diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'old/60422-h/60422-h.htm')
| -rw-r--r-- | old/60422-h/60422-h.htm | 9052 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 9052 deletions
diff --git a/old/60422-h/60422-h.htm b/old/60422-h/60422-h.htm deleted file mode 100644 index 8cc5b8d..0000000 --- a/old/60422-h/60422-h.htm +++ /dev/null @@ -1,9052 +0,0 @@ -<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" - "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> -<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en" lang="en"> - <head> - <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1" /> - <meta http-equiv="Content-Style-Type" content="text/css" /> - <title> - The Project Gutenberg eBook of Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics, by John Dewey. - </title> - <link rel="coverpage" href="images/cover.jpg" /> - <style type="text/css"> - -body { - margin-left: 10%; - margin-right: 10%;} - - h1,h2,h3,h4,h5 { - text-align: center; - clear: both;} - -h1.hidden {visibility: hidden; font-size: small;} - -p { margin-top: .51em; - text-align: justify; - margin-bottom: .49em;} - -.ph1, .ph2 { text-align: center; text-indent: 0em; font-weight: bold; } -.ph1 { font-size: xx-large; margin: .67em auto; } -.ph2 { font-size: x-large; margin: .75em auto; } - -hr {width: 65%; - margin-top: 2em; - margin-bottom: 2em; - margin-left: auto; - margin-right: auto; - clear: both; - page-break-after: always;} - -ins { text-decoration:none;} - - .pb { position: absolute; - left: 92%; - font-size: small; - text-align: right; - font-weight:normal; - font-style:normal; - letter-spacing: 0em; } - -table { margin: 2em auto;} -table.toc td { padding-bottom: 0.5em; } -td.tocpart { vertical-align: top; text-align: center;} -td.tocchap { vertical-align: top; text-align: left; text-indent: -0.5em; padding-left: 0.5em; padding-right: 2.5em; } -td.tocsec { vertical-align: top; text-align: left; text-indent: -0.5em; padding-left: 1.5em; padding-right: 2.5em; } -td.tocpag { vertical-align: bottom; text-align: right; } - -.blockquote { - margin-left: 10%; - margin-right: 10%;} - -.center {text-align: center;} -.smcap {font-variant: small-caps;} - -.footnote {margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; font-size: 0.9em;} - .footnote .label {margin-left: -5%; position: absolute} - .fnanchor {font-size: .8em; text-decoration: none;} - -ul.index { list-style-type: none; } -li.ifrst { margin-top: 1em; } -li.isub1 {text-indent: 1em;} -li.isub2 {text-indent: 2em;} - -.poetry-container { text-align: center;} -.poem {display: inline-block; - text-align: left;} -.poem .stanza {margin: 1em 0em 1em 0em;} -.poem .verse {padding-left: 3em; text-indent: -3em;} -.poem .indent6 {text-indent: 2em;} - -.sidenote { - text-indent: 0; - text-align: left; - min-width: 5em; - max-width: 7.75em; - padding-bottom: .3em; - padding-top: .3em; - padding-left: .3em; - padding-right: .3em; - margin-right: 2em; - float: left; - clear: left; - margin-top: 1em; - margin-bottom: .3em; - font-weight: bold; - color: black; - border: thin dotted gray;} - -@media handheld -{.sidenote, .sni - { float: left; - clear: none; - font-weight: bold;} -} - - </style> - </head> -<body> - - -<pre> - -Project Gutenberg's Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics, by John Dewey - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics - -Author: John Dewey - -Release Date: October 4, 2019 [EBook #60422] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK OUTLINES OF CRITICAL THEORY OF ETHICS *** - - - - -Produced by The Online Distributed Proofreading Team at -http://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images -generously made available by The Internet Archive/American -Libraries.) - - - - - - -</pre> - - -<p class="center"><big>TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE:</big></p> -<p>Inconsistencies in hyphenation and punctuation have not been corrected. -A list of other corrections can be found at the <a href="#Corrections">end -of the document</a>. The Table of Contents is left as in the original and does -not list all of the subsections.</p> - -<h1 class="hidden">Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics.</h1> -<hr /> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p><cite>For we are not children of the bond-woman, but of -the free.</cite></p> - -<p><i lang="la" xml:lang="la">E pur se muove.</i></p></div> -<hr /> - -<p class="ph1">OUTLINES<br /> -<small>OF A</small><br /> -CRITICAL THEORY OF ETHICS</p> - -<p class="center">BY</p> - -<p class="ph2">JOHN DEWEY<br /> -<small>Professor of Philosophy in the University of Michigan</small></p> - -<p class="center">ANN ARBOR, MICHIGAN<br /> -REGISTER PUBLISHING COMPANY<br /> -The Inland Press<br /> -1891.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p class="center">Copyright, 1891. <span class="smcap">Register Publishing Co.</span>, Ann Arbor, Mich.</p> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<h2>CONTENTS.</h2> - -<table class="toc" summary="Table of Contents"><tr> -<td class="tocchap"><span class="smcap">Introduction</span></td> -<td class="tocpag"><a href="#Pg001">1-12</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tocpart">PART I.—FUNDAMENTAL ETHICAL NOTIONS.</td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tocchap"><span class="smcap">Chapter I.</span>—<i>The Good</i></td> -<td class="tocpag"><a href="#Pg013">13-138</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tocsec">Hedonism</td> -<td class="tocpag"><a href="#Pg014">14</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tocsec">Utilitarianism</td> -<td class="tocpag"><a href="#Pg052">52</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tocsec">Evolutionary Utilitarianism</td> -<td class="tocpag"><a href="#Pg067">67</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tocsec">Kantianism</td> -<td class="tocpag"><a href="#Pg078">78</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tocsec">Problem and Solution</td> -<td class="tocpag"><a href="#Pg095">95</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tocsec">Realization of Individuality</td> -<td class="tocpag"><a href="#Pg097">97</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tocsec">Ethical Postulate</td> -<td class="tocpag"><a href="#Pg127">127</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tocchap"><span class="smcap">Chapter II.</span>—<i>The Idea of Obligation</i></td> -<td class="tocpag"><a href="#Pg139">139-158</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tocsec">Bain's Theory</td> -<td class="tocpag"><a href="#Pg140">140</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tocsec">Spencer's Theory</td> -<td class="tocpag"><a href="#Pg142">142</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tocsec">Kant's Theory</td> -<td class="tocpag"><a href="#Pg147">147</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tocsec">Its Real Nature</td> -<td class="tocpag"><a href="#Pg152">152</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tocchap"><span class="smcap">Chapter III.</span>—<i>The Idea of Freedom</i></td> -<td class="tocpag"><a href="#Pg158">158-166</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tocsec">Negative Freedom</td> -<td class="tocpag"><a href="#Pg158">158</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tocsec">Potential Freedom</td> -<td class="tocpag"><a href="#Pg159">159</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tocsec">Positive Freedom</td> -<td class="tocpag"><a href="#Pg164">164</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tocpart">PART II.—THE ETHICAL WORLD.</td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tocsec">Social Relations</td> -<td class="tocpag"><a href="#Pg167">167</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tocsec">Moral Institutions</td> -<td class="tocpag"><a href="#Pg169">169</a><span class="pb" id="Pgvi">[vi]</span></td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tocpart">PART III.—THE MORAL LIFE OF THE INDIVIDUAL.</td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tocsec">Division of Subject</td> -<td class="tocpag"><a href="#Pg181">181</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tocchap"><span class="smcap">Chapter I.</span>—<i>The Formation and Growth of Ideals</i></td> -<td class="tocpag"><a href="#Pg182">182-211</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tocsec">Conscience</td> -<td class="tocpag"><a href="#Pg182">182</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tocsec">Conscientiousness</td> -<td class="tocpag"><a href="#Pg199">199</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tocsec">Development of Ideals</td> -<td class="tocpag"><a href="#Pg206">206</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tocchap"><span class="smcap">Chapter II.</span>—<i>The Moral Struggle or the Realizing of Ideals</i></td> -<td class="tocpag"><a href="#Pg211">211-227</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tocsec">Goodness as Struggle</td> -<td class="tocpag"><a href="#Pg211">211</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tocsec">Badness</td> -<td class="tocpag"><a href="#Pg214">214</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tocsec">Goodness and Badness</td> -<td class="tocpag"><a href="#Pg221">221</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tocchap"><span class="smcap">Chapter III.</span>—<i>Realized Morality or the Virtues</i></td> -<td class="tocpag"><a href="#Pg227">227-233</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tocsec">Cardinal Virtues</td> -<td class="tocpag"><a href="#Pg231">231</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tocchap"><span class="smcap">Conclusion</span></td> -<td class="tocpag"><a href="#Pg233">233-238</a></td> -</tr></table> - -</div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<h2>PREFACE.</h2> - -<p>Although the following pages have taken shape -in connection with class-room work, they are intended -as an independent contribution to ethical -science. It is commonly demanded of such a work -that its readers shall have some prefatory hint of -its sources and deviations. In accordance with -this custom, I may state that for the backbone of -the theory here presented—the conception of the -will as the expression of ideas, and of social ideas; -the notion of an objective ethical world realized in -institutions which afford moral ideals, theatre and -impetus to the individual; the notion of the moral -life as growth in freedom, as the individual finds -and conforms to the law of his social placing—for -this backbone I am especially indebted to Green's -'Prolegomena to Ethics', to Mr. Bradley's 'Ethical -Studies', to Professor Caird's 'Social Philosophy of -Comte' and 'Critical Philosophy of Kant' (to this -latter book in particular my indebtedness is fundamental), -and to Alexander's 'Moral Order and Progress'. -Although I have not been able to adopt -the stand-point or the method of Mr. Spencer, or of -Mr. Leslie Stephen my obligation to the 'Data of -Ethics' and to the 'Science of Ethics' (especially -to the latter) is large.</p> - -<p>As to the specific forms which give a flesh and -blood of its own to this backbone, I may call attention -<span class="pb" id="Pgviii">[viii]</span> -to the idea of desire as the ideal activity in contrast -with actual possession; to the analysis of individuality -into function including capacity and environment; -to the treatment of the social bearings of -science and art (a point concerning which I am -indebted to my friend, Mr. Franklin Ford); to the -statement of an ethical postulate; to the accounts -of obligation, of moral rules, and of moral badness.</p> - -<p>While the book is an analysis, in outline, of the -main elements of the theory of ethics rather than -a discussion of all possible detailed questions, it -will not be found the less fitted, I hope, to give a -student an idea of the main methods and problems -of contemporary ethics. Other teachers, indeed, -may agree that a general outline is better than a -blanket-mortgage spread over and forestalling all -the activity of the student's mind.</p> - -<p>I have not been unmindful of the advisability -of avoiding in presentation both undue polemic, -and undue dogmatism without sufficient reference -to the statements of others. I hope the method -hit upon, of comparing opposite one-sided views -with the aim of discovering a theory apparently -more adequate, will help keep the balance. I have -quoted freely from the chief modern authorities, -hoping that the tastes here given will tempt the -reader to the banquet waiting in the authors -themselves. The occasional references introduced -are not bibliographical, nor intended as exhaustive -statements of authorities consulted; they are meant -as aids to an intelligent reading on the part of the -general student. For this reason they are confined -mainly to modern English writings.</p> -</div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<span class="pb" id="Pg001">[1]</span> - -<h3>INTRODUCTION.</h3> - -<h4>I.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Definition of Ethics.</div> - -<p>The term ethics is derived from a -Greek word meaning manners, customs, -habits, just as the term morals -is derived from a Latin word with a similar meaning. -This suggests the character of the science as -an account of human action. Anthropology, ethnology, -psychology, are also, in their way, accounts -of human action. But these latter branches of -knowledge simply <em>describe</em>, while the business of -ethics is to <em>judge</em>.</p> - -<p>This does not mean that it belongs to ethics to -prescribe what man ought to do; but that its business -is to detect the element of obligation in conduct, -to examine conduct to see what gives it its -<em>worth</em>. Anthropology, etc., do not take into account -the <em>whole</em> of action, but simply some of its -aspects—either external or internal. Ethics deals -with conduct in its entirety, with reference, that is, -to what makes it conduct, its <em>end</em>, its real meaning. -Ethics is the science of conduct, understanding by -conduct man's activity in its whole reach.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>Three of the branches of philosophy may be called -<em>normative</em>, implying that they deal with some <em>norm, -<span class="pb" id="Pg002">[2]</span> -standard</em> or <em>end</em>, estimating the value of their respective -subject-matters as tested by this end. These are -Logic, dealing with the end Truth, and the value of -intellectual processes with respect to it; Æsthetics, -dealing with Beauty and the value of emotional conditions -as referred to it; and Ethics, as defined above. -But this norm in no case comes from outside the subject-matter; -it is the subject-matter considered in its -totality.</p></div> - -<h4 id="II">II.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Meaning of Moral.</div> - -<p>In its widest sense, the term moral or -ethical means nothing more than relating -to conduct; having to do with practice, -when we look at conduct or practice from the -point of view not of its occurrence, but of its value. -Action is something which takes place, and as such -it may be described like any objective fact. But -action has also relation to an end, and so considered -it is <em>moral</em>. The first step in ethics is to fix firmly -in mind the idea that the term moral does not mean -any special or peculiar kind of conduct, but simply -means practice and action, conduct viewed not -partially, but in connection with the end which it -realizes.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>It should be noted that the term moral has a wider -and a narrower sense. In the wider sense it means -action in the moral sphere, as opposed to <em>non</em>-moral, -and thus includes both good and bad conduct. In the -narrower sense it means moral, as opposed to <em>im</em>moral. -See Bradley, Ethical Studies, p. 53, note, for a -further meaning.</p></div> - -<span class="pb" id="Pg003">[3]</span> - -<h4 id="III">III.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Meaning of Conduct.</div> - -<p>Ethics then has to do with conduct or -action viewed completely, or in relation -to its end. But what is conduct? It -must be distinguished from action in general; for -any process of change, the working of a pump, the -growth of a plant, the barking of a dog, may be -called action. Conduct implies more than something -taking place; it implies purpose, motive, -intention; that the agent knows what he is about, -that he has something which he is aiming at. All -action accomplishes something or brings about -results, but conduct has the result <em>in view</em>. It -occurs for the sake of producing this result. Conduct -does not simply, like action in general, have a -cause, but also a reason, and the reason is present -to the mind of the agent. There can be conduct -only when there is a being who can propose to himself, -as an end to be reached by himself, something -which he regards as worth while. Such a being is -a moral agent, and his action, when conscious, is -conduct.</p> - -<h4>IV.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Division of Ethics.</div> - -<p>The main ethical problem is just this: -What is the conduct that really deserves -the name of conduct, the conduct of -which all other kinds of action can be only a perverted -or deflected form? Or, since it is the end -<span class="pb" id="Pg004">[4]</span> -which gives action its moral value, what is the true -end, <i lang="la" xml:lang="la">summum bonum</i> of man? Knowing this, we -have a standard by which we judge particular -acts. Those which embody this end are <em>right</em>, -others wrong. The question of the rightness of -conduct is simply a special form of the question -concerning the nature of the end or good. But the -end bears another relation to specific acts. They -are not only marked off by it as right or wrong, but -they have to fulfill it. The end or good decides -what should be or <em>ought</em> to be. Any act necessary -to fulfill the end is a <em>duty</em>. Our second inquiry -will be as to the nature of obligation or duty. -Then we have to discuss the nature of a being who -is capable of action, of manifesting and realizing the -end; capable of right (or wrong) of obligatory and -good action. This will lead us to discuss the question -of <i>Freedom, or Moral Capacity and its Realization</i>. -The discussion of these three abstract questions -will constitute Part I of our theory; Part II -will take up the various forms and institutions -in which the good is objectively realized, the family, -state, etc.; while Part III will be devoted to an -account of the moral experience of the individual.</p> - -<h4>V.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">The Motive in Conduct.</div> - -<p>Before taking up the first problem -presented, the nature of the good or -the end of conduct, it is necessary to -<span class="pb" id="Pg005">[5]</span> -analyze somewhat further the various sides and -factors of conduct in order to see where the distinctly -ethical element is to be found. The elements -particularly deserving consideration are (1) -the Motive; (2) the Feelings or Sentiments; (3) -Consequences of the Act; (4) Character of Agent. -We shall begin with</p> - -<p>1. <i>The Motive.</i> The motive of the act is the -end aimed at by the agent in performing the act. -Thus the motive of Julius Cæsar in crossing the -Rubicon was the whole series of results which he -intended to reach by that act of his. The motive -of a person in coming to college is to gain knowledge, -to prepare himself for a certain profession. -The motive is thus identical with the ideal element -of the action, the purpose in view.</p> - -<p>2. <i>The Feelings or Disposition.</i> Some writers -speak of the feelings under which the agent acts -as his motive. Thus we may suppose Julius Cæsar -'moved' by the feelings of ambition, of revenge, -etc., in crossing the Rubicon. The student may be -'moved' by curiosity, by vainglory, by emulation, -by conscience, in coming to college. It is better, -however, to regard the motive as the reason for -which the act is performed, and to use the term -moving or impelling cause for the feelings in their -relation to action. Thus we may imagine a parent -asking a child why he struck a playmate, meaning -<span class="pb" id="Pg006">[6]</span> -what was the motive of the action. If the child -should reply that he struck his playmate because -he was angry, this answer would give the moving -cause or impelling force of the action, but not its -motive. The motive would be the idea of punishing -this playmate, of getting even with him, of -taking something away from him. The motive is -the end which he desired to reach by striking and -on account of which he struck. This is implied by -the fact that the parent would ask, "What <em>made</em> you -<em>angry</em>?"</p> - -<h4>VI.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Moral Bearing of These Distinctions.</div> - -<p>It is the feelings which supply -the impelling force to action. -They may be termed, collectively, -the <em>natural disposition</em>. The natural disposition -in itself has no <em>moral</em> value. This has been well -illustrated by Bentham.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>Principles of Morals and Legislation, pp. 49-55. -Bentham here uses the term 'motive' to designate -what we have called the moving cause.</p></div> - -<p>We may select of the many examples which he -gives that of curiosity. We may imagine a boy -spinning a top, reading a useful book and letting -a wild ox loose in a road. Now curiosity may be -the 'motive' of each of these acts, yet the first act -would generally be called morally indifferent, the -second good, the third abominable.</p> - -<span class="pb" id="Pg007">[7]</span> -<p>What we mean by the 'natural' feelings, then, -is the feelings considered in abstraction from -activity: Benevolence, as a <em>mere</em> feeling, has no -higher moral value than malevolence. But if it is -directed upon action it gets a value at once; let the -end, the act, be right, and benevolence becomes a -name for a <em>moral</em> disposition—a tendency to <em>act</em> in -the due way. Nothing is more important than to -distinguish between mere sentiments, and feeling -as an element in conduct.</p> - -<h4 id="VII">VII.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Relation of Consequences and Conduct.</div> - -<p>Do the consequences of an act -have anything to do with its morality? -We may say no, pointing -to the fact that a man who does his -best we call good, although the -consequences of his act may be far from good. -We say his purpose in acting was right, and using -as he did all the knowledge that he had, he is not -to be blamed for its bad consequences. On the -other hand, it is evident that we do take into account -consequences in estimating the moral value -of an act. Suppose, to use one of Bentham's examples, -a person were about to shoot an animal but -foresaw that in doing so there was a strong probability -that he would also wound some bystander. -If he shot and the spectator were wounded, should -we not hold the agent morally responsible? Are -<span class="pb" id="Pg008">[8]</span> -there not multitudes of intended acts of which we -say that we cannot tell whether they are good or -bad until we know how they are likely to turn -out?</p> - -<p>The solution of the difficulty is in recognizing -the ambiguity of the term 'consequences'. It may -mean the whole outcome of the act. When I speak, -I set in motion the air, and its vibrations have, in -turn, long chains of effects. Whatever I do must -have an endless succession of 'consequences' of -which I can know but very little; just so far as, in -any act, I am ignorant of the conditions under -which it is performed, so far I am ignorant -of its consequences. <em>Such</em> consequences are -wholly irrelevant morally. They have no more to do -with the morality of the act than has the fact that -the earth is revolving while the act is taking -place.</p> - -<p>But we may mean by consequences the <em>foreseen</em> -consequences of an act. Just in the degree -that any consequence is considered likely to result -from an act, just in that degree it gets moral value, -for it becomes <em>part of the act</em> itself. The reason -that in many cases we cannot judge of the morality -of an intended act until we can judge its probable -results, is that until we know of these results the -action is a mere abstraction, having no content at -all. <em>The conceived results constitute the content of -<span class="pb" id="Pg009">[9]</span> -the act to be performed.</em> They are not merely relevant -to its morality, but <em>are</em> its moral quality. The -question is whether any consequence is foreseen, -conceived, or not. The foreseen, the <em>ideal</em> consequences -are the end of the act, and as such form -the <em>motive</em>.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>See on Sections 6 and 7, Alexander, Moral Order and -Progress, pp. 36-46; on Section 7, Green, Prolegomena -to Ethics, pp. 317-323.</p></div> - -<h4 id="VIII">VIII.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Character and Conduct.</div> - -<p>We have seen that the moral sentiments, -or the moral disposition (distinguished -from the feelings as passing -emotions), on one side, and the consequences as -ideal or conceived (distinguished from the consequences -that, <i lang="la" xml:lang="la">de facto</i>, result), on the other, both -have moral value. If we take the moral feelings, -not one by one, but as a whole, as an <em>attitude</em> of -the agent toward conduct, as expressing the kind of -motives which upon the whole moves him to action, -we have <em>character</em>. And just so, if we take the -consequences willed, not one by one, but as a -whole, as the kind of end which the agent endeavors -to realize, we have <em>conduct</em>. Character and -conduct are, morally, the same thing, looked at first -inwardly and then outwardly. Character, except -as manifest in conduct, is a barren ideality. Our -moral judgments are always severe upon a man -<span class="pb" id="Pg010">[10]</span> -who has nothing to show but 'good intentions' never -executed. This is what character comes to, apart -from conduct. Our only way of telling the nature -of character is the conduct that issues from it. -But, on the other hand, conduct is mere outward -formalism, excepting as it manifests character. To -say that a man's conduct is good, unless it is the -manifestation of a good character, is to pass a -judgment which is self-contradictory.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>See Alexander, Op. cit., pp. 48-50 and p. 39.</p></div> - -<p>From this point of view we are enabled to -identify the two senses of motive already discussed—the -ideal of action and the moving feelings. -Apart from each other they are abstractions. -Cæsar's motive in crossing the Rubicon may have -been 'ambition,' but this was not some bare feeling. -It was a feeling of ambition produced in view of -the contemplation of a certain end which he wished -to reach. So a boy's motive in striking a playmate -may be anger, but this means (if the act is anything -more than one of blind physical reaction) an -anger having its conscious cause and aim, and not -some abstract feeling of anger in general. The -feeling which has its nature made what it is by the -conceived end, and the end which has ceased to be -a bare abstract conception and become an interest, -are all one with each other.</p> - -<p>Morality is then a matter pertaining to character—to -<span class="pb" id="Pg011">[11]</span> -the feelings and inclinations as transformed -by ends of action; and to conduct—to conceived -ends transformed into act under the influence of -emotions. But what <em>kind</em> of character, of conduct, -is right or realizes its true end? This brings us to -our first problem.</p> -</div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<span class="pb" id="Pg013">[13]</span> - -<h2>PART I.<br /> -FUNDAMENTAL ETHICAL NOTIONS.</h2> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter I.</span>—THE GOOD.</h3> - -<h4>IX.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Subdivision of Theories.</div> - -<p>We may recognize three main -types of theories regarding the good, -of which the first two represent (we -shall attempt to show) each respectively one side of -the truth, while the third combines the one-sided -truths of the other two. Of the first two theories -one is abstract, because it tends to find the good in -the mere consequences of conduct aside from -character. This is the hedonistic theory, which -finds the good to be pleasure. This is either individualistic -or universalistic according as it takes -individual or general pleasure to be the good. The -second type of theories attempts to find the good -in the motive of conduct apart from consequences -even as willed; it reduces the good to conformity -to abstract moral law. The best type of this -<span class="pb" id="Pg014">[14]</span> -theory is the Kantian. We shall criticize these -theories with a view to developing the factors -necessary to a true moral theory.</p> - -<h4>X.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Hedonism.</div> - -<p>According to the strict hedonistic -position, the pleasure resulting to the agent from -his act is the end of conduct and is therefore the -criterion of its morality. The position as usually -taken involves, first, that pleasure is psychologically -the sole motive to action; and, secondly, that the -results of an act in the way of the pain or pleasure it -produces are the only tests we have of the rightness -of the act.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>It is said above that these two points are involved -in the hedonistic position as <em>usually</em> taken. They are -not <em>necessarily</em> involved.</p> - -<p>Sidgwick (Methods of Ethics, Bk. I, ch. IV and -Bk. IV, ch. I) holds that pleasure is not the object -of desire or motive of action, but that happiness is -the moral end and criterion. On the other hand -Hodgson (Theory of Practice, Vol. II, ch. II) holds -that pleasure may be the motive (in the sense of impelling -force) but it is never the criterion of conduct. -Kant adopts the psychology of hedonism regarding -pleasure as the object of desire, but holds that on that -very account no object of desire can be the standard -of moral conduct.</p> - -<p>A good statement of strict individualistic hedonism -is the following from Barratt, Physical Ethics, -page 71: "If man aims at pleasure merely by the -physical law of action, that pleasure must evidently be -ultimately his own, and whether it be or not preceded -<span class="pb" id="Pg015">[15]</span> -by phenomena which he calls the pain and pleasure of -others, is a question not of principle but of detail, just -as the force of a pound weight is unaltered whether it -be composed of lead or of feathers, or whether it act -directly or through pulleys."</p></div> - -<h4>XI.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">The Hedonistic Position Supported.</div> - -<p>Hedonism holds that pleasure -is both the natural end and the -proper criterion of action:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>The following quotation from Bentham (Principles -of Morals and Legislation, Works, Vol. I, p. 1) -gives a statement of both these elements. "Nature -has placed man under the governance of two sovereign -masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to -point out what we ought to do, [i. e. they are criteria] -as well as to determine what we shall do [motives]. On -the one hand, the standard of right or wrong [criterion]; -on the other the chain of causes and effects -[motives], are fastened to their throne."</p></div> - -<p>1. <i>Pleasure as Criterion.</i> That the tendency -of an action to produce pleasure is the standard -for judging its moral value is generally held by the -hedonists to be so axiomatic as to be beyond -argument.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>See Bain, Moral Science, p. 27. "The ultimate data -must be accepted as self-evident: they have no higher -authority than that mankind generally are disposed to -accept them.... Now there can be no proof offered -for the position that happiness is the proper end of all -human pursuits, the criterion of all right conduct. It -is an ultimate or final assumption to be tested by -reference to the individual judgment of mankind." -So Bentham, Enquiry I, II, "The principle is not -<span class="pb" id="Pg016">[16]</span> -susceptible of direct proofs for that which is used to -prove everything else can not itself be proved; a chain -of proofs must have their commencement somewhere." -Mill, Utilitarianism. (Dissertations and -Discussions, pp. 348-349). "The only proof capable of -being given that an object is visible is that people -actually see it. In like manner the sole evidence it is -possible to produce that anything is desirable is that -people do actually desire it." See Stephen, Science -of Ethics, p. 42; Spencer, Data of Ethics, pp. 30-32 -and p. 46; Lotze, Practical Philosophy, pp. 18-19: -Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, pp. 368-369.</p></div> - -<p>Hedonism, then, represents the good or the -desirable and pleasure to be two names for the -same fact. What indeed can be worth while unless -it be either enjoyable in itself or at least a means -to enjoyment? Would theft be considered bad if it -resulted in pleasure or truth itself good if its -universal effect were pain?</p> - -<p>2. <i>Pleasure as object of desire.</i> It is also -urged that psychological analysis shows that pleasure -is not only the desirable, but also always the -<em>desired</em>. Desire for an object is only a short way -of saying desire for the pleasure which that object -may bring. To want food is to want the pleasure -it brings; to want scientific ability is to desire -to find satisfaction, or attain happiness. Thus it -is laid down as a general principle that the invariable -object of desire, and motive of action is some -pleasure to be attained; the action itself and the -direct end of action being simply means to pleasure.</p> - -<span class="pb" id="Pg017">[17]</span> -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>For a strong statement of this doctrine see Mill, -Op. cit., pp. 354-5. "Desiring a thing and finding it -pleasant, aversion to it and thinking of it as painful, -are phenomena entirely inseparable, or rather two -parts of the same phenomenon,—in strictness of language, -two different modes of naming the same psychological -fact; to think of an object as desirable and -to think of it as pleasant are one and the same thing.<ins id="C017" title="endquote missing">"</ins> -See also, Bain, Emotions and Will, p. 436, Senses and -Intellect, pp. 338-344; Sully, Outlines of Psychology, p. -575, "The inclination or tendency of the active mind -towards what is pleasurable and away from what is -painful is the essential fact in willing." Also pp. 576-577.</p></div> - -<h4>XII. Criticism.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Pleasure Not the End of Impulse.</div> - -<p>Taking up the points in reverse -order, we shall endeavor to show -first, that the motive of action, in -the sense of end aimed at, is not pleasure. This -point in itself, is, of course, rather psychological -than ethical. Taking up then the psychology of -pleasure in its connection with will, we shall -discuss its relation to impulse, to desire and to -motive.</p> - -<p>It is generally agreed that the raw material of -volition is found in some form or other of the impulsive -or instinctive actions. Such tendencies -(<i lang="la" xml:lang="la">e. g.</i>, the impulse for food, for drink, for unimpeded -motion) clearly precede the reaching of an -end, and hence the experience of any pleasure in -the end. Our first actions, at least, are not for -<span class="pb" id="Pg018">[18]</span> -pleasure; on the contrary, there is an activity for -some independent end, and this end being reached -there is pleasure in an act which has succeeded. -This suggests as a possible principle that pleasure -is not so much the end of action, as an element in -the activity which reaches an end. What Aristotle -says of another matter is certainly true of instinctive -action. "It is not true of every characteristic -function that its action is attended with pleasure, -<em>except indeed the pleasure of attaining its end</em>."</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>See Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory, Vol. II, -pp. 299-300; Sidgwick, Op. cit., pp. 38-45.</p></div> - -<h4 id="XIII">XIII. Criticism—<i>Continued</i>.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Pleasure Not the End of Desire.</div> - -<p>It may, however, be said that, -while our instinctive actions have -another end than pleasure, this is -not true of conscious desires—that, indeed, just the -difference between instinct and desire is that the -former goes blindly to its end, while the latter -superimposes the thought of the pleasure to be -reached upon the mere instinct. So we have to -analyze the nature of desire.</p> - -<p>A child, led by impulse, has put a piece of sugar -into his mouth, just as, under the same circumstances, -he would put a piece of stone into his -mouth. But his action results in a state of pleasure -wholly unforseen by him. Now the next time -the child sees the sugar he will not merely have -<span class="pb" id="Pg019">[19]</span> -the impulse to put it in his mouth. There will -also be the remembrance of the pleasure enjoyed -from sugar previously. There is consciousness of -sugar as satisfying impulse and hence desire for it.</p> - -<p>1. This is a description of an instance of desire. -Does it bear us out in the doctrine that pleasure is -the object of desire? It is possible that, in an irrational -animal, the experience of eating food reinforces -the original instinct for it with associated -images of pleasure. But even this is very different -from a desire for pleasure. It is simply the primordial -instinct intensified and rendered more -acute by new sensational factors joined to it. In -the strict sense, there is still no desire, but only -<em>stronger</em> impulse. Wherever there is desire there -is not only a feeling of pleasure associated with -other feelings (<i lang="la" xml:lang="la">e. g.</i>, those of hunger, thirst), but -there is the <em>consciousness of an object in which -satisfaction is found</em>. The error of the hedonistic -psychology is in omitting one's consciousness of an -<em>object</em> which satisfies. The hedonists are quite -right in holding that the end of desire is not any -object external to consciousness, but a condition -of consciousness itself. The error begins in eliminating -all objective (that is, active) elements from -consciousness, and declaring it to be a mere state -of feeling or sensation. The practical consciousness, -or will, cannot be reduced to mere feeling, -<span class="pb" id="Pg020">[20]</span> -any more than the theoretical consciousness, or -knowledge, can be so reduced.</p> - -<p>Even Mill, in its statement of the hedonistic -psychology, does not succeed in making the object -of desire mere pleasure as a state of feeling. It -is the "pleasant <em>thing</em>" and not pleasure alone -which he finds equivalent to the desire. It is -true enough that sugar as an external fact does not -awaken desire, but it is equally true that a child does -not want a passive pleasure. What he wants is his -own activity in which he makes the sugar his own. -And it should be remembered that the case of sugar -is at once a trivial and an exceptional one. Not -even children want simply <ins id="C020" title="sweat-meats">sweet-meats</ins>; and the -larger the character which finds expression in wants, -the more does the direct object of want, the bread, -the meat, become a mere element in a larger system -of activity. What a man wants is to live, and he -wants sweet-meats, amusements, etc., just as he -wants substantials—on account of their value in -life.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>Professor James compares the idea that pleasure is -the end of desire to saying that "because no steamer -can go to sea without incidentally consuming coal, -... therefore no steamer can go to sea for any other -motive than that of coal-consumption." Psychology, -Vol. II, p. 558. See the entire passage, pp. 549-559.</p></div> - -<p>2. But granting that an 'object' and a 'pleasure' -are both necessary to desire, it may be argued -<span class="pb" id="Pg021">[21]</span> -that the 'object' is ultimately a means to 'pleasure.' -This expressly raises a question already incidentally -touched upon: What is the controlling -element in desire? Why is the object thought of -as pleasant? Simply because it is thought of as -satisfying want. The hedonists, says Green (Prolegomena -to Ethics, p. 168), make the "mistake of -supposing that a desire can be excited by the anticipation -of its own satisfaction." This is to say, of -course, that it exists before it exists, and thus -brings itself into being.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>Green, Op. cit., p. 167, states the matter thus: -"Ordinary motives are interests in the attainment of -objects, without which it seems to the man that he -cannot satisfy himself, and in the attainment of -which, <em>because he has desired them</em>, he will find a certain -pleasure, but only because he has previously desired -them, not because pleasures are the objects -desired." Bradley says on this same point (Ethical -Studies, p. 230): "The difference is between my finding -my pleasure in an end, and my finding means for -the end of my pleasure, and the difference is enormous." -Consult the entire passage, pp. 226-235. See -also Caird, Critical Philosophy of Kant, Vol. II, p. 229.</p></div> - -<p>It is the object, then, which controls, and the -pleasure is on account of the attaining of the -desired object. But even this statement makes -more division in desire than actually exists; for</p> - -<p>3. The real object of desire is activity itself. -The will takes its rise, as we have seen, in impulse; -in the reaching for something to satisfy some felt -<span class="pb" id="Pg022">[22]</span> -lack. Now, in reality, desire adds nothing to -impulse excepting <em>consciousness</em> of the impulse. -Volitional action does not differ from impulsive or -instinctive, <em>except in bringing to consciousness the -nature of the want and of the activity necessary to -satisfy it</em>. But this makes just the difference -between 'natural' or animal activity, and 'moral' -or human activity. To be conscious of the impulse -is to elevate it from a blind impelling force to an -intended or proposed end; and thus, by bringing it -<em>before</em> consciousness, both to extend its range and -to idealize it, spiritualize it. To be conscious of an -impulse for food means to give up the unreasoned -and momentary seizing of it; to consider the relation -of things to this want, what will satisfy it best, -most easily, etc. The <em>object</em> of desire is not something -outside the action; it is an element in the -enlarged action. And as we become more and -more conscious of impulse for food, we analyze our -action into more and more 'objects' of desire, but -these objects never become anything apart from the -action itself. They are simply its analyzed and -defined content. Man wants activity still, but he -knows better what activity means and includes.</p> - -<p>Thus, when we learn what the activity means, it -changes its character. To the animal the activity -wanted is simply that of eating the food, of -realizing the momentary impulse. To man the -<span class="pb" id="Pg023">[23]</span> -activity becomes enlarged to include the satisfaction -of a whole life, and not of one life singly, but of -the family, etc., connected with the single life. -The material well-being of the family becomes -one of the objects of desire into which the original -impulse has grown. But we misinterpret, when -we conceive of this well-being as an external object -lying outside the action. It means simply one -aspect of the fuller action. By like growing consciousness -of the meaning of the impulse, production -and exchange of commodities are organized. -The impulse for food is extended to include a -whole range of commercial activities.</p> - -<p>It is evident that this growing consciousness of -the nature of an impulse, whereby we resolve it into -manifold and comprehensive activities, also takes -the impulse out of its isolation and brings it into -connection with other impulses. We come to have -not a series of disconnected impulses, but one all-inclusive -activity in which various subordinate activities -(or conscious impulses) are included. Thus, -in the previous example, the impulse for food is -united with the family impulse, and with the -impulse for communication and intercourse with -society generally. It is this growing unity with -the whole range of man's action that is the -'spiritualizing' of the impulse—the natural -and brutal impulse being just that which insists -<span class="pb" id="Pg024">[24]</span> -upon itself irrespective of all other wants. The -spiritualizing of the impulse is organizing it so -that it <ins id="C024" title="becoms">becomes</ins> one factor in action. Thus we literally -come to 'eat to live', meaning by life not -mere physical existence, but the whole possible -sphere of active human relations.</p> - -<p>4. Relation of activity to pleasure. We have -seen that the 'object' of desire in itself is a mere -abstraction; that the real object is full activity itself. -We are always after larger scope of movement, -fuller income in order to get larger outgo. The -'thing' is always for the sake of doing; is a part of -the doing. The idea that anything less or other -than life (movement, action, and doing), can satisfy -man is as ridiculous when compared with the actual -course of things in history, as it is false psychologically. -Freedom is what we want, and freedom -means full unimpeded play of interests, that -is, of conscious impulses (see Sec. <a href="#XXXIV">34</a> and <a href="#LI">51</a>). If -the object is a mere abstraction apart from activity, -much more is pleasure. Mere pleasure as an -object is simply the extreme of passivity, of mere -having, as against action or doing. It is <em>possible</em> to -make pleasure to some degree the object of desire; -this is just what the voluptuary does. But it is a -commonplace that the voluptuary always defeats -himself. He never gets satisfaction who identities -satisfaction with having pleasures. The reason is -<span class="pb" id="Pg025">[25]</span> -evident enough. Activity is what we want, and since -pleasure comes from getting what we want, pleasure -comes only with activity. To give up the activity, -and attempt to get the pleasure is a contradiction in -effect. Hence also the 'hedonistic paradox'—that -in order to get pleasure we must aim at something -else.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>There is an interesting recognition of this in Mill -himself, (see his Autobiography, p. 142). And in his -Utilitarianism, in discussing the feasibility of getting -happiness, he shows (pp. 318-319) that the sources of -happiness are an intelligent interest in surrounding -things—objects of nature, achievements of art, incidents -of history—and especially an unselfish devotion -to others. Which is to say that man does not find satisfaction -in pleasure as such at all, but only in objective -affairs—that is, in complete interpretation, in -activity with a wide and full content. Further consideration -of the end of desire and its relation to -pleasure may be found in Green, Op. cit., pp. 123-132; -pp. 163-167. Bradley, Mind, Vol. XIII, p. 1, and -Dewey, Psychology, pp. 360-365.</p></div> - -<h4>XIV. Criticism—<i>Continued</i>.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Character and Pleasure.</div> - -<p>It now being admitted that the end -of desire is activity itself in which the -'object' and 'pleasure' are simply factors, -what is the moving spring to action? What -is it that arouses the mind to the larger activity? -Most of the hedonists have confounded the two -senses of motive already spoken of, and have held -that <em>because</em> pleasure is the end of desire, therefore -<span class="pb" id="Pg026">[26]</span> -it is the moving spring of conduct (or more often -that because it is the moving spring of conduct -it <em>therefore</em> is the end of desire).</p> - -<p>Mr. Stephen (Science of Ethics, pp. 46-58), -although classing himself as a hedonist, has -brought out this confusion very clearly. Ordinary -hedonism confounds, as he shows, the judgment of -what is pleasant—the supposed end—with the -pleasant judgment—the moving spring. (See also -Bradley, Op. cit., pp. 232-236). It may be admitted -that it is feeling which moves to action, but -it is the <em>present</em> feeling which moves. If the -feeling aimed at moves, it is only as through -anticipation it becomes the present feeling. Now -is this present feeling which moves (1) mere pleasure -and (2) mere feeling at all? This introduces -us to the question of the relation of pleasure (and -of feeling in general) to character.</p> - -<p>1. If the existing state of consciousness—that -which moves—were pure pleasure, why should -there be any movement, any act at all? The feeling -which moves must be in so far complex: over -against the pleasure felt in the anticipation of an -end as satisfying, there must be pain felt in the -contrasting unsatisfactory present condition. There -must be tension between the anticipated or ideal -action, and the actual or present (relative) non-action. -And it is this tension, in which pain is just -<span class="pb" id="Pg027">[27]</span> -as normal an element as pleasure, which moves. -Desire is just this tension of an action which satisfies, -and yet is only ideal, against an actual possession -which, in contrast with the ideal action, is felt -as incomplete action, or lack, and hence as unsatisfactory.</p> - -<p>2. The question now comes as to the nature of -this tension. We may call it 'feeling,' if we will, -and say that feeling is the sole motive power to -action. But there is no such thing as feeling at -large, and the important thing, morally, is what -<em>kind</em> of feeling moves. To take a mere abstraction -like 'feeling' for the source of action is, at root, -the fallacy of hedonism. To raise the question, -What is it that makes the feeling what it is, is to -recognize that the feeling, taken concretely, is <em>character</em> -in a certain attitude.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>Stephen, who has insisted with great force that -feeling is the sole 'motive' to action, has yet shown -with equal cogency the moral uselessness of such a -doctrine, when feeling is left undefined (Op. cit., p. 44). -"The love of happiness must express the sole possible -motive of Judas Iscariot and his master; it must explain -the conduct of Stylites on his column, of Tiberius -at Capreæ, of A Kempis in his cell, and of Nelson in the -cockpit of the Victory. It must be equally good for -saints, martyrs, heroes, cowards, debauchees, ascetics, -mystics, cynics, misers, prodigals, men, women, and -babes in arms." Surely, this is only to say, in effect, -that 'love of happiness' is a pure bit of scholasticism, -an undefined entity.</p></div> - -<span class="pb" id="Pg028">[28]</span> -<p>In a hedonistic argument (by Stanton Coit, Mind, -Vol. XI, p. 349), the fallacy is seen in the following -discussion. The story is told of Abraham Lincoln -that he once passed an animal in distress by the -side of the road, and that, after going by, he finally -went back and got him out of the ditch. On being -praised for his act, he replied that he did it on his -own account, since he kept getting more uncomfortable -as he thought of the animal in distress. From -this, it cannot be inferred that love of pleasure is at -the basis of moral acts. The mere lumping off of -feeling as the spring of conduct overlooks the only -important thing morally—the fact that Lincoln felt -pain at the thought of the animal unrelieved, -and pleasure at the idea of its relief, just because -he was a man of compassionate <em>character</em>. -It was not the feeling, but the character revealed -in, and creative of, the feeling that was the real -source of the act.</p> - -<p>To connect this with our previous account of desire -(p. 26): the important thing morally is that the -nature of the tension between fact and idea—the -actual state and the ideal activity—is an expression -of character. What kind of activity does it take -to satisfy a man? Does riding in a comfortable -carriage, and following the course of his own reflections -exhaust his need of action? or does his full -activity require that note be taken of a suffering -<span class="pb" id="Pg029">[29]</span> -animal? It is the kind of character one is (that is, -the kind of activity which satisfies and expresses -one) which decides what pleasure shall be taken in -an anticipated end, what feeling of lack or hindrance -(what pain) there shall be in the given state, -and hence what the resulting tension, or desire, -shall be. It is, therefore, character which moves to -conduct.</p> - -<p>Mere wishing, the mere floating fancy of this or -that thing as desirable, is not desire. To <em>want</em> is -an active projection of character; really and deeply -to want is no surface and passing feeling; it is the -stirring of character to its depths. There may be -repressed activity; that is not, of itself, desire. -There may be an image of larger activity; that is -not, of itself, desire. But given the <em>consciousness</em> -of a repressed activity in view of the perception of -a possible larger action, and a man strives within -himself to break his bonds and reach the new satisfaction. -This striving within one's self, before the -activity becomes overt, is the emotional antecedent -of action. But this inward striving or tension, -which constitutes desire, is so far from being <em>mere</em> -emotion that it is character itself—character as it -turns an inward or ideal advance into an outward, -or real progress, into action.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>We may fall back on Aristotle's statement (page -38, of Peters' translation of his ethics): "The pleasure -<span class="pb" id="Pg030">[30]</span> -or pain that accompanies an act must be regarded as a -<em>test</em> of <em>character</em>. He who abstains from the pleasures -of the body and rejoices in his abstinence is temperate, -while he who is vexed at having to abstain is still profligate. -As Plato tells us, man needs to be so trained -from youth up as to take pleasure and pain <em>in the right -objects</em>."</p></div> - -<h4>XV.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Summary.</div> - -<p>The truth in hedonism is its conviction -that the good, the end of man, is not to be -found in any outward object, but only in what -comes home to man in his own conscious experience. -The error is in reducing this experience to -mere having, to bare feelings or affections, eliminating -the element of doing. It is this doing -which satisfies man, and it is this which involves as -its content (as knowledge of impulse, instead of -blind impulse) objective and permanent ends. -When Mill speaks of the end of desire as a "satisfied -life," (p. 317 of Utilitarianism) he carries our -assent; but to reduce this satisfied life to feelings of -pleasure, and absence of pains, is to destroy the -life and hence the satisfaction. As Mill recognizes, -a life bounded by the agent's own feelings would -be, as of course, a life "centred in his own miserable -individuality." (Mill, p. 319). Such words -have meaning only because they suggest the contrast -with activity in which are comprehended, as -'ends' or 'objects' (that is, as part of its defined -<span class="pb" id="Pg031">[31]</span> -content) things—art, science and industry—and -persons (see Secs. <a href="#XXXIV">34</a> and <a href="#XXXV">35</a>).</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>Here too we must 'back to Aristotle.' According -to him the end of conduct is <i lang="gr" xml:lang="gr">eudaimonia</i>, success, welfare, -satisfied life. But <i lang="gr" xml:lang="gr">eudaimonia</i> is found not in -pleasure, but in the fulfillment of human powers and -functions, in which fulfillment, since it is fulfillment, -pleasure is had. (Ethics, Bk. I, ch. 4-8).</p></div> - -<p>We now take up the question whether pleasure -is a standard of right action, having finished the -discussion concerning it as an end of desire.</p> - -<h4 id="XVI">XVI.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Pleasure as the Standard of Conduct.</div> - -<p>The line of criticism on this point -may be stated as follows: Pleasure -fails as a standard for the very reason -that it fails as a motive. Pleasure, -<em>as conceived by the hedonist</em>, is passive, -merely agreeable sensations, without any objective -and qualitative (active) character. This being -so, there is no permanent, fixed basis to which we -may refer <em>acts</em> and by which we may judge them. -A standard implies a single comprehensive end -which unifies all acts and through connection with -which each gets its moral value fixed. Only action -can be a standard for acts. To reduce all acts to -means to getting a mere state of feeling is the inevitable -consequence of hedonism. So reducing them -is to deprive them of any standard of value.</p> - -<p>An end to serve as standard must be (1) a comprehensive -<span class="pb" id="Pg032">[32]</span> -end for all the acts of an individual, and -(2) an end comprehending the activities of various -individuals—a common good.</p> - -<p>1. The moral end must be that for the sake of -which all conduct occurs—the <em>organizing principle</em> -of conduct—a totality, a system. If pleasure is -the end it is because each detail of conduct gets its -placing, its moral value through relation to pleasure, -through the contribution it makes to pleasure.</p> - -<p>2. The moral end must also include the ends of -the various agents who make up society. It must -be capable of constituting a social system out of -the acts of various agents, as well as an individual -system out of the various acts of one agent; or, -more simply, the moral end must be not only the -good for all the particular acts of an individual, -but must be a <em>common good</em>—a good which in satisfying -one, satisfies others.</p> - -<p>All ethical theories would claim that the end -proposed by them served these two purposes. We -shall endeavor to show that the hedonistic theory, -the doctrine that the pleasure is the good, is not -capable of serving either of them.</p> - -<h4>XVII.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Pleasure Not a Standard.</div> - -<p>1. <i>It does not unify character.</i> In -the first place, the hedonistic theory -makes an unreal and impossible separation -between conduct and character. The psychology -<span class="pb" id="Pg033">[33]</span> -of hedonism comes into conflict with its -ethics. According to the former the motive of all -action is to secure pleasure or avoid pain. So -far as the motive is concerned, on this theory there -can be no immoral action at all. That the agent -should not be moved by pleasure, and by what, at -the time of acting, is the greatest pleasure possible, -would be a psychological impossibility. -Every motive would be good, or rather there would -be no distinction of good or bad pertaining to the -motive. The character of the agent, as measured -by his motives, could never, under such circumstances, -have any moral quality.</p> - -<p>To the consequences of action, or the conduct -proper, however, the terms good and bad might be -applied. Although the agent is moved by pleasurable -feelings, the result of his action may be painful -and thus bad. In a word, on the hedonistic theory, -it is only the external consequences of conduct, or -conduct divorced from character, to which moral -adjectives have any application. Such a separation -not only contradicts our experience (see <a href="#VIII">VIII</a>), but -inverts the true order of moral judgment. Consequences -do not enter into the moral estimate at -all, except so far as, being foreseen, they are the -act in idea. That is, it is only as the consequences -are taken up into the motive, and thus related to -character, that they are subject to moral judgment. -<span class="pb" id="Pg034">[34]</span> -Indeed, except so far as action expresses character, -it is not conduct, but mere physical sequence, as -irrelevant to morality as the change in blood distribution, -which also is the 'result' of an action. -Hedonism has to rule out at the start the only -thing that gives totality to action—the character of -the agent, or conduct as the outcome of motives. -Furthermore, the ordinary judgment of men, instead -of saying that the sole moral motive is to get pleasure, -would say that to reduce everything to means for -getting pleasure is the very essence of immorality.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>On the point above, compare Bentham, Op. cit., I, -p. 48. "A motive is substantially nothing more than -pleasure or pain operating in a certain manner. Now -pleasure is in itself a good: nay, even, setting aside -immunity from pain, the only good; pain is in itself -an evil, and, indeed, without exception, the only evil; -or else the words good and evil have no meaning. And -this is alike true of every sort of pain and of every -sort of pleasure. It follows, therefore, immediately -and incontestably, that there is no such thing as any -sort of motive that is in itself a bad one. If motives -are good or bad, it is only on account of their effects; -good on account of their tendency to produce pleasure -or avert pain; bad on account of their tendency to -produce pain or avert pleasure. Now the case is, that -from one and the same motive, and from every kind -of motive, may proceed actions that are good, others -that are bad and others that are indifferent." Further, -on p. 60, Bentham asks: "Is there nothing, then, -about a man that can properly be termed good or bad, -when on such or such an occasion he suffers himself -to be governed by such or such a motive? Yes, certainly, -<span class="pb" id="Pg035">[35]</span> -his <em>disposition</em>. Now disposition is a kind of -fictitious entity, feigned for the convenience of discourse, -in order to express what there is supposed to -be <em>permanent</em> in a man's frame of mind. It is with -disposition as with everything else; it will be good or -bad according to its effects." The first quotation, it -will be noticed, simply states that the motive is in -itself always good, while conduct (<i lang="la" xml:lang="la">i. e.</i>, consequences) -may be good, bad or indifferent. The second quotation -seems, however, to pass moral judgment upon character -under the name of disposition. But disposition is -judged according to the tendency of a person's actions. -A good or bad disposition, here, can mean nothing -intrinsic to the person, but only that the person has -been observed to act in ways that usually produce pain -or pleasure, as the case may be. The term is a -'fiction', and is a backhanded way of expressing a -somewhat habitual <em>result</em> of a given person's conduct -his motive remaining good (or for pleasure) all the -time. The agent would never pronounce any such judgment -upon his own disposition, unless as a sort of -<ins id="C035" title="suprise">surprise</ins> that, his motive being 'good,' his actions turn -out so 'bad' all the time. At most, the judgment -regarding disposition is a sort of label put upon a man -by others, a label of "Look out for him, he is dangerous," -or, "Behold, a helpful man."</p></div> - -<p>The moral standard of hedonism does not, then, -bear any relation to the character of the agent, does -not enable us to judge it, either as a whole or in -any specific manifestation.</p> - -<h4>XVIII.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">It Does Not Give a Criterion for Concrete Acts.</div> - -<p>Pleasure, as the end, -fails also to throw light -on the moral value of -any specific acts. Its failure in this respect is, -<span class="pb" id="Pg036">[36]</span> -indeed, only the other side of that just spoken -of. There is no organizing principle, no 'universal' -on the basis of which various acts fall into a -system or order. The moral life is left a series of -shreds and patches, where each act is torn off, as -to its moral value, from every other. Each act is -right or wrong, according as <em>it</em> gives pleasure or pain, -and independently of any whole of life. There -is, indeed, no whole of moral life at all, but only a -series of isolated, disconnected acts. Possession, -passivity, <em>mere</em> feeling, by its very nature cannot -unite—each feeling is itself and that is the end of -it. It is action which reduces multiplicity to unity. -We cannot say, in the hedonistic theory, that pleasure -is the end, but <em>pleasures</em>.</p> - -<p>Each act stands by itself—the only question is: -What pleasure will <em>it</em> give? The settling of this -question is the "hedonistic calculus." We must -discover the intensity, duration, certainty, degree -of nearness of the pleasure likely to arise from the -given act, and also its purity, or likelihood of being -accompanied by secondary pains and pleasures. -Then we are to strike the balance between the -respective sums on the pleasure and pain sides, and, -according as this balance is one of pleasure or pain, -the act is good or evil.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>Bentham, Op. cit., p. 16, was the first to go into -detail as to this method. He has also given certain -<span class="pb" id="Pg037">[37]</span> -memoriter verses stating "the points on which the -whole fabric of morals and legislation may be seen to -rest.</p> - -<div class="poetry-container"> -<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> -<div class="verse">Intense, long, certain, speedy, fruitful, pure,</div> -<div class="verse">Such marks in pleasures and in pains endure,</div> -<div class="verse">Such pleasures seek, if private be thy end.</div> -<div class="verse">If it be public, wide let them extend.</div> -<div class="verse">Such pains avoid whichever be thy view,</div> -<div class="verse">If pains must come, let them extend to few."</div> -</div></div></div> - -<p>This, however, in its reference to others, states the -utilitarian as well as the hedonistic view.</p></div> - -<p>Now, it must be remembered that, if pleasure -is the end, there is no intrinsic connection between -the motive of the act, and its result. It is not -claimed that there is anything belonging intrinsically -to the motive of the act which makes it result -in pleasure or pain. To make such a claim would -be to declare the moral quality of the act the criterion -of the pleasure, instead of pleasure the -criterion of the act. The pleasures are external to -the act; they are irrelevant and accidental to its -quality. There is no 'universal,' no intrinsic bond -of connection between the act and its consequences. -The consequence is a mere particular state of feeling, -which, in this instance, the act has happened -to bring about.</p> - -<p>More concretely, this act of truth-telling has in -this instance, brought about pleasure. Shall we -call it right? Right in <em>this</em> instance, of course; -but is it right generally? Is truth-telling, as such, -<span class="pb" id="Pg038">[38]</span> -right, or is it merely that this instance of it happens -to be right? Evidently, on the hedonistic -basis, we cannot get beyond the latter judgment. -<em>Prior</em> to any act, there will be plenty of difficulties -in telling whether it, as <em>particular</em>, is right or wrong. -The consequences depend not merely on the result -intended, but upon a multitude of circumstances -outside of the foresight and control of the agent. -And there can be only a precarious calculation of -possibilities and probabilities—a method which -would always favor laxity of conduct in all but <ins id="C038" title="the -the">the</ins> most conscientious of men, and which would -throw the conscientious into uncertainty and perplexity -in the degree of their conscientiousness.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>"If once the pleas of instinct are to be abolished -and replaced by a hedonistic arithmetic, the whole -realm of animated nature has to be reckoned with in -weaving the tissue of moral relations, and the problem -becomes infinite and insoluble".—Martineau, Op. cit., -Vol. II, p. 334.</p></div> - -<p>But waive this; let the particular case be settled. -There is still no law, no principle, indeed no presumption -as to future conduct. The act is not right <em>because</em> -it is <em>truth-telling</em>, but because, in this instance, -<ins id="C038a" title="cicumstances">circumstances</ins> were such as to throw a balance of -pleasure in its favor. This establishes no certainty, -no probability as to its next outcome. The result -<em>then</em> will depend wholly upon circumstances existing -<em>then</em>—circumstances which have no intrinsic -<span class="pb" id="Pg039">[39]</span> -relation to the act and which must change from -time to time.</p> - -<p>The hedonist would escape this abolition of all -principle, or even rule, by falling back upon a -number of cases—'past experience' it is called. -We have found in a number of cases that a certain -procedure has resulted in pleasure, and this result -is sufficient to guide us in a vast number of cases -which come up.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>Says Mill (Op. cit., pp. 332-4): "During the whole -past duration of the species, mankind have been learning -by experience the tendencies of actions, on which -experience all the prudence as well as all the morality -of life are dependent.... Mankind must by this -time have acquired positive belief as to the effects of -some actions on their happiness; and the beliefs which -have thus come down are the rules of morality for the -multitude, and for the philosopher, until he has succeeded -in finding better.... Nobody argues that -the art of navigation is not founded on astronomy, -because sailors cannot wait to calculate the 'Nautical -Almanac'. Being rational creatures, they go to sea -with it ready calculated; and all rational creatures go -out upon the sea of life with their minds made up on -the common questions of right and wrong, as well as -on many of the far more difficult questions of wise and -foolish."</p></div> - -<p>That we do learn from experience the moral -nature of actions is undoubted. The only question -is: <em>if</em> hedonism were true, <em>could</em> we so learn? -Suppose that I were convinced that the results of -murder in the past had been generally, or even -<span class="pb" id="Pg040">[40]</span> -without exception (though this could not be proved), -painful; as long as the act and the result in the -way of feeling (pain or pleasure) are conceived as -having no intrinsic connection, this would not prove -that in the present instance murder will give a surplus -of pain. I am not thinking of committing murder -in general, but of murder under certain specific -present circumstances. These circumstances may, -and, to some extent, <em>must</em> vary from all previous instances -of murder. How then can I reason from -them to it? Or, rather, let me use the previous -cases as much as I may, the moral quality of the -act I am now to perform must still be judged not -from them, but from the circumstances of the present -case. To judge otherwise, is, on hedonistic -principles, to be careless, perhaps criminally careless -as to one's conduct. The more convinced a man -is of the truth of hedonism and the more conscientious -he is, the more he is bound <em>not</em> to be guided -by previous circumstances, but to form his judgment -anew concerning the new case. This result -flows out of the very nature of the hedonistic ideal. -Pleasure is not an activity, but simply a particular -feeling, enduring only while it is felt. Moreover, -there is in it no principle which connects it intrinsically -with any <em>kind</em> of action. To suppose then -that, because ninety-nine cases of murder have resulted -in pain, the hundredth will, is on a par with -<span class="pb" id="Pg041">[41]</span> -reasoning that because ninety-nine days have been -frosty, the hundredth will be. Each case, taken as -particular, must be decided wholly by itself. There -is no continuous moral life, and no system of conduct. -There is only a succession of unlike acts.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>Mill, in his examination of Whewell, (Diss. and Diss., -Vol. III, pp. 158-59), tries to establish a general principle, -if not a universal law, by arguing that, even in exceptional -cases, the agent is bound to respect the rule, -because to act otherwise would weaken the rule, and -thus lead to its being disregarded in other cases, in -which its observance results in pleasure. There are, -he says, persons so wicked that their removal from the -earth would undoubtedly increase the sum total of -happiness. But if persons were to violate the general -rule in these cases, it would tend to destroy the rule. -"If it were thought allowable for any one to put to -death at pleasure any human being whom he believes -that the world would be well rid of,—nobody's life -would be safe." That is to say, if every one were -really to act upon and carry out the hedonistic principle, -no rule of life would exist. This does very well -as a <i lang="la" xml:lang="la">reductio ad absurdum</i> of hedonism, or as an argument -against adopting hedonism, but it is difficult to -see how Mill thought that it established a 'rule' on a -hedonistic basis. Mill's argument comes to saying -that if hedonism were uniformly acted upon, it would -defeat itself—that is, pleasure would not result. Therefore, -in order to get pleasure, we must not act upon the -principle of hedonism at all, but follow a general rule. -Otherwise put: hedonism gives no general rule, but -we must have a general rule to make hedonism works -and therefore there is a general rule! This begging of -the question comes out even more plainly as Mill goes -<span class="pb" id="Pg042">[42]</span> -on: "If one person may break through the rule on his -own judgment, the same liberty cannot be refused to -others; and, since no one could rely on the rule's -being observed, the rule would cease to exist." All of -this is obviously true, but it amounts to saying: "We -<em>must</em> have a rule, and this we would not have if we -carried out the hedonistic principle in each case; therefore, -we must not carry it out." A principle, that carried -out destroys all rules which pretend to rest upon -it, lays itself open to suspicion. Mill assumes the entire -question in assuming that there is a rule. Grant -this, and the necessity of not 'making exceptions,' -that is, of not applying the hedonistic standard to -each case, on its own merits, follows. But the argument -which Mill needs to meet is that hedonism -<em>requires</em> us to apply the standard to each case in itself, -and that, therefore, there <em>is</em> no rule. Mill simply says—<em>assume</em> -the rule, and it follows, etc.</p> - -<p>See Bradley, Op. cit., pp. 96-101; Green, Bk. IV, Ch. -3; Martineau, Vol. II, pp. 329-334.</p></div> - -<h4>XIX.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">The Sum and the Quality of Pleasure as the Standard.</div> - -<p>We have been dealing with hedonism -in its strict form—that which -makes <em>a</em> pleasure, considered as to -its intensity, certainty, etc., the end -of an act. Hedonism in this form -fails to unify life, and fails, therefore, -to supply any standard. But -the end of conduct is often stated to be the greatest -possible sum of <ins id="C042" title="pleasnres">pleasures</ins> thus introducing a certain -element of generality. Mill goes further and -brings in the idea of quality of pleasure.</p> - -<span class="pb" id="Pg043">[43]</span> -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>Regarding the sum of pleasures the following from -Sidgwick (Op. cit., p. 382; see also p. 114) gives the -hedonistic statement. "The assumption is involved -that all pleasures are capable of being compared qualitatively -with one another and with all pains; that -every feeling has a certain intensive quality, positive -or negative (or perhaps zero) in respect to its desirableness -and that the quantity may be known, so that -each may be weighed in ethical scales against any -other. This assumption is involved in the very motion -of maximum happiness," as the attempt to make "as -great as possible a sum of elements not quantitatively -commensurable would be a mathematical absurdity."</p></div> - -<p>I. Sum of pleasures as the moral end. This, -first, taken as criterion, comes into conflict with the -hedonistic psychology of pleasure as the motive of -acts; and, secondly, it requires some objective -standard by means of which pleasure is to be -summed, and is, in so far, a surrender of the whole -hedonistic position.</p> - -<p>1. If the object of desire is pleasure or a state -of feeling which exists only as it is felt, it is impossible -that we should desire a greatest sum of -pleasures. We can desire a pleasure and that only. -It is not even possible that we should ever desire a -continuous series of pleasures. We can desire one -pleasure and when that is gone, another, but we can -not unify our desires enough to aim at even a sum -of pleasures.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>This is well put by Green (Op. cit, p. 236). "For -the feeling of a pleased person, or in relation to his -<span class="pb" id="Pg044">[44]</span> -sense of enjoyment, pleasure cannot form a sum. However -numerous the sources of a state of pleasant feeling, -it is one and is over before another can be -enjoyed. It and its successors can be added together -in thought, but not in enjoyment or in imagination of -an enjoyment. If the desire is only for pleasure, <i lang="la" xml:lang="la">i. e.</i>, -for an enjoyment or feeling of pleasure, we are simply -victims of words when we talk of desire for a sum -of pleasures, much more when we take the greatest -imaginable sum to be the most desirable." See the -whole passage, pp. 235-246.</p></div> - -<p>2. But the phrase "sum of pleasures" undoubtedly -has a meaning—though the fact that it has a -meaning shows the untruth of the hedonistic psychology. -Surrendering this psychology, what shall -we say of the maximum possibility of pleasure as -the criterion of the morality of acts? It must be conceded -that this conception does afford some basis—although -a rather slippery one—for the unification -of conduct. Each act is considered now not in its -isolation merely, but in its connection with other -acts, according as its relation to them may increase -or decrease the possible sum of future happiness. -But this very fact that some universal, or element of -relation, albeit a quantitative one, has been introduced, -arouses this inquiry: Whence do we derive -it? How do we get the thought of a sum of pleasure, -and of a maximum sum? <em>Only by taking into -account the objective conditions upon which pleasures -depend, and by judging the pleasures from the -<span class="pb" id="Pg045">[45]</span> -standpoint of these objective conditions.</em> When -we imagine we are thinking of a sum of pleasures, -we are really thinking of that totality of conditions -which will come nearest affording us self-satisfaction—we -are thinking of a comprehensive and continuous -activity whose various parts are adjusted to -one another. Because it is complete activity, it is -necessarily conceived as giving the greatest possible -pleasure, but apart from reference to complete -activity and apart from the objects in which this is -realized, the phrase 'greatest sum of happiness' is -a mere phrase. Pleasures must be measured by a -standard, by a yard stick, before they can be summed -in thought, and the yard stick we use is the -activity in which the pleasure comes. We do not -measure conduct by pleasure, but we compare and -sum up pleasures on the basis of the objects which -occasion them. To add feelings, mere transitory -consequences, without first reducing those feelings -to a common denominator by their relation to one -objective standard, is an impossibility. Pleasure is -a sort of sign or symbol of the object which satisfies, -and we may carry on our judgment, if we will, -in terms of the sign, without reference to the standard, -but to argue as if the sign were the thing, as -if the sum of pleasure were the activity, is suicidal.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>Thus Green says (Op. cit., p. 244): "In truth a -man's reference to his own true happiness is a reference -<span class="pb" id="Pg046">[46]</span> -to the objects which chiefly interest him, and has -its controlling power on that account. More strictly, -it is a reference to an ideal state of well-being, a state -in which he shall be satisfied; <em>but the objects of the -man's chief interests supply the filling of that ideal -state</em>." See the argument as put by Alexander (Moral -Order and Progress, pp. 199-200). Alexander has also -brought out (Ibid., pp. 207-210) that even if we are -going to use a quantitative standard, the idea of a -sum is not a very happy one. It is not so much a sum -of pleasures we want, as a certain proportionate distribution -and combination of pleasures. "To regard -the greatest sum of pleasures as the test of conduct, -supposing that we could express it in units of pleasure, -would be like declaring that when you had an -atomic weight of 98 you had sulphuric acid. The -numerical test would be useless unless we knew what -elements were to be combined, and in what proportion. -Similarly till we know what kinds of -activities (and therefore what kinds of pleasures) -go with one another to form the end, the greatest sum -of pleasures will give us only the equivalent of the -end, but will not tell us what the composition of the -end is, still less how to get at it; or, to put the matter -more simply, when we know what the characters of -persons are, and how they are combined in morality, -we then estimate the corresponding sum of pleasures." -(p. 209.)</p></div> - -<p>II. A certain quality of pleasure the end. -Some moralists, notably John Stuart Mill, introduce -considerations regarding the quality of pleasure into -the conception of the end. "It is quite compatible," -says Mill, "with the principle of utility to -recognize the fact that some kinds of pleasure -<span class="pb" id="Pg047">[47]</span> -are more desirable and more valuable than others." -(p. 310.) Is it compatible? Is kind of pleasure -the same thing as pleasure? does not strict hedonism -demand that all kinds of pleasure equally present -as to intensity in consciousness shall be of -the same value? To say otherwise is to give up -pleasure as such as the standard and to hold that -we have means for discriminating the respective -values of pleasures which simply, <em>as feelings</em>, are -the same. It is to hold, that is to say, that there is -some standard of value external to the pleasures as -such, by means of which their moral quality may -be judged. In this case, this independent standard -is the real moral criterion which we are employing. -Hedonism is surrendered.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>Kant's position on this point seems impregnable. -"It is surprising," he says, "that men otherwise astute -can think it possible to distinguish between higher -and lower desires, according as the ideas which are -connected with the feeling of pleasure have their origin -in the senses or in the understanding; for when -we inquire what are the determining grounds of desire, -and place them in some expected pleasantness, it is of -no consequence whence the <em>idea</em> of this pleasing -object is derived, but only how much it <em>pleases</em>.... -The only thing that concerns one, in order to decide -choice, is how great, how long continued, how easily -obtained and how often repeated, this <ins id="C047" title="agreableness">agreeableness</ins> is. -For as to the man who wants money to spend, it is all -the same whether the gold was dug out of the mountain -or washed out of the sand, provided it is every-where -<span class="pb" id="Pg048">[48]</span> -accepted at the same value; so the man who -cares only for the enjoyment of life does not ask -whether the ideas are of the understanding or the -senses, but only <em>how much</em> and <em>how great pleasure</em> -they will give for the longest time."</p> - -<p>See also Bradley, Op. cit., pp. 105-110.</p></div> - -<p>When we ask how the differences in quality are -established and how we translate this qualitative -difference into moral difference, the surrender of -pleasure as the standard becomes even more evident. -We must know not only the fact of different -qualities, but how to decide which is 'higher' than -any other. We must bring the qualities before a -tribunal of judgment which applies to them some -standard of measurement. In themselves qualities -may be different, but they are not higher and lower. -What is the tribunal and what is the law of judgment? -According to Mill the tribunal is the preference -of those who are acquainted with both kinds -of pleasure.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>"Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all, or -almost all who have experience of both, give a decided -preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation -to prefer it, that is the more desirable -pleasure." It is an unquestionable fact that such -differences exist. "Few human creatures would consent -to be changed into any of the lower animals for a -promise of the fullest allowance of a beast's pleasures. -No intelligent person would consent to be a fool; no -instructed person would be an ignoramus; no person -of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, -<span class="pb" id="Pg049">[49]</span> -even though they should be persuaded that the fool, -the dunce or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot -than they are with theirs.... It is better to be a -human being dissatisfied, than a pig satisfied; better -to be a Socrates dissatisfied, than a fool satisfied. And -if the fool or the pig are of a different opinion, it is -because they only know their own side of the question. -The other party to the comparison knows both -sides."—Mill, Op. cit., pp. 311-313. And in an omitted -portion Mill says the reason that one of the higher -faculty would prefer a suffering which goes along -with that higher capacity, to more pleasure on a lower -plane, is something of which "the most appropriate -appellation is a sense of dignity, which all human -beings possess in one form or another."</p></div> - -<p>A question immediately arises regarding this -standard of preferability. Is it the mere historical -fact that some man, who has experienced both, prefers -A to B that makes A more desirable? Surely -I might say that if that person prefers A, A is more -desirable to him, but that I for my part prefer B, -and that I do not intend to give up my preference. -And why should I, even though thousands of other -men happened to prefer A? B is the greater -pleasure, none the less, to me, and as a hedonist I -must cling to the only standard that I have. The -hedonists, in a word, have appealed to feeling, and -to feeling they must go for judgment. And feeling -exists only as it is felt and only to him who feels it.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, perhaps it is not the bare -act that some men prefer one pleasure to another -<span class="pb" id="Pg050">[50]</span> -that makes it more desirable, but something in the -character of the men who prefer. And this is -what Mill implies. It is a "sense of dignity" -belonging to man which makes his judgment of -pleasure better than that of animals; it is the -human being against the pig, Socrates against the -fool, the good man against the rascal. This is the -complete surrender of hedonism, and the all but -explicit assertion that human character, goodness, -wisdom, are the criteria of pleasure, instead of -pleasure the criterion of character and goodness. -Mill's "sense of dignity," which is to be considered -in all estimates of pleasures, is just the sense -of a moral (or active) capacity and destiny belonging -to man. To refer pleasures to <em>this</em> is to make -it the standard, and with this standard the anti-hedonist -may well be content, while asking, however, -for its further analysis.</p> - -<p>To sum up our long discussion of pleasure as a -criterion of conduct in respect of its unity, we may -say: Pleasure, <em>as it actually exists in man</em>, may be -taken as <em>a</em> criterion, although not the really primary -one, of action. But this is not hedonism; for -pleasure as it <em>exists</em> is something more than pleasurable -feeling; it is qualified through and through -by the kind of action which it accompanies, by the -kind of objects which the activity comprehends. -And thus it is always a secondary criterion. The -<span class="pb" id="Pg051">[51]</span> -moment we begin to analyze we must ask what -<em>kind of activity</em>, what kind of object it is which -the pleasure accompanies and of which it is a symbol. -We may, if we will, calculate a man's -wealth in terms of dollars and cents; but this is -only because we can translate the money, the -symbol, into goods, the reality. To desire pleasure -instead of an activity of self, is to substitute -symbol for fact, and a symbol cut off from fact -ceases to be a symbol. Pleasure, as the hedonist -treats it, mere agreeable feeling without active and -thus objective relationships, is wholly an abstraction. -Since an abstraction, to make it the end of -desire results in self-contradiction; while to make -it the standard of conduct is to deprive life of all -unity, all system, in a word—of all standard.</p> - -<h4>XX.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">The Failure of Pleasure as a Standard to Unify Conduct Socially.</div> - -<p>Thus far our examination of -the hedonistic criterion has been -devoted to showing that it will -not make a system out of individual -conduct. We have now to -recognize the fact that pleasure is not a common -good, and therefore fails to give a social unity to -conduct—that is, it does not offer an end for which -men may coöperate, or a good which reached by -one must be shared by another. No argument is -needed to show, theoretically, that any proposed -<span class="pb" id="Pg052">[52]</span> -moral criterion must, in order to be valid, harmonize -the interests and activities of different men, or -to show, practically, that the whole tendency of the -modern democratic and philanthropic movement -has been to discover and realize a good in which -men shall share on the basis of an equal principle. -It is contended that hedonism fails to satisfy these -needs. According to it, the end for each man is -his own pleasure. Pleasure is nothing objective in -which men may equally participate. It is purely -individual in the most exclusive sense of that term. -It is a state of feeling and can be enjoyed only -while felt, and only by the one who feels it. To set -it up for the ideal of conduct is to turn life into an -exclusive and excluding struggle for possession of -the means of personal enjoyment; it is to erect into -a principle the idea of the war of all against all. -No end more thoroughly disintegrating than individual -agreeable sensation could well be imagined.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>Says Kant, (page 116 of Abbott's Trans., entitled -Kant's Theory of Ethics) on the basis of the desire of -happiness "there results a harmony like that which a -certain satirical poem depicts as existing between a -married couple bent on going to ruin: O, marvellous -harmony, what he wishes, she wishes also; or like -what is said of the pledge of Francis I to the emperor -Charles V, what my brother Charles wishes that I -wish also (<i lang="la" xml:lang="la">viz.</i>, Milan)."</p></div> - -<p>Almost all modern moralists who take pleasure -as the end conceive it to be not individual -<span class="pb" id="Pg053">[53]</span> -pleasure, but the happiness of all men or even of -all sentient creatures. Thus we are brought to the -consideration of Utilitarianism.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>Says Mill (Op. cit., p. 323), "The happiness which -forms the Utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct -is not the agent's own happiness, but that of all -concerned; as between his own happiness and that of -others, Utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly -impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator." -And (page 315) the Utilitarian standard is "not the -agent's own greatest happiness, but the greatest -amount of happiness altogether." See also Sidgwick -(Op. cit., p. 379), "By Utilitarianism is here meant -the ethical theory, first distinctly formulated by Bentham, -that the conduct which, under any given circumstances -is externally or objectively right is that -which will produce the greatest amount of happiness -<em>on the whole</em>; that is, taking into account all whose -happiness is affected by the conduct. It would tend to -clearness if we might call this principle, and the -method based upon it, by some such name as Universalistic -hedonism." As popularly put, the utilitarian -standard is the "greatest happiness of the greatest -number." While in its calculation "each is to -count for one and only one." (<cite>Bentham</cite>). And finally -Bain (Emotions and Mill, p. 303), "Utility is opposed -to the selfish theory, for, as propounded, it always implies -the good of society generally, and the subordination -of individual interests to the general good."</p></div> - -<h4>XXI.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Criticism of Utilitarianism.</div> - -<p>The utilitarian theory certainly -does away entirely with one of the -two main objections to hedonism—its -failure to provide a general, as distinct from a -<span class="pb" id="Pg054">[54]</span> -private end. The question which we have to meet, -however, is whether this extension of the end from -the individual to society is consistent with the fundamental -principles of hedonism. <em>How</em> do we get -from individual pleasure to the happiness of all?</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>An intuitional utilitarian, like Sidgwick, has ready -an answer which is not open to the empirical utilitarians, -like Bentham, Mill and Bain. Methods of Ethics, -Bk. III, ch. 13-14, p. 355. "We may obtain the -<em>self-evident principle</em> that the good of any one individual -is of no more importance, as a part of universal -good, than the good of any other. The abstract principle -of the duty of benevolence, <em>so far as it is cognizable -by direct intuition</em>" is, "that one is morally -bound to regard the good of any other individual as -much as one's own"—and page 364, "<em>the principles, -so far as they are immediately known by abstract intuition</em>, -can only be stated as precepts to seek (1) one's -own good on the whole, and (2) the good of any other -no less than one's own, in so far as it is no less an element -of universal good." Sidgwick, that is, differs in -two important points from most utilitarians. He -holds that pleasure is not the sole, or even the usual -object of desire. And he holds that we have an immediate -faculty of rational intuition which informs us -that the good of others is as desirable an end of our -conduct as is our own happiness. Our former arguments -against pleasure as the <em>end</em>, bear, of course, equally -against this theory, but not the following arguments. -Criticisms of this position of Sidgwick's will be found -in Green (Op. cit., pp. 406-415); Bradley (Op. cit., pp. -114-117).</p></div> - -<p>The popular answer to the question how we get -from individual to general happiness, misses the -<span class="pb" id="Pg055">[55]</span> -entire point of the question. This answer simply -says that happiness is '<em>intrinsically</em> desirable'. -Let it be so; but 'happiness' in this general way is -a mere abstraction. Happiness is always a particular -condition of one particular person. Whose -happiness is desirable and <em>to whom</em>? Because my -happiness is intrinsically desirable to me, does it -follow that your happiness is intrinsically desirable -to me? Indeed, in the hedonistic psychology, is it -not nonsense to say that a state of your feeling is -desirable to me? Mill's amplified version of the -popular answer brings out the ambiguity all the -more plainly. He says (Utilitarianism, p. 349), -"No reason can be given why the general happiness -is desirable, except that each person, so far as -he believes it to be obtainable, desires his own happiness. -This, however, being a fact, we have not -only all the proof which the case admits of, but all -which it is possible to require, that happiness is a -good; that each person's happiness is a good to -that person; and the general happiness, therefore, -a good to the aggregate of all persons." But does -it follow that because the happiness of A is an end -to A, the happiness of B an end to B, and the -happiness of C an end to C, that, therefore, the -happiness of B and C is an end to A? There is -obviously no connection between the premises and -the supposed conclusion. And there appears to be, -<span class="pb" id="Pg056">[56]</span> -as Mill puts it, only an account of the ambiguity -of his last clause, "the general happiness a good -to the aggregate of all persons." The good of A -and B and C may be a good to the aggregate -(A + B + C), but what universalistic hedonism -requires is that the aggregate good of A + B + -C, be a good to A and to B and to C taken separately—a -very different proposition. Mill is guilty of -the fallacy known logically as the fallacy of division—arguing -from a collective whole to the distributed -units. Because all men want to be happy, -it hardly follows that every man wants all to be -happy. There is, accordingly, no <em>direct</em> road from -individualistic hedonism—private pleasure—to universalistic—general -pleasure. Moreover, if we -adopt the usual psychology of hedonism and say -that pleasure is the motive of acting, it is absolutely -absurd to say that general pleasure can be a -motive. How can I be moved by the happiness -which exists in some one else? I may feel a pleasure -resembling his, and be moved by it, but that is -quite a different matter.</p> - -<h4>XXII.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Indirect Means of Identifying Private and General Pleasure.</div> - -<p>Is there any <em>indirect</em> -method of going from the -pleasure of one to the -pleasure of all? Upon the -whole, the utilitarians do not claim that there is any -<span class="pb" id="Pg057">[57]</span> -natural and immediate connection between the -desire for private and for general happiness, but -suppose that there are certain means which are -instrumental in bringing about an identity. Of -these means the sympathetic emotions and the -influence of law and of education are the chief. -Each of these, moreover, coöperates with the other.</p> - -<h5>1. <i>Sympathetic and Social Emotions.</i></h5> - -<p>We are so constituted by nature that we take -pleasure in the happiness of others and feel -pain in their misery. A proper regard for our -own welfare must lead us, therefore, to take an -interest in the pleasure of others. Our own feelings, -moreover, are largely influenced by the feelings -of others toward us. If we act in a certain way -we shall incur the disapprobation of others, and -this, independently of any overt punishment it -may lead them to inflict upon us, arouses feelings -of shame, of inferiority, of being under the displeasure -of others, feelings all of which are decidedly -painful. The more enlightened our judgment, -the more we see how our pleasures are bound -up in those of others.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>"The Dictates of Utility" (Bentham, Op. cit., p. 56) -"are neither more nor less than the dictates of the most -extensive and enlightened (that is, well advised) benevolence," -and (p. 18), "The pleasures of benevolence are -the pleasures resulting from the view of any pleasures -supposed to be possessed by the beings who may be -<span class="pb" id="Pg058">[58]</span> -the objects of benevolence.... These may also be -called the pleasures of good will, the pleasures of sympathy, -or the pleasures of the benevolent or social -affections"; and (p. 144), "What motives (independent -of such as legislation and religion may choose to furnish) -can one man have to consult the happiness of -another?... In answer to this, it cannot but be -admitted that the only interests which a man at all -times and upon all occasions is sure to find <em>adequate</em> -motives for consulting, are his own. Notwithstanding -this, there are no occasions in which a man has not -some motives for consulting the happiness of other -men. In the first place he has, on all occasions, the -purely social motive of sympathy and benevolence; -in the next place he has, on most occasions, the semi-social -motives of love of amity and love of reputation." -And so in the Deontology, which, however, -was not published by Bentham himself, page 203, "The -more enlightened one is, the more one forms the -habit of general benevolence, because it is seen that -the interests of men combine with each other in more -points than they conflict in."</p></div> - -<h5>2. <i>Education and Law.</i></h5> - -<p>Education, working directly and internally upon -the feelings, and government, appealing to them from -without through commands and penalties, are constantly -effecting an increasing identity of self-interest -and regard for others. These means -supplement the action of sympathy and the more -instinctive emotions. They stimulate and even -induce a proper interest in the pleasures of others. -In governmental law, with its punishments, we -have an express instrument for making the pleasures -<span class="pb" id="Pg059">[59]</span> -of one harmonize with (or at least not conflict -with) the pleasures of others.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>Thus Bentham, after stating that an enlightened -mind perceives the identity of self-interest and that of -others (or of <em>egoism</em> and <em>altruism</em>, as these interests -are now commonly called), goes on (Deontology, p. -201): "The majority do not have sufficient enlightenment, -nor enough moral feeling so that their character -goes beyond the aid of laws, and so the legislator -should supplement the frailty of this natural interest, -in adding to it an artificial interest more appreciable -and more continuous. Thus the government augments -and extends the connexion which exists between prudence -and benevolence." Mill says (Op. cit., p. 323): -"To do as you would be done by, and to love your -neighbor as yourself, constitute the ideal perfection of -utilitarian morality. As the means of making the -nearest approach to this ideal, utility would enjoin, -first, that laws and social arrangements should place -the happiness or the interest of every individual as -nearly as possible in harmony with the interest of the -whole; and, secondly, that education and opinion, -which have so vast a power over human character, -should so use that power as to establish in the mind of -every individual an indissoluble association between -his own happiness and the good of the whole."</p></div> - -<h4>XXIII.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Private Pleasures and General Welfare.</div> - -<p>In criticism of these indirect -methods of establishing -the identity of 'egoism' and -'altruism,' it may be said:</p> - -<p>1. That the supposed relation between the private -and the general happiness is extrinsic, and -<span class="pb" id="Pg060">[60]</span> -hence always accidental and open to exception.</p> - -<p>It is not contended that there is any order which -<em>morally</em> demands that there be an identity of interests. -It is simply argued that there are certain -physical and psychological forces which operate, -<em>as matter of fact</em>, to bring about such a result. -Now we may admit, if we like, that such forces -exist and that they are capable of accomplishing all -that Bentham and Mill claim for them. But all -that is established is, at most, a certain state of -facts which is interesting as a state of facts, but -which has no especial moral bearing. It is not -pretended that there is in the very order of things -any necessary and intrinsic connection between the -happiness of one and of another. Such identity -as exists, therefore, must be a mere external result -of the action of certain forces. It is accidental. -This being the case, how can it constitute the universal -ideal of action? Why is it not open for an -agent, under exceptional circumstances, to act for -his own pleasure, to the exclusion of that of others? -We may admit that, upon the whole (or that -always, though this is wholly impossible to prove) -in past experience, personal pleasure has been best -attained by a certain regard for the pleasures of -others; but the connection being wholly empirical -(that is, of past instances and not of an intrinsic -law), we may ask how it can be claimed that the -<span class="pb" id="Pg061">[61]</span> -same connection is <em>certain</em> to hold in this new case? -Nor is it probable that any one would claim that -the connection between individual pleasure and -general pleasure had been so universal and invariable -in past experience.</p> - -<p><em>Intrinsic moral considerations</em> (that is, those -based on the very nature of human action) being -put aside, a pretty strong case could be made -out for the statement that individual happiness is -best attained by ignoring the happiness of others. -Probably the most that can be established on the -other side is that a due prudence dictates that <em>some</em> -attention be paid to the pleasures of others, in calculating -one's own pleasures.</p> - -<p>And this suggests:</p> - -<p>2. That the end is still private pleasure, general -pleasure being simply a means. Granting all that -the hedonists urge, what their arguments prove is -not that the general pleasure is the end of action, -but that, private pleasure being the end, regard for -the pleasures of others is one of the most efficient -means of reaching it. If private pleasure is a -selfish end, the end is not less selfish because the -road to it happens to bring pleasure to others also.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>See Royce, Religious Aspect of Philosophy, pp. -61-74.</p></div> - -<p>3. The use of education and law to bring about -this identity, presupposes that we already have the -<span class="pb" id="Pg062">[62]</span> -<em>ideal</em> of the identity as something desirable to -realize—it takes for granted the very thing to be -proved. Why should it occur to men to use the -private influence of opinion and education, and -the public influences of law and penalty to identify -private welfare with public, unless they were already -convinced that general welfare was the end -of conduct, the one desirable thing? What the -hedonist has to do is to show how, from the end of -private happiness, we may get to the end of general -happiness. What Bentham and Mill do show is, -that if we take general happiness as the end, we -may and do use education and law to bring about -an identity of personal and general pleasures. -This may go undoubted, but the question how we -get the general happiness as the end, the good, remains -unanswered.</p> - -<p>Nor is this all. The conception of general happiness, -taken by itself, has all the abstractness, -vagueness and uncertainty of that of personal happiness, -multiplied indefinitely by the greater number -of persons introduced. To calculate the effects -of actions upon the general happiness—when happiness -is interpreted as a state of feeling—is an -impossibility. And thus it is that when one is -speaking of pleasures one is really thinking of welfare, -or well-being, or satisfied and progressive -human lives. Happiness is considered as it would -<span class="pb" id="Pg063">[63]</span> -be, if determined by certain active and well defined -interests, and thus the hedonistic theory, while contradicting -itself, gets apparently all the support of -an opposed theory. Universalistic hedonism thus, -more or less expressly, takes for granted a social -order, or community of persons, of which the agent -is simply one member like any other. This is the -ideal which it proposes to realize. In this way—although -at the cost of logical suicide—the ideal -gets a content and a definiteness upon which it is -possible to base judgments.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>That this social organization of persons is the -ideal which Mill is actually thinking of, rather than -any succession of states of agreeable sensation, is evident -by his treatment of the whole subject. Mill is -quite clear that education and opinion may produce -<em>any</em> sort of feeling, as well as truly benevolent motives -to actions. For example, in his critique of Whewell, -he says, (Op. cit., p. 154): "All experience shows that -the moral feelings are preëminently artificial, and the -products of culture; that even when reasonable, they -are no more spontaneous than the growth of corn and -wine (which are quite as natural), and that the most -senseless and pernicious feeling can as easily be raised -to the utmost intensity by inculcation, as hemlock and -thistles could be reared to luxuriant growth by sowing -them instead of wheat." It is certainly implied here -that legislation, education and public opinion must -have as a presupposed standard the identity of general -and private interests or else they may produce anything -whatever. That is to say, Mill instead of arriving -at his result of general happiness simply takes it -for granted.</p> - -<p><span class="pb" id="Pg064">[64]</span> -This fact and the further fact that he virtually -defines happiness through certain objective interests -and ends (thus reversing the true hedonistic position) -is obvious from the following, (Mill, Op. cit., pp. 343-347): -After again stating that the moral feelings are -capable of cultivation in almost any direction, and -stating that moral associations that are of artificial -construction dissolve through the force of intellectual -analysis (<i lang="la" xml:lang="la">cf.</i> his Autobiography, p. 136), and that the association -of pleasure with the feeling of duty would -similarly dissolve unless it had a <em>natural</em> basis of sentiment, -he goes on. "But there is this basis of powerful -<em>natural</em> sentiment. This firm foundation is that -of the social feelings of mankind; the desire to be in -unity with our fellow-creatures. <em>The social state is at -once so natural, so necessary, and so habitual to man -that except in some unusual circumstances, or by an -effort of voluntary abstraction he never conceives of -himself otherwise than as a member of a body.</em> Any -condition, therefore, which is essential to a state of -society becomes more and more an inseparable part of -every person's conception of the state of things which -he is born into, and which is the destiny of a human -being." Mill then goes on to describe some of the -ways in which the social unity manifests itself and -influences the individual's conduct. Then the latter -"comes, as though instinctively, to be conscious of -himself as a being who <em>of course</em> pays regard to others. -The good of others becomes to him a thing naturally -and necessarily to be attended to, like any of the physical -conditions of our existence. <em>The deeply-rooted -conception which every individual even now has of -himself as a social being tends to make him feel it as -one of his natural wants, that there should be harmony -between his feelings and aims and those of his fellow-creatures.</em> -<span class="pb" id="Pg065">[65]</span> -This conviction is the ultimate sanction of -the greatest happiness morality."</p></div> - -<p>It is to be noticed that there is involved in this -account three ideas, any one of which involves such -a reconstruction of the pleasure theory as to be a -surrender of hedonism.</p> - -<p>1. There is, in one instance, a <em>natural</em> (or intrinsic) -connection between the end of conduct and -the feelings, and not simply an external or artificial -bond. This is in the case of the social feelings. -In other words, in one case the ideal, that is, happiness, -is intrinsically, or necessarily connected with -a certain kind of conduct, that flowing from the -social impulses. This, of course, reverses hedonism -for it makes happiness dependent upon a certain -kind of conduct, instead of determining the nature -of conduct according as it happens to result in -pleasure or pain.</p> - -<p>2. Man conceives of himself, of his end or of -his destiny as a member of a social body, and -this conception determines the nature of his wants -and aims. That is to say, it is not mere happiness -that a man wants, but a certain <em>kind</em> of happiness, -that which would satisfy a man who conceived of -himself as social, or having ends and interests in -common with others.</p> - -<p>3. Finally, it is not mere general "happiness" -which is the end, at all. It is social unity; "harmony -<span class="pb" id="Pg066">[66]</span> -of feelings and aims," a beneficial condition -for one's self in which the benefits of all are included. -Instead of the essentially vague idea of states of -pleasurable sensation we have the conception of a -community of interests and ends, in securing which -alone is true happiness to be found. This conception -of the moral ideal we regard as essentially -true, but it is not hedonism. It gives up wholly -the notion that pleasure is the <em>desired</em>, and, since it -sets up a standard by which it determines pleasure, -it gives up equally the notion that pleasure as -such is the <em>desirable</em>.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>In addition to the works already referred to, the -following will give fuller ideas of hedonism and utilitarianism: -For historical treatment see Sidgwick, -History of Ethics; Jodl, Geschichte der Ethik, Vol. -II., pp. 482-468; Bain, Moral Science, Historical Mention; -Guyau, La Morale Anglaise Contemporaine; -Wallace, Epicureanism; Pater, Marius, the Epicurean; -Paley, Moral and Political Philosophy; Grote, Examination -of the Utilitarian Philosophy (especially fair -and valuable criticism); Lecky, History of European -Morals, Vol. I, ch. I; Birks, Utilitarianism (hostile); -Blackie, Four Phases of Morals: Essay on Utilitarianism -(hostile); Gizycki, Students' Manual of Ethical -Philosophy, (Coit's trans., favorable); Calderwood, -Hand-Book of Moral Philosophy (opposed); Laurie, -Ethica (<i lang="la" xml:lang="la">e. g.</i>, p. 10). "The object of will is not pleasure, -not yet happiness, but reason-given law—the law -of harmony; but this necessarily ascertained through -feeling, and, therefore, through happiness."</p> - -<p>Wilson and Fowler, Principles of Morals, Vol. I, -<span class="pb" id="Pg067">[67]</span> -pp. 98-112; Vol. II, pp. 262-273. Paulsen, System der -Ethik, pp. 195-210.</p></div> - -<h4>XXIV.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">The Utilitarian Theory Combined With the Doctrine of Evolution.</div> - -<p>There has lately -been an attempt to -combine utilitarian -morality with the theory of evolution. This position, -chiefly as occupied by Herbert Spencer and -Leslie Stephen, we shall now examine.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>Alexander, also, Moral Order and Progress, makes -large use of the theory of evolution, but does not -attempt to unite it with any form of hedonism.</p></div> - -<p>For the combination, at least three decided advantages -are claimed over ordinary utilitarianism.</p> - -<p>1. It transforms 'empirical rules' into 'rational -laws.' The evolutionary hedonists regard pleasure -as the good, but hold that the theory of evolution enables -them to judge <em>of the relation of acts to -pleasure</em> much better than the ordinary theory. As -Mr. Spencer puts it, the ordinary theory is not scientific, -because it does not fully recognize the -principle of causation as existing between certain -acts as causes, and pleasures (or pains) as effects. -It undoubtedly recognizes that some acts <em>do</em> result -in pain or pleasure, but does not show <em>how</em> or <em>why</em> -they so result. By the aid of the theory of evolution -we can demonstrate that certain acts <em>must</em> be -beneficial because furthering evolution, and others -painful because retarding it.</p> - -<span class="pb" id="Pg068">[68]</span> -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>Spencer, Data of Ethics, pp. 5758. "Morality -properly so-called—the science of right conduct—has -for its object to determine <em>how</em> and <em>why</em> certain rules -of conduct are detrimental, and certain other rules -beneficial. Those good and bad results cannot be accidental, -but must be necessary consequences of the -constitution of things; and I conceive it to be the -business of moral science to <em>deduce, from the laws of -life and the conditions of existence</em>, what kinds of -action <em>necessarily</em> tend to produce happiness, and what -kinds to produce unhappiness. Having done this, its -deductions are to be recognized as laws of conduct; -and are to be conformed to irrespective of a direct -estimation of happiness or misery.... The objection -which I have to the current utilitarianism is, -that it recognizes no more developed form of utility—does -not see that it has reached but the initial stage -of moral science.... It is supposed that in future, -as now, utility is to be determined only by observation -of results; and that there is no possibility of knowing -by deduction from fundamental principles what conduct -<em>must</em> be detrimental and what conduct <em>must</em> be -beneficial." <i lang="la" xml:lang="la">Cf.</i> also ch. IX, and Stephen, Science of -<ins id="C068" title="Ehtics">Ethics</ins>, ch. IX.</p></div> - -<p>It is contended, then, that by the use of the evolutionary -theory, we may substitute certain conditions, -which in the very nature of things tend to -produce happiness, for a calculation, based upon -observation of more or less varying cases in the past, -of the probable results of the specific action. Thus -we get a fixed objective standard and do away with -all the objections based upon the uncertainty, -vagueness and liability to exceptions, of the ordinary -utilitarian morality.</p> - -<span class="pb" id="Pg069">[69]</span> -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>Spencer, Op. cit., p. 162: "When alleging that -empirical utilitarianism is but introductory to rational -utilitarianism I pointed out that the last does not -take welfare for its <em>immediate</em> object of pursuit, but -takes for its immediate object of pursuit conformity -to certain principles which, in the nature of things, -causally determine welfare."</p></div> - -<p>2. It reconciles 'intuitionalism' with 'empiricism.' -The theory of evolution not only gives us -an objective standard on which happiness necessarily -depends, and from which we may derive our -laws of conduct, instead of deriving them from observation -of particular cases, but it enables us to -recognize that there are certain moral ideas now -innate or intuitive. The whole human race, the -whole animal race, has for an indefinite time been -undergoing experiences of what leads to pleasure -and of what leads to pain, until finally the results -of these experiences have become organized into -our very physical and mental make-up. The first -point was that we could substitute for consideration -of results consideration of the causes which determine -these results; the present point is that so far -as we have to use results, we can use those of the -race, instead of the short span of the individual's -life.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>Spencer, Op. cit., pp. 123-124. "The experiences of -utility organized and consolidated through all past -generations of the human race have been producing -corresponding nervous modifications, which, by continued -<span class="pb" id="Pg070">[70]</span> -transmission and accumulation, have become -in us certain faculties of moral intuition—certain -emotions corresponding to right and wrong conduct, -which have no apparent basis in the individual experiences -of utility.... The evolution hypothesis thus -enables us to reconcile opposed moral theories.... -The doctrine of innate powers of moral perception -become congruous with the utilitarian doctrine, when -it is seen that preferences and aversions are rendered -organic by inheritance of the effects of pleasurable -and painful experiences in progenitors."</p></div> - -<p>3. It reconciles 'egoism' with 'altruism.' As -we have seen, the relation of personal pleasure to -general happiness presents very serious difficulties to -hedonism. It is claimed, however, that the very process -of evolution necessitates a certain identity. -The being which survives must be the being which -has properly adapted himself to his environment, -which is largely social, and there is assurance that -the conduct will be adapted to the environment -just in the degree in which pleasure is taken in -acts which concern the welfare of others. If an -agent has no pleasure in such acts he will either not -perform them, or perform them only occasionally, -and thus will not meet the conditions of surviving. -If surrounding conditions demand constantly certain -actions, those actions in time must come to be pleasurable. -The conditions of survival demand altruistic -action, and hence such action must become -pleasurable to the agent (and in that sense egotistic).</p> - -<span class="pb" id="Pg071">[71]</span> -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>"From the laws of life (Spencer Op. cit., p. 205) it -must be concluded that unceasing social discipline -will so mould human action, that eventually sympathetic -pleasures will be pursued to the fullest extent -advantageous to each and all.... Though pleasure -may be gained by giving pleasure, yet the thought of -the sympathetic pleasure to be gained will not occupy -consciousness, but only the thought of the pleasure -given."</p></div> - -<h4>XXV.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Criticism of Evolutionary Utilitarianism.</div> - -<p>Regarding the whole foregoing -scheme, it may be said so far as it -is true, or suggestive of truth, it is -not hedonistic. It does not judge -actions from their effects in the way of pleasure or -pain, but it judges pleasures from the basis of an -independent standard 'in the nature of things.' -It is expressly declared that happiness is not to be -so much the end, as the <em>test</em> of conduct, and it is -not happiness in general, of every sort and kind, -but a certain kind of happiness, happiness conditioned -by certain modes of activity, that is the test. -Spencer's hedonism in its final result hardly comes -to more than saying that in the case of a perfect -individual in a perfect society, every action whatever -would be accompanied by pleasure, and that, -therefore, <em>in such a society</em>, pleasure would be an -infallible sign and test of the morality of action—a -position which is not denied by any ethical writer -whatever, unless a few extreme ascetics. Such a -<span class="pb" id="Pg072">[72]</span> -position simply determines the value of pleasure -by an independent criterion, and then goes on to -say <em>of pleasure so determined</em>, that it is the test of -the morality of action. This may be true, but, true -or not, it is not hedonistic.</p> - -<p>Furthermore, this standard by which the nature -of pleasure is determined is itself an ethical (that -is, active) standard. We have already seen that -Spencer conceives that the modes of producing happiness -are to be deduced from the "laws of life and -the conditions of existence". This might be, of -course, a deduction from <em>physical</em> laws and conditions. -But when we find that the laws and conditions -which Spencer employs are mainly those of -<em>social</em> life, it is difficult to see why he is not employing -a strictly ethical standard. To deduce not -right actions directly from happiness, but the kinds -of actions which will produce happiness from a consideration -of a certain ideal of social relationships -seems like a reversal of hedonism; but this is what -Mr. Spencer does.</p> - -<h4>XXVI.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">The Real Criterion of Evolutionary Ethics.</div> - -<p>Mr. Spencer expressly recognizes -that there exists (1) an ideal code of -conduct, formulating the conduct of -the completely adapted man in the -completely evolved society. Such a -code is called absolute ethics as distinguished from -<span class="pb" id="Pg073">[73]</span> -relative ethics—a code the injunctions of which are -alone to be considered "as absolutely right, in contrast -with those that are relatively right or least -wrong, and which, as a system of ideal conduct, is -to serve as a standard for our guidance in solving, -as well as we can, the problems of real conduct" -(p. 275 of the Data of Ethics). "The ideal code -deals, it will be observed, with the behavior of the -completely adapted man in a completely evolved -society." This ideal as elsewhere stated, is "an -ideal social being so constituted that his spontaneous -activities are congruous with the conditions -imposed by the social environment formed by -other such beings.... The ultimate man is -one in whom there is a correspondence between -all the promptings of his nature and all the -requirements of his life as carried on in society" -(p. 275). Furthermore, "to make the ideal man -serve as a standard, he has to be defined <em>in terms -of the conditions which his nature fulfill</em>—in terms -of the objective requisites which must be met -before conduct can be right" (p. 179). "Hence it -is manifest that we must consider the ideal man as -existing in the ideal social state" (p. 280).</p> - -<p>Here we have in the most express terms the recognition -of a final and permanent standard with -reference to which the nature of happiness is determined, -and the standard is one of social relationships. -<span class="pb" id="Pg074">[74]</span> -To be sure it is claimed that the standard -is one which results in greatest happiness, but every -ethical theory has always claimed that the ideal -moral condition would be accompanied by the maximum -possible happiness.</p> - -<p>2. The ideal state is defined with reference to -the end of evolution. That is, Spencer defines -pleasure from an independent standard instead of -using pleasure as the standard. This standard is -to be got at by considering that idea of "fully -evolved conduct" given by the theory of evolution. -This fully evolved conduct implies: (i.) Greatest -possible quantity of life, both in length and -breadth; (ii.) Similar maintenance of life in progeny; -and (iii.) Life in which there is no interference -of actions by one with those of another, and, -indeed, life in which the "members of a society<ins id="C074" title="endquote missing">"</ins> -give material help in the achievement of ends, -thus rendering the "lives of all more complete". -(See Chap. II of Data of Ethics). Furthermore, -the "complete life here identified with the ideally -moral life" may be otherwise defined as a life of -perfect equilibrium (p. 74), or balance of functions -(p. 90), and this considered not simply with reference -to the individual, but also with reference to -the relation of the individual to society. "Complete -life in a complete society is but another name -for complete equilibrium between the co-ordinated -<span class="pb" id="Pg075">[75]</span> -activities of each social unit and those of the aggregate -of units" (p. 74, and the whole of chap. -V. See also pp. 169-170 for the position that -the end is a society in which each individual has -full functions freely exercised in due harmony, and -is, p. 100, "the spontaneous exercise of duly proportioned -faculties").</p> - -<p>3. Not only is pleasure thus determined by an -objective standard of "complete living in a complete -society" but it is expressly recognized that -<em>as things are now, pleasure is not a perfect guide -to, or even test of action</em>. And this difficulty is -thought to be removed by reference to the ideal -state in which right action and happiness will fully -coincide.</p> - -<p>The failure of pleasure as a perfect test and -guide of right conduct, comes out in at least three -cases:—</p> - -<p>1. There is the conflict of one set of pleasures -with another, or of present happiness with future, -one lot having to be surrendered for the sake of -another. This is wrong, since pleasure as such is -good, and, although a fact at present, exists only on -account of the incomplete development of society. -When there is "complete adjustment of humanity -to the social state there will be recognition of the -truth that actions are completely right only when, -besides being conducive to future happiness, special -<span class="pb" id="Pg076">[76]</span> -and general, they are immediately pleasurable, and -that painfulness, not only ultimate but proximate, -is the concomitant of actions which are wrong" -(p. 29. See for various cases in which "pleasures -are not connected with actions which must be performed" -and for the statement that this difficulty -will be removed in an ideal state of society, p. 77; -pp. 85-87; pp. 98-99).</p> - -<p>2. There is also, at present, a conflict of individual -happiness with social welfare. In the first -place, as long as there exist antagonistic societies, -the individual is called upon to sacrifice his own -happiness to that of others, but "such moralities -are, by their definition, shown to belong to incomplete -conduct; not to conduct that is fully -evolved" (See pp. 133-137). Furthermore, there -will be conflict of claims, and consequent compromises -between one's own pleasure and that of -others (p. 148), until there is a society in which -there is "complete living through voluntary co-operation", -this implying negatively that one shall -not interfere with another and shall fulfill contracts, -and positively that men shall spontaneously help to -aid one another lives beyond any specified agreement -(pp. 146-149).</p> - -<p>3. There is, at present, a conflict of obligation -with pleasure. Needed activities, in other words, -have often to be performed under a pressure, which -<span class="pb" id="Pg077">[77]</span> -either lessens the pleasure of the action, or brings -pain, the act being performed, however, to avoid a -greater pain (so that this point really comes under -the first head). But "the remoulding of human -nature into fitness for the requirements of social -life, must eventually make all needful activities -pleasurable, while it makes displeasurable all -activities at variance with these requirements" -(p. 183). "The things now done with dislike, -through sense of obligation, will be done then -with immediate liking" (p. 84, and p. 186; -and pp. 255-256). All the quotations on these -various points are simply so many recognitions -that pleasure and pain as such are not tests of -morality, but that they become so when morality -is independently realized. Pleasure is <em>not</em> now a -test of conduct, but becomes such a test as fast as -activity becomes full and complete! What is this -but to admit (what was claimed in Sec. <a href="#XIII">XIII</a>) that -activity itself is what man wants; not <em>mere</em> activity, -but the activity which belongs to man as man, and -which therefore has for its realized content all -man's practical relationships.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>Of Spencer's conception of the ideal as something -not now realized, but to be some time or other realized -once for all, we have said nothing. But see below, -Sec. <a href="#LXIV">64</a>, and also Alexander, Op. cit., pp. 264-277, and -also James, Unitarian Review, Vol. XXII., pp. 212-213.</p> - -<p>We have attempted, above, to deal with evolutionary -<span class="pb" id="Pg078">[78]</span> -ethics only in the one point of its supposed -connection with pleasure as a standard. Accounts and -criticisms of a broader scope will be found in Darwin, -Descent of Man; Martineau, Op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 335-393; -Schurman, Ethical Import of Darwinism; Sorley, -Ethics of Naturalism, chapters V, and VI; Stephen, -Science of Ethics, particularly pp. 31-34; 78-89; 359-379; -Royce, Religious Aspect of Philosophy, pp. 74-85; -Everett, Poetry, Comedy and Duty, Essay on the New -Ethics; Seth in Mind, Jan. 1889, on Evolution of Morality; -Dewey, Andover Review, Vol. VII, p. 570; -Hyslop, Ibid., Vol. IX, p. 348.</p></div> - -<h4>XXVII.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Formal Ethics.</div> - -<p>We come now to the ethical -theories which attempt to find the good not only -in the will itself, but in the will irrespective of -any end to be reached by the will. The typical -instance of such theories is the Kantian, and we -shall, therefore, make that the basis of our examination. -Kant's theory, however, is primarily a theory -not of the good, but of the nature of duty, and that -makes a statement of his doctrine somewhat more -difficult.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>"The concept of good and evil must not be determined -before the moral law (of which it seems as if it -must be the foundation), but only after it and by -means of it" (Abbott's Trans., p. 154).</p></div> - -<p>Separating, as far as we can, his theory of the -good from that of duty, we get the following results:</p> - -<p>1. Goodness belongs to the will, and to that alone. -<span class="pb" id="Pg079">[79]</span> -"Nothing can possibly be conceived, in the world -or out of it, which can be called good without qualification -except a good will." The will is not good -because of what it brings about, or what it is fitted -to bring about; that is, it is not good on account -of its adaptation to any end outside of itself. It -is good in itself. "It is like a jewel which -shines by its own light, having its whole value in -itself."</p> - -<p>2. The good, then, is not to be found in any -<em>object</em> of will or of desire, nor in the will <em>so far as it -is directed towards an end outside itself</em>. For the -will to be moved by inclination or by desire is for it -to be moved for the sake of some external end, which, -moreover, is always pleasure (Kant, <i lang="la" xml:lang="la">i. e.</i>, agrees -with the hedonists regarding the object of desire, -but on that very ground denies that pleasure is the -good or the desirable). If, then, no object of desire -can be the motive of a good will, what is its motive? -Evidently only some principle derived from the will -itself. The good will is the will which acts from -regard to its own law.</p> - -<p>3. What is the nature of this law? All objects -of desire (<i lang="la" xml:lang="la">i. e.</i>, all material) have been excluded -from it. It must, therefore, be purely formal. -The only content of the law of the good will is the -<em>idea of law itself</em>. The good will acts from reverences -for law as <em>law</em>. It not only acts <em>in conformity -<span class="pb" id="Pg080">[80]</span> -with law</em>, but has the conception of law as its -directing spring.</p> - -<p>4. There must, however, be some application of -this motive of law in general to particular motives -or acts. This is secured as follows: The idea of -law carries with it the idea of universality or self-identity. -To act from the idea of law is then so to -act that the motive of action can be generalized—made -a motive for all conduct. The good will is -the <em>legislative</em> will; the will whose motive can be -made a law for conduct universally. The question -in a specific case is then: Can your motive -here be made universal, <i lang="la" xml:lang="la">i. e.</i>, a law? If the action -is bad, determined by an object of desire, it will be -contingent and variable, since pleasures are different -to different persons and to the same person -from moment to moment. The will is good, -then, when its motive (or maxim) is to be found -solely in the <em>legislative form</em> of the action, or in its -fitness to be generalized into a universal principle -of conduct, and the law of the good will is: "Act -so that the maxim of thy will can always at the -same time hold good as a principle of universal -legislation" (Abbott's Trans., p. 119; also p. 55).</p> - -<p>5. The application may be illustrated by the following -cases:</p> - -<p>(<i>a</i>) Some one, wearied by what he conceives to -be the entire misery of life proposes to commit suicide, -<span class="pb" id="Pg081">[81]</span> -but he asks himself whether this maxim based -on the principle of self-love could become a universal -law of nature; and "we see at once that a system -of nature in which the very feeling, whose office is -to compel men to the preservation of life, should -lead men by a universal law to death, cannot be -conceived without contradiction". That is to say, -the principle of the motive which would lead a man -to suicide cannot be generalized without becoming -contradictory—it cannot be made a law universal.</p> - -<p>(<i>b</i>) An individual wishes to borrow money which -he knows that he cannot repay. Can the maxim of -this act be universalized? Evidently not: "a system -of nature in which it should be a universal law to -promise without performing, for the sake of private -good, would contradict itself, for then no one would -believe the promise—the promise itself would become -impossible as well as the end it had in view."</p> - -<p>(<i>c</i>) A man finds that he has certain powers, -but is disinclined to develop them. Can he make -the maxim of such conduct a universal law? He -cannot <em>will</em> that it should become universal. "As a -rational being, he must will that his faculties be -developed."</p> - -<p>(<i>d</i>) A prosperous individual is disinclined to relieve -the misery of others. Can his maxim be generalized? -"It is impossible to <em>will</em> that such a -principle should have the universal validity of a -<span class="pb" id="Pg082">[82]</span> -law of nature. For a will which resolved this -would contradict itself, in as much as many cases -might occur in which one would have need of the -love and sympathy of others, and in which, by -such a law of nature, sprung from his own will, he -would deprive himself of all hope of the aid he -desires."</p> - -<p>In conclusion, then, the good is the good will -itself, and the will is good in virtue of the bare -form of its action, independently of all special -material willed.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>See Abbott's trans., pp. 9-46; 105-120. Caird's Critical -Philosophy of Kant, Vol. II, pp. 171-181; 209-212.</p></div> - -<h4>XXVIII.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Relation of this Theory to Hedonism.</div> - -<p>The Kantian theory, as already -noticed, agrees in its psychology with -hedonism. It holds that pleasures -are the objects of desire. But it -reverses the conclusion which hedonism -draws from this fact <em>as to the desirable</em>. Since -pleasures are the object of desire, and pleasures -can give no law, no universality to action, the end -of action must be found wholly <em>outside</em> the pleasures, -and wholly outside the desires. It can be -found only in the bare law of the will itself.</p> - -<p>1. Hedonism finds the end of conduct, or the -desirable, wholly determined by the various particular -desires which a man happens to have; Kantianism -<span class="pb" id="Pg083">[83]</span> -holds that to discover the end of conduct, -we must wholly exclude the desires.</p> - -<p>2. Hedonism holds that the rightness of conduct -is determined wholly by its consequences; -Kantianism holds that the consequences have nothing -to do with the rightness of an act, but that it -is decided wholly by the motive of the act.</p> - -<p>From this contrast, we may anticipate both our -criticism of the Kantian theory and our conception -of the true end of action. The fundamental -error of hedonism and Kantianism is the same—the -supposition that desires are for pleasure -only. Let it be recognized that desires are for -objects conceived as satisfying or developing the -self, and that pleasure is incidental to this fulfillment -of the capacities of self, and we have the -means of escaping the one-sidedness of Kantianism -<ins id="C083" title="of">as</ins> well as of hedonism. We can see that the end -is neither the procuring of particular pleasures -through the various desires, nor action from the -mere idea of abstract law in general, but that it is -the <em>satisfaction of desires according to law</em>. The -desire in its particular character does not give the -law; this, as we saw in our criticism of hedonism, is -to take away all law from conduct and to leave us -at the mercy of our chance desires as they come -and go. On the other hand the law is not something -wholly apart from the desires. This, as we -<span class="pb" id="Pg084">[84]</span> -shall see, is equally to deprive us of a law capable -of governing conduct. The law is the law of the -desires themselves—the harmony and adjustment -of desires necessary to make them instruments -in fulfilling the special destiny or business of the -agent.</p> - -<p>From the same point of view we can see that the -criterion is found neither in the consequences of -our acts <em>as pleasures</em>, nor <em>apart from consequences</em>. -It is found indeed in the consequences of acts, <em>but in -their complete consequences</em>:—those upon the agent -and society, as helping or hindering them in fulfillment -of their respective functions.</p> - -<h4>XXIX.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Criticism of Kantian Criterion of Conduct.</div> - -<p>1. <i>With reference to the unification -of the conduct of the individual.</i> Of -pleasure as the object of desire, we need -now say nothing further, but may proceed -at once to the criticism of the -theory that the will, acting according -to the mere idea of law in general, is the end of man -and hence that it is the criterion of the rightness -or wrongness of his acts. We shall attempt to -show that such an end is wholly empty, and that it -fails (as much as hedonism) to unify conduct or -to place any specific act as to its morality.</p> - -<p>The difficulty of the end proposed by Kant is -that it is an abstraction; that it is remote. The -<span class="pb" id="Pg085">[85]</span> -hedonist leaves out one element from conduct, and -takes into account the merely particular or individualistic -side; the Kantian abstracts the opposite -element—the merely universal. The formal -universal, or universal stripped of all particular -content, has, considered as an end of action, at least -three defects.</p> - -<p>I. It is an end which would make impossible -that very conduct of which it is taken to be the -end—that is, moral conduct. In denying that -pleasure is the end of action, we took pains to show -that it (or rather the feeling due to the tension -between pleasure of a state considered better and -the pain of the experienced worse state) is a necessary -element in the force impelling to action. The -mere conception of an end is purely intellectual; -there is nothing in it to move to action. It must -be <em>felt</em> as valuable, as worth having, and as more -valuable than the present condition before it can -induce to action. It must <em>interest</em>, in a word, and -thus excite desire. But if feeling is, as Kant declares, -to be excluded from the motive to action, because -it is pathological or related to pleasure as the -object of desire, how can there be any force moving -to action? The mind seems to be set over -against a purely theoretical idea of an end, with -nothing to connect the mind with the end. -Unless the end interests, unless it arouses emotion, -<span class="pb" id="Pg086">[86]</span> -why should the agent ever aim at it? And if the -law does excite feeling or desire, must not this, -on Kant's theory, be desire for pleasure and thus -vitiate the morality of the act? We seem to be in -a dilemma, one side of which makes moral action -impossible by taking away all inducing force, -while the other makes it impossible by introducing -an immoral factor into the motive.</p> - -<p>Kant attempts to escape from this difficulty by -claiming that there is one feeling which is rational, -and not sensuous in quality, being excited not by -the conception of pleasure or pain, but by that of -the moral law itself. This is the feeling of reverence, -and through this feeling we can be moved to -moral action. Waiving the question whether the -mere idea of law in general would be capable of -arousing any moral sentiment—or, putting the -matter from the other side, whether Kant gives us -a true account of the feeling of reverence—it is -clear that this admission is fatal to Kant's theory. -If desire or feeling as such is sensuous (or <em>pathological</em>, -as Kant terms it), what right have we to -make this one exception? And if we can make -this one exception, why not others? If it is possible -in the case of reverence, why not in the case, -say, of patriotism, or of friendship, or of philanthropy, -or of love—or even of curiosity, or of -indignation, or of desire for approbation? Kant's -<span class="pb" id="Pg087">[87]</span> -separation of reverence, as the one moral sentiment -from all others as pathological, is wholly arbitrary. -The only distinction we can draw is of the feelings -as they well up naturally in reaction upon stimuli, -sentiments not conceived and thus neither moral nor -immoral, and sentiments as transformed by ends -of action, in which case all without exception may -be moral or immoral, according to the character of -the end. The Kantian separation is not only arbitrary -psychologically, but is false historically. -So far is it from true that the only moral sentiment -is reverence for law, that men must have been -moved toward action for centuries by motives of -love and hate and social regard, before they became -capable of such an abstract feeling as reverence. -And it may be questioned whether this feeling, as -Kant treats it, is even the highest or ultimate form -of moral sentiment—whether it is not transitional -to love, in which there is complete union of the -individual interest on one hand, and the objective -end on the other.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>For these criticisms at greater length, see Caird, -Critical Philosophy of Kant, Vol. II, Bk. II, ch. IV.</p></div> - -<p>II. The Kantian end would not bring about any -system in conduct—on the contrary, it would tend -to differences and collisions. What is required to -give unity to the sphere of conduct is, as we have -seen, a principle which shall comprehend all the -<span class="pb" id="Pg088">[88]</span> -motives to action, giving each its due place in contributing -to the whole—a universal which shall -organize the various particular acts into a harmonious -system. Now Kant's conception of the good -does not lead to such result. We may even say -that it makes it impossible. According to Kant each -act must be considered independently of every -other, and must be capable of generalization on its -own account. Each motive of action must be -capable of being <em>itself</em> a universal law of nature. -Each particular rule of action is thus made absolute, -and we are left not with one universal which -comprehends all particulars in their relations to -one another, but literally with a lot of universals. -These not only fail to have a unity, but each, as -absolute, must contradict some other. If the principles -always to tell the truth and always to -preserve life are universal <em>in themselves</em>, and not -universal simply <em>through their relation to some -total and controlling principle of life</em>, it must be -impossible to reconcile them when they come into -conflict.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>See Caird, Op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 187-190, and p. 215. -<i lang="la" xml:lang="la">Cf.</i> "Treated as universal and without exception, -even two such commands as <i lang="la" xml:lang="la">e. g.</i>, 'Thou shalt not -steal,' and 'Thou shalt not kill,' must ultimately come -into conflict with each other; for, if all other interests -are to be postponed to the maintenance of the rights -of property, it is impossible that all other interests -should also be postponed to the preservation of -<span class="pb" id="Pg089">[89]</span> -human life—and to make either property or life an -absolute end is to raise a particular into a universal, -to treat a part as if it were a whole. But the true -moral vindication of each particular interest cannot -be found in elevating it into something universal and -absolute, but only in determining its place in relation -to the others in a complete system of morality."</p></div> - -<p>III. The principle is so empty of all content -that it does not enable us to judge of any specific -act.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>A caution should be noticed here, which is equally -applicable to the criticism of hedonism: When it is -said that the end does not enable us to judge of specific -acts, the objection is not that the <em>theory</em> (Kantianism -or hedonism, as the case may be) does not give us -rules for moral conduct. It is not the business of any -theory, however correct as a theory, to lay down rules -for conduct. The theory has simply to discover what -the <em>end</em> is, and it is the end in view which determines -specific acts. It is no more the business of ethics to -tell what in particular a man ought to do, than it is of -trigonometry to survey land. But trigonometry must -state the principles by which land <em>is</em> surveyed, and so -ethics must state the end by which conduct <em>is</em> governed. -The objection to hedonism and Kantianism is -that the end they give does not <em>itself</em> stand in any -practical relation to conduct. We do not object to -Kantianism because the <em>theory</em> does not help us as to -specific acts, but because the <em>end</em>, formal law, does -not help us, while the real moral end must determine -the whole of conduct.</p></div> - -<p>Suppose a man thrown into the complex -surroundings of life with an intelligence fully -developed, but with no previous knowledge of right -<span class="pb" id="Pg090">[90]</span> -or wrong, or of the prevailing moral code. He is -to know, however, that goodness is to be found in -the good will, and that the good will is the will -moved by the mere idea of the universality of law. -Can we imagine such an one deriving from his -knowledge any idea of what concrete ends he ought -to pursue and what to avoid? He is surrounded -by special circumstances calling for special acts, -and all he knows is that <em>whatever</em> he does is to be -done from respect for its universal or legislative -quality. What community is there between this -principle and <em>what</em> he is to do? There is no bridge -from the mere thought of universal law to any -concrete end coming under the law. There is no -common principle out of which grows the conception -of law on one hand, and of the various special -ends of action, on the other.</p> - -<p>Suppose, however, that ends are independently -suggested or proposed, will the Kantian conception -serve to <em>test</em> their moral fitness? Will the conception -that the end must be capable of being generalized -tell us whether this or that end is one to be -followed? The fact is, that there is no end whatever -that <em>in or by itself</em>, cannot be considered as -self-identical, or as universal. If we presuppose a -certain rule, or if we presuppose a certain moral -order, it may be true that a given motive cannot be -universalized without coming into conflict with this -<span class="pb" id="Pg091">[91]</span> -presupposed rule or order. But aside from some -moral system into connection with which a proposed -end may be brought, for purposes of comparison, -lying is just as capable as truth-telling of -generalization. There is no more contradiction in -the motive of universal stealing than there is in -that of universal honesty—unless there is as standard -some order or system of things into which the -proposed action is to fit as a member. And this -makes not the bare universality of the act, but the -system, the real criterion for determining the morality -of the act.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>Thus Mill remarks, regarding Kant's four illustrations -(<cite>Ante</cite>, <a href="#Pg080">p. 80</a>), that Kant really has to employ utilitarian -considerations to decide whether the act is -moral or not.</p> - -<p>For the foregoing criticisms, see Bradley, Ethical -Studies, Essay IV; Caird, Op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 185-186, -and 212-214, and, indeed, the whole of ch. II of Bk. II.</p></div> - -<h4>XXX.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Criticism of Kantian Criterion of Conduct.</div> - -<p>2. <i>With reference to the furnishing -of a common good or end.</i> If -the Kantian end is so formal and -empty as not to enable us to bring -into relation with one another the various acts of one -individual, we may agree, without argument, that -it does not provide us with an end which shall unify -the acts of different men into a connected order of -conduct. The moral end, the acting from regard -<span class="pb" id="Pg092">[92]</span> -for law as law, is presented to each individual by -himself, entirely apart from his relations to others. -That he has such relations may, indeed, furnish additional -material to which the law must be applied, -but is something to which the character of the law -is wholly indifferent. The end is not in itself a -social end, and it is a mere accident if in any case -social considerations have to be taken into account. -It is of the very quality of the end that it appeals -to the individual as an isolated individual.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>It is interesting to note the way in which Kant, -without <ins id="C092" title="expressily">expressly</ins> giving up the purely formal -character of the moral end, gives it more and more -content, and that content social. The moral law is -not imposed by any external authority, but by the rational -will itself. To be conscious of a universal self-imposed -law is to be conscious of one's self as having -a universal aspect. The source of the law and its end -are both in the will—in the rational self. Thus man -is an end to himself, for the rational self is man. Such -a being is a person—"Rational beings are <em>persons</em>, because -their nature marks them out as ends in themselves, -<i lang="la" xml:lang="la">i. e.</i>, as beings who should never be used merely -as means.... Such beings are not ends simply <em>for us</em>, -whose existence as brought about by our action has -value, but <em>objective ends</em>, <i lang="la" xml:lang="la">i. e.</i>, beings whose existence -is an end in itself, an end for which no other end can -be substituted so as to reduce it to a mere means." -Thus, we get a second formula. "Always treat humanity, -both in your own person and in the person of -others, as an end and never merely as a means." (Abbott's -Trans., pp. 46-47; Caird, Op. cit., Vol. II, 219). -Here the criterion of action is no longer the bare self-consistency -<span class="pb" id="Pg093">[93]</span> -of its motive, but its consistency with the -rational nature of the agent, that which constitutes -him a person. And, too, "the will of every rational -being is likewise a universally law-giving will." (Abbott, -p. 49). The conception of humanity embodied in -others as well as in one's self is introduced, and thus -our criterion is socialized. Even now, however, we -have a lot of persons, each of whom has to be considered -as an end in himself, rather than a social unity as -to which every individual has an equal and common -reference. Kant advances to this latter idea in his -notion of a "Kingdom of ends." "We get the idea of -a complete and systematically connected totality of -all ends—a whole system of rational beings as ends in -themselves as well as of the special ends which each -of them may set up for himself—<i lang="la" xml:lang="la">i.e.</i>, a kingdom of -ends.... Morality is the reference of all deeds to the -legislation which alone can make such a kingdom possible." -(See Abbott's Trans., pp. 51-52). This transformation -of a mere formal universal into a society or -kingdom of persons—while not sufficiently analyzed -as Kant states it (see Caird, Vol. II, pp. 225-226)—gives -us truly a social criterion, and we shall hereafter meet -something resembling it as the true ideal. As finally -stated, it does not differ in essential content from Mill's -individual who "conceives of himself only as a member -of a body," or from Spencer's free man in a free society.</p></div> - -<h4>XXXI.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Value of Kantian Theory.</div> - -<p>We must not leave the Kantian -theory with the impression -that it is simply the caprice of a philosopher's brain. -In two respects, at least, it presents us, as we shall -see, with elements that must be adopted; and even -where false it is highly instructive.</p> - -<span class="pb" id="Pg094">[94]</span> -<p>Kant's fundamental error is in his conception -that all desires or inclinations are for private pleasure, -and are, therefore, to be excluded from the -conception of the moral end. Kant's conclusion, accordingly, -that the good will is purely formal follows -inevitably if ever it is granted that there is any -intrinsic opposition between inclination as such, -and reason or moral law as such. If there is such -an opposition, <em>all</em> desire must be excluded from relation -to the end. We cannot make a compromise -by distinguishing between higher and lower desires. -On the contrary, if the end is to have content, -it must include all desires, leaving out none as in -itself base or unworthy. Kant's great negative -service was showing that the ascetic principle logically -results in pure formalism—meaning by ascetic -principle that which disconnects inclinations from -moral action.</p> - -<p>Kant's positive service was, first, his clear insight -into the fact that the good is to be found only -in activity; that the will itself, and nothing beyond -itself, is the end; and that to adopt any other doctrine, -is to adopt an immoral principle, since it is to -subordinate the will (character, self and personality), -to some outside end. His second great service -was in showing the necessity of putting in abeyance -the immediate satisfaction of each desire as it happens -to arise, and of subordinating it to some law -<span class="pb" id="Pg095">[95]</span> -not to be found in the particular desire. He -showed that not the particular desire, but only the -desire as controlled by the idea of law could be the -motive of moral action. And if he fell into the -error of holding that this meant that the desire -must be excluded from the moral motive, this error -does not make it less true that every particular -desire must be controlled by a universal law. The -truth of asceticism is that the desire must be -checked until subordinated to the activity of the -whole man. See Caird, Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 200; -pp. 203-207; 226-227.</p> - -<h4>XXXII.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">The Problem and Its Solution.</div> - -<p>If we gather together the results -of our observations of hedonism -and of Kantianism we get something -like the following problem and solution -in outline. The end of action, or the good, is the -realized will, the developed or satisfied self. This -satisfied self is found neither in the getting of a -lot of pleasures through the satisfaction of desires -just as they happen to arise, nor in obedience to -law simply because it is law. It is found in <em>satisfaction -of desires according to law</em>. This law, -however, is not something external to the desires, -but is their own law. Each desire is only one -striving of character for larger action, and the only -<span class="pb" id="Pg096">[96]</span> -way in which it can really find satisfaction (that is, -pass from inward striving into outward action) is <em>as</em> -a manifestation of character. A desire, taken as a -desire for its own apparent or direct end <em>only</em>, is an -abstraction. It is a desire for an entire and continuous -activity, and its satisfaction requires that it -fitted into this entire and continuous activity; that -it be made conformable to the conditions which will -bring the whole man into action. It is this fitting-in -which is the law of the desire—the 'universal' -controlling its particular nature. This 'fitting-in' is -no mechanical shearing off, nor stretching out, -but a reconstruction of the natural desire till it -becomes an expression of the whole man. The -problem then is to find that special form of character, -of self, which includes and transforms all -special desires. This form of character is at once -the Good and the Law of man.</p> - -<p>We cannot be content with the notion that the -end is the satisfaction of the self, a satisfaction -at once including and subordinating the ends of -the particular desire. This tells us nothing positive—however -valuable it may be negatively in -warning us against one-sided notions—until we -know <em>what</em> that whole self is, and <em>in what</em> concretely -its satisfaction consists. As the first step -towards such a more concrete formula, we may -say:</p> - -<span class="pb" id="Pg097">[97]</span> -<h4 id="XXXIII">XXXIII.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">The Moral End or the Good is the Realization by a Person and as a Person of Individuality.</div> - -<p>In saying that this realization -is <em>by a person</em> and <em>as a -person</em> we are saying nothing -new. We are simply repeating -what we have already -learned about moral conduct -(Sec. <a href="#III">III</a>). Conduct is not that which simply reaches -certain consequences—a bullet shot from a rifle -does that; there is conduct only when the consequences -are foreseen; made the reason of action. -A person is a being capable of conduct—a being -capable of proposing to himself ends and of attempting -to realize them.</p> - -<p>But what is the meaning of the rest of the formula? -What do we mean by individuality? We -may distinguish two factors—or better two aspects, -two sides—in individuality. On one side, it means -special disposition, temperament, gifts, bent, or -inclination; on the other side, it means special -station, situation, limitations, surroundings, opportunities, -etc. Or, let us say, it means <em>specific capacity</em> -and <em>specific environment</em>. Each of these elements, -apart from the other, is a bare abstraction -and without reality. Nor is it strictly correct to -say that individuality is constituted by these two -factors <em>together</em>. It is rather, as intimated above, -that each is individuality looked at from a certain -<span class="pb" id="Pg098">[98]</span> -point of view, from within or from without.</p> - -<p>If we are apt to identify individuality with the -inner side alone, with capacity apart from its surroundings, -a little reflection will show the error. -Even the most devoted adherent of "self-culture" -would not hold that a gift could be developed, or a -disposition manifested, in isolation from all exterior -circumstances. Let the disposition, the gift be -what it may (amiable or irascible, a talent for -music or for abstract science, or for engineering), -its existence, to say nothing of its culture, apart -from some surroundings is bare nonsense. If a -person shuts himself up in a closet or goes out into -the desert the better to cultivate his capacities, -there is still the desert or the closet there; and it -is as conditioned by them, and with reference to -them that he must cultivate himself. For more is -true than that, as a matter of fact, no man can -wholly withdraw himself from surroundings; the -important point is that the manner and the purpose -of exercising his capacity is always <em>relative</em> to and -<em>dependent</em> upon the surroundings. Apart from the -environment the capacity is mere emptiness; the -exercise of capacity is always establishing a relation -to something exterior to itself. All we can say of -capacity apart from environment is that <em>if</em> certain -circumstances were supplied, there would be something -there. We call a capacity <em>capability</em>, possibility, -<span class="pb" id="Pg099">[99]</span> -as if for the very purpose of emphasizing -the necessity of external supplementing.</p> - -<p>We get the same fact, on the other side, by calling -to mind that circumstances, environment are -not indifferent or irrelevant to individuality. The -difference between one individual and another lies -as much in the station in which each is placed as in -the capacity of each. That is to say, environment -enters into individuality as a constituent factor, -helping make it what it is.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, it is capacity which makes the -environment really an environment <em>to</em> the individual.</p> - -<p>The environment is not simply the facts which -happen objectively to lie about an agent; it is such -part of the facts as may be <em>related</em> to the capacity -and the disposition and gifts of the agent. Two members -of the same family may have what, to the outward -eye, are exactly the same surroundings, and -yet each may draw from these surroundings wholly -unlike stimulus, material and motives. Each has a -different environment, made different by his own -mode of selection; by the different way in which -his interests and desires play upon the plastic material -about him. It is not, then, the environment -as physical of which we are speaking, but as it appeals -to consciousness, as it is affected by the make-up -of the agent. This is the <em>practical</em> or <em>moral</em> -environment. The environment is not, then, -<span class="pb" id="Pg100">[100]</span> -what is then and there present in space. To the -Christian martyr the sufferings of his master, and -the rewards of faithfulness to come to himself were -more real parts of his environment than the stake -and fire. A Darwin or a Wallace may find his environment -in South America or the Philippine -Islands—or, indeed, in every fact of a certain sort -wherever found upon the earth or in whatever geological -era. A man of philanthropic instincts may -find <em>his</em> environment among Indians or Congo -negroes. Whatever, however near or remote in -time and space, an individual's capacities and -needs relate him to, is his environment. The moment -we realize that only what one conceives as -proper material for calling out and expressing some -internal capacity is a part of his surroundings, we -see not only that capacity depends upon environment, -but that environment depends upon capacity. -In other words, we see that each in itself -is an abstraction, and that the real thing is the individual -who is constituted by capacity and environment -in their relation to one another.</p> - -<p><em>Function</em> is a term which we may use to express -union of the two sides of individuality. The idea -of function is that of an active relation established -between power of doing, on one side, and something -to be done on the other. To exercise a -function as a student is not to cultivate tastes and -<span class="pb" id="Pg101">[101]</span> -possibilities internally; it is also to meet external -demands, the demands of fact, of teachers, of -others needing knowledge. The citizen exercises -his function not simply in cultivating sentiments of -patriotism within; one has to meet the needs of the -city, the country in which one lives. The realization -of an artistic function is not poring over emotions -of beauty pumped up within one's self; it is -the exercise of some calling. On the other hand, -it hardly needs saying that the function of a student, -a citizen, an artist, is not exercised in bare -conformity to certain external requirements. Without -the inner disposition and inclination, we call -conduct dead, perfunctory, hypocritical. An activity -is not functional, unless it is organic, expressing -the life of the agent.</p> - -<p>A function thus includes two sides—the external -and the internal—and reduces them to elements -in one activity. We get an analogy in any animal -function. The digestive function includes the material -appropriated, just as much as it does the -organ appropriating. It is the service, the work -which the organ does <em>in</em> appropriating material. So, -morally, function is capacity <em>in action</em>; environment -transformed into an element in personal service.</p> - -<p>Thus we get another formula for the moral end:</p> - -<p>The performance by a person of his specific -function, this function consisting in an activity -<span class="pb" id="Pg102">[102]</span> -which realizes wants and powers with reference to -their peculiar surroundings.</p> - -<h4 id="XXXIV">XXXIV.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Moral Functions as Interests.</div> - -<p>If morality consists in the -exercise of one's <em>specific</em> functions, -it follows that no <em>detailed</em> -account of the content of the moral end can possibly -be given. This content is thoroughly individual -or infinite. It is concrete to the core, including -every detail of conduct, and this not in a rigid -formula, but in the movement of life. All we can -do is, by abstraction, to select some of the main -features of the end, such as the more common and -the more permanent. While each individual has -his own particular functions, which can no more be -exhausted by definition or description than the -qualities of any other individual object, it is also -true that we can recognize certain typical functions -to be found permanently and in all. These make, -as it were, the skeleton of the moral end which each -clothes with his own flesh and blood.</p> - -<p>Functions are <em>interests</em>—objective interests were -not the term tautological. Interests have three -traits worth special mention.</p> - -<p>1. They are <em>active</em>. An interest is not an emotion -produced from without. It is the reaction of -the emotion to the object. Interest is identified, in -ordinary speech, with attention; we <em>take</em> an interest, -<span class="pb" id="Pg103">[103]</span> -or, if we say simply 'interested,' that involves -some excitation, some action just beginning. We -talk of a man's interests, meaning his occupations -or range of activities.</p> - -<p>2. They are <em>objective</em>. The emotion aroused -goes out to some object, and is fixed upon that; we -are always interested <em>in something</em>. The active -element of interest is precisely that which takes it -out of the inner mood itself and gives it a terminus, -an end in an object.</p> - -<p>3. An interest is <em>satisfaction</em>. It is its own reward. -It is not a striving for something unrealized, -or a mere condition of tension. It is the -satisfaction in some object which the mind already -has. This object may be possessed in some -greater or less degree, in full realization or in faint -grasp, but interest attaches to it as possessed. This -differentiates it from desire, even where otherwise -the states are the same. Desire refers to the lack, -to what is not present to the mind. One state of -mind may be called both interest in, and desire for, -knowledge, but desire emphasizes the unknown, -while interest is on account of the finding of self, -of intelligence, in the object. Interest is the union -in feeling, through action, of self and an object. -An interest in life is had when a man can practically -identify himself with some object lying -beyond his immediate or already acquired self -<span class="pb" id="Pg104">[104]</span> -and thus be led to further expression of himself.</p> - -<p>To have an interest, then, is to be alert, to have -an object, and to find satisfaction in an activity -which brings this object home to self.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>Not every interest carries with it <em>complete</em> satisfaction. -But no interest can be wholly thwarted. The -purer the interest, the more the interest is in the object -for its own sake, and not for that of some ulterior -consequence, the more the interest fulfills itself. "It -is better to have loved and lost than never to have -loved at all", and love is simply the highest power of -interest—interest freed from all extrinsic stuff.</p></div> - -<p>Of the interests, two abstract forms may be recognized, -interest in persons and interest in things. -And these may be subdivided: Interest in persons: -interest in <em>self</em> and <em>others</em>. Interest in things—into -their contemplation (<em>knowledge</em>) and into their -production (<em>art</em>). And art again may be either -productive of things to be contemplated (fine art), -or useful—manufactures, industry, etc. The -moral end, then, or the Good will consist in the -exercise of these interests, varied as they may be in -each individual by the special turn which his capacities -and opportunities take.</p> - -<h4 id="XXXV">XXXV.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">The Exercise of Interests as the Moral End.</div> - -<p>Let us now, as a means of rendering -our conception of the -moral end more concrete, consider -briefly each of the forms of interest.</p> - -<span class="pb" id="Pg105">[105]</span> -<p>1. Interest in self. We must free ourselves -from any notion that an interest in self is non-moral, -if not actually immoral. The latter position -is seldom consciously assumed, but it is not uncommon -to have interest in self, under the name of -prudence, marked off from the moral sphere. Interest -in self, if the interest is pure, is just as much -an interest in the moral end as interest in anything -or anybody else. Interest in self may take the -form of selfishness, or of sentimentalism; but this -is only an <em>impure</em> interest, an interest not in self, -but in some consequences to which the self may be -directed. Interest in self may take many forms, -according to the side of self which is the object of -attention, and according to the range of the self -taken into account. A <em>rudimentary</em> form is prudence, -but even this, instead of being non-moral, is, -in proper place and degree, moral, as moral as benevolence; -and, if not in its proper place, immoral. -From such an interest there are all stages up to -the interest in self as it most deeply and broadly is, -the sense of honor, moral dignity, self-respect, -conscientiousness, that attempt to be and to make -the most of one's self, which is at the very root of -moral endeavor.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>The ground that is usually given for making the -distinction between Prudence, Self-Regard, Self-Love -as non-moral, and Benevolence, Altruism etc., as moral, -is that in the former case a mere regard for one's own -<span class="pb" id="Pg106">[106]</span> -advantage dictates proper conduct, while in the latter -case there must be a positive virtuous intent. We -may, for example, be pointed to some cool calculating -man who takes care of his health and his property, -who indeed is generally 'prudent', because he sees that -it is for his advantage, and be told that while such an -end is not immoral it is certainly not moral. But in -return it must be asked what is meant here by advantage? -If by it is meant private pleasure, or advantage -over somebody else, then this conduct does not -spring from interest in self at all, but from interest in -some exterior consequence, and as springing from such -an impure interest is not simply non-moral, but positively -immoral. On the other hand, if 'advantage' -means regard for one's whole function, one's place in -the moral order, then such interest in self is moral. -Care for bodily health in the interest of efficiency in -conduct is supremely moral beside reckless disregard -of it in the interest of some supposed higher or more -spiritual function.</p> - -<p>If it is meant that conduct is immoral because it -springs from some interest on the part of the agent, -the reply is that all conduct must so arise, and that -any other supposition leads us immediately into asceticism -and into formalism.</p></div> - -<p>2. Interest in others. The generic form of interest -in others is sympathy, this being specified by -the various forms of social organization of which the -individual is a member. A person is, we have seen, -one who can conceive of ends and can act to realize -these ends. Only a person, therefore, can conceive -of others as ends, and so have true sympathy.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>It is not meant, of course, that animals do not perform -acts which, <i lang="la" xml:lang="la">de facto</i>, are altruistic or even self-sacrificing. -<span class="pb" id="Pg107">[107]</span> -What is meant is that the animal does -not act from the <em>idea</em> of others of his kind as ends in -themselves. If the animal does so act, it cannot be -denied the name of person.</p></div> - -<p>True interest in others is pure, or disinterested, -in the sense of having no reference to some further -and external consequence to one's self. Interest in -others need not be moral (or pure) any more than -interest in self is necessarily immoral (or impure). -It is a mistake to distinguish interest in self as -<em>egoistic</em> and interest in others as <em>altruistic</em>. Genuine -interests, whatever their object, are both egoistic -and altruistic. They are egoistic simply because -they <em>are interests</em>—imply satisfaction in a realized -end. If man is truly a social being, constituted by -his relationships to others, then social action must -inevitably realize himself, and be, in that sense, -egoistic. And on the other hand, if the individual's -interest in himself is in himself <em>as</em> a member of -society, then such interest is thoroughly altruistic. -In fact, the very idea of altruism is likely to carry -a false impression when it is so much insisted upon, -as it is nowadays in popular literature, as the -essence of morality. The term as used seems to -imply that the mere giving up of one's self to others, -as others, is somehow moral. Just as there may be -an immoral interest in self, so there may be an immoral -'altruism.' It is immoral in any case to sacrifice -the actual relationships in the case, those -<span class="pb" id="Pg108">[108]</span> -which demand action, to some feeling outside themselves—as -immoral when the feeling to which the -sacrifice is offered up is labelled 'benevolence', as -when it is termed 'greediness'. It is no excuse -when a man gives unwisely to a beggar that he -feels benevolent. <em>Moral</em> benevolence is the feeling -directed toward a certain end which is known to be -the fit or right end, the end which expresses the situation. -The question is as to the <em>aim</em> in giving. -Apart from this aim, the act is simply relieving the -agent's own feelings and has no moral quality. -Rather it is immoral; for feelings do have a moral -<em>capacity</em>, that is, a relation to ends of action, and -hence to satisfy them on their account, to deprive -them of their practical reference, is bad. Aside -from what this illustrates, there is a tendency in the -present emphasis of altruism to erect the principle -of charity, in a sense which implies continued social -inequality, and social slavery, or undue dependence -of one upon another, into a fundamental moral -principle. It is well to "do good" to others, but -it is much better to do this by securing for them -the freedom which makes it possible for them to -get along in the future without such 'altruism' from -others. There is what has been well termed an -"egotism of renunciation"; a desire to do for others -which, at bottom, is simply an attempt to regulate -their conduct. Much of altruism is an egoism of a -<span class="pb" id="Pg109">[109]</span> -larger radius, and its tendency is to "manufacture -a gigantic self", as in the case where a father sacrifices -everything for his children or a wife for her -husband.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>See Caird, Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 402. See also Hinton, -The Law Breaker, p. 287: "The real meaning -of the difficulty about a word for "regard for others" -is that we do not want it. It would mislead us if we -had it. It is not a regard for <em>others</em> that we need, but -simply a <em>true</em> regard, a regard to the facts, to nature; -it is only a truth to facts in our regard, and its nature -is obscured by a reference to "others", as if that were -the essential point.... It is not as being for -others, but as being <em>true</em>, that the regard for others is -demanded."</p></div> - -<p>Some ethical writers have gone to the other -extreme and held that all benevolence is a disguised -or an enlightened selfishness, since having a necessary -reference to self. The reference to self must -be admitted; unless the action springs from an -interest of the agent himself the act may be outwardly -useful, but cannot be moral. But the argument -alluded to inverts the true relation involved. -If a man's interests are such that he can find satisfaction -only in the satisfaction of others, what an -absurdity to say that his acting from these interests -is selfish! The very fact of such identity of -self with others in his interest is the proof of his -unselfishness.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>See Leslie Stephen, Science of Ethics, p. 241, for an -admirable discussion of this difficulty. When it is said -<span class="pb" id="Pg110">[110]</span> -that your pain is painful to me, he says, the inference -is often "insinuated that I dislike your pain because -it is painful to me in some special relation. I do not -dislike it <em>as</em> your pain, but in virtue of some particular -consequence, such, for example, as its making you -less able to render me a service. In that case <em>I do not -really object to your pain as your pain at all</em>, but only -to some removable and accidental consequences." -(And see his whole treatment of sympathy, pp. 230-245). -The whole question is shown to come to this: Is my -interest in, my sympathy with, your joy and sorrow as -such, or in your joy and sorrow as contributing to -mine? If the latter, of course the interest is selfish, -not being an interest in others at all. But if the former, -then the fact that such sympathy involves one's -own satisfaction is the best proof that man is not selfishly -constructed. When Stephen goes on to say that -such sympathy does not involve the existence of a real -unity larger than the individual, he seems to me to -misread his own facts, probably because he conceives -of this unity as some abstract or external thing.</p> - -<p>Discussion regarding self-love and benevolence, -or, in modern phrase, egoism and altruism, has been -rife in English ethics since the time of Hobbes, and -especially of Shaftesbury and Butler. See, in particular, -the Sermons of the latter, which gave the central -point of discussion for almost a century. With reference -to the special weakness of this point of view, -with its co-ordination of two independent principles, -see Green, Philosophical Works, Vol. III, pp. 99-104. -The essential lack (the lack which we have tried to -make good in the definition of individuality as the -union of capacity and surroundings in function), was -the failure to analyze the idea of the individual. -Individuality being defined as an exclusive principle, -the inevitable result was either (i.) the "disguised -<span class="pb" id="Pg111">[111]</span> -selfishness" theory; or (ii.) the assumption of two -fundamentally different principles in man. The ordinary -distinction between prudence and virtue is an echo -of the latter theory. Then, finally, (iii.) a third principle, -generally called conscience by Butler, was brought -in as umpire in the conflict of prudence and virtue.</p> - -<p>Suggestive modern treatment of the matter, from -a variety of points of view, will be found in Spencer, -Data of Ethics, chs. XI-XIII; Stephen, Op. cit., ch. -VI; Sidgwick, Op. cit., Bk. V, ch. VII; Royce, Op. -cit., ch. IV; Sorley, Ethics of Naturalism, pp. 134-150; -Alexander, Op. cit., pp. 172-180; Caird, Op. cit., Vol. II, -pp. 400-405; Paulsen, System der Ethik, pp. 295-311.</p></div> - -<p>3. Interest in Science and Art. Man is interested -in the world about him; the knowledge of the -nature and relations of this world become one of -his most absorbing pursuits. Man identifies himself -with the meaning of this world to the point that -he can be satisfied only as he spells out and reads -its meaning. (See, for example, Browning's -"Grammarian's Funeral".) The scientific interest -is no less a controlling motive of man than the personal -interest. This knowledge is not a means for -having agreeable sensations; it is not dilettanteism -or "love of culture"; it is interest in the large and -goodly frame of things. And so it is with art; man -has interests which can be satisfied only in the -reconstruction of nature in the way of the useful -and the beautiful.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>I have made no distinction between 'fine' and -'useful' art. The discussion of this question does not -<span class="pb" id="Pg112">[112]</span> -belong here, but the rigid separation of them in æsthetic -theory seems to me to have no justification. -Both are products of intelligence in the service of -interests, and the only difference is in the range of -intelligence and interests concerned. 'Use' is a <em>limited</em> -service and hence implies an external end; beauty -is complete use or service, and hence not mere use at -all, but self-expression. Historically, all art which has -not been merely sentimental and 'literary' has -sprung from interest in good workmanship in the -realizing of an idea.</p></div> - -<p>It seems as if here interests violated their general -law, and, in the case of use at least, were an -interest in some ulterior end. But it may be questioned -whether a carpenter whose aim was consciously -beyond the work he was doing, would be -a good workman—and this whether the further -end is his own private advantage, or social benefit -at large. The thought of the further benefit to -self and of the utility to accrue to some one else, -will, if it becomes a <em>part</em> of what he is doing, undoubtedly -intensify his interest—it must do so, for -it enlarges its content. But to <em>identify</em> one's own -or another's well-being with work, and to make the -work a mere <i>means</i> to this welfare, are two quite -different things. The good artisan "has his heart -in his work". His self-respect makes it necessary -for him to respect this technical or artistic capacity, -and to do the best by it that he can without -scrimping or lowering. To a good business man -<span class="pb" id="Pg113">[113]</span> -business is not the mere means to money-making; -and it is sentimentalism (and hence immoral) to -demand that it be a mere means to the good of society. -The business, if it is a moral one (and <i>any</i> -business, <i>so far</i> as it is thus carried on, is moral), -is carried on for the sake of the activity itself, as a -realizing of capacity in a specific situation.</p> - -<h4 id="XXXVI">XXXVI.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">The Moral Quality of Science.</div> - -<p>We seem, however, to meet here, -in relation to science and art, a difficulty -which threatens our whole -theory. Can it be claimed, it may be asked, that -devotion to science or art constitutes goodness in -the same sense that devotion to the interests of -one's family or state constitutes it? No one doubts -that a good father or a good citizen is a good man, -in so far forth. Are we ready to say that a good -chemist or good carpenter, or good musician is, in -so far, a good man? In a word, is there not a -reference to the good of persons present in one case -and absent in another, and does not its absence -preclude the scientific and artistic activities from -any share, <em>as such</em>, in the moral end?</p> - -<p>It must be remembered that the moral end does -not refer to some consequence which happens, <i lang="la" xml:lang="la">de -facto</i>, to be reached. It refers to an end <em>willed</em>; -<i lang="la" xml:lang="la">i.e.</i>, to an idea held to and realized as an idea. And -this fact shows us the way to meet the query, in -<span class="pb" id="Pg114">[114]</span> -part at least. If, when we say good carpenter, or -good merchant, we are speaking from the standpoint -of results, independently of the idea conceived -as end in the mind of the agent; if we mean -simply, 'we like what that man does', then the -term good has no moral value. A man may paint -'good' pictures and not be, in so far, a good man, -but in this sense a man may <em>do</em> a great deal of -'good', and yet not be a good man. It was agreed -at the outset that moral goodness pertains to the -kind of idea or end which a man clings to, and not -to what he happens to effect visibly to others.</p> - -<p>If a scientific man pursues truth as a mere -means to reputation, to wealth, etc., we do not (or -should not) hesitate to call him immoral.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>This does not mean that if he <em>thinks</em> of the reputation, -or of wealth, he is immoral, for he may foresee -wealth and the reputation as necessarily bound up in -what he is doing; it may become a part of the end. It -means that if knowledge of truth is a <em>mere means</em> to -an end beyond it, the man is immoral.</p></div> - -<p>What reason is there why we should not call him -moral if he does his work for its own sake, from -interest in this cause which takes him outside his -"own miserable individuality", in Mill's phrase? -After all, the phrase a 'good father' means but a -character manifesting itself in certain relations, as -is right according to these relations; the phrase has -moral significance not in itself, but with reference -<span class="pb" id="Pg115">[115]</span> -to the end aimed at by character. And so it is -with the phrase 'a good carpenter.' That also -means devotion of character to certain outer relations -for their own sake. These relations may not -be so important, but that is not lack of moral -meaning.</p> - -<h4>XXXVII.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Adjustment to Environment.</div> - -<p>So far we have been discussing -the moral ideal in terms of its -inner side—capacity, interest. -We shall now discuss it on its outer or objective -side—as 'adjustment to environment' in the phrase -made familiar by the evolutionists. Certain cautions, -however, must be noted in the use of the -phrase. We must keep clearly in mind the relativity -of environment to inner capacity; that it exists -only as one element of function. Even a plant -must do something more than adjust itself <em>to</em> a -fixed environment; it must assert itself <em>against</em> its -surroundings, subordinating them and transforming -them into material and nutriment; and, on the -surface of things, it is evident that <em>transformation</em> -of existing circumstances is moral duty rather than -mere reproduction of them. The environment -must be plastic to the ends of the agent.</p> - -<p>But admitting that environment is made what it -is by the powers and aims of the agent, what -sense shall we attribute to the term adjustment? -<span class="pb" id="Pg116">[116]</span> -Not bare conformity to circumstances, nor bare external -reproduction of them, even when circumstances -are taken in their proper moral meaning. -The child in the family who simply adjusts himself -<em>to</em> his relationships in the family, may be living a -moral life only in outward seeming. The citizen -of the state may transgress no laws of the state, he -may punctiliously fulfill every contract, and yet be -a selfish man. True adjustment must consist in -<em>willing</em> the maintenance and development of moral -surroundings as <em>one's own end</em>. The child must -take the spirit of the family into himself and live -out this spirit according to his special membership -in the family. So a soldier in the army, a friend -in a mutual association, etc. Adjustment to intellectual -environment is not mere conformity of ideas -to facts. It is the living assimilation of these facts -into one's own intellectual life, and maintaining -and asserting them as <em>truth</em>.</p> - -<p>There are environments existing prior to the -activities of any individual agent; the family, for -example, is prior to the moral activity of a child -born into it, but the point is to see that 'adjustment', -to have a moral sense, means <em>making the environment -a reality for one's self</em>. A true description -of the case would say that the child takes for -his own end, ends already existing for the wills of -others. And, in making them his own, he creates and -<span class="pb" id="Pg117">[117]</span> -supports for himself an environment that already -exists for others. In such cases there is no special -transformation of the existing environment; there -is simply the process of making it the environment -for one's self. So in learning, the child simply appropriates -to himself the intellectual environment -already in existence for others. But in the activity -of the man of science there is more than such personal -reproduction and creation; there is increase, -or even reconstruction of the prior environment. -While the ordinary citizen hardly does more than -make his own the environment of ends and interests -already sustained in the wills of others, the -moral reformer may remake the whole. But -whether one case or the other, adjustment is not -outer conformity; it is living realization of certain -relations in and through the will of the agent.</p> - -<h4 id="XXXVIII">XXXVIII.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">The Moral End is the Realization of a Community of Wills.</div> - -<p>Since the performance -of function is, -on the other side, the -creation, perpetuation, and further development of -an environment, of relations to the wills of others, -its performance <em>is a common good</em>. It satisfies -others who participate in the environment. The -member of the family, of the state, etc., in exercising -his function, contributes to the whole of -which he is a member by realizing its spirit in -<span class="pb" id="Pg118">[118]</span> -himself. But the question discussed in section -<a href="#XXXVI">XXXVI</a> recurs under another aspect. Granting -that the satisfying of personal interests realizes a -common good, what shall we say of the impersonal -interests—interests in science and art. Is the -good carpenter or chemist not only in so far a good -man, but also a good social member? In other -words, does every form of moral activity realize a -common good, or is the moral end partly social, -partly non-social?</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>One objection sometimes brought to the doctrine -that the moral end is entirely social, may be now -briefly dismissed. This is the objection that a man -has moral duties toward <em>himself</em>. Certainly, but what -of <em>himself</em>? If he is essentially a social member, his -duties toward himself have a social basis and bearing. -The only relevant question is whether one is wholly a -social member—whether scientific and artistic activities -may not be non-social.</p></div> - -<p>The ground here taken is that the moral end is -wholly social. This does not mean that science -and art are means to some social welfare beyond -themselves. We have already stated that even the -production of utilities must, as moral, be its own -end. The position then is that intellectual and -artistic interests <em>are themselves</em> social, when considered -in the completeness of their relations—that interest -in the development of intelligence is, in and -of itself, interest in the well-being of society.</p> - -<p>Unless this be true there is no moral end at all, -<span class="pb" id="Pg119">[119]</span> -but only moral ends. There is no comprehensive -unity in life, but a number of ends which, being -irreducible to a common principle, must be combined -on the best principle of compromise available. -We have no 'The Good', but an aggregate of -fragmentary ends.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>It helps nothing to say that this necessary unity is -found in the <em>self</em> to be realized, unless we are pointed -to something in the self that unites the social and non-social -functions. Our objection is that the separation -of intellectual interests from social makes a chasm in -the self.</p></div> - -<p>For the same reason it follows that in the case -of a collision of social with intellectual ends—say -the conflict of a man's interests as a member of a -family with his interests in new scientific discovery—no -reconciliation is possible. If the interests are -forms of social interest, there is a common end in -both, on the basis of which the conflict can be resolved. -While such considerations do not prove -that there is but one end, and that social, they may -well make us hesitate about carelessly taking a -position of which they are the logical consequence.</p> - -<p>Of course, every one recognizes that a certain -amount of scientific and artistic interest is social -in character. A certain amount of interest in truth, -or in intelligence, a certain amount of susceptibility -to beauty, a certain amount of devotion to utility, -are universally recognized to be necessary to make -<span class="pb" id="Pg120">[120]</span> -judicious, agreeable and efficient social members. -The whole system of modern education has meaning -only on this supposition.</p> - -<p>More than this: A certain amount of intelligence, -and a certain amount of susceptibility to -embodied ideals, <em>must</em> exist to give moral conduct. -A moral end is, as we have seen, always a <em>conception</em>, -an idea. The very act of bringing conduct -out of the impulsive into the moral sphere, depends -upon the development of intelligence so as to transform -a feeling into the perception of a situation. -And, as we watch moral development from childhood -to maturity, is it not evident that progress -consists in power to conceive of larger and better -defined ends? to analyze the situation which demands -active response, the function which needs -exercise, into specific relations, instead of taking it -partially or even upon some one else's say so? -Conduct, so far as not based upon an intelligent -recognition and realization of the relationships involved, -is either sentimental, or <em>merely</em> habitual—in -the former case immoral, and in the latter failing -of the complete morality possible.</p> - -<p>If the necessary part played in conduct by artistic -cultivation is not so plain, it is largely because -'Art' has been made such an unreal Fetich—a -sort of superfine and extraneous polish to be acquired -only by specially cultivated people. In reality, living -<span class="pb" id="Pg121">[121]</span> -is itself the supreme art; it requires fineness of -touch; skill and thoroughness of workmanship; -susceptible response and delicate adjustment to a -situation apart from reflective analysis; instinctive -perception of the proper harmonies of act and act, -of man and man. Active art is the embodiment of -ideals; the clothing of ideas otherwise abstract -in their peculiar and fit garb of concrete outward -detail; passive art is the quick and accurate -response to such embodiments as are already -made. What were human conduct without the one -and the other?</p> - -<p>Granting the necessity of knowledge and of -its artistic application in conduct, the question -arises as to where the line is to be drawn. -Evidently, if anywhere, at specialisms, remote philosophic -or mathematical endeavors; life-times -spent in inventive attempts without appreciable -outcome. But to draw the line is not easy. The -remote of one generation is the social tool of the -next; the abstract mathematics and physics of the -sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are the great -social forces of the nineteenth—the locomotive, the -telegraph, the telephone, etc. And how, in any -case, can we tell a scientific investigator that up to -a certain experiment or calculation his work may -be social, beyond that, not? All that we can say is -that beyond a certain point its social character is not -<span class="pb" id="Pg122">[122]</span> -obvious to sense and that the work must be carried -on by faith.</p> - -<p>Thus it is that we dispose of objections like -Bradley's (Ethical Studies, p. 202): "Nothing is -easier than to suppose a life of art or speculation -which, as far as we can see, though true to itself, -has, so far as others are concerned, been sheer -waste or even loss, and which knew that it was so." -That we can not <em>see</em> any social <em>result</em> in such cases -has nothing to do with the question whether or not -the interests themselves are social. We may imagine -a life of philanthropic activity, say of devotion -to emancipation of slaves in a country wholly given -over to slavery, or of a teacher in an unenlightened -country, which, as far as we can see, (though, in -this case, as in the one referred to by Mr. Bradley, -everything depends upon how far we <em>can</em> see) has -been sheer waste, so far as influence on others is -concerned. The point is whether in such cases the -life lived is not one of devotion to the interests of -humanity as such.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>We have been trying to show that everyone admits -that science and art, up to a certain point, are social, -and that to draw a line where they cease to be so, is in -reality to draw a line where we cease to <em>see</em> their social -character. That we should cease to <em>see</em> it, is necessary -in the case of almost every advance. Just because the -new scientific movement is new, we can realize its -social effects only afterwards. But it may be questioned -whether the motive which actuates the man of -<span class="pb" id="Pg123">[123]</span> -science is not, when fully realized, a <em>faith</em> in the social -bearing of what he is doing. If we were to go into a -metaphysical analysis, the question would have to -be raised whether a barely intellectual fact or theory -be not a pure abstraction—an unreality if kept apart -entirely from the activities of men in relation to one -another.</p></div> - -<h4>XXXIX.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Science and Art as Necessary Factors of Social Welfare.</div> - -<p>Let us consider the problem on its -other side. What kind of an interest is -our interest in persons, our distinctively -social interest? Suppose we -attempt to separate our interests in -truth, beauty, and use from our interest -in persons: <em>What remains in the -persons to be interested in?</em> Is not a -necessary part of out interest in persons, -an interest in them as beings fulfilling their -respective intellectual and artistic capacities; and -if we cut this out of our social interest, have we not -maimed and stunted our interest in persons? We -wish the fullest life possible to ourselves and to -others. And the fullest life means largely a complete -and free development of capacities in knowledge -and production—production of beauty and use. -Our interest in others is not satisfied as long as -their intelligence is cramped, their appreciation of -truth feeble, their emotions hard and uncomprehensive, -their powers of production compressed. -To will their true good is to will the freeing of all -<span class="pb" id="Pg124">[124]</span> -such gifts to the highest degree. Shall we say -that their true good requires that they shall go to -the point of understanding algebra, but not quaternions, -of understanding ordinary mechanics, but -not to working out an electro-magnetic theory of -light? to ability to appreciate ordinary chords <ins id="C124" title="and -and">and</ins> tunes, but not to the attempt to make further -developments in music?</p> - -<p>And this throws light upon the case referred to -by Mr. Bradley. <em>Social</em> welfare demands that the -individual be permitted to devote himself to the -fulfilling of <em>any</em> scientific or artistic capacity that -he finds within himself—provided, of course, it does -not conflict with some more important capacity—irrespective -of results. To say to a man: You may -devote yourself to this gift, provided you demonstrate -beforehand its social bearing, would be to -talk nonsense. The new discovery is not yet made. -It is absolutely required by the interests of a progressive -society that it allow freedom to the individual -to develop such functions as he finds in -himself, irrespective of any <em>proved</em> social effect. -Here, as elsewhere, morality works by faith, not by -sight.</p> - -<p>Indeed the ordinary conception of social interests, -of benevolence, needs a large over-hauling. -It is practically equivalent to doing something -directly for others—to one form or another of -<span class="pb" id="Pg125">[125]</span> -charity. But this is only negative morality. A -true social interest is that which wills for others -freedom from dependence on our <em>direct</em> help, which -wills to them the self-directed power of exercising, -in and by themselves, their own functions. Any -will short of this is not social but selfish, willing -the dependence of others that we may continue -benignly altruistic. The idea of "giving pleasure" -to others, "making others happy", if it means anything -else than securing conditions so that they -may act freely in their own satisfaction, means -slavery.</p> - -<p>As society advances, social interest must consist -more and more in free devotion to intelligence for -its own sake, to science, art and industry, and in -rejoicing in the exercise of such freedom by others. -Meantime, it is truth which makes free.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>See Spencer, Data of Ethics, pp. 249-257, where this -doctrine is stated with great force.</p></div> - -<p>Where, finally, does the social character of science -and art come in? Just here: they are elements -in the perfection of individuality, and they are elements -whose very nature is to be moving, not rigid; -distributed from one to another and not monopolistic -possessions. If there are forms of science -and art which, at present, are static, being merely -owned collections of facts, as one may have a collection -of butterflies in a frame, or of etchings in a -<span class="pb" id="Pg126">[126]</span> -closed portfolio, this is not because they are science -and art, but imperfect science and art. To -complete their scientific and artistic character is to -set these facts in motion; to hurl them against the -world of physical forces till new instruments of -man's activity are formed, and to set them in circulation -so that others may also participate in their -truth and rejoice in their beauty. So far as scientific -or artistic attainments are treasured as individual -possessions, so far it <em>is</em> true that they are -not social—but so far it is <em>also</em> true that they are -immoral: indeed that they are not fully scientific -or artistic, being subordinated to having certain -sensations.</p> - -<p>The intellectual movement of the last four or -five centuries has resulted in an infinite specialization -in methods, and in an immense accumulation -of fact. It is quite true, since the diversity of fact -and of method has not yet been brought to an -organic unity, that their social bearing is not yet -realized. But when the unity is attained (as attained -it must be if there is unity in the object of -knowledge), it will pass into a corresponding unity -of practice. And then the question as to the social -character of even the most specialized knowledge -will seem absurd. It will be to ask whether men -can coöperate better when they do not know than -when they do know what they want. Meantime -<span class="pb" id="Pg127">[127]</span> -the intellectual confusion, and the resulting divorce -of knowledge from practice, exists. But this -constitutes a part of the environment of which -action must take heed. It makes it one of the -pressing duties that every man of intelligence -should do his part in bringing out the public and -common aspects of knowledge. <em>The</em> duty of the -present is the socializing of intelligence—the realizing -of its bearing upon social practice.</p> - -<h4 id="XL">XL.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">The Ethical Postulate.</div> - -<p>We have attempted to show that -the various interests are social in -their very nature. We have not attempted to show -that this can be seen or proved in any given case. -On the contrary, in most, if not all cases, the agent -acts from a faith that, in realizing his own capacity, -he will satisfy the needs of society. If he were -asked to <em>prove</em> that his devotion to his function -were right because certain to promote social good, -he might well reply: "That is none of my affair. -I have only to work myself out as strength and -opportunity are given me, and let the results take -care of themselves. I did not make the world, and -if it turns out that devotion to the capacity which -was given me, and loyalty to the surroundings in -which I find myself do not result in good, I do not -hold myself responsible. But, after all, I cannot -believe that it will so turn out. What is really -<span class="pb" id="Pg128">[128]</span> -good for me <em>must</em> turn out good for all, or else -there is no good in the world at all." The basis, -in a word, of moral conduct, with respect to the -exercise of function, is a faith that moral self-satisfaction -(that is, satisfaction in accordance with the -performance of function as already defined) means -social satisfaction—or the faith that self and others -make a true community. Now such faith or conviction -is at the basis of all moral conduct—not -simply of the scientific or artistic. Interest in self -must mean belief in one's business, conviction of -its legitimacy and worth, even prior to any sensible -demonstration. Under any circumstances, such demonstration -can extend only to past action; the social -efficiency of any new end must be a matter of -faith. Where such faith is wanting, action becomes -halting and character weak. Forcible action fails, -and its place is taken by a feeble idealism, of -vague longing for that which is not, or by a pessimistic -and fruitless discontent with things as they -are—leading, in either case, to neglect of actual -and pressing duty. The basis of moral strength is -<em>limitation</em>, the resolve to be one's self only, and to -be loyal to the actual powers and surroundings of -that self. The saying of Carlyle's about doing -the "duty that lies nearest", and of Goethe's that -"America is here or nowhere", both imply that -faith in the existing moral capacity and environment -<span class="pb" id="Pg129">[129]</span> -is the basis of conduct. All fruitful and -sound human endeavor roots in the conviction that -there is something absolutely worth while, something -'divine' in the demands imposed by one's -actual situation and powers. In the great moral -heroes of the world the conviction of the worth of -their destiny, and of what they were meant to do, -has amounted to a kind of fatalism. They have -done not simply what they <em>could</em> do, but what they -<em>must</em> do.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, effective social interest is -based upon what is vaguely called 'faith in humanity', -or, more specifically, belief in the value of -each man's individuality, belief in some particular -function which he might exercise, given appropriate -conditions and stimuli. Moral interest in others -must be an interest in their possibilities, rather -than in their accomplishments; or, better, in -their accomplishments so far as these testify -to a fulfilling of function—to a working out of capacity. -Sympathy and work for men which do not -grow out of faith in them are a perfunctory and -unfertile sort of thing.</p> - -<p>This faith is generally analyzed no further; it -is left as faith in one's 'calling' or in 'humanity'. -But what is meant is just this: in the performing -of such special service as each is capable of, there -is to be found not only the satisfaction of self, but -<span class="pb" id="Pg130">[130]</span> -also the satisfaction of the entire moral order, the -furthering of the community in which one lives. -All moral conduct is based upon such a faith; and -<em>moral theory must recognize this as the postulate -upon which it rests</em>. In calling it a postulate, we -do not mean that it is a postulate which our theory -makes or must make in order to be a theory; but -that, through analysis, theory <em>finds that moral -practice makes this postulate</em>, and that with its -reality the reality end value of conduct are bound -up.</p> - -<p>In calling it a postulate we do not mean to call -it unprovable, much less unverifiable, for moral -experience is itself, so far as it goes, its verification. -But we mean that the further consideration of this -postulate, its demonstration or (if the case so be) -its refutation, do not belong to the realm of ethics -as such. Each branch of human experience rests -upon some presupposition which, <em>for that branch</em>, -is ultimate. The further inquiry into such presuppositions -belong not to mathematics, or physics, -or ethics, but to metaphysics.</p> - -<p>Unless, then, we are to extend our ethical theory -to inquire into the possibility and value of moral -experience, unless, that is, we are to make an excursion -into the metaphysics of ethics, we have here -reached our foundation. The ethical postulate, the -presupposition involved in conduct, is this:</p> - -<span class="pb" id="Pg131">[131]</span> -<p><span class="smcap">In the realization of individuality there is -found also the needed realization of some community -of persons of which the individual is a -member; and, conversely, the agent who duly -satisfies the community in which he shares, by -that same conduct satisfies himself.</span></p> - -<p>Otherwise put, the postulate is that there is a -community of persons; a good which realized by -the will of one is made not private but public. -It is this unity of individuals as respects the end -of action, this existence of a practical common -good, that makes what we call the moral order of -the world.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>Shakespeare has stated the postulate—</p> - -<div class="poetry-container"> -<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> -<div class="verse indent6">To thine ownself be true;</div> -<div class="verse">And it must follow, as the night the day,</div> -<div class="verse">Thou can'st not then be false to any man.</div> -</div></div></div></div> - -<p>Its significance may be further developed by -comparing it with the scientific postulate.</p> - -<p>All science rests upon the conviction of the thorough-going -and permanent unity of the world of -objects known—a unity which is sometimes termed -the 'uniformity of nature' or the 'reign of law'; -without this conviction that objects are not mere -isolated and transitory appearances, but are connected -together in a system by laws or relations, -science would be an impossibility. Moral experience -<em>makes for the world of practice</em> an assumption analogous -in kind to that which intellectual experience -<span class="pb" id="Pg132">[132]</span> -makes for the world of knowledge. And just as it -is not the affair of science, as such, or even of logic -(the theory of science) to justify this presupposition -of science, or to do more than show its presence -in intellectual experience, so it is not the business -of conduct, or even of ethics (the theory of conduct) -to justify what we have termed the 'ethical -postulate'. In each case the further inquiry belongs -to metaphysics.</p> - -<h4>XLI.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Does the End Proposed Serve as a Criterion of Conduct?</div> - -<p>We have now concluded that -an end which may be termed indifferently -'The Realization of -Individuality', 'The Performance -of Specific Functions', 'The Satisfaction -of Interests', 'The Realization of a Community -of Individuals' is the moral end. Will -this end serve the two aims (see Sec. <a href="#XVI">XVI</a>) required -of a criterion, or standard: (1) Will it unify individual -conduct? (2) Will it afford a common -good? We have just been endeavoring to show -that it does both of these things; that as the realization -of one's specific capacity, it unifies individual -conduct, and that, as the performance of function, it -serves to satisfy the entire community. To take -up just these points, accordingly, would involve a -repetition of what has been said, and we shall -therefore take up instead some aspects of the individual -<span class="pb" id="Pg133">[133]</span> -and social unity of conduct, not already considered.</p> - -<p>1. The System of Individual Conduct. We -must be careful not to interpret the idea of -specific function too rigidly or abstractly. It does -not mean that each one has some supreme mission -in life to which everything else must be sacrificed—that -a man is to be an artist, or a soldier, or a -student, or a day-laborer and nothing else. On the -contrary, the idea of function is that which comprehends -all the various sides of life, and it cannot -be narrowed below the meaning we have already -given: the due adjustment of capacity and surroundings. -Wherever there is any capacity or any -circumstance, no matter how trivial, there is something -included in the exercise of function, and, -therefore to be satisfied—according to its place, of -course, in the whole of life. Amusements and all -the minor details of life are included within the -scope of morality. They are elements in the exercise -of function, and their insignificance and triviality -does not exclude them from the grasp of -duty and of the good. It is a mistake to suppose -that because it is optional or indifferent—as it constantly -is—what acts among the minor details of -life are to be done or left undone, or unimportant -whether they are done or left undone at all, therefore -such acts have no moral value. Morality consists -<span class="pb" id="Pg134">[134]</span> -in treating them just as they are—if they are -slight or trivial they are to be performed as slight -and trivial. Morality does not simply permit the -performance of such acts, but demands it. To try -to make, in the interests of duty, a serious matter -out of every detail of life would be immoral—as -much so, in kind, as to make light of momentous -matters.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>See Alexander, Op. cit. pp. 53-54.</p> - -<p>Bradley, Op. cit., pp, 194-197.</p></div> - -<p>Consider, also, how this conception of the end -stands in definite relation to concrete acts; how it -explains the possibility of decision as to whether -this or that proposed act is right. We do not have -to trace the connection of the act with some end -beyond, as pleasure, or abstract law. We have -only to analyze the <em>act itself</em>. We have certain -definite and wholly concrete facts; the given capacity -of the person at the given moment, and his -given surroundings. The judgment as to the -nature of these facts is, in and of itself, a judgment -as to the act to be done. The question is not: -What is the probability that this act will result in -the balance of maximum pleasure; it is not what -general rule can we hunt up under which to bring -this case. It is simply: <em>What is this case?</em> The -moral act is not that which satisfies some far-away -principle, hedonistic or transcendental. It is that -<span class="pb" id="Pg135">[135]</span> -which meets the present, actual situation. Difficulties -indeed, arise, but they are simply the difficulty -of resolving a complex case; they are intellectual, -not moral. The case made out, the moral end -stands forth. No extraneous manipulation, to bring -the case under some foreign end, is required.</p> - -<p>And this suggests the elasticity of the criterion. -In fact moral conduct is entirely individualized. -It is where, when, how and of whom. There has -been much useless discussion as to the absolute or -relative character of morals—useless because the -terms absolute and relative are not defined. If absolute -is taken to mean immobile and rigid, it is anything -but desirable that morals should be absolute. -If the physical world is a scene of movement, in -which there is no rest, it is a poor compliment to -pay the moral world to conceive of it as static and -lifeless. A rigid criterion in a world of developing -social relations would speedily prove no criterion -at all. It would be an abstract rule, taking no -account of the individualized character of each act; -its individuality of capacity and of surroundings, -of time, place and relationships involved. A truly -absolute criterion is one which adjusts itself to each -case according to the specific nature of the case; -one which moves with the moving world. On the -other hand, if relative means uncertain in application, -changing in time and place without reason for change -<span class="pb" id="Pg136">[136]</span> -in the facts themselves, then certainly the criterion is -not relative. If it means taking note of all concrete -relations involved, it <em>is</em> relative. The absoluteness, -in fine, of the standard of action consists -not in some rigid statement, but in never-failing -application. Universality here, as elsewhere, resides -not in a thing, but in a way, a method of -action. The absolute standard is the one applicable -to all deeds, and the conception of the exercise -of function is thus absolute, covering all conduct -from the mainly impulsive action of the savage to -the most complex reaches of modern life.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>Aristotle's well known theory of the 'mean' -seems to have its bearing here. "It is possible," he -says (Peters' trans. of Ethics, p. 46), "to feel fear, -confidence, desire, anger, pity, and generally to be -affected pleasantly and painfully, either too much or -too little—in either case wrongfully; but to be -affected thus at the right <em>times</em>, and on the right <em>occasions</em>, -and toward the right <em>persons</em>, and with the -right <em>object</em> and in the right <em>fashions</em>, is the mean -course and the best course, and these are characteristics -of virtue." The right time, occasion, person, purpose -and fashion—what is it but the complete individualization -of conduct in order to meet the whole -demands of the whole situation, instead of some abstraction? -And what else do we mean by fit, due, -proper, right action, but that which just hits the -mark, without falling short or deflecting, and, to mix -the metaphor, without slopping over?</p></div> - -<p>2. The system of social conduct, or common -good. Moral conduct springs from the faith that -<span class="pb" id="Pg137">[137]</span> -all right action is social and its purpose is to justify -this faith by working out the social values involved. -The term 'moral community' can mean -only a unity of action, made what it is by the co-operating -activities of diverse individuals. There is -unity in the work of a factory, not in spite of, but -<em>because of</em> the division of labor. Each workman -forms the unity not by doing the same that everybody -else does, or by trying to do the whole, but by -doing his specific part. The unity is the one activity -which their varied activities make. And so -it is with the moral activity of society and the -activities of individuals. The more individualized -the functions, the more perfect the unity. (See -section <a href="#LII">LII</a>.)</p> - -<p>The exercise of function by an agent serves, -then, both to define and to unite him. It makes him -a <em>distinct</em> social member at the same time that it -makes him a <em>member</em>. Possession of peculiar capacities, -and special surroundings mark one person -off from another and make him an individual; -and the due adjustment of capacities to surroundings -(in the exercise of function) effects, therefore, -the realization of individuality—the realization of -what we specifically are as distinct from others. -At the same time, this distinction is not isolation; -the exercise of function is the performing of a -special <em>service</em> without which the social whole is defective. -<span class="pb" id="Pg138">[138]</span> -Individuality means not separation, but -defined position in a whole; special aptitude in -constituting the whole.</p> - -<p>We are now in a position to take up the consideration -of the two other fundamental ethical conceptions—obligation -and freedom. These ideas -answer respectively to the two sides of the exercise -of function. On the one hand, the performing of -a function realizes the social whole. Man is thus -'bound' by the relations necessary to constitute -this whole. He is subject to the conditions which -the existence and growth of the social unity impose. -He is, in a word, under <em>obligation</em>; the performance -of his function is duty owed to the community -of which he is a member.</p> - -<p>But on the other hand, activity in the way of -function realizes the individual; it is what makes -him an individual, or distinct person. In the performance -of his own function the agent satisfies his -own interests and gains power. In it is found his -<em>freedom</em>.</p> - -<p>Obligation thus corresponds to the <em>social</em> satisfaction, -freedom to the <em>self</em>-satisfaction, involved in -the exercise of function; and they can no more -be separated from each other than the correlative -satisfaction can be. One has to realize himself as -a member of a community. In this fact are found -both freedom and duty.</p> -</div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<span class="pb" id="Pg139">[139]</span> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter II.</span>—THE IDEA OF OBLIGATION.</h3> - -<h4>XLII.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Theories Regarding Moral Authority.</div> - -<p>The idea of obligation -or duty has two sides. -There is the idea of law, of something which controls -conduct, and there is the <em>consciousness</em> of the -necessity of conforming to this law. There is, of -course, no separation between the two sides, but -the consideration of the latter side—the recognition -of obligation—may be best dealt with in discussing -conscience. Here we shall deal simply with -the fact that there is such a thing in conduct as -law controlling action, and constituting obligation. -Theories regarding obligation may, for our purposes, -be subdivided into those which make its -exercise restraint or coercion (and which therefore -hold that in perfect moral conduct, duty as such -disappears); and those which hold that obligation -is a normal element in conduct as such, and -that it is not, essentially, but only under certain -circumstances, coercive. Of the former type, some -theories (mainly the hedonistic) regard the restraint -as originally imposed from without upon -the desires of the individual, while others (as the -Kantian) regard it as imposed by man's reason -upon his desires and inclinations.</p> - -<span class="pb" id="Pg140">[140]</span> -<h4>XLIII.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Bain's Theory of Obligation.</div> - -<p>It is obvious that the question -of obligation presents considerable -difficulty to the hedonistic school. -If the end of conduct is pleasure, as the satisfaction -of desire, why should not each desire be satisfied, -if possible, as it arises, and thus pleasure -secured? What meaning is there in the term -'duty' or 'obligation' if the moral end or good -coincides wholly with the natural end of the inclinations -themselves? It is evident, at all events, that -the term can have significance only if there is -some cause preventing the desires as they arise -from natural satisfaction. The problem of obligation -in hedonism thus becomes the problem of -discovering that outside force which restrains, or, at -least, constrains, the desire from immediate gratification. -According to Bain, this outside force is -social disapprobation manifested through the form -of punishment.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>"I consider that the proper meaning, or import of -the terms [duty, obligation] refers to that class of -action which is enforced by the sanction of punishment.... -The powers that impose the obligatory -sanction are Law and Society, or the community acting -through the Government by public judicial acts, and -apart from the Government by the unofficial expressions -of disapprobation and the exclusion from social -good offices". Emotions and Will, p. 286. See also pp. -321-323 and p. 527.</p></div> - -<span class="pb" id="Pg141">[141]</span> -<p>Through this 'actual and ideal avoidance of certain -acts and dread of punishment' the individual -learns to forego the gratification of some of his natural -impulses, and learns also to cultivate and even -to originate desires not at first spontaneous. "The -child is open from the first to the blame and praise -of others, and thus is led to do or avoid certain acts".</p> - -<p>On the model, however, of the action of this -external authority there grows up, in time an -internal authority—"an ideal resemblance of public -authority" (p. 287), or "a <i lang="la" xml:lang="la">fac simile</i> of the system -of government around us" (p. 313).</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>"The sentiment, at first formed and cultivated by -the relations of actual command and obedience, may -come at last to stand upon an independent foundation.... -When the young mind, accustomed at the -outset to implicitly obeying any set of rules is sufficiently -advanced to appreciate the motive—the utilities -or the sentiment that led to their imposition—the -character of the conscience is entirely changed.... -Regard is now had to the intent and meaning of the -law, and not to the mere fact of its being prescribed -by some power" (E. and W., p. 318).</p> - -<p>But when the sense of obligation becomes entirely -detached from the social sanction, "even then the -notion, sentiment or form of duty is derived from -what society imposes, although the particular matter -is quite different. Social obligation develops in the -mind originally the feeling and habit of obligation, -and this remains although the particular articles are -changed" (page 319, note). <i lang="la" xml:lang="la">Cf.</i> also Bain, Moral Science, -pp. 20-21 and 41-43.</p></div> - -<span class="pb" id="Pg142">[142]</span> -<h4>XLIV.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Spencer's Theory of Obligation.</div> - -<p>Spencer's theory is, in substance, -an enlarged and better analyzed -restatement of Bain's theory. Bain -nowhere clearly states in what the essence of obligation -consists, when it becomes independent, when -the internal <i lang="la" xml:lang="la">fac simile</i> is formed. <em>Why</em> should I -not gratify my desires as I please in case social -pressure is absent or lets up? Spencer supplies -the missing element. According to him, "the essential -trait in the moral consciousness is the control -of some feeling or feelings by some other feeling -or feelings" (Data of Ethics, p. 113). The kind -of feeling which controls is that which is more complex -and which relates to more remote ends; or, -we are 'obliged' to give up more immediate, special -and direct pleasures for the sake of securing more -general, remote and indirect ones. Obligation, in -its essence, is the surrender or subordination of -present to future satisfaction. This control, restraint, -or suppression may be 'independent' or, -self-imposed, but is not so at first, either in the -man or in the child. Prior to self-restraint are the -restraints imposed by the "visible ruler, the invisible -ruler and society at large"—the policeman, the -priest and public opinion. The man is induced to -postpone immediate gratification through his fear of -others, especially of the chief, of the dead and of -<span class="pb" id="Pg143">[143]</span> -social displeasure—"legal penalty, supernatural -punishment and social reprobation". Thus there -grows up the sense of obligation. This refers at first -only to the above-mentioned extrinsic effects of -action. But finally the mind learns to consider the -intrinsic effect of the action itself—the evil inflicted -by the evil deed, and then the sense of duty, or -coercion, evolved through the aforesaid external -agencies, becomes transferred to this new mode of -controlling action. Desires are now controlled -through considerations of what their <em>own</em> effects -would be, were the desires acted upon.</p> - -<p>It follows "that the sense of duty or moral obligation -is transitory, and will diminish as fast as -moralization increases" (page 127). Even when -compulsion is self-imposed, there is still compulsion, -coercion, and this must be done away with. -It <em>is</em> done away with as far as an act which is at -first done only for the sake of its own remoter -consequences comes to be done for its own sake. -And this will ultimately occur, if the act is continued, -since "persistence in performing a duty -ends in making it a pleasure".</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>See Guyau, La Morale Anglaise Contemporaine, -besides the works of Bain and Spencer. In addition -to objections which will forthwith be made, we may -here note a false abstraction of Spencer's. He makes -the act and its consequences <em>two</em> things, while the act -and its consequences (provided they are known as -<span class="pb" id="Pg144">[144]</span> -such) are the same thing, no matter whether consequences -are near or remote. The only distinction is -that consequences once not known as such at all are -seen in time to be really consequences, and thus to be -part of the content of the act. The transfer from the -"external consequences" imposed by the ruler, priest -and public-opinion to the intrinsic consequences of the -act itself, is thus a transfer from an immoral to a -moral basis. This is very different from a change -of the form of obligation itself.</p></div> - -<h4>XLV.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Criticism of these Theories.</div> - -<p>Putting aside the consideration of -the relation of desire to duty, (the -question whether duty is essentially -coercive) until after we have taken up the Kantian -idea of obligation, we may note the following -objections to the theories just stated. Their great -defect is that they do not give us any method -of differentiating moral coercion (or obligation) -from the action of mere superior physical force. -Taking it (first) upon the side of the individual: Is -there any reason <em>why</em> the individual submits to the -external authority of government except that he <em>has</em> -to do so? He may argue that, since others possess -superior force, he will avoid certain pains by conforming -to their demands, but such yielding, -whether temporary or permanent, to superior force -is very far from being a recognition that one <em>ought</em> -to act as the superior force dictates. The theories -must logically commit us to the doctrine that 'might -<span class="pb" id="Pg145">[145]</span> -makes right' in its baldest form. Every one knows -that, when the individual surrenders the natural -gratifications of his desires to the command of -others, if his sole reason is the superior force of the -commanding party, he does not forego in the surrender -his right to such gratification the moment -he has the chance to get it. Actual slavery would -be the model school of duties, if these theories were -true.</p> - -<p>The facts adduced by Bain and Spencer—the -growth of the recognition of duties in the child -through the authority of the parents, and in the -savage through the use of authority by the chief—are -real enough, but what they prove is that obligation -may be brought home to one by force, not that -force creates obligation. The child and the man -yield to force in such a way that their sense of duty -is developed only in case they recognize, implicitly, -the force or the authority as already <em>right</em>. Let it -be recognized that <em>rightful</em> force (as distinct from -mere brute strength) resides in certain social -authorities, and these social authorities may do -much, beyond the shadow of doubt, to give effect to -the special deeds and relations which are to be considered -obligatory. These theories, in fine, take -the fact of obligation for granted, and, at most, only -show the historical process by which its fuller -recognition is brought about. Force in the service -<span class="pb" id="Pg146">[146]</span> -of right is one thing; force as constituting and -creating right is another.</p> - -<p>And this is to say (secondly), considering the -matter from the side of society, that the theories of -Bain and Spencer do not explain why or how social -authority should exercise coercive force over the -individual. If it is implied that they do so in the -moral interests of the individual or of the community, -this takes it for granted that there already is -in existence a moral ideal obligatory upon the -individual. If it is implied that they exercise -coercive force in the interests of their own private -pleasure, this might establish a despotism, or lead -to a political revolt, but it is difficult to see how it -could create the fact of duty. When we consider -any concrete case, we see that society, in its compelling -of the individual, is possessed of moral -ideals; and that it conceives itself not merely as -having the <em>power</em> to make the individual conform to -them, nor as having the <em>right</em> merely; but as under -the bounden <em>duty</em> of bringing home to the individual -<em>his</em> duties. The social authorities do not, perforce, -create morality, but they embody and make effective -the existing morality. It is only just because the -actions which they impose are thought of as <em>good</em>, -good for others as for themselves, that this imposition -is taken out of the realm of tyranny into that of -duty (see Sec. <a href="#XXXVIII">XXXVIII</a>).</p> - -<span class="pb" id="Pg147">[147]</span> -<h4>XLVI.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">The Kantian Theory of Obligation.</div> - -<p>As we have seen, Kant takes the -conception of duty as the primary -ethical notion, superior to that of -the good, and places it in the most abrupt opposition -to desire. The relation of duty to desire is -not control of some feelings by others, but rather -suppression of all desire (not in itself, but as a -<em>motive</em> of action) in favor of the consciousness of -law universal. We have, on one side, according to -Kant, the desire and inclination, which are sensuous -and pathological. These constitute man's 'lower -nature'. On the other side there is Reason, which -is essentially universal, above all caprice and all -prostitution to private pleasure. This Reason, or -'higher nature', imposes a law upon the sentient -being of man, a law which takes the form of a -command (the 'Categorical Imperative'). This -relation of a higher rational nature issuing commands -to a lower sensuous nature (both within man -himself), is the very essence of duty. If man -were wholly a sentient being, he would have only -to follow his natural impulses, like the animals. -If he were only a rational being, he would necessarily -obey his reason, and there would still be no -talk of obligation. But because of the dualism, -because of the absolute opposition between Reason -and Desire, man is a being subject to obligation. -<span class="pb" id="Pg148">[148]</span> -Reason says to the desires "Thou shalt" or "Thou -shalt not". Yet this obligation is not externally -imposed; the man as rational imposes it upon himself -as sensuous. Thus Kant says that, in the -realm of morality, man is both sovereign and subject.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>The reflex influence of Rousseau's social theories -upon Kant's moral doctrines in this respect is worthy -of more attention than it usually receives. Kant's -moral theory is hardly more than a translation of -Rousseau's politics into ethical terms, through its -union with Kant's previously established dualism of -reason and sense.</p></div> - -<h4>XLVII.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Criticism of the Kantian Theory.</div> - -<p>1. No one can deny that a -genuine opposition exists between -the 'natural' desires and -moral activity. The being that satisfies each desire -or appetite as it arises, without reference of it to, -or control of it by, some principle, has not had the -horizon of conduct lift before him. But Kant -makes the satisfaction of desire <em>as such</em> (not of -this or that desire) antagonistic to action from -duty. Kant was forced into this position by his -fundamental division of sense from reason, but it -carries with it its own condemnation and thus that -of the premises from which it is derived. It comes -to saying that the actual desires and appetites -are not what they ought to be. This, in itself, -<span class="pb" id="Pg149">[149]</span> -is true enough. But when Kant goes on to -say, as he virtually does, that what ought to be <em>cannot</em> -be, that the desires as such cannot be brought -into harmony with principle, he has made the -moral life not only a riddle, but a riddle with no -answer. If mankind were once convinced that the -moral ideal were something which ought to be but -which could not be, we may easily imagine how -much longer moral endeavor would continue. The -first or immediate stimulus to moral effort is the -conviction that the desires and appetites are not -what they should be; the underlying and continuing -stimulus is the conviction that the expression of -desires in harmony with law is the sole abiding good -of man. To reconcile the two is the very meaning of -the moral struggle (see Sec. <a href="#LXIV">LXIV</a>). Strictly, according -to Kant, morality would either leave the -appetites untouched or would abolish them—in -either case destroying morality.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>See Caird, Op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 226-28.</p></div> - -<p>2. Kant again seems to be on the right track -in declaring that obligation is not anything externally -imposed, but is the law of man's being, self-imposed. -This principle of 'autonomy' is the -only escape from a theory of obligation which -would make obligation external, and regard for it -slavish fear, or servile hope of reward. To regard -even a Divine Being as the author of obligation is -<span class="pb" id="Pg150">[150]</span> -to make it a form of external constraint, appealing -only to hope or fear, unless this Divine Being is -shown to be organically connected with self.</p> - -<p>But this abstract universal reason which somehow -dwells, without mediation or reason, in each -individual, seems to be somewhat scholastic, a trifle -mythological. There is undoubtedly in man's experience -a function which corresponds to what -Kant is aiming, thus mythologically, to describe. -But it is one thing to recognize an opposition of a -desire, in its isolation, to desire as organic to the -function of the whole man; it is another to split -man into a blank dualism of an abstract reason, -on one side, having no antecedents or bearings, and -of a mess of appetites, having only animal relationship, -on the other. The truth that Kant is -aiming to preserve seems to be fairly stated as two-fold: -first, that duty is self-imposed, and thus -the dutiful will autonomous or free; and, second, -the presence of struggle in man between -a 'lower' and a 'higher'. The first point -seems to be sufficiently met by the idea already advanced -that self, or individuality, is essentially -social, being constituted not by isolated capacity, -but by capacity acting in response to the needs of -an environment—an environment which, when -taken in its fullness, is a community of persons. -Any law imposed by such a self would be 'universal', -<span class="pb" id="Pg151">[151]</span> -but this universality would not be an isolated -possession of the individual; it would be another -name for the concrete social relationships which -make the individual what he is, as a social member -or organ. Furthermore, such a universal law would -not be formal, but would have a content—these -same relationships.</p> - -<p>The second point seems to be met by recognizing -that in the realization of the law of social -function, conflict must occur between the desire as -an immediate and direct expression of the individual—the -desire in its isolation—and desire as an -expression of the whole man; desire, that is, as -wholly conformable to the needs of the surroundings. -Such a conflict is real enough, as everyone's -experience will testify, but it is a conflict which -may be solved—which must be solved so far as -morality is attained. And since it is a conflict -within desire itself, its solution or morality, does -not require any impossible obliteration of desire, -nor any acting from an 'ought' which has no relation -to what 'is'. This, indeed, is <em>the</em> failure of -the Kantian Ethics: in separating what should be -from what is, it deprives the latter, the existing -social world as well as the desires of the individual, -of all moral value; while, by the same separation, it -condemns that which should be to a barren abstraction. -An 'ought' which does not root in and -<span class="pb" id="Pg152">[152]</span> -flower from the 'is', which is not the fuller realization -of the actual state of social relationships, is a -mere pious wish that things should be better. And -morality, that is, right action, is not so feeble as -this would come to.</p> - -<h4>XLVIII.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">The Source and Nature of Obligation.</div> - -<p>The basis of a correct theory -of obligation lies, as already -stated, in holding fast to its -concrete relations to the moral end, or good. This -end consists in an activity in which capacity is exercised -in accordance with surroundings, with the -social needs which affect the individual. It is implied -in this very idea, that the end is not something -which the individual may set up at his own -arbitrary will. The social needs give control, law, -authority. The individual may not manifest his -capacity, satisfy his desires, apart from their specific -relation to the environment in which they -exist. The general fact of obligation which is -constituted through this control of capacity by the -wider function is, of course, differentiated into -specific 'laws' or duties by the various forms which -the one function takes, as capacity and circumstances -vary.</p> - -<p>In other words, obligation or duty is simply the -aspect which the good or the moral end assumes, as -the individual conceives of it. From the very fact -<span class="pb" id="Pg153">[153]</span> -that the end is the good, and yet is not realized by -the individual, it presents itself to him as that -which <em>should be realized</em>—as the ideal of action. -It requires no further argument to show that obligation -is at once self-imposed, and social in its content. -It is self-imposed because it flows from the -good, from the idea of the full activity of the individual's -own will. It is no law imposed from without; -but is his own law, the law of his own function, -of his individuality. Its social content flows from -the fact that this individuality is not mere capacity, -but is this capacity <em>acting</em>, and acting so as to comprehend -social relationships.</p> - -<p>Suppose that man's good and his conviction of -duty were divorced from one another—that man's -duty were other than to fulfill his own specific -function. Such a thing would make duty purely -formal; the moral law would have no intrinsic relation -to daily conduct, to the expression of man's -powers and wants. There have, indeed, been moralists -who think they do the Lord service, who -think they add to the dignity and sacredness of -Duty by making it other than the idea of the activity -of man, regulated indeed, but regulated only -by its own principle of activity. But such moralists -in their desire to consecrate the idea of duty -remove from it all content, and leave it an empty -abstraction. On the other hand, their eagerness to -<span class="pb" id="Pg154">[154]</span> -give absoluteness and imperativeness to duty by -making it a law other than that of the normal expression -of man, casts discredit upon the one moral -reality—the full, free play of human life. In denying -that duty is simply the <em>intrinsic</em> law, the <em>self</em>-manifestation -of this life, they make this life -immoral, or at least non-moral. They degrade it -to a bundle of appetites and powers having no -moral value until the outside moral law is applied -to them. In reality, the dignity and imperativeness -of duty are simply the manifest dignity and unconditioned -worth of human life as exhibited in its -free activity. The whole idea of the separateness -of duty from the concrete flow of human action is -a virulent example of the fallacy mentioned in an -early section—the fallacy that moral action means -something more than action itself (see Sec. <a href="#II">II</a>).</p> - -<p>The attempt to act upon a theory of the divorce -of satisfaction and duty, to carry it out in practice, -means the maiming of desire through distrust of -its moral significance, and thus, by withdrawing -the impetus of action, the reduction of life to mere -passivity. So far as this does not happen, it means -the erection of the struggle itself, the erection of -the opposition of law to desire, into the very principle -of the moral life. The essential principle of -the moral life, that good consists in the freeing of -impulse, of appetite, of desire, of power, by enabling -<span class="pb" id="Pg155">[155]</span> -them to flow in the channel of a unified and -full end is lost sight of, and the free service of the -spirit is reduced to the slavish fear of a bond-man -under a hard taskmaster.</p> - -<p>The essential point in the analysis of moral law, -or obligation, having been found, we may briefly -discuss some subsidiary points.</p> - -<p>1. The relation of duty to a given desire. -As any desire arises, it will be, except so far as -character has already been moralized, a demand -for its own satisfaction; the desire, in a word, will -be isolated. In so far, duty will be in a negative -attitude towards the desire; it will insist first upon -its limitation, and then upon its transformation. -So far as it is merely limitative, it demands the -denying of the desire, and so far assumes a coercive -form. But this limitation is not for its own sake, -but for that of the transformation of desire into a -freer and more adequate form—into a form, that is, -where it will carry with it, when it passes into -action, <em>more of activity</em>, than the original desire -would have done.</p> - -<p>Does duty itself disappear when its constraint -disappears? On the contrary, so far as an act is -done unwillingly, under constraint, so far the act is -impure, and <em>undutiful</em>. The very fact that there is -need of constraint shows that the self is divided; -that there is a two-fold interest and purpose—one -<span class="pb" id="Pg156">[156]</span> -in the law of the activity according to function, the -other in the special end of the particular desire. -Let the act be done <em>wholly as duty</em>, and it is done -wholly for its own sake; love, passion take the place -of constraint. This suggests:</p> - -<p>2. Duty for duty's sake.</p> - -<p>It is clear that such an expression states a real -moral fact; unless a duty is done <em>as</em> duty it is not -done morally. An act may be outwardly just <ins id="C156" title="what -what">what</ins> morality demands, and yet if done for the -sake of some private advantage it is not counted -moral. As Kant expresses it, an act must be done -not only in accordance with duty, but <em>from duty</em>. -This truth, however, is misinterpreted when it is -taken to mean that the act is to be done for the -sake of duty, and duty is conceived as a third -thing outside the act itself. Such a theory contradicts -the true sense of the phrase 'duty for duty's -sake', for it makes the act done not for its own sake, -but as a mere means to an abstract law beyond itself. -'Do the right because it is the right' means -do the right <em>thing</em> because it <em>is</em> the right thing; that -is, do the act disinterestedly from interest in the act -itself. A duty is always some act or line of action, -not a third thing outside the act to which it is to -conform. In short, duty means <em>the act which is to -be done</em>, and 'duty for duty's sake' means do the -required act as it really is; do not degrade it into -<span class="pb" id="Pg157">[157]</span> -a means for some ulterior end. This is as true in -practice as in theory. A man who does his duty -not for the sake of the acts themselves, but for the -sake of some abstract 'ideal' which he christens -duty in general, will have a morality at once hard -and barren, and weak and sentimental.</p> - -<p>3. The agency of moral authority in prescribing -moral law and stimulating to moral conduct.</p> - -<p>The facts, relied upon by Bain and Spencer, as -to the part played by social influences in imposing -duties, are undeniable. The facts, however, are -unaccountable upon the theory of these writers, as -that theory would, as we have seen, explain only -the influence of society in producing acts done from -fear or for hope of reward. But if the individual -and others are equally members of one society, if -the performance by each man of his own function -constitutes a good common to all, it is inevitable -that social authorities should be an influence in -constituting and teaching duties. The community, -in imposing its own needs and demands upon the -individual, is simply arousing him to a knowledge -of his relationships in life, to a knowledge of the -moral environment in which he lives, and of the -acts which he must perform if he is to realize his -individuality. The community in awakening moral -consciousness in the morally immature may appeal -to motives of hope and fear. But even this fact -<span class="pb" id="Pg158">[158]</span> -does not mean that to the child, duty is necessarily -constituted by fear of punishment or hope of reward. -It means simply that his capacity and his -surroundings are both so undeveloped that the -exercise of his function takes mainly the form of -pleasing others. He may still do his duty <em>as</em> his -duty, but his duty now consists in pleasing others.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>On Obligation see Green, Op. cit., pp. 352-356; -Alexander, Op. cit., pp. 142-147. For different views, -Martineau, Op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 92-119; Calderwood, -Op. cit., pp. 131-138, and see also, Grote, Treatise on -Moral Ideals, ch. VII.</p></div> -</div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter III.</span>—THE IDEA OF FREEDOM.</h3> - -<h4>XLIX.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">The Forms of Freedom.</div> - -<p>We may now deal, more briefly, -with the problem of moral capacity. -It is, in principle, the ability to conceive -of an end and to be governed in action by this -conceived end. We may consider this capacity in -three aspects, as negative, as potential and as -positive.</p> - -<p>1. <i>Negative Aspect of Freedom.</i> The power to -be governed in action by the thought of some end to -be reached is freedom <em>from</em> the appetites and desires. -An animal which does not have the power -of proposing ends to itself is impelled to action by -its wants and appetites just as they come into consciousness. -<span class="pb" id="Pg159">[159]</span> -It is <em>irritated</em> into acting. Each -impulse demands its own satisfaction, and the -animal is helpless to rise above the particular want. -But a <em>person</em>, one who can direct his action by -conscious ends, is emancipated from subjection to -the particular appetites. He can consider their -relation to the end which he has set before himself, -and can reject, modify or use them as best agrees -with the purposed end. This capacity to control -and subjugate impulses by reflection upon their -relationship to a rational end is the power of self-government, -and the more distinct and the more -comprehensive in scope the end is, the more real -the self-government.</p> - -<p>2. <i>Potential Freedom.</i> The power to conceive -of ends involves the possibility of thinking of -many and various ends, and even of ends which -are contrary to one another. If an agent could -conceive of but one end in some case, it would always -seem to him afterwards that he had been -necessitated to act in the direction of that end; -but the power to put various ends before self constitutes -"freedom of choice", or potential freedom. -After action, the agent calls to mind that -there was another end open to him, and that if he -did not choose the other end, it was because of -something in his character which made him prefer -the one he actually chose.</p> - -<span class="pb" id="Pg160">[160]</span> -<h4>L.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Moral Responsibility.</div> - -<p>Here we have the basis of moral <em>responsibility</em> -or <em>accountability</em>. There -is no responsibility for any result -which is not intended or foreseen. Such a consequence -is only physical, not moral. (Sec. <a href="#VII">VII</a>). -But when any result has been foreseen, and adopted -as foreseen, such result is the outcome not of any -external circumstances, nor of mere desires and -impulses, but of the agent's conception of his own -end. Now, because the result thus flows from the -agent's own conception of an end, he feels himself -responsible for it.</p> - -<p>It must be remembered that the end adopted is -that which is conceived <em>as satisfying self</em>—that, -indeed, when we say end of action, we mean only -some proposed form of self-satisfaction. The -adopted end always indicates, therefore, that sort -of condition which the agent considers to be good, -or self-satisfactory. It is because a result flows -from the agent's <em>ideal of himself</em>, the thought -of himself which he considers desirable or worth -realizing, that the agent feels himself responsible. -The result is simply an expression of himself; a -manifestation of what he would have himself be. -Responsibility is thus one aspect of the identity of -character and conduct. (Sec. <a href="#VII">VII</a>). We are responsible -<span class="pb" id="Pg161">[161]</span> -for our conduct because that conduct is -ourselves objectified in actions.</p> - -<p>The idea of responsibility is intensified whenever -there have been two contrary lines of conduct -conceived, of which one has been chosen. If the -end adopted turns out not to be satisfactory, but, -rather, unworthy and degrading, the agent feels -that he <em>might</em> have chosen the other end, and that -if he did not, it was because his character was such, -his ideal of himself was such, that this other end -did not appeal to him. The actual result is felt to -be the outcome of an unworthy character manifested -in the adoption of a low form of satisfaction; -and the evident contrast of this low form -with a higher form, present to consciousness but -rejected, makes the sense of responsibility more -acute. As such, it is the judgment of disapprobation -passed upon conduct; the feeling of remorse -and of the desert of punishment. Freedom as the -power of conceiving ends and of realizing the ideal -end in action, is thus the basis both of responsibility -and of approbation (or disapprobation).</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p><i>The Freedom of Indifference.</i> It is this potential -freedom, arising from the power of proposing various -ends of action, which, misinterpreted, gives rise to the -theory of a liberty of indifferent choice—the theory -that the agent can choose this or that without any -ground or motive. The real experience is the knowledge, -after the choice of one end, that since another -<span class="pb" id="Pg162">[162]</span> -end was also present to consciousness that other end -might have been chosen, <em>if only the character had -been such as to find its satisfaction in that other end</em>. -The theory of indifference misconstrues this fact to -mean that the agent might just as well have chosen -that other end, without any if or qualification whatever. -The theory of indifference, moreover, defeats -its own end. The point which it is anxious to save is -responsibility. It sees that if only one course of -action were ever open to an agent, without the possibility -of any <em>conception</em> of another course, an agent, -so acting, could not be held responsible for not having -adopted that other course. And so it argues that -there must always be the possibility of indifferent or -alternate choice; the possibility of adopting this or -that line of action without any motive. But if such -were the case responsibility would be destroyed. If -the end chosen is not an expression of character, if it -does not manifest the agent's ideal of himself, if its -choice is a matter of indifference, it does not signify -morally, but is mere accident or caprice. It is because -choice is <em>not</em> a matter of indifference, but an outcome -of character that the agent feels responsibility, and -approves or disapproves. He virtually says: "I am -responsible for this outcome, not because I could have -chosen another end just as well <em>without any reason</em>, -but because I thought of another end and rejected it; -because my character was such that that end did not -seem good, and was such that this end did seem good. -My character is myself, and in this unworthy end I -stand self-condemned."</p></div> - -<h4 id="LI">LI.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Moral Reformation.</div> - -<p>Freedom considered as potential, -depending upon the power -of the agent to frame diverse ends, is the basis not -<span class="pb" id="Pg163">[163]</span> -only of responsibility, but also of the possibility of -reformation, or of change in character and conduct. -All moral action is the expression of self, -but the self is not something fixed or rigid. -It includes as a necessary part of itself the possibility -of framing conceptions of what it would -be, and there is, therefore, at any time the possibility -of acting upon some ideal hitherto unrealized. -If conduct were the expression of character, -in a sense which identified character wholly -with past attainments, then reformation would be -impossible. What a man once was he must always -continue to be. But past attainments do not exhaust -all the possibilities of character. Since conduct -necessarily implies a continuous adjustment of -developing capacity to new conditions, there is the -ability to frame a changed ideal of self-satisfaction—that -is, ability to lead a new life. That the new -ideal is adopted from experience of the unworthy -nature of former deeds is what we should expect. -The chosen end having proved itself unsatisfactory, -the alternative end, previously rejected, recurs to -consciousness with added claims. To sum up: -The doctrine that choice depends upon character is -correct, but the doctrine is misused when taken to -mean that a man's outward conduct will always be -in the same direction that it has been. Character -involves all the ideas of different and of better -<span class="pb" id="Pg164">[164]</span> -things which have been present to the agent, although -he has never attempted to carry them out. -And there is always the possibility that, if the -proper influences are brought to bear, some one of -these latent ideals may be made vital, and wholly -change the bent of character and of conduct.</p> - -<h4 id="LII">LII.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Positive Freedom.</div> - -<p>The <em>capacity</em> of freedom lies in -the power to form an ideal or conception -of an end. <em>Actual</em> freedom lies in the -realization of that end which actually satisfies. An -end may be freely adopted, and yet its actual working -out may result not in freedom, but in slavery. -It may result in rendering the agent more subject -to his passions, less able to direct his own conduct, -and more cramped and feeble in powers. Only -that end which executed really effects greater energy -and comprehensiveness of character makes for -actual freedom. In a word, only the good man, -the man who is truly realizing his individuality, is -free, in the positive sense of that word.</p> - -<p>Every action which is not in the line of performance -of functions must necessarily result in -self-enslavement. The end of desire is activity; -and it is only in fullness and unity of activity that -freedom is found. When desires are not unified—when, -that is, the idea of the exercise of function -does not control conduct—one desire must conflict -<span class="pb" id="Pg165">[165]</span> -with another. Action is directed now this way, now -that, and there is friction, loss of power. On account -of this same lack of control of desires by the -comprehensive law of social activity, one member -of society is brought into conflict with another, with -waste of energy, and with impeded and divided activity -and satisfaction of desire. Exercise of function, -on the other hand, unifies the desires, giving -each its relative, although subordinate, place. It fits -each into the others, and, through the harmonious -adjustment of one to another, effects that complete -and unhindered action which is freedom. The -performance of specific function falls also into -free relations with the activities of other persons, -coöperating with them, giving and receiving what -is needed, and thus constituting full liberty. -Other aspects of freedom, as the negative and the -potential, are simply means instrumental to the realization -of individuality, and when not employed -toward this, their true end, they become methods -of enslaving the agent.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>On the subject of moral freedom, as, upon the -whole, in agreement with the view presented here: See</p> - -<p>Green: Prolegomena to Ethics, pp. 90-117; 142-158. -Bradley: Ethical Studies, ch. I; Caird: Phil. of Kant, -Vol. II, Bk. II, ch. 3; Alexander: Moral Order and -Progress, pp. 336-341.</p> - -<p>And, for a view agreeing in part, Stephen: Science -of Ethics, pp. 278-293.</p> - -<p>For presentations of the freedom of indifference, -<span class="pb" id="Pg166">[166]</span> -see, Lotze: Practical Philosophy, ch. 3. Martineau: -Op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 34-40. Calderwood: Handbook -of Moral Philosophy.</p></div> -</div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<span class="pb" id="Pg167">[167]</span> - -<h2>PART II.<br /> -THE ETHICAL WORLD.</h2> - -<h4>LIII.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">The Reality of Moral Relations.</div> - -<p>The habit of conceiving moral -action as a certain <em>kind</em> of action, -instead of all action so far as it really -is action, leads us to conceive of morality as a -highly desirable something which somehow ought -to be brought into our lives, but which upon the -whole is not. It gives rise to the habit of conceiving -morality as a vague ideal which it is praiseworthy -for the individual to strive for, but which -depends wholly for its existence upon the individual's -wish in the matter. Morality, that is, is -considered as a relation existing between something -which merely <em>ought to be</em>, on one hand, and the -individual's choice, or his conscience on the other. -This point of view has found typical expression in -Bishop Butler's saying: "If conscience had might -as it has right, it would rule the world."</p> - -<p>But right is not such a helpless creature. It -exists not in word but in power. The moral world -is, here and now; it is a reality apart from the -<span class="pb" id="Pg168">[168]</span> -wishes, or failures to wish, of any given individual. -It bears the same relation to the individual's activity -that the 'physical world' does to his knowledge. -Not till the individual has to spin the physical -world out of his consciousness in order to know it, -will it be necessary for him to create morality by -his choice, before it can exist. As knowledge is mastery -in one's self of the real world, the reproduction -of it in self-consciousness, so moral action is the -appropriation and vital self-expression of the values -contained in the existing practical world.</p> - -<p>The existence of this moral world is not anything -vaguely mysterious. Imagine a well organized -factory, in which there is some comprehensive -industry carried on—say the production of cotton -cloth. This is the end; it is a common end—that -for which each individual labors. Not all individuals, -however, are doing the same thing. The -more perfect the activity, the better organized the -work, the more differentiated their respective labors. -This is the side of individual activity or freedom. -To make the analogy with moral activity complete -we have to suppose that each individual is doing the -work because of itself, and not merely as drudgery -for the sake of some further end, as pay. Now -these various individuals are bound together by -their various acts; some more nearly because doing -closely allied things, all somewhat, because contributing -<span class="pb" id="Pg169">[169]</span> -to a common activity. This is the side of -laws and duties.</p> - -<p>This group of the differentiated and yet related -activities is the analogue of the moral world. -There are certain wants which have constantly to be -fulfilled; certain ends which demand coöperating -activities, and which establish fixed relations between -men. There is a world of ends, a realm of -definite activities in existence, as concrete as the -ends and activities in our imagined factory. The -child finds, then, ends and actions in existence when -he is born. More than this: he is not born as a -mere spectator of the world; he is born <em>into</em> it. -He finds himself encompassed by such relations, -and he finds his own being and activity intermeshed -with them. If he takes away from himself, as an -agent, what he has, as sharing in these ends and -actions, nothing remains.</p> - -<h4>LIV.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Moral Institutions.</div> - -<p>This world of purposes and activities -is differentiated into various -institutions. The child is born as a member of a -<em>family</em>; as he grows up he finds that others have -possessions which he must respect, that is, he runs -upon the institution of <em>property</em>. As he grows still -older, he finds persons outside of the family of -whose actions he must take account as respects his -own: <em>society</em>, in the limited sense as meaning relations -<span class="pb" id="Pg170">[170]</span> -of special intimacy or acquaintanceship. Then -he finds the political institutions; the city, state -and nation. He finds an educational institution, the -school, the college; religious institutions, the church, -etc., etc. Everywhere he finds men having common -wants and thus proposing common ends and -using coöperative modes of action. To these organized -modes of action, with their reference to common -interests and purposes, he must adjust his -activities; he must take his part therein, if he acts -at all, though it be only negatively or hostilely, as -in evil conduct. These institutions <em>are</em> morality -real and objective; the individual becomes moral as -he shares in this moral world, and takes his due -place in it.</p> - -<p>Institutions, then, are organized modes of action, -on the basis of the wants and interests which unite -men. They differ as the family from the town, -the church from the state, according to the scope -and character of the wants from which they -spring. They are not bare <em>facts</em> like objects of -knowledge; they are <em>practical</em>, existing for the sake -of, and by means of the will—as execution of ideas -which have interest. Because they are expressions -of common purposes and ideas, they are not merely -private will and intelligence, but, in the literal sense, -<em>public</em> will and reason.</p> - -<p>The moral endeavor of man thus takes the form -<span class="pb" id="Pg171">[171]</span> -not of isolated fancies about right and wrong, not -of attempts to frame a morality for himself, not of -efforts to bring into being some praiseworthy ideal -never realized; but the form of sustaining and -furthering the moral world of which he is a member. -Since the world is one of action, and not of -contemplation like the world of knowledge, it can -be sustained and furthered only as he makes its -ends his own, and identifies himself and his satisfaction -with the activities in which other wills find -their fulfillment.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>This is simply a more concrete rendering of what -has already been said about the moral environment -(see Sec. <a href="#XXXIII">33</a>).</p></div> - -<h4>LV.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">The Aspects of a Moral Institution.</div> - -<p>An institution is, as we have -seen the expression of unity of desires -and ideas; it is general intelligence -in action, or common will. As such common -will, it is, as respects the merely private or -exclusive wants and aims of its members, absolutely -<em>sovereign</em>. It must aim to control them. -It must set before them the common end or ideal -and insist upon this as the only real end of individual -conduct. The ends so imposed by the public -reason are <em>laws</em>. But these laws are for the -sake of realizing the <em>common</em> end, of securing that -organized unity of action in which alone the individual -<span class="pb" id="Pg172">[172]</span> -can find freedom and fullness of action, or -his own satisfaction. Thus the activity of the -common will gives freedom, or <em>rights</em>, to the various -members of the institution.</p> - -<p>Every institution, then, has its sovereignty, or -authority, and its laws and rights. It is only a -false abstraction which makes us conceive of sovereignty, -or authority, and of law and of rights -as inhering only in some supreme organization, as -the national state. The family, the school, the -neighborhood group, has its authority as respects -its members, imposes its ideals of action, or laws, -and confers its respective satisfactions in way of -enlarged freedom, or rights. It is true that no -one of these institutions is isolated; that each -stands in relation with other like and unlike institutions. -Each minor institution is a member of -some more comprehensive whole, to which it bears -the same relation that the individual bears to it. -That is to say, <em>its</em> sovereignty gives way to the -authority of the more comprehensive organization; -its laws must be in harmony with the laws which -flow from the larger activity; its rights must become -aspects of a fuller satisfaction. Only humanity -or the organized activity of all the wants, -powers and interests common to men, can have absolute -sovereignty, law and rights.</p> - -<p>But the narrower group has its relations, none -<span class="pb" id="Pg173">[173]</span> -the less, although, in ultimate analysis, they flow -from and manifest the wider good, which, as -wider, must be controlling. Without such minor -local authorities, rights and laws, humanity would -be a meaningless abstraction, and its activity -wholly empty. There is an authority in the family, -and the moral growth of the child consists in identifying -the law of his own conduct with the ends -aimed at by the institution, and in growing into -maturity and freedom of manhood through the -rights which are bestowed upon him as such a -member. Within its own range this institution is -ultimate. But its range is not ultimate; the family, -valuable and sacred as it is, does not exist for -itself. It is not a larger selfishness. It exists as -one mode of realizing that comprehensive common -good to which all institutions must contribute, if -they are not to decay. It is the same with property, -the school, the local church, and with the -national state.</p> - -<p>We can now translate into more concrete terms -what was said, in Part I, regarding the good, -obligation and freedom. That performance of -function which is 'the good', is now seen to consist -in vital union with, and reproduction of, the -practical institutions of which one is a member. -The maintenance of such institutions by the free -participation therein of individual wills, is, of -<span class="pb" id="Pg174">[174]</span> -itself, the common good. Freedom also gets concreteness; -it is the assured rights, or powers of -action which one gets as such a member:—powers -which are not mere claims, nor simply claims -recognized as valid by others, but claims re-inforced -by the will of the whole community. Freedom becomes -real in the ethical world; it becomes force -and efficiency of action, because it does not mean -some private possession of the individual, but means -the whole coöperating and organized action of an -institution in securing to an individual some power -of self expression.</p> - -<h4 id="LVI">LVI.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Moral Law and the Ethical World.</div> - -<p>Without the idea of the ethical -world, as the unified -activity of diverse functions -exercised by different individuals, the idea of the -good, and of freedom, would be undefined. But -probably no one has ever attempted to conceive of -the good and of freedom in total abstraction from -the normal activity of man. Such has not been -the lot of duty, or of the element of law. Often by -implication, sometimes in so many words, it is -stated that while a physical law may be accounted -for, since it is simply an abstract from observed -facts, a moral law stands wholly above and apart -from actual facts; it expresses solely what 'ought -to be' and not what is; that, indeed, whether anything -<span class="pb" id="Pg175">[175]</span> -in accordance with it ever has existed or not, -is a matter of no essential moral importance theoretically, -however it may be practically. Now it -is evident that a law of something which has not -existed, does not and perhaps never will exist, is essentially -inexplicable and mysterious. It is as -against such a notion of moral law that the idea of -a real ethical world has perhaps its greatest service.</p> - -<p>A moral law, <i lang="la" xml:lang="la">e. g.</i>, the law of justice, is no more -<em>merely</em> a law of what ought to be than is the law of -gravitation. As the latter states a certain relation -of moving masses to one another, so the law of -justice states a certain relation of active wills to -one another. For a given individual, at a given -time and circumstances, the law of justice may appear -as the law of something which ought to be, -but is not:—is not <em>for him in this respect</em>, that is to -say. But the very fact that it ought to be for him -implies that it already is for others. It <em>is</em> a law of -the society of which he is a member. And it is because -he <em>is</em> a member of a society having this law, -that is a law of what <em>should</em> be for him.</p> - -<p>Would then justice cease to be a law for him if -it were not observed at all in the society of which -he is a member? Such a question is as contradictory -as asking what would happen to a planet if -the solar system went out of existence. It is the -law of justice (with other such laws) that <em>makes</em> -<span class="pb" id="Pg176">[176]</span> -society; that is, it is those active relations which find -expression in these laws that unify individuals so -that they have a common end, and thus mutual -duties. To imagine the abolition of these laws is -to imagine the abolition of society; and to ask for -the law of individual conduct apart from all relationship, -actual or ideal, to society, is to ask in what -morality consists when moral conditions are destroyed. -A society in which the social bond we -call justice does not obtain to some degree in the relations -of man to man, is <em>not</em> society; and, on the -other hand, wherever some law of justice actually -obtains, there the law <em>is</em> for every individual who -is a member of the society.</p> - -<p>This does not mean that the 'is', the actual -status of the moral world, is identical with the -'ought', or the ideal relations of man to man. -But it does mean that there is no obligation, either -in general or as any specific duty, which does not -<em>grow</em> out of the 'is', the actual relations now obtaining.<a name="FNanchor_1" id="FNanchor_1" href="#Footnote_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> -The ethical world at any given time is -undoubtedly imperfect, and, <em>therefore</em>, it demands -a certain act to meet the situation. The very imperfection, -the very badness in the present condition -of things, is a part of the environment with -reference to which we must act; it is, thus, an element -<span class="pb" id="Pg177">[177]</span> -in the <em>law</em> of future action that it shall not -exactly repeat the existing condition. In other -words, the 'is' gives the law of the 'ought', but it -is a part of this law that the 'ought' shall not be -as the 'is'. It is because the relation of justice -does hold in members of a stratum of society, having -a certain position, power or wealth, but does -not hold between this section and another class, -that the law of what should be is equal justice for -all. In holding that actual social relations afford -the law of what should be, we must not forget that -these actual relations have a negative as well as a -positive side, and that the new law must be framed -in view of the negatives, the deficiencies, the -wrongs, the contradictions, as well as of the positive -attainments. A moral law, to sum up, is the -principle of action, which, acted upon, will meet -the needs of the existing situation as respects the -wants, powers, and circumstances of the individuals -concerned. It is no far-away abstraction, but expresses -the <em>movement</em> of the ethical world.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_1" id="Footnote_1" href="#FNanchor_1" class="label">[1]</a> See Secs. <a href="#LIX">59</a>, <a href="#LX">60</a> and <a href="#LXIII">63</a> for discussion of other aspects of -this question.</p></div> - -<p>One example will help define the discussion. -Take the case of a street railway conductor, -whose union has ordered a strike. What determines -the law of his conduct under the circumstances? -Evidently the existing ethical institutions -of which he is a member, so far as he is -conscious of their needs. To determine what he -<span class="pb" id="Pg178">[178]</span> -should do, he does not hunt up some law of an -'ought' apart from what is; if he should hunt for -and should find such a law he would not know -what to do with it. Just because it is apart from -his concrete circumstances it is no guide, no law -for his conduct at all. He has to act not in view -of some abstract principle, but in view of a concrete -situation. He considers his present wage, -its relation to its needs and abilities; his capacity -and taste for this and for that work; the reasons -for the strike; the conditions of labor at present -with reference to winning the strike, and as to the -chance of getting other work. He considers his -family, their needs and developing powers; the -demand that they should live decently; that his -children should be fairly educated and get a fair -start in the world; he considers his relationships -to his fellow members in the union, etc. These -considerations, and such as these, give the law to -his decision in so far as he acts morally and not instinctively. -Where in this law-giving is there any -separation from facts? On the contrary, the more -right the act (the nearer it comes to its proper law), -the more it will simply express and reflect the -actual concrete facts. The law, in other words, of -action, is the law of actual social forces in their onward -movement, in so far as these demand some -response in the way of conduct from the individual.</p> - -<span class="pb" id="Pg179">[179]</span> -<p>We may restate from this point of view, what -we have already learned: A moral law is thoroughly -individualized. It cannot be duplicated; it -cannot be for one act just what it is for another. -The ethical world is too rich in capacity and circumstance -to permit of monotony; it is too swift -in its movement to allow of bare repetition. It -will not hold still; it moves on, and moral law is -the law of action required from individuals by this -movement.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>The consideration of specific institutions, as the -family, industrial society, civil society, the nation, -etc., with their respective rights and laws, belongs -rather to political philosophy than to the general theory -of ethics.</p></div> -</div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<span class="pb" id="Pg181">[181]</span> - -<h2>PART III.<br /> -THE MORAL LIFE OF THE INDIVIDUAL.</h2> - -<h4>LVII.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Division of Subject.</div> - -<p>We have now analyzed the fundamental -moral notions—the good, duty -and freedom; we have considered their -objective realization, and seen that they are outwardly -expressed in social relations, the more typical -and abiding of which we call institutions; that -abstract duties are realized in the laws created and -imposed by such institutions, and that abstract -freedom is realized in the rights possessed by -members in them. We have now to consider the -concrete moral life of an individual born into this -existing ethical world and finding himself confronted -with institutions in which he must execute -his part, and in which he obtains his satisfaction -and free activity. We have to consider how these -institutions appeal to the individual, awakening in -him a distinct <em>moral</em> consciousness, or the consciousness -of active relations to persons, in antithesis -to the theoretical consciousness of relations -which exist in contemplation; how the individual -<span class="pb" id="Pg182">[182]</span> -behaves towards these institutions, realizing them -by assuming his proper position in them, or attempting -to thwart them by living in isolation -from them; and how a moral character is thus -called into being. More shortly, we have to deal -(I) with the practical consciousness, or the formation -and growth of ideals of conduct; (II) with -the moral struggle, or the process of realizing -ideals, and (III) with moral character, or the -virtues.</p> -</div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter I.</span>—THE FORMATION AND GROWTH -OF IDEALS.</h3> - -<h4>LVIII.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Analysis of Conscience.</div> - -<p>The practical consciousness, or -the recognition of ends and relations -of action, is what is usually -termed <em>conscience</em>. The analysis of conscience -shows that it involves three elements, which may be -distinguished in theory, although they have no -separate existence in the actual fact of conscience -itself. These three elements are (1) the knowledge -of certain specific forms of conduct, (2) the -recognition of the authority or obligatoriness of -the forms, and (3) the emotional factors which -cluster about this recognition. That is to say, we -often speak (1) of conscience telling or informing -<span class="pb" id="Pg183">[183]</span> -us of duties; we speak of an enlightened or unenlightened -conscience; of savage, or mediæval, or -modern conscience. Here we are evidently thinking -of the kind and range of particular acts considered -right or wrong. But we also speak (2) of -the authority and majesty of conscience; of the -commands of conscience, etc. Here we are thinking -of the consciousness of <em>obligation in general</em>. -The savage and the civilized man may vary -greatly in their estimate of what particular acts -are right or wrong, and yet agree in the recognition -that such acts as are right are absolutely -obligatory. Finally we speak of an approving or -disapproving, or remorseful conscience, of a tender -or a hardened conscience, of the pangs, the pricks -of conscience, etc. Here (3) we are evidently dealing -with the responsiveness of the disposition to -moral distinctions, either in particular acts, or in -the recognition of moral law in general.</p> - -<h4 id="LIX"><ins id="C183" title="LVIX.">LIX.</ins></h4> -<div class="sidenote">Conscience as the Recognition of Special Acts as Right or Wrong.</div> - -<p>Conscience in this sense is -no peculiar, separate faculty -of mind. It is simply intelligence -dealing with a certain -subject-matter. That is, conscience -is distinguished not -by the kind of mental activity -at work, but by the kind of material the mind -<span class="pb" id="Pg184">[184]</span> -works upon. Intelligence deals with the nature -and relations of things, and we call it understanding; -intelligence deals with the relations of persons -and deeds, and it is termed conscience.</p> - -<p>We may, with advantage, recognize these stages -in the development of intelligence as dealing with -moral relationships:</p> - -<p>1. <i>The Customary or Conventional Conscience.</i> -The existing moral world, with the types -and varieties of institutions peculiar to it, is constantly -impressing itself upon the immature mind; -it makes certain demands of moral agents and enforces -them with all the means in its power—punishment, -reward, blame, public-opinion, and the -bestowal of social leadership. These demands and -expectations naturally give rise to certain convictions -in the individual as to what he should or -should not do. Such convictions are not the outcome -of independent reflection, but of the moulding -influence of social institutions. Moreover the -morality of a time becomes consolidated into -proverbs, maxims and law-codes. It takes shape -in certain habitual ways of looking at and judging -matters. All these are instilled into the growing -mind through language, literature, association and -legal custom, until they leave in the mind a corresponding -habit and attitude toward things to be -done. This process may be compared to the process -<span class="pb" id="Pg185">[185]</span> -by which knowledge of the world of things -is first attained. Certain of the more permanent -features of this world, especially those whose observance -is important in relation to continued -physical existence and well-being, impress themselves -upon the mind. Consciousness, with no -reflective activity of its own, comes to mirror -some of the main outlines of the world. The -more important distinctions are fixed in language, -and they find their way into the individual mind, -giving it unconsciously a certain bent and coloring.</p> - -<p>2. <i>The Loyal Conscience.</i> But just as the -mind, which seems at first to have the facts and -features of the world poured into itself as a passive -vessel, comes in time through its own experience to -appreciate something of their meaning, and, to -some extent, to verify them for itself; so the mind -in its moral relations. Without forming any -critical theory of the institutions and codes which -are forming character, without even considering -whether they are what they should be, the individual -yet comes at least to a practical recognition -that it is in these institutions that he gets his satisfactions, -and through these codes that he is protected. -He identifies himself, his own life, with -the social forms and ideals in which he lives, and -repels any attack upon them as he would an attack -<span class="pb" id="Pg186">[186]</span> -upon himself. The demands which the existing -institutions make upon him are not felt as the -coercions of a despot, but as expressions of his -own will, and requiring loyalty as such. The -conventional conscience, if it does not grow into -this, tends to become slavish, while an intelligence -which practically realizes, although without -continual reflection, the <em>significance</em> of conventional -morality is <em>free</em> in its convictions and -service.</p> - -<p>3. <i>The Independent or Reflective Conscience.</i> -The intelligence may not simply appropriate, as -its own, conventions embodied in current institutions -and codes, but may <em>reflect</em> upon them. It -may ask: What is this institution of family, -property for? Does the institution in its present -form work as it should work, or is some modification -required? Does this rule which is now -current embody the true needs of the situation, -or is it an antiquated expression of by-gone relations? -What is the true spirit of existing institutions, -and what sort of conduct does this spirit -demand?</p> - -<p>Here, in a word, we have the same relation to -the ethical world, that we have in physical science -to the external world. Intelligence is not content, -on its theoretical side, with having facts impressed -upon it by direct contact or through language; it -<span class="pb" id="Pg187">[187]</span> -is not content with coming to feel for itself the -value of the truths so impressed. It assumes an -independent attitude, putting itself over against -nature and cross-questioning her. It proposes its -own ideas, its own theories and hypotheses, and -manipulates facts to see if this rational meaning -can be verified. It criticises what passes as truth, -and pushes on to more adequate statement.</p> - -<p>The correlative attempt, on the part of intelligence -on its practical side, may have a larger or a -smaller scope. In its wider course it aims to criticise -and to re-form prevailing social ideals and institutions—even -those apparently most fixed. -This is the work of the great moral teachers of the -world. But in order that conscience be critical, -it is not necessary that its range be so wide. The -average member of a civilized community is nowadays -called upon to reflect upon his immediate relationships -in life, to see if they are what they -should be; to regulate his own conduct by rules -which he follows not simply because they are customary, -but the result of his own examination of -the situation. There is no difference in kind between -the grander and the minuter work. And it -is only the constant exercise of reflective examination -on the smaller scale which makes possible, -and which gives efficiency to, the deeper criticism -and transformation.</p> - -<span class="pb" id="Pg188">[188]</span> -<h4 id="LX">LX.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Reflective Conscience and the Ethical World.</div> - -<p>This conception of -conscience as critical -and reflective is one of -the chief fruits of the Socratic ethics, fructified -by the new meaning given life through the -Christian spirit. It involves the 'right of free -conscience'—the right of the individual to know -the good, to know the end of action, for himself, -rather than to have some good, however imposing -and however beneficent, enjoined from without. -It is this principle of subjective freedom, -says Hegel, which marks the turning-point in the -distinction of modern from ancient times (Sec. 124, -<cite>Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts</cite>, Vol. VIII -of Hegel's Works).<a name="FNanchor_2" id="FNanchor_2" href="#Footnote_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_2" id="Footnote_2" href="#FNanchor_2" class="label">[2]</a> I hardly need say how largely I am indebted in the -treatment of this topic, and indeed, in the whole matter of -the 'ethical world', to Hegel.</p></div> - -<p>But this notion of conscience is misinterpreted -when the content as well as the form of conscience -is thought to be individual. There is no right of -private judgment, in the sense that there is not a -public source and standard of judgment. What is -meant by this right is that the standard, the source, -is not the opinion of some other person, or group -of persons. It is a common, objective standard. It -is that embodied in social relationships themselves.</p> - -<span class="pb" id="Pg189">[189]</span> -<p>The conception of conscience as a private possession, -to be exercised by each one in independence -of historical forms and contemporary ideals, is -thoroughly misleading. The saying "I had to follow -my own notion of what is right" has been -made the excuse for all sorts of capricious, obstinate -and sentimental performance. It is of such -notions that Hegel further says: "The striving -for a morality of one's own is futile, and by its -very nature impossible of attainment; in respect -of morality the saying of the wisest men of antiquity -is the only true one: To be moral is -to live in accordance with the moral tradition -of one's country" (Hegel, Works, Vol. I, p. 389). -And in discussing the same question, Bradley has -said that the wish to have a morality of one's own -better than that of the world is to be on the -threshold of morality (p. 180).</p> - -<p>Yet, on the other hand, conscience should not -simply repeat the burden of existing usages and -opinions. No one can claim that the existing -morality embodies the highest possible conception -of personal relations. A morality which does not -recognize both the possibility and the necessity -of advance is immorality. Where then is the way -out from a capricious self-conceit, on one hand, -and a dead conformity on the other? Reflective -conscience must be <em>based</em> on the moral consciousness -<span class="pb" id="Pg190">[190]</span> -expressed in existing institutions, manners and -beliefs. Otherwise it is empty and arbitrary. -But the existing moral status is never wholly self-consistent. -It realizes ideals in one relation which -it does not in another; it gives rights to 'aristocrats' -which it denies to low-born; to men, which -it refuses to women; it exempts the rich from obligations -which it imposes upon the poor. Its institutions -embody a common good which turns out -to be good only to a privileged few, and thus -existing in self-contradiction. They suggest ends -which they execute only feebly or intermittently. -Reflective intelligence cross-questions the existing -morality; and extracts from it the ideal which it -pretends to embody, and thus is able to criticise -the existing morality in the light of its <em>own</em> ideal. -It points out the inconsistencies, the incoherencies, -the compromises, the failures, between the actual -practice and the theory at the basis of this practice. -And thus the new ideal proposed by the individual -is not a product of his private opinions, -but is the outcome of the ideal embodied in existing -customs, ideas and institutions.</p> - -<h4>LXI.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">The Sense of Obligation.</div> - -<p>There has been much discussion -regarding the nature of the -act of mind by which obligation is recognized. A -not uncommon view has been that the sense of -<span class="pb" id="Pg191">[191]</span> -duty as such must be the work of a peculiar faculty -of the mind. Admitting that the recognition -of this or that particular thing as right or wrong, is -the work of ordinary intelligence, it is held that -the additional recognition of the absolute obligatoriness -of the right cannot be the work of this -intelligence. For our intellect is confined to judging -what is or has been; the conception of obligation, -of something which should be, wholly transcends -its scope. There is, therefore, some special -moral in faculty called which affixes to the ordinary -judgments the stamp of the categorical imperative -"You ought".</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>See for example Maurice on "Conscience". The -view is traceable historically to Kant's conception of -Practical Reason, but as the view is ordinarily advanced -the function of Practical Reason in Kant's -philosophy is overlooked. The Practical Reason is no -special faculty of man's being; it is his consciousness -of himself as an acting being; that is, as a being -capable of acting from ideas. Kant never separates -the consciousness of duty from the very nature of -will as the realization of conceptions. In the average -modern presentation, this intrinsic connection of duty -with activity is absent. Conscience becomes a faculty -whose function it is to clap the idea of duty upon the -existent conception of an act; and this existent conception -is regarded as morally indifferent.</p> - -<p>It is true that Kant's Practical Reason has a certain -separateness or isolation. But this is because of -his general separation of the rational from the sensuous -factor, and not because of any separation of the -<span class="pb" id="Pg192">[192]</span> -consciousness of action from the consciousness of -duty. If Kant erred in his divorce of desire and -duty, then even the relative apartness of the Practical -Reason must be given up. The consciousness of obligation -is involved in the recognition of <em>any</em> end of -conduct, and not simply in the end of abstract law.</p></div> - -<p>Such a conception of conscience, however, is -open to serious objections. Aside from the fact -that large numbers of men declare that no amount -of introspection reveals any such machinery within -themselves, this separate faculty seems quite -<ins id="C192" title="superflous">superfluous</ins>. The real distinction is not between the -consciousness of an action with, and without, the -recognition of duty, but between a consciousness -which is and one which is not capable of conduct. -Any being who is capable of putting before himself -ideas as motives of conduct, who is capable of -forming a conception of something which he would -realize, is, by that very fact, capable of a sense of -obligation. The consciousness of an end to be -realized, the idea of something to be done, is, in -and of itself, the consciousness of duty.</p> - -<p>Let us consider again the horse-car conductor -(see Sec. <a href="#LVI">LVI</a>). After he has analyzed the situation -which faces him and decided that a given course of -conduct is the one which fits the situation, does he -require some additional faculty to inform him that -this course is the one which should be followed? -The analysis of practical ideas, that is, of proposed -<span class="pb" id="Pg193">[193]</span> -ends of conduct, is from the first an analysis of -what should be done. Such being the case, it is no -marvel that the conclusion of the reflection is: "This -should (ought to) be done."</p> - -<p>Indeed, just as every judgment about existent -fact naturally takes the form 'S <em>is</em> P', so every -judgment regarding an activity which executes an -idea takes the form, 'S ought (or ought not) to be -P'. It requires no additional faculty of mind, after -intelligence has been studying the motions of the -moon, to insert itself, and affirm some objective -relation or truth—as that the moon's motions are -explainable by the law of gravitation. It is the -very essence of theoretical judgment, judgment -regarding fact, to state truth—what is. And it is the -very essence of practical judgment, judgment regarding -deeds, to state that active relation which -we call obligation, what <em>ought to be</em>.</p> - -<p>The judgment as to what a practical situation <em>is</em>, -is an untrue or abstract judgment.</p> - -<p>The practical situation is itself an <em>activity</em>; the -needs, powers, and circumstances which make it -are moving on. At no instant in time is the scene -quiescent. But the agent, in order to determine his -course of action in view of this situation, has to <em>fix</em> -it; he has to arrest its onward movement in order -to tell what it is. So his abstracting intellect cuts a -cross-section through its on-going, and says 'This -<span class="pb" id="Pg194">[194]</span> -<em>is</em> the situation'. Now the judgment 'This ought -to be the situation', or 'in view of the situation, my -conduct ought to be thus and so', is simply restoring -the movement which the mind has temporarily -put out of sight. By means of its cross-section, intelligence -has detected the principle, or law of movement, -of the situation, and it is on the basis of this -movement that conscience declares what ought to be.</p> - -<p>Just as the fact of moral law, or of authority, of -the incumbency of duty, needs for its explanation -no separation of the 'is' from the 'ought' (see -<a href="#LVI">LVI</a>), but only recognition of the law of the 'is' -which is, perforce, a law of movement, and of -change;—so the consciousness of law, 'the sense -of obligation' requires no special mental faculty -which may declare what ought to be. The intelligence -that is capable of declaring truth, or what -is, is capable also of making known obligation. -For obligation is only <em>practical</em> truth, the 'is' of -doing.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>See upon this point, as well as upon the relation of -laws and rules to action, my article in Vol. I, No. 2, of -the International Journal of Ethics, entitled 'Moral -Theory and Practice'.</p></div> - -<h4>LXII.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Conscience as Emotional Disposition.</div> - -<p>Probably no judgment is entire-free -from emotional coloring and -accompaniments. It is doubtful -whether the most indifferent judgment is not based -<span class="pb" id="Pg195">[195]</span> -upon, and does not appeal to, some interest. Certainly -all the more important judgments awaken -some response from the self, and excite its interests -to their depths. Some of them may be excited by the -intrinsic nature of the subject-matter under judgment, -while others are the results of associations -more or less accidental. The former will necessarily -be aroused in every being, who has any emotional -nature at all, whenever the judgment is -made, while the latter will vary from time to time, -and may entirely pass away. That moral judgments, -judgments of what should be (or should -have been) done, arouse emotional response, is -therefore no cause for surprise. It may help clear -up difficulties if we distinguish three kinds of such -emotional accompaniment.</p> - -<p>1. There are, first, the interests belonging to -the sense of obligation as such. We have just -seen that this sense of obligation is nothing separate -from the consciousness of the particular act -which is to be performed. Nevertheless the consciousness -of obligation, of an authority and law, -recurs with every act, while the special content of -the act constantly varies. Thus an idea of law, or of -duty in general, is formed, distinct from any special -duty. Being formed, it arouses the special emotional -excitation appropriate to it. The formation -of this general idea of duty, and the growth of -<span class="pb" id="Pg196">[196]</span> -feeling of duty as such, is helped on through the -fact that children (and adults so far as their moral -life is immature) need to have their moral judgments -constantly reinforced by recurrence to the -thought of law. That is to say, a child, who is not -capable of seeing the true moral bearings and -claims of an act, is yet continually required to perform -such an act on the ground that it is obligatory. -The feeling, therefore, is natural and -legitimate. It must, however, go hand in hand -with the feelings aroused by the special moral -relations under consideration. Disconnected from -such union, it necessarily leads to slavish and arbitrary -forms of conduct. A child, for example, who -is constantly taught to perform acts simply because -he <em>ought</em> to do so, without having at the same time -his intelligence directed to the nature of the act -which is obligatory (without, that is, being led to -see how or why it is obligatory), may have a -strongly developed sense of obligation. As he -grows up, however, this sense of duty will be -largely one of dread and apprehension; a feeling -of constraint, rather than of free service. Besides -this, it will be largely a matter of accident to what -act this feeling attaches itself. Anything that -comes to the mind with the force of associations of -past education, any ideal that forces itself persistently -into consciousness from any source may -<span class="pb" id="Pg197">[197]</span> -awaken this sense of obligation, wholly irrespective -of the true nature of the act. This is the explanation -of strongly 'conscientious' persons, whose -morality is yet unintelligent and blundering. It -is of such persons that it has been said that a -thoroughly <em>good</em> man can do more harm than a number -of bad men.</p> - -<p>When, however, the feeling of obligation in -general is developed along with particular moral -judgments (that is, along with the habit of considering -the special nature of acts performed), it is one -of the strongest supports to morality. Acts constantly -need to be performed which are recognized -as right and as obligatory, and yet with reference -to which there is no fixed habit of conduct. In -these cases, the more direct, or spontaneous, stimulus -to action is wanting.</p> - -<p>If, however, there is a strong sense of obligation -in general, this may attach itself to the particular -act and thus afford the needed impetus. In -unusual experiences, and in cases where the ordinary -motive-forces are lacking, such a feeling of -regard for law may be the only sure stay of -right conduct.</p> - -<p>2. There is the emotional accompaniment appropriate -to the special content of the act. If, for -example, the required act has to do with some -person, there arise in consciousness the feelings of -<span class="pb" id="Pg198">[198]</span> -interest, of love and friendship, or of dislike, -which belong to that person. If it relate to some -piece of work to be done, the sweeping of a room, -the taking of a journey, the painting of a picture, -there are the interests natural to such subjects. -These feelings when aroused necessarily form part -of the emotional attitude as respects the act. It is -the strength and normal welling-up of such specific -interests which afford the best assurance of -healthy and progressive moral conduct, as distinct -from mere sentimental dwelling upon ideals. Only -interests prevent the divorce of feelings and ideas -from habits of action. Such interests are the -union of the subjective element, the self, and the -objective, the special relations to be realized (Sec. -<a href="#XXXIV">XXXIV</a>), and thus necessarily produce a right -and healthy attitude towards moral ends. It is -obvious that in a normal moral life, the law of obligation -in general, and the specific interests in -particular cases, should more and more fuse. The -interests, at their strongest, take the form of <em>love</em>. -And thus there is realized the ideal of an effective -character; the union of law and inclination -in its pure form—love for the action in and of -itself.</p> - -<p>3. Emotions due to accidental associations. It -is matter of common notice that the moral feelings -are rarely wholly pure; that all sorts of sentiments, -<span class="pb" id="Pg199">[199]</span> -due to associations of time and place and person -not strictly belonging to the acts themselves, cluster -about them. While this is true, we should not -forget the great difficulty there is in marking off -any associations as <em>wholly</em> external to the nature of -the act. We may say that mere fear of punishment -is such a wholly external feeling, having no place -in moral emotion. Yet it may be doubted whether -there is any feeling that may be called mere fear of -punishment. It is, perhaps, fear of punishment by -a parent, for whom one has love and respect, and -thus the fear has partially a genuinely moral aspect. -Some writers would call the æsthetic feelings, the -feelings of beauty, of harmony, which gather about -moral ends adventitious. Yet the fact that other -moralists have made all moral feelings essentially -æsthetic, as due to the perception of the fitness -and proportion of the acts, should warn us from -regarding æsthetic feelings as wholly external. -About all that can be said is that feelings which -do not spring from <em>some</em> aspect of the content -of the act itself should be extruded, with growing -maturity of character, from influence upon -conduct.</p> - -<h4 id="LXIII">LXIII.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Conscientiousness.</div> - -<p>Conscientiousness is primarily -the virtue of intelligence in regard to -conduct. That is to say, it is the formed habit of -<span class="pb" id="Pg200">[200]</span> -bringing intelligence to bear upon the analysis of -moral relations—the habit of considering what -ought to be done. It is based upon the recognition -of the idea first distinctly formulated by -Socrates—that "an unexamined life is not one that -should be led by man". It is the outgrowth of -the customary morality embodied in usages, codes -and social institutions, but it is an advance upon -custom, because it requires a meaning and a reason. -It is the mark of a "character which will not -be satisfied without understanding the law that it -obeys; without knowing what the good is, for -which the demand has hitherto been blindly at -work" (Green, Op. cit., p. 270). Conscientiousness, -then, is reflective intelligence grown into -character. It involves a greater and wider recognition -of obligation in general, and a larger -and more stable emotional response to everything -that presents itself as duty; as well as -the habit of deliberate consideration of the moral -situation and of the acts demanded by it.</p> - -<p>Conscientiousness is an analysis of the conditions -under which conduct takes place, and -of the action that will meet these conditions; -it is a thoroughly <em>objective</em> analysis. What is -sometimes termed conscientiousness is merely the -habit of analyzing internal moods and sentiments; -of prying into 'motives' in that sense of motive -<span class="pb" id="Pg201">[201]</span> -which identifies it not with the end of action, -but with some subjective state of emotion. -Thus considered, conscientiousness is morbid. We -are sometimes warned against <em>over</em>-conscientiousness. -But such conscientiousness means simply -over-regard of one's private self; keeping an eye -upon the effect of conduct on one's internal state, -rather than upon conduct itself. Over-conscientiousness -is as impossible as over-intelligence, -since it is simply the application of intelligence to -conduct. It is as little morbid and introspective -as is the analysis of any fact in nature. Another -notion which is sometimes thought to be bound up -with that of conscience, also has nothing to do -with it; namely, the notion of a precision and coldness -opposed to all large spontaneity and broad -sympathy in conduct. The reflective man of narrow -insight and cramped conduct is often called -the conscientious man and opposed to the man of -generous impulses. This comes from identifying -conscience with a ready-made code of rules, -and its action with the application of some such -fixed code to all acts as they come up. It is -evident, on the contrary, that such a habit is -opposed to conscience. Conscience means the -consideration of each case <em>in itself</em>; measuring it -not by any outside code, but in the existing moral -situation.</p> - -<span class="pb" id="Pg202">[202]</span> -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>On conscientiousness, see Green, Op. cit., pp. 269-271 -and 323-327; and Alexander, Op. cit., pp. 156-160. -These writers, however, seem to identify it too much -with internal scrutiny. Green, for example, expressly -identifies conscientiousness with a man's "questioning -about himself, whether he has been as good as he -should have been, whether a better man would not -have acted otherwise than he has done" (p. 323). He -again speaks of it as "comparison of our own practice, -as we know it on the inner side in relation to the motives -and character which it expresses, with an ideal -of virtue". The first definition seems to be misleading. -Questioning as to whether the end adopted was -what it should have been, <i lang="la" xml:lang="la">i. e.</i>, whether the analysis of -the situation was correctly performed, may be of -great service in aiding future decisions, but questioning -regarding the purity of one's own 'motive' does -not seem of much avail. In a man upon the whole -good, such questioning is apt to be paralyzing. The -energy that should go to conduct goes to anxiety -about one's conduct. It is the view of goodness as -directed mainly towards one's own private motives, -which has led such writers as Henry James, Sr., and -Mr. Hinton, to conceive of 'morality', the struggle -for goodness, to be in essence bad. They conceived -of the struggle for 'private goodness' as no different -from the struggle for private pleasure, although -likely, of course, to lead to better things. Nor in a -bad man is such scrutiny of 'motive', as apart from -objective end, of much value. The bad man is generally -aware of the badness of his motive without much -close examination. The truth aimed at by Green is, I -think, amply covered by recognizing that conscientiousness -as a constant will to know what should be, and -to readjust conduct to meet the new insight, is the -spring of the moral life.</p></div> - -<span class="pb" id="Pg203">[203]</span> -<h4 id ="LXIV">LXIV.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Moral Commands, Rules and Systems.</div> - -<p>What is the part played -by specific commands and -by general rules in the examination -of conduct by conscience? We should -note, in the first place, that commands are not -rules, and rules are not commands. A command, -to be a command, must be specific and individual. -It must refer to time, place and circumstance. -'Thou shalt do no murder' is not strictly speaking -a command, for it allows questioning as to what is -murder. Is killing in war murder? Is the hanging -of criminals murder? Is taking life in self-defense -murder? Regarded simply as a command, -this command would be 'void for uncertainty'. A -true command is a specific injunction of one person -to another to do or not to do a stated thing or -things. Under what conditions do commands -play a part in moral conduct? In cases where the -intelligence of the agent is so undeveloped that he -cannot realize for himself the situation and see the -act required, and when a part of the agent's environment -is constituted by others who have such -required knowledge, there <em>is</em> a moral element in -command and in obedience.</p> - -<p>This explains the moral responsibility of parents -to children and of children to parents. The soldier, -too, in recognizing a general's command, is recognizing -<span class="pb" id="Pg204">[204]</span> -the situation as it exists for him. Were there -simply superior force on one side, and fear on the -other, the relation would be an immoral one. It -is implied, of course, in such an instance as the -parents' command, that it be so directed as to -enable the child more and more to dispense with -it—that is, that it be of such a character as to give -the child insight into the situation for himself. -Here is the transition from a command to a rule.</p> - -<p>A rule does not tell what to do or what to leave -undone. The Golden Rule, for example, does not -tell me how to act in any specific case. <em>A rule is -a tool of analysis.</em> The moral situation, or capacity -in its relation to environment, is often an extremely -complicated affair. How shall the individual resolve -it? How shall he pick it to pieces, so as to -see its real nature and the act demanded by it? It -is evident that the analysis will be the more truly -and speedily performed if the agent has a method -by which to attack it, certain principles in the light -of which he may view it, instruments for cross-questioning -it and making it render up its meaning. -Moral rules perform this service. While the -Golden Rule does not of itself give one jot of information -as to what I should do in a given case, -it does, if accepted, immensely simplify the situation. -Without it I should perhaps have to act -blindly; with it the question comes to this: What -<span class="pb" id="Pg205">[205]</span> -should I, under the given circumstances, like to -have done to me? This settled, the whole question -of what should be done is settled.</p> - -<p>It is obvious, then, that the value of a moral -rule depends upon its potency in revealing the -inner spirit and reality of individual deeds. Rules -in the negative form, rules whose application is -limited in scope because of an attempt to be specific, -are midway between commands proper and -rules. The Golden Rule, on the other hand, is -positive, and not attempting to define any specific -act, covers in its range all relations of man to man. -It is indeed only a concrete and forcible statement -of the ethical principle itself, the idea of a common -good, or of a community of persons. This is also -a convenient place for considering the practical -value of ethical systems. We have already -seen that no system can attempt to tell what in -particular should be done. The principle of a -system, however, may be of some aid in analyzing -a specific case. In this way, a system may be regarded -as a highly generalized rule. It attempts -to state some fundamental principle which lies at -the basis of moral conduct. So far as it succeeds -in doing this, there is the possibility of its practical -application in particular cases, although, of -course, the mediate rules must continue to be the -working tools of mankind—on account of their -<span class="pb" id="Pg206">[206]</span> -decided concrete character, and because they have -themselves taken shape under the pressure of -practice rather than of more theoretical needs.</p> - -<h4 id="LXV">LXV.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Development of Moral Ideals.</div> - -<p>Thus far we have been -speaking of conscience mainly -as to its method of working. We have now to -speak more definitely of its content, or of the development -of ideals of action.</p> - -<p>It is of the very nature of moral conduct to be -progressive. Permanence of <em>specific</em> ideals means -moral death. We say that truth-telling, charity, -loyalty, temperance, have always been moral ends -and while this is true, the statement as ordinarily -made is apt to hide from us the fact that the content -of the various ideals (what is <em>meant</em> by temperance, -etc.) has been constantly changing, and -this of necessity. The realization of moral ends -must bring about a changed situation, so that the -repetition of the same ends would no longer satisfy. -This progress has two sides: the satisfaction -of wants leads to a larger view of what satisfaction -really is, <i lang="la" xml:lang="la">i. e.</i>, to the creation of new capacities -and wants; while adjustment to the environment -creates wider and more complex social relationships.</p> - -<p>Let the act be one of intelligence. Some new -fact or law is discovered. On one hand, this discovery -may arouse a hitherto comparatively dormant -<span class="pb" id="Pg207">[207]</span> -mind; it may suggest the possession of -capacities previously latent; it may stimulate -mental activity and create a thirst for expanding -knowledge. This readjustment of intellectual needs -and powers may be comparatively slight, or it may -amount, as it has with many a young person, to -a revolution. On the other hand, the new fact -changes the intellectual outlook, the mental horizon, -and, by transforming somewhat the relations -of things, demands new conduct. All this, -even when the growth of knowledge concerns only -the physical world. But development of insight -into social needs and affairs has a larger and more -direct progressive influence. The social world -exists spiritually, as conceived, and a new conception -of it, new perception of its scope and bearings, -is, perforce, a change of that world. And thus it -is with the satisfaction of the human want of -knowledge, that patience, courage, self-respect, humility, -benevolence, all change character. When, -for example, psychology has given an increase of -knowledge regarding men's motives, political -economy an increase of knowledge regarding -men's wants, when historical knowledge has -added its testimony regarding the effects of -indiscriminate giving, charity must change its -content. While once, the mere supplying of -food or money by one to another may have been -<span class="pb" id="Pg208">[208]</span> -right as meeting the recognized relations, charity -now comes to mean large responsibility in knowledge -of antecedents and circumstances, need of -organization, careful tracing of consequences, and, -above all, effort to remove the conditions which -made the want possible. The activity involved has -infinitely widened.</p> - -<p>Let the act be in the region of industrial life—a -new invention. The invention of the telephone -does not simply satisfy an old want—it creates -new. It brings about the possibility of closer -social relations, extends the distribution of intelligence, -facilitates commerce. It is a common saying -that the luxury of one generation is the necessity -of the next; that is to say, what once satisfied -a somewhat remote need becomes in time the basis -upon which new needs grow up. Energy previously -pent up is set free, new power and ideals are -evoked. Consider again a person assuming a family -relation. This seems, at first, to consist mainly in -the satisfaction of certain common and obvious -human wants. But this satisfaction, if moral, -turns out rather to be the creation of new insight -into life, of new relationships, and thus of new -energies and ideals. We may generalize these -instances. The secret of the moral life is not getting -or having, it is doing and thus being. The -getting and the possessing side of life has a moral -<span class="pb" id="Pg209">[209]</span> -value only when it is made the stimulus and nutriment -of new and wider acting. To solve the -equation between getting and doing is the moral -problem of life. Let the possession be acquiesced -in for its own sake, and not as the way to freer -(and thus more moral) action, and the selfish life -has set in (see Sec. <a href="#LXVII">LXVII</a>). It is essential to -moral activity that it feed itself into larger appetites -and thus into larger life.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>This must not be taken to deny that there is a -mechanical side even to the moral life. A merchant, -for example, may do the same thing over and over -again, like going to his business every morning at the -same hour. This is a moral act and yet it does not -seem to lead to a change in moral wants or surroundings. -Yet even in such cases it should be noted that -it is only outwardly that the act is the <em>same</em>. In itself, -that is, in its relation to the will of the agent, it is -simply one element in the whole of character; and as -character opens up, the act must change somewhat -also. It is performed somehow in a new spirit. If -this is not to some extent true, if such acts become -wholly mechanical, the moral life is hardening into -the rigidity of death.</p></div> - -<p>This progressive development consists on one -side in a richer and subtler individual activity, in -increased individualization, in wider and freer -functions of life; on the other it consists in increase -in number of those persons whose ideal is a -'common good', or who have membership in the -same moral community; and, further, it consists in -<span class="pb" id="Pg210">[210]</span> -more complex relations between them. It is both -intensive and extensive.</p> - -<p>History is one record of growth in the sense of -specific powers. Its track is marked by the appearance -of more and more internal and distinguishing -traits; of new divisions of labor and corresponding -freedom in functioning. It begins with -groups in which everything is massed, and the good -is common only in the sense of being undifferentiated -for all. It progresses with the evolution of -individuality, of the peculiar gifts entrusted to each, -and hence of the specific service demanded of each.</p> - -<p>The other side, the enlargement of the community -of ends, has been termed growth in -"comprehensiveness". History is again a record -of the widening of the social consciousness—of the -range of persons whose interests have to be taken -into account in action. There has been a period -in which the community was nothing more than a -man's own immediate family group, this enlarging -to the clan, the city, the social class, the nation; -until now, in theory, the community of interests -and ends is humanity itself.</p> - -<p>This growth in comprehensiveness is not simply -a growth in the number of persons having a common -end. The quantitative growth reacts upon -the <em>nature</em> of the ends themselves. For example, -when the conceived community is small, bravery -<span class="pb" id="Pg211">[211]</span> -may consist mainly in willingness to fight for the -recognized community against other hostile groups. -As these groups become themselves included in the -moral community, courage must change its form, -and become resoluteness and integrity of purpose -in defending manhood and humanity as such. -That is to say, as long as the community is based -largely upon physical facts, like oneness of blood, -of territory, etc., the ideal of courage will have a -somewhat external and physical manifestation. -Let the community be truly spiritual, consisting in -recognition of unity of destiny and function in -coöperation toward an all-inclusive life, and the -ideal of courage becomes more internal and spiritual, -consisting in loyalty to the possibilities of -humanity, whenever and wherever found.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>On this development of moral ideals, and especially -of the growth in "comprehensiveness" as reacting -upon the intrinsic form which the ideal itself takes, -see Green, Op. cit., pp. 264-308, followed by Alexander, -Op. cit., pp. 384-398. For the process of change of ideals -in general, see Alexander, pp. 271-292, and 369-371.</p></div> -</div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter II.</span>—THE MORAL STRUGGLE OR -THE REALIZING OF IDEALS.</h3> - -<h4>LXVI.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Goodness as a Struggle.</div> - -<p>We have already seen that the -bare repetition of identically the -same acts does not consist with morality. To aim -<span class="pb" id="Pg212">[212]</span> -at securing a satisfaction precisely like the one -already experienced, is to fail to recognize the -altered capacity and environment, and the altered -duty. Moral satisfaction prior to an act is <em>ideal</em>; -ideal not simply in the sense of being conceived, -or present to thought, but ideal in the sense that -it has not been already enjoyed. Some satisfaction -has been enjoyed in a previous activity, but -that very satisfaction has so enlarged and complicated -the situation, that its mere repetition would -not afford moral or active satisfaction, but only -what Kant terms 'pathological' satisfaction. Morality -thus assumes the form of a struggle. The -past satisfaction speaks for itself; it has been verified -in experience, it has conveyed its worth to our -very senses. We have tried and tasted it, and -know that it is good. If morality lay in the repetition -of similar satisfactions, it would not be a -struggle. We should know experimentally before -hand that the chosen end would bring us satisfaction, -and should be at rest in that knowledge. But -when morality lies in striving for satisfactions -which have not verified themselves to our sense, it -always requires an effort. We have to surrender -the enjoyed good, and stake ourselves upon that of -which we cannot say: We <em>know</em> it is good. To -surrender the actual experienced good for a possible -ideal good is the struggle.</p> - -<span class="pb" id="Pg213">[213]</span> -<p>We arrive, in what is termed the opposition of -desire and duty, at the heart of the moral struggle. -Of course, taken strictly, there can be no opposition -here. The duty which did not awaken <em>any</em> desire -would not appeal to the mind even as a duty. -But we may distinguish between a desire which is -based on past satisfaction actually experienced, -and desire based simply upon the idea that the end -is <em>desirable</em>—that it ought to be desired. It may -seem strange to speak of a desire based simply -upon the recognition that an end <em>should</em> be desired, -but the possibility of awakening such a desire and -the degree of its strength are the test of a moral -character. How far does this end awaken response -in me because I see that it is the end which is fit -and due? How far does it awaken this response -although it does not fall into line with past satisfactions, -or although it actually thwart some -habitual satisfaction? Here is the opposition of -duty and desire. It lies in the contrast of a good -which has demonstrated itself as such in experience, -and a good whose claim to be good rests only -on the fact that it is the act which meets the situation. -It is the contrast between a good of possession, -and one of action.</p> - -<p>From this point of view morality is a life of -<em>aspiration</em>, and of <em>faith</em>; there is required constant -willingness to give up past goods as the good, and -<span class="pb" id="Pg214">[214]</span> -to press on to new ends; not because past achievements -are bad, but because, being good, they have -created a situation which demands larger and more -intricately related achievements. This willingness -is aspiration and it implies <em>faith</em>. Only the old -good is of sight, has verified itself to sense. The -new ideal, the end which meets the situation, is -felt as good only in so far as the character has -formed the conviction that to meet obligation is -itself a good, whether bringing sensible satisfaction -or not. You can prove to a man that he -ought to act so and so (that is to say, that such an -act is the one which fits the present occasion), but -you cannot <em>prove</em> to him that the performance of -that duty will be good. Only faith in the moral -order, in the identity of duty and the good, can -assert this. Every time an agent takes as his end -(that is, chooses as good) an activity which he has -not already tried, he asserts his belief in the goodness -of right action as such. This faith is not a -mere intellectual thing, but it is practical—the -staking of self upon activity as against passive -possession.</p> - -<h4 id="LXVII">LXVII.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Moral Badness.</div> - -<p>Badness originates in the contrast -which thus comes about between <em>having</em> -the repetition of former action, and <em>doing</em>—pressing -forward to the new right action. Goodness -<span class="pb" id="Pg215">[215]</span> -is the choice of doing; the refusal to be content -with past good as exhausting the entire content -of goodness. It is, says Green, 'in the continued -effort to be better that goodness consists'. The -man, however bad his past and however limited his -range of intellectual, æsthetic and social activity, -who is dissatisfied with his past, and whose dissatisfaction -manifests itself in act, is accounted better -than the man of a respectable past and higher -plane of life who has lapsed into contented acquiescence -with past deeds. For past deeds are not -<em>deeds</em>, they are passive enjoyments. The bad man, -on the other hand, is not the man who loves badness -<em>in and for itself</em>. Such a man would be a -mad man or a devil. All conduct, bad as well as -good, is for the sake of <em>some</em> satisfaction, that is, -some good. In the bad man, the satisfaction which -is aimed at is <em>simply</em> the one congruent with existing -inclinations, irrespective of the sufficiency of -those inclinations in view of the changed capacity -and environment: it is a good of <em>having</em>. The bad -man, that is to say, does not recognize any <em>ideal</em> or -<em>active</em> good; any good which has not already commended -itself to him as such. This good may be -good in <em>itself</em>; but, as distinguished from the good -which requires action, that which would fulfill the -present capacity or meet the present situation, -it is bad.</p> - -<span class="pb" id="Pg216">[216]</span> -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>Thus Alexander terms badness <em>a survival</em>, in part -at least, of former goodness. Hinton says (Philosophy -and Religion, p. 146), "That a thing is wrong does not -mean that it ought never to have been done or -thought, but that it ought to be left off". It will be -noted that we are not dealing with the metaphysical -or the religious problem of the nature and origin of -evil, but simply with an account of bad action as it -appears in individual conduct.</p></div> - -<p>Badness has four traits, all derivable from this -basal fact. They are: (1) Lawlessness, (2) Selfishness, -(3) Baseness, (4) Demoralization.</p> - -<p>1. <i>Lawlessness.</i> When desire and duty, that -is, when desires based on past having and on future -acting, conflict, the bad man lets duty go. He -virtually denies that it is a good at all—it may be a -good in the abstract but not a good for him. He -denies that obligation as such has any value; that -any end is to be consulted save his own state of -mind. He denies that there is law for conduct—at -least any law beyond the inclination which he happens -to have at the time of action. Keeping himself -within that which has verified itself to his -feeling in the past, he abrogates all authority excepting -that of his own immediate feelings.</p> - -<p>2. <i>Selfishness.</i> It has already been shown -that the self is not necessarily immoral, and hence -that action for self is not necessarily bad—indeed, -that the true self is social and interest in it right -(see Sec. <a href="#XXXV">XXXV</a>). But when a satisfaction based on -<span class="pb" id="Pg217">[217]</span> -past experience is set against one proceeding from -an act as meeting obligation, there grows up a -divorce in the self. The actual self, the self recognizing -only past and sensible satisfaction, is set -over against the self which recognizes the necessity -of expansion and a wider environment. Since the -former self confines its action to benefits demonstrably -accruing to itself, while the latter, in -meeting the demands of the situation, necessarily -contributes to the satisfaction of others, one -takes the form of a <em>private</em> self, a self whose good -is set over against and exclusive of that of others, -while the self recognizing obligation becomes a -social self—the self which performs its due function -in society. It is, again, the contrast between -getting and doing.</p> - -<p>All moral action is based upon the presupposition -of the identity of good (Sec. <a href="#XL">XL</a>), but it by -no means follows that this identity of good can be -demonstrated to the agent at the time of action. -On the contrary, it is matter of the commonest -experience that the sensible good, the demonstrable -good (that is, the one visible on the line of past satisfaction) -may be contradictory to the act which -would satisfy the interests of others. The identity -of interests can be proved <em>only by acting upon it</em>; -to the agent, prior to action, it is a matter of faith. -Choice presents itself then in these cases as a test: -<span class="pb" id="Pg218">[218]</span> -Do you believe that the Good is simply your private -good, or is the true Good, is <em>your</em> good, one which -includes the good of others? The condemnation -passed upon the 'selfish' man is that he virtually -declares that good is essentially exclusive and private. -He shuts himself up within himself, within, -that is, his past achievements, and the inclinations -based upon them. The good man goes out of himself -in new action. Bad action is thus essentially -narrowing, it confines the self; good action is -expansive and vital, it moves on to a larger self.</p> - -<p>In fine, all conduct, good and bad, satisfies the -self; bad conduct, however, aims at a self which, -keeping its eye upon its private and assured satisfaction, -refuses to recognize the increasing function -with its larger social range,—the 'selfish' self.</p> - -<p>Light is thrown upon this point by referring to -what was said about interest (Sec. <a href="#XXXIV">XXXIV</a>). Interest -is <em>active</em> feeling, feeling turned upon an object, -and going out toward it so as to identify it with self. -In this active and objective interest there is satisfaction, -but the satisfaction is <em>in</em> the activity which -has the object for its content. This is the satisfaction -of the good self. In the bad self, interest is -reduced to mere feeling; for the aim of life in such -a self is simply to have certain feelings as its own -possession; activity and its object are degraded -into mere means for getting these sensations.</p> - -<span class="pb" id="Pg219">[219]</span> -<p>Activity has two sides; as activity, as projection -or expression of one's powers, it satisfies self; as -activity, also, it has some end, some object, for its -content. The activity as such, therefore, the activity -for its own sake, must involve the realization -of this object for its own sake. But in having, in -getting, there is no such creation or maintenance of -an object for itself. Objects cease to be 'ends in -themselves' when they cease to be the content of -action; and are degraded into means of private -satisfaction, that is, of sensation.</p> - -<p>3. <i>Baseness.</i> For, when we say that bad action -takes account of ideals only on the basis of possession, -we say, in effect, that it takes account only of -<em>sensible</em> satisfaction. As it is in the progressive -movement of morality that there arises the distinction -of the law-abiding and the lawless self, of the -social and the selfish self, so in the same aspect -there comes into existence the distinction of the -low, degraded, sensual self, as against the higher or -spiritual self. In themselves, or naturally, there is -no desire high, none low. But when an inclination -for an end which consists in possession comes into -conflict with one which includes an active satisfaction—one -not previously enjoyed—the contrast -arises. It is wrong to say, with Kant, that the bad -act is simply for pleasure; for the bad act, the -choice of a past satisfaction as against the aspiration -<span class="pb" id="Pg220">[220]</span> -for a wider good, may have a large content—it -may be the good of one's family; it may be scientific -or æsthetic culture. Yet the moment a man -begins to live on the plane of past satisfaction as -such, he has begun to live on the plane of 'sense', -or for pleasure. The refusal to recognize the ideal -good, to acknowledge activity as good, throws the -agent back into a life of dwelling upon his own -sensible good, and thus he falls more and more -into a life of dwelling upon mere sensations. What -made the past good a good at all was the spirit, the -activity, in it, and when it is no longer an activity, -but a mere keeping, the life is gone out of it. The -selfish life must degenerate into mere sensuality—although -when sensuality is 'refined' we call it -sentimentality.</p> - -<p>4. <i>Demoralization.</i> Morality is activity; exercise -of function. To cease this activity is not to -remain on the attained level, for that, <em>when attained</em>, -was active. It is to relapse, to slip down into badness. -The moral end is always an activity. To -fail in this activity is, therefore, to involve character -in disintegration. It can be kept together only by -constant organizing activity; only by acting upon -new wants and moving toward new situations. Let -this activity cease, and disorganization ensues, as -surely as the body decays when life goes, instead -of simply remaining inert as it was. Bad conduct -<span class="pb" id="Pg221">[221]</span> -is thus <em>unprincipled</em>; it has no center, no movement. -The good man is 'organic'; he uses his -attainments to discover new needs, and to assimilate -new material. He lives from within outwards, his -character is compact, coherent; he has <em>integrity</em>. -The bad man, having no controlling unity, has no -consistent line of action; his motives of conduct -contradict one another; he follows this maxim in -relation to this person, that in relation to another; -character is <em>demoralized</em>.</p> - -<p>The bad man is unstable and double-minded. -He is not one person, but a group of conflicting -wills. So far as he is really bad he becomes as -many persons as he has desires. His conduct cannot -be made universal. He always makes exceptions -in favor of himself. He does not want moral -relations abolished, but relaxed or deflected in his -own case, while they still hold for other men.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>This is the truth at the basis of Kant's contention -regarding goodness as conduct whose maxim is capable -of generalization. See also Bradley, Op. cit., pp. 261-271. -And Alexander, Op. cit., pp. 309-312.</p></div> - -<h4>LXVIII.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Goodness in its Relation to the Struggle.</div> - -<p>1. Two aspects of this we -have already noted; one, that of -conscientiousness, or habitual -alertness and responsiveness of intelligence to the -nature of obligation, both in general and as to the -<span class="pb" id="Pg222">[222]</span> -specific acts which are obligatory. The other is -that goodness, in this relation, consists in <em>progressive</em> -adjustment, involving aspiration as to future conduct, -and correlative humility as to present achievements -of character.</p> - -<p>2. We may state what has already been suggested, -that goodness as self-sacrifice or self-renunciation -has also its place here. The moral attitude -is one of renunciation, because, on account of the -constantly growing wants and circumstances, the -satisfactions which belong to the actually realized -self must be given up for active goods. That the -self-sacrifice takes largely the form of the surrender -of private interests to the welfare of the whole, -is explained by what has just been said regarding -selfishness. Self-sacrifice is not in any way the -moral end or the last word. Life is lost that it -may be found. The smaller local life of the private -self is given up in order that the richer and -fuller life of the social or active self may be realized. -But none the less the self-sacrifice at the -time that it is made is genuine and real. While it -is involved in the very nature of morality that moral -conduct shall bring greater activity, larger life, the -motive of the agent in self-sacrifice is not to give -up the lesser satisfaction for the sake of getting a -greater. It is only so far as he is already moral that -he is convinced that the new duty will bring satisfaction, -<span class="pb" id="Pg223">[223]</span> -and his conviction is not one of sense, but -of faith. To the agent at the time of action, it -is a real satisfaction which is given up for one -that is only ideal, and given up because the ideal -satisfaction is ethical, active—one congruent to -duty, while the actual satisfaction is only pathological; -that is, congruent to the actualized self—to -the having, instead of the doing self.</p> - -<p>3. Goodness is not remoteness from badness. -In one sense, goodness is based upon badness; that -is, good action is always based upon action good -once, but bad if persisted in under changing circumstances. -The moral struggle thus presents itself -as the conflict between this "bad" and the good -which would duly meet the existing situation. This -good, of course, does not involve the annihilation -of the previously attained good—the present bad—but -its subordination; its use in the new function. -This is the explanation of the apparently paradoxical -statement that badness is the material of good -action—a statement literally correct when badness -is understood as it is here. Evil is simply that -which goodness has to <em>overcome</em>—has to make an -element of itself.</p> - -<p>Badness, as just spoken of, is only potential—the -end is bad as contrasted with the better. Badness -may also, of course, be actual; the bad end -may be chosen, and adopted into character. Even -<span class="pb" id="Pg224">[224]</span> -in this sense, goodness is not the absence of evil, -or entire freedom from it. Badness even on this -basis is the material of goodness; it is to be -put under foot and made an element in good action. -But how can actual evil be made a factor of right -conduct? In this way; the good man learns from -his own bad acts; he does not continue to repeat -such acts, nor does he, while recognizing their badness, -simply endeavor to do right without regard to -the previous bad conduct. Perceiving the effect of -his own wrong acts, the change produced in his -own capacities, and his altered relations to other -people, he acts so as to meet the situation which -his own bad act has helped to create. Conduct is -then right, although made what it is, to some -degree, by previous wrong conduct.</p> - -<p>In this connection, the introduction of Christianity -made one of its largest ethical contributions. -It showed how it was possible for a man to put his -badness behind him and even make it an element -in goodness. Teaching that the world of social -relations was itself an ethical reality and a good (a -redeemed world), it taught that the individual, by -identifying himself with the spirit of this ethical -world, might be freed from slavery to his past -evil; that by recognizing and taking for his own -the evil in the world, instead of engaging in an -isolated struggle to become good by himself, he -<span class="pb" id="Pg225">[225]</span> -might make the evil a factor in his own right action.</p> - -<p>Moreover, by placing morality in activity and -not in some thing, or in conformity to an external -law, Christianity changed the nature of the -struggle. While the old struggle had been an -effort to get away from evil to a good beyond, -Christianity made the struggle itself a good. It, -then, was no longer the effort to escape to some -fixed, unchanging state; the constant onward movement -was itself the goal. Virtue, as Hegel says, is -the battle, the struggle, carried to its full.</p> - -<p>4. <i>The conception of merit.</i> This is, essentially, -the idea of social desert—the idea that an agent -deserves well of others on account of his act or his -character. An action evokes two kinds of judgments: -first, that the act is right or virtuous, that it -fulfills duty. This judgment may be passed by any -one; as well by the agent as by any one else. It is -simply the recognition of the moral character of -the act. But a right act may also awaken a conviction -of desert; that the act is one which furthers -the needs of society, and thus is meritorious.</p> - -<p><em>This</em> is <em>not</em> a judgment which the agent can pass -upon his own act. Virtue and duty are strictly -coextensive; no act can be so virtuous, so right, as -to go beyond meeting the demands of the situation. -Everything is a duty which needs to be done in a -given situation; the doing of what needs to be done -<span class="pb" id="Pg226">[226]</span> -is right or virtuous. While the agent may and -must approve of right action in himself, he cannot -claim desert or reward because of its virtuousness; -he simply does what he should.</p> - -<p>Others, however, may see that the act has been -done in the face of great temptation; after a hard -struggle; that it denotes some unusual qualification -or executes some remarkable service. It is -not only right, but obligatory, for others to take -due notice of these qualities, of these deeds. -Such notice is as requisite as it is to show gratitude -for generosity, or forgiveness to a repentant -man.</p> - -<p>Two errors are to be avoided here; both arising -from the identification of merit with virtue. One -view holds that the virtue and merit consist in -doing something over and above duty. There is a -minimum of action which is obligatory; to perform -this, since it is obligatory, is no virtue. Anything -above this is virtuous. The other view reverses -this and holds that since no man can do more than -he ought, there is no such thing as merit. Great -excellence or heroism in one man is no more meritorious -than ordinary conduct in another; since the -one man is naturally more gifted than the other. -But while one act is no more right or virtuous -than another, it may be more meritorious, because -contributing more to moral welfare or progress. To -<span class="pb" id="Pg227">[227]</span> -depreciate the meritorious deed is a sign of a carping, -a grudging or a mean spirit.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> -<p>The respective relations of duty, virtue and merit -have been variously discussed. Different views will be -found in Sidgwick, Method of Ethics, Bk. III, ch. iv; -Alexander, Moral Order and Progress, pp. 187-195 and -242-247; Stephen, Science of Ethics, pp. 293-303; Martineau, -Types of Ethical Theory, pp. 78-81; Laurie, -Ethica, pp. 145-148.</p></div> -</div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter III.</span>—REALIZED MORALITY OR -THE VIRTUES.</h3> - -<h4>LXIX.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Goodness as Found in Character.</div> - -<p>We have treated of the forming -of moral ideals, and of the attempt -to realize them against the counter -attractions of sensible desire. We have now to -treat these ideas as actual ends of conduct and -thus reacting upon the agent. The good character, -considered in relation to the moral <em>struggle</em>, is the -one which chooses the right end, which endeavors -to be better. The good character <em>in itself</em> is that -made by this choice. It is good for the self to -choose a due end in an effort caused by contrary -allurements. But the very fact of the struggle -witnesses that morality is not yet the natural and -spontaneous manifestation of character. A <em>wholly</em> -<span class="pb" id="Pg228">[228]</span> -good man would feel such satisfaction in the contemplation -of the ideal good that contrary desires -would not affect him. He would take pleasure -only in the right. Every accomplished moral deed -tends to bring this about. Moral realization brings -satisfaction. The satisfaction becomes one with -the right act. Duty and desire grow into harmony. -Interest and virtue tend toward unity.</p> - -<p>This is the truth aimed at, but not attained, by -the hedonistic school. In complete moral action, -happiness and rightness know no divorce. And -this is true, even though the act, in some of its -aspects, involves pain. The act, so far as its quality -of rightness is concerned, calls forth unalloyed -satisfaction, however bound up with pain to self -and to others in some respects. The error of -hedonism is not in insisting that right action is -pleasurable, but in its failure to supply content to -the idea of happiness, in its failure to define what -happiness is. In the failure to show those active -relations of man to nature and to man involved in -human satisfaction, it reduces happiness to the -abstraction of agreeable sensation.</p> - -<p>A virtue then, in the full sense, that is as the -expression of virtuous character, and not of the -struggle of character to be virtuous against the -allurements of passive goods, is an <em>interest</em>. The -system of virtues includes the various forms which -<span class="pb" id="Pg229">[229]</span> -interest assumes. Truthfulness, for example, is -interest in the media of human exchange; generosity -is interest in sharing any form of superior -endowment with others less rich by nature or -training, etc. It is distinguished from natural -generosity, which may be mere impulse, by its -being an interest in the activity or social relation -itself, instead of in some accidental accompaniment -of the relation.</p> - -<p>Another way of getting at the nature of the -virtues is to consider them as forms of freedom. -Positive freedom is the good, it is realized activity, -the full and unhindered performance of function. -A virtue is any one aspect which the free performance -of function may take. Meekness is one form -of the adjustment of capacity to surroundings; -honesty another; indignation another; scientific -excellence another, and so on. In each of these -virtues, the agent realizes his freedom: Freedom -from subjection to caprice and blind appetite, -freedom in the full play of activity.</p> - -<h4>LXX.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">Two Kinds of Virtues.</div> - -<p>We may recognize two types of -virtuous action. These are:</p> - -<p>1. <i>The Special Virtues.</i> These arise from -special capacities or special opportunities. The -Greek sense of virtue was almost that of "excellence", -some special fitness or power of an agent. -<span class="pb" id="Pg230">[230]</span> -There is the virtue of a painter, of a scientific -investigator, of a philanthropist, of a comedian, of -a statesman, and so on. The special act may be -manifested in view of some special occasion, some -special demand of the environment—charity, -thankfulness, patriotism, chastity, etc. Goodness, -as the realization of the moral end, is a system, -and the special virtues are the particular members -of the system.</p> - -<p>2. <i>Cardinal Virtues.</i> Besides these special -members of a system, however, the whole system -itself may present various aspects. That is to say, -even in a special act the whole spirit of the man -may be called out, and this expression of the whole -character is a cardinal virtue. While the special -virtues differ in content, as humility from bravery, -earnestness from compassion, the cardinal virtues -have the same content, showing only different sides -of it. Conscientiousness, for example, is a cardinal -virtue. It does not have to do with an act -belonging to some particular capacity, or evoked -by some special circumstance, but with the spirit of -the whole self as manifested in the will to recognize -duty—both its obligatoriness in general and -the concrete forms which it takes. Truthfulness -as a special virtue would be the desire to make -word correspond to fact in some instance of speech. -As a cardinal virtue, it is the constant will to clarify -<span class="pb" id="Pg231">[231]</span> -and render true to their ideal all human relations—those -of man to man, and man to nature.</p> - -<h4>LXXI.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">The Cardinal Virtues.</div> - -<p>The cardinal virtues are -marked by</p> - -<p>1. <i>Wholeness.</i> This or that virtue, not calling -the whole character into play, but only some special -power, is partial. But a cardinal virtue is not <em>a</em> -virtue, but the spirit in which all acts are performed. -It lies in the attitude which the agent -takes towards duty; his obedience to recognized -forms, his readiness to respond to new duties, his -enthusiasm in moving forward to new relations. -It is a common remark that moral codes change -from 'Do not' to 'Do', and from this to 'Be'. A -Mosaic code may attempt to regulate the specific -acts of life. Christianity says, 'Be ye perfect'. -The effort to exhaust the various special right acts -is futile. They are not the same for any two men, -and they change constantly with the same man. -The very words which denote virtues come less and -less to mean specific acts, and more the spirit in -which conduct occurs. Purity, for example, does not -mean freedom from certain limited outward forms of -defilement; but comes to signify rightness of natures -as a whole, their freedom from all self-seeking -or exclusive desire for private pleasure, etc. Thus -purity of heart comes to mean perfect goodness.</p> - -<span class="pb" id="Pg232">[232]</span> -<p>2. <i>Disinterestedness.</i> Any act, to be virtuous, -must of course be disinterested, but we may now -connect this disinterestedness with the integral -nature of moral action just spoken of. Immoral -action never takes account of the whole nature of -an end; it deflects the end to some ulterior purpose; -it bends it to the private satisfaction of the agent; -it takes a part of it by making exceptions in favor -of self. Bad action is never 'objective'. It is 'abstract'; -it takes into account only such portion of -the act as satisfies some existing need of the -private self. The immoral man shows his partial -character again by being full of casuistries, -devices by which he can get the act removed -from its natural placing and considered in some -other light:—this act, for example, <em>would</em> be dishonest, -of course, if done under certain circumstances, -but since I have certain praiseworthy feelings, -certain remote intentions, it may now be considered -otherwise. It is a large part of the badness -of 'good' people that instead of taking the whole -act just as it is, they endeavor to make the natural -feelings in their own mind—feelings of charity, or -benevolence—do substitute duty for the end aimed -at; they excuse wrong acts on the ground that -their 'intentions' were good, meaning by intentions -the prevailing mood of their mind. It is in this -sense that 'hell is paved with good intentions.'</p> - -<span class="pb" id="Pg233">[233]</span> -<p>Now it is against this deflection, perversion -and mutilating of the act that disinterestedness -takes its stand. Disinterested does not mean without -interest, but without interest in anything -except <em>the act itself</em>. The interest is not in the -wonderful moods or sentiments with which we do -the act; it is not in some ulterior end to be gained -by it, or in some private advantage which it will -bring, but in the act itself—in the real and concrete -relations involved. There is a vague French -saying that 'morality is the nature of things.' -If this phrase has a meaning it is that moral conduct -is not a manifestation of private feelings nor a -search for some unattainable ideal, but observance -and reproduction of actual relations. And this is -the mark of a disinterested character.</p> -</div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<h3>CONCLUSION.</h3> - -<h4>LXXII.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">The Practical End of Morality.</div> - -<p>Virtues, then, are cardinal, -and character is integral, -just in the degree in which every want is a want -of the whole man. So far as this occurs, the burden -of the moral struggle is transformed into -freedom of movement. There is no longer effort -to bring the particular desire into conformity with -<span class="pb" id="Pg234">[234]</span> -a law, or a universal, outside itself. The fitting -in of each special desire, as it arises, to the organism -of character takes place without friction, as a -natural re-adjustment. There is not constraint, -but growth. On the other side, the attained character -does not tend to petrify into a fixed possession -which resists the response to needs that grow -out of the enlarged environment. It is plastic to -new wants and demands; it does not require to be -wrenched and wracked into agreement with the -required act, but moves into it, of itself. The -law is not an external ideal, but the principle of -the movement. There is the identity of freedom -and law in the good.</p> - -<p>This union of inclination and duty in act is the -practical end. All the world's great reformers -have set as their goal this ideal, which may be -termed either the freeing of wants, or the humanizing -of the moral law. It will help summarize -our whole discussion, if we see how the theories of -hedonism and of Kant have endeavored to express -this same goal. Hedonism, indeed, has this -identity for its fundamental principle. It holds -strongly to the idea of moral law immanent in -human wants themselves. But its error lies in -taking this identity of desire and the good, as a -direct or immediate unity, while, in reality, it exists -only in and through activity; it is a unity which -<span class="pb" id="Pg235">[235]</span> -can be attained only as the result of a process. It -mistakes an ideal which is realized only in action -for bare fact which exists of itself.</p> - -<p>Hedonism, as represented by Spencer, recognizes, -it is true, that the unity of desire and duty is -not an immediate or natural one; but only to fall -into the error of holding that the separation is due -to some external causes, and that when these are -removed we shall have a fixed millenium. As -against this doctrine, we must recognize that the -difference between want and duty is always removed -so far as conduct is moral; that it is not an -ideal in the sense of something to be attained at -some remote period, but an ideal in the sense of -being the very meaning of moral activity whenever -and wherever it occurs. The realizing of this ideal -is not something to be sometime reached once for -all, but progress is itself the ideal. Wants are -ever growing larger, and thus freedom ever comes -to have a wider scope (Sec. <a href="#LXV">LXV</a>).</p> - -<p>Kant recognizes that the identity of duty and -inclination is not a natural fact, but is the ideal. -However, he understands by ideal something -which ought to be, but is not. Morality is ever a -struggle to get desire into unity with law, but a -struggle doomed, by its very conditions, not to -succeed. The law is the straight line of duty, -which the asymptotic curve of desire may approximate, -<span class="pb" id="Pg236">[236]</span> -but never touch. An earthly taint of pleasure-seeking -always clings to our wants, and makes -of morality a striving which defeats itself.</p> - -<p>The theory that morality lies in the realization -of individuality recognizes that there is no direct, -or natural, identity of desire and law, but also -recognizes that their identification is not an impossible -task. The problem is solved in the exercise -of function, where the desires, however, are not -unclothed, but clothed upon. Flowing in the -channel of response to the demands of the moral -environment, they unite, at once, social service and -individual freedom.</p> - -<h4>LXXIII.</h4> -<div class="sidenote">The Means of Moralization.</div> - -<p>This practical end of the -unification of desire and duty, -in the play of moral interests, is -reached, therefore, so far as the desires are socialized. -A want is socialized when it is not a want -for its own isolated and fixed satisfaction, but reflects -the needs of the environment. This implies, -of course, that it is bound by countless ties to the -whole body of desires and capacities. The eye, in -seeing for itself, sees for the whole body, because it -is not isolated but, through its connections, an organ -of a system. In this same way, the satisfaction of -a want for food, or for commercial activity, may -necessitate a satisfaction of the whole social system.</p> - -<span class="pb" id="Pg237">[237]</span> -<p>But how shall this socialization of wants be -secured? It is in answering this question that we -are brought again to a point already discussed at -length: the moral bearings of intelligence. It is -intelligence that is the sole sure means of taking a -want out of the isolation of merely impulsive -action. It is the passing of the desire through the -alembic of ideas that, in rationalizing and spiritualizing -it, makes it an expression of the want of the -whole man, and thus of social needs.</p> - -<p>To know one's self was declared by Socrates, -who first brought to conscious birth the spirit of -the moral life, to be the very core of moral endeavor. -This knowledge of self has taken, indeed, -a more circuitous and a more painful path, than -Socrates anticipated. Man has had, during two -thousand years of science, to go around through -nature to find himself, and as yet he has not wholly -come back to himself—he oftentimes seems still -lost in the wilderness of an outer world. But -when man does get back to himself it will be as -a victor laden with the spoils of subdued nature. -Having secured, in theory and invention, his unity -with nature, his knowledge of himself will rest on -a wide and certain basis.</p> - -<p>This is the final justification of the moral value -of science and art. It is because through them -wants are inter-connected, unified and socialized, -<span class="pb" id="Pg238">[238]</span> -that they are, when all is said and done, the preëminent -moral means. And if we do not readily -recognize them in this garb, it is because we have -made of them such fixed things, that is, such -abstractions, by placing them outside the movement -of human life.</p> -</div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<span class="pb" id="Pg239">[239]</span> - -<h2>INDEX.</h2> - -<ul class="index"> -<li class="ifrst">Absolute—and relative Ethics, according to Spencer <a href="#Pg072">72</a>.</li> - -<li>Accountability—See <a href="#RES">responsibility.</a></li> - -<li><a id="ACT">Activity</a>—human, the subject-matter of ethics <a href="#Pg001">1 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—the object of desire <a href="#Pg021">21 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—the standard of pleasure <a href="#Pg045">45</a>; <a href="#Pg050">50</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—equals exercise of function <a href="#Pg101">101</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—opposed to mere possession <a href="#Pg209">209</a>; <a href="#Pg215">215</a>; <a href="#Pg218">218</a>; <a href="#Pg220">220</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—two sides of <a href="#Pg219">219</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—see <a href="#FRE">freedom</a>.</li> - -<li>Æsthetic feelings—may be moral <a href="#Pg199">199</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—see <a href="#ART">art</a>.</li> - -<li>Agent—moral, one capable of acting from ideas <a href="#Pg003">3</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—see <a href="#PER">person</a>.</li> - -<li>Alexander, S.—quoted: on idea of sum of pleasures <a href="#Pg046">46</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—referred to: <a href="#Pg009">9</a>; <a href="#Pg046">46</a>; <a href="#Pg077">77</a>; <a href="#Pg111">111</a>; <a href="#Pg134">134</a>; <a href="#Pg158">158</a>; <a href="#Pg165">165</a>; <a href="#Pg202">202</a>; <a href="#Pg216">216</a>; <a href="#Pg221">221</a>; <a href="#Pg227">227</a>.</li> - -<li><a id="ALT">Altruism</a>—how identified with egoism <a href="#Pg059">59</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—reconciled, by Spencer, with egoism <a href="#Pg070">70 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—conflicts, at present, with egoism <a href="#Pg076">76</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—older moralists termed benevolence <a href="#Pg195">195</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—not necessarily moral <a href="#Pg107">107</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—not disguised selfishness <a href="#Pg109">109</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—may equal charity <a href="#Pg125">125</a>.</li> - -<li>Amusements—moral nature of <a href="#Pg133">133</a>.</li> - -<li>Approbation—nature of <a href="#Pg161">161</a>.<span class="pb" id="Pg240">[240]</span></li> - -<li>Aristotle—quoted: on pleasure <a href="#Pg018">18</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">on pleasure and character <a href="#Pg029">29</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">on the mean <a href="#Pg136">136</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—referred to: <a href="#Pg031">31</a>.</li> - -<li><a id="ART">Art</a> (and Science)—nature of interest in <a href="#Pg111">111</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—distinction of fine and useful <a href="#Pg112">112</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—interest in, why moral <a href="#Pg113">113 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—interest in, really social <a href="#Pg118">118 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—life an, <a href="#Pg120">120</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—essentially dynamic <a href="#Pg126">126</a>.</li> - -<li>Asceticism—means formalism <a href="#Pg094">94</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—element of truth in <a href="#Pg095">95</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—results when interest is excluded <a href="#Pg106">106</a>.</li> - -<li>Aspiration—involved in morality <a href="#Pg213">213</a>; <a href="#Pg222">222</a>.</li> - -<li>Autonomy—Kant's conception of justified <a href="#Pg149">149</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Badness—of environment a factor in right action <a href="#Pg176">176</a>; <a href="#Pg224">224</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—its source and factors <a href="#Pg214">214</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—its relation to goodness <a href="#Pg223">223</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—potential and actual <a href="#Pg223">223</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—of good people <a href="#Pg232">232</a>.</li> - -<li>Bain, A.—quoted: that pleasure is a self-evident criterion <a href="#Pg016">16</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">his definition of utilitarianism <a href="#Pg053">53</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">on obligation <a href="#Pg140">140</a>; <a href="#Pg141">141</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—referred to: <a href="#Pg017">17</a>; <a href="#Pg066">66</a>; <a href="#Pg227">227</a>.</li> - -<li>Barratt—quoted: that all pleasure is individual <a href="#Pg014">14</a>.</li> - -<li>Baseness—why badness becomes <a href="#Pg219">219</a>.</li> - -<li>Benevolence—see <a href="#ALT">altruism</a>.</li> - -<li>Bentham, J.—quoted: pleasure both criterion and motive <a href="#Pg015">15</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">self-evident criterion <a href="#Pg016">16</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">all motives good <a href="#Pg034">34 ff</a>.;</li> -<li class="isub2">hedonistic calculus <a href="#Pg036">36 ff</a>.;</li> -<li class="isub2">identity of individual and general pleasure <a href="#Pg057">57 ff</a>.;</li> -<li class="isub2">influence of law <a href="#Pg059">59</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—referred to: <a href="#Pg053">53</a>.<span class="pb" id="Pg241">[241]</span></li> - -<li>Birks—referred to: <a href="#Pg066">66</a>.</li> - -<li>Blackie, J. S.—referred to: <a href="#Pg066">66</a>.</li> - -<li>Bradley, F. H.—quoted: on pleasure and desire <a href="#Pg021">21</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">scientific interest not necessarily social <a href="#Pg122">122</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">on merely individual conscience <a href="#Pg189">189</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—referred to: <a href="#Pg025">25</a>; <a href="#Pg026">26</a>; <a href="#Pg042">42</a>; <a href="#Pg048">48</a>; <a href="#Pg054">54</a>; <a href="#Pg091">91</a>; <a href="#Pg124">124</a>; <a href="#Pg134">134</a>; <a href="#Pg165">165</a>; <a href="#Pg221">221</a>.</li> - -<li>Browning, R.—referred to: <a href="#Pg111">111</a>.</li> - -<li>Butler—Bishop, quoted: on conscience <a href="#Pg167">167</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—referred to: <a href="#Pg110">110</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Caird, E.—quoted: on collision of moral ends <a href="#Pg088">88</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—referred to: <a href="#Pg021">21</a>; <a href="#Pg082">82</a>; <a href="#Pg087">87</a>; <a href="#Pg091">91</a>; <a href="#Pg092">92</a>; <a href="#Pg093">93</a>; <a href="#Pg095">95</a>; <a href="#Pg109">109</a>; <a href="#Pg111">111</a>; <a href="#Pg149">149</a>; <a href="#Pg165">165</a>.</li> - -<li>Calderwood—referred to: <a href="#Pg158">158</a>; <a href="#Pg166">166</a>.</li> - -<li><a id="CAP">Capacity</a>—its relation to environment <a href="#Pg097">97</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—increased by moral action <a href="#Pg206">206</a>.</li> - -<li>Carlyle, T.—referred to: <a href="#Pg128">128</a>.</li> - -<li>Casuistry—inevitable, if moral end is not wholly social <a href="#Pg119">119</a>.</li> - -<li><a id="CHA">Character</a>—reciprocal with conduct <a href="#Pg009">9</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—the source of motive, desire and moral pleasure <a href="#Pg026">26 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—separated from conduct by hedonists <a href="#Pg032">32 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—and virtues <a href="#Pg227">227 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—see <a href="#CAP">capacity</a>, <a href="#CON">conduct</a>, <a href="#INT">interests</a> and <a href="#MOT">motive</a>.</li> - -<li>Charity—idea of, involves social inequality <a href="#Pg125">125</a>.</li> - -<li>Christianity—ethical influence of <a href="#Pg224">224</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—has no specific ethical code <a href="#Pg231">231</a>.</li> - -<li>Coit, S.—referred to: <a href="#Pg028">28</a>; <a href="#Pg066">66</a>.</li> - -<li>Commands—moral value of: <a href="#Pg203">203</a>.<span class="pb" id="Pg242">[242]</span></li> - -<li><a id="COM">Common Good</a>—an ethical ideal <a href="#Pg051">51</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—not furnished by hedonism <a href="#Pg060">60</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—not furnished by Kant <a href="#Pg091">91</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—why necessarily involved in morality <a href="#Pg117">117</a>; <a href="#Pg217">217</a>; <a href="#Pg222">222</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—demands reciprocal satisfaction of individual and society <a href="#Pg127">127</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—its existence postulated by moral conduct <a href="#Pg130">130</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—results from exercise of function <a href="#Pg168">168</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—constituted by activity <a href="#Pg169">169 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—realized in institutions <a href="#Pg173">173</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—development of <a href="#Pg210">210</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—see <a href="#INS">institutions</a> and <a href="#SOC">society</a>.</li> - -<li>Comprehensiveness—growth of, in moral end <a href="#Pg210">210 ff</a>.</li> - -<li><a id="CON">Conduct</a>—defined <a href="#Pg003">3</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—relation to consequences <a href="#Pg007">7</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—relation to character <a href="#Pg009">9</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—an individual system <a href="#Pg133">133</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—a social system <a href="#Pg136">136</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—how related to character <a href="#Pg163">163</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—see <a href="#ACT">activity</a>, <a href="#CONS">consequences</a>, <a href="#CHA">character</a> and <a href="#MOT">motive</a>.</li> - -<li><a id="CONF">Conflict</a>—of moral ends <a href="#Pg088">88 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—morality has an aspect of <a href="#Pg151">151</a>; <a href="#Pg227">227</a>.</li> - -<li>Conscience—Bain's idea of <a href="#Pg141">141</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—equals consciousness of action <a href="#Pg181">181</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—elements in <a href="#Pg182">182</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—not a special faculty <a href="#Pg183">183</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—kinds of <a href="#Pg183">183 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—not merely individual <a href="#Pg188">188</a>.</li> - -<li>Conscientiousness—nature of <a href="#Pg199">199</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—does not equal introspection <a href="#Pg200">200</a>.<span class="pb" id="Pg243">[243]</span></li> -<li class="isub1">—nor application of code <a href="#Pg201">201</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—a cardinal virtue <a href="#Pg232">232</a>.</li> - -<li><a id="CONS">Consequences</a>—moral value of <a href="#Pg007">7 ff</a>.; <a href="#Pg084">84</a>; <a href="#Pg114">114</a>; <a href="#Pg160">160</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—excluded from morality by Kantianism <a href="#Pg013">13</a>; <a href="#Pg029">29</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—identified with moral value by hedonism <a href="#Pg033">33</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—responsibility for <a href="#Pg160">160</a>.</li> - -<li>Criterion—hedonistic is pleasure <a href="#Pg015">15</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—criticism of hedonistic <a href="#Pg031">31 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—two ends to be met by every <a href="#Pg032">32</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—of higher and lower pleasures <a href="#Pg049">49 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—when pleasure may be a <a href="#Pg050">50</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—Mill's really social <a href="#Pg063">63</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—Spencer's really social <a href="#Pg073">73</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—Kant's nominally formal <a href="#Pg079">79 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—the real <a href="#Pg132">132 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—its elasticity <a href="#Pg135">135</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Darwin, C.—referred to: <a href="#Pg078">78</a>.</li> - -<li>Demoralization—involved in badness <a href="#Pg220">220</a>.</li> - -<li><a id="DES">Desire</a>—pleasure as end of <a href="#Pg016">16</a>; <a href="#Pg018">18 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—defined <a href="#Pg019">19</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—how spiritualized <a href="#Pg023">23</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—not purely pleasurable <a href="#Pg027">27</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—an expression of character <a href="#Pg028">28</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—excluded from moral motive by Kant <a href="#Pg079">79</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—all or no involved in morality <a href="#Pg094">94</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—relation to pleasure <a href="#Pg083">83</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—particular, an abstraction <a href="#Pg096">96</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—how distinguished from interest <a href="#Pg103">103</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—opposed to reason by Kant <a href="#Pg147">147</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—when opposed to moral action <a href="#Pg148">148</a>; <a href="#Pg155">155</a>; <a href="#Pg213">213</a>; <a href="#Pg216">216</a>.<span class="pb" id="Pg244">[244]</span></li> -<li class="isub1">—how socialized, <a href="#Pg237">237</a>.</li> - -<li>Dewey, J.—referred to: <a href="#Pg025">25</a>; <a href="#Pg078">78</a>; <a href="#Pg194">194</a>.</li> - -<li>Disinterestedness—equals full interest <a href="#Pg107">107</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—an aspect of cardinal virtue <a href="#Pg232">232</a>.</li> - -<li>Disposition—Bentham on <a href="#Pg035">35</a>.</li> - -<li>Dualism—the Kantian <a href="#Pg148">148 ff</a>.</li> - -<li>Duty—see <a href="#OBL">obligation</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Egoism—see <a href="#ALT">altruism</a>.</li> - -<li>Empiricism—Spencer's reconciliation with intuitionalism <a href="#Pg069">69 ff</a>.</li> - -<li>End—moral: see <a href="#COM">common good</a>; <a href="#FUN">function</a>; <a href="#MOT">motive</a>.</li> - -<li>Environment—defined by relation to capacity <a href="#Pg099">99 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—meaning of adjustment to <a href="#Pg115">115 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—moral, exists in institutions <a href="#Pg171">171</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—badness of, an element in right action <a href="#Pg176">176</a>; <a href="#Pg190">190</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—enlarged by moral action <a href="#Pg207">207</a>.</li> - -<li>Ethical World—discussed <a href="#Pg167">167 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—nature illustrated <a href="#Pg168">168</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—relation to moral law <a href="#Pg174">174</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—see <a href="#INS">Institutions</a>.</li> - -<li>Ethics—defined <a href="#Pg001">1</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—divided <a href="#Pg003">3</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—its object according to Spencer <a href="#Pg068">68</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—see <a href="#THE">theory</a>.</li> - -<li>Evolution, Theory of—combined with hedonism <a href="#Pg067">67 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—not really hedonistic <a href="#Pg071">71 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—its real standard objective <a href="#Pg072">72</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Faith—a factor in moral progress <a href="#Pg123">123</a>; <a href="#Pg127">127 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—in humanity, meaning of <a href="#Pg129">129</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—why demanded in moral action <a href="#Pg217">217</a>; <a href="#Pg222">222</a>.</li> - -<li>Feelings—natural and moral <a href="#Pg005">5 ff</a>.; <a href="#Pg025">25 ff</a>.; <a href="#Pg087">87</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—sympathetic relied upon by utilitarians <a href="#Pg057">57</a>.<span class="pb" id="Pg245">[245]</span></li> -<li class="isub1">—necessary in moral activity <a href="#Pg085">85</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—active, equal interests <a href="#Pg102">102</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—moral, defined by end <a href="#Pg108">108</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">see also <a href="#MOT">motive</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—value of <a href="#Pg195">195 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—moral, not too narrowly limited <a href="#Pg199">199</a>.</li> - -<li><a id="FRE">Freedom</a>—is object of desire <a href="#Pg024">24</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—equals exercise of function <a href="#Pg138">138</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—various aspects of <a href="#Pg158">158</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—of choice defined <a href="#Pg159">159</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—of indifference discussed <a href="#Pg161">161 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—actualized in rights <a href="#Pg172">172</a>; <a href="#Pg174">174</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—positive, realized in virtues <a href="#Pg229">229</a>.</li> - -<li><a id="FUN">Function</a>—union of capacity and circumstance in act <a href="#Pg103">103</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—freedom found in exercise of <a href="#Pg164">164 ff</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Gizycki—referred to: <a href="#Pg066">66</a>.</li> - -<li>God—an external, cannot be the source of obligation <a href="#Pg149">149</a>.</li> - -<li>Goethe—referred to: <a href="#Pg128">128</a>.</li> - -<li>Golden Rule—identified by Mill with principle of utilitarianism <a href="#Pg059">59</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—gives no directions as to conduct <a href="#Pg204">204</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—is a concrete statement of ethical postulate <a href="#Pg205">205</a>.</li> - -<li>Green, T. H.—quoted: on desire and pleasure <a href="#Pg021">21</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">on sum of pleasures <a href="#Pg043">43</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">on nature of happiness <a href="#Pg045">45</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">on conscientiousness <a href="#Pg200">200</a>; <a href="#Pg202">202</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">on goodness <a href="#Pg215">215</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—referred to: <a href="#Pg009">9</a>; <a href="#Pg025">25</a>; <a href="#Pg042">42</a>; <a href="#Pg054">54</a>; <a href="#Pg110">110</a>; <a href="#Pg158">158</a>; <a href="#Pg165">165</a>.</li> - -<li>Grote, J.—referred to: <a href="#Pg066">66</a>; <a href="#Pg158">158</a>.</li> - -<li>Guyau—referred to: <a href="#Pg066">66</a>; <a href="#Pg143">143</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst"><a id="HED">Hedonism</a>—defined <a href="#Pg014">14 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—its paradox <a href="#Pg025">25</a>.<span class="pb" id="Pg246">[246]</span></li> -<li class="isub1">—confuses feeling and idea <a href="#Pg026">26</a>; <a href="#Pg043">43 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—summarized <a href="#Pg030">30</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—all motives good <a href="#Pg033">33</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—its calculus <a href="#Pg036">36</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—fails to provide laws <a href="#Pg039">39 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—its contrast with Kantianism <a href="#Pg082">82 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—its treatment of obligation <a href="#Pg140">140 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—is correct in holding rightness to be pleasurable <a href="#Pg228">228</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—truth and falsity in <a href="#Pg234">234</a>.</li> - -<li>Hegel—quoted: on reflective conscience <a href="#Pg188">188</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">on merely individual conscience <a href="#Pg189">189</a>.</li> - -<li>Hinton, J.—quoted: on altruism <a href="#Pg109">109</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">on badness <a href="#Pg216">216</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—referred to: <a href="#Pg202">202</a>.</li> - -<li>Hodgson, S. H.—referred to: <a href="#Pg014">14</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Idealism—when feeble <a href="#Pg128">128</a>.</li> - -<li>Ideals—moral, progressive, <a href="#Pg206">206</a>.</li> - -<li>Imperative, Categorical—of Kant <a href="#Pg147">147</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—of conscience <a href="#Pg191">191</a>.</li> - -<li>Impulse—and pleasure <a href="#Pg017">17</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—and desire <a href="#Pg022">22</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—nature of action from <a href="#Pg159">159</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—see <a href="#DES">desire</a>.</li> - -<li>Individuality—defined <a href="#Pg097">97</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—not identical with inner side alone <a href="#Pg098">98</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—evils of defining from this standpoint <a href="#Pg110">110</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—made by function <a href="#Pg131">131</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—realized is autonomy <a href="#Pg150">150</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—realized is freedom <a href="#Pg164">164</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—growth in <a href="#Pg210">210</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—see <a href="#FRE">freedom</a> and <a href="#RIG">rights</a>.</li> - -<li><a id="INS">Institutions</a>—nature of <a href="#Pg169">169 ff</a>.<span class="pb" id="Pg247">[247]</span></li> -<li class="isub1">—sovereignty, rights and law inhere in <a href="#Pg171">171 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—influence of, upon conscience <a href="#Pg184">184</a>; <a href="#Pg189">189</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—movement of, the source of duties, <a href="#Pg194">194</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—see <a href="#COM">common good</a> and <a href="#SOC">society</a>.</li> - -<li><a id="INT">Interests</a>—are functions on personal side <a href="#Pg102">102 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—classified and discussed <a href="#Pg104">104 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—social, involve science and art <a href="#Pg123">123 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—realized in institutions <a href="#Pg170">170</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—their relation to conscience <a href="#Pg198">198</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—pure, are virtue <a href="#Pg228">228</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—the active element of <a href="#Pg218">218</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—the freeing of, the moral goal <a href="#Pg233">233</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">James, Sr., H.—referred to: <a href="#Pg202">202</a>.</li> - -<li>James, Wm.—quoted: on pleasure and desire <a href="#Pg020">20</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—referred to: <a href="#Pg077">77</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Kant—agrees with hedonism as to end of desire <a href="#Pg079">79</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—his end an abstraction <a href="#Pg084">84</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—his practical ideal that of Mill and Spencer <a href="#Pg093">93</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—value of his theory <a href="#Pg093">93</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—his theory of obligation <a href="#Pg147">147</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—his conception of autonomy <a href="#Pg149">149</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—his idea of duty <a href="#Pg156">156</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—his conception of practical reason <a href="#Pg191">191</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—quoted: on pleasure <a href="#Pg047">47</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">on pleasure as common good <a href="#Pg052">52</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">on priority of duty to good <a href="#Pg078">78</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">on good will <a href="#Pg079">79</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">his formula for right action <a href="#Pg080">80</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">illustrations of moral law <a href="#Pg080">80 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—referred to: <a href="#Pg014">14</a>; <a href="#Pg078">78</a>; <a href="#Pg212">212</a>; <a href="#Pg221">221</a>; <a href="#Pg235">235</a>.</li> - -<li>Kantianism—compared with hedonism <a href="#Pg082">82 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—its practical breakdown <a href="#Pg090">90</a>.</li> - -<li>Knowledge—moral effect of advance in <a href="#Pg207">207</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—socializes wants <a href="#Pg237">237</a>.<span class="pb" id="Pg248">[248]</span></li> -<li class="isub1">—see <a href="#ART">art</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Laurie, S. S.—quoted: on happiness <a href="#Pg066">66</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—referred to: <a href="#Pg227">227</a>.</li> - -<li><a id="LAW">Law</a>—utilitarian use of <a href="#Pg058">58</a>; <a href="#Pg061">61 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—Kant's moral, formal <a href="#Pg078">78</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—relation to desire <a href="#Pg094">94</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—realized in institutions <a href="#Pg172">172</a>; <a href="#Pg174">174</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—of the 'is', not merely of the 'ought' <a href="#Pg175">175</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—idea of, in general <a href="#Pg195">195</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—see <a href="#OBL">obligation</a>.</li> - -<li>Lawlessness—involved in morality <a href="#Pg216">216</a>.</li> - -<li>Leckey—referred to: <a href="#Pg066">66</a>.</li> - -<li>Limitation—the basis of moral strength <a href="#Pg128">128</a>.</li> - -<li>Lincoln, A.—anecdote regarding <a href="#Pg028">28</a>.</li> - -<li>Lotze—referred to: <a href="#Pg016">16</a>; <a href="#Pg166">166</a>.</li> - -<li>Love—the union of duty and desire <a href="#Pg154">154</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Martineau, J.—quoted: on the difficulty of the hedonistic calculus <a href="#Pg038">38</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—referred to: <a href="#Pg042">42</a>; <a href="#Pg078">78</a>; <a href="#Pg158">158</a>; <a href="#Pg166">166</a>; <a href="#Pg227">227</a>.</li> - -<li>Maurice, F. D.—referred to: <a href="#Pg191">191</a>.</li> - -<li>Merit—means social desert <a href="#Pg225">225</a>.</li> - -<li>Mill, J. S.—criticizes Kant <a href="#Pg091">91</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—his equivoke of pleasure and pleasant thing <a href="#Pg020">20</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—his fallacy <a href="#Pg056">56</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—introduces quality of pleasure into hedonism <a href="#Pg042">42</a>; <a href="#Pg046">46</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—quoted: pleasure self-evident criterion <a href="#Pg016">16</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">end of desire <a href="#Pg017">17</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">on rules of morality <a href="#Pg039">39 ff</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">on moral tribunal <a href="#Pg048">48</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">on utilitarian standard <a href="#Pg053">53</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">on importance of law and education <a href="#Pg059">59</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">on social feeling <a href="#Pg063">63 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—referred to: <a href="#Pg025">25</a>; <a href="#Pg030">30</a>; <a href="#Pg049">49</a>.<span class="pb" id="Pg249">[249]</span></li> - -<li>Morality—sphere of as broad as conduct <a href="#Pg002">2</a>; <a href="#Pg154">154</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—not dependent upon an individual's wish <a href="#Pg167">167 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—realized in institutions <a href="#Pg170">170</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—struggle for private, bad <a href="#Pg202">202</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—in the nature of things <a href="#Pg233">233</a>.</li> - -<li><a id="MOT">Motive</a>—defined <a href="#Pg005">5</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—two elements in <a href="#Pg010">10</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—determined by character <a href="#Pg028">28</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—never bad according to hedonism <a href="#Pg033">33</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—formal and legislative according to Kant <a href="#Pg080">80</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—not a subjective mood <a href="#Pg232">232</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Norms—in philosophy <a href="#Pg001">1</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst"><a id="OBL">Obligation</a>—in conflict with pleasure <a href="#Pg076">76 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—how related to function <a href="#Pg138">138</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—theories regarding <a href="#Pg139">139</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—distinct from coercion <a href="#Pg144">144</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—enforced, not created by power <a href="#Pg145">145</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—Kantian idea of criticized <a href="#Pg148">148</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—does not relate simply to what ought to be, but is not <a href="#Pg151">151</a>; <a href="#Pg174">174 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—relation to conscience <a href="#Pg183">183</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—how made known <a href="#Pg190">190 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—practical value of sense of <a href="#Pg196">196</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—must be individualized <a href="#Pg197">197</a>; <a href="#Pg201">201</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—when opposed to desire <a href="#Pg213">213</a>; <a href="#Pg216">216</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—the union with desire the moral ideal <a href="#Pg234">234</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—see <a href="#DES">desire</a>, <a href="#LAW">law</a> and <a href="#UNI">universal</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Pater—referred to: <a href="#Pg066">66</a>.</li> - -<li>Pathological—all inclination, according to Kant <a href="#Pg086">86</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—opposed to active <a href="#Pg212">212</a>.</li> - -<li>Paulsen—referred to: <a href="#Pg067">67</a>; <a href="#Pg111">111</a>.</li> - -<li><a id="PER">Person</a>—is one capable of conduct <a href="#Pg097">97</a>.<span class="pb" id="Pg250">[250]</span></li> - -<li>Pleasure—an element in activity <a href="#Pg024">24</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—not the moving spring to action <a href="#Pg026">26</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—sum of, dependent on objective conditions <a href="#Pg044">44 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—quality of, similarly dependent <a href="#Pg047">47 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—may symbolize action <a href="#Pg051">51</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—general, a vague idea <a href="#Pg062">62</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—fixed by social relations <a href="#Pg065">65</a>; <a href="#Pg077">77</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—not a sufficient guide at present <a href="#Pg075">75</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—dependent on self-realization <a href="#Pg083">83</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—all right action involves <a href="#Pg228">228</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—see <a href="#DES">desire</a> and <a href="#HED">hedonism</a>.</li> - -<li>Postulate—moral, defined <a href="#Pg129">129 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—equals Golden Rule <a href="#Pg205">205</a>.</li> - -<li>Problem—moral <a href="#Pg003">3</a>.</li> - -<li>Progress—necessary in moral action <a href="#Pg135">135 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—moral, nature of <a href="#Pg209">209</a>.</li> - -<li>Prudence—not outside moral sphere <a href="#Pg105">105</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Reason—opposed to desire by Kant <a href="#Pg147">147</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—Kant's conception too immediate <a href="#Pg150">150</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—practical, idea of <a href="#Pg191">191</a>.</li> - -<li>Reformation—possibility of <a href="#Pg162">162 ff</a>.</li> - -<li>Relativity—of morals, means what <a href="#Pg136">136</a>.</li> - -<li><a id="RES">Responsibility</a>—nature of <a href="#Pg160">160 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—of parents and children <a href="#Pg203">203</a>.</li> - -<li>Reverence—Kant regards as sole moral feeling <a href="#Pg086">86</a>.</li> - -<li><a id="RIG">Rights</a>—exist by common will <a href="#Pg172">172</a>.</li> - -<li>Rousseau—his influence upon Kant <a href="#Pg148">148</a>.</li> - -<li>Royce, J.—referred to: <a href="#Pg061">61</a>; <a href="#Pg111">111</a>.</li> - -<li>Rule—moral, not a command <a href="#Pg204">204</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—a tool of analysis <a href="#Pg204">204</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Satisfaction—moral, creates new wants <a href="#Pg208">208</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—good and bad <a href="#Pg217">217</a>.<span class="pb" id="Pg251">[251]</span></li> - -<li>Science—nature of interest in <a href="#Pg111">111</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—the preëminent moral means <a href="#Pg237">237</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—see <a href="#ART">art</a>.</li> - -<li>Schurman, J. G.—referred to: <a href="#Pg078">78</a>.</li> - -<li>Self—interest in <a href="#Pg105">105 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—involves sympathy <a href="#Pg109">109</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—dualism in self, how arises <a href="#Pg216">216</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—knowledge of <a href="#Pg237">237</a>.</li> - -<li>Selfishness—involved in immorality <a href="#Pg216">216</a>.</li> - -<li>Self-sacrifice—its moral nature <a href="#Pg222">222</a>.</li> - -<li>Sentimentality—immoral <a href="#Pg113">113</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—escape from, only through knowledge <a href="#Pg120">120</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—results from abstract idea of duty <a href="#Pg157">157</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—refined, equals sensuality <a href="#Pg220">220</a>.</li> - -<li>Shakespeare—quoted: on common good <a href="#Pg131">131</a>.</li> - -<li>Sidgwick, H.—quoted: on the hedonistic assumption <a href="#Pg043">43</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">on utilitarian standard <a href="#Pg053">53</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">on intuitional utilitarianism <a href="#Pg054">54</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—referred to: <a href="#Pg014">14</a>; <a href="#Pg016">16</a>; <a href="#Pg018">18</a>; <a href="#Pg066">66</a>; <a href="#Pg111">111</a>; <a href="#Pg227">227</a>.</li> - -<li><ins id="C251" title="entry missing"><a id="SOC">Society</a></ins>—its moral influence <a href="#Pg146">146</a>; <a href="#Pg157">157</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—its relation to obligation <a href="#Pg152">152</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—constituted by moral relationships <a href="#Pg175">175</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—development of, changes moral ideals <a href="#Pg207">207</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—see <a href="#COM">common good</a>, <a href="#INS">institutions</a>.</li> - -<li>Socrates—author of idea of reflective conscience <a href="#Pg188">188</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—initiator of modern ethical spirit <a href="#Pg237">237</a>.</li> - -<li>Sorley—referred to: <a href="#Pg078">78</a>; <a href="#Pg111">111</a>.</li> - -<li>Sovereignty—exists in common will and good <a href="#Pg171">171</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—ultimate possessed in humanity <a href="#Pg173">173</a>.</li> - -<li>Spencer, H.—believes in fixed social ideal <a href="#Pg073">73 ff</a>.; <a href="#Pg235">235</a>.<span class="pb" id="Pg252">[252]</span></li> -<li class="isub1">—quoted: on pleasure as a necessary effect <a href="#Pg068">68</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">not immediate object of desire <a href="#Pg069">69</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">egoism and altruism <a href="#Pg070">70 ff</a>.;</li> -<li class="isub2">on ideal man <a href="#Pg073">73</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">equilibrium of functions <a href="#Pg074">74</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">on obligation <a href="#Pg142">142</a>; <a href="#Pg143">143</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—referred to: <a href="#Pg016">16</a>; <a href="#Pg067">67</a>; <a href="#Pg072">72</a>; <a href="#Pg073">73</a>; <a href="#Pg074">74</a>; <a href="#Pg075">75</a>; <a href="#Pg076">76</a>; <a href="#Pg111">111</a>; <a href="#Pg125">125</a>; <a href="#Pg235">235</a>.</li> - -<li>Stephen, L.—quoted: on feeling as universal motive <a href="#Pg027">27</a>;</li> -<li class="isub2">on sympathy <a href="#Pg109">109 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—referred to: <a href="#Pg016">16</a>; <a href="#Pg025">25</a>; <a href="#Pg067">67</a>; <a href="#Pg068">68</a>; <a href="#Pg078">78</a>; <a href="#Pg111">111</a>; <a href="#Pg165">165</a>; <a href="#Pg227">227</a>.</li> - -<li>Struggle—when morality is a <a href="#Pg212">212</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—changed by Christianity into movement <a href="#Pg225">225</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—see <a href="#CONF">conflict</a>.</li> - -<li>Sully, J.—referred to: <a href="#Pg017">17</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst"><a id="THE">Theory</a>—ethical and conduct <a href="#Pg001">1</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—ethical, sub-divided <a href="#Pg013">13</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—ethical, not casuistry <a href="#Pg089">89</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—value of <a href="#Pg186">186</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst"><a id="UNI">Universal</a>—a, lacking in hedonism <a href="#Pg037">37</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—Kant's emphasis of <a href="#Pg080">80</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—Kant's, formal <a href="#Pg080">80</a>; <a href="#Pg085">85</a>; <a href="#Pg090">90</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—Kant's, leads to conflict <a href="#Pg087">87</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—true, equals organization, <a href="#Pg088">88</a>; <a href="#Pg090">90</a>; <a href="#Pg096">96</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—bad action cannot be <a href="#Pg221">221</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—means a method, not a thing <a href="#Pg136">136</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—found in movement of character <a href="#Pg234">234</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—see <a href="#LAW">law</a>.</li> - -<li>Utilitarianism—is universalistic hedonism <a href="#Pg013">13</a>; <a href="#Pg053">53</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—defined by Mill, Sidgwick, Bain, <a href="#Pg053">53</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—criticized <a href="#Pg054">54 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—assumes social order <a href="#Pg063">63 ff</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—combined with evolution <a href="#Pg067">67</a>.<span class="pb" id="Pg253">[253]</span></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Virtue—change in nature of <a href="#Pg211">211</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—correlative to duty <a href="#Pg225">225</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—distinguished from merit <a href="#Pg226">226</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—is an interest of character <a href="#Pg228">228</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—two types of <a href="#Pg229">229</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">—cardinal <a href="#Pg230">230</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Wants—see <a href="#DES">desires</a>.</li> - -<li>Wilson (and Fowler)—referred to: <a href="#Pg067">67</a>.</li> - -<li>Will—Kant's good will <a href="#Pg079">79</a>.</li></ul> -</div> -<hr /> - -<p class="center" id="Corrections"><big>Transcriber's Corrections:</big></p> - -<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="corrections"> -<tr><td>page</td><td>original text</td><td>correction</td></tr> -<tr><td><a href="#C017">17</a></td><td colspan="2">endquote missing</td></tr> -<tr><td><a href="#C020">20</a></td><td>sweat-meats</td><td>sweet-meats</td></tr> -<tr><td><a href="#C024">24</a></td><td>becoms</td><td>becomes</td></tr> -<tr><td><a href="#C035">35</a></td><td>suprise</td><td>surprise</td></tr> -<tr><td><a href="#C038">38</a></td><td>the the</td><td>the</td></tr> -<tr><td><a href="#C038a">38</a></td><td>cicumstances</td><td>circumstances</td></tr> -<tr><td><a href="#C042">42</a></td><td>pleasnres</td><td>pleasures</td></tr> -<tr><td><a href="#C047">47</a></td><td>agreableness</td><td>agreeableness</td></tr> -<tr><td><a href="#C068">68</a></td><td>Ehtics</td><td>Ethics</td></tr> -<tr><td><a href="#C074">74</a></td><td colspan="2">endquote missing</td></tr> -<tr><td><a href="#C083">83</a></td><td>of</td><td>as</td></tr> -<tr><td><a href="#C092">92</a></td><td>expressily</td><td>expressly</td></tr> -<tr><td><a href="#C124">124</a></td><td>and and</td><td>and</td></tr> -<tr><td><a href="#C156">156</a></td><td>what what</td><td>what</td></tr> -<tr><td><a href="#C183">183</a></td><td>LVIX</td><td>LIX</td></tr> -<tr><td><a href="#C192">192</a></td><td>superflous</td><td>superfluous</td></tr> -<tr><td><a href="#C251">251</a></td><td colspan="2">entry Society missing in original</td></tr> -</table> - - - - - - - - -<pre> - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics, by -John Dewey - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK OUTLINES OF CRITICAL THEORY OF ETHICS *** - -***** This file should be named 60422-h.htm or 60422-h.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/6/0/4/2/60422/ - -Produced by The Online Distributed Proofreading Team at -http://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images -generously made available by The Internet Archive/American -Libraries.) - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part -of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm -concept and trademark. Project Gutenberg is a registered trademark, -and may not be used if you charge for the eBooks, unless you receive -specific permission. If you do not charge anything for copies of this -eBook, complying with the rules is very easy. You may use this eBook -for nearly any purpose such as creation of derivative works, reports, -performances and research. They may be modified and printed and given -away--you may do practically ANYTHING in the United States with eBooks -not protected by U.S. copyright law. Redistribution is subject to the -trademark license, especially commercial redistribution. - -START: FULL LICENSE - -THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE -PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK - -To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free -distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work -(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full -Project Gutenberg-tm License available with this file or online at -www.gutenberg.org/license. - -Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works - -1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to -and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property -(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all -the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or -destroy all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your -possession. If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a -Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound -by the terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the -person or entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph -1.E.8. - -1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be -used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who -agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few -things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See -paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this -agreement and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works. See paragraph 1.E below. - -1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the -Foundation" or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection -of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual -works in the collection are in the public domain in the United -States. If an individual work is unprotected by copyright law in the -United States and you are located in the United States, we do not -claim a right to prevent you from copying, distributing, performing, -displaying or creating derivative works based on the work as long as -all references to Project Gutenberg are removed. Of course, we hope -that you will support the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting -free access to electronic works by freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm -works in compliance with the terms of this agreement for keeping the -Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with the work. You can easily -comply with the terms of this agreement by keeping this work in the -same format with its attached full Project Gutenberg-tm License when -you share it without charge with others. - -1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern -what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are -in a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, -check the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this -agreement before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, -distributing or creating derivative works based on this work or any -other Project Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no -representations concerning the copyright status of any work in any -country outside the United States. - -1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: - -1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other -immediate access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear -prominently whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work -on which the phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the -phrase "Project Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, -performed, viewed, copied or distributed: - - This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and - most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no - restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it - under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this - eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the - United States, you'll have to check the laws of the country where you - are located before using this ebook. - -1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is -derived from texts not protected by U.S. copyright law (does not -contain a notice indicating that it is posted with permission of the -copyright holder), the work can be copied and distributed to anyone in -the United States without paying any fees or charges. If you are -redistributing or providing access to a work with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the work, you must comply -either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 or -obtain permission for the use of the work and the Project Gutenberg-tm -trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted -with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution -must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any -additional terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms -will be linked to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works -posted with the permission of the copyright holder found at the -beginning of this work. - -1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm -License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this -work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. - -1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this -electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without -prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with -active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project -Gutenberg-tm License. - -1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, -compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including -any word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access -to or distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format -other than "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official -version posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site -(www.gutenberg.org), you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense -to the user, provide a copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means -of obtaining a copy upon request, of the work in its original "Plain -Vanilla ASCII" or other form. Any alternate format must include the -full Project Gutenberg-tm License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. - -1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, -performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works -unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing -access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -provided that - -* You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from - the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method - you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is owed - to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he has - agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the Project - Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments must be paid - within 60 days following each date on which you prepare (or are - legally required to prepare) your periodic tax returns. Royalty - payments should be clearly marked as such and sent to the Project - Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the address specified in - Section 4, "Information about donations to the Project Gutenberg - Literary Archive Foundation." - -* You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies - you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he - does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm - License. You must require such a user to return or destroy all - copies of the works possessed in a physical medium and discontinue - all use of and all access to other copies of Project Gutenberg-tm - works. - -* You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of - any money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the - electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days of - receipt of the work. - -* You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free - distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. - -1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work or group of works on different terms than -are set forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing -from both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and The -Project Gutenberg Trademark LLC, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm -trademark. Contact the Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. - -1.F. - -1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable -effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread -works not protected by U.S. copyright law in creating the Project -Gutenberg-tm collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may -contain "Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate -or corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other -intellectual property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or -other medium, a computer virus, or computer codes that damage or -cannot be read by your equipment. - -1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right -of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project -Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all -liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal -fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT -LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE -PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE -TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE -LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR -INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH -DAMAGE. - -1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a -defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can -receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a -written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you -received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium -with your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you -with the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in -lieu of a refund. If you received the work electronically, the person -or entity providing it to you may choose to give you a second -opportunity to receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If -the second copy is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing -without further opportunities to fix the problem. - -1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth -in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS', WITH NO -OTHER WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT -LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. - -1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied -warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of -damages. If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement -violates the law of the state applicable to this agreement, the -agreement shall be interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or -limitation permitted by the applicable state law. The invalidity or -unenforceability of any provision of this agreement shall not void the -remaining provisions. - -1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the -trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone -providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in -accordance with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the -production, promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works, harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, -including legal fees, that arise directly or indirectly from any of -the following which you do or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this -or any Project Gutenberg-tm work, (b) alteration, modification, or -additions or deletions to any Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any -Defect you cause. - -Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm - -Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of -electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of -computers including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It -exists because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations -from people in all walks of life. - -Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the -assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's -goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will -remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure -and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future -generations. To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation and how your efforts and donations can help, see -Sections 3 and 4 and the Foundation information page at -www.gutenberg.org - - - -Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation - -The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit -501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the -state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal -Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification -number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent permitted by -U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. - -The Foundation's principal office is in Fairbanks, Alaska, with the -mailing address: PO Box 750175, Fairbanks, AK 99775, but its -volunteers and employees are scattered throughout numerous -locations. Its business office is located at 809 North 1500 West, Salt -Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email contact links and up to -date contact information can be found at the Foundation's web site and -official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact - -For additional contact information: - - Dr. Gregory B. Newby - Chief Executive and Director - gbnewby@pglaf.org - -Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg -Literary Archive Foundation - -Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide -spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of -increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be -freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest -array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations -($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt -status with the IRS. - -The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating -charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United -States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a -considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up -with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations -where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To SEND -DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any particular -state visit www.gutenberg.org/donate - -While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we -have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition -against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who -approach us with offers to donate. - -International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make -any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from -outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. - -Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation -methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other -ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. To -donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate - -Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works. - -Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project -Gutenberg-tm concept of a library of electronic works that could be -freely shared with anyone. For forty years, he produced and -distributed Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of -volunteer support. - -Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed -editions, all of which are confirmed as not protected by copyright in -the U.S. unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not -necessarily keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper -edition. - -Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search -facility: www.gutenberg.org - -This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, -including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to -subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. - - - -</pre> - -</body> -</html> |