were bold enough to
-cross the Pinarus[280] and vigorously to charge the Thessalians; with
-whom they maintained a close contest, until the news spread that
-Darius had disappeared, and that the left of the army was routed.
-They then turned their backs and fled, sustaining terrible damage
-from their enemies in the retreat. Of the Kardakes on the _right_
-flank of the Grecian hoplites in the Persian line, we hear nothing,
-nor of the Macedonian infantry opposed to them. Perhaps these
-Kardakes came little into action, since the cavalry on their part of
-the field were so severely engaged. At any rate they took part in the
-general flight of the Persians, as soon as Darius was known to have
-left the field.[281]
-
-  [280] Arrian, ii. 11, 3; Curtius, iii. 11, 13. Kallisthenes
-  stated the same thing as Arrian—that this Persian cavalry had
-  crossed the Pinarus, and charged the Thessalians with bravery.
-  Polybius censures him for it, as if he had affirmed something
-  false and absurd (xii. 18). This shows that the criticisms of
-  Polybius are not to be accepted without reserve. He reasons as if
-  the Macedonian phalanx _could_ not cross the Pinarus—converting a
-  difficulty into an impossibility (xii. 22).
-
-  [281] Arrian, ii. 11; Curtius, iii. 11.
-
-The rout of the Persians being completed, Alexander began a
-vigorous pursuit. The destruction and slaughter of the fugitives
-was prodigious. Amidst so small a breadth of practicable ground,
-narrowed sometimes into a defile and broken by frequent watercourses,
-their vast numbers found no room, and trod one another down. As many
-perished in this way as by the sword of the conquerors; insomuch
-that Ptolemy (afterwards king of Egypt, the companion and historian
-of Alexander) recounts that he himself in the pursuit came to a
-ravine choked up with dead bodies, of which he made a bridge to pass
-over it.[282] The pursuit was continued as long as the light of a
-November day allowed; but the battle had not begun till a late hour.
-The camp of Darius was taken together with his mother, his wife, his
-sister, his infant son, and two daughters. His chariot, his shield,
-and his bow also fell into the power of the conquerors; and a sum
-of 3000 talents in money was found, though much of the treasure
-had been sent to Damascus. The total loss of the Persians is said
-to have amounted to 10,000 horse and 100,000 foot; among the slain
-moreover were several eminent Persian grandees,—Arsames, Rheomithres,
-and Atizyes, who had commanded at the Granikus—Sabakes, satrap of
-Egypt. Of the Macedonians we are told that 300 foot and 150 horse
-were killed. Alexander himself was slightly wounded in the thigh by a
-sword.[283]
-
-  [282] Arrian, i. 11, 11; Kallisthenes ap. Polyb. xii 20.
-
-  [283] Arrian, ii. 11; Diodor. xvii. Curtius (ii. 11, 27) says
-  that the Macedonians lost thirty-two foot and one hundred and
-  fifty horse, killed; with 504 men wounded;—Justin states, 130
-  foot, and 150 horse (xi. 9).
-
-The mother, wife, and family of Darius, who became captives, were
-treated by Alexander’s order with the utmost consideration and
-respect. When Alexander returned at night from the pursuit, he found
-the regal tent reserved and prepared for him. In an inner compartment
-of it he heard the tears and wailings of women. He was informed that
-the mourners were the mother and wife of Darius, who had learnt that
-the bow and shield of Darius had been taken, and were giving loose
-to their grief under the belief that Darius himself was killed.
-Alexander immediately sent Leonnatus to assure them that Darius was
-still living, and to promise further that they should be allowed
-to preserve the regal title and state—his war against Darius being
-undertaken not from any feelings of hatred, but as a fair contest
-for the empire of Asia.[284] Besides this anecdote, which depends on
-good authority, many others, uncertified or untrue, were recounted
-about his kind behavior to these princesses; and Alexander himself,
-shortly after the battle, seems to have heard fictions about it,
-which he thought himself obliged to contradict in a letter. It is
-certain, (from the extract now remaining of this letter) that he
-never saw, nor ever entertained the idea of seeing, the captive wife
-of Darius, said to be the most beautiful woman in Asia; moreover he
-even declined to hear encomiums upon her beauty.[285]
-
-  [284] Arrian, ii. 12, 8—from Ptolemy and Aristobulus. Compare
-  Diodor. xvii. 36; Curtius, iii. 11, 24; iii. 12, 17.
-
-  [285] Plutarch, Alex. 22. ἐγὼ γὰρ (Alexander) οὐχ ὅτι ἑωρακὼς ἂν
-  εὑρεθείην τὴν Δαρείου γυναῖκα ἢ βεβουλευμένος ἰδεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ
-  τῶν λεγόντων περὶ τῆς εὐμορφίας αὐτῆς προσδεδεγμένος τὸν λόγον.
-
-How this vast host of fugitives got out of the narrow limits of
-Kilikia, or how many of them quitted that country by the same pass
-over Mount Amanus as that by which they had entered it—we cannot make
-out. It is probable that many, and Darius himself among the number,
-made their escape across the mountain by various subordinate roads
-and by-paths; which, though unfit for a regular army with baggage,
-would be found a welcome resource by scattered companies. Darius
-managed to get together 4000 of the fugitives, with whom he hastened
-to Thapsakus, and there recrossed the Euphrates. The only remnant of
-force, still in a position of defence after the battle, consisted of
-8000 of the Grecian mercenaries under Amyntas and Thymôdes. These
-men, fighting their way out of Kilikia (seemingly towards the south,
-by or near Myriandrus), marched to Tripolis on the coast of Phenicia,
-where they still found the same vessels in which they had themselves
-been brought from the armament of Lesbos. Seizing sufficient means
-of transport, and destroying the rest to prevent pursuit, they
-immediately crossed over to Cyprus, and from thence to Egypt.[286]
-With this single exception, the enormous Persian host disappears
-with the battle of Issus. We hear of no attempt to rally or reform,
-nor of any fresh Persian force afoot until two years afterwards. The
-booty acquired by the victors was immense, not merely in gold and
-silver, but also in captives for the slave-merchant. On the morrow of
-the battle, Alexander offered a solemn sacrifice of thanksgiving,
-with three altars erected on the banks of the Pinarus; while he at
-the same time buried the dead, consoled the wounded, and rewarded or
-complimented all who had distinguished themselves.[287]
-
-  [286] Arrian, ii. 13, 2, 3; Diodor. xvii. 48. Curtius says
-  that these Greeks got away by by-paths across the mountains
-  (Amanus)—which may be true (Curtius, iii. 11, 19).
-
-  [287] Arrian, ii. 12, 1; Curtius, iii. 12, 27; Diodor. xvii. 40.
-  The “Aræ Alexandri, in radicibus Amani”, are mentioned by Cicero
-  (ad Famil. xv. 4) When commanding in Kilikia he encamped there
-  with his army four days.
-
-No victory recorded in history was ever more complete in itself, or
-more far-stretching in its consequences, than that of Issus. Not
-only was the Persian force destroyed or dispersed, but the efforts
-of Darius for recovery were paralyzed by the capture of his family.
-Portions of the dissipated army of Issus may be traced, re-appearing
-in different places for operations of detail; but we shall find no
-farther resistance to Alexander and his main force, except from the
-brave freemen of two fortified cities. Everywhere an overwhelming
-sentiment of admiration and terror was spread abroad, towards the
-force, skill, or good fortune of Alexander, by whichever name it
-might be called—together with contempt for the real value of a
-Persian army, in spite of so much imposing pomp and numerical show; a
-contempt, not new to intelligent Greeks, but now communicated even to
-vulgar minds by the recent unparalleled catastrophe. Both as general
-and as soldier, indeed, the consummate excellence of Alexander stood
-conspicuous, not less than the signal deficiency of Darius. The fault
-in the latter, upon which most remark is usually made, was, that of
-fighting the battle, not in an open plain, but in a narrow valley,
-whereby his superiority of number was rendered unprofitable. But this
-(as I have already observed) was only one among many mistakes, and
-by no means the most serious. The result would have been the same,
-had the battle been fought in the plains to the eastward of Mount
-Amanus. Superior numbers are of little avail on any ground unless
-there be a general who knows how to make use of them; unless they be
-distributed into separate divisions ready to combine for offensive
-action on many points at once, or at any rate to lend support to each
-other in defence, so that a defeat of one fraction is not a defeat
-of the whole. The faith of Darius in simple multitude was altogether
-blind and childish;[288] nay, that faith, though overweening
-beforehand, disappeared at once when he found his enemies did not run
-away, but faced him boldly—as was seen by his attitude on the banks
-of the Pinarus, where he stood to be attacked instead of executing
-his threat of treading down the handful opposed to him.[289] But it
-was not merely as a general, that Darius acted in such a manner as
-to render the loss of the battle certain. Had his dispositions been
-ever so skilful, his personal cowardice, in quitting the field and
-thinking only of his own safety, would have sufficed to nullify their
-effect.[290] Though the Persian grandees are generally conspicuous
-for personal courage, yet we shall find Darius hereafter again
-exhibiting the like melancholy timidity, and the like incompetence
-for using numbers with effect, at the battle of Arbela, though fought
-in a spacious plain chosen by himself.
-
-  [288] See this faith put forward in the speech of Xerxes—Herodot.
-  vii. 48; compare the speech of Achæmenes, vii. 236.
-
-  [289] Arrian, ii. 10, 2. καὶ ταύτῃ ὡς δῆλος ἐγένετο (Darius) τοῖς
-  ἀμφ᾽ Ἀλέξανδρον τῇ γνώμῃ δεδουλωμένος (a remarkable expression
-  borrowed from Thucydides, iv. 34). Compare Arrian, ii. 6, 7.
-
-  [290] Immediately before the battle of Kunaxa, Cyrus the younger
-  was asked by some of the Grecian Officers, whether he thought
-  that his brother Artaxerxes (who had as yet made no resistance)
-  would fight—“To be sure he will (was the reply) if he is the son
-  of Darius and Parysatis, and my brother, I shall not obtain the
-  crown without fighting!” Personal cowardice, in a king of Persia
-  at the head of his army, seemed inconceivable (Xenoph. Anab. i.
-  7, 9)
-
-Happy was it for Memnon, that he did not live to see the renunciation
-of his schemes, and the ruin consequent upon it! The fleet in the
-Ægean, which had been transferred at his death to Pharnabazus, though
-weakened by the loss of those mercenaries whom Darius had recalled
-to Issus, and disheartened by a serious defeat which the Persian
-Orontobates had received from the Macedonians in Karia,[291] was
-nevertheless not inactive in trying to organize an anti-Macedonian
-manifestation in Greece. While Pharnabazus was at the island of
-Siphnos with his 100 triremes, he was visited by the Lacedæmonian
-king Agis, who pressed him to embark for Peloponnesus as large a
-force as he could spare, to second a movement projected by the
-Spartans. But such aggressive plans were at once crushed by the
-terror-striking news of the battle of Issus. Apprehending a revolt
-in the island of Chios as the result of this news, Pharnabazus
-immediately sailed thither with a large detachment. Agis, obtaining
-nothing more than a subsidy of thirty talents and a squadron of ten
-triremes, was obliged to renounce his projects in Peloponnesus, and
-to content himself with directing some operations in Krete, to be
-conducted by his brother Agesilaus; while he himself remained among
-the islands, and ultimately accompanied the Persian Autophradates
-to Halikarnassus.[292] It appears, however, that he afterwards went
-to conduct the operations in Krete, and that he had considerable
-success in that island, bringing several Kretan towns to join the
-Persians.[293] On the whole, however, the victory of Issus overawed
-all free spirit throughout Greece, and formed a guarantee to
-Alexander for at least a temporary quiescence. The philo-Macedonian
-synod, assembled at Corinth during the Isthmian festival, manifested
-their joy by sending to him an embassy of congratulation and a wreath
-of gold.[294]
-
-  [291] Arrian, ii. 5, 8.
-
-  [292] Arrian, ii. 13, 4-8.
-
-  [293] Diodor. xvii. 48.
-
-  [294] Diodor. xvii. 48; Curtius, iv. 5, 11. Curtius seems to
-  mention this vote later, but it must evidently have been passed
-  at the first Isthmian festival after the battle of Issus.
-
-With little delay after his victory, Alexander marched through
-Kœle-Syria to the Phenician coast, detaching Parmenio in his way
-to attack Damascus, whither Darius, before the battle, had sent
-most part of his treasure with many confidential officers, Persian
-women of rank, and envoys. Though the place might have held out a
-considerable siege, it was surrendered without resistance by the
-treason or cowardice of the governor; who made a feint of trying to
-convey away the treasure, but took care that it should fall into the
-hands of the enemy.[295] There was captured a large treasure—with a
-prodigious number and variety of attendants and ministers of luxury,
-belonging to the court and the grandees.[296] Moreover the prisoners
-made were so numerous, that most of the great Persian families had
-to deplore the loss of some relative, male or female. There were
-among them the widow and daughters of king Ochus, the predecessor
-of Darius—the daughter of Darius’s brother Oxathres—the wives of
-Artabazus, and of Pharnabazus—the three daughters of Mentor, and
-Barsinê, widow of the deceased Memnon with her child, sent up by
-Memnon to serve as an hostage for his fidelity. There were also
-several eminent Grecian exiles, Theban, Lacedæmonian and Athenian,
-who had fled to Darius, and whom he had thought fit to send to
-Damascus, instead of allowing them to use their pikes with the army
-at Issus. The Theban and Athenian exiles were at once released by
-Alexander; the Lacedæmonians were for the time put under arrest, but
-not detained long. Among the Athenian exiles was a person of noble
-name and parentage—Iphikrates, son of the great Athenian officer of
-that name.[297] The captive Iphikrates not only received his liberty,
-but was induced by courteous and honorable treatment to remain with
-Alexander. He died however shortly afterwards from sickness, and his
-ashes were then collected, by order of Alexander, to be sent to his
-family at Athens.
-
-  [295] Arrian, ii. 11, 13; Curtius, iii. 13. The words of Arrian
-  (ii. 15, 1)—ὀπίσω κομίσαντα ἐς Δαμασκὸν—confirm the statement of
-  Curtius, that this treasure was captured by Parmenio, not in the
-  town, but in the hands of fugitives who were conveying it away
-  from the town.
-
-  [296] A fragment of the letter from Parmenio to Alexander is
-  preserved, giving a detailed list of the articles of booty
-  (Athenæus, xiii. p. 607).
-
-  [297] Arrian, ii. 15, 5; Curtius, iii. 13, 13-16. There is some
-  discrepancy between the two (compare Arrian, iii. 24, 7) as to
-  the names of the Lacedæmonian envoys.
-
-I have already stated in a former volume[298] that the elder
-Iphikrates had been adopted by Alexander’s grandfather into the regal
-family of Macedonia, as the savior of their throne: probably this was
-the circumstance which determined the superior favor shown to the
-son, rather than any sentiment either towards Athens or towards the
-military genius of the father. The difference of position, between
-Iphikrates the father and Iphikrates the son, is one among the
-painful evidences of the downward march of Hellenism; the father, a
-distinguished officer moving amidst a circle of freemen, sustaining
-by arms the security and dignity of his own fellow-citizens, and
-even interfering for the rescue of the Macedonian regal family;
-the son, condemned to witness the degradation of his native city
-by Macedonian arms, and deprived of all other means of reviving or
-rescuing her, except such as could be found in the service of an
-Oriental prince, whose stupidity and cowardice threw away at once his
-own security and the freedom of Greece.
-
-  [298] See above, in the History, Vol. X. Ch. lxxvii. p. 108; Vol.
-  X. Ch. lxxix. p. 251; and Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 263. c. 13.
-
-  Alexander himself had consented to be adopted by Ada princess of
-  Karia as her son (Arrian, i. 23, 12).
-
-Master of Damascus and of Kœle-Syria, Alexander advanced onward to
-Phenicia. The first Phenician town which he approached was Marathus,
-on the mainland opposite the islet of Aradus, forming, along with
-that islet and some other neighboring towns, the domain of the
-Aradian prince Gerostratus. That prince was himself now serving with
-his naval contingent among the Persian fleet in the Ægean; but his
-son Strata, acting as viceroy at home, despatched to Alexander his
-homage with a golden wreath, and made over to him at once Aradus with
-the neighboring towns included in its domain. The example of Strato
-was followed, first by the inhabitants of Byblus, the next Phenician
-city in a southerly direction; next, by the great city of Sidon, the
-queen and parent of all Phenician prosperity. The Sidonians even sent
-envoys to meet him and invite his approach.[299] Their sentiments
-were unfavorable to the Persians, from remembrance of the bloody
-and perfidious proceedings which (about eighteen years before) had
-marked the recapture of their city by the armies of Ochus.[300]
-Nevertheless, the naval contingents both of Byblus and of Sidon (as
-well as that of Aradus), were at this moment sailing in the Ægean
-with the Persian admiral Autophradates, and formed a large proportion
-of his entire fleet.[301]
-
-  [299] Arrian, ii. 14, 11; ii. 15, 8.
-
-  [300] Diodor. xvi. 45.
-
-  [301] Arrian, ii. 15, 8; ii. 20, 1. Curtius, iv. 1, 6-16.
-
-While Alexander was still at Marathus, however, previous to his
-onward march, he received both envoys and a letter from Darius,
-asking for the restitution of his mother, wife, and children—and
-tendering friendship and alliance, as from one king to another.
-Darius farther attempted to show, that the Macedonian Philip had
-begun the wrong against Persia,—that Alexander had continued it—and
-that he himself (Darius) had acted merely in self-defence. In reply,
-Alexander wrote a letter, wherein he set forth his own case against
-Darius, proclaiming himself the appointed leader of the Greeks, to
-avenge the ancient invasion of Greece by Xerxes. He then alleged
-various complaints against Darius, whom he accused of having
-instigated the assassination of Philip, as well as the hostilities
-of the anti-Macedonian cities in Greece. “Now (continued he), by the
-grace of the gods, I have been victorious, first over your satraps,
-next over yourself. I have taken care of all who submit to me, and
-made them satisfied with their lot. Come yourself to me also, as to
-the master of all Asia. Come without fear of suffering harm; ask me,
-and you shall receive back your mother and wife, and anything else
-which you please. When next you write to me, however, address me not
-as an equal, but as lord of Asia and of all that belongs to you;
-otherwise I shall deal with you as a wrong-doer. If you intend to
-contest the kingdom with me, stand and fight for it, and do not run
-away. I shall march forward against you, wherever you may be.”[302]
-
-  [302] Arrian, ii. 14; Curtius, iv. i. 10; Diodor. xvii. 39. I
-  give the substance of this correspondence from Arrian. Both
-  Curtius and Diodorus represent Darius as offering great sums
-  of money and large cessions of territory, in exchange for the
-  restitution of the captives. Arrian says nothing of the kind.
-
-This memorable correspondence, which led to no result, is of
-importance only as it marks the character of Alexander, with whom
-fighting and conquering were both the business and the luxury of
-life, and to whom all assumption of equality and independence with
-himself, even on the part of other kings—every thing short of
-submission and obedience—appeared in the light of wrong and insult to
-be avenged. The recital of comparative injuries, on each side, was
-mere unmeaning pretence. The real and only question was (as Alexander
-himself had put it in his message to the captive Sisygambis[303])
-which of the two should be master of Asia.
-
-  [303] Arrian, ii. 12, 9.
-
-The decision of this question, already sufficiently advanced on the
-morrow after the battle of Issus, was placed almost beyond doubt
-by the rapid and unopposed successes of Alexander among most of
-the Phenician cities. The last hopes of Persia now turned chiefly
-upon the sentiments of these Phenicians. The greater part of the
-Persian fleet in the Ægean was composed of Phenician triremes, partly
-from the coast of Syria, partly from the island of Cyprus. If the
-Phenician towns made submission to Alexander, it was certain that
-their ships and seamen would either return home spontaneously or be
-recalled; thus depriving the Persian quiver of its best remaining
-arrow. But if the Phenician towns held out resolutely against him,
-one and all, so as to put him under the necessity of besieging them
-in succession—each lending aid to the rest by sea, with superiority
-of naval force, and more than one of them being situated upon
-islets—the obstacles to be overcome would have been so multiplied,
-that even Alexander’s energy and ability might hardly have proved
-sufficient for them: at any rate, he would have had hard work before
-him for perhaps two years, opening the door to many new accidents and
-efforts. It was therefore a signal good fortune to Alexander when
-the prince of the islet of Aradus spontaneously surrendered to him
-that difficult city, and when the example was followed by the still
-greater city of Sidon. The Phenicians, taking them generally, had
-no positive tie to the Persians; neither had they much confederate
-attachment one towards the other, although as separate communities
-they were brave and enterprising. Among the Sidonians, there was
-even a prevalent feeling of aversion to the Persians, from the cause
-above mentioned. Hence the prince of Aradus, upon whom Alexander’s
-march first came, had little certainty of aid from his neighbors,
-if he resolved to hold out; and still less disposition to hold
-out single-handed, after the battle of Issus had proclaimed the
-irresistible force of Alexander not less than the impotence of
-Persia. One after another, all these important Phenician seaports,
-except Tyre, fell into the hands of Alexander without striking a
-blow. At Sidon, the reigning prince Strato, reputed as philo-Persian,
-was deposed, and a person named Abdalonymus—of the reigning family,
-yet poor in circumstances—was appointed in his room.[304]
-
-  [304] Curtius, iv. 1, 20-25; Justin, xi. 10. Diodorus (xvii. 47)
-  tells the story as if it had occurred at Tyre, and not at Sidon;
-  which is highly improbable.
-
-With his usual rapidity, Alexander marched onward towards Tyre; the
-most powerful among the Phenician cities, though apparently less
-ancient than Sidon. Even on the march, he was met by a deputation
-from Tyre, composed of the most eminent men in the city, and headed
-by the son of the Tyrian prince Azemilchus, who was himself absent
-commanding the Tyrian contingent in the Persian fleet. These men
-brought large presents and supplies for the Macedonian army, together
-with a golden wreath of honor; announcing formally that the Tyrians
-were prepared to do whatever Alexander commanded.[305] In reply,
-he commended the dispositions of the city, accepted the presents,
-and desired the deputation to communicate at home, that he wished
-to enter Tyre and offer sacrifice to Herakles. The Phenician god
-Melkart was supposed identical with the Grecian Herakles, and was
-thus ancestor of the Macedonian kings. His temple at Tyre was of
-the most venerable antiquity; moreover the injunction, to sacrifice
-there, is said to have been conveyed to Alexander in an oracle.[306]
-The Tyrians at home, after deliberating on this message, sent out an
-answer declining to comply, and intimating that they would not admit
-within their walls either Macedonians or Persians; but that as to all
-other points, they would obey Alexander’s orders.[307] They added
-that his wish to sacrifice to Herakles might be accomplished without
-entering their city, since there was in Palætyrus (on the mainland
-over against the islet of Tyre, separated from it only by the narrow
-strait) a temple of that god yet more ancient and venerable than
-their own.[308] Incensed at this qualified adhesion, in which he took
-note only of the point refused,—Alexander dismissed the envoys with
-angry menaces, and immediately resolved on taking Tyre by force.[309]
-
-  [305] Arrian. iii 15, 9. ὡς ἐγνωκότων Τυρίων πράσσειν, ὅ,τι ἂν
-  ἐπαγγέλλῃ Ἀλέξανδρος. Compare Curtius, iv. 2, 3.
-
-  [306] Curtius (_ut suprà_) adds these motives: Arrian asserts
-  nothing beyond the simple request. The statement of Curtius
-  represents what is likely to have been the real fact and real
-  feeling of Alexander.
-
-  It is certainly true that Curtius overloads his narrative with
-  rhetorical and dramatic amplification; but it is not less true
-  that Arrian falls into the opposite extreme—squeezing out _his_
-  narrative until little is left beyond the dry skeleton.
-
-  [307] Arrian, ii. 16, 11.
-
-  [308] Curtius, iv. 2, 4; Justin, xi. 10. This item, both prudent
-  and probable, in the reply of the Tyrians, is not noticed by
-  Arrian.
-
-  [309] Arrian, ii. 16, 11. τοὺς μὲν πρέσβεις πρὸς ὀργὴν ὀπίσω
-  ἀπέπεμψεν, etc. Curtius, iv. 2, 5. “Non tenuit iram, cujus
-  alioqui potens non erat”, etc.
-
-Those who (like Diodorus) treat such refusal on the part of the
-Tyrians as foolish wilfulness,[310] have not fully considered how
-much the demand included. When Alexander made a solemn sacrifice to
-Artemis at Ephesus, he marched to her temple with his whole force
-armed and in battle army.[311] We cannot doubt that his sacrifice at
-Tyre to Herakles—his ancestral Hero, whose especial attribute was
-force—would have been celebrated with an array equally formidable, as
-in fact it was, after the town had been taken.[312] The Tyrians were
-thus required to admit within their walls an irresistible military
-force; which might indeed be withdrawn after the sacrifice was
-completed, but which might also remain, either wholly or in part, as
-permanent garrison of an almost impregnable position. They had not
-endured such treatment from Persia, nor were they disposed to endure
-it from a new master. It was in fact hazarding their all; submitting
-at once to a fate which might be as bad as could befall them after a
-successful siege. On the other hand, when we reflect that the Tyrians
-promised everything short of submission to military occupation, we
-see that Alexander, had he been so inclined, could have obtained
-from them all that was really essential to his purpose, without the
-necessity of besieging the town. The great value of Phenician cities
-consisted in their fleet, which now acted with the Persians, and
-gave to them the command of the sea.[313] Had Alexander required
-that this fleet should be withdrawn from the Persians and placed in
-his service, there can be no doubt that he would have obtained it
-readily. The Tyrians had no motive to devote themselves for Persia,
-nor did they probably (as Arrian supposes) attempt to trim between
-the two belligerents, as if the contest were still undecided.[314]
-Yet rather than hand over their city to the chances of a Macedonian
-soldiery, they resolved to brave the hazards of a siege. The pride of
-Alexander, impatient of opposition even to his most extreme demands,
-prompted him to take a step politically unprofitable, in order to
-make display of his power, by degrading and crushing, with or without
-a siege, one of the most ancient, spirited, wealthy and intelligent
-communities of the ancient world.
-
-  [310] Diodorus, xvii. 40. Οἱ δὲ Τύριοι, βουλομένου τοῦ βασιλέως
-  τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ τῷ Τυρίῳ θῦσαι, προπετέστερον διεκώλυσαν αὐτὸν τῆς εἰς
-  τὴν πόλιν εἰσόδου.
-
-  [311] Arrian, i. 18, 4.
-
-  [312] Arrian, ii. 24, 10.
-
-  [313] This is the view expressed by Alexander himself, in his
-  address to the army, inviting them to undertake the siege of Tyre
-  (Arrian, ii. 17, 3-8).
-
-  [314] Arrian, ii. 16, 12. Curtius says (iv. 2, 2), “Tyros
-  facilius _societatem_ Alexandri acceptura videbatur, quam
-  _imperium_.” This is representing the pretensions of the Tyrians
-  as greater than the fact warrants. They did not refuse the
-  _imperium_ of Alexander, though they declined compliance with one
-  extreme demand.
-
-  Ptolemy I. (son of Lagus) afterwards made himself master of
-  Jerusalem, by entering the town on the Sabbath, under pretence of
-  offering sacrifice (Josephus, Antiq. Jud. xii. 1).
-
-Tyre was situated on an islet nearly half a mile from the
-mainland;[315] the channel between the two being shallow towards the
-land, but reaching a depth of eighteen feet in the part adjoining
-the city. The islet was completely surrounded by prodigious walls,
-the loftiest portion of which, on the side fronting the mainland,
-reached a height not less than 150 feet, with corresponding solidity
-and base.[316] Besides these external fortifications, there was a
-brave and numerous population within, aided by a good stock of arms,
-machines, ships, provisions, and other things essential to defence.
-
-  [315] Curtius, iv. 2, 7, 8. The site of Tyre at the present day
-  presents nothing in the least conformable to the description of
-  Alexander’s time.
-
-  [316] Arrian, ii. 18, 3; ii. 21, 4; ii. 22, 8.
-
-It was not without reason, therefore, that the Tyrians, when driven
-to their last resource, entertained hopes of holding out even against
-the formidable arm of Alexander; and against Alexander as he then
-stood, they might have held out successfully; for he had as yet no
-fleet, and they could defy any attack made simply from land. The
-question turned upon the Phenician and Cyprian ships, which were for
-the most part (the Tyrian among them) in the Ægean under the Persian
-admiral. Alexander—master as he was of Aradus, Byblus, Sidon, and all
-the Phenician cities except Tyre—calculated that the seamen belonging
-to these cities would follow their countrymen at home and bring away
-their ships to join him. He hoped also, as the victorious potentate,
-to draw to himself the willing adhesion of the Cyprian cities. This
-could hardly have failed to happen if he had treated the Tyrians with
-decent consideration; but it was no longer certain, now that he had
-made them his enemies.
-
-What passed among the Persian fleet under Autophradates in the Ægean,
-when they were informed, first that Alexander was master of the other
-Phenician cities; next, that he was commencing the siege of Tyre—we
-know very imperfectly. The Tyrian prince Azemilchus brought home his
-ships for the defence of his own city;[317] the Sidonian and Aradian
-ships also went home, no longer serving against a power to whom their
-own cities had submitted; but the Cyprians hesitated longer before
-they declared themselves. If Darius, or even Autophradates without
-Darius, instead of abandoning Tyre altogether (as they actually did),
-had energetically aided the resistance which it offered to Alexander,
-as the interests of Persia dictated—the Cypriot ships might not
-improbably have been retained on that side in the struggle. Lastly,
-the Tyrians might indulge a hope, that their Phenician brethren, if
-ready to serve Alexander against Persia, would be nowise hearty as
-his instruments for crushing a kindred city. These contingencies,
-though ultimately they all turned out in favor of Alexander, were
-in the beginning sufficiently promising to justify the intrepid
-resolution of the Tyrians; who were farther encouraged by promises
-of aid from the powerful fleets of their colony Carthage. To that
-city, whose deputies were then within their walls for some religious
-solemnities, they sent many of their wives and children.[318]
-
-  [317] Azemilchus was with Autophradates when Alexander declared
-  hostility against Tyre (Arrian, ii. 15, 10); he was in Tyre when
-  it was captured (Arrian, ii. 24, 8).
-
-  [318] Curtius, iv. 2, 10; Arrian, ii. 24, 8; Diodor. xvli. 40,
-  41. Curtius (iv. 2, 15) says that Alexander sent envoys to the
-  Tyrians to invite them to peace; that the Tyrians not only
-  refused the propositions, but put the deputies to death, contrary
-  to the law of nations. Arrian mentions nothing about this sending
-  of deputies, which he would hardly have omitted to do had he
-  found it stated in his authorities, since it tends to justify
-  the proceedings of Alexander. Moreover it is not conformable to
-  Alexander’s temperament, after what had passed between him and
-  the Tyrians.
-
-Alexander began the siege of Tyre without any fleet; the Sidonian
-and Aradian ships not having yet come. It was his first task to
-construct a solid mole two hundred feet broad, reaching across the
-half mile channel between the mainland and the islet. He pressed into
-his service laboring hands by thousands from the neighborhood; he
-had stones in abundance from Palætyrus, and wood from the forests in
-Lebanon. But the work, though prosecuted with ardor and perseverance,
-under pressing instigations from Alexander, was tedious and toilsome,
-even near the mainland, where the Tyrians could do little to impede
-it; and became far more tedious as it advanced into the sea, so as
-to be exposed to their obstruction, as well as to damage from winds
-and waves. The Tyrian triremes and small boats perpetually annoyed
-the workmen, and destroyed parts of the work, in spite of all the
-protection devised by the Macedonians, who planted two towers in
-front of their advancing mole, and discharged projectiles from
-engines provided for the purpose. At length, by unremitting efforts,
-the mole was pushed forward until it came nearly across the channel
-to the city wall; when suddenly, on a day of strong wind, the Tyrians
-sent forth a fireship loaded with combustibles, which they drove
-against the front of the mole and set fire to the two towers. At
-the same time, the full naval force of the city, ships and little
-boats, was sent forth to land men at once on all parts of the mole.
-So successful was this attack, that all the Macedonian engines were
-burnt,—the outer wood-work which kept the mole together was torn up
-in many places,—and a large part of the structure came to pieces.[319]
-
-  [319] Arrian, ii. 18, 19; Diodor. xvii. 42; Curtius, iv. 3, 6, 7.
-
-Alexander had thus not only to construct fresh engines, but also to
-begin the mole nearly anew. He resolved to give it greater breadth
-and strength, for the purpose of carrying more towers abreast in
-front, and for better defence against lateral attacks. But it had
-now become plain to him, that while the Tyrians were masters of the
-sea, no efforts by land alone would enable him to take the town.
-Leaving Perdikkas and Kraterus to reconstruct the mole and build new
-engines, he himself repaired to Sidon, for the purpose of assembling
-as large a fleet as he could. He got together triremes from various
-quarters—two from Rhodes, ten from the seaports in Lykia, three from
-Soli and Mallus. But his principal force was obtained by putting in
-requisition the ships of the Phenician towns, Sidon, Byblus, and
-Aradus, now subject to him. These ships, eighty in number, had left
-the Persian admiral and come to Sidon, there awaiting his orders;
-while not long afterwards, the princes of Cyprus came thither also,
-tendering to him their powerful fleet of 120 ships of war.[320] He
-was now master of a fleet of 200 sail, comprising the most part
-and the best part, of the Persian navy. This was the consummation
-of Macedonian triumph—the last real and effective weapon wrested
-from the grasp of Persia. The prognostic afforded by the eagle near
-the ships at Miletus, as interpreted by Alexander, had now been
-fulfilled; since by successful operations on land, he had conquered
-and brought into his power a superior Persian fleet.[321]
-
-  [320] Arrian. ii. 20, 1-4; Curtius, iv. 2, 14. It evinces how
-  strongly Arrian looks at everything from Alexander’s point of
-  view, when we find him telling us, that that monarch _forgave_
-  the Phenicians and Cyprians for their adherence and past service
-  in the Persian fleet, considering that they had acted under
-  compulsion.
-
-  [321] Arrian, i. 18, 15. In the siege of Tyre (four centuries
-  earlier) by the Assyrian monarch Salmaneser, Sidon and other
-  Phenician towns had lent their ships to the besieger (Menander
-  apud Joseph. Antiq. Jud. ix. 14, 2).
-
-Having directed these ships to complete their equipments and
-training, with Macedonians as soldiers on board, Alexander put
-himself at the head of some light troops for an expedition of
-eleven days against the Arabian mountaineers on Libanus, whom he
-dispersed or put down, though not without some personal exposure and
-hazard.[322] On returning to Sidon, he found Kleander arrived with
-a reinforcement of 4000 Grecian hoplites, welcome auxiliaries for
-prosecuting the siege. Then, going aboard his fleet in the harbor
-of Sidon, he sailed with it in good battle order to Tyre, hoping
-that the Tyrians would come out and fight. But they kept within,
-struck with surprise and consternation; having not before known that
-their fellow-Phenicians were now among the besiegers. Alexander,
-having ascertained that the Tyrians would not accept a sea-fight,
-immediately caused their two harbors to be blocked up and watched;
-that on the north, towards Sidon, by the Cyprians—that on the south,
-towards Egypt, by the Phenicians.[323]
-
-  [322] Arrian, ii. 20, 5; Plutarch, Alexander, 24.
-
-  [323] Arrian, ii. 20, 9-16; Curtius, iv. 3, 11.
-
-From this time forward, the doom of Tyre was certain. The Tyrians
-could no longer offer obstruction to the mole, which was completed
-across the channel and brought up to the town. Engines were planted
-upon it to batter the walls: movable towers were rolled up to take
-them by assault; attack was also made from seaward. Yet though
-reduced altogether to the defensive, the Tyrians still displayed
-obstinate bravery, and exhausted all the resources of ingenuity in
-repelling the besiegers. So gigantic was the strength of the wall
-fronting the mole, and even that of the northern side fronting Sidon,
-that none of Alexander’s engines could make any breach in it; but
-on the south side towards Egypt he was more successful. A large
-breach having been made in this south-wall, he assaulted it with two
-ships manned by the hypaspists and the soldiers of his phalanx: he
-himself commanded in one and Admêtus in the other. At the same time
-he caused the town to be menaced all round, at every approachable
-point, for the purpose of distracting the attention of the defenders.
-Himself and his two ships having been rowed close up to the breach
-in the south wall, boarding bridges were thrown out from each deck,
-upon which he and Admêtus rushed forward with their respective
-storming-parties. Admêtus got upon the wall, but was there slain;
-Alexander also was among the first to mount, and the two parties got
-such a footing on the wall as to overpower all resistance. At the
-same time, his ships also forced their way into the two harbors, so
-that Tyre came on all sides into his power.[324]
-
-  [324] Arrian, ii. 23, 24; Curtius, iv. 4, 11; Diodor. xvii. 46.
-
-Though the walls were now lost, and resistance had become desperate,
-the gallant defenders did not lose their courage. They barricaded
-the streets, and concentrated their strength especially at a
-defensible post called the Agenorion, or chapel of Agenor. Here the
-battle again raged furiously until they were overpowered by the
-Macedonians, incensed with the long toils of the previous siege,
-as well as by the slaughter of some of their prisoners, whom the
-Tyrians had killed publicly on the battlements. All who took shelter
-in the temple of Hêraklês were spared by Alexander from respect to
-the sanctuary: among the number were the prince Azemilchus, a few
-leading Tyrians, the Carthaginian envoys, and some children of both
-sexes. The Sidonians also, displaying a tardy sentiment of kindred,
-and making partial amends for the share which they had taken in the
-capture, preserved some lives from the sword of the conqueror.[325]
-But the greater number of the adult freemen perished with arms in
-their hands; while 2000 of them who survived, either from disabling
-wounds, or from the fatigue of the slaughterers, were hanged on the
-sea-shore by order of Alexander.[326] The females, the children, and
-the slaves, were sold to the slave-merchant. The number sold is said
-to have been about 30,000: a total rather small, as we must assume
-slaves to be included; but we are told that many had been previously
-sent away to Carthage.[327]
-
-  [325] Curtius, iv. 4, 15.
-
-  [326] This is mentioned both by Curtius (iv. 4, 17) and by
-  Diodorus (xvii. 46). It is not mentioned by Arrian, and perhaps
-  may not have found a place in Ptolemy or Aristobulus; but I see
-  no ground for disbelieving it.
-
-  [327] Arrian, iv. 24, 9; Diodorus, xvii. 46.
-
-Thus master of Tyre, Alexander marched into the city and consummated
-his much-desired sacrifice to Herakles. His whole force, land and
-naval, fully armed and arrayed, took part in the procession. A more
-costly hecatomb had never been offered to that god, when we consider
-that it had been purchased by all the toils of an unnecessary siege,
-and by the extirpation of these free and high-spirited citizens, his
-former worshippers. What the loss of the Macedonians had been, we
-cannot say. The number of their slain is stated by Arrian at 400,
-which must be greatly beneath the truth; for the courage and skill
-of the besieged had prolonged the siege to the prodigious period
-of seven months, though Alexander had left no means untried to
-accomplish it sooner.[328]
-
-  [328] The resuscitating force of commercial industry is seen by
-  the fact, that in spite of this total destruction, Tyre again
-  rose to be a wealthy and flourishing city (Strabo, xvi. p. 757).
-
-Towards the close of the siege of Tyre, Alexander received and
-rejected a second proposition from Darius, offering 10,000 talents,
-with the cession of all the territory westward of the Euphrates, as
-ransom for his mother and wife, and proposing that Alexander should
-become his son-in-law as well as his ally. “If I were Alexander (said
-Parmenio) I should accept such terms, instead of plunging into
-farther peril.”—“So would I (replied Alexander) if I were Parmenio;
-but since I am Alexander, I must return a different answer.” His
-answer to Darius was to this effect—“I want neither your money nor
-your cession. All your money and territory are already mine, and
-you are tendering to me a part in place of the whole. If I choose
-to marry your daughter, I _shall_ marry her—whether you give her
-to me or not. Come hither to me, if you wish to obtain from me any
-act of friendship.”[329] Alexander might spare the submissive and
-the prostrate; but he could not brook an equal or a competitor, and
-his language towards them was that of brutal insolence. Of course
-this was the last message sent by Darius, who now saw, if he had not
-before seen, that he had no chance open except by the renewal of war.
-
-  [329] Arrian, ii. 25, 5; Curtius, iv. 5. The answer is more
-  insolent in the naked simplicity of Arrian, than in the pomp
-  of Curtius. Plutarch (Alexand. 29) both abridges and softens
-  it. Diodorus also gives the answer differently (xvii. 54)—and
-  represents the embassy as coming somewhat later in time, after
-  Alexander’s return from Egypt.
-
-Being thus entire master of Syria, Phenicia, and Palestine, and
-having accepted the voluntary submission of the Jews, Alexander
-marched forward to conquer Egypt. He had determined, before he
-undertook any farther expedition into the interior of the Persian
-empire, to make himself master of all the coast-lands which kept open
-the communications of the Persians with Greece, so as to secure his
-rear against any serious hostility. His great fear was, of Grecian
-soldiers or cities raised against him by Persian gold;[330] and
-Egypt was the last remaining possession of the Persians, which gave
-them the means of acting upon Greece. Those means were indeed now
-prodigiously curtailed by the feeble condition of the Persian fleet
-in the Ægean, unable to contend with the increasing fleet of the
-Macedonian admirals Hegelochus and Amphoterus, now numbering 160
-sail.[331] During the summer of 332 B. C., while Alexander
-was prosecuting the siege of Tyre, these admirals recovered all the
-important acquisitions—Chios, Lesbos, and Tenedos—which had been made
-by Memnon for the Persian interests. The inhabitants of Tenedos
-invited them and ensured their success; those of Chios attempted
-to do the same, but were coerced by Pharnabazus, who retained the
-city by means of his insular partisans, Apollonides and others, with
-a military force. The Macedonian admirals laid siege to the town,
-and were presently enabled to carry it by their friends within.
-Pharnabazus was here captured with his entire force; twelve triremes
-thoroughly armed and manned, thirty store-ships, several privateers,
-and 3000 Grecian mercenaries. Aristonikus, philo-Persian despot of
-Methymna—arriving at Chios shortly afterwards, but ignorant of the
-capture—was entrapped into the harbor, and made prisoner. There
-remained only Mitylênê, which was held for the Persians by the
-Athenian Chares, with a garrison of 2000 men; who, however, seeing no
-hope of holding out against the Macedonians, consented to evacuate
-the city on condition of a free departure. The Persians were thus
-expelled from the sea, from all footing among the Grecian islands,
-and from the vicinity of Greece and Macedonia.[332]
-
-  [330] Arrian, ii. 17, 4.
-
-  [331] Curtius, iv. 5, 14.
-
-  [332] Curtius, iv. 5, 14-22; Arrian, iii. 2, 4-8.
-
-These successes were in full progress, when Alexander himself
-directed his march from Tyre to Egypt, stopping in his way to besiege
-Gaza. This considerable town, the last before entering on the desert
-track between Syria and Egypt, was situated between one and two
-miles from the sea. It was built upon a lofty artificial mound, and
-encircled with a high wall; but its main defence was derived from
-the deep sands immediately around it, as well as from the mud and
-quicksand on its coast. It was defended by a brave man, the eunuch
-Batis, with a strong garrison of Arabs, and abundant provision of
-every kind. Confiding in the strength of the place, Batis refused
-to admit Alexander. Moreover his judgment was confirmed by the
-Macedonian engineers themselves, who, when Alexander first surveyed
-the walls, pronounced it to be impregnable, chiefly from the height
-of its supporting mound. But Alexander could not endure the thought
-of tacitly confessing his inability to take Gaza. The more difficult
-the enterprise, the greater was the charm for him, and the greater
-would be the astonishment produced all around when he should be seen
-to have triumphed.[333]
-
-  [333] Arrian, ii. 26, 5. Οἱ δὲ μηχανοποιοὶ γνώμην ἀπεδείκνυντο,
-  ἄπορον εἶναι βίᾳ ἑλεῖν τὸ τεῖχος, διὰ ὕψος τοῦ χώματος· ἀλλ᾽
-  Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἐδόκει αἱρετέον εἶναι, ὅσῳ ἀπορώτερον· ἐκπλήξειν γὰρ
-  τοὺς πολεμίους τὸ ἔργον τῷ παραλόγῳ ἐπὶ μέγα, καὶ τὸ μὴ ἑλεῖν
-  αἰσχρὸν εἶναί οἱ, λεγόμενον ἔς τε τοὺς Ἕλληνας καὶ Δαρεῖον.
-
-  About the fidelity, and obstinate defensive courage, shown more
-  than once by the inhabitants of Gaza—see Polybius, xvi. 40.
-
-He began by erecting a mound south of the city, close by the wall,
-for the purpose of bringing up his battering engines. This external
-mound was completed, and the engines had begun to batter the wall,
-when a well-planned sally by the garrison overthrew the assailants
-and destroyed the engines. The timely aid of Alexander himself with
-his hypaspists, protected their retreat; but he himself, after
-escaping a snare from a pretended Arabian deserter, received a severe
-wound through the shield and the breastplate into the shoulder, by
-a dart discharged from a catapult; as the prophet Aristander had
-predicted—giving assurance at the same time, that Gaza would fall
-into his hands.[334] During the treatment of his wound, he ordered
-the engines employed at Tyre to be brought up by sea; and caused his
-mound to be carried around the whole circumference of the town, so
-as to render it approachable from every point. This Herculean work,
-the description of which we read with astonishment, was 250 feet
-high all round, and two stadia (1240 feet) broad[335]; the loose
-sand around could hardly have been suitable, so that materials must
-have been brought up from a distance. The undertaking was at length
-completed; in what length of time we do not know, but it must have
-been considerable—though doubtless thousands of laborers would be
-pressed in from the circumjacent country.[336]
-
-  [334] Arrian, ii. 26, 27; Curtius, iv. 6, 12-18; Plutarch,
-  Alexand. 25.
-
-  [335] Arrian, ii. 27, 5. ~χῶμα~ χωννύναι ~ἐν κύκλῳ παντόθεν~
-  τῆς πόλεως. It is certainly possible, as Droysen remarks
-  (Gesch. Alex. des Grossen, p. 199), that παντόθεν is not to be
-  interpreted with literal strictness, but only as meaning in _many
-  different portions_ of the walled circuit.
-
-  Yet if this had been intended, Arrian would surely have said
-  χώματα in the plural, not χῶμα.
-
-  [336] Diodorus (xvii. 48) states the whole duration of the siege
-  as two months. This seems rather under than over the probable
-  truth.
-
-Gaza was now attacked at all points by battering-rams, by mines, and
-by projectile engines with various missiles. Presently the Walls were
-breached in several places, though the defenders were unremitting
-in their efforts to repair the damaged parts. Alexander attempted
-three distinct general assaults; but in all three he was repulsed by
-the bravery of the Gazæans. At length, after still farther breaching
-the wall, he renewed for the fourth time his attempt to storm. The
-entire Macedonian phalanx being brought up to attack at different
-points, the greatest emulation reigned among the officers. The Æakid
-Neoptolemus was first to mount the wall; but the other divisions
-manifested hardly less ardor, and the town was at length taken. Its
-gallant defenders resisted, with unabated spirit, to the last; and
-all fell in their posts, the incensed soldiery being no way disposed
-to give quarter.
-
-One prisoner alone was reserved for special treatment—the prince
-or governor himself, the eunuch Batis; who, having manifested the
-greatest energy and valor, was taken severely wounded, yet still
-alive. In this condition he was brought by Leonatus and Philôtas into
-the presence of Alexander, who cast upon him looks of vengeance and
-fury. The Macedonian prince had undertaken the siege mainly in order
-to prove to the world that he could overcome difficulties insuperable
-to others. But he had incurred so much loss, spent so much time and
-labor, and undergone so many repulses before he succeeded,—that the
-palm of honor belonged rather to the minority vanquished than to
-the multitude of victors. To such disappointment, which would sting
-Alexander in the tenderest point, is to be added the fact, that
-he had himself incurred great personal risk and received a severe
-wound. Here was ample ground for violent anger; which was moreover
-still farther exasperated by the appearance of Batis—an eunuch—a
-black man—tall and robust, but at the same time fat and lumpish—and
-doubtless at the moment covered with blood and dirt. Such visible
-circumstances, repulsive to eyes familiar with Grecian gymnastics,
-contributed to kindle the wrath of Alexander to its highest pitch.
-After the siege of Tyre, his indignation had been satiated by the
-hanging of the 2000 surviving combatants; here, to discharge the
-pressure of a still stronger feeling, there remained only the single
-captive, upon whom therefore he resolved to inflict a punishment as
-novel as it was cruel. He directed the feet of Batis to be bored, and
-brazen rings to be passed through them; after which the naked body of
-this brave man, yet surviving, was tied with cords to the tail of a
-chariot driven by Alexander himself, and dragged at full speed amidst
-the triumphant jeers and shouts of the army.[337] Herein Alexander,
-emulous even from childhood of the exploits of his legendary ancestor
-Achilles, copied the ignominious treatment described in the Iliad as
-inflicted on the dead body of Hektor.[338]
-
-  [337] Curtius, iv. 6, 25-30; Dionys. Hal. De Comp. Verbor. p.
-  123-125—with the citation there given from Hegesias of Magnesia.
-  Diodorus (xvii. 48, 49) simply mentions Gaza in two sentences,
-  but gives no details of any kind.
-
-  Arrian says nothing about the treatment of Batis, nor did he
-  probably find anything about it in Ptolemy or Aristobulus. There
-  are assignable reasons why they should pass it over in silence,
-  as disgraceful to Alexander. But Arrian, at the same time, says
-  nothing inconsistent with or contradicting the statement of
-  Curtius; while he himself recognizes how emulous Alexander was of
-  the proceedings of Achilles (vii. 14, 7).
-
-  The passage describing this scene, cited from the lost author
-  Hegesias by Dionysius of Halikarnassus, as an example of bad
-  rhythm and taste, has the merit of bringing out the details
-  respecting the person of Batis, which were well calculated to
-  disgust and aggravate the wrath of Alexander. The bad taste of
-  Hegesias as a writer does not diminish his credibility as a
-  witness.
-
-  [338] Arrian. vii. 14, 7.
-
-This proceeding of Alexander, the product of Homeric reminiscences
-operating upon an infuriated and vindictive temperament, stands
-out in respect of barbarity from all that we read respecting the
-treatment of conquered towns in antiquity. His remaining measures
-were conformable to received usage. The wives and children of the
-Gazæans were sold into slavery. New inhabitants were admitted from
-the neighborhood, and a garrison was placed there to hold the town
-for the Macedonians.[339]
-
-  [339] Arrian, ii. 27. 11. About the circumstances and siege of
-  Gaza see the work of Stark, Gaza and die Philistäische Küste, p.
-  242, Leip. 1852.
-
-The two sieges of Tyre and Gaza, which occupied both together nine
-mouths,[340] were the hardest fighting that Alexander had ever
-encountered, or in fact ever did encounter throughout his life. After
-such toils, the march to Egypt, which he now commenced (October
-332 B. C.), was an affair of holiday and triumph. Mazakes,
-the satrap of Egypt, having few Persian troops and a disaffected
-native population, was noway disposed to resist the approaching
-conqueror. Seven days’ march brought Alexander and his army from
-Gaza to Pelusium, the frontier fortress of Egypt, commanding the
-eastern branch of the Nile, whither his fleet, under the command of
-Hephæstion, had come also. Here he found not only open gates and
-a submissive governor, but also crowds of Egyptians assembled to
-welcome him.[341] He placed a garrison in Pelusium, sent his fleet
-up the river to Memphis, and marched himself to the same place by
-land. The satrap Mazakes surrendered himself, with all the treasure
-in the city, 800 talents in amount, and much precious furniture. Here
-Alexander reposed some time, offering splendid sacrifices to the
-gods generally, and especially to the Egyptian god Apis; to which he
-added gymnastic and musical matches, sending to Greece for the most
-distinguished artists.
-
-  [340] Diodor. xvii. 48; Josephus, Antiq. xi. 4.
-
-  [341] Arrian, iii. 1, 3; Curtius iv. 7, 1, 2; Diodor. xvii. 49.
-
-From Memphis, he descended the westernmost branch of the Nile to
-Kanôpus at its mouth, from whence he sailed westerly along the
-shore to look at the island of Pharos, celebrated in Homer, and the
-lake Mareôtis. Reckoning Egypt now as a portion of his empire, and
-considering that the business of keeping down an unquiet population,
-as well as of collecting a large revenue, would have to be performed
-by his extraneous land and sea force, he saw the necessity of
-withdrawing the seat of government from Memphis, where both the
-Persians and the natives had maintained it, and of founding a new
-city of his own on the seaboard, convenient for communication with
-Greece and Macedonia. His imagination, susceptible to all Homeric
-impressions and influenced by a dream, first fixed upon the isle of
-Pharos as a suitable place for his intended city.[342] Perceiving
-soon, however, that this little isle was inadequate by itself, he
-included it as part of a larger city to be founded on the adjacent
-mainland. The gods were consulted, and encouraging responses were
-obtained; upon which Alexander himself marked out the circuit of
-the walls, the direction of the principal streets, and the sites
-of numerous temples to Grecian gods as well as Egyptian.[343] It
-was thus that the first stone was laid of the mighty, populous, and
-busy Alexandria; which however the founder himself never lived to
-see, and wherein he was only destined to repose as a corpse. The
-site of the place, between the sea and the Lake Mareôtis, was found
-airy and healthy, as well as convenient for shipping and commerce.
-The protecting island of Pharos gave the means of forming two good
-harbors for ships coming by sea, on a coast harborless elsewhere;
-while the Lake Mareôtis, communicating by various canals with the
-river Nile, received with facility the exportable produce from the
-interior.[344] As soon as houses were ready, commencement was made by
-transporting to them in mass the population of the neighboring town
-of Kanôpus, and probably of other towns besides, by the intendant
-Kleomenes.[345]
-
-  [342] Curtius, iv. 8, 1-4; Plutarch, Alexand. 26.
-
-  [343] Arrian, iii. 1, 8; Curtius, iv. 8, 2-6; Diodor. xvii. 52.
-
-  [344] Strabo, xvii. p. 793. Other authors however speak of the
-  salubrity of Alexandria less favorably than Strabo: see St.
-  Croix, Examen des Hist. d’ Alexandre, p. 287.
-
-  [345] Pseudo-Aristotle, Œconomic. ii. 32.
-
-Alexandria became afterwards the capital of the Ptolemaic princes.
-It acquired immense grandeur and population during their rule of two
-centuries and a half, when their enormous revenues were spent greatly
-in its improvement and decoration. But we cannot reasonably ascribe
-to Alexander himself any prescience of such an imposing future.
-He intended it as a place from which he could conveniently rule
-Egypt, considered as a portion of his extensive empire all round the
-Ægean; and had Egypt remained thus a fraction, instead of becoming a
-substantive imperial whole, Alexandria would probably not have risen
-beyond mediocrity.[346]
-
-  [346] Arrian, iii. 5, 4-9. Tacitus (Annal. i. 11) says about
-  Egypt under the Romans—“provinciam aditu difficilem, annonæ
-  fecundam, superstitione et lasciviâ discordem et mobilem, insciam
-  legum, ignaram magistratuum”, etc. Compare Polybius ap. Strabon.
-  xvii. p. 797.
-
-The other most notable incident, which distinguished the four or five
-months’ stay of Alexander in Egypt, was his march through the sandy
-desert to the temple of Zeus Ammon. This is chiefly memorable as it
-marks his increasing self-adoration and inflation above the limits
-of humanity. His achievements during the last three years had so
-transcended the expectations of every one, himself included—the gods
-had given to him such incessant good fortune, and so paralyzed or
-put down his enemies—that the hypothesis of a superhuman personality
-seemed the natural explanation of such a superhuman career.[347]
-He had to look back to the heroic legends, and to his ancestors
-Perseus and Herakles, to find a worthy prototype.[348] Conceiving
-himself to be (like them) the son of Zeus, with only a nominal human
-parentage, he resolved to go and ascertain the fact by questioning
-the infallible oracle of Zeus Ammon. His march of several days,
-through a sandy desert—always fatiguing, sometimes perilous, was
-distinguished by manifest evidences of the favor of the gods.
-Unexpected rain fell just when the thirsty soldiers required water.
-When the guides lost their track, from shifting of the sand, on a
-sudden two speaking serpents, or two ravens, appeared preceding the
-march and indicating the right direction. Such were the statements
-made by Ptolemy, Aristobulus, and Kallisthenes, companions and
-contemporaries; while Arrian, four centuries afterwards, announces
-his positive conviction that there was a divine intervention on
-behalf of Alexander, though he cannot satisfy himself about the
-details.[349] The priest of Zeus Ammon addressed Alexander, as being
-the son of the god, and farther assured him that his career would
-be one of uninterrupted victory, until he was taken away to the
-gods; while his friends also, who consulted the oracle for their own
-satisfaction, received for answer that the rendering of divine honors
-to him would be acceptable to Zeus. After profuse sacrifices and
-presents, Alexander quitted the oracle, with a full and sincere faith
-that he really was the son of Zeus Ammon; which faith was farther
-confirmed by declarations transmitted to him from other oracles—that
-of Erythræ in Ionia, and of Branchidæ near Miletus.[350] Though he
-did not directly order himself to be addressed as the son of Zeus,
-he was pleased with those who volunteered such a recognition, and
-angry with sceptics or scoffers, who disbelieved the oracle of Ammon.
-Plutarch thinks that this was a mere political manœuvre of Alexander,
-for the purpose of overawing the non-Hellenic population over whom
-he was enlarging his empire.[351] But it seems rather to have been a
-genuine faith,—a simple exaggeration of that exorbitant vanity which
-from the beginning reigned so largely in his bosom. He was indeed
-aware that it was repugnant to the leading Macedonians in many ways,
-but especially as a deliberate insult to the memory of Philip. This
-is the theme always touched upon in moments of dissatisfaction. To
-Parmenio, to Philôtas, to Kleitus, and other principal officers, the
-insolence of the king in disclaiming Philip and putting himself above
-the level of humanity, appeared highly offensive. Discontents on this
-subject among the Macedonian officers, though condemned to silence by
-fear and admiration of Alexander, became serious, and will be found
-re-appearing hereafter.[352]
-
-  [347] Diodor. xvii. 51. τεκμήρια δ᾽ ἔσεσθαι τῆς ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ
-  γενέσεως τὸ μέγεθος τῶν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι κατορθωμάτων (answer of
-  the priest of Ammon to Alexander).
-
-  [348] Arrian, iii. 3, 2.
-
-  [349] Arrian, iii. 3, 12. Καὶ ὅτι μὲν θεῖόν τι ξυνεπέλαβεν αὐτῷ,
-  ~ἔχω ἰσχυρίσασθαι~, ὅτι καὶ τὸ εἰκὸς ταύτῃ ἔχει· τὸ δ᾽ ἀτρεκὲς
-  τοῦ λόγου ἀφείλοντο οἱ ἄλλῃ καὶ ἄλλῃ ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ ἐξηγησάμενοι.
-
-  Compare Curtius, iv. 7, 12-15; Diodor. xvii. 49-51; Plutarch,
-  Alex. 27; Kallisthenes ap. Strabon. xvii. p. 814.
-
-  [350] Kallisthenes, Fragm. xvi. ap. Alexand. Magn. Histor.
-  Scriptor. ed. Geier. p. 257; Strabo, xvii. p. 814.
-
-  [351] Plutarch, Alexand. 28. Arrian, hints at the same
-  explanation (vii. 29, 6).
-
-  [352] Curtius, iv. 10, 3—“fastidio esse patriam, abdicari
-  Philippum patrem cœlum vanis cogitationibus petere.” Arrian, iii.
-  26, 1; Curtius, vi. 9, 18; vi. 11, 23.
-
-The last month of Alexander’s stay in Egypt was passed at Memphis.
-While nominating various officers for the permanent administration
-of the country, he also received a visit of Hegelochus his admiral,
-who brought as prisoners Aristonikus of Methymna, and other despots
-of the various insular Grecian cities. Alexander ordered them to
-be handed over to their respective cities, to be dealt with as the
-citizens pleased; all except the Chian Apollonides, who was sent
-to Elephantinê in the south of Egypt for detention. In most of the
-cities, the despots had incurred such violent hatred, that when
-delivered up, they were tortured and put to death.[353] Pharnabazus
-also had been among the prisoners, but had found means to escape
-from his guards when the fleet touched at Kos.[354]
-
-  [353] Curtius, iv. 8, 11.
-
-  [354] Arrian, iii. 2, 8, 9.
-
-In the early spring, after receiving reinforcements of Greeks and
-Thracians, Alexander marched into Phenicia. It was there that he
-regulated the affairs of Phenicia, Syria, and Greece, prior to his
-intended expedition into the interior against Darius. He punished
-the inhabitants of Samaria, who had revolted and burnt alive the
-Macedonian prefect Andromachus.[355] In addition to all the business
-transacted, Alexander made costly presents to the Tyrian Herakles,
-and offered splendid sacrifices to other gods. Choice festivals with
-tragedy were also celebrated, analogous to the Dionysia at Athens,
-with the best actors and chorists contending for the prize. The
-princes of Cyprus vied with each other in doing honor to the son of
-Zeus Ammon; each undertaking the duty of chorêgus, getting up at his
-own cost a drama with distinguished chorus and actors, and striving
-to obtain the prize from pre-appointed judges—as was practised among
-the ten tribes at Athens.[356]
-
-  [355] Curtius, iv. 8, 10.
-
-  [356] Plutarch, Alexand. 29; Arrian, _l. c._
-
-In the midst of these religious and festive exhibitions, Alexander
-was collecting magazines for his march into the interior.[357] He had
-already sent forward a detachment to Thapsacus, the usual ford of the
-Euphrates, to throw bridges over the river. The Persian Mazæus was on
-guard on the other side, with a small force of 3000 men, 2000 of them
-Greeks; not sufficient to hinder the bridges from being built, but
-only to hinder them from being carried completely over to the left
-bank. After eleven days of march from Phenicia, Alexander and his
-whole army reached Thapsakus. Mazæus, on the other side, as soon as
-he saw the main army arrive, withdrew his small force without delay,
-and retreated to the Tigris; so that the two bridges were completed,
-and Alexander crossed forthwith.[358]
-
-  [357] Arrian, iii. 6, 12.
-
-  [358] Arrian, iii. 7, 1-6; Curtius, iv. 9, 12—“undecimis castris
-  pervenit ad Euphraten.”
-
-Once over the Euphrates, Alexander had the option of marching down
-the left bank of that river to Babylon, the chief city of the
-Persian empire, and the natural place to find Darius.[359] But this
-march (as we know from Xenophon, who made it with the Ten Thousand
-Greeks) would be one of extreme suffering and through a desert
-country where no provisions were to be got. Moreover, Mazæus in
-retreating had taken a north-easterly direction towards the upper
-part of the Tigris; and some prisoners reported that Darius with his
-main army was behind the Tigris, intending to defend the passage
-of that river against Alexander. The Tigris appears not to be
-fordable below Nineveh (Mosul). Accordingly he directed his march,
-first nearly northward, having the Euphrates on his left hand; next
-eastward across Northern Mesopotamia, having the Armenian mountains
-on his left hand. On reaching the ford of the Tigris, he found it
-absolutely undefended. Not a single enemy being in sight, he forded
-the river as soon as possible, with all his infantry, cavalry, and
-baggage. The difficulties and perils of crossing were extreme, from
-the depth of the water, above their breasts, the rapidity of the
-current, and the slippery footing.[360] A resolute and vigilant enemy
-might have rendered the passage almost impossible. But the good
-fortune of Alexander was not less conspicuous in what his enemies
-left undone, than in what they actually did.[361]
-
-  [359] So Alexander considers Babylon (Arrian, ii. 17,
-  3-10)—προχωρησάντων ξὺν τῇ δυνάμει ἐπὶ Βαβυλῶνά τε καὶ Δαρεῖον
-  ... τόν τε ἐπὶ Βαβυλῶνος στόλον ποιησόμεθα, etc. This is the
-  explanation of Arrian’s remark, iii. 7, 6—where he assigns the
-  reason why Alexander, after passing the Euphrates at Thapsakus,
-  did not take the straight road towards Babylon. Cyrus the younger
-  marched directly to Babylon to attack Artaxerxes. Susa, Ekbatana,
-  and Persepolis were more distant, and less exposed to an enemy
-  from the west.
-
-  [360] Arrian, iii. 7, 8; Diodor. xvii. 55; Curtius. iv. 9, 17-24.
-  “Magna munimenta regni Tigris atque Euphrates erant”, is a part
-  of the speech put into the mouth of Darius before the battle of
-  Arbela, by Curtius, (iv. 14, 10). Both these great defences were
-  abandoned.
-
-  [361] Curtius, iv. 9, 23; Plutarch, Alexand. 39.
-
-After this fatiguing passage, Alexander rested for two days. During
-the night an eclipse of the moon occurred, nearly total; which
-spread consternation among the army, combined with complaints
-against his overweening insolence, and mistrust as to the unknown
-regions on which they were entering. Alexander, while offering
-solemn sacrifices to Sun, Moon, and Earth, combated the prevailing
-depression by declarations from his own prophet Aristander and from
-Egyptian astrologers, who proclaimed that Helios favored the Greeks,
-and Selênê the Persians; hence the eclipse of the moon portended
-victory to the Macedonians—and victory too (so Aristander promised),
-before the next new moon. Having thus reassured the soldiers,
-Alexander marched for four days in a south-easterly direction through
-the territory called Aturia, with the Tigris on his right hand, and
-the Gordyene or Kurd mountains on his left. Encountering a small
-advanced guard of the Persians, he here learnt from prisoners that
-Darius with his main host was not far off.[362]
-
-  [362] Arrian, iii. 7, 12; iii. 8, 3. Curtius, iv. 10, 11-18.
-
-Nearly two years had elapsed since the ruinous defeat of Issus. What
-Darius had been doing during this long interval, and especially
-during the first half of it, we are unable to say. We hear only
-of one proceeding on his part—his missions, twice repeated, to
-Alexander, tendering or entreating peace, with the especial view of
-recovering his captive family. Nothing else does he appear to have
-done, either to retrieve the losses of the past, or to avert the
-perils of the future; nothing, to save his fleet from passing into
-the hands of the conqueror; nothing, to relieve either Tyre or Gaza,
-the sieges of which collectively occupied Alexander for near ten
-months. The disgraceful flight of Darius at Issus had already lost
-him the confidence of several of his most valuable servants. The
-Macedonian exile Amyntas, a brave and energetic man, with the best
-of the Grecian mercenaries, gave up the Persian cause as lost,[363]
-and tried to set up for himself, in which attempt he failed and
-perished in Egypt. The satrap of Egypt, penetrated with contempt for
-the timidity of his master, was induced, by that reason as well as by
-others, to throw open the country to Alexander.[364] Having incurred
-so deplorable a loss, as well in reputation as in territory, Darius
-had the strongest motives to redeem it by augmented vigor.
-
-  [363] Arrian, ii. 13; Curtius, iv. 1, 27-30—“cum in illo statu
-  rerum id quemque, quod occupasset, habiturum arbitraretur”
-  (Amyntas).
-
-  [364] Arrian, iii. 1, 3. τήν τε ἐν Ἰσσῷ μάχην ὅπως συνέβη
-  πεπυσμένος (the satrap of Egypt) καὶ Δαρεῖον ὅτι αἰσχρᾷ φυγῇ
-  ἔφυγε, etc.
-
-But he was paralyzed by the fact, that his mother, his wife, and
-several of his children, had fallen into the hands of the conqueror.
-Among the countless advantages growing out of the victory of Issus,
-this acquisition was not the least. It placed Darius in the condition
-of one who had given hostages for good behavior to his enemy. The
-Persian kings were often in the habit of exacting from satraps or
-generals the deposit of their wives and families, as a pledge for
-fidelity; and Darius himself had received this guarantee from Memnon,
-as a condition of entrusting him with the Persian fleet.[365] Bound
-by the like chains himself, towards one who had now become his
-superior, Darius was afraid to act with energy, lest success should
-bring down evil upon his captive family. By allowing Alexander to
-subdue unopposed all the territory west of the Euphrates, he hoped
-to be allowed to retain his empire eastward, and to ransom back
-his family at an enormous price. Such propositions did satisfy
-Parmenio, and would probably have satisfied even Philip, had Philip
-been the victor. The insatiate nature of Alexander had not yet been
-fully proved. It was only when the latter contemptuously rejected
-everything short of surrender at discretion, that Darius began to
-take measures east of the Euphrates for defending what yet remained.
-
-  [365] Diodor. xvii. 23. Compare Xenophon, Anabasis, i. 4, 9;
-  Herodotus, vii. 10.
-
-The conduct of Alexander towards the regal hostages, honorable as it
-was to his sentiment, evinced at the same time that he knew their
-value as a subject of political negotiation.[366] It was essential
-that he should treat them with the full deference due to their rank,
-if he desired to keep up their price as hostages in the eyes of
-Darius as well as of his own army. He carried them along with his
-army, from the coast of Syria, over the bridge of the Euphrates, and
-even through the waters of the Tigris. To them, this must have proved
-a severe toil; and in fact, the queen Statira became so worn out
-that she died shortly after crossing the Tigris;[367] to him also,
-it must have been an onerous obligation, since he not only sought to
-ensure to them all their accustomed pomp, but must have assigned a
-considerable guard to watch them, at a moment when he was marching
-into an unknown country, and required all his military resources to
-be disposable. Simply for safe detention, the hostages would have
-been better guarded and might have been treated with still greater
-ceremony, in a city or a fortress. But Alexander probably wished to
-have them near him, in case of the possible contingency of serious
-reverses to his army on the eastern side of the Tigris. Assuming such
-a misfortune to happen, the surrender of them might ensure a safe
-retreat under circumstances otherwise fatal to its accomplishment.
-
-  [366] The praise bestowed upon the continence of Alexander, for
-  refusing to visit Statira the wife of Darius, is exaggerated even
-  to absurdity.
-
-  In regard to women, Alexander was by temperament cold, the
-  opposite of his father Philip. During his youth, his development
-  was so tardy, that there was even a surmise of some physical
-  disability (Hieronymus ap. Athenæ. x. p. 435). As to the most
-  beautiful persons, of both sexes, he had only to refuse the
-  numerous tenders made to him by those who sought to gain his
-  favor (Plutarch, Alex. 22). Moreover, after the capture of
-  Damascus, he did select for himself, from among the female
-  captives, Barsinê, the widow of his illustrious rival Memnon;
-  daughter of Artabazus, a beautiful woman of engaging manners, and
-  above all, distinguished, by having received Hellenic education,
-  from the simply Oriental harem of Darius (Plutarch, Alex. 21).
-  In adopting the widow of Memnon as his mistress, Alexander may
-  probably have had present to his imagination the example of his
-  legendary ancestor Neoptolemus, whose tender relations with
-  Andromache, widow of his enemy Hektor, would not be forgotten by
-  any reader of Euripides. Alexander had by Barsinê a son called
-  Herakles.
-
-  Lastly, Alexander was so absorbed by ambition,—so overcharged
-  with the duties and difficulties of command, which he always
-  performed himself—and so continually engaged in fatiguing bodily
-  effort,—that he had little leisure left for indulgences; such
-  leisure as he had, he preferred devoting to wine-parties with the
-  society and conversation of his officers.
-
-  [367] Curtius, iv. 10, 19. “Itineris continui labore animique
-  ægritudine fatigata”, etc.
-
-  Curtius and Justin mention a third embassy sent by Darius
-  (immediately after having heard of the death and honorable
-  obsequies of Statira) to Alexander, asking for peace. The other
-  authors allude only to two tentatives of this kind; and the third
-  seems by no means probable.
-
-Being at length convinced that Alexander would not be satisfied with
-any prize short of the entire Persian empire, Darius summoned all
-his forces to defend what he still retained. He brought together a
-host said to be superior in number to that which had been defeated
-at Issus.[368] Contingents arrived from the farthest extremities of
-the vast Persian territory—from the Caspian sea, the rivers Oxus and
-Indus, the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea. The plains eastward of
-the Tigris, about the latitude of the modern town of Mosul, between
-that river and the Gordyene mountains (Zagros), were fixed upon for
-the muster of this prodigious multitude; partly conducted by Darius
-himself from Babylon, partly arriving there by different routes from
-the north, east, and south. Arbêla—a considerable town about twenty
-miles east of the Great Zab river, still known under the name of
-Erbil, as a caravan station on the ordinary road between Erzeroum and
-Bagdad—was fixed on as the muster-place or head-quarters, where the
-chief magazines were collected and the heavy baggage lodged, and near
-which the troops were first assembled and exercised.[369]
-
-  [368] Arrian, iii. 7, 7.
-
-  [369] Diodorus, xvii. 53; Curtius, iv. 9, 9.
-
-But the spot predetermined for a pitched battle was, the neighborhood
-of Gaugamela near the river Bumôdus, about thirty miles west of
-Arbêla, towards the Tigris, and about as much south-east of Mosul—a
-spacious and level plain, with nothing more than a few undulating
-slopes, and without any trees. It was by nature well adapted for
-drawing up a numerous army, especially for the free manœuvres of
-cavalry, and the rush of scythed chariots; moreover, the Persian
-officers had been careful beforehand to level artificially such of
-the slopes as they thought inconvenient.[370] There seemed every
-thing in the ground to favor the operation both of the vast total,
-and the special forces, of Darius; who fancied that his defeat
-at Issus had been occasioned altogether by his having adventured
-himself in the narrow defiles of Kilikia—and that on open and level
-ground his superior numbers must be triumphant. He was even anxious
-that Alexander should come and attack him on the plain. Hence the
-undefended passage of the Tigris.
-
-  [370] Arrian, iii. 8, 12. Καὶ γὰρ καὶ ὅσα ἀνώμαλα αὐτοῦ ἐς
-  ἱππασίαν, ταῦτά τε ~ἐκ πολλοῦ~ οἱ Πέρσαι τοῖς τε ἅρμασιν
-  ἐπελαύνειν εὐπετῆ πεποιήκεσαν καὶ τῇ ἵππῳ ἱππάσιμα.
-
-For those who looked only to numbers, the host assembled at Arbêla
-might well inspire confidence; for it is said to have consisted of
-1,000,000 of infantry[371]—40,000 cavalry—200 scythed chariots—and
-fifteen elephants; of which animals we now read for the first time
-in a field of battle. But besides the numbers, Darius had provided
-for his troops more effective arms; instead of mere javelins, strong
-swords and short thrusting pikes, such as the Macedonian cavalry
-wielded so admirably in close combat—together with shields for the
-infantry and breastplates for the horsemen.[372] He counted much
-also on the terrific charge of the chariots, each of which had a
-pole projecting before the horses and terminating in a sharp point,
-together with three sword-blades stretching from the yoke on each
-side, and scythes also laterally from the naves of the wheels.[373]
-
-  [371] This is the total given by Arrian as what he found set
-  forth (ἐλέγετο), probably the best information which Ptolemy and
-  Aristobulus could procure (Arrian, iii. 8, 8).
-
-  Diodorus (xvii. 53) says 800,000 foot, 200,000 horse, and 200
-  scythed chariots. Justin (xi. 12) gives 400,000 foot and 100,000
-  horse. Plutarch (Alex. 31) talks generally of a million of men.
-  Curtius states the army to have been almost twice as large as
-  that which had fought in Kilikia (iv. 9, 3); he gives the total
-  as 200,000 foot, and 45,000 horse (iv. 12, 13).
-
-  [372] Diodor. xvii. 53; Curtius, iv. 9, 2.
-
-  [373] Curtius, iv. 9, 3; Diodor. xvii. 53. Notwithstanding the
-  instructive note of Mützel upon this passage of Curtius, the mode
-  in which these chariots were armed is not clear on all points.
-
-Informed of the approach of Alexander, about the time when the
-Macedonian army first reached the Tigris, Darius moved from Arbêla,
-where his baggage and treasure were left—crossed by bridges the river
-Lykus or Great Zab, an operation which occupied five days—and marched
-to take post on the prepared ground near Gaugamela. His battle array
-was formed—of the Baktrians on the extreme left, under command of
-Bessus the satrap of Baktria; next, the Dahæ and Arachôti, under
-command of Barsäentes, satrap of Arachosia; then the native Persians,
-horse and foot alternating—the Susians, under Oxathres,—and the
-Kadusians. On the extreme right were the contingents of Syria both
-east and west of the Euphrates, under Mazæus; then the Medes, under
-Atropates; next, the Parthians, Sakæ, Tapyrians, and Hyrkanians, all
-cavalry, under Phrataphernes; then the Albanians and the Sakesinæ.
-Darius himself was in the centre, with the choice troops of the
-army near and around him—the Persian select Horse-guards, called
-the king’s kinsmen—the Persian foot-guards, carrying pikes with a
-golden apple at the butt-end—a regiment of Karians, or descendants
-of Karians, who had been abstracted from their homes and planted as
-colonists in the interior of the empire—the contingent of Mardi, good
-archers—and lastly, the mercenary Greeks, of number unknown, in whom
-Darius placed his greatest confidence.
-
-Such was the first or main line of the Persians. In the rear of it
-stood deep masses of Babylonians,—inhabitants of Sittakê down to the
-Persian Gulf—Uxians, from the territory adjoining Susiana to the
-east—and others in unknown multitude. In front of it were posted the
-scythed chariots, with small advanced bodies of cavalry—Scythians
-and Baktrians on the left, with one hundred chariots—Armenians and
-Kappadokians on the right, with fifty more—and the remaining fifty
-chariots in front of the centre.[374]
-
-  [374] The Persian battle order here given by Arrian (iii. 11),
-  is taken from Aristobulus, who affirmed that it was so set down
-  in the official scheme of the battle, drawn up by the Persian
-  officers, and afterwards captured with the baggage of Darius.
-  Though thus authentic as far as it goes, it is not complete,
-  even as to names—while it says nothing about numbers or depth or
-  extent of front. Several names, of various contingents stated to
-  have been present in the field, are not placed in the official
-  return—thus the Sogdiani, the Arians, and the Indian mountaineers
-  are mentioned by Arrian as having joined Darius (iii. 8); the
-  Kossæans, by Diodorus (xvii. 59); the Sogdiani, Massagetæ,
-  Belitæ, Kossæans, Gortyæ, Phrygians, and Kataonians, by Curtius
-  (iv. 12).
-
-Alexander had advanced within about seven miles of the Persian army,
-and four days’ march since his crossing the Tigris—when he first
-learnt from Persian prisoners how near his enemies were. He at once
-halted, established on the spot a camp with ditch and stockade;
-and remained there for four days, in order that the soldiers might
-repose. On the night of the fourth day, he moved forward, yet
-leaving under guard in the camp the baggage, the prisoners, and the
-ineffectives. He began his march, over a range of low elevations
-which divided him from the enemy, hoping to approach and attack
-them at daybreak. But his progress was so retarded, that day broke,
-and the two armies first came in sight, when he was still on the
-descending slope of the ground, more than three miles distant. On
-seeing the enemy, he halted, and called together his principal
-officers, to consult whether he should not prosecute his march and
-commence the attack forthwith.[375] Though most of them pronounced
-for the affirmative, yet Parmenio contended that this course would be
-rash; that the ground before them, with all its difficulties, natural
-or artificial, was unknown, and that the enemy’s position, which
-they now saw for the first time, ought to be carefully reconnoitred.
-Adopting this latter view, Alexander halted for the day; yet still
-retaining his battle order, and forming a new entrenched camp,
-to which the baggage and the prisoners were now brought forward
-from the preceding day’s encampment.[376] He himself spent the
-day, with an escort of cavalry and light troops, in reconnoitring
-both the intermediate ground and the enemy, who did not interrupt
-him, in spite of their immense superiority in cavalry. Parmenio,
-with Polysperchon and others, advised him to attack the enemy in
-the night; which promised some advantages, since Persian armies
-were notoriously unmanageable by night,[377] and since their camp
-had no defence. But on the other hand, the plan involved so many
-disadvantages and perils, that Alexander rejected it; declaring—with
-an emphasis intentionally enhanced, since he spoke in the hearing of
-many others—that he disdained the meanness of stealing a victory;
-that he both would conquer, and could conquer, Darius fairly and in
-open daylight.[378] Having then addressed to his officers a few brief
-encouragements, which met with enthusiastic response, he dismissed
-them to their evening meal and repose.
-
-  [375] Arrian, iii. 9, 5-7.
-
-  [376] Arrian, iii. 9, 2-8. It is not expressly mentioned by
-  Arrian that the baggage, etc. was brought forward from the first
-  camp to the second. But we see that such must have been the
-  fact, from what happened during the battle. Alexander’s baggage,
-  which was plundered by a body of Persian cavalry, cannot have
-  been so far in the rear of the army as the distance of the first
-  camp would require. This coincides also with Curtius, iv. 13,
-  35. The words ἔγνω ἀπολείπειν (Arrian, iii. 9, 2), indicate the
-  contemplation of a purpose which was not accomplished—ὡς ἅμ᾽
-  ἡμέρᾳ προσμῖξαι τοῖς πολεμίοις (iii. 9, 3). Instead of “coming
-  into conflict” with the enemy at break of day—Alexander only
-  arrived within sight of them at break of day; he then halted the
-  whole day and night within sight of their position; and naturally
-  brought up his baggage, having no motive to leave it so far in
-  the rear.
-
-  [377] Xenoph. Anabas. iii. 4, 35.
-
-  [378] Arrian, iii. 10, 3; Curtius, iv. 13, 4-10.
-
-On the next morning, he marshalled his army, consisting of
-40,000 foot, and 7000 horse, in two lines.[379] The first or
-main line was composed, on the right, of the eight squadrons of
-Companion-cavalry, each with its separate captain, but all under
-the command of Philôtas, son of Parmenio. Next (proceeding from
-right to left) came the Agêma or chosen band of the Hypaspistæ—then
-the remaining Hypaspistæ, under Nikanor—then the phalanx properly
-so called, distributed into six divisions, under the command of
-Kœnus, Perdikkas, Meleager, Polysperchon, Simmias, and Kraterus,
-respectively.[380] Next on the left of the phalanx, were ranged the
-allied Grecian cavalry, Lokrian and Phokian, Phthiot, Malians, and
-Peloponnesians; after whom, at the extreme left, came the Thessalians
-under Philippus—among the best cavalry in the army, hardly inferior
-to the Macedonian Companions. As in the two former battles, Alexander
-himself took the command of the right half of the army, confiding the
-left to Parmenio.
-
-  [379] Arrian, iii. 12, 1-9.
-
-  [380] Arrian, ii. 11; Diodor. xvii. 57; Curtius, iv. 13, 26-30.
-
-Behind this main line, was placed a second or body of reserve,
-intended to guard against attacks in the flanks and rear, which the
-superior numbers of the Persians rendered probable. For this purpose,
-Alexander reserved,—on the right, the light cavalry or Lancers—the
-Pæonians, under Aretes and Aristo—half the Agrianes, under
-Attalus—the Macedonian archers, under Brisson—and the mercenaries
-of old service, under Kleander; on the left, various bodies of
-Thracian and allied cavalry, under their separate officers. All these
-different regiments were held ready to repel attack either in flank
-or rear. In front of the main line were some advanced squadrons
-of cavalry and light troops—Grecian cavalry, under Menidas on the
-right, and under Andromachus on the left—a brigade of darters under
-Balakrus, together with Agrianian darters, and some bowmen. Lastly,
-the Thracian infantry were left to guard the camp and baggage.[381]
-
-  [381] Arrian, iii. 12, 2-6; Curtius, iv. 13, 30-32; Diodor. xvii.
-  57.
-
-Forewarned by a deserter, Alexander avoided the places where iron
-spikes had been planted to damage the Macedonian cavalry.[382] He
-himself, at the head of the Royal Squadron, on the extreme right, led
-the march obliquely in that direction, keeping his right somewhat
-in advance. As he neared the enemy, he saw Darius himself with the
-Persian left centre immediately opposed to him—Persian guards,
-Indians, Albanians, and Karians. Alexander went on inclining to the
-right, and Darius stretching his front towards the left to counteract
-this movement, but still greatly outflanking the Macedonians to the
-left. Alexander had now got so far to his right, that he was almost
-beyond the ground levelled by Darius for the operations of his
-chariots in front. To check any farther movement in this direction,
-the Baktrian 1000 horse and the Scythians in front of the Persian
-left, were ordered to make a circuit and attack the Macedonian right
-flank. Alexander detached against them his regiment of cavalry under
-Menidas, and the action thus began.[383]
-
-  [382] Curtius, iv. 13, 36; Polyænus, iv. 3, 17.
-
-  [383] Arrian, iii. 13, 1-5.
-
-The Baktrian horse, perceiving the advance of Menidas, turned from
-their circuitous movement to attack him, and at first drove him back
-until he was supported by the other advanced detachments—Pæonians
-and Grecian cavalry. The Baktrians, defeated in their turn, were
-supported by the satrap Bessus with the main body of Baktrians and
-Scythians in the left portion of Darius’s line. The action was here
-for some time warmly contested, with some loss to the Greeks; who
-at length however, by a more compact order against enemies whose
-fighting was broken and desultory, succeeded in pushing them out of
-their place in the line, and thus making a partial opening in it.[384]
-
-  [384] Arrian, iii. 13, 9.
-
-While this conflict was still going on, Darius had ordered his
-scythed chariots to charge, and his main line to follow them,
-calculating on the disorder which he expected that they would
-occasion. But the chariots were found of little service. The horses
-were terrified, checked, or wounded, by the Macedonian archers and
-darters in front; who even found means to seize the reins, pull down
-the drivers, and kill the horses. Of the hundred chariots in Darius’s
-front, intended to beat down the Macedonian ranks by simultaneous
-pressure along their whole line, many were altogether stopped or
-disabled; some turned right round, the horses refusing to face the
-protended pikes, or being scared with the noise of pike and shield
-struck together; some which reached the Macedonian line, were let
-through without mischief by the soldiers opening their ranks; a few
-only inflicted wounds or damage.[385]
-
-  [385] About the chariots. Arrian, iii. 13, 11; Curtius, iv. 15,
-  14; Diodor. xvii. 57, 58.
-
-  Arrian mentions distinctly only those chariots which were
-  launched on Darius’s left, immediately opposite to Alexander. But
-  it is plain that the chariots along the whole line must have been
-  let off at one and the same signal—which we may understand as
-  implied in the words of Curtius—“Ipse (Darius) ante se falcatos
-  currus habebat, quos signo dato universos in hostem effudit” (iv.
-  14, 3).
-
-  The scythed chariots of Artaxerxes, at the battle of Kunaxa,
-  did no mischief (Xenoph. Anab. i. 8, 10-20). At the battle of
-  Magnesia, gained by the Romans (B. C. 190) over the
-  Syrian king Antiochus, his chariots were not only driven back,
-  but spread disorder among their own troops (Appian, Reb. Syriac.
-  33).
-
-As soon as the chariots were thus disposed of, and the Persian main
-force laid open as advancing behind them, Alexander gave orders
-to the troops of his main line, who had hitherto been perfectly
-silent,[386] to raise the war-shout and charge at a quick pace;
-at the same time directing Aretes with the Pæonians to repel the
-assailants on his right flank. He himself, discontinuing his slanting
-movement to the right, turned towards the Persian line, and dashed,
-at the head of all the Companion-cavalry, into that partial opening
-in it, which had been made by the flank movement of the Baktrians.
-Having by this opening got partly within the line, he pushed straight
-towards the person of Darius; his cavalry engaging in the closest
-hand-combat, and thrusting with their short pikes at the faces of the
-Persians. Here, as at the Granikus, the latter were discomposed by
-this mode of fighting—accustomed as they were to rely on the use of
-missiles, with rapid wheeling of the horse for renewed attack.[387]
-They were unable to prevent Alexander and his cavalry from gaining
-ground and approaching nearer to Darius; while at the same time,
-the Macedonian phalanx in front, with its compact order and long
-protended pikes, pressed upon the Persian line opposed to it. For
-a short interval, the combat here was close and obstinate; and it
-might have been much prolonged—since the best troops of Darius’s
-army—Greeks, Karians, Persian guards, regal kinsmen, etc., were here
-posted,—had the king’s courage been equal to that of his soldiers.
-But here, even worse than at Issus, the flight of the army began with
-Darius himself. It had been the recommendation of Cyrus the younger,
-in attacking the army of his brother Artaxerxes at Kunaxa, to aim
-the main blow at the spot where his brother was in person—since he
-well knew that victory there was victory everywhere. Having already
-once followed this scheme successfully at Issus, Alexander repeated
-it with still more signal success at Arbêla. Darius, who had long
-been in fear, from the time when he first beheld his formidable enemy
-on the neighboring hills, became still more alarmed when he saw the
-scythed chariots prove a failure, and when the Macedonians, suddenly
-breaking out from absolute silence into an universal war-cry, came
-to close quarters with his troops, pressing towards and menacing
-the conspicuous chariot on which he stood.[388] The sight and
-hearing of this terrific _mêlée_, combined with the prestige already
-attaching to Alexander’s name, completely overthrew the courage and
-self-possession of Darius. He caused his chariot to be turned round,
-and himself set the example of flight.[389]
-
-  [386] See the remarkable passage in the address of Alexander
-  to his soldiers previous to the battle, about the necessity of
-  absolute silence until the moment came for the terrific war-shout
-  (Arrian, iii. 9, 14): compare Thucyd. ii. 89—a similar direction
-  from Phormio to the Athenians.
-
-  [387] Arrian, iii. 15, 4. οὔτε ἀκοντισμῷ ἔτι, οὔτε ἐξελιγμοῖς τῶν
-  ἵππων, ἥπερ ἱππομαχίας δίκη, ἐχρῶντο—about the Persian cavalry
-  when driven to despair.
-
-  [388] Arrian, iii. 14, 2. ἦγε δρόμῳ τε καὶ ἀλαλαγμῷ ὡς ἐπὶ αὐτὸν
-  Δαρεῖον—Diodor. xvii. 60. Alexander μετὰ τῆς βασιλικῆς ἴλης καὶ
-  τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων ἱππέων ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸν ἤλαυνε τὸν Δαρεῖον.
-
-  [389] Arrian, iii. 14, 3. Καὶ χρόνον μέν τινα ὀλίγον ἐν χερσὶν
-  ἡ μάχη ἐγένετο. Ὣς δὲ οἵ τε ἱππεῖς οἱ ἀμφ᾽ Ἀλέξανδρον καὶ
-  αὐτὸς Ἀλέξανδρος εὐρώστως ἐνέκειντο, ὠθισμοῖς τε χρώμενοι, καὶ
-  τοῖς ξυστοῖς τὰ πρόσωπα τῶν Περσῶν κόπτοντες, ἥ τε φάλαγξ ἡ
-  Μακεδονικὴ, πυκνὴ καὶ ταῖς σαρίσσαις πεφρικυῖα, ἐμβέβληκεν ἤδη
-  αὐτοῖς, ~καὶ πάντα ὁμοῦ τὰ δεινὰ καὶ πάλαι ἤδη φοβερῷ ὄντι Δαρείῳ
-  ἐφαίνετο, πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἐπιστρέψας ἔφευγεν~. At Issus, Arrian
-  states that “Darius fled along with the first” (ii. 11, 6); at
-  Arbela here, he states that “Darius was the first to turn and
-  flee;” an expression yet stronger and more distinct. Curtius
-  and Diodorus, who seem here as elsewhere to follow generally
-  the same authorities, give details, respecting the conduct of
-  Darius, which are not to be reconciled with Arrian, and which are
-  decidedly less credible than Arrian’s narrative. The fact that
-  the two kings were here (as at Issus) near, and probably visible,
-  to each other, has served as a basis for much embroidery. The
-  statement that Darius, standing on his chariot, hurled his spear
-  against the advancing Macedonians—and that Alexander also hurled
-  his spear at Darius, but missing him, killed the charioteer—is
-  picturesque and Homeric, but has no air of reality. Curtius and
-  Diodorus tell us that this fall of the charioteer was mistaken
-  for the fall of the king, and struck the Persian army with
-  consternation, causing them forthwith to take flight, and thus
-  ultimately forcing Darius to flee also (Diodor. xvii. 60; Curt.
-  iv. 15, 26-32). But this is noway probable; since the real fight
-  then going on was close, and with hand-weapons.
-
-From this moment, the battle, though it had lasted so short a
-time, was irreparably lost. The king’s flight, followed of course
-immediately by that of the numerous attendants around him, spread
-dismay among all his troops, leaving them neither centre of command,
-nor chief to fight for. The best soldiers in his army, being those
-immediately around him, were under these circumstances the first to
-give way. The fierce onset of Alexander with the Companion-cavalry,
-and the unremitting pressure of the phalanx in front was obstructed
-by little else than a mass of disordered fugitives. During the same
-time, Aretes with his Pæonians had defeated the Baktrians on the
-right flank,[390] so that Alexander was free to pursue the routed
-main body,—which he did most energetically. The cloud of dust raised
-by the dense multitude is said to have been so thick, that nothing
-could be clearly seen, nor could the pursuers distinguish the track
-taken by Darius himself. Amidst this darkness, the cries and noises
-from all sides were only the more impressive; especially the sound
-from the whips of the charioteers, pushing their horses to full
-speed.[391] It was the dust alone which saved Darius himself from
-being overtaken by the pursuing cavalry.
-
-  [390] Arrian, iii. 14, 4.
-
-  [391] Diodor. xvii. 60; Curtius, iv. 15, 32, 33. The cloud of
-  dust, and the noise of the whips, are specified both by Diodorus
-  and Curtius.
-
-While Alexander was thus fully successful on his right and centre,
-the scene on his left under Parmenio was different. Mazæus, who
-commanded the Persian right, after launching his scythed chariots
-(which may possibly have done more damage than those launched on
-the Persian left, though we have no direct information about them),
-followed it up by vigorously charging the Grecian and Thessalian
-horse in his front, and also by sending round a detachment of
-cavalry to attack them on their left flank.[392] Here the battle was
-obstinately contested, and success for some time doubtful. Even after
-the flight of Darius, Parmenio found himself so much pressed, that he
-sent a message to Alexander. Alexander, though full of mortification
-at relinquishing the pursuit, checked his troops, and brought them
-back to the assistance of his left, by the shortest course across the
-field of battle. The two left divisions of the phalanx, under Simmias
-and Kraterus, had already stopped short in the pursuit, on receiving
-the like message from Parmenio; leaving the other four divisions to
-follow the advanced movement of Alexander.[393] Hence there arose a
-gap in the midst of the phalanx, between the four right divisions,
-and the two left; into which gap a brigade of Indian and Persian
-cavalry darted, galloping through the midst of the Macedonian line to
-get into the rear and attack the baggage.[394] At first this movement
-was successful, the guard was found unprepared, and the Persian
-prisoners rose at once to set themselves free; though Sisygambis,
-whom these prisoners were above measure anxious to liberate, refused
-to accept their aid, either from mistrust of their force, or
-gratitude for the good treatment received from Alexander.[395] But
-while these assailants were engaged in plundering the baggage, they
-were attacked in the rear by the troops forming the second Macedonian
-line, who though at first taken by surprise, had now had time to
-face about and reach the camp. Many of the Persian brigade were thus
-slain, the rest got off as they could.[396]
-
-  [392] Curtius, iv. 16, 1; Diodorus, xvii. 59, 60; Arrian, iii.
-  14, 11. The two first authors are here superior to Arrian, who
-  scarcely mentions at all this vigorous charge of Mazæus, though
-  he alludes to the effects produced by it.
-
-  [393] Arrian, iii. 14, 6. He speaks directly here only of the
-  τάξις under the command of Simmias; but it is plain that what he
-  says must be understood of the τάξις commanded by Kraterus also.
-  Of the six τάξεις or divisions of the phalanx, that of Kraterus
-  stood at the extreme left—that of Simmias (who commanded on this
-  day the τάξις of Amyntas son of Andromenes) next to it (iii.
-  11, 16). If therefore the τάξις of Simmias was kept back from
-  pursuit, on account of the pressure upon the general Macedonian
-  left (iii. 14, 6)—_à fortiori_, the τάξις of Kraterus must have
-  been kept back in like manner.
-
-  [394] Arrian, iii. 14, 7.
-
-  [395] Curtius. iv. 15, 9-11; Diodor. xvii. 59. Curtius and
-  Diodorus represent the brigade of cavalry who plundered the camp
-  and rescued the prisoners, to have been sent round by Mazæus
-  from the Persian right; while Arrian states, more probably, that
-  they got through the break accidentally left in the phalanx, and
-  traversed the Macedonian lines.
-
-  [396] Arrian, iii. 14, 10. Curtius represents this brigade as
-  having been driven off by Aretes and a detachment sent expressly
-  by Alexander himself. Diodorus describes it as if it had not been
-  defeated at all, but had ridden back to Mazæus after plundering
-  the baggage. Neither of these accounts is so probable as that of
-  Arrian.
-
-Mazæus maintained for a certain time fair equality, on his own
-side of the battle, even after the flight of Darius. But when, to
-the paralyzing effect of that fact in itself, there was added the
-spectacle of its disastrous effects on the left half of the Persian
-army, neither he nor his soldiers could persevere with unabated vigor
-in a useless combat. The Thessalian and Grecian horse, on the other
-hand, animated by the turn of fortune in their favor, pressed their
-enemies with redoubled energy and at length drove them to flight; so
-that Parmenio was victor, on his own side and with his own forces,
-before the succors from Alexander reached him.[397]
-
-  [397] Diodor. xvii. 60. Ὁ Παρμενίων ... μόλις ἐτρέψατο τοὺς
-  βαρβάρους, μάλιστα καταπλαγέντας τῇ κατὰ τὸν Δαρεῖον φυγῇ.
-  Curtius, iv. 16, 4-7. “Interim ad Mazæum fama superati regis
-  pervenerat. Itaque, quanquam validior erat, tamen fortunâ partium
-  territus, perculsis languidius instabat.” Arrian, iv. 14, 11; iv.
-  15, 8.
-
-In conducting those succors, on his way back from the pursuit,
-Alexander traversed the whole field of battle, and thus met face
-to face some of the best Persian and Parthian cavalry, who were
-among the last to retire. The battle was already lost, and they
-were seeking only to escape. As they could not turn back, and had
-no chance for their lives except by forcing their way through his
-Companion-cavalry, the combat here was desperate and murderous; all
-at close quarters, cut and thrust with hand weapons on both sides
-contrary to the Persian custom. Sixty of the Macedonian cavalry were
-slain; and a still greater number, including Hephæstion, Kœnus,
-and Menidas, were wounded, and Alexander himself encountered great
-personal danger. He is said to have been victorious; yet probably
-most of these brave men forced their way through and escaped, though
-leaving many of their number on the field.[398]
-
-  [398] Arrian, iii. 15, 6. Curtius also alludes to this combat;
-  but with many particulars very different from Arrian (iv. 16,
-  19-25).
-
-Having rejoined his left, and ascertained that it was not only out
-of danger, but victorious, Alexander resumed his pursuit of the
-flying Persians, in which Parmenio now took part.[399] The host of
-Darius was only a multitude of disorderly fugitives, horse and foot
-mingled together. The greater part of them had taken no share in
-the battle. Here, as at Issus, they remained crowded in stationary
-and unprofitable masses, ready to catch the contagion of terror
-and to swell the number of runaways, so soon as the comparatively
-small proportion of real combatants in the front had been beaten.
-On recommencing the pursuit, Alexander pushed forward with such
-celerity, that numbers of the fugitives were slain or taken,
-especially at the passage of the river Lykus;[400] where he was
-obliged to halt for a while, since his men as well as their horses
-were exhausted. At midnight, he again pushed forward, with such
-cavalry as could follow him, to Arbêla, in hopes of capturing the
-person of Darius. In this he was disappointed, though he reached
-Arbêla the next day. Darius had merely passed through it, leaving an
-undefended town, with his bow, shield, chariot, a large treasure,
-and rich equipage, as prey to the victor. Parmenio had also occupied
-without resistance the Persian camp near the field of battle,
-capturing the baggage, the camels, and the elephants.[401]
-
-  [399] Arrian, iii. 15, 9.
-
-  [400] Arrian, iii. 15, 10. Curtius (iv. 16, 12-18) gives
-  aggravated details about the sufferings of the fugitives in
-  passing the river Lykus—which are probably founded on fact. But
-  he makes the mistake of supposing that Alexander had got as far
-  as this river in his first pursuit, from which he was called back
-  to assist Parmenio.
-
-  [401] Arrian, iii. 15, 14; Curtius, v. 1, 10.
-
-To state anything like positive numbers of slain or prisoners, is
-impossible. According to Arrian, 300,000 Persians were slain, and
-many more taken prisoners. Diodorus puts the slain at 90,000, Curtius
-at 40,000. The Macedonian killed were, according to Arrian, not more
-than 100—according to Curtius, 300: Diodorus states the slain at
-500, besides a great number of wounded.[402] The estimate of Arrian
-is obviously too great on one side, and too small on the other;
-but whatever may be the numerical truth, it is certain that the
-prodigious army of Darius was all either killed, taken, or dispersed,
-at the battle of Arbêla. No attempt to form a subsequent army ever
-succeeded; we read of nothing stronger than divisions or detachments.
-The miscellaneous contingents of this once mighty empire, such at
-least among them as survived, dispersed to their respective homes and
-could never be again mustered in mass.
-
-  [402] Arrian, iii. 15, 16; Curtius, iv. 16, 27, Diodor. xvii. 61.
-
-The defeat of Arbêla was in fact the death blow of the Persian
-empire. It converted Alexander into the Great King, and Darius into
-nothing better than a fugitive pretender. Among all the causes of
-the defeat—here as at Issus—the most prominent and indisputable was
-the cowardice of Darius himself. Under a king deficient not merely
-in the virtues of a general, but even in those of a private soldier,
-and who nevertheless insisted on commanding in person—nothing
-short of ruin could ensue. To those brave Persians whom he dragged
-into ruin along with him and who knew the real facts, he must have
-appeared as the betrayer of the empire. We shall have to recall
-this state of sentiment, when we describe hereafter the conspiracy
-formed by the Baktrian satrap Bessus. Nevertheless, even if Darius
-had behaved with unimpeachable courage, there is little reason to
-believe, that the defeat of Arbêla, much less that of Issus, could
-have been converted into a victory. Mere immensity of number, even
-with immensity of space, was of no efficacy without skill as well
-as bravery in the commander. Three-fourths of the Persian army were
-mere spectators, who did nothing, and produced absolutely no effect.
-The flank movement against Alexander’s right, instead of being made
-by some unemployed division, was so carried into effect, as to
-distract the Baktrian troops from their place in the front line, and
-thus to create a fatal break, of which Alexander availed himself
-for his own formidable charge in front. In spite of amplitude of
-space—the condition wanting at Issus,—the attacks of the Persians on
-Alexander’s flanks and rear were feeble and inefficient. After all,
-Darius relied mainly upon his front line of battle, strengthened by
-the scythed chariots; these latter being found unprofitable, there
-remained only the direct conflict, wherein the strong point of the
-Macedonians resided.
-
-On the other hand, in so far as we can follow the dispositions of
-Alexander, they appear the most signal example recorded in antiquity,
-of military genius and sagacious combination. He had really as great
-an available force as his enemies, because every company in his army
-was turned to account, either in actual combat, or in reserve against
-definite and reasonable contingences. All his successes, and this
-most of all, were fairly earned by his own genius and indefatigable
-effort, combined with the admirable organization of his army. But
-his good fortune was no less conspicuous in the unceasing faults
-committed by his enemies. Except during the short period of Memnon’s
-command, the Persian king exhibited nothing but ignorant rashness
-alternating with disgraceful apathy; turning to no account his vast
-real power of resistance in detail—keeping back his treasures to
-become the booty of the victor—suffering the cities which stoutly
-held out to perish unassisted—and committing the whole fate of
-the empire on two successive occasions, to that very hazard which
-Alexander most desired.
-
-The decisive character of the victory was manifested at once by the
-surrender of the two great capitals of the Persian empire—Babylon
-and Susa. To Babylon, Alexander marched in person; to Susa, he sent
-Philoxenus. As he approached Babylon, the satrap Mazæus met him
-with the keys of the city; Bagophanes, collector of the revenue,
-decorated the road of march with altars, sacrifices, and scattered
-flowers; while the general Babylonian population and their Chaldæan
-priests poured forth in crowds with acclamations and presents. Susa
-was yielded to Philoxenus with the same readiness, as Babylon to
-Alexander.[403] The sum of treasure acquired at Babylon was great:
-sufficient to furnish a large donative to the troops—600 drachms
-per man to the Macedonian cavalry, 500 to the foreign cavalry,
-200 to the Macedonian infantry, and something less to the foreign
-infantry.[404] But the treasure found and appropriated at Susa was
-yet greater. It is stated at 50,000 talents[405] (= about £11,500,000
-sterling), a sum which we might have deemed incredible, if we did
-not find it greatly exceeded by what is subsequently reported about
-the treasures in Persepolis. Of this Susian treasure four-fifths
-are said to have been in uncoined gold and silver, the remainder in
-golden Darics[406]; the untouched accumulations of several preceding
-kings, who had husbanded them against a season of unforeseen urgency.
-A moderate portion of this immense wealth, employed by Darius three
-years earlier to push the operations of his fleet, subsidize able
-Grecian Officers, and organize anti-Macedonian resistance—would have
-preserved both his life and his crown.
-
-  [403] Arrian, iii. 16, 5-11; Diodor. xvii. 64; Curtius, v. 1,
-  17-20.
-
-  [404] Curtius, v. 1, 45; Diodor. xvii. 64.
-
-  [405] Arrian states this total of 50,000 talents (iii. 16. 12).
-
-  I have taken them as Attic talents; if they were Æginæan talents,
-  the value of them would be greater in the proportion of five to
-  three.
-
-  [406] Curtius, v. 2, 11; Diodor. xvii. 66.
-
-Alexander rested his troops for more than thirty days amidst the
-luxurious indulgences of Babylon. He gratified the feelings of the
-population and the Chaldæan priests by solemn sacrifices to Belus,
-as well as by directing that the temple of that god, and the other
-temples destroyed in the preceding century by Xerxes, should be
-rebuilt.[407] Treating the Persian empire now as an established
-conquest, he nominated the various satraps. He confirmed the Persian
-Mazæus in the satrapy of Babylon, but put along with them two Greeks
-as assistants and guarantees—Apollodorus of Amphipolis, as commander
-of the military force—Asklepiodorus as collector of the revenue.
-He rewarded the Persian traitor Mithrines, who had surrendered at
-his approach the strong citadel of Sardis, with the satrapy of
-Armenia. To that of Syria and Phenicia, he appointed Menes, who took
-with him 3000 talents, to be remitted to Antipater for levying new
-troops against the Lacedæmonians in Peloponnesus.[408] The march of
-Alexander from Babylon to Susa occupied twenty days; an easy route
-through a country abundantly supplied. At Susa he was joined by
-Amyntas son of Andromenes, with a large reinforcement of about 15,000
-men—Macedonians, Greeks, and Thracians. There were both cavalry and
-infantry—and what is not the least remarkable, fifty Macedonian
-youths of noble family, soliciting admission into Alexander’s corps
-of pages.[409] The incorporation of these new-comers into the army
-afforded him the opportunity for remodelling on several points the
-organization of his different divisions, the smaller as well as the
-larger.[410]
-
-  [407] Arrian, iii. 16, 6-9: compare Strabo, xvi. p. 738.
-
-  [408] Arrian, iii. 16, 16; Curtius, v. 1, 44; Diodor. xvii. 64.
-  Curtius and Diodorus do not exactly coincide with Arrian; but the
-  discrepancy here is not very important.
-
-  [409] Curtius, v. 1, 42: compare Diodor. xvii. 65; Arrian, iii,
-  16, 18.
-
-  [410] Arrian, iii. 16, 20; Curtius, v. 2, 6; Diodor. xvii. 65.
-  Respecting this reorganization, begun now at Susa and carried
-  farther during the next year at Ekbatana, see Rüstow and Köchly,
-  Griechisches Kriegswesen, p. 252 _seq._
-
-  One among the changes now made was, that the divisions
-  of cavalry—which, having hitherto coincided with various
-  local districts or towns in Macedonia, had been officered
-  accordingly—were re-distributed and mingled together (Curtius, v.
-  2, 6).
-
-After some delay at Susa—and after confirming the Persian Abulites,
-who had surrendered the city, in his satrapy, yet not without two
-Grecian officers as guarantees, one commanding the military force,
-the other governor of the citadel—Alexander crossed the river Eulæus
-or Pasitigris, and directed his march to the south-east towards
-Persis proper, the ancient hearth or primitive seat from whence
-the original Persian conquerors had issued.[411] Between Susa and
-Persis lay a mountainous region occupied by the Uxii—rude but warlike
-shepherds, to whom the Great King himself had always been obliged
-to pay a tribute whenever he went from Susa to Persepolis, being
-unable with his inefficient military organization to overcome the
-difficulties of such a pass held by an enemy. The Uxii now demanded
-the like tribute from Alexander, who replied by inviting them to
-meet him at their pass and receive it. Meanwhile a new and little
-frequented mountain track had been made known to him, over which he
-conducted in person a detachment of troops so rapidly and secretly
-as to surprise the mountaineers in their own villages. He thus not
-only opened the usual mountain pass for the transit of his main army,
-but so cut to pieces and humiliated the Uxii, that they were forced
-to sue for pardon. Alexander was at first disposed to extirpate or
-expel them; but at length, at the request of the captive Sisygambis,
-permitted them to remain as subjects of the satrap of Susa, imposing
-a tribute of sheep, horses, and cattle, the only payment which their
-poverty allowed.[412]
-
-  [411] Arrian, iii. 17, 1. Ἄρας δὲ ἐκ Σούσων, καὶ διαβὰς τὸν
-  Πασιτίγρην ποταμὸν, ἐμβάλλει εἰς τὴν Οὐξίων γῆν.
-
-  The Persian Susa was situated between two rivers; the Choaspes
-  (now Kherkha) on the west; the Eulæus or Pasitigris, now Karun,
-  on the east; both rivers distinguished for excellent water. The
-  Eulæus appears to have been called Pasitigris in the lower part
-  of its course—Pliny, H. N. xxxi. 21. “Parthorum reges ex Choaspe
-  et Eulæo tantum bibunt.”
-
-  Ritter has given an elaborate exposition respecting these two
-  rivers and the site of the Persian Susa (Erdkunde, part ix. book
-  iii. West-Asien, p. 291-320).
-
-  [412] Arrian, iii. 17; Curtius. v. 3, 5-12; Diodor. xvii.
-  67; Strabo, xv. p. 729. It would seem that the road taken by
-  Alexander in this march, was that described by Kinneir, through
-  Bebahan and Kala-Sefid to Schiraz (Geographical Memoir of the
-  Persian Empire, p. 72). Nothing can exceed the difficulties of
-  the territory for military operation.
-
-  No certainty is attainable, however, respecting the ancient
-  geography of these regions. Mr. Long’s Map of Ancient Persia
-  shows how little can be made out.
-
-But bad as the Uxian pass had been, there remained another still
-worse—called the Susian or Persian gates,[413] in the mountains
-which surrounded the plain of Persepolis, the centre of Persis
-proper. Ariobarzanes, satrap of the province, held this pass; a
-narrow defile walled across, with mountain positions on both sides,
-from whence the defenders, while out of reach themselves, could
-shower down missiles upon an approaching enemy. After four days of
-march, Alexander reached on the fifth day the Susian Gates; which,
-inexpugnable as they seemed, he attacked on the ensuing morning. In
-spite of all the courage of his soldiers, however, he sustained loss
-without damaging his enemy, and was obliged to return to his camp. He
-was informed that there was no other track by which this difficult
-pass could be turned; but there was a long circuitous march of many
-days whereby it might be evaded, and another entrance found into the
-plain of Persepolis. To recede from any enterprise as impracticable,
-was a humiliation which Alexander had never yet endured. On farther
-inquiry, a Lykian captive, who had been for many years tending sheep
-as a slave on the mountains, acquainted him with the existence of a
-track known only to himself, whereby he might come on the flank of
-Ariobarzanes. Leaving Kraterus in command of the camp, with orders
-to attack the pass in front, when he should hear the trumpet give
-signal—Alexander marched forth at night at the head of a light
-detachment, under the guidance of the Lykian. He had to surmount
-incredible hardship and difficulty—the more so as it was mid-winter,
-and the mountain was covered with snow; yet such were the efforts of
-his soldiers and the rapidity of his movements, that he surprised
-all the Persian outposts, and came upon Ariobarzanes altogether
-unprepared. Attacked as they were at the same time by Kraterus also,
-the troops of the satrap were forced to abandon the Gates, and were
-for the most part cut to pieces. Many perished in their flight among
-the rocks and precipices; the satrap himself being one of a few that
-escaped.[414]
-
-  [413] See the instructive notes of Mützel—on Quintus Curtius, v.
-  10, 3; and v. 12, 17, discussing the topography of this region,
-  in so far as it is known from modern travellers. He supposes the
-  Susian Gates to have been near Kala-Sefid, west of the plain
-  of Merdasht or Persepolis. Herein he dissents from Ritter,
-  apparently on good grounds, as far as an opinion can be formed.
-
-  [414] Arrian, iii. 18, 1-14; Curtius, v. 4, 10-20; Diodor. xvii.
-  68.
-
-Though the citadel of Persepolis is described as one of the strongest
-of fortresses,[415] yet after this unexpected conquest of a pass
-hitherto deemed inexpugnable, few had courage to think of holding it
-against Alexander. Nevertheless Ariobarzanes, hastening thither from
-the conquered pass, still strove to organize a defence, and at least
-to carry off the regal treasure, which some in the town were already
-preparing to pillage. But Tiridates, commander of the garrison,
-fearing the wrath of the conqueror, resisted this, and despatched
-a message entreating Alexander to hasten his march. Accordingly
-Alexander, at the head of his cavalry, set forth with the utmost
-speed, and arrived in time to detain and appropriate the whole.
-Ariobarzanes, in a vain attempt to resist, was slain with all his
-companions. Persepolis and Pasargadæ—the two peculiar capitals of the
-Persian race, the latter memorable as containing the sepulchre of
-Cyrus the Great—both fell into the hands of the conqueror.[416]
-
-  [415] Diodor. xvii. 71.
-
-  [416] Arrian, iii. 18, 16; Curtius, v. 4, 5; Diodor. xvii. 69.
-
-On approaching Persepolis, the compassion of the army was powerfully
-moved by the sight of about 800 Grecian captives, all of them
-mutilated in some frightful and distressing way, by loss of legs,
-arms, eyes, ears, or some other bodily members. Mutilation was a
-punishment commonly inflicted in that age by Oriental governors, even
-by such as were not accounted cruel. Thus Xenophon, in eulogizing
-the rigid justice of Cyrus the younger, remarks that in the public
-roads of his satrapy, men were often seen who had been deprived of
-their arms or legs, or otherwise mutilated, by penal authority.[417]
-Many of these maimed captives at Persepolis were old, and had lived
-for years in their unfortunate condition. They had been brought up
-from various Greek cities by order of some of the preceding Persian
-kings; but on what pretences they had been thus cruelly dealt with,
-we are not informed. Alexander, moved to tears at such a spectacle,
-offered to restore them to their respective homes, with a comfortable
-provision for the future. But most of them felt so ashamed of
-returning to their homes, that they entreated to be allowed to
-remain all together in Persis, with lands assigned to them, and with
-dependent cultivators to raise produce for them. Alexander granted
-their request in the fullest measure, conferring besides upon each an
-ample donation of money, clothing, and cattle.[418]
-
-  [417] Xenoph. Anabas. i. 9, 13. Similar habits have always
-  prevailed among Orientals. “The most atrocious part of the
-  Mohammedan system of punishment, is, that which regards theft and
-  robbery. Mutilation, by cutting off the hand or the foot, is the
-  prescribed remedy for all higher degrees of the offence” (Mill,
-  History of British India, book iii. ch. 5. p. 447).
-
-  “Tippoo Saib used to cut off the right hands and noses of the
-  British camp-followers that fell into his hands” (Elphinstone,
-  Hist. of India, vol. i. p. 380. ch. xi.).
-
-  A recent traveller notices the many mutilated persons, female as
-  well as male, who are to be seen in the northern part of Scinde
-  (Burton, Scenes in Scinde, vol. ii. p. 281).
-
-  [418] Diodor. xvii. 69; Curtius, v. 5; Justin, xi. 14. Arrian
-  does not mention these mutilated captives; but I see no reason
-  to mistrust the deposition of the three authors by whom it is
-  certified. Curtius talks of 4000 captives; the other two mention
-  800. Diodorus calls them —Ἕλληνες ὑπὸ τῶν πρότερον βασιλέων
-  ἀνάστατοι γεγονότες, ὀκτακόσιοι μὲν σχεδὸν τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὄντες,
-  ταῖς δ᾽ ἡλικίαις οἱ πλεῖστοι μὲν γεγηρακότες, ἠκρωτηριασμένοι δὲ
-  πάντες, etc. Some ἀνάρπαστοι πρὸς βασιλέα διὰ σοφίαν are noticed
-  in Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2, 33; compare Herodot. iii. 93; iv. 204. I
-  have already mentioned the mutilation of the Macedonian invalids,
-  taken at Issus by Darius.
-
-  Probably these Greek captives were mingled with a number of
-  other captives, Asiatics and others, who had been treated in the
-  same manner. None but the Greek captives would be likely to show
-  themselves to Alexander and his army, because none but they would
-  calculate on obtaining sympathy from an army of Macedonians and
-  Greeks. It would have been interesting to know who these captives
-  were, or how they came to be thus cruelly used. The two persons
-  among them, named by Curtius as spokesmen in the interview with
-  Alexander, are—Euktemon, a Kymæan—and Theætêtus, an Athenian.
-
-The sight of these mutilated Greeks was well calculated to excite
-not merely sympathy for them, but rage against the Persians, in
-the bosoms of all spectators. Alexander seized this opportunity,
-as well for satiating the anger and cupidity of his soldiers, as
-for manifesting himself in his self-assumed character of avenger of
-Greece against the Persians, to punish the wrongs done by Xerxes a
-century and a half before. He was now amidst the native tribes and
-seats of the Persians, the descendants of those rude warriors who,
-under the first Cyrus, had overspread Western Asia from the Indus
-to the Ægean. In this their home the Persian kings had accumulated
-their national edifices, their regal sepulchres, the inscriptions
-commemorative of their religious or legendary sentiment, with many
-trophies and acquisitions arising out of their conquests. For the
-purposes of the Great King’s empire, Babylon, or Susa, or Ekbatana,
-were more central and convenient residences; but Persepolis was
-still regarded as the heart of Persian nationality. It was the chief
-magazine, though not the only one, of those annual accumulations
-from the imperial revenue, which each king successively increased,
-and which none seems to have ever diminished. Moreover, the Persian
-grandees and officers, who held the lucrative satrapies and posts
-of the empire, were continually sending wealth home to Persis, for
-themselves or their relatives. We may therefore reasonably believe
-what we find asserted, that Persepolis possessed at this time more
-wealth, public and private, than any place within the range of
-Grecian or Macedonian knowledge.[419]
-
-  [419] Diodor. xvii. 70. πλουσιωτάτης οὔσης τῶν ὑπὸ τὸν ἥλιον,
-  etc. Curtius, v. 6, 2, 3.
-
-Convening his principal officers, Alexander denounced Persepolis as
-the most hostile of all Asiatic cities,—the home of those impious
-invaders of Greece, whom he had come to attack. He proclaimed his
-intention of abandoning it to be plundered, as well as of burning
-the citadel. In this resolution he persisted, notwithstanding the
-remonstrance of Parmenio, who reminded him that the act would
-be a mere injury to himself by ruining his own property, and
-that the Asiatics would construe it as evidence of an intention
-to retire speedily, without founding any permanent dominion in
-the country.[420] After appropriating the regal treasure—to the
-alleged amount of 120,000 talents in gold and silver = £27,600,000
-sterling[421]—Alexander set fire to the citadel. A host of mules,
-with 5000 camels, were sent for from Mesopotamia and elsewhere, to
-carry off this prodigious treasure; the whole of which was conveyed
-out of Persis proper, partly to be taken along with Alexander
-himself in his ulterior marches, partly to be lodged in Susa and
-Ekbatana. Six thousand talents more, found in Pasargadæ, were added
-to the spoil.[422] The persons and property of the inhabitants were
-abandoned to the license of the soldiers, who obtained an immense
-booty, not merely in gold and silver, but also in rich clothing,
-furniture, and ostentatious ornaments of every kind. The male
-inhabitants were slain,[423] the females dragged into servitude;
-except such as obtained safety by flight, or burned themselves with
-their property in their own houses. Among the soldiers themselves,
-much angry scrambling took place for the possession of precious
-articles, not without occasional bloodshed.[424] As soon as their
-ferocity and cupidity had been satiated, Alexander arrested the
-massacre. His encouragement and sanction of it was not a burst of
-transient fury, provoked by unexpected length of resistance, such
-as the hanging of the 2000 Tyrians and the dragging of Batis at
-Gaza—but a deliberate proceeding, intended partly as a recompense
-and gratification to the soldiery, but still more as an imposing
-manifestation of retributive vengeance against the descendants of
-the ancient Persian invaders. In his own letters seen by Plutarch,
-Alexander described the massacre of the native Persians as having
-been ordered by him on grounds of state policy.[425]
-
-  [420] Arrian, iii. 18, 18; Diodor. xvii. 70; Curtius, v. 6, 1;
-  Strabo, xv. p. 731.
-
-  [421] This amount is given both by Diodorus (xvii. 71) and by
-  Curtius (v. 6, 9). We see however from Strabo that there were
-  different statements as to the amount. Such overwhelming figures
-  deserve no confidence upon any evidence short of an official
-  return. At the same time, we ought to expect a very great sum,
-  considering the long series of years that had been spent in
-  amassing it. Alexander’s own letters (Plutarch, Alex. 37) stated
-  that enough was carried away to load 10,000 mule carts and 5000
-  camels.
-
-  To explain the fact, of a large accumulated treasure in the
-  Persian capitals, it must be remarked, that what we are
-  accustomed to consider as expenses of government, were not
-  defrayed out of the regal treasure. The military force, speaking
-  generally, was not paid by the Great King, but summoned
-  by requisition from the provinces, upon which the cost of
-  maintaining the soldiers fell, over and above the ordinary
-  tribute. The king’s numerous servants and attendants received no
-  pay in money, but in kind; provisions for maintaining the court
-  with its retinue were furnished by the provinces, over and above
-  the tribute. See Herodot. i. 192; and iii. 91—and a good passage
-  of Heeren, setting forth the small public disbursement out of
-  the regal treasure, in his account of the internal constitution
-  of the ancient Persian Empire (Ideen über die Politik and den
-  Verkehr der Völker der alten Welt, part i. Abth. 1. p. 511-519).
-
-  Respecting modern Persia, Jaubert remarks (Voyage en Arménie
-  et en Perse, Paris, 1821, p. 272, ch. 30)—“Si les sommes que
-  l’on verse dans le trésor du Shah ne sont pas exorbitantes,
-  comparativement à l’étendue et à la population de la Perse, elles
-  n’en sortent pas non plus que pour des dépenses indispensables
-  qui n’en absorbent pas la moitié. Le reste est converti en
-  lingots, en pierreries, et en divers objets d’une grande valeur
-  et d’un transport facile en cas d’évènement: ce qui doit suffire
-  pour empêcher qu’on ne trouve exagérés les rapports que tous les
-  voyageurs ont faits de la magnificence de la cour de Perse. Les
-  Perses sont assez clairvoyans pour pénétrer les motifs réels qui
-  portent Futteh Ali Shah à thésauriser.”
-
-  When Nadir-Shah conquered the Mogul Emperor Mohammed, and
-  entered Delhi in 1739,—the imperial treasure and effects which
-  fell into his hands is said to have amounted to £32,000,000
-  sterling, besides heavy contributions levied on the inhabitants
-  (Mill, History of British India, vol. ii, B. iii, ch. 4, p.
-  403).—Runjeet Sing left at his death (1839) a treasure of
-  £8,000,000 sterling: with jewels and other effects to several
-  millions more. [The Punjaub, by Col. Steinbach, p. 16. London,
-  1845].
-
-  Mr. Mill remarks in another place, that “in Hindostan, gold,
-  silver, and gems are most commonly hoarded, and not devoted to
-  production” (vol. i, p. 254, B. ii. ch. 5).
-
-  Herodotus (iii. 96) tells us that the gold and silver brought
-  to the Persian regal treasure was poured in a melted state
-  into earthern vessels; when it cooled, the earthern vessel was
-  withdrawn, and the solid metallic mass left standing; a portion
-  of it was cut off when occasion required for disbursements. This
-  practice warrants the supposition that a large portion of it was
-  habitually accumulated, and not expended.
-
-  [422] Arrian, iii. 18, 17. He does not give the amount which I
-  transcribe from Curtius, v. 6, 10.
-
-  [423] Diodor. xvii. 70. Οἱ Μακεδόνες ἐπῄεσαν, τοὺς μὲν ἄνδρας
-  πάντας φονεύοντες, τὰς δὲ κτήσεις διαρπάζοντες, etc. Curtius, v.
-  6, 6.
-
-  [424] Diodor. xvii. 70, 71; Curtius, v. 6, 3-7. These two authors
-  concur in the main features of the massacre and plunder in
-  Persepolis, permitted to the soldiers of Alexander. Arrian does
-  not mention it; he mentions only the deliberate resolution of
-  Alexander to burn the palace or citadel, out of revenge on the
-  Persian name. And such feeling, assuming it to exist, would also
-  naturally dictate the general license to plunder and massacre.
-  Himself entertaining such vindictive feeling, and regarding it
-  as legitimate, Alexander would either presume it to exist, or
-  love to kindle it, in his soldiers; by whom indeed the license
-  to plunder would be sufficiently welcomed, with or without any
-  antecedent sentiment of vengeance.
-
-  The story (told by Diodorus, Curtius, and Plutarch, Alex. 38)
-  that Alexander, in the drunkenness of a banquet, was first
-  instigated by the courtesan Thais to set fire to the palace of
-  Persepolis, and accompanied her to begin the conflagration with
-  his own hand—may perhaps be so far true, that he really showed
-  himself in the scene and helped in the burning. But that his
-  resolution to burn was deliberately taken, and even maintained
-  against the opposition of esteemed officers, is established on
-  the authority of Arrian.
-
-  [425] Plutarch, Alexand. 37. Φόνον μὲν οὖν ἐνταῦθα πολὺν τῶν
-  ἁλισκομένων γενέσθαι συνέπεσε· ~γράφει γὰρ αὐτὸς, ὡς νομίζων
-  αὐτῷ τοῦτο λυσιτελεῖν ἐκέλευεν ἀποσφάττεσθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους~·
-  νομίσματος δὲ εὑρεῖν πλῆθος ὅσον ἐν Σούσοις, τὴν δὲ ἄλλην
-  κατασκευὴν καὶ τὸν πλοῦτον ἐκκομισθῆναί φησι μυρίοις ὀρικοῖς
-  ζεύγεσι, καὶ πεντακισχιλίαις καμήλοις. That ἐνταῦθα means
-  Persepolis, is shown by the immediately following comparison with
-  the treasure found at Susa.
-
-As it was now winter or very early spring, he suffered his main
-army to enjoy a month or more of repose at or near Persepolis. But
-he himself, at the head of a rapidly moving division, traversed the
-interior of Persia proper; conquering or receiving into submission
-the various towns and villages.[426] The greatest resistance which
-he experienced was offered by the rude and warlike tribe called
-the Mardi; but worse than any enemy was the severity of the season
-and the rugged destitution of a frozen country. Neither physical
-difficulties, however, nor human enemies, could arrest the march
-of Alexander. He returned from his expedition, complete master of
-Persis; and in the spring, quitted that province with his whole
-army, to follow Darius into Media. He left only a garrison of
-3000 Macedonians at Persepolis, preserving to Tiridates, who had
-surrendered to him the place, the title of satrap.[427]
-
-  [426] Diod. xvii. 73; Curtius, v. 6, 12-20.
-
-  [427] Curtius, v. 6, 11.
-
-Darius was now a fugitive, with the mere title of king, and with a
-simple body-guard rather than an army. On leaving Arbêla after the
-defeat, he had struck in an easterly direction across the mountains
-into Media; having only a few attendants round him, and thinking
-himself too happy to preserve his own life from an indefatigable
-pursuer.[428] He calculated that, once across these mountains,
-Alexander would leave him for a time unmolested, in haste to march
-southward for the purpose of appropriating the great and real prizes
-of the campaign—Babylon, Susa, and Persepolis. The last struggles of
-this ill-starred prince will be recounted in another chapter.
-
-  [428] Arrian, iii. 16, 1-4.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER XCIV.
-
-MILITARY OPERATIONS AND CONQUESTS OF ALEXANDER, AFTER HIS
-WINTER-QUARTERS IN PERSIS, DOWN TO HIS DEATH AT BABYLON.
-
-
-From this time forward to the close of Alexander’s life—a period of
-about seven years—his time was spent in conquering the eastern half
-of the Persian empire, together with various independent tribes lying
-beyond its extreme boundary. But neither Greece, nor Asia Minor, nor
-any of his previous western acquisitions, was he ever destined to see
-again.
-
-Now, in regard to the history of Greece—the subject of these
-volumes—the first portion of Alexander’s Asiatic campaigns (from
-his crossing the Hellespont to the conquest of Persis, a period of
-four years, March 334 B. C., to March 330 B. C.), though not of
-direct bearing, is yet of material importance. Having in his first
-year completed the subjugation of the Hellenic world, he had by
-these subsequent campaigns absorbed it as a small fraction into the
-vast Persian empire, renovated under his imperial sceptre. He had
-accomplished a result substantially the same as would have been
-brought about if the invasion of Greece by Xerxes, destined, a
-century and a half before, to incorporate Greece with the Persian
-monarchy, had succeeded instead of failing.[429] Towards the kings of
-Macedonia alone, the subjugation of Greece would never have become
-complete, so long as she could receive help from the native Persian
-kings, who were perfectly adequate as a countervailing and tutelary
-force, had they known how to play their game. But all hope for Greece
-from without was extinguished, when Babylon, Susa, and Persepolis
-became subject to the same ruler as Pella and Amphipolis—and that
-ruler too, the ablest general, and most insatiate aggressor, of
-his age; to whose name was attached the prestige of success almost
-superhuman. Still, against even this overwhelming power, some of the
-bravest of the Greeks at home tried to achieve their liberation with
-the sword: we shall see presently how sadly the attempt miscarried.
-
-  [429] Compare the language addressed by Alexander to his weary
-  soldiers, on the banks of the Hyphasis (Arrian, v. 26), with that
-  which Herodotus puts into the mouth of Xerxes, when announcing
-  his intended expedition against Greece (Herodot. vii. 8).
-
-But though the first four years of Alexander’s Asiatic expedition,
-in which he conquered the Western half of the Persian empire, had
-thus an important effect on the condition and destinies of the
-Grecian cities—his last seven years, on which we are now about to
-enter, employed chiefly in conquering the Eastern half, scarcely
-touched these cities in any way. The stupendous marches to the rivers
-Jaxartes, Indus, and Hyphasis, which carried his victorious arms
-over so wide a space of Central Asia, not only added nothing to his
-power over the Greeks, but even withdrew him from all dealings with
-them, and placed him almost beyond their cognizance. To the historian
-of Greece, therefore, these latter campaigns can hardly be regarded
-as included within the range of his subject. They deserve to be
-told, as examples of military skill and energy, and as illustrating
-the character of the most illustrious general of antiquity—one who,
-though not a Greek, had become the master of all Greeks. But I shall
-not think it necessary to recount them in any detail, like the
-battles of Issus and Arbêla.
-
-About six or seven months had elapsed from the battle of Arbêla
-to the time when Alexander prepared to quit his most recent
-conquest—Persis proper. During all this time, Darius had remained
-at Ekbatana,[430] the chief city of Media, clinging to the hope,
-that Alexander, when possessed of the three southern capitals and
-the best part of the Persian empire, might have reached the point of
-satiation, and might leave him unmolested in the more barren East. As
-soon as he learnt that Alexander was in movement towards him, he sent
-forward his harem and his baggage to Hyrkania, on the south-eastern
-border of the Caspian sea. Himself, with the small force around him,
-followed in the same direction, carrying off the treasure in the city
-(7000 talents= £1,610,000 in amount), and passed through the Caspian
-Grates into the territory of Parthyênê. His only chance was to escape
-to Baktria at the eastern extremity of the empire, ruining the
-country in his way for the purpose of retarding pursuers. But this
-chance diminished every day, from desertion among his few followers,
-and angry disgust among many who remained.[431]
-
-  [430] I see no reason for doubting that the Ekbatana here meant
-  is the modern Hamadan. See a valuable Appendix added by Dr.
-  Thirlwall to the sixth volume of his History of Greece, in which
-  this question is argued against Mr. Williams.
-
-  Sir John Malcolm observes—“There can hardly be said to be any
-  roads in Persia; nor are they much required, for the use of wheel
-  carriages has not yet been introduced into that kingdom. Nothing
-  can be more rugged and difficult than the paths which have been
-  cut over the mountains by which it is bounded and intersected”
-  (ch. xxiv. vol. ii. p. 525).
-
-  In this respect, indeed, as in others, the modern state of Persia
-  must be inferior to the ancient; witness the description given by
-  Herodotus of the road between Sardis and Susa.
-
-  [431] Arrian, iii. 19, 2-9; iii. 20, 3.
-
-Eight days after Darius had quitted Ekbatana, Alexander entered it.
-How many days had been occupied in his march from Persepolis, we
-cannot say: in itself a long march, it had been farther prolonged,
-partly by the necessity of subduing the intervening mountaineers
-called Parætakeni,[432] partly by rumors exaggerating the Persian
-force at Ekbatana, and inducing him to advance with precaution and
-regular array. Possessed of Ekbatana—the last capital stronghold of
-the Persian kings, and their ordinary residence during the summer
-months—he halted to rest his troops, and establish a new base of
-operations for his future proceedings eastward. He made Ekbatana
-his principal depôt; depositing in the citadel, under the care of
-Harpalus as treasurer, with a garrison of 6000 or 7000 Macedonians,
-the accumulated treasures of his past conquests, out of Susa and
-Persepolis; amounting, we are told, to the enormous sum of 180,000
-talents = £41,400,000 sterling.[433] Parmenio was invested with the
-chief command of this important post, and of the military force
-left in Media; of which territory Oxodates, a Persian who had been
-imprisoned at Susa by Darius, was named satrap.[434]
-
-  [432] Arrian, iii. 19, 5.
-
-  [433] Arrian, iii. 19, 14; Diodor. xvii. 80. Diodorus had before
-  stated (xvii. 66, 71) the treasure in Susa as being 49,000
-  talents, and that in Persepolis as 120,000. Arrian announces the
-  treasure in Susa as 50,000 talents—Curtius gives the uncoined
-  gold and silver alone as 50,000 talents (v. 8, 11). The treasure
-  of both places was transported to Ekbatana.
-
-  [434] Arrian, iii. 20, 4.
-
-At Ekbatana Alexander was joined by a fresh force of 6000 Grecian
-mercenaries,[435] who had marched from Kilikia into the interior,
-probably crossing the Euphrates and Tigris at the same points as
-Alexander himself had crossed. Hence he was enabled the better to
-dismiss his Thessalian cavalry, with other Greeks who had been
-serving during his four years of Asiatic war, and who now wished to
-go home.[436] He distributed among them the sum of 2000 talents in
-addition to their full pay, and gave them the price of their horses,
-which they sold before departure. The operations which he was now
-about to commence against the eastern territories of Persia were
-not against regular armies, but against flying corps and distinct
-native tribes, relying for defence chiefly on the difficulties which
-mountains, deserts, privation, or mere distance, would throw in the
-way of an assailant. For these purposes he required an increased
-number of light troops, and was obliged to impose even upon his
-heavy-armed cavalry the most rapid and fatiguing marches, such
-as none but his Macedonian Companions would have been contented
-to execute; moreover he was called upon to act less with large
-masses, and more with small and broken divisions. He now therefore
-for the first time established a regular Taxis, or division of
-horse-bowmen.[437]
-
-  [435] Curtius, v. 23, 12.
-
-  [436] Arrian, iii. 19, 10: compare v. 27, 7.
-
-  [437] Arrian, iii. 24, 1. ἤδη γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ ἱππακοντισταὶ ἦσαν
-  τάξις.
-
-  See the remarks of Rüstow and Köchly upon the change made by
-  Alexander in his military organization about this period, as soon
-  as he found that there was no farther chance of a large collected
-  Persian force, able to meet him in the field (Geschichte des
-  Griech. Kriegswesens, p. 252 _seq._).
-
-  The change which they point out was real,—but I think they
-  exaggerate it in degree.
-
-Remaining at Ekbatana no longer than was sufficient for these new
-arrangements, Alexander recommenced his pursuit of Darius. He hoped
-to get before Darius to the Caspian Gates, at the north-eastern
-extremity of Media; by which Gates[438] was understood a
-mountain-pass, or rather a road of many hours’ march, including
-several difficult passes stretching eastward along the southern
-side of the great range of Taurus towards Parthia. He marched with
-his Companion-cavalry, the light-horse, the Agrianians, and the
-bowmen—the greater part of the phalanx keeping up as well as it
-could—to Rhagæ, about fifty miles north of the Caspian Gates; which
-town he reached in eleven days, by exertions so severe that many men
-as well as horses were disabled on the road. But in spite of all
-speed, he learnt that Darius had already passed through the Caspian
-Gates. After five days of halt at Rhagæ, indispensable for his army,
-Alexander passed them also. A day’s march on the other side of them,
-he was joined by two eminent Persians, Bagistanes and Antibêlus, who
-informed him that Darius was already dethroned and in imminent danger
-of losing his life.[439]
-
-  [438] The passes called the Caspian Gates appear to be those
-  described by Morier, Fraser, and other modern travellers, as the
-  series of narrow valleys and defiles called Ser-Desch, Sirdari,
-  or Serdara Kahn,—on the southernmost of the two roads which
-  lead eastward from Teheran towards Damaghan, and thence farther
-  eastward towards Mesched and Herat. See the note of Mützel in his
-  edition of Curtius, v. 35, 2, p. 489; also Morier, Second Journey
-  through Persia, p. 363; Fraser’s Narrative of a Journey into
-  Khorasan, p. 291.
-
-  The long range of mountains, called by the ancients Taurus,
-  extends from Lesser Media and Armenia in an easterly direction
-  along the southern coast of the Caspian Sea. Its northern
-  declivity, covered by prodigious forests with valleys and
-  plains of no great breadth reaching to the Caspian, comprehends
-  the moist and fertile territories now denominated Ghilan and
-  Mazanderan. The eastern portion of Mazanderan was known in
-  ancient times as Hyrkania, then productive and populous; while
-  the mountain range itself was occupied by various rude and
-  warlike tribes—Kadusii, Mardi, Tapyri, etc. The mountain range,
-  now called Elburz, includes among other lofty eminences the very
-  high peak of Demavend.
-
-  The road from Ekbatana to Baktra, along which both the flight of
-  Darius and the pursuit of Alexander lay, passed along the broken
-  ground skirting the southern flank of the mountain range Elburz.
-  Of this broken ground the Caspian Gates formed the worst and most
-  difficult portion.
-
-  [439] Arrian, iii. 20, 21.
-
-The conspirators by whom this had been done, were Bessus, satrap
-of Baktria—Barsaentes, satrap of Drangiana and Arachosia—and
-Nabarzanes, general of the regal guards. The small force of Darius
-having been thinned by daily desertion, most of those who remained
-were the contingents of the still unconquered territories, Baktria,
-Arachosia, and Drangiana, under the orders of their respective
-satraps. The Grecian mercenaries, 1500 in number, and Artabazus,
-with a band under his special command, adhered inflexibly to Darius,
-but the soldiers of Eastern Asia followed their own satraps. Bessus
-and his colleagues intended to make their peace with Alexander by
-surrendering Darius, should Alexander pursue so vigorously as to
-leave them no hope of escape; but if they could obtain time to
-reach Baktria and Sogdiana, they resolved to organize an energetic
-resistance, under their own joint command, for the defence of those
-eastern provinces—the most warlike population of the empire.[440]
-Under the desperate circumstances of the case, this plan was perhaps
-the least unpromising that could be proposed. The chance of resisting
-Alexander, small as it was at the best, became absolutely nothing
-under the command of Darius, who had twice set the example of flight
-from the field of battle, betraying both his friends and his empire,
-even when surrounded by the full force of Persia. For brave and
-energetic Persians, unless they were prepared at once to submit to
-the invader, there was no choice but to set aside Darius; nor does
-it appear that the conspirators intended at first anything worse.
-At a village called Thara in Parthia, they bound him in chains of
-gold—placed him in a covered chariot surrounded by the Baktrian
-troops,—and thus carried him onward, retreating as fast as they
-could; Bessus assuming the command. Artabazus, with the Grecian
-mercenaries, too feeble to prevent the proceeding, quitted the army
-in disgust, and sought refuge among the mountains of the Tapuri
-bordering on Hyrkania towards the Caspian Sea.[441]
-
-  [440] Masistes, after the shocking outrage upon his wife by Queen
-  Amestris, was going to Baktria to organize a revolt: see Herodot.
-  ix. 113—about the importance of that satrapy.
-
-  [441] Arrian, iii. 21-23. Justin (xi. 15) specifies the name
-  of the place—Thara. Both he and Curtius mention the _golden
-  chain_ (Curtius, 34, 20). Probably the conspirators made use
-  of some chains which had formed a part of the ornaments of
-  the royal wardrobe. Among the presents given by Darius son
-  of Hystaspes to the surgeon Demokedes, there were two pairs
-  of golden chains—Δωρέεται δή μιν Δαρεῖος πεδέων χρυσέων δύο
-  ζεύγεσιν—Herodot. iii. 130: compare iii. 15. The Persian king and
-  grandees habitually wore golden chains round neck and arms.
-
-On hearing this intelligence, Alexander strained every nerve to
-overtake the fugitives and get possession of the person of Darius.
-At the head of his Companion-cavalry, his light-horse, and a body of
-infantry picked out for their strength and activity, he put himself
-in instant march, with nothing but arms and two days’ provisions
-for each man; leaving Kraterus to bring on the main body by easier
-journeys. A forced march of two nights and one day, interrupted only
-by a short midday repose (it was now the month of July), brought him
-at daybreak to the Persian camp which his informant Bagistanes had
-quitted. But Bessus and his troops were already beyond it, having
-made considerable advance in their flight; upon which Alexander,
-notwithstanding the exhaustion both of men and horses, pushed on
-with increased speed through all the night to the ensuing day at
-noon. He there found himself in the village where Bessus had encamped
-on the preceding day. Yet learning from deserters that his enemies
-had resolved to hasten their retreat by night marches, he despaired
-of overtaking them, unless he could find some shorter road. He
-was informed that there was another shorter, but leading through
-a waterless desert. Setting out by this road late in the day with
-his cavalry, he got over no less than forty-five miles during the
-night, so as to come on Bessus by complete surprise on the following
-morning. The Persians, marching in disorder without arms, and having
-no expectation of an enemy, were so panic-struck at the sudden
-appearance of their indefatigable conqueror, that they dispersed and
-fled without any attempt to resist. In this critical moment, Bessus
-and Barsaentes urged Darius to leave his chariot, mount his horse,
-and accompany them in their flight. But he refused to comply. They
-were determined however that he should not fall alive into the hands
-of Alexander, whereby his name would have been employed against them,
-and would have materially lessened their chance of defending the
-eastern provinces; they were moreover incensed by his refusal, and
-had contracted a feeling of hatred and contempt to which they were
-glad to give effect. Casting their javelins at him, they left him
-mortally wounded, and then pursued their flight.[442] His chariot,
-not distinguished by any visible mark, nor known even to the Persian
-soldiers themselves, was for some time not detected by the pursuers.
-At length a Macedonian soldier named Polystratus found him expiring,
-and is said to have received his last words; wherein he expressed
-thanks to Alexander for the kind treatment of his captive female
-relatives, and satisfaction that the Persian throne, lost to himself,
-was about to pass to so generous a conqueror. It is at least certain
-that he never lived to see Alexander himself.[443]
-
-  [442]
-
-    “Rarus apud Medos regum cruor; unaque cuncto
-    Pœna manet generi; quamvis crudelibus æque
-    Paretur dominis.” (Claudian. in Eutrop. ii. p. 478.)
-
-  Court conspiracies and assassinations of the prince, however were
-  not unknown either among the Achæmenidæ or the Arsakidæ.
-
-  [443] This account of the remarkable incidents immediately
-  preceding the death of Darius, is taken mainly from Arrian (iii.
-  21), and seems one of the most authentic chapters of his work.
-  He is very sparing in telling what passed in the Persian camp;
-  he mentions indeed only the communications made by the Persian
-  deserters to Alexander.
-
-  Curtius (v. 27-34) gives the narrative far more vaguely and
-  loosely than Arrian, but with ample details of what was going on
-  in the Persian camp. We should have been glad to know from whom
-  these details were borrowed. In the main they do not contradict
-  the narrative of Arrian, but rather amplify and dilute it.
-
-  Diodorus (xvii. 73), Plutarch (Alexand. 42, 43), and Justin (xi.
-  15) give no new information.
-
-Alexander had made the prodigious and indefatigable marches of the
-last four days, not without destruction to many men and horses, for
-the express purpose of taking Darius alive. It would have been a
-gratification to his vanity to exhibit the Great King as a helpless
-captive, rescued from his own servants by the sword of his enemy, and
-spared to occupy some subordinate command as a token of ostentatious
-indulgence. Moreover, apart from such feelings, it would have been a
-point of real advantage to seize the person of Darius, by means of
-whose name Alexander would have been enabled to stifle all farther
-resistance in the extensive and imperfectly known regions eastward of
-the Caspian Gates. The satraps of these regions had now gone thither
-with their hands free, to kindle as much Asiatic sentiment and levy
-as large a force as they could, against the Macedonian conqueror; who
-was obliged to follow them, if he wished to complete the subjugation
-of the empire. We can understand therefore that Alexander was deeply
-mortified in deriving no result from this ruinously fatiguing march,
-and can the better explain that savage wrath which we shall hereafter
-find him manifesting against the satrap Bessus.
-
-Alexander caused the body of Darius to be buried with full pomp
-and ceremonial, in the regal sepulchres of Persis. The last days
-of this unfortunate prince have been described with almost tragic
-pathos by historians; and there are few subjects in history better
-calculated to excite such a feeling, if we regard simply the
-magnitude of his fall, from the highest pitch of power and splendor
-to defeat, degradation, and assassination. But an impartial review
-will not allow us to forget that the main cause of such ruin was
-his own blindness—his long apathy after the battle of Issus, and
-abandonment of Tyre and Gaza, in the fond hope of repurchasing queens
-whom he had himself exposed to captivity—lastly, what is still less
-pardonable, his personal cowardice in both the two decisive battles
-deliberately brought about by himself. If we follow his conduct
-throughout the struggle, we shall find little of that which renders
-a defeated prince either respectable or interesting. Those who had
-the greatest reason to denounce and despise him were his friends
-and his countrymen, whom he possessed ample means of defending, yet
-threw those means away. On the other hand, no one had better grounds
-for indulgence towards him than his conqueror; for whom he had kept
-unused the countless treasures of the three capitals, and for whom he
-had lightened in every way the difficulties of a conquest, in itself
-hardly less than impracticable.[444]
-
-  [444] Arrian (iii. 22) gives an indulgent criticism on Darius,
-  dwelling chiefly upon his misfortunes, but calling him ἀνδρὶ τὰ
-  μὲν πολέμια, εἴπερ τινὶ ἄλλῳ, μαλθακῷ τε καὶ οὐ φρενήρει, etc.
-
-The recent forced march, undertaken by Alexander for the purpose of
-securing Darius as a captive, had been distressing in the extreme
-to his soldiers, who required a certain period of repose and
-compensation. This was granted to them at the town of Hekatompylus
-in Parthia, where the whole army was again united. Besides abundant
-supplies from the neighboring region, the soldiers here received
-a donative derived from the large booty taken in the camp of
-Darius.[445] In the enjoyment and revelry universal throughout the
-army, Alexander himself partook. His indulgences in the banquet
-and in wine-drinking, to which he was always addicted when leisure
-allowed were now unusually multiplied and prolonged. Public
-solemnities were celebrated, together with theatrical exhibitions
-by artists who joined the army from Greece. But the change of most
-importance in Alexander’s conduct was, that he now began to feel
-and act manifestly as successor of Darius on the Persian throne;
-to disdain the comparative simplicity of Macedonian habits, and to
-assume the pomp, the ostentatious apparatus of luxuries, and even the
-dress, of a Persian king.
-
-  [445] Curtius, vi. 5, 10; vi. 6, 15. Diodor. xvii. 74.
-  Hekatompylus was an important position, where several roads
-  joined (Polyb. x. 28). It was situated on one of the roads
-  running eastward from the Caspian Gates, on the southern flank
-  of Mount Taurus (Elburz). Its locality cannot be fixed with
-  certainty: Ritter (Erdkunde, part viii. 465, 467) with others
-  conceives it to have been near Damaghan; Forbiger (Handbuch der
-  Alten Geographie, vol. ii. p. 549) places it further eastward,
-  near Jai-Jerm. Mr. Long notes it on his map, as _site unknown_.
-
-To many of Alexander’s soldiers, the conquest of Persia appeared
-to be consummated and the war finished, by the death of Darius.
-They were reluctant to exchange the repose and enjoyments of
-Hekatompylus for fresh fatigues; but Alexander, assembling the
-select regiments, addressed to them an emphatic appeal which revived
-the ardor of all.[446] His first march was, across one of the
-passes from the south to the north of Mount Elburz, into Hyrkania,
-the region bordering the south-eastern corner of the Caspian Sea.
-Here he found no resistance; the Hyrkanian satrap Phrataphernes,
-together with Nabarzanes, Artabazus, and other eminent Persians,
-surrendered themselves to him, and were favorably received. The Greek
-mercenaries, 1500 in number, who had served with Darius, but had
-retired when that monarch was placed under arrest by Bessus, sent
-envoys requesting to be allowed to surrender on capitulation. But
-Alexander—reproaching them with guilt for having taken service with
-the Persians, in contravention of the vote passed by the Hellenic
-synod—required them to surrender at discretion; which they expressed
-their readiness to do, praying that an officer might be despatched
-to conduct them to him in safety.[447] The Macedonian Andronikus
-was sent for this purpose, while Alexander undertook an expedition
-into the mountains of the Mardi; a name seemingly borne by several
-distinct tribes in parts remote from each other, but all poor and
-brave mountaineers. These Mardi occupied parts of the northern
-slope of the range of Mount Elburz a few miles from the Caspian Sea
-(Mazanderan and Ghilan). Alexander pursued them into all their
-retreats,—overcame them, when they stood on their defence, with great
-slaughter,—and reduced the remnant of the half-destroyed tribes to
-sue for peace.[448]
-
-  [446] This was attested by his own letters to Antipater, which
-  Plutarch had seen (Plutarch, Alexand. 47). Curtius composes a
-  long speech for Alexander (vi. 7, 9).
-
-  [447] Arrian, iii. 23, 15.
-
-  [448] Arrian, iii. 24, 4. In reference to the mountain
-  tribes called Mardi, who are mentioned in several different
-  localities—on the parts of Mount Taurus south of the Caspian,
-  in Armenia, on Mount Zagros, and in Persis proper (see Strabo,
-  xi. p. 508-523; Herodot. i. 125), we may note, that the Nomadic
-  tribes, who constitute a considerable fraction of the population
-  of the modern Persian Empire, are at this day found under the
-  same name in spots widely distant: see Jaubert, Voyage en Arménie
-  et en Perse, p. 254.
-
-From this march, which had carried him in a westerly direction,
-he returned to Hyrkania. At the first halt he was met by the
-Grecian mercenaries who came to surrender themselves, as well as by
-various Grecian envoys from Sparta, Chalkedon, and Sinôpe, who had
-accompanied Darius in his flight. Alexander put the Lacedæmonians
-under arrest, but liberated the other envoys, considering Chalkedon
-and Sinôpe to have been subjects of Darius, not members of the
-Hellenic synod. As to the mercenaries, he made a distinction between
-those who had enlisted in the Persian service before the recognition
-of Philip as leader of Greece—and those whose enlistment had been of
-later date. The former he liberated at once; the latter he required
-to remain in his service under the command of Andronikus, on the
-same pay as they had hitherto received.[449] Such was the untoward
-conclusion of Grecian mercenary service with Persia; a system whereby
-the Persian monarchs, had they known how to employ it with tolerable
-ability, might well have maintained their empire even against such an
-enemy as Alexander.[450]
-
-  [449] Arrian, iii. 24, 8; Curtius, vi. 5, 9. An Athenian officer
-  named Demokrates slew himself in despair, disdaining to surrender.
-
-  [450] See a curious passage on this subject, at the end of the
-  Cyropædia of Xenophon.
-
-After fifteen days of repose and festivity at Zeudracarta, the chief
-town of Hyrkania, Alexander marched eastward with his united army
-through Parthia into Aria—the region adjoining the modern Herat with
-its river now known as Herirood. Satibarzanes, the satrap of Aria,
-came to him near the border, to a town named Susia,[451] submitted,
-and was allowed to retain his satrapy; while Alexander, merely
-skirting the northern border of Aria, marched in a direction nearly
-east towards Baktria against the satrap Bessus, who was reported as
-having proclaimed himself King of Persia. But it was discovered,
-after three or four days, that Satibarzanes was in league with
-Bessus; upon which Alexander suspended for the present his plans
-against Baktria, and turned by forced marches to Artakoana, the
-chief city of Aria.[452] His return was so unexpectedly rapid, that
-the Arians were overawed, and Satibarzanes was obliged to escape. A
-few days enabled him to crush the disaffected Arians and to await
-the arrival of his rear division under Kraterus. He then marched
-southward into the territory of the Drangi, or Drangiana (the modern
-Seiestan), where he found no resistance—the satrap Barsaentes having
-sought safety among some of the Indians.[453]
-
-  [451] Arrian, iii. 25, 3-8. Droysen and Dr. Thirlwall identify
-  Susia with the town now called Tûs or Toos, a few miles
-  north-west of Mesched. Professor Wilson (Ariana Antiqua, p.
-  177) thinks that this is too much to the west, and too far from
-  Herat: he conceives Susia to be Zuzan, on the desert side of the
-  mountains west of Herat. Mr. Prinsep (notes on the historical
-  results deducible from discoveries in Afghanistan, p. 14)
-  places it at Subzawar, south of Herat, and within the region of
-  fertility.
-
-  Tûs seems to lie in the line of Alexander’s march, more than
-  the other two places indicated; Subzawar is too far to the
-  south. Alexander appears to have first directed his march from
-  Parthia to Baktria (in the line from Asterabad to Baikh through
-  Margiana), merely touching the borders of Aria in his route.
-
-  [452] Artakoana, as well as the subsequent city of Alexandria in
-  Ariis, are both supposed by Wilson to coincide with the locality
-  of Herat (Wilson, Ariana Antiqua, p. 152-177).
-
-  There are two routes from Herat to Asterabad, at the south-east
-  corner of the Caspian; one by Schahrood which is 533 English
-  miles; the other by Mesched, which is 688 English miles (Wilson,
-  p. 149).
-
-  [453] Arrian, iii. 25; Curtius, vi. 24, 36. The territory of the
-  Drangi, or Zarangi, southward from Aria, coincides generally with
-  the modern Seistan, adjoining the lake now called Zareh, which
-  receives the waters of the river Hilmend.
-
-In the chief town of Drangiana occurred the revolting tragedy, of
-which Philotas was the first victim, and his father Parmenio the
-second. Parmenio, now seventy years of age, and therefore little
-qualified for the fatigue inseparable from the invasion of the
-eastern satrapies, had been left in the important post of commanding
-the great depôt and treasure at Ekbatana. His long military
-experience, and confidential position even under Philip, rendered him
-the second person in the Macedonian army, next to Alexander himself.
-His three sons were all soldiers. The youngest of them, Hektor,
-had been accidentally drowned in the Nile, while in the suite of
-Alexander in Egypt; the second, Nikanor, had commanded the hypaspists
-or light infantry, but had died of illness, fortunately for himself,
-a short time before;[454] the eldest, Philotas, occupied the high
-rank of general of the Companion-cavalry, in daily communication with
-Alexander, from whom he received personal orders.
-
-  [454] Arrian, iii. 25, 6; Curtius, iv. 8, 7; vi. 6, 19.
-
-A revelation came to Philotas, from Kebalinus, brother of a youth
-named Nikomachus, that a soldier, named Dimnus of Chalastra, had
-made boast to Nikomachus, his intimate friend or beloved person,
-under vows of secrecy, of an intended conspiracy against Alexander,
-inviting him to become an accomplice.[455] Nikomachus, at first
-struck with abhorrence, at length simulated compliance, asked
-who were the accomplices of Dimnus, and received intimation of a
-few names; all of which he presently communicated to his brother
-Kebalinus, for the purpose of being divulged. Kebalinus told the
-facts to Philotas, entreating him to mention them to Alexander. But
-Philotas, though every day in communication with the king, neglected
-to do this for two days; upon which Kebalinus began to suspect him of
-connivance, and caused the revelation to be made to Alexander through
-one of the pages named Metron. Dimnus was immediately arrested, but
-ran himself through with his sword, and expired without making any
-declaration.[456]
-
-  [455] Curtius, vi. 7, 2. “Dimnus, modicæ apud regem auctoritates
-  et gratiæ, exoleti, cui Nicomacho erat nomen, amore flagrabat,
-  obsequio uni sibi dediti corporis vinctus.” Plutarch, Alex. 49;
-  Diodor. xvii. 79.
-
-  [456] Curt. vi. 7, 29; Plutarch, Alex. 49. The latter says that
-  Dimnus resisted the officer sent to arrest him, and was killed by
-  him in the combat.
-
-Of this conspiracy, real or pretended, every thing rested on the
-testimony of Nikomachus. Alexander indignantly sent for Philotas,
-demanding why he had omitted for two days to communicate what he had
-heard. Philotas replied, that the source from which it came was too
-contemptible to deserve notice—that it would have been ridiculous
-to attach importance to the simple declarations of such a youth as
-Nikomachus, recounting the foolish boasts addressed to him by a
-lover. Alexander received, or affected to receive, the explanation,
-gave his hand to Philotas, invited him to supper, and talked to him
-with his usual familiarity.[457]
-
-  [457] Curtius, vi. 7, 33. “Philotas respondit, Cebalinum quidem
-  scorti sermonem ad se detulisse, sed ipsum tam levi auctori nihil
-  credidisse—veritum, ne jurgium inter amatorem et exoletum non
-  sine risu aliorum detulisset.”
-
-But it soon appeared that advantage was to be taken of this incident
-for the disgrace and ruin of Philotas, whose free-spoken criticisms
-on the pretended divine paternity,—-coupled with boasts, that he
-and his father Parmenio had been chief agents in the conquest of
-Asia,—had neither been forgotten nor forgiven. These, and other
-self-praises, disparaging to the glory of Alexander, had been
-divulged by a mistress to whom Philotas was attached; a beautiful
-Macedonian woman of Pydna, named Antigonê, who, having first
-been made a prize in visiting Samothrace by the Persian admiral
-Autophradates, was afterwards taken amidst the spoils of Damascus
-by the Macedonians victorious at Issus. The reports of Antigonê,
-respecting some unguarded language held by Philotas to her, had
-come to the knowledge of Kraterus, who brought her to Alexander,
-and caused her to repeat them to him. Alexander desired her to take
-secret note of the confidential expressions of Philotas, and report
-them from time to time to himself.[458]
-
-  [458] Plutarch, Alexand. 48.
-
-It thus turned out that Alexander, though continuing to Philotas
-his high military rank, and talking to him constantly with seeming
-confidence, had for at least eighteen months, ever since his
-conquest of Egypt and perhaps even earlier, disliked and suspected
-him, keeping him under perpetual watch through the suborned and
-secret communications of a treacherous mistress.[459] Some of the
-generals around Alexander—especially Kraterus, the first suborner
-of Antigonê—fomented these suspicions, from jealousy of the great
-ascendency of Parmenio and his family. Moreover, Philotas himself
-was ostentatious and overbearing in his demeanor, so as to have made
-many enemies among the soldiers.[460] But whatever may have been
-his defects on this head—defects which he shared with the other
-Macedonian generals, all gorged with plunder and presents[461]—his
-fidelity as well as his military merits stand attested by the fact
-that Alexander had continued to employ him in the highest and most
-confidential command throughout all the long subsequent interval;
-and that Parmenio was now general at Ekbatana, the most important
-military appointment which the king had to confer. Even granting
-the deposition of Nikomachus to be trustworthy, there was nothing
-to implicate Philotas, whose name had not been included among the
-accomplices said to have been enumerated by Dimnus. There was not a
-tittle of evidence against him, except the fact that the deposition
-had been made known to him, and that he had seen Alexander twice
-without communicating it. Upon this single fact, however, Kraterus,
-and the other enemies of Philotas, worked so effectually as to
-inflame the suspicions and the pre-existing ill-will of Alexander
-into fierce rancor. He resolved on the disgrace, torture, and death
-of Philotas,—and on the death of Parmenio besides.[462]
-
-  [459] Plutarch, Alexand. 48, 49. Πρὸς δὲ αὐτὸν Ἀλέξανδρον ~ἐκ
-  πάνυ πολλῶν χρόνων~ ἐτύγχανε διαβεβλημένος (Philotas).... Ὁ μὲν
-  οὖν Φιλώτας ἐπιβουλευόμενος οὕτως ἠγνόει, καὶ συνῆν τῇ Ἀντιγόνῃ
-  πολλὰ καὶ πρὸς ὀργὴν καὶ μεγαλαυχίαν ῥήματα καὶ λόγους κατὰ τοῦ
-  βασιλέως ἀνεπιτηδείους προϊέμενος.
-
-  Both Ptolemy and Aristobulus recognized these previous
-  communications made to Alexander against Philotas in Egypt, but
-  stated that he did not believe them (Arrian, iii. 26, 1).
-
-  [460] Plutarch, Alexand. 40-48; Curtius, vi. 11, 3.
-
-  [461] Phylarchus, Fragment. 41. ed. Didot, ap. Athenæum, xii. p.
-  539; Plutarch, Alexand. 39, 40. Even Eumenes enriched himself
-  much; though being only secretary, and a Greek, he could not
-  take the same liberties as the great native Macedonian generals
-  (Plutarch, Eumenes, 2).
-
-  [462] Plutarch, Alexand. 49; Curtius, vi. 8.
-
-To accomplish this, however, against the two highest officers in
-the Macedonian service, one of them enjoying a separate and distant
-command—required management. Alexander was obliged to carry the
-feelings of the soldiers along with him, and to obtain a condemnation
-from the army; according to an ancient Macedonian custom, in regard
-to capital crimes, though (as it seems) not uniformly practised.
-Alexander not only kept the resolution secret, but is even said to
-have invited Philotas to supper with the other officers, conversing
-with him just as usual.[463] In the middle of the night, Philotas
-was arrested while asleep in his bed,—put in chains,—and clothed
-in an ignoble garb. A military assembly was convened at daybreak,
-before which Alexander appeared with the chief officers in his
-confidence. Addressing the soldiers in a vehement tone of mingled
-sorrow and anger, he proclaimed to them that his life had just
-been providentially rescued from a dangerous conspiracy organized
-by two men hitherto trusted as his best friends—Philotas and
-Parmenio—through the intended agency of a soldier named Dimnus,
-who had slain himself when arrested. The dead body of Dimnus was
-then exhibited to the meeting, while Nikomachus and Kebalinus were
-brought forward to tell their story. A letter from Parmenio to his
-sons Philotas and Nikanor, found among the papers seized on the
-arrest, was read to the meeting. Its terms were altogether vague and
-unmeaning; but Alexander chose to construe them as it suited his
-purpose.[464]
-
-  [463] Curtius, vi. 8, 16. “Invitatus est etiam Philotas
-  ad ultimas sibi epulas et rex non cœnare modo, sed etiam
-  familiariter colloqui, cum eo quam damnaverat, sustinuit.”
-
-  [464] Arrian, iii. 26, 2. Λέγει δὲ Πτολεμαῖος εἰσαχθῆναι εἰς
-  Μακεδόνας Φιλώταν, καὶ κατηγορῆσαι αὐτοῦ ἰσχυρῶς Ἀλέξανδρον, etc.
-  Curtius, vi. 9, 13; Diodorus, xvii, 80.
-
-We may easily conceive the impression produced upon these assembled
-soldiers by such denunciations from Alexander himself—revelations of
-his own personal danger, and reproaches against treacherous friends.
-Amyntas, and even Kœnus, the brother-in-law of Philotas, were yet
-more unmeasured in their invectives against the accused.[465]
-They, as well as the other officers with whom the arrest had been
-concerted, set the example of violent manifestation against him,
-and ardent sympathy with the king’s danger. Philotas was heard in
-his defence, which though strenuously denying the charge, is said
-to have been feeble. It was indeed sure to be so, coming from one
-seized thus suddenly, and overwhelmed with disadvantages; while a
-degree of courage, absolutely heroic, would have been required
-for any one else to rise and presume to criticise the proofs. A
-soldier named Bolon harangued his comrades on the insupportable
-insolence of Philotas, who always (he said) treated the soldiers with
-contempt, turning them out of their quarters to make room for his
-countless retinue of slaves. Though this allegation (probably enough
-well-founded) was no way connected with the charge of treason against
-the king, it harmonized fully with the temper of the assembly, and
-wound them up to the last pitch of fury. The royal pages began the
-cry, echoed by all around, that they would with their own hands tear
-the parricide in pieces.[466]
-
-  [465] Curtius, vi. 9, 30.
-
-  [466] Curtius, vi. 11, 8. “Tum vero universa concio accensa
-  est, et a corporis custodibus initium factum, clamantibus,
-  discerpendum esse parricidam manibus eorum. Id quidam Philotas,
-  qui graviora supplicia metueret, haud sane iniquo animo audiebat.”
-
-It would have been fortunate for Philotas if their wrath had been
-sufficiently ungovernable to instigate the execution of such a
-sentence on the spot. But this did not suit the purpose of his
-enemies. Aware that he had been condemned upon the regal word, with
-nothing better than the faintest negative ground of suspicion,
-they determined to extort from him a confession such as would
-justify their own purposes, not only against him, but against
-his father Parmenio—whom there was as yet nothing to implicate.
-Accordingly, during the ensuing night, Philotas was put to the
-torture. Hephæstion, Kraterus, and Kœnus—the last of the three
-being brother-in-law of Philotas[467]—themselves superintended the
-ministers of physical suffering. Alexander himself too was at hand,
-but concealed by a curtain. It is said that Philotas manifested
-little firmness under torture, and that Alexander, an unseen witness,
-indulged in sneers against the cowardice of one who had fought by
-his side in so many battles.[468] All who stood by were enemies,
-and likely to describe the conduct of Philotas in such manner as to
-justify their own hatred. The tortures inflicted,[469] cruel in the
-extreme and long-continued, wrung from him at last a confession,
-implicating his father along with himself. He was put to death;
-and at the same time, all those whose names had been indicated by
-Nikomachus, were slain also—apparently by being stoned, without
-preliminary torture. Philotas had serving in the army a numerous
-kindred, all of whom were struck with consternation at the news
-of his being tortured. It was the Macedonian law that all kinsmen
-of a man guilty of treason were doomed to death along with him.
-Accordingly, some of these men slew themselves, others fled from
-the camp, seeking refuge wherever they could. Such was the terror
-and tumult in the camp, that Alexander was obliged to proclaim a
-suspension of this sanguinary law for the occasion.[470]
-
-  [467] Curtius, vi. 9, 30; vi. 11, 11.
-
-  [468] Plutarch, Alexand. 49.
-
-  [469] Curtius, vi. 11, 15, “Per ultimos deinde cruciatus, utpote
-  et damnatus et inimicis in gratiam regis torquentibus, laceratur.
-  Ac primo quidam, quanquam hinc ignis, illinc verbera, jam non ad
-  quæstionem, sed ad pœnam, ingerebantur, non vocem modo, sed etiam
-  gemitus habuit in potestate; sed postquam intumescens corpus
-  ulceribus flagellorum ictus nudis ossibus incussos ferre non
-  poterat”, etc.
-
-  [470] Curtius, vi. 11, 20.
-
-It now remained to kill Parmenio, who could not be safely left
-alive after the atrocities used towards Philotas; and to kill him,
-moreover, before he could have time to hear of them, since he was
-not only the oldest, most respected, and most influential of all
-Macedonian officers, but also in separate command of the great depôt
-at Ekbatana. Alexander summoned to his presence one of the Companions
-named Polydamas; a particular friend, comrade, or _aide de camp_, of
-Parmenio. Every friend of Philotas felt at this moment that his life
-hung by a thread; so that Polydamas entered the king’s presence in
-extreme terror, the rather as he was ordered to bring with him his
-two younger brothers. Alexander addressed him, denouncing Parmenio as
-a traitor, and intimating that Polydamas would be required to carry a
-swift and confidential message to Ekbatana, ordering his execution.
-Polydamas was selected as the attached friend of Parmenio, and
-therefore as best calculated to deceive him. Two letters were placed
-in his hands, addressed to Parmenio; one from Alexander himself,
-conveying ostensibly military communications and orders; the other,
-signed with the seal-ring of the deceased Philotas, and purporting to
-be addressed by the son to the father. Together with these, Polydamas
-received the real and important despatch, addressed by Alexander
-to Kleander and Menidas, the officers immediately subordinate to
-Parmenio at Ekbatana; proclaiming Parmenio guilty of high treason,
-and directing them to kill him at once. Large rewards were offered to
-Polydamas if he performed this commission with success, while his two
-brothers were retained as hostages against scruples or compunction.
-He promised even more than was demanded—too happy to purchase this
-reprieve from what had seemed impending death. Furnished with native
-guides and with swift dromedaries, he struck by the straightest
-road across the desert of Khorasan, and arrived at Ekbatana on the
-eleventh day—a distance usually requiring more than thirty days to
-traverse.[471] Entering the camp by night, without the knowledge
-of Parmenio, he delivered his despatch to Kleander, with whom he
-concerted measures. On the morrow he was admitted to Parmenio, while
-walking in his garden with Kleander and the other officers marked
-out by Alexander’s order as his executioners. Polydamas ran to
-embrace his old friend, and was heartily welcomed by the unsuspecting
-veteran, to whom he presented the letters professedly coming from
-Alexander and Philotas. While Parmenio was absorbed in the perusal,
-he was suddenly assailed by a mortal stab from the hand and sword
-of Kleander. Other wounds were heaped upon him as he fell, by the
-remaining officers,—the last even after life had departed.[472]
-
-  [471] Strabo, xv. p. 724; Diodor. xvii. 80; Curtius, vii. 2,
-  11-18.
-
-  [472] Curtius, vii. 2, 27. The proceedings respecting Philotas
-  and Parmenio are recounted in the greatest detail by Curtius; but
-  his details are in general harmony with the brief heads given by
-  Arrian from Ptolemy and Aristobulus—except as to one material
-  point. Plutarch (Alex. 49), Diodorus (xvii. 79, 80), and Justin
-  (xii. 5), also state the fact in the same manner.
-
-  Ptolemy and Aristobulus, according to the narrative of Arrian,
-  appear to have considered that Philotas was really implicated in
-  a conspiracy against Alexander’s life. But when we analyze what
-  they are reported to have said, their opinion will not be found
-  entitled to much weight. In the first place, they state (Arrian,
-  iii. 26, 1) that the _conspiracy of Philotas had been before made
-  known to Alexander while he was in Egypt_, but that he did not
-  then believe it. Now eighteen months had elapsed since the stay
-  in Egypt; and the idea of a conspiracy going on for eighteen
-  months is preposterous. That Philotas was in a mood in which he
-  might be supposed likely to conspire, is one proposition; that
-  he actually did conspire is another; Arrian and his authorities
-  run the two together as if they were one. As to the evidence
-  purporting to prove that Philotas did conspire, Arrian tells us
-  that “the informers came forward before the assembled soldiers
-  and convicted Philotas with the rest by other _indicia_ not
-  obscure, _but chiefly by this_—that Philotas confessed to
-  have heard of a conspiracy going on, without mentioning it
-  to Alexander, though twice a day in his presence”—καὶ τοὺς
-  μηνυτὰς τοῦ ἔργου παρελθόντας ἐξελέγξαι Φιλώταν τε καὶ τοὺς
-  ἀμφ᾽ αὐτὸν ~ἄλλοις τε ἐλέγχοις οὐκ ἀφανέσι, καὶ μάλιστα δὴ~
-  ὅτι αὐτὸς Φιλώτας πεπύσθαι μὲν—συνέφη, etc. What these other
-  _indicia_ were, we are not told; but we may see how slender was
-  their value, when we learn that the non-revelation admitted by
-  Philotas was stronger than any of them. The non-revelation,
-  when we recollect that Nikomachus was the _only_ informant
-  (Arrian loosely talks of μηνυτὰς, as if there were more), proves
-  absolutely nothing as to the complicity of Philotas, though
-  it may prove something as to his indiscretion. Even on this
-  minor charge, Curtius puts into his mouth a very sufficient
-  exculpation. But if Alexander had taken a different view, and
-  dismissed or even confined him for it, there would have been
-  little room for remark.
-
-  The point upon which Arrian is at variance with Curtius, is,
-  that he states “Philotas with the rest to have been shot to
-  death by the Macedonians”—thus, seemingly contradicting, at
-  least by implication, the fact of his having been tortured.
-  Now Plutarch, Diodorus, and Justin, all concur with Curtius in
-  affirming that he was tortured. On such a matter, I prefer their
-  united authority to that of Ptolemy and Aristobulus. These two
-  last-mentioned authors were probably quite content to believe
-  in the complicity of Philotas upon the authority of Alexander
-  himself; without troubling themselves to criticise the proofs.
-  They tell us that Alexander vehemently denounced (κατηγορῆσαι
-  ἰσχυρῶς) Philotas before the assembled soldiers. After this, any
-  mere shadow or pretence of proof would be sufficient. Moreover,
-  let us recollect that Ptolemy obtained his promotion, to be one
-  of the confidential _body guards_ (σωματοφύλακες), out of this
-  very conspiracy, real or fictitious; he was promoted to the post
-  of the condemned Demetrius (Arrian, iii. 27. 11).
-
-  How little Ptolemy and Aristobulus cared to do justice to any one
-  whom Alexander hated, may be seen by what they say afterwards
-  about the philosopher Kallisthenes. Both of them affirmed
-  that the pages, condemned for conspiracy against Alexander,
-  deposed against Kallisthenes as having instigated them to the
-  deed (Arrian, iv. 14, 1). Now we know, from the authority of
-  Alexander himself, whose letters Plutarch quotes (Alexand. 55),
-  that the pages denied the privity of any one else—maintaining
-  the project to have been altogether their own. To their great
-  honor, the pages persisted in this deposition, even under extreme
-  tortures—though they knew that a deposition against Kallisthenes
-  was desired from them.
-
-  My belief is, that Diodorus, Plutarch, Curtius, and Justin,
-  are correct in stating that Philotas was tortured. Ptolemy and
-  Aristobulus have thought themselves warranted in omitting this
-  fact, which they probably had little satisfaction in reflecting
-  upon. If Philotas was not tortured, there could have been no
-  evidence at all against Parmenio—for the only evidence against
-  the latter was the extorted confession of Philotas.
-
-The soldiers in Ekbatana, on hearing of this bloody deed, burst
-into furious mutiny, surrounded the garden wall, and threatened to
-break in for the purpose of avenging their general, unless Polydamas
-and the other murderers should be delivered to them. But Kleander,
-admitting a few of the ringleaders, exhibited to them Alexander’s
-written orders, to which the soldiers yielded, not without murmurs
-of reluctance and indignation. Most of them dispersed, yet a few
-remained, entreating permission to bury Parmenio’s body. Even this
-was long refused by Kleander, from dread of the king’s displeasure.
-At last, however, thinking it prudent to comply in part, he cut off
-the head, delivering to them the trunk alone for burial. The head was
-sent to Alexander.[473]
-
-  [473] Curtius, vii. 2, 32, 33.
-
-Among the many tragical deeds recounted throughout the course of
-this history, there is none more revolting than the fate of these
-two generals. Alexander, violent in all his impulses, displayed
-on this occasion a personal rancor worthy of his ferocious mother
-Olympias, exasperated rather than softened by the magnitude of past
-services.[474] When we see the greatest officers of the Macedonian
-army directing in person, and under the eye of Alexander, the
-laceration and burning of the naked body of their colleague Philotas,
-and assassinating with their own hands the veteran Parmenio,—we feel
-how much we have passed out of the region of Greek civic feeling into
-that of the more savage Illyrian warrior, partially orientalized. It
-is not surprising to read, that Antipater, viceroy of Macedonia, who
-had shared with Parmenio the favor and confidence of Philip as well
-as of Alexander, should tremble when informed of such proceedings,
-and cast about for a refuge against the like possibilities to
-himself. Many other officers were alike alarmed and disgusted with
-the transactions.[475] Hence Alexander, opening and examining the
-letters sent home from his army to Macedonia, detected such strong
-expressions of indignation, that he thought it prudent to transfer
-many pronounced malcontents into a division by themselves, parting
-them off from the remaining army.[476] Instead of appointing any
-substitute for Philotas in the command of the Companion-cavalry,
-he cast that body into two divisions, nominating Hephæstion to the
-command of one and Kleitus to that of the other.[477]
-
-  [474] Contrast the conduct of Alexander towards Philotas and
-  Parmenio, with that of Cyrus the younger towards the conspirator
-  Orontes, as described in Xenophon, Anabas. i. 6.
-
-  [475] Plutarch, Alexand. 49.
-
-  [476] Curtius, vii. 2, 36; Diodor. xvii. 80; Justin, xii. 5.
-
-  [477] Arrian, iii. 27, 8.
-
-The autumn and winter were spent by Alexander in reducing Drangiana,
-Gedrosia, Arachosia, and the Paropamisadæ; the modern Seiestan,
-Afghanistan, and the Western part of Kabul, lying between Ghazna on
-the north, Kandahar or Kelat on the south, and Furrah in the west.
-He experienced no combined resistance, but his troops suffered
-severely from cold and privation.[478] Near the southern termination
-of one of the passes of the Hindoo-Koosh (apparently north-east
-of the town of Kabul) he founded a new city, called Alexandria ad
-Caucasum, where he planted 7000 old soldiers, Macedonians, and others
-as colonists.[479] Towards the close of Winter he crossed over the
-mighty range of the Hindoo-Koosh; a march of fifteen days through
-regions of snow, and fraught with hardship to his army. On reaching
-the north side of these mountains, he found himself in Baktria.
-
-  [478] Arrian, iii. 28, 2. About the geography, compare Wilson’s
-  Ariana Antiqua, p. 173-178. “By perambulator, the distance from
-  Herat to Kandahar is 371 miles; from Kandahar to Kabul, 309:
-  total 688 miles (English).” The principal city in Drangiana
-  (Seiestan) mentioned by the subsequent Greek geographers is,
-  Prophthasia; existing seemingly before Alexander’s arrival. See
-  the fragments of his _mensores_, ap. Didot, Fragm. Hist. Alex.
-  Magn. p. 135; Pliny, H. N. vi. 21. The quantity of remains
-  of ancient cities, still to be found in this territory, is
-  remarkable. Wilson observes this (p. 154).
-
-  [479] Arrian, iii. 28, 6; Curtius, vii. 3, 23; Diodor. xvii. 83.
-  Alexandria in Ariis is probably Herat; Alexandria in Arachosia
-  is probably Kandahar. But neither the one nor the other is
-  mentioned as having been founded by _Alexander_, either in
-  Arrian or Curtius, or Diodorus. The name Alexandria does not
-  prove that they were founded by him; for several of the Diadochi
-  called their own foundations by his name (Strabo, xiii. p.
-  593). Considering how very short a time Alexander spent in
-  these regions, the wonder is, that he could have found time to
-  establish those foundations which are expressly ascribed to him
-  by Arrian and his other historians. The authority of Pliny and
-  Steph. Byzant. is hardly sufficient to warrant us in ascribing
-  to him more. The exact site of Alexandria ad Caucasum cannot be
-  determined, for want of sufficient topographical data. There
-  seems much probability that it was at the place called Beghram,
-  twenty-five miles north-east of Kabul—in the way between Kabul
-  on the south side of the Hindoo-Koosh, and Anderhab on the north
-  side. The prodigious number of coins and relics, Greek as well as
-  Mohammedan, discovered by Mr. Masson at Beghram, supply better
-  evidence for identifying the site with that of Alexandria ad
-  Caucasum, than can be pleaded on behalf of any other locality.
-  See Masson’s Narrative of Journeys in Afghanistan, etc., vol.
-  iii. ch. 7. p 148 _seqq._
-
-  In crossing the Hindoo-Koosh from south to north Alexander
-  probably marched by the pass of Bamian, which seems the only one
-  among the four passes open to an army in the winter. See Wood’s
-  Journey to the Oxus, p 195.
-
-The Baktrian leader Bessus, who had assumed the title of king,
-could muster no more than a small force, with which he laid waste
-the country, and then retired across the river Oxus into Sogdiana,
-destroying all the boats. Alexander overran Baktria with scarce
-any resistance; the chief places, Baktra (Balkh) and Aornos
-surrendering to him on the first demonstration of attack. Having
-named Artabazus satrap of Baktria, and placed Archelaus with a
-garrison in Aornos,[480] he marched northward towards the river
-Oxus, the boundary between Baktria and Sogdiana. It was a march of
-extreme hardship; reaching for two or three days across a sandy
-desert destitute of water, and under very hot weather, The Oxus, six
-furlongs in breadth, deep, and rapid, was the most formidable river
-that the Macedonians had yet seen.[481] Alexander transported his
-army across it on the tent-skins inflated and stuffed with straw. It
-seems surprising that Bessus did not avail himself of this favorable
-opportunity for resisting a passage in itself so difficult; he had
-however been abandoned by his Baktrian cavalry at the moment when
-he quitted their territory. Some of his companions, Spitamenes and
-others, terrified at the news that Alexander had crossed the Oxus,
-were anxious to make their own peace by betraying their leader.[482]
-They sent a proposition to this effect; upon which Ptolemy with a
-light division was sent forward by Alexander, and was enabled, by
-extreme celerity of movements, to surprise and seize Bessus in a
-village. Alexander ordered that he should be held in chains, naked
-and with a collar round his neck, at the side of the road along which
-the army were marching. On reaching the spot, Alexander stopped his
-chariot, and sternly demanded from Bessus, on what pretence he had
-first arrested, and afterwards slain, his king and benefactor Darius.
-Bessus replied, that he had not done this single-handed; others were
-concerned in it along with him, to procure for themselves lenient
-treatment from Alexander. The king said no more, but ordered Bessus
-to be scourged, and then sent back as prisoner to Baktra[483]—where
-we shall again hear of him.
-
-  [480] Arrian, iii. 29, 3; Curtius, vii. 5, 1.
-
-  [481] Arrian, iii. 29, 4; Strabo, xi. p. 509. Evidently Ptolemy
-  and Aristobulus were much more awe-struck with the Oxus, than
-  with either the Tigris or the Euphrates. Arrian (iv. 6, 13) takes
-  his standard of comparison, in regard to rivers, from the river
-  Peneius in Thessaly.
-
-  [482] Curtius, vii. 5, 19. The exactness of Quintus Curtius,
-  in describing the general features of Baktria and Sogdiana, is
-  attested in the strongest language by modern travellers. See
-  Burnes’s Travels into Bokhara, vol. ii. ch. 8. p. 211, 2nd edit.;
-  also Morier, Second Journey in Persia, p. 282.
-
-  But in the geographical details of the country, we are at fault.
-  We have not sufficient data to identify more than one or two
-  of the localities mentioned, in the narrative of Alexander’s
-  proceedings, either by Curtius or Arrian. That Marakanda is the
-  modern Samarkand—the river Polytimetus, the modern Kohik—and
-  Baktra or Zariaspa the modern Balkh—appears certain; but the
-  attempts made by commentators to assign the site of other places
-  are not such as to carry conviction.
-
-  In fact, these countries, at the present moment, are known
-  only superficially as to their general scenery; for purposes
-  of measurement and geography, they are almost unknown; as may
-  be seen by any one who reads the Introduction to Erskine’s
-  translation of the Memoirs of Sultan Baber.
-
-  [483] Arrian. iii. 30, 5-10. These details are peculiarly
-  authentic, as coming from Ptolemy, the person chiefly concerned.
-
-  Aristobulus agreed in the description of the guise in which
-  Bessus was exhibited, but stated that he was brought up in this
-  way by Spitamenes and Dataphernes. Curtius (vii. 24, 36) follows
-  this version. Diodorus also gives an account very like it,
-  mentioning nothing about Ptolemy (xvii. 83).
-
-In his onward march, Alexander approached a small town, inhabited
-by the Branchidæ; descendants of those Branchidæ near Miletus on
-the coast of Ionia, who had administered the great temple and oracle
-of Apollo on Cape Poseidion, and who had yielded up the treasures
-of that temple to the Persian king Xerxes, 150 years before. This
-surrender had brought upon them so much odium, that when the dominion
-of Xerxes was overthrown on the coast, they retired with him into the
-interior of Asia. He assigned to them lands in the distant region of
-Sogdiana, where their descendants had ever since remained; bilingual
-and partially dis-hellenized, yet still attached to their traditions
-and origin. Delighted to find themselves once more in commerce with
-Greeks, they poured forth to meet and welcome the army, tendering
-all that they possessed. Alexander, when he heard who they were
-and what was their parentage, desired the Milesians in his army to
-determine how they should be treated. But as these Milesians were
-neither decided nor unanimous, Alexander announced that he would
-determine for himself. Having first occupied the city in person
-with a select detachment, he posted his army all round the walls,
-and then gave orders not only to plunder it, but to massacre the
-entire population—men, women, and children. They were slain without
-arms or attempt at resistance, resorting to nothing but prayers and
-suppliant manifestations. Alexander next commanded the walls to be
-levelled, and the sacred groves cut down, so that no habitable site
-might remain, nor any thing except solitude and sterility.[484]
-Such was the revenge taken upon these unhappy victims for the
-deeds of their ancestors in the fourth or fifth generation before.
-Alexander doubtless considered himself to be executing the wrath
-of Apollo against an accursed race who had robbed the temple of
-the god.[485] The Macedonian expedition had been proclaimed to
-be undertaken originally for the purpose of revenging upon the
-contemporary Persians the ancient wrongs done to Greece by Xerxes;
-so that Alexander would follow out the same sentiment in revenging
-upon the contemporary Branchidæ the acts of their ancestors—yet more
-guilty than Xerxes, in his belief. The massacre of this unfortunate
-population was in fact an example of human sacrifice on the largest
-scale, offered to the gods by the religious impulses of Alexander,
-and worthy to be compared to that of the Carthaginian general
-Hannibal, when he sacrificed 3000 Grecian prisoners on the field of
-Himera, where his grandfather Hamilkar had been slain seventy years
-before.[486]
-
-  [484] Curtius, vii. 23; Plutarch de Serâ Numinis Vindictâ, p.
-  557 B; Strabo xi. p. 518: compare also xiv. p. 634, and xvii. p.
-  814. This last-mentioned passage of Strabo helps us to understand
-  the peculiarly strong pious fervor with which Alexander regarded
-  the temple and oracle of Branchidæ. At the time when Alexander
-  went up to the oracle of Ammon in Egypt, for the purpose of
-  affiliating himself to Zeus Ammon, there came to him envoys from
-  Miletus, announcing that the oracle at Branchidæ, which had been
-  silent ever since the time of Xerxes, had just begun to give
-  prophecy, and had certified the fact that Alexander was the son
-  of Zeus, besides many other encouraging predictions.
-
-  The massacre of the Branchidæ by Alexander was described by
-  Diodorus, but was contained in that part of the seventeenth book
-  which is lost; there is a great lacuna in the MSS. after cap.
-  83. The fact is distinctly indicated in the table of contents
-  prefixed to Book xvii.
-
-  Arrian makes no mention of these descendants of the Branchidæ in
-  Sogdiana, nor of the destruction of the town and its inhabitants
-  by Alexander. Perhaps neither Ptolemy nor Aristobulus, said
-  anything about it. Their silence is not at all difficult to
-  explain, nor does it, in my judgment, impeach the credibility
-  of the narrative. They do not feel under obligation to give
-  publicity to the worst acts of their hero.
-
-  [485] The Delphian oracle pronounced, in explaining the
-  subjugation and ruin of Krœsus king of Lydia, that he had thereby
-  expiated the sin of his ancestor in the fifth generation before
-  (Herodot. i. 91: compare vi. 86). Immediately before the breaking
-  out of the Peloponnesian war, the Lacedæmonians called upon the
-  Athenians to expel the descendants of those who had taken part
-  in the Kylonian sacrilege, 180 years before; they addressed this
-  injunction with a view to procure the banishment of Perikles, yet
-  still τοῖς θεοῖς πρῶτον τιμωροῦντες (Thucyd. i. 125-127).
-
-  The idea that the sins of fathers were visited upon their
-  descendants, even to the third and fourth generation, had great
-  currency in the ancient world.
-
-  [486] Diodor. xiii. 62. See Vol. X. Ch. lxxxi. p 413 of this
-  History.
-
-Alexander then continued his onward progress, first to Marakanda
-(Samarcand), the chief town of Sogdiana—next, to the river Jaxartes,
-which he and his companions, in their imperfect geographical
-notions, believed to be the Tanais, the boundary between Asia, and
-Europe.[487] In his march, he left garrisons in various towns,[488]
-but experienced no resistance, though detached bodies of the natives
-hovered on his flanks. Some of these bodies, having cut off a few of
-his foragers, took refuge afterwards on a steep and rugged mountain,
-conceived to be unassailable. Thither however Alexander pursued them,
-at the head of his lightest and most active troops. Though at first
-repulsed, he succeeded in scaling and capturing the place. Of its
-defenders, thirty thousand in number, three fourths were either put
-to the sword, or perished in jumping down the precipices. Several
-of his soldiers were wounded with arrows, and he himself received a
-shot from one of them through his leg.[489] But here, as elsewhere,
-we perceive that nearly all the Orientals whom Alexander subdued were
-men little suited for close combat hand to hand,—fighting only with
-missiles.
-
-  [487] Pliny, H. N. vi. 16. In the Meteorologica of Aristotle (i.
-  13, 15-18) we read that the rivers Bahtrus, Choaspes, and Araxes
-  flowed from the lofty mountain Parnasus (Paropamisus?) in Asia;
-  and that the Araxes bifurcated, one branch forming the Tanais,
-  which fell into the Palus Mæotis. For this fact he refers to
-  the γῆς περιόδοι current in his time. It seems plain that by
-  the Araxes Aristotle must mean the Jaxartes. We see, therefore,
-  that Alexander and his companions, in identifying the Jaxartes
-  with the Tanais, only followed the geographical descriptions and
-  ideas current in their time. Humboldt remarks several cases in
-  which the Greek geographers were fond of supposing bifurcation of
-  rivers (Asie Centrale, vol. ii. p. 291).
-
-  [488] Arrian, iv. 1, 5.
-
-  [489] Arrian, iii. 30, 17.
-
-Here, on the river Jaxartes, Alexander projected the foundation of a
-new city to bear his name; intended partly as a protection against
-incursions from the Scythian Nomads on the other side of the river,
-partly as a facility for himself to cross over and subdue them, which
-he intended to do as soon as he could find opportunity.[490] He was
-however called off for the time by the news of a wide-spread revolt
-among the newly-conquered inhabitants both of Sogdiana and Baktria.
-He suppressed the revolt with his habitual vigor and celerity,
-distributing his troops so as to capture five townships in two days,
-and Kyropolis or Kyra, the largest of the neighboring Sogdian towns
-(founded by the Persian Cyrus), immediately afterwards. He put all
-the defenders and inhabitants to the sword. Returning then to the
-Jaxartes, he completed in twenty days the fortifications of his new
-town of Alexandria (perhaps at or near Khodjend), with suitable
-sacrifices and festivities to the gods. He planted in it some
-Macedonian veterans and Grecian mercenaries, together with volunteer
-settlers from the natives around.[491] An army of Scythian Nomads,
-showing themselves on the other side of the river, piqued his vanity
-to cross over and attack them. Carrying over a division of his army
-on inflated skins, he defeated them with little difficulty, pursuing
-them briskly into the desert. But the weather was intensely hot, and
-the army suffered much from thirst; while the little water to be
-found was so bad, that it brought upon Alexander a diarrhœa which
-endangered his life.[492] This chase, of a few miles on the right
-bank of the Jaxartes (seemingly in the present Khanat of Kokand),
-marked the utmost limit of Alexander’s progress northward.
-
-  [490] Arrian, iv. 1, 3
-
-  [491] Arrian, iv. 3, 17; Curtius, vii. 6, 25.
-
-  [492] Arrian. iv. 5, 6; Curtius, vii. 9.
-
-Shortly afterwards, a Macedonian detachment, unskilfully conducted,
-was destroyed in Sogdiana by Spitamenes and the Scythians: a rare
-misfortune, which Alexander avenged by overrunning the region[493]
-near the river Polytimêtus (the Kohik), and putting to the sword
-the inhabitants of all the towns which he took. He then recrossed
-the Oxus, to rest during the extreme season of winter at Zariaspa
-in Baktria, from whence his communications with the West and
-with Macedonia were more easy, and where he received various
-reinforcements of Greek troops.[494] Bessus, who had been here
-retained as a prisoner, was now brought forward amidst a public
-assembly; wherein Alexander, having first reproached him for his
-treason to Darius, caused his nose and ears to be cut off—and sent
-him in this condition to Ekbatana, to be finally slain by the Medes
-and Persians.[495] Mutilation was a practice altogether Oriental
-and non-Hellenic: even Arrian, admiring and indulgent as he is
-towards his hero, censures this savage order, as one among many
-proofs how much Alexander had taken on Oriental dispositions. We may
-remark that his extreme wrath on this occasion was founded partly on
-disappointment that Bessus had frustrated his toilsome efforts for
-taking Darius alive—partly on the fact that the satrap had committed
-treason against the king’s person, which it was the policy as well
-as the feeling of Alexander to surround with a circle of Deity.[496]
-For as to traitors against Persia, as a cause and country, Alexander
-had never discouraged, and had sometimes signally recompensed them.
-Mithrines, the governor of Sardis, who opened to him the gates of
-that almost impregnable fortress immediately after the battle of
-the Granikus—the traitor who perhaps, next to Darius himself, had
-done most harm to the Persian cause—obtained from him high favor and
-promotion.[497]
-
-  [493] Arrian, iv. 6, 11; Curtius, vii. 9, 22. The river, called
-  by the Macedonians Polytimetus (Strabo, xi. p. 518), now bears
-  the name of Kohik or Zurufshan. It rises in the mountains east of
-  Samarkand, and flowing westward on the north of that city and of
-  Bokhara. It does not reach so far as the Oxus; during the full
-  time of the year, it falls into a lake called Karakul; during the
-  dry months, it is lost in the sands, as Arrian states (Burnes’s
-  Travels, vol. ii. ch. xi. p. 299. ed. 2nd.).
-
-  [494] Arrian, iv. 7, 1; Curtius, vii. 10, 12.
-
-  [495] Arrian, iv. 7, 5.
-
-  [496] After describing the scene at Rome, when the Emperor
-  Galba was deposed and assassinated in the forum, Tacitus
-  observes—“Plures quam centum et viginti libellos præmia
-  exposcentium, ob aliquam notabilem illà die operam, Vitellius
-  posteà invenit, omnesque conquiri et interfici jussit: _non
-  honore Galbæ, sed tradito principibus more, munimentum ad
-  præsens, in posterum ultionem_” (Tacitus, Hist. i. 44).
-
-  [497] Arrian, i. 17, 3; iii. 16, 8. Curtius, iii. 12, 6; v. 1, 44.
-
-The rude but spirited tribes of Baktria and Sogdiana were as yet but
-imperfectly subdued, seconded as their resistance was by wide spaces
-of sandy desert, by the neighborhood of the Scythian Nomads, and
-by the presence of Spitamenes as a leader. Alexander, distributing
-his army into five divisions, traversed the country and put down
-all resistance, while he also took measures for establishing
-several military posts, or new towns in convenient places.[498]
-After some time the whole army was reunited at the chief place of
-Sogdiana—Marakanda—where some halt and repose was given.[499]
-
-  [498] Curtius (vii. 10, 15) mentions six cities (oppida) founded
-  by Alexander in these regions; apparently somewhere north of the
-  Oxus, but the sites cannot be made out. Justin (xii. 5) alludes
-  to twelve foundations in Baktria and Sogdiana.
-
-  [499] Arrian, iv. 16, 4; Curtius, vii. 10, 1. “Sogdiana regio
-  magnâ ex parte deserta est; octingenta ferè stadia in latitudinem
-  vastæ solitudines tenent.”
-
-  Respecting the same country (Sogdiana and Baktria), Mr. Erskine
-  observes (Introduction to the Memoirs of Sultan Baber, p.
-  xliii.):—“The face of the country is extremely broken, and
-  divided by lofty hills; even the plains are diversified by great
-  varieties of soil,—some extensive districts along the Kohik
-  river, nearly the whole of Ferghana (along the Jaxartes), the
-  greater part of Kwarizm along the branches of the Oxus, with
-  the large portions of Balkh, Badakshan, Kesh, and Hissar, being
-  of uncommon fertility; while the greater part of the rest is a
-  barren waste, and in some places a sandy desert. Indeed the whole
-  country north of the Oxus has a decided tendency to degenerate
-  into desert, and many of its most fruitful spaces are nearly
-  surrounded by barren sands; so that the population of all these
-  districts still, as in the time of Baber, consists of the fixed
-  inhabitants of the cities and fertile lands, and of the unsettled
-  and roving wanderers of the desert, who dwell in tents of felt,
-  and live on the produce of their flocks.”
-
-During this halt at Marakanda (Samarcand) the memorable banquet
-occurred wherein Alexander murdered Kleitus. It has been already
-related that Kleitus had saved his life at the battle of the
-Granikus, by cutting off the sword arm of the Persian Spithridates
-when already uplifted to strike him from behind. Since the death of
-Philotas, the important function of general of the Companion-cavalry
-had been divided between Hephæstion and Kleitus. Moreover, the family
-of Kleitus had been attached to Philip, by ties so ancient, that his
-sister, Lanikê, had been selected as the nurse of Alexander himself
-when a child. Two of her sons had already perished in the Asiatic
-battles. If, therefore, there were any man who stood high in the
-service, or was privileged to speak his mind freely to Alexander, it
-was Kleitus.
-
-In this banquet at Marakanda, when wine, according to the Macedonian
-habit, had been abundantly drunk, and when Alexander, Kleitus, and
-most of the other guests were already nearly intoxicated, enthusiasts
-or flatterers heaped immoderate eulogies upon the king’s past
-achievements.[500] They exalted him above all the most venerated
-legendary heroes; they proclaimed that his superhuman deeds proved
-his divine paternity, and that he had earned an apotheosis like
-Herakles, which nothing but envy could withhold from him during his
-life. Alexander himself joined in these boasts, and even took credit
-for the later victories of the reign of his father, whose abilities
-and glory he depreciated. To the old Macedonian officers, such an
-insult cast on the memory of Philip was deeply offensive. But among
-them all, none had been more indignant than Kleitus, with the growing
-insolence of Alexander—his assumed filiation from Zeus Ammon, which
-put aside Philip as unworthy—his preference for Persian attendants,
-who granted or refused admittance to his person—his extending to
-Macedonian soldiers the contemptuous treatment habitually endured
-by Asiatics, and even allowing them to be scourged by Persian
-hands and Persian rods.[501] The pride of a Macedonian general in
-the stupendous successes of the last five years, was effaced by
-his mortification when he saw that they tended only to merge his
-countrymen amidst a crowd of servile Asiatics, and to inflame the
-prince with high-flown aspirations transmitted from Xerxes or Ochus.
-But whatever might be the internal thoughts of Macedonian officers,
-they held their peace before Alexander, whose formidable character
-and exorbitant self-estimation would tolerate no criticism.
-
-  [500] Arrian, iv. 8, 7.
-
-  [501] Plutarch, Alexand. 51. Nothing can be more touching than
-  the words put by Plutarch into the mouth of Kleitus—Ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ
-  νῦν χαίρομεν, Ἀλέξανδρε, τοιαῦτα τέλη τῶν πόνων κομιζόμενοι,
-  μακαρίζομεν δὲ τοὺς ἤδη τεθνηκότας πρὶν ἐπιδεῖν Μηδικαῖς ῥάβδοις
-  ξαινομένους Μακεδόνας, καὶ Περσῶν δεομένους ἵνα τῷ βασιλεῖ
-  προσέλθωμεν.
-
-At the banquet of Marakanda, this long suppressed repugnance found
-an issue, accidental indeed and unpremeditated, but for that very
-reason all the more violent and unmeasured. The wine, which made
-Alexander more boastful and his flatterers fulsome to excess,
-overpowered altogether the reserve of Kleitus. He rebuked the impiety
-of those who degraded the ancient heroes in order to make a pedestal
-for Alexander. He protested against the injustice of disparaging
-the exalted and legitimate fame of Philip; whose achievements he
-loudly extolled, pronouncing them to be equal, and even superior
-to those of his son. For the exploits of Alexander, splendid as
-they were, had been accomplished, not by himself alone, but by that
-unconquerable Macedonian force which he had found ready made to his
-hands;[502] whereas those of Philip had been his own—since he had
-found Macedonia prostrate and disorganized, and had had to create for
-himself both soldiers, and a military system. The great instruments
-of Alexander’s victories had been Philip’s old soldiers, whom he now
-despised—and among them Parmenio, whom he had put to death.
-
-  [502] Arrian, iv. 8, 8. οὔκουν μόνον γε (Ἀλέξανδρον) καταπρᾶξαι
-  αὐτὰ, ἀλλὰ τὸ γὰρ πολὺ μέρος Μακεδόνων εἶναι τὰ ἔργα, etc.
-
-Remarks such as these, poured forth in the coarse language of a
-half-intoxicated Macedonian veteran, provoked loud contradiction from
-many, and gave poignant offence to Alexander; who now for the first
-time heard the open outburst of disapprobation, before concealed
-and known to him only by surmise. But wrath and contradiction, both
-from him and from others, only made Kleitus more reckless in the
-outpouring of his own feelings, now discharged with delight after
-having been so long pent up. He passed from the old Macedonian
-soldiers to himself individually. Stretching forth his right hand
-towards Alexander, he exclaimed—“Recollect that you owe your life
-to me; this hand preserved you at the Granikus. Listen to the
-outspoken language of truth, or else abstain from asking freemen to
-supper, and confine yourself to the society of barbaric slaves.” All
-these reproaches stung Alexander to the quick. But nothing was so
-intolerable to him as the respectful sympathy for Parmenio, which
-brought to his memory one of the blackest deeds of his life—and the
-reminiscence of his preservation at the Granikus, which lowered
-him into the position of a debtor towards the very censor under
-whose reproof he was now smarting. At length wrath and intoxication
-together drove him into uncontrollable fury. He started from his
-couch, and felt for his dagger to spring at Kleitus; but the dagger
-had been put out of reach by one of his attendants. In a loud voice
-and with the Macedonian word of command, he summoned the body guards
-and ordered the trumpeter to sound an alarm. But no one obeyed so
-grave an order, given in his condition of drunkenness. His principal
-officers, Ptolemy, Perdikkas and others, clung round him, held his
-arms and body, and besought him to abstain from violence; others at
-the same time tried to silence Kleitus and hurry him out of the hall,
-which had now become a scene of tumult and consternation. But Kleitus
-was not in a humor to confess himself in the wrong by retiring; while
-Alexander, furious at the opposition now, for the first time, offered
-to his will, exclaimed, that his officers held him in chains as
-Bessus had held Darius, and left him nothing but the name of a king.
-Though anxious to restrain his movements, they doubtless did not dare
-to employ much physical force; so that his great personal strength,
-and continued efforts, presently set him free. He then snatched a
-pike from one of the soldiers, rushed upon Kleitus, and thrust him
-through on the spot, exclaiming, “Go now to Philip and Parmenio”.[503]
-
-  [503] Arrian, iv. 8; Curtius, viii. 1; Plutarch, Alexand. 50, 51;
-  Justin, xii. 6.
-
-  The description given by Diodorus was contained in the lost
-  part of his seventeenth book; the table of contents, prefixed
-  thereunto, notes the incident briefly.
-
-  All the authors describe in the same general way the
-  commencement, progress, and result, of this impressive scene in
-  the banqueting hall of Marakanda; but they differ materially
-  in the details. In giving what seems to me the most probable
-  account, I have borrowed partly from all, yet following mostly
-  the account given by Arrian from Ptolemy, himself present. For
-  Arrian’s narrative down to sect. 14 of c. 8 (before the words
-  Ἀριστόβουλος δὲ) may fairly be presumed to be derived from
-  Ptolemy.
-
-  Both Plutarch and Curtius describe the scene in a manner more
-  dishonorable to Alexander than Arrian; and at the same time
-  (in my judgment) less probable. Plutarch says that the brawl
-  took its rise from a poet named Pierion singing a song which
-  turned into derision those Macedonians who had been recently
-  defeated in Sogdiana; that Alexander and those around him greatly
-  applauded this satire; that Kleitus protested against such an
-  insult to soldiers, who, though unfortunate, had behaved with
-  unimpeachable bravery; that Alexander then turned upon Kleitus
-  saying, that he was seeking an excuse for himself by extenuating
-  cowardice in others; that Kleitus retorted by reminding him of
-  the preservation of his life at the Granikus. Alexander is thus
-  made to provoke the quarrel by aspersing the courage of Kleitus,
-  which I think noway probable; nor would he be likely to encourage
-  a song of that tenor.
-
-  Curtius agrees with Arrian in ascribing the origin of the
-  mischief to the extravagant boasts of Alexander and his
-  flatterers, and to their depreciation of Philip. He then tells
-  us that Kleitus, on hearing their unseemly talk, turned round
-  and whispered to his neighbor some lines out of the Andromachê
-  of Euripides (which lines Plutarch also ascribes to him, though
-  at a later moment); that Alexander, not hearing the words,
-  asked what had been said, but no one would tell him; at length
-  Kleitus himself repeated the sentiment in language of his own.
-  This would suit a literary Greek; but an old Macedonian officer
-  half intoxicated, when animated by a vehement sentiment, would
-  hardly express it by whispering a Greek poetical quotation to his
-  neighbor. He would either hold his tongue, or speak what he felt
-  broadly and directly. Nevertheless Curtius has stated two points
-  very material to the case, which do not appear in Arrian. 1. It
-  was Alexander himself, not his flatterers, who vilipended Philip;
-  at least the flatterers only did so after him, and following his
-  example. The topic would be dangerous for them to originate, and
-  might easily be carried too far. 2. Among all the topics touched
-  upon by Kleitus, none was so intolerable as the open expression
-  of sympathy, friendship, and regret for Parmenio. This stung
-  Alexander in the sorest point of his conscience; he must have
-  known that there were many present who sympathized with it; and
-  it was probably the main cause which worked him up to phrenzy.
-  Moreover we may be pretty sure that Kleitus, while expatiating
-  upon Philip, would not forget Philip’s general in chief and his
-  own old friend, Parmenio.
-
-  I cannot believe the statement of Aristobulus, that Kleitus was
-  forced by his friends out of the hall, and afterward returned
-  to it of his own accord, to defy Alexander once more. It seems
-  plain from Arrian that Ptolemy said no such thing. The murderous
-  impulse of Alexander was gratified on the spot, and without
-  delay, as soon as he got clear from the gentle restraint of his
-  surrounding friends.
-
-No sooner was the deed perpetrated, than the feelings of Alexander
-underwent an entire revolution. The spectacle of Kleitus, a bleeding
-corpse on the floor,—the marks of stupefaction and horror evident
-in all the spectators, and the reaction from a furious impulse
-instantaneously satiated—plunged him at once into the opposite
-extreme of remorse and self-condemnation. Hastening out of the
-hall, and retiring to bed, he passed three days in an agony of
-distress, without food or drink. He burst into tears and multiplied
-exclamations on his own mad act; he dwelt upon the name of Kleitus
-and Lanikê with the debt of gratitude which he owed to each, and
-denounced himself as unworthy to live after having requited such
-services with a foul murder.[504] His friends at length prevailed
-on him to take food, and return to activity. All joined in trying
-to restore his self-satisfaction. The Macedonian army passed a
-public vote that Kleitus had been justly slain, and that his body
-should remain unburied; which afforded opportunity to Alexander to
-reverse the vote, and to direct that it should be buried by his own
-order.[505] The prophets comforted him by the assurance that his
-murderous impulse had arisen, not from his own natural mind, but
-from a maddening perversion intentionally brought on by the god
-Dionysus, to avenge the omission of a sacrifice due to him on the
-day of the banquet, but withheld.[506] Lastly, the Greek sophist
-or philosopher, Anaxarchus of Abdera, revived Alexander’s spirits
-by well-timed flattery, treating his sensibility as nothing better
-than generous weakness; reminding him that in his exalted position
-of conqueror and Great King, he was entitled to prescribe what was
-right and just, instead of submitting himself to laws dictated from
-without.[507] Kallisthenes the philosopher was also summoned, along
-with Anaxarchus, to the king’s presence, for the same purpose of
-offering consolatory reflections. But he is said to have adopted a
-tone of discourse altogether different, and to have given offence
-rather than satisfaction to Alexander.
-
-  [504] Arrian, iv. 9, 4; Curtius, viii. 2, 2.
-
-  [505] Curtius, viii. 2, 12. “Quoque minus cædis puderet, jure
-  interfectum Clitum Macedones decernunt; sepulturâ quoque
-  prohibituri, ni rex humari jussisset.”
-
-  In explanation of this monstrous verdict of the soldiers, we must
-  recollect that the safety of the whole army (now at Samarcand,
-  almost beyond the boundary of inhabited regions, ἔξω τῆς
-  οἰκουμένης) was felt to depend on the life of Alexander. Compare
-  Justin, xii. 6, 15.
-
-  [506] Arrian, iv. 9, 6. Alexander imagined himself to have
-  incurred the displeasure of Dionysus by having sacked and
-  destroyed the city of Thebes, the supposed birth-place and
-  favorite locality of that god (Plutarch, Alex. 13).
-
-  The maddening delusion brought upon men by the wrath of Dionysus
-  is awfully depicted in the Bacchæ of Euripides. Under the
-  influence of that delusion, Agavê, mother of Pentheus, tears her
-  son in pieces and bears away his head in triumph, not knowing
-  what is in her hands. Compare also Eurip. Hippolyt. 440-1412.
-
-  [507] Arrian, iv. 9, 10; Plutarch. Alex. 52.
-
-To such remedial influences, and probably still more to the absolute
-necessity for action, Alexander’s remorse at length yielded. Like the
-other emotions of his fiery soul, it was violent and overpowering
-while it lasted. But it cannot be shown to have left any durable
-trace on his character, nor any effects justifying the unbounded
-admiration of Arrian; who has little but blame to bestow on the
-murdered Kleitus, while he expresses the strongest sympathy for the
-mental suffering of the murderer.
-
-After ten days,[508] Alexander again put his army in motion, to
-complete the subjugation of Sogdiana. He found no enemy capable of
-meeting him in pitched battle; yet Spitamenes, with the Sogdians and
-some Scythian allies, raised much hostility of detail, which it cost
-another year to put down. Alexander underwent the greatest fatigue
-and hardships in his marches through the mountainous parts of this
-wide, rugged, and poorly supplied country, with rocky positions,
-strong by nature, which his enemies sought to defend. One of these
-fastnesses, held by a native chief named Sisymithres, seemed almost
-unattackable, and was indeed taken rather by intimidation than by
-actual force.[509] The Scythians, after a partial success over a
-small Macedonian detachment, were at length so thoroughly beaten
-and overawed, that they slew Spitamenes and sent his head to the
-conqueror as a propitiatory offering.[510]
-
-  [508] Curtius, viii. 2, 13—“decem diebus ad confirmandum pudorem
-  apud Maracanda consumptis”, etc.
-
-  [509] Curtius, viii. 2, 20-30.
-
-  [510] Arrian, iv. 17, 11. Curtius (viii. 3) gives a different
-  narrative of the death of Spitamenes.
-
-After a short rest at Naütaka during the extreme winter, Alexander
-resumed operations, by attacking a strong post called the Sogdian
-Rock, whither a large number of fugitives had assembled, with
-an ample supply of provision. It was a precipice supposed to be
-inexpugnable; and would seemingly have proved so, in spite of the
-energy and abilities of Alexander, had not the occupants altogether
-neglected their guard, and yielded at the mere sight of a handful of
-Macedonians who had scrambled up the precipice. Among the captives,
-taken by Alexander on this rock, were the wife and family of the
-Baktrian chief Oxyartes; one of whose daughters, named Roxana, so
-captivated Alexander by her beauty that he resolved to make her
-his wife.[511] He then passed out of Sogdiana into the neighboring
-territory Parætakênê, where there was another inexpugnable site
-called the Rock of Choriênes, which he was also fortunate enough to
-reduce.[512]
-
-  [511] Arrian, iv. 18, 19.
-
-  [512] Arrian, iv. 21. Our geographical knowledge does not enable
-  us to verify these localities, or to follow Alexander in his
-  marches of detail.
-
-From hence Alexander went to Baktra. Sending Kraterus with a
-division to put the last hand to the reduction of Parætakênê, he
-himself remained at Baktra, preparing for his expedition across
-the Hindoo-Koosh to the conquest of India. As a security for the
-tranquillity of Baktria and Sogdiana during his absence, he levied
-30,000 young soldiers from those countries to accompany him.[513]
-
-  [513] Curtius, viii. 5, 1; Arrian, iv. 22, 2.
-
-It was at Baktra that Alexander celebrated his marriage with
-the captive Roxana. Amidst the repose and festivities connected
-with that event, the Oriental temper which he was now acquiring
-displayed itself more forcibly than ever. He could no longer be
-satisfied without obtaining prostration, or worship, from Greeks
-and Macedonians as well as from Persians; a public and unanimous
-recognition of his divine origin and superhuman dignity. Some Greeks
-and Macedonians had already rendered to him this homage. Nevertheless
-to the greater number, in spite of their extreme deference and
-admiration for him, it was repugnant and degrading. Even the
-imperious Alexander shrank from issuing public and formal orders on
-such a subject; but a manœuvre was concerted, with his privity, by
-the Persians and certain compliant Greek sophists or philosophers,
-for the purpose of carrying the point by surprise.
-
-During a banquet at Baktra, the philosopher Anaxarchus, addressing
-the assembly in a prepared harangue, extolled Alexander’s exploits as
-greatly surpassing those of Dionysus and Herakles. He proclaimed that
-Alexander had already done more than enough to establish a title to
-divine honors from the Macedonians; who, (he said) would assuredly
-worship Alexander after his death, and ought in justice to worship
-him during his life, forthwith.[514]
-
-  [514] Arrian, iv. 10, 7-9. Curtius (viii. 5, 9-13) represents
-  the speech proposing divine honors to have been delivered, not
-  by Anaxarchus, but by another lettered Greek, a Sicilian named
-  Kleon. The tenor of the speech is substantially the same, as
-  given by both authors.
-
-This harangue was applauded, and similar sentiments were enforced,
-by others favorable to the plan; who proceeded to set the example
-of immediate compliance, and were themselves the first to tender
-worship. Most of the Macedonian officers sat unmoved, disgusted at
-the speech. But though disgusted they said nothing. To reply to a
-speech doubtless well-turned and flowing, required some powers of
-oratory; moreover, it was well known that whoever dared to reply
-stood marked out for the antipathy of Alexander. The fate of
-Kleitus, who had arraigned the same sentiments in the banqueting
-hall of Marakanda, was fresh in the recollection of every one. The
-repugnance which many felt, but none ventured to express, at length
-found an organ in Kallisthenes of Olynthus.
-
-This philosopher, whose melancholy fate imparts a peculiar interest
-to his name, was nephew of Aristotle, and had enjoyed through his
-uncle an early acquaintance with Alexander during the boyhood of
-the latter. At the recommendation of Aristotle, Kallisthenes had
-accompanied Alexander in his Asiatic expedition. He was a man of
-much literary and rhetorical talent, which he turned towards the
-composition of history—and to the history of recent times.[515]
-Alexander, full of ardor for conquest, was at the same time anxious
-that his achievements should be commemorated by poets and men
-of letters;[516] there were seasons also when he enjoyed their
-conversation. On both these grounds, he invited several of them
-to accompany the army. The more prudent among them declined, but
-Kallisthenes obeyed, partly in hopes of procuring the reconstitution
-of his native city Olynthus, as Aristotle had obtained the like
-favor for Stageira.[517] Kallisthenes had composed a narrative (not
-preserved) of Alexander’s exploits, which certainly reached to
-the battle of Arbela, and may perhaps have gone down farther. The
-few fragments of this narrative remaining seem to betoken extreme
-admiration, not merely of the bravery and ability, but also of the
-transcendent and unbroken good fortune, of Alexander—marking him
-out as the chosen favorite of the gods. This feeling was perfectly
-natural under the grandeur of the events. Insofar as we can judge
-from one or two specimens, Kallisthenes was full of complimentary
-tribute to the hero of his history. But the character of Alexander
-himself had undergone a material change during the six years between
-his first landing in Asia and his campaign in Sogdiana. All his worst
-qualities had been developed by unparalleled success and by Asiatic
-example. He required larger doses of flattery, and had now come to
-thirst, not merely for the reputation of divine paternity, but for
-the actual manifestations of worship as towards a god.
-
-  [515] Kallisthenes had composed three historical works—1.
-  Hellenica—from the year 387-357 B. C. 2. History of the
-  sacred war—from 357-346 B. C. 3. Τὰ κατ᾽ Ἀλέξανδρον.
-  His style is said by Cicero to have been rhetorical; but the
-  Alexandrine critics included him in their Canon of Historians.
-  See Didot, Fragm. Hist. Alex. Magn. p. 6-9.
-
-  [516] See the observation ascribed to him expressing envy towards
-  Achilles for having been immortalized by Homer (Arrian, i. 12, 2).
-
-  [517] It is said that Ephorus, Xenokrates, and Menedemus, all
-  declined the invitation of Alexander (Plutarch, De Stoicorum
-  Repugnantiis, p. 1043). Respecting Menedemus, the fact can hardly
-  be so: he must have been then too young to be invited.
-
-To the literary Greeks who accompanied Alexander, this change in
-his temper must have been especially palpable and full of serious
-consequence; since it was chiefly manifested, not at periods of
-active military duty, but at his hours of leisure, when he recreated
-himself by their conversation and discourses. Several of these
-Greeks—Anaxarchus, Kleon, the poet Agis of Argos—accommodated
-themselves to the change, and wound up their flatteries to the
-pitch required. Kallisthenes could not do so. He was a man of
-sedate character, of simple, severe, and almost unsocial habits—to
-whose sobriety the long Macedonian potations were distasteful.
-Aristotle said of him, that he was a great and powerful speaker,
-but that he had no judgment; according to other reports, he was a
-vain and arrogant man, who boasted that Alexander’s reputation and
-immortality were dependent on the composition and tone of _his_
-history.[518] Of personal vanity,—a common quality among literary
-Greeks,—Kallisthenes probably had his full share. But there is no
-ground for believing that _his_ character had altered. Whatever his
-vanity may have been, it had given no offence to Alexander during the
-earlier years, nor would it have given offence now, had not Alexander
-himself become a different man.
-
-  [518] Arrian, iv. 10, 2; Plutarch, Alex. 53, 54. It is
-  remarkable that Timmæus denounced Kallisthenes as having in
-  his historical work flattered Alexander to excess (Polybius,
-  xii. 12). Kallisthenes seems to have recognized various special
-  interpositions of the gods, to aid Alexander’s successes—see
-  Fragments 25 and 36 of the Fragmenta Callisthenis in the edition
-  of Didot.
-
-  In reading the censure which Arrian passes on the arrogant
-  pretensions of Kallisthenes, we ought at the same time to
-  read the pretensions raised by Arrian on his own behalf as an
-  historian (i. 12, 7-9)—καὶ ἐπὶ τῷδε οὐκ ἀπαξιῶ ἐμαυτὸν τῶν
-  πρώτων ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῇ Ἑλλάδι, εἴπερ καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος τῶν ἐν τοῖς
-  ὅπλοις, etc. I doubt much whether Kallisthenes pitched his
-  self-estimation so high. In this chapter, Arrian recounts, that
-  Alexander envied Achilles for having been fortunate enough to
-  obtain such a poet as Homer for panegyrist; and Arrian laments
-  that Alexander had not, as yet, found an historian equal to his
-  deserts. This, in point of fact, is a reassertion of the same
-  truth which Kallisthenes stands condemned for asserting—that the
-  fame even of the greatest warrior depends upon his commemorators.
-  The boastfulness of a poet is at least pardonable, when he
-  exclaims, like Theokritus, Idyll. xvi. 73—
-
-    Ἔσσεται οὗτος ἀνὴρ, ὃς ἐμεῦ κεχρήσετ᾽ ἀοιδοῦ,
-    Ῥέξας ἢ Ἀχιλεὺς ὅσσον μέγας, ἢ βαρὺς Αἴας
-    Ἐν πεδίῳ Σιμόεντος, ὅθι Φρυγὸς ἠρίον ῎Ιλου.
-
-On occasion of the demonstration led up by Anaxarchus at the banquet,
-Kallisthenes had been invited by Hephæstion to join in the worship
-intended to be proposed towards Alexander; and Hephæstion afterwards
-alleged, that he had promised to comply.[519] But his actual conduct
-affords reasonable ground for believing that he made no such promise;
-for he not only thought it his duty to refuse the act of worship,
-but also to state publicly his reasons for disapproving it; the more
-so, as he perceived that most of the Macedonians present felt like
-himself. He contended that the distinction between gods and men
-was one which could not be confounded without impiety and wrong.
-Alexander had amply earned,—as a man, a general, and a king,—the
-highest honors compatible with humanity; but to exalt him into a
-god would be both an injury to him, and an offence to the gods.
-Anaxarchus (he said) was the last person from whom such a proposition
-ought to come, because he was one of those whose only title to
-Alexander’s society was founded upon his capacity to give instructive
-and wholesome counsel.[520]
-
-  [519] Plutarch, Alex. 55.
-
-  [520] Arrian, iv. 11. ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ τε καὶ παιδεύσει Ἀλεξάνδρῳ
-  συνόντα.
-
-Kallisthenes here spoke out, what numbers of his hearers felt.
-The speech was not only approved, but so warmly applauded by the
-Macedonians present, especially the older officers,—that Alexander
-thought it prudent to forbid all farther discussion upon this
-delicate subject. Presently the Persians present, according to
-Asiatic custom, approached him and performed their prostration; after
-which Alexander pledged, in successive goblets of wine, those Greeks
-and Macedonians with whom he had held previous concert. To each of
-them the goblet was handed, and each, after drinking to answer the
-pledge, approached the king, made his prostration, and then received
-a salute. Lastly, Alexander sent the pledge to Kallisthenes, who,
-after drinking like the rest, approached him, for the purpose of
-receiving the salute, but without any prostration. Of this omission
-Alexander was expressly informed by one of the Companions; upon which
-he declined to admit Kallisthenes to a salute. The latter retired,
-observing, “Then I shall go away, worse off than others as far as the
-salute goes.”[521]
-
-  [521] Arrian, iv. 12, 7. φιλήματι ἔλαττον ἔχων ἄπειμι.
-
-Kallisthenes was imprudent, and even blamable, in making this last
-observation, which without any necessity or advantage, aggravated
-the offence already given to Alexander. He was more imprudent
-still, if we look simply to his own personal safety in standing
-forward publicly to protest against the suggestion for rendering
-divine honors to that prince, and in thus creating the main offence
-which even in itself was inexpiable. But here the occasion was one
-serious and important, so as to convert the imprudence into an act
-of genuine moral courage. The question was, not about obeying an
-order given by Alexander, for no order had been given—but about
-accepting or rejecting a motion made by Anaxarchus; which Alexander,
-by a shabby, preconcerted manœuvre, affected to leave to the free
-decision of the assembly, in full confidence that no one would be
-found intrepid enough to oppose it. If one Greek sophist made a
-proposition, in itself servile and disgraceful, another sophist could
-do himself nothing but honor by entering public protest against it;
-more especially since this was done (as we may see by the report in
-Arrian) in terms no way insulting, but full of respectful admiration,
-towards Alexander personally. The perfect success of the speech
-is in itself a proof of the propriety of its tone;[522] for the
-Macedonian officers would feel indifference, if not contempt towards
-a rhetor like Kallisthenes, while towards Alexander they had the
-greatest deference short of actual worship. There are few occasions
-on which the free spirit of Greek letters and Greek citizenship, in
-their protest against exorbitant individual insolence, appears more
-conspicuous and estimable than in the speech of Kallisthenes.[523]
-Arrian disapproves the purpose of Alexander, and strongly blames
-the motion of Anaxarchus; nevertheless, such is his anxiety to find
-some excuse for Alexander, that he also blames Kallisthenes for
-unseasonable frankness, folly, and insolence, in offering opposition.
-He might have said with some truth, that Kallisthenes would have done
-well to withdraw earlier (if indeed he could have withdrawn without
-offence) from the camp of Alexander, in which no lettered Greek could
-now associate without abnegating his freedom of speech and sentiment,
-and emulating the servility of Anaxarchus. But being present, as
-Kallisthenes was, in the hall at Baktra when the proposition of
-Anaxarchus was made, and when silence would have been assent—his
-protest against it was both seasonable and dignified; and all the
-more dignified for being fraught with danger to himself.
-
-  [522] Arrian, iv. 12, 1. ἀνιᾶσαι μὲν μεγαλωστὶ Ἀλέξανδρον,
-  Μακεδόσι δὲ πρὸς θυμοῦ εἰπεῖν....
-
-  Curtius, viii. 5, 20. “Æquis auribus Callisthenes velut vindex
-  publicæ libertatis audiebatur. Expresserat non assensionem modo,
-  sed etiam vocem, seniorum præcipuè quibus gravis erat inveterati
-  moris externa mutatio.”
-
-  [523] There was no sentiment more deeply rooted in the free
-  Grecian mind, prior to Alexander’s conquests, than the repugnance
-  to arrogant aspirations on the part of the fortunate man,
-  swelling himself above the limits of humanity—and the belief
-  that such aspirations were followed by the Nemesis of the gods.
-  In the dying speech which Xenophon puts into the mouth of Cyrus
-  the Great, we find—“Ye gods, I thank you much, that I have
-  been sensible of your care for me, and that I have never in my
-  successes raised my thoughts above the measure of man” (Cyropæd.
-  viii. 7, 3). Among the most striking illustrations of this
-  sentiment is, the story of Solon and Crœsus (Herodot. i. 32-34).
-
-  I shall recount in the next chapter examples of monstrous
-  flattery on the part of the Athenians, proving how this sentiment
-  expired with their freedom.
-
-Kallisthenes knew that danger well, and was quickly enabled to
-recognize it in the altered demeanor of Alexander towards him. He
-was, from that day, a marked man in two senses: first, to Alexander
-himself, as well as to the rival sophists and all promoters of
-the intended deification,—for hatred, and for getting up some
-accusatory pretence such as might serve to ruin him; next, to the
-more free-spirited Macedonians, indignant witnesses of Alexander’s
-increased insolence, and admirers of the courageous Greek who had
-protested against the motion of Anaxarchus. By such men he was
-doubtless much extolled; which praises aggravated his danger, as they
-were sure to be reported to Alexander. The pretext for his ruin was
-not long wanting.
-
-Among those who admired and sought the conversation of Kallisthenes,
-was Hermolaus, one of the royal pages—the band, selected from noble
-Macedonian families, who did duty about the person of the king. It
-had happened that this young man, one of Alexander’s companions in
-the chase, on seeing a wild boar rushing up to attack the king,
-darted his javelin, and slew the animal. Alexander, angry to be
-anticipated in killing the boar, ordered Hermolaus to be scourged
-before all the other pages, and deprived him of his horse.[524] Thus
-humiliated and outraged—for an act not merely innocent, but the
-omission of which, if Alexander had sustained any injury from the
-boar, might have been held punishable—Hermolaus became resolutely
-bent on revenge.[525] He enlisted in the project his intimate friend
-Sostratus, with several others among the pages, and it was agreed
-among them to kill Alexander in his chamber, on the first night when
-they were all on guard together. The appointed night arrived, without
-any divulgation of their secret; yet the scheme was frustrated
-by the accident, that Alexander continued till daybreak drinking
-with his officers, and never retired to bed. On the morrow, one
-of the conspirators, becoming alarmed or repentant, divulged the
-scheme to his friend Charikles, with the names of those concerned.
-Eurylochus, brother to Charikles, apprised by him of what he had
-heard, immediately informed Ptolemy, through whom it was conveyed to
-Alexander. By Alexander’s order, the persons indicated were arrested
-and put to the torture;[526] under which they confessed that they had
-themselves conspired to kill him, but named no other accomplices,
-and even denied that any one else was privy to the scheme. In this
-denial they persisted, though extreme suffering was applied to extort
-the revelation of new names. They were then brought up and arraigned
-as conspirators before the assembled Macedonian soldiers. There
-their confession was repeated. It is even said that Hermolaus, in
-repeating it, boasted of the enterprise as legitimate and glorious;
-denouncing the tyranny and cruelty of Alexander us having become
-insupportable to a freeman. Whether such boast was actually made or
-not, the persons brought up were pronounced guilty, and stoned to
-death forthwith by the soldiers.[527]
-
-  [524] Plutarch, Alexand. 54. He refers to Hermippus, who mentions
-  what was told to Aristotle by Strœbus, the reader attendant on
-  Kallisthenes.
-
-  [525] Arrian, iv. 13; Curtius, viii. 6, 7.
-
-  [526] Arrian, iv. 13, 13.
-
-  [527] Arrian, iv, 14, 4. Curtius expands this scene into great
-  detail; composing a long speech for Hermolaus, and another for
-  Alexander (viii. 6, 7, 8).
-
-  He says that the soldiers who executed these pages, tortured them
-  first, in order to manifest zeal for Alexander (viii. 8, 20).
-
-The pages thus executed were young men of good Macedonian families,
-for whose condemnation accordingly, Alexander had thought it
-necessary to invoke—what he was sure of obtaining against any
-one—the sentence of the soldiers. To satisfy his hatred against
-Kallisthenes—not a Macedonian, but only a Greek citizen, one of
-the surviving remnants of the subverted city of Olynthus—no such
-formality was required.[528] As yet, there was not a shadow of proof
-to implicate this philosopher; for obnoxious as his name was known
-to be, Hermolaus and his companions had, with exemplary fortitude,
-declined to purchase the chance of respite from extreme torture by
-pronouncing it. Their confessions,—all extorted by suffering, unless
-confirmed by other evidence, of which we do not know whether any
-was taken—were hardly of the least value, even against themselves;
-but against Kallisthenes, they had no bearing whatever; nay, they
-tended indirectly, not to convict, but to absolve him. In his case,
-therefore, as in that of Philotas before, it was necessary to pick
-up matter of suspicious tendency from his reported remarks and
-conversations. He was alleged[529] to have addressed dangerous and
-inflammatory language to the pages, holding up Alexander to odium,
-instigating them to conspiracy, and pointing out Athens as a place of
-refuge; he was moreover well known to have been often in conversation
-with Hermolaus. For a man of the violent temper and omnipotent
-authority of Alexander, such indications were quite sufficient as
-grounds of action against one whom he hated.
-
-  [528] “Quem, si Macedo esset (Callisthenem), tecum introduxissem,
-  dignissimum te discipulo magistrum: nunc Olynthio non idem
-  juris est” (Curtius. viii. 8, 19—speech of Alexander before the
-  soldiers addressing Hermolaus especially).
-
-  [529] Plutarch, Alexand. 55; Arrian, iv. 10, 4.
-
-On this occasion, we have the state of Alexander’s mind disclosed
-by himself, in one of the references to his letters given by
-Plutarch. Writing to Kraterus and to others immediately afterwards,
-Alexander distinctly stated that the pages throughout all their
-torture had deposed against no one but themselves. Nevertheless, in
-another letter, addressed to Antipater in Macedonia, he used these
-expressions—“The pages were stoned to death by the Macedonians; but
-I myself shall punish the sophist, as well as those who sent him
-out here, and those who harbor in their cities conspirators against
-me.”[530] The sophist Kallisthenes had been sent out by Aristotle,
-who is here designated; and probably the Athenians after him.
-Fortunately for Aristotle, he was not at Baktra, but at Athens. That
-he could have had any concern in the conspiracy of the pages, was
-impossible. In this savage outburst of menace against his absent
-preceptor, Alexander discloses the real state of feeling which
-prompted him to the destruction of Kallisthenes; hatred towards that
-spirit of citizenship and free speech, which Kallisthenes not only
-cherished, in common with Aristotle and most other literary Greeks,
-but had courageously manifested in his protest against the motion for
-worshipping a mortal.
-
-  [530] Plutarch, Alex. 55. Καίτοι τῶν περὶ Ἑρμόλαον οὐδεὶς
-  οὐδὲ διὰ τῆς ἐσχάτης ἀνάγκης Καλλισθένους κατεῖπεν. Ἀλλὰ καὶ
-  Ἀλέξανδρος ~αὐτὸς εὐθὺς γράφων~ Κρατερῷ καὶ Ἀττάλῳ καὶ Ἀλκέτᾳ
-  φησὶ τοὺς παῖδας βασανιζομένους ὁμολογεῖν, ὡς αὐτοὶ ταῦτα
-  πράξειαν, ~ἄλλος δὲ οὐδεὶς συνειδείη~. Ὕστερον δὲ γράφων πρὸς
-  Ἀντίπατρον, καὶ τὸν Καλλισθένην συνεπαιτιασάμενος, Οἱ μὲν παῖδές,
-  φησιν, ὑπὸ τῶν Μακεδόνων κατελεύσθησαν, ~τὸν δὲ σοφιστὴν ἐγὼ
-  κολάσω~, καὶ ~τοὺς ἐκπέμψαντας αὐτὸν~, καὶ τοὺς ὑποδεχομένους
-  ταῖς πόλεσι τοὺς ἐμοὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντας ... ἄντικρυς ἔν γε τούτοις
-  ἀποκαλυπτόμενος πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλην, etc.
-
-  About the hostile dispositions of Alexander towards Aristotle,
-  see Dio Chrysostom, Orat. 64. de Fortunâ, p. 598.
-
-  Kraterus was at this time absent in Sogdiana, engaged in
-  finishing the suppression of the resistance (Arrian, iv. 22, 1).
-  To him, therefore, Alexander would naturally write.
-
-  This statement, from the pen of Alexander himself, distinctly
-  contradicts and refutes (as I have before observed) the
-  affirmation of Ptolemy and Aristobulus as given by Arrian (iv.
-  14, 1)—that the pages deposed against Kallisthenes.
-
-Kallisthenes was first put to the torture and then hanged.[531]
-His tragical fate excited a profound sentiment of sympathy and
-indignation among the philosophers of antiquity.[532]
-
-  [531] Arrian, iv. 14, 5. Curtius also says—“Callisthenes quoque
-  tortus interiit, initi consilii in caput regis innoxius, sed
-  haudquaquam aulæ et assentantium accommodatus ingenio (viii. 8,
-  21).” Compare Plutarch, Alex. 55.
-
-  This is the statement of Ptolemy; who was himself concerned in
-  the transactions, and was the officer through whom the conspiracy
-  of the pages had been revealed. His partiality might permit him
-  to omit or soften what was discreditable to Alexander, but he may
-  be fully trusted when he records an act of cruelty. Aristobulus
-  and others affirmed that Kallisthenes was put in chains and
-  carried about in this condition for some time; after which he
-  died of disease and a wretched state of body. But the witnesses
-  here are persons whose means of information we do not know to
-  be so good as those of Ptolemy; besides that, the statement is
-  intrinsically less probable.
-
-  [532] See the language of Seneca, Nat. Quæst. vi. 23; Plutarch,
-  De Adulator. et Amici Discrimine, p. 65; Theophrast. ap. Ciceron.
-  Tusc. Disp. iii. 10.
-
-  Curtius says that this treatment of Kallisthenes was followed by
-  a late repentance on the part of Alexander (viii. 8, 23). On this
-  point there is no other evidence—nor can I think the statement
-  probable.
-
-The halts of Alexander were formidable to friends and companions;
-his marches, to the unconquered natives whom he chose to treat as
-enemies. On the return of Kraterus from Sogdiana, Alexander began his
-march from Baktra (Balkh) southward to the mountain range Paropamisus
-or Caucasus (Hindoo-Koosh); leaving however at Baktra Amyntas, with a
-large force of 10,000 foot and 3500 horse, to keep these intractable
-territories in subjugation.[533] His march over the mountains
-occupied ten days; he then visited his newly-founded city Alexandria
-in the Paropamisadæ. At or near the river Kophen (Kabool river),
-he was joined by Taxiles, a powerful Indian prince, who brought
-as a present twenty-five elephants, and whose alliance was very
-valuable to him. He then divided his army, sending one division under
-Hephæstion and Perdikkas, towards the territory called Peukelaôtis
-(apparently that immediately north of the confluence of the Kabool
-river with the Indus); and conducting the remainder himself in
-an easterly direction, over the mountainous regions between the
-Hindoo-Koosh and the right bank of the Indus. Hephæstion was ordered,
-after subduing all enemies in his way, to prepare a bridge ready for
-passing the Indus by the time when Alexander should arrive. Astes,
-prince of Peukelaôtis, was taken and slain in the city where he had
-shut himself up; but the reduction of it cost Hephæstion a siege of
-thirty days.[534]
-
-  [533] Arrian, iv. 22, 4.
-
-  [534] Arrian, iv. 22, 8-12.
-
-Alexander, with his own half of the army, undertook the reduction
-of the Aspasii, the Guræi, and the Assakeni, tribes occupying
-mountainous and difficult localities along the southern slopes
-of the Hindoo-Koosh; but neither they nor their various towns
-mentioned—Arigæon, Massaga, Bazira, Ora, Dyrta, etc., except perhaps
-the remarkable rock of Aornos,[535] near the Indus—can be more
-exactly identified. These tribes were generally brave, and seconded
-by towns of strong position as well as by a rugged country, in many
-parts utterly without roads.[536] But their defence was conducted
-with little union, no military skill, and miserable weapons; so that
-they were no way qualified to oppose the excellent combination and
-rapid movements of Alexander, together with the confident attack and
-very superior arms, offensive, as well as defensive, of his soldiers.
-All those who attempted resistance were successively attacked,
-overpowered and slain. Even those who did not resist, but fled to the
-mountains, were pursued, and either slaughtered or sold for slaves.
-The only way of escaping the sword was to remain, submit, and await
-the fiat of the invader. Such a series of uninterrupted successes,
-all achieved with little loss, it is rare in military history to
-read. The capture of the rock of Aornos was peculiarly gratifying
-to Alexander, because it enjoyed the legendary reputation of having
-been assailed in vain by Herakles—and indeed he himself had deemed
-it, at first sight, unassailable. After having thus subdued the upper
-regions (above Attock or the confluence of the Kabul river) on the
-right bank of the Indus, he availed himself of some forests alongside
-to fell timber and build boats. These boats were sent down the
-stream, to the point where Hephæstion and Perdikkas were preparing
-the bridge.[537]
-
-  [535] Respecting the rock called Aornos, a valuable and elaborate
-  article, entitled “Gradus ad Aornon” has been published by Major
-  Abbott in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, No. iv.
-  1854. This article gives much information, collected mainly by
-  inquiries on the spot, and accompanied by a map, about the very
-  little known country west of the Indus, between the Kabool river
-  on the south, and the Hindoo-Koosh on the north.
-
-  Major Abbott attempts to follow the march and operations of
-  Alexander, from Alexandria ad Caucasum to the rock of Aornos (p.
-  311 _seq._). He shows highly probable reason for believing that
-  the Aornos described by Arrian is the Mount Mahabunn, near the
-  right bank of the Indus (lat. 34° 20´), about sixty miles above
-  its confluence with the Kabool river. “The whole account of
-  Arrian of the rock Aornos is a faithful picture of the Mahabunn.
-  It was the most remarkable feature of the country. It was the
-  refuge of all the neighboring tribes. It was covered with forest.
-  It had good soil sufficient for a thousand ploughs, and pure
-  springs of water everywhere abounded. It was 4125 feet above the
-  plain, and fourteen miles in circuit. The summit was a plain
-  where cavalry could act. It would be difficult to offer a more
-  faithful description of the Mahabunn. The side on which Alexander
-  scaled the main summit had certainly the character of a rock. But
-  the whole description of Arrian indicates a table mountain” (p.
-  341). The Mahabunn “is a mountain table, scarped on the east by
-  tremendous precipices, from which descends one large spur down
-  upon the Indus between Sitana and Umb” (p. 340).
-
-  To this similarity in so many local features, is to be added the
-  remarkable coincidence of name, between the town Embolima, where
-  Arrian states that Alexander established his camp for the purpose
-  of attacking Aornos—and the modern names Umb and Balimah (between
-  the Mahabunn and the Indus)—“the one in the river valley, the
-  other on the mountain immediately above it” (p. 344). Mount
-  Mahabunn is the natural refuge for the people of the neighborhood
-  from a conqueror, and was among the places taken by Nadir Shah
-  (p. 338).
-
-  A strong case of identity is thus made out between this mountain
-  and the Aornos _described by Arrian_. But undoubtedly it does not
-  coincide with the Aornos _described by Curtius_, who compares
-  Aornos to a Meta (the conical goal of the stadium), and says that
-  the Indus washed its base,—that at the first assault several
-  Macedonian soldiers were hurled down into the river. This close
-  juxtaposition of the Indus has been the principal feature looked
-  for by travellers who have sought for Aornos; but no place has
-  yet been found answering the conditions required. We have here
-  to make our election between Arrian and Curtius. Now there is
-  a general presumption in Arrian’s favor, in the description of
-  military operations, where he makes a positive statement; but in
-  this case, the presumption is peculiarly strong, because Ptolemy
-  was in the most conspicuous and difficult command for the capture
-  of Aornos, and was therefore likely to be particular in the
-  description of a scene where he had reaped much glory.
-
-  [536] Arrian, iv. 30, 13. ἡ στρατιὰ αὐτῷ ὡδοποίει τὸ πρόσω ἰοῦσα,
-  ἄπορα ἄλλως ὄντα τὰ ταύτῃ χωρία, etc.
-
-  The countries here traversed by Alexander include parts of
-  Kafiristan, Swart, Bajore, Chitral, the neighborhood of the
-  Kameh and other affluents of the river Kabul before it falls
-  into the Indus near Attock. Most of this is Terra Incognita
-  even at present; especially Kafiristan, a territory inhabited
-  by a population said to be rude and barbarous, but which has
-  never been conquered—nor indeed ever visited by strangers. It is
-  remarkable, that among the inhabitants of Kafiristan,—as well
-  as among those of Badakshan, on the other or northern side of
-  the Hindoo-Koosh—there exist traditions respecting Alexander,
-  together with a sort of belief that they themselves are descended
-  from his soldiers. See Ritter’s Erdkunde, part vii. book iii. p.
-  200 _seq._; Burnes’s Travels, vol. iii. ch. 4. p. 186, 2nd ed.;
-  Wilson, Ariana Antiqua, p. 194 _seq._
-
-  [537] Arrian, iv. 30, 16; v. 7, 2.
-
-Such fatiguing operations of Alexander, accomplished amidst all
-the hardships of winter, were followed by a halt of thirty days,
-to refresh the soldiers before he crossed the Indus, in the early
-spring of 326 B. C.[538] It is presumed, probably enough,
-that he crossed at or near Attock, the passage now frequented. He
-first marched to Taxila, where the prince Taxilus at once submitted,
-and reinforced the army with a strong contingent of Indian soldiers.
-His alliance and information was found extremely valuable. The whole
-neighboring territory submitted, and was placed under Philippus
-as satrap, with a garrison and depôt at Taxila. He experienced no
-resistance until he reached the river Hydaspes (Jelum), on the other
-side of which the Indian prince Porus stood prepared to dispute
-the passage; a brave man, with a formidable force, better armed
-than Indians generally were, and with many trained elephants; which
-animals the Macedonians had never yet encountered in battle. By
-a series of admirable military combinations, Alexander eluded the
-vigilance of Porus, stole the passage of the river at a point a
-few miles above, and completely defeated the Indian army. In spite
-of their elephants, which were skilfully managed, the Indians
-could not long withstand the shock of close combat, against such
-cavalry and infantry as the Macedonian. Porus, a prince of gigantic
-stature, mounted on an elephant, fought with the utmost gallantry,
-rallying his broken troops and keeping them together until the last.
-Having seen two of his sons slain, himself wounded and perishing
-with thirst, he was only preserved by the special directions of
-Alexander. When Porus was brought before him, Alexander was struck
-with admiration at his stature, beauty, and undaunted bearing.[539]
-Addressing him first, he asked, what Porus wished to be done for
-him. “That you should treat me as a king,” was the reply of Porus.
-Alexander, delighted with these words, behaved towards Porus with
-the utmost courtesy and generosity; not only ensuring to him his
-actual kingdom, but enlarging it by new additions. He found in
-Porus a faithful and efficient ally. This was the greatest day of
-Alexander’s life; if we take together the splendor and difficulty of
-the military achievement, and the generous treatment of his conquered
-opponent.[540]
-
-  [538] The halt of thirty days is mentioned by Diodorus, xvii. 86.
-  For the proof that these operations took place in winter, see the
-  valuable citation from Aristobulus given in Strabo (xv. p. 691).
-
-  [539] Arrian. v. 19, 1. Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ ὡς προσάγοντα ἐπύθετο,
-  προσιππεύσας πρὸ τῆς τάξεως σὺν ὀλίγοις τῶν ἑταίρων ἀπαντᾷ τῷ
-  Πώρῳ, καὶ ἐπιστήσας τὸν ἵππον, τό τε μέγεθος ἐθαύμαζεν ὑπὲρ πέντε
-  πήχεις μάλιστα ξυμβαῖνον, ~καὶ τὸ κάλλος τοῦ Πώρου~, καὶ ὅτι οὐ
-  δεδουλωμένος τῇ γνώμῃ ἐφαίνετο, etc.
-
-  We see here how Alexander was struck with the stature and
-  personal beauty of Porus, and how much these visual impressions
-  contributed to determine, or at least to strengthen, his
-  favorable sympathies towards the captive prince. This illustrates
-  what I have observed in the last chapter, in recounting his
-  treatment of the eunuch Batis after the capture of Gaza; that
-  the repulsive appearance of Batis greatly heightened Alexander’s
-  indignation. With a man of such violent impulses as Alexander,
-  these external impressions were of no inconsiderable moment.
-
-  [540] These operations are described in Arrian, v. 9. v. 19 (we
-  may remark that Ptolemy and Aristobulus, though both present,
-  differed on many points, v. 14); Curtius, viii. 13, 14; Diodor.
-  xvii. 87, 88. According to Plutarch (Alex. 60), Alexander dwelt
-  much upon the battle in his own letters.
-
-  There are two principal points—Jelum and Julalpoor—where high
-  roads from the Indus now cross the Hydaspes. Each of these
-  points have been assigned by different writers, as the probable
-  scene of the crossing of the river by Alexander. Of the two
-  Jelum (rather higher up the river than Julalpoor) seems the more
-  probable. Burnes points out that near Jelum the river is divided
-  into five or six channels with islands (Travels, vol. ii. ch. 2.
-  p. 50, 2nd ed.). Captain Abbott (in the Journal of the Asiatic
-  Society, Calcutta, Dec. 1848) has given an interesting memoir on
-  the features and course of the Hydaspes a little above Jelum,
-  comparing them with the particulars stated by Arrian, and showing
-  highly plausible reasons in support of this hypothesis—that the
-  crossing took place near Jelum.
-
-  Diodorus mentions a halt of thirty days, after the victory (xvii.
-  89), which seems not probable. Both he and Curtius allude to
-  numerous serpents, by which the army was annoyed between the
-  Akesines and the Hydraotes (Curtius, ix. 1, 11).
-
-Alexander celebrated his victory by sacrifices to the gods, and
-festivities on the banks of the Hydaspes; where he also gave
-directions for the foundation of two cities—Nikæa, on the eastern
-bank; and Bukephalia, on the western, so named in commemoration of
-his favorite horse, who died here of age and fatigue.[541] Leaving
-Kraterus to lay out and erect these new establishments, as well
-as to keep up communication, he conducted his army onward in an
-easterly direction towards the river Akesines (Chenab).[542] His
-recent victory had spread terror around; the Glaukæ, a powerful
-Indian tribe, with thirty-seven towns and many populous villages,
-submitted, and were placed under the dominion of Porus; while
-embassies of submission were also received from two considerable
-princes—Abisares, and a second Porus, hitherto at enmity with his
-namesake. The passage of the great river Akesines, now full and
-impetuous in its current, was accomplished by boats and by inflated
-hides, yet not without difficulty and danger. From thence he
-proceeded onward in the same direction, across the Punjab—finding
-no enemies, but leaving detachments at suitable posts to keep up
-his communications and ensure his supplies—to the river Hydraotes
-or Ravee; which, though not less broad and full than the Akesines,
-was comparatively tranquil, so as to be crossed with facility.[543]
-Here some free Indian tribes, Kathæans and others, had the courage
-to resist. They first attempted to maintain themselves in Sangala by
-surrounding their town with a triple entrenchment of waggons. These
-being attacked and carried, they were driven within the walls, which
-they now began to despair of defending, and resolved to evacuate by
-night. But the project was divulged to Alexander by deserters, and
-frustrated by his vigilance. On the next day, he took the town by
-storm, putting to the sword 17,000 Indians, and taking (according to
-Arrian) 70,000 captives. His own loss before the town was less than
-100 killed, and 1200 wounded. Two neighboring towns, in alliance with
-Sangala, were evacuated by their terrified inhabitants. Alexander
-pursued, but could not overtake them, except 500 sick or weakly
-persons, whom his soldiers put to death. Demolishing the town of
-Sangala, he added the territory to the dominion of Porus, then
-present, with a contingent of 5000 Indians.[544]
-
-  [541] Arrian states (v. 19, 5) that the victory over Porus
-  was gained in the month Munychion of the archon Hegemon at
-  Athens—that is, about the end of April, 326 B. C. This
-  date is not to be reconciled with another passage, v. 9, 6—where
-  he says that the summer solstice had already passed, and that all
-  the rivers of the Punjab were full of water, turbid and violent.
-
-  This swelling of the rivers begins about June; they do not attain
-  their full height until August. Moreover, the description of the
-  battle, as given both by Arrian and by Curtius, implies that it
-  took place after the rainy season had begun (Arrian, v. 9, 7; v.
-  12, 5. Curtius, viii. 14, 4).
-
-  Some critics have proposed to read _Metageitnion_ (July-August)
-  as the month, instead of _Munychion_; an alteration approved by
-  Mr. Clinton and received into the text by Schmieder. But if this
-  alteration be admitted, the name of the Athenian archon must be
-  altered also; for Metageitnion of the archon Hegemon would be
-  eight months earlier (July-August, 327 B. C.); and at
-  this date Alexander had not as yet crossed the Indus, as the
-  passage of Aristobulus (ap. Strabo. xv. p. 691) plainly shows—and
-  as Droysen and Mützel remark. Alexander did not cross the Indus
-  before the spring of 326 B. C. If, in place of the
-  archon Hegemon, we substitute the next following archon Chremês
-  (and it is remarkable that Diodorus assigns the battle to this
-  later archonship, xvii. 87), this would be July-August 326 B. C.;
-  which would be a more admissible date for the battle than the
-  preceding month of Munychion. At the same time, the substitution
-  of Metageitnion _is_ mere conjecture; and seems to leave hardly
-  time enough for the subsequent events. As far as an opinion can
-  be formed, it would seem that the battle was fought about the end
-  of June or beginning of July 326 B. C. after the rainy season had
-  commenced; towards the close of the archonship of Hegemon, and
-  the beginning of that of Chremes.
-
-  [542] Arrian, v. 20; Diodor. xvii. 95. Lieut. Wood (Journey to
-  the source of the Oxus, p. 11-39) remarks that the large rivers
-  of the Punjab change their course so often and so considerably,
-  that monuments and indications of Alexander’s march in that
-  territory cannot be expected to remain, especially in ground near
-  rivers.
-
-  [543] Arrian, v. 20.
-
-  [544] Arrian, v, 23, 24; Curtius, ix. 1, 15.
-
-Sangala was the easternmost of all Alexander’s conquests. Presently
-his march brought him to the river Hyphasis (Sutledge), the last of
-the rivers in the Punjab—seemingly at a point below its confluence
-with the Beas. Beyond this river, broad and rapid, Alexander was
-informed that there lay a desert of eleven days’ march, extending
-to a still greater river called the Ganges; beyond which dwelt the
-Gandaridæ, the most powerful, warlike, and populous, of all the
-Indian tribes, distinguished for the number and training of their
-elephants.[545] The prospect of a difficult march, and of an enemy
-esteemed invincible, only instigated his ardor. He gave orders for
-the crossing. But here for the first time his army, officers as
-well as soldiers, manifested symptoms of uncontrollable weariness;
-murmuring aloud at these endless toils, and marches they knew not
-whither. They had already over-passed the limits where Dionysus
-and Herakles were said to have stopped: they were travelling into
-regions hitherto unvisited either by Greeks or by Persians, merely
-for the purpose of provoking and conquering new enemies. Of victories
-they were sated; of their plunder, abundant as it was, they had
-no enjoyment;[546] the hardships of a perpetual onward march,
-often excessively accelerated, had exhausted both men and horses;
-moreover, their advance from the Hydaspes had been accomplished in
-the wet season, under rains more violent and continued than they had
-ever before experienced.[547] Informed of the reigning discontent,
-Alexander assembled his officers and harangued them, endeavoring
-to revive in them that forward spirit and promptitude which he had
-hitherto found not inadequate to his own.[548] But he entirely
-failed. No one indeed dared openly to contradict him. Kœnus alone
-hazarded some words of timid dissuasion; the rest manifested a
-passive and sullen repugnance, even when he proclaimed that those
-who desired might return, with the shame of having deserted their
-king, while he would march forward with the volunteers only. After a
-suspense of two days, passed in solitary and silent mortification—he
-still apparently persisted in his determination, and offered the
-sacrifice usual previous to the passage of a river. The victims were
-inauspicious; he bowed to the will of the gods; and gave orders for
-return, to the unanimous and unbounded delight of his army.[549]
-
-  [545] Curtius, ix. 2, 3; Diodor. xvii. 93; Plutarch, Alex. 62.
-
-  [546] Curtius, ix. 3, 11 (speech of Kœnus). “Quoto cuique lorica
-  est? Quis equum habet? Jube quæri, quam multos servi ipsorum
-  persecuti sint, quid cuique supersit ex prædâ. Omnium victores,
-  omnium inopes sumus.”
-
-  [547] Aristobulus ap. Strabo. xv. p. 691-697. ὕεσθαι συνεχῶς.
-  Arrian, v, 29, 8; Diodor. xvii. 93. χειμῶνες ἄγριοι κατεῤῥάγησαν
-  ἐφ᾽ ἡμέρας ἑβδομήκοντα, καὶ βρονταὶ συνεχεῖς καὶ κεραυνοὶ
-  κατέσκηπτον, etc.
-
-  [548] In the speech which Arrian (v. 25, 26) puts into the mouth
-  of Alexander, the most curious point is, the geographical views
-  which he promulgates. “We have not much farther now to march (he
-  was standing on the western bank of the Sutledge) to the river
-  Ganges, and the great Eastern Sea which surrounds the whole
-  earth. The Hyrkanian (Caspian) Sea joins on to this great sea on
-  one side, the Persian Gulf on the other; after we have subdued
-  all those nations which lie before us eastward towards the Great
-  Sea, and northward towards the Hyrkanian Sea, we shall then sail
-  by water first to the Persian Gulf, next round Libya to the
-  pillars of Herakles; from thence we shall march back all through
-  Libya, and add it to all Asia as parts of our empire.” (I here
-  abridge rather than translate).
-
-  It is remarkable, that while Alexander made so prodigious an
-  error in narrowing the eastern limits of Asia, the Ptolemaic
-  geography, recognized in the time of Columbus, made an error not
-  less in the opposite direction, stretching it too far to the
-  East. It was upon the faith of this last mistake, that Columbus
-  projected his voyage of circumnavigation from Western Europe,
-  expecting to come to the eastern coast of Asia from the West,
-  after no great length of voyage.
-
-  [549] Arrian, v. 28, 7. The fact that Alexander, under all
-  this insuperable repugnance of his soldiers, still offered the
-  sacrifice preliminary to crossing—is curious as an illustration
-  of his character, and was specially attested by Ptolemy.
-
-To mark the last extremity of his eastward progress, he erected
-twelve altars of extraordinary height and dimension on the western
-bank of the Hyphasis, offering sacrifices of thanks to the gods,
-with the usual festivities, and matches of agility and force. Then,
-having committed all the territory west of the Hyphasis to the
-government of Porus, he marched back, repassed the Hydraotes and
-Akesines, and returned to the Hydaspes near the point where he had
-first crossed it. The two new cities—Bukephalia and Nikæa—which he
-had left orders for commencing on that river, had suffered much from
-the rains and inundations during his forward march to the Hyphasis,
-and now required the aid of the army to repair the damage.[550] The
-heavy rains continued throughout most of his return march to the
-Hydaspes.[551]
-
-  [550] Arrian, v. 29, 8; Diodor. xvii. 95.
-
-  [551] Aristobulus ap. Strab. xv. p. 691—until the rising of
-  Arkturus. Diodorus says, 70 days (xvii. 73), which seems more
-  probable.
-
-On coming back to this river, Alexander received a large
-reinforcement both of cavalry and infantry, sent to him from Europe,
-together with 25,000 new panoplies, and a considerable stock of
-medicines.[552] Had these reinforcements reached him on the Hyphasis,
-it seems not impossible that he might have prevailed on his army to
-accompany him in his farther advance to the Ganges and the regions
-beyond. He now employed himself, assisted by Porus and Taxilus, in
-collecting and constructing a fleet for sailing down the Hydaspes and
-thence down to the mouth of the Indus. By the early part of November,
-a fleet of nearly 2000 boats or vessels of various sizes having
-been prepared, he began his voyage.[553] Kraterus marched with one
-division of the army, along the right bank of the Hydaspes—Hephæstion
-on the left bank with the remainder, including 200 elephants;
-Nearchus had the command of the fleet in the river, on board of
-which was Alexander himself. He pursued his voyage slowly down the
-river, to the confluence of the Hydaspes with the Akesines—with the
-Hydraotes—and with the Hyphasis—all pouring, in one united stream,
-into the Indus. He sailed down the Indus to its junction with the
-Indian Ocean. Altogether this voyage occupied nine months,[554]
-from November 326 B. C. to August 325 B. C. But it was a voyage full
-of active military operations on both sides of the river. Alexander
-perpetually disembarked to attack, subdue, and slaughter all such
-nations near the banks as did not voluntarily submit. Among them were
-the Malli and Oxydrakæ, free and brave tribes, who resolved to defend
-their liberty, but, unfortunately for themselves, were habitually
-at variance, and could not now accomplish any hearty co-operation
-against the common invader.[555] Alexander first assailed the Malli
-with his usual celerity and vigor, beat them with slaughter in the
-field, and took several of their towns.[556] There remained only
-their last and strongest town, from which the defenders were already
-driven out and forced to retire to the citadel.[557] Thither they
-were pursued by the Macedonians, Alexander being among the foremost,
-with only a few guards near him. Impatient because the troops with
-their scaling-ladders did not come up more rapidly, he mounted upon
-a ladder that happened to be at hand, attended only by Peukestes and
-one or two others, with an adventurous courage even transcending what
-he was wont to display. Having cleared the wall by killing several
-of its defenders, he jumped down into the interior of the citadel,
-and made head for some time, nearly alone, against all within. He
-received however a bad wound from an arrow in the breast, and was
-on the point of fainting, when his soldiers burst in, rescued him,
-and took the place. Every person within, man, woman, and child, was
-slain.[558]
-
-  [552] Diodor. xvii. 95; Curtius, ix. 3, 21.
-
-  [553] The voyage was commenced a few days before the setting of
-  the Pleiades (Aristobulus, ap. Strab. xv. p. 692).
-
-  For the number of the ships, see Ptolemy ap. Arrian, vi. 2, 8.
-
-  On seeing crocodiles in the Indus, Alexander was at first led
-  to suppose that it was the same river as the Nile, and that he
-  had discovered the higher course of the Nile, from whence it
-  flowed into Egypt. This is curious, as an illustration of the
-  geographical knowledge of the time (Arrian, vi. 1, 3).
-
-  [554] Aristobulus ap. Strab. xv. p. 692. Aristobulus said that
-  the downward voyage occupied ten months; this seems longer than
-  the exact reality. Moreover Aristobulus said that they had no
-  rain during all the voyage down, through all the summer months:
-  Nearchus stated the contrary (Strabo, _l. c._).
-
-  [555] Curtius, ix. 4, 15; Diodor. xvii 98.
-
-  [556] Arrian, vi. 7, 8.
-
-  [557] This last stronghold of the Malli is supposed, by Mr.
-  Cunningham and others, to have been the modern city of Multan.
-  The river Ravee or Hydraotes is said to have formerly run past
-  the city of Multan into the Chenab or Akesines.
-
-  [558] Arrian, vi. 9, 10, 11. He notices the great discrepancy
-  in the various accounts given of this achievement and dangerous
-  wound of Alexander.
-
-  Compare Diodor. xvii. 98, 99; Curtius, ix. 4, 5; Plutarch, Alex.
-  63.
-
-The wound of Alexander was so severe, that he was at first reported
-to be dead to the great consternation and distress of the army.
-However, he became soon sufficiently recovered to show himself, and
-to receive their ardent congratulations, in the camp established at
-the point of junction between the Hydraotes (Ravee) and Akesines
-(Chenab).[559] His voyage down the river, though delayed by the care
-of his wound, was soon resumed and prosecuted, with the same active
-operations by his land-force on both sides to subjugate all the
-Indian tribes and cities within accessible distance. At the junction
-of the river Akesines (Punjnud) with the Indus, Alexander directed
-the foundation of a new city, with adequate docks and conveniences
-for ship-building, whereby he expected to command the internal
-navigation.[560] Having no farther occasion now for so large a
-land-force, he sent a large portion of it, under Kraterus, westward
-(seemingly through the pass now called Bolan) into Karmania.[561] He
-established another military and naval post at Pattala, where the
-Delta of the Indus divided; and he then sailed, with a portion of his
-fleet, down the right arm of the river to have the first sight of the
-Indian Ocean. The view of ebbing and flowing tide, of which none had
-had experience on the scale there exhibited, occasioned to all much
-astonishment and alarm.[562]
-
-  [559] Arrian, xi. 13.
-
-  [560] Arrian, xi. 15, 5.
-
-  [561] Arrian, xi. 17, 6; Strabo, xv. p. 721.
-
-  [562] Arrian, xi. 18, 19; Curtius, ix. 9. He reached Pattala
-  towards the middle or end of July, περὶ κυνὸς ἐπιτολήν (Strabo,
-  xv. p. 692).
-
-  The site of Pattala has been usually looked for near the modern
-  Tatta. But Dr. Kennedy, in his recent ‘Narrative of the Campaign
-  of the Army of the Indus in Scinde and Kabool’ (ch. v. p.
-  104), shows some reasons for thinking that it must have been
-  considerably higher up the river than Tatta; somewhere near
-  Sehwan. “The delta commencing about 130 miles above the sea, its
-  northern apex would be somewhere midway between Hyderabad and
-  Sehwan; where local traditions still speak of ancient cities
-  destroyed, and of greater changes having occurred than in any
-  other part of the course of the Indus.”
-
-  The constant changes in the course of the Indus, however (compare
-  p. 73 of his work), noticed by all observers, render every
-  attempt at such identification conjectural—see Wood’s Journey to
-  the Oxus, p. 12.
-
-The fleet was now left to be conducted by the admiral Nearchus,
-from the mouth of the Indus round by the Persian Gulf to that of
-the Tigris: a memorable nautical enterprise in Grecian antiquity.
-Alexander himself (about the month of August) began his march by land
-westward through the territories of the Arabitæ and the Oritæ, and
-afterwards through the deserts of Gedrosia. Pura, the principal town
-of the Gedrosians, was sixty days’ march from the boundary of the
-Oritæ.[563]
-
-  [563] Arrian, vi. 24, 2; Strabo, xv. p. 723.
-
-Here his army, though without any formidable opposing enemy,
-underwent the most severe and deplorable sufferings; their march
-being through a sandy and trackless desert, with short supplies of
-food and still shorter supplies of water, under a burning sun. The
-loss in men, horses, and baggage-cattle from thirst, fatigue, and
-disease was prodigious; and it required all the unconquerable energy
-of Alexander to bring through even the diminished number.[564] At
-Pura the army obtained repose and refreshment, and was enabled to
-march forward into Karmania, where Kraterus joined them with his
-division from the Indus, and Kleander with the division which had
-been left at Ekbatana. Kleander, accused of heinous crimes in his
-late command, was put to death or imprisoned: several of his comrades
-were executed. To recompense the soldiers for their recent distress
-in Gedrosia, the king conducted them for seven days in drunken
-bacchanalian procession through Karmania, himself and all his friends
-taking part in the revelry; an imitation of the jovial festivity
-and triumph with which the god Dionysus had marched back from the
-conquest of India.[565]
-
-  [564] Arrian, vi. 25, 26; Curtius. ix. 10; Plutarch, Alex. 66.
-
-  [565] Curtius, ix. 10; Diodor. xvii. 106; Plutarch, Alex. 67.
-  Arrian (vi. 28) found this festal progress mentioned in some
-  authorities, but not in others. Neither Ptolemy nor Aristobulus
-  mentioned it. Accordingly Arrian refuses to believe it. There
-  may have been exaggerations or falsities as to the details of
-  the march; but as a general fact, I see no sufficient ground for
-  disbelieving it. A season of excessive license to the soldiers,
-  after their extreme suffering in Gedrosia, was by no means
-  unnatural to grant. Moreover, it corresponds to the general
-  conception of the returning march of Dionysus in antiquity,
-  while the imitation of that god was quite in conformity with
-  Alexander’s turn of sentiment.
-
-  I have already remarked, that the silence of Ptolemy and
-  Aristobulus is too strongly insisted on, both by Arrian and by
-  others, as a reason for disbelieving affirmations respecting
-  Alexander.
-
-  Arrian and Curtius (x. 1) differ in their statements about the
-  treatment of Kleander. According to Arrian, he was put to death;
-  according to Curtius, he was spared from death, and simply put
-  in prison, in consequence of the important service which he had
-  rendered by killing Parmenio with his own hand; while 600 of his
-  accomplices and agents were put to death.
-
-During the halt in Karmania Alexander had the satisfaction of seeing
-his admiral Nearchus,[566] who had brought the fleet round from the
-mouth of the Indus to the harbor called Harmozeia (Ormuz), not far
-from the entrance of the Persian Gulf; a voyage of much hardship
-and distress, along the barren coasts of the Oritæ, the Gedrosians,
-and the Ichthyophagi.[567] Nearchus, highly commended and honored,
-was presently sent back to complete his voyage as far as the mouth
-of the Euphrates; while Hephæstion also was directed to conduct the
-larger portion of the army, with the elephants and heavy baggage,
-by the road near the coast from Karmania into Persis. This road,
-though circuitous, was the most convenient, as it was now the winter
-season;[568] but Alexander himself, with the lighter divisions of his
-army, took the more direct mountain road from Karmania to Pasargadæ
-and Persepolis. Visiting the tomb of Cyrus the Great, founder of the
-Persian empire, he was incensed to find it violated and pillaged.
-He caused it to be carefully restored, put to death a Macedonian
-named Polymachus as the offender, and tortured the Magian guardians
-of it for the purpose of discovering accomplices, but in vain.[569]
-Orsines, satrap of Persis, was however accused of connivance in
-the deed, as well as of various acts of murder and spoliation:
-according to Curtius, he was not only innocent, but had manifested
-both good faith and devotion to Alexander;[570] in spite of which
-he became a victim of the hostility of the favorite eunuch Bagoas,
-who both poisoned the king’s mind with calumnies of his own, and
-suborned other accusers with false testimony. Whatever may be the
-truth of the story, Alexander caused Orsines to be hanged; naming as
-satrap Peukestes, whose favor was now high, partly as comrade and
-preserver of the king in his imminent danger at the citadel of the
-Malli,—partly from his having adopted the Persian dress, manners, and
-language more completely than any other Macedonian.[571]
-
-  [566] Nearchus had begun his voyage about the end of September,
-  or beginning of October (Arrian, Indic. 21; Strabo, xv. p. 721).
-
-  [567] Arrian, vi. 28, 7; Arrian, Indica, c. 33-37.
-
-  [568] Arrian, vi. 28, 12-29, 1.
-
-  [569] Plutarch, Alex. 69; Arrian, vi. 29, 17; Strabo, xv. p. 730.
-
-  [570] Arrian, vi. 30, 2; Curtius, x. 1, 23-38. “Hic fuit exitus
-  nobilissimi Persarum, nec insontis modo, sed eximiæ quoque
-  benignitatis in regem.” The great favor which the beautiful
-  eunuch Bagoas (though Arrian does not mention him) enjoyed
-  with Alexander, and the exalted position which he occupied,
-  are attested by good contemporary evidence, especially the
-  philosopher Dikæarchus—see Athenæ. xiii. p. 603; Dikæarch. Fragm.
-  19. ap. Hist. Græc. Fragm. Didot, vol. ii. p. 241. Compare the
-  Fragments of Eumenes and Diodotus (Ælian, V. H. iii. 23) in
-  Didot, Fragm. Scriptor. Hist. Alex. Magni, p. 121; Plutarch De
-  Adul. et Amic. Discrim. p. 65.
-
-  [571] Arrian, vi. 30; Curtius, x. 1, 22-30.
-
-It was about February, in 324 B. C.,[572] that Alexander
-marched out of Persis to Susa. During this progress, at the point
-where he crossed the Pasitigris, he was again joined by Nearchus, who
-having completed his circumnavigation from the mouth of the Indus
-to that of the Euphrates, had sailed back with the fleet from the
-latter river and come up the Pasitigris.[573] It is probable that
-the division of Hephæstion also rejoined him at Susa, and that the
-whole army was there for the first time brought together, after the
-separation in Karmania.
-
-  [572] Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fast. Hellen. B. C. 325, also Append. p.
-  232) places the arrival of Alexander in Susiana, on his return
-  march, in the month of February B. C. 325; a year too early, in
-  my opinion. I have before remarked on the views of Mr. Clinton
-  respecting the date of Alexander’s victory over Porus on the
-  Hydaspes, where he alters the name of the month as it stands
-  in the text of Arrian (following Schmieder’s conjecture), and
-  supposes that battle to have occurred in August B. C. 327 instead
-  of April B. C. 326. Mr. Clinton antedates by one year all the
-  proceedings of Alexander subsequent to his quitting Baktria
-  for the last time in the summer of B. C. 327. Dr. Vincent’s
-  remark—“that the supposition of _two winters_ occurring after
-  Alexander’s return to Susa is not borne out by the historians”
-  (see Clinton. p. 232), is a perfectly just one; and Mitford has
-  not replied to it in a satisfactory manner. In my judgment,
-  there was only an interval of sixteen months (not an interval of
-  twenty-eight months, as Mr. Clinton supposes) between the return
-  of Alexander to Susa and his death at Babylon (Feb. 324 B. C. to
-  June 323 B. C.).
-
-  [573] Arrian, vii. 5. 9; Arrian, Indica, c. 42. The voluntary
-  death of Kalanus the Indian Gymnosophist must have taken place
-  at Susa (where Diodorus places it—xvii. 107), and not in Persis;
-  for Nearchus was seemingly present at the memorable scene of the
-  funeral pile (Arrian, vii. 3, 9)—and he was not with Alexander in
-  Persis.
-
-In Susa and Susiana Alexander spent some months. For the first time
-since his accession to the throne, he had now no military operations
-in hand or in immediate prospect. No enemy was before him, until it
-pleased him to go in quest of a new one;—nor indeed could any new
-one be found, except at a prodigious distance. He had emerged from
-the perils of the untrodden East, and had returned into the ordinary
-localities and conditions of Persian rule, occupying that capital
-city from whence the great Achæmenid kings had been accustomed to
-govern the Western as well as the Eastern portions of their vast
-empire. To their post, and to their irritable love of servility,
-Alexander had succeeded; but bringing with him a restless energy such
-as none of them except the first founder Cyrus had manifested—and a
-splendid military genius, such as was unknown alike to Cyrus and to
-his successors.
-
-In the new position of Alexander, his principal subjects of
-uneasiness were, the satraps and the Macedonian soldiers. During
-the long interval (more than five years) which had elapsed since he
-marched eastward from Hyrkania in pursuit of Bessus, the satraps had
-necessarily been left much to themselves. Some had imagined that
-he would never return; an anticipation noway unreasonable, since
-his own impulse towards forward march was so insatiate that he was
-only constrained to return by the resolute opposition of his own
-soldiers; moreover his dangerous wound among the Malli, and his
-calamitous march through Gedrôsia, had given rise to reports of
-his death, credited for some time even by Olympias and Kleopatra
-in Macedonia.[574] Under these uncertainties, some satraps stood
-accused of having pillaged rich temples, and committed acts of
-violence towards individuals. Apart from all criminality, real
-or alleged, several of them, also, had taken into pay bodies of
-mercenary troops, partly as a necessary means of authority in their
-respective districts, partly as a protection to themselves in the
-event of Alexander’s decease. Respecting the conduct of the satraps
-and their officers, many denunciations and complaints were sent in;
-to which Alexander listened readily and even eagerly, punishing the
-accused with indiscriminate rigor, and resenting especially the
-suspicion that they had calculated upon his death.[575] Among those
-executed, were Abulites, satrap of Susiana, with his son Oxathres;
-the latter was even slain by the hands of Alexander himself, with a
-sarissa[576]—the dispensation of punishment becoming in his hands
-an outburst of exasperated temper. He also despatched peremptory
-orders to all the satraps, enjoining them to dismiss their mercenary
-troops without delay.[577] This measure produced considerable
-effect on the condition of Greece—about which I shall speak in a
-subsequent chapter. Harpalus, satrap of Babylon (about whom also
-more, presently), having squandered large sums out of the revenues of
-the post upon ostentatious luxury, became terrified when Alexander
-was approaching Susiana, and fled to Greece with a large treasure
-and a small body of soldiers.[578] Serious alarm was felt among all
-the satraps and officers, innocent as well as guilty. That the most
-guilty were not those who fared worst, we may see by the case of
-Kleomenes in Egypt, who remained unmolested in his government, though
-his iniquities were no secret.[579]
-
-  [574] Plutarch, Alexand. 68.
-
-  [575] Arrian, vii. 4, 2-5; Diodor. xvii. 108; Curtius, x. 1,
-  7. “Cœperat esse præceps ad repræsentanda supplicia, item ad
-  deteriora credenda” (Curtius, x. 1, 39).
-
-  [576] Plutarch, Alex. 68.
-
-  [577] Diodor. xvii. 106-111.
-
-  [578] Among the accusations which reached Alexander against this
-  satrap, we are surprised to find a letter addressed to him (ἐν
-  τῇ πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον ἐπιστολῇ) by the Greek historian Theopompus;
-  who set forth with indignation the extravagant gifts and honors
-  heaped by Harpalus upon his two successive mistresses—Pythionikê
-  and Glykera; celebrated Hetæræ from Athens. These proceedings
-  Theopompus describes as insults to Alexander (Theopompus ap.
-  Athenæ. xiii. p. 586-595; Fragment. 277, 278 ed. Didot).
-
-  The satyric drama called Ἀγὴν, represented before Alexander at
-  a period subsequent to the flight of Harpalus, cannot have been
-  represented (as Athenæus states it to have been) on the banks
-  of _the Hydaspes_, because Harpalus did not make his escape
-  until he was frightened by the approach of Alexander _returning_
-  from India. At the Hydaspes, Alexander was still on his outward
-  progress; very far off, and without any idea of returning.
-  It appears to me that the words of Athenæus respecting this
-  drama—ἐδίδαξε Διονυσίων ὄντων ἐπὶ τοῦ ~Ὑδάσπου~ τοῦ ποταμοῦ
-  (xiii, p. 595)—involve a mistake or misreading; and that it
-  ought to stand ἐπὶ τοῦ ~Χοάσπου~ τοῦ ποταμοῦ. I may remark that
-  the words _Medus Hydaspes_ in Virgil, Georg. iv. 211, probably
-  involve the same confusion. The Choaspes was the river, near
-  Susa; and this drama was performed before Alexander at Susa
-  during the Dionysia of the year 324 B. C., after
-  Harpalus had fled. The Dionysia were in the month Elaphebolion;
-  now Alexander did not fight Porus on the Hydaspes until the
-  succeeding month Munychion at the earliest—and probably later.
-  And even if we suppose (which is not probable) that he reached
-  the Hydaspes in Elaphebolion, he would have no leisure to
-  celebrate dramas and a Dionysiac festival, while the army of
-  Porus was waiting for him on the opposite bank. Moreover it is no
-  way probable that, on the remote Hydaspes, he had any actors or
-  chorus, or means of celebrating dramas at all.
-
-  [579] Arrian, vii. 18, 2; vii. 23, 9-13.
-
-Among the Macedonian soldiers, discontent had been perpetually
-growing, from the numerous proofs which they witnessed that Alexander
-had made his election for an Asiatic character, and abnegated his own
-country. Besides his habitual adoption of the Persian costume and
-ceremonial, he now celebrated a sort of national Asiatic marriage at
-Susa. He had already married the captive Roxana, in Baktria; he next
-took two additional wives—Statira, daughter of Darius—and Parysatis,
-daughter of the preceding king Ochus. He at the same time caused
-eighty of his principal friends and officers, some very reluctantly,
-to marry (according to Persian rites) wives selected from the
-noblest Persian families, providing dowries for all of them.[580] He
-made presents besides, to all those Macedonians who gave in their
-names as having married Persian women. Splendid festivities[581]
-accompanied these nuptials, with honorary rewards distributed to
-favorites and meritorious officers. Macedonians and Persians, the
-two imperial races, one in Europe, the other in Asia, were thus
-intended to be amalgamated. To soften the aversion of the soldiers
-generally towards these Asiatising marriages,[582] Alexander issued
-proclamation that he would himself discharge their debts, inviting
-all who owed money to give in their names with an intimation of the
-sums due. It was known that the debtors were numerous; yet few came
-to enter their names. The soldiers suspected the proclamation as
-a stratagem, intended for the purpose of detecting such as were
-spendthrifts, and obtaining a pretext for punishment: a remarkable
-evidence how little confidence or affection Alexander now inspired,
-and how completely the sentiment entertained towards him was that
-of fear mingled with admiration. He himself was much hurt at their
-mistrust, and openly complained of it; at the same time proclaiming
-that paymasters and tables should be planted openly in the camp,
-and that any soldier might come and ask for money enough to pay
-his debts, without being bound to give in his name. Assured of
-secrecy, they now made application in such numbers that the total
-distributed was prodigiously great; reaching, according to some, to
-10,000 talents—according to Arrian, not less than 20,000 talents or
-£4,600,000 sterling.[583]
-
-  [580] Arrian, vii. 4, 6-9. By these two marriages, Alexander thus
-  engrafted himself upon the two lines of antecedent Persian Kings.
-  Ochus was of the Achæmenid family, but Darius Codomannus, father
-  of Statira, was not of that family; he began a new lineage. About
-  the overweening regal state of Alexander, outdoing even the
-  previous Persian kings, see Phylarchus ap. Athenæ. xii. p. 539.
-
-  [581] Chares ap. Athenæ. xii. p. 538.
-
-  [582] Arrian, vii. 6, 3. καὶ τοὺς γάμους ἐν τῷ νόμῳ τῷ Περσικῷ
-  ποιηθέντας οὐ πρὸς θυμοῦ γενέσθαι τοῖς πολλοῖς αὐτῶν, οὐδὲ τῶν
-  γημάντων ἐστὶν οἷς, etc.
-
-  [583] Arrian, vii. 5; Plutarch, Alexand. 70; Curtius, x. 2, 9;
-  Diodor. xvii. 109.
-
-Large as this donative was, it probably gave but partial
-satisfaction, since the most steady and well-conducted soldiers could
-have received no benefit, except in so far as they might choose to
-come forward with fictitious debts. A new modification moreover was
-in store for the soldiers generally. There arrived from the various
-satrapies—even from those most distant, Sogdiana, Baktria, Aria,
-Drangiana, Arachosia, etc.—contingents of young and fresh native
-troops, amounting in total to 30,000 men; all armed and drilled
-in the Macedonian manner. From the time when the Macedonians had
-refused to cross the river Hyphasis and march forward into India,
-Alexander saw, that for his large aggressive schemes it was necessary
-to disband the old soldiers, and to organize an army at once more
-fresh and more submissive. He accordingly despatched orders to the
-satraps to raise and discipline new Asiatic levies, of vigorous
-native youths; and the fruit of these orders was now seen.[584]
-Alexander reviewed the new levies, whom he called the Epigoni, with
-great satisfaction. He moreover incorporated many native Persians,
-both officers and soldiers, into the Companion-cavalry, the most
-honorable service in the army; making the important change of arming
-them with the short Macedonian thrusting-pike in place of the missile
-Persian javelin. They were found such apt soldiers, and the genius of
-Alexander for military organization was so consummate, that he saw
-himself soon released from his dependence on the Macedonian veterans;
-a change evident enough to them as well as to him.[585]
-
-  [584] Diodor. xvii. 108. It must have taken some time to get
-  together and discipline these young troops; Alexander must
-  therefore have sent the orders from India.
-
-  [585] Arrian, vii. 6.
-
-The novelty and success of Nearchus in his exploring voyage had
-excited in Alexander an eager appetite for naval operations. Going on
-board his fleet in the Pasitigris (the Karun, the river on the east
-side of Susa), he sailed in person down to the Persian Gulf, surveyed
-the coast as far as the mouth of the Tigris, and then sailed up the
-latter river as far as Opis. Hephæstion meanwhile, commanding the
-army, marched by land in concert with this voyage, and came back to
-Opis, where Alexander disembarked.[586]
-
-  [586] Arrian, vii. 7.
-
-Sufficient experiment had now been made with the Asiatic levies, to
-enable Alexander to dispense with many of his Macedonian veterans.
-Calling together the army, he intimated his intention of sending
-home those who were unfit for service either from age or wounds, but
-of allotting to them presents at departure sufficient to place them
-in an enviable condition, and attract fresh Macedonian substitutes.
-On hearing this intimation, all the long-standing discontent of the
-soldiers at once broke out. They felt themselves set aside as worn
-out and useless,—and set aside, not to make room for younger men of
-their own country, but in favor of those Asiatics into whose arms
-their king had now passed. They demanded with a loud voice that he
-should dismiss them all—advising him by way of taunt to make his
-future conquests along with his father Ammon. These manifestations so
-incensed Alexander, that he leaped down from the elevated platform on
-which he had stood to speak, rushed with a few of his guards among
-the crowd of soldiers, and seized or caused to be seized thirteen
-of those apparently most forward, ordering them immediately to be
-put to death. The multitude were thoroughly overawed and reduced to
-silence, upon which Alexander remounted the platform and addressed
-them in a speech of considerable length. He boasted of the great
-exploits of Philip, and of his own still greater: he affirmed that
-all the benefit of his conquests had gone to the Macedonians, and
-that he himself had derived from them nothing but a double share of
-the common labors, hardships, wounds, and perils. Reproaching them
-as base deserters from a king who had gained for them all these
-unparalleled acquisitions, he concluded by giving discharge to
-all—commanding them forthwith to depart.[587]
-
-  [587] Arrian, vii. 9, 10; Plutarch, Alex. 71; Curtius, x. 2;
-  Justin, xii. 11.
-
-After this speech—teeming (as we read it in Arrian) with that
-exorbitant self-exaltation which formed the leading feature in
-his character—Alexander hurried away into the palace, where he
-remained shut up for two days without admitting any one except his
-immediate attendants. His guards departed along with him, leaving
-the discontented soldiers stupefied and motionless. Receiving no
-farther orders, nor any of the accustomed military indications,[588]
-they were left in the helpless condition of soldiers constrained to
-resolve for themselves, and at the same time altogether dependent
-upon Alexander whom they had offended. On the third day, they learnt
-that he had convened the Persian officers, and had invested them with
-the chief military commands, distributing the newly arrived Epigoni
-into divisions of infantry and cavalry, all with Macedonian military
-titles, and passing over the Macedonians themselves as if they did
-not exist. At this news, the soldiers were overwhelmed with shame and
-remorse. They rushed to the gates of the palace, threw down their
-arms, and supplicated with tears and groans for Alexander’s pardon.
-Presently he came out, and was himself moved to tears by seeing their
-prostrate deportment. After testifying his full reconciliation,
-he caused a solemn sacrifice to be celebrated, coupled with a
-multitudinous banquet of mixed Macedonians and Persians. The Grecian
-prophets, the Persian magi and all the guests present, united in
-prayer and libation for fusion, harmony, and community of empire,
-between the two nations.[589]
-
-  [588] See the description given by Tacitus (Hist. ii. 29) of
-  the bringing round of the Vitellian army,—which had mutinied
-  against the general Fabius Valens:—“Tum Alphenus Varus,
-  præfectus castrorum, deflagrante paulatim seditione, addit
-  consilium—vetitis obire vigilias centurionibus, omisso tubæ
-  sono, quo miles ad belli munia cietur. Igitur torpere cuncti,
-  circumspectare inter se attoniti, _et id ipsum, quod nemo
-  regeret, paventes_; silentio, patientiâ, postremo precibus et
-  lacrymis veniam quærebant. Ut vero deformis et fiens, et præter
-  spem incolumis, Valens processit, gaudium, miseratio, favor;
-  versi in lætitiam (ut est vulgus utroque immodicum) laudantes
-  gratantesque, circumdatum aquilis signisque, in tribunal ferunt.”
-
-  Compare also the narrative in Xenophon (Anab. i. 3) of the
-  embarrassment of the Ten Thousand Greeks at Tarsus, when they at
-  first refused to obey Klearchus and march against the Great King.
-
-  [589] Arrian, vii. 11.
-
-This complete victory over his own soldiers was probably as
-gratifying to Alexander as any one gained during his past life;
-carrying as it did a consoling retribution for the memorable stoppage
-on the banks of the Hyphasis, which he had neither forgotten nor
-forgiven. He selected 10,000 of the oldest and most exhausted among
-the soldiers to be sent home under Kraterus, giving to each full pay
-until the time of arrival in Macedonia, with a donation of one talent
-besides. He intended that Kraterus, who was in bad health, should
-remain in Europe as viceroy of Macedonia, and that Antipater should
-come out to Asia with a reinforcement of troops.[590] Pursuant to
-this resolution, the 10,000 soldiers were now singled out for return,
-and separated from the main army. Yet it does not appear that they
-actually did return, during the ten months of Alexander’s remaining
-life.
-
-  [590] Arrian, vii. 12, 1-7; Justin, xii. 12. Kraterus was
-  especially popular with the Macedonian soldiers, because he had
-  always opposed, as much as he dared, the Oriental transformation
-  of Alexander (Plutarch, Eumenes, 6).
-
-Of the important edict issued this summer by Alexander to the
-Grecian cities, and read at the Olympic festival in July—directing
-each city to recall its exiled citizens—I shall speak in a future
-chapter. He had now accomplished his object of organizing a land
-force, half Macedonian, half Asiatic. But since the expedition of
-Nearchus, he had become bent upon a large extension of his naval
-force also; which was indeed an indispensable condition towards
-his immediate projects of conquering Arabia, and of pushing both
-nautical exploration and aggrandizement from the Persian Gulf round
-the Arabian coast. He despatched orders to the Phenician ports,
-directing that a numerous fleet should be built; and that the ships
-should then be taken to pieces, and conveyed across to Thapsakus
-on the Euphrates, from whence they would sail down to Babylon. At
-that place, he directed the construction of other ships from the
-numerous cypress trees around—as well as the formation of an enormous
-harbor in the river at Babylon, adequate to the accommodation of
-1000 ships of war. Mikkalus, a Greek of Klazomenæ, was sent to
-Phenicia with 500 talents, to enlist, or to purchase, seamen for the
-crews. It was calculated that these preparations (probably under the
-superintendence of Nearchus) would be completed by the spring, for
-which period contingents were summoned to Babylon for the expedition
-against Arabia.[591]
-
-  [591] Arrian, vii. 19. He also sent an officer named Herakleides
-  to the shores of the Caspian sea, with orders to construct ships
-  and make a survey of that sea (vii. 16).
-
-In the mean time, Alexander himself paid a visit to Ekbatana, the
-ordinary summer residence of the Persian kings. He conducted his army
-by leisurely marches, reviewing by the way the ancient regal parks
-of the celebrated breed called Nisæan horses now greatly reduced in
-number.[592] On the march, a violent altercation occurred between his
-personal favorite Hephæstion,—and his secretary Eumenes, the most
-able, dexterous, and long-sighted man in his service. Eumenes, as a
-Greek of Kardia, had been always regarded with slight and jealousy by
-the Macedonian officers, especially by Hephæstion; Alexander now took
-pains to reconcile the two, experiencing no difficulty with Eumenes,
-but much with Hephæstion.[593] During his stay at Ekbatana, he
-celebrated magnificent sacrifices and festivities, with gymnastic and
-musical exhibitions, which were farther enlivened, according to the
-Macedonian habits, by banquets and excessive wine-drinking. Amidst
-these proceedings, Hephæstion was seized with a fever. The vigor of
-his constitution emboldened him to neglect all care or regimen, so
-that in a few days the disease carried him off. The final crisis came
-on suddenly, and Alexander was warned of it while sitting in the
-theatre; but though he instantly hurried to the bedside, he found
-Hephæstion already dead. His sorrow for this loss was unbounded,
-manifesting itself in excesses suitable to the general violence of
-his impulses, whether of affection or of antipathy. Like Achilles
-mourning for Patroklus, he cast himself on the ground near the dead
-body, and remained there wailing for several hours; he refused
-all care, and even food, for two days; he cut his hair close, and
-commanded that all the horses and mules in the camp should have their
-manes cut close also; he not only suspended the festivities, but
-interdicted all music and every sign of joy in the camp; he directed
-that the battlements of the walls belonging to the neighboring cities
-should be struck off; he hung, or crucified, the physician Glaukias,
-who had prescribed for Hephæstion; he ordered that a vast funeral
-pile should be erected at Babylon, at a cost given to us as 10,000
-talents (£2,300,000), to celebrate the obsequies; he sent messengers
-to the oracle of Ammon, to inquire whether it was permitted to
-worship Hephæstion as a god. Many of those around him, accommodating
-themselves to this passionate impulse of the ruler, began at once
-to show a sort of worship towards the deceased, by devoting to
-him themselves and their arms; of which Eumenes set the example,
-conscious of his own personal danger, if Alexander should suspect
-him of being pleased at the death of his recent rival. Perdikkas was
-instructed to convey the body in solemn procession to Babylon, there
-to be burnt in state when preparations should be completed.[594]
-
-  [592] Arrian, vii. 13, 2; Diodor. xvii. 110. How leisurely the
-  march was may be seen in Diodorus.
-
-  The direction of Alexander’s march from Susa to Ekbatana, along
-  a frequented and good road which Diodorus in another place
-  calls a royal road (xix. 19), is traced by Ritter, deriving
-  his information chiefly from the recent researches of Major
-  Rawlinson. The larger portion of the way lay along the western
-  side of the chain of Mount Zagros, and on the right bank of the
-  river Kerkha (Ritter, Erdkunde, part ix. b. 3. p. 329, West Asia).
-
-  [593] Arrian, vii. 13, 1; Plutarch, Eumenes, 2.
-
-  [594] Arrian, vii. 14; Plutarch, Alexand. 72; Diodor. xvii. 110.
-  It will not do to follow the canon of evidence tacitly assumed
-  by Arrian, who thinks himself authorized to discredit all the
-  details of Alexander’s conduct on this occasion, which transgress
-  the limits of a dignified, though vehement sorrow.
-
-  When Masistius was slain, in the Persian army commanded by
-  Mardonius in Bœotia, the manes of the horses were cut, as token
-  of mourning: compare also Plutarch, Pelopidas, 33; and Euripid.
-  Alkestis, 442.
-
-Alexander stayed at Ekbatana until winter was at hand, seeking
-distraction from his grief in exaggerated splendor of festivals
-and ostentation of life. His temper became so much more irascible
-and furious, that no one approached him without fear, and he was
-propitiated by the most extravagant flatteries.[595] At length he
-roused himself and found his true consolation, in gratifying the
-primary passions of his nature—fighting and man-hunting.[596] Between
-Media and Persis, dwelt the tribes called Kossæi, amidst a region
-of lofty, trackless, inaccessible mountains. Brave and predatory,
-they had defied the attacks of the Persian kings. Alexander now
-conducted against them a powerful force, and in spite of increased
-difficulties arising from the wintry season, pushed them from point
-to point, following them into the loftiest and most impenetrable
-recesses of their mountains. These efforts were continued for forty
-days, under himself and Ptolemy, until the entire male population
-was slain; which passed for an acceptable offering to the manes of
-Hephæstion.[597]
-
-  [595] See the curious extracts from Ephippus the
-  Chalkidian,—seemingly a contemporary, if not an eye-witness (ap.
-  Athenæ. xii. p. 537, 538)—εὐφημία δὲ καὶ σιγὴ κατεῖχε πάντας ὑπὸ
-  δέους τοὺς παρόντας· ἀφόρητος γὰρ ἦν (Alexander) καὶ φονικός·
-  ἐδόκει γὰρ εἶναι μελαγχολικὸς, etc.
-
-  [596] I translate here, literally, Plutarch’s expression—Τοῦ
-  δὲ πένθους παρηγορίᾳ τῷ πολέμῳ χρώμενος, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ θήραν καὶ
-  ~κυνηγέσιον ἀνθρώπων~ ἐξῆλθε, καὶ τὸ Κοσσαίων ἔθνος κατεστρέψατο,
-  ~πάντας ἡβηδὸν ἀποσφάττων~. Τοῦτο δὲ Ἡφαιστίωνος ἐναγισμὸς
-  ἐκαλεῖτο (Plutarch, Alexand. 72: compare Polyænus, iv. 3, 31).
-
-  [597] Arrian, vii. 15; Plutarch, Alex. 72; Diodor. xvii. 111.
-  This general slaughter, however, can only be true of portions of
-  the Kossæan name; for Kossæans occur in after years (Diodor. xix.
-  19.).
-
-Not long afterwards, Alexander commenced his progress to Babylon;
-but in slow marches, farther retarded by various foreign embassies
-which met him on the road. So widely had the terror of his name
-and achievements been spread, that several of these envoys came
-from the most distant regions. There were some from the various
-tribes of Lybia—from Carthage—from Sicily and Sardinia—from
-the Illyrians and Thracians—from the Lucanians, Bruttians, and
-Tuscans, in Italy—nay, even (some affirmed) from the Romans, as
-yet a people of moderate power.[598] But there were other names
-yet more surprising—Æthiopians, from the extreme south, beyond
-Egypt—Scythians from the north, beyond the Danube—Iberians and Gauls,
-from the far west, beyond the Mediterranean Sea. Legates also arrived
-from various Grecian cities, partly to tender congratulations and
-compliments upon his matchless successes, partly to remonstrate
-against his sweeping mandate for the general restoration of the
-Grecian exiles.[599] It was remarked that these Grecian legates
-approached him with wreaths on their heads, tendering golden wreaths
-to him,—as if they were coming into the presence of a god.[600] The
-proofs which Alexander received even from distant tribes with names
-and costumes unknown to him, of fear for his enmity and anxiety
-for his favor, were such as had never been shown to any historical
-person, and such as entirely to explain his superhuman arrogance.
-
-  [598] Pliny, H. N. iii. 9. The story in Strabo, v. p. 232, can
-  hardly apply to Alexander the Great. Livy (ix. 18) conceives that
-  the Romans knew nothing of Alexander even by report, but this
-  appears to me not credible.
-
-  On the whole, though the point is doubtful, I incline to believe
-  the assertion of a Roman embassy to Alexander. Nevertheless,
-  there were various false statements which afterwards became
-  current about it—one of which may be seen in Memnon’s history
-  of the Pontic Herakleia ap. Photium, Cod. 224; Orelli Fragment.
-  Memnon, p. 36. Kleitarchus (contemporary of Alexander), whom
-  Pliny quotes, can have had no motive to insert falsely the name
-  of Romans, which in his time was nowise important.
-
-  [599] Arrian, vii. 15; Justin, xii. 13; Diodor. xvii. 113. The
-  story mentioned by Justin in another place (xxi. 6) is probably
-  referable to this season of Alexander’s career. A Carthaginian
-  named Hamilkar Rhodanus, was sent by his city to Alexander;
-  really as an emissary to acquaint himself with the king’s real
-  designs, which occasioned to the Carthaginians serious alarm—but
-  under color of being an exile tendering his services. Justin says
-  that Parmenio introduced Hamilkar—which must, I think, be an
-  error.
-
-  [600] Arrian, vii. 19, 1; vii. 23, 3.
-
-In the midst of this exuberant pride and good fortune, however, dark
-omens and prophecies crowded upon him as he approached Babylon. Of
-these the most remarkable was, the warning of the Chaldean priests,
-who apprised him, soon after he crossed the Tigris, that it would
-be dangerous for him to enter that city, and exhorted him to remain
-outside of the gates. At first he was inclined to obey; but his
-scruples were overruled, either by arguments from the Greek sophist
-Anaxarchus, or by the shame of shutting himself out from the most
-memorable city of the empire, where his great naval preparations
-were now going on. He found Nearchus with his fleet, who had come
-up from the mouth of the river,—and also the ships directed to be
-built in Phenicia, which had come down the river from Thapsakus,
-together with large numbers of seafaring men to serve aboard.[601]
-The ships of cypress-wood, and the large docks, which he had ordered
-to be constructed at Babylon, were likewise in full progress. He lost
-no time in concerting with Nearchus the details of an expedition
-into Arabia and the Persian Gulf, by his land-force and naval
-force coöperating. From various naval officers, who had been sent
-to survey the Persian Gulf and now made their reports, he learned
-that though there were no serious difficulties within it or along
-its southern coast, yet to double the eastern cape which terminated
-that coast—to circumnavigate the unknown peninsula of Arabia—and
-thus to reach the Red Sea—was an enterprise perilous at least, if
-not impracticable.[602] But to achieve that which other men thought
-impracticable, was the leading passion of Alexander. He resolved to
-circumnavigate Arabia as well as to conquer the Arabians, from whom
-it was sufficient offence that they had sent no envoys to him. He
-also contemplated the foundation of a great maritime city in the
-interior of the Persian Gulf, to rival in wealth and commerce the
-cities of Phenicia.[603]
-
-  [601] Arrian, vii. 19, 5-12; Diodor. xvii. 112.
-
-  [602] Arrian, vii. 20, 15; Arrian, Indica, 43. To undertake this
-  circumnavigation, Alexander had despatched a ship-master of Soli
-  in Cyprus, named Hiero; who becoming alarmed at the distance
-  to which he was advancing, and at the apparently interminable
-  stretch of Arabia towards the south, returned without
-  accomplishing the object.
-
-  Even in the time of Arrian, in the second century after the
-  Christian era, Arabia had never been circumnavigated, from the
-  Persian Gulf to the Red Sea—at least so far as his knowledge
-  extended.
-
-  [603] Arrian, vii. 19, 11.
-
-Amidst preparations for this expedition—and while the immense funeral
-pile destined for Hephæstion was being built—Alexander sailed down
-the Euphrates to the great dyke called Pallakopas, about ninety miles
-below Babylon; a sluice constructed by the ancient Assyrian kings,
-for the purpose of being opened when the river was too full, so as
-to let off the water into the interminable marshes stretching out
-near the western bank. The sluice being reported not to work well,
-he projected the construction of a new one somewhat farther down. He
-then sailed through the Pallakopas in order to survey the marshes,
-together with the tombs of the ancient Assyrian kings which had been
-erected among them. Himself steering his vessel, with the kausia on
-his head, and the regal diadem above it,[604] he passed some time
-among these lakes and swamps, which were so extensive that his fleet
-lost the way among them. He stayed long enough also to direct, and
-even commence, the foundation of a new city, in what seemed to him a
-convenient spot.[605]
-
-  [604] Arrian, vii. 22, 2, 3; Strabo, xvi. p. 741.
-
-  [605] Arrian, vii. 21, 11. πόλιν ἐξῳκοδόμησέ τε καὶ ἐτείχισε.
-
-On returning to Babylon, Alexander found large reinforcements arrived
-there—partly under Philoxenus, Menander, and Menidas, from Lydia and
-Karia—partly 20,000 Persians, under Peukestes the satrap. He caused
-these Persians to be incorporated in the files of the Macedonian
-phalanx. According to the standing custom, each of these files
-was sixteen deep, and each soldier was armed with the long pike
-or sarissa wielded by two hands; the lochage, or front-rank man,
-being always an officer receiving double pay, of great strength and
-attested valor—and those second and third in the file, as well as the
-rearmost man of all, being likewise strong and good men, receiving
-larger pay than the rest. Alexander, in his new arrangement, retained
-the three first ranks and the rear rank unchanged, as well as the
-same depth of file; but he substituted twelve Persians in place
-of the twelve Macedonians who followed after the third-rank man;
-so that the file was composed first of the lochage and two other
-chosen Macedonians, each armed with the sarissa—then of twelve
-Persians armed in their own manner with bow or javelin—lastly, of a
-Macedonian with his sarissa bringing up the the rear.[606] In this
-Macedonico-Persian file, the front would have only three projecting
-pikes, instead of five, as the ordinary Macedonian phalanx presented;
-but then, in compensation, the Persian soldiers would be able to
-hurl their javelins at an advancing enemy, over the heads of their
-three front-rank men. The supervening death of Alexander prevented
-the actual execution of this reform, interesting as being his last
-project for amalgamating Persians and Macedonians into one military
-force.
-
-  [606] Arrian, vii. 23, 5. Even when performing the purely
-  military operation of passing these soldiers in review,
-  inspecting their exercise, and determining their array,—Alexander
-  sat upon the regal throne, surrounded by Asiatic eunuchs; his
-  principal officers sat upon couches with silver feet, near to him
-  (Arrian, vii. 24, 4). This is among the evidences of his altered
-  manners.
-
-Besides thus modifying the phalanx, Alexander also passed in review
-his fleet, which was now fully equipped. The order was actually
-given for departing, so soon as the obsequies of Hephæstion should
-be celebrated. This was the last act which remained for him to
-fulfil. The splendid funeral pile stood ready—two hundred feet
-high, occupying a square area, of which the side was nearly one
-furlong, loaded with mostly decorations from the zeal, real and
-simulated, of the Macedonian officers. The invention of artists was
-exhausted, in long discussions with the king himself, to produce
-at all cost an exhibition of magnificence singular and stupendous.
-The outlay (probably with addition of the festivals immediately
-following) is stated at 12,000 talents, or £2,760,000 sterling.[607]
-Alexander awaited the order from the oracle of Ammon, having sent
-thither messengers to inquire what measure of reverential honor he
-might properly and piously show to his departed friend.[608] The
-answer was now brought back, intimating that Hephæstion was to be
-worshipped as a Hero—the secondary form of worship, not on a level
-with that paid to the gods. Delighted with this divine testimony
-to Hephæstion, Alexander caused the pile to be lighted, and the
-obsequies celebrated, in a manner suitable to the injunctions of the
-oracle.[609] He farther directed that magnificent chapels or sacred
-edifices should be erected for the worship and honor of Hephæstion,
-at Alexandria in Egypt,—at Pella in Macedonia,—and probably in other
-cities also.[610]
-
-  [607] Diodorus, xvii. 115; Plutarch, Alex. 72.
-
-  [608] Arrian, vii. 23, 8.
-
-  [609] Diodor. xvii. 114, 115: compare Arrian, vii. 14, 16;
-  Plutarch, Alexand. 75.
-
-  [610] Arrian, vii. 23, 10-13; Diod. xviii. 4. Diodorus speaks
-  indeed, in this passage, of the πυρὰ or funeral pile in honor
-  of Hephæstion, as if it were among the vast expenses included
-  among the memoranda left by Alexander (after his decease) of
-  prospective schemes. But the funeral pile had already been
-  erected at Babylon, as Diodorus himself had informed us.
-
-  What Alexander left unexecuted at his decease, but intended to
-  execute if he had lived, was the splendid edifices and chapels in
-  Hephæstion’s honor—as we see by Arrian, vii. 23, 10. And Diodorus
-  must be supposed to allude to these intended sacred buildings,
-  though he has inadvertently spoken of the funeral pile. Kraterus,
-  who was under orders to return to Macedonia, was to have built
-  one at Pella.
-
-  The Olynthian Ephippus had composed a book περὶ τῆς Ἡφαιστίωνος
-  καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου ταφῆς, of which there appear four or five
-  citations in Athenæus. He dwelt especially on the luxurious
-  habits of Alexander, and on his unmeasured potations—common to
-  him with other Macedonians.
-
-Respecting the honors intended for Hephæstion at Alexandria, he
-addressed to Kleomenes, the satrap of Egypt, a despatch which becomes
-in part known to us. I have already stated that Kleomenes was among
-the worst of the satraps; having committed multiplied public crimes,
-of which Alexander was not uninformed. The regal despatch enjoined
-him to erect in commemoration of Hephæstion a chapel on the terra
-firma of Alexandria, with a splendid turret on the islet of Pharos;
-and to provide besides that all mercantile written contracts, as
-a condition of validity, should be inscribed with the name of
-Hephæstion. Alexander concluded thus: “If on coming I find the
-Egyptian temples and the chapels of Hephæstion completed in the best
-manner, I will forgive you for all your past crimes; and in future,
-whatever magnitude of crime you may commit, you shall suffer no bad
-treatment from me.”[611] This despatch strikingly illustrates how
-much the wrong doings of satraps were secondary considerations in
-his view, compared with splendid manifestations towards the gods and
-personal attachments towards friends.
-
-  [611] Arrian, vii. 23, 9-14. Καὶ Κλεομένει ἀνδρὶ κακῷ, καὶ πολλὰ
-  ἀδικήματα ἀδικήσαντι ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ, ἐπιστέλλει ἐπιστολήν.... Ἢν γὰρ
-  καταλάβω ἐγὼ (ἔλεγε τὰ γράμματα) τὰ ἱερὰ τὰ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ καλῶς
-  κατεσκευασμένα καὶ τὰ ἡρῷα τὰ Ἡφαιστίωνος, εἴτε τι πρότερον
-  ἡμάρτηκας, ἀφήσω σε τούτων, καὶ τολοιπόν, ὁπήλικον ἂν ἁμάρτῃς,
-  οὐδὲν πείσῃ ἐξ ἐμοῦ ἄχαρι.—In the oration of Demosthenes against
-  Dionysodoras (p. 1285), Kleomenes appears as enriching himself by
-  the monopoly of corn exported from Egypt: compare Pseudo-Aristot.
-  Œconom. c. 33. Kleomenes was afterwards put to death by the first
-  Ptolemy, who became king of Egypt (Pausanias, i. 6, 3).
-
-The intense sorrow felt by Alexander for the death of Hephæstion—not
-merely an attached friend, but of the same age and exuberant vigor
-as himself—laid his mind open to gloomy forebodings from numerous
-omens, as well as to jealous mistrust even of his oldest officers.
-Antipater especially, no longer protected against the calumnies of
-Olympias by the support of Hephæstion,[612] fell more and more into
-discredit; whilst his son Kassander, who had recently come into Asia
-with a Macedonian reinforcement, underwent from Alexander during
-irascible moments much insulting violence. In spite of the dissuasive
-warning of the Chaldean priests,[613] Alexander had been persuaded to
-distrust their sincerity, and had entered Babylon, though not without
-hesitation and uneasiness. However, when, after having entered the
-town, he went out of it again safely on his expedition for the survey
-of the lower Euphrates, he conceived himself to have exposed them
-as deceitful alarmists, and returned to the city with increased
-confidence, for the obsequies of his deceased friend.[614]
-
-  [612] Plutarch, Alex. 74; Diodor. xvii. 114.
-
-  [613] Arrian, vii. 16, 9; vii. 17, 6. Plutarch, Alex. 73. Diodor.
-  xvii. 112.
-
-  [614] Arrian, vii. 22, 1. Αὐτὸς δὲ ~ὡς ἐξελέγξας δὴ~ τῶν Χαλδαίων
-  μαντείαν, ὅτι οὐδὲν πεπονθὼς εἴη ἐν Βαβυλῶνι ἄχαρι (ἀλλ᾽ ἔφθη γὰρ
-  ἐλάσας ἔξω Βαβυλῶνος πρίν τι παθεῖν) ἀνέπλει αὖθις κατὰ τὰ ἕλη
-  ~θαῤῥῶν~, etc.
-
-  The uneasiness here caused by these prophecies and omens, in the
-  mind of the most fearless man of his age, is worthy of notice as
-  a psychological fact, and is perfectly attested by the authority
-  of Aristobulus and Nearchus. It appears that Anaxarchus and
-  other Grecian philosophers encouraged him by their reasonings
-  to despise all prophecy, but especially that of the Chaldæan
-  priests; who (they alleged) wished to keep Alexander out of
-  Babylon in order that they might continue to possess the large
-  revenues of the temple of Belus, which they had wrongfully
-  appropriated; Alexander being disposed to rebuild that ruined
-  temple, and to re-establish the suspended sacrifices to which its
-  revenues had been originally devoted (Arrian, vii. 17; Diodor.
-  xvii. 112). Not many days afterwards, Alexander greatly repented
-  of having given way to these dangerous reasoners, who by their
-  sophistical cavils set aside the power and the warnings of
-  destiny (Diodor. xvii. 116).
-
-The sacrifices connected with these obsequies were on the most
-prodigious scale. Victims enough were offered to furnish a feast for
-the army, who also received ample distributions of wine. Alexander
-himself presided at the feast, and abandoned himself to conviviality
-like the rest. Already full of wine, he was persuaded by his friend
-Medius to sup with him, and to pass the whole night in yet farther
-drinking, with the boisterous indulgence called by the Greeks Kômus
-or Revelry. Having slept off his intoxication during the next day,
-he in the evening again supped with Medius, and spent a second night
-in the like unmeasured indulgence.[615] It appears that he already
-had the seeds of fever upon him, which was so fatally aggravated by
-this intemperance that he was too ill to return to his palace. He
-took the bath, and slept in the house of Medius; on the next morning,
-he was unable to rise. After having been carried out on a couch to
-celebrate sacrifice (which was his daily habit), he was obliged to
-lie in bed all day. Nevertheless he summoned the generals to his
-presence, prescribing all the details of the impending expedition,
-and ordering that the land-force should begin its march on the
-fourth day following, while the fleet, with himself aboard, would
-sail on the fifth day. In the evening, he was carried on a couch
-across the Euphrates into a garden on the other side, where he
-bathed and rested for the night. The fever still continued, so that
-in the morning, after bathing and being carried out to perform the
-sacrifices, he remained on his couch all day, talking and playing at
-dice with Medius; in the evening, he bathed, sacrificed again, and
-ate a light supper, but endured a bad night with increased fever. The
-next two days passed in the same manner, the fever becoming worse
-and worse; nevertheless Alexander still summoned Nearchus to his
-bedside, discussed with him many points about his maritime projects,
-and repeated his order that the fleet should be ready by the third
-day. On the ensuing morning the fever was violent; Alexander reposed
-all day in a bathing-house in the garden, yet still calling in the
-generals to direct the filling up of vacancies among the officers,
-and ordering that the armament should be ready to move. Throughout
-the two next days, his malady became hourly more aggravated. On the
-last day of the two, Alexander could with difficulty support the
-being lifted out of bed to perform the sacrifice; even then, however,
-he continued to give orders to the generals about the expedition.
-On the morrow, though desperately ill, he still made the effort
-requisite for performing the sacrifice; he was then carried across
-from the garden-house to the palace, giving orders that the generals
-and officers should remain in permanent attendance in and near the
-hall. He caused some of them to be called to his bedside; but though
-he knew them perfectly, he had by this time become incapable of
-utterance. One of his last words spoken is said to have been, on
-being asked to whom he bequeathed his kingdom, “_To the strongest_;”
-one of his last acts was, to take the signet ring from his finger,
-and hand it to Perdikkas.[616]
-
-  [615] Arrian, vii. 24, 25. Diodorus states (xvii. 117) that
-  Alexander, on this convivial night, swallowed the contents of a
-  large goblet called the cup of Herakles, and felt very ill after
-  it; a statement repeated by various other writers of antiquity,
-  and which I see no reason for discrediting, though some modern
-  critics treat it with contempt. The royal Ephemerides, or Court
-  Journal, attested only the general fact of his long potations and
-  the long sleep which followed them: see Athenæus, x. p. 434.
-
-  To drink to intoxication at a funeral, was required as a token of
-  respectful sympathy towards the deceased—see the last words of
-  the Indian Kalanus before he ascended the funeral pile—Plutarch,
-  Alexander, 69.
-
-  [616] These last two facts are mentioned by Arrian (vii. 26, 5)
-  and Diodorus (xvii. 117), and Justin (xii. 15): but they found
-  no place in the Court Journal. Curtius (x. v. 4) gives them with
-  some enlargement.
-
-For two nights and a day he continued in this state, without either
-amendment or repose. Meanwhile, the news of his malady had spread
-through the army, filling them with grief and consternation. Many of
-the soldiers, eager to see him once more, forced their way into the
-palace, and were admitted unarmed. They passed along by the bedside,
-with all the demonstrations of affliction and sympathy: Alexander
-knew them, and made show of friendly recognition as well as he could;
-but was unable to say a word. Several of the generals slept in the
-temple of Serapis, hoping to be informed by the god in a dream
-whether they ought to bring Alexander into it, as a suppliant to
-experience the divine healing power. The god informed them in their
-dream, that Alexander ought not to be brought into the temple—that it
-would be better for him to be left where he was. In the afternoon he
-expired—June 323 B. C.—after a life of thirty-two years and
-eight months—and a reign of twelve years and eight months.[617]
-
-  [617] The details, respecting the last illness of Alexander,
-  are peculiarly authentic, being extracted both by Arrian and by
-  Plutarch, from the Ephemerides Regiæ, or short Court Journal;
-  which was habitually kept by his secretary Eumenes, and another
-  Greek named Diodotus (Athenæ. x. p. 434): see Arrian, vii. 25,
-  26; Plutarch, Alex. 76.
-
-  It is surprising that throughout all the course of this malady
-  no mention is made of any physician as having been consulted. No
-  advice was asked; if we except the application to the temple of
-  Serapis, during the last day of Alexander’s life. A few months
-  before, Alexander had hanged or crucified the physician who
-  attended Hephæstion in his last illness. Hence it seems probable
-  that he either despised or mistrusted medical advice, and would
-  not permit any to be invoked. His views must have been much
-  altered since his dangerous fever at Tarsus, and the successful
-  treatment of it by the Akarnanian physician Philippus.
-
-  Though the fever (see some remarks from Littré attached to
-  Didot’s Fragm. Script. Alex. Magn. p. 124) which caused
-  Alexander’s death is here a plain fact satisfactorily made out,
-  yet a different story was circulated some time afterwards, and
-  gained partial credit (Plutarch De Invidiâ, p. 538), that he
-  had been poisoned. The poison was said to have been provided
-  by Aristotle,—sent over to Asia by Antipater through his son
-  Kassander,—and administered by Iollas (another son of Antipater),
-  Alexander’s cupbearer (Arrian, vii. 27, 2; Curtius, x. 10, 17;
-  Diodor. xvii. 118; Justin, xii. 13). It is quite natural that
-  fever and intemperance (which latter moreover was frequent with
-  Alexander) should not be regarded as causes sufficiently marked
-  and impressive to explain a decease at once so unexpected and so
-  momentous. There seems ground for supposing, however, that the
-  report was intentionally fomented, if not originally broached,
-  by the party-enemies of Antipater and Kassander—especially by
-  the rancorous Olympias. The violent enmity afterwards displayed
-  by Kassander against Olympias, and all the family of Alexander
-  helped to encourage the report. In the life of Hyperides in
-  Plutarch, (Vit. X. Oratt. p. 849) it is stated, that he proposed
-  at Athens public honors to Iollas for having given the poison to
-  Alexander. If there is any truth in this, it might be a stratagem
-  for casting discredit on Antipater (father of Iollas), against
-  whom the Athenians entered into the Lamian war, immediately after
-  the death of Alexander.
-
-The death of Alexander, thus suddenly cut off by a fever in the
-plenitude of health, vigor, and aspirations, was an event impressive
-as well as important, in the highest possible degree, to his
-contemporaries far and near. When the first report of it was brought
-to Athens, the orator Demades exclaimed:—“It cannot be true: if
-Alexander were dead, the whole habitable world would have smelt of
-his carcass.”[618] This coarse but emphatic comparison illustrates
-the immediate, powerful, and wide-reaching impression produced by
-the sudden extinction of the great conqueror. It was felt by each
-of the many remote envoys who had so recently come to propitiate
-this far-shooting Apollo—by every man among the nations who had sent
-these envoys—throughout Europe, Asia, and Africa, as then known,—to
-affect either his actual condition or his probable future.[619] The
-first growth and development of Macedonia, during the twenty-two
-years preceding the battle of Chæroneia, from an embarrassed
-secondary State into the first of all known powers, had excited
-the astonishment of contemporaries, and admiration for Philip’s
-organizing genius. But the achievements of Alexander, during his
-twelve years of reign, throwing Philip into the shade, had been on a
-scale so much grander and vaster, and so completely without serious
-reverse or even interruption, as to transcend the measure, not only
-of human expectation, but almost of human belief. The Great King (as
-the king of Persia was called by excellence) was, and had long been,
-the type of worldly power and felicity, even down to the time when
-Alexander crossed the Hellespont. Within four years and three months
-from this event, by one stupendous defeat after another, Darius had
-lost all his Western Empire, and had become a fugitive eastward of
-the Caspian Gates, escaping captivity at the hands of Alexander only
-to perish by those of the satrap Bessus. All antecedent historical
-parallels—the ruin and captivity of the Lydian Crœsus, the expulsion
-and mean life of the Syracusan Dionysius, both of them impressive
-examples of the mutability of human condition,—sank into trifles
-compared with the overthrow of this towering Persian colossus.
-The orator Æschines expressed the genuine sentiment of a Grecian
-spectator, when he exclaimed (in a speech delivered at Athens shortly
-before the death of Darius):—“What is there among the list of strange
-and unexpected events, that has not occurred in our time? Our lives
-have transcended the limits of humanity; we are born to serve as a
-theme for incredible tales to posterity. Is not the Persian king—who
-dug through Athos and bridged the Hellespont,—who demanded earth
-and water from the Greeks,—who dared to proclaim himself, in public
-epistles, master of all mankind from the rising to the setting sun—is
-not _he_ now struggling to the last, not for dominion over others,
-but for the safety of his own person?”[620]
-
-  [618] Plutarch, Phokion, 22; Demetrius Phaler. De Elocution.
-  s. 300. Οὐ τέθνηκεν Ἀλέξανδρος, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι—ὦζε γὰρ ἂν ἡ
-  οἰκουμένη τοῦ νεκροῦ.
-
-  [619] Dionysius, despot of the Pontic Herakleia, fainted away
-  with joy when he heard of Alexander’s death, and erected a statue
-  of Εὐθυμία or Comfort (Memn. Heracl. Fragm. ap. Photium, Cod.
-  224. c. 4).
-
-  [620] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 524. c. 43. Τοιγάρτοι τί τῶν
-  ἀνελπίστων καὶ ἀπροσδοκήτων ἐφ᾽ ἡμῶν οὐ γέγονεν! οὐ γὰρ βίον
-  γ᾽ ἡμεῖς ἀνθρώπινον βεβιώκαμεν, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς παραδοξολογίαν τοῖς
-  ἐσομένοις μεθ᾽ ἡμᾶς ἔφυμεν. Οὐχ ὁ μὲν τῶν Περσῶν βασιλεὺς, ὁ τὸν
-  Ἄθων διορύξας καὶ τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ζεύξας, ὁ γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ τοὺς
-  Ἕλληνας αἰτῶν, ὁ τολμῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς γράφειν ὅτι δεσπότης
-  ἐστὶν ἁπάντων ἀνθρώπων ἀφ᾽ ἡλίου ἀνιόντος μέχρι δυομένου, νῦν οὐ
-  περὶ τοῦ κύριος ἑτέρων εἶναι διαγωνίζεται, ἀλλ᾽ ἤδη περὶ τῆς τοῦ
-  σώματος σωτηρίας;
-
-  Compare the striking fragment, of a like tenor, out of the lost
-  work of the Phalerean Demetrius—Περὶ τῆς τύχης—Fragment. Histor.
-  Græcor. vol. ii. p. 368.
-
-Such were the sentiments excited by Alexander’s career even in the
-middle of 330 B. C., more than seven years before his death.
-During the following seven years, his additional achievements had
-carried astonishment yet farther. He had mastered, in defiance of
-fatigue, hardship, and combat, not merely all the eastern half of the
-Persian empire, but unknown Indian regions beyond its easternmost
-limits. Besides Macedonia, Greece, and Thrace, he possessed all that
-immense treasure and military force which had once rendered the Great
-King so formidable. By no contemporary man had any such power ever
-been known or conceived. With the turn of imagination then prevalent,
-many were doubtless disposed to take him for a god on earth, as
-Grecian spectators had once supposed with regard to Xerxes, when they
-beheld the innumerable Persian host crossing the Hellespont.[621]
-
-  [621] Herodot. vii. 56.
-
-Exalted to this prodigious grandeur, Alexander was at the time of
-his death little more than thirty-two years old—the age at which a
-citizen of Athens was growing into important commands; ten years
-less than the age for a consul at Rome;[622] two years younger
-than the age at which Timour first acquired the crown, and began
-his foreign conquests.[623] His extraordinary bodily powers were
-unabated; he had acquired a large stock of military experience; and
-what was still more important, his appetite for farther conquest
-was as voracious, and his readiness to purchase it at the largest
-cost of toil or danger, as complete, as it had been when he first
-crossed the Hellespont. Great as his past career had been, his
-future achievements, with such increased means and experience, were
-likely to be yet greater. His ambition would have been satisfied
-with nothing less than the conquest of the whole habitable world
-as then known;[624] and if his life had been prolonged, he would
-probably have accomplished it. Nowhere (so far as our knowledge
-reaches) did there reside any military power capable of making head
-against him; nor were his soldiers, when he commanded them, daunted
-or baffled by any extremity of cold, heat, or fatigue. The patriotic
-feelings of Livy dispose him to maintain[625] that Alexander,
-had he invaded Italy and assailed Romans or Samnites, would have
-failed and perished like his relative Alexander of Epirus. But this
-conclusion cannot be accepted. If we grant the courage and discipline
-of the Roman infantry to have been equal to the best infantry of
-Alexander’s army, the same cannot be said of the Roman cavalry as
-compared with the Macedonian Companions. Still less is it likely
-that a Roman consul, annually changed, would have been found a match
-for Alexander in military genius and combinations; nor, even if
-personally equal, would he have possessed the same variety of troops
-and arms, each effective in its separate way, and all conspiring
-to one common purpose—nor the same unbounded influence over their
-minds in stimulating them to full effort. I do not think that even
-the Romans could have successfully resisted Alexander the Great;
-though it is certain that he never throughout all his long marches
-encountered such enemies as they, nor even such as Samnites and
-Lucanians—combining courage, patriotism, discipline, with effective
-arms both for defence and for close combat.[626]
-
-  [622] Cicero, Philippic. v. 17, 48.
-
-  [623] See Histoire de Timour-Bec, par Cherefeddin Ali, translated
-  by Petit de la Croix, vol. i. p. 203.
-
-  [624] This is the remark of his great admirer Arrian, vii. 1, 6.
-
-  [625] Livy, ix. 17-19. A discussion of Alexander’s chances
-  against the Romans—extremely interesting and beautiful, though
-  the case appears to me very partially set forth. I agree with
-  Niebuhr in dissenting from Livy’s result; and with Plutarch in
-  considering it as one of the boons of fortune to the Romans, that
-  Alexander did not live long enough to attack them (Plutarch de
-  Fortunâ Romanor. p. 326).
-
-  Livy however had great reason for complaining of those Greek
-  authors (he calls them “levissimi ex Græcis”) who said that
-  the Romans would have quailed before the terrible reputation
-  of Alexander, and submitted without resistance. Assuredly his
-  victory over them would have been dearly bought.
-
-  [626] Alexander of Epirus is said to have remarked, that he, in
-  his expeditions into Italy, had fallen upon the ἀνδρωνῖτις or
-  chamber of the men; while his nephew (Alexander the Great), in
-  invading Asia, had fallen upon the γυναικωνῖτις or chamber of the
-  women (Aulus Gellius, xvii. 21; Curtius, viii. 1, 37).
-
-Among all the qualities which go to constitute the highest military
-excellence, either as a general or as a soldier, none was wanting
-in the character of Alexander. Together with his own chivalrous
-courage—sometimes indeed both excessive and unseasonable, so as to
-form the only military defect which can be fairly imputed to him—we
-trace in all his operations the most careful dispositions taken
-beforehand, vigilant precaution in guarding against possible reverse,
-and abundant resource in adapting himself to new contingences.
-Amidst constant success, these precautionary combinations were never
-discontinued. His achievements are the earliest recorded evidence
-of scientific military organization on a large scale, and of its
-overwhelming effects. Alexander overawes the imagination more than
-any other personage of antiquity, by the matchless development of
-all that constitutes effective force—as an individual warrior,
-and as organizer and leader of armed masses; not merely the blind
-impetuosity ascribed by Homer to Ares, but also the intelligent,
-methodized, and all-subduing compression which he personifies in
-Athênê. But all his great qualities were fit for use only against
-enemies; in which category indeed were numbered all mankind, known
-and unknown, except those who chose to submit to him. In his Indian
-campaigns, amidst tribes of utter strangers, we perceive that not
-only those who stand on their defence, but also those who abandon
-their property and flee to the mountains, are alike pursued and
-slaughtered.
-
-Apart from the transcendent merits of Alexander as a soldier and a
-general, some authors give him credit for grand and beneficent views
-on the subject of imperial government, and for intentions highly
-favorable to the improvement of mankind. I see no ground for adopting
-this opinion. As far as we can venture to anticipate what would have
-been Alexander’s future, we see nothing in prospect except years of
-ever-repeated aggression and conquest, not to be concluded until he
-had traversed and subjugated all the inhabited globe. The acquisition
-of universal dominion—conceived not metaphorically, but literally,
-and conceived with greater facility in consequence of the imperfect
-geographical knowledge of the time—was the master-passion of his
-soul. At the moment of his death, he was commencing fresh aggression
-in the south against the Arabians, to an indefinite extent;[627]
-while his vast projects against the western tribes in Africa and
-Europe, as far as the pillars of Herakles, were consigned in the
-orders and memoranda confidentially communicated to Kraterus.[628]
-Italy, Gaul, and Spain, would have been successively attacked and
-conquered; the enterprises proposed to him when in Baktria by the
-Chorasmian prince Pharasmanes, but postponed then until a more
-convenient season, would have been next taken up, and he would
-have marched from the Danube northward round the Euxine and Palus
-Mæotis against the Scythians and the tribes of Caucasus.[629] There
-remained moreover the Asiatic regions east of the Hyphasis, which
-his soldiers had refused to enter upon, but which he certainly would
-have invaded at a future opportunity, were it only to efface the
-poignant humiliation of having been compelled to relinquish his
-proclaimed purpose. Though this sounds like romance and hyperbole, it
-was nothing more than the real insatiate aspiration of Alexander, who
-looked upon every new acquisition mainly as a capital for acquiring
-more.[630] “You are a man like all of us, Alexander—except that
-you abandon your home (said the naked Indian to him[631]) like a
-meddlesome destroyer, to invade the most distant regions; enduring
-hardship yourself, and inflicting hardship upon others.” Now, how
-an empire thus boundless and heterogeneous, such as no prince has
-ever yet realized, could have been administered with any superior
-advantages to subjects—it would be difficult to show. The mere task
-of acquiring and maintaining—of keeping satraps and tribute-gatherers
-in authority as well as in subordination—of suppressing resistances
-ever liable to recur in regions distant by months of march[632]—would
-occupy the whole life of a world-conqueror, without leaving any
-leisure for the improvements suited to peace and stability, if we
-give him credit for such purposes in theory.
-
-  [627] Arrian, vii. 28, 5.
-
-  [628] Diodor. xviii. 4.
-
-  [629] Arrian, iv. 15, 11.
-
-  [630] Arrian, vii. 19, 12. Τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς, ὥς γέ μοι δοκεῖ,
-  ἄπληστος ἦν τοῦ κτᾶσθαί τι ἀεὶ Ἀλέξανδρος. Compare vii. 1, 3-7;
-  vii. 15, 6, and the speech made by Alexander to his soldiers on
-  the banks of the Hyphasis, when he was trying to persuade them
-  to march forward, v. 26 _seq._ We must remember that Arrian
-  had before him the work of Ptolemy, who would give, in all
-  probability, the substance of this memorable speech from his own
-  hearing.
-
-  [631] Arrian, vii. 1, 8. σὺ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ὢν, παραπλήσιος τοῖς
-  ἄλλοις, πλήν γε δὴ, ὅτι πολυπράγμων καὶ ἀτάσθαλος, ἀπὸ τῆς
-  οἰκείας τοσαύτην γῆν ἐπεξέρχῃ, πράγματα ἔχων τε καὶ παρέχων
-  ἄλλοις.
-
-  [632] Arrian, vii. 4, 4, 5.
-
-But even this last is more than can be granted. Alexander’s
-acts indicate that he desired nothing better than to take up
-the traditions of the Persian empire; a tribute-levying and
-army-levying system, under Macedonians, in large proportion, as
-his instruments; yet partly also under the very same Persians who
-had administered before, provided they submitted to him. It has
-indeed been extolled among his merits that he was thus willing to
-re-appoint Persian grandees (putting their armed force however
-under the command of a Macedonian officer)—and to continue native
-princes in their dominions, if they did willing homage to him, as
-tributary subordinates. But all this had been done before him by the
-Persian kings, whose system it was to leave the conquered princes
-undisturbed, subject only to the payment of tribute, and to the
-obligation of furnishing a military contingent when required.[633] In
-like manner Alexander’s Asiatic empire would thus have been composed
-of an aggregate of satrapies and dependent principalities, furnishing
-money and soldiers; in other respects, left to the discretion of
-local rule, with occasional extreme inflictions of punishment, but
-no systematic examination or control.[634] Upon this, the condition
-of Asiatic empire in all ages, Alexander would have grafted one
-special improvement: the military organization of the empire, feeble
-under the Achæmenid princes, would have been greatly strengthened by
-his genius, and by the able officers formed in his school, both for
-foreign aggression and for home control.[635]
-
-  [633] Herodot. iii. 15. Alexander offered to Phokion (Plutarch,
-  Phok. 18) his choice between four Asiatic cities, of which (that
-  is, of any one of them) he was to enjoy the revenues; just
-  as Artaxerxes Longimanus had acted towards Themistokles, in
-  recompense for his treason. Phokion refused the offer.
-
-  [634] See the punishment of Sisamnes by Kambyses (Herodot. v. 25).
-
-  [635] The rhetor Aristeides, in his Encomium on Rome, has some
-  good remarks on the character and ascendancy of Alexander,
-  exercised by will and personal authority, as contrasted with the
-  systematic and legal working of the Roman empire (Orat. xiv. p.
-  332-360, vol. i. ed. Dindorf).
-
-The Persian empire was a miscellaneous aggregate, with no strong
-feeling of nationality. The Macedonian conqueror who seized its
-throne was still more indifferent to national sentiment. He was
-neither Macedonian nor Greek. Though the absence of this prejudice
-has sometimes been mounted to him as a virtue, it only made room,
-in my opinion, for prejudices yet worse. The substitute for it was
-an exorbitant personality and self-estimation, manifested even in
-his earliest years, and inflamed by extraordinary success into the
-belief in divine parentage; which, while setting him above the
-idea of communion with any special nationality, made him conceive
-all mankind as subjects under one common sceptre to be wielded by
-himself. To this universal empire the Persian king made the nearest
-approach,[636] according to the opinions then prevalent. Accordingly
-Alexander, when victorious, accepted the position and pretensions of
-the overthrown Persian court as approaching most nearly to his full
-due. He became more Persian than either Macedonian or Greek. While
-himself adopting, as far as he could safely venture, the personal
-habits of the Persian court, he took studied pains to transform his
-Macedonian officers into Persian grandees, encouraging and even
-forcing intermarriages with Persian women according to Persian rites.
-At the time of Alexander’s death, there was comprised, in his written
-orders given to Kraterus, a plan for the wholesale transportation
-of inhabitants, both out of Europe into Asia, and out of Asia into
-Europe, in order to fuse these populations into one by multiplying
-intermarriages and intercourse.[637] Such reciprocal translation of
-peoples would have been felt as eminently odious, and could not have
-been accomplished without coercive authority.[638] It is rash to
-speculate upon unexecuted purposes; but, as far as we can judge, such
-compulsory mingling of the different races promises nothing favorable
-to the happiness of any of them, though it might serve as an imposing
-novelty and memento of imperial omnipotence.
-
-  [636] Xenoph. Cyropæd. viii. 6, 21; Anabas. i. 7, 6; Herodot.
-  vii. 8, 13: compare Arrian, v. 26, 4-10.
-
-  [637] Diodor. xviii. 4. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις πόλεων συνοικισμοὺς
-  καὶ σωμάτων μεταγωγὰς ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας εἰς τὴν Εὐρώπην, καὶ κατὰ
-  τοὐναντίον ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν, ὅπως τὰς μεγίστας
-  ἠπείρους ταῖς ἐπιγαμίαις καὶ ταῖς οἰκειώσεσιν εἰς κοινὴν ὁμόνοιαν
-  καὶ συγγενικὴν καταστήσῃ.
-
-  [638] See the effect produced upon the Ionians by the false
-  statement of Histiæus (Herodot. vi. 3) with Wesseling’s note—and
-  the eagerness of the Pæonians to return (Herod. v. 98; also
-  Justin, viii. 5).
-
-  Antipater afterwards intended to transport the Ætolians in
-  mass from their own country into Asia, if he had succeeded in
-  conquering them (Diodor. xviii. 25). Compare Pausanias (i.
-  9, 8-10) about the forcible measures used by Lysimachus, in
-  transporting new inhabitants, at Ephesus and Lysimacheia.
-
-In respect of intelligence and combining genius, Alexander was
-Hellenic to the full; in respect of disposition and purpose, no one
-could be less Hellenic. The acts attesting his Oriental violence of
-impulse, unmeasured self-will,[639] and exaction of reverence above
-the limits of humanity—have been already recounted. To describe him
-as a son of Hellas, imbued with the political maxims of Aristotle,
-and bent on the systematic diffusion of Hellenic culture for the
-improvement of mankind[640]—is, in my judgment, an estimate of
-his character contrary to the evidence. Alexander is indeed said
-to have invited suggestions from Aristotle as to the best mode of
-colonizing; but his temper altered so much, after a few years of
-Asiatic conquest, that he came not only to lose all deference for
-Aristotle’s advice, but even to hate him bitterly.[641] Moreover,
-though the philosopher’s full suggestions have not been preserved,
-yet we are told generally that he recommended Alexander to behave
-to the Greeks as a leader or president, or limited chief—and to
-the Barbarians (non-Hellenes) as a master;[642] a distinction
-substantially coinciding with that pointed out by Burke in his
-speeches at the beginning of the American war, between the principles
-of government proper to be followed by England in the American
-colonies, and in British India. No Greek thinker believed the
-Asiatics to be capable of that free civil polity[643] upon which
-the march of every Grecian community was based. Aristotle did not
-wish to degrade the Asiatics below the level to which they had been
-accustomed, but rather to preserve the Greeks from being degraded
-to the same level. Now Alexander recognized no such distinction as
-that drawn by his preceptor. He treated Greeks and Asiatics alike,
-not by elevating the latter, but by degrading the former. Though he
-employed all indiscriminately as instruments, yet he presently found
-the free speech of Greeks, and even of Macedonians, so distasteful
-and offensive, that his preferences turned more and more in favor of
-the servile Asiatic sentiment and customs. Instead of hellenizing
-Asia, he was tending to asiatize Macedonia and Hellas. His temper
-and character, as modified by a few years of conquest, rendered him
-quite unfit to follow the course recommended by Aristotle towards the
-Greeks—quite as unfit as any of the Persian kings, or as the French
-Emperor Napoleon, to endure that partial frustration, compromise, and
-smart from free criticism, which is inseparable from the position of
-a limited chief. Among a multitude of subjects more diverse-colored
-than even the army of Xerxes, it is quite possible that he might have
-turned his power towards the improvement of the rudest portions.
-We are told (though the fact is difficult to credit, from his want
-of time) that he abolished various barbarisms of the Hyrkanians,
-Arachosians, and Sogdians.[644] But Macedonians as well as Greeks
-would have been pure losers by being absorbed into an immense Asiatic
-aggregate.
-
-  [639] Livy, ix. 18. “Referre in tanto rege piget superbam
-  mutationem vistis, et desideratas humi jacentium adulationes,
-  etiam victis Macedonibus graves, nedum victoribus: en fœda
-  supplicia, et inter vinum et epulas cædes amicorum, et vanitatem
-  ementiendæ stirpis. Quid si vini amor in dies fieret acrior? quid
-  si trux et præfervida ira? (_nec quidquam dubium inter scriptores
-  refero_) nullane hæc damna imperatoriis virtutibus ducimus?”
-
-  The appeal here made by Livy to the full attestation of these
-  points in Alexander’s character deserves notice. He had doubtless
-  more authorities before him than we possess.
-
-  [640] Among other eulogists of Alexander, it is sufficient
-  to name Droysen—in his two works, both of great historical
-  research—Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen—and Geschichte des
-  Hellenismus oder der Bildung des Hellenischen Staaten Systemes
-  (Hamburg, 1843). See especially the last and most recent work, p.
-  27 _seqq._, p. 651 _seqq._—and elsewhere _passim_.
-
-  [641] Plutarch, Alex. 55-74.
-
-  [642] Plutarch, Fortun. Alex. M. p. 329. Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ τῷ λόγῳ τὸ
-  ἔργον παρέσχεν· οὐ γὰρ, ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης συνεβούλευεν αὐτῷ, τοῖς
-  μὲν Ἕλλησιν ἡγεμονικῶς, τοῖς δὲ βαρβάροις δεσποτικῶς χρώμενον
-  ... ἀλλὰ κοινὸς ἥκειν θεόθεν ἁρμοστὴς καὶ διαλλακτὴς τῶν ὅλων
-  νομίζων, οὓς τῷ λόγῳ μὴ συνῆγε, τοῖς ὅπλοις βιαζόμενος, εἰς τὸ
-  αὐτὸ συνενεγκὼν τὰ παντάχοθεν, etc.
-
-  Strabo (or Eratosthenes, see Strabo, i. p. 66) and Plutarch
-  understand the expression of Aristotle erroneously—as if that
-  philosopher had meant to recommend harsh and cruel treatment of
-  the non-Hellenes, and kind treatment only towards Greeks. That
-  Aristotle could have meant no such thing, is evident from the
-  whole tenor of his treatise on Politics. The distinction really
-  intended is between a greater and a less measure of extra-popular
-  authority—not between kind and unkind purposes in the exercise
-  of authority. Compare Tacitus, Annal. xii. 11—the advice of the
-  Emperor Claudius to the Parthian prince Meherdates.
-
-  [643] Aristot. Politic. i. 1, 5; vii. 6, 1. See the memorable
-  comparison drawn by Aristotle (Polit. vii. 6) between the
-  Europeans and Asiatics generally. He pronounces the former to be
-  courageous and energetic, but wanting in intelligence or powers
-  of political combination; the latter to be intelligent and clever
-  in contrivance, but destitute of courage. Neither of them have
-  more than a “one-legged aptitude” (φύσιν μονόκωλον); the Greek
-  alone possesses both the courage and intelligence united. The
-  Asiatics are condemned to perpetual subjection; the Greeks might
-  govern the world could they but combine in one political society.
-
-  [644] Plutarch, Fortun. Alex. M. p. 328. The stay of Alexander
-  in these countries was however so short, that even with the best
-  will he could not have enforced the suppression of any inveterate
-  customs.
-
-Plutarch states that Alexander founded more than seventy new cities
-in Asia.[645] So large a number of them is neither verifiable nor
-probable, unless we either reckon up simple military posts, or borrow
-from the list of foundations really established by his successors.
-Except Alexandria in Egypt, none of the cities founded by Alexander
-himself can be shown to have attained any great development. Nearly
-all were planted among the remote, warlike, and turbulent peoples
-eastward of the Caspian Gates. Such establishments were really
-fortified posts to hold the country in subjection: Alexander lodged
-in them detachments from his army; but none of these detachments
-can well have been large, since he could not afford materially to
-weaken his army, while active military operations were still going
-on and while farther advance was in contemplation. More of these
-settlements were founded in Sogdiana than elsewhere; but respecting
-the Sogdian foundations, we know that the Greeks whom he established
-there, chained to the spot only by fear of his power, broke away
-in mutiny immediately on the news of his death.[646] Some Greek
-soldiers in Alexander’s army on the Jaxartes or the Hydaspes, sick
-and weary of his interminable marches, might prefer being enrolled
-among the colonists of a new city on one of these unknown rivers, to
-the ever-repeated routine of exhausting duty.[647] But it is certain
-that no volunteer emigrants would go forth to settle at distances
-such as their imaginations could hardly conceive. The absorbing
-appetite of Alexander was conquest, to the East, West, South, and
-North; the cities which he planted were established, for the most
-part, as garrisons to maintain his most distant and most precarious
-acquisitions. The purpose of colonization was altogether subordinate;
-and that of hellenizing Asia, so far as we can see, was not even
-contemplated, much less realized.
-
-  [645] Plutarch, Fortun. Al. M. p. 328. Plutarch mentions, a few
-  lines afterwards, Seleukeia in Mesopotamia, as if he thought that
-  it was among the cities established by Alexander himself. This
-  shows that he has not been exact in distinguishing foundations
-  made by Alexander, from those originated by Seleukus and the
-  other Diadochi.
-
-  The elaborate article of Droysen (in the Appendix to his
-  Geschichte des Hellenismus, p. 588-651), ascribes to Alexander
-  the largest plans of colonization in Asia, and enumerates a
-  great number of cities alleged to have been founded by him. But
-  in regard to the majority of these foundations, the evidence
-  upon which Droysen grounds his belief that Alexander was the
-  founder, appears to me altogether slender and unsatisfactory. If
-  Alexander founded so many cities as Droysen imagines, how does it
-  happen that Arrian mentions only so comparatively small a number?
-  The argument derived from Arrian’s silence, for rejecting what
-  is affirmed by other ancients respecting Alexander, is indeed
-  employed by modern authors (and by Droysen himself among them),
-  far oftener than I think warrantable. But if there be any one
-  proceeding of Alexander more than another, in respect of which
-  the silence of Arrian ought to make us suspicious—it is the
-  foundation of a new colony; a solemn act, requiring delay and
-  multiplied regulations, intended for perpetuity, and redounding
-  to the honor of the founder. I do not believe in any colonies
-  founded by Alexander, beyond those comparatively few which Arrian
-  mentions, except such as rest upon some other express and good
-  testimony. Whoever will read through Droysen’s list, will see
-  that most of the names in it will not stand this test. The short
-  life, and rapid movements, of Alexander, are of themselves the
-  strongest presumption against his having founded so large a
-  number of colonies.
-
-  [646] Diodor. xvii. 99; xviii. 7. Curtius, ix. 7, 1. Curtius
-  observes (vii. 10, 15) respecting Alexander’s colonies in
-  Sogdiana—that they were founded “velut fræni domitarum gentium;
-  nunc originis suæ oblita serviunt, quibus imperaverunt.”
-
-  [647] See the plain-spoken outburst of the Thurian Antileon, one
-  of the soldiers in Xenophon’s Ten Thousand Greeks, when the army
-  reached Trapezus (Xenoph. Anabas. v. 1, 2).
-
-This process of hellenizing Asia—in so far as Asia was ever
-hellenized—which has often been ascribed to Alexander, was in
-reality the work of the Diadochi who came after him; though his
-conquests doubtless opened the door and established the military
-ascendency which rendered such a work practicable. The position, the
-aspirations, and the interests of these Diadochi—Antigonus, Ptolemy,
-Seleukus, Lysimachus, etc.—were materially different from those of
-Alexander. They had neither appetite nor means for new and remote
-conquest; their great rivalry was with each other; each sought to
-strengthen himself near home against the rest. It became a matter
-of fashion and pride with them, not less than of interest, to found
-new cities immortalizing their family names. These foundations
-were chiefly made in the regions of Asia near and known to Greeks,
-where Alexander had planted none. Thus the great and numerous
-foundations of Seleukus Nikator and his successors covered Syria,
-Mesopotamia, and parts of Asia Minor. All these regions were known
-to Greeks, and more or less tempting to new Grecian immigrants—not
-out of reach or hearing of the Olympic and other festivals, as the
-Jaxartes and the Indus were. In this way a considerable influx of new
-hellenic blood was poured into Asia during the century succeeding
-Alexander,—probably in great measure from Italy and Sicily, where the
-condition of the Greek cities became still more calamitous—besides
-the numerous Greeks who took service as individuals under these
-Asiatic kings. Greeks, and Macedonians speaking Greek, became
-predominant, if not in numbers, at least in importance, throughout
-most of the cities in Western Asia. In particular, the Macedonian
-military organization, discipline, and administration, was maintained
-systematically among these Asiatic kings. In the account of the
-battle of Magnesia, fought by the Seleukid king Atiochus the Great
-against the Romans in 190 B. C., the Macedonian phalanx,
-constituting the main force of his Asiatic army, appears in all its
-completeness, just as it stood under Philip and Perseus in Macedonia
-itself.[648]
-
-  [648] Appian, Syriac. 32.
-
-When it is said however that Asia became hellenized under Alexander’s
-successors, the phrase requires explanation. Hellenism, properly
-so called—the aggregate of habits, sentiments, energies, and
-intelligence, manifested by the Greeks during their epoch of
-autonomy[649]—never passed over into Asia; neither the highest
-qualities of the Greek mind, not even the entire character of
-ordinary Greeks. This genuine Hellenism could not subsist under
-the overruling compression of Alexander, nor even under the less
-irresistible pressure of his successors. Its living force, productive
-genius, self-organizing power, and active spirit of political
-communion, were stifled, and gradually died out. All that passed
-into Asia was a faint and partial resemblance of it, carrying
-the superficial marks of the original. The administration of the
-Greco-Asiatic kings was not hellenic (as it has been sometimes
-called), but completely despotic, as that of the Persians had been
-before. Whoever follows their history, until the period of Roman
-dominion, will see that it turned upon the tastes, temper, and
-ability of the prince, and on the circumstances of the regal family.
-Viewing their government as a system, its prominent difference
-as compared with their Persian predecessors, consisted in their
-retaining the military traditions and organization of Philip and
-Alexander, an elaborate scheme of discipline and manœuvring, which
-would not be kept up without permanent official grades and a higher
-measure of intelligence than had ever been displayed under the
-Achæmenid kings, who had no military school or training whatever.
-Hence a great number of individual Greeks found employment in the
-military as well as in the civil service of these Greco-Asiatic
-kings. The intelligent Greek, instead of a citizen of Hellas, became
-the instrument of a foreign prince; the details of government were
-managed to a great degree by Greek officials, and always in the Greek
-language.
-
-  [649] This is the sense in which I have always used the word
-  Hellenism, throughout the present Work.
-
-  With Droysen, the word _Hellenismus_—_Das Hellenistische
-  Staatensystem_—is applied to the state of things which followed
-  upon Alexander’s death; to the aggregate of kingdoms into which
-  Alexander’s conquests become distributed, having for their
-  point of similarity the common use of Greek speech, a certain
-  proportion of Greeks both as inhabitants and as officers, and a
-  partial streak of Hellenic culture.
-
-  I cannot but think that such an employment of the word is
-  misleading. At any rate, its sense must be constantly kept in
-  mind, in order that it may not be confounded with _hellenism_ in
-  the stricter meaning.
-
-Moreover, besides this, there was the still more important fact of
-the many new cities founded in Asia by the Seleukidæ and the other
-contemporary kings. Each of these cities had a considerable infusion
-of Greek and Macedonian citizens, among the native Orientals located
-there, often brought by compulsion from neighboring villages. In
-what numerical ratio these two elements of the civic population
-stood to each other, we cannot say. But the Greeks and Macedonians
-were the leading and active portion, who exercised the greatest
-assimilating force, gave imposing effect to the public manifestations
-of religion, had wider views and sympathies, dealt with the central
-government, and carried on that contracted measure of municipal
-autonomy which the city was permitted to retain. In these cities the
-Greek inhabitants, though debarred from political freedom, enjoyed
-a range of social activity suited to their tastes. In each, Greek
-was the language of public business and dealing; each formed a
-centre of attraction and commerce for an extensive neighborhood; all
-together, they were the main hellenic or quasi-hellenic element in
-Asia under the Greco-Asiatic kings, as contrasted with the rustic
-villages, where native manners, and probably native speech, still
-continued with little modification. But the Greeks of Antioch, or
-Alexandria, or Seleukeia, were not like citizens of Athens or Thebes,
-nor even like men of Tarentum or Ephesus. While they communicated
-their language to Orientals, they became themselves substantially
-orientalized. Their feelings, judgments, and habits of action, ceased
-to be hellenic. Polybius, when he visited Alexandria, looked with
-surprise and aversion on the Greeks there resident, though they
-were superior to the non-hellenic population, whom he considered
-worthless.[650] Greek social habits, festivals, and legends, passed
-with the hellenic settlers into Asia; all becoming amalgamated and
-transformed so as to suit a new Asiatic abode. Important social and
-political consequences turned upon the diffusion of the language,
-and upon the establishment of such a common medium of communication
-throughout Western Asia. But after all, the hellenized Asiatic was
-not so much a Greek as a foreigner with Grecian speech, exterior
-varnish, and superficial manifestations; distinguished fundamentally
-from those Greek citizens with whom the present history has been
-concerned. So he would have been considered by Sophokles, by
-Thucydides, by Sokrates.
-
-  [650] Strabo, xvii. p. 797, ὁ γοῦν Πολύβιος, γεγονὼς ἐν τῇ πόλει
-  (Alexandria), βδελύττεται τὴν ταύτῃ κατάστασιν, etc.
-
-  The Museum of Alexandria (with its library) must be carefully
-  distinguished from the city and the people. It was an artificial
-  institution, which took its rise altogether from the personal
-  taste and munificence of the earlier Ptolemies, especially the
-  second. It was one of the noblest and most useful institutions
-  recorded in history, and forms the most honorable monument of
-  what Droysen calls the _hellenistic_ period, between the death
-  of Alexander and the extension of the Roman empire into Asia.
-  But this Museum, though situated at Alexandria, had no peculiar
-  connection with the city or its population; it was a College of
-  literary Fellows (if we may employ a modern word) congregated
-  out of various Grecian towns. Eratosthenes, Kallimuchus,
-  Aristophanes, Aristarchus, were not natives of Alexandria.
-
-Thus much is necessary in order to understand the bearing of
-Alexander’s conquests, not only upon the hellenic population, but
-upon hellenic attributes and peculiarities. While crushing the Greeks
-as communities at home, these conquests opened a wider range to the
-Greeks as individuals abroad; and produced—perhaps the best of all
-their effects—a great increase of intercommunication, multiplication
-of roads, extension of commercial dealing, and enlarged facilities
-for the acquisition of geographical knowledge. There already
-existed in the Persian empire an easy and convenient royal road
-(established by Darius son of Hystaspes and described as well as
-admired by Herodotus) for the three months’ journey between Sardis
-and Susa; and there must have been another regular road from Susa
-and Ekbatana to Baktria, Sogdiana, and India. Alexander, had he
-lived, would doubtless have multiplied on a still larger scale the
-communications both by sea and land between the various parts of his
-world-empire. We read that among the gigantic projects which he was
-contemplating when surprised by death, one was, the construction of
-a road all along the northern coast of Africa, as far as the Pillars
-of Herakles.[651] He had intended to found a new maritime city on
-the Persian Gulf, at the mouth of the Euphrates, and to incur much
-outlay for regulating the flow of water in its lower course. The
-river would probably have been thus made again to afford the same
-conveniences, both for navigation and irrigation, as it appears to
-have furnished in earlier times under the ancient Babylonian kings.
-Orders had been also given for constructing a fleet to explore the
-Caspian Sea. Alexander believed that sea to be connected with the
-Eastern Ocean,[652] and intended to make it his point of departure
-for circumnavigating the eastern limits of Asia, which country
-yet remained for him to conquer. The voyage already performed by
-Nearchus, from the mouth of the Indus to that of the Euphrates, was
-in those days a splendid maritime achievement; to which another
-still greater was on the point of being added—the circumnavigation
-of Arabia from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea; though here we must
-remark, that this same voyage (from the mouth of the Indus round
-Arabia into the Red Sea) had been performed in thirty months, a
-century and a half before, by Skylax of Karyanda, under the orders
-of Darius son of Hystaspes;[653] yet, though recorded by Herodotus,
-forgotten (as it would appear) by Alexander and his contemporaries.
-This enlarged and systematic exploration of the earth, combined with
-increased means of communication among its inhabitants, is the main
-feature in Alexander’s career which presents itself as promising real
-consequences beneficial to humanity.
-
-  [651] Diodor. xviii. 4. Pausanias (ii. 1. 5) observes that
-  Alexander wished to cut through Mount Mimas (in Asia. Minor), but
-  that this was the only one, among all his undertakings, which
-  did not succeed. “So difficult is it (he goes on) to put force
-  upon the divine arrangements”, τὰ θεῖα βιάσασθαι. He wished to
-  cut through the isthmus between Teos and Klazomenæ, so as to
-  avoid the navigation round the cliffs of Mimas (σκόπελον νιφόεντα
-  Μίμαντος—Aristophan. Nub. 274) between Chios and Erythræ.
-  Probably this was among the projects suggested to Alexander, in
-  the last year of his life. We have no other information about it.
-
-  [652] Arrian, v. 26, 2.
-
-  [653] Herodot. iv. 44: compare iii. 102. That Arrian had not
-  present to his memory this narrative of Herodotus, is plain
-  from the last chapter of his Indica; though in his history of
-  Alexander he alludes several times to Herodotus. Some authors
-  have concluded from Arrian’s silence that he disbelieved the
-  fact: if he had disbelieved it, I think that he would have
-  mentioned the statement of Herodotus nevertheless, with an
-  intimation that he did not think it worthy of credit. Moreover,
-  Arrian’s disbelief (even granting that such was the state of his
-  mind) is not to be held as a conclusive disproof of the story.
-  I confess that I see no sufficient reason for discrediting the
-  narrative of Herodotus—though some eminent modern writers are of
-  an opposite opinion.
-
-We read that Alexander felt so much interest in the extension
-of science, that he gave to Aristotle the immense sum of 800
-talents in money, placing under his directions several thousand
-men, for the purpose of prosecuting zoological researches.[654]
-These exaggerations are probably the work of those enemies of the
-philosopher who decried him as a pensioner of the Macedonian court;
-but it is probable enough that Philip, and Alexander in the early
-part of his reign, may have helped Aristotle in the difficult process
-of getting together facts and specimens for observation—from esteem
-towards him personally, rather than from interest in his discoveries.
-The intellectual turn of Alexander was towards literature, poetry,
-and history. He was fond of the Iliad especially, as well as of the
-Attic tragedians; so that Harpalus, being directed to send some books
-to him in Upper Asia, selected as the most acceptable packet various
-tragedies of Æschylus, Sophokles, and Euripides, with the dithyrambic
-poems of Telestes and the histories of Phlistus.[655]
-
-  [654] Pliny, H. N. viii. 17; Athenæus, ix. p. 398. See
-  Schneider’s Preface to his edition of Aristotle’s Historiæ De
-  Animalibus, p. xxxix. _seq._
-
-  [655] Plutarch, Alexand. 8.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER XCV.
-
-GRECIAN AFFAIRS FROM THE LANDING OF ALEXANDER IN ASIA TO THE CLOSE OF
-THE LAMIAN WAR.
-
-
-Even in 334 B. C., when Alexander first entered upon his
-Asiatic campaigns, the Grecian cities, great as well as small, had
-been robbed of all their free agency, and existed only as appendages
-of the kingdom of Macedonia. Several of them were occupied by
-Macedonian garrisons, or governed by local despots who leaned upon
-such armed force for support. There existed among them no common
-idea or public sentiment, formally proclaimed and acted on, except
-such as it suited Alexander’s purpose to encourage. The miso-Persian
-sentiment—once a genuine expression of Hellenic patriotism, to the
-recollection of which Demosthenes was wont to appeal, in animating
-the Athenians to action against Macedonia, but now extinct and
-supplanted by nearer apprehensions—had been converted by Alexander
-to his own purposes, as a pretext for headship, and a help for
-ensuring submission during his absence in Asia. Greece had become a
-province of Macedonia; the affairs of the Greeks (observes Aristotle
-in illustrating a philosophical discussion) are “in the hands of the
-king.”[656] A public synod of the Greeks sat from time to time at
-Corinth; but it represented only philo-Macedonian sentiment; all that
-we know of its proceedings consisted in congratulations to Alexander
-on his victories. There is no Grecian history of public or political
-import; there are no facts except the local and municipal details
-of each city—“the streets and fountains which we are repairing
-and the battlements which we are whitening”, to use a phrase of
-Demosthenes[657]—the good management of the Athenian finances by the
-orator Lykurgus, and the contentions of orators respecting private
-disputes or politics of the past.
-
-  [656] Aristot. Physic. iv. 3. p. 210 a. 21. ἔτι ~ὡς ἐν βασιλεῖ τὰ
-  τῶν Ἑλλήνων~, καὶ ὅλως ~ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ κινητικῷ~.
-
-  [657] Demosthen. Olynthiac. iii. p. 36.
-
-But though Grecian history is thus stagnant and suspended during the
-first years of Alexander’s Asiatic campaigns, it might at any moment
-have become animated with an active spirit of self-emancipation, if
-he had experienced reverses, or if the Persians had administered
-their own affairs with skill and vigor. I have already stated, that
-during the first two years of the war, the Persian fleet (we ought
-rather to say, the Phenician fleet in the Persian service) had a
-decided superiority at sea. Darius possessed untold treasures which
-might have indefinitely increased that superiority and multiplied
-his means of transmarine action, had he chosen to follow the advice
-of Memnon, by acting vigorously from the sea and strictly on the
-defensive by land. The movement or quiescence of the Greeks therefore
-depended on the turn of affairs in Asia; as Alexander himself was
-well aware.
-
-During the winter of 334-333 B. C., Memnon with the Persian fleet
-appeared to be making progress among the islands in the Ægean,[658]
-and the anti-Macedonian Greeks were expecting him farther westward in
-Eubœa and Peloponnesus. Their hopes being dashed by his unexpected
-death, and still more by Darius’s abandonment of the Memnonian plans,
-they had next to wait for the chance of what might be achieved by the
-immense Persian land-force. Even down to the eve of the battle of
-Issus, Demosthenes[659] and others (as has already been mentioned)
-were encouraged by their correspondents in Asia to anticipate success
-for Darius even in pitched battle. But after the great disaster at
-Issus, during a year and a half (from November 333 B. C. to March
-or April 331 B. C.), no hope was possible. The Persian force seemed
-extinct, and Darius was so paralyzed by the captivity of his family,
-that he suffered even the citizens of Tyre and Gaza to perish in
-their gallant efforts of defence, without the least effort to save
-them. At length, in the spring of 331 B. C., the prospects again
-appeared to improve. A second Persian army, countless like the first,
-was assembling eastward of the Tigris; Alexander advanced into the
-interior, many weeks’ march from the shores of the Mediterranean, to
-attack them; and the Persians doubtless transmitted encouragements
-with money to enterprising men in Greece, in hopes of provoking
-auxiliary movements. Presently (October 331 B. C.) came the
-catastrophe at Arbela; after which no demonstration against Alexander
-could have been attempted with any reasonable hope of success.
-
-  [658] Arrian, ii. 1.
-
-  [659] Æschines cont. Ktesiph. p. 552.
-
-Such was the varying point of view under which the contest in Asia
-presented itself to Grecian spectators, during the three years and
-a half between the landing of Alexander in Asia and the battle of
-Arbela. As to the leading states in Greece, we have to look at Athens
-and Sparta only; for Thebes had been destroyed and demolished as
-a city; and what had been once the citadel of the Kadmeia was now
-a Macedonian garrison.[660] Moreover, besides that garrison, the
-Bœotian cities, Orchomenus, Platæa, etc., were themselves strongholds
-of Macedonian dependence; being hostile to Thebes of old, and having
-received among themselves assignments of all the Theban lands.[661]
-In case of any movement in Greece, therefore, Antipater, the viceroy
-of Macedonia, might fairly count on finding in Greece interested
-allies, serving as no mean check upon Attica.
-
-  [660] Vita Demosthenis ap. Westermann, Scriptt. Biograph. p.
-  301. φρουρὰν καταστήσαντος Ἀλέξανδρου ἐν ταῖς Θήβαις μετὰ τὸ
-  κατασκάψαι τοὺς Θηβαίους, etc.
-
-  [661] Pausanias, i. 25, 4.
-
-At Athens, the reigning sentiment was decidedly pacific. Few
-were disposed to brave the prince who had just given so fearful
-an evidence of his force by the destruction of Thebes and the
-enslavement of the Thebans. Ephialtes and Charidemus, the military
-citizens at Athens most anti-Macedonian in sentiment, had been
-demanded as prisoners by Alexander, and had withdrawn to Asia, there
-to take service with Darius. Other Athenians, men of energy and
-action, had followed their example, and had fought against Alexander
-at the Granikus, where they became his prisoners, and were sent
-to Macedonia to work in fetters at the mines. Ephialtes perished
-at the siege of Halikarnassus, while defending the place with the
-utmost gallantry; Charidemus suffered a more unworthy death from the
-shameful sentence of Darius. The anti-Macedonian leaders who remained
-at Athens, such as Demosthenes and Lykurgus, were not generals or
-men of action, but statesmen and orators. They were fully aware that
-submission to Alexander was a painful necessity, though they watched
-not the less anxiously for any reverse which might happen to him,
-such as to make it possible for Athens to head a new struggle on
-behalf of Grecian freedom.
-
-But it was not Demosthenes nor Lykurgus who now guided the general
-policy of Athens.[662] For the twelve years between the destruction
-of Thebes and the death of Alexander, Phokion and Demades were
-her ministers for foreign affairs; two men of totally opposite
-characters, but coinciding in pacific views, and in looking to the
-favor of Alexander and Antipater as the principal end to be attained.
-Twenty Athenian triremes were sent to act with the Macedonian
-fleet, during Alexander’s first campaign in Asia; these, together
-with the Athenian prisoners taken at the Granikus, served to him
-farther as a guarantee for the continued submission of the Athenians
-generally.[663] There can be no doubt that the pacific policy of
-Phokion was now prudent and essential to Athens, though the same
-cannot be said (as I have remarked in the proper place) for his
-advocacy of the like policy twenty years before, when Philip’s power
-was growing and might have been arrested by vigorous opposition. It
-suited the purpose of Antipater to ensure his hold upon Athens by
-frequent presents to Demades, a man of luxurious and extravagant
-habits. But Phokion, incorruptible as well as poor to the end,
-declined all similar offers, though often made to him, not only by
-Antipater, but even by Alexander.[664]
-
-  [662] “Since Macedonian dominion became paramount (observes
-  Demosthenes, De Coronâ, p. 331), Æschines and men of his stamp
-  are in full ascendency and affluence—I am impotent: there is
-  no place at Athens for free citizens and counsellors, but only
-  for men who do what they are ordered, and flatter the ruling
-  potentate.”
-
-  [663] Arrian, i. 29, 8.
-
-  [664] Plutarch, Phokion, 30.
-
-It deserves particular notice, that though the macedonizing policy
-was now decidedly in the ascendent—accepted, even by dissentients,
-as the only course admissible under the circumstances, and confirmed
-the more by each successive victory of Alexander—yet statesmen, like
-Lykurgus and Demosthenes, of notorious anti-Macedonian sentiment,
-still held a conspicuous and influential position, though of course
-restricted to matters of internal administration. Thus Lykurgus
-continued to be the real acting minister of finance, for three
-successive Panathenaic intervals of four years each, or for an
-uninterrupted period of twelve years. He superintended not merely
-the entire collection, but also the entire disbursement of the
-public revenue; rendering strict periodical account, yet with a
-financial authority greater than had belonged to any statesman since
-Perikles. He improved the gymnasia and stadia of the city—multiplied
-the donatives and sacred furniture in the temples—enlarged, or
-constructed anew, docks and arsenals,—provided a considerable
-stock of arms and equipments, military as well as naval—and
-maintained four hundred triremes in a seaworthy condition, for the
-protection of Athenian commerce. In these extensive functions he
-was never superseded, though Alexander at one time sent to require
-the surrender of his person, which was refused by the Athenian
-people.[665] The main cause of his firm hold upon the public mind,
-was, his known and indisputable pecuniary probity, wherein he was the
-parallel of Phokion.
-
-  [665] See the remarkable decree in honor of Lykurgus, passed by
-  the Athenian people seventeen or eighteen years after his death,
-  in the archonship of Anaxikrates, B. C. 307 (Plutarch,
-  Vit. X. Oratt. p. 852). The reciting portion of this decree,
-  constituting four-fifths of the whole, goes over the public
-  conduct of Lykurgus, and is very valuable.
-
-  It seems that the twelve years of financial administration
-  exercised by Lykurgus, are to be taken probably, either from
-  342-330 B. C.—or four years later, from 338-326 B.
-  C. Boeckh leaves the point undetermined between the two.
-  Droysen and Meier prefer the earlier period—O. Müller the later.
-  (Boeckh, Urkunden über das Attische Seewesen, also the second
-  edition of his Staatshaushaltung der Athener, vol. ii. p.
-  114-118).
-
-  The total of public money, recorded by the Inscription as having
-  passed through the hands of Lykurgus in the twelve years, was
-  18,900 talents = £4,340,000, or thereabouts. He is said to have
-  held, besides, in deposit, a great deal of money entrusted to him
-  by private individuals. His official duties as treasurer were
-  discharged, for the first four years, in his own name: during the
-  last eight years, in the names of two different friends.
-
-As to Demosthenes, he did not hold any such commanding public
-appointments as Lykurgus; but he enjoyed great esteem and sympathy
-from the people generally, for his marked line of public counsel
-during the past. The proof of this is to be found in one very
-significant fact. The indictment, against Ktesiphon’s motion for
-crowning Demosthenes, was instituted by Æschines, and official entry
-made of it, before the death of Philip—which event occurred in
-August 336 B. C. Yet Æschines did not venture to bring it
-on for trial until August 330 B. C., after Antipater had
-subdued the ill-fated rising of the Lacedæmonian king Agis; and even
-at that advantageous moment, when the macedonizers seemed in full
-triumph, he signally failed. We thus perceive, that though Phokion
-and Demades were now the leaders of Athenian affairs, as representing
-a policy which every one felt to be unavoidable—yet the preponderant
-sentiment of the people went with Demosthenes and Lykurgus. In
-fact, we shall see that after the Lamian war, Antipater thought it
-requisite to subdue or punish this sentiment by disfranchising or
-deporting two-thirds of the citizens.[666] It seems however that the
-anti-Macedonian statesmen were very cautious of giving offence to
-Alexander, between 334 and 330 B. C. Ktesiphon accepted a
-mission of condolence to Kleopatra, sister of Alexander, on the death
-of her husband Alexander of Epirus; and Demosthenes stands accused of
-having sent humble and crouching letters to Alexander (the Great) in
-Phenicia, during the spring of 331 B. C. This assertion of
-Æschines, though not to be trusted as correct, indicates the general
-prudence of Demosthenes as to his known and formidable enemy.[667]
-
-  [666] Plutarch, Phokion, 28.
-
-  [667] Æschines (adv. Ktesiph. p. 635) mentions this mission of
-  Ktesiphon to Kleopatra. He also (in the same oration, p. 550)
-  charges Demosthenes with having sent letters to Alexander,
-  soliciting pardon and favor. He states that a young man named
-  Aristion, a friend of Demosthenes, was much about the person of
-  Alexander, and that through him the letters were sent. He cites
-  as his authority the seamen of the public Athenian vessel called
-  _Paralus_, and the Athenian envoys who went to Alexander in
-  Phenicia in the spring or summer of 331 B. C. (compare
-  Arrian, iii. 6, 3). Hyperides also seems to have advanced the
-  like allegation against Demosthenes—see Harpokration, v. Ἀριστίων.
-
-  The fragments of the oration of Hyperides in defence of
-  Euxenippus (recently published by Mr. Churchill Babington),
-  delivered at some period during the reign of Alexander, give
-  general evidence of the wide-spread feeling of jealous aversion
-  to the existing Macedonian ascendancy. Euxenippus had been
-  accused of devotion to Macedonia; Hyperides strenuously denies
-  it, saying that Euxenippus had never been in Macedonia, nor ever
-  conversed with any Macedonian who came to Athens. Even boys at
-  school (says Hyperides) know the names of the corrupt orators, or
-  servile flatterers, who serve Macedonia—Euxenippus is not among
-  them (p 11, 12).
-
-It was not from Athens, but from Sparta, that anti-Macedonian
-movements now took rise.
-
-In the decisive battle unsuccessfully fought by Athens and Thebes
-at Chæroneia against Philip, the Spartans had not been concerned.
-Their king Archidamus,—who had been active conjointly with Athens
-in the Sacred War, trying to uphold the Phokians against Philip
-and the Thebans,—had afterwards withdrawn himself from Central
-Greece to assist the Tarentines in Italy, and had been slain in a
-battle against the Messapians.[668] He was succeeded by his son
-Agis, a brave and enterprising man, under whom the Spartans, though
-abstaining from hostilities against Philip, resolutely declined to
-take part in the synod at Corinth, whereby the Macedonian prince
-was nominated Leader of the Greeks; and even persisted in the same
-denial on Alexander’s nomination also. When Alexander sent to Athens
-three hundred panoplies after his victory at the Granikus, to be
-dedicated in the temple of Athênê, he expressly proclaimed in the
-inscription, that they were dedicated “by Alexander and the Greeks,
-_excepting the Lacedæmonians_.”[669] Agis took the lead in trying to
-procure Persian aid for anti-Macedonian operations in Greece. Towards
-the close of summer 333 B. C., a little before the battle
-of Issus, he visited the Persian admirals at Chios, to solicit men
-and money for intended action in Peloponnesus.[670] At that moment,
-they were not zealous in the direction of Greece, anticipating (as
-most Asiatics then did) the complete destruction of Alexander in
-Kilikia. As soon, however, as the disaster of Issus became known,
-they placed at the disposal of Agis thirty talents and ten triremes;
-which he employed, under his brother Agesilaus, in making himself
-master of Krete—feeling that no movement in Greece could be expected
-at such a discouraging crisis. Agis himself soon afterwards went
-to that island, having strengthened himself by a division of the
-Greek mercenaries who had fought under Darius at Issus. In Krete,
-he appears to have had considerable temporary success; and even in
-Peloponnesus, he organized some demonstrations, which Alexander sent
-Amphoterus with a large naval force to repress, in the spring of 331
-B. C.[671] At that time, Phenicia, Egypt, and all the naval
-mastery of the Ægean, had passed into the hands of the conqueror, so
-that the Persians had no direct means of acting upon Greece. Probably
-Amphoterus recovered Krete, but he had no land-force to attack Agis
-in Peloponnesus.
-
-  [668] Plutarch, Camill. 19; Diodor. xvi. 88; Plutarch, Agis, 3.
-
-  [669] Arrian, i. 16, 11: compare Pausan. vii. 10, 1.
-
-  [670] Arrian, ii. 13, 4.
-
-  [671] Arrian, iii. 6, 4; Diodor. xvii. 48; Curtius, iv. 1, 39. It
-  is to this war in Krete, between Agis and the Macedonian party
-  and troops, that Aristotle probably alludes (in the few words
-  contained, Politica, ii. 7, 8), as having exposed the weakness of
-  the Kretan institutions—see Schneider’s note on the passage. At
-  least we do not know of any other event, suitable to the words.
-
-In October 331 B. C., Darius was beaten at Arbela and became a
-fugitive in Media, leaving Babylon, Susa, and Persepolis, with the
-bulk of his immense treasures, as a prey to the conqueror during the
-coming winter. After such prodigious accessions to Alexander’s force,
-it would seem that any anti-Macedonian movement, during the spring
-of 330 B. C., must have been obviously hopeless and even insane. Yet
-it was just then that King Agis found means to enlarge his scale
-of operations in Peloponnesus, and prevailed on a considerable
-body of new allies to join him. As to himself personally, he and
-the Lacedæmonians had been previously in a state of proclaimed
-war with Macedonia,[672] and therefore incurred little additional
-risk; moreover, it was one of the effects of the Asiatic disasters
-to cast back upon Greece small hands of soldiers who had hitherto
-found service in the Persian armies. These men willingly came to
-Cape Tænarus to enlist under a warlike king of Sparta; so that Agis
-found himself at the head of a force which appeared considerable
-to Peloponnesians, familiar only with the narrow scale of Grecian
-war-muster, though insignificant as against Alexander or his viceroy
-in Macedonia.[673] An unexpected ray of hope broke out from the
-revolt of Memnon, the Macedonian governor of Thrace. Antipater was
-thus compelled to withdraw some of his forces to a considerable
-distance from Greece; while Alexander, victorious as he was, being
-in Persis or Media, east of Mount Zagros, appeared in the eyes of a
-Greek to have reached the utmost limits of the habitable world.[674]
-Of this partial encouragement Agis took advantage, to march out of
-Lakonia with all the troops, mercenary and native, that he could
-muster. He called on the Peloponnesians for a last effort against
-Macedonian dominion, while Darius still retained all the eastern half
-of his empire, and while support from him in men and money might yet
-be anticipated.[675]
-
-  [672] Alexander, as soon as he got possession of the Persian
-  treasures at Susa (about December 331 B. C.), sent a
-  large remittance of 3000 talents to Antipater, as means for
-  carrying on the war against the Lacedæmonians (Arrian, iii. 16.
-  17). The manifestations of Agis in Peloponnesus had begun in
-  the spring of 331 B. C. (Arrian, iii. 6, 4); but his
-  aggressive movements in Peloponnesus did not assume formidable
-  proportions until the spring of 330 B. C. At the date
-  of the speech of Æschines against Ktesiphon (August 330 B.
-  C.), the decisive battle by which Antipater crushed the
-  forces of Agis had only recently occurred; for the Lacedæmonian
-  prisoners were only _about to be sent_ to Alexander to learn
-  their fate (Æsch. adv. Kt. p. 524). Curtius (vii. 1, 21) is
-  certainly mistaken in saying that the contest was terminated
-  before the battle of Arbela. Moreover, there were Lacedæmonian
-  envoys, present with Darius until a few days before his death
-  (July 330 B. C.), who afterwards fell into the hands
-  of Alexander (Arrian iii. 24, 7); these men could hardly have
-  known of the prostration of their country at home. I suppose the
-  victory of Antipater to have taken place about June 330 B.
-  C.—and the Peloponnesian armament of Agis to have been got
-  together about three months before (March 330 B. C.).
-
-  Mr. Clinton (Fast. H. App. c. 4. p. 234) discusses the chronology
-  of this event, but in a manner which I cannot think satisfactory.
-  He seems inclined to put it some months earlier. I see no
-  necessity for construing the dictum ascribed to Alexander
-  (Plutarch, Agesilaus, 15) as proving close coincidence of time
-  between the battle of Arbela and the final defeat of Agis.
-
-  [673] Alexander in Media, when informed of the whole affair after
-  the death of Agis, spoke of it with contempt as a battle of frogs
-  and mice, if we are to believe the dictum of Plutarch, Agesilaus,
-  15.
-
-  [674] Æschines adv. Ktesiphont. p. 553. ὁ δ᾽ Ἀλέξανδρος ἔξω τῆς
-  ἄρκτου καὶ τῆς οἰκουμένης ὀλίγου δεῖν πάσης μεθειστήκει, etc.
-
-  [675] Diodor. xvii. 62; Deinarchus cont. Demosthen. s. 35.
-
-Respecting this war, we know very few details. At first, a flush
-of success appeared in attend Agis. The Eleians, the Achæans
-(except Pellênê), the Arcadians (except Megalopolis) and some
-other Peloponnesians, joined his standard; so that he was enabled
-to collect an army stated at 20,000 foot and 2000 horse. Defeating
-the first Macedonian forces sent against him, he proceeded to
-lay siege to Megalopolis; which city, now as previously, was the
-stronghold of Macedonian influence in the peninsula, and was probably
-occupied by a Macedonian garrison. An impulse manifested itself
-at Athens in favor of active sympathy, and equipment of a fleet
-to aid this anti-Macedonian effort. It was resisted by Phokion
-and Demades, doubtless upon all views of prudence, but especially
-upon one financial ground, taken by the latter, that the people
-would be compelled to forego the Theoric distribution.[676] Even
-Demosthenes himself, under circumstances so obviously discouraging,
-could not recommend the formidable step of declaring against
-Alexander—though he seems to have indulged in the expression of
-general anti-Macedonian sympathies, and to have complained of
-the helplessness into which Athens had been brought by past bad
-policy.[677] Antipater, closing the war in Thrace on the best terms
-that he could, hastened into Greece with his full forces, and reached
-Peloponnesus in time to relieve Megalopolis, which had begun to be in
-danger. One decisive battle, which took place in Arcadia, sufficed to
-terminate the war. Agis and his army, the Lacedæmonians especially,
-fought with gallantry and desperation, but were completely defeated.
-Five thousand of their men were slain, including Agis himself; who,
-though covered with wounds, disdained to leave the field, and fell
-resisting to the last. The victors, according to one account, lost
-3500 men; according to another, 1000 slain, together with a great
-many wounded. This was a greater loss than Alexander had sustained
-either at Issus or at Arbela; a plain proof that Agis and his
-companions, however unfortunate in the result, had manifested courage
-worthy of the best days of Sparta.
-
-  [676] Plutarch, Reipubl. Gerend. Præcept. p. 818.
-
-  [677] This is what we make out, as to the conduct of Demosthenes,
-  from Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 553.
-
-  It is however difficult to believe, what Æschines insinuates,
-  that Demosthenes boasted of having himself got up the
-  Lacedæmonian movement—and yet that he made no proposition or
-  suggestion for countenancing it. Demosthenes can hardly have
-  lent any positive aid to the proceeding, though of course his
-  anti-Macedonian feelings would be counted upon, in case things
-  took a favorable turn.
-
-  Deinarchus (_ut suprà_) also accuses Demosthenes of having
-  remained inactive at this critical moment.
-
-The allied forces were now so completely crushed, that all submitted
-to Antipater. After consulting the philo-Macedonian synod at
-Corinth, he condemned the Achæans and Eleians to pay 120 talents to
-Megalopolis, and exacted from the Tegeans the punishment of those
-among their leading men who had advised the war.[678] But he would
-not take upon him to determine the treatment of the Lacedæmonians,
-without special reference to Alexander. Requiring from them fifty
-hostages, he sent up to Alexander in Asia some Lacedæmonian envoys
-or prisoners, to throw themselves on his mercy.[679] We are told
-that they did not reach the king until a long time afterwards, at
-Baktra;[680] what he decided about Sparta generally, we do not know.
-
-  [678] Curtius, vi. 1, 15-20; Diodor. xvii. 63-73. After the
-  defeat, a suspensive decree was passed by the Spartans, releasing
-  from ἀτιμία those who had escaped from the battle—as had been
-  done after Leuktra (Diodor. xix. 70).
-
-  [679] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 524.
-
-  [680] Curtius, vii. 4, 32.
-
-The rising of the Thebans, not many months after Alexander’s
-accession, had been the first attempt of the Greeks to emancipate
-themselves from Macedonian dominion; this enterprise of Agis was the
-second. Both unfortunately had been partial, without the possibility
-of any extensive or organized combination beforehand; both ended
-miserably, riveting the chains of Greece more powerfully than ever.
-Thus was the self-defensive force of Greece extinguished piecemeal.
-The scheme of Agis was in fact desperate from the very outset, as
-against the gigantic power of Alexander; and would perhaps never have
-been undertaken, had not Agis himself been already compromised in
-hostility against Macedonia, before the destruction of the Persian
-force at Issus. This unfortunate prince, without any superior ability
-(so far as we know), manifested a devoted courage and patriotism
-worthy of his predecessor Leonidas at Thermopylæ; whose renown
-stands higher, only because the cause in which he fell ultimately
-triumphed. The Athenians and Ætolians, neither of whom took part
-with Agis, were now left, without Thebes and Sparta, as the two great
-military powers of Greece which will appear presently, when we come
-to the last struggle for Grecian independence—the Lamian war; better
-combined and more promising, yet not less disastrous in its result.
-
-Though the strongest considerations of prudence kept Athens quiet
-during this anti-Macedonian movement in Peloponnesus, a powerful
-sympathy must have been raised among her citizens while the struggle
-was going on. Had Agis gained the victory over Antipater, the
-Athenians might probably have declared in his favor; and although no
-independent position could have been permanently maintained against
-so overwhelming an enemy as Alexander, yet considering that he was
-thoroughly occupied and far in the interior of Asia, Greece might
-have held out against Antipater for an interval not inconsiderable.
-In the face of such eventualities, the fears of the macedonizing
-statesmen now in power at Athens, the hopes of their opponents,
-and the reciprocal antipathies of both, must have become unusually
-manifest; so that the reaction afterwards, when the Macedonian power
-became more irresistible than ever, was considered by the enemies
-of Demosthenes to offer a favorable opportunity for ruining and
-dishonoring him.
-
-To the political peculiarity of this juncture we owe the judicial
-contest between the two great Athenian orators; the memorable
-accusation of Æschines against Ktesiphon, for having proposed a crown
-to Demosthenes—and the still more memorable defence of Demosthenes,
-on behalf of his friend as well as of himself. It was in the autumn
-or winter of 337-336 B. C., that Ktesiphon had proposed this vote
-of public honor in favor of Demosthenes, and had obtained the
-probouleuma or preliminary acquiescence of the senate; it was in the
-same Attic year, and not long afterwards, that Æschines attacked the
-proposition under the Graphê Paranomôn, as illegal, unconstitutional,
-mischievous, and founded on false allegations.[681] More than six
-years had thus elapsed since the formal entry of the accusation;
-yet Æschines had not chosen to bring it to actual trial; which
-indeed could not be done without some risk to himself, before the
-numerous and popular judicature of Athens. Twice or thrice before
-his accusation was entered, other persons had moved to confer the
-same honor upon Demosthenes,[682] and had been indicted under the
-Graphê Paranomôn; but with such signal ill-success, that their
-accusers did not obtain so much as one-fifth of the suffrages of the
-Dikasts, and therefore incurred (under the standing regulation of
-the Attic law) a penalty of 1000 drachmæ. The like danger awaited
-Æschines; and although, in reference to the illegality of Ktesiphon’s
-motion (which was the direct and ostensible purpose aimed at under
-the Graphê Paranomôn), his indictment was grounded on special
-circumstances such as the previous accusers may not have been able
-to show, still it was not his real object to confine himself within
-this narrow and technical argument. He intended to enlarge the range
-of accusation, so as to include the whole character and policy of
-Demosthenes; who would thus, if the verdict went against him, stand
-publicly dishonored both as citizen and as politician. Unless this
-latter purpose were accomplished, indeed, Æschines gained nothing
-by bringing the indictment into court; for the mere entry of the
-indictment would have already produced the effect of preventing the
-probouleuma from passing into a decree, and the crown from being
-actually conferred. Doubtless Ktesiphon and Demosthenes might have
-forced Æschines to the alternative of either dropping his indictment
-or bringing it into the Dikastery. But this was a forward challenge,
-which, in reference to a purely honorary vote, they had not felt bold
-enough to send; especially after the capture of Thebes in 335 B. C.
-when the victorious Alexander demanded the surrender of Demosthenes
-with several other citizens.
-
-  [681] Among the various documents, real or pretended, inserted in
-  the oration of Demosthenes De Coronâ, there appears one (p. 266)
-  purporting to be the very decree moved by Ktesiphon; and another
-  (p. 243) purporting to be the accusation preferred by Æschines. I
-  have already stated that I agree with Droysen in mistrusting all
-  the documents annexed to this oration; all of them bear the name
-  of wrong archons, most of them names of unknown archons; some of
-  them do not fit the place in which they appear. See my preceding
-  Vol. XI. Ch. lxxxix. p. 424; Ch. xc. p. 456-486.
-
-  We know from the statement of Æschines himself that the motion
-  of Ktesiphon was made after the appointment of Demosthenes to
-  be one of the inspectors of the fortifications of the city; and
-  that this appointment took place in the last month of the archon
-  Chærondas (June 337 B. C.—see Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p.
-  421-426). We also know that the accusation of Æschines against
-  Ktesiphon was preferred before the assassination of Philip,
-  which took place in August 336 B. C. (Æschin. ib. p.
-  612, 613). It thus appears that the motion of Ktesiphon (with
-  the probouleuma which followed upon it) must have occurred some
-  time during the autumn or winter of 337-336 B. C.—that
-  the accusation of Æschines must have been handed in shortly
-  after it—and that this accusation cannot have been handed in
-  at the date borne by the pseudo-document, p. 243—the month
-  Elaphebolion of the archon Chærondas, which would be anterior to
-  the appointment of Demosthenes. Moreover, whoever compares the
-  so-called motion of Ktesiphon, as it stands inserted Demosth. De
-  Coronâ, p. 266, with the words in which Æschines himself (Adv.
-  Ktesiph. p. 631. ὅθεν τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ ψηφίσματος ἐποιήσω, see also
-  p. 439) describes the exordium of that motion, will see that it
-  cannot be genuine.
-
-  [682] Demosthenes De Coronâ, p. 253, 302, 303, 310. He says (p.
-  267-313) that he had been crowned _often_ (πολλάκις) by the
-  Athenians and other Greek cities. The crown which he received on
-  the motion of Aristonikus (after the successes against Philip at
-  Byzantium and the Chersonesus, etc. in 340 B. C.) was
-  the _second_ crown (p. 253)—Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 848.
-
-In this state of abeyance and compromise—Demosthenes enjoying the
-inchoate honor of a complimentary vote from the senate, Æschines
-intercepting it from being matured into a vote of the people—both
-the vote and the indictment had remained for rather more than six
-years. But the accuser now felt encouraged to push his indictment to
-trial, under the reactionary party feeling, following on abortive
-anti-Macedonian hopes, which succeeded to the complete victory of
-Antipater over Agis, and which brought about the accusation of
-anti-Macedonian citizens in Naxos, Thasos, and other Grecian cities
-also.[683] Amidst the fears prevalent that the victor would carry
-his resentment still farther, Æschines could now urge that Athens
-was disgraced by having adopted or even approved the policy of
-Demosthenes,[684] and that an emphatic condemnation of him was the
-only way of clearing her from the charge of privity with those who
-had raised the standard against Macedonian supremacy. In an able and
-bitter harangue, Æschines first shows that the motion of Ktesiphon
-was illegal, in consequence of the public official appointments held
-by Demosthenes at the moment when it was proposed—next he enters at
-large into the whole life and character of Demosthenes, to prove him
-unworthy of such an honor, even if there had been no formal grounds
-of objection. He distributes the entire life of Demosthenes into four
-periods, the first ending at the peace of 346 B. C., between
-Philip and the Athenians—the second, ending with the breaking out
-of the next ensuing war in 341-340 B. C.—the third, ending
-with the disaster at Chæroneia—the fourth, comprising all the time
-following.[685] Throughout all the four periods, he denounces the
-conduct of Demosthenes as having been corrupt, treacherous, cowardly,
-and ruinous to the city. What is more surprising still—he expressly
-charges him with gross subservience both to Philip and to Alexander,
-at the very time when he was taking credit for a patriotic and
-intrepid opposition to them.[686]
-
-  [683] Demosthenes De Coronâ, p. 294.
-
-  [684] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 645. διαβέβληται δ᾽ ἡμῶν ἡ
-  πόλις ἐκ τῶν Δημοσθένους πολιτευμάτων ~περὶ τοὺς νῦν καιρούς~·
-  δόξετε δ᾽ ἐὰν μὲν τοῦτον στεφανώσητε, ~ὁμογνώμονες εἶναι τοῖς
-  παραβαίνουσι τὴν κοινὴν εἰρήνην~· ἐὰν δὲ τοὐναντίον τούτου
-  πράξητε, ἀπολύσετε τὸν δῆμον τῶν αἰτιῶν.—Compare with this, the
-  last sentence of the oration of Demosthenes in reply, where he
-  puts up a prayer to the gods—ἡμῖν δὲ τοῖς λοιποῖς τὴν ταχίστην
-  ἀπαλλαγὴν ~τῶν ἐπηρτημένων φόβων~ δότε καὶ σωτηρίαν ἀσφαλῆ.
-
-  The mention by Æschines (immediately before) of the Pythian
-  games, as about to be celebrated in a few days, marks the date of
-  this judicial trial—August, 330 B. C.
-
-  [685] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 443.
-
-  [686] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. pp. 449, 456, 467, 551.
-
-That Athens had undergone sad defeat and humiliation, having been
-driven from her independent and even presidential position into the
-degraded character of a subject Macedonian city, since the time
-when Demosthenes first began political life—was a fact but too
-indisputable. Æschines even makes this a part of his case; arraigning
-the traitorous mismanagement of Demosthenes as the cause of so
-melancholy a revolution, and denouncing him as candidate for public
-compliment or no better plea than a series of public calamities.[687]
-Having thus animadverted on the conduct of Demosthenes prior to the
-battle of Chæroneia, Æschines proceeds to the more recent past, and
-contends that Demosthenes cannot be sincere in his pretended enmity
-to Alexander, because he has let slip three successive occasions, all
-highly favorable, for instigating Athens to hostility against the
-Macedonians. Of these three occasions, the first was, when Alexander
-first crossed into Asia; the second, immediately before the battle
-of Issus; the third, during the flush of success obtained by Agis
-in Peloponnesus.[688] On neither of these occasions did Demosthenes
-call for any public action against Macedonia; a proof (according to
-Æschines) that his anti-Macedonian professions were insincere.
-
-  [687] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. pp. 526, 538, 541.
-
-  [688] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 551-553.
-
-I have more than once remarked, that considering the bitter enmity
-between the two orators, it is rarely safe to trust the unsupported
-allegation of either against the other. But in regard to the
-last-mentioned charges advanced by Æschines, there is enough of known
-fact, and we have independent evidence, such as is not often before
-us, to appreciate him as an accuser of Demosthenes. The victorious
-career of Alexander, set forth in the preceding chapters, proves
-amply that not one of the three periods, here indicated by Æschines,
-presented even decent encouragement for a reasonable Athenian
-patriot, to involve his country in warfare against so formidable
-an enemy. Nothing can be more frivolous than these charges against
-Demosthenes, of having omitted promising seasons for anti-Macedonian
-operations. Partly for this reason, probably, Demosthenes does not
-notice them in his reply; still more, perhaps, on another ground,
-that it was not safe to speak out what he thought and felt about
-Alexander. His reply dwells altogether upon the period before the
-death of Philip. Of the boundless empire subsequently acquired,
-by the son of Philip, he speaks only to mourn it as a wretched
-visitation of fortune, which has desolated alike the Hellenic and
-the barbaric world—in which Athens has been engulfed along with
-others—and from which even those faithless and trimming Greeks, who
-helped to aggrandize Philip, have not escaped better than Athens, nor
-indeed so well.[689]
-
-  [689] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 311-316.
-
-I shall not here touch upon the Demosthenic speech De Coronâ in
-a rhetorical point of view, nor add anything to those encomiums
-which have been pronounced upon it with one voice, both in ancient
-and in modern times, as the unapproachable masterpiece of Grecian
-oratory. To this work it belongs as a portion of Grecian history;
-a retrospect of the efforts made by a patriot and a statesman to
-uphold the dignity of Athens and the autonomy of the Grecian world,
-against a dangerous aggressor from without. How these efforts were
-directed, and how they lamentably failed, has been recounted in
-my last preceding volume. Demosthenes here passes them in review,
-replying to the criminations against his public conduct during the
-interval of ten years, between the peace of 346 B. C., (or
-the period immediately preceding it) and the death of Philip. It is
-remarkable, that though professing to enter upon a defence of his
-whole public life,[690] he nevertheless can afford to leave unnoticed
-that portion of it which is perhaps the most honorable to him—the
-early period of his first Philippics and Olynthiacs—when, though a
-politician as yet immature and of no established footing, he was the
-first to descry in the distance the perils threatened by Philip’s
-aggrandizement, and the loudest in calling for timely and energetic
-precautions against it; in spite of apathy and murmurs from older
-politicians as well as from the general public. Beginning with the
-peace of 346 B. C., Demosthenes vindicates his own share in
-the antecedents of that event against the charges of Æschines, whom
-he denounces as the cause of all the mischief; a controversy which
-I have already tried to elucidate, in my last volume. Passing next
-to the period after that peace—to the four years first of hostile
-diplomacy, then of hostile action, against Philip, which ended with
-the disaster of Chæroneia—Demosthenes is not satisfied with simple
-vindication. He re-asserts this policy as matter of pride and honor,
-in spite of its results. He congratulates his countrymen on having
-manifested a Pan-hellenic patriotism worthy of their forefathers, and
-takes to himself only the credit of having been forward to proclaim
-and carry out this glorious sentiment common to all. Fortune has been
-adverse; yet the vigorous anti-Macedonian policy was no mistake;
-Demosthenes swears it by the combatants of Marathon, Platæa and
-Salamis.[691] To have had a foreign dominion obtruded upon Greece, is
-an overwhelming calamity; but to have had this accomplished without
-strenuous resistance on the part of Athens, would have been calamity
-aggravated by dishonor.
-
-  [690] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 227. μέλλων τοῦ τε ἰδίου βίου
-  ~παντός~, ὡς ἔοικε, λόγον διδόναι τήμερον καὶ τῶν κοινῇ
-  πεπολιτευμένων, etc.
-
-  [691] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 297. ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐκ
-  ἔστιν ὅπως ἡμάρτετε, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἁπάντων
-  ἐλευθερίας καὶ σωτηρίας κίνδυνον ἀράμενοι—οὐ μὰ τοὺς Μαραθῶνι
-  προκινδυνεύσαντας τῶν προγόνων καὶ τοὺς ἐν Πλαταιαῖς
-  παραταξαμένους καὶ τοὺς ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχήσαντας, etc., the oath
-  so often cited and admired.
-
-Conceived in this sublime strain, the reply of Demosthenes to his
-rival has an historical value, as a funeral oration of extinct
-Athenian and Grecian freedom. Six years before, the orator had been
-appointed by his countrymen to deliver the usual public oration over
-the warriors slain at Chæroneia. That speech is now lost, but it
-probably touched upon the same topics. Though the sphere of action,
-of every Greek city as well as of every Greek citizen, was now
-cramped and confined by irresistible Macedonian force; there still
-remained the sentiment of full political freedom and dignity enjoyed
-during the past—the admiration of ancestors who had once defended it
-successfully—and the sympathy with leaders who had recently stood
-forward to uphold it, however unsuccessfully. It is among the most
-memorable facts in Grecian history, that in spite of the victory of
-Philip at Chæroneia—in spite of the subsequent conquest of Thebes by
-Alexander, and the danger of Athens after it—in spite of the Asiatic
-conquests which had since thrown all Persian force into the hands
-of the Macedonian king—the Athenian people could never be persuaded
-either to repudiate Demosthenes, or to disclaim sympathy with his
-political policy. How much art and ability was employed, to induce
-them to do so, by his numerous enemies, the speech of Æschines is
-enough to teach us. And when we consider how easily the public sicken
-of schemes which end in misfortune—how great a mental relief is
-usually obtained by throwing blame on unsuccessful leaders—it would
-have been no matter of surprise, if, in one of the many prosecutions
-wherein the fame of Demosthenes was involved, the Dikasts had given
-a verdict unfavorable to him. That he always came off acquitted, and
-even honorably acquitted, is a proof of rare fidelity and steadiness
-of mind in the Athenians. It is a proof that those noble, patriotic,
-and Pan-hellenic sentiments, which we constantly find inculcated in
-his orations, throughout a period of twenty years, had sunk into the
-minds of his hearers; and that amidst the many general allegations of
-corruption against him, loudly proclaimed by his enemies, there was
-no one well-ascertained fact which they could substantiate before the
-Dikastery.
-
-The indictment now preferred by Æschines against Ktesiphon only
-procured for Demosthenes a new triumph. When the suffrages of the
-Dikasts were counted, Æschines did not obtain so much as one fifth.
-He became therefore liable to the customary fine of 1000 drachmæ. It
-appears that he quitted Athens immediately, without paying the fine,
-and retired into Asia, from whence he never returned. He is said to
-have opened a rhetorical school at Rhodes, and to have gone into the
-interior of Asia during the last year of Alexander’s life (at the
-time when that monarch was ordaining on the Grecian cities compulsory
-restoration of all their exiles), in order to procure assistance for
-returning to Athens. This project was disappointed by Alexander’s
-death.[692]
-
-  [692] See the various lives of Æschines—in Westermann, Scriptores
-  Biographici, pp. 268, 269.
-
-We cannot suppose that Æschines was unable to pay the fine of 1000
-drachmæ, or to find friends who would pay it for him. It was not
-therefore legal compulsion, but the extreme disappointment and
-humiliation of so signal a defeat, which made him leave Athens.
-We must remember that this was a gratuitous challenge sent by
-himself; that the celebrity of the two rivals had brought together
-auditors, not merely from Athens, but from various other Grecian
-cities; and that the effect of the speech of Demosthenes in his
-own defence,—delivered with all his perfection of voice and
-action, and not only electrifying hearers by the sublimity of its
-public sentiment, but also full of admirably managed self-praise,
-and contemptuous bitterness towards his rival—must have been
-inexpressibly powerful and commanding. Probably the friends of
-Æschines became themselves angry with him for having brought the
-indictment forward. For the effect of his defeat must have been
-that the vote of the Senate which he indicted, was brought forward
-and passed in the public assembly; and that Demosthenes must have
-received a public coronation.[693] In no other way, under the
-existing circumstances of Athens, could Demosthenes have obtained so
-emphatic a compliment. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that such
-a mortification was insupportable to Æschines. He became disgusted
-with his native city. We read that afterwards, in his rhetorical
-school at Rhodes, he one day declaimed, as a lesson to his pupils,
-the successful oration of his rival, De Coronâ. Of course it excited
-a burst of admiration. “What, if you had heard the beast himself
-speak it!”—exclaimed Æschines.
-
-  [693] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 315. ἀλλὰ νυνὶ τήμερον ἐγὼ μὲν
-  ὑπὲρ τοῦ στεφανωθῆναι δοκιμάζομαι, τὸ δὲ μήδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν ἀδικεῖν
-  ἀνωμολόγημαι—σοὶ δὲ συκοφάντῃ μὲν εἶναι δοκεῖν ὑπάρχει,
-  κινδυνεύεις δὲ εἴτε δεῖ σε ἔτι τοῦτο ποιεῖν, εἴτ᾽ ἤδη πεπαῦσθαι
-  μὴ μεταλαβόντα τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων, etc.
-
-  Yet Æschines had become opulent, according to Demosthenes, p. 329.
-
-From this memorable triumph of the illustrious orator and defendant,
-we have to pass to another trial—a direct accusation brought against
-him, from which he did not escape so successfully. We are compelled
-here to jump over five years and a half (August 330 B. C.,
-to January 324 B. C.), during which we have no information
-about Grecian history; the interval between Alexander’s march into
-Baktria and his return to Persis and Susiana. Displeased with the
-conduct of the satraps during his absence, Alexander put to death
-or punished several, and directed the rest to disband without delay
-the mercenary soldiers whom they had taken into pay. This peremptory
-order filled both Asia and Europe with roving detachments of
-unprovided soldiers, some of whom sought subsistence in the Grecian
-islands and on the Lacedæmonian southern coast, at Cape Tænarus in
-Laconia.
-
-It was about this period (the beginning of 324 B. C.),
-that Harpalus the satrap of Babylonia and Syria, becoming alarmed
-at the prospect of being punished by Alexander for his ostentatious
-prodigalities, fled from Asia into Greece, with a considerable
-treasure and a body of 5000 soldiers.[694] While satrap, he had
-invited into Asia, in succession, two Athenian women as mistresses,
-Pythionikê and Glykera, to each of whom he was much attached, and
-whom he entertained with lavish expense and pomp. On the death of
-the first, he testified his sorrow by two costly funereal monuments
-to her memory; one at Babylon, the other in Attica, between Athens
-and Eleusis. With Glykera he is said to have resided at Tarsus in
-Kilikia,—to have ordered that men should prostrate themselves before
-her, and address her as queen—and to have erected her statue along
-with his own at Rhossus, a seaport on the confines of Kilikia and
-Syria.[695] To please these mistresses, or perhaps to ensure a
-retreat for himself in case of need, he had sent to Athens profuse
-gifts of wheat for distribution among the people, for which he had
-received votes of thanks with the grant of Athenian citizenship.[696]
-Moreover he had consigned to Charikles, son-in-law of Phokion, the
-task of erecting the monument in Attica to the honor of Pythionikê;
-with a large remittance of money for the purpose.[697] The profit or
-embezzlement arising out of this expenditure secured to him the good
-will of Charikles—a man very different from his father-in-law, the
-honest and austere Phokion. Other Athenians were probably conciliated
-by various presents, so that when Harpalus found it convenient to
-quit Asia, about the beginning of 324 B. C., he had already
-acquired some hold both on the public of Athens and on some of her
-leading men. He sailed with his treasure and his armament straight
-to Cape Sunium in Attica, from whence he sent to ask shelter and
-protection in that city.[698]
-
-  [694] Diodor. xvii. 108. He states the treasure brought out of
-  Asia by Harpalus as 5000 talents.
-
-  [695] See the fragments of the letter or pamphlet of Theopompus
-  addressed to Alexander, while Harpalus was still at Tarsus, and
-  before his flight to Athens—Theopomp. Fragm. 277, 278, ed. Didot,
-  ap. Athenæum, xiii. p. 586-595. Theopompus speaks in the present
-  tense—~καὶ ὁρᾷ~ (Harpalus) ὑπὸ τοῦ λάου προσκυνουμένην (Glykera),
-  etc. Kleitarchus stated these facts, as well as Theopompus
-  (Athenæ. ibid.).
-
-  [696] Athenæus, xiii. p. 596—the extract from the satirical
-  drama called Agên, represented before Alexander at Susa, in the
-  Dionysiac festival or early months of 324 B. C.
-
-  [697] Plutarch, Phokion, 22; Pausanias, i. 37, 4; Dikæarchi
-  Fragment. 72. ed. Didot.
-
-  Plutarch’s narrative is misleading, inasmuch as it seems to imply
-  that Harpalus gave this money to Charikles _after_ his arrival at
-  Athens. We know from Theopompus (Fr. 277) that the monument had
-  been finished some time before Harpalus quitted Asia. Plutarch
-  treats it as a mean structure, unworthy of the sum expended on
-  it; but both Dikæarchus and Pausanias describe it as stately and
-  magnificent.
-
-  [698] Curtius, x. 2, 1.
-
-The first reports transmitted to Asia appear to have proclaimed that
-the Athenians had welcomed Harpalus as a friend and ally, thrown off
-the Macedonian yoke, and prepared for a war to re-establish Hellenic
-freedom. Such is the color of the case, as presented in the satiric
-drama called Agên, exhibited before Alexander in the Dionysiac
-festival at Susa, in February or March 324 B. C. Such news,
-connecting itself in Alexander’s mind with the recent defeat of
-Zopyrion in Thrace and other disorders of the disbanded mercenaries,
-incensed him so much, that he at first ordered a fleet to be
-equipped, determining to cross over and attack Athens in person.[699]
-But he was presently calmed by more correct intelligence, certifying
-that the Athenians had positively refused to espouse the cause of
-Harpalus.[700]
-
-  [699] Curtius, x. 2, 1. “Igitur triginta navibus Sunium
-  transmittunt” (Harpalus and his company), “unde portum urbis
-  petere decreverunt. His cognitis, rex Harpalo Atheniensibusque
-  juxta infestus, classem parari jubet, Athenas protinus
-  petiturus.” Compare Justin, xiii. 5, 7—who mentions this hostile
-  intention in Alexander’s mind, but gives a different account of
-  the cause of it.
-
-  The extract from the drama _Agên_ (given in Athenæus, xiii.
-  p. 596) represents the reports which excited this anger of
-  Alexander. It was said that Athens had repudiated her slavery,
-  with the abundance which she had before enjoyed under it,—to
-  enter upon a struggle for freedom, with the certainty of present
-  privations and future ruin:—
-
-    A. ὅτε μὲν ἔφασκον (the Athenians) δοῦλον ἐκτῆσθαι βίον,
-       ἱκανὸν ἐδείπνουν· ~νῦν δὲ~, τὸν χέδροπα μόνον
-       καὶ τὸν μάραθον ~ἔσθουσι~, πυροὺς δ᾽ οὐ μάλα.
-
-    B. καὶ μὴν ἀκούω μυριάδας τὸν Ἅρπαλον
-       αὐτοῖσι τῶν Ἀγῆνος οὐκ ἐλάττονας
-       σίτου παραπέμψαι, καὶ πολίτην γεγονέναι.
-
-    A. Γλυκέρας ὁ σῖτος οὗτος ἦν· ἔσται δ᾽ ἴσως
-       αὐτοῖσιν ~ὀλέθρου~ κοὐκ ἑταίρας ἀῤῥαβών.
-
-  I conceive this drama Agên to have been represented on the banks
-  of the _Choaspes_ (not the _Hydaspes_—see my note in the Chapter
-  immediately preceding, p. 240), that is, at Susa, in the Dionysia
-  of 324 B. C. It is interesting as a record of the
-  feelings of the time.
-
-  [700] Nevertheless the impression, that Alexander was intending
-  to besiege Athens, must have prevailed in the army for several
-  months longer, during the autumn of 324 B. C. when
-  he was at Ekbatana. Ephippus the historian, in recounting the
-  flatteries addressed to Alexander at Ekbatana, mentions the
-  rhodomontade of a soldier named Gorgus—Γόργος ὁ ὁπλοφύλαξ
-  Ἀλέξανδρον Ἄμμωνος υἱὸν στεφανοῖ χρυσοῖς τρισχιλίοις, ~καὶ ὅταν
-  Ἀθήνας πολιορκῇ~, μυρίαις πανοπλίαις καὶ ταῖς ἴσαις καταπέλταις
-  καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις βέλεσιν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἱκανοῖς (Ephippus
-  ap. Athenæum, xii. p. 538. Fragment. 3. ed. Didot).
-
-The fact of such final rejection by the Athenians is quite
-indisputable. But it seems, as far as we can make out from imperfect
-evidence, that this step was not taken without debate, nor without
-symptoms of a contrary disposition, sufficient to explain the
-rumors first sent to Alexander. The first arrival of Harpalus
-with his armament at Sunium, indeed, excited alarm, as if he were
-coming to take possession of Peiræus; and the admiral Philokles was
-instructed to adopt precautions for defence of the harbor.[701]
-But Harpalus, sending away his armament to Krete or to Tænarus,
-solicited and obtained permission to come to Athens, with a single
-ship and his own personal attendants. What was of still greater
-moment, he brought with him a large sum of money, amounting, we
-are told to upwards of 700 talents, or more than £160,000. We must
-recollect that he was already favorably known to the people by large
-presents of corn, which had procured for him a vote of citizenship.
-He now threw himself upon their gratitude as a suppliant seeking
-protection against the wrath of Alexander; and while entreating
-from the Athenians an interference so hazardous to themselves, he
-did not omit to encourage them by exaggerating the means at his own
-disposal. He expatiated on the universal hatred and discontent felt
-against Alexander, and held out assurance of being joined by powerful
-allies, foreign as well as Greek, if once a city like Athens would
-raise the standard of liberation.[702] To many Athenian patriots,
-more ardent than long-sighted, such appeals inspired both sympathy
-and confidence. Moreover Harpalus would of course purchase every
-influential partisan who would accept a bribe; in addition to men
-like Charikles, who were already in his interest. His cause was
-espoused by Hyperides,[703] an earnest anti-Macedonian citizen, and
-an orator second only to Demosthenes. There seems good reason for
-believing that at first, a strong feeling was excited in favor of
-taking part with the exile; the people not being daunted even by the
-idea of war with Alexander.[704]
-
-  [701] Deinarchus adv. Philokl. s. 1. φάσκων κωλύσειν Ἅρπαλον εἰς
-  τὸν Πειραῖα καταπλεῦσαι, στατηγὸς ὑφ᾽ ὑμῶν ἐπὶ τὰ νεώρια καὶ τὴν
-  Μουνυχίαν κεχειροτονημένος, etc. Deinarchus adv. Aristogeiton,
-  s. 4. ὃς παρ᾽ Ἁρπάλου λαβεῖν χρήματα ἐτόλμησεν, ὃν ᾔσθεθ᾽ ἥκειν
-  καταληψόμενον τὴν πόλιν ὑμῶν, etc.
-
-  [702] See the new and interesting, though unfortunately scanty,
-  fragments of the oration of Hyperides against Demosthenes,
-  published and elucidated by Mr. Churchill Babington from a
-  recently discovered Egyptian papyrus (Cambridge, 1850). From
-  Fragm. 14 (p. 38 of Mr. Babington’s edition) we may see that
-  the promises mentioned in the text were actually held out by
-  Harpalus—indeed we might almost have presumed it without positive
-  evidence. Hyperides addresses Demosthenes—ταύτας ὑπ...ις τῷ
-  ψηφίσματι, συλλαβὼν τὸν Ἅρπαλον· καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἅπαντας
-  πρεσβεύεσθαι πεποίηκας ὡς Ἀλέξανδρον, οὐκ ἔχοντας ἄλλην οὐδεμίαν
-  ἀποστροφήν· ~τοὺς δὲ βαρβάρους~, οἳ αὐτοὶ ἂν ἧκον φέροντες εἰς
-  ταὐτὸ τὴν δύναμιν, ἔχοντες τὰ χρήματα καὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας ὅσους
-  ἕκαστος αὐτῶν εἶχε, ~τούτους σύμπαντας~ οὐ μόνον ~κεκώλυκας
-  ἀποστῆναι ἐκείνου~ τῇ συλλήψει τοῦ Ἁρπάλου, ἀλλὰ καὶ....
-
-  From the language thus used by Hyperides in his accusation, we
-  are made to perceive what prospects he (and of course Harpalus,
-  upon whose authority he must have spoken) had held out to the
-  people when the case was first under discussion.
-
-  The fragment here cited is complete as to the main sense, not
-  requiring very great help from conjecture. In some of the other
-  fragments, the conjectural restorations of Mr. Babington, though
-  highly probable and judicious, form too large a proportion of the
-  whole to admit of our citing them with confidence as testimony.
-
-  [703] Pollux, x. 159.
-
-  [704] Plutarch, De Vitioso Pudore, p. 531. τῶν γὰρ Ἀθηναίων
-  ὡρμημένων Ἁρπάλῳ βοηθεῖν, καὶ κορυσσόντων ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον,
-  ἐξαίφνης ἐπεφάνη Φιλόξενος, ὁ τῶν ἐπὶ θαλάσσῃ πραγμάτων
-  Ἀλεξάνδρου στρατηγός· ἐκπλαγέντος δὲ τοῦ δήμου, καὶ σιωπῶντος
-  διὰ τὸν φόβον, ὁ Δημοσθένης—Τί ποιήσουσιν, ἔφη, πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον
-  ἰδόντες, οἱ μὴ δυνάμενοι πρὸς τὸν λύχνον ἀντιβλέπειν;
-
-Phokion, whom Harpalus vainly endeavored to corrupt, resisted of
-course the proposition of espousing his cause. And Demosthenes
-also resisted it, not less decidedly, from the very outset.[705]
-Notwithstanding all his hatred of Macedonian supremacy, he could not
-be blind to the insanity of declaring war against Alexander. Indeed
-those who study his orations throughout, will find his counsels
-quite as much distinguished for prudence as for vigorous patriotism.
-His prudence, on this occasion, however, proved injurious to his
-political position; for while it incensed Hyperides and the more
-sanguine anti-Macedonians, it probably did not gain for himself
-anything beyond a temporary truce from his old macedonizing opponents.
-
-  [705] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 21; Plutarch, Demosthen. 25.
-
-The joint opposition of politicians so discordant as Demosthenes
-and Phokion, prevailed over the impulse which the partisans of
-Harpalus had created. No decree could be obtained in his favor.
-Presently however the case was complicated by the coming of envoys
-from Antipater and Olympias in Macedonia, requiring that he should
-be surrendered.[706] The like requisition was also addressed by the
-Macedonian admiral Philoxenus, who arrived with a small squadron
-from Asia. These demands were refused, at the instance of Phokion no
-less than of Demosthenes. Nevertheless the prospects of Macedonian
-vengeance were now brought in such fearful proximity before the
-people, that all disposition to support Harpalus gave way to the
-necessity of propitiating Alexander. A decree was passed to arrest
-Harpalus, and to place all his money under sequestration in the
-acropolis, until special directions could be received from Alexander;
-to whom, apparently, envoys were sent, carrying with them the slaves
-of Harpalus to be interrogated by him, and instructed to solicit
-a lenient sentence at his hands.[707] Now it was Demosthenes who
-moved these decrees for personal arrest and for sequestration of
-the money;[708] whereby he incurred still warmer resentment from
-Hyperides and the other Harpalian partisans, who denounced him
-as a subservient creature of the all-powerful monarch. Harpalus
-was confined, but presently made his escape; probably much to the
-satisfaction of Phokion, Demosthenes, and every one else; for even
-those who were most anxious to get rid of him would recoil from the
-odium and dishonor of surrendering him, even under constraint, to a
-certain death. He fled to Krete, where he was soon after slain by one
-of his own companions.[709]
-
-  [706] Diodor. xvii. 108.
-
-  [707] Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 69. ἐὰν τοὺς παῖδας καταπέμψῃ
-  (Alexander) πρὸς ἡμᾶς τοὺς νῦν εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀνακεκομισμένους, καὶ
-  τούτων ἀξιοῖ τὴν ἀληθείαν πυθέσθαι, etc.
-
-  [708] See the fragment cited in a preceding note from the oration
-  of Hyperides against Demosthenes. That it was _Demosthenes_ who
-  moved the decree for depositing the money in the acropolis,
-  we learn also from one of his other accusers—the citizen who
-  delivered the speech composed by Deinarchus (adv. Demosthen.
-  sect. 68, 71, 89)—~ἔγραψεν αὐτὸς, ἐν τῷ δήμῳ Δημοσθένης~, ὡς
-  δηλονότι δικαίου τοῦ πράγματος ὄντος, φυλάττειν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ τὰ εἰς
-  τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἀφικόμενα μετὰ Ἁρπάλου χρήματα.
-
-  Deinarchus (adv. Demosth. s. 97-106) accuses Demosthenes of base
-  flattery to Alexander. Hyperides also makes the same charge—see
-  the Fragments in Mr. Babington’s edition, sect. 2. Fr. 11. p. 12;
-  sect. 3. Fr. 5. p. 34.
-
-  [709] Pausan. ii. 33, 4; Diodor. xvii. 108.
-
-At the time when the decrees for arrest and sequestration were
-passed, Demosthenes requested a citizen near him to ask Harpalus
-publicly in the assembly, what was the amount of his money, which
-the people had just resolved to impound.[710] Harpalus answered,
-720 talents; and Demosthenes proclaimed this sum to the people, on
-the authority of Harpalus, dwelling with some emphasis upon its
-magnitude. But when the money came to be counted in the acropolis, it
-was discovered that there was in reality no more than 350 talents.
-Now it is said that Demosthenes did not at once communicate to the
-people this prodigious deficiency in the real sum as compared with
-the announcement of Harpalus, repeated in the public assembly by
-himself. The impression prevailed, for how long a time we do not
-know, that 720 Harpalian talents had actually been lodged in the
-acropolis; and when the truth became at length known, great surprise
-and outcry were excited.[711] It was assumed that the missing half
-of the sum set forth must have been employed in corruption; and
-suspicions prevailed against almost all the orators, Demosthenes and
-Hyperides both included.
-
-  [710] This material fact, of the question publicly put to
-  Harpalus in the assembly by some one at the request of
-  Demosthenes, appears in the Fragments of Hyperides, p. 5, 7,
-  9, ed. Babington—καθήμενος κάτω ὑπὸ τῇ κατατομῇ, ἐκέλευσε ...
-  τὸν χορευτὴν ἐρωτῆσαι τὸν Ἅρπαλον ὁπόσα εἴη τὰ χρήματα τὰ
-  ἀνοισθησόμενα εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν· ~ὁ δὲ ἀπεκρίνατο~ ὅτι ἑπτακόσια,
-  etc.
-
-  The term κατατομὴ (see Mr. Babington’s note) “designates a
-  broad passage occurring at intervals between the concentrically
-  arranged benches of seats in a theatre, and running parallel with
-  them.”
-
-  [711] Plutarch, Vit. X. Orat. p. 846. In the life of Demosthenes
-  given by Photius (Cod. 265, p. 494) it is stated that only 308
-  talents were found.
-
-In this state of doubt, Demosthenes moved that the Senate of
-Areopagus should investigate the matter and report who were the
-presumed delinquents[712] fit to be indicted before the Dikastery;
-he declared in the speech accompanying his motion that the real
-delinquents, whoever they might be, deserved to be capitally
-punished. The Areopagites delayed their report for six months, though
-Demosthenes is said to have called for it with some impatience.
-Search was made in the houses of the leading orators, excepting
-only one who was recently married.[713] At length the report
-appeared, enumerating several names of citizens chargeable with
-the appropriation of this money, and specifying how much had been
-taken by each. Among these names were Demosthenes himself, charged
-with 20 talents—Demades charged with 6000 golden staters—and other
-citizens, with different sums attached to their names.[714] Upon
-this report, ten[715] public accusers were appointed to prosecute
-the indictment against the persons specified, before the Dikastery.
-Among the accusers was Hyperides, whose name had not been comprised
-in the Areopagitic report. Demosthenes was brought to trial, first
-of all the persons accused, before a numerous Dikastery of 1500
-citizens,[716] who confirmed the report of the Areopagites, found
-him guilty, and condemned him to pay fifty talents to the state.
-Not being able to discharge this large fine, he was put in prison;
-but after some days he found means to escape, and fled to Trœzen
-in Peloponnesus, where he passed some months as a dispirited and
-sorrowing exile, until the death of Alexander.[717] What was done
-with the other citizens included in the Areopagitic report, we do not
-know. It appears that Demades[718]—who was among those comprised, and
-who is especially attacked, along with Demosthenes, by both Hyperides
-and Deinarchus—did not appear to take his trial, and therefore
-must have been driven into exile; yet if so, he must have speedily
-returned, since he seems to have been at Athens when Alexander died.
-Philokles and Aristogeiton were also brought to trial as being
-included by the Areopagus in the list of delinquents; but how their
-trial ended, does not appear.[719]
-
-  [712] That this motion was made by Demosthenes himself, is a
-  point strongly pressed by his accuser Deinarchus—adv. Demosth. s.
-  5. 62, 84, etc.: compare also the Fragm. of Hyperides, p. 59, ed.
-  Babington.
-
-  Deinarchus, in his loose rhetoric, tries to put the case as
-  if Demosthenes had proposed to recognize the sentence of the
-  Areopagus as final and peremptory, and stood therefore condemned
-  upon the authority invoked by himself. But this is refuted
-  sufficiently by the mere fact that the trial was instituted
-  afterwards; besides that, it is repugnant to the judicial
-  practice of Athens.
-
-  [713] Plutarch, Demosth. 26. We learn from Deinarchus (adv.
-  Demosth. s. 46) that the report of the Areopagites was not
-  delivered until after an interval of six months. About their
-  delay and the impatience of Demosthenes see Fragm. Hyperides, pp.
-  12-33, ed. Babington.
-
-  [714] Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 92. See the Fragm. of Hyperides
-  in Mr. Babington, p. 18.
-
-  [715] Deinarchus adv. Aristogeiton, s. 6. Stratokles was one of
-  the accusers.
-
-  [716] Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 108, 109.
-
-  [717] Plutarch, Demosth. 26.
-
-  [718] Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 104.
-
-  [719] See the two orations composed by Deinarchus, against
-  Philokles and Aristogeiton.
-
-  In the second and third Epistles ascribed to Demosthenes (p.
-  1470, 1483, 1485), he is made to state, that he alone had
-  been condemned by the Dykastery, because his trial had come
-  on first—that Aristogeiton and all the others tried were
-  acquitted, though the charge against all was the same, and the
-  evidence against all was the same also—viz. nothing more than
-  the simple report of the Areopagus. As I agree with those who
-  hold these epistles to be probably spurious, I cannot believe,
-  on such authority alone, that all the other persons tried were
-  acquitted—a fact highly improbable in itself.
-
-This condemnation and banishment of Demosthenes—unquestionably the
-greatest orator, and one of the greatest citizens, in Athenian
-antiquity,—is the most painful result of the debates respecting
-the exile Harpalus. Demosthenes himself denied the charge; but
-unfortunately we possess neither his defence, nor the facts alleged
-in evidence against him; so that our means of forming a positive
-conclusion are imperfect. At the same time, judging from the
-circumstances as far as we know them—there are several which go to
-show his innocence, and none which tend to prove him guilty. If we
-are called upon to believe that he received money from Harpalus, we
-must know for what service the payment was made. Did Demosthenes
-take part with Harpalus, and advise the Athenians to espouse his
-cause? Did he even keep silence, and abstain from advising them to
-reject the propositions? Quite the reverse. Demosthenes was from
-the beginning a declared opponent of Harpalus, and of all measures
-for supporting his cause. Plutarch indeed tells an anecdote—that
-Demosthenes began by opposing Harpalus, but that presently he
-was fascinated by the beauty of a golden cup among the Harpalian
-treasures. Harpalus, perceiving his admiration, sent to him on
-the ensuing night the golden cup, together with twenty talents,
-which Demosthenes accepted. A few days afterwards, when the cause
-of Harpalus was again debated in the public assembly, the orator
-appeared with his throat enveloped in woollen wrappers, and affected
-to have lost his voice; upon which the people, detecting this
-simulated inability as dictated by the bribe which had been given,
-expressed their displeasure partly by sarcastic taunts, partly by
-indignant murmuring.[720] So stands the anecdote in Plutarch. But
-we have proof that it is untrue. Demosthenes may indeed have been
-disabled by sore throat from speaking at some particular assembly;
-so far the story may be accurate; but that he desisted from opposing
-Harpalus (the real point of the allegation against him) is certainly
-not true; for we know from his accusers Deinarchus and Hyperides,
-that it was he who made the final motion for imprisoning Harpalus
-and sequestrating the Harpalian treasure in trust for Alexander.
-In fact, Hyperides himself denounces Demosthenes, as having from
-subservience to Alexander, closed the door against Harpalus and his
-prospects.[721] Such direct and continued opposition is a conclusive
-proof that Demosthenes was neither paid nor bought by Harpalus.
-The only service which he rendered to the exile was, by refusing
-to deliver him to Antipater, and by not preventing his escape
-from imprisonment. Now in this refusal even Phokion concurred;
-and probably the best Athenians, of all parties, were desirous of
-favoring the escape of an exile whom it would have been odious to
-hand over to a Macedonian executioner. Insofar as it was a crime not
-to have prevented the escape of Harpalus, the crime was committed
-as much by Phokion as by Demosthenes; and indeed more, seeing that
-Phokion was one of the generals, exercising the most important
-administrative duties—while Demosthenes was only an orator and mover
-in the assembly. Moreover, Harpalus had no means of requiting the
-persons, whoever they were, to whom he owed his escape; for the same
-motion which decreed his arrest, decreed also the sequestration of
-his money, and thus removed it from his own control.[722]
-
-  [720] Plutarch, Demosth. 25: compare also Plutarch, Vit. X.
-  Oratt. p. 846; and Photius, Life of Demosth. Cod. 265, p. 494.
-
-  [721] See the fragment of Hyperides in Mr. Babington’s edition,
-  pp. 37, 38 (a fragment already cited in a preceding note),
-  insisting upon the prodigious mischief which Demosthenes had done
-  by his decree for arresting (σύλληψις) Harpalus.
-
-  [722] In the Life of Demosthenes apud Photium (Cod. 265), the
-  service alleged to have been rendered by him to Harpalus, and for
-  which he was charged with having received 1000 Darics, is put as
-  I have stated it in the text—Demosthenes first spoke publicly
-  against receiving Harpalus, but presently Δαρεικοὺς χιλίους
-  (~ὥς φασι~) λαβὼν πρὸς τοὺς ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ λέγοντας μετετάξατο
-  (then follow the particular acts whereby this alleged change of
-  sentiment was manifested, which particular acts are described
-  as follows)—καὶ βουλομένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων Ἀντιπάτρῳ προδοῦναι τὸν
-  ἄνθρωπον ἀντεῖπεν, τά τε Ἁρπάλεια χρήματα εἰς ἀκρόπολιν ἔγραψεν
-  ἀποθέσθαι, μηδὲ τῷ δήμῳ τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτῶν ἀποσημηνάμενος.
-
-  That Demosthenes should first oppose the reception of
-  Harpalus—and then afterwards oppose the surrender of Harpalus
-  to Antipater’s requisition—is here represented as a change of
-  politics requiring the hypothesis of a bribe to explain it.
-  But it is in reality no change at all. The two proceedings are
-  perfectly consistent with each other, and both of them defensible.
-
-The charge therefore made against Demosthenes by his two
-accusers,—that he received money _from_ Harpalus,—is one which all
-the facts known to us tend to refute. But this is not quite the whole
-case. Had Demosthenes the means of embezzling the money, after it
-had passed out of the control of Harpalus? To this question also we
-may reply in the negative, so far as Athenian practice enables us to
-judge. Demosthenes had moved, and the people had voted, that these
-treasures should be lodged in trust for Alexander, in the acropolis;
-a place where all the Athenian public money was habitually kept—in
-the back chamber of the Parthenon. When placed in that chamber, these
-new treasures would come under the custody of the officers of the
-Athenian exchequer; and would be just as much out of the reach of
-Demosthenes as the rest of the public money. What more could Phokion
-himself have done to preserve the Harpalian fund intact, than to put
-it in the recognized place of surety? Then, as to the intermediate
-process, of taking the money from Harpalus up to the acropolis, there
-is no proof,—and in my judgment no probability,—that Demosthenes was
-at all concerned in it. Even to count, verify, and weigh, a sum of
-above £80,000—not in bank notes or bills of exchange, but subdivided
-in numerous and heavy coins (staters, darics, tetradrachms), likely
-to be not even Attic, but Asiatic—must have been a tedious duty
-requiring to be performed by competent reckoners, and foreign to
-the habits of Demosthenes. The officers of the Athenian treasury
-must have gone through this labor, providing the slaves or mules
-requisite for carrying so heavy a burthen up to the acropolis.
-Now we have ample evidence from the remaining Inscriptions, that
-the details of transfering and verifying the public property, at
-Athens, were performed habitually with laborious accuracy. Least
-of all would such accuracy be found wanting in the case of the
-large Harpalian treasure, where the very passing of the decree
-implied great fear of Alexander. If Harpalus, on being publicly
-questioned in the assembly—What was the sum to be carried up into the
-acropolis,—answered by stating the amount which he had originally
-brought and not that which he had remaining—Demosthenes might surely
-repeat that statement immediately after him, without being understood
-thereby to bind himself down as guarantee for its accuracy. An
-adverse pleader, like Hyperides, might indeed turn a point in his
-speech[723]—“_You_ told the assembly that there were 700 talents,
-and now _you_ produce no more than half”—but the imputation wrapped
-up in these words against the probity of Demosthenes, is utterly
-groundless. Lastly, when the true amount was ascertained, to make
-report thereof was the duty of the officers of the treasury.
-Demosthenes could only learn it from them; and it might certainly
-be proper in him, though in no sense an imperative duty, to inform
-himself on the point, seeing that he had unconsciously helped to give
-publicity to a false statement. The true statement was given; but we
-neither know by whom, nor how soon.[724]
-
-  [723] Fragm. Hyperides, p. 7, ed. Babington—ἐν τῷ δήμῳ ἑπτακόσια
-  ~φήσας~ εἶναι τάλαντα, ~νῦν τὰ ἡμίση ἀναφέρεις~;
-
-  In p. 26 of the same Fragments, we find Hyperides reproaching
-  Demosthenes for not having kept effective custody over the
-  person of Harpalus; for not having proposed any decree providing
-  a special custody; for not having made known beforehand, or
-  prosecuted afterwards, the negligence of the ordinary jailers.
-  This is to make Demosthenes responsible for the performance of
-  _all_ the administrative duties of the city; for the good conduct
-  of the treasurers and the jailers.
-
-  We must recollect that Hyperides had been the loudest advocate
-  of Harpalus, and had done all he could to induce the Athenians
-  to adopt the cause of that exile against Alexander. One of the
-  charges (already cited from his speech) against Demosthenes, is,
-  that Demosthenes prevented this from being accomplished. Yet
-  here is another charge from the same speaker, to the effect that
-  Demosthenes did not keep Harpalus under effective custody for the
-  sword of the Macedonian executioner!
-
-  The line of accusation taken by Hyperides is full of shameful
-  inconsistencies.
-
-  [724] In the Life of Demosthenes (Plutarch, Vit. X Oratt. p.
-  846), the charge of corruption against him is made to rest
-  chiefly on the fact, that he did not make this communication to
-  the people—καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μήτε τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν ἀνακομισθέντων
-  μεμηνυκὼς μήτε τῶν φυλασσόντων ἀμελείαν, etc. The biography apud
-  Photium seems to state it as if Demosthenes did not communicate
-  the amount, _at the time_ when he proposed the decree of
-  sequestration. This last statement we are enabled to contradict,
-  from the testimony of Hyperides.
-
-Reviewing the facts known to us, therefore, we find them all tending
-to refute the charge against Demosthenes. This conclusion will
-certainly be strengthened by reading the accusatory speech composed
-by Deinarchus; which is mere virulent invective, barren of facts and
-evidentiary matter, and running over all the life of Demosthenes for
-the preceding twenty years. That the speech of Hyperides also was of
-the like desultory character, the remaining fragments indicate. Even
-the report made by the Areopagus contained no recital of facts—no
-justificatory matter—nothing except a specification of names with the
-sums for which each of them is chargeable.[725] It appears to have
-been made _ex-parte_, as far as we can judge—that is, made without
-hearing these persons in their own defence, unless they happened to
-be themselves Areopagites. Yet this report is held forth both by
-Hyperides and Deinarchus as being in itself conclusive proof which
-the Dikasts could not reject. When Demosthenes demanded, as every
-defendant naturally would, that the charge against him should be
-proved by some positive evidence, Hyperides sets aside the demand as
-nothing better than cavil and special pleading.[726]
-
-  [725] Hyperid. Fragm. p. 18, ed. Babington. τὰς γὰρ ἀποφάσεις
-  πάσας τὰς ὑπὲρ τῶν χρημάτων Ἁρπάλου, πάσας ὁμοίως ἡ βουλὴ
-  πεποίηται, καὶ τὰς αὐτὰς κατὰ πάντων· καὶ ~οὐδεμιᾷ προσγέγραφε,
-  δι᾽ ὅτι ἕκαστον ἀποφαίνει~· ἀλλ᾽ ~ἐπικεφάλαιον~ γράψασα, ὁπόσον
-  ἕκαστος εἴληφε χρυσίον, τοῦτ᾽ οὖν ὀφειλέτω....
-
-  [726] Hyperid. Frag. p. 20, ed. Babingt. ἐγὼ δ᾽ ὅτι μὲν ἔλαβες
-  τὸ χρυσίον, ~ἱκανὸν οἶμαι εἶναι σημεῖον τοῖς δικασταῖς, τὸ τὴν
-  βουλὴν σοῦ καταγνῶναι~ (see Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 46, and
-  the beginning of the second Demosthenic epistle).
-
-  Hyperid. p. 16, ed Babingt. Καὶ ~συκοφαντεῖς τὴν βουλὴν~,
-  προκλήσεις προτιθεὶς, καὶ ~ἐρωτῶν ἐν ταῖς προκλήσεσιν, πόθεν
-  ἔλαβες τὸ χρυσίον, καὶ τίς ἦν σοὶ ὁ δοὺς, καὶ πῶς; τελευταῖον δ᾽
-  ἴσως ἐρωτήσεις, καὶ εἰ ἐχρήσω τῷ χρυσίῳ, ὥσπερ τραπεζιτικὸν λόγον
-  παρὰ τῆς βουλῆς ἀπαιτῶν~.
-
-  This monstrous sentence creates a strong presumption in favor
-  of the defendant,—and a still stronger presumption against the
-  accuser. Compare Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 6, 7.
-
-  The biographer apud Photium states that Hyperides and four other
-  orators procured (κατεσκεύασαν) the condemnation of Demosthenes
-  by the Areopagus.
-
-One farther consideration remains to be noticed. Only nine months
-after the verdict of the Dikastery against Demosthenes, Alexander
-died. Presently the Athenians and other Greeks rose against Antipater
-in the struggle called the Lamian war. Demosthenes was then recalled;
-received from his countrymen an enthusiastic welcome, such as
-had never been accorded to any returning exile since the days of
-Alkibiades; took a leading part in the management of the war; and
-perished, on its disastrous termination, along with his accuser
-Hyperides.
-
-Such speedy revolution of opinion about Demosthenes, countenances the
-conclusion which seems to me suggested by the other circumstances
-of the case—that the verdict against him was not judicial, but
-political; growing out of the embarrassing necessities of the time.
-
-There can be no doubt that Harpalus, to whom a declaration of active
-support from the Athenians was matter of life and death, distributed
-various bribes to all consenting recipients, who could promote his
-views,—and probably even to some who simply refrained from opposing
-them; to all, in short, except pronounced opponents. If we were to
-judge from probabilities alone, we should say that Hyperides himself,
-as one of the chief supporters, would also be among the largest
-recipients.[727] Here was abundant bribery—notorious in the mass,
-though perhaps untraceable in the detail—all consummated during the
-flush of promise which marked the early discussions of the Harpalian
-case. When the tide of sentiment turned—when fear of Macedonian force
-became the overwhelming sentiment—when Harpalus and his treasures
-were impounded in trust for Alexander—all these numerous receivers
-of bribes were already compromised and alarmed. They themselves
-probably, in order to divert suspicion, were among the loudest in
-demanding investigation and punishment against delinquents. Moreover,
-the city was responsible for 700 talents to Alexander, while no
-more than 350 were forthcoming.[728] It was indispensable that some
-definite individuals should be pronounced guilty and punished, partly
-in order to put down the reciprocal criminations circulating through
-the city, partly in order to appease the displeasure of Alexander
-about the pecuniary deficiency. But how to find out who were the
-guilty? There was no official Prosecutor-general; the number of
-persons suspected would place the matter beyond the reach of private
-accusations; perhaps the course recommended by Demosthenes himself
-was the best, to consign this preliminary investigation to the
-Areopagites.
-
-  [727] The biographer of Hyperides (Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt.
-  p. 48) tells us that he was the only orator who kept himself
-  unbribed; the comic writer Timokles names Hyperides along with
-  Demosthenes and others as recipients (ap. Athenæ. viii. p. 342).
-
-  [728] See this point urged by Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 69, 70.
-
-Six months elapsed before these Areopagites made their report. Now
-it is impossible to suppose that all this time could have been spent
-in the investigation of facts—and if it had been, the report when
-published would have contained some trace of these facts, instead
-of embodying a mere list of names and sums. The probability is,
-that their time was passed quite as much in party-discussions as in
-investigating facts; that dissentient parties were long in coming
-to an agreement whom they should sacrifice; and that when they did
-agree, it was a political rather than a judicial sentence, singling
-out Demosthenes as a victim highly acceptable to Alexander, and
-embodying Demades also, by way of compromise, in the same list of
-delinquents—two opposite politicians, both at the moment obnoxious.
-I have already observed that Demosthenes was at that time unpopular
-with both the reigning parties: with the philo-Macedonians, from long
-date, and not without sufficient reason; with the anti-Macedonians,
-because he had stood prominent in opposing Harpalus. His accusers
-count upon the hatred of the former against him, as a matter of
-course; they recommend him to the hatred of the latter, as a base
-creature of Alexander. The Dikasts doubtless included men of both
-parties; and as a collective body, they might probably feel, that
-to ratify the list presented by the Areopagus was the only way of
-finally closing a subject replete with danger and discord.
-
-Such seems the probable history of the Harpalian transactions. It
-leaves Demosthenes innocent of corrupt profit, not less than Phokion;
-but to the Athenian politicians generally, it is noway creditable;
-while it exhibits the judicial conscience of Athens as under pressure
-of dangers from without, worked upon by party-intrigues within.[729]
-
-  [729] We read in Pausanias (ii. 33, 4) that the Macedonian
-  admiral Philoxenus, having afterwards seized one of the slaves
-  of Harpalus, learnt from him the names of those Athenians whom
-  his master had corrupted; and that Demosthenes was _not_ among
-  them. As far as this statement goes, it serves to exculpate
-  Demosthenes. Yet I cannot assign so much importance to it as
-  Bishop Thirlwall seems to do. His narrative of the Harpalian
-  transactions is able and discriminating (Hist. vol. vii. ch. 56.
-  p. 170 _seqq._).
-
-During the half-year and more which elapsed between the arrival of
-Harpalus at Athens, and the trial of Demosthenes, one event at least
-of considerable moment occurred in Greece. Alexander sent Nicanor
-to the great Olympic festival held in this year, with a formal
-letter or rescript, directing every Grecian city to recall all its
-citizens that were in exile, except such as were under the taint
-of impiety. The rescript, which was publicly read at the festival
-by the herald who had gained the prize for loudness of voice, was
-heard with the utmost enthusiasm by 20,000 exiles, who had mustered
-there from intimations that such a step was intended. It ran thus:
-“King Alexander to the exiles out of the Grecian cities—We have not
-been authors of your banishment, but we will be authors of your
-restoration to your native cities. We have written to Antipater about
-this matter, directing him to apply force to such cities as will not
-recall you of their own accord.”[730]
-
-  [730] Diodor. xix. 8.
-
-It is plain that many exiles had been pouring out their complaints
-and accusations before Alexander, and had found him a willing
-auditor. But we do not know by what representations this rescript
-had been procured. It would seem that Antipater had orders farther,
-to restrain or modify the confederacies of the Achæan and Arcadian
-cities;[731] and to enforce not merely recall of the exiles, but
-restitution of their properties.[732]
-
-  [731] See the Fragments of Hyperides, p. 36, ed. Babington.
-
-  [732] Curtius, x. 2, 6.
-
-That the imperial rescript was dictated by mistrust of the tone of
-sentiment in the Grecian cities generally, and intended to fill each
-city with devoted partisans of Alexander—we cannot doubt. It was on
-his part a high-handed and sweeping exercise of sovereignty—setting
-aside the conditions under which he had been named leader of
-Greece—disdaining even to inquire into particular cases, and to
-attempt a distinction between just and unjust sentences—overruling
-in the mass the political and judicial authorities in every city. It
-proclaimed with bitter emphasis the servitude of the hellenic world.
-Exiles restored under the coercive order of Alexander, were sure to
-look to Macedonia for support, to despise their own home authorities,
-and to fill their respective cities with enfeebling discord. Most of
-the cities, not daring to resist, appear to have yielded a reluctant
-obedience; but both the Athenians and Ætolians are said to have
-refused to execute the order.[733] It is one evidence of the disgust
-raised by the rescript at Athens, that Demosthenes is severely
-reproached by Deinarchus, because, as chief of the Athenian Theôry or
-sacred legation to the Olympic festival, he was seen there publicly
-consorting and in familiar converse with Nikanor.[734]
-
-  [733] Curtius, x. 2, 6. The statement of Diodorus (xviii. 8)—that
-  the rescript was popular and acceptable to all Greeks, except
-  the Athenians and Ætolians—cannot be credited. It was popular,
-  doubtless, with the exiles themselves, and their immediate
-  friends.
-
-  [734] Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 81; compare Hyperid. Fragm. p.
-  36, ed. Babington.
-
-In the winter or early spring of 323 B. C. several Grecian
-cities sent envoys into Asia to remonstrate with Alexander against
-the measure; we may presume that the Athenians were among them; but
-we do not know whether the remonstrance produced any effect.[735]
-There appears to have been considerable discontent in Greece during
-this winter and spring (323 B. C.). The disbanded soldiers
-out of Asia still maintained a camp at Tænarus; where Leosthenes,
-an energetic Athenian of anti-Macedonian sentiments, accepted the
-command of them, and even attracted fresh mercenary soldiers from
-Asia, under concert with various confederates at Athens, and with
-the Ætolians.[736] Of the money, said to be 5000 talents, brought by
-Harpalus out of Asia, the greater part had not been taken by Harpalus
-to Athens, but apparently left with his officers for the maintenance
-of the troops who had accompanied him over.
-
-  [735] Diodor. xvii. 113.
-
-  [736] Diodor. xvii. 111: compare xviii. 21. Pausanias (i. 25, 5;
-  viii. 52, 2) affirms that Leosthenes brought over 50,000 of these
-  mercenaries from Asia into Peloponnesus, during the lifetime of
-  Alexander, and against Alexander’s will. The number here given
-  seems incredible; but it is probable enough that he induced some
-  to come across.—Justin (xiii. 5) mentions that armed resistance
-  was prepared by the Athenians and Ætolians against Alexander
-  himself during the latter months of his life, in reference to the
-  mandate enjoining recall of the exiles. He seems to overstate the
-  magnitude of their doings, before the death of Alexander.
-
-Such was the general position of affairs, when Alexander died at
-Babylon in June 323 B. C. This astounding news, for which no
-one could have been prepared, must have become diffused throughout
-Greece during the month of July. It opened the most favorable
-prospects to all lovers of freedom and sufferers by Macedonian
-dominion. The imperial military force resembled the gigantic
-Polyphemus after his eye had been blinded by Odysseus:[737] Alexander
-had left no competent heir, nor did any one imagine that his vast
-empire could be kept together in effective unity by other hands.
-Antipater in Macedonia was threatened with the defection of various
-subject neighbors.[738]
-
-  [737] A striking comparison made by the orator Demades (Plutarch,
-  Apophthegm. p. 181).
-
-  [738] See Frontinus, Stratagem, ii. 11, 4.
-
-No sooner was the death of Alexander indisputably certified, than the
-anti-Macedonian leaders in Athens vehemently instigated the people
-to declare themselves first champions of Hellenic freedom, and to
-organize a confederacy throughout Greece for that object. Demosthenes
-was then in exile; but Leosthenes, Hyperides and other orators of the
-same party, found themselves able to kindle in their countrymen a
-strenuous feeling and determination, in spite of decided opposition
-on the part of Phokion and his partisans.[739] The rich men for the
-most part took the side of Phokion, but the mass of the citizens were
-fired by the animating recollection of their ancestors and by the
-hopes of reconquering Grecian freedom. A vote was passed, publicly
-proclaiming their resolution to that effect. It was decreed that 200
-quadriremes, and 40 triremes should be equipped; that all Athenians
-under 40 years of age should be in military requisition; and that
-envoys should be sent round to the various Grecian cities, earnestly
-invoking their alliance in the work of self-emancipation.[740]
-Phokion, though a pronounced opponent of such warlike projects,
-still remained at Athens, and still, apparently, continued in his
-functions as one of the generals.[741] But Pytheas, Kallimedon, and
-others of his friends, fled to Antipater, whom they strenuously
-assisted in trying to check the intended movement throughout Greece.
-
-  [739] Plutarch, Phokion, 23. In the Fragments of Dexippus, there
-  appear short extracts of two speeches, seemingly composed by
-  that author in his history of these transactions; one which he
-  ascribes to Hyperides instigating the war, the other to Phokion,
-  against it (Fragm. Hist. Græc. vol. iii. p. 668).
-
-  [740] Diodor. xviii. 10. Diodorus states that the Athenians sent
-  the Harpalian treasures to the aid of Leosthenes. He seems to
-  fancy that Harpalus had brought to Athens all the 5000 talents
-  which he had carried away from Asia; but it is certain, that no
-  more than 700 or 720 talents were declared by Harpalus in the
-  Athenian assembly—and of these only half were really forthcoming.
-  Moreover, Diodorus is not consistent with himself, when he says
-  afterwards (xviii. 19) that Thimbron, who killed Harpalus in
-  Krete, got possession of the Harpalian treasures and mercenaries,
-  and carried them over to Kyrênê in Africa.
-
-  [741] It is to this season, apparently, that the anecdote (if
-  true) must be referred—The Athenians were eager to invade Bœotia
-  unseasonably; Phokion, as general of eighty years old, kept
-  them back, by calling out the citizens of sixty years old and
-  upwards for service, and offering to march himself at their head
-  (Plutarch, Reip. Ger. Præcept. p. 818).
-
-Leosthenes, aided by some money and arms from Athens, put himself
-at the head of the mercenaries assembled at Tænarus, and passed
-across the Gulf into Ætolia. Here he was joined by the Ætolians and
-Akarnanians, who eagerly entered into the league with Athens for
-expelling the Macedonians from Greece. Proceeding onward towards
-Thermopylæ and Thessaly, he met with favor and encouragement almost
-everywhere. The cause of Grecian freedom was espoused by the
-Phokians, Lokrians, Dorians, Ænianes, Athamantes, and Dolopes; by
-most of the Malians, Œtæans, Thessalians, and Achæans of Phthiôtis;
-by the inhabitants of Leukas, and by some of the Molossians. Promises
-were also held out of co-operation from various Illyrian and Thracian
-tribes. In Peloponnesus, the Argeians, Sikyonians, Epidaurians,
-Trœzenians, Eleians, and Messenians, enrolled themselves in the
-league, as well as the Karystians in Eubœa.[742] These adhesions were
-partly procured by Hyperides and other Athenian envoys, who visited
-the several cities; while Pytheas and other envoys were going round
-in like matter to advocate the cause of Antipater. The two sides
-were thus publicly argued by able pleaders before different public
-assemblies. In these debates, the advantage was generally on the
-side of the Athenian orators, whose efforts moreover were powerfully
-seconded by the voluntary aid of Demosthenes, then living as an exile
-in Peloponnesus.
-
-  [742] Diodor. xviii. 11; Pausanias, i. 25, 4.
-
-To Demosthenes the death of Alexander, and the new prospect of
-organizing an anti-Macedonian confederacy with some tolerable chance
-of success, came more welcome than to any one else. He gladly
-embraced the opportunity of joining and assisting the Athenian
-envoys, who felt the full value of his energetic eloquence, in the
-various Peloponnesian towns. So effective was the service which he
-thus rendered to his country, that the Athenians not only passed
-a vote to enable him to return, but sent a trireme to fetch him
-to Peiræus. Great was the joy and enthusiasm on his arrival. The
-archons, the priests, and the entire body of citizens, came down to
-the harbor to welcome his landing, and escorted him to the city. Full
-of impassioned emotion, Demosthenes poured forth his gratitude for
-having been allowed to see such a day, and to enjoy a triumph greater
-even than that which had been conferred on Alkibiades on returning
-from exile; since it had been granted spontaneously, and not extorted
-by force. His fine could not be remitted, consistently with Athenian
-custom; but the people passed a vote granting to him fifty talents
-as superintendent of the periodical sacrifice to Zeus Soter; and his
-execution of this duty was held equivalent to a liquidation of the
-fine.[743]
-
-  [743] Plutarch, Demosth. 27.
-
-What part Demosthenes took in the plans or details of the war, we
-are not permitted to know. Vigorous operations were now carried on,
-under the military command of Leosthenes. The confederacy against
-Antipater included a larger assemblage of Hellenic states than that
-which had resisted Xerxes in 480 B. C. Nevertheless, the
-name of Sparta does not appear in the list. It was a melancholy
-drawback to the chances of Greece, in this her last struggle for
-emancipation, that the force of Sparta had been altogether crushed in
-the gallant but ill-concerted effort of Agis against Antipater seven
-years before, and had not since recovered. The great stronghold of
-Macedonian interest, in the interior of Greece, was Bœotia. Platæa,
-Orchomenus, and the other ancient enemies of Thebes, having received
-from Alexander the domain once belonging to Thebes herself, were well
-aware that this arrangement could only be upheld by the continued
-pressure of Macedonian supremacy in Greece. It seems probable also
-that there were Macedonian garrisons in the Kadmeia—in Corinth—and
-in Megalopolis; moreover, that the Arcadian and Achæan cities had
-been macedonized by the measures taken against them under Alexander’s
-orders in the preceding summer;[744] for we find no mention made
-of these cities in the coming contest. The Athenians equipped a
-considerable land-force to join Leosthenes at Thermopylæ; a citizen
-force of 5000 infantry and 500 cavalry, with 2000 mercenaries
-besides. But the resolute opposition of the Bœotian cities hindered
-them from advancing beyond Mount Kithæron, until Leosthenes
-himself, marching from Thermopylæ to join them with a part of his
-army, attacked the Bœotian troops, gained a complete victory, and
-opened the passage. He now proceeded with the full Hellenic muster,
-including Ætolians and Athenians, into Thessaly to meet Antipater,
-who was advancing from Macedonia into Greece at the head of the force
-immediately at his disposal—13,000 infantry, and 600 cavalry—and with
-a fleet of 110 ships of war co-operating on the coast.[745]
-
-  [744] See the Fragments of Hyperides, p. 36, ed. Babington. καὶ
-  περὶ τοῦ τοὺς κοινοὺς συλλόγους Ἀχαιῶν τε καὶ Ἀρκάδων ... we do
-  not know what was done to these district confederacies, but it
-  seems that some considerable change was made in them, at the time
-  when Alexander’s decree for restoring the exiles was promulgated.
-
-  [745] Diodor. xviii. 13.
-
-Antipater was probably not prepared for this rapid and imposing
-assemblage of the combined Greeks at Thermopylæ, nor for the
-energetic movements of Leosthenes. Still less was he prepared for
-the defection of the Thessalian cavalry, who, having always formed
-an important element in the Macedonian army, now lent their strength
-to the Greeks. He despatched urgent messages to the Macedonian
-commanders in Asia—Kraterus, Leonnatus, Philotas, etc., soliciting
-reinforcements; but in the mean time, though inferior in numbers,
-he thought it expedient to accept the challenge of Leosthenes. In
-the battle which ensued, however, he was completely defeated, and
-even cut off from the possibility of retreating into Macedonia;
-so that no resource was left to him except the fortified town of
-Lamia (near to the river Spercheius, beyond the southern border of
-Thessaly), where he calculated on holding out until relief came
-from Asia. Leosthenes immediately commenced the siege of Lamia,
-and pressed it with the utmost energy, making several attempts to
-storm the town; but its fortifications were strong, with a garrison
-ample and efficient—so that he was repulsed with considerable loss.
-Unfortunately he possessed no battering train nor engineers, such as
-had formed so powerful an element in the military successes of Philip
-and Alexander. He therefore found himself compelled to turn the siege
-into a blockade, and to adopt systematic measures for intercepting
-the supply of provisions. In this he had every chance of succeeding,
-and of capturing the person of Antipater. Hellenic prospects looked
-bright and encouraging; nothing was heard in Athens and the other
-cities except congratulations and thanksgivings.[746] Phokion, on
-hearing the confident language of those around him remarked—“The
-stadium (or short course) has been done brilliantly, but I fear
-we shall not have strength to hold out for the long course.”[747]
-At this critical moment, Leosthenes, in inspecting the blockading
-trenches, was wounded on the head by a large stone, projected from
-one of the catapults on the city-walls, and expired in two days.[748]
-A funeral oration in his honor, as well as in that of the other
-combatants against Antipater, was pronounced at Athens by Hyperides,
-on whom the people devolved that duty in preference to Demosthenes.
-
-  [746] Plutarch, Phokion, 23, 24.
-
-  [747] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 23; Plutarch, Reip. Ger. Præcept. p.
-  803.
-
-  [748] Diodor. xviii. 12, 13.
-
-The death of this eminent general, in the full tide of success, was a
-hard blow struck by fortune at the cause of Grecian freedom. For the
-last generation, Athens had produced several excellent orators, and
-one who combined splendid oratory with wise and patriotic counsels.
-But during all that time, none of her citizens, before Leosthenes had
-displayed military genius and ardor along with Panhellenic purposes.
-His death appears to have saved Antipater from defeat and captivity.
-The difficulty was very great, of keeping together a miscellaneous
-army of Greeks, who after the battle, easily persuaded themselves
-that the war was finished, and desired to go home—perhaps under
-promise of returning. Even during the lifetime of Leosthenes, the
-Ætolians, the most powerful contingent of the army, had obtained
-leave to go home, from some domestic urgency, real or pretended.[749]
-When he was slain, there was no second in command; nor, even if there
-had been, could the personal influence of one officer be transferred
-to another. Reference was made to Athens, where, after some debate,
-Antiphilus was chosen commander, after the proposition to name
-Phokion had been made and rejected.[750] But during this interval
-there was no authority to direct military operations, or even to
-keep the army together; so that the precious moments for rendering
-the blockade really stringent, were lost, and Antipater was enabled
-to maintain himself until the arrival of Leonnatus from Asia to his
-aid. How dangerous the position of Antipater was, we may judge from
-the fact, that he solicited peace, but was required by the besiegers
-to surrender at discretion[751]—with which condition he refused to
-comply.
-
-  [749] Diodor. xviii. 13-15.
-
-  [750] Plutarch, Phokion, 24.
-
-  [751] Diodor. xviii. 11; Plutarch, Phokion, 26.
-
-Antiphilus appears to have been a brave and competent officer. But
-before he could reduce Lamia, Leonnatus with a Macedonian army had
-crossed the Hellespont from Asia, and arrived at the frontiers of
-Thessaly. So many of the Grecian contingents had left the camp, that
-Antiphilus was not strong enough at once to continue the blockade and
-to combat the relieving army. Accordingly, he raised the blockade,
-and moved off by rapid marches to attack Leonnatus apart from
-Antipater. He accomplished this operation with vigor and success.
-Through the superior efficiency of the Thessalian cavalry under
-Menon, he gained an important advantage in a cavalry battle over
-Leonnatus, who was himself slain;[752] and the Macedonian phalanx
-having its flanks and rear thus exposed, retired from the plain to
-more difficult ground, leaving the Greeks masters of the field with
-the dead bodies. On the very next day, Antipater came up with the
-troops from Lamia, and took command of the defeated army. He did not
-however think it expedient to renew the combat, but withdrew his army
-from Thessaly into Macedonia, keeping in his march the high ground,
-out of the reach of cavalry.[753]
-
-  [752] Plutarch, Phokion, 25; Diodor. xviii. 14, 15: compare
-  Plutarch, Pyrrhus, 1.
-
-  [753] Diodor. xviii. 15.
-
-During the same time generally as these operations in Thessaly,
-it appears that war was carried on actively by sea. We hear of
-a descent by Mikion with a Macedonian fleet at Rhamnus on the
-eastern coast of Attica, repulsed by Phokion; also of a Macedonian
-fleet, of 240 sail, under Kleitus, engaging in two battles with the
-Athenian fleet under Eetion, near the islands called Echinades,
-at the mouth of the Achelous, on the western Ætolian coast. The
-Athenians were defeated in both actions, and great efforts were
-made at Athens to build new vessels for the purpose of filling up
-the losses sustained.[754] Our information is not sufficient to
-reveal the purposes or details of these proceedings. But it seems
-probable that the Macedonian fleet were attacking Ætolia through
-Œniadæ, the citizens of which town had recently been expelled by the
-Ætolians;[755] and perhaps this may have been the reason why the
-Ætolian contingent was withdrawn from Thessaly.
-
-  [754] Diodor. xviii. 15.
-
-  [755] Diodor. xviii. 8.
-
-In spite of such untoward events at sea, the cause of Panhellenic
-liberty seemed on the whole prosperous. Though the capital
-opportunity had been missed, of taking Antipater captive in Lamia,
-still he had been expelled from Greece, and was unable, by means
-of his own forces in Macedonia, to regain his footing. The Grecian
-contingents had behaved with bravery and unanimity in prosecution
-of the common purpose; and what had been already achieved was
-quite sufficient to justify the rising, as a fair risk, promising
-reasonable hopes of success. Nevertheless Greek citizens were not
-like trained Macedonian soldiers. After a term of service not much
-prolonged, they wanted to go back to their families and properties,
-hardly less after a victory than after a defeat. Hence the army
-of Antiphilus in Thessaly became much thinned,[756] though still
-remaining large enough to keep back the Macedonian forces of
-Antipater, even augmented as they had been by Leonnatus—and to compel
-him to await the still more powerful reinforcement destined to follow
-under Kraterus.
-
-  [756] Diodor. xviii. 17.
-
-In explaining the relations between these three Macedonian
-commanders—Antipater, Leonnatus, and Kraterus—it is necessary to go
-back to June 323 B. C., the period of Alexander’s death, and
-to review the condition into which his vast and mighty empire had
-fallen. I shall do this briefly, and only so far as it bears on the
-last struggles and final subjugation of the Grecian world.
-
-On the unexpected death of Alexander, the camp at Babylon with its
-large force became a scene of discord. He left no offspring, except
-a child named Herakles, by his mistress Barsinê. Roxana, one of
-his wives, was indeed pregnant; and amidst the uncertainties of
-the moment, the first disposition of many was to await the birth
-of her child. She herself, anxious to shut out rivalry, caused
-Statira, the queen whom Alexander had last married to be entrapped
-and assassinated along with her sister.[757] There was, however,
-at Babylon, a brother of Alexander, named Aridæus (son of Philip
-by a Thessalian mistress), already of full age though feeble in
-intelligence, towards whom a still larger party leaned. In Macedonia,
-there were Olympias, Alexander’s mother—Kleopatra, his sister, widow
-of the Epirotic Alexander—and Kynanê,[758] another sister, widow of
-Amyntas (cousin of Alexander the Great, and put to death by him);
-all of them disposed to take advantage of their relationship to the
-deceased conqueror, in the scramble now opened for power.
-
-  [757] Plutarch, Alexand. 77.
-
-  [758] Arrian, De Rebus post Alexandrum, vi. ap. Photium, Cod. 92.
-
-After a violent dispute between the cavalry and the infantry at
-Babylon, Aridæus was proclaimed king under the name of Philip
-Aridæus. Perdikkas was named as his guardian and chief minister;
-among the other chief officers, the various satrapies and fractions
-of the empire were distributed. Egypt and Libya were assigned to
-Ptolemy; Syria to Laomedon; Kilikia to Philôtas; Pamphylia, Lykia,
-and the greater Phrygia, to Antigonus; Karia, to Asander; Lydia, to
-Menander; the Hellespontine Phrygia, to Leonnatus; Kappadokia and
-Paphlagonia, to the Kardian Eumenes; Media, to Pithon. The eastern
-satrapies were left in the hands of the actual holders.
-
-In Europe, the distributors gave Thrace with the Chersonese to
-Lysimachus; the countries west of Thrace, including (along with
-Illyrians, Triballi, Agrianes, and Epirots) Macedonia and Greece, to
-Antipater and Kraterus.[759] We thus find the Grecian cities handed
-over to new masters, as fragments of the vast intestate estate left
-by Alexander. The empty form of convening and consulting a synod of
-deputies at Corinth, was no longer thought necessary.
-
-  [759] Arrian, De Rebus post Alexand. _ut supra_; Diodor. xviii.
-  3, 4; Curtius, x. 10; Dexippus, Fragmenta ap. Photium, Cod. 82,
-  ap. Fragm. Hist. Græc. vol. iii. p. 667, ed. Didot (De Rebus post
-  Alexandrum).
-
-All the above-named officers were considered as local lieutenants,
-administering portions of an empire one and indivisible, under
-Aridæus. The principal officers who enjoyed central authority,
-bearing on the entire empire, were, Perdikkas, chiliarch of the
-horse (the post occupied by Hephæstion until his death), a sort of
-vizir,[760] and Seleukus, commander of the Horse Guards. No one at
-this moment talked of dividing the empire. But it soon appeared that
-Perdikkas, profiting by the weakness of Aridæus, had determined to
-leave to him nothing more than the imperial name, and to engross for
-himself the real authority. Still, however, in his disputes with the
-other chiefs, he represented the imperial family, and the integrity
-of the empire, contending against severality and local independence.
-In this task (besides his brother Alketas), his ablest and most
-effective auxiliary was Eumenes of Kardia, secretary of Alexander for
-several years until his death. It was one of the earliest proceedings
-of Perdikkas to wrest Kappadokia from the local chief Ariarathes (who
-had contrived to hold it all through the reign of Alexander), and to
-transfer it to Eumenes, to whom it had been allotted in the general
-scheme of division.[761]
-
-  [760] Arrian and Dexippus—De Reb. post Alex. _ut supra_: compare
-  Diodor. xviii. 48.
-
-  [761] Diodor. xviii. 16.
-
-At the moment of Alexander’s death, Kraterus was in Kilikia, at
-the head of an army of veteran Macedonian soldiers. He had been
-directed to conduct them home into Macedonia, with orders to remain
-there himself in place of Antipater, who was to come over to
-Asia with fresh reinforcements. Kraterus had with him a paper of
-written instructions from Alexander, embodying projects on the most
-gigantic scale; for western conquest—transportation of inhabitants
-by wholesale from Europe into Asia and Asia into Europe—erection
-of magnificent religious edifices in various parts of Greece and
-Macedonia, etc. This list was submitted by Perdikkas to the officers
-and soldiers around him, who dismissed the projects as too vast for
-any one but Alexander to think of.[762] Kraterus and Antipater had
-each a concurrent claim to Greece and Macedonia, and the distributors
-of the empire had allotted these countries to them jointly, not
-venturing to exclude either. Amidst the conflicting pretensions of
-these great Macedonian officers, Leonnatus also cherished hopes of
-the same prize. He was satrap of the Asiatic territory bordering
-upon the Hellespont, and had received propositions from Kleopatra
-at Pella, inviting him to marry her and assume the government of
-Macedonia. About the same time, urgent messages were also sent to him
-(through Hekatæus despot of Kardia) from Antipater, immediately after
-the defeat preceding the siege of Lamia, entreating his co-operation
-against the Greeks. Leonnatus accordingly came, intending to assist
-Antipater against the Greeks, but also to dispossess him of the
-government of Macedonia and marry Kleopatra.[763] This scheme
-remained unexecuted, because (as has been already related) Leonnatus
-was slain in his first encounter with the Greeks. To them, his death
-was a grave misfortune; to Antipater, it was an advantage which more
-than countervailed the defeat, since it relieved him from a dangerous
-rival.
-
-  [762] Diodor. xviii. 4.
-
-  [763] Plutarch, Eumenes, 3.
-
-It was not till the ensuing summer that Kraterus found leisure to
-conduct his army into Macedonia. By this junction, Antipater to
-whom he ceded the command, found himself at the head of a powerful
-army—40,000 heavy infantry, 5000 cavalry, and 3000 archers and
-slingers. He again marched into Thessaly against the Greeks under
-Antiphilus; and the two armies came in sight on the Thessalian plains
-near Krannon. The Grecian army consisted of 25,000 infantry, and 3500
-cavalry—the latter, Thessalians under Menon, of admirable efficiency.
-The soldiers in general were brave, but insubordinate; while the
-contingents of many cities had gone home without returning, in spite
-of urgent remonstrances from the commander. Hoping to be rejoined
-by these absentees, Antiphilus and Menon tried at first to defer
-fighting; but Antipater forced them to a battle. Though Menon with
-his Thessalian cavalry defeated and dispersed the Macedonian cavalry,
-the Grecian infantry were unable to resist the superior number of
-Antipater’s infantry, and the heavy pressure of the phalanx. They
-were beaten back and gave way, yet retiring in tolerable order, the
-Macedonian phalanx being incompetent for pursuit, to some difficult
-neighboring ground, where they were soon joined by their victorious
-cavalry. The loss of the Greeks is said to have been 500 men; that of
-the Macedonians, 120.[764]
-
-  [764] Diodor. xviii. 17; Plutarch, Phokion, 26.
-
-The defeat of Krannon (August 322 B. C.) was no way
-decisive or ruinous, nor would it probably have crushed the spirit
-of Leosthenes, had he been alive and in command. The coming up of
-the absentee contingents might still have enabled the Greeks to make
-head. But Antiphilus and Menon, after holding counsel, declined to
-await and accelerate that junction. They thought themselves under the
-necessity of sending to open negotiations for peace with Antipater;
-who however returned for answer, that he would not recognize or
-treat with any Grecian confederacy, and that he would receive no
-propositions except from each city severally. Upon this the Grecian
-commanders at once resolved to continue the war, and to invoke
-reinforcements from their countrymen. But their own manifestation
-of timidity had destroyed the chance that remained of such
-reinforcements arriving. While Antipater commenced a vigorous and
-successful course of action against the Thessalian cities separately,
-the Greeks became more and more dispirited and alarmed. City after
-city sent its envoys to entreat peace from Antipater, who granted
-lenient terms to each, reserving only the Athenians and Ætolians. In
-a few days, the combined Grecian army was dispersed; Antiphilus with
-the Athenians returned into Attica; Antipater followed them southward
-as far as Bœotia, taking up his quarters at the Macedonian post on
-the Kadmeia, once the Hellenic Thebes—within two days’ march of
-Athens.[765]
-
-  [765] Diodor. xviii. 17; Plutarch, Phokion, c. 26.
-
-Against the overwhelming force thus on the frontiers of Attica, the
-Athenians had no means of defence. The principal anti-Macedonian
-orators, especially Demosthenes and Hyperides, retired from the city
-at once, seeking sanctuary in the temples of Kalauria and Ægina.
-Phokion and Demades, as the envoys most acceptable to Antipater,
-were sent to Kadmeia as bearers of the submission of the city, and
-petitioners for lenient terms. Demades is said to have been at this
-time disfranchised and disqualified from public speaking—having been
-indicted and found guilty thrice (some say seven times) under the
-Graphê Paranomon; but the Athenians passed a special vote of relief,
-to enable him to resume his functions of citizen. Neither Phokion
-nor Demades, however, could prevail upon Antipater to acquiesce in
-anything short of the surrender of Athens at discretion; the same
-terms as Leosthenes had required from Antipater himself at Lamia.
-Kraterus was even bent upon marching forward into Attica, to dictate
-terms under the walls of Athens; and it was not without difficulty
-that Phokion obtained the abandonment of this intention; after which
-he returned to Athens with the answer. The people had no choice
-except to throw themselves on the mercy of Antipater;[766] and
-Phokion and Demades came back to Thebes to learn his determination.
-This time they were accompanied by the philosopher Xenokrates—the
-successor of Plato and Speusippus, as presiding teacher in the school
-of the Academy. Though not a citizen of Athens, Xenokrates had long
-resided there; and it was supposed that his dignified character and
-intellectual eminence might be efficacious in mitigating the wrath
-of the conqueror. Aristotle had quitted Athens for Chalkis before
-this time; otherwise he, the personal friend of Antipater, would have
-been probably selected for this painful mission. In point of fact,
-Xenokrates did no good, being harshly received, and almost put to
-silence by Antipater. One reason of this may be, that he had been to
-a certain extent the rival of Aristotle; and it must be added to his
-honor, that he maintained a higher and more independent tone than
-either of the other envoys.[767]
-
-  [766] Demochares, the nephew of Demosthenes, who had held a bold
-  language and taken active part against Antipater throughout
-  the Lamian war, is said to have delivered a public harangue
-  recommending resistance even at this last moment. At least such
-  was the story connected with his statue, erected a few years
-  afterwards at Athens, representing him in the costume of an
-  orator, but with a sword in hand—Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 847:
-  compare Polybius, xii. 13.
-
-  [767] Plutarch, Phokion, 27; Diodor. xviii. 18.
-
-According to the terms dictated by Antipater, the Athenians
-were required to pay a sum equal to the whole cost of the war;
-to surrender Demosthenes, Hyperides, and seemingly at least two
-other anti-Macedonian orators; to receive a Macedonian garrison in
-Munychia; to abandon their democratical constitution and disfranchise
-all their poorer citizens. Most of these poor men were to be
-transported from their homes, and to receive new lands on a foreign
-shore. The Athenian colonists in Samos were to be dipossessed and the
-island retransferred to the Samian exiles and natives.
-
-It is said that Phokion and Demades heard these terms with
-satisfaction, as lenient and reasonable. Xenokrates entered against
-them the strongest protest which the occasion admitted, when he
-said[768]—“If Antipater looks upon us as slaves, the terms are
-moderate; if as freemen, they are severe.” To Phokion’s entreaty,
-that the introduction of the garrison might be dispensed with,
-Antipater replied in the negative, intimating that the garrison would
-be not less serviceable to Phokion himself than to the Macedonians;
-while Kallimedon also, an Athenian exile there present, repelled the
-proposition with scorn. Respecting the island of Samos, Antipater was
-prevailed upon to allow a special reference to the imperial authority.
-
-  [768] Plutarch, Phokion, 27. Οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι πρέσβεις ἠγάπησαν
-  ὡς φιλανθρώπους τὰς διαλύσεις, πλὴν τοῦ Ξενοκράτους, etc.
-  Pausanias even states (vii. 10, 1) that Antipater was disposed
-  to grant more lenient terms, but was dissuaded from doing so by
-  Demades.
-
-If Phokion thought these terms lenient, we must imagine that he
-expected a sentence of destruction against Athens, such as Alexander
-had pronounced and executed against Thebes. Under no other comparison
-can they appear lenient. Out of 21,000 qualified citizens of Athens,
-all those who did not possess property to the amount of 2000 drachmæ
-were condemned to disfranchisement and deportation. The number
-below this prescribed qualification, who came under the penalty,
-was 12,000, or three-fifths of the whole. They were set aside as
-turbulent, noisy democrats; the 9000 richest citizens, the “party
-of order”, were left in exclusive possession, not only of the
-citizenship, but of the city. The condemned 12,000 were deported out
-of Attica, some to Thrace, some to the Illyrian or Italian coast,
-some to Libya or the Kyrenaic territory. Besides the multitude
-banished simply on the score of comparative poverty, the marked
-anti-Macedonian politicians were banished also, including Agnonides,
-the friend of Demosthenes, and one of his earnest advocates when
-accused respecting the Harpalian treasures.[769] At the request
-of Phokion, Antipater consented to render the deportation less
-sweeping than he had originally intended, so far as to permit some
-exiles, Agnonides among the rest, to remain within the limits of
-Peloponnesus.[770] We shall see him presently contemplating a still
-more wholesale deportation of the Ætolian people.
-
-  [769] See Fragments of Hyperides adv. Demosth. p. 61-65, ed.
-  Babington.
-
-  [770] Diodor. xviii. 18. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ὄντες πλείους τῶν μυρίων
-  (instead of δισμυρίων, which seems a mistake) καὶ δισχιλίων
-  μετεστάθησαν ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος· οἱ δὲ τὴν ὡρισμένην τίμησιν ἔχοντες
-  περὶ ἐννακισχιλίους, ἀπεδείχθησαν κύριοι τῆς τε πόλεως καὶ τῆς
-  χώρας, καὶ κατὰ τοὺς Σόλωνος νόμους ἐπολιτεύοντο. Plutarch states
-  the disfranchised as above 12,000.
-
-  Plutarch, Phokion, 28, 29. Ὅμως δ᾽ οὖν ὁ Φωκίων καὶ φυγῆς
-  ἀπήλλαξε πολλοὺς δεηθεὶς τοῦ Ἀντιπάτρου· καὶ φεύγουσι διεπράξατο,
-  μὴ καθάπερ οἱ λοιποὶ τῶν μεθισταμένων ὑπὲρ τὰ Κεραύνια ὄρη καὶ
-  τὸν Ταίναρον ἐκπεσεῖν τῆς Ἑλλάδος, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ κατοικεῖν,
-  ὧν ἦν καὶ Ἁγνωνίδης ὁ συκοφάντης.
-
-  Diodorus and Plutarch (c. 29) mention that Antipater assigned
-  residences in Thrace for the expatriated. Those who went beyond
-  the Keraunian mountains must have gone either to the Illyrian
-  coast, Apollonia or Epidamnus—or to the Gulf of Tarentum. Those
-  who went beyond Tænarus would probably be sent to Libya: see
-  Thucydides, vii. 19, 10; vii. 50, 2.
-
-It is deeply to be lamented that this important revolution, not
-only cutting down Athens to less than one-half of her citizen
-population, but involving a deportation fraught with individual
-hardship and suffering, is communicated to us only in two or three
-sentences of Plutarch and Diodorus, without any details from
-contemporary observers. It is called by Diodorus a return to the
-Solonian constitution; but the comparison disgraces the name of
-that admirable lawgiver, whose changes, taken as a whole, were
-prodigiously liberal and enfranchising, compared with what he found
-established. The deportation ordained by Antipater must indeed have
-brought upon the poor citizens of Athens a state of suffering in
-foreign lands analogous to that which Solon describes as having
-preceded his Seisachtheia, or measure for the relief of debtors.[771]
-What rules the nine thousand remaining citizens adopted for their
-new constitution, we do not know. Whatever they did, must now have
-been subject to the consent of Antipater and the Macedonian garrison,
-which entered Munychia, under the command of Menyllus, on the
-twentieth day of the month Boedromion (September), rather more than
-a month after the battle of Krannon. The day of its entry presented
-a sorrowful contrast. It was the day on which, during the annual
-ceremony of the mysteries of Eleusinian Demeter, the multitudinous
-festal procession of citizens escorted the god Iacchus from Athens to
-Eleusis.[772]
-
-  [771] Plutarch, Phokion, 28. ἐκπεπολιορκημένοις ἐῴκεσαν: compare
-  Solon, Fragment 28, ed. Gaisford.
-
-  [772] Plutarch, Phokion, 28.
-
-One of the earliest measures of the nine thousand was, to condemn to
-death, at the motion of Demades, the distinguished anti-Macedonian
-orators who had already fled—Demosthenes, Hyperides, Aristonikus, and
-Himeræus, brother of the citizen afterwards celebrated as Demetrius
-the Phalerean. The three last having taken refuge in Ægina, and
-Demosthenes in Kalauria, all of them were out of the reach of an
-Athenian sentence, but not beyond that of the Macedonian sword.
-At this miserable season, Greece was full of similar exiles, the
-anti-Macedonian leaders out of all the cities which had taken part in
-the Lamian war. The officers of Antipater, called in the language of
-the time the Exile-Hunters,[773] were everywhere on the look-out to
-seize these proscribed men; many of the orators, from other cities as
-well as from Athens, were slain; and there was no refuge except the
-mountains of Ætolia for any of them.[774] One of these officers, a
-Thurian named Archias, who had once been a tragic actor, passed over
-with a company of Thracian soldiers to Ægina, where he seized the
-three Athenian orators—Hyperides, Aristonikus, and Himeræus—dragging
-them out of the sanctuary of the Æakeion or chapel of Æakus. They
-were all sent as prisoners to Antipater, who had by this time marched
-forward with his army to Corinth and Kleonæ in Peloponnesus. All were
-there put to death, by his order. It is even said, and on respectable
-authority, that the tongue of Hyperides was cut out before he was
-slain; according to another statement, he himself bit it out—being
-put to the torture, and resolving to make revelation of secrets
-impossible. Respecting the details of his death, there were several
-different stories.[775]
-
-  [773] Plutarch, Demosth. 28. Ἀρχίας ὁ κληθεὶς Φυγαδοθήρας.
-  Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 846.
-
-  [774] Polybius, ix. 29, 30. This is stated, as matter of
-  traditional pride, by an Ætolian speaker more than a century
-  afterwards. In the speech of his Akarnanian opponent, there is
-  nothing to contradict it—while the fact is in itself highly
-  probable.
-
-  See Westermann, Geschichte der Beredtsamkeit in Griechenland, ch.
-  71, note 4.
-
-  [775] Plutarch, Demosth. 28; Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 849;
-  Photius, p. 496.
-
-Having conducted these prisoners to Antipater, Archias proceeded
-with his Thracians to Kalauria in search of Demosthenes. The temple
-of Poseidon there situated, in which the orator had taken sanctuary,
-was held in such high veneration, that Archias, hesitating to drag
-him out by force, tried to persuade him to come forth voluntarily,
-under promise that he should suffer no harm. But Demosthenes, well
-aware of the fate which awaited him, swallowed poison in the temple,
-and when the dose was beginning to take effect, came out of the
-sacred ground, expiring immediately after he had passed the boundary.
-The accompanying circumstances were recounted in several different
-ways.[776] Eratosthenes (to whose authority I lean) affirmed that
-Demosthenes carried the poison in a ring round his arm; others said
-that it was suspended in a linen bag round his neck; according to
-a third story, it was contained in a writing-quill, which he was
-seen to bite and suck, while composing a last letter to Antipater.
-Amidst these contradictory details, we can only affirm as certain,
-that the poison which he had provided beforehand preserved him from
-the sword of Antipater, and perhaps from having his tongue cut out.
-The most remarkable assertion was that of Demochares, nephew of
-Demosthenes, made in his harangues at Athens a few years afterwards.
-Demochares asserted that his uncle had not taken poison, but had
-been softly withdrawn from the world by a special providence of the
-gods, just at the moment essential to rescue him from the cruelty
-of the Macedonians. It is not less to be noted, as an illustration
-of the vein of sentiment afterwards prevalent, that Archias the
-Exile-Hunter was affirmed to have perished in the utmost dishonor and
-wretchedness.[777]
-
-  [776] Plutarch, Demosth. 30. τῶν δ᾽ ἄλλων, ὅσοι γεγράφασί τι
-  περὶ αὐτοῦ, ~παμπολλοὶ δ᾽ εἰσὶ~, τὰς διαφορὰς οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον
-  ἐπεξελθεῖν, etc.
-
-  The taunts on Archias’s profession, as an actor, and as an
-  indifferent actor, which Plutarch puts into the mouth of
-  Demosthenes (c. 29), appear to me not worthy either of the
-  man or of the occasion; nor are they sufficiently avouched to
-  induce me to transcribe them. Whatever bitterness of spirit
-  Demosthenes might choose to manifest, at such a moment, would
-  surely be vented on the chief enemy, Antipater; not upon the mere
-  instrument.
-
-  [777] Plutarch, Demosth. 30; Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 846;
-  Photius, p. 494; Arrian, De Rebus post Alexand. vi. ap. Photium,
-  Cod. 92.
-
-The violent deaths of these illustrious orators, the disfranchisement
-and deportation of the Athenian Demos, the suppression of the public
-Dikasteries, the occupation of Athens by a Macedonian garrison, and
-of Greece generally by Macedonian Exile-Hunters—are events belonging
-to one and the same calamitous tragedy, and marking the extinction
-of the autonomous hellenic world. Of Hyperides as a citizen we know
-only the general fact, that he maintained from first to last, and
-with oratorical ability inferior only to Demosthenes, a strenuous
-opposition to Macedonian dominion over Greece; though his prosecution
-of Demosthenes respecting the Harpalian treasure appears (as far as
-it comes before us) discreditable. Of Demosthenes we know more—enough
-to form a judgment of him both as citizen and statesman. At the time
-of his death he was about sixty-two years of age, and we have before
-us his first Philippic, delivered thirty years before (352-351 B.
-C.). We are thus sure, that even at that early day, he took
-a sagacious and provident measure of the danger which threatened
-Grecian liberty from the energy and encroachments of Philip. He
-impressed upon his countrymen this coming danger, at a time when the
-older and more influential politicians either could not or would not
-see it; he called aloud upon his fellow-citizens for personal service
-and pecuniary contributions, enforcing the call by all the artifices
-of consummate oratory, when such distasteful propositions only
-entailed unpopularity upon himself. At the period when Demosthenes
-first addressed these earnest appeals to his countrymen, long before
-the fall of Olynthus, the power of Philip, though formidable,
-might have been kept perfectly well within the limits of Macedonia
-and Thrace; and would probably have been so kept, had Demosthenes
-possessed in 351 B. C. as much public influence as he had
-acquired ten years afterwards, in 341 B. C.
-
-Throughout the whole career of Demosthenes as a public adviser, down
-to the battle of Chæroneia, we trace the same combination of earnest
-patriotism with wise and long-sighted policy. During the three years’
-war which ended with the battle of Chæroneia, the Athenians in the
-main followed his counsel; and disastrous as were the ultimate
-military results of that war, for which Demosthenes could not be
-responsible—its earlier periods were creditable and successful,
-its general scheme was the best that the case admitted, and its
-diplomatic management universally triumphant. But what invests the
-purposes and policy of Demosthenes with peculiar grandeur, is, that
-they were not simply Athenian, but in an eminent degree Panhellenic
-also. It was not Athens only that he sought to defend against Philip,
-but the whole hellenic world. In this he towers above the greatest
-of his predecessors for half a century before his birth—Perikles,
-Archidamus, Agesilaus, Epaminondas; whose policy was Athenian,
-Spartan, Theban, rather than hellenic. He carries us back to the time
-of the invasion of Xerxes and the generation immediately succeeding
-it, when the struggles and sufferings of the Athenians against Persia
-were consecrated by complete identity of interest with collective
-Greece. The sentiments to which Demosthenes appeals throughout his
-numerous orations, are those of the noblest and largest patriotism;
-trying to inflame the ancient Grecian sentiment, of an autonomous
-hellenic world, as the indispensable condition of a dignified and
-desirable existence[778]—but inculcating at the same time that these
-blessings could only be preserved by toil, self-sacrifice, devotion
-of fortune, and willingness to brave hard and steady personal service.
-
-  [778] Demosthenes, De Coronâ, p. 324. οὗτοι—τὴν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ τὸ
-  μηδένα ἔχειν δεσπότην αὑτῶν, ἃ τοῖς προτέροις Ἕλλησιν ὅροι τῶν
-  ἀγαθῶν ἦσαν καὶ κανόνες, ἀνατετραφότες, etc.
-
-From the destruction of Thebes by Alexander in 335 B. C.,
-to the Lamian war after his death, the policy of Athens neither was
-nor could be conducted by Demosthenes. But, condemned as he was to
-comparative inefficacy, he yet rendered material service to Athens,
-in the Harpalian affair of 324 B. C. If, instead of opposing
-the alliance of the city with Harpalus, he had supported it as warmly
-as Hyperides—the exaggerated promises of the exile might probably
-have prevailed, and war would have been declared against Alexander.
-In respect to the charge of having been corrupted by Harpalus, I
-have already shown reasons for believing him innocent. The Lamian
-war, the closing scene of his activity, was not of his original
-suggestion, since he was in exile at its commencement. But he threw
-himself into it with unreserved ardor, and was greatly instrumental
-in procuring the large number of adhesions which it obtained from
-so many Grecian states. In spite of its disastrous result, it was,
-like the battle of Chæroneia, a glorious effort for the recovery of
-Grecian liberty, undertaken under circumstances which promised a fair
-chance of success. There was no excessive rashness in calculating
-on distractions in the empire left by Alexander—on mutual hostility
-among the principal officers—and on the probability of having only
-to make head against Antipater and Macedonia, with little or no
-reinforcement from Asia. Disastrous as the enterprise ultimately
-proved, yet the risk was one fairly worth incurring, with so noble
-an object at stake; and could the war have been protracted another
-year, its termination would probably have been very different. We
-shall see this presently when we come to follow Asiatic events. After
-a catastrophe so ruinous, extinguishing free speech in Greece, and
-dispersing the Athenian Demos to distant lands, Demosthenes himself
-could hardly have desired, at the age of sixty-two, to prolong his
-existence as a fugitive beyond sea.
-
-Of the speeches which he composed for private litigants, occasionally
-also for himself, before the Dikastery—and of the numerous
-stimulating and admonitory harangues on the public affairs of the
-moment, which he had addressed to his assembled countrymen, a few
-remain for the admiration of posterity. These harangues serve to us,
-not only as evidence of his unrivalled excellence as an orator, but
-as one of the chief sources from which we are enabled to appreciate
-the last phase of free Grecian life, as an acting and working reality.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER XCVI.
-
-FROM THE LAMIAN WAR TO THE CLOSE OF THE HISTORY OF FREE HELLAS AND
-HELLENISM.
-
-
-The death of Demosthenes, with its tragical circumstances recounted
-in my last chapter, is on the whole less melancholy than the
-prolonged life of Phokion, as agent of Macedonian supremacy in a city
-half-depopulated, where he had been born a free citizen, and which he
-had so long helped to administer as a free community. The dishonor
-of Phokion’s position must have been aggravated by the distress in
-Athens, arising both out of the violent deportation of one-half of
-its free citizens, and out of the compulsory return of the Athenian
-settlers from Samos; which island was now taken from Athens, after
-she had occupied it forty-three years, and restored to the Samian
-people and to their recalled exiles, by a rescript of Perdikkas in
-the name of Aridæus.[779] Occupying this obnoxious elevation, Phokion
-exercised authority with his usual probity and mildness. Exerting
-himself to guard the citizens from being annoyed by disorders on the
-part of the garrison of Munychia, he kept up friendly intercourse
-with its commander Menyllus, though refusing all presents both
-from him and from Antipater. He was anxious to bestow the gift of
-citizenship upon the philosopher Xenokrates, who was only a metic, or
-resident non-freeman; but Xenokrates declined the offer, remarking,
-that he would accept no place in a constitution against which he had
-protested as envoy.[780] This mark of courageous independence, not a
-little remarkable while the Macedonians were masters of the city, was
-a tacit reproach to the pliant submission of Phokion.
-
-  [779] Diodor. xviii. 18; Diogen. Laert. x. 1, 1. I have
-  endeavored to show, in the Tenth Volume of this History (Ch.
-  lxxix. p. 297, note), that Diodorus is correct in giving
-  forty-three years, as the duration of the Athenian Kleruchies
-  in Samos; although both Wesseling and Mr. Clinton impugn his
-  statement. The Athenian occupation of Samos _began_ immediately
-  after the conquest of the island by Timotheus, in 366-365 B.
-  C.; but additional batches of colonists were sent thither in
-  later years.
-
-  [780] Plutarch, Phokion, 29, 30.
-
-Throughout Peloponnesus, Antipater purged and remodelled the cities,
-Argos, Megalopolis, and others, as he had done at Athens; installing
-in each an oligarchy of his own partisans—sometimes with a Macedonian
-garrison—and putting to death, deporting, or expelling, hostile, or
-intractable, or democratical citizens.[781] Having completed the
-subjugation of Peloponnesus, he passed across the Corinthian Gulf
-to attack the Ætolians, now the only Greeks remaining unsubdued. It
-was the purpose of Antipater, not merely to conquer this warlike and
-rude people, but to transport them in mass across into Asia, and
-march them up to the interior deserts of the empire.[782] His army
-was too powerful to be resisted on even ground, so that all the more
-accessible towns and villages fell into his hands. But the Ætolians
-defended themselves bravely, withdrew their families into the high
-towns and mountain tops of their very rugged country, and caused
-serious loss to the Macedonian invaders. Nevertheless, Kraterus,
-who had carried on war of the same kind with Alexander in Sogdiana,
-manifested so much skill in seizing the points of communication,
-that he intercepted all their supplies and reduced them to extreme
-distress, amidst the winter which had now supervened. The Ætolians,
-in spite of bravery and endurance, must soon have been compelled to
-surrender from cold and hunger, had not the unexpected arrival of
-Antigonus from Asia communicated such news to Antipater and Kraterus,
-as induced them to prepare for marching back to Macedonia, with a
-view to the crossing of the Hellespont and operating in Asia. They
-concluded a pacification with the Ætolians—postponing till a future
-period their design of deporting that people,—and withdrew into
-Macedonia; where Antipater cemented his alliance with Kraterus by
-giving to him his daughter Phila in marriage.[783]
-
-  [781] Diodor. xviii. 55, 56, 57, 68, 69. φανεροῦ δ᾽ ὄντος, ὅτι
-  Κάσανδρος τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα πόλεων ἀνθέξεται, διὰ τὸ τὰς μὲν
-  αὐτῶν πατρικαῖς φρουραῖς φυλάττεσθαι, τὰς δ᾽ ὑπ᾽ ὀλιγαρχιῶν
-  διοικεῖσθαι, κυριευομένας ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀντιπάτρου φίλων καὶ ξένων.
-
-  That citizens were not only banished, but deported, by Antipater
-  from various other cities besides Athens, we may see from the
-  edict issued by Polysperchon shortly after the death of Antipater
-  (Diod. xviii. 56)—καὶ τοὺς ~μεταστάντας ἢ φυγόντας~ ὑπὸ τῶν
-  ἡμετέρων στρατηγῶν (_i. e._ Antipater and Kraterus), ἀφ᾽ ὧν
-  χρόνων Ἀλέξανδρος εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν διέβη, κατάγομεν, etc.
-
-  [782] Diodor. xviii. 25. διεγνωκότες ὕστερον αὐτοὺς
-  καταπολεμῆσαι, καὶ ~μεταστῆσαι πανοικίους ἅπαντας~ εἰς τὴν
-  ἐρημίαν καὶ ποῤῥωτάτω τῆς Ἀσίας κειμένην χώραν.
-
-  [783] Diodor. xviii. 18-25.
-
-Another daughter of Antipater, named Nikæa, had been sent over to
-Asia not long before, to become the wife of Perdikkas. That general,
-acting as guardian or prime minister to the kings of Alexander’s
-family (who are now spoken of in the plural number, since Roxana had
-given birth to a posthumous son, called Alexander, and made king
-jointly with Philip Aridæus), had at first sought close combination
-with Antipater, demanding his daughter in marriage. But new views
-were presently opened to him by the intrigues of the princesses at
-Pella (Olympias, with her daughter Kleopatra, widow of the Molossian
-Alexander)—who had always been at variance with Antipater, even
-throughout the life of Alexander—and Kynanê (daughter of Philip by
-an Illyrian mother, and widow of Amyntas, first cousin of Alexander,
-but slain by Alexander’s order) with her daughter Eurydikê. It has
-been already mentioned that Kleopatra had offered herself in marriage
-to Leonnatus, inviting him to come over and occupy the throne of
-Macedonia: he had obeyed the call, but had been slain in his first
-battle against the Greeks, thus relieving Antipater from a dangerous
-rival. The first project of Olympias being thus frustrated, she
-had sent to Perdikkas proposing to him a marriage with Kleopatra.
-Perdikkas had already pledged himself to the daughter of Antipater;
-nevertheless he now debated whether his ambition would not be better
-served by breaking his pledge, and accepting the new proposition.
-To this step he was advised by Eumenes, his ablest friend and
-coadjutor, steadily attached to the interest of the regal family,
-and withal personally hated by Antipater. But Alketas, brother of
-Perdikkas, represented that it would be hazardous to provoke openly
-and immediately the wrath of Antipater. Accordingly Perdikkas
-resolved to accept Nikæa for the moment, but to send her away after
-no long time, and take Kleopatra; to whom secret assurances from him
-were conveyed by Eumenes. Kynanê also (daughter of Philip and widow
-of his nephew Amyntas) a warlike and ambitious woman, had brought
-into Asia her daughter Eurydikê for the purpose of espousing the
-king Philip Aridæus. Being averse to this marriage, and probably
-instigated by Olympias also, Perdikkas and Alketas put Kynanê to
-death. But the indignation excited among the soldiers by this deed
-was so furious as to menace their safety, and they were forced to
-permit the marriage of the king with Eurydikê.[784]
-
-  [784] Diodor. xviii. 23; Arrian, De Rebus post Alex. vi. ap.
-  Phot. Cod. 92. Diodorus alludes to the murder of Kynanê or Kynna,
-  in another place (xix. 52).
-
-  Compare Polyænus, viii. 60—who mentions the murder of Kynanê
-  by Alketas, but gives a somewhat different explanation of her
-  purpose in passing into Asia.
-
-  About Kynanê, see Duris, Fragm. 24, in Fragment. Hist. Græc. vol.
-  ii. p. 475; Athenæ. xiii. p. 560.
-
-All these intrigues were going on through the summer of 322 B.
-C., while the Lamian war was still effectively prosecuted
-by the Greeks. About the autumn of the year, Antigonus (called
-Monophthalmus), the satrap of Phrygia, detected these secret
-intrigues of Perdikkas; who, for that and other reasons, began to
-look on him as an enemy, and to plot against his life. Apprised
-of his danger, Antigonus made his escape from Asia into Europe
-to acquaint Antipater and Kraterus with the hostile manœuvres of
-Perdikkas; upon which news, the two generals, immediately abandoning
-the Ætolian war, withdrew their army from Greece for the more
-important object of counteracting Perdikkas in Asia.
-
-To us, these contests of the Macedonian officers belong only so far
-as they affect the Greeks. And we see, by the events just noticed,
-how unpropitious to the Greeks were the turns of Fortune, throughout
-the Lamian war: the grave of Grecian liberty, not for the actual
-combatants only, but for their posterity also.[785] Until the battle
-of Krannon and the surrender of Athens, everything fell out so as
-to relieve Antipater from embarrassment, and impart to him double
-force. The intrigues of the princesses at Pella, who were well known
-to hate him, first raised up Leonnatus, next Perdikkas, against him.
-Had Leonnatus lived, the arm of Antipater would have been at least
-weakened, if not paralyzed; had Perdikkas declared himself earlier,
-the forces of Antipater must have been withdrawn to oppose him, and
-the battle of Krannon would probably have had a different issue. As
-soon as Perdikkas became hostile to Antipater, it was his policy
-to sustain and seek alliance with the Greeks, as we shall find him
-presently doing with the Ætolians.[786] Through causes thus purely
-accidental, Antipater obtained an interval of a few months, during
-which his hands were not only free, but armed with new and unexpected
-strength from Leonnatus and Kraterus, to close the Lamian war. The
-disastrous issue of that war was therefore in great part the effect
-of casualties, among which we must include the death of Leosthenes
-himself. Such issue is not to be regarded as proving that the project
-was desperate or ill-conceived on the part of its promoters, who had
-full right to reckon, among the probabilities of their case, the
-effects of discord between the Macedonian chiefs.
-
-  [785] The fine lines of Lucan (Phars. vii. 640) on the effects of
-  the battle of Pharsalia, may be cited here:—
-
-    “Majus ab hac acie, quam quod sua sæcula ferrent,
-    Vulnus habent populi: plus est quam vita salusque
-    Quod perit: in totum mundi prosternimur ævum.
-    Vincitur his gladiis omnis, quæ serviet, ætas.
-    Proxima quid soboles, aut quid meruere nepotes,
-    In regnum nasci?” etc.
-
-  [786] Diodor. xviii. 38. Ἀντιπάτρου δ᾽ εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν
-  διαβεβηκότος, Αἰτωλοὶ ~κατὰ τὰς πρὸς Περδίκκαν συνθήκας~
-  ἐστράτευσαν εἰς τὴν Θετταλίαν, etc.
-
-In the spring of 321 B. C., Antipater and Kraterus, having
-concerted operations with Ptolemy governor of Egypt, crossed into
-Asia, and began their conflict with Perdikkas; who himself, having
-the kings along with him, marched against Egypt to attack Ptolemy;
-leaving his brother Alketas, in conjunction with Eumenes as general,
-to maintain his cause in Kappadokia and Asia Minor. Alketas,
-discouraged by the adverse feeling of the Macedonians generally,
-threw up the enterprise as hopeless. But Eumenes, though embarrassed
-and menaced in every way by the treacherous jealousy of his own
-Macedonian officers, and by the discontent of the soldiers against
-him as a Greek—and though compelled to conceal from these soldiers
-the fact that Kraterus, who was popular among them, commanded on the
-opposite side,—displayed nevertheless so much ability that he gained
-an important victory,[787] in which both Neoptolemus and Kraterus
-perished. Neoptolemus was killed by Eumenes with his own hand, after
-a personal conflict desperate in the extreme and long doubtful, and
-at the cost of a severe wound to himself.[788] After the victory, he
-found Kraterus still alive, though expiring from his wound. Deeply
-afflicted at the sight, he did his utmost to restore the dying man;
-and when this proved to be impossible, caused his dead body to be
-honorably shrouded and transmitted into Macedonia for burial.
-
-  [787] Plutarch, Eumenes, 7; Cornel. Nepos, Eumenes, c. 4. Eumenes
-  had trained a body of Asiatic and Thracian cavalry to fight in
-  close combat with the short pike and sword of the Macedonian
-  Companions—relinquishing the javelin, the missiles, and the
-  alternation of charging and retiring usual to Asiatics.
-
-  Diodorus (xviii. 30, 31, 32) gives an account at some length of
-  this battle. He as well as Plutarch may probably have borrowed
-  from Hieronymus of Kardia.
-
-  [788] Arrian ap. Photium, Cod. 92; Justin, xiii. 8; Diodor.
-  xviii. 33.
-
-This new proof of the military ability and vigor of Eumenes, together
-with the death of two such important officers as Kraterus and
-Neoptolemus—proved ruinous to the victor himself, without serving
-the cause in which he fought. Perdikkas his chief did not live to
-hear of it. That general was so overbearing and tyrannical in his
-demeanor towards the other officers—and withal so unsuccessful in
-his first operations against Ptolemy on the Pelusiac branch of the
-Nile—that his own army mutinied and slew him.[789] His troops joined
-Ptolemy, whose conciliatory behavior gained their goodwill. Only
-two days after this revolution, a messenger from Eumenes reached
-the camp, announcing his victory and the death of Kraterus. Had
-this intelligence been received by Perdikkas himself at the head of
-his army, the course of subsequent events might have been sensibly
-altered. Eumenes would have occupied the most commanding position
-in Asia, as general of the kings of the Alexandrine family, to whom
-both his interests and his feelings attached him. But the news,
-arriving at the moment when it did, caused throughout the army only
-the most violent exasperation against him; not simply as ally of the
-odious Perdikkas, but as cause of death to the esteemed Kraterus. He,
-together with Alketas and fifty officers, was voted by the soldiers
-a public enemy. No measures were kept with him henceforward by
-Macedonian officers or soldiers. At the same time several officers
-attached to Perdikkas in the camp, and also Atalanta his sister, were
-slain.[790]
-
-  [789] Diodor. xviii. 36.
-
-  [790] Plutarch, Eumenes, 8; Cornel. Nepos, Eumenes, 4; Diodor.
-  xviii. 36, 37.
-
-By the death of Perdikkas, and the defection of his soldiers,
-complete preponderance was thrown into the hands of Antipater,
-Ptolemy, and Antigonus. Antipater was invited to join the army,
-now consisting of the forces both of Ptolemy and Perdikkas united.
-He was there invested with the guardianship of the persons of the
-kings, and with the sort of ministerial supremacy previously held by
-Perdikkas. He was however exposed to much difficulty, and even to
-great personal danger, from the intrigues of the princess Eurydikê,
-who displayed a masculine boldness in publicly haranguing the
-soldiers—and from the discontents of the army, who claimed presents,
-formerly promised to them by Alexander, which there were no funds
-to liquidate at the moment. At Triparadisus in Syria, Antipater
-made a second distribution of the satrapies of the empire; somewhat
-modified, yet coinciding in the main with that which had been drawn
-up shortly after the death of Alexander. To Ptolemy was assured Egypt
-and Libya,—to Antigonus, the Greater Phrygia, Lykia, and Pamphylia—as
-each had had before.[791]
-
-  [791] Diodor. xviii. 39. Arrian, ap. Photium.
-
-Antigonus was placed in command of the principal Macedonian army in
-Asia, to crush Eumenes and the other chief adherents of Perdikkas;
-most of whom had been condemned to death by a vote of the Macedonian
-army. After a certain interval, Antipater himself, accompanied by the
-kings, returned to Macedonia, having eluded by artifice a renewed
-demand on the part of his soldiers for the promised presents. The
-war of Antigonus, first against Eumenes in Kappadokia, next against
-Alketas and the other partisans of Perdikkas in Pisidia, lasted
-for many months, but was at length successfully finished.[792]
-Eumenes, beset by the constant treachery and insubordination of the
-Macedonians, was defeated and driven out of the field. He took refuge
-with a handful of men in the impregnable and well-stored fortress of
-Nora in Kappadokia, where he held out a long blockade, apparently
-more than a year, against Antigonus.[793]
-
-  [792] Arrian, De Rebus post Alexandr. lib. ix. 10. ap. Photium,
-  Cod. 92; Diodor. xviii. 39, 40, 46; Plutarch, Eumenes, 3, 4.
-
-  [793] Plutarch, Eumenes, 10, 11; Cornel. Nepos, Eumenes, c. 5;
-  Diodor. xviii. 41.
-
-Before the prolonged blockade of Nora had been brought to a close,
-Antipater, being of very advanced age, fell into sickness, and
-presently died. One of his latest acts was, to put to death the
-Athenian orator Demades, who had been sent to Macedonia as envoy to
-solicit the removal of the Macedonian garrison at Munychia. Antipater
-had promised, or given hopes, that if the oligarchy which he had
-constituted at Athens maintained unshaken adherence to Macedonia, he
-would withdraw the garrison. The Athenians endeavored to prevail on
-Phokion to go to Macedonia as solicitor for the fulfilment of this
-promise; but he steadily refused. Demades, who willingly undertook
-the mission, reached Macedonia at a moment very untoward for himself.
-The papers of the deceased Perdikkas had come into possession of his
-opponents; and among them had been found a letter written to him
-by Demades, inviting him to cross over and rescue Greece from her
-dependence “on an old and rotten warp”—meaning Antipater. This letter
-gave great offence to Antipater—the rather, as Demades is said to
-have been his habitual pensioner—and still greater offence to his son
-Kassander; who caused Demades with his son to be seized—first killed
-the son in the immediate presence and even embrace of the father—and
-then slew the father himself, with bitter invective against his
-ingratitude.[794] All the accounts which we read depict Demades, in
-general terms, as a prodigal spendthrift and a venal and corrupt
-politician. We have no ground for questioning this statement: at the
-same time, we have no specific facts to prove it.
-
-  [794] Plutarch, Phokion, 30; Diodor. xviii. 48; Plutarch,
-  Demosth. 31; Arrian, De Reb. post Alex. vi. ap. Photium, Cod. 92.
-
-  In the life of Phokion, Plutarch has written inadvertently
-  _Antigonus_ instead of _Perdikkas_.
-
-  It is not easy to see, however, how Deinarchus can have been the
-  accuser of Demades on such a matter—as Arrian and Plutarch state.
-  Arrian seems to put the death of Demades too early, from his
-  anxiety to bring it into immediate juxtaposition with the death
-  of Demosthenes, whose condemnation Demades had proposed in the
-  Athenian assembly.
-
-Antipater by his last directions appointed Polysperchon, one of
-Alexander’s veteran officers, to be chief administrator, with full
-powers on behalf of the imperial dynasty; while he assigned to his
-own son Kassander only the second place, as Chiliarch, or general of
-the body-guard.[795] He thought that this disposition of power would
-be more generally acceptable throughout the empire, as Polysperchon
-was older and of longer military service than any other among
-Alexander’s generals. Moreover, Antipater was especially afraid of
-letting dominion fall into the hands of the princesses;[796] all of
-whom—Olympias, Kleopatra, and Eurydikê—were energetic characters; and
-the first of the three (who had retired to Epirus from enmity towards
-Antipater) furious and implacable.
-
-  [795] Diod. xviii. 48.
-
-  [796] Diod. xix. 11.
-
-But the views of Antipater were disappointed from the beginning,
-because Kassander would not submit to the second place, nor tolerate
-Polysperchon as his superior. Immediately after the death of
-Antipater, but before it became publicly known, Kassander despatched
-Nikanor with pretended orders from Antipater to supersede Menyllus
-in the government of Munychia. To this order Menyllus yielded. But
-when after a few days the Athenian public came to learn the real
-truth, they were displeased with Phokion for having permitted the
-change to be made—assuming that he knew the real state of the facts,
-and might have kept out the new commander.[797] Kassander, while
-securing this important post in the hands of a confirmed partisan,
-affected to acquiesce in the authority of Polysperchon, and to
-occupy himself with a hunting-party in the country. He at the same
-time sent confidential adherents to the Hellespont and other places
-in furtherance of his schemes; and especially to contract alliance
-with Antigonus in Asia and with Ptolemy in Egypt. His envoys being
-generally well received, he himself soon quitted Macedonia suddenly,
-and went to concert measures with Antigonus in Asia.[798] It suited
-the policy of Ptolemy, and still more that of Antigonus, to aid
-him against Polysperchon and the imperial dynasty. On the death of
-Antipater, Antigonus had resolved to make himself the real sovereign
-of the Asiatic Alexandrine empire, possessing as he did the most
-powerful military force within it.
-
-  [797] Plutarch, Phokion, 31. Diodorus (xviii. 64) says also that
-  Nikanor was nominated by Kassander.
-
-  [798] Diodor. xviii. 54.
-
-Even before this time the imperial dynasty had been a name rather
-than a reality; yet still a respected name. But now, the preference
-shown to Polysperchon by the deceased Antipater, and the secession
-of Kassander, placed all the real great powers in active hostility
-against the dynasty. Polysperchon and his friends were not blind
-to the difficulties of their position. The principal officers in
-Macedonia having been convened to deliberate, it was resolved to
-invite Olympias out of Epirus, that she might assume the tutelage of
-her grandson Alexander (son of Roxana)—to place the Asiatic interests
-of the dynasty in the hands of Eumenes, appointing him to the
-supreme command[799]—and to combat Kassander in Europe, by assuring
-to themselves the general goodwill and support of the Greeks. This
-last object was to be obtained by granting to the Greeks general
-enfranchisement, and by subverting the Antipatrian oligarchies and
-military governments now paramount throughout the cities.
-
-  [799] Diodor. xviii. 49-58.
-
-The last hope of maintaining the unity of Alexander’s empire in Asia,
-against the counter-interests of the great Macedonian officers, who
-were steadily tending to divide and appropriate it—now lay in the
-fidelity and military skill of Eumenes. At his disposal Polysperchon
-placed the imperial treasures and soldiers in Asia; especially
-the brave, but faithless and disorderly, Argyraspides. Olympias
-also addressed to him a pathetic letter, asking his counsel as the
-only friend and savior to whom the imperial family could now look.
-Eumenes replied by assuring them of his devoted adherence to their
-cause. But he at the same time advised Olympias not to come out of
-Epirus into Macedonia; or if she did come, at all events to abstain
-from vindictive and cruel proceedings. Both these recommendations,
-honorable as well to his prudence as to his humanity, were
-disregarded by the old queen. She came into Macedonia to take the
-management of affairs; and although her imposing title, of mother
-to the great conqueror, raised a strong favorable feeling, yet her
-multiplied executions of the Antipatrian partisans excited fatal
-enmity against a dynasty already tottering. Nevertheless Eumenes,
-though his advice had been disregarded, devoted himself in Asia with
-unshaken fidelity to the Alexandrine family, resisting the most
-tempting invitations to take part with Antigonus against them.[800]
-His example contributed much to keep alive the same active sentiment
-in those around him; indeed, without him, the imperial family would
-have had no sincere or commanding representative in Asia. His gallant
-struggles, first in Kilikia and Phenicia, next (when driven from the
-coast), in Susiana, Persis, Media, and Parætakênê—continued for two
-years against the greatly preponderant forces of Ptolemy, Antigonus,
-and Seleukus, and against the never-ceasing treachery of his own
-officers and troops[801]—do not belong to Grecian history. They
-are however among the most memorable exploits of antiquity. While
-even in a military point of view, they are hardly inferior to the
-combinations of Alexander himself—they evince, besides, a flexibility
-and aptitude such as Alexander neither possessed nor required, for
-overcoming the thousand difficulties raised by traitors and mutineers
-around him. To the last, Eumenes remained unsubdued; he was betrayed
-to Antigonus by the base and venal treachery of his own soldiers, the
-Macedonian Argyraspides.[802]
-
-  [800] Plutarch, Eumenes, 11, 12; Cornelius Nepos, Eumenes, c. 6;
-  Diodor. xviii. 58-62.
-
-  Diodor. xviii, 58. ἧκε δὲ καὶ παρ᾽ Ὀλυμπιάδος αὐτῷ γράμματα,
-  δεομένης καὶ λιπαρούσης βοηθεῖν τοῖς βασιλεῦσι καὶ ἑαυτῇ· μόνον
-  γὰρ ἐκεῖνον πιστότατον ἀπολελεῖφθαι τῶν φίλων, καὶ δυνάμενον
-  διορθώσασθαι τὴν ἐρημίαν τῆς βασιλικῆς οἰκίας.
-
-  Cornelius Nepos, Eumenes, 6. “Ad hunc (Eumenem) Olympias,
-  quum literas et nuntios misisset in Asiam, consultum, utrum
-  repetitum Macedoniam veniret (nam tum in Epiro habitabat) et
-  eas res occuparet—huic ille primum suasit ne se moveret, et
-  expectaret quoad Alexandri filius regnum adipisceretur. Sin
-  aliquâ cupiditate raperetur in Macedoniam, omnium injuriarum
-  oblivisceretur, et in neminem acerbiore uteretur imperio. Horum
-  illa nihil fecit. Nam et in Macedoniam profecta est, et ibi
-  crudelissime se gessit.” Compare Justin, xiv. 6; Diodor. xix. 11.
-
-  The details respecting Eumenes may be considered probably as
-  depending on unusually good authority. His friend Hieronymus of
-  Kardia had written a copious history of his own time; which,
-  though now lost, was accessible both to Diodorus and Plutarch.
-  Hieronymus was serving with Eumenes, and was taken prisoner along
-  with him by Antigonus; who spared him and treated him well, while
-  Eumenes was put to death (Diodor. xix. 44). Plutarch had also
-  read letters of Eumenes (Plut. Eum. 11).
-
-  [801] Diodor. xviii. 63-72; xix. 11, 17, 32, 44.
-
-  [802] Plutarch (Eumenes, 16-18), Cornelius Nepos (10-13), and
-  Justin (xiv. 3, 4) describe in considerable detail the touching
-  circumstances attending the tradition and capture of Eumenes. On
-  this point Diodorus is more brief; but he recounts at much length
-  the preceding military operations between Eumenes and Antigonus
-  (xix. 17, 32, 44).
-
-  The original source of these particulars must probably be, the
-  history of Hieronymus of Kardia, himself present, and copied,
-  more or less accurately, by others.
-
-For the interests of the imperial dynasty (the extinction of which
-we shall presently follow), it is perhaps to be regretted that
-they did not abandon Asia at once, at the death of Antipater, and
-concentrate their attention on Macedonia alone, summoning over
-Eumenes to aid them. To keep together in unity the vast aggregate of
-Asia was manifestly impracticable, even with his consummate ability.
-Indeed, we read that Olympias wished for his presence in Europe, not
-trusting any one but him as protector of the child Alexander.[803]
-In Macedonia, apart from Asia, Eumenes, if the violent temper of
-Olympias had permitted him, might have upheld the dynasty; which,
-having at that time a decided interest in conciliating the Greeks,
-might probably have sanctioned his sympathies in favor of free
-Hellenic community.[804]
-
-  [803] Plutarch, Eumenes, 13; Diodor. xviii. 58.
-
-  [804] Plutarch, Eumenes, 3.
-
-On learning the death of Antipater, most of the Greek cities had
-sent envoys to Pella.[805] To all the governments of these cities,
-composed as they were of his creatures, it was a matter of the utmost
-moment to know what course the new Macedonian authority would adopt.
-Polysperchon, persuaded that they would all adhere to Kassander, and
-that his only chance of combating that rival was by enlisting popular
-sympathy and interests in Greece, or at least by subverting these
-Antipatrian oligarchies—drew up in conjunction with his counsellors a
-proclamation which he issued in the name of the dynasty.
-
-  [805] Diodor. xviii. 55. εὐθὺς οὖν τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων παρόντας
-  πρεσβευτὰς προσκαλεσάμενοι, etc.
-
-After reciting the steady goodwill of Philip and Alexander towards
-Greece, he affirmed that this feeling had been interrupted by the
-untoward Lamian war, originating with some ill-judged Greeks, and
-ending in the infliction of many severe calamities upon the various
-cities. But all these severities (he continued) had proceeded from
-the generals (Antipater and Kraterus): the kings had now determined
-to redress them. It was accordingly proclaimed that the political
-constitution of each city should be restored, as it had stood in
-the times of Philip and Alexander; that before the thirtieth of the
-month Xanthikus, all those who had been condemned to banishment, or
-deported, by the generals, should be recalled and received back; that
-their properties should be restored, and past sentences against them
-rescinded; that they should live in amnesty as to the past, and good
-feeling as to the future, with the remaining citizens. From this act
-of recall were excluded, the exiles of Amphissa, Trikka, Pharkadon,
-and Herakleia, together with a certain number of Megalopolitans,
-implicated in one particular conspiracy. In the particular case of
-those cities, the governments of which had been denounced as hostile
-by Philip or Alexander, special reference and consultation was opened
-with Pella, for some modification to meet the circumstances. As to
-Athens, it was decreed that Samos should be restored to her, but not
-Orôpus; in all other respects, she was placed on the same footing as
-in the days of Philip and Alexander. “All the Greeks (concluded this
-proclamation) shall pass decrees, forbidding every one either to bear
-arms or otherwise act in hostility against us—on pain of exile and
-confiscation of goods, for himself and his family. On this and on all
-other matters, we have ordered Polysperchon to take proper measures.
-Obey him—as we have before written you to do; for we shall not omit
-to notice those who on any point disregard our proclamation.”[806]
-
-  [806] Diodor. xviii. 56. In this chapter the proclamation is
-  given _verbatim_. For the exceptions made in respect to Amphissa,
-  Trikka, Herakleia, etc., we do not know the grounds.
-
-  Reference is made to prior edicts of the kings—ὑμεῖς οὖν, καθάπερ
-  ὑμῖν καὶ πρότερον ἐγράψαμεν, ἀκούετε τούτου (Πολυσπέρχοντος).
-  These words must allude to written answers given to particular
-  cities, in reply to special applications. No general
-  proclamation, earlier than this, can have been issued since the
-  death of Antipater.
-
-Such was the new edict issued by the kings, or rather by Polysperchon
-in their names. It directed the removal of all the garrisons, and the
-subversion of all the oligarchies, established by Antipater after
-the Lamian war. It ordered the recall of the host of exiles then
-expelled. It revived the state of things prevalent before the death
-of Alexander—which indeed itself had been, for the most part, an
-aggregate of macedonizing oligarchies interspersed with Macedonian
-garrisons. To the existing Antipatrian oligarchies, however, it was
-a deathblow; and so it must have been understood by the Grecian
-envoys—including probably deputations from the exiles, as well as
-envoys from the civic governments—to whom Polysperchon delivered it
-at Pella. Not content with the general edict, Polysperchon addressed
-special letters to Argos and various other cities, commanding that
-the Antipatrian leading men should be banished with confiscation
-of property, and in some cases put to death;[807] the names being
-probably furnished to him by the exiles. Lastly, as it was clear that
-such stringent measures could not be executed without force,—the
-rather as these oligarchies would be upheld by Kassander from
-without—Polysperchon resolved to conduct a large military force into
-Greece; sending thither first, however, a considerable detachment,
-for immediate operations, under his son Alexander.
-
-  [807] Diodor. xviii. 57.
-
-To Athens, as well as to other cities, Polysperchon addressed
-special letters, promising restoration of the democracy and recall
-of the exiles. At Athens, such change was a greater revolution than
-elsewhere, because the multitude of exiles and persons deported had
-been the greatest. To the existing nine thousand Athenian citizens,
-it was doubtless odious and alarming; while to Phokion with the other
-leading Antipatrians, it threatened not only loss of power, but
-probably nothing less than the alternative of flight or death.[808]
-The state of interests at Athens, however, was now singularly novel
-and complicated. There were the Antipatrians and the nine thousand
-qualified citizens. There were the exiles, who, under the new edict,
-speedily began re-entering the city, and reclaiming their citizenship
-as well as their properties. Polysperchon and his son were known to
-be soon coming with a powerful force. Lastly, there was Nikanor, who
-held Munychia with a garrison, neither for Polysperchon, nor for the
-Athenians, but for Kassander; the latter being himself also expected
-with a force from Asia. Here then were several parties; each distinct
-in views and interests from the rest—some decidedly hostile to each
-other.
-
-  [808] Plutarch, Phokion, 32. The opinion of Plutarch, however,
-  that Polysperchon intended this measure as a mere trick to ruin
-  Phokion, is only correct so far—that Polysperchon wished to put
-  down the Antipatrian oligarchies everywhere, and that Phokion was
-  the leading person of that oligarchy at Athens.
-
-The first contest arose between the Athenians and Nikanor respecting
-Munychia; which they required him to evacuate, pursuant to the
-recent proclamation. Nikanor on his side returned an evasive answer,
-promising compliance as soon as circumstances permitted, but in the
-mean time entreating the Athenians to continue in alliance with
-Kassander, as they had been with his father Antipater.[809] He
-seems to have indulged hopes of prevailing on them to declare in
-his favor—and not without plausible grounds, since the Antipatrian
-leaders and a proportion of the nine thousand citizens could not but
-dread the execution of Polysperchon’s edict. And he had also what
-was of still greater moment—the secret connivance and support of
-Phokion: who put himself in intimate relation with Nikanor, as he had
-before done with Menyllus[810]—and who had greater reason than any
-one else to dread the edict of Polysperchon. At a public assembly
-held in Peiræus to discuss the subject, Nikanor even ventured to
-present himself in person, in the company and under the introduction
-of Phokion, who was anxious that the Athenians should entertain the
-proposition of alliance with Kassander. But with the people, the
-prominent wish was to get rid altogether of the foreign garrison,
-and to procure the evacuation of Munychia—for which object, of
-course, the returned exiles would be even more anxious than the nine
-thousand. Accordingly, the assembly refused to hear any propositions
-from Nikanor; while Derkyllus with others even proposed to seize his
-person. It was Phokion who ensured to him the means of escaping;
-even in spite of serious wrath from his fellow-citizens, to whom he
-pleaded, that he had made himself guarantee for Nikanor’s personal
-safety.[811]
-
-  [809] Diodor. xviii. 64.
-
-  [810] Plutarch, Phokion, 31.
-
-  [811] Plutarch, Phokion, 32.
-
-Foreseeing the gravity of the impending contest, Nikanor had been
-secretly introducing fresh soldiers into Munychia. And when he found
-that he could not obtain any declared support from the Athenians,
-he laid a scheme for surprising and occupying the town and harbor
-of Peiræus, of which Munychia formed the adjoining eminence and
-harbor, on the southern side of the little peninsula. Notwithstanding
-all his precautions, it became known to various Athenians that he
-was tampering with persons in Peiræus, and collecting troops in
-the neighboring isle of Salamis. So much anxiety was expressed in
-the Athenian assembly for the safety of Peiræus, that a decree
-was passed, enjoining all citizens to hold themselves in arms for
-its protection, under Phokion as general. Nevertheless Phokion,
-disregarding such a decree, took no precautions, affirming that he
-would himself be answerable for Nikanor. Presently that officer,
-making an unexpected attack from Munychia and Salamis, took Peiræus
-by surprise, placed both the town and harbor under military
-occupation, and cut off its communication with Athens by a ditch and
-palisade. On this palpable aggression, the Athenians rushed to arms.
-But Phokion as general damped their ardor, and even declined to head
-them in an attack for the recovery of Peiræus before Nikanor should
-have had time to strengthen himself in it. He went however, with
-Konon (son of Timotheus), to remonstrate with Nikanor, and to renew
-the demand that he should evacuate, under the recent proclamation,
-all the posts which he held in garrison. But Nikanor would give no
-other answer, except that he held his commission from Kassander, to
-whom they must address their application.[812] He thus again tried to
-bring Athens into communication with Kassander.
-
-  [812] Diodor. xviii. 64; Plutarch, Phokion, 32; Cornelius Nepos,
-  Phokion, 2.
-
-The occupation of Peiræus in addition to Munychia was a serious
-calamity to the Athenians, making them worse off than they had
-been even under Antipater. Peiræus, rich, active, and commercial,
-containing the Athenian arsenal, docks, and muniments of war, was
-in many respects more valuable than Athens itself; for all purposes
-of war, far more valuable. Kassander had now an excellent place of
-arms and base, which Munychia alone would not have afforded, for his
-operations in Greece against Polysperchon; upon whom therefore the
-loss fell hardly less severely than upon the Athenians. Now Phokion,
-in his function as general, had been forewarned of the danger, might
-have guarded against it, and ought to have done so. This was a grave
-dereliction of duty, and admits of hardly any other explanation
-except that of treasonable connivance. It seems that Phokion,
-foreseeing his own ruin and that of his friends in the triumph of
-Polysperchon and the return of the exiles, was desirous of favoring
-the seizure of Peiræus by Nikanor, as a means of constraining Athens
-to adopt the alliance with Kassander; which alliance indeed would
-probably have been brought about, had Kassander reached Peiræus by
-sea sooner than the first troops of Polysperchon by land. Phokion was
-here guilty, at the very least, of culpable neglect, and probably of
-still more culpable treason, on an occasion seriously injuring both
-Polysperchon and the Athenians; a fact which we must not forget, when
-we come to read presently the bitter animosity exhibited against
-him.[813]
-
-  [813] Cornelius Nepos, Phokion, 2. “Concidit autem maxime uno
-  crimine: quod cum apud eum summum esset imperium populi, et
-  Nicanorem, Cassandri præfectum, insidiari Piræo Atheniensium,
-  a Dercyllo moneretur: idemque postularet, ut provideret, ne
-  commeatibus civitas privaretur—huic, audiente populo, Phocion
-  negavit esse periculam, seque ejus rei obsidem fore pollicitus
-  est. Neque ita multo post Nicanor Piræo est potitus. Ad quem
-  recuperandum cum populus armatus concurrisset, ille non modo
-  neminem ad arma vocavit, sed ne armatis quidem præsse voluit,
-  sine qua Athenæ omnino esse non possunt.”
-
-The news, that Nikanor had possessed himself of Peiræus, produced
-a strong sensation. Presently arrived a letter addressed to him
-by Olympias herself, commanding him to surrender the place to the
-Athenians, upon whom she wished to confer entire autonomy. But
-Nikanor declined obedience to her order, still waiting for support
-from Kassander. The arrival of Alexander (Polysperchon’s son) with a
-body of troops, encouraged the Athenians to believe that he was come
-to assist in carrying Peiræus by force, for the purpose of restoring
-it to them. Their hopes, however, were again disappointed. Though
-encamped near Peiræus, Alexander made no demand for the Athenian
-forces to co-operate with him in attacking it; but entered into
-open parley with Nikanor, whom he endeavored to persuade or corrupt
-into surrendering the place.[814] When this negotiation failed, he
-resolved to wait for the arrival of his father, who was already on
-his march towards Attica with the main army. His own force unassisted
-was probably not sufficient to attack Peiræus; nor did he choose to
-invoke assistance from the Athenians, to whom he would then have been
-compelled to make over the place when taken, which they so ardently
-desired. The Athenians were thus as far from their object as ever;
-moreover, by this delay the opportunity of attacking the place was
-altogether thrown away; for Kassander with his armament reached it
-before Polysperchon.
-
-  [814] Diodor. xviii. 65; Plutarch, Phokion, 33.
-
-It was Phokion and his immediate colleagues who induced Alexander
-to adopt this insidious policy; to decline reconquering Peiræus for
-the Athenians, and to appropriate it for himself. To Phokion, the
-reconstitution of autonomous Athens, with its democracy and restored
-exiles, and without any foreign controlling force—was an assured
-sentence of banishment, if not of death. Not having been able to
-obtain protection from the foreign force of Nikanor and Kassander,
-he and his friends resolved to throw themselves upon that of
-Alexander and Polysperchon. They went to meet Alexander as he entered
-Attica—represented the impolicy of his relinquishing so important a
-military position as Peiræus, while the war was yet unfinished,—and
-offered to co-operate with him for this purpose, by proper management
-of the Athenian public. Alexander was pleased with these suggestions,
-accepted Phokion with the others as his leading adherents at Athens,
-and looked upon Peiræus as a capture to be secured for himself.[815]
-Numerous returning Athenian exiles accompanied Alexander’s army.
-It seems that Phokion was desirous of admitting the troops, along
-with the exiles, as friends and allies into the walls of Athens,
-so as to make Alexander master of the city—but that this project
-was impracticable in consequence of the mistrust created among the
-Athenians by the parleys of Alexander with Nikanor.[816]
-
-  [815] Diodor. xviii. 65. Τῶν γὰρ Ἀντιπάτρῳ γεγονότων φίλων τινὲς
-  (ὑπῆρχον) καὶ ~οἱ περὶ Φωκίωνα φοβούμενοι τὰς ἐκ τῶν νόμων
-  τιμωρίας~, ὑπήντησαν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, καὶ διδάξαντες τὸ συμφέρον,
-  ἔπεισαν αὐτὸν ἰδίᾳ κατέχειν τὰ φρούρια, καὶ μὴ παραδιδόναι τοῖς
-  Ἀθηναίοις, μέχρις ἂν ὁ Κάσσανδρος καταπολεμήθῃ.
-
-  [816] Plutarch, Phokion, 33; Diod. xviii. 65. 66. This seems
-  to me the probable sequence of facts, combining Plutarch with
-  Diodorus. Plutarch takes no notice of the negotiation opened
-  by Phokion with Alexander, and the understanding established
-  between them; which is stated in the clearest manner by
-  Diodorus, and appears to me a material circumstance. On the
-  other hand, Plutarch mentions (though Diodorus does not) that
-  Alexander was anxious to seize Athens itself, and was very near
-  succeeding. Plutarch seems to conceive that it was the exiles
-  who were disposed to let him in; but if that had been the case,
-  he probably would have been let in when the exiles became
-  preponderant. It was Phokion, I conceive, who was desirous, for
-  his own personal safety, of admitting the foreign troops.
-
-The strategic function of Phokion, however, so often conferred
-and re-conferred upon him—and his power of doing either good or
-evil—now approached its close. As soon as the returning exiles
-found themselves in sufficient numbers, they called for a revision
-of the list of state-officers, and for the re-establishment of
-the democratical forms. They passed a vote to depose those who
-had held office under the Antipatrian oligarchy and who still
-continued to hold it down to the actual moment. Among these Phokion
-stood first: along with him were his son-in-law Charikles, the
-Phalerean Demetrius, Kallimedon, Nikokles, Thudippus, Hegemon, and
-Philokles. These persons were not only deposed, but condemned,
-some to death, some to banishment and confiscation of property.
-Demetrius, Charikles, and Kallimedon sought safety by leaving
-Attica; but Phokion and the rest merely went to Alexander’s camp,
-throwing themselves upon his protection on the faith of the recent
-understanding.[817] Alexander not only received them courteously,
-but gave them letters to his father Polysperchon, requesting safety
-and protection for them, as men who had embraced his cause, and who
-were still eager to do all in their power to support him.[818] Armed
-with these letters, Phokion and his companions went through Bœotia
-and Phokis to meet Polysperchon on his march southward. They were
-accompanied by Deinarchus and by a Platæan named Solon, both of them
-passing for friends of Polysperchon.[819]
-
-  [817] Diodor. xviii. 65; Plutarch, Phokion, 35.
-
-  [818] Diodor. xviii. 66. Προσδεχθέντες δὲ ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ (Alexander)
-  φιλοφρόνως, γράμματα ἔλαβον πρὸς τὸν πατέρα Πολυσπέρχοντα, ὅπως
-  μηδὲν πάθωσιν οἱ περὶ Φωκίωνα ~τἀκείνου πεφρονηκότες, καὶ νῦν
-  ἐπαγγελλόμενοι πάντα συμπράξειν~.
-
-  This application of Phokion to Alexander, and the letters
-  obtained to Polysperchon, are not mentioned by Plutarch, though
-  they are important circumstances in following the last days of
-  Phokion’s life.
-
-  [819] Plutarch, Phokion, 33.
-
-The Athenian democracy, just reconstituted, which had passed the
-recent condemnatory votes, was disquieted at the news that Alexander
-had espoused the cause of Phokion and had recommended the like policy
-to his father. It was possible that Polysperchon might seek, with
-his powerful army, both to occupy Athens and to capture Peiræus,
-and might avail himself of Phokion (like Antipater after the Lamian
-war) as a convenient instrument of government. It seems plain that
-this was the project of Alexander, and that he counted on Phokion
-as a ready auxiliary in both. Now the restored democrats, though
-owing their restoration to Polysperchon, were much less compliant
-towards him than Phokion had been. Not only they would not admit
-him into the city, but they would not even acquiesce in his separate
-occupation of Munychia and Peiræus. On the proposition of Agnonides
-and Archestratus, they sent a deputation to Polysperchon accusing
-Phokion and his comrades of high treason; yet at the same time
-claiming for Athens the full and undiminished benefit of the late
-regal proclamation—autonomy and democracy, with restoration of
-Peiræus and Munychia free and ungarrisoned.[820]
-
-  [820] Diodor. xviii. 66.
-
-The deputation reached Polysperchon at Pharyges in Phokis, as early
-as Phokion’s company, which had been detained for some days at
-Elateia by the sickness of Deinarchus. That delay was unfortunate
-for Phokion. Had he seen Polysperchon, and presented the letter of
-Alexander, before the Athenian accusers arrived, he might probably
-have obtained a more favorable reception. But as the arrival of
-the two parties was nearly simultaneous, Polysperchon heard both
-of them at the same audience, before King Philip Aridæus in his
-throne with the gilt ceiling above it. When Agnonides,—chief of the
-Athenian deputation, and formerly friend and advocate of Demosthenes
-in the Harpalian cause—found himself face to face with Phokion and
-his friends, their reciprocal invectives at first produced nothing
-but confusion; until Agnonides himself exclaimed—“Pack us all into
-one cage and send us back to Athens to receive judgment from the
-Athenians.” The king laughed at this observation, but the bystanders
-around insisted upon more orderly proceedings, and Agnonides then set
-forth the two demands of the Athenians—condemnation of Phokion and
-his friends, partly as accomplices of Antipater, partly as having
-betrayed Peiræus to Nikanor—and the full benefit of the late regal
-proclamation to Athens.[821] Now, on the last of these two heads,
-Polysperchon was noway disposed to yield—nor to hand over Peiræus
-to the Athenians as soon as he should take it. On this matter,
-accordingly, he replied by refusal or evasion. But he was all the
-more disposed to satisfy the Athenians on the other matter—the
-surrender of Phokion; especially as the sentiment now prevalent at
-Athens evinced clearly that Phokion could not be again useful to him
-as an instrument. Thus disposed to sacrifice Phokion, Polysperchon
-heard his defence with impatience, interrupted him several times, and
-so disgusted him, that he at length struck the ground with his stick,
-and held his peace. Hegemon, another of the accused, was yet more
-harshly treated. When he appealed to Polysperchon himself, as having
-been personally cognizant of his (the speaker’s) good dispositions
-towards the Athenian people (he had probably been sent to Pella, as
-envoy for redress of grievances under the Antipatrian oligarchy),
-Polysperchon exclaimed—“Do not utter falsehoods against me before the
-king.” Moreover, king Philip himself was so incensed, as to start
-from his throne and snatch his spear; with which he would have run
-Hegemon through,—imitating the worst impulses of his illustrious
-brother—had he not been held back by Polysperchon. The sentence could
-not be doubtful. Phokion and his companions were delivered over as
-prisoners to the Athenian deputation, together with a letter from the
-king, intimating that in his conviction they were traitors, but that
-he left them to be judged by the Athenians, now restored to freedom
-and autonomy.[822]
-
-  [821] Plutarch, Phokion, 33; Cornel. Nepos. Phokion, 3.
-  “Hic (Phocion), ab Agnonide accusatus, quod Piræum Nicanori
-  prodidisset, ex consilii sententiâ, in custodiam conjectus,
-  Athenas deductus est, ut ibi de eo legibus fieret judicium.”
-
-  Plutarch says that Polysperchon, before he gave this hearing
-  to both parties, ordered _the Corinthian Deinarchus_ to be
-  tortured and to be put to death. Now the person so named cannot
-  be Deinarchus, the logographer—of whom we have some specimens
-  remaining, and who was alive even as late as 292 B.
-  C.—though he too was a Corinthian. Either, therefore, there
-  were two Corinthians, both bearing this same name (as Westermann
-  supposes—Gesch. der Beredtsamkeit, sect. 72), or the statement
-  of Plutarch must allude to an order given but not carried into
-  effect—which latter seems to me most probable.
-
-  [822] Plutarch, Phokion, 33, 34; Diodor. xviii. 66.
-
-The Macedonian Kleitus was instructed to convey them to Athens as
-prisoners under a guard. Mournful was the spectacle as they entered
-the city; being carried along the Kerameikus in carts, through
-sympathizing friends and an embittered multitude, until they reached
-the theatre, wherein the assembly was to be convened. That assembly
-was composed of every one who chose to enter, and is said to have
-contained many foreigners and slaves. But it would have been
-fortunate for Phokion had such really been the case; for foreigners
-and slaves had no cause of antipathy towards him. The assembly was
-mainly composed of Phokion’s keenest enemies, the citizens just
-returned from exile or deportation; among whom may doubtless have
-been intermixed more or less of non-qualified persons, since the
-lists had probably not yet been verified. When the assembly was about
-to be opened, the friends of Phokion moved, that on occasion of so
-important a trial, foreigners and slaves should be sent away. This
-was in every sense an impolitic proceeding; for the restored exiles,
-chiefly poor men, took it as an insult to themselves, and became only
-the more embittered, exclaiming against the oligarchs who were trying
-to exclude them.
-
-It is not easy to conceive stronger grounds of exasperation than
-those which inflamed the bosoms of these returned exiles. We must
-recollect that at the close of the Lamian war, the Athenian democracy
-had been forcibly subverted. Demosthenes and its principal leaders
-had been slain, some of them with antecedent cruelties; the poorer
-multitude, in number more than half of the qualified citizens,
-had been banished or deported into distant regions. To all the
-public shame and calamity, there was thus superadded a vast mass
-of individual suffering and impoverishment, the mischiefs of which
-were very imperfectly healed, even by that unexpected contingency
-which had again thrown open to them their native city. Accordingly,
-when these men returned from different regions, each hearing from
-the rest new tales of past hardship, they felt the bitterest hatred
-against the authors of the Antipatrian revolution; and among these
-authors Phokion stood distinctly marked. For although he had neither
-originated nor advised these severities, yet he and his friends,
-as administering the Antipatrian government at Athens, must have
-been agents in carrying them out, and had rendered themselves
-distinctly liable to the fearful penalties pronounced by the psephism
-of Demophantus,[823] consecrated by an oath taken by Athenians
-generally, against any one who should hold an official post after the
-government was subverted.
-
-  [823] Andokides de Mysteriis, sect. 96, 97; Lycurgus adv.
-  Leokrat. s. 127.
-
-When these restored citizens thus saw Phokion brought before
-them, for the first time after their return, the common feeling
-of antipathy against him burst out into furious manifestations.
-Agnonides the principal accuser, supported by Epikurus[824] and
-Demophilus, found their denunciations welcomed and even anticipated,
-when they arraigned Phokion as a criminal who had lent his hand to
-the subversion of the constitution,—to the sufferings of his deported
-fellow-citizens,—and to the holding of Athens in subjection under
-a foreign potentate; in addition to which, the betrayal of Peiræus
-to Nikanor[825] constituted a new crime; fastening on the people
-the yoke of Kassander, when autonomy had been promised to them by
-the recent imperial edict. After the accusation was concluded,
-Phokion was called on for his defence; but he found it impossible
-to obtain a hearing. Attempting several times to speak, he was as
-often interrupted by angry shouts; several of his friends were cried
-down in like manner; until at length he gave up the case in despair,
-and exclaimed, “For myself, Athenians, I plead guilty; I pronounce
-against myself the sentence of death for my political conduct; but
-why are you to sentence these men near me, who are not guilty?”
-“Because they are your friends, Phokion”—was the exclamation of those
-around. Phokion then said no more; while Agnonides proposed a decree,
-to the effect, that the assembled people should decide by show of
-hands, whether the persons now arraigned were guilty or not; and that
-if declared guilty, they should be put to death. Some persons present
-cried out, that the penalty of torture ought to precede death; but
-this savage proposition, utterly at variance with Athenian law in
-respect to citizens, was repudiated not less by Agnonides than by the
-Macedonian officer Kleitus. The decree was then passed; after which
-the show of hands was called for. Nearly every hand in the assembly
-was held up in condemnation; each man even rose from his seat to make
-the effect more imposing; and some went so far as to put on wreaths
-in token of triumph. To many of them doubtless, the gratification
-of this intense and unanimous vindictive impulse,—in their view not
-merely legitimate, but patriotic,—must have been among the happiest
-moments of life.[826]
-
-  [824] _Not_ the eminent philosopher so named.
-
-  [825] Cornel. Nepos, Phoc. 4. “Plurimi vero ita exacuerentur
-  propter proditionis suspicionem Piræi, maximeque quod adversus
-  populi commoda in senectute steterat.”
-
-  [826] Diodor. xviii. 66, 67; Plutarch, Phokion, 34, 35; Cornelius
-  Nepos, Phokion, 2, 3.
-
-After sentence, the five condemned persons, Phokion, Nikokles,
-Thudippus, Hegemon, and Pythokles, were consigned to the supreme
-magistrates of Police, called The Eleven, and led to prison for the
-purpose of having the customary dose of poison administered. Hostile
-bystanders ran alongside, taunting and reviling them. It is even said
-that one man planted himself in the front, and spat upon Phokion; who
-turned to the public officers and exclaimed—“Will no one check this
-indecent fellow?” This was the only emotion which he manifested; in
-other respects, his tranquillity and self-possession were resolutely
-maintained, during this soul-subduing march from the theatre to the
-prison, amidst the wailings of his friends, the broken spirit of his
-four comrades, and the fiercest demonstrations of antipathy from his
-fellow-citizens generally. One ray of comfort presented itself as he
-entered the prison. It was the nineteenth of the month Munychion,
-the day on which the Athenian Horsemen or Knights (the richest class
-in the city, men for the most part of oligarchical sentiments)
-celebrated their festal procession with wreaths on their heads in
-honor of Zeus. Several of these horsemen halted in passing, took off
-their wreaths, and wept as they looked through the gratings of the
-prison.
-
-Being asked whether he had anything to tell his son Phokus, Phokion
-replied—“I tell him emphatically, not to hold evil memory of the
-Athenians.” The draught of hemlock was then administered to all
-five—to Phokion last. Having been condemned for treason, they were
-not buried in Attica; nor were Phokion’s friends allowed to light
-a funeral pile for the burning of his body; which was carried out
-of Attica into the Megarid, by a hired agent named Konopion, and
-there burnt by fire obtained at Megara. The wife of Phokion, with
-her maids, poured libations and marked the spot by a small mound of
-earth; she also collected the bones and brought them back to Athens
-in her bosom, during the secrecy of night. She buried them near her
-own domestic hearth, with this address—“Beloved Hestia, I confide
-to thee these relics of a good man. Restore them to his own family
-vault, as soon as the Athenians shall come to their senses.”[827]
-
-  [827] Plutarch, Phokion, 36, 37. Two other anecdotes are
-  recounted by Plutarch, which seem to be of doubtful authenticity.
-  Nikokles entreated that he might be allowed to swallow his potion
-  before Phokion; upon which the latter replied—“Your request,
-  Nikokles, is sad and mournful; but as I have never yet refused
-  you anything throughout my life, I grant this also.”
-
-  After the four first had drunk, all except Phokion, no more
-  hemlock was left; upon which the jailer said that he would
-  not prepare any more, unless twelve drachmæ of money were
-  given to him to buy the material. Some hesitation took place,
-  until Phokion asked one of his friends to supply the money,
-  sarcastically remarking, that it was hard if a man could not even
-  die _gratis_ at Athens.
-
-  As to the first of these anecdotes—if we read, in Plato’s Phædon
-  (152-155), the details of the death of Sokrates,—we shall see
-  that death by hemlock was not caused instantaneously, but in a
-  gradual and painless manner; the person who had swallowed the
-  potion being desired to walk about for some time, until his legs
-  grew heavy, and then to lie down in bed, after which he gradually
-  chilled and became insensible, first in the extremities, next in
-  the vital centres. Under these circumstances, the question—which
-  of the persons condemned should swallow the first of the five
-  potions—could be of very little moment.
-
-  Then, as to the alleged niggardly stock of hemlock in the
-  Athenian prison—what would have been the alternative, if
-  Phokion’s friend had not furnished the twelve drachmæ? Would
-  he have remained in confinement, without being put to death?
-  Certainly not; for he was under capital sentence. Would he
-  have been put to death by the sword or some other unexpensive
-  instrument? This is at variance with the analogy of Athenian
-  practice. If there be any truth in the story, we must suppose
-  that the Eleven had allotted to this jailer a stock of hemlock
-  (or the price thereof) really adequate to five potions, but that
-  he by accident or awkwardness had wasted a part of it, so that
-  it would have been necessary for him to supply the deficiency
-  out of his own pocket. From this embarrassment he was rescued
-  by Phokion and his friend; and Phokion’s sarcasm touches upon
-  the strangeness of a man being called upon to pay for his own
-  execution.
-
-After a short time (we are told by Plutarch) the Athenians did
-thus come to their senses. They discovered that Phokion had been a
-faithful and excellent public servant, repented of their severity
-towards him, celebrated his funeral obsequies at the public expense,
-erected a statue in his honor, and put to death Agnonides by public
-judicial sentence; while Epikurus and Demophilus fled from the city
-and were slain by Phokion’s son.[828]
-
-  [828] Plutarch, Phokion, 38
-
-  These facts are ostensibly correct; but Plutarch omits to notice
-  the real explanation of them. Within two or three months after
-  the death of Phokion, Kassander, already in possession of Peiræus
-  and Munychia, became also master of Athens; the oligarchical
-  or Phokionic party again acquired predominance; Demetrius the
-  Phalerean was recalled from exile, and placed to administer
-  the city under Kassander, as Phokion had administered it under
-  Antipater.
-
-  No wonder, that under such circumstances, the memory of Phokion
-  should be honored. But this is a very different thing from
-  spontaneous change of popular opinion respecting him. I see no
-  reason why such change of opinion should have occurred, nor do
-  I believe that it did occur. The Demos of Athens, banished and
-  deported in mass, had the best ground for hating Phokion, and
-  were not likely to become ashamed of the feeling. Though he
-  was personally mild and incorruptible, they derived no benefit
-  from these virtues. To them it was of little moment that he
-  should steadily refuse all presents from Antipater, when he did
-  Antipater’s work gratuitously. Considered as a judicial trial,
-  the last scene of Phokion before the people in the theatre
-  is nothing better than a cruel imposture; considered as a
-  manifestation of public opinion already settled, it is one for
-  which the facts of the past supplied ample warrant.
-
-  We cannot indeed read without painful sympathy the narrative of
-  an old man above eighty,—personally brave, mild, and superior to
-  all pecuniary temptation, so far as his positive administration
-  was concerned,—perishing under an intense and crushing storm
-  of popular execration. But when we look at the whole case—when
-  we survey, not merely the details of Phokion’s administration,
-  but the grand public objects which those details subserved, and
-  towards which he conducted his fellow-citizens—we shall see that
-  this judgment is fully merited. In Phokion’s patriotism—for so
-  doubtless he himself sincerely conceived it—no account was taken
-  of Athenian independence; of the autonomy or self-management of
-  the Hellenic world; of the conditions, in reference to foreign
-  kings, under which alone such autonomy could exist. He had
-  neither the Panhellenic sentiment of Aristeides, Kallikratidas,
-  and Demosthenes—nor the narrower Athenian sentiment, like the
-  devotion of Agesilaus to Sparta, and of Epaminondas to Thebes.
-  To Phokion it was indifferent whether Greece was an aggregate
-  of autonomous cities, with Athens as first or second among
-  them—or one of the satrapies under the Macedonian kings. Now
-  this was among the most fatal defects of a Grecian public man.
-  The sentiment in which Phokion was wanting, lay at the bottom
-  of all those splendid achievements which have given to Greece a
-  substantive and pre-eminent place in the history of the world.
-  Had Themistokles, Arsiteides, and Leonidas resembled him, Greece
-  would have passed quietly under the dominion of Persia, and the
-  brilliant, though checkered, century and more of independent
-  politics which succeeded the repulse of Xerxes would never have
-  occurred. It was precisely during the fifty years of Phokion’s
-  political and military influence, that the Greeks were degraded
-  from a state of freedom, and Athens from ascendency as well as
-  freedom, into absolute servitude. Insofar as this great public
-  misfortune can be imputed to any one man—to no one was it more
-  ascribable than to Phokion. He was stratêgus during most of
-  the long series of years when Philip’s power was growing; it
-  was his duty to look ahead for the safety of his countrymen,
-  and to combat the yet immature giant. He heard the warnings of
-  Demosthenes, and he possessed exactly those qualities which were
-  wanting to Demosthenes—military energy and aptitude. Had he lent
-  his influence to inform the short-sightedness, to stimulate the
-  inertia, to direct the armed efforts, of his countrymen, the
-  kings of Macedon might have been kept within their own limits,
-  and the future history of Greece might have been altogether
-  different. Unfortunately, he took the opposite side. He acted
-  with Æschines and the Philippizers; without receiving money
-  from Philip, he did gratuitously all that Philip desired— by
-  nullifying and sneering down the efforts of Demosthenes and the
-  other active politicians. After the battle of Chæroneia, Phokion
-  received from Philip first, and from Alexander afterwards, marks
-  of esteem not shown towards any other Athenian. This was both the
-  fruit and the proof of his past political action—anti-Hellenic
-  as well as anti-Athenian. Having done much, in the earlier
-  part of his life, to promote the subjugation of Greece under
-  the Macedonian kings, he contributed somewhat, during the
-  latter half, to lighten the severity of their dominion; and it
-  is the most honorable point in his character that he always
-  refrained from abusing their marked favor towards himself, for
-  purposes either of personal gain or of oppression over his
-  fellow-citizens. Alexander not only wrote letters to him, even
-  during the plenitude of imperial power, in terms of respectful
-  friendship, but tendered to him the largest presents—at one time
-  the sum of 100 talents, at another time the choice of four towns
-  on the coast of Asia Minor, as Xerxes gave to Themistokles. He
-  even expressed his displeasure when Phokion, refusing everything,
-  consented only to request the liberation of three Grecian
-  prisoners confined at Sardis.[829]
-
-  [829] Plutarch, Phokion, 18; Plutarch, Apophthegm. p. 188.
-
-The Lamian war and its consequences, were Phokion’s ruin. He
-continued at Athens, throughout that war, freely declaring his
-opinion against it; for it is to be remarked, that in spite of his
-known macedonizing politics, the people neither banished nor degraded
-him, but contented themselves with following the counsels of others.
-On the disastrous termination of the war, Phokion undertook the
-thankless and dishonorable function of satrap under Antipater at
-Athens, with the Macedonian garrison at Munychia to back him. He
-became the subordinate agent of a conqueror who not only slaughtered
-the chief Athenian orators, but disfranchised and deported the Demos
-in mass. Having accepted partnership and responsibility in these
-proceedings, Phokion was no longer safe except under the protection
-of a foreign prince. After the liberal proclamation issued in the
-name of the Macedonian kings, permitting the return of the banished
-Demos, he sought safety for himself, first by that treasonable
-connivance which enabled Nikanor to seize the Peiræus, next by
-courting Polysperchon the enemy of Nikanor. A voluntary expatriation
-(along with his friend the Phalerean Demetrius) would have been less
-dangerous, and less discreditable, than these manœuvres, which still
-farther darkened the close of his life, without averting from him,
-after all, the necessity of facing the restored Demos. The intense
-and unanimous wrath of the people against him is an instructive,
-though a distressing spectacle. It was directed, not against the
-man or the administrator—for in both characters Phokion had been
-blameless, except as to the last collusion with Nikanor in the
-seizure of the Peiræus—but against his public policy. It was the last
-protest of extinct Grecian freedom, speaking as it were from the
-tomb in a voice of thunder, against that fatal system of mistrust,
-inertia, self-seeking, and corruption, which had betrayed the once
-autonomous Athens to a foreign conqueror.
-
-I have already mentioned that Polysperchon with his army was in
-Phokis when Phokion was brought before him, on his march towards
-Peloponnesus. Perhaps he may have been detained by negotiation with
-the Ætolians, who embraced his alliance.[830] At any rate he was
-tardy in his march, for before he reached Attica, Kassander arrived
-at Peiræus to join Nikanor with a fleet of thirty-five ships and 4000
-soldiers obtained from Antigonus. On learning this fact, Polysperchon
-hastened his march also, and presented himself under the walls of
-Athens and Peiræus with a large force of 20,000 Macedonians, 4000
-Greek allies, 1000 cavalry, and sixty-five elephants; animals which
-were now seen for the first time in European Greece. He at first
-besieged Kassander in Peiræus, but finding it difficult to procure
-subsistence in Attica for so numerous an army, he marched with
-the larger portion into Peloponnesus, leaving his son Alexander
-with a division to make head against Kassander. Either approaching
-in person the various Peloponnesian towns—or addressing them by
-means of envoys—he enjoined the subversion of the Antipatrian
-oligarchies, and the restoration of liberty and free speech to the
-mass of the citizens.[831] In most of the towns, this revolution
-was accomplished; but in Megalopolis, the oligarchy held out; not
-only forcing Polysperchon to besiege the city, but even defending
-it against him successfully. He made two or three attempts to storm
-it, by movable towers, by undermining the walls, and even by the aid
-of elephants; but he was repulsed in all of them,[832] and obliged
-to relinquish the siege with considerable loss of reputation. His
-admiral Kleitus was soon afterwards defeated in the Propontis, with
-the loss of his whole fleet, by Nikanor (whom Kassander had sent from
-Peiræus) and Antigonus.[833]
-
-  [830] Diodor. xix. 35.
-
-  [831] Diodor. xviii. 69.
-
-  [832] Diodor. xxiii. 70, 71.
-
-  [833] Diodor. xviii. 72.
-
-After these two defeats, Polysperchon seems to have evacuated
-Peloponnesus, and to have carried his forces across the Corinthian
-Gulf into Epirus, to join Olympias. His party was greatly weakened
-all over Greece, and that of Kassander proportionally strengthened.
-The first effect of this was, the surrender of Athens. The Athenians
-in the city, including all or many of the restored exiles, could
-no longer endure that complete severance from the sea, to which
-the occupation of Peiræus and Munychia by Kassander had reduced
-them. Athens without a port was hardly tenable; in fact, Peiræus
-was considered by its great constructor, Themistokles, as more
-indispensable to the Athenians than Athens itself.[834] The
-subsistence of the people was derived in large proportion from
-imported corn, received through Peiræus; where also the trade and
-industrial operations were carried on, most of the revenue collected,
-and the arsenals, docks, ships, etc. of the state kept up. It became
-evident that Nikanor, by seizing on the Peiræus, had rendered Athens
-disarmed and helpless; so that the irreparable mischief done by
-Phokion, in conniving at that seizure, was felt more and more every
-day. Hence the Athenians, unable to capture the port themselves, and
-hopeless of obtaining it through Polysperchon, felt constrained to
-listen to the partisans of Kassander, who proposed that terms should
-be made with him. It was agreed that they should become friends and
-allies of Kassander; that they should have full enjoyment of their
-city, with the port Peiræus, their ships and revenues; that the
-exiles and deported citizens should be readmitted; that the political
-franchise should for the future be enjoyed by all citizens who
-possessed 1000 drachmæ of property and upwards; that Kassander should
-hold Munychia with a governor and garrison, until the war against
-Polysperchon was brought to a close; and that he should also name
-some one Athenian citizen, in whose hands the supreme government of
-the city should be vested. Kassander named Demetrius the Phalerean
-(_i. e._ an Athenian of the Deme Phalerum), one of the colleagues
-of Phokion; who had gone into voluntary exile since the death of
-Antipater, but had recently returned.[835]
-
-  [834] Thucyd. i. 93.
-
-  [835] Diodor. xviii. 74.
-
-This convention restored substantially at Athens the Antipatrian
-government; yet without the severities which had marked its original
-establishment—and with some modifications in various ways. It made
-Kassander virtually master of the city (as Antipater had been before
-him), by means of his governing nominee, upheld by the garrison, and
-by the fortification of Munychia; which had now been greatly enlarged
-and strengthened,[836] holding a practical command over Peiræus,
-though that port was nominally relinquished to the Athenians.
-But there was no slaughter of orators, no expulsion of citizens:
-moreover, even the minimum of 1000 drachmæ, fixed for the political
-franchise, though excluding the multitude, must have been felt as an
-improvement compared with the higher limit of 2000 drachmæ prescribed
-by Antipater. Kassander was not, like his father, at the head of an
-overwhelming force, master of Greece. He had Polysperchon in the
-field against him with a rival army and an established ascendency in
-many of the Grecian cities; it was therefore his interest to abstain
-from measures of obvious harshness towards the Athenian people.
-
-  [836] See the notice of Munychia, as it stood ten years
-  afterwards (Diodor. xx. 45).
-
-Towards this end his choice of the Phalerean Demetrius appears
-to have been judicious. That citizen continued to administer
-Athens, as satrap or despot under Kassander, for ten years. He
-was an accomplished literary man, friend both of the philosopher
-Theophrastus, who had succeeded to the school of Aristotle—and of
-the rhetor Deinarchus. He is described also as a person of expensive
-and luxurious habits; towards which he devoted the most of the
-Athenian public revenue, 1200 talents in amount, if Duris is to
-be believed. His administration is said to have been discreet and
-moderate. We know little of its details, but we are told that he made
-sumptuary laws, especially restricting the cost and ostentation of
-funerals.[837] He himself extolled his own decennial period as one
-of abundance and flourishing commerce at Athens.[838] But we learn
-from others, and the fact is highly probable, that it was a period
-of distress and humiliation, both at Athens and in other Grecian
-towns; and that Athenians, as well as others, welcomed new projects
-of colonization (such as that of Ophellas from Kyrênê) not simply
-from prospects of advantage, but also as an escape from existing
-evils.[839]
-
-  [837] Cicero, De Legg. ii. 26, 66; Strabo, ix. p. 398; Pausanias,
-  i. 25, 5. τύραννόν τε Ἀθηναίοις ἔπραξε γενέσθαι Δημήτριον, etc.
-  Duris ap. Athenæum, xii. 542. Fragm. 27. vol. iii. p. 477. Frag.
-  Hist. Græc.
-
-  The Phalerean Demetrius composed, among numerous historical,
-  philosophical, and literary works, a narrative of his own
-  decennial administration (Diogenes Laert. v. 5, 9; Strabo,
-  ib.)—περὶ τῆς δεκαετίας.
-
-  The statement of 1200 talents, as the annual revenue handled by
-  Demetrius, deserves little credit.
-
-  [838] See the Fragment of Demochares, 2. Fragment. Historic.
-  Græc. ed. Didot, vol. ii. p. 448, ap. Polyb. xii. 13. Demochares,
-  nephew of the orator Demosthenes, was the political opponent of
-  Demetrius Phalereus, whom he reproached with these boasts about
-  commercial prosperity, when the liberty and dignity of the city
-  were overthrown. To such boasts of Demetrius Phalereus probably
-  belongs the statement cited from him by Strabo (iii. p. 147)
-  about the laborious works in the Attic mines at Laureium.
-
-  [839] Diodor. xx. 40. ὥσθ᾽ ὑπελάμβανον μὴ μόνον ἐγκρατεῖς ἔσεσθαι
-  πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν παρόντων κακῶν ἀπαλλαγήσεσθαι.
-
-What forms of nominal democracy were kept up during this interval,
-we cannot discover. The popular judicature must have been continued
-for private suits and accusations, since Deinarchus is said to have
-been in large practice as a logographer, or composer of discourses
-for others.[840] But the fact that three hundred and sixty statues
-were erected in honor of Demetrius while his administration was
-still going on, demonstrates the gross flattery of his partisans,
-the subjection of the people, and the practical abolition of all
-free-spoken censure or pronounced opposition. We learn that, in
-some one of the ten years of his administration, a census was taken
-of the inhabitants of Attica; and that there were numbered, 21,000
-citizens, 10,000 metics, and 400,000 slaves.[841] Of this important
-enumeration we know the bare fact, without its special purpose or
-even its precise date. Perhaps some of those citizens, who had
-been banished or deported at the close of the Lamian war, may have
-returned and continued to reside at Athens. But there still seems
-to have remained, during all the continuance of the Kassandrian
-Oligarchy, a body of adverse Athenian exiles, watching for an
-opportunity of overthrowing it, and seeking aid for that purpose from
-the Ætolians and others.[842]
-
-  [840] Dionys. Halic. Judicium de Dinarcho, p. 633, 634; Plutarch,
-  Demetrius, 10. λόγῳ μὲν ὀλιγαρχικῆς, ἔργῳ δὲ μοναρχικῆς,
-  καταστάσεως γενομένης διὰ τὴν τοῦ Φαληρέως δύναμιν, etc.
-
-  [841] Ktesikles ap. Athenæum, vi. p. 272. Mr. Fynes Clinton
-  (following Wesseling), supplies the defect in the text of
-  Athenæus, so as to assign the census to the 115th Olympiad.
-  This conjecture _may_ be right, yet the reasons for it are not
-  conclusive. The census may have been either in the 116th, or
-  in the 117th Olympiad; we have no means of determining which.
-  The administration of Phalerean Demetrius covers the ten years
-  between 317 and 307 B. C. (Fast. Hell. Append. p. 388).
-
-  Mr. Clinton (ad ann. 317 B. C. Fast. Hell.) observes
-  respecting the census—“The 21,000 Athenians express those who
-  had votes in the public assembly, or all the males above the age
-  of twenty years; the 10,000 μέτοικοι described also the males of
-  full age. When the women and children are computed, the total
-  free population will be about 127,660; and 400,000 slaves, added
-  to this total, will give about 527,660 for the total population
-  of Attica.” See also the Appendix to F. H. p. 390 _seq._
-
-  This census is a very interesting fact; but our information
-  respecting it is miserably scanty, and Mr. Clinton’s
-  interpretation of the different numbers is open to some remark.
-  He cannot be right, I think, in saying—“The 21,000 Athenians
-  express those who had votes in the assembly, _or_ all the males
-  above the age of twenty years.” For we are expressly told, that
-  under the administration of Demetrius Phalereus, all persons who
-  did not possess 1000 drachmæ were excluded from the political
-  franchise; and therefore a large number of males above the age of
-  twenty years would have no vote in the assembly. Since the two
-  categories are not coincident, then, to which shall we apply the
-  number 21,000? To those who had votes? Or to the total number of
-  free citizens, voting or not voting, above the age of twenty?
-  The public assembly, during the administration of Demetrius
-  Phalereus, appears to have been of little moment or efficacy; so
-  that a distinct record, of the number of persons entitled to vote
-  in it, is not likely to have been sought.
-
-  Then again, Mr. Clinton interprets the three numbers given, upon
-  two principles totally distinct. The two first numbers (citizens
-  and metics), he considers to designate only males of full age;
-  the third number, of οἰκέται, he considers to include both sexes
-  and all ages.
-
-  This is a conjecture which I think very doubtful, in the absence
-  of farther knowledge. It implies that the enumerators take
-  account of the _slave_ women and children—but that they take no
-  account of the _free_ women and children, wives and families
-  of the citizens and metics. The number of the free women and
-  children are wholly unrecorded, on Mr. Clinton’s supposition. Now
-  if, for the purposes of the census, it was necessary to enumerate
-  the _slave_ women and children—it surely would be not less
-  necessary to enumerate the _free_ women and children.
-
-  The word οἰκέται sometimes means, not slaves only, but the
-  inmates of a family generally—free as well as slave. If such be
-  its meaning here (which however there is not evidence enough to
-  affirm), we eliminate the difficulty of supposing the slave women
-  and children to be enumerated—and the free women and children
-  _not_ to be enumerated.
-
-  We should be able to reason more confidently, if we knew the
-  purpose for which the census had been taken—whether with a view
-  to military or political measures—to finance and taxation—or to
-  the question of subsistence and importation of foreign corn (see
-  Mr. Clinton’s Fast. H. ad ann. 444 B. C., about another
-  census taken in reference to imported corn).
-
-  [842] See Dionys. Halic. Judic. de Dinarcho, p. 658 Reisk.
-
-The acquisition of Athens by Kassander, followed up by his capture
-of Panaktum and Salamis, and seconded by his moderation towards the
-Athenians, procured for him considerable support in Peloponnesus,
-whither he proceeded with his army.[843] Many of the cities,
-intimidated or persuaded, joined him and deserted Polysperchon;
-while the Spartans, now feeling for the first time their defenceless
-condition, thought it prudent to surround their city with walls.[844]
-This fact, among many others contemporaneous, testifies emphatically,
-how the characteristic sentiments of the Hellenic autonomous world
-were now dying out everywhere. The maintenance of Sparta as an
-unwalled city, was one of the deepest and most cherished of the
-Lykurgean traditions; a standing proof of the fearless bearing and
-self-confidence of the Spartans against dangers from without. The
-erection of the walls showed their own conviction, but too well borne
-out by the real circumstances around them, that the pressure of the
-foreigner had become so overwhelming as hardly to leave them even
-safety at home.
-
-  [843] Diodor. xviii. 75.
-
-  [844] Justin, xiv. 5; Diodor. xviii. 75; Pausan. vii. 8, 3;
-  Pausanias, i. 25, 5.
-
-The warfare between Kassander and Polysperchon became now embittered
-by a feud among the members of the Macedonian imperial family. King
-Philip Aridæus and his wife Eurydikê, alarmed and indignant at the
-restoration of Olympias which Polysperchon was projecting, solicited
-aid from Kassander, and tried to place the force of Macedonia at
-his disposal. In this however they failed. Olympias, assisted not
-only by Polysperchon, but by the Epirotic prince Æakides, made her
-entry into Macedonia out of Epirus, apparently in the autumn of 317
-B. C. She brought with her Roxana and her child—the widow
-and son of Alexander the Great. The Macedonian soldiers, assembled by
-Philip Aridæus and Eurydikê to resist her, were so overawed by her
-name and the recollection of Alexander, that they refused to fight,
-and thus ensured to her an easy victory. Philip and Eurydikê became
-her prisoners; the former she caused to be slain; to the latter she
-offered only an option between the sword, the halter, and poison. The
-old queen next proceeded to satiate her revenge against the family
-of Antipater. One hundred leading Macedonians, friends of Kassander,
-were put to death, together with his brother Nikanor;[845] while the
-sepulchre of his deceased brother Iollas, accused of having poisoned
-Alexander the Great, was broken up.
-
-  [845] Diodor. xix. 11; Justin, x. 14, 4; Pausanias, i. 11, 4.
-
-During the winter, Olympias remained thus completely predominant in
-Macedonia; where her position seemed strong, since her allies the
-Ætolians were masters of the pass at Thermopylæ, while Kassander
-was kept employed in Peloponnesus by the force under Alexander,
-son of Polysperchon. But Kassander, disengaging himself from these
-embarrassments, and eluding Thermopylæ by a maritime transit to
-Thessaly, seized the Perrhæbian passes before they had been put
-under guard, and entered Macedonia without resistance. Olympias,
-having no army competent to meet him in the field, was forced to shut
-herself up in the maritime fortress of Pydna, with Roxana, the child
-Alexander, and Thessalonikê daughter of her late husband Philip son
-of Amyntas.[846] Here Kassander blocked her up for several months by
-sea, as well as by land, and succeeded in defeating all the efforts
-of Polysperchon and Æakides to relieve her. In the spring of the
-ensuing year (316 B. C.), she was forced by intolerable famine
-to surrender. Kassander promised her nothing more than personal
-safety, requiring from her the surrender of the two great fortresses,
-Pella and Amphipolis, which made him master of Macedonia. Presently
-however, the relatives of those numerous victims, who had perished by
-order of Olympias, were encouraged by Kassander to demand her life in
-retribution. They found little difficulty in obtaining a verdict of
-condemnation against her from what was called a Macedonian assembly.
-Nevertheless, such was the sentiment of awe and reverence connected
-with her name, that no one except these injured men themselves could
-be found to execute the sentence. She died with a courage worthy of
-her rank and domineering character. Kassander took Thessalonikê to
-wife—confined Roxana with the child Alexander in the fortress of
-Amphipolis—where (after a certain interval) he caused both of them to
-be slain.[847]
-
-  [846] Diodor. xix. 36.
-
-  [847] Diodor. xix. 50, 51; Justin, xiv. 5; Pausan. i. 25, 5; ix.
-  7, 1.
-
-While Kassander was thus master of Macedonia—and while the imperial
-family were disappearing from the scene in that country—the defeat
-and death of Eumenes (which happened nearly at the same time as the
-capture of Olympias[848]) removed the last faithful partisan of
-that family in Asia. But at the same time, it left in the hands of
-Antigonus such overwhelming preponderance throughout Asia, that he
-aspired to become vicar and master of the entire Alexandrine empire,
-as well as to avenge upon Kassander the extirpation of the regal
-family. His power appeared indeed so formidable, that Kassander of
-Macedonia, Lysimachus of Thrace, Ptolemy of Egypt, and Seleukus of
-Babylonia, entered into a convention, which gradually ripened into an
-active alliance, against him.
-
-  [848] Even immediately before the death of Olympias, Aristonous,
-  governor of Amphipolis in her interest, considered Eumenes to be
-  still alive (Diodor. xix. 50).
-
-During the struggles between these powerful princes, Greece appears
-simply as a group of subject cities, held, garrisoned, grasped at,
-or coveted, by all of them. Polysperchon, abandoning all hopes in
-Macedonia after the death of Olympias, had been forced to take
-refuge among the Ætolians, leaving his son Alexander to make the
-best struggle that he could in Peloponnesus; so that Kassander was
-now decidedly preponderant throughout the Hellenic regions. After
-fixing himself on the throne of Macedonia, he perpetuated his own
-name by founding, on the isthmus of the peninsula of Pallênê and
-near the site where Potidæa had stood, the new city of Kassandreia;
-into which he congregated a large number of inhabitants from the
-neighborhood, and especially the remnant of the citizens of Olynthus
-and Potidæa,—towns taken and destroyed by Philip more than thirty
-years before.[849] He next marched into Peloponnesus with his army
-against Alexander son of Polysperchon. Passing through Bœotia,
-he undertook the task of restoring the city of Thebes, which had
-been destroyed twenty years previously by Alexander the Great,
-and had ever since existed only as a military post on the ancient
-citadel called Kadmeia. The other Bœotian towns, to whom the old
-Theban territory had been assigned, were persuaded or constrained
-to relinquish it; and Kassander invited from all parts of Greece
-the Theban exiles or their descendants. From sympathy with these
-exiles, and also with the ancient celebrity of the city, many Greeks,
-even from Italy and Sicily, contributed to the restoration. The
-Athenians, now administered by Demetrius Phalereus under Kassander’s
-supremacy, were particularly forward in the work; the Messenians
-and Megalopolitans, whose ancestors had owed so much to the Theban
-Epaminondas, lent strenuous aid. Thebes was re-established in the
-original area which it had occupied before Alexander’s siege; and
-was held by a Kassandrian garrison in the Kadmeia, destined for the
-mastery of Bœotia and Greece.[850]
-
-  [849] Diodor. xix. 52; Pausanias, v. 23, 2.
-
-  [850] Diodor. xix. 52, 54, 78; Pausan. ix. 7, 2-5. This seems an
-  explanation of Kassander’s proceeding, more probable than that
-  given by Pausanias; who tells us that Kassander hated the memory
-  of Alexander the Great, and wished to undo the consequences of
-  his acts. That he did so hate Alexander, is however extremely
-  credible: see Plutarch, Alexand. 74.
-
-After some stay at Thebes, Kassander advanced toward Peloponnesus.
-Alexander (son of Polysperchon) having fortified the Isthmus, he was
-forced to embark his troops with his elephants at Megara, and cross
-over the Saronic Gulf to Epidaurus. He dispossessed Alexander of
-Argos, of Messenia, and even of his position on the Isthmus, where
-he left a powerful detachment, and then returned to Macedonia.[851]
-His increasing power raised both apprehension and hatred in the
-bosom of Antigonus, who endeavored to come to terms with him, but in
-vain.[852] Kassander preferred the alliance with Ptolemy, Seleukus,
-and Lysimachus—against Antigonus, who was now master of nearly
-the whole of Asia, inspiring common dread to all of them.[853]
-Accordingly, from Asia to Peloponnesus, with arms and money Antigonus
-despatched the Milesian Aristodemus to strengthen Alexander against
-Kassander; whom he further denounced as an enemy of the Macedonian
-name, because he had slain Olympias, imprisoned the other members of
-the regal family, and re-established the Olynthian exiles. He caused
-the absent Kassander to be condemned by what was called a Macedonian
-assembly, upon these and other charges.
-
-  [851] Diodor. xix. 54.
-
-  [852] Diodor. xix. 56.
-
-  [853] Diodor. xix. 57.
-
-Antigonus farther proclaimed, by the voice of this assembly, that all
-the Greeks should be free, self-governing, and exempt from garrisons
-or military occupation.[854] It was expected that these brilliant
-promises would enlist partisans in Greece against Kassander;
-accordingly Ptolemy ruler of Egypt, one of the enemies of Antigonus,
-thought fit to issue similar proclamations a few months afterwards,
-tendering to the Greeks the same boon from himself.[855] These
-promises, neither executed, not intended to be executed, by either
-of the kings, appear to have produced little or no effect upon the
-Greeks.
-
-  [854] Diodor. xix. 61.
-
-  [855] Diodor. xix. 62.
-
-The arrival of Aristodemus in Peloponnesus had re-animated the party
-of Alexander, (son of Polysperchon), against whom Kassander was again
-obliged to bring his full forces from Macedonia. Though successful
-against Alexander at Argos, Orchomenus, and other places, Kassander
-was not able to crush him, and presently thought it prudent to gain
-him over. He offered to him the separate government of Peloponnesus,
-though in subordination to himself: Alexander accepted the offer,
-becoming Kassander’s ally[856]—and carried on war, jointly with him,
-against Aristodemus, with varying success, until he was presently
-assassinated by some private enemies. Nevertheless his widow
-Kratesipolis, a woman of courage and energy, still maintained herself
-in considerable force at Sikyon.[857] Kassander’s most obstinate
-enemies were the Ætolians, of whom we now first hear formal mention
-as a substantive confederacy.[858] These Ætolians became the allies
-of Antigonus as they had been before of Polysperchon, extending
-their predatory ravages even as far as Attica. Protected against
-foreign garrisons, partly by their rude and fierce habits, partly by
-their mountainous territory, they were almost the only Greeks who
-could still be called free. Kassander tried to keep them in check
-through their neighbors the Akarnanians, whom he induced to adopt a
-more concentrated habit of residence, consolidating their numerous
-petty townships into a few considerable towns,—Stratus, Sauria, and
-Agrinium—convenient posts for Macedonian garrisons. He also made
-himself master of Leukas, Apollonia, and Epidamnus, defeating the
-Illyrian king Glaukias, so that his dominion now extended across from
-the Thermaic to the Adriatic Gulf.[859] His general Philippus gained
-two important victories over the Ætolians and Epirots, forcing the
-former to relinquish some of their most accessible towns.[860]
-
-  [856] Diodor. xix. 63, 64.
-
-  [857] Diodor. xix. 62, 67.
-
-  [858] Diodor. xix. 66. Ἀριστόδημος, ~ἐπὶ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν~
-  δικαιολογησάμενος, προετρέψατο τὰ πλήθη βοηθεῖν τοῖς Ἀντιγόνου
-  πράγμασιν, etc.
-
-  [859] Diodor. xix. 67, 68; Justin, xv. 2. See Brandstäter,
-  Geschichte des Ætolischen Volkes und Bundes, p. 178 (Berlin,
-  1844).
-
-  [860] Diodor. xix. 74.
-
-The power of Antigonus in Asia underwent a material diminution,
-by the successful and permanent establishment which Seleukus now
-acquired in Babylonia; from which event the era of the succeeding
-Seleukidæ takes its origin. In Greece, however, Antigonus gained
-ground on Kassander. He sent thither his nephew Ptolemy with a
-large force to liberate the Greeks, or in other words, to expel
-the Kassandrian garrisons; while he at the same time distracted
-Kassander’s attention by threatening to cross the Hellespont and
-invade Macedonia. This Ptolemy (not the Egyptian) expelled the
-soldiers of Kassander from Eubœa, Bœotia, and Phokis. Chalkis in
-Eubœa was at this time the chief military station of Kassander;
-Thebes (which he had recently re-established) was in alliance with
-him; but the remaining Bœotian towns were hostile to him. Ptolemy,
-having taken Chalkis—the citizens of which he conciliated by
-leaving them without any garrison—together with Oropus, Eretria,
-and Karystus—entered Attica and presented himself before Athens. So
-much disposition to treat with him was manifested in the city, that
-Demetrius the Phalerean was obliged to gain time by pretending to
-open negotiations with Antigonus, while Ptolemy withdrew from Attica.
-Nearly at the same epoch, Apollonia, Epidamnus, and Leukas, found
-means, assisted by an armament from Korkyra, to drive out Kassander’s
-garrisons, and to escape from his dominion.[861] The affairs of
-Antigonus were now prospering in Greece, but they were much thrown
-back by the discontent and treachery of his admiral Telesphorus,
-who seized Elis and even plundered the sacred treasures of Olympia.
-Ptolemy presently put him down, and restored these treasures to the
-god.[862]
-
-  [861] Diodor. xix. 77, 78, 89.
-
-  [862] Diodor. xix. 87.
-
-In the ensuing year, a convention was concluded between Antigonus,
-on one side—and Kassander, Ptolemy (the Egyptian) and Lysimachus, on
-the other, whereby the supreme command in Macedonia was guaranteed
-to Kassander, until the maturity of Alexander son of Roxana; Thrace
-being at the same time assured to Lysimachus, Egypt to Ptolemy, and
-the whole of Asia to Antigonus. It was at the same time covenanted
-by all, that the Hellenic cities should be free.[863] Towards the
-execution of this last clause, however, nothing was actually done.
-Nor does it appear that the treaty had any other effect, except to
-inspire Kassander with increased jealousy about Roxana and her child;
-both of whom (as has been already stated) he caused to be secretly
-assassinated soon afterwards, by the governor Glaukias, in the
-fortress of Amphipolis, where they had been confined.[864] The forces
-of Antigonus, under his general Ptolemy, still remained in Greece.
-But this general presently (310 B. C.) revolted from Antigonus, and
-placed them in co-operation with Kassander; while Ptolemy of Egypt,
-accusing Antigonus of having contravened the treaty by garrisoning
-various Grecian cities, renewed the war and the triple alliance
-against him.[865]
-
-  [863] Diodor. xix. 105.
-
-  [864] Diodor. xix. 105.
-
-  [865] Diodor. xx. 19.
-
-Polysperchon,—who had hitherto maintained a local dominion over
-various parts of Peloponnesus, with a military force distributed
-in Messênê and other towns[866]—was now encouraged by Antigonus to
-espouse the cause of Herakles (son of Alexander by Barsinê), and to
-place him on the throne of Macedonia in opposition to Kassander.
-This young prince Herakles, now seventeen years of age, was sent
-to Greece from Pergamus in Asia, and his pretensions to the throne
-were assisted not only by a considerable party in Macedonia itself,
-but also by the Ætolians. Polysperchon invaded Macedonia, with
-favorable prospects of establishing the young prince; yet he thought
-it advantageous to accept treacherous propositions from Kassander,
-who offered to him partnership in the sovereignty of Macedonia, with
-an independent army and dominion in Peloponnesus. Polysperchon,
-tempted by these offers, assassinated the young prince Herakles,
-and withdrew his army towards Peloponnesus. But he found such
-unexpected opposition, in his march through Bœotia, from Bœotians and
-Peloponnesians, that he was forced to take up his winter quarters
-in Lokris[867] (309 B. C.). From this time forward, as far
-as we can make out, he commanded in Southern Greece as subordinate
-ally or partner of Kassander;[868] whose Macedonian dominion, thus
-confirmed, seems to have included Akarnania and Amphilochia on the
-Ambrakian Gulf, together with the town of Ambrakia itself, and a
-supremacy over many of the Epirots.
-
-  [866] Messênê was garrisoned by Polysperchon (Diodor. xix. 64).
-
-  [867] Diodor. xx. 28; Trogus Pompeius—Proleg. ad Justin. xv.
-  Justin. xv. 2.
-
-  [868] Diodor. xx. 100-103; Plutarch, Pyrrhus, 6. King Pyrrhus
-  was of προγόνων ἀεὶ δεδουλευκότων Μακεδόσι—at least this was the
-  reproach of Lysimachus (Plutarch, Phyrrhus, 12).
-
-The assassination of Herakles was speedily followed by that of
-Kleopatra, sister of Alexander the Great, and daughter of Philip
-and Olympias. She had been for some time at Sardis, nominally at
-liberty, yet under watch by the governor, who received his orders
-from Antigonus; she was now preparing to quit that place, for the
-purpose of joining Ptolemy in Egypt, and of becoming his wife. She
-had been invoked as auxiliary, or courted in marriage, by several
-of the great Macedonian chiefs, without any result. Now, however,
-Antigonus, afraid of the influence which her name might throw into
-the scale of his rival Ptolemy, caused her to be secretly murdered
-as she was preparing for her departure; throwing the blame of the
-deed on some of her women, whom he punished with death.[869] All
-the relatives of Alexander the Great (except Thessalonikê wife
-of Kassander, daughter of Philip by a Thessalian mistress) thus
-successively perished, and all by the orders of one or other among
-his principal officers. The imperial family, with the prestige of its
-name, thus came to an end.
-
-  [869] Diodor. xx. 37 compare Justin, xiii. 6; xiv. 1.
-
-Ptolemy of Egypt now set sail for Greece with a powerful armament. He
-acquired possession of the important cities—Sikyon and Corinth—which
-were handed over to him by Kratesipolis, widow of Alexander son of
-Polysperchon. He then made known by proclamation his purpose as a
-liberator, inviting aid from the Peloponnesian cities themselves
-against the garrisons of Kassander. From some he received encouraging
-answers and promises; but none of them made any movement, or seconded
-him by armed demonstrations. He thought it prudent therefore to
-conclude a truce with Kassander and retire from Greece, leaving
-however secure garrisons in Sikyon and Corinth.[870] The Grecian
-cities had now become tame and passive. Feeling their own incapacity
-of self-defence, and averse to auxiliary efforts, which brought upon
-them enmity without any prospect of advantage—they awaited only the
-turns of foreign interference and the behests of the potentates
-around them.
-
-  [870] Diodor. xx. 37.
-
-The Grecian ascendency of Kassander, however, was in the following
-year exposed to a graver shock than it had ever yet encountered—by
-the sudden invasion of Demetrius called Poliorketes, son of
-Antigonus. This young prince, sailing from Ephesus with a formidable
-armament, contrived to conceal his purposes so closely, that he
-actually entered the harbor of Peiræus (on the 26th of the month
-Thargelion—May) without expectation, or resistance from any one;
-his fleet being mistaken for the fleet of the Egyptian Ptolemy. The
-Phalerean Demetrius, taken unawares, and attempting too late to guard
-the harbor, found himself compelled to leave it in possession of the
-enemy, and to retire within the walls of Athens; while Dionysius,
-the Kassandrian governor, maintained himself with his garrison
-in Munychia, yet without any army competent to meet the invaders
-in the field. This accomplished Phalerean, who had administered
-for ten years as the viceroy and with the force of Kassander, now
-felt his position and influence at Athens overthrown, and even his
-personal safety endangered. He with other Athenians went as envoys
-on the ensuing day to ascertain what terms would be granted. The
-young prince ostentatiously proclaimed, that it was the intention
-of his father Antigonus and himself to restore and guarantee to the
-Athenians unqualified freedom and autonomy. Hence the Phalerean
-Demetrius foresaw that his internal opponents, condemned as they
-had been to compulsory silence during the last ten years, would now
-proclaim themselves with irresistible violence, so that there was no
-safety for him except in retreat. He accordingly asked and obtained
-permission from the invader to retire to Thebes, from whence he
-passed over soon after to Ptolemy in Egypt. The Athenians in the city
-declared in favor of Demetrius Poliorketes; who however refused to
-enter the walls until he should have besieged and captured Munychia,
-as well as Megara, with their Kassandrian garrisons. In a short
-time he accomplished both these objects. Indeed energy, skill, and
-effective use of engines, in besieging fortified places, were among
-the most conspicuous features in his character; procuring for him the
-surname whereby he is known to history. He proclaimed the Megarians
-free, levelling to the ground the fortifications of Munychia, as an
-earnest to the Athenians that they should be relieved for the future
-from all foreign garrison.[871]
-
-  [871] Philochor. Fragm. 144, ed. Didot; Diodor. xx. 45, 46;
-  Plutarch, Demetrius, 8, 9. The occupation of Peiræus by Demetrius
-  Poliorketes is related somewhat differently by Polyænus, iv. 7,
-  6.
-
-After these successes, Demetrius Poliorketes made his triumphant
-entry into Athens. He announced to the people, in formal assembly,
-that they were now again a free democracy, liberated from all
-dominion either of soldiers from abroad or oligarchs at home. He
-also promised them a farther boon from his father Antigonus and
-himself—150,000 medimni of corn for distribution, and ship-timber
-in quantity sufficient for constructing 100 triremes. Both these
-announcements were received with grateful exultation. The feelings
-of the people were testified not merely in votes of thanks and
-admiration towards the young conqueror, but in effusions of
-unmeasured and exorbitant flattery. Stratokles (who has already been
-before us as one of the accusers of Demosthenes in the Harpalian
-affair) with others exhausted their invention in devising new
-varieties of compliment and adulation. Antigonus and Demetrius
-were proclaimed to be not only kings, but gods and saviors: a high
-priest of these saviors was to be annually chosen, after whom each
-successive year was to be named (instead of being named after the
-first of the nine Archons, as had hitherto been the custom), and the
-dates of decrees and contracts commemorated; the month Munychion was
-re-named as Demetrion—two new tribes, to be called Antigonis and
-Demetrias, were constituted in addition to the preceding ten:—the
-annual senate was appointed to consist of 600 members instead of
-500; the portraits and exploits of Antigonus and Demetrius were to
-be woven, along with those of Zeus and Athênê, into the splendid and
-voluminous robe periodically carried in procession, as an offering
-at the Panathenaic festival; the spot of ground where Demetrius had
-alighted from his chariot, was consecrated with an altar erected in
-honor of Demetrius Katæbates or the Descender. Several other similar
-votes were passed, recognizing, and worshipping as gods, the saviors
-Antigonus and Demetrius. Nay, we are told that temples or altars
-were voted to Phila-Aphroditê, in honor of Phila wife of Demetrius;
-and a like compliment was paid to his two mistresses, Leæna and
-Lamia. Altars are said to have been also dedicated to Adeimantus and
-others, his convivial companions or flatterers.[872] At the same
-time the numerous statues which had been erected in honor of the
-Phalerean Demetrius during his decennial government, were overthrown,
-and some of them even turned to ignoble purposes, in order to cast
-greater scorn upon the past ruler.[873] The demonstrations of
-servile flattery at Athens, towards Demetrius Poliorketes, were in
-fact so extravagantly overdone, that he himself is said to have
-been disgusted with them, and to have expressed contempt for these
-degenerate Athenians of his own time.[874]
-
-  [872] Plutarch, Demetrius, 9-11; Diodor. xx. 47; Demochares ap.
-  Athenæum, vi. p. 253.
-
-  [873] Diogen. Laert. v, 77. Among the numerous literary works
-  (all lost) of the Phalerean Demetrius, one was entitled Ἀθηναίων
-  καταδρομή (ib. v. 82).
-
-  [874] Demochares ap. Athenæum, vi. p. 253.
-
-In reviewing such degrading proceedings, we must recollect that
-thirty-one years had now elapsed since the battle of Chæroneia,
-and that during all this time the Athenians had been under the
-practical ascendancy, and constantly augmenting pressure, of foreign
-potentates. The sentiment of this dependence on Macedonia had been
-continually strengthened by all the subsequent events—by the capture
-and destruction of Thebes, and the subsequent overwhelming conquests
-of Alexander—by the deplorable conclusion of the Lamian war, the
-slaughter of the free-spoken orators, the death of the energetic
-military leaders, and the deportation of Athenian citizens—lastly,
-by the continued presence of a Macedonian garrison in Peiræus or
-Munychia. By Phokion, Demetrius Phalereus, and the other leading
-statesmen of this long period, submission to Macedonia had been
-inculcated as a virtue, while the recollection of the dignity and
-grandeur of old autonomous Athens had been effaced or denounced as
-a mischievous dream. The fifteen years between the close of the
-Lamian war and the arrival of Demetrius Poliorketes (322-307 B.
-C.), had witnessed no free play, nor public discussion and
-expression, of conflicting opinions; the short period during which
-Phokion was condemned must be excepted, but that lasted only long
-enough to give room for the outburst of a preconceived but suppressed
-antipathy.
-
-During this thirty years, of which the last half had been an
-aggravation of the first, a new generation of Athenians had grown
-up, accustomed to an altered phase of political existence. How
-few of those who received Demetrius Poliorketes, had taken part in
-the battle of Chæroneia, or listened to the stirring exhortations
-of Demosthenes in the war which preceded that disaster![875] Of
-the citizens who yet retained courage and patriotism to struggle
-again for their freedom after the death of Alexander, how many must
-have perished with Leosthenes in the Lamian war! The Athenians of
-307 B. C. had come to conceive their own city, and Hellas
-generally, as dependent first on Kassander, next on the possible
-intervention of his equally overweening rivals, Ptolemy, Antigonus,
-Lysimachus, etc. If they shook off the yoke of one potentate, it
-could only be by the protectorate of another. The sentiment of
-political self-reliance and autonomy had fled; the conception of a
-citizen military force, furnished by confederate and co-operating
-cities, had been superseded by the spectacle of vast standing armies,
-organized by the heirs of Alexander and of his traditions.
-
-  [875] Tacitus, Annal. i. 3. “Juniores post Actiacam victoriam,
-  seniores plerique inter bella civium nati: quotusquisque
-  reliquus, qui rempublicam vidisset?”
-
-Two centuries before (510 B. C.), when the Lacedæmonians
-expelled the despot Hippias and his mercenaries from Athens, there
-sprang up at once among the Athenian people a forward and devoted
-patriotism, which made them willing to brave, and competent to avert,
-all dangers in defence of their newly-acquired liberty.[876] At that
-time, the enemies by whom they were threatened were Lacedæmonians,
-Thebans, Æginetans, Chalkidians, and the like (for the Persian force
-did not present itself until after some interval, and attacked not
-Athens alone, but Greece collectively). These hostile forces, though
-superior in number and apparent value to those of Athens, were yet
-not so disproportionate as to engender hopelessness and despair.
-Very different were the facts in 307 B. C., when Demetrius
-Poliorketes removed the Kassandrian mercenaries with their fortress
-Munychia, and proclaimed Athens free. To maintain that freedom by
-their own strength—in opposition to the evident superiority of
-organized force residing in the potentates around, one or more
-of whom had nearly all Greece under military occupation,—was an
-enterprise too hopeless to have been attempted even by men such as
-the combatants of Marathon or the contemporaries of Perikles. “Who
-would be free, themselves must strike the blow!” but the Athenians
-had not force enough to strike it; and the liberty proclaimed by
-Demetrius Poliorketes was a boon dependent upon him for its extent
-and even for its continuance. The Athenian assembly of that day was
-held under his army as masters of Attica, as it had been held a few
-months before under the controlling force of the Phalerean Demetrius
-together with the Kassandrian governor of Munychia; and the most
-fulsome votes of adulation proposed in honor of Demetrius Poliorketes
-by his partisans, though perhaps disapproved by many, would hardly
-find a single pronounced opponent.
-
-  [876] Herodotus, v. 78.
-
-One man, however, there was, who ventured to oppose several of
-the votes—the nephew of Demosthenes—Demochares; who deserves to
-be commemorated as the last known spokesman of free Athenian
-citizenship. We know only that such were his general politics, and
-that his opposition to the obsequious rhetor Stratokles ended in
-banishment, four years afterwards.[877] He appears to have discharged
-the functions of general during this period—to have been active
-in strengthening the fortifications and military equipment of the
-city—and to have been employed in occasional missions.[878]
-
-  [877] Plutarch, Demetr. 24.
-
-  [878] Polybius, xii. 13; Decretum apud Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt.
-  p. 851.
-
-The altered politics of Athens were manifested by impeachment
-against Demetrius Phalereus and other leading partisans of the
-late Kassandrian government. He and many others had already gone
-into voluntary exile; when their trials came on, they were not
-forthcoming, and all were condemned to death. But all those who
-remained, and presented themselves for trial, were acquitted;[879]
-so little was there of reactionary violence on this occasion.
-Stratokles also proposed a decree, commemorating the orator Lykurgus
-(who had been dead about seventeen years) by a statue, an honorary
-inscription, and a grant of maintenance in the Prytaneum to his
-eldest surviving descendant.[880] Among those who accompanied
-the Phalerean Demetrius into exile was the rhetor or logographer
-Deinarchus.
-
-  [879] Philochori Fragm. 144, ed. Didot, ap. Dionys. Hal. p. 636.
-
-  [880] Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 842-852. Lykurgus at his death
-  (about 324 B. C.) left three sons, who are said, shortly
-  after his death, to have been prosecuted by Menesæchmus, and
-  put in prison (“handed over to the Eleven”). But Thrasykles,
-  supported by Demokles, stood forward on their behalf; and
-  Demosthenes, then in banishment at Trœzen, wrote emphatic
-  remonstrances to the Athenians against such unworthy treatment of
-  the sons of a distinguished patriot. Accordingly the Athenians
-  soon repented and released them.
-
-  This is what we find stated in Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 842.
-  The third of the so-called Demosthenic Epistles purports to be
-  the letter written on this subject by Demosthenes.
-
-  The harsh treatment of the sons of Lykurgus (whatever it may have
-  amounted to, and whatever may have been its ground) certainly did
-  not last long; for in the next page of the very same Plutarchian
-  life (p. 843), an account is given of the family of Lykurgus,
-  which was ancient and sacerdotal; and it is there stated that his
-  sons after his death fully sustained the dignified position of
-  the family.
-
-  On what ground they were accused, we cannot make out. According
-  to the Demosthenic epistle (which epistles I have before stated
-  that I do not believe to be authentic), it was upon some
-  allegation, which, if valid at all, ought to have been urged
-  against Lykurgus himself during his life (p. 1477, 1478); but
-  Lykurgus had been always honorably acquitted, and always held
-  thoroughly estimable, up to the day of his death (p. 1475).
-
-The friendship of this obnoxious Phalerean, and of Kassander also,
-towards the philosopher Theophrastus, seems to have been one main
-cause which occasioned the enactment of a restrictive law against
-the liberty of philosophizing. It was decreed, on the proposition of
-a citizen named Sophokles, that no philosopher should be allowed to
-open a school or teach, except under special sanction obtained from a
-vote of the Senate and people. Such was the disgust and apprehension
-occasioned by the new restriction, that all the philosophers with
-one accord left Athens. This spirited protest, against authoritative
-restriction on the liberty of philosophy and teaching, found
-responsive sympathy among the Athenians. The celebrity of the schools
-and professors was in fact the only characteristic mark of dignity
-still remaining to them—when their power had become extinct, and
-when even their independence and free constitution had degenerated
-into a mere name. It was moreover the great temptation for young
-men, coming from all parts of Greece, to visit Athens. Accordingly,
-a year had hardly passed, when Philon, impeaching Sophokles the
-author of the law, under the Graphê Paranomôn, prevailed on the
-Dikastery to find him guilty, and condemn him to a fine of five
-talents. The restrictive law being thus repealed, the philosophers
-returned.[881] It is remarkable that Demochares stood forward as one
-of its advocates; defending Sophokles against the accuser Philon.
-From scanty notices remaining of the speech of Demochares, we gather
-that, while censuring the opinions no less than the characters of
-Plato and Aristotle, he denounced yet more bitterly their pupils, as
-being for the most part ambitious, violent, and treacherous men. He
-cited by name several among them, who had subverted the freedom of
-their respective cities, and committed gross outrages against their
-fellow-citizens.[882]
-
-  [881] Diogen. Laert. v. 38. It is probably to this return of the
-  philosophers that the φυγάδων κάθοδος mentioned by Philochorus,
-  as foreshadowed by the omen in the Acropolis, alludes
-  (Philochorus, Frag. 145, ed. Didot, ap Dionys. Hal. p. 637).
-
-  [882] See the few fragments of Demochares collected in Fragmenta
-  Historicorum Græcorum, ed. Didot, vol. ii. p. 445, with the notes
-  of Carl Müller.
-
-  See likewise Athenæus, xiii. 610, with the fragment from the
-  comic writer Alexis. It is there stated that Lysimachus also,
-  king of Thrace, had banished the philosophers from his dominions.
-
-  Demochares might find (besides the persons named in Athenæ. v.
-  21, xi. 508) other authentic examples of pupils of Plato and
-  Isokrates who had been atrocious and sanguinary tyrants in their
-  native cities—see the case of Klearchus of Herakleia, Memnon ap.
-  Photium, Cod. 224. cap. 1. Chion and Leonides, the two young
-  citizens who slew Klearchus, and who perished in endeavoring to
-  liberate their country—were also pupils of Plato (Justin, xvi.
-  5). In fact, aspiring youths, of all varieties of purpose, were
-  likely to seek this mode of improvement. (Alexander the Great,
-  too, the very impersonation of subduing force, had been the pupil
-  of Aristotle).
-
-Athenian envoys were despatched to Antigonus in Asia, to testify the
-gratitude of the people, and communicate the recent complimentary
-votes. Antigonus not only received them graciously, but sent to
-Athens, according to the promise made by his son, a large present of
-150,000 medimni of wheat, with timber sufficient for 100 ships. He
-at the same time directed Demetrius to convene at Athens a synod of
-deputies from the allied Grecian cities, where resolutions might be
-taken for the common interests of Greece.[883] It was his interest
-at this moment to raise up a temporary self-sustaining authority
-in Greece, for the purpose of upholding the alliance with himself,
-during the absence of Demetrius; whom he was compelled to summon into
-Asia with his army—requiring his services for the war against Ptolemy
-in Syria and Cyprus.
-
-  [883] Diodor. xx. 46.
-
-The following three years were spent by Demetrius—1. In victorious
-operations near Cyprus, defeating Ptolemy and making himself master
-of that island; after which Antigonus and Demetrius assumed the
-title of kings, and the example was followed by Ptolemy, in Egypt—by
-Lysimachus, in Thrace—and by Seleukus in Babylonia, Mesopotamia,
-and Syria[884]—thus abolishing even the titular remembrance of
-Alexander’s family. 2. In an unsuccessful invasion of Egypt by land
-and sea, repulsed with great loss. 3. In the siege of Rhodes. The
-brave and intelligent citizens of this island resisted for more
-than a year the most strenuous attacks and the most formidable
-siege-equipments of Demetrius Poliorketes. All their efforts
-however would have been vain had they not been assisted by large
-reinforcements and supplies from Ptolemy, Lysimachus, and Kassander.
-Such are the conditions under which alone even the most resolute
-and intelligent Greeks can now retain their circumscribed sphere of
-autonomy. The siege was at length terminated by a compromise; the
-Rhodians submitted to enrol themselves as allies of Demetrius, yet
-under proviso not to act against Ptolemy.[885] Towards the latter
-they carried their grateful devotion so far, as to erect a temple to
-him, called the Ptolemæum, and to worship him (under the sanction
-of the oracle of Ammon) as a god.[886] Amidst the rocks and shoals
-through which Grecian cities were now condemned to steer, menaced on
-every side by kings more powerful than themselves, and afterwards by
-the giant-republic of Rome—the Rhodians conducted their political
-affairs with greater prudence and dignity than any other Grecian city.
-
-  [884] Diodor. xx. 53; Plutarch, Demetr. 18.
-
-  [885] Diodor. xx. 99. Probably this proviso extended also to
-  Lysimachus and Kassander (both of whom had assisted Rhodes) as
-  well as to Ptolemy—though Diodorus does not expressly say so.
-
-  [886] Diodor. xx. 100.
-
-Shortly after the departure of Demetrius from Greece to Cyprus,
-Kassander and Polysperchon renewed the war in Peloponnesus and its
-neighborhood.[887] We make out no particulars respecting this war.
-The Ætolians were in hostility with Athens, and committed annoying
-depredations.[888] The fleet of Athens, repaired or increased by
-the timber received from Antigonus, was made to furnish thirty
-quadriremes to assist Demetrius in Cyprus, and was employed in
-certain operations near the island of Amorgos, wherein it suffered
-defeat.[889] But we can discover little respecting the course of the
-war, except that Kassander gained ground upon the Athenians, and
-that about the beginning of 303 B. C., he was blockading
-or threatening to blockade, Athens. The Athenians invoked the
-aid of Demetrius Poliorketes, who, having recently concluded an
-accommodation with the Rhodians, came again across from Asia, with
-a powerful fleet and army, to Aulis in Bœotia.[890] He was received
-at Athens with demonstrations of honor equal or superior to those
-which had marked his previous visit. He seems to have passed a year
-and a half, partly at Athens, partly in military operations carried
-successfully over many parts of Greece. He compelled the Bœotians
-to evacuate the Eubœan city of Chalkis, and to relinquish their
-alliance with Kassander. He drove that prince out of Attica—expelled
-his garrisons from the two frontier fortresses of Attica,—Phylê
-and Panaktum—and pursued him as far as Thermopylæ. He captured, or
-obtained by bribing the garrisons, the important towns of Corinth,
-Argos, and Sikyon; mastering also Ægium, Bura, all the Arcadian towns
-(except Mantineia), and various other towns in Peloponnesus.[891] He
-celebrated, as president, the great festival of the Heræa at Argos;
-on which occasion he married Deidameia, sister of Pyrrhus, the young
-king of Epirus. He prevailed on the Sikyonians to transfer to a
-short distance the site of their city, conferring upon the new city
-the name of Demetrias.[892] At a Grecian synod, convened in Corinth
-under his own letters of invitation, he received by acclamation
-the appointment of leader or Emperor of the Greeks, as it had been
-conferred on Philip and Alexander. He even extended his attacks
-as far as Leukas and Korkyra. The greater part of Greece seems to
-have been either occupied by his garrisons, or enlisted among his
-subordinates.
-
-  [887] Diodor. xx. 100.
-
-  [888] That the Ætolians were just now most vexatious enemies to
-  Athens, may be seen by the Ithyphallic ode addressed to Demetrius
-  Poliorketes (Athenæus, vi. p. 253).
-
-  [889] Diodor. xx. 50; Plutarch, Demetr. 11. In reference to this
-  defeat near Amorgos, Stratokles (the complaisant orator who
-  moved the votes of flattery towards Demetrius and Antigonus) is
-  said to have announced it first as a victory, to the great joy
-  of the people. Presently evidences of the defeat arrived, and
-  the people were angry with Stratokles. “What harm has happened
-  to you? (replied he)—have you not had two days of pleasure and
-  satisfaction?” This is at any rate a very good story.
-
-  [890] Diodor. xx. 100; Plutarch, Demetr. 23.
-
-  [891] Diodor. xx. 102, 103; Plutarch, Demetr. 23-25.
-
-  [892] Diodor. xx. 102; Plutarch, Demetr. 25; Pausanias, ii. 7, 1.
-  The city was withdrawn partially from the sea, and approximated
-  closely to the acropolis. The new city remained permanently: but
-  the new name Demetrias gave place to the old name Sikyon.
-
-So much was Kassander intimidated by these successes, that he sent
-envoys to Asia, soliciting peace from Antigonus; who, however,
-elate and full of arrogance, refused to listen to any terms short
-of surrender at discretion. Kassander, thus driven to despair,
-renewed his applications to Lysimachus, Ptolemy, and Seleukus. All
-these princes felt equally menaced by the power and dispositions of
-Antigonus—and all resolved upon an energetic combination to put him
-down.[893]
-
-  [893] Diodor. xx. 106
-
-  After uninterrupted prosperity in Greece, throughout the summer
-  of 302 B. C., Demetrius returned from Leukas to Athens,
-  about the month of September, near the time of the Eleusinian
-  mysteries.[894] He was welcomed by festive processions,
-  hymns, pæans, choric dances, and bacchanalian odes of joyous
-  congratulation. One of these hymns is preserved, sung by a
-  chorus of Ithyphalli—masked revellers, with their heads and arms
-  encircled by wreaths,—clothed in white tunics, and in feminine
-  garments reaching almost to the feet.[895]
-
-  [894] That he returned from Leukas about the time of these
-  mysteries, is attested both by Demochares and by the Ithyphallic
-  ode in Athenæus, vi. p. 253. See also Duris ap. Athenæ, xii. p.
-  535.
-
-  [895] Semus ap. Athenæum, xiv. p. 622.
-
-This song is curious, as indicating the hopes and fears prevalent
-among Athenians of that day, and as affording a measure of their
-self-appreciation. It is moreover among the latest Grecian documents
-that we possess, bearing on actual and present reality. The poet,
-addressing Demetrius as a god, boasts that two of the greatest
-and best-beloved of all divine beings are visiting Attica at the
-same moment—Demeter (coming for the season of her mysteries), and
-Demetrius, son of Poseidon and Aphroditê. “To thee we pray (the hymn
-proceeds); for other gods are either afar off—or have no ears—or do
-not exist—or care nothing about us; but _thee_ we see before us,
-not in wood or marble, but in real presence. First of all things,
-establish peace; for thou hast the power—and chastise that Sphinx who
-domineers, not merely over Thebes, but over all Greece—the Ætolian,
-who, (like the old Sphinx) rushes from his station on the rock to
-snatch and carry away our persons, and against whom we cannot fight.
-At all times, the Ætolians robbed their neighbors; but now, they rob
-far as well as near.[896]”
-
-  [896] Athenæus, vi. p. 253.
-
-    Ἄλλοι μὲν ἢ μακρὰν γὰρ ἀπέχουσιν θεοὶ,
-      ἢ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὦτα,
-    ἢ οὐκ εἰσὶν, ἢ οὐ προσέχουσιν ἡμῖν οὐδὲ ἕν·
-      σὲ δὲ παρόνθ᾽ ὁρῶμεν,
-    οὐ ξύλινον, οὐδὲ λίθινον, ἀλλ᾽ ἀληθινόν.
-      Εὐχόμεσθα δὴ σοί·
-    πρῶτον μὲν εἰρήνην ποιῆσον, φίλτατε,
-      κύριος γὰρ εἶ σύ.
-    Τὴν δ᾽ οὐχὶ Θηβῶν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅλης τῆς Ἑλλάδος,
-      Σφίγγα περικρατοῦσαν,
-    Αἰτωλὸς ὅστις ἐπὶ πέτρας καθήμενος,
-      ὥσπερ ἡ παλαιὰ,
-    τὰ σώμαθ᾽ ἡμῶν πάντ᾽ ἀναρπάσας φέρει,
-      ~κοὐκ ἔχω μάχεσθαι~·
-    Αἰτωλικὸν γὰρ ἁρπάσαι τὰ τῶν πέλας,
-      νυνὶ δὲ καὶ τὰ πόῤῥω—
-    μάλιστα μὲν δὴ κόλασον αὐτὸς· εἰ δὲ μὴ,
-      Οἰδίπουν τιν᾽ εὗρε,
-    τὴν Σφίγγα ταύτην ὅστις ἢ κατακρημνιεῖ,
-      ἢ σπίνον ποιήσει.
-
-Effusions such as these, while displaying unmeasured idolatry and
-subservience towards Demetrius, are yet more remarkable, as betraying
-a loss of force, a senility, and a consciousness of defenceless
-and degraded position, such as we are astonished to find publicly
-proclaimed at Athens. It is not only against the foreign potentates
-that the Athenians avow themselves incapable of self-defence, but
-even against the incursions of the Ætolians.—Greeks like themselves,
-though warlike, rude, and restless.[897] When such were the feelings
-of a people, once the most daring, confident, and organizing—and
-still the most intelligent—in Greece, we may see that the history of
-the Greeks as a separate nation or race is reaching its close—and
-that from henceforward they must become merged in one or other of the
-stronger currents that surround them.
-
-  [897] Compare Pausanias, vii. 7, 4.
-
-After his past successes, Demetrius passed some months in enjoyment
-and luxury at Athens. He was lodged in the Parthenon, being
-considered as the guest of the goddess Athênê. But his dissolute
-habits provoked the louder comments, from being indulged in such a
-domicile; while the violences which he offered to beautiful youths
-of good family led to various scenes truly tragical. The subservient
-manifestations of the Athenians towards him, however, continued
-unabated. It is even affirmed, that, in order to compensate for
-something which he had taken amiss, they passed a formal decree,
-on the proposition of Stratokles, declaring that every thing which
-Demetrius might command was holy in regard to the gods, and just in
-regard to men.[898] The banishment of Demochares is said to have
-been brought on by his sarcastic comments upon this decree.[899]
-In the month Munychion (April) Demetrius mustered his forces and
-his Grecian allies for a march into Thessaly against Kassander;
-but before his departure, he was anxious to be initiated in the
-Eleusinian mysteries. It was however not the regular time for
-this ceremony; the Lesser Mysteries being celebrated in February,
-the Greater in September. The Athenians overruled the difficulty
-by passing a special vote, enabling him to be initiated at once,
-and to receive in immediate succession, the preparatory and the
-final initiation, between which ceremonies a year of interval was
-habitually required. Accordingly, he placed himself disarmed in the
-hands of the priests, and received both first and second initiation
-in the month of April, immediately before his departure from
-Athens.[900]
-
-  [898] Plutarch, Demetr. 24.
-
-  [899] Such is the statement of Plutarch (Demetr. 24); but it
-  seems not in harmony with the recital of the honorary decree,
-  passed in 272 B. C., after the death of Demochares,
-  commemorating his merits by a statue, etc. (Plutarch, Vit. X.
-  Oratt. p. 850). It is there recited that Demochares rendered
-  services to Athens (fortifying and arming the city, concluding
-  peace and alliance with the Bœotians, etc.) ἐπὶ τοῦ τετραετοῦς
-  πολέμου, ἀνθ᾽ ὧν ἐξέπεσεν ὑπὸ τῶν καταλυσάντων τὸν δῆμον. Οἱ
-  καταλύσαντες τὸν δῆμον cannot mean either Demetrius Poliorketes,
-  or Stratokles. Moreover, we cannot determine when the “four
-  years’ war”, or the alliance with the Bœotians, occurred. Neither
-  the discussion of Mr. Clinton (Fast. H. 302 B. C., and
-  Append. p. 380), nor the different hypothesis of Droysen, are
-  satisfactory on this point—see Carl Müller’s discussion on the
-  fragments of Demochares, Fragm. Hist. Gr. v. ii. p. 446.
-
-  [900] Diodor. xx. 110. παραδοὺς οὖν αὑτὸν ἄνοπλον τοῖς ἱερεῦσι,
-  καὶ πρὸ τῆς ὡρισμένης ἡμέρας μυηθεὶς, ἀνέζευξεν ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν.
-
-  The account of this transaction in the text is taken from
-  Diodorus, and is a simple one; a vote was passed granting special
-  license to Demetrius, to receive the mysteries at once, though it
-  was not the appointed season.
-
-  Plutarch (Demetr. 26) superadds other circumstances, several of
-  which have the appearance of jest rather than reality. Pythodôrus
-  the Daduch or Torch-bearer of the Mysteries stood alone in his
-  protest against any celebration of the ceremony out of time:
-  this is doubtless very credible. Then (according to Plutarch)
-  the Athenians passed decrees, on the proposition of Stratokles,
-  that the month Munychion should be called Anthesterion. This
-  having been done, the Lesser Mysteries were celebrated, in which
-  Demetrius was initiated. Next, the Athenians passed another
-  decree, to the effect, that the month Munychion should be called
-  Boêdromion—after which, the Greater Mysteries (which belonged to
-  the latter month) were forthwith celebrated. The comic writer
-  Philippides said of Stratokles, that he had compressed the whole
-  year into a single month.
-
-  This statement of Plutarch has very much the air of a caricature,
-  by Philippides or some other witty man, of the simple decree
-  mentioned by Diodorus—a special license to Demetrius to be
-  initiated out of season. Compare another passage of Philippides
-  against Stratokles (Plutarch, Demetr. 12).
-
-Demetrius conducted into Thessaly an army of 56,000 men; of whom
-25,000 were Grecian allies—so extensive was his sway at this moment
-over the Grecian cities.[901] But after two or three months of
-hostilities, partially successful, against Kassander, he was summoned
-into Asia by Antigonus to assist in meeting the formidable army
-of the allies—Ptolemy, Seleukus, Lysimachus, and Kassander. Before
-retiring from Greece, Demetrius concluded a truce with Kassander,
-whereby it was stipulated that the Grecian cities, both in Europe
-and Asia, should be permanently autonomous and free from garrison or
-control. This stipulation served only as an honorable pretext for
-leaving Greece; Demetrius had little expectation that it would be
-observed.[902] In the ensuing spring was fought the decisive battle
-of Ipsus in Phrygia (B. C. 300), by Antigonus and Demetrius,
-against Ptolemy, Seleukus, and Lysimachus; with a large army and
-many elephants on both sides. Antigonus was completely defeated and
-slain, at the age of more than eighty years. His Asiatic dominion was
-broken up, chiefly to the profit of Seleukus, whose dynasty became
-from henceforward ascendent, from the coast of Syria eastward to the
-Caspian Gates and Parthia; sometimes, though imperfectly, farther
-eastward, nearly to the Indus.[903]
-
-  [901] Diodor. xx. 110.
-
-  [902] Diodor. xx. 111. It must have been probably during this
-  campaign that Demetrius began or projected the foundation of
-  the important city of Demetrias on the Gulf of Magnesia, which
-  afterwards became one of the great strongholds of the Macedonian
-  ascendency in Greece (Strabo, ix. p. 436-443, in which latter
-  passage, the reference to Hieronymus of Kardia seems to prove
-  that that historian gave a full description of Demetrias and its
-  foundation). See about Demetrias, Mannert, Geogr. v. Griech. vii.
-  p. 591.
-
-  [903] Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fast. Hell. B. C. 301) places
-  the battle of Ipsus in August 301 B. C.; which appears
-  to me some months earlier than the reality. It is clear from
-  Diodorus, (and indeed from Mr. Clinton’s own admission) that
-  winter-quarters in Asia intervened between the departure of
-  Demetrius from Athens in or soon after April 301 B. C.,
-  and the battle of Ipsus. Moreover Demetrius, immediately after
-  leaving Athens, carried on many operations against Kassander in
-  Thessaly, before crossing over to Asia to join Antigonus (Diodor.
-  xx. 110, 111).
-
-The effects of the battle of Ipsus were speedily felt in Greece.
-The Athenians passed a decree proclaiming themselves neutral, and
-excluding both the belligerent parties from Attica. Demetrius,
-retiring with the remnant of his defeated army, and embarking at
-Ephesus to sail to Athens, was met on the voyage by Athenian envoys,
-who respectfully acquainted him that he would not be admitted. At
-the same time, his wife Deidameia, whom he had left at Athens, was
-sent away by the Athenians under an honorable escort to Megara, while
-some ships of war which he had left in the Peiræus were also restored
-to him. Demetrius, indignant at this unexpected defection of a city
-which had recently heaped upon him such fulsome adulation, was still
-farther mortified by the loss of most of his other possessions in
-Greece.[904] His garrisons were for the most part expelled, and the
-cities passed into Kassandrian keeping or dominion. His fortunes
-were indeed partially restored by concluding a peace with Seleukus,
-who married his daughter. This alliance withdrew Demetrius to
-Syria, while Greece appears to have fallen more and more under the
-Kassandrian parties. It was one of these partisans, Lachares, who,
-seconded by Kassander’s soldiers, acquired a despotism at Athens
-such as had been possessed by the Phalerean Demetrius, but employed
-in a manner far more cruel and oppressive. Various exiles driven out
-by his tyranny invited Demetrius Poliorketes, who passed over again
-from Asia into Greece, recovered portions of Peloponnesus, and laid
-siege to Athens. He blocked up the city by sea and land, so that the
-pressure of famine presently became intolerable. Lachares having
-made his escape, the people opened their gates to Demetrius, not
-without great fear of the treatment awaiting them. But he behaved
-with forbearance, and even with generosity. He spared them all,
-supplied them with a large donation of corn, and contented himself
-with taking military occupation of the city, naming his own friends
-as magistrates. He put garrisons, however, not only into Peiræus and
-Munychia, but also into the hill called Museum, a part of the walled
-circle of Athens itself[905] (B. C. 298).
-
-  [904] Plutarch, Demetr. 31.
-
-  [905] Plutarch, Demetr. 34, 35; Pausan. i. 25, 5. Pausanias
-  states (i. 26, 2) that a gallant Athenian named Olympiodorus (we
-  do not know when) encouraged his fellow-citizens to attack the
-  Museum, Munychia, and Peiræus; and expelled the Macedonians from
-  all of them. If this be correct, Munychia and Peiræus must have
-  been afterwards reconquered by the Macedonians: for they were
-  garrisoned (as well as Salamis and Sunium) by Antigonus Gonatas
-  (Pausanias, ii. 8, 5; Plutarch, Aratus, 34).
-
-While Demetrius was thus strengthening himself in Greece, he lost
-all his footing both in Cyprus, Syria, and Kilikia, which passed
-into the hands of Ptolemy and Seleukus. New prospects however
-were opened to him in Macedonia by the death of Kassander (his
-brother-in-law, brother of his wife Phila) and the family feuds
-supervening thereupon. Philippus, eldest son of Kassander, succeeded
-his father, but died of sickness after something more than a year.
-Between the two remaining sons, Antipater and Alexander, a sanguinary
-hostility broke out. Antipater slew his mother Thessalonikê, and
-threatened the life of his brother, who in his turn invited aid
-both from Demetrius, and from the Epirotic king Pyrrhus. Pyrrhus
-being ready first, marched into Macedonia, and expelled Antipater;
-receiving as his recompense the territory called Tymphæa (between
-Epirus and Macedonia), together with Akarnania, Amphilochia,
-and the town of Ambrakia, which became henceforward his chief
-city and residence.[906] Antipater sought shelter in Thrace with
-his father-in-law Lysimachus; by whose order, however, he was
-presently slain. Demetrius, occupied with other matters, was more
-tardy in obeying the summons; but, on entering into Macedonia,
-he found himself strong enough to dispossess and kill Alexander
-(who had indeed invited him, but is said to have laid a train for
-assassinating him), and seized the Macedonian crown; not without the
-assent of a considerable party, to whom the name and the deeds of
-Kassander and his sons were alike odious.[907]
-
-  [906] Plutarch, Pyrrhus, 6.
-
-  [907] Plutarch, Demetr. 36; Dexippus ap. Syncell. p. 264 _seq._;
-  Pausan. 7, 3; Justin, xvi. 1, 2.
-
-Demetrius became thus master of Macedonia, together with the greater
-part of Greece, including Athens, Megara, and much of Peloponnesus.
-He undertook an expedition into Bœotia, for the purpose of conquering
-Thebes; in which attempt he succeeded, not without a double siege of
-that city, which made an obstinate resistance. He left as viceroy in
-Bœotia the historian, Hieronymus of Kardia,[908] once the attached
-friend and fellow-citizen of Eumenes. But Greece as a whole was
-managed by Antigonus (afterwards called Antigonus Gonatas) son of
-Demetrius, who maintained his supremacy unshaken during all his
-father’s lifetime; even though Demetrius was deprived of Macedonia
-by the temporary combination of Lysimachus with Pyrrhus, and
-afterwards remained (until his death in 283 B. C.) a captive in the
-hands of Seleukus. After a brief possession of the crown of Macedonia
-successively by Seleukus, Ptolemy, Keraunus, Meleager, Antipater, and
-Sosthenes—Antigonus Gonatas regained it in 277 B. C. His descendants
-the Antigonid kings maintained it until the battle of Pydna in 168 B.
-C.; when Perseus, the last of them, was overthrown, and his kingdom
-incorporated with the Roman conquests.[909]
-
-  [908] Plutarch, Demetr. 39.
-
-  [909] See Mr. Clinton’s Fasti Hellenici, Append. 4. p. 236-239.
-
-Of Greece during this period we can give no account, except that the
-greater number of its cities were in dependence upon Demetrius and
-his son Antigonus; either under occupation by Macedonian garrisons,
-or ruled by local despots who leaned on foreign mercenaries and
-Macedonian support. The spirit of the Greeks was broken, and their
-habits of combined sentiment and action had disappeared. The invasion
-of the Gauls indeed awakened them into a temporary union for the
-defence of Thermopylæ in 279 B. C. So intolerable was the
-cruelty and spoliation of those barbarian invaders, that the cities
-as well as Antigonus were driven by fear to the efforts necessary
-for repelling them.[910] A gallant army of Hellenic confederates
-was mustered. In the mountains of Ætolia and in the neighborhood of
-Delphi, most of the Gallic horde with their king Brennus perished.
-But this burst of spirit did not interrupt the continuance of the
-Macedonian dominion in Greece, which Antigonus Gonatas continued
-to hold throughout most of a long reign. He greatly extended the
-system begun by his predecessors, of isolating each Grecian city from
-alliances with other cities in its neighborhood—planting in most of
-them local despots—and compressing the most important by means of
-garrisons.[911] Among all Greeks, the Spartans and the Ætolians
-stood most free from foreign occupation, and were the least crippled
-in their power of self-action. The Achæan league too developed itself
-afterwards as a renovated sprout from the ruined tree of Grecian
-liberty,[912] though never attaining to anything better than a feeble
-and puny life, nor capable of sustaining itself without foreign
-aid.[913]
-
-  [910] Pausanias, i. 4, 1; x. 20, 1. Τοῖς δέ γε Ἕλλησι
-  κατεπεπτώκει μὲν ἐς ἅπαν τὰ φρονήματα, τὸ δὲ ἰσχυρὸν τοῦ δείματος
-  προῆγεν ἐς ἀνάγκην τῇ Ἑλλάδι ἀμύνειν· ἑώρων δὲ τόν τε ἐν τῷ
-  παρόντι ἀγῶνα, οὐκ ὑπὲρ ἐλευθερίας γενησόμενον, καθὰ ἐπὶ τοῦ
-  Μήδου πότε ... ὡς οὖν ἀπολωλέναι δέον ἢ ἐπικρατεστέρους εἶναι,
-  κατ᾽ ἄνδρα τε ἰδίᾳ καὶ αἱ πόλεις διέκειντο ἐν κοινῷ. (On the
-  approach of the invading Gauls.)
-
-  [911] Polyb. ii. 40, 41. πλείστους γὰρ δὴ μονάρχους οὗτος
-  (Antigonus Gonatas) ἐμφυτεῦσαι δοκεῖ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν. Justin, xxvi.
-  1.
-
-  [912] Pausanias, vii. 17, 1. Ἅτε ἐκ δένδρου λελωβημένου,
-  ἀνεβλάστησεν ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος τὸ Ἀχαϊκόν.
-
-  [913] Plutarch, Aratus, 47. ἐθισθέντες γὰρ ἀλλοτρίαις σώζεσθαι
-  χερσὶν, καὶ τοῖς Μακεδόνων ὅπλοις αὑτοὺς ὑπεσταλκότες (the
-  Achæans), etc. Compare also c. 12, 13, 15, in reference to the
-  earlier applications to Ptolemy king of Egypt.
-
-With this after-growth, or half-revival, I shall not meddle. It
-forms the Greece of Polybius, which that author treats, in my
-opinion justly, as having no history of its own,[914] but as an
-appendage attached to some foreign centre and principal among its
-neighbors—Macedonia, Egypt, Syria, Rome. Each of these neighbors
-acted upon the destinies of Greece more powerfully than the Greeks
-themselves. The Greeks to whom these volumes have been devoted—those
-of Homer, Archilochus, Solon, Æschylus, Herodotus, Thucydides,
-Xenophon, and Demosthenes—present as their most marked characteristic
-a loose aggregation of autonomous tribes or communities, acting and
-reacting freely among themselves, with little or no pressure from
-foreigners. The main interest of the narrative has consisted in the
-spontaneous grouping of the different Hellenic fractions—in the
-self-prompted cooperations and conflicts—the abortive attempts to
-bring about something like an effective federal organization, or to
-maintain two permanent rival confederacies—the energetic ambition,
-and heroic endurance, of men to whom Hellas was the entire political
-world. The freedom of Hellas, the life and soul of this history from
-its commencement, disappeared completely during the first years of
-Alexander’s reign. After following to their tombs the generation of
-Greeks contemporary with him, men like Demosthenes and Phokion, born
-in a state of freedom—I have pursued the history into that gulf of
-Grecian nullity which marks the succeeding century; exhibiting sad
-evidence of the degrading servility, and suppliant king-worship,
-into which the countrymen of Aristeides and Perikles had been driven,
-by their own conscious weakness under overwhelming pressure from
-without.
-
-  [914] Polybius, i. 3, 4; ii. 37.
-
-I cannot better complete that picture than by showing what the
-leading democratical citizen became, under the altered atmosphere
-which now bedimmed his city. Demochares, the nephew of Demosthenes,
-has been mentioned as one of the few distinguished Athenians in
-this last generation. He was more than once chosen to the highest
-public offices;[915] he was conspicuous for his free speech, both
-as an orator and as an historian, in the face of powerful enemies;
-he remained throughout a long life faithfully attached to the
-democratical constitution, and was banished for a time by its
-opponents. In the year 280 B. C., he prevailed on the Athenians
-to erect a public monument, with a commemorative inscription, to
-his uncle Demosthenes. Seven or eight years afterwards, Demochares
-himself died, aged nearly eighty. His son Laches proposed and
-obtained a public decree, that a statue should be erected, with an
-annexed inscription, to his honor. We read in the decree a recital of
-the distinguished public services, whereby Demochares merited this
-compliment from his countrymen. All that the proposer of the decree,
-his son and fellow-citizen, can find to recite, as ennobling the last
-half of the father’s public life (since his return from exile), is as
-follows:—1. He contracted the public expenses, and introduced a more
-frugal management. 2. He undertook an embassy to King Lysimachus,
-from whom he obtained two presents for the people, one of thirty
-talents, the other of one hundred talents. 3. He proposed the vote
-for sending envoys to King Ptolemy in Egypt, from whom fifty talents
-were obtained for the people. 4. He went as envoy to Antipater,
-received from him twenty talents, and delivered them to the people at
-the Eleusinian festival.[916]
-
-  [915] Polybius, xii. 13.
-
-  [916] See the decree in Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 850. The
-  Antipater here mentioned is the son of Kassander, not the father.
-  There is no necessity for admitting the conjecture of Mr. Clinton
-  (Fast. Hell. App. p. 380) that the name ought to be _Antigonus_,
-  and not _Antipater_; although it may perhaps be true that
-  Demochares was on favorable terms with Antigonus Gonatas (Diog.
-  Laert. vii, 14).
-
-  Compare Carl Müller ad Democharis Fragm. apud Fragm. Hist. Græc.
-  vol. ii. p. 446, ed. Didot.
-
-When such begging missions are the deeds, for which Athens both
-employed and recompensed her most eminent citizens, an historian
-accustomed to the Grecian world as described by Herodotus,
-Thucydides, and Xenophon, feels that the life has departed from his
-subject, and with sadness and humiliation brings his narrative to a
-close.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER XCVII.
-
-SICILIAN AND ITALIAN GREEKS. — AGATHOKLES.
-
-
-It has been convenient, throughout all this work, to keep the history
-of the Italian and Sicilian Greeks distinct from that of the Central
-and Asiatic. We parted last from the Sicilian Greeks,[917] at the
-death of their champion the Corinthian Timoleon (337 B. C.),
-by whose energetic exploits, and generous political policy, they
-had been almost regenerated—rescued from foreign enemies, protected
-against intestine discord, and invigorated by a large reinforcement
-of new colonists. For the twenty years next succeeding the death of
-Timoleon, the history of Syracuse and Sicily is an absolute blank;
-which is deeply to be regretted, since the position of these cities
-included so much novelty—so many subjects for debate, for peremptory
-settlement, or for amicable compromise—that the annals of their
-proceedings must have been peculiarly interesting. Twenty years after
-the death of Timoleon, we find the government of Syracuse described
-as an oligarchy; implying that the constitution established by
-Timoleon must have been changed either by violence or by consent.
-The oligarchy is stated as consisting of 600 chief men, among whom
-Sosistratus and Herakleides appear as leaders.[918] We hear generally
-that the Syracusans had been engaged in wars, and that Sosistratus
-either first originated, or first firmly established, his oligarchy,
-after an expedition undertaken to the coast of Italy, to assist the
-citizens of Kroton against their interior neighbors and assailants
-the Bruttians.
-
-  [917] See my last preceding Vol. XI. Ch. lxxxv. p. 196.
-
-  [918] Diodor. xix. 3. It appears that Diodorus had recounted
-  in his eighteenth Book the previous circumstances of these two
-  leaders; but this part of his narrative is lost: see Wesseling’s
-  note.
-
-Not merely Kroton, but other Grecian cities also on the coast of
-Italy, appear to have been exposed to causes of danger and decline,
-similar to those which were operating upon so many other portions
-of the Hellenic world. Their non-Hellenic neighbors in the interior
-were growing too powerful and too aggressive to leave them in peace
-or security. The Messapians, the Lucanians, the Bruttians, and other
-native Italian tribes, were acquiring that increased strength which
-became ultimately all concentrated under the mighty republic of Rome.
-I have in my preceding volume recounted the acts of the two Syracusan
-despots, the elder and younger Dionysius, on this Italian coast.[919]
-Though the elder gained some advantage over the Lucanians, yet the
-interference of both contributed only to enfeeble and humiliate the
-Italiot Greeks. Not long before the battle of Chæroneia (340-338
-B. C.), the Tarentines found themselves so hard pressed by the
-Messapians, that they sent to Sparta, their mother-city, to entreat
-assistance. The Spartan king Archidamus son of Agesilaus, perhaps
-ashamed of the nullity of his country since the close of the Sacred
-War, complied with their prayer, and sailed at the head of a
-mercenary force to Italy. How long his operations there lasted, we do
-not know; but they ended by his being defeated and killed, near the
-time of the battle of Chæroneia[920] (338 B. C.).
-
-  [919] See Vol. XI. Ch. lxxxiii. p. 22; Ch. lxxxv. p. 133.
-
-  [920] Diodor. xvi. 88; Plutarch, Camill. 19; Pausan. iii. 10,
-  5. Plutarch even says that the two battles occurred on the same
-  _day_.
-
-About six years after this event, the Tarentines, being still pressed
-by the same formidable neighbors, invoked the aid of the Epirotic
-Alexander, king of the Molossians, and brother of Olympias. These
-Epirots now, during the general decline of Grecian force, rise into
-an importance which they had never before enjoyed[921]. Philip of
-Macedon, having married Olympias, not only secured his brother-in-law
-on the Molossian throne, but strengthened his authority over subjects
-not habitually obedient. It was through Macedonian interference that
-the Molossian Alexander first obtained (though subject to Macedonian
-ascendency) the important city of Ambrakia; which thus passed out
-of a free Hellenic community into the capital and seaport of the
-Epirotic kings. Alexander farther cemented his union with Macedonia
-by marrying his own niece Kleopatra, daughter of Philip and Olympias.
-In fact, during the lives of Philip and Alexander the Great, the
-Epirotic kingdom appears a sort of adjunct to the Macedonian;
-governed by Olympias either jointly with her brother the Molossian
-Alexander—or as regent after his death.[922]
-
-  [921] The Molossian King Neoptolemus was father both of Alexander
-  (the Epirotic) and of Olympias. But as to the genealogy of the
-  preceding kings, nothing certain can be made out: see Merleker,
-  Darstellung des Landes und der Bewohner von Epeiros, Königsberg,
-  1844, p. 2-6.
-
-  [922] A curious proof how fully Olympias was queen of Epirus is
-  preserved in the fragments (recently published by Mr. Babington)
-  of the oration of Hyperides in defence of Euxenippus, p. 12. The
-  Athenians, in obedience to an oracular mandate from the Dodonæan
-  Zeus, had sent to Dodona a solemn embassy for sacrifice, and had
-  dressed and adorned the statue of Diônê there situated. Olympias
-  addressed a despatch to the Athenians, reproving them for this as
-  a trespass upon her dominions—ὑπὲρ τούτων ὑμῖν τὰ ἐγκλήματα ἦλθε
-  παρ᾽ Ὀλυμπιάδος ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς, ὡς ~ἡ χώρα εἴη ἡ Μολοσσία
-  αὐτῆς~, ἐν ᾗ τὸ ἱερόν ἐστιν· οὔκουν προσῆκεν ἡμᾶς τῶν ἐκεῖ οὐδὲ
-  ἓν κινεῖν. Olympias took a high and insolent tone in this letter
-  (τὰς ~τραγῳδίας~ αὐτῆς καὶ τὰς κατηγορίας, etc.)
-
-  The date of this oration is at some period during the life of
-  Alexander the Great—but cannot be more precisely ascertained.
-  After the death of Alexander, Olympias passed much time in
-  Epirus, where she thought herself more secure from the enmity of
-  Antipater (Diodor. xviii. 49).
-
-  Dodona had been one of the most ancient places of pilgrimage
-  for the Hellenic race—especially for the Athenians. The order
-  here addressed to them,—that they should abstain from religious
-  manifestations at this sanctuary—is a remarkable proof of the
-  growing encroachments on free Hellenism; the more so, as Olympias
-  sent offerings to temples at Athens when she chose and without
-  asking permission—we learn this from the same fragment of
-  Hyperides.
-
-It was about the year after the battle of Issus that the Molossian
-Alexander undertook his expedition into Italy;[923] doubtless
-instigated in part by emulation of the Asiatic glories of his
-nephew and namesake. Though he found enemies more formidable than
-the Persians at Issus, yet his success was at first considerable.
-He gained victories over the Messapians, the Lucanians, and the
-Samnites; he conquered the Lucanian town of Consentia, and the
-Bruttian town of Tereina; he established an alliance with the
-Pœdiculi, and exchanged friendly messages with the Romans. As far
-as we can make out from scanty data, he seems to have calculated on
-establishing a comprehensive dominion in the south of Italy, over
-all its population—over Greek cities, Lucanians, and Bruttians.
-He demanded and obtained three hundred of the chief Lucanian and
-Messapian families, whom he sent over as hostages to Epirus.
-Several exiles of these nations joined him as partisans. He farther
-endeavored to transfer the congress of the Greco-Italian cities,
-which had been usually held at the Tarentine colony of Herakleia, to
-Thurii; intending probably to procure for himself a compliant synod
-like that serving the purpose of his Macedonian nephew at Corinth.
-But the tide of his fortune at length turned. The Tarentines became
-disgusted and alarmed; his Lucanian partisans proved faithless; the
-stormy weather in the Calabrian Apennines broke up the communication
-between his different detachments, and exposed them to be cut off
-in detail. He himself perished, by the hands of a Lucanian exile,
-in crossing the river Acheron, and near the town of Pandosia. This
-was held to be a memorable attestation of the prophetic veracity of
-the oracle; since he had received advice from Dodona to beware of
-Pandosia and Acheron; two names which he well knew, and therefore
-avoided, in Epirus—but which he had not before known to exist in
-Italy.[924]
-
-  [923] Livy (viii. 3-24) places the date of this expedition of the
-  Molossian Alexander eight years earlier; but it is universally
-  recognized that this is a mistake.
-
-  [924] Livy, viii. 17-24; Justin, xii. 2; Strabo, vi. p. 280.
-
-The Greco-Italian cities had thus dwindled down into a prize to be
-contended for between the Epirotic kings and the native Italian
-powers—as they again became, still more conspicuously, fifty years
-afterwards, during the war between Pyrrhus and the Romans. They
-were now left to seek foreign aid, where they could obtain it, and
-to become the prey of adventurers. It is in this capacity that we
-hear of them as receiving assistance from Syracuse, and that the
-formidable name of Agathokles first comes before us—seemingly about
-320 B. C.[925] The Syracusan force, sent to Italy to assist
-the Krotoniates against their enemies the Bruttians, was commanded by
-a general named Antander, whose brother Agathokles served with him in
-a subordinate command.
-
-  [925] Diodor. xix. 3.
-
-To pass over the birth and childhood of Agathokles—respecting which,
-romantic anecdotes are told, as about most eminent men,—it appears
-that his father, a Rhegine exile named Karkinus, came from Therma (in
-the Carthaginian portion of Sicily) to settle at Syracuse, at the
-time when Timoleon invited and received new Grecian settlers to the
-citizenship of the latter city. Karkinus was in comparative poverty,
-following the trade of a potter; which his son Agathokles learnt
-also, being about eighteen years of age when domiciliated with his
-father at Syracuse.[926] Though starting from this humble beginning,
-and even notorious for the profligacy and rapacity of his youthful
-habits, Agathokles soon attained a conspicuous position, partly
-from his own superior personal qualities, partly from the favor of
-a wealthy Syracusan named Damas. The young potter was handsome,
-tall, and of gigantic strength; he performed with distinction the
-military service required from him as a citizen, wearing a panoply
-so heavy, that no other soldier could fight with it; he was moreover
-ready, audacious, and emphatic in public harangue. Damas became much
-attached to him, and not only supplied him profusely with money,
-but also, when placed in command of a Syracusan army against the
-Agrigentines, nominated him one of the subordinate officers. In this
-capacity Agathokles acquired great reputation, for courage in battle,
-ability in command, and fluency of speech. Presently Damas died of
-sickness, leaving a widow without children. Agathokles married the
-widow, and thus raised himself to a high fortune and position in
-Syracuse.[927]
-
-  [926] Timæus apud Polybium, xii. 15; Diodor. xix. 2.
-
-  [927] Diodor. xix. 3; Justin, xxii. 1. Justin states the earliest
-  military exploits of Agathokles to have been against the Ætuæans,
-  not against the Agrigentines.
-
-Of the oligarchy which now prevailed at Syracuse, we have no
-particulars, nor do we know how it had come to be substituted
-for the more popular forms established by Timoleon. We hear only
-generally that the oligarchical leaders, Sosistratus and Herakleides,
-were unprincipled and sanguinary men.[928] By this government an
-expedition was despatched from Syracuse to the Italian coast, to
-assist the inhabitants of Kroton against their aggressive neighbors
-the Bruttians. Antander, brother of Agathokles, was one of the
-generals commanding this armament, and Agathokles himself served in
-it as a subordinate officer. We neither know the date, the duration,
-nor the issue, of this expedition.
-
-  [928] Diodor. xix. 3, 4. Diodorus had written more about this
-  oligarchy in a part of his eighteenth book; which part is not
-  preserved: see Wesseling’s note.
-
-But it afforded a fresh opportunity to Agathokles to display his
-adventurous bravery and military genius, which procured for him
-high encomium. He was supposed by some, on his return to Syracuse,
-to be entitled to the first prize for valor; but Sosistratus and
-the other oligarchical leaders withheld it from him and preferred
-another. So deeply was Agathokles incensed by this refusal, that he
-publicly inveighed against them among the people, as men aspiring to
-despotism. His opposition being unsuccessful, and drawing upon him
-the enmity of the government, he retired to the coast of Italy.
-
-Here he levied a military band of Grecian exiles and Campanian
-mercenaries, which he maintained by various enterprises for or
-against the Grecian cities. He attacked Kroton, but was repulsed
-with loss; he took service with the Tarentines, fought for some time
-against their enemies, but at length became suspected and dismissed;
-he then joined himself with the inhabitants of Rhegium, assisting
-in the defence of the town against a Syracusan aggression. He even
-made two attempts to obtain admission by force into Syracuse, and
-to seize the government.[929] Though repulsed in both of them, he
-nevertheless contrived to maintain a footing in Sicily, was appointed
-general at the town of Morgantium, and captured Leontini, within a
-short distance north of Syracuse. Some time afterwards, a revolution
-took place at Syracuse, whereby Sosistratus and the oligarchy were
-dispossessed and exiled with many of their partisans.
-
-  [929] Diodor. xix. 4; Justin, xxii. 1. “Bis occupare imperium
-  Syracusarum voluit; bis in exilium actus est.”
-
-  In the same manner, the Syracusan exile Hermokrates had attempted
-  to extort by force his return, at the head of 3000 men, and by
-  means of partisans within; he failed and was slain—B. C.
-  408 (Diodor. xiii. 75).
-
-Under the new government, Agathokles obtained his recall, and soon
-gained increased ascendency. The dispossessed exiles contrived to
-raise forces, and to carry on a formidable war against Syracuse
-from without; they even obtained assistance from the Carthaginians,
-so as to establish themselves at Gela, on the southern confines of
-the Syracusan territory. In the military operations thus rendered
-necessary, Agathokles took a forward part, distinguishing himself
-among the ablest and most enterprising officers. He tried, with 1000
-soldiers, to surprise Gela by night; but finding the enemy on their
-guard, he was repulsed with loss and severely wounded; yet by an able
-manœuvre he brought off all his remaining detachment. Though thus
-energetic against the public enemy, however, he at the same time
-inspired both hatred and alarm for his dangerous designs, to the
-Syracusans within. The Corinthian Akestorides, who had been named
-general of the city—probably from recollection of the distinguished
-services formerly rendered by the Corinthian Timoleon—becoming
-persuaded that the presence of Agathokles was full of peril to the
-city, ordered him to depart, and provided men to assassinate him on
-the road during the night. But Agathokles, suspecting their design,
-disguised himself in the garb of a beggar, appointing another man to
-travel in the manner which would be naturally expected from himself.
-This substitute was slain in the dark by the assassins, while
-Agathokles escaped by favor of his disguise. He and his partisans
-appear to have found shelter with the Carthaginians in Sicily.[930]
-
-  [930] Diodor. xix. 5, 6. A similar stratagem is recounted of the
-  Karian Datames (Cornelius Nepos, Datames, 9).
-
-  That Agathokles, on leaving Syracuse, went to the Carthaginians,
-  appears to be implied in the words of Diodorus, c. 6—τοὺς αὐτῷ
-  πρότερον συμπορευθέντας ~πρὸς~ Καρχηδονίους (see Wesseling’s
-  note on the translation of ~πρὸς~). This fact is noticed merely
-  incidentally, in the confused narrative of Diodorus; but it
-  brings him to a certain extent into harmony with Justin (xxii.
-  2), who insists much on the combination between Agathokles and
-  the Carthaginians, as one of the main helps whereby he was
-  enabled to seize the supreme power.
-
-Not long afterwards, another change took place in the government
-of Syracuse, whereby the oligarchical exiles were recalled, and
-peace made with the Carthaginians. It appears that a senate of
-600 was again installed as the chief political body; probably not
-the same men as before, and with some democratical modifications.
-At the same time, negotiations were opened, through the mediation
-of the Carthaginian commander Hamilkar, between the Syracusans
-and Agathokles. The mischiefs of intestine conflict, amidst the
-numerous discordant parties in the city, pressed hard upon every one,
-and hopes were entertained that all might be brought to agree in
-terminating them. Agathokles affected to enter cordially into these
-projects of amnesty and reconciliation. The Carthaginian general
-Hamilkar, who had so recently aided Sosistratus and the Syracusan
-oligarchy, now did his best to promote the recall of Agathokles,
-and even made himself responsible for the good and pacific behavior
-of that exile. Agathokles, and the other exiles along with him were
-accordingly restored. A public assembly was convened in the temple of
-Demeter, in the presence of Hamilkar; where Agathokles swore by the
-most awful oaths, with his hands touching the altar and statue of the
-goddess, that he would behave as a good citizen of Syracuse, uphold
-faithfully the existing government, and carry out the engagements
-of the Carthaginian mediators—abstaining from encroachments on
-the rights and possessions of Carthage in Sicily. His oaths and
-promises were delivered with so much apparent sincerity, accompanied
-by emphatic harangues, that the people were persuaded to name him
-general and guardian of the peace, for the purpose of realizing the
-general aspirations towards harmony. Such appointment was recommended
-(it seems) by Hamilkar.[931]
-
-  [931] The account here given is the best which I can make out
-  from Diodorus (xix. 5), Justin (xxii. 2),—Polyænus (v. 3, 8). The
-  first two allude to the solemn oath taken by Agathokles—παραχθεὶς
-  εἰς τὸ τῆς Δήμητρος ἱερὸν ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν, ὤμοσε μηδὲν
-  ἐναντιωθήσεσθαι τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ—“Tunc Hamilcari expositis ignibus
-  Cereris tactisque in obsequia Pœnorum jurat.” “Jurare in obsequia
-  Pœnorum” can hardly be taken to mean that Syracuse was to become
-  subject to Carthage; there was nothing antecedent to justify
-  such a proceeding, nor does anything follow in the sequel which
-  implies it.
-
-  Compare also the speech which Justin puts into the
-  mouth of Bomilkar when executed for treason by the
-  Carthaginians—“objectans illis (Carthaginiensibus) in Hamilcarem
-  patruum suum tacita suffragia, quod Agathoclem _sociam illis
-  facere, quam hostem, maluerit_” (xxii. 7). This points to
-  previous collusion between Hamilkar and Agathokles.
-
-All this train of artifice had been concerted by Agathokles with
-Hamilkar, for the purpose of enabling the former to seize the
-supreme power. As general of the city, Agathokles had the direction
-of the military force. Under the pretence of marching against some
-refractory exiles at Erbita in the interior, he got together 3000
-soldiers strenuously devoted to him—mercenaries and citizens of
-desperate character—to which Hamilkar added a reinforcement of
-Africans. As if about to march forth, he mustered his troops at
-daybreak in the Timoleonteon (chapel or precinct consecrated to
-Timoleon), while Peisarchus and Dekles, two chiefs of the senate
-already assembled, were invited with forty others to transact with
-him some closing business. Having these men in his power, Agathokles
-suddenly turned upon them, and denounced them to the soldiers as
-guilty of conspiring his death. Then, receiving from the soldiers a
-response full of ardor, he ordered them immediately to proceed to a
-general massacre of the senate and their leading partisans, with full
-permission of licentious plunder in the houses of these victims, the
-richest men in Syracuse. The soldiers rushed into the street with
-ferocious joy to execute this order. They slew not only the senators,
-but many others also, unarmed and unprepared; each man selecting
-victims personally obnoxious to him. They broke open the doors of the
-rich, or climbed over the roofs, massacred the proprietors within,
-and ravished the females. They chased the unsuspecting fugitives
-through the streets, not sparing even those who took refuge in the
-temples. Many of these unfortunate sufferers rushed for safety to
-the gates, but found them closed and guarded by special order of
-Agathokles; so that they were obliged to let themselves down from the
-walls, in which many perished miserably. For two days Syracuse was
-thus a prey to the sanguinary, rapacious, and lustful impulses of the
-soldiery; four thousand citizens had been already slain, and many
-more were seized as prisoners. The political purposes of Agathokles,
-as well as the passions of the soldiers, being then sated, he
-arrested the massacre. He concluded this bloody feat by killing such
-of his prisoners as were most obnoxious to him, and banishing the
-rest. The total number of expelled or fugitive Syracusans is stated
-at 6000; who found a hospitable shelter and home at Agrigentum. One
-act of lenity is mentioned, and ought not to be omitted amidst this
-scene of horror. Deinokrates, one among the prisoners, was liberated
-by Agathokles from motives of former friendship: he too, probably,
-went into voluntary exile.[932]
-
-  [932] Diodor. xix. 8, 9; Justin, xxii. 2.
-
-After a massacre thus perpetrated in the midst of profound peace,
-and in the full confidence of a solemn act of mutual reconciliation
-immediately preceding—surpassing the worst deeds of the elder
-Dionysius, and indeed (we might almost say) of all other Grecian
-despots—Agathokles convened what he called an assembly of the people.
-Such of the citizens as were either oligarchical, or wealthy, or
-in any way unfriendly to him, had been already either slain or
-expelled; so that the assembly probably included few besides his own
-soldiers: Agathokles, addressing them in terms of congratulation on
-the recent glorious exploit, whereby they had purged the city of
-its oligarchical tyrants—proclaimed that the Syracusan people had
-now reconquered their full liberty. He affected to be weary of the
-toils of command, and anxious only for a life of quiet equality as
-one among the many; in token of which he threw off his general’s
-cloak and put on a common civil garment. But those whom he addressed,
-fresh from the recent massacre and plunder, felt that their whole
-security depended upon the maintenance of his supremacy, and loudly
-protested that they would not accept his resignation. Agathokles,
-with pretended reluctance, told them, that if they insisted, he would
-comply, but upon the peremptory condition of enjoying a single-handed
-authority, without any colleagues or counsellors for whose misdeeds
-he was to be responsible. The assembly replied by conferring upon
-him, with unanimous acclamations, the post of general with unlimited
-power, or despot.[933]
-
-  [933] Diodor. xix. 9.
-
-Thus was constituted a new despot of Syracuse about fifty years
-after the decease of the elder Dionysius, and twenty-two years after
-Timoleon had rooted out the Dionysian dynasty, establishing on its
-ruins a free polity. On accepting the post, Agathokles took pains
-to proclaim that he would tolerate no farther massacre or plunder,
-and that his government would for the future be mild and beneficent.
-He particularly studied to conciliate the poorer citizens, to whom
-he promised abolition of debts and a new distribution of lands. How
-far he carried out this project systematically, we do not know; but
-he conferred positive donations on many of the poor—which he had
-abundant means of doing, out of the properties of the numerous exiles
-recently expelled. He was full of promises to every one, displaying
-courteous and popular manners, and abstaining from all ostentation
-of guards, or ceremonial attendants, or a diadem. He at the same
-time applied himself vigorously to strengthen his military and
-naval force, his magazines of arms and stores, and his revenues. He
-speedily extended his authority over all the territorial domain of
-Syracuse, with her subject towns, and carried his arms successfully
-over many other parts of Sicily.[934]
-
-  [934] Diodor. xix. 9.; Justin, xxii. 2.
-
-The Carthaginian general Hamilkar, whose complicity or connivance
-had helped Agathokles to this blood-stained elevation, appears to
-have permitted him without opposition to extend his dominion over a
-large portion of Sicily, and even to plunder the towns in alliance
-with Carthage itself. Complaints having been made to Carthage, this
-officer was superseded, and another general (also named Hamilkar) was
-sent in his place. We are unable to trace in detail the proceedings
-of Agathokles during the first years of his despotism; but he went on
-enlarging his sway over the neighboring cities, while the Syracusan
-exiles, whom he had expelled, found a home partly at Agrigentum
-(under Deinokrates), partly at Messênê. About the year 314 B.
-C., we hear that he made an attempt on Messênê, which he was on
-the point of seizing, had he not been stopped by the interference of
-the Carthaginians (perhaps the newly-appointed Hamilkar), who now
-at length protested against his violation of the convention; meaning
-(as we must presume, for we know of no other convention) the oath
-which had been sworn by Agathokles at Syracuse under the guarantee
-of the Carthaginians.[935] Though thus disappointed at Messênê,
-Agathokles seized Abakænum—where he slew the leading citizens opposed
-to him,—and carried on his aggressions elsewhere so effectively,
-that the leaders at Agrigentum, instigated by the Syracusan exiles
-there harbored, became convinced of the danger of leaving such
-encroachments unresisted.[936] The people of Agrigentum came to the
-resolution of taking up arms on behalf of the liberties of Sicily,
-and allied themselves with Gela and Messênê for the purpose.
-
-  [935] Diodor. xix. 65. καθ᾽ ὃν δὴ χρόνον ἧκον ἐκ Καρχηδόνος
-  πρέσβεις, οἳ τῷ μὲν Ἀγαθοκλεῖ περὶ τῶν πραχθέντων ἐπετίμησαν,
-  ὡς παραβαίνοντι τὰς συνθήκας· τοῖς δὲ Μεσσηνίοις εἰρήνην
-  παρεσκεύασαν, καὶ τὸ φρούριον ἀναγκάσαντες ἀποκαταστῆσαι τὸν
-  τύραννον, ἀπέπλευσαν εἰς τὴν Λιβύην.
-
-  I do not know what συνθῆκαι can be here meant, except that oath
-  described by Justin under the words “in obsequia Pœnorum jurat”
-  (xxii. 2).
-
-  [936] Diodor. xix. 70. μὴ περιορᾷν Ἀγαθοκλέα συσκευαζόμενον τὰς
-  πόλεις.
-
-But the fearful example of Agathokles himself rendered them so
-apprehensive of the dangers from any military leader, at once
-native and energetic, that they resolved to invite a foreigner.
-Some Syracusan exiles were sent to Sparta, to choose and invoke
-some Spartan of eminence and ability, as Archidamus had recently
-been called to Tarentum—and even more, as Timoleon had been brought
-from Corinth, with results so signally beneficent. The old Spartan
-king Kleomenes (of the Eurysthenid race) had a son Akrotatus, then
-unpopular at home,[937] and well disposed towards foreign warfare.
-This prince, without even consulting the Ephors, listened at once to
-the envoys, and left Peloponnesus with a small squadron, intending to
-cross by Korkyra and the coast of Italy to Agrigentum. Unfavorable
-winds drove him as far north as Apollonia, and delayed his arrival
-at Tarentum; in which city, originally a Spartan colony, he met with
-a cordial reception, and obtained a vote of twenty vessels to assist
-his enterprise of liberating Syracuse from Agathokles. He reached
-Agrigentum with favorable hopes, was received with all the honors
-due to a Spartan prince, and undertook the command. Bitterly did he
-disappoint his party. He was incompetent as a general; he dissipated
-in presents or luxuries the money intended for the campaign,
-emulating Asiatic despots; his conduct was arrogant, tyrannical,
-and even sanguinary. The disgust which he inspired was brought to
-a height, when he caused Sosistratus, the leader of the Syracusan
-exiles, to be assassinated at a banquet. Immediately the exiles rose
-in a body to avenge this murder; while Akrotatus, deposed by the
-Agrigentines, only found safety in flight.[938]
-
-  [937] Diodor. xix. 70. After the defeat of Agis by Antipater,
-  the severe Lacedæmonian laws against those who fled from battle
-  had been suspended for the occasion; as had been done before,
-  after the defeat of Leuktra. Akrotatus had been the _only_ person
-  (μόνος) who opposed this suspension; whereby he incurred the most
-  violent odium generally, but most especially from the citizens
-  who profited by the suspension. These men carried their hatred
-  so far, that they even attacked, beat him and conspired against
-  his life (οὗτοι γὰρ συστραφέντες πληγάς τε ἐνεφόρησαν αὐτῷ καὶ
-  διετέλουν ἐπιβουλεύοντες).
-
-  This is a curious indication of Spartan manners.
-
-  [938] Diodor. xix. 71.
-
-To this young Spartan prince, had he possessed a noble heart and
-energetic qualities, there was here presented a career of equal
-grandeur with that of Timoleon—against an enemy able indeed and
-formidable, yet not so superior in force as to render success
-impossible. It is melancholy to see Akrotatus, from simple
-worthlessness of character, throwing away such an opportunity; at
-a time when Sicily was the only soil on which a glorious Hellenic
-career was still open—when no similar exploits were practicable
-by any Hellenic leader in Central Greece, from the overwhelming
-superiority of force possessed by the surrounding kings.
-
-The misconduct of Akrotatus broke up all hopes of active operations
-against Agathokles. Peace was presently concluded with the latter
-by the Agrigentines and their allies, under the mediation of the
-Carthaginian general Hamilkar. By the terms of this convention,
-all the Greek cities in Sicily were declared autonomous, yet under
-the hegemony of Agathokles; excepting only Himera, Selinus, and
-Herakleia, which were actually, and were declared still to continue,
-under Carthage. Messênê was the only Grecian city standing aloof
-from this convention; as such, therefore still remaining open to the
-Syracusan exiles. The terms were so favorable to Agathokles, that
-they were much disapproved at Carthage.[939] Agathokles, recognized
-as chief and having no enemy in the field, employed himself actively
-in strengthening his hold on the other cities, and in enlarging his
-military means at home. He sent a force against Messênê, to require
-the expulsion of the Syracusan exiles from that city, and to procure
-at the same time the recall of the Messenian exiles, partisans of
-his own, and companions of his army. His generals extorted these two
-points from the Messenians. Agathokles, having thus broken the force
-of Messênê, secured to himself the town still more completely, by
-sending for those Messenian citizens who had chiefly opposed him,
-and putting them all to death, as well as his leading opponents
-at Tauromenium. The number thus massacred was not less than six
-hundred.[940]
-
-  [939] Diodor. xix. 71, 72, 102. When the convention specifies
-  Herakleia, Selinus, and Himera, as being under the Carthaginians,
-  this is to be understood as in addition to the primitive
-  Carthaginian settlements of Solus, Panormus, Lilybæum, etc.,
-  about which no question could arise.
-
-  [940] Diodor. xix. 72: compare a different narrative—Polyænus, v.
-  15.
-
-It only remained for Agathokles to seize Agrigentum. Thither he
-accordingly marched. But Deinokrates and the Syracusan exiles,
-expelled from Messênê, had made themselves heard at Carthage,
-insisting on the perils to that city from the encroachments of
-Agathokles. The Carthaginians alarmed sent a fleet of sixty sail,
-whereby alone Agrigentum, already under siege by Agathokles, was
-preserved. The recent convention was now broken on all sides,
-and Agathokles kept no farther measures with the Carthaginians.
-He ravaged all their Sicilian territory, and destroyed some of
-their forts; while the Carthaginians on their side made a sudden
-descent with their fleet on the harbor of Syracuse. They could
-achieve nothing more, however, than the capture of one Athenian
-merchant-vessel, out of two there riding. They disgraced their
-acquisition by the cruel act (not uncommon in Carthaginian warfare)
-of cutting of the hands of the captive crew; for which, in a few
-days, retaliation was exercised upon the crews of some of their own
-ships, taken by the cruisers of Agathokles.[941]
-
-  [941] Diodor. xix. 103. It must be noticed, however, that even
-  Julius Cæsar, in his wars in Gaul, sometimes cut off the hands of
-  his Gallic prisoners taken in arms, whom he called rebels (Bell.
-  Gall. viii. 44).
-
-The defence of Agrigentum now rested principally on the Carthaginians
-in Sicily, who took up a position on the hill called Eknomus—in
-the territory of Gela, a little to the west of the Agrigentine
-border. Here Agathokles approached to offer them battle—having been
-emboldened by two important successes obtained over Deinokrates and
-the Syracusan exiles, near Kentoripa and Gallaria.[942] So superior
-was his force, however, that the Carthaginians thought it prudent to
-remain in their camp; and Agathokles returned in triumph to Syracuse,
-where he adorned the temples with his recently acquired spoils. The
-balance of force was soon altered by the despatch of a large armament
-from Carthage under Hamilkar, consisting of 130 ships of war, with
-numerous other transport ships, carrying many soldiers—2000 native
-Carthaginians, partly men of rank—10,000 Africans—1000 Campanian
-heavy-armed and 1000 Balearic slingers. The fleet underwent in its
-passage so terrific a storm, that many of the vessels sunk with all
-on board, and it arrived with very diminished numbers in Sicily.
-The loss fell upon the native Carthaginian soldiers with peculiar
-severity; insomuch that when the news reached Carthage, a public
-mourning was proclaimed, and the city walls were hung with black
-serge.
-
-  [942] Diodor. xix. 103, 104.
-
-Those who reached Sicily, however, were quite sufficient to place
-Hamilkar in an imposing superiority of number as compared with
-Agathokles. He encamped on or near Eknomus, summoned all the
-reinforcements that his Sicilian allies could furnish, and collected
-additional mercenaries; so that he was soon at the head of 40,000
-infantry and 5000 cavalry.[943] At the same time, a Carthaginian
-armed squadron, detached to the strait of Messênê, fell in with
-twenty armed ships belonging to Agathokles, and captured them all
-with their crews. The Sicilian cities were held to Agathokles
-principally by terror, and were likely to turn against him, if the
-Carthaginians exhibited sufficient strength to protect them. This the
-despot knew and dreaded; especially respecting Gela, which was not
-far from the Carthaginian camp. Had he announced himself openly as
-intending to place a garrison in Gela, he feared that the citizens
-might forestall him by calling in Hamilkar. Accordingly he detached
-thither, on various pretences, several small parties of soldiers, who
-presently found themselves united in a number sufficient to seize
-the town. Agathokles then marched into Gela with his main force.
-Distrusting the adherence of the citizens, he let loose his soldiers
-upon them, massacred four thousand persons, and compelled the
-remainder, as a condition of sparing their lives, to bring in to him
-all their money and valuables. Having by this atrocity both struck
-universal terror and enriched himself, he advanced onward towards
-the Carthaginian camp, and occupied a hill called Phalarion opposite
-to it.[944] The two camps were separated by a level plain or valley
-nearly five miles broad, through which ran the river Himera.[945]
-
-  [943] Diodor. xix. 106.
-
-  [944] Diodor. xix. 107, 108.
-
-  [945] Diodor. xix. 108, 109.
-
-For some days of the hottest season (the dog-days), both armies
-remained stationary, neither of them choosing to make the attack. At
-length Agathokles gained what he thought a favorable opportunity.
-A detachment from the Carthaginian camp sallied forth in pursuit
-of some Grecian plunderers; Agathokles posted some men in ambush,
-who fell upon this detachment unawares, threw it into disorder, and
-pursued it back to the camp. Following up this partial success,
-Agathokles brought forward his whole force, crossed the river Himera,
-and began a general attack. This advance not being expected, the
-Grecian assailants seemed at first on the point of succeeding.
-They filled up a portion of the ditch, tore up the Stockade, and
-were forcing their way into the camp. They were however repulsed
-by redoubled efforts, and new troops coming up, on the part of the
-defenders; mainly, too, by the very effective action of the 1000
-Balearic slingers in Hamilkar’s army, who hurled stones weighing
-a pound each, against which the Grecian armor was an inadequate
-defence. Still Agathokles, noway discouraged, caused the attack to be
-renewed on several points at once and with apparent success, when
-a reinforcement landed from Carthage—the expectation of which may
-perhaps have induced Hamilkar to refrain from any general attack.
-These new troops joined in the battle, coming upon the rear of the
-Greeks; who were intimidated and disordered by such unforeseen
-assailants, while the Carthaginians in their front, animated to more
-energetic effort, first repulsed them from the camp, and then pressed
-them vigorously back. After holding their ground for some time
-against their double enemy, the Greeks at length fled in disorder
-back to their own camp, recrossing the river Himera. The interval
-was between four and five miles of nearly level ground, over which
-they were actively pursued and severely handled by the Carthaginian
-cavalry, 5000 in number. Moreover, in crossing the river, many
-of them drank eagerly, from thirst, fatigue, and the heat of the
-weather; the saltness of the water proved so destructive to them,
-that numerous dead bodies are said to have been found unwounded on
-the banks.[946] At length they obtained shelter in their own camp,
-after a loss of 7000 men; while the loss of the victors is estimated
-at 500.
-
-  [946] Diodor. xix. 109.
-
-Agathokles, after this great disaster, did not attempt to maintain
-his camp, but set it on fire, and returned to Gela; which was well
-fortified and provisioned, capable of a long defence. Here he
-intended to maintain himself against Hamilkar, at least until the
-Syracusan harvest (probably already begun) should be completed. But
-Hamilkar, having ascertained the strength of Gela, thought it prudent
-to refrain from a siege, and employed himself in operations for the
-purpose of strengthening his party in Sicily. His great victory
-at the Himera had produced the strongest effect upon many of the
-Sicilian cities, who were held to Agathokles by no other bonds except
-those of fear. Hamilkar issued conciliatory proclamations, inviting
-them all to become his allies, and marching his troops towards
-the most convenient points. Presently Kamarina, Leontini, Katana,
-Tauromenium, Messênê, Abakænum, with several other smaller towns
-and forts, sent to tender themselves as allies; and the conduct of
-Hamilkar towards all was so mild and equitable, as to give universal
-satisfaction. Agathokles appears to have been thus dispossessed of
-most part of the island, retaining little besides Gela and Syracuse.
-Even the harbor of Syracuse was watched by a Carthaginian fleet,
-placed to intercept foreign supplies. Returning to Syracuse after
-Hamilkar had renounced all attempts on Gela, Agathokles collected
-the corn from the neighborhood, and put the fortifications in the
-best state of defence. He had every reason to feel assured that the
-Carthaginians, encouraged by their recent success, and reinforced by
-allies from the whole island, would soon press the siege of Syracuse
-with all their energy; while for himself, hated by all, there was
-no hope of extraneous support, and little hope of a successful
-defence.[947]
-
-  [947] Diodor. xix. 110.
-
-In this apparently desperate situation, he conceived the idea of a
-novelty alike daring, ingenious, and effective; surrounded indeed
-with difficulties in the execution, but promising, if successfully
-executed, to change altogether the prospects of the war.
-
-He resolved to carry a force across from Syracuse to Africa, and
-attack the Carthaginians on their own soil. No Greek, so far as we
-know, had ever conceived the like scheme before; no one certainly
-had ever executed it. In the memory of man, the African territory of
-Carthage had never been visited by hostile foot. It was known that
-the Carthaginians would be not only unprepared to meet an attack at
-home, but unable even to imagine it as practicable. It was known
-that their territory was rich, and their African subjects harshly
-treated, discontented, and likely to seize the first opportunity
-for revolting. The landing of any hostile force near Carthage
-would strike such a blow, as at least to cause the recall of the
-Carthaginian armament in Sicily, and thus relieve Syracuse; perhaps
-the consequences of it might be yet greater.
-
-How to execute the scheme was the grand difficulty—for the
-Carthaginians were superior not merely on land, but also at sea.
-Agathokles had no chance except by keeping his purpose secret, and
-even unsuspected. He fitted out an armament, announced as about to
-sail forth from Syracuse on a secret expedition, against some unknown
-town on the Sicilian coast. He selected for this purpose his best
-troops, especially his horsemen, few of whom had been slain at the
-battle of the Himera; he could not transport horses, but he put
-the horsemen aboard with their saddles and bridles, entertaining
-full assurance that he could procure horses in Africa. In selecting
-soldiers for his expedition, he was careful to take one member from
-many different families, to serve as hostage for the fidelity of
-those left behind. He liberated, and enrolled among his soldiers,
-many of the strongest and most resolute slaves. To provide the
-requisite funds, his expedients were manifold; he borrowed from
-merchants, seized the money belonging to orphans, stripped the
-women of their precious ornaments, and even plundered the richest
-temples. By all these proceedings, the hatred as well as fear towards
-him was aggravated, especially among the more opulent families.
-Agathokles publicly proclaimed, that the siege of Syracuse, which the
-Carthaginians were now commencing, would be long and terrible—that
-he and his soldiers were accustomed to hardships and could endure
-them, but that those, who felt themselves unequal to the effort,
-might retire with their properties while it was yet time. Many of
-the wealthier families—to a number stated as 1600 persons—profited
-by this permission; but as they were leaving the city, Agathokles
-set his mercenaries upon them, slew them all, and appropriated their
-possessions to himself.[948] By such tricks and enormities, he
-provided funds enough for an armament of sixty ships, well filled
-with soldiers. Not one of these soldiers knew where they were
-going; there was a general talk about the madness of Agathokles;
-nevertheless such was their confidence in his bravery and military
-resource, that they obeyed his orders without asking questions. To
-act as viceroy of Syracuse during his own absence, Agathokles named
-Antander his brother, aided by an Ætolian officer named Erymnon.[949]
-
-  [948] Diodor. xx. 4, 5; Justin, xxii. 4. Compare Polyænus, 3-5.
-
-  [949] Diodor. xx. 4-16.
-
-The armament was equipped and ready, without any suspicion on the
-part of the Carthaginian fleet blockading the harbor. It happened
-one day that the approach of some corn-ships seduced this fleet
-into a pursuit; the mouth of the harbor being thus left unguarded,
-Agathokles took the opportunity of striking with his armament into
-the open sea. As soon as the Carthaginian fleet saw him sailing
-forth, they neglected the corn-ships, and prepared for battle,
-which they presumed that he was come to offer. To their surprise,
-he stood out to sea as fast as he could; they then pushed out in
-pursuit of him, but he had already got a considerable advance and
-strove to keep it. Towards nightfall however they neared him so much,
-that he was only saved by the darkness. During the night he made
-considerable way; but on the next day there occurred an eclipse of
-the sun so nearly total, that it became perfectly dark, and the stars
-were visible. The mariners were so terrified at this phenomenon,
-that all the artifice and ascendency of Agathokles were required to
-inspire them with new courage. At length, after six days and nights,
-they approached the coast of Africa. The Carthaginian ships had
-pursued them at a venture, in the direction towards Africa; and they
-appeared in sight, just as Agathokles was nearing the land. Strenuous
-efforts were employed by the mariners on both sides to touch land
-first; Agathokles secured that advantage, and was enabled to put
-himself into such a posture of defence that he repulsed the attack
-of the Carthaginian ships, and secured the disembarcation of his own
-soldiers, at a point called the Latomiæ or Stone quarries.[950]
-
-  [950] Diodor. xx. 6. Procopius, Bell. Vand. i. 15. It is here
-  stated, that for nine days’ march eastward from Carthage, as far
-  as Juka, the land is παντελῶς ἀλίμενος.
-
-After establishing his position ashore, and refreshing his soldiers,
-the first proceeding of Agathokles was to burn his vessels; a
-proceeding which seemed to carry an air of desperate boldness. Yet
-in truth the ships were now useless—for, if he was unsuccessful on
-land, they were not enough to enable him to return in the face of
-the Carthaginian fleet; they were even worse than useless, since, if
-he retained them, it was requisite that he should leave a portion of
-his army to guard them, and thus enfeeble his means of action for
-the really important achievements on land. Convening his soldiers
-in assembly near the ships, he first offered a sacrifice to Demeter
-and Persephonê—the patron goddesses of Sicily, and of Syracuse in
-particular. He then apprised his soldiers, that during the recent
-crossing and danger from the Carthaginian pursuers, he had addressed
-a vow to these goddesses—engaging to make a burnt-offering of his
-ships in their honor, if they would preserve him safe across to
-Africa. The goddesses had granted this boon; they had farther, by
-favorably responding to the sacrifice just offered, promised full
-success to his African projects: it became therefore incumbent on
-him to fulfil his vow with exactness. Torches being new brought,
-Agathokles took one in his hand, and mounted on the stern of the
-admiral’s ship, directing each of the trierarchs to do the like on
-his own ship. All were set on fire simultaneously, amidst the sound
-of trumpets, and the mingled prayers and shouts of the soldiers.[951]
-
-  [951] This striking scene is described by Diodorus, xx. 7
-  (compare Justin, xxii. 6), probably enough copied from Kallias,
-  the companion and panegyrist of Agathokles: see Diodor. xxi.
-  Fragm. p. 281.
-
-Though Agathokles had succeeded in animating his soldiers with a
-factitious excitement, for the accomplishment of this purpose, yet
-so soon as they saw the conflagration decided and irrevocable, thus
-cutting off all their communication with home—their spirits fell,
-and they began to despair of their prospects. Without allowing
-them time to dwell upon the novelty of the situation, Agathokles
-conducted them at once against the nearest Carthaginian town, called
-Megalê-Polis.[952] His march lay for the most part through a rich
-territory in the highest cultivation. The passing glance which we
-thus obtain into the condition of the territory near Carthage is
-of peculiar interest; more especially when contrasted with the
-desolation of the same coast, now and for centuries past. The
-corn-land, the plantations both of vines and olives, the extensive
-and well-stocked gardens, the size and equipment of the farm
-buildings, the large outlay for artificial irrigation, the agreeable
-country-houses belonging to wealthy Carthaginians, etc., all excited
-the astonishment, and stimulated the cupidity, of Agathokles and his
-soldiers. Moreover, the towns were not only very numerous, but all
-open and unfortified, except Carthage itself and a few others on the
-coast.[953]
-
-  [952] Megalê-Polis is nowhere else mentioned—nor is it noticed
-  by Forbiger in his list of towns in the Carthaginian territory
-  (Handbuch der Alten Geographie, sect. 109).
-
-  Dr. Barth (Wanderungen auf den Küsten Ländern des Mittelmeeres,
-  vol. i. p. 131-133) supposes that Agathokles landed at an
-  indentation of the coast on the western face of that projecting
-  tongue of land which terminates in Cape Bon (Promontorium
-  Mercurii), forming the eastern boundary of the Gulf of Carthage.
-  There are stone quarries here, of the greatest extent as well as
-  antiquity. Dr. Barth places Megalê-Polis not far off from this
-  spot, on the same western face of the projecting land, and near
-  the spot afterwards called Misua.
-
-  [953] Justin, xxii. 5. “Huc accedere, quod urbes castellaque
-  Africæ non muris cinctæ, non in montibus positæ sint: sed in
-  planis campis sine ullis munimentis jaceant: quas omnes metu
-  excidii facile ad belli societatem perlici posse.”
-
-The Carthaginians, besides having little fear of invasion by sea,
-were disposed to mistrust their subject cities, which they ruled
-habitually with harshness and oppression.[954] The Liby-Phenicians
-appear to have been unused to arms—a race of timid cultivators and
-traffickers, accustomed to subjection and practised in the deceit
-necessary for lightening it.[955] Agathokles, having marched through
-this land of abundance, assaulted Megalêpolis without delay. The
-inhabitants, unprepared for attack, distracted with surprise and
-terror, made little resistance. Agathokles easily took the town,
-abandoning both the persons of the inhabitants and all the rich
-property within, to his soldiers; who enriched themselves with a
-prodigious booty both from town and country—furniture, cattle, and
-slaves. From hence he advanced farther southward to the town called
-Tunês (the modern Tunis, at the distance of only fourteen miles
-south-west of Carthage itself), which he took by storm in like
-manner. He fortified Tunês as a permanent position; but he kept his
-main force united in camp, knowing well that he should presently have
-an imposing army against him in the field, and severe battles to
-fight.[956]
-
-  [954] Seven centuries and more after these events, we read that
-  the Vandal king Genseric conquered Africa from the Romans—and
-  that he demolished the fortifications of all the other towns
-  except Carthage alone—from the like feeling of mistrust. This
-  demolition materially facilitated the conquest of the Vandal
-  kingdom by Belisarius, two generations afterwards (Procopius,
-  Bell. Vandal. i. 5; i. 15).
-
-  [955] Livy (xxix. 25), in recounting the landing of Scipio in
-  the Carthaginian territory in the latter years of the second
-  Punic war, says, “Emporia ut peterent, gubernatoribus edixit.
-  Fertilissimus ager, eoque abundans omnium copiâ rerum est regio,
-  et imbelles (quod plerumque in uberi agro evenit) barbari sunt:
-  priusque quam Carthagine subveniretur, opprimi videbantur posse.”
-
-  About the harshness of the Carthaginian rule over their African
-  subjects, see Diodor. xv. 77; Polyb. i. 72. In reference to
-  the above passage of Polybius, however, we ought to keep in
-  mind—That in describing this harshness, he speaks with _express
-  and exclusive reference_ to the conduct of the Carthaginians
-  towards their subjects during the first Punic war (against Rome),
-  when the Carthaginians themselves were hard pressed by the
-  Romans and required everything that they could lay hands upon
-  for self-defence. This passage of Polybius has been sometimes
-  cited as if it attested the _ordinary_ character and measure of
-  Carthaginian dominion; which is contrary to the intention of the
-  author.
-
-  [956] Diodor. xx. 8. Compare Polybius, i. 29, where he describes
-  the first invasion of the Carthaginian territory by the Roman
-  consul Regulus. Tunês was 120 stadia or about fourteen miles
-  south-east of Carthage (Polyb. i. 67). The Tab. Peuting. reckons
-  it only ten miles. It was made the central place for hostile
-  operations against Carthage both by Regulus in the first Punic
-  war (Polyb. i. 30),—by Matho and Spendius, in the rebellion of
-  the mercenary soldiers and native Africans against Carthage,
-  which followed on the close of the first Punic war (Polyb. i.
-  73)—and by the revolted Libyans in 396 B. C. (Diodor.
-  xiv. 77).
-
-  Diodorus places Tunês at the distance of 2000 stadia from
-  Carthage, which must undoubtedly be a mistake. He calls it _White
-  Tunês_; an epithet drawn from the chalk cliffs adjoining.
-
-The Carthaginian fleet had pursued Agathokles during his crossing
-from Syracuse, in perfect ignorance of his plans. When he landed
-in Africa, on their own territory, and even burnt his fleet, they
-at first flattered themselves with the belief that they held him
-prisoner. But as soon as they saw him commence his march in military
-array against Megalêpolis, they divined his real purposes, and were
-filled with apprehension. Carrying off the brazen prow-ornaments of
-his burnt and abandoned ships, they made sail for Carthage, sending
-forward a swift vessel to communicate first what had occurred.
-Before this vessel arrived, however, the landing of Agathokles had
-been already made known at Carthage, where it excited the utmost
-surprise and consternation; since no one supposed that he could have
-accomplished such an adventure without having previously destroyed
-the Carthaginian army and fleet in Sicily. From this extreme dismay
-they were presently relieved by the arrival of the messengers from
-their fleet; whereby they learnt the real state of affairs in
-Sicily. They now made the best preparations in their power to resist
-Agathokles. Hanno and Bomilkar, two men of leading families, were
-named generals conjointly. They were bitter political rivals,—but
-this very rivalry was by some construed as an advantage, since each
-would serve as a check upon the other and as a guarantee to the
-state; or, what is more probable, each had a party sufficiently
-strong to prevent the separate election of the other.[957] These two
-generals, unable to wait for distant succors, led out the native
-forces of the city, stated at 40,000 infantry, 1000 cavalry, derived
-altogether from citizens and residents—with 2000 war-chariots. They
-took post on an eminence (somewhere between Tunis and Carthage) not
-far from Agathokles; Bomilkar commanding on the left, where the
-ground was so difficult that he was unable to extend his front, and
-was obliged to admit an unusual depth of files; while Hanno was on
-the right, having in his front rank the Sacred Band of Carthage, a
-corps of 2500 distinguished citizens, better armed and braver than
-the rest. So much did the Carthaginians outnumber the invaders—and
-so confident were they of victory—that they carried with them 20,000
-pairs of handcuffs for their anticipated prisoners.[958]
-
-  [957] Diodor. xx. 10.
-
-  [958] Diodor. xx. 10-13. See, respecting the Sacred Band of
-  Carthage (which was nearly cut to pieces by Timoleon at the
-  battle of the Krimesus), Diodor. xvi. 80, 81; also Vol. XI. of
-  this History, Chap. lxxxv. p. 171-177.
-
-  The amount of native or citizen-force given here by Diodorus
-  (40,000 foot and 1000 horse) seems very great. Our data for
-  appreciating it however are lamentably scanty; and we ought to
-  expect a large total. The population of Carthage is said to have
-  been 700,000 souls; even when it was besieged by the Romans in
-  the third Punic war, and when its power was prodigiously lessened
-  (Strabo, xvii. p. 833). Its military magazines, even in that
-  reduced condition, were enormous,—as they stood immediately
-  previous to their being given up to the Romans, under the
-  treacherous delusions held out by Rome.
-
-Agathokles placed himself on the left, with 1000 chosen hoplites
-round him, to combat the Sacred Band; the command of his right he
-gave to his son Archagathus. His troops—Syracusans, miscellaneous
-mercenary Greeks, Campanians or Samnites, Tuscans, and Gauls—scarcely
-equalled in numbers one-half of the enemy. Some of the ships’ crews
-were even without arms,—a deficiency, which Agathokles could only
-supply in appearance, by giving to them the leather cases or wrappers
-of shields, stretched out upon sticks. The outstretched wrappers thus
-exhibited looked from a distance like shields; so that these men,
-stationed in the rear, had the appearance of a reserve of hoplites.
-As the soldiers however were still discouraged, Agathokles tried to
-hearten them up by another device yet more singular, for which indeed
-he must have made deliberate provision beforehand. In various parts
-of the camp, he let fly a number of owls, which perched upon the
-shields and helmets of the soldiers. These birds, the favorite of
-Athênê, were supposed and generally asserted to promise victory; the
-minds of the soldiers are reported to have been much reassured by the
-sight.
-
-The Carthaginian war-chariots and cavalry, which charged first, made
-little or no impression; but the infantry of their right pressed the
-Greeks seriously. Especially Hanno, with the Sacred Band around him,
-behaved with the utmost bravery and forwardness, and seemed to be
-gaining advantage, when he was unfortunately slain. His death not
-only discouraged his own troops, but became fatal to the army, by
-giving opportunity for treason to his colleague Bomilkar. This man
-had long secretly meditated the project of rendering himself despot
-of Carthage. As a means of attaining that end, he deliberately sought
-to bring reverses upon her; and no sooner had he heard of Hanno’s
-death, than he gave orders for his own wing to retreat. The Sacred
-Band, though fighting with unshaken valor, were left unsupported,
-attacked in rear as well as front, and compelled to give way along
-with the rest. The whole Carthaginian army was defeated and driven
-back to Carthage. Their camp fell into the hands of Agathokles, who
-found among their baggage the very handcuffs which they had brought
-for fettering their expected captives.[959]
-
-  [959] Diodor. xx. 12. The loss of the Carthaginians was
-  differently given—some authors stated it at 1000 men—others at
-  6000. The loss in the army of Agathokles was stated at 200 men.
-
-This victory made Agathokles for the time master of the open country.
-He transmitted the news to Sicily, by a boat of thirty oars,
-constructed expressly for the purpose—since he had no ships of his
-own remaining. Having fortified Tunês and established it as his
-central position, he commenced operations along the eastern coast
-(Zeugitana and Byzakium, as the northern and southern portions of
-it were afterwards denominated by the Romans) against the towns
-dependent on Carthage.[960]
-
-  [960] Diodor. xx. 17.
-
-In that city, meanwhile, all was terror and despondency in
-consequence of the recent defeat. It was well known that the African
-subjects generally entertained nothing but fear and hatred towards
-the reigning city. Neither the native Libyans or Africans,—nor the
-mixed race called Liby-Phœnicians, who inhabited the towns[961]—could
-be depended on if their services were really needed. The distress of
-the Carthaginians took the form of religious fears and repentance.
-They looked back with remorse on the impiety of their past lives, and
-on their omissions of duty towards the gods. To the Tyrian Herakles,
-they had been slack in transmitting the dues and presents required
-by their religion; a backwardness which they now endeavored to make
-up by sending envoys to Tyre, with prayers and supplications, with
-rich presents, and especially with models in gold and silver of
-their sacred temples and shrines. Towards Kronus, or Moloch, they
-also felt that they had conducted themselves sinfully. The worship
-acceptable to that god required the sacrifice of young children,
-born of free and opulent parents, and even the choice child of the
-family. But it was now found out, on investigation, that many parents
-had recently put a fraud upon the god, by surreptitiously buying
-poor children, feeding them well, and then sacrificing them as their
-own. This discovery seemed at once to explain why Kronus had become
-offended, and what had brought upon them the recent defeat. They
-made an emphatic atonement, by selecting 200 children from the most
-illustrious families in Carthage, and offering them up to Kronus
-at a great public sacrifice; besides which, 300 parents, finding
-themselves denounced for similar omissions in the past, displayed
-their repentance by voluntarily immolating their own children for
-the public safety. The statue of Kronus,—placed with outstretched
-hands to receive the victim tendered to him, with fire immediately
-underneath—was fed on that solemnity certainly with 200, and probably
-with 500, living children.[962] By this monstrous holocaust the full
-religious duty being discharged, and forgiveness obtained from the
-god, the mental distress of the Carthaginians was healed.
-
-  [961] Diodor. xx. 55.
-
-  [962] Diodor. xx. 14. ᾐτιῶντο δὲ καὶ τὸν Κρόνον αὑτοῖς
-  ἐναντιοῦσθαι, καθόσον ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν χρόνοις θύοντες τούτῳ
-  τῷ θεῷ τῶν υἱῶν τοὺς κρατίστους, ὕστερον ὠνούμενοι λάθρα παῖδας
-  καὶ θρέψαντες ἔπεμπον ἐπὶ τὴν θυσίαν· καὶ ζητήσεως γενομένης,
-  εὑρέθησάν τινες τῶν καθιερουργημένων ὑποβολιμαῖοι γεγονότες·
-  τούτων δὲ λαβόντες ἔννοιαν, καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους πρὸς τοῖς τείχεσιν
-  ὁρῶντες στρατοπεδεύοντας, ἐδεισιδαιμόνουν ὡς καταλελυκότες τὰς
-  πατρίους τῶν θεῶν τιμάς· διορθώσασθαι δὲ τὰς ἀγνοίας σπεύδοντες,
-  διακοσίους μὲν τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων παίδων προκρίναντες ἔθυσαν
-  δημοσίᾳ· ἄλλοι δ᾽ ἐν διαβολαῖς ὄντες, ἑκουσίως ἑαυτοὺς ἔδοσαν,
-  οὐκ ἐλάττους ὄντες τριακοσίων· ἦν δὲ παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἀνδριὰς Κρόνου
-  χαλκοῦς, ἐκτετακὼς τὰς χεῖρας ὑπτίας ἐγκεκλιμένας ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν,
-  ὥστε τὸν ἐπιτεθέντα τῶν παίδων ἀποκυλίεσθαι καὶ πίπτειν εἴς τι
-  χάσμα πλῆρες πυρός. Compare Festus ap. Lactantium, Inst. Div. i.
-  21; Justin, xviii. 6, 12.
-
-  In this remarkable passage (the more remarkable because so little
-  information concerning Carthaginian antiquity has reached us),
-  one clause is not perfectly clear, respecting the three hundred
-  who are said to have voluntarily _given themselves up_. Diodorus
-  means (I apprehend) as Eusebius understood it, that these were
-  fathers who gave up _their children_ (not themselves) to be
-  sacrificed. The victims here mentioned as sacrificed to Kronus
-  were children, not adults (compare Diodor. xiii. 86): nothing
-  is here said about adult victims. Wesseling in his note adheres
-  to the literal meaning of the words, dissenting from Eusebius:
-  but I think that the literal meaning is less in harmony with the
-  general tenor of the paragraph. Instances of self-devotion, by
-  persons torn with remorse, are indeed mentioned: see the case of
-  Imilkon, Diodor. xiv. 76; Justin, xix. 3.
-
-  We read in the Fragment of Ennius—“Pœni sunt soliti suos
-  sacrificare puellos:” see the chapter iv. of Münter’s work,
-  Religion der Karthager, on this subject.
-
-Having thus relieved their consciences on the score of religious
-obligation, the Carthaginians despatched envoys to Hamilkar in
-Sicily, acquainting him with the recent calamity, desiring him
-to send a reinforcement, and transmitting to him the brazen prow
-ornaments taken from the ships of Agathokles. They at the same time
-equipped a fresh army, with which they marched forth to attack
-Tunês. Agathokles had fortified that town, and established a strong
-camp before it; but he had withdrawn his main force to prosecute
-operations against the maritime towns on the eastern coast of the
-territory of Carthage. Among these towns, he first attacked Neapolis
-with success, granting to the inhabitants favorable terms. He then
-advanced farther southwards towards Adrumetum, of which he commenced
-the siege, with the assistance of a neighboring Libyan prince named
-Elymas, who now joined him. While Agathokles was engaged in the siege
-of Adrumetum, the Carthaginians attacked his position at Tunês, drove
-his soldiers out of the fortified camp into the town, and began to
-batter the defences of the town itself. Apprised of this danger
-while besieging Adrumetum, but nevertheless reluctant to raise the
-siege,—Agathokles left his main army before it, stole away with
-only a few soldiers and some camp-followers, and conducting them to
-an elevated spot—halfway between Adrumetum and Tunês, yet visible
-from both—he caused them to kindle at night upon this eminence a
-prodigious number of fires.[963] The effect, of these fires, seen
-from Adrumetum on one side and from Tunês on the other, was, to
-produce the utmost terror at both places. The Carthaginians besieging
-Tunês fancied that Agathokles with his whole army was coming to
-attack them, and forthwith abandoned the siege in disorder, leaving
-their engines behind. The defenders of Adrumetum, interpreting these
-fires as evidence of a large reinforcement on its way to join the
-besieging army, were so discouraged that they surrendered the town on
-capitulation.[964]
-
-  [963] Diodor. xx. 17. λάθρα προσῆλθεν ἐπί τινα τόπον ὀρεινὸν,
-  ὅθεν ~ὁρᾶσθαι δυνατὸν ἦν αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀδρυμητινῶν καὶ τῶν
-  Καρχηδονίων τῶν Τύνητα πολιορκούντων~· νυκτὸς δὲ συντάξας τοῖς
-  στρατιώταις ἐπὶ πολὺν τόπον πυρὰ καίειν, δόξαν ἐν εποίησε,
-  τοῖς μὲν Καρχηδονίοις, ὡς μετὰ μεγάλης δυνάμεως ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς
-  πορευόμενος, τοῖς δὲ πολιορκουμένοις, ὡς ἄλλης δυνάμεως ἁδρᾶς
-  τοῖς πολεμίοις εἰς συμμαχίαν παραγεγενημένης.
-
-  [964] Diodor. xx. 17. The incident here recounted by Diodorus
-  is curious, but quite distinct and intelligible. He had good
-  authorities before him in his history of Agathokles. If true,
-  it affords an evidence for determining, within some limits, the
-  site of the ancient Adrumetum, which Mannert and Shaw place at
-  Herkla— while Forbiger and Dr. Barth put it near the site of the
-  modern port called Susa, still more to the southward, and at a
-  prodigious distance from Tunis. Other anthem have placed it at
-  Hamamat, more to the northward than Herkla, and nearer to Tunis.
-
-  Of these three sites, Hamamat is the only one which will consist
-  with the narrative of Diodorus. Both the others are too distant.
-  Hamamat is about forty-eight English miles from Tunis (see Barth,
-  p. 184, with his note). This is as great a distance (if not too
-  great) as can possibly be admitted; both Herkla and Susa are very
-  much more distant, and therefore out of the question.
-
-  Nevertheless, the other evidence known to us tends apparently
-  to place Adrumetum at Susa, and not at Hamamat (see Barth, p.
-  142-154; Forbiger, Handb. Geog. p. 845). It is therefore probable
-  that the narrative of Diodorus is not true, or must apply to some
-  other place on the coast (possibly Neapolis, the modern Nabel)
-  taken by Agathokles, and not to Adrumetum.
-
-By this same stratagem—if the narrative can be trusted—Agathokles
-both relieved Tunês, and acquired possession of Adrumetum. Pushing
-his conquests yet farther south, he besieged and took Thapsus,
-with several other towns on the coast to a considerable distance
-southward.[965] He also occupied and fortified the important position
-called Aspis, on the south-east of the headland Cape Bon, and not far
-distant from it; a point convenient for maritime communication with
-Sicily.[966]
-
-  [965] Diodor. xx. 17.
-
-  [966] Strabo, xvii. p. 834. Solinus (c. 30) talks of Aspis as
-  founded by the _Siculi_. Aspis (called by the Romans Clypea),
-  being on the eastern side of Cape Bon, was more convenient for
-  communication with Sicily than either Carthage, or Tunis, or
-  any part of the Gulf of Carthage, which was on the western side
-  of Cape Bon. To get round that headland is, even at the present
-  day, a difficult and uncertain enterprise for navigators: see
-  the remarks of Dr. Barth, founded partly on his own personal
-  experience (Wanderungen auf den Küstenländern des Mittelmeeres,
-  i. p. 196). A ship coming from Sicily to Aspis was not under the
-  necessity of getting round the headland.
-
-  In the case of Agathokles, there was a further reason for
-  establishing his maritime position at Aspis. The Carthaginian
-  fleet was superior to him at sea; accordingly they could easily
-  interrupt his maritime communication from Sicily with Tunis, or
-  with any point in the Gulf of Carthage. But it was not so easy
-  for them to watch the coast at Aspis; for in order to do this,
-  they must get from the Gulf round to Cape Bon.
-
-By a series of such acquisitions, comprising in all not less than
-200 dependencies of Carthage, Agathokles became master along the
-eastern coast.[967] He next endeavored to subdue the towns in the
-interior, into which he advanced as far as several days’ march. But
-he was recalled by intelligence from his soldiers at Tunês, that the
-Carthaginians had marched out again to attack them, and had already
-retaken some of his conquests. Returning suddenly by forced marches,
-he came upon them by surprise, and drove in their advanced parties
-with considerable loss; while he also gained an important victory
-over the Libyan prince Elymas, who had rejoined the Carthaginians,
-but was now defeated and slain.[968] The Carthaginians, however,
-though thus again humbled and discouraged, still maintained the
-field, strongly entrenched, between Carthage and Tunês.
-
-  [967] Diodor. xx. 17. The Roman consul Regulus, when he invaded
-  Africa during the first Punic war, is said to have acquired,
-  either by capture or voluntary adhesion, two hundred dependent
-  cities of Carthage (Appian, Punica, c. 3). Respecting the
-  prodigious number of towns in Northern Africa, see the very
-  learned and instructive work of Mövers, Die Phönikier, vol.
-  ii. p. 454 _seqq._ Even at the commencement of the third Punic
-  war, when Carthage was so much reduced in power, she had still
-  three hundred cities in Libya (Strabo, xvii. p. 833). It must be
-  confessed that the name cities or towns (πόλεις) was used by some
-  authors very vaguely. Thus Posidonius ridiculed the affirmation
-  of Polybius (Strabo, iii. p. 162), that Tiberius Gracchus had
-  destroyed three hundred πόλεις of the Celtiberians; Strabo
-  censures others who spoke of one thousand πόλεις of the Iberians.
-  Such a number could only be made good by including large κῶμαι.
-
-  [968] Diodor. xx. 17, 18.
-
-Meanwhile the affairs of Agathokles at Syracuse had taken a turn
-unexpectedly favorable. He had left that city blocked up partially
-by sea and with a victorious enemy encamped near it; so that
-supplies found admission with difficulty. In this condition,
-Hamilkar, commander of the Carthaginian army, received from
-Carthage the messengers announcing their recent defeat in Africa;
-yet also bringing the brazen prow ornaments taken from the ships
-of Agathokles. He ordered the envoys to conceal the real truth,
-and to spread abroad news that Agathokles had been destroyed with
-his armament; in proof of which he produced the prow ornaments,—an
-undoubted evidence that the ships had really been destroyed. Sending
-envoys with these evidences into Syracuse, to be exhibited to
-Antander, and the ether authorities, Hamilkar demanded from them
-the surrender of the city, under promise of safety and favorable
-terms; at the same time marching his army close up to it, with
-the view of making an attack. Antander with others, believing the
-information and despairing of successful resistance, were disposed
-to comply; but Erymnon the Ætolian insisted on holding out until
-they had fuller certainty. This resolution Antander adopted. At the
-same time, mistrusting those citizens of Syracuse who were relatives
-or friends of the exiles without, he ordered them all to leave the
-city immediately, with their wives and families. No less than 8000
-persons were expelled under this mandate. They were consigned to the
-mercy of Hamilkar, and his army without; who not only suffered them
-to pass, but treated them with kindness. Syracuse was now a scene
-of aggravated wretchedness and despondency; not less from this late
-calamitous expulsion, than from the grief of those who believed that
-their relatives in Africa had perished with Agathokles. Hamilkar had
-brought up his battering-engines, and was preparing to assault the
-town, when Nearchus, the messenger from Agathokles, arrived from
-Africa after a voyage of five days, having under favor of darkness
-escaped, though only just escaped, the blockading squadron. From him
-the Syracusan government learnt the real truth, and the victorious
-position of Agathokles. There was no farther talk of capitulation;
-Hamilkar—having tried a partial assault, which was vigorously
-repulsed,—withdrew his army, and detached from it a reinforcement of
-5000 men to the aid of his countrymen in Africa.[969]
-
-  [969] Diodor. xx. 15, 16.
-
-During some months, he seems to have employed himself in partial
-operations for extending the Carthaginian dominion throughout
-Sicily. But at length he concerted measures with the Syracusan exile
-Deinokrates, who was at the head of a numerous body of his exiled
-countrymen, for a renewed attack upon Syracuse. His fleet already
-blockaded the harbor, and he now with his army, stated as 120,000
-men, destroyed the neighboring lands, hoping to starve out the
-inhabitants. Approaching close to the walls of the city, he occupied
-the Olympieion, or temple of Zeus Olympius, near the river Anapus and
-the interior coast of the Great Harbor. From hence—probably under the
-conduct of Deinokrates and the other exiles, well-acquainted with
-the ground—he undertook by a night-march to ascend the circuitous
-and difficult mountain track, for the purpose of surprising the
-fort called Euryalus, at the highest point of Epipolæ, and the
-western apex of the Syracusan lines of fortification. This was
-the same enterprise, at the same hour, and with the same main
-purpose, as that of Demosthenes during the Athenian siege, after
-he had brought the second armament from Athens to the relief of
-Nikias.[970] Even Demosthenes, though conducting his march with
-greater precaution than Hamilkar, and successful in surprising the
-fort of Euryalus, had been driven down again with disastrous loss.
-Moreover, since his time, this fort Euryalus, instead of being left
-detached, had been embodied by the elder Dionysius as an integral
-portion of the fortifications of the city. It formed the apex or
-point of junction for the two converging walls—one skirting the
-northern cliff, the other the southern cliff, of Epipolæ.[971]
-The surprise intended by Hamilkar—difficult in the extreme, if at
-all practicable—seems to have been unskilfully conducted. It was
-attempted with a confused multitude, incapable of that steady order
-requisite for night-movements. His troops, losing their way in the
-darkness, straggled, and even mistook each other for enemies; while
-the Syracusan guards from Euryalus, alarmed by the noise, attacked
-them vigorously and put them to the rout. Their loss, in trying
-to escape down the steep declivity, was prodigious; and Hamilkar
-himself, making brave efforts to rally them, became prisoner to the
-Syracusans. What lent peculiar interest to this incident, in the
-eyes of a pious Greek, was that it served to illustrate and confirm
-the truth of prophecy. Hamilkar had been assured by a prophet that
-he would sup that night in Syracuse; and this assurance had in part
-emboldened him to the attack, since he naturally calculated on
-entering the city as a conqueror.[972] He did indeed take his evening
-meal in Syracuse, literally fulfilling the augury. Immediately after
-it, he was handed over to the relatives of the slain, who first
-paraded him through the city in chains, then inflicted on him the
-worst tortures, and lastly killed him. His head was cut off and sent
-to Africa.[973]
-
-  [970] See Vol. VII. Ch. lx. p. 304 of this History.
-
-  [971] For a description of the fortifications added to Syracuse
-  by the elder Dionysius, see Vol. X. Ch. lxxxii. p. 499 of this
-  History.
-
-  [972] Diodor. xx. 29, 30. Cicero (Divinat. i. 24) notices this
-  prophecy and its manner of fulfilment; but he gives a somewhat
-  different version of the events preceding the capture of Hamilkar.
-
-  [973] Diodor. xx. 30. τὸν δ᾽ οὖν Ἁμίλκαν οἱ τῶν ἀπολωλότων
-  συγγενεῖς δεδεμένον ἀγαγόντες διὰ τῆς πόλεως, καὶ δειναῖς αἰκίαις
-  κατ᾽ αὐτοῦ χρησάμενοι, μετὰ τῆς ἐσχάτης ὕβρεως ἀνεῖλον.
-
-The loss and humiliation sustained in this repulse—together with the
-death of Hamilkar, and the discord ensuing between the exiles under
-Deinokrates and the Carthaginian soldiers—completely broke up the
-besieging army. At the same time, the Agrigentines, profiting by the
-depression both of Carthaginians and exiles, stood forward publicly,
-proclaiming themselves as champions of the cause of autonomous city
-government throughout Sicily, under their own presidency, against
-both the Carthaginians on one side, and the despot Agathokles on
-the other. They chose for their general a citizen named Xenodokus,
-who set himself with vigor to the task of expelling everywhere the
-mercenary garrisons which held the cities in subjection. He began
-first with Gela, the city immediately adjoining Agrigentum, found
-a party of the citizens disposed to aid him, and in conjunction
-with them, overthrew the Agathoklean garrison. The Geloans, thus
-liberated, seconded cordially his efforts to extend the like benefits
-to others. The popular banner proclaimed by Agrigentum proved so
-welcome, that many cities eagerly invited her aid to shake off the
-yoke of the soldiery in their respective citadels, and regain their
-free governments.[974] Enna, Erbessus, Echetla,[975] Leontini, and
-Kamarina, were all thus relieved from the dominion of Agathokles;
-while other cities were in like manner emancipated from the sway
-of the Carthaginians; and joined the Agrigentine confederacy.
-The Agathoklean government at Syracuse was not strong enough to
-resist such spirited manifestations. Syracuse still continued to be
-blocked up by the Carthaginian fleet; though the blockade was less
-efficacious, and supplies were now introduced more abundantly than
-before.[976]
-
-  [974] Diodor. xx. 31. διαβοηθείσης δὲ τῆς τῶν Ἀκραγαντίνων
-  ἐπιβολῆς κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν νῆσον, ἐνέπεσεν ὁρμὴ ταῖς πόλεσι πρὸς τὴν
-  ἐλευθερίαν.
-
-  [975] Enna is nearly in the centre of Sicily; Erbessus is not far
-  to the north-east of Agrigentum; Echetla is placed by Polybius
-  (i. 15) midway between the domain of Syracuse and that of
-  Carthage.
-
-  [976] Diodor. xx. 32.
-
-The ascendency of Agathokles was thus rather on the wane in Sicily:
-but in Africa, he had become more powerful than ever—not without
-perilous hazards which brought him occasionally to the brink of ruin.
-On receiving from Syracuse the head of the captive Hamilkar, he rode
-forth close to the camp of the Carthaginians, and held it up to their
-view in triumph; they made respectful prostration before it, but the
-sight was astounding and mournful to them.[977] While they were thus
-in despondency, however, a strange vicissitude was on the point of
-putting their enemy into their hands. A violent mutiny broke out in
-the camp of Agathokles at Tunês, arising out of a drunken altercation
-between his son Archagathus and an Ætolian officer named Lykiskus;
-which ended in the murder of the latter by the former. The comrades
-of Lykiskus rose in arms with fury to avenge him, calling for the
-head of Archagathus. They found sympathy with the whole army; who
-seized the opportunity of demanding their arrears of outstanding
-pay, chose new generals, and took regular possession of Tunês with
-its defensive works. The Carthaginians, informed of this outbreak,
-immediately sent envoys to treat with the mutineers, offering to them
-large presents and double pay in the service of Carthage. Their offer
-was at first so favorably entertained, that the envoys returned with
-confident hopes of success; when Agathokles, as a last resource,
-clothed himself in mean garb, and threw himself on the mercy of the
-soldiers. He addressed them in a pathetic appeal, imploring them not
-to desert him, and even drew his sword to kill himself before their
-faces. With such art did he manage this scene, that the feelings of
-the soldiers underwent a sudden and complete revolution. They not
-only became reconciled to him, but even greeted him with enthusiasm,
-calling on him to resume the dress and functions of general, and
-promising unabated obedience for the future.[978] Agathokles gladly
-obeyed the call, and took advantage of their renewed ardor to attack
-forthwith the Carthaginians; who, expecting nothing less, were
-defeated with considerable loss.[979]
-
-  [977] Diodor. xx. 33. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι, περιαλγεῖς γενόμενοι,
-  καὶ βαρβαρικῶς προσκυνήσαντες, etc.
-
-  [978] Compare the description in Tacitus, Hist. ii. 29, of the
-  mutiny in the Vitellian army commanded by Fabius Valens, at
-  Ticinum.
-
-  “Postquam immissis lictoribus, Valens coercere seditionem
-  cœptabat, ipsum invadunt (milites), saxa jaciunt, fugientem
-  sequuntur.—Valens, servili veste, apud decurionem equitum
-  tegebatur.” (Presently the feeling changes, by the adroit
-  management of Alphenus Varus, prefect of the camp)—then,
-  “silentio, patientia, postremo precibus et lacrymis, veniam
-  quærebant. Ut vero deformis et flens, et præter spem incolumis
-  Valens processit, gaudium, miseratio, favor: versi in lætitiam
-  (ut est vulgus utroque immodicum) laudantes gratantesque
-  circumdatum aquilis signisque, in tribunal ferunt.”
-
-  [979] Diodor. xx. 34.
-
-In spite of this check, the Carthaginians presently sent a
-considerable force into the interior, for the purpose of reconquering
-or regaining the disaffected Numidian tribes. They met with good
-success in this enterprise; but the Numidians were in the main
-faithless and indifferent to both the belligerents, seeking only
-to turn the war to their own profit. Agathokles, leaving his son
-in command at Tunês, followed the Carthaginians into the interior
-with a large portion of his army. The Carthaginian generals were
-cautious, and kept themselves in strong position. Nevertheless
-Agathokles felt confident enough to assail them in their camp; and
-after great effort, with severe loss on his own side, he gained an
-indecisive victory. This advantage however was countervailed by the
-fact, that during the action the Numidians assailed his camp, slew
-all the defenders, and carried off nearly all the slaves and baggage.
-The loss on the Carthaginian side fell most severely upon the Greek
-soldiers in their pay; most of them exiles under Klinon, and some
-Syracusan exiles. These men behaved with signal gallantry, and were
-nearly all slain, either during the battle or after the battle, by
-Agathokles.[980]
-
-  [980] Diodor. xx. 39.
-
-It had now become manifest, however, to this daring invader that
-the force of resistance possessed by Carthage was more than he
-could overcome—that though humbling and impoverishing her for the
-moment, he could not bring the war to a triumphant close; since
-the city itself, occupying the isthmus of a peninsula from sea to
-sea, and surrounded with the strongest fortifications, could not
-be besieged except by means far superior to his.[981] We have
-already seen, that though he had gained victories and seized rich
-plunder, he had not been able to provide even regular pay for his
-soldiers, whose fidelity was consequently precarious. Nor could he
-expect reinforcements from Sicily; where his power was on the whole
-declining, though Syracuse itself was in less danger than before.
-He therefore resolved to invoke aid from Ophellas at Kyrênê and
-despatched Orthon as envoy for that purpose.[982]
-
-  [981] Diodor. xx. 59. Ὁ δὲ τῆς πόλεως οὐκ ἦν κίνδυνος, ἀπροσίτου
-  τῆς πόλεως οὔσης διὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν τειχῶν καὶ τῆς θαλάττης
-  ὀχυρότητα.
-
-  [982] Diodor. xx. 40.
-
-To Kyrênê and what was afterwards called its Pentapolis (i. e. the
-five neighboring Grecian towns, Kyrênê, its port Apollonia, Barka,
-Teucheira, and Hesperides), an earlier chapter of this history has
-already been devoted.[983] Unfortunately information respecting
-them, for a century and more anterior to Alexander the Great, is
-almost wholly wanting. Established among a Libyan population, many
-of whom were domiciliated with the Greeks as fellow-residents, these
-Kyreneans had imbibed many Libyan habits in war, in peace, and in
-religion; of which their fine breed of horses, employed both for
-the festival chariot-matches and in battle, was one example. The
-Libyan tribes, useful as neighbors, servants, and customers,[984]
-were frequently also troublesome as enemies. In 413 B. C.
-we hear accidentally that Hesperides was besieged by Libyan tribes,
-and rescued by some Peloponnesian hoplites on their way to Syracuse
-during the Athenian siege.[985] About 401 B. C. (shortly
-after the close of the Peloponnesian war), the same city was again
-so hard pressed by the same enemies, that she threw open her
-citizenship to any Greek new-comer who would aid in repelling them.
-This invitation was accepted by several of the Messenians, just then
-expelled from Peloponnesus, and proscribed by the Spartans; they
-went to Africa, but, becoming involved in intestine warfare among
-the citizens of Kyrênê, a large proportion of them perished.[986]
-Except these scanty notices, we hear nothing about the Greco-Libyan
-Pentapolis in relation to Grecian affairs, before the time of
-Alexander. It would appear that the trade with the native African
-tribes, between the Gulfs called the Greater and Lesser Syrtis,
-was divided between Kyrênê (meaning the Kyrenaic Pentapolis) and
-Carthage—at a boundary point called the Altars of the Philæni,
-ennobled by a commemorative legend; immediately east of these Altars
-was Automala, the westernmost factory of Kyrênê.[987] We cannot doubt
-that the relations, commercial and otherwise, between Kyrênê and
-Carthage, the two great emporia on the coast of Africa, were constant
-and often lucrative—though not always friendly.
-
-  [983] See Vol. IV. Ch. xxvii. p. 29-49.
-
-  [984] See Isokrates, Or. iv. (Philipp.) s. 6, where he speaks of
-  Kyrênê as a spot judiciously chosen for colonization; the natives
-  near it being not dangerous, but suited for obedient neighbors
-  and slaves.
-
-  [985] Thucyd. vii. 50.
-
-  [986] Pausan. iv. 26; Diodor. xiv. 34.
-
-  [987] Strabo, xvii. p. 836; Sallust, Bell. Jugurth. p. 126.
-
-In the year 331 B. C., when the victorious Alexander overran Egypt,
-the inhabitants of Kyrênê sent to tender presents and submission
-to him, and became enrolled among his subjects.[988] We hear
-nothing more about them until the last year of Alexander’s life
-(324 B. C. to 323 B. C.). About that time, the exiles from Kyrênê
-and Barka, probably enough emboldened by the rescript of Alexander
-(proclaimed at the Olympic festival of 324 B. C., and directing
-that all Grecian exiles, except those guilty of sacrilege, should
-be recalled forthwith), determined to accomplish their return by
-force. To this end they invited from Krete an officer named Thimbron;
-who, having slain Harpalus after his flight from Athens (recounted
-in a previous chapter), had quartered himself in Krete, with the
-treasure, the ships, and the 6000 mercenaries, brought over from
-Asia by that satrap.[989] Thimbron willingly carried over his army
-to their assistance, intending to conquer for himself a principality
-in Libya. He landed near Kyrênê, defeated the Kyrenean forces with
-great slaughter, and made himself master of Apollonia, the fortified
-port of that city, distant from it nearly ten miles. The towns of
-Barka and Hesperides sided with him; so that he was strong enough to
-force the Kyreneans to a disadvantageous treaty. They covenanted to
-pay 500 talents,—to surrender to him half of their war-chariots for
-his ulterior projects—and to leave him in possession of Apollonia.
-While he plundered the merchants in the harbor, he proclaimed
-his intention of subjugating the independent Libyan tribes, and
-probably of stretching his conquests to Carthage.[990] His schemes
-were however frustrated by one of his own officers, a Kretan named
-Mnasikles; who deserted to the Kyreneans, and encouraged them to set
-aside the recent convention. Thimbron, after seizing such citizens of
-Kyrênê as happened to be at Apollonia, attacked Kyrênê itself, but
-was repulsed; and the Kyreneans were then bold enough to invade the
-territory of Barka and Hesperides. To aid them, Thimbron moved his
-quarters from Apollonia; but during his absence, Mnasikles contrived
-to surprise that valuable port; thus mastering at once his base of
-operations, the station for his fleet, and all the baggage of his
-soldiers. Thimbron’s fleet could not be long maintained without a
-harbor. The seamen, landing here and there for victuals and water,
-were cut off by the native Libyans, while the vessels were dispersed
-by storms.[991]
-
-  [988] Arrian, vii. 9, 12; Curtius, iv. 7, 9; Diodor. xvii. 49.
-  It is said that the inhabitants of Kyrênê (exact date unknown)
-  applied to Plato to make laws for them, but that he declined. See
-  Thrige, Histor. Cyrênês, p. 191. We should be glad to have this
-  statement better avouched.
-
-  [989] Diodor. xvii. 108, xviii. 19; Arrian, De Rebus; post
-  Alexandr. vi. apud Photium, Cod. 92; Strabo, xvii. p. 837.
-
-  [990] Diodor. xviii. 19.
-
-  [991] Diodor. xvii. 20.
-
-The Kyreneans, now full of hope, encountered Thimbron in the field,
-and defeated him. Yet though reduced to distress, he contrived
-to obtain possession of Teucheira; to which port he invoked as
-auxiliaries 2500 fresh soldiers, out of the loose mercenary bands
-dispersed near Cape Tænarus in Peloponnesus. This reinforcement
-again put him in a condition for battle. The Kyreneans on their
-side also thought it necessary to obtain succor, partly from the
-neighboring Libyans, partly from Carthage. They got together a force
-stated as 30,000 men, with which they met him in the field. But, on
-this occasion they were totally routed, with the loss of all their
-generals and much of their army. Thimbron was now in the full tide of
-success; he pressed both Kyrênê and the harbor so vigorously, that
-famine began to prevail, and sedition broke out among the citizens.
-The oligarchical men, expelled by the more popular party, sought
-shelter, some in the camp of Thimbron; some at the court of Ptolemy
-in Egypt.[992]
-
-  [992] Diodor. xviii. 21.
-
-I have already mentioned, that in the partition after the decease
-of Alexander, Egypt had been assigned to Ptolemy. Seizing with
-eagerness the opportunity of annexing to it so valuable a possession
-as the Kyrenaic Pentapolis, this chief sent an adequate force under
-Ophellas to put down Thimbron and restore the exiles. His success was
-complete. All the cities in the Pentapolis were reduced; Thimbron,
-worsted and pursued as a fugitive, was seized in his flight by
-some Libyans, and brought prisoner to Teucheira; the citizens of
-which place (by permission of the Olynthian Epikydes, governor for
-Ptolemy), first tortured him, and then conveyed him to Apollonia to
-be hanged. A final visit from Ptolemy himself regulated the affairs
-of the Pentapolis, which were incorporated with his dominions and
-placed under the government of Ophellas.[993]
-
-  [993] Arrian, De Rebus post Alex. vi. ap. Phot. Cod. 92; Diodor.
-  xviii. 21; Justin, xiii. 6, 20.
-
-It was thus that the rich and flourishing Kyrênê, an interesting
-portion of the once autonomous Hellenic world, passed like the rest
-under one of the Macedonian Diadochi. As the proof and guarantee of
-this new sovereignty, we find erected within the walls of the city,
-a strong and completely detached citadel, occupied by a Macedonian
-or Egyptian garrison (like Munychia at Athens), and forming the
-stronghold of the viceroy. Ten years afterwards (B. C. 312)
-the Kyreneans made an attempt to emancipate themselves, and besieged
-this citadel; but being again put down by an army and fleet which
-Ptolemy despatched under Agis from Egypt,[994] Kyrênê passed once
-more under the vice-royalty of Ophellas.[995]
-
-  [994] Diodor. xix. 79. Οἱ Κυρηναῖοι ... τὴν ἄκραν
-  περιεστρατοπέδευσαν, ὡς αὔτικα μάλα τὴν φρουρὰν ἐκβαλοῦντες, etc.
-
-  [995] Justin (xxii. 7, 4) calls Ophellas “rex Cyrenarum;” but it
-  is noway probable that he had become independent of Ptolemy—as
-  Thrige (Hist. Cyrênês, p. 214) supposes. The expression in
-  Plutarch (Demetrius, 14), Ὀφέλλᾳ τῷ ἄρξαντι Κυρήνης, does not
-  necessarily imply an independent authority.
-
-To this viceroy Agathokles now sent envoys, invoking his aid against
-Carthage. Ophellas was an officer of consideration and experience.
-He had served under Alexander, and had married an Athenian wife,
-Euthydikê,—a lineal descendant from Miltiades the victor of
-Marathon, and belonging to a family still distinguished at Athens.
-In inviting Ophellas to undertake jointly the conquest of Carthage,
-the envoys proposed that he should himself hold it when conquered.
-Agathokles (they said) wished only to overthrow the Carthaginian
-dominion in Sicily, being well aware that he could not hold that
-island in conjunction with an African dominion. To Ophellas,[996]
-such an invitation proved extremely seducing. He was already on
-the look out for aggrandizement towards the west, and had sent an
-exploring nautical expedition along the northern coast of Africa,
-even to some distance round and beyond the Strait of Gibraltar.[997]
-Moreover, to all military adventurers, both on sea and on land, the
-season was one of boundless speculative promise. They had before
-them not only the prodigious career of Alexander himself, but the
-successful encroachments of the great officers his successors. In
-the second distribution, made at Triparadeisus, of the Alexandrine
-empire, Antipater had assigned to Ptolemy not merely Egypt and
-Libya, but also an undefined amount of territory west of Libya, to
-be afterwards acquired;[998] the conquest of which was known to
-have been among the projects of Alexander, had he lived longer.
-To this conquest Ophellas was now specially called, either as the
-viceroy or the independent equal of Ptolemy, by the invitation
-of Agathokles. Having learnt in the service of Alexander not to
-fear long marches, he embraced the proposition with eagerness. He
-undertook an expedition from Kyrênê on the largest scale. Through
-his wife’s relatives, he was enabled to make known his projects at
-Athens, where, as well as in other parts of Greece, they found much
-favor. At this season, the Kassandrian oligarchies were paramount
-not only at Athens, but generally throughout Greece. Under the
-prevalent degradation and suffering, there was ample ground for
-discontent, and no liberty of expressing it; many persons therefore
-were found disposed either to accept army-service with Ophellas,
-or to enrol themselves in a foreign colony under his auspices. To
-set out under the military protection of this powerful chief—to
-colonize the mighty Carthage, supposed to be already enfeebled by the
-victories of Agathokles—to appropriate the wealth, the fertile landed
-possessions, and the maritime position, of her citizens—was a prize
-well calculated to seduce men dissatisfied with their homes, and not
-well informed of the intervening difficulties.[999]
-
-  [996] Diodor. xx. 40.
-
-  [997] From an incidental allusion in Strabo (xvii. p. 826), we
-  learn this fact—that Ophellas had surveyed the whole coast of
-  Northern Africa, to the straits of Gibraltar, and round the old
-  Phenician settlements on the western coast of modern Morocco.
-  Some eminent critics (Grosskurd among them) reject the reading in
-  Strabo—ἀπὸ τοῦ Ὀφέλα (or Ὀφέλλα) περιπλοῦ, which is sustained by
-  a very great preponderance of MSS. But I do not feel the force of
-  their reasons; and the reading which they would substitute has
-  nothing to recommend it. In my judgment, Ophellas, ruling in the
-  Kyrenaica and indulging aspirations towards conquest westward,
-  was a man both likely to order, and competent to bring about, an
-  examination of the North African coast. The knowledge of this
-  fact may have induced Agathokles to apply to him.
-
-  [998] Arrian, De Rebus post Alex. ap. Photium, Cod. 92. Αἴγυπτον
-  μὲν γὰρ καὶ Λιβύην, καὶ τὴν ἐπέκεινα ταύτης τὴν πολλὴν, καὶ ὅ,τι
-  περ ἂν πρὸς τούτοις δ᾽ ὅριον ἐπικτήσηται πρὸς δυομένου ἡλίου,
-  Πτολεμαίου εἶναι.
-
-  [999] Diodor. xx. 40. πολλοὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων προθύμως ὑπήκουσαν εἰς
-  τὴν στρατείαν· οὐκ ὀλίγοι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων, ἔσπευδον
-  κοινωνῆσαι τῆς ἐπιβολῆς, ἐλπίζοντες τήν τε κρατίστην τῆς Λιβύης
-  κατακληρουχήσειν, καὶ τὸν ἐν Καρχηδόνι διαρπάσειν πλοῦτον.
-
-  As to the great encouragement held out to settlers, when a new
-  colony was about to be founded by a powerful state, see Thucyd.
-  iii. 93, about Herakleia Trachinia—πᾶς γάρ τίς, Λακεδαιμονίων
-  οἰκιζόντων, θαρσαλέως ᾔει, βέβαιαν νομίζων τὴν πόλιν.
-
-Under such hopes, many Grecian colonists joined Ophellas at Kyrênê,
-some even with wives and children. The total number is stated at
-10,000. Ophellas conducted them forth at the head of a well appointed
-army of 10,000 infantry, 600 cavalry, and 100 war-chariots; each
-chariot carrying the driver and two fighting men. Marching with this
-miscellaneous body of soldiers and colonists, he reached in eighteen
-days the post of Automalæ—the westernmost factory of Kyrênê.[1000]
-From thence he proceeded westward along the shore between the two
-Syrtes, in many parts a sandy, trackless desert, without wood and
-almost without water (with the exception of particular points of
-fertility), and infested by serpents many and venomous. At one time,
-all his provisions were exhausted; he passed through the territory
-of the natives called Lotophagi, near the lesser Syrtis; where the
-army had nothing to eat except the fruit of the lotus, which there
-abounded.[1001] Ophellas met with no enemies; but the sufferings
-of every kind endured by his soldiers—still more of course by the
-less hardy colonists and their families—were most distressing. After
-miseries endured for more than two months, he joined Agathokles in
-the Carthaginian territory; With what abatement of number, we do not
-know, but his loss must have been considerable.[1002]
-
-  [1000] Diodor. xx. 41.
-
-  [1001] Theophrastus, Hist. Plant. iv. 3. p. 127, ed. Schneider.
-
-  The philosopher would hear this fact from some of the Athenians
-  concerned in the expedition.
-
-  [1002] Diodor. xx. 42. See the striking description of the
-  miseries of this same march, made by Cato and his Roman troops
-  after the death of Pompey, in Lucan, Pharsalia, ix. 382-940:—
-
-    “Vadimus in campos steriles, exustaque mundi.
-    Quà nimius Titan, et raræ in fontibus undæ,
-    Siccaque letiferis squalent serpentibus arva,
-    Durum iter.”
-
-  The entire march of Ophellas must (I think) have lasted longer
-  than two months; probably Diodorus speaks only of the more
-  distressing or middle portion of it when he says—κατὰ τὴν
-  ὁδοιπορίαν πλεῖον ἢ δύο μῆνας κακοπαθήσαντες, etc. (xx. 42).
-
-Ophellas little knew the man whose invitation and alliance he
-had accepted. Agathokles at first received him with the warmest
-protestations of attachment, welcoming the new-comers with profuse
-hospitality, and supplying to them full means of refreshment and
-renovation after their past sufferings. Having thus gained the
-confidence and favorable sympathies of all, he proceeded to turn it
-to his own purposes. Convening suddenly the most devoted among his
-own soldiers, he denounced Ophellas as guilty of plotting against
-his life. They listened to him with the same feelings of credulous
-rage as the Macedonian soldiers exhibited when Alexander denounced
-Philotas before them. Agathokles then at once called them to arms,
-set upon Ophellas unawares, and slew him with his more immediate
-defenders. Among the soldiers of Ophellas, this act excited horror
-and indignation, no less than surprise; but Agathokles at length
-succeeded in bringing them to terms, partly by deceitful pretexts,
-partly by intimidation: for this unfortunate army, left without any
-commander of fixed purpose, had no resource except to enter into
-his service.[1003] He thus found himself (like Antipater after the
-death of Leonnatus) master of a double army, and relieved from a
-troublesome rival. The colonists of Ophellas—more unfortunate still,
-since they could be of no service to Agathokles—were put by him on
-board some merchant vessels, which he was sending to Syracuse with
-spoil. The weather becoming stormy, many of these vessels foundered
-at sea,—some were driven off and wrecked on the coast of Italy—and a
-few only reached Syracuse.[1004] Thus miserably perished the Kyrenean
-expedition of Ophellas; one of the most commanding and powerful
-schemes, for joint conquest and colonization, that ever set out from
-any Grecian city.
-
-  [1003] Diodor. xx. 42; Justin. xxii. 7.
-
-  [1004] Diodor. xx. 44.
-
-It would have fared ill with Agathokles, had the Carthaginians
-been at hand, and ready to attack him in the confusion immediately
-succeeding the death of Ophellas. It would also have fared yet
-worse with Carthage, had Agathokles been in a position to attack
-her during the terrible sedition excited, nearly at the same time,
-within her walls by the general Bomilkar.[1005] This traitor (as
-has been already stated) had long cherished the design to render
-himself despot, and had been watching for a favorable opportunity.
-Having purposely caused the loss of the first battle—fought in
-conjunction with his brave colleague Hanno, against Agathokles—he
-had since carried on the war with a view to his own project (which
-explains in part the continued reverses of the Carthaginians); he
-now thought that the time was come for openly raising his standard.
-Availing himself of a military muster in the quarter of the city
-called Neapolis, he first dismissed the general body of the soldiers,
-retaining near him only a trusty band of 500 citizens, and 4000
-mercenaries. At the head of these, he then fell upon the unsuspecting
-city: dividing them into five detachments, and slaughtering
-indiscriminately the unarmed citizens in the streets, as well as in
-the great market-place. At first the Carthaginians were astounded
-and paralyzed. Gradually however they took courage, stood upon their
-defence against the assailants, combatted them in the streets and
-poured upon them missiles from the house-tops. After a prolonged
-conflict, the partisans of Bomilkar found themselves worsted, and
-were glad to avail themselves of the mediation of some elder
-citizens. They laid down their arms on promise of pardon. The promise
-was faithfully kept by the victors, except in regard to Bomilkar
-himself; who was hanged in the market-place, having first undergone
-severe tortures.[1006]
-
-  [1005] Diodor. xx. 43.
-
-  [1006] Diodor. xx. 44; Justin, xxii. 7. Compare the description
-  given by Appian (Punic. 128), of the desperate defence made by
-  the Carthaginians in the last siege of the city, against the
-  assault of the Romans, from the house-tops and in the streets.
-
-Though the Carthaginians had thus escaped from an extreme peril, yet
-the effects of so formidable a conspiracy weakened them for some time
-against their enemy without; while Agathokles on the other hand,
-reinforced by the army from Kyrênê, was stronger than ever. So elate
-did he feel, that he assumed the title of King;[1007] following
-herein the example of the great Macedonian officers, Antigonus,
-Ptolemy, Seleukus, Lysimachus, and Kassander; the memory of Alexander
-being now discarded, as his heirs had been already put to death.
-Agathokles, already master of nearly all the dependent towns east and
-south-east of Carthage, proceeded to carry his arms to the north-west
-of the city. He attacked Utica,—the second city next to Carthage
-in importance, and older indeed than Carthage itself—situated
-on the western or opposite shore of the Carthaginian Gulf, and
-visible from Carthage, though distant from it twenty-seven miles
-around the Gulf on land.[1008] The Uticans had hitherto remained
-faithful to Carthage, in spite of her reverses, and of defection
-elsewhere.[1009] Agathokles marched into their territory with such
-unexpected rapidity (he had hitherto been on the south-east of
-Carthage, and he now suddenly moved to the north-west of that city),
-that he seized the persons of three hundred leading citizens, who
-had not yet taken the precaution of retiring within the city. Having
-vainly tried to prevail on the Uticans to surrender, he assailed
-their walls, attaching in front of his battering engines the three
-hundred Utican prisoners; so that the citizens, in hurling missiles
-of defence, were constrained to inflict death on their own comrades
-and relatives. They nevertheless resisted the assault with unshaken
-resolution; but Agathokles found means to force an entrance through a
-weak part of the walls, and thus became master of the city. He made
-it a scene of indiscriminate slaughter, massacring the inhabitants,
-armed and unarmed, and hanging up the prisoners. He further captured
-the town of Hippu-Akra, about thirty miles north-west of Utica,
-which had also remained faithful to Carthage—and which now, after a
-brave defence, experienced the like pitiless treatment.[1010] The
-Carthaginians, seemingly not yet recovered from their recent shock,
-did not interfere, even to rescue these two important places; so that
-Agathokles, firmly established in Tunês as a centre of operations,
-extended his African dominion more widely than ever all round
-Carthage, both on the coast and in the interior; while he interrupted
-the supplies of Carthage itself, and reduced the inhabitants to great
-privations.[1011] He even occupied and fortified strongly a place
-called Hippagreta, between Utica and Carthage; thus pushing his posts
-within a short distance both east and west of her gates.[1012]
-
-  [1007] There are yet remaining coins—Ἀγαθοκλέος Βασιλέως—the
-  earliest Sicilian coins that bear the name of a prince
-  (Humphreys, Ancient Coins and Medals, p. 50).
-
-  [1008] Strabo, xvii. p. 832; Polyb. i. 73.
-
-  [1009] Polybius (i. 82) expressly states that the inhabitants
-  of Utica and of Hippu-Akra (a little further to the west than
-  Utica), remained faithful to Carthage throughout the hostilities
-  carried on by Agathokles. This enables us to correct the passage
-  wherein Diodorus describes the attack of Agathokles upon Utica
-  (xx. 54)—ἐπὶ μὲν Ἰτυκαίους ἐστράτευσεν ~ἀφεστηκότας~, ἄφνω δὲ
-  αὐτῶν τῇ πόλει προσπεσών, etc. The word ~ἀφεστηκότας~ here is
-  perplexing. It must mean that the Uticans had revolted _from
-  Agathokles_; yet Diodorus has not before said a word about the
-  Uticans, nor reported that they had either joined Agathokles,
-  or been conquered by him. Everything that Diodorus has reported
-  hitherto about Agathokles, relates to operations among the towns
-  east or south-east of Carthage.
-
-  It appears to me that the passage ought to stand—ἐπὶ μὲν
-  Ἰτυκαίους ἐστράτευσεν ~οὐκ ἀφεστηκότας~, _i. e._ from Carthage;
-  which introduces consistency into the narrative of Diodorus
-  himself, while it brings him into harmony with Polybius.
-
-  [1010] Diodor. xx. 54, 55. In attacking Hippu-Akra (otherwise
-  called Hippo-Zarytus, near the Promontorium Pulchrum, the
-  northernmost point of Africa), Agathokles is said to have got the
-  better in a naval battle—ναυμαχία περιγενόμενος. This implies
-  that he must have got a fleet superior to the Carthaginians even
-  in their own gulf; perhaps ships seized at Utica.
-
-  [1011] Diodor. xx. 59.
-
-  [1012] Appian distinctly mentions this place _Hippagreta_ as
-  having been fortified by Agathokles—and distinctly describes
-  it as being between Utica and Carthage (Punic. 110). It cannot
-  therefore be the same place as Hippu-Akra (or Hippo-Zarytus);
-  which was considerably further from Carthage than Utica was.
-
-In this prosperous condition of his African affairs, he thought the
-opportunity favorable for retrieving his diminished ascendency in
-Sicily; to which island he accordingly crossed over, with 2000 men,
-leaving the command in Africa to his son Archagathus. That young
-man was at first successful, and seemed even in course of enlarging
-his father’s conquests. His general Eumachus overran a wide range
-of interior Numidia, capturing Tokæ, Phellinê, Meschelæ, Akris, and
-another town bearing the same name of Hippu-Akra—and enriching his
-soldiers with a considerable plunder. But in a second expedition,
-endeavoring to carry his arms yet farther into the interior, he
-was worsted in an attack upon a town called Miltinê, and compelled
-to retreat. We read that he marched through one mountainous region
-abounding in wild cats—and another, in which there were a great
-number of apes, who lived in the most tame and familiar manner in
-the houses with men—being greatly caressed, and even worshipped as
-gods.[1013]
-
-  [1013] Diodor. xx. 57, 58. It is vain to attempt to identify
-  the places mentioned as visited and conquered by Eumachus. Our
-  topographical knowledge is altogether insufficient. This second
-  Hippu-Akra is supposed to be the same as Hippo-Regius; Tokæ may
-  be Tucca Terebinthina, in the south-eastern region or Byzakium.
-
-The Carthaginians however had now regained internal harmony and
-power of action. Their senate and their generals were emulous, both
-in vigor and in provident combinations, against the common enemy.
-They sent forth 30,000 men, a larger force than they had yet had in
-the field; forming three distinct camps, under Hanno, Imilkon, and
-Adherbal, partly in the interior, partly on the coast. Archagathus,
-leaving a sufficient guard at Tunês, marched to meet them,
-distributing his army in three divisions also; two, under himself
-and Æschrion, besides the corps under Eumachus in the mountainous
-region. He was however unsuccessful at all points. Hanno, contriving
-to surprise the division of Æschrion, gained a complete victory,
-wherein Æschrion himself with more than 4000 men were slain. Imilkon
-was yet more fortunate in his operations against Eumachus, whom he
-entrapped by simulated flight into an ambuscade, and attacked at such
-advantage, that the Grecian army was routed and cut off from all
-retreat. A remnant of them defended themselves for some time on a
-neighboring hill, but being without water, nearly all soon perished,
-from thirst, fatigue, and the sword of the conqueror.[1014]
-
-  [1014] Diodor. xx. 59, 60.
-
-By such reverses, destroying two-thirds of the Agathoklean army,
-Archagathus was placed in serious peril. He was obliged to
-concentrate his force in Tunês, calling in nearly all his outlying
-detachments. At the same time, those Liby-Phenician cities, and
-rural Libyan tribes, who had before joined Agathokles, now detached
-themselves from him when his power was evidently declining, and made
-their peace with Carthage. The victorious Carthaginian generals
-established fortified camps round Tunês, so as to restrain the
-excursions of Archagathus; while with their fleet they blocked up
-his harbor. Presently provisions became short, and much despondency
-prevailed among the Grecian army. Archagathus transmitted this
-discouraging news to his father in Sicily, with urgent entreaties
-that he would come to the rescue.[1015]
-
-  [1015] Diodor. xx. 61.
-
-The career of Agathokles in Sicily, since his departure from Africa,
-had been checkered, and on the whole unproductive. Just before his
-arrival in the island,[1016] his generals Leptines and Demophilus had
-gained an important victory over the Agrigentine forces commanded by
-Xenodokus, who were disabled from keeping the field. This disaster
-was a fatal discouragement both to the Agrigentines, and to the
-cause which they had espoused as champions—free and autonomous
-city-government with equal confederacy for self-defence, under the
-presidency of Agrigentum.[1017] The outlying cities confederate with
-Agrigentum were left without military protection, and exposed to the
-attacks of Leptines, animated and fortified by the recent arrival
-of his master Agathokles. That despot landed at Selinus—subdued
-Herakleia, Therma, and Kephaloidion, on or near the northern coast of
-Sicily—then crossed the interior of the island to Syracuse. In his
-march he assaulted Kentoripa, having some partisans within, but was
-repulsed with loss. At Apollonia,[1018] he was also unsuccessful in
-his first attempt; but being stung with mortification, he resumed the
-assault next day, and at length, by great efforts, carried the town.
-To avenge his loss, which had been severe, he massacred most of the
-citizens, and abandoned the town to plunder.[1019]
-
-  [1016] Diodor. xx. 56. Ἀγαθοκλῆς δὲ, τῆς ~μάχης ἄρτι~
-  γεγενημένης, καταπλεύσας τῆς Σικελίας εἰς Σελινοῦντα, etc.
-
-  [1017] Diodor. xx. 56. Οἱ μὲν οὖν Ἀκραγαντῖνοι ταύτῃ τῇ συμφορᾷ
-  περιπεσόντες, διέλυσαν ἑαυτῶν μὲν τὴν καλλίστην ἐπιβολὴν, τῶν δὲ
-  συμμάχων τὰς τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἐλπίδας.
-
-  [1018] Apollonia was a town in the interior of the island,
-  somewhat to the north-east of Enna (Cicero, Verr. iii. 43).
-
-  [1019] Diodor. xx. 56.
-
-From hence he proceeded to Syracuse, which he now revisited after
-an absence of (apparently) more than two years in Africa. During
-all this interval, the Syracusan harbor had been watched by a
-Carthaginian fleet, obstructing the entry of provisions, and causing
-partial scarcity.[1020] But there was no blockading army on land;
-nor had the dominion of Agathokles, upheld as it was by his brother
-Antander and his mercenary force, been at all shaken. His arrival
-inspired his partisans and soldiers with new courage, while it
-spread terror throughout most parts of Sicily. To contend with the
-Carthaginian blockading squadron, he made efforts to procure maritime
-aid from the Tyrrhenian ports in Italy;[1021] while on land, his
-forces were now preponderant—owing to the recent defeat, and broken
-spirit, of the Agrigentines. But his prospects were suddenly checked
-by the enterprising move of his old enemy—the Syracusan exile
-Deinokrates; who made profession of taking up that generous policy
-which the Agrigentines had tacitly let fall—announcing himself as
-the champion of autonomous city-government, and equal confederacy,
-throughout Sicily. Deinokrates received ready adhesion from most of
-the cities belonging to the Agrigentine confederacy—all of them who
-were alarmed by finding that the weakness or fears of their presiding
-city had left them unprotected against Agathokles. He was soon at
-the head of a powerful army—20,000 foot, and 1500 horse. Moreover a
-large proportion of his army were not citizen militia, but practised
-soldiers; for the most part exiles, driven from their homes by
-the distractions and violences of the Agathoklean æra.[1022] For
-military purposes, both he and his soldiers were far more strenuous
-and effective than the Agrigentines under Xenodokus had been. He not
-only kept the field against Agathokles, but several times offered him
-battle, which the despot did not feel confidence enough to accept.
-Agathokles could do no more than maintain himself in Syracuse, while
-the Sicilian cities generally were put in security against his
-aggressions.
-
-  [1020] Diodor. xx. 62.
-
-  [1021] Diodor. xx. 61.
-
-  [1022] Diodor. xx. 57. καὶ πάντων τούτων ἐν φυγαῖς καὶ μελέταις
-  τοῦ πονεῖν συνεχῶς γεγονότων, etc.
-
-Amidst this unprosperous course of affairs in Sicily, Agathokles
-received messengers from his son, reporting the defeats in Africa.
-Preparing immediately to revisit that country, he was fortunate
-enough to obtain a reinforcement of Tyrrhenian ships of war, which
-enabled him to overcome the Carthaginian blockading squadron at
-the mouth of the Syracusan harbor. A clear passage to Africa was
-thus secured for himself, together with ample supplies of imported
-provisions for the Syracusans.[1023] Though still unable to combat
-Deinokrates in the field, Agathokles was emboldened by his recent
-naval victory to send forth Leptines with a force to invade the
-Agrigentines—the jealous rivals, rather than the allies, of
-Deinokrates. The Agrigentine army—under the general Xenodokus, whom
-Leptines had before defeated—consisted of citizen militia mustered
-on the occasion; while the Agathoklean mercenaries, conducted by
-Leptines, had made arms a profession, and were used to fighting
-as well as to hardships.[1024] Here as elsewhere in Greece, we
-find the civic and patriotic energy trampled down by professional
-soldiership, and reduced to operate only as an obsequious instrument
-for administrative details.
-
-  [1023] Diodor. xx. 61, 62.
-
-  [1024] Diodor. xx. 62.
-
-Xenodokus, conscious of the inferiority of his Agrigentine force,
-was reluctant to hazard a battle. Driven to this imprudence by the
-taunts of his soldiers, he was defeated a second time by Leptines,
-and became so apprehensive of the wrath of the Agrigentines, that he
-thought it expedient to retire to Gela. After a period of rejoicing,
-for his recent victories by land as well as by sea, Agathokles passed
-over to Africa, where he found his son, with the army at Tunês in
-great despondency and privation, and almost mutiny for want of
-pay. They still amounted to 6000 Grecian mercenaries, 6000 Gauls,
-Samnites, and Tyrrhenians—1500 cavalry—and no less than 6000 (if the
-number be correct) Libyan war-chariots. There were also a numerous
-body of Libyan allies; faithless time-servers, watching for the
-turn of fortune. The Carthaginians, occupying strong camps in the
-vicinity of Tunês, and abundantly supplied, awaited patiently the
-destroying effects of privation and suffering on their enemies. So
-desperate was the position of Agathokles, that he was compelled to go
-forth and fight. Having tried in vain to draw the Carthaginians down
-into the plain, he at length attacked them in the full strength of
-their entrenchments. But in spite of the most strenuous efforts, his
-troops were repulsed with great slaughter, and driven back to their
-camp.[1025]
-
-  [1025] Diodor. xx. 64; Justin, xxii. 8.
-
-The night succeeding this battle was a scene of disorder and panic in
-both camps; even in that of the victorious Carthaginians. The latter,
-according to the ordinances of their religion, eager to return their
-heartfelt thanks to the gods for this great victory, sacrificed to
-them as a choice offering the handsomest prisoners captured.[1026]
-During this process, the tent or tabernacle consecrated to the gods,
-close to the altar as well as to the general’s tent, accidentally
-took fire. The tents being formed by mere wooden posts, connected
-by a thatch of hay or straw both on roof and sides,—the fire spread
-rapidly, and the entire camp was burnt, together with many soldiers
-who tried to arrest the conflagration. So distracting was the terror
-occasioned by this catastrophe, that the whole Carthaginian army for
-the time dispersed; and Agathokles, had he been prepared, might have
-destroyed them. But it happened that at the same hour, his own camp
-was thrown into utter confusion by a different accident, rendering
-his soldiers incapable of being brought into action.[1027]
-
-  [1026] Diodor. xx. 65. See an incident somewhat similar (Herod.
-  vii. 180)—the Persians, in the invasion of Greece by Xerxes,
-  sacrificed the handsomest Grecian prisoner whom they captured on
-  board the first prize-ship that fell into their hands.
-
-  [1027] Diodor. xx. 66, 67.
-
-His position at Tunês had now become desperate. His Libyan allies had
-all declared against him, after the recent defeat. He could neither
-continue to hold Tunês, nor carry away his troops to Sicily; for
-he had but few vessels, and the Carthaginians were masters at sea.
-Seeing no resource, he resolved to embark secretly with his younger
-son Herakleides; abandoning Archagathus and the army to their fate.
-But Archagathus and the other officers, suspecting his purpose,
-were thoroughly resolved that the man who had brought them into
-destruction should not thus slip away and betray them. As Agathokles
-was on the point of going aboard at night, he found himself watched,
-arrested, and held prisoner, by the indignant soldiery. The whole
-town now became a scene of disorder and tumult, aggravated by the
-rumor that the enemy were marching up to attack them. Amidst the
-general alarm, the guards who had been set over Agathokles, thinking
-his services indispensable for defence, brought him out with his
-fetters still on. When the soldiers saw him in this condition,
-their sentiment towards him again reverted to pity and admiration,
-notwithstanding his projected desertion; moreover they hoped for his
-guidance to resist the impending attack. With one voice they called
-upon the guards to strike off his chains and set him free. Agathokles
-was again at liberty. But insensible to everything except his own
-personal safety, he presently stole away, leaped unperceived into a
-skiff, with a few attendants, but without either of his sons,—and was
-lucky enough to arrive, in spite of stormy November weather, on the
-coast of Sicily.[1028]
-
-  [1028] Diodor. xx. 69; Justin, xxii. 8. ... τὸ δὲ πλῆθος, ὡς
-  εἶδεν, εἰς ἔλεον ἐτράπη, καὶ πάντες ἐπεβόων ἀφεῖναι· ὁ δὲ λυθεὶς
-  καὶ μετ᾽ ὀλίγων ἐμβὰς εἰς τὸ πορθμεῖον, ἔλαθεν ἐκπλεύσας κατὰ τὴν
-  δύσιν τῆς Πλειάδος, χειμῶνος ὄντος.
-
-So terrible was the fury of the soldiers, on discovering that
-Agathokles had accomplished his desertion, that they slew both his
-sons, Archagathus and Herakleides. No resource was left but to elect
-new generals, and make the best terms they could with Carthage. They
-were still a formidable body, retaining in their hands various other
-towns besides Tunês; so that the Carthaginians, relieved from all
-fear of Agathokles, thought it prudent to grant an easy capitulation.
-It was agreed that all the towns should be restored to the
-Carthaginians, on payment of 300 talents; that such soldiers as chose
-to enter into the African service of Carthage, should be received on
-full pay; but that such as preferred returning to Sicily should be
-transported thither, with permission to reside in the Carthaginian
-town of Solus (or Soluntum). On these terms the convention was
-concluded, and the army finally broken up. Some indeed among the
-Grecian garrisons, quartered in the outlying posts, being rash enough
-to dissent and hold out, were besieged and taken by the Carthaginian
-force. Their commanders were crucified, and the soldiers condemned to
-rural work as fettered slaves.[1029]
-
-  [1029] Diodor. xx. 69.
-
-Thus miserably terminated the expedition of Agathokles to Africa,
-after an interval of four years from the time of his landing. By
-the _vana mirantes_,[1030] who looked out for curious coincidences
-(probably Timæus), it was remarked, that his ultimate flight, with
-the slaughter of his two sons, occurred exactly on the same day of
-the year following his assassination of Ophellas.[1031] Ancient
-writers extol, with good reason, the bold and striking conception
-of transferring the war to Africa, at the very moment when he was
-himself besieged in Syracuse by a superior Carthaginian force.
-But while admitting the military resource, skill, and energy, of
-Agathokles, we must not forget that his success in Africa was
-materially furthered by the treasonable conduct of the Carthaginian
-general Bomilkar—an accidental coincidence in point of time. Nor
-is it to be overlooked, that Agathokles missed the opportunity
-of turning his first success to account, at a moment when the
-Carthaginians would probably have purchased his evacuation of Africa
-by making large concessions to him in Sicily.[1032] He imprudently
-persisted in the war, though the complete conquest of Carthage was
-beyond his strength—and though it was still more beyond his strength
-to prosecute effective war, simultaneously and for a long time, in
-Sicily and in Africa. The African subjects of Carthage were not
-attached to her; but neither were they attached to him;—nor, on the
-long run, did they do him any serious good. Agathokles is a man of
-force and fraud—consummate in the use of both. His whole life is a
-series of successful adventures, and strokes of bold ingenuity to
-extricate himself from difficulties; but there is wanting in him all
-predetermined general plan, or measured range of ambition, to which
-these single exploits might be made subservient.
-
-  [1030] Tacit. Annal. i. 9. “Multus hinc ipso de Augusto sermo,
-  plerisque _vana mirantibus_—quod idem dies accepti quondam
-  imperii princeps, et vitæ supremus—quod Nolæ in domo et cubiculo,
-  in quo pater ejus Octavius, vitam finivisset”, etc.
-
-  [1031] Diodor. xx. 70.
-
-  [1032] This is what Agathokles might have done, but did not
-  do. Nevertheless, Valerius Maximus (vii. 4, 1) represents him
-  as having actually done it, and praises his sagacity on that
-  ground. Here is an example how little careful these collectors of
-  anecdotes sometimes are about their facts.
-
-After his passage from Africa, Agathokles landed on the western
-corner of Sicily near the town of Egesta, which was then in alliance
-with him. He sent to Syracuse for a reinforcement. But he was hard
-pressed for money; he suspected, or pretended to suspect, the
-Egestæans of disaffection; accordingly, on receiving his new force,
-he employed it to commit revolting massacre and plunder in Egesta.
-The town is reported to have contained 10,000 citizens. Of these
-Agathokles caused the poorer men to be for the most part murdered;
-the richer were cruelly tortured, and even their wives tortured and
-mutilated, to compel revelations of concealed wealth; the children
-of both sexes were transported to Italy, and there sold as slaves to
-the Bruttians. The original population being thus nearly extirpated,
-Agathokles changed the name of the town to Dikæopolis, assigning
-it as a residence to such deserters as might join him.[1033] This
-atrocity, more suitable to Africa[1034] than Greece (where the
-mutilation of women is almost unheard of), was probably the way in
-which his savage pride obtained some kind of retaliatory satisfaction
-for the recent calamity and humiliation in Africa. Under the like
-sentiment, he perpetrated another deed of blood at Syracuse. Having
-learnt that the soldiers, whom he had deserted at Tunês, had after
-his departure put to death his two sons, he gave orders to Antander
-his brother (viceroy of Syracuse), to massacre all the relatives
-of those Syracusans who had served him in the African expedition.
-This order was fulfilled by Antander (we are assured) accurately
-and to the letter. Neither age or sex—grandsire or infant—wife or
-mother—were spared by the Agathoklean executioners. We may be sure
-that their properties were plundered at the same time; we hear of no
-mutilations.[1035]
-
-  [1033] Diodor. xx. 71. We do not know what happened afterwards
-  with this town under its new population. But the old name Egesta
-  was afterwards resumed.
-
-  [1034] Compare the proceedings of the Greco-Libyan princess
-  Pheretimê (of the Battiad family) at Barka (Herodot. iv. 202).
-
-  [1035] Diodor. xx. 72. Hippokrates and Epikydes—those Syracusans
-  who, about a century afterwards, induced Hieronymus of Syracuse
-  to prefer the Carthaginian alliance to the Roman—had resided
-  at Carthage for some time, and served in the army of Hannibal,
-  because their grandfather had been banished from Syracuse as one
-  concerned in killing Archagathus (Polyb. vii. 2).
-
-Still Agathokles tried to maintain his hold on the Sicilian towns
-which remained to him; but his cruelties as well as his reverses
-had produced a strong sentiment against him, and even his general
-Pasiphilus revolted to join Deinokrates. That exile was now at the
-head of an army stated at 20,000 men, the most formidable military
-force in Sicily; so that Agathokles, feeling the inadequacy of his
-own means, sent to solicit peace, and to offer tempting conditions.
-He announced his readiness to evacuate Syracuse altogether, and
-to be content, if two maritime towns on the northern coast of the
-island—Therma and Kephaloidion—were assigned to his mercenaries and
-himself. Under this proposition, Deinokrates, and the other Syracusan
-exiles, had the opportunity of entering Syracuse, and reconstituting
-the free city-government. Had Deinokrates been another Timoleon, the
-city might now have acquired and enjoyed another temporary sunshine
-of autonomy and prosperity; but his ambition was thoroughly selfish.
-As commander of this large army, he enjoyed a station of power and
-license such as he was not likely to obtain under the reconstituted
-city-government of Syracuse. He therefore evaded the propositions of
-Agathokles, requiring still larger concessions; until at length the
-Syracusan exiles in his own army (partly instigated by emissaries
-from Agathokles himself) began to suspect his selfish projects,
-and to waver in their fidelity to him. Meanwhile Agathokles, being
-repudiated by Deinokrates, addressed himself to the Carthaginians,
-and concluded a treaty with them, restoring or guaranteeing to them
-all the possessions that they had ever enjoyed in Sicily. In return
-for this concession, he received from them a sum of money, and a
-large supply of corn.[1036]
-
-  [1036] Diodor. xx. 78, 79. Some said that the sum of money paid
-  by the Carthaginians was 300 talents. Timæus stated it at 150
-  talents.
-
-Relieved from Carthaginian hostility, Agathokles presently ventured
-to march against the army of Deinokrates. The latter was indeed
-greatly superior in strength, but many of his soldiers were now
-lukewarm or disaffected, and Agathokles had established among them
-correspondences upon which he could rely. At a great battle fought
-near Torgium, many of them went over on the field to Agathokles,
-giving to him a complete victory. The army of Deinokrates was
-completely dispersed. Shortly afterwards a considerable body among
-them (4000 men, or 7000 men, according to different statements)
-surrendered to the victor on terms. As soon as they had delivered up
-their arms, Agathokles, regardless of his covenant, caused them to be
-surrounded by his own army, and massacred.[1037]
-
-  [1037] Diodor. xx. 89.
-
-It appears as if the recent victory had been the result of a secret
-and treacherous compact between Agathokles and Deinokrates; and as if
-the prisoners massacred by Agathokles were those of whom Deinokrates
-wished to rid himself as malcontents; for immediately after the
-battle, a reconciliation took place between the two. Agathokles
-admitted the other as a sort of partner in his despotism; while
-Deinokrates not only brought into the partnership all the military
-means and strong posts which he had been two years in acquiring, but
-also betrayed to Agathokles the revolted general Pasiphilus with the
-town of Gela occupied by the latter. It is noticed as singular, that
-Agathokles, generally faithless and unscrupulous towards both friends
-and enemies, kept up the best understanding and confidence with
-Deinokrates to the end of his life.[1038]
-
-  [1038] Diodor. xx. 90.
-
-The despot had now regained full power at Syracuse, together with
-a great extent of dominion in Sicily. The remainder of his restless
-existence was spent in operations of hostility or plunder against
-more northerly enemies—the Liparæan isles[1039]—the Italian cities
-and the Bruttians—the island of Korkyra. We are unable to follow
-his proceedings in detail. He was threatened with a formidable
-attack[1040] by the Spartan prince Kleonymus, who was invited by
-the Tarentines to aid them against the Lucanians and Romans. But
-Kleonymus found enough to occupy him elsewhere, without visiting
-Sicily. He collected a considerable force on the coast of Italy,
-undertook operations with success against the Lucanians, and even
-captured the town of Thurii. But the Romans, now pushing their
-intervention even to the Tarentine Gulf, drove him off and retook the
-town; moreover his own behavior was so tyrannical and profligate, as
-to draw upon him universal hatred. Returning from Italy to Korkyra,
-Kleonymus made himself master of that important island, intending to
-employ it as a base of operations both against Greece and against
-Italy.[1041] He failed however in various expeditions both in the
-Tarentine Gulf and the Adriatic. Demetrius Poliorketes and Kassander
-alike tried to conclude an alliance with him; but in vain.[1042]
-At a subsequent period, Korkyra was besieged by Kassander with a
-large naval and military force; Kleonymus then retired (or perhaps
-had previously retired) to Sparta. Kassander, having reduced the
-island to great straits, was on the point of taking it, when it was
-relieved by Agathokles with a powerful armament. That despot was
-engaged in operations on the coast of Italy against the Bruttians
-when his aid to Korkyra was solicited; he destroyed most part of the
-Macedonian fleet, and then seized the island for himself.[1043] On
-returning from this victorious expedition to the Italian coast, where
-he had left a detachment of his Ligurian and Tuscan mercenaries,
-he was informed that these mercenaries had been turbulent during
-his absence, in demanding the pay due to them from his grandson
-Archagathus. He caused them all to be slain, to the number of
-2000.[1044]
-
-  [1039] Diodor. xx. 101. This expedition of Agathokles against
-  the Lyparæan isles seems to have been described in detail by his
-  contemporary historian, the Syracusan Kallias: see the Fragments
-  of that author, in Didot’s Fragment. Hist. Græc. vol. ii. p. 383.
-  Fragm. 4.
-
-  [1040] Diodor. xx. 104.
-
-  [1041] Diodor. xx. 104; Livy, x. 2. A curious anecdote appears in
-  the Pseudo-Aristotle, De Mirabilibus (78) respecting two native
-  Italians, Aulus and Caius, who tried to poison Kleonymus at
-  Tarentum, but were detected and put to death by the Tarentines.
-
-  That Agathokles, in his operations on the coast of southern
-  Italy, found himself in conflict with the Romans, and that their
-  importance was now strongly felt—we may judge by the fact, that
-  the Syracusan Kallias (contemporary and historian of Agathokles)
-  appears to have given details respecting the origin and history
-  of Rome. See the Fragments of Kallias, ap. Didot, Hist. Græc.
-  Frag. vol. ii. p. 383; Fragm. 5—and Dionys. Hal. Ant. Rom. i. 72.
-
-  [1042] Diodor. xx. 105.
-
-  [1043] Diodor. xxi. Fragm. 2. p. 265.
-
-  [1044] Diodor. xxi. Fragm. 3. p. 266.
-
-As far as we can trace the events of the last years of Agathokles,
-we find him seizing the towns of Kroton and Hipponia in Italy,
-establishing an alliance with Demetrius Poliorketes,[1045] and giving
-his daughter Lanassa in marriage to the youthful Pyrrhus king of
-Epirus. At the age of seventy-two, still in the plenitude of vigor
-as well as of power, he was projecting a fresh expedition against
-the Carthaginians in Africa, with two hundred of the largest ships
-of war, when his career was brought to a close by sickness and by
-domestic enemies.
-
-  [1045] Diodor. xxi. Fragm. 4, 8, 11. p. 266-273.
-
-He proclaimed as future successor to his dominion, his son, named
-Agathokles; but Archagathus his grandson (son of Archagathus who had
-perished in Africa), a young prince of more conspicuous qualities,
-had already been singled out for the most important command, and
-was now at the head of the army near Ætna. The old Agathokles,
-wishing to strengthen the hands of his intended successor, sent his
-favored son Agathokles to Ætna, with written orders directing that
-Archagathus should yield up to him the command. Archagathus, noway
-disposed to obey, invited his uncle Agathokles to a banquet, and
-killed him; after which he contrived the poisoning of his grandfather
-the old despot himself. The instrument of his purpose was Mænon; a
-citizen of Egesta, enslaved at the time when Agathokles massacred
-most of the Egestæan population. The beauty of his person procured
-him much favor with Agathokles; but he had never forgotten, and
-had always been anxious to avenge, the bloody outrage on his
-fellow-citizens. To accomplish this purpose, the opportunity was
-now opened to him, together with a promise of protection, through
-Archagathus. He accordingly poisoned Agathokles, as we are told, by
-means of a medicated quill, handed to him for cleaning his teeth
-after dinner.[1046] Combining together the various accounts, it seems
-probable that Agathokles was at the time sick—that this sickness may
-have been the reason why he was so anxious to strengthen the position
-of his intended successor—and that his death was as much the effect
-of his malady as of the poison. Archagathus, after murdering his
-uncle, seems by means of his army to have made himself real master of
-the Syracusan power; while the old despot, defenceless on a sick bed,
-could do no more than provide for the safety of his Egyptian wife
-Theoxena and his two young children, by despatching them on shipboard
-with all his rich movable treasures to Alexandria. Having secured
-this object, amidst extreme grief on the part of those around, he
-expired.[1047]
-
-  [1046] Diodor. xxi. Fragm. 12. p. 276-278. Neither Justin (xxiii.
-  2) nor Trogus before him, (as it seems from the Prologue) alludes
-  to poison. He represents Agathokles as having died by a violent
-  distemper. He notices however the bloody family feud, and the
-  murder of the uncle by the nephew.
-
-  [1047] Justin (xxiii. 2) dwells pathetically on this last parting
-  between Agathokles and Theoxena. It is difficult to reconcile
-  Justin’s narrative with that of Diodorus; but on this point, as
-  far as we can judge, I think him more credible than Diodorus.
-
-The great lines in the character of Agathokles are well marked.
-He was of the stamp of Gelon and the elder Dionysius—a soldier of
-fortune, who raised himself from the meanest beginnings to the summit
-of political power—and who, in the acquisition as well as maintenance
-of that power, displayed an extent of energy, perseverance, and
-military resource, not surpassed by any one, even of the generals
-formed in Alexander’s school. He was an adept in that art at which
-all aspiring men of his age aimed—the handling of mercenary soldiers
-for the extinction of political liberty and security at home, and
-for predatory aggrandizement abroad. I have already noticed the
-opinion delivered by Scipio Africanus—that the elder Dionysius and
-Agathokles were the most daring, sagacious, and capable men of
-action within his knowledge.[1048] Apart from this enterprising
-genius, employed in the service of unmeasured personal ambition,
-we know nothing of Agathokles except his sanguinary, faithless,
-and nefarious dispositions; in which attributes also he stands
-pre-eminent, above all his known contemporaries, and above nearly
-all predecessors.[1049] Notwithstanding his often-proved perfidy, he
-seems to have had a joviality and apparent simplicity of manner (the
-same is recounted of Cæsar Borgia) which amused men and put them off
-their guard, throwing them perpetually into his trap.[1050]
-
-  [1048] Polyb. xv. 35. See above in this History, Vol. XI. Ch.
-  lxxxiii. p. 46.
-
-  [1049] Polybius (ix. 23) says that Agathokles, though cruel
-  in the extreme at the beginning of his career, and in the
-  establishment of his power, yet became the mildest of men after
-  his power was once established. The latter half of this statement
-  is contradicted by all the particular facts which we know
-  respecting Agathokles.
-
-  As to Timæus the historian, indeed (who had been banished from
-  Sicily by Agathokles, and who wrote the history of the latter
-  in five books), Polybius had good reason to censure him, as
-  being unmeasured in his abuse of Agathokles. For Timæus not only
-  recounted of Agathokles numerous acts of nefarious cruelty—acts
-  of course essentially public, and therefore capable of being
-  known—but also told much scandal about his private habits, and
-  represented him (which is still more absurd) as a man vulgar and
-  despicable in point of ability. See the Fragments of Timæus ap.
-  Histor. Græc. ed. Didot. Frag. 144-150.
-
-  All, or nearly all, the acts of Agathokles, as described in the
-  preceding pages, have been copied from Diodorus; who had as good
-  authorities before him as Polybius possessed. Diodorus does not
-  copy the history of Agathokles from Timæus; on the contrary,
-  he censures Timæus for his exaggerated acrimony and injustice
-  towards Agathokles, in terms not less forcibly than those which
-  Polybius employs (xxi. Fragm. p. 279). Diodorus cites Timæus by
-  name, occasionally and in particular instances: but he evidently
-  did not borrow from that author the main stream of his narrative.
-  He seems to have had before him other authorities—among them
-  some highly favorable to Agathokles—the Syracusan Kallias—and
-  Antander, brother of Agathokles (xxi. p. 278-282).
-
-  [1050] Diodor. xx. 63.
-
-Agathokles, however, though among the worst of Greeks, was yet
-a Greek. During his government of thirty-two years, the course
-of events in Sicily continued under Hellenic agency, without the
-preponderant intervention of any foreign power. The power of
-Agathokles indeed rested mainly on foreign mercenaries; but so had
-that of Dionysius and Gelon before him; and he as well as they,
-kept up vigorously the old conflict against the Carthaginian power
-in the island. Grecian history in Sicily thus continues down to the
-death of Agathokles; but it continues no longer. After his death,
-Hellenic power and interests become incapable of self-support,
-and sink into a secondary and subservient position, overridden or
-contended for by foreigners. Syracuse and the other cities passed
-from one despot to another, and were torn with discord arising out
-of the crowds of foreign mercenaries who had obtained footing among
-them. At the same time, the Carthaginians made increased efforts to
-push their conquests in the island, without finding any sufficient
-internal resistance; so that they would have taken Syracuse, and made
-Sicily their own, had not Pyrrhus king of Epirus (the son-in-law
-of Agathokles) interposed to arrest their progress. From this
-time forward, the Greeks of Sicily become a prize to be contended
-for—first between the Carthaginians and Pyrrhus—next, between the
-Carthaginians and Romans[1051]—until at length they dwindle into
-subjects of Rome; corn-growers for the Roman plebs, clients under the
-patronage of the Roman Marcelli, victims of the rapacity of Verres,
-and suppliants for the tutelary eloquence of Cicero. The historian of
-self-acting Hellas loses sight of them at the death of Agathokles.
-
-  [1051] The poet Theokritus (xvi. 75-80) expatiates on the bravery
-  of the Syracusan Hiero II., and on the great warlike power
-  of the Syracusans under him (B. C. 260-240), which
-  he represents as making the Carthaginians tremble for their
-  possessions in Sicily. Personally, Hiero seems to have deserved
-  this praise—and to have deserved yet more praise for his mild and
-  prudent internal administration of Syracuse. But his military
-  force was altogether secondary in the great struggle between Rome
-  and Carthage for the mastery of Sicily.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER XCVIII.
-
-OUTLYING HELLENIC CITIES.
-
-  1 IN GAUL AND SPAIN.
-  2 ON THE COAST OF THE EUXINE.
-
-
-To complete the picture of the Hellenic world while yet in its
-period of full life, in freedom and self-action, or even during its
-decline into the half-life of a dependent condition—we must say a few
-words respecting some of its members lying apart from the general
-history, yet of not inconsiderable importance. The Greeks of Massalia
-formed its western wing; the Pontic Greeks (those on the shores of
-the Euxine), its eastern; both of them the outermost radiations of
-Hellenism, where it was always militant against foreign elements, and
-often adulterated by them. It is indeed little that we have the means
-of saying; but that little must not be left unsaid.
-
-In my third volume (ch. xxii. p. 397), I briefly noticed the
-foundation and first proceedings of Massalia (the modern Marseilles),
-on the Mediterranean coast of Gaul or Liguria. This Ionic city,
-founded by the enterprising Phokæans of Asia Minor, a little before
-their own seaboard was subjugated by the Persians, had a life and
-career of its own, apart from those political events which determined
-the condition of its Hellenic sisters in Asia, Peloponnesus,
-Italy, or Sicily. The Massaliots maintained their own relations of
-commerce, friendship or hostility with their barbaric neighbors, the
-Ligurians, Gauls, and Iberians, without becoming involved in the
-larger political confederacies of the Hellenic world. They carried
-out from their mother-city established habits of adventurous coast
-navigation and commercial activity. Their situation, distant from
-other Greeks and sustained by a force hardly sufficient even for
-defence, imposed upon them the necessity both of political harmony
-at home, and of prudence and persuasive agency in their mode of
-dealing with neighbors. That they were found equal to this necessity,
-appears sufficiently attested by the few general statements
-transmitted in respect to them; though their history in its details
-is unknown. Their city was strong by position, situated upon a
-promontory washed on three sides by the sea, well-fortified, and
-possessing a convenient harbor securely closed against enemies.[1052]
-The domain around it however appears not to have been large, nor
-did their population extend itself much into the interior. The land
-around was less adapted for corn than for the vine and the olive;
-wine was supplied by the Massaliots throughout Gaul.[1053] It was
-on shipboard that their courage and skill was chiefly displayed; it
-was by maritime enterprise that their power, their wealth, and their
-colonial expansion was obtained. In an age when piracy was common,
-the Massaliot ships and seamen were effective in attack and defence
-not less than in transport and commercial interchange; while their
-numerous maritime successes were attested by many trophies adorning
-the temples.[1054] The city contained docks and arsenals admirably
-provided with provisions, stores, arms, and all the various muniments
-of naval war.[1055] Except the Phenicians and Carthaginians, these
-Massaliots were the only enterprising mariners in the Western
-Mediterranean; from the year 500 B. C. downward, after the
-energy of the Ionic Greeks had been crushed by inland potentates. The
-Iberian and Gallic tribes were essentially landsmen, not occupying
-permanent stations on the coast, nor having any vocation for the
-sea; but the Ligurians, though chiefly mountaineers, were annoying
-neighbors to Massalia as well by their piracies at sea as from
-their depredations by land.[1056] To all these landsmen, however,
-depredators as they were, the visit of the trader soon made itself
-felt as a want, both for import and export; and to this want the
-Massaliots, with their colonies, were the only ministers, along the
-Gulfs of Genoa and Lyons, from Luna (the frontier of Tuscany) to
-the Dianium (Cape della Nao) in Spain.[1057] It was not until the
-first century before the Christian era that they were outstripped in
-this career by Narbon, and a few other neighbors, exalted into Roman
-colonies.
-
-  [1052] Cæsar, Bell. Gall. ii. 1; Strabo, iv. p. 179.
-
-  [1053] See Poseidonius ap. Athenæum, iv. p. 152.
-
-  [1054] Strabo, iv. p. 180.
-
-  [1055] Strabo (xii. p. 575) places Massalia in the same rank as
-  Kyzikus, Rhodes and Carthage; types of maritime cities highly and
-  effectively organized.
-
-  [1056] Livy, xl. 18; Polybius, xxx. 4.
-
-  [1057] The oration composed by Demosthenes πρὸς Ζηνόδεμιν,
-  relates to an affair wherein a ship, captain, and mate, all from
-  Massalia, are found engaged in the carrying trade between Athens
-  and Syracuse (Demosth. p. 382 _seq._).
-
-Along the coast on both sides of their own city, the Massaliots
-planted colonies, each commended to the protection, and consecrated
-by the statue and peculiar rites, of their own patron goddess, the
-Ephesian Artemis.[1058] Towards the east were Tauroentium, Olbia,
-Antipolis, Nikæa, and the Portus Monœki; towards the west, on the
-coast of Spain, were Rhoda, Emporiæ, Alônê, Hemeroskopium, and
-Artemisium or Dianium. These colonies were established chiefly on
-outlying capes or sometimes islets, at once near and safe; they were
-intended more as shelter and accommodation for maritime traffic,
-and as depots for trade with the interior,—than for the purpose of
-spreading inland, and including a numerous outlying population round
-the walls. The circumstances of Emporiæ were the most remarkable.
-That town was built originally on a little uninhabited islet off the
-coast of Iberia; after a certain interval, it became extended to the
-adjoining mainland, and a body of native Iberians were admitted to
-joint residence within the new-walled circuit there established. This
-new circuit however was divided in half by an intervening wall, on
-one side of which dwelt the Iberians, on the other side the Greeks.
-One gate alone was permitted, for intercommunication, guarded night
-and day by appointed magistrates, one of whom was perpetually on
-the spot. Every night, one third of the Greek citizens kept guard
-on the walls, or at least held themselves prepared to do so. How
-long these strict and fatiguing precautions were found necessary,
-we do not know; but after a certain time they were relaxed, and the
-intervening wall disappeared, so that Greeks and Iberians freely
-coalesced into one community.[1059] It is not often that we are
-allowed to see so much in detail the early difficulties and dangers
-of a Grecian colony. Massalia itself was situated under nearly
-similar circumstances among the rude Ligurian Salyes; we hear of
-these Ligurians hiring themselves as laborers to dig on the fields
-of Massaliot proprietors.[1060] The various tribes of Ligurians,
-Gauls, and Iberians extended down to the coast, so that there was no
-safe road along it, nor any communication except by sea, until the
-conquests of the Romans in the second and first century before the
-Christian era.[1061]
-
-  [1058] Brückner, Histor. Massiliensium, c. 7 (Göttingen).
-
-  [1059] Livy, xxxiv. 8; Strabo. iii. p. 160. At Massalia, it is
-  said that no armed stranger was ever allowed to enter the city,
-  without depositing his arms at the gate (Justin, xliii. 4).
-
-  This precaution seems to have been adopted in other cities also:
-  see Æneas, Poliorket. c. 30.
-
-  [1060] Strabo, iii. p. 165. A fact told to Poseidonius by a
-  Massaliot proprietor who was his personal friend.
-
-  In the siege of Massalia by Cæsar, a detachment of
-  Albici,—mountaineers not far from the town, and old allies or
-  dependents—were brought in to help in the defence (Cæsar, Bell.
-  G. i. 34).
-
-  [1061] Strabo, iv. p. 180.
-
-The government of Massalia was oligarchical, carried on chiefly
-by a Senate or Great Council of Six Hundred (called Timuchi),
-elected for life—and by a small council of fifteen, chosen among
-this larger body to take turn in executive duties.[1062] The public
-habits of the administrators are said to have been extremely
-vigilant and circumspect; the private habits of the citizens,
-frugal and temperate—a maximum being fixed by law for dowries and
-marriage-ceremonies.[1063] They were careful in their dealings
-with the native tribes, with whom they appear to have maintained
-relations generally friendly. The historian Ephorus (whose history
-closed about 340 B. C.) represented the Gauls as especially
-phil-hellenic;[1064] an impression which he could hardly have derived
-from any but Massaliot informants. The Massaliots (who in the first
-century before Christ were _trilingues_, speaking Greek, Latin, and
-Gallic[1065]) contributed to engraft upon these unlettered men a
-certain refinement and variety of wants, and to lay the foundation
-of that taste for letters which afterwards became largely diffused
-throughout the Roman Province of Gaul. At sea, and in traffic, the
-Phenicians and Carthaginians were their formidable rivals. This was
-among the causes which threw them betimes into alliance and active
-co-operation with Rome, under whose rule they obtained favorable
-treatment, when the blessing of freedom was no longer within their
-reach.
-
-  [1062] Strabo, iv. p. 181; Cicero, De Republ. xxvii. Fragm.
-  Vacancies in the senate seem to have been filled up from
-  meritorious citizens generally—as far as we can judge by a brief
-  allusion in Aristotle (Polit. vi. 7).
-
-  From another passage in the same work, it seems that the narrow
-  basis of the oligarchy must have given rise to dissensions (v.
-  6). Aristotle had included the Μασσαλιωτῶν πολιτεία in his lost
-  work Περὶ Πολιτειῶν.
-
-  [1063] Strabo, _l. c._ However, one author from whom Athenæus
-  borrowed (xii. p. 523), described the Massaliots as luxurious in
-  their habits.
-
-  [1064] Strabo, iv. p. 199. Ἔφορος δὲ ὑπερβάλλουσαν τῷ μεγέθει
-  λέγει τὴν Κελτικὴν, ὥστε ἧσπερ νῦν Ἰβηρίας καλοῦμεν ἐκείνοις τὰ
-  πλεῖστα προσνέμειν μέχρι Γαδείρων, ~φιλέλληνάς τε ἀποφαίνει τοὺς
-  ἀνθρώπους~, καὶ πολλὰ ἰδίως λέγει περὶ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐοικότα τοῖς
-  νῦν. Compare p. 181.
-
-  It is to be remembered that Ephorus was a native of the Asiatic
-  Kymê the immediate neighbor of Phokæa, which was the metropolis
-  of Massalia. The Massaliots never forgot or broke off their
-  connection with Phokæa: see the statement of their intercession
-  with the Romans on behalf of Phokæa (Justin, xxxvii. 1). Ephorus
-  therefore had good means of learning whatever Massaliot citizens
-  were disposed to communicate.
-
-  [1065] Varro, Antiq. Fragm. p. 350, ed. Bipont.
-
-Enough is known about Massalia to show that the city was a genuine
-specimen of Hellenism and Hellenic influences—acting not by force
-or constraint, but simply by superior intelligence and activity—by
-power of ministering to wants which must otherwise have remained
-unsupplied—and by the assimilating effect of a lettered civilization
-upon ruder neighbors. This is the more to be noticed as it contrasts
-strikingly with the Macedonian influences which have occupied so
-much of the present volume; force admirably organized and wielded
-by Alexander, yet still nothing but force. The loss of all details
-respecting the history of Massalia is greatly to be lamented;
-and hardly less, that of the writings of Pytheas, an intelligent
-Massaliotic navigator, who, at this early age (330-320 B.
-C.),[1066] with an adventurous boldness even more than Phokæan,
-sailed through the Pillars of Herakles and from thence northward
-along the coast of Spain, Gaul, Britain, Germany—perhaps yet farther.
-Probably no Greek except a Massaliot could have accomplished such a
-voyage; which in his case deserves the greater sympathy, as there
-was no other reward for the difficulties and dangers braved, except
-the gratification of an intelligent curiosity. It seems plain that
-the publication of his “Survey of the Earth”—much consulted by
-Eratosthenes, though the criticisms which have reached us through
-Polybius and Strabo dwell chiefly upon its mistakes, real or
-supposed—made an epoch in ancient geographical knowledge.
-
-  [1066] See the Fragmenta Pytheæ collected by Arfwedson, Upsal,
-  1824. He wrote two works—1. Γῆς Περιόδος. 2. Περὶ Ὠκεανοῦ.
-  His statements were greatly esteemed, and often followed, by
-  Eratosthenes; partially followed by Hipparchus; harshly judged
-  by Polybius, whom Strabo in the main follows. Even by those who
-  judge him most severely, Pytheas is admitted to have been a good
-  mathematician and astronomer (Strabo, iv. p. 201)—and to have
-  travelled extensively in person. Like Herodotus, he must have
-  been forced to report a great deal on hearsay; and all that
-  he could do was to report the best hearsay information which
-  reached him. It is evident that his writings made an epoch in
-  geographical inquiries; though they doubtless contained numerous
-  inaccuracies. See a fair estimate of Pytheas in Mannert, Geog.
-  der Gr. und Römer, Introd. i. p. 73-86.
-
-  The Massaliotic Codex of Homer, possessed and consulted among
-  others by the Alexandrine critics, affords presumption that
-  the celebrity of Massalia as a place of Grecian literature and
-  study (in which character it competed with Athens towards the
-  commencement of the Roman empire) had its foundations laid at
-  least in the third century before the Christian era.
-
-From the western wing of the Hellenic world, we pass to the
-eastern—the Euxine Sea. Of the Pentapolis on its western coast
-south of the Danube (Apollonia, Mesembria, Kallatis, Odessus,
-and probably Istrus)—and of Tyras near the mouth of the river so
-called (now Dniester)—we have little to record, though Istrus
-and Apollonia were among the towns whose political constitutions
-Aristotle thought worthy of his examination.[1067] But Herakleia on
-the south coast, and Pantikapæum or Bosporus between the Euxine and
-the Palus Mæotis (now Sea of Azof), are not thus unknown to history;
-nor can Sinôpê (on the south coast) and Olbia (on the north-west)
-be altogether passed over. Though lying apart from the political
-headship of Athens or Sparta, all these cities were legitimate
-members of the Hellenic brotherhood. All supplied spectators and
-competitors for the Pan-hellenic festivals—pupils to the rhetors and
-philosophers—purchasers, and sometimes even rivals, to the artists.
-All too were (like Massalia and Kyrênê) adulterated partially—Olbia
-and Bosporus considerably—by admixture of a non-hellenic element.
-
-  [1067] Aristotle, Politic. v. 2, 11; v. 5, 2.
-
-Of Sinôpê, and its three dependent colonies Kotyôra, Kerasus,
-and Trapezus, I have already said something,[1068] in describing
-the retreat of the Ten Thousand Greeks. Like Massalia with its
-dependencies Antipolis, Nikæa, and others—Sinôpê enjoyed not merely
-practical independence, but considerable prosperity and local
-dignity, at the time when Xenophon and his companions marched through
-those regions. The citizens were on terms of equal alliance, mutually
-advantageous, with Korylas prince of Paphlagonia, on the borders of
-whose territory they dwelt. It is probable that they figured on the
-tribute list of the Persian king as a portion of Paphlagonia, and
-paid an annual sum; but here ended their subjection. Their behavior
-towards the Ten Thousand Greeks, pronounced enemies of the Persian
-king, was that of an independent city. Neither they, nor even the
-inland Paphlagonians, warlike and turbulent, were molested with
-Persian governors or military occupation.[1069] Alexander however
-numbered them among the subjects of Persia; and it is a remarkable
-fact, that envoys from Sinôpê were found remaining with Darius almost
-to his last hour, after he had become a conquered fugitive, and had
-lost his armies, his capitals, and his treasures. These Sinopian
-envoys fell into the hands of Alexander; who set them at liberty
-with the remark, that since they were not members of the Hellenic
-confederacy, but subjects of Persia—their presence as envoys near
-Darius was very excusable.[1070] The position of Sinôpê placed her
-out of the direct range of the hostilities carried on by Alexander’s
-successors against each other; and the ancient Kappadokian princes
-of the Mithridatic family (professedly descendants of the Persian
-Achæmenidæ),[1071] who ultimately ripened into the king of Pontus,
-had not become sufficiently powerful to swallow up her independence
-until the reign of Pharnakes, in the second century before Christ.
-Sinôpê then passed under his dominion; exchanging (like others)
-the condition of a free Grecian city for that of a subject of the
-barbaric kings of Pontus, with a citadel and mercenary garrison
-to keep her citizens in obedience. We know nothing however of the
-intermediate events.
-
-  [1068] See Vol. IX. Ch. lxxi. p. 129 _seqq._
-
-  [1069] See the remarkable life of the Karian Datames, by
-  Cornelius Nepos, which gives some idea of the situation of
-  Paphlagonia about 360-350 B. C. (cap. 7, 8). Compare
-  Xenoph. Hellenic. iv. 1, 4.
-
-  [1070] Arrian, iii. 24, 8; Curtius, vi. 5, 6.
-
-  [1071] Polybius, v. 43.
-
-Respecting the Pontic Herakleia, our ignorance is not so complete.
-That city—much nearer than Sinôpê to the mouth of the Thracian
-Bosporus, and distant by sea from Byzantium only one long day’s
-voyage of a rowboat—was established by Megarians and Bœotians on the
-coast of the Mariandyni. These natives were subdued, and reduced to
-a kind of serfdom; whereby they became slaves, yet with a proviso
-that they should never be sold out of the territory. Adjoining, on
-the westward, between Herakleia and Byzantium, were the Bithynian
-Thracians—villagers not merely independent, but warlike and fierce
-wreckers, who cruelly maltreated any Greeks stranded on their
-coast.[1072] We are told in general terms that the government of
-Herakleia was oligarchical;[1073] perhaps in the hands of the
-descendants of the principal original colonists, who partitioned
-among themselves the territory with its Mariandynian serfs, and who
-formed a small but rich minority among the total population. We hear
-of them as powerful at sea, and as being able to man, through their
-numerous serfs, a considerable fleet, with which they invaded the
-territory of Leukon prince of the Kimmerian Bosporus.[1074] They
-were also engaged in land-war with Mithridates, a prince of the
-ancient Persian family established as district rulers in Northern
-Kappadokia.[1075]
-
-  [1072] Xenoph. Anab. vi. 6, 2.
-
-  [1073] Aristot. Polit. v. 5, 2; v. 5, 5. Another passage in
-  the same work, however (v. 4, 2), says, that in Herakleia, the
-  democracy was subverted immediately after the foundation of the
-  colony, through the popular leaders; who committed injustice
-  against the rich. These rich men were banished, but collected
-  strength enough to return and subvert the democracy by force.
-
-  If this passage alludes to the same Herakleia (there were many
-  towns of that name), the government must have been originally
-  democratical. But the serfdom of the natives seems to imply an
-  oligarchy.
-
-  [1074] Aristot. Polit. vii. 5, 7; Polyæn. vi. 9, 3, 4; compare
-  Pseudo-Aristotle Œconomic. ii. 9.
-
-  The reign of Leukon lasted from about 392-352 B. C. The
-  event alluded to by Polyænus must have occurred at some time
-  during this interval.
-
-  [1075] Justin, xvi. 4.
-
-Towards 380-370 B. C., the Herakleots became disturbed by
-violent party-contentions within the city. As far as we can divine
-from a few obscure hints, these contentions began among the oligarchy
-themselves;[1076] some of whom opposed, and partially threw open,
-a close political monopoly—yet not without a struggle, in the
-course of which an energetic citizen named Klearchus was banished.
-Presently however the contest assumed larger dimensions; the plebs
-sought admission into the constitution, and are even said to have
-required abolition of debts with a redivision of the lands.[1077]
-A democratical constitution was established; but it was speedily
-menaced by conspiracies of the rich, to guard against which, the
-classification of the citizens was altered. Instead of three tribes,
-and four centuries, all were distributed anew into sixty-four
-centuries; the tribes being discontinued. It would appear that in the
-original four centuries, the rich men had been so enrolled as to form
-separate military divisions (probably their rustic serfs being armed
-along with them)—-while the three tribes had contained all the rest
-of the people; so that the effect of thus multiplying the centuries
-was, to divest the rich of their separate military enrolment, and to
-disseminate them in many different regiments along with a greater
-number of poor.[1078]
-
-  [1076] Aristot. v. 5, 2; 5, 10.
-
-  [1077] Justin, xvi. 4.
-
-  [1078] Æneas, Poliorket. c. 11. I have given what seems the most
-  probable explanation of a very obscure passage.
-
-  It is to be noted that the distribution of citizens into
-  centuries (ἑκατοστύες) prevailed also at Byzantium; see Inscript.
-  No. 2060 ap. Boeck. Corp. Inscr. Græc. p. 130. A citizen of
-  Olbia, upon whom the citizenship of Byzantium is conferred, is
-  allowed to enroll himself in any one of the ἑκατοστύες, that he
-  prefers.
-
-Still however the demands of the people were not fully granted, and
-dissension continued. Not merely the poorer citizens, but also the
-population of serfs—homogeneous, speaking the same language, and
-sympathizing with each other, like Helots or Penestæ—when once
-agitated by the hope of liberty, were with difficulty appeased.
-The government, though greatly democratized, found itself unable
-to maintain tranquillity, and invoked assistance from without.
-Application was made first, to the Athenian Timotheus—next, to the
-Theban Epaminondas; but neither of them would interfere—nor was
-there, indeed, any motive to tempt them. At length application was
-made to the exiled citizen Klearchus.
-
-This exile, now about forty years of age, intelligent, audacious and
-unprincipled, had passed four years at Athens partly in hearing the
-lessons of Plato and Isokrates—and had watched with emulous curiosity
-the brilliant fortune of the despot Dionysius at Syracuse, in whom
-both these philosophers took interest.[1079] During his banishment,
-moreover, he had done what was common with Grecian exiles; he had
-taken service with the enemy of his native city, the neighboring
-prince Mithridates,[1080] and probably enough against the city
-itself. As an officer, he distinguished himself much; acquiring
-renown with the prince and influence over the minds of soldiers.
-Hence his friends, and a party in Herakleia, became anxious to
-recall him, as moderator and protector under the grievous political
-discords prevailing. It was the oligarchical party who invited him
-to come back, at the head of a body of troops, as their auxiliary
-in keeping down the plebs. Klearchus accepted their invitation; but
-with the full purpose of making himself the Dionysius of Herakleia.
-Obtaining from Mithridates a powerful body of mercenaries, under
-secret promise to hold the city only as his prefect, he marched
-thither with the proclaimed purpose of maintaining order, and
-upholding the government. As his mercenary soldiers were soon found
-troublesome companions, he obtained permission to construct a
-separate stronghold in the city, under color of keeping them apart
-in the stricter discipline of a barrack.[1081] Having thus secured
-a strong position, he invited Mithridates into the city, to receive
-the promised possession; but instead of performing this engagement,
-he detained the prince as prisoner, and only released him on payment
-of a considerable ransom. He next cheated, still more grossly, the
-oligarchy who had recalled him; denouncing their past misrule,
-declaring himself their mortal enemy, and espousing the pretensions
-as well as the antipathies of the plebs. The latter willingly
-seconded him in his measures—even extreme measures of cruelty and
-spoliation—against their political enemies. A large number of the
-rich were killed, imprisoned, or impoverished and banished; their
-slaves or serfs, too, were not only manumitted by order of the new
-despot, but also married to the wives and daughters of the exiles.
-The most tragical scenes arose out of these forced marriages; many
-of the women even killed themselves, some after having first killed
-their new husbands. Among the exiles, a party, driven to despair,
-procured assistance from without, and tried to obtain by force
-readmittance into the city; but they were totally defeated by
-Klearchus, who after this victory became more brutal and unrelenting
-than ever.[1082]
-
-  [1079] Diodor. xv. 81. ἐζήλωσε μὲν τὴν Διονυσίου τοῦ Συρακοσίου
-  διαγωγὴν, etc. Memnon, Fragm. c. 1; Isokrates, Epist. vii.
-
-  It is here that the fragments of Memnon, as abstracted by Photius
-  (Cod. 224), begin. Photius had seen only eight books of Memnon’s
-  History of Herakleia (Books ix.-xvi. inclusive); neither the
-  first eight books (see the end of his Excerpta from Memnon),
-  nor those after the sixteenth, had come under his view. This
-  is greatly to be regretted, as we are thus shut out from the
-  knowledge of Heraklean affairs anterior to Klearchus.
-
-  It happens, not unfrequently, with Photius, that he does not
-  possess an entire work, but only parts of it; this is a curious
-  fact, in reference to the libraries of the ninth century A.
-  D.
-
-  The fragments of Memnon are collected out of Photius, together
-  with those of Nymphis and other Herakleotic historians, and
-  illustrated with useful notes and citations, in the edition of
-  Orelli; as well as by K. Müller, in Didot’s Fragm. Hist. Græc.
-  tom. iii. p. 525. Memnon carried his history down to the time
-  of Julius Cæsar, and appears to have lived shortly after the
-  Christian era. Nymphis (whom he probably copied) was much older;
-  having lived seemingly from about 300-230 B. C. (see the
-  few Fragmenta remaining from him, in the same work, iii. p. 12).
-  The work of the Herakleotic author Herodôrus seems to have been
-  altogether upon legendary matter (see Fragm. in the same work,
-  ii. p. 27). He was half a century earlier than Nymphis.
-
-  [1080] Suidas v. Κλέαρχος.
-
-  [1081] Polyænus, ii. 30, 1; Justin, xvi. 4. “A quibus revocatus
-  in patriam, per quos in arce collocatus fuerat”, etc.
-
-  Æneas (Poliorket. c. 12) cites this proceeding as an example of
-  the mistake made by a political party, in calling in a greater
-  number of mercenary auxiliaries than they could manage or keep in
-  order.
-
-  [1082] Justin, xvi. 4, 5; Theopompus ap. Athenæ. iii. p. 85.
-  Fragm. 200, ed. Didot.
-
-He was now in irresistible power; despot of the whole city, plebs as
-well as oligarchy. Such he continued to be for twelve years; during
-which he displayed great warlike energy against exterior enemies,
-together with unabated cruelty towards the citizens. He farther
-indulged in the most overweening insolence of personal demeanor,
-adopting an Oriental costume and ornaments, and proclaiming himself
-the son of Zeus—as Alexander the Great did after him. Amidst all
-these enormities, however, his literary tastes did not forsake him;
-he collected a library, at that time a very rare possession.[1083]
-Many were the conspiracies attempted by suffering citizens against
-this tyrant; but his vigilance baffled and punished all. At length
-two young men, Chion and Leonidas (they too having been among the
-hearers of Plato), found an opportunity to stab him at a Dionysiac
-festival. They, with those who seconded them, were slain by his
-guards, after a gallant resistance; but Klearchus himself died of the
-wound, in torture and mental remorse.[1084]
-
-  [1083] Memnon, c. 1. The seventh Epistle of Isokrates, addressed
-  to Timotheus son of Klearchus, recognizes generally this
-  character of the latter with whose memory Isokrates disclaims all
-  sympathy.
-
-  [1084] Memnon, c. 1; Justin, xvi. 5; Diodor. xvi 36.
-
-His death unfortunately brought no relief to the Herakleots. The two
-sons whom he left, Timotheus and Dionysius, were both minors; but his
-brother Satyrus, administering in their name, grasped the sceptre
-and continued the despotism, with cruelty not merely undiminished,
-but even aggravated and sharpened by the past assassination. Not
-inferior to his predecessor in energy and vigilance, Satyrus was in
-this respect different, that he was altogether rude and unlettered.
-Moreover he was rigidly scrupulous in preserving the crown for his
-brother’s children, as soon as they should be of age. To ensure to
-them an undisturbed succession, he took every precaution to avoid
-begetting children of his own by his wife.[1085] After a rule of
-seven years, Satyrus died of a lingering and painful distemper.
-
-  [1085] Memnon, c. 2. ἐπὶ δὲ τῇ φιλαδελφίᾳ τὸ πρῶτον ἠνέγκατο·
-  τὴν γὰρ ἀρχὴν τοῖς τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ παισὶν ἀνεπηρέαστον συντηρῶν,
-  ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον τῆς αὐτῶν κηδεμονίας λόγον ἐτίθετο, ὡς καὶ γυναικὶ
-  συνὼν, καὶ τότε λίαν στεργομένῃ, μὴ ἀνασχέσθαι παιδοποιῆσαι,
-  ἀλλὰ μηχανῇ πάσῃ γονῆς στέρησιν ἑαυτῷ δικάσαι, ὡς ἂν μήδ᾽ ὅλως
-  ὑπολίποι τινὰ ἐφεδρεύοντα τοῖς τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ παισίν.
-
-  In the Antigonid dynasty of Macedonia, we read that Demetrius,
-  son of Antigonus Gonatas, died leaving his son Philip a boy.
-  Antigonus called Doson, younger brother of Demetrius, assumed the
-  regency on behalf of Philip; he married the widow of Demetrius,
-  and had children by her; but he was so anxious to guard Philip’s
-  succession against all chance of being disturbed, that he
-  refused to bring up his own children—Ὁ δὲ παιδῶν γενομένων ἐκ
-  τῆς Χρυσηΐδος, οὐκ ἀνεθρέψατο, τὴν ἀρχὴν τῷ Φιλιππῷ περισώζων
-  (Porphyry, Fragm. ap. Didot, Fragm. Histor. Græc. vol. iii. p.
-  701).
-
-  In the Greek and Roman world, the father was generally considered
-  to have the right of determining whether he would or would not
-  bring up a new-born child. The obligation was only supposed to
-  commence when he accepted or sanctioned it, by taking up the
-  child.
-
-The government of Herakleia now devolved on Timotheus, who exhibited
-a contrast, alike marked and beneficent, with his father and uncle.
-Renouncing all their cruelty and constraint, he set at liberty
-every man whom he found in prison. He was strict in dispensing
-justice, but mild and even liberal in all his dealings towards the
-citizens. At the same time, he was a man of adventurous courage,
-carrying on successful war against foreign enemies, and making his
-power respected all round. With his younger brother Dionysius, he
-maintained perfect harmony, treating him as an equal and partner.
-Though thus using his power generously towards the Herakleots, he
-was, however, still a despot, and retained the characteristic marks
-of despotism—the strong citadel, fortified separately from the town,
-with a commanding mercenary force. After a reign of about nine years,
-he died, deeply mourned by every one.[1086]
-
-  [1086] Memnon, c. 3. The Epistle of Isokrates (vii.) addressed to
-  Timotheus in recommendation of a friend, is in harmony with this
-  general character, but gives no new information.
-
-  Diodorus reckons Timotheus as immediately succeeding Klearchus
-  his father—considering Satyrus simply as regent (xvi. 36).
-
-Dionysius, who succeeded him, fell upon unsettled times, full both
-of hope and fear; opening chances of aggrandizement, yet with many
-new dangers and uncertainties. The sovereignty which he inherited
-doubtless included, not simply the city of Herakleia, but also
-foreign dependencies and possessions in its neighborhood; for
-his three predecessors[1087] had been all enterprising chiefs,
-commanding a considerable aggressive force. At the commencement of
-his reign, indeed, the ascendency of Memnon and the Persian force
-in the north-western part of Asia Minor was at a higher pitch than
-ordinary; it appears too that Klearchus—and probably his successors
-also—had always taken care to keep on the best terms with the Persian
-court.[1088] But presently came the invasion of Alexander (334 B.
-C.), with the battle of the Granikus, which totally extinguished
-the Persian power in Asia Minor, and was followed, after no long
-interval, by the entire conquest of the Persian empire. The Persian
-control being now removed from Asia Minor—while Alexander with the
-great Macedonian force merely passed through it to the east, leaving
-viceroys behind him—new hopes of independence or aggrandizement
-began to arise among the native princes in Bithynia, Paphlagonia,
-and Kappadokia. The Bithynian prince even contended successfully
-in the field against Kalas, who had been appointed by Alexander as
-satrap in Phrygia.[1089] The Herakleot Dionysius, on the other hand,
-enemy by position of these Bithynians, courted the new Macedonian
-potentates, playing his political game with much skill in every way.
-He kept his forces well in hand, and his dominions carefully guarded;
-he ruled in a mild and popular manner, so as to preserve among the
-Herakleots the same feelings of attachment which had been inspired
-by his predecessor. While the citizens of the neighboring Sinôpê (as
-has been already related) sent their envoys to Darius, Dionysius kept
-his eyes upon Alexander; taking care to establish a footing at Pella,
-and being peculiarly assiduous in attentions to Alexander’s sister,
-the princess Kleopatra.[1090] He was the better qualified for this
-courtly service, as he was a man of elegant and ostentatious tastes,
-and had purchased from his namesake, the fallen Syracusan Dionysius,
-all the rich furniture of the Dionysian family, highly available for
-presents.[1091]
-
-  [1087] We hear of Klearchus as having besieged Astakus
-  (afterwards Nikomedia)—at the interior extremity of the
-  north-eastern indentation of the Propontis, called the Gulf of
-  Astakus (Polyænus, ii. 30, 3).
-
-  [1088] Memnon, c. 1.
-
-  [1089] Memnon, c. 20.
-
-  [1090] Memnon, c. 3.
-
-  [1091] Memnon, c. 3. See in this History, Vol. XI. Ch. lxxxv. p.
-  154.
-
-By the favor of Antipater and the regency at Pella, the Herakleotic
-despot was enabled both to maintain and extend his dominions, until
-the return of Alexander to Susa and Babylon in 324 B. C.
-All other authority was now superseded by the personal will of the
-omnipotent conqueror; who, mistrusting all his delegates—Antipater,
-the princesses, and the satraps—listened readily to complainants from
-all quarters, and took particular pride in espousing the pretensions
-of Grecian exiles. I have already recounted how in June 324 B.
-C., Alexander promulgated at the Olympic festival a sweeping
-edict, directing that in every Grecian city the exiles should be
-restored—by force, if force was required. Among the various Grecian
-exiles, those from Herakleia were not backward in soliciting his
-support, to obtain their own restoration, as well as the expulsion of
-the despot. As they were entitled, along with others, to the benefit
-of the recent edict, the position of Dionysius became one of extreme
-danger. He now reaped the full benefit of his antecedent prudence,
-in having maintained both his popularity with the Herakleots at
-home, and his influence with Antipater, to whom the enforcement of
-the edict was entrusted. He was thus enabled to ward off the danger
-for a time; and his good fortune rescued him from it altogether, by
-the death of Alexander in June 323 B. C. That event, coming
-as it did unexpectedly upon every one, filled Dionysius with such
-extravagant joy, that he fell into a swoon: and he commemorated it
-by erecting a statue in honor of Euthymia, or the tranquillizing
-goddess. His position however seemed again precarious, when the
-Herakleotic exiles renewed their solicitations to Perdikkas: who
-favored their cause, and might probably have restored them, if he had
-chosen to direct his march towards the Hellespont against Antipater
-and Kraterus, instead of undertaking the ill-advised expedition
-against Egypt, wherein he perished.[1092]
-
-  [1092] Memnon, c. 4.
-
-The tide of fortune now turned more than ever in favor of Dionysius.
-With Antipater and Kraterus, the preponderant potentates in his
-neighborhood, he was on the best terms; and it happened at this
-juncture to suit the political views of Kraterus to dismiss his
-Persian wife Amastris (niece of the late Persian king Darius,
-and conferred upon Kraterus by Alexander when he himself married
-Statira), for the purpose of espousing Phila daughter of Antipater.
-Amastris was given in marriage to Dionysius; for him, a splendid
-exaltation—attesting the personal influence which he had previously
-acquired. His new wife, herself a woman of ability and energy,
-brought to him a large sum from the regal treasure, as well as
-the means of greatly extending his dominion round Herakleia.
-Noway corrupted by this good fortune, he still persevered both in
-his conciliating rule at home, and his prudent alliances abroad,
-making himself especially useful to Antigonus. That great chief,
-preponderant throughout most parts of Asia Minor, was establishing
-his ascendency in Bithynia and the neighborhood of the Propontis,
-by founding the city of Antigonia in the rich plain adjoining the
-Askanian Lake.[1093] Dionysius lent effective maritime aid to
-Antigonus, in that war which ended by his conquest of Cyprus from the
-Egyptian Ptolemy (307 B. C.) To the other Ptolemy, nephew
-and general of Antigonus, Dionysius gave his daughter in marriage;
-and even felt himself powerful enough to assume the title of king,
-after Antigonus, Lysimachus, and the Egyptian Ptolemy had done the
-like.[1094] He died, after reigning thirty years with consummate
-political skill and uninterrupted prosperity—except that during the
-last few years he lost his health from excessive corpulence.[1095]
-
-  [1093] Strabo, xii. p. 565.
-
-  [1094] Memnon, c. 4: compare Diodor. xx. 53.
-
-  [1095] Nymphis, Fragm. 16. ap. Athenæum, xii. p. 549; Ælian, V.
-  H. ix. 13.
-
-Dionysius left three children under age—Klearchus, Oxathres and
-a daughter—by his wife Amastris; whom he constituted regent, and
-who, partly through the cordial support of Antigonus, maintained
-the Herakleotic dominion unimpaired. Presently Lysimachus, king
-of Thrace and of the Thracian Chersonese (on the isthmus of
-which he had founded the city of Lysimacheia), coveted this as a
-valuable alliance, paid his court to Amastris, and married her. The
-Herakleotic queen thus enjoyed double protection, and was enabled
-to avoid taking a part in the formidable conflict of Ipsus (300
-B. C.); wherein the allies Lysimachus, Kassander, Ptolemy,
-and Seleukus were victorious over Antigonus. The latter being
-slain, and his Asiatic power crushed, Lysimachus got possession
-of Antigonia, the recent foundation of his rival in Bithynia, and
-changed its name to Nikæa.[1096] After a certain time, however,
-Lysimachus became desirous of marrying Arsinoê, daughter of the
-Egyptian Ptolemy; accordingly, Amastris divorced herself from him,
-and set up for herself separately as regent of Herakleia. Her two
-sons being now nearly of age, she founded and fortified, for her
-own residence, the neighboring city of Amastris, about sixty miles
-eastward of Herakleia on the coast of the Euxine.[1097] These young
-men, Klearchus and Oxathres, assumed the government of Herakleia, and
-entered upon various warlike enterprises; of which we know only, that
-Klearchus accompanied Lysimachus in his expedition against the Getæ,
-sharing the fate of that prince, who was defeated and taken prisoner.
-Both afterwards obtained their release, and Klearchus returned to
-Herakleia; where he ruled in a cruel and oppressive manner, and even
-committed the enormity (in conjunction with his brother Oxathres) of
-killing his mother Amastris. This crime was avenged by her former
-husband Lysimachus; who, coming to Herakleia under professions of
-friendship (B. C. 286), caused Klearchus and Oxathres to be
-put to death, seized their treasure, and keeping separate possession
-of the citadel only, allowed the Herakleots to establish a popular
-government.[1098]
-
-  [1096] Strabo, xii. p. 565. So also Antioch, on the Orontes in
-  Syria, the great foundation of Seleukus Nikator, was established
-  on or near the site of another Antigonia, also previously founded
-  by Antigonus Monophthalmus (Strabo, xv. p. 750).
-
-  [1097] Strabo, xii. p. 544.
-
-  [1098] Memnon, c. 6.
-
-Lysimachus, however, was soon persuaded by his wife Arsinoê to make
-over Herakleia to her, as it had been formerly possessed by Amastris;
-and Arsinoê sent thither a Kymæan officer named Herakleides, who
-carried with him force sufficient to re-establish the former
-despotism, with its oppressions and cruelties. For other purposes
-too, not less mischievous, the influence of Arsinoê was all-powerful.
-She prevailed upon Lysimachus to kill his eldest son (by a former
-marriage) Agathokles, a young prince of the most estimable and
-eminent qualities. Such an atrocity, exciting universal abhorrence
-among the subjects of Lysimachus, enabled his rival Seleukus to
-attack him with success. In a great battle fought between these two
-princes, Lysimachus was defeated and slain—by the hand and javelin of
-a citizen of Herakleia, named Malakon.[1099]
-
-  [1099] Memnon, c. 7, 8.
-
-This victory transferred the dominions of the vanquished prince to
-Seleukus. At Herakleia too, its effect was so powerful, that the
-citizens were enabled to shake off their despotism. They at first
-tried to make terms with the governor Herakleides, offering him money
-as an inducement to withdraw. From him they obtained only an angry
-refusal; yet his subordinate officers of mercenaries, and commanders
-of detached posts in the Herakleotic territory, mistrusting their
-own power of holding out, accepted an amicable compromise with the
-citizens, who tendered to them full liquidation of arrears of pay,
-together with the citizenship. The Herakleots were this enabled
-to discard Herakleides, and regain their popular government. They
-signalized their revolution by the impressive ceremony of demolishing
-their Bastile—the detached fort or stronghold within the city, which
-had served for eighty-four years as the characteristic symbol, and
-indispensable engine, of the antecedent despotism.[1100] The city,
-now again a free commonwealth, was farther reinforced by the junction
-of Nymphis (the historian) and other Herakleotic citizens, who
-had hitherto been in exile. These men were restored, and welcomed
-by their fellow-citizens in full friendship and harmony; yet with
-express proviso, that no demand should be made for the restitution
-of their properties, long since confiscated.[1101] To the victor
-Seleukus, however, and his officer Aphrodisius, the bold bearing
-of the newly-emancipated Herakleots proved offensive. They would
-probably have incurred great danger from him, had not his mind been
-first set upon the conquest of Macedonia in the accomplishment of
-which he was murdered by Ptolemy Keraunus.
-
-  [1100] Memnon, c. 9; Strabo, xii. p. 542.
-
-  [1101] Memnon, c. 11.
-
-The Herakleots thus became again a commonwealth of free citizens,
-without any detached citadel or mercenary garrison; yet they lost,
-seemingly through the growing force and aggressions of some inland
-dynasts, several of their outlying dependencies—Kierus, Tium,
-and Amastris. The two former they recovered some time afterwards
-by purchase, and they wished also to purchase back Amastris; but
-Eumenes, who held it, hated them so much, that he repudiated their
-money, and handed over the place gratuitously to the Kappadokian
-chief Ariobarzanes.[1102] That their maritime power was at this time
-very great, we may see by the astonishing account given of their
-immense ships,—numerously manned, and furnished with many brave
-combatants on the deck—which fought with eminent distinction in the
-naval battle between Ptolemy Keraunus (murderer and successor of
-Seleukus) and Antigonus Gonatas.[1103]
-
-  [1102] Memnon, c. 16. The inhabitants of Byzantium also purchased
-  for a considerable sum the important position called the Ἱερὸν,
-  at the entrance of the Euxine on the Asiatic side (Polybius, iv.
-  50).
-
-  These are rare examples, in ancient history, of cities acquiring
-  territory or dependencies _by purchase_. Acquisitions were often
-  made in this manner by the free German, Swiss, and Italian cities
-  of mediæval Europe; but as to the Hellenic cities, I have not had
-  occasion to record many such transactions in the course of this
-  history.
-
-  [1103] Memnon, c. 13: compare Polyb. xviii. 34.
-
-It is not my purpose to follow lower down the destinies of Herakleia.
-It maintained its internal autonomy, with considerable maritime
-power, a dignified and prudent administration, and a partial, though
-sadly circumscribed, liberty of foreign action—until the successful
-war of the Romans against Mithridates (B. C. 69). In Asia Minor, the
-Hellenic cities on the coast were partly enabled to postpone the
-epoch of their subjugation, by the great division of power which
-prevailed in the interior; for the potentates, of Bithynia, Pergamus,
-Kappadokia, Pontus, Syria, were in almost perpetual discord—while
-all of them were menaced by the intrusion of the warlike and
-predatory Gauls, who extorted for themselves settlements in Galatia
-(B. C. 276). The kings, the enemies of civic freedom, were kept
-partially in check by these new and formidable neighbors,[1104]
-who were themselves however hardly less formidable to the Grecian
-cities on the coast.[1105] Sinôpê, Herakleia, Byzantium,—and even
-Rhodes, in spite of the advantage of an insular position,—isolated
-relics of what had once been an Hellenic aggregate, become from
-henceforward cribbed and confined by inland neighbors almost at their
-gates[1106]—dependent on the barbaric potentates, between whom they
-were compelled to trim, making themselves useful in turn to all. It
-was however frequent with these barbaric princes to derive their
-wives, mistresses, ministers, negotiators, officers, engineers,
-literati, artists, actors, and intermediate agents both for ornament
-and recreation—from some Greek city. Among them all, more or less
-of Hellenic influence became thus insinuated; along with the Greek
-language which spread its roots everywhere—even among the Gauls or
-Galatians, the rudest and latest of the foreign immigrants.
-
-  [1104] This is a remarkable observation made by Memnon, c. 19.
-
-  [1105] See the statement of Polybius, xxii. 24.
-
-  [1106] Contrast the independent and commanding position occupied
-  by Byzantium in 399 B. C., acknowledging no superior
-  except Sparta (Xenoph. Anab. vii. 1)—with its condition in the
-  third century B. C.—harassed and pillaged almost to
-  the gates of the town by the neighboring Thracians and Gauls,
-  and only purchased immunity by continued money payments: see
-  Polybius, iv. 45.
-
-Of the Grecian maritime towns in the Euxine south of the
-Danube—Apollonia, Mesembria, Odêssus, Kallatis, Tomi, and Istrus—five
-(seemingly without Tomi) formed a confederate Pentapolis.[1107] About
-the year 312 B. C., we hear of them as under the power of
-Lysimachus king of Thrace, who kept a garrison in Kallatis—probably
-in the rest also. They made a struggle to shake off his yoke,
-obtaining assistance from some of the neighboring Thracians and
-Scythians, as well as from Antigonus. But Lysimachus, after a contest
-which seems to have lasted three or four years, overpowered both
-their allies and them, reducing them again into subjection.[1108]
-Kallatis sustained a long siege, dismissing some of its ineffective
-residents; who were received and sheltered by Eumelus prince of
-Bosporus. It was in pushing his conquests yet farther northward, in
-the steppe between the rivers Danube and Dniester, that Lysimachus
-came into conflict with the powerful prince of the Getæ—Dromichætes;
-by whom he was defeated and captured, but generously released.[1109]
-I have already mentioned that the empire of Lysimachus ended with
-his last defeat and death by Seleukus—(281 B. C.). By his
-death, the cities of the Pontic Pentapolis regained a temporary
-independence. But their barbaric neighbors became more and more
-formidable, being reinforced seemingly by immigration of fresh
-hordes from Asia; thus the Sarmatians, who in Herodotus’s time were
-on the east of the Tanais, appear, three centuries afterwards, even
-south of the Danube. By these tribes—Thracians, Getæ, Scythians, and
-Sarmatians—the Greek cities of this Pentapolis were successively
-pillaged. Though renewed indeed afterwards, from the necessity
-of some place of traffic, even for the pillagers themselves—they
-were but poorly renewed, with a large infusion of barbaric
-residents.[1110] Such was the condition in which the exile Ovid found
-Tomi, near the beginning of the Christian era. The Tomitans were more
-than half barbaric, and their Greek not easily intelligible. The
-Sarmatian or Getic horse-bowmen, with their poisoned arrows, ever
-hovered near, galloped even up to the gates, and carried off the
-unwary cultivators into slavery. Even within a furlong of the town,
-there was no security either for person or property. The residents
-were clothed in skins, or leather; while the women, ignorant both of
-spinning and weaving, were employed either in grinding corn or in
-carrying on their heads the pitchers of water.[1111]
-
-  [1107] Strabo, vii. p. 319. Philip of Macedon defeated the
-  Scythian prince Atheas or Ateas (about 340 B. C.)
-  somewhere between Mount Hæmus and the Danube (Justin, ix. 2). But
-  the relations of Ateas with the towns of Istrus and Apollonia,
-  which are said to have brought Philip into the country, are very
-  difficult to understand. It is most probable that these cities
-  invited Philip as their defender.
-
-  In Inscription No. 2056 c. (in Boeckh’s Corp. Inscript. Græc.
-  part xi. p. 79), the five cities constituting the Pentapolis
-  are not clearly named. Boeckh supposes them to be Apollonia,
-  Mesembria, Odêssus, Kallatis, and Tomi; but Istrus seems more
-  probable than Tomi. Odêssus was on the site of the modern Varna
-  where the Inscription was found; greatly south of the modern town
-  of Odessa, which is on the site of another town _Ordêsus_.
-
-  An Inscription (2056) immediately preceding the above, also found
-  at Odêssus, contains a vote of thanks and honors to a certain
-  citizen of Antioch, who resided with ... (name imperfect), king
-  of the Scythians and rendered great service to the Greeks by his
-  influence.
-
-  [1108] Diodor. xix. 73; xx. 25.
-
-  [1109] Strabo, vii. p. 302-305; Pausanias, i. 9, 5.
-
-  [1110] Dion Chrysost. Orat. xxxvi. (Borysthenitica) p. 75, Reisk.
-  εἶλον δὲ καὶ ταύτην (Olbia) Γέται, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς ἐν τοῖς
-  ἀριστέροις τοῦ Πόντου πόλεις, μέχρι Ἀπολλωνίας· ὅθεν δὴ καὶ σφόδρα
-  ταπεινὰ τὰ πράγματα κατέστη τῶν ταύτῃ Ἑλλήνων· τῶν μὲν οὐκέτι
-  συνοικισθεισῶν πόλεων, τῶν δὲ φαυλῶς, καὶ τῶν πλείστων βαρβάρων
-  εἰς αὐτὰς συῤῥεόντων.
-
-  [1111] The picture drawn by Ovid, of his situation as an exile
-  at Tomi, can never fail to interest, from the mere beauty and
-  felicity of his expression; but it is not less interesting, as
-  a real description of Hellenism in its last phase, degraded and
-  overborne by adverse fates. The truth of Ovid’s picture is fully
-  borne out by the analogy of Olbia, presently to be mentioned. His
-  complaints run through the five books of the Tristia, and the
-  four books of Epistolæ ex Ponto (Trist. v. 10, 15).
-
-    “Innumeræ circa gentes fera bella minantur,
-      Quæ sibi non rapto vivere turpe putant.
-    Nil extra tutum est: tumulus defenditur ægre
-      Mœnibus exiguis ingenioque soli.
-    Cum minime credas, ut avis, densissimus hostis
-      Advolat, et prædam vix bene visus agit.
-    Sæpe intra muros clausis venientia portis
-      Per medias legimus noxia tela vias.
-    Est igitur rarus, qui colere audeat, isque
-      Hac arat infelix, hac tenet arma manu.
-    Vix ope castelli defendimur: et tamen intus
-      Mista facit Græcis barbara turba metum.
-    Quippe simul nobis habitat discrimine nullo
-      Barbarus, et tecti plus quoque parte tenet.
-    Quos ut non timeas, possis odisse, videndo
-      Pellibus et longâ corpora tecta comâ.
-    Hos quoque, qui geniti Graiâ creduntur ab urbe,
-      Pro patrio cultu Persica bracca tegit,” etc.
-
-  This is a specimen out of many others: compare Trist. iii. 10,
-  53; iv. 1, 67; Epist. Pont. iii. 1.
-
-  Ovid dwells especially upon the fact that there was more of
-  barbaric than of Hellenic speech at Tomi—“Graiaque quod Getico
-  victa loquela sono est” (Trist. v. 2, 68). Woollen clothing, and
-  the practice of spinning and weaving by the free women of the
-  family, were among the most familiar circumstances of Grecian
-  life; the absence of these feminine arts, and the use of skins or
-  leather for clothing, were notable departures from Grecian habits
-  (Ex Ponto, iii. 8):—
-
-    “Vellera dura ferunt pecudes; et Palladis uti
-      Arte Tomitanæ non didicere nurus.
-    Femina pro lanâ Cerealia munera frangit,
-      Suppositoque gravem vertice portat aquam.”
-
-By these same barbarians, Olbia also (on the right bank of the
-Hypanis or Bug near its mouth) became robbed of that comfort and
-prosperity which it had enjoyed when visited by Herodotus. In his
-day, the Olbians lived on good terms with the Scythian tribes in
-their neighborhood. They paid a stipulated tribute, giving presents
-besides to the prince and his immediate favorites; and on these
-conditions, their persons and properties were respected. The Scythian
-prince Skylês (son of an Hellenic mother from Istrus, who had
-familiarized him with Greek speech and letters) had built a fine
-house in the town, and spent in it a month, from attachment to Greek
-manners and religion, while his Scythian army lay near the gates
-without molesting any one.[1112] It is true, that this proceeding
-cost Skylês his life; for the Scythians would not tolerate their own
-prince in the practice of foreign religious rites, though they did
-not quarrel with the same rites when observed by the Greeks.[1113]
-To their own customs the Scythians adhered tenaciously, and those
-customs were often sanguinary, ferocious, and brutish. Still they
-were warriors, rather than robbers—they abstained from habitual
-pillage, and maintained with the Greeks a reputation for honesty and
-fair dealing, which became proverbial with the early poets. Such were
-the Scythians as seen by Herodotus (probably about 440 to 430 B. C.);
-and the picture drawn by Ephorus a century afterwards (about 340 B.
-C.), appears to have been not materially different.[1114] But after
-that time it gradually altered. New tribes seem to have come in—the
-Sarmatians out of the East—the Gauls out of the West; from Thrace
-northward to the Tanais and the Palus Mæotis, the most different
-tribes became intermingled—Gauls, Thracians, Getæ, Scythians,
-Sarmatians, etc.[1115] Olbia was in an open plain, with no defence
-except its walls and the adjoining river Hypanis, frozen over in the
-winter. The hybrid Helleno-Scythian race, formed by intermarriages of
-Greeks with Scythians—and the various Scythian tribes who had become
-partially sedentary cultivators of corn for exportation—had probably
-also acquired habits less warlike than the tribes of primitive
-barbaric type. At any rate, even if capable of defending themselves,
-they could not continue their production and commerce under repeated
-hostile incursions.
-
-  [1112] Herodot. iv. 16-18. The town was called _Olbia_ by its
-  inhabitants, but _Borysthenes_ usually by foreigners; though it
-  was not on the Borysthenes river (Dnieper), but on the right bank
-  of the Hypanis (Bug).
-
-  [1113] Herodot. iv. 76-80.
-
-  [1114] Strabo, vii. p. 302: Skymnus Chius, v. 112, who usually
-  follows Ephorus.
-
-  The rhetor Dion tells us (Orat. xxxvi. init.) that he went to
-  Olbia in order that he might _go through the Scythians to the
-  Getæ_. This shows that in his time (about A. D. 100)
-  the Scythians must have been between the Bug and Dniester—the
-  Getæ nearer to the Danube—just as they had been four centuries
-  earlier. But many new hordes were mingled with them.
-
-  [1115] Strabo, vii. p. 296-304.
-
-A valuable inscription remaining enables us to compare the Olbia (or
-Borysthenes) seen by Herodotus, with the same town in the second
-century B. C.[1116] At this latter period, the city was diminished
-in population, impoverished in finances, exposed to constantly
-increasing exactions and menace from the passing barbaric hordes,
-and scarcely able to defend against them even the security of its
-walls. Sometimes there approached the barbaric chief Saitapharnes
-with his personal suite, sometimes his whole tribe or horde in mass,
-called Saii. Whenever they came, they required to be appeased by
-presents, greater than the treasury could supply, and borrowed only
-from the voluntary help of rich citizens; while even these presents
-did not always avert ill treatment or pillage. Already the citizens
-of Olbia had repelled various attacks, partly by taking into pay
-a semi-Hellenic population in their neighborhood (Mix-Hellenes,
-like the Liby-Phenicians in Africa); but the inroads became more
-alarming, and their means of defence less, through the uncertain
-fidelity of these Mix-Hellenes, as well as of their own slaves—the
-latter probably barbaric natives purchased from the interior.[1117]
-In the midst of public poverty, it was necessary to enlarge and
-strengthen the fortifications; for they were threatened with the
-advent of the Gauls—who inspired such terror that the Scythians and
-other barbarians were likely to seek their own safety by extorting
-admission within the walls of Olbia. Moreover even corn was scarce,
-and extravagantly dear. There had been repeated failures in the
-produce of the lands around, famine was apprehended, and efforts were
-needed, greater than the treasury could sustain, to lay in a stock at
-the public expense. Among the many points of contrast with Herodotus,
-this is perhaps the most striking; for in his time, corn was the
-great produce and the principal export from Olbia; the growth had now
-been suspended, or was at least perpetually cut off, by increased
-devastation and insecurity.
-
-  [1116] This Inscription—No. 2058—in Boeckh’s Inscr. Græc. part
-  xi. p. 121 _seq._—is among the most interesting in that noble
-  collection. It records a vote of public gratitude and honor to
-  a citizen of Olbia named Protogenes, and recites the valuable
-  services which he as well as his father had rendered to the
-  city. It thus describes the numerous situations of difficulty
-  and danger from which he had contributed to extricate them. A
-  vivid picture is presented to us of the distress of the city.
-  The introduction prefixed by Boeckh (p. 86-89) is also very
-  instructive.
-
-  Olbia is often spoken of by the name of _Borysthenes_, which
-  name was given to it by foreigners, but not recognized by the
-  citizens. Nor was it even situated on the Borysthenes river; but
-  on the right or western bank of the Hypanis (Bug) river; not far
-  from the modern Oczakoff.
-
-  The date of the above Inscription is not specified, and has been
-  differently determined by various critics. Niebuhr assigns it
-  (Untersuchungen über die Skythen, etc. in his Kleine Schriften,
-  p. 387) to a time near the close of the second Punic war. Boeckh
-  also believes that it is not much after that epoch. The terror
-  inspired by the Gauls, even to other barbarians, appears to suit
-  the second century B. C. better than it suits a later
-  period.
-
-  The Inscription No. 2059 attests the great number of strangers
-  resident at Olbia; strangers from eighteen different cities, of
-  which the most remote is Miletus, the mother-city of Olbia.
-
-  [1117] On one occasion, we know not when, the citizens of Olbia
-  are said to have been attacked by one Zopyrion, and to have
-  succeeded in resisting him only by emancipating their slaves, and
-  granting the citizenship to foreigners (Macrobius, Saturnal. i.
-  11).
-
-After perpetual attacks, and even several captures, by barbaric
-neighbors—this unfortunate city, about fifty years before the
-Christian era, was at length so miserably sacked by the Getæ, as to
-become for a time abandoned.[1118] Presently, however, the fugitives
-partially returned, to re-establish themselves on a reduced scale.
-For the very same barbarians who had persecuted and plundered them,
-still required an emporium with a certain amount of import and
-export, such as none but Greek settlers could provide; moreover it
-was from the coast near Olbia, and from care of its inhabitants, that
-many of the neighboring tribes derived their supply of salt.[1119]
-Hence arose a puny after-growth of Olbia—preserving the name,
-traditions, and part of the locality, of the deserted city—by the
-return of a portion of the colonists with an infusion of Scythian or
-Sarmatian residents; an infusion indeed so large, as seriously to
-dishellenize both the speech and the personal names in the town.[1120]
-
-  [1118] Dion Chrys. (Or. xxxvi. p. 75), ἀεὶ μὲν πολεμεῖται,
-  πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἑάλωκε, etc.
-
-  [1119] Dion Chrysost. Orat. xxxvi. (Borysthenit.) p. 75, 76,
-  Reisk.
-
-  [1120] See Boeckh’s Commentary on the language and personal names
-  of the Olbian Inscriptions, part xi. p. 108-116.
-
-To this second edition of Olbia, the rhetor Dion Chrysostom paid a
-summer visit (about a century after the Christian era), of which
-he has left a brief but interesting account. Within the wide area
-once filled by the original Olbia—the former circumference of which
-was marked by crumbling walls and towers—the second town occupied
-a narrow corner; with poor houses, low walls, and temples having
-no other ornament except the ancient statues mutilated by the
-plunderers. The citizens dwelt in perpetual insecurity, constantly
-under arms or on guard; for the barbaric horsemen, in spite of
-sentinels posted to announce their approach, often carried off
-prisoners, cattle, or property, from the immediate neighborhood
-of the gates. The picture drawn of Olbia by Dion confirms in a
-remarkable way that given of Tomi by Ovid. And what imparts to it
-a touching interest is, that the Greeks whom Dion saw contending
-with the difficulties, privations, and dangers of this inhospitable
-outpost, still retained the activity, the elegance, and the
-intellectual aspirations of their Ionic breed; in this respect much
-superior to the Tomitans of Ovid. In particular, they were passionate
-admirers of Homer; a considerable proportion of the Greeks of Olbia
-could repeat the Iliad from memory.[1121] Achilles (localized under
-the surname of Pontarches, on numerous islands and capes in the
-Euxine) was among the chief divine or heroic persons to whom they
-addressed their prayers.[1122] Amidst Grecian life, thus degraded
-and verging towards its extinction, and stripped even of the purity
-of living speech—the thread of imaginative and traditional sentiment
-thus continues without suspension or abatement.
-
-  [1121] Dion, Orat. xxxvi. (Borysthenit.), p. 78, Reiske. ... καὶ
-  τἄλλα μὲν οὐκέτι σαφῶς ἑλληνίζοντες, διὰ τὸ ἐν μέσοις οἰκεῖν τοῖς
-  βαρβάροις, ὅμως τήν γε Ἰλιάδα ὀλίγου πάντες ἴσασιν ἀπὸ στόματος.
-  I translate the words ὀλίγου πάντες with some allowance for
-  rhetoric.
-
-  The representation given by Dion of the youthful citizen of
-  Olbia—Kallistratus—with whom he conversed, is curious as a
-  picture of Greek manners in this remote land; a youth of eighteen
-  years of age, with genuine Ionic features, and conspicuous for
-  his beauty (εἶχε πολλοὺς ἐραστάς) a zealot for literature and
-  philosophy, but especially for Homer; clothed in the costume of
-  the place, suited for riding—the long leather trowsers, and short
-  black cloak; constantly on horseback for defence of the town, and
-  celebrated as a warrior even at that early age, having already
-  killed or made prisoners several Sarmatians (p. 77).
-
-  [1122] See Inscriptions, Nos. 2076, 2077, ap. Boeckh; and
-  Arrian’s Periplus of the Euxine, ap. Geogr. Minor. p. 21, ed.
-  Hudson.
-
-Respecting Bosporus or Pantikapæum (for both names denote the same
-city, though the former name often comprehends the whole annexed
-dominion), founded by Milesian settlers[1123] on the European side
-of the Kimmerian Bosporus (near Kertsch), we first hear, about
-the period when Xerxes was repulsed from Greece (480-479 B.
-C.). It was the centre of a dominion including Phanagoria,
-Kepi, Hermonassa, and other Greek cities on the Asiatic side of the
-strait; and is said to have been governed by what seems to have been
-an oligarchy—called the Archæanaktidæ, for forty-two years[1124]
-(480-438 B. C.).
-
-  [1123] Strabo, vii. p. 310.
-
-  [1124] Diodor. xii. 31.
-
-After them we have a series of princes standing out individually by
-name, and succeeding each other in the same family. Spartokus I. was
-succeeded by Seleukus; next comes Spartokus II.; then Satyrus I.
-(407-393 B. C.); Leukon (393-353 B. C.); Spartokus III. (353-348 B.
-C.); Parisades I. (348-310 B. C.); Satyrus II., Prytanis, Eumelus
-(310-304 B. C.); Spartokus IV. (304-284 B. C.); Parisades II.[1125]
-During the reigns of these princes, a connection of some intimacy
-subsisted between Athens and Bosporus; a connection not political,
-since the Bosporanic princes had little interest in the contentions
-about Hellenic hegemony—but of private intercourse, commercial
-interchange, and reciprocal good offices. The eastern corner of
-the Tauric Chersonesus, between Pantikapæum and Theodosia, was
-well-suited for the production of corn; while plenty of fish, as well
-as salt, was to be had in or near the Palus Mæotis. Corn, salted
-fish and meat, hides, and barbaric slaves in considerable numbers,
-were in demand among all the Greeks round the Ægean, and not least
-at Athens, where Scythian slaves were numerous;[1126] while oil and
-wine, with other products of more southern regions, were acceptable
-in Bosporus and the other Pontic ports. This important traffic seems
-to have been mainly carried on in ships and by capital belonging to
-Athens and other Ægean maritime towns; and must have been greatly
-under the protection and regulation of the Athenians, so long as
-their maritime empire subsisted. Enterprising citizens of Athens went
-to Bosporus (as to Thrace and the Thracian Chersonesus), to push
-their fortunes; merchants from other cities found it advantageous to
-settle as resident strangers or metics at Athens, where they were
-more in contact with the protecting authority, and obtained readier
-access to the judicial tribunals. It was probably during the period
-preceding the great disaster at Syracuse in 413 B. C., that Athens
-first acquired her position as a mercantile centre for the trade with
-the Euxine; which we afterwards find her retaining, even with reduced
-power, in the time of Demosthenes.
-
-  [1125] See Mr. Clinton’s Appendix on the Kings of Bosporus—Fast.
-  Hellen. App. c. 13. p. 280. etc.; and Boeckh’s Commentary on the
-  same subject, Inscript. Græc. part xi. p. 91 _seq._
-
-  [1126] Polybius (iv. 38) enumerates the principal articles of
-  this Pontic trade; among the exports τά τε δέρματα καὶ τὸ τῶν εἰς
-  τὰς δουλείας ἀγομένων σωμάτων πλῆθος, etc., where Schweighäuser
-  has altered ~δέρματα~ to ~θρέμματα~ seemingly on the authority
-  of one MS. only. I doubt the propriety of this change, as well
-  as the facts of any large exportation of live cattle from the
-  Pontus; whereas the exportation of hides was considerable: see
-  Strabo, xi. p. 493.
-
-  The Scythian public slaves or policemen of Athens are well known.
-  Σκύθαινα also is the name of a female slave (Aristoph. Lysistr.
-  184). Σκύθης, for the name of a slave, occurs as early as
-  Theognis, v. 826.
-
-  Some of the salted preparations from the Pontus were
-  extravagantly dear; Cato complained of a κεράμιον Ποντικῶν
-  ταρίχον as sold for 300 drachmæ (Polyb. xxxi. 24).
-
-How strong was the position enjoyed by Athens in Bosporus, during
-her unimpaired empire, we may judge from the fact, that Nymphæum
-(south of Pantikapæum, between that town and Theodosia) was among
-her tributary towns, and paid a talent annually.[1127] Not until
-the misfortunes of Athens in the closing years of the Peloponnesian
-war, did Nymphæum pass into the hands of the Bosporanic princes;
-betrayed (according to Æschines) by the maternal grandfather of
-Demosthenes, the Athenian Gylon; who however probably did nothing
-more than obey a necessity rendered unavoidable by the fallen
-condition of Athens.[1128] We thus see that Nymphæum, in the midst
-of the Bosporanic dominion, was not only a member of the Athenian
-empire, but also contained influential Athenian citizens, engaged
-in the corn-trade. Gylon was rewarded by a large grant of land at
-Kepi—probably other Athenians of Nymphæum were rewarded also—by
-the Bosporanic prince; who did not grudge a good price for such an
-acquisition. We find also other instances,—both of Athenian citizens
-sent out to reside with the prince Satyrus,—and of Pontic Greeks who,
-already in correspondence and friendship with various individual
-Athenians, consign their sons to be initiated in the commerce,
-society, and refinements of Athens.[1129] Such facts attest the
-correspondence and intercourse of that city, during her imperial
-greatness, with Bosporus.
-
-  [1127] Harpokration and Photius, v. Νυμφαῖον—from the ψηφίσματα
-  collected by Kraterus. Compare Boeckh, in the second edition of
-  his Staatshaushaltung der Athener, vol. ii. p. 658.
-
-  [1128] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 78. c. 57. See my last preceding
-  Vol. XI. Ch. lxxxvii. p. 263.
-
-  [1129] Lysias, pro Mantitheo, Or. xvi. s. 4; Isokrates
-  (Trapezitic.), Or. xvii. s. 5. The young man, whose case
-  Isokrates sets forth, was sent to Athens by his father Sopæus,
-  a rich Pontic Greek (s. 52) much in the confidence of Satyrus.
-  Sopæus furnished his son with two ship-loads of corn, and with
-  money besides—and then despatched him to Athens ἅμα κατ᾽ ἐμπορίαν
-  καὶ κατὰ θεωρίαν.
-
-The Bosporanic prince Satyrus was in the best relations with Athens,
-and even seems to have had authorized representatives there to
-enforce his requests, which met with very great attention.[1130]
-He treated the Athenian merchants at Bosporus with equity and
-even favor, granting to them a preference in the export of corn
-when there was not enough for all.[1131] His son Leukon not only
-continued the preference to Athenian exporting ships, but also
-granted to them remission of the export duty (of one-thirtieth
-part), which he exacted from all other traders. Such an exemption
-is reckoned as equivalent to an annual present of 13,000 medimni of
-corn (the medimnus being about 1⅓ bushel); the total quantity of
-corn brought from Bosporus to Athens in a full year being 400,000
-medimni.[1132] It is easy to see moreover that such a premium must
-have thrown nearly the whole exporting trade into the hands of
-Athenian merchants. The Athenians requited this favor by public votes
-of gratitude and honor, conferring upon Leukon the citizenship,
-together with immunity from all the regular burthens attaching to
-property at Athens. There was lying in that city money belonging
-to Leukon;[1133] who was therefore open (under the proposition of
-Leptines) to that conditional summons for exchange of properties,
-technically termed Antidosis. In his time, moreover, the corn-trade
-of Bosporus appears to have been farther extended; for we learn that
-he established an export from Theodosia as well as from Pantikapæum.
-His successor Parisades I. continuing to Athenian exporters of corn
-the same privilege of immunity from export duty, obtained from Athens
-still higher honors than Leukon; for we learn that his statue,
-together with those of two relatives, was erected in the agora, on
-the motion of Demosthenes.[1134] The connection of Bosporus with
-Athens was durable as well as intimate; its corn-trade being of high
-importance to the subsistence of the people. Every Athenian exporter
-was bound by law to bring his cargo in the first instance to Athens.
-The freighting and navigating of ships for that purpose, together
-with the advance of money by rich capitalists (citizens and metics)
-upon interest and conditions enforced by the Athenian judicature,
-was a standing and profitable business. And we may appreciate the
-value of equitable treatment, not to say favor, from the kings of
-Bosporus—when we contrast it with the fraudulent and extortionate
-behavior of Kleomenes, satrap of Egypt, in reference to the export of
-Egyptian corn.[1135]
-
-  [1130] Isokrates, Trapez. s. 5, 6. Sopæus, father of this
-  pleader, had incurred the suspicions of Satyrus in the Pontus,
-  and had been arrested; upon which Satyrus sends to Athens
-  to seize the property of the son, to order him home,—and if
-  he refused, then to require the Athenians to deliver him
-  up—ἐπιστέλλει δὲ τοῖς ἐνθάδε ἐπιδημοῦσιν ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου τά τε
-  χρήματα παρ᾽ ἐμοῦ κομίσασθαι, etc.
-
-  [1131] Isokrates, Trapezit. s. 71. Demosthenes also recognizes
-  favors from Satyrus—καὶ αὐτὸς (Leukon) καὶ οἱ πρόγονοι, etc.
-  (adv. Leptin. p. 467).
-
-  [1132] Demosth. adv. Leptin., p. 467.
-
-  [1133] Demosth. adv. Leptin., p. 469.
-
-  [1134] Demosth. adv. Phormion., p. 917; Deinarchus adv. Demosth.,
-  p. 34. The name stands Berisades as printed in the oration; but
-  it is plain that Parisades is the person designated. See Boeckh,
-  Introd. ad Inscr. No. 2056, p. 92.
-
-  Deinarchus avers, that Demosthenes received an annual present of
-  1000 modii of corn from Bosporus.
-
-  [1135] Demosthen. adv. Dionysodor. p. 1285.
-
-The political condition of the Greeks at Bosporus was somewhat
-peculiar. The hereditary princes (above enumerated), who ruled them
-substantially as despots, assumed no other title (in respect to
-the Greeks) than that of Archon. They paid tribute to the powerful
-Scythian tribes who bounded them on the European side, and even
-thought it necessary to carry a ditch across the narrow isthmus,
-from some point near Theodosia northward to the Palus Mæotis, as a
-protection against incursions.[1136] Their dominion did not extend
-farther west than Theodosia; this ditch was their extreme western
-boundary; and even for the land within it, they paid tribute. But
-on the Asiatic side of the strait, they were lords paramount for a
-considerable distance, over the feebler and less warlike tribes who
-pass under the common name of Mæotæ or Mæêtae—the Sindi, Toreti,
-Dandarii, Thatês, etc. Inscriptions, yet remaining, of Parisades I.
-record him as King of these various barbaric tribes, but as Archon of
-Bosporus and Theodosia.[1137] His dominion on the Asiatic side of the
-Kimmerian Bosporus, sustained by Grecian and Thracian mercenaries,
-was of considerable (though to us unknown) extent, reaching to
-somewhere near the borders of Caucasus.[1138]
-
-  [1136] Strabo, vii. p. 310, 311.
-
-  [1137] See Inscript. Nos. 2117, 2118, 2119, in Boeckh’s
-  Collection, p. 156.
-
-  In the Memorabilia of Xenophon (ii. 1, 10). Sokrates cites the
-  Scythians as an example of ruling people, and the Mæotæ as an
-  example of subjects. Probably this refers to the position of the
-  Bosporanic Greeks, who paid tribute to the Scythians, but ruled
-  over the Mæotæ. The name _Mæotæ_ seems confined to tribes on the
-  Asiatic side of the Palus Mæotis; while the Scythians were on the
-  European side of that sea. Sokrates and the Athenians had good
-  means of being informed about the situation of the Bosporani and
-  their neighbors on both sides. See K. Neumann, die Hellenen im
-  Skythenlande, b. ii. p. 216.
-
-  [1138] This boundary is attested in another Inscription No.
-  2104, of the same collection. Inscription No. 2103, seems to
-  indicate Arcadian mercenaries in the service of Leukon: about the
-  mercenaries, see Diodor. xx. 22.
-
-  Parisades I. is said to have been worshipped as a god, after his
-  death (Strabo, vii. p. 310).
-
-Parisades I. on his death left three sons—Satyrus, Prytanis, and
-Eumelus. Satyrus, as the eldest, succeeded; but Eumelus claimed the
-crown, sought aid without, and prevailed on various neighbors—among
-them a powerful Thracian king named Ariopharnes—to espouse his
-cause. At the head of an army said to consist of 20,000 horse and
-22,000 foot, the two allies marched to attack the territories of
-Satyrus, who advanced to meet them, with 2000 Grecian mercenaries,
-and 2000 Thracians of his own, reinforced by a numerous body of
-Scythian allies—20,000 foot, and 10,000 horse, and carrying with him
-a plentiful supply of provisions in waggons. He gained a complete
-victory, compelling Eumelus and Ariopharnes to retreat and seek
-refuge in the regal residence of the latter, near the river Thapsis;
-a fortress built of timber, and surrounded with forest, river, marsh,
-and rock, so as to be very difficult of approach. Satyrus, having
-first plundered the country around, which supplied a rich booty of
-prisoners and cattle, proceeded to assail his enemies in their almost
-impracticable position. But though he, and Meniskus his general of
-mercenaries, made the most strenuous efforts, and even carried some
-of the outworks, they were repulsed from the fortress itself; and
-Satyrus, exposing himself forwardly to extricate Meniskus, received
-a wound of which he shortly died—after a reign of nine months.
-Meniskus, raising the siege, withdrew the army to Gargaza; from
-whence he conveyed back the regal corpse to Pantikapæum.[1139]
-
-  [1139] Diodor. xx. 24 The scene of these military operations
-  (as far as we can pretend to make it out from the brief and
-  superficial narrative of Diodorus), seems to have been on the
-  European side of Bosporus; somewhere between the Borysthenes
-  river and the Isthmus of Perekop, in the territory called by
-  Herodotus _Hylæa_. This is Niebuhr’s opinion, which I think more
-  probable than that of Boeckh, who supposes the operations to have
-  occurred on the Asiatic territory of Bosporus. So far I concur
-  with Niebuhr; but his reasons for placing Dromichætes king of the
-  Getæ (the victor over Lysimachus), east of the Borysthenes, are
-  noway satisfactory.
-
-  Compare Niebuhr’s Untersuchungen über die Skythen, etc. (in
-  his Kleine Schriften, p. 380). with Boeckh’s Commentary on the
-  Sarmatian Inscriptions, Corp. Ins. Græc. part xi. p. 83-103.
-
-  The mention by Diodorus of a wooden fortress, surrounded by
-  morass and forest, is curious, and may be illustrated by the
-  description in Herodotus (iv. 108) of the city of the Budini.
-  This habit of building towns and fortifications of wood,
-  prevailed among the Slavonic population in Russia and Poland
-  until far down in the middle ages. See Paul Joseph Schaffarik,
-  Slavische Alterhümer, in the German translation of Wuttke, vol.
-  i. ch. 10 p. 192; also K. Neumann, Die Hellenen im Skythenlande,
-  p. 91.
-
-Prytanis, the next brother, rejecting an offer of partition tendered
-by Eumelus, assumed the sceptre, and marched forth to continue the
-struggle. But the tide of fortune now turned in favor of Eumelus;
-who took Gargaza with several other places, worsted his brother
-in battle, and so blocked him up in the isthmus near the Palus
-Mæotis, that he was forced to capitulate and resign his pretensions.
-Eumelus entered Pantikapæum as conqueror. Nevertheless, the defeated
-Prytanis, in spite of his recent covenant, made a renewed attempt
-upon the crown; wherein he was again baffled, forced to escape to
-Kêpi, and there slain. To assure himself of the throne, Eumelus put
-to death the wives and children of both his two brothers, Satyrus
-and Prytanis—together with all their principal friends. One youth
-alone—Parisades, son of Satyrus—escaped and found protection with the
-Scythian prince Agarus.
-
-Eumelus had now put down all rivals; yet his recent cruelties had
-occasioned wrath and disgust among the Bosporanic citizens. He
-convoked them in assembly, to excuse his past conduct, and promised
-good government for the future; at the same time guaranteeing to them
-their full civic constitution, with such privileges and immunities
-as they had before enjoyed, and freedom from direct taxation.[1140]
-Such assurances, combined probably with an imposing mercenary force,
-appeased or at least silenced the prevailing disaffection. Eumelus
-kept his promises so far as to govern in a mild and popular spirit.
-While thus rendering himself acceptable at home, he maintained an
-energetic foreign policy, and made several conquests among the
-surrounding tribes. He constituted himself a sort of protector
-of the Euxine, repressing the piracies of the Heniochi and Achæi
-(among the Caucasian mountains to the east) as well as of the
-Tauri in the Chersonesus (Crimea); much to the satisfaction of
-the Byzantines, Sinopians, and other Pontic Greeks. He received a
-portion of the fugitives from Kallatis, when besieged by Lysimachus,
-and provided for them a settlement in his dominions. Having thus
-acquired great reputation, Eumelus was in the full career of conquest
-and aggrandizement, when an accident terminated his life, after a
-reign of rather more than five years. In returning from Scythia to
-Pantikapæum, in a four-wheeled carriage (or waggon) and four with a
-tent upon it, his horses took fright and ran away. Perceiving that
-they were carrying him towards a precipice, he tried to jump out;
-but his sword becoming entangled in the wheel, he was killed on the
-spot.[1141] He was succeeded by his son Spartokus IV., who reigned
-twenty years (304-284 B. C.); afterwards came the son of
-Spartokus, Parisades II.; with whose name our information breaks
-off.[1142]
-
-  [1140] Diodor. xx. 24.
-
-  [1141] Diodor. xx. 25.
-
-  [1142] Diodor. xx. 100. Spartokus IV.—son of Eumelus—is
-  recognized in one Attic Inscription (No. 107), and various
-  Bosporanic (No. 2105, 2106, 2120) in Boeckh’s Collection.
-  Parisades II.—son of Spartokus—is recognized in another
-  Bosporanic Inscription, No. 2107—seemingly also in No. 2120 _b._
-
-This dynasty, the Spartokidæ, though they ruled the Greeks of
-Bosporus as despots by means of a foreign mercenary force—yet seem to
-have exercised power with equity and moderation.[1143] Had Eumelus
-lived, he might probably have established an extensive empire over
-the barbaric tribes on all sides of him. But empire over such
-subjects was seldom permanent; nor did his successors long maintain
-even as much as he left. We have no means of following their fortunes
-in detail; but we know that about a century B. C., the then
-reigning prince, Parisades IV., found himself so pressed and squeezed
-by the Scythians,[1144] that he was forced (like Olbia and the
-Pentapolis) to forego his independence; and to call in, as auxiliary
-or master, the formidable Mithridates Eupator of Pontus; from whom a
-new dynasty of Bosporanic kings began—subject however after no long
-interval, to the dominion and interference of Rome.
-
-  [1143] Strabo, vii. p. 310. Deinarchus however calls Parisades,
-  Satyrus, and Gorgippus, τοὺς ἐχθίστους τύραννους (adv. Demosth.
-  s. 44).
-
-  [1144] Strabo, vii. p. 310. οὐχ οἷός τε ὢν ἀντέχειν πρὸς τοὺς
-  βαρβάρους, φόρον πραττομένους μείζω τοῦ πρότερον, etc.
-
-These Mithridatic princes lie beyond our period; but the cities of
-Bosporus under the Spartokid princes, in the fourth century B.
-C., deserve to be ranked among the conspicuous features of the
-living Hellenic world. They were not indeed purely Hellenic, but
-presented a considerable admixture of Scythian or Oriental manners;
-analogous to the mixture of the Hellenic and Libyan elements at
-Kyrênê with its Battiad princes. Among the facts attesting the
-wealth and power of these Spartokid princes, and of the Bosporanic
-community, we may number the imposing groups of mighty sepulchral
-tumuli near Kertch (Pantikapæum); some of which have been recently
-examined, while the greater part still remain unopened. These
-spacious chambers of stone—enclosed in vast hillocks (Kurgans),
-cyclopian works piled up with prodigious labor and cost—have been
-found to contain not only a profusion of ornaments of the precious
-metals (gold, silver, and electron, or a mixture of four parts of
-gold to one of silver), but also numerous vases, implements, and
-works of art, illustrating the life and ideas of the Bosporanic
-population. “The contents of the tumuli already opened are so
-multifarious, that from the sepulchres of Pantikapæum alone, we might
-become acquainted with everything which served the Greeks either
-for necessary use, or for the decoration of domestic life.”[1145]
-Statues, reliefs and frescoes on the walls, have been found, on
-varied subjects both of war and peace, and often of very fine
-execution; besides these, numerous carvings in wood, and vessels
-of bronze or terra cotta; with necklaces, armlets, bracelets,
-rings, drinking cups, etc. of precious metal—several with colored
-beads attached.[1146] The costumes, equipment, and physiognomy
-represented, are indeed a mixture of Hellenic and barbaric; moreover,
-even the profusion of gold chains and other precious ornaments,
-indicates a tone of sentiment partially orientalized, in those for
-whom they were destined.
-
-  [1145] Neumann, Die Hellenen im Skythenlande, p. 503.
-
-  [1146] An account of the recent discoveries near Kertch or
-  Pantikapæum, will be found in Dubois de Montpéreux, Voyage
-  dans le Caucase, vol. v. p. 135 _seqq._; and in Neumann, Die
-  Hellenen im Skythenlande, pp. 483-533. The last-mentioned work
-  is peculiarly copious and instructive; relating what has been
-  done since Dubois’s travels, and containing abundant information
-  derived from the recent memoirs of the St. Petersburg Literary
-  Societies.
-
-  The local and special type, which shows itself so much on these
-  works of art, justifies the inference that they were not brought
-  from other Grecian cities, but executed by Grecian artists
-  resident at Pantikapæum (p. 507). Two marble statues, a man and
-  a woman, both larger than life, exhumed in 1850, are spoken of
-  with peculiar admiration (p. 491). Coins of the third and fourth
-  century B. C. have been found in several (p. 494, 495).
-  A great number of the so-called Etruscan vases have also been
-  discovered, probably fabricated from a species of clay still
-  existing in the neighborhood: the figures on these vases are
-  often excellent, with designs and scenes of every description,
-  religious, festal, warlike, domestic (p. 522). Many of the
-  sarcophagi are richly ornamented with carvings, in wood, ivory,
-  etc; some admirably executed (p. 521).
-
-  Unfortunately, the belief prevails, and has long prevailed,
-  among the neighboring population, that these tumuli contain
-  hidden treasures. One of the most striking among them—called the
-  Kul-Obo—was opened in 1830 by the Russian authorities. After
-  great pains and trouble, the means of entrance were discovered,
-  and the interior chamber was reached. It was the richest that
-  had ever been opened; being found to contain some splendid
-  golden ornaments, as well as many other relics. The Russian
-  officers placed a guard to prevent any one from entering it;
-  but the cupidity of the population of Kertch was so inflamed
-  by the report of the expected treasure being discovered, that
-  they forced the guard, broke into the interior, and pillaged
-  most of the contents (p. 509). The Russian authorities have been
-  generally anxious for the preservation and gradual excavation of
-  these monuments, but have had to contend against repugnance and
-  even rapacity on the part of the people near.
-
-  Dubois de Montpéreux gives an interesting description of the
-  opening of these tumuli near Kertch—especially of the Kul-Obo,
-  the richest of all, which he conceives to have belonged to one
-  of the Spartokid kings, and the decorations of which were the
-  product of Hellenic art:—
-
-  “Si l’on a enterré (he observes) un roi entouré d’un luxe
-  Scythique, ce sont des Græcs et des artistes de cette nation
-  qui ont travaillé à ses funerailles” (Voyage autour du Caucase,
-  pp. 195, 213, 227). Pantikapæum and Phanagoria (he says) “se
-  reconnoissent de loin à la foule de leurs tumulus” (p. 137).
-
-But the design as well as the execution comes clearly out of the
-Hellenic workshop; and there is good ground for believing, that in
-the fourth century B. C., Pantikapæum was the seat, not
-only of enterprising and wealthy citizens, but also of strenuous
-and well-directed artistic genius. Such manifestations of the
-refinements of Hellenism, in this remote and little-noticed city,
-form an important addition to the picture of Hellas as a whole,—prior
-to its days of subjection,—which it has been the purpose of this
-history to present.
-
-       *       *       *       *       *
-
-I have now brought down the history of Greece to the point of
-time marked out in the Preface to my First Volume—the close of
-the generation contemporary with Alexander—the epoch, from whence
-dates not only the extinction of Grecian political freedom and
-self-action, but also the decay of productive genius, and the
-debasement of that consummate literary and rhetorical excellence
-which the fourth century B. C. had seen exhibited in Plato
-and Demosthenes.[1147] The contents of this last Volume indicate but
-too clearly that Greece as a separate subject of history no longer
-exists; for one full half of it is employed in depicting Alexander
-and his conquests—ἄγριον αἰχμητὴν, κρατερὸν μήστωρα φόβοιο[1148]—that
-Non-Hellenic conqueror into whose vast possessions the Greeks are
-absorbed, with their intellectual brightness bedimmed, their spirit
-broken, and half their virtue taken away by Zeus—the melancholy
-emasculation inflicted (according to Homer) upon victims overtaken by
-the day of slavery.[1149]
-
-  [1147] How marked that degradation was, may be seen attested by
-  Dionysius of Halikarnassus, De Antiquis Oratoribus, pp. 445, 446,
-  Reiske—ἐν γὰρ δὴ τοῖς πρὸ ἡμῶν χρόνοις ἡ μὲν ἀρχαία καὶ φιλόσοφος
-  ῥητορικὴ προπηλακιζομένη καὶ δεινὰς ὕβρεις ὑπομένουσα κατελύετο,
-  ἀρξαμένη μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ Μακεδόνος τελευτῆς ἐκπνεῖν
-  καὶ μαραίνεσθαι κατ᾽ ὀλίγον, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς ἡλικίας μικροῦ
-  δεήσασα εἰς τέλος ἠφανίσθαι. Compare Dionys. De Composit. Verbor.
-  p. 29, 30, Reisk.; and Westermann, Geschichte der Griechischen
-  Beredtsamkeit, s. 75-77.
-
-  [1148] Hom. Iliad, vi. 97.
-
-  [1149] Hom. Odyss. xvii. 322.—
-
-    ἥμισυ γάρ τ᾽ ἀρετῆς ἀποαίνυται εὐρύοπα Ζεὺς
-    ἀνέρος, εὖτ᾽ ἄν μιν κατὰ δούλιον ἦμαρ ἕλῃσιν.
-
-One branch of intellectual energy there was, and one alone, which
-continued to flourish, comparatively little impaired, under the
-preponderance of the Macedonian sword—the spirit of speculation and
-philosophy. During the century which we have just gone through, this
-spirit was embodied in several eminent persons, whose names have been
-scarcely adverted to in this history. Among these names, indeed,
-there are two, of peculiar grandeur, whom I have brought partially
-before the reader, because both of them belong to general history
-as well as to philosophy; Plato, as citizen of Athens, companion
-of Sokrates at his trial, and counsellor of Dionysius in his
-glory—Aristotle, as the teacher of Alexander. I had at one time hoped
-to include in my present work a record of them as philosophers also,
-and an estimate of their speculative characteristics; but I find
-the subject far too vast to be compressed into such a space as this
-volume would afford. The exposition of the tenets of distinguished
-thinkers is not now numbered by historians, either ancient or modern,
-among the duties incumbent upon them, nor yet among the natural
-expectations of their readers; but is reserved for the special
-historian of philosophy. Accordingly, I have brought my history of
-Greece to a close, without attempting to do justice either to Plato
-or to Aristotle. I hope to contribute something towards supplying
-this defect, the magnitude of which I fully appreciate, in a separate
-work, devoted specially to an account of Greek speculative philosophy
-in the fourth century B. C.
-
-
-APPENDIX.
-
-ON ISSUS AND ITS NEIGHBORHOOD, AS CONNECTED WITH THE WAR.
-
-
-The exact battle-field of Issus cannot be certainly assigned, upon
-the evidence accessible to us. But it may be determined, within a few
-miles north or south; and what is even more important—the general
-features of the locality, as well as the preliminary movements of the
-contending armies, admit of being clearly conceived and represented.
-
-That the battle was fought in some portion of the narrow space
-intervening between the eastern coast of the Gulf of Issus and the
-western flank of Mount Amanus—that Alexander’s left and Darius’s
-right, rested on the sea, and their right and left respectively on
-the mountain—that Darius came upon Alexander unexpectedly from the
-rear, thus causing him to return back a day’s march from Myriandrus,
-and to reoccupy a pass which he had already passed through and
-quitted—these points are clearly given, and appear to me not open to
-question. We know that the river Pinarus, on which the battle was
-fought, was at a certain distance _south_ of Issus, the last town of
-Kilikia before entering Syria (Arrian, ii. 7. 2)—ἐς δὲ τὴν ὑστεραίαν
-προὐχώρει (Darius from Issus) ἐπὶ τὸν ποταμὸν τὸν Πίναρον—Ritter
-erroneously states that Issus was _upon_ the river Pinarus, which
-he even calls _the Issus river_ (Erdkunde, Theil iv. Abth. 2. p.
-1797-1806). We know also that this river was at some distance _north_
-of the maritime pass called the Gates of Kilikia and Assyria, through
-which Alexander passed and repassed.
-
-But when we proceed, beyond these data (the last of them only vague
-and relative), to fix the exact battle-field, we are reduced to
-conjecture. Dr. Thirlwall, in an appendix to the sixth volume of his
-history, has collected and discussed very ably the different opinions
-of various geographers.
-
-To those whom he has cited, may be added—Mr. Ainsworth’s Essay on the
-Cilician and Syrian Gates (in the Transactions of the Geographical
-Society for 1837)—Mützel’s Topographical Notes on the third book of
-Quintus Curtius—and the last volume of Ritter’s Erdkunde, published
-only this year (1855), ch. xxvii. p. 1778 _seqq._
-
-We know from Xenophon that Issus was a considerable town close to
-the sea—two days’ march from the river Pyramus, and one day’s march
-northward of the maritime pass called the Gates of Kilikia and
-Syria. That it was near the north-eastern corner of the Gulf, may
-also be collected from Strabo, who reckons the shortest line across
-Asia Minor, as stretching from Sinôpê or Amisus _to Issus_—and who
-also lays down the Egyptian sea as having its northern termination
-_at Issus_ (Strabo, xiv. p. 677; xvi. p. 749). The probable site of
-Issus has been differently determined by different authors; Rennell
-(Illustrations of the Geography of the Anabasis, p. 42-48) places
-it near Oseler or Yusler; as far as I can judge, this seems too far
-distant from the head of the Gulf, towards the south.
-
-In respect to the maritime pass, called the Gates of Kilikia and
-Syria, there is much discrepancy between Xenophon and Arrian. It
-is evident that, in Xenophon’s time, this pass and the road of
-march through it lay between the mountains and the sea,—and that
-the obstructions (walls blocking up the passage), which he calls
-insurmountable by force, were mainly of artificial creation. But when
-Alexander passed, no walls existed. The artificial obstructions had
-disappeared during the seventy years between Xenophon and Alexander;
-and we can assign a probable reason why. In Xenophon’s time, Kilikia
-was occupied by the native prince Syennesis, who, though tributary,
-maintained a certain degree of independence even in regard to the
-Great King, and therefore kept a wall guarded by his own soldiers
-on his boundary towards Syria. But in Alexander’s time, Kilikia
-was occupied, like Syria, by a Persian satrap. Artificial boundary
-walls, between two conterminous satrapies under the same master, were
-unnecessary; and must even have been found inconvenient, during the
-great collective military operations of the Persian satraps against
-the revolted Evagoras of Cyprus (principally carried on from Kilikia
-as a base, about 380 B. C., Diodor. xv. 2)—as well as in the
-subsequent operations against the Phenician towns (Diodor. xvi. 42).
-Hence we may discern a reason why all artificial obstructions may
-have been swept away before the time of Alexander; leaving only the
-natural difficulties of the neighboring ground, upon which Xenophon
-has not touched.
-
-The spot still retained its old name—“The Gates of Kilikia and
-Syria”—even after walls and gates had been dispensed with. But that
-name, in Arrian’s description, designates a difficult and narrow
-point of the road _over hills and rocks_; a point which Major Rennell
-(Illustrations, p. 54) supposes to have been about a mile south of
-the river and walls described by Xenophon. However this may be, the
-precise spot designated by Xenophon seems probably to be sought
-about seven miles north of Scanderoon, near the ruins now known as
-Jonas’s Pillars (or Sakal Tutan), and the Castle of Merkes, where a
-river called _Merkes_, _Mahersy_, or _Kara-su_, flows across from the
-mountain to the sea. That this river is the same with the Kersus of
-Xenophon, is the opinion of Rennell, Ainsworth, and Mützel; as well
-as of Colonel Callier, who surveyed the country when accompanying
-the army of Ibrahim Pacha as engineer (cited by Ritter, Erdk. p.
-1792). At the spot here mentioned, the gulf indents eastward, while
-the western flank of Amanus approaches very close to it, and drops
-with unusual steepness towards it. Hence the road now followed does
-not pass between the mountain and the sea, but ascends over a portion
-of the mountain, and descends again afterwards to the low ground
-skirting the sea. Northward of Merkes, the space between the mountain
-and the sea gradually widens, towards Bayas. At some distance to the
-north of Bayas occurs the river now called Delle Tschai, which is
-considered I think with probability, to be the Pinarus, where the
-battle between Alexander and Darius was fought. This opinion however
-is not unanimous; Kinneir identifies the _Merkes_ with the Pinarus.
-Moreover, there are several different streams which cross the space
-between Mount Amanus and the sea. Des Monceaux notices six streams
-as having been crossed between the Castle of Merkes and Bayas; and
-five more streams between Bayas and Ayas (Mützel ad Curtium, p. 105).
-Which among these is the Pinarus, cannot be settled without more or
-less of doubt.
-
-Besides the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, noted by Xenophon and Arrian
-in the above passages, there are also other Gates called _the
-Amanian Gates_, which are spoken of in a perplexing manner. Dr.
-Thirlwall insists with propriety on the necessity of distinguishing
-the _maritime_ passes, between Mount Amanus and the sea—from the
-_inland_ passes, which crossed over the ridge of Mount Amanus
-itself. But this distinction seems not uniformly observed by ancient
-authors, when we compare Strabo, Arrian, and Kallisthenes. Strabo
-uses the phrase, _Amanian Gates_, twice (xiv. p. 676; xvi. p. 751);
-in both cases designating a _maritime pass_, and not a pass _over_
-the mountain,—yet designating one maritime pass in the page first
-referred to, and another in the second. In xiv. p. 676—he means by
-αἱ Ἀμανίδες πύλαι, the spot called by modern travellers Demir Kapu,
-between Ægæ and Issus, or between Mopsuestia and Issus; while in xvi.
-751—he means by the same words that which I have been explaining as
-the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, on the eastern side of the Gulf of
-Issus. In fact, Strabo seems to conceive as a whole the strip of
-land between Mount Amanus and the Gulf, beginning at Demir Kapu,
-and ending at the Gates of Kilikia and Syria—and to call both the
-beginning and the end of it by the same name—the Amanian Gates.
-But he does not use this last phrase to designate the passage over
-or across Mount Amanus; neither does Arrian; who in describing the
-march of Darius from Sochi into Kilikia, says (ii. 7, 1)—ὑπερβαλὼν
-δὴ τὸ ὄρος Δαρεῖος τὸ κατὰ τὰς πύλας τὰς Ἀμανικὰς καλουμένας, ὡς ἐπὶ
-Ἴσσον προῆγε, καὶ ἐγένετο κατόπιν Ἀλεξάνδρου λαθών. Here, let it be
-observed, we do not read ὑπερβαλὼν τὰς πύλας—nor can I think that the
-words mean, as the translator gives them—“transiit Amanum, _eundo per
-Pylas Amanicas_.” The words rather signify, that Darius “crossed
-over the mountain where it adjoined the Amanian Gates”—_i. e._ where
-it adjoined the strip of land skirting the Gulf, and lying between
-those two extreme points which Strabo denominates _Amanian Gates_.
-Arrian employs this last phrase more loosely than Strabo, yet still
-with reference to the maritime strip, and not to a _col_ over the
-mountain ridge.
-
-On the other hand, Kallisthenes (if he is rightly represented by
-Polybius, who recites his statement, not his words, xii. 17) uses the
-words _Amanian Gates_ to signify the passage by which Darius entered
-Kilikia—that is, the passage _over_ the mountain. That which Xenophon
-and Arrian call the _Gates of Kilikia and Syria_—and which Strabo
-calls _Amanian Gates_—is described by Polybius as τὰ στενὰ, καὶ τὰς
-λεγομένας ἐν τῇ Κιλικίᾳ πύλας.
-
-It seems pretty certain that this must have been Darius’s line of
-march, because he came down immediately upon Issus, and then marched
-forward to the river Pinarus. Had he entered Kilikia by the pass of
-Beylan, he must have passed the Pinarus _before_ he reached Issus.
-The positive grounds for admitting a practicable pass near the 37th
-parallel, are indeed called in question by Mützel (ad Curtium, p.
-102, 103), and are not in themselves conclusive; still I hold them
-sufficient, when taken in conjunction with the probabilities of the
-case. This pass was, however, we may suppose, less frequented than
-the maritime line of road through the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, and
-the pass of Beylan; which, as the more usual, was preferred both by
-the Cyreians and by Alexander.
-
-Respecting the march of Alexander, Dr. Thirlwall here starts a
-question, substantially to this effect: “Since Alexander intended
-to march through the pass of Beylan for the purpose of attacking
-the Persian camp at Sochi, what could have caused him to go to
-Myriandrus, which was more south than Beylan, and out of his road?”
-Dr. Thirlwall feels this difficulty so forcibly, that in order
-to eliminate it, he is inclined to accept the hypothesis of Mr.
-Williams, which places Myriandrus at Bayas, and the Kiliko-Syrian
-Gates at Demir-Kapu; an hypothesis which appears to me inadmissible
-on various grounds, and against which Mr. Ainsworth (in his Essay on
-the Cilician and Syrian Gates) has produced several very forcible
-objections.
-
-I confess that I do not feel the difficulty on which Dr. Thirlwall
-insists. When we see that Cyrus and the Ten Thousand went to
-Myriandrus, in their way to the pass of Beylan, we may reasonably
-infer that, whether that town was in the direct line or not, it was
-at least in the _usual_ road of march—which does not always coincide
-with the direct line. But to waive this supposition, however—let us
-assume that there existed another shorter road leading to Beylan
-without passing by Myriandrus—there would still be reason enough to
-induce Alexander to go somewhat out of his way, in order to visit
-Myriandrus. For it was an important object with him to secure the
-sea ports in his rear, in case of a possible reverse. Suppose him
-repulsed and forced to retreat—it would be a material assistance to
-his retreat, to have assured himself beforehand of Myriandrus as well
-as the other seaports. In the approaching months, we shall find him
-just as careful to make sure of the Phenician cities on the coast,
-before he marches into the interior to attack Darius at Arbela.
-
-Farther, Alexander, marching to attack Darius, had nothing to gain by
-haste, and nothing to lose by coming up to Sochi three days later. He
-knew that the enormous Persian host would not try to escape; it would
-either await him at Sochi, or else advance into Kilikia to attack him
-there. The longer he tarried, the more likely they were to do the
-latter, which was what he desired. He had nothing to lose therefore
-in any way, and some chance of gain, by prolonging his march to Sochi
-for as long a time as was necessary to secure Myriandrus. There is no
-more difficulty, I think, in understanding why he went to Myriandrus,
-than why he went westward from Tarsus (still more out of his line of
-advance) to Soli and Anchialus.
-
-It seems probable (as Rennell, p. 56, and others think), that the
-site of Myriandrus is now some distance inland; that there has been
-an accretion of new land and morass on the coast.
-
-The modern town of Scanderoon occupies the site of Ἀλεξανδρεία
-κατ᾽ Ἴσσον, founded (probably by order of Alexander himself) in
-commemoration of the victory of Issus. According to Ritter (p. 1791),
-“Alexander had the great idea of establishing there an emporium for
-the traffic of the East with Europe, as at the other Alexandria for
-the trade of the East with Egypt.” The importance of the site of
-Scanderoon, in antiquity, is here greatly exaggerated. I know no
-proof that Alexander had the idea which Ritter ascribes to him; and
-it is certain that his successors had no such idea; because they
-founded the great cities of Antioch and Seleukeia (in Pieria), both
-of them carrying the course of trade up the Orontes, and therefore
-diverting it away from Scanderoon. This latter town is only of
-importance as being the harbor of Aleppo; a city (Berœa) of little
-consequence in antiquity, while Antioch became the first city in the
-East, and Seleukeia among the first: see Ritter, p. 1152.
-
-
-END.
-
-
-
-
-INDEX
-
-
-  _Abantes_, iii. 165.
-
-  _Abdêra_, the army of Xerxes at, v. 42.
-
-  _Abrokomas_, ix. 27, 31.
-
-  _Abydos_, march of Xerxes to, v. 28;
-    revolt of, from Athens, viii. 94;
-    Athenian victory at, over the Peloponnesians, viii. 110;
-    Athenian victory over Pharnabazus at, viii. 121;
-    Derkyllidas at, ix. 310 _seq._;
-    Anaxibius and Iphikrates at, ix. 369 _seq._
-
-  _Achæan_ origin affected by Spartan kings, ii. 11;
-    league, xii. 391.
-
-  _Achæans_, various accounts of, i. 104, 105;
-    effect of the Dorian occupation of Peloponnesus on, ii. 12;
-    Homeric view of, ii. 12;
-    of Phthiôtis and Peloponnesus, ii. 275;
-    of Peloponnesus, ii. 284, 303.
-
-  _Achæmenes_, v. 96.
-
-  _Achæus_, i. 101, 199.
-
-  _Achaia_, ii. 269;
-    towns and territory of, ii. 465 _seq._;
-    Epaminondas in, B. C. 367, x. 266;
-    proceedings of the Thebans in B. C. 367, x. 268;
-    alliance of, with Sparta and Elis, B. C. 365, x. 313.
-
-  _Acharnæ_, Archidamus at, vi. 131 _seq._
-
-  _Achelôus_, i. 282.
-
-  _Achillêis_, the basis of the Iliad, ii. 175 _seq._
-
-  _Achillês_, i. 291 _seq._, 297 _seq._
-
-  _Achradina_, capture of, by Neon, xi. 157.
-
-  _Acropolis at Athens_, flight to, on Xerxes’s approach, v. 114;
-    capture of by Xerxes, v. 117 _seq._;
-    visit of the Peisistratids to, after its capture by Xerxes, v. 118;
-    inviolable reserve fund in, vi. 138 _seq._
-
-  _Ada_, queen of Karia, xii. 94, 99.
-
-  _Adeimantus_, of Corinth, and Themistoklês, at Salamis, v. 122, 124.
-
-  _Admêtus_ and Alkêstis, i. 113 _seq._
-
-  _Admêtus_ and Themisoklês, v. 283.
-
-  _Adranum_, Timoleon at, xi. 148, 156.
-
-  _Adrastus_, i. 256, _seq._, 268; iii. 34.
-
-  _Adrastus_, the Phrygian exile, iii. 152.
-
-  _Adrumetum_, captured by Agathokles, xii. 419.
-
-  _Æa_, i. 250 _seq._
-
-  _Æakid_ genealogy, i. 184 _seq._, 189.
-
-  _Æakus_, i. 184 _seq._
-
-  _Æêtês_, i. 115;
-    and the Argonauts, i. 231 _seq._;
-    and Circê, i. 251.
-
-  _Ægæ_, iii. 190.
-
-  _Ægean_, islands in, ii. 214;
-    the Macedonian fleet master of, xii. 141.
-
-  _Ægean_ islands, effect of the battle of Chæroneia on, xi. 504.
-
-  _Ægeids_ at Sparta, ii. 361.
-
-  _Ægeus_, i. 205; death of, i. 221.
-
-  _Ægialeus_, i. 82.
-
-  _Ægina_, i. 184;
-    war of, against Athens, at the instigation of the Thebans, iv. 171,
-      173, 315;
-    submission of, to Darius, iv. 315;
-    appeal of Athenians to Sparta against the Medism of, iv. 318;
-    attempted revolution at, by Nikodromus, v. 47 _seq._;
-    from B. C. 488 to 481, v. 47, 48 _seq._, 53;
-    and Athens, settlement of the feud between, v. 58;
-    removal of Athenians to, on Xerxes’s approach, v. 108;
-    Greek fleet at, in the spring of B. C. 479, v. 147;
-    war of Athens against, B. C. 459, v. 321;
-    subdued by Athens, v. 331;
-    expulsion of the Æginetans from, by the Athenians, vi. 136;
-    and Athens, B. C. 389, ix. 371 _seq._;
-    Gorgôpas in, ix. 373 _seq._;
-    Teleutias in, ix. 373, 376.
-
-  _Æginæan_ scale, ii. 319 _seq._, 325; iii. 171.
-
-  _Æqinetans_, and Thebans, i. 184;
-    and the hostages taken from them by Kleomenês and Leotychidês,
-      v. 46 _seq._;
-    pre-eminence of, at Salamis, v. 145;
-    at Thyrea, capture and death of, B. C. 424, vi. 366.
-
-  _Ægistheus_, i. 162 _seq._
-
-  _Ægospotami_, battle of, viii. 217 _seq._;
-    condition of Athens and her dependencies after the battle of,
-      viii. 223, 225, 227 _seq._
-
-  _Ægyptos_, i. 87.
-
-  _Æimnestus_ and Dionysius, x. 468.
-
-  _Æneadæ_ at Skêpsis, i. 316.
-
-  _Æneas_, i. 293, 315 _seq._
-
-  _Ænianes_, ii. 286.
-
-  _Æolic_ Greeks in the Trôad, i. 335;
-    emigration under the Pelopids, ii. 19;
-    Kymê, custom at, in cases of murder, ii. 94 _n._;
-    and Doric dialects, ii. 335;
-    cities in Asia, iii. 190 _seq._;
-    emigration, iii. 191, 193;
-    establishments near Mount Ida, iii. 195.
-
-  _Æolid line_, the first, i. 107 _seq._;
-    the second, i. 112 _seq._;
-    the third, i. 119 _seq._;
-    the fourth, i. 123 _seq._
-
-  _Æolis_, iii. 195;
-    the subsatrapy of, and Pharnabazus, ix. 206 _seq._
-
-  _Æolus_, i. 95 _seq._, 103.
-
-  _Æpytus_, i. 176.
-
-  _Æschinês_, at the battle of Tamynæ, xi. 342;
-    proceedings of, against Philip, after his capture of Olynthus,
-      xi. 366;
-    early history of, xi. 366;
-    as envoy of Athens in Arcadia, xi. 367;
-    desire of, for peace, B. C. 347, xi. 368;
-    and the embassies from Athens to Philip, xi. 381 _seq._, 406, 410,
-      413 _seq._, 422;
-    and the motion of Philokrates for peace and alliance with Philip,
-      xi. 391 _seq._;
-    fabrications of, about Philip, xi. 398, 408, 409, 412 _seq._;
-    visit of, to Philip in Phokis, xi. 422;
-    justifies Philip after his conquest of Thermopylæ, xi. 425;
-    corruption of, xi. 430 _seq._;
-    at the Amphiktyonic assembly at Delphi, B. C. 359, xi. 470 _seq._;
-    on the special Amphiktyonic meeting at Thermopylæ, xi. 479;
-    conduct of, after the battle of Chæroneia, xi. 506;
-    accusation against Ktesiphon by, xii. 286 _seq._;
-    exile of, xii. 293 _seq._
-
-  _Æschylus_, Promêtheus of, i. 78, 381 _n._;
-    his treatment of mythes, i. 379 _seq._;
-    Sophoklês, and Euripidês, viii. 317 _seq._
-
-  _Æsculapius_, i. 178 _seq._
-
-  _Æsôn_, death of, i. 114.
-
-  _Æsymnête_, iii. 19.
-
-  _Æthiopis_ of Arktinus, ii. 156.
-
-  _Æêthlius_, i. 99.
-
-  _Ætna_, foundation of the city of, v. 229;
-    second city of, v. 236;
-    reconquered by Duketius, vii. 123;
-    conquest of, by Dionysius, x. 468;
-    Campanians of, x. 497.
-
-  _Ætolia_, legendary settlement of, i. 137;
-    expedition of Demosthenes against, vi. 296 _seq._
-
-  _Ætolian_ genealogy, i. 138.
-
-  _Ætolians_, ii. 290;
-    rude condition of, ii. 292;
-    emigration of, into Peloponnesus, ii. 325 _seq._;
-    and Akarnanians, iii. 411;
-    and Peloponnesians under Eurylochus attack Naupaktus, xi. 291;
-    contest and pacification of, with Antipater, xii. 332;
-    Kassander’s attempt to check, xii. 370.
-
-  _Ætolo-Eleians_ and the Olympic games, ii. 317.
-
-  _Ætôlus_, i. 102, 103;
-    and Oxylus, i. 153.
-
-  _Africa_, circumnavigation of, by the Phenicians, iii. 283 _seq._;
-    expedition of Agathokles to, against Carthage, xii. 410 _seq._, 444.
-
-  _Agamêdês_ and Trophonius, i. 129.
-
-  _Agamemnôn_, pre-eminence of, i. 154 _seq._, 161 _seq._, 163;
-    and Orestes transferred to Sparta, i. 165;
-    and the Trojan expedition, i. 289, 293.
-
-  _Agaristê_ and Megaklês, iii. 38.
-
-  _Agasias_, ix. 145, 147 _seq._
-
-  _Agathokles_, first rise of, xii. 397;
-    distinction of, in the Syracusan expedition to Kroton, xii. 398;
-    retires from Syracuse to Italy, xii. 398;
-    exploits of, in Italy and Sicily, about B. C. 320, xii. 285;
-    first ascendency of, at Syracuse, xii. 399;
-    his readmission to Syracuse, xii. 400;
-    massacres the Syracusans, xii. 401 _seq._;
-    constituted despot of Syracuse, xii. 402;
-    his popular manners, and military success, xii. 404 _seq._;
-    and the Agrigentines, xii. 404, 406, 407;
-    and Deinokrates, xii. 407, 440, 446 _seq._;
-    massacre at Gela by, xii. 408;
-    defeat of, at the Himera, xii. 409;
-    expedition of, to Africa, xii. 410 _seq._, 444;
-    capture of Megalêpolis and Tunês by, xii. 414;
-    victory of, over Hanno and Bomilkar, xii. 416 _seq._;
-    operations of, on the eastern coast of Carthage, xii. 419 _seq._;
-    mutiny in the army of, at Tunês, xii. 426;
-    in Numidia, xii. 427;
-    and Ophellas, xii. 427, 431 _seq._;
-    capture of Utica by, xii. 436;
-    goes from Africa to Sicily, B. C. 306-305, xii. 438, 439;
-    in Sicily, B. C. 306-305, xii. 439 _seq._;
-    returns from Sicily to Africa, where he is defeated by the
-      Carthaginians, xii. 441;
-    deserts his army at Tunês, and they capitulate, xii. 443, 444;
-    barbarities of, at Egesta and Syracuse, after his African
-      expedition, xii. 445;
-    operations of, in Liparæ, Italy, and Korkyra, xii. 448;
-    last projects and death of, xii. 449 _seq._;
-    genius and character of, xii. 450 _seq._
-
-  _Agavê_ and Pentheus, i. 261 _seq._
-
-  _Agêma_, Macedonian, xii. 63.
-
-  _Agên_, the satiric drama, xii. 296 and _n._ 2.
-
-  _Agenôr_ and his offspring, i. 257.
-
-  _Agesandridas_, viii. 71, 74 _seq._
-
-  _Agesilaus_, character of, ix. 242, 246, 280;
-    nomination of, as king, ix. 244 _seq._;
-    popular conduct and partisanship of, ix. 246;
-    expedition of, to Asia, B. C. 397, ix. 257 _seq._;
-    humiliation of Lysander by, ix. 260 _seq._;
-    Tissaphernes breaks the truce with, ix. 261;
-    attacks of, on the satrapy of Pharnabazus, ix. 261, 273 _seq._;
-    his enrichment of his friends, ix. 262;
-    humanity of, ix. 263;
-    naked exposure of Asiatic prisoners by, ix. 265 _seq._;
-    at Ephesus, ix. 266;
-    victory of, near Sardis, ix. 267;
-    negotiations of, with Tithraustes, ix. 269;
-    appointed to command at sea and on land, ix. 269, 271;
-    efforts of, to augment his fleet, ix. 273;
-    and Spithridates, ix. 274;
-    and Pharnabazus, conference between, ix. 277 _seq._;
-    large preparations and recall of, from Asia, ix. 280, 286,
-      308 _seq._;
-    relations of Sparta with her neighbors and allies after the
-      accession of, ix. 284;
-    on the northern frontier of Bœotia, ix. 312;
-    victory of, at Koroneia, ix. 313 _seq._;
-    and Teleutias, capture of the Long Walls at Corinth, and of Lechæum
-      by, ix. 339 _seq._;
-    capture of Peiræum and Œnoê by, ix. 344, 345 _seq._;
-    and the Isthmian festival, ix. 344;
-    and the envoys from Thebes, ix. 346, 352;
-    and the destruction of the Lacedæmonian _mora_ by Iphikrates,
-      ix. 348, 352;
-    expedition of, against Akarnania, ix. 354;
-    and the peace of Antalkidas, ix. 385 _seq._;
-    miso-Theban sentiment of, x. 28, 34;
-    his defence of Phœbidas, x. 62;
-    subjugation of Phlius by, x. 70 _seq._;
-    and the trial of Sphodrias, x. 100;
-    expeditions of, against Thebes, x. 127 _seq._;
-    and Epaminondas, at the congress at Sparta, B. C. 371, x. 170;
-    and the re-establishment of Mantinea, x. 205 _seq._;
-    feeling against, at Sparta, B. C. 371, x. 207;
-    march of, against Mantinea, x. 211 _seq._;
-    vigilant defence of Sparta by, against Epaminondas, x. 221, 330;
-    in Asia, B. C. 366, x. 294, 296;
-    in Egypt, x. 362 _seq._, and the independence of Mêssêne, x. 360;
-    death and character of, x. 363 _seq._
-
-  _Agesipolis_, ix. 356 _seq._; x. 35 _seq._, 67, 70.
-
-  _Agêtus_ and Aristo, iv. 326.
-
-  _Agis II._, invasion of Attica by, B. C. 425, vi. 313;
-    advance of, to Leuktra, B. C. 419, vii. 64;
-    invasion of Argos by, vii. 71 _seq._;
-    retirement of, from Argos, vii. 74 _seq._;
-    at the battle of Mantinea, B. C. 418, vii. 81 _seq._;
-    invasion of Attica by, vii. 288, 353;
-    movements of, after the Athenian disaster in Sicily, vii. 364;
-    applications from Eubœa and Lesbos to, B. C. 413, vii. 365;
-    overtures of peace from the Four Hundred to, viii. 44;
-    repulse of, by Thrasyllus, viii. 128;
-    fruitless attempt of, to surprise Athens, viii. 156;
-    invasions of Elis by, ix. 225 _seq._;
-    death of, ix. 241.
-
-  _Agis III._, ii. 387 _seq._, 127, 281 _seq._
-
-  _Aglaurion_, v. 117 _n._
-
-  _Agnonides_, xii. 351.
-
-  _Agones_ and festivals in honor of gods, i. 51.
-
-  _Agora_, Homeric, ii. 67 _seq._; and Boulê, ii. 75.
-
-  _Agoratus_, viii. 235, 240.
-
-  _Agrigentine_ generals, accusation and death of, x. 427.
-
-  _Agrigentines_, and Agathokles, xii. 404, 406, 425;
-    defeat of, by Leptines and Demophilus, xii. 440;
-    defeat of, by Leptines, xii. 441.
-
-  _Agrigentum_, iii. 366;
-    Phalaris of, iv. 378, v. 204;
-    and Syracuse, before B. C. 500, v. 205;
-    prisoners sent to, after the battle of Himera, v. 225;
-    and Syracuse, B. C. 446, vii. 126;
-    after the Theronian dynasty, vii. 127;
-    and Hannibal’s capture of Selinus, x. 408;
-    defensive preparations at, against Hannibal and Imilkon, x. 422;
-    strength, wealth, and population of, B. C. 406, x. 423 _seq._;
-    blockade and capture of, by the Carthaginians, x. 425 _seq._;
-    complaints against the Syracusan generals at, x. 427, 431,
-      433 _seq._;
-    declaration of, against Dionysius, xi. 6;
-    Timoleon and the fresh colonization of, xi. 187;
-    siege of, by Agathokles, xii. 406.
-
-  _Agylla_, plunder of the temple at, xi. 25.
-
-  _Agyrium_, Dionysius and Magon at, ix. 7.
-
-  _Agyrrhius_, ix. 368.
-
-  _Ajax_, son of Telamôn, i. 187, 299.
-
-  _Ajax_, son of Oïleus, i. 189, 305, 310.
-
-  _Akanthus_, iv. 25;
-    march of Xerxes to, v. 43;
-    induced by Brasidas to revolt from Athens, vi. 406 _seq._;
-    speech of Brasidas at, ix. 193 _seq._;
-    opposition of, to the Olynthian confederacy, x. 52 _seq._, 57.
-
-  _Akarnan_ and Amphoterus, i. 282.
-
-  _Akarnania_, Demosthenês in, B. C. 426, vi. 296;
-    expedition of Agesilaus against, ix. 354.
-
-  _Akarnanians_, ii. 292 _seq._, iii. 407 _seq._;
-    and Athens, alliance between, vi. 120;
-    under Demosthenês save Naupaktus, vi. 303;
-    and Amphilochians, pacific treaty of, with the Ambrakiots, vi. 311.
-
-  _Akastus_, wife of, and Pêleus, i. 114.
-
-  _Akesines_, crossed by Alexander, xii. 230.
-
-  _Akræ_ in Sicily, iii. 366.
-
-  _Akragas_, iii. 366.
-
-  _Akrisois_, Danaê and Perseus, i. 89 _seq._
-
-  _Akrotatus_, xii. 404.
-
-  _Aktæôn_, i. 260.
-
-  _Aktê_, Brasidas in, vi. 421.
-
-  _Akusilaus_, his treatment of mythes, i. 390.
-
-  _Alæsa_, foundation of, x. 469.
-
-  _Alalia_, Phokæan colony at, iv. 205.
-
-  _Alazônes_, iii. 239.
-
-  _Alcyone_ and Kêyx, i. 135.
-
-  _Alêtês_, ii. 9.
-
-  _Aleus_, i. 176.
-
-  _Alexander of Macedon_, and Greeks at Tempê, on Xerxes’s invasion,
-      v. 69;
-    embassy of, to Athens, v. 150 _seq._;
-    and the Athenians before the battle of Platæa, v. 151.
-
-  _Alexander the Great_, his visit to Ilium, i. 326, xii. 69;
-    successors of, and Ilium, i. 326;
-    comparison between the invasion of, and that of Xerxes, v. 240;
-    birth of, xi. 241;
-    at the battle of Chæroneia, xi. 500;
-    quarrels of, with his father, xi. 513, xii. 3;
-    accession of, xi. 517, xii. 1, 7;
-    character, education, and early political action of, xii. 2 _seq._;
-    uncertain position of, during the last year of Philip, xii. 5;
-    Amyntas put to death by, xii. 8;
-    march of, into Greece, B. C. 336, xii. 11;
-    chosen Imperator of the Greeks, xii. 13;
-    convention at Corinth under, B. C. 336, xii. 13;
-    authority claimed by, under the convention at Corinth, xii. 15;
-    violations of the convention at Corinth by, xii. 16 _seq._;
-    expedition of, into Thrace, xii. 22 _seq._, 25, _n._;
-    embassy of Gauls to, xii. 26;
-    victories of, over Kleitus and the Illyrians, xii. 27 _seq._;
-    revolt of Thebes against, xii. 29 _seq._;
-    march of, from Thrace to Thebes, xii. 36;
-    capture and destruction of Thebes by, xii. 37 _seq._;
-    demands the surrender of anti-Macedonian leaders at Athens, xii. 45;
-    at Corinth, B. C. 335, xii. 48;
-    and Diogenes, xii. 48;
-    reconstitution of Bœotia by, xii. 48;
-    Grecian history a blank in the reign of, xii. 50;
-    connection of his Asiatic conquests with Grecian history, xii. 50,
-      179 _seq._;
-    Pan-Hellenic pretences of, xii. 51;
-    analogy of his relation to the Greeks with those of Napoleon to the
-      Confederation of the Rhine, xii. 51, 52 _n._;
-    military endowments of, xii. 52;
-    military changes in Greece during the sixty years before the
-      accession of, xii. 53 _seq._;
-    measures of, before going to Asia, xii. 67;
-    his march to the Hellespont and passage to Asia, xii. 69, 78;
-    analogy of, to the Greek heroes, xii. 71;
-    review of his army in Asia, xii. 72;
-    Macedonian officers of his army in Asia, xii. 73;
-    Greeks in his service in Asia, xii. 74;
-    defensive preparation of Darius against, xii. 76;
-    victory of, at the Granikus, xii. 81 _seq._;
-    submission of the Asiatics to, after the battle of the Granikus,
-      xii. 89;
-    and Mithrines, xii. 90, 207;
-    capture of Ephesus by, xii. 90;
-    capture of Miletus by, xii. 92 _seq._;
-    debate of, with Parmenio at Miletus, xii. 92;
-    disbands his fleet, xii. 94;
-    capture of Halikarnassus by, xii. 94 _seq._;
-    conquest of Lykia, Pamphylia, and Pisidia by, xii. 99;
-    at Kelænæ, xii. 101;
-    cuts the Gordian knot, xii. 104;
-    refuses to liberate the Athenians captured at the Granikus,
-      xii. 105;
-    subjugation of Paphlagonia and Kappadokia by, xii. 111;
-    passes Mount Taurus and enters Tarsus, xii. 111 _seq._;
-    operations of, in Kilikia, xii. 113;
-    march of, from Kilikia to Myriandrus, xii. 114;
-    return of, from Myriandrus, xii. 117;
-    victory of, at Issus, xii. 118 _seq._;
-    his courteous treatment of Darius’s mother, wife and family,
-      xii. 124, 153;
-    his treatment of Greeks taken at Damascus, xii. 129;
-    in Phœnicia, xii. 130 _seq._, 150;
-    his correspondence with Darius, xii. 130, 140;
-    siege and capture of Tyre by, xii. 132 _seq._;
-    surrender of the princes of Cyprus to, xii. 138;
-    his march towards Egypt, xii. 141, 142, 145;
-    siege and capture of Gaza by, xii. 142 _seq._;
-    his cruelty to Batis, xii. 145;
-    in Egypt, xii. 146 _seq._;
-    crosses the Euphrates at Thapsakus, xii. 150;
-    fords the Tigris, xii. 151;
-    continence of, xii. 158 _n._ 2;
-    victory of, at Arbela, xii. 155 _seq._;
-    surrender of Susa and Babylon to, xii. 168;
-    his march from Susa to Persepolis, xii. 171;
-    at Persepolis, xii. 172 _seq._;
-    subjugation of Persis by, xii. 177;
-    at Ekbatana, xii. 181, 246 _seq._;
-    sends home the Thessalian cavalry, xii. 181;
-    pursues Darius into Parthia, xii. 181 _seq._;
-    disappointment of, in not taking Darius alive, xii. 186;
-    Asiatizing tendencies of, xii. 188, 215, 267;
-    at Hekatompylus, xii. 187;
-    in Hyrkania, xii. 188;
-    his treatment of the Grecian mercenaries and envoys with Darius,
-      xii. 188, 189;
-    in Aria and Drangiana, xii. 189 _seq._, 200;
-    Parmenio and Philotas put to death by, xii. 190 _seq._;
-    in Gedrosia, xii. 200, 236;
-    foundation of Alexandria ad Caucasum by, xii. 200;
-    in Baktria and Sogdiana, xii. 201 _seq._;
-    and Bessus, 12, 202, 208;
-    massacre of the Branchidæ by, xii. 203 _seq._;
-    at Marakanda, xii. 204, 207 _seq._;
-    and the Scythians, xii. 206, 213;
-    Kleitus killed by, xii. 208 _seq._, 213, 216 _seq._, 222 _seq._;
-    capture of the Sogdian rock and the rock of Choriênes by, xii. 214;
-    and Roxana, xii. 214, 215;
-    and Kallisthenes, conspiracy of royal pages against, xii. 221;
-    reduces the country between Hindoo Koosh and the Indus,
-      xii. 225 _seq._;
-    crosses the Indus and the Hydaspes, and defeats Porus,
-      xii. 227 _seq._, 228 _n._ 2, and _n._ 1 page 229;
-    conquests of, in the Punjab, xii. 227 _seq._;
-    refusal of his army to march farther, xii. 231;
-    voyage of, down the Hydaspes and the Indus, xii. 234;
-    wounded in attacking the Malli, xii. 234;
-    posts on the Indus established by, xii. 235;
-    his bacchanalian procession thro’ Karmania, xii. 236;
-    and the tomb of Cyrus the Great, xii. 237;
-    satraps of, xii. 239 _seq._;
-    discontents and mutiny of his Macedonian soldiers, xii. 241 _seq._;
-    Asiatic levies of, xii. 243;
-    sails down the Pasitigris and up the Tigris to Opis, xii. 243;
-    partial disbanding of his Macedonian soldiers by, xii. 245;
-    preparations of, for the conquest and circumnavigation of Asia,
-      xii. 245, 250;
-    his grief for the death of Hephæstion, xii. 247, 253;
-    extermination of the Kossæi by, xii. 248;
-    his last visit to Babylon, xii. 248 _seq._;
-    numerous embassies to, B. C. 323, xii. 248;
-    his sail on the Euphrates, xii. 250;
-    his incorporation of Persians in the Macedonian phalanx, xii. 251;
-    his despatch to Kleomenes, xii. 253;
-    forebodings and suspicion of, at Babylon, xii. 253, 254 _n._ 3;
-    illness and death of, xii. 254 _seq._;
-    rumored poisoning of, xii. 256 _n._ 2;
-    sentiments excited by the career and death of, xii. 258 _seq._;
-    probable achievements of, if he had lived longer, xii. 259 _seq._;
-    character of, as a ruler, xii. 261 _seq._;
-    absence of nationality in, xii. 264;
-    Livy’s opinion as to his chances, if he had attacked the Romans,
-      xii. 260;
-    unrivalled excellence of, as a military man, xii. 261;
-    not the intentional diffuser of Hellenic culture, xii. 265 _seq._;
-    cities founded in Asia by, xii. 267;
-    Asia not Hellenized by, xii. 269;
-    increased intercommunication produced by the conquests of,
-      xii. 272 _seq._;
-    his interest in science and literature, xii. 274;
-    state of the Grecian world when he crossed the Hellespont, xii. 275;
-    possibility of emancipating Greece during his earlier Asiatic
-      campaigns, xii. 276;
-    his rescript directing the recall of Grecian exiles,
-      xii. 310 _seq._;
-    his family and generals, after his death, xii. 319 _seq._;
-    partition of the empire of, xii. 319, 337;
-    list of projects entertained by, at the time of his death, xii. 320.
-
-  _Alexander_, son of Alexander the Great, xii. 333, 340, 342, 366, 367,
-      371.
-
-  _Alexander_, son of Polysperchon, xii. 366, 368, 369.
-
-  _Alexander_, son of Kassander, xii. 389.
-
-  _Alexander_, king of the Molossians, xii. 396 _seq._
-
-  _Alexander_, son of Amyntas, x. 248, 249.
-
-  _Alexander of Epirus_, marriage of, xi. 515.
-
-  _Alexander_, the Lynkestian, xi. 517 _seq._
-
-  _Alexander of Pheræ_, x. 248;
-    expeditions of Pelopidas against, x. 248, 263, 303, 307 _seq._,
-      309 _n._ 3;
-    seizure of Pelopidas and Ismenias by, x. 282 _seq._;
-    release of Pelopidas and Ismenias by, x. 285;
-    subdued by the Thebans, x. 309 _seq._;
-    naval hostilities of, against Athens, x. 370;
-    cruelties and assassination of, xi. 203 _seq._
-
-  _Alexandreia Trôas_, i. 326.
-
-  _Alexandria_ in Egypt, xii. 146;
-    ad Caucasum, xii. 200;
-    in Ariis, and in Arachosia, xii. 200 _n._ 4;
-    ad Jaxartem, xii. 205, 206.
-
-  _Alexandrine_ chronology from the return of the Herakleids to the
-      first Olympiad, ii. 304.
-
-  _Alexiklês_, viii. 64, 67, 68.
-
-  _Alkæus_, Herodotus’s mistake about, iii. 155 _n._;
-    his flight from battle, iii. 199;
-    opposition of, to Pittakus, iii. 199, iv., 90 _seq._;
-    collected works of, iv. 90 _n._ 4;
-    subjective character of his poetry, i. 363.
-
-  _Alkamenês_, son of Têleklus, ii. 420.
-
-  _Alkamenês_, appointment of, to go to Lesbos, vii. 365;
-    defeat and death of, vii. 369.
-
-  _Alkestis_ and Admêtus, i. 113 _seq._
-
-  _Alketas_, x. 139, 147 _n._, 153, xi. 54.
-
-  _Alkibiades_, reputed oration of Androkidês against, iv. 151, _n._ 3,
-      vi. 7, _n._ 2;
-    alleged duplication of the tribute-money of Athenian allies by,
-      vi. 7, _n._ 2;
-    at the battle of Delium, v. 397;
-    education and character of, vii. 30 _seq._;
-    and Sokratês, vii. 35 _seq._;
-    conflicting sentiments entertained towards, vii. 40;
-    attempts of, to revive his family tie with Sparta, vii. 42;
-    early politics of, vii. 42;
-    adoption of anti-Laconian politics by, vii. 43;
-    attempt of, to ally Argos with Athens, B. C. 420, vii. 43;
-    trick of, upon the Lacedæmonian envoys, vii. 46 _seq._;
-    display of, at the Olympic festival, vii. 53 _seq._, 59 _n._;
-    intra-Peloponnesian policy of, B. C. 419, vii. 62 _seq._;
-    expedition of, into the interior of Peloponnesus, B. C. 419,
-      vii. 63;
-    at Argos, B. C. 418, vii. 75, and B. C. 416, vii. 98;
-    and Nikias, projected contention of ostracism between,
-      vii. 104 _seq._;
-    his support of the Egestæan envoys at Athens, B. C. 416, vii. 146;
-    and the Sicilian expedition, vii. 148, 152 _seq._, 160 _seq._;
-    attack upon, in connection with the mutilation of the Hermæ,
-      vii. 175, 207 _seq._;
-    the Eleusinian mysteries and, vii. 175 _seq._, 211 _seq._;
-      viii. 150;
-    plan of action in Sicily proposed by, vii. 191;
-    at Messênê in Sicily, vii. 193;
-    at Katana, vii. 193;
-    recall of, to take his trial, vii. 195, 211 _seq._;
-    escape and condemnation of, vii. 211 _seq._, 235 _n._ 2;
-    at Sparta, vii. 235 _seq._;
-    Lacedæmonians persuaded by, to send aid to Chios, vii. 367;
-    expedition of, to Chios, vii. 370 _seq._;
-    revolt of Milêtus from Athens, caused by, vii. 375;
-    order from Sparta to kill, viii. 2;
-    escape of, to Tissaphernês, viii. 3;
-    advice of, to Tissaphernês, viii. 3;
-    acts as interpreter between Tissaphernês and the Greeks,
-      viii. 5 _seq._;
-    oligarchical conspiracy of, with the Athenian officers at Samos,
-      viii. 6 _seq._;
-    counter manœuvres of, against Phrynichus, viii. 12;
-    proposed restoration of, to Athens, viii. 12, 13;
-    negotiations of, with Peisander, viii. 15, 20 _seq._;
-    and the Athenian democracy at Samos, viii. 49 _seq._, 51, 52 _seq._;
-    at Aspendus, viii. 100;
-    return of, from Aspendus to Samos, viii. 116;
-    arrival of, at the Hellespont, from Samos, viii. 117;
-    arrest of Tissaphernês by, viii. 120;
-    escape of, from Sardis, viii. 120;
-    and the Athenian fleet, at the Bosphorus, viii. 126;
-    attack upon Chalkêdon by, viii. 126;
-    occupation of Chrysopolis by, viii. 127;
-    and Thrasyllus, at the Hellespont, viii. 130;
-    capture of Chalkêdon by, viii. 132;
-    and Pharnabazus, viii. 133;
-    proceedings of, in Thrace and Asia, B. C. 407, viii. 144;
-    return of, to Athens, B. C. 407, viii. 145 _seq._;
-    expedition of, to Asia, B. C. 407, viii. 150 _seq._;
-    dissatisfaction of the armament at Samos with, viii. 153;
-    accusations against, at Athens, B. C. 407, viii. 153;
-    alteration of sentiment towards, at Athens, B. C. 407,
-      viii. 156 _seq._;
-    and Nikias, different behavior of the Athenians towards, viii. 158;
-    dismissal of, from his command, B. C. 407, viii. 158;
-    at Ægospotami, viii. 217;
-    position and views of, in Asia, after the battle of Ægospotami,
-      viii. 313 _seq._;
-    assassination of, viii. 314 _seq._;
-    character of, viii. 316 _seq._
-
-  _Alkidas_, vi. 237, 239 _seq._, 266 _seq._
-
-  _Alkmæôn_, i. 278 _seq._
-
-  _Alkmæônids_, curse, trial, and condemnation of, iii. 82;
-    proceedings of, against Hippias, iv. 120;
-    rebuilding of Delphian temple by, iv. 121;
-    false imputation of treachery on at the battle of Marathon, iv. 356;
-    demand of Sparta for the expulsion of, vi. 97.
-
-  _Alkman_, iv. 77, 82, 85 _seq._
-
-  _Alkmênê_, i. 91.
-
-  _Allegorical_ interpretation of mythes, i. 418 _seq._, 425, 436.
-
-  _Allegory_ rarely admissible in the interpretation of mythes, i. 2.
-
-  _Alôids_, the, i. 136.
-
-  _Alos_, sanguinary rites at, i. 125.
-
-  _Althæa_ and the burning brand, i. 144.
-
-  _Althæmenês_, founder of Rhodes, ii. 30.
-
-  _Althæmenês_ and Katreus, i. 224.
-
-  _Alyattês_ and Kyaxarês, iii. 230;
-    war of, with Milêtus, iii. 255 _seq._;
-    sacrilege committed by, iii. 256;
-    long reign, death and sepulchre of, iii. 257.
-
-  _Amaltheia_, the horn of, i. 150.
-
-  _Amanus_, Mount, march of Darius to, xii. 115.
-
-  _Amasis_, iii. 328 _seq._;
-    death of, iv. 229.
-
-  _Amasis_ and Polykratês, iv. 241.
-
-  _Amastris_, xii. 467 _seq._
-
-  _Amazons_, legend of, i. 209 _seq._
-
-  _Ambrakia_, iii. 404, 405.
-
-  _Ambrakiots_, attack of, upon Amphilokian Argos, vi. 180;
-    attack of upon Akarnania, vi. 192 _seq._;
-    projected attack of, on Amphilochian Argos, vi. 302;
-    defeat of, at Olpæ, vi. 304;
-    Menedæus’s desertion of, vi. 305 _seq._;
-    Demosthenês’s victory over, vi. 307 _seq._;
-    pacific convention of, with the Akarnanians and Amphilochians,
-      vi. 311.
-
-  _Ambrysus_, re-fortification of, xi. 494.
-
-  _Ammon_, Alexander’s visit to the oracle of, xii. 147.
-
-  _Amnesty_ decreed by Solon, iii. 98;
-    proposed by Patrokleidês, viii. 225;
-    at Athens, B. C. 403, viii. 293, 299 _seq._
-
-  _Amompharetus_, v. 174 _seq._
-
-  _Amorgês_, vii. 375;
-    capture of, vii. 388.
-
-  _Amphiaraus_, i. 272, 275.
-
-  _Amphiktyon_, i. 98, 99, 103.
-
-  _Amphiktyonic assembly_, i. 100, ii. 243 _seq._, xi. 241;
-    condemnation of Sparta by, x. 202 _seq._;
-    accusation of Thebes against Sparta before, xi. 242;
-    accusation of Thebes against Phokis before, xi. 243;
-    resistance of Phokis to, xi. 244 _seq._;
-    sentence of, against the Phokians, and honors conferred upon Philip
-      by, xi. 425, 429;
-    at Delphi, B. C. 339, xi. 470 _seq._
-
-  _Amphiktyonies_, or exclusive religious partnerships, ii. 243 _seq._,
-      248.
-
-  _Amphiktyons_, punishment of the Kirrhæans by, iv. 61;
-    establishment of the Pythian games by, iv. 63;
-    violent measures of, against the Amphissians, xi. 474 _seq._
-
-  _Amphiktyony_ at Kalauria, i. 133.
-
-  _Amphilochian Argos_, Eurylochus’s projected attack upon, vi. 302.
-
-  _Amphilochians_ and Akarnanians, pacific treaty of, with the
-      Ambrakiots, vi. 211.
-
-  _Amphilochus_, i. 278;
-    wanderings of, i. 313.
-
-  _Amphiôn and Zethus_, i. 263 _seq._;
-    Homeric legend of, i. 257.
-
-  _Amphipolis_, foundation of, vi. 11 _seq._;
-    acquisition of, by Brasidas, vi. 406 _seq._;
-    proceedings of Brasidas in, vi. 420;
-    policy of Kleon and Nikias for the recovery of, vi. 457 _seq._;
-    Kleon’s expedition against, vi. 462 _seq._;
-    topography of, vi. 464 _seq._;
-    battle of, vi. 471 _seq._;
-    negotiations for peace after the battle of, vi. 489;
-    not restored to Athens, on the peace of, Nikias, vii. 4;
-    neglect of, by the Athenians, vii. 104, xi. 215;
-    claim of Athens to, x. 245 _seq._, 294;
-    Iphikrates at, x. 251, 299;
-    failure of Timotheus at, x. 301;
-    nine defeats of the Athenians at, x. 302 _n._ 2;
-    Kallisthenes at, x. 370;
-    Philip renounces his claim to, xi. 212;
-    siege and capture of, by Philip, xi. 232 _seq._;
-    Philip’s dealings with the Athenians respecting, xi. 235.
-
-  _Amphissa_, capture of, by Philip, xi. 497.
-
-  _Amphissians_, accusation of, against Athens, xi. 470 _seq._;
-    violent proceedings of the Amphiktyons against, xi. 473 _seq._
-
-  _Amphitryôn_, i. 91.
-
-  _Amphoterus_ and Akarnan, i. 283.
-
-  _Amyklæ_, ii. 327;
-    conquest of, ii. 419.
-
-  _Amykus_, i. 169.
-
-  _Amyntas_, and the Peisistratids, iv. 19.
-
-  _Amyntas, father of Philip_, x. 48 _seq._, 243 _seq._;
-    and the Olynthian confederacy, x. 50, 56, 58, 65;
-    and Iphikrates, x. 108;
-    and Athens, x. 243, 245;
-    death of, x. 243;
-    assistance of Iphikrates to the family of, x. 250.
-
-  _Amyntas_, son of Antiochus, xii. 9, 116, 125.
-
-  _Amyntas_, son of Perdikkas, xii. 8.
-
-  _Anaktorium_, iii. 402 _seq._, vi. 360.
-
-  _Anaphê_, i. 240.
-
-  _Anapus_, crossing of, by Dion, xi. 91.
-
-  _Anaxagoras_, vi. 101.
-
-  _Anaxandrides_, bigamy of, ii. 386.
-
-  _Anaxarchus_ of Abdera, xii. 213, 215, 217.
-
-  _Anaxibius_, ix. 150 _seq._, 156 _seq._;
-    in the Hellespont, ix. 369;
-    death of, ix. 371 _seq._
-
-  _Anaxikratês_, v. 335.
-
-  _Anaxilaus_, v. 211, 230.
-
-  _Anaximander_, iv. 381 _seq._
-
-  _Anaximenês_ of Lampsakus, i. 409.
-
-  _Andokidês_, reputed oration of, against Alkibiadês, iv. 151 _n._ 1,
-      vi. 6 _n._ 1;
-    de Mysteriis, iv. 123 _n._ 3;
-    and the mutilation of, the Hermæ, vii. 196, 200 _seq._
-
-  _Androgeos_, death of, i. 211.
-
-  _Androklus_, iii. 175.
-
-  _Andromachê_ and Helenus, i. 305.
-
-  _Andromachus_, xi. 146.
-
-  _Andrôn_, story of, respecting Krête, ii. 29.
-
-  _Andros_, siege of, by Themistoklês, v. 141;
-    siege of, by Alkibiadês and Konon, viii. 151.
-
-  _Animals_, worship of, in Egypt, iii. 319.
-
-  _Ankæus_, i. 177.
-
-  _Antalkidas_, embassy of, to Tiribazus, ix. 374 _seq._;
-    embassies of, to Persia, ix. 383, x. 157;
-    in the Hellespont, ix. 384;
-    the peace of, ix. 385 _seq._, x. 1 _seq._
-
-  _Antandrus_, expulsion of Arsakes from, viii. 114;
-    the Syracusans at, x. 386.
-
-  _Ante-Hellenic_ inhabitants of Greece, ii. 261;
-    colonies from Phœnicia and Egypt not probable, ii. 267.
-
-  _Antênôr_, i. 304, 315.
-
-  _Antigonê_, i. 276.
-
-  _Antigonus_ and Perdikkas, xii. 334;
-    and Eumenes, xii. 338;
-    great power of, xii. 367;
-    alliance of Kassander, Lysimachus and Ptolemy against, xii. 367,
-      372, 383, 387;
-    measures of, against Kassander, xii. 369, 370;
-    pacification of, with Kassander, Lysimachus, and Ptolemy, xii. 371;
-    Roxana and her son Alexander put to death by, xii. 371;
-    murders Kleopatra, sister of Alexander, xii. 372;
-    Athenian envoys sent to, xii. 380; death of, xii. 387.
-
-  _Antigonus_ Gonatas, xii. 390.
-
-  _Antilochus_, death of, i. 298.
-
-  _Antimachus_ of Kolophon, i. 268.
-
-  _Antiochus_ at Samos and Notium, viii. 152, 153.
-
-  _Antiochus_, the Arcadian, x. 280.
-
-  _Antiopê_, i. 257 _seq._
-
-  _Antipater_, embassy of, from Philip to Athens, xi. 386, 387, 390,
-      397, 401;
-    made viceroy of Macedonia, xii. 67, 68;
-    and Olympias, xii. 68, 254;
-    defeat of Agis by, xii. 284;
-    submission of all Greece to, xii. 285;
-    Grecian hostilities against, after Alexander’s death,
-      xii. 313 _seq._;
-    and Kraterus, xii. 321 _seq._, 335;
-    victory of, at Krannon, xii. 321, 322;
-    terms imposed upon Athens by, xii. 324 _seq._;
-    remodels the Peloponnesian cities, xii. 332;
-    contest and pacification of, with the Ætolians, xii. 332;
-    made guardian of Alexander’s family, xii. 337;
-    death of, xii. 338;
-    last directions of, xii. 339.
-
-  _Antipater_, son of Kassander, xii. 389.
-
-  _Antiphilus_, xii. 319, 321.
-
-  _Antiphon_, viii. 18, 30 _seq._, 57 _seq._, 78 _seq._
-
-  _Antiquity_, Grecian, a religious conception, i. 445;
-    stripped of its religious character by chronology, i. 446.
-
-  _Antisthenês_, at Kaunus, vii. 397.
-
-  _Antistrophê_, introduction of, iv. 89.
-
-  _Anytus_, viii. 130, 242.
-
-  _Aornos_, rock of, xii. 225 _n._ 2, 227.
-
-  _Apatê_, i. 7.
-
-  _Apaturia_, excitement at the, after the battle of Arginusæ,
-      viii. 193 _seq._
-
-  _Aphareus_, i. 168, 169.
-
-  _Apheidas_, i. 176.
-
-  _Aphepsion_, and Mantitheus, vii. 200.
-
-  _Aphetæ_, Persian fleet at, v. 97, 98, 101.
-
-  _Aphroditê_, i. 5, 52.
-
-  _Apis_, i. 83.
-
-  _Apodektæ_, iv. 137.
-
-  _Apollo_, i. 10;
-    legends of, i. 45 _seq._, 50;
-    worship and functions of, i. 49 _seq._, iii. 168;
-    and Laomedon, i. 57, 285;
-    and Hermês, i. 59;
-    types of, i. 61;
-    and Admêtus, i. 113;
-    and Korônis, i. 176;
-    Sminthius, i. 337;
-    evidence of the Homeric Hymn to, as to early Ionic life, iii. 168;
-    temple of at Klarus, iii. 184;
-    reply of Delphian to the remonstrance of Crœsus, iv. 189.
-
-  _Apollodôrus_, his genealogy of Hellên, i. 106 _seq._
-
-  _Apollodôrus_ and the Theôric fund, xi. 348.
-
-  _Apollokratês_, xi. 105, 107, 117.
-
-  _Apollonia_, iii. 402 _seq._;
-    and the Illyrians, iv. 6 _seq._;
-    and the Olynthian confederacy, x. 52.
-
-  _Apollonides_, xii. 142, 149.
-
-  _Apriês_, reign and death of, iii. 323 _seq._
-
-  _Apsyrtus_, i. 238.
-
-  _Arabia_, Alexander’s projects with regard to, xii. 245, 250.
-
-  _Arachosia_, Alexander in, xii. 200.
-
-  _Aradus_, surrender of, to Alexander xii. 130.
-
-  _Arbela_, battle of, xii. 155 _seq._
-
-  _Arbitration_ at Athens, v. 354.
-
-  _Arcadia_, ii. 299;
-    state of, B. C. 560, ii. 441 _seq._;
-    and Sparta, ii. 444 _seq._, v. 315;
-    proceedings in, after the battle of Leuktra, x. 204 _seq._;
-    invasions of, by Archidamus, x. 265, 310 _seq._;
-    mission of Epaminondas to, x. 288;
-    dissensions in, x. 322 _seq._;
-    embassy of Æschines to, xi. 368.
-
-  _Arcadians_, ii. 301, 433 seq;
-    sympathy of, with Messenians, ii. 427;
-    impulse of towards a Pan-Arcadian union, x. 208;
-    application of, to Athens and Thebes, for aid against Sparta,
-      x. 213;
-    Epaminondas and the consolidation of, x. 215;
-    energetic action and insolence of, x. 259 _seq._;
-    envoy to Persia from, x. 278, 280;
-    protest of, against the headship of Thebes, x. 281;
-    alliance of Athens with, x. 287;
-    and Eleians, x. 314 _seq._, 323;
-    occupation and plunder of Olympia by, x. 314, 320 _seq._;
-    celebration of the Olympic games by, x. 318 _seq._;
-    seizure of, at Tegea, by the Theban harmost, x. 324 _seq._
-
-  _Archagathus_, xii. 438, 439, 443.
-
-  _Archêgelês_, Apollo, i. 50.
-
-  _Archelaus_, x. 46 _seq._;
-    siege of Pydna by, viii. 118.
-
-  _Archeptolemus_, viii. 84 _seq._
-
-  _Archias_, œkist of Syracuse, iii. 363.
-
-  _Archias_, the Theban, x. 82, 85.
-
-  _Archias_, the Exile-Hunter, xii. 326 _seq._
-
-  _Archidamus II._, speech of, against war with Athens, vi. 80 _seq._;
-    invasions of Attica by, vii. 126 _seq._, 152, 221;
-    his expedition to Platæa, vi. 185 _seq._
-
-  _Archidamus III._, invasions of Arcadia by, x. 265, 316 _seq._;
-    and the independence of Messênê, x. 291, 360;
-    and Philomelus, xi. 254;
-    expedition of, against Megalopolis, xi. 306;
-    aid to the Phokians at Thermopylæ under, xi. 419, 421; xii. 281,
-      394.
-
-  _Archilochus_, i. 362; iv. 26, 73, 76 _seq._
-
-  _Archinus_, decrees of, viii. 299, 308.
-
-  _Architects_ at Athens, under Periklês, vi. 20.
-
-  _Architecture_, Grecian, between B. C. 600-550, iv. 98.
-
-  _Archonides_, x. 469.
-
-  _Archons_ after Kodrus, iii. 49;
-    the nine, iii. 75;
-    judges without appeal till after Kleisthenês, iii. 129;
-    effect of Kleisthenês’s revolution on, iv. 137 _seq._, 142 _seq._;
-    limited functions of, after the Persian war, v. 276;
-    limitation of the functions of, by Periklês, v. 355, 358, 365.
-
-  _Ardys_, iii. 223.
-
-  _Areopagus, senate of_, iii. 73;
-    and the Ephetæ, iii. 79;
-    and the Eumenides of Æschylus, iii. 80 _n._;
-    powers of, enlarged by Solon, iii. 122;
-    under the Solonian and Kleisthenean constitutions, iv. 141;
-    in early Athens, v. 352 _seq._;
-    oligarchical tendencies of, v. 354;
-    venerable character and large powers of, v. 359;
-    at variance with the growing democratic sentiment, B. C. 480-460,
-      v. 361;
-    a centre of action for the oligarchical party, v. 361;
-    power of, abridged by Periklês and Ephialtês, v. 366 _seq._
-
-  _Arês_, i. 10.
-
-  _Aretê_, xi. 55, 56, 82, 129.
-
-  _Argadeis_, iii. 50.
-
-  _Argæus_ and Philip, xi. 212.
-
-  _Arganthonius_ and the Phokæans, iv. 199.
-
-  _Argeian_ Demos, proceedings of, vii. 99.
-
-  _Argeian_ genealogies, i. 81.
-
-  _Argeians_, attempts of, to recover Thyrea, ii. 447;
-    defeat and destruction of, by Kleomenês, iv. 321;
-    trick of, with their callendar, vii. 65;
-    Epidaurus, vii. 69, 70, 88;
-    at the battle within the Long Walls of Corinth, ix. 333;
-    manœuvres of, respecting the holy truce, ix. 344;
-    and the peace of Antalkidas, ix. 387;
-    and Mardonius, v. 157.
-
-  _Argês_, i. 5.
-
-  _Argilus_, acquisition of, by Brasidas, vi. 406 _seq._
-
-  _Arginusæ_, battle of, viii. 173 _seq._;
-    recall, impeachment, defence, and condemnation of the generals at
-      the battle of, viii. 181, 210;
-    inaction of the Athenian fleet after the battle of, viii. 215.
-
-  _Argô_, the, i. 231.
-
-  _Argonautic expedition_, i. 231 _seq._;
-    monuments of, i. 241 _seq._;
-    how and when attached to Kolchis, i. 251;
-    attempts to reconcile the, with geographical knowledge,
-      i. 254 _seq._;
-    continued faith in, i. 255;
-    Dr. Warton and M. Ginguené on the, i. 481 _n._
-
-  _Argos_, rise of, coincident with the decline of Mykênæ, i. 165;
-    occupation of, by the Dorians, ii. 6;
-    and neighboring Dorians greater than Sparta, in 776 B. C., ii. 307;
-    Dorian settlements in, ii. 308, 309, 311;
-    early ascendency of, ii. 312, 320;
-    subsequent decline of, ii. 321;
-    acquisitions of Sparta from, ii. 448 _seq._;
-    military classification at, ii. 460;
-    struggles of, to recover the headship of Greece, ii. 463 _seq._;
-    and Kleônæ, ii. 464;
-    victorious war of Sparta against, B. C. 496-5, iv. 221 _seq._;
-    prostration of, B. C. 496-5, iv. 324;
-    assistance of, to Ægina, v. 49;
-    neutrality of, on the invasion of Xerxes, v. 64 _seq._;
-    position of, on its alliance with Athens about B. C. 461,
-      v. 319 _seq._;
-    uncertain relations between Sparta and, B. C. 421, vii. 3;
-    position of, on the peace of Nikias, vii. 11 _seq._;
-    the Thousand-regiment at, vii. 11;
-    induced by the Corinthians to head a new Peloponnesian alliance,
-      B. C. 421, vii. 13;
-    joined by Matinea, vii. 14;
-    joined by the Corinthians, vii. 17, 19;
-    joined by Elis, vii. 19;
-    refusal of Tegea to join, vii. 20;
-    and Sparta, projected alliance between, vii. 24;
-    and Bœotia, projected alliance between, vii. 24 _seq._;
-    conclusion of a fifty years’ peace between Sparta and,
-      vii. 28 _seq._;
-    and Athens, alliance between, vii. 44, 51 _seq._;
-    embassy from, for alliance with Corinth, vii. 61;
-    attack of, upon Epidaurus, vii. 65, 69;
-    invasion of, by the Lacedæmonians and their allies, B. C. 418,
-      vii. 71 _seq._;
-    Alkibiadês at, B. C. 418, vii. 75;
-    political change at, through the battle of Mantinea, B. C. 418,
-      vii. 89 _seq._;
-    treaty of peace between Sparta and, B. C. 418, vii. 92 _seq._;
-    alliance between Sparta and, B. C. 418, vii. 94;
-    renounces alliance with Athens, Elis and Mantinea, vii. 94;
-    oligarchical revolution at, vii, 96, 97;
-    restoration of democracy at, vii. 100;
-    renewed alliance of, with Athens, vii. 101;
-    Alkibiadês at, B. C. 416, vii. 101;
-    Lacedæmonian intervention in behalf of the oligarchy at, vii. 101,
-      102;
-    envoys from, to the Athenian Demos at Samos, viii. 53;
-    alliance of, with Thebes, Athens, and Corinth, against Sparta,
-      ix. 284;
-    consolidation of Corinth with, ix. 332;
-    expedition of Agesipolis against, ix. 355 _seq._;
-    violent intestine feud at, x. 199 _seq._
-
-  _Argos, Amphilochian_, capture of, by Phormio, vi. 121;
-    attack of Ambrakiots on, vi. 180;
-    Eurylochus’s projected attack upon, vi. 302.
-
-  _Argus_, destruction of Argeians in the grove of, iv. 321.
-
-  _Aria_, Alexander in, xii. 189.
-
-  _Ariadnê_, i. 220 _seq._
-
-  _Ariæus_, flight of, after the battle of Kunaxa, ix. 47;
-    and Klearchus, ix. 52, 54;
-    and the Greeks after the battle of Kunaxa, ix. 54, 56, 62, 78.
-
-  _Aridæus_, Philip, xii. 319, 320, 334.
-
-  _Ariobarzanes_, intervention of, in Greece, x. 261;
-    revolt of, x. 294 _seq._;
-    at the Susian Gates, xii. 171;
-    death of, xii. 172.
-
-  _Arion_, iv. 78 _seq._
-
-  _Aristagoras_ and Megabatês, iv. 284;
-    revolt of, iv. 285 _seq._, 292;
-    application of, to Sparta, iv. 286 _seq._;
-    application of, to Athens, iv. 289;
-    march of, to Sardis, iv. 290;
-    desertion of the Ionic revolt by, iv. 296 _seq._
-
-  _Aristarchus_, the Athenian, viii. 82.
-
-  _Aristarchus_, the Lacedæmonian, ix. 164 _seq._
-
-  _Aristeidês_, constitutional change introduced by, iv. 145;
-    character of, iv. 338 _seq._;
-    elected general, iv. 341;
-    banishment of, by ostracism, v. 50;
-    and Themistoklês, rivalry between, v. 50, 273;
-    restoration of, from banishment, v. 110;
-    joins the Greek fleet at Salamis, v. 130;
-    slaughters the Persians at Psyttaleia, v. 136;
-    equitable assessment of, upon the allied Greeks, v. 264 _seq._;
-    popularity of, after the Persian war, v. 278;
-    death and poverty of, v. 289.
-
-  _Aristeus_, vi. 70, 73 _seq._ 182.
-
-  _Aristo_ and Agêtus, iv. 326.
-
-  _Aristocrats_, Grecian, bad morality of, vi. 287.
-
-  _Aristodêmus_, ii. 2 _seq._
-
-  _Aristodêmus_, king of Messenia, ii. 476.
-
-  _Aristodêmus Malakus_, iii. 359.
-
-  _Aristodêmus_, “the coward”, v. 94, 188.
-
-  _Aristodêmus_, the actor, xi. 373.
-
-  _Aristodikus_, iv. 201.
-
-  _Aristogeitôn_ and Harmodius, iv. 111 _seq._
-
-  _Aristoklês_ and Hipponoidas, vii. 85, 89.
-
-  _Aristokratês_, king of Orchomenus, ii. 428, 437.
-
-  _Aristokratês_, the Athenian, vii. 368.
-
-  _Aristomachê_, x. 480.
-
-  _Aristomenês_, ii. 421, 428 _seq._
-
-  _Aristonikus_ of Methymna, xii. 142, 149.
-
-  _Aristophanês_, viii. 327;
-    his reason for showing up Sokratês, viii. 408;
-    his attack upon the alleged impiety of Sokratês, i. 400 _n._;
-    and Kleon, vi. 482 _seq._, 488.
-
-  _Aristoteles_ the Spartan, xi. 2.
-
-  _Aristotle_ on Spartan women, ii. 387;
-    on the Spartan laws of property, ii. 408;
-    meaning of the word Sophist in, viii. 354;
-    formal logic of, viii. 429;
-    novelties ascribed to Sokratês by, viii. 424;
-    and Hermeias, xi. 441, 441 _n._;
-    instruction of Alexander by, xii. 3;
-    and Alexander, political views of, compared, xii. 265 _seq._
-
-  _Aristoxenus_, of Tarentum, xi. 154.
-
-  _Aristus_ and Nikoteles, x. 466.
-
-  _Arkas_ and Kallisto, i. 175.
-
-  _Arkesilaus_ the Second, iv. 40;
-    the Third, iv. 45 _seq._
-
-  _Arktinus_, Æthiopis of, ii. 156.
-
-  _Armenia_, the Ten Thousand Greeks in, ix. 95 _seq._
-
-  _Armenus_, i. 242.
-
-  _Arnold_, his edition of Thucydides, viii. 106 _n._
-
-  _Arrhibæus_, vi. 400, 440, 443 _seq._
-
-  _Arrian_ on the Amazons, i. 216 _seq._;
-    conjecture of, respecting Geryôn, i. 249;
-    on Darius’s plan against Alexander, xii. 110.
-
-  _Arsakes_ at Antandrus, viii. 114.
-
-  _Arsames_, xii. 112.
-
-  _Arsinoê_, xii. 469 _seq._
-
-  _Arsites_, xii. 78, 80.
-
-  _Art_, Grecian. iv. 98 _seq._
-
-  _Artabanus_, v. 8 _seq._
-
-  _Artabazus, Xerxes’s general_, siege of Potidæa and Olynthus by,
-      v. 142;
-    jealousy of, against Mardonius, v. 160;
-    conduct of, at and after the battle of Platæa, v. 180, 182;
-    and Pausanias, v. 254, 268.
-
-  _Artabazus, satrap of Daskylium_, xi. 230, 257, 300.
-
-  _Artabazus, Darius’s general_, xii. 183, 184, 188.
-
-  _Artaphernês, satrap of Sardis_, Hippias’s application to, iv. 277;
-    and Histiæus, iv. 298, 309;
-    proceedings of, after the conquest of Ionia, iv. 311;
-    and Datis, Persian armament under, iv. 329;
-    return of, to Asia, after the battle of Marathon, iv. 362.
-
-  _Artaphernês, the Persian envoy_, vi. 360 _seq._
-
-  _Artaxerxes Longimanus_, v. 285 _seq._, vi. 361 _seq._
-
-  _Artaxerxes Mnemon_, accession of, ix. 7;
-    and Cyrus the Younger, viii. 312; ix. 7, 42 _seq._;
-    at Kunaxa, ix. 42 _seq._, 48, 52;
-    death of, x. 366.
-
-  _Artayktês_, v. 198 _seq._
-
-  _Artemis_, i. 10;
-    worship of, in Asia, iii. 170.
-
-  _Artemis_ Limnatis, temple of, ii. 424.
-
-  _Artemisia_, v. 119, 133, 139.
-
-  _Artemisium_, resolution of Greeks to oppose Xerxes at, v. 71;
-    Greek fleet at, v. 79, 80, 97 _seq._;
-    sea-fight off, v. 99, 101;
-    retreat of the Greek fleet from, to Salamis, v. 102.
-
-  _Arthur_, romances of, i. 476.
-
-  _Artisans_, at Athens, iii. 136 _seq._
-
-  _Arts_, rudimentary state of, in Homeric and Hesiodic Greece, ii. 116.
-
-  _Aryandes_, Persian satrap of Egypt, iv. 47.
-
-  _Asia_, twelve Ionic cities in, iii. 172 _seq._;
-    Æolic cities in, iii. 190 _seq._;
-    collective civilization in, without individual freedom or
-      development, iii. 303;
-    state of, before the Persian monarchy, iv. 182;
-    conquests of Cyrus the Great in, iv. 209;
-    expedition of Greek fleet against, B. C. 478, v. 253;
-    Alkibiadês in, viii. 144, 153 _seq._, 311 _seq._;
-    expedition of Timotheus to, x. 252, 294 _seq._;
-    Agesilaus in, x. 294, 296;
-    measures of Alexander before going to, xii. 67;
-    passage of Alexander to, xii. 69;
-    review of Alexander’s army in, xii. 72;
-    cities founded by Alexander in, xii. 267;
-    Hellenized by the Diadochi, not by Alexander, xii. 269;
-    how far really Hellenized, xii. 270.
-
-  _Asia Minor_, Greeks in, ii. 235;
-    non-Hellenic people of, iii. 203, 205 _seq._;
-    features of the country of, iii. 205;
-    Phrygian music and worship among Greeks in, iii. 212;
-    predominance of female influence in the legends of, iii. 222;
-    Cimmerian invasion of, iii. 245 _seq._;
-    conquest of, by the Persians, iv. 201;
-    arrival of Cyrus the Younger in, viii. 135, 137.
-
-  _Asia, Upper_, Scythian invasion of, iii. 253.
-
-  _Asiatic_ customs and religion blended with Hellenic in the Trôad,
-      i. 338.
-
-  _Asiatic Dorians_, iii. 201, 202.
-
-  _Asiatic_ frenzy grafted on the joviality of the Grecian Dionysia,
-      i. 35.
-
-  _Asiatic Greece_, deposition of despots of, by Aristagoras, iv. 245.
-
-  _Asiatic Greeks_, conquest of, by Crœsus, iii. 259 _seq._;
-    state of, after Cyrus’s conquest of Lydia, iv. 198;
-    application of, to Sparta, B. C. 546, iv. 199;
-    alliance with, against Persia, abandoned by the Athenians, iv. 291;
-    successes of Persians against, iv. 294;
-    reconquest of, after the fall of Milêtus, iv. 306;
-    first step to the ascendency of Athens over, v. 198;
-    not tributary to Persia between B. C. 477 and 412, v. 339 _n._;
-    surrender of, to Persia, by Sparta, ix. 205;
-    and Tissaphernes, x. 206; ix. 207;
-    application of to Sparta for aid against Tissaphernes, ix. 207;
-    after the peace of Antalkidas, x. 26 _seq._;
-    Spartan project for the rescue of, x. 44.
-
-  _Asidates_, ix. 172.
-
-  _Askalaphus_ and Ialmenus, i. 130.
-
-  _Asklepiadês_ of Myrlea, legendary discoveries of, i. 247 _n._ 4.
-
-  _Asklêpiads_, i. 181.
-
-  _Asklêpius_, i. 178 _seq._
-
-  _Asopius_, son of Phormio, vi. 231.
-
-  _Asopus_, Greeks and Persians at, before the battle of Platæa,
-      v. 158 _seq._
-
-  _Aspasia_, vi. 98 _seq._
-
-  _Aspendus_, Phenician fleet at, B. C. 411, viii. 99, 100, 114;
-    Alkibiadês at, viii. 99;
-    Alkibiadês, return from, to Samos, viii. 116;
-    Alexander at, xii. 100.
-
-  _Aspis_, xii. 421.
-
-  _Assembly_, Spartan popular, ii. 345, 356;
-    Athenian judicial, iv. 137, 140 _seq._;
-    Athenian political, iv. 139.
-
-  _Assyria_, relations of, with Egypt, iii. 324.
-
-  _Assyrian_ kings, their command of human labor, iii. 302.
-
-  _Assyrians_ and Medes, iii. 224 _seq._, 290 _seq._;
-    contrasted with Phenicians, Greeks, and Egyptians, iii. 303;
-    and Phenicians, effect of, on the Greek mind, iii. 343 _seq._
-
-  _Astakus_, vi. 135, 141.
-
-  _Asteria_, i. 6.
-
-  _Asterius_, i. 220.
-
-  _Astræus_, i. 6; and Eôs, children of, i. 6.
-
-  _Astronomy_, physical, thought impious by ancient Greeks, i. 346 _n._;
-    and physics, knowledge of, among the early Greeks, ii. 114.
-
-  _Astyages_, story of, iv. 182 _seq._
-
-  _Astyanax_, death of, i. 305.
-
-  _Astyochus_, expedition of, to Ionia, vii. 383;
-    at Lesbos, vii. 384;
-    at Chios and the opposite coast, vii. 391;
-    accidental escape of, vii. 392;
-    and Pedaritus, vii. 393, 394;
-    and Tissaphernês, treaty between, vii. 395 _seq._;
-    mission of Lichas and others respecting, vii. 397;
-    victory of, over Charmînus, and junction with Antisthenês, vii. 397;
-    at Rhodes, viii. 94;
-    at Milêtus, viii. 97;
-    recall of, viii. 98.
-
-  _Atalanta_, i. 56, 145 _seq._
-
-  _Atarneus_, captured and garrisoned by Derkyllidas, ix. 219;
-    Hermeias of, xi. 441, and _n._ 3.
-
-  _Atê_, i. 7.
-
-  _Athamas_, i. 123 _seq._
-
-  _Athenagoras_, vii. 184 _seq._
-
-  _Athênê_, birth of, i. 10;
-    various representations of, i. 54;
-    her dispute with Poseidon, i. 56, 191;
-    Chalkiœkus, temple of, and Pausanias, v. 272;
-    Polias, reported prodigy in the temple of, on Xerxes’s approach,
-      v. 109.
-
-  _Athenian_, victims for the Minôtaur, i. 221;
-    ceremonies commemorative of the destruction of the Minôtaur, i. 223;
-    democracy, Kleisthenês, the real author of, iv. 139;
-    people, judicial attributes of, iv. 140;
-    nobles, early violence of, iv. 152;
-    energy, development of, after Kleisthenês’s revolution, iv. 176;
-    seamen, contrasted with the Ionians at Ladê, iv. 300;
-    dikasts, temper of, in estimating past services, iv. 372;
-    democracy, origin of the apparent fickleness of, iv. 375 _seq._;
-    envoy, speech of, to Gelo, v. 219;
-    parties and politics, effect of the Persian war upon, v. 274 _seq._;
-    empire, v. 290 _seq._, 304 _n._ 2, 346, vi. 398 _seq._, 44 _n._, 48;
-      viii. 281-290;
-    power, increase of, after the formation of the Delian confederacy,
-      v. 313;
-    auxiliaries to Sparta against the Helots, v. 317 _seq._;
-    democracy, consummation of, v. 380;
-    armament against Samos, under Periklês, Sophoklês, etc.,
-      vi. 26 _seq._;
-    private citizens, redress of the allies against, vi. 38;
-    assembly, speeches of the Korkyræan and Corinthian envoys to,
-      vi. 58 _seq._;
-    navel attack, vi. 63;
-    envoy, reply of, to the Corinthian envoy, at the Spartan assembly,
-      vi. 85 _seq._;
-    expedition to ravage Peloponnesus, B. C. 431, vi. 134;
-    armament to Potidæa and Chalkidic Thrace, B. C. 429, vi. 191;
-    assembly, debates in, respecting Mitylênê. vi. 244, 248 _seq._;
-    assembly, about the Lacedæmonian prisoners in Sphakteria,
-      vi. 328 _seq._;
-    assembly, on Demosthenes’ application for reinforcements to attack
-      Sphakteria, vi. 334 _seq._;
-    hoplites, at the battle of Amphipolis, vi. 477;
-    fleet, operations of, near Messênê and Rhegium, B. C. 425, vii. 133;
-    assembly and the expedition to Sicily, vii. 145, 147 _seq._, 279;
-    treasury, abundance in, B. C. 415, vii. 164;
-    fleet in the harbor of Syracuse, vii. 302, 303 _seq._, 315 _seq._,
-      325 _seq._;
-    prisoners at Syracuse, vii. 344 _seq._;
-    fleet at Samos, B. C. 412, vii. 394;
-    democracy, securities in, against corruption, vii. 402;
-    assembly, vote of, in favor of oligarchical change, viii. 14;
-    assembly, at Kolônus, viii. 35;
-    democracy, reconstitution of, at Samos, viii. 46;
-    squadron, escape of from Sestos to Elæus, viii. 105;
-    fleet at Kynossêma, viii. 109 _seq._;
-    fleet at Abydos, viii. 117 _seq._;
-    fleet, concentration of, at Kardia, viii. 120;
-    fleet, at the Bosphorus, B. C. 410, viii. 127;
-    fleet at Arginusæ, viii. 170 _seq._;
-    assembly, debate in, on the generals at Arginusæ, viii. 178-186,
-      190-194;
-    fleet, inaction of, after the battle of Arginusæ, viii. 211;
-    fleet, removal of, from Samos to Ægospotami, viii. 215;
-    fleet, capture of, at Ægospotami, viii. 216 _seq._;
-    kleruchs and allies after the battle of Ægospotami, viii. 223;
-    tragedy, growth of, viii. 317, 319;
-    mind, influence of comedy on, viii. 331 _seq._;
-    character not corrupted between B. C. 480 and 405, viii. 374 _seq._;
-    confederacy, new, B. C. 378, x. 192 _seq._;
-    and Theban cavalry, battle of, near Mantinea, B. C. 362,
-      x. 333 _seq._;
-    marine, reform in the administration of, by Demosthenês,
-      xi. 462 _seq._
-
-  _Athenians_ and the Hêrakleids, i. 94;
-    and Sigeium, i. 339;
-    and Samians, contrast between, iv. 247;
-    active patriotism of, between B. C. 500-400, iv. 178;
-    diminished active sentiment of, after the Thirty Tyrants, iv. 180;
-    alliance with Asiatic Greeks abandoned by, iv. 291;
-    Darius’s revenge against, iv. 297;
-    terror and sympathy of, on the capture of Milêtus, iv. 309;
-    appeal of, to Sparta, against the Medism of Ægina, iv. 318;
-    condition and character of, B. C. 490, iv. 334;
-    application of, to Sparta, before the battle of Marathon, iv. 341;
-    victory of, at Marathon, iv. 348 _seq._, 358;
-    alleged fickleness and ingratitude of, towards Miltiadês,
-      iv. 370 _seq._;
-    answers of the Delphian oracle to, on the eve of Xerxes’s invasion,
-      v. 59;
-    Pan-Hellenic patriotism of, on Xerxes’s invasion, v. 63 _seq._;
-    hopeless situation of, after the battle of Thermopylæ, v. 106;
-    conduct of, on the approach of Xerxes, v. 107, _seq._;
-    victory of, at Salamis, v. 115, 132 _seq._;
-    honor awarded to, after the battle of Salamis, v. 146;
-    under Pausanias in Bœotia, v. 164;
-    and Alexander of Macedon, before the battle of Platæa, v. 170;
-    and Spartans at Platæa, v. 171, 174;
-    victory of, at Platæa, v. 179 _seq._;
-    and continental Ionians, after the battle of Mykalê, v. 199;
-    attack the Chersonese, B. C. 479, v. 200;
-    the leaders of Grecian progress after the battle of Salamis, v. 242;
-    rebuild their city after the battle of Platæa, v. 243;
-    effect of the opposition to the fortification of Athens upon,
-      v. 246;
-    induced by Themistoklês to build twenty new triremes annually,
-      v. 252;
-    activity of, in the first ten years of their hegemony,
-      v. 294 _seq._, 303;
-    renounce the alliance of Sparta, and join Argos and Thessaly,
-      v. 319 _seq._;
-    proceedings of, in Cyprus, Phœnicia, Egypt, and Megara, B. C. 460,
-      v. 321;
-    defeat the Æginetans, B. C. 459, v. 323;
-    defeat of at Tanagra, v. 328;
-    victory of, at Œnophyta, v. 331;
-    sail round Peloponnesus under Tolmidês, v. 331;
-    march against Thessaly, v. 334;
-    defeat and losses of, in Egypt, B. C. 460-455, v. 383;
-    victories of, at Cyprus, under Anaxikratês, v. 337;
-    defeat of, at Korôneia, v. 348;
-    personal activity of, after the reforms of Periklês and Ephialtês,
-      vi. 1;
-    settlements of, in the Ægean, during the Thirty years’ truce,
-      vi. 11;
-    pride of, in the empire of Athens, vi. 9;
-    decision of, respecting Corinth and Korkyra, vi. 62;
-    victory of near Potidæa, vi. 73;
-    blockade of Potidæa by, vi. 74;
-    counter-demand of, upon Sparta, for expiation of sacrilege, vi. 105;
-    final answer of, to the Spartans before the Peloponnesian war,
-      vi. 110;
-    expel the Æginetans from Ægina, B. C. 431, vi. 186;
-    ravage of the Megarid by, in the Peloponnesian war, vi. 137;
-    irritation of, at their losses from the plague and the
-      Peloponnesians, vi. 164;
-    energetic demonstration of, B. C. 428, vi. 226;
-    their feeling and conduct towards the revolted Mitylenæans,
-      vi. 249 _seq._, 255 _seq._;
-    and Lacedæmonians at Pylus, armistice between, vi. 324;
-    demands of, in return for the release of the Lacedæmonians in
-      Sphakteria, vi. 329;
-    and Bœotians, debate between, after the battle of Delium, B. C. 424,
-      vi. 393 _seq._;
-    discontent of, with Sparta, on the non-fulfilment of the peace of
-      Nikias, vii. 10;
-    recapture of Skiônê by, vii. 22;
-    and Amphipolis, vii. 104, xi. 215, 233 _seq._;
-    siege and capture of Mêlos by, vii. 109 _seq._;
-    treatment of Alkibiadês by, for his alleged profanation of the
-      mysteries, vii. 211 _seq._;
-    victory of, near the Olympieion at Syracuse, vii. 221 _seq._;
-    forbearance of, towards Nikias, vii. 227 _seq._;
-    not responsible for the failure of the Sicilian expedition,
-      B. C. 415, vii. 227 _n._;
-    defeat of, at Epipolæ, B. C. 414, vii. 277;
-    conduct of, on receiving Nikias’s despatch, B. C. 414, vii. 279,
-      280 _seq._;
-    victory of, in the harbor of Syracuse, B. C. 413, vii. 316;
-    and Syracusans, conflicts between, in the Great Harbor, vii. 291,
-      294 _seq._, 317 _seq._, 323 _seq._;
-    postponement of their retreat from Syracuse by an eclipse of the
-      moon, vii. 315;
-    blockade of, in the harbor of Syracuse, vii. 319 _seq._, 329 _seq._;
-    and Corinthians near Naupaktus, vii. 358 _seq._;
-    resolutions of, after the disaster at Syracuse, vii. 362 _seq._;
-    suspicions of, about Chios, vii. 368;
-    defeat Alkamenês and the Peloponnesian fleet, vii. 369;
-    effect of the Chian revolt on, vii. 372;
-    harassing operations of, against Chios, B. C. 412, vii. 345 _seq._,
-      391, 393;
-    victory of, near Milêtus, B. C. 412, vii. 385, 387;
-    retirement of, from Milêtus, B. C. 412, vii. 388;
-    naval defeat of, near Eretria, B. C. 411, viii. 72 _seq._;
-    moderation of, on the deposition of the Thirty and the Four Hundred,
-      viii. 88 _seq._, 300 _seq._;
-    victory of, at Kyzikus, viii. 121;
-    convention of, with Pharnabazus, about Chalkêdon, viii. 132;
-    capture of Byzantium by, viii. 134;
-    different behavior of, towards Alkibiadês and Nikias, viii. 158;
-    victory of, at Arginusæ, viii. 173 _seq._;
-    remorse of, after the death of the generals at Arginusæ, viii. 205;
-    first proposals of, to Sparta after the battle of Ægospotami,
-      viii. 227;
-    repayment of the Lacedæmonians by, after the restoration of the
-      democracy, B. C. 403, viii. 305;
-    their treatment of Dorieus, ix. 272 _seq._;
-    restoration of the Long Walls at Corinth by, ix. 338;
-    and Evagoras of Cyprus, ix. 365, 375;
-    successes of Antalkidas against, ix. 344;
-    their alleged envy of distinguished generals, x. 108 _n._ 2;
-    and Alexander of Pheræ, x. 283;
-    project of, to seize Corinth, B. C. 366, x. 289;
-    and Charidemus in the Chersonese, B. C. 360-358, x. 377 _seq._;
-    the alliance of Olynthus rejected by, B. C. 358, xi. 236;
-    their remissness in assisting Methônê, xi. 260;
-    change in the character of, between B. C. 431 and 360, xi. 279;
-    prompt resistance of, to Philip at Thermopylæ, xi. 296;
-    expedition of, to Olynthus, B. C. 349, xi. 346;
-    capture of, at Olynthus, xi. 365, 372;
-    letters of Philip to, xi. 411, 416, 417;
-    and the Phokians at Thermopylæ, B. C. 374-346, xi. 418 _seq._;
-    letter of Philip to, declaring war, B. C. 340, xi. 456 _seq._;
-    refusal of, to take part in the Amphiktyonic proceedings against
-      Amphissa, xi. 478;
-    Philip asks the Thebans to assist in attacking, xi. 483 _seq._;
-    and Thebans, war of, against Philip in Phokis, xi. 493, 495 _seq._;
-    and Philip, peace of Demades between, xi. 507 _seq._;
-    their recognition of Philip as head of Greece, xi. 507, 511 _seq._;
-    captured at the Granikus, xii. 105;
-    champions of the liberation of Greece, B. C. 323, xii. 312;
-    helpless condition of, B. C. 302-301, xii. 385.
-
-  _Athens_, historical, impersonal authority of law in, ii. 81;
-    treatment of homicide in, ii. 92 _seq._;
-    military classification at, ii. 460;
-    meagre history of, before Drako, iii. 48;
-    tribunals for homicide at, iii. 77;
-    local superstitions at, about trial of homicide, iii. 79;
-    pestilence and suffering at, after the Kylonian massacre, iii. 82;
-    and Megara, war between, about Salamis, iii. 90 _seq._;
-    acquisition of Salamis by, iii. 91 _seq._;
-    state of, immediately before the legislation of Solon,
-      iii. 93 _seq._;
-    rights of property sacred at, iii. 105, 112 _seq._;
-    rate of interest free at, iii. 108;
-    political rights of Solon’s four classes at, iii. 120 _seq._;
-    democracy at, begins with Kleisthenês, iii. 127;
-    distinction between the democracy at, and Solon’s constitution,
-      iii. 131;
-    Solon’s departure from, iii. 147;
-    Solon’s return to, iii. 153;
-    connection of, with Thracian Chersonesus, under Peisistratus,
-      iv. 117 _seq._;
-    after the expulsion of Hippias, iv. 126;
-    introduction of universal admissibility to office at, iv. 145;
-    necessity for creating a constitutional morality at, in the time of
-      Kleisthenês, iv. 153;
-    application of, for alliance with Persia, iv. 165;
-    and Platæa, first connection between, iv. 166;
-    successes of, against Bœotians and Chalkidians, iv. 170;
-    war of Ægina against, iv. 173, 316;
-    application of Aristagoras to, iv. 289;
-    treatment of Darius’s herald at, iv. 316;
-    traitors at, B. C. 490, iv. 356, 358;
-    penal procedure at, iv. 368 _n._;
-    and Ægina war between, from B. C. 488 to 481, v. 47, 49 _seq._, 50,
-      53, 323;
-    first growth of the naval force of, v. 51;
-    fleet of, the salvation of Greece, v. 53;
-    and Sparta, no heralds sent from Xerxes to, v. 57;
-    Pan-Hellenic congress convened by, at the Isthmus of Corinth,
-      v. 58 _seq._;
-    and Ægina, occupation of, Xerxes, v. 109, 112 _seq._;
-    Mardonius at, v. 154 _seq._;
-    first step to the separate ascendancy of, over Asiatic Greeks,
-      v. 200;
-    conduct of, in the repulse of the Persians, v. 242;
-    Long Walls at, v. 244 _seq._, 322 _seq._, ix. 325 _seq._;
-    plans of Themistoklês for the naval aggrandizement of,
-      v. 249 _seq._;
-    increase of metics and commerce at, after the enlargement of Piræus,
-      v. 251;
-    headship of the allied Greeks transferred from Sparta to,
-      v. 256 _seq._;
-    and Sparta, first open separation between, v. 258 _seq._, 290;
-    proceedings of, on being made leader of the allied Greeks,
-      v. 263 _seq._;
-    stimulus to democracy at, from the Persian war, v. 275;
-    changes in the Kleisthenean constitution at, after the Persian war,
-      v. 275 _seq._;
-    long-sighted ambition imputed to, v. 293;
-    enforcing sanction of the confederacy of Delos exercised by, v. 298;
-    increasing power and unpopularity of among the allied Greeks,
-      v. 299 _seq._;
-    as guardian of the Ægean against piracy, between B. C. 476-466,
-      v. 304;
-    bones of Theseus conveyed to, v. 304, 305;
-    quarrel of, with Thasos, B. C. 465, v. 309, 311;
-    first attempt of, to found a city at Ennea Hodoi on the Strymon,
-      v. 310;
-    alliance of, with Megara, B. C. 461, v. 321;
-    growing hatred of Corinth and neighboring states to, B. C. 461,
-      v. 321;
-    war of, with Corinth, Ægina, etc., B. C. 459, v. 322 _seq._;
-    reconciliation between leaders and parties at, after the battle of
-      Tanagra, v. 329;
-    acquisition of Bœotia, Phokis, and Lokris by, v. 331;
-    and the Peloponnesians, five years’ truce between, v. 334;
-    and Persia, treaty between, B. C. 450, v. 335 _seq._;
-    fund of the confederacy transferred from Delos to, v. 343;
-    position and prospects of, about B. C. 448, v. 344 _seq._;
-    commencement of the decline of, v. 346 _seq._;
-    and Delphi, B. C. 452-447, v. 346;
-    loss of Bœotia by, v. 347 _seq._;
-    despondency at, after the defeat at Korôneia, v. 350;
-    and Sparta, thirty years’ truce between, v. 350;
-    and Megara, feud between, v. 351;
-    magistrates and Areopagus in early, v. 352;
-    increase of democratical sentiment at, between the time of
-      Aristeidês and of Periklês, v. 355;
-    choice of magistrates by lot at, v. 355;
-    oligarchical party at, v. 361;
-    maritime empire of, vi. 2 _seq._, viii. 281-293, ix. 199 _seq._;
-    maritime revenue of, vi. 5 _seq._, 6, _n._ 1, 36;
-    commercial relations of, in the Thirty years’ truce, vi. 11;
-    political condition of, between B. C. 445-431, vi. 15 _seq._;
-    improvements in the city of, under Periklês, vi. 20 _seq._,
-      23 _seq._;
-    Periklês’s attempt to convene a Grecian congress at, vi. 25;
-    application of the Samians to Sparta for aid against, vi. 29;
-    funeral ceremony of slain warriors at, vi. 31;
-    and her subject-allies, vi. 33 _seq._, 48;
-    and Sparta, confederacies of, vi. 49;
-    reinforcement from, to Korkyra against Corinth, vi. 57 _seq._, 67;
-    and Corinth, after the second naval battle between Corinth and
-      Korkyra, vi., 69 _seq._;
-    and Perdikkas, vi. 71 _seq._, 449, _seq._, vii. 96;
-    non-aggressive, between B. C. 445-431, vi. 76;
-    Megara prohibited from trading with, vi. 76;
-    hostility of the Corinthians to, after their defeat near Potidæa,
-      vi. 77;
-    discussion and decision of the Spartan assembly upon war with,
-      B. C. 431, vi. 79 _seq._;
-    position and prospects of, on commencing the Peloponnesian war,
-      vi. 94 _seq._, 113 _seq._, 121 _seq._;
-    requisitions addressed to, by Sparta, B. C. 431, vi. 97 _seq._,
-      106 _seq._;
-    assembly at, on war with Sparta, B. C. 431, vi. 108 _seq._;
-    conduct of, on the Theban night-surprise of Platæa, vi. 119 _seq._;
-    and the Akarnanians, alliance between, vi. 121;
-    crowding of population into, on Archidamus’s invasion of Attica,
-      vi. 129;
-    and Sicily, relations of, altered by the quarrel between Corinth and
-      Korkyra, vi. 130;
-    clamor at, on Archidamus’s ravage of Acharnæ, vi. 131;
-    measures for the permanent defence of, B. C. 431, vi. 138 _seq._;
-    alliance of Stitalkês with, vi. 141, 215 _seq._;
-    freedom of individual thought and action at, vi. 149 _seq._;
-    position of, at the time of Periklês’s funeral oration, vi. 152;
-    the plague at, vi. 154 _seq._, 293;
-    proceedings of, on learning the revolt of Mitylênê, vi. 223;
-    exhausted treasury of, B. C. 428, vi. 232;
-    new politicians at, after Periklês, vi. 245 _seq._;
-    revolutions at, contrasted with those at Korkyra, vi. 283;
-    political clubs at, vi. 290;
-    and the prisoners in Sphakteria vi. 325 _seq._, 353 _seq._,
-      vii. 6 _seq._;
-    fluctuation of feeling at, as to the Peloponnesian war, vi. 355;
-    and her Thracian subject-allies, vi. 405 _seq._;
-    and Brasidas’s conquests in Thrace, vi. 413;
-    and Sparta, one year’s truce between, B. C. 423, vi. 432 _seq._;
-    and Sparta, relations between, B. C. 423-422, vi. 449, 452 _seq._;
-    necessity for voluntary accusers at, vi. 486;
-    and Sparta, alliance between, B. C. 421, vii. 5;
-    application of Corinthians to, B. C. 421, vii. 20;
-    Lacedæmonian envoys at, about Panaktum and Pylus, B. C. 420,
-      vii. 29;
-    and Argos, alliance between, B. C. 420, vii. 43 _seq._;
-    convention of, with Argos, Mantineia, and Elis, B. C. 420,
-      vii. 49 _seq._;
-    policy of, attempted by Alkibiades, B. C. 419, vii. 62 _seq._;
-    attack of, upon Epidaurus, B. C. 419, vii. 64, 66;
-    and Sparta, relations between, B. C. 419, vii. 69;
-    and Argos, renewed alliance between, B. C. 417, vii. 101;
-    and Sparta, relations between, B. C. 416, vii. 103;
-    Sicilian expedition, vii. 132, 142, 144 _seq._, 163 _seq._,
-      364 _seq._;
-    mutilation of the Hermæ at, vii. 167 _seq._, 197 _seq._;
-    injurious effects of Alkibiadês’s banishment upon, B. C. 415,
-      vii. 216;
-    Nikias’s despatch to, for reinforcements, B. C. 414,
-      vii. 274 _seq._;
-    and Sparta, violation of the peace between, B. C. 414, vii. 286;
-    effects of the Lacedæmonian occupation of Dekeleia on,
-      vii. 354 _seq._;
-    dismissal of Thracian mercenaries from, 357 _seq._;
-    revolt of Chios, Erythræ, and Klazomenæ from, B. C. 412, vii. 371;
-    appropriation of the reserve fund at, vii. 373;
-    loss of Teos by, B. C. 412, vii. 374;
-    revolt of Lebedos and Eræ from, B. C. 412, vii. 375;
-    loss and recovery of Lesbos by, B. C. 412, vii. 384 _seq._;
-    recovery of Klazomenæ by, B. C. 412, vii. 384;
-    rally of, during the year after the disaster at Syracuse, viii. 1;
-    conspiracy of the Four Hundred at, viii. 1, 7 _seq._, 31 _seq._;
-    loss of Orôpus by, viii. 25;
-    arrival of the Paralus at, from Samos, viii. 30;
-    constitutional morality of, viii. 25;
-    restoration of democracy at, B. C. 411, viii. 69 _seq._, 77 _seq._,
-      81 _seq._, 89;
-    contrast between oligarchy at, and democracy at Samos, B. C. 411,
-      viii. 91 _seq._;
-    revolt of Byzantium from, B. C. 411, viii. 97;
-    revolt of Abydos and Lampsakus from, viii. 94;
-    revolt of Kyzikus from, viii. 112;
-    zeal of Pharnabazus against, viii. 113;
-    proposals of peace from Sparta to, B. C. 410, viii. 122 _seq._;
-    return of Alkibiadês to, B. C. 407, viii. 145 _seq._;
-    fruitless attempt of Agis to surprise, B. C. 407, viii. 150;
-    complaints at, against Alkibiadês, B. C. 407, viii. 152 _seq._;
-    conflicting sentiments at, caused by the battle of Arginusæ,
-      viii. 175;
-    alleged proposals of peace from Sparta to, after the battle of
-      Arginusæ, viii. 210;
-    condition of her dependencies, after the battle of Ægospotami,
-      viii. 213 _seq._;
-    oath of mutual harmony at, after the battle of Ægospotami,
-      viii. 225;
-    surrender of, to Lysander, viii. 226 _seq._;
-    return of oligarchical exiles to, B. C. 404, viii. 234;
-    oligarchical party at, B. C. 404, viii. 235;
-    imprisonment of Strombichidês and other democrats at, B. C. 404,
-      viii. 236;
-    the Thirty tyrants at, viii. 237, 240 _seq._, ix. 182 _seq._,
-      186 _seq._, 198;
-    Lacedæmonian garrison at, under Kallibius, viii. 242;
-    alteration of feeling in Greece after the capture of, by Lysander,
-      viii. 259, 264, 275;
-    restoration of Thrasybulus and the exiles to, viii. 279;
-    restoration of the democracy at, B. C. 403, viii. 280, 294, 295,
-      295 _seq._, 308 _seq._;
-    condition of, B. C. 405-403, viii. 293;
-    abolition of Hellenotamiæ and restriction of citizenship at
-      B. C. 403, viii. 310 _seq._;
-    development of dramatic genius at, between the time of Kleisthenês
-      and of Eukleidês, viii. 318 _seq._, 327 _seq._;
-    accessibility of the theatre at, viii. 321;
-    growth of rhetoric and philosophy at, viii. 338 _seq._;
-    literary and philosophical antipathy at, viii. 348;
-    enlargement of the field of education at, viii. 349;
-    sophists at, viii. 350 _seq._, 399;
-    banishment of Xenophon from, ix. 175;
-    Theban application to, for aid against Sparta, B. C. 395,
-      ix. 291 _seq._;
-    alliance of Thebes, Corinth, Argos and, against Sparta, ix. 301;
-    contrast between political conflicts at, and at Corinth,
-      ix. 330 _n._ 3;
-    alarm at, on the Lacedæmonian capture of the Long Walls at Corinth,
-      ix. 340;
-    and Ægina, B. C. 389, ix. 372 _seq._;
-    financial condition of, from B. C. 403 to 387, ix. 378 _seq._;
-    creation of the Theôric Board at, ix. 379;
-    property-taxes at, ix. 380 _n._;
-    and the peace of Antalkidas, x. 2, 12;
-    applications of, to Persia, B. C. 413, x. 7, 8;
-    and Evagoras, x. 18 _seq._;
-    naval competition of, with Sparta, after the peace of Antalkidas,
-      x. 42 _seq._;
-    and Macedonia, contrast between, x. 47;
-    Theban exiles at, after the seizure of the Kadmeia by Phœbidas,
-      x. 61, 80 _seq._;
-    condemnation of the generals at, who had favored the enterprise of
-      Pelopidas, x. 96;
-    contrast between judicial procedure at, and at Sparta, x. 102;
-    hostility of, to Sparta, and alliance with Thebes, B. C. 378,
-      x. 102 _seq._;
-    exertions of, to form a new maritime confederacy, B. C. 378,
-      x. 103 _seq._;
-    absence of Athenian generals from, x. 108 _n._ 2;
-    synod of new confederates at, B. C. 378, x. 112;
-    nature and duration of the Solonian census at, x. 113 _seq._;
-    new census at, in the archonship of Nausinikus, x. 115 _seq._;
-    symmories at, x. 117 _seq._;
-    financial difficulties of, B. C. 374, x. 133;
-    displeasure of, against Thebes, B. C. 374, x. 133, 159;
-    separate peace of, with the Lacedæmonians, B. C. 374, x. 137, 141;
-    disposition of, towards peace with Sparta, B. C. 372, x. 158, 164;
-    and the dealings of Thebes with Platæa and Thespiæ, B. C. 372,
-      x. 162 _seq._;
-    and the peace of, B. C. 371, x. 167, 172;
-    and Sparta, difference between in passive endurance and active
-      energy, x. 187;
-    the Theban victory at Leuktra not well received at, x. 189;
-    at the head of a new Peloponnesian land confederacy, B. C. 371,
-      x. 201;
-    application of Arcadians to, for aid against Sparta, B. C. 370,
-      x. 213;
-    application of Sparta, Corinth, and Phlius to, for aid against
-      Thebes, B. C. 369, x. 234 _seq._;
-    ambitious views of, after the battle of Leuktra, x. 244 _seq._;
-    and Sparta, alliance between, B. C. 369, x. 253;
-    embassies from, to Persia, x. 278, 280, 293;
-    loss of Orôpus by, B. C. 366, x. 286;
-    alliance of, with Arcadia, B. C. 366, x. 288;
-    partial readmission of, to the Chersonese, B. C. 365, x. 295 _seq._;
-    and Kotys, x. 298 _seq._, 372, 373;
-    Theban naval operations against, under Epaminondas, x. 303 _seq._;
-    naval operations of Alexander of Pheræ against, x. 370;
-    and Miltokythes, x. 372;
-    restoration of the Chersonese to, B. C. 358, x. 379;
-    transmarine empire of, B. C. 358, x. 381;
-    condition of, B. C. 360-359, xi. 199;
-    proceedings of Philip towards, on his accession, xi. 212;
-    and Eubœa, xi. 217 _seq._, 340 _seq._;
-    surrender of the Chersonese to, B. C. 358, xi. 219;
-    revolt of Chios, Kos, Rhodes, and Byzantium from, B. C. 358,
-      xi. 220 _seq._, 231;
-    armaments and operations of, in the Hellespont, B. C. 357, xi. 224;
-    loss of power to, from the Social War, xi. 232;
-    Philip’s hostilities against, B. C. 358-356, xi. 237;
-    recovery of Sestos by, B. C. 353, xi. 257;
-    intrigues of Kersobleptes and Philip against, B. C. 353, xi. 258;
-    countenance of the Phokians by, B. C. 353, xi. 262;
-    applications of Sparta and Megalopolis to, B. C. 353, xi. 263, 290;
-    alarm about Persia at, B. C. 354, xi. 285;
-    Philip’s naval operations against, B. C. 351, xi. 304 _seq._;
-    and Olynthus, xi. 326, 331, 334, 345 _seq._, 365, 372;
-    and Philip overtures for peace between, B. C. 348 xi. 368 _seq._;
-    application of the Phokians to, for aid against Philip at
-      Thermopylæ, xi. 376 _seq._;
-    embassies to Philip from, xi. 379 _seq._; 401 _seq._, 422,
-      430 _seq._;
-    resolution of the synod of allies at, respecting Philip, xi. 388;
-    assemblies at, in the presence of the Macedonian envoys,
-      xi. 390 _seq._;
-    envoys from Philip to, xi. 386, 387, 390, 398, 401;
-    motion of Philokrates for peace and alliance between Philip and,
-      xi. 390 _seq._;
-    ratification of peace and alliance between Philip and,
-      xi. 398 _seq._, 429 _seq._;
-    alarm and displeasure at, on the surrender of Thermopylæ to Philip,
-      xi. 423;
-    professions of Philip to, after his conquest of Thermopylæ, xi. 425;
-    and the honors conferred upon Philip by the Amphiktyons, xi. 429;
-    and Philip, formal peace between, from B. C. 346 to 340, xi. 442;
-    mission of Python from Philip to, xi. 446;
-    and Philip, proposed amendments in the peace of, B. C. 346, between,
-      xi. 446 _seq._;
-    and Philip, disputes between, about the Bosporus and Hellespont,
-      xi. 450;
-    increased influence of Demosthenes at, B. C. 341-338, xi. 452;
-    services of Kalias the Chalkidian to, B. C. 341, xi. 452;
-    and Philip, declaration of war between, B. C. 340, xi. 455 _seq._;
-    votes of thanks from Byzantium and the Chersonese to, xi. 461;
-    accusation of the Amphissians against, at the Amphiktyonic assembly,
-      B. C. 339, xi. 470 _seq._;
-    and Thebes, unfriendly relations between, B. C. 339, xi. 484;
-    proceedings at, on Philip’s fortification of Elateia and application
-      to Thebes for aid, xi. 484 _seq._ 491;
-    and Thebes, alliance of, against Philip, B. C. 339, xi. 490;
-    Demosthenes crowned at, xi. 493, 495;
-    proceedings at, on the defeat at Chæroneia, xi. 502 _seq._;
-    lenity of Philip towards, after the battle of Chæroneia, xi. 505;
-    means of resistance at, after the battle of, Chæroneia, xi. 508;
-    honorary votes at, in favor of Philip, xi. 509;
-    sentiment at, on the death of Philip, xii. 10;
-    submission of, to Alexander, xii. 12;
-    conduct of, on Alexander’s violation of the convention at Corinth,
-      xii. 17 _seq._;
-    proceedings at, on the destruction of Thebes by Alexander, xii. 44;
-    Alexander demands the surrender of anti-Macedonian leaders at,
-      xii. 45;
-    pacific policy of, in Alexander’s time, xii. 277 _seq._;
-    position of parties at, during and after the anti-Macedonian
-      struggle of Agis, xii. 286;
-    submission of, to Antipater, xii. 322 _seq._;
-    state of parties at, on the proclamation of Polysperchon, xii. 345;
-    Kassander gets possession of, xii. 361; under Demetrius Phalereus,
-      xii. 362 _seq._;
-    census at, under Demetrius Phalereus, xii. 363;
-    Demetrius Poliorketes at, xii. 373 _seq._, 382, 384 _seq._, 388;
-    alteration of sentiment at, between B. C. 338 and 307, xii. 376;
-    in B. C. 501 and 307, contrast between, xii. 377;
-    restrictive law against philosophers at, B. C. 307, xii. 379;
-    embassy to Antigonus from, xii. 380;
-    political nullity of, in the generation after Demosthenes, xii. 392;
-    connection of, with Bosporus or Pantikapæum, xii. 480 _seq._
-
-  _Athos_, iv. 23;
-    colonies in, iv. 25;
-    Mardonius’s fleet destroyed near, iv. 314;
-    Xerxes’s canal through, v. 21 _seq._
-
-  _Atlas_, i. 6, 8, 9.
-
-  _Atossa_, iv. 252.
-
-  _Atreids_, i. 157.
-
-  _Atreus_, i. 155 _seq._
-
-  _Atropos_, i. 7.
-
-  _Attalus, the Macedonian_, xi. 513;
-    and Pausanias, xi. 515;
-    death of, xi. 518.
-
-  _Attalus, uncle of Kleopatra_, death of, xi. 8.
-
-  _Attic_ legends, i. 191 _seq._;
-    chronology. commencement of, iii. 49;
-    gentes, iii. 54 _seq._;
-    demes, iii. 63, 66, 68, iv. 133 _n._;
-    law of debtor and creditor, iii. 99, 109 _n._;
-    scale, ratio of, to the Æginæan and Euboic, iii. 171;
-    Dionysia, iv. 69.
-
-  _Attica_ original distribution of, i. 193;
-    division of, by Kekrops, i. 195;
-    obscurity of the civil condition of, before Solon, iii. 49;
-    alleged duodecimal division of, in early times, iii. 50;
-    four Ionic tribes in, iii. 50 _seq._;
-    original separation and subsequent consolidation of communities in,
-      iii. 69;
-    long continuance of the cantonal feeling in, iii. 70;
-    state of, after Solon’s legislation, iii. 154;
-    Spartan expeditions to, against Hippias, iv. 122;
-    Xerxes in, v. 111 _seq._;
-    Lacedæmonian invasion of, under Pleistoanax, v. 349;
-    Archidamus’s invasions of, vi. 129 _seq._, 154, 221;
-    Lacedæmonian invasion of, B. C. 427, vi. 239;
-    invasion of, by Agis, B. C. 413, vii. 288;
-    king Pausanias’s expedition to, viii. 275 _seq._
-
-  _Augê_, i. 177.
-
-  _Augeas_, i. 139.
-
-  _Aulis_, Greek forces assembled at, against Troy, i. 293 _seq._;
-    Agesilaus at, ix. 258.
-
-  _Ausonians_, iii. 355.
-
-  _Autoklês_ at the congress at Sparta, B. C. 371, x. 165;
-    in the Hellespont, x. 371 _seq._
-
-  _Autolykus_, i. 119.
-
-  _Azan_, i. 176.
-
-
-  B
-
-  _Babylon_, iii. 291 _seq._;
-    Cyrus’s capture of, iv. 213 _seq._;
-    revolt, and reconquest of, by Darius, iv. 231 _seq._;
-    Alexander at, xii. 168 _seq._, 248 _seq._;
-    Harpalus satrap of, xii. 240.
-
-  _Babylonian_ scale, ii. 319;
-    kings, their command of human labor, iii. 302.
-
-  _Babylonians_, industry of, iii. 300;
-    deserts and predatory tribes surrounding, iii. 304.
-
-  _Bacchæ_ of Euripides, i. 262 _n._
-
-  _Bacchiads_, ii. 307, iii. 2.
-
-  _Bacchic_ rites, i. 33, 34, 38.
-
-  _Bacchus_, birth of, i. 260;
-    rites of, i. 261.
-
-  _Bacon_ and Sokratês, viii. 450 _n._ 1;
-    on the Greek philosophers, viii. 454 _n._ 3.
-
-  _Bad_, meaning of, in early Greek writers, ii. 64;
-    double sense of the Greek and Latin equivalents of, iii. 45 _n._ 4.
-
-  _Bagæus_ and Orœtês, iv. 230.
-
-  _Bagoas_, xi. 439, 441, xii. 76, 237.
-
-  _Baktria_, Alexander in, xii. 201, 206, 215 _seq._
-
-  _Barbarian_, meaning of, ii. 276;
-    and Grecian military feeling, contrast between, vi. 446.
-
-  _Bards_, ancient Grecian, ii. 136, 143.
-
-  _Bardylis_, defeat of, by Philip, xi. 215.
-
-  _Barka_, modern observations of, iv. 32 _n._ 2, 36 _n._ 3, 37 _n._;
-    foundation of, iv. 42;
-    Persian expedition from Egypt against, iv. 48;
-    capture of, iv. 48;
-    submission of, to Kambysês, iv. 220.
-
-  _Basilids_, iii. 162 _n._ 4, 188.
-
-  _Batis_, governor of Gaza, xii. 144.
-
-  _Battus_, founder of Kyrênê, iv. 30 _seq._;
-    dynasty of, iv. 40 _seq._;
-    the Third, iv. 43.
-
-  _Bebrykians_, iii. 207, 208.
-
-  _Bellerophôn_, i. 121 _seq._
-
-  _Bêlus_, temple of, iii. 297.
-
-  _Bequest_, Solon’s law of, iii. 139.
-
-  _Berœa_, Athenian attack upon, vi. 76 _n._ 2.
-
-  _Bessus_, xii. 183 _seq._, 202, 206.
-
-  _Bias_, i. 91, 109 _seq._
-
-  _Bisaltæ_, the king of, iv. 21, v. 43.
-
-  _Bithynia_, Derkyllidas in, ix. 216.
-
-  _Bithynians_, iii. 207.
-
-  _Boar_, the Kalydônian, i. 147, 148 _seq._
-
-  _Bœotia_, affinities of, with Thessaly, ii. 18;
-    transition from mythical to historical, ii. 19;
-    cities and confederation of, ii. 295;
-    Mardonius in, v. 153, 161;
-    Pausanias’s march to, v. 168;
-    supremacy of Thebes in, restored by Sparta, v. 319, 326;
-    expedition of the Lacedæmonians into, B. C. 458, v. 326 _seq._;
-    acquisition of, by Athens, v. 331;
-    loss of, by Athens, v. 347 _seq._, 351 _n._;
-    scheme of Demosthenês and Hippokratês for invading, B. C. 424,
-      vi. 379;
-    and Argos, projected alliance between, B. C. 421, vii. 24 _seq._;
-    and Sparta, alliance between, B. C. 420, vii. 26;
-    and Eubœa, bridge connecting, viii. 112, 118;
-    Agesilaus on the northern frontier of, ix. 315;
-    expeditions of Kleombrotus to, x. 94 _seq._, 129;
-    expulsion of the Lacedæmonians from, by the Thebans, B. C. 374,
-      x. 135;
-    proceedings in, after the battle of Leuktra, x. 188;
-    retirement of the Spartans from, after the battle of Leuktra,
-      x. 190;
-    extinction of free cities in, by Thebes, xi. 201;
-    successes of Onomarchus in, xi. 293;
-    reconstitution of, by Alexander, xii. 48.
-
-  _Bœotian_ war, ix. 295 _seq._;
-    cities after the peace of Antalkidas, x. 29, 33.
-
-  _Bœotians_, ii. 14 _seq._ 293 _seq._;
-    and Chalkidians, successes of Athens against, iv. 171;
-    and Athenians, debate between, after the battle of Delium,
-      vi. 403 _seq._;
-    at peace during the One year’s truce between Athens and Sparta,
-      vi. 457;
-    repudiate the peace of Nikias, vi. 493, vii. 3;
-    refuse to join Argos, B. C. 421, vii. 16.
-
-  _Bϙtus_, genealogy of, i. 256 _n._ 2, ii. 18 _n._ 3.
-
-  _Bogês_, v. 295.
-
-  _Bomilkar_, xii. 416 _seq._, 435.
-
-  _Boreas_, i. 6, 199, 200.
-
-  _Bosporus_, Alkibiades and the Athenian fleet at the, viii. 125;
-    Autokles in the, x. 372;
-    disputes between Philip and Athens about, xi. 450.
-
-  _Bosporus_ or Pantikapæum, xii. 479 _seq._
-
-  _Bottiæans_, iv. 14, 19 _n._
-
-  _Boulê_, Homeric, ii. 65;
-    and Agora, ii. 74.
-
-  _Branchidæ_ and Alexander, xii. 202 _seq._
-
-  _Brasidas_, first exploit of, vi. 135;
-    and Knêmus, attempt of, upon Peiræus, vi. 211;
-    at Pylus, vi. 324;
-    sent with Helot and other Peloponnesian hoplites to Thrace, vi. 370;
-    at Megara, vi. 376 _seq._;
-    march of, through Thessaly to Thrace, vi. 399 _seq._;
-    and Perdikkas, relations between, vi. 400, 450, 443 _seq._;
-    prevails upon Akanthus to revolt from Athens, vi. 402 _seq._;
-    proceedings of, at Argilus, vi. 408, 409;
-    at Amphipolis, vi. 408 _seq._, 476 _seq._;
-    repelled from Eion, vi. 411;
-    capture of Lêkythus by, vi. 424;
-    revolt of Skiônê to, vi. 435 _seq._;
-    and Perdikkas, proceedings of, towards Arrhibæus, vi. 400, 440,
-      443 _seq._;
-    personal ascendency of, vi. 412, 425;
-    operations of, after his acquisition of Amphipolis, vi. 420;
-    surprises and takes Toronê, vi. 422;
-    acquisition of Mendê by, vi. 439;
-    retreat of, before the Illyrians, vi. 447 _seq._;
-    Lacedæmonian reinforcement to, vi. 449;
-    attempt of, upon Potidæa, vi. 450;
-    opposition of, to peace on the expiration of the One year’s truce,
-      vi. 455;
-    death and character of, vi. 473, 474, 479 _seq._;
-    speech of, at Akanthus, ix. 193 _seq._;
-    language of, contrasted with the acts of Lysander, ix. 194.
-
-  _Brazen_ race, the, i. 65.
-
-  _Brennus_, invasion of Greece by, xii. 390.
-
-  _Briarcus_, i. 5.
-
-  _Bribery_, judicial, in Grecian cities, v. 188.
-
-  _Brisêis_, i. 294.
-
-  _Bromias_, xi. 298.
-
-  _Brontês_, i. 5.
-
-  _Brundusium_, iii. 391.
-
-  _Brute_, the Trojan, i. 482 _seq._
-
-  _Bruttians_, xi. 10, 133.
-
-  _Bryant_, hypothesis on the Trojan war, i. 330 _n._ 1;
-    on Palæphatus, i. 418 _n._
-
-  _Bryas_, vii. 99.
-
-  _Budini_, iii. 244.
-
-  _Bukephalia_, xii. 229, 233.
-
-  _Bull_, Phalaris’s brazen, v. 205 _n._
-
-  _Bura_, destruction of, x. 157.
-
-  _Butadæ_, i. 197.
-
-  _Byblus_, surrender of, to Alexander, xii. 130.
-
-  _Byzantium_, iv. 27;
-    extension of the Ionic revolt to, iv. 291;
-    Pausanias at, v. 268, 280;
-    revolt of, from Athens, B. C. 411, viii. 97;
-    Klearchus, the Lacedæmonian, sent to, viii. 128;
-    capture of, by the Athenians, viii. 134;
-    mission of Cheirisophus to, ix. 125;
-    return of Cheirisophus from, ix. 144;
-    the Ten Thousand Greeks at, ix. 154 _seq._;
-    revolt of, from Athens, B. C. 358, xi. 220 _seq._, 231;
-    mission of Demosthenes to, xi. 453;
-    siege of, by Philip, xi. 459;
-    vote of thanks from, to Athens, xi. 461;
-    Philip concludes peace with, xi. 461.
-
-
-  C.
-
-  _Calabrian_ peninsula, Dionysius’s projected wall across, xi. 43.
-
-  _Calycê_, i. 137.
-
-  _Campanians_, xi. 9;
-    of Ætna, x. 407.
-
-  _Canacê_, i. 136 _n._
-
-  _Carthage_, iii. 273;
-    foundation and dominion of, iii. 345 _seq._;
-    and Tyre, amicable relations of, iii. 348;
-    projected expedition of Kambysês against, iv. 220;
-    empire, power, and population of, x. 391 _seq._;
-    and her colonies, x. 394;
-    military force of, x. 396 _seq._;
-    political constitution of, x. 397 _seq._;
-    oligarchical system and sentiment at, x. 398 _seq._;
-    powerful families at, x. 400;
-    intervention of, in Sicily, B. C. 410, x. 401 _seq._;
-    and Dionysius, x. 469, 473, 481, 483;
-    distressat, on the failure of Imilkon’s expedition against Syracuse,
-      x. 511;
-    danger of, from her revolted Libyan subjects, B. C. 394, x. 511;
-    Dionysius renews the war with, xi. 41 _seq._;
-    Dionysius concludes an unfavorable peace with, xi. 42;
-    new war of Dionysius with, xi. 44;
-    danger from, to Syracuse, B. C. 344, xi. 134;
-    operations of Agathokles on the eastern coast of, xii. 419 _seq._;
-    sedition of Bomilkar at, xii. 435.
-
-  _Carthaginian_ invasion of Sicily, B. C. 480, v. 221 _seq._;
-    fleet, entrance of, into the Great Harbor of Syracuse, x. 498.
-
-  _Carthaginians_, and Phenicians, difference between the aims of,
-      iii. 275;
-    and Greeks, first known collision between, iii. 348;
-    peace of, with Gelo, after the battle of the Himera, v. 225;
-    and Egestæans, victory of, over the Selinuntines, x. 404;
-    blockade and capture of Agrigentum by, x. 405 _seq._;
-    plunder of Syracuse by, x. 482;
-    in Sicily, expedition of Dionysius against, x. 483 _seq._;
-    naval victory of, off Katana, x. 495;
-    before Syracuse, x. 499 _seq._, 506 _seq._;
-    defeat of, in the Great Harbor of Syracuse, x. 501;
-    in Sicily, frequency of pestilence among, xi. 1;
-    purchase the robe of the Lakinian Hêrê, xi. 23;
-    and Hipponium, xi. 43;
-    invade Sicily, B. C. 340, xi. 170, 171;
-    Timoleon’s victory over, at the Krimêsus, xi. 174 _seq._;
-    peace of Timoleon with, xi. 182;
-    their defence of Agrigentum against Agathokles, xii. 406 _seq._;
-    victory of, over Agathokles at the Himera, xii. 408 _seq._;
-    recover great part of Sicily from Agathokles, xii. 409;
-    expedition of Agathokles to Africa against, xii. 410 _seq._;
-    religious terror of after the defeat of Hanno and Bomilkar,
-      xii. 418;
-    success of, against Agathokles in Numidia, xii. 427;
-    victories of, over Archagathus, xii. 439;
-    Archagathus blocked up at Tunês by, xii. 439, 441;
-    victory of, over Agathokles near Tunês, xii. 442;
-    nocturnal panic in the camp of, near Tunês, xii. 442;
-    the army of Agathokles capitulate with, after his desertion,
-      xii. 443.
-
-  _Caspian_ Gates, xii. 182 _n._ 2.
-
-  _Castes_, Egyptian, iii. 314 _seq._
-
-  _Catalogue_ in the Iliad, i. 290 _seq._, ii. 157.
-
-  _Cato_ the elder, and Kleon, vi. 485 _n._, 486 _n._
-
-  _Census_, nature and duration of the Solonian, x. 113 _seq._;
-    in the archonship of Nausinikus, x. 114 _seq._
-
-  _Centaur_ Nessus, i. 151.
-
-  _Centimanes_, i. 8.
-
-  _Ceremonies_, religious, a source of mythes, i. 62, 63.
-
-  _Cestus_, iv. 57 _n._ 2.
-
-  _Chabrias_, defeat of Gorgôpas by, ix. 375;
-    proceedings of between B. C. 387-378, x. 105;
-    at Thebes, x. 127;
-    victory of, near Naxos, x. 130 _seq._;
-    at Corinth, x. 258;
-    in Egypt, x. 361, 362;
-    and Charidemus, x. 379;
-    death of, xi. 223.
-
-  _Chæreas_, viii. 30, 46.
-
-  _Chæroneia_, victory of the Thebans over Onomarchus at, xi. 257;
-    battle of, B. C. 338, xi. 498 _seq._
-
-  _Chaldæan_ priests and Alexander, xii. 249, 254.
-
-  _Chaldæans_, iii. 290 _seq._
-
-  _Chalkêdon_ and Alkibiadês, viii. 126, 132.
-
-  _Chalkideus_, expedition of, to Chios, vii. 370, 371 _seq._;
-    and Tissaphernes, treaty between, vii. 376;
-    defeat and death of, vii. 385.
-
-  _Chalkidians_, Thracian, iv. 22 _seq._, vi. 183, 396;
-    of Eubœa, successes of Athens against, iv. 170.
-
-  _Chalkidikê_, success of Timotheus in, x. 294;
-    three expeditions from Athens to, B. C. 349-348, xi. 334 _n._, 349;
-    success of Philip in, xi. 350 _seq._, 364.
-
-  _Chalkis_, iii. 164 _seq._; retirement of the Greek fleet to, on the
-      loss of three triremes, v. 80.
-
-  _Chalybes_, iii. 252, ix. 106 _seq._, 110.
-
-  _Champions_, select, change in Grecian opinions respecting, ii. 451.
-
-  _Chaonians_, iii. 413 _seq._
-
-  _Chaos_, i. 4;
-    and her offspring, i. 4.
-
-  _Chares_, assistance of, to Phlius, x. 272;
-    recall of, from Corinth, x. 287;
-    unsuccessful attempt of, to seize Corinth, x. 289;
-    in the Chersonese, B. C. 358, x. 379;
-    at Chios, xi. 374;
-    in the Hellespont, xi. 224;
-    accusation of Iphikrates and Timotheus by, xi. 226 _seq._;
-    and Artabazus, xi. 230;
-    conquest of Sestos by, xi. 258;
-    expedition of, to Olynthus, xi. 349;
-    at the battle of Chæroneia, xi. 502;
-    capitulation of, at Mitylênê, xii. 142.
-
-  _Charidemus_, x. 251;
-    and Iphikrates, x. 299;
-    and Timotheus, x. 300, 301;
-    and Kephisodotus, x. 374, 377;
-    and Kersobleptes, x. 376, 377;
-    and the Athenians in the Chersonese, B. C. 360-358, x. 377 _seq._;
-    and Miltokythes, x. 378;
-    his popularity and expedition to Thrace, xi. 307;
-    expedition of, to Chalkidikê, xi. 349;
-    put to death by Darius, xii. 108.
-
-  _Charidemus_ and Ephialtes, banishment of, xii. 46.
-
-  _Chariklês_, expedition of, to Peloponnesus, B. C. 413, vii. 288;
-    and Peisander, vii. 198.
-
-  _Charilaus_ and Lykurgus, ii. 344;
-    the Samian, iv. 249.
-
-  _Charites_, the, i. 10.
-
-  _Charitesia_, festival of, i. 128.
-
-  _Charlemagne_, legends of, i. 475.
-
-  _Charmandê_, dispute among the Cyreian forces near, ix. 35.
-
-  _Charmînus_, victory of Astyochus over, vii. 397.
-
-  _Charon_ the Theban, x. 81 _seq._
-
-  _Charondas_, iv. 417.
-
-  _Charopinus_, iv. 290.
-
-  _Cheirisophus_, ix. 80;
-    and Xenophon, ix. 92, 95, 106 _seq._;
-    at the Kentritês, ix. 99;
-    mission of, to Byzantium, ix. 125;
-    return of, from Byzantium, ix. 144;
-    elected sole general of the Ten Thousand Greeks, ix. 145;
-    death of, ix. 148.
-
-  _Chersonese_, Thracian, iv. 27;
-    connection of, with Athens under Peisistratus, iv. 117 _seq._;
-    attacked by the Athenians, B. C. 479, v. 201;
-    operations of Periklês in, vi. 10;
-    retirement of Alkibiadês to, B. C. 407, viii. 159;
-    fortification of, by Derkyllidas, ix. 218;
-    partial readmission of Athenians to, B. C. 365, x. 296 _seq._;
-    Epaminondas near, x. 301, 306;
-    Timotheus at, x. 302, 306, 368;
-    Ergophilus in the, x. 369 _seq._;
-    Kotys in the, x. 373;
-    Kephisodotus in the, x. 374;
-    Charidemus and the Athenians in the, x. 377 _seq._;
-    restoration of, to Athens, B. C. 358, x. 379, xi. 219;
-    Kersobleptes cedes part of, to Athens, xi. 258;
-    speech of Demosthenes on, xi. 451;
-    mission of Demosthenes to, xi. 453;
-    votes of thanks from, to Athens, xi. 461.
-
-  _Chians_ at Ladê, iv. 304;
-    activity of, in promoting revolt among the Athenian allies,
-      vii. 374;
-    expedition of, against Lesbos, vii. 382 _seq._;
-    improved condition of, B. C. 411, viii. 94.
-
-  _Chimæra_, the, i. 7.
-
-  _Chios_, foundation of, iii. 147;
-    Histiæus at, iv. 299;
-    an autonomous ally of Athens, vi. 2;
-    proceeding of Athenians at, B. C. 425, vi. 360;
-    application from, to Sparta, B. C. 413, vii. 365;
-    the Lacedæmonians persuaded by Alkibiadês to send aid to, vii. 367;
-    suspicions of the Athenians about, B. C. 412, vii. 368;
-    expedition of Chalkideus and Alkibiadês to, vii. 369 _seq._;
-    revolt of, from Athens, B. C. 412, vii. 371 _seq._;
-    expedition of Strombichidês to, vii. 374;
-    harassing operations of the Athenians against, B. C. 412,
-      vii. 385 _seq._, 391, 393;
-    prosperity of, between B. C. 480-412. vii. 387;
-    defeat of Pedaritus at, viii. 20;
-    removal of Mindarus from Milêtus to, viii. 101;
-    voyage of Mindarus from, to the Hellespont, viii. 102, 102 _n._;
-    revolution at, furthered by Kratesippidas, viii. 140;
-    escape of Eteonikus from Mitylenê to, viii. 175, 189;
-    Eteonikus at, viii. 211;
-    revolt of, from Athens, B. C. 358, xi. 220 _seq._, 231;
-    repulse of the Athenians at, B. C. 358, xi. 223;
-    acquisition of, by Memnon, xii. 105;
-    capture of, by Macedonian admirals, xii. 141.
-
-  _Chivalry_, romances of, i. 475 _seq._
-
-  _Chlidon_, x. 84.
-
-  _Chœrilus_, Näke’s comments on, ii. 137 _n._;
-    poem of, on the expedition of Xerxes into Greece, v. 39 _n._
-
-  _Choric_ training at Sparta and Krête, iv. 84 _seq._
-
-  _Choriênes_, Alexander’s capture of the rock of, xii. 214.
-
-  _Chorus_, the Greek, iv. 83;
-    improvements in, by Stesichorus, iv. 87.
-
-  _Chronicle_ of Turpin, the, i. 475.
-
-  _Chronological_ calculation destroys the religious character of
-      mythical genealogies, i. 446;
-    table from Clinton’s Fasti Hellenici, ii. 36 _seq._;
-    computations, the value of, dependent on the trustworthiness of the
-      genealogies, ii. 41;
-    evidence of early poets, ii. 45.
-
-  _Chronologists_, modern, ii. 37.
-
-  _Chronologizing_ attempts indicative of mental progress, ii. 56.
-
-  _Chronology_ of mythical events, various schemes of, ii. 34 _seq._;
-    Alexandrine, from the return of the Herakleids to the first
-      Olympiad, ii. 304;
-    of Egyptian kings from Psammetichus to Amasis, iii. 330 _n._ 2;
-    Egyptian, iii. 339 _seq._;
-    Grecian, between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, v. 304 _n._ 2;
-    of the period between Philip’s fortification of Elateia and the
-      battle of Chæroneia, xi. 494 _n._ 2.
-
-  _Chrysaor_, i. 1, 7.
-
-  _Chryseis_, i. 294.
-
-  _Chrysippus_, i. 160.
-
-  _Chrysopolis_, occupation of, by the Athenians, viii. 127.
-
-  _Cimmerian_ invasion of Asia Minor, iii. 249 _seq._
-
-  _Cimmerians_, iii. 234;
-    driven out of their country by the Scythians, iii. 247 _seq._
-
-  _Circê_ and Æêtês, i. 252.
-
-  _Clinton’s_ Fasti Hellenici, chronological table from, ii. 36 _seq._;
-    opinion on the computations of the date of the Trojan war, ii. 39;
-    vindication of the genealogies, ii. 42 _seq._
-
-  _Coined_ money, first introduction of, into Greece, ii. 318.
-
-  _Comedy_, growth, development, and influence of, at Athens,
-      viii. 325 _seq._
-
-  _Comic_ poets, before Aristophanês, viii. 327;
-    writers, mistaken estimate of, as witnesses and critics,
-      viii. 332 _seq._
-
-  _Commemorative_ influence of Grecian rites, i. 454 _seq._
-
-  _Congress_ at Corinth, B. C. 421, vii. 13-15;
-    at Sparta, B. C. 421, vii. 24;
-    at Mantinea, B. C. 419, vii. 67 _seq._
-
-  _Conón_ on the legend of Kadmus, i. 258.
-
-  _Constitutional_ forms, attachment of the Athenians to, viii. 41;
-    morality, necessity for creating, in the time of Kleisthenês,
-      iv. 159.
-
-  _Corinth_, origin of, i. 119 _seq._;
-    Dorians, at, ii. 9;
-    early distinction of, ii. 113;
-    isthmus of, ii. 216;
-    Herakleid kings of, ii. 306;
-    Dorian settlers at, ii. 309;
-    despots at, iii. 39 _seq._;
-    great power of, under Periander, iii. 43;
-    Sikyôn and Megara, analogy of, iii. 47;
-    voyage from, to Gadês in the seventh and sixth centuries B. C.,
-      iii. 277;
-    relations of Korkyra with, iii. 404 _seq._;
-    and Korkyra, joint settlements of, iii. 405 _seq._;
-    relations between the colonies of, iii. 407;
-    decision of, respecting the dispute between Thebes and Platæa,
-      iv. 166;
-    protest of, at the first convocation at Sparta, iv. 175;
-    Pan-Hellenic congress at the Isthmus of, v. 57 _seq._;
-    rush of Peloponnesians to the Isthmus of, after the battle of
-      Thermopylæ, v. 106;
-    growing hatred of, to Athens, B. C. 461, v. 320;
-    operations of the Athenians in the Gulf of, B. C. 455, v. 332;
-    and Korkyra, war between, vi. 51 _seq._;
-    and Athens, after the naval battle between Corinth and Korkyra,
-      vi. 69 _seq._;
-    congress at, B. C. 421, vii. 13, 15 _seq._;
-    and Syracuse, embassy from, to Sparta, vii. 235;
-    synod at, B. C. 412, vii. 368;
-    altered feeling of, after the capture of Athens by Lysander,
-      viii. 259, 264, 275;
-    alliance of, with Thebes, Athens, and Argos, against Sparta,
-      ix. 301;
-    anti-Spartan allies at, ix. 302;
-    battle of, ix. 307 _seq._, 317;
-    Pharnabazus and the anti-Spartan allies at, ix. 320;
-    philo-Laconian party at, B. C. 392, ix. 328 _seq._;
-    _coup d’état_ of the government at, ix. 329;
-    contrast between political conflicts at, and at Athens,
-      ix. 330 _n._ 3;
-    and Argos, consolidation of, B. C. 392, ix. 332;
-    victor of the Lacedæmonians within the Long Walls at ix. 333 _seq._;
-    the Long Walls of, partly pulled down by the Lacedæmonians, ix. 335;
-    the Long Walls of, restored by the Athenians, and taken by Agesilaus
-      and Teleutias, ix. 345 _seq._;
-    and the peace of Antalkidas, ix. 387, x. 12;
-    application of, to Athens, for aid against Thebes, x. 234 _seq._;
-    Iphikrates at, x. 237;
-    and the Persian rescript in favor of Thebes, x. 282;
-    project of the Athenians to seize, B. C. 366, x. 289;
-    peace of, with Thebes, B. C. 366, x. 290 _seq._;
-    application from Syracuse to, B. C. 344, xi. 134;
-    message from Hiketas to, xi. 143;
-    Dionysius the Younger at, xi. 151 _seq._;
-    reinforcement from, to Timoleon, xi. 152, 155, 157;
-    efforts of, to restore Syracuse, xi. 167, 168;
-    Philip chosen chief of the Greeks at the congress at, xi. 511;
-    convention at, under Alexander, B. C. 336, xii. 13 _seq._;
-    violations of the convention at, by Alexander, xii. 16 _seq._;
-    Alexander at, B. C. 335, xii. 48.
-
-  _Corinthian envoys_, speech of, to the Athenian assembly, in reply to
-      the Korkyræans, vi. 59;
-    speech of, to the Spartan assembly, against Athens, vi. 82 _seq._;
-    speech of, at the congress of allies at Sparta, vi. 93 _seq._
-
-  _Corinthian_ genealogy of Eumelus, i. 119 _seq._;
-
-  _Corinthian_ Gulf, naval conflicts of Corinthians and Lacedæmonians
-      in, ix. 326;
-    territory, Nikias’s expedition against, vi. 355 _seq._;
-    war, commencement of, ix. 301.
-
-  _Corinthians_, early commerce and enterprise of, iii. 1;
-    behavior of, at Salamis, v. 145;
-    defeated by Myronides, v. 324;
-    procure the refusal of the Samians’ application to Sparta for aid
-      against Athens, vi. 30, 50;
-    instigate Potidæa, the Chalkidians and Bottiæans to revolt from
-      Athens, vi. 65 _seq._;
-    defeat of, near Potidæa, vi. 73;
-    strive to excite war against Athens after their defeat near Potidæa,
-      vi. 78;
-    repudiate the peace of Nikias, vi. 493, vii. 2;
-    induce Argos to head a new Peloponnesian alliance, vii. 12;
-    hesitate to join Argos, vii. 16, 62;
-    join Argos, vii. 18;
-    application of, to the Bœotians and Athenians, B. C. 421, vii. 20;
-    and Karneia, vii. 308 _n._ 1;
-    and Athenians, naval battle between, near Naupaktus,
-      vii. 358 _seq._;
-    and Lacedæmonians, naval and land conflicts between, B. C. 393,
-      ix. 333 _seq._
-
-  _Courts_ of Requests, their analogy to Athenian dikasteries,
-      v. 399 _n._ 1.
-
-  _Creditor_ and debtor, law of, at Athens before Solon, iii. 95;
-    Roman law of, iii. 159.
-
-  _Criticisms_ on the first two volumes of this history, reply to,
-      i. 408 _n._
-
-  _Crœsus_ and Solon, alleged interview between, iii. 149 _seq._;
-    moral of Herodotus’s story about, iii. 153;
-    reign and conquests of, iii. 258 _seq._;
-    power and alliances of, iv. 182;
-    and Cyrus, war between, iv. 188 _seq._;
-    and the oracles, iv. 189, 190, 193;
-    solicits the alliance of Sparta, iv. 190;
-    fate of, impressive to the Greek mind, iv. 195.
-
-  _Cumæ_ in Campania, iii. 357 _seq._
-
-  _Cyclades_, ii. 214, iii. 163;
-    Themistoklês levies fines on, v. 141.
-
-  _Cycle_, epic, ii. 122 _seq._
-
-  _Cyclic_ poets, ii. 122 _seq._
-
-  _Cyclôpes_, i. 4, 5.
-
-  _Cyprus_, influence of Aphroditê upon, i. 5;
-    Solon’s visit to, iii. 148;
-    Phenicians and Greeks in, iii. 277;
-    extension of the Ionic revolt to, iv. 291;
-    subjugation of, by Phenicians and Persians, iv. 293;
-    conquest of, by the Turks in 1570, iv. 293 _n._;
-    expedition to, under Kimon, v. 335;
-    before and under Evagoras, x. 14 _seq._;
-    subjugation of, to the Persian king Ochus, xi. 437;
-    surrender of the princes of, to Alexander, xii. 137.
-
-  _Cyrenaica_, iv. 36 _n._ 3, 37 _n._
-
-  _Cyropædia_, Xenophon’s, iv. 183.
-
-  _Cyrus the Great_, early history and rise of, iv. 183 _seq._;
-    and Crœsus, war between, iv. 188 _seq._;
-    and the Lacedæmonians, iv. 199;
-    conquests of, in Asia, iv. 209;
-    capture of Babylon by, iv. 211 _seq._;
-    exploits and death of, iv. 215;
-    effects of his conquests upon the Persians, iv. 216 _seq._;
-    the tomb of, xii. 237.
-
-  _Cyrus the Younger_, arrival of, in Asia Minor, B. C. 408, viii. 135,
-      137;
-    Lysander’s visits to, at Sardis, viii. 140 _seq._, 214;
-    pay of the Peloponnesian fleet by, viii. 143;
-    and Kallikratidas, viii. 162;
-    entrusts his satrapy and revenues to Lysander, viii. 214;
-    and Artaxerxes Mnemon, viii. 312, ix. 8 _seq._;
-    youth and education of, ix. 5;
-    his esteem for the Greeks and hopes of the crown, ix. 6;
-    charge of Tissaphernes against, ix. 7;
-    strict administration and prudent behavior of, ix. 9;
-    forces of, collected at Sardis, ix. 11;
-    march of, from Sardis to Kunaxa, ix. 14 _seq._;
-    assistance of Epyaxa to, ix. 18;
-    review of his troops at Tyriæum, ix. 19;
-    and Syennesis, ix. 20;
-    at Tarsus, ix. 21 _seq._;
-    desertion of Xenias and Pasion from, ix. 28;
-    at Thapsakus, ix. 29 _seq._;
-    in Babylonia, ix. 35 _seq._;
-    speech of, to his Greek forces in Babylonia, ix. 36;
-    his conception of Grecian superiority, ix. 37;
-    his present to the prophet Silanus, ix. 40;
-    passes the undefended trench, ix. 41;
-    at Kunaxa, ix. 42 _seq._;
-    character of, ix. 49;
-    probable conduct of, towards Greece, if victorious at Kunaxa, ix. 51;
-    and the Asiatic Greeks, ix. 207.
-
-
-  D.
-
-  _Dædalus_, i. 225, 228 _seq._
-
-  _Dæmon_ of Sokratês, viii. 408 _seq._
-
-  _Dæmons_, i. 65, 67, 70 _seq._;
-    and gods, distinction between, i. 425 _seq._;
-    admission of, as partially evil beings, i. 427.
-
-  _Damascus_, capture of, by the Macedonians, xii. 128.
-
-  _Damasithymus_ of Kalyndus, v. 135.
-
-  _Danaê_, legend of, i. 90.
-
-  _Danaos_ and the Danaides, i. 88.
-
-  _Dancing_, Greek, iv. 85.
-
-  _Daphnæus_, at Agrigentum, x. 426 _seq._;
-    death of, x. 444.
-
-  _Dardanus_, son of Zeus, i. 285.
-
-  _Daric_, the golden, iv. 239 _n._ 2.
-
-  _Darius Hystaspes_, accession of, iv. 224 _seq._;
-    discontents of the satraps under, iv. 226 _seq._;
-    revolt of the Medes against, iv. 227 _n._;
-    revolt of Babylon against, iv. 230;
-    organization of the Persian empire by, iv. 233 _seq._;
-    twenty satrapies of, iv. 235 _seq._;
-    organizing tendency, coinage, roads, and posts of, iv. 238 _seq._;
-    and Sylosôn, iv. 240;
-    conquering dispositions of, iv. 252;
-    probable consequences of an expedition by, against Greece before
-      going against Scythia, iv. 260 _seq._;
-    invasion of Scythia by, iv. 262 _seq._;
-    his orders to the Ionians at the bridge over the Danube, iv. 269;
-    return of, to Susa from Scythia, iv. 280;
-    revenge of, against the Athenians, iv. 297;
-    preparations of, for invading Greece, iv. 314;
-    submission of Greeks to, before the battle of Marathon, iv. 315;
-    heralds of, at Athens and Sparta, iv. 316;
-    instructions of, to Datis and Artaphernês, iv. 329;
-    resolution of, to invade Greece a second time, v. 1;
-    death of, v. 2.
-
-  _Darius_, son of Artaxerxes Mnemon, x. 367.
-
-  _Darius Codomannus_, encouragement of anti-Macedonians in Greece by,
-      xii. 20;
-    his accession and preparations for defence against Alexander,
-      xii. 76;
-    irreparable mischief of Memnon’s death to, xii. 106;
-    change in the plan of, after Memnon’s death, xii. 107, 109;
-    puts Charidemus to death, xii. 108;
-    Arrian’s criticism on the plan of, against Alexander, xii. 110;
-    at Mount Amanus, xii. 115 _seq._;
-    advances into Kilikia, xii. 117;
-    at Issus before the battle, xii. 117;
-    defeat of, at Issus, xii. 118 _seq._;
-    capture of his mother, wife, and family by Alexander, xii. 124, 153;
-    his correspondence with Alexander, xii. 130, 140;
-    inaction of, after the battle of Issus, xii. 152;
-    defeat of, at Arbela, xii. 155 _seq._;
-    a fugitive in Media, xii. 178, 180;
-    pursued by Alexander into Parthia, xii. 182 _seq._;
-    conspiracy against, by Bessus and others, xii. 183 _seq._;
-    death of, xii. 185;
-    Alexander’s disappointment in not taking him alive, xii. 186;
-    funeral, fate, and conduct of, xii. 186.
-
-  _Darius Nothus_, ix. 2 _seq._;
-    death of, ix. 6.
-
-  _Daskon_, attack of Dionysius on the Carthaginian naval station at,
-      x. 508.
-
-  _Datames_, x. 360.
-
-  _Datis_, siege and capture of Eretria by, iv. 330 _seq._;
-    conquest of Karystus by, iv. 331;
-    Persian armament at Samos under, iv. 329;
-    conquest of Naxos and other Cyclades by, iv. 330 _seq._;
-    forbearance of, towards Delos, iv. 330;
-    at Marathon, iv. 333, 345 _seq._;
-    return of, to Asia, after the battle of Marathon, iv. 362.
-
-  _Debtor and creditor_, law of, at Athens before Solon, iii. 95;
-    Roman law of, iii. 159 _seq._
-
-  _Debtors_, Solon’s relief of, iii. 99;
-    treatment of, according to Gallic and Teutonic codes, iii. 110 _n._
-
-  _Debts_, the obligation of, inviolable at Athens, iii. 105, 113;
-    distinction between the principal and interest of, in an early
-      society, iii. 107.
-
-  _Defence_, means of, superior to those of attack in ancient Greece,
-      ii. 111.
-
-  _Deianeira_, i. 151.
-
-  _Deinokrates_, xii. 406, 407, 440, 446 _seq._
-
-  _Dêïokes_, iii. 227 _seq._
-
-  _Deities_ not included in the twelve great ones, i. 10;
-    of guilds or trades, i. 344.
-
-  _Dekamnichus_, x. 47.
-
-  _Dekarchies_ established by Lysander, ix. 184 _seq._, 194, 197.
-
-  _Dekeleia_, legend of, 159;
-    fortification of, by the Lacedæmonians, vii. 286, 288, 364;
-    Agis at, vii. 365, viii. 150.
-
-  _Delian Apollo_, i. 45.
-
-  _Delian festival_, iii. 167 _seq._;
-    early splendor and subsequent decline of, iv. 54;
-    revival of, B. C. 426, vi. 312.
-
-  _Delium_, Hippokratês’s march to, and fortification of, B. C. 424,
-      vi. 382 _seq._;
-    battle of, B. C. 424, vi. 389 _seq._;
-    siege and capture of, by the Bœotians, B. C. 424, vi. 396;
-    Sokratês and Alkibiadês at the battle of, vi. 397.
-
-  _Dêlos_, Ionic festival at, iii. 167, _seq._, iv. 54;
-    forbearance of Datis towards, iv. 330;
-    the confederacy of, v. 263 _seq._, 290 _seq._;
-    the synod of, v. 301, 302;
-    first breach of union in the confederacy of, v. 312;
-    revolt of Thasos from the confederacy of, v. 315;
-    transfer of the fund of the confederacy from, to Athens, v. 343;
-    transition of the confederacy of, into an Athenian empire, v. 343;
-    purification of, by the Athenians, vi. 312;
-    restoration of the native population to, B. C. 421, vii. 23.
-
-  _Delphi_, temple and oracle of, i. 48 _seq._, ii. 253;
-    oracle of, and the Battiad dynasty, iv. 41;
-    early state and site of, iv. 59;
-    growth of, iv. 62;
-    conflagration and rebuilding of the temple at, iv. 120 _seq._;
-    the oracle at, worked by Kleisthenês, iv. 122;
-    oracle of, and Xerxes’s invasion, v. 59 _seq._;
-    Xerxes’s detachment against, v. 417;
-    proceedings of Sparta and Athens at, B. C. 452-447, v. 346;
-    answer of the oracle of, to the Spartans on war with Athens,
-      B. C. 432, vi. 92;
-    reply of the oracle at, about Sokratês, viii. 412 _seq._;
-    Agesipolis and the oracle at, ix. 357;
-    claim of the Phokians to the presidency of the temple at,
-      xi. 245 _seq._;
-    Philomelus seizes and fortifies the temple at, xi. 247;
-    Philomelus takes part of the treasures in the temple at, xi. 252;
-    employment of the treasures in the temple at, by Onomarchus,
-      xi. 255;
-    Phayllus despoils the temple at, xi. 297;
-    peculation of the treasures at, xi. 375;
-    miserable death of all concerned in the spoliation of the temple at,
-      xi. 434;
-    relations of the Lokrians of Amphissa with, xi. 469;
-    Amphiktyonic meeting at, B. C. 339, xi. 470 _seq._
-
-  _Delphian Apollo_, reply of, to the remonstrance of Crœsus, iv. 189.
-
-  _Delphians_ and Amphiktyons, attack of, upon Kirrha, xi. 474.
-
-  _Delphinium_ at Athens, iii. 78 _n._
-
-  _Deluge_ of Deukaliôn, i. 96 _seq._
-
-  _Demades_, reproof of Philip by, xi. 505;
-    peace of, xi. 506 _seq._;
-    remark of, on hearing of Alexander’s death, xii. 257;
-    Macedonizing policy of, xii. 278;
-    and Phokion, embassy of, to Antipater, xii. 322;
-    death of, xii. 338.
-
-  _Demagogues_, iii. 18, 21, viii. 39 _seq._
-
-  _Demaratus_ and Kleomenês, iv. 325 _seq._;
-    conversations of, with Xerxes, v. 40, 86, 96;
-    advice of, to Xerxes after the death of Leonidas, v. 96.
-
-  _Demes, Attic_, iii. 63, 66, 68; iv. 132 _seq._
-
-  _Dêmêtêr_, i. 6, 7, 10;
-    foreign influence on the worship of, i. 24, 25;
-    how represented in Homer and Hesiod, i. 37;
-    Homeric hymn to, i. 38 _seq._;
-    legends of, differing from the Homeric hymn, i. 44;
-    Hellenic importance of, i. 44.
-
-  _Dêmêtrius_ of Skêpsis, on Ilium, i. 328.
-
-  _Demetrius Phalereus_, administration of, at Athens, xii. 362 _seq._;
-    retires to Egypt, xii. 374;
-    condemnation of, xii. 378.
-
-  _Demetrius Poliorketes_, at Athens, xii. 373 _seq._, 382, 383 _seq._,
-      388;
-    exploits of, B. C. 307-304, xii. 381;
-    his successes in Greece against Kassander, xii. 382;
-    march of, through Thessaly into Asia, xii. 386;
-    return of, from Asia to Greece, xii. 388;
-    acquires the crown of Macedonia, xii. 389;
-    Greece under, xii. 389;
-    captivity and death of, xii. 390.
-
-  _Demiurgi_, iii. 72.
-
-  _Demochares_, xii. 378, 380, 385, 392.
-
-  _Democracies_, Grecian, securities against corruption in, vii. 402.
-
-  _Democracy_, Athenian, iii. 128, 140; v. 380;
-    effect of the idea of, upon the minds of the Athenians,
-      iv. 179 _seq._;
-    at Athens, stimulus to, from the Persian war, v. 275;
-    reconstitution of, at Samos, viii. 46 _seq._;
-    restoration of, at Athens, B. C. 411, viii. 75 _seq._, 80 _seq._,
-      and B. C. 403, viii. 288, 300;
-    moderation of Athenian, viii. 92, 304 _seq._;
-    at Samos, contrasted with the oligarchy of the Four Hundred,
-      viii. 93 _seq._
-
-  _Democratical_ leaders at Athens, and the Thirty, viii. 240,
-      245 _seq._;
-    sentiment, increase of, at Athens, between B. C. 479-459, v. 355.
-
-  _Dêmokêdês_, romantic history of, iv. 253 _seq._
-
-  _Demônax_, reform of Kyrênê by, iv. 44;
-    constitution of, not durable, iv. 49.
-
-  _Demophantus_, psephism of, viii. 80.
-
-  _Demos_ at Syracuse, v. 206.
-
-  _Demosthenês the general_, in Akarnania, vi. 296;
-    expedition of, against Ætolia, vi. 296 _seq._;
-    saves Naupaktus, vi. 301;
-    goes to protect Amphilochian Argos, vi. 302;
-    his victory over Eurylochus at Olpæ, vi. 304 _seq._;
-    his triumphant return from Akarnania to Athens, vi. 312;
-    fortifies and defends Pylus, vi. 317 _seq._;
-    application of, for reinforcements from Athens, to attack
-      Sphakteria, vi. 334 _seq._;
-    victory of, in Sphakteria, vi. 341 _seq._;
-    attempt of, to surprise Megara and Nisæ, vi. 372 _seq._;
-    scheme of, for invading Bœotia, B. C. 424, vi. 379;
-    unsuccessful descent upon Bœotia by, vi. 380;
-    his evacuation of the fort at Epidaurus, vii. 97;
-    expedition of, to Sicily, vii. 289, 298, 303;
-    arrival of, at Syracuse, vii. 302, 304;
-    plans of, on arriving at Syracuse, vii. 306;
-    night attack of, upon Epipolæ, vii. 306 _seq._;
-    his proposals for removing from Syracuse, vii. 308 _seq._;
-    and Nikias, resolution of, after the final defeat in the harbor of
-      Syracuse, vii. 338;
-    capture and subsequent treatment of, vii. 341 _seq._, 347;
-    respect for the memory of, vii. 348;
-    death of, vii. 347.
-
-  _Demosthenes_, father of the orator, xi. 265.
-
-  _Demosthenes the orator_, first appearance of, as public adviser in
-      the Athenian assembly, xi. 263;
-    parentage and early youth of, xi. 263 _seq._;
-    and his guardians, xi. 265;
-    early rhetorical tendencies of, xi. 266;
-    training and instructors of, xi. 268 _seq._;
-    action and matter of, xi. 271;
-    first known as a composer of speeches for others, xi. 272;
-    speech of, against Leptines, xi. 272;
-    speech of, on the Symmories, xi. 285 _seq._;
-    exhortations of, to personal effort and sacrifice, xi. 289, 357;
-    recommendations of, on Sparta and Megalopolis, xi. 291;
-    first Philippic of, xi. 309 _seq._;
-    opponents of, at Athens, B. C. 351, xi. 318;
-    earliest Olynthiac of, xi. 327 _seq._;
-    practical effect of his speeches, xi. 329;
-    second Olynthiac of, xi. 331 _seq._;
-    allusions of, to the Theôric fund, xi. 334, 338;
-    third Olynthiac of, xi. 335 _seq._, 336;
-    insulted by Meidias, xi. 343;
-    reproached for his absence from the battle of Tamynæ, xi. 344;
-    serves as hoplite in Eubœa, and is chosen senator for,
-      B. C. 349-348, xi. 345;
-    order of the Olynthiacs of, xi. 358 _seq._;
-    and Æschines, on the negotiations with Philip, B. C. 347-346,
-      xi. 371 _n._, 378 _n._;
-    speaks in favor of peace, B. C. 347, xi. 372;
-    and the first embassy from Athens to Philip, xi. 380 _seq._, 386;
-    failure of, in his speech before Philip, xi. 382;
-    and the confederate synod at Athens respecting Philip, xi. 389 _n._,
-      390, 392 _n._ 3;
-    and the motion of Philokratês for peace and alliance with Philip,
-      xi. 391 _seq._;
-    and the exclusion of the Phokians from the peace and alliance
-      between Athens and Philip, xi. 400 _seq._;
-    and the second embassy from Athens to Philip, xi. 403, 405 _seq._,
-      412, 415;
-    and the third embassy from Athens to Philip, xi. 422;
-    charges of, against Æschines, xi. 431;
-    and the peace and alliance of Athens with Philip, B. C. 346,
-      xi. 432;
-    recommends acquiescence in the Amphiktyonic dignity of Philip,
-      xi. 435;
-    vigilance and warnings of, against Philip, after B. C. 246, xi. 444;
-    speech on the Chersonese and third Philippic of, xi. 451;
-    increased influence of, at Athens, B. C. 341-338, xi. 452;
-    mission of, to the Chersonese and, Byzantium, xi. 453;
-    vote of thanks to, at Athens, xi. 461;
-    reform in the administration of the Athenian marine by,
-      xi. 462 _seq._, 464 _n._;
-    his opposition to the proceedings of Æschines at the Amphiktyonic
-      meeting, B. C. 339, xi. 478;
-    on the special Amphiktyonic meeting at Thermopylæ, xi. 479;
-    advice of, on hearing of the fortification of Elateia by Philip,
-      xi. 486;
-    mission of, to Thebes, B. C. 339, xi. 488 _seq._;
-    crowned at Athens, xi. 493, 496;
-    at the battle of Chæroneia, xi. 498 _seq._, 501;
-    confidence shown to, after the battle of Chæroneia, xi. 503, 509;
-    conduct of, on the death of Philip, xii. 10;
-    correspondence of, with Persia, xii. 20 _seq._;
-    accusation against, respecting the revolt of Thebes against
-      Alexander, xii. 34;
-    position and policy of, in Alexander’s time, xii. 278 _seq._;
-    and Æschines, judicial contest between, xii. 286 _seq._;
-    accusation against, in the affair of Harpalus, xii. 294 _seq._;
-    recall of, from exile, xii. 314;
-    flight of, to Kalauria, xii. 322;
-    condemnation and death of, xii. 326 _seq._;
-    life and character of, xii. 328 _seq._
-
-  _Derdas_ at Olynthus, x. 65.
-
-  _Derkyllidas_, in Asia, ix. 209 _seq._, 219 _seq._, 255;
-    at Abydos and Sestos, ix. 320;
-    superseded by Anaxibius at Abydos, ix. 368.
-
-  _Despots_, in Greece, iii. 4, 18 _seq._;
-    at Sikyôn, iii. _seq._, 39;
-    at Corinth, iii. 41 _seq._;
-    of Asiatic Greece, deposition of, by Aristagoras, iv. 285;
-    Sicilian, v. 206, 233.
-
-  _Deukaliôn_, i. 96 _seq._
-
-  _Dexippus_, ix. 126, 149 _seq._; x. 423, 429, 444.
-
-  _Diadochi_, Asia Hellenized by, xii. 269.
-
-  _Diagoras_, prosecution of, vii. 208.
-
-  _Dialectics_, Grecian, iv. 87; viii. 338, 345 _seq._, 454 _seq._
-
-  _Dictators_ in Greece, iii. 19.
-
-  _Dido_, legend of, iii. 347.
-
-  _Digamma_ and the Homeric poems, ii. 147.
-
-  _Diitrephês_, vii. 356 _seq._
-
-  _Dikæus_, vision of, v. 118.
-
-  _Dikasteries_, not established by Solon, iii. 125;
-    Athenian, iv. 140 _seq._, v. 378 _seq._, 385, 393;
-    constitution of, by Periklês, v. 355 _seq._, 366;
-    working of, at Athens, v. 381 _seq._;
-    at Rhodes and other Grecian cities, v. 384 _n._ 2;
-    jurisdiction of, over the subject-allies of Athens, vi. 39 _seq._,
-      42, 43, 45.
-
-  _Dikasts_, oath of, at Athens, iii. 105, viii. 298;
-    Athenian iv. 141, 372;
-    under Periklês, v. 357, 366, 376 _seq._, 388.
-
-  _Dikon_ of Kaulonia, xi. 28.
-
-  _Dimnus_, xii. 191, 194.
-
-  _Diodôrus_, his historical versions of mythes, i. 413;
-    statement of, respecting the generals at Arginusæ, viii. 184.
-
-  _Diodotus_, speech of, vi. 254 _seq._
-
-  _Diogenes_ and Alexander, xii. 48.
-
-  _Diokleidês_, vii. 198, 204.
-
-  _Dioklês the Corinthian_, ii. 297.
-
-  _Dioklês the Syracusan_, the laws of, x. 389 _seq._;
-    aid to Himera under, x. 410, 412;
-    banishment of, x. 417.
-
-  _Dio Chrysostom’s_ attempt to historicise the legend of Troy, i. 321.
-
-  _Dio Chrysostom_ at Olbia, xii. 477 _seq._
-
-  _Diomêdês_, return of, from Troy, i. 316.
-
-  _Diomedon_, pursuit of Chians by, vii. 375;
-    at Teos and Lesbos, vii. 383;
-    at Milêtus and Chios, vii. 385 _seq._;
-    at Samos, viii. 28;
-    defeat of, by Kallikratidas, viii. 169.
-
-  _Dion_, his Dionysian connection, and character, xi. 58;
-    Plato, and the Pythagoreans, xi. 56 _seq._;
-    political views of, xi. 58 _seq._;
-    maintains the confidence of Dionysius the Elder to the last, xi. 61;
-    his visits to Peloponnesus and Athens, xi. 61;
-    conduct of, on the accession of Dionysius the Younger,
-      xi. 64 _seq._;
-    efforts of, to improve Dionysius the Younger, xi. 64 _seq._;
-    entreats Plato to visit Dionysius the Younger, xi. 69;
-    and Plato urge Dionysius the Younger to reform himself, xi. 73;
-    and Plato, intrigues of Philistus against, xi. 76;
-    alienation of Dionysius the Younger from, xi. 77;
-    banishment of, xi. 78;
-    property of, confiscated by Dionysius the Younger, xi. 82;
-    resolution of, to avenge himself on Dionysius the Younger, and free
-      Syracuse, xi. 82 _seq._, 85;
-    forces of, at Zakynthus, xi. 84, 87;
-    expedition of, against Dionysius the Younger, xi. 85 _seq._;
-    entry of, into Syracuse, B. C. 357, xi. 92 _seq._;
-    chosen general by the Syracusans, xi. 94;
-    captures Epipolæ and Euryalus, xi. 95;
-    blockade of Ortygia by, xi. 95, 98, 114;
-    negotiations of Dionysius the Younger with, xi. 97, 104;
-    victory of, over Dionysius the Younger, xi. 97 _seq._;
-    intrigues of Dionysius the Younger against, xi. 103;
-    suspicions of the Syracusans against, xi. 100, 193, 118;
-    and Herakleides, xi. 101, 103, 112, 115 _seq._, 121, 122;
-    deposition and retreat of, from Syracuse, xi. 105;
-    at Leontini, xi. 106, 108, 109;
-    repulse of Nepsius and rescue of Syracuse by, xi. 108 _seq._;
-    entry of, into Syracuse, B. C. 356, xi. 110;
-    entry of, into Ortygia, xi. 117;
-    conduct of, on his final triumph, xi. 118 _seq._;
-    his omission to grant freedom to Syracuse, xi. 119 _seq._;
-    opposition to, as dictator, xi. 121 _seq._;
-    tyranny, unpopularity and disquietude of, xi. 122 _seq._;
-    death and character of, xi. 123 _seq._;
-    and Timoleon, contrast between, xi. 195 _seq._
-
-  _Dionysia_, Attic, i. 31, iv. 69.
-
-  _Dionysiac_ festival at Athens, B. C. 349, xi. 343.
-
-  _Dionysius, Phôkæan_, iv. 305 _seq._, 309.
-
-  _Dionysius the Elder_, and Konon, ix. 325;
-    demonstration against, at Olympia, B. C. 384, x. 73 _seq._,
-      xi. 27 _seq._;
-    triremes of, captured by Iphikrates, x. 151;
-    first appearance of, at Syracuse, x. 420;
-    movement of the Hermokratean party to elevate, x. 432;
-    harangue of, against the Syracusan generals at Agrigentum,
-      x. 433 _seq._;
-    one of the generals of Syracuse, x. 434 _seq._;
-    first expedition of, to Gela, x. 438;
-    accusations of, against his colleagues, x. 439;
-    election of, as sole general, x. 440;
-    stratagem of, to obtain a body-guard, x. 441 _seq._;
-    establishes himself as despot at Syracuse, x. 444 _seq._, 454;
-    second expedition of, to Gela, x. 447 _seq._;
-    charges of treachery against, x. 451, 456;
-    mutiny of the Syracusan horsemen against, x. 451 _seq._;
-    and Imilkon, peace between, x. 455 _seq._;
-    sympathy of Sparta with, x. 457;
-    strong position of, after his peace with Imilkon, x. 457;
-    fortification and occupation of Ortygia by, x. 458 _seq._;
-    re-distribution of property by, x. 459 _seq._;
-    exorbitant exactions of, x. 461;
-    mutiny of the Syracusan soldiers against, x. 462 _seq._;
-    besieged in Ortygia, x. 462 _seq._;
-    strengthens his despotism, x. 466 _seq._;
-    conquers Ætna, Naxus, Katana, and Leontini, x. 467;
-    at Enna, x. 468;
-    resolution of, to make war upon Carthage, B. C. 400, x. 469;
-    additional fortifications at Syracuse by, x. 471 _seq._;
-    preparations of, for war with Carthage, B. C. 399-397, x. 473,
-      477 _seq._;
-    improved behavior of, to the Syracusans, B. C. 399, x. 473;
-    conciliatory policy of, towards the Greek cities, near the Strait
-      of Messênê, B. C. 399, x. 474 _seq._;
-    marriage of, with Doris and Aristomachê, x. 476, 480;
-    exhorts the Syracusan assembly to war against Carthage, x. 481;
-    permits the plunder of the Carthaginians at Syracuse, x. 482;
-    declares war against Carthage, B. C. 397, x. 483;
-    marches against the Carthaginians in Sicily, B. C. 397,
-      x. 483 _seq._;
-    siege and capture of Motyê by, x. 485 _seq._;
-    revolt of the Sikels from, x. 494;
-    provisions of, for the defence of Syracuse against the Carthaginians
-      B. C. 396, x. 494;
-    naval defeat of, near Katana, x. 495;
-    retreat of, from Katana to Syracuse, B. C. 395, x. 497;
-    Syracusan naval victory over the Carthaginians in the absence of,
-      x. 501;
-    speech of Theôdorus against, x. 501 _seq._;
-    discontent of the Syracusans with, B. C. 395, x. 501 _seq._;
-    and Pharakidas, x. 504;
-    attacks the Carthaginian camp before Syracuse and sacrifices his
-      mercenaries, x. 507;
-    success of, by sea and land against the Carthaginians before
-      Syracuse, x. 508;
-    secret treaty of, with Imilkon before Syracuse, x. 510;
-    and the Iberians, x. 510;
-    capture of Libyans by, x. 510;
-    difficulties of, from his mercenaries, xi. 2;
-    re-establishment of Messênê by, xi. 3;
-    conquests of, in the interior of Sicily, B. C., 394, xi. 4;
-    at Tauromenium, xi. 5, 8;
-    and the Sikels, B. C. 394-393, xi. 5, 6;
-    declaration of Agrigentum against, B. C. 393, xi. 6;
-    victory of, near Abakæna, xi. 6;
-    expedition of, against Rhegium, B. C. 393, xi. 7;
-    repulses Magon at Agyrium, xi. 7;
-    plans of against the Greek cities in southern Italy, xi. 8;
-    alliance of, with the Lucanians against the Italiot Greeks, xi. 11;
-    attack of, upon Rhegium, B. C. 390, xi. 11;
-    expedition of, against the Italian Greeks, B. C. 389, xi. 14 _seq._;
-    his capture and generous treatment of Italiot Greeks, xi. 15;
-    besieges and grants peace to Rhegium, xi. 16;
-    capture of Kaulonia and Hipponium by, xi. 7;
-    capture of Rhegium by, xi. 7, 18, 21;
-    cruelty of, to Phyton, xi. 19;
-    and Sparta, ascendancy of, B. C. 387, xi. 22;
-    capture of Kroton, by xi. 23;
-    schemes of for conquests in Epirus and Illyria, xi. 23;
-    plunders Latium, Etruria, and the temple of Agylla, xi. 25;
-    poetical compositions of, xi. 26;
-    dislike and dread of, in Greece, xi. 25, 30;
-    harshness of, to Plato, xi. 39;
-    new constructions and improvements by, at Syracuse, B. C. 387-383,
-      xi. 39;
-    renews the war wish Carthage, B. C. 383, xi. 41 _seq._;
-    disadvantageous peace of, with Carthage, B. C. 383, xi. 42;
-    projected wall of, across the Calabrian peninsula, xi. 43;
-    relations of, with Central Greece, B. C. 382-369, xi. 44;
-    war of, with Carthage, B. C. 368, xi. 44;
-    gains the tragedy prize at the Lenæan festival at Athens, xi. 46;
-    death and character of, xi. 46 _seq._, 62;
-    family left by, xi. 54, 62;
-    the good opinion of, enjoyed by Dion to the last, xi. 61;
-    drunken habits of his descendants, xi. 132.
-
-  _Dionysius the Younger_, age of, at his father’s death, xi. 55 _n._ 1;
-    accession and character of, xi. 63;
-    Dion’s efforts to improve, xi. 67 _seq._;
-    Plato’s visits to, xi. 69 _seq._, 80 _seq._;
-    Plato’s injudicious treatment of, xi. 73 _seq._;
-    his hatred and injuries to Dion, xi. 77, 78, 81 _seq._;
-    detention of Plato by, xi. 79;
-    Dion’s expedition against, xi. 85 _seq._;
-    weakness and drunken habits of, xi. 87;
-    absence of, from Syracuse, B. C. 357, xi. 89;
-    negotiations of, with Dion and the Syracusans, xi. 96, 104;
-    defeat of, by Dion, xi. 97 _seq._;
-    blockaded in Ortygia by Dion, xi. 98;
-    intrigues of, against Dion, xi. 101, 103;
-    his flight in Lokri, xi. 104;
-    return of, to Syracuse, xi. 133;
-    at Lokri, xi. 133;
-    his surrender of Ortygia to Timoleon, xi. 150;
-    at Corinth, xi. 151 _seq._
-
-  _Dionysius_ of the Pontic Herakleia, xii. 465 _seq._
-
-  _Dionysus_, worship of, i. 23, 24, 30, 33;
-    legend of, in the Homeric hymn to, i. 34;
-    alteration of the primitive Grecian idea of, i. 36 _seq._
-
-  _Diopeithes_, xi. 450.
-
-  _Dioskuri_, i. 172.
-
-  _Diphilus_ at Naupaktus, B. C. 413, vii. 358.
-
-  _Diphridas_, in Asia, ix. 363.
-
-  _Dirkê_, i. 263.
-
-  _Discussion_, growth of, among the Greeks, iv. 96.
-
-  _Dithyramb_, iv. 88.
-
-  _Dôdôna_, i. 396.
-
-  _Doloneia_, ii. 178, 189.
-
-  _Dolonkians_ and Miltiadês the first, iv. 117.
-
-  _Dorian cities_ in Peloponnesus about 450 B. C., ii. 298;
-    islands in the Ægean and the Dorians in Argolis, ii. 323;
-    immigration to Peloponnesus, ii. 303;
-    settlers at Argos and Corinth, ii. 308 _seq._, 311;
-    settlement in Sparta, ii. 328;
-    allotment of land at Sparta, ii. 416;
-    mode, the, ii. 433, iii. 212;
-    states, inhabitants of, iii. 31;
-    tribes at Sikyôn, names of, iii. 32, 35.
-
-  _Dorians_, early accounts of, 103 _seq._; ii. 2;
-    mythical title of, to the Peloponnesus, ii. 6;
-    their occupation of Argos, Sparta, Messenia, and Corinth, ii. 8, 9;
-    early Krêtan, ii. 310;
-    in Argolis and the Dorian islands in the Ægean, ii. 323;
-    of Sparta and Stenyklêrus, ii. 326 _seq._;
-    divided into three tribes, ii. 361;
-    Messenian, ii. 438;
-    Asiatic, iii. 201, 202;
-    of Ægina, iv. 172.
-
-  _Doric_ dialect, ii. 337 _seq._, iv. 87;
-    emigrations, ii. 25 _seq._
-
-  _Dorieus the Spartan Prince_, aid of, to Kinyps, iv. 39;
-    and the Krotoniates, iv. 415, 416;
-    Sicily, v. 207.
-
-  _Dorieus the Rhodian_, vii. 394, viii. 116, 117;
-    capture and liberation of, viii. 159;
-    treatment of, by the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, ix. 273 _seq._;
-    and Hermokrates in the Ægean, x. 385.
-
-  _Doris_, i. 102, ii. 289.
-
-  _Doris_, wife of Dionysius, x. 476, 480.
-
-  _Doriskus_, Xerxes at, v. 31 _seq._
-
-  _Dorkis_, v. 256, 257.
-
-  _Dôrus_, i. 99 _seq._
-
-  _Drako_ and his laws, iii. 73 _seq._
-
-  _Dramatic_ genius, development of, at Athens, viii. 317 _seq._
-
-  _Drangiana_, Alexander in, xii. 190 _seq._, 191.
-
-  _Drepanê_, i. 239.
-
-  _Dryopians_, settlements of, formed by sea, ii. 310.
-
-  _Dryopis_, ii. 289.
-
-  _Duketius_, the Sikel prince, iii. 374, vii. 122 _seq._
-
-  _Dymanes_, Hylleis, and Pamphyli, ii. 360.
-
-  _Dyrrachium_, iii. 407 _seq._
-
-
-  E.
-
-  _Earliest Greeks_, residences of, ii. 108 _seq._
-
-  _Early poets_, historical value of, ii. 45.
-
-  _Echemus_, i. 95, 177.
-
-  _Echidna_, i. 7.
-
-  _Eclipse_ of the sun in a battle between Medes and Lydians, iii. 231;
-    of the moon, B. C. 413, vii. 315;
-    of the moon, B. C. 333, xii. 151.
-
-  _Edda_, the, i. 479.
-
-  _Edessa_, the dynasty of, iv. 13, 17.
-
-  _Eetioneia_, fort at, viii. 57, 63; viii. 67.
-
-  _Egesta_, application of, to Athens, vii. 145 _seq._;
-    application of, to Carthage, x. 401 _seq._;
-    Syracusan attack upon, x. 489;
-    barbarities of Agathokles at, xii. 445.
-
-  _Egypt_, influence of, upon the religion of Greece, i. 24, 29, 31;
-    the opening of, to Grecian commerce, i. 365;
-    ante-Hellenic colonies from, to Greece not probable, ii. 267;
-    Solon’s visit to, iii. 148;
-    Herodotus’s account of, iii. 308 _seq._;
-    antiquity of, iii. 311;
-    peculiar physical and moral features of, iii. 311;
-    large town-population in, iii. 319;
-    profound submission of the people in, iii. 320, 321;
-    worship of animals in, iii. 322;
-    relations of, with Assyria, iii. 324;
-    archæology and chronology of, iii. 339 _seq._;
-    and Kyrênê, iv. 42;
-    Persian expedition from, against Barka, iv. 49;
-    Kambyses’s invasion and conquest of, iv. 219;
-    revolt and reconquest of, under Xerxes, v. 3;
-    defeat and losses of the Athenians in, v. 333;
-    unavailing efforts of Persia to reconquer, x. 13;
-    Agesilaus and Chabrias in, x. 362 _seq._;
-    reconquest of, by Ochus, xi. 439;
-    march of Alexander towards, xii. 141, 142, 145;
-    Alexander in, xii. 146 _seq._
-
-  _Egyptians_, ethnography of, iii. 264;
-    contrasted with Greeks, Phenicians, and Assyrians, iii. 304;
-    and Ethiopians, iii. 313;
-    effect of, on the Greek mind, iii. 343.
-
-  _Eileithyia_, i. 10.
-
-  _Eion_, capture of, by Kimon, v. 295 _seq._;
-    defended by Thucydidês against Brasidas, vi. 411;
-    Kleon at, vi. 471.
-
-  _Ekbatana_, foundation of, iii. 228;
-    Darius at, xii. 180;
-    Alexander at, xii. 181 _seq._, 246 _seq._;
-    Parmenio at, xii. 181, 196 _seq._
-
-  _Ekdikus_, expedition of, to Rhodes, ix. 363.
-
-  _Ekklesia_, Athenian, iv. 139.
-
-  _Elæa_, iii. 191.
-
-  _Elæus_, escape of the Athenian squadron from Sestos to, viii. 106;
-    Mindarus and Thrasyllus at, viii. 109, 113.
-
-  _Elateia_, re-fortification of, by Philip, xi. 483.
-
-  _Elatus_, i. 178.
-
-  _Elea_, Phôkæan colony at, iv. 206; vii. 127.
-
-  _Eleatic_ school, viii. 343 _seq._, 369.
-
-  _Elegiac_ verse of Kallinus, Tyrtæus, and Mimnermus, iv. 78.
-
-  _Eleian_ genealogy, i. 138, 141.
-
-  _Eleians_ excluded from the Isthmian games, i. 140;
-    and the Olympic games, ii. 10, 321;
-    and Pisatans, ii. 434, 439;
-    their exclusion of the Lacedæmonians from the Olympic festival,
-      vii. 57 _seq._;
-    desert the Argeian allies, vii. 76;
-    and Arcadians, X. 314 _seq._, 324;
-    exclusion of, from the Olympic festival, B. C. 364, x. 318 _seq._
-
-  _Elektra_ and Thaumas, progeny of, i. 7.
-
-  _Elektryôn_, death of, i. 92.
-
-  _Eleusinian_ mysteries, i. 38, 41, 43;
-    alleged profanation of, by Alkibiadês and others, vii. 175 _seq._,
-      211 _seq._;
-    celebration of, protected by Alkibiades, viii. 150.
-
-  _Eleusinians_, seizure and execution of by the Thirty at Athens,
-      viii. 267.
-
-  _Eleusis_, temple of, i. 40;
-    importance of mysteries to, i. 43;
-    early independence of, iii. 71;
-    retirement of the Thirty to, viii. 266;
-    capture of, viii. 274.
-
-  _Eleutheria_, institution of, at Platæa, v. 189.
-
-  _Elis_, genealogy of, i. 137, 139;
-    Oxylus and the Ætolians at, ii. 9;
-    Pisa, Triphylia, and Lepreum, ii. 39, 440;
-    formation of the city of, v. 315;
-    revolt of, from Sparta to Argos, vii. 18 _seq._;
-    and Lepreum, vii. 18;
-    and Sparta, war between, ix. 224 _seq._;
-    claim of, to Triphylia and the Pisatid, x. 260 _seq._, 313;
-    alienation of, from the Arcadians, x. 260;
-    alliance of, with Sparta and Achaia, x. 313.
-
-  _Elymi_, iii. 349.
-
-  _Emigrants_ to Iônia, the, ii. 21 _seq._
-
-  _Emigration_, early, from Greece, iii. 349.
-
-  _Emigrations_ consequent on the Dorian occupation of the Peloponnesus,
-      ii. 12;
-    Æolic, Ionic, and Doric, ii. 19 _seq._
-
-  _Empedoklês_, i. 424 _seq._, vii. 127, viii. 340.
-
-  _Emporiæ_, xii. 455.
-
-  _Endius_, viii. 122 _seq._
-
-  _Endymiôn_, stories of, i. 137.
-
-  _Eneti_, the, i. 319.
-
-  _England_, her government of her dependencies compared with the
-      Athenian empire, vi. 48 _n._
-
-  _Eniênes_, ii. 286.
-
-  _Enna_, Dionysius at, x. 468.
-
-  _Ennea Hodoi_, v. 310, vi. 12.
-
-  _Enômoties_, ii. 456 _seq._
-
-  _Entella_, Syracusan attack upon, x. 490, 497.
-
-  _Eos_, i. 6.
-
-  _Epaminondas_, and the conspiracy against the philo-Laconian oligarchy
-      at Thebes, x. 81, 87, 124 _seq._;
-    training and character of, x. 121 _seq._;
-    and Pelopidas, x. 121;
-    and Kallistratus, x. 164, 288;
-    and Agesilaus at the congress at Sparta, x. 167 _seq._, 173;
-    at Leuktra, x. 179;
-    and Orchomenus, x. 194;
-    proceedings and views of, after the battle of Leuktra,
-      x. 213 _seq._;
-    expeditions of, into Peloponnesus, x. 215 _seq._, x. 254 _seq._,
-      266 _seq._, 343 _seq._;
-    foundation of Megalopolis and Messênê by, x. 224 _seq._;
-    his retirement from Peloponnesus, x. 233;
-    his trial of accountability, x. 239 _seq._;
-    mildness of, x. 259;
-    and the Theban expedition to Thessaly, to rescue Pelopidas, x. 283,
-      285;
-    mission of, to Arcadia, x. 288;
-    Theban fleet and naval expedition under, x. 303 _seq._;
-    and Menekleidas, x. 268, 304 _seq._;
-    and the destruction of Orchomenus, x. 312;
-    and the arrest of Arcadians by the Theban harmost at Tegea,
-      x. 326 _seq._;
-    attempted surprise of Mantinea by the cavalry of, x. 332 _seq._;
-    at the battle of Mantinea, x. 335 _seq._;
-    death of, x. 346 _seq._, character of, x. 351 _seq._
-
-  _Epeians_, i. 138, 141 _seq._, ii. 12.
-
-  _Epeius_ of Panopeus, i. 302, 312.
-
-  _Epeunaktæ_, iii. 387.
-
-  _Ephesus_, iii. 180 _seq._;
-    capture of, by Crœsus, iii. 260;
-    defeat of Thrasyllus at, viii. 129;
-    Lysander at, viii. 152, 215;
-    capture of, by Alexander, xii. 90.
-
-  _Ephetæ_, iii. 77, 79 _seq._
-
-  _Ephialtês, the Alôid_, i. 136.
-
-  _Ephialtês, the general_, xii. 46, 95, 97.
-
-  _Ephialtês, the statesman_, v. 366, 372;
-    and Periklês, constitution of dikasteries by, v. 357 _seq._;
-    judicial reform of, v. 368.
-
-  _Ephors_, Spartan, ii. 350, 352 _seq._, 358, vii. 24;
-    appointment of, at Athens, viii. 236.
-
-  _Ephorus_, i. 409, ii. 369.
-
-  _Epic cycle_, ii. 122 _seq._
-
-  _Epic poems_, lost, ii. 121;
-    recited in public, not read in private, ii. 135;
-    variations in the mode of reciting, ii. 141 _seq._;
-    long, besides the Iliad and Odyssey, ii. 156.
-
-  _Epic poetry_ in early Greece, ii. 118 _seq._
-
-  _Epic poets_ and their dates, ii. 122.
-
-  _Epic_ of the middle ages, i. 481.
-
-  _Epical_ localities, transposition of, i. 245;
-    age preceding the lyrical, iv. 74.
-
-  _Epicharmus_, i. 376 _n._
-
-  _Epidamnus_, iii. 407 _seq._;
-    and the Illyrians, iv. 6 _seq._;
-    foundation of, vi. 51;
-    application of the democracy at, to Korkyra and Corinth, vi. 52;
-    attacked by the Korkyræans, vi. 53;
-    expeditions from Corinth to, vi. 53.
-
-  _Epidaurus_, attack of Argos and Athens upon, vii. 64, 68;
-    ravaged by the Argeians, vii. 69;
-    Lacedæmonian movements in support of, vii. 69;
-    attempts of the Argeians to storm, vii. 70;
-    operations of the Argeian allies near, vii. 90;
-    evacuation of the fort at, vii. 97.
-
-  _Epigoni_, the, i. 278, ii. 130 _n._ 2.
-
-  _Epimenides_, visit of, to Athens, i. 28.
-
-  _Epimenides of Krete_, iii. 87 _seq._
-
-  _Epimêtheus_, i. 6, 74.
-
-  _Epipolæ_, vii. 245;
-    intended occupation of, by the Syracusans, vii. 247;
-    occupation of, by the Athenians, vii. 247;
-    defeat of the Athenians at, vii. 272;
-    Demosthenês’s night-attack upon, vii. 305 _seq._;
-    capture of by Dion, xi. 95;
-    capture of, by Timoleon, xi. 160.
-
-  _Epirots_, ii. 233, iii. 351, 413 _seq._;
-    attack of, upon Akarnania, vi. 193 _seq._
-
-  _Epirus_, discouraging to Grecian colonization, iii. 417;
-    Dionysius’s schemes of conquest in, xi. 23;
-    government of Olympias in, xii. 394, 395 _n._ 2.
-
-  _Epistatês_, iv. 138.
-
-  _Epitadas_, vi. 334, 345 _seq._, 342.
-
-  _Epitadeus_, the Ephor, ii. 406.
-
-  _Epôdus_, introduction of, iv. 89.
-
-  _Epyaxa_, and Cyrus the Younger, ix. 18.
-
-  _Eræ_, revolt of, from Athens, vii. 375.
-
-  _Erasinides_, trial and imprisonment of, viii. 180.
-
-  _Eratosthenês_, viii. 248, 272, 292.
-
-  _Erechtheion_, restoration of, vi. 21.
-
-  _Erechtheus_, i. 191 _seq._, 198, 204.
-
-  _Eresus_, Thrasyllus at, viii. 101.
-
-  _Eretria_, iii. 164 _seq._, 170 _seq._;
-    assistance of, to the Milesians, iv. 290;
-    siege and capture of, by Datis, iv. 331 _seq._;
-    fate of captives taken by Datis at, iv. 362;
-    naval defeat of the Athenians near viii. 71 _seq._;
-    Phokion at, xi. 339 _seq._;
-    Philippizing faction at, xi. 449;
-    liberation of, xi. 452.
-
-  _Ergoklês_, ix. 368 _n._ 1.
-
-  _Ergophilus_, x. 369 _seq._
-
-  _Erichthonius_, i. 192, 196, 285.
-
-  _Eriphylê_, i. 272 _seq._
-
-  _Erôs_, i. 4;
-    and Aphrodite, function of, i. 5.
-
-  _Erytheia_, i. 249.
-
-  _Erythræ_, iii. 187, vii. 371.
-
-  _Eryx_, defeat of Dionysius at, xi. 46.
-
-  _Eryxô_ and Learchus, iv. 43.
-
-  _Eteokles_, i. 128, 267, 280.
-
-  _Eteonikus_, expulsion of, from Thasos, viii. 127;
-    at Mitylênê, viii. 170;
-    escape of, from Mitylênê to Chios, viii. 174, 190;
-    at Chios, viii. 211;
-    removal of, from Chios to Ephesus, viii. 213;
-    in Ægina, ix. 372, 375.
-
-  _Ethiopians_ and Egyptians, iii. 313.
-
-  _Etruria_, plunder of, by Dionysius, xi. 25.
-
-  _Euæphnus_ and Polycharês, ii. 426.
-
-  _Eubœa_, iii. 163 _seq._;
-    resolution of Greeks to oppose Xerxes at the strait on the north of,
-      v. 71;
-    advance of the Persian fleet to, v. 102;
-    revolt and reconquest of, by Periklês, v. 349;
-    application from, to Agis, vii. 364;
-    revolt of, from Athens, B. C. 411, viii. 73;
-    Peloponnesian fleet summoned from, by Mindarus, viii. 111;
-    bridge joining Bœotia and, viii. 112, 118;
-    rescued from Thebes by Athens, B. C. 358, xi. 216 _seq._;
-    revolt of, from Athens, B. C. 350-349, xi. 339 _seq._;
-    intrigues of Philip in, xi. 339;
-    expedition of Phokion to, B. C. 342, xi. 340 _seq._;
-    hostilities in, B. C. 349-348, xi. 345;
-    Philippizing factions in, B. C. 342, xi. 449;
-    expedition of Phokion to, B. C. 341, xi. 452.
-
-  _Eubœa in Sicily_, v. 215.
-
-  _Euboic scale_, ii. 319, 324, iii. 171.
-
-  _Euboic synod_, xi. 453.
-
-  _Eubulus_, xi. 277, 308, 366, 368, 394.
-
-  _Eudamidas_, x. 58, 65.
-
-  _Euemerus’s_ treatment of mythes, i. 411.
-
-  _Euenus_, i. 112.
-
-  _Eukleides_, archonship of, viii. 280, 309.
-
-  _Eukles_, vi. 407, 409, 413 _seq._
-
-  _Eumachus_, xii. 438, 439.
-
-  _Eumelus of Bosporus_, xii. 481 _seq._
-
-  _Eumelus the poet_, i. 120 _seq._
-
-  _Eumenes_, xii. 74;
-    and Hephæstion, xii. 246;
-    and Perdikkas, xii. 320;
-    victory of, over Kraterus and Neoptolemus, xii. 336 _seq._;
-    attempts of, to uphold Alexander’s dynasty in Asia, xii. 340 _seq._;
-    and Antigonus, xii. 337.
-
-  _Eumenides_, Æschylus’s, and the Areopagus, iii. 80 _n._
-
-  _Eumolpus_, i. 202 _seq._
-
-  _Eunomus_, ix. 374.
-
-  _Eupatridæ_, iii. 72 _seq._
-
-  _Euphaes_, ii. 426.
-
-  _Euphemus_, speech of, at Kamarina, vii. 231.
-
-  _Euphiletus_ and Melêtus, vii. 204.
-
-  _Euphræus_, xi. 206, 448.
-
-  _Euphrates_, Cyrus the Younger at, ix. 31;
-    the Ten Thousand Greeks at, ix. 103;
-    Alexander at, xii. 150, 250.
-
-  _Euphron_, x. 269 _seq._
-
-  _Euripides_, faults imputed to, i. 389 _seq._;
-    story about the dramas of, and the Athenian prisoners in Sicily,
-      vii. 346;
-    number of tragedies by, viii. 319 _n._;
-    Æschylus and Sophokles, viii. 322 _seq._;
-    and Dekamnichus, x. 47.
-
-  _Euripides_, financial proposal of, ix. 380 _n._
-
-  _Euripus_, bridge across, viii. 112, 118.
-
-  _Eurôpa_, i. 218 _seq._, 527.
-
-  _Eurotas_, crossed by Epaminondas, x. 218.
-
-  _Euryalus_, Hamilkar’s attempt on, xii. 423.
-
-  _Eurybatês_, v. 49.
-
-  _Eurybiades_, v. 75, 120 _seq._
-
-  _Eurydike_, widow of Amyntas, x. 250.
-
-  _Eurydike_, granddaughter of Philip, xii. 333, 334, 337.
-
-  _Euryleon_, v. 207.
-
-  _Eurylochus_, vi. 301, 302, 304, 305.
-
-  _Eurymedon_, victories of the, v. 308.
-
-  _Eurymedon_ at Korkyra, vi. 274 _seq._;
-    and Sophokles, expedition of, to Korkyra and Sicily, vi. 316 _seq._,
-      360 _seq._;
-    at Pylus, vi. 322 _seq._, 333;
-    expeditions of, to Sicily, vii. 133, 136, 287;
-    return of, from Sicily to Athens, vii. 139.
-
-  _Eurynomê_ and Zeus, offspring of, i. 10.
-
-  _Euryptolemus_, viii. 177 _n._, 184, 197, 200 _seq._
-
-  _Eurypylus_, i. 301.
-
-  _Eurystheus_, i. 91, 92, 93, 94.
-
-  _Eurytos_, i. 139, 151.
-
-  _Eurytus_, v. 94.
-
-  _Eutæa_, Agesilaus at, B. C. 370, x. 211.
-
-  _Euthydemus_, Plato’s, viii. 392 _n._
-
-  _Euthykrates_ and Lasthenes, xi. 351, 352.
-
-  _Euxine_, Greek settlements on, iii. 236; iv. 27, ix. 121;
-    first sight of, by the Ten Thousand Greeks, ix. 111;
-    indigenous tribes on, ix. 122;
-    the Greeks on, and the Ten Thousand, ix. 123 _seq._;
-    Xenophon’s idea of founding a new city on the, ix. 132 _seq._
-
-  _Evadnê_, i. 278.
-
-  _Evagoras_, ix. 364, 374, x. 14 _seq._
-
-
-  F.
-
-  _Family_ tie, in legendary Greece, ii. 83;
-    rites in Greece, iii. 51.
-
-  _Fates_, i. 7;
-    and Crœsus, iv. 195 _seq._
-
-  _Ferdousi_, Persian epic of, i. 641.
-
-  _Festivals_, Grecian, i. 51, ii. 228, iv. 53, 67 _seq._, 71 _seq._;
-    at Athens, viii. 324.
-
-  _Fiction_, plausible, i. 435; ii. 51.
-
-  _Fictitious_ matter in Greek tradition, i. 433.
-
-  _Financial changes_, Kleisthenean, iv. 137.
-
-  _Five Thousand_, the, at Athens, viii. 31, 54 _n._, 61, 75 _n._ 1,
-      78 _seq._
-
-  _Flaying alive_ by Persians and Turks, iv. 293 _n._ 2.
-
-  _Fleece, Golden_, legend of, i. 123.
-
-  _Flute_, use of, in Sparta, iv. 87.
-
-  _Fortification_ of towns in early Greece, ii. 108 _seq._;
-    of the Grecian camp in the Iliad, ii. 186.
-
-  _Four Hundred_, the oligarchy of, viii. 30 _seq._
-
-  _Frenzy_, religious, of women, i. 30 _seq._
-
-  _Funeral_ ceremony at Athens over slain warriors, vi. 31;
-    orations, besides that of Periklês, vi. 142 _n._;
-    obsequies of Hephæstion, xii. 252, 254.
-
-  _Funerals_, Solon’s regulations about iii. 140.
-
-
-  G.
-
-  _Gadês_, iii. 271 _seq._;
-    voyage from Corinth to, in the seventh and sixth centuries B. C.,
-      iii. 277.
-
-  _Gæa_, i. 4, 6, 9.
-
-  _Gæsylus_, xi. 116.
-
-  _Games_, Olympic, i. 100, ii. 241 _seq._, 317 _seq._, iv. 55 _seq._;
-    Isthmian, i. 124, ii. 306 _n._ 1, iv. 65;
-    the four great Grecian, ii. 240, iv. 67, 80 _seq._;
-    Solon’s rewards to victors at, iii. 141;
-    Pythian, iv. 58, 64 _seq._;
-    Nemean, iv. 65.
-
-  _Gamori_, iii. 30;
-    at Syracuse, v. 206.
-
-  _Gargaphia_, fountain of, v. 165 _n._ 3.
-
-  _Gaugamela_, battle of, xii. 155 _seq._
-
-  _Gauls_, embassy of, to Alexander, xii. 28;
-    invasion of Greece by, xii. 390.
-
-  _Gaza_, capture of, by Alexander, xii. 142 _seq._
-
-  _Gedrosia_, Alexander in, xii. 200, 236.
-
-  _Gela_, v. 208; and Syracuse, before B. C. 500, v. 204;
-    Kleander of, v. 208;
-    Gelo, despot of, v. 213 _seq._;
-    congress of Sicilian cities at, vii. 137;
-    and Hannibal’s capture of Selinus, x. 408;
-    expeditions of Dionysius to, x. 438, 439, 447 _seq._;
-    capture of, by Imilkon, x. 447 _seq._;
-    Timoleon and the fresh colonization of, xi. 187;
-    Agathokles at, xii. 408.
-
-  _Geleontes_, iii. 51.
-
-  _Gelo_, v. 67, 204-239.
-
-  _Gelôni_, iii. 244.
-
-  _Gelonian_ dynasty, fall of, v. 233;
-    citizens of Syracuse, v. 234 _seq._
-
-  _Genealogies_, Grecian, i. 80 _seq._, 448;
-    Argeian, i. 81, mythical, i. 191, 445 _seq._;
-    Egyptian, i. 448;
-    Clinton’s vindication of, ii. 37 _seq._
-
-  _Genealogy_, Corinthian, of Eumelus, i. 120 _seq._;
-    of Orchomenos, i. 127 _seq._;
-    Eleian, i. 139;
-    Ætolian, i. 143;
-    Laconian, i. 168;
-    Messênian i. 171;
-    Arcadian, i. 173.
-
-  _Generals_, Kleisthenean, iv. 136.
-
-  _Gentes_, Attic, iii. 53 _seq._, 66 _seq._;
-    analogy between those of Greece and other nations, iii. 58 _seq._;
-    Grecian, patronymic names of, iii. 63;
-    difference between Grecian and Roman, iii. 65;
-    non-members of, under Solon, iii. 133.
-
-  _Geographical_ knowledge, Hesiodic and Homeric, ii. 114;
-    views of Alexander, xii. 232 _n._ 1.
-
-  _Geography_, fabulous, i. 245 _seq._;
-    Homeric, iii. 204;
-    of the retreat of the Ten Thousand, ix. 115 _seq._
-
-  _Geological_ features of Greece, ii. 215.
-
-  _Geomori_, iii. 30, 72.
-
-  _Gergis_, iii. 197;
-    Derkyllidas at, ix. 212.
-
-  _Gergithes_, iii. 197.
-
-  _German_ progress brought about by violent external influences,
-      i. 463;
-    mythes, i. 464.
-
-  _Gerontes_, ii. 66.
-
-  _Geronthræ_, conquest of, ii. 419.
-
-  _Geryôn_, i. 7, 249.
-
-  _Getæ_, Alexander’s defeat of, xii. 24.
-
-  _Gigantes_, birth of, i. 5, 9 _n._
-
-  _Gillus_, iv. 258.
-
-  _Giskon_, x. 401, 403 _n._, xi. 180.
-
-  _Glaukæ_, xii. 230.
-
-  _Glauke_, i. 117.
-
-  _Glaukon_, discourse of, in Plato’s Republic, viii. 391.
-
-  _Glaukus_, i. 224.
-
-  _Gnomic_, Greek poets, iv. 90 _seq._
-
-  _Gnomon_, whence obtained by the Greeks, iii. 345.
-
-  _Goddesses_, and gods, twelve great, i. 10.
-
-  _Gods_, Grecian, how conceived by the Greeks, i. 3 _seq._, 347 _seq._;
-    and dæmons, i. 425 _seq._;
-    and men, i. 449.
-
-  _Golden Fleece_, legend of, i. 123.
-
-  _Golden race_, the, i. 65.
-
-  _Gongylus_, the Corinthian, vii. 265, 271.
-
-  _Good_, etc., meaning of, in early Greek writers, ii. 64;
-    double sense of the Greek and Latin equivalents of, iii. 45 _n._ 4.
-
-  _Gordian knot_, Alexander cuts the, xii. 104.
-
-  _Gordium_, Alexander’s march from, xii. 111.
-
-  _Gordius_, legend of, iii. 217.
-
-  _Gorgias_ of Leontini, vii. 128, 132, viii. 369, 382.
-
-  _Gorgons_, i. 90.
-
-  _Gorgôpas_ at Ægina, ix. 373 _seq._
-
-  _Government_ of historical and legendary Greece, ii. 60 _seq._;
-    heroic, ii. 75;
-    earliest changes of, in Greece, iii. 4 _seq._;
-    kingly, iii. 5 _seq._;
-    change from monarchical to oligarchical in Greece, iii. 15 _seq._
-
-  _Governments_, Grecian, weakness of, iv. 152.
-
-  _Graces_, the, i. 10.
-
-  _Grææ_, i. 7.
-
-  _Græci_, ii. 269.
-
-  _Græcia_ Magna, iii. 399.
-
-  _Græco-Asiatic_ cities, xii. 271.
-
-  _Granikus_, battle of the, xii. 80 _seq._;
-    Athenians captured at the, xii. 105.
-
-  _Graphê Paranomôn_, v. 375 _seq._;
-    abolition of, B. C. 411, viii. 36.
-
-  _Grecian_ mythes, i. 51, 426 _seq._;
-    genealogies, i. 80 _seq._;
-    mythology, sources of our information on, i. 106;
-    intellect, expansive force of, i. 362;
-    progress between B. C. 700 and 500, i. 365 _seq._;
-    antiquity, i. 445, 448; genealogies, i. 447;
-    townsman, intellectual acquisitions of a, i. 458;
-    poetry, matchless, i. 463;
-    progress self-operated, i. 463;
-    mythology, how it would have been affected by the introduction of
-      Christianity, B. C. 500, i. 467;
-    mythes, proper treatment of, i. 487 _seq._;
-    computation of time, ii. 115 _n._ 2;
-    festivals, intellectual influence of, ii. 228;
-    history, first and second periods of, ii. 270 _seq._, iv. 52;
-    opinion, change in, on the decision of disputes by champions,
-      ii. 451;
-    states, growing communion of, between B. C. 600 and 547, ii. 461;
-    “faith”, iii. 115;
-    settlements on the Euxine, iii. 236;
-    marine and commerce, growth of, iii. 336;
-    colonies in Southern Italy, iii. 374 _seq._;
-    world about 560 B. C., iii. 398;
-    history, want of unity in, iv. 51, 52;
-    games, influence of, upon the Greek mind, iv. 70 _seq._;
-    art, beginnings and importance of, iv. 98 _seq._;
-    architecture, iv. 99;
-    governments, weakness of, iv. 152;
-    world, in the Thirty years’ truce, vi. 47;
-    and barbarian military feeling, contrast between, vi. 446;
-    youth, society and conversation of, vii. 33 _n._;
-    states, complicated relations among, B. C. 420, vii. 52, and
-      B. C. 366, x. 292;
-    philosophy, negative side of, viii. 345;
-    dialectics, their many-sided handling of subjects, viii. 454 _seq._;
-    states embassies from, at Pella, B. C. 346, xi. 404 _seq._;
-    captives, mutilated, at Persepolis, xii. 173;
-    history, bearing of Alexander’s Asiatic campaigns on,
-      xii. 179 _seq._;
-    mercenaries under Darius, xii. 183, 184, 188, 189;
-    envoys with Darius, xii. 189;
-    world, state of, B. C. 334, xii. 275;
-    exiles, Alexander’s rescript directing the recall of,
-      xii. 310 _seq._
-
-  _Greece_, legends of, originally isolated, afterwards thrown into
-      series, i. 105;
-    legendary and historical, state of society and manners in,
-      ii. 57-118;
-    subterranean course of rivers in, ii. 218;
-    difficulty of land communication in, ii. 220;
-    accessibility of, by sea, ii. 222;
-    islands and colonies of, ii. 224;
-    difference between the land-states and sea-states in, ii. 225;
-    effects of the configuration of, ii. 226 _seq._;
-    mineral and other productions of, ii. 229 _seq._;
-    climate of, ii. 232;
-    difference between the inhabitants of different parts of, ii. 233;
-    ante-Hellenic inhabitants of, ii. 261;;
-    discontinuance of kingship in, iii. 7;
-    anti-monarchical sentiment of, iii. 11 _seq._, iv. 176;
-    the voyage from, to Italy or Sicily, iii. 361;
-    seven wise men of, iv. 94 _seq._;
-    first advance of, towards systematic conjunction, iv. 174;
-    probable consequences of a Persian expedition against, before that
-      against Scythia, iv. 261 _seq._;
-    on the eve of Xerxes’s invasion, v. 57, 60;
-    first separation of, into two distinct parties, v. 262 _seq._, 290;
-    proceedings in central, between B. C. 470-464, v. 312;
-    state of feeling in, between B. C. 445-431, vi. 76;
-    bad morality of the rich and great in, vi. 284;
-    atmospherical disturbances in, B. C. 427, vi. 293;
-    warlike preparations in, during the winter of B. C. 414-413,
-      vii. 287;
-    alteration of feeling in, after the capture of Athens by Lysander,
-      viii. 259, 264, 275;
-    disgust in, at the Thirty at Athens, viii. 262;
-    degradation of, by the peace of Antalkidas, x. 2 _seq._, 10;
-    effect of the battle of Leuktra on, x. 184, 185, 193;
-    relations of Dionysius with, B. C. 382-369, xi. 44;
-    state of, B. C. 360-359, xi. 197;
-    decline of citizen-soldiership and increase of mercenaries in, after
-      the Peloponnesian war, xi. 280 _seq._;
-    effect of the peace and alliance between Philip and Athens upon,
-      xi. 430;
-    movements and intrigues of Philip throughout, after B. C. 346,
-      xi. 443 _seq._;
-    state of, on Alexander’s accession, xii. 1, 9 _seq._;
-    march of Alexander into, B. C. 336, xii. 11;
-    Macedonian interventions in, B. C. 336-335, xii. 16 _seq._;
-    terror in, on the destruction of Thebes by Alexander, xii. 43;
-    connection of Alexander with, history of, xii. 50 _seq._,
-      179 _seq._;
-    an appendage to Macedonia under Alexander, xii. 52;
-    military changes in, during the sixty years before Alexander’s
-      accession, xii. 53 _seq._;
-    possibility of emancipating, during Alexander’s earlier Asiatic
-      campaigns, xii. 276;
-    hopes raised in, by the Persian fleet and armies, B. C. 334-331,
-      xii. 276;
-    submission of, to Antipater, xii. 285;
-    effect of Alexander’s death on, xii. 311;
-    confederacy for liberating, after Alexander’s death,
-      xii. 311 _seq._;
-    Ptolemy of Egypt in, xii. 373;
-    success of Demetrius Poliorketes in, against Kassander, xii. 382;
-    under Demetrius Poliorketes and Antigonus Gonatas, xii. 390;
-    invasion of, by the Gauls, xii. 390;
-    of Polybius, xii. 391.
-
-  _Greece, Proper_, geography of, ii. 211 _seq._
-
-  _Greek_ forces against Troy, i. 289 _seq._;
-    language and the mythes, i. 351;
-    tradition, matter of, uncertified, i. 433;
-    language, various dialects of, ii. 238;
-    alphabet, origin of, iii. 344 _n._;
-    Latin and Oscan languages, iii. 354;
-    settlements, east of the Strymôn in Thrace, iv. 20;
-    settlements on the Euxine south of the Danube, iv. 27;
-    settlements in Libya, and the nomads, iv. 38;
-    cities, local festivals in, iv. 51, 67 _seq._;
-    lyric poetry, iv. 73, 90;
-    poetry about the middle of the seventh century B. C., iv. 74;
-    music, about the middle of the seventh century B. C., iv. 75;
-    poetry, after Terpander, iv. 77;
-    hexameter, new metres superadded to, iv. 79;
-    chorus, iv. 83, 87;
-    dancing, iv. 85;
-    mind, positive tendencies of, in the time of Herodotus,
-      iv. 105 _n._;
-    philosophy, in the sixth century B. C., 380 _seq._;
-    fleet at Artemisium, v. 79 _seq._, 83 _seq._;
-    fleet at Salamis, v. 111;
-    fleet at Mykalê, v. 193 _seq._;
-    fleet after the battle of Mykalê, v. 200 _seq._;
-    fleet, expedition of, against Asia, B. C. 478, v. 253;
-    generals and captains, slaughter of Cyreian, ix. 72 _seq._;
-    heroes, analogy of Alexander to the, xii. 71.
-
-  _Greeks_, return of, from Troy, i. 309 _seq._;
-    their love of antiquities, i. 353;
-    their distaste for a real history of the past, i. 359;
-    Homeric, ii. 92, 114;
-    in Asia Minor, ii. 235, iii. 212;
-    extra-Peloponnesian north of Attica in the first two centuries,
-      ii. 273 _seq._;
-    advance of, in government in the seventh and sixth centuries B. C.,
-      iii. 20;
-    musical modes of, iii. 212;
-    and Phenicians in Sicily and Cyprus, iii. 276;
-    contrasted with Egyptians, Assyrians, and Phenicians, iii. 304;
-    influence of Phenicians, Assyrians, and Egyptians on,
-      iii. 343 _seq._;
-    and Carthaginians, first known collision between, iii. 348;
-    Sicilian and Italian, monetary and statical scale of, iii. 369;
-    in Sicily, prosperity of, between B. C. 735-485, iii. 368 _seq._;
-    in Sicily and in Greece Proper, difference between, iii. 372;
-    Italian, between B. C. 700-500, iii. 392, 394, 398;
-    their talent for command over barbarians, iv. 17;
-    first voyage of, to Libya, iv. 29;
-    and Libyans at Kyrene, iv. 39;
-    political isolation of, iv. 51;
-    tendencies to political union among, after B. C. 560, iv. 52;
-    growth of union among, between B. C. 776-560, iv. 53;
-    rise of philosophy and dialectic among, iv. 96;
-    writing among, iv. 97;
-    Asiatic, after Cyrus’s conquest of Lydia, iv. 198;
-    Asiatic, application of, to Sparta, 546 B. C., iv. 199;
-    and Darius, before the battle of Marathon, iv. 315;
-    eminent, liable to be corrupted by success, iv. 375 _seq._;
-    and Persians, religious conception of history common to, v. 11;
-    northern, and Xerxes, v. 64, 69;
-    confederate, engagement of, against such as joined Xerxes, v. 70;
-    effect of the battle of Thermopylæ on, v. 105 _seq._;
-    and the battle of Salamis, v. 121 _seq._;
-    Medising, and Mardonius, v. 148;
-    Medising, at Platæa, v. 161;
-    at Platæa, v. 163 _seq._;
-    at Mykalê, v. 194 _seq._;
-    Asiatic, first step to the ascendancy of Athens over, v. 200;
-    Sicilian, early governments of, v. 206;
-    Sicilian, progress of, between the battle of Salamis and Alexander,
-      v. 241;
-    allied, oppose the fortification of Athens, v. 243 _seq._, 246;
-    allied, transfer the headship from Sparta to Athens, B. C. 477,
-      v. 260 _seq._;
-    allied, Aristeides assessment of, v. 263;
-    allied, under Athens, substitute money-payment for personal service,
-      v. 298 _seq._;
-    effect of the Athenian disaster in Sicily upon, vii. 363;
-    and Tissaphernes, Alkibiades acts as interpreter between,
-      viii. 4 _seq._;
-    Asiatic, surrender of, by Sparta to Persia, ix. 205;
-    Asiatic, and Cyrus the Younger, ix. 206;
-    Asiatic, and Tissaphernes, ix. 207;
-    the Ten Thousand, their position and circumstances, ix. 11;
-    Ten Thousand, at Kunaxa, ix. 42 _seq._;
-    Ten Thousand, after the battle of Kunaxa, ix. 52 _seq._;
-    Ten Thousand, retreat of, ix. 56-121, 181 _seq._;
-    Ten Thousand, after their return to Trapezus, ix. 121-180;
-    Asiatic, their application to Sparta for aid against Tissaphernes,
-      ix. 207;
-    in the service of Alexander in Asia, xii. 74;
-    unpropitious circumstances for, in the Lamian war, xii. 334;
-    Italian, pressed upon by enemies from the interior, xii. 394.
-
-  _Gurylls_, death of, x. 335.
-
-  _Guilds_, Grecian deities of, i. 344;
-    German and early English, iii. 60 _n._ 2;
-    compared with ancient political associations, viii. 16 _n._ 2.
-
-  _Gyges_, i. 5, iii. 219 _seq._
-
-  _Gylippus_, expedition of, to Syracuse, vii. 242, 265 _seq._,
-    275 _seq._, 298 _seq._, 323, 330 _seq._
-
-  _Gylon_, father of Kleobulê, the mother of Demosthenes,
-      xi. 261 _n._ 1.
-
-  _Gymnêsii_, iii. 35.
-
-  _Gyndês_, distribution of, into channels by Cyrus, iv. 212.
-
-
-  H.
-
-  _Hadês_, i. 6 _seq._, 7, 9.
-
-  _Hæmôn_ and Antigonê, i. 276.
-
-  _Haliartus_, Lysander at, ix. 294.
-
-  _Halikarnassus_, ii. 31, iii. 201;
-    capture of, by Alexander, xii. 94 _seq._
-
-  _Halonnesus_, dispute between Philip and the Athenians about,
-      xi. 449 _seq._
-
-  _Halys_, the, 207.
-
-  _Hamilkar_, defeat and death of, at Himera, v. 222 _seq._
-
-  _Hamilkar_, collusion of, with Agathokles, xii. 401;
-    superseded in Sicily by another general of the same name, xii. 403.
-
-  _Hamilkar_, victory of, at the Himera, xii. 408 _seq._;
-    attempt of, upon Syracuse, xii. 422;
-    defeat and death of, xii. 424.
-
-  _Hannibal_, expeditions of, to Sicily, x. 402-415, 421 _seq._
-
-  _Hanno_, silly fabrication of, xi. 158.
-
-  _Harmodius_ and Aristogeitôn, iv. 111 _seq._
-
-  _Harmosts_, Spartan, ix. 189 _seq._, 197, 201.
-
-  _Harpagus_, iv. 202, 207.
-
-  _Harpalus_, xii. 240, 294 _seq._
-
-  _Harpies_, the, i. 1, 266.
-
-  _Hêbê_, i. 10.
-
-  _Hectôr_, i. 286, 297.
-
-  _Hegemony_, Athenian, v. 291 _seq._
-
-  _Hegesippus_, xi. 446.
-
-  _Hegesistratus_, iv. 118, v. 191, xii. 90, 91.
-
-  _Hekabê_, i. 286.
-
-  _Hekatæus_ on Geryôn, i. 249;
-    on the Argonauts, i. 253;
-    and the mythes, i. 391;
-    and the Ionic revolt, iv. 284, 296.
-
-  _Hekatompylus_, Alexander at, xii. 188.
-
-  _Hekatoncheires_, the, i. 4, 5.
-
-  _Hekatonymus_ and the Ten Thousand Greeks, ix. 129 _seq._
-
-  _Helen_, i. 161, 168, 169;
-    necklace of, i. 282;
-    and Paris, i. 287;
-    and Achilles, i. 294;
-    various legends of, i. 305 _seq._
-
-  _Helenus_ and Andromachê, i. 305.
-
-  _Heliæa_, iii. 128 _n._, iv. 137, 141 _seq._
-
-  _Heliasts_, iv. 141.
-
-  _Helikê_, destruction of, x. 157.
-
-  _Helios_, i. 6, 344.
-
-  _Helixus_, viii. 133.
-
-  _Hellanikus_, his treatment of mythes, i. 390;
-    contrasted with Saxo Grammaticus and Snorro Sturleson, i. 468.
-
-  _Hellas_, division of, i. 100;
-    proper, ii. 212;
-    mountain systems of, ii. 212 _seq._;
-    islands and colonies of, ii. 224;
-    most ancient, ii. 268;
-    first historical manifestation of, as an aggregate body, iv. 318.
-
-  _Hellê_ and Phryxus, i. 123.
-
-  _Hellên_ and his sons, i. 99 _seq._
-
-  _Hellênes_, i. 99, ii. 236 _seq._, 255 _seq._
-
-  _Hellenic_ religion and customs in the Trôad, i. 337;
-    cities, ii. 257.
-
-  _Hellênion_ at Naukratis, iii. 336.
-
-  _Hellenism_, definition of, xii. 270.
-
-  _Hellenotamiæ_, v. 265, viii. 310.
-
-  _Hellespont_, bridges of Xerxes over, v. 15 _seq._, 19 _n._;
-    crossed by Xerxes, v. 31;
-    retreating march of Xerxes to, v. 144 _seq._;
-    Grecian fleet at, B. C. 479, v. 200;
-    Strombichidês at, viii. 96;
-    Peloponnesian reinforcement to, B. C. 411, viii. 97;
-    Mindarus and Thrasyllus at, viii. 102, 109, 117;
-    Athenians and Peloponnesians at, after the battle of Kynossêma,
-      viii. 117;
-    Thrasyllus and Alkibiadês at, viii. 131;
-    Thrasybulus at, ix. 366;
-    Iphikrates at, ix. 369 _seq._;
-    Antalkidas at, ix. 384;
-    Epaminondas at, x. 301, 306;
-    Timotheus at, x. 301, 306, 368;
-    Autoklês at, x. 371 _seq._;
-    operations of the Athenians at, B. C. 357, xi. 224;
-    disputes between Athens and Philip about, xi. 450;
-    imprudence of the Persians in letting Alexander cross the, xii. 78.
-
-  _Helôris_, unsuccessful expedition of, xi. 5, 7, 15.
-
-  _Helots_, ii. 373 _seq._;
-    Pausanias and, v. 270;
-    revolt of, v. 315 _seq._;
-    at Ithômê, capitulation of, v. 333;
-    assassination of, vi. 368 _seq._;
-    Brasidean, vii. 21;
-    brought back to Pylus, vii. 71;
-    and the invasion of, Laconia by Epaminondas, x. 219;
-    establishment of, with the Messenians, x. 229 _seq._
-
-  _Helus_, conquered by Alkamenês, ii. 420.
-
-  _Hephæstion_, xii. 246, 247, 252, 254.
-
-  _Hephæstos_, i. 10, 58.
-
-  _Hêræon_ near Mykênæ, i. 165.
-
-  _Hêræon Teichos_, siege of, by Philip, xi. 307.
-
-  _Hêrakleia Pontica_, i. 241; xii. 460 _seq._;
-    the Ten Thousand Greeks at, ix. 146.
-
-  _Hêrakleia in Italy_, iii. 384, vi. 14.
-
-  _Hêrakleia in Sicily_, v. 207;
-    Dion at, xi. 89, 90 _seq._
-
-  _Hêrakleia Trachinea_, vi. 90 _seq._; vii. 60, ix. 284, 302,
-      xi. 90 _seq._
-
-  _Hêrakleid_ kings of Corinth, ii. 307.
-
-  _Hêrakleides the Syracusan_, exile of, xi. 86;
-    victory of, over Philistus, xi. 100;
-    and Dion, xi. 101, 105, 110, 112 _seq._, 121;
-    victory of, over Nypsius, xi. 107;
-    death of, xi. 122.
-
-  _Hêrakleides_, governor of the Pontic Herakleia, xii. 469, 470.
-
-  _Hêrakleids_, i. 94, 95, ii. 1 _seq._;
-    Lydian dynasty of, iii. 222.
-
-  _Hêraklês_, i. 92 _seq._;
-    attack of, on Pylos, i. 110;
-    and Alkêstis, i. 113;
-    overthrows Orchomenos, i. 133;
-    death of, i. 151;
-    and Hylas, i. 234;
-    and Laomedôn, i. 286;
-    Tyrian temple of, iii. 269.
-
-  _Hêraklês_, son of Alexander, xii. 372.
-
-  _Hêrê_, i. 6, 7, 10, 58;
-    and Mykênæ, i. 165;
-    temple of, near Argos, burnt, vi. 451;
-    Lakinian, robe of, xi. 52.
-
-  _Herippidas_, ix. 285, 326, 339.
-
-  _Hermæ_, mutilation of, at Athens, vii. 167 _seq._, 199 _seq._
-
-  _Hermeias_ of Atarneus, xi. 441.
-
-  _Hermes_, i. 10, 58 _seq._
-
-  _Hermionê_, i. 163.
-
-  _Hermokratês_, at the congress at Gela, vii. 137;
-    and the Athenian armament, vii. 182;
-    recommendations of, after the battle near Olympieion, vii. 227;
-    speech of at Kamarina, vii. 229;
-    urges the Syracusans to attack the Athenians at sea, vii. 290;
-    postpones the Athenians’ retreat from Syracuse, vii. 330;
-    and Tissaphernês, vii. 390; viii. 98;
-    in the Ægean, x. 385 _seq._;
-    banishment of, x. 387 _seq._;
-    his return to Sicily, and death, x. 415 _seq._
-
-  _Hermokratean_ party, x. 432;
-    exiles, x. 438.
-
-  _Hermolaus_, xii. 221.
-
-  _Hermotybii_ and Kalasiries, iii. 316.
-
-  _Herodotus_, on Minôs, i. 228, 229;
-    on Helen and the Trojans, i. 308;
-    treatment of mythes by, i. 393 _seq._;
-    his view of Lykurgus, ii. 343;
-    his story of Solon and Crœsus, iii. 151 _seq._;
-    chronological mistakes of, iii. 154 _n._, 198 _n._ 3;
-    chronological discrepancies of, respecting Kyaxarês, iii. 232 _n._;
-    his description of Scythia, iii. 236 _seq._;
-    his account of Babylon, iii. 295 _seq._, 297 _n._ 2;
-    distinction between what he professes to have seen and heard,
-      iii. 309;
-    on the effects of despotism and democracy upon the Athenians,
-      iv. 178;
-    and Ktêsias, on Cyrus, iv. 185;
-    chronology of his life and authorship, iv. 277 _n._, v. 49 _n._;
-    his narrative of Darius’s march into Scythia, iv. 265 _seq._;
-    does not mention Pythagoras in connection with the war between
-      Sybaris and Kroton, iv. 416;
-    historical manner and conception of, v. 5, 11, _n._ 3;
-    his estimate of the number of Xerxes’s army, v. 36 _seq._;
-    doubts about the motives ascribed to Xerxes at Thermopylæ by, v. 87;
-    a proof of the accuracy of, v. 89 _n._;
-    on the movements of the Persian fleet before the battle of Salamis,
-      v. 132 _nn._
-
-  _Heroes_ appear with gods and men on mythes, i. 64;
-    Greek, at Aulis, i. 293 _seq._, 289;
-    Greek, analogy of Alexander to, xii. 70.
-
-  _Heroic_ race, i. 66, legends, i. 424.
-
-  _Hesiod_, theogony of, i. 3, 16, 20, 74;
-    family affairs of, i. 72;
-    Iapetids in, i. 73;
-    complaints of, against kings, ii. 73;
-    dark picture of Greece by, ii. 91.
-
-  _Hesiodic_ mythes traceable to Krête and Delphi, i. 15;
-    “Works and Days”, i. 66 _seq._;
-    philosophy, i. 367;
-    Greeks, ii. 114 _seq._;
-    epic, ii. 119.
-
-  _Hesionê_, i. 286.
-
-  _Hesperides_, dragon of, i. 7.
-
-  _Hesperides_, town of, iv. 32 _n._ 2, 42.
-
-  _Hestia_, i. 6, 7, 58.
-
-  _Hestiæa_ on Ilium, i. 329.
-
-  _Hetæræ_, vi. 100.
-
-  _Hetæries_, at Athens, vi. 290, viii. 15.
-
-  _Hexameter_, the ancient, i. 73;
-    new metres superadded to, iv. 75.
-
-  _Hierax_, ix. 373.
-
-  _Hiero of Syracuse_, v. 227 _seq._
-
-  _Hieromnêmôn_, ii. 246.
-
-  _Hiketas_, xi. 128;
-    and the Syracusans, xi. 134;
-    message of, to Corinth and to Timoleon, xi. 143, 144;
-    defeat of, at Adranum, xi. 148;
-    and Magon, xi. 156 _seq._, 159;
-    flight of, from Syracuse to Leontini, xi. 161;
-    capitulation of, with Timoleon, xi. 170;
-    invites the Carthaginians to invade Sicily, xi. 171;
-    defeat, surrender, and death of, xi. 181, 182.
-
-  _Himera_, iii. 367;
-    battle of, v. 221 _seq._;
-    treatment of, by Thêro, v. 228;
-    capture of, by Hannibal, x. 410 _seq._;
-    defeat of Agathokles at the, xii. 408 _seq._
-
-  _Hindoos_, rivers personified by, i. 342 _n._ 2;
-    their belief with regard to the small pox, i. 360 _n._;
-    belief of, in fabulous stories, i. 430 _n._;
-    expensiveness of marriage among, iii. 141 _n._ 2;
-    sentiment of, with regard to the discontinuance of sacrifices,
-      xii. 43 _n._ 1.
-
-  _Hindoo Koosh_, Alexander at, xii. 200;
-    Alexander reduces the country between the Indus and, xii. 224 _seq._
-
-  _Hindostan_, hoarding in, xii. 175 _n._ 3.
-
-  _Hipparchus_, ii. 153 _n._, iv. 111 _seq._
-
-  _Hipparinus_, son of Dionysius, xi. 130.
-
-  _Hippeis_, Solonian, iii. 118.
-
-  _Hippias_, of Elis, viii. 380 _seq._
-
-  _Hippias, Peisistratid_, iv. 111 _seq._, 120 _seq._, 281, 356 _n._ 2.
-
-  _Hippo_, iv. 385.
-
-  _Hippodameia_, i. 159.
-
-  _Hippodamus_, vi. 20.
-
-  _Hippokleidês_, iii. 39.
-
-  _Hippokratês the physician_, i. 373; viii. 426 _n._ 2.
-
-  _Hippokratês of Gela_, v. 213 _seq._
-
-  _Hippokratês, the Athenian general_, vi. 370 _seq._, 379, 382 _seq._,
-      388.
-
-  _Hippon_, xi. 184.
-
-  _Hipponikus_, iii. 102.
-
-  _Hipponium_, capture of, xi. 17;
-    re-establishment of, xi. 43.
-
-  _Hipponoidas_, vii. 85, 89.
-
-  _Histiæus_ and the bridge over the Danube, iv. 272;
-    and Myrkinus, iv. 273, 277;
-    detention of, at Susa, iv. 277;
-    and the Ionic revolt, iv. 284, 299 _seq._, 309.
-
-  _Historians_, treatment of mythes by, i. 391 _seq._
-
-  _Historical_ proof, positive evidence indispensable to, i. 430;
-    sense of modern times not to be applied to an unrecording age,
-      i. 432;
-    evidence, the standard of, raised with regard to England, but not
-      with regard to Greece, i. 485;
-    and legendary Greece compared, ii. 60 _seq._
-
-  _Historicizing_ innovations in the tale of Troy, i. 333;
-    of ancient mythes, i. 409 _seq._;
-    applicable to all mythes, or none, i. 422.
-
-  _History_, uninteresting to early Greeks, i. 359;
-    of England, how conceived down to the seventeenth century,
-      i. 482 _seq._;
-    and legend, Grecian, blank between, ii. 33 _seq._;
-    Grecian first period of, from B. C. 776 to 560, ii. 270, 273;
-    Grecian, second period of, from B. C. 560 to 300, ii. 270 _seq._;
-    religious conception of, common to Greeks and Persians, v. 10.
-
-  _Homer_ and Hesiod, mythology of, i. 12;
-    personality and poems of, ii. 127 _seq._
-
-  _Homeric Zeus_, i. 12;
-    hymns, i. 34, 37 _seq._, 45, 59, 60, iii. 168 _seq._;
-    legend of the birth of Hêraklês, i. 93 _seq._;
-    Pelops, i. 159;
-    gods, types of, i. 350;
-    age, mythical faith of, i. 359;
-    philosophy, i. 368;
-    account of the inhabitants of Peloponnesus, ii. 12;
-    Boulê and Agora, ii. 65 _seq._;
-    Greeks, social condition of, ii. 97 _seq._, 107;
-    Greeks, unity, idea of, partially revived, ii. 162 _seq._;
-    epoch, right conception of, ii. 174;
-    mode of fighting, ii. 457;
-    geography, iii. 204.
-
-  _Homêrids_, the poetical gens of, ii. 132.
-
-  _Homicide_, purification for, i. 25, 26;
-    mode of dealing with, in legendary and historical Greece,
-      ii. 93 _seq._;
-    tribunals for, at Athens, iii. 77;
-    Drake’s laws of, retained by Solon, iii. 134;
-    trial for and the senate of Areopagus, v. 368 _n._
-
-  _Homoioi_, Spartan, ii. 363, 418.
-
-  _Hoplêtes_, iii. 51.
-
-  _Hôræ_, the, i. 10.
-
-  _Horkos_, i. 7, 8.
-
-  _Horse_, the wooden, of Troy, i. 302, 309.
-
-  _Horsemen_ at Athens, after the restoration of the democracy,
-      B. C. 403, viii. 305.
-
-  _Hospitality_ in legendary Greece, ii. 84.
-
-  _Human_ sacrifices in Greece, i. 126 _seq._
-
-  _Hyakinthia_ and the Lacedæmonians, v. 153.
-
-  _Hyakinthus_, i. 168.
-
-  _Hyblæan Megara_, iii. 365.
-
-  _Hydarnês_, v. 88.
-
-  _Hydaspes_, Alexander at the, xii. 227 _seq._;
-    Alexander sails down the, xii. 333.
-
-  _Hydra_, the Lernæan, i. 7.
-
-  _Hydra_, sailors of, v. 51 _n._ 2.
-
-  _Hykkara_, capture of, vii. 216.
-
-  _Hylas_ and Hêraklês, i. 234.
-
-  _Hylleis_, ii. 360.
-
-  _Hyllus_, i. 94, 177.
-
-  _Hymns_, Homeric, i. 34, 37 _seq._, 45, 59, 60, iii. 168 _seq._;
-    at festival in honor of gods, i. 49.
-
-  _Hypaspistæ_, xii. 61.
-
-  _Hyperbolus_, iv. 151, vii. 108 _seq._, viii. 27.
-
-  _Hyperides_, xi. 509, xii. 298 _n._ 1, 305 _n._, 326, 327.
-
-  _Hyperiôn_, i. 5, 6.
-
-  _Hypermênes_, x. 146.
-
-  _Hypermnêstra_, i. 88.
-
-  _Hyphasis_, Alexander at, xii. 231.
-
-  _Hypomeiones_, Spartan, ii. 363, 418.
-
-  _Hyrkania_, Alexander in, xii. 166.
-
-
-  I.
-
-  _Ialmenos_ and Askalaphos, i. 130.
-
-  _Iapetids_ in Hesiod, i. 74.
-
-  _Iapetos_, i. 5, 6.
-
-  _Iapygians_, iii. 392.
-
-  _Iasus_, capture of, vii. 389.
-
-  _Iberia_ in Spain, iii. 275.
-
-  _Iberians_ and Dionysius, x. 510.
-
-  _Ida_ in Asia, iii. 195, 197.
-
-  _Ida_ in Crête, Zeus at, i. 6.
-
-  _Idanthyrsus_, iv. 267.
-
-  _Idas_, i. 169, 171.
-
-  _Idomenê_, Demosthenês at, vi. 306 _seq._
-
-  _Idrieus_, xi. 437.
-
-  _Ikarus_, i. 225.
-
-  _Iliad_ and the Trojan war, i. 297;
-    and Odyssey, date, structure, and authorship of, ii. 118-209.
-
-  _Ilium_, i. 286, 334 _seq._
-
-  _Illyria_, Dionysius’s schemes of conquest in, xi. 24.
-
-  _Illyrians_, different tribes of, iv. 1 _seq._;
-    retreat of Perdikkas and Brasidas before, vi. 447 _seq._;
-    victory of Philip over, xi. 214 _seq._;
-    defeat of, by Alexander, xii. 28 _seq._
-
-  _Ilus_, i. 285, 286.
-
-  _Imbros_, iv. 28, 278 _seq._
-
-  _Imilkon_ and Hannibal, invasion of Sicily by, x. 421 _seq._;
-    at Agrigentum, x. 425 _seq._;
-    at Gela, x. 447 _seq._;
-    and Dionysius, x. 454 _seq._;
-    at Motyê, x. 479, 490;
-    capture of Messênê by, 491 _seq._;
-    and the Campanians of Ætna, x. 497;
-    before Syracuse, x. 498 _seq._;
-    flight of, from Syracuse, x. 510;
-    miserable end of, x. 511.
-
-  _Inachus_, i. 82.
-
-  _Indus_, Alexander at, xii. 225 _seq._, 233 _seq._;
-    voyage of Nearchus from the mouth of, to that of the Tigris,
-      xii. 235, 237.
-
-  _Industry_, manufacturing, at Athens, iii. 136 _seq._
-
-  _Infantry_ and oligarchy, iii. 31.
-
-  _Inland_ and maritime cities contrasted, ii. 225.
-
-  _Inô_, i. 123 _seq._
-
-  _Inscriptions_, ii. 41.
-
-  _Interest_ on loans, iii. 107 _seq._, 159.
-
-  _Interpreters_, Egyptian, iii. 327.
-
-  _Io_, legend of, i. 84 _seq._
-
-  _Iôn_, i. 198, 204.
-
-  _Iônia_, emigrants to, ii. 24 _seq._;
-    conquest of, by Harpagus, iv. 202;
-    Mardonius’s deposition of despots in, iv. 312;
-    expedition of Astyochus to, vii. 382;
-    expedition of Thrasyllus to, viii. 129.
-
-  _Ionian_, the name a reproach, iii. 169.
-
-  _Ionians_, ii. 12, 13;
-    and Darius’s bridge over the Danube, iv. 271 _seq._;
-    abandonment of, by the Athenians, iv. 297;
-    at Ladê, iv. 301 _seq._;
-    at Mykalê, v. 192 _seq._, 197;
-    after the battle of Mykalê, v. 199.
-
-  _Ionic_ emigration, ii. 21, 24 _seq._, iii. 172;
-    tribes in Attica, iii. 50, 52 _seq._;
-    cities in Asia, iii. 172 _seq._, 260;
-    and Italic Greeks, iii. 398;
-    revolt, iv. 285 _seq._, 306 _n._ 2;
-    philosophers, iv. 378;
-    Sicilians and Athens, vii. 132;
-    alphabet and the Athenian laws, viii. 308.
-
-  _Iphigeneia_, i. 293.
-
-  _Iphiklos_, i. 110.
-
-  _Iphikrates_, destruction of a Lacedæmonian _mora_ by, ix. 327 _n._,
-      341 _n._, 348 _seq._;
-    military improvements and successes of, ix. 335 _seq._, 353;
-    defeat of Anaxibius by, ix. 370 _seq._;
-    proceedings of, between B. C. 387-378, x. 105 _seq._;
-    and Kotys, x. 106, 299, 369, 374;
-    expedition of, to Korkyra, x. 149 _seq._, 154 _n._;
-    and Timotheus, x. 149, 299, xi. 231 _seq._;
-    expedition of, to aid Sparta against Thebes, x. 237 _seq._;
-    in Thrace and Macedonia, x. 250 _seq._, 299;
-    in the Hellespont, xi. 224;
-    and Chares, xi. 224 _seq._
-
-  _Iphikrates the Younger_, xii. 129.
-
-  _Ipsus_, battle of, xii. 387.
-
-  _Iran_, territory of, iv. 184.
-
-  _Irasa_, iv. 31.
-
-  _Iris_, i. 7.
-
-  _Iron race_, the, i. 66.
-
-  _Isagoras_, iv. 126, 164 _seq._
-
-  _Ischagoras_, vi. 449.
-
-  _Ischolaus_, x. 217.
-
-  _Ischys_, i. 178.
-
-  _Isidas_, x. 332.
-
-  _Islands_ in the Ægean, ii. 234.
-
-  _Ismenias_ in the north of Bœotia, ix. 301;
-    and Leontiades, x. 59;
-    trial and execution of, x. 63.
-
-  _Ismenias_ and Pelopidas, x. 277 _seq._, 283, 285.
-
-  _Isokratês_, his treatment of mythes, i. 407 _n._ 2;
-    on the origin of Periœki, ii. 367;
-    panegyrical oration of, x. 44, 77;
-    the Plataic oration of, x. 163;
-    the Archidamus of, x. 228 _n._ 2, 229 _n._ 1, 291 _n._ 2;
-    his letter to Philip, xi. 282, 436.
-
-  _Issêdones_, iii. 245.
-
-  _Issus_, Alexander at, before the battle, xii. 114;
-    Darius at, before the battle, xii. 117;
-    battle of, xii. 118 _seq._;
-    inaction of Darius after the battle of, xii. 152;
-    and its neighborhood, as connected with the battle, xii. 491 _seq._
-
-  _Isthmian games_, i. 124, ii. 242, iv. 65 _seq._;
-    Eleians excluded from, i. 140, ii. 306 _n._;
-    B. C. 412, vii. 368;
-    and Agesilaus, ix. 344.
-
-  _Istônê_, Korkyræan fugitives at, vi. 278, 313, 357 _seq._
-
-  _Italia_, iii. 350.
-
-  _Italian_ Greeks, iii. 369, 392, 394 _seq._, xi. 7 _seq._, 133,
-      xii. 394.
-
-  _Italians_, iii. 369.
-
-  _Italy and Sicily_, early languages and history of, iii. 354 _n._
-
-  _Italy_, the voyage from Greece to, iii. 361;
-    Grecian colonies in, iii. 354, 360, 374 _seq._;
-    decline of Greek power in, after the fall of Sybaris, iv. 415;
-    Southern, affairs of, B. C. 382-369, xi. 43.
-
-  _Ithômê_, ii. 422, v. 316.
-
-
-  J.
-
-  _Jason_, i. 114 _seq._, 237 _seq._
-
-  _Jason of Pheræ_, x. 137 _seq._, 147 _n._, 153, 189 _seq._, 195 _seq._
-
-  _Jaxartes_, Alexander at the, xii. 204 _seq._
-
-  _Jocasta_, i. 266 _seq._
-
-  _Jurkæ_, iii. 245.
-
-  _Jury-trial_, characteristics of, exhibited in the Athenian
-      dikasteries, v. 385 _seq._
-
-
-  K.
-
-  _Kabala_, victory of Dionysius at, xi. 41.
-
-  _Kabeirichus_, x. 85.
-
-  _Kadmeia_, at Thebes, seizure of, by Phœbidas, x. 58 _seq._;
-    surrender of, by the Lacedæmonians, x. 88 _seq._
-
-  _Kadmus_, i. 257 _seq._
-
-  _Kalais_ and Zêtês, i. 199.
-
-  _Kalasiries_ and Hermotybii, iii. 316.
-
-  _Kalauria_, i. 56;
-    Amphiktyony at, i. 133;
-    the Athenian allied armament at, x. 148;
-    death of Demosthenes at, xii. 327 _seq._
-
-  _Kalchas_, wanderings and death of, i. 313.
-
-  _Kalê Aktê_, foundation of, vii. 125.
-
-  _Kallias_, treaty of, v. 336 _seq._
-
-  _Kallias, son of Kalliades_, vi. 70, 72.
-
-  _Kallias_ at the congress at Sparta, B. C. 371, x. 165.
-
-  _Kallias of Chalkis_, xi. 341 _seq._, 452.
-
-  _Kallibius, the Lacedæmonian_, viii. 242; ix. 188.
-
-  _Kallibius_ of Tegea, x. 209.
-
-  _Kalliklês_, in Plato, viii. 382 _seq._
-
-  _Kallikratidas_, viii. 160 _seq._, 263.
-
-  _Kallimachus_, the polemarch, iv. 341, 348.
-
-  _Kallinus_, iv. 73, 77.
-
-  _Kallipidæ_, iii. 239.
-
-  _Kallippus_, xi. 123 _seq._, 128 _seq._
-
-  _Kallirrhoe_, i. 7, 282.
-
-  _Kallisthenês, the historian_, i. 410.
-
-  _Kallisthenes, the general_, failure and condemnation of, x. 370,
-      xi. 423.
-
-  _Kallisthenes of Olynthus_, xii. 213, 216 _seq._, 222 _seq._
-
-  _Kallistô_, i. 175.
-
-  _Kallistratus_, x. 110, 164, _seq._, 172, 288, xi. 266.
-
-  _Kallixenus_, viii. 194 _seq._, 203, 205.
-
-  _Kalpê_, the Ten Thousand Greeks at, ix. 148 _seq._
-
-  _Kalydônian_ boar, i. 143, 146 _seq._
-
-  _Kamarina_, iii. 366;
-    restoration of, to independence, v. 237;
-    and the Athenians, vii. 194;
-    Athenian and Syracusan envoys at, vii. 229 _seq._;
-    neutral policy of, B. C. 415, vii. 233;
-    evacuation of, x. 450;
-    and Timoleon, xi. 187.
-
-  _Kambyses_, iv. 47, 218 _seq._
-
-  _Kandaulês_, iii. 220.
-
-  _Kannônus_, psephism of, viii. 197 _n._
-
-  _Kanôpic branch of the Nile_., opening of, to Greek traffic, iii. 327.
-
-  _Kapaneus_. i. 273, 278.
-
-  _Kappadokia_ subdued by Alexander, xii. 111.
-
-  _Kardia_, Athenian fleet at, viii. 120;
-    alliance of, with Philip, xi. 451;
-    Eumenes of, xii. 74.
-
-  _Karduchians_, and the Ten Thousand Greeks, ix. 95 _seq._
-
-  _Karia_, resistance of, to Daurisês, iv. 294.
-
-  _Karmania_, Alexander’s bacchanalian procession through, xii. 237.
-
-  _Karneian_ festival, ii. 306 _n._, v. 78.
-
-  _Karneius_ Apollo, i. 49.
-
-  _Karnus_, ii. 3.
-
-  _Karpathus_, ii. 31.
-
-  _Karystus_, iv. 331, v. 303.
-
-  _Kassander_, Alexander’s treatment of, xii. 254;
-    schemes of, on Antipater’s death, xii. 339;
-    and Polysperchon, war between, xii. 360;
-    gets possession of Athens, xii. 361;
-    in Peloponnesus, xii. 365;
-    defeat of Olympias by, xii. 366;
-    confederacy of, with Lysimachus, Ptolemy, and Seleukus against
-      Antigonus, xii. 367, 372, 382, 387;
-    founds Kassandreia and restores Thebes, xii. 368;
-    and Alexander, son of Polysperchon, xii. 368, 369;
-    and the Ætolians, xii. 370;
-    measures of Antigonus against, xii. 369, 370;
-    great power of, in Greece, xii. 371;
-    Ptolemy, and Lysimachus, pacification of, with Antigonus, xii. 371;
-    compact of Polysperchon with, xii. 372, 381;
-    Ptolemy makes a truce with, xii. 373;
-    success of Demetrius Poliorketes in Greece against, xii. 382;
-    truce of, with Demetrius Poliorketes, xii. 387;
-    death of, xii. 389.
-
-  _Kassandra_. i. 287.
-
-  _Kastôr_ and Pollux, i. 169 _seq._
-
-  _Katabothra_, ii. 218.
-
-  _Katana_, iii. 364;
-    and Ætna, v. 236;
-    Alkibiadês at, vii. 194;
-    Nikias at, vii. 234;
-    conquest of, by Dionysius, x. 468;
-    Carthaginian naval victory near, x. 495;
-    Hiketas and Magon at, xi. 156.
-
-  _Katônakophori_, iii. 35.
-
-  _Katreus_ and Althæmenês, i. 224.
-
-  _Kaulonia_, iii. 384, xi. 14, 17;
-    Dikon of, xi. 28.
-
-  _Kaunus_, Antisthenês at, vii. 397.
-
-  _Käystru-Pedion_, march of Cyrus from Keramôn-Agora to, ix. 17 _n._ 2.
-
-  _Kebalinus_, xii. 191, 194.
-
-  _Kekrops_, i. 195 _seq._;
-    the second, i. 204.
-
-  _Kelænæ_, Alexander at, xii. 101.
-
-  _Keleos_, i. 38 _seq._, 196.
-
-  _Keleustes_, vi. 200 _n._
-
-  _Kenchreæ_, Peloponnesian fleet at, vii. 382.
-
-  _Kentrites_, the Ten Thousand Greeks at the, ix. 99 _seq._
-
-  _Kephallênia_, iii. 410, vi. 135, 141.
-
-  _Kephalus_, i. 195 _n._ 4, 198;
-    and Dionysius at Syracuse, xi. 167.
-
-  _Kephisodotus_, x. 374, 377.
-
-  _Kerasus_, the Ten Thousand Greeks at, ix. 127.
-
-  _Kersobleptes_, x. 366;
-    and Charidemus, x. 366, 378, 379;
-    intrigue of, against Athens, xi. 258;
-    and the peace and alliance between Athens and Philip,
-      xi. 396 _seq._;
-    defeat of, by Philip, xi. 443.
-
-  _Kertch_, tumuli near, xii. 487 _seq._
-
-  _Ketô_, i. 7.
-
-  _Keyx_ and Alcyone, i. 135.
-
-  _Kilikia_, Alexander in, xii. 113, 114;
-    Darius in, xii. 116.
-
-  _Kimon_ and Themistoklês, v. 278, 280;
-    capture of Skyros by, v. 304, 304 _n._ 2.;
-    victories of, at the Eurymedon, v. 308;
-    trial and acquittal of, v. 312, 365;
-    and the Spartan application for aid against the Helots, v. 318, 365;
-    recall of, from ostracism, v. 329;
-    death of, v. 335, 340;
-    political party of, v. 361;
-    and Periklês, v. 329, 362 _seq._, 371;
-    character of, v. 364;
-    ostracism of, v. 366.
-
-  _Kimonian_ treaty, the so-called, v. 337 _seq._
-
-  _Kinadon_, conspiracy and character of, ix. 251 _seq._
-
-  _King_, the, in legendary Greece, ii. 61 _seq._, 74 _seq._;
-    the, in historical Greece, ii. 76;
-    English theory of a, iii. 13.
-
-  _Kings_, Egyptian, iii. 321, 330 _n._ 2.
-
-  _Kingship_, discontinuance of, in Greece generally, ii. 76, iii. 8;
-    in mediæval and modern Europe, iii. 8 _seq._
-
-  _Kinyps_ and Dorieus, iv. 36.
-
-  _Kirrha_, iv. 60 _n._, 61 _seq._, xi. 468 _seq._, 474.
-
-  _Kirrhæans_, punishment of, iv. 62 _seq._
-
-  _Kissidas_, x. 265.
-
-  _Klarus_, temple of Apollo at, iii. 185.
-
-  _Klazomenæ_, iii. 188, vii. 372, 384, 391.
-
-  _Kleander_ of Gela, v. 207.
-
-  _Kleander the Lacedæmonian_, ix. 149 _seq._, 152, 154, 165, xii. 197.
-
-  _Kleandridas_, vi. 14.
-
-  _Kleandridês_, v. 349.
-
-  _Klearchus the Lacedæmonian_, at the Hellespont, viii. 96;
-    at Byzantium, viii. 128;
-    and Cyrus the Younger, ix. 8, 22 _seq._;
-    and Menon’s soldiers, ix. 35;
-    and Ariæus, ix. 52;
-    and Tissaphernes, ix. 63, 70 _seq._
-
-  _Klearchus of the Pontic Herakleia_, xii. 461 _seq._
-
-  _Klearidas_, vi. 450, 470, 472, vii. 3.
-
-  _Kleinas_, iii. 102.
-
-  _Kleisthenês of Sikyôn_, i. 279, ii. 129, iii. 32 _seq._
-
-  _Kleisthenês the Athenian_, revolution in Attic tribes by,
-      iii. 63, 67;
-    and the oracle at Delphi, iv. 121;
-    retirement and recall of, iv. 164, 165;
-    development of Athenian energy after, iv. 176;
-    changes in the constitution of, after the Persian war, v. 275.
-
-  _Kleïppidês_, vi. 224 _seq._
-
-  _Kleitarchus_, xi. 450, 452.
-
-  _Kleitus the Illyrian_, xii. 28 _seq._
-
-  _Kleitus, Alexander’s general_, xii. 85, 208 _seq._
-
-  _Kleobulê_, mother of Demosthenes, xi. 263.
-
-  _Kleobûlus_ and Xenarês, vii. 24 _seq._
-
-  _Kleokritus_, viii. 270.
-
-  _Kleombrotus_, x. 94 _seq._, 129, 136, 176 _seq._, 180 _seq._
-
-  _Kleomenês I._, his expeditions to Athens, iv. 122, 164 _seq._;
-    and Aristagoras, iv. 287;
-    defeat of Argeians by, iv. 320 _seq._;
-    return of, without attacking Argos, iv. 321;
-    trial of, iv. 323;
-    and the Æginetans, iv. 325, 328;
-    and Demaratus, iv. 325 _seq._;
-    violent proceedings and death of, v. 45.
-
-  _Kleomenês III._, ii. 349, 350.
-
-  _Kleomenês, Alexander’s satrap_, xii. 241, 253, 253 _n._ 1.
-
-  _Kleon the Athenian_, first mention of, by Thucydidês, vi. 244;
-    policy and character of, vi. 246, 480 _seq._;
-    and Mitylênê, vi. 249 _seq._;
-    political function of, vi. 290, 292;
-    and the prisoners in Sphakteria, vi. 329 _seq._;
-    expedition of, to Pylus, vi. 336 _seq._;
-    warlike influence of, vi. 355, 457 _seq._;
-    at Amphipolis, vi. 462 _seq._, 467 _seq._;
-    capture of Torônê by, vi. 463;
-    at Eion, vi. 463;
-    Thucydidês’s treatment of, vi. 479, 483 _seq._;
-    and Aristophanês, vi. 481 _seq._, 485.
-
-  _Kleon, of Halikarnassus_, ix. 237, 300.
-
-  _Kleônæ_ and Argos, ii. 464, iv. 65 _n._ 2.
-
-  _Kleonikê_ and Pausanias, v. 255.
-
-  _Kleonymus_, xii. 448, 449.
-
-  _Kleopatra, wife of Philip_, xi. 513 _seq._, 518 _n._ 2,
-      xii. 4 _seq._, 8.
-
-  _Kleopatra, daughter of Philip_, xi. 514, xii. 321, 372.
-
-  _Kleophon_, viii. 123.
-
-  _Kleopus_, iii. 228.
-
-  _Kleruchies, Athenian_, revival of B. C. 365, vi. 31 _n._,
-      x. 296 _seq._
-
-  _Kleruchs, Athenian_, in Chalkis, iv. 170;
-    in Lesbos, vi. 257;
-    after the battle of Ægospotami, viii. 223.
-
-  _Klonas_, musical improvements of, iv. 75.
-
-  _Klothô_, i. 7.
-
-  _Klymenê_, i. 6.
-
-  _Klytæmnêstra_, i. 162, 168.
-
-  _Knêmus_, vi. 193 _seq._, 202, 213.
-
-  _Knidus_, settlement of, ii. 31;
-    maritime contests near, B. C. 412 vii. 394;
-    Antisthenês and Astyochus at, vii. 397;
-    the battle of, ix. 283;
-    and Agesilaus, ix. 312;
-    reverses of Sparta after the battle of, 317.
-
-  _Knights at Athens_, viii. 305, ix. 183.
-
-  _Knôpus_, iii. 187.
-
-  _Kodrids_, i. 112.
-
-  _Kodrus_, ii. 24;
-    archons after, iii. 48.
-
-  _Kœnus_, xii. 194, 195, 232.
-
-  _Kœos_, i. 5, 7.
-
-  _Kœratadus_, viii. 134, iv. 160, 163.
-
-  _Kôês_, iv. 270, 273, 285.
-
-  _Kokalus_, i. 225 _seq._
-
-  _Kôlæus_, his voyage to Tartêssus, iii. 279.
-
-  _Kôlakretæ_, iv. 137.
-
-  _Kolchians_ and the Ten Thousand Greeks, ix. 112, 126.
-
-  _Kolchis_, and the Argonautic expedition, i. 241, 255.
-
-  _Kolônus_, Athenian assembly at, viii. 35.
-
-  _Kolophôn_, iii. 184 _seq._
-
-  _Konipodes_, iii. 35.
-
-  _Konon_ at Naupaktus, vii. 358;
-    at Andros, viii. 151;
-    appointment of, to succeed Alkibiadês, viii. 159;
-    at Samos, 160;
-    at Mitylênê, viii. 166 _seq._;
-    escape of, from Ægospotami, viii. 219;
-    renewed activity of, ix. 255, 269;
-    at Rhodes, ix. 270;
-    visit of, to the Persian court, ix. 280 _seq._;
-    and Pharnabazus, ix. 281, 318, 321 _seq._;
-    rebuilds the Long Walls of Athens, ix. 322;
-    large plans of, ix. 325;
-    sent as envoy to Tiribazus, ix. 359;
-    arrest of, ix. 361;
-    long absence of, from Athens, x. 108 _n._ 2.
-
-  _Kopaïs_, lake of, i. 132.
-
-  _Korkyra_ and the Argonauts, i. 243;
-    early inhabitants of, iii. 402;
-    relations of, with Corinth, iii. 403 _seq._;
-    relations of, with Epirus, iii. 405;
-    and Corinth, joint settlements of, iii. 405 _seq._;
-    commerce of, iii. 409;
-    and Corinth, disputes between, vi. 51 _seq._;
-    application of the Epidamnian democracy to, vi. 52;
-    and Corinth, hostilities between, vi. 55, 63 _seq._;
-    and Corinth, decision of the Athenians between, vi. 62;
-    oligarchical violence at, vi. 270 _seq._;
-    vengeance of the victorious Demos at, B. C. 427, vi. 275 _seq._;
-    Nikostratus and Alkidas at, vi. 282;
-    revolutions at, contrasted with those at Athens, vi. 283;
-    distress at, B. C. 425, vi. 313;
-    expedition of Eurymedon and Sophoklês to, vi. 313 _seq._,
-      357 _seq._;
-    muster of the Athenian armament at, vii. 180;
-    Demosthenês’s voyage from, to Sicily, vii. 301;
-    renewed troubles at, viii. 118;
-    Lacedæmonian expedition against, x. 142 _seq._;
-    expedition of Iphikrates to, x. 149 _seq._;
-    Kleonymus and Agathokles in, xii. 449.
-
-  _Korkyræan_ envoys, speech of, to the Athenian assembly,
-      vi. 58 _seq._;
-    captives return home from Corinth, vi. 266 _seq._;
-    oligarchical fugitives at Istônê, vi. 278, 313, 357.
-
-  _Korkyræans_, and Xerxes’s invasion, v. 66;
-    attack Epidamnus, vi. 53;
-    remonstrate with the Corinthians and Peloponnesians, vi. 54;
-    seek the alliance of Athens, vi. 56 _seq._
-
-  _Korôbius_ and the foundation of Kyrênê, iv. 30.
-
-  _Korôneia_, Athenian defeat at, v. 348;
-    Theban victory at, ix. 312 _seq._, 317.
-
-  _Korônis_ and Asklêpius, i. 178.
-
-  _Korynephori_, iii. 35.
-
-  _Kôs_, settlement of, ii. 30;
-    capture of, by Astyochus, vii. 397;
-    revolt of, from Athens, xi. 220 _seq._, 231.
-
-  _Kossæi_, xii. 248.
-
-  _Kottas_, i. 5.
-
-  _Kottyphus_, xi. 475, 479, 480.
-
-  _Kotyôra_, the Ten Thousand Greeks at, ix. 126 _seq._
-
-  _Kotys_ and Iphikrates, x. 106, 299, 369, 373;
-    and Athens, x. 228 _seq._, 372, 373;
-    and Timotheus, x. 301, 368;
-    and Miltokythes, x. 372;
-    capture of Sestos by, x. 373;
-    assassination of, x. 375.
-
-  _Kranaus_, i. 196.
-
-  _Krannon_, battle of, xii. 321.
-
-  _Kraterus_ and Philôtas, xii. 192 _seq._;
-    and Antipater, xii. 320 _seq._, 335;
-    death of, xii. 336.
-
-  _Kratês_, comedy of, viii. 328.
-
-  _Kratesippidas_, viii. 128, 138.
-
-  _Kratinus_, viii. 327, 332 _n._
-
-  _Kreôn, king of Thêbes_, i. 117, 276.
-
-  _Kreôn, archon at Athens_, iii. 48.
-
-  _Kresphontês_, ii. 2 _seq._, 331 _n._
-
-  _Krêtan_ settlements on the Gulf of Tarentum, i. 330;
-    and Phrygian worship, iii. 215.
-
-  _Krêtans_ and Minôs, i. 229;
-    in the time of Homer, ii. 102;
-    and Xerxes, v. 66.
-
-  _Krête_, migrations of Dorians to, ii. 30;
-    early Dorians in, ii. 310;
-    Periœki in, ii. 364 _n._ 3;
-    Phalækus in, xi. 433.
-
-  _Krêthêis_ and Pêleus, i. 114.
-
-  _Krêtheus_, descendants of, i. 113.
-
-  _Kreüsa_, i. 198, 204.
-
-  _Krimêsus_, Timoleon’s victory over the Carthaginians at the,
-      xi. 174 _seq._
-
-  _Krios_, i. 5, 6.
-
-  _Krissa_, iv. 59 _seq._
-
-  _Kritias_ and Sokratês, vii. 36 _seq._;
-    return of, to Athens, viii. 233 _seq._;
-    and Theramenês, viii. 237 _seq._, 245 _seq._;
-    death of, viii. 290.
-
-  _Krius_, iv. 325, 328.
-
-  _Krommyon_, capture of, ix. 335;
-    recovery of, ix. 353.
-
-  _Kromnus_, capture of Lacedæmonians at, x. 316 _seq._
-
-  _Kronium_, Dionysius at, xi. 41.
-
-  _Kronos_, i. 5 _seq._, 8.
-
-  _Krotôn_, foundation, territory, and colonies of, iii. 376 _seq._;
-    fall of, iii. 392;
-    maximum power of, iii. 394;
-    citizens and government of, iii. 399;
-    and Pythagoras, iv. 401 _seq._;
-    and Sybaris, iv. 413 _seq._;
-    capture of, by Dionysius, xi. 22;
-    expedition from Syracuse to, xii. 397.
-
-  _Krypteia_, ii. 378.
-
-  _Kteatos_ and Eurytos, i. 141.
-
-  _Ktêsias_ and Herodotus on Cyrus, iv. 185;
-    on Darius, iv. 264.
-
-  _Ktesiphon_, xi. 371, xii. 286 _seq._
-
-  _Kunaxa_, battle of, ix. 42 _seq._
-
-  _Kurêtes_, ceremonies of, i. 31.
-
-  _Kyaxarês_, iii. 231, 254.
-
-  _Kydonta_, vi. 203.
-
-  _Kyknus_, i. 294.
-
-  _Kylôn the Athenian_, attempted usurpation of, iii. 81 _seq._
-
-  _Kylôn of Krotôn_, iv. 409.
-
-  _Kyllyrii_ at Syracuse, v. 206.
-
-  _Kymæans_ and Pactyas, iv. 201.
-
-  _Kymê_, iii. 190;
-    Alkibiadês at, viii. 153.
-
-  _Kynegeirus_, iv. 350.
-
-  _Kynossêma_, battle of, viii. 109 _seq._
-
-  _Kynurians_, ii. 303;
-    in Argolis, ii. 451.
-
-  _Kypselus_, iii. 40;
-    fall of the dynasty of, iii. 43.
-
-  _Kyrênê_, foundation of, iv. 29 _seq._;
-    situation, fertility and prosperity of, iv. 31 _seq._;
-    and the Libyans, iv. 35 _seq._, 42 _seq._;
-    second migration of Greeks to, iv. 41;
-    and Egypt, iv. 42;
-    reform of, by Demônax, iv. 43;
-    Periœki at, iv. 45;
-    third immigration to, iv. 46;
-    submission of, to Kambysês, iv. 220;
-    history of, from about B. C. 450 to 306, xii. 428 _seq._;
-    Ophellas, viceroy of, xii. 431 _seq._
-
-  _Kythera_, capture of, by the Athenians, vi. 365 _seq._
-
-  _Kytinium_, occupation of, by Philip, xi. 498.
-
-  _Kyzikus_ and the Argonauts, i. 234;
-    revolt of, from Athens, viii. 112;
-    siege of, by Mindarus, viii. 120;
-    battle of, viii. 121.
-
-
-  L.
-
-  _Labdalum_, vii. 248, 269.
-
-  _Lacedæmonian_ envoys to Persia, B. C. 430, vi. 181;
-    embassy to Athens about the prisoners in Sphakteria, vi. 325 _seq._;
-    reinforcement to Brasidas in Chalkidikê, vi. 449;
-    envoys at the congress at Corinth, B. C. 421, vii. 15;
-    envoys at Athens, about Panaktum and Pylus, vii. 29;
-    embassy to Athens, against the alliance of Athens with Argos,
-      vii. 44 _seq._;
-    army, vii. 79, 81 _n._ 2;
-    assembly, speech of Alkibiadês in, vii. 237 _seq._;
-    fleet under Agesandridas, viii. 66, 71;
-    fleet victory of, near Eretria, viii. 72 _seq._;
-    _mora_, destruction of a, by Iphikrates, ix. 350 _seq._;
-    auxiliaries to the Phokians at Thermopylæ, xi. 419, 421.
-
-  _Lacedæmonians_ and Cyrus the Great, iv. 199;
-    attack of, upon Polykratês, iv. 243;
-    and Themistoklês, v. 149, 278, 280;
-    and Mardonius’s offer of peace to the Athenians, v. 151 _seq._;
-    invoke the aid of their allies against the Helots, v. 316;
-    dismiss their Athenian auxiliaries against the Helots,
-      v. 317 _seq._;
-    expedition of, into Bœotia, B. C. 458, v. 327 _seq._;
-    victory of, at Tanagra, v. 328;
-    proceedings of, on Phormio’s victory over the Peloponnesian fleet
-      near Rhium, vi. 202;
-    proceedings of, for the recovery of Pylus, vi. 319, 320 _seq._;
-    occupation of Sphakteria by, vi. 320, 347;
-    blockade of, in Sphakteria, vi. 324 _seq._, 333 _seq._, 342 _seq._;
-    offers of peace from, after the capture of Sphakteria, vi. 353;
-    assassination of Helots by, vi. 368 _seq._;
-    and the Peace of Nikias, vii. 3;
-    liberate the Arcadian subjects of Mantinea, and plant Helots at
-      Lepreum, vii. 21;
-    exclusion of, from the Olympic festival, vii. 57 _seq._;
-    detachment of, to reinforce Epidaurus, B. C. 419, vii. 70;
-    and their allies, invasions of Argos by, vii. 71 _seq._, 102;
-    Gylippus sent to Syracuse by, vii. 242;
-    fortification of Dekeleia by, vii. 288, 354;
-    and the Four Hundred, viii. 65;
-    recapture of Pylus by, viii. 131;
-    defeat of, at Arginusæ, viii. 173 _seq._;
-    repayment of, by the Athenians, after the restoration of the
-      democracy, B. C. 403, viii. 305;
-    assassination of Alkibiadês demanded by, viii. 313;
-    the Cyreians under, ix. 170, 174, 208, 217, 318;
-    and Dorieus, ix. 271 _seq._;
-    and Corinthians, conflicts between, B. C. 393, ix. 326 _seq._;
-    victory of, within the Long Walls of Corinth, ix. 333 _seq._;
-    and the Olynthian confederacy, x. 56;
-    seizure of the Kadmeia at Thebes by, x. 60 _seq._;
-    trial and execution of Ismenias by, x. 64;
-    their surrender of the Kadmeia at Thebes, x. 88 _seq._;
-    defeat of, at Tegyra, x. 134;
-    expulsion of, from Bœotia, B. C. 374, x. 135;
-    at Kromnus, x. 316 _seq._;
-    at Mantinea, B. C. 362, x. 329, 335, 338, 340 _seq._;
-    and Alexander, xii. 13.
-
-  _Lachês_, expedition to Sicily under, vii. 132.
-
-  _Lachesis_, i. 7.
-
-  _Laconia_, genealogy of, i. 168;
-    population of, ii. 362;
-    gradual conquest of, ii. 417;
-    modern, ii. 418 _n._ 3, 454 _n._;
-    invasions of, by Epaminondas, x. 215 _seq._, 330 _seq._;
-    western, abstraction of, from Sparta, x. 226 _seq._
-
-  _Ladê_, combined Ionic fleet at, iv. 300 _seq._;
-    victory of Persian fleet at, iv. 304.
-
-  _Laius_ and Œdipus, i. 265.
-
-  _Lakes_ and marshes of Greece, ii. 219.
-
-  _Lamachus_, vii. 148, 190 _seq._, 256.
-
-  _Lamia_, Antipater at, xii. 315 _seq._
-
-  _Lamian_ war, xii. 315 _seq._, 334.
-
-  _Lampsakus_, revolt of, viii. 94;
-    recovery of, by Strombichidês, viii. 96.
-
-  _Language_, Greek, dialects of, ii. 239.
-
-  _Lanikê_, xii. 208.
-
-  _Laocoôn_, i. 303.
-
-  _Laomedôn_, i. 57, 285.
-
-  _Laphystios_, Zeus, i. 127.
-
-  _Laphystius_ and Timoleon, xi. 192.
-
-  _Larissa_, Asiatic, iii. 191 _n._ 1, 192.
-
-  _Lash_, use of, by Xerxes, v. 24, 31.
-
-  _Lasthenes_ and Euthykrates, xi. 351, 352.
-
-  _Latin_, Oscan, and Greek languages, iii. 354.
-
-  _Latium_, emigration from Arcadia to, iii. 351 _n._ 3;
-    plunder of, by Dionysius, xi. 25.
-
-  _Latins_, Œnotrians and Epirots, relationship of, iii. 351.
-
-  _Latona_ and Zeus, offspring of, i. 10.
-
-  _Laurium_, mines of, v. 55 _seq._
-
-  _Laws_, authority of, in historical Athens, ii. 81;
-    of Solon, iii. 131 _seq._;
-    of Zaleukus, iii. 382;
-    and psephisms, distinction between, v. 373;
-    enactment and repeal of, at Athens, v. 373 _seq._
-
-  _Layard’s_ “Nineveh and its Remains”, iii. 305.
-
-  _Learchus_ and Eryxô, iv. 43.
-
-  _Lebedos_, revolt of, from Athens, vii. 383.
-
-  _Lechæum_, capture of, by the Lacedæmonians, ix. 345 _n._ 1, 348.
-
-  _Leda_, and Tyndareus, i. 168 _seq._
-
-  _Legend_ of Dêmêtêr, i. 39 _seq._;
-    of the Delphian oracle, i. 45;
-    of Pandôra, i. 75 _n._ 4, 76;
-    of Io, i. 84 _seq._;
-    of Hêraklês, i. 93 _seq._;
-    Argonatic, i. 234 _n._ 3, 245 _seq._, 255 _seq._;
-    of Troy, i. 289 _seq._;
-    of the Minyæ from Lemnos, ii. 27;
-    and history, Grecian, blank between, ii. 31 _seq._
-
-  _Legendary_ Greece, social state of, ii. 57-118;
-    poems of Greece, value of, ii. 55 _seq._
-
-  _Legends_, mystic, i. 32 _seq._;
-    of Apollo, i. 45 _seq._;
-    of Greece, originally isolated, afterwards thrown into series,
-      i. 105;
-    of Mêdea and Jasôn, i. 118 _n._;
-    change of feeling with regard to, i. 186;
-    Attic, i. 191;
-    ancient, deeply rooted in the faith of the Greeks, i. 217, 348;
-    of Thebes, i. 256 _seq._;
-    divine, allegorized, heroic historicized, i. 424;
-    of saints, i. 469 _seq._;
-    of Asia Minor, iii. 227.
-
-  _Lekythus_, capture of, by Brasidas, vi. 425.
-
-  _Leleges_, ii. 264.
-
-  _Lelex_, i. 172.
-
-  _Lemnos_ and the Argonauts, i. 233;
-    early condition of, iv. 28;
-    conquest of, by Otanês, iv. 278;
-    Miltiadês at, iv. 279 _seq._
-
-  _Lending_ houses, iii. 162.
-
-  _Leokrates_, xi. 504.
-
-  _Leon_ and Diomedon, vii. 385 _seq._; viii. 28.
-
-  _Leon the Spartan_, viii. 20, 94.
-
-  _Leon_, mission of, to Persia, x. 278, 280.
-
-  _Leonidas_ at Thermopylæ, v. 76 _seq._, 89 _seq._
-
-  _Leonnatus_, xii. 317, 321.
-
-  _Leontiades_, the oligarchy under, x. 29 _n._;
-    conspiracy of, x. 58 _seq._;
-    at Sparta, x. 62;
-    Thebes under, x. 79, 80;
-    conspiracy against, x. 81 _seq._;
-    death of, x. 86.
-
-  _Leontini_, iii. 364;
-    intestine dissention at, vii. 140;
-    Demos at, apply to Athens, vii. 142, 143;
-    Dionysius at, B. C. 396, x. 442, 468, 492;
-    the mercenaries of Dionysius at, xi. 2;
-    Philistus at, xi. 99;
-    Dion at, xi. 106, 108, 109;
-    Hiketas at, xi. 160, 170;
-    surrender of, to Timoleon, xi. 182.
-
-  _Leosthenes the admiral_, x. 370.
-
-  _Leosthenes the general_, xii. 311, 313 _seq._
-
-  _Leotychides the Prokleid_, ii. 430;
-    chosen king of Sparta, iv. 326;
-    and Æginetan hostages, iv. 328, v. 46;
-    at Mykalê, v. 193;
-    banishment of, v. 259.
-
-  _Leotychides, son of Agis II._, ix. 242, 244.
-
-  _Lepreum_ and Elis, ii. 440, vii. 18;
-    Brasidean Helots at, vii. 21.
-
-  _Leptines, brother of Dionysius_, x. 489, 491, 495, xi. 13, 33, 42.
-
-  _Leptines the Athenian_, xi. 272.
-
-  _Leptines, general of Agathokles_, xii. 434, 441.
-
-  _Lesbians_, their application to Sparta, vi. 76.
-
-  _Lesbos_, early history of, iii. 193 _seq._;
-    autonomous ally of Athens, vi. 2;
-    Athenian kleruchs in, vi. 257;
-    application from, to Agis, vii. 365;
-    expedition of the Chians against, vii. 382 _seq._;
-    Thrasyllus at, viii. 102;
-    Kallikratidas in, viii. 166;
-    Thrasybulus in, ix. 166;
-    Memnon in, xii. 105;
-    recovery of, by Macedonian admirals, xii. 141.
-
-  _Lethe_, i. 7.
-
-  _Letô_, i. 6, 10.
-
-  _Leukas_, iii. 404 _seq._
-
-  _Leukon_ of Bosporus, xii. 481.
-
-  _Leukothea_, the temple of, i. 242.
-
-  _Leuktra_, the battle of, x. 176 _seq._;
-    treatment of Spartans defeated at, x. 192 _seq._;
-    extension of Theban power after the battle of, x. 193;
-    proceedings in Peloponnesus after the battle of, x. 198, 242;
-    position of Sparta after the battle of, x. 201;
-    proceedings in Arcadia after the battle of, x. 204 _seq._;
-    proceedings and views of Epaminondas after the battle of,
-      x. 213 _seq._
-
-  _Libya_, first voyages of Greeks to, iv. 29;
-    nomads of, iv. 38 _seq._;
-    expedition of Kambyses against, iv. 220.
-
-  _Libyans_ and Greeks at Kyrênê, iv. 39 _seq._;
-    and Dionysius, x. 510.
-
-  _Liby-Phœnicians_, x. 332.
-
-  _Lichas_ and bones of Orestes, ii. 447;
-    and the Olympic festival, iv. 72 _n._ 2, vii. 53 _n._, 59;
-    mission of to Milêtus, vii. 397, 398, viii. 98.
-
-  _Lilybæum_, defeat of Dionysius near, xi. 45.
-
-  _Limos_, i. 7, 10, _n._ 6.
-
-  _Lion_, the Nemean, i. 7.
-
-  _Lissus_, foundation of, xi. 24.
-
-  _Livy_, his opinion as to the chances of Alexander, if he had attacked
-      the Romans, xii. 260;
-    on the character of Alexander, xii. 265 _n._ 3.
-
-  _Lixus_ and Tingis, iii. 273 _n._ 1.
-
-  _Loans_ on interest, iii. 109, 159.
-
-  _Localities_, epical, i. 245.
-
-  _Lochages_, Spartan, ii. 459.
-
-  _Lochus_, Spartan, ii. 458 _seq._;
-    Macedonian, xii. 60.
-
-  _Logographers_ and ancient mythes, i. 377, 390 _seq._
-
-  _Lokri, Epizephrian_, early history of, iii. 379 _seq._;
-    and Dionysius, x. 476, xi. 17, 21, 23;
-    Dionysius the Younger at, xi. 105, 132 _seq._
-
-  _Lokrian_ coast opposite Eubœa, Athenian ravage of, vi. 136.
-
-  _Lokrians_, ii. 287;
-    Ozolian, ii. 290;
-    Italian, iii. 380 _seq._, iv. 172 _n._;
-    of Opus and Leonidas, v. 76;
-    and Phokians, xi. 251, 253;
-    of Amphissa, xi. 469.
-
-  _Lokris_ and Athens, v. 331.
-
-  _Long Walls_ at Megara, v. 324;
-    at Athens, v. 325 _seq._, 327, 331, vi. 20, viii. 231,
-      ix. 328 _seq._;
-    at Corinth, ix. 340 _seq._
-
-  _Lucanians_, xi. 9 _seq._, 132.
-
-  _Lucretius_ and ancient mythes, i. 430 _n._
-
-  _Lydia_, early history of, iii. 220 _seq._
-
-  _Lydian_ music and instruments, iii. 212, 219;
-    monarchy, iii. 262, iv. 191 _seq._
-
-  _Lydians_, iii. 215 _seq._, 219, iv. 198.
-
-  _Lykæus_, Zeus, i. 174.
-
-  _Lykambes_ and Archilochus, iv. 81.
-
-  _Lykaôn_ and his fifty sons, i. 173 _seq._
-
-  _Lykia_, conquest of, by Alexander, xii. 99.
-
-  _Lykidas_, the Athenian senator, v. 155.
-
-  _Lykomedes_, x. 259 _seq._, 281, 288.
-
-  _Lykophrôn, son of Periander_, iii. 42.
-
-  _Lykophrôn, despot of Pheræ_, xi. 261, 292, 294.
-
-  _Lykurgus the Spartan_, laws and discipline of, ii. 337-349, 381-421.
-
-  _Lykurgus the Athenian_, xii. 278, 378.
-
-  _Lykus_, i. 204; and Dirkê, i. 263.
-
-  _Lynkeus_ and Idas, i. 172.
-
-  _Lyre_, Hermes the inventor of, i. 59.
-
-  _Lyric poetry_, Greek, ii. 136, iv. 73, 93.
-
-  _Lysander_, appointments of, as admiral, viii. 138 _n._, 212;
-    character and influence of, viii. 139, ix. 309;
-    and Cyrus the Younger, viii. 140 _seq._, 214, 215;
-    factions organized by, in the Asiatic cities, viii. 143;
-    at Ephesus, viii. 152, 212;
-    victory of, at Notium, viii. 153;
-    superseded by Kallikratidas, viii. 162;
-    revolution at Milêtus by the partisans of, viii. 213;
-    operations of, after the battle of Arginusæ, viii. 215 _seq._;
-    victory of, at Ægospotami, viii. 217 _seq._;
-    proceedings of, after the battle of Ægospotami, viii. 222;
-    at Athens, viii. 226 _seq._, 237;
-    conquest of Samos by, viii. 238;
-    triumphant return of, to Sparta, viii. 238;
-    ascendency and arrogance of, after the capture of Athens, viii. 261,
-      ix. 204, 236 _seq._;
-    opposition to, at Sparta, viii. 262, ix. 204;
-    contrasted with Kallikratidas, viii. 263;
-    expedition of, against Thrasybulus, viii. 274;
-    dekarchies established by, ix. 184 _seq._, 197;
-    contrasted with Brasidas, ix. 195;
-    recall and temporary expatriation of, ix. 205;
-    introduction of gold and silver to Sparta by, ix. 230 _seq._;
-    intrigues of, to make himself king, ix. 237, 239 _seq._, 300;
-    and Agesilaus, ix. 242 _seq._, 257, 260 _seq._;
-    and the Bœotian war, ix. 292, 295;
-    death of, ix. 296.
-
-  _Lysias_, seizure of, by the Thirty at Athens, viii. 248;
-    speech of, against Phormisius’s disfranchising proposition,
-      viii. 294;
-    proposed citizenship of, viii. 309;
-    oration of, against Ergoklês, ix. 367;
-    oration of, at Olympia, B. C. 384, x. 73 _seq._;
-    panegyrical oration of, xi. 29 _seq._, 35 _n._
-
-  _Lysikles_, vi. 232.
-
-  _Lysikles, general at Chæoroneia_, xi. 502.
-
-  _Lysimachus_, confederacy of, with Kassander, Ptolemy, and Seleukus,
-      against Antigonus, xii. 367, 372, 383;
-    Kassander, Ptolemy, and Seleukus, pacification of, with Antigonus,
-      xii. 371;
-    and Amastris, xii. 468;
-    and Arsinoê, xii. 469 _seq._;
-    death of, xii. 470;
-    and the Pentapolis on the south-west coast of the Euxine, xii. 472.
-
-
-  M.
-
-  _Macedonia_, Mardonius in, iv. 313;
-    Perdikkas and Brasidas in, vi. 449, 453 _seq._;
-    increasing power of, from B. C. 414, x. 44;
-    and Athens, contrasted, x. 47;
-    kings of, after Archelaus, x. 48;
-    state of, B. C. 370, x. 248, 249;
-    Iphikrates in, x. 250 _seq._;
-    Timotheus in, x. 300;
-    government of, xi. 210 _seq._;
-    military condition of, under Philip, xi. 282 _seq._, xii. 55 _seq._;
-    and conquered Greece, xii. 1, 52;
-    and the Greeks, on Alexander’s accession, xii. 9;
-    Antipater, viceroy of, xii. 67, 68;
-    and Sparta, war between, xii. 281 _seq._;
-    Grecian confederacy against, after Alexander’s death,
-      xii. 313 _seq._;
-    Kassander in, xii. 366;
-    Demetrius Poliorketes acquires the crown of, xii. 389.
-
-  _Macedonian_ dynasty, iv. 12, 13;
-    envoys at Athens, xi. 387, 390, 398;
-    phalanx, xi. 501, xii. 59 _seq._, 251;
-    interventions in Greece, B. C. 336-335, xii. 16 _seq._;
-    pike, xii. 57, 101 _seq._;
-    troops, xii. 61 _seq._;
-    officers of Alexander’s army in Asia, xii. 72;
-    fleet, master of the Ægean, xii. 141;
-    soldiers of Alexander, mutiny of, xii. 242 _seq._
-
-  _Macedonians_, ii. 233, iv. 1 _n._, 8 _seq._;
-    conquered by Megabazus, iv. 276;
-    poverty and rudeness of, xi. 283;
-    military aptitude of, xii. 67;
-    small loss of, at the battle of the Granikus, xii. 86.
-
-  _Machaôn_ and Podaleirius, i. 180.
-
-  _Mæandrius_, iv. 245 _seq._
-
-  _Mæonians_ and Lydians, iii. 219.
-
-  _Magians_, massacre of, after the assassination of Smerdis, iv. 225.
-
-  _Magistrates_ of early Athens, v. 352 _seq._;
-    Athenian, from the time of Periklês, v. 355, 357, 366 _seq._
-
-  _Magna Græcia_, iii. 399.
-
-  _Magnesia_, iii. 179, 192; Xerxes’s fleet near, v. 84 _seq._;
-    on the Pagasæan Gulf, xi. 304 _n._ 3.
-
-  _Magnetes_, Thessalian and Asiatic, ii. 285.
-
-  _Magon_, off Katana, x. 495;
-    near Abakæna, xi. 6;
-    at Agyrium, xi. 7;
-    death of, xi. 41.
-
-  _Magon_ and Hiketas, xi. 156 _seq._;
-    death of, xi. 171.
-
-  _Maia_ and Zeus, offspring of, i. 10.
-
-  _Makrônes_ and the Ten Thousand, ix. 112.
-
-  _Malians_, ii. 282.
-
-  _Malli_, xii. 234.
-
-  _Mallus_, Alexander at, xii. 114.
-
-  _Mamerkus_ and Timoleon, xi. 180 _seq._
-
-  _Manetho_ and the Sothiac period, iii. 339 _seq._
-
-  _Mania_, sub-satrap of Æolis, ix. 214 _seq._
-
-  _Mantinea_ and Tegea, ii. 442 _seq._, vi. 452, vii. 14;
-    and Sparta, ii. 444, vii. 20, 94, x. 35 _seq._;
-    and Argos, vii. 19;
-    congress at, vii. 81 _seq._;
-    battle of, B. C. 418, vii. 81 _seq._;
-    expedition of Agesipolis to, x. 36 _seq._;
-    and the river Ophis, x. 36 _n._ 2;
-    re-establishment of, x. 205 _seq._;
-    march of Agesilaus against, x. 211 _seq._;
-    muster of Peloponnesian enemies to Thebes at, x. 329;
-    attempted surprise of, by the cavalry of Epaminondas, x. 332 _seq._;
-    battle of, B. C. 362, x. 335 _seq._, 357;
-    peace concluded after the battle of, x. 350.
-
-  _Mantineans_ and the Pan-Arcadian union, x. 322 _seq._;
-    opposition of to Theban intervention, x. 326.
-
-  _Mantinico-Tegeatic_ plain, x. 338.
-
-  _Mantitheus_ and Aphepsion, vii. 200 _seq._
-
-  _Mantô_, iii. 184.
-
-  _Marakanda_, Alexander at, xii. 204, 207 _seq._
-
-  _Marathon_, battle of, iv. 342-360.
-
-  _Marathus_ surrenders to Alexander, xii. 130.
-
-  _Mardi_ and Alexander, xii. 178, 188.
-
-  _Mardonius_, in Ionia, iv. 313;
-    in Thrace and Macedonia, iv. 315;
-    fleet of, destroyed near Mount Athos, iv. 314;
-    urges Xerxes to invade Greece, v. 3 _seq._, 7;
-    advice of, to Xerxes after the battle of Salamis, v. 138;
-    forces left with, in Thessaly, v. 141;
-    and Medizing Greeks, after Xerxes’s retreat, v. 148;
-    in Bœotia, v. 149, 158 _seq._;
-    offers of peace to Athens by, v. 150 _seq._, 154;
-    at Athens, v. 154;
-    and his Phokiôn contingent, v. 161;
-    on the Asôpus, v. 167;
-    at Platæa, v. 169 _seq._
-
-  _Marine_, military, unfavorable to oligarchy, iii. 31.
-
-  _Maritime_ and inland cities contrasted, ii. 225.
-
-  _Marpessa_ and Idas, i. 172.
-
-  _Marriage_ in legendary Greece, ii. 83;
-    among the Spartans, ii. 386;
-    among the Hindoos, iii. 141 _n._ 2.
-
-  _Marshes_ and lakes of Greece, ii. 219.
-
-  _Marsyas_, iii. 213, 213 _n._ 1.
-
-  _Masistes_, v. 199.
-
-  _Masistius_, v. 164.
-
-  _Maskames_, v. 295.
-
-  _Massagetæ_, iii. 245.
-
-  _Massalia_, iii. 280, 348, 400 _seq._, xii. 453 _seq._
-
-  _Mausôlus_ and the Social War, xi. 222.
-
-  _Mazæus_ at Thapsakus, xii. 150;
-    at the battle of Arbela, xii. 164, 165;
-    surrender of Babylon by, xii. 168;
-    appointed satrap of Babylon by Alexander, xii. 169.
-
-  _Mazares_, iv. 200 _seq._
-
-  _Medea_ and the Argonauts, i. 237 _seq._
-
-  _Medes_, early history of, iii. 224 _seq._;
-    and Persians, iv. 183, 224 _seq._
-
-  _Media_, the wall of, iii. 304 _n._ 2, ix. 63, 65 _n._;
-    Darius a fugitive in, xii. 178, 180.
-
-  _Medius_, xii. 254.
-
-  _Medus_, i. 205 _n._ 4, 242.
-
-  _Medusa_, i. 7, 90.
-
-  _Megabates_, iv. 283, 284.
-
-  _Megabazus_, iv. 275, 276.
-
-  _Megabyzus_, v. 333.
-
-  _Megaklês_, iii. 37 _n._, 38, 82.
-
-  _Megalêpolis_, capture of, by Agathokles, xii. 414.
-
-  _Megalopolis_, foundation of, ii. 448, x. 224 _seq._, 233 _n._ 6;
-    the centre of the Pan-Arcadian confederacy, x. 232;
-    disputes at, x. 358;
-    and Sparta, xi. 198, 263, 290, 300 _seq._
-
-  _Megapenthes_ and Perseus, i. 90.
-
-  _Megara_, early history of, iii. 2, 44 _seq._;
-    Corinth and Sikyôn, analogy of, iii. 47;
-    and Athens, iii. 90 _seq._, v. 321, 348, 351 _n._, 352, vi. 76,
-      370 _seq._;
-    Long Walls at, v. 322;
-    Brasidas at, vi. 375 _seq._;
-    revolution at, vi. 378 _seq._;
-    Philippizing faction at, xi. 449.
-
-  _Megara in Sicily_, iii. 365, v. 215.
-
-  _Megarian Sicily_, iii. 365.
-
-  _Megarians_ under Pausanias, and Persian cavalry under Masistius,
-      v. 164;
-    repudiate the peace of Nikias, vi. 493, vii. 2;
-    refuse to join Argos, vii. 16;
-    recovery of Nisea by, viii. 131.
-
-  _Megarid_, Athenian ravage of, in the Peloponnesian war, vi. 137.
-
-  _Meidias of Skepsis_, ix. 213 _seq._
-
-  _Meidias the Athenian_, xi. 343, 343 _n._ 2.
-
-  _Meilaniôn_ and Atalanta, i. 149.
-
-  _Meilichios_, meaning of, ix. 171 _n._
-
-  _Melampus_, i. 33, 109, 398, v. 89.
-
-  _Melannippus_ and Tydeus, i. 274, 279.
-
-  _Melanthus_, ii. 23.
-
-  _Meleager_, legend of, i. 143 _seq._
-
-  _Meleagrides_, i. 145.
-
-  _Melesippus_, vi. 126.
-
-  _Melian_ nymphs, i. 5.
-
-  _Melissus_, vi. 28, viii. 341, 343.
-
-  _Melkarth_, temple of, iii. 269.
-
-  _Melon_, x. 81 _seq._, 88.
-
-  _Melos_, settlement of, ii. 28;
-    expedition against, under Nikias, vi. 295;
-    capture of, vii. 109 _seq._;
-    Antisthenês at, vii. 396.
-
-  _Memnôn, son of Tithônus_, i. 298.
-
-  _Memnôn the Rhodian_, operations of, between Alexander’s accession and
-      landing in Asia, xii. 49, 77;
-    and Mentor, xii., 75;
-    advice of, on Alexander’s landing in Asia, xii. 78;
-    made commander-in-chief of the Persians, xii. 92;
-    at Halikarnassus, xii. 95 _seq._;
-    his progress with the Persian fleet, and death, xii. 105 _seq._;
-    change in the plan of Darius after his death, xii. 107, 109.
-
-  _Memphis_, Alexander at, xii. 146.
-
-  _Men_, races of, in “Works and Days”, i. 64 _seq._
-
-  _Mende_, and Athens, vi. 441 _seq._
-
-  _Menedæus_, and the Ambrakiots, vi. 305 _seq._
-
-  _Menekleidas_ and Epaminondas, x. 268, 305 _seq._
-
-  _Menekles_, viii. 203.
-
-  _Menelaus_, i. 162 _seq._, iii. 269 _n._ 4.
-
-  _Menestheus_, i. 312, ii. 22.
-
-  _Menœkeus_, i. 274.
-
-  _Menœtius_, i. 6, 8.
-
-  _Menon the Thessalian_, ix. 30, 71.
-
-  _Menon the Athenian_, x. 373.
-
-  _Mentor the Rhodian_, xi. 439 _seq._, xii. 75.
-
-  _Mercenary_ soldiers, multiplication of, in Greece after the
-      Peloponnesian war, xi. 281 _seq._
-
-  _Mermnads_, Lydian dynasty of, iii. 221.
-
-  _Meroe_, connection of, with Egyptian institutions, iii. 313.
-
-  _Messapians_, iii. 391;
-    and Tarentines, xii. 394.
-
-  _Messene_, foundation of, ii. 422, iii. 366;
-    foundation of, by Epaminondas, x. 225, 233 _n._ 6, 261;
-    and Sparta, x. 290, 350, xi. 198, 263, 290.
-
-  _Messene, in Sicily_, chorus sent to Rhegium from, iv. 53 _n._;
-    re-colonization of, by Anaxilaus, v. 213;
-    Laches at, vii. 134;
-    Athenian fleet near, vii. 136;
-    Alkibiades at, vii. 193;
-    Nikias at, vii. 223;
-    and Dionysius, x. 474 _seq._, xi. 3;
-    Imilkon at, x. 492 _seq._;
-    and Timoleon, xi. 158.
-
-  _Messenia_, Dorian settlements in, ii. 8, 311.
-
-  _Messenian_ genealogy, i. 172; wars, ii. 421-438;
-    victor proclaimed at Olympia, B. C. 368, x. 262.
-
-  _Messenians_ and Spartans, early proceedings of, ii. 328;
-    expelled by Sparta, ix. 229, xi. 3;
-    plan of Epaminondas for the restoration of, x. 214.
-
-  _Messenians in Sicily_, defeated by Naxians and Sikels, vii. 135.
-
-  _Metaneira_, i. 38.
-
-  _Metapontium_, iii. 386.
-
-  _Methana_, Athenian Garrion at, vi. 451.
-
-  _Methône_, iv. 23;
-    Philip at, xi. 260.
-
-  _Methône in Peloponnesus_, Athenian assault upon, vi. 134.
-
-  _Methymna_, vi. 222, 225;
-    Kallikratidas at, viii. 164.
-
-  _Metics_, and the Thirty at Athens, viii. 247.
-
-  _Metis_ and Zeus, daughter of, i. 9.
-
-  _Metrodorus_, i. 419, 444 _n._
-
-  _Metropolis_, relation of a Grecian, to its colonies, vi. 60 _n._
-
-  _Midas_, iii. 209, 217.
-
-  _Middle ages_, monarchy in, iii. 8 _seq._
-
-  _Mikythus_, v. 230, 231, 238.
-
-  _Milesian_ colonies in the Troad, i. 339.
-
-  _Milesians_ and Lichas, viii. 98;
-    and Kallikratidas, viii. 164.
-
-  _Miletus_, early history of, iii. 176 _seq._;
-    and Alyattês, iii. 255 _seq._;
-    and Crœsus, iii. 258;
-    sieges of, by the Persians, iv. 290, 305;
-    Histiæus of, iv. 273 _seq._, 277, 280, 284, 298 _seq._;
-    Phrynichus’s tragedy on the capture of, iv. 309;
-    exiles from, at Zanklê, v. 211 _seq._;
-    and Samos, dispute between, vi. 26;
-    revolt of, from Athens, vii. 375, 385, 387 _seq._;
-    Tissaphernes at, vii. 376, 399;
-    Lichas at, vii. 399;
-    Peloponnesian fleet at, viii. 25, 94, 95 _seq._, 99;
-    revolution at, by the partisans of Lysander, viii. 213;
-    capture of, by Alexander, xii. 92 _seq._
-
-  _Military_ array of legendary and historical Greece, ii. 106 _seq._;
-    divisions not distinct from civil in any Grecian cities but Sparta,
-      ii. 456;
-    force of early oligarchies, iii. 31;
-    order, Egyptian, iii. 316;
-    arrangements, Kleisthenean, iv. 136.
-
-  _Miltas_, xi. 88.
-
-  _Miltiades the First_, iv. 117.
-
-  _Miltiades the Second_, iv. 119;
-    and the bridge over the Danube, iv. 271, 274 _n._ 2;
-    his retirement from the Chersonese, iv. 274;
-    capture of Lemnos and Imbros by, iv. 278;
-    escape of, from Persian pursuit, iv. 307;
-    adventures and character of, iv. 334 _seq._;
-    elected general, 490 B. C., iv. 341;
-    and the battle of Marathon, iv. 343 _seq._;
-    expedition of, against Paros, iv. 363;
-    disgrace, punishment, and death of, iv. 365 _seq._
-
-  _Milto_, ix. 47.
-
-  _Miltokythes_, x. 372, 378.
-
-  _Milton_ on the early series of British kings, i. 484;
-    his treatment of British fabulous history, i. 487.
-
-  _Mimnermus_, iv. 82.
-
-  _Mindarus_, supersedes Astyochus, viii. 98;
-    deceived by Tissaphernês, viii. 99;
-    removal of, from Milêtus to Chios, viii. 181;
-    eludes Thrasyllus and reaches the Hellespont, viii. 102, 103 _n._;
-    at the Hellespont, viii. 109;
-    Peloponnesian fleet summoned from Eubœa by, viii. 111;
-    siege of Kyzikus by, viii. 121;
-    death of, viii. 121.
-
-  _Mineral_ productions of Greece, ii. 229.
-
-  _Minôa_, capture of, by Nikias, vi. 285.
-
-  _Minôs_, i. 219 _seq._
-
-  _Minôtaur_, the, i. 220 _seq._
-
-  _Minyæ_, i. 130, ii. 26 _seq._
-
-  _Minyas_, i. 128 _seq._
-
-  _Miraculous_ legends, varied interpretation of, i. 472 _n._ 2.
-
-  _Mistake_ of ascribing to an unrecording age the historical sense of
-      modern times, i. 432.
-
-  _Mitford_, his view of the anti-monarchical sentiment of Greece,
-      iii. 12 _seq._
-
-  _Mithridates the Persian_, ix. 87 _seq._
-
-  _Mithridates of Pontus_, xii. 463.
-
-  _Mithrines_, xii. 90, 207.
-
-  _Mitylenæan_ envoys, speech of, to the Peloponnesians at Olympia,
-      vi. 226 _seq._;
-    prisoners sent to Athens by Pachês, vi. 243, 255.
-
-  _Mityleneans_ at Sigeium, i. 339.
-
-  _Mitylênê_, iii. 193; political dissensions and poets of, iii. 198;
-    revolt of, from Athens, vi. 221 _seq._;
-    blockade of, by Pachês, vi. 237 _seq._;
-    and the Athenian assembly, vi. 244, 246 _seq._;
-    loss and recovery of, by Athens, B. C. 412, vii. 383, 384;
-    Kallikratidas at, viii. 167 _seq._;
-    removal of Kallikratidas from, viii. 170;
-    Eteonikus at, viii. 170, 174, 189;
-    blockade of, by Memnon, xii. 105;
-    surrender of, by Chares, xii. 142.
-
-  _Mnassippus_, expedition of, to Korkyra, x. 142 _seq._
-
-  _Mnêmosynê_, i. 5, 10.
-
-  _Mnesiphilus_, v. 122.
-
-  _Mœræ_, and Crœsus, iv. 194 _seq._
-
-  _Mœris_, lake of, iii. 322 _n._ 1.
-
-  _Molionids_, the, i. 140.
-
-  _Molossian_ kingdom of Epirus, xii. 395.
-
-  _Molossians_, iii. 413 _seq._
-
-  _Molossus_, i. 189.
-
-  _Mômus_, i. 7.
-
-  _Monarchy_, in mediæval and modern Europe, iii. 8 _seq._;
-    aversion to, in Greece, after the expulsion of Hippias, iv. 176.
-
-  _Money_, coined, not known to Homeric or Hesiodic Greeks, ii. 116;
-    coined, first introduction of, into Greece, ii. 320.
-
-  _Money-lending_ at Florence in the middle ages, iii. 109 _n._;
-    and the Jewish law, iii. 111 _n._;
-    and ancient philosophers, iii. 113.
-
-  _Money-standard_, Solon’s debasement of, iii. 100;
-    honestly maintained at Athens after Solon, iii. 114.
-
-  _Monsters_, offspring of the gods, i. 11.
-
-  _Monstrous_ natures associated with the gods, i. 1.
-
-  _Monts de Piété_, iii. 162.
-
-  _Monuments_ of the Argonautic expedition, i. 241 _seq._
-
-  _Moon_, eclipse of, B. C. 413, vii. 315;
-    eclipse of, B. C. 331, xii. 151.
-
-  _Mopsus_, iii. 184.
-
-  _Mora_, Spartan, ii. 458 _seq._;
-    destruction of a Spartan, by Iphikrates, ix. 351 _seq._
-
-  _Moral_ and social feeling in legendary Greece, ii. 79.
-
-  _Moralizing_ Greek poets, iv. 91 _seq._
-
-  _Mosynæki_, and the Ten Thousand Greeks, ix. 128.
-
-  _Mothakes_, ii. 418.
-
-  _Motyê_, capture of, by Dionysius, x. 485 _seq._;
-    recapture of, by Imilkon, x. 490.
-
-  _Motyum_, Duketius at, vii. 123.
-
-  _Mountainous_ systems of Greece, ii. 212 _seq._
-
-  _Müller_ on Sparta as the Dorian type, ii. 342.
-
-  _Multitude_, sentiment of a, compared with that of individuals,
-      ix. 279.
-
-  _Munychia_ and Peiræus, Themistoklês’ wall round, v. 249;
-    Menyllus in, xii. 326, 339;
-    Nikanor in, xii. 339, 345.
-
-  _Muse_, inspiration and authority of the, i. 355.
-
-  _Muses_, the, i. 10.
-
-  _Music_, ethical effect of old Grecian, ii. 433;
-    Greek, improvements in, about the middle of the seventh century
-      B. C., iv. 77;
-    comprehensive meaning of, among the ancient Greeks, viii. 349.
-
-  _Musical_ modes of the Greeks, iii. 212.
-
-  _Musicians_, Greek, in the seventh century B. C., iv. 76 _n._
-
-  Μῦθος, i. 356, 432 _n._, 458.
-
-  _Mutilated_ Grecian captives at Persepolis, xii. 173.
-
-  _Mutilation_ of dead bodies in legendary and historical Greece,
-      ii. 92;
-    of Bessus, xii. 206.
-
-  _Mutiny_ at Athens immediately before Solon’s legislation, iii. 93.
-
-  _Mygdonia_, iii. 210.
-
-  _Mykalê_, Pan-Ionic festival at, iii. 177;
-    the battle of, v. 191 _seq._
-
-  _Mykalêssus_, massacre at, vii. 357 _seq._
-
-  _Myknæ_, i. 90 _seq._
-
-  _Myriandrus_, Alexander’s march from Kilikia to, xii. 114;
-    Alexander’s return from, xii. 117.
-
-  _Myrkinus_, iv. 273, 296.
-
-  _Myrmidons_, origin of, i. 184.
-
-  _Myrôn_, iii. 32.
-
-  _Myrônidês_, v. 323, 331.
-
-  _Myrtilus_, i. 159.
-
-  _Mysia_, the Ten Thousand Greeks in, ix. 172 _seq._
-
-  _Mysians_, iii. 196, 205 _seq._, 209.
-
-  _Mysteries_, principal Pan-Hellenic, i. 28, 38, 41, 43, v. 209 _n._;
-    and mythes, i. 496.
-
-  _Mystic_ legends, connection of, with Egypt, i. 32;
-    legends, contrast of, with Homeric hymns, i. 34;
-    brotherhoods, iii. 87.
-
-  _Mythe_ of Pandôra and Prometheus, now used in “Works and Days”,
-      i. 71;
-    meaning of the word, i. 356.
-
-  _Mythes_, how to be told, i. 2;
-    Hesiodic, traceable to Krête and Delphi, i. 15;
-    Grecian, origin of, i. 4, 52, 61 _seq._, 340 _seq._;
-    of the gods, discrepancies in, i. 53 _n._, 54;
-    contain gods, heroes and men, i. 64;
-    formed the entire mental stock of the early Greeks, i. 340, 359;
-    difficulty of regarding them in the same light as the ancients did,
-      i. 341;
-    Grecian, adapted to the personifying and patriotic tendencies of the
-      Greeks, i. 344 _seq._;
-    Grecian, beauty of, i. 351;
-    Grecian, how to understand properly, i. 351 _seq._;
-    how regarded by superior men in the age of Thucydides, i. 375;
-    accommodated to a more advanced age, i. 376 _seq._;
-    treatment of, by poets and logographers, i. 377 _seq._;
-    treatment of, by historians, i. 391 _seq._;
-    historicised, i. 409 _seq._;
-    treatment of, by philosophers, i. 418 _seq._;
-    allegorized, i. 419 _seq._;
-    semi-historical interpretation of, i. 433;
-    allegorical theory of, i. 436;
-    connection of, with mysteries, i, 436;
-    supposed ancient meaning of, i. 438;
-    Plato on, i. 441 _seq._, 420;
-    recapitulation of remarks on, i. 450 _seq._;
-    familiarity of the Greeks with, i. 456 _seq._;
-    bearing of, on Grecian art, i. 459 _seq._;
-    German, i. 363;
-    Grecian, proper treatment of, i. 487 _seq._;
-    Asiatic, iii. 221.
-
-  _Mythical_ world, opening of, i. 1;
-    sentiment in “Works and Days”, i. 68 _seq._;
-    geography, i. 246 _seq._;
-    faith in the Homeric age, i. 357;
-    genealogies, i. 445 _seq._;
-    age, gods and men undistinguishable in, i. 449;
-    events, relics of, i. 457;
-    account of the alliance between the Hêrakleids and Dorians, ii. 2;
-    races of Greece, ii. 19.
-
-  _Mythology_, Grecian, sources of our information on, i. 106;
-    German, Celtic, and Grecian, i. 462, 463;
-    Grecian, how it would have been affected by the introduction of
-      Christianity, B. C. 500, i. 467.
-
-  _Mythopæic_ faculty, stimulus to, i. 351;
-    age, the, i. 361;
-    tendencies, by what causes enfeebled, i. 361 _seq._;
-    tendencies in modern Europe, i. 469 _seq._
-
-  _Myûs_, iii. 172.
-
-
-  N.
-
-  _Napoleon_, analogy between his relation to the confederation of the
-      Rhine, and that of Alexander to the Greeks, xii. 51.
-
-  _Nature_, first regarded as impersonal, i. 368.
-
-  _Naukraries_, iii. 52, 65.
-
-  _Naukratis_, iii. 327, 335 _seq._
-
-  _Naupaktus_, origin of the name, ii. 3;
-    Pharmio’s victory near, vi. 206 _seq._;
-    Eurylochus’s attack upon, vi. 301;
-    Demosthenês at, vi. 301;
-    naval battle at, B. C. 413, vii. 358 _seq._
-
-  _Nausinikus_, census in the archonship of, x. 115 _seq._
-
-  _Naval_ attack, Athenian, vi. 63.
-
-  _Naxians_ and Sikels, defeat of Messenians by, vii. 135.
-
-  _Naxos_, early power of, iii. 165;
-    expedition of Aristagoras against, iv. 282 _seq._;
-    Datis at, iv. 330;
-    revolt and reconquest of, v. 307.
-
-  _Naxos in Sicily_, iii. 363, vii. 193, x. 468.
-
-  _Nearchus_, voyages of, xii. 233, 235, 237, 238.
-
-  _Nebuchadnezzar_, iii. 333.
-
-  _Necklaces_ of Eriphylê and Helen, i. 287 _seq._
-
-  _Nectanebus_, xi. 440.
-
-  _Negative_ side of Grecian philosophy, viii. 345.
-
-  _Neileus_, or _Nêleus_, i. 109, ii. 24, iii. 173.
-
-  _Nekôs_, iii. 329 _seq._
-
-  _Nektanebis_, x. 362, 366.
-
-  _Nêleids_ down to Kodrus, i. 111.
-
-  _Nêleus_ and Pelias, i. 107 _seq._
-
-  _Nemean_ lion, the, i. 7;
-    games, ii. 461, iv. 65 _seq._
-
-  _Nemesis_, i. 7.
-
-  _Neobulê_ and Archilochus, iv. 81.
-
-  _Neon the Cyreian_, ix. 136 _seq._, 147.
-
-  _Neon the Corinthian_, xi. 156 _seq._
-
-  _Neoptolemus, son of Achilles_, i. 188, 300, 305.
-
-  _Neoptolemus the actor_, xi. 373.
-
-  _Nephelê_, i. 123 _seq._
-
-  _Nereas_, i. 7.
-
-  _Nereids_, i. 7.
-
-  _Nessus_, the centaur, i. 150.
-
-  _Nestor_, i. 110.
-
-  _Niebelungen_ Lied, i. 479.
-
-  _Nikæa_ on the Hydaspes, xii. 229, 233.
-
-  _Nikanor_, xii. 339, 354 _seq._
-
-  _Nikias_, at Minôa, vi. 285;
-    position and character of, vi. 285 _seq._;
-    and Kleon, vi. 287 _seq._, 457 _seq._;
-    at Mêlos, vi. 295;
-    in the Corinthian territory, vi. 355 _seq._;
-    at Mendê and Skiônê, vi. 441 _seq._;
-    peace of, vi. 490 _seq._ vii. 1 _seq._;
-    and the Spartans taken at Sphakteria, vii. 6 _seq._;
-    embassy of, to Sparta, vii. 44;
-    and Alkibiadês, vii. 104 _seq._, viii. 158;
-    appointed commander of the Sicilian expedition, B. C. 415, vii. 148;
-    speeches and influence of, on the Sicilian expedition, B. C. 415,
-      vii. 148 _seq._, 155, 159;
-    his plan of action in Sicily, vii. 191;
-    dilatory proceedings of, in Sicily, vii. 219, 225, 258 _seq._;
-    stratagem of, for approaching Syracuse, vii. 221;
-    at the battle near the Olympeion at Syracuse, vii. 220;
-    measures of, after his victory near the Olympeion at Syracuse,
-      vii. 223;
-    at Messênê in Sicily, vii. 223;
-    forbearance of the Athenians towards, vii. 225 _seq._;
-    at Katana, vii. 234;
-    in Sicily in the spring of B. C. 414, vii. 243;
-    his neglect in not preventing Gylippus’s approach to Sicily and
-      Syracuse, vii. 263 _seq._, 266 _seq._;
-    fortification of Cape Plenimyrium by, vii. 270;
-    at Epipolæ, vii. 272;
-    despatch of, to Athens for reinforcements, vii. 275 _seq._,
-      281 _seq._;
-    opposition of, to Demosthenês’s proposals for leaving Syracuse,
-      vii. 308 _seq._;
-    consent of, to retreat from Syracuse, vii. 313;
-    exhortations of, before the final defeat of the Athenians in the
-      harbor of Syracuse, vii. 321 _seq._;
-    and Demosthenês, resolution of, after the final defeat in the harbor
-      of Syracuse, vii. 330;
-    exhortations of, to the Athenians on their retreat from Syracuse,
-      vii. 333 _seq._;
-    and his division, surrender of, to Gylippus, vii. 343 _seq._,
-      347 _n._ 2;
-    and Demosthenês, treatment of, by their Syracusan conquerors,
-      vii. 346;
-    disgrace of, at Athens after his death, vii. 348;
-    opinion of Thucydidês about, vii. 349;
-    opinion and mistake of the Athenians about, vii. 351 _seq._
-
-  _Nikodromus_, v. 47.
-
-  _Nikoklês_, x. 26.
-
-  _Nikomachus the Athenian_, viii. 307 _seq._
-
-  _Nikomachus the Macedonian_, xii. 191, 194.
-
-  _Nikostratus_, vi. 271 _seq._, 440 _seq._
-
-  _Nikoteles_, x. 466.
-
-  _Nile_, the, iii. 309.
-
-  _Nineveh_, or _Ninus_, siege of, iii. 233;
-    capture of, iii. 255;
-    and Babylon, iii. 290;
-    site of, iii. 294 _n._ 2;
-    and its remains, iii. 305.
-
-  _Nine Ways_, nine defeats of the Athenians at the, x. 302 _n._ 1.
-
-  _Ninon_ and Kylon, iv. 409.
-
-  _Niobê_, i. 158.
-
-  _Nisæa_, alleged capture of, by Peisistratus, iii. 154 _n._;
-    connected with Megara by “Long Walls”, v. 324;
-    surrender of, to the Athenians, vi. 375 _seq._;
-    recovery of, by the Megarians, viii. 131.
-
-  _Nisus_, i. 205, 221.
-
-  _Nobles_, Athenian, early violence of, iv. 152.
-
-  _Nomads_, Libyan, iv. 35 _seq._
-
-  _Nomios_ Apollo, i. 61.
-
-  _Nomophylakes_, v. 371.
-
-  _Nomothetæ_, iii. 123, 125, v. 372, viii. 296.
-
-  _Non-Amphiktyonic_ races, ii. 270.
-
-  _Non-Hellenic_ practices, ii. 256.
-
-  _Non-Olympiads_, ii. 435.
-
-  _Notium_, iii. 183;
-    Pachês at, vi. 242;
-    recolonized from Athens, vi. 243;
-    battle of, viii. 153.
-
-  _Notus_, i. 6.
-
-  _Numidia_, Agathokles and the Carthaginians in, xii. 427.
-
-  _Nymphæum_, xi. 264, _n._ 1, xii. 480.
-
-  _Nymphs_, i. 5, 7.
-
-  _Nypsius_, xi. 107, 109, 111.
-
-  _Nyx_, i. 4, 6.
-
-
-  O.
-
-  _Oarus_, fortresses near, iv. 266.
-
-  _Oath_ of mutual harmony at Athens, after the battle of Ægospotami,
-      viii. 225.
-
-  _Obæ_ ar Obês, ii. 361.
-
-  _Ocean_, ancient belief about, iii. 286 _n._
-
-  _Oceanic_ nymphs, i. 6.
-
-  _Oceanus_, i. 5, 6, 8.
-
-  _Ochus_, x. 367, xi. 437 _seq._, xii. 75 _seq._
-
-  _Odeon_, building of, vi. 31.
-
-  _Odes_ at festivals in honor of gods, i. 52.
-
-  _Odin_ and other gods degraded into men, i. 466.
-
-  _Odrysian_ kings, vi. 215 _seq._
-
-  _Odysseus_, i. 290;
-    and Palamêdês, i. 294;
-    and Ajax, i. 299;
-    steals away the Palladium, i. 302;
-    return of, from Troy, i. 309;
-    final adventures and death of, i. 314 _seq._;
-    at the agora in the second book of the Iliad, ii. 70 _seq._
-
-  _Odyssey_ and Iliad, date, structure, authorship and character of,
-      ii. 118-209.
-
-  _Œchalia_, capture of, i. 151.
-
-  _Œdipus_, i. 265 _seq._
-
-  _Œneus_ and his offspring, i. 143 _seq._
-
-  _Œnoê_, vi. 127, viii. 83, ix. 353.
-
-  _Œnomaus_ and Pelops, i. 158.
-
-  _Œnônê_, i. 301 _n._ 3.
-
-  _Œnophyta_, Athenian victory at, v. 331.
-
-  _Œnotria_, iii. 350 _seq._
-
-  _Œnotrians_, iii. 351, 375, 393.
-
-  _Œta_, path over Mount, v. 78.
-
-  _Œtæi_, ii. 213.
-
-  _Office_, admissibility of Athenians citizens to, iv. 113.
-
-  _Ogygês_, i. 194.
-
-  _Okypetê_, i. 7.
-
-  _Olbia_, xii. 474 _seq._
-
-  _Oligarchical_ government, change from monarchical to, in Greece,
-      iii. 15 _seq._;
-    party at Athens, v. 365, viii. 235 _seq._, 300 _seq._;
-    Greeks, corruption of, vii. 401;
-    conspiracy at Samos, viii. 6 _seq._, 26 _seq._;
-    conspiracy at Athens, viii. 15, 31 _seq._;
-    exiles, return of, to Athens, viii. 232.
-
-  _Oligarchies_ in Greece, iii. 17, 29, 30, 31.
-
-  _Oligarchy_, conflict of, with despotism, iii. 28;
-    vote of the Athenian assembly in favor of, viii. 14;
-    establishment of, in Athenian allied cities, viii. 34;
-    of the Four Hundred, viii. 36 _seq._, 45 _seq._, viii. 75, 88 _seq._
-
-  _Olive trees_, sacred, near Athens, iii. 135 _n._ 2, vi. 267 _n._ 3.
-
-  _Olpæ_, Demosthenes’s victory at, vi. 303 _seq._
-
-  _Olympia_, Agesipolis, and the oracle at, ix. 356;
-    Lysias at, x. 73 _seq._;
-    panegyrical oration of Isokrates at, x. 77;
-    occupation of, by the Arcadians, x. 315, 322;
-    topography of, x. 319 _n._ 2;
-    plunder of, by the Arcadians, x. 322 _seq._
-
-  _Olympias_, xi. 262, 512, 516, 519;
-    and Antipater, xii. 68, 254, 256 _n._ 2;
-    intrigues of, after Alexander’s death, xii. 333;
-    return of, from Epirus to Macedonia, xii. 340 _seq._, 366;
-    death of, xii. 366;
-    Epirus governed by, xii. 395 _n._ 2.
-
-  _Olympic_ games, and Aëthlius, i. 100;
-    origin of, i. 140;
-    presidency of, ii. 10, 317 _seq._;
-    nature and importance of, ii. 241, 242;
-    the early point of union between Spartans, Messenians, and Eleians,
-      ii. 334;
-    and the Delian festival, iv. 54;
-    celebrity, history and duration of, iv. 55 _seq._;
-    interference of, with the defence of Thermopylæ, v. 77;
-    and the Karneia, v. 77 _n._;
-    conversation of Xerxes on, v. 113;
-    of the 90th Olympiad, vii. 52 _seq._;
-    celebration of, by the Arcadians and Pisatans, x. 318 _seq._;
-    legation of Dionysius to, xi. 28 _seq._
-
-  _Olympieion_ near Syracuse, battle of, vii. 219 _seq._
-
-  _Olympus_, ii. 211.
-
-  _Olympus, the Phrygian_, iii. 213 _n._, iv. 75.
-
-  _Olynthiac_, the earliest, of Demosthenês, xi. 327 _seq._;
-    the second, of Demosthenês, xi. 331 _seq._;
-    the third, of Demosthenês, xi. 335 _seq._
-
-  _Olynthiacs_ of Demosthenês, order of, xi. 358 _seq._
-
-  _Olynthian_ confederacy, x. 50 _seq._, 68, 381, xi. 324;
-    war, xi. 325-363.
-
-  _Olynthus_, iv. 24;
-    capture and re-population of, by Artabazus, v. 149;
-    increase of, by Perdikkas, vi. 69;
-    expedition of Eudamidas against, x. 58;
-    Teleutias at, x. 65 _seq._;
-    Agesipolis at, x. 67;
-    submission of, to Sparta, x. 68;
-    alliance of, rejected by the Athenians, xi. 236;
-    alliance of, with Philip, xi. 236 _seq._;
-    secedes from the alliance of Philip, and makes peace with Athens,
-      xi. 319;
-    hostility of Philip to, xi. 320;
-    Philip’s half-brothers flee to, xi. 321;
-    intrigues of Philip in, xi. 321;
-    attack of Philip upon, xi. 325, 381;
-    alliance of, with Athens, xi. 326;
-    renewed application of, to Athens, against Philip, xi. 331;
-    assistance from Athens to, B. C. 350, xi. 334;
-    three expeditions from Athens to, B. C. 349-348, xi. 334 _n._, 349;
-    expedition of Athenians to, B. C. 349, xi. 346, 347;
-    capture of, by Philip, xi. 350 _seq._, 364, 365, 372.
-
-  _Oneirus_, i. 7, ii. 185.
-
-  _Oneium_, Mount, Epaminondas at, x. 254.
-
-  _Onesilus_, iv. 292 _seq._
-
-  _Onomakles_, viii. 84 _seq._
-
-  _Onamakritus_, v. 3.
-
-  _Onomarchus_, and the treasures in the temple at Delphi, xi. 255;
-    successes of, 256, 293;
-    at Chæroneia, xi. 257;
-    power of the Phokians under, xi. 261;
-    aid to Lykophron by, xi. 293;
-    death of, xi. 294.
-
-  _Ophellas_, xii. 428, 431 _seq._
-
-  _Ophis_, the, x. 36.
-
-  _Opici_, iii. 353.
-
-  _Opis_, Alexander’s voyage to, xii. 243.
-
-  _Oracle at Delphi_, legend of, i. 41;
-    and the Krêtans, i. 226 _n._ 2;
-    and the Battiad dynasty, iv. 43;
-    answers of, on Xerxes’s invasion, v. 60 _seq._
-
-  _Oracles_, consultation and authority of, among the Greeks, ii. 255;
-    in Bœotia consulted by Mardonius, v. 149.
-
-  _Orations_, funeral, of Periklês, vi. 31, 144 _seq._
-
-  _Orchomenians_, i. 313.
-
-  _Orchomenus_, ante-historical, i. 130 _seq._;
-    and Thêbes, i. 135, v. 159 _n._ 4, x. 194.
-
-  _Orchomenus_, early historical, ii. 273;
-    capitulation of, B. C. 418, vii. 75;
-    revolt of, from Thebes to Sparta, ix. 293;
-    and the Pan-Arcadian union, x. 209, 210;
-    destruction of, x. 311.
-
-  _Oreithyia_, i. 199.
-
-  _Orestês_, i. 163 _seq._;
-    and Agamemnôn transferred to Sparta, i. 165.
-
-  _Orestês_, bones of, ii. 447.
-
-  _Oreus_, xi. 449, 452.
-
-  _Orgies_, post-Homeric, i. 27.
-
-  _Orœtês_, iv. 226, 245.
-
-  _Orontês the Persian nobleman_, ix. 36, 40 _n._ 2.
-
-  _Orontês_, the Persian satrap, x. 22, 24.
-
-  _Orôpus_, vi. 383 _n._ 2, viii. 25, x. 286.
-
-  _Orphans_ in legendary and historical Greece, ii. 91.
-
-  _Orpheotelestæ_, iii. 87.
-
-  _Orpheus_, i. 21, 22.
-
-  _Orphic_ Theogony, i. 16 _seq._;
-    egg, i. 18;
-    life, the, i. 23;
-    brotherhood, i. 34.
-
-  _Orsines_, xii. 237.
-
-  _Orthagoridæ_, iii. 33 _seq._
-
-  _Orthros_, i. 7.
-
-  _Ortygês_, iii. 187.
-
-  _Ortygia_, iii. 363;
-    fortification and occupation of, by Dionysius, x. 458 _seq._;
-    Dionysius besieged in, x. 462 _seq._;
-    blockade of, by Dion, xi. 95, 98, 114;
-    sallies of Nypsius from, xi. 107, 109, 111;
-    Dion’s entry into, xi. 117;
-    surrender of, to Timoleon, xi. 150 _seq._;
-    advantage of, to Timoleon, xi. 155;
-    siege of, by Hiketas and Magon, xi. 156 _seq._;
-    Timoleon’s demolition of the Dionysian works in, xi. 165;
-    Timoleon erects courts of justice in, xi. 165.
-
-  _Oscan_, Latin and Greek languages, iii. 354.
-
-  _Oscans_, iii. 353.
-
-  _Ossa_ and Pelion, ii. 214.
-
-  _Ostracism_, similarity of, to Solon’s condemnation of neutrality in
-      sedition, iii. 145, 147 _seq._, vii. 108 _seq._;
-    of Hyperbolus, iv. 151, vii. 101 _seq._;
-    of Kimon, v. 366;
-    of Thucydidês, son of Melêsias, vi. 19;
-    projected contention of, between Nikias and Alkibiadês,
-      vii. 106 _seq._;
-    at Syracuse, vii. 122.
-
-  _Otanês_, iv. 223, 249 _seq._, 277.
-
-  _Othryadês_, ii. 449.
-
-  _Othrys_, ii. 213 _seq._
-
-  _Otos_ and Ephialtês, i. 136.
-
-  _Ovid_ at Tomi, xii. 474 _n._
-
-  _Oxus_ crossed by Alexander, xii. 201.
-
-  _Oxylus_, i. 153, ii. 4, 9.
-
-  _Oxythemis Korônæus_, ii. 332 _n._ 2.
-
-
-  P.
-
-  _Pachês_, at Mitylênê, vi. 226, 237 _seq._;
-    at Notium, vi. 242;
-    pursues the fleet of Alkidas to Patmos, vi. 241;
-    sends Mitylenæan prisoners to Athens, vi. 243;
-    crimes and death of, vi. 258.
-
-  _Pæonians_, iv. 15;
-    conquest of, by Megabazus, iv. 276;
-    victory of Philip over, xi. 214.
-
-  _Pagasæ_, conquest of, by Philip, xi. 295;
-    importance of the Gulf of, to Philip, xi. 303.
-
-  _Pagondas_, vi. 384 _seq._
-
-  _Paktyas, the Lydian_, iv. 200 _seq._
-
-  _Palæmon_ and Inô, i. 124.
-
-  _Palæphatus_, his treatment of mythes, i. 415 _seq._
-
-  _Palamêdês_, i. 294.
-
-  _Palikê_, foundation of, vii. 123.
-
-  _Palladium_, capture of, i. 302.
-
-  _Pallakopas_, xii. 250.
-
-  _Pallas_, i. 6, 8.
-
-  _Pallas, son of Pandiôn_, i. 205.
-
-  _Pallênê_, i. 318, iv. 24.
-
-  _Palus Mæotis_, tribes east of, iii. 242.
-
-  _Pammenes_, expedition of, to Megalopolis, x. 359, xi. 257, 299.
-
-  _Pamphyli_, Hylleis, and Dymanes, ii. 360.
-
-  _Pamphylia_, conquest of, by Alexander, xii. 99.
-
-  _Panaktum_, vii. 24, 29.
-
-  _Pan-Arcadian Ten Thousand_, x. 232, 322.
-
-  _Pan-Arcadian union_, x. 208 _seq._, 321 _seq._
-
-  _Pandiôn_, i. 196.
-
-  _Pandiôn, son of Phineus_, i. 199.
-
-  _Pandiôn II._, i. 204.
-
-  _Pandôra_, i. 71, 76 _seq._
-
-  _Pan-Hellenic_ proceeding, the earliest approach to, iv. 50;
-    feeling, growth of, between B. C. 776-560, iv. 51;
-    character of the four great games, iv. 67;
-    congress at the Isthmus of Corinth, v. 57 _seq._;
-    patriotism of the Athenians on Xerxes’s invasion, v. 62;
-    union under Sparta after the repulse of Xerxes, v. 260;
-    schemes and sentiment of Periklês, vi. 18;
-    pretences of Alexander, xii. 51.
-
-  _Pan-Ionic_ festival and Amphiktyony in Asia, iii. 177.
-
-  _Panoptês_, Argos, i. 84.
-
-  _Pantaleôn_, ii. 434.
-
-  _Pantikapæum_, xii. 479 _seq._, 487.
-
-  _Pantitês_, story of, v. 94 _n._ 1.
-
-  _Paphlagonia_, submission of, to Alexander, xii. 111.
-
-  _Paphlagonians_, and the Ten Thousand Greeks, ix. 144.
-
-  _Paragraphê_, viii. 299.
-
-  _Parali_, at Samos, viii. 29.
-
-  _Paralus_, arrival of, at Athens from Samos, viii. 30.
-
-  _Paranomôn_, Graphê, v. 375 _seq._, viii. 36.
-
-  _Parasang_, length of, ix. 14 _n._ 3.
-
-  _Paris_, i. 286 _seq._, 301.
-
-  _Parisades I._, xii. 482.
-
-  _Parmenidês_, viii. 343, 344 _n._
-
-  _Parmenio_, embassy of, from Philip to Athens, xi. 386, 388, 389, 398,
-      401;
-    operations of, in Asia Minor against Memnon, xii. 49;
-    debate of, with Alexander at Milêtus, xii. 92;
-    captures Damascus, xii. 128;
-    at the battle of Arbela, xii. 158, 159, 164, 165;
-    invested with the chief command at Ekbatana, xii. 181;
-    family of, xii. 190;
-    alleged conspiracy and assassination of, xii. 196 _seq._
-
-  _Paropamisadæ_, subjugation of, by Alexander, xii. 200.
-
-  _Paros_, Theramenês at, viii. 118.
-
-  _Partheniæ_, iii. 387.
-
-  _Parthenon_, vi. 21, 22;
-    records of offerings in, xi. 249 _n._, 252 _n._ 3.
-
-  _Parthia_, Darius pursued by Alexander into, xii. 182 _seq._
-
-  _Partition of lands_ ascribed to Lykurgus, ii. 380, 393 _seq._,
-      401 _seq._;
-    proposed by Agis, iii. 399, 401.
-
-  _Parysatis, wife of Darius Nothus_, ix. 61, 72.
-
-  _Parysatis, daughter of Darius Nothus_, xii. 241.
-
-  _Pasimêlus_, ix. 331 _seq._
-
-  _Pasion_, and Xenias, ix. 28.
-
-  _Pasiphaë_ and the Minôtaur, i. 220.
-
-  _Pasippidas_, banishment of, viii. 128.
-
-  _Patizeithês_, conspiracy of, iv. 223.
-
-  _Patrokleidês_, amnesty proposed by, viii. 224.
-
-  _Patroklus_, treatment of, in the Iliad, ii. 177.
-
-  _Patronymic_ names of demes, iii. 63 _n._ 2.
-
-  _Patrôus_ Apollo, i. 50.
-
-  _Pattala_, xii. 235 _n._ 4.
-
-  _Pausanias, the historian_, on the Achæans, i. 104;
-    his view of mythes, i. 414;
-    his history of the Bœotians between the siege of Troy and the Return
-      of the Hêrakleids, ii. 16;
-    his account of the Messenian wars, ii. 425 _seq._, 428 _seq._;
-    on Iphikrates at Corinth, B. C. 369, x. 238 _n._
-
-  _Pausanias, the Spartan regent_, at the Isthmus of Corinth, v. 165;
-    at Platæa, v. 168 _seq._, 177 _seq._;
-    misconduct of, after the battle of Platæa, v. 178 _seq._, 181;
-    conduct of, after losing the command of the Greeks, v. 269;
-    detection and death of, v. 272 _seq._;
-    and Themistoklês, v. 273, 282.
-
-  _Pausanias the Spartan king_, and Lysander, viii. 262;
-    his expedition to Attica, viii. 275 _seq._;
-    his attack upon Peiræus, viii. 276;
-    his pacification between the Ten at Athens and the exiles at
-      Peiræus, viii. 277 _seq._;
-    in Bœotia, ix. 295 _seq._;
-    condemnation of, ix. 297 _seq._;
-    and the democratical leaders of Mantinea, x. 37.
-
-  _Pausanias the Macedonian_, x. 249, xi. 515 _seq._
-
-  _Pedaritus_, vii. 399, 391, viii. 19.
-
-  _Pedieis_, iii. 93.
-
-  _Pedigrees_, mythical, connect _gentes_, i. 193.
-
-  _Pegasus_, i. 4, 122.
-
-  _Peiræum_, Athenian victory near, vii. 369;
-    defeat of the Athenian fleet near, vii. 381;
-    capture of, by Agesilaus, ix. 343, 345 _seq._;
-    recovery of, by Iphikrates, ix. 353.
-
-  _Peiræus_, fortification of, by Themistoklês, v. 249 _seq._;
-    and Athens, Long Walls between, v. 324 _seq._, viii. 229,
-      ix. 333 _seq._;
-    improvements at, under Periklês, vi. 20;
-    departure of the armament for Sicily from, vii. 181;
-    walls built at, by the Four Hundred, viii. 63;
-    approach of the Lacedæmonian fleet under Agesandridas to,
-      viii. 66, 71;
-    Thrasybulus at, viii. 272 _seq._;
-    king Pausanias’s attack upon, viii. 276;
-    attack of Teleutias on, ix. 377 _seq._;
-    attempt of Sphodrias to surprise, x. 98 _seq._;
-    seizure of, by Nikanor, xii. 346.
-
-  _Peisander_, and the mutilation of the Hermæ, vii. 200;
-    and the conspiracy of the Four Hundred, viii. 8, 12, 13 _seq._, 21,
-      26, 33 _seq._;
-    statements respecting, viii. 32 _n._;
-    punishment of, viii. 88.
-
-  _Peisander, the Lacedæmonian admiral_, ix. 274, 283.
-
-  _Peisistratids_, and Thucydidês iv. 112 _n._ 2;
-    fall of the dynasty of, iv. 122;
-    with Xerxes in Athens, v. 115 _seq._
-
-  _Peisistratus_, iii. 153 _seq._, iv. 102 _seq._, 117.
-
-  _Peithias, the Korkyræan_, vi. 268 _seq._
-
-  _Pelasgi_, ii. 261 _seq._;
-    in Italy, iii. 351;
-    of Lemnos and Imbros, iv. 277.
-
-  _Pelasgikon_, oracle about the, vi. 129 _n._ 2.
-
-  _Pelasgus_, i. 173.
-
-  _Pêleus_, i. 114, 187 _seq._
-
-  _Pelias_, i. 108 _seq._, 114 _seq._
-
-  _Pelion_ and Ossa, ii. 214.
-
-  _Pella_, embassies from Grecian states at, B. C. 346, xi. 404 _seq._;
-    under Philip, xii. 66.
-
-  _Pellênê_, i. 318;
-    and Phlius, x. 271.
-
-  _Pelopidas_, escape of, to Athens, x. 61;
-    conspiracy of, against the philo-Laconian rulers at Thebes,
-      x. 81 _seq._;
-    slaughter of Leontiades by, x. 86;
-    and Epaminondas, x. 121;
-    victory of, at Tegyra, x. 134;
-    in Thessaly, x. 249, 263, 283 _seq._, 303, 307 _seq._;
-    and Philip, x. 249 _n._ 2, 264;
-    and Alexander of Pheræ, x. 282 _seq._;
-    death of, x. 308.
-
-  _Pelopidas_, i. 153 _seq._, 160.
-
-  _Peloponnesian_ war, its injurious effects upon the Athenian empire,
-      vi. 46;
-    war, commencement of, vi. 103-153;
-    fleet, Phormio’s victories over, vi. 196 _seq._, 203 _seq._;
-    war, agreement of the Peloponnesian confederacy at the commencement
-      of, vii. 19 _n._;
-    allies, synod of, at Corinth, B. C. 412, vii. 368;
-    fleet of under Theramenês, vii. 387 _seq._;
-    fleet at Rhodes, vii. 400 _seq._, viii. 94;
-    fleet, return of, from Rhodes to Milêtus, viii. 25;
-    fleet discontent in, Milêtus, viii. 95, 97 _seq._;
-    fleet, capture of, at Kyzikus, viii. 121;
-    fleet, pay of, by Cyrus, viii. 143;
-    confederacy, assembly of, at Sparta, B. C. 404, viii. 228;
-    confederacy, Athens at the head of, B. C. 371, x. 201;
-    allies of Sparta after the Peloponnesian war, xi. 280.
-
-  _Peloponnesians_, immigrant, ii. 303;
-    conduct of, after the battle of Thermopylæ, v. 106;
-    and Mardonius’s approach, v. 154 _seq._;
-    and the fortification of Athens, v. 243 _seq._, 247;
-    five years’ truce of, with Athens, v. 334;
-    position and views of, in commencing the Peloponnesian war,
-      vi. 94 _seq._, 113, 124 _seq._;
-    invasions of Attica, by, under Archidamus, vi. 126 _seq._, 154;
-    slaughter of neutral prisoners by, vi. 182;
-    and Ambrakiots attack Akarnania, vi. 194 _seq._;
-    application of revolted Mitylenæans to, vi. 226 _seq._;
-    and Ætolians attack Naupaktus, vi. 301;
-    and Tissaphernês, vii. 387, 395 _seq._, viii. 4, 21 _seq._, 113 _seq._;
-    defeat of, at Kynossêma, viii. 109 _seq._;
-    at Abydos, viii. 117;
-    aid of Pharnabazus to, viii. 126;
-    letters of Philip to, xi. 492.
-
-  _Peloponnesus_, eponym of, i. 154;
-    invasion and division of, by the Hêrakleids, ii. 4;
-    mythical tide of the Dorians to, ii. 6;
-    extension of Pindus through, ii. 212;
-    distribution of, about B. C. 450, ii. 299 _seq._;
-    difference between the distribution, B. C. 450 and 776, ii. 302;
-    population of, which was believed to be indigenous, ii. 303;
-    southern inhabitants of, before the Dorian invasion, ii. 337;
-    events in, during the first twenty years of the Athenian hegemony,
-      v. 315 _seq._;
-    voyage of Tolmidês round, v. 331;
-    ravages of, by the Athenians, vi. 135, 164;
-    political relations in, B. C. 421, vii. 23;
-    expedition of Alkibiadês into the interior of, vii. 63;
-    expedition of Konon and Pharnabazus to, ix. 322;
-    circumnavigation of, by Timotheus, x. 132;
-    proceedings in, after the battle of Leuktra, x. 198, 242;
-    expedition of Epaminondas to, x. 215 _seq._, 254 _seq._, 266 _seq._,
-      328 _seq._;
-    state of, B. C. 362, x. 313 _seq._;
-    visits of Dion to, xi. 61;
-    disunion of, B. C. 360-359, xi. 199;
-    affairs of, B. C. 354-352, xi. 290 _seq._;
-    war in, B. C. 352-351, xi. 299;
-    intervention of Philip in, after B. C. 346, xi. 443;
-    expedition of Philip to, xi. 511;
-    Kassander and Polysperchon in, xii. 360, 365;
-    Kassander and Alexander, son of Polysperchon, in, xii. 368, 369.
-
-  _Pelops_, i. 154 _seq._
-
-  _Pelusium_, Alexander at, xii. 146.
-
-  _Penal_ procedure at Athens, iv. 366 _n._
-
-  _Penestæ_, Thessalian, ii. 279 _seq._
-
-  _Pentakosiomedimni_, iii. 117.
-
-  _Pentapolis_ on the south-west coast of the Euxine, xii. 458, 472.
-
-  _Pentekontêrs_, Spartan, ii. 459.
-
-  _Pentekostys_, i. 458.
-
-  _Penthesileia_, ii. 209, 298.
-
-  _Pentheus_ and Agavê, i. 262 _seq._
-
-  _Perdikkas I._, iv. 17.
-
-  _Perdikkas II._, relations and proceedings of, towards Athens,
-      vi. 67 _seq._, 71, 141, 370, 448 _seq._, vii. 96, 104;
-    and Sitalkês, xi. 217, 220;
-    application of, to Sparta, vi. 398;
-    and Brasidas, relations between, vi. 369, 448, 450 _seq._;
-    joins Sparta and Argos, vii. 96;
-    death of, x. 46.
-
-  _Perdikkas, brother of Philip_, x. 300, 301, 370, 382, xi. 205 _seq._
-
-  _Perdikkas, Alexander’s general_, xii. 256, 319, 333 _seq._, 337.
-
-  _Pergamum_, i. 286 _n._ 5, 324.
-
-  _Pergamus_, custom in the temple of Asklêpius at, i. 301 _n._ 4.
-
-  _Pergamus in Mysia_, the Ten Thousand Greeks at, ix. 172 _seq._
-
-  _Periander, the Corinthian despot_, power and character of,
-      iii. 41 _seq._
-
-  _Perikles_, difference between the democracy after, and the
-      constitution of Kleisthenês, iv. 148;
-    effect of, on constitutional morality, iv. 163;
-    at the battle of Tanagra, v. 328;
-    expeditions of, to Sikyon and Akarnania, v. 332;
-    policy of, B. C. 450, v. 342;
-    reconquest of Eubœa by, v. 349;
-    and Ephialtês, constitution of dikasteries by, v. 355 _seq._;
-    and Kimon, v. 362 _seq._;
-    public life and character of, v. 362 _seq._;
-    and Ephialtês, judicial reform of, v. 355 _seq._, 366 _seq._;
-    real nature of the constitutional changes effected by,
-      v. 367 _seq._;
-    commencement of the ascendancy of, v. 370;
-    and Kimon, compromise between, v. 329, 371;
-    his conception of the relation between Athens and her allies, vi. 4;
-    and Athenian kleruchs by, vi. 10;
-    and Thucydidês, son of Melêsias, vi. 15 _seq._;
-    Pan-Hellenic schemes and sentiment of, vi. 18;
-    city-improvements at Athens under, vi. 20 _seq._, 23 _seq._;
-    sculpture at Athens under, vi. 22;
-    attempt of, to convene a Grecian congress at Athens, vi. 25;
-    Sophoklês, etc., Athenian armament under, vi. 27 _seq._;
-    funeral orations of, vi. 31, 143 _seq._;
-    demand of the Spartans for his banishment, vi. 97, 105;
-    indirect attacks of his political opponents upon, vi. 98 _seq._;
-    his family relations, and connection with Aspasia, vi. 101, 102;
-    charge of peculation against, vi. 103 _seq._;
-    stories of his having caused the Peloponnesian war, vi. 104 _n._;
-    speech of, before the Peloponnesian war, vi. 107 _seq._;
-    and the ravages of Attica by Archidamus, vi. 128 _seq._;
-    last speech of, xii. 165 _seq._;
-    accusation and punishment of, vi. 168 _seq._;
-    old age and death of, vi. 170 _seq._;
-    life and character of, vi. 172 _seq._;
-    new class of politicians at Athens after, vi. 171 _seq._;
-    and Nikias compared, vi. 287.
-
-  _Perriklymenos_, i. 112 _seq._
-
-  _Perinthus_, iv. 27;
-    and Athens, viii. 126, xi. 461;
-    siege of, by Philip, xi. 454, 458.
-
-  _Periœki_, ii. 364 _seq._, 369, 371 _n._ 2;
-    Libyan, iv. 40, 42, 45.
-
-  _Pêrô_, Bias and Melampus, i. 110 _seq._
-
-  _Perseid_ dynasty, i. 91.
-
-  _Persephonê_, i. 10;
-    mysteries of, v. 208 _n._ 2.
-
-  _Persepolis_, Alexander’s march from Susa to, xii. 170 _seq._;
-    Alexander at, xii. 172 _seq._, 237;
-    Alexander’s return from India to, xii. 237.
-
-  _Persês_, i. 6.
-
-  _Perseus_, exploits of, i. 89 _seq._
-
-  _Persia_, application of Athens for alliance with, iv. 165;
-    state of, on the formation of the confederacy of Delos, v. 267;
-    treatment of Themistoklês in, v. 284 _seq._;
-    operations of Athens and the Delian confederacy against,
-      v. 303 _seq._;
-    and Athens, treaty between, B. C. 450, v. 335 _seq._;
-    Asiatic Greeks not tributary to, between B. C. 477-412,
-      v. 337 _n._ 2;
-    surrender of the Asiatic Greeks by Sparta to, ix. 205;
-    and the peace of Antalkidas, ix. 385 _seq._, x. 2 _seq._, 158;
-    applications of Sparta and Athens to, x. 5 _seq._;
-    hostility of, to Sparta after the battle of Ægospotami, x. 8;
-    unavailing efforts of, to reconquer Egypt, x. 13;
-    and Evagoras, x. 20 _seq._;
-    Spartan project against, for the rescue of the Asiatic Greeks,
-      x. 44;
-    application of Thebes to, x. 277 _seq._;
-    embassy from Athens to, B. C. 366, x. 293;
-    state of, B. C. 362, x. 360, 366;
-    alarm at Athens about, B. C. 354, xi. 285;
-    projected invasion of, by Philip, xi. 511 _seq._;
-    correspondence of Demosthenes with, xii. 20 _seq._;
-    accumulation of royal treasures in, xii. 175 _n._ 3;
-    roads in, xii. 180 _n._
-
-  _Persian_ version of the legend of Io, i. 86;
-    noblemen, conspiracy of, against the false Smerdis, iv. 223 _seq._;
-    empire, organization of, by Darius Hystaspês, iv. 233 _seq._;
-    envoys to Macedonia, iv. 276;
-    armament against Cyprus, iv. 292;
-    force against Milêtus, iv. 299;
-    fleet at Ladê, iv. 304;
-    fleet and Asiatic Greeks, iv. 307;
-    armament under Datis, iv. 329 _seq._, 345;
-    fleet before the battle of Salamis, v. 85 _seq._, 99 _seq._, 113,
-      119, 125, 127 _nn._;
-    army, march of, from Thermopylæ to Attica, v. 114 _seq._;
-    fleet at Salamis, v. 130 _seq._;
-    fleet after the battle of Salamis, v. 137, 147;
-    army under Mardonius, v. 154 _seq._;
-    fleet at Mykalê, v. 191;
-    army at Mykalê, v. 193;
-    army, after the defeat at Mykalê, v. 198;
-    war effect of, upon Athenian political sentiment, v. 274;
-    kings, from Xerxes to Artaxerxes Mnemon, vi. 362 _seq._;
-    cavalry, and the retreating Ten Thousand Greeks, ix. 89 _seq._;
-    empire, distribution of, into satrapies and subsatrapies, ix. 209;
-    preparations for maritime war against Sparta, B. C. 397, ix. 255,
-      268;
-    king, Thebans obtain money from, xi. 302;
-    forces in Phrygia on Alexander’s landing, xii. 75, 78;
-    Gates, Alexander at, xii. 171;
-    fleet and armies, hopes raised in Greece by, B. C. 334-331,
-      xii. 276.
-
-  _Persians_, condition of, at the rise of Cyrus the Great, iv. 187;
-    conquests of, under Cyrus the Great, iv. 209, 216 _seq._;
-    the first who visited Greece, iv. 257 _seq._;
-    conquest of Thrace by, under Darius Hystaspês, iv. 273;
-    successes of, against the revolted coast of Asia Minor, iv. 289;
-    attempts of, to disunite the Ionians at Ladê, iv. 300;
-    narrow escape of Miltiadês from, iv. 307;
-    cruelties of, at Milêtus, iv. 308;
-    attempted revolt of Thasos from, iv. 314;
-    at Marathon, iv. 333, 345 _seq._;
-    after the battle of Marathon, iv. 351, 352;
-    change of Grecian feeling towards, after the battle of Marathon,
-      iv. 355;
-    their religious conception of history, v. 10;
-    at Thermopylæ, v. 83, 85 _seq._;
-    in Psyttaleia, v. 128, 136;
-    at Salamis, v. 131 _seq._;
-    at Platæa, v. 163 _seq._;
-    at Mykalê, v. 197;
-    between Xerxes and Darius Codomannus, v. 241;
-    necessity of Grecian activity against, after the battles of Platæa
-      and Mykalê, v. 296;
-    mutilation inflicted by, ix. 9;
-    heralds from, to the Ten Thousand Greeks, ix. 52;
-    impotence and timidity of, ix. 75;
-    imprudence of, in letting Alexander cross the Hellespont, xii. 78;
-    defeat of, at the Granikus, xii. 80 _seq._;
-    defeat of, at Issus, xii. 118 _seq._;
-    incorporation of, in the Macedonian phalanx, xii. 251.
-
-  _Persis_, subjugation of, by Alexander, xii. 177;
-    Alexander’s return from India to, xii. 237.
-
-  _Personages_, quasi-human, in Grecian mythology, i. 342 _seq._
-
-  _Personal_ ascendency of the king in legendary Greece, ii. 61;
-    feeling towards the gods, the king, or individuals in legendary
-      Greece, ii. 80 _seq._;
-    sympathies the earliest form of social existence, ii. 84.
-
-  _Personalities_, great predominance of, in Grecian legend, ii. 74.
-
-  _Personality_ of divine agents in mythes, i. 2.
-
-  _Personification_, tendency of the ancient Greeks to, i. 342 _seq._;
-    of the heavenly bodies by Boiocalus, the German chief, i. 345 _n._
-
-  _Pestilence_ and suffering at Athens after the Kylonian massacre,
-      iii. 84.
-
-  _Petalism_ at Syracuse, iv. 163, vii. 122.
-
-  _Peuke_, xii. 23, 25 _n._ 2.
-
-  _Peukestes_, xii. 234, 238.
-
-  _Pezetæri_, xii. 59.
-
-  _Phæax_, expedition of, to Sicily, vii. 143.
-
-  _Phalækus_ succeeds to the command of the Phokians, xi. 301;
-    decline of the Phokians under, xi. 374, 418;
-    opposition to, in Phokis, xi. 375;
-    opposition of, to aid from Athens to Thermopylæ, xi. 376;
-    position of, at Thermopylæ, xi. 375, 418 _seq._;
-    death of, xi. 434.
-
-  _Phalanthus_, œkist of Tarentum, iii. 387 _seq._
-
-  _Phalanx_, Macedonian, xi. 501, xii. 57 _seq._, 251.
-
-  _Phalaris_, iv. 378, v. 204.
-
-  _Phalerium_, Xerxes at, v. 118.
-
-  _Phalinus_, ix. 52.
-
-  _Phanes_, and Zeus, i. 18.
-
-  _Phanosthenes_, viii. 159.
-
-  _Pharakidas_, x. 504 _seq._
-
-  _Pharax_, ix. 270, 271 _n._ 3.
-
-  _Pharax the officer of Dionysius_, xi. 115, 116, 133.
-
-  _Pharis_, conquest of, ii. 420.
-
-  _Pharnabazus_ and Tissaphernês, embassy from, to Sparta, vii. 366;
-    and Derkyllidas, viii. 94;
-    and Athens, viii. 114, 125;
-    Athenian victory over, viii. 130;
-    convention of, about Chalkêdon, viii. 132;
-    and Alkibiades, viii. 133, 311 _seq._;
-    and Greek envoys, viii. 135, 137;
-    after the battle of Ægospotami, viii. 311;
-    and Anaxibius, ix. 154, 166;
-    and Lysander, ix. 204;
-    and the subsatrapy of Æolis, ix. 210 _seq._;
-    and Agesilaus, ix. 269, 279 _seq._;
-    and Konon, ix. 283, 322, 325 _seq._;
-    and Abydos, ix. 324;
-    and the anti-Spartan allies at Corinth, ix. 327;
-    and the Syracusans, x. 386;
-    anti-Macedonian efforts of, xii. 127;
-    capture of, with his force, at Chios, xii. 142.
-
-  _Pharsalus_, Polydamas of, x. 137 _seq._;
-    and Halus, xi. 411.
-
-  _Phaselis_, Alexander at, xii. 100.
-
-  _Phayllus_, xi. 293, 297 _seq._, 301.
-
-  _Pheidias_, vi. 23, 102.
-
-  _Pheidôn the Temenid_, ii. 314;
-    claims and projects of, as representative of Hêraklês, ii. 316;
-    and the Olympic games, ii. 316 _seq._;
-    coinage and scale of, ii. 318 _seq._, 323 _seq._;
-    various descriptions of, ii. 320.
-
-  _Pheidôn, one of the Thirty_, viii. 271, 293.
-
-  _Phenicia_, ante-Hellenic colonies from, to Greece not probable,
-      ii. 262 _seq._;
-    situation and cities of, iii. 267;
-    reconquest of, by Darius Nothus, xi. 438, 440 _n._ 3;
-    Alexander in, xii. 130 _seq._, 150.
-
-  _Phenician_ version of the legend of Io, i. 86;
-    colonies, iii. 271 _seq._;
-    fleet at Aspendus, viii. 99, 100, 114;
-    towns, surrender of, to Alexander, xii. 130, 132.
-
-  _Phenicians_ in Homeric times, ii. 103 _seq._;
-    historical, iii. 204, 289, 303, 308, 342 _seq._;
-    and Persians, subjugation of Cyprus by, iv. 293;
-    and Persians at Milêtus, iv. 300 _seq._;
-    and Persians, reconquest of Asiatic Greeks by, iv. 307;
-    and the cutting through Athos, v. 24;
-    and Greeks in Sicily, v. 207;
-    in Cyprus, x. 14 _seq._
-
-  _Pheræ, Jason of_, x. 138 _seq._, x. 147 _n._, 153, 189 _seq._,
-      195 _seq._
-
-  _Pheræ, Alexander of_, x. 248, xi. 202 _seq._;
-    despots of, xi. 202 _seq._;
-    Philip and the despots of, xi. 261, 292, 294 _seq._;
-    Philip takes the oath of alliance with Athens at, xi. 417;
-    Alexander of, and Pelopidas, 256, 277 _seq._, 297, 301 _seq._;
-    Alexander of, subdued by the Thebans, x. 309 _seq._;
-    hostilities of Alexander of, against Athens, x. 369.
-
-  _Pherekydes_, i. 390, iv. 390.
-
-  _Phretime_, iv. 45 _seq._
-
-  _Philæus_, eponym of an Attic dême, i. 189.
-
-  _Philaidæ_, origin of, i. 189.
-
-  _Philip of Macedon_, detained as a hostage at Thebes, x. 249 _n._ 1,
-      263, xi. 207 _seq._;
-    accession of, x. 382, xi. 212 _seq._;
-    as subordinate governor in Macedonia, xi. 207, 208;
-    position of, on the death of Perdikkas, xi. 209;
-    capture of Amphipolis by, xi. 232 _seq._;
-    his alliance with Olynthus and hostilities against Athens,
-      xi. 236 _seq._;
-    capture of Pydna and Potidæa by, xi. 237 _seq._;
-    increased power of, B. C. 358-356, xi. 239;
-    marriage of, with Olympias, xi. 240;
-    intrigue of, with Kersobleptes against Athens, xi. 158;
-    his activity, and conquest of Methônê, xi. 259 _seq._;
-    and the despots of Pheræ, xi. 261, 292 _seq._;
-    development of Macedonian military force under, xi. 282 _seq._;
-    and Onomarchus, xi. 293;
-    conquest of Pheræ and Pagasæ by, xi. 295;
-    checked at Thermopylæ by the Athenians, xi. 296;
-    power and attitude of, B. C. 352-351, xi. 322;
-    naval power and operations of, B. C. 351, xi. 297 _seq._;
-    in Thrace, B. C. 351, xi. 301;
-    hostility of, to Olynthus, B. C. 351-350, xi. 320;
-    flight of his half-brothers to Olynthus, xi. 321;
-    intrigues of, in Olynthus, xi. 322;
-    destruction of the Olynthian confederacy by, xi. 324, 325, 331,
-      350 _seq._, 364;
-    Athenian expedition to Olynthus against, xi. 334;
-    intrigues of, in Eubœa, xi. 339;
-    and Athens, overtures for peace between, B. C. 348, xi. 369 _seq._;
-    Thebans invoke the aid of, against the Phokians, xi. 375;
-    and Thermopylæ, xi. 377, 407, 410, 416, 421, 424;
-    embassies from Athens to, xi. 375 _seq._, 401 _seq._, 422;
-    envoys to Athens from, xi. 386, 387, 390, 398, 401;
-    synod of allies at Athens about, xi. 388;
-    peace and alliance between Athens, and, xi. 390 _seq._, 409,
-      429 _seq._, 442, 446 _seq._;
-    fabrications of Æschines and Philokrates about, xi. 398, 408, 409,
-      412 _seq._;
-    in Thrace, xi. 402, 404, 450 _seq._;
-    letter of, taken by Æschines to Athens, xi. 410, 416;
-    surrender of Phokis to, xi. 421;
-    declared sympathy of, with the Thebans, B. C. 346, xi. 421;
-    visit of Æschines to, in Phokis, xi. 423;
-    admitted into the Amphiktyonic assembly, xi. 425;
-    ascendancy of, B. C. 346, xi. 428 _seq._;
-    named president of the Pythian festival, xi. 428;
-    position of, after the Sacred War, xi. 434;
-    letter of Isokrates to, xi. 436;
-    movements of, after B. C. 346, xi. 443 _seq._;
-    warnings of Demosthenês against, after B. C. 346, xi. 444;
-    mission of Python from, to Athens, xi. 446;
-    and Athens, dispute between about Halonnesus, xi. 448 _seq._;
-    and Kardia, xi. 450;
-    and Athens, disputes between, about the Bosporus and Hellespont,
-      xi. 450;
-    at Perinthus and the Chersonese, xi. 454, 458 _seq._;
-    and Athens, declaration of war between, xi. 454 _seq._;
-    makes peace with Byzantium, Chios, and other islands, attacks the
-      Scythians, and is defeated by the Triballi, xi. 461;
-    and the Amphissians, xi. 480 _seq._, 497;
-    re-fortification of Elateia by, xi. 482, 484 _seq._;
-    application of, to Thebes for aid in attacking the Athenians,
-      xi. 483 _seq._, 489;
-    alliance of Athens and Thebes against, xi. 490 _seq._, 593 _seq._;
-    letters of, to the Peloponnesians for aid, xi. 492;
-    victory of, at Chæroneia, xi. 497 _seq._, 505;
-    military organization of, xi. 501, xii. 56 _seq._;
-    and the Athenians, peace of Demades between, xi. 507 _seq._;
-    honorary votes at Athens in favor of, xi. 509;
-    expedition of, into Peloponnesus, xi. 510;
-    at the congress at Corinth, xi. 511;
-    preparations of, for the invasion of Persia, xi. 512;
-    repudiates Olympias, and marries Kleopatra, xi. 512;
-    and Alexander, dissensions between, xi. 513;
-    assassination of, xi. 514 _seq._, xii. 6 _seq._;
-    character of, xi. 519 _seq._;
-    discord in the family of, xii. 4;
-    military condition of Macedonia before, xii. 55.
-
-  _Philip Aridæus_, xii. 319, 334.
-
-  _Philippi_, foundation of, xi. 241.
-
-  _Philippics_ of Demosthenes, xi. 309 _seq._, 445, 451.
-
-  _Philippizing_ factions in Megara and Eubœa, xi. 448.
-
-  _Philippus, the Theban polemarch_, x. 82, 85.
-
-  _Philippus, Alexander’s physician_, xii. 113.
-
-  _Philiskus_, x. 261.
-
-  _Philistides_, xi. 449, 452.
-
-  _Philistus_, his treatment of mythes, i. 410;
-    banishment of, xi. 33;
-    recall of, xi. 67;
-    intrigues of, against Plato and Dion, xi. 76;
-    tries to intercept Dion in the Gulf of Tarentum, xi. 89;
-    at Leontini, xi. 99;
-    defeat and death of, xi. 100.
-
-  _Philokrates_, motion of, to allow Philip to send envoys to Athens,
-      xi. 371;
-    motion of, to send envoys to Philip, xi. 379;
-    motion of, for peace and alliance with Philip, xi. 390 _seq._, 416;
-    fabrications of, about Philip, xi. 398, 408, 409, 412;
-    impeachment and condemnation of, xi. 433.
-
-  _Philoktetes_, i. 301, 310.
-
-  _Philolaus_ and Dioklês, ii. 297.
-
-  _Philomela_, i. 196 _seq._
-
-  _Philomelus_, xi. 245;
-    seizes the temple at Delphi, xi. 248;
-    and Archidamus, xi. 247;
-    and the Pythia at Delphi, xi. 250;
-    successful battles of, with the Lokrians, xi. 251;
-    defeat and death of, xi. 255;
-    takes part of the treasures in the temple at Delphi, xi. 252.
-
-  _Philonomus_ and the Spartan Dorians, ii. 327.
-
-  _Philosophers_, mythes allegorized by, i. 418 _seq._
-
-  _Philosophy_, Homeric and Hesiodic, i. 368;
-    Ionic, i. 372 _n._ 2;
-    ethical and social among the Greeks, iv. 76.
-
-  _Philotas_, alleged conspiracy, and execution of, xii. 190 _seq._,
-      197 _n._ 2.
-
-  _Philoxenus_ and Dionysius, xi. 26.
-
-  _Phineus_, i. 199, 235.
-
-  _Phlegyæ_, the, i. 128.
-
-  _Phlius_, return of philo-Laconian exiles to, x. 42;
-    intervention of Sparta with, x. 70;
-    surrender of, to Agesilaus, x. 70 _seq._;
-    application of, to Athens, x. 234 _seq._;
-    fidelity of, to Sparta, x. 257, 270;
-    invasion of, by Euphron, x. 270;
-    and Pellênê, x. 271;
-    assistance of Chares to, x. 272;
-    and Thebes, x. 290 _seq._
-
-  _Phœbe_, i. 5, 6.
-
-  _Phœbidas_, at Thebes, x. 58 _seq._, 62, 63, 128.
-
-  _Phœnissæ_ of Phrynichus, v. 138 _n._ 1.
-
-  _Phœnix_, i. 257.
-
-  _Phôkæa_, foundation of, iii. 188;
-    surrender of, to Harpagus, iv. 203;
-    Alkibiadês at, viii. 152.
-
-  _Phôkæan_ colonies at Atalia and Elea, iv. 206.
-
-  _Phôkæans_, exploring voyages of, iii. 281;
-    effects of their exploring voyages upon Grecian knowledge and fancy,
-      iii. 282;
-    emigration of, iv. 205 _seq._
-
-  _Phokian_ defensive wall at Thermopylæ, ii. 283;
-    townships, ravage of, by Xerxes’s army, v. 114.
-
-  _Phokians_, ii. 288;
-    application of Leonidas to, v. 76;
-    at Leuktra, x. 181, 182;
-    and the presidency of the temple at Delphi, xi. 245 _seq._;
-    Thebans strive to form a confederacy against, xi. 251;
-    take the treasures of the temple at Delphi, xi. 252, 255, 297, 374;
-    war of, with the Lokrians, Thebans, and Thessalians, xi. 254;
-    under Onomarchus, xi. 261, 293;
-    under Phayllus, xi. 297 _seq._;
-    under Phalækus, xi. 374, 418;
-    Thebans invoke the aid of Philip against, xi. 375;
-    application of, to Athens, xi. 376;
-    exclusion of, from the peace and alliance between Philip and Athens,
-      xi. 396 _seq._, 411;
-    envoys from, to Philip, xi. 404, 406;
-    motion of Philokrates about, xi. 416;
-    at Thermopylæ, xi. 418 _seq._;
-    treatment of, after their surrender to Philip, xi. 425 _seq._;
-    restoration of, by the Thebans and Athenians, xi. 493.
-
-  _Phokion_, first exploits of, x. 131;
-    character and policy of, xi. 273 _seq._, 308, xii. 278, 311,
-      357 _seq._;
-    in Eubœa, xi. 340 _seq._, 452;
-    at Megara, xi. 449;
-    in the Propontis, xi. 460;
-    and Alexander’s demand that the anti-Macedonian leaders at Athens
-      should be surrendered, xii. 46, 47;
-    and Demades, embassy of, to Antipater, xii. 322;
-    at Athens under Antipater, xii. 324;
-    and Nikanor, xii. 339, 346 _seq._;
-    and Alexander, son of Polysperchon, xii. 348;
-    condemnation and death of, xii. 349 _seq._;
-    altered sentiment of the Athenians towards, after his death,
-      xii. 357.
-
-  _Phokis_, acquisition of, by Athens, v. 331;
-    loss of, by Athens, v. 348;
-    invasion of, by the Thebans, B. C. 374, x. 136;
-    accusation of Thebes against, before the Amphiktyonic assembly,
-      xi. 243;
-    resistance of, to the Amphiktyonic assembly, xi. 246 _seq._;
-    Philip in, xi. 421, 482, 492 _seq._
-
-  _Phôkus_, i. 185.
-
-  _Phokylidês_, iv. 92.
-
-  _Phorkys_ and Kêtô, progeny of, i. 7.
-
-  _Phormio_ at Potidæa, vi. 74;
-    at Amphilochian Argos, vi. 121;
-    at Naupaktus, vi. 180;
-    his victories over the Peloponnesian fleet, vi. 199 _seq._,
-      206 _seq._;
-    in Akarnania, vi. 213;
-    his later history, vi. 277 _n._
-
-  _Phormisius_, disfranchising proposition of, viii. 294.
-
-  _Phorôneus_, i. 82, 83.
-
-  _Phraortês_, iii. 228.
-
-  _Phratries_, iii. 52 _seq._, 63;
-    and gentes, non-members of, iii. 133.
-
-  _Phrikônis_, iii. 192.
-
-  _Phrygia_, Persian forces in, on Alexander’s landing, xii. 75, 78;
-    submission of, to Alexander, xii. 89.
-
-  _Phrygian_ influence on the religion of the Greeks, i. 26, 28;
-    music and worship, iii. 213 _seq._
-
-  _Phrygians_ and Trojans, i. 335;
-    and Thracians, iii. 210, 213;
-    ethnical affinities and early distribution of, iii. 209 _seq._
-
-  _Phrynichus the tragedian_, his capture of Milêtus, iv. 309;
-    his Phœnissæ, v. 138, _n._ 1.
-
-  _Phrynichus the commander_, at Milêtus, vii. 388;
-    and Amorgês, vii. 389 _n._ 1;
-    and Alkibiadês, viii. 10 _seq._;
-    deposition of, viii. 15;
-    and the Four Hundred, viii. 11, 58 _seq._;
-    assassination of, viii. 66, 85, _n._;
-    decree respecting the memory of, viii. 85.
-
-  _Phrynon_, xi. 370.
-
-  _Phryxus_ and Hellê, i. 123 _seq._
-
-  _Phthiôtis_ and Deukalion, i. 96.
-
-  Φύσις, first use of, in the sense of _nature_, i. 368.
-
-  _Phyê-Athênê_, iv. 104.
-
-  _Phylarch_, Athenian, ii. 461.
-
-  _Phylê_, occupation of, by Thrasybulus, viii. 265.
-
-  _Phyllidas_ and the conspiracy against the philo-Laconian oligarchy at
-      Thebes, x. 81 _seq._
-
-  _Physical_ astronomy thought impious by ancient Greeks, i. 346 _n._;
-    science, commencement of, among the Greeks, i. 368.
-
-  _Phytalids_, their tale of Dêmêtêr, i. 44.
-
-  _Phyton_, xi. 18 _seq._
-
-  _Pierians_, original seat of, iv. 14.
-
-  _Piété, Monts de_, iii. 162.
-
-  Πῖλοι of the Lacedæmonians in Sphakteria, vi. 344 _n._
-
-  _Pinarus_, Alexander and Darius on the, xii. 118 _seq._
-
-  _Pindar_, his treatment of mythes, i. 378 _seq._
-
-  _Pindus_, ii. 211 _seq._
-
-  _Piracy_ in early Greece, ii. 90, 113.
-
-  _Pisa_ and Ellis, relations of, ii. 439.
-
-  _Pisatans_ and the Olympic games, ii. 318, 434, ix. 228,
-      x. 318 _seq._;
-    and Eloians, ii. 434, 439.
-
-  _Pisatic_ sovereignty of Pelops, i. 157.
-
-  _Pisidia_, conquest of, by Alexander, xii. 99.
-
-  _Pissuthnes_, vi. 26, 28, ix. 8.
-
-  _Pitane_, iii. 190.
-
-  _Pittakus_, power and merit of, iii. 198 _seq._
-
-  _Plague at Athens_, vi. 154 _seq._;
-    revival of, vi. 293.
-
-  _Platæa_, and Thebes, disputes between, iv. 166;
-    and Athens, first connection of, iv. 165;
-    battle of, v. 164 _seq._;
-    revelation of the victory of, at Mykalê the same day, v. 194;
-    night-surprise of, by the Thebans, vi. 114 _seq._;
-    siege of, by Archidamus, vi. 188 _seq._;
-    surrender of, to the Lacedæmonians, vi. 264 _seq._;
-    restoration of, by Sparta, x. 30 _seq._;
-    capture of, by the Thebans, x. 159 _seq._
-
-  _Platæans_ at Marathon, iv. 248.
-
-  _Plato_, his treatment of mythes, i. 441;
-    on the return of the Hêrakleids, ii. 6;
-    on homicide, ii. 96 _n._;
-    his Republic and the Lykurgean institutions, ii. 390;
-    and the Sophists, viii. 345-399;
-    and Xenophon, evidence of, about Sokratês, viii. 403 _seq._,
-      444 _n._, 450 _n._;
-    his extension and improvement of the formal logic founded by
-      Sokratês, viii. 429;
-    purpose of his dialogues, viii. 453;
-    incorrect assertions in the Menexenus of, ix. 360 _n._;
-    the letters of, x. 435 _n._ 1;
-    and Dionysius the Elder, xi. 38, 60;
-    and Dion, xi. 39, 57 _seq._, 69, 84;
-    and Dionysius the Younger, xi. 52, 69-80;
-    Dion, and the Pythagoreans, xi. 56 _seq._;
-    statements and advice of, on the condition of Syracuse,
-      xi. 130 _seq._;
-    and the kings of Macedonia, xi. 206.
-
-  _Plausible fiction_, i. 435, ii. 51.
-
-  _Pleistoanax_, v. 349, 429 _seq._
-
-  _Plemmyrium_, vii. 270, 290 _seq._
-
-  _Plutarch_ and Lykurgus, ii. 337, 343, 403 _seq._;
-    on the ephor Epitadeus, ii. 405;
-    and Herodotus, iv. 202 _n._, v. 6 _n._ 2;
-    on Periklês, vi. 172.
-
-  _Plutarch of Eretria_, xi. 340 _seq._
-
-  _Plyntêria_, viii. 144.
-
-  _Podaleirus_ and Machaôn, i. 180.
-
-  _Podarkês_, birth of, i. 110.
-
-  _Poems_, lost epic, ii. 120;
-    epic, recited in public, not read in private, ii. 135.
-
-  _Poetry_, Greek, transition of, from the mythical past to the positive
-      present, i. 349;
-    epic, ii. 117 _seq._;
-    epic, Homeric and Hesiodic, ii. 118;
-    didactic and mystic hexameter, ii. 119;
-    lyric and choric, intended for the ear, ii. 137;
-    Greek, advances of, within a century and a half after Terpander,
-      iv. 77.
-
-  _Poets_ inspired by the Muse, i. 355;
-    iambic, elegiac, and lyric, predominance of the present in, i. 363;
-    and logographers, their treatment of mythes, i. 377 _seq._;
-    early, chronological evidence of, ii. 45 _seq._;
-    epic, and their probable dates, ii. 122;
-    cyclic, ii. 123 _seq._;
-    gnomic or moralizing, iv. 91 _seq._
-
-  _Polemarch_, Athenian, iii. 74.
-
-  _Polemarchs_, Spartan, ii. 459.
-
-  _Polemarchus_, viii. 248.
-
-  _Political clubs_ at Athens, viii. 15.
-
-  _Politicians_, new class of, at Athens, after Periklês, vi. 245 _seq._
-
-  _Pollis_, defeat of, by Chabrias, x. 130.
-
-  _Pollux_ and Castor, i. 171 _seq._
-
-  _Polyarchus_, xi. 154.
-
-  _Polybiades_, x. 68.
-
-  _Polybius_, his transformation of mythes to history, i. 412;
-    perplexing statement of, respecting the war between Sybaris and
-      Kroton, iv. 416;
-    the Greece of, xii. 318.
-
-  _Polychares_, and Euæphnus, ii. 426.
-
-  _Polydamas of Pharsalus_, x. 137 _seq._
-
-  _Polydamas the Macedonian_, xii. 197.
-
-  _Polydamidas_, at Mendê, vi. 440 _seq._
-
-  _Polykrates of Samos_, iv. 241 _seq._
-
-  _Polykrates the Sophist_, harangue of, on the accusation against
-      Sokratês, viii. 478 _n._
-
-  _Polynikes_, i. 267, 269 _seq._, 273, 280.
-
-  _Polyphron_, x. 248.
-
-  _Polysperchon_, appointed by Antipater as his successor, xii. 339;
-    plans of, xii. 340;
-    edict of, at Pella, xii. 343 _seq._;
-    Phokion and Agnonides heard before, xii. 351 _seq._;
-    and Kassander, xii. 360, 372, 382;
-    flight of, Ætalia, xii. 367.
-
-  _Polystratus_, one of the Four Hundred, viii. 68 _n._ 1, 69 _n._, 78,
-      88.
-
-  _Polyxena_, death of, i. 305.
-
-  _Polyzelus_ and Hiero, v. 228.
-
-  _Pompey_ in Colchis, i. 243.
-
-  _Pontic Greeks_, xii. 458 _seq._
-
-  _Pontic Herakleia_, xii. 460-471.
-
-  _Pontus_ and Gæa, children of, i. 7.
-
-  _Popular belief_ in ancient mythes, i. 424, 427.
-
-  _Porus_, xii. 227 _seq._
-
-  _Poseidôn_, i. 6, 9, 56;
-    prominence of, in Æolid legends, i. 110;
-    Erechtheus, i. 192, 193;
-    and Athênê, i. 195;
-    and Laomedôn, i. 285.
-
-  _Positive_ evidence indispensable to historical proof, i. 429.
-
-  _Positive_ tendencies of the Greek mind in the time of Herodotus,
-      iv. 105 _n._
-
-  _Post-Homeric_ poems on the Trojan war, i. 297.
-
-  _Potidæa_ and Artabazus, v. 149;
-    relations of, with Corinth and Athens, vi. 67;
-    designs of Perdikkas and the Corinthians upon, vi. 68;
-    revolt of, from Athens, vi. 69 _seq._;
-    Athenian victory near, vi. 73;
-    blockade of, by the Athenians, vi. 74, 140, 164, 182;
-    Brasidas’s attempt upon, vi. 150;
-    capture of, by Philip and the Olynthians, xi. 238.
-
-  _Prasiæ_, expedition of Pythodôrus to, vii. 285.
-
-  _Praxitas_, ix. 327 _n._ 1, 333 _seq._
-
-  _Priam_, i. 285, 292 _n._ 5, 304.
-
-  _Priene_, iii. 172, 178, vi. 26.
-
-  _Priests_, Egyptian, iii. 314.
-
-  _Primitive_ and historical Greece, ii. 57-118.
-
-  _Private property_, rights of, at Athens, viii. 304.
-
-  _Probability_ alone not sufficient for historical proof, i. 429.
-
-  _Pro-Bouleutic Senate_, Solon’s, iii. 121.
-
-  _Probûli_, board of, vii. 362.
-
-  _Prodikus_, viii. 370, 380 _seq._
-
-  _Prœtos_ and his daughters, i. 88 _seq._
-
-  _Proknê_, i. 197 _seq._
-
-  _Prokris_, i. 198.
-
-  _Promêtheus_, i. 6;
-    and Zeus, i. 63, 76, 79 _seq._;
-    and Pandora, i. 75;
-    and Epimêtheus, i. 75;
-    Æschylus’s, i. 382 _n._ 3.
-
-  _Property_, rights of, at Athens, iii. 106, 114 _seq._
-
-  _Prophecies_, Sibylline, i. 338.
-
-  _Propontis_, Phokion in, xi. 460.
-
-  _Propylæa_, building of, vi. 21, 23 _n._ 4.
-
-  _Prose writing_ among the Greeks, iv. 97.
-
-  _Protagoras_, viii. 376, 379 _seq._, 389 _seq._, 392 _n._
-
-  _Protesilaus_, i. 290, v. 201.
-
-  _Prothoüs_, x. 176.
-
-  _Proxenus of Tegea_, x. 209.
-
-  _Prytaneium_, Solon’s regulations about, iii. 143.
-
-  _Prytanes_, iv. 138.
-
-  _Prytanies_, iv. 138.
-
-  _Prytanis_, xii. 485.
-
-  _Psammenitus_, iv. 219.
-
-  _Psammetichus I._, iii. 325 _seq._
-
-  _Psammetichus_ and Tamos, x. 13.
-
-  _Psammis_, iii. 333.
-
-  _Psephism_, Demophantus’s democratical, viii. 81.
-
-  _Psephisms_ and laws, distinction between, v. 373.
-
-  _Psyttaleia_, Persian troops in, v. 128, 136.
-
-  _Ptolemy of Alôrus_, x. 249, 250;
-    and Pelopidas, x. 263;
-    assassination of, x. 300.
-
-  _Ptolemy of Egypt_, attack of Perdikkas on, xii. 335;
-    alliance of, with Kassander, Lysimachus and Seleukus against
-      Antigonus, xii. 367, 372, 383, 387;
-    proclamations of, to the Greeks, xii. 369;
-    Lysimachus and Kassander, pacification of, with Antigonus, xii. 371;
-    in Greece, xii. 373.
-
-  _Ptolemy, nephew of Antigonus_, xii. 370.
-
-  _Public speaking_, its early origin and intellectual effects,
-      ii. 77 _seq._
-
-  _Punjab_, Alexander’s conquests in the, xii. 227 _seq._
-
-  _Purification_ for homicide, i. 25, 26.
-
-  _Pydna_, siege of, by Archestratus, vi. 70;
-    siege of, by Archelaus, viii. 118;
-    and Philip, xi. 236, 237.
-
-  _Pylæ_, in Babylonia, ix. 36 _n._ 2., 43 _n._
-
-  _Pylagoræ_, ii. 247.
-
-  _Pylians_, ii. 12, 335.
-
-  _Pylus_, attack of Hêraklês on, i. 110;
-    long independence of, ii. 331 _n._ 2;
-    occupation and fortification of, by the Athenians, vi. 317 _seq._;
-    armistice concluded at, vi. 324, 332;
-    Kleon’s expedition to, vi. 365 _seq._;
-    cession of, demanded by the Lacedæmonians, vii. 29;
-    helots brought back to, by the Athenians, vii. 70;
-    recapture of, by the Lacedæmonians, viii. 131.
-
-  _Pyramids_, Egyptian, iii. 321.
-
-  _Pyrrha_ and Deukaliôn, i. 96.
-
-  _Pyrrho_ and Sokratês, viii. 489 _n._
-
-  _Pyrrhus, son of Achilles_, i. 188.
-
-  _Pyrrhus, king of Epirus_, and Antipater, son of Kassander, xii. 389.
-
-  _Pythagoras, the philosopher_, i. 367 _seq._, iv. 390-411, 416.
-
-  _Pythagoras, the Ephesian despot_, iii. 182.
-
-  _Pythagorean order_, iv. 395, 403 _seq._, 416.
-
-  _Pythagoreans_, logical distinction of genera and species unknown to,
-      viii. 427 _n._ 2;
-    Plato, and Dion, xi. 57 _seq._
-
-  _Pytheas_, xii. 457.
-
-  _Pythia_, the, at Delphi, and Philomelus, xi. 250.
-
-  _Pythian Apollo_, i. 47.
-
-  _Pythian games_, ii. 240, 243, iv. 58, 63 _seq._, iv. 65,
-      x. 137 _n._ 1, 195, xi. 428.
-
-  _Pythius, the Phrygian_, v. 27.
-
-  _Pythodôrus_, vii. 133, 139, 285.
-
-  _Python_, mission of, to Athens, xi. 446.
-
-  _Pythonikus_, vii. 175, 197.
-
-
-  Q
-
-  _Quadriremes_, x. 479.
-
-  _Quinqueremes_, v. 47 _n._ 2, x. 479.
-
-
-  R
-
-  _Races_ of men in “Works and Days”, i. 64 _seq._
-
-  _Religious_ ceremonies a source of mythes, i. 62, 63, 451 _seq._;
-    views paramount in the Homeric age, i. 357;
-    views, opposition of, to scientific, among the Greeks, i. 358,
-      370 _seq._;
-    festivals, Grecian, iv. 53, 67 _seq._, xi. 353;
-    associations, effect of, on early Grecian art, iv. 99.
-
-  _Reply_ to criticisms on the first two volumes of this history,
-      i. 408 _n._
-
-  _Rhadamanthus_ and Minôs, i. 219.
-
-  _Rhapsodes_, ii. 129, 137 _seq._
-
-  _Rhea_, i. 5, 6.
-
-  _Rhegians_ and Tarentines, expedition of, against the Iapygians,
-      v. 238.
-
-  _Rhegium_, iii. 383;
-    the chorus sent from Messênê to, iv. 53 _n._ 1;
-    and Athens, vii. 128 _n._ 3;
-    the Athenian fleet near, B. C. 425, vii. 134;
-    progress of the Athenian armament for Sicily to, vii. 181;
-    discouragement of the Athenians at, vii. 190;
-    relations of, with Dionysius, B. C. 399, x. 474 _seq._;
-    and Dionysius, xi. 5, 71, 11, 16 _seq._;
-    and Dionysius the Younger, xi. 133;
-    Timoleon at, xi. 144 _seq._
-
-  _Rhetoric_, v. 402, viii. 335, 339, 346 _seq._
-
-  _Rhetors_ and sophists, v. 402 _seq._
-
-  _Rhetra_, the primitive constitutional, ii. 344 _n._ 2, 345 _n._ 2.
-
-  _Rhetræ_, the Three Lykurgean, ii. 355 _n._ 3.
-
-  _Rhienus_ and the second Messenian war, ii. 430.
-
-  _Rhium_, Phormio in the Gulf at, vi. 196 _seq._
-
-  _Rhodes_, founder of, ii. 30;
-    dikasteries at, v. 384 _n._ 2;
-    and the Olympic games, vii. 52 _n._ 4;
-    the Peloponnesian fleet at, vii. 399, 400 _seq._, viii. 94, ix. 368,
-      373;
-    Dorieus at, viii. 116;
-    revolt of, from Sparta, ix. 271;
-    revolt of, from Athens, xi. 220 _seq._;
-    siege of, by Demetrius Poliorketes, xii. 381.
-
-  _Rhodians_ and the battle of Chæroneia, xi. 504.
-
-  _Rhodôpis_, iii. 337 _n._ 2.
-
-  _Rhœkus_ of Samos, iv. 100.
-
-  _Rhœsakes_, xii. 84.
-
-  _Rites_, post-Homeric, i. 27, 28;
-    ecstatic, i. 30 _seq._
-
-  _Rivers_, mythical personages identified with, i. 342 _n._ 2;
-    of Greece, ii. 217.
-
-  _Robbery_, violent, how regarded in Greece and Europe, ii. 111 _n._ 2.
-
-  _Romances_ of chivalry, i. 475, ii. 156 _n._ 2.
-
-  _Roman kings_, authority of, ii. 68 _n._ 3.
-
-  _Roman law_ of debtor and creditor, iii. 159 _seq._
-
-  _Romans_, respect of, for Illium, i. 327;
-    belief of, with regard to earthquakesi. 400 _n._;
-    dislike of, to paijudicial pleading, viii. 361 _n._ 2;
-    embassy from, to Alexander, xii. 248 _n._ 2;
-    Livy’s opinion as to the chances of Alexander, if he had attacked
-      the, xii. 260.
-
-  _Rome_, reduction of the rate of interest at, iii. 112 _n._ 1;
-    debasement of coin at, iii. 114;
-    new tables at, iii. 115 _n._ 2;
-    law of debtor and creditor at, iii. 159 _seq._;
-    political associations at, viii, 16 _n._ 2;
-    and Carthage, treaties between, x. 392 _n._
-
-  _Roxana_, xii. 214, 215, 319, 333, 367, 371.
-
-
-  S.
-
-  _Sacred games_, Solon’s rewards to victors at, iii. 141;
-    objects, Greek view of material connection with, iii. 84 _n._ 1.,
-      260.
-
-  _Sacred War_, the first, iv. 63 _seq._, v. 346;
-    the second, xi. 241 _seq._, 374, 421 _seq._;
-    position of Philip after the second, xi. 434;
-    the third, xi. 467.
-
-  _Sacrifices_, i. 62;
-    human, in Greece, i. 126 _seq._
-
-  _Sacrilege_, French legislation upon, vii. 212 _n._
-
-  _Sadyattês_, iii. 253.
-
-  _Saga_, the, Ampère on, i. 357 _n._
-
-  _Sage_, a universal manifestation of the human mind, i. 461.
-
-  _Sagen-poesie_, applied as a standard to the Iliad and Odyssey,
-      ii. 162.
-
-  _Sagra_, date of the battle at, iv. 411 _n._ 2.
-
-  _Saints_, legends of, i. 469 _seq._
-
-  _Sakadas_, iv. 89.
-
-  _Salæthus_, vi. 237 _seq._
-
-  _Salamis_, the serpent of, i. 186;
-    war between Athens and Megara about, iii. 98 _seq._;
-    retreat of the Greek fleet from Artemisium to, v. 102, 107;
-    the battle of, v. 104-147;
-    Persian and Greek fleets after the battle of, v. 147;
-    migration of Athenians to, on Mardonius’s approach, v. 154;
-    seizure of prisoners at, by the Thirty Tyrants at Athens, viii. 267.
-
-  _Salamis in Cyprus_, i. 189, x. 14 _seq._
-
-  _Salmoneus_, i. 108.
-
-  _Samian exiles_, application of, to Sparta, iv. 242;
-    attack of, on Siphnos, iv. 244;
-    at Zanklê, v. 211.
-
-  _Samians_ and Athenians, contrast between, iv. 247;
-    slaughter of, by Otanês, iv. 249;
-    at Ladê, iv. 304;
-    migration of, to Sicily, iv. 305;
-    transfer of the fund of the confederacy from Delos to Athens
-      proposed by, v. 343;
-    application of, to Sparta for aid against Athens, vi. 29.
-
-  _Samnites_, xi. 8.
-
-  _Samos_, foundation of, iii. 173;
-    condition of, on the accession of Darius Hystaspês, iv. 240;
-    Lacedæmonians and Polykratês at, iv. 243;
-    Persian armament under Datis at, iv. 329;
-    Persian fleet at, after the battle of Salamis, v. 147, 192;
-    Greek fleet moves to the rescue of, from the Persians, v. 192;
-    an autonomous ally of Athens, vi. 2;
-    revolt of, from the Athenians, vi. 25 _seq._, 29;
-    and Milêtus, dispute between, about Priênê, vi. 26;
-    Athenian armament against, under Periklês, Sophoklês, etc.,
-      vi. 27 _seq._;
-    blockaded, vi. 28;
-    government of, after its capture by Periklês, vi. 30;
-    democratical revolution at, vii. 377 _seq._;
-    powerful Athenian fleet at, B. C. 412, vii. 386;
-    oligarchical conspiracy at, viii. 7 _seq._, 25 _seq._;
-    embassy from the Four Hundred to, viii. 44, 52 _seq._, 55;
-    Athenian democracy reconstituted at, viii. 46 _seq._;
-    the Athenian democracy at, and Alkibiadês, viii. 49 _seq._;
-    eagerness of the Athenian democracy at, to sail to Peiræus,
-      viii. 52, 54;
-    envoys from Argosto the Athenian Demos at, viii. 57;
-    Athenian democracy at, contrasted with the oligarchy of the Four
-      Hundred, viii. 92 _seq._;
-    Strombichidês’s arrival at, from the Hellespont, viii. 96;
-    Alkibiadês’s return from Aspendus to, viii. 115;
-    Alkibiadês sails from, to the Hellespont, viii. 116;
-    Alkibiadês at, B. C. 407, viii. 155;
-    Alkibiadês leaves Antiochus in command at, viii. 153;
-    dissatisfaction of the armament at, with Alkibiadês, viii. 154;
-    Konon at, viii. 160;
-    Lysander at, viii. 223, 237;
-    conquest of, by Timotheus, x. 294, 297 _n._ 2.
-
-  _Samothracians_, exploit of, at Salamis, v. 135.
-
-  _Sangala_, capture of, by Alexander, xii. 231.
-
-  _Sapphô_, i. 363, iv. 90 _seq._
-
-  _Sardinia_, proposition of Bias for a Pan-Ionic emigration to, iv. 207.
-
-  _Sardis_, iii. 220;
-    capture of, by Cyrus, iv. 192;
-    march of Aristagoras to, and burning of, iv. 290;
-    march of Xerxes to, and collection of his forces at, v. 14;
-    march of Xerxes from, v. 27;
-    retirement of the Persian army to, after their defeat at Mykalê,
-      v. 198
-    Alkibiadês’s imprisonment at, and escape from, viii. 119, 120;
-    forces of Cyrus the Younger collected at, ix. 8;
-    march of Cyrus the Younger from, to Kunaxa, ix. 11 _seq._;
-    victory of Agesilaus near, ix. 267;
-    surrender of, to Alexander, xii. 89.
-
-  _Sarissa_, xii. 57, 101 _seq._
-
-  _Sarmatians_, iii. 243.
-
-  _Sarpêdôn_, i. 219.
-
-  _Sataspes_, iii. 285, 288 _n._
-
-  _Satrapies_ of Darius Hystaspes, iv. 235 _seq._
-
-  _Satraps_ under Darius Hystaspes, discontents of, iv. 226 _seq._;
-    of Alexander, xii. 239 _seq._
-
-  _Satyrus of Herakleia_, xii. 564.
-
-  _Satyrus I._ of Bosporus, xi. 264 _n._ 1, xii. 481.
-
-  _Satyrus the actor_, xi. 270, 364.
-
-  _Satyrus II._ of Bosporus, xii. 484.
-
-  _Saxo Grammaticus_ and Snorro Sturleson contrasted with Pherekydes and
-      Hellanikus, i. 468.
-
-  _Scales_ Æginæan and Euboic, ii. 319 _seq._, 325;
-    Æginæan, Euboic and Attic, iii. 171.
-
-  _Scandinavian_ mythical genealogies, i. 465 _n._ 3;
-    and Teutonic epic, i. 479 _seq._
-
-  _Scardus_, ii. 212.
-
-  _Science_, physical, commencement of, among the Greeks, i. 367.
-
-  _Scientific_ views, opposition of, to religions, among the Greeks,
-      i. 359-370 _seq._
-
-  _Scission_ between the superior men and the multitude among the Greeks,
-      i. 375.
-
-  _Sculpture_ at Athens, under Periklês, vi. 22.
-
-  _Scurrility_ at festivals, iv. 80 _n._ 2.
-
-  _Scylla_, i. 1, 221.
-
-  _Scythia_, iii. 235;
-    Darius’s invasion of, iv. 263 _seq._
-
-  _Scythians_, iii. 233 _seq._, xii. 475;
-    invasion of Asia Minor and Upper Asia by, iii. 245 _seq._;
-    strong impression produced by, upon Herodotus’s imagination, iv. 268;
-    attack of Philip on, xi. 462;
-    and Alexander, xii. 206, 214.
-
-  _Secession_ of the mythical races of Greece, ii. 19.
-
-  _Seisachtheia_, or debtors’ relief-law of Solon, iii. 99 _seq._
-
-  _Selene_, i. 6, 346 _n._
-
-  _Seleukus_, alliance of, with Kassander, Lysimachus, and Ptolemy
-      against Antigonus, xii. 367, 372, 383, 387;
-    Kassander, Lysimachus, and Ptolemy, pacification of, with Antigonus,
-      xii. 371;
-    and the Pontic Hêrakleia, xii. 470;
-    death of, xii. 470.
-
-  _Selinuntines_, defeat of, by the Egestæans and Carthaginians, x. 404.
-
-  _Selinus_, iii. 367;
-    and Egesta, vii. 145, x. 401, 404;
-    application of, to Syracuse, x. 404;
-    capture of, by Hannibal, x. 405 _seq._;
-    abandonment of, by the rest of Sicily, x. 408;
-    Hermokrates at, x. 417.
-
-  _Selli_, ii. 268.
-
-  _Selymbria_, viii. 126, 133, xi. 455 _n._ 3.
-
-  _Selymbris_, iv. 27.
-
-  _Semele_, i. 259.
-
-  _Semi-historical_ interpretation of ancient mythes, i. 433.
-
-  _Senate_ and Agora subordinate in legendary, paramount in historical
-      Greece, ii. 76;
-    Spartan, ii. 345, 357;
-    of Areopagus, iii. 73;
-    powers of, enlarged by Solon, iii. 122;
-    of Four Hundred, Solon’s, iii. 121;
-    of Five Hundred, iv. 137;
-    at Athens, expulsion of, by the Four Hundred, viii. 39.
-
-  _Senators_, addition to the oath of Athenian, viii. 298.
-
-  _Sentiment_, mingled ethical and mythical, in “Works and Days”,
-      i. 69 _seq._
-
-  _Sepias Akte_, Xerxes’s fleet at, v. 83 _seq._
-
-  _Servitude_, temporary, of the gods, i. 57, 113 _n._ 2.
-
-  _Sestos_, capture of, B. C. 479, v. 202 _seq._;
-    escape of the Athenian squadron from, to Elæus, viii. 105;
-    Derkyllidas at, ix. 320;
-    capture of, by Kotys, x. 373;
-    surrender of, to Athens, B. C. 358, x. 379 _n._;
-    conquest of, by Chares, xi. 257.
-
-  _Seuthes_, and the Ten Thousand Greeks, ix. 154, 169 _seq._
-
-  _Seven chiefs_ against Thebes, the, i. 274.
-
-  _Seven wise men_ of Greece, iv. 95 _seq._
-
-  _Sibyl_, the Erythræan, i. 28.
-
-  _Sibylline_ prophecies, i. 28, 338.
-
-  _Sicilian_ Greeks, prosperity of, between B. C. 735 and 485,
-      iii. 367 _seq._;
-    Greeks, peculiarity of their monetary and statical scale, iii. 369;
-    comedy, iii. 373;
-    Greeks, early governments of, v. 206;
-    Greeks, and Phenicians, v. 207;
-    cities, B. C. 431, vii. 127, 131;
-    and Italian Dorians, aid expected from, by Sparta, vii. 129;
-    cities, general peace between, B. C. 424, vii. 138;
-    aid to Syracuse, B. C. 413, vii. 295.
-
-  _Sicily_, Phenicians and Greeks in, iii. 276;
-    ante-Hellenic population of, iii. 350, 361, 372;
-    and Italy, early languages and history of, iii. 354 _n._;
-    and Italy, date of earliest Grecian colony in, iii. 356;
-    rapid multiplication of Grecian colonies in, after B. C. 735,
-      iii. 360;
-    the voyage from Greece to, iii. 361;
-    spot where the Greeks first landed in, iii. 361;
-    Megarian, iii. 365;
-    subcolonies from, iii. 366;
-    Sikel or Sikan caverns in, iii. 368 _n._;
-    mixed population of, iii. 369;
-    difference between Greeks in, and those in Greece Proper,
-      iii. 372;
-    despots in, about B. C. 500, v. 204;
-    Carthaginian invasion of, B. C. 480, v. 220;
-    expulsion of despots from, B. C. 465, v. 233;
-    after the expulsion of the despots, B. C. 465, v. 234, 236 _seq._,
-      vii. 118;
-    return of Duketius to, vii. 122;
-    intellectual movement in, between B. C. 461-416, vii. 127;
-    relations of, to Athens and Sparta, altered by the quarrel between
-      Corinth and Korkyra, vii. 129;
-    Dorians attack the Ionians in, about B. C. 427, vii. 131;
-    Ionic cities in, solicit aid from Athens, against the Dorians,
-      B. C. 427, vii. 132;
-    Athenian expedition to, B. C. 427, vii. 133;
-    Athenian expedition to, B. C. 425, vii. 133;
-    Athenian expedition to, B. C. 422, vii. 142;
-    Athenian expedition to, B. C. 415, vii. 148-162, 179-191, 217-278;
-    Athenian expedition to, B. C. 413, vii. 279-287, 288-353;
-    effect of the Athenian disaster in, upon all Greeks, vii. 363;
-    intervention of Carthage in, B. C. 410, x. 401 _seq._;
-    invasion of, by Hannibal, B. C. 409, x. 405 _seq._;
-    abandonment of Selinus by the Hellenic cities of, B. C. 409, x. 408;
-    Hannibal’s return from, B. C. 409, x. 415;
-    return of Hermokrates to, x. 415;
-    invasion of, by Hannibal and Imilkon, x. 422 _seq._;
-    southern, depressed condition of, B. C. 405, x. 457;
-    expedition of Dionysius against the Carthaginians in, x. 483 _seq._;
-    frequency of pestilence among the Carthaginians in, xi. 1;
-    Dionysius’s conquests in the interior of, B. C. 394, xi. 4;
-    condition of, B. C. 353-344, xi. 130;
-    voyage of Timoleon to, xi. 143 _seq._;
-    invasion of, by the Carthaginians, B. C. 340, xi. 170;
-    Timoleon in, xi. 170-195;
-    expedition to, under Giskon, xi. 180;
-    Agathokles in, xii. 439 _seq._;
-    ceases to be under Hellenic agency after Agathokles, xii. 451.
-
-  _Sidon_, iii. 265;
-    conquest of, by Darius Nothus, xi. 438;
-    surrender of, to Alexander, xii. 130.
-
-  _Sidus_, capture of, by the Lacedæmonians, ix. 335;
-    recovery of, by Iphikrates, ix. 353.
-
-  _Siege of Troy_, i. 284-306.
-
-  _Sigeium_, Mitylenæan at, i. 339;
-    and Peisistratus, iv. 117.
-
-  _Sikans_, iii. 349, 351 _n._ 3, 369.
-
-  _Sikel_ prince, Duketius, iii. 374.
-
-  _Sikels_, iii. 349;
-    in Italy, iii. 351, 375;
-    migration of, from Italy to Sicily, iii. 353 _n._ 2;
-    in Sicily, iii. 367, x. 494, xi. 5, 6.
-
-  _Sikinnus_, v. 126, 140, 313 _n._ 2.
-
-  _Sikyôn_, origin of, i. 120 _seq._;
-    early condition of, iii. 4;
-    despots at, iii. 32 _seq._, 38;
-    classes of people at, iii. 35;
-    names of Dorion and non-Dorion tribes at, iii. 34, 37;
-    Corinth, and Megara, analogy of, iii. 47;
-    Athenian attacks upon, v. 332;
-    Spartan and Argeian expedition against, vii. 97;
-    desertion of, from Sparta to Thebes, x. 257;
-    intestine dissensions at, B. C. 367-366, x. 269 _seq._;
-    Euphron at, x. 269 _seq._, 272, 273.
-
-  _Silanus the prophet_, ix. 40, 133 _seq._
-
-  _Silphium_, iv. 33.
-
-  _Silver race_, the, i. 65.
-
-  _Simon_, i. 304.
-
-  _Simonidês of Keôs_, epigram of, on the battle of Thermopylæ, v. 104;
-    mediation of, between Hiero and Thero, v. 227.
-
-  _Simonidês of Amorgus_, poetry of, i. 463, iv. 73, 82.
-
-  _Sinôpe_ and the Amazons, i. 212 _n._ 3;
-    date of the foundation of, iii. 249 _n._ 3;
-    Perikles’s expedition to, vi. 10;
-    and the Ten Thousand Greeks, ix. 129 _seq._, 144;
-    long independence of, xii. 459;
-    envoys from with Darius, xii. 459.
-
-  _Siphnus_, iii. 166;
-    attack of Samian exiles on, iv. 244.
-
-  _Sirens_, the, i. 1.
-
-  _Siris_, or Herakleia, iii. 384.
-
-  _Sisygambis_, xii. 124, 164, 171.
-
-  _Sisyphus_, i. 118 _seq._
-
-  _Sitalkes_, vi. 141, 215 _seq._
-
-  _Sithonia_, iv. 24, 25.
-
-  _Sittake_, the Ten Thousand Greeks at, ix. 65.
-
-  _Skalds_, Icelandic, songs of, ii. 150 _n._ 2, ii. 157 _n._
-
-  _Skedasus_, x. 178.
-
-  _Skepsis_, Derkyllidas at, ix. 213.
-
-  _Skillus_, Xenophon at, ix. 176 _seq._
-
-  _Skiône_, revolt of, from Athens to Brasidas, vi. 435 _seq._;
-    dispute about, after the One year’s truce between Athens and Sparta,
-      vi. 437;
-    blockade of, by the Athenians, B. C. 423, vi. 442;
-    capture of, by the Athenians, B. C. 421, vii. 22.
-
-  _Skiritæ_, vii. 80, 84, x. 233.
-
-  _Skylax_, iv. 237, 283, x. 227 _n._ 6.
-
-  _Skyllêtium_, iii. 384.
-
-  _Skyros_, conquest of, by Kimon, v. 303.
-
-  _Skytalism_ at Argos, x. 200 _seq._
-
-  _Skythês_ of Zanklê, v. 211 _seq._
-
-  _Skythini_, and the Ten Thousand Greeks, ix. 110.
-
-  _Slavery_ of debtors in Attica before Solon, iii. 94.
-
-  _Slaves_ in legendary Greece, ii. 97 _seq._
-
-  _Smerdis_, iv. 221 _seq._
-
-  _Sminthian Apollo_, i. 50, 337.
-
-  _Smyrna_, iii. 182, 189.
-
-  _Social War_, xi. 220, 231.
-
-  _Socratic philosophers_, their unjust condemnation of rhapsodes,
-      ii. 139.
-
-  _Socratici viri_, viii. 403 _n._
-
-  _Sogdian rock_, capture of, by Alexander, xii. 214.
-
-  _Sogdiana_, Alexander in, xii. 202 _seq._, 207.
-
-  _Sôkratês_, his treatment of the discrepancy between scientific and
-      religious views, i. 370;
-    treatment of, by the Athenians, i. 374 _seq._;
-    alleged impiety of, attacked by Aristophanês, i. 401 _n._;
-    and the sophists, v. 404, vii. 35 _n._ 2; viii. 387 _n._, 400,
-      441 _n._;
-    at the battle of Delium, vi. 396;
-    and Alkibiadês, vii. 35 _seq._;
-    and Kritias, vii. 35 _seq._;
-    at the Athenian assembly, on the generals at Arginusæ, vii. 200;
-    and the Thirty, viii. 244, 257;
-    and Parmenidês, viii. 346 _n._;
-    dislike of, to teaching for pay, viii. 342;
-    life, character, philosophy, teaching, and death of, viii. 400-496.
-
-  _Solemnities_ and games, i. 106.
-
-  _Soli_ in Cyprus, iii. 148.
-
-  _Sollium_, Athenian capture of, vi. 135.
-
-  _Soloeis_, Cape, iii. 272 _n._ 2.
-
-  _Solon_ and the Iliad, ii. 152 _n._ 2;
-    civil condition of Attica before, iii. 48;
-    life, character, laws, and constitution of, iii. 88-159.
-
-  _Sophokles_, his Œdipus, i. 270;
-    his treatment of mythes, i. 379 _seq._, 385;
-    Periklês, etc., Athenian armament under, against Samos,
-      vi. 27 _seq._;
-    number of tragedies by, viii. 319 _n._;
-    Æschylus and Euripidês, viii. 332;
-    and Herodotus, viii. 323 _n._ 2.
-
-  _Sophokles_ and Eurymedon, expeditions of, to Sicily and Korkyra,
-      vi. 313 _seq._, 357 _seq._, vii. 133, 136, 139.
-
-  _Sôsis_, xi. 104.
-
-  _Sosistratus_, xii. 394, 388, 405.
-
-  _Sothiac period_ and Manetho, iii. 340 _seq._
-
-  _Sparta_ and Mykênæ, i. 165 _seq._;
-    occupation of, by the Dorians, ii. 311, 326 _seq._, 360;
-    and the disunion of Greek towns, ii. 259;
-    not strictly a city, ii. 261;
-    inferior to Argos and neighboring Dorians, B. C. 776, ii. 307, 312;
-    first historical view of, ii. 323;
-    not the perfect Dorian type, ii. 341;
-    pair of kings at, ii. 349;
-    classification of the population at, ii. 348 _seq._;
-    syssitia and public training at, ii. 380 _seq._;
-    partition of lands at, ascribed to Lykurgus, ii. 393-415;
-    progressive increase of, ii. 417;
-    and Lepreum, ii. 440;
-    Argos, and Arcadia, relations of, ii. 443 _n._ 2;
-    and Mantinea, ii. 444;
-    and Arcadia, ii. 445 _seq._;
-    and Tegea, ii. 446 _seq._;
-    bones of Orestês taken to, ii. 447;
-    acquisitions of, towards Argos, ii. 450 _seq._;
-    extensive possessions and power of by, B. C. 540, ii. 453 _seq._;
-    military institutions of, ii. 456 _seq._;
-    recognized superiority of, ii. 461, iv. 242, 318;
-    peculiar government of, iii. 6;
-    alleged intervention of, with the Nemean and Isthmian games,
-      iv. 66 _n._;
-    exclusive character of her festivals, iv. 69;
-    musical and poetical tendencies at, iv. 83 _seq._, 86 _n._ 1;
-    choric training at, iv. 84 _seq._;
-    first appearance of, as head of Peloponnesian allies, iv. 169,
-      174 _seq._;
-    preparations at, for attacking Athens, after the failure of
-      Kleomenês, iv. 173 _seq._;
-    and Crœsus, iv. 190;
-    and Asiatic Greeks, iv. 199, iv. 207, 208;
-    and Samian exiles, iv. 242;
-    and Aristagoras, iv. 287 _seq._;
-    treatment of Darius’s herald at, iv. 317;
-    appeal of Athenians to, against the Medism of Ægina, iv. 318;
-    war of, against Argos, B. C. 496-5, iv. 320 _seq._;
-    no heralds sent from Xerxes to, v. 57;
-    Pan-Hellenic congress convened by, at the Isthmus of Corinth,
-      v. 57 _seq._;
-    leaves Athens undefended against Mardonius, v. 153 _seq._;
-    headship of the allied Greeks transferred from, to Athens,
-      v. 261 _seq._;
-    and Athens, first open separation between, v. 263, 265 _seq._, 290;
-    secret promise of, to the Thasians, to invade Attica, v. 312;
-    restores the supremacy of Thebes in Bœotia, v. 313, 331;
-    and the rest of Peloponnesus, between B. C. 477-457, v. 314;
-    earthquake and revolt of Helots at, B. C. 464, v. 315 _seq._;
-    Athenian auxiliaries to, against the Helots, v. 316 _seq._;
-    Athenians renounce the alliance of, B. C. 464, v. 319;
-    and Athens, five years’ truce between, v. 334;
-    and Delphi, B. C. 452-447, v. 346;
-    and Athens, thirty years’ truce between, v. 350;
-    application of Samians to, vi. 29;
-    imperial, compared with imperial Athens, vi. 39, ix. 187 _seq._;
-    and her subject-allies, vi. 41;
-    and Athens, confederacies of, vi. 46;
-    promise of, to the Potidæans, to invade Attica, vi. 69;
-    application of the Lesbians to, vi. 76;
-    assembly at, before the Peloponnesian war, vi. 78 _seq._;
-    relations of, with her allies, vi. 79;
-    congress of allies at, B. C. 432, vi. 92 _seq._;
-    requisitions addressed to Athens by, B. C. 431, vi. 97 _seq._,
-      105 _seq._;
-    efforts of, to raise a naval force on commencing the Peloponnesian
-      war, vi. 125;
-    and the Mitylenæans, vi. 226 _seq._;
-    despatches from Artaxerxes to, vi. 360 _seq._;
-    and Athens one year’s truce between, B. C. 423, vi. 437 _seq._, 453,
-      457 _seq._;
-    and the Peace of Nikias, vii. 2, 9;
-    and Argos, uncertain relations between, B. C. 421, vii. 3;
-    and Athens, alliance between, B. C. 421, vii. 5;
-    revolt of Elis from, vii. 17 _seq._;
-    congress at, B. C. 421, vii. 24;
-    and Bœotia, alliance between, B. C. 420, vii. 26;
-    and Argos, fifty years’ peace between, vii. 28 _seq._;
-    embassy of Nikias to, vii. 44;
-    and Athens, relations between, B. C. 419, vii. 70;
-    and the battle of Mantinea, B. C. 418, vii. 86;
-    and Argos, peace and alliance between, B. C. 418, vii. 92 _seq._;
-    submission of Mantinea to, vii. 95;
-    and Athens, relations between, B. C. 416, vii. 103;
-    and Sicily, relations of, altered by the quarrel between Corinth and
-      Korkyra, vii. 129;
-    aid expected from the Sicilian Dorians by, B. C. 431, vii. 130;
-    embassy from Syracuse and Corinth to, B. C. 415, vii. 235 _seq._;
-    Alkibiadês at, vii. 236 _seq._, viii. 2;
-    and Athens, violation of the peace between, B. C. 414, vii. 285;
-    resolution of, to fortify Dekeleia and send a force to Syracuse,
-      B. C. 414, vii. 286;
-    application from Chios to, vii. 365;
-    embassy from Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus to, vii. 366;
-    embassy from the Four Hundred to, viii. 63, 84;
-    proposals of peace from, to Athens, B. C. 410, viii. 122 _seq._;
-    alleged proposals of peace from, to Athens, after the battle of
-      Argenusæ, viii. 210;
-    first proposals of Athens to, after the battle of Ægospotami,
-      viii. 226;
-    embassies of Theramenês to, viii. 227, 228;
-    assembly of the Peloponnesian confederacy at, B. C. 404, viii. 228;
-    terms of peace granted to Athens by, B. C. 404, viii. 229;
-    triumphant return of Lysander to, viii. 238;
-    and her allies, after the capture of Athens by Lysander, viii. 259;
-    oppressive dominion of after the capture of Athens by Lysander,
-      viii. 260;
-    opposition to Lysander at, viii. 262;
-    pacification by, between the Ten at Athens and the exiles at Peiræus,
-      viii. 278;
-    empire of, contrasted with her promises of liberty, ix. 191 _seq._;
-    change in the language and plans of, towards the close of the
-      Peloponnesian war, ix. 194;
-    and the Thirty at Athens, ix. 197;
-    opportunity lost by, for organizing a stable confederacy throughout
-      Greece, ix. 199 _seq._;
-    alienation of the allies of, after the battle of Ægospotami,
-      ix. 223 _seq._;
-    and Elis, war between, ix. 225 _seq._;
-    refuses to restore the Olympic presidency to the Pisatans, ix. 229;
-    expels the Messenians from Peloponnesus, ix. 229;
-    introduction of gold and silver to, by Lysander, ix. 230 _seq._;
-    in B. C. 432 and after B. C. 404, contrast between, ix. 232;
-    position of kings at, ix. 238 _seq._;
-    conspiracy of Kinadon at, ix. 247 _seq._;
-    Persian preparations for maritime war against, B. C. 397, ix. 255,
-      270;
-    revolt of Rhodes from, ix. 271;
-    relations of, with her neighbors and allies, after the accession of
-      Agesilaus, ix. 284;
-    and Hêrakleia Trachynia, ix. 285, 302;
-    and Timokrates, ix. 286 _seq._;
-    and Thebes, war between, B. C. 395, ix. 289 _seq._;
-    alliance of Thebes, Athens, Corinth, and Argos against, ix. 301;
-    proceedings of, against Thebes, Athens, Corinth, and Argos, ix. 303,
-      305 _seq._;
-    consequences of the battles of Corinth, Knidus, and Korôneia to,
-      ix. 317 _seq._;
-    hostility of, to partial land confederacies in Greece, ix. 361;
-    congress at, on the peace of Antalkidas, ix. 386;
-    and the peace of Antalkidas, x. 2 _seq._, 9 _seq._, 28;
-    applications of, for Persian aid, x. 5 _seq._;
-    and Persia after the battle of Ægospotami, x. 8;
-    and Grecian autonomy, x. 11 _seq._, 28;
-    miso-Theban proceedings of, after the peace of Antalkidas,
-      x. 28 _seq._;
-    restores Platæa, x. 30 _seq._;
-    oppressive conduct of towards Mantinea, B. C. 386, x. 35 _seq._;
-    mischievous influence of, after the peace of Antalkidas,
-      x. 40 _seq._;
-    naval competition of Athens with, after the peace of Antalkidas,
-      x. 42 _seq._;
-    and the Olynthian confederacy, x. 52 _seq._, 57, 65 _seq._;
-    and the surprise of Thebes by Phœbidas, x. 61 _seq._;
-    and Phlius, x. 70;
-    ascendency and unpopularity of, B. C. 379, x. 72 _seq._;
-    Xenophon on the conduct of, between B. C. 387-379, x. 77;
-    effect of the revolution at Thebes, B. C. 379, on, x. 93;
-    trial of Sphodrias at, x. 100 _seq._;
-    war declared by Athens against, B. C. 378, x. 102;
-    separate peace of Athens with, B. C. 374, x. 137, 141;
-    and Polydamas, x. 137 _seq._;
-    decline of the power of, between B. C. 382-374, x. 140;
-    discouragement of, by her defeat at Korkyra and by earthquakes,
-      B. C. 372, x. 157;
-    disposition of Athens to peace with, B. C. 372, x. 158, 165;
-    general peace settled at, B. C. 371, x. 165 _seq._, 174, 198;
-    effect of the news of the defeat at Leuktra on, x. 186;
-    and Athens, difference between in passive endurance and active
-      energy, x. 188;
-    reinforcements from, after the battle of Leuktra, x. 188;
-    treatment of defeated citizens on their return from Leuktra,
-      x. 192 _seq._;
-    and Thebes, alleged arbitration of the Achæans between, after the
-      battle of Leuktra, x. 199 _n._;
-    position of, after the battle of Leuktra, x. 201;
-    and the Amphiktyonic assembly, x. 202 _seq._, xi. 242;
-    feeling against Agesilaus at, B. C. 371, x. 207;
-    hostile approaches of Epaminondas to, x. 218 _seq._, 330 _seq._;
-    abstraction of Western Laconia from, x. 226 _seq._;
-    application of, to Athens for aid against Thebes, B. C. 369,
-      x. 234 _seq._;
-    and Athens, alliance between, B. C. 369, x. 253;
-    reinforcement from Syracuse in aid of, x. 258;
-    peace of her allies with Thebes, x. 290 _seq._;
-    alliance of Elis and Achaia with, B. C. 365, x. 313;
-    and Dionysius, x. 457, 505, xi. 22;
-    degradation of, B. C. 360-359, xi. 197 _seq._;
-    countenance of the Phokians by, B. C. 353, xi. 262;
-    plans of, against Megalopolis and Messênê, B. C. 353, ix. 263, 290;
-    decline in military readiness among the Peloponnesian allies of,
-      after the Peloponnesian war, xi. 280;
-    ineffectual campaign of, against Megalopolis, xi. 299 _seq._;
-    envoys from, to Philip, xi. 405, 409;
-    envoys from, with Darius, xii. 189;
-    anti-Macedonian policy of, after Alexander’s death, xii. 281 _seq._
-
-  _Spartan_ kings, ii. 11, 76, 353 _seq._;
-    senate, assembly, and ephors, ii. 349 _seq._;
-    popular assembly, ii. 357;
-    constitution, ii. 359 _seq._;
-    government, secrecy of, ii. 378;
-    discipline, ii. 381 _seq._;
-    women, ii. 383 _seq._;
-    law and practice of succession, erroneous suppositions about,
-      ii. 409 _seq._;
-    arbitration of the dispute between Athens and Megan about Salamis,
-      iii. 92;
-    expeditions against Hippias, iv. 122;
-    empire, commencement of, ix. 181, 184 _seq._, 188 _seq._;
-    empire, Theopompus on, ix. 195 _n._;
-    allies at the battle of Leuktra, x. 182.
-
-  _Spartans_, and Pheidôn, ii. 318;
-    and Messenians, early proceedings of, ii. 329;
-    local distinctions among, ii. 361;
-    the class of, ii. 361 _seq._;
-    and Helots, ii. 373 _seq._;
-    marriage among, ii. 385; their ignorance of letters, ii. 390 _n._ 3;
-    musical susceptibilities of, ii. 433;
-    and the second Messenian war, ii. 434, 437;
-    careful training of, when other states had none, ii. 455;
-    and the battle of Marathon, iv. 342, 358;
-    unwillingness of, to postpone or neglect festivals, v. 77;
-    at Platæa, v. 157, 166 _seq._;
-    and the continental Ionians after the battle of Mykalê, v. 193;
-    and the fortification of Athens, v. 243 _seq._;
-    favorable answer of the oracle at Delphi to, on war with Athens,
-      B. C. 432, vi. 91;
-    final answer of the Athenians to, before the Peloponnesian war,
-      vi. 106;
-    their desire for peace, to regain the captives from Sphakteria,
-      vi. 428 _seq._;
-    and Thebans, at the battle of Korôneia, ix. 317;
-    project of, for the rescue of the Asiatic Greeks, x. 44;
-    miso-Theban impulse of, B. C. 371, x. 175;
-    confidence and defeat of, at Leuktra, x. 179 _seq._;
-    retirement of, from Bœotia after the battle of Leuktra, x. 190;
-    refusal of, to acknowledge the independence of Messênê, x. 290, 350;
-    and Dion, xi. 61.
-
-  _Sparti_, i. 259, 261.
-
-  _Spartokidæ_, xii. 479 _seq._
-
-  _Speaking_, public, its early origin and intellectual effects,
-      ii. 77 _seq._
-
-  _Sperthiês_ and Bulis, vi. 182 _n._
-
-  _Speusippus_, indictment of, by Leogoras, vii. 206 _n._ 3.
-
-  _Sphakteria_, locality of, vi. 314;
-    occupation of, by the Lacedæmonians, vi. 320, 346;
-    blockade of Lacedæmonians in, vi. 324, 332 _seq._;
-    Lacedæmonian embassy to Athens for the release of the prisoners in,
-      vi. 324 _seq._;
-    Demosthenês’s application for reinforcements to attack,
-      vi. 334 _seq._;
-    condition of, on the attack by Demosthenês and Kleon, vi. 340;
-    victory of Demosthenês and Kleon over Lacedæmonians in,
-      vi. 341 _seq._;
-    surrender of Lacedæmonians in, vi. 345 _seq._;
-    arrival of prisoners from, at Athens, vi. 351;
-    restoration of prisoners taken at, vii. 6 _seq._;
-    disfranchisement of restored prisoners from, vii. 22.
-
-  _Sphendaleis_, Attic deme of, v. 158 _n._ 2.
-
-  _Sphinx_, the, i. 7, 266.
-
-  _Spodrias_, attempt of, to surprise Peiræus, x. 98 _seq._
-
-  _Spitamenes_, xii. 207, 213, 214.
-
-  _Spithridates_, and the Lacedæmonians, ix. 260, 274 _seq._
-
-  _Stables_, the Augean, i. 139.
-
-  _Stageira_, iv. 25.
-
-  _Standard_ of historical evidence raised with regard to England, but
-      not with regard to Greece, i. 484.
-
-  _Stasippus_, x. 209.
-
-  _Statira_, xii. 124, 154, 241.
-
-  _Statues_, Greek, identified with the beings they represented, i. 460.
-
-  _Stenyklêrus_, Dorians of, ii. 328.
-
-  _Steropês_, i. 5.
-
-  _Stesichorus, the lyric poet_, and Helen, i. 307 _seq._;
-    dialect of, iv. 78 _seq._
-
-  _Stesiklês_, x. 144, 147 _n._
-
-  _Sthenelaïdas_, the ephor, vi. 90 _seq._
-
-  _Story_ of striking off the overtopping ears of corn, iii. 24 _n._
-
-  _Strabo_ on the Amazons, i. 214;
-    his version of the Argonautic expedition, i. 255;
-    on Old and New Ilium, i. 329 _seq._;
-    his transformation of mythes to history, i. 413.
-
-  _Strangers_, supplication of, ii. 79 _n._;
-    reception of, in legendary Greece, ii. 85.
-
-  _Stratêgi_, Kleisthenean, iv. 136;
-    enlarged functions of Athenian, after the Persian war, v. 276.
-
-  _Stratolas_, x. 320.
-
-  _Stratus_, attack of Peloponnesians, Ambrakiots and Epirots upon,
-      B. C. 429, vi. 194.
-
-  _Strelitzes_, suppression of the revolt of, by Peter the Great,
-      iv. 232 _n._ 3.
-
-  _Strombichidês_, pursuit of Chalkideus and Alkibiadês by, vii. 371;
-    expedition of, to Chios, vii. 374, 390, 392;
-    removal of, from Chios to the Hellespont, viii. 94;
-    arrival of, at Samos, from the Hellespont, viii. 95;
-    and other Athenian democrats, imprisonment of, viii. 236;
-    trial and execution of, viii. 240 _seq._
-
-  _Strophê_, introduction of, iv. 89.
-
-  _Struthas_, victory of, over Thimbron, ix. 362.
-
-  _Strymôn_, Greek settlements east of, in Thrace, iv. 25;
-    Xerxes’s bridges across the, v. 25.
-
-  _Styx_, i. 7, 8.
-
-  _Styx_, rocks near, ii. 301 _n._
-
-  _Subterranean_, course of rivers in Greece, ii. 219.
-
-  _Succession_, Solon’s laws of, iii. 139.
-
-  _Suli_, iii. 418.
-
-  _Suppliants_, reception of, in legendary Greece, ii. 85.
-
-  _Supplication_ of strangers, ii. 79 _n._
-
-  _Susa_, sum found in by Alexander the Great, iv. 236 _n._;
-    Pharnabazus conveys Greek escorts towards, viii. 135;
-    Alexander at, xii. 168, 238;
-    Alexander’s march from, to Persepolis, xii. 246 _seq._
-
-  _Susia_, xii. 189.
-
-  _Susian Gates_, Alexander at, xii. 171.
-
-  _Syagrus_, reply of, to Gelôn, i. 167.
-
-  _Sybaris_, foundation, territory and colonies of, iii. 376 _seq._;
-    fall of, iii. 392, 399, iv. 413 _seq._;
-    maximum power of, iii. 394 _seq._;
-    and Krotôn, war between, iv. 412.
-
-  _Sybarites_, character of, iii. 394 _seq._;
-    defeat of, by the Krotoniates, iv. 413;
-    descendants of, at Thurii, vi. 13.
-
-  _“Sybaritic tales”_, iii. 394.
-
-  _Syennesis of Kilikia_, and Cyrus the Younger, ix. 18.
-
-  _Sylosôn_, iv. 248 _seq._
-
-  _Symmories_ at Athens, x. 117 _seq._;
-    speech of Demosthenês on the, xi. 285 _seq._
-
-  _Symplêgades_, the, i. 235.
-
-  _Syntagma_, Macedonian, xii. 60.
-
-  _Syracusan_ assembly, on the approaching Athenian expedition,
-      B. C. 415, vii. 183 _seq._;
-    ships, improvements in, to suit the narrow harbor, vii. 297;
-    squadron under Hermokrates against Athens in the Ægean,
-      x. 385 _seq._;
-    generals at Agrigentum, complaints against, x. 427, 431;
-    generals at Agrigentum, speech of Dionysius against, x. 433 _seq._;
-    horsemen, mutiny of, against Dionysius, x. 451 _seq._;
-    soldiers mutiny of, against Dionysius, x. 462 _seq._
-
-  _Syracusans_, confidence and proceedings of, after the capture of
-      Plemmyrium, B. C. 413, vii. 293 _seq._;
-    and Athenians, conflicts between, in the Great Harbor, vii. 294,
-      299 _seq._, 316 _seq._, 324 _seq._;
-    defeat of the Athenian night attack upon Epipolæ by, vii. 305 _seq._;
-    their blockade of the Athenians in the harbor, vii. 318;
-    captured by Thrasyllus, viii. 129;
-    delay of, in aiding Selinus, B. C. 409, x. 404, 408;
-    improvement in Dionysius’s behavior towards, B. C. 399, x. 473;
-    victory of, over the Carthaginians in the great Harbor, x. 501;
-    negotiations of Dionysius the Younger with Dion and the, xi. 96;
-    defeat of Dionysius the Younger, by Dion and the, xi. 97 _seq._;
-    application from, to Dion at Leontini, xi. 108;
-    gratitude of, to Dion, xi. 112;
-    opposition of, to Dion as dictator, xi. 121 _seq._;
-    application of, to Hiketas and Corinth, B. C. 344, x. 134 _seq._;
-    and Timoleon, application of, to Corinth, xi. 167.
-
-  _Syracuse_, foundation of, iii. 363;
-    petalism or ostracism at, iv. 162;
-    inferior to Agrigentum and Gela, before B. C. 500, v. 204;
-    in B. C. 500, v. 205;
-    increased population and power of, under Gelo, v. 214 _seq._;
-    prisoners awarded to, after the battle of Himera, v. 225;
-    topography of, B. C. 465, v. 235 _n._;
-    fall of the Gelonian dynasty at, v. 235 _seq._;
-    Gelonian citizens of, v. 237 _seq._;
-    reaction against despotism at, after the fall of the Gelonian
-      dynasty, v. 240;
-    political dissensions and failure of ostracism at, vii. 122;
-    foreign exploits of, B. C. 452, vii. 123;
-    Duketius at, vii. 124;
-    and Agrigentum, hostilities between, B. C. 446, vii. 125;
-    conquests and ambitious schemes of, B. C. 440, vii. 126;
-    incredulity and contempt at, as to the Athenian armament for Sicily,
-      B. C. 415, vii. 182;
-    quiescence of the democracy at, vii. 183 _n._;
-    preparations at, on the approach of the Athenian armament at,
-      B. C. 415, vii. 190;
-    empty display of the Athenian armament at, B. C. 415, vii. 194;
-    increased confidence at, through Nikias’s inaction, B. C. 415,
-      vii. 218;
-    landing of Nikias and his forces in the Great Harbor of, B. C. 415,
-      vii. 219;
-    defensive measures of, after the battle near the Olympieion,
-      vii. 228;
-    embassy from, to Corinth and Sparta, B. C. 415, vii. 235;
-    local condition and fortifications of, in the spring of B. C. 414,
-      vii. 244;
-    localities outside the walls of, vii. 245;
-    possibilities of the siege of, B. C. 415 and 414, vii. 245;
-    siege of, B. C. 414, vii. 248 _seq._;
-    battle near, B. C. 414, vii. 255 _seq._;
-    entrance of the Athenian fleet into the Great Harbor at, B. C. 414,
-      vii. 256;
-    approach of Gylippus to, vii. 262 _seq._;
-    arrival of Gylippus and Gongylus at, vii. 265;
-    expedition to, under Demosthenês B. C. 413, vii. 289;
-    Athenian victory in the harbor of, B. C. 413, vii. 291;
-    defeat of a Sicilian reinforcement to, B. C. 413, vii. 295;
-    disadvantages of the Athenian fleet in the harbor of, vii. 296;
-    arrival of Demosthenês at, vii. 301, 303;
-    philo-Athenians at, during the siege, vii. 311 _n._;
-    increase of force and confidence in, after the night attack upon
-      Epipolæ, vii. 314;
-    postponement of the Athenians’ retreat from, by an eclipse of the
-      moon, vii. 315;
-    number and variety of forces engaged at, vii. 318;
-    postponement of the Athenians’ retreat from, by Hermokratês,
-      vii. 330;
-    retreat of the Athenians from, vii. 331 _seq._;
-    number and treatment of Athenian prisoners at, vii. 344 _seq._;
-    topography of, and the operations during the Athenian siege,
-      vii. 401 _seq._;
-    rally of Athens during the year after the disaster at, viii. 1;
-    reinforcement from, in aid of Sparta, B. C. 368, x. 258;
-    after the destruction of the Athenian armament, x. 383, 389 _seq._;
-    and the quarrel between Selinus and Egesta, B. C. 410, x. 403 _seq._;
-    embassy from, to Hannibal, at Selinus, x. 409;
-    aid from, to Himera, against Hannibal, x. 410, 411;
-    attempts of Hermokrates to enter, x. 416 _seq._;
-    first appearance of Dionysius at, x. 420;
-    discord at, B. C. 407, x. 421;
-    reinforcement from, to Agrigentum, x. 426;
-    movement of the Hermokratean party at, to raise Dionysius to power,
-      x. 432;
-    Dionysius one of the generals at, 434 _seq._;
-    return of the Hermokratean exiles to, x. 436;
-    return of Dionysius from Gela, to, B. C. 405, x. 429;
-    establishment of Dionysius as despot at, x. 444 _seq._, 454;
-    re-distribution of property at, by Dionysius, x. 459 _seq._;
-    locality of, x. 470;
-    additional fortifications at, by Dionysius, x. 471 _seq._;
-    plunder of Carthaginians at, by permission of Dionysius, x. 482;
-    provisions of Dionysius for the defence of, against the
-      Carthaginians, B. C. 396, x. 494;
-    retreat of Dionysius from, to Katana, B. C. 395, x. 497;
-    siege of, by Imilkon, x. 498 _seq._;
-    Carthaginians before, x. 498 _seq._, 506 _seq._;
-    exultation at, over the burning of the Carthaginian fleet at Daskon,
-      x. 509;
-    new constructions and improvements by Dionysius at, xi. 39;
-    feeling at, towards Dionysius the Younger and Dion, B. C. 357,
-      xi. 86;
-    Dion’s march from Herakleia to, xi. 90;
-    Timokrates, governor of, xi. 92 _seq._;
-    Dion’s entries into, B. C. 357 and B. C. 356, xi. 92 _seq._, 110;
-    flight of Dionysius the Younger from, to Lokri, xi. 104;
-    rescue of, by Dion, xi. 108 _seq._;
-    condition of, B. C. 353-344, xi. 129 _seq._;
-    return of Dionysius the Younger to, xi. 132;
-    first arrival of Timoleon at, xi. 149;
-    return of Timoleon from Adranum to, xi. 158;
-    flight of Magon from, xi. 159 _seq._;
-    Timoleon’s temptations and conduct on becoming master of,
-      xi. 163 _seq._;
-    Timoleon’s recall of exiles to, xi. 166;
-    desolate condition of, on coming into the hands of Timoleon,
-      xi. 166, 167;
-    efforts of Corinth to reconstitute, xi. 167, 168;
-    influx of colonists to, on the invitation of Corinth and Timoleon,
-      xi. 169;
-    Timoleon marches from, against the Carthaginians, xi. 172 _seq._;
-    Timoleon lays down his power at, xi. 185;
-    great influence of Timoleon at, after his resignation, xi. 186, 193;
-    residence of Timoleon at, xi. 190;
-    Timoleon in the public assembly of, xi. 190 _seq._;
-    the constitution established by Timoleon at, exchanged for a
-      democracy, xii. 393;
-    expedition from, to Krotôn, about B. C. 320, xii. 397;
-    revolutions at, about B. C. 320, xii. 399, 400;
-    massacre at, by Agathokles in collusion with Hamilkar,
-      xii. 401 _seq._;
-    Agathokles constituted despot of, xii. 402;
-    Hamilkar’s unsuccessful attempt to take, xii. 422 _seq._;
-    barbarities of Agathokles at, after his African expedition, xii. 446.
-
-  _Syrians_, not distinguished from Assyrians in Greek authors,
-      iii. 290 _n._
-
-  _Syrphax_, xii. 90.
-
-  _Syssitia_, or public mess at Sparta, ii. 381.
-
-
-  T.
-
-  _Tachos_, x. 361 _seq._
-
-  _Tagus_, Thessalian, ii. 281.
-
-  _Talôs_, i. 240.
-
-  _Tamos_, x. 13.
-
-  _Tamynæ_, Phokion’s victory at, xi. 341;
-    Demosthenes reproached for his absence from the battle of, xi. 344.
-
-  _Tanagra_, battle of, v. 328;
-    reconciliation of leaders and parties at Athens, after the battle
-      of, v. 329.
-
-  _Tantalus_, i. 157.
-
-  _Taochi_, and the Ten Thousand Greeks, ix. 109 _seq._
-
-  _Taphians_ in Homer’s time, ii. 102.
-
-  _Taranto_, fishery at, iii. 389 _n._ 2.
-
-  _Tarentines_ and Rhegians, expedition of, against the Iapygians,
-      v. 238;
-    and Mesapians, xii. 394.
-
-  _Tarentum_, foundation of cities in the Gulf of, i. 230;
-    Greek settlements on the Gulf of, iii. 384;
-    foundation and position of, iii. 387 _seq._
-
-  _Tarsus_, origin of, i. 85 _n._, iii. 277;
-    Cyrus the Younger at, ix. 20 _seq._;
-    Alexander at, xii. 112.
-
-  _Tartarus_, i. 4, 8, 9.
-
-  _Tartessus_, iii. 274;
-    not visited by Greeks before B. C. 630, iii. 277;
-    Kôlæus’s voyage to, iii. 278.
-
-  _Tauri_ in the Crimea, iii. 245.
-
-  _Tauromenium_, iii. 362;
-    commencement of, x. 493;
-    repulse of Dionysius at, xi. 5;
-    capture of, by Dionysius, xi. 8;
-    Timoleon at, xi. 146.
-
-  _Taurus_, xii. 182 _n._ 2.
-
-  _Taurus, Mount_, Alexander at, xii. 111.
-
-  _Taxiarch_, ii. 460.
-
-  _Taxila_, Alexander at, xii. 227.
-
-  _Tearless Battle_, the, x. 265 _seq._
-
-  _Tegea_ and Mantinea, ii. 443 _seq._, vi. 452, vii. 13;
-    and Sparta, ii. 447 _seq._;
-    bones of Orestês taken from, ii. 448;
-    refusal of, to join Argos, B. C. 421, vii. 19;
-    plans of the Argeian allies against, B. C. 418, vii. 76;
-    march of Agis to the relief of, B. C. 418, vii. 77;
-    revolution at, B. C. 370, x. 209;
-    seizure of Arcadians at, by the Theban harmost, x. 324 _seq._;
-    Epaminondas at, B. C. 362, x. 329, 330, 333, 335 _seq._;
-    march of Epaminondas from, B. C. 362, x. 333 _seq._
-
-  _Tegyra_, victory of Pelopidas at, x. 134.
-
-  _Teian_ inscriptions, iii. 186 _n._
-
-  _Telamôn_, i. 189 _seq._
-
-  _Telegonus_, i. 315.
-
-  _Têlekus_, conquests of, ii. 421;
-    death of, ii. 425.
-
-  _Teleontes_, iii. 51.
-
-  _Têlephus_, i. 177, 292.
-
-  _Teleutius_ and Agesilaus, capture of the Long Walls at Corinth, and of
-      Lechæum by, ix. 339 _seq._;
-    expedition of, to Rhodes, ix. 364, 368;
-    at Ægina, ix. 373, 376;
-    attack of, on the Peiræus, ix. 377 _seq._;
-    at Olynthus, x. 65 _seq._
-
-  _Têlinês_, iv. 106 _n._, v. 208 _seq._
-
-  _Telys, of Sybaris_, iv. 412 _seq._
-
-  _Temenion_ and Solygeius, ii. 309.
-
-  _Temenus_, Kresphontês, and Aristodêmus, ii. 2 _seq._;
-    and Kresphontês, family of, lowest in the series of subjects for
-      heroic drama, ii. 10.
-
-  _Temnos_, situation of, iii. 191 _n._ 1.
-
-  _Tempe_, remarks of Herodotus on the legend of, i. 400;
-    Delphian procession to, ii. 275 _n._ 2;
-    Grecian army sent to defend, against Xerxes, v. 68;
-    abandonment of the defence of, against Xerxes, v. 69 _seq._
-
-  _Temple of Eleusis_ built by order of Dêmêtêr, i. 40.
-
-  _Tenedos_, continental settlements of, iii. 195;
-    recovery of, by Macedonian admiralty, xii. 141.
-
-  _Ten_, appointment of the, at Athens, viii. 271;
-    measures of the, at Athens, viii. 272;
-    peace between the, at Athens, and Thrasybulus, viii. 279 _seq._;
-    treatment of the, at Athens, B. C. 403, viii. 293.
-
-  _Ten generals_ appointed to succeed Alkibiadês, viii. 159.
-
-  _Tennes_, the Sidonian prince, xi. 438.
-
-  _Ten Thousand Greeks_, position and circumstances of, ix. 11;
-    commencement of their retreat, ix. 52;
-    Persian heralds to, on commencing their retreat, ix. 52;
-    negotiations and convention of Tissaphernes with, ix. 59 _seq._;
-    quarrel of, with Ariæus, ix. 63;
-    retreating march of, under Tissaphernes, ix. 63 _seq._;
-    at the Tigris, ix. 65 _seq._;
-    at the Greater Zab, ix. 69;
-    summoned by Ariæus to surrender, ix. 76;
-    distress of, after the seizure of the generals, ix. 76;
-    new generals appointed by, ix. 80;
-    great ascendency of Xenophon over, ix. 83 _seq._;
-    crossing of the Great Zab by, ix. 88;
-    harassing attacks of the Persian cavalry on, ix. 88 _seq._;
-    retreat of, along the Tigris, ix. 90 _seq._;
-    and the Karduchians, ix. 96 _seq._;
-    at the Kentritês, ix. 100 _seq._;
-    in Armenia, ix. 102 _seq._;
-    and the Chalybes, ix. 107 _seq._;
-    and the Taochi, ix. 107 _seq._;
-    and the Skythine, ix. 110;
-    first sight of the Euxine by, ix. 111;
-    and the Makrônes, ix. 112;
-    and the Kolchians, ix. 112, 127;
-    at Trapezus, ix. 113, 124 _seq._;
-    geography of the retreat of, ix. 115 _seq._;
-    feelings of the Greeks on the Euxine towards, ix. 123 _seq._;
-    leave Trapezus, ix. 127;
-    at Kerasus, ix. 127;
-    march of, to Kotyôra, ix. 128;
-    at Kotyôra, ix. 129 _seq._;
-    and the Paphlagonians, ix. 144;
-    sail to Sinopê, ix. 144;
-    at Herakleia, ix. 146;
-    at Kalpê, ix. 147;
-    and Kleander, ix. 149 _seq._, 164;
-    and Anaxibius, ix. 154 _seq._, 163;
-    and Seuthes, ix. 154, 165 _seq._;
-    after leaving Byzantium, ix. 163 _seq._;
-    and Aristarchus, ix. 164 _seq._;
-    under the Lacedæmonians, ix. 168, 173, 206, 214;
-    in Mysia, ix. 172 _seq._;
-    Xenophon’s farewell of, ix. 175;
-    effects of their retreat on the Greek mind, ix. 179 _seq._
-
-  _Ten Thousand_, the Pan-Arcadian, x. 232.
-
-  _Teôs_, foundation of, iii. 185;
-    inscriptions of, iii. 186 _n._;
-    emigration from, on the conquest of Harpagus, iv. 203;
-    loss of, to Athens, B. C. 412, vii. 383;
-    capture of, by the Lacedæmonians, viii. 154.
-
-  _Tereus_, i. 196.
-
-  _Terpander_, ii. 141;
-    musical improvements of, iv. 75.
-
-  _Tethys_, i. 5, 6.
-
-  _Teukrians_, the, i. 335;
-    and Mysians, ethnical affinities and migrations of, iii. 208 _seq._
-
-  _Teukrus_, i. 189.
-
-  _Teukrus, the metic_, vii. 195, 197, 205 _n._ 1.
-
-  _Teuthrania_ mistaken by the Greeks for Troy, i. 292.
-
-  _Teutonic and Scandinavian epic_, its analogy with the Grecian,
-      i. 479 _seq._;
-    points of distinction between the Grecian and, i. 481.
-
-  _Thais_ and the burning of the palace of Persepolis, xii. 176 _n._ 3.
-
-  _Thales_, Xenophanês, and Pythagoras, i. 367 _seq._;
-    predictions ascribed to, ii. 116;
-    alleged prediction of an eclipse of the sun by, iii. 231 _n._ 3;
-    suggestion of, respecting the twelve Ionic cities in Asia, iii. 259;
-    philosophy and celebrity of, iv. 381 _seq._
-
-  _Thaletas_, iv. 83, 86.
-
-  _Thamyris_, analogy between the story of, and that of Marsyas,
-      iii. 214.
-
-  _Thanatos_, i. 7.
-
-  _Thapsakus_, Cyrus the Younger end his forces at, ix. 29 _seq._;
-    Alexander crosses the Euphrates at, xii. 150.
-
-  _Thasos_, island of, iv. 25;
-    attempted revolt of, from the Persians, iv. 313;
-    contribution levied by Xerxes on, v. 42;
-    revolt of, from the confederacy of Delos, v. 310;
-    blockade and conquest of, B. C. 464-463, v. 312;
-    application of, to Sparta, for aid against Athens, v. 312;
-    expulsion of the Lacedæmonians from, viii. 127;
-    reduction of, by Thrasyllus, viii. 144;
-    slaughter at, by Lysander, viii. 222.
-
-  _Thaumas_, i. 7.
-
-  _Theagenes of Rhegium_, the first to allegorize mythical narratives,
-      v. i. 418.
-
-  _Theagenes, despot of Megara_, iii. 44.
-
-  _Theagenes of Thasus_, statue of, 17, v. _n._ 2.
-
-  _Theatre_, Athenian, accessibility of, to the poorest citizens,
-      viii. 320.
-
-  _Thebaïd_ of Antimachus, i. 268.
-
-  _Thebaïs_, the Cyclic, i. 268;
-    ascribed to Homer, ii. 129.
-
-  _Theban_ contingent of Leonidas, doubts about, v. 91, 95;
-    leaders put to death after the battle of Platæa, v. 187;
-    prisoners in the night-surprise at Platæa, slaughter of,
-      vi. 118 _seq._;
-    military column, depth of, vi. 386, 390;
-    band of Three Hundred, vi. 387;
-    exiles at Athens, x. 61, 80 _seq._
-
-  _Thebans_ and Æginetans, i. 184;
-    against the seven chiefs, i. 273;
-    application of, to Ægina, for assistance against Athens, iv. 172;
-    and Xerxes’s invasion, v. 76;
-    defeated by the Athenians at Platæa, v. 179;
-    night-surprise of Platæa by, B. C. 431, vi. 114 _seq._;
-    capture of, in the night-surprise of Platæa, vi. 116 _seq._;
-    captured in the night-surprise of Platæa, slaughter of,
-      vi. 118 _seq._;
-    opposition of, to peace with Athens, B. C. 404, viii. 229 _n._;
-    humiliation of Agesilaus by, ix. 256;
-    application of, to Athens for aid against Sparta, B. C. 395,
-      ix. 291 _seq._;
-    at the battle of Corinth, ix. 306 _n._;
-    and Spartans at the battle of Korôneia, ix. 315;
-    and the peace of Antalkidas, ix. 386;
-    expulsion of the Lacedæmonians from Bœotia by, B. C. 374, x. 135;
-    invasion of Phokis by, B. C. 374, x. 136;
-    discouragement and victory of, at Leuktra, x. 177 _seq._;
-    and allies, invasion of Laconia by, B. C. 370, x. 215 _seq._;
-    displeasure of, with Epaminondas, B. C. 367, x. 268;
-    expeditions of, to Thessaly, to rescue Pelopidas, x. 283, 303 _seq._;
-    destruction of Orchomenus by, x. 311;
-    under Pammenes, expedition of, to Megalopolis, x. 359;
-    extinction of free cities in Bœotia by, xi. 201;
-    exertions of, to raise a confederacy against the Phokians, B. C. 356,
-      ix. 251;
-    Lokrians and Thessalians, war of, against the Phokians, B. C. 355,
-      xi. 254;
-    assistance under Pammenes sent by, to Artabazus, xi. 257, 299;
-    assistance of, to Megalopolis against Sparta, B. C. 352-351,
-      xi. 299 _seq._;
-    obtain money from the Persian king, B. C. 350-349, xi. 302;
-    invoke the aid of Philip to put down the Phokians, xi. 375;
-    Philip declares his sympathy with, B. C. 346, xi. 421;
-    invited by Philip to assist in an attack upon Attica, B. C. 339,
-      xi. 483 _seq._;
-    and Athenians, war of, against Philip in Phokis, xi. 493, 494 _seq._;
-    revolt of, against Alexander, xii. 29 _seq._
-
-  _Thêbê_, xi. 204 _seq._
-
-  _Thebes_ and Orchomenos, i. 135;
-    legends of, i. 256 _seq._;
-    how founded by Kadmus, i. 258;
-    five principal families at, i. 259;
-    foundation of, by Amphiôn, i. 263;
-    poems on the sieges of, i. 266;
-    sieges of, i. 269 _seq._;
-    the seven chiefs against, i. 273 _seq._;
-    repulse of the seven chiefs against, i. 274 _seq._;
-    the seven chiefs against death of all but Adrastus, i. 276;
-    the seven chiefs against, burial of the fallen, i. 277;
-    second siege of, i. 279, 280;
-    early legislation of, ii. 297;
-    and Platæa, disputes between, iv. 166;
-    summoned to give up its leaders after the battle of Platæa, v. 186;
-    discredit of, for its _Medism_, v. 314;
-    supremacy of, in Bœotia restored by Sparta, v. 314, 327;
-    mastery of Athens over, B. C. 456, v. 331;
-    reinforcements from, in support of the night-surprise at Platæa,
-      vi. 114 _seq._;
-    hard treatment of Thespiæ by, B. C. 423, vi. 452;
-    altered feeling of, after the capture of Athens by Lysander,
-      viii. 259, 264, 275;
-    and Sparta, war between, B. C. 395, ix. 289 _seq._;
-    revolt of Orchomenos from, to Sparta, ix. 293;
-    alliance of, with Athens, Corinth, and Argos, against Sparta,
-      ix. 301;
-    increased importance of, B. C. 395, ix. 301;
-    alarm at, and proposals of peace from, on the Lacedæmonian capture of
-      the Long Walls at Corinth, ix. 341;
-    envoys from, to Agesilaus, ix. 347, 352;
-    and the peace of Antalkidas, x. 12;
-    proceedings of Sparta against, after the peace of Antalkidas,
-      x. 28 _seq._;
-    seizure of the Kadmeia at, by Phœbidas, x. 58 _seq._;
-    government of, B. C. 382, x. 59 _n._ 1;
-    under Leontiades and other philo-Laconian oligarchs, x. 79 _seq._;
-    conspiracy against the philo-Laconian oligarchy at, x. 81 _seq._;
-    alliance of, with Athens, B. C. 378, x. 102;
-    state of, after the revolution of, B. C. 379, x. 119;
-    the Sacred Band at, x. 120;
-    expeditions of Agesilaus against, B. C. 378 and 377, x. 127 _seq._;
-    displeasure of Athens against, B. C. 474, x. 134, 158;
-    dealings of, with Platæa and Thespiæ, B. C. 372, x. 159 _seq._;
-    exclusion of, from the peace of B. C. 371, x. 167 _seq._;
-    increased power of, after the battle of Leuktra, x. 193;
-    and Sparta, alleged arbitration of the Achæans between, after the
-      battle of Leuktra, x. 199 _n._;
-    influence of, in Thessaly, B. C. 369, x. 248;
-    alienation of the Arcadians from, B. C. 368, x. 259 _seq._;
-    assassination of Euphron at, x. 273 _seq._;
-    application of, to Persia, B. C. 367, x. 277 _seq._;
-    Persian rescript in favor of, x. 278 _seq._;
-    protest of the Arcadians against the headship of, x. 281;
-    peace of Corinth, Epidaurus an Phlius with, B. C. 366, x. 290 _seq._;
-    opposition of the Mantineans and other Arcadians to, B. C. 362,
-      x. 326;
-    power of, B. C. 360-359, xi. 200 _seq._;
-    Philip at, xi. 207 _seq._;
-    Eubœa rescued from, by Athens, B. C. 358, xi. 217 _seq._;
-    accusation of, against Sparta before the Amphiktyonic assembly,
-      xi. 243;
-    accusation of, against Phokis before the Amphiktyonic assembly,
-      xi. 243;
-    the Phokians countenanced by Athens and Sparta as rivals of, xi. 262;
-    envoys to Philip from, B. C. 346, xi. 405, 408;
-    and Athens, unfriendly relations between, B. C. 339, xi. 484;
-    mission of Demosthenês to, B. C. 339, xi. 486 _seq._;
-    and Athens, alliance of, against Philip, B. C. 339, xi. 490;
-    severity of Philip towards, after the battle of Chæroneia, xi. 505;
-    march of Alexander from Thrace to, xii. 36;
-    capture and destruction of, by Alexander, xii. 37 _seq._;
-    restored by Kassander, xii. 441.
-
-  _Thebes in Egypt_, iii. 312.
-
-  _Theft_, laws of, at Athens, iii. 142.
-
-  _Theia_, i. 5.
-
-  _Themis_, i. 5, 10.
-
-  _Themistoklês_, character of, iv. 337 _seq._;
-    and Aristeidês, rivalry between, v. 50, 273;
-    change of Athens from a land-power to a sea-power proposed by, v. 52;
-    long-sighted views of, in creating a navy at Athens, v. 53,
-      293 _n._ 2;
-    and the Laurian mines, v. 54;
-    his explanation of the answer of the Delphian oracle on Xerxes’s
-      invasion, v. 61;
-    prevails upon the Greeks to stay and fight at Artemisium,
-      v. 97 _seq._;
-    inscribed invitations of, to the Ionians under Xerxes, v. 102;
-    activity and resource of, on Xerxes’s approach, v. 110;
-    opposes the removal of the Greek fleet from Salamis to the isthmus
-      of Corinth, v. 121 _seq._;
-    and Eurybiadês at Salamis, v. 123 _n._;
-    and Adeimantus of Corinth, at Salamis, v. 122, 125;
-    his message to Xerxes before the battle of Salamis, v. 126;
-    his message to Xerxes after the battle of Salamis, v. 139;
-    levies fines on the Cyclades, v. 141;
-    honors rendered to, after the battle of Salamis, v. 146;
-    alleged proposal of, to burn all the Grecian ships except the
-      Athenian, v. 203 _n._ 2;
-    stratagem of, respecting the fortification of Athens, v. 244 _seq._;
-    plans of, for the naval aggrandizement of Athens, v. 248 _seq._;
-    persuades the Athenians to build twenty new triremes annually,
-      v. 252;
-    and Pausanias, v. 273, 282;
-    opponents and corruption of, after the Persian war, v. 278 _seq._;
-    and Timokreon, v. 278;
-    first accusation of treason against, v. 280;
-    two accusations of treason against, v. 280 _n._ 1;
-    ostracism of, v. 281, 282 _n._ 1;
-    second accusation of treason against, v. 382;
-    flight and adventures of, on charge of _Medism_, v. 283 _seq._;
-    and Admêtus, v. 283;
-    and Artaxerxes Longimanus, v. 285 _seq._;
-    in Persia, v. 285 _seq._;
-    rewards and death of, v. 287 _seq._
-
-  _Theodôrus of Samos_, iv. 98 _n._
-
-  _Theodôrus the Syracusan_, speech of, against Dionysius, x. 501 _seq._
-
-  _Theognis_, iii. 44, iv. 92.
-
-  _Theogony_ of the Greeks not a cosmogony, i. 2;
-    of Hesiod, i. 3;
-    Orphic, i. 17 _seq._;
-    Hesiodic and Orphic, compared, i. 20 _seq._;
-    Hesiodic legend of Pandôra in, i. 75.
-
-  _Theoklês_, the founder of Naxos, in Sicily, iii. 361;
-    expels the Sikels from Leontini and Katana, iii. 363.
-
-  _Theology_, triple, of the pagan world, i. 439.
-
-  _Theophrastus_, the phytologist, i. 360 _n._;
-    his treatment of mythes, i. 412.
-
-  _Theopompus, the Spartan king_, ii. 424 _nn._
-
-  _Theopompus, the historian_, on the Spartan empire, ix. 195 _n._
-
-  _Theôric Board_ at Athens, creation of, ix. 379.
-
-  _Theôric Fund_, allusions of Demosthenês to, xi. 334, 338;
-    motion of Apollodorus about, xi. 348;
-    not appropriated to war purposes till just before the battle of
-      Chæroneia, xi. 353;
-    true character of, xi. 353 _seq._;
-    attempt of the Athenian property-classes to evade direct taxation by
-      recourse to, xi. 357;
-    application of, to military purposes, xi. 492.
-
-  _Theôrikon_, viii. 321.
-
-  _Theôrs_, ii. 243.
-
-  _Thêra_, ii. 27;
-    foundation of Kyrênê from, iv. 29 _seq._
-
-  _Theramenês_, Peloponnesian fleet under, vii. 388;
-    statement of, respecting the Four Hundred, viii. 13 _n._ 2;
-    expedition of, to the Hellespont, viii. 118;
-    accusation of the generals at Arginusæ by, viii. 181 _seq._;
-    probable conduct of, at Arginusæ, viii. 185 _seq._, 187 _n._;
-    first embassy of, to Sparta, viii. 227;
-    second embassy of, to Sparta, viii. 228;
-    and the executions by the Thirty, viii. 241, 242, 245;
-    and Kritias, dissentient views of, viii. 241 _seq._, 249;
-    exasperation of the majority of the Thirty against, viii. 249;
-    denunciation of, by Kritias in the senate, viii. 249;
-    reply of, to Kritins’s denunciation in the senate, viii. 251;
-    condemnation and death of, vii. 253 _seq._
-
-  _Theramenês_ the Athenian, viii. 19;
-    his opposition to the Four Hundred, viii. 58 _seq._;
-    his impeachment of the embassy of the Four Hundred to Sparta,
-      viii. 84 _seq._
-
-  _Therimachus_, ix. 366.
-
-  _Therma_, Xerxes’s movements from, to Thermopylæ, v. 83;
-    capture of, by Archestratus, vi. 70.
-
-  _Thermaic Gulf_, original occupants on, iv. 13.
-
-  _Thermopylæ_, Greeks north of, in the first two centuries, ii. 274;
-    Phokian defensive wall at, ii. 283;
-    resolution of Greeks to defend against Xerxes, v. 71;
-    the pass of, v. 73 _seq._;
-    path over Mount Œta avoiding, v. 73;
-    movements of Xerxes from Therma to, v. 83;
-    impressions of Xerxes about the defenders at, v. 86;
-    repeated Persian attacks upon, repulsed, v. 87;
-    debate among the defenders of, when the Persians approached their
-      rear, v. 89;
-    manœuvres ascribed to Xerxes respecting the dead at, v. 103;
-    numbers slain at, on both sides, v. 103;
-    inscriptions commemorative of the battle at, v. 104;
-    effect of the battle of, on the Greeks and Xerxes, v. 105 _seq._;
-    conduct of the Peloponnesians after the battle of, v. 106;
-    hopeless situation of the Athenians after the battle of, v. 106;
-    Onomarchus at, xi. 256;
-    Philip checked at, by the Athenians, xi. 296;
-    position of Phalækus at, B. C. 347-346, xi. 374, 418;
-    application of the Phokians to Athens for aid against Philip at,
-      B. C. 347, xi. 376;
-    importance of, to Philip and Athens, B. C. 347, xi. 378;
-    march of Philip to, B. C. 346, xi. 407 _seq._;
-    plans of Philip against, B. C. 346, xi. 410;
-    letters of Philip inviting the Athenians to join him at, xi. 417;
-    Phokians at, B. C. 347-346, xi. 418 _seq._;
-    surrender of, to Philip, xi. 421;
-    professions of Philip after his conquest of, xi. 424;
-    special meeting of the Amphiktyous at, B. C. 339, xi. 479.
-
-  _Thermus_, ii. 291.
-
-  _Thêro of Agrigentum_ and Gelo, v. 220 _seq._;
-    and Hiero, v. 228;
-    severe treatment of Himeræans by, v. 228;
-    death of, v. 230.
-
-  _Thersander_, the Orchomenian, at the Theban banquet to Mardonius,
-      v. 160.
-
-  _Thersitês_, i. 298, ii. 70 _seq._
-
-  _Therseium_ at Athens, v. 306.
-
-  _Thêseus_, i. 169, 207 _seq._;
-    and the Minôtaur, i. 223;
-    obtains burial for the fallen chiefs against Thêbes, i. 277;
-    the political reforms of, ii. 21;
-    and Menestheus, ii. 22;
-    restoration of the sons of, to his kingdom, ii. 23;
-    consolidation of Attica by, iii. 69;
-    bones of, conveyed to Athens, v. 304.
-
-  _Thesmoi_, iii. 76.
-
-  _Thesmophoria_, festival of, i. 44.
-
-  _Thesmothetæ_, iii. 74.
-
-  _Thespiæ_, hard treatment of, by Thebes, B. C. 423, vi. 452;
-    severity of Thebes towards, B. C. 372, x. 162.
-
-  _Thespian_ contingent of Leonidas, v. 91.
-
-  _Thespians_, distress of, caused by Xerxes’s invasion, v. 91 _n._ 1;
-    at the battle of Leuktra, x. 180;
-    expulsion of, from Bœotia, after the buds of Leuktra, x. 195.
-
-  _Thespis_ and Solon, story of, iii. 146.
-
-  _Thesprotians_, iii. 414 _seq._
-
-  _Thessalian_ cities, disorderly confederacy of, ii. 282;
-    and Athenian cavalry, skirmishes of, with Archidamus, vi. 134;
-    cavalry sent home by Alexander, xii. 181.
-
-  _Thessalians_, migration of, from Thesprôtis to Thessaly, ii. 14;
-    non-Hellenic character of, ii. 15;
-    and their dependants in the first two centuries, ii. 274 _seq._;
-    character and condition of, ii. 276 _seq._;
-    and Xerxes’s invasion, v. 67, 69;
-    alliance of, with Athens and Argos, about B. C. 461, v. 320;
-    Thebans, and Lokrians, war of, with the Phokians, B. C. 355, xi. 254.
-
-  _Thessalus_, son of Kimon, impeachment of Alkibiadês by, vii. 210.
-
-  _Thessaly_, affinities of, with Bœotia, ii. 17;
-    quadruple division of, ii. 281;
-    power of, when united, ii. 283;
-    Athenian march against, B. C. 454, v. 382;
-    Brasidas’s march through, to Thrace, vi. 399 _seq._;
-    Lacedæmonian reinforcements to Brasidas prevented from passing
-      through, vi. 449;
-    state of, B. C. 370, x. 248;
-    influence of Thebes in, B. C. 369, x. 248;
-    expedition of Pelopidas to, B. C. 369, x. 248;
-    expedition of Pelopidas to, B. C. 368, x. 263;
-    expeditions of Pelopidas to, x. 264 _n._ 2;
-    mission of Pelopidas to, B. C. 366, x. 282;
-    expedition of Pelopidas to, B. C. 363, x. 303, 307 _seq._;
-    despots of, xi. 202 _seq._;
-    first expedition of Philip into, against the despots of Pheræ,
-      xi. 261, 292, 295 _n._ 2;
-    second expedition of Philip into, against the despots of Pheræ,
-      xi. 292;
-    victory of Leosthenes over Antipater in, xii. 315.
-
-  _Thêtes_ in legendary Greece, ii. 100;
-    in Attica immediately before Solon’s legislation, iii. 94 _seq._;
-    mutiny of, iii. 97.
-
-  _Thetis_ and Pêleus, i. 187.
-
-  _Thimbron_, expedition of, to Asia, ix. 208;
-    defeat and death of, ix. 362, xii. 429 _seq._
-
-  _Thirlwall’s_ opinion on the partition of land ascribed to Lykurgus,
-      ii. 401 _seq._, 404, 407 _seq._
-
-  _Thirty at Athens_, nomination of, viii. 236;
-    proceedings of, viii. 239 _seq._;
-    executions by, viii. 240 _seq._, 243 _seq._, 247 _seq._;
-    discord among, viii. 243;
-    three thousand hoplites nominated by, viii. 246;
-    disarming of hoplites by, viii. 247;
-    murders and spoliations by, viii. 247, 256;
-    tyranny of, after the death of Theramenês, viii. 256;
-    intellectual teaching forbidden by, viii. 257;
-    and Sokratês, viii. 258;
-    growing insecurity of, viii. 259;
-    disgust in Greece at the enormities of, viii. 262;
-    repulse and defeat of, by Thrasybulus at Phylê, viii. 265;
-    seizure and execution of prisoners at Eleusis and Salamis by,
-      viii. 267;
-    defeat of, by Thrasybulus at Peiræus, viii. 269 _seq._;
-    deposition of, viii. 271;
-    reaction against, on the arrival of king Pausanias, viii. 275;
-    flight of the survivors of the, viii. 280;
-    treatment of, B. C. 403, viii. 292;
-    oppression and suffering of Athens under the, ix. 185;
-    Athens rescued from the, ix. 185;
-    the knights or horsemen supporters of the, ix. 186;
-    Athens under the, a specimen of the Spartan empire, ix. 187;
-    compared with the Lysandrian Dekarchies, ix. 188;
-    and Kallibius, ix. 188;
-    put down by the Athenians themselves, ix. 198.
-
-  _Thorax_ and Xenophon, ix. 134 _seq._
-
-  _Thrace_, Chalkidic colonies in, iv. 22 _seq._;
-    Greek settlements east of the Strymôn in, iv. 25;
-    conquest of, by the Persians under Darius, iv. 273;
-    and Macedonia, march of Mardonius into, iv. 373;
-    contributions levied by Xerxes on towns in, v. 41;
-    Brasidas’s expedition to, vi. 370, 397 _seq._;
-    war continued in, the one year’s truce between Athens and Sparta,
-      vi. 438;
-    Alkibiadês and Thrasybulus in, B. C. 407, viii. 144;
-    Iphikrates in, between B. C. 387-378, x. 106 _seq._;
-    Iphikrates in, B. C. 368-365, x. 250 _seq._;
-    Philip in, B. C. 351, xi. 306, and B. C. 346, xi. 402, 404, and
-      B. C. 342-341, xi. 450 _seq._;
-    Alexander’s expedition into, xii. 22 _seq._;
-    march of Alexander from, to Thebes, xii. 36.
-
-  _Thracian_ influence upon Greece, i. 31;
-    race in the north of Asia Minor, iii. 207;
-    Chersonesus, iv. 27;
-    subject-allies of Athens not oppressed by her, vi. 404 _seq._;
-    mercenaries under Diitrephês, vii. 356 _seq._
-
-  _Thracians_ in the time of Herodotus and Thucydides, ii. 88;
-    and Phrygians, affinities between, iii. 208 _seq._, 212;
-    affinities and migrations of, iii. 208 _seq._;
-    numbers and abode of, iv. 15;
-    general character of, iv. 15 _seq._;
-    Asiatic characteristics of, iv. 17;
-    venality of, vi. 217 _n._ 2.
-
-  _Thrasius_, xi. 173, 180.
-
-  _Thrasybulus of Syracuse_, v. 232 _seq._
-
-  _Thrasybulus, the Athenian_, speech of, at Samos, viii. 47;
-    efforts of, at Samoa, in favor of Alkibiadês, viii. 50;
-    in Thrace, viii. 144;
-    accusation of the generals at Arginusæ by, viii. 182 _seq._;
-    flight of, from Attica, viii. 242;
-    occupation of Phylê, and repulse and defeat of the Thirty by,
-      viii. 265;
-    occupation of Peiræus by, viii. 268;
-    victory of, over the Thirty at Peiræus, viii. 269 _seq._;
-    increasing strength of, at Peiræus, vii. 273;
-    straitened condition of, in Peiræus, viii. 274;
-    at Peiræus, king Pausanias’s attack upon, viii. 276;
-    and the Ten at Athens, peace between, viii. 277;
-    and the exiles, restoration of, to Athens, viii. 279;
-    assistance of, to Evander and others, viii. 306 _n._ 2;
-    honorary reward to, viii. 309;
-    aid to the Thebans by, ix. 295;
-    acquisitions of, in the Hellespont and Bosporus, ix. 366;
-    victory of, in Lesbos, ix. 367;
-    death and character of, ix. 367.
-
-  _Thrasydæus_, v. 226;
-    cruel government, defeat, and death of, v. 228, ix. 223, 226.
-
-  _Thrasyklês_ and Strombichidês, expedition of, to Chios, vii. 374.
-
-  _Thrasyllus_, vii. 73, 74;
-    at Samos, B. C. 411, viii. 46, 48;
-    at Lesbos, viii. 101;
-    eluded by Mindarus, viii. 102;
-    at Elæus, viii. 109;
-    repulse of Agis by, viii. 128;
-    expedition of, to Ionia, viii. 129;
-    and Alkibiadês, at the Hellespont, viii. 130.
-
-  _Thrasylochus_ and Demosthenês, xi. 268 _n._ 2.
-
-  _Thrasymachus_, rhetorical precepts of, viii. 370;
-    doctrine of, in Plato’s Republic, viii. 390 _seq._
-
-  _Three thousand_, nominated the Thirty at Athens, viii. 246.
-
-  _Thucydidês_, altered intellectual and ethical standard in the age of,
-      i. 366;
-    his treatment of ancient mythes, i. 391, 405 _seq._;
-    his version of the Trojan war, i. 405 _seq._;
-    on the dwellings of the earliest Greeks, ii. 109;
-    his date for the return of the Herakleids, ii. 13;
-    silence of, on the treaty between Athens and Persia, v. 336;
-    descent of, vi. 12 _n._ 2;
-    various persons named, vi. 28 _n._ 2;
-    his division of the year, vi. 114 _n._ 2;
-    his judgment respecting Periklês, vi. 173, 176;
-    first mention of Kleon by, vi. 244;
-    reflections of, on the Korkyræan massacre, B. C. 427, vi. 278 _seq._;
-    structure of his history, vi. 309 _n._;
-    judgment of, on Kleon’s success at Pylus, vi. 347 _seq._;
-    on Kythêra, vi. 364 _n._;
-    and the capitulation of Amphipolis to Brasidas, vi. 409, 410,
-      412 _seq._;
-    banishment of, vi. 413 _seq._;
-    on Kleon’s views and motives in desiring war, B. C. 422,
-      vi. 456 _seq._, 459;
-    passages of, on the battle of Amphipolis, vi. 405 _nn._, 466 _n._,
-      468 _n._;
-    feelings of, towards Brasidas and Kleon, vi. 474;
-    treatment of Kleon by, vi. 474, 477 _seq._;
-    dialogue set forth by, between the Athenian envoys and Executive
-      Council of Mêlos, vii. 109 _seq._, 115 _seq._;
-    his favorable judgment of the Athenians at the restoration of the
-      democracy, B. C. 411, viii. 90 _seq._;
-    study of, by Demosthenes, xi. 269.
-
-  _Thucydides, son of Melesias_, v. 342;
-    rivalry of, with Periklês, vi. 15 _seq._;
-    ostracised, vi. 19;
-    history of, after his ostracism, vi. 28 _n._ 2.
-
-  _Thurians_, defeat of, by the Lucanians, xi. 13.
-
-  _Thurii_, foundation of, vi. 13 _seq._;
-    few Athenian settlers at, vi. 15;
-    revolution at, B. C. 413, x. 384.
-
-  _Thyania_, surprise of, by the Phliasians and Chares, x. 272.
-
-  _Thyestean banquet_, the, i. 162.
-
-  _Thyestes_, i. 161 _seq._
-
-  _Thymochares_, defeat of, near Eretria, viii. 72 _seq._
-
-  _Thymodes_, xii. 116, 125.
-
-  _Thynians_, iii. 207.
-
-  _Thyrea_, conquest of, ii. 449;
-    capture of, by Nikias, B. C. 424, vi. 366;
-    stipulation about, between Sparta and Argos, B. C. 420, vii. 27.
-
-  _Thyssagetæ_, iii. 244.
-
-  _Tigris_, the Ten Thousand Greeks at the, ix. 64 _seq._;
-    retreat of the Ten Thousand along the, ix. 88 _seq._;
-    forded by Alexander, xii. 151;
-    voyage of Nearchus from the mouth of the Indus to that of the,
-      xii. 235, 236;
-    Alexander’s voyage up the, to Opis, xii. 243.
-
-  _Tilphusios Apollo_, origin of the name, i. 48.
-
-  _Timæus’s_ treatment of mythes, i. 410.
-
-  _Timagoras_, his mission to Persia, and execution, x. 278, 280,
-      280 _n._ 1.
-
-  _Timandra_, i. 168.
-
-  _Timarchus_, decree of, xi. 368, 369 _n._
-
-  _Timasion_, and Xenophon, ix. 134 _seq._
-
-  _Time_, Grecian computation of, ii. 115 _n._ 2.
-
-  _Timegenidas_, death of, v. 187.
-
-  _Timocracy_ of Solon, iii. 120 _seq._
-
-  _Timokrates, the Rhodian_, ix. 286 _seq._
-
-  _Timokrates, of Syracuse_, xi. 92 _seq._
-
-  _Timokreon_ and Themistoklês, v. 279.
-
-  _Timolaus_, speech of, ix. 304.
-
-  _Timoleon_, appointment of, to aid Syracuse, xi. 136, 142;
-    life and character of, before B. C. 344, xi. 136 _seq._;
-    and Timophanes, xi. 136 _seq._;
-    preparations of, for his expedition to Syracuse, xi. 143;
-    voyage of, from Corinth to Sicily, xi. 143 _seq._;
-    message from Hiketas to, xi. 144;
-    at Rhegium, xi. 144 _seq._;
-    at Tauromenium, xi. 146;
-    at Adranum, xi. 148, 156;
-    first arrival of, at Syracuse, xi. 149;
-    surrender of Ortygia to, xi. 150 _seq._;
-    reinforcement from Corinth to, xi. 152, 155, 157;
-    admiration excited by the successes of, xi. 152, 162;
-    advantage of Ortygia to, xi. 155;
-    return of, from Adranum to Syracuse, xi. 158;
-    Messênê declares in favor of, xi. 158;
-    capture of Epipolæ by, xi. 160;
-    favor of the gods towards, xi. 161, 179, 181;
-    ascribes his successes to the gods, xi. 163;
-    temptations and conduct of, on becoming master of Syracuse,
-      xi. 163 _seq._;
-    demolition of the Dionysian stronghold in Ortygia by, xi. 165;
-    erection of courts of justice at Syracuse by, xi. 166;
-    recall of exiles to Syracuse, by, xi. 166;
-    capitulation of Hiketas with, at Leontini, xi. 170;
-    puts down the despots in Sicily, xi. 170, 180 _seq._;
-    march of, from Syracuse against the Carthaginians, xi. 172 _seq._;
-    and Thrasius, xi. 172, 180;
-    victory of, over the Carthaginians at the Krimêsus, xi. 174 _seq._;
-    and Mamerkus, xi. 180 _seq._;
-    partial defeats of his troops, xi. 180;
-    victory of, over Hiketas at the Damurias, xi. 181;
-    surrender of Leontini and Hiketas to, xi. 182;
-    peace of, with the Carthaginians, xi. 182;
-    capture of Messênê and Hippon by, xi. 184;
-    lays down his power at Syracuse, xi. 185;
-    great influence of, after his resignation at Syracuse, xi. 186, 193;
-    and the immigration of new Greek settlers into Sicily,
-      xi. 188 _seq._;
-    residence of, at Syracuse, xi. 190;
-    in the public assembly at Syracuse, xi. 190 _seq._;
-    uncorrupted moderation and public spirit of, xi. 192;
-    freedom and prosperity in Sicily, introduced by, xi. 193;
-    death and obsequies of, xi. 194;
-    and Dion, contrast between, xi. 196 _seq._;
-    the constitution established at Syracuse by, exchanged for an
-      oligarchy, xii. 393.
-
-  _Timomachus_ in the Hellespont, x. 373.
-
-  _Timophanes_ and Timoleon, xi. 136 _seq._
-
-  _Timotheus, son of Konon_, x. 110;
-    circumnavigation of Peloponnesus by, x. 132;
-    at Zakynthus, x. 141;
-    appointment of, to aid Korkyra, B. C. 373, x. 144;
-    delay of, in aiding Korkyra, x. 146 _seq._, 147 _n._;
-    and Iphikrates, x. 149, 288, 299 _n._ 2;
-    trial and acquittal of, x. 153 _seq._, 154 _n._;
-    expedition of, to Asia Minor, B. C. 366, x. 252, 294 _seq._;
-    and Charidemus, x. 299, 300;
-    successes of, in Macedonia and Chalkidikê, B. C. 365-364, x. 300;
-    failure of, at Amphipolis, B. C. 364, x. 301;
-    and Kotys, x. 302;
-    in the Chersonese, B. C. 363, x. 302, 306, 368;
-    in the Hellespont, B. C. 357, xi. 224;
-    accusation of, by Chares, xi. 226 _seq._, 228 _n._ 4;
-    arrogance and unpopularity of, xi. 227;
-    exile and death of, xi. 229.
-
-  _Timotheus, of the Pontic Herakleia_, xii. 465.
-
-  _Tiribazus_ and The Ten Thousand Greeks, ix. 99, 102;
-    embassy of Antalkidas, Konon, and others to, ix. 359 _seq._;
-    and Antalkidas at, Susa, ix. 383;
-    and the peace of Antalkidas, ix. 385;
-    and Orontes, x. 22, 23.
-
-  _Tisamenus, son of Orestes_, ii. 4, 7, 8 _n._ 1.
-
-  _Tisamenus, the Athenian_, decree of, viii. 295.
-
-  _Tisiphonus_, despot at Pheræ, xi. 205.
-
-  _Tissaphernes_ and Pharnabazus, embassy from, to Sparta, B. C. 413,
-      vii. 366;
-    and Chalkideus, treaty between, vii. 376;
-    first treaty of, with the Peloponnesians, vii. 376;
-    payment of the Peloponnesian fleet by, vii. 389;
-    and Astyochus, treaty between, vii. 395 _seq._;
-    second treaty of, with the Peloponnesians, vii. 395 _seq._;
-    and Lichas, at Milêtus, vii. 398;
-    double-dealing and intrigues of, with the Peloponnesian fleet,
-      vii. 398, 400 _seq._;
-    escape and advice of Alkibiades, to, viii. 3 _seq._;
-    and the Greeks, Alkibiadês acts as interpreter between, viii. 5;
-    reduction of pay to the Peloponnesian fleet by, viii. 5;
-    third treaty of, with the Peloponnesians, viii. 23 _seq._;
-    envoy from, to Sparta, B. C. 411, viii. 98;
-    false promises of, to Mindarus, viii. 99;
-    and the Phenician fleet at Aspendus, viii. 99, 100, 111;
-    and the Peloponnesians at the Hellespont, viii. 110 _seq._;
-    Alkibiadês arrested by, viii. 120;
-    charge of, against Cyrus the Younger, ix. 7;
-    negotiations and convention of, with the Ten Thousand Greeks,
-      ix. 59 _seq._;
-    retreating march of the Ten Thousand under, ix. 63 _seq._;
-    treachery of, towards Klearchus and other Greeks, ix. 70 _seq._;
-    plan of, against the Ten Thousand Greeks, ix. 75;
-    attack of, on the Ten Thousand Greeks, ix. 90;
-    and the Asiatic Greeks, ix. 206;
-    and Derkyllidas, ix. 209, 219 _seq._;
-    and Agesilaus, ix. 261, 267;
-    death of, ix. 268.
-
-  _Titanides_, the, i. 4.
-
-  _Titans_, the, i. 4, 5, 8;
-    the Orphic, i. 17.
-
-  Τίθεσθαι τὰ ὅπλα, meaning of, vi. 114 _n._ 3, 356 _n._ 2, 373 _n._,
-      385 _n._ 2, 387 _n._ 2.
-
-  _Tithraustes_ supersedes Tissaphernes, and opens negotiations with
-      Agesilaus, ix. 268;
-    sends an envoy to Greece against Sparta, ix. 286 _seq._;
-    victory of Chares and Artabazus over, xi. 231.
-
-  _Tolmidês_, voyage of, round Peloponnesus, v. 333;
-    defeat and death of, v. 348.
-
-  _Tomi_, legendary origin of the name, i. 238 _n._ 3, xii. 473.
-
-  _Topographical_ impossibilities in the legend of Troy no obstacles to
-      its reception, i. 332;
-    criticisms inapplicable to the legend of Troy, i. 333.
-
-  _Torgium_, victory of Agathokles over Deinokrates at, xii. 447.
-
-  _Torônê_, surprise and capture of, by Brasidas, vi. 422;
-    capture of, by Kleon, vi. 462.
-
-  _Torrhêbia_, iii. 223.
-
-  _Torture_, use of, to elicit truth, vii. 201 _n._
-
-  _Town-occupations_, encouragement to, at Athens, iii. 136.
-
-  _Towns_, fortification of, in early Greece, ii. 108 _seq._
-
-  _Trades_, Grecian deities of, i. 342.
-
-  _Tradition, Greek_, matter of, uncertified, i. 433;
-    fictitious matter in, does not imply fraud, i. 434.
-
-  _Træzen_, removal of Athenians to, on Xerxes’s approach, v. 108.
-
-  _Tragedies_, lost, of Promêtheus, i. 78 _n._ 2.
-
-  _Tragedy_, Athenian, growth of, viii. 318;
-    Athenian, abundant production of, viii. 319;
-    Athenians, effect of, on the public mind, viii. 321;
-    Grecian, ethical sentiment in, viii. 336.
-
-  _Trapezus_, legendary origin of, i. 175;
-    date of the foundation of, iii. 252 _n._ 2;
-    the Ten Thousand at, xi. 111, 120 _seq._;
-    departure of the Ten Thousand from, ix. 127.
-
-  _Trench_ of Artaxerxes from the Euphrates to the wall of Media, ix. 40,
-      42 _n._ 1.
-
-  _Triballi_, defeat of Philip by, xi. 462;
-    victory of Alexander over, xii. 23.
-
-  _Tribes_ and demes of Kleisthenês, iv. 132 _seq._
-
-  _Tribute_ of the subject-allies of Athens, vi. 5 _n._ 1, 6 _n._ 1.
-
-  _Trierarchic_ reform of Demosthenês, xi. 462 _seq._
-
-  _Trinakria_, town of, vii. 125.
-
-  _Triphylia_, Minyæ in, ii. 27;
-    and Elis, ii. 442, x. 260, 313.
-
-  _Triphylians_, ii. 303.
-
-  _Triple_ theology of the pagan world, i. 439;
-    partition of past time by Varro, i. 488.
-
-  _Tripolis_, iii. 268.
-
-  _Trireme_, equipment of a, vi. 200 _n._
-
-  _Tritantæchmês_, exclamation of, on the Greeks and the Olympic games,
-      v. 113.
-
-  _Tritôn_ and the Argonauts, i. 239.
-
-  _Tritônis_, Lake, iv. 35 _n._ 1;
-    prophecies about, iv. 39.
-
-  _Trittyes_, iii. 52, 67 _n._
-
-  _Trôad_, the, i. 334.
-
-  _Trôas Alexandreia_, i. 328.
-
-  _Trôas historical_, and the Teukrians, i. 334.
-
-  _Trojan war_, Thucydidês’s version of, i. 405 _seq._;
-    the date of, ii. 38, 54.
-
-  _Trojans_, allies of, i. 293;
-    new allies of, i. 298;
-    and Phrygians, i. 335.
-
-  _Trophonius_ and Agamêdês, i. 130.
-
-  _Trôs_, i. 285.
-
-  _Troy_, legend of, i. 284-340.
-
-  _Tunês_, capture of, by Agathokles, xii. 414;
-    mutiny in the army of Agathokles at, xii. 426;
-    Archagathus blocked up by the Carthaginians at, xii. 439, 442;
-    the Carthaginians over Agathokles near, xii. 442;
-    nocturnal panic in the Carthaginian camp near, xii. 442;
-    Agathokles deserts his army at, and they capitulate, xii. 443, 444.
-
-  _Turpin_, chronicle of, i. 475.
-
-  _Tychê_, near Syracuse, vii. 245.
-
-  _Tydeus_, i. 152, 271.
-
-  _Tyndareus_, and Lêda, i. 168 _seq._
-
-  _Tyndarion_, vii. 121.
-
-  _Tyndaris_, foundation of, xi. 4.
-
-  _Types_, manifold, of the Homeric gods, i. 349.
-
-  _Typhaôn_ and Echidna, offspring of, i. 7.
-
-  _Typhôeus_, i. 9.
-
-  _Tyre_, iii. 266 _seq._;
-    siege and subjugation of, by Nebuchadnezzar, iii. 332;
-    and Carthage, amicable relations between, iii. 348;
-    siege and capture of, by Alexander, xii. 132 _seq._
-
-  _Tyrô_, different accounts of, i. 107.
-
-  _Tyrrhenians_, O. Müller’s view of the origin of, iii. 180.
-
-  _Tyrtæus_ and the first Messenian war, ii. 422, 424, 427;
-    efficiency of, in the second Messenian war, ii. 431 _seq._;
-    poetry of, iv. 82;
-    age and metres of, iv. 78.
-
-
-  U.
-
-  _Uranos_, i. 4, 5.
-
-  _Usury_ and the Jewish law, iii. 111 _n._
-
-  _Utica_, iii. 271;
-    capture of, by Agathokles, xii. 437.
-
-  _Uxii_, conquest of, by Alexander, xii. 170.
-
-
-  V.
-
-  _Varro’s_ triple division of pagan theology, i. 439;
-    his triple partition of past time, i. 488.
-
-  _Veneti_, the, i. 319.
-
-  _Villagers_ regarded as inferiors by Hellens, ii. 259, 263.
-
-  _Villages_ numerous in early Greece, ii. 261.
-
-  _Volsunga Saga_, i. 479.
-
-
-  W.
-
-  _War_, the first sacred, iv. 62 _seq._, v. 346;
-    the social, xi. 220, 231;
-    the second sacred, xi. 241 _seq._, 374, 421 _seq._;
-    the third sacred. xi. 468.
-
-  _Wise men_ of Greece, seven, iv. 94 _seq._
-
-  _Wolf’s_ Prolegomena to Homer, ii. 142;
-    his theory on the composition of the Iliad and Odyssey,
-      ii. 150 _seq._
-
-  _Women_, Solon’s laws respecting, iii. 140.
-
-  _Wooden horse_ of Troy, the, i. 303, 309.
-
-  _“Works and Days”_, races of men in, i. 64 _seq._;
-    differs from the Theogony and Homer, i. 66;
-    mingled ethical and mythical sentiment in, i. 67 _seq._;
-    the earliest didactic poem, i. 69;
-    personal feeling pervading, i. 71;
-    probable age of, i. 72;
-    legend of Pandôra in, i. 76;
-    general feeling of the poet in, i. 77;
-    on women, i. 77.
-
-  _Writing_, unknown to Homeric and Hesiodic Greeks, ii. 116;
-    few traces of, long after the Homeric age, ii. 142;
-    among the Greeks, iv. 97.
-
-
-  X.
-
-  _Xanthippus_ and Miltiadês, iv. 357, 365.
-
-  _Xanthippus son of Periklês_, vi. 100.
-
-  _Xenarês_ and Kleobulus, the anti-Athenian ephors, vii. 24 _seq._
-
-  _Xenias_ and Pasion, desertion of Cyrus by, ix. 28.
-
-  _Xenodokus_, xii. 425, 439, 441.
-
-  _Xenokrates_, embassy of, to Antipater, xii. 323, 324, 332.
-
-  _Xenophanes_, his condemnation of ancient legends, i. 397;
-    Thalês, and Pythagoras, i. 367 _seq._;
-    his treatment of ancient mythes, i. 418;
-    philosophy and school of, iv. 387 _seq._
-
-  _Xenophôn_, his treatment of ancient mythes, i. 410;
-    on Spartan women, ii. 388, 389 _n._ 1;
-    his Cyropædia, iii. 229 _n._ 2; iv. 183;
-    his version of Cyrus’s capture of Babylon, iv. 213 _n._;
-    on the dikasteries, vi. 42, 46 _n._ 2;
-    and Plato, evidence of, about Sokratês, viii. 409 _seq._, 448 _n._ 3;
-    the preceptorial and positive exhortation of Sokrates exhibited by,
-      viii. 450;
-    remarks of, on the accusation against Sokrates, viii. 473;
-    on the condemnation of Sokrates, viii. 482;
-    and his joining of the Cyreian army, ix. 12;
-    length of the parasang in, ix. 14 _n._ 3;
-    dream of, after the seizure of the generals, ix. 77;
-    address of, to the captains of the Ten Thousand, after the seizure of
-      the generals, ix. 78;
-    chosen a general of the Ten Thousand, ix. 80;
-    first speech of, to the Ten Thousand, after being chosen a general,
-      ix. 81 _seq._;
-    great ascendancy acquired by, over the Ten Thousand, ix. 83 _seq._;
-    and Cheirisophus, ix. 92, 96, 106, 107;
-    prowess of, against the Persians, ix. 92 _seq._;
-    in the mountains of the Karduchians, ix. 95 _seq._;
-    at the Kentritês, ix. 100 _seq._;
-    propositions of, to the Ten Thousand at Trapezus, ix. 125;
-    his idea of founding a new city on the Euxine, ix. 132 _seq._;
-    charges against, and speeches of, at Kotyôra, ix. 139 _seq._;
-    offered the sole command of the Ten Thousand, ix. 195;
-    at Herakleia and Kalpê, ix. 146 _seq._;
-    and Kleander, ix. 153, 155;
-    at Byzantium, ix. 154;
-    and Anaxibius, ix. 164, 165 _seq._;
-    takes leave of the Ten Thousand, ix. 164;
-    rejoins the Ten Thousand, ix. 165;
-    and Aristarchus, ix. 166;
-    and Seuthes, ix. 154, 167 _seq._;
-    his poverty and sacrifice to Zeus Meilichios, ix. 171 _seq._;
-    at Pergamus in Mysia, ix. 172 _seq._;
-    takes his second farewell of the Ten Thousand, ix. 174;
-    and the Cyreian army under the Lacedæmonians, ix. 174, 208, 314, 317;
-    banishment of, by the Athenians, ix. 174, 175 _n._ 3;
-    at Skillus, ix. 176 _seq._;
-    later life of, ix. 177;
-    and Deinarchus, ix. 178 _n._ 3;
-    on the conduct of Sparta between B. C. 387-379, x. 77;
-    partiality of, to Sparta in his Hellenica, x. 230 _n._;
-    on the results of the battle of Mantinea, x. 350.
-
-  _Xerxes_, chosen as successor to Darius, v. 2;
-    instigated to the invasion of Greece, v. 3;
-    resolves to invade Greece, v. 4;
-    deliberation and dreams of, respecting the invasion of Greece,
-      v. 6 _seq._;
-    vast preparations of, for the invasion of Greece, v. 13 _seq._;
-    march of, to Sardis, and collection of his forces there, v. 14;
-    throws two bridges across the Hellespont, v. 15;
-    wrath of, on the destruction of his bridges across the Hellespont,
-      v. 16;
-    punishment of the Hellespont by, v. 16 _seq._;
-    second bridges of, over the Hellespont, v. 18 _seq._;
-    ship-canal of, across the isthmus of Mount Athos, v. 22 _seq._;
-    bridges of, across the Strymôn, v. 25;
-    demands of, sent to Greece before his invasion, v. 25, 56;
-    and the mare which brought forth a hare, v. 25 _n._;
-    march of, from Sardis, v. 25;
-    and Pythius, the Phrygian, v. 27;
-    march of, to Abydos, v. 28;
-    respect shown to Ilium by, v. 29;
-    crossing of the Hellespont by, v. 29 _seq._;
-    march of, to Doriskus, v. 31;
-    review and muster of the forces of, at Doriskus, v. 31, 40;
-    numbering of the army of, at Doriskus, v. 33;
-    number of the army of, v. 33 _seq._;
-    conversations of, with Demaratus, v. 40, 86, 96;
-    march of, from Doriskus along Thrace, v. 41 _seq._;
-    crosses the Strymôn and marches to Akanthus, v. 43;
-    march of, to Therma, v. 44;
-    favorable prospects of, on reaching the boundary of Hellas, v. 44;
-    preparations of, known beforehand in Greece, v. 56;
-    heralds of, obtain submission from many Grecian cities, v. 57;
-    alarm and mistrust in Greece on the invasion of, v. 59;
-    unwillingness or inability of northern Greeks to resist, v. 64;
-    inability of Gelon to join in resisting the invasion of, v. 67;
-    the Thessalians and the invasion of, v. 67;
-    Grecian army sent to defend Tempê against, v. 68;
-    abandonment of the defence of Tempê against, v. 69 _seq._;
-    submission of northern Greeks to, after the retreat from Tempê,
-      v. 69;
-    engagement of confederate Greeks against, such as joined, v. 70;
-    first encounter of the fleet of, with that of the Greeks, v. 79;
-    movements of, from Therma to Thermopylæ, v. 82;
-    movements of the fleet of, from Therma to Thermopylæ, v. 82 _n._ 3;
-    destruction of the fleet of, by storm at Magnesia, v. 84 _seq._;
-    delay of, with his land force near Trachis, v. 86 _seq._;
-    impressions of, about the defenders at Thermopylæ, v. 87;
-    at Thermopylæ, doubts about the motives ascribed by Herodotus to,
-      v. 87;
-    the mountain-path avoiding Thermopylæ revealed to, v. 88;
-    impressions of, after the combat with Leonidas, v. 95;
-    Demaratus’s advice to, after the death of Leonidas, v. 96;
-    manœuvres ascribed to, respecting the dead at Thermopylæ, v. 103;
-    losses of, repaired after the battle of Thermopylæ, v. 105;
-    abandonment of Attica on the approach of, v. 107 _seq._;
-    occupation of Attica and Athens by, v. 111;
-    conversation of, with Arcadians, on the Olympic games, v. 113;
-    detachment of, against Delphi, v. 114;
-    capture of the Acropolis at Athens by, v. 116 _seq._;
-    number of the fleet of, at Salamis, v. 118 _n._ 3;
-    reviews his fleet at Phalêrum, and calls a council of war, v. 119;
-    resolution of, to fight at Salamis, v. 119;
-    Themistoklês’s message to, before the battle of Salamis, v. 127;
-    surrounds the Greeks at Salamis, v. 128 _seq._;
-    and the fleets at Salamis, position of, v. 131;
-    story of three nephews of, at Salamis, v. 132 _n._;
-    fears of, after the battle of Salamis, v. 138;
-    resolves to go back to Asia after the battle of Salamis,
-      v. 139 _seq._;
-    sends his fleet to Asia after the battle of Salamis, v. 139;
-    Mardonius’s proposal to, after the battle of Salamis, v. 140;
-    Themistoklês’s message to, after the battle of Salamis, v. 141;
-    retreating march of, to the Hellespont, v. 142 _seq._;
-    and Artayktês, v. 202;
-    causes of the repulse of, from Greece, v. 240;
-    comparison between the invasion of, and that of Alexander, v. 241;
-    death of, ix. 2.
-
-  _Xuthus_, i. 99 _seq._, 103;
-     and Kreüsa, i. 204.
-
-
-  Z.
-
-  _Zab, the Great_, the Ten Thousand Greeks at, ix. 69 _seq._;
-    crossed by the Ten Thousand Greeks, ix. 88.
-
-  _Zagreus_, i. 18, 19 _n._
-
-  _Zakynthus_, iii. 410;
-    Timotheus at, x. 141;
-    forces of Dion mustered at, xi. 84, 87;
-    Dion’s voyage from, to Herakleia, xi. 88.
-
-  _Zaleukus_, iii. 382.
-
-  _Zalmoxis_, i. 448.
-
-  _Zanklê_, iii. 365;
-    fate of, v. 211 _seq._
-
-  _Zariaspa_, Alexander at, xii. 206.
-
-  _Zêlos_, i. 8.
-
-  _Zeno of Elea_, viii. 341, 344, 345.
-
-  _Zephyrus_, i. 6.
-
-  _Zêtês_ and Kalais, i. 199.
-
-  _Zethus_ and Amphiôn, Homeric legend of, i. 257, 263 _seq._
-
-  _Zeugitæ_, iii. 118;
-    Boeckh’s opinion on the pecuniary qualification of, iii. 119 _n._
-
-  _Zeus_, i. 3, 7, 8 _seq._, 12;
-    Homeric, i. 13;
-    account of, in the Orphic Theogony, i. 18;
-    mythical character, names, and functions, i. 61 _seq._;
-    origin of the numerous mythes of, i. 62;
-    and Promêtheus, i. 63, 75;
-    and Danaê, i. 90;
-    and Alkmênê, i. 93;
-    and Ægina, i. 184;
-    and Eurôpa, i. 257;
-    and Ganymêdês, i. 285;
-    in the fourth book of the Iliad different from Zeus in the first and
-      eighth, ii. 190;
-    fluctuation of Greek opinion on the supremacy of, iv. 196 _n._
-
-  _Zeus Ammon_, Alexander’s visit to the oracle of, xii. 147.
-
-  _Zeus Laphystios_, i. 127.
-
-  _Zeus Lykæus_, i. 174.
-
-  _Zeus Meilichios_, Xenophon’s sacrifice to, ix. 171 _seq._
-
-  _Zopyrus_, iv. 231.
-
-
-
-
-
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